

The Role Of Small States in International Relations

Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the
award of the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

ASHOK SWAIN

**Centre for International Politics Organisation and Disarmament
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067, India
1988**

476


JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT.

Telegram : JAYENU
Telephones : 652282
661444
661351
New Delhi-110 067




C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS", submitted by Ashok Swain in fulfilment of nine credits out of total requirements of twenty four credits for the Degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) of this University is his original work according to the best of my knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this university or of any other university.


(Prof. M.L. Sondhi)

Chairman


(Prof. K.P. Misra);

Supervisor

C O N T E N T S

	<u>PAGE NO.</u>
PREFACE	i-ii
<u>CHAPTERS</u>	
1. Introduction	1-19
2. Small States in the Contemporary International Relations	20-41
3. Commonwealth and Small States	42-63
4. Security of Small States	64-86
5. Socio-Economic Viability and Prospects of Survival	87-113
CONCLUSION	114-120
TABLES	121-124
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125-133

Preface


It is to note the discipline of international relations traditionally is most concerned with explaining the role of the great powers in the international system. Since the end of the 1970s, however, some scholars have been interested in the specific role played by small states and the action possibilities of these states. From the outset, research on small states in the international system has been hampered by the problem of a definition of its own subject matter. However, something of a consensus has recently emerged about taking a population of one million or less as the critical threshold, which criterion has also been used in this research work.

The chapter - 1 of the dissertation contains the debates on definition of small states and an overview of the subject. Chapter 2 discusses the role of the various international and regional organisations with a real or potential security role. Chapter -3 is concerned with the commonwealth's concern with small state. In the remaining two chapters we have attempted to give a detailed des-

cription of security aspect of small states and their socio-economic viability as well as prospects of their survival. We hope that we have succeeded in our attempt to focus on the problems of the small states, particularly in the present day world.

Every research activity involves a collective process. Mine is no exception. First of all, I owe a great debt of gratitude to my affable supervisor, Prof. K.P. Misra. I am extremely fortunate to have benefited from his valuable suggestions, constructive criticisms, friendly hospitality and unflagging interest and continuous support and encouragement at all stages of this work. I am extremely grateful to Prof. M.S. Rajan for his valuable suggestions and help at various stages. I owe a lot to his intellectual excellence.

My million thanks to my family members and relatives, especially to my parents, who stood by me through thick and thin. I take this opportunity to express my heart-felt thanks to all of my friends, for their friendlier suggestions and intellectual discussions. Last but not the least, I would like to thank Ms. Bhagawati and Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Arunachalam for taking pains in typing this dissertation


(ASHOK SWAIN)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Neither conventional nor customary international law has cared to define the quantitative attributes (area and population) of a state in the international system. They only call for a permanent population, a well-defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (i.e. exercise of independence in the matter of foreign policy and relations). In consequence, since the birth of the sovereign-nation-state system in the middle of the seventeenth century there have always been states of varying size whether in terms of area or population. The situation still remains unchanged although the sovereign-nation-state system has been in existence for the last three-and-a-half centuries and has witnessed tremendous vicissitudes during the period. There have also been some micro-states in Europe for centuries-Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, and San Marino. Of course, in practice, the international community has sought to ignore the existence of these states as the international system has been dominated by the Great and Medium Powers or governed by the self-judgement of "civilized" nations.¹

The existence of small states which are fully or

1. M.S. Rajan, "Small States and the Sovereign-Nation-State System", International Studies (New Delhi), Vol.25, No.1 (1988), p.1.

partially independent or of very small territories which want to attain a similar status is not a new phenomenon in international life. They have emerged, survived, disappeared, re-emerged through out history in one form or another, and their right to existence has not been challenged very often in the past merely on the ground that they are too small to merit a separate existence. "Infact, many have been integrated with bigger neighbours, or conquered by colonizers. However, a number of minor states have survived and asserted themselves, and a surprisingly large number are now in the process of emerging from a twilight zone of semi-separate or dependent existence," ¹²

In the past, small states more than once played a leading role, in world affairs. The Republic of Venice was a world power in the 15th Century, with a population under 150,000. It was also considered quite normal in the past to let small and insignificant states participate in world conferences. All the states of Europe which had participated in the war had the right to send plenipotentiaries to the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815, which meant the innumerable minor powers were represented,

2. Jacques Rapaport and others, ed. Small States and Territories; Status and Problems (New York, 1971), p.11.

including scores of independent German and Italian mini-states. Well-established small European states also have existed for a long time, without arousing any special controversy.

The element of smallness per se did not give rise to much concern or study. Apart from monographs on specific territories, interest usually centered on problems common to territories small and large: political questions, such as colonialism and self-determination; economic questions, such as development; social problems, such as race relations; educational problems such as brain drain, etc.

Interest in the consequences of smallness is a relatively new field, not only in the academic world,³ but also in the forums of international organizations. The first difficult question is that of defining smallness: where does smallness begin and where does it end?

Having power-hierarchy as the major criterion in his four-fold framework Robert O. Keohane ascribes the lowest place to the 'small' states. According to him, at the apex are the 'system determining states'

3. One of the first books to appear on this subject is 'Problems of Smaller Territories' edited by Burton Benedict, and published for Institute of Commonwealth Studies by the University of London, The Athlone Press, 1967.

(Great Powers) who through their foreign policy interactions play a critical role in shaping the nature of the international system. In the second category are the "system influencing states" (Secondary Powers) which cannot expect individually to alter a system, but may nevertheless be able to 'significantly influence' its nature through unilateral as well as multilateral actions. In the third category are the "system affecting states" (Middle Powers) which, acting alone, cannot hope to affect the system but can exert significant pressure on the system by working through small groups or international or regional organisations. In the last category are the "system ineffectual states" which neither individually nor collectively can influence the system of inter-state behaviour there in.⁴

so far as identification is concerned, in the first category, states like the U.S. and the USSR figure. In the second category are states like China, Japan, West Germany, U.K., India, and others. In the third category are states like Canada, Sweden, Brazil and Australia, etc. The least category includes those who must adjust their foreign policies to the external setting "with little

4. Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemma: Small States in International Politics", International Organisation (Stanford), vol.23(1969), pp. 1291-1310.

hope or rearranging it."⁵

Keohane has not spelt out the precise nature of the 'critical' role or 'significant' influence of these states. Nor is it easy to agree with him on the perenniality of the 'ineffectualness' of the last category in the international system, which is characterised by interpolation of varied interests. Further, some of the 'system ineffectual' states may create international instability, because of their fragile economic and political conditions; consequently, influence the other states or they might provide grounds for the penetration or intervention of competing powers leading to mutual adjustment or confrontation having global bearings.

While Keohane views the 'great', secondary', 'middle', and 'small' powers as discrete categories, Johan Galtung emphasises on the nature of interaction in his ranking of states in a global framework. Depicting the world as "consisting of states ranked according to a number of dimensions such as size, population, wealth, military power, degree of development, etc.", he maintains, that such ranking has tendency to be

5. Ralph Potterman, "Small Power Politics and International Relations", South-east Asia (London, 1975), p.10.

concordant.⁶ Thus in a world divided into 'topdogs' 'middle level' and 'underdogs' in descending order of capabilities, Galtung builds his paradigm of international stratification, wherein he opines that the world is pinned at the top and poised at the bottom, and the interaction patterns in this paradigm is that 'underdogs' depend on the 'topdogs', while the topdogs' interdepend among each other.

In a later contribution, Galtung substitutes "size" for rank concordance, equating 'topdogs', and 'under dogs' in terms of 'large' and 'small'. He concludes that "international politics....is a big power politics and that initiative is concentrated on the big and taken away from the small" because "if you think is over, it is only the USA and the USSR that really count the other countries are of little or no importance."⁷ Although Galtung's observation on international system is a highly stratified one, provides valuable insight into the structural and functional complexes of the states' interactions, his propositions need further elucidation and modification particularly his dismal and pessimistic view regarding the role of small states. The small states, being well aware of

6. Johan Galtung, "East-West Interaction Patterns", Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), Vol 3, No 3, (1966), pp 146-77

7. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, vol.8(1971), pp 81-117.

the structural differences that exist between them and the big states, through shrewd diplomatic and foreign policy manoeuvres "minimise the restrictions upon their freedom of actions and maximise the benefits they may derive.

Unlike Keohane and Galtung, some scholars have attempted to define small states as a separate analytic category on the basis of various quantitative and qualitative variables.

A first group of authors avoids the entire problem of definition, either because it seems irrelevant to them or because it seems impossible to solve. For reasons to be discussed below, both Annette Baker Fox and David Vital find a strict definition unnecessary or irrelevant. Others have found the problem of size so complex that they argue that a definition should not be sought. The seminar on smaller territories run by the Institute of Commonwealth Studies 1962-64 concluded that it proved impossible for the seminar to decide what "smallness" means with any precision. It is a comparative and not an absolute idea. Whatever scales of magnitude are employed seem arbitrary and it is difficult to pickout on them "where smallness begins or ends." Similar observation can be found in

the report from the Conference of the International Economic Association in 1957 on the economic consequences of the size of nations and in the study by Mario Hirsh on Benelux,⁸ to mention only a few examples.

For a second and a heterogeneous group the relationship between small states and greater powers cannot be explained by the size variable alone, but also depends on other variables such as the structure of the international system, the geographical position, and the domestic political system of the small state. Some authors also point out that the importance of size is much dependent on the issue in question. In general it can be said that this group of authors regards size in relative or relational terms. It can also be said that this observation leads to a de-emphasis of the size variable as such and points to the necessity of introducing other variables in the explanation of small states' relations with other states.

The third group concentrates on size as a perceptual problem. According to this view, states which perceive themselves as small are also-by definition-

8. Mario Hirsch, "La situation Internationale Des Petits Etats Des systems Politiques Penetres, L'exemple Des pays Du Benelux", Revue Francaise De Science Politique(Paris), vol.24 (1974) pp.1026-55.

small states. Robert L. Rothstein observes that "any definition which relies solely on objective or tangible criteria ends by aligning states along an extended power spectrum so that it can only be said that "B is stronger than A but weaker than C"⁹. This makes it impossible to separate a distinct group of small states, and for this reason Rothstein introduces a perceptual dimension, arguing that there is a psychological, as well as a material distinction between Great and Small Powers. . . . Thus, a small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics. Christmas - Moller carries this argument even further by arguing that the smallness of a state is often used by the decision-makers as a legitimating argument for the policy actually pursued.¹⁰

9. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliance and Small Powers (New York, 1968), pp. 23-30.

10. Wilhelm Christmas-Moller, Smastats forskning og Komparativ Udenrigspolitik: En Diskussion af to Forskningstilgange (Copenhagen, 1975), p.14

A fourth group points to the necessity of a differentiation of the size concept. In a bold attempt to integrate the various approaches to the problem of definition Raimo Vayrynen suggests a classificatory scheme containing five different dimensions along which to categorize small states : 11

1. Low rank/status, either as measured by 'hard' data or by perceptual data;
2. High degree of external penetration;
3. Specific type of behaviour;
4. Specific interest of small states compared with other states;
5. A specific role of small states, and in particular a specific role conception by the decision-makers of the small states.

Vayrynen does not find the five dimensions of equal importance and is inclined to regard rank and role as basic definitional elements and consider the interests approach as very promising, but to a large extent unexplored. A crucial question is, however, whether the states analyzed vary in the same way on the different dimensions, and in this respect Vayrynen is perhaps too optimistic. But the relationship between rank and role performance seems

11. Raimo Vayrynen, "On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1971) pp 91-102.

much worthy of further research.¹²

The difficulties underlying the definitional issue of small states thus seem to be far too many; so much so, that even as late as 1974 Baehr concluded that whatever be the criterion, small states formed too broad a category for purpose of analysis and that it was virtually futile to conceptualise the category of small state¹³. Notwithstanding these definitional problems, certain general observations can still be made and a workable definition can be provided for.

So I took the view that it would be wise to avoid the seemingly inconclusive debate about what was true essence of a small state and decided as a result to impose a definition on my research work. The task was made easier by the fact that something of a consensus has recently emerged about taking a population of one million or less as "the critical threshold"¹⁴. The criterion was used by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research in its report on small states as long ago as 1971 and was also adopted by the 1985 Commonwealth Consultative

12 Nails Amstrup, "The Perennial Problem of small States: A Survey of Research Efforts", Co-operation and Conflict, Vol.11, No.3, (1976), pp.165-7.

13 Peter R. Baehr, "Small States: A Tool for Analysis", World Politics, vol.27 (1974-75), p.456.

14 Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, ed., Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London, 1987), p.xvii.

Group. I followed suit and have used it as the upper limit in defining a small state. I also chose to confine the analysis to states that are politically independent whose number is around forty now.

As long as the number of small states was quite small (as in Europe), the international community (and even international organizations) could afford to ignore them in the conduct of international relations as maverick entities of little or no consequence. But their number is no longer small. Today there are forty independent states, thirty two of them Members of the United Nations, twenty four of them Members of Commonwealth of Nations and twenty two of them Members of Non-aligned Movement. They constitute more than one-fourth on the community of states. They constitute more than one-fourth of the community of states. Many of them do play a part, however small, in international relations and in international organizations. If nothing else, they can emerge, and have emerged, as trouble-spots of the world from time to time (as Grenada, Fiji and Maldives did recently), or the subjects of a struggle between the Great Powers for influence etc. (as, for example, Kiribati and Vanuatu in the Pacific Ocean, which entered in to a fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union). They are constantly seeking economic or technical assistance

(as Grenada did in 1983). For these and other reasons, the small states can no longer be ignored by the international community; their needs must be taken into account collectively as a new factor in international relations.¹⁵

It should be stressed here that the problems facing small states are not unique. Their particular difficulties arise from their greater vulnerability and lower capacity to respond to crises. By the very nature of their size they are particularly susceptible to both natural and man-made disasters. A coup in an island only thirty miles wide have a far greater chance of success than one in larger area where it might be contained; and one hurricane can destroy the economy of a small state dependent on a single crop.

It is true that a small state has the capacity to cause a major political havoc at the United Nations and in major world capitals. The US invasion of Grenada of 1983, coup in Fiji of 1987 and the temporary takeover of Maldives by a small group of invaders have served to underline the point that the great powers seem chronically prone to underestimate these problems. Perhaps the very fact that they look like storms in teacups, when they first appear in the in-tray of a busy foreign minister. In what inevitably turns out to be a not-too well-disguised scramble

15. Rajan, n.1, pp.4-6.

of improvisation, these same powers try to grapple with a problem that might have been averted. They are forced to do this under pressure from angry public opinion and sharp inquiry by press and broadcasting organisations.¹⁶

The truth probably is that the world community has not yet thought its way through the phenomenon of very small states in the world that is emerging in the closing years of the twentieth century. At best, it has applied to them the same set of assumptions it applies to states generally. But what is the right to self-defence without the means of defence? What is the right to equality in the councils of the world without the means to participate in those councils? What is the equality of sovereignty if reality dictates the absence of choices? In all these respects small states are so specially disadvantaged that their needs in large measure become qualitatively different from those of other developing countries.¹⁷

The retention of territorial independence, sovereignty and equality, combined with reasonable ability to protect them, is one of the most important problems of

16. Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (London, 1985) pp. 2-4.

17. It has been told by Mr. Shridath Ramphal, Secretary General at Marlborough House, Commonwealth Secretariat, 18 July, 1984 in his speech "small is Beautiful but Vulnerable".

the small states. A well-known maxim defines the security of the state as the absence of threat to its minimum core values. But deeper reflection leads to the perception that security is a matter not only of the absence of threats but of the absence of vulnerability. In short, the question can be approached from both sides- the elimination of threats or vulnerability. This perception serves importantly to put the question of military power in perspective. The small does not, by definition, have the means to deter threats or to repulse an attack. Indeed, this approach to the security of small states must inevitably lead to a sense of hopelessness or to the conviction that security can only lie in protection by a major power. On the other hand, it is within the competence of the small state to diminish its vulnerabilities and thus enhance its security.

It is, moreover, increasingly doubtful whether in the contemporary international system the military option is ever wholly the key to security. Threats are very often political rather than military in nature. "It is not surprising, therefore, that the state that is weak in institutional structure, or whose people lack national identity with their state, should prove prime targets for threats. It is arguable that the strong state, even though weak as power, can by diminishing its vulnerabilities, enhance

its security." ¹⁸

It is nevertheless to discern certain common elements of an inherent vulnerability. On the one hand, small states' populations provide too limited a human resource base to meet essential security needs at a variety of levels: on the other, almost all of them lack the economic capacity not only to take countervailing measures but even to purchase necessary security-related material.

In the main, both the elimination of threats and of vulnerability, small states need to be secured by judicious foreign policy and relations. Dynamic diplomacy ought to take care of the problem of preserving independence. This would necessarily call for active participation in international politics, despite the limitation of shortage of skilled personnel. A de facto policy of non-alignment (if not formal membership of NAM) could help considerably (as in the case of some of the Pacific island states, like Nauru and Kiribati); membership of regional organization is a must, if it cannot also be member of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies. Membership of the United Nations is especially valuable for small states, so that they are entitled to use a great world forum in order to raise an alarm over threats to their security or aggression on

18. Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability Small States in the Global Society (London, 1985), pp. 14-5.

them. Military pacts/ alliances in peace time have a usually a tendency to erode a state's freedom of policy/action in internal affairs.

The main problem that practically all the small states face in economic, ^{and} no so much security. Most are insignificant or inconsequential as strategic outposts for other states to invince interest in them; Their economic resources are extremely limited-with the exception of the Gulf States (and some others with rich petroleum resources) and Nauru (phosphate deposits) apart. Even in respect of the latter states, their resources are exhaustale. Most of them are over populated -- that is in terms of the area and economic resources -- and their aspirations for a higher standard of living cannot be sustained by their economic resources.

The economic problems can only be solved by regional cooperation which is usually of mutual benefit. The Commonwealth Secretariat and some International Organisations (e.g. the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations) can help too.. Bilateral assistance from the affluent states have little or no political/strategic advantage to be derived from such assistance-- for pure idealism or humanitarianism plays no part in such nations with respect to

small states. Where and if available, they are usually short-term adhoc, and aid "with strings", the beneficiary states need also to ensure that they do not become dependent on the aid and erode their independence and sovereignty. It is necessary for the governments of small states themselves to determine the delicate balance between the level (and condition) of external economic assistance and the freedom of policy/ action in international affairs that they prefer to exercise.

A major problem the 32 member states and the reason why the 8 other states have not cared to become members - is the existence shortage of trained personnel for diplomatic/consular representation abroad as well as the high cost of doing so. Recently, the Commonwealth Secretariat has found a novel solution for this problem. They maintain at the United Nations, common office facilities for four small Commonwealth states - Solomon islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Maldives. This facility is likely to be extended for all other small states of the Commonwealth. It is also open to small states to have joint representation abroad -- as some of them already have.


Hence, the question boils down how the international community could and should accommodate the wishes, aspira-

tions, needs and demands of the small states, as much in the interests of the international community as that of these states. The former has, I believe, a moral and political duty to protect, support and maintain these states. They should not be ignored -- as they were before the Second World War. Because of their much larger number now, it might be dangerous to ignore them.

CHAPTER 2
SMALL STATES IN THE CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In a speech in Birmingham in 1904 Joseph Chamberlain, with a remarkable combination of arrogance and inaccuracy said: "The day of small nations has long passed away. The day of Empire has come." In fact, history has shown the reverse to be true. The empires have passed away, leaving in their wake a large number of new, small nations established with the blessing and indeed the encouragement both of former colonial powers and of the USSR, as well as of world opinion as expressed through the United Nations and the non-aligned movement. As Diggins points out, "so long as the concept of national sovereignty, anachronistic as it maybe in the age of jet aircraft, satellites, nuclear weapons and instant mass communication, continues to find general acceptance, it is impossible as well as unreasonable to define some lower limit of small-ness which could deprive these countries of the right to live their own lives in their own way." ¹ If in the course of doing so, they make mistakes (or what appear as mistakes to the outside world), so do larger and more developed countries, often with excuse and much more damaging consequences. The problem resolves

1. C.E. Diggins, "The Problems of Small States, The Round Table (London), no. 271, (1985) pp. 204-5.



itself, therefore, into that of providing a reasonably secure international framework for small states to continue their independent existence with the minimum of external pressure or interference.



TH-2775

Despite some misgivings that the small states are quite viable-politically, economically and militarily- the world community facilitated their birth by recognition and economic and other assistance. Most of them were also admitted to the United Nations and/or its specialised agencies, and to regional organisations as well. Many of them are also members of the Commonwealth of Nations. However, having admitted them to the community of nations, the community does not seem to care for them - and these states do need the care and assistance of the best of the community. Without that care and assistane, these small states might turn out to be trouble spots, if not sources of de-stabilisation world order

DISS
V. ... 118

'Clearly the world's micro-states, whether enjoying technical sovereignty or still classed as dependencies, have the capacity to cause macropolitical havoc at the UN and in major world capitals.'² The Falkland Crisis

2. Sheila Harden, ed., Small in Dangerous, Micro States in a Macro-world (London, 1985) p. 4.

of 1982, the Grenada debacle in 1983, the coup in Fiji in 1987 and another attempted coup in Maldives in 1988 have served to underline the point that great powers seem chronically prone to underestimate these problems. Perhaps the very fact that they look like storms in tea-cups when they first appear in the in-tray of a busy foreign minister, explains why such crises are ignored in first instances with the loss of valuable time. In what inevitably turns out to be a not-too-disguised scramble of improvisation, these same powers try to grapple with a problem that might have been averted. They are forced to do this under pressure from angry public opinion and sharp inquiry by press and broadcasting organisations.

It comes as no surprise that the ultimate political harvest of these micro-state crises, should take the form of friction and recrimination between major allies, as with Grenada and the Falklands. This leads to the departure of ministers from office and the imposition of strains on the western alliance, serving only to weaken the joint stance of the industrial democracies. At the same time, their relations with the Third World and the NAM come under parallel strain.

"Small is beautiful". but not quite when it refers to small states. They have many problems of viability, even

of survival in an imperfect community of nations, where despite all the progress in the development of that community since the 19th century, the small states are at the mercy of the large and medium states—even if that "mercy" is only indifference or neglect (and not the military/economic power of the mighty). As Harden has pointed out: "Sometimes it seems as if small states were like small boats, pushed out in the turbulent sea, free in one sense to traverse it, but without oars or provisions, without compass or sails, free also to perish. Or perhaps to be rescued and taken aboard a large vessel." 3

In considering the place of micro states in international affairs, one cannot (and ought not to) question their position as sovereign/independent states; it is too late to do so. They have been welcomed and recognised by the international community by global and regional organisations. Hence, the question boils down to how the international community could and should accommodate the wishes, aspirations, needs and demands of these states, as much in the interests of the international community as that of these small states.

3. Ibid, p.5.

The problems posed by the vulnerability of micro-states call some hard thinking not only by the small states themselves but also by the international community as a whole. The environment in which the micro-states operate is crisis-crossed and shaped by a multitude of organisations at the global, regional or sub regional level. These organisations have either a clear security or defence purpose, or at least offer a forum in which disputes and disagreements can be argued out. Although membership of such bodies can be important in the search for greater security, a number of independent small states also rely on bilateral security arrangements.

SMALL STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS:

As a UNITAR study state, "In the U.N., the question of the participation of small states raised no major difficulty in the early days of the Organisation"⁴ Luxembourg is an original member. Iceland was admitted on 19 November 1946. Monaco, Liechstestein, and San Marino never applied for membership but Monaco has had an observer Mission at the United Nations since 1956. Liechtenstein and San Marino are both parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice

4- J. Rapaport and others ed. Small states and territories; Status and problems; A UNITAR study (New York), 1971), P.118.

In subsequent years, a number of states with a population under one million have been admitted to membership in the United Nations without any objection: (Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus and Gabon in 1960; Trinidad and Tobago in 1962; Kuwait in 1963; Malta in 1964 The Gambia and the Maldive Islands in 1965; Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho and Barbados in 1966; Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland in 1968; Fiji in 1970, and so on ⁵

Back in 1967-68, UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, first raised the limited problem of membership of small states of the World Organisation. The Committee of Experts of the Security Council considered the problem briefly, but was unable to come to any conclusion. The basic issue was, and is, how to lay down criteria for determining which entity constitutes a "State" and more importantly, where to (and who should) draw a line (in terms of area, population and other material factors) beyond which the entity is not eligible for membership. Some Member states, have opposed the idea of any limitation of membership based on size or population. United Nations Charter makes no provision for restricted forms of membership, although such membership exists in some of its bodies, for instance, the Regional Economic Commission, it would seem that it is futile to try to evolve objective, quanti-

quantitative criteria for Membership as long as Membership is regarded as a badge of sovereignty by Communities which aspire for their recognition as states " ⁶ Naturally, therefore, the United Nations has given up its efforts. It has not closed the door to any state on grounds on size or viability.

Membership of the United Nations has come to be regarded as particularly important for micro-states: it is seen by many as an expression of their international legitimacy; it also provides them with ready access to the services of the United Nations and its specialised agencies. Moreover, representation in the United Nations offers small states a much more cost-effective method of maintaining extensive relations with the outside world than bilateral diplomacy, which is often too costly both in financial and human terms for micro-states to contemplate. " Indeed, the very fact that small states can nowadays participate in the activities of international organisations of various kinds, advertises and underlines the basic and persisting conditions of international politics: the formal equality of sovereign states (regardless of size

6 M.S. Rajan, "Small States and the Sovereign - Nation State System", in International Studies Vol 25, no 1, (1988), p.3.

and resources) and their substantive inequalities⁷

Here is the list of the micro-states who are the members of the United Nations along with their year of admission into the world body.⁸

1. Antigua and Barbuda - 1981	1981
2. Bahamas - 1973	1973
3. Bahrain - 1971	1971
4. Barbados - 1966	1966
5. Belize - 1981	1981
6. Brunei -	
7. Cape Verde - 1975	1975
8. Comoros - 1975	1975
9. Cyprus - 1960	1960
10. Djibouti - 1977	1977
11. Dominica - 1978	1978
12. Equatorial Guinea - 1968	1968
13. Fiji - 1970	1970
14. Gambia - 1965	1965
15. Grenada - 1974	1974
16. Guinea - Bissau - 1974	1974

7. Harden, ed., n.2, p.16.

8. Bair, ed, n.5.

17. Guyana - 1966	1966
18. Iceland - 1946	1946
19. Luxembourg - 1945	1945
20. Maldives - 1965	1965
21. Malta - 1964	1964
22. Qatar - 1971	1971
23. Saint Christopher and Nevis - 1983	1983
24. Saint Lucia - 1979	1979
25. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - 1980	1980
26. Sao Tome and Principe - 1975	1975
27. Seychelles - 1976	1976
28. Solemn Islands - 1978	1978
29. Suriname - 1975	1975
30. Swaziland - 1968	1968
31. Vanuatu - 1981	1981
32. Western Samoa -	

The smaller states, at least some of them, have tried to redress the lacunae, as it were, in the Charter by amending it particularly its provisions to the veto power of the five permanent members of the United Nations. However, this is likely to be unsuccessful since the whole concept and philosophy underlining the framing of the Charter of the United Nations pre-supposes weighted power for the five permanent members. It has been said that "there is already a resolution purported to strengthen the collective

security provisions of the UN Charter--all these efforts tend to put renewed trust of the smaller states in the world body: It is demonstration of their confidence in the UN since the UN has lent a new dimension to the respect and dignity of the small states hitherto unknown in the history of mankind'.⁹ It is true that "security is not a gift for the international community, nations do not present gift" The principles and purposes embodied in the Charter of the U N. however, constitute the best possible instrument in guaranteeing safety and security of the world.

The tremendous economic and social benefits flowing from the UN system to the developing small states give a new dimension to the trust of the small states in the efficacy of the UN system. The Charter, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol hold out the best hope for the security, political as well as economic of the small states.

9. Waliur Rahman, "The Role of the UN in the emergence and Security of small state", in M.A. Hafiz & A.R. Khan, ed., Security of small states, (Dacca, Oct. 1987), pp.258.

The adoption of the resolution in the Forty First session of the United Nations General Assembly declaring that decision on financial matters will be taken by consensus is indeed a milestone. "The small states, while not wishing to sacrifice the principle of one country one vote, the philosophy of democratization underlying the Charter, did not at the same time want to be seen as irresponsible is not adequately responding to the worst ever financial crisis faced by the UN system"¹⁰ The adoption of this resolution has, therefore, been termed, and rightly so, as historic by the President of the Forty First session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is not only a victory of the commonsense, but also a victory for the United Nations is bestowing upon itself greater resilience in meeting the felt needs of the international community in general and the smaller states in particular.

It is clear that the presence in the United Nations continues to be of great advantage to small states, giving unrivalled access to the world community and to technical agencies. Further "The United Nations has also been crucial in cases of real crisis for small states-Guyana against Venezuela, Cyprus against Turkey and Greece, and Belize against Venezuela Guatemala -where, in its absence, state security

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 258.

would have been more seriously threatened "¹¹

Small states and the Non-Aligned Movement:

"The essence of non-alignment is the exercise of independent judgement in foreign policy and international relations."¹² Indeed, the term 'non-alignment', assumes greater meaning and significance in the context of cold war between two power blocs. To the newly independent states, the choice is limited to two broad alternatives. On the one hand, there is the choice of participating in the fight between two power blocs, inevitably including military alliances and counter-alliances, possibly compromising to a considerable extent, the newly-won sovereignty, contributing through conscious and deliberate design to the psychology of war both at home and abroad, and probably also sliding inexorably into the vortex of a totally destructive Third World War. There is the choice, on the other hand, of keeping out of the bi-polar confrontation, preserving the newly won sovereignty and playing an independent role in international politics, concentrating on domestic economic development and state building, and endea-

11. Neville, Linton, A policy Perspective, in C. Clarke, & Tony Payne, ed., Politics, Security and Development in Small States, (London, 1987), p.219.

12. M S. Rajan. Non-Alignment. the Dichotomy between Theory and practice, India Quarterly Vol 36, no 1 (1980), p.54.

vouring to reduce tension and control conflict situations by all possible means. Undoubtedly, the second alternative is the best choice for the newly independent states, for which they joined the non-alignment movement to which small states are not exception. Though out of 40-odd small states, 22 are the members on Non-Aligned Movement but mostly others adhere to the policy of non-alignment (if not formal membership of the NAM).

The small states who are members of the Non-aligned Movement and their data and place of admission to the organisation is as follows.;

Countries	Place of Admission	Date of the admission
1. Bahamas	Harare	Sept. 1986
2. Baharein	Algers Algeria	Sept. 1973
3. Barbados	Harare	Sept. 1986
4. Belize	New Delhi	March, 1983
5. Cape Verde	Colombo	Aug. 7, 1976
6. comoros	Colombo	Aug. 6, 1961
7. Cyprus	Belgrade	Sept. 1961
8. Djibouti		July 7, 1978
9. Equatorial Guinea	Lusaka	Sept. 1970
10. Gambia	Algers	Sept. 1973
11. Grenada	Havana	Sept. 1979

12. Guinea-Bissau	Colombo	Aug. 7 1976
13. Guyana	Lusaka	Sept. 7 1970
14. Maldives	Colombo	Aug. 7 1976
15. Malta	Algiers	Sept. 7 1973
16. Qatar	Algiers	Sept. 7 1973
17. Saint Lucia	New Delhi	Feb. 8 1981
18. Sao Tome & Principe	Colombo	Aug. 7 1976
19. Seychelles	Colombo	Aug. 7 1976
20. Suriname	Havana	Sept. 7 1979
21. Swaziland	Lusaka	Sept. 7 1970
22. Vanuatu	Harare	Sept. 8 1986

Membership of the Non-Aligned Movement can, however, be of service to micro-states subject to external threats their independence. Both Guyana and Belize have benefited for Non-Aligned support for their right to self-determination and the repudiation of irredentist claims.¹³ The backing of the Non-Aligned Movement has almost certainly contributed to the security of these two micro-states.

In the last conference of Non-Aligned countries at Harare the leaders have shown a great deal of concern for the small states. In the political declaration of

13. Harden, ed., n.2, pp.22-3.

the Conference, a package of proposals have been declared for helping the front-line states among which a small state, Swaziland, is included. "At Harare, the Heads of state or Government reiterated their full solidarity with and support for the people and Government of the Republic of Cyprus and reaffirmed their support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial, integrity unity and non-aligned status of the Republic¹⁴ In the economic declaration, the Heads of state or Government recognized the particular problems faced by small island developing countries, which were due in particular to the limitations arising from their smallness, remoteness and proneness to natural disasters, constraints in transport and communications, great distances from market centres, highly limited internal markets, scarcity of natural resources, heavy dependence on a few commodities. They further recognized that such limitations inherently constituted major constraints on the development process, particularly, in small-island economies. In this context, the Heads of state of Government emphasized that the criteria, terms and conditions governing the flow of bilateral and multilateral financial and technical assistance to small island developing countries

14. Review of International Affairs (Belgrade) September

should be geared to the special needs and problems of each of the countries concerned and that a major portion of such aid should be made on grant basis.

It is true that the policy and membership of the NAM offers the small states some sense of security in political as well as economic front.

Small States and the Commonwealth

Although the Commonwealth has evolved from the former British empire, it is not a British run club. As Khan says, "since the commonwealth has not born in an age of imperialism but in the age of winding up of imperialism, its roots can be traced (not in British constitutional practices and institutions - part of it as the starting point are undoubtedly there-but in their "disruption", mutation and transformation by the triumphant liberation movements which congregated in the Commonwealth."¹⁵ At the same time, it is not a military alliance; many of its members also belong to the Non-Aligned Movement. Of the Commonwealth's present forty-nine members (before Fijis suspension), twenty four have populations of under one million. In view of the large and rapidly growing number of micro-states, the Commonwealth has devo-

15. Rasheeduddin, Khan, "Commonwealth and the Third World," in India Quarterly, (New Delhi) vol.40, no.1, 1984, pp.57-8.

ted considerable attention to their special problems.¹⁶

Small States and Regional Organisations:

"The problem of smallness of small states does not appear to have affected participation in several international and regional organisations."¹⁶ Regional cooperation organizations which promote normalisation of bilateral and multilateral relations between and among its members, are probably the best insurance the small states in today's world can buy for the security of their national frontiers against external challenges, threats and invasions. Small states may find themselves threatened from other small states, from larger states in the neighbourhood, from major external powers and the super-powers. In each of these four contingencies, small states are more secure if they belong to a regional cooperation organisation committed to bilateral and multilateral good neighbourliness. In a regional organization whose motto is cooperation and good neighbourliness and which is endowed with mechanisms of conflicts control and mediation, it is unlikely that a large state will threaten a small member of the group; if it does, the threatened state can mobilise the other members of the group to bring pressure on the large state.

16. Rapaport and others, ed., n.4, p.143.

to moderate its behaviour and submit the dispute to negotiation or the dispute to negotiation or arbitration. "The only way a small state can hope to protect itself from aggression or intervention by a major external power, or by a super-power, is by mobilising the support of an entire regional organisation in its behalf. This will certainly caution, if not always deter, the external power."¹⁷ Being a member in the regional cooperation organization, small state gets a lot of help from other member for their economic development also,

There are four areas in the contemporary world with clusters of small states. These are in and around the Caribbean; in and around Africa; in the Gulf; and in the Pacific

The Caribbean- The free trade area, CARIFTA ¹⁹⁷³ gave way to the Caribbean Community, CARICOM, in 1973. While CARICOM is essentially economic in its concerns, the intention was to go further; not only were the Heads of Government conferences responsible ultimately for determining the organisation's policy, including policy towards other international organizations, but a Foreign Affairs Committee was established with the aim of achieving a measure of co-ordination of foreign policy. Increasing political

17. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Regional Organisations and the security of Small states," M.A. Hafif & A.R. Khan, ed., Security of Small States (Dacca, 1987), p.263.

and ideological divisions have exacerbated economic tensions and problems in between members. For some non-Commonwealth Caribbean states, however, such problems have not been enough to counteract a belief in the passible benefits of membership and now have observer status.

Moreover, while the states of the Caribbean have normally become members of the wider Organization of American States (OAS) on gaining their independence. Belize and Guyana have been unable to do so because of objections by Guatemala and Venezuela respectively. OAS has thirty-one members now among which USA is the most powerful one. "It has been held by a number of commentations that the dominating role of the United States in the OAS system has been a weakness as well as a strength" ¹⁸ as well as strength. ¹⁸

Africa -- The most comprehensive contemporary African Organization is the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in May 1963 with thirty-two members. There are now fifty members, ten of which are small states. It is a relativeley loose association of states designed to promote unity and solidarity in Africa on the basis of the basis of the principles of sovereignty, non-

18. Gordon Connell-Smith, "The Crisis in Central America: President Regans Options," World Today, Oct. 1983.

interference in internal affairs of member states, respect for territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, the condemnation of political subversion and a dedication to the emancipation of dependent territories and international non-alignment. 'Decisions of the OAU are not binding on members; they are recommendations only.'¹⁹

The Arab League - The Arab League stretches from Mauritania in the west to the Gulf peninsula and includes the small states of Bahrain, Djibouti and Qatar. A number of defence-related committees and groupings have been established under the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defence and Cooperation which complements the League Charter. There is a Joint Defence Council of Foreign and Defence Ministers and a Permanent Military Committee of army general staffs. The league has contributed to the settlement of disputes on a number of occasions. Under the 1950 Treaty it is authorised to act in resolving disputes between member states and between members and non-members. Its attempts at conciliation have been reinforced several times by a collective peace keeping force. The degree of defence co-operation among the member states of the council has varied. Although they have not been able to agree on

19. Harden, ed. n.2, p. 29.

the creation of a joint Defence Council, they have held a number of joint military exercises.

The Pacific—^m The small states of the Pacific are individually incapable either of defending themselves from threats on the smallest scale, or of protecting their marine resources. They have, however, taken various steps to concert on a regional basis, primarily through the South Pacific Commission and the South Pacific Forum."²⁰ The Commission is a non-political body mainly concerned with training and aid programmes in the development and cultural fields which membership includes France the United Kingdom and the United States other than the small states of South Pacific and Australia and New Zealand.

The South Pacific Forum is primarily a political organisation, comprising the Heads of Government of independent and self-governing states of the South Pacific Region, i.e. including Australia and New Zealand, but excluding the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It meets at least annually, more often if necessary, at Heads of Government level and issues a communique at the end of the meeting which indicates the preoccupations of participants.

20. Ibid., p. 34.

The small states are destined to co-exist with big states. They have no separate collective organisations to protect their independence and national frontiers. They are insecure from internal contradictions and failing more than from the pursuit of national interests by their big brothers. But small states can influence big states more by efficient management of their domestic political economics and by achieving faster growth and development.

The power thrust to create independent entities has been balanced by the emergence of an increasingly interdependent world. That interdependence and the Communications system which goes with it mean that the citizens of small states can have access to information and services way beyond their states' inherent capacity to supply them. The smallness of a state therefore does not automatically impose penalties on its citizens in their private capacities. With luck, judgement, and the adoption of appropriate policies, they should be able to enjoy the advantages of smallness, while having access, at will, to the wider world.²¹

21. Linton, n.11, p.224.

CHAPTER 3

COMMONWEALTH AND SMALL STATES

The erstwhile British Empire has in some respects crumbled into "exceedingly small" fragments, and post-colonial Empire, Willy-nilly has to grapple with the problems precipitated by a large number of mini-state members. Cyprus, Fiji, Grenada, the Sychelles- each of these place-names evoke recent and continuing perplexities, and a full list of all the small states of the contemporary Commonwealth and their problems would be very long indeed. For Britain, of course, the age of empire, however reluctantly protracted, is not entirely over. Britain is still vested with some onerous colonial responsibilities, left-over of empire, as the Falklands, Gibraltar and Hong-kong factors have each forcibly remained us recently.¹

Here our aim is centred around independent small states, so we have to see how the commonwealth has so far handled the phenomenon of the small states with their fragilities and fixations, not the Britain with its small dependencies.

The commonwealth is a unique post-imperial international association which since 1965, has been vested with its own secretariat and headquarters in London.

1. Editorial, "Small States and Left-Overs of Empire." Round Table (London), no.256 (1984), p.122.

Although the Commonwealth has evolved from the former British Empire, it is not a British run club. Nor is it a military alliance; many of its members also belong to the Non-Aligned Movement. Of the Commonwealth's present forty-eight members (after Fiji's suspension in 1987), twenty-four have populations of under one million. The Commonwealth micro-states are mostly to be found in three areas: ten in the Carribean, three in Southern Africa or off the east African coast, and seven in the pacific.²

In view of the large and rapidly growing number of micro-states, the Commonwealth has devoted considerable attention to their special problems. "The security needs of micro-states were initially discussed by Commonwealth Heads of Government in 1969 in the light of the problems facing Guyana."³ Commonwealth concern with 'small states' was first given formal expression at the meeting of Finance Ministers in 1977 in Barbados. Having noted the special characteristics of small island economies, particularly their extreme dependence on exports and imports, high dependence on capital inflows, and in some cases their natural resources, the Ministers urged

2. Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro States in Macro World (London, 1985) pp. 1-23.

3. ibid., pp. 8-23.

the international community to adopt a more flexible approach to the requirements of these countries as well as special measures to assist them.⁴ The following year, at their first regional Meeting, Commonwealth Heads of Government from the Asia/Pacific region asked the Secretary-General to seek support for Commonwealth-wide programmes to counteract the particular difficulties which beset the growing number of small members, particularly the island developing countries.

In response, the Commonwealth Secretariat prepared a programme designed to assist in overcoming "the disadvantages of small size, isolation and scarce resources which severely limit the capacity of such countries to achieve their development objectives or to pursue their national interests in a wider international context."⁵

This was endorsed by Commonwealth Heads of Government at their 1979 Meeting held in Lusaka. Its importance of this work was reaffirmed at their 1981 Meeting held in Melbourne. Since that time the effort has continued to be expanded on a pragmatic basis: a small states perspective now informs the work of all of the secretariat's functional Divisions.

4. Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society, (London, 1985) p.1.

5. *ibid.*, pp.1-2.

Meeting in New Delhi in November 1983, with the Political repercussions of events in Grenada still resonant, Commonwealth leaders felt that the problems of small states "deserved consideration on a wider basis, including that of national security". They accordingly requested the Secretary-General to understand a study of the special needs of small states "Consonant with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity that they shared with all nations". In their Goa Declaration on International security, the Commonwealth leaders articulated their particular concern at the "vulnerability of small states to external attacks and interference in their affairs. "These Countries," they declared "are members of the international community which must respect their independence and, at the very least has a moral obligation to provide effectively for their territorial integrity."⁶

It was ~~since~~ⁱⁿ pursuance of this that the Secretary General established a Group which consisted of Fourteen distinguished diplomats, academics, and civil servants from the Commonwealth countries to carry out the study on small states. The study says small states are either

6. Small is a Beautiful but vulnerable-opening address by Commonwealth Secretary General to the first meeting of the Commonwealth consultative Group on the Special Needs of small states, 18 July, 84.

islands or are flanked by larger more powerful neighbours as, for example, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are with South Africa. Their location often means they have greater strategic importance than their size would otherwise merit. Although the report makes 79 recommendations for enhancing the security of small states, it implicitly recognizes that there are limitations as to what can be done either by the international community or the countries themselves about their security. Small will always be vulnerable. But the report stresses that the international community, particularly the United Nations, has a special obligation to ensure their security.

The report calls upon the United Nations Secretary-General to play a more active role in the spirit of Article 99 of the UN Charter when a small state feels itself to be "under military threat" from another state and not wait for an attack. It also suggests that the Security Council should consider recognizing formal declarations of neutrality or nonalignment by small states it further recommends that small states should consider establishing their own regional security arrangements, a solution particularly appropriate to a region like the Caribbean where a large number of small countries are clustered together. It also suggests establishing defence links with larger regi-

onal powers although warns of the danger of becoming unacceptably subordinate to large neighbours. The report also recommends small states should in their own interests "adopt a generally discreet posture" in foreign Policy to avoid provoking hostility from other state. ⁷

At Nassau (Bahamas) on 22 October, 1985, Heads of Government of Commonwealth Countries, welcomed the report "Vulnerability" Small States in a global society". They stressed particular problems being faced by small land-locked Countries in southern Africa, especially at that time, and the need for increased assistance for domestic and regional efforts to overcome their transportation problems. ⁸

The leaders at Nassau stressed that action to reduce the vulnerability of the small states should not diminish their status as independent, sovereign and equal members of the world Community. Efforts should be directed at working for the realization of a global environment safe for small states and conducive to their economic reality. ⁹

7. The Times (London), 30 September, 1985

8. The Times, 24 October 1985.

9. M.S. Rajan, "Small States and the Sovereign-Nation-State System," International Studies, vol.25, no.1, (1988), pp. 1-4.

Later at Vancouver summit in October 1987, Heads of Government of Commonwealth Countries reaffirmed their view that because of their particular problems, small states merited special measures of support and should continue to have priority in the developmental assistance given by the Secretariat. They recognised that international developments continued to demonstrate the peculiar vulnerability of these states and they urged the continuation of efforts towards the achievement, at both domestic and global levels, of an environment conducive to the security and viability of these states. Heads of Government thought it important to improve cooperation among the small states themselves and for the Commonwealth to maintain recognition of these states as a group and to ensure that their problems were given adequate attention in international fora generally. 10

After US invasion of Grenada, publicity and a degree of plausibility have been given to the dramatic phrase apparently coined by sir Geoffery Howe, that there is a dire need for measures to prevent the "hijacking of small states".¹¹ Hijacking we may point out, means the seizure of persons, sometimes also of property

10. Survey of Current Affairs (London, November 1987), p.361.

11. Editorial, n.l. p.122.

(very frequently these days aeroplanes, hence 'skyjacking') for purpose of extortion and black mail. But the subversion or invasion of a state inherently is usually aimed at securing that monopoly of governmental power and control of the state which will enable that usurper to become the government.

Because the most frequent security threats taking small states today are those of subversion, the coup d'état or (much more rarely than is commonly supposed) revolution, it follows that preventing security measures need to be those of counter-subversion, legitimate rule and counter-revolution. It has been observed : "The security and other problems of small states are many and real but these should not be primarily conceived in terms of warding off hijacking".¹²

Whether the Commonwealth can act as a constructive agent of peaceful practical resolution of particular conflicts cannot be foreseen in advance. In principle it is always available for its members to try to utilize. Whether and how skilfully and successfully the Commonwealth will actually be used does and will vary each case. For Cyprus in 1947 and for Grenada in 1983 the Commonwealth was impotent or inept or both. For Belize and Guyana, and perhaps for the Sychéles, it has provided some succour

12. Ibid., p. 123.

and valuable support.

The commonwealth is not a security system; but it is an association for encouraging measures of individual and collective self-help in security as in other matters. With more than half its current membership being small states it is inevitable that the Commonwealth of the present and the future be much preoccupied with their problems. The people of dependencies, no less than those of independent mini-states, do not, of course, see themselves as parts of mere left-overs of empire. Whether or not fixated about their past, they are more naturally concerned about their futures. There is much recent evidence to remind us that micro-states can beget, or be a cause of more than micro-problems.

As Harden points out, "the Commonwealth has so far played only a limited military role".¹³ A number of its members have provided joint security forces on occasions, most notably in the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, which, together with the Commonwealth Observer Group, oversaw Zimbabwe's transition to independence. In 1982, a small (thirty six member) team drawn from eight Commonwealth Countries was also sent

13. Harden, n.2, p.23.

to Uganda with the aim of assisting the creation of a Ugandan national army. Individually, several Commonwealth States have provided troops to a fellow Commonwealth Country for training purposes or in civil support roles, including not only the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, but also Tanzania, Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

However, while the Commonwealth has been much concerned about the problem of Cyprus since it became independent and a member in 1960, it has proved ineffective in its support for the Cypriot government following the Turkish invasion of 1974. On the other hand, in other cases, Commonwealth diplomatic support has been influential. It is highlighted that, "The Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize, for example, acted as a persuasive pressure group in mobilising support in the United Nations and among the Non-Aligned Movement for the right of Belize to independence, and in exposing Guatemalan irredentism" ¹⁴

The commonwealth not only provides a forum for discussion on political and economic issues, but has also established a number of development funds, operated by the Secretariat, and other technical services such as

14. Ibid., p. 24.

as the Commonwealth Legal Advisory Service, which have been widely commended. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTP), with its small in-house consultancy unit the Technical Assistance Group (TAG), has been especially successful. The expertise of TAG's consultants covers a wide range of issues and sectors: the delimitation and negotiation of maritime boundaries; advice on public investment, economic management and statistical services; oil exploration and oil development strategies; and tax and royalty levels for various minereals. It works increasingly in collaboration with other agencies, and has in deed provided a model for other programmes. It has proved especially attractive to, and useful for, many of the Commonwealth's micro-states, most of whom have sought its services in one sector or another. The CFTP is funded largely by Britain (30 percent), Canada, and Australia, although all Commonwealth members contribute. It has grown considerably over the past fifteen years: from £400,000 in 1971 to an estimated £26 million in 1985/86. In view of the value attached to it, consideration should be given to its further enlargement.¹⁵

At the Melbourne CHOGM an item on 'small island

15. *ibid.*, p.25.

states and other specially disadvantaged countries' was tabled for the first time as a separate issue on the agenda. This subject provoked a lively debate. For some of the small states their contributions under this heading were their principal, and in some cases their only, statements during the formal business of the meeting. When Nauru (that coral atoll in the Central Pacific with a population slightly over 7000 in 1979) became independent in 1968 it was deemed too small for full membership of the Commonwealth and the category of special Member was invented for it. Special members enjoy all the benefits of membership but do not attend the CHOGMS— by now, with Tuvalu, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as Nauru, there are four special Members. 16

The commonwealth's ministates (and they mostly are mini as well as insular) are to be found mostly in the Caribbean or in the South Pacific and their policies and problems bear the imprint of these environments especially in relation to regionalism.

In the Pacific, eleven island states are currently associated with Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific

16. Editorial, "The Commonwealth in Geopolitics," Round Table, no.250, (1988), p. 374.

Forum. Territorially and demographically small though these eleven island states are, distances in the South Pacific are immense and their homelands range over 4000 miles, from western Australia in the west to the Cook islands in the east, and from Kiribati on the Equator to the Ross Sea dependency on the Antarctic Continent. 'At the Melbourne CHOGM in 1981 the only public reservations made about the relevance of the Commonwealth associated for their needs were made known by some Pacific island leaders (Ratu Mara, Efi and Abelua) who at times showed impatience with what they felt was a lack of concentration on practical, especially economic measures'.¹⁷

At the Melbourne CHOG Australia repeated an earlier offer to pay for appropriate facilities to be provided in New York to enable Pacific states to maintain representation at the United Nations. The Melbourne Communique noted that this matter would be the subject of further consultation between the governments concerned. At the meeting of Caribbean Commonwealth countries with Canada in St. Lucia in February 1981, Canada was asked, and in principle it agreed to express Caribbean interests and concerns at the economic summits of the seven major

17. *ibid.*, p. 374.

industrialized countries and at other relevant meetings where she was a participant and the small states were not.

Although the Australian government saw this item regarding 'island and specially disadvantaged states' as an opportunity to concentrate attention on some special problems confronting the small Pacific Island States, the participation of Pacific leaders who spoke tended to be overshadowed by and by ~~and~~ large by ~~more~~ assured and articulate Caribbean spokesman. Grenada and St. Lucia strongly urged the establishment of a Commonwealth Select Committee on the Small Island States and Other Specially Disadvantaged Countries, in the event, this proposal, which ~~and~~ failed to secure endorsement in Lusaka in 1979, again was not accepted.

An Indian expert is of the ~~view~~ ^{view} that "a small state face a number of problems to become a member of any international organisations, the main problem ~~here~~ is the financial constraint. There is also an acute scarcity of trained personnel for representation, at the headquarters of international organisations."¹⁸ This is especially felt by states which want to be members of the United

18. Rajan, n.9, pp 6-8.

Nations. Here the Commonwealth came up with an imaginative solution. The Commonwealth Secretariat London has set up an office in New York for the benefit of small Commonwealth states which cannot afford to maintain an office. These states need pay only for the national personnel of their respective permanent missions. The national personnel of their respective permanent Missions. This facility is being financed with Australian assistance and is being used by the Maldives, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Western Samoa. Commonwealth officials decided to extend this facility recently (1986) to other small Commonwealth states too by broadening the sources of financial assistance.

It is true that the Commonwealth Secretariat has already initiated an extensive programme of assistance to small states in many spheres. "In spite of that the Commonwealth Consultative Group which had been set up after Delhi CHOGM, opines that the commonwealth is especially well placed to take practical measures to help small states in promoting their security interest as well"¹⁹. The programme already encompasses a wide spectrum of support in the political, economic and social fields, and an expansion of the secretariat's activities in these areas

19. Report, n.4, pp. 104-113.

would contribute significantly to reducing small states' vulnerability. Small states security problems and objectives should, however, be kept constantly in mind when formulating new projects or considering how best to respond to requests for assistance from their governments. The present programme can be adapted by making a more focused use of the existing institutions and procedures. There is also a need for additional assistance at the bilateral level, but again, in many instances this will be largely a matter of building on existing aid and co-operation arrangements. "The Commonwealth Consultative Group in their report, has made 20 suggestions under two heads, i.e. Extending the use of the Commonwealth structures and specific new measures by which Commonwealth will be, able to help the small states in an effective way.

A. Extending the use of Commonwealth structure:

1. The Secretary-General has been in an excellent position personally to contribute to the general promotion of small states' security interest and group would urge that he continues this role through quiet diplomacy on an on-going basis .
2. He has also been able to contribute to the resolution of disputes involving member countries. In furtherance

of this role, with regard to a security crisis arising for a small member state the Secretary-General might consider it advisable to initiate immediate consultations with that state and with the other member states in the region in order to determine whether there is any wish for pan-Commonwealth action. In certain circumstances it might also be appropriate for him to despatch a team at the request of a small state facing an external threat to its security.

3. Special meetings of small states specifically on economic and financial matters should be arranged when the occasion warrants. They would be particularly helpful if organised in preparation for upcoming major international negotiating conferences, and would assist the Secretariat in trying to ensure that small state's interests are adequately represented at these fora.

4. The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation should be enabled to respond to requests from small states for training assistance and consultancy services for projects relevant to their Security problems. As the Fund's terms of reference preclude it from financing projects directly concerned with national security, group recommends that

these be revised with a view to removing the restriction entirely, or at least in the case of the smaller number countries.

5. Additional resources should be provided to enable the Commercial Crime Unit of the Secretariat to meet the increasing demand for its services, mainly from small states.

6. The Group has made a list of the small states general training needs and Group wants that these should be noted by the Secretariat/CFTC with a view to augmenting the training programmes where appropriate.

7. Number countries could likewise review the list of training needs in order to determine the level and type of additional training assistance; they feel, they are in a position to offer, either by expanding existing programme or by offering new ones as may be appropriate.

8. In the sphere specifically military, paramilitary and police training, where a number of permanent arrangements have already been established, there is also room for both wider and more intensive bilateral cooperation.

9. Member Countries should take initiatives to increase the flow of intelligence information to and between small states.

10. Existing intra-Commonwealth bilateral defence co-operation programmes which include the supply of military hardware and joint service operations, have proved their utility and should constitute a basis for expanded co-operation.

11. There have been occasions when a Commonwealth country has provided direct military assistance to a small member-state at its request at a moment of crisis, this practice is worth maintaining/.

12. The flow-up work on the establishment of a Commonwealth Risk Capital Facility being carried out by the Secretariat should pay particular attention to small state's needs and be completed as early as passible.

13. The Secretariat's capital markets programme should give increased attention to assisting small states to ta'pcapital markets.

14. If a new round of multilateral trade negotiations

is held, the Secretariat should arrange a meeting of small member states to discuss issues of special interest to them and also to ensure that their interests are adequately represented in the negotiations.

15. Despite current budget stringency, the significant levels of commonwealth bilateral aid to small states should not only be maintained but improved over time.

B. Specific New Measures:

16. In the event that a particular group of small states decides set up its own regional security force, Commonwealth resources should, whenever possible, be made available on both a multilateral and bilateral basis.

17. Commonwealth governments should consider with sympathy requests for adhoc forces to assist member states facing acute security problems.

18. All Commonwealth governments are urged to use their good offices to discourage intensive and irresponsible reporting about small states, at least by the media in their own countries. This concern should also be brought to the attention of the Commonwealth Press Union.

19. The successful Australian funded scheme providing a joint New York office for the permanent United Nations missions for four of the Commonwealth's very small countries should now be accepted as a permanent measure and undertaken as a collective Commonwealth obligation, including a minimal contribution by the beneficiary countries. Resources should also be made available for similar facilities for other regional groups of small states that might seek such assistance.

20. Group strongly urges Commonwealth Heads of Government to consider ways in which the United Nations can be utilised to promote action for advancing the security interests of small states and, specifically, how the measures advocated in the report could be brought to the attention of the international Community.

It is true that the recommendations of the Commonwealth Consultative Group regarding small states has been widely appreciated by one and all. At Nassau summit in the year of 1985, Commonwealth Heads of Government while welcoming the report, urged the need for increased assistance for domestic and regional efforts to overcome the transportation problems of small land-locked states. Again in the Vancouver summit in 1987, Heads of Government

reaffirmed their view that because of their particular problems, small states merited special measures of support and should continue to have priority in the development assistance given by the Secretariat. There is no doubt that the small states enjoy priorities at the time of distribution of assistance by the Commonwealth Secretariat and they are being helped by other technical services such as the Commonwealth Legal Advising Service, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) with its small in house consultancy unit, the Technical Assistance Group (TAG). But all these are not enough and the Commonwealth Secretariat is facing acute shortage of funds while thinking of doing something special for the small states. So, the Report's recommendations for diplomatic and military courses of action are largely academic unless the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth countries decide to back them with funds. 20

20. Roberto Espindola, "Let Grenadas go Neutral, says Security Report," Sunday Times (London), 13 October 1985.

CHAPTER- 4
SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

Security is a lively topic in contemporary thought but the relative absence of security in the world attests to its elusive nature. Today, confidence in the possibility of a more lasting peace wavers. Current events do not indicate the durability of security arrangements. However, history reveals the ever present striving of nations for security. It is stated that "Because security is oftene identified with the survival of the nation itself, great many theories and strategies have been formulated to show how security may be attained by effective manipulation of social economic, political, and military conditions. Yet the relative absence of security is quite obvious."¹

Defence and national security pose special problems for small states and territories, though the question is of universal concern and importance. For comparatively tiny territories which have neither the man-power nor the resources to create and maintain a defence system adequate for even token resistance, physical and psychological arrangements

1. Estrella D. Solidum, "The Policy of Distancing by Small States for Security", M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed., Security of Small State States (Dacca, 1987), p. 289.

are essential for security. At one stage of history, small states tried to remain neutral and non-committal hoping that they would be ignored by bigger states. But the experience of the two World Wars in this century alone has shown this approach to be unworkable. Since World War II, small states and territories have had to look for other arrangements,"²

Robert Espindola is of view that the small states face two overreaching security threats at present: escalating East-West tension and an increase in the use of military force in the resolution of conflicts.³ Having contained the development of each other's spheres of influence in Europe and having reached a dangerous stalemate in nuclear deterrence, the two superpowers have translated their conflict in to a zero-sum, game played out at every corner of the Third World.⁴ They are no longer interested only in those countries with strategic value because of their geographical position or natural resources.

2. J. Rapaport and others, Small Scales and Territories: Status and Problems (New York, 1971), p.145.

3. R. Espindola, "Security Dilemmas", in Clarke and T. Payne, ed., Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London 1987) p.63.

4. R. Cassen, ed. Soviet Interests in the Third World (London, 1985).

Low-cost operations to destabilize a country or effect a change in its affiliation to a superpower are now undertaken, even if the country in question is of little real strategic value: The object is to make the other superpower blink, force it to stretch its political and military resources away from the main theatres of conflict and acquire additional bargaining powers.⁵

Coupled with the extension of superpower confirmation, the end of the 1970s, brought about an intensification relations, with the consequent weakening of belief in the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflicts. The end of the Vietnam war appeared to have demonstrated the futility and high cost of military solutions, but reliance on alternative means was short lived, as has been shown in the South Atlantic, the Sahara, Chad, Afghanistan, the Arab Gulf, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Southern Africa, Grenada, Central America, and the Seychelles.⁶ Military manoeuvres, particularly naval exercises, have come to

5. Espindola, n.3, p.61.

6. *ibid.*, p.65.

symbolize the presence of the superpower throughout the Third World.

Threats to small states can be grouped within four categories.⁷ These are threats to:

- i) territorial security
- ii) political security
- iii) economic security
- iv) technological security

Threats to territorial security may arise from the actions of a primary power or more powerful neighbours. Other than direct intervention in the form of invasion or occupation of territory, external assistance might be provided to overseas based national dissidents mercenaries, or internally to guerrilla or secessionist groups.⁸ In some instances secessionist or separatist groups have become linked with transitional violence. More generally, transnational violence, in the form of sabotage, assassination, the taking of hostages and the hijacking or destruction of aircraft and ships have intensified and been facili-

7. Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society (London, 1985), pp. 14-33.

8. R.P. Barton, "Diplomacy and Security : Dilemmas for Small States" in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed. Security of Small States, (Dacca, 1987) p.232

tated by the modern transport. The modern state too faces major administrative problems in controlling both its territory and external policy. In this respect, other threats to territorial security include refugee movements and externally controlled illicit operations, e.g. smuggling, drug traffic, arms deals and piracy. Scattered small island states in this respect face recurrent difficulties, which tend to be magnified and exacerbated if the small state is an offshore transit centre close to a major power.^{9 9}

Threats to political security are amongst the communist forms of threat to small states. "The weak nature of many Third World States essentially derives from the lack of legitimate and effective civilian or military institution".¹⁰ A regime may be threatened from a number of sources such as ethnic disturbances, major domestic cleavages, and internal threats backed by external involvement. Some small states have also become extremely sensitive to external media coverage of internal developments in their country. Moves to limit information may, however, have an opposite effect

9. Report, n. 7, .16.

10. David Goldsworthy, "Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa", African Affairs, Vol. 80, no. 318, 1981.

to that intended by creating heightened uncertainty about a regime and its policies.

In the third area of threats to economic security are included internal, external or transnational actions which adversely affect three main aspects, national economic development policies, the international financial position and international trade policies. A fourth aspect of economic security may be the effect of periodic major natural disasters and industrial accidents. A key aspect of these problems relates to the dependent nature of small states' economics. Small states need external aid to develop their infrastructure; markets in which to sell their commodity production, and foreign investment to introduce a measure of industrialization to their economy. Some even require financial assistance to balance the budgets, and most need help in securing oil supplies. The solution to these problems is in the hands of the developed industrial nations, but their assistance is not free, it requires the allegiance of the small states which, accordingly becomes a client of one of the two blocs.¹¹

11. Espinadola, no.3, p.68.

The fourth group of threats - technological is suggested in order to convey the problems associated with the technological development of state. Rapid developments in a number of areas of technology, such as telecommunications and data transform has drawn attention to the problem of technological management. Thus, technological security is concerned with the ability of a state to evaluate, plan and co-ordinate both the acquisition and use of appropriate technology for development requirements. Rather than the piecemeal acquisition of technology, the concept of technological security places emphasis on developing national capabilities to make strategic analyses of technology.¹²

All states are concerned with their security, However, not all states are able to identify their national values and arrange them into a hierarchy for appropriate identification of their satisfaction levels. Obviously, big states, because of a greater command of the resources available to them are able to prescribe their national values. It is a different matter with small states. "Small States have less resources and

12. NEIL CC. Livingstone, The Impact of Technological Innovation, p. 225.

less ability to manipulate local and external conditions to satisfy their national values".¹³ As a result, their values are not as much in quantity as quality as those of the big states. But suffice it to say that, small states keenly desire to maintain their security as well. Some of the strategies that small states use for their security include isolation, alliance, submerging to larger entities in order to maintain part of its security, using leverage of geography and population characteristics to advantage, reliance on the United Nations and internal legal systems, non-alignment, and the like.¹⁴

Many small states have pursued economic policies suitable for their national conditions, making their economies independent and their people better off. As the Chinese saying goes, the best way to rule a country is first of all to make the people rich. After their political independence won, the small countries like other economic construction, and try to establish an independent economy.¹⁵ In order to develop production and liberate productive forces, they have also

¹³. Solidum, n. 1, p. 289.
¹⁴. Ibid., p. 291.

¹⁵. Guo Jingan, "Ways and Means of promote Peace and Development and Safeguard the Security of Small States", in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed., Security of small states (Dacca, 1987, p. 301.

attempted necessary reforms, tackled the question of the cost of living of their people, especially that the farmers and herdsmen who make the majority of the population. They have tried to lighten the tax burden on the people so as to improve their living standard. In order to develop their economies, they have adopted a policy of self-reliance with their attention focussed on the domestic conditions, and at the same time have tried to make good use of foreign capital and technology and useful foreign experience in management, for the purpose of developing their economies. The outcome, however, has not always been encouraging.¹⁶

Regional cooperation organizations which promote normalisation of bilateral and multilateral relations between and among its members, are probably the best insurance the small states in to-day's world can buy for the security of their national frontiers, against external challenges, threats and invasions.¹⁷ Small States are more secure if they belong to a regional cooperation organisation best suited to mediate between

16. *ibid.*, p.301

17. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Regional Organisations and the Security of Small States", in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan ed., Security of Small States (Dacca, 1987), pp.263-4.

two conflicting small member-states.

In a regional organisation whose motto is cooperation and good neighbourliness, and which is endowed with mechanisms of conflicts control and mediation, it is unlikely that a large state will threaten a small member of the group; if it does, the threatened state can mobilise the other members of the group to bring pressure on the large state to moderate its behaviour and submit the dispute to negotiation or arbitration. The best way a small state can hope to protect itself from aggression or intervention by a major external power, or by a super power, is by mobilising the support of an entire regional organisation in its behalf. "This will certainly, caution, if not always deter, the external power."¹⁸ In recent years, small countries have attached greater importance to developing regional economic cooperation and South-South cooperation. Regional economic cooperation and South-South Cooperation are something new to these countries but undoubtedly they have great potentialities and a bright future ahead.

18. *ibid.*, p.265.

Many small countries have attempted consolidation of the unity of all nationalities, people of different strata, political parties and political forces, and elimination of internal disturbing factors. The best internal guarantee of their national security is to make the people live and work in happiness, harmony and solidarity, leaving no room for the hegemonists to play a role in their affairs. The leaders are trying to adopt the Grave-yard strategy which involves the mobilisation of the entire populace for national defence.¹⁹ Since it is a strategy which commits a country to resist aggression to the last citizen, the graveyard strategy satisfies the essential principles of an effective deterrence policy. This is because apart from maximising the cost of aggression, the strategy seems to deny the potential aggressor any possible gain by presenting the latter with the most likely option of perishing in the process of its aggression or inheriting a grave-yard. The point is that the incentive for aggression with ~~be~~ diminished considerably the very moment, it is understood that there is nothing worthwhile to gain. The grave-yard strategy is meant solely

19. T.A. Imobighe, "The Grave-Yard Strategy: A Survival Strategy for the small States" in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed., Security of Small States, (Dacca, 1987), p.326.

to serve a defensive purpose. In the final analysis, a country's security has to rely on its own people. The unity of the people of the whole country is the bastion of iron safeguard to their security.

Another strategy that small states use these days is the policy of "Distancing". "Distancing" is a policy of maintain relationship with external big states to a level where by the small states, as user of the policy, is able to ensure itself against external interference or undue influence and at the same time, is able to conduct its domestic and external policies with reasonable autonomy.²⁰⁾ The distance has to be a certain proportion between the states capabilities and the impinging external pressures and is characterised by a consistency of duration in accordance with the capabilities and pressures. On a desired level, distancing will allow for a minimum of interference and involvement with big power politics and maintain a maximum of vitality for the user state. Distancing in a strategy for use by a small state dealing with a big state whose actions are perceived to produce threats to the

20. Solidum, n.1, p.290.

former's security. Since there are equally strong external actions that are competing for influence over a small state, the latter state maintains equal distance on equidistance to them both. Today, more and more countries (Small and medium sized) have realised that to adopt such a foreign policy is wise and in the interest of their own people, and that to align with big power is not beneficial to their security. It has prompted them to adopt an independent and non-aligned foreign policy.

Lastly, the overwhelming majority of the small states have pursued a good neighbourhood policy.²¹ Due to imperialist and colonialist domination in history, there have been disputes among many small countries. So long as they adhere to the principles of mutual understanding and accommodation their disputes are not hard to solve through negotiations. If they resort to force, it would not contribute to the solution of the disputes but harm their relationship with neighbours. And the superpowers would make easy use of their disputes.

The maintenance of small countries' security is a long process of struggles and cannot be won for good

21. Jingan, n. 15, p. 301.

overnight. The security of small countries be maintained as long as the people of various countries unite themselves on the basis of the five principles of Peaceful Coexistence and support each other in their resolute fight against hegemonism and power politics, oppose the arms race and aggresssion and expansion, enforce the "South-South" cooperation to help obtain the Third World's prosperity and security and promote the establishment of a new international economic order. ²²

In practice, small states are likely to adopt policies close to one of the above alternatives or indeed a combination of them, depending on their assessment of their security objectives and the resources at their disposal. But, in final analysis their security will depend on the political will of other larger states expressed through assistance, alliance, or the action of regional and international organisation.²³

In a world characterised by East-West conflict, such will is unlikely to exist, and small states are likely to remain pawns in superpower areas. Only concerted international action can prevent that conflict from spreading and there-by provide a more secure environment for all members of the international community.

22. Ibid., p.301.

23. Espindola, n.3, p.63.

The United Nations is not a super-state or anything resembling a world government. Membership of the United Nations does not simply confer a degree of legitimacy on its member states or offer possible material benefits.²⁶ Its primary purpose is to maintain international peace and security.

The organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security together with other appropriate bodies, have tried to make arrangements under which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of some of the territories can be preserved and, if possible, guaranteed by the United Nations. Discussions in the United Nations have devoted to devising special machinery to supplement the collective security arrangements envisaged under the Charter. While strict adherence to the principles of the Charter by all Member States would obviate any need for special arrangements, the United Nations Members have recognized the possibility of non-observance of these principles by some Member states and consequently the need for further safeguards.²⁷

26. Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (London 1985), p.14.

27. Rapaport and Others, n.2, p.145.

Small States and the UN Security System

The United Nations, since it was founded in 1945, has gone through many vicissitudes: from five members at this inception, the membership of the world body has increased to 159 with the admission of the last member, Brunei Darus Salam. In spite of the many difficulties through which the world body has passed in its long journey from 1945, the continuing validity of the United Nations is recognised by all the countries, big and small, weak and powerful.²⁴ It is to be noted that of the 159 members of the United Nations, thirty three are small states. Of the dozen or so small states which are not Members of the World body, many of them are members of other institutions of the World Nations family.²⁵

24. Waliur Rehman, "The Role of the UN in Emergence and Security of Small States" in M.A. Hafiz and A.R. Khan, ed.; Security of Small States (Dacca, 1987) p.152.

25. M. S. Rajan, "Small States and Sovereign - Nation State System", International Studies Vol.25, no.1, (1988) pp. 3-8.

In particular, the case of certain territories in southern Africa have been a subject of grave concern to the United Nations. It was in regard to the former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, that the United Nations was faced with the question of providing an adequate guarantee from external aggression to these states . It as a matter of continuing concern to the United nations that these territories had been claimed by the 'minority racialist' Government in the Republic of South Africa. Successive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly before the territories became independent included no concrete step, but the operative paragraph of General Assembly resolution 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 stated that "the General Assembly solemnly warns the Government of the Republic of South Africa that any attempt to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of these three Territories shall be considered an act of aggression."

In regard to South-West Africa (Namibia), the General Assembly²⁸ called upon South Africa to remove all bases and other military installations located

28. General Assembly Resolution 2372(XXII) of 12 June 1968.

in the territory and to refrain from utilizing the territory in any way whatsoever as a military base for internal or external purposes. It also declared that the continued foreign occupation by South Africa of the Territory of South-West Africa constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. But South Africa has continued to refuse to comply with the United Nations' demands that it withdraw from the former mandated territory.

The United Nations has examined the situation in the Pacific (Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Papua-New Guinea), in the Caribbean (Bermuda, United States Virgin Islands, Bahamas) in the Indian Ocean (British Indian Ocean Territory) and has concluded that strategic military considerations are an important factor in prolonging colonial rule in many parts of the world. While it is contended that the existence of military bases in small territories would adversely affect their march to independence, it is also said that the existence of military bases after independence, often serves to bolster security. It must be recognized, however, that in the event of military confrontation between opposing powers, the

small states with military bases might be more vulnerable to outside attack.

Presumably when small states were admitted to the UN it was assumed that they would at least be as secure as other states and there was no recognition of special vulnerability. Indeed small states have not been the object of more threats than larger units, and it is their potential vulnerability in the contemporary world which is the cause for concern. In theory, the United Nations Charter provides for the military protection of small countries as of larger ones.²⁹ But whereas the latter might hope to put up at least some show of resistance against armed attack until the United Nations can assemble some kind of peace-keeping force, very small states have no hope of doing this and will therefore almost certainly be overwhelmed and occupied by the attacker before any effective United Nations action can be organised, even supposing that a sufficient degree of agreement can be achieved at all by the body. "The guarantees of protection of their sovereignty embodied in the UN Charter are, at least in the present state of the world, sadly illusory so

29. Neville Linton, "A Policy Perspective", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, ed., Politics Security and Development in Small States (London, 1987) p.214.

far as small states are concerned".³⁰

But, it is certain that the proliferation of small states had a moderating effect (to put it no higher than that) on the operation of the "law of the jungle" in the sovereign nation-state system, the law which permits the big fish to swallow small ones. According to Prof. Rajan, the operation of the "law" has been moderated in the post-1945 years by certain other factors too—such as the tremendous expansion of the membership of the international community, the near-universal membership of global organisation, the great progress achieved in the development of world public opinion in consequence of the technological advance in communication and new media, the acceptance of the principle of self-determination of peoples as an operating norm of international politics, the widespread consciousness of the evils of imperialism and of the domination of the larger states over the smaller ones, and so on.³¹ The cumulative and total effect of these developments is that the big states cannot attack or absorb the small states to-day with impunity as they

30. C.E. Diggines, "The Problem of Small States", The Rund Table (London), no.271 (1985)pp.204-8.

31. Rajan, n.25, p.9-10.

used to do till the second World war. Whenever the "law of the jungle" has operated in recent years against a small state as, for example against the Bahamas (Abco Island), the Comoros, Grenada, Lesotho, the Seychelles, Vanuatu (Espirito Santo Island), or Zanzibar the aggressor state has had to explain and justify its action to the international community, saying (dishonestly, though) that it did what it did "in self-defence" under Article 51 of the UN Charter or for some other reason. What is more important, it has felt the need to affirm solemnly that it has no intention of annexing the victim state, or that it has not in fact annexed it (as the Soviet Union annexed the Baltic states in the later 1930s).³²

The aggressor states have generally withdrawn or think to withdraw, from the territory of the victim states and have proclaimed their respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples. This is indeed a far-reaching achievement of the sovereign nation-state system and augurs well for the small states in the system. It is due to this achievement that some small states feel that they can now afford to dispense with their defence forces as no longer necessary for their protection from threats or acts of aggression. If some other small states still maintain defence forces

32. *ibid.*, p.12.

they do so only for symbolic or ceremonial reasons, indeed most small states do not even perceive any insecurity from external sources to their sovereignty and independence. The International Community acknowledges the inherent right of a sovereign state-irrespective of its apparent inability to defend itself by its own armed strength against external attempts to conquer or subdue it-to coexist and function in the sovereign - nation-state system as though it did not need any longer its own armed strength for its survival or as though the sovereign-state system or the international community would protect or was capable of protecting every state. This is so despite the tragedy of Grenada in 1983. The various states, including the small states, know only too well that the traditional "law of the jungle" still prevails, However, with the threat of conquest and absorption by the large states almost disappearing in the post-Second World War , the threat to small states has become more subtle- if more dangerous in the sense that it takes the forms of economic and cultural subversion. ³³ Therefore, small states do not seem

33. New Nation (Dacca), 15 February 1987.

to accord higher priority to the adoption of measures against threats to their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence from external sources than to their economic development. This is a significant development, one that testifies to the new-born confidence of the small states about maintaining their sovereignty and territorial independence without even, or with only, symbolic armed forces, as well as the tolerance and understanding of the other states and their willingness to encourage and support the small states in their self-confidence.

CHAPTER - 5

SOCIO-ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND PROSPECTS OF SURVIVAL

For many developing micro-states the most important threats to their political stability are economic and social in nature. Uneven rural and industrial development, the resentments created by poverty and inequality of wealth, and the dislocation and uncertainties caused by social, cultural and environmental changes brought about the development process itself can have profoundly important consequences for political stability and security. Such problems are not, of course contained to micro-states, they are often shared by other developing states also. However, the evidence suggests that many micro-states are particularly disadvantaged economically because of their size; for example, because of the narrowness of domestic markets and remoteness from world markets which raise trading costs, poor international communications, which hamper the movement of produce and their special vulnerability of natural disasters.¹

The major thrust of the early work that was undertaken was devoted to identifying the main economic characteristics which small states had in common.

1. Sheila Harden, ed., Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro World (London, 1985), p. 89.

They are typically viewed as constraints upon development and nearly always examined within a neoclassical framework. In the Benedict volume, for example, Knox engaged in precisely this kind of exercise. He concluded that broadly speaking, small states had small home markets and were likely to have at their disposal less diverse resources than might be found in larger states. This tallied with the high degree of specialisation found in small states. As he put it, they generally concentrate what resources they have on a comparatively limited range of products and satisfy their other requirements through international trade." ² Small states were, therefore, likely to be more heavily dependent on foreign trade than large states. Associated with this was a concentration in both the sources of their imports and the destination of their exports, as well as in the range of commodities typically exported.

Other writers have built upon these observations to the extent that something of classic syndrome of constraints and disabilities has emerged. The best summary of these arguments has been provided by Ward,

(2) A.D. Knox, "Some Economic Problems of Small Countries;" in B. Benedict, ed; Problems of Smaller Territories (London, 1967), pp.35-44.

who set out the problem in traditional supply and demand terms. Among the fundamental supply problems he listed³

a) Land Not only is land restricted in area, but often the inherent physical properties of the land as well as its variety of resources are limited. In addition, in so far as many small developing countries are tropical islands and desirable for tourist and residential expatriate development, there may be problems of controlling real estate speculation and land price-risers.

b) Labour - There is likely to be a narrower spread of labour skills in a small state as well as less effective manpower capability, even though the proportion of people in the labour force may be the same as in a larger developing country. The country will probably also be more affected by imbalances in its demographic structure, especially of an age, sex, or racial nature.

(c) Capital - In a small developing country, a large proportion of the available capital will probably

3. M. Ward, "Dependent Development - Problems of Economic Planning in Small Developing Countries," in P. Selwyn, ed; Development policy in Small countries (London, 1975), pp. 115-33.

be owned and controlled by foreign organizations. The government also has to rely heavily on outside grants and loans of one sort or another. In general, therefore, the borrower is small in relation to both actual and potential lenders and investors.

(d) Entrepreneurship - Independent local businessmen in small countries tend to be few in number, lack organizational skills and to face many obstacles in their local economic environment such as the difficulty of securing freehold tenure for industrial activities.

Among the demand constraints mentioned by Ward, two were given prominence:

(a) The Domestic Market: The basic problem of the limited size and narrowness of the domestic market is often further complicated by demographic characteristics which increase the diversification of the pattern of demand and lead to even greater fragmentation of an already small market. The maximum let-alone optimum, technically efficient scale of plant that can be introduced in such small economies thus renders some productive activities completely uneconomical unless a substantial export potential is also available.

(b) External Markets. As a result of these limitations the rate of growth of the economy in a small state tends to be primarily a function of the rate of growth of exports of goods and services. In turn, as previously noted, exports are typically highly concentrated on one or two products, whereas imports are very diverse. The small-state economy is thus dependent on foreign trade but lacks the capacity to exert any influence over the international market either in respect of price or quotas.

It should be noted that even in the work of neo-classical economists concerned with size, the fact that small-state economics had necessarily to exist within a wider international economic system was not ignored. "The reliance of such economies on foreign trade was commented upon by just about everybody, but it was not elevated into the centrepiece of analysis. That had to await the advent of dependence theory."⁴ The class of two perspectives was revealed very clearly in a seminal book review of Demas's text on the economy

4. Tony Payne, "Economic Issues", In Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, ed. Politics, Security and Development in Small States, (London, 1987) pp. 51-5.

of development in small countries.⁵ Demas had argued, in broadly conventional terms, that a small market imposed sharp limits on the process of import-substitution industrialisation and thus removed the option of balanced growth, incorporating a roughly equal mixture of export stimulation and import substitution, a goal which he believed could only really be attained by large continental countries.

Yet, in his review, another Caribbean economist, Best, criticised Demas for his almost exclusive emphasis on 'natural' variables, such as size, as opposed to 'societal', and therefore 'manipulable', policy variables. In this view, Demas failed to demonstrate "that smallness necessarily places economies at a disadvantage in the exploitation of their own "endowment" of resources' and often seemed to imply that the significant feature of the development of what he classifies as transformed and wealthy nations was the fact that they began as economies with large populations and favourable resource endowments."⁶

5. W.G. Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Economies with Special Reference to the Caribbean (Montreal, 1965).

6. L. Best, "Size and Survival," in N. Girvan and O. Jefferson, ed., Readings in the political Economy of the Caribbean (Kingston, 1971), pp. 29-34.

Neither in his review, nor indeed subsequently, did Best spell out the path of transformation that was, in his opinion, available to small economics, but he did at least succeed in introducing an entirely new note into the debate about the economics of smallness. "In this vision, underdevelopment was seen no longer as a passive condition in which states found themselves at birth but rather as a phenomenon brought about by their dependence upon, the peripheral location within, the international economy as a whole." ⁷ This was satisfactory enough as long as it was understood to mean that such economics were both small and dependent, but it became misleading as soon as it was assumed, as often it was that they were dependent because they were small. The thrust of dependency analysis was to identify a series of factors (the role of foreign investment, the position of certain comprador classes, a tradition of monoculture, the intermediary function of the state) capable of explaining underdevelopment and economic weakness quite apart from the fact of small size. Small economics could thus be developed, just as much as large economies could be underdeveloped. "With this distinction clear, dependency theory can be seen to have added something of value to the analysis of the economic constraints facing small states." ⁷

(7) Payne, n.4, p.55.

In their report the Commonwealth Consultative Group has very lucidly presented the points about the economic hazards of the small state in the present-day world.⁸

Threats to economic security seldom take overt forms. They are mostly concerned with the ever-present dangers for economic independence, economic stability and economic progress arising from weakness and vulnerability and exposure to a wider variety of relatively strong external economic forces.

Small size is usually associated with undiversified economic structures and a tendency to concentrate on industries with unstable external demand - thus enhancing exposure to external economic shocks. In many cases, high dependence on external sources for strategic supplies such as food and energy widen this exposure. Internal shocks also tend to be severe. Pervasive economic damage results from time to time from cyclones, volcanic eruptions, farm diseases and pests.

A further threat to economic independence and

8. Report of Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability of Small States in the Global Society (London 1985,)

security arises from the rise of bilateralism in international trading and financial arrangements at the expense of multilateral co-operation which is being eroded. Multilateral cooperation is of special value to small states, whose weakness becomes more exposed in bilateral relations.

The need to have predictable concessional resources and assured markets have led many small states to seek and maintain economic cooperation arrangements with major countries. The major powers themselves may have strategic and commercial interests in such arrangements. In today's world of tight aid budgets and restrictive trade access, in terms of the options available such bilateral or regional arrangements have a significant importance to the development of small states. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) are examples of such arrangements. However, small states would need to ensure that their interests are fully protected in negotiating such arrangements and that over time the arrangements do not compromise their security and their regional and wider interests.

The provision of facilities for military and naval bases has economic attractions for small states. They can, however, have socially damaging effects, particularly in small communities. Although the attractions of such bases are becoming less, the desire to retain a particular base on the part of a major country may encourage it to exercise political influence on the host country. The presence of foreign bases in turn can generate internal dissensions and external pressures. This is another case where an arrangement voluntarily entered into could lead to long-term adverse political and social consequences to the weak partner, who may later find it difficult, for economic reasons as well, to end the relationship. Conversely, foreign bases can be hostages to fortune, both regarding the domestic politics of the host country and the nature of the bilateral relationship with external power. The host state may have some leverage over the external, it may nonetheless become caught up in a complex webs of domestic and international politics over which it has little control and which ultimately causes more problems than it solves.

Another threat is from unscrupulous foreign

business firms and 'adventures' that are attracted to the tourist industry and off-shore financial activities on which small states increasingly rely to secure economic progress. The heart of the problem is the weak power and administration of small states and the encouragement these economic activities give to corruption, fraud, commercial crime, drug trafficking, prostitution and political interference. There is an increasing incidence of criminal intent in foreign business ventures in small states and besides the administrative, economic and political problems this causes, it also carries serious security implications.

Lastly, small states do not have the administrative and security capacity to delineate and monitor effectively their economic zones and to deter foreign intrusion into it. Many of them have thus not been able to prevent illegal exploitation by foreign deep-sea fishing fleets.

Now we should start discussion on the solution rather than the problem of economics of smallness. This discussion is related to strategy and the question of what small states can actually do to overcome or ameliorate their particular economic problems.

Countries that chose to withdraw from the international economic system would have to meet their food and energy needs from local resources, and these two items constitute the major imports of nearly all small countries. To become self-sufficient in food would in most cases require their inhabitants to relearn the agricultural skill of growing food for local consumption after centuries of plantation agriculture with its different techniques; to become self-sufficient in energy might be literally impossible for many countries. In other words, it would only be by accepting primitive standards of development for all the people that autarky could be made in any way practicable, and these days there are very few, states or islands remote enough for such a strategy to be politically sustainable.⁹

The converse of this rejection of self sufficiency has often been a firm assertion of the need for small states to achieve closer or more effective integration with the international economy. Yet it would not be automatically right to believe that the more extensive the trade linkages, the greater the capital flows, the better is the prospect of development for small

9. Payne, n.4, p.56.

states. Dommen and Hein note the conventional critique of this argument.¹⁰

One of the main problems which small islands may face, in implementing their trade policy and entering into some of the most dynamic sectors available, is that their policies may appear unfashionable, if not down-right unpopular, in international 'development circles'. A number of islands are already accused of encouraging smuggling or harbouring dubious operators. Any mention of tourism, overseas entrepreneurs, migration, work on foreign ships, i.e., crews of convenience, export processing zones, tax-havens, offshore banking, strategic bases, concentration on specialized exotic products, flags of convenience, etc., goes against the mainstream of the prescriptions of self-reliant, grass-root development apologists.¹¹

While smallness provides a continuing limitation, the extent to which the economic capacity of a state

10. E.C. Dommen and P.L. Hein, "Foreign Trade in Goods and Services: the Dominant Activity of Small Island Economics", in E.C. Dommen and P.L. Hein, ed, States, Micro States and Islands(London, 1985) pp. 152-84.

11. Payne, n.4, p. 56.

can increase, economic progress could help substantially in reducing economic weakness and insecurity, especially to the extent that it produces economic resilience. Development efforts must therefore be concerned not only with promoting growth but also with overcoming the constraints of size and promoting self-reliance.

Diversified economic development must continue to be an important objective of small states however difficult its achievement and however limited its scope in mini-states. Despite the difficulties in achieving such development, small states should not be too quick to resort to 'softer' options. In some cases, non-traditional activities like tourism and financial services, may well be appropriate choices in relation to the opportunities available. There are, however, risks that several undesirable activities may spring up in association with legitimate 'service' activities. High standard of administration and economic management are required to prevent or minimise such adverse consequences and to ensure that even where the economic benefits are large, these 'soft' options do not impede more sturdy development,

and district attention and resources away from investment opportunities. ¹²

One of the main problems confronting the very small states, especially those not richly endowed with natural resources, is the difficulty in attracting the interest of transnational corporations. Even when this objective is achieved, small states can experience new difficulties, first in negotiating terms satisfactory to themselves and second in controlling the companies' activities once they have become operational. While relations with transnational corporations pose special difficulties for weak states, this is not a sufficient reason for rejecting them and foregoing the contribution they can make in providing much needed capital, technology and market outlets. The crucial issue for small states is to avoid inequitable contractual arrangements and political interference. ¹³

However successful a small state might be in attracting foreign investment, a major role in economic development must be played by domestic entrepreneurs. Much attention must therefore be paid to

12. Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, n. 8, p. 55.

13. Ibid., pp. 56-7.

improving the management of private and public enterprises.

A particular problem of small states is the development of an indigenous technological capability. It is not only a case of retaining high level research personnel but also of affording research facilities and securing adequate returns from research and development expenditure, gains from which could only be spread over a small population.

Smallness need not imply poor endowment of resources. Early modernisation has led to high educational standards in many small states which help to compensate for limited human resources, in the case of island states, 'sand and sea' can be a substantial natural resource. Even where population density is high and land is scarce, intensive agriculture could increase production potential, while land reform and technical support for farmers could assist agricultural development. Making the best use of available resources could help small states to accelerate growth and transformation, avoid the adverse features of soft options, and discourage the loss of skilled and professional people.

There is a special significance for small states of regional economic co-operation. Many small states have tried regional co-operation as a means of overcoming problems arising from smallness. On the whole, regionalism has not lived up to expectations, especially as a means of widening markets, and this has resulted in a tendency to underestimate its achievements and potential on the basis of wider consideration-economic, administrative and political - and taking into account the limited options available to these states. In this situation it is not surprising that small states are persisting with regional cooperation and its objectives. Besides helping to overcome size constraints, it helps to promote stable development through the widening of economic opportunities. Particular areas where regional co-operation requires added emphasis both by small states themselves and by the aid agencies are : the surveillance and development of marine resources, sea and air transport arrangements, disaster preparedness and relief, higher education, research and development, development banking, and pooling arrangements for the sharing of special and expertise. In some regions, such as the Caribbean and the Pacific, arrangements covering many of these

areas are well established and their experience could be useful to other regions.¹⁴

In their report to Commonwealth, the scholars have rightly pointed out that in the light of the economic weakness and vulnerability of small states, the international community has a special obligation to provide an international environment which could assist them in promoting self-reliant and stable development and in strengthening their economic independence. That environment does not now exist and the need for it is very inadequately recognised. A basic question which arises is whether, in the light of the special problems facing small states, it is advisable to consider the creation of a formal category of such states in the international economic system as a way of officially recognising these problems and ensuring adequate attention to them. While it is true that most of the economic problems identified are not peculiar to small states, in many cases they apply more sharply to them. We believe that small state's economic features and problems have sufficiently identifiable characteristics to justify

14. *ibid.*, pp. 57-8.

categorisation. However, in the current international situation, the process of categorisation would face political difficulties. For the reasons, without advocating a formal economic grouping of small state at the present time, a pragmatic approach should be developed involving two strands : securing better recognition of the problems facing small states and of the need for remedial action; and identifying formally or informally, a special category in specific economic fields where a clear need is established for such categorisation.¹⁵

Apart from economic problems small states in general face a number of social problems also.

Those who live in small states cling tenaciously to familiar patterns of life. Their settled conservatism stems from a caution born of long experience with resources whose exploitation is severely limited by scale, by isolation, and by physical and economic hazards beyond their own control. These constraints incline residents toward the maintenance of continuity, the practice of conservation, and the hedging of bets by taking on multiple occupation.

15. *ibid.*, p. 84.

Just as smallness cramps resource exploitation, so does it put many goods and services beyond local reach. Small states cannot afford amenities elsewhere taken for granted. Paved roads, electric power, piped water, and telephones may require equipment, capital outlay, or minimum levels of consumption that exceed local capacities. These diseconomies of scale are not static: advances in global technology progressively worsen the plight of small states. It is not enough for them to maintain a stable population, for social viability demands ever larger number of consumers. In large states big schools replace small ones health facilities centralize to accommodate sophisticated medical equipment and facilities and services concentrate in bigger and bigger centres, "Smallness deprives small states not only of new advances but even of previously customary, services which technology has now made obsolete." 16

Small states are as fragile socially as ecologically and for similar reasons.¹⁷ Smallness makes

16. D. Lowenthal, "The Return of the Non-Native : New Life for Depopulated Areas"; in L.A. Koninski and J.W. Webb. ed. Population at Microscale (Palmerston North,, 1976) pp. 143-8.

17. R.H. Mac Arthur and E.O. Wilson, The Theory of Island Biogeography (Princeton, 1967).

them excessively vulnerable to demographic change. Large state can undergo substantial population fluctuations without serious damage to resource management or institutional structure. But their small initial base and their precarious population-resource balance magnifies the impact of such changes in small states. A sudden or sustained increase stemming from mortality reduction or influx of outsiders severely strains and may exhaust the state's limited resources. "A sudden or sustained reduction owing to lower natality, epidemic disease, or increased rates of emigration has dire effects on productivity, resource maintenance, and social structure" ¹⁸. Where local enterprises and services are already marginal, even small imbalances can endanger the fabric, the departure of just a few workers, school children, or medical personnel may close a factory, school, a cottage hospital and erode the entire social structure.

Mass departure, especially of the able bodied young not only cripples agriculture and leaves arable

18. R. Doumenge, "The Viability of Small Intertropical Islands", in E.C. Dommen and P.L. Heins, ed. States, Micro-states and Islands (London, 1985), pp. 931-

lands idle, it leaves behind a residual population that is less innovative and more dependent, unable to cope even with normal environmental vicissitudes or to sustain traditional social networks.

Well aware of the fragility of their economic and social fabric, small-scale inhabitants are conscious that any major change comes at the risk of catastrophic loss. Hence they often view innovation with profound mistrust and deal conservatively with most decisions they must take. Realizing that potential improvement may ultimately entail an unacceptable shift in resource exploitation or in the scale of local enterprise, they usually opt to conserve what they have rather than venture new development. "Progress" may upset the delicate equilibrium of services and goods that is the lynchpin of community interdependency; short term gains may spell ruin in the longer run. The virtues of stability induces small entities to bolster traditional ways even at pecuniary sacrifice.

However, in short, small-state conservatism encourages resource diversification in place of monoculture, keeps open many possible occupational

options against the failure of some, inhibits specialization in favour of all-round competence, maintains economic and social resources in long-term balance and celebrates the virtues of stability and tradition."

19

A second consequence of smallness in states is that their inhabitants must get along with one another. Most of them grow up within an independent network where each, person figures many times over; as in Gluckman's 'multiplex' societies, nearly every social relationship serves many interests. Relationship in small states seldom concentrate on a single act or specific function but tend instead to be functionally diffuse and to last for a long time, though their specific content changes over the course of life span.

Bonds of family underpin small-state intimacies. Families generate most other linkages; family loyalties suffuse small-state economic, social, and political enterprise. Those in position of consequence

19. David Lowenthal, "Social Features", in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, ed., Politics, Security and Development in small states (London, 1987) p.38.

and authority in small states with still smaller elites are bound to be interrelated. "Large-state outsiders consider nepotism morally wrong; to use a position of power, or authority to benefit one's relatives seem iniquitous." ²⁰ But where everyone is related personal involvement in public affairs is inevitable and nepotism unavoidable. Small state citizens accept kinship relations as the warp and woof of public affairs and family favouritism as a fact of life. Theirs is a realistic perspective on how human beings normally conduct their affairs.

Small states tend to mute intergroup tensions, much as they do personal hostilities, because they can otherwise become serious impediments to harmony and dangerous harbingers of a divisive future. Two opposing ethnic groups of equivalent size or power especially aggravate such tensions, as Cyprus, Guyana and Fiji variously illustrate. Ethnic tensions can be contained by personal familiarity, be a recognised need for cooperation, and by mutual fears

20. B. Benedict, "Sociological Aspects of Smallness," in B. Benedict, ed., Problems of Smaller Territories (London, 1967) pp. 45-55.

of conflagration and outside intervention.

The role of small - state emigrants is another special consequence of smallness. Emigration is a ubiquitous aspect of modern life, but in many small states, as in small islands generally, it has long been a persistent feature. The strength and durability of their emigrant ties distinguishes small states from other cradles of emigration. Those who leave are seldom lost to their homelands but extend their boundaries, helping to bolster small-state economies, strengthen their autonomy, and resist unwanted change. The sudden loss of many able-bodied may strain a states' stability, but remittances cushion the departure, and migration and return often become an established routine, working away a normal part of the life cycle. Few small-state emigrants stay away for good; many remain citizens. Thus many small states survive as social entities when their apparent numbers seem to doom them. Periodic return of the absent ensures continuity and community participation.²¹

21. Lowenthal, n.19, p.41-2.

People in small states zealously guard their statehood. Yet statehood costs them dear, Small-State governments are both meddlesome and burdensome. The omnipresent government, moreover, feels omnipotent. Inhabitants of small states have virtually no recourse to impartial authority. Neither the civil service nor the judiciary can escape influence, if not coercion, exerted by political leaders. Yet however, costly to coerce their governments, most inhabitants of small prefer these liabilities to those they would probably suffer should they lose their sovereignty. Small-state self-rule is not just empty chauvinism, it expresses a cohesion needed to bolster autonomy against the incursions of larger states, the pressures of global development, and perils of piracy.

"Small states have positive as well as negative virtues" ²² Their existence enhances human diversity. Their sovereignty fosters the continuance of cultures of myriad kinds. Their devotion to their own survival, narrowly chauvinist though it may sometime seem, nurtures attachments to particular

22. *ibid.*, p.46.

and uniquely precious lands and landscapes. No one would wish to preserve a small state as museum piece in the modern world against its inhabitants' own wishes. But by the same token, no one ought to seek to deprive them of that status against their will.

CONCLUSION

SECRET

"It is said that writing is an art. But in the process of investigation about the problems of small states, I have felt as it description is an art".¹ In this little framework, the description is presented of the security and socio-economic problems of small states and their position among other macro-states in the present -day world.

It is the case that virtually all the small states that have recently become independent have achieved sovereignty through decolonization and the general demise of empire following the end of World War II. Many of the problems of security of small states have their origin in the traumatic process of decolonisation and in the circumstances in which these societies have to persue their nation-building efforts. Ethnic, linguistic, religious, sectarian and other divergences are among the domestic issues that in some cases with cross-border ramifications, generated threats to the security and stability of these states. Threats from such sources do not merely jeopardize national cohesion and territorial integrity but also induce harmful

1. Avaya Kumar Nayak, "Neo-Feudalism: A case study of Dolasahi" (M.Phil thesis, Meerut University, Department of Political Science, Institute of Advanced Studies, Meerut, 1987) p.87.

exogenous involvement straining theory inter-state relations particularly in the regional and sub-regional context.

The extent of deleterious impact of domestic sources of insecurity is conditioned (and in turn is influenced) by the nature and character of polity which is the outcome of such factors as the state of social, political and economic institutions, level and nature of participation, and type and intensity to intra-group conflicts. There is no doubt that in the context of management of the internal dimensions of security, accommodation, conciliation and power-sharing geared to attain and sustain national consensus on basic national issues of paramount importance. ²

However, few economic advantages attach to smallness, the case studies amply testify. Such success in economic development as has been achieved has a great deal to do with the quality of economic management, both in governmental and the private sector. The lack of innovation in Antigua and Barbuda and the choice of economic growth within a framework

2. Abdul Hafiz and Abdur Rob Khan, ed.; Security of Small States (Dacca, 1987), p. 342.

reinforced dependency in Swaziland contrast very markedly with the energetic multilateralism pursued in Gambia and Grenada, at least during the revolutionary era. Moreover, the instances of Malta, and Fiji show that geopolitical location backed by skilful bargaining can be used to extract financial support from a regional or superpower patron.³

The problem is that economic weakness has the effect of making it difficult for most small states to defend themselves from interference by other states. It is not even easy to repel mercenary invasion or contain internal subversion and insurrection. Treaties of assistance can be negotiated to remove some of these threats, and careful diplomacy can be used to defuse confrontations between the small state and regional powers or super powers. An additional important factor is the need to develop a political culture to counter militarism. What emerges as critical, however, is the fact that the legitimacy of the political process is a security resource more crucial for small state stability even than the existence of security forces.

3. Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, ed., Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London, 1987), pp. 226-7.

There is no doubt that regional co-operation, mutual understanding and confidence are effective catalysts to reducing vulnerabilities and insecurities of states irrespective of size. Besides helping overcome size and resource constraint and promoting thereby continued development such co-operation has immense potential in promoting mutual trust, confidence and understanding in the regional context which are of crucial importance in removing emotional and psychological barriers which appears to be a major cause of strained inter-state relations. Regional co-operation is expected to contribute to peace, progress and development and thereby to stability and security of the participant small member-states.

This is the need for assigning a higher priority on multilateralism in international economic relations as a promoting factor of the security of small states. Under the existing international economic order the countries in the south are perpetually at a disadvantage and there is a need to replace it by a new international economic order based on sovereign equality of nations. Liberalisation of trade, greater flow of Official Development Assistance (ODA) particu-

larly concessional aid, increasing technical cooperation, greater balance of payments support including stabilisation of export earnings are vital measures for development and security of small states.

It is to be noted that of the 159 Members of the United Nations, thirty two are small states. Of the eight small states which are not Members of the world body, many of them are members of other institutions of the U.N. family. Of the Commonwealth's forty-nine members, twenty four are small states. Of all the associations of nations, it is the Commonwealth which has devoted the most attention to the problem of security of small states and assisted them in a variety of ways.⁴ The nonaligned movement is not unconcerned with the security problem of the small states although it has done very little beyond persistently condemning the domination or hegemony and intervention or interference by the Great Powers in other states. Belize, Cyprus, and Guyana, for instance, have greatly benefited from the support of the nonaligned movement in their effort to protect their rights of self-determination and resist the

4. Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability : Small States in the Global Society (London 1985).

territorial claims of their neighbours.⁵

Of course, some small states have, willingly or otherwise, acquiesced in the traditional ways of ensuring their security i.e. by becoming members of bilateral or multilateral military alliance by offering military bases to foreign Powers, by permitting foreign powers to station forces on their territories, by adopting external military alliance in various forms, etc. Other small states have, however, avoided these traditional ways for fear of compromising their sovereignty and independence.

One of the characteristic features of most small states is their extreme suspicion of any possibility of an external influence adversely impinging on their independence or sovereignty. Perhaps because they are small and weak in military terms, they tend to guard their autonomy more zealously than the large states, which can afford to take their sovereignty and independence for granted. Many of their leaders are men of tremendous shrewdness, determination, and will power to stand up to external pressures.

5. M.S. Rajan, "Small States and the sovereign-Nation-State System," International Studies, vol.25, no.1, (1988), pp.19-20.

While their states may be small or weak economical-ly or militarily, their political strength among their own people is as great as that of the leaders of any of the large states.

It can perhaps be expected that the small states will develop a stronger sense of nationhood as an expression of their identity and their determination to maintain a separate political existence. But they will only be able to survive if the international system in theory and in practice, emphasizes the equality of states and insists upon the upholding the international rule of law. Most of the problems discussed in this research work are infact somehow unique to small states. Smallness is neither intrinsically ugly nor beautiful. It simply represents an additional set of factors which have to be considered. By skilful political leadership and a policy of diversifying dependency, states can take advantage of its positive aspects and minimize its disadvantages.



TABLE 1

SMALL STATES COMPARISONS

Country	Area (sq km.)	Mid-1985 Population ('000)	1985 Gross national product(\$ million)	1985 GNP per head (\$)
(1) Andorra	467	47	n a.	n.a.
(2) Antigua and Barbuda	440	80	160	2,030
(3) Bahamas	13,935	234	1,670	7,150
(4) Bahrain	622	412	4,040	9,560
(5) Barbados	431	253	1,180	4,680
(6) Belize	22,965	166	180	1,130
(7) Brunei	5,765	224	3,940	17,580
(8) Cape Verde	4,033	334	140	430
(9) Comoros	2,171	476	110	280
(10) Cyprus	9,251	665	2,650	3,790
(11) Djibouti	22,000	430	180	480
(12) Dominica	751	83	90	1,160
(13) Equatorial Guinea	28,051	300	62	180
(14) Fiji	18,274	715	1,190	1,700
(15) Gambia	11,295	688	170	230
(16) Grenada	344	89	90	970
(17) Guinea- Bissau	36,125	810	150	170
(18) Guyana	2,14,969	790	460	570

(Table 1 Contd.)

(19) Iceland	1,03,000	241	2580	10,720
(20) Kiribati	861	64	30	450
(21) Liechtenstein	160	27	n.a.	n.a.
(22) Luxembourg	2,586	367	4,900	13,380
(23) Maldives	298	189	50	290
(24) Malta	316	360	1,190	3,300
(25) Monaco	1.8	27	n.a.	n.a.
(26) Nauru	21	7	n.a.	n.a.
(27) Qatar	11,000	257	5,110	15,980
(28) St. Christopher & Nevis	261	46	70	1,520
(29) St. Lucia	616	134	160	1,210
(30) St. Vincent & The Grenadines	388	108	100	840
(31) San Marino	61	22	n.a.	n.a.
(32) Sao Tome & Principe	964	108	30	310
(33) Seychelles	308	65	160	2,430
(34) Solomon Islands	228,446	221	140	510
(35) Suriname	1,63,265	389	1,010	2,570
(36) Swaziland	17,363	647	490	650
(37) Tonga	699	97	70	730
(38) Tuvalu	25	7	5	680
(39) Vanuatu	14,763	140	40	350
(40) Western Samoa	2,842	159	110	660

TABLE 2

Membership of the Small States in the U.N. and its Specialized

Countries	Agencies																		
	U N	I A E A	I B R D	I D A	I F C	I M F	W F O	I F A D	G A T T	I M O	I C A O	I L O	I T U	U N E S C O	U N I D O	U P U	W H O	W M O	W I P O
(1) Antigua & Barbuda	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X		
(2) Bahamas	X		X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X				X	X	X
(3) Bahrain	X		X			X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(4) Barbados	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(5) Belize	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X		
(6) Brunei	X										X	X		X			X	X	X
(7) Cape Verde	X			X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(8) Comoros	X			X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(9) Cyprus	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(10) Djibouti	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X	
(11) Dominica	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
(12) Equatorial Guinea	X		X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
(13) Fiji	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(14) Gambia	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(15) Grenada	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X		
(16) Guinea-Bissau	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(17) Guyana	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(18) Iceland	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
(19) Kiribati			X	X	X						X	X			X	X	X		

(20) Liechtenstein			X									X	X	X	
(21) Luxembourg	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(22) Maldives	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(23) Malta	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(24) Monaco		X							X	X	X	X	X	X	
(25) Nauru									X	X		X			
(26) Qatar	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
(27) St.Christopher & Nevis	X		X	X	X	X	X					X		X	
(28) St.Lucia	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(29) St. Vincent & Grenadines	X				X	X		X	X	X		X	X		
(30) San Marino									X	X	X	X			
(31) Sao Tome & Principe	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(32) Seychelles	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(33) Solomon Islands	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	
(34) Suriname	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(35) Swaziland	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(36) Tonga			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
(37) Tuvalu												X			
(38) Vanuatu	X			X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	
(39) West.Samoa	X		X	X	X	X	X	X						X	

(Table 2 Contd.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

First Special Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons of England on the Economic & Political Security of Small States, May 1984.

Report of a Commonwealth Consultative Group on the Vulnerability of the Small States in the Global Society to the Commonwealth Secretary General, 2 August, 1985.

Report of the Annual Conference of the Royal Commonwealth Society on the Small States and the Commonwealth, 1984.

Report of the Heritage Foundation on Moscow's South Pacific Fishing Fleet, 6 September 1988.

Report of the Study Group of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association on the Security of Small States to the Commonwealth Secretary General, 19-21, September 1984.

Report of the U.N. Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 1982 to Trusteeship Council T/1850, 1983.

Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of House of Commons of England on Grenada March 1984.

Study Prepared for the State Department of the U.S.
on the Potential for Soviet Penetration of the
South Pacific Islands, Robert C. Kiste and Richard
A. Herr, December, 1984.

Text of Communique issued at the Conclusion of the Meeting
of the South Pacific Forum, 1984, 28 August 1984.

The Goa Declaration on International Security, Common-
wealth Secretariat, London, 1985.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Azar, Edward E., Probe for Peace: Small State Hostilities
(Minneapolis, 1973).

Azline, Andrew W., and Stegenga, James A., The Global
Community (New York, 1972) .

Barston, Ronald P. ed., The Other States Studies in the
Foreign Policies of Small States (London 1973).

Blair, Patricia W., The Mini State Dilemma (New York
1968).

Burten, John, W. Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules
(London, 1968).

- Cassen, R. ed., Soviet Intervention in the Third World (London, 1985).
- Clarke, Colin and Payne Tony, ed., Politics, Security and Development in Small States (London, 1987)
- Cosgrove, C.A. and Twitehett, K. J., The New International Actors (London, 1970).
- Crabb, Cecil, V., The Elephants and the Grass : A Study of Non alignment (New York, 1963).
- Demas, W.G., The Economics of Development in Small Economics with Special Reference to the Caribbean (Montreal, 1965).
- Dommen, E.C. and Hein, P.L., ed., States, Micro States and Islnds (London, 1985).
- Fox, Annette B. , The Power of Small States Diplomacy, in World War II, (Chicago, 1959).
- Frank, Jerome D., Sanity and Survival (New York, (1968).
- Gregg, Robert W., and Barkan, Michael , The United Nations System and its Functions, (Princeton, 1968).
- Hafiz, M.A., and Khan, A.R., ed., Security of Small States, (Dacca, 1987).

Handel, Michael, Weak States in the International System
(London 1980).

Harden, Sheila, ed., Small in Dangerous: Micro States
in Macroworld (London, 1985).

Jalan, B. ed., Problems and Policies in Small Economics
(London, 1982).

Lloyd, Peter J., International Trade Problems of Small
Nations (Durham, 1968).

Mathisen, T., The Function of Small States in the Stra-
gies of the Great Powers (Oslo, 1971)

Neumann, Stephanie G. ed., Small States and Segmented
Societies: National Political Integration in
a Global Environment, (New York, 1976)

Obler, J., Stiner, J., Dierckx, G., Decision-Making and
Small Democracies: The Consociational "Burden"
(California, 1977).

Pettman, R., Small Power Politics and International
Relations in South East Asia, (London, 1975).

Plischke, E., Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Pro-
blems and Options (Washington, D.C. 1977).

Rapoport, J. Mutaba, E. and Theratill, J. J., Small States: Status and Problems (New York, 1971).

Reid, G.L., The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behaviour of Microstates (London, 1974).

Robinson, E.A.G., ed., Economic Consequences of the Size of the Nations: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Association (London, 1960).

Rothstein, R. L., Alliance and Small Powers, (New York, 1968).

Schou, A. and Brundtland A.O. ed., Small States in International Relations, (Stockholm, 1971).

Selwyn, P. ed., Development Policy in Small Countries, (London, 1975).

Shand, R.T., ed., The Island States of the Pacific and Indian Ocean: Anatomy of Development (Canberra, 1980).

Singer, Marshall R., Weak States in World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships (New York, 1972).

Sveies, V.V., Small Nations Survival, Political Defence in Unequal Conflicts (New York, 1969).

Vital, David, The inequality of States (Oxford, 1967).

Worsley, P., and Kitromilides, P. ed, Small States in Modern World (Nicosia, 1979).

ARTICLES IN PERIODICALS

Alford, Jonathan, "Security Dilemmas of Small States" The Round Table, (London), no.262 (1984), pp.377-82.

Amstrum, Niel, "The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.II, no.3, pp. 163-82.

Baehr, Peter R., "Small States: A Tool for Analysis" World Politics, vol.27, no.,3, 1975, pp. 456-66.

Bell, Coral, "The Security of Pacific Mini-States", Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Special Supplement, Winter, 1985-86.

Bjøl, Erling, "The Power of the Weak", Cooperation and Conflict vol. 3, no.3, pp. 157-68.

Diggines, C.E., "The problem of Small States," The Round Table no.271 (1985), pp. 191-205.

East M.A., "Policy Making in Small States: Some Theoretical Observations based on a Study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Policy Sciences, vol.4, no.4, 1973, pp.491-508.

Fabem Mike, "Island Micro States: Problem of Viability", The Rund Table, no.262, 1984, pp. 372-6.

Gitelson, S.A., "Why do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers, Lessons from the African Experience", International Studies Quarterly, (Arizona), Vol.18, no.3. 1974, pp.451-84.

Hafiz, M.A., "National Security and Small States: A Third World Perspective", BIISS, (Dacca) vol.7, no.3, 1986.

Kechane, R.O., "Lilliputian Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", International Organisation, vol.23, no.2, 1969, pp. 291-310.

Laux, J.K., "Small States and Inter-European Relations: An Analysis of the Group of Nine" Journal of Peace Research, (Oslo), Vol.9, no.2, 1972, pp. 147-60.

Maniruzzaman, T., "The Security of Small States in the Third World," Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no.25, 1982.

Nuechterlein, D.E., "small States in Alliances: Iceland, Thailand and Australia", Orbis, (Philadelphia) vol.13, no.2, 1969, pp. 600-23.

Paterson, W.E., "Small States in International politics", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.4, no.2, 1969, pp. 119-23.

Pottman, R., "small; Power Politics and International Relations", South-east Asia (London, 1975). p.10

Quester G.H., "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States," International Security vol.8, no.2, 1983.

Rajan, M.S., "Small States and the Sovereign-Nation-State System", International Studies, (New Delhi), vol.25, no.1, 1988, pp. 1-23.

Rothstein, Richard L., "Alignment, Non alignment and Small Powers - 1945 - 65," International Organization, vol.20, no.3, 1966, pp. 367-418.

Vandenboah, Amry, "The Small States in International Politics and Organisation" The Journal of Politics vol.26, no.2, 1964, pp. 293-312.

Vayrynen, Raimo, "On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status", Cooperation and Conflict, vol.6, no.2, 1971, pp. 91-102.

NEWSPAPERS

Daily Telegraph (London)

Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

International Herald Tribune (Singapore)

New Nation (Dacca)

New York Times

Sunday Times (London)

The Hindu (New Delhi)

The Observer (London)

The Times (London)

Times of India (New Delhi)

Washington Post

(2304)