

The Nature of Self in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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With Love and Gratitude
Dedicated to my Parents



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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the dissertation entitled '**The Nature of Self in Wittgenstein's Philosophy**' submitted by **Shruti Sharma** is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. This is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for any other degree or diploma of any other University. We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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
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DECLARATION

I, Shruti Sharma, hereby declare that the dissertation entitled, '**THE NATURE OF SELF IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY**', submitted by me for the partial fulfillment of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work and has not been submitted by me or by anyone else for any other degree or diploma of this or any other university.



Shruti Sharma

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Introduction

The present work is an inquiry into the nature of self of Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations*¹. I proposed to show that Wittgenstein argued against privilege conception of self as articulated by dualist and essentialists. Though the approach in the two works are different but the intention to jettison such as essentialist position can be clearly captured from both the works. We shall also analyze a methodological shift from *Tractatus* to *Investigations*. The strict logical structure of *Tractatus* is dispelled in *Investigations* for a more flexible account of language. The concept of meaning as reference is objected into *Investigations*. Meaning as ‘use’ is accepted as the motto. According to Hacker, “The author of the *Tractatus* labored to reveal that the structure of the world cannot be said but only shown. The author of the *Investigations* bent his effort to reveal how what seemed to show itself was an optical illusion.”² We shall see here a major methodological shift in Wittgenstein’s earlier notion of analysis to the later one. There is a complete overturn of notions which were central to his earlier conception. From purely a priori method of the *Tractatus*, he goes on to recommend the a posteriori method of investigating the actual phenomena of language. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein focuses on the cognitive use of language, in *Investigations* he stresses on the expressive aspect such as, gestures, reporting, play acting, guessing, making a joke, and greeting. This appears to be a shift towards a more pragmatic conception of language. We shall examine into these areas which are essential in formulating Wittgenstein’s conception of self in the two works.

In the *Tractatus*, we shall see how the subject is placed in the strict ontology represented by a three-tier structure of language and the world. Can a self be a part of such a priori structure of language and reality? How Wittgenstein deals with the conception of Cartesian self? These are the issues with which we shall engage, while studying the first work.

In *Investigations*, Wittgenstein argues extensively against an epistemic account of self and the special status of the self an inner entity. We shall enquire how he refutes the

¹ Henceforth *Tractatus*
Henceforth *Investigations*

² Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, 1972 , Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2nd revised edition, 1986.p.128

idea of private language and thereby solipsist account of self. In *Investigations*, he proposes an expressivist account of self. Here we see a positive development of his philosophy. The traditional account of self imposes that the first person present tense ascription described one's mental state. In this sense, they imposes a privileged right of the bearer of those states towards their own mental life and thus created a gap between the first person and the third person perspective. Wittgenstein argues against this traditional account on the grounds that self-ascriptions are not descriptions but rather expressions and mental states captured in self-ascriptions are not private to the owner.

The concept of self is a very intriguing and fascinating concept in philosophy. There is no one conception of self. In fact, self is referred to in various different terminologies in philosophy. 'Self', 'inner', 'soul', 'subject', 'mind' are used interchangeably with respect to the very concept of self. Thus, this also indicates that there is no one understanding on the nature of self. This indicates further why the problem of self has baffled many philosophers since beginning of philosophy. The more we discuss about it, the more it gives birth to various intricate issues and unfathomable complexities. Due to this, the issue of self has become more of a mystery, 'a kind of unknowable journey'.

It is essential to enquire what makes the self a problematic issue in philosophy. Self is the most important and intimate feature in our lives. Thus everybody is curious to know what lies in one's own inner self or in somebody else's, what exactly is the self and where is it located? Is it located inside the individual, if so, where exactly can it be located? Another problem is that it is difficult to describe or define self accurately. A very common sense answer to it is that we cannot perceive it. We can only try to capture it through our conscious experience, our expression, through our actions, through our relation with others... and the list may be endless! If we articulate self in terms of one's personal experience which can only be known by the person whose experiences they are, then we land up with the problem of solipsism. Some thinkers denote self as a substance and believed that self is immortal. Such sort of dualism was largely upheld by the Greeks. However, in modern times René Descartes gave a systematic articulation of the dualist theory of self. There are other thinkers, who completely denied any status to the self. Hume reserves the opinion that self is illusory and according to Kant it belongs to the realm of the transcendental. A very brief look at how self has been understood by traditional thinkers, in what form it was adopted by modern thinkers can provide us with a starting point in understanding Wittgenstein's notion of the self.

The Greeks described self in terms of psyche. They used psyche is a much wider sense as the power of a living thing to grow and move and have an effect upon its surrounding, as well as to 'will something' to happen and the other aspect of what we would call 'mental states'. Thus for example both Plato and Aristotle thought that plant has psyche, and the very first philosopher and scientist, Thales of Miletus (6th Century BCE), described magnets as having psyche because of their power to move other things and declared that 'all things are full of Gods' implying that psyche is universal.

It is essential to note here, that the ancient philosophers looked at mental state without trying to relate them to a separate, immaterial substance called 'minds'. The notion of psyche was much broader; it was the power of a being to grow and change, in other words, you do not have a separate, invisible thing, called a mind in order to do these things; psyche was simply the word used to describe those aspects of a living thing. Thus, Plato had a dualism of immaterial substance (psyche) and physical body. He also believed that the psyche is immortal; reason being, that it has power to move and change things, so cannot be itself moved by the physical body.

Aristotle, on the other hand, thought that all living things had souls and that the psyche was a 'principle of life'- that which distinguishes the living from the inanimate. He rejected Plato's idea of the psyche as an immaterial substance and instead sees the psyche in the form that organizes the material body into what it essentially is. One must note here that this makes the psyche distinct from the material body, but not separate from it. They are locked together, the former giving its shape and characteristics of the latter. The soul is the actuality of the body as an organized thing. Thus we may say here that, for Aristotle, the self is the essence or form of a human being, an essence that is distinct from, but also inseparable from the material body.

Later Greek thought reverted more towards materialist conception of self. Epicurus (341-271 BCE) objected to the Platonic notion of an immortal and immaterial substance on the grounds that such a psyche could neither act nor be acted on, since it would have no direct link with the physical and immutable. Stoics considered the soul to be like breath, animating the body, giving it ability to move about and relate to the world. Against the Stoics, Plotinus (205-270 BCE) and other Neo-Platonist continued the tradition of separating the soul from the body.

With the advent of medieval period, the desire to make clear the distinction between mind and bodies arose. René Descartes bifurcated mind and body into two substances. He was basically in search of indubitable true knowledge. He argued that he could doubt the existence of bodies, but that he could not himself be a body. He captured

such truth in, 'I think, therefore I am'. Here 'I' necessarily refers to a being that experiences, thinks, desire, wills and so on.³

Locke was the first important philosopher who felt odd about the view that self or mind is a substance. He objected to calling it (mind) a substance, because of its mysterious characteristics, and about substance he says it is something that 'I know not what'. David Hume, followed Locke and said, in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, that when he looked inside himself, he could find many perceptions, but no self linking them together. Thus, Hume regarded mind as a bundle of perceptions. Immanuel Kant held that the nature of self as it is in itself is actually unknowable and that one only has knowledge of oneself as one appears to oneself⁴. We must note here that Kant did not cater to explain self as such. Although, he was of the opinion that a concept was needed, but regarding what actually exists, he stated it as unknowable.

Through the assessment of above accounts of self we can perhaps get an idea how divergent and complex the notion of self is. Broadly speaking, some thinkers follow a substantive notion of self and others reject it. Speaking of self in terms of substance leads to an introspective account of self, in which self is given to us in some form of inner observation, as we find in Descartes.

However, the theory of self with which we are concerned in the present inquiry is opposed to the way self has been understood traditionally. But the sort of idea of self that we intend to explore here is closely connected, as we will discuss later, with the concept of the 'person'.

The best way to understand self is through our understanding of self- knowledge. The philosophical problem which runs through the idea of self-knowledge is the problem of privileged access. Privileged access means "the special way that we each have of knowing our own thoughts, intentions and sensations. This implies the subject has access to (and knows) his own thoughts (has self- knowledge) in such a way that the third person (others) do not"⁵. Thus there is a presumption that there is a basic asymmetry between first person and third-person perspectives. A person can make reliable psychological ascription to himself immediately without needing to observe what he says and does. And this capacity lies in the nature of the first person position itself. It is not a kind of access he may have to the mind of another person. This has its lineage to the Cartesian view of mind. According to this view, mental states constitute an inner realm that is directly available to

³ Sorabji, Richard. *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*, the university of Chicago press, U.S.A., 2006, p.17

⁴ See, Cassam, Quassim. *Self-Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 2

⁵ Donald, Davidson. *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, Clarendon press, Oxford, 2002.

the subject whose mental states they are. The issue which have troubled philosophers, including Wittgenstein, is that how could there be such a thing with such capacity of epistemic completeness and infallibility? In what sense is this knowledge supposed to be essentially or exclusively first-personal?

My dissertation excluding introduction and conclusion consists of three chapters. In the first chapter I intend to explore the place of self in *Tractatus* and a shift in conception of language from *Tractatus* to *Investigations*. *Tractatus* is a work of a priori structure of language in which language represents the world. To extract from such a closed structure the nature of self, is indeed a challenging task. The issue around which our discussion would revolve is the status of self placed against the logical structure of language and the world. In *Investigations*, we shall see a major shift in the understanding of the structure of language. The logical scaffolding in *Tractatus* is given up for ‘language in use’. With this shift in language, we shall see how the nature of self is adopted in this reformed idea of language.

The second chapter is on *Investigations*. Here I intend to show how Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist. It is a charge that is usually imposed on him, for he argues against the privileged epistemic status of one’s mental states. Further I shall thoroughly examine Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Here I intend to put forth his deconstruction of solipsist account of self. Is the mental, a private arena which none other than the bearer can enter into? Are our sensations private? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this context.

The third chapter is a positive construction of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. After his deconstruction of the traditional picture of self, we can see here a positive picture of self that emerges from it. Here Crispin Wright proposes an expressivist account of self. We shall examine and see how his reading of *Investigations* coheres with an expressivist account of self.

CHAPTER 1

The Journey: Understanding the Self

Introduction

In this chapter, I intend to discuss the nature of self in *Tractatus*. We shall see how language, thought and reality reflect one another in strict conditions of logically perfect order which Wittgenstein intends to show. Further, this would also show us how he accommodates values in this logical framework and more specifically, how he accommodates the notion of self in this work. In the second book, that is, *Investigations*, he comes up with a much wider and pragmatic approach to language and its application to comprehend our world. In order to uncover the 'self' here, we must undertake the task of understanding the world of language and the world of discourse. For the kind of notion of language adopted in *Investigations* is not chained in a logical scaffolding. Here language is not divorced from its discourse; rather it is constituted by it. Language here is not a static phenomenon, rather it is captured as a lived phenomenon that grows and mutates. Language and world are not separate but rather fused into each other.

1.1 Self in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

'Self' or 'the inner' or 'I' is one of the most contentious concepts in philosophy. As we venture and try to understand the self in *Tractatus*, we shall see that the whole treatment of the text is bounded by strict logical structures. As far as my reading goes, 'self' is the most special part of the entire text. The whole project of logical-linguistic workability and exposing misrepresentation of ordinary language ultimately demands an ethical treatment wherein self becomes an indispensable component. Values in *Tractatus* are necessary and absolute, in the sense that they are not subject to truth/falsity. Hence, values cannot be expressed in propositions of logic. In this sense, they do not belong to

the sphere of logic. However, they stand outside the domain of logic and indirectly limit it. Tracking the self in *Tractatus* is to indulge in the whole enterprise of understanding the ontology with which Wittgenstein begins. This is an important point at this juncture. We must understand that the kind of project which Wittgenstein undertook in *Tractatus* is based on the foundations of his ontology. The ontology which he projected is the trilogy of language, world and logic. One can only capture the self and how it is placed in the structure of the *Tractatus* once we try and understand the structure of language and the world. Perhaps, self is the logical precondition which is demanded by the ontology of *Tractatus*.

The Nature of Language

It is pertinent to acknowledge that Wittgenstein wrote *Tractatus* with the very clear intention of exposing the misconceptions regarding our use of ordinary language, whose use in turn, leads to germination of the so called philosophical problems. He didn't want to create another perfect logical language. Rather his task was to show how our present language, which is as perfect as any language, is camouflaged by the surface structure and thus fails to show the deep structure below it.

Wittgenstein's conception of language can be grasped when it is placed in a historical perspective of the twentieth century analytic philosophy. The immediate problem which hooked the philosophers was regarding the logic of our language. At the turn of twentieth century G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell articulated their alternative to idealism; they used linguistic analysis, frequently basing their arguments on the meanings of terms and propositions. Russell strongly believed that the grammar of natural language often is philosophically misleading, and the way to dispel the illusion is to express propositions in the ideal formal language or symbolic language, thereby revealing their true logical form. Their emphasis on linguistic analysis led to a turn towards language as the subject matter of philosophy. Thus, there was a methodological shift towards linguistic analysis as a means of solving or dissolving philosophical problems. On the traditional view analytic philosophy was born in this linguistic turn. It was a revolt

against British idealism as well as traditional philosophy on the whole. Wittgenstein entered the scenario around 1911 with Russell. This was approximately the second phase of analytic philosophy -- an age of logical atomism and ideal language analysis.

Wittgenstein was greatly influenced by the writings of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. These thinkers were obsessive about the problems of philosophy and how it could be solved by logical analysis. According to Russell, it is the philosopher's job to discover a logically ideal language – a language that would exhibit the true nature of the world in such a way that we will not be misled by the surface structure of natural language. Russell was of the opinion that the structure of ordinary language is highly superficial. The surface structure of our language cast shadow and does not reveal its true nature. It is only through analysis that we get the true logical structure. The contention that there is a gap between the ordinary grammar of language and its logical form is implicit in the *Tractatus*. So he writes,

Language disguises thought so much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes¹

He also mentions,

Ordinary language does not show its logical structure, and it is not humanly possible to gather immediately from everyday language what its underlying logic is. Despite our ability to speak correctly, we may be blind to the logical structure of our language and the outward aspect of ordinary language makes every kind of illusion and confusion possible².

Additionally we must acknowledge that Wittgenstein did not set to project a perfect logical language. Rather his aim was clearly to demystify the haze that surrounds

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge&Kegan Paul, London,1961, prop.4002

² Ibid., Prop.40015

our language and thus give rise to unwarranted philosophical problems. This is apparently stated in *Tractatus*,

Man possess the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having an idea how each word has meaning or what's its meaning is- just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.³

All our propositions of everyday language are in perfect logical order just as they are.⁴

The above lines clearly speak out that the everyday language is not barred from having sense. It is indeed in a perfect logical order. Wittgenstein thus emphasized on the adequacy of ordinary language. His aim was to specify the condition which must be fulfilled by any language, for any language is and must be logically perfect. It was not that he was trying to supplement something essential which is perhaps obsolete in ordinary language. Rather his intention was simply to make explicit that which remains implicit and hidden behind the grammatical structure of our language. It should be noted that according to Wittgenstein, the logical structure of language is distinct from its grammatical structure and is usually hidden in our ordinary use of language. The task of analysis is to reveal the logical order of our everyday language itself.

It is essential here to acknowledge this difference between what Russell supposed and what Wittgenstein intended. Russell in his introduction to *Tractatus* stated that, "Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for accurate symbolism, that is, for symbolism in which a sentence means something quite definite. In practice language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise"⁵. However, Wittgenstein was quite clear that our ordinary language is indeed in perfect order. The

³ Ibid., Prop.4002

⁴ Ibid., Prop.5.5563

⁵ Ibid. Prop. .9

Surface structure of our language shadows the logical structure beneath it. Due to this the actual sense is not revealed and this accentuates philosophical problems. This is well taken in *Tractatus*.

.... most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language⁶.

Following this line of thought, Wittgenstein argued extensively that every meaningful sentence must have precise logical structure and must be capable of being true or false. This bipolarity is an essential factor of his atomism which he borrowed from Russell. Every meaningful sentence must be true or false in correspondence to atomic sentence. Further, every atomic sentence is a logical picture of possible states of affairs and must share the same formal structure with the state of affairs. This is well explicated in Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. This theory assures a definite remedy to cast off the grammatical layer of language which blurs one's vision and to show the actual logical structure hidden behind it. The logical structure gives a definite sense to the meaning of a word. It removes the misrepresentation of facts and makes the logical form of language come alive. Thus, he proposes that all philosophical problems arise due to faulty understanding of the logic of our language. In order to appreciate what he attempts to show, we must understand his theory of language and picture theory of meaning.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's apprehension regarding Russell's theory of names, provide him with an incentive to analyze a problematic area of philosophy, namely, how a proposition gets sense viz-a-viz the relation between subject and predicate. Wittgenstein's contention was that the sense of the proposition is embedded in it. A proposition shows its sense. The distinction between saying and showing will be discussed in detail in the following section. If we use a proposition we must know its possible occurrences. He was convinced that there must be a priori conditions of language. Once the logic of our language is understood the grammatical haze vanishes. One can gauge his direction towards a priori understanding of the language and how significant the place of logic is in his analysis from his notebook-

⁶ Ibid., prop 4.003

It must in a certain sense impossible for us to go wrong in logic. This is already partly expressed by saying, 'logic must take care of itself'. This is an extremely profound and important insight.⁷

Ontology of *Tractatus*

Wittgenstein explains that propositions we use daily have sense just as they are. When a person asserts something, he is aware of its sense, but other person may not understand and the explanation goes wrong.⁸ It is quite possible that the two involved in the process, might not get what the other person is trying to put across. This process of analysis may go on indefinitely, but if it is true that we can make statements about the world, then the process must sometimes come to an end⁹. The end product must be in direct contact with the world. What Wittgenstein is trying to put forth is, that there must be some elementary, a priori propositions which are basic, such that its truth or falsity is not determined by the propositions, but by the world. This he called an elementary proposition. These elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts. Further, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. All ordinary propositions are complex, they can be analyzed into simple, to the most basic propositions of which no further analysis is possible.

These elementary propositions further consist of names. Names are primitive signs¹⁰. It refers to something simple, and cannot disappear on further analysis. Thus, ordinary names such as Dog, Circle, Socrates, are not names, as they can be further analyzed. By being the constituent of elementary propositions names cannot be complex, for then the names could themselves be subject to further analysis and hence elementary propositions would not remain basic or elementary any longer. Further, a name signifies only what is an element of reality and cannot be destroyed. It remains constant.

⁷ Ibid., Prop. 5. 473

⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1961.

⁹ Ibid., p. 46

¹⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, Prop. 3.26

This logical name is not an empty string but it has the job of referring. Thus, that to which a name refers is called an object. It is essential to note that 'object' was a logical necessity for Wittgenstein. For if 'objects' are not there, then elementary propositions would consist of terms without reference and would be senseless.. Wittgenstein borrowed this concept of reference from Frege, though, unlike Frege, he thinks that the sense of a proposition depends upon its constituents (that is names having reference). It is essential to note here that according to Wittgenstein, for a proposition to acquire sense two essential conditions have to be fulfilled. The first is the condition of bipolarity, that is, truth or falsity, which he borrowed from Russell and the other, is the conception of reference that he acquired from Frege. Wittgenstein thus altered the Fregean notion because in Frege, the sense of a proposition is not linked in the same way with truth and falsity as it is in Wittgenstein's theory. For Frege, the sense of a proposition is independent of the reference of its component parts. Thus, a proposition can be meaningful even if it contains proper names that are 'empty', that is, if it contains names that lack a referent in reality¹¹. But for Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition is closely linked with the condition of bipolarity and its reference in the possible states of affairs. For Wittgenstein the sense of a sentence is already embedded in it. Thus, he states,

If [a proposition] has no sense [sinn], that can only be because we have failed to give a meaning [Bedeutung] to some of its constituents¹²

Every proposition must already have a sense; it cannot be given sense by affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed.¹³

His ontology moves further on the ladder with atomic facts. The configuration of objects is atomic fact¹⁴. These atomic facts are the combination of objects. In atomic fact

¹¹ Aalto, Maija. *Sense and Substance in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, (2003), pp 9-11.

¹² Ibid., Prop. 5.4733

¹³ Ibid., Prop. 4.064

¹⁴ Ibid., Prop. 00272

objects fit into one another like the link of a chain.¹⁵ Further, elementary propositions are the linguistic counterpart of the atomic facts. The elementary propositions assert the existence of an atomic fact¹⁶.

Let us try to make sense of this framework and figure out how different elements in this structure are linked together. To conjoin these fragmented pieces and get the picture aright, we must recapitulate some basic hypothesis on which this ontology operates. Firstly, Wittgenstein sets his strategy to give a priori conditions for any language to work. Secondly, he was concerned about how we can a priori assert the sense of a proposition without resorting to its empirical standing.

Thus by purely a priori considerations Wittgenstein carves out his ontology in which he logically determines the structure of any logically perfect language. In this layout, he puts forth the contention that – the world is all that is the case¹⁷. The world is divided into facts¹⁸. Thus, the totality of facts makes up the world. Facts are fundamental to objects and comprises of all the possibilities of the object in the logical space. Facts are existent states of affairs. A state of affair is a possible combination of objects, which themselves are simples. This is the way world is structured. Each of these objects and atomic facts have their linguistic counterpart; names and elementary proposition. Additionally, elementary propositions assert the existence of atomic facts.¹⁹ This atomic fact in turn shows the configuration of objects, how they are combined. Elementary propositions assert the truth/falsity of atomic facts. This leads towards Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. How does this picture theory work and how it complements the a priori project of Wittgenstein?

¹⁵ Ibid., prop.2.03

¹⁶ Ibid., prop. 421

¹⁷ Ibid., prop.1

¹⁸ Ibid., prop.1.2

¹⁹ Ibid., prop.4.110

Picture Theory of Meaning

Wittgenstein was looking for a priori conditions for language to work. And so he gave his theory of representation or picture theory. In providing this theory of meaning he was inspired by a model of a motor car accident placed in a law court in Paris²⁰. With the help of a two dimensional picture one can represent how the real situation was placed. Thus, it acts as a picture of reality. By means of pictorial representation one can know whether an elementary proposition is true/false. One can logically portray the proposition and can determine its actual standing in the state of affairs. Thus, a proposition only says something in so far as it is a picture.²¹

A bird's eye view of the ontological structure reveals two distinct realms. These are language and the world. Both the language and the world are connected with one another in an isomorphic relation. Thus, there is one-to-one correspondence between the two realms. This is explained by means of pictorial relation that they share. "Language pictures the world".²² The isomorphic structure of language and reality is connected with logical form. Elementary proposition is the logical picture of reality. What makes its logical form logical is that the elements are related to one another in a determinate way.²³ The logical structure of the picture and the situation pictured has to be identical. This identity gives the pictorial representation its reality. Thus, in elementary propositions, names are arranged in a determinate way, it has an exact logical structure which corresponds to the way objects are arranged in atomic facts. This is how elementary propositions show their sense. It reaches right out to the world,²⁴. By just looking at the logical structure one can tell the actual state of affairs.

Further, for language to picture facts, names must be correlated with the constituent's of the world. Only then a name can have meaning. The constituent must be

²⁰Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1961,p7

²¹ Ibid., p 8

²² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. &B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,1961, prop. 2.12

²³ Ibid., prop.2.14

²⁴ Ibid., prop.2.1511

simple. The task of language is to picture facts. For this it must share same logical structure with the world. Thus, we have names which have meaning only in a proposition. And similarly, we have objects which make up the facts. The combination of names in a proposition shows a possible combination of objects in a state of affairs. All possible combinations of objects fix the limit to all possible worlds. Here, the totality of elementary proposition describes all possible worlds. If the fact matches with elementary propositions then it is true otherwise it is false.

The picture theory of meaning gives a reductive explanation to figure out how language pictures the world. By means of this picturing it also sets a logical string which corresponds to the identical structure of the world. By means of truth functional analysis, language sets limit to the world. It is an essential feature which is demanded by the picture theory.

A proposition is a truth function of elementary proposition²⁵.

A proposition is an expression of agreement or disagreement with truth possibilities of elementary proposition.²⁶

If a set of elementary proposition constitutes the complete analysis of a proposition, the truth value of that proposition must be completely determined by the truth value of those elementary propositions. If a complex proposition P.Q is completely analyzed in terms of elementary propositions; p and q, and they are connected by the truth functional connective 'and', then the truth value of P.Q is completely determined by those of p and q in the following way:

P.Q /P

T.T/T

T.F/F

F.T/F

F.F/F

²⁵ Ibid., prop 5

²⁶ Ibid., prop 4.4

By means of truth table, we can know the conditions under which a proposition is true/false. In this way its sense is also determined. Wittgenstein states, for any proposition, given its complete analysis in terms of elementary proposition, there is a mechanical method to test whether a proposition has sense or not.²⁷ By means of truth analysis language also sets limit to the world. It captures what can be represented and what not. It circumscribes the mobility of the state of affairs. The point which is essential here is that the whole of *Tractatus* is placed on the backdrop of the isomorphic structure of language and the world. Within this structure, an a priori set is made against which we try to understand the state of affairs. Everything is logically determined in this set up and nothing escapes from the vicinity of logic. This is an integral part of the *Tractatus*. We must emphasize and explore more closely this aspect. This is well taken in his theory of inexpressible and unsayable. This would also provide us insight into the Tractarian limit of the expression of thought. Furthermore it helps in expounding how 'self' is placed or camouflaged within this Tractarian limit.

Saying and Showing

It is important to note that in the author's preface to *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein wrote, "the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence". It appears that the whole exercise of Wittgenstein's theory of language was to put clearly what can and cannot be said in language. The trouble arises when one tries to forego this important distinction and tries to express something inexpressible. This is precisely the reason that we fail to take note of the logical structure which hides behind the grammatical structure. Let us in this context, look at the following proposition.

World is all that is the case.²⁸

This proposition has strong implication for Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein appears to convey that whatever we try to express beyond the periphery of

²⁷Ibid., prop 4.31

²⁸ Ibid., prop 1

the world is not the case, or rather it cannot be expressed by means of language. By excluding an important class of propositions which cannot be expressed in language, he thereby sets limit to the world. These are important and controversial views in his philosophy and require further explanation. In *Tractatus* the task of language is to describe the world. This task he shoulders on to the propositions of natural sciences.

The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural sciences²⁹.

What can be said is identified as propositions of natural sciences.³⁰

The propositions of logic, mathematics, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics tries to express what cannot be expressed by means of language. They are limiting cases of our thoughts, as they cannot be conceived in our expression. This is so because they do not describe anything. These propositions lack sense because they attempt to transcend language. However, they have an important role to play in *Tractarian* philosophy.

A serious reading to *Tractatus* focuses essentially on what can be said. The whole exercise of explicating the world, facts in terms of propositions, bi-polarity of propositions, all shows what can be clearly expressed in language. Language being picture of reality shows its extensive isomorphic structure with the world. The whole picturing metaphor acts as a tool to measure genuineness of propositions. *Tractatus* also shows that a proposition has sense in so far as it is a logical picture of the world. On the other hand, logical propositions are true a priori, they are tautologies³¹. Propositions of logic say nothing.³² Logical propositions do not violate any principle of logical syntax; they show the formal logical properties of language and the world.³³ They do not picture reality as they are not bi-polar, that is neither true nor false. They have no truth value, for tautologies are unconditionally true and contradictions are unconditionally false. Although they do not say anything about the world, they show the limit within which all possible worlds must be contained and the limits within which language can function.

²⁹ Ibid., prop 4.11

³⁰ Ibid., prop 6.53

³¹ Ibid., prop. 6.1

³² Ibid., prop. 6.11

³³ Ibid., prop. 6.122

Such logical propositions lack sense, for they say nothing, but they are not nonsense. Philosophers have interpreted this theory in innumerable ways. Some of the interesting and unique interpretations are of P.M.S. Hacker who provides the traditional interpretation and the other is the resolute view by Cora Diamond.

P.M.S Hacker takes a close-look at the notion of senseless and nonsense. All genuine propositions that are contingent have sense. They picture facts and say truly or falsely that the world is thus or otherwise. The other set of propositions are termed as degenerate propositions. These are tautologies and contradictions. They do not violate any principles of logical syntax, as they do not represent any picture of reality. They are limiting case of truth functional combinations. On the other hand, there are nonsense propositions which are also called pseudo propositions. They violate the rules of logical syntax. They say nothing and show nothing about the world, neither about form nor content. These 'nonsense' propositions can be further bifurcated into overt and covert nonsense. Overt nonsense is that which can be immediately seen. An example of such obvious philosophical nonsense, "is good more or less identical than the beautiful?" Covert nonsense is another class of nonsense which is not evidently seen in ordinary language. It violates the principle of the logical syntax of language. Hacker says, this is a kind of nonsense which philosophers usually exhibit in their sayings. Covert nonsense can be illuminating nonsense.

Hacker says, illuminating nonsense guides the attentive reader to apprehend what is shown by the proposition, which do not purport to be philosophical. Further those who really understand its intention, will thereby see its own illegitimacy. Thus, *Tractatus* in this respect is classified under illuminating nonsense. Hacker states, "We have to make sense of what Wittgenstein meant in *Tractatus*. So it is not just a case of ordinary nonsense, but a sheer case of illuminating nonsense"³⁴. Propositions of *Tractatus*, such as – 'objects are simple', 'the world is the totality of facts', are illuminating nonsense (gezeit). According to Hacker, all these are pseudo propositions; they legitimately try to show what can only be shown.

³⁴, P.M.S. Hacker. *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford University Press, London, 1986. p18.

After stating the traditional account we have another view advocated by Cora Diamond, Rupert Reed and James Conant, who are also referred as ‘new Wittgenstein’. This view is known as ‘resolute view’³⁵. According to these resolute thinkers, Wittgenstein is not putting any philosophical doctrine; neither is he saying it cannot be done. They challenged the traditional account of interpretation of *Tractatus*, which was given by Hacker. They completely rejected and argued against the view that *Tractatus* is the work of illuminating nonsense. On the contrary it is just a piece of complete nonsense that Wittgenstein wrote in order to exemplify what sort of nonsense philosophers indulge into. According to the resolute thinkers, Wittgenstein wanted to make us aware of the fact what we call ‘problems of philosophy’ are actually a set of complete nonsense. According to them, the only meaningful proposition in the *Tractatus* is the proposition 6.4. Moreover, the resolute thinkers took this proposition quite seriously and clubbed the whole of *Tractatus* as a discourse of nonsense.

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands will eventually recognize them as nonsensical when he has used them – steps – to climb or beyond them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed it up)”. He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see his world aright.³⁶

K.T.Fann however more or less follows the traditional line of thought. He agrees with Hacker in some respects, that philosophical propositions are not false but nonsensical. He asserts, “according to the traditional theory all that can be said is how reality is (that is, certain atomic facts exist and that certain others do not): nothing can be significantly said about what reality is³⁷, which is precisely what metaphysicians attempt to talk about.”³⁸

With respect to ‘saying’, K.T. Fann explains that, ‘sense’, ‘senseless’ and ‘nonsense’ are terms applicable to saying, that is, propositions. We can say things with

³⁵ See Crary, Alice. & Read, Rupert. *The New Wittgenstein*, Routledge, London, 2000.

³⁶ Ibid., prop. 6.4

³⁷ Ibid., prop. 3.221

³⁸ Fann, K.T. *Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, p11

sense only within the limits of language. Attempts to say anything, about the limit of language, results in senseless propositions. And to say anything about what lies on the other side of the limit, end in nonsense. Thus, these are logical categories and failure to understand these distinctions results in misinterpreting the *Tractatus* as an anti-metaphysical treatise.

The above interpretations are as alluring as the theory itself. It is hard to agree with the resolute thinkers. Although, whatever they have interpreted is quite fascinating. But reason forces us not to think sweepingly, one cannot render a work of such precision as gibberish. The suggestive of the traditional interpretation is quite illuminating and K.T.Fann indeed gives a more appealing perspective of the *Tractatus*.

It is pertinent to acknowledge that for Wittgenstein 'saying' refers to a legitimate expression; it is a proposition in which sense precedes truth. A thing which shows itself cannot be said. For if it shows itself, it become redundant to specify conditions under which it can be shown. In other words, to show does not mean to point to something but to 'see'. When we talk of relations, say between two people, we do not point out and talk of relations existing outside the concerned persons. It shows itself, the sense exhibits itself. Further, if we try to say it, then it would lead to an infinite regress. For to confirm it, we have to go outside that relation and then ad infinitum.

One might think that amidst this 'saying and showing', where is the space for the self that we are trying to extract? The structure which is measured with strict logical barriers does not seem to share the space with the metaphysical space. This boils down to the question how do we understand the metaphysical, ethical domain within the purview of logico-semantic relation of language and the world? This leads us towards the proposition 6.41, which reads,

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happen as it does happen: *in* it no value exists – and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have a value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case is accidental. What

makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.

The Abode of Self and Tractarian Limit

In the Tractarian limit, “sense of the world must lie outside the world”³⁹. Values cannot be accommodated in the world of discourse. This is because all propositions concerning values are unipolar and not bipolar. That is, they are not subject to truth or falsity. For Wittgenstein, values are something that is necessary, uncreated, indestructible and immutable. None of these features can be found in the contingent world. That is why we cannot speak of ethics, it is not discursive. The moment we try to speak of ethics, it ceases to have meaning. According to Wittgenstein, the realm of ethics or of cannot exist in the world of facts and thus cannot be said. The world of facts consists of propositions which are bipolar. Ethics, being absolute and universal cannot be accommodated in it. Thus whatever belongs to ethical domain cannot be articulated and is therefore inexpressible.⁴⁰


Ethics, though inexpressible, nevertheless occupies an important position in our lives. Wittgenstein remarks that we cannot avoid being ethical, he is here not discarding ethics but tries to show clearly where its domain lies, so that we should stop speaking about values. Ethics cannot be put into language it shows itself. So the whole project of the *Tractatus* is to show the inexpressible by exhibiting clearly, the expressible. Thus Wittgenstein stated, “What can be shown cannot be said”⁴¹. The whole of *Tractatus* is encapsulated in the cocoon of what can be said and shown. This is how the Tractarian limit is maneuvered to get the a priori account of what can be said and indirectly what cannot be said. Within this Tractarian limit we must surf the Tractarian ‘self’. Extrapolation of the ‘self’ from the Tractarian limit is the task which we shall venture into.

³⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop. 4.1

⁴⁰ Ibid. prop. 6.522

⁴¹ Ibid., prop. 4.1212

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After an expansive illustration of how language operates within a strict logical structure and fencing the limit of the world, we are stranded with the question how this gadget works without any willing subject. Is there any 'self' that is revealed in this quite impressive piece of architecture? If so, how it is placed in it? What sort of self would this be and how it coordinates with a sort of language projected within the logical discourse? With such perplexing questions I would like to analyze and interpret some illuminating insight of the 'self' as implied in *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein's remarks on self are contained in *Tractatus* from proposition 5.6 to 5.641. It is difficult to make sense of what kind of self Wittgenstein portrays, whether he is supporting the view of solipsism. The journey of uncovering the place of subject in *Tractatus* is fascinating. We have already glanced through how language and reality are connected with one another in an isomorphic fashion. The Tractarian limit of language is placed clearly laying on the backdrop of elementary propositions as the centrifugal force. Wittgenstein tried to further limit language by taking solipsistic position. How it comes out to be the case we shall examine further. He thus tries to limit the language further and also charges limitation on its expressibility in that language. To put the matter straight, by limiting what can be expressed by means of language and what cannot be, places some restriction on how the subject configures. Self is not something about which one can speak in language, for it is the precondition of the world, and may be even for speaking itself. The value of the world cannot be inside it. It has to be outside its boundary. For then the value would lack sense. These are the demarcations which follow directly from the limit of language. In that sense, although self is a precondition of the world, it cannot correlate itself with it. Self is not contained in the world. The subject or ego, in relation to which good and evil exist is said to be transcendent.

Exposition of Self: a Solipsist Journey

The treatment of solipsism in *Tractatus* occupies a strategic position for his later philosophy of mind. It is the treatment of solipsism in the *Tractatus*, which in *Investigations*, is countered, leading to an opening up of a new discourse of mental

phenomena.⁴² Solipsist is one who drops out the world and other people. It is also referred to an epistemological position that knowledge of anything outside one's own specific mind is impossible. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein attempts to review the solipsist position. The trouble with the solipsist position is how could a detached subject be a part of the world of language? How a 'solipsist' could aim to achieve an independent existence?

There are certain problematic issues which need to be addressed at the outset. Firstly, why would there be any requirement of a subject or self in such perfect logical order, given the fact that language pictures the world and they are logically conjoined in an order of representation. For this we must resort to proposition 5.557 – 5.5571. It is pertinent to note that Wittgenstein introduces solipsism in *Tractatus* while dealing with logic. He resorts to enquire whether logic tells us in advance what the various forms of elementary propositions there are⁴³. But logic cannot do that, for it would require logic to go outside of itself. Also it would be 'nonsense' (in the context of what can be 'said' and 'shown') to go beyond the boundary of language and make an assertion. Thus, logic is incompetent for this task, as it is not a matter that can be settled a priori. Here, Wittgenstein introduces solipsism, because it is another claim to limit factual discourse in a more restrictive way than he is prepared to allow. To put the matter in perspective, solipsist intention is that his mental life has an ego, but does not contain it. Solipsist is attached indirectly to the world through the ego. Thus, he wrongly entertains a conception that he can set limit to the language that he understands, using himself as a reference point, but without actually identifying himself. How far the solipsist claim succeeds is indeed what we need to analyze here. Thus, 'solipsist shield' is brought into the picture to set limit. Hence, the proposition 5.6 reads,

The limit of my language means the limit of my world.

⁴². Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol. 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p20

⁴³ Ibid., prop. 5.55

This proposition compresses within it a strong philosophical implication. It portrays the newly imposed limit of the language by the experience which thereby cannot be expressed in language, but which carves the limit explicitly.

Wittgenstein's discussion on self commences on the fact that the empirical reality is limited by the totality of object⁴⁴, this implies that the objects exist and are the main ingredients of the empirical world. There could be numerous combinations of objects which lead to the existence of possible world. But they must have a form common with object. This is the logical form. To put the matter straight, combinatorial properties of possible world is determined by the concatenation of objects. These objects which would make up the substance of the world are limited by the truth-function of elementary properties. Thus, the limit of the world is referred to as the limit of the possible world that one can construct in imagination. As explicated by David Pears,

The new step is that the world is now my world and the language my language...another specific restriction might be imposed on language, over and above its general limitation of truth functions of elementary proposition. This time the suggested further restriction is not based on the specific types of objects, but on the specification of the person who has encountered them, namely myself.⁴⁵

This exposition reflects the limit of the logic. Logic sets the limit to the world, but logic cannot anticipate what the contents of the world are. This has already been explained by what is sayable and not sayable in language. This very assumption gives rise to the problem of solipsism.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein gives a further exposition, wherein he states.

That what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest". Further, "the world is my world;

⁴⁴ Ibid.,prop.5.5561

⁴⁵ Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p162

that is manifest in the fact that the limit of language (of the language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world⁴⁶.

Wittgenstein tries to put solipsist position in a perspective and analyzes its implication. He states that what the solipsist means is quite correct, but one cannot express it in language. This limitation is referred to as limitation of logic and language. The theory of saying and showing puts further restriction on solipsist claim and bars it from having factual status. But it is also clear that Wittgenstein did not discard the solipsist claim completely. For he leaves the room for its manifestation⁴⁷. So the solipsist bug is here to stay. As it is not yet defused.

How do we make sense of the proposition, “the world is my world”, how do we get sense of this? And further he says, “This is manifest in the fact that the limit of language (of the language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world”. What kind of ‘I’ or ‘me’ is signified here? The solipsist claim cannot be expressed in language but it could only be shown. Here the subject cannot be the part of the world but still manifests itself in it. Is it the psychological ego that Wittgenstein refers to? By ego we commonly understand, “the experienced ‘I’ which is not coextensive with either mind or body but the center of organization of attitudes towards the body, the physical and social world, and all experience that determines identity and individuality”.⁴⁸ Now if this psychological ego pervades my world (solipsist), then the ‘I’ cannot be the part of language of my world. According to Pears,

Solipsist implies that it is my language, because language, from my point of view is my thought. It is what I can understand, and get the ‘I’, that is the subject at the centre of my circle cannot figure in it as an object. Solipsism occupies a strategic place in the *Tractatus*. We must here notice the fact that although

⁴⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F. Mc Guinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop.5.62

⁴⁷ Ibid., prop.5.62

⁴⁸ Flew, Antony. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Pan Books Ltd., London, 1979.

Solipsist enters the scenario to limit the language, it is itself limited by its own inexpressibility in its own language.⁴⁹

According to Pears, when Wittgenstein writes,

The world and life are one⁵⁰.

“This proposition here refers not to the world of facts but the world which solipsist constructs in imagination; it is the world of possibilities”⁵¹. In this way, world is connected with life. And the following lines indeed connects the world and life with the ego,

I am my world (the microcosm)⁵²,

The world and life are one. Physiological life is of course not ‘life’. And neither is psychological life. Life is the world.⁵³

So, Wittgenstein sweepingly abolishes subject as a thinking being. Thus, Physiological self is outdone with, as it refers to the body of the subject, which in any case cannot be taken in our explanation. Further the psychological self- ego is also eliminated.

Proposition 5.631 reads,

There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.

This should not be taken as the last lines on subject. For he appears to be limiting the applicability of the subject, he is stating the limitations which are encountered when we try to capture it in language. This is clearly seen in his further contention:

⁴⁹ Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p 173

⁵⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F.McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop 5.621.

⁵¹ Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p.174.

⁵² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F.McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop 5.63.

⁵³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, G.H. Von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1961, p77

If I wrote a book called *The world as I found it*, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject, for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.⁵⁴

It is pivotal to take note of the fact that Wittgenstein is in no sense postulating that there is no subject or self. He is just limiting it in a sense that it cannot be described in any way.

In 5.632, Wittgenstein remarks,

The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is limit of the world.

How can one capture the essence of this contention? The subject cannot be labeled as a constituent in our description of the world; one cannot give an exposition of oneself while giving a description of one's activity or action. Rather one captures it from that very angle and so the measuring part cannot be inside the vicinity of what one measures, rather it is the limit of the object being measured. Pears clearly elucidates this point in Humean terms; "It is not just that I am not acquainted with my ego, but, rather, that I could not be acquainted with it". Thus, "no language can possibly mention the point of view from which it can be understood. It is in this sense that the ego or subject is a limit of the world". Further, "It is the inner limit of the world, point without magnitude. It is the unplaced, therefore, unrepresentable point of view from which I view my world"

Wittgenstein further states that,

The form of visual field is surely not like this⁵⁵.

Wittgenstein meticulously illustrates the claim that one does not 'see' metaphysical subject with an analogy of an 'eye'. An eye cannot see the self. It cannot

⁵⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop 5.631

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, prop. 5.6331

perceive itself physically and this restriction is in the germ of the 'act of seeing'. It's not that one is deprived of this act rather it is absurd to indulge in it. But surely one cannot rule out the eyes that 'sees'. There has to be a focal point of seeing something. For is not the presence of 'eye' presupposed in the very act of seeing? Here the eye refers to the geometrical eye. This 'geometrical eye' Wittgenstein points as ego. His contention is that one cannot 'see' this ego inside the field of one's perception. We can say that unlike Hume he did not exclude 'self' completely from the domain of one's experience rather mounted it at the periphery of its world. In the notebook he writes, " the situation is not simply that I everywhere notice where I see anything, but I also always find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my visual space has as it were a shape."⁵⁶ His discussion on solipsism concludes by discarding the psychological self and Cartesian self. Here the self of solipsism is pushed at the limit of the world. He further postulated the presence of metaphysical self.

Before we embark on the journey towards Wittgenstein later work, it is essential to figure out where we are standing. *Tractatus* began with an enthusiastic approach to explain a priori conditions of working of language. Thus, whatever could be pictured by language was true and contrary false. To talk of things outside the domain of language is all gibberish and nonsense. This isomorphism of language and the world exhibits a strong need for an a priori space for the analysis of language and reality. It is apparent that Wittgenstein generated such philosophy to show the absurdity of traditional philosophical problems. They are pseudo problems; they are hitting the wrong side of the wall. From this starting point, it swiftly led us towards the metaphysical journey of self. Here the Cartesian self, which Wittgenstein set forth to abolish, was given a cloth of metaphysical self or rather a transcendental solipsist. This self is detached from the world and from the 'object'. It is not the part of the outer world nor a resident of the inner rather it is reduced to a diminutive point stationed at the limit of the world.

⁵⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, , G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1961,p86

I view this strange Tractarian self as a mythological figure, namely, 'Elf'⁵⁷. This strange creature which has been variously understood in different mythologies is a perfect baptized name for our Tractarian self. Wittgenstein analyzed multiple self in order to maintain stability of the a priori interplay of language. Initially he began with the phenomenal self, moving on to the empirical self finally resting on to the philosophical self, which he called metaphysical self. Thus, what we get is a baggage of self which is completely alien to us but still is blessed with superficial powers to manipulate us.

1.2: Language in Use: *Philosophical Investigations* [Use theory and Language game]

Meaning as Use

The grandeur with which Wittgenstein had built the *Tractatus* was demolished by him in the *Investigations*. We see here the great meltdown of his earlier conception of language. *Investigations* comes up as a strong attack on the traditional theory of meaning or language. The direct repudiation of his theory of meaning in *Tractatus* is quite apparently visible in the opening section of the *Investigations*.

The conception of language as the picture of essence of human language, the meaning of the word as the object it denotes, the whole sacrosanct notion of the sign and what it denotes comes into scanner in *Investigations*. Wittgenstein begins *Investigations* by attacking the very notion of language which he entertained earlier. He begins with a classic example of St'Augustine's theory as stated in his Confessions, and quoted by Wittgenstein,

When they (my elders) named some object and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of

⁵⁷ I quote this word 'Elf' in order to express a multiplicity of self.

other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.⁵⁸

Investigations broadens the notion of language and enhances its workability. The picture theory of meaning is not discarded but subsumed as one of the functions of language and not the only activity. St. Augustine's conception of language, according to which, language is meant to serve for communication is analyzed. Language, according to Augustine, is a system of signs. Signs include a wide range of linguistic and nonlinguistic items: words, inscriptions, gestures, symbols, icons, statues, flags. Three elements are involved: the sign, which may be any sort of object; the semantic relation of signifying, which is what a sign does, roughly like our notion of meaning; and its significant, which is the item signified by the sign. Therefore, a sign signifies its significant—when a word is linked to a thing, the word becomes a sign, the thing its significant; and the linkage is accomplished by the semantic relation of signifying. The paradigm case of signs is proper names: a proper name (sign) names (signifies) its bearer (significant), so that meaning is taken to be a kind of labeling of things. Here Augustine attempts to construe meaning solely in terms of naming, using the model of proper names. Wittgenstein was greatly influenced by his teachings. But in *Investigations* he critically scrutinizes Augustine's views on language.

These words of Augustine give a particular picture of the essence of human language. It signifies that the individual words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such objects. This picture of language establishes the notion that it is the object for which the word stands for.⁵⁹ It is essential to note here that Augustine's teaching points to ostensive teaching in which one learns the use of words by means of pointing to an object. But this is not the complete description rather a misrepresentation of

⁵⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, para 1

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Para 1

the whole exercise of language. The Augustinian picture is misleading for one misses to grasp the function of language and make it captive inside a strict boundary. According to Wittgenstein, Augustine failed to discriminate between various kinds of words and their uses. There are words to which we cannot refer to, as they do not generate any picture. Further, this way of understanding the meaning is to think of language in terms of nouns, proper names. There are many words which do not refer “ouch!”, “awe!”, “help!”, still they have use in language.

Wittgenstein explains that language is not used for mere communicating but there is variety of other uses language has. Communication is just one such activity. If one analyses the sole purpose of language as communication then, one imagines a language between a builder ‘A’ and it’s assistant ‘B’. ‘B’ is supposed to pass the material say, ‘slab’, ‘pillars’ , etc, as and when required by ‘A’. For this they employ a language consisting of words- ‘blocks’, ‘pillars’, ‘slab’. ‘A’ calls out and ‘B’ brings them. This is a complete primitive language. This form of language is quite suffocating as it is well apparent in *Investigations*.

... we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of the word surrounding the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible.⁶⁰

Let us consider how children use language. They are told about certain actions and asked to react in a particular way. Teachers teach children words and their respective objects by pointing at them. This Wittgenstein calls as ostensive teaching. They are made to react and picture as soon as the word is uttered. But can such ostensive teaching work when a word ‘slab’ is uttered?

Thus there is wide stream of things of which we call language. It is a composite term which consists of various functions. Indeed, ostensive teaching is one part of it. In that sense no language is complete in itself. Referential theory of meaning fails to express a variety of uses of language. This point is well substantiated in *Investigations* with a

⁶⁰ Ibid., Para 5

plethora of instances. If we stick to 'referential theory' then how could one explain words like, 'the' and 'this'? How can one learn the use of these words? The referential theory fails to provide us with the complete picture of language. Perhaps one could say that, it fails to cover a wide function of language in our life. For no language is complete as such. This narrow view dismantles the ability of human mind to refer to something other than what the word signifies. But for this to work one must be acquainted with all the conditions under which the word or sentence has relevance. For otherwise there could be various ways in which a sentence could be interpreted. This amounts to saying that in ostensive training one requires to be apprised with a special training and anyone who is not trained in that fashion surely reacts in a manner which does not comply with the trained pattern. Wittgenstein makes a quite focused assertion against the very thought that was a part of *Tractatus*. In *Investigations* he says "when we say: "every word in a language signify something" we have so far said nothing whatever, unless we have explained exactly what distinction one wish to make. (It might be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish the words of language from words without meaning, such as occur in Lewis Carroll's poem, or words like "Lilliburlero" in songs.)"⁶¹

Wittgenstein stated, "What is the meaning of the word? This question, like the questions, 'what is time?', 'what is truth?', 'what is beauty?' etc., and produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something (we are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it)."⁶² The phrase 'the meaning of a word' exercises a certain spell which results in the idea that there must be a thing (either an object or a quality) corresponding to each noun or adjective, and this thing is the meaning of the word, and named by it, as an individual is named by a proper name. Wittgenstein is concerned with the perplexity that arises when we entertain such notions. "In case of a person's name, the meaning is the person referred to: the meaning of a name is identified with the bearer of the name. Suppose the bearer of the name dies. It would follow that the name no longer has a meaning, the entire sentence lacks sense. But this is absurd. Surely the correct view is that when the person

⁶¹ Ibid., Para 7

⁶² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Blue and the brown book*. Blackwell,oxford,1958,p1

dies, one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. The meaning of the name and the bearer of it are altogether different.” The whole discussion boils down to the fact that meaning cannot be sacrosanct to the object it denotes. In Cambridge Moral Science Club, he made the famous recommendation: Don’t ask for the meaning ask for the use.⁶³ He thus provides us with the rule of the thumb, “For a large class of cases – though not for all- in which we employ the word meaning, it can be defined thus: the meaning of word is its use in language”⁶⁴

Language Games

Language not just comprises of words with meanings and references. There are a plethora of words and sentences in a language which may not refer to any picture whatsoever but are incorporated to imply sense to an expression. There could be metaphors, words without any meaning, or words which just produce some sound that makes sense only when they are used in certain context. This is quite evident when Wittgenstein uses words like, ‘this’, ‘that’, etc. for what picture do they project? Also in our day to day communication we use words like, ‘owe’ ‘ahha!’, ‘oopes!’, surely they help us in expressing our emotions but as such they do not refer to any picture.

Wittgenstein explains this by means of an illustration, “All tools serve to modify something. The hammer modifies the position of the nail, the ‘saw’ the shape of the board, and so on.” One might ask, what is modified by the rule, glue pot, the nails? Thus, the statement fails to cover a wider function of the tools.

It is essential to acknowledge that language is a concatenation of different words. Each has a different role to play. It all depends upon how we use it. By means of various illustrations, Wittgenstein explains that language is compared with a game. There is no monotonous aspect of language but a variety and divergent games which operate in it. It is not the case that Wittgenstein was against language as a tool for referring rather; it is the whole enterprise of looking for a supposed common, fixed essence of language that is

⁶³ John Wisdom, *Wittgenstein*, 1934 – 27, in Fann (ed) op.cit, p.46

⁶⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969. para20

at fault. There could be innumerable ways in which words could be used and it depends on what context and part of life it belongs to. Thus, capturing the sense of a word or a sentence is contextual and not something given or immanent. This Wittgenstein calls a 'language-game'. Nothing here is patent or has a meaning per se but acquires its meaning with respect to its use.

'Language games' is a metaphor which Wittgenstein used as a tool to make explicit a variety of uses which language has. By means of this he proposed to criticize the primitive understanding of philosophers on the use of language. Earlier philosophers thought language as a means to communicate and presumed that the exclusive task of language is to establish meaning, where a name refers to an object. Such sufficient and necessary conditions were blown out and a more consistent and acceptable role of language is mounted. This is emphatically made evident by a variety of uses of language, which is accomplished by the instrument of language games.

Language is a wider concept and consists not just one kind of sentence structure but innumerable sentences, parts of speeches, symbols, words, etc. Further, this multidimensional aspect of language is not fixed in its use. There are many language games which come into existence and others become obsolete and forgotten.

Here the term language game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life⁶⁵.

Wittgenstein compares various functions of language with an analogy of an ancient city,

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid., Para 23

⁶⁶ Ibid., Para 8

Here we can perhaps see the different ways in which we play language games in our lives. Hence a multiplicity of language games that we encounter and become a part and parcel of in our lives: these are: giving orders and obeying them, describing the appearance of an object, drawing, reporting an event, speculating, forming and testing a hypothesis, play-acting, singing, catches, guessing riddles, making a joke, solving a problem.

Our obsession to name things or give names to an object is wrongly accepted as the only function of language. “Naming is something like attaching a label to a thing”. A set of illustrations in *Investigations* shows that not all words are names of an object. An interesting example which counters the thesis of labeling is as follows. Wittgenstein invites someone to define someone number ‘two’. Now how can one define someone what is number two? One might show the person a group of nuts and tells this as an illustration of ‘two’. But there is a possibility that the person might take ‘nuts’ to be ‘two’. There are innumerable ways in which a thing could be interpreted, all is conditional, and no sense is fixed. It depends on circumstances and on the person who enters into discussion. In similar manner one could explain someone what does the chess-board comprises of and the names of all chessman and their movements. But is it all sufficient to play chess? Mere defining is not playing the game; it is the moves and winning the game which is most important in the chess game. Perhaps, one is required to be acquainted with various language games as each has its own rules.

Thus, we get the rule of the thumb –

We must look for the USE and not meaning. The meaning of a word is its use in language.⁶⁷

While analyzing ‘names’ Wittgenstein ponders over the idea that, ‘names signify simples’. Here he critically evaluates his notion of ‘objects’ in *Tractatus* and Russell’s ‘individuals’ as primary elements can have no description. They are as it is. What are exactly simples? They are pseudo concepts, inevitable concept necessarily demanded by the structure of language in *Tractatus*. Moving towards *Investigations*, simples perhaps

⁶⁷ Ibid., Para 43

lose their essence. Can we really capture anything as proposing to be simple and elementary, such that it is excluded from the sphere of questioning? If a thing is not simple then it is composite. However, how does one draw a line between simple and complex? What is the hard line here? Simple and complex are not air tight names rather they operate on the ground of language games of which they are the parts. An illustration in *Investigations* states that, “if someone tells someone without any explanation, what I see before me is complex, he reserves the right to ask, what you understand by complex?⁶⁸” And this would make sense only if one knows what kind of word is in question. The notions of simple and complex are contextual.

Speaking about language games extensively, Wittgenstein elaborates what really constitutes language games? How it operates and what sort of language is this? Meaning is not the sole prerogative of the word. We should not ask for the meaning rather ask for its use. This sounds quite rational, for there are so many languages and what a word meaning stands for in one language may not be the same in a different form of language. This amounts to saying that there are varieties of language games. Further language does not operate in vacuum. We see here a hard core shift in linguistic philosophy from the strict logical sphere of language-world relation to a more sensitive and social aspect of it. He offers a social aspect of language.

Language is part of a form of life and there are rules governing it. He dismisses that there is anything so called ‘essence’ of a language. Language is not static and to look for essence is similar to freezing it. To look for a common essence restricts the mobility and expression of a word, for there could be various ways in which language could be interpreted. There is always a relation by means of which we call them games. There is no common essence but diversity of expressions. There are languages and all that we call language are related to one another. There is no one essential underlying factor which we call language.⁶⁹

Wittgenstein explains this with an illustration of games. There are so many kinds of games- board games, card games, ball games, Olympic Games. Now there are so many

⁶⁸ Ibid., Para 47

⁶⁹ Ibid., Para 65

similarities, relationships, dissimilarities, etc, that makes them call games. Each has certain rules and technique of playing, there are quite similarities and dissimilarities, and Wittgenstein encapsulates these as 'family resemblances'. By quoting the analogy of 'family of games' Wittgenstein tries to put across the workability of how language operates, how different language games play with words? How words can be used in innumerable ways? There is no fixed usage of any word in language game.

Role of Propositions in Later Work

It is apt to acknowledge that the whole project of *Investigations* was to make a sharp attack on the traditional conception of language or any language that looks for essence and postulates that a word should refer to an object. This purist stand also advocates essences as a standard for truth. This Wittgenstein relinquishes in his later work.

Further it is not by meaning of language that we can only 'describe', it is one's 'use' of language, and to 'refer' is one function of it. There are avowals like – 'I have a toothache', 'I am in pain', which do not refer to anything as such, but are one of the language games. By dismantling the confusing edifice of strict logical structure and referential nature of objects, *Investigations* welcomes a broader perspective by epitomizing that propositions have no common essence. There are many different kinds of structure which we call propositions. It opens up an arena for a variety of language games which operate in a variety of propositions. For instance, avowals of private experiences (such as 'I have pain') avowals of intent, ordinary empirical propositions, hypothesis, expressions of laws of nature, logical and mathematical propositions, ethical, grammatical and aesthetic propositions. These propositions cannot be circumscribed into the dogmatic structure of bipolarity. Also the misconceived notion which was one of the founding principles of *Tractatus* (the essential function of proposition to describe) was done away with. To describe is one of the functions of proposition and not the only one. This shifts our attention to a variety of avowals and first person assertions in *Investigations*.

The not so Superfluous 'I'

Investigations proceed from a critique of Tractarian limit towards a more worldly and everyday approach to language. A language in which the meaning of a word is not a prison of an object, instead it's a pool of a variety of language games. While mounting an attack on the referential theory of meaning, Wittgenstein profoundly deals with how to make sense of avowals which we use in our language. He analyses psychological verbs such as 'understanding, intending, willing and remembering. By breaking the gulf between the word and the object in *Investigations*, it becomes pertinent to make sense how they should be understood. Firstly, Wittgenstein could get back the little 'Elf' of *Tractatus* into everyday world and secondly, he explodes the Cartesian picture of mind and body, wherein the self is described as a sacrosanct entity and enjoys its exclusivity.

Wittgenstein's views on 'self' can be captured by understanding the distinction between 'object use and subject use'. He proclaims in *Investigations* that it is essential to make distinction between how first person avowals differ from third person ascriptions in terms of subject and object. He remarks that by claiming one in terms of another lead to abuse of the term and renders it mystical.

Avowals of experience and expressions of thought have been traditionally conceived as a case of description. This distorted picture contributed to refer to 'I' (subject), as a referring term. This very subject is put to question by Wittgenstein. Distinction between subject and object is contained in the Blue Book. The subject use is denoted by expressions like 'I think it will rain', 'I am in pain', and 'I have a toothache'. In such expressions one cannot be mistaken about oneself. In expressions such as, "I have got a matchbox", there is recognition of a particular person and a possibility of error also remains.⁷⁰ This can be substantiated from *Investigations*, "when I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is he". Further, he contends that in uses such as, "I am in pain", one might want to draw attention towards oneself.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Blue and the brown book*, Blackwell, oxford, 1958, p66

⁷¹ Ibid., Para 405

The basic contention is that 'I' in 'I am in pain', is not case of reference. In which case, one could dispense with 'I' and is superfluous. But this does not signify that Wittgenstein outrightly rejects the 'I' as 'experiencer' rather, he is against the very act of objectification of its use in language game. He argues against the special sense in which 'I' is distinguished from the 'body' and is rendered mysterious. Perhaps the deep implication of his contention could be well captured when analyzed with his views in *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology*.

I argue for the fact that by annulling the objectification of 'I' Wittgenstein does not render it as nothing. On the contrary, he talks of self in a very special sense but simply rejects any appeal for its separate identity apart from the body. Thus, Wittgenstein intends to give us an alternative to combat Cartesian thought by pointing that first person avowals such as, 'I am in pain', has sense in our language game. But it does not owe any knowledge claim. For, 'I' does not have any misreference and thus has no reference. We must acknowledge that Wittgenstein is only devoiding it of epistemic status and not from its other uses. One can understand it in terms of Wittgenstein's conception of 'saying' and 'showing'. It can only be shown in our use and cannot be said. The above discussion can be well explicated from the following quotes in *Investigations*:

I know what I want, wish, believe, and feel, (And so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosopher's nonsense, or at any rate not a judgment a priori". Further, "I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking', and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking.'⁷²

Conclusion

In the *Tractatus*, It is worth introspecting, what sort of self is this, and what is the nature of language, which is captured in such a water-tight personality? Do we need to remain content with the solipsist or we should embark on another journey to understand and reframe it? This brings us to *Investigations*. *Investigations* provided us with an ordinary

⁷² Ibid., Para 122

picture of a variety of propositions in a language game. By expressing meaning in terms of use Wittgenstein explicates that different kinds of expressions in language enjoy the status of meaning irrespective of any reference. This is a strategic move and it also shows how first person expressions could be employed in language.

CHAPTER 2

Self in Philosophical Investigations

Introduction

In this chapter, I intend to explore the 'Private Language Argument in *Investigations*. By an in depth analysis of the impossibility of private language, Wittgenstein explodes the subject- object dichotomy, the notion of self which is signified by owning ones sensation and the Augustinian picture of meaning which was adopted in *Tractarian* account of meaning. The Cartesian dualism is vehemently criticized and done away with. We shall see how the concept of language is untenable when applied by private linguist. By denying the epistemic status to first person present self-ascriptions, Wittgenstein, tries to show that these self-ascriptive statements require an expressivist reading. This has led to charging Wittgenstein as a behaviorist in disguise. He tries to argue why he isn't a behaviorist. These are some significant issues which we shall critically examine.

2.1 Critique of dualism and behaviorism

Descartes' Legacy

The concept of self in philosophy has its strong roots in Cartesian dualism. René Descartes was the first modern philosopher, who systematically raised doubts about the certainty of knowledge claims. Thus, he showed a systematic epistemological concern over the issue of knowledge and how do we acquire it. Descartes was of the opinion that minds and bodies are substances of distinct kinds which in the case of living beings, particularly humans, happened to be intimately related. This Cartesian dualism is the root cause of the historic debate relating to the primacy of the mind and body. The implication of such a theory forms the basic ingredient on which philosophy of mind rests. Descartes enumerated methodic doubt in which he questioned the certainty of our knowledge. He extended doubt on every aspect, knowledge derived from the external world, knowledge

derived from different senses and finally knowledge of mathematics. The conclusion of such widespread doubt was that he could not doubt himself as a thinking being, for the very act of doubting required thought, this he encapsulated in his first indubitable axiom : Cogito Ergo Sum, 'I think, therefore I am'. Cartesian dualism bifurcated mind and body into two realms. Firstly, matter was extended in space, while mind was unextended, comprising of thoughts and sensation. They were qualitatively different from one another. Another upshot of the dualism was epistemological and extremely radical. The knowledge you have of your own states of your mind is direct, immediate and infallible in a way that your knowledge of material object is not. Thus we have a 'privileged access' to our own states of mind. Your thoughts about your current states of mind could not be false. Further the contents of our own minds are transparent to us. First person knowledge of our own current minds is referred to as 'accessive'. Such epistemic priority of 'accessive' prompted various philosophers to unfold the absurdity inherent in Cartesian dualism and to reorient the whole concept of self- knowledge in a broader perspective. Wittgenstein's move in *Investigations* is one form of radical criticism of Cartesian dualism. This task he carried out by systematically refuting the workability of private language, which we shall see in the second section.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Behaviorism

The rejection of inner, as a representation of one's privileged status, on the contrary, led to the nurturance of belief that Wittgenstein advocated logical behaviorism. It needs to be noted that he did not deny the existence of mental states completely rather he denied their privileged epistemic status and a sacrosanct picture of the inner upheld by the dualist. We shall see here, that it may be a wrong way of interpreting him as a behaviorist. One must see his work in the light of his repudiation of private language with respect to 'form of life' argument. One cannot get a complete picture of his view unless one looks into the various aspects of his philosophy interwoven with each other. Perhaps only then one can articulate what Wittgenstein tries to put forth.

in one situation rather than another. Thus, when we attribute a belief to someone we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he might do in a particular situation. Thus, if a person has a toothache, this could only be captured and understood in terms of his or her outward behavior which acts as a verification of the claim uttered. Here, the meaning of a mental statement is analyzable into statements about behavior and about the observable circumstances in which such behavior occurs. The truth –value of these statements depend upon their verifiability. Thus, the main contention is that mental descriptions are equivalent to purely physical description.

Having defined the two behaviorist theories, we must acknowledge that Wittgenstein argued extensively against psychological as well as logical/philosophical behaviorism. Wittgenstein refutation of the primacy of the inner cannot be taken as his being a behaviorist. It is essential to take cognizance of the fact that his entire project was to make evident that inner is not excluded from the outer. There is no demarcation between mental and one's outward behavior, rather the two are juxtaposed into one another. The mental does not enjoy privileged access, but for that we cannot consider it to be non-existent and fictional in nature. "In *Investigations*, he clearly states,

"Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?" – If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.²

Wittgenstein's refutation of the inner and his objections against Cartesian dualism wrongly led philosophers to associate him as a philosophical behaviorist. But we shall see that his entire arguments against the special status of the inner, is not a blanket removal of it. He did not deny that there are mental states but only the privileged epistemic position attached to it.

While refuting the private language argument, Wittgenstein shows that we have no special way of knowing sensation, such as 'pains'. He argues as to how we learn about

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 307

these sensations. According to Wittgenstein, we learn them against the background of certain instinctive types expressions. He quotes in *Investigations*,

...The words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expression of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adult talks to him and teaches him exclamation and later sentences. They teach the child a new pain behavior³.

It is pertinent to take cognizance of the fact; it is only through the outward expression (cry) of the child that one learns that the child is in pain. In this way, the inner sensation reaches out by means of its outer expression, that is, pain behavior of crying. Thus, there is a strong connection between the inner and the outer. Also this is how language is connected with the inner sensations. Thus the child, in later stages, learns to replace the expression of crying with a language, as in, 'I am in pain' or 'my stomach aches'. Does this amount to saying that Wittgenstein embraces behaviorism? On the contrary, it's not that the pain behavior which gets associated as the meaning of being in pain, rather the verbal expression of pain replaces crying.

Another essential factor here is that although the pain behavior of others can be observed from their outward expression of them, it is ridiculous or nonsensical (as Wittgenstein puts it) to apply it to oneself. This point has been discussed in detailed in the context of the private language argument. It is sufficient to note here that one does not assign the same criteria of pain behavior exhibition as in case of others. For one does not express it to oneself that 'I am in pain'. The confusion, Wittgenstein contends lies in the grammar of a language. We wrongly construe an utterance of a sentence ascribing mental states to ourselves as a description of something. On the contrary they are not akin to descriptions, but mere expressions of our sensations. Consider a case of toothache, to utter that 'I have toothache' is not to describe something about myself. It is equivalent to or identical with having a toothache. In a description such as "the grass is green", there is a gap between it and the fact that it is being described. However, there is no such gap between my being in pain and saying "I am in pain".

³ Ibid., Para 244

Logical behaviorist strictly reduces the mental, 'inner' to the outer behavior but Wittgenstein did not agree just on aspect of plain behavior, rather he espoused an element of feeling 'expressive' behavior. In *Investigations* Wittgenstein enquires "could someone understand the word "pain", who had never felt pain?"⁴ And further says "suppose we think while we talk or write- I mean, as we normally do- we shall not in general say that we think quicker than we talk; the thought seems 'not to be separate' from the expression"⁵. Thus, saying that 'one is in pain' and 'pain' are not two separate domains. They are infused into one another.

Additionally, although Wittgenstein states, outer provide the criteria in terms of which the inner is characterized, the relation of outer and inner is not static and varies with respect to various emotions and sensation. This can be ascertained from the following quote,

⁶ How do we compare the behavior of anger, joy, hope, expectation, belief, love and understanding- Act like an angry person! That's easy. Like a joyful one-here it would depend on what the joy was about. The joy of seeing someone again, or the joy of listening to a piece of music...? - Hope? That would be hard. Why? There are no gestures of hope. How does hoping that someone will return express itself?

The above stated lines also seem to point towards a serious charge on behavioral psychologist who experiment on animal behavior and try to extrapolate the result on human behavior. For even if, say a dog could be conditioned to respond at certain outer expressions of its master, it is surely inconceivable that it could gesture certain subtle and higher order expressions, say of depression, loneliness, hope etc. This points towards an essential requirement, that is, of human feeling. This human feeling is not mere a part of personal vocabulary, but is a shared activity. There is a serious attack of mind and body

⁴ Ibid., Para 315

⁵ Ibid., Para 318

⁶ *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1, 1982, vol. 2, , G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (trans.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, para.357.

dualism here. We are not mechanical projectors of our thoughts and desires. There is no separate compartment from where our inner gets processed and is represented in the form of behavior. There is a sensitive element of 'spontaneity' which operates. Here spontaneity refers to expression related to both outer behavior and inner states. Such spontaneity is our form of life, it is nurtured by the environment, and a shared element with other humans. Thus, Wittgenstein famous phrase goes, 'if a lion could talk we could not understand him'⁷.

The crux of the argument is that human behavior cannot be gauged by mere facial expression and gestures. Paul Johnston rightly says,

The whole point is that we do not treat each other as bodies which happen to behave in particular ways, but as conscious individuals, who act. The notion of the inner does not refer to some separate reality but expresses our relation to each other and a particular way of understanding human actions. Wittgenstein urges us to recognize that we are interested in people's utterances not as report on mysterious occurrences about which we are for some reason curious, but as expressions of what the individual concerned feel. We are interested in them not because they are accurate reports on inner processes but because they are what the individuals are inclined to say.⁸

A similar account is made by P.M.S. Hacker while explaining Wittgenstein's statement,

'The human body is the best picture of the human soul', and not because the soul is something bodily, but precisely because the soul is manifested in behavior. Only a creature with eyes can cast a loving look or a contemptuous gaze, weep with joy or grief. Only a creature with a mouth can smile, with sympathy or cruelty, in amusement or cold anger. But for these forms of

⁷ *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1, vol. 2, 1992, G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (trans.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, Para.190.

⁸ Johnston, Paul. *Wittgenstein Rethinking the inner*, Routledge, London,1993,p. 228

expression to be possible a highly complex behavioral repertoire in widely varying circumstances is presupposed. The soul of a fish, if it had one, would be a poor thing. The articulations of the human face and body in the circumstances of the human life are not externally related to what it makes sense to say of the human soul⁹.

Thus, it is not the case that in denying Cartesian dualism Wittgenstein adopted behaviorism. He embraced behavioral aspects as to show the absurdity of the 'inner', as a special category. Like behaviorists, he did not deny the mental, rather showed how it is manifested in our language and outward expression. The form of life and language games explicitly enlightens the fact that being human is not to mirror merely as a cold appearance of the inner, but to show it as an expression of 'life'. This 'life' expresses the life of a 'sentient being'¹⁰, who feels and acts in a shared form of life, and has a reflective consciousness. Thus, Wittgenstein added a human element, a human conduct, to the 'automata' Cartesian being.

2.2 Private Language Argument and Rule-following

The Notion of Private Language Argument

Wittgenstein in *Investigations* propagates arguments against the workability of private language which comes to be known as private language arguments. We must note here that the notion of private language rests on a theory upheld by Cartesian conception of self. By refuting the private linguistic conception of self, Wittgenstein intends a severe attack on the Cartesian conception of self. He tries to show the absurdity of private language notion by means of reductio-ad-absurdum. The whole of Wittgenstein's philosophy is centered on the notion of language. *Tractarian* language was a strict logical

⁹ Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p253.

¹⁰ Expression borrowed from P.M.S.Hacker.

scaffolding, in which language pictures the reality. Whereas, in *Investigations* language is juxtaposed with world and reality in a pool of variety of language games. By means of private language argument Wittgenstein tries to show the inadequacy of any form of language (if it can be called language), that is, unshareable. This brings us to the concept of private language.

If there is an inner self then there should be a private language to talk about this inner/private self. There is no private language to talk of inner self. Therefore, there is no private self. So the whole idea of *Investigations* is to justify the second premiss. One really gets baffled by the very notion of private language. Can a language be called 'private'? What sort of language will it be where privacy is an essence? Can we ascribe private names to our sensations? These are some of the questions which we shall deal in this section. Wittgenstein begins by giving an exposition of kind of language which the private linguist talks of. Here we refer to *Investigations* 243, where Wittgenstein talks of language in which a person gives orders, obeys and blames himself. A monologist indeed indulges in such a form of language. There is also a kind of language in which a person gives name to his own experiences, feelings, moods, etc., as in code language. One can conceive of such languages but this is not with which Wittgenstein is concerned in *Investigations*. By private language one means a language, in which "the individual words of the language are to be referred to what can only be known to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language"¹¹. Hacker says,

What Wittgenstein analysis here is not a contingently private language which no one else happens to understand, but an essentially private language which it is logically impossible for another person to understand? What the words of such a language refer to are the speaker's immediate private sensation and experiences, which only he can know¹².

¹¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 243

¹² Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 3

The implication of such a language is extremely deep and highly debatable. On the first note, it goes contrary to our normal conception of language. What is the basis of language in communication? Is it merely restricted to communication within one self or with the society at large? If we follow a soliloquist, what is the purpose of indulging in private naming of his sensations and what is the form of life he leads. The same can be inquired about a private linguist. But there is a difference in degree, for we can still comprehend what a soliloquist tries to express, by means of translation. But there is no room for translation, in case of a private linguist. It has more devastating consequences, as it is logically incomprehensible to others. One cannot ascertain what sort of activity or sensation a private linguist adheres to. The very idea of private language intensifies when we completely exclude the possibility of knowing an individual's immediate private sensations. For here, the sensations have no public expression. Furthermore, one cannot gauge as to what a private linguist is referring to, for the part of speech comprises of one's inner definition, subscribed to own private immediate sensations. One can correlate it by an analogy of a magician (a private linguist), who locks himself inside a cupboard with its keys locked from outside and disappears the key. In such a case he cannot come out, neither we can know what is inside. This is beautifully brought out in Para 293:

....Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language- game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the

model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.¹³

This gives us a fair idea of how serious is the argument and engulfs the very notion of language and communication. We must understand that the argument poses a sharp attack on the traditional theories of meaning and understanding. How do we establish a meaning of a word? How people happen to learn and associate it with the same thing? One can resort to ostensive definition, in which one gives a rule for the use of a word, and typically introduces a sample to function as a standard of correct application. But the problem arises when one give such definition by referring to a private sample (i.e. one which it is logically impossible to show to anyone else).

At this juncture, it is pertinent to acknowledge how words get associated with a particular meaning and obtains a shareable common understanding of it. This is essential to test whether a private language comprises of rules and if not then for what use is it in a language game?

Rule Following and Form of Life

The very conception of private language rest on the assumption that one's sensations are private and can be known immediately only to the person who experiences it. Thus, one imparts a name to one's sensation, like 'pain' for instance, and establishes a connection between them. But is that all we need to understand a language and does a language work in such a set up? Wittgenstein explicitly explains that language is governed by certain rules which need to be adhered to in a social set up. Further, a private linguist cannot arbitrarily employ words, it is essential to form a concept between word and sensation. The question arises, can it be developed only through ostention or does it involve some other element in our language?

A private linguist holds a special right to his/her sensations and personal experiences. Let us take the example of the private sensation of pain, as Wittgenstein

¹³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 293.

does. A private linguist has to say that I know only from my own case what the word 'pain' means¹⁴; another person cannot have my pains¹⁵; that I can undertake to call this (pointing at a word) 'pain' in the future¹⁶; that when I say 'I am in pain' I am at any rate justified before myself¹⁷.

If this is the contention of the private linguist then the question arises as to, can one employ a private name to one's sensations such that, no one other than the speaker can understand? Can a language work in such a way, where a name is ascribed to a sensation by one's own choice? Wittgenstein strongly upholds that a language does not operate on such parameters. He tries to show loopholes in private linguist conception of language by propounding social nature of language and the concept of rule following.

Wittgenstein elucidates the concept of 'rules' which acts as an ingredient for any language to work. His submission is that language is not something which is a product of mind. It has its space in our society and form of life in which we live. Speaking or indulging in any linguistic activity, sharing one's emotions, sensations, thoughts, all are subject to shared rules or agreement. Language in this sense is a rule governed activity which pre-supposes a form of life. He says "...it is only in language that I can mean something by something"¹⁸. Thus we cannot call anything a word or a sentence unless it is a part of that kind of rule governed activity which we call a language. A language is thus part of a set of activities defined by certain rules, which further govern all the various uses of words in the language. This he explicates by means of an illustration of the 'game of chess'. "The question what is the word really?" is analogous of "what is a piece in chess"¹⁹. "To understand what a piece in chess is one must understand the whole game rules defining it, and the role of the piece in the game". Chess is a game in virtue of all its use²⁰. It is absurd to distinguish the game of chess from its rules. Further, a game of chess

¹⁴ See Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969. Para 293

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 253

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 263

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 289

¹⁸ Ibid., Para 13

¹⁹ Ibid., Para 108

²⁰ Ibid., Para 293

involves, making a move, solving a chess problem²¹. Such a move is analogous to making utterances in language.

An essential element related to rule following is that, one cannot be said to follow a rule in isolation. Wittgenstein inquires “is what we call obeying a rule something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life time”²². Wittgenstein calls our attention to show the nonsensicality of such an assertion. He asserts in *Investigations*,

...It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, order given or understood. To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique²³.

Thus to follow a rule refers to the practice of following rule. For instance, sign-post with an arrow pointing towards a direction, gives us an indication of moving in a certain directions. It guides our way, but it is not by virtue of its physical appearance that we follow it, rather because it is followed on a regular basis and it is successfully pointing towards a desired destination, that holds its significance. Thus, here follows a custom, a practice, of following the direction, which shows its use. Its application depends on its being followed on a regular basis by living beings. Supposedly, there were no regular use of a sign-post and no convention as to how it is to be interpreted, each individual interprets it in its own way, and would it still function as a guide?²⁴ Thus, one of the underlining characteristic of rule following is that it is a practice, a convention.

²¹ Ibid., Para 13

²² Ibid., Para 199

²³ Ibid., Para 199

²⁴ See Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969 Para. 198.

It is worth examining another significant feature of rule following, it acts as a yardstick for verification. Following a rule pre-supposes the notion of making a mistake. Wittgenstein states,

It is quite conceivable to make a mistake while following a rule and it is natural. For when we obey the rule, we practice something on a regular basis. There is a set pattern or same task that we indulge in. Thus, we agree with a particular practice of doing an activity the word 'agreement' and 'rule' are interwoven²⁵.

The crux of the argument is that following a rule presupposes one to be in agreement with a pattern and one might make a mistake in such a situation. In fact the whole exercise of following a rule 'correctly' or 'incorrectly' makes us learn to follow a rule aright and thus becomes a custom. This is how one learns the use of a word and its disuse. Otherwise, there would be no check in one's following a certain rule. "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about right"²⁶.

Surmising the above discussion, for Wittgenstein language cannot be static, dormant; rather it is fluid and dynamic. It works on certain rules which are indispensable for a language to communicate. It is rule governed activity and its task is to be in perfect harmony with the convention and customs. There are various language games and indeed there are rules which govern them. Such multifarious picture of language poses serious concern over the issue of private language. With such strong parameters of language as being a rule governed activity how does a private linguist conception fit in? This brings us to evaluate how naming of private sensations could gel with such a conception of language. To put it in Wittgenstein's own words:

²⁵ Ibid., Para 224

²⁶ Ibid., Para 258

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it²⁷.

Pain Argument

One can only see the intensity and comprehensiveness of private language argument by clarifying the notion of privacy. The basic contention of a private linguist, as we have seen, is that one's sensations are private. We have already seen how private language cannot work on the principles of rules, which determine the use of language. This can be best explained by means of 'pain argument'.

Private linguist absurdly holds the view that one's sensations are private. This notion of privacy, rest on two extreme assumptions of a private linguist.

(i) Private ownership

(ii) Epistemic privacy

The sacrosanct picture of one's own sensations and experiences implies that the inner is completely unknown and personal abode which cannot be accessible to the outer. Private linguist asserts here that none can have my pains; my pains belong to me and cannot be shared by anyone. Thus, 'I' am the sole owner of 'pains'. Nobody else has my pains. This creates a barrier between one's own sensations and others. There are far reaching consequences, which are indeed, as Wittgenstein puts it, concealed in our use of faulty grammar. The problem is indeed embedded in our deep understanding of the 'myth of the given'. We wrongly presume our personal experiences of sensations, emotions as a sort of object in our realm of particular inner world. Thus, a sort of mental fencing is laid and we are tempted to entertain a fact that such experience are essentially unique and thereby we restrict its mobility to the inner realm itself.

²⁷ Ibid., Para 202

(i) Private ownership

The concept of private ownership deals with an analysis of a question- 'are sensations inalienable'? This question exclusively deals with the assumption made by private linguist that only 'I' can have my pains and another person neither can have it nor can understand my pain. This is a very intriguing argument and its consequences are equally devastating. With this respect, Wittgenstein poses two questions in *Investigations* ²⁸;

- (a) Which are my pains?
- (b) What counts as criterion of identity here?

The first question is concerning one's ownership of pains, such that, pains which the bearer feels has its exclusive right of its possession. It focuses on one's belongingness to one's own sensation as if another person cannot have the similar sensation. We must consider certain case which shoots from the above contentions. Private linguist assertions that one's pains are private, reflects towards a relationship of one's pain sensations as an object. It exhibits a sort of ownership which is contended in case of one's having or possessing an object. Are our pains sensation equated with object in the outer world? Wittgenstein asserts the deceptiveness of grammar in one's employment of such an ownership. Feeling of pain cannot be equated with a form of perception. We do not perceive pain as we perceive pin. Pain does not signify a sort of ownership or possession, as in case of pin. One can surely own a pin and perceive it. But we cannot possess pain in that sense. To have a pain is to be in pain, to suffer. To 'own' belongs to the domain of objects and has no application here. The underlining fact here is that one cannot talk of pains as if one speaks of 'one's coat', 'one's penny', and 'one's pen'. The surface grammar creates an illusion here when we employ the use of words such as, 'having' or 'feeling'. The objectification of one's sensation is what is under serious scanner. In similar vein, when one asserts that it is 'his pain', 'your pain' or 'my pain', these do not reflect towards one's sole possession of pain. The trouble arises when we equate these

²⁸ Ibid., Para 253

with, 'my pen', 'his pen', 'and your pen'. The similarity in surface grammar creates the effect of such an authoritative right and allures one to wrongly presume sensation as object of inner world.

Private linguist wrongly entertain the fact that another person cannot feel pain in someone else's body²⁹. On the contrary one cannot become aware of pain in one's own body by means of any method. There is no method or criteria by which one could know that one is in pain. There is indeed a way by which we can feel pain in other person's body. One does observe and come to know that other person is suffering from pain through his exhibition of pain behavior. This is well apparent when a person cries of pain; we surely say that she is in such a pain. Also, when a person is met with an accident and is bleeding, we do feel that he or she is suffering from immense pain. Thus, the pain behavior of other shows itself that she is in pain and we do take notice of this fact. There is no logical contradiction in supposing that another person is in pain, we can and do conceive of pain in other person's body. The private linguist contention stands refuted. We must accept the fact that 'pains' are not an object which is only possessed by the one who manifest it. Further, it is the surface grammar which makes the thesis disputed. The grammar of 'my pain', 'his pain', obscures the natural phenomena of pain. We feel pain as a natural sensation of body. The sensation of pain shows and is manifested in our behavior.

An important implication of ownership of privacy is with respect to the criterion of identity of pain. The question pertaining to the criterion of identity of pain rests on the phenomenal characteristic of pain, such as, intensity and location. According to the private linguist no one can express my pains. The line of arguments which follows is that my pain belongs to pain in my body and thus cannot be the pain in others body. The pain which I feel is located inside my body, so in that sense it belongs to me. Pains which are felt in others body belongs to them so are not equivalent to my pain. It follows that my pains are distinct from the pain in somebody else's body i.e., they are numerically

²⁹ *The Blue and Brown Books (BB)*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p.68.

different³⁰. Further, since my pains are unshareable one cannot even have my pains after I no longer have it. That pain has passed and no longer exists. It cannot enter the world of another person. Reason being that it belongs to a person's private subjective experience.

This argument further becomes more complicated as we move on with its consequences. If we go by the argument posed by the private linguist, then, A's pain, say in the knee, is A's pain. Now, 'B' may have a similar pain in his knee, but since B's knee cannot be at the same place as A's knee, his pains cannot be at the same place either. Consequently, one might say that their pains are qualitatively identical, but numerically distinct. This amounts to saying that there cannot be similar pains, but essentially different.

In *Investigations* Wittgenstein ask us to ponder over a possibility wherein we speak of physical objects as "two exactly the same". For instance "this chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it"³¹. By means of this argument Wittgenstein draws our attention towards private linguist persistent claim over his pain (or for that matter any inner emotion). What prompts a private linguist to assert that another person cannot have the identical pains one have, though of course he can have the same pain. For instance, if one is having a severe pain in ankles and other person is also having a similar pain in his body, then according to a private linguist they cannot be said to possess the same pain. As the pain in corresponding body is not the same. Wittgenstein however, argues against the contention and asserts that even if we affirm that the pain in corresponding body is not the same, this does not follow that the pain is essentially different. It is indeed the same pain. He illustrates the case of Siamese twins wherein, they feel pain in exactly the same place where they are joined together. Thus, although they are different bodies but the pain is same³².

The trouble lies in misunderstanding the grammar of something being 'same' or 'identical'. The two are used quite interchangeably in our language. We do not use them

³⁰ Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 49.

³¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 253

³² *Ibid.*, Para 253.

in isolation, in abstract sense, but in some relation to a thing or emotions. There are different language games. For instance, our reference to some similar pain is different with respect to a similar chair. We have already discussed that the concept of 'possession' does not apply to 'pain', it is related to object. Thus, Wittgenstein claims that two people can surely have same pains. As Wittgenstein says, "in so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain."³³

(ii) Epistemic Privacy

The notion of Epistemic Privacy rests on the conception that one's experiences are private in the sense that no one else can know them. Thus something is private to me, if and only if I alone can know about it. Other person cannot have knowledge about my inner experiences. With respect to pain sensation it follows that only I can know that I am in pain, others can only surmise it. Here private linguist adheres to the assumption that one's sensations are incommunicable.

At this juncture, we must take note of the fact that such sort of epistemic privacy glorifies the traditional conception of knowledge of self. It advocates the thesis wherein we have a privileged access of one's inner sensation, beliefs and desires. Further we have a kind of epistemic privilege such that other person cannot share one's experience. This has its lineage to the Cartesian view of mind. According to this view, mental states constitute an inner realm that is directly available to the subject whose mental states they are. The philosophical question which have troubled the philosophers is that how could there be such a thing with such a capacity of epistemic completeness and infallibility? Wittgenstein argues extensively against this exclusivity and special access that one has. He proclaims that it is wrong and nonsense to assert that 'I know I have a pain'³⁴. This claim has no epistemic relevance and is a grammatical assertion. By arguing against such an epistemic assertion he intends to showcase nonsensicality that operates in traditional conception of self knowledge. It is worth knowing that his charge was not to prove the opposite (that we have unprivileged access), but rather to expose the faulty grammatical

³³ Ibid., Para 253.

³⁴ Ibid., Para 246.

construction that lures one to such misinterpretation. Wittgenstein denies any epistemic status to statement about first person avowals.

The concept of knowing something pre-supposes the possibility of making an error. Wittgenstein states,

....My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arise from this; if I assume the abrogation of the normal language game with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exist ³⁵.

P.M.S. Hacker analyses Wittgenstein's treatment of epistemic status of first person present sensations. It makes sense to say of a person that she knows that such-and-such is the case if and only if it also makes sense to deny that she know. Thus, "I know I am in pain" can only be conceived as an epistemic utterance if 'I do not know whether I am in pain' is held to be intelligible. But it would be absurd to say that one is doubtful whether one is in pain or not. One cannot be suspicious about one's avowals of present sensations. Wittgenstein proclaims "the truth is; it make sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself"³⁶. Thus, one cannot be ignorant of one's being in pain or other sensations, and therefore, cannot claim to have knowledge of one's own pain either.

Another problematic issue with respect to epistemic status of one's avowals relating to present sensations is the use of the verb 'to know'. Hacker is of the opinion that, it makes sense to talk of knowing that 'P' where it makes sense to talk of finding out, coming to know, or learning that 'P'. But when I have pain, I do not find out, one can surely assert if one knows an object or a situation, by stating grounds in terms of evidence for knowing that thing. How about cases of one's immediate sensations? We do not find out for ourselves whether we are in pain or not. For instance when one has a toothache, there is no such thing as inferring from some evidence nor one can perceive

³⁵ Ibid., Para 288

³⁶ Ibid., Para 246

one's toothache. These task of knowing, conferring, guessing have no language game in case of such utterances like, 'I am in pain'. It makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain but not to say it about myself.

The confusion arises due to grammatical structure which violates the meaning of a sentence. There is nothing of the sort as making an epistemic claim about one's sensations as they cannot be disputed. One is in pain because one feels the pain, there is no special epistemic connection involved here. Thus, such expressions cannot be used as an expression of certainty. There is no requirement for any question of justification here.

If a blind man were to ask me 'have you got two hands?' I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it then I do not know why I should trust my eyes. For, why should not I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? *What* is to be tested for what?³⁷

In the same vein, Wittgenstein remarks,

In fact in 'I am in pain' there, simply is not the question, 'how'? As in 'why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet, when I want to get up from a chair'? There is no 'why', I simply do not. This is how I act.³⁸

Thus, when one makes a claim that 'I am in pain' or 'I am feeling restless', they are not making any epistemic claim. By means of these utterances one is just expressing what one feels. The problem lies when we try to put across a wrong question, such as 'how?', 'why?', 'what?' Rather we must look in for purpose and occasion under which it takes place. Thus, there is nothing epistemic about our first person psychological statements.

Another aspect here is that we can easily know other person is in pain. The private linguist argues against this contention and proclaims that one can never know about other

³⁷ *On Certainty*, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe and D. Paul (trans.), Blackwell, Oxford: 1969, p. 125.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148

person's inner states as there is possibility of pretence or shamming by other people. Wittgenstein states 'lying is a language game that needs to be learned like any other one'³⁹. By means of this, he asserts that even pretence or shamming is a skill that needs to be learnt. In order to pretend one must be familiar with the act of which one pretends to be. Thus, it presupposes the familiarity with that particular behavior or act. Further it cannot be the case that all behavior is a case of lying. For instance, a person who is bleeding because of an accident and crying due to severe pain cannot be doubted. To lie about one's pain is, to be in pain and to say that one is not. Thus one cannot be ignorant of pain behavior as such. It shows that pains are communicable and that there is a no epistemic privilege enjoyed by first person claims about one's present sensations.

Conclusion

The Self of *Investigations* comes out as a free bird from chains of classical traditional conception of self. The extensionless Tractarian self is subsumed in the everyday world and is given much broader conception. Wittgenstein releases self from its Cartesian couch. In the first section, he rejects the distinction between mind and body dualism in order to give a more acceptable conception of self. Self here is portrayed as being subsumed in human manifestation in a variety of aspects and various forms of life. It is important to acknowledge that here Wittgenstein makes a sharp critique of behaviorist tendencies in psychology and philosophy. By acknowledging the difference between various emotions and sensations, he makes it explicit that every human feeling cannot be captured completely in terms of physical impressions.

In the second section, we saw how Wittgenstein tries to demystify the nature of the self. He tries to breach the tendency that self enjoys a privilege position, a sacred corner, which cannot be infiltrated by anyone. This is well explicated by his refutation of private language argument in *Investigations*. The argument explicitly rejects that a language can take place in isolation. An individual cannot indulge in language with him/her self. There is a whole form of life, which provides an interface to communicate

³⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 249

one's thoughts and feelings with others and share a form of life. It calls for context, circumstances, criteria and rules to play various language games.

The self is assumed as embedded in human form of life. Our knowledge of certain mental states is not to assert any priority status but a mere expression of the mental. It is our natural expression and there is nothing sacrosanct about it. This is the thesis which is defended and analyzed here. Wittgenstein's project in *Investigations* is to show that there is nothing per se special about our immediate avowals. We must come over the task of asserting epistemic status to one's avowals. We merely represent our mental states and there is no requirement to describe or provide any explanation of it as in case of ascribing mental states of others. This is rightly captured in his 'use theory of meaning'. He intends to debunk the traditional picture of self as projected by Cartesian dualism. The expressivist account is one way of dealing with the cognitivist. It provides us with a better approach in understanding of avowals, albeit, we shall see in the next chapter that it has its own shortcomings.

CHAPTER 3

Wittgensteinian Self: Expressivism and its Interpretation

Introduction

In the previous chapter we have seen how the private language argument exposes the inconsistencies inherent in Cartesian dualism. The private language has created ripples in the philosophical world and thus generated many related arguments in philosophy. One of the upshots is the status of 'self'. Doubt about the workability of private language explored in *Investigations* throws an illuminating insight into the nature of our knowledge about our own intentional states, such as beliefs, desire, intentions etc. This aspect has been deeply explored by Crispin Wright in his reading of Wittgenstein. By noting the dimensions of how we understand our own intentions and the way we acknowledge others give a clear insight of self-knowledge which acts as a key to the notion of self. It helps us to explore and critically analyze the assumption with regard to 'privileged access' of one's own intentions as holding an epistemic priority position in contrast to third-person ascriptions. Thus here we shall explore an expressivist account of self. Wittgenstein argues against Cartesian approach and instead propagates expressivist and non-cognitivist account. We shall also examine Wright's account and his interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of self. He gives us a critical account of minimalist position as a better alternative to bet for.

3.1 Non-Cognitivist and Expressivist account of the Self

Expressivism

Investigations nurtures multiple theories and arguments and upshots. Rethinking on the notion of private language and rejection of private ownership as well as its epistemic status, leads to other issues which revolves around the philosophical enterprise of self-

knowledge. In *Investigations* Wittgenstein asserted that first person psychological utterances are devoid of any privilege access. Thus the inner does not hold any special treatment over and above the outer. The issue with which we are concerned here is that how the first person present psychological statements are to be classified. Are they utterances or assertions? How do we approach such description in the case of the inner? Do they have any cognitive status? We shall venture here to show whether Wittgenstein provides an expressivist account of avowals.

Mental States

In the light of the above discussion, it is essential to understand a marked difference within our mental states. Broadly, we categorized mental states into (a) propositional attitudes and (b) sensations.

a) Propositional attitudes

Propositional attitudes are mental states which have propositions as its content. The paradigm example of a propositional attitude – is the state of belief, wish, desire, hope, and intention is all regarded as propositional attitudes. These mental states are relational in nature and can be expressed in terms of sentences like, “A believes that P” where the ‘that’ clause articulates the content of A’s belief. Propositional attitudes are also intentional states.

b) Sensations

Sensations on the other hand, refer to sensory states of mind, such as bodily pain or pleasure, perceptual sensation like experiences of color, sound, feelings. They do not have a relational structure and are not expressed in terms of ‘that’ clause. These sensations further have phenomenal aspect, a felt content. It explains what-it- is-like for a subject to experience a particular state.

Wittgenstein is mainly concerned with such non-propositional mental states, the paradigm example being that of pain. How could one understand utterances like 'I am in pain'? Whether it falls under the canopy of descriptivist or expressivist account of self?

We have already discussed the preferential treatment of first person psychological utterances (henceforth referred to as avowals) while analyzing private language argument. The traditional picture of authority and epistemic access to one's avowals leads to the assertions that they are known directly to us. Against this picture Wittgenstein argues that there is no special status attributed to avowals of such kind. Thus 'I am in pain' is not a case of description and is not to be evaluated either as true or false. Such a claim purports to a central debate in philosophy. This brings us to the expressivist account of self.

Expressivist account of self rests on the assumption that avowals are not description or reports, rather they are merely expressions. Thus utterances like 'I am in pain', 'I believe this is true', can be classified under the expressivist account. Here, there is no epistemological question concerning how people in a disposition like state can manifest that state in their behavior, nor is there any epistemic accomplishment realized in so manifesting it¹.

In contrast to expressivist there is a cognitive account of the self. It says that self ascriptions are assertions by means of which we report or describe the mental states indicated by their psychological terms, and these statements are subject to truth-evaluability.

Wittgenstein advances an expressivist account of self. This is explicitly clear from his readings of *Investigations*. He states,

¹ Jacobsen, Rockney. 'Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression', *Philosophical quarterly*, vol.46, no.182. jan.1996,p.14

I know what I want, wish, believe, feel (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosopher's nonsense, or at any rate not a judgment a priori²

He asserts in *Investigations* that our self ascriptions merely express our psychological states, and so represent no epistemic accomplishment on our part, they do not count as assertions, description or reports of my mental states....³ Further, Wittgenstein states,

Avowals are conceived of as extension of natural expressive behavior; words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensations and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later sentences. They teach the child new pain behavior⁴.

A similar argument states, that there is a difference between moaning and saying that someone moans. Moaning is a natural expression of pain. It does not describe pain, it is not subject to truth or falsity, and it cannot be learnt. It is a natural primitive kind of pain behavior. But there runs a peculiar difference between 'I have pain' and 'he has pain'. In case of 'I have pain', though it is a natural pain expression is not an epistemic claim, not a description, not subject to truth or falsity, is an acquired kind of pain behavior and is an utterance, it is indeed a criterion for the truth of the assertions that he is in pain. Thus in *Blue Book* he wrote the difference between the proposition 'I have pain' and 'he has pain' is not that of 'L.W. has pain' and 'smith has pain'. Rather it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying that someone moans⁵.

Thus the above passages highlight the central thesis of Wittgenstein's conception of expressivism. He embraces expressivism and contends that an avowal does not

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, para 221

³ Jacobsen, Rockney. 'Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression', *Philosophical quarterly*, vol.46, no.182, jan.1996, p.16.

⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 244.

⁵ *The Blue and Brown Books (BB)*, 1958, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 68.

proclaim any knowledge claim. More prominently, it is not subject to truth or falsity. These two conditions represent Wittgenstein thesis as expressivist and non cognitivist respectively.

3.2 Crispin Wright's Interpretation of Wittgensteinian Expressivism

Crispin Wright's minimalism

Wright's interpretation of self-knowledge is mainly based on Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. The issue of self-knowledge in *Investigations* pertains to the private language arguments, as stated earlier. The notion of self which precipitates from the argument poses a serious challenge to the philosophers. Cartesian mentalist view dominated the philosophical world and was accepted as an evident fact. With the advent of Wittgenstein's systematic attack on Cartesianism, philosophers have tried to re-think the entire landscape with a new approach. Precisely one can say, Cartesian view proposed mental states as constituting an inner realm which enjoys privilege status, which is directly connected to the subject of whom it is a state of. The Cartesian view of self-knowledge has been challenged by many philosophers. There still persist challenging tasks to explain the notion of self-ascription which is essential for understanding self. Cartesian notion of self views self as indubitable, incorrigible, infallible, and are in epistemically privileged position. This framework of self knowledge is what Wittgenstein strongly argued against in *Investigations*. The problem lies in explaining the status of avowals, and how do we account for them in the absence of a Cartesian model. Wright tries to interpret Wittgenstein's deconstruction of Cartesian picture of self and formulate an alternative account of understanding avowals.

Phenomenal and attitudinal avowals

Wright states that the basic philosophical problem of self-knowledge is to explain the phenomenon of avowals. By avowals he refers to the phenomenon of authoritative, non-inferential present tense self-ascription. The problem lies in how to understand the position by means of which one is in privilege position than the other, in claiming about

oneself. Wright distinguishes two kinds of avowals on the basis of three marked characteristics which avowals possess. Avowals are said to be groundless, authoritative and transparent⁶.

Phenomenal avowals are exhibited as 'I am happy', 'I feel depressed', 'I have a toothache' etc. They are groundless, in the sense that it is unreasonable to ask someone claiming that, 'I am unwell', a justification or grounds for claiming it. Secondly, they are strongly authoritative. In the sense, if someone makes such a claim, with sincerity and understanding, then it stands as a guarantee of truth in itself. To doubt such a claim is to question, one's sincerity about that person. Further, once we accept the sincere claim of the person, it stands as a criterion of correctness for the corresponding third-person ascription. Further, phenomenal avowals, Wright asserts, are transparent in the sense that a person making a claim about oneself is immediately aware of it.

Other class of avowals is attitudinal avowals. These are 'content-bearing states', they have a propositional form. These are self -ascription of our intentional states. For instance, 'I believe that it will rain today', 'I hope that my work gets complete on time', 'I am thinking of my mother'. According to Wright, these intentional avowals are usually arrived at through a process of self interpretation. Hence, they lack the three features of phenomenal avowals. We usually arrive at them through inference and self interpretation. He explains it with an example of Jane Austen's Emma, in which Emma suddenly realizes her love for Professor Knightly, by interpreting her reaction of discontent when she learns about Harriet's love for the same person.⁷ The point which Wright wants to make is that, many times our desires, emotions are suppressed in our awareness of them. By a process of interpretation, through our reaction to such instances we are able to reveal the real feeling to ourselves that remained dormant. However, Wright strongly asserts that even attitudinal avowals are said to be known non-inferentially. Wright contends what we call self-interpretative cases cannot be considered as basic cases, they are not restricted to recollected behavior, rather they possess an avowable content which in itself becomes a criterion for such interpretation. Thus, Emma's interpretation of her

⁶ Note: This is how Crispin Wright has put it.

⁷ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 15.

reaction to Harriet's declaration as evidence that she herself loves Knightly, lies in her avowing—something like 'I am disconcerted by her love for that man and, more so, by the thought that it might be returned'- which is a datum for-rather than a product of self interpretation. Thus, Wright regards attitudinal avowals as characterizing non-inferential knowledge, reflecting matters for the particular subject in the particular context requiring no interpretation.⁸ He thus, clarifies attitudinal avowals as both groundlessness and transparent. However, such avowals have weak authority. They are devoid of the feature of immediacy of phenomenal avowals. This is so because there is a possibility of confusion or self-deception, which lies in it. Here Wright suggests presumptive acceptability as a guarantee for such authority. This claim holds that unless there is special evidence to the contrary, present-tense self-ascriptions are to be taken as true. Wright states,

What distinguishes the presumptive acceptability of attitudinal avowals from anything characteristic of testimony generally is that the authority which attaches to them is, in a certain sense, inalienable. Further, no corresponding wholesale suspicion concerning my attitudinal avowals is possible. You may not suppose me sincere and comprehending, yet chronically unreliable, about what I hope, believe, fear and intend. Wholesale suspicion about my attitudinal avowals- where it is not a doubt about sincerity or understanding- jars with conceiving of me as an intentional subject at all⁹.

Presumptive acceptability provides the possibility of having a miss-apprehension of oneself, without claiming that one is systematically wrong in making claims about one's current mental states. In this way, such avowals remain inalienable. Thus, Wright formulates both phenomenal and attitudinal avowals as having all the three characteristics. The problem arises as to co-opt these avowals within the discourse of self- ascriptions. The task remains for Wright to explain, how to distance away from the Cartesian mentalist view, which professes epistemic security of one's mental processes.

⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁹ Ibid.,p. 17

Traditional models of self

The above difficulties regarding self-knowledge and explanation of avowals takes a centre-stage in philosophy of mind. Traditionally there are two accounts pertaining to self. One is the contemporary observational account of self and other is the inferential model. Wright examines the two accounts and shows inherent inconsistencies prevalent in them. We shall see that these models fail to accommodate the basic features of avowals, which Wright upholds. This paves the way for exploring an alternative model of self that would also subsume a rational account of avowals which jells well with the more acceptable version of understanding self.

The observational model of self- knowledge holds that it is through observation that we get to know ourselves, but that these inner observations differ from ordinary perceptual observation, in that nothing mediates, epistemically or metaphysically, between the observational state and the state observed. Inner observations or, sometimes called ‘introspection’ are thus non-inferential and metaphysically direct. On the other hand, inferential model is directed towards outward observation. Inner observation model is generally associated with Descartes. The upshot of Cartesian dualism states that, the knowledge one has of one’s own state of mind is direct and unchallengeable in a way that one’s knowledge of material object or of other minds is not. This position holds that we have a ‘privileged access’ to one’s own state of mind. Descartes himself believed that this knowledge was incorrigible; your thoughts about your own current state of mind could not be false. It is well explicated in terms of the properties of transparency and incorrigibility.

(a) Transparency: if you are in a particular state of mind, you know, you are in that state; and

(b) Incorrigibility: if you believe that you are in a particular state of mind, you are in that state.

The Cartesian observational model, Wright proclaims can be understood by an analogy, wherein “we can imagine somebody looking into a Kaleidoscope and reporting

on what he sees. No one else can look in, of course, atleast while he is taking his turn".¹⁰ Such notion, according to Wright will accommodate all features of phenomenal avowals- authority, groundlessness and transparency. There cannot be any room for mistake as it is necessarily observed by the subject. This Cartesian picture personifies mind as a form of theater, where avowals are non-inferentially known to the utterer. Furthermore, others can only have an indirect and mediate awareness of those mental states.

Wright asserts that though attractive, of observational model is actually hopeless. In fact Wittgenstein was the first philosopher, Wright asserts, who carried out the deconstruction of Cartesian model. Wright's project is to explicate Wittgenstein's deconstructive approach which he carried out in *Investigations*. By means of private language argument Wittgenstein questions the efficacy of 'privacy' and of inner private observation and vehemently rejects it. Cartesian conception of transparency and incorrigibility of one's inner state directly assures the possibility of 'private self'. This goes completely against the grain of common sense conception of the self located in a social set up. Wright interprets Wittgenstein deconstruction of Cartesian view of self by means of a two-way attack. He asserts that, by refuting private language argument Wittgenstein challenges the idea of phenomenal avowal as inner observation report. Secondly, attitudinal avowals are challenged by showing that intentional states are not mental processes.

We must herewith note that Wittgenstein's attack on private language harps on the conception that the private linguist fails to account for its correctness. He thus lacks the sense to distinguish what is right and what seems right. Further the grammatical structure camouflages the logical structure. This gives an illusion that the truth claim of private linguist is a report of his inner contents of mind. We have already discussed this in second chapter. The contention of Wright is that the only option left is to go 'public'.¹¹ To take a position, that the inner stage (which is identified as truth conferring states) are available to public view. This eventually leads to behaviorist stand. This we have already

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 22

¹¹ Ibid., p. 33

denied to be the case. This paves the way for 'expressivism' as an alternative account. Wright explains the expressivist conception of self, and analyses it in the light of Wittgenstein's comments in the *Investigations*.

Wright interprets Wittgenstein as formulating an expressivist account to analyze avowals and their status. Expressivism as we have mentioned earlier, upholds that instead of viewing avowals as assertions projecting truth/falsity, one may hold them as expressions. Expressivism states that the grammatical structure of an avowal like 'I am in pain' is of subject- predicate form, pretending to describe mental states. On the contrary, expressivist account proclaims that our avowals are mere expressions of mental states and are not subject to truth/falsity. The surface grammatical structure between avowals and other forms of self- ascriptions mislead us to conclude that just as third-person ascription are assertion, so should avowals. Following this line of thought, Wright urges that Wittgenstein in *Investigations* exhibits expressivist account of one's psychological states. This is apparent in *Investigations* Para no.244. Here Wittgenstein contends that pain avowals are not statement with truth evaluable content, but are natural forms of expressions. Furthermore, Wright explains that expressivism subsumes all the three characteristics of avowals quite well. Considering that the avowal 'I am in pain' is an expression and not description, it cannot be put to question (groundless), one is a sincerely aware of this pain as a feeling (transparent) and it bears a strong authority.

However, Wright poses some serious constraints in following the expressivist account. Expressivist claim of not adhering to avowals as assertions and thereby rejecting their applicability to truth or falsity needs to be reconciled with the rules of language. It is worthy to take note that serious objections to expressivism comes from Peter Geach, in his article 'Assertion'.¹²

¹² Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 35

1. In expressivist account, we speak of expression as a present tense form i.e. an expression manifests at the same time as when it is expressed. Thus, 'I am in pain' is taken to be an example of expression. How does expressivist account explains the transformation of tense from-'I am in pain' to 'I was in pain' or 'I will be in pain'? In neither of the last two sentences we see the presence of pain. How do we establish the continuity between avowals like, 'I am in pain' and its past and future tense counterparts?

2. How does expressivist account makes room for locutions such as-'he knows that I am in pain', where 'I am in pain' is embedded in a knowledge claim. Here the knowledge ascription is subject to truth or falsity, as it is a case of assertion. With the same token, 'I am in pain' is also accounted as assertions.

3. Furthermore the statement 'I am in pain' which stands in logical relation to-'someone is in pain'. The problem lies, how can a genuine statement be derived from a mere expression?

4. 'I am in pain' is embedded in a perfectly acceptable conditional statement like 'if I am in pain, I should take an asprin', or a negation like 'it is not the case that I am in pain'. In understanding both these statements, we cannot take the avowal 'I am in pain' as a mere expression. For in the conditional statement, where it is an antecedent, 'I am in pain', needs to be taken as a hypothesis that something is the case. While in the negation, it also needs to be as assertion, because a mere expression cannot be denied. The truth or falsity of a conditional statement and negation depends upon the truth-value of its constituent statement.

Wright's response to 'Geach Point'

Wright says that basically Peter Geach criticizes the form of expressivism that is prevalent in ethical discourse. Ethical expressivism holds that there are no real moral states of affairs. In that sense, it rules out the evaluability of moral judgment in terms of truth or falsity. However, Peter Geach strongly objects and asserts that, since every day moral thought are expressed in terms of sentences which co-opt rules of logic, it has to

presuppose truth /falsity. Thus, avowals cannot be taken as simply expressions. Here Wright contends that this problem is a problem of ethical expressivism and need not affect expressivism in philosophy of mind. Also, according to Wright, Wittgenstein is not denying any mental facts; he is not against admitting psychological facts. Neither is he rejecting the presence of assertions in statements like-‘he is in pain’. The primary focus is the expressivist thesis concerning first-person ascriptions.

It is pertinent to acknowledge, that the distinction between ethical expressivism and expressivism in philosophy of mind helps to preserve the security of avowals which Wright upholds as the ‘presumption of truth’. According to Wright the presumptive acceptability of avowals holds the truth of self- ascriptions, unless contrary evidence to it is given. He apprehends here a problem for expressivism to sustain with strict relation to natural expressions and performatives. The ‘Geach point’ threatens expressivism to gel with performatives and natural expressions. This we have noted in the above stated problems, noted by Peter Geach regarding expressivism. Wright however distinguishes between ethical and mental expressivism and tries to answer Geach by posing two questions:

1. Whether an indicative sentence is associated with truth-evaluable content?
2. Whether its characteristic use is actually assertoric? ¹³

Wright states that, “these questions can be understood in terms of performatives in which they usually appear”¹⁴ . It should be noted that, performative utterances although truth -evaluable, are not the case of descriptions. What Geach insisted is the presence of truth-evaluable content in avowals and that they are indispensable. However, Wright is of the opinion that what expressivists are concerned with is, “a typical use of such sentences are expressions rather than assertions”¹⁵.

¹³ Ibid., p. 36

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 36

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 36

We must note that by making room for 'presumptive acceptability of truth', Wright shows the unworkability of radical expressivism and instead suggests a more flexible form of it. He asserts that in certain cases avowals may differ from being natural expressions. What Wright suggests is that it is quite possible, for our psychological states can very well be asserted rather than expressed. Wright says, "There can be no suggestion that one cannot make assertions about one's own psychology". Thus, in non-typical sense one can make assertions about one's mental state.

We must consider here a natural expression of wanting to have a toy, like crying for a toy, and an avowal, or a linguistic expression, "I want a Teddy". Here we can see both the expressions are direct from the subject. What a subject is doing when issuing an avowal is similar to letting out a cry or gasping in fear, in that she is directly giving voice to her conditions, rather than deliberately crafting an assertoric report, that she is in a certain state of mind. But at the same time, avowals are said to differ from natural expressions. For instance, my saying of my thirst, "I am really thirsty" is capable of being truth-apt.¹⁶ At the same time, it might be used as a direct expression and not assertion. This reflects towards a hybrid character of avowals.¹⁷

Wright maintains that it is the grammatical structure which wrongly construes an expression for an assertion. According to the expressivist account the surface grammar shields the logical structure of an ascription, and we tend to assume that a sentence is a description. This is also what Wittgenstein in *Investigations* affirmed. Wright says, "When selves do make strict assertions about their own psychology, any epistemic advantages they enjoy are confined to those of superiority of evidence".¹⁸ Here he refers to presumptive acceptability of truth. Wright asserts that, epistemic privilege position of avowals is an illusion, although our first person avowals enjoy privilege position, it is non-epistemic. This is due to one's being in a direct position to give vent to one's

¹⁶ Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas, 'Avowals and First-Person Privilege', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.LXII, No.2, 2001, p. 327.

¹⁷ See Bar-On and Douglas, 2001, p. 327.

¹⁸ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 37.

expressions. This also maintains the asymmetry between first and third person ascriptions. In this way adding a clause of 'presumptive acceptance of truth' Wright tries to answer Geach's objections.

Wright however poses some serious threat to expressivism. The first objection states that the expressivist account seems to be very restricted to natural, non-linguistic forms of expressions. But this problem, Wright says is not so problematic. The second threat he explains with an example, "Suppose a highly trained secret agent under torture gives no ordinary behavioral sign of pain. However, his tormentors are well equipped to ascertain the amount of torture he is going through"¹⁹. The issue that is raised here is, how does expressivism account for superiority of the first person viewpoint? For in this situation, his tormentors are better placed, in a sense they are at an advantageous position, as they can very much know the torture he is going through.

The third problem Wright states, one can very well conceive of a situation where the content of an avowal is available to oneself without any public expression. One might say to oneself in thoughts like, "my headache has gone" or "what a lazy day", etc. These expressions do contain the three essential characteristics of avowals- authority, transparency and groundlessness. Since there is no outward expression of behavior, one cannot take them to be genuine avowals. This goes against the illocutionary aspect of avowals as explaining present mental states.

Wright proposes his 'default view' against the standard Cartesian model. This he believes is also Wittgenstein's viewpoint and tries to interpret it in terms of problems faced by expressivist account of avowals. The default view is based on the presumptive acceptability of truth. It works on the constitutive principle according to which, the special status enjoyed by avowals is due to conditions which are based on subjects beliefs, hopes and what it intends.²⁰ The argument goes, "according to the default view it is just primitively constitutive of the acceptability of psychological claims that show in

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 37

²⁰ Ibid., p. 12

cases whose justification would involve active self-interpretation, a subject's opinion about herself are default-authoritative and default-limitative: unless you can show how to make better sense of her by overriding or going beyond it, her active self-conception, as manifest in what she is willing to avow must be deferred to"²¹

Thus, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, one must accept what a subject avows. It is to be noted that it, in a way, denies epistemic status to our avowals. However, according to the default view, the first/third person asymmetries belong to the grammar of the language game of ordinary psychology. This assumption gels quite well with Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. Wittgenstein clearly upheld that philosophical problems arise due to faulty surface grammatical structure.

Another aspect of default view is that it allows for the truth aptness of avowals. Wright says, "The truth condition of psychological ascriptions is primitively conditioned by this constraint"²². The constraint here is of 'default acceptance of truth'.

An assessment of Wright's interpretation

Wright attributed to Wittgenstein a negative (deconstruction) and a positive (construction) contribution with regard to the notion of self and self-knowledge. Wittgenstein carries his negative task by deconstructing Cartesian model of self-knowledge. The positive task, Wright argues, is the propagation of an expressivist account of self-knowledge.²³ Wittgenstein carries this task by projecting anti-explanatory stance in philosophy. This can be clearly captured from his remarks in *Investigations*.

We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say, its purpose, from the

²¹ Ibid., p. 41

²² Ibid., p. 41

²³ Ibid., p. 38

philosophical problems.... (philosophical problems) are solved rather by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such away as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of our urge to misunderstand them....philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.²⁴

Analyzing the above stanza in light of an expressivist account of self, it shows that the problem is manifested in our demand for explanation. Wright states,

We are asking: what is the explanation of the characteristic marks of avowals? And we easily accept a refinement of the question along the lines: what is it about the subject matter of avowals, and about their author's relation to it, which explains the possession by these utterances of their characteristic effortless, non-inferential authority?²⁵

This Wright claims, is indeed a wrong road. We are misled by our craving for explanation. He asserts that Wittgenstein's deconstruction encompasses this very tool through which he bears critique of traditional theories, that is, the tool of anti-explanation. We must acknowledge that this is an important aspect of *Investigations*. Wittgenstein asserts that we must do away with all explanations. He attacks the very idea of forming an explanation or solving a philosophical problem. Explanations in philosophy merely try to show, something which is observable, apparent, by identifying it with something 'deeper'.²⁶ This is clearly foreshadowed in *Investigations*,

Language is something unique- this proves to be a superstition, itself produced by grammatical illusion" Further, "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the form of our

²⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, para 109

²⁵ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 39

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39

language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.²⁷

From the above quoted remarks, it is clear that our search for explanation is a mere illusion. What we should look for, is the purpose or use of a word or a sentence and not some underlying deeper relation. This is in accordance with Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning. Also, an essential factor which we can extract from the anti-explanatory stance is Wittgenstein's anti-essentialist view both at the level of language and at the level of self. To look for an explanation is to look for some deeper relation or essence. Wittgenstein indeed argues against this view and gives an anti-essentialist account in *Investigations*. What Wright asserts here is that Wittgenstein denies explanation and put forth the conception of the 'autonomy of grammar'.

It is futile to crave for explanation with respect to the notion of avowals and their relationship with the subject. Wright claims, "The first-third person asymmetries that pose our question belong primitively to the grammar of the language – game of ordinary psychology"²⁸. Wright argues, what expressivists are concerned with is the truth evaluability of avowals, but this is not Wittgenstein proposes in *Investigations*. Wittgenstein vehemently argues against the dogmatic conception of language which is the core of his earlier work- *Tractatus*. He contends, "That our statements always serve 'the same purpose' to convey thoughts, which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please".²⁹

According to this dogmatic picture the only purpose of sentence is to make an assertion expressed in a form of proposition, to state its truth/falsity and laid over against reality as a picture of it. Accordingly, Wittgenstein urges us to set free from such

²⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969. Para 110-111

²⁸ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.39

²⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 304

conceptions and thus questions pertaining to a set picture of avowals to state truth/falsity and thus asymmetries regarding it.

Thus, Wright proposes a 'default view' to Wittgenstein's analysis of expressivist account of self. However, Wright himself claims that 'default view' has its own difficulties. He states it as a 'philosophical turning of the back'.³⁰ John McDowell in his response to Wright poses some serious objections pertaining to his default view. With respect to the anti-explanatory stance, which Wright attributes to Wittgenstein, McDowell argues that a demand for explanation is a natural way to inquire about a phenomenon. Otherwise we won't be able to know what problem we need to deal with. He also objects that although Wright propagates the default view in which the demand for explanation is inappropriate, it fails to provide with any response to certain important questions regarding avowals, such as, 'why exactly should we find it puzzling that avowals differ from reports about others in the ways they do?'.³¹

Conclusion

Thus we see here how default view lacks, in sense of explanation, a clear picture of the status of avowals. Such minimalist theory although serves to account for the avowals as epistemically better placed, they fail to provide them with any truth value. Does it amount to saying that we cannot give any truth value to avowals? We must note here that amongst the contemporary readings of avowals, we see a shift towards a more explanatory and truth assertability of avowals. Neo-expressivism is genuinely engaged towards this new outlook towards avowals. Dorit Bar-on and Douglas C. Long are primarily concerned with such ambitious approach. According to them, avowals can be assigned truth value and enjoy privileged status. One might explore this area with a new approach. However, contribution of minimalist accounts of self cannot be undermined.

³⁰ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.41

³¹ McDowell, John, 'Response to Crispin Wright', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.41

As far as our present text is concerned, we indeed see here a great resemblance of such expressivist proposal with Wittgenstein's reading.

Conclusion

In this present work, we sought to give an account of self as projected in both *Tractatus* and *Investigations*. I must confess that it is injustice to ascribe to Wittgenstein as upholding a philosophical theory. This is in consonance with the very fact that he was against any sort of theorization which the traditional philosophers were usually engaged in. This is not to comply with the opposite view that he was not critical. Rather, he was against a dogmatic practice of labeling and propagating theories. To label is not to argue for anything and judgments are nothing more than a dogmatic exercise. Wittgenstein appreciated the task of clarification and removal of illusions from our thinking. Hence the task of philosophy is to clear away the conceptual confusions. My submission is that his clarificatory mechanism runs through both the works and in the light of this we must explore his intentions.

By investigating the notion of self in both the works, we notice a major shift. In the first chapter we sought to investigate self in a strict logical structure. The Tractarian self emerged as a metaphysical self. He deployed self at the limit of the world and reduced it to the extensionless point. By means of the metaphysical self he tried to impose limit on language. This metaphysical self emerged as explaining the logical structure of the world without actually being in the world.

In the second chapter we saw a major shift in the position of self. Here self is subsumed in the world and is reflected in terms of language without any strict logical scaffolding. The nature of self emerged here as a self in use. I showed that, according to Wittgenstein, there is no personal or private experience which only the bearer could understand. Here we have argued against the sacrosanct picture of self. We saw how Wittgenstein exploded the notion of private language. We must acknowledge here that the self of solipsist is vehemently attacked in both the works. Thus, there is a sharp attack on Cartesian self. Wittgenstein tried to demystify the nature of self and breakthrough from the tendency, that self enjoys a privileged position, a sacred

corner, which cannot be infiltrated by anyone. This is well explicated by his refutation of private language argument in *Investigations*. The argument explicitly rejects that a language can take place in isolation. An individual cannot indulge in language with him/herself. There is a whole form of life, which provides an interface to communicate one's thoughts and feelings with others and share a form of life. It calls for context, circumstances, criteria and rules to play various language games. The 'pain argument' in *Investigations* fairly explains this aspect. Our pains are not private and we do understand other persons pain sensations. We live in a shared form of life and so we share each other's language, culture and traditions.

In the third chapter, we argued that avowals are not descriptions of our mental states rather they are expressions. We also learnt that according to Wittgenstein, our first person present tense utterances cannot be subject to doubt and hence, it is absurd to question their validity. At the same time, they do not have any privilege epistemic status as they are non- cognitive accounts of self. We also saw that such utterances are not descriptions but mere expressions, just like 'cry' or 'moan'. Hence the epistemic status of one's inner sensations, emotions is completely given up in terms of everyday account of self. In this way we tried to overcome the problem of self as a means to describing one's inner emotions and sensations.

Thus, we saw how expressivist account of self emerges in *Investigations*. The self here is embedded in a form of life and a variety of uses of language, which is in turn reflected by criteria and circumstances. Thus, I feel it is more of a situated self. In following this line of thought we can say that there are different perspectives and that there is no one notion of self. Self is viewed here with a lens of a variety of language-games in various forms of life.

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The Nature of Self in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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2011

With Love and Gratitude
Dedicated to my Parents



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CERTIFICATE

It is certified that the dissertation entitled '**The Nature of Self in Wittgenstein's Philosophy**' submitted by **Shruti Sharma** is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. This is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for any other degree or diploma of any other University. We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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
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DECLARATION

I, Shruti Sharma, hereby declare that the dissertation entitled, '**THE NATURE OF SELF IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY**', submitted by me for the partial fulfillment of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work and has not been submitted by me or by anyone else for any other degree or diploma of this or any other university.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Shruti Sharma', with several horizontal lines drawn over it.

Shruti Sharma

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Introduction

The present work is an inquiry into the nature of self of Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations*¹. I proposed to show that Wittgenstein argued against privilege conception of self as articulated by dualist and essentialists. Though the approach in the two works are different but the intention to jettison such as essentialist position can be clearly captured from both the works. We shall also analyze a methodological shift from *Tractatus* to *Investigations*. The strict logical structure of *Tractatus* is dispelled in *Investigations* for a more flexible account of language. The concept of meaning as reference is objected into *Investigations*. Meaning as ‘use’ is accepted as the motto. According to Hacker, “The author of the *Tractatus* labored to reveal that the structure of the world cannot be said but only shown. The author of the *Investigations* bent his effort to reveal how what seemed to show itself was an optical illusion.”² We shall see here a major methodological shift in Wittgenstein’s earlier notion of analysis to the later one. There is a complete overturn of notions which were central to his earlier conception. From purely a priori method of the *Tractatus*, he goes on to recommend the a posteriori method of investigating the actual phenomena of language. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein focuses on the cognitive use of language, in *Investigations* he stresses on the expressive aspect such as, gestures, reporting, play acting, guessing, making a joke, and greeting. This appears to be a shift towards a more pragmatic conception of language. We shall examine into these areas which are essential in formulating Wittgenstein’s conception of self in the two works.

In the *Tractatus*, we shall see how the subject is placed in the strict ontology represented by a three-tier structure of language and the world. Can a self be a part of such a priori structure of language and reality? How Wittgenstein deals with the conception of Cartesian self? These are the issues with which we shall engage, while studying the first work.

In *Investigations*, Wittgenstein argues extensively against an epistemic account of self and the special status of the self an inner entity. We shall enquire how he refutes the

¹ Henceforth *Tractatus*
Henceforth *Investigations*

² Hacker, P.M.S., *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, 1972 , Oxford: Clarendon Press; 2nd revised edition, 1986.p.128

idea of private language and thereby solipsist account of self. In *Investigations*, he proposes an expressivist account of self. Here we see a positive development of his philosophy. The traditional account of self imposes that the first person present tense ascription described one's mental state. In this sense, they imposes a privileged right of the bearer of those states towards their own mental life and thus created a gap between the first person and the third person perspective. Wittgenstein argues against this traditional account on the grounds that self-ascriptions are not descriptions but rather expressions and mental states captured in self-ascriptions are not private to the owner.

The concept of self is a very intriguing and fascinating concept in philosophy. There is no one conception of self. In fact, self is referred to in various different terminologies in philosophy. 'Self', 'inner', 'soul', 'subject', 'mind' are used interchangeably with respect to the very concept of self. Thus, this also indicates that there is no one understanding on the nature of self. This indicates further why the problem of self has baffled many philosophers since beginning of philosophy. The more we discuss about it, the more it gives birth to various intricate issues and unfathomable complexities. Due to this, the issue of self has become more of a mystery, 'a kind of unknowable journey'.

It is essential to enquire what makes the self a problematic issue in philosophy. Self is the most important and intimate feature in our lives. Thus everybody is curious to know what lies in one's own inner self or in somebody else's, what exactly is the self and where is it located? Is it located inside the individual, if so, where exactly can it be located? Another problem is that it is difficult to describe or define self accurately. A very common sense answer to it is that we cannot perceive it. We can only try to capture it through our conscious experience, our expression, through our actions, through our relation with others... and the list may be endless! If we articulate self in terms of one's personal experience which can only be known by the person whose experiences they are, then we land up with the problem of solipsism. Some thinkers denote self as a substance and believed that self is immortal. Such sort of dualism was largely upheld by the Greeks. However, in modern times René Descartes gave a systematic articulation of the dualist theory of self. There are other thinkers, who completely denied any status to the self. Hume reserves the opinion that self is illusory and according to Kant it belongs to the realm of the transcendental. A very brief look at how self has been understood by traditional thinkers, in what form it was adopted by modern thinkers can provide us with a starting point in understanding Wittgenstein's notion of the self.

The Greeks described self in terms of psyche. They used psyche is a much wider sense as the power of a living thing to grow and move and have an effect upon its surrounding, as well as to 'will something' to happen and the other aspect of what we would call 'mental states'. Thus for example both Plato and Aristotle thought that plant has psyche, and the very first philosopher and scientist, Thales of Miletus (6th Century BCE), described magnets as having psyche because of their power to move other things and declared that 'all things are full of Gods' implying that psyche is universal.

It is essential to note here, that the ancient philosophers looked at mental state without trying to relate them to a separate, immaterial substance called 'minds'. The notion of psyche was much broader; it was the power of a being to grow and change, in other words, you do not have a separate, invisible thing, called a mind in order to do these things; psyche was simply the word used to describe those aspects of a living thing. Thus, Plato had a dualism of immaterial substance (psyche) and physical body. He also believed that the psyche is immortal; reason being, that it has power to move and change things, so cannot be itself moved by the physical body.

Aristotle, on the other hand, thought that all living things had souls and that the psyche was a 'principle of life'- that which distinguishes the living from the inanimate. He rejected Plato's idea of the psyche as an immaterial substance and instead sees the psyche in the form that organizes the material body into what it essentially is. One must note here that this makes the psyche distinct from the material body, but not separate from it. They are locked together, the former giving its shape and characteristics of the latter. The soul is the actuality of the body as an organized thing. Thus we may say here that, for Aristotle, the self is the essence or form of a human being, an essence that is distinct from, but also inseparable from the material body.

Later Greek thought reverted more towards materialist conception of self. Epicurus (341-271 BCE) objected to the Platonic notion of an immortal and immaterial substance on the grounds that such a psyche could neither act nor be acted on, since it would have no direct link with the physical and immutable. Stoics considered the soul to be like breath, animating the body, giving it ability to move about and relate to the world. Against the Stoics, Plotinus (205-270 BCE) and other Neo-Platonist continued the tradition of separating the soul from the body.

With the advent of medieval period, the desire to make clear the distinction between mind and bodies arose. René Descartes bifurcated mind and body into two substances. He was basically in search of indubitable true knowledge. He argued that he could doubt the existence of bodies, but that he could not himself be a body. He captured

such truth in, 'I think, therefore I am'. Here 'I' necessarily refers to a being that experiences, thinks, desire, wills and so on.³

Locke was the first important philosopher who felt odd about the view that self or mind is a substance. He objected to calling it (mind) a substance, because of its mysterious characteristics, and about substance he says it is something that 'I know not what'. David Hume, followed Locke and said, in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, that when he looked inside himself, he could find many perceptions, but no self linking them together. Thus, Hume regarded mind as a bundle of perceptions. Immanuel Kant held that the nature of self as it is in itself is actually unknowable and that one only has knowledge of oneself as one appears to oneself⁴. We must note here that Kant did not cater to explain self as such. Although, he was of the opinion that a concept was needed, but regarding what actually exists, he stated it as unknowable.

Through the assessment of above accounts of self we can perhaps get an idea how divergent and complex the notion of self is. Broadly speaking, some thinkers follow a substantive notion of self and others reject it. Speaking of self in terms of substance leads to an introspective account of self, in which self is given to us in some form of inner observation, as we find in Descartes.

However, the theory of self with which we are concerned in the present inquiry is opposed to the way self has been understood traditionally. But the sort of idea of self that we intend to explore here is closely connected, as we will discuss later, with the concept of the 'person'.

The best way to understand self is through our understanding of self- knowledge. The philosophical problem which runs through the idea of self-knowledge is the problem of privileged access. Privileged access means "the special way that we each have of knowing our own thoughts, intentions and sensations. This implies the subject has access to (and knows) his own thoughts (has self- knowledge) in such a way that the third person (others) do not"⁵. Thus there is a presumption that there is a basic asymmetry between first person and third-person perspectives. A person can make reliable psychological ascription to himself immediately without needing to observe what he says and does. And this capacity lies in the nature of the first person position itself. It is not a kind of access he may have to the mind of another person. This has its lineage to the Cartesian view of mind. According to this view, mental states constitute an inner realm that is directly available to

³ Sorabji, Richard. *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death*, the university of Chicago press, U.S.A., 2006, p.17

⁴ See, Cassam, Quassim. *Self-Knowledge*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 2

⁵ Donald, Davidson. *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, Clarendon press, Oxford, 2002.

the subject whose mental states they are. The issue which have troubled philosophers, including Wittgenstein, is that how could there be such a thing with such capacity of epistemic completeness and infallibility? In what sense is this knowledge supposed to be essentially or exclusively first-personal?

My dissertation excluding introduction and conclusion consists of three chapters. In the first chapter I intend to explore the place of self in *Tractatus* and a shift in conception of language from *Tractatus* to *Investigations*. *Tractatus* is a work of a priori structure of language in which language represents the world. To extract from such a closed structure the nature of self, is indeed a challenging task. The issue around which our discussion would revolve is the status of self placed against the logical structure of language and the world. In *Investigations*, we shall see a major shift in the understanding of the structure of language. The logical scaffolding in *Tractatus* is given up for ‘language in use’. With this shift in language, we shall see how the nature of self is adopted in this reformed idea of language.

The second chapter is on *Investigations*. Here I intend to show how Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist. It is a charge that is usually imposed on him, for he argues against the privileged epistemic status of one’s mental states. Further I shall thoroughly examine Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Here I intend to put forth his deconstruction of solipsist account of self. Is the mental, a private arena which none other than the bearer can enter into? Are our sensations private? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in this context.

The third chapter is a positive construction of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. After his deconstruction of the traditional picture of self, we can see here a positive picture of self that emerges from it. Here Crispin Wright proposes an expressivist account of self. We shall examine and see how his reading of *Investigations* coheres with an expressivist account of self.

CHAPTER 1

The Journey: Understanding the Self

Introduction

In this chapter, I intend to discuss the nature of self in *Tractatus*. We shall see how language, thought and reality reflect one another in strict conditions of logically perfect order which Wittgenstein intends to show. Further, this would also show us how he accommodates values in this logical framework and more specifically, how he accommodates the notion of self in this work. In the second book, that is, *Investigations*, he comes up with a much wider and pragmatic approach to language and its application to comprehend our world. In order to uncover the 'self' here, we must undertake the task of understanding the world of language and the world of discourse. For the kind of notion of language adopted in *Investigations* is not chained in a logical scaffolding. Here language is not divorced from its discourse; rather it is constituted by it. Language here is not a static phenomenon, rather it is captured as a lived phenomenon that grows and mutates. Language and world are not separate but rather fused into each other.

1.1 Self in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

'Self' or 'the inner' or 'I' is one of the most contentious concepts in philosophy. As we venture and try to understand the self in *Tractatus*, we shall see that the whole treatment of the text is bounded by strict logical structures. As far as my reading goes, 'self' is the most special part of the entire text. The whole project of logical-linguistic workability and exposing misrepresentation of ordinary language ultimately demands an ethical treatment wherein self becomes an indispensable component. Values in *Tractatus* are necessary and absolute, in the sense that they are not subject to truth/falsity. Hence, values cannot be expressed in propositions of logic. In this sense, they do not belong to

the sphere of logic. However, they stand outside the domain of logic and indirectly limit it. Tracking the self in *Tractatus* is to indulge in the whole enterprise of understanding the ontology with which Wittgenstein begins. This is an important point at this juncture. We must understand that the kind of project which Wittgenstein undertook in *Tractatus* is based on the foundations of his ontology. The ontology which he projected is the trilogy of language, world and logic. One can only capture the self and how it is placed in the structure of the *Tractatus* once we try and understand the structure of language and the world. Perhaps, self is the logical precondition which is demanded by the ontology of *Tractatus*.

The Nature of Language

It is pertinent to acknowledge that Wittgenstein wrote *Tractatus* with the very clear intention of exposing the misconceptions regarding our use of ordinary language, whose use in turn, leads to germination of the so called philosophical problems. He didn't want to create another perfect logical language. Rather his task was to show how our present language, which is as perfect as any language, is camouflaged by the surface structure and thus fails to show the deep structure below it.

Wittgenstein's conception of language can be grasped when it is placed in a historical perspective of the twentieth century analytic philosophy. The immediate problem which hooked the philosophers was regarding the logic of our language. At the turn of twentieth century G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell articulated their alternative to idealism; they used linguistic analysis, frequently basing their arguments on the meanings of terms and propositions. Russell strongly believed that the grammar of natural language often is philosophically misleading, and the way to dispel the illusion is to express propositions in the ideal formal language or symbolic language, thereby revealing their true logical form. Their emphasis on linguistic analysis led to a turn towards language as the subject matter of philosophy. Thus, there was a methodological shift towards linguistic analysis as a means of solving or dissolving philosophical problems. On the traditional view analytic philosophy was born in this linguistic turn. It was a revolt

against British idealism as well as traditional philosophy on the whole. Wittgenstein entered the scenario around 1911 with Russell. This was approximately the second phase of analytic philosophy -- an age of logical atomism and ideal language analysis.

Wittgenstein was greatly influenced by the writings of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. These thinkers were obsessive about the problems of philosophy and how it could be solved by logical analysis. According to Russell, it is the philosopher's job to discover a logically ideal language – a language that would exhibit the true nature of the world in such a way that we will not be misled by the surface structure of natural language. Russell was of the opinion that the structure of ordinary language is highly superficial. The surface structure of our language cast shadow and does not reveal its true nature. It is only through analysis that we get the true logical structure. The contention that there is a gap between the ordinary grammar of language and its logical form is implicit in the *Tractatus*. So he writes,

Language disguises thought so much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes¹

He also mentions,

Ordinary language does not show its logical structure, and it is not humanly possible to gather immediately from everyday language what its underlying logic is. Despite our ability to speak correctly, we may be blind to the logical structure of our language and the outward aspect of ordinary language makes every kind of illusion and confusion possible².

Additionally we must acknowledge that Wittgenstein did not set to project a perfect logical language. Rather his aim was clearly to demystify the haze that surrounds

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge&Kegan Paul, London,1961, prop.4002

² Ibid., Prop.40015

our language and thus give rise to unwarranted philosophical problems. This is apparently stated in *Tractatus*,

Man possess the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having an idea how each word has meaning or what's its meaning is- just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.³

All our propositions of everyday language are in perfect logical order just as they are.⁴

The above lines clearly speak out that the everyday language is not barred from having sense. It is indeed in a perfect logical order. Wittgenstein thus emphasized on the adequacy of ordinary language. His aim was to specify the condition which must be fulfilled by any language, for any language is and must be logically perfect. It was not that he was trying to supplement something essential which is perhaps obsolete in ordinary language. Rather his intention was simply to make explicit that which remains implicit and hidden behind the grammatical structure of our language. It should be noted that according to Wittgenstein, the logical structure of language is distinct from its grammatical structure and is usually hidden in our ordinary use of language. The task of analysis is to reveal the logical order of our everyday language itself.

It is essential here to acknowledge this difference between what Russell supposed and what Wittgenstein intended. Russell in his introduction to *Tractatus* stated that, "Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for accurate symbolism, that is, for symbolism in which a sentence means something quite definite. In practice language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise"⁵. However, Wittgenstein was quite clear that our ordinary language is indeed in perfect order. The

³ Ibid., Prop.4002

⁴ Ibid., Prop.5.5563

⁵ Ibid. Prop. .9

Surface structure of our language shadows the logical structure beneath it. Due to this the actual sense is not revealed and this accentuates philosophical problems. This is well taken in *Tractatus*.

.... most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language⁶.

Following this line of thought, Wittgenstein argued extensively that every meaningful sentence must have precise logical structure and must be capable of being true or false. This bipolarity is an essential factor of his atomism which he borrowed from Russell. Every meaningful sentence must be true or false in correspondence to atomic sentence. Further, every atomic sentence is a logical picture of possible states of affairs and must share the same formal structure with the state of affairs. This is well explicated in Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. This theory assures a definite remedy to cast off the grammatical layer of language which blurs one's vision and to show the actual logical structure hidden behind it. The logical structure gives a definite sense to the meaning of a word. It removes the misrepresentation of facts and makes the logical form of language come alive. Thus, he proposes that all philosophical problems arise due to faulty understanding of the logic of our language. In order to appreciate what he attempts to show, we must understand his theory of language and picture theory of meaning.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's apprehension regarding Russell's theory of names, provide him with an incentive to analyze a problematic area of philosophy, namely, how a proposition gets sense viz-a-viz the relation between subject and predicate. Wittgenstein's contention was that the sense of the proposition is embedded in it. A proposition shows its sense. The distinction between saying and showing will be discussed in detail in the following section. If we use a proposition we must know its possible occurrences. He was convinced that there must be a priori conditions of language. Once the logic of our language is understood the grammatical haze vanishes. One can gauge his direction towards a priori understanding of the language and how significant the place of logic is in his analysis from his notebook-

⁶ Ibid., prop 4.003

It must in a certain sense impossible for us to go wrong in logic. This is already partly expressed by saying, 'logic must take care of itself'. This is an extremely profound and important insight.⁷

Ontology of *Tractatus*

Wittgenstein explains that propositions we use daily have sense just as they are. When a person asserts something, he is aware of its sense, but other person may not understand and the explanation goes wrong.⁸ It is quite possible that the two involved in the process, might not get what the other person is trying to put across. This process of analysis may go on indefinitely, but if it is true that we can make statements about the world, then the process must sometimes come to an end⁹. The end product must be in direct contact with the world. What Wittgenstein is trying to put forth is, that there must be some elementary, a priori propositions which are basic, such that its truth or falsity is not determined by the propositions, but by the world. This he called an elementary proposition. These elementary propositions are logical pictures of atomic facts. Further, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. All ordinary propositions are complex, they can be analyzed into simple, to the most basic propositions of which no further analysis is possible.

These elementary propositions further consist of names. Names are primitive signs¹⁰. It refers to something simple, and cannot disappear on further analysis. Thus, ordinary names such as Dog, Circle, Socrates, are not names, as they can be further analyzed. By being the constituent of elementary propositions names cannot be complex, for then the names could themselves be subject to further analysis and hence elementary propositions would not remain basic or elementary any longer. Further, a name signifies only what is an element of reality and cannot be destroyed. It remains constant.

⁷ Ibid., Prop. 5. 473

⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1961.

⁹ Ibid., p. 46

¹⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, Prop. 3.26

This logical name is not an empty string but it has the job of referring. Thus, that to which a name refers is called an object. It is essential to note that 'object' was a logical necessity for Wittgenstein. For if 'objects' are not there, then elementary propositions would consist of terms without reference and would be senseless.. Wittgenstein borrowed this concept of reference from Frege, though, unlike Frege, he thinks that the sense of a proposition depends upon its constituents (that is names having reference). It is essential to note here that according to Wittgenstein, for a proposition to acquire sense two essential conditions have to be fulfilled. The first is the condition of bipolarity, that is, truth or falsity, which he borrowed from Russell and the other, is the conception of reference that he acquired from Frege. Wittgenstein thus altered the Fregean notion because in Frege, the sense of a proposition is not linked in the same way with truth and falsity as it is in Wittgenstein's theory. For Frege, the sense of a proposition is independent of the reference of its component parts. Thus, a proposition can be meaningful even if it contains proper names that are 'empty', that is, if it contains names that lack a referent in reality¹¹. But for Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition is closely linked with the condition of bipolarity and its reference in the possible states of affairs. For Wittgenstein the sense of a sentence is already embedded in it. Thus, he states,

If [a proposition] has no sense [sinn], that can only be because we have failed to give a meaning [Bedeutung] to some of its constituents¹²

Every proposition must already have a sense; it cannot be given sense by affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed. ¹³

His ontology moves further on the ladder with atomic facts. The configuration of objects is atomic fact¹⁴. These atomic facts are the combination of objects. In atomic fact

¹¹ Aalto, Maija. *Sense and Substance in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, (2003), pp 9-11.

¹² Ibid., Prop. 5.4733

¹³ Ibid., Prop. 4.064

¹⁴ Ibid., Prop. 00272

objects fit into one another like the link of a chain.¹⁵ Further, elementary propositions are the linguistic counterpart of the atomic facts. The elementary propositions assert the existence of an atomic fact¹⁶.

Let us try to make sense of this framework and figure out how different elements in this structure are linked together. To conjoin these fragmented pieces and get the picture aright, we must recapitulate some basic hypothesis on which this ontology operates. Firstly, Wittgenstein sets his strategy to give a priori conditions for any language to work. Secondly, he was concerned about how we can a priori assert the sense of a proposition without resorting to its empirical standing.

Thus by purely a priori considerations Wittgenstein carves out his ontology in which he logically determines the structure of any logically perfect language. In this layout, he puts forth the contention that – the world is all that is the case¹⁷. The world is divided into facts¹⁸. Thus, the totality of facts makes up the world. Facts are fundamental to objects and comprises of all the possibilities of the object in the logical space. Facts are existent states of affairs. A state of affair is a possible combination of objects, which themselves are simples. This is the way world is structured. Each of these objects and atomic facts have their linguistic counterpart; names and elementary proposition. Additionally, elementary propositions assert the existence of atomic facts.¹⁹ This atomic fact in turn shows the configuration of objects, how they are combined. Elementary propositions assert the truth/falsity of atomic facts. This leads towards Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. How does this picture theory work and how it complements the a priori project of Wittgenstein?

¹⁵ Ibid., prop.2.03

¹⁶ Ibid., prop. 421

¹⁷ Ibid., prop.1

¹⁸ Ibid., prop.1.2

¹⁹ Ibid., prop.4.110

Picture Theory of Meaning

Wittgenstein was looking for a priori conditions for language to work. And so he gave his theory of representation or picture theory. In providing this theory of meaning he was inspired by a model of a motor car accident placed in a law court in Paris²⁰. With the help of a two dimensional picture one can represent how the real situation was placed. Thus, it acts as a picture of reality. By means of pictorial representation one can know whether an elementary proposition is true/false. One can logically portray the proposition and can determine its actual standing in the state of affairs. Thus, a proposition only says something in so far as it is a picture.²¹

A bird's eye view of the ontological structure reveals two distinct realms. These are language and the world. Both the language and the world are connected with one another in an isomorphic relation. Thus, there is one-to-one correspondence between the two realms. This is explained by means of pictorial relation that they share. "Language pictures the world".²² The isomorphic structure of language and reality is connected with logical form. Elementary proposition is the logical picture of reality. What makes its logical form logical is that the elements are related to one another in a determinate way.²³ The logical structure of the picture and the situation pictured has to be identical. This identity gives the pictorial representation its reality. Thus, in elementary propositions, names are arranged in a determinate way, it has an exact logical structure which corresponds to the way objects are arranged in atomic facts. This is how elementary propositions show their sense. It reaches right out to the world,²⁴. By just looking at the logical structure one can tell the actual state of affairs.

Further, for language to picture facts, names must be correlated with the constituent's of the world. Only then a name can have meaning. The constituent must be

²⁰Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1961,p7

²¹ Ibid., p 8

²² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. &B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,1961, prop. 2.12

²³ Ibid., prop.2.14

²⁴ Ibid., prop.2.1511

simple. The task of language is to picture facts. For this it must share same logical structure with the world. Thus, we have names which have meaning only in a proposition. And similarly, we have objects which make up the facts. The combination of names in a proposition shows a possible combination of objects in a state of affairs. All possible combinations of objects fix the limit to all possible worlds. Here, the totality of elementary proposition describes all possible worlds. If the fact matches with elementary propositions then it is true otherwise it is false.

The picture theory of meaning gives a reductive explanation to figure out how language pictures the world. By means of this picturing it also sets a logical string which corresponds to the identical structure of the world. By means of truth functional analysis, language sets limit to the world. It is an essential feature which is demanded by the picture theory.

A proposition is a truth function of elementary proposition²⁵.

A proposition is an expression of agreement or disagreement with truth possibilities of elementary proposition.²⁶

If a set of elementary proposition constitutes the complete analysis of a proposition, the truth value of that proposition must be completely determined by the truth value of those elementary propositions. If a complex proposition P.Q is completely analyzed in terms of elementary propositions; p and q, and they are connected by the truth functional connective 'and', then the truth value of P.Q is completely determined by those of p and q in the following way:

P.Q /P

T.T/T

T.F/F

F.T/F

F.F/F

²⁵ Ibid., prop 5

²⁶ Ibid., prop 4.4

By means of truth table, we can know the conditions under which a proposition is true/false. In this way its sense is also determined. Wittgenstein states, for any proposition, given its complete analysis in terms of elementary proposition, there is a mechanical method to test whether a proposition has sense or not.²⁷ By means of truth analysis language also sets limit to the world. It captures what can be represented and what not. It circumscribes the mobility of the state of affairs. The point which is essential here is that the whole of *Tractatus* is placed on the backdrop of the isomorphic structure of language and the world. Within this structure, an a priori set is made against which we try to understand the state of affairs. Everything is logically determined in this set up and nothing escapes from the vicinity of logic. This is an integral part of the *Tractatus*. We must emphasize and explore more closely this aspect. This is well taken in his theory of inexpressible and unsayable. This would also provide us insight into the Tractarian limit of the expression of thought. Furthermore it helps in expounding how ‘self’ is placed or camouflaged within this Tractarian limit.

Saying and Showing

It is important to note that in the author’s preface to *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein wrote, “the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence”. It appears that the whole exercise of Wittgenstein’s theory of language was to put clearly what can and cannot be said in language. The trouble arises when one tries to forego this important distinction and tries to express something inexpressible. This is precisely the reason that we fail to take note of the logical structure which hides behind the grammatical structure. Let us in this context, look at the following proposition.

World is all that is the case.²⁸

This proposition has strong implication for Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein appears to convey that whatever we try to express beyond the periphery of

²⁷Ibid., prop 4.31

²⁸ Ibid., prop 1

the world is not the case, or rather it cannot be expressed by means of language. By excluding an important class of propositions which cannot be expressed in language, he thereby sets limit to the world. These are important and controversial views in his philosophy and require further explanation. In *Tractatus* the task of language is to describe the world. This task he shoulders on to the propositions of natural sciences.

The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural sciences²⁹.

What can be said is identified as propositions of natural sciences.³⁰

The propositions of logic, mathematics, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics tries to express what cannot be expressed by means of language. They are limiting cases of our thoughts, as they cannot be conceived in our expression. This is so because they do not describe anything. These propositions lack sense because they attempt to transcend language. However, they have an important role to play in *Tractarian* philosophy.

A serious reading to *Tractatus* focuses essentially on what can be said. The whole exercise of explicating the world, facts in terms of propositions, bi-polarity of propositions, all shows what can be clearly expressed in language. Language being picture of reality shows its extensive isomorphic structure with the world. The whole picturing metaphor acts as a tool to measure genuineness of propositions. *Tractatus* also shows that a proposition has sense in so far as it is a logical picture of the world. On the other hand, logical propositions are true a priori, they are tautologies³¹. Propositions of logic say nothing.³² Logical propositions do not violate any principle of logical syntax; they show the formal logical properties of language and the world.³³ They do not picture reality as they are not bi-polar, that is neither true nor false. They have no truth value, for tautologies are unconditionally true and contradictions are unconditionally false. Although they do not say anything about the world, they show the limit within which all possible worlds must be contained and the limits within which language can function.

²⁹ Ibid., prop 4.11

³⁰ Ibid., prop 6.53

³¹ Ibid., prop. 6.1

³² Ibid., prop. 6.11

³³ Ibid., prop. 6.122

Such logical propositions lack sense, for they say nothing, but they are not nonsense. Philosophers have interpreted this theory in innumerable ways. Some of the interesting and unique interpretations are of P.M.S. Hacker who provides the traditional interpretation and the other is the resolute view by Cora Diamond.

P.M.S Hacker takes a close-look at the notion of senseless and nonsense. All genuine propositions that are contingent have sense. They picture facts and say truly or falsely that the world is thus or otherwise. The other set of propositions are termed as degenerate propositions. These are tautologies and contradictions. They do not violate any principles of logical syntax, as they do not represent any picture of reality. They are limiting case of truth functional combinations. On the other hand, there are nonsense propositions which are also called pseudo propositions. They violate the rules of logical syntax. They say nothing and show nothing about the world, neither about form nor content. These 'nonsense' propositions can be further bifurcated into overt and covert nonsense. Overt nonsense is that which can be immediately seen. An example of such obvious philosophical nonsense, "is good more or less identical than the beautiful?" Covert nonsense is another class of nonsense which is not evidently seen in ordinary language. It violates the principle of the logical syntax of language. Hacker says, this is a kind of nonsense which philosophers usually exhibit in their sayings. Covert nonsense can be illuminating nonsense.

Hacker says, illuminating nonsense guides the attentive reader to apprehend what is shown by the proposition, which do not purport to be philosophical. Further those who really understand its intention, will thereby see its own illegitimacy. Thus, *Tractatus* in this respect is classified under illuminating nonsense. Hacker states, "We have to make sense of what Wittgenstein meant in *Tractatus*. So it is not just a case of ordinary nonsense, but a sheer case of illuminating nonsense"³⁴. Propositions of *Tractatus*, such as – 'objects are simple', 'the world is the totality of facts', are illuminating nonsense (gezeit). According to Hacker, all these are pseudo propositions; they legitimately try to show what can only be shown.

³⁴, P.M.S. Hacker. *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford University Press, London, 1986. p18.

After stating the traditional account we have another view advocated by Cora Diamond, Rupert Reed and James Conant, who are also referred as ‘new Wittgenstein’. This view is known as ‘resolute view’³⁵. According to these resolute thinkers, Wittgenstein is not putting any philosophical doctrine; neither is he saying it cannot be done. They challenged the traditional account of interpretation of *Tractatus*, which was given by Hacker. They completely rejected and argued against the view that *Tractatus* is the work of illuminating nonsense. On the contrary it is just a piece of complete nonsense that Wittgenstein wrote in order to exemplify what sort of nonsense philosophers indulge into. According to the resolute thinkers, Wittgenstein wanted to make us aware of the fact what we call ‘problems of philosophy’ are actually a set of complete nonsense. According to them, the only meaningful proposition in the *Tractatus* is the proposition 6.4. Moreover, the resolute thinkers took this proposition quite seriously and clubbed the whole of *Tractatus* as a discourse of nonsense.

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands will eventually recognize them as nonsensical when he has used them – steps – to climb or beyond them. (He must so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed it up)”. He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see his world aright.³⁶

K.T.Fann however more or less follows the traditional line of thought. He agrees with Hacker in some respects, that philosophical propositions are not false but nonsensical. He asserts, “according to the traditional theory all that can be said is how reality is (that is, certain atomic facts exist and that certain others do not): nothing can be significantly said about what reality is³⁷, which is precisely what metaphysicians attempt to talk about.”³⁸

With respect to ‘saying’, K.T. Fann explains that, ‘sense’, ‘senseless’ and ‘nonsense’ are terms applicable to saying, that is, propositions. We can say things with

³⁵ See Crary, Alice. & Read, Rupert. *The New Wittgenstein*, Routledge, London, 2000.

³⁶ Ibid., prop. 6.4

³⁷ Ibid., prop. 3.221

³⁸ Fann, K.T. *Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, p11

sense only within the limits of language. Attempts to say anything, about the limit of language, results in senseless propositions. And to say anything about what lies on the other side of the limit, end in nonsense. Thus, these are logical categories and failure to understand these distinctions results in misinterpreting the *Tractatus* as an anti-metaphysical treatise.

The above interpretations are as alluring as the theory itself. It is hard to agree with the resolute thinkers. Although, whatever they have interpreted is quite fascinating. But reason forces us not to think sweepingly, one cannot render a work of such precision as gibberish. The suggestive of the traditional interpretation is quite illuminating and K.T.Fann indeed gives a more appealing perspective of the *Tractatus*.

It is pertinent to acknowledge that for Wittgenstein 'saying' refers to a legitimate expression; it is a proposition in which sense precedes truth. A thing which shows itself cannot be said. For if it shows itself, it become redundant to specify conditions under which it can be shown. In other words, to show does not mean to point to something but to 'see'. When we talk of relations, say between two people, we do not point out and talk of relations existing outside the concerned persons. It shows itself, the sense exhibits itself. Further, if we try to say it, then it would lead to an infinite regress. For to confirm it, we have to go outside that relation and then ad infinitum.

One might think that amidst this 'saying and showing', where is the space for the self that we are trying to extract? The structure which is measured with strict logical barriers does not seem to share the space with the metaphysical space. This boils down to the question how do we understand the metaphysical, ethical domain within the purview of logico-semantic relation of language and the world? This leads us towards the proposition 6.41, which reads,

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happen as it does happen: *in* it no value exists – and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have a value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case is accidental. What

makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.

The Abode of Self and Tractarian Limit

In the Tractarian limit, “sense of the world must lie outside the world”³⁹. Values cannot be accommodated in the world of discourse. This is because all propositions concerning values are unipolar and not bipolar. That is, they are not subject to truth or falsity. For Wittgenstein, values are something that is necessary, uncreated, indestructible and immutable. None of these features can be found in the contingent world. That is why we cannot speak of ethics, it is not discursive. The moment we try to speak of ethics, it ceases to have meaning. According to Wittgenstein, the realm of ethics or of cannot exist in the world of facts and thus cannot be said. The world of facts consists of propositions which are bipolar. Ethics, being absolute and universal cannot be accommodated in it. Thus whatever belongs to ethical domain cannot be articulated and is therefore inexpressible.⁴⁰


Ethics, though inexpressible, nevertheless occupies an important position in our lives. Wittgenstein remarks that we cannot avoid being ethical, he is here not discarding ethics but tries to show clearly where its domain lies, so that we should stop speaking about values. Ethics cannot be put into language it shows itself. So the whole project of the *Tractatus* is to show the inexpressible by exhibiting clearly, the expressible. Thus Wittgenstein stated, “What can be shown cannot be said”⁴¹. The whole of *Tractatus* is encapsulated in the cocoon of what can be said and shown. This is how the Tractarian limit is maneuvered to get the a priori account of what can be said and indirectly what cannot be said. Within this Tractarian limit we must surf the Tractarian ‘self’. Extrapolation of the ‘self’ from the Tractarian limit is the task which we shall venture into.

³⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F. Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop. 4.1

⁴⁰ Ibid. prop. 6.522

⁴¹ Ibid., prop. 4.1212

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After an expansive illustration of how language operates within a strict logical structure and fencing the limit of the world, we are stranded with the question how this gadget works without any willing subject. Is there any 'self' that is revealed in this quite impressive piece of architecture? If so, how it is placed in it? What sort of self would this be and how it coordinates with a sort of language projected within the logical discourse? With such perplexing questions I would like to analyze and interpret some illuminating insight of the 'self' as implied in *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein's remarks on self are contained in *Tractatus* from proposition 5.6 to 5.641. It is difficult to make sense of what kind of self Wittgenstein portrays, whether he is supporting the view of solipsism. The journey of uncovering the place of subject in *Tractatus* is fascinating. We have already glanced through how language and reality are connected with one another in an isomorphic fashion. The Tractarian limit of language is placed clearly laying on the backdrop of elementary propositions as the centrifugal force. Wittgenstein tried to further limit language by taking solipsistic position. How it comes out to be the case we shall examine further. He thus tries to limit the language further and also charges limitation on its expressibility in that language. To put the matter straight, by limiting what can be expressed by means of language and what cannot be, places some restriction on how the subject configures. Self is not something about which one can speak in language, for it is the precondition of the world, and may be even for speaking itself. The value of the world cannot be inside it. It has to be outside its boundary. For then the value would lack sense. These are the demarcations which follow directly from the limit of language. In that sense, although self is a precondition of the world, it cannot correlate itself with it. Self is not contained in the world. The subject or ego, in relation to which good and evil exist is said to be transcendent.

Exposition of Self: a Solipsist Journey

The treatment of solipsism in *Tractatus* occupies a strategic position for his later philosophy of mind. It is the treatment of solipsism in the *Tractatus*, which in *Investigations*, is countered, leading to an opening up of a new discourse of mental

phenomena.⁴² Solipsist is one who drops out the world and other people. It is also referred to an epistemological position that knowledge of anything outside one's own specific mind is impossible. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein attempts to review the solipsist position. The trouble with the solipsist position is how could a detached subject be a part of the world of language? How a 'solipsist' could aim to achieve an independent existence?

There are certain problematic issues which need to be addressed at the outset. Firstly, why would there be any requirement of a subject or self in such perfect logical order, given the fact that language pictures the world and they are logically conjoined in an order of representation. For this we must resort to proposition 5.557 – 5.5571. It is pertinent to note that Wittgenstein introduces solipsism in *Tractatus* while dealing with logic. He resorts to enquire whether logic tells us in advance what the various forms of elementary propositions there are⁴³. But logic cannot do that, for it would require logic to go outside of itself. Also it would be 'nonsense' (in the context of what can be 'said' and 'shown') to go beyond the boundary of language and make an assertion. Thus, logic is incompetent for this task, as it is not a matter that can be settled a priori. Here, Wittgenstein introduces solipsism, because it is another claim to limit factual discourse in a more restrictive way than he is prepared to allow. To put the matter in perspective, solipsist intention is that his mental life has an ego, but does not contain it. Solipsist is attached indirectly to the world through the ego. Thus, he wrongly entertains a conception that he can set limit to the language that he understands, using himself as a reference point, but without actually identifying himself. How far the solipsist claim succeeds is indeed what we need to analyze here. Thus, 'solipsist shield' is brought into the picture to set limit. Hence, the proposition 5.6 reads,

The limit of my language means the limit of my world.

⁴². Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol. 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p20

⁴³ Ibid., prop. 5.55

This proposition compresses within it a strong philosophical implication. It portrays the newly imposed limit of the language by the experience which thereby cannot be expressed in language, but which carves the limit explicitly.

Wittgenstein's discussion on self commences on the fact that the empirical reality is limited by the totality of object⁴⁴, this implies that the objects exist and are the main ingredients of the empirical world. There could be numerous combinations of objects which lead to the existence of possible world. But they must have a form common with object. This is the logical form. To put the matter straight, combinatorial properties of possible world is determined by the concatenation of objects. These objects which would make up the substance of the world are limited by the truth-function of elementary properties. Thus, the limit of the world is referred to as the limit of the possible world that one can construct in imagination. As explicated by David Pears,

The new step is that the world is now my world and the language my language...another specific restriction might be imposed on language, over and above its general limitation of truth functions of elementary proposition. This time the suggested further restriction is not based on the specific types of objects, but on the specification of the person who has encountered them, namely myself.⁴⁵

This exposition reflects the limit of the logic. Logic sets the limit to the world, but logic cannot anticipate what the contents of the world are. This has already been explained by what is sayable and not sayable in language. This very assumption gives rise to the problem of solipsism.

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein gives a further exposition, wherein he states.

That what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest". Further, "the world is my world;

⁴⁴ Ibid.,prop.5.5561

⁴⁵ Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p162

that is manifest in the fact that the limit of language (of the language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world⁴⁶.

Wittgenstein tries to put solipsist position in a perspective and analyzes its implication. He states that what the solipsist means is quite correct, but one cannot express it in language. This limitation is referred to as limitation of logic and language. The theory of saying and showing puts further restriction on solipsist claim and bars it from having factual status. But it is also clear that Wittgenstein did not discard the solipsist claim completely. For he leaves the room for its manifestation⁴⁷. So the solipsist bug is here to stay. As it is not yet defused.

How do we make sense of the proposition, “the world is my world”, how do we get sense of this? And further he says, “This is manifest in the fact that the limit of language (of the language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world”. What kind of ‘I’ or ‘me’ is signified here? The solipsist claim cannot be expressed in language but it could only be shown. Here the subject cannot be the part of the world but still manifests itself in it. Is it the psychological ego that Wittgenstein refers to? By ego we commonly understand, “the experienced ‘I’ which is not coextensive with either mind or body but the center of organization of attitudes towards the body, the physical and social world, and all experience that determines identity and individuality”.⁴⁸ Now if this psychological ego pervades my world (solipsist), then the ‘I’ cannot be the part of language of my world. According to Pears,

Solipsist implies that it is my language, because language, from my point of view is my thought. It is what I can understand, and get the ‘I’, that is the subject at the centre of my circle cannot figure in it as an object. Solipsism occupies a strategic place in the *Tractatus*. We must here notice the fact that although

⁴⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F. Mc Guinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop.5.62

⁴⁷ Ibid., prop.5.62

⁴⁸ Flew, Antony. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, Pan Books Ltd., London, 1979.

Solipsist enters the scenario to limit the language, it is itself limited by its own inexpressibility in its own language.⁴⁹

According to Pears, when Wittgenstein writes,

The world and life are one⁵⁰.

“This proposition here refers not to the world of facts but the world which solipsist constructs in imagination; it is the world of possibilities”⁵¹. In this way, world is connected with life. And the following lines indeed connects the world and life with the ego,

I am my world (the microcosm)⁵²,

The world and life are one. Physiological life is of course not ‘life’. And neither is psychological life. Life is the world.⁵³

So, Wittgenstein sweepingly abolishes subject as a thinking being. Thus, Physiological self is outdone with, as it refers to the body of the subject, which in any case cannot be taken in our explanation. Further the psychological self- ego is also eliminated.

Proposition 5.631 reads,

There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.

This should not be taken as the last lines on subject. For he appears to be limiting the applicability of the subject, he is stating the limitations which are encountered when we try to capture it in language. This is clearly seen in his further contention:

⁴⁹ Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p 173

⁵⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F.McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop 5.621.

⁵¹ Pears, David. *The false prison, A study of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy*, vol 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987, p.174.

⁵² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F.McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop 5.63.

⁵³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, G.H. Von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1961, p77

If I wrote a book called *The world as I found it*, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject, for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.⁵⁴

It is pivotal to take note of the fact that Wittgenstein is in no sense postulating that there is no subject or self. He is just limiting it in a sense that it cannot be described in any way.

In 5.632, Wittgenstein remarks,

The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is limit of the world.

How can one capture the essence of this contention? The subject cannot be labeled as a constituent in our description of the world; one cannot give an exposition of oneself while giving a description of one's activity or action. Rather one captures it from that very angle and so the measuring part cannot be inside the vicinity of what one measures, rather it is the limit of the object being measured. Pears clearly elucidates this point in Humean terms; "It is not just that I am not acquainted with my ego, but, rather, that I could not be acquainted with it". Thus, "no language can possibly mention the point of view from which it can be understood. It is in this sense that the ego or subject is a limit of the world". Further, "It is the inner limit of the world, point without magnitude. It is the unplaced, therefore, unrepresentable point of view from which I view my world"

Wittgenstein further states that,

The form of visual field is surely not like this⁵⁵.

Wittgenstein meticulously illustrates the claim that one does not 'see' metaphysical subject with an analogy of an 'eye'. An eye cannot see the self. It cannot

⁵⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D.F.Pears. & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, prop 5.631

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, prop. 5.6331

perceive itself physically and this restriction is in the germ of the 'act of seeing'. It's not that one is deprived of this act rather it is absurd to indulge in it. But surely one cannot rule out the eyes that 'sees'. There has to be a focal point of seeing something. For is not the presence of 'eye' presupposed in the very act of seeing? Here the eye refers to the geometrical eye. This 'geometrical eye' Wittgenstein points as ego. His contention is that one cannot 'see' this ego inside the field of one's perception. We can say that unlike Hume he did not exclude 'self' completely from the domain of one's experience rather mounted it at the periphery of its world. In the notebook he writes, "the situation is not simply that I everywhere notice where I see anything, but I also always find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my visual space has as it were a shape."⁵⁶ His discussion on solipsism concludes by discarding the psychological self and Cartesian self. Here the self of solipsism is pushed at the limit of the world. He further postulated the presence of metaphysical self.

Before we embark on the journey towards Wittgenstein later work, it is essential to figure out where we are standing. *Tractatus* began with an enthusiastic approach to explain a priori conditions of working of language. Thus, whatever could be pictured by language was true and contrary false. To talk of things outside the domain of language is all gibberish and nonsense. This isomorphism of language and the world exhibits a strong need for an a priori space for the analysis of language and reality. It is apparent that Wittgenstein generated such philosophy to show the absurdity of traditional philosophical problems. They are pseudo problems; they are hitting the wrong side of the wall. From this starting point, it swiftly led us towards the metaphysical journey of self. Here the Cartesian self, which Wittgenstein set forth to abolish, was given a cloth of metaphysical self or rather a transcendental solipsist. This self is detached from the world and from the 'object'. It is not the part of the outer world nor a resident of the inner rather it is reduced to a diminutive point stationed at the limit of the world.

⁵⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Notebooks 1914-1916*, , G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe (eds.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1961,p86

I view this strange Tractarian self as a mythological figure, namely, 'Elf'⁵⁷. This strange creature which has been variously understood in different mythologies is a perfect baptized name for our Tractarian self. Wittgenstein analyzed multiple self in order to maintain stability of the a priori interplay of language. Initially he began with the phenomenal self, moving on to the empirical self finally resting on to the philosophical self, which he called metaphysical self. Thus, what we get is a baggage of self which is completely alien to us but still is blessed with superficial powers to manipulate us.

1.2: Language in Use: *Philosophical Investigations* [Use theory and Language game]

Meaning as Use

The grandeur with which Wittgenstein had built the *Tractatus* was demolished by him in the *Investigations*. We see here the great meltdown of his earlier conception of language. *Investigations* comes up as a strong attack on the traditional theory of meaning or language. The direct repudiation of his theory of meaning in *Tractatus* is quite apparently visible in the opening section of the *Investigations*.

The conception of language as the picture of essence of human language, the meaning of the word as the object it denotes, the whole sacrosanct notion of the sign and what it denotes comes into scanner in *Investigations*. Wittgenstein begins *Investigations* by attacking the very notion of language which he entertained earlier. He begins with a classic example of St'Augustine's theory as stated in his Confessions, and quoted by Wittgenstein,

When they (my elders) named some object and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of

⁵⁷ I quote this word 'Elf' in order to express a multiplicity of self.

other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.⁵⁸

Investigations broadens the notion of language and enhances its workability. The picture theory of meaning is not discarded but subsumed as one of the functions of language and not the only activity. St. Augustine's conception of language, according to which, language is meant to serve for communication is analyzed. Language, according to Augustine, is a system of signs. Signs include a wide range of linguistic and nonlinguistic items: words, inscriptions, gestures, symbols, icons, statues, flags. Three elements are involved: the sign, which may be any sort of object; the semantic relation of signifying, which is what a sign does, roughly like our notion of meaning; and its significant, which is the item signified by the sign. Therefore, a sign signifies its significant—when a word is linked to a thing, the word becomes a sign, the thing its significant; and the linkage is accomplished by the semantic relation of signifying. The paradigm case of signs is proper names: a proper name (sign) names (signifies) its bearer (significant), so that meaning is taken to be a kind of labeling of things. Here Augustine attempts to construe meaning solely in terms of naming, using the model of proper names. Wittgenstein was greatly influenced by his teachings. But in *Investigations* he critically scrutinizes Augustine's views on language.

These words of Augustine give a particular picture of the essence of human language. It signifies that the individual words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such objects. This picture of language establishes the notion that it is the object for which the word stands for.⁵⁹ It is essential to note here that Augustine's teaching points to ostensive teaching in which one learns the use of words by means of pointing to an object. But this is not the complete description rather a misrepresentation of

⁵⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, para 1

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Para 1

the whole exercise of language. The Augustinian picture is misleading for one misses to grasp the function of language and make it captive inside a strict boundary. According to Wittgenstein, Augustine failed to discriminate between various kinds of words and their uses. There are words to which we cannot refer to, as they do not generate any picture. Further, this way of understanding the meaning is to think of language in terms of nouns, proper names. There are many words which do not refer “ouch!”, “awe!”, “help!”, still they have use in language.

Wittgenstein explains that language is not used for mere communicating but there is variety of other uses language has. Communication is just one such activity. If one analyses the sole purpose of language as communication then, one imagines a language between a builder ‘A’ and it’s assistant ‘B’. ‘B’ is supposed to pass the material say, ‘slab’, ‘pillars’ , etc, as and when required by ‘A’. For this they employ a language consisting of words- ‘blocks’, ‘pillars’, ‘slab’. ‘A’ calls out and ‘B’ brings them. This is a complete primitive language. This form of language is quite suffocating as it is well apparent in *Investigations*.

... we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of the word surrounding the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible.⁶⁰

Let us consider how children use language. They are told about certain actions and asked to react in a particular way. Teachers teach children words and their respective objects by pointing at them. This Wittgenstein calls as ostensive teaching. They are made to react and picture as soon as the word is uttered. But can such ostensive teaching work when a word ‘slab’ is uttered?

Thus there is wide stream of things of which we call language. It is a composite term which consists of various functions. Indeed, ostensive teaching is one part of it. In that sense no language is complete in itself. Referential theory of meaning fails to express a variety of uses of language. This point is well substantiated in *Investigations* with a

⁶⁰ Ibid., Para 5

plethora of instances. If we stick to ‘referential theory’ then how could one explain words like, ‘the’ and ‘this’? How can one learn the use of these words? The referential theory fails to provide us with the complete picture of language. Perhaps one could say that, it fails to cover a wide function of language in our life. For no language is complete as such. This narrow view dismantles the ability of human mind to refer to something other than what the word signifies. But for this to work one must be acquainted with all the conditions under which the word or sentence has relevance. For otherwise there could be various ways in which a sentence could be interpreted. This amounts to saying that in ostensive training one requires to be apprised with a special training and anyone who is not trained in that fashion surely reacts in a manner which does not comply with the trained pattern. Wittgenstein makes a quite focused assertion against the very thought that was a part of *Tractatus*. In *Investigations* he says “when we say: “every word in a language signify something” we have so far said nothing whatever, unless we have explained exactly what distinction one wish to make. (It might be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish the words of language from words without meaning, such as occur in Lewis Carroll’s poem, or words like “Lilliburlero” in songs.)”⁶¹

Wittgenstein stated, “What is the meaning of the word? This question, like the questions, ‘what is time?’, ‘what is truth?’, ‘what is beauty?’ etc., and produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can’t point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something (we are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it).”⁶² The phrase ‘the meaning of a word’ exercises a certain spell which results in the idea that there must be a thing (either an object or a quality) corresponding to each noun or adjective, and this thing is the meaning of the word, and named by it, as an individual is named by a proper name. Wittgenstein is concerned with the perplexity that arises when we entertain such notions. “In case of a person’s name, the meaning is the person referred to: the meaning of a name is identified with the bearer of the name. Suppose the bearer of the name dies. It would follow that the name no longer has a meaning, the entire sentence lacks sense. But this is absurd. Surely the correct view is that when the person

⁶¹ Ibid., Para 7

⁶² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Blue and the brown book*. Blackwell,oxford,1958,p1

dies, one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. The meaning of the name and the bearer of it are altogether different.” The whole discussion boils down to the fact that meaning cannot be sacrosanct to the object it denotes. In Cambridge Moral Science Club, he made the famous recommendation: Don’t ask for the meaning ask for the use.⁶³ He thus provides us with the rule of the thumb, “For a large class of cases – though not for all- in which we employ the word meaning, it can be defined thus: the meaning of word is its use in language”⁶⁴

Language Games

Language not just comprises of words with meanings and references. There are a plethora of words and sentences in a language which may not refer to any picture whatsoever but are incorporated to imply sense to an expression. There could be metaphors, words without any meaning, or words which just produce some sound that makes sense only when they are used in certain context. This is quite evident when Wittgenstein uses words like, ‘this’, ‘that’, etc. for what picture do they project? Also in our day to day communication we use words like, ‘owe’ ‘ahha!’, ‘oopes!’, surely they help us in expressing our emotions but as such they do not refer to any picture.

Wittgenstein explains this by means of an illustration, “All tools serve to modify something. The hammer modifies the position of the nail, the ‘saw’ the shape of the board, and so on.” One might ask, what is modified by the rule, glue pot, the nails? Thus, the statement fails to cover a wider function of the tools.

It is essential to acknowledge that language is a concatenation of different words. Each has a different role to play. It all depends upon how we use it. By means of various illustrations, Wittgenstein explains that language is compared with a game. There is no monotonous aspect of language but a variety and divergent games which operate in it. It is not the case that Wittgenstein was against language as a tool for referring rather; it is the whole enterprise of looking for a supposed common, fixed essence of language that is

⁶³ John Wisdom, *Wittgenstein*, 1934 – 27, in Fann (ed) op.cit, p.46

⁶⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969. para20

at fault. There could be innumerable ways in which words could be used and it depends on what context and part of life it belongs to. Thus, capturing the sense of a word or a sentence is contextual and not something given or immanent. This Wittgenstein calls a 'language-game'. Nothing here is patent or has a meaning per se but acquires its meaning with respect to its use.

'Language games' is a metaphor which Wittgenstein used as a tool to make explicit a variety of uses which language has. By means of this he proposed to criticize the primitive understanding of philosophers on the use of language. Earlier philosophers thought language as a means to communicate and presumed that the exclusive task of language is to establish meaning, where a name refers to an object. Such sufficient and necessary conditions were blown out and a more consistent and acceptable role of language is mounted. This is emphatically made evident by a variety of uses of language, which is accomplished by the instrument of language games.

Language is a wider concept and consists not just one kind of sentence structure but innumerable sentences, parts of speeches, symbols, words, etc. Further, this multidimensional aspect of language is not fixed in its use. There are many language games which come into existence and others become obsolete and forgotten.

Here the term language game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life⁶⁵.

Wittgenstein compares various functions of language with an analogy of an ancient city,

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid., Para 23

⁶⁶ Ibid., Para 8

Here we can perhaps see the different ways in which we play language games in our lives. Hence a multiplicity of language games that we encounter and become a part and parcel of in our lives: these are: giving orders and obeying them, describing the appearance of an object, drawing, reporting an event, speculating, forming and testing a hypothesis, play-acting, singing, catches, guessing riddles, making a joke, solving a problem.

Our obsession to name things or give names to an object is wrongly accepted as the only function of language. "Naming is something like attaching a label to a thing". A set of illustrations in *Investigations* shows that not all words are names of an object. An interesting example which counters the thesis of labeling is as follows. Wittgenstein invites someone to define someone number 'two'. Now how can one define someone what is number two? One might show the person a group of nuts and tells this as an illustration of 'two'. But there is a possibility that the person might take 'nuts' to be 'two'. There are innumerable ways in which a thing could be interpreted, all is conditional, and no sense is fixed. It depends on circumstances and on the person who enters into discussion. In similar manner one could explain someone what does the chess-board comprises of and the names of all chessman and their movements. But is it all sufficient to play chess? Mere defining is not playing the game; it is the moves and winning the game which is most important in the chess game. Perhaps, one is required to be acquainted with various language games as each has its own rules.

Thus, we get the rule of the thumb –

We must look for the USE and not meaning. The meaning of a word is its use in language.⁶⁷

While analyzing 'names' Wittgenstein ponders over the idea that, 'names signify simples'. Here he critically evaluates his notion of 'objects' in *Tractatus* and Russell's 'individuals' as primary elements can have no description. They are as it is. What are exactly simples? They are pseudo concepts, inevitable concept necessarily demanded by the structure of language in *Tractatus*. Moving towards *Investigations*, simples perhaps

⁶⁷ Ibid., Para 43

lose their essence. Can we really capture anything as proposing to be simple and elementary, such that it is excluded from the sphere of questioning? If a thing is not simple then it is composite. However, how does one draw a line between simple and complex? What is the hard line here? Simple and complex are not air tight names rather they operate on the ground of language games of which they are the parts. An illustration in *Investigations* states that, “if someone tells someone without any explanation, what I see before me is complex, he reserves the right to ask, what you understand by complex?⁶⁸” And this would make sense only if one knows what kind of word is in question. The notions of simple and complex are contextual.

Speaking about language games extensively, Wittgenstein elaborates what really constitutes language games? How it operates and what sort of language is this? Meaning is not the sole prerogative of the word. We should not ask for the meaning rather ask for its use. This sounds quite rational, for there are so many languages and what a word meaning stands for in one language may not be the same in a different form of language. This amounts to saying that there are varieties of language games. Further language does not operate in vacuum. We see here a hard core shift in linguistic philosophy from the strict logical sphere of language-world relation to a more sensitive and social aspect of it. He offers a social aspect of language.

Language is part of a form of life and there are rules governing it. He dismisses that there is anything so called ‘essence’ of a language. Language is not static and to look for essence is similar to freezing it. To look for a common essence restricts the mobility and expression of a word, for there could be various ways in which language could be interpreted. There is always a relation by means of which we call them games. There is no common essence but diversity of expressions. There are languages and all that we call language are related to one another. There is no one essential underlying factor which we call language.⁶⁹

Wittgenstein explains this with an illustration of games. There are so many kinds of games- board games, card games, ball games, Olympic Games. Now there are so many

⁶⁸ Ibid., Para 47

⁶⁹ Ibid., Para 65

similarities, relationships, dissimilarities, etc, that makes them call games. Each has certain rules and technique of playing, there are quite similarities and dissimilarities, and Wittgenstein encapsulates these as 'family resemblances'. By quoting the analogy of 'family of games' Wittgenstein tries to put across the workability of how language operates, how different language games play with words? How words can be used in innumerable ways? There is no fixed usage of any word in language game.

Role of Propositions in Later Work

It is apt to acknowledge that the whole project of *Investigations* was to make a sharp attack on the traditional conception of language or any language that looks for essence and postulates that a word should refer to an object. This purist stand also advocates essences as a standard for truth. This Wittgenstein relinquishes in his later work.

Further it is not by meaning of language that we can only 'describe', it is one's 'use' of language, and to 'refer' is one function of it. There are avowals like – 'I have a toothache', 'I am in pain', which do not refer to anything as such, but are one of the language games. By dismantling the confusing edifice of strict logical structure and referential nature of objects, *Investigations* welcomes a broader perspective by epitomizing that propositions have no common essence. There are many different kinds of structure which we call propositions. It opens up an arena for a variety of language games which operate in a variety of propositions. For instance, avowals of private experiences (such as 'I have pain') avowals of intent, ordinary empirical propositions, hypothesis, expressions of laws of nature, logical and mathematical propositions, ethical, grammatical and aesthetic propositions. These propositions cannot be circumscribed into the dogmatic structure of bipolarity. Also the misconceived notion which was one of the founding principles of *Tractatus* (the essential function of proposition to describe) was done away with. To describe is one of the functions of proposition and not the only one. This shifts our attention to a variety of avowals and first person assertions in *Investigations*.

The not so Superfluous 'I'

Investigations proceed from a critique of Tractarian limit towards a more worldly and everyday approach to language. A language in which the meaning of a word is not a prison of an object, instead it's a pool of a variety of language games. While mounting an attack on the referential theory of meaning, Wittgenstein profoundly deals with how to make sense of avowals which we use in our language. He analyses psychological verbs such as 'understanding, intending, willing and remembering. By breaking the gulf between the word and the object in *Investigations*, it becomes pertinent to make sense how they should be understood. Firstly, Wittgenstein could get back the little 'Elf' of *Tractatus* into everyday world and secondly, he explodes the Cartesian picture of mind and body, wherein the self is described as a sacrosanct entity and enjoys its exclusivity.

Wittgenstein's views on 'self' can be captured by understanding the distinction between 'object use and subject use'. He proclaims in *Investigations* that it is essential to make distinction between how first person avowals differ from third person ascriptions in terms of subject and object. He remarks that by claiming one in terms of another lead to abuse of the term and renders it mystical.

Avowals of experience and expressions of thought have been traditionally conceived as a case of description. This distorted picture contributed to refer to 'I' (subject), as a referring term. This very subject is put to question by Wittgenstein. Distinction between subject and object is contained in the Blue Book. The subject use is denoted by expressions like 'I think it will rain', 'I am in pain', and 'I have a toothache'. In such expressions one cannot be mistaken about oneself. In expressions such as, "I have got a matchbox", there is recognition of a particular person and a possibility of error also remains.⁷⁰ This can be substantiated from *Investigations*, "when I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is he". Further, he contends that in uses such as, "I am in pain", one might want to draw attention towards oneself.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Blue and the brown book*, Blackwell, oxford, 1958, p66

⁷¹ Ibid., Para 405

The basic contention is that 'I' in 'I am in pain', is not case of reference. In which case, one could dispense with 'I' and is superfluous. But this does not signify that Wittgenstein outrightly rejects the 'I' as 'experiencer' rather, he is against the very act of objectification of its use in language game. He argues against the special sense in which 'I' is distinguished from the 'body' and is rendered mysterious. Perhaps the deep implication of his contention could be well captured when analyzed with his views in *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology*.

I argue for the fact that by annulling the objectification of 'I' Wittgenstein does not render it as nothing. On the contrary, he talks of self in a very special sense but simply rejects any appeal for its separate identity apart from the body. Thus, Wittgenstein intends to give us an alternative to combat Cartesian thought by pointing that first person avowals such as, 'I am in pain', has sense in our language game. But it does not owe any knowledge claim. For, 'I' does not have any misreference and thus has no reference. We must acknowledge that Wittgenstein is only devoiding it of epistemic status and not from its other uses. One can understand it in terms of Wittgenstein's conception of 'saying' and 'showing'. It can only be shown in our use and cannot be said. The above discussion can be well explicated from the following quotes in *Investigations*:

I know what I want, wish, believe, and feel, (And so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosopher's nonsense, or at any rate not a judgment a priori". Further, "I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking', and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking.'⁷²

Conclusion

In the *Tractatus*, It is worth introspecting, what sort of self is this, and what is the nature of language, which is captured in such a water-tight personality? Do we need to remain content with the solipsist or we should embark on another journey to understand and reframe it? This brings us to *Investigations*. *Investigations* provided us with an ordinary

⁷² Ibid., Para 122

picture of a variety of propositions in a language game. By expressing meaning in terms of use Wittgenstein explicates that different kinds of expressions in language enjoy the status of meaning irrespective of any reference. This is a strategic move and it also shows how first person expressions could be employed in language.

CHAPTER 2

Self in Philosophical Investigations

Introduction

In this chapter, I intend to explore the 'Private Language Argument in *Investigations*. By an in depth analysis of the impossibility of private language, Wittgenstein explodes the subject- object dichotomy, the notion of self which is signified by owning ones sensation and the Augustinian picture of meaning which was adopted in *Tractarian* account of meaning. The Cartesian dualism is vehemently criticized and done away with. We shall see how the concept of language is untenable when applied by private linguist. By denying the epistemic status to first person present self-ascriptions, Wittgenstein, tries to show that these self-ascriptive statements require an expressivist reading. This has led to charging Wittgenstein as a behaviorist in disguise. He tries to argue why he isn't a behaviorist. These are some significant issues which we shall critically examine.

2.1 Critique of dualism and behaviorism

Descartes' Legacy

The concept of self in philosophy has its strong roots in Cartesian dualism. René Descartes was the first modern philosopher, who systematically raised doubts about the certainty of knowledge claims. Thus, he showed a systematic epistemological concern over the issue of knowledge and how do we acquire it. Descartes was of the opinion that minds and bodies are substances of distinct kinds which in the case of living beings, particularly humans, happened to be intimately related. This Cartesian dualism is the root cause of the historic debate relating to the primacy of the mind and body. The implication of such a theory forms the basic ingredient on which philosophy of mind rests. Descartes enumerated methodic doubt in which he questioned the certainty of our knowledge. He extended doubt on every aspect, knowledge derived from the external world, knowledge

derived from different senses and finally knowledge of mathematics. The conclusion of such widespread doubt was that he could not doubt himself as a thinking being, for the very act of doubting required thought, this he encapsulated in his first indubitable axiom : Cogito Ergo Sum, 'I think, therefore I am'. Cartesian dualism bifurcated mind and body into two realms. Firstly, matter was extended in space, while mind was unextended, comprising of thoughts and sensation. They were qualitatively different from one another. Another upshot of the dualism was epistemological and extremely radical. The knowledge you have of your own states of your mind is direct, immediate and infallible in a way that your knowledge of material object is not. Thus we have a 'privileged access' to our own states of mind. Your thoughts about your current states of mind could not be false. Further the contents of our own minds are transparent to us. First person knowledge of our own current minds is referred to as 'accessive'. Such epistemic priority of 'accessive' prompted various philosophers to unfold the absurdity inherent in Cartesian dualism and to reorient the whole concept of self- knowledge in a broader perspective. Wittgenstein's move in *Investigations* is one form of radical criticism of Cartesian dualism. This task he carried out by systematically refuting the workability of private language, which we shall see in the second section.

Wittgenstein's Critique of Behaviorism

The rejection of inner, as a representation of one's privileged status, on the contrary, led to the nurturance of belief that Wittgenstein advocated logical behaviorism. It needs to be noted that he did not deny the existence of mental states completely rather he denied their privileged epistemic status and a sacrosanct picture of the inner upheld by the dualist. We shall see here, that it may be a wrong way of interpreting him as a behaviorist. One must see his work in the light of his repudiation of private language with respect to 'form of life' argument. One cannot get a complete picture of his view unless one looks into the various aspects of his philosophy interwoven with each other. Perhaps only then one can articulate what Wittgenstein tries to put forth.

in one situation rather than another. Thus, when we attribute a belief to someone we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he might do in a particular situation. Thus, if a person has a toothache, this could only be captured and understood in terms of his or her outward behavior which acts as a verification of the claim uttered. Here, the meaning of a mental statement is analyzable into statements about behavior and about the observable circumstances in which such behavior occurs. The truth –value of these statements depend upon their verifiability. Thus, the main contention is that mental descriptions are equivalent to purely physical description.

Having defined the two behaviorist theories, we must acknowledge that Wittgenstein argued extensively against psychological as well as logical/philosophical behaviorism. Wittgenstein refutation of the primacy of the inner cannot be taken as his being a behaviorist. It is essential to take cognizance of the fact that his entire project was to make evident that inner is not excluded from the outer. There is no demarcation between mental and one's outward behavior, rather the two are juxtaposed into one another. The mental does not enjoy privileged access, but for that we cannot consider it to be non-existent and fictional in nature. "In *Investigations*, he clearly states,

"Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?" – If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.²

Wittgenstein's refutation of the inner and his objections against Cartesian dualism wrongly led philosophers to associate him as a philosophical behaviorist. But we shall see that his entire arguments against the special status of the inner, is not a blanket removal of it. He did not deny that there are mental states but only the privileged epistemic position attached to it.

While refuting the private language argument, Wittgenstein shows that we have no special way of knowing sensation, such as 'pains'. He argues as to how we learn about

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 307

these sensations. According to Wittgenstein, we learn them against the background of certain instinctive types expressions. He quotes in *Investigations*,

...The words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expression of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adult talks to him and teaches him exclamation and later sentences. They teach the child a new pain behavior³.

It is pertinent to take cognizance of the fact; it is only through the outward expression (cry) of the child that one learns that the child is in pain. In this way, the inner sensation reaches out by means of its outer expression, that is, pain behavior of crying. Thus, there is a strong connection between the inner and the outer. Also this is how language is connected with the inner sensations. Thus the child, in later stages, learns to replace the expression of crying with a language, as in, 'I am in pain' or 'my stomach aches'. Does this amount to saying that Wittgenstein embraces behaviorism? On the contrary, it's not that the pain behavior which gets associated as the meaning of being in pain, rather the verbal expression of pain replaces crying.

Another essential factor here is that although the pain behavior of others can be observed from their outward expression of them, it is ridiculous or nonsensical (as Wittgenstein puts it) to apply it to oneself. This point has been discussed in detailed in the context of the private language argument. It is sufficient to note here that one does not assign the same criteria of pain behavior exhibition as in case of others. For one does not express it to oneself that 'I am in pain'. The confusion, Wittgenstein contends lies in the grammar of a language. We wrongly construe an utterance of a sentence ascribing mental states to ourselves as a description of something. On the contrary they are not akin to descriptions, but mere expressions of our sensations. Consider a case of toothache, to utter that 'I have toothache' is not to describe something about myself. It is equivalent to or identical with having a toothache. In a description such as "the grass is green", there is a gap between it and the fact that it is being described. However, there is no such gap between my being in pain and saying "I am in pain".

³ Ibid., Para 244

Logical behaviorist strictly reduces the mental, 'inner' to the outer behavior but Wittgenstein did not agree just on aspect of plain behavior, rather he espoused an element of feeling 'expressive' behavior. In *Investigations* Wittgenstein enquires "could someone understand the word "pain", who had never felt pain?"⁴ And further says "suppose we think while we talk or write- I mean, as we normally do- we shall not in general say that we think quicker than we talk; the thought seems 'not to be separate' from the expression"⁵. Thus, saying that 'one is in pain' and 'pain' are not two separate domains. They are infused into one another.

Additionally, although Wittgenstein states, outer provide the criteria in terms of which the inner is characterized, the relation of outer and inner is not static and varies with respect to various emotions and sensation. This can be ascertained from the following quote,

⁶ How do we compare the behavior of anger, joy, hope, expectation, belief, love and understanding- Act like an angry person! That's easy. Like a joyful one-here it would depend on what the joy was about. The joy of seeing someone again, or the joy of listening to a piece of music...? - Hope? That would be hard. Why? There are no gestures of hope. How does hoping that someone will return express itself?

The above stated lines also seem to point towards a serious charge on behavioral psychologist who experiment on animal behavior and try to extrapolate the result on human behavior. For even if, say a dog could be conditioned to respond at certain outer expressions of its master, it is surely inconceivable that it could gesture certain subtle and higher order expressions, say of depression, loneliness, hope etc. This points towards an essential requirement, that is, of human feeling. This human feeling is not mere a part of personal vocabulary, but is a shared activity. There is a serious attack of mind and body

⁴ Ibid., Para 315

⁵ Ibid., Para 318

⁶ *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1, 1982, vol. 2, , G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (trans.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, para.357.

dualism here. We are not mechanical projectors of our thoughts and desires. There is no separate compartment from where our inner gets processed and is represented in the form of behavior. There is a sensitive element of 'spontaneity' which operates. Here spontaneity refers to expression related to both outer behavior and inner states. Such spontaneity is our form of life, it is nurtured by the environment, and a shared element with other humans. Thus, Wittgenstein famous phrase goes, 'if a lion could talk we could not understand him'⁷.

The crux of the argument is that human behavior cannot be gauged by mere facial expression and gestures. Paul Johnston rightly says,

The whole point is that we do not treat each other as bodies which happen to behave in particular ways, but as conscious individuals, who act. The notion of the inner does not refer to some separate reality but expresses our relation to each other and a particular way of understanding human actions. Wittgenstein urges us to recognize that we are interested in people's utterances not as report on mysterious occurrences about which we are for some reason curious, but as expressions of what the individual concerned feel. We are interested in them not because they are accurate reports on inner processes but because they are what the individuals are inclined to say.⁸

A similar account is made by P.M.S. Hacker while explaining Wittgenstein's statement,

'The human body is the best picture of the human soul', and not because the soul is something bodily, but precisely because the soul is manifested in behavior. Only a creature with eyes can cast a loving look or a contemptuous gaze, weep with joy or grief. Only a creature with a mouth can smile, with sympathy or cruelty, in amusement or cold anger. But for these forms of

⁷ *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. 1, vol. 2, 1992, G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman (eds.), trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue (trans.), Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, Para.190.

⁸ Johnston, Paul. *Wittgenstein Rethinking the inner*, Routledge, London,1993,p. 228

expression to be possible a highly complex behavioral repertoire in widely varying circumstances is presupposed. The soul of a fish, if it had one, would be a poor thing. The articulations of the human face and body in the circumstances of the human life are not externally related to what it makes sense to say of the human soul⁹.

Thus, it is not the case that in denying Cartesian dualism Wittgenstein adopted behaviorism. He embraced behavioral aspects as to show the absurdity of the 'inner', as a special category. Like behaviorists, he did not deny the mental, rather showed how it is manifested in our language and outward expression. The form of life and language games explicitly enlightens the fact that being human is not to mirror merely as a cold appearance of the inner, but to show it as an expression of 'life'. This 'life' expresses the life of a 'sentient being'¹⁰, who feels and acts in a shared form of life, and has a reflective consciousness. Thus, Wittgenstein added a human element, a human conduct, to the 'automata' Cartesian being.

2.2 Private Language Argument and Rule-following

The Notion of Private Language Argument

Wittgenstein in *Investigations* propagates arguments against the workability of private language which comes to be known as private language arguments. We must note here that the notion of private language rests on a theory upheld by Cartesian conception of self. By refuting the private linguistic conception of self, Wittgenstein intends a severe attack on the Cartesian conception of self. He tries to show the absurdity of private language notion by means of reductio-ad-absurdum. The whole of Wittgenstein's philosophy is centered on the notion of language. *Tractarian* language was a strict logical

⁹ Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p253.

¹⁰ Expression borrowed from P.M.S.Hacker.

scaffolding, in which language pictures the reality. Whereas, in *Investigations* language is juxtaposed with world and reality in a pool of variety of language games. By means of private language argument Wittgenstein tries to show the inadequacy of any form of language (if it can be called language), that is, unshareable. This brings us to the concept of private language.

If there is an inner self then there should be a private language to talk about this inner/private self. There is no private language to talk of inner self. Therefore, there is no private self. So the whole idea of *Investigations* is to justify the second premiss. One really gets baffled by the very notion of private language. Can a language be called 'private'? What sort of language will it be where privacy is an essence? Can we ascribe private names to our sensations? These are some of the questions which we shall deal in this section. Wittgenstein begins by giving an exposition of kind of language which the private linguist talks of. Here we refer to *Investigations* 243, where Wittgenstein talks of language in which a person gives orders, obeys and blames himself. A monologist indeed indulges in such a form of language. There is also a kind of language in which a person gives name to his own experiences, feelings, moods, etc., as in code language. One can conceive of such languages but this is not with which Wittgenstein is concerned in *Investigations*. By private language one means a language, in which "the individual words of the language are to be referred to what can only be known to the person speaking, to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language"¹¹. Hacker says,

What Wittgenstein analysis here is not a contingently private language which no one else happens to understand, but an essentially private language which it is logically impossible for another person to understand? What the words of such a language refer to are the speaker's immediate private sensation and experiences, which only he can know¹².

¹¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 243

¹² Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 3

The implication of such a language is extremely deep and highly debatable. On the first note, it goes contrary to our normal conception of language. What is the basis of language in communication? Is it merely restricted to communication within one self or with the society at large? If we follow a soliloquist, what is the purpose of indulging in private naming of his sensations and what is the form of life he leads. The same can be inquired about a private linguist. But there is a difference in degree, for we can still comprehend what a soliloquist tries to express, by means of translation. But there is no room for translation, in case of a private linguist. It has more devastating consequences, as it is logically incomprehensible to others. One cannot ascertain what sort of activity or sensation a private linguist adheres to. The very idea of private language intensifies when we completely exclude the possibility of knowing an individual's immediate private sensations. For here, the sensations have no public expression. Furthermore, one cannot gauge as to what a private linguist is referring to, for the part of speech comprises of one's inner definition, subscribed to own private immediate sensations. One can correlate it by an analogy of a magician (a private linguist), who locks himself inside a cupboard with its keys locked from outside and disappears the key. In such a case he cannot come out, neither we can know what is inside. This is beautifully brought out in Para 293:

....Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language- game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the

model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.¹³

This gives us a fair idea of how serious is the argument and engulfs the very notion of language and communication. We must understand that the argument poses a sharp attack on the traditional theories of meaning and understanding. How do we establish a meaning of a word? How people happen to learn and associate it with the same thing? One can resort to ostensive definition, in which one gives a rule for the use of a word, and typically introduces a sample to function as a standard of correct application. But the problem arises when one give such definition by referring to a private sample (i.e. one which it is logically impossible to show to anyone else).

At this juncture, it is pertinent to acknowledge how words get associated with a particular meaning and obtains a shareable common understanding of it. This is essential to test whether a private language comprises of rules and if not then for what use is it in a language game?

Rule Following and Form of Life

The very conception of private language rest on the assumption that one's sensations are private and can be known immediately only to the person who experiences it. Thus, one imparts a name to one's sensation, like 'pain' for instance, and establishes a connection between them. But is that all we need to understand a language and does a language work in such a set up? Wittgenstein explicitly explains that language is governed by certain rules which need to be adhered to in a social set up. Further, a private linguist cannot arbitrarily employ words, it is essential to form a concept between word and sensation. The question arises, can it be developed only through ostention or does it involve some other element in our language?

A private linguist holds a special right to his/her sensations and personal experiences. Let us take the example of the private sensation of pain, as Wittgenstein

¹³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 293.

does. A private linguist has to say that I know only from my own case what the word 'pain' means¹⁴; another person cannot have my pains¹⁵; that I can undertake to call this (pointing at a word) 'pain' in the future¹⁶; that when I say 'I am in pain' I am at any rate justified before myself¹⁷.

If this is the contention of the private linguist then the question arises as to, can one employ a private name to one's sensations such that, no one other than the speaker can understand? Can a language work in such a way, where a name is ascribed to a sensation by one's own choice? Wittgenstein strongly upholds that a language does not operate on such parameters. He tries to show loopholes in private linguist conception of language by propounding social nature of language and the concept of rule following.

Wittgenstein elucidates the concept of 'rules' which acts as an ingredient for any language to work. His submission is that language is not something which is a product of mind. It has its space in our society and form of life in which we live. Speaking or indulging in any linguistic activity, sharing one's emotions, sensations, thoughts, all are subject to shared rules or agreement. Language in this sense is a rule governed activity which pre-supposes a form of life. He says "...it is only in language that I can mean something by something"¹⁸. Thus we cannot call anything a word or a sentence unless it is a part of that kind of rule governed activity which we call a language. A language is thus part of a set of activities defined by certain rules, which further govern all the various uses of words in the language. This he explicates by means of an illustration of the 'game of chess'. "The question what is the word really?" is analogous of "what is a piece in chess"¹⁹. "To understand what a piece in chess is one must understand the whole game rules defining it, and the role of the piece in the game". Chess is a game in virtue of all its use²⁰. It is absurd to distinguish the game of chess from its rules. Further, a game of chess

¹⁴ See Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969. Para 293

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 253

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 263

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 289

¹⁸ Ibid., Para 13

¹⁹ Ibid., Para 108

²⁰ Ibid., Para 293

involves, making a move, solving a chess problem²¹. Such a move is analogous to making utterances in language.

An essential element related to rule following is that, one cannot be said to follow a rule in isolation. Wittgenstein inquires “is what we call obeying a rule something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life time”²². Wittgenstein calls our attention to show the nonsensicality of such an assertion. He asserts in *Investigations*,

...It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, order given or understood. To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique²³.

Thus to follow a rule refers to the practice of following rule. For instance, sign-post with an arrow pointing towards a direction, gives us an indication of moving in a certain directions. It guides our way, but it is not by virtue of its physical appearance that we follow it, rather because it is followed on a regular basis and it is successfully pointing towards a desired destination, that holds its significance. Thus, here follows a custom, a practice, of following the direction, which shows its use. Its application depends on its being followed on a regular basis by living beings. Supposedly, there were no regular use of a sign-post and no convention as to how it is to be interpreted, each individual interprets it in its own way, and would it still function as a guide?²⁴ Thus, one of the underlining characteristic of rule following is that it is a practice, a convention.

²¹ Ibid., Para 13

²² Ibid., Para 199

²³ Ibid., Para 199

²⁴ See Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969 Para. 198.

It is worth examining another significant feature of rule following, it acts as a yardstick for verification. Following a rule pre-supposes the notion of making a mistake. Wittgenstein states,

It is quite conceivable to make a mistake while following a rule and it is natural. For when we obey the rule, we practice something on a regular basis. There is a set pattern or same task that we indulge in. Thus, we agree with a particular practice of doing an activity the word 'agreement' and 'rule' are interwoven²⁵.

The crux of the argument is that following a rule presupposes one to be in agreement with a pattern and one might make a mistake in such a situation. In fact the whole exercise of following a rule 'correctly' or 'incorrectly' makes us learn to follow a rule aright and thus becomes a custom. This is how one learns the use of a word and its disuse. Otherwise, there would be no check in one's following a certain rule. "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about right"²⁶.

Surmising the above discussion, for Wittgenstein language cannot be static, dormant; rather it is fluid and dynamic. It works on certain rules which are indispensable for a language to communicate. It is rule governed activity and its task is to be in perfect harmony with the convention and customs. There are various language games and indeed there are rules which govern them. Such multifarious picture of language poses serious concern over the issue of private language. With such strong parameters of language as being a rule governed activity how does a private linguist conception fit in? This brings us to evaluate how naming of private sensations could gel with such a conception of language. To put it in Wittgenstein's own words:

²⁵ Ibid., Para 224

²⁶ Ibid., Para 258

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it²⁷.

Pain Argument

One can only see the intensity and comprehensiveness of private language argument by clarifying the notion of privacy. The basic contention of a private linguist, as we have seen, is that one's sensations are private. We have already seen how private language cannot work on the principles of rules, which determine the use of language. This can be best explained by means of 'pain argument'.

Private linguist absurdly holds the view that one's sensations are private. This notion of privacy, rest on two extreme assumptions of a private linguist.

(i) Private ownership

(ii) Epistemic privacy

The sacrosanct picture of one's own sensations and experiences implies that the inner is completely unknown and personal abode which cannot be accessible to the outer. Private linguist asserts here that none can have my pains; my pains belong to me and cannot be shared by anyone. Thus, 'I' am the sole owner of 'pains'. Nobody else has my pains. This creates a barrier between one's own sensations and others. There are far reaching consequences, which are indeed, as Wittgenstein puts it, concealed in our use of faulty grammar. The problem is indeed embedded in our deep understanding of the 'myth of the given'. We wrongly presume our personal experiences of sensations, emotions as a sort of object in our realm of particular inner world. Thus, a sort of mental fencing is laid and we are tempted to entertain a fact that such experience are essentially unique and thereby we restrict its mobility to the inner realm itself.

²⁷ Ibid., Para 202

(i) Private ownership

The concept of private ownership deals with an analysis of a question- 'are sensations inalienable'? This question exclusively deals with the assumption made by private linguist that only 'I' can have my pains and another person neither can have it nor can understand my pain. This is a very intriguing argument and its consequences are equally devastating. With this respect, Wittgenstein poses two questions in *Investigations* ²⁸;

- (a) Which are my pains?
- (b) What counts as criterion of identity here?

The first question is concerning one's ownership of pains, such that, pains which the bearer feels has its exclusive right of its possession. It focuses on one's belongingness to one's own sensation as if another person cannot have the similar sensation. We must consider certain case which shoots from the above contentions. Private linguist assertions that one's pains are private, reflects towards a relationship of one's pain sensations as an object. It exhibits a sort of ownership which is contended in case of one's having or possessing an object. Are our pains sensation equated with object in the outer world? Wittgenstein asserts the deceptiveness of grammar in one's employment of such an ownership. Feeling of pain cannot be equated with a form of perception. We do not perceive pain as we perceive pin. Pain does not signify a sort of ownership or possession, as in case of pin. One can surely own a pin and perceive it. But we cannot possess pain in that sense. To have a pain is to be in pain, to suffer. To 'own' belongs to the domain of objects and has no application here. The underlining fact here is that one cannot talk of pains as if one speaks of 'one's coat', 'one's penny', and 'one's pen'. The surface grammar creates an illusion here when we employ the use of words such as, 'having' or 'feeling'. The objectification of one's sensation is what is under serious scanner. In similar vein, when one asserts that it is 'his pain', 'your pain' or 'my pain', these do not reflect towards one's sole possession of pain. The trouble arises when we equate these

²⁸ Ibid., Para 253

with, 'my pen', 'his pen', 'and your pen'. The similarity in surface grammar creates the effect of such an authoritative right and allures one to wrongly presume sensation as object of inner world.

Private linguist wrongly entertain the fact that another person cannot feel pain in someone else's body²⁹. On the contrary one cannot become aware of pain in one's own body by means of any method. There is no method or criteria by which one could know that one is in pain. There is indeed a way by which we can feel pain in other person's body. One does observe and come to know that other person is suffering from pain through his exhibition of pain behavior. This is well apparent when a person cries of pain; we surely say that she is in such a pain. Also, when a person is met with an accident and is bleeding, we do feel that he or she is suffering from immense pain. Thus, the pain behavior of other shows itself that she is in pain and we do take notice of this fact. There is no logical contradiction in supposing that another person is in pain, we can and do conceive of pain in other person's body. The private linguist contention stands refuted. We must accept the fact that 'pains' are not an object which is only possessed by the one who manifest it. Further, it is the surface grammar which makes the thesis disputed. The grammar of 'my pain', 'his pain', obscures the natural phenomena of pain. We feel pain as a natural sensation of body. The sensation of pain shows and is manifested in our behavior.

An important implication of ownership of privacy is with respect to the criterion of identity of pain. The question pertaining to the criterion of identity of pain rests on the phenomenal characteristic of pain, such as, intensity and location. According to the private linguist no one can express my pains. The line of arguments which follows is that my pain belongs to pain in my body and thus cannot be the pain in others body. The pain which I feel is located inside my body, so in that sense it belongs to me. Pains which are felt in others body belongs to them so are not equivalent to my pain. It follows that my pains are distinct from the pain in somebody else's body i.e., they are numerically

²⁹ *The Blue and Brown Books (BB)*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p.68.

different³⁰. Further, since my pains are unshareable one cannot even have my pains after I no longer have it. That pain has passed and no longer exists. It cannot enter the world of another person. Reason being that it belongs to a person's private subjective experience.

This argument further becomes more complicated as we move on with its consequences. If we go by the argument posed by the private linguist, then, A's pain, say in the knee, is A's pain. Now, 'B' may have a similar pain in his knee, but since B's knee cannot be at the same place as A's knee, his pains cannot be at the same place either. Consequently, one might say that their pains are qualitatively identical, but numerically distinct. This amounts to saying that there cannot be similar pains, but essentially different.

In *Investigations* Wittgenstein ask us to ponder over a possibility wherein we speak of physical objects as "two exactly the same". For instance "this chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it"³¹. By means of this argument Wittgenstein draws our attention towards private linguist persistent claim over his pain (or for that matter any inner emotion). What prompts a private linguist to assert that another person cannot have the identical pains one have, though of course he can have the same pain. For instance, if one is having a severe pain in ankles and other person is also having a similar pain in his body, then according to a private linguist they cannot be said to possess the same pain. As the pain in corresponding body is not the same. Wittgenstein however, argues against the contention and asserts that even if we affirm that the pain in corresponding body is not the same, this does not follow that the pain is essentially different. It is indeed the same pain. He illustrates the case of Siamese twins wherein, they feel pain in exactly the same place where they are joined together. Thus, although they are different bodies but the pain is same³².

The trouble lies in misunderstanding the grammar of something being 'same' or 'identical'. The two are used quite interchangeably in our language. We do not use them

³⁰ Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p. 49.

³¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 253

³² *Ibid.*, Para 253.

in isolation, in abstract sense, but in some relation to a thing or emotions. There are different language games. For instance, our reference to some similar pain is different with respect to a similar chair. We have already discussed that the concept of 'possession' does not apply to 'pain', it is related to object. Thus, Wittgenstein claims that two people can surely have same pains. As Wittgenstein says, "in so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain."³³

(ii) Epistemic Privacy

The notion of Epistemic Privacy rests on the conception that one's experiences are private in the sense that no one else can know them. Thus something is private to me, if and only if I alone can know about it. Other person cannot have knowledge about my inner experiences. With respect to pain sensation it follows that only I can know that I am in pain, others can only surmise it. Here private linguist adheres to the assumption that one's sensations are incommunicable.

At this juncture, we must take note of the fact that such sort of epistemic privacy glorifies the traditional conception of knowledge of self. It advocates the thesis wherein we have a privileged access of one's inner sensation, beliefs and desires. Further we have a kind of epistemic privilege such that other person cannot share one's experience. This has its lineage to the Cartesian view of mind. According to this view, mental states constitute an inner realm that is directly available to the subject whose mental states they are. The philosophical question which have troubled the philosophers is that how could there be such a thing with such a capacity of epistemic completeness and infallibility? Wittgenstein argues extensively against this exclusivity and special access that one has. He proclaims that it is wrong and nonsense to assert that 'I know I have a pain'³⁴. This claim has no epistemic relevance and is a grammatical assertion. By arguing against such an epistemic assertion he intends to showcase nonsensicality that operates in traditional conception of self knowledge. It is worth knowing that his charge was not to prove the opposite (that we have unprivileged access), but rather to expose the faulty grammatical

³³ Ibid., Para 253.

³⁴ Ibid., Para 246.

construction that lures one to such misinterpretation. Wittgenstein denies any epistemic status to statement about first person avowals.

The concept of knowing something pre-supposes the possibility of making an error. Wittgenstein states,

....My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arise from this; if I assume the abrogation of the normal language game with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the sensation; and then the possibility of error also exist³⁵.

P.M.S. Hacker analyses Wittgenstein's treatment of epistemic status of first person present sensations. It makes sense to say of a person that she knows that such-and-such is the case if and only if it also makes sense to deny that she know. Thus, "I know I am in pain" can only be conceived as an epistemic utterance if 'I do not know whether I am in pain' is held to be intelligible. But it would be absurd to say that one is doubtful whether one is in pain or not. One cannot be suspicious about one's avowals of present sensations. Wittgenstein proclaims "the truth is; it make sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself"³⁶. Thus, one cannot be ignorant of one's being in pain or other sensations, and therefore, cannot claim to have knowledge of one's own pain either.

Another problematic issue with respect to epistemic status of one's avowals relating to present sensations is the use of the verb 'to know'. Hacker is of the opinion that, it makes sense to talk of knowing that 'P' where it makes sense to talk of finding out, coming to know, or learning that 'P'. But when I have pain, I do not find out, one can surely assert if one knows an object or a situation, by stating grounds in terms of evidence for knowing that thing. How about cases of one's immediate sensations? We do not find out for ourselves whether we are in pain or not. For instance when one has a toothache, there is no such thing as inferring from some evidence nor one can perceive

³⁵ Ibid., Para 288

³⁶ Ibid., Para 246

one's toothache. These task of knowing, conferring, guessing have no language game in case of such utterances like, 'I am in pain'. It makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain but not to say it about myself.

The confusion arises due to grammatical structure which violates the meaning of a sentence. There is nothing of the sort as making an epistemic claim about one's sensations as they cannot be disputed. One is in pain because one feels the pain, there is no special epistemic connection involved here. Thus, such expressions cannot be used as an expression of certainty. There is no requirement for any question of justification here.

If a blind man were to ask me 'have you got two hands?' I should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it then I do not know why I should trust my eyes. For, why should not I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two hands? *What* is to be tested for what?³⁷

In the same vein, Wittgenstein remarks,

In fact in 'I am in pain' there, simply is not the question, 'how'? As in 'why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet, when I want to get up from a chair'? There is no 'why', I simply do not. This is how I act.³⁸

Thus, when one makes a claim that 'I am in pain' or 'I am feeling restless', they are not making any epistemic claim. By means of these utterances one is just expressing what one feels. The problem lies when we try to put across a wrong question, such as 'how?', 'why?', 'what?' Rather we must look in for purpose and occasion under which it takes place. Thus, there is nothing epistemic about our first person psychological statements.

Another aspect here is that we can easily know other person is in pain. The private linguist argues against this contention and proclaims that one can never know about other

³⁷ *On Certainty*, G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe and D. Paul (trans.), Blackwell, Oxford: 1969, p. 125.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 148

person's inner states as there is possibility of pretence or shamming by other people. Wittgenstein states 'lying is a language game that needs to be learned like any other one'³⁹. By means of this, he asserts that even pretence or shamming is a skill that needs to be learnt. In order to pretend one must be familiar with the act of which one pretends to be. Thus, it presupposes the familiarity with that particular behavior or act. Further it cannot be the case that all behavior is a case of lying. For instance, a person who is bleeding because of an accident and crying due to severe pain cannot be doubted. To lie about one's pain is, to be in pain and to say that one is not. Thus one cannot be ignorant of pain behavior as such. It shows that pains are communicable and that there is a no epistemic privilege enjoyed by first person claims about one's present sensations.

Conclusion

The Self of *Investigations* comes out as a free bird from chains of classical traditional conception of self. The extensionless Tractarian self is subsumed in the everyday world and is given much broader conception. Wittgenstein releases self from its Cartesian couch. In the first section, he rejects the distinction between mind and body dualism in order to give a more acceptable conception of self. Self here is portrayed as being subsumed in human manifestation in a variety of aspects and various forms of life. It is important to acknowledge that here Wittgenstein makes a sharp critique of behaviorist tendencies in psychology and philosophy. By acknowledging the difference between various emotions and sensations, he makes it explicit that every human feeling cannot be captured completely in terms of physical impressions.

In the second section, we saw how Wittgenstein tries to demystify the nature of the self. He tries to breach the tendency that self enjoys a privilege position, a sacred corner, which cannot be infiltrated by anyone. This is well explicated by his refutation of private language argument in *Investigations*. The argument explicitly rejects that a language can take place in isolation. An individual cannot indulge in language with him/her self. There is a whole form of life, which provides an interface to communicate

³⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 249

one's thoughts and feelings with others and share a form of life. It calls for context, circumstances, criteria and rules to play various language games.

The self is assumed as embedded in human form of life. Our knowledge of certain mental states is not to assert any priority status but a mere expression of the mental. It is our natural expression and there is nothing sacrosanct about it. This is the thesis which is defended and analyzed here. Wittgenstein's project in *Investigations* is to show that there is nothing per se special about our immediate avowals. We must come over the task of asserting epistemic status to one's avowals. We merely represent our mental states and there is no requirement to describe or provide any explanation of it as in case of ascribing mental states of others. This is rightly captured in his 'use theory of meaning'. He intends to debunk the traditional picture of self as projected by Cartesian dualism. The expressivist account is one way of dealing with the cognitivist. It provides us with a better approach in understanding of avowals, albeit, we shall see in the next chapter that it has its own shortcomings.

CHAPTER 3

Wittgensteinian Self: Expressivism and its Interpretation

Introduction

In the previous chapter we have seen how the private language argument exposes the inconsistencies inherent in Cartesian dualism. The private language has created ripples in the philosophical world and thus generated many related arguments in philosophy. One of the upshots is the status of 'self'. Doubt about the workability of private language explored in *Investigations* throws an illuminating insight into the nature of our knowledge about our own intentional states, such as beliefs, desire, intentions etc. This aspect has been deeply explored by Crispin Wright in his reading of Wittgenstein. By noting the dimensions of how we understand our own intentions and the way we acknowledge others give a clear insight of self-knowledge which acts as a key to the notion of self. It helps us to explore and critically analyze the assumption with regard to 'privileged access' of one's own intentions as holding an epistemic priority position in contrast to third-person ascriptions. Thus here we shall explore an expressivist account of self. Wittgenstein argues against Cartesian approach and instead propagates expressivist and non-cognitivist account. We shall also examine Wright's account and his interpretation of Wittgenstein's conception of self. He gives us a critical account of minimalist position as a better alternative to bet for.

3.1 Non-Cognitivist and Expressivist account of the Self

Expressivism

Investigations nurtures multiple theories and arguments and upshots. Rethinking on the notion of private language and rejection of private ownership as well as its epistemic status, leads to other issues which revolves around the philosophical enterprise of self-

knowledge. In *Investigations* Wittgenstein asserted that first person psychological utterances are devoid of any privilege access. Thus the inner does not hold any special treatment over and above the outer. The issue with which we are concerned here is that how the first person present psychological statements are to be classified. Are they utterances or assertions? How do we approach such description in the case of the inner? Do they have any cognitive status? We shall venture here to show whether Wittgenstein provides an expressivist account of avowals.

Mental States

In the light of the above discussion, it is essential to understand a marked difference within our mental states. Broadly, we categorized mental states into (a) propositional attitudes and (b) sensations.

a) Propositional attitudes

Propositional attitudes are mental states which have propositions as its content. The paradigm example of a propositional attitude – is the state of belief, wish, desire, hope, and intention is all regarded as propositional attitudes. These mental states are relational in nature and can be expressed in terms of sentences like, “A believes that P” where the ‘that’ clause articulates the content of A’s belief. Propositional attitudes are also intentional states.

b) Sensations

Sensations on the other hand, refer to sensory states of mind, such as bodily pain or pleasure, perceptual sensation like experiences of color, sound, feelings. They do not have a relational structure and are not expressed in terms of ‘that’ clause. These sensations further have phenomenal aspect, a felt content. It explains what-it- is-like for a subject to experience a particular state.

Wittgenstein is mainly concerned with such non-propositional mental states, the paradigm example being that of pain. How could one understand utterances like 'I am in pain'? Whether it falls under the canopy of descriptivist or expressivist account of self?

We have already discussed the preferential treatment of first person psychological utterances (henceforth referred to as avowals) while analyzing private language argument. The traditional picture of authority and epistemic access to one's avowals leads to the assertions that they are known directly to us. Against this picture Wittgenstein argues that there is no special status attributed to avowals of such kind. Thus 'I am in pain' is not a case of description and is not to be evaluated either as true or false. Such a claim purports to a central debate in philosophy. This brings us to the expressivist account of self.

Expressivist account of self rests on the assumption that avowals are not description or reports, rather they are merely expressions. Thus utterances like 'I am in pain', 'I believe this is true', can be classified under the expressivist account. Here, there is no epistemological question concerning how people in a disposition like state can manifest that state in their behavior, nor is there any epistemic accomplishment realized in so manifesting it¹.

In contrast to expressivist there is a cognitive account of the self. It says that self ascriptions are assertions by means of which we report or describe the mental states indicated by their psychological terms, and these statements are subject to truth-evaluability.

Wittgenstein advances an expressivist account of self. This is explicitly clear from his readings of *Investigations*. He states,

¹ Jacobsen, Rockney. 'Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression', *Philosophical quarterly*, vol.46, no.182. jan.1996,p.14

I know what I want, wish, believe, feel (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosopher's nonsense, or at any rate not a judgment a priori²

He asserts in *Investigations* that our self ascriptions merely express our psychological states, and so represent no epistemic accomplishment on our part, they do not count as assertions, description or reports of my mental states....³ Further, Wittgenstein states,

Avowals are conceived of as extension of natural expressive behavior; words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensations and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later sentences. They teach the child new pain behavior⁴.

A similar argument states, that there is a difference between moaning and saying that someone moans. Moaning is a natural expression of pain. It does not describe pain, it is not subject to truth or falsity, and it cannot be learnt. It is a natural primitive kind of pain behavior. But there runs a peculiar difference between 'I have pain' and 'he has pain'. In case of 'I have pain', though it is a natural pain expression is not an epistemic claim, not a description, not subject to truth or falsity, is an acquired kind of pain behavior and is an utterance, it is indeed a criterion for the truth of the assertions that he is in pain. Thus in *Blue Book* he wrote the difference between the proposition 'I have pain' and 'he has pain' is not that of 'L.W. has pain' and 'smith has pain'. Rather it corresponds to the difference between moaning and saying that someone moans⁵.

Thus the above passages highlight the central thesis of Wittgenstein's conception of expressivism. He embraces expressivism and contends that an avowal does not

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, para 221

³ Jacobsen, Rockney. 'Wittgenstein on self-knowledge and self-expression', *Philosophical quarterly*, vol.46, no.182, jan.1996, p.16.

⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 244.

⁵ *The Blue and Brown Books (BB)*, 1958, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 68.

proclaim any knowledge claim. More prominently, it is not subject to truth or falsity. These two conditions represent Wittgenstein thesis as expressivist and non cognitivist respectively.

3.2 Crispin Wright's Interpretation of Wittgensteinian Expressivism

Crispin Wright's minimalism

Wright's interpretation of self-knowledge is mainly based on Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. The issue of self-knowledge in *Investigations* pertains to the private language arguments, as stated earlier. The notion of self which precipitates from the argument poses a serious challenge to the philosophers. Cartesian mentalist view dominated the philosophical world and was accepted as an evident fact. With the advent of Wittgenstein's systematic attack on Cartesianism, philosophers have tried to re-think the entire landscape with a new approach. Precisely one can say, Cartesian view proposed mental states as constituting an inner realm which enjoys privilege status, which is directly connected to the subject of whom it is a state of. The Cartesian view of self-knowledge has been challenged by many philosophers. There still persist challenging tasks to explain the notion of self-ascription which is essential for understanding self. Cartesian notion of self views self as indubitable, incorrigible, infallible, and are in epistemically privileged position. This framework of self knowledge is what Wittgenstein strongly argued against in *Investigations*. The problem lies in explaining the status of avowals, and how do we account for them in the absence of a Cartesian model. Wright tries to interpret Wittgenstein's deconstruction of Cartesian picture of self and formulate an alternative account of understanding avowals.

Phenomenal and attitudinal avowals

Wright states that the basic philosophical problem of self- knowledge is to explain the phenomenon of avowals. By avowals he refers to the phenomenon of authoritative, non-inferential present tense self-ascription. The problem lies in how to understand the position by means of which one is in privilege position than the other, in claiming about

oneself. Wright distinguishes two kinds of avowals on the basis of three marked characteristics which avowals possess. Avowals are said to be groundless, authoritative and transparent⁶.

Phenomenal avowals are exhibited as 'I am happy', 'I feel depressed', 'I have a toothache' etc. They are groundless, in the sense that it is unreasonable to ask someone claiming that, 'I am unwell', a justification or grounds for claiming it. Secondly, they are strongly authoritative. In the sense, if someone makes such a claim, with sincerity and understanding, then it stands as a guarantee of truth in itself. To doubt such a claim is to question, one's sincerity about that person. Further, once we accept the sincere claim of the person, it stands as a criterion of correctness for the corresponding third-person ascription. Further, phenomenal avowals, Wright asserts, are transparent in the sense that a person making a claim about oneself is immediately aware of it.

Other class of avowals is attitudinal avowals. These are 'content-bearing states', they have a propositional form. These are self -ascription of our intentional states. For instance, 'I believe that it will rain today', 'I hope that my work gets complete on time', 'I am thinking of my mother'. According to Wright, these intentional avowals are usually arrived at through a process of self interpretation. Hence, they lack the three features of phenomenal avowals. We usually arrive at them through inference and self interpretation. He explains it with an example of Jane Austen's Emma, in which Emma suddenly realizes her love for Professor Knightly, by interpreting her reaction of discontent when she learns about Harriet's love for the same person.⁷ The point which Wright wants to make is that, many times our desires, emotions are suppressed in our awareness of them. By a process of interpretation, through our reaction to such instances we are able to reveal the real feeling to ourselves that remained dormant. However, Wright strongly asserts that even attitudinal avowals are said to be known non-inferentially. Wright contends what we call self-interpretative cases cannot be considered as basic cases, they are not restricted to recollected behavior, rather they possess an avowable content which in itself becomes a criterion for such interpretation. Thus, Emma's interpretation of her

⁶ Note: This is how Crispin Wright has put it.

⁷ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 15.

reaction to Harriet's declaration as evidence that she herself loves Knightly, lies in her avowing—something like 'I am disconcerted by her love for that man and, more so, by the thought that it might be returned'- which is a datum for-rather than a product of self interpretation. Thus, Wright regards attitudinal avowals as characterizing non-inferential knowledge, reflecting matters for the particular subject in the particular context requiring no interpretation.⁸ He thus, clarifies attitudinal avowals as both groundlessness and transparent. However, such avowals have weak authority. They are devoid of the feature of immediacy of phenomenal avowals. This is so because there is a possibility of confusion or self-deception, which lies in it. Here Wright suggests presumptive acceptability as a guarantee for such authority. This claim holds that unless there is special evidence to the contrary, present-tense self-ascriptions are to be taken as true. Wright states,

What distinguishes the presumptive acceptability of attitudinal avowals from anything characteristic of testimony generally is that the authority which attaches to them is, in a certain sense, inalienable. Further, no corresponding wholesale suspicion concerning my attitudinal avowals is possible. You may not suppose me sincere and comprehending, yet chronically unreliable, about what I hope, believe, fear and intend. Wholesale suspicion about my attitudinal avowals- where it is not a doubt about sincerity or understanding- jars with conceiving of me as an intentional subject at all⁹.

Presumptive acceptability provides the possibility of having a miss-apprehension of oneself, without claiming that one is systematically wrong in making claims about one's current mental states. In this way, such avowals remain inalienable. Thus, Wright formulates both phenomenal and attitudinal avowals as having all the three characteristics. The problem arises as to co-opt these avowals within the discourse of self- ascriptions. The task remains for Wright to explain, how to distance away from the Cartesian mentalist view, which professes epistemic security of one's mental processes.

⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁹ Ibid.,p. 17

Traditional models of self

The above difficulties regarding self-knowledge and explanation of avowals takes a centre-stage in philosophy of mind. Traditionally there are two accounts pertaining to self. One is the contemporary observational account of self and other is the inferential model. Wright examines the two accounts and shows inherent inconsistencies prevalent in them. We shall see that these models fail to accommodate the basic features of avowals, which Wright upholds. This paves the way for exploring an alternative model of self that would also subsume a rational account of avowals which jells well with the more acceptable version of understanding self.

The observational model of self- knowledge holds that it is through observation that we get to know ourselves, but that these inner observations differ from ordinary perceptual observation, in that nothing mediates, epistemically or metaphysically, between the observational state and the state observed. Inner observations or, sometimes called ‘introspection’ are thus non-inferential and metaphysically direct. On the other hand, inferential model is directed towards outward observation. Inner observation model is generally associated with Descartes. The upshot of Cartesian dualism states that, the knowledge one has of one’s own state of mind is direct and unchallengeable in a way that one’s knowledge of material object or of other minds is not. This position holds that we have a ‘privileged access’ to one’s own state of mind. Descartes himself believed that this knowledge was incorrigible; your thoughts about your own current state of mind could not be false. It is well explicated in terms of the properties of transparency and incorrigibility.

(a) Transparency: if you are in a particular state of mind, you know, you are in that state; and

(b) Incorrigibility: if you believe that you are in a particular state of mind, you are in that state.

The Cartesian observational model, Wright proclaims can be understood by an analogy, wherein “we can imagine somebody looking into a Kaleidoscope and reporting

on what he sees. No one else can look in, of course, atleast while he is taking his turn".¹⁰ Such notion, according to Wright will accommodate all features of phenomenal avowals- authority, groundlessness and transparency. There cannot be any room for mistake as it is necessarily observed by the subject. This Cartesian picture personifies mind as a form of theater, where avowals are non-inferentially known to the utterer. Furthermore, others can only have an indirect and mediate awareness of those mental states.

Wright asserts that though attractive, of observational model is actually hopeless. In fact Wittgenstein was the first philosopher, Wright asserts, who carried out the deconstruction of Cartesian model. Wright's project is to explicate Wittgenstein's deconstructive approach which he carried out in *Investigations*. By means of private language argument Wittgenstein questions the efficacy of 'privacy' and of inner private observation and vehemently rejects it. Cartesian conception of transparency and incorrigibility of one's inner state directly assures the possibility of 'private self'. This goes completely against the grain of common sense conception of the self located in a social set up. Wright interprets Wittgenstein deconstruction of Cartesian view of self by means of a two-way attack. He asserts that, by refuting private language argument Wittgenstein challenges the idea of phenomenal avowal as inner observation report. Secondly, attitudinal avowals are challenged by showing that intentional states are not mental processes.

We must herewith note that Wittgenstein's attack on private language harps on the conception that the private linguist fails to account for its correctness. He thus lacks the sense to distinguish what is right and what seems right. Further the grammatical structure camouflages the logical structure. This gives an illusion that the truth claim of private linguist is a report of his inner contents of mind. We have already discussed this in second chapter. The contention of Wright is that the only option left is to go 'public'.¹¹ To take a position, that the inner stage (which is identified as truth conferring states) are available to public view. This eventually leads to behaviorist stand. This we have already

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 22

¹¹ Ibid., p. 33

denied to be the case. This paves the way for 'expressivism' as an alternative account. Wright explains the expressivist conception of self, and analyses it in the light of Wittgenstein's comments in the *Investigations*.

Wright interprets Wittgenstein as formulating an expressivist account to analyze avowals and their status. Expressivism as we have mentioned earlier, upholds that instead of viewing avowals as assertions projecting truth/falsity, one may hold them as expressions. Expressivism states that the grammatical structure of an avowal like 'I am in pain' is of subject- predicate form, pretending to describe mental states. On the contrary, expressivist account proclaims that our avowals are mere expressions of mental states and are not subject to truth/falsity. The surface grammatical structure between avowals and other forms of self- ascriptions mislead us to conclude that just as third-person ascription are assertion, so should avowals. Following this line of thought, Wright urges that Wittgenstein in *Investigations* exhibits expressivist account of one's psychological states. This is apparent in *Investigations* Para no.244. Here Wittgenstein contends that pain avowals are not statement with truth evaluable content, but are natural forms of expressions. Furthermore, Wright explains that expressivism subsumes all the three characteristics of avowals quite well. Considering that the avowal 'I am in pain' is an expression and not description, it cannot be put to question (groundless), one is a sincerely aware of this pain as a feeling (transparent) and it bears a strong authority.

However, Wright poses some serious constraints in following the expressivist account. Expressivist claim of not adhering to avowals as assertions and thereby rejecting their applicability to truth or falsity needs to be reconciled with the rules of language. It is worthy to take note that serious objections to expressivism comes from Peter Geach, in his article 'Assertion'.¹²

¹² Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 35

1. In expressivist account, we speak of expression as a present tense form i.e. an expression manifests at the same time as when it is expressed. Thus, 'I am in pain' is taken to be an example of expression. How does expressivist account explains the transformation of tense from-'I am in pain' to 'I was in pain' or 'I will be in pain'? In neither of the last two sentences we see the presence of pain. How do we establish the continuity between avowals like, 'I am in pain' and its past and future tense counterparts?

2. How does expressivist account makes room for locutions such as-'he knows that I am in pain', where 'I am in pain' is embedded in a knowledge claim. Here the knowledge ascription is subject to truth or falsity, as it is a case of assertion. With the same token, 'I am in pain' is also accounted as assertions.

3. Furthermore the statement 'I am in pain' which stands in logical relation to-'someone is in pain'. The problem lies, how can a genuine statement be derived from a mere expression?

4. 'I am in pain' is embedded in a perfectly acceptable conditional statement like 'if I am in pain, I should take an asprin', or a negation like 'it is not the case that I am in pain'. In understanding both these statements, we cannot take the avowal 'I am in pain' as a mere expression. For in the conditional statement, where it is an antecedent, 'I am in pain', needs to be taken as a hypothesis that something is the case. While in the negation, it also needs to be as assertion, because a mere expression cannot be denied. The truth or falsity of a conditional statement and negation depends upon the truth-value of its constituent statement.

Wright's response to 'Geach Point'

Wright says that basically Peter Geach criticizes the form of expressivism that is prevalent in ethical discourse. Ethical expressivism holds that there are no real moral states of affairs. In that sense, it rules out the evaluability of moral judgment in terms of truth or falsity. However, Peter Geach strongly objects and asserts that, since every day moral thought are expressed in terms of sentences which co-opt rules of logic, it has to

presuppose truth /falsity. Thus, avowals cannot be taken as simply expressions. Here Wright contends that this problem is a problem of ethical expressivism and need not affect expressivism in philosophy of mind. Also, according to Wright, Wittgenstein is not denying any mental facts; he is not against admitting psychological facts. Neither is he rejecting the presence of assertions in statements like-‘he is in pain’. The primary focus is the expressivist thesis concerning first-person ascriptions.

It is pertinent to acknowledge, that the distinction between ethical expressivism and expressivism in philosophy of mind helps to preserve the security of avowals which Wright upholds as the ‘presumption of truth’. According to Wright the presumptive acceptability of avowals holds the truth of self- ascriptions, unless contrary evidence to it is given. He apprehends here a problem for expressivism to sustain with strict relation to natural expressions and performatives. The ‘Geach point’ threatens expressivism to gel with performatives and natural expressions. This we have noted in the above stated problems, noted by Peter Geach regarding expressivism. Wright however distinguishes between ethical and mental expressivism and tries to answer Geach by posing two questions:

1. Whether an indicative sentence is associated with truth-evaluable content?
2. Whether its characteristic use is actually assertoric? ¹³

Wright states that, “these questions can be understood in terms of performatives in which they usually appear”¹⁴ . It should be noted that, performative utterances although truth -evaluable, are not the case of descriptions. What Geach insisted is the presence of truth-evaluable content in avowals and that they are indispensable. However, Wright is of the opinion that what expressivists are concerned with is, “a typical use of such sentences are expressions rather than assertions”¹⁵.

¹³ Ibid., p. 36

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 36

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 36

We must note that by making room for 'presumptive acceptability of truth', Wright shows the unworkability of radical expressivism and instead suggests a more flexible form of it. He asserts that in certain cases avowals may differ from being natural expressions. What Wright suggests is that it is quite possible, for our psychological states can very well be asserted rather than expressed. Wright says, "There can be no suggestion that one cannot make assertions about one's own psychology". Thus, in non-typical sense one can make assertions about one's mental state.

We must consider here a natural expression of wanting to have a toy, like crying for a toy, and an avowal, or a linguistic expression, "I want a Teddy". Here we can see both the expressions are direct from the subject. What a subject is doing when issuing an avowal is similar to letting out a cry or gasping in fear, in that she is directly giving voice to her conditions, rather than deliberately crafting an assertoric report, that she is in a certain state of mind. But at the same time, avowals are said to differ from natural expressions. For instance, my saying of my thirst, "I am really thirsty" is capable of being truth-apt.¹⁶ At the same time, it might be used as a direct expression and not assertion. This reflects towards a hybrid character of avowals.¹⁷

Wright maintains that it is the grammatical structure which wrongly construes an expression for an assertion. According to the expressivist account the surface grammar shields the logical structure of an ascription, and we tend to assume that a sentence is a description. This is also what Wittgenstein in *Investigations* affirmed. Wright says, "When selves do make strict assertions about their own psychology, any epistemic advantages they enjoy are confined to those of superiority of evidence".¹⁸ Here he refers to presumptive acceptability of truth. Wright asserts that, epistemic privilege position of avowals is an illusion, although our first person avowals enjoy privilege position, it is non-epistemic. This is due to one's being in a direct position to give vent to one's

¹⁶ Bar-On, Dorit and Long, Douglas, 'Avowals and First-Person Privilege', in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol.LXII, No.2, 2001, p. 327.

¹⁷ See Bar-On and Douglas, 2001, p. 327.

¹⁸ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 37.

expressions. This also maintains the asymmetry between first and third person ascriptions. In this way adding a clause of 'presumptive acceptance of truth' Wright tries to answer Geach's objections.

Wright however poses some serious threat to expressivism. The first objection states that the expressivist account seems to be very restricted to natural, non-linguistic forms of expressions. But this problem, Wright says is not so problematic. The second threat he explains with an example, "Suppose a highly trained secret agent under torture gives no ordinary behavioral sign of pain. However, his tormentors are well equipped to ascertain the amount of torture he is going through"¹⁹. The issue that is raised here is, how does expressivism account for superiority of the first person viewpoint? For in this situation, his tormentors are better placed, in a sense they are at an advantageous position, as they can very much know the torture he is going through.

The third problem Wright states, one can very well conceive of a situation where the content of an avowal is available to oneself without any public expression. One might say to oneself in thoughts like, "my headache has gone" or "what a lazy day", etc. These expressions do contain the three essential characteristics of avowals- authority, transparency and groundlessness. Since there is no outward expression of behavior, one cannot take them to be genuine avowals. This goes against the illocutionary aspect of avowals as explaining present mental states.

Wright proposes his 'default view' against the standard Cartesian model. This he believes is also Wittgenstein's viewpoint and tries to interpret it in terms of problems faced by expressivist account of avowals. The default view is based on the presumptive acceptability of truth. It works on the constitutive principle according to which, the special status enjoyed by avowals is due to conditions which are based on subjects beliefs, hopes and what it intends.²⁰ The argument goes, "according to the default view it is just primitively constitutive of the acceptability of psychological claims that show in

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 37

²⁰ Ibid., p. 12

cases whose justification would involve active self-interpretation, a subject's opinion about herself are default-authoritative and default-limitative: unless you can show how to make better sense of her by overriding or going beyond it, her active self-conception, as manifest in what she is willing to avow must be deferred to"²¹

Thus, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, one must accept what a subject avows. It is to be noted that it, in a way, denies epistemic status to our avowals. However, according to the default view, the first/third person asymmetries belong to the grammar of the language game of ordinary psychology. This assumption gels quite well with Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. Wittgenstein clearly upheld that philosophical problems arise due to faulty surface grammatical structure.

Another aspect of default view is that it allows for the truth aptness of avowals. Wright says, "The truth condition of psychological ascriptions is primitively conditioned by this constraint"²². The constraint here is of 'default acceptance of truth'.

An assessment of Wright's interpretation

Wright attributed to Wittgenstein a negative (deconstruction) and a positive (construction) contribution with regard to the notion of self and self-knowledge. Wittgenstein carries his negative task by deconstructing Cartesian model of self-knowledge. The positive task, Wright argues, is the propagation of an expressivist account of self-knowledge.²³ Wittgenstein carries this task by projecting anti-explanatory stance in philosophy. This can be clearly captured from his remarks in *Investigations*.

We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say, its purpose, from the

²¹ Ibid., p. 41

²² Ibid., p. 41

²³ Ibid., p. 38

philosophical problems.... (philosophical problems) are solved rather by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such away as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of our urge to misunderstand them....philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.²⁴

Analyzing the above stanza in light of an expressivist account of self, it shows that the problem is manifested in our demand for explanation. Wright states,

We are asking: what is the explanation of the characteristic marks of avowals? And we easily accept a refinement of the question along the lines: what is it about the subject matter of avowals, and about their author's relation to it, which explains the possession by these utterances of their characteristic effortless, non-inferential authority?²⁵

This Wright claims, is indeed a wrong road. We are misled by our craving for explanation. He asserts that Wittgenstein's deconstruction encompasses this very tool through which he bears critique of traditional theories, that is, the tool of anti-explanation. We must acknowledge that this is an important aspect of *Investigations*. Wittgenstein asserts that we must do away with all explanations. He attacks the very idea of forming an explanation or solving a philosophical problem. Explanations in philosophy merely try to show, something which is observable, apparent, by identifying it with something 'deeper'.²⁶ This is clearly foreshadowed in *Investigations*,

Language is something unique- this proves to be a superstition, itself produced by grammatical illusion" Further, "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the form of our

²⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, para 109

²⁵ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 39

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 39

language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language.²⁷

From the above quoted remarks, it is clear that our search for explanation is a mere illusion. What we should look for, is the purpose or use of a word or a sentence and not some underlying deeper relation. This is in accordance with Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning. Also, an essential factor which we can extract from the anti-explanatory stance is Wittgenstein's anti-essentialist view both at the level of language and at the level of self. To look for an explanation is to look for some deeper relation or essence. Wittgenstein indeed argues against this view and gives an anti-essentialist account in *Investigations*. What Wright asserts here is that Wittgenstein denies explanation and put forth the conception of the 'autonomy of grammar'.

It is futile to crave for explanation with respect to the notion of avowals and their relationship with the subject. Wright claims, "The first-third person asymmetries that pose our question belong primitively to the grammar of the language – game of ordinary psychology"²⁸. Wright argues, what expressivists are concerned with is the truth evaluability of avowals, but this is not Wittgenstein proposes in *Investigations*. Wittgenstein vehemently argues against the dogmatic conception of language which is the core of his earlier work- *Tractatus*. He contends, "That our statements always serve 'the same purpose' to convey thoughts, which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please".²⁹

According to this dogmatic picture the only purpose of sentence is to make an assertion expressed in a form of proposition, to state its truth/falsity and laid over against reality as a picture of it. Accordingly, Wittgenstein urges us to set free from such

²⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969. Para 110-111

²⁸ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.39

²⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, London, 1969, Para 304

conceptions and thus questions pertaining to a set picture of avowals to state truth/falsity and thus asymmetries regarding it.

Thus, Wright proposes a 'default view' to Wittgenstein's analysis of expressivist account of self. However, Wright himself claims that 'default view' has its own difficulties. He states it as a 'philosophical turning of the back'.³⁰ John McDowell in his response to Wright poses some serious objections pertaining to his default view. With respect to the anti-explanatory stance, which Wright attributes to Wittgenstein, McDowell argues that a demand for explanation is a natural way to inquire about a phenomenon. Otherwise we won't be able to know what problem we need to deal with. He also objects that although Wright propagates the default view in which the demand for explanation is inappropriate, it fails to provide with any response to certain important questions regarding avowals, such as, 'why exactly should we find it puzzling that avowals differ from reports about others in the ways they do?'.³¹

Conclusion

Thus we see here how default view lacks, in sense of explanation, a clear picture of the status of avowals. Such minimalist theory although serves to account for the avowals as epistemically better placed, they fail to provide them with any truth value. Does it amount to saying that we cannot give any truth value to avowals? We must note here that amongst the contemporary readings of avowals, we see a shift towards a more explanatory and truth assertability of avowals. Neo-expressivism is genuinely engaged towards this new outlook towards avowals. Dorit Bar-on and Douglas C. Long are primarily concerned with such ambitious approach. According to them, avowals can be assigned truth value and enjoy privileged status. One might explore this area with a new approach. However, contribution of minimalist accounts of self cannot be undermined.

³⁰ Wright, Crispin. 'Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.41

³¹ McDowell, John, 'Response to Crispin Wright ', Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p.41

As far as our present text is concerned, we indeed see here a great resemblance of such expressivist proposal with Wittgenstein's reading.

Conclusion

In this present work, we sought to give an account of self as projected in both *Tractatus* and *Investigations*. I must confess that it is injustice to ascribe to Wittgenstein as upholding a philosophical theory. This is in consonance with the very fact that he was against any sort of theorization which the traditional philosophers were usually engaged in. This is not to comply with the opposite view that he was not critical. Rather, he was against a dogmatic practice of labeling and propagating theories. To label is not to argue for anything and judgments are nothing more than a dogmatic exercise. Wittgenstein appreciated the task of clarification and removal of illusions from our thinking. Hence the task of philosophy is to clear away the conceptual confusions. My submission is that his clarificatory mechanism runs through both the works and in the light of this we must explore his intentions.

By investigating the notion of self in both the works, we notice a major shift. In the first chapter we sought to investigate self in a strict logical structure. The Tractarian self emerged as a metaphysical self. He deployed self at the limit of the world and reduced it to the extensionless point. By means of the metaphysical self he tried to impose limit on language. This metaphysical self emerged as explaining the logical structure of the world without actually being in the world.

In the second chapter we saw a major shift in the position of self. Here self is subsumed in the world and is reflected in terms of language without any strict logical scaffolding. The nature of self emerged here as a self in use. I showed that, according to Wittgenstein, there is no personal or private experience which only the bearer could understand. Here we have argued against the sacrosanct picture of self. We saw how Wittgenstein exploded the notion of private language. We must acknowledge here that the self of solipsist is vehemently attacked in both the works. Thus, there is a sharp attack on Cartesian self. Wittgenstein tried to demystify the nature of self and breakthrough from the tendency, that self enjoys a privileged position, a sacred

corner, which cannot be infiltrated by anyone. This is well explicated by his refutation of private language argument in *Investigations*. The argument explicitly rejects that a language can take place in isolation. An individual cannot indulge in language with him/herself. There is a whole form of life, which provides an interface to communicate one's thoughts and feelings with others and share a form of life. It calls for context, circumstances, criteria and rules to play various language games. The 'pain argument' in *Investigations* fairly explains this aspect. Our pains are not private and we do understand other persons pain sensations. We live in a shared form of life and so we share each other's language, culture and traditions.

In the third chapter, we argued that avowals are not descriptions of our mental states rather they are expressions. We also learnt that according to Wittgenstein, our first person present tense utterances cannot be subject to doubt and hence, it is absurd to question their validity. At the same time, they do not have any privilege epistemic status as they are non- cognitive accounts of self. We also saw that such utterances are not descriptions but mere expressions, just like 'cry' or 'moan'. Hence the epistemic status of one's inner sensations, emotions is completely given up in terms of everyday account of self. In this way we tried to overcome the problem of self as a means to describing one's inner emotions and sensations.

Thus, we saw how expressivist account of self emerges in *Investigations*. The self here is embedded in a form of life and a variety of uses of language, which is in turn reflected by criteria and circumstances. Thus, I feel it is more of a situated self. In following this line of thought we can say that there are different perspectives and that there is no one notion of self. Self is viewed here with a lens of a variety of language-games in various forms of life.

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