

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST GULF WAR PERIOD

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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled "International Security in the Post Gulf War Period" submitted by Swarabji, B. in partial fulfilment of nine credits out of the total requirements of twenty-four credits for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy (M.Phil)** of this University, is his original work and has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or any other Institute.

We recommend that this dissertation should be placed before the examiners for final evaluation.

(Prof. R.C. SHARMA)
Chairperson

(Prof. K.P. MISRA)
Supervisor

Dedicated to my
revered
parents

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PREFACE

In today's trouble torn world the maintenance of peace and security has become a global concern. Local or regional conflicts tend to assume global dimensions, thus posing a serious threat to international peace and security. The increasingly complex socio-economic and political problems of modern society have prompted nations to resort to the use of force.

After the Second World War, maintenance of world peace and security has been the main aim of nations. The United Nations has been created with the main objective of ensuring collective security through peaceful means. Unfortunately because of the Cold War and the ideological rivalry, nations have been trying to ensure their security through accumulation of arms and military alliances instead of pursuing these objectives. The recent Gulf crisis is a good example for this.

The aim of this study entitled "International Security in the Post Gulf War Period" was to analyse the Gulf crisis, and to show how the US led allied forces were able to unite the nations against the aggression. It also tried to judge its impact on the Middle East countries and international security. The question that emerged after the Crisis was that how far had the fabric of international security been strengthened and how far had the status of Iraq changed. Or had the United Nations become an organisation dominated by major powers, which could be so moulded as to facilitate the interest of the US and its

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allies thereby tightening their hold over the small nations.

The subject of this study was conceived in the aftermath of the Gulf war.

The Middle East is of great importance, because of its oil wealth and geostrategic location. The ramifications of the security aspect in this region are not only felt in the neighbouring areas but throughout the world. The international security in the post Gulf War period is to a large extent moulded through the developments in the Gulf war. Since less attention is given for connecting the Middle East security with the international security it is worthwhile to investigate the complex structure of international security in the post Gulf war period. However, the study takes into consideration the developments up to October 1991, i.e., till the Madrid Peace Conference. The analysis with regard to the emerging international security scenario, therefore, projects the pattern that developed till the end of October 1991. The later developments in the world were not taken into consideration. Hence the greatest limitation of this work is its time frame, August 1990 to October 1991.

In Chapter I an attempt has been made to give a background to the problem by analysing the scenario prior to the Gulf crisis.

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Chapter II gives a brief history of the two countries and examines the factors which led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Chapter III analyses the actual crisis and responses of the major powers, concerned parties and international organisations to the crisis.

Chapter IV examines the emerging security structure in the Middle East and international security system in the post Gulf war period. The analysis takes into consideration the Madrid Peace Conference and the world scenario up to October 1991. The later develops are beyond the purview of this work.

Chapter V is a brief analysis of the post Gulf war security and the conclusions of the study.

During the course of my research work I have received great encouragement and guidance from my superviosr, Professor K.P.Misra. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to him, who inspite of his busy schedule, rendered his valuable guidance and suggestions throughout the work. He always showed the utmost kindness and concern to me. I am extremely grateful to Dr.Regina Mulay Parakh for her guidance and comments and sugges-tions at every stage of this work. Without her sincere guidance this work could not have completed.

I am thankful to the University Grants Commission for granting me the Junior Research Fellowship to pursue my research.

(iv)

I have completed this study with the help of primary and secondary source materials available at various libraries in New Delhi. In this connection, special mention may be made to libraries of JNU, American Centre, IDSA, and Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. I am thankful to the Librarians and staff of all these libraries for all the assistance they had extended to me.

I was helped by several of my friends during the course of this work. My special thanks are due to Joseph, Jagat, Sanjay, Subrat, Srinivas and Sridhar for their invaluable help at various stages of this work.

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SWARABJI, B.

Chapter I

BACKGROUND

The Gulf crisis, the first major crisis in the post-Cold War era, opened a new chapter in the regional and international security order. The crisis started when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The response of the international community towards the crisis was unprecedented. It witnessed the joining together of the five permanent members of UN Security Council for the first time in forty-five years of its history. UN condemned the invasion and asked Iraq for an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. After the Iraqi refusal to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 - the UN deadline prescribed by the Security Council Resolution No.678 - the Multinational Forces led by USA started attacking Iraqi forces on 16 January 1991. After 43 days of fierce battle Iraq was driven back from Kuwait by Multinational Forces which declared ceasefire on 28 February 1991.

Definition

Before going into details it is necessary to make an attempt to define the term international security. Security means the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger.¹ Security can be identified in terms of "absence of threats and conflicts and accumulation of instruments of power to ensure it".²

1. Oxford Dictionary of English Language (2nd edn.)

2. M.Abdul Hafiz, "New Challenges to Security Studies", BIISS Journal (Dhaka), vol.11, no.4, 1990, p.421.

Thus, international security may be understood as a state where different nation states are being protected from and not exposed to danger. It is a state of 'threat free security environment' in which sovereignty and freedom of nations are not threatened and nation states are free from attack.

But international security is a term with wider connotations. It is an all encompassing concept which includes political, economic, social and environmental aspects. For instance McNamara observes,

Security means development. Security is not military hardware though it may involve it. Security is not military activity though it may encompass it. Security is development³ and without development there can be no security.

But security in international politics today is identified primarily with military security and a threat free environment. The Gulf crisis unequivocally proved that it is the military might alone that ensures security.

World Security Prior to Gulf Crisis

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait happened when the world was about to reap the dividends of the end of the Cold War era. The culmination of the Second World War saw the emergence of two monolithic blocs spearheaded by the United States and the Soviet Union each adhering to an ideology and a system which aimed at the annihilation of the other. This was accompanied

3. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York, 1968), p.149.

by the arms race and the Cold War dividing the whole of Europe and part of Asia into armed camps drawing industrial powers in the world on one side or the other. The process was further aggravated by the consolidation of real alliances - the NATO and the Warsaw Pact - under the leadership of USA and USSR respectively.

The new thinking in international relations generated by the active and firm decisions taken by Mikhail Gorbachev heralded an era of greater cooperation between the super powers in problems affecting international security. The Soviet Union could not be identified anymore with the global, adversarial power to the West.

The threat of military confrontation ceased to dominate the relations between USA and USSR. A variety of factors contributed to this. Mainly, they are, the collapse of communism, German Unification and the enthusiasm of super powers to give greater role to UN Security Council in solving conflicts which were threatening international security.

The nuclear revolution and the bipolar international system that emerged after World War II totally changed the international security. As multipolarism came to an end with the Second World War, the world was divided into two belligerent camps - East and West - each fighting for security. Each of them tried to woo the neutral Third World countries into their camps offering aid and protection. This gradually led into arms race and nuclear proliferation. As the two power blocs got

locked in a protracted Cold War and lived under the shadow of a nuclear confrontation, the bulk of the security debate was dominated by the central strategic balance of East-West conflicts. "The centrality of East-West frame and excessive emphasis on military had been the hall mark of all post war security thoughts."⁴

Nuclear weapons initiated a new approach to the use of agreements for ensuring security. The introduction of nuclear weapons the growth of the number of nuclear powers, the transition from confrontation of traditional type to mutual deterrence (the situation in which one nuclear power cannot attack another with nuclear weapons without putting its own survival at stake) - all these have turned agreements regulating military competition between the nuclear powers into an indispensable precondition for avoiding a nuclear catastrophe. The world was becoming increasingly vulnerable to settling disputes by military means. The contenders convinced that a global war could not be fought and won. "The cold war persisted for forty five years because of the victor's inability to agree upon a security structure for Europe. Political and military stalemate substituted for agreement."⁵

4. Hafiz, n.2, p.422.

5. Gregory Flynn and David J.Scheffer, "Limited Collective Security", Foreign Policy (London), no.80, Fall 1990, p.87.

The new thinking in international relations provided certain bold initiatives. Mainly, they were, the rejection of confrontation and affirmation of cooperation as the ground rule of international coexistence; the discarding of the strategic concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the kingpin of the dominant doctrine of deterrence between the two super powers, which was presumed to maintain peace through a balance of terror, and its substitution by the concept of mutually assured survival through phased disarmament, and the negotiated joint efforts by the US and USSR for solving regional conflicts.⁶

Among the positive achievements in disarmament area the INF Treaty of 1987 under which USA and USSR agreed to eliminate particular category of weapons - the ground based intermediate (500 to 5000 km) range missiles carrying nuclear war heads from Europe and Asia⁷ followed by the arms reduction treaty in Paris (1990) were significant breakthroughs.

Another factor which changed the international security order was the collapse of communism in East Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev sent a signal to the countries in East Europe that the Soviet Union would not interfere in their internal affairs. Gorbachev followed the principles of the freedom of "choice",

6. Rasheeduddin Khan, "New Thinking in International Affairs", World Focus (New Delhi), vol.11, no.4, p.8.

7. Jasjit Singh, "A 'Disarming' Europe: Implications for Third World", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.11, no.10, January 1991, p.1104.

non-interference, and non-use of force in other's internal affairs in East Europe. The Soviet Union stood aloof from developments like the mass exodus of East Germans to West Germany through Hungary in May 1989, and institution of the solidarity - PUWP coalition government in Poland in August 1989. This led to the crumbling of the 'Berlin Wall' and change of regimes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and German Democratic Republic peacefully and, in Romania, after considerable violence. The East European countries were no more satellites of USSR.

The Unification of Germany was another aspect which totally changed the security structure. The unforeseen and underestimated rapidity of German Unification process made the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) obsolete. Germany is the winner of the Cold War and USSR the loser.⁸ The WTO, set up in 1955 immediately after the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) joining the NATO, was the key political alliance which, together with the NATO, ensured security in Europe largely through the policy of deterrence. With the fundamental changes sweeping East Europe and the East-West relations having been improved considerably, NATO also came under pressure to change.

The effectiveness of the UN in resolving regional conflicts is directly related to the relationship between the major powers and their commitment to this international organization.

8. Flynn and Scheffer, n.5, p.92.

Disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union have been a dominant and troubling theme in the history of United Nations especially in the Security Council, the organ bearing the 'primary' responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it has often paralysed UN efforts to bring about peace.

Improved relations between the super powers helped UN sponsored negotiated settlements to settle conflicts such as Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Namibia, Western Sahara and Cyprus.

As the winds of change blew across the world, no area of international relations which pertains to defence spending - security, political or economic remained unaffected. The US decided to cut its defence budget and there were indications that USSR may also be doing the same. The overall NATO military expenditure for 1988 was three per cent lower than that for 1987. The Soviet Union was spending 19 per cent of its total budget on military expenditure. Currently USSR is spending approximately 100 million roubles on its military.⁹

Several hot wars ended - notably those between Iran and Iraq, and between South Africa and Cuban/Angolan forces in Namibia. Foreign troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and Vietnam. As a result of these developments, arms imports by these countries dropped considerably.

9. SIPRI Year Book, 1989, p.133.

The volume of arms exports by United States to the Third World countries decreased and although as many as 58 Third World countries were recipients of US major conventional arms between 1985 and 1989, a small group of countries dominated US exports to the Third World. In 1989 five countries - Brazil, South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand and Taiwan - accounted for over 70 per cent of US major conventional arms exports to the Third World.¹⁰

After a period of reduced exports French arms sales increased in 1989 by almost 25 per cent. This is still below the level of 1985 and 1986. But during 1989 the Afghan imports (by both the government and the Mujahideen) more than doubled.¹¹

Defence spending of NATO countries showed only a marginal growth of 1 per cent during 1989-90. Of the industrialised nations only Canada (1 per cent) and Denmark (3 per cent) increased their expenditure; all others either remained at around the previous year's level or recorded significant reductions, such as Turkey where defence spending dropped by over 10 per cent and United States (4.5 per cent) and Norway 4.5 per cent.¹²

10. Ibid., 1990, p.224.

11. Ibid., p.225.

12. "The Military Balance 1989-90", International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), Autumn 1989, p.54.

The Warsaw Pact countries announced cuts in defence spending. Bulgaria claimed that it cut the 1989 defence budget by 12 per cent, Czechoslovakia proposed 15 per cent reduction over 1989 and 1990, while the GDR proposed to cut defence expenditure by 10 per cent by the end of 1990. In Hungary there was a 17 per cent cut in defence spending in real terms, while Polish budget cut amounted to 4 per cent in real terms.¹³ Thus prior to the Gulf crisis the world witnessed a fall in defence spending and exports.

The speed of changes made it easy to realize that states could enjoy greater security by eschewing new weaponry or deployments which its adversary perceived as particularly threatening. Thus the Iraqi aggression on Kuwait took place when the competitive model of security was losing its relevance.

Security in the Persian Gulf

Middle East is an area of vital interest to the whole world and especially to the Western countries because of its rich oil reserves and geographical situation. As a land bridge connecting Europe, Africa, and Asia the Middle East influences all these three continents. Unfortunately Middle East became the most volatile spot in the Globe because of its incessant armed rivalries and increased super power interests.

13. Ibid., p.44.

The security equation in the Gulf is complex and involves global and regional balances, as well as questions of national defense and internal security. With the end of 1980s when the whole world was changing - changing for the better in the field of arms race and reduction of tension - Middle East was also experiencing a sense of relief from armed conflicts. However, the security arrangements in the Middle East continued to be complex. Unable to protect themselves from an external aggression, the Gulf countries opted for security arrangements with either or both of the super powers. "The majority of the Gulf countries lack the manpower and military resources needed to influence the overall regional military balance although their arms shopping lists are impressive."¹⁴ Both USA and USSR exploited the weakness of the Gulf security system for their achievements.

The Palestinian problem is the main issue which continues to threaten the Middle East Security for the last four decades. The conflict in its present form began in 1948 by the formation of Israel in a land which till then was inhabited by the Palestinian Arab people. Soon after the British announcement regarding termination of mandate over Palestine, the Jews proclaimed the formation of the state of Israel. The new state kept the territory which was recognised by the UN committee

14. B.K.Narayanan, "Gulf Security", in Surendra Bhutani, ed., Contemporary Gulf (New Delhi, 1980), p.6.

as Jewish area. Except Turkey most of the Arab countries hesitated to recognise Israel.¹⁵ As a result of this the Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1948. In the war Israel seized more territory than what had been earmarked for it under the UN partition plan. The West Bank came under Jordanian control and Gaza (where a provisional government of Palestine was established) under Egypt. From that time onwards the Palestinians were bereft of home land and were compelled to live as refugees.¹⁶

The situation got further aggravated after 1967 Arab-Israeli war that saw Israel capturing the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt and West Bank and Jerusalem from Jordan. Later in 1978, Israel returned Sinai to Egypt in accordance with the provisions of the Camp David accord, but kept its control over other occupied territories. The Camp David accord infuriated the Arabs and resulted in ousting of Egypt from Arab League and the transfer of Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis in 1979.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1964 with its headquarters in Jordan.¹⁷ After that, under the Chairmanship of Yasser Arafat, PLO became the sole spokesman

15. Sumit Chakravarty, "Feature of Palestine Depends on Arab Unity", World Focus (New Delhi), vol.9, no.9, September 1988, p.12.

16. Ibid., p.13.

17. K.K.Sud, "The Radicals: At a Dead End", World Focus, vol.6, no.10, p.20.

of the Palestinians. After clash between Jordanian army and PLO commandoes, Arafat with his commandoes settled in Lebanon. They conducted commando raids against Israel from Lebanon. And also it was involved in the ongoing Lebanese civil war. But when the Israelis found that Palestinians were creating trouble from Lebanon, they attacked Lebanon and forced the PLO commandoes to leave Lebanon. PLO thus settled in Tunis. "With the PLO divided and the oil weapons blunted the prospect of a peaceful political settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem has all but vanished."¹⁸

Thus by 1987 the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank revolted against the Israeli atrocities and it turned into a big uprising of Palestinians in their struggle for homeland. The Palestinian problem continued as an unsettled conflict affecting the entire Middle East security.

The Soviet invasion on Afghanistan, Iranian revolution and dethroning of Shah, and Iran's decision to leave CENTO at the end of 1979 had profound influence on the security system in Gulf. These developments shook the Gulf security at every level.¹⁹

18. M.S.Agwani, "A Region of Conflict", World Focus, vol.6, no.18, p.6.

19. Charles Mac Donald, "US Policy and Security", in Robert G. Darius and Others, eds., Gulf Security into the 1980s (California, 1984), p.98.

From the early 1950s to 1978, the Shah of Iran had been relentlessly engaged in a weapon building programme to ensure the security of Iran. Insecurity for Iran arose from the fear of Soviet Union as its 2,500 km northern border lies along that great land power.²⁰ Iraq severed the relationship with CENTO with the revolution in 1959. Since Iraq was lost as an alliance partner, the US was over-cautious to arm the Shah both to satisfy its own strategic needs of maintaining its hold and influence in the Gulf and supporting the Shah against any internal and external threat to his regime.²¹

The revolutionary regime in Iran installed immediately after the revolution in 1979, first of all, had removed Iran from the US sphere of influence particularly damaging the US position in the Gulf. Iran withdrew from CENTO and arms supply to Iran from USA reduced considerably. Not only did Iran slash the US arms deal but it also scrapped major UK arms deal as well. In 1979 itself Ayatollah Khomeini nationalised all the private banks in which US banks had considerable shares.

Soviets were concerned about the security of their southern periphery. In this regard, Iran had always been of major importance to the Soviet calculus not only because of its land

20. John Muttam, Arms and Insecurity in the Gulf (New Delhi, 1984), p.63.

21. Ibid., p.151.

border, but also Iran occupies the northern shore of the Gulf and partly controls the Gulf's outlet to the Indian Ocean.²² Soviet Union was worried about the spilling over of unrest in Iran to USSR since it was also having a large number of Muslim population. USSR also did not want a pro-Western government on its border.

Soviet Union found Iraq as a trusted ally in the Gulf to increase its influence and thereby to weaken the Iranian control. Iraq's relationship with the USSR, dating from 1958, reached its zenith with the conclusion of the Twenty Year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972. Between 1974 and 1978 Iraq received more than US \$3.6 billion worth of arms from the Soviet Union and more than 1,000 technicians from East European countries imparted training to the Iraqi armed forces.²³

The emergence of the Ayotollah Khomeini regime offered substantial opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence. Soviet Union was relieved because the pro-Western government was replaced through the revolution. But Iran became displeased with Soviet support for Iraq and Moscow's support of Iran's communist Tudeh Party which opposed Muslim fundamentalism of

22. Roger F.Pajak, "Soviet Designs and Dilemmas in the Gulf Region", in Richard H.Sindelar III and J.E.Peterson, eds., Cross Currents in the Gulf (New York, 1988), p.65.

23. Sreedhar, Gulf: Scramble for Security (New Delhi, 1982), p.81.

Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1983 Iran prohibited the Tudeh Party in response to Soviet support to Iraq. Iran seemed to adopt a principle of "negative equilibrium" in its relations with both super powers, whereby Teheran sought to prevent both the US and the USSR from acquiring influence in Iran.²⁴

Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian revolution which dethroned the Shah, USA announced the formation of Rapid Deployment Force on 5 December 1979. In 1980 Oman accorded the contingent rights to USA at Oman military facilities at Masira island, and more limited usage facilities at al-Sib Thamarit and Khasa airfields, the last in the Musandam peninsula.²⁵ Base facilities in Oman, Kenya and Somalia and Diego Garcia were strengthened and pumping of arms and ammunition, on a large scale unprecedented in US history was launched.²⁶

In November 1981 USA provided AWACS to Saudi Arabia purporting to prevent the encroachment of its air space. Despite looking to US assistance in the near term, Saudi Arabia adamantly refused to be linked to the United States in any defensive alliance and strongly opposed any US military presence or base rights in the Gulf. Kuwait also followed the same stand. Since

24. Ibid., p.66.

25. Herman Frederick Eilts, "Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Gulf States", in Darius and Others, eds., n.19, p.28.

26. Sreedhar, n.23, p.107.

neither Saudi Arabia nor Kuwait was prepared to allow the establishment of a long-sought forward command post for the US Central Command (CENTCOM). Such a tactical operational headquarters had to be put aboard a US naval vessel positioned in the Gulf of Oman. Most conservative Gulf states also remained apprehensive about the intentions of the Rapid Deployment Force in the region. The centrist Arabs preferred to remain pro-Western but at the same time to avoid any actions that would make them appear 'puppets' of the United States.²⁷ For instance, in 1985 negotiations took place between Oman and the United States over renewal of the five year access agreement to Omani military facilities. The negotiations were more difficult than many American officials had anticipated.²⁸

The outbreak of Iran-Iraq war in 1980 had a negative impact on Soviet position in Gulf. The USSR was linked to Iraq by the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and had been Iraq's main provider of arms since 1958. On the other hand the revolutionary regime in Iran had removed Iran from the US sphere of influence particularly damaging the US position in the Gulf. Iran's defeat could result in the replacement of Khomeini's regime by a more pro-Western government, whereas if the war went badly for Iraq, Baghdad could also turn more to the West for

27. Robert G. Darius, "The Multiple Dimensions of Gulf Politics and Security", in Darius and Others, eds., n.19, p.3.

28. Eilts, n.25, p.33.

assistance.²⁹ Despite the semblance of a pro-Iraqi tilt, Moscow remained officially neutral in the war.

One of the interesting features of the war had been the changes made by the two super powers in their respective alliances. After being Iraq's largest supplier in the 1970s, the USSR refused to supply arms to Iraq for 18 months after Iraq's invasion of Iran. The USSR and WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) countries supplied arms to Iran from Libya, North Korea, and Syria. After 1981, and especially after 1983, as Iran gained the upperhand, the USSR became Iraq's largest supplier of arms. In 1988 and 1989 as Iraq gained the military initiative the USSR and East European countries resumed supplies to Iran.³⁰

When the war started Iraq was firmly in the Soviet orbit, relying heavily on the USSR for its military equipment. But by 1984 these alliances shifted. Iraq and the USA renewed their diplomatic relations, and within three years Iraq had become America's third largest trading partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The American fleet in and around the Gulf gradually grew to such an extent that it was said to be the largest such assembly abroad since the Vietnam war. It

29. Pajak, n.22, p.65.

30. SIPRI Year Book, 1990, p.230.

included thirty ships and at least 30,000 men.³¹ But the Western world's early concern faded away once it became apparent that neither side would carry the day and thus there was no need to make hard political, military and strategic choices.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war compelled the Gulf countries to formulate an effective security structure. The Arab League, an intergovernmental association of sovereign Arab states for coordinating their policies and actions which formally came into existence on 22 March 1945, miserably failed to provide any genuine security system on account of inter-regional rivalries and inherent military weaknesses. The Gulf countries viz., Oman, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia jointly established Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 25 May 1981 with Riyadh as its headquarters. With Iran-Iraq war raging barely twenty minutes away from their borders, the need to find a credible and effective means to deal with the problems of security was, of course, among the most compelling reasons for establishing the GCC. The main strategic aim was to establish a framework within which to confront the inherent dangers of the Iran-Iraq war. The GCC countries, as a first step of the strategy, strongly favoured the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia by USA. The GCC countries established a Desert or

31. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of Modern Gulf States (London, 1989), p.157.

Peninsula Shield Force of 7,000 soldiers and an air defence with US operated AWACS planes based in Riyadh.³²

In 1981 Oman participated in RDF exercise Operation Bright Star II and in 1983 UAE and Bahrain also joined with USA for the RDF exercises.

Among the GCC countries Kuwait was the only country having diplomatic relations with USSR initially. Kuwait regularly urged GCC partners to recognise or to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviets as a counter to what is portrayed as an uncritically pro-Israeli USA.³³ The US attitude towards Kuwait was evident when the latter approached the former for the sale of stinger anti-aircraft missiles in the summer of 1984. Washington refused and proposed instead the sale of ground based air defense system. Whatever the reasons, the Soviet Union quickly agreed to considerable arms supplies and, for the first time, some Soviet military advisers arrived in Kuwait with the first part of the deliveries.³⁴ Kuwait has had a unique relationship with Moscow. Going beyond the exchange of ambassadors, the Soviet-Kuwaiti relationship has resulted in

32. A.K.Pasha, "The Kuwaiti Crisis: GCC Response", in A.H.H.Abidi and K.R.Singh, eds., The Gulf Crisis (New Delhi, 1991),p.115.

33. Elits, n.22, p.24.

34. Ursula Brown, "The GCC's Security Role", in B.R.Pridham, ed., The Arab Gulf and the Arab World (London, 1986), p.261.

Kuwait's purchase of Soviet arms, joint statements critical of the US on numerous policy issues and Kuwaiti endorsement of Soviet Middle East Peace proposals.³⁵

It was a fact that the Gulf states supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war by providing financial aid. But they were unwilling to be militarily involved. There was also fear in Kuwait regarding the Iraqi's dominance in the region; mainly because of the unresolved border disputes between Iraq and Kuwait and the Iraqi claim over Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah. In July 1981, for example, Iraq officially restated its request to lease Bubiyan island, an issue which had been dormant since 1977.³⁶

In 1987, when Iran started attacking the oil tankers in the Gulf, Kuwait requested the help of super powers. Both the super powers came to the help of Kuwait, especially America. America permitted the Kuwaiti tankers to fly the American flag and the US naval force escorted the flagged ships. This arrangement augmented the US naval presence in the Gulf. America took keen interest in this issue only for keeping the shipping lane open through the strait of Hormuz for the smooth flow of oil. In 1988 Western countries received about 30 per cent of the oil from the Gulf while Japan received 60 per cent and United States 5 per cent.³⁷

35. Pajak, n.22, p.75.

36. Zahlan, n.31, p.148.

37. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "After the Carter Doctrine: Geostrategic States and Turbulent Cross Currents in the Gulf", in Sindler III and Peterson, n.22, p.2.

Thus when the international pressure was mounting on the warring parties, both the countries agreed to the UN sponsored ceasefire on 20 August 1988. A war which lasted eight years could hardly fail to affect its surrounding region. Because of the war Palestinian issue got lesser importance in the agenda of Arab world. Egypt had been a major beneficiary of the war. Egypt was able to revive its credibility with the Arab world by helping Iraq in the war. Arab Cooperation Council was a product of their friendship in the Gulf war. Through the war Iraq was able to establish friendship with other Arab states. Thus by the close of 1980s an uneasy calm prevailed in the Persian Gulf and it was no longer a place of anxious attention. The oil crisis in all its successive manifestations disappeared.

But the Middle East remained a conflict-ridden region. There were conflicts between Israel and Arab countries in Lebanon, in Islamic countries between Turkey and Syria, Iraq and Syria and between Iraq and Iran. Conflicts also existed within countries in the region and between governments and stateless people - notably Kurds and Palestinians.³⁸ Other developments were PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security, and renunciation of terrorism. American boycott of PLO also ended.

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38. SIPRI Year Book, 1990, p.231.

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At the same time Iraq was heading for a debt trap. It owed \$50 billion to Western and Eastern bloc countries and around a further \$40 billion to its Arab neighbours.³⁹

But on the military front, with the formidable arsenal acquired during the war besides a recent stockpile of few other deadly weapons, Iraq emerged as the new military super power of the Arab world. Iraq was almost like a garrison state with one million battle-tested army, 700 combat aircrafts, 6,000 tanks, a vast array of chemical weapons and missiles capable of delivering warhead up to 200 km.⁴⁰

Conclusion

In the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War and super power rivalry, a sense of optimism prevailed everywhere as armed conflicts gave way to negotiated peaceful settlements. In the Middle East as well, even though the underlying conflicts continued to persist, armed rivalries ceased to dominate at least temporarily. The Iran-Iraq war left Iraq with a debt-ridden economy but with a super power status in the Middle East, militarily. It was in this background that Iraq attacked Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and annexed the latter as the former's 19th province.

39. Strategic Balance 1990, IISS (London), p.95.

40. Time (Chicago), 11 June 1990.

Chapter II

PRELUDE TO GULF CRISIS

Gulf crisis was the culmination of long-standing Iraqi claim over Kuwait and a number of other factors which developed during and after the eight year old Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). The other factors which need mention are the foreign debt of Iraq, which mounted during the war, the over production of oil by the OPEC members, especially Kuwait and UAE and the regional ambitions of Iraq in the Middle East. Before going into details of these aspects which led to the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, a brief historical description of the Iraqi claims to the Kuwait is essential.

Iraq

The history of modern Iraq as a politically and geographically defined and demarcated nation begins in 1920, when after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the three provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were merged into one political entity under the guidance of Britain, which had occupied the territory during the World War I. "The Allied Powers, in their meeting at San Remo (April 1920), assigned the mandate of Iraq to Britain."¹ Iraq was classified as a class 'A' mandate, or as a state which would be ready for independence and self-government after a brief period of rehabilitation and administrative training. In 1921 an Iraqi national government was established, and

1. A.H.H.Abidi, "Backgrounder", in A.H.H.Abidi and K.R.Singh, eds., Gulf Crisis (New Delhi, 1991), p.8.

Faisal Ibn Hussein of the British supported Hashemite family was accepted as King.² The British mandate came to an end in 1932, and Iraq became independent and eventually the British forces were withdrawn from the country in 1947.³

On 14 July 1958, two officers in the Iraqi army, Abdul Karim Kassem and Abdul Salam Arif overthrew the monarchy established by Britain.⁴ Kassem, head of the revolutionary force, formed a Cabinet and appointed himself Commander of the National Forces, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. "Iraq was declared a republic and Islam the state religion."⁵ But Kassem's regime was a short lived one. In February 1963 a dissident military faction overthrew Kassem. After five years, in July 1968, the new ruler was overthrown by several 'Ba'athists'⁶ led by four young army officers. General Ahman al-Bakr became the President and formed a government under Ba'athist control.

All governmental authority rested in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which consisted of a chairman, Bakr, and four senior officers - including the Army Chief of Staff. The number of members of RCC was enlarged to 14 in 1970 and 22 in


2. Collier's Encyclopaedia (New York, 1983), vol.13, p.241.

3. Ibid., p.247.

4. Ibid., p.242.

5. Ibid.

6. The Ba'ath (Arab Socialist Renaissance) Party was formed in 1947. Its slogans are popular sovereignty, scientific socialism and liberated nation.



1977. The President appoints the other members of RCC who are selected from the military and civilian leaders of the Ba'ath Party. General Bakr resigned in 1979 paving the way for Saddam Hussein to become the President of Iraq.

Iraq is bound on the North by Turkey, on the West by Syria and Jordan; on the South by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf; and on the East by Iran. It is now divided into 18 administrative provinces called governorates.

The 1977 census counted a population of 12,171,480. Of these about 16 per cent, or almost 2,000,000 were Kurds, about 375,000 were Iranians and about 250,000 were Turkomans.⁷

Kuwait

Kuwait became an independent nation on 19 June 1961, when Great Britain cancelled its protectorate over the Sheikdom. It is bordered on the North and West by Iraq, on the East by the Persian Gulf, and on the South by Saudi Arabia. From 1899 to 1961 Kuwait was autonomous in internal affairs and was under the rule of "an Emir chosen from among the Sabah family".⁸ The Sabah dynasty which controlled Kuwait from 1756 was founded by Sheikh Sabah bin Jabir. Britain came into contact with Kuwait in 1775 through East India Company. During the period between 1756-1871 Kuwait paid tribute to Sultan of Turkey but Kuwait

7. Collier's Encyclopaedia, n.2.

8. *Ibid.*, vol.14, p.206.

was not under Turkish control. In 1890s Turkey, Russia, Germany and Britain tried for the control of Kuwait.⁹ The ruler of Kuwait sought the protection of Britain in 1896 when Turkey tried to absorb Kuwait. As a result on 23 January 1899 Britain signed an agreement with Kuwait which bound the Sheikh

not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation, or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subject of any other Power... In return the British assured the Sheikh of their protection and good offices.¹⁰

The main factor which compelled Britain to sign the Treaty was the German attempt to extend the Berlin-Baghdad railway towards the Persian Gulf and direct access to the sea-routes to the East.¹¹ The project naturally conceived of Kuwait a railway terminus, considering the well known deficiencies of Basra. A treaty with the Al-Sabahs was then seen by Britain to serve the important function of frustrating the German bid to gain access to the Persian Gulf. Thus by the Treaty of 1899, Kuwait was placed under the protection of Britain.

The Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention on the Persian Gulf area (29 July 1913) provided for Turkey's recognition of the 1899 Anglo-Kuwait Agreement, a pledge by Turkey not to disturb

9. A.H.H.Abidi, "Origins and Dimensions of the Iraqi Claim Over Kuwait", India International Quarterly (New Delhi), Spring 1991, p.130.

10. Abidi, n.1, p.6.

11. Sukumar Muralidharan, "Arab Identity Versus Pax Anglo-Americana: Understanding the Vendetta Against Iraq", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), 30 March 1991, p.843.

the status-quo in Kuwait. Under the Agreement, "the islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, and Falaikah were included in Kuwaiti territory".¹² With the outbreak of World War I Britain established its protectorate over Kuwait¹³ and it continued till 1961 when Kuwait became free.

Iraqi Claim Over Kuwait

Iraq made its claim over Kuwait first in 1936-41.¹⁴ The justification was that Kuwait was a part of Iraq during Ottoman rule. The claim, next reiterated on the eve of Kuwait's independence in June 1961, not only scuttled the fate of the infant state but also, brought to the fore the question of Kuwait's political and legal status in international affairs.

The basic unannounced objective of Iraq in all these cases was to acquire more mileage in its outlet on the Gulf. As it is, Iraq has just 40 kilometres of shore line and most of it is blocked by the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan.

Landlocked on three sides, and with a narrow opening in the south through the Shatt al-Arab under the close surveillance of Iran, Iraq's motive in putting pressure on Kuwait was dictated by a pressing strategic and commercial imperative.¹⁵

12. Abidi, n.9, p.131.

13. Abidi, n.1, p.6.

14. Abidi, n.9, p.129.

15. Ibid.

Kuwait's northern border with Iraq (160 kms. long) was defined in a friendly Agreement on 19 April 1923. This was reinforced by the Iraq-Kuwait convention on boundaries drawn in 1932.¹⁶ The Iraq-Kuwait territorial dispute acquired a new character after Britain granted independence to Kuwait on 19 June 1961. The Anglo-Kuwait Agreement of 1899 was abrogated and a new Treaty was signed between Britain and Kuwait. It envisaged bilateral relations based on "a spirit of close friendship, consultation on matters of mutual concern and British assistance if desired by Kuwait".¹⁷

On 25 June 1961 - just six days after Kuwait gained independence - the Iraqi Prime Minister General Kassem announced the Iraqi sovereignty over Kuwait.¹⁸ The Iraqi claim was based on three contentions, viz., a similarity between archaeological ruins in Kuwait and Mesopotamia, Kuwait's position as a part of the vilayet of Basra during the Ottoman role, and Iraq's legitimacy as a successor state of Ottoman Empire. According to Professor A.H.H.Abidi all the three grounds are unreasonable. He proceeds:

mere similarity in archaeological ruins of an ancient past on different lands cannot be accepted as a valid ground for a territorial claim by any state in the modern state system. The claim over

16. Ibid., p.132.

17. Ibid., p.134.

18. Sreedhar, "Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.13, no.7, October 1990, p.723.

a certain territory by virtue of its having been a part of a given state in the past is not only dubious but also politically dangerous and historically irrational...¹⁹

There was also massive development of Iraqi forces on Iraq-Kuwait border. Kuwait refused the Iraqi claim and sought the help of Britain and Saudi Arabia. On the following day British troops joined with Saudi troops began landing in Kuwait. In UN Security Council the problem was discussed and United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Arab states sought the withdrawal of British forces and demanded an Arab solution to the problem. In accordance with the Security Council Resolution, the British military retreat began within three weeks of their induction. Immediately the British troops were replaced by Arab forces. By February 1963 the Arab troops were withdrawn from Kuwait.²⁰

On 4 October 1963, following a second coup the new Iraqi government announced its recognition of Kuwait's sovereign independence. Here it may be noted that once recognition is granted to a state, as per international law, withdrawal of it is very difficult.²¹ As Iran-Iraq relations grew tense in April 1969 and the threat of hostilities loomed large, Iraq requested Kuwait to allow the stationing of its troops in Kuwaiti territory in order to protect the port of Umm al Qasar.

19. Abidi, n.9, p.134.

20. Ibid., p.136.

21. J.G.Starke, An Introduction to International Law (London, 1977), p.152.

This shows the strategic necessity of Iraq for more access to the Gulf waters. This time under severe pressure Kuwait permitted the stationing of Iraqi troops on its soil. During 1970 and 1975 Iraq demanded the island of Warbah and Bubiyan from Kuwait. But Kuwait denied the request. It was the "Politico-strategic compulsion which forced Iraq to acquire more access to the Gulf waters".²²

The Iran-Iraq war created a new environment in the Persian Gulf region.

The war provided an opportunity when, forgetting their bilateral problems, Iraq and Kuwait, in the spirit of Arabism, reached an understanding on confronting and containing Iran. In the name of Arab nationalism and solidarity Kuwait offered substantial financial, political and logistic support to Iraq during its protracted war with Iran.²³

In order to confront Iranian military forward thrusts in 1984, Iraq redoubled its pressure for securing Kuwaiti island. "The Kuwaitis eventually relented and the two countries had agreed that three islands of Kuwait - Warbah, Bubiyan and Falaikah - would be put under Iraqi control for security reasons." In a sense, this was the first de facto step towards Iraq's complete control over Kuwait. During the visit of the Iraqi minister of the Interior, Samir Abdur Razzaq, to Kuwait in August 1988 Iraq

22. Abul Kalam Azad, "The Gulf Crisis", BISS Journal (Dhaka), vol.2, no.4, 1990, p.448.

23. Abidi, n.9, p.140.

demanded the transfer of Bubiyan. Again in February 1989 during the visit of the Kuwaiti crown Prince Sheikh Saad Abdullah al Salem al Sabah, Iraq took stern stand on the demand of Kuwaiti islands and after that the Iraqi attitude towards Kuwait became more belligerent. By this time it was very clear that "no border talks or agreement could satisfy Iraq unless it gets physical control over the Bubiyan island that presents her greater war-front to the Gulf".²⁴

In mid July 1990 Iraq charged Kuwait along with UAE with 'direct aggression' against Iraq. Complaints included encroachments on Iraqi territory, oil theft, and excessive oil production thereby sabotaging the Iraqi economy. All these ended up in the 2 August 1990 aggression and subsequent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq.

Foreign Debt of Iraq

Foreign debt was another factor which compelled Iraq to attack Kuwait. The eight year long war with Iran totally shattered the Iraqi economy and the foreign debt mounted to \$80 billion by the end of 1989.²⁵ Iraq started the war as one of the richest nations in the Third World. In 1980 "official estimates showed that Iraq had foreign reserve of \$20 billion".²⁶

24. Azad, n.22, p.449.

25. P.R.Kumaraswamy, "The US Response to the Gulf Crisis", Strategic Analysis, vol.13, no.7, October 1990, p.763.

26. SIPRI Year Book, 1989, p.166.

The arms race generated by the war and Iraq's effort to stockpile and develop weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles were expensive, particularly because Iraq tried to achieve higher levels of independence in production. The 1990 Iraqi Budget was characterised by its open austerity measures like import substitutions and an order to all government departments to cut their number of staff by 50 per cent. In 1988 alone, Iraqi gross domestic product fell by some 10 per cent.²⁷ But on the other-side Kuwaiti budget showed a surplus of \$425 million.²⁸

Iraq had financed much of the war with loans from Europe and the Gulf states. About half of the foreign debt was owed to the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and Iraq expected it to be forgiven, but between \$30 billion and \$35 million in short-term loans was due to Europe, Japan and the United States, which had to be repayed in hard currency.²⁹ Iraq thought that it could break out of the debt cycle through increased oil revenues - based on predictions of rising of oil prices. "When oil prices dropped from \$20 to \$14 a barrel between January and June 1990, Iraq faced cash flow problems."³⁰ In the absence of new sources of credit from Europe, Iraq had to turn to the

27. Peter D.Carlin, "Iraq's New War", Petroleum Economist (London), vol.57, no.9, September 1990, p.5.

28. Ibid.

29. Phebe Marr, "Iraq in the 1990s: Oil-Revenues, Debt Management Spending Priorities", Middle East Executive Reports, June 1990, p.13.

30. Phebe Marr, "Iraq's Uncertain Future", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.90, no.552, January 1991, p.2.

neighbouring Gulf states, who were unwilling to help Iraq.

Saddam Hussein pressured the Gulf states to forgive their loans to Iraq, claiming that the Iran-Iraq war had not been Iraq's private business, but a defence of the eastern flank of the Arab world against fundamentalist Iran.³¹

In the summit meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council in Amman in February 1990, celebrating the Organization's first anniversary, Saddam Hussein asked King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to inform the Gulf states that Iraq was not only adamant about complete moratorium on its wartime loans, but urgently needed an immediate infusion of additional funds estimated \$30 billion. "Let the Gulf regimes know", he added, "that if they do not give this money to me I would know how to get it".³² From this it was clear that Saddam was ready to use force against the Gulf states. Instead of reordering his priorities and scaling down his ambitious military programmes, like development of Super Gun, clandestine nuclear programme etc., Saddam blamed Kuwait and UAE for lower oil prices. When Kuwait temporized on paying the sizable sums Iraq was asking in connection with other claims and when Kuwait refused to cancel Iraq's wartime debts, Iraq marched its troops to the border and finally turned on Kuwait's rulers.

31. Efraim Karsh and Innari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait", Survival (London), vol.33, no.1, January/February 1991, p.19.

32. Ibid., p.21.

Regional Ambitions of Saddam Hussein

Regional ambitions of Saddam Hussein also played a major part in annexing Kuwait. The Iran-Iraq war left Iraq the only serious military power in the Gulf. At the end of the war, Iraq had more than one million men under arms, including the crack Republican Guard, which had grown from 3 to 25 brigades between 1986 and 1988. In equipment, Iraq possessed more than 5,500 tanks, more than 7,000 armoured personnel carriers and more than 3,500 artillery pieces. It had an airforce of more than 500 planes.³³ This overwhelming military preponderance gave Iraq an unprecedented capacity to challenge and intimidate its neighbours. One of the best examples which showed the dominance of Iraq in the region was the Pact signed between Saudi Arabia and Iraq in March 1989 during the visit by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to Baghdad.³⁴ This was a Non-Aggression Pact in which both the countries agreed not to attack each other's territory. Surely it was the outcome of the Saudi fear of Iraqi attack.

There were certain long term objectives behind the Iraqi ambitions. Saddam Hussein envisioned "the unification of Arab states into an integral Arab nation, the original goal of the Ba'ath Party".³⁵ Realising the difficulties in achieving

33. Marr, n.30, p.1.

34. The Military Balance 1989-90, IISS (London), Autumn 1989, p.94.

35. Marr, n.30, p.4.

his objective Saddam Hussein envisioned a new Arab consensus around goals and policies, with Iraq as model.

The decision of Gorbachev to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan and East Europe, the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe, growing stagnation of Soviet economy, the problems related to change over to market economy, unemployment, bureaucratisation and the demand for more openness weakened the Soviet power. The decline of Soviet power and the changing international balance left only one super power i.e., USA. Saddam Hussein forecast the dominance of USA along with israel in the entire Middle East. Saddam saw this situation both as a challenge to the Arab world and as an opportunity for leadership. By championing popular causes and developing a mass power base, he saw himself emerging as the leader of a new constellation of forces that might stand up to the United States. And also "it remains true that a number of important Arab states, including Egypt, were compelled to acknowledge that Iraq was defending their interests".³⁶

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a quasi military alliance, formed in 1981 by Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states was regarded as a challenge to Iraqi domination. But during the Iran-Iraq war GCC continued as "a de facto ally to Iraq" by providing financial aid for the military machinery of

36. "The Middle East", Strategic Survey 1989-90, IISS (London), Spring 1989, p.179.

Iraq³⁷ because of the fear of Iranian fundamentalism, i.e., the Iranian call to overthrow pro-Western proteges in the Gulf. The Iraqi efforts to join the GCC were thwarted by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on one pretext or the other. As an effort to consolidate its position Iraq formed the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) in February 1989, by Egypt, Jordan, and North Yemen as its other members. "The ACC has far greater human resources than the GCC, but it lacks the latter's political homogeneity (and geographical contiguity)."³⁸

By doing all these Saddam Hussein was aiming to make Iraq a regional big power, the dominant nation of the Middle East. His conquest of Kuwait could greatly further this ambition not only by demonstrating Iraq's military prowess to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates. He could then by threat alone effectively control these countries and their oil.³⁹ The result would have been Iraq gaining tremendous leverage over the world economy, and be in a position to demand changes in the political order at least in the Middle East.

The end of Iran-Iraq war with the victory of Iraq altered the military balance of Iraq with Israel. The reports of Iraq's military programme and clandestine nuclear weapon development

37. Shahram Chubin, "Post War Gulf Security", Survival, vol.33, no.2, March/April 1991, p.142.

38. "The Middle East", n.36, p.181.

39. Jack Stauder, "Oil Internationalism", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol.41, no.20, November 1990, p.27.

programme invited strong protest from Israel and the West. At the same time "with vivid memories of Israel's destruction of Iraq's nuclear installation in 1981, Saddam became obsessed by fear of an Israeli attack".⁴⁰ The fear was evident in his speech to military on 2 April 1991, in which Saddam Hussein threatened to burn half of Israel using chemical weapons if Israel attacked Iraq. For controlling an Israeli onslaught it was imperative for Saddam Hussein to control the Middle East. Iraq was also suspicious about the West. The Iran-Contra revelations, in which US has made secret shipment of arms to Iran in 1986, made the suspicion more substantial. After the Iran-Iraq war there appeared many reports in the Western media, particularly in USA about the human rights violations in Iraq, especially the use of chemical weapons and the plights of the Kurds. For instance, on 15 February 1990, the Voice of America broadcasted a violent anti-Saddam Editorial. Another was the state Department's release, on 21 February 1990, of its annual report on human rights including 12 pages criticizing Iraq for its treatment of Kurds, torture and other abuses.⁴¹ Iraq considered these as an attempt to defame Iraq in world arena and considered as an intervention of internal affairs of Iraq. Iraq accused it as a wider conspiracy of the West to destroy Iraqi superiority in the Gulf. In a memorandum to Arab League, on 16 July 1990,

40. Marr, n.30, p.4.

41. John K.Cooley, "Pre-War Gulf Diplomacy", Survival, vol.33, March/April 1991, p.126.

Tariq Aziz, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Iraq, accused "Kuwait and UAE of being a part of Zionist plot aided by imperialists against the Arab nation, with mention that Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad as an American agent".⁴²

Over Production of Oil by the OPEC Members

Although debt accumulated during its war with Iran had done much to devastate the Iraqi Economy, the slackness of world oil prices - in no small part due to the perpetual problem of OPEC over production - contributed to the persistence of Iraq's economic problems. One of the first real indications that Iraq was approaching the breaking point of frustration over the production discipline issue was in the new diplomatic tone emanating from Baghdad in foreign minister Tariq Aziz's 3 May 1990 statement (without naming names) put the long term over producers - Kuwait and UAE - on formal notice. As he related "This is a very serious issue, ...we warn them against continuing with this irresponsible game".⁴³

It was a fact that all the members of the OPEC except two (Qatar and Indonesia) were exceeding their production quotas during the January-June 1990 period. Even Iraq was exceeding

42. Ibid., p.127.

43. Carlin, n.27, p.6.

its quota by 113,000 barrels daily as against its allotted quota of 2.98 million barrels per day during January-June 1990. During the same period, Kuwait and UAE were overproducing by 300,000 and 214,000 barrels per day respectively.⁴⁴ The only fact in the Iraqi allegation was that Kuwait and UAE exceeded their quotas much more as compared to other OPEC members.

The 2 May 1990 meeting of the eight member Ministerial Monitoring Committee of the OPEC resulted in a seemingly firm commitment to trim 1.44 million barrels per day from the April production level of 23.5 million barrel per day.⁴⁵ But Kuwaiti and UAE over production persisted.

Speaking on the anniversary of the 1958 and 1968 Revolutions on 17 July 1990, President Saddam Hussein for the first time talked of the conspiracy between US and unnamed Gulf oil producers to drive down the oil prices for political purposes. He warned that Iraq would take appropriate action to remedy the situation. Saddam Hussein's speech was followed by a formal letter on 18 July 1990 by foreign minister Tariq Aziz to the Arab League.⁴⁶ The letter accused Kuwait and UAE for direct aggression against Iraq and the Arab nation and also it accused Kuwait particularly for erecting oil installations on the Southern part of Iraqi Rumaila oilfield and produced oil from it

44. Sreedhar, n.18.

45. Ibid., p.718.

46. Ibid.

to the tune of \$2.4 billion.⁴⁷ Iraq also "asserted its sovereignty over oil in the Rumaila oil field which extended 3.2 kilometres into Kuwait".⁴⁸

Kuwait denied the Iraqi charges and sent delegations to GCC and other Arab countries to explain its position. It also sent letters to Arab League Secretary General and UN Secretary General drawing the attention to the unmistakable threatening of Tariq Aziz's letter against Kuwait.

On 23 July 1990, reports also started appearing, quoting US satellite intelligence, that Iraq had moved about 30,000 troops to Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. There were reports of joint military exercise in Gulf by UAE and US, but UAE denied it. In an effort to reduce tension the President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, visited Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia on 24 July 1990 and arranged a meeting between Iraq and Kuwait for direct talks on 28-29 July at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. Conspicuously, on 27 July 1990, when the OPEC Ministerial meeting had taken place in Geneva in an atmosphere of utmost tension as Saddam assembled troops on Kuwaiti border, decade long problems were sorted out within minutes. The meeting among other things agreed to fix the minimum price for OPEC crude oil of \$21 per barrel after making necessary cuts in production. UAE and

47. Karsh and Rautsi, n.31, p.24.

48. Abidi, n.1, p.15.

Kuwait agreed to cut down the production as per the OPEC guidelines. By forcing Kuwait and UAE to backdown at the Geneva OPEC meeting Saddam Hussein had emerged as the acknowledged strongman of OPEC.

The Geneva meeting was victory for Iraq. From this victory they moved to the conference table to talk to Kuwait in Jeddah on 31 July 1990. The Iraqi demands to Kuwait in the Summit were: ceding the southern part of Rumaila oilfield, payment of \$2.4 billion as compensation for oil extracted from the Rumaila oilfield, and writing off of debt and additional financial compensation to Iraq for oil market losses.⁴⁹ But Kuwait linked the Iraqi demands with a favourable border Treaty. The summit failed to produce any result.

Conclusion

The Iraqi attitude was mainly conditioned by its national interests. Iraq, a country mainly dependent on its oil exports was severely handicapped in its efforts to expand the international trades, because of its geopolitical location. It was essential for Iraq to expand its navigational facilities in the Gulf, for which the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah were to be obstructions. Iraq feared that the Gulf countries were increasingly being influenced by Western countries. Iraq decided to take charge of the balance of powers in the region, since it was already tilted in her favour. After the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq armed to the teeth wanted to assert its superiority over the

49. Sreedhar, n.18, p.722.

entire Middle East. On the economic side Iraq wanted to reconstruct its war ravaged economy, for this it desperately needed economic assistance from other countries. Once he realised that the Gulf states were unwilling to help Iraq in its developmental efforts, Saddam Hussein decided to use force. On 2 August 1990 with his one million-strong, battle trained army he attacked and annexed Kuwait. Thus considering the politico-strategic and economic compulsions what Saddam has done through the annexation of Kuwait was availing an opportunity most expeditiously to achieve his aim at the cost of a weaker neighbour.

Chapter III

THE GULF CRISIS

The Gulf crisis can be seen in the background of the successful working of the UNO in solving the international conflicts and the increasing manipulations of United States in forging a unipolar world. The US had already neutralised USSR, its main opponent. But for establishing itself as the axis of power it became necessary to silence the emerging regional powers like Iraq who could go against US dictates. In order to understand this better, Gulf crisis should be seen in the background of the responses it got from various countries and international organizations.

Part I: The Gulf War

As we have seen in the previous chapter, after the failure of all the negotiations and the 31 July 1990 Jeddah meeting between Iraq and Kuwait, the Iraqi forces supported by tank and airforce invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. "The ruler and most members of the royal family fled from the country leaving the government in a state of limbo."¹ The Kuwaiti forces offered little resistance to the invading army. Within hours the Iraqi troops captured most of the vital installations in Kuwait, including airport, communication centres etc., and announced that the Kuwaiti Government was overthrown by revolution and Iraqi troops are there to help the new rulers.

1. A.H.H.Abidi, "Arab Islamic Responses to the Gulf Crisis", in A.H.H.Abidi and K.R.Singh, eds., The Gulf Crisis (New Delhi, 1991), p.76.

The same day itself there was world wide condemnation of Iraqi attack on Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through resolution 660 on 2 August 1990, acting under articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter, condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.²

In response to the Gulf crisis, the US President George Bush ordered the freezing of Iraqi and (protectively) Kuwaiti assets.³ Iraqi assets in Japan, Germany, Britain and France were also frozened. USSR stopped arms deliveries to Iraq. In a joint statement on 3 August 1990 USA and USSR condemned the Iraqi invasion. This was followed by the announcement of US naval forces to the Gulf and the US troops to Saudi Arabia. US troops began landing at Daharan in Saudi Arabia on 8 August 1990. US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney signed

a secret agreement with Prince Sultan, the Saudi Arabian Defense Minister. American troops would have Saudi aid and logistical support inside the Kingdom, but would be subject to Saudi⁴ veto on offensive actions beyond Saudi territory.

In the following months the number of US troops deployed in Saudi Arabia amounted to 300,000 or so, the biggest US troop

2. UN Resolution 660 (see appendix).

3. John K.Cooley, "Pre-War Gulf Diplomacy", Survival (London), vol.33, no.2, March/April 1991, p.129.

4. Ibid., p.130.

deployment since Vietnam.⁵ President Bush while justifying the sending of troops stated the US policy to the crisis was guided by four principles:

The demand for withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; the US commitment to peace and stability in the Persian Gulf;⁶ and the protection of American lives in the region.

Meanwhile Iraq had described the UNSC resolutions as iniquitous and unjust.⁷ As a further step acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the UNSC passed the resolution 661 (on 6 August 1990) imposing trade embargo on Iraq and called upon the member states to cooperate with the committee of the Security Council to fulfil the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the resolution.⁸ USA and other Western countries quickly responded to the UNSC call and vowed to implement the resolutions in letter and spirit. Immediately a Multinational Force (MNF) was created under the leadership of USA, consisting mainly of Western countries. In the following months the strength of MNF was increased to 28 as many other countries joined in (see Table).

5. Financial Express (New Delhi), 4 November 1990.

6. US Information Service (New Delhi), Backgrounder, 9 August 1990.

7. K.P.Saksena and C.R.S.Murthy, "The United Nations and the Gulf Crisis", in Abidi and Singh, eds., n.1, p.25.

8. UNSC Resolution 661 (see appendix).

Table

GULF ALLIES AND THE FORCES DEPLOYED

Allies	Forces Deployed
Afghanistan	300 ground troops
Argentina	One frigate and one corvette
Australia	One guided missile destroyer, one frigate and a support ship.
Bangladesh	2000 ground troops
Belgium	Two mine hunters and a support ship.
Britain	43000 troops - army, navy and airforce.
Canada	3 ships, 24 fighter jets.
Czechoslovakia	200 anti-chemical warfare specialists.
Denmark	One corvette
Egypt	40000 ground troops
France	16000 troops, air force and navy.
Germany	Five mine sweepers, eighteen Alpha jet fighters and 240 soldiers.
Greece	One frigate
Gulf countries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, UAE)	10000 troops; ships and planes
Hungary	Medical personnel
Italy	Ships and planes
Kuwait	7000 troops; planes
Morocco	1300 ground troops
Netherlands	Two frigates and supplyship
Newzealand	Planes

Allies	Forces Deployed
Niger	500 ground troops
Norway	One coast guard ship
Pakistan	11000 ground troops
Philippines	Medical personnel
Poland	Two rescue ships
Romania	Medical team and anti-chemical warfare specialists.
Saudi Arabia	118,000 troops; planes
Spain	One frigate and two corvette
Senegal	500 ground troops
Sierra Leone	30 Medical personnel
Singapore	Medical team
South Korea	Planes
Sweden	Field hospital and medical personnel.
Syria	15000 ground troops
United States	More than 540,000 troops; army, marines and air force.

Source: New York Times, 24 March 1991, p.14.

But Iraq was not ready to yield to the mounting pressure to withdraw from Kuwait. It declared that Kuwait had merged with Iraq and the merger as eternal. Thus Iraq annexed Kuwait formally on 8 August 1990. To counter the Iraqi strategy UNSC promptly passed Resolution 662 declaring the annexation of Kuwait as null and void.

Thus when the pressure was mounting on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco and Syria also sent troops to Saudi Arabia. With a view to check the increasing support to US forces from the Arab countries, on 12 August 1991 Iraq linked the withdrawal of Kuwait with the Israeli withdrawals from West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and Syria from Lebanon. This was a tactical move by Saddam Hussein to become the champion of Arab cause and to isolate the America-led forces from the Arab world. Regarding the Iraqi linkages of the withdrawal from Kuwait and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories Professor M.S.Agwani writes:

...his attempt to link the Gulf crisis with Palestine question was at best an after thought and worst a self serving ploy. In all probability, the popular Arab response, including that of the PLO, was an expression of intense Arab resentment against the whole range of American attitudes and policies towards the Arabs rather than an endorsement of Saddam's actions.

9. M.S.Agwani, "The Aftermath", World Focus (New Delhi), vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.3.

When confronted with intense pressure one of the first steps taken by Iraq was to conclude a hasty peace with Iran in the hope of building up an alliance. As an attempt to muster support to Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, the former agreed to divide the controversial Shat-al-Arab Waterway with Iran. On 14 August 1990 Saddam Hussein offered to conclude full peace with Iran returning territory and exchange of prisoners of war. The 9 September Tehran meeting between Iraqi-Iranian foreign ministers decided to re-establish diplomatic ties.¹⁰ By 14 September 1990 Iraqi troops started withdrawing from Iran and the first group of Iranian prisoners returned home.¹¹ By making peace with Iran, Saddam Hussein made another strategic achievement. "This protected his eastern flank and freed over half a million Iraqi troops for the awaited struggle in Kuwait".¹²

The events in Gulf got further aggravated when Iraq declared that it was going to keep Western nationals in strategic installations to prevent a possible US led attack. This prompted the UN Security Council to pass the Resolution 664 demanding the release of all foreign nationals unharmed. For the first time since the crisis began President Bush referred to the detained foreigners as 'hostages'. But by the beginning of the month of September 1990 Iraq began allowing selected people to leave the country.

10. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 19 September 1990.

11. Times of India (New Delhi), 15 September 1990.

12. Cooley, n.3, p.132.

Kuwait was declared as the nineteenth province of Iraq on 28 August 1990 and declared all the diplomatic missions in Kuwait lost their diplomatic status and asked the countries to close down their Missions. The Western countries rejected the Iraqi declaration and as a result on 14 September 1990 Iraqi troops raided embassies of France, Canada, and Belgium in Kuwaiti city. Iraqi soldiers forcefully entered the residence of French ambassador to Kuwait and the French President, Mitterand characterised the Iraqi action as 'aggression'.¹³

The upshot of the episode was that France which till then had not committed ground force to the Gulf decided to do so... He (Mitterand) said that if such an aggression was allowed to remain unchecked anarchy would prevail.¹⁴

This incident again forced UNSC to pass the Resolution 667 on 16 September 1990 condemning Iraq's violation of diplomatic premises in Kuwait.

The UNSC passed the crucial Resolution 678 on 30 November 1990 authorising the member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.¹⁵ The Resolution set the date for complete Iraqi withdrawal on 15 January 1991. Meeting hours

13. B.K.Shrivastava, "The Great Powers and the Gulf Crisis: The Course of an Uneasy Alliance", in Abidi and Singh, eds., n.1, p.57.

14. Ibid.

15. UNSC Resolution 678 (appendix).

after the Security Council voted the Resolution - with China abstaining the Yemen as well as Cuba opposing - the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council and Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party Regional Command, with President Saddam Hussein in the chair condemned the UN Resolution as "illegal and invalid" and said it was adopted under US pressure. The Council and Command protested that USA was violating all norms of international law and was trying to become a world policeman. Commenting on the Resolution, the US President George Bush said that the "UNSC vote underscore the unity and determination of international community to end Iraq's illegal occupation of Kuwait".¹⁶ The Resolution represents a "very strong and very powerful message that will go all around the world loud and clear. The message is that President Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait".¹⁷

On 7 December 1990 Iraq decided to free all the hostages. At the same time it rejected the invitation of President Bush to Tariq Aziz, the then foreign minister to visit Washington for discussion and the visit of US Foreign Secretary James Baker to Baghdad for discussions. Again on 3 January 1990 President Bush proposed a meeting between James Baker and Tariq Aziz in Switzerland during the period 7-9 January 1991. Iraq agreed for a final meeting with America on 9 January to avoid a war in the Gulf.¹⁸ This was a final hope for a negotiated settlement.

16. USIS, Press Release, 30 November 1990.

17. Ibid.

18. Times (London), 5 January 1991.

George Bush described it as the final chance to resolve conflict without war. But the Geneva talks on 9 January failed miserably. Immediately the United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez De Cuellar announced his plan to travel to Baghdad for talks with Saddam Hussein.

In the meantime on 12 January the Congress of United States passed a resolution authorising President Bush to use armed forces to achieve the implementation of Security Council resolutions. On the same day itself De Cuellar arrived in Baghdad for talks while the last of the US diplomats in Iraq left the country.

The meeting of De Cuellar with Saddam Hussein on 13 January did not yield any breakthrough. On his return to New York Perez De Cuellar asserted,

as far as I am concerned I have done what I have to do. I don't know whether others will do something, but it appears to me that it is perhaps a little¹⁹ late for embarking on any other (peace) efforts.

On the eve of UN deadline, Perez De Cuellar urged Iraq to commence without delay the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The last minute effort by the UN Secretary General assured Iraq that an international conference would be convened under the United Nations' auspices to resolve the Palestinian issue. The German Bundestag and British House of Commons adopted

19. Times, 14 January 1991.

resolutions to use force against Iraq on 15 January 1991. Thus it was almost clear that a war was imminent with the end of UN deadline i.e., 15 January 1991.

Thus with the end of UN deadline the Multinational Forces (MNF) of 28 nations led by USA started attacking Iraqi forces on 16 January 1991. "This military action followed months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations and many other countries."²⁰ Iraq's adamant rejection of the dozen UNSC Resolutions passed since 2 August 1990, demanding Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, backed up thereafter by a series of other measures including the trade embargo had inevitably led to that situation.

Perhaps it was the very delay of over five months in taking a clearcut stand and laying down the deadline for the withdrawal which had led to, Iraq's misreading of the mood of the international community encouraging it in the belief that there was no real need to fear it.²¹

After 42 days of fierce battle, Iraq was driven back from Kuwait by the multinational forces which declared ceasefire on 28 February 1991.

On 17 January 1991 at 2.30 a.m. (Iraqi time) the first Allied forces planes attacked targets in Iraq and within hours the American President George Bush announced that the Operation

20. USIS, Press Release, 17 January 1991.

21. Ibid.

Desert Storm had begun. While justifying the military action against Iraq, George Bush said:

while world waited, Saddam Hussain sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal, he now possess an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction, a new nuclear weapon... while the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, ²² to the entire world including to our own economy.

In the days which followed the Allied forces bombed industrial centres, oil installations, communication facilities, defence targets, and almost all infrastructure within Iraq.

Waves after waves of airstrikes have destroyed virtually every power station in the country... Every public telecommunications building had been hit. Scores of refineries and fuel dumps have gone up in flames. ²³

The multinational forces

used their overwhelming superiority to destroy Iraq's economic infrastructure, besides using the whole country as a testing site for the newest and most sophisticated American weaponry. ²⁴

The Iraqi forces retaliated by Scud missile attack on Israel and Saudi Arabia and burning oil fields in Kuwait and spilling oil into the sea. The Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel was a deliberate attempt to turn the Gulf war into an Arab-Israeli conflict. But Israel never retaliated during the

22. Ibid.

23. Bernd Debusman, "Besieged Iraq Bombed Back to Last Century", The Observer (London), 10 February 1991.

24. Agwani, n.9, p.4.

war. At the same time Iraq never used the much feared chemical weapons against Israel or the Allied forces. The main reason behind this may be the fear of retaliation. The Time magazine gave the other possible reasons as:

the hostile weather conditions, and the destruction of communication facilities between the central command of Iraq and field units. The allied attack badly damaged the Iraqi artillery, the main delivery system for chemical weapons, which incapacitated to launch a concerted attack.²⁵

Iraq abrogated all agreements with Saudi Arabia including a two year old non-aggression pact on 21 January 1991. And also on 6 February Iraq decided to snap diplomatic ties with USA, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.²⁶

The Allied attack on a bomb shelter in Amirya district of Baghdad resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians on 13 February. Followed by this incident the USSR revived the diplomatic initiatives to end the hostilities. Soviet Union sent Yevgeny Primakov as special envoy of Gorbachev to Iraq. Following the discussions, on 15 February 1991 for the first time since August 1990, Iraq accepted in principle that it should withdraw from Kuwait but insisted that Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be part of regional negotiations.²⁷

The Iraqi proposal of conditional withdrawal was rejected by the American President George Bush and the British Prime

25. Times (Chicago), 11 March 1991, p.11.

26. Times of India, 7 February 1991.

27. The Hindu (Madras), 16 February 1991.

Minister John Major. Soviet Union redoubled its diplomatic initiatives and proposed an eight point peace plan on 18 February. The plan had included among other things withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait immediately after ceasefire, the withdrawal would be completed within 21 days, including withdrawal from Kuwait City within the first four days; release of all Prisoners Of War and immediately after the withdrawal all the United Nations Resolution will lose its relevance and would be lifted.²⁸ But against the proposal of USSR the Allies proposed an immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces. Their key proposal at that point was that the pullout had to be completed within 96 hours of Iraq's agreement. "The idea was to make it impossible for Saddam's troops to take along their heavy armaments...."²⁹ The Iraqis had been using many tanks as a kind of stationary artillery digging them deeply into sand beams and piling sand bags on them. Digging them out, reviving up their long idled motors and driving out of Kuwait within 96 hours supposedly cannot be done. Shorn of much heavy equipment, the Iraqi army might not be an offensive threat to the country's neighbours at any time soon.³⁰ Thus the Soviet peace plan was scuttled by the Allies.

In the five weeks since the war began the Allies continuously bombed targets in Iraq, the Republican Guard and other

28. Time (Chicago), 4 March 1991, p.21.

29. Ibid., p.16.

30. Ibid.

Iraqi troops, for softening up the Iraqis and to pave the way for an easy^c ground war. During this period, United States and coalition aircrafts made more than 94,000 sorties and dropped 55 million kilogram of explosives on targets in Kuwait and Iraq. At the end of the fifth week of the war, the Allied forces announced that Iraq had lost, at a minimum 1,685 tanks (out of pre-war total of 4,280), 925 armoured personnel carriers (out of 2,800), 1,450 artillery pieces (out of 3,110) and 375 fixed wing aircraft (out of 800) including 138 stashed away in Iran.³¹

The Allied forces began the ground war on 24 February 1990 at 4 a.m. (Saudi Arabia time) after destroying large chunk of Iraqi forces. Iraqi forces offered little resistance. Finding no other alternative, Iraq decided to withdraw from Kuwait on 26 February 1991.³² The next day the 100 hours ground war ended and the Arab forces and US marines gained control over Kuwaiti City and its airport. The Allied forces declared ceasefire on 28 February 1991 at 8 a.m. (Greenwich meantime). The formal agreement of ceasefire came on 3 March 1991 when Iraqi army commanders agreed all terms of the ceasefire at a meeting with the chief of coalition forces in the Allied occupied Iraq.³³

As a follow up action, a formal ceasefire Resolution on the Persian Gulf War was adopted by the UN Security Council on

31. Ibid., p.22.

32. Times (London), 26 February 1991.

33. Statesman (New Delhi), 4 March 1991.

3 April 1991. The Resolution among other things authorised the deployment of a UN observer unit to monitor a demilitarized zone extending 10 km. into Iraq and 5 km. into Kuwait. It stated that Iraq should unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all its chemical and biological weapons and all its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. And also made it mandatory to Iraq to allow the UN inspection team to inspect all its weapon capabilities. The Resolution prohibited Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons and stated that Iraq should allow the UN special commission to inspect all the military installations inside Iraq. It also made Iraq liable for all war reparations.³⁴

The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) constituted as per the provisions of the Resolution was deployed in the demilitarised zone on 6 May 1991. The UNIKOM consisted of 1460 military personnel from thirty six different countries. For the first time, a United Nations unit had observers from all five permanent members of the Security Council.³⁵ The mission was to ensure that no military personnel and equipment were in the 15 km. wide demilitarised zone and no military fortifications and installations were maintained.

Thus, through the strict restrictions adopted by the UN ceasefire Resolution the Allied powers led by USA ensured that

34. UN Resolution 687, see Appendix.

35. USIS, Middle East Update, 3 May 1991.

Iraq would not be a threat to neighbouring areas and the Middle East in the near future.

Aftermath of the Gulf Crisis

Immediately after the end of the Gulf War, revolts erupted in northern and southern parts of Iraq. In the north it was the Kurdish people who were demanding autonomy and in the south the Shiite Muslims. But the Kurdish revolt and the subsequent events got wider importance.

Kurds are a religious minority spread over Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Soviet Union. These stateless people constitutes 23 per cent of Iraqi population i.e., four million people.³⁶ The Kurdish people revolted against the Iraqi authorities immediately after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf war. At the initial stages the uprisings were successful. The entire I and V divisions and part of the II division of the Iraqi army were destroyed by the Kurds by 11 March 1991. Over 50,000 government troops surrendered to Kurdish guerrillas. The most treasured prize in the battle of Kurdistan, the oil centre of Kirkurk, also briefly came under the control of the Kurdish refugees.³⁷

Mr. Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Mr. Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

36. Times of India, 28 May 1991.

37. Ibid., 20 April 1991.

were the two leaders who led the revolt of the Kurds.

Iraq's defeat in the Gulf war offered the Kurds "their best opportunity in decades to win political freedom, human rights and the hope of a decent life".³⁸ But the Republican Guards of Iraq supported by army divisions brutally suppressed the revolt. The whole of Iraq, excluding the areas zoned by the Allied forces, had been turned into a giant killing field by the Iraqi troops. The primary purpose of this carnage was to extinguish hope in any alternative to the present system.³⁹

At the beginning of the Iraqi crackdown on Kurds, the USA had been reluctant to intervene on behalf of the Kurds viewing the Kurdish problem as the internal affair of Iraq. But the days followed witnessed the mass exodus of refugees to adjoining Turkey and Iran fearing execution from the Iraqi army. "The Iraqi gunships were raining death on hundreds of thousands of fleeing men, women, and children".⁴⁰

The Kurdish guerrilla commander Barzani called upon the United States, United Kingdom, and France on 1 April 1991 to help the Kurdish people from genocide and torture by the Iraqi forces.⁴¹ This invited the attention of the world community and

38. David Bradshaw, "After the Gulf War: The Kurds", The World Today (London), vol.47, no.5, May 1991, p.78.

39. Times of India, 28 April 1991.

40. Ibid., 7 April 1991.

41. USIS, Middle East Update, 3 May 1991.

the problem got an international dimension. And again the UNSC passed the Resolution 688 condemning the Iraqi repression on Kurds on 5 April 1991. The Allied forces intervened and United States cargo planes began airlifting supplies to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq.

On 17 April the United States forces began to move into Iraq for setting up safe havens and established security zones for the return of Kurdish refugees. Iraq strongly protested to the United Nations the setting up of safe centres in its northern part by the United States and the coalition forces for the Kurdish refugees and asked the world body to take charge of them.⁴²

The UN Secretary General, after receiving the complaint from the Iraqi government on setting up of refugee camps by US troops, strongly questioned the authority of George Bush to send troops inside Iraq and set up camps. He declared that it will jeopardise the sovereignty of Baghdad.⁴³

On 24 April, a four men delegation led by Massoud Barzani, leader of KDP, met Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and arrived at an agreement for greater autonomy for the Kurds.⁴⁴ By 29 April the United Nations raised its blue and white flag in northern

42. Times of India, 24 April 1991.

43. Ibid., 18 April 1991.

44. Ibid., 8 May 1991.

Iraq, the first step in assuming control of camps built by the US troops to shelter thousands of Kurdish refugees. This was a prelude to the United Nations take over of the camp.⁴⁵

Coalition forces had been very successful in carrying out their humanitarian mission, and virtually all the Kurdish and other refugees who fled to the mountains on the Turkish border returned to their homes.⁴⁶ On 12 July 1991 United States' forces supporting humanitarian relief efforts in northern Iraq finished their job and pulled out of Iraq with a clear warning to Iraqi forces not to intervene in the internal affairs of Kurdish refugees. It also prohibited the Iraqi aircrafts from flying beyond the north of the 36 parallel which separates Kurdish region and the remaining part of Iraq, even after the departure of the coalition forces, and the Iraqi army, special police, and military border guards were asked to remain outside the security zone.

Thus the Kurdish rebellion, eventhough an internal affair of Iraq, got an international dimension and thereby ended in the intervention of coalition forces and setting up of camps under the UN supervision. This proved that other than the provisions of the UN ceasefire Resolution 687 Iraqi future depended on the mercy of the US-led forces and the United Nations.

45. Ibid., 30 April 1991.

46. USIS, Middle East Update, 31 July 1991.

Part II: Global Responses to the Gulf War

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait met with unprecedented response from the world community. Most of the countries and forums agreed that the Iraqi action was a violation of international law. But the intensity of the reaction to the crisis varied according to their position and status in the international field and their interest in the Middle East.

Role of United Nations

The response of the United Nations to the Gulf crisis was unprecedented in the history of the World Organisation.

As it is mentioned in the first chapter, the repute of the United Nations had certainly been enhanced during the past few years hand in hand with great changes in contemporary international scenario. Prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the World Organization had achieved a number of breakthroughs in reducing the intensity of various regional conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Kampuchea etc. Namibian independence and the process of abolishing apartheid in the South African Republic were outstanding results scored in strengthening United Nations activities and implementing the United Nations Charter, the foundations of today's international legal and political order.⁴⁷

47. Milan Sahovic, "Where are the United Nations Going?", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol.42, 5 January 1991.

As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, the United Nations passed a series of resolutions condemning Iraq and imposing sanctions against it. The first resolution, Resolution 660 passed on 2 August 1990, demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. And as a corollary, United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 661 imposing trade embargo on Iraq. Resolution 678 adopted four months later issued an ultimatum to Iraq to get out of Kuwait by 15 January 1991, failing which Kuwait and its allies were authorised to use all necessary means to evict Iraq.

As we have seen Iraq was not ready to obey the United Nations resolutions and US-led Multinational Forces acting under Resolution 678 of the United Nations Security Council attacked Iraq and driven it back from Kuwait.

The Resolution 678 authorised the member states to take all necessary means to ensure that Iraq vacated Kuwait but it was clear that this did not mean armed action against Iraq. The way of the United Nations is always the way of peace. The United Nations Security Council did not authorise armed action against Iraq.⁴⁸

The Resolution 678 of the Security Council which authorised the action of the US-led coalition, was itself of dubious validity. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter dealing with

48. Romesh Chandra, "New Lessons and Tasks", World Focus, vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.3.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes enjoins upon the Security Council, vide Article 31-32, that it would call upon parties to a dispute to settle it by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.⁴⁹ Article 34 provides that the Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or the situation is likely endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

None of these avenues, not open to but mandatory according to United Nations Charter, were seriously explored before passing the resolution which authorised 'all necessary means'. It was later found that the expression 'all necessary means' was only a euphemism⁵⁰ for military action on an unprecedented scale.

India's former permanent representative to the United Nations Rikhi Jaipal argues that the United Nations had not exhausted all the means for a peaceful settlement to the Gulf crisis and the validity of the Resolution 678 itself was in doubt.⁵¹ The sanctions should have been given more time to achieve the desired result. The sweeping authorisation in Resolution 678 of "the use of all necessary means" by the

49. D.W.Bowett, Law of International Institutions (London, 1963), p.32.

50. D.R.Goyal, "NAM's Poor Response", in World Focus, vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.45.

51. Rikhi Jaipal, "UN is Scapegoat in Gulf War", Times of India, 28 March 1991.

multinational force was questionable. No such authorisation is required under United Nations Charter.

But by authorising them to use all necessary means, the Security Council has placed itself in an awkward position. In the Gulf War, the UNSC delegated authority to a force that was neither under its control nor accountable to it. In such a situation, it is conceivable that the ends sought by the United Nations might well be exceeded⁵² by the use of excessive and indiscriminate force.

Again, Article 42 of the United Nations Charter empowers the United Nations Security Council to use force to remove threat or aggression which are threatening international peace and security. In acting according to Article 42, the United Nations Security Council has to be advised and assisted by the military staff committee. But this committee was not used in the Gulf crisis.⁵³

Under the Charter it is the duty of the Security Council to lead, supervise, and control military actions conducted in pursuance of chapter VII of the Charter. During the Gulf War the Security Council showed not even the slightest interest in the implementation of the basic principles of humanitarian international law which governs armed conflicts.⁵⁴ The humanitarian international law includes principles such as the

52. Ibid.

53. Georges Fischer, "Considerations on the Gulf War", World Affairs (New Delhi), June 1991, p.11.

54. Ibid.

belligerents do not have an unlimited right to chose the means of injuring the enemy and it prohibits the bombing on civilian population etc.

The UN mandate was used for destroying the Iraqi infrastructure by the United States forces.

The United Nations Secretary General was made helpless, so much so that he felt constrained to unburden his conscience with the statement that the war against Iraq was⁵⁵ not the United Nations war but United States war.

During the Gulf crisis the President of the United States virtually hijacked the United Nations by pressing the Security Council to pass a series of resolutions exactly as he desired. It was not the United Nations war as explained by the United Nations Secretary General; it was in the hands of the United States led coalition. Such hijacking should be ruled out in all contingencies.

But from the view point of United Nations, the role played by it in the Gulf crisis was so unique and unparalleled in the history of World Organisation. It was a remarkable fact that the United Nations acted so quickly and swiftly to avert a threat to international peace and security as envisaged by the founding fathers of the organisation. The United Nations role revived the concept of collective security in international relations. In future also the United Nations and member

55. Goyal, n.50, p.45.

countries who participated in the Gulfwar would be morally bound to keep the dictum that no aggression against an independent state should go unnoticed.

American Response to the Gulf Crisis

The American response to the Gulf crisis was conditioned by several factors. USA responded quickly to the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. The main factors which were responsible for the US policy can be classified into political, economic and military.

The avowed political aspects were the protection of Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi attack, to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, and to reinforce the principle that occupation of territory by force would not be tolerated by the world community.⁵⁶ While addressing the UN General Assembly on 1 October 1990, the American President George Bush described the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait as a

menace to the entire world's vision of the future. It threatened to turn the freedom of a new international order into a grim nightmare of anarchy, in which the law of the jungle supplants the law of nations.⁵⁷

The main economic consideration was to secure the steady flow of oil at a reasonable price. Although ostensibly it sought

56. Monte Palmer, "Understanding the Ambivalence of US Policy in the Iraqi Crisis", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) vol.41, 20 November 1990, p.30.

57. USIS, Official Text, 2 October 1990.

to establish the principle that an aggressor state should not be permitted to enjoy the fruits of its aggression, the real reason behind the conflict was to ensure that the United States and West continued to receive uninterrupted supplies of oil at reasonable price. On 8 August 1990 George Bush made a speech at the White House in which he made it clear that "American troops had been sent to Saudi Arabia not only to defend that country against possible Iraqi invasion but also to protect vital United States interests in the region".⁵⁸ Bush also stated that the United States now imports half of its oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. He also emphasized that the impact of this regional instability can be global. From this it was understandable that main concern of USA was free supply of oil.

The American interest of oil in the Persian Gulf is not a recent origin. United States is rich in oil. "The main objective was to explore the resources of other countries first and keep the oil reserves within the United States intact as long as it was economically and strategically viable".⁵⁹ Keeping this view in mind, the United States always tried to maximise its control and dominance in the Persian Gulf.

58. Chintamani Mahapatra, "Gulf War: Aspects of American Approach", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.14, no.2, May 1991, p.201.

59. Ibid., p.202.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict was a watershed for politics of oil. The Arab countries imposed oil embargo on United States and its allies for supporting Israel and increased oil prices.⁶⁰ Again with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, United States faced the second oil shock as US had been importing 50 per cent of its oil from Iran.

In 1990 when Saddam Hussein controlled 20 per cent of world crude oil through the annexation of Kuwait, Washington considered it as yet another case of strategic and economic loss to the United States.

And George Bush was not prepared to tolerate Saddam threatening the existing political order of a region that holds on its bosom 65 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves and 70 per cent of excess production capacity.⁶¹

Another important economic aspect which prompted the American support to Kuwait was the latter's external investment. Kuwait had external assets of \$122 billion.⁶² The Kuwaiti Investment Company had a sizable holdings in many of the companies such as British Petroleum, Dainlex, Benz, etc. And annexation of Kuwait by another country was dangerous to this

60. Ibid., p.204.

61. Ibid.

62. Frederick F.Clairmonte, "Makings of an Imperial President", Economics and Political Weekly (Bombay), vol.26, no.14, 6 April 1991, p.885.

global capital whose political custodian is the United States. In 1989, Kuwait earned \$9 billion from its foreign assets when its earning from oil exports was \$8 billion.⁶³ This shows the importance of Kuwaiti assets abroad. American and Western countries could hardly hope that Saddam Hussein would allow them to control the external assets of Kuwait if it is ruled by Iraq.

Military considerations were to establish a permanent military base in the region for its military buildup in the Gulf. The United States had been looking since 1973 oil crisis for an opportunity to station its forces in the oil rich Arab countries of the Gulf.⁶⁴ As we have seen, the Iranian Revolution stripped off the only American supported regime in 1979. Thus "active military involvement in the Gulf crisis provided justification for the continued buildup of an American military establishment."⁶⁵ From this it was clear that:

the Americans actually welcomed the war as it enabled them under the flag of the United Nations and with only symbolic aid from the multinational forces, to consolidate the military presence in a region of exceptional importance to them and from which the USA draws about 30 per cent of its oil.⁶⁶

63. Ibid.

64. A.K.Pasha, "The Kuwaiti Crisis: GCC Response", in Abidi and Singh, eds., n.1, p.144.

65. Palmer, n.56, p.31.

66. Manojlo Babic, "Lessons of the Gulf War", Review of International Affairs, vol.42, 5 April 1991, p.26.

The United States goal was largely achieved when regional heavy weights such as Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia decided to contribute troops to the US-led multinational forces in the region. So did the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) members. And so did other Islamic countries such as Morocco, Pakistan and Bangladesh. What was not possible during the prolonged Vietnam war was possible this time - support of regional countries to American policy.

The next target of the American diplomacy was to obtain the legitimacy from the UN for the entire United States operations. USA approached United Nations when the United States-USSR rapprochement was at its maximum and so it was quite easy to pass all the United Nations Resolutions without any veto in the Security Council.

The American President George Bush ensured the support of European powers and Arab countries. And then he approached the United States' Congress for the approval of Operation Desert Storm.

America had taken all the precautions to preclude that it was not an Arab-American war. For that first of all America sought the support of Japan, Germany, Italy, France, Britain, Canada and other countries. On the Arab side America had taken all the precautions to ensure the participation of Arab forces in the multinational forces. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Oman,

Qatar, Egypt, Bahrain, UAE, Turkey and Morocco contributed to the Multinational Forces.

To achieve active participation of the Arab countries USA and West European countries extended grants and developmental assistance. Saudi Arabia was the greatest beneficiary. It got \$21 billion United States aid.⁶⁷ Syria, a terrorist state according to Western countries, suddenly became an ally in the Gulf war. The European Economic Community released the frozen EC/Syrian Aid Protocol since 1986. Loans worth \$193 million held back earlier by the European Community when Syria was adjudged a terrorist state were released. Egypt had also got a tremendous financial assistance. "US written off \$7 billion of debt and 6 billion dollars by Arab Gulf States."⁶⁸

At the same time, Jordan which adjudged to be an ally of Iraq lost the US financial assistance. In early February 1991 the United States government freezed its aid to Jordan amounting to \$56 million for 1990 and \$57.2 million allotted for 1991. On 22 March 1991, the United States Congress approved a bill cutting its aid programme to Amman as a mark of displeasure.⁶⁹ Thus by clear and evident political and economic manipulation USA obtained the support for Multinational Force and covertly

67. International Herald Tribune, 24 September 1990.

68. Abidi, n.1, p.86.

69. Girijesh Pant, "Gulf War and Arab Economic", World Focus, vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.37.

made it as a Global Force but overtly it was an American controlled force to fight against Iraq.

The world succumbed to the pressure of USA "because the whole international community, not just the United States or the Europeans or the Japanese, but the poorer nations too, have an interest in the free flow of oil".⁷⁰ But USA cleverly manipulated this interest to achieve their own national interest and military objectives.

It could not have been the violation of an international law which prompted USA to act in such unprecedented manner of making a world force against an aggression. The critics pointed out that:

the United States itself had been guilty in recent years of violating international law and the United Nations Charter - for example in Panama, Nicaragua and Grenada. These actions were condemned by various international bodies, but of course no sanctions were imposed.⁷¹

In the Middle East itself, Israel was continuously flouting United Nations Resolutions. And in the recent past Iraq itself was a violator of international law. It used poison gas, first against Iranian soldiers and then against rebellious Kurdish villages. The Iraqi army used chemical weapons in the town of Halabaja in 1988 which killed 5,000 Kurds.⁷² "There was minor outcry in the West but no sanctions."⁷³

70. Jack Stauder, "Oil Internationalism", Review of International Affairs, vol.41, 20 November 1990, p.27.

71. Ibid.

72. Bradshaw, n.38, p.79.

73. Stauder, n.70, p.27.

But all of a sudden USA became a champion of international law and dictated the terms. "The Middle East had all along been a tough area for the Americans to achieve their objectives and the Gulf war apparently offered them an opportunity to fulfil that goal".⁷⁴ USA used the opportunity maximum and flouted all international norms. Professor M.S. Agwani argues that the war was a hasty and imposed one. Iraq was bound to oblige to the economic embargo,

considering the fact that Iraq had depended for 90 per cent of its revenues on oil exports and that it normally imported substantial quantities of food, medicines and other essential goods for its 17 million - strong population... But the pace and magnitude of American build up in Saudi Arabia, unprecedented in military history, showed that Washington had already made up its mind to use massive physical force against Iraq rather than wait for the sanctions to produce results.⁷⁵

The war revealed that the US intention was not the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions. The Gulf war proved

how the United Nations Security Council's limited mandate on the liberation of Kuwait is no constraint on their extension of the war to achieve their motivated desire of other, illegitimate, objectives such as destruction⁷⁶ of Iraq's political and economic infrastructure...

The scope and intensity of the American air strikes, the choice of targets and the magnitude of 'collateral' damage to civilian lives in Iraq,

74. Chintamani Mahapatra, "American Role in the Post-Gulf War Period", Strategic Analysis, vol.14, no.3, p.341.

75. Agwani, n.9, p.4.

76. M.S. Rajan, "What Price Forcible Kuwaiti Liberation?", Review of International Affairs, vol.42, 20 May 1991.

revealed a wider purpose than was ostensibly envisaged by the United Nations Security Council.⁷⁷

Thus the American approach to the Gulf crisis was totally dominated by its own national interest. The free-flow of oil, viable government in the Middle East, destruction of regional hegemony and establishment of a permanent military presence were the main factors which conditioned the American response to the crisis.

Soviet Response to the Gulf Crisis

The Soviet response to the crisis was conditioned by so many factors including the principles of new political thinking, the rapid normalisation of US-USSR relations, the considerations of the changing political alignment in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the impact of the internal economic situation on Soviet foreign policy, the Soviet efforts to see the United Nations in a key role in the resolution of the regional conflicts and the changing attitudes towards the third world countries.

Notwithstanding the 1972 USSR-Iraq Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the special relationship, that characterised the ties between the two countries had collapsed in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.⁷⁸ Moscow unambiguously condemned the attack. The 2 August 1990 official statement described the

77. Agwani, n.9, p.4.

78. Arvind Gupta, "Soviet Response to Gulf Crisis", Strategic Analysis, vol.13, no.7, October 1990, p.773.

Iraqi action as invasion and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The Iraqi action, in Moscow's opinion, was a betrayal of trust and flagrant contempt of international law, the United Nations Charter as well as "everything on which the world community relies in its attempts to turn the civilization towards peaceful development".⁷⁹ Thus on 3 August 1990 USSR declared the stoppage of arms supply to Iraq.

It was true that the Soviet Union had turned into an inward looking power on account of its domestic, political and economic problems.⁸⁰ For all practical purposes USSR identified the Gulf strategy of the United States. "Without the Soviet assent, the United Nations Security Council could never have demanded that Iraq pull out of Kuwait, or organised the worldwide embargo against Iraq, or approved the use of force against Baghdad".⁸¹ According to Professor M.S.Agwani, "the Soviet Union was, for all practical purposes, on 'sick leave' from the world stage during the Gulf Crisis".⁸²

But USSR wanted a regional initiative of the Arabs armed with authority of the United Nations and the Security Council to help resolve the problem without recourse to military action

79. Sumit Chakravathy, "Soviet Search for Peace", in World Focus vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.18.

80. Mahapatra, n.58, p.211.

81. Times (Chicago), 4 March 1991, p.16.

82. Agwani, n.9, p.5.

and escalation of the conflict into a full scale war. With an aim to achieve these goals Mr.Yevgeney Primakov, the special envoy of President Gorbachev, visited Baghdad in October and November. During his visit to Baghdad Primakov was able to convince the Iraqi authorities of the futility of keeping the foreign nationals as hostages. "The Soviet contribution to this welcome development made it amply clear that the Soviets, after all, were not sitting wholly idle when the crisis was assuming alarming proportions".⁸³

The next major diplomatic initiative from USSR came in the wake of preparations for the ground war. USSR tried its maximum to avoid a ground war. Primakov, special envoy of Gorbachev arrived in Baghdad on 13 February 1991 for alleviating the situation. As a result of the discussions on 14 February 1991, Iraq showed its willingness to withdraw from Kuwait, first time after the crisis on the condition of linking the Palestinian-Israeli problem. It was clear that Soviet efforts were behind the decision of Iraq.⁸⁴ But United States President Bush rejected the proposal calling it as a "cruel hoax on the world".⁸⁵ Again on 23 February 1991 Soviet Union proposed a six point peace plan containing the withdrawal of Iraqi troops but it also rejected by Bush saying the plan "falls short of what would be

83. Chakravarthy, n.79, p.19.

84. The Hindu (Madras), 16 February 1991.

85. Ibid.

required".⁸⁶ Soviet Union never pressed its peace plans against the wishes of USA but extended full cooperation to the American strategy in the Gulf.

Eventhough Soviet Union had extended full cooperation to the American strategy in the Gulf, it was not devoid of differences. "As the coalition forces mounted heavy bombing on targets inside Iraqi territory, Gorbachev warned against exceeding the Security Council mandate".⁸⁷ This warning came when it became apparent that USA was trying to destroy the military and economic potential of Iraq. And Soviet Union was also against an all out war against Iraq. Regarding the Soviet difference to the United States policy Time magazine writes:

Domestically Gorbachev must appease the military, KGB and communist party hardliners he increasingly relies on to maintain his authority...still more to the point, in strict power terms, a Middle East outcome that frozen Soviet influence out of the region and left a triumphant United States as dominant power in that strategic cross roads so close to the USSR's southern⁸⁸ borders would make any Kremlin regime nervous.

But on the whole, the Soviet response to the Gulf crisis was carefully worked out so as not to upset the gains of US-USSR detente. This explains the mild reaction to the US military action in the Gulf.

86. The Hindu, 28 February 1991.

87. Vladimir Radyuhin, quoted in Chakravarthi, n.79.

88. Times (Chicago), 4 March 1991, p.16.

Response of Germany and Japan

Both Germany and Japan, the two nations which were at the receiving end of the Second World War were conspicuous by their apathy to the American cause in the Gulf crisis, even though both depended heavily on the free flow of oil.

German response to the crisis was slack because it had to concentrate more in its domestic problems - an election (December 1990) and mounting difficulties due to the reunification of Germany. Still Germany contributed DM 17.6 million for the preparation of Gulf war besides sending five minesweepers, 18 Alpha Jet fighters and 240 soldiers.⁸⁹ But the otherside was that the alleged involvement of Germany in the development of Scud missiles, used by Iraq, tarnished the German image.

Japan, because of its pacifist constitution⁹⁰ was unable to participate in any military action outside its territory. It contributed \$13 billion to the Multinational Forces in the Gulf besides sending a group of minesweepers and a medical team to assist the MNF.⁹¹

89. Rajendra K.Jain, "United Germany's Role in the Gulf War", Times of India, 27 April 1991.

90. Amano Yashikazu, "Abstract Criticism: Japan Debates the Peace Constitution", AMPO (Tokyo), vol.23, no.1, p.38.

91. Art.9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits the use of military power.

The apathetical attitude of the two countries may be attributed to the peace movements in these countries, which demanded abstention from the Gulf war. The tragedy and suffering of their people during the Second World War which lurked large in the collective memory of these nations might also have served as a deterrent factor.

Response of Israel

Israel was always preferred to stay away from the Gulf crisis but kept a clear watch on the turns and twists. Iraqi President's attempt to draw the Gulf crisis into an Arab-Israeli conflict failed only because of the tolerance and patience of the Israeli people even after the Scud missile attack that killed many of the civilians. This was because of the Western pressure and assistance that Israel abstained from involving in the Gulf crisis.

Germany announced on 23 January 1991 a humanitarian aid of \$165 million to Israel in the wake of Scud missile attack.⁹² As a goodwill gesture, European community cancelled the trade sanctions on Israel in 1990.⁹³ United States by offering Patriot cover against the Iraqi Scud attack kept away Israel from interfering in the war.

92. P.R.Kumaraswamy, "Gulf War: A Chronology", Strategic Analysis vol.14, no.6, September 1991.

93. Ibid.

Any involvement of Israel would have created "enormous upheavals in the Islamic world, possibly driving Iran and other nations into the Iraqi camp".⁹⁴ According to Professor Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Israel, on its part, has contributed most significantly to the Allied war by not retaliating against the Scud attack on its cities and towns..."⁹⁵

Response of Arab League

Arab League, the common forum for 22 Arab states, failed to take any credible initiative in the midst of the crisis and had remained paralysed. The Arab League was divided on the issue of Iraqi attack on Kuwait and the subsequent induction of multinational forces. The first sign of division in the Arab League emerged in a ministerial meeting on 10 August 1990 at Cairo when the League passed the resolution for condemning the Iraqi invasion. Among 20 members present only 12 voted in favour of the Resolution.⁹⁶ The resolution called for the restoration of the Al-Sabah regime and asked the Arab governments to send troops for a Pan-Arab force to defend the borders of Saudi Arabia from Iraqi attack. Since then only three Arab

94. Sahrough Akhavi, "Why Iran Prefers to Stay on the Sidelines", Telegraph (Calcutta), 5 September 1991.

95. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Post War Security in the Gulf", News Time (Hyderabad), 3 March 1991.

96. Satyabrata Rai Choudhary, "The Arab World and the Gulf Crisis", National Herald (New Delhi), 27 September 1990.

countries of the Arab League - Egypt, Morocco, and Syria - sent troops to Saudi Arabia.

The legitimacy of the decisions taken by the meeting itself was doubtful. As per the League Charter "no decision on important issues was binding or valid unless it was taken unanimously. So technically the League not formally or fully condemned Iraq."⁹⁷ Among the Arab countries the decision of Egypt was so crucial. Egypt sent troops to join the Multinational Forces and during the war fought against Iraq. And Syria and Morocco also did the same.

Response of Gulf Cooperation Council

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance of six⁹⁸ Gulf countries, formed in 1981 in a view to create a viable security mechanism in the event of aggression. But when Iraq attacked and annexed one of its members, GCC was helpless to do anything to the prevention of the attack.

Soon after the Iraqi attack, the Kuwaiti Radio appealed to the GCC Desert Shield Force for help. The call was given on the basis of the agreement that an attack on one member would be viewed as an attack on all of them. But as we have seen in the first chapter, the Desert Shield is a small force having 7,000

97. Abidi, n.1, p.72.

98. The six countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE.

armed men and an air defence system of having only a couple of United States AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia. Then it was natural that it cannot match a big invading army and offered little response to the call. Thus the GCC security system proved its futility.

"The six members of the GCC reacted with nervous cohesion"⁹⁹ towards the Iraqi invasion on Kuwait. The first official statement came on 3 August 1990, condemning the Iraqi aggression and called for unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.¹⁰⁰ And also it requested other friendly nations for military help.

With the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, with an 800 km long border with Iraq and 160 km long border with Kuwait, "got scared about its own security".¹⁰¹ But on 5 August 1990 itself Iraq had declared that it had no intention to attack Saudi Arabia. This was followed by the visit of the United States Secretary of State, James Baker to Saudi Arabia. As a result of the discussions, Saudi Arabia invited the help of friendly countries and US troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia with an agreement that the Saudis had a veto power in the event

99. Abidi, n.1, p.75.

100. A.K.Pasha, "The Kuwaiti Crisis: GCC Response", in Abidi and Singh, eds., n.1, p.124.

101. Abidi, n.1, p.77.

of a war with Iraq.¹⁰² The GCC in Arab meet held at Cairo on 10 August 1990 justified the Saudi Arabian and other Arab Gulf State's decision to seek non-Arab multinational protection. On 15 August 1990 GCC approved the decision of its members to take all the measures

deemed necessary for their defence/security, safety, stability, preservation of their interests and national resources, including cooperation and coordination with all those friendly forces which are qualified to provide assistance.¹⁰³

Thus by the month of August itself all the GCC states had taken steps to deploy foreign forces in their territories.¹⁰⁴

After ensuring the military security the next move of GCC was to isolate Iraq from its friendly states through diplomatic initiatives. Saudi Arabia and Iran established diplomatic relations. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had no diplomatic ties with Moscow.¹⁰⁵ Saudi Arabia on 17 September 1990 and Bahrain on 28 September 1990 established diplomatic relations with Moscow. Through this the GCC states ensured that either Iran or Moscow or both would not help the Iraqi government.

When the war broke out all the GCC states participated actively against Iraq. They extended full cooperation to the multinational forces by providing base facilities, to the allied war planes and their own troops and aircrafts were

102. Ibid., p.78.

103. Pasha, n.100, p.135.

104. Quoted in ibid., p.134.

105. Ibid., p.128.

participated in the war. The GCC response was so predicted and it was so firm and rigid. They never showed any type of flexible attitude towards the Iraqi regime.

Position of PLO in the Gulf Crisis

During the Gulf crisis PLO was the supporter of Iraq. The first public support for Iraq by PLO came in Arab League meeting at Cairo on 10 August 1990. In that meeting PLO voted against the resolution condemning Iraq.¹⁰⁶

But the PLO position on Iraq's invasion was profoundly ambivalent. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the Palestinian community in Kuwait helped the invading troops by collecting information. With the linking of withdrawal from Kuwait with the Israeli pullout from occupied Arab territories Iraq won the clear support of Palestinians.¹⁰⁷ PLO firmly believes in United Nations Resolution 242 relates to the Arab-Israeli conflict which denounces acquisition of territory by war. Because of this PLO firmly affirmed that it opposed the Iraqi occupation and annexation of Kuwait. On the other hand PLO wanted the United States military presence out of the region.¹⁰⁸ Here the ambivalent position of PLO was very clear.

106. Rashid I.Khalid, "The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.90, no.552, January 1991, p.18.

107. Abidi, n.1, p.84.

108. Khalid, n.106, p.19.

Even though PLO disapproved Iraqi action, it wanted an inter Arab solution to the problem instead of deployment of foreign forces. PLO was highly critical of the United States intervention and Arab countries which invited the forces. This made the GCC countries to take a stand against the PLO. "The PLO is in a difficult position. GCC states have a deep grudge against the PLO because it sympathised with Iraq. Iraq has lost the ability to take care of the PLO."¹⁰⁹

But the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and linkage of it with the Palestinian problem served another great purpose the Arab-Israeli relations and the Homeland for Palestinians became the top of the political agenda the world over.

Response of Iran

Iran's geographical location, size, resources, long border with Iraq and political orientation gave a pivotal role to it in the Gulf crisis. Its eight year war with Iraq totally weakened the country.

Since the ceasefire in the war with Iraq (1988), Iran looked inward and concentrated on fostering political stability and national reconstruction. In its foreign policy it gave signals of becoming a conservative force committed to preserve the status quo.¹¹⁰

109. Rakesh Gupta, "Regional Instability", World Focus, vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.34.

110. A.H.H.Abidi, "Challenges Before Iran", World Focus, vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.31.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iran condemned the invasion and called for immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces and suggested a peaceful solution to the dispute. "Iran adopted a balanced posture and neutrality"¹¹¹ throughout the crisis. Iran viewed the Iraqi-ruled Kuwait as always a danger to it because of its closeness to Iran. At the same time, Iran viewed the induction of US led multinational force as a long term threat to it. So it advocated a peaceful settlement.

In an effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, the Iranian speaker, Mehdi Karroubi proposed a five point plan. The proposals envisaged among other things, the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the withdrawal of multinational forces. And also proposed the deployment of Arab forces in the place of multinational forces.¹¹² The Iranian President Rafsanjani offered to mediate in between USA and Iraq. But Iraq rejected any Iranian attempt of mediation to end the Gulf War.¹¹³

Iran is one of the greatest beneficiaries of the Gulf crisis. The United States gave hints of releasing \$400 million frozen Iranian assets.¹¹⁴ Iraq vacated 2800 sq.km. of Iranian territory and pulled out the bulk of its troops from the Iranian

111. Ibid.

112. The Hindu, 28 January 1991.

113. Ibid., 11 February 1991.

114. Times of India, 15 September 1990.

front. Iraq released almost all the Iranian Prisoners of War. The crisis which boosted the oil prices increased Iran's revenues by \$33 million per day, which was 12 per cent higher than the previous year.¹¹⁵ Thus with all these advantages, "the Islamic Republic of Iran achieved its most powerful position since the down fall of the Shah".¹¹⁶

Thus the Gulf crisis made Iran most conspicuous in regional politics. Iranian diplomacy during the Gulf crisis aimed at asserting its primacy in the region and defying external hegemony.

Response of NATO

Since the NATO countries were the beneficiaries of the free supply of oil, it was quite obvious that they responded to the crisis with maximum intensity. An emergency meeting of NATO's 16 foreign ministers on 10 August 1991 endorsed the United States military deployment in the Gulf. It called for the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq in its strict terms. The West European Council on 21 August 1990 agreed to sent coordinated military presence in the Gulf. The next day Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy and Netherlands decided to sent armed forces to the Gulf. NATO declared that it resolved

115. Abidi, n.110, p.34.

116. The Observer (London), 3 January 1991.

to restore the independence of Kuwait and called upon Iraq to release all the hostages. Britain and France became the second and third largest military contingent to the multinational forces after USA. Turkey, another member of NATO provided base facilities in Incirlik and Diyarbakir for the use of multinational forces to attack Iraq.

The Gulf crisis had happened when the NATO alliance was facing the question of the very rationale of the continuance of the military alliance after the withdrawal of Warsaw Pact. Through the participation in the Gulf crisis the NATO supporters had got an opportunity to prove the necessity of the continuance of the military alliance with an outside area role.

For all practical purposes NATO recognised the policies of USA during the crisis. For instance, when Tariq Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Iraq declined to meet Bush, the European community under NATO influence agreed on 18 December 1990 that there could be no European community meeting with Tariq Aziz until he had met Bush.¹¹⁷

During the Gulf war it was the NATO which provided base facilities and other operational facilities to the multinational forces to crackdown the Iraqi military machine.

117. Cooley, n.3, p.137.

Non-Aligned Movement and the Gulf Crisis

The response of the Non-Aligned Movement towards the crisis was poor. It failed to take timely action in the Gulf crisis as NAM was inactive during the Gulf War.

The ministerial meeting on 4 October 1990 held at New York endorsed the United Nations Resolutions and called for the solution to the crisis on the basis of it. After this, the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister visited many state capitals including Baghdad, Paris, etc. to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.¹¹⁸

When Iraq annexed Kuwait, almost all the NAM countries individually condemned the Iraqi action. "No one Non-aligned country has supported the aggressor".¹¹⁹ But as a collective forum, NAM failed to give any concrete initiative. The delay in convening the NAM Foreign Minister's meeting crippled the initiative of NAM. "The conflict would have been localised as was done in the case of Iran-Iraq war if NAM had taken timely action".¹²⁰

118. Zivojin Jazic, "The Gulf Crisis Peace of War", Review of International Affairs, vol.42, 20 January 1991, p.4.

119. Zivojin Jazic, "The Non-Aligned and the Gulf War", Review of International Affairs, vol.42, 20 February 1991, p.4.

120. D.R.Goyal, "NAM's Poor Response", in World Focus, vol.12, nos.4-5, April-May 1991, p.45.

During the war the consultative meeting of NAM ministers of 16 countries held on 13 February 1991 in Belgrade. The consultative meeting ended without a formal communique.¹²¹ That was a proof of serious differences among the NAM and the weakness to act with unision during the crisis. It called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait and a peaceful solution to the problem. The Belgrade meeting sent Missions to Baghdad, Kuwait, the European community and Washington. The NAM initiatives or poor response failed to contribute anything concrete to alleviate the crisis and the subsequent war in the Gulf. NAM was bound by its own principles to intervene in such a manner as to get the aggression vacated without resort to military means which tantamounted to counter aggression.¹²² The Non-Alignment, a mechanism which was aimed as "an alternative to, or a substitute for power politics in international relations"¹²³ simply failed to perform that long cherished goal.

Conclusion

Major part of Iraq's military machine had been destroyed in the war. Its military industries are devastated and its

121. Jazic, n.119, p.4.

122. Goyal, n.120, p.43.

123. K.P.Misra, "The Conceptual Profile of Non-alignment", in K.P.Misra, ed., Contemporary International Relations (New Delhi, 1981), p.204.

capacity to develop nuclear weapons and non-conventional weapons was eliminated. The United Nations Ceasefire Resolution called for the destruction and removal of biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missile systems, sub-systems, component research and related facilities of Iraq.

The Kurdish insurgency and the havens created inside Iraqi territory also weakened the power of the Iraq. With all these it is now clear that for the coming few years Iraq will be in a defensive position.

Chapter IV

POST GULF WAR SECURITY

In a world where nation states are becoming increasingly interdependent, in every aspect, international security is becoming a complex and debatable issue. The use of arbitrary force and unilateralism have lost their relevance in finding solutions to any international conflict because the world has reached a point in its march of development where neither a nation nor a group of nations alone can survive on its own. The end of the Cold War and the disarmament race are but the outcome of this awareness.

Since the Gulf crisis has been a major crisis after the end of the Cold War, it is imperative to analyse the emerging security structure in the Middle East after the Gulf war in order to understand the bearing of the Middle East security on international security.

Gulf After the War

The immediate concern after the Gulf war was to constitute a stable regional balance of power that deterred aggression from any source, while ensuring that Iraq was neither a continuing threat nor a regional outcast. On 12 October 1991, the UNSC passed a resolution in which Iraq was prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction all over again. The UN armed itself with a sweeping array of powers to disarm Iraq of all its

declared and undeclared stocks of all conceivable weapons of mass destruction. There was also provision for an indefinite monitoring of Iraq's future attempts, if any, to manufacture atomic and other weapons of mass destruction.¹ The Resolution 687, already made effective enforcement mechanism upon Iraq on its military capability in return for a permanent ceasefire. The resolution also prohibited Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons and other chemical weapons. The menace of nuclear threat from Iraq was prevented. All these efforts put Iraq for the coming years in a defensive position and its threat to its neighbours ceased for a while.

Iran like Syria, sought to exploit the crisis to break out of its isolation. It gained a windfall from Saddam's sudden renunciation of the territorial claims which had been the focal point of his bloody eight-year war. Iran is now rid of its Iraqi rival, but at the cost of strengthening its other main enemy, the United States. Iran lacks the political cohesion and a sophisticated military power to dominate the Middle East.

Iran is a major factor in the security structure. The suspicions regarding Iran's future intensions are also complicating the plans for the establishment of a new regional security system.²

1. The Hindu (Gurgaon), 13 October 1991.

2. Farhang Jahanpour, "A New Order for the Middle East?", The World Today (London), vol.47, no.5, May 1991, p.76.

Iran is one of the countries which has benefitted from the war. Now it is in a stronger position to assert its superiority. "By virtue of its geography, history, population and potentialities, Iran is entitled to regard itself as the pre-eminent power in the Gulf."³ Even today in order to have feasible security arrangements in the Gulf, the participation of Iran is necessary for the stability in the region and for international security. Hence Iran's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, severed ten years ago after Egypt's signing of the Camp David Agreement with Israel, assumes great importance.

Syria has also benefitted from the crisis, however, breaking out of its long isolation in the Arab world, seizing the moment to consolidate its brutal hold on Lebanon, winning a rapprochement with the United States and new subsidies from the Saudis and other Gulf countries as a reward for its commitment of forces to the anti-Saddam cause. Syria is arming itself by forming new armoured divisions and shopping for new surface-to-surface missiles from China, North Korea and the Soviet Union.⁴ But Syria is not in a position to bid for hegemony. It has neither the oil wealth nor the Soviet backing it would need for military dominance.

3. Sunday Mail (New Delhi), 17 November 1991.

4. Peter W. Rodman, "Middle East Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs (Colorado), vol.70, no.2, Spring 1991, p.5.

With the defeat of Saddam Hussein Saudi Arabia's immediate threat to its border is over.

Egypt's role is more clearly strengthened by the coalition's success against Saddam. The Gulf war had more solid support in Egypt than elsewhere in the Arab world, given its traditional rivalry with and popular mistrust of Iraq. Egypt gained the forgiveness of its military debt to the United States, financial assistance and the promise of firmer post war political backing from Saudi Arabia. Victory indicated its pro-American and moderate stance and thrust it forward as a regional power.

Gulf crisis has made it clear that a relationship exists between the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue and the events in the Gulf. The ongoing West Asian Peace Conference is one of the steps to solve this problem. The 30 October 1991 Madrid peace meet was the first meeting of its kind in which all directly involved Arab countries had been present. Diplomats from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation represented in the meeting. "Arabs wanted the return of land won by Israel since 1948. Israel sought peace. Palestinians looked forward to the birth of the state of their own."⁵ But no agreement was reached in the meeting but the parties decided to resume the talks.

5. Sunday Mail, 17 November 1991.

Thus, a search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict began with the Madrid peace conference, which is yet to produce any favourable result for the regional security.

Effect of Gulf War on Middle East Security

Rampant Arab nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict are the three major factors which conditions the security in the Middle East.⁶ "With the collapse of Arab nationalism and the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict Islamic fundamentalism is bound to grow and pose a greater challenge to regional stability and the West in the years to come."⁷

The war in the Gulf has undoubtedly been a watershed in Middle East politics, affecting assumptions and alignments alike. With the rapprochement between USA and USSR determinants in the Middle East changed. Before the Gulf war the security in the Middle East was divided between USA and USSR. USA was giving military assistance to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, USSR was providing arms to Iraq and Syria. But with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, USSR stopped the supply of arms to Iraq and Syria joined the Multinational Forces as an ally of USA.

6. Jahanpour, n.2, p.75.

7. Ibid.

In the past, Soviet positions in West Asia, as in other regions of the Third World, rested on three pillars: arms supplies, economic aid, and ideological influence. Today, only arms supplies are still there, but the Soviet Union is increasingly reluctant to use them as a political instrument.⁸

The crisis precipitated a strategic realignment in the region and has brought Iran and Syria, marginal and isolated before the crisis, to centre-stage. Turkey and Egypt have gained in prominence, while Iraq's virtual allies,⁹ Jordan, the PLO and Yemen, have been marginalised.

At the same time Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and other GCC countries are acquiring arms.

The Gulf war and changes in the socialist states led to the significant shift in the balance of power. The war reflected a breakdown of the previous security arrangements, providing a compelling reason to look anew at this question.

The decision of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to set up joint force of 100,000 soldiers with rotating command to look after the security of GCC states was a first step towards this end.¹⁰ Again the security of Middle East will depend on how the Gulf states are moulding their own security.

8. The Hindu, 13 October 1991.

9. Shahram Chubin, "Post War Gulf Security", Survival (London), vol.33, no.2, March/April 1991, p.145.

10. The Hindu, 24 October 1991.

Now that the US ground forces would be kept in Kuwait for an undertermined length of time (About 5000 to 6000 US troops will remain there),¹¹ it gets special significance.

On 5 March 1991 GCC Foreign Ministers held a joint meeting in Damascus with Egyptian and Syrian Foreign Ministers, which formulated a plan envisaging an active role for Syria and Egypt in the Persian Gulf security arrangements. However, any realistic security system in the Persian Gulf is yet to emerge.

The Multinational Forces are still in the Middle East and Iraq. There are over 15,000 troops already stationed in Iraq, of these 11,000 belong to the US Air Force. At least nine battleships were anchored at strategic points in the Middle East.¹² The US military has a sizeable presence in Saudi Arabia and also two American carrier battle groups were stationed in the area, one each in the Gulf and the Red Sea.¹³ In Kuwait too, 5,000-6,000 US troops are expected to remain for an undetermined period of time.

Deep seated animosities can perhaps be dissolved with the help of the US which has by now acquired an unprecedented diplomatic hold over the region.

11. Times of India (New Delhi), 18 March 1991.

12. Sunday Mail, 22 September 1991.

13. The Hindu, 30 October 1991.

For a stable security arrangement in the Middle East, arms control and disarmament measures are essential. While announcing the Middle East Arms Initiative Bush said it aimed to achieve "a comprehensive approach to stop and, where possible, reverse the accumulation of arms in that part of the world most prone to violence".¹⁴ On 29 May 1991 Bush unveiled a more comprehensive Middle East Arms control policy in a speech at the US Air Force Academy at Colorado. The key elements of the plan included a proposal to freeze the purchase, production and testing of surface to surface missiles by Middle Eastern states and eventually to eliminate such missiles; a ban on chemical and biological weapons; an effort by key arms suppliers to identify the most dangerous conventional weapons in the region, curb their sales of these weapons, and inform each other of major sales; and a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of enriched Uranium and weapon grade plutonium.¹⁵

For an effective Middle East security the role of Israel is of great significance. So it is necessary to include the weapons programme of Israel also in the comprehensive Middle East security programme. If not it will be a destabilising factor and insecurity to the region.

14. Quoted in Times of India, 25 September 1991.

15. Geoffrey Kemp, "The Middle East Arms Race: Can it be Controlled?", The Middle East Journal, vol.45, no.3, Summer 1991, p.442.

The menacing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction compels attention. The arms suppliers in the world have the responsibility to see that no arms are supplied to the Middle East.

With all these uncertainties, an equilibrium of sorts is unlikely to return to the region now that Iraq's disproportionate power has been reduced.

World Security After Gulf War

As we have seen in the first chapter the collapse of communism and the development of democracy in Eastern Europe relieved the world from the constant threat of war and destruction which haunted the world for the past four decades. It totally changed the security environment from hostility to a peaceful and a confidence building process among the East and West.

It is quite interesting to note that the former Soviet bloc countries in the Eastern Europe have been invited to become partners in NATO, though not as full members. Their ministers will be invited to first meeting on 20 December 1991 at NATO headquarters at Brussels, Belgium, to draw up a plan for the unprecedented contracts.¹⁶ The Conference on Security in Europe which comprises almost all the nations in Europe is

16. The Hindu, 9 November 1991.

devising a structure in which the security and peace of all the concerned states are ensured. Another welcome change which augmented the new security environment was the dismantling of Warsaw Treaty Organisation on 1 April 1991. This will naturally question the locus standi of NATO, and may eventually lead to the change of its role, if not dismantled. Thus the collapse of communism and spread of democracy in Eastern Europe totally changed the security environment. Certain other elements which moulding the international security are the unification of Germany, the arms reduction and limitation agreements and the shape of the emerging new world order.

By the unification of Germany it became one of the most powerful nations among European countries.

The collapse of the Soviet power meant an end of the security threat to Germany, among others. At the same time, it deprived the Western allies of a common purpose and in the absence of the unifying factor, the differences in their perceptions have come to the fore. In the new emerging scenario, Germany's voice would count more and more, with the passage of time.¹⁷

In its newly assertive mood Germany had been demanding removal of all tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe. "Germany, until now littered with these weapons of both NATO and the Soviet Union, has had a special stake in the elimination of these weapons."¹⁸

17. K.K.Katyal, "German National Pride Restored", The Hindu, 30 September 1991.

18. C.Rajmohan, "New Dimensions to Nuclear Debate", The Hindu, 30 September 1991.

In the recent past Germany has become more assertive in its foreign policy. For instance, it has threatened to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia (the republics of Yugoslavia which demands cession from the former), unilaterally. Similarly it has demanded a ban on short-range nuclear missiles, many of which are positioned on its territory by NATO. It has taken lead in urging Western economic assistance to the stricken economies of Soviet Union and Eastern Europe while other G-7 countries are doing it with much reservation.¹⁹

Germany also has suggested that the conference on security and cooperation in Europe could have its own peace keeping force for the area. In such a situation it is sure that the influence of Germany will prevail because of its economic and military capabilities.

In Gulf war also Germany had taken a quite passive step. Germany sent five mine sweepers, 18 Alpha jet fighters and despatched 240 soldiers only.²⁰ The assertiveness of Germany after its unification is a clear indication that the security arrangement which is emerging in the post Cold War era, Germany must have a privileged position.

19. Times of India, 8 October 1991.

20. Rajendra K.Jain, "United Germany's Role in Gulf War", Times of India, 27 September 1991.

The disarmament race which is going on will inevitably lead to a safer international security. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991 between USA and USSR was one of the major steps towards reduction of arms in which Soviet Union agreed to cut down 35 per cent of its nuclear arsenals and American side agreed to cut down its stock pile by about 28 per cent. And also this would be the first to reduce rather than limit, long-range nuclear weapons.²¹

The cuts in arms were assymetrical or unequal because the US has more of its strategic weapons based at sea or on bombers, while the Soviet Union had more warheads in land based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and because the latter has accepted its inferior negotiating status. The biggest reduction is in the number (308) of Soviet SS-18 heavy ICBMs. The USSR will have to cut these by one half at the rate of 22 a year. The SS-18s take only 25 to 30 minutes to reach their targets while strategic bombers take hours.²²

START could turn out to be the precursor to a joint super power (or nuclear weapon states) effort to create an insurmountable barrier to the spread of nuclear and missile technologies.

21. Times of India, 1 August 1991.

22. Ibid., 5 August 1991.

Another dramatic development which changed the international security environment was the failed coup in Soviet Union on 19 August 1991 and the developments which followed. On 19 August 1991, Gorbachev, the President of USSR, was overthrown by putschists under the leadership of the Vice-President, Genady Yanayev, seized power, and promulgated an emergency for six months. But by 21 August 1991 Gorbachev was able to control the putschists and regained control of Soviet Union. The coup attempt on 19 August 1991 severely jolted Soviet society and it is bound to affect foreign policy as well. The defeat of the putschists swept away from the Soviet political scene the Communist Party, which had been the main opposition force to Gorbachev's democratic reform at home and his foreign policy of 'new thinking'.²³

Immediately after the coup the three Baltic republics of Soviet Union - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - declared themselves sovereign and independent. Soviet Union reluctantly agreed the sovereignty of these republics and within days they were admitted in the United Nations. The days which followed witnessed the declaration of independence by other republics of the Soviet Union. But the Soviet leaders managed to keep the republics in a loose confederation. The accelerating process of transformation of the monolithic Soviet Union into a loose

23. Vladimir Radyuhin, "Soviet Move for Active Role in West Asia", The Hindu, 13 October 1991.

confederation of sovereign nations is bound to reduce its political weight in international affairs.²⁴

The immediate concern of the world community to the disintegration of USSR was its nuclear weapons positioned in various republics.

Battlefield nuclear arms scattered all over the country are far more difficult to control than strategic weapons stationed in just three republics - the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Moreover, some republics are not averse to keeping nuclear arms to themselves as additional guarantee of their sovereignty.²⁵

Following the signing of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on 31 July 1991, most experts agreed that both sides would take a long break before resuming talks.²⁶ But during the failed coup attempt in Moscow, USA played down their concern that thousands of tactical nuclear weapons spread throughout the Soviet Union could fall into the wrong hands.²⁷ USA realised this fact and on 27 September 1991 announced that the United States will eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons on land and at sea in Europe and Asia. As per the

24. Ibid.

25. Vladimir Radyuhin, "Will Bush's Plan to Tilt the Balance in US Favour?", The Hindu, 4 October 1991.

26. Ibid.

27. Michael R. Gordon, "The Nuclear Spector", New York Times, 28 September 1991.

unilateral announcement, the United States will withdraw all of its ground-launched short range nuclear missiles and artillery to the United States. They and those stored in the United States will be destroyed. Tactical nuclear weapons including nuclear cruise missiles, will be removed from ship and attack-submarines and from land-based naval aircraft. Some will be destroyed; others will be placed in storage. Strategic bombers will be removed from day to day alert status and their weapons will be returned to storage. Development of short-range attack missiles and the mobile launch intercontinental ballistic missile system will be cancelled.²⁸

This was the most one-sided cut in nuclear arms by any power and reflected the dramatically changed world environment since the collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.²⁹ Explaining the importance of unilateral reduction, President Bush said, "We now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union".³⁰

The US President, George Bush, has certainly taken a decisive step towards the creation of a new world order by presenting a carefully packaged sheaf of arms control proposals

28. New York Times, 28 September 1991.

29. Ibid.

30. Quoted in *ibid.*

that are essentially designed to change nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union. As we have seen in the first chapter, taking the advantage of the unparalleled opportunity for peace moves, which the collapse of the Soviet style communism has now thrown up as a beneficial fallout, United States proposed partial nuclear disarmament as a realistic means of lowering the temperature in the relations between Washington and Moscow.

Significantly, the latest Bush initiative will make no difference to the Star War programme and the sea oriented long range nuclear weapons.³¹ The Bush proposal was a sequel to an event with global consequences, there will now be pressures on the other nuclear powers to start negotiations on reducing their own respective nuclear arsenals.

Following the Bush proposals, Britain declared that it is also scrapping short range nuclear missiles. Under the proposals, Britain's 12 Lance short range nuclear missile launchers would be destroyed along with seventy missiles.

On 5 October, Gorbachev announced sweeping cuts in tactical nuclear weapons on land and sea to match reductions announced by the US President. Soviet Union would liquidate all nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, moved nuclear-tipped zenith

31. The Hindu, 30 September 1991.

missiles to a central base and destroy some of them, remove all tactical nuclear weapons from ships and from multipurpose submarines.

On 17 October 1991 NATO also decided to cut down its short range nuclear arsenals by 80 per cent. Through this the NATO has decided to add its own mite to the current process of nuclear disarmament. To this extent NATO has opened a third front for global peace, with Soviet leader Gorbachev's wholesome response to the Bush initiative having already thrown open a second frontier in the efforts towards an ultimate goal of a nuclear weapons free world. The dissolution of Warsaw Pact several months ago, as well as the Soviet Union's correlative commitment to pull out of the territory of the erstwhile Germany, have virtually averted the need for more focal points in this unfolding series of Euro-Atlantic moves.

The NATO leaders on 7 November 1991 in their meeting in Rome approved a new military strategy, calling for fewer soldiers, more mobile units and less reliance on nuclear weapons. The summit meeting endorsed a new policy that acknowledges the reduction of Soviet Union as a military threat. The document mentioned that "the monolithic, massive and potential threat which was a principal concern of the alliance in its first forty years has disappeared".³² The reference was surely the collapse of communism and USSR.

32. Ibid., 9 November 1991.

The alliance also divided on the issue of out of area role. America wanted to extend the NATO's area of action beyond the defence of its 16 members. But President Francois Mitterand of France opposed the idea because he felt that NATO should not become a world policeman. "The NATO treaty could not be applied, outside its geographical area without a new treaty"³³ he told the summit. This is a welcome development as far as the international security is concerned.

The next aspect which is moulding the international security is the Third World Arms race and nuclear energy development. The London summit of G-7 countries in July 1991 invested the newly well managed UN, tested in the Gulf crisis, with a new supranational role, threatened the potential proliferators with serious consequences, and decided to almost fix for every country quotas for tanks and fighters.

With the end of the Cold War and the new relationship between the USA and the USSR with the latter helplessly dependent upon the former - there has been a significant narrowing of their differences over Third World conflicts and arms race. The USSR increasingly the supplicant, is unable and unwilling to provide counterveiling power. Instead both the countries emphasise the danger of nuclear arms race in other regions.³⁴ The recent initiatives of USA regarding the nuclear development

33. Ibid.

34. Times of India, 5 August 1991.

of Pakistan and India can be viewed in this context. Inevitably, the emphasis has shifted from super power nuclear disarmament or arms reduction to prevent proliferation, basically in the Third World.

With the dramatic reductions of their own, the US and USSR are now in a much better position to get the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extended indefinitely in 1995, demand universal adherence to the NPT and strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency verification procedures by making them more intrusive and stringent with the experience now being gained in disarming Iraq.³⁵

According to Jasjit Singh in the evolving international order and under pressure from both within and outside, the South which has always been heterogenous, could splinter further.

Their ability to coordinate collective approaches would erode further. Fractionalisation of the South would also retard the slow pace of development and increase the North-South gap. In the long run this would have a debilitating and even destabilising effect not only of the international³⁶ system at all levels but even of the North.

It implies the necessity of better North-South cooperation for a stable international order.

The post Gulf War security depends primarily on what type of regional and world order emerges. During the Gulf crisis,

35. Rajmohan, n.18.

36. Jasjit Singh, "Towards a New International Order", Strategic Analysis, vol.14, no.7, October 1991, p.777.

President Bush made many references to the new world order which would emerge after the end of the crisis. The talk of a new world order is related to the new regional order in the Middle East since all the major actors in the world politics in one way or other interested in the developments in the Middle East.

The idea of new world order had emerged during the height of the Gulf crisis. The convincing victory of the MNF was the foundation of the new world order. The action of Saddam Hussein on 2 August 1990 was a challenge to the emerging world order according to the American view.³⁷

An assessment of the 'new' order can be comprehended by comparing it with the 'old' order. As we have seen in the first chapter the old order was characterised by the Cold War in which nation states were divided on the basis of ideology, the way of life and difference of Soviet communism and US capitalism on the other.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the ceasing of USSR as potential threat to American and Western interests smoothen the way for the emergence of a new world order.

Even though the Cold War ended before the Gulf crisis, the type of world order America envisaged had begun evolving only after the end of the Gulf crisis. Before the crisis USA

37. USIS, Official Text, 3 October 1991.

was doubtful about the other countries including USSR. But the active support the USA got from other countries dared it to go for a new world order. The Soviet support to the US in the UN gave an opportunity to USA to decide the course of events in the Middle East during the Gulf crisis and through this USA automatically acquired the status of the sole super power.

While addressing the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 2 October 1990 the American President Bush said,

...we have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the cold war. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations. A partnership united by principle and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace and reduce arms... see a world of open borders, open trade, and - most importantly - open minds. A world that celebrates the common heritage that belongs to all the world's people, taking pride not just in hometown or homeland but in humanity itself... I see a new world... whole and free.³⁸

According to Samuel P. Huntington, in the new world order,

there are changes in the distribution of power in the international system. These include: the relative decline in American economic power after World War II; the rise of Japanese economic power; the unification of Germany and the consolidation of its position as the pre-eminent West European power; the rise of locally dominant powers in many Third World regimes; the general diffusion of economic and military capabilities

38. Ibid., 2 October 1991.

in the Third World; and the social mobilization of publics in the Third World. Most significant and dramatic of the power changes, however, is the decline and perhaps collapse of Soviet power, now manifest in its economic weakness and its withdrawal from Eastern Europe.³⁹

In his most elaborate speech on new world order todate - the one made at the Maxwell Airforce Base in Alabama on 13 April 1991 - Bush was not thinking in terms of a novel "blue print that will govern the conduct of nations or some superstructural structure or institution. Nor would his ideas erode the national sovereignty interests of the United States in any manner".⁴⁰ P.S.Suryanarayan says, "New World Order" is buzzword of Bush for the US foreign policy goals in the post Cold War era.⁴¹

It is, therefore, not inconceivable that an international organization acceptable to the major powers - as the UN was during the recent Gulf crisis - could easily replace any one country, the US for instance, as the harbinger of a new world order. In this scenario, the US may at best get a chance to play the role of a first power among equals. Because, the receding ideological rivalries of the recent past cannot easily give way to an old-fashioned quest for imperial style pre-eminence on the world stage in the new age of political enlightenment that we are passing through.⁴²

39. Samuel P.Huntington, "America's Changing Strategic Interests" Survival (London), vol.33, no.1, January/February 1991, p.6.

40. P.S.Suryanarayana, "Mr.Bush and New World Order", The Hindu, 23 October 1991.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

"The US is certainly the most balanced of all the great powers but it is in no position unilaterally to determine the structure of a new world order."⁴³ "It is true", as Paul Kennedy says, "that in the twenty first century the relative power of the United States will be less. But no nation will have greater power".⁴⁴ As we have seen in the previous chapter USA had to expend considerable political energy to hold the alliance which fought against Iraq in the Gulf. This surely shows American envisaged world order has its own limitations. Thus the argument of unipolarity is not so correct. Robert S. McNamara says, "for the first time, no nation and no group of nations will be able to stand alone economically, technologically environmentally, politically or militarily".⁴⁵ He envisages that the new relationship will be:

...one of mutual security instead of war-fighting; with vastly smaller nuclear forces, no more than a few hundred weapons in place of fifty thousand; with conventional forces in balance and in defensive rather than offensive postures...⁴⁶

We have already seen how the UN security system was manipulated to achieve the war aims of US and allies. With the

43. C.Rajamohan, "New World Order: Myth of American Hegemony", Times of India, 21 March 1991.

44. Robert S.MacNamara, Out of the Cold (New York, 1989), p.193.

45. Ibid., p.186.

46. Ibid., p.192.

weakening of the UN system the international peace and security would be in jeopardy. Hence it is imperative for the successful maintenance of New World Order, that the UN structure should be revamped so as to meet any threat to international peace and security. International security organs of the UN will need to be transformed if the organisation is to seize this unique opportunity of reverting to its original purpose of international peace and security.

In the emerging world, international security is heavily dependent on the United Nations Security Council. The Gulf war showed that for effective deterrence and a peaceful world order adequate military means at the disposal of UN is necessary. In the coming world the nation states should be secured by the capacity of the UN to guarantee their freedom through collective measures. The Gulf war showed that the multinational forces are not viable unless vital interests of one or major military powers are at risk. In the future the Security Council should have the capacity to take collective measures essential for the maintenance of peace in a new world order. A military force under the UN should be created for the enforcement of new world order.

Conclusion

From this we can say that the 'new world' may be a brave new world of disarmament and also there may not be any

place for force. Rule of law should become an acceptable and practical reality in our international relations. A global system of rule of law based on the UN Charter. World security should be ensured by the lowest possible of arms. The world will move towards a safer and more stable world.

The world is moving towards a new order based on the balance of interests and cooperation. The ball has been set rolling and in terms of global stability and greater security the chances for peace are going to be tremendously boosted.

In a period of rapid changes it is not easy to state with any degree of certainty as to what shape the paradigm of international order will adopt. At this stage we can assert with confidence only to the extent that the old order is certainly dead; the Cold War has ended. The order that will replace the bipolar system is still in the process of evolution.

According to Jasjit Singh, the evolving international system is polycentric which indicates a complex, pluralist system characterised by a number of centres of power trying to achieve a balance of interests rather than classical balance of power model. New international order will continue to be characterised by change and uncertainty.

Samuel P. Huntington put the emerging world as unimultipolar in which only United States could be called super power with various power centres in other parts of the world.

All these arguments demonstrated that the urgency of both the quest for democracy and responsive government and the insistant demand by millions for social justice and respect for the fundamental rights of the peoples and the nations. The world may now sleep better with the knowledge that many of the nuclear weapons would be taken off the alert status, thus reducing the dangers of an unintended or accidental nuclear war.

Chapter V

CONCLUSIONS

The post Second World War security structure was characterised by the ideological rivalry between USA and USSR and their quest for the domination of the world resulting in Cold War and a bipolar international system. The nuclear revolution and the arms race that followed the Second World War totally changed the international security putting the world into two armed camps - East and West. This led to perpetual fear of an incidental war and a shadow of nuclear confrontation.

But the coming of Gorbachev into power in USSR and his new thinking in international relations changed the focus from arms race to a nuclear free world. His new thinking in international relations coupled with perestroika and glasnost drastically changed the world security structure. The conducting of the INF Treaty (1987) in Geneva and the Arms Reduction Treaty (1990) in Paris leading to the end of the Cold War.

The principles of freedom of choice, non-interference and non-use of force in the internal affairs adopted by Gorbachev, brought about collapse of communism in the Eastern Europe and led to the emergence of democracy in this sensitive area. The unification of Germany and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact were the other developments which changed the international security environment. In the improved security environment US, USSR, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries agreed to cut down their

military expenditure. This trend continued till the outbreak of the Gulf crisis in August 1990.

The enhanced cooperation between the East and the West helped the UN sponsored negotiated settlements to solve regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Namibia, Western Sahara, Cyprus and even the Iran-Iraq war.

While the world in general was changing for the better because of arms reduction and the policy of detente and the end of Cold War, the Middle East security continued to be a complex problem, inspite of the end of Iran-Iraq war. The arms race, Palestinian issue, Arab-Isaeli conflict and the disproportionate power equation among the Middle East countries continued to create uncertainty in the security structure of the region. In spite of the formulation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a collective security mechanism for the member countries, the super powers continued to compete over the Middle East even after the end of the Cold War.

It was under these circumstances that Iraq gained a major-power status in the Middle East with the end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988. With its enhanced position in the Middle East Iraq began dictating terms - both political and economic - to the other Gulf countries.

Compelled by its own domestic problems Iraq attacked and annexed Kuwait, a militarily weak country. The Iraqi attack

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invited unprecedented response from the world community. The United Nations passed a series of resolutions condemning the Iraqi invasion and urged for an early withdrawal from Kuwait. The role played by the United Nations in the Gulf crisis was hence unique and unparalleled in the history of the world organisation.

The response of the international community was unprecedented. Under the leadership of the US the multinational forces acting under the authority of the UN resolution pushed Iraq out of Kuwait. The poor response of NAM, Arab League, and the other peace loving organisations provided a blank cheque to the US allied forces to attack Iraq.

As a result of the Gulf crisis, the Arab world was divided into those who favoured an Arab solution to the crisis and those who favoured an international military action to restore Kuwait's sovereignty and independence. The Arab Cooperation Council in which Iraq and Egypt were the major partners, virtually became defunct as Egypt joined the America led Multinational Forces against Iraq.

Iraq's linking of the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories to its withdrawal from Kuwait has put the Palestinian issue back into the political agenda. The Madrid Peace Conference and the initiatives which aim to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine issue are clearly the outcomes of the Gulf crisis.

The American control over the security structure of the Gulf enhanced after the Gulf war. The UN ceasefire resolution, called for the destruction and removal of the nuclear and chemical weapons of the already decimated Iraqi military. It also prohibited Iraq from developing ballistic missile systems.

Even after destroying the Iraqi military infrastructure the American led forces carved out havens inside Iraqi territory in the name of human rights to help Kurdish rebels. This further weakened the power of Iraq and put it in a defensive stance at least for a while.

USA further tightened its hold over the Gulf because of its military agreements with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. On the other hand, the importance of USSR in the security set up of the Middle East declined as Russia refused to help Iraq and Syria joined the American allies.

The Gulf war projects the USA as the only super power dictating its terms on international security. The US led MNF misused the UN resolution 678 to achieve its own political aims. The MNF destroyed the entire infrastructure of Iraq while it was never envisaged in the UN resolution. The arbitrary involvement of USA in Kurdish insurgency demonstrates the ambiguous use of military power by the USA.

An analysis of the American involvement in the Gulf crisis reveals that the free flow of oil, viable governments in the Middle

East, destruction of regional hegemony and establishment of a permanent military presence were the main factors which conditioned the American response.

The Gulf war has many serious repercussions on the world security set up. In the Gulf a defeated Iraq, with its sovereignty vastly abridged stands precariously on the brink of disintegration. At the apex, the Arab League was divided and the GCC was not in a position to ensure security of its member states. The resultant instability in the region would strengthen the Israeli position, the natural enemy of the Arabs. Moreover, with Soviet Union being disinterested in the Gulf due to its own internal problems, USA is now in a position to exert its views on the Gulf region. The reintroduction of Palestinian question, and American initiatives would force Israel to compromise its position with regard to the state of Palestine.

The invasion of Kuwait, no doubt, was a challenge to the UN Charter. Since the Iraqi action was in violation of UN Charter the right approach to solve the crisis would have been to deal with it through the collective efforts of all the interested parties within the UN framework. The choice of a military response by some states to implement the UN resolutions weakened the UN as an organisation. It also brought to the fore the role of the great powers within the United Nations. The entire crisis and its management highlighted the limited role

of the Third World countries at international level.

The above resume of the world security indicates that though the Gulf war has ended, the Middle East security structure continues to be complex. During the Gulf war major share of Iraqi military capability had been destroyed. The UN cease-fire resolution prohibited Iraq from acquiring new weapons of mass destruction including nuclear and chemical weapons. Iran has got the control of Shat-al-Arab waterways and the threat of Iraq to its sovereignty has diminished. Iran has already resumed diplomatic relations with other countries. Syria has got control over Lebanon and its position in Middle East has strengthened. Thus Iran, Syria and Egypt are now in a position to assert their superiority in the Middle East.

Egypt's role is further strengthened with the defeat of Iraq. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue remains without any solution. Israel is still occupying the Arab territories.

The arms race in the Middle East is still going on. There is no agreement among the countries of the Middle East for arms control. The US forces and multinational forces are expected to remain in the Middle East for an undetermined period. All these factors further compounds the Middle Eastern security system. A viable security arrangement is yet to emerge.

At the same time the nature of international security is also undergoing changes. The US led MNF won a decisive victory in the Gulf. It was the military capacity of the USA which was demonstrated in the war. By deploying the most sophisticated weapons in the war USA proved its military superiority. The victory prompted George Bush to think in terms of a new world order. In fact it is an order aimed to establish American superiority throughout the world or order the world according to American wishes. The fact that the USA had to spend a lot of energy to obtain financial support from the Gulf countries and countries like Japan and Germany for the war preparations indicates the inherent weakness of the American economy. The US economy cannot bear the burden of a limited escalation as was seen in the Gulf war against Iraq. The Gulf crisis witnessed the growth of transnationalisation of the US, European and Japanese economies in the war effort. It showed that America was not in a position to undertake a big military exercise like the Gulf war. It established that military superiority without economic support would find difficulty to sustain. This shows that the international security is moving from military security to economic security.

Another factor affecting the security system is the multipolarity of the international security structure. America still continues to be the military super power. Japan and

Germany are in a new assertive mood in international relations. The Conference on security in Europe is trying to devise its own security structure for the Europe. With the dismantling of Warsaw Treaty Organisation and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and USSR, the Western countries have lost a common unifying factor. It will naturally split the Western unity. USSR is also heading towards virtual disintegration and is on the brink of an economic disaster. In this situation nothing concrete can be said (at present) about the patterns of international security that would emerge in future. The international security continues to be in a state of flux, with America as single military power center, and Japan and Germany as the upcoming economic power centres.

Thus the international security in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis is marked by alignments and realignments of forces both at military and economic levels. It is only with the passage of time that a clear pattern of security system would emerge. Till then the world system would remain in a state of uncertainty.

Appendix

RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEALING WITH GULF CRISIS

i) Resolution 660 (2 August 1990)

The Security Council

Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq,

Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990;
3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States;
4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution.

ii) Resolution 661 (6 August 1990)

The Security Council

Affirming its Resolution 660 (1990),

Deeply concerned that this resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait continues with further loss of human life and material destruction,

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with resolution 660 (1990),

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Determines that Iraq so far has

failed to comply with operative paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

2. Decides as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with operative paragraph 2 and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

3. Decides that all States shall prevent;

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including, in particular, any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products.

4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public

utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and, in special humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.

5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 2(b) of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations;

(a) to examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of this resolution which will be submitted by the Secretary General;

(b) to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the provisions laid down in this resolution;

7. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

8. Requests the Secretary General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for these purposes;

9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8, nothing in this resolution shall prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States;

(a) to take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies; and

(b) not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying power;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days;

11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the invasion by Iraq.

iii) Resolution 662 (9 August 1990)

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 660(1990) and 661(1990),

Gravely alarmed by the declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait,

Demanding, once again, that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990.

Determined to bring the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,

Determined also to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

1. Decides that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void,

2. Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation,

3. Further demands that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait,

4. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occupation.

iv) Resolution 664 (18 August 1990)

The Security Council

Recalling the Iraqi invasion and purported annexation of Kuwait and Resolutions 660, 661 and 662.

Deeply concerned for the safety and well-being of third State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under international law,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to pursue urgent consultations with the Government of Iraq following the concern and anxiety expressed by the members of the Council on 17 August 1990,

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

1. Demands that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of the nationals of third countries and grant immediate and continuing access of consular officials to such nationals,

2. Further demands that Iraq take no action to jeopardise the safety, security or health of such nationals,

3. Reaffirms its decision in Resolution 662 (1990) that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void, and therefore demands that the Government of Iraq rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel, and refrain from any such actions in the future,

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on compliance with this resolution at the earliest possible time.

v) Resolution 665 (25 August 1990)

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661(1990), 662(1990) and 664(1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation,

Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Determined to bring an end to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of a Member State and to restore the legitimate authority, and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait which requires the speedy implementation of the above resolutions,

Deploring the loss of innocent life stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined to prevent further such losses,

Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 and 664 and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using Iraqi flag vessels to export oil.

1. Calls upon those Member States co-ordinating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 661 (1990),

2. invites Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the provisions of Resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above,

3. Requests all States to provide in accordance with Charter such assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 of this resolution,

4. Further requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above paragraph of this resolution using as appropriate mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its Committee Established Under Resolution 661(1990) to facilitate the Monitoring of the Implementation of this Resolution,

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

vi) Resolution 666 (13 September 1990)

The Security Council

Recalling its resolution 661(1990), paragraphs 3(c) and 4 of which apply, except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs,

Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering,

Noting that in this respect the Committee established under paragraph 6 of that resolution has received communications from several Member States,

Emphasizing that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the Committee, to determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen,

Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of the safety and well-being of third State nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not for the purposes of paragraph 3(c) and paragraph 4 of resolution 661(1990) humanitarian circumstances have arisen the Committee shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant review;

2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664 (1990) in respect of third State nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in accordance with international humanitarian law including where applicable, the Fourth Geneva Convention;

3. Requests for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution, that the Secretary-General, seek urgently and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the Committee regularly;

4. Requests further that in seeking and supplying such information particular attention will be paid to such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly;

5. Decides that the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve sufferings, it will report promptly to the Council its decision as to how such need should be met;

6. Directs the Committee that in formulating its decisions it should bear in mind that foodstuffs should be provided through the United Nations in co-operation with the humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and distribution of foodstuffs to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the provisions of this and other relevant resolutions;

8. Recalls that resolution 661 (1990) does not apply to supplies intended for medical purposes, but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the strict supervision of the Government of the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian agencies.

vii) Resolution 667 (16 September 1990)

The Security Council

Reaffirming its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662 (1990), 664(1990), 665(1990) and 666(1990).

Recalling the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations and of April 1963 on consular relations, to both of which Iraq is a party,

Considering that the decision of Iraq to order the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and to withdraw the immunity and privileges of these missions and their personnel is contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, the international conventions mentioned above and international law,

Deeply concerned that Iraq, notwithstanding the decisions of the Security Council and the provisions of the conventions mentioned above, has committed acts of violence against diplomatic missions and their personnel in Kuwait,

Outraged at recent violations by

Iraq of diplomatic premises in Kuwait and at the abduction of personnel enjoying diplomatic immunity and foreign nationals who were present in these premises,

Considering that the above actions by Iraq constitute aggressive acts and a flagrant violation of its international obligations which strike at the root of the conduct of international relations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that Iraq is fully responsible for any use of violence against foreign nationals or against any diplomatic or consular missions or its personnel,

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Further considering that the grave nature of Iraq's actions, which constitute a new escalation of its violations of international law, obliges the Council not only to express its immediate action but also to consider further concrete measures to ensure Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions.

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns aggressive acts perpetrated by Iraq against diplomatic premises and personnel in Kuwait, including the abduction of foreign nationals who were present in those premises,

2. Demanding the immediate release of those foreign nationals, as well as all nationals mentioned in resolution 664(1990),

3. Further demands that Iraq immediately and fully comply with its international obligations under resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990) and 664(1990), of the Security Council, the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations and international law,

4. Further demands that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq and take no action to hinder the diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interest,

5. Reminds all States that they are obliged to observe strictly resolutions 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990) and 666(1990),

6. Decides to consult urgently to take further concrete measures as soon as possible, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in response to Iraq's continued violation of the Charter, of resolutions of the Council and of international law.

viii) Resolution 669 (24 September 1990)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 661(1990) of 6 August 1990,

Recalling also Article 58 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have been received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Entrusts the committee established under resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.

ix) Resolution 670 (27 September 1990)

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its Resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990), 664 (1990), 665(1990), 666(1990) and 667(1990),

Condemning Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait, its failure to rescind its actions and end its purported annexation and its holding of third State nationals against their will, in flagrant violation of resolutions 660(1990), 664(1990) and 667(1990) and of international humanitarian law,

Condemning further the treatment by Iraqi forces of Kuwait nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country and mistreatment of persons and property in Kuwait in violation of international law,

Noting with grave concern the persistent attempts to evade the measures laid down in Resolution 661(1990),

Further noting that a number of States have limited the number of Iraqi diplomatic and consular officials in their countries and that others are planning to do so,

Determined to ensure by all necessary means the strict and complete application of the measures laid down in Resolution 661(1990),

Determined to ensure respect for its decisions and the provisions of Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Affirming that any acts of the Government of Iraq which are contrary to the above-mentioned resolutions or to Articles 25 or 48 of the Charter of the United Nations, such as Decree No.377 of the Revolution Command Council of Iraq of 16 September 1990, are null and void,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's use of his good offices to advance a peaceful resolution based on the relevant Security Council resolutions and noting with appreciation his continuing efforts to this end,

Underlining to the Government of Iraq that its continued failure to comply with the terms of Resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 666(1990) and 667(1990) could lead to further serious action by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations including under Chapter VII,

Recalling the provisions of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls upon all States to carry out their obligations to ensure strict and complete compliance with Resolution 661 (1990) and in particular, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 thereof;

2. Confirms that Resolution 661(1990) applies to all means of transport, including aircraft;

3. Decides that all States, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted before the date of the present resolution, shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the Committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) and in accordance with Resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical purposes or solely for UNIIMOG;

4. Decides further that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory unless;

(a) the aircraft lands at an air-field designated by that State outside Iraq or Kuwait in order to permit its inspection to ensure that there is no cargo on board in violation of Resolution 661(1990) or the present resolution, and for this purpose the aircraft may be detained for as long as necessary, or

(b) the particular flight has been approved by the committee established by Resolution 661(1990), or

(c) the flight is certified by the United Nations as solely for the purposes of UNIIMOG;

5. Decides that the State shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any aircraft registered in its territory or operated by an operator who has his principal place of business or permanent residence in its territory complies with the provisions of Resolution 661(1990) and the present resolution;

6. Decides further that all States shall notify in a timely fashion the committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) of any flight between its territory and Iraq or Kuwait to which the requirement to land in paragraph 4 above does not apply, and the purposes for such a flight;

7. Calls upon all States to co-operate in taking such measures as may be necessary, consistent with international law, including the Chicago Convention, to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of Resolution 661(1990) or the present resolution;

8. Calls upon all States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their ports and which are being or have been used in violation of Resolution 661(1990), or to deny such ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognised under international law as necessary to safeguard human life;

9. Reminds all States of their obligations under Resolution 661(1990) with regard to the freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to the committee established under Resolution 661 (1990), regarding those assets;

10. Calls upon all States to provide to the committee established under Resolution 661(1990) information regarding the action taken by them to implement the provisions laid down in the present resolution;

11. Affirms that the United Nations Organisation, the specialised agencies and other international organisations in the United Nations system are required to take such measures as may be necessary to give effect to the terms of Resolution 661 (1990) and this resolution;

12. Decides to consider, in the event of evasion of the provisions of Resolution 661(1990) or the present resolution by a State or its nationals or through its territory, measures directed at the State in question to prevent such evasion;

13. Reaffirms that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a high contracting party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all terms and, in particular, is liable under the Convention in respect to the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches.

x) Resolution 674(29 October 1990)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990), 666(1990), 667(1990) and 670(1990),

Stressing the urgent need for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait, for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and of the authority of its legitimate government,

Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces to take third-State nationals hostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwait and third-State nationals, and the other actions reported to the Security Council such as the destruction of Kuwaiti demographic records, the forced departure of Kuwaitis, the relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful destruction and seizure of public and private property in Kuwait, including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation of the Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law,

Expressing grave alarm over the situation of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of the diplomatic and consular missions of such States,

Reaffirming that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the Convention Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who commit or order the commission of grave breaches,

Recalling the efforts of the Secretary-General concerning the safety and well-being of third-State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,

Deeply concerned at the economic cost and at the loss and suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait and Iraq as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

* * *

Reaffirming the goal of the international community of maintaining international peace and security by seeking to resolve international disputes and conflicts through peaceful means,

Recalling the important role that the United Nations and its Secretary-General have played in the peaceful solution of disputes and conflicts in conformity with the provisions of the Charter,

Alarmed by the dangers of the present crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, which directly threaten international peace and security, and seeking to avoid any further worsening of the situation,

Calling upon Iraq to comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular its resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990) and 664(1990).

Reaffirming its determination to ensure compliance by Iraq with the Security Council resolutions by maximum use of political and diplomatic means,

A

1. Demands that the Iraqi authorities and occupying forces immediately cease and desist from taking third-State nationals hostage, mistreating and oppressing Kuwaiti and third-State nationals and any other actions, such as those reported to the Security Council and described above, that violate the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law;

2. Invites States to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them on the grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph 1 above and to make this information available to the Security Council;

3. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately fulfil its obligations to third-State nationals in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, under the Charter, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, general principles of international law and the relevant resolutions of the Council;

4. Also reaffirms its demand that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of those third-State nationals, including diplomatic and consular personnel, who wish to leave;

5. Demands that Iraq ensure the immediate access to food, water and basic services necessary to the protection and well-being of Kuwaiti nationals and of nationals of third States in Kuwait and Iraq, including the personnel of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait;

6. Reaffirms its demand that Iraq immediately protect the safety and well-being of diplomatic and consular personnel and premises in Kuwait and in Iraq, take no action to hinder these diplomatic and consular missions in the performance of their functions, including access to their nationals and the protection of their person and interests and rescind its orders for the closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the withdrawal of the immunity of their personnel;

7. Requests the Secretary-General, in the context of the continued exercise of his good offices concerning the safety and well being of third-State nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, to seek to achieve the objectives of paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 above and in particular the provision of food, water and basic services to Kuwaiti nationals and to the diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait and the evacuation of third-State nationals;

8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;

9. Invites States to collect relevant information regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in accordance with international law;

10. Requires that Iraq comply with the provisions of the present resolution and its previous resolutions, failing which the Security Council will need to take further measures under the Charter;

11. Decides to remain actively and permanently seized of the matter until Kuwait has regained its independence and peace has been restored in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

B

12. Reposes its trust in the Secretary-General to make available his good offices and, as he considers appropriate, to pursue them and to undertake diplomatic efforts in order to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on the basis of Security Council resolutions 660(1990), 662(1990) and 664(1990), and calls upon all States, both those in the region and others, to pursue on this basis their efforts to this end, in conformity with the Charter, in order to improve the situation and restore peace, security and stability;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the results of his good offices and diplomatic efforts.

xi) Resolution 677 (28 November 1990)

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660(1990) of 2 August 1990, 662(1990) of 9 August and 674(1990) of 29 October 1990,

Reiterating its concern for the suffering cause to individuals to Kuwait as a result of the invasion and

occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,

Gravely concerned at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

2. Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the population register of Kuwait, the authenticity of

which has been certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait and which covers the registration of the population up to 1 August 1990;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, in co-operation with the legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules and Regulations governing access to and use of the said copy of the population register.

xii) Resolution 678 (30 November 1990)

The Security Council

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990), 666(1990), 667(1990), 669(1990), 670(1990), 674(1990), and 677(1990),

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660(1990) and the above subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Council,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of this resolution;

4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

xiii) Resolution 687

Belgium, Zaire, France, Romania, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution,

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660(1990), 661(1990), 662(1990), 664(1990), 665(1990), 666(1990), 667(1990), 669(1990), 670(1990), 674(1990), 677(1990), 678(1990) and 686(1991),

Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate government,

Affirming the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the member states cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678(1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686(1991),

Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait,

Taking note of the letter sent by the foreign minister of Iraq on 27 February 1991 (S/22275) and those sent pursuant to resolution 686(1991) (S/22273, S/22276, S/22320, S/22321 and S/22330),

Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign states, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 "Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters," thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the charter and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the state of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the prime minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,

Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the Use in war of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the declaration adopted by all states participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held at Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

Recalling further that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,

Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this convention,

Noting moreover the importance of all states adhering to this convention and encouraging its forthcoming review conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

Concerned by the reports in the hands of member states that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons program contrary to its obligations under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Conscious of the threat which all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the states of the region,

Noting that resolution 686(1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661(1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686(1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the secretary general of 20 March 1991 (S/22366) and 28 March 1991 (S/22409), and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent council resolutions,

Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the charter,

1. Affirms all 13 resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire;

A

2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters," signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, U.N.Treaty Series, 1964;

3. Calls on the secretary general to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;

4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the charter;

B

5. Requests the secretary general, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a U.N. observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one state to the other; and for the secretary general to report regularly to the council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone of potential threats to peace;

6. Notes that as soon as the secretary general notifies the council of the completion of the deployment of the U.N. observer unit, the conditions will be established for the member states cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678(1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686(1991);

C

7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research development, support and manufacturing facilities;

(b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the secretary general, within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;

(b) the secretary general, in consultation with the appropriate governments and, where appropriate, with the director general of the World Health Organization (W.H.O.), within 45 days of the passage of this resolution, shall develop, and submit to the council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within 45 days of such approval:

(i) the forming of a special commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the special commission itself;

(ii) the yielding by Iraq of possession to the special commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above including items at the additional locations designated by the special commission under paragraph 9(b)

(i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under supervision of the special commission, of all its missile capabilities including launchers as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;

(iii) the provision by the special commission of the assistance and cooperation to the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the secretary

general, in consultation with the special commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the council for approval within 120 days of the passage of this resolution;

11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968;

12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the secretary general and the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the IAEA, with the assistance and cooperation of the special commission as provided for in the plan of the secretary general discussed in paragraph 9(b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

13. Requests the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through the secretary general, with the assistance and cooperation of the special commission as provided for in the plan of the secretary general in paragraph 9(b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the special commission to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within 45 days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within 45 days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the agency's verification and inspections to confirm that IAEA safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the council for approval within 120 days of the passage of this resolution;

14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons;

D

15. Requests the secretary general to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property which Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

E

16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990, repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq scrupulously adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

18. Decides to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a commission that will administer the fund;

19. Directs the secretary general to develop and present to the council for decision, no later than 30 days following the adoption of this resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a program to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the council by the secretary general, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for

evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq's liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the commission designated above;

F

20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto, contained in resolution 661(1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the committee established by resolution 661(1990) or, with the approval of that committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the secretary general dated 20 March 1991 (S/22366), and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the committee;

21. Decides that the council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every 60 days in light of the policies and practices of the government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

22. Decides that upon the approval by the council of the program called for in paragraph 19 above and upon council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661(1990) shall have no further force or effect;

23. Decides that, pending action by the council under paragraph 22 above, the committee established under resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carryout the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;

24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the council, all states shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

(a) arms and related material of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;

(b) items specified and defined in paragraph 8 and paragraph 12 above not otherwise covered above;

(c) technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

(d) personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

25. Calls upon all states and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses, or any other arrangements;

26. Requests the secretary general, in consultation with appropriate governments, to develop within 60 days, for approval of the council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all states and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;

27. Calls upon all states to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;

28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22, 23, 24, and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case 120 days following passage of this resolution, taking into account Iraq's compliance with this resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;

29. Decides that all states, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any

contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661(1990) and related resolutions;

30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;

31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the secretary general apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

H

32. Requires Iraq to inform the council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism;

I

33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the secretary general and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the member states cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of this resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

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