


**NATIONAL PARTIES IN REGIONAL CONTEXT:
BJP IN HARYANA**

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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I hereby certify that the dissertation entitled "NATIONAL PARTIES IN REGIONAL CONTEXT: BJP IN HARYANA" submitted by me is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of this University. The dissertation is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for any other degree or diploma of any other University.

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We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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For Mamma & Papa

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Annapurna Sharma
Annapurna Sharma

GLOSSARY

ABVP	Akil Bhartiya Vidhyarthi Paraishad
AIADMK	All India Anna Dravida Munnetta Kazhakam
AISF	All India Students Federation
BJD	Biju Janata Dal
BJP	Bhartiya Janata Party
BMS	Bhartiya Mazdoor Sang
CPI (M)	Communist Party Of India (Marxist)
CPI	Communist Party Of India
DMK	Dravida Munnetta Kazhakam
HVP	Haryana Vikas Party
<i>INLD</i>	<i>Indian National Lok Dal</i>
JD (U)	Janata Dal (United)
LD	Lok Dal
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
PEPSU	Patiala And East Punjab States Union
RSS	Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAD	Shiromani Akali Dal
SFI	Students Federation Of India
TDP	Telegu Desam Party
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
VHP	Vishwa Hindu Parishad

CHAPTER1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 SCOPE, OBJECTIVE, JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY

The spectacular rise of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) is one of the major political stories in the 1990s. During this period the party has undergone a rapid geographical and political expansion.¹ The party has taken big leap from 2 seats in 1984 to 182 seats in 1999 Parliamentary elections. The BJP today is the largest opposition party in the country with 138 seats in the Lok Sabha. It has built itself over the last decade on the slogan of 'Hindutva' – a word interpreted to mean different things to different people. The BJP's ideology is based on Hindu Nationalism which is widely debated by the scholars. All sorts of questions have been raised and answered by various scholars. Broadly the viewpoints cover the party and label it as a communal outfit due to its close association with the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP). The growth of Hindu Nationalism is seen as a potential threat to the future of democracy in india and to Indian secularism.

In 1990s, the BJP tried to moderate its Hindu Nationalism by shedding its hard-core Hindutava image. It is indicated in the party's projection of Vajapayee, the most acceptable and liberal face in the party, as its main campaigner in 1996 Parliamentary Elections. Secondly, the BJP'S moderate element can be seen in its strategy of making new alliances. The party entered into alliances with parties which had no ideological affinities with Hindu Nationalism, Samata Party in Bihar, SAD in Punjab,

¹ Health, Oliver, *Anatomy of BJP's Rise to Power: Social, Regional and Political Expansion in 1990s in Parties and Party Politics in India*, Zoya Hasan (ed.), (New Delhi: Oxford Press, 2000), p. 223

HVP in Haryana, AIDMK in Tamil Nadu. Although these alliances were for short term purposes i.e. to capture the power, and have been labeled as alliances of opportunism. It became clear when Mamta Banerjee and Ram Vilas Paswan walked out 'mid-way' from the National Democratic alliances (NDA), George Fernandes was made to quit on the Tehlka episode but later was brought back to the NDA council of ministers. The DMK had extended full support to the Vajpayee- led central government but walked out 'mid-way' because it felt that the NDA government had not proved 'beneficial' to the party.²

Study of the BJP in contemporary times has become quite relevant because, the rise of Hindu Nationalism has transformed the Indian political scene. In 1990s Indian politics witnessed growing Hindu Nationalist politics among upper-caste Hindus and urban middle classes in northern and western India.³ This was a reaction against the 'Mandalization'. After the Mandal Commission there was an emergence of Backward Class Politics. UP and Bihar were the first states which got divided on the basis of the upper caste versus the lower caste issue. BJP successfully manipulated this issue and got the maximum support from the upper cast its numerical strength improved from 86 seats in 1989 to 120 in 1991 General elections.

Another justification for the study of the BJP lies in the fact that the congress party has been losing its grip over national political space since the Lok Sabha elections of 1989 and this trend continued through 1991, 1996, 1998 and 1999. All the five Lok

² Bhambhriil, C.P., *Indian Politics 2001-2004, Political Process and Change of Government*, (Shipra Publication), p.9

³ See, Hansen, Thoma blom and Christopher Jaffrelot ed. *The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India*, (Oxford : 2001)

Sabha elections held in the last decade revealed a common trend: the decline of the congress and the rise of the BJP.

Table 1.1

Sr.No.	Year of Election	Total parliamentary seats won by parties	
		Congress	BJP
1	1989	193	86
2	1991	226	120
3	1996	136	161
4	1998	141	182
5	1999	112	182

It is evident from table 1.1 that BJP successfully emerged as an alternative to the congress party. It has become the first party, after the congress, which emerged as a 'true national party'. The BJP challenged the congress hegemony at all India level. BJP's rise and congress' decline is a parallel development. After BJP's rise to power, India witnessed the end of the 'One Party National Dominance' system of the congress and the emergence of the two party national system around the ideologies of the BJP versus the congress. The state level parties either line up behind the BJP or the congress as they are the main contenders now, both at national as well as state level.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

The Indian federal system underwent a change over the past fifty years. The hold of the central government on the polity has weakened. The development which helped to transform India's federation can be briefly summed up as:

- The evolution of linguistic states in the early 1950s and 1960s.

- The restriction on the use of Article 356 (President rule) by Supreme court in Bommai case in 1994.
- The central control over the economy began to decline after the liberalization of the economy in 1991.
- The growth of permanent and significant state-based parties has eroded the national parties' grip over the states.

The aforesaid factors led to the 'Regionalization of Indian Politics'. The phenomenon of regionalization taken up new shape with the proliferation of state-level parties or regional outfits. In 1989 general elections the number of state parties was 20, which doubled in 1999 general elections to 40, and there were 49 recognized parties which contested election. The state parties have come to play a very crucial role in national politics since neither the congress nor the BJP is in a position to prove majority on their own in a house of 543 seats.

National parties in regional context follow a particular strategy. They contest alone and also with allies in different states of India. Each state has its own political atmosphere which may or may not suit the national parties. The electoral norm is to maximize gains. National parties follow this norm and in order to maximize their seats, they fight elections on their own where they are a major player, and try to win some seats where regional parties are strong.

The BJP during the last Lok Sabha elections 2004, contested on its own in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Rajasthan, UP and

Uttanchal. These were the states where BJP had some scope of winning significant number of seats. And it contested with allies with T.D.P. in Andhra Pradesh, JD (U) in Meghalaya, MNF in Mizoram, BJD in Orissa, SAD in Punjab and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu. This reflects that BJP has formed alliances in south and north east as it is a marginal player in these states and intends to win a few seats on the shoulders of pure regional parties. But in states like Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and UP, where the party has a sizeable presence, the party contested on its own.

The BJP's regional expansion all over India has taken shape in three distinct waves.⁴

These waves can be clearly understood with the help of table (See table 1.2)

Table 1.2

S. No.	Waves	Time Period	Classification of states	States
1	First Wave	1950s and Early 1960s	Primary States	Delhi, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, UP and Himachal Pradesh
2	Second Wave	1960s to 1980s	Secondary States	Karnataka, Bihar, Goa, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana
3	Third Wave	1989 to 2005	Tertiary States	Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and North Eastern States

⁴ Health, Oliver, *Anatomy of BJP's Rise to Power: Social, Regional and Political Expansion in 1990s in Parties and Party Politics in India*, Zoya Hasan (ed.), (New Delhi: Oxford Press, 2000).

Oliver Heath has categorized these states as primary, secondary and tertiary states. 'Primary states' are the oldest strongholds of the BJP. In these states the party entered through upper castes and gradually expands its support to the other communities also. 'Secondary states' are those states where the party extended through alliance – making. And the 'Tertiary States' are those where BJPs position is very weak. It has almost a non-existent position. The state of Haryana falls under the category of 'secondary state' where the party wins seats only when it forge alliances with regional outfit.

1.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HARYANA

Like Punjab, the state of Haryana is different in many respects from the other states of the Indian union. On the one hand it represent a fusion of primordial loyalties of caste with politics whereas on the other hand it is the vanguard of the 'Green Revolution' due to which its per capita income has also gone up far ahead of most of the other states. In fact the state has taken a big lead over most other states in the production of food grains and its contribution to the central pool has become highest.

However, the 'Green Revolution' has not been entirely without its quota of problems, while it has helped in attaining self-sufficiency in food grains, it has not been able to bring about any desirable changes in the socioeconomic and political power structure in the countryside. Socio-economic inequalities still persist. The hope that with modernization and development there would take place a steady and rationalisation of policies and that the new identities would gradually take the place of caste

consideration has been completely belied. Haryana is a state, where good economy has not been followed by a good politics.

Haryana as a separate state came into existence on 1st November 1966 after the bifurcation of Punjab into two states- Punjabi-speaking Punjab and Hindi-speaking Haryana. It is located in the north-western side of the Indian union adjoining the capital city of Delhi and is bounded on the east by UP, Punjab on the west, Himachal Pradesh on the North and Rajasthan on the south. It is a small state with an area of 44,212sq.km (1.34 percent of India's total area) and population of 21,082,989 (2.05percent of India's total population).⁵ The population of Haryana can be divided into many sociologically significant groups, which are religious groups, linguistic groups, rural urban divisions and the caste groups. Majority of population of Haryana is formed by Hindu (89.30 percent) followed by Sikhs (6.20 percent) and Muslim (4.05 percent). Religion is not an issue as 90 percent population is Hindu.

Haryana's politics appears to be constituted by a series of absences and some peculiar characteristic features:

A) Lack of a coherent party system. Right from its constitution, this small state has not developed the attributes one associates with a party system, such as a stable structure of party competition, a long term alignment of the different sections of the votes with their respective political parties. Despite a very high participation rate, the voter is not wedded to a political party. It is interesting to note that since its formation, the voters of Haryana have supported a

⁵ The Population figures are based upon 2001 census: Gathered from the web site of the census of India 2001, <http://www.censusindia.net/resuts/state/phpstod-A>

different political party in every election. There has been a weak presence of the Congress Party since pre-independence days, which persisted even after the creation of the state in 1996. The state has never witnessed dominance of Congress party. Reason may be called that the Haryana region has been marked by the absence of strong political movement due of Sir Chottu Ram's Unionist Party ⁶ which was a pro – British party and which kept Haryana alienated from main stream political culture and resulted in the lacking of a strong ideological basis. Consequently voters shift their loyalties from one party to another. The state lacks a rich political culture.

- B) Absence of Mandalisation:** Although there is a substantial population (19.7 percent) of dalits and other backward casts yet they are not separate political force as they are in U.P. and Bihar. Haryana has not witnessed the an upsurge of dalits which has been the characteristic feature of states of U.P. and Bihar in recent decades. Dalits have not been properly mobilized in politics. The major party of dalits, BSP, is very weak in Haryana. There are three reasons for this, firstly, it is not seen as a party of Haryana as its main leadership does not comprise of any Harayanvi leader. Ms Shelja, who represents the Ambala reserved Parliamentary seat, has emerged as an all Haryana dalit leader in the state and she belongs to the congress.

Secondly, there is an absence of the dominance of traditional upper castes like Brahmins and Rajputs. Historically, the hold of the Brahminical ideology has been very weak in this region because of the socio-cultural dominance of the peasant castes and whatever status the Brahmins enjoyed earlier went down

⁶ Chaudhary Prem, *Role of Sir Chhota Ram*, (Deep and Deep Publications).

further with the spread of Arya Samaj Movement among Jats. Because of this absence of upper caste dominance, the Mandal/Non-Mandal line is not drawn very sharply in the politics of the state.

Finally, dalit population is not concentrated in one particular region. They are scattered all over the state. Dalits are not united in this context.

- C) **Significance of the Caste:** Next to Bihar caste exercise the single most important influence on politics of Haryana. Politics of Haryana has always been dominated by middle level dominant peasant castes, especially the Jats. Jats constitute majority of the total population in the state they are largest owners of agricultural land. All the chief ministers, except two, of Haryana hailed from this caste. Jats are numerically large, economically strong, culturally confident and politically most powerful. Caste is the real player which determines the electoral behavior of the people. There is a local saying, "*Jat ki Beti Jat Ko, Jat ka Vote Jat Ko*", which reflects the psyche of Haryana's people. Caste consideration are very strong and are deeply rooted. Political organizations are formed around the major castes. The Congress party is viewed as a non-jat party and INLD is seen as a pro-jat party.

BJP in Haryana got stuck into stereotype contradictions such as rural versus urban, Jat versus non-jat, local versus Punjabi and agriculturalist versus non agriculturalist. Haryana is primarily a rural state with 70 per cent of its population living in villages. BJP's urban image hampers its growth in the state.

The BJP in context of Haryana is a very peculiar phenomenon,. Haryana is a state in which situation cannot be communalized because of the marginal presence of the Muslims. It becomes difficult for the BJP, which is labelled as communal, to act in a situation where the issue of Hindu versus the 'other' is absent. Does it act in a moderate way or follows the idioms of Hindutava or does it manipulate the situation on the basis of caste? It is caste which has bulldozed the communal issue here. The BJP, in order to show its presence, needs a society which is either characterized by Hindu-Muslim factor or the urbanized attitude of voters. And both the factors are absent in case of Haryana,. This makes the study more interesting.

Objectives of the study:

1. The study attempts to analyze the genesis, support structure and electoral performance of the BJP in the state.
2. The strategies and efforts to expand the base of the party in new areas (other than its traditional strongholds) particularly in the countryside.
3. The pattern of alliances and implications for the growth of the party

1.4 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is an absence of a coherent and systematic work on the BJP in Haryana. There is plenty of literature available on the BJP, but there is scant literature on Haryana. Although there are some works which are indicative of some of the aspects of electoral politics in Haryana, in the sense that they are not directly related but they throw some light upon the subject, indirectly. And most of the literature remain journalistic in nature which remain informative.

A study by S. P. Shukla⁷ which deals with period from 1930 to 1945 analyse the role of Haryana region regarding the national liberation movement. He points out that during this period the people of Haryana had acquired a pro-British outlook which was a cumulative result of various forces namely, weakness of congress party to stabilise itself in the region, mobilization of peasantry by Unionist party and a constructed environment of British policies while enforcing a sense of identity among peasant castes by projecting them as martial races along with land laws. The book provides a good insight in the socio-political conditions of the region in pre 1947 period, which have a long-standing impact upon the political life of the day.

The book also presents an explanation regarding the weak basis of the national movement in the region despite the fact that the people of Haryana had participated in the revolt of 1857 with great zeal and fervor. His study also deals with the dynamics of Punjab politics as the compulsions of the Indian politics in totality. The identity politics in the region can be seen as an attribute of that period and environment.

Prem Choudhary in her study regarding the role of Sir Chhotu Ram in politics of Panjab deals with the socio-economic conditions of the period which underlay the political realities of Punjab with special reference to its south east region which came to be known as Haryana highlights the factors which have gone into making the Unionist politics. The Unionist politics shows the loyalism par excellence, which was made possible by Sir Chhotu Ram, who forged an enduring political alliance between the predominant unionist Muslims and Hindu agriculturalists, which has proved instrumental in forming one of the most, successful noncongress ministries under the provincial autonomy. Her work throws light upon the relationship of various castes

⁷ S. P. Shukla, *India's Freedom Struggle and the Role Of Haryana*, Deep &Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1985

and mobilization of dominant caste. Her analysis reveals how Sir Chhotu Ram emerged first as the leader of "jats" of Rohtak and then gained recognition and acceptance by officials and others as leader of the Hindu agriculturalists of Punjab.⁸

Ranbir Singh while focusing upon parliamentary polls of 1999 indicated the importance of social cleavages⁹ as the determinants of politics of state and also pointed out the changing political alignments and consequently the changing support basis of the parties. The author has discussed in detail provide with an analysis regarding the division of state into two demographic, three linguistic, and four caste groups.

Similarly, Shivalal¹⁰ and Siwach also tells about the two main social divisions related to caste and class compositions-the agriculturist and the non-agriculturist. Both of them saw it as a contribution of Sir Chhotu Ram. For them, some of the castes have set patterns of political behaviour.

Siwach's study regarding social dynamics, defections counter-defections that defined the initial period of the politics of the state indicates that politics of Aya Ram and Gaya Ram was a manifestation of caste politics. For him the root cause of defections was an inadequate political representation of the dominant castes. He calls it "doing Haryana"¹¹ style.

Indian polity after 4th general election have experienced a dynamic shift from a

⁸ Prem Chaudhry, *Punjab Politics The Role of Sir Chhotu Ram*, Vikas Publishing House, 1984

⁹ Ranbir Singh, "Social cleavages and Political Alignments in Haryana" in Paul Wallace and Ramashary Roy (eds.) " *India's 1999 Elections .and 20th Century Politics*", Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2003.

¹⁰ ShivLal, "*Indian Election Since Independence*", The Election Archive, New Delhi, 1972.

¹¹ I.R Siwach. "Haryana Social Dynamics and Politics of Defections" in Iqbal Narain (ed.) *State Politics in India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, New Delhi, 1976.

smooth kind of phenomenon. The politics of defections at state level provide new contours of Indian politics. Haryana represents a case of its kind, as it gave new contexts and terminologies to politics of Aya Ram Gaya Ram. Kashyap saw it as mere corruption and opportunism. He agrees that the phenomenon of defections or loyalty and commitment to a particular party depends upon the nearness to the seat of power. According to author the strongest influence on the people of this region have always been of caste He also provide causes of dominance of jats or land owning classes, being their numerical strength, land ownership and mobilization by Unionist party and Sir Chhotu Ram.

Studies have indicated that the dominant castes ¹² have enjoyed preponderance in electoral politics due to matrix of their numerical strength and land ownership or in other words, economically and socially privileged groups have greater access to political opportunities. Within the peasant castes the jats constitute the most dominant category¹³. 8For the record of 19 elected governments the state has seen 13 has been headed by a jat, and this particular caste group, has provided maximum number of MLAs and CMs. It seems that every ruling party high command keep the jat factor in mind while deciding for chief ministerial candidate.

Weaker sections of society or backward castes do not have much say in political decision making. Although they constitute 19.5 % of total population and constitute the second largest caste group in the state. Various articles by Rajalaxmi reveals that the backward castes are landless oppressed and marginalized in the state. They are prone to discrimination and target of attack from dominant castes especially jats,

¹² M.N. Srinivas, "Social Change in Modern India" University of California, Berkeley, 1966.

¹³ Hitender Rao, "Jat, non-Jat, can't caste it aside" Hindustan Times, Thursday, January, 12, 2005

social institutions like khap panchayats¹⁴ and the state machinery including police. She viewed the situation as an aspect, which distinguish Haryana from its neighboring states. She pointed out that BSP¹⁵ including other main streams political parties of the state has not done much for them but they are more interested in making electoral gains rather than bringing out a qualitative change in their lives, or to ensure them a secure social status. She illustrated 'various instances revealing the atrocities committed upon dalits by police and dominant caste. Time and again they has to pay the cost of their prosperity.¹⁶ It seems that people of dominant castes are not ready to accept the changing power relations in economic and social arena.¹⁷

A related issue of role of gender in political process is indicative of lack of proper politicization and mobilization among women. T-e reason behind such condition in the state which has one of the worst sex ratio in the country can be given in terms of highly patriarchal social structure and confinement of women's sphere to the task of household management and farming activities.¹⁸

The social status of women is well reflected from the cases of bitter contestation of marital issues in the name of gotra and village *bhaichara*¹⁹ by khap-panchyats. The studies have indicated about the re-emergence of caste jkhap panchyats that can be traced to the medieval period. And these institutions have imposed drastic changes to the status of women and institution of marriage. despite the fact that women along

¹⁴ T.K. Rajalakshmi, "Caste Injustice", *Frontline*, May 6, 2005.

¹⁵ T.K. Rajalakshmi, "Oppressed and Marginalized", *Frontline*, May 6, 2005

¹⁶ T.K. Rajalakshmi, "Fire of aggression" *Frontline*, September 23, 2005

¹⁷ P. Sainath, "There's a much larger house" *The Hindu*, Thursday, September 6, 2005

¹⁸ Prem Chaudhary, "Caste Panchayats and Policing of Marriage in Haryana: Enforcing Kinship and Territorial Exogamy," *Contribution to INDIAN SOCIOLOGY*, vol.38, Nos.1 and 2, January-August 2004.

¹⁹ Prem Chaudhary, *Veiled Women: Shifting Equations in Haryana, 1980-1990*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1994

with dalits hardly have a say in these so called democratic institutions.²⁰

As far as electoral politics is concerned an interesting fact reveal that in case of a considerable number of women the pre-condition to get register as a voter is considered marriage.²¹ Although some of the women representative are doing well but the number is essentially small. The reason behind the inadequate representation of women is given in terms of their lack of winnability²² by various political parties.

Studies by Choudhry²³ and Rajbir Prashar also reveal the gloomy picture of state of affairs. Choudhry feels that state lacks a developed political culture and the situation is further worsened due to economic prosperity, which has taken the form of jeep-gun culture.¹⁸ While analyzing the verdict of parliamentary polls of 1989 in maintains that the state the democratic ethos are still to take roots, and the state lacks all the necessary determinants of sociopolitical consciousness. For him Haryana politics is the interplay of a good economy and bad politics and Haryana society has lost its cohesiveness and is driven with sharp dissensions.

Similarly Rajbir²⁴ has also pointed out that economic development has been failed to undo the social and cultural backwardness in the state and it seems that a common Haryanavi has forgotten the principle of peaceful co-existence. He also has indicated that political parties for their electoral gains perpetuate social problems and issues. He demands a mature and responsible behaviour on the part of political elite instead of

²⁰ T.K. Rajalakshmi, "Fire of Aggression," *Frontline*, September 23,2005.

²¹ Singh, Sidharth Singh, " Voter's List has few misses in Chief Minister Ten ", Times of India, Sunday, January 30, 2005

²² Hitender Rao " But where are the women" Hindustan Times, Sunday, January, 16, 2005

²³ D.R.Chaudhary, "Lok Sabha Elections and Haryana", *Teaching Politics*, Vol XV, No.3 &4, Mercury Printers, New Delhi, 1989

²⁴ Rajbir Prashar, Politics After Ninth Lok Sabha Elections", *Punjab Journal of Politics*, Vol XIV, No.1 &2, 1990

patronizing negative forces promoting sectarianism.

Vinay Kumar Malhotra in his study also points out that during 1990s Haryana hit the headlines but all for wrong reasons.²⁵ While viewing the situation it seems that politics is experiencing the erosion of legitimacy on the part of political leadership. As its manifestation is seen in the form of anti-incumbency factor due to lack of a viable alternative. As ruling parties keep on changing but the dismal state of affairs remain the same. The rural Haryana is experiencing serious social imbalance. Yogendra Yadav, Dhananjay Joshi²⁶, Parveen Rai²⁷. Dutta²⁸ has pointed out about the Feb 2005 poll verdict that the landslide victory of Congress was not the result of a positive vote in its favor but it was due to negative votes against ruling INLD. The erosion of legitimacy can be attributed to the fact that almost *every* established political party and leaders are accused of corruption, mishandling of governmental affairs.

Similarly P.S. Verma²⁹ while analyzing the profile of three consecutive legislative assemblies with the help of variables like past legislative experience, caste, gender, religion, and education concludes that the domestication of the entire body politic has taken place.

²⁵ Vinay Kumar Malhotra, "Haryana Politics After Ninth Lok Sabha Elections", Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol XIV, No.1 &2, 1990

²⁶ Yogendra Yadav and Dhananjay Joshi, "How Haryana Voted, Assembly Election 2005 The Wave and What Caused it", Sunday, The Hindu, March 6, 2005

²⁷ Dhananjay Joshi, Parveen Rai, Haryana Landslide Victory for Congress, Economic Political Weekly, December 18, 2004.

²⁸ Nonica Dutta, "Haryana-A Resounding Verdict". Economic and Political Weekly, March 12-15, 2005

²⁹ P.S. Verma, "Profile of the Legislative Elite in Haryana" New Challenges of Politics in Indian States, T.R. Sharma (ed.) Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986

Book by Christophe Jaffrelot³⁰ deals with the Jan Sangh and dilemma. The key argument made in the book is that the JS have always oscillated between a militant and a moderate approach to politics. Christophe also presents an exhaustive study of the formation of the JS during 1950s and 1960s and tries to show the links between politics and religion in Indian context.

Another *very* insightful book is edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jafferlot.³¹ Broadly the book explores reasons behind BJP's rise to power in Indian states. It is divided in three parts. The first two ones are dealing with strategies of the BJP and the third part focus on the tensions within the Sangh Parivar. The study shows that the making of alliances with other parties are the main compulsions of politics the BJP had to face.

A book by Zoya Hasan³² contains essays by B.D. Graham, Christophe and Oliver Heath, focusing on 'The leadership and organization of JS', 'A specific party building strategy: the JS and the RSS network,' 'Anatomy of BJP's rise to power: Social, regional and political expansion in 1990s' respectively.

Craig Baxter³³ in his book provides foundational information about the Jana Sangh as a political party in India. This book has focused on the leaders of the party, their style of functioning and associations with the Hindu Maha Sabha. Major problem faced by the party in 1950s and 1960s are also taken in this book..

³⁰ Jaffrelot Christophe, *The Hindu Nationalist movement and Indian Politics*, (New Delhi: Penguin India, 1996)

³¹ Hansen, Thomas Blom and Christophe Jaffrelot, *The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India*, (Oxford Press, 2001)

³² Hasan, Zoya, ed., *Parties and Party Politics in India*, (New Delhi: Oxford Press, 2004)

³³ Baxter, Craig, *The Jana Sangh; a biography of an Indian political party*. (Bombay Oxford, 1971).

C.P. Bhanbhari³⁴ have made a critical study on the BJP and its rise to power. The book consists of four chapters dealing with the party's ideology, the history of its rise to power, the record of the its rule as the leader of a ruling coalition, and last, its foreign policy.

1.5 HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY

The entire dissertation rests upon the following hypothesis:

- a. The BJP failed to find a place in Haryana politics because the Hindutva factors do not appeal to the Hindus who form 90 per cent of the total population.
- b. Strong presence of regional outfits hampered the growth of the party as the political space was already crowded.
- c. The BJP was forced in coalition politics at an early stage, consequently the party did not get time to establish its own separate identity. People will take some time to acknowledge the BJP as a 'regional party' a 'Haryana Party'
- d. Party's internal weaknesses. There are organizational weaknesses and leadership crisis in the party.

³⁴ Bhambhri, C.P., *Bhartiya Janata Party; Periphery to the centre*, (Shipra Publications, Delhi 2001)

METHODOLOGY

The present study relied upon an analysis of primary as well as secondary sources. The research is analytical. This work is based on survey of existing literature both academic as well as journalistic ones. The interview with BJP's state unit leaders have been conducted. Shri Ram Bilas Sharma, former state unit president of the party, Gahlot, Speaker of Haryana Vidhansabha, Gulshan Bhatia, Office bearer in Rohtak BJP office, have been personally interviewed. Discussions with scholars who are working on the subject have been also done. Prof. P.S. Verma Chandigarh retired chairperson of Political science department, Punjab University and Prof. Ranbir Singh, retired chairperson of Political Science Department, Kurukshetra University, have given a direction to this study.

CHAPTER –2

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BJP IN HARYANA

(1982-2005)

2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND FOUNDING OF THE PARTY

This chapter deals with the growth and development of the BJP in Haryana. For the purpose of analysing the historical background and founding of the party, we have divided the history of the BJP in three parts. The life span of the BJP in Haryana can be divided into following parts.

- 1951 to 1966; formative phase
- 1966 to 1977; initial period in newly formed Haryana, the Emergency period and the subsequent developments leading to the merger of the Jana Sangh with the Janata party.
- Third phase, from 1980-2005; the BJP and its strategy of electoral expansion in the state.

I. The First phase in the history of the party covers the Jana Sangh and its formation in Punjab before 1966. On May 5 1951, Shayamaprasad Mukherjee announced the formation of the “People’s Party”¹ in Calcutta. On May 27, the Delhi group of Peoples Party formed the Bhartiya Jana Sangh at a meeting in Jallandhar.² Balraj Bhalla was elected as President, Sharma Vice-President, and Balraj Madhok secretary. Among members of the working committee was Rao

¹ Baxter, Craig, *Jana Sanga: A Biography of an Indian Political Party* (Bombay, Oxford, 1971)

² Ibid

Birender Singh, who was a congress minister in Punjab and a Jana Sangh-supported non-congress chief Minister of Haryana. The territory of this group included Punjab, PEPSU, Himachal Pradesh and Delhi³. The party was taking shape as a movement of the urban Hindu and was not effective in the rural, Sikh-populated areas.

The greatest disappointment to Jana Sangh leaders came in the Punjab. Here the party was founded and here it expected to achieve major successes in 1951 general elections. It lost completely. Out-of ten candidates for the Lok Sabha only one retained his deposit. Lala Yodhraj contested two seats, Karnal and Kangra, and was beaten in both. Out of 66 Jana Sangh candidates for the assembly, 43 lost their deposits. In PEPSU region, the Jana Sangh won two assembly seats in Mahendergarh district.

The elections of 1951-52 were very important for the party. Bhartiya Jana Sangh made a reasonable showing and it was recognised as a national party.

In Punjab, the party was most active in the cities of Punjabi-speaking part of the state. It was weak in Haryana region and in the rural areas of the Punjabi-speaking part. It was a party of the urban Hindus. However, in 1962 assembly election, the Jana Sangh made some inroads in rural constituencies. Fazilka, predominantly a rural seat, was won by the party in 1962. The prominent leaders of the Jana Sangh in the state legislative assembly were Baldev Prakash, Balram Das Tandon and Dr. Mangal Sein.

³ Ibid



The major issue on which the Jana Sangh was active in this region was the Punjabi Suba question. The Shiromani Akali Dal, led by Master Tara Singh, pressed its demand that a separate state be created for the Punjabi-speaking areas of Punjab. The Jana Sangh condemned this demand and demanded for a Maha-Punjab which would include Punjab, PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh. The government of India, much against the Jana Sang's will, agreed to divide the state of Punjab into Punjabi Suba and Haryana. The Jana Sangh, however criticised this reorganisation of the state as a manifestation of the sub-national loyalties.

II. The second phase covers the period from 1966 to 1977. It is important to mention here that the Jana Sangh entered the state of Haryana with its demand against the creation of Haryana. This is a peculiar feature. The Jana Sangh got stigmatised with it. As it was not in favour of the creation of Haryana.

When the state of Haryana was formed in 1966, Jana Sangh had 3 seats in the Haryana region of the erstwhile Punjab legislative assembly. It in fact, was the main opposition party of the newly formed state. The first general elections for the new state was held on February 17, 1967. The opposition formed a united Front and there was an alliance between the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra Party to give Congress a tough fight. The Jana Sangh contested 48 seats for Haryana assembly and won 12 seats. In the Lok Sabha elections, it contested at 7 seats and could capture only 1 seat. Thus, the Jana Sangh which emerged as the second largest party with 12 members, made a determined bid to make an entry to the politics of Haryana during the year 1967. In the first non-congress

ministry under the leadership of Rao Biredra Sigh, Bhartiya Jana Sangh did not accept any ministerial berth.

During the mid-term poll on May 12 and 14, 1968, the Sangh contested 44 seats and won only 7 seats. Thus, the party could not do well in comparison to its performance in 1967 when it had captured 12 seats. The reason for its decline in percentage of votes was seen in its role in supporting the Government of defectors of Raw Birendra Singh. In 1971 Lok Sabha elections, the Jana Sangh contested 3 seats and won 1 seat. Its candidate Mukhtiyar Singh was elected from Rohtak parliamentary constituency. In the Assembly elections of March 1972, the Jana Sangh received a setback. It contested 19 seats but could win only 2 seats, one from Nilokheri and other from Karnal, both were urban constituencies.

Ch. Mukhtiyar Singh and Ch. Shivram Verma were the main leader of the Jana Sangh at that time. Ch. Shivram Verma was president of state unit of the Jana Sangh when the emergency was declared. All prominent leaders were Jailed during Emergency. Elections were held in 1977 after lifting of the Emergency. Almost all the important opposition parties gathered under one banner. A new political party, the Janata Party, came into existence. Jana Sangh also merged itself into it. Janata Party gave a crushing defeat to the Congress. Congress won 3 seats against 75 won by the Janata Party. The Jana Sangh won 15 seats. But the Janata party could not live long as its major constituents withdrew from it. Bhartiya Jana Sangh, after pulling out of Janata party, reorganised itself under the new name of the 'Bhartiya Janata Party'.

III. The third phase in the history of the BJP covers the time period from 1980 to 2005 assembly elections. This is a phase of revivalism and of pragmatic approach of alliance-formation.

The Jana Sangh members decided to walk out from the Moraji Desai's govt. on the issue of dual membership.⁴ On April 6, a conference of the party workers was organised at the Kotla ground in which the formation of a new party with the name of 'Bhartiya Janata party' was announced. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Advani took over the responsibilities of president and general Secretary respectively. The Jana Sangh was hanged on Friday, April 4, 1980 and it was revived again in the shape of Bhartiya Janata Party.

Dr. Kamala Verma, a Punjabi, was nominated BJP president in 1980 in Haryana State unit. Suraj Bhan, (S.C), was finally elected as party's state unit president in 1982 and remained in the office for four years. In April 1982, the Haryana Vidhan Sabha was dissolved and elections were held. At National level, Vajpayee was making alignments with Ch. Charang Singh in order to expand party's base in small areas. Bound by National compulsions, the BJP had to forge alliance with Devi Lal, state unit president of Lok Dal. BJP won 6 seats only in 1982 assembly election.

It is a case of territory lost and regained for the BJP in Haryana. It started its journey as a political party formally after 1980. From 1980 to 2005, the party has contested six elections. It has tarnished its image among its original support

⁴ See, *BJP birth and memorable events* (Published by: office secretary, BJP 11 Ashoka Road New Delhi).

base, mainly among Punjabi traders, by making alliance with pro-jat regional parties.

The BJP in Haryana is a formation of a particular community belonging to Punjabi, urban people and traders, largely the upper caste, including the Brahmins and Banias Dr. Mangal Sein, who became president of the party's state unit in 1986 revived the party and was also seen as a potential leader. After his death in 1990 the BJP lost its most potential Punjabi leader and also lost its representation in Punjabi community, which has been life-line of the party.

2.2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY

Article VII of the constitution and Rules⁵ deals with the organisational structure of the party. There are three forums at the National level:

- (1) The plenary or special session of the party
- (2) The National Council
- (3) The National Executive.

At the state level there are two corresponding institutions: (1) State Councils and (2) State executives. This is followed by organisational units in a descending order; regional committees, district committees, Mandal committees and local committees.

⁵ 'Constitution & Rules of the BJP' (office Secretary, B.J.P II Ashoka Raod, New Delhi-110001)

All the levels of the party, from the lowest to the highest, are organically linked and establish a network of effective communication. The office of the president emerges as the most crucial in the overall development of all the units of the party at various levels. The president, at national as well as state level, is elected. But once elected, he is empowered with tremendous organisational clout in terms of nominations and decision making, coordinating, communicating, monitoring-in shot, leading the unit. The primacy assigned to the president in the organisational set up of BJP is also designed to ensure the creation of a cadre-based party.

Before coming to the state level organisation, it is pertinent to mention that in party's 'constitution and Rules' there is a categorisation of states.

“Article XII (A): CATEGORISATION OF STATES

The states shall be dividend into 3 categories

Category 1- The states that have got 5 or less than 5 Lok Sabha seats.

Category 2- The states that have got 6 to 20 Lok Sabha seats.

Category 3- The states tat have get 21 or more Lok Sabaha seats.”

At the state level there are two corresponding institution:

- (1) State Councils
- (2) State executives.

“Article XVI: STATE COUNCIL

1. A State Council shall consist of:
 - (a) Members elected by the District Units as laid down in sub-clause 2.
 - (b) 10% of Party legislators to be elected by all the members of the legislative party, but not less than 10' if the total number of legislators is below 10, then all of them.
 - (c) 10 % of Party Parliament members from the State, but not less than 3. If the number of Parliament members from the States is below 3, then all of them.
 - (d) All members of National Council from the State.
 - (e) All former State Presidents.
 - (f) All members of the State Executive.
 - (g) All office-bearers of a Regional Committee.
 - (h) Leaders of the Party in State Assembly and State Council.
 - (i) President and General Secretaries of the District Committees in the state.
 - (j) Party Presidents/Chairmen of Corporations, Municipalities, Jilla Parishads and Blocks.
 - (k) Nominated members (not more than 25) by the State president.
 - (l) State Presidents of allied Morchas and Cells.
2. Member of the elected Mandal Committees in a District shall elect members for the State Council equal in number to the number of seats in

the State Assembly allocated to the District, provided that these elected members shall include a minimum number of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes/Tribes, equal to the Assembly seats reserved for them from that District.

Two Legislative Assembly Constituents of each District shall be grouped together and divided into Sectors and at least one representative must be elected from each Sector. The demarcation of these sectors shall be made by the State Executive. If the members so elected do not include a woman member and if all the seats of the District are reserved then one additional woman member and one additional representative not belonging to Scheduled Castes/Tribes shall be elected for the State Council from that District.

3. Each member of the State Council shall pay a fee of Rs. 50/-

Article XVIII: STATE EXECUTIVE

1. (a) The state Executive of Category 1 States shall consist of a President and not more than 50 members, at least six (6) of whom shall be women and four (4) belonging to S.C/S.T.
- (b) The State Executive of Category 2 State shall consist of a President and not more than 60 members, at least eight (8) of whom shall be women and five belonging to S.C/ST.

- (c) The State Executive Category 3 State shall consist of a President and not more than 70 members, at least ten (10) of whom shall be women and not less than 6 SC/ST.
2. The President shall be elected by members of the State Council from categories (a), (b) and (c) of Article XVI (1) as per rules prescribed by the National Executive.
3. The President so elected shall nominate his Executive Committee.
- (1) The President would nominate from among the members of the Executive of Category 1 State not more than four Vice-Presidents, two General Secretaries (one of them to be General Secretary-Organization), five Secretaries and one Treasurer. Among office bearers one will be woman and 2 SC/ST.
- (2) The President would nominate from among the members of the Executive of Category 2 State not more than five Vice-Presidents, three General Secretaries (one of them to be General Secretary-Organization), five Secretaries and one Treasurer. Among office bearers one will be woman and 2 SC/ST.
- (3) The president would nominate from among the members of the Executive of Category 3 State not more than six Vice-Presidents, four General Secretaries, (one of them to be General Secretary-Organization,) six Secretaries and one Treasurer. Among office bearers one will be woman and tow SC/ST.

- 4 Any ten members of state electoral college should jointly propose any person who has been an active member for three terms and a primary member for 10 years, for the post of President. But such joint proposal should come from at least 1/3 of the elected district. The consent of the candidate is necessary.
5. With the prior consent of the National President the State President can appoint a General Secretary (organisation) even from outside his Executive Committee. Such a person shall be full fledged member of the Executive Committee.

The present organisational set-up of the party consists of:

One President; Prof. Ganerti Lal (Punjabi)

Five Vice-Presidents, Kailash Chand (Brahmin), Gurdayal Sing Saini (BC), Niti Sen Bhatia (Punjabi), Ram Chandu Bainsa (Jat), and Ram Chander Janger (S.C.)

Five General Secretaries: (a) Two 'Sangthan Mantris' who are basically R.S.S representatives. They are the most powerful people in the party apparatus at the state level. Two Sangthan Mantris are-Ram Pyare Pandey and Bhagwat Sharma Mathm (b) three General Secretaries are, VM Kumar Yadav (Ahina), Kanwar Pal (Gyjan BC), Bharat Bhushan Bharti.

Five Secretaries: Sita Ram Bagdi, Mr. Santosh, Mr. Shankutea Raj,
Mahavir Prasad, M.L Sarwan

One cashier: Gyan Chand Gupta (Punjabi)

One Office in charge: Ganeshan Bhatia (Punjabi)

And there are 60 members in the working Committee.

The BJP in state is also organised at Morcha and cells. There are five Morchas in the State; Kisan Morcha, Mahila Morcha, Youth, Minorities and Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes Morcha.

Table 2.1

(Morchas at state level with the names of their presidents and secretaries)

S. NO	Morcha's Name	President's Name	Secretary
1.	Kisan (Farmer)	Kr. Shyam Bharkar	Haridas Saini
2.	Mahila (Women)	Ms. Malik Rozi	Ms. Jarwinder Kaur
3.	Anusuchit (Schedule)	Mange Ram	Krishan Bedi
4.	Yuva (Youth)	Dharmambir Singh	Deepak Mngoa
5.	Minority	Tayyib Hussain	

2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF FRONT ORGANISATIONS

"Although they claimed to be apolitical, the Rashtriya Swaymsevaks sangh's leader were driven to an interest in power by their advocacy of a Hindu Rashtra. Golwalkar may have thought that the government should accept an advisory and consultant role for the RSS on the model of the traditional relationship between temporal power and spiritual authority. But some swaymsevaks, thought the RSS should be directly involved in party politics, and they therefore became associated with the Jana Sangh, a party initiated by S.P. Mukerjee." Christopher Jaffrelot'⁶

After independence, the RSS decided to build up a wide range of affiliated organization within different sectors and institutions of Indian society as a means of infusing Hindu nationalist values into public life. The Jana Sangh acted as political face of the RSS. Need was felt to expand its ideology in public life. Thus, it formed a students' union and a trade union.

This part of the chapter deals with the development of such 'Front organisations' in Haryana and their role in expanding the ideology of he BJP at grassroot level. For this purpose, we will focus on three such front organisations, ABVP, BMS and Mahila Morcha.

⁶ Jaffrelot, Chrisotphe: 'A Specific Party-building strategy. The Jana Sangh and the RSS network', in *Parties and Politics in India*. Zoya Hasan, (ed.) (New Delhi, Oxford Press, 2000.)

Akhil Bhartiya Vidhyarthi Parishd (ABVP)

“The pro-Jana Sangh and pro-RSS elements among students organised the ABVP in 1953. This organisation has been active in Delhi, M.P, U.P and several other states. It has sought to propagate the ideals of Indian culture and tried to make students conscious of the glory of India.” (Janata, Aug. 15, 1962)⁷

This reflects that the ABVP was founded on the similar lines of propagating Indian culture and tradition among Indian youth. J.A Curran said that though the historians of the RSS have noted that the parishad is not officially a part of the RSS but it is run mainly by swayamsevaks and others sympathetic to Hindu Nationalism. Various political parties in order to expand their ideology, establish front organisations. Congress party is associated with NSUI, CPI and CPI (M) are linked with AISF and SFI, similarly BJP with ABVP. Vajpayee, Thengade, Arun Jaitley, Govindacharaya have been in Parishad. In Haryana, ABVP is active in Chandigarh only. In other parts of Haryana, students' elections in colleges and universities are banned as they were not held peacefully. Headquarter of the ABVP located in Rohtak.

⁷ Curran, J. A. *'Militant Hindusim in India, a study of the RSS'* (New York, 1951)

Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS)

On the labor front the BJP is closely associated with the Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh. The founder of the BMS, Duttapart Bapamo Thengade, was elected as a Jana Sangh member of the Rajya Sabha from U.P in 1964. The BMS has continued but has achieved no notable gain in membership. Earlier it was not even recognized by the government of India as one of the four national labor federations. Its headquarter is in Rohtak. Though it participates in local rallies but is not very significant.

Mahila Morcha.

Although the BJP has been very much a men's organisation. The party has attempted to form women's groups to work with the formal organisation. The first women member of the legislature to be elected on the BJP ticket was Mrs. Shakuntala Nayar from U.P. in 1962. The party's working committee first had a woman in its membership at the Ambala session in 1958. At this session, a Mahila Sammelan became a regular part of the session .

Before 1980, women's representation in the party was very scant. There was hardly any women who contested or won elections. Dr. Kamala Verma was party's first state president and won Yamunanagar seat thrice. Sushama Swaraj contested election from Karnal than she shifted to centre. Now, the party's position on women has improved. Veena Chhibar, Sakuntala Bhagwadia, Sarita Narain, are some women faces in Haryana BJP.

2.4 RELATION BETWEEN THE RSS AND STATE PARTY UNIT

The RSS is the backbone of the BJP's organisational set-up. It is, very categorically mentioned in 'the constitution and Rules' of the party that each state unit must have two 'Sangathan mantris' as General Secretary. These Sangathan mantris actually are political face of the RSS who assert pressure on decision making at state level. The remote control is in their hands.

The relationship between the RSS and the BJP state unit is not unknown. Before 1966, it was from this highly disciplined association that the party could draw dedicated and hand-working young men, as analyzed by Graig Baxter.⁸ In Punjab, the Sikhs distrusted the RSS, but the organisation was strong in the urban Hindu areas. RSS was the primary source of membership for the Jana Sangh in greater Punjab. Lala Yodhraj and Lala Hansraj Gupta, were leaders of the Jana who later became Sanghchalak of Delhi RSS unit.

The Punjabis voted for the Jana Sangh on account of the role of the RSS at the time of partition in protecting them. Swaymsevaks participated actively in resettlement programme of the refugees.⁹ After the formation of the Haryana, Punjabi refugees continued voting for the BJP in wake of the RSS' role in resettlements after partition.

The RSS at state level is organised very systematically in descending order.

The entire state is divided into six *Vibhags*. Four districts are put together to

⁸ See Craig Baxter. op. cit.

⁹ Punjab Journal of politics, "The 199 Parliamentary election in Haryana: continuity & change' Rambin Singh

make a unit. It is organised at district level, tehsil level and block level. Head of the RSS in the state is known as *Prant Sanghchalak*; then comes *Prant Pracharak*, *Sah Pranthprachark*, *Prant karwah* and *Sah prant Sangchalak*.

The present state unit RSS organisation comprise of:

<i>Prant Sanghchalak</i>	-	Darshan Jain
<i>Prant Pracharak</i>	-	Rameshwar Jain
<i>Sah Prant Prachark</i>	-	Suresh Jain
<i>Prant Karwah</i>	-	Sita Ram Vyas
<i>Sah prant Sanghchalak</i>	-	Major Kartar Singh.

These people are, in fact, people of power. Whenever any decision is to be taken, these RSS people are informed first. They play very crucial role in the election of the party's state unit president. In the party apparatus also, RSS set guidelines for the BJP. At the state level the Sangathan mantris are largely in command.

CHAPTER – 3

CHANGING PROFILE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP : 1982-2005

3.1 PROFILE OF BJP LEADERS

This chapter seeks to examine the social profile of the BJP legislators of three consecutive state Assemblies of Haryana constituted in 1996, 2000 and 2005. The most distinctive feature of these assemblies was the continuous decline in the BJP's performance. Whereas in 1996 it won 11 seats, in 2000 it was reduced to 6, and in 2005 it won non-significant 2 seats. The purpose of this study is to know whether such a decline have made some significant impact on the nature of the party leadership.

In terms of variables, the social profile of legislator has been analysed on the basis of such categories as age, past legislative experience, rural-urban background, caste and sex,

Age : With regard to their age, the legislatives have been distributed into three broad categories, that is : (a) 25-40 yrs; (b) 41-55 yrs.; (c) 56 yrs. and above. According to this, in 1996 the total number of the BJP MLAs was 11 in the assembly. Out of there 11, 2 belonged to the first age group, i.e. between 25-40 years, 6 represent the middle age group of 41-55 years, and 3 fall under the category of third group of 56 years and above. In 2000 elections, 6 candidates made it to the assembly. This time, out of 6 BJP MLAs, 5 represent the first age group of 25-40 years and only 1 belonged to the last category of more than 56 years. In 2005 elections, the BJP won two seats. One

winning candidate belonged to the first group and others to the second group of 46-55 years.

The above figures show that among the BJP leaders, there is a trend towards younger age group. Leaders of old age have failed to win in last two elections.

Past Legislative Experience : Turning to their legislative experience, it would be found that out of total 16 MLAs of the BJP from 1996 to 2005 assembly election, 6 MLAs had served more than two terms of the state Assembly in the past, out of these 6, two MLAs were old timer - one served for three terms and another for four terms. There were 10 fresh entries. This shows a trend towards an end to the legislative career of a number of old political stalwarts. This reflects that the BJP is becoming a party of young and fresh leaders.

Rural-Urban Background : Maximum number of the legislators represent the urban background. In 1996, out of 11 MLAs, of the party, only 3 represent rural background, Ram Bilas Sharma, Suraj Pal and Krishan Pal. Rest of the 8 MLA, belonged to the urban background. In 2000 state Assembly, out of 6 BJP MLAs, 2 represent the rural background and four represent urban, whereas in 2005 state Assembly, out of 2 MLAs of the party, 1 belonged to the rural background and other to the urban. This reflects the urban image of the BJP in Haryana. This shows that the party need to make some inroads in rural areas so that leaders from rural background can identify themselves from the party.

Caste-Background : The caste factor in the politics of Haryana plays the most conspicuous role. Though the state has made tremendous progress after the advent of the green revolution, caste consciousness in Haryana shows no sign of abating.

In terms of castewise representation of the legislators, the largest caste group, represented by the BJP MLAs, is upper caste group. Out of total 16 MLAs (11 in 1996, 6 in 2000 and 2 in 2005) 4 hailed from Punjabi Caste, 2 from Bania, 5 from Brahmin, 1 Rajput, 2 SC, 2 Gujar (BC) and 1 Jat. Punjabis, Brahmins and Banias are over-represented and Jat and Rajput under-represented. However, this also shows that Jat alongwith BCs have started entering the BJP and Punjabis are going away from the party.

Sex : As regards sex, female representation among BJP's MLAs was almost negligible. In 1996, out of total 11 MLAs, there was only 1 woman member. In 2000, however, two women were elected out of total 6 BJP MLAs. Again in 2005, no woman candidate won elections. In 2005 BJP got only 2 seats. This shows that the party is also trying to give representation to women.

3.2. DOMINANCE OF PUNJABI LEADERSHIP

The BJP's influence has traditionally been confined to the urban dwellers, and especially the Punjabi refugees.

In 1967, the party won 12 state Assembly seats. These constituencies were urban in nature with Punjabis, Brahmins and Banias composition. These were the constituencies of Jagadhari, Ambala, Nilokheri, Karnal, Sambhalka, Panipat, Rohtak, Kalanan, Gurgaon, Narnaul, Bhiwani and Sirsa. These were primarily urban constituencies.

Table 3.1: Regional Classification of Assembly Constituencies

Nature of Constituencies (Total Seats)	District	Assembly Constituencies
Rural - Jat - 35	Bhiwani	63 Badhra, 64 Dadri, 65 Mundhal Khurd, 67 Tosham, 68 Loharu, 69 Bawani Khera
	Sonipat	38 Baroda (SC), 39 Gohana, 40 Kailana, 42 Rai, 43 Rohat
	Jind	45 Narwana, 46 Uchana Kalan, 47 Rajond, 48 Jind, 49 Julana, 50 Safidon
	Rohtak	28 Hassangarh, 29 Kilo, 31 Meham, 32 Kalanaur (SC)
	Jhajjar	33 Beri, 35 Jhajjar (SC), 36 Badli, 37 Bahadurgarh
	Hisar	70 Barwala, 71 Narnaund, 75 Ghirai, 79 Adampur
	Kaithal	27 Pai, 44 Kalayat (SC)
	Karnal	16 Assandh (SC)
	Panipat	19 Naulatha
	Sirsa	80 Darba Kalan
	Fatehabad	73 Bhattu Kalan
Rural-South-15	Gurgaon	57 Ferozepur Jhirka, 58 Nuh, 59 Taoru, 60 Sohna, 62 Pataud (SC)
	Faridabad	52 Mewla Maharajpur, 55 Hassanpur (SC), 56 Hathin
	Rewari	85 Bawal (SC), 86 Rewari, 87 Jatusana
	Mahendragarh	88 Mahendragarh, 89 Ateli, 90 Narnaul
	Jhajjar	34 Salhawas
Rural-North-23	Yamunanagar	3 Sadhaura (SC), 4 Chhachhrauli, 6 Jagadhari, 21 Radaur (SC)
	Karnal	11 Indri, 12 Nilokheri, 14 Jundala (SC), 15 Gharaunda
	Ambala	2 Naraingarh, 7 Mullana (SC), 10 Naggal

	Fatehabad	76 Tohana, 77 Ratia (SC), 78 Fatehabad.
	Sirsa	81 Ellenabad (SC), 78 Fatehabad
	Kaithal	24 Guhla, 26 Pundri
	Kurukshetra	20 Shahabad, 23 Pehowa
	Panipat	18 Samalakha
	Hisar	72 Hansi
Urban-17	Faridabad	51 Faridabad, 53 Ballabgarh, 54 Palwal
	Ambala	8 Ambala cantt., 9 Ambala city
	Panchkula	1 Kalka
	Yamunanagar	5 Yamunanagr
	Kaithal	25 Kaithal
	Kurukshetra	22 Thanesar
	Karnal	13 Karnal
	Panipat	17 Panipat
	Rohtak	30 Rohtak
	Bhiwani	66 Bhiwani
	Sonipat	41 Sonipat
	Gurgaon	61 Gurgaon
	Hisar	74 Hisar
	Sirsa	82 Sirsa

Source : CSDS Data Unit :

Social composition of the constituencies vary from one another. They vary in size as well as in socio-economic composition. There are total 90 assembly seats in Haryana. 17 are reserved, 7 seats are Ahir dominated seats, 19 Punjabi dominated, 29 Jat dominated, 5 Brahmin, 3 Meo, 2 Ror, 3 Bania, 4 Gujjar, 1 Saini and 1 Kambhoj dominated seat. In 1967, the party won 12 seats. 4 Punjabi dominated seats, 3 Brahmin dominated, 1 Jat, 1 Bania, 1 Ror and 2 Rajput dominated seats. This shows that in initial days, the BJP (Jana Sangh) had representation among almost all the castes, though Punjabis had slightly upper hand.

This part of the chapter deals with the dominance of Punjabi leadership in the BJP from 1980 to 1990. After the founding of the BJP on 6th April 1980. Dr. Kamla Verma (BC) was nominated as party's state unit president. The initial moves were taken with caution. In order to shed party's image of 'Brahmin-Bania' party, an attempt was made to mobilize SC and BC votes, consequently the presidentship was vested in the hands of people belonging to these communities. But the party did not perform well in 1982 assembly elections when party was almost reduced to half. In 1982, the party secured 6 seats. However, it retained its original support base, as out of total 6 seats, 4 Punjabi leaders were elected from the constituencies of Ambala City, Panipat, Rohtak and Sonapat.

In 1986, Dr. Mangal Sein, a punjabi was elected as the party's state unit president. Dr. Mangal Sein was seen as a potential leader who could get maximum support from the Punjabis. He remained in the office as party president until his death in 1990.

In case of Haryana, the BJP organised itself around a small group of Punjabi refugees and urban dweller. There was prominence of Punjabi leaders in party apparatus. In 1967 elections out of 12 winning candidates, 4 were Punjabis. In 1988, out of total 7 winning leader, 5 were Punjabis. See Table.

This table reflects that Punjabis were liberally represented in the party.

Table 3.2

Sl.No.	Yr. of Election	St unit President	Total seats won	Strength of Punjabi
1.	1967	Mukhtiar Singh (Jat)	12	4
2.	1968	Mukhtiar Singh (Jat)	7	5
3.	1972	Shiv Ram Verma (Awa)	2	1
4.	1977	Chand Ram	15	6
5.	1982	Suraj Bhan (SC)	6	4
6.	1987	Dr. Mangal Sen (Pm)	17	6
7.	1991	Ram Bilas (Brah.)	2	0
8.	1996	Ramesh Joshi (Brah.)	11	2
9.	2000	Rattan Lal (SC)	6	2
10.	2005	Ganeshi Lal (Bania)	2	0

It is clear from the table that there was dominance of the Punjabis. The BJP remained largely identified with the Banias and Punjabis also because the party apparatus was continuously in the hands of leaders belonging to this section of society both at the local as well as the state level.

3.3. SHIFT TO NON-PUNJABI LEADERSHIP 1990-2005

In the 1990s, after the 'Mandal affair', leaders of the BJP have been inclined to make room for non-upper-caste people within the party. This policy, which is often

described as 'Social engineering' is gradually gaining momentum, but meets opposition from RSS people and also from those who object that the BJP may lose its traditional base it runs after low-caste votes.

BJP in Haryana tries to woo jat voters by changing their approach. It makes an attempt to include more and more jat leaders in the party apparatus it also assigned important designation to jats. The policy of appeasement towards jats have disadvantages the party. Its non-jat leaders and workers get annoyed and alienated themselves from the party. BJP is trying to appease such a community of jats who have never voted and will never vote for it.

In case of Haryana, it seems that the BJP is obsessed with Jat leader projection. It never skips any opportunity of recruiting new leaders, defecting from other political outfits. The new recruits however, did not show the same discipline and commitment to the party as old timer with RSS background did. These leaders are breakaway leaders either from Congress or INLD such leaders are concerned more about their own future perspectives rather than the party. However, such leaders join the party but never adopt the party's ideology.

After the death of Dr. Mangal Sein, the state unit party president, it became difficult for the party to retain Jana Sangh's original support base among Punjabis, Brahmins and Banias. After in Mangal Sein, in the state party unit, nobody else could capture the credibility among Punjabis. Moreover, the party started aligning with regional parties, who are pro-jat and pro-peasant parties, such as Devi Lal's Lok Dal, Bansi Lal's HVP and Chautala's INLD. These regional outfits followed pro-peasant policies and labelled as anti-urban. The party consequently started losing their support among its original strongholds.

After winning 12 seats in 1967, the party won only 2 new seats in 1968. In 1972, it did not add any new constituency, in 1977, however, it expanded to four new constituencies of Sadhaura (Reserved), Kaithal, Faridabad and Palwal. In 1982, it entered in rural constituency of Mahendragarh. In 1987 state assembly elections, the party expanded in Mullana (reserved), Radaur (reserved and Hansi. The major shift comes after 1991 elections, after the death of Dr. Mangal Sein. Secondly, BJP's National Compulsion of making alliances and finally, party's attempt to give more and more representation to the SCs and BCs. From 1991 to 2005 state elections, the BJP have expanded in 4 new constituencies only and it has started loosing its traditional strongholds to the Congress.

3.4. POWER EQUATIONS IN THE BJP : AN ASSESSMENT

"Accurate facts on castewise distribution are not available after the 1931 census but approximations done by scholars and political activists indicate that the strength of various caste groups in Haryana comes roughly to : Jats 25 to 28 percent, Ahir's 6 to 8 percent; Gujjars and Rajputs about 3 percent; Rors 1.5 to 2 percent; Bishnois, Kambojh (including Sikhs) about 2 percent; Punjabis, mostly the refugees from West Punjab, about 28 percent; and scheduled castes comprising various groups of like Chaman, Dhanck, Bhangi, etc. abotu 18 percent."¹

It is pertinent to mention here that Jats are numerically the largest group in Haryana and Punjabis are also equal in their percentage of population. Jats are 25 to 28 percent and Punjabis also 28 percent. If jat's and Punjabis are almost equal in their strength, than why the BJP, atleast being a party of Punjabis, is not a political power to reckon with in the state. The Regional parties represent jats and they are politically powerful

¹ CSDS Report.

outfits, similarly the BJP, which is tagged as a Punjabi Party, should have some share in politics of the state. But, surprisingly enough, the BJP has reduced to 2 seats.

This part of the chapter intends to show that the BJP is no more a Punjabis party. The Party's image of 'Party of Punjabi's has become a myth in the sense that the Punjabi representation in the party's organisational set-up has significantly declined. Dr. Mangal Sein was the last Punjabi president of the party's state unit. There is only one Punjabi among five vice-presidents; none among General Secretary and Secretary, the office incharge is a Punjabi. Most surprisingly, there are only 2 Punjabis in the state working committee, Shashipal Mehta and Atam Prakash Manchanda. In the list of 78 special invited members, there are only four members who belong to Punjabi group. In Permanent Invited Members list of 25 members, there is only Punjabi. This reflects the party's grip over Punjabis and Punjabis grip over the party is diminishing significantly.

The party can become a visible force in Haryana's political scene if it projects itself as a non-jat party. Jats have organised politically in INLD, non-jats in Congress (due to Bhajan Lal's presence), the Punjabi population can make a big difference to BJP's prospects. The BJP, at this point of time, should revive itself on the lines of its previous image of party of Punjabis. The dictum, the party should follow is-back to basics. If the BJP successfully projects itself as a party of Punjabi's and if it successfully consolidates Punjabi vote bank, it can emerge as a powerful force in Haryana.

CHAPTER IV

PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL ALLIANCES AND PERFORMANCE

4.1 NATIONAL COMPULSIONS AND STATE RESPONSES

“Parties have a strong incentive to aggregate votes through formation of alliances, by sharing the total number of contested seats, so as not to split but to pool votes. This is because a small addition of votes has the potential to hugely increase or alternatively decimate a party on coalition in terms of seats”.¹

The previous chapter speaks about the changing profile of party leadership and how the change in leadership paved the way for major shifts in party's support base. This chapter deals with the importance of alliances in the state. Haryana hardly defies the national trend. In Haryana the electorate usually votes for that party in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections whose chances of forming a government at the centre appears the brightest

The 2004 general elections saw, for the first time, a contest at the national level between two serious coalitions, the National Democratic Alliance and the United Progressive Alliance. The Congress Party for the first time put together a broad-based pre-election coalition. Coalitions have come to play a major role because there has been growing ideological polarization since 1989 on the basis of secular versus communal; Congress versus BJP. And now it has become NDA versus UPA. No

¹ Sridharan, E. “Electoral Coalitions in 2004 General Assembly: Theory and Evidence”, EPW, December 14, 2004.

political party can escape the compulsions of coalitions in present scenario. The Congress party which until recently resisted coalitions, became a significant coalition builder in 2004 Lok Sabha elections.

BJP started the quest for power by adopting the ideological moderation consisted in the seat adjustments with other parties. Quite unconventionally, the party indulged in alliance-making with regional parties with a strong base among non-upper caste. This kind of arrangement was prevalent in Maharashtra where BJP alongwith RSS associated itself with the Brahmins while the Shiv Sena took it among low castes. The seat adjustment made between Samata Party and the BJP in Bihar gave birth to a similar sociological combine.

Under the presidentship of Vajpayee, the National Executive of the BJP which met at Bombay on 7-9 May 1983, made an appeal to all parties which subscribe to National unity and democracy to come together in the form of a National Democratic Front. It favoured electoral arrangements, including the formation of a front on the basis of a common programme with opposition parties (barring the communists and the Muslim League), aiming at defecting the Congress. Under Vajpayee, the BJP had also given a 'gaon-chalo' call to the party.

A front was formed to work together with the acknowledged leader of the farmers, Ch. Charan Singh. A coalition was formed with the Lok Dal and was named National Democratic Alliance. Prof. Vijay Kumar Malhotra was appointed its Secretary, Charan Singh was the President and Vajpayee became the Vice-President. Ch.Charan

Singh declared at the public meeting in Delhi “From today Shri Vajpayee has become Chaudhary Atal Bihari Vajpayee and I have become Pandit Charan Singh”.²

The BJP intended to make inroads in rural area via Lok Dal. This alliance could facilitate the party’s entry into the villages of Northern India where it already had a social base in the urban areas. The ground was formed for the emergence of NDA, representing two significant social formations in Northern India – one powerful in rural society and the other deeply entrenched in urban society.

From 1980 to 1984, BJP focused itself around alliances, and it succeeded in forging a powerful electoral alliance with the Lok Dal. In Haryana, Devi Lal, pro-jat and pro-farmer leader, was the state unit president of the Lok Dal. Due to National compulsions, the BJP had to indulge in alliance in the state. And in 1982 assembly elections, the party fought with Devi Lal’s Lok Dal. But the alliance, at centre, ran into rough weather towards the close of 1984. In the meanwhile, the Lok Dal had struck an alliance with the Democratic Socialist Party led by H.N.Bahugana. But the coalition between Lok Dal and BJP continued in the State because of the personality clash between Ch.Charan Singh and Devi Lal.

In 1996 General elections, once again the BJP experimented with coalition political tactic. According to Christophe, “the BJP high command embraced the tactic of ‘Indirect Mandalisation’”.

Indirect Mandalisation consisted in making alliances with regional parties with a strong base among the low and intermediate castes. For eg. the seat adjustment between the JD(U) and BJP in Bihar. In Haryana the BJP, whose influence has

² *BJP, Birth, Memorable Events*. Published by Office Secretary, BJP 11, Ashok Road, (Delhi, 2000), p.21.

traditionally been confined to the urban dwellers, and especially the Punjabi refugees, make an alliance with Bansi Lal's Haryana Vikas Party. HVP has a strong base among jats. This alliance enabled the BJP win four Lok Sabha seats out of nine in 1996. BJP withdrew support from HVP on 22nd July 1998 and forged alliance with Chautala's Indian National Lok Dal (INLD). There are no permanent friends and foes – this absolutely suits Haryana politics.

These negotiations showed that the adjustment of seats was based more on a common objective of defeating Congress than on ideological like mindedness of different parties. From the 1997 onwards, the party focused all its attention on setting up an alternative coalition by wooing regional forces. Its most significant achievement was its alliance with the AIADMK which gave the party a foothold in T.N. Gradually it succeeded in forging alliance with a dozen parties. In Haryana, the party forged alliance with HVP and INLD.

Advani explicitly established a relation between the way the BJP has diluted its Hindu nationalist ideology and the making of alliances. Both phenomenon culminated in 1998 in the formation of the NDA. This shows the compulsions of coalition politics and the ideological moderation of the BJP. In other words we can rightly say that the compulsions of coalition politics led to the ideological moderation of the BJP. It is evident from its alliance-making with parties without ideological affinities.

4.2 ELECTORAL ALLIANCES IN THE STATE: 1982-2005

“In the context of Haryana, the position of the BJP is like a ‘zero’ which when placed after one makes it ten”.

Yogendra Gupta, the Tribune

The BJP largely plays the role of a spoiler for the Congress Party. In Haryana, the BJP has neither established as the ruling party nor as the opposition party, yet whenever forged alliance with regional party it spoiled Congress party's chance to make the government. It is evident from the fact that whenever there is a non-Congress government in the state it has always been with the support of the BJP. Haryana is a new state which has witnessed ten assembly elections till now. BJP participated in all the elections, except in 1977 when it was merged with Janta Party. It contested five elections with alliances and five without alliances. The Congress party has come to power for five times and there have been five non-Congress governments in the state.

Table 4.1

Alliance Pattern

S.No.	Year	Alliance Pattern	Chief Minister
1.	1967	Lok Dal + Vishal Haryana Party (U.F.)	Rao Birender Singh (U.F.)
2.	1968	Congress	Bansi Lal (Congress)
3.	1975	Congress	Bansi Lal (Congress)
4.	1977	Lok Dal + Jana Sangh + Socialist + Arya Sabha (Janata Party)	Devi Lal (Janata Dal)
5.	1982	Congress	Bhajan Lal (Congress)
6.	1987	Lok Dal + BJP	Devi Lal (LD)
7.	1991	Congress	Bhajan Lal (Congress)
8.	1996	Haryana Vikas Party + BJP	Bansi Lal (HVP)
9.	2000	INLD + BJP	Chautala (INLD)
10.	2005	Congress	Bhupinder Singh Hooda (Congress)

This chapter deals with the patterns of electoral alliances. We have divided all the assembly elections into two parts, first part covers elections held from 1967 to 1980 and second covers elections held from 1982 to 2005. The first part covers the initial phase in Haryana politics. After its formation in 1966, the state went for elections the next very year i.e. in 1967. In fact this was a phase of initial turbulence, which is characterised by politics of 'Aya Ram, Gaya Ram'.³ The politics of the state came to be seen as nothing more than a concept and opportunity exercise in defections.

“But the defections of this period symbolized something more than the apparent political opportunism and fluid identification of leaders with political parties. The leaders of the dominant caste groups in the state were trying to get their share in the political cake. There were leaders from the numerically dominant agricultural castes. They were not ready to accept the leadership of a Brahmin”.⁴

This reflects that Jat-psyche and prominence of caste in electoral politics of the state. This shows that Jat versus non-jat factor is deeply rooted in the state right from its existence in 1966. This period is also characterised by the Janata Party's experiment. Period of 1980 to 2005 witnessed 6 elections. This chapter will cover all six elections. In 1982, 1987, 1996 and 2000, the BJP forged alliance, and in 1991 and 2005 it contested on its own. For the purpose of analyzing the pattern of alliance and support base of the BJP, we have taken 6 assembly constituencies as unit of study. For this purpose we have selected only those assembly constituencies which were contested

³ See Yadav, Vivek, "Electoral Politics in Haryana in the 1990s. Dominance of the Middle Peasantry". (EPW)

⁴ Yadav Vivek, "Haryana: Social Coalitions, Political Strategies and the Capture of State Power" Journal of Indian School of Pol. Eco. Jan.-June 2003.

by the BJP in all the Haryana Assembly elections held in the state since 1982. Out of the constituencies selected by us, Ambala city and Yamuna Nagar are predominantly urban, Hindu and Punjabi dominated constituencies. Shahabad and Kalanaur are rural constituencies. Kalanaur is reserved constituency. Narnaul and Mahendergarh, are rural and Ahir dominated constituencies.

1982 Elections: Since the BJP was aware of the fact that it has a limited support base in the state which was confined to the Punjabis and the high castes in the urban areas, it decided to have an alliance with the Lok Dal.

The comparison of the BJP in the 1982 Elections with 1972 and 1977 elections to Haryana Assembly.

Table 4.2

Comparative Analysis of Party's Performance

S.No.	Name of the Constituency	Percentage of votes in the 1972 elections	Percentage of votes in the 1977 elections	Percentage of votes in the 1982 elections
1.	Ambala City	48.39	47.77	47.38
2.	Yamuna Nagar	34.51	41.66	29.21
3.	Shahabad	21.54	Did not contest	35.68
4.	Kalanaur	43.14	39.50	36.40
5.	Narnaul	Did not contest	Did not contest	32.45
6.	Mahendergargh	Did not contest	29.22	50.46

Source: Records of the office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh

It is pertinent to mention here that the support base of the Jana Sangh faction of the Janata Party which had increased in the 1977 due to the powerful impact of Janata

wave had begun to decline soon after the foundation of the Janata Government in Haryana under the leadership of Devi Lal. The Jana Sangh minister (Mangal Sain, Sushma Swaraj, Suraj Bhan and Kamla Verma) failed to protect the interests of their traditional support base; i.e. the urban based trading class and middle class supporters belonging to the high castes and the Punjabi Community, due to the centralization of all the power in the hands of the Chief Minister, Devi Lal. As a result they shifted their support to the Congress. This became evident at the time of the by-election to Karnal parliamentary constituency held in April, 1978. They mostly voted for the Congress candidate Chiranji Lal Sharma instead of voting for the Janata Party candidate, Mahender Singh Lather.⁵ They also voted for the candidates of the Congress in the 1980 parliamentary elections and did not vote for JS candidates in Karnal (Sushma Swaraj), in Sonipat (Mukhtiar Singh) and in Mahendergarh (Ram Bilas Sharma). This shows that the BJP was not able to expand the traditional support base that it had inherited from the Jana Sangh. The marginal increase in its vote share in the 1982 Haryana Assembly elections was mainly due to the support from the peasant castes particularly the Jats owing to its alliance with the Lok Dal.⁶

The BJP was able to retain its support base intact in the predominantly urban constituency of Ambala City (See table). The support for the party, however, declined substantially in the predominantly urban, highly industrialized and Punjabi dominated Yamuna Nagar constituency. This reflects party's lost among the Punjabi voters belonging to the trading and middle classes. It also lost support among the working class voters due to their perception of the BJP as a party of the capitalist class. BJP, however, made some gains in the rural constituency of Shahabad. The gain made by

⁵ Ranbir Singh, Caste and Voting Behaviour in 1982 Haryana Vidhan Sabha Elections, *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, No.4, 1983, pp.332-38.

⁶ This happened because of the anti-urban, anti-trades, anti-Punjabi and the anti-high caste image on the one hand and the pro-rural, pro-agriculturalist and the pro-jat image that the Lok Dal had in the state. See H.S.Sidhu, *The 1984 Pan-election in Hon. M.Phil. Diss. (unpublished) K.U.Kurk. 1986.*

the party in 1982 elections the Lok Dal. Via Lok Dal, BJP made inroads in rural areas and among peasantry.

Alliance with the Lok Dal did not keep the BJD in reserved seat of Kalanaur and its vote share went down by almost 4 percent. On the other hand, the party was able to build up a fairly large support base in the Ahir dominated rural constituency of Mahendargarh. BJP's candidate, Sh.Ram Bilas Sharma got 50.46 percent votes in these elections.

1987 Election: In 1987 elections also BJP forged alliance with Devi Lal's Lok Dal. We must mention here that, the BJP and Ch. Charan Singh were no more allies at the centre and got separated as Charan Singh joined Bahugana's party. Against the background of the joint struggle put up by the BJP as a partner of Sangharsh Samiti, the BJP and the Lok Dal fought the elections jointly and the results were fruitful.

Table 4.3

In the background of alliance with Devi Lal in the 1987 Election

Sr. No.	Name of the Constituency	Percentage of Votes in the 1982 Election	Percentage of Votes in the 1987 Election	Swing
1.	Ambala city	47.38	45.67	-1.71
2.	Yamunanagar	29.21	44.37	+15.16
3.	Shahabad	35.68	10.57	-25.11
4.	Kalanaur	36.40	60.08	+23.68
5.	Narnanul	32.45	40.91	+8.46
6.	Mahendargarh	50.46	41.26	-9.20

Source: Records of the office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh

The 1987 elections are characterized by the Devi Lal wave. The BJP-Lok Dal alliance had swept the 1987 election as a result of the powerful impact of the Haryana Sangharsh Samiti Movement⁷ against the Punjab Accord (1985) on the one hand and the repression of the Sarva Karamchari Sangh agitation by Bansi Lal on the other hand.

The constituency-wise analysis (see table) shows that there was an overall increase in the vote share. Shahabad is an exception as the Lok Dal decided to support the candidate of the Communist Party⁸. The BJP, however, declined marginally (by 1.71 percent) in Ambala city. This was due to the dissatisfaction among a section of the BJP supporters with the performance of the candidate, Master Shiv Prasad. Moreover, the party got deprived of a sizeable number of Sikhs due to the presence of an independent Sikh candidate. In Yamunanagar, BJP was benefited by the alliance.

The party was able to get increased support from the Sikhs, because the members of this community had become hostile to the Congress throughout the country to the fall out of the 'Operation Blue Star'.⁹ In both the constituencies Kalanaur and Narnaul, the party made some gain. However, the party's performance declined in the Ahir-dominated rural constituency of Mahendergarh.

1991 Elections: It may be mentioned at the outset that the BJP contested the 1991 elections to Haryana Assembly without having an alliance with any other political party. It decided to do so because the BJP which had contested the 1987 elections in alliance with the Lok Dal and joined the government had to pay a heavy price for sharing power. Its support base got badly eroded because its ministers failed to protect

⁷ The Sarva Karamchari Sangh, (The Federation of the Association of the Government Employees) were demanding increased pay and removal of anomalies.

⁸ The Lok Dal supported the CPI candidate Comrade Harnam Singh in Shahbad.

⁹ This took place for flushing out the Sikh terrorists from the Golden Temple, Amritsar. See, white paper on the Operation Blue Star, Govt. of India, New Delhi, 1984.

the interests of its urban based supporters, especially the Punjabi. It is pertinent to point out the fact that Devi Lal led government followed pro-rural, pro-agriculturist and the pro-jat policies during its regime from 1987 to 1990. During those days youth wing of Lok Dal headed by Jai Parkash popularly known as the 'Green Buigade' had created terror in the minds of people belonging to urban areas.

Table 4.4

Performance of the BJP in 1991 Election as compared to 1987 Elections

S.No.	Name of the constituency	Percentage of votes in the 1987 elections	Percentage of votes in the 1987 elections	Swing
1.	Ambala City	45.67	33.28	-12.39
2.	Yamunanagar	44.37	30.96	-13.41
3.	Shahabad	10.57	26.09	+15.52
4.	Kalanaur	60.08	19.56	-40.52
5.	Narnaul	40.91	27.78	-13.13
6.	Mahendergarh	41.26	50.46	+9.20

Source: Records of the office of the Chief Electoral Office, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh

It was because of this reason that the BJP candidates were defeated in both Ambala and Karnal constituencies in the 1989 parliamentary elections despite alliance with Janata Dal. This defeat made the BJP to decide to not to join the Lok Dal (than Janata Dal) government headed by O.P.Chautala. The Meham episode further affected the relationship of the BJP with the Janata Dal (which later on became S.J.P.).¹⁰ But despite the 'Rath Yatra' launched by the BJP in wake of Mandir issue, the party failed

¹⁰ Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 'Haryana Politics after 9th Lok Sabha Election' Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol.XIV, No.1-2, 1990, pp.63-74.

to recover the support base that it had lost by participation in Devi Lal led coalition government.¹¹ This becomes clearer by constituency wise analysis.

The decline in the support for BJP was visible in urban Constituency of Ambala City. The percentage of votes polled by it was reduced by 12.39 despite the fact that the BJP had fielded its sitting M.L.A., Faqir Chand. The same pattern was followed in Yamunanagar constituency where the vote share reduced by 13.49 percent. However, there was a surprise increase in the percentage of votes obtained by the BJP in Shahabad constituency. Then, the percentage of votes polled by its candidate increased by 15.52 percent. But the credit for this gain has mainly to be given to its decision of the BJP to field Khairati Lal Sharma. Since Sharma is a local Brahmin, he was able to secure votes of the Banias as well as the Brahmins in the constituency. Besides, the BJP candidate, who was a rebel Congressman, could get support from Bhajan Lal faction of the Congress which was unhappy over the allotment of the party ticket to Igmeet Cheema, who belonged to Birender faction of the party.¹²

The support of the party declined most heavily in Kalanaur reserved constituency. The percentage of votes polled by the BJP was reduced by 40.52 percent. Punjabi voters alienated themselves from the party due to the alliance in 1987 and due to the absence of the alliance resulted in the loss of support from the Rajputs and Jats.

The BJP also lost considerable support in the local dominated constituency of Narnaul. The BIP fielded an unknown Ahir candidate, Udhami Ram, instead of Kailash Sharma a Brahmin.

¹¹ The Rath Yatra did not make any impact on the votes of Haryana because caste is more important in Haryana than religion. Refer to, R.P.Rana An Anatomy of Haryana, Mainstream, Vol.XXI, No.17, 1983, pp.17-19.

¹² There was intense factionalism in the groups led by Bhajan Lal and Birender Singh in those elections both of them projected themselves as the future CM of Haryana.

The denial of the party ticket to Kailash chand a annoyed the Brahmin voters, however, the performance of the party improved in the Ahir dominated rural constituency of Mahendergarh.

1996 Election: The BJP contested the 1996 election to Haryana Assembly, that were held simultaneously with the 1996 parliamentary election, in alliance with Bansilal led HVP. It may be pertinent to point out that Bansilal had acquired the image of the builder of Haryana, development oriented leader, during his first tenure as the Chief Minister of state from 1968 to 1972. He, however, had gained the image of an authoritarian leader during his second tenure as the chief Minister of Haryana from 1972 to 1975 owing to his arbitrary and ruthless style of administration.¹³ Alliance with HVP helped the BJP, to improve its performance in 1996 election.

Table 4.5

Performance of the BJP in 1996 election

Sr. No.	Name of the constituency	Percentage of votes in the 1991 election	Percentage of votes in the 1996 election	Swing
1.	Ambala City	33.28	38.18	+4.09
2.	Yamuna nagar	30.96	35.49	+0.53
3.	Shahabad	26.09	32.29	+6.20
4.	Kalanaur	19.56	26.91	+7.35
5.	Narnoul	27.78	24.69	-3.05
6.	Mahendergarh	50.46	20.83	-29.63

Source: Records of the office of the Chief electoral officer, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh.

¹³ Refer to Ranbir Singh, 'A study of Leadership style in Haryana: Political Idioms of Bansilal' in gopal Singh (ed). South Asia: Democracy, Disconting and societal Conflicts, Anamika, Publishers, New Delhi, 1998 pp, 392-399.

The BJP wanted to take advantage of the alliance with HVP became the appeal of the ideology of Hindustava which helped it in other Neighbouring states like UP, Rajasthan, M.P. Himachal Pradesh and the National capital Territory of Delhi, however could not prove effective in Haryana.¹⁴

The constituency level analysis shows that the BJP was able to improve its performance due to the alliance. The BJP obtained 4.09% more votes in Ambala city in 1996. It also increased its vote share in the industrialized urban constituency of Yamunanagar. One of the factors that helped the party was its success in recovering its traditional support base among the punjabis. Moreover the party candidate Kamla Verma got support from the backward castes because her husband was a Kambhoj (a backward caste).¹⁵ A section of the peasant castes in the rural area of the constituency due to its alliance with the HVP also supported her. In the rural constituency of Shahabad, the party increased its percentage of votes by 6.2 percent. Although this gain has mainly be ascribed to the state level factors that enabled the BJP to retrieve the support base that it had lost to the congress in 1991 elections. As a result the BJP got bulk of the votes of the Brahmins and the Banias in the urban areas.¹⁶

The performance of the BJP increased substantially in the predominantly rural constituency of Kalanaur. However, there was a small decline in the support for the BJP in the Narnaul constituency. Most surprisingly there was a heavy loss of electoral support for the BJP in Ahir dominated rural constituency of Mahendergarh. BJP candidate, Ram Bilas Sharma, got 29.63 percentage lesser votes. The alliance with the

¹⁴ The Jat Leader Chhotu Ram had mobilised the peasant castes in the pre-independence period on economic basis instead of religion, see Paul, "Peasant Mobilization in India and the contemporary, Political significance of Sin Chhotu Ram' Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol XXXXI, No. 4, 1980, pp. 683-693.

¹⁵ Although Kamla Verma is a punjabi, She is married to a Kamboj Prof. Satya Dev Verma.

¹⁶ This was due to the effect of the local-punjabi divide in the constituency

HVP failed to help it in this constituency. At the local level this constituency was divided between Ahir and non-ahir. The social cleavages at the local level reduced the importance of the state level factors.

2000 Election : Haryana assembly elections held in February 2000, were contested by the BJP in alliance with the INLD. After its defeat in the 1998 parliamentary elections the BJP had decided to break its alliance with the HVP. That is why it withdrew from the coalition government led by Bansilal and played an important role in toppling it. The BJP also played an important role in the formation of the INLD government led by Chautala in June 1999. Later on, it forged alliance with the INLD in the 1999 parliamentary elections.¹⁷

If may be mentioned here that the BJP won all 5 seats it contested in 1999 parliamentary election and had secured 29.21percent votes. The BJP decided to continue its alliance with the INLD in the 2000 elections to Haryana assembly in the hope of sharing power after the elections. But the alliance between the two had to face problems right from the beginning. The BJP wanted allotment of 35 out of 90 seats, but the INLD was prepared to give it only 18 seats.¹⁸ Ultimately 29 seats were given to it as a result of the mediation by Atal Bihar Vajpai.¹⁹

¹⁷ Refer to T.K. Rajalaxmi, 'Bansi lal rides on' in Erontline, vol. Xiii No. 13, July 3-16, 1999, pp. 30-31.

¹⁸ Refer to Ranbir Singh, 'The 1998 Parliamentary election in Haryana; an analysis,' Politics India, Vol 11, 1998 pp 14-15.

¹⁹ Ibid

Table 4.6

Performance of the BJP in the 2000 Election

Sr. No.	Name of the constituency	Percentage of votes in the 1991 election	Percentage of votes in the 1996 election	Swing
1.	Ambala City	38.18	22.62	-15.55
2.	Yamunanagar	35.49	20.58	-14.91
3.	Shahabad	32.29	37.77	+5.48
4.	Kalanaur	26.91	45.63	+18.72
5.	Narnaul	24.69	16.07	-8.66
6.	Mahendegarh	20.83	28.93	+8.10

Source: Records of the office of the chief Electoral officer government of Haryana, Chandigarh.

The constituency level analysis given in the table shows that alliance with INLD did not help much. In Ambala city and Yamunagar, Party's Performance declined quite significantly. Both the constituencies are urban and Punjabi dominated in nature. Alliance with INLD, a Pro-jat party, annoyed BJP's original support base. On the other hand the support base of the party increased in Shahabad. Local level factors helped BJP candidate in this constituency. Congress Candidate Tara Singh's image had been tarnished when he was a minister in Bhajan Lal Government from 1991 to 1996. Since Tara Singh belonged to Bhajan Lal faction the supporters of Hooda decided to vote for the BJP candidate to ensure his defeat.

There was a heavy swing of 18.72 percent in the favour of the BJP in Kalanaur reserved constituency. This may be explained by the following factor. Firstly, there was sympathy for the BJP candidate Sarita Narain, whose father Jai Narain had died a few months before the election. He had been elected to Haryana assembly from

Kalanaur in the 1977 and 1987 election. Though the performance of the party declined by 8.66 percent in Narnaul constituency, vote share increased by 8.10 percent in the Ahir dominated rural constituency of Mahendergarh.

Election 2005: The BJP contested all the 90 seats on its own in the 2005 assembly elections. The BJP, which had won six seats in the 2000 polls, managed to win only 2 seats. This time, BJP decided to contest the lok Sabha and Assembly election on its own. Relations between the INLD and the BJP soured after BJPs six MLAs resigned from the outgoing House on the issue of Satluj Yamuna canal. Party rejected Feelers from Mr. Chantala for a patch-up and decided to contest alone.

Table 4.7

Parties Performance in 1996 Compared to 1991

Sr. No.	Name of the constituency	Percentage of votes in the 1991 election	Percentage of votes in the 1996 election	Swing
1.	Ambala City	22.62	11.97	-10.62
2.	Yamuna nagar	20.58	23.26	+2.68
3.	Shahabad	37.77	7.9	-29.87
4.	Kalanaur	45.63	3.9	-41.73
5.	Narnoul	16.07	2.41	-13.66
6.	Mahendegarh	28.93	33.91	+4.98

Source: Records of the office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Government of Haryana, Chandigarh

The BJP the constituency wise analysis shows that the BJP suffered a significant decline. The party suffered the worst rout in the Ambala City constituency where the sitting BJP MLA, Veena Chibber, even lost her security deposit to the former Union

minister, Venod Sharma. Constituencies of Shahabad, Kalanaur and Narnaul suffered equally worst. In the constituency of Shahabad, the party declined by 29.87 percent showed the worst result with the decline of 41.73 percent in the vote share compared to 2000 elections.

In the constituency of Narnaul the party fielded new candidate Rpithvi Raj, who secured only 2.41 percent of votes. In the Ahir dominated rural constituency of Mahendergarh, however, the party witnessed a marginal increase in vote share by 4.98 percent.

4.3 STRATEGY OF ALLIANCES AN ASSESSMENT

Since the BJP has originated in urban areas with Punjabi leadership, it has failed to establish itself in rural areas. Thus, it tries to penetrate into rural areas through the regional outfits, by way of making alliances with regional parties. And the personality based regional political. Parties generally find it difficult to defeat the congress they also go along with the BJP.

Alliance formation has become an essential condition for the BJP to show its presences in the state the Party has become a crucial factor in Haryana in the sense that it is only with the BJP's support that a non-congress group comes to power. Only BJP has election winning formula. As mentioned earlier, only alliance with the BJP can bring any non-congress. Party to power. It was the coalition arrangements that catapulted the BJP from the margins to the centre of the political arena on occasion, such as in 1977, 1987 and 1996.

These negotiations showed that the adjustment of seats was based more on a common objective of defeating Congress than on ideological like-mindedness of different parties. In Haryana alliances have never been motivated by ideological commitment.

Another salience of alliances in Haryana is that only an alliance between the BJP and regional peasant based political outfit has proved successful. The most formidable alliance ensuring ouster of Congress from power has been the one between BJP and a major regional party. The alliance between Samata Party and BSP in 1998 and an alliance between the CPI, CPI (M), HVP in 1968 failed to emerge victorious. Whereas an alliance between BJP and Lok Dal in 1987, BJP and HVP in 1996 and BJP and INLD in 2000, emerged victorious.

Separately the BJP has never fared better in the state. Its support base mainly confines to town and it has triumphed in Haryana only in alliance with the rural based regional outfits.

However, the strategy of alliance has proved to be a tragedy for the party. The BJP's dilemma in case of Haryana is, how to handle political scenario. If it makes alliance with regional parties which are primarily pro-jat and pro-peasant then its original support base which is urban and trading class, alienates itself from the BJP and shifts to Congress for example, in 1991 and 2000 election, party's support have declined significantly in its strongholds. And without alliance the party never succeed in getting sizeable number of seats, for eg., in 1991 and 2005. Alignment of the BJP with peasant party though it helps the BJP to come into power for some time and some of its leaders also share power, but it also leads to the alienation of its own

voters. Following points indicates that how the BJP's strategy of alliance becomes a tragedy :

- IN haryana there are social division; local versus Punjabis, jat Versus non-jats, urban versus rural, peasants versus traders,. Locals, jats, rural and peasants form the majority of the state's population and Punjabis, non jats, urban -trades are marginal groups. The BJP is tagged as party of punjabis, urban traders and non-jats. Consequently, the BJP represents the minority group and it is always in a search for alliance partner who can enlarge its support base. The Regional parties available in the state are pro-rural and pro-jat. The BJP is left with no choice but to align with Regional outfits.
- Another tragedy of alliance is that the BJP's votes transfer to its partners, but not vice-versa. The vote bank does not reciprocate. The party has achieved only a limited expansion outside its traditional support structure. There a has been hardly any transfer of sizeable number of votes from the support structure of regional parties.
- The party plays an important role in the process of king – making, that is it is only with the BJP's, support that a regional party's leader becomes Chief Minister it also gets some share in the government but gradually being a junior partner its share starts deminishing and the regional party, senior partner starts powering its hands. BJP's ministers have portfolios, but not power and they virtually become powerless Minster.

- Finally, some sort of reflection of opportunism has been identified with the BJP. Its image as an alliance partner received a set back. It is labeled as a party of betray and opportunism. In 1987, it supported Devilal in 1991 it withdrew its support from him. In 1996 it supported HVP of Bansilal and dislodged government mid-way in July 1999. Again, BJP, after securing anti-incumbency factor against Chautala , withdrew from him. The BJP switch on and switch off very quickly.

CHAPTER - 5

CONCLUSION : BJP'S CURRENT STRATEGIES AND

DILEMMAS.

This study was an attempt to sought the answer the question; why the BJP which has been able to expand its support base in other states of Hindi heartland due to the powerful impact of the issue of 'Mandir' and the ideology of Hindutava could not do so in Haryana inspite of the fact that the state is an overwhelming a Hindu in terms of its religious composition? The study has also been undertaken to find out the impact of the alliance of the BJP with other political parties on its support base. To be more specific, to find out how far the party gained as a result of its alliance with the Lok Dal in 1982 and 1997 elections to Haryana Assembly, its alliance with the H.V.P. in the 1996 election and with the INLD in the 2000 elections to the state legislature.

This study shows that the BJP could only partly retain the traditional support base of the Jana Sangh among the urban based upper castes and Punjabi traders and the middle class voters because a long segment of these sections had been alienated from the jana sangh group during the regime of Devi Lal because BJP's ministers belonging to this group had failed to protect their interests, Punjabi were also annoyed with the BJP because of its participation in Devi Lal Government. which had pro-rural, pro-peasant and pro-jat on the one hand and an anti-urban and anti-Punjabi on the other hand. Consequently, Some of them shifted their support to the Congress. But despite this, BJP was able to retain the traditional support base of the Jana Sangh in the 1982 election. The alliance of the party with Lok Dal did help it in getting support

from the peasant castes in the rural areas. But the support base of the BJP remained, by and large, confined to the urban based upper castes and middle class voter.

The BJP, as an emerging National power, had its own priorities and compulsions, which is centre-oriented. BJP's first priority was coming to power at the centre. It forged alliances with all sort of parties in almost all the states. In Haryana it forged alliance with pro-jat regional outfits which harmed its non-jat image. Article XII (A) of 'Constitution and Ruler' of the party categorises the states on the basis of seats in Lok Sabha. The party pay more attention to states where there are more Lok Sabha seats, such as UP, Bihar, MP, Rajasthan, Gujarat, etc. Consequently the party did not attach much importance to the number of seats it would win in the Assembly, but opted for a greater share in the lok sabha seats.

As far as Haryana is concerned it lacks contiguous and meaningful electoral regions. Middle class peasantry dominates politics and upper castes never enjoyed predominance. Because socio-economic forces here have unleashed different kind of structural features. when we argue about electoral politics in Haryana it appears to be constituted by a series of absence of peculiar characteristics features alike politics of 'Aya Ram Gaya Ram', frequency of anti-incumbancy factor, changing political affiliation, lack of a coherent party system, absence of social and political assertion of weaker sections of society, etc. are some patterns which constitute certain defining patterns of politics of state.

The Bhartiya Jana Sangh made little impact on the determinants of Haryana politics. The main issue at play was caste, and not Hindu Rashtra. The religion has never been an important factor in the politics of Haryana due to historical and demographic factor. The failure of the BJP in Haryana can largely be ascribed to its image of an

outsider. Interestingly, the party was founded by people who were against the demand for Punjabi Suba, and were against the demand for the creation of the state of Haryana. Naturally, after 1966 i.e. after the formation of the state, it was seen as an outsider. Most of the crop has been harvested by those who supported the formation of Haryana and the BJP felt alienated due to its stand on Punjabi Suba after the creation of the state.

The BJP could not change its image. The rural based peasant-castes could not be won over by it as they continue to view it as a party of the urban traders. The backward castes and scheduled castes stayed away from it as, the BJP remained a party of the upper castes in their eye. The minorities, the Sikhs and Muslims can not be won over by the BJP because of its Hindutava image. Moreover, the absence of Charismatic leadership handicapped the party. The BJP never had a leader of the stature of three Lals, Devi Lal, Bhajan Lal and Bansi Lal. In a state when politics is personality oriented rather than party or ideology oriented, the BJP could not expand its support base due to the absence of a charismatic leadership.

Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are two Hindi speaking states where the BJP has registered its presence. In both the state the party never forged alliance, it fought elections without electoral alliances. Where as in the states of Haryana the party had to make alliances due to regional as well as national compulsions. The party made certain attempts to fight elections on its own, in 1991 and 2005 assembly elections, but somehow could not continue the trend. Quite interestingly, the party secured 9.42 percent of votes in 1991 assembly elections and 10.36 percent in 2005 assembly elections, as compared to 8.88 percent in 1996 and 8.95 percent in 2000 assembly elections, when it fought in alliance with the HVP and INLD respectively. If the party

would have continued the 1991 elections trend then its percentage of votes would have gone much higher in 2005 assembly elections. This indicates that the BJP may emerge as a significant party in Haryana even if it does not forge alliance with any regional party well. In case of Haryana, the BJP is sitting on horns of dilemma. The main dilemma of the BJP is that if it happens to advocate the cause of jats, it may lose parts of its base among its non-jat support base. I would like to conclude by saying that Punjabis have left the party and jats are yet to join it.

Annexure 1

General Election to Haryana Vidhan Sabha, 1987: Region/District-wise Performance

Region/District (1)	Seats (2)	Turn out (%) (3)	Congress		BJP		Janta Dal		Left Parties		Other Parties		Independent	
			Won/ Cont (4)	Vote (%) (5)	Won/ Cont. (6)	Vot (%) (7)	Won/ Cont. (8)	Vot (%) (9)	Won/ Cont. (10)	Vote (%) (11)	Won/ Cont. (12)	Vote (%) (13)	Won/ Cont. (14)	Vote (%) (15)
Ambala	19	74.0	1/19	27.5	6/9	15.5	8/10	26.7	1/2	2.2	0/18	1.8	3/221	26.3
Panchkula	1	68.5	0/1	40.6	0/1	2.5	1/1	50.3	0/1	0.0	0/1	1.3	0/11	5.3
Ambala	5	74.9	0/5	30.9	3/5	29.3	0/1	4.2	0/1	0.0	0/5	0.9	2/59	34.7
Yamuna-Nagar	5	74.6	1/5	27.9	3/3	28.4	0/1	3.3	0/1	1.1	0/4	1.7	1/54	37.6
Kurukshetra	3	72.8	0/3	20.7	0/1	3.4	2/2	39.5	1/1	11.9	0/3	2.5	0/52	22.0
Kaithal	5	74.6	0/5	25.2	0/0	0.0	5/5	58.1	0/0	0.0	0/5	2.3	0/45	14.4
Rohtak	25	69.0	1/25	27.1	4/5	9.6	18/20	42.7	0/2	0.2	0/24	2.9	2/273	17.5
Karnal	6	69.1	0/6	26.1	1/1	8.5	4/5	42.3	0.0	0.0	0/3	0.4	1/73	22.7
Panipat	3	73.9	1/3	31.9	0/1	8.7	2/2	32.6	1.2	1.2	0/4	1.5	0/37	24.1
Rohtak	5	68.0	0/5	33.6	2/2	21.9	3/3	37.9	0.0	0.0	0/5	1.6	0/67	5.0
Jhajjar	5	64.3	0/5	23.4	0/0	0.0	4/5	47.4	0.0	0.0	0/4	6.8	1/45	22.4
Sonipat	6	70.9	0/6	23.4	1/1	8.7	5/5	48.6	0.0	0.0	0/8	4.5	0/54	14.8
Hisar	28	73.7	1/28	29.7	2/2	4.7	23/25	49.3	2.3	2.3	0/22	1.8	1/349	12.2
Jind	6	75.2	0/6	25.6	0/0	0.0	5/6	56.3	0.0	0.0	0/6	0.5	1/66	17.6
Bhiwani	7	68.7	0/7	33.3	0/0	0.0	7/7	54.6	0.0	0.0	0/9	1.5	0/91	10.6
Hisar	6	74.0	1/6	29.8	1/1	11.2	4/5	43.1	0/0	0.0	0/3	5.7	0/84	10.2
Fatehabad	4	74.4	0/4	26.8	1/1	15.5	2/2	29.5	1/2	16.1	0/1	0.0	0/38	12.1
Sirsa	5	77.6	0/5	31.8	0/0	0.0	5/5	57.2	0/0	0.0	0/3	0.2	0/70	10.8
Gorgaon	18	68.4	2/18	32.4	4/4	13.6	11/14	29.0	0/3	0.4	0/25	2.7	1/199	21.9
Faridabad	6	64.2	1/6	32.9	1/1	9.5	4/5	26.9	0/2	0.8	0/12	5.1	0/84	24.8
Gurgaon	6	72.6	1/6	32.6	1/1	11.3	3/5	27.7	0/1	0.3	0/6	2.1	1/56	26.0
Rewari	3	68.3	0/3	31.2	0/0	0.0	3/3	49.4	0/0	0.0	0/4	0.6	0/35	19.8
Mahendragarh	3	70.0	0/3	32.4	2/2	39.5	1/1	16.1	0/0	0.0	0/3	1.5	0/24	10.5
Total	90	71.2	5/90	29.2	16/20	10.1	60/69	38.6	2/9	1.3	0/89	2.3	7/1042	18.5

Annexure 2

1991 Assembly Election

Region/ District	Seats	Turn out (%)	Congress		BJP		Janta Dal		HVP		JNP (JP)		BSP		Other Parties		Independent	
			Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)	Won/ Con.	Vote (%)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
Ambala	19	70.9	11/19	29.6	1/19	14.2	0/3	1.3	2/14	11.1	3/19	21.4	1/14	8.5	0/17	2.6	1/216	11.3
Panchkula	1	65.7	1/1	32.3	0/1	24.5	0/0	0.0	0/1	26.7	0/1	5.8	0/1	5.3	0/0	0.0	0/16	5.4
Ambala	5	70.9	4/5	35.6	0/5	18.3	0/1	0.1	0/4	5.9	0/5	13.6	1/5	13.1	0/6	3.5	0/45	9.9
Yamuna-Nagar	5	71.5	2/5	21.8	0/5	14.5	0/1	2.4	2/4	14.0	0/5	20.9	0/4	15.1	0/7	1.0	1/48	10.3
Kurukshetra	3	71.7	1/3	24.5	1/3	15.5	0/0	0.0	0/1	6.9	1/3	27.1	0/3	3.7	0/4	8.7	0/33	13.6
Kaithal	5	71.2	3/5	35.0	0/5	6.2	0/1	2.3	0/4	11.4	2/5	30.1	0/1	1.0	0/0	0.0	0/74	14.0
Rohtak	25	64.2	13/25	34.5	0/24	6.9	1/8	5.8	1/16	8.5	8/25	27.5	0/2	0.5	0/24	0.8	2/321	15.5
Karnal	6	67.9	3/6	27.0	0/6	10.0	0/1	2.3	1/5	9.5	1/6	18.1	2/1	2.1	0/7	0.9	1/101	30.1
Panipat	3	68.6	1/3	36.3	0/3	9.8	1/2	16.9	0/1	0.3	1/3	22.6	0/0	0.0	0/1	0.1	0/39	14.0
Rohtak	5	63.0	4/5	46.6	0/4	7.1	0/0	0.0	0/4	12.7	1/5	28.5	0/0	0.0	0/3	1.5	0/76	3.6
Jhajjar	5	60.1	2/5	30.1	0/5	2.2	0/2	7.9	0/3	10.7	3/5	35.5	0/1	0.0	0/3	0.2	0/62	13.4
Sonapat	6	62.7	3/6	35.1	0/6	5.3	0/3	6.4	0/3	7.2	2/6	32.9	0/0	0.0	0/10	0.9	1/43	12.2
Hisar	28	67.3	13/28	34.0	0/28	5.1	2/8	5.2	8/19	16.6	4/27	22.7	0/8	0.9	0/22	2.1	1/658	13.4
Jind	6	70.6	4/6	36.1	0/6	4.1	0/3	6.7	0/3	8.4	2/6	28.6	0/0	0.0	0/6	0.6	0/144	15.5
Bhiwani	7	61.0	0/7	22.4	0/7	5.5	1/1	5.5	6/6	38.3	0/7	16.1	0/1	0.1	0/8	0.2	0/183	11.9
Hisar	6	67.7	3/6	40.6	0/6	3.2	1/4	11.6	1/3	12.9	0/5	17.9	0/1	0.3	0/3	0.1	1/153	13.4
Fatehabad	4	69.4	2/4	25.5	0/4	7.0	0/0	0.0	1/2	12.6	1/4	0/4	0/4	3.0	0/3	12.1	0/75	19.1
Sirsa	5	70.2	4/5	43.9	0/5	6.3	0/1	0.0	0/5	7.9	1/5	0/2	0/2	1.9	0/2	0.5	0/13	8.7
Gorgaon	18	61.8	14/18	36.5	1/18	14.2	0/6	5.1	1/12	13.0	1/17	14.9	0/2	0.4	0/31	1.4	1/217	14.5
Faridabad	6	61.2	5/6	39.4	0/6	16.2	0/2	5.5	1/4	13.8	0/6	13.6	0/2	1.0	0/8	0.2	0/75	10.3
Gurgaon	6	64.4	4/6	30.1	0/6	14.8	0/4	9.5	0/2	6.9	1/6	13.4	0/0	0.0	0/7	0.6	1/71	24.7
Rewari	3	59.18	3/3	49.6	6.7	6.7	0/0	0.0	0/3	16.5	0/2	15.9	0.0	0.0	0/7	3.8	0/31	7.5
Mahendragarh	3	60.1	2/3	29.8	15.6	15.6	0/0	0.0	0/3	20.1	0/3	20.2	0/0	0.0	0/9	4.3	0/40	10.0
Total	90	65.9	51/90	33.7	2/89	9.4	3/25	4.5	12/61	12.5	16/88	22.0	1/26	2.3	0/94	1.9	5/1412	13.7

Annexure 3

General Election to Haryana Vidhan Sabha, 1996, Region / District-wise Performance

Region/District (1)	Seats (2)	Turn-out (%) (3)	Congress		BJP		INC(T)		HVP		Samata		Other Parties		Independent	
			Won/Cont. (4)	Vote (%) (5)	Won/Cont. (6)	Vote (%) (7)	Won/Cont. (8)	Vote (%) (9)	Won/Cont. (10)	Vote (%) (11)	Won/Cont. (12)	Vote (%) (13)	Won/Cont. (14)	Vote (%) (15)	Won/Cont. (16)	Vote (%) (17)
Ambala	19	74.8	2/19	20.5	3/9	11.9	0/16	3.0	3/10	12.3	7/19	23.1	0/49	12.0	4/281	17.2
Panchkula	1	70.0	1/1	41.0	0/1	25.6	0/0	0.0	0/0	0.0	0/1	25.1	0/4	5.7	0/11	2.6
Ambala	5	73.1	0/5	21.3	1/3	15.7	0/5	2.0	½	9.6	1/5	15.4	0/15	14.2	2/66	21.8
Yamuna-Nagar	5	76.7	0/5	14.2	1/4	16.5	0/5	2.8	1/1	5.9	2/5	19.9	0/9	19.6	1/75	21.1
Kurukshetra	3	77.0	0/3	18.0	1/1	10.0	0/3	5.9	0/2	20.7	2/3	29.3	0/7	6.3	0/55	19.8
Kaithal	5	74.5	1/5	21.7	0/1	0.0	0/3	3.0	1/5	37.2	2/5	29.2	0/14	7.2	1/74	11.7
Rohtak	25	69.2	2/25	18.8	2/5	5.7	0/18	3.1	8/20	22.4	10/24	23.9	0/78	7.8	3/433	18.3
Karjal	6	72.1	1/6	21.9	2/2	10.8	0/6	5.7	0/4	11.5	2/6	23.0	0/22	11.9	1/222	15.2
Panipat	3	73.0	0/3	19.6	0/1	10.4	0/3	1.1	2/2	15.9	0/2	14.7	0/11	9.7	1/39	28.6
Rohtak	5	68.6	1/5	25.7	0/1	4.5	0/1	4.3	1/4	30.7	3/5	25.2	0/10	1.5	0/92	8.1
Jhajjar	5	65.9	0/5	19.2	0/0	0.0	0/3	1.2	2/5	31.5	3/5	26.6	0/18	9.0	0/78	12.5
Sonipat	6	67.0	0/6	9.4	0/1	2.2	0/5	1.9	3/5	25.5	2/6	27.3	0/17	6.0	1/112	27.7
Hisar	28	74.6	2/28	22.7	1/3	2.9	2/14	2.6	15/25	34.0	6/28	21.8	0/70	4.1	2/835	11.9
Jind	6	74.5	1/6	19.5	0/1	2.7	2/4	9.9	2/5	27.2	1/6	24.7	0/23	7.2	0/154	8.8
Bhiwani	7	68.9	0/7	20.6	0/0	0.0	0/3	1.6	7/7	53.4	0/7	11.3	0/20	3.7	0/197	9.4
Fatehabad	4	74.2	1/6	27.5	0/1	3.9	0/4	0.7	3/5	30.7	0/6	11.5	0/14	3.5	2/252	22.2
Sirsa	5	78.6	0/4	19.0	0/0	0.0	0/0	0.0	3/4	34.3	1/4	29.9	0/7	3.4	0/93	13.4
		79.6	0/5	26.0	1/1	7.7	0/3	0.4	0/4	21.6	4/5	36.5	0/6	2.6	0/139	5.2
Gorgaon	18	63.3	3/18	20.8	5/8	18.4	1/14	4.4	7/10	16.9	1/18	12.1	0/58	11.9	1/473	15.5
Faridabad	6	58.5	0/6	18.2	3/3	31.0	0/5	2.5	3/3	14.5	0/6	7.5	0/18	12.2	0/169	14.1
Gurgaon	6	65.8	1/6	20.8	1/2	11.2	1/6	10.8	2/4	17.9	1/6	19.8	0/18	10.5	0/166	9.0
Rewari	3	65.4	1/3	29.3	0/1	7.2	0/2	0.7	2/2	30.0	0/3	10.0	0/10	11.7	0/40	11.1
Mahendragarh	3	68.7	1/3	18.2	1/2	15.2	0/1	0.1	0/1	7.5	0/3	9.6	0/12	13.4	1/98	36.0
Total	90	70.5	9/90	20.8	11/25	8.9	3/62	3.2	33.65	22.7	24/89	20.6	0/225	8.3	10/2022	15.5

Annexure 4

General Election to Haryana Vidhan Sabha, 2000: Region/District-wise Performance

Region/District (1)	Seats (2)	Turn-out (%) (3)	Congress		BJP		INLD		HVP		RPI		BSP		Other Parties		Independent	
			Won/ Cont. (4)	Vote (%) (5)	Won/ Cont. (6)	Vote (%) (7)	Won/ Cont. (8)	Vote (%) (9)	Won/ Cont. (10)	Vote (%) (11)	Won/ Cont. (12)	Vote (%) (13)	Won/ Cont. (14)	Vote (%) (15)	Won/ Cont. (16)	Vote (%) (17)	Won/ Cont. (18)	Vote (%) (19)
Ambala	19	70.9	2/19	29.1	3/8	12.5	11/11	26.6	0/16	4.0	0/1	0.0	1/19	8.3	0/23	1.1	2/80	18.4
Panchkula	1	59.2	1/1	51.7	0/1	39.12	0/0	0.0	0/1	1.2	0/0	0.0	0/1	4.2	0/1	1.0	0/5	2.7
Ambala	5	70.3	0/5	33.9	½	11.8	3/3	32.6	0/3	0.3	0/1	0.0	0/5	5.5	0/5	0.5	1/18	15.4
Yamuna-Nagar	5	74.3	1/5	21.2	1/3	16.4	2/2	15.5	0/5	6.9	0/0	0.0	1/5	19.0	0/8	1.5	0/19	19.5
Kurukshetra	3	70.9	0/3	29.8	1/1	11.2	2/2	31.7	0/2	9.1	0/0	0.0	0/3	3.0	0/4	2.5	0/10	12.7
Kaithal	5	72.2	0/5	26.0	0/1	2.2	4/4	37.3	0/5	2.1	0/0	0.0	0/5	3.8	0/5	0.3	1/28	28.3
Rohtak	25	67.0	6/25	31.4	1/6	7.8	14/19	34.0	0/24	4.2	0/2	0.0	0/22	3.2	0/26	1.3	4/120	18.1
Karnal	6	67.6	0/6	23.6	0/1	5.6	4/5	40.7	0/6	2.9	0/0	0.0	0/6	2.9	0/7	2.0	2/27	22.3
Panipat	3	67.2	1/3	29.1	0/1	10.6	2/2	29.8	0/3	0.6	0/1	0.1	0/3	8.6	0/4	1.9	0/20	19.3
Rohtak	5	68.2	2/5	42.7	1/2	16.5	2/3	24.7	0/5	1.5	0/0	0.0	0/5	2.8	0/3	0.4	0/29	11.4
Jhajjar	5	64.9	2/5	41.8	0/1	2.8	2/4	35.6	0/5	7.8	0/1	0.1	0/3	0.5	0/4	0.4	1/18	11.0
Sonipat	6	67.0	1/6	24.7	0/1	5.7	4/5	35.2	0/5	7.0	0/0	0.0	0/5	2.9	0/8	1.2	1/26	23.3
Hisar	28	73.1	7/28	33.8	0/7	3.6	17/21	33.3	2/25	10.6	0/0	0.0	0/26	2.6	1/22	2.0	1/219	14.1
Jind	6	74.0	2/6	40.2	0/1	0.9	4/6	44.1	0/5	3.8	0/0	0.0	0/5	2.7	0/4	0.5	0/31	7.8
Bhiwani	7	70.6	1/7	24.0	0/2	3.6	3/5	24.0	2/7	30.7	0/0	0.0	0/7	2.9	1/8	4.8	0/70	10.0
Hisar	6	73.8	3/6	41.5	0/3	7.2	2/2	12.4	0/7	10.2	0/0	0.0	0/6	2.9	0/4	0.3	1/65	25.5
Fatehabad	4	72.6	0/4	28.1	0/0	0.0	4/4	49.4	0/3	0.8	0/0	0.0	0/4	2.9	0/2	3.6	0/24	15.2
Sirsa	5	74.9	1/5	34.5	0/1	5.4	4/4	44.4	0/3	0.9	0/0	0.0	0/4	1.5	0/4	1.0	0/29	12.3
Gurgaon	18	64.2	6/18	29.3	2/8	14.5	5/10	20.2	0/17	2.2	1/2	2.8	0/16	10.8	0/24	1.1	4/101	19.1
Faridabad	6	59.9	0/6	16.4	2/3	23.4	1/3	13.8	0/5	4.4	1/2	7.9	0/5	16.0	0/8	1.3	2/31	16.8
Gurgaon	6	66.6	2/6	34.8	0/2	9.9	3/4	25.3	0/6	1.3	0/0	0.0	0/6	12.1	0/6	0.6	1/31	16.0
Rewari	3	67.1	2/3	36.5	0/1	3.3	½	31.8	0/3	0.8	0/0	0.0	0/2	5.1	0/2	0.5	0/18	22.0
Mahendragarh	3	66.9	2/3	38.9	0/2	15.5	0/1	11.8	0/3	0.7	0/0	0.0	0/3	2.9	0/8	2.5	1/21	27.7
Total	90	69.0	21/90	31.2	6/29	8.9	47/61	29.2	2/82	5.7	1/5	0.6	1/83	5.7	1/95	1.6	11/520	17.1

Annexure 5

Chief Ministers of Haryana: 1967-2003

Name	Party	Tenure	Caste
Bhagwat Dayal Sharma	INC	1 Nov 1966-23 March 67	Brahmin
Rao Birendra Singh	VHP	24 March 1967-20 Nov 67	Ahir
Bansi Lal	INC	22 May 1968-30 Nov 75	Jat
Bararsi Das Gupta	INC	1 Dec 1975-30 April 77	Bania
Devi Lal	JP	21 June 1977-28 June 79	Jat
Bhajan Lal	JP	29 June 1979-05 July 85	Bishnoi
Bansi Lal	INC	5 July 1985-19 June 87	Jat
Devi Lal	Lok Dal	17 July 1987-2 Dec 89	Jat
Om Prakash Chautala	JD	2 Dec 1989-22 May 90	Jat
Banarsi Das Gupta	JD	22 May 1990-12 July 90	Bania
Om Prakash Chautala	JD	12 July 1990-17 July 90	Jat
Hukum Singh	JD	17 July 1990-21 Mar 91	Jat
Om Prakash Chautala	JD	22 March 1991-6 April 91	Jat

Bhajan Lal	INC	23 July 1991-9 May 96	Bishnoi
Bansi Lal	HVP	11 May 1996-23 July 99	Jat
Om Prakash Chautala	INLD	24 July 1999-6 March 05	Jat
Bhupinder Hooda	INC	March 2005 -	Jat

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