


**U. S. VIEWS ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE
SECURITY OF ASIA-PACIFIC,
1981-1984**

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Map 1. East Asia and Pacific

Source: John M. Collins, *U.S. - Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985*
 New York: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defense Publishers,
 1985), p.140.

P R E F A C E

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has been an influential and a paramount power in the Pacific, in spite of the losses sustained in the two conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Since the beginning of the seventies, the U.S. has been increasingly paying more attention to Asia-Pacific. The growing strength and global importance of the Pacific economies and the fact that the region is becoming the focus of superpower rivalry has renewed America's interest in this region. The Soviet Union has steadily extended its influence in the Pacific. Hence, new elements in the security equation of the superpowers in Asia-Pacific pose a challenge for the U.S. and its Pacific allies.

Japan's cooperation is necessary for the U.S. for meeting Soviet armed challenge in the western Pacific Ocean. The U.S. does not object to a more autonomous diplomacy by Japan as it regards this as a natural step in the evolution of both Japan and Asia. America is no longer prepared to assume the preponderate burdens and responsibilities in U.S. - Japanese relations as it did since the end of the Second World War. It insists on a greater equity in their relations. Japan also is increasingly becoming aware of the fact that its economic prowess does not grant it a sufficient international status to compensate for its military weakness. But at the same time, Japan is aware of the

fact that an increased U.S. Japanese strategic cooperation would make Japan a greater magnet for Soviet attack. The U.S. on its part realizes that it would be the major beneficiary of increased Japanese preparedness.

The objective of this dissertation is to trace the various phases of U.S. Japanese security ties from 1981 to 1984 and its implications for the wider security commitments of the U.S. in Asia Pacific. It is sought, in this dissertation, to deal specifically with the varied attitudes of Japan and America on the issue of defense burden sharing; and how a greater contribution by Japan as demanded by America could improve the U.S. strategic position in Asia Pacific.

This is an analytical and interpretative study which attempts to discern the objective contents from available source reference material and leave behind unwarranted generalizations. It seeks to trace the origin and resolution of conflict in U.S. Japanese security perceptions, and its wider implications for the superpower rivalry in the Asia Pacific region.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr. B.K. Shrivastava. Without his guidance I would not have been able to do justice to this study. I owe much to my family for their encouragement which made it possible for me to

finish this work. I am indebted to the staff of the various libraries I have worked in - the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library; the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House; the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, Sapru House and the American Centre Library.

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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The earliest manifestation of American interest in Asia Pacific region was essentially economic in nature. The need for tropical raw materials and markets for its increasing industrial output made the U.S. seek trade links with nations in the Asia Pacific region. Later, as the competition with West European nations for acquiring markets in the region increased, the need to have American bases in the Pacific was felt.

Still, until the later half of the nineteenth century, there was not much emphasis on increasing the American military strength in far off regions. In late nineteenth century, Captain Alfred T. Mahan (U.S. Navy), stressed the need for a nation to control the seas as a key to expanding national power and prestige.¹ This idea did not take long to take a hold in the U.S. and it soon acquired strategic island bases in the Asia Pacific region and became a Pacific power in the military sense. The important island bases acquired were : Hawaii, annexed in 1893; Samoa and Midway; and the Philippines, acquired after the Spanish American War of 1898. Other islands acquired by the U.S. to facilitate its commerce were; Wake Island, Spanish Island of

1. For details see, Captian Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power: Present and Future (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1897).

Guam, Midways, the Southern Island of Palmyra in the Hawaiian group, and Guano islands in the mid-Pacific. These acquisitions projected the image of the U.S. as a world power.

President Theodore Roosevelt further strengthened the U.S. navy and sent it across the globe as a demonstration of US determination to Japan that he was ready to go to war if necessary. Since the adoption of Open Door Policy with regard to China, the U.S. commercial opportunities in the region were enhanced. However, the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 threatened to destabilize the balance of power in the region thereby seriously jeopardizing the American interests. The U.S. therefore tried to restore the balance by mediating in the war and helping in the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth.

To secure the U.S. interests in the face of rising Japanese militarism, Roosevelt's successor President William Howard Taft worked towards establishing a fleet to carry on an offensive war in the Western Pacific in case a crisis evolved.² But due to unfavourable domestic atmosphere and intraparty strife not much was done to strengthen the military. This flaw in the policy for strengthening the U.S. navy to improve the country's position in the Pacific Ocean was greatly overcome with the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914.³

2. See, Henry F. Pringle. The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939).

3. See, Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1946), Chapter 18.

Before 1914, Japan was comparatively weaker militarily than the U.S. By the end of the First World War Japan was still a lesser power than the U.S. but had considerably strengthened its military. Consequently, American and Japanese policies came into conflict in Shantung, Siberia, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands and Marina's Islands which were of great strategic value. The Washington Naval Conference in 1921, though set limits on the growth of naval power in the Pacific Ocean failed to check unprecedented growth in Japan's military strength. By 1930 the U.S. naval presence in the Asia-Pacific had deteriorated and Japan had acquired superior navy in the region. Japanese military capabilities were a cause of concern for the U.S. as the Japanese aggression in China directly threatened the U.S. access there.⁴

In September 1939 with the outbreak of the Second World War and Japan's joining the Axis Powers the next year, caused grave concern to the U.S. In 1941, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions against Japan and expected retaliatory Japanese military attack on the Philippines, Thailand or British Malaya. The Japanese took the U.S. by surprise by attacking the Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. The U.S. resorted to a strategy of defense and submarines and airpower were used to destroy Japan.⁵

4. For details see, George, T.Davis, A Navy Second to None: The Development of Modern American Naval Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1940).

5. Russell Spurr, "Seventh Fleets New Asian Role," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol.96, 3 June 1977, p.28.

The Pacific War brought numerous changes in Asia Pacific region. Both the Japanese and European imperialism ended. The U.S. emerged out of the war as a mighty super power and stepped into the region to fill the vacuum created by the defeat of Japan.

The American national objective after the Second World War was to strive for the establishment of peace which would guarantee external security and internal stability to the U.S. In Northeast Asia, attaining this goal meant, on the one hand, an active participation of America in the region and on the other hand, opening up of the region to unrestrained economic activities.⁶ The policy required stripping Japan of its military power, since its imperialism had led to the war.

POST WORLD WAR II PACIFIC SETTLEMENTS

On 2 September 1945, on board the battleship U.S.S. Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay, the representatives of the Emperor of Japan signed the documents of unconditional surrender and the Allied military command took over the reigns of the nation.⁷ The occupation of Japan under the Allied troops lasted for almost seven years. During this period, the U.S. decided to ensure a lasting peace for the future; and to achieve this objective the

6. Martin Weinstein (ed.), Northeast Asian Security After Vietnam (Chicago : Univ. of Illinois Press, 1982), p.4.

7. Hyman Kublin, Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p.182.

island nation was made a strong democracy devoid of all the forces making for militarism and war.

The task to set up an administrative machinery to suit the American plans fell to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the Pacific. His first task was to remove all traces of Japanese militarism. With this objective he dismantled all the Japanese military installations in Japan, South East Asia and the Pacific. The war supplies were destroyed and civilian organisation of nationalistic and militaristic character were disbanded. The domestic police were placed under major restrictions. By the spring of 1946, Japan was completely disarmed. But the process of demilitarization did not end even after it was deprived of its ability to wage war.

Japan was deprived of its overseas possessions. Manchuria was now restored to China; Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands were occupied by the troops of Chiang Kai-Shek. In the Korean peninsula, the North of 38th parallel was occupied by the Russian armies and the Southern part was controlled by American forces. Japanese colony was thus liberated after its tragic division into two. Japan's mandated islands in the Central Pacific were occupied and administered later by the U.S. as a United Nations trusteeship. Its other island territories - Okinawa and Bonin were to come under American control, while South Sakhalin and the Kuriles went to the Soviet Union.

The security agreement thus envisaged got a formal approval in 1945 at the Yalta conference. Its main objective was to maintain the postwar status quo in the world. The positions of the U.S., the Great Britain and Soviet Russia were made clear. The U.S. would be the predominant power in the Pacific Ocean, including the Philippines, Okinawa and Japan. The Soviet Union would extend its influence over Northeast Asia, regaining Sakhalin and Kuriles as well as obtaining rights in Manchurian railways and the Port Arthur. Great Britain was restored to its colonial regions in Southeast Asia, while China was freed from the Japanese occupation. It reflected the reality of power in the region therefore this arrangement proved to be stable. Until 1949 the Yalta Agreement paid by providing overall systemic stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The settlement left the U.S. relatively free in Japan. Without the "tampering influence of allies" hindering its actions, the U.S. got a unique opportunity to "impose on a culturally alien but industrialized society the fundamental ideals of American diplomatic tradition".⁸

As the SCAP set about demilitarising Japan, it also attempted building democratic government for Japan. The new constitution came into effect on 3 May 1947. It was also known as MacArthur Constitution since the principle framer of the

8. Robert A. Scalapino, The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (London: Univ. of California Press, 1947), p.322.

constitution was General MacArthur. The constitution was first drafted in the offices of SCAP and then sent to a committee of the Diet (Japanese national legislature) to be given a native form. It established democracy in Japan. The Executive functions were endowed in the office of the Prime Minister, a member of the House of Representatives. He was chosen for the office as the leader of the strongest political party in the legislature. A cabinet of the Prime Minister's choice was to assist him in performing his functions. The Emperor remained a national symbol. The national court system (judiciary) was made completely independent of all legislative and executive influences.

The outstanding feature of the Japanese constitution is Article IX, known as the "no war clause", embodied in the constitution to check the rebirth of Japanese militarism. It reads :

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁹

This postwar formative stage of Japanese national policy was complicated due to the Korean war that broke out in June 1950.

9. Donald C. Hellman, Japan and East Asia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1947), p. 142.

The Korean War:

The North Korean invasion of South Korea provided the U.S. with what it considered to be the proof of Soviet expansionism in the Asia Pacific. It also brought to the fore the negligence of Korea, strategically important peninsular country, hitherto overlooked by the U.S. In 1950, the Secretary of State, Acheson stated that the U.S. defense perimeters in Asia excluded Korea. Such an outlook changed drastically with the subsequent events in Korea and the developing Cold War.

The outbreak of war in Korea put the U.S. in a precarious position. To adhere to Acheson's definition would have affected Japan's security directly along with giving the Soviet Union the impression that its aggression, direct or through proxies would be tolerated by Washington. Any inaction on the part of the U.S. would have revealed America's lack of determination to resist Communist expansion. The U.S. believed that the Chinese intervention in the war revealed that China also posed a threat to peace in the region, if not contained by the U.S. When the war began it was concluded that not only the peace in the world but the security and interests of the U.S. itself were at stake. Hence it became important for the U.S. to participate in the war.¹⁰

As a direct consequence of the war the U.S. demanded Japan

10. For details see, *Ibid.* Chapter 6.

As a direct consequence of the war the U.S. demanded Japan

to upgrade its Self Defense Forces to meet the regional challenges. The Korean war made a lasting impact on Japan's postwar foreign policy as it set the ball rolling for a long campaign by the U.S. to get Japan to shoulder more responsibility and cost of its own defense.

During the Korean war the American bases on Okinawa became active staging centres. There was a general feeling in Washington that continued U.S. administrative control over Okinawa and other outlying Japanese islands would prove a valuable strategic asset in the long run.¹¹ Due to the pressing American concern for security, Okinawa was not reverted to Japan until 1972. In addition, because of its strategic position Japan was now expected to upgrade its Self Defense Forces. But during the rest of the 1950s, and throughout much of 1960s, the U.S. was "not overly agitated" about the lack of Japanese cooperation. The primary reason for this was minimal expectations about Japan's ability to contribute strategically.

Mutual Security Treaty:

On 8 September 1951, Japan and 48 other nations signed the San Francisco Treaty. This peace treaty ended the state of war that had continued for ten years. On the same day as the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, a U.S. Japan Mutual

11. I.M. Destler, Priscilla Clapp and others, Managing an Alliance (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Instn. Inc., 1976), p.11.

Security Treaty was also signed. The U.S. agreed to retain the major responsibilities for defending Japan against aggression. Instead of expecting Japan to rebuild its own forces and insure the security of neighbouring Asian countries, it was expected (with assurance from Prime Minister Shigoru Yoshida) that Japan would gradually rearm within the limits of economic capability and constitutional law. The Treaty allows the U.S. to use its forces in Japan for the defense of Japanese territory. But the use in combat for any other purpose would require a prior consent of the Japanese government.

There were many reasons for the Japanese acceptance of the Mutual Security Treaty, with its provisions to leave Japan militarily weak. Firstly, the level of rearmament suggested by the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles in the wake of the Korean war was not acceptable to Premier Yoshida and his advisers. This suggestion, made in 1951, would have caused a drain on Japanese reconstruction plan. Secondly, any plan of rebuilding Japanese military would affect its relations with its Asian neighbours, who were still suspicious of Japan. This lack of trust could lead to their reluctance to trade with Japan, thereby hampering Japanese economic recovery and reconstruction. But such a policy did not go unopposed within the country. Socialist and Communist parties were quite vociferous in their opposition on the point. They alleged that the nature of the proposed commitment to the U.S. in the Mutual Security Treaty would inhibit development of good neighbourly Japanese relations with the Communist countries. It was difficult for the dominant

conservative party in Japan to refute the argument that American bases in Japan were simply a revised form of American occupation.¹²

The Changing Structure of Japanese Self Defense Forces:

The resolution of Japan to remain unarmed began to fade gradually as the international scenario changed. With the beginning of the Korean war in 1950, the U.S. withdrew many of its troops from Japan and stationed them in the Korean peninsula. Japan had to organise small army and naval units to replace them. Since the Constitution did not allow the maintenance of "armed forces" the new military units were named "Self Defense Forces" in 1954. Later air units were also added to the forces.

After the Korean war the U.S. decided to maintain only small military forces in Japan. This shifted the responsibility of defense of the island to the Japanese themselves. The number of troops stationed in Japan dropped from nearly 2,00,000 in late 1954 to about 90,000 in December 1956.¹³ Since then, successive Japanese governments have been stepping up rearmaments. In 1952, the National Police Reserve, formed by the American occupation for maintaining internal security was reorganized into a National Security Forces. It included Maritime Safety Force and was subject to gradual expansion.

12. Ibid, p.15.

13. Ibid,p.15.

Major change in the structure of Japanese Security Forces was introduced in 1954. Legislation was passed to establish National Defense Forces, composed of separate ground, air and naval arms. Their strength reached 214,182 men by late 1956.¹⁴ This increase did not meet Dulles' expectations of 350,000 men, yet the rise was significant. By 1957, the Japanese and the U.S. governments had reached a series of understandings on limitations of the Security Treaty. These were not mentioned in the Treaty itself. These understandings evolved from consultations between the two governments; and dealt with details about the deployment and use of the U.S. Forces in Japan. The understandings thus reached were not made explicit in the security treaty.

U.S. - JAPANESE RELATIONS FROM 1960 TO 1980

Since the Korean war the Japanese became increasingly aware of their vulnerability as an "economic giant" but a "military dwarf". The course of events since the Korean war in the Asia Pacific indicated the possibility of a general conflict in the region resulting in the total involvement of the U.S., leaving Japan to its own devices to defend its territories. Many developments in the 1960s and 1970s like the revision of the Mutual Security Treaty, the Vietnam War and the Declaration of Nixon Doctrine demonstrated the need for Japan to activate and update its defense capabilities. The task could not be ignored any more.

14. Ibid, p.15.

Revision of the Mutual Security Treaty 1960-61:

The U.S. Japanese defense treaty was controversial since its inception. A majority of Japanese believed they had no better alternative to the agreement and hence supported the treaty. A small but vocal minority however felt the American bases on the Japanese soil to be humiliating, reminding them of the Occupation. In addition, there was pervasive fear among the Japanese that a military alliance with the U.S. would drag them into a war, should the latter get involved. The Japanese Socialist Party was strongly opposed to the Security Treaty. When the question of revising the Security Treaty in 1960 was raised, in order to change some of its objectionable features, the Socialists backed by the Communists launched a series of demonstrations bringing about a political crisis in the country.

The revision of the Mutual Security Treaty was aimed at meeting "conditions of mutuality" that the Japanese leaders considered essential for the security and sovereignty of the country. The Americans were disappointed with Japan's contribution to "free world defense". John Foster Dulles viewed mutual security as an equal and parallel commitment by two or more governments to the defense of each other. This meant contribution by each according to its ability. Differences arose as what Japan viewed as its contribution to mutual defense, i.e. provision of bases, was not considered equal and parallel to the American contribution. The Americans saw no justification for guaranteeing security to Japan so long as the latter did not contribute

materially to collective security or made an explicit commitment to the security of its neighbours.

Japanese had their own misgivings about the Security Treaty which authorized the use of U.S. forces "at the express requests of the Japanese government", to control externally instigated insurrection within Japan. Apart from this there was no provision for mutual consultation on the deployment or use of U.S. forces in Japan, except whatever "conditions" might be "determined by administrative agreements". It also prohibited Japan from granting any base rights to a third power without the consent of the United States. The agreement was criticized by various quarters in Japan and finally culminated in a political deadlock that was resolved only with the resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, in June 1960.¹⁵

The problems with the old "unequal" treaty were mutually recognized. A negotiated solution was reached as a result of the adjustment by both the parties. Particularly important results of the negotiations were: that the Americans yielded and compromised on Japanese rearmament; and that the Japanese agreed with the American position on the Communist threat to Asia, particularly to the security of South Korea in future.

The opposition to the revision of the Treaty was triggered by the Socialist and Communist elements in Japan. They staged a

15. Ibid, p.22.

series of demonstrations and tried to block ratification of the treaty by creating a deadlock in the National Diet. The crisis ended only when Prime Minister Kishi finally pushed ratification of the revised treaty through the Diet. He was able to do this at the expense of his own political career as his party split and he had to resign from the office. The objections to the revised Mutual Security Pact however disappeared by the late 1960s. The Japanese opponents resumed their protest again only to demonstrate their resentment over the United States' use of Japanese facilities in carrying on the Vietnam War before the renewal of the Treaty in 1970.

The Vietnam War:

The Vietnam War brought about a major change in the pacifist outlook of Japan. The involvement of the U.S. in the war left Japan comparatively unprotected. As the U.S. was caught in a deep crisis the Communist government of North Vietnam intended to "liberate" the South and unify the country under the Communist rule. As a result of North Vietnam's attempts at subversion the use of Communist gurilla became more effective. The very existence of South Vietnam was threatened. The U.S. was committed to the preservation of the independence of South Vietnam.

The U.S. was opposed by the Communist forces of Dr. Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, who had earlier received U.S. assistance while resisting Japanese occupation forces in 1940-45. He later resisted French reoccupation after the Japanese withdrawal.

Beginning with economic aid to South Vietnam and training the Vietnamese army in counter insurgency the American involvement in Vietnam gradually increased. As Ho Chi Minh established control over North Vietnam and then strove to extend it over the rest of the country, and the French who had reoccupied South Vietnam after Japan's withdrawal resisted the move; the U.S. found itself deeply involved in the conflict.

As a part of their strategy of containment of global Communism the U.S. aided the French and this led to the U.S. supporting a corrupt South Vietnamese government which did not have popular support. In spite of the increased level of United States military assistance to South Vietnam, the country staggered under the North Vietnamese blows. As the war drew to a close in the early 1970s, the U.S. army in Vietnam suffered great loss. Nixon and his advisers decided to withdraw gracefully from South Vietnam by negotiating an agreement. The withdrawal finally took place in 1973.¹⁶ The inability of U.S. to deal with the situation in Vietnam effectively had its long term repercussions on its policies in the Asia Pacific.

Public support in the U.S. for Asian commitments declined as a result of the "post-Vietnam syndrome." The U.S. foreign policy for the following years was clouded with skeptical scrutiny of its military commitments and reversion to the isolationist biases. To make the American position worse the Soviet Union had, under the

16. Norman Podhoretz, Why we were in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p.172.

cover of detente improved its military position in Asia Pacific. The American failure and the surge in the Soviet power in the region shattered the confidence of East Asian nations in Washington's commitments. The reaction of the United States to this change was an effort to rebuild its defense structure and attempt to create Asian counterweights to the Soviet Union. The Vietnam War had a direct bearing on Japanese defense structure as the U.S. withdrew its troops from Japan to be stationed in Vietnam, and pressurised Japan to raise its defense expenditure to ensure a strong defense structure.

The Nixon Doctrine:

As the Vietnam War continued the need for a critical reevaluation of America's security interest in the Asia Pacific region and a need for redefinition of its military postures to fulfil its commitments to the region were regarded as a necessity. President Nixon in the Nixon Doctrine argued that the U.S. was a Pacific power and consequently it had its treaty commitments in the region that could not be overlooked.

The Nixon Doctrine, which was universal in its application had its origin in Asia in 1969. Nixon in his Memoirs writes:

As I looked at America's foreign policy during the 1960s, I felt that it had been held hostage first under Kennedy to the Cold War and then under Johnson to the Vietnami war. Our tendency to become prooccupied with only one or two problems at a time had led to a deterioration of policy on all fronts. I did not feel that there should be any single

foreign policy priority. There were many priorities, moving in tandem, each effecting the others..."¹⁷

It was with this view of giving a broader framework to the policy tenets that Nixon Doctrine was framed. It reiterated the global commitment of the U.S. and underlined the factors that were to shape future relations of the U.S. with its various allies. In East Asia it sought to build a cooperative relationship in which all would share the burdens and responsibilities of peace and security.

The Doctrine did not weaken the U.S. commitments in East Asia, but it "provided the United States with the means to readjust the level of its involvement and responsibilities in Asia to one which better fits our interests and capabilities in the seventies...."¹⁸ The importance of the Doctrine lay in encouraging a greater degree of self-reliance among many of the East Asian nations and providing a strong impetus to the development of regional cooperation.

However, what affected the American allies in Asia Pacific most was the principle of sharing responsibilities. The U.S. resolution of stepping down its military presence in the region was to leave the nations there to bear more burden of defense in the region.

17. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), p. 343.

18. United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State (Washington D.C. : USGPO, 1973), p.239.

The United States through the Doctrine reiterated its intention to continue "its close consultations with its allies and friends in the region and to retain bases in Japan and elsewhere in the Western Pacific". It promised that it would "continue to play a vital balancing role in Asia and the Pacific." It firmly stated its desire to maintain in the area that mix of ground, naval and air forces necessary to make that role effective.¹⁹ At the same time it proclaimed its resolve to reduce the U.S. military presence in the region.

In 1972, the level of the troops was reduced to nearly 600,000 from a total of over 840,000 in 1962. Under the Vietnam cease-fire agreement of 27 January 1973, all U.S. troops and military personnel were withdrawn from Vietnam by the end of March 1973. Further reductions were carried out in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines.

Apart from the reduction of troops in the region, a new dimension that was added to U.S. policies in Asia was that the U.S. became aware of the importance of People's Republic of China. Nixon wrote in his Memoirs that "... some new and direct relationship between the two nations was essential if there were to be any chance at all after the Vietnam War was over to build a lasting peace in Asia, in which free nations would have a chance to survive".²⁰ The reduction of troop levels coupled with the prospect of improved relations of the U.S. with China caused much

19. Ibid., p. 239.

20. Nixon, Memoirs, n.17, p.283.

anxiety among the Japanese and other East Asian allies.


Japan and the U.S. Relations with China :

In 1964, Communist China exploded its first atomic bomb causing concern among the Asian nations as well as the U.S. The U.S. believed that peace and security in the region could be maintained only by reaching an understanding with China. Japan had been the sheet anchor of the U.S. policy in Asia. Now Nixon intended to change that without any reference to Japan. In 1971, America moved to open relations with China with the announcement that Nixon would go to China. This compelled the Sato Government in Japan to review its own China policy. Ever since Nixon became president in 1969 the relations between the U.S. and Japan were subject to serious strain and were known in Japan as the "Nixon Shocks". One of the "Nixon Shocks" concerned the U.S. policy towards China.

When the Communists gained control over mainland China in 1949, the U.S. had refused to recognize it. The American government continued to recognize the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai Shek, based on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. This policy was also adopted by Japan. No basic change was made in either the American or Japanese position until President Nixon announced in 1971 that relations with China would be normalized.

This sudden change in the U.S. policy stunned the Japanese government and it protested the failure of the U.S. to consult it

in planning a major policy shift towards PRC. To restore the relationship of trust and cooperation between Japan and the U.S., a meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato took place on 7 January 1972. Although it was thought that Nixon's planned visit to Peking was one of the key subjects that dominated much of the meeting, the two leaders made only a brief mention of China.²¹ The tensions still persisted. Apart from the China factor acting as an irritant, Nixon's trade policies to correct the U.S. deficit were not favourable to Japan.



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However, the U.S. expended much effort to cultivate the PRC as a quasi-ally, as the Soviet Union was seen as a threat by both the nations. The United States counted on China's immensity and its armed forces to balance the large Soviet manpower and its arms. It was believed that the Chinese conventional ground forces, nuclear forces and strategic interests complimented those of the U.S. The PRC was considered to be useful to U.S. for its naval strategy too. Japan's reluctance to play a significant role in defense matters was another reason that drove the U.S. to the PRC and led to the signing of the Shanghai Communique of 28 February 1972.

It was only in the 1980s, when Soviet Union expanded its naval presence in Northeast and Southeast Asia that the U.S. once again turned to Japan. It was felt that China's "potential strategic value" was doubtful because of its uncertain long term

21. Facts on File Yearbook 1972 (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1973), p.4.



ability to modernize its forces and economy.

Carter's Policies 1977:

During the 1970s, the U.S. Congress debated intensely the question of "Burden sharing" and the relative "free-ride" of Japan in matters of defense. In 1976, the cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki set a ceiling on Japanese defense expenditure. It was never to cross the upper limit of 1 percent of the GNP of Japan. The U.S. pressures on Japan to contribute more than 1 percent of the GNP mounted during the Carter Administration.

At the same time significant weaknesses of Japanese defense system came to the notice. On 6 September 1976, Japanese fighters could not track potential enemy - a Soviet aircraft that was designed to gauge, test and practice defeating Japanese defenses. This incident, together with many similar incidences threw some light on inadequacy of Japanese defenses. It was concluded that Japan had "little combat capability" and according to some Western intelligence experts, "Japan's air force might last 10 minutes in a full-scale war with the Soviet Union."²² This set the ball rolling in Japan for reconsidering the nation's military needs and government spending priorities.

The Carter Administrations emphasis on adjusting its military presence in the Pacific region made thing more difficult for Japan. The government was intent on keeping Carter's campaign

22. The New York Times, 22 March 1977, p.3.

pledge to withdraw American ground forces from Korea. Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs of the Carter Administration:

Toward the end of our tenure, we started to press Japan for a larger defense effort. However, we were careful not to pose the issue in such an abrasive fashion as to undermine the internal stability of the Japanese government. We took the position that increased Japanese contributions to the development of some strategically important countries would be a good substitute for a more direct defense effort. This had the advantage of encouraging the Japanese to do more in the broader area of security, without the defense budget becoming a major domestic issue in Japanese politics.²³

The "Nixon shocks" of 1971, which included the major devaluation of the dollar and the abrupt announcement of the American move to improve relations with Peking, first made Japan reconsider its foreign policy.²⁴ Later, with the U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina, the fall of Saigon and then the U.S. proposal to withdraw its troops from South Korea, made Japan consider a more independent course on defense issues.

It led Japan to "quietly accelerating defense programs [sic], stepping up military purchases in the United States and strengthening defense links to Western nations."²⁵ The Carter Administration officials said that Japan's changing mood toward the issue of defense was evident during Defense Secretary, Harold Brown's visit to Tokyo in November 1978. This resulted in an agreement under which the Japanese would contribute more to the

23. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977 - 1981 (New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1983), p.314.

24. The New York Times, 1 Aug. 1977, p.3.

25. Ibid., 19 Nov. 1978, p.8.

cost of keeping American troops in the region.²⁶ Still, the proposal of withdrawal of troops from South Korea was seen by the American allies in the Asia Pacific region as a sign of American retreat. This seriously affected their confidence in the American capacity to deter the enhanced Soviet military in the region.

In 1977, the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees warned that the withdrawal of troops from South Korea entailed great risks. President Carter was therefore forced to reconsider the issue and on 20 July 1979, with the approval of the Congress suspended further withdrawals of U.S. troops from South Korea until 1981.²⁷ Though there were to be no further reductions in the U.S. Pacific forces, still President Carter's Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, noted that because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, "steady and significant increases" in Japan's defense efforts were appreciated.²⁸

In the early postwar years, Japan's helplessness in a hostile world encouraged the development of pacifism. But when its economy regained strength its military strength grew substantially in the 1970s.²⁹ It can be said that "The rearmament of Japan has been

26. Congress and the Nation Vol. V. 1977-80 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1981), p. 153.

27. Ibid., p. 153.

28. See James E. Auer, "Japanese Defense Policy", Current History, (Philadelphia), Vol. 87, April 1988, p. 146.

29. Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 312.

closely associated with the American Pacific Defense strategy since the days of the occupation. It is this close cooperation between the two nations that has built the strong armed forces of Japan today."³⁰

The current emphasis of Washington is on seeing Asia as a whole. It no longer elevates China to a status of a global state, subordinating the rest of Asia to the China policy. China is viewed, first and foremost, as part of Asia and only secondly as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. As a result of this changed outlook the emphasis has shifted to Japan. It is felt that China must modernize and develop its economy before it can translate its "sophisticated global approach" into the realities of world power; while Japan already exerts the influence to play a major international role due to its economic prowess. However, the fact that Japan has to evolve foreign policy and security postures, that are necessary for the best use of its economic strength, is not overlooked. The United States goes about aligning itself more closely with China's modernization while trying to cultivate a sense of global responsibility in Japan.

One of the major reasons responsible for the shift of the United States emphasis from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in the Pacific region from China to Japan is the emergence of Soviet Union in the 1970s as a Pacific power. Japan's geography, industrial base and security treaty with the United States as

30. Harold Hakwan Sunoo, Japanese Militarism: Past and Present (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Inc., 1975), p.ix.

providing an answer to the Soviet threat, and the new power configuration in the Pacific lent the region further importance.

In the recent years the Pentagon's real preoccupation in Asia has been the growth and increased efficiency of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The United States defense officials claim that these forces pose a threat not only to American allies in the Pacific, but also to the West Coast of the United States. Due to its geographic location Japan figures in the Pentagon's plans as a possible deterrent to Soviet moves in Asia Pacific. The Soviet Pacific Fleet, which has its home ports at Vladivostok has to pass through the narrow straits which can be controlled by Japan and Korea. This means a great deal to Washington, as the intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles launched from Soviet submarines in the Pacific are seen as a threat to the United States, which can be countered through the U.S. alliance with Asia-Pacific nations.³¹

Pentagon believes that the Soviet military build up in East Asia is intended to politically intimidate Japan which relies on the United States for its defense under the provisions of Mutual Security Treaty. Hence, it is argued that the U.S. should respond to the Soviet Union's Pacific power by preserving credibility of the American deterrent for Japan. The principal mission of the U.S. in Asia Pacific is thus to maintain an ability to deter Soviet Union and acquire enhanced capability to attack Soviet

31. R. Nations, "A Tilt Towards Tokyo", Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), Vol.120, 21 April 1983, pp.38-39.

targets in Northeast Asia. While providing Japan with a nuclear umbrella and maintaining political stability in the region, the U.S. aims at cultivating a growing sense of Soviet threat and corresponding security consciousness among the Japanese.

As is evident from the course of events since 1945, in the early years of occupation, the U.S. helped in "rehabilitating a miscreant" Japan for possible membership of the International organization. In the later years of occupation the U.S. helped Japan in developing its resources to gain full membership in international society. But by 1960, it was evident that Japan had regained its full independence and was winning back a place of leadership among nations.

The chief reason responsible for Japan's emergence as a potential world leader was its spectacular economic success. It also had a relatively high degree of efficiency in meeting the political and social problems faced by an advanced society. Apart from its own potential of developing into a leading economic power, the Japanese benefitted from the U.S. strategic support. Japan under U.S. protection could remain "lightly armed non nuclear power", exerting itself only in the economic field.³²

Japan's postwar antimilitarism and aversion to power politics were not approved of by the U.S. in the decades after the Korean War. The realisation that America's position in Asia was bound to be closely linked to Japan made

32. I.M. Destler, n.11, p.168. to closely link to Japan made

the U.S. treat the island nation with a little more of deference than would be forthcoming with its criticism of Japan's determination not to participate in Asian 'Real Politik'.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet build up in the Pacific and the strong U.S. pressure to increase military spending led Japan to strengthen militarily. In the 1970s, the military budget increased six fold (see Table 1.1). By the end of the decade Japan had the seventh largest military establishment in the world.

The number of setbacks faced by the U.S. in Asia Pacific led it to give second thoughts to its entire Asian policy. One result, as stated before, was what is referred to as "The Nixon Doctrine". This was to lay a new emphasis on getting U.S. partners everywhere to bolster the U.S. leadership position by doing more on their own behalf. In Japan the slowly increasing U.S. pressures had mixed results, the importance of which is crucial to the future of both countries.

T a b l e - 1.1

TRENDS IN LEVEL AND SHARE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURE, 1955-84

(FISCAL YEARS)

	Defense Expenditures (billion yen)	Change in Amount over Previous year	Ratio to GNP	Ratio to General Account Budget
1955	134.9	-3.3%	1.78%	13.61 %
1960	156.9	0.6	1.23	9.99
1965	301.4	9.6	1.07	8.24
1970	569.5	17.7	0.79	7.16
1975	1,327.3	21.4	0.84	6.23
1977	1,690.6	11.8	0.88	5.93
1978	1,901.0	12.4	0.90	5.54
1979	2,094.5	10.2	0.90	5.43
1980	2,230.2	6.5	0.90	5.24
1981	2,400.00	7.6	0.91	5.13
1982	2,586.1	7.8	0.93	5.21
1983	2,754.2	6.5	0.98	5.47
1984	2,934.6	6.5	0.99	5.80

Source:

Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs, Japan 1984: "An International Comparison" (Tokyo; Keizai Koho Centre, 1984), p.86
 Also printed in, Chalmers Johnson, "Reflections on the Dilemma of Japanese Defense" Asian Survey, Vol. 26, May 1986, p.568.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY BUILDUP IN ASIA-PACIFIC 1981-84

The Carter Administration ended on an optimistic note for the nations in the Asia-Pacific as the withdrawal of troops from South Korea was postponed. The U.S. policy seen as a consequence of the Vietnam war had aroused serious concern among countries of the region. Their constant demand that the U.S. maintain its presence in the region left the latter in a relatively good bargaining position.

Since it were the Asian nations - the Philippines, South Korea and Japan, who now clamoured for the U.S. presence in the region, it was apparent that there was a convergence of interests of the U.S. and Asia-Pacific countries. This mutuality of interest had never before come to the fore with such force, especially in Japan. The insistence of the U.S. on retaining bases in the region had made the interests appear to be one-sided. But when the nations in Asia-Pacific articulated their national interest, the U.S. was in a position to make a counter proposal that they support its strategy for containing the increasing Soviet power in the region.

The mutuality of interests focuses on strategic cooperation between the U.S. and the nations of the region. The 1980s made it clear that the U.S. was becoming increasingly dependent on the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to contain and deter the

Soviet Union with their economic, military and diplomatic strength.¹

During the early 1980s the U.S. tried to create a new basis for strategic cooperation in Asia that required far greater Asian self-reliance, interdependence and cooperation with the U.S. Once the new relationship became operative, the U.S. could devote its resources more easily and effectively ^{in other} regions of the world, especially in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. These regions claimed the U.S. attention due to their strategic and economic importance.

As a result of the U.S. emphasis on self reliance of the allies, towards the end of the 1970s, President elect Ronald Reagan and the Carter Administration agreed that the U.S. relations with Japan would be affected if the latter did not strengthen its military position.² This indicated that the Reagan Administration was going to pursue a policy towards Japan which was not going to be much different from that of the Carter Administration.

The Congressional debates in 1982 testified that "The Reagan Administration like the Carter Administration before it - generally agreed with Congress that U.S. allies in Europe and

1. Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.), Asian-Pacific Security: Emerging Challenges and Responses (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Pub. Inc., 1986), p.22.

2. The New York Times, 13 Dec. 1980, p.3.

Japan ought to carry more of the burden of defense".³

The Reagan Administration carried on the determination of the Carter Administration to maintain troops in South Korea. "It identified the Soviet Union as the primary security threat to Asian-Pacific states in a manner reminiscent of the containment approach championed by Dulles..."⁴ The Soviets were seen by the Reagan Administration as expanding their regional military capabilities to maximise their opportunity to improve its strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region.

During the 1970s Japan had strengthened its military and increased its defense budget by sixfold because of the Soviet military buildup in the Pacific and strong American pressure to increase defense spending. But in the beginning of the 1980s debates began in Japan over its long-range security strategy and linkage with American defense. In 1981, for the first time since the Second World War, Japan seriously considered changing its military posture. In April 1981, Japanese Joint Chiefs of Staff Council, General Goro Takeda, urged the nation to increase defense spending from 1 percent to 3 percent of the GNP.⁵ This was also the period during which the U.S. officials "quietly" urged Japan to build up its conventional military power

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3. Congress and the Nation. Vol. VI: 1983-84 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1985), p.222.
 4. William T. Tow and William R. Feeney (eds.), U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Trans-regional Approach (Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p.4.
 5. The New York Times, 9 April 1981, p.1.

in order to deter Soviet threat in Asia.⁶

The Japanese defense authorities themselves indicated that a number of glaring deficiencies existed in the SDF. The Defense White Paper of 1980 pointed out some major shortcomings. This was followed by an American government report entitled "Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in North-East Asia", which came to similar conclusions.

It is notable that during these debates on the level of defense spending and defense posture, all the basic tenets guiding Japan's defense policies: the 1 percent GNP ceiling on defense expenditure; the Three Non-nuclear principles; and the concept of "comprehensive security," were questioned. These principals have dominated Japanese thinking for so long that any realistic perception of threats in the Asia-Pacific region and a critical appreciation of its own defense capabilities have remained subdued. It is important to understand these guiding principles that determine current Japanese defense postures, in order to be able to assess its stance on the issues of the security of the region.

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles were enunciated in 1967. These precluded Japan from manufacturing, processing or permitting entry of nuclear weapons into the country.⁷ Over the

6. The New York Times, 14 Jan. 1981, p.7.

7. J.W.M. Champman, R. Drifte and I.T.M. Gow, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (Frances Pinter, London, 1983), p.5.

years, the Japanese have zealously guarded these principles, which are known to be Japan's "nuclear allergy." In 1981 former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer disclosed that Japan permits U.S. warships to carry nuclear weapons in and out of Japan under 21-year old confidential "oral-agreement". He noted that the transfer is not considered "introduction" of such weapons into Japan, as forbidden by the postwar Constitution and the Non-Nuclear Principles.⁸ This incident, known as the "Reischauer Disclosure", was closely followed by a statement of the former Defense Department official, Daniel J. Ellsberg, that the U.S. had stationed ship with nuclear weapons only 300 yards off Japanese coast in 1961, which remained there till 1967.⁹

These disclosures made the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka, which served as home port for the Seventh Fleet, the focus of Japanese protests against the presence of nuclear-armed ship in Japanese waters. In May 1981, about 1,300 demonstrators gathered at Yokosuka to protest the scheduled arrival of the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway.¹⁰ This indicated the extent to which Japanese would go to resist introduction of nuclear weapons in the country. According to Reischauer, it is inconsistent for Japan to forbid the passage of nuclear arms through its territorial waters when it benefits from the U.S. nuclear umbrella on the

8. The New York Times, 19 May 1981, p.5.

9. The New York Times, 22 May 1981, p.2.

10. The New York Times, 29 May 1981, p.8.

basis of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty ¹¹. However, this is not the only principle which exposes Japanese defense policy to the U.S. criticism.

The 1 percent of GNP limit on defense spending, originally established in 1976 as a ceiling by the "Dovish" cabinet of Prime Minister Takeo Miki, has also been subjected to a lot of criticism.¹² This 1 percent ceiling has become an unwritten but accepted restriction of successive Japanese governments. According to Ikeuchi Fumio, specialist on defense affairs, for the leading Japanese newspaper 'Asahi Shimbun', "...the 1 percent ceiling had no military rationale it was a symbolic pledge that Japan would never again become a big military power."¹³ According to Fumio, an economic power tends to become a military power, and neither the US nor the Asian countries want to see Japan rising again militarily. Hence, "squelching instantly any suspicion that militarism is rising again is the primary task of Japanese diplomacy, for imports of raw materials sustain the national economy. Herein lies the greatest significance of the 1 percent limit: It effectively prevents suspicion."¹⁴

11. As quoted in Yagisawa Mitsuo, "Maintaining Japanese Security", Japan Quarterly (Tokyo, Japan), Vol.30, Oct.-Dec. 1983, p.359.

12. Charles Smith, "The 1% solution" Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 127, 14 March 1985, p.32.

13. Ikeuchi Fumio, "The 1986 - 90 Medium Term Defense Plan", Japan Quarterly, Vol. 31, Oct. - Dec. 1984, p.255.

14. Ibid., p.256.

The ceiling has never been appreciated by the U.S. It argues that while the U.S. contributes 6% of its GNP for defense and the NATO countries contribute 3% to 5% of their GNP, Japan takes a "free ride" by contributing only 1% of its GNP for its defense. Along with the restriction on defense expenditure, other factors that inhibit Japan's defense policies are : (a) restrictions on the deployment of military forces on overseas missions; and (b) definitive administrative steps to include formal deliberations by the Japanese Diet on matters concerning the formation of defense forces.¹⁵ This checks any rapid and dynamic change within the SDF.

"Comprehensive National Security" is another Japanese concept, of which the U.S. is highly critical. It contends that it does nothing to strengthen Japanese military posture, but on the contrary lets economic, political and diplomatic aspects to predominate defense policies. It is difficult to trace the origin of the use of the term but in its current sense it was first used in 1978 in a research paper published by the Nomura Research Institute in Japan.¹⁶ Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira adhered to the idea. In December 1978, while talking to the press he said:

As far as comprehensive security policy in the broad sense is concerned, my policy is to establish a chain of tautly balanced national power, including various factors such as the

15. James V. Young, "A realistic approach to the U.S. Japan Alliance", Military Review (Kansas), Vol.LXV, May 1985, p.66.

16. J.W.M. Champman, Drifte and Gow, n.7, p.xv.

economy, diplomacy and politics and to support the security of nation with these.¹⁷

Later, in 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki gave the concept verbal support. He said, in a Diet statement, "We must not see security from the defensive aspect alone. I consider efforts ought to be made from a wider perspective which will include the economy, diplomacy etc."¹⁸

The U.S. objection to this concept is that it is not based on the policy of "response-to-threat" and restricts Japanese military buildup. However, misgivings regarding this concept are not as pronounced as against the 1 percent GNP ceiling. John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in a statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs said, "Japan has developed a concept of 'comprehensive security' - embracing a defense effort, foreign aid and diplomacy. While we do not regard foreign aid as a substitute for defense it is certainly complementary."¹⁹

It is obvious that except for the three non-nuclear principles which evolved due to Japan's experience of nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all the principles guiding its defense policy stress economic development. This exclusive emphasis on economic development appears to be misplaced when seen

17. Ibid., p.xvi.

18. For details, see Ibid., p.xv.

19. John H. Holdridge, "Japan and the U.S.: A Cooperative Relationship", Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.: USGPO), Vol.82, April 1982, p.55.

in relation to the military buildup in the region, Japan's incapacity for self-defense, and its vulnerability in any crisis in the region leading to disruption of communication and transportation through the sea lanes.

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

It is due to the above mentioned restraints on Japan's defense policy - making that the country has refrained from actively involving in 'real politik' in the region. Despite the concern generally voiced by the National Security Agency officials from time to time over the Soviet military buildup, Japan remains committed to its Pacifist Constitution. The U.S. has been increasingly critical of this attitude since the Soviet military has gained parity with the U.S. in the Asia Pacific. It feels desirable that the nations of the region which benefit from the strong position of the U.S. should also contribute to maintain it.

As Richard C. Holbrooke put it in his address before the Japan Society in New York in November 1980, " Our fundamental challenge during the 1980s will be to consolidate and integrate our major alliances - with NATO, with Japan, with ANZUS... Our strategic interests in remaining a vital Asian power are more apparent today than ever. But there cannot be a strong American policy in the Pacific if it doesn't begin with a strong U.S. - Japanese

relationship."²⁰ The U.S. during this decade seems to be greatly banking on Japan to assume a greater international role. The U.S. hope to see Japan actively associating itself with the political and security goals of the West is based on the expected change in Japan's perception of the Soviet Union as a threat to regional stability.

Paul D. Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said on 12 June 1984, in a statement before the subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and Trade, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

...since the events in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afganistan in 1979, the Japanese have come to realize that their own well-being is affected directly by political and security developments elsewhere in the world. The implications are clear : the days of economic giant, political pygmy are over. The United states wishes to encourage this trend toward a greater international political and economic role by Japan within the frame work of a continued close bilateral relationship.²¹

But if Japan saw any threat from the Soviet Union, it was not evident from its defense postures. The military expenditure remained within limits; Prime Minister Suzuki adhered to the concepts of " comprehensive security"; and Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito, during his visit to the U.S. told U.S. Secretary Casper Weinberger that Japan will not join collective

20. Richard C. Holbrooke, "U.S. - Japanese Relations in the 1980s", Department of State Bulletin, Vol.81, Jan. 1981, p.17.

21. Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Taking Stock of U.S. Japan Relations". Department of State Bulletin, Vol.84, Sept. 1984, p.28.

defense efforts and will decide level of military spending unilaterally.²²

What one sees here is differing threat perceptions. It is likely that the Japanese do not see the Soviet presence in the region to be as much of a threat as the U.S. makes it to be. This could explain its reluctance to arm sufficiently apart from the responsiveness to the strong pacifist public opinion which checks any growth on military expenditure.

According to an analyst, "... threat perceptions are crucial to the existence and legitimacy of U.S. - Japan defense cooperation... However, there are significant differences in each nations view of the threats facing Japan and how they should be coped with strategically."²³ The U.S. contention that the Soviet Union is the major threat to the peace and stability of the region does not convince Japan, who has difference with the Soviet Union only due to Post World War II territorial settlement, which the Japanese seek to settle through peaceful negotiations rather than through military means. The Japanese sense a remote threat from North Korea but this is again not considered a direct threat since it is more concerned with South Korea. But on the other hand, the U.S. constantly refers to the threat from Soviet Russia, when pressurising Japan to rapidly increase military strength to counter the Soviet military buildup in the region.

22. The New York Times, 25 March 1981, p.9.

23. Edward A. Olsen, U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity (California: Hoover Instn. Press, 1985), p.40.

Wolfowitz says, "I hear people say that Japan does not see the threat in the same way as the United States, but the threat to peace in Asia is real enough."²⁴ According to Wolfowitz, stability on the Korean peninsula, cannot be taken for granted because the two Koreas have shared "precarious peace" for 30 years, Vietnam's illegal military occupation of Cambodia and encroachment on Thai territory, insurgency in the Philippines, does not assure stability in the region. There is also the "potential" for nuclear conflict along the Sino-Soviet border. Apart from this, the Soviet SS-20 force in the region is alarming due to its nuclear potential.

It is difficult to overlook that the Soviet permanent military presence is close to northern Japanese island. These forces have been equipped with 40 MIG -23 fighters, Hind ground attack gunship helicopters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft missiles, and artillery including 130 millimeter long range cannon.²⁵ The Sea of Japan is a regular operating area for the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet, and time and again Japanese airspace has been violated by Soviet military aircraft patrolling in areas West of Japan. But another reason which stresses Japan's need to increase its capabilities is the required U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which leaves the Asia - Pacific region in a comparatively vulnerable

24. P.D. Wolfowitz, "Japan and the United States: A global partnership", Atlantic Community Quarterly (Washington D.C.), Vol. 24, Winter 1985-86, p.345.

25. Ibid., p.345.

position. There are major threats to Japan if a crisis were to erupt in the region. However, these are not military but economic. One is its dependence on the oil from the Gulf as its major source of energy and the second is the importance of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) to Japan's economy. For guarding both these interests Japan depends on the U.S.

The outstanding feature of Japan's defense policy is the denial of a "response-to-threat" defense policy, which means that a country should increase its military strength as the military strength of the perceived enemy increases. The Japanese White Paper for 1977 stated:

A threat becomes an aggression when the capability of aggression and the will to commit aggression come together [Thus] the size of one's defense capability cannot be calculated only in terms of the size of the threat.²⁶

This interpretation does not define Soviet military buildup as a threat. As Chuma Kiyofuku, a senior staff writer for 'Asahi Shimbun' interpreted it, "A buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East or an increase in Soviet troop strength directed against Japan would not constitute a threat unless a further condition, a clear intent to commit aggression was present." He added, "Unless both conditions are present, Japan is not justified in building up defensive capability."²⁷ Similar view was held by Ikeuchi Fumio, another 'Asahi Shimbun' writer. He says, "There is still no military confrontation between Japan and the Soviet Union, nor

26. Chuma Kiyofuku, "What Price the Defense of Japan?" Japan Quarterly, Vol. 34, July-Sept. 1987, p.254.

27. Ibid., p.254.

has the ocean separating us dried up. The policy of limiting defense spending... remains a wise one. Japan should not allow itself to be influenced by U.S. talk of the 'Soviet threat'."²⁸

In 1978 Soviet forces on three of the four northern islands claimed by Japan increased. The Soviet military flights came much closer to Japan and Soviet naval vessels passage through the nearby straits increased. This, and a further deployment of approximately one third of the Soviet theatre SS-20 missiles and supersonic Backfire Bombers deployed in the Soviet Far East led to the 1980 Japanese Defense White Paper to describe Soviet Union as a "potential threat". In March 1983, Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro described it as a "growing potential threat."²⁹ Yet to most Japanese planners, it was inconceivable that Japanese Soviet relations would deteriorate to the extent where the Soviet Union would risk a direct armed attack on Japan.

The U.S. pressure on Japan to enhance its military power is obviously not in response to any immediate military threat to Japan, but it is to assure that Japan contributes its share of stabilizing the great power relations in the region. Thus, John H. Holdridge in a speech made before the Japan - America Society of Washington D.C., in October 1981, stated, "... while much has been said recently about differing U.S. and Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat. We both have recognized the destabilizing effect of

28. Fumio, n.13, p.397.

29. RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1986 (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986), p.279.

the Soviet military buildup."³⁰

In order to appreciate whether a threat really exists for Japan in the region and whether the rising Soviet military buildup should be countered by enhanced role for Japanese SDF, it is important to review the military buildup in the region during the current decade.

SUPER POWER EQUATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC

An analyst, John F. Copper wrote:

The most important feature of the changing strategic equation in East Asia is the rapid buildup of Soviet forces in the region - much more rapid than anywhere else in the world. Moreover, the Soviet military presence in East Asia, especially its air and naval forces, must be seen in the context of those forces being new to the area and Moscow having exerted little or no influence in the region before.³¹

Yet it is very difficult to determine which of the two superpowers possesses military superiority over the other. Numerical assessment of manpower, the numbers and types of weapons, and the size of the military budget can be misleading for a comparison of real military strength of the countries. The differences in the geographical position of each country, and the kind of threat its forces are designed to meet, coupled with the alliance

30. John H. Holdridge, "Japan and the U.S.: A durable relationship", Department of State Bulletin, Vol.81, Dec. 1981, p.38.

31. John F. Copper, "East Asia and the Global Strategic Balance of Power", Strategy '86 (Washington D.C.: D & FA Conference Inc., 1986), p.1.

relationships - largely contribute to enhancing or reducing the relative power of a country.

The Korean war, as mentioned in Chapter I, led to strengthening of NATO allies, rapid build-up of the U.S. forces, and set the ball rolling for Japan's rearmament. But the Vietnam War diminished popular support for the U.S. military commitments abroad. This weakened the international position of the U.S. On the other hand, the Communist victory in China's civil war in 1949, and the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 created a friendly "buffer" state for the USSR in the Far East, and posed a challenge to the U.S. The breakdown of the alliance in the summer of 1960, and subsequent border dispute between China and the USSR deteriorated the position of the USSR in the Asia-Pacific. It was in this context that Brezhnev initiated the first phase of Soviet Union's Asian military buildup in 1965. As a result it increased its ground force divisions in the Siberian, TransBaykal and Far East military districts.³² Later, Moscow's anticipation of China's normalization of relations with the U.S. and Japan led to the second phase of Soviet Asian military buildup in 1977. This phase was designed not only to encircle China but also to prepare for the possible formation of a coalition of the U.S., Chinese and Japanese forces against the Soviet Union.³³

The nuclearization of Moscows' military forces started during

32. Richard H. Soloman and Masataka Kosaka, The Soviet Far East Military Buildup (London: Croom Helm Ltd. 1986), p.5.

33. Ibid., p.5.

this period. It deployed SS-20 intermediate range "theatre" missile in 1977 and medium-range Backfire bomber in early 1980. This created a qualitatively new threat to the U.S. The U.S. response to the renewed threat came slowly and then only with the initiation of its NATO allies. In East Asia, Japan and China protested against Moscow's expanding nuclear deployments but the U.S. allies did not put any pressure on it to respond to the Moscow's nuclearization of its forces. By the late 1970's the Soviet Union had positioned a quarter of its land forces facing the Northeast Asia. Its army divisions grew along with the naval forces. Of these, Soviet naval and air power are more of a threat to the U.S.

The situation was summed up thus by the Joint Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the U.S. and the Tokyo Research Institute for Peace and Security :

However one may judge the current state of the global military balance; the view is widely accepted in the United States and among U.S. allies that in recent years the Soviet Union has been outspending the United States³⁴ and acquiring new weapons at a faster rate.

The Soviet power in Northeast Asia resides with the Pacific Fleet. Biggest of the four Soviet Fleets, the Pacific Fleet operates primarily out of Vladivostok and Sovetskaya Gavan along the Sea of Japan, and Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Its area of geopraghic responsibility covers the Sea of Japan, the

34. U. Alexis Johnson and George R. Packard. The Common Security Interests of Japan, United States and NATO (Cambridge: Ballinger Pub. Co. 1981), p.28.

Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean and also the Indian Ocean as it is the main source of units maintained there. The Pacific Fleet has to cope up with many geostrategic handicaps while operating in the Asia Pacific region.

More than half of the combatants in the Soviet Pacific Fleet are stationed at just two of its naval bases - Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The naval forces are cut off from open ocean by narrow straits - the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya straits. These straits act as "choke points" for the movement of the Soviet Fleet. Petropavlovsk happens to be the only major Soviet base devoid of any "Choke Points". But even this has its limitations. It depends on supply lines, airlift and sea-lift that are highly vulnerable and inefficient. Another point of disadvantage for the Soviet forces is that the Sea of Okhotsk and ports in the Bering Sea are restricted by heavy winter icing.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is now larger than ever before. Both the Soviet tactical and strategic air power have been growing steadily. The concentration of Soviet military force is a source of grave concern for the U.S. since it believes in Soviet willingness to use military power for political ends, as it did in Afghanistan, Cambodia and on the Korean Peninsula.

The Soviet military buildup in the region is not exclusively defensive. China, lacking sufficiently modernized weapons, faces Soviet forces positioned on Sino-Soviet border which are much stronger than required to cope with a Chinese attack. Soviet naval

and air forces based at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk are stationed in the region to deter the U.S., but serve the purpose of demonstrating Soviet power to the Japanese and of spreading Soviet influence through Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean.³⁵ Soviet use of Danang and Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam facilitates the display of power.

Since a large part of the Soviet Union's territory lies in the Asia-Pacific region, it is said to have an advantage over the U.S. which is thousands of miles away from the region, except for its territory - Guam. But this advantage doesnot compensate for the strategic disadvantages for the USSR mentioned earlier. Apart from the hampered navigation at its principal naval bases due to ice, its East Asian neighbours Japan and the PRC are a cause of grave concern to the Soviet Union. Both being "potentially" powerful countries friendly to the U.S. The U.S. on the other hand, has no potentially threatening neighbours close to its borders. Moreover, U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, and the Philippines are much better located than the Soviet bases.

In the late 1970s and during the early 1980s the deployment of the U.S. forces in the Pacific has concentrated on qualitative rather than quantitative improvements. The U.S. maintains a large logistical infrastructure throughout the Pacific region. On the other hand, since 1978, the Soviet Union has been making quantitative improvements in its forces in the Northeast Asian

35. Ibid., p.30.


region. A comparative analysis of the naval, air and ground forces of the superpowers would throw some light on the current trends of military build up in the region.

Naval Forces:

The U.S. naval presence in the Pacific Ocean consists of two fleets : Seventh Fleet, responsible for the Western Pacific, Southeast Asian waters and the Indian Ocean, and the Third Fleet, responsible for the Eastern Pacific and the U.S. West coast. Between 1969 and 1976 the overall number of major combatants in both fleets decreased sharply but since then their number in the Pacific has been rising. The distribution of these forces among individual ship has changed in the 1980's. Older vessels have been replaced by more capable ships. The new types that are being deployed include 'Spruance' -class destroyer, 'Knox' and 'Perry' - class frigates, and 'Los-Angeles' - class nuclear attack submarines. The major additions to the U.S. Pacific Fleets made in 1983, included the newest nuclear powered aircraft carrier - 'Carl Vinson' and newly furnished battleship - 'New Jersey'.³⁶


As noted during this period the position of the Soviet Pacific Fleet became strong. In 1983, its strength had risen to a total of approximately 125 boats, with 65 of these being nuclear powered vessels. A large number of strategic ballistic missile submarines has been deployed in the Far East which now accounts

36. International Security Yearbook 1983-84 (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1984), pp.167-168.



Map 2. U.S. Naval Deployment

Source: John M. Collins, U.S. - Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985 (New York: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985), p.146.



Map 3. Soviet Naval Deployment

Source: John M. Collins, U.S. Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985 (New York: Pergamon Brasseley's International Defense Publishers, 1985), p.147.

for 40 percent of all Soviet ballistic missile submarines. The number of nuclear attack submarines in the Soviet Pacific Fleet has risen with deployments of the Modern 'Victor III' attack boat, and the 'Charlie I' cruise missile submarine. The Soviets also have begun deploying a new conventionally - powered attack submarine with the Pacific Fleet - Code named 'Kilo' and also included Kiev-class aircraft carrier 'Minsk'. By 1983, the number of heavy cruisers in the fleet had expanded to ten combatants, including 'Kara' and 'Kresta' I - class vessels. Modern frigates in the Pacific Fleet increased from seven in 1978 to ten by 1982. The Soviet aircraft based at Cam Rahn Bay conduct reconnaissance missions over the Western Pacific and South China Sea while an electronic intelligence complex near Cam Rahn Bay is used to monitor U.S. communications to Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay naval station.³⁷

Air Forces:

At the time of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam the U.S. Pacific Force was about 244 aircrafts and 50,000 personnel. But has since then risen to approximately 350 aircrafts. Forces in the region have been modernized e.g. F-15 fighters and E-3A early warning aircraft were assigned to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. In late 1981, 48 F-16 fighters/bombers were sent to Kunsan Air Base in Korea. By the end of 1982, a squadron of 26 A-10 close support aircraft were assigned to Suwon Air Base in Korea. In late 1982,

37. Ibid., pp. 175-177.

the U.S. and Japan announced an agreement to station two additional squadrons of F-16 fighter/bombers (48 aircrafts) at Misawa Air Base in northern Japan. These deployments beginning in 1985 and scheduled for completion by 1988, are designed to offset the growth of Soviet air power in the region, particularly, the deployment of Backfire Bombers in Soviet Siberia.³⁸

About 25 percent of Soviet tactical air assets, over 1,700 aircraft are stationed in the Far East. In 1982, the Soviet Union deployed ten MiG - 21 at airfields in the Russian-occupied Kurile islands, mainly on Etorofu. After withdrawing these in 1983, approximately twelve MiG-23 were deployed in the Etorofu airfield. These Soviet deployments are designed to offset the expected deployments of American F-16 fighter bombers in Northern Japan.³⁹

Ground Forces :

The U.S. Pacific Army Command's combat forces number approximately 47,000 men and women. These forces are undergoing important qualitative improvements to enhance their ability to fight on the ground. The modernization introduced - M60 A3 main battle tank, new artillery including the multiple launch rocket system, the Blackhawk transport helicopter, OV-10 forward air control aircraft stationed at Osan Air Base. The U.S. ground forces in South Korea also continue to improve their command control,

38. Ibid., pp.170-171.

39. Ibid., p.178.

communications and intelligence capabilities.⁴⁰

The Soviet ground forces in the region include about 51 divisions consisting of 460,000 men. It has currently introduced T-77 tanks, modern surface to air missiles and mobile, self propelled artillery weapons, particularly the nuclear capable 152mm gun. The USSR also continued to upgrade logistics and ground installations. On completion, the new Baykal-Amur Mainline Railroad will provide a valuable backup for the vulnerable Trans - Siberian trunkline which lies close to the Sino-Soviet border.⁴¹

40. Ibid., p.173.

41. Ibid., p.178-179.

T a b l e - 2.1

U.S. Soviet military Balance in the Pacific Ocean

	<u>UNITED STATES</u>		SOVIET UNION	
	WESTERN	EASTERN	TOTAL	
Divisions	1 - 2/3	2 - 1/3	4	35
Tanks	189	136	325	9000
Bombers	14	0	14	435
Tactical Aircraft	449	301	750	1565
Naval Aircraft	36	72	108	50
<u>Naval ships</u>				
Aircraft carriers				
Attack	3	3	6	0
Helicopter	1	5	6	1
Cruisers	5	9	14	13
Destroyers	13	18	31	20
Frigates	17	24	41	50
Total Surface Ships	39	59	98	84
<u>Submarines</u>				
Strategic	0	1	1	31
Attack	13	33	46	91
Total Submarines	13	34	47	122
Amphibious	7	24	31	12

Source: Congressional Research Service. Report M.83-153S, U.S./Soviet Military Balance August 1, 1983. pp. 125 - 128. Reprinted in Stephen J. Solarz. "The Soviet Challenge in Asia," Asia Pacific Community Vol.24 (Summer 1984), p. 15.

T a b l e - 2.2

Changes in the Soviet Pacific Fleet

1978 - 86

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1986</u>
<u>Surface Combatents</u>				
Aircraft carriers	0	1	1	2
Guided missile cruisers	6	10	10	15
Fight Cruisers	3	4	3	
Guided missiles destroyers	15	10	10	14
Destroyers	10	8	10	
Frigates	30	40	45	21
Missile Frigates	0	10	10	30
<u>Sub Total</u>	64	83	89	82
<u>Attack Submarines</u>				
Nuclear	6	19	21	25
Conventional	46	47	49	52
<u>Sub Total</u>	52	66	70	77
<u>Cruise Missile Submarines</u>				
Nuclear	12	20	21	
Conventional	9	4	4	
<u>Subtotal</u>	21	24	25	25
<u>Ballistic Missile Submarines</u>				
Nuclear	24	23	23	
Conventional	6	7	7	
<u>Sub total</u>	30	30	30	25

Sources : International Security Yearbook 1983-84 (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1984).
Military Balance 1986-87.

T a b l e - 2.3

Changes in the composition of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1969-86

Number of Ships

	1969	1976	1983	1986
<u>Surface Combatants</u>				
Aircraft Carriers	12	6	6	6
Cruisers	18	15	14	18
Destroyers	102	28	31	29
Frigates	23	33	41	47
<u>Sub Total</u>	155	82	92	100
<u>Attack Submarines</u>				
Nuclear	17	25	42	42
Conventional	23	10	4	7
<u>Sub total</u>	40	35	46	49
<u>Amphibious Assault ships</u>	99	32	31	31
<u>Underway Replenishment ship</u>	44	22	27	--
<u>Other support ships</u>	88	37	14	--

Sources : International Security Year book 1983-84 (London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 1984) p. 168.
Military Balance 1986 = 87.

T a b l e - 2.4

U.S. - SOVIET - PACIFIC EQUATION

	U.S.	U.S.S.R
<u>SHIPS</u>		
Aircraft carriers	6	2
Battle ships	2	0
Guided missile		
Cruisers	18	12
Destroyers	29	15
Frigates	28	11
Guided Missile		
frigates	18	11
<u>SUBMARINES</u>		
Ballistic and		
Cruise Missile	8	25
Attack	43	90
<u>AIRCRAFT</u>		
Tactical	368	180
Support	60	90
Anti submarine	255	175

Source : TIME, November 24, 1986, p.10.

In addition to the super power military build-up in the region, many trends and events in the Northeast Asian countries have been affecting the global balance of power. To begin with, Japan - which is referred to as a military weakling has been for many years the 7th largest nation in the world in terms of military spending.⁴² Japan's navy could close the straits by which the Soviet navy has access to the Pacific Ocean. Apart from cooperating with the U.S. Tokyo has welcomed an increased level of U.S. military presence in Japan. As a result, there is an increase in the U.S. port calls to Japan. Sophisticated fighter planes are also stationed in Japan and above all Japan has shown a serious interest in Strategic Defence Initiative.

The Korean Peninsula remains highly tense. North Korea has become more aggressive and reliant upon the Soviet Union for arms and economic assistance. There is also an increase in North Korean forces facing South Korea. Moscow has recently supplied sophisticated MiG - 23 fighter planes to North Korea as well as helped it in building nuclear power plants which North Korea might use to develop nuclear weapons.⁴³ In return, the Soviet Union has acquired the facility to use of North Korean Ports and enjoys overflight rights. Consequently, South Korea depends for its security on a combination of its own military forces and the U.S. defense commitment. Currently there is deployment of some 40,000 American troops and various aircraft on South Korean territory in

42. John F. Copper, n. 31, p.3.

43. Ibid., p.5.

fulfilment of the commitment.⁴⁴

China maintains a low profile in the region. During the current decade, it has reduced its military manpower by nearly a million and is concentrating on its economic development. Yet, it is giving increased importance to high technology in order to improve its air force and navy qualitatively. In the recent years it has developed both an ICBM and SCBM to enhance its own capacity. It has emerged as the fourth largest arms seller in the world. The Sino-Soviet relations remain tense due to a high level of Soviet forces on the Sino - Soviet border; Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; and assistance to Vietnam to enable Hanoi to occupy Kampuchea. Chinese leaders have tried to follow a policy of "equidistance" in their relations with the two superpowers. Though China wants increased trade and U.S. technology, it seeks to remain detached from the U.S. in many other ways.

Taiwan has been trying to build its own arms because of the Washington Peking alignment. It focuses on better fighter plane and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Though it cannot build the capability to deter an all out assault or nuclear attack by Peking, it has tried to maintain a level of deterrence vis-a-vis Peking. American help to Taiwan, specially in the form of weapons technology clashes with the interests of China. In Philippines, the new government of Mrs. Corazon Aquino has at times displayed a desire to show her independence, but has not threatened the U.S. base in the Philippines.

44. Solomon and Kosaka, n.32, p.9.

This account of the development in Asia - Pacific region shows that it is politically stable and relatively free of conflict in recent years. Yet, the build up of strategic forces and the alignments and realignments of major powers in the area could be a source of conflict in the future.

EFFECTS OF THE MILITARY BUILDUP ON THE U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION

The Soviet military buildup in the region triggers off the upgrading of the U.S. defense in Asia Pacific, yet the increased attention given to the region cannot be attributed to this alone. The Soviet military build-up, while portrayed by the U.S. as designed to put pressure on Japan and the U.S., is more realistically a response to Soviet Union's tense relations with China, prospects of Japanese remilitarization, and shifts in the U.S. strategy.⁴⁵

The U.S. has been reiterating its concern over Japan's incapability to defend its own territories, but its pressure on Japan to "rearm" can be attributed more to its need to give increased attention to the Middle East than to changes in the Soviet Pacific threat. The U.S. involvement in the Middle East does not imply a decline in its military interest in Asia. Since its withdrawal from Southeast Asia and normalization of relations with the PRC, the U.S. continued to base half of its Navy in the Pacific and even put new Trident SLBMs in the region. At the same

45. W.M.Arkin and R.W.Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race (Mass: Ballinger Pub.Co.1985),p.118.

time, the Soviet forces in the Asia-Pacific have grown steadily. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are renewing their plans to deter war in the Sea of Japan, on the Korean Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf.

As a result, Japan began to place greater emphasis on defense during the 1980s. It was beginning to doubt the ability of the U.S. to come to its assistance in a crisis due to its preoccupation in other parts of the world. Secondly, it was feeling the weight of Soviet political and military pressure. This led the Japanese military expenditure for fiscal year 1981 to increase by 7.6% for fiscal year 1981 compared with 1980. This was the first time since the Second World War that defense increase exceeded all other major budget items. The 1980 Defense White Paper published on 5 August and the Foreign Ministry's Blue Book for 1980 listed deficiencies in military equipments and gave suggestions to improve the self-defense capability at an appropriate scale.⁴⁶ The increase denoted that suggestion were not only accepted but implemented.

During his visit to Washington in May 1981, Suzuki was still emphasizing Japan's resolve to adhere by the concept of "comprehensive security." Yet, the Joint Communique following the meeting with President Reagan stated that Japan "will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defense capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding sea and air space..."

46. Strategic Survey, 1980-81 (London: IISS, Spring 1981), p.105.

Moreover, "In ensuring peace and stability in the region and the defense of Japan, they acknowledge the desirability of an appropriate division of roles between Japan and the U.S."⁴⁷ Reagan and U.S. Defense Secretary, Casper Weinberger continued to voice the U.S. expectations of Japan to undertake "New Far East defense responsibilities."

The Communique however was bitterly criticised in Japan because of the use of word "alliance" by Suzuki. The word was used in the context of United States - Japanese relations. It implied that a military relationship was developing between the two countries as sought by Reagan administration. As the result of public criticism Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito and Deputy minister Masuo Takashima had to resign taking the responsibility for the confusion caused by the wording of the Communique.⁴⁸ This coupled with the resistance of Japan's Defense Minister Joji Omura to increase military strength to counter USSR buildup during his meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger in June 1981, gives the impression that Japan would still resist any change in its military posture.⁴⁹ But some elements in Japan, particularly its military establishment agreed with the U.S. It completely supported the U.S. attempt to persuade Japan to increase military spending.⁵⁰

47. Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.: Ronald Reagan (Washington: USGPO, 1982), p.415.

48. The New York Times, 16 May 1981, p.3.

49. The New York Times, 30 June 1981, p.3.

50. The New York Times, 29 Sept. 1981, p.6.

In May 1981, the Heritage Foundation, which is said to be a major influence on the Reagan administration, published a report on Japan's defense policy. It described Japanese defensive preparations as inadequate both qualitatively and quantitatively. It recommended that antisubmarine, sea reconnaissance and air-defense capabilities be strengthened to counter the Soviet military buildup and permit the deployment of the US Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean.⁵¹

Japan has quietly responded to this and slowly and steadily increased its conventional defense capabilities. It has also increased its military cooperation with the U.S. Moscow's militarization of the islands of Etorofu and Shikotan in the Northern territories, and the shooting down of an unarmed Korean Airlines plane in 1983 significantly shifted public opinion in Japan against the Soviet Union and in favour of more active defense cooperation with the US.

The Japanese response to the situation was stated thus in the Defense White Paper 1984:

The Soviet Union continues its unrelenting military buildup in this area... both qualitative and quantitative, thus increasing the latest threat to Japan. A shocking incident of a Soviet war plane shooting down an unarmed and non-resisting private Korean Airliner in September of last year revealed the hard military situation in the peripheral areas of Japan.

51. Yagisawa Mitsuo, "Maintaining Japanese Security", Japan Quarterly (Tokyo, Japan), Vol.30, Oct. - Dec. 1983, p.358.

It went on to say:

Japan should make self-reliance efforts to maintain a defense capability adequate for deterring and dealing with aggression... should firmly maintain the Japan - US security arrangements and ensure their smooth and effective implementation.⁵²

It should be noted here that major changes in Japanese defense policy could be seen only since Nakasone's coming into power. He took office as the Prime Minister in November 1982 and immediately set about improving relations with the U.S. The Reagan Administration applauded his approach since Nakasone promised increased defense cooperation. The National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO) however, designed only the direct defense of Japan and did not widen the role of Japan's defense forces which Washington wanted Japan to undertake. Therefore, responding to the pressure of the U.S. Nakasone, reiterated Japan's resolve to assume responsibility for the defense of sea lanes extending upto 1,000 miles from the Japanese shores.⁵³ The defense of sea lanes was part of "roles and missions" for Japan and was suggested during the Suzuki period and repeatedly emphasized by the Reagan Administration. This would free the overstretched US Seventh Fleet for duties elsewhere.⁵⁴

52. White Papers of Japan 1983-84 (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs Pub. 1985), pp. 43-45.

53. The New York Times, 14 Jan. 1981, p.7.

54. "Down Memory Lane", Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 122, 15 Dec. 1983, p.30.

The Japanese forces have also been participating in joint exercises with the US forces. Their mutual defense roles have been subject to study at US - Japan meetings covering such matters as air defense over the straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya, and the modalities of sea lane defense. "In the past four years," wrote Lieutenant Colonel (P) James V. Young of the US army in May 1985, "Japanese participation in joint and combined exercises has grown substantially. The catalyst for this expanding participation was the 1978 US - Japan guidelines for defense cooperation which allowed participation in exercises such as the 1980 RIMPAC exercises."*55

During Nakasone's term as the Prime Minister, Defense share of the general budget increased gradually from 5.13% in 1981 to 5.8% in 1984, and the defense budget increased by 6.9% for fiscal year 1985 compared with 1984.⁵⁶ In fiscal year 1984 the government was only able to keep within the politically inspired defense budget ceiling of 1% of GNP by making cuts in defense spending at the end of the year. So it doesn't seem likely that observance of the 1% ceiling can be maintained.⁵⁷

* In the 1980 RIMPAC exercise, Japanese maritime forces joined with naval forces from the U.S., Canada, New Zealand and Australia in combined naval manoeuvres some 500 miles south of Hawaii.

55. James V. Young, "Realistic Approach to the U.S. - Japan alliance", Military Review, Vol. LXV, May 1985, p.70.

56. Strategic Survey 1984-85 (London: IISS, Spring 1985), p.94.

57. The 1% GNP ceiling was removed by a Cabinet decree on 24 Jan. 1987.

The USSR was not pleased with Japan's increasing cooperation with the US and termed it as Japan's 'remilitarization'. In the beginning of 1983, Nakasone during his visit to Washington had stated that Japan should be turned into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and that Japan and the US shared a common destiny.⁵⁸ This led to a direct Soviet threat to Japan as the USSR targeted SS-20 medium-range missile based in Siberia on Japan for the first time.⁵⁹ This caused serious concern to Japan.

Furthermore, Moscow warned Japan that it could face retaliatory strike more devastating than that of 1945 atomic bomb explosion if it agrees to deployment of more weapons aimed at the USSR.⁶⁰ At the same time, Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Vladimir T. Pavlov protested strongly against Japanese defense policies and offered talks in the Spring of 1983, on Japanese-Soviet issues, several days after the U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz ended his visit to Japan. Pavlov met with Tashiaki Kato, a Japan's ministry official in February 1983, and said that he was disturbed by what the USSR viewed as a trend to "militarism" in Japan in alliance with the US.⁶¹

The emerging trend of Japan's more active support to the US

58. Yagisawa Mitsuo, n.51, p.357.

59. The New York Times, 20 Jan. 1983, p.3.

60. Ibid., p.9.

61. The New York Times, 8 Feb. 1983, p.14.

in the region exposed it to Soviet retaliatory action. The pacifist Japanese took it seriously and attacked Nakasone's policies, who continued strengthening Japanese SDF. Though some still maintained that "Japanese people simply do not feel threatened by other countries. They feel anxious about the Soviet military buildup, but they do not perceive it as an immediate threat to Japan."⁶² The fact remains that the trend toward strengthening SDF began during Nakasone's stewardship.

During this period the level of Japan's conflict on trade and defense issues with the US remained very low mainly because of Nakasone's liberal trade and defense policies. The improvement in relationship was clear during the annual defense talks in Honolulu in June 1984. The U.S. during these talks did not press Japan for greater rearmament effort. The same harmony prevailed during Nakasone's visit to the U.S. in January 1985.

Another important change that can be attributed to have occurred due to the Soviet military buildup was the conclusion of a joint US - Japan military operation plan in December 1984. The guidelines for this called for joint plans for deterring aggression, for response to armed attack against Japan and cooperation in the case of emergencies in the Far East (a euphemism for armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula). Support for the U.S. forces through transport and other logistic supply, even in a crises was interpreted by many as a commitment which

62. Chuma Kiyofuku, "The 1986-90 Defense Plan: Does it go too far?" Japan Quarterly, Vol. 33, Jan.-Mar. 1986, p.258.

would involve Japan in a war to which it was not an original party.⁶³ The Japanese are aware that the Soviet threat to their country would become pronounced only if Japan actively embarked on the policy of cooperation with the U.S.

At the governmental level, it is accepted that the U.S.-Japan relationship is closer than ever. It is clear that due to the Soviet military buildup in the region, Japan's military posture is becoming less oriented towards the defense of the country and more an integral part of the U.S. strategy towards the Soviet Union.

63. James V. Young, n.55, p.95.

CHAPTER III

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Since the 1950s the U.S. had enjoyed nuclear preeminence and superiority over the Soviets in most military dimensions. In the 1980s however the Soviet Union emerged as a military superpower as a result of a large percentage of GNP being spent on defense. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. would acquiesce to the Soviet challenge or counter it by new strategy.

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981. It was committed to rebuild American military power. During this period in response to the expansion of the Soviet power, the U.S. adopted a strategy of confronting the Soviets on three fronts : NATO in the west, the Asia-Pacific region in the east, and the Persian Gulf in the south.¹

The term "global" in the U.S. security strategy no longer concentrated on the continents alone, it stretched to the oceans as well. Herein lies the importance of Asia-Pacific in the U.S. global strategy. The Asia-Pacific land masses dominate vital sea-lanes, especially those linking the Indian Ocean, the China sea and the Western Pacific. The main assets for Soviet Russia, for protecting its Asian borders and projecting its influence beyond this region also lie in the western Pacific. It

1. James C. Hsiung (ed.) U.S. Asian Relation: The National Security Paradox (New York: Praeger Publishers 1983), p.1.

is the objective of this chapter to identify the strategic importance which the U.S. has assigned to Japan in its own strategy in the Asia-Pacific.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE ASIA PACIFIC

The factors that increase the importance of Asia-Pacific in the global strategy of the U.S. are : (a) China has abandoned its international isolation. It is actively involved in economic and political interaction with other countries. Also, China is prepared for active participation in the international community; (b) During this decade Japan is taking major steps in determining its future role in international political structure and its own self-defense; (c) The ~~the~~ ideological conflict between the two Koreans remains unresolved, resulting in accumulation of arsenals on both sides.

Strategically, the Soviet naval bases in the Asia-Pacific at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, are of considerable importance. Moreover Japan's Tsushima Island, which happens to be the centre of the Korean Strait, is the centre of attraction for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and other naval warfare, to be waged jointly in a crisis by the South Korean, the U.S. and the Japanese forces, supported by the U.S. nuclear arms. This also enhances the importance of the Soviet-Pacific coast. Its proximity to Alaska makes it strategically important to the U.S.

The strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region has been

thus described by an analyst:

Raw materials markets, Japan's military potential and technological acumen, China's expanding power, and geographic position astride indispensable sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) make East Asia and the Western Pacific increasingly important to U.S. and Soviet strategists.²

He goes on to state, "The Reagan Administration which contends that continued erosion of U.S. military power in the Pacific could undercut security as far away as America and the Middle East is trying to reverse current trends. Unflogging Soviet emphasis on the Far East, however, makes relative improvements difficult."³ The U.S. is not only concerned with the military balance in the region but is also worried about the fact that the American military presence is an important issue in South Korea and the Philippines. So is the issue of an expanded Japanese military role in the region in Japanese politics. Thus, the Asia-Pacific is becoming increasingly important in the U.S. war planning.

Nuclear weapons figured prominently in the U.S. global military strategy. The interests, territories, supply lines and testing facilities of nuclear powers, the U.S., the USSR and China converge in the Pacific. As stated previously, the number of Nuclear Attack Submarines of both the Super Powers has more than doubled since 1978.⁴ In the last decade the Soviet Union

2. John M. Collins. U.S. Soviet Military Balance 1980-85., (Washington: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1985), p.139.

3. Ibid., p.139.

4. See Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

deployed Delta III - class submarines and the U.S. deployed Trident submarines.⁵ Evidently, the primary role for the nuclear weapons in the Pacific is Anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This lends the region an additional strategic dimension. During the current decade, the U.S. has to assert its military superiority in the Asia Pacific region to meet the challenge posed by the enhanced Soviet military capabilities. As Casper Weinberger put it, "We are not trying to regain the earlier margin of advantage. Rather we are struggling to win the resources necessary to enable us to maintain sufficient military strength to ensure deterrence." He went on to add:

Our strategy is simple. We seek to prevent war by maintaining forces and demonstrating the determination to use them, if necessary in ways that will persuade our adversaries that the cost of any attack on our vital interests will exceed the benefits they could hope to gain. The label for this strategy is deterrence.⁶

The most important features of the U.S. deterrence, as stated by Weinberger are: the Strategic Defence Initiative and secure nuclear deterrence; uses of military force and secure conventional deterrence; a strategy for reducing and countrolling arms; and competitive strategies.⁷ It will be seen that all four features are present in the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific, and the involvement of the nations of Asia-Pacific to support the U.S. strategy is considerable.

5. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields : Global links the Arms Race. (Massachusetts: Ballinger Pub. Co. 1985), p. 126.

6. Casper Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy", Foreign Affairs Vol. 64, Spring 1986, pp. 676-677.

7. For details see, Ibid.

Keeping in mind the need of the U.S. to exert itself in the region, Robert Scalapino, a well known foreign policy analyst, has suggested three alternative strategies for the United States in its approach to Asia Pacific:

- 1) The minimalist: The U.S. would restrict itself to the key alliance with Japan. Its naval deployment would be restricted to mid-Pacific islands from where it can use strategic submarine fleet.
- 2) Creating a united front with China: The U.S. would join forces with the PRC and check the extension of Soviet influence in the region.
- 3) Limiting the U.S. formal commitments to its allies: This would be done along with maintaining a "forward" military presence in the region.⁸

The first policy alternative assumes that the security of the U.S. allies, Korea and Philippines is not endangered, that there is no threat to the security of SLOCs, and that the American influence in the region can be limited to economic, political and cultural activities. Such assumptions render the policy alternative ineffective as the security of South Korea, bases in Philippines and SLOCs cannot be ignored being essential to the U.S. interests in the region. The second strategy, that of forming a United front with China is ruled out as dependence on China for security is out of question, there being no 'alliance'

8. Cited in, Richard M. Soloman, Asian Security in the 1980s, (Cambridge:Oclgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Pub. Inc.1979),p.25.

between the two countries. Moreover, joining hands with China against Soviet Union will result in worsening of the situation in the region as it would make Soviet Union respond by enhancing its military capability in the region. The third policy is more acceptable as the U.S. defence resources would be applied in a flexible and responsive way without provoking Moscow. Richard Solomon, director in Rand Corporation of a research programme on International security, agrees with the third proposition. He says that, "A viable security strategy is likely to combine elements of coalition activity among the region powers of the region with the flexible application of U.S. defense assets in response to challenges to regional stability".⁹

While working towards attaining a strategic goal the U.S. faced a dilemma in developing relationships with countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Any friendly overtures of the U.S. towards Japan was followed by bitter criticism from China. This went on till the PRC was proffered a friendship treaty with the U.S. in 1972. This treaty made the U.S. Japanese Security Treaty more acceptable to China as it no longer felt threatened by the alliance. With a secure friendship treaty with the U.S. the PRC could now concentrate on conflict centred along Sino-Soviet border. With a peace treaty signed with Japan in August 1978, the PRC went farther and supported the idea of enhanced Japanese military preparedness. During Peking Meeting with group of former officials of Japanese Self-Defense Forces, in October 1977,

9. Ibid., p.25.

Chinese Deputy Prime Minister, Teng Hsiao - Peng, called on Japan along with the West Europe and the U.S. to build up its defenses in order to "deter new war", referring obviously to the USSR.¹⁰

The U.S. and the PRC have no active programme of security cooperation. Yet, consolidating political and economic interests and assuring social and cultural exchanges have a positive effect on America's global position. But this positive aspect carries in its wake the Soviet displeasure. The Soviet Union tends to see the improvement of relations between the U.S. and China as a sign of spreading American influence in the Asia-Pacific region and severely attacks both China and Japan for joining hands with the U.S. against the Soviet Union. The normalization of China's relation with the U.S. and Japan lead to further Soviet aggressiveness. Such antagonistic attitude towards the Chinese and American cooperation provoke heightened U.S. - Chinese cooperation and this further affects the power balance in the region. The U.S. dilemma is that China cannot be ignored, but any association with China heightens the Super-Power rivalry in the region.

An almost similar dilemma is faced by Japan while speeding up its defense efforts. Due to the U.S. pressure and the need to assure a minimal self-defence, Japan has to step up its military expenditure. But every effort made in this direction exposes it to an increasing Soviet threat thereby necessitating a further

10. The New York Times, 8 Oct. 1977, p.9.

increase in defense expenditure.

The U.S. faces another dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. It strives toward stabilizing the Korean peninsula, but its presence in South Korea is strongly opposed by the Soviet Union. Yet it cannot withdraw its forces from South Korea because of the fear of losing credibility in the region. It is in Japan's interest to cooperate with the U.S. in maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula. It is quite likely that a large scale military conflict in the peninsula would involve Japan. Firstly, the U.S. military support to South Korea depends upon the use of bases in Japan. Secondly in case of war between the two Koreas, it is likely that a large number of refugees would arrive in Japan due to its closeness to the Korean peninsula. Japan has also economic interests in South Korea which would be affected in case of large-scale military conflict between North and South Korea. Japan clearly feels concerned about the increasing Soviet naval and aircraft deployments in Pacific. But to admit concern would make it obligatory for Japan to work more effectively towards an improved self-defence. Since Japan has the political and economic prowess to shoulder its defense burden the U.S. puts pressure on Japan to do so. Japan has resolved already to defend 1,000 nautical miles of its sea. America now seeks its cooperation in producing arms in research on the Strategic Defense Initiative. These, if achieved, would undoubtedly strengthen the U.S. strategy of deterrence, both on the regional and global level.

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY AND JAPAN

The U.S. sees its relationship with Japan as the cornerstone of its Asian policy. Situated off the eastern seaboard of the Soviet Union, Japan is in a strategically important position. It serves as a useful base for U.S. forces. It is strategically situated to control three vital outlets for the Soviet Navy to the Pacific, the straits of Soya, Tsugara and Tsushima. The strategic importance of Japan was reemphasized by Secretary of State George Shultz in September 1982. He said in a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Japan and South Korea complimented each other militarily and served as a stronghold against the Soviet Union and Communism in the Far East.¹¹ Undoubtedly security ties which Japan are essential for the U.S. to be able to effectively fulfil its security commitment in South Korea and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region.

The U.S. hopes that in future Japan will assume greater responsibilities for its own defense, alongwith strengtheing the position of the U.S. in the Asian defense perimeter. The Secretary of State George Shultz stated in a speech on 5 March 1983, "As Japan's weight has grown, so too have its responsibilities. If we are patient, as well as persistent, we can do more than just maintain the remarkable post World War II record of Japanese - American cooperation. We can build on its

11. Cited in S. Chugrov, "Outlines of a New Militaristic Alliance in the Far East," International Affairs (Moscow), July 1983, p.102.

and make it an increasingly important part of our future."¹²
The speech, "shifts the emphasis to Japan, as the one Asian country whose economy is already of overwhelming global importance and whose democratic institutions qualify it to cooperate in future with the U.S. in the Middle East, Latin America and elsewhere ..., while the U.S. should align itself more closely with China's modernisation, it should cultivate in Japan a sense of its global responsibilities and interests."¹³

As the U.S. emphasized Japan's strategic importance, the U.S.S.R. set about increasing its military power in the Asia Pacific. This growth can be attributed to the anxiety of the USSR on becoming apparently encircled by the U.S. - China - Japan alliance. As the Soviet Union strives to acquire parity with the U.S. military power, the maintenance of global strategic balance becomes more costly for the U.S. Though Soviet improvement of its strategic capability in the region poses a serious problem for the U.S., it still has a positive side as this buildup increases Japan's interest in defense and brings the country strategically closer to the U.S.

The Soviet strategy of using every possible opportunity to expand its influence over strategically important areas in the Third world has caused uneasiness in Japan. To add to this is

12. George Shultz, "The U.S. and East Asia, A partnership for the future", Deptt. of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.:USGPO), Vol. 83, April 1983, p.33.

13. R. Nations, "A Tilt Towards Tokyo", Far Eastern-Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol.120, April 21, 1983, p.38.

the relative decline of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region in the wake of the Vietnam war. According to Yukio Satoh, a member of the Japanese Foreign Service:

Improved Soviet air and naval projection capability began to limit the global influence of U.S. forces and increased the Soviet ability to project power to distant areas. Soviet expansion of influence to strategically important countries in the Third World, such as Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam and Afghanistan, strengthened the Soviet strategic position, particularly in the area surrounding the oil rich Gulf states.¹⁴

This according to Satoh, alongwith deficiencies in the combat readiness of the American forces added to the Japanese anxiety and heightened threat peception gave rise to the national debates on enhanced Japanese military positions.

What contributed to closer strategic ties between the U.S. and Japan is that in late seventies and early eighties the Soviet Union deployed a new generation of offensive weapons in the region. It also acquired access to air and naval facilities in Vietnam. Using new base facilities from Ethiopia and South Yemen, it has been able to increase its continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean.¹⁵ This along with an increased military presence on the Sino-Soviet border since the late 1960s added to the Soviet capacity to project power in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

14. Yukio Satoh, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy. Adelphi Papers, No.178 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Autumn 1982, p.7.

15. Ibid., p.7.

As the Soviet Union stationed its forces on the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan, off the northern coast of Japan to strengthen its position in the Western Pacific, Japan became more conscious of the Soviet threat. In October 1982, Japanese government brought to public notice its agreement with the U.S. to deploy U.S. F-16 fighter bomber squadrons in northern Japan. These were to counter Soviet military buildup in the Far East and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to regional defense.¹⁶

A stronger naval presence in the Western Pacific is very important for any Soviet strategy directed towards Asia. The Soviet Union would greatly improve logistic support in the Far East due to the economic development of Eastern Siberia, and completion of Baikal Amur trunk line and the Siberian railway to connect Tayshet to the North-West of Irkutsk and Sovetskaya-Gavan on the strait of Tartan at the northern end of the Sea of Japan.¹⁷ Moreover, to strengthen this strategic position in the north of Japan the Soviet Union is prepared to improve relations with Japan. This is not very effective as the Soviet Union still denies Japanese claim over the northern territories which the Soviet Union uses as its bases guarding the Sea of Japan.

To the Soviet challenge in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. responds by modernization of its nuclear forces. In response to the Soviet

16. The New York Times, 9 Oct. 1982, p.4.

17. For details see, Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, The Soviet Far East Military Buildup (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986).

Union's launching of Delta-III class submarine, the U.S. has deployed Trident submarines. The U.S. Pacific based Trident submarines, replaced a squadron of ten Polaris submarines, based in Guam. The U.S. has also based a squadron of B-52 G bombers in Guam. These bombers are committed to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and take part in regional bombing, mining and sea surveillance exercises. In order to refuel B-52 Gs flying to bomb the Soviet Union from Guam, KC-135 aerial refueling planes are based at Kadena Air Base (Okinawa). Along with these the U.S. has also deployed its first nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in the Pacific. These will be able to strike targets deep in the Soviet Union.¹⁸

In the Pacific, the major role for the nuclear weapons is Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) operating from its base at Adak in the middle of the Aleutian Islands, the U.S. could immediately deliver some 400 ASW nuclear warheads from aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and ASW patrol planes. The U.S. P-3 maritime patrol aircraft flying from Adak collect information from the ocean surveillance network and follow the movements of Soviet submarines and surface ships. The stress is on destroying the communication facilities of the Soviet submarines, as submarines are protected when submerged.¹⁹

The allies of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific need America's

18. For details see, W.M. Arkin, n.5.

19. Ibid., pp.126-127.

military capabilities and nuclear deterrent to countervail Soviet forces deployed in the Far East at various bases in Vietnam and territories lying north of Japan. For effective defense against the Soviet military buildup, the U.S. needs the use of foreign bases and collaboration of regional allies. The absence of these renders the task difficult for the U.S.

In order to support a strategy that involves the U.S. allies in Asia-Pacific region for deterring the increasing Soviet nuclear power, Solomon and Kosaka suggest the following military response:

The U.S. should maintain an effective but low visibility nuclear retaliatory force in the region. This would deter Soviet nuclear initiatives and assure allied governments that there is an effective "coupling" between American defense capability and their own security.²⁰

This policy echoes what Scalapino said earlier that in the Asia-Pacific region the U.S. should limit its formal commitments to its allies and maintain a 'forward' military presence. This can be effectively done if the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific undertake a variety of relatively passive measures to ensure the survivability of the American retaliatory nuclear forces. The task can be accomplished by securing command control and communications systems and developing effective early warning capabilities for surveillance of Soviet aircraft movements. This does not involve nuclear force operations and is politically "non-provocative". This could help to bind the U.S. closer to its allies in the region.

20. Solomon and Kosaka, n.17, p.14.

In addition, America's allies could maintain strong conventional forces to diminish the use of nuclear weapons in the early stages of a confrontation with non-nuclear Soviet forces. South Korea could maintain a force level that deters North Korea. Japan could play an effective role by strengthening its ground forces in the North, specially on Hokkaido, and counter the Soviet deployment on Etorofu and Kunashiri islands. Japan can also secure its sea lanes by acquiring the capacity to patrol an area upto 1000 nautical miles from its shores in adhering to the declaration made by Zenko Suzuki in early 1982.²¹

The cause of concern for the U.S. is that the Japanese SDF do not have a system for integrated command and control of ground, air and sea forces. Nor do they have effective unified information and surveillance capability. After evaluating the strategic position of the Asia-Pacific region, the mounting Soviet Military presence and growing inability of the U.S. to maintain the global balance without the contribution of the allies it is easy to conclude that, (a) Japan has much to loose in case of a Soviet aggression. It does not have an effective direct defense nor is it capable of retaliation, and (b) that a U.S. Northeast Asia Command with subordinate participation on the part of Japan and South Korea has become a strategic requirement for the U.S.

Japan's association, both with the U.S. and the PRC makes it

21. D. Jenkins, "Down Memory Lane", Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.122, 15 Dec. 1983, p.30.

a target for Soviet Union. Firstly, it is felt that "the Soviet Union might at some point judge, that direct nuclear threats to Japan are not very risky, especially if its aims were limited, for example, to enforcing [sic] Japan to alter its policies toward China."²² This is probable if the relative power of the U.S. vis-a-vis the Soviet Union declines. Secondly, in case of a war between the two super powers in the Asia-Pacific region, the chances are that Japan would be involved too. In August 1985, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, S.R. Foley, wrote that:

We assume that in any conflict the Japanese would be active allies. It is, in fact essential for the successful defense of Japan and for the success of our larger strategy in the North-West Pacific - which includes obviously, the survival of South Korea that Japan play an active role as an ally in the event of any conflict. 23

This opinion is not one-sided. There is a growing awareness in Japan of its involvement with the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Frank Langdon, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Canada, writes, "The most important change in Japan is the extent to which the defense forces, and even defense cooperation with the U.S. has come to be accepted by the general public."²⁴ A large number of Japanese have started questioning the adequacy of Japan's defense posture. Public discussions on defense-related issues raise less intense

22. Henry Rowen, Daedalus (London), Fall 1980, p.89.

23. Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Reborn, (London: Frances Pinter Pub. Ltd., 1986), p.106.

24. Frank Langdon, "The Security Debate in Japan", Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), Vol. 58, Fall 1985, p.406.

political storms than they did earlier. Only the Japanese Communist Party is critical of the increasing importance given to the SDF and the U.S. Japan Security Treaty of 1961. The crucial defense issues to be debated in Japan are: (a) whether Japan should expand its military establishment and to what extent; (b) whether it is prudent for Japan to remain dependent on the U.S. for its defense; and (c) what should be Japan's contribution to Asia-Pacific regional security.

The Comprehensive National Security Study Group Report stated in 1979 that the major objectives to ensure Japan's security were: (a) increased military cooperation with the U.S. and increased support for global ties among the liberal democratic states; (b) strong Japanese defense capability; (c) persuading the Soviet Union that Japan is neither weak nor threatening; (d) assuring energy and food security; (e) improved measure for coping with natural disasters like earthquakes.²⁵

This conception of "comprehensive security" gives rise to friction between the U.S. and Japan as stated earlier. The U.S. wants to define the bilateral security ties primarily in military terms and the Japanese prefer a broader definition as embodied in the concept of "comprehensive security" which includes economic and political aspects also. To deal effectively with this discordance along with tackling with its defense requirements, subsequent Japanese Prime Ministers, Suzuki and Nakasone came up

25. Chapman and Drifte, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (London: Frances Pinter Pub.Inc. 1983), p.xii.

with different propositions to enhance Japan's military role over a period of time. Some important proposals were:

- (a) To extend Japan's sea-lane defense perimeter to 1,000 nautical miles from Japanese main islands.
- (b) To extend substantial economic support to the Seoul government, since it cannot extend its military role beyond the "defensive" functions.
- (c) To control the straits that pass through Japanese islands in order to restrict the passage of Soviet submarines.
- (d) To secure and maintain the ocean lines of communication.
- (e) To improve air defense, intelligence and maritime capabilities.
- (f) To ensure interoperability of forces with the U.S. and increased number of joint exercises.
- (g) To cooperate with the U.S. in the development of sophisticated military technology.²⁶


The propositions are certainly more acceptable to the U.S. as they assure active Japanese participation in security of the Asia-Pacific region and as these do not veer around the controversial question of increase in defense expenditure. When the U.S. Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger visited Japan in March 1982, he said

26. As cited in: Ikeuchi Fumio, "The 1986-90 Medium-Term Defense Plan", Japan Quarterly, Vol. 31, Oct. - Dec. 1984, p.398.

W.M. Arkin, n.5, Chapter 7.

James V. Young, "A Realist Approach to the U.S. - Japan Alliance", Military Review, Vol. LXV, May 1985, pp. 68-73.

Gregg A. Rubinstein, "Emerging Bonds of U.S. Japanese Defense Technology Cooperation", Strategic Review, Winter 1987, pp.43-50.



Map 4. Japan's Sea-Lane Defense Plan.

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol.122, 15 Dec. 1983, p.30.

that he was not so much interested in what percentage of gross national product Japan spent on defense. What concerned him was the way in which the money was spent and how much strength came from it. ²⁷

This emphasizes the "roles-and-missions" approach that the U.S. adopted towards U.S. - Japan security partnership in the 1980s. It recognizes the need for the U.S. to continue to provide Japan with a nuclear umbrella; maintaining ability to attack Soviet targets in north-east Asia; and securing the sea-lanes in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. But this calls on Japan to perform the role of providing for the defense of its land, the surrounding air and sea space and sea-lanes upto 1,000 miles to the east and south of Tokyo. ²⁸

This approach does not mean that Washington wants Japan to become a regional power militarily nor that the U.S. would retreat from Asia. The objective of this approach is to make Japan aware of the Soviet threat and to make it more security concious. Along with this, the approach is also "designed to play upon the Soviet sense of insecurity in East Asia, where Moscow is concerned primarily to prevent the formation of a U.S. - led bloc."²⁹ The "roles and missions" assigned to Japan though

27. Quoted in James Bartholomew, "Gentle Persuasion", Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April 1982, p.31.

28. R. Nations "Why the Pentagon plumps for Japan" Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 April 1983, p.39.

29. Ibid., p.39.

contribute to the inter-operability of U.S. and Japanese forces, expose Japan to the possibility of being drawn into a super-power rivalry. This is so, because Japan's home waters and the straits, which it is being assigned to defend, control Soviet access to the Pacific. However the U.S. has much to gain as this approach would free the overstretched U.S. Seventh Fleet for missions elsewhere.

It is still doubtful whether Japan would be able to effectively handle this role of 1,000 miles sea-lane defense. Shinkini Eto, professor of international relations at Tokyo University feels that, "it is just a paper plan, because even the great Japanese Imperial Navy in the 1930s did not have any military capability to defend 1,000 mile sea-lanes"³⁰ Apart from the question of practicability, the Japanese cannot bottle up the straits except in "self defense" as the constitution does not permit it. Yet striving towards fulfilling this commitment Japan would spend more than 1% of its GNP on defense.

It should be understood here that Japan is not so naive not to see that such overt defense efforts would expose it to the Soviet threat. It is evident that the U.S. cooperation happens to be indispensable for Japan and hence it undertakes the roles assigned to it by the U.S. with utmost seriousness. Prime Minister Ohira said, "In the current situation, with nuclear weapons developed to their highest potential, it is absolutely

30. Quoted in, D. Jenkins, "Down Memory Lane", Far Eastern Economics Review, Vol. 122, 15 Dec. 1983, p.31.

impossible for Japan to defend itself solely by itself from any direct attack."³¹ This makes U.S. protection fundamental to Japan's defense. One could agree that, "For Japan, persistent courses of action to enhance governability, the Japan-U.S. relationship and economic success are security strategy."³²

But apart from the need to cooperate with the U.S. due to its dependence on the Security Treaty, Japan realizes the shortcomings of the defense provided by the Seventh-Fleet to protect Japan's surrounding waters. Though the defense of Persian Gulf is important to Japan, the expected shift of the U.S. would leave Japan in a vulnerable position, as the defence of its SLOCs would then lie with Japan. Japan imports over 99 percent of her oil to produce three quarters of the energy required to sustain her economy. The fact that over 70 percent of the oil it imports comes from Gulf States makes peace and stability in the Gulf region, and the security of sea lanes connecting the Gulf and Japan a matter of vital importance to Japan's security. It cannot extend its SDF to safeguard oil supply, so it becomes vital for Japan to rely on the U.S. for safeguarding its interests in the Middle East.³³

Japan has major reasons to have the United States continue

31. Quoted in Davis B. Bobrow, "Playing for Safety: Japan's Security Practices", Japan Quarterly, Vol.31, 1984, p.37

32. Ibid., p. 37.

33. Yukio Satoh. The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy. Adelphi Paper No.178 (London: 11SS Inc. 1982), p.10.

carrying Japan's burden in Southeast Asia and in the sea-lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean to the Middle East. Although Japan carefully refrains from expressing any interest in externally helping the United States protect these regions that might lead Washington to believe Japan is prepared to help, there is no doubt that Tokyo realizes the extent of its stake.³⁴ As the realization of its dependence on U.S. forces to defend its economy in times of war dawns on the Japanese the U.S. presses hard the need for Japan "to play a strictly defined role in the Asia-Pacific region - i.e. contribute more substantially to U.S. military strategy... without itself becoming a nuclear or dominant regional power."³⁵

Japan's interests in the defense of SLOCs, Persian Gulf and the South Korea propell it to military and political cooperation with the U.S. The American strategists see the role of Japan and South Korea in one context. As a result the Department of National Defense in Japan has started considering plans for joint military maneuvers between the Japanese Air Force and the U.S. Air Force stationed in South Korea. But this cooperation between the U.S. and Japan which makes the latter play an active role, though worded in pacific terms, have a negative impact on peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. Konstantin O. Sarkisov, Professor and Section Chief, Institute of Oriental Studies in

34. Edward A. Olsen U.S. Japan Strategic Reciprocity, (California: Hoover Instn. Press, 1985), p. 137.

35. Hiroko Yamane, "Japan as an Asian/Pacific Power", Asian Survey, (Berkeley), Volume 27, Dec. 1987, p. 1304.

Moscow, writes, "This cooperation, being in line with a U.S. strategy that is designed to attain a missile and nuclear superiority over the USSR and to break the existing balance of force is objectively a distabilizing factor."³⁶

Other countries of the Asia-Pacific region also do not favour an increasing military role for Japan. The PRC though willing to support the idea of Japan increasing its conventional forces, remains anxious about increasing Japanese military potential. Behind this anxiety lurks the fear that the great economy of Japan if used to increase its military potential might become a serious threat to China. South Korea similarly does not appreciate the emphasis of the U.S. on Japan and fears Japanese colonialism which may result from its military strength. Still, Japan's cordial approach toward South Korea is making it gradually accept Japan as an "important regional strategic actor". North Korea has always denounced the Japanese Self Defense Forces and thinks of it as a tool of the U.S. in the region. Philippines too have nothing in favour of Japanese militarism.

These reactions have not deterred the U.S. thus far from pushing Japan towards an important strategic role in the region. The U.S. attitude is clearly portrayed in the following words:

Reciprocity must remain the ultimate goal for the United States in its relations with Japan; it can afford no less... the United States should never be deterred from seeking Japanese

36. Konstantin O. Sarkisov, "Japan and the U.S. in Asia: Cooperation and Contradictions" Asian Survey, Vol.24, Nov. 1984, p. 1181.

cooperation by Asian protestations that it values Japan too much. For the United States, Japan is the most important country in Asia. In terms of Japan's ability to lead the region economically, politically, and -yes-militarily, Japan is the "No.1" ally of the United States. Everything else in U.S. Asian relations is a corollary of this fact.³⁷

Hence, it is easy to conclude that in the foreseeable future the security of Japan remains of critical concern to the U.S. Both forward deployment in East Asia and the denial of Soviet access to the open waters of the Pacific remain an object of fundamental strategic interest for the U.S. It is important for the U.S. to control the critical choke points off the Japanese home islands and South Korea to make the Pacific Fleet effective and to ensure the survivalability of Japan and South Korea. In order to achieve this objective, the sea lanes of the West Pacific have to be secured and this requires the provision of basing facilities along the entire Asian Archipelagic chain. Thus, for the U.S. the recognition that Japan is a critical part of the security triangle in Northeast Asia comprising of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan is a logical conclusion of any rational assessment based on U.S. economic political and military interests in East Asia.

As far as Japan is concerned, it is evident that in its own economic and security interests it cannot abide by the Post-War "pacifist sentiments". Increasing its military capability in cooperation with the U.S. is greatly in Japan's favour also. The

37. Olsen, n.29, p.150.

U.S. is already banking on Japan as its leading ally in the Asia Pacific region in case of a confrontation with the Soviet Union in this region. James T. Eastwood, a defense analyst observes, "The next ten years... are likely to witness changes in Japan's defense posture that will be in stark contrast with the picture of... past years. Those projected capabilities, if fulfilled, would present the Soviet Union with a substantially altered strategic scenario in East Asia"³⁸

38. Quoted in James V. Young, n.26, p.72.

CHAPTER IV

DEFENSE BURDEN SHARING

Japan is strategically placed and the U.S. maximises its strategic advantage in the Asia-Pacific region with its support. However, the question still remains as to what this 'support' means. The rightist and the leftist forces in Japan would not allow Japan to be rearmed the way and to the extent the U.S. wants it to. But a gradual shift and an increased emphasis on self-defense has been evident since Nakasone's Prime Ministership. Since then Japan has shown a positive trend toward increasing Japan's self-defense capabilities.

The U.S. has always felt the need to have strong allies in the Asia-Pacific region, if it has to maintain military balance on the global level. The contributions made by Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea, even if conventional in their military potential would greatly support the U.S. strategy in the region. This realisation makes the U.S. clamour for increased military endeavours on the part of its Asia-Pacific allies. Japan becomes an object of criticism (a) because of its relatively strong economy, and (b) because of the low profile it keeps in military preparedness.

Every time the question of making the NATO Allies bear more of defense burden arises, Japan is dragged into the debate too because by international standards Japan is contributing a lesser

percentage of its GNP for military preparedness. The constraints, both domestic and external, which check Japan from spending more of its GNP on defense cannot be ignored. But the current U.S. contention is that even by keeping within certain limits, abiding by the non-nuclear principles, working for 'comprehensive security', and working within the constraints of censure from the neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan can still do much more to support the U.S. strategy in the region.

The beginning of 1980s brought to light the mounting U.S. pressure on Japan to increase its military spending relative to its national income. The continuing adverse balance of trade for the U.S. brought Japan under direct U.S. allegations. Jerome E. Schwartz held that the main reason for Japan's flourishing economy was its being subsidised by the U.S. and secondly, Japan contributing less than 1 percent of its GNP on national defense.¹

Japan is sensitive to the linkage between its prosperity, minimal self defense programmes, and the cost of these for American economic and strategic well being. On the other hand, there is a widespread perception among Americans that the U.S. is no longer getting what it should be getting from its ties with Japan and that Japan is getting much more than its fair share from the bilateral arrangements.² Thus Japan is often assailed

1. The New York Times, 26 Jan. 1979, p.20.

2. Edward A. Olsen. US Japanese Strategic Reciprocity (California: Hoover Instn. Press, 1985), p.7.

in U.S. Congressional debates. There is a recurring demand in the Congress for the NATO allies and Japan to pay for a larger share of U.S. efforts to defend their interests in Western Europe and in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

The burden sharing issue is directly related to economic growth and competition in international market. The Congressional anger is based on the belief that Western Europe and Japan derive a competitive advantage over the U.S. industry as a result of bearing less of defense burden when compared to the U.S. An analyst openly stated in The New York Times, 14 July 1979, that Japan's economy progressed as a result of "deemphasis on armament".³

BURDEN SHARING DEFINED

Before going into details of the question of Japan's bearing a "fair share" of defense burden, it is necessary to define the concept of "Burden sharing". Colin Humphreys defines Burden sharing as "the fair distribution of the ... defense burden between the Allies."⁴ This was worded to deal with the controversy over NATO Burden sharing, where the U.S. claimed that the West European Allies were not contributing sufficiently to ensure security in the North Atlantic region. It is equally applicable to U.S. - Japanese Burden sharing.

3. The New York Times, 14 July 1979, p.18.

4. Colin Humphreys, "NATO: The European Contribution" NATO Review, No.1, Feb. 1986, p.21.

The definition has a few shortcomings and does not explain the concept of Burden sharing in its totality. Yet it deals with the concept of "fair distribution" which puts the contribution of individual countries for the defense of an alliance to the test of critical assessment. The difficulty is that it is still undefined as to what constitutes a "fair share" or the "fair distribution" of the defense burden. The difficulty in determining "fair share" arises because the defense burden consists of several factors which due to qualitative differences cannot be compared or quantified.

Colin Humphreys has taken the following forms of "Burden sharing" to illustrate the burden that is borne by the various countries in an alliance, these throw ample light on the factors which should be taken into account while assessing the "burden" borne by an ally :-

1. Money: The relative increase in the defense budget with the sustained growth of capabilities over a period of time. This forms an effective measuring rod to assess the contribution of various countries.
2. Output: What counts in the end is not the amount of money spent on defense but the output gained from that expenditure—tanks, ships, aircraft and trained fighting men for which it pays.
3. Manpower: This constitutes the standing forces and the mobilized strength and provides an effective tool for measurement.
4. Forces in the Theatre: Forces which are to bear the greater

part of responsibility for defense of a particular region, in case of Japan it is Asia-Pacific, help one in understanding whether the ally or the U.S. is contributing more to the security.

5. Other Factors: Factors such as the essential support facilities, real estate charges, facilities for ground and air training, explains the additional expenses incurred by various countries to "share" the "burden".

The following query seeks to find the contribution made by Japan to its security alliance with the U.S. in terms of the factors given above, and to reach the conclusions: (i) Whether Japan is contributing sufficient for its self defense; (ii) If the U.S. bears a preponderate burden, why; (iii) What constitutes the fair share that Japan is supposed to be bearing; and (iv) How can equitable "Burden sharing" be brought about.

JAPAN AND BURDEN SHARING

It is clear from the preceding chapters that Japan still has very little combat capability and its surveillance system has been assailed severely due to its being ineffective. Furthermore, Japan faces serious setbacks in defending its sea lanes of communications, its economic lifelines. It is also not capable of protecting its interests in the Gulf region, which is done by the U.S. Such protection is provided to Japan by the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The treaty is confined to the defense of Japan and the security of the Far East. Yukio Satoh a member of

the Japanese Foreign Service writes:

United States cooperation with Japan in securing Japanese interests in the Gulf or along the sea lanes derives either from the strategic interests of the United States or from the political partnership existing between Japan and the United States. In other words, the U.S. military forces close to the gulf and in the Western Pacific are maintained not because of any treaty obligations to Japan but as a part of the global security policy of the United States.⁵

As Japan reaps maximum benefits of this U.S. commitment without contributing to the defense in monetary terms, it is easy to understand the allegations of the U.S. Congress. It argues that Japan "does not do sufficient" for its self defense and should upgrade its defense expenditure to meet its defense requirements.

Seen in this light, it is comprehensible what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles H. Percy (R.Ill.) said on 14 Dec. 1982, "There is a wide feeling on Capitol Hill that Japan must do more." It is unconscionable for Japan to stand aside "While the United States spent billions of dollars on protecting Japan."⁶

The U.S. believes that although American defense efforts are important to their own security, they also contribute to the physical security enjoyed by Western Europe and Japan. "... discrepancies in defense spending were tolerable when these

5. Yukio Satoh, The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy (London: IISS, 1982), p. 26.

6. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1982 (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1982), p.166.

countries were relatively weak economically, particularly in the immediate postwar period when massive reconstruction efforts, supported by the United States, were underway. But now there is a question as to whether the allies have become too dependent on the United States militarily while reaping the advantages of the strong economies that have benefitted from the security umbrella provided by the United States."⁷

Before going into this debate over Burden sharing and viewing the trends in Japan's contribution to defense burden, one question to be considered is why does the U.S. bear a preponderate burden of defense. Keeping in mind that any alliance is based on mutuality of interests and benefits, it is important to understand the following remark of Klaus Knorr:

Any approach to approximate fairness in the distribution of costs is unrealistic without also considering national differences in the receipt of benefits... The intra-alliance distribution of costs and gains is not as important as the national balance of advantages and disadvantages. To the extent that a country behaves rationally, it will join or stay in the alliance (or consortium of nations) so long as the benefits exceed the disadvantages, even if it bears more burdens in proportion to size and wealth, than do their members.

According to Knorr, the proportion of burden shared by a member of an Alliance corresponds to the importance of the Alliance to the member. He writes:

The more a member (of an Alliance) wants the Alliance or particular programs, he will have to pay in one form or another, compared with

7. "Defense Burden Sharing : US Relations with NATO Allies and Japan." Major Legislation of the Congress, 97th Congress (Wash. D.C.: USGPO 1982), Issue No.5, Jan. 1982, MLC - 015.

less eager members. If X is more afraid than Y of external aggression (or political intimidation) and sees no better alternative to improved security, then X is ready to make concessions in exchange for Y's cooperation ⁸

America's interest in developing a healthy bilateral relationship with Japan is just as important for the U.S. as for Japan. But the involvement of the U.S. on a global level can be met only when the U.S. bears a preponderate defense burden, which means a higher rate of GNP being spent on its defense expenditure. Japan gains a great deal through its alliance with the U.S. Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote:

Japan would simply not be - nor would it remain what it is without the American connection... on the narrow level of military expenditure, it can be roughly estimated that without American protection Japan would probably have to spend on its defense some additional \$50 billion a year in order to feel truly secure (while at the same time alienating and frightening by such expenditure many of its neighbours).⁹

On the other hand, America apart from needing basing facilities in Japan due to its geostrategic position, needs Japanese capital to finance its industrial renovation and technological innovation. It needs Japanese cooperation in protecting its significant global lead in creative R & D. It also needs Japanese participation in securing through enhanced economic development such geopolitically threatened yet vital areas as the

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8. As quoted in, Jack A. LeCuyer, "Burdensharing : Has the term outlived its Usefulness?" Atlantic Community Quarterly (Washington D.C.), Spring, 1986, p.64.
 9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America's New Geostrategy", Foreign Affairs (New York), Spring 1988, p.697.

Philippines, Pakistan, Egypt, Central America and Mexico.¹⁰ Hence, wrote Brzezinski, "Japan for many years to come will be heavily dependent on American security protection, obtained by an American willingness* to spend on defense a share of its GNP more than three times larger than Japan's..."¹¹

The Americans make a large contribution to the alliance defense willingly, still want Japan to step up its defense expenditure. This aspect can be understood in the light of the need of the U.S. to strengthen militarily in the Asia-Pacific region. Given the political stability in Japan and its dynamic economy it can do much to strengthen the U.S. hand in the region. The U.S. pressure on Japan to play a more effective role in the defense of the Asia-Pacific region emanates not so much from the wish to abandon responsibilities in the region as much from the wish to evoke active participation of Japan to strengthen its strategy.

One tactic used to make Japan bear more of defense burden is proposal of withdrawing troops from South Korea as done by President Carter. It is obviously not in the US interest to carry out such a policy in the face of geostrategic demands for maintaining super power balance in the region. Any such proposal might lead to a minimal increase in the allies contribution but would seriously harm American credibility in the region. George

10. Ibid., p.696.

11. Ibid., p.697.

* Emphasis added.

Shultz says, "Our goal in asking others to increase their efforts is to gain added strength together, not to decrease our own efforts. The United States will remain a Pacific power. Although specific tasks may change, our overall responsibilities will not be diminished in importance or shifted to others. This is particularly true of our security relationships with our friends and allies in the area."¹² Even though the threat of massive troop withdrawals is considered to be too extreme, some members of the Congress might still want to use the threat of marginal reduction for pressurising the allies.

Another tactic used by the U.S. Congress to pressurize Japan to spend more on defense was through defense authorization process. Amendment to authorization bills is used to deny funds for activities that the Congress decides should be funded by an ally.¹³ One instance of using this process to pressurize Japan was that of approval of \$ 17 million bill in 1983, for the US F-16 fighter plane base at Misawa in Japan. It stated clearly that "the funds could not be used until Japan allocated its agreed upon share"¹⁴

At times, the Congressional pressure on Japan comes in the

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12. George Shultz, "The US and East Asia: A partnership for the future" Department of State Bulletin, Vol.83, No.2073. p. 34.
 13. Major Legislation of the Congress 97th Congress (Wash. D.C.: USGPO, 1982), Issue no. 5, Jan. 1982, MLC-065.
 14. CQ Almanac 1983 (Wash. D.C.: USGPO, 1983), p.472.

form of American restrictions on Japanese imports.¹⁵ In March 1982, U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger warned Japanese leaders that Congress might restrict Japanese imports if Tokyo did not quickly and significantly increase its defense capabilities.¹⁶

It is evident that due to its constitutional and domestic restrictions Japan is contributing lesser percentage of its GNP on defense than most countries do. It is also true that one of the factors contributing to the remarkable growth of Japanese economy is "deemphasis on defense." The question is for how long would Japan adhere to its Pacifist constitution and would not yield to the U.S. pressure for joining the arms race and acquiring offensive capability. From the current trends in Japanese armament one may conclude that the country would resort to conventional arms (see Table 4.2): but this is not to say that Japan is not a part of U.S. nuclear strategy in the region. The debate over Defense Burden sharing and continual US pressure on Japan is leading the country towards ever increasing armed capabilities. After perusing the trends in the Defense Burden sharing and considering what constitutes a "fair share" for Japan as set by American strategists, it would be evident that Japan is becoming more or less a "forward deployment base" of the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region.

15. See The New York Times, 28 March 1982, p.3.

16. Allen S. Whiting "Prospects for Japanese Defense Policy", Asian Survey, Vol.22, No.11, Nov.1982.

TRENDS IN BURDEN SHARING

The debate over U.S. - Japanese defense Burden sharing found a head start when Senator Jesse Helms (R.,N.C.) proposed an amendment to make it a reciprocal arrangement.¹⁷ This was followed by Stephen Neal (D., N.C.) introducing a bill calling on Japan to share the defense burden by paying a 2 percent "security tax" to the U.S.¹⁸ Later, Congressman Clement Zablocki (D.,Ill.) introduced a bill including a request that Tokyo spend more than 1 percent of Japan's GNP on defense. He also suggested that Japan should allow US nuclear powered ships to stop at ports in Japan.¹⁹

During Prime Minister Ohira's government in late 1970s, there were positive signs of Japan wanting to contribute more for its self defense to increase the capability of SDF. But nothing substantial was done, and with constant articulation of demand by the U.S. Japan inched towards strengthening the SDF. The changes that came about were so minimal that the U.S. Congressmen were not impressed. For instance, in February 1980 the U.S. State Department said that it expected Japan to undertake steady and significant increase in military spending in coming year.²⁰ This made Japan to increase its financial support for 46,000. American


17. Edward A. Olsen, n.2, p.27.

18. Major Legislations of the Congress 97th Congress (Wash. D.C.: USGPO,1982), Issue No.5, Jan. 1982, MLC-016.

19. Edward A.Olsen, n.2, p.27.

20. The New York Times 24 February 1979, p.21.

Trends in Japanese Defense Spending



Source: Adapted from a figure in *Asahi Graph*, Jan. 23, 1987.
 Note: Figures for 1986 and 1987 are initial, projected figures. Figures for the remaining three years of the Mid-Term Defense Program, are averages.

Source: Adapted from a figure in *Asahi Graph*, 23 Jan. 1987. Also printed in, Chuma Kiyofuku, "What Price the Defense of Japan?" *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 34, Jul. - Sept. 1987, p. 253.

Trends in Japanese Defense Spending.

servicemen stationed in Japan in March 1980. The support cost that Japan assumed was estimated to be over 1 billion dollars.²¹ This coupled with the resolve of buying some \$14 billion worth of American warplanes, was seen by the U.S. as an attempt to ease pressure from the Carter Administration and the U.S. Congress for higher defense spending by Japan. It also sought to forestall American criticism of Japan on defense and economic issues. Another attempt at taking a symbolic step towards more interest in military policies was apparent with the decision of establishing first Post World War II Parliamentary Committee for Defense in Japan in 1980. The new Committee was headed by Michita Sakata and provided a forum for debate on military issues.

While Prime Minister Suzuki was in power nothing substantial was done to improve Japan's defense posture and the country reverted back to the age-old Pacifism. Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki said that Japan would not change military policy to one of rearmament and by implication, would remain dependent on the US for strategic defense. This clearly meant that Japan would resist the U.S. pressure to increase arms spending in the wake of Russian intervention in Afghanistan. At the same time Minister Masayoshi Ito was assigned to rebut the Soviet Union charge that Japan sought to become a major military power.

There is a strong feeling in Japan that the Soviet Union does not pose a direct threat to Japan, while conclusion of any

21. The New York Times 20 March 1980, p.11.

treaty with the Western nations by way of embarking on a scheme for collective security would make Japan more susceptible to threats from the Soviet Union.

Ongoing debate over the level of defense spending shifted at this stage, as Japan for the first time since the Second World War, seriously considered improving its military posture. In April 1981, JCS Council General Goro Takeda urged the nation to increase defense spending from under 1 percent to 3 percent of its GNP²² Towards the end of April 1981, the U.S. Secretary Casper Weinberger, in a speech in San Francisco, warned Japan that it would find it exceedingly difficult to defend itself with its current state of forces and should provide "much more" for its own defense.²³ Suzuki's response to this was not very enthusiastic. He cited Japan's Pacifist Constitution while rejecting the U.S. proposal to increase Japan's military spending. Undoubtedly this was in sympathy with the public opinion. Suzuki himself stated in a TV interview that increased military spending could lead to the fall of Liberal Democratic Party from power.

One may ask what should be the realistic approach of Japan on the question of increasing military expenditure. On the one hand, the need for increased defense expenditure is felt, and on the other hand it is turned down by the party in power for domestic reasons.

22. The New York Times, 9 April 1981, p.1.

23. Ibid., 29 April 1981, p.7.

This trend continued throughout the year. In March 1982, Casper Weinberger proposed Japan to double its military spending and contribute more to support the U.S. Forces stationed there.²⁴ It should be noted here that Japan does not include security benefits and pensions to its army personnel in the military budget. Thus, the budget is maintained within the 1 percent GNP ceiling. If the Japanese military spending was to be calculated by NATO standards, then the budget would amount to 1.6 percent of its GNP. Doubling this, as proposed by Casper Weinberger, would mean over 3 percent of its GNP which is fairly high.²⁵ At this stage, Weinberger also asked Japan to permit the flow of military related technology to the US in return for the U.S. technology.²⁶ This signifies the expanding US demand, which includes most of the factors that form military "burden". The U.S. sought Japanese cooperation by gradual persuasion, overlooking at times the domestic scene, and opposition within Japan.

In August 1982, the issue of burden sharing cropped up again. A U.S. Defense Department report on Allied contributions to common defense showed that the U.S. continued to spend more funds for security than all other European allies and Japan. The report

24. The New York Times 27 March 1982, p.3.

25. Japan's 1988 cabinet approved defense budget is Yen. 3.7 trillion in excess of \$ 30 billion at 123 yen per dollar. The British, French and West German defense budgets were all less than \$30 billion in 1987, If Japan, does not become number three in 1988, it will probably reach that status in 1989 or in 1990. See James E. Luer, "Japan's Defense Policy" Current History Vol.87, April 1988, p.145.

26. The New York Times 27 March 1982, p.3.

singled out Japan, asserting that Japan appeared to be contributing "far less" than its share.²⁷ This report was closely followed by the U.S. Navy Secretary John Lehman Jr's urging Japan to spend more funds to speed military buildup and counter increased Soviet naval threat. Once again, the US resentment of Japanese economic progress came to the fore. An analyst held that the US bears too heavy a burden for NATO and Japanese defense. In doing so, it hurts its own economy.²⁸

These views were echoed in Congressional debates also. The Senate by a voice vote on 21 December 1982 stated that Japan should "immediately increase" its spending on defense and should assume a significantly larger share of the U.S. costs of defending Japan. Senator Carl Lewin (D., Mich.) said that an American "gripped by 10.8 percent unemployment and staggering federal deficits will remain unconvinced when the Japanese government pleads that its own debt - financing situation problems prevent increased defense investments".²⁹

These continual reminders of the need for Japan to do more for its own defense went unheeded. It was with the advent of P.M. Yasuhiro Nakasone, that some change in attitude was expected. He recognized the inequity of Japan's low defense expenditures compared to other countries and led the public opinion towards

27. The New York Times, 2 Aug. 1982, p.3.

28. The New York Times, 4 Sept. 1982, p.21.

29. Congress and Nation, Vol. VI, 1981-84 (Wash. D.C.:USGPO, 1982), p.153.

thinking more in terms of enhanced military role for the nation. But during the initial stages of his Prime Ministership he did not venture to do away with the 1 percent ceiling on defense expenditure.³⁰ But Nakasone had more than once claimed that he would abolish the 1 percent GNP limit before he stepped down as Prime Minister, even if doing so involved risking his own political life.³¹ The logic behind this was to deprive the U.S. Congress of a "stick with which to beat Japan in the continuing battle over trade - in which Congress had deliberately sought to gain points by accusing Japan of enjoying a 'free-ride' in defense."³² Secondly, the 1 percent GNP ceiling was "artificial" as the defense expenditure, as stated earlier, was higher in real terms than 1 percent GNP.

During the 1980s period, the SDF had gained a lot of Japanese support. In a public opinion poll when people were asked the question "should Japan have Self-Defense Force", 86 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively. When asked about SDF force levels, a large number of respondents said that the current size was appropriate, but the number in favour of an increased military buildup went up by a few percentage points.³³ The ground was thus prepared for Prime Minister Nakasone to convince the

30. The New York Times, 9 Jan. 1983, p.8.

31. C. Smith, "A shot in the foot", Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 129, 26 Sept. 1985, p.52.

32. Ibid., p.52.

33. Joyce E. Larson, (ed)New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security (New Brunswick: National Strategy Information Centre, Inc. 1980), p. 98.

countrymen that the need for increasing military expenditure was great.

Masao Horie, Councillor Japanese Diet, wrote, "... major policy changes are likely to come slowly. However, it is clear that Japan is paying more and closer attention to security issues, with a heightened awareness of the implications for an adequate defense and security posture which flow from the country's growing economic and political involvement in the Western Pacific region and the world at large"³⁴ Such views confirm the findings of a study conducted by the Centre for Defense Information, a Washington based military research organization. It stated that the current US policy could push Japan to become an independent military power in the Western Pacific against American interests in the area.³⁵

Thus the U.S. pressure on Japan to increase the percentage of GNP on military expenditure has not served the real purpose of making the alliance more effective. This failure can be attributed to the stress laid on monetary aspect of burden sharing. Japan has gradually increased its defense spending, but that has not served much strategic purpose. This is mainly because of a lack of clarity in the U.S. policy as to what it really wanted Japan to do. The continuous U.S. contention that Japan is not contributing a "fair share" to the "defense burden" was never followed by a clear cut view as to what Japan should really be doing in order to

34. Ibid., p. 93.

35. The New York Times, 11 Feb. 1983, p.13.

shoulder a "fair share" of "burden".

When the U.S. stressed on the "output" and assigned to Japan various "roles and missions", the attitude of Japan to cope up with these responsibilities was more positive. In order to meet these assignments Japan ended the 1 percent ceiling. Yet, bringing the nation so far from its Pacifist Constitution and still wanting it not to assume a military role that supports the U.S. interests in the region is not quite comprehensible.

The view held by U.S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in March 1982, was:

Some analysts actively oppose shifting more of the allied defense burden to Japan, and argue that the United States itself should continue to bear the main brunt of offsetting Soviet military power. They argue that the existing defense relationship and relative burden sharing have had important foreign policy benefits for the United States, and that these will be lost or diminished if Japan sharply increases defense preparedness. Among other things, a rearmed Japan would presumably be more independent of US leadership in world affairs and might also become a very able competitor in the arms and weaponry market.³⁶

If the U.S. has to check any trend towards the emergence of an independent Japanese military strategy, it would have to mention specifically what it expects from Japan. The U.S. will have to appreciate all other factors apart from percentage of GNP, that

36. Stanley R. Sloan, "Defense Burden Sharing: U.S. Relations with NATO Allies and Japan", Major studies and Issue Briefs of the Congressional Research Service 1982 - 83 Supplement (Washington D.C.: USGPO), P.34.

constitute Japan's defense burden. As can be seen from Table 4.1 Japanese real defense spending increased by an average of more than 7 percent annually. This increase is more than increase in nearly all other types of government spending. It is also more than the annual increase of defense expenditure of NATO countries, which is around 3 percent annual increase.

Apart from this, Japan contributes about \$ 1 billion annually in support costs for US military forces in Japan. It's armed forces of approximately 250,000 men are acquiring modern equipments like F-15 fighter aircraft and P-3C antisubmarine planes. The Japanese navy has 34 modern destroyers and 16 frigates, more than twice as many as the U.S. Seventh Fleet.³⁷ Moreover, cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese military forces and periodic joint exercises have increased the ability of Japan to face a crisis.

The U.S. Defense Department officials admit that Japan is shouldering a heavy burden in the form of the costs of the US armed forces stationed in Japan. In fact it contributes more as a "forward deployment base" and as one of the pillars of US global defense strategy than the NATO countries do.³⁸

The 1980s have seen the opening of new avenues constituting

37. Stephen J. Solarz. "A search for Balance", Foreign Policy Vol.49, Winter 1982-83, p.78.

38. Chuma Kiyofuku, "What price the Defense of Japan?" Japan Quarterly, Vol.34, Jul. - Sept. 1987, p.257.

"fair share" for Japan. One of these is defense technological cooperation which upgrades mutual defense posture by reducing research and development costs while producing more advanced weapons system. Arms exports are also seen as means of alleviating the burden on the defense budget and as a means of asserting Japan's right as a sovereign nation.³⁹ The U.S. has promoted this trend by pressurising Japan to do more for its own defense and by becoming more reluctant to part with its military technology. Moreover, Japan is considering joining the SDI research. This adds an additional facet to the military alliance and may serve as a factor balancing the defense burden.

The result of achieving an equitable "burden sharing" may lead Japan into shouldering significant strategic responsibilities. As the emphasis shifts from the level of GNP to specific roles assigned to the SDF, there are increased chances of active Japanese involvement. Thus Japan is maneuvered into an alliance that takes it further from its Pacifist Constitution and quietly makes it partner in a strong strategic relationship.

Richard C. Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs proposed:

The issue of sharing the defense burden must be addressed in the broader context of economic, political and security cooperation among the allies. This will make it possible for Japan to find alternate - perhaps unique - ways to carry 'its fair share' without feeling pressured to assume an uncomfortably high military profile.

39. Richard Drifte, "Japan's growing Arms Production and the American Connection", The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1986, pp. 55 - 56.

By the same token, it can help reassure Japan's neighbours that the development of more impressive Japanese defense capabilities - or a rising Japanese defense budget - do not foreshadow independent or militaristic policies.⁴⁰

Thus, Japan is cajoled, persuaded and pressurised into becoming a "pillar of US global defense strategy".

The U.S. and Western industrialized nations are of the view that Japan should increase its defense efforts rapidly. But to what extent Japan should increase its defense efforts has still not been decided. Japan is preparing itself for a changed security perception which removes it farther from its ideology and assigns to it a more practical role in the world arena.

40. Richard C. Holbrooke, "US- Japanese Relations in the 1980s", Deptt. of State Bulletin, Vol.81, Jan. 1981, p.17.

T a b l e - 4.1

TRENDS IN JAPANESE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1980 - 85

FISCAL YEAR	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Budget (billion yen)	2230	2400	2586	2754	2935	
Gross Increase rate %	6.5	7.6	7.8	6.5	6.55	
Real increase rate %	2.0	3.9	4.6	4.3	4.8	
Defense expenditure as % of GNP	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.98	0.99	0.99

Sources : Strategic Survey 1983-84 (London IISS, 1984)
Tokinoya, Atsushi, The Japan - US Alliance:
 A Japanese Perspective, Adelphi Papers 212,
 (IISS London 1986), p.19.

T a b l e - 4.2

JAPANESE DEFENSE PLAN, 1983 -87 (SELECTED WEAPONS)

TYPE	Number planned to be purchased	Planned 1987 force level

AIR SELF DEFENSE FORCES		
Operation Aircraft	120	395
F - 15 Interceptor	75	138
F - 1 Supporter Fighter	6	58
F S-X Support Fighter	24	24
E - 2C Early Warning Aircraft	1	9
Surface to air missile	?	?
GROUND SELF DEFENSE FORCES		
Type 74 Tanks	373	850
Type 75 155 mm self propelled Howitzers	50	201
New 155 mm Howitzers	72	91
Type 73 armoured personnel carrier	105	225
AH-1S anti tank Helicopter	43	56
Portable Surface to air weapons	468	517
MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCES		
Destroyers/Frigates	14	60
Submarines	6	15
Minesweepers	13	33
P-3C patrol aircraft	50	72
Anti-submarine helicopter	20	43

Japan decided in 1983 to purchase US patrol surface - to - air missiles to replace its aging Nike-J system beginning in the mid 1980s. The exact number is nuclear.

Source : International Security Year book 1983 - 84

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

With the end of the Second World War the U.S. emerged as a super power. To ensure peace to the conflict ridden areas and to secure its global economic and military interests, the U.S. became involved in various regions of the world. The Asia Pacific region was opened to unrestrained economic activities and Japan, that had threatened the U.S. interests, was stripped of its military strength. During the seven year occupation of Japan under the Allied troops, much was done to assure that Japanese militarism does not rise again to threaten the stability of the region. In order to completely disarm Japan a "no war clause" was included in its Constitution.

The subsequent Cold War brought about a marginal change in the attitude of the U.S. towards the disarmed Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War this change became more pronounced and soon the U.S. started encouraging Japan to rearm in order to aid America in maintaining a global balance of power. At this stage the U.S. desired Japan to develop self defense capabilities which would free the U.S. to deal with conflicts in other parts of the region.

A relatively poorly armed Japan needed the U.S. protection which was provided through the Mutual Security Treaty. This Treaty was one-sided, as the U.S. had an obligation to come to

Japan's defense in case of an aggression but not vice versa. Since the outbreak of the Korean War the U.S. desired Japan's active participation for the collective security of its neighbours in the Asia Pacific region. Hence, it became important to introduce "conditions of mutuality" in the Treaty. Changes in the constitution of Japanese Self Defense Forces were apparent too. A gradual move towards rearmament could be seen in Japan.

The Nixon Doctrine redefined the U.S. commitment to its allies and laid emphasis on greater independence of the allies for self defense. After the war in Vietnam ended, the U.S. put considerable pressure on Japan to meet its own security requirements and lessen its dependence on the U.S. As the U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam and the capacity of the U.S. to come to the aid of an ally critically declined, Japan felt a need to review its security policy. Thus beginning from an unarmed position, Japan's defense contribution grew steadily to meet the requirements of the changing international situations. This trend clearly indicates that although Japan gained the U.S. protection through Mutual Security Treaty, the changing environment affected the origin and growth of its armed forces.

Being a major economic power allied to the U.S. and located near the Soviet Union's Pacific Coastline, Japan cannot avoid playing an important role in the security of the Asia Pacific. Still, it spends a bare minimum for its defense when compared to other nations. What enhances its vulnerability is its extreme

dependence on imports of fuel and raw materials. A continuous inflow of raw materials can be assured only when there is peace. This factor makes Japanese security sensitive to the U.S. domestic and foreign policies. Its need for an effective U.S. global strategy ensuring peace and stability is a corollary to its requirement of an open international economy.

The U.S. - Japan strategic relations began to change with the end of the Occupation. The change came with greater force with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. During this period, Japan was required to enhance its capability to deal with a threat. Due to the constitutional restriction and domestic policy of not spending more than 1 percent of GNP on its defense, Japan failed to be sufficiently armed. Its three non-nuclear principles imposed further restrictions on any change in its defense capabilities. The U.S. contended that since the Japanese refused to pay more for their own defense, America should not contribute to Japan's security. This expressed the U.S. wish to get its allies to be better equipped for self defense, but did not mean a lessened U.S. interest in the region. In the face of increasing Soviet Military in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. had little choice but to maintain its presence.

The U.S. and Japan share the perception that Japan faces no direct threat in the region. Yet the U.S. takes the view that the changing Soviet capabilities in the Asia Pacific region impose a need on Japan to change its policy. As the Soviet and Japanese territorial dispute persists, the Soviet military build-

up is seen as a potential threat. The Soviet presence on the islands Etorofu and Shikotan, which lie in the north of Japan, are seen as the Soviet demonstration to Japan of its intentions to use force if necessary.

This Soviet move is seen as a response to the normalization of the U.S. - PRC relations and Japan - China Friendship Treaty concluded during the early 1970s. Japan's gradual improvement of its Self Defense Forces is attributed by the Soviets to its alliance with the U.S. This exposes Japan to an increased Soviet threat.

The U.S. strategists treat Asia Pacific region as a zone of "vital interests". Hence, there is concentration on improving its basing facilities in the region and aligning itself more closely to Japan, China, South Korea and the Philippines. The U.S. seeks to block the Soviet Union's advancement in the east and its military growth in the Pacific Ocean, through a joint effort of its allies. Japan, more prosperous than most countries in the Asia Pacific region, is expected by the U.S. to play the most supportive role for strengthening the U.S. strategy.

The concern with Japan's inadequacy in meeting an external threat is not only voiced by the U.S. but by Japanese domestic elements too. A significantly large number of Japanese have begun to question the ability of the Self Defense Forces to deal with a threat. Though there is still no support for revising the pacifist constitution, a majority of Japanese support a stronger

role for the SDF. Japanese concern over a growing amphibious assault capability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and powerful airborne forces which threaten Japan from Sakhalian and Kuriles reinforce the position of those who take this view. Japanese strategists are aware that Japan can do little on its own for its territorial defense when confronting the Soviet power. It is therefore concluded that Japan's security lies in developing healthy bilateral international relations.

Thus far, the U.S. has provided Japanese SDF with a considerable support with its presence in the region. Only a loss of American protection or confidence in American commitment would lead to a revelation of Japanese security policy. In the absence of the American commitments Japan might bolster its military efforts to a considerable extent.

The neighbouring nations are concerned about Japan's potential to develop into a military power. China does not think of Japan as a military threat as long as the Japanese defense postures reflect the U.S. strategy in the region. But China, South Korea and the Philippines remain unconvinced that the extent of military improvements in SDF encouraged by the U.S. would not lead Japan to become a threat to the regional stability. Still as the bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan improved in 1983, South Korea began accepting Japan as an important regional strategic actor. The Filipinos fear an unprecedented growth in Japanese militarism if the U.S. were to go on encouraging self-sufficiency for the Japanese SDF. North

Korea fears a formation of a tripartite alliance against its interests if Japan increased its military strength with American encouragement and South Korean support. The neighbouring countries though critical of Japan's increasing military capabilities feel that in the near future there is no threat from Japan so long as it does not acquire nuclear weapons.

The Reagan Administration pressurized Japan to increase its defense spending substantially. It wanted Japan to assume a greater responsibility for regional security. Since the beginning of the debate on defense burden sharing the U.S. has not been certain as to the military role it wants Japan to play. But the Reagan Administration stated clearly that it wanted Japan to expand its military as much as it could within its domestic constraints. The Japanese government used the U.S. persuasions to convince the public opinion at home about the need for an expanded security role in the region for their country.

With the assignment of the tasks to the SDF of defending Japan's sea lanes and 1,000 nautical miles of its coastal waters, the U.S. secured a positive and active commitment of Japan to support its strategy in the region. The military tasks thus undertaken by Japan raised it above the controversial issue of keeping defense expenditure within the 1 percent of GNP limit. U.S. - Japanese cooperation in defense technology and the latter's interest in the Strategic Defense Initiative further added to Japan's enhanced defense posture. It pleased the U.S. to see Japan responding responsibly to the security requirements

of the region.

Japan has made these roles an integral part of its strategy. The U.S. pressure is the only force working towards this acceptance of new military assignments. The increasing involvement of the U.S. in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf may result in Asia Pacific being left to the regional powers to defend in case a crisis evolved in the two regions simultaneously. If the U.S. was preoccupied elsewhere, the Japanese SDF would be required to play a crucial role in the defense of South Korea or blocking Soviet naval passage through the narrow straits to the Pacific.

This fear of isolation in face of a crisis in the Asia Pacific region makes Japan reconsider its defense policy. But the nuclear option still remains out of question. There are several reasons for Japanese refusal to take up nuclear armament. Firstly, Japan still abides by its non-nuclear principles. Secondly, its geographic feature of being a densely populated small insular nation does not make nuclear deterrence a feasible solution. Thirdly, the degree of security assured by nuclear weapons would be more than negated as it would invoke criticism from Japan's neighbours and would particularly expose it to the Soviet hostility. Moreover, Japan is also a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The domestic resistance to Japan's acquiring nuclear power for military purposes would also be great.

The continuing military involvement of the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region raised the question of the role the Japanese armed forces would play. Considering a substitution of Japanese combat units for American units in Korea is not acceptable to the countries in the region and also to the public opinion in Japan. There are legal constraints on Japan to send its forces to the aid of other countries. As deployment of forces abroad is just as improbable as the nuclear option for Japan, it can actively participate only in the antisubmarine warfare which lies out of the limitations on its foreign and domestic politics. The U.S. strategists support the view that Japan could cope with its military vulnerabilities to nuclear weapons and submarine warfare by developing its military potential for antisubmarine warfare. This would also not expose Japan to an immediate and formidable political opposition.

Yet there are many obstacles in Japan's developing a stronger defense posture. The interpretation of Japan's "Peace Constitution" is subject to differing ideas and opinions. Its interpretation to suit the changing international environment in the Asia Pacific region, which could bring about a major shift in Japan's stance on the defense issues would give rise to a considerable political controversy. So major policy changes would come about gradually. Still it is clear that Japan is paying more attention to security issues. It is aware of the importance of an adequate defense capability to the country's growing economic and political involvement in the region. This proves that war cannot be denounced simply by constitutional

provisions. There are many factors controlling the growth and independence of a country which play a decisive role in determining its need for armament. Idealistic statements alone cannot keep a country away from the possibility of war.

Coming to the U.S. concern for Japan's security, one needs to ask what benefits accrue to the U.S. to continue providing Japan with a one-sided protection. The only acceptable answer to this is that the relationship is not as one-sided as it is made out to be. Japan's defense budget has been increasing in real terms. It cooperates in providing bases that are crucial to the American interests in the Pacific and East Asia. But this assessment of Japan's contribution to security in Asia Pacific is subject to change with changing political scenario in both the U.S. and Japan. If the domestic pressure in America builds up demanding more contribution from the allies in the Asia - Pacific region, Japan due to its economic prowess would have to revise its stance over its armament. If the trend towards a growing acceptance of Japanese SDF within the nation continues, there is a likelihood of Japan adopting a 'symmetric' security relationship with the U.S. Attitudes on defense are changing in Japan. If the defense, energy and economic issues are seen together, it may be logically concluded that there is more room for an enhanced Japanese military role, which would be adequately supported by the U.S.

The U.S. feels very strongly that in view of the American preoccupation with the Middle East and the deteriorating balance

of forces with the Soviet Union in the Asia Pacific region Japan must do more for its self defense. The U.S. wants Japan to take the primary responsibility for its own defense with the U.S. in a supporting role. If such a responsibility is undertaken by Japan it would have major implications for its defense programmes and expenditures. Japan would then be in a position to contribute more directly to the security of the Asia Pacific region.

How far and how fast Japan would increase its security efforts remains to be seen. It has already begun stepping up its security. It is becoming evident that Japan can no longer pursue an ideal irrespective of the changing international circumstances. The American reluctance to shoulder responsibilities of Japan's defense infinitely, and Japan's economic capability to bear more of its defense burden would make Japan take on more responsibility for its own security.

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