

**FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING:
A CASE STUDY ON CANADA'S ROLE IN
PEACEBUILDING IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the Degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

RACHEL Z. SUMI



**Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies
Canadian Studies Division
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi – 110 067
India
2005**



CENTRE FOR CANADIAN, US AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY


NEW DELHI - 110067

Proforma of Certificate for the M. Phil Dissertation


Date: 28 July 2005


CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: A Case Study on Canada's Role in Peacebuilding in the Former Yugoslavia", submitted by me in partial fulfillment for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other University and is my own work.


Signature of the Student

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


Prof. Christopher S. Raj
(Chairperson)


Prof. Christopher S. Raj
(Supervisor)

*To My Beloved Parents
Zhewoto and Vitoni*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Immense help from a lot of people has gone into the writing of this dissertation. I am especially grateful to my supervisor Prof. Christopher S. Raj for directing my humble beginnings and helping me in completing this work in the desired direction. Without his indispensable guidance, support and encouragement, this dissertation would not have been possible. I owe my deepest and heartfelt gratitude to him for his time, patience, warmth and friendliness.

I owe my gratitude to the staffs of JNU Central Library and the Shastri-Indo Canadian Institute for their valuable help in accessing the relevant materials. I am also grateful to my classmates Thari and Upasana whose company made my work much more interesting.

I thank my friends Tshering, Rana, Keren, Papoori and Robert for their support and encouragement. My special thanks go to Tshering and Rana for always being there and helping me in every possible way.

I thank my parents and family members who have supported me with their love and prayers throughout. Their contribution to this endeavour is immeasurable.

Above all, I thank God for sustaining me in every possible way and providing my every need.

Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi,

2005


Rachel Z. Sumi

CONTENTS

	Page no.
Acknowledgement	i
Preface	iii-v
Chapter I	1-25
History of Canada's Peacekeeping Role	
1.1 Canada's Role in Peacekeeping	
1.2 The Origins of UN Peacekeeping	
1.3 Origin and Evolution of Canadian Peacekeeping	
1.4 Emergence of Canadian Peacekeeping Policy	
1.5 The Nature of Peacekeeping Operations Today and Canada's Changed Role	
Chapter II	26-60
Canada's Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Period	
2.1 The Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Period	
2.2 Peacebuilding: Origin and Concept	
2.3 The Transition in Canadian Foreign Policy from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding	
2.4 The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative	
2.5 The Role of CIDA and DFAIT in Peacebuilding	
2.5.1 <i>The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework</i>	
2.5.2 <i>The Canadian Peacebuilding Fund</i>	
Chapter III	61-88
Case Study: Canada's Role in Peacebuilding in the Former Yugoslavia	
3.1 A Background of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia	
3.2 The Response of the International Community to the Conflict	
3.3 Canada's Response to the Conflict	
3.4 Peacebuilding Initiatives of the International Community in the Former Yugoslavia	
3.5 Canada's Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Former Yugoslavia	
3.5.1 <i>Peacebuilding Initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina</i>	
3.5.2 <i>Peacebuilding Initiatives in Kosovo</i>	
3.5.3 <i>Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Former Yugoslavia in general</i>	
Chapter IV	
Conclusion	89-99
Bibliography	100-110

PREFACE

The end of the Cold War opened a dangerous and unstable international environment, with bloody intrastate conflicts and their consequent atrocities occurring in many parts of the world. In the light of the new threats to international order and stability, peacekeeping went on to acquire a wider meaning and role. The beginning of 1990s saw major changes in the nature of peacekeeping operations which came to have aspects of peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacebuilding and the like.

Accruing out of this change, the Post-Cold War Canadian foreign policy is characterised by new methods and philosophies of engagement in international zones of conflict. The new realities have brought about a substantial demise in the traditional peacekeeping policy of Canada. Canada has now moved on from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding in conflict and strife-ridden societies, expressing concerns and acknowledging the need to address the economic, social, and political aspects of reconstruction and reconciliation. Post-Cold War Canadian initiatives differ both in scope and context. They address not only protracted armed conflicts that take place between states, but also conflicts that occur within and across states borders. Also, they involve not only in the military aspects, but also in the socio-political issues related both to the conflict and peace negotiations in post-conflict situations.

In view of these developments, this dissertation has attempted to look into the vast transformations brought to peacekeeping by the demise of the Cold War and the paradigm shift in Canadian foreign policy thereafter i.e., the shift from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The dissertation is based on a case study of the former Yugoslavia and has attempted to establish that current Canadian foreign policy vis-à-vis international conflict resolution relies on the notion of peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. The former Yugoslavia has been chosen as the focus of this dissertation because Canada's participation in the UN and NATO operations there can be cited as one of the examples representing the departure from traditional Canadian peacekeeping policy and criteria. Canada became a major leader in peacebuilding efforts in the region, aiming to root out

the underlying causes of violent conflict as well as to support the emergence of sustainable peace in the post-conflict situation. The dissertation has mainly focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the region because a great deal of Canada's peacebuilding efforts took place and are taking place there. Canada has provided humanitarian assistance at the height of the conflicts in the regions, and in the post-conflict situation also, it began to assume a far greater role in peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts.

Chapter 1 of this dissertation has focused on the history, origin and evolution of Canada's peacekeeping role. This study has attempted to look back at Canada's involvement in traditional UN peacekeeping as a way to distinguish the current transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Since Canada's peacekeeping role developed and matured under UN, a brief description about how UN peacekeeping came about is also given. The chapter also deals with the emergence of Canadian peacekeeping policy, how it came to be emphasised and articulated by the different Canadian governments beginning from the Post-Second World War period up to the end of the Cold War. The chapter has also observed about how the nature of UN peacekeeping operations has changed in the Post-Cold War period, and how Canada's traditional peacekeeping role changed accordingly.

Chapter 2 has dealt with the transition in Canadian foreign policy from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War period. It has examined in general about how and why this transition came about. The chapter has also discussed about how the peacebuilding concept originated and has attempted to give the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of peacebuilding. It has also dealt with the nature and direction of the evolving Canadian peacebuilding role. The chapter has also made a study of the peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by Canada in zones of conflict around the world. It has also dwelt on the role of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in implementing and carrying out Canada's various peacebuilding programmes in different geographic areas.

To make an in-depth analysis of the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, Chapter 3 is the case study which has used the former Yugoslavia as the immediate framework of analysis. The chapter has dealt with the background of the conflict and the beginning of the involvement of Canada and the international community therein. The chapter has examined how the international community and more specifically, Canada's initial involvement in the conflicts in the region evolved and went on to transform itself into long-term peacebuilding exercises. The chapter has also looked into the peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by Canada and the international community in the former Yugoslavia. More specifically, the chapter has made a detailed study of Canada's peacebuilding initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and how far Canada has been able to undertake peacebuilding activities there.

Chapter 4 is the conclusion which sums up in whole, the evolution of Canada's peacekeeping role into peacebuilding, and the resulting peacebuilding activities it has undertaken in the former Yugoslavia and the progress made in this regard. This chapter has also presented some of the impediments that have stood in the way of Canada while it undertakes its peacebuilding activities. The chapter has also talked about how Canada can take up the leadership role in promoting the acceptance of peacebuilding by the international community. Lastly, the chapter has made suggestions as to how Canada can work out an effective peacebuilding plan and strategy in areas embroiled in violence, so that its peacebuilding efforts yields maximum success and help in building and bringing sustainable peace.


Rachel Z. Sumi.

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF CANADA'S PEACEKEEPING ROLE

1.1 Canada's Role in Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping, since the 1950s, has been acknowledged as a corner stone of Canadian foreign and defence policies. Based on its reputation as a "middle power", Canada has undertaken the role of peacekeeping in order to make a meaningful contribution to international peace and security. Over the decades, Canada has maintained its multilateral approach to international peace and security. Its leaders have staunchly supported the United Nations (UN) as the legitimate, international governing body, and through the UN, it has been a forerunner in the UN's efforts to keep peace.

In the midst of the Cold War and numerous conflicts, Canada saw a principal mission in assisting countries- largely those emerging from post-colonial struggles and the legacies of imperialism- in managing hostilities after the period of decolonisation, pre-empting east-west intrusion, and creating conditions for non-violent dispute resolution. In all these, Canada was guided by the compelling need to 'do something' and thereby, it assumed a personal sense of mission about bringing peace to troubled parts of the world. Thus the UN operations gave Canada the opportunity of making a difference, where Canada's role was to lead, and where its political as well as economic attributes were significant aspects of its influence.¹

Working closely with the United Nations and other multilateral institutions has had a positive impact on Canada. It has provided Canada with opportunities for pursuing issue-specific interests and developing coalition around areas of Canadian priority. Canada has found in the UN "a place to stand" and the UN, in turn, has provided Canada the opportunity for the articulation and enhancement of Canada's place in the international community. According to Andrew Cooper, "peacekeeping has been central to the definition of Canada's national identity, role and influence in the world," that it

¹ David B. Dewitt, "Directions in Canada's International Policy: From Marginal Actor at the Centre to Central Actor at the Margins", *International Journal*, Spring 2000, p. 176.

has become “a symbol of Canada’s world view,” “a staple tool for the application of constructive internationalism,” and “an area of issue specific advantage.” He adds that peacekeeping has provided Canada with international recognition, has been enormously popular domestically, and has provided Canada with repeated opportunities for exercising its talent for mediation.² It can be said that Canada’s engagements and participation in UN peacekeeping operations have contributed in substantial ways to forging a sense of who Canadians are and their place in the international community.

Canada possesses the required human and material resources which enable it to raise and equip her armed forces for UN peacekeeping operations if and when necessary. Almost every UN peacekeeping operation has involved Canadian troops. Canada has been one of a small minority of countries which has officially designed troops for the purpose of peacekeeping. The peacekeeping role has been officially designed as a priority for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and on their part, the CAF have incorporated peacekeeping into their ethos, planning, training, equipment and resource allocations.³ Canadian troops have been valued because of their comparative advantage over other countries in terms of their training, expertise and their capability to contribute substantively in areas of conflict around the world. In over 50 years of peacekeeping, over 100,000 Canadian personnel have served in peacekeeping operations of the UN, which is more than any other country, and over 100 Canadian peacekeepers have lost their lives while performing their duties. At present, approximately 4000 Canadian peacekeepers are deployed in about 13 missions overseas such as in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), Jerusalem (UNTSO), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Ethiopia / Eritrea (UMEE), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Albania etc.

1.2 The Origins of UN Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping may be defined as the deployment, under the auspices of a recognised international authority, of military, para military or non military personnel or

² Andrew Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits And New Directions* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice- Hall, 1997) pp. 173-177.

³ Rod B. Byers, “Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy: Ambivalence and Uncertainty”, in B. D. Hunt and R. G. Haycock eds., *Canada’s Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993) p. 179.

forces in an area of conflict for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. It principally involves the use of military multinational forces, authorised by the Security Council and under the command of the Secretary-General, operating with the consent of the parties to the conflict, to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement...⁴ The main purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the belligerents to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. It is 'arguably the most important innovation of conflict management in the last fifty years.'⁵

Peacekeeping is usually done by the UN, though regional organisations like the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Organisation of African Unity and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have also undertaken it. The practice of peacekeeping developed during the Cold War as a countermeasure to the principle of collective security and generally involved international personnel monitoring a cease-fire, or placing themselves between belligerent armies. It was an instrument of Cold War diplomacy and its chief object was to prevent local or "brush fire" wars from escalating and embroiling the Cold War nuclear adversaries. It was also begun as a way to circumvent the political deadlock between the USA and the USSR in the Security Council while allowing the UN to fulfil its charter obligations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.⁶ Except for certain cases, most peacekeeping operations during the Cold War involved wars between sovereign states.

The United Nations has played a useful and effective role in maintaining peace and preventing conflict through the medium of peacekeeping. It invented peacekeeping as a means of insulating local wars, most of them in the third world, to prevent super-power entanglement and consequent globalisation of the conflict.⁷ Although no reference to

⁴ Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999) p. 3.

⁵ Virginia Page Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5 (4), 2003, p. 97.

⁶ Laura Neack, "UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?", *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1995, p. 182.

⁷ Harald Von Riekhoff and Maureen Appel Molot, "Introduction: A Part of the Peace", in Harald Von Riekhoff and Maureen Appel Molot eds., *Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994) p. 5.

peacekeeping is made in the UN Charter, the United Nations began to sponsor peacekeeping operations to prevent conflict and to maintain international peace and security. The creation of UN peacekeeping mandates and mechanisms are based on Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter. These chapters differ with regard to the use of force or pacific means to resolve disputes, but they agree on the principle that the prerequisite for their enactment is a threat to or an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security.⁸

UN peacekeeping developed out of the aspirations of middle powers like Canada who unleashed an aggressive campaign to establish a special status for itself and other 'middle power' states in the new United Nations. The Canadians wanted this special status in recognition of Canada's military and financial contributions to the allied victory in the war and to solidify the rank of the middle powers directly below the 'Big Five' and above everyone else.⁹ Other self-identified middle powers such as Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Poland, Belgium, and Sweden supported and endorsed this campaign.

Canada argued that middle powers should be given a special status in the UN because they could be entrusted to use their power responsibly in the interest of the world community. The argument continued that 'middle powers could not challenge the international peace and order- as could the great powers- but they possessed sufficient resources *together* to protect the order against aggressive states.'¹⁰ Middle powers could do this through 'middle power diplomacy', an approach to diplomacy aimed at mitigating interstate tensions and conflicts in order to prevent the possibility of war between the great powers. Although this argument failed to win the middle powers a special status in the UN, it came to have a crucial impact in driving the deliberations of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson over the Suez Crisis of 1956. Out of these deliberations came the first formal UN

⁸ Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5 (4), 2003, p. 37.

⁹ Neack, n. 6, p. 183.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

peacekeeping operation. Soon after, UN peacekeeping became the 'prerogative' and role of middle powers like Canada.

Although the United Nations began deploying peacekeepers as early as 1948, the term "peacekeeping" itself was not broadly used until the Suez Crisis, where the Anglo-French forces along with Israel attacked Egypt. It was here that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson, put forth "a plan for setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities..."¹¹ Thus the Suez Crisis led to the undertaking of the 'first force-level peacekeeping operation'¹² -the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I). It was an important development which established the first major precedent for future UN peacekeeping operations. UNEF I was quite successful in fulfilling its mandated function of securing a ceasefire and facilitating the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. The success of the force generated considerable optimism for the prospects of future UN peacekeeping operations. In previous years two observer missions had been deployed but until the Suez Crisis they had not been characterised as peacekeeping.¹³ The crisis also brought the attention of the global community on the idea of interposing troops from many nations between warring armies.

Before 1956, UN and other peacekeeping operations were modest efforts, of limited success, and carried out by relatively modest groups of observers. After 1956, peacekeeping was often a large-scale operation, and involved infantry, armoured reconnaissance and service troops, as well as air force personnel, sometimes in combat roles. The classical model of peacekeeping was done at Suez, which was based on the concept of neutral observation of agreed behaviour, and military resources in support of diplomatic agreements. The basic principle for all peacekeeping operations was that

¹¹ Quoted in *Canada and the United Nations 1945-1975* (Department Of External Affairs, 1977) p. 40.

¹² A. B. Fetherstone, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1994) p. 12.

¹³ These observer missions were the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) set up in 1948 and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) set up in 1949.

states were the forces to be dealt with, and that the insertion of a recognised global authority backed by neutral military was acceptable to them.¹⁴

The classical model of peacekeeping flourished for close to thirty-five years and Canada made a profound profession of it. The aim of these missions Canada undertook as part of the UN brigade was to maintain a state of reduced or no-conflict between nation-states and thereby avoid a direct involvement of the great powers. Conditions on the ground were predominantly static, with bursts of violence only between defined antagonists. There was a clear chain of command. The resources required were limited, predictable, and almost exclusively military. The exit strategy, existed separately, in the diplomatic realm.¹⁵

1.3 Origin and Evolution of Canadian Peacekeeping

Prior to the Second World War, foreign policy was a low priority for Canadians and their government. However participation in the war changed that dramatically. Canada made a significant contribution to the allied war effort and its bureaucrats in particular played an important role in the construction of the post war order. It emerged from that conflict a country with a strong economy and a perception that it was a player of consequence in the post war world.¹⁶ This sense of Canada's place in the world was captured by the principle of functionalism, conceived by Canada during the war, which asserted that size alone was insufficient to determine participation in the councils of the war and post war period. Capacity for contribution, interest, and expertise should constitute considerations in determining representation.

Canada also learnt an important lesson from the war- that isolationism was no guarantee for safety and was 'equivalent to fool's gold'.¹⁷ According to J. L. Granatstein,

¹⁴ Patricia Fortier, "The Evolution of Peacekeeping", in Rob McRae and Don Hubert eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) p. 42.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 43.

¹⁶ Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot eds., *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 5.

¹⁷ J. L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did: Peacekeeping Make To Canada?" in John English and Norman Hillmer eds., *Making A Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1992) p. 224.

the triumph of Canadian achievement in the war effectively squelched the “little Canadianism” of non-internationalism and isolationism that seemingly had dominated Canadian policy in the interwar years.¹⁸ Hence, Canadian foreign and defence policy in the post-war period embarked on a path of active and constructive internationalism, and it attempted to carve out an independent niche for itself in the international realm.

Canada emerged from the Second World War as something close to a great power with enormous prestige and influence. Not only was Canada the world’s third largest economic power at the end of the Second World War, but its leaders were also key architects in the construction of the new political and economic orders.¹⁹ Canada was a war profiteer, producing and supplying materials of war to the allies. At the end of the war, Canada had the fourth largest air force, the fifth largest navy, and a well-trained, splendidly-equipped army of almost half a million men and women.

Thus, out of the Second World War sprung the spirit of nationalism in Canadians and in the post-war period, peacekeeping bolstered and refined that nationalism. The idea of fostering nationalism through service came alive and Canada wanted to show the world that they were prepared to do their part. Out of this responsible internationalism grew a great pride in Canada about its place and position in the world. This attitude seems to have been at the root of the eagerness with which Canadians seized on the responsibility after the war.²⁰

At the same time, peacekeeping also had its origins in the missionary impulse that was so much a part of Canada before the Second World War. J. L. Granatstein says that, probably the idea emerged out of the missionary strain in Canada’s Protestantism and Roman Catholicism that saw Canadian men and women go abroad in large numbers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to bring the word of God to parts of India, Africa,

¹⁸ *ibid*, p. 234.

¹⁹ Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, “The New ‘Can-do’ Foreign Policy”, in Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot eds., *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 1.

²⁰ J. L. Granatstein, “Canada and Peacekeeping: Image and Reality”, in J. L. Granatstein, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986) p. 233.

and China.²¹ The missionary impulse to serve abroad and to “do-good” was enormously strong and genuine and it had its strong resonances in the Department of External Affairs. Lester Pearson, indeed, was another diplomat whose Methodist upbringing undoubtedly shaped his thinking and outlook profoundly.

The Canadian public support for an internationalist foreign policy and peacekeeping has also been wide and enormously popular. Public opinion has always given peacekeeping role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) top priority even if Canadian experiences with peacekeeping has had its share of highs and lows, and has sometimes been difficult and disappointing too. Thus Canadians thought that peacekeeping constituted a source of consensus-building that had the potential to bridge linguistic and regional differences.²² Peacekeeping also helped create a political basis on which all Canadians could agree.

Peacekeeping also emerged out of Canada’s deep desire to move away from the American influence on Canada, emerging out of the ‘traditional anti-american bias which is always somewhat latent in Canadian political culture.’²³ All too often Canadians had found themselves regarded as Americans but peacekeeping helped to differentiate between them. Peacekeeping made Canadians different and somehow better.²⁴ Canadians preferred peacekeeping to other types of military involvement because it did not make them junior partner to their giant neighbour i.e. the United States. Canada wanted to ‘be more than a junior partner’²⁵ to the United States and convince the United States not merely by words but by action that they were playing their part in the international sphere. Canada found that peacekeeping somehow smacked of independence from the United States, of a more-Canadian foreign policy and was the ideal role for Canada: responsible, useful, inexpensive and satisfying.²⁶

²¹ Granatstein, n. 17, p. 223.

²² Pierre Martin and Michael Fortman, “Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World”, *International Journal*, Spring 1995, p. 379.

²³ *ibid*, p. 383.

²⁴ J. L. Granatstein, in J. L. Granatstein ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings*, n. 20, p. 233.

²⁵ Lloyd Axworthy, “Introduction”, in Rob McRae and Don Hubert eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001) p. 9.

²⁶ Granatstein, n. 20, p. 232.

Moreover, throughout Canada during the early 1950's there was an undercurrent of grumbling at Canada's apparent willingness to bend to America's line. Already Canadians had begun to be apprehensive and show signs of concern at the huge amount of American investments being made in Canada. Hence, Canada's geopolitical position and the historic conditioning of multilateralist reflexes oriented it towards the United Nations, and together these deep-seated forces disposed Canada towards the in-between innovation, which is peacekeeping.²⁷ Thus Canada was looking forward to and being prepared to accept and try on new initiatives.

The opportunity came with the Suez crisis in 1956 when France, Israel and United Kingdom colluded with Egypt. Lester Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, proposed to the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, that an international force under the UN flag be deployed to ease the conflict. Under Pearson's leadership Canada suddenly found itself promising to serve on a major United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Middle East. Speaking to the General Assembly on November 23, 1956, Lester Pearson, defined Canada's attitude to UNEF thus: "there is very strong enthusiastic support in my country for this force – but only as a United Nations Force, under United Nations control, and as an effective and organised Force which can do the job that has been given to it and which, if it can do that job, maybe the beginning of something bigger and more permanent in the history of our organisation: something which we have talked about at the United Nations meetings for many years, the organisation of the peace through international action."²⁸

Thus the first UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force 1 (UNEF 1), supervised the withdrawal of armed forces from the Egyptian territory and served as a buffer between Egypt and Israel after the withdrawal (the operation was led by General E.L.M. Burns, a Canadian). Canada's role in the UNEF did not come without obstacles. President Nasser of Egypt refused to accept Canadian peacekeepers on grounds that they wore the same uniforms as that of the British military. Moreover, they were

²⁷ James Patrick Sewell, "A World Without Canada: Would Today's United Nations be the Same?" in John English and Norman Hillmer eds., *Making A Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1992), p. 195.

²⁸ As Quoted in *Canada and the United Nations*, n. 11, p. 41.

carrying the same flag as that of Britain. Understandably, Canada was a NATO ally of Britain and France and the prospect of the invaders assuming the role of peacekeepers was unacceptable to Egypt.

Despite the setback received, Canada's role in the UNEF was still a success. Subsequently, Lester Pearson won the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1957. Canada's role in the Suez Crisis and Pearson's subsequent Nobel Prize established strongly the reputation and image of Canada as a peacekeeper. The circumstances of Suez in 1956 were unique for all concerned. In Canada, they had the effect of galvanising what had been a dormant impulse to clothe the UN with real authority and to give meaning to the commitment to earmark forces for UN service.²⁹ Peacekeeping became enormously popular with the Canadian public. Abroad, Canada earned a very good reputation as a peacekeeper and its work came to be generally appreciated – except sometimes in the communist camp which resented actions which went against communist policies.³⁰

1.4 Emergence of Canadian Peacekeeping Policy

Prior to the mid-1950s, the Canadian government had not clearly articulated which foreign policy objectives and interests were being served by peacekeeping, and no official government statement explicitly linked peacekeeping to other foreign and defence policy instruments.³¹ In fact from 1949 through 1955, peacekeeping rated no mention in the annual reports of the Defence department; and government policy remained vague and unclear. During this period, the thrust of Canadian military activity focused primarily on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) and the United Nations. However, NATO area remained the principal focus and priority concern for Canada's defence community.

Yet, while Canadian foreign and defence policy were essentially determined by NATO and NORAD commitments, Canada made its most significant contributions to

²⁹ Geoffrey A. H. Pearson, "Canadian Attitudes to Peacekeeping", in Henry Wiseman ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983) p. 122.

³⁰ Charlotte S. M. Girard, *Canada in World Affairs (1963-1965)*, Vol. XIII (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979) p. 278.

³¹ Byers, n. 3, p. 180.

international peace and security in the areas of United Nations and NATO out-of-area operations, wherein Canada 'arguably made a difference'. While NATO and NORAD were essentially static, status quo defence arrangements in which Canada was a minor player, the United Nations became the arena in which Canada came to occupy a position of central importance and wherein, it operated so effectively and successfully.

The emergence of peacekeeping in Canada's foreign and defence policy can be traced to some extent, to the Korean War. However, the Canadian peacekeepers were sent to Korea in the context of the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" resolution of the UN General Assembly which fell under the principle of Collective Security. Initially, therefore, peacekeeping was a limited and relatively unimportant aspect of post-war Canadian foreign policy. At that time, peacekeeping was not a major concern for Canada as attention was first focused on collective security and subsequently on collective self-defence via NATO, once it became clear that the UN was unable to fulfill its collective security mandate.³²

Before participation in the Korean War, Canada had also sent observers to Palestine after 1948 (UNTSO) and observers to the UN Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in early 1949. However, it was not so enthusiastic about the idea of participation in UN peacekeeping operations and if it did participate, it was done rather reluctantly, without much fervour and enthusiasm. Requests for sending observers were treated very coldly and 'Ask someone else, please' was the message Canada gave.³³ Canada acceded to the UN request to send observers to UNMOGIP but it was done with minimum publicity and without declaring how participation related to Canadian foreign policy objectives.³⁴ In fact, Canada's participation in UNMOGIP occurred partly because it happened to be on the Security Council at the time of the creation of UNMOGIP. Hence, during the early 1950s, the attitude of the Canadian government toward the peacekeeping initiatives of the United Nations was one of disinterest and of minimum enthusiasm.

³² Byers, n. 3, p. 181.

³³ Granatstein, n. 17, p. 225.

³⁴ Byers, n. 3, p. 181.

Despite the low enthusiasm attributed to early peacekeeping activities, successive liberal governments, over time, began to attach increasing importance to peacekeeping as an important instrument of Canadian foreign policy. In this context, the impact of Lester Pearson was profound. He deeply impacted and influenced the actions of his liberal government, and by 1954, a pattern of continued participation emerged as the norm. For example, despite reservations over possible participation in the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Indochina, it has been argued that there never had been a moment's doubt that this was an obligation that Canada had to accept.³⁵

After the experience at Suez, the focus of Canadian policy came to be fixed on its peacekeeping role, and the United Nations became the locus of action for Canada. The Canadian public support for peacekeeping also grew. The lack of public and official enthusiasm for Canada's earlier peacekeeping activities in Palestine, the Indo-Pakistan borders and Indochina was replaced by keen enthusiasm and interest in peacekeeping. Canadians began to take pride in the positive contribution the country was making, in ceasing hostilities and bringing peace to many parts of the globe. The enthusiasm became very strong, even among the Conservatives who did not favour much, the role Canada had played during the Suez Crisis wherein the Liberals had been accused of betrayal and of selling out on its mother countries and historic allies – France and Britain and 'slavishly following a course laid down by Washington.'³⁶

The public reaction in Canada in response to the success at Suez was so strong that even when the government changed in 1957 there was no deviation in Canada's newfound delight with peacekeeping. John Diefenbaker of the Conservative party came to power and when another crisis erupted in the Middle East (Lebanon) in 1958, the government sent a large contingent of observers to serve with the United Nations Observation Force (UNOGIL) in Lebanon. It was during this period that Canada officially earmarked a military unit as a standby force for possible UN operations. Such actions were entirely in consonance with the past practice of the liberal government of Pearson.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ Granatstein, n. 17, p. 228.

In 1959, the conservatives came out with its annual report, *Defence, 1959* which stated that Canada would provide military forces for the defence of North America, for NATO in Europe and the North Atlantic, and for “the United Nations to assist that organisation in attaining its peaceful aims.”³⁷ The annual report went on to outline the existing level of Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations, but made no reference to future operations. Also, the report did not explicitly address the relationship between peacekeeping and the other major defence roles.

Rather the report implied that NATO would constitute the pre-eminent defence activity for Canada. This view remained consistent throughout the Diefenbaker era, even though, during that time, Canada had made a sizeable commitment and contribution to the Congo operation (ONUC) in 1960. The Conservatives during this period, participated in peacekeeping operations when the opportunity arose, but did not place particular emphasis on the role.

The Canadian public’s desire that Canada should continue to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations was so strong indeed that it could force the government’s hand. This became evident in 1960 during the Congo Crisis. The UN decided to intervene with a new peacekeeping force to preserve order, and Canada was also invited to contribute forces. For the Diefenbaker government, running a country hard hit by unemployment and budgetary problems, the crisis in Congo ‘was the wrong crisis at the wrong time.’³⁸ The government was reluctant and unwilling to participate in a peacekeeping operation at such a time. But the press very soon began to ask “why is Canada not represented?”³⁹ The *Ottawa Journal*, demanded a “most imaginative and wide-visioned and generous consideration” of UN requests.⁴⁰ And even after the government reversed its stand and considered to send the peacekeepers to Congo in a month’s time, the *Vancouver Province* pointed out sharply that Ireland and Sweden had had their men underway in 48 hours.⁴¹

³⁷ Quoted in Byers, n. 3, p. 181.

³⁸ Granatstein, n. 17, p. 235.

³⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁴¹ *ibid.*

The response of the Canadian public to the Congo Crisis was quite extraordinary. Canada did not have any historic ties with Congo, there was no aggression involved, none of the usual factors which triggers public response were there. Nonetheless, by that time, the Canadian public had already come to identify Canada as a peacekeeping nation and that it was the ideal role for Canada to play. They had begun to expect that their government would be eager and willing to assist the United Nations in any new peacekeeping operations.

Canada sent its peacekeepers again in 1962 to West Irian and in 1963 to the Yemen. Though these operations were small, they were relatively successful, and they furthered the growing conviction that peacekeeping was the proper role and policy for Canada. Then came the Cyprus operation of 1964. The UN force in Cyprus was largely the creation of Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Lester Pearson government that had taken office in 1963. Martin successfully imposed a UN presence in Cyprus where conflict had erupted between Greek- and Turkish- Cypriots. In the process he headed off a threatening war between Greece and Turkey. However, Cyprus became the last peacekeeping victory for Canada.

In 1964, the liberal government of Lester Pearson came out with the *Defence White Paper* which ‘constituted an ambitious, and to that date most complete, attempt to articulate Canadian defence policy within the domestic and international environments, and then relate military roles to broader policy objectives.’⁴² The White Paper listed three major objectives: “to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organisations; and to provide for the protection and surveillance of our territory, our airspace and our coastal waters.”⁴³ And for fulfilling these objectives, the government agreed on the following set of priorities:⁴⁴

1. Forces for the direct protecting of Canada which can be deployed as required.
2. Forces in-being as part of the deterrent in the European theatre.
3. Maritime forces in-being as a contribution to the deterrent.

⁴² Byers, n. 3, p. 182.

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

4. Forces in-being for UN peacekeeping operations which would also be included in 1 above.

5. Reserve forces and mobilization potential.

Here, UN peacekeeping was ranked fourth, but then multi-tasked with forces allocated for the defence of Canada. The upgrading of peacekeeping was based, in good part, on the assumption that the third world instability will probably continue in the decade ahead and that the peacekeeping responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations can be expected to grow correspondingly. It further called for the containment measures which do not lend themselves to Great Power or Alliance action.

The White Paper further stated that “it is essential that a nation’s diplomacy be backed up by adequate and flexible military forces to permit participation in collective security and peacekeeping, and to be ready for crises should they arise.”⁴⁵ Based on this set of factors, the White Paper stated that “it is the policy of the government, in determining Canada’s force structure for the balance of the decade, to build in maximum flexibility. This will permit the disposition of the majority of our forces in Canada where they will be available for deployment in a variety of peacekeeping activities.”⁴⁶ At the same time, however, the White Paper clearly indicated that Canada’s main defence contribution would continue to be towards NATO.

The Pearson government clubbed and multi-tasked the role of peacekeeping with the CAF who were allocated for the defence of Canada because it adopted the view that the peacekeeping role complemented other military activities, including NATO. The government wanted a broader role for the CAF, to increase its mobility and flexibility so that it could be capable and compatible to function ‘across the entire range of Canadian defence activities.’⁴⁷ This objective dovetailed with the increased emphasis placed on peacekeeping and assumed a high degree of compatibility between existing NATO commitments and future peacekeeping operations.⁴⁸ Both government and senior military personnel seemed to share the view that compatibility between the two types of

⁴⁵ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁶ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

commitments could and should be maintained and that the CAF should be able to fulfill NATO commitments and at the same time, participate in peacekeeping operations too.⁴⁹

The 1964 *Defence White Paper* represented a high water mark in terms of declared government policy as far as peacekeeping was concerned. While Canada participated in its first peacekeeping operation in 1949, the policy implications were not very clearly and officially spelled out until the 1964 Defence White Paper. It was 'a milestone in the development of Canada's peacekeeping policies,' because it not only marked the beginning of a radically new policy, but because it also indicated the importance that the liberal government attached to peacekeeping responsibilities and to the necessity to integrate defence and foreign policies. It clearly indicated, in terms of policy, that peacekeeping was one of the important instruments, to support the country's foreign and defence policy objectives. The White Paper of 1964 reaffirmed Canada's commitment to peacekeeping, and was a sure indication that it was a popular Canadian undertaking.

While the White Paper of 1964 provided some hope for Canadian peacekeeping for taking off in a positive direction, events took a different turn. A number of events in 1967-68 combined to bring about a review of the peacekeeping commitment. In May, 1967 President Nasser expelled UNEF from Egypt and set in train the events that precipitated Israel's subsequent invasion and conquest of the Sinai. Most significantly for Canada, Nasser singled out the Canadian component of UNEF and demanded immediate departure. The Canadian public were stunned. "Peacekeeping has become the foundation on which much of Canada's foreign and defence policy is built," the *Montreal Gazette* said. "If the foundation is undermined... the superstructure built on that foundation will not last very long."⁵⁰ The *Toronto Star* wondered: "Can UN peacekeeping survive the Sinai crisis?" and as the *Canadian Annual Review* for 1967 noted, "it is not an exaggeration to say that the Canadian press was as concerned, if not more so, with the effect the UNEF withdrawal would have on one of the main 'cornerstones' of Canadian

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Quoted in Granatstein, n. 17, p .236.

foreign policy than it was with the possible catastrophes that might befall both Jew and Arab in the region.”⁵¹

The withdrawal of UNTSO from Egypt and the continuing status quo in Cyprus, were at that time, all too indicative of the weaknesses of peacekeeping and the growing disillusionment and disenchantment of contributing states. Under these circumstances, Canada began to question the likelihood of further demands on the UN to keep the peace and the capacity of the organisation to respond. Moreover, the Canadian public too began to question the utility of peacekeeping.

From 1956 to 1967, Canada’s peacekeeping role was at its zenith and it fostered in Canada a sense of self-importance and worth. It mediated between Britain and United States in 1956, prevented a possible war between Greece and Turkey in 1956, restored order in the Congo in 1960 etc. But after the events of 1967, Canada’s peacekeeping seemed to have embarked on a path of decline, assuming a position of secondary importance. Peacekeeping which had held a very high priority through the 1960’s was relegated further down the list of priorities. From then on, the new stress for the Canadian military came to rest on defending Canada’s sovereignty and maintaining order within the country. The internationalism of 1948 and the idealism of 1956 came to be superseded by the neo-isolationism of 1968.⁵² The concept of nationalism through international responsibility that had motivated the foreign policy of St Laurent and Pearson came to be replaced by a foreign and defence policy of unabashed self-interest.⁵³

By 1971 the official disillusionment and disappointment over the utility and future prospects for peacekeeping in Canadian foreign and defence policies also had further raised its head above the surface. At this time, Pierre Trudeau was already the Prime Minister and he was much less enthusiastic about Canada’s peacekeeping role. The Defence White Paper of 1971 appeared to reflect the reality and change in priorities. Terrorism at home drew attention to a more basic priority for the armed forces, which

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ *ibid.*

was put first in the following listing of their roles in the White Paper: ⁵⁴ the protection of Canada; the defence of North America in cooperation with U. S. forces; the fulfillment of such commitments as may be agreed upon; and the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.

Trudeau's liberal government's *Defence in the 70s* could with justification, give examples which pointed to the demise of peacekeeping. The expulsion of the UNEF I from the Middle East in 1967, the inability of the UN to reach an agreement on a general peacekeeping formula as well as the problems of financing peacekeeping operations, the ineffectiveness of the ICSC in Indochina, the inability to move from peacekeeping to peacemaking and the presumed future demand for peacekeeping represented factors were some of the instances which caused the government to re-evaluate the country's commitment to the role. The 1971 White Paper argued that 'the scope for useful and effective peacekeeping now appears more modest than it did earlier, despite the persistence of widespread violence in many parts of the world.'⁵⁵ Indeed, the 1971 Defence White Paper stated, for example, that the viability and usefulness of peacekeeping in the 1970s held less promise than it had during the previous decade.⁵⁶

Based on these premises, peacekeeping became a priority of lesser importance for the Trudeau government. Over peacekeeping, greater priority came to be allocated to the protection of Canadian sovereignty, to the defence of North America, and to NATO in that order. This change in the government's declared priorities relegated and 'reallocated the peacekeeping role to its pre-1964 position vis-à-vis other defence activities.'⁵⁷

Nevertheless, certain provisions laid down in the 1964 White Paper were retained. For instance, the objective to increase mobility and flexibility of the CAF which had been outlined in the 1964 White Paper was retained as the government stated its intention to maintain within feasible limits a general purpose combat capability of high professional standard within the Armed Forces, and to keep available the widest possible choice of

⁵⁴ Pearson, n. 29, pp. 125-126.

⁵⁵ Byers, n. 3, p. 184.

⁵⁶ William M. Dobell, "A Sow's ear in Vietnam", *International Journal*, Vol. 29, Summer 1974, p. 356.

⁵⁷ Byers, n. 3, p. 184.

options for responding to unforeseen international developments. Also, the commitment for a standby peacekeeping force was retained and military personnel continued to receive training for such operations. On the whole, the practice of relating defence activities to broader foreign and defence policy objectives remained central and the necessary linkages between peacekeeping and other defence role was maintained in the 1971 White Paper.

The events that occurred after the publication of *Defence in the 70s* contradicted the premises of the White Paper regarding the priority that was allocated to peacekeeping. The scope of peacekeeping operations expanded during the mid-1970s and Canadian military personnel became involved with the abortive and short-lived ICSC in Vietnam, with UNEF 11, UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on the Syrian-Israeli border.

This rather unanticipated and different turn of events had to be taken into account when the defence department undertook its defence review in late 1974. After the completion of the first phase of the review in November 1975, the Defence Minister reaffirmed in the House of Commons the priorities of the 1971 White Paper and stated that “the structure of the Canadian Armed Forces will provide up to 2000 personnel to be available for the United Nations peacekeeping purposes at any one time.”⁵⁸ Nonetheless, though the Trudeau government committed Canadian military personnel for peacekeeping duty during their tenure as the Pearson government had earlier, the major difference between them was that the Trudeau government consistently maintained a more wary and skeptical attitude toward peacekeeping which clearly affected perceptions about the utility of peacekeeping.

During Trudeau’s time, peacekeeping occupied a position of official ambiguity. Though the policy and practice were clear, the outcome was one of official ambivalence. Increasingly, therefore, during the late 1970s members of the Trudeau administration adopted the position of reluctant participation- particularly in the case of Cyprus. After Trudeau’s tenure, statements by the spokesmen for the succeeding government of Joe

⁵⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*

Clark indicated that the Conservatives would retain the general, policy posture of the Trudeau government on the question of peacekeeping even though no definitive position had been adopted by the end of 1979. Consequently, it became imperative for the newly elected conservative government to clearly formulate its policy posture on peacekeeping. But before that could happen, the Clark government was defeated and Trudeau returned to power. After that, the government somewhat reluctantly, agreed to the Secretary-General's "insistence" that Canada contribute to UNIFIL in Lebanon though doubts were raised about the viability of the operation and the strain on the CAF and on Canada's resources. Hence, during the 1970s and into the 1980s, a combination of the change in defence priorities and increased doubts regarding the utility of peacekeeping also led to greater uncertainty within the CAF.

The last major iteration of Canada's peacekeeping policy is to be found in the Defence White Paper of 1987, which put the emphasis on the escalation of regional conflicts into superpower confrontations and on the prevention of rifts within the Atlantic alliance, as conditions for Canadian participation in peacekeeping.⁵⁹ However, things took on a different shape and the White Paper's statement of peacekeeping policy came to be largely overtaken by events. The end of the Cold War and the rapid increase in new kinds of conflicts in many parts of the world led to an explosion in the number of peacekeeping operations launched by the United Nations, which gave rise to the creation of types of missions that had never been envisaged by the UN. This also necessitated Canada to rethink its traditional peacekeeping policy and move on from simple peacekeeping, and find other ways and means to prevent or moderate the new conflicts that were emerging.

⁵⁹ Louis A. Delvoie "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales," in Michael J. Tucker, Raymond Blake and P. E. Bryden eds., *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium* (Ontario, Canada: Irwin Publishing Ltd., 2000) p. 22.

1.5 The Nature of Peacekeeping Operations Today and Canada's Changed Role

The end of the Cold War led to the emergence of 'ethnocentric nationalism and geocentric transnationalism.'⁶⁰ Instances of violent intra-state conflicts rather than inter-state conflicts substantially increased in number and severity. Thus the nature of peacekeeping operations has changed considerably with the burst of what is now being called as the "complex emergencies". These operations, also called the "Second Generation Peacekeeping" are complex and have multifaceted dimensions. Peacekeeping in both its traditional sense of monitoring ceasefires and lines of disengagement has come to be replaced by active intervention by the UN in areas of conflict. The UN is now expected to rebuild ravaged, divided societies. The concomitant increase in UN-sponsored missions often at greater financial cost and more complex in mandate and operations is but one indicator of the stark situation the international community face now.⁶¹


Recent United Nations military operations are so different in scope and mandate that they can be characterised as 'peacekeeping' only by stretching analytical categories to the breaking point.⁶² The definition of peacekeeping now includes peace enforcement, peace support and peacebuilding, sometimes grouped under the banner of "peace support operations". The UN missions to Cambodia, the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti etc illustrate clearly the stark new challenges the UN faces in its peacekeeping operations.

The ending of the Cold War has also opened the way to greater assertion on the part of the United Nations. The international community and the UN have moved beyond traditional peacekeeping, becoming much more involved in civil conflicts and aiding in the transition from war to peace within states and helping in the search for a durable solution to conflicts. Doing so has meant adding a new set of functions to its

⁶⁰ Michael J. Tucker, Raymond Blake and P. E. Bryden, "Introduction", in Michael J. Tucker, Raymond Blake and P. E. Bryden eds., *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium* (Ontario, Canada: Irwin Publishing House, 2000) p. viii.

⁶¹ Dewitt, n. 1, p. 178.

⁶² Alan James, "Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era", *International Journal*, L. 2, Spring 1995, p. 255.



TH-12242

peacekeeping role – election monitoring, police training, sometimes even administering the state to facilitate the transition from war to peace etc.

Peacekeepers today have wide ranging responsibilities resting with them, and have to perform demanding duties under difficult conditions. These new missions are expected to bring peace, build the institutional capacity of receiving states, and sometimes fulfil all the functions of government while being responsive to people's wish to govern themselves and the aims include stability, protection, human rights, justice and development.⁶³

Thus in the early 1990s, Canada also saw drastic changes in the nature of the international environment, where the situation had grown more complex, confusing and threatening. In the context of the changing international environment and at time of rapid change in the nature of the role of the United Nations in controlling or preventing seemingly intractable conflicts around the world, there has been a change in Canada's traditional peacekeeping policy too. On Canada's part, it experienced a three-fold increase in its peacekeeping activities in 1992 and 1993 and the Canadian commitment to peacekeeping substantively increased from 2,000 to 4,300 troops in a short period.⁶⁴

As a response to the changed situation, the Canadian government changed its policy posture on peacekeeping incrementally, although not particularly coherently, between 1991 and 1995. In the liberal government's foreign and defence policy reviews of 1994-95, it called for “ a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state to state relations” to one which would involve “ working for the promotion of democracy and good governance, of human rights and the rule of law and of prosperity through sustainable development.”

The government's Defence White Paper abandoning the use of the term *peacekeeping*, spoke of *multilateral operations*, which encompassed the full range of military activity from preventive deployments to all-out wars and it also stated that the purpose of these operations should be to address not only “genuine threats to

⁶³ Fortier, n. 14, pp. 44-45.

⁶⁴ Martin and Fortman, n. 22, p. 386.

international peace and security” but also “emerging humanitarian tragedies.”⁶⁵ Hence the main policy rationales and the criteria that underpinned Canada’s participation in international peacekeeping in the Cold War period and its immediate aftermath has been largely overtaken by events. It has led to the dilution of the traditional peacekeeping policies and resulting in the expansion of peacekeeping to include the promotion of democracy, human rights, social justice etc.

Canada having been a leading proponent and participant in UN peacekeeping operations, has presently caught up with the trend on the emphasis given by the UN to peacebuilding in those operations. The creation of Canada’s peacebuilding fund is an evident and interesting response to this. Canada has transformed and reequipped its peacekeeping into peacebuilding exercises. Its recent initiatives demonstrate its interest in and commitment to the concept of peacebuilding. Through its Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, it has established the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, which together with the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia and Canada’s promotion of anti-personnel landmines, indicate Canada’s commitment to the process of moving away from simple peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

As a result of this shift Canada has been reshaping and refocusing its foreign policy priorities. It has moved away from peacekeeping and has come to place an emphasis on peacebuilding – a package of initiatives delivered at the appropriate moment after the fighting has stopped that can develop the social infrastructure of war-torn societies and break the cycle of violence; and a number of specific initiatives in discrete but related areas: the anti-personnel landmines campaign and treaty, efforts to control the proliferation of military small arms and light weapons, the creation of an international court of justice, and efforts to address the plight of war-affected children.⁶⁶ Canada has come to focus on a whole new set of functional issue-areas – human rights, rule of law, peacebuilding, terrorism, drug-trafficking, governance, development and trade; education

⁶⁵ Delvoie et al., n. 59, p. 24.

⁶⁶ Robin Jeffrey Hay, “Present at the Creation? Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century,” in Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart and Martin Rudner eds., *Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player?* (Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 221.

and health; and public engagement etc, issues which are critical to the implementation of Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy's "human security" agenda.

In addition, the CAF now often find themselves at the center of a large network of actors working with military allies, civil authorities and non-governmental organisations to coordinate peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, and to secure the foundations needed to rebuild societies. There has been the emergence of peacebuilding and human security as prominent paradigms of international diplomacy and Canada's peacekeeping role now involves aspects of human security as purported both by the United Nations and the Canadian government. Canada has tried to link the human security agenda to Canadian foreign policy traditions such as peacekeeping and development assistance. It has also tried to draw direct links between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, noting that the concept of the former was evolving to incorporate aspects of the latter in an effort to provide long-term solutions to conflict.⁶⁷

In addition, Canada's response to the changed and increasingly more complicated peacekeeping missions are,⁶⁸ among others, the creation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade, "SHIRBRIG" – a multinational rapid deployment force. Canada has also worked on mechanism for deploying civilian police so that the transition in responsibility for security, the maintenance of law and order is carried out as quickly as possible from military to the police which is well equipped to carry out these responsibilities and help local capacity. It has also tried to enhance the capacity for civilian expert deployments, of experts primarily in the field of human rights and now expanded to cover most of what expertise modern peacekeeping mission requires, viz humanitarian, legal, judicial etc.

While the end of the Cold War era, has not made the issues or the tools of Lester Pearson's day obsolete, it has meant that new issues are emerging that necessitate the international community find alternative ways of thinking and acting multilaterally.⁶⁹ Thus Canada now, has its focus on and supports post-conflict peacebuilding and is

⁶⁷ *ibid*, p. 217.

⁶⁸ Marie Isabel Massip, "UNPKOs: A Canadian Perspective," ARF Peacekeeping Seminar: Best Practices and Lessons Learnt , New Delhi, March 20-21, 2002, United Service Institution Of India, Centre For United Nations Peacekeeping, p. 27.

⁶⁹ Axworthy, n. 25, p. 9.

working towards the same at the international level. As of today, Canada has embraced the policy of peacebuilding – policies that are intended to help countries in conflict achieve stability by mobilising civilian, military, governmental, and non-governmental expertise.

CHAPTER II

CANADA'S PEACEBUILDING IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

2.1 The Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Period:

The end of the Cold War signaled a new chapter in the affairs of the UN and the international community. Its end brought about more insecurity to the world in the form of new and numerous conflicts, most of them being regional and intra-state rather than inter-state. Bernard Wood, in his final report as executive director of the now defunct Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, correctly pointed out in early 1992 that 'the end of the Cold War, while stopping the global confrontation of the two superpowers, opened up more instability, more challenges to security, and more dangers of armed conflict.'¹ These new conflicts made traditional peacekeeping undertaken by the UN and the international community, insufficient to tackle the new forms of conflicts that had cropped up. As a result, the international community and the UN moved beyond "traditional peacekeeping", to what is now known as "second generation peacekeeping" that encompassed aspects of peacemaking, peacebuilding and, peace enforcement.

The following facts point out to the fact that the incidence of civil wars increased drastically in the Post-Cold War period which simultaneously also led to the increase in the peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding activities of the UN and the international community. During the 11- year Post-Cold War period (1990-2000), there were 56 major armed conflicts out of which 53 were internal conflicts, such as conflicts in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Liberia etc. In 2003, there were 19 major armed conflicts, out of which 17 were intra-state conflicts and only two were conflicts between countries.² From 1948 to 1978, 13 peacekeeping and observer forces were set up. Then, for ten years, no new forces were established. From May 1988 to October

¹ Quoted in, Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada's Defence Policy in a Unstable World", *International Journal*, Vol. XLVIII, Spring 1993, p. 381.

² B.S. Prakash and K. Nandini, "Issues and Challenges in Modern Peace Operations", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2005, pp. 5-6.

1993, a further 20 forces were created.³ From 1948 to 1992 around 650,000 personnel participated in peacekeeping operations at an estimated cost of 8.3 billion US dollars. In 1992 alone, the number of peacekeepers on the ground increased from approximately 10,000 to 62,000, while the budget rose to 1.4 billion US dollars. At the peak of UN activity in the mid-1990s, there were nearly 80,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the globe.⁴ Of these, 80,000 peacekeepers, 4500 were civilian police (in 1987 only 35 civilian police were deployed) and 10,000 were civilian personnel (in 1987 only 1000 civilian personnel were deployed).⁵

While death and disablement were a common feature of both classic ‘wars’ and contemporary ‘Complex Political Emergencies’ (CPEs), there was a horrifying shift in the distribution of suffering and around 90 per cent of casualties came to be inflicted on civilians.⁶ The displacement of civilian populations because of conflicts, as refugees or internally displaced persons, led to more than 22 million people having to flee their home areas. The proportion of civilian war-related deaths which had averaged around 50 per cent since the eighteenth century increased to 73 per cent in the 1970s and was close to 90 per cent in 1990.⁷ Thus the end of the Cold War decreased the number of major armed conflicts slightly, but it led to a large increase in the category of minor armed conflicts. Hence the slight decrease in wars suggests that the international community was able to contain major conflicts, but ‘the number of protracted conflicts testified...to the inability to find lasting solutions to well-known conflicts.’⁸

Between 1946 and 1988, the international community generally did not have the practice of keeping peace between belligerents within states. The UN and others did intervene in civil wars during this period (in the Congo, Lebanon, and Cyprus), but these missions were intended to contain civil conflicts that might otherwise draw in the great

³ Adam Roberts, “The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping”, *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 95-96.

⁴ DFAIT, “Canada and Peace Support Operations”, Available at <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.asp>>

⁵ A. B. Fetherstone, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1994), p. 23.

⁶ Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peacebuilding in the New World Disorder”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, p. 13

⁷ Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 21.

⁸ Quoted in, *ibid*, p. 20.

powers and/or to assist deconcolonisation, not necessarily to keep peace between civil war belligerents themselves.⁹ Traditional peacekeeping took place between states in order to monitor a ceasefire or a peace treaty upon which all parties had agreed. In the Post-Cold War period, a feature that became common of peacekeeping operations was their involvement with internal conflicts (as opposed to traditional peacekeeping missions deployed along international borders or truce lines). They became multi-functional (as opposed to simple military monitoring missions), and tended to eclipse traditional operations in size, with various new components (such as supervising elections or monitoring human rights).¹⁰

With conflicts becoming increasingly internal and belligerents often being non-governmental actors, peacekeeping became more “robust” and multidimensional forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement became the norm. This type of peacekeeping began with the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989, while the largest, most complex and successful example is the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).¹¹ Starting with the peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989 (UNTAG), the international community began to attempt peacekeeping in many more civil wars, trying to help in post-conflict peacebuilding through promotion of reconciliation, institution building and reconstruction. The practice of peacekeeping thus evolved accordingly, and generally came to have much more extensive civilian components: electoral observation, police monitoring and training, and civilian administration.

During 1992 and 1993 the UN deployed its largest operations ever in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia. These missions, each of which has had significant Canadian involvement were unprecedented not only in the number of troops involved, but also in their mandates. The activities ranged from past activities such as typical monitoring of cease-fires to new and non-traditional duties as election-monitoring, protection of minorities, humanitarian relief, disarmament, demobilisation and

⁹ Virginia Page Fortna. “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War”. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, p. 271.

¹⁰ Yasushi Akashi. “The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation”, *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, p. 85.

¹¹ *ibid*, p. 85.

reintegration (DDR) of warring parties, assistance in post-conflict social and political reconstruction including ‘Quick Impact Projects’, peacebuilding through training and development of indigenous institutions, establishment of the Rule of Law chain, and occasionally even providing transitional administration, i.e., running a country as in Kosovo and East Timor.¹² With such a wide-ranging mandate, peace operations no longer remained exclusively military-led. Modern peacekeeping operations came to involve a multiplicity of actors which include NGOs, humanitarian agencies, police, civilian administrators, legal, electoral and constitutional experts, and even private military companies.¹³

The scale of human problems and their complex relationship to armed conflict and structural violence were largely neglected or suppressed during the Cold War years. Thus, the end of the Cold War brought about these issues to the attention of the UN and the world community. While the end of the Cold War enabled the UN to work more freely, the scale of the problems which cropped up became immense and thus peacekeeping was expanded to meet the emerging challenges. In the absence of other options peacekeeping was singled out to play a significant role in bringing about resolution of some of the most acute problems leading to the deployment in situations which were substantially different from the pre-1988 circumstances.¹⁴ The new languages of peacebuilding and peacemaking and peace enforcement were created to complement that of peacekeeping. This was one indication that violent conflicts were no longer viewed simply in terms of peace and war.¹⁵

A. B. Fetherstone has broken down the functions of the multidimensional operations undertaken by the international community in the Post-Cold War period into three groups – military, governmental/ political and civil.¹⁶

¹² Prakash and Nandini, n. 2, p. 6.

¹³ *ibid*, p. 6

¹⁴ Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 23.

¹⁵ David B. Dewitt, “Directions in Canada’s International Security Policy: From Marginal Actor at the Centre to Central Actor at the Margins”, *International Journal*, Spring 2000, p. 178.

¹⁶ Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 32.

a. Military functions: Observation and monitoring of ceasefires; supervision of the withdrawal of forces; maintenance of buffer zones (UNEF I, UNEF II, UNOGIL); regulation of the disposition and movement of military forces (UNSF/ UNTEA, UNTAG, MINURSO); prevention of infiltration (UNIFIL), and the prevention of civil war (ONUC); verification of security agreements (ONUCA); disarming of warring factions (UNTAC, UNOSOM, ONUMOZ); supervision of cantonment and repatriation of warring factions (UNTAC); escort/protection of humanitarian aid (UNOSOM, UNPROFOR); mine clearance and training for mine clearance (UNTAC); assisting in retraining and re-forming of military (UNMIH).

b. Governmental/Political Functions: Maintenance of territorial integrity (ONUC); monitoring/supervision/provision of law and order (UNTAG/UNTAC/UNMIH); ensuring political independence (ONUC, UNTAG, UNTAC); assisting in the establishment of a viable government (ONUC, UNTAG, UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNAMIR); security of the population (MINURSO); coping/negotiating with non-governmental entities (ONUC, UNTAG, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNTAG, UNOSOM, UNPROFOR, ONUSAL); assumption of temporary governmental authority and administration (UNTEA, UNTAC); administration of an election of a constituent assembly to write a constitution (UNTAG, UNTAC); conduct of elections and referendum (UNTAG, MINURSO, UNTAC, ONUVEN, ONUVEH, UNAVEM II, ONUMOZ); assisting in the formation of local administration (UNIFIL, UNOSOM); verification of human rights agreements (ONUSAL); provision of security for the re-establishment of economic life of local populations (UNIFIL, UNFICYP).

c. Civil Functions: Provision of humanitarian assistance (ONUC, UNFICYP, UNOSOM, UNPROFOR); monitoring and regulation of the flow of refugees (UNTAG, UNTAC, UNFICYP, UNIFIL); assisting in the repatriation of refugees (UNTAG, UNTAC, UNFICYP, UNIFIL); provision of confidence-building measures (UNFICYP, UNTAG, ONUSAL); training police (UNTAC, UNMIH).

Thus, the perception that internal conflicts constitute a threat to international peace and security gave rise to growing demands on the UN to expand significantly the

mandate of peacekeeping and through, it deal with violent and potentially conflicts. With the recognition that violent conflicts were likely to recur in the absence of a long-term effort aimed at sustainable political, economic and social reconstruction, peace operations came to be increasingly tasked with wide-ranging multi-dimensional mandates.¹⁷ The expanded and complex missions with building peace as the main aim, sought to wipe out the factors that engender long term cycles of violence, and in the process, build lasting peace. The international community came to involve itself much more in civil conflicts, monitoring and often managing or administering various aspects of the transition to peace within states.

The new conflicts that emerged destroyed already limited resources, infrastructure, institutions of governance, and often undermined fragile ethnic and social structures. The international community thus responded to this challenge through efforts aimed at better understanding violent conflict and its links with development. The international community also came to recognise good governance and the strengthening of civil society as one of the foundations for peacebuilding and began stressing on peacebuilding measures for post-conflict recovery (such as demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants). They also came to realise the importance of international and in-country coordination, as well as the need for regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding mechanisms.

Further, as there was no clear area of conflict, and fighting was often spread through a country's entire territory, the result of such conflicts was that the international community increasingly felt the need to create the elementary structures of peace and security and take on responsibilities that used to be the internal affairs of the states involved. Often conflicts have social, political and economic dimensions to it, which makes the conflict to erupt in the first place. The international community realised the importance of rectifying these socio-economic and political factors, through the task of peacebuilding in conflict ridden states, so that violent conflict does not recur or erupt in the first place.

¹⁷ Prakash and Nandini, n. 2, p. 6.

In order to respond to the more complex crises that were thus faced in the Post-Cold War period, the international community began to deploy personnel with more varied and diverse skills. Military personnel in coordination with police and other experts started making efforts to develop security in conflict-affected societies. These experts include regional and municipal administrators; judges and prosecutors to develop judiciaries and run courts; media, health, tax and social policy advisors; child protection experts; facilitators and mediators; and even people to manage basic infrastructure, such as sewage treatment plants or railways.

2.2 Peacebuilding: Origin and Concept

Referring to wars as “complex emergencies”, Jon Bennet wrote about the multidimensional nature of conflict, i.e., “the interwoven results of war, politics, economics, famine and often refugees.”¹⁸ Thus the concept of peacebuilding has come to play a central role in recognising the multidimensional and interwoven complexities of civil conflicts. Peacebuilding endeavours to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. It is often used to mean any activity undertaken with the purpose of preventing, alleviating or resolving violent or potentially violent, conflict. It is “the promotion of institutional and socioeconomic measures, at the local or national level, to address the underlying causes of conflict... and most directly tries to reverse the destructive processes that accompany violence.”¹⁹

Peacebuilding involves a shift away from the warriors, with whom peacekeepers are mainly concerned. It concentrates on the context of the conflict rather than on the issues which divide the conflicting parties.²⁰ Peacebuilding measures attend to the roots of socio-political conflict and help in building stable and sustainable societies with social, political, and economic conditions conducive to a durable peace and individual security.²¹ It seeks to address this challenge by finding means to institutionalise the peaceful

¹⁸ Quoted in, Sarah Tarry, “Sleeping With The ‘Enemy’? Canadian Government Funding of NGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina”. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall 2000), p. 109.

¹⁹ Quoted in, Goodhand and Hulme, n. 6, p. 15.

²⁰ *ibid*, p. 15.

²¹ Ernie Regehr. “Small Arms: Testing the Peacebuilding Paradigm”, in Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart and Martin Rudner eds., *Canada among Nations 1999: A Big League Player?* (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 258-259.

resolution of conflicts. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence.²² Ultimately, peacebuilding aims at building human security, a concept which includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security. Peacebuilding may involve conflict prevention, conflict resolution, as well as various kinds of post-conflict activities.

Theoretically, peacebuilding is designed to respond to the more complex nature of contemporary missions in war-torn societies. Peacebuilding is intended to constitute a more pro-active strategy that addresses the root causes of conflict, rather than reacting to the immediate crisis.²³ The peacebuilding paradigm commits itself to building local capacity in civil institutions and infusing greater input from civilian actors, e.g. civilian police, in the diplomatic resolution of conflict through cooperation with local communities, moderate leaderships, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), youth, and women.

As discussed earlier, the demise of the Cold War brought about a varied change in the nature of violent conflicts around the world. The substantial increase in violent conflict, much of which took the form of civil wars and which had the maximum toll on civilian lives, set a different trend in international politics. Out of this situation, the trend which became a prominent feature of international politics in the 1990s was the emphasis which came to be placed on individual human rights and human security. Subsequently, there was a significant increase in the number, variety, scope, and prominence of intervention for allegedly humanitarian purposes. Motivated, it seems, by a concern for human rights and a sense of urgency in the face of the scope of humanitarian and political disasters in many parts of the world, a variety of individuals, groups, governments, and organisations intervened in the affairs of other countries in the hope of contributing to a

²² Quoted in, Michael Small, "Peacebuilding in Post-conflict Societies", in Rob McRae and Don Hubert eds., *Human Security And The New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), p. 75.

²³ Tami Amanda Jacoby, "Canadian Peacebuilding in the Middle East: Case Study of the Canada Fund for Dialogue and Development In Israel/Palestine and Jordan", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Fall 2000), p. 85.

more stable, peaceful, and just world.²⁴ Within this context, the theory and practice of peacebuilding emerged in the Post-Cold War period.

Beginning from the mid-1990s, some governments, international and regional organisations (IGOs), and many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well, began to adopt an even more comprehensive view of civil conflict and identified the need for a multifaceted approach that supports a sustainable peace in a post-conflict situation to avoid the recurrence of violent conflict in the future. Out of such a need, the concept of peacebuilding was born, which found its first utterances in the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). The publication of Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* has gone some way toward bringing peacekeeping into the Post-Cold War world by recognizing the importance of utilising it as one part of a broader intervention process.²⁵

The responses which cover the potential range of action at different stages of a conflict and were developed into a plan of action by Boutros-Ghali in his *An Agenda for Peace*. He pointed to the importance of peacebuilding, which he identified as 'action to identify and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.'²⁶ Elsewhere, Boutros-Ghali noted that peacebuilding amounts to 'rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formally at war.'²⁷ The emphasis was on the prevention of future conflict or, more specifically, the prevention of recurrence of violent conflict. Close attention was given to addressing the post-conflict situation. A number of specific measures were advanced, including: 'disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections,

²⁴ Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating, "Outside Agents and the Politics of Peacebuilding and Reconciliation", *International Journal*, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 80-81.

²⁵ Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 22.

²⁶ Quoted in, Abiew and Keating, n. 24, p. 86.

²⁷ Quoted in, Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 130.

advancing efforts to promote human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.’²⁸

A vibrant field of research, advocacy, and policy development around peacebuilding emerged. The different approaches taken by scholars in the field of peacebuilding are worth examining while the concept of peacebuilding and its role in conflict prevention gains prominence in its practical application. Some scholars have conceptualised peacebuilding in terms of a strategic and responsive framework – an approach that is more comprehensive than that offered by Boutros Ghali.²⁹ John Lederach, for instance, finds fault with Boutros-Ghali’s use of the term peacebuilding as limited to post-conflict support of peace agreements and the rebuilding of torn societies. He focuses instead on the problems encountered in peacebuilding- i.e., transforming hostile and violent relationships into a peace system characterised by just and interdependent relationships. For him ‘peacebuilding is more than post-accord reconstruction...peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords.’ In the broad view, this conceptual framework responds to the set of needs and challenges confronted by societies embroiled in conflict. It addresses structural issues dividing parties, the social dynamics of building relationships, and the development of supportive structures and institutions.

Lederach, drawing on field work in Central America, describes five components of peacebuilding: process, relationships, structures, resources, and coordination. Peacebuilding should focus on the affected populations from the small numbers in the highest leadership positions, through the large numbers of middle-range leaders, to the mass of grassroots leaders in the population at large. The process of peacebuilding entails setting immediate, short, medium, and long-range goals targeting the progression of conflict. Reconciliation of communities in conflict entails establishing relationships

²⁸ Abiew and Keating, n. 24, p. 86.

²⁹ Discussed in *ibid*, pp. 81-82.

between them, based on truth, mercy, justice, and peace. The structure Lederach proposes includes a peace coordination unit, linked to in-country liaison teams and an advisory working group. Resources are needed to enhance local socio-economic and socio-cultural assets, building commitment and responsibility, supporting and enlarging the peace constituency, and building on indigenous conflict-resolution traditions. Coordination of the peacebuilding effort may involve providing points of contact, improving communications between the mid-range and top-range leadership, linking domestic and international activists, establishing strategic resource groups to support the process, and holding “peace donor” conferences to coordinate international contributions.³⁰

Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme note how peacebuilding is used loosely and is only partly explained. They list several assumptions that underlie peacebuilding as a concept:³¹ peace requires social transformation and must be a long endeavour; that peace embraces economic, social, cultural, political, and humanitarian issues and goes beyond the absence of violence to include notions of sustainable development and social justice; peacebuilding is not a specific activity but a consequence of an activity – it is defined by its outcome or process; and it is grounded on the premise that societies affected by violence are still comprised of individuals, groups, attitudes, and processes that promote peace. For Goodhand and Hulme, even when violent conflict ends, sustained efforts at peacebuilding are necessary to minimize or reduce the likelihood of a resumption of hostilities.

Scholars like Evans give a more detailed version of peacebuilding noting that strategies which aim to forestall conflict or ensure that it does not recur fall into two categories: in international regimes and in-country measures. International regimes which are ‘designed to minimize threats to security, promote confidence and trust, and create framework of dialogue and cooperation’ apply. In-country strategies include pre-conflict peacebuilding (a kind of preventive action) to complement Boutros-Ghali’s notion of post-conflict peacebuilding. These strategies focus on economic development and

³⁰ D. M. Last, *Defeating Fear and Hatred through Peacebuilding: Multiplying the Impact of a Military Contribution*, *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1998), p. 58.

³¹ Goodhand and Hulme, n. 6, p. 16.

institution building.³² For A. B. Fetherstone, peacebuilding entails several distinct functions. First, peacebuilding is activity targeted specifically at rebuilding economic/and or political infrastructure; second, peacebuilding is activity targeted specifically at reconciliation, or restoring severed interactions; third, peacebuilding is the provision of humanitarian aid.³³

Ron Fisher suggests that peacebuilding may be a bridge to longer-term resolution. It is necessary, he argues, to build trust and confidence which will allow the parties to enter into lasting agreements with each other. Both theory and practice suggest that peacebuilding, encompassing a range of activities, should begin as early as possible and continue after a settlement is reached, to minimise the chance of recurring conflict.³⁴ Offering a definition with a different emphasis, the proceedings of the International Conference on Peacebuilding, held in 1986, said that peacebuilding is a 'positive, continuous cooperative human endeavour to build bridges between conflicting nations and groups. It aims to enhance understanding and communication and dispel the 'wandering rocks' of distrust, fear and hate.'³⁵

Malitza describes peacebuilding as 'the deliberate and systematic build-up of interactions, dense and durable, initiating a state in which the resumption of conflict would be improbable. According to Coate and Puchala, 'Peacebuilding policies prescribe action aimed at eliminating the social and economic sources of tension that are among the causes of war.'³⁶ In their study of peacebuilding in civil wars since World War II, Doyle and Sambanis "find that multilateral, United Nations peace operations make a positive difference." In particular, they find strong evidence that multidimensional peacekeeping, i.e., "missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight" significantly improve the chances of peacebuilding success.³⁷

³² Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 130.

³³ *ibid*, p. 137.

³⁴ D. M. Last, n. 30, p. 58.

³⁵ Quoted in, Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 132.

³⁶ *ibid*, p. 132.

³⁷ Fortna, n. 9, p. 270.

Ernie Regehr describes peacebuilding as essentially crisis intervention, either to prevent armed conflict or, in the wake of armed conflict, to consolidate peace and promote reconciliation.³⁸ A more critical view has been offered by Roland Paris who argues that ‘a single-paradigm – liberal internationalism – appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peacebuilding. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, i.e., a liberal democratic polity and a market economy. Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering- an experiment that involves transplanting western models of social, political and economic liberalization. .³⁹

Regardless of the definitions, there seems to be consensus on the difficulty of the task. Rebuilding social capital and livelihood systems in conflict circumstances is more complex and difficult than restoring physical infrastructure in natural disasters. It involves, among other things, “redefining and reorienting relationships between political authority and the citizenry, revisiting relationships between different ethnic and social groups, creating a civil society in its broadest sense, promoting psychosocial healing and reconciliation, and reforming economic policies and institutions.”⁴⁰ Franke Wilmer, in a discussion of the peacebuilding process in Bosnia, identified similar concerns. ‘ the problem is ...that we know little about what to do once an intervention has stopped the shooting...we need to know how to go beyond interventions aimed at stopping violence and toward intervention and facilitation aimed at the resolution and reconciliation of conflicts and the reconstruction (or in many cases the construction) of civil society.’ He argues that ‘ the problem of moving from intervention meant to de-escalate violence to resolution and reconciliation will require both a change in thinking about the relationship between intervention and conflict resolution, and the appropriation of resources to practitioners of the latter.’⁴¹

³⁸ Abiew and Keating, n. 24, p. 86.

³⁹ *ibid.* p. 86

⁴⁰ Quoted in, Ismail I. Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green, “Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace, and Development: Towards Reconceptualisation”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, February 1999, pp. 191-92.

⁴¹ Franke Wilmer, “The Social Construction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia”, *Social Justice*. Vol. 25 (Winter, 1998), p. 109.

In the Post-Cold War period, peacebuilding has become one of the main areas of UN activity associated with the peaceful settlement of disputes. Although its relation to peacekeeping has received less attention than the link between peacemaking and peacekeeping, peacebuilding as a means of preventing the recurrence of hostilities, reconstructing economic and social interactions and facilitating resolution has become crucial.⁴² The need to coordinate peacebuilding activities with other areas of UN involvement emerged as a growing concern. Peacebuilding was given new prominence and the intention to better manage peacebuilding activity became reflected in the emphasis of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's reform agenda. Consequently, the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs with its mandate to work toward integrated relief efforts, as well as the proposal to further rationalise UN missions by creating a Department of Peace Operations indicated movement toward prioritising peacebuilding.⁴³ In addition, a Department of Political Affairs was to be created which was to be responsible for coordinating the peacebuilding work of the development, peace and security arms of the United Nations, the specialised agencies and the World Bank. Also, recognising that strengthening democracy is essential to strengthening peace and human rights, leaders at the Denver Summit of the Eight (June, 1997) made a commitment to build on their governments' most effective programs for democratic development, peacebuilding and human rights.⁴⁴

The UN's peacebuilding activity is carried out by agencies within the system such as the World Food Programme (WFP), UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and by specialised agencies like the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). In addition, a large number of non-governmental organisations are also engaged in peacebuilding activities, often alongside peacekeeping missions.⁴⁵

Peacebuilding has also developed into a major foreign policy initiative of the Canadian government. It has also become a prominent feature in the foreign policies of

⁴² Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 130.

⁴³ *ibid*, p. 132.

⁴⁴ Abiew and Keating, n. 24, p. 82.

⁴⁵ Fetherstone, n. 5, p. 132.

other governments and in the work of international and regional IGOs and NGOs, all of which want to contribute to the amelioration of recurring conflict in divided societies.⁴⁶ It has become a concept that is now widely used and expounded by relief and development workers as well as conflict resolution specialists.

2.3 The Transition in Canadian Foreign Policy from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

In the Post-Cold War period, Canadian foreign policy has undergone a paradigm shift as far as engagement in international zones of conflict is concerned. This shift takes place in the context of the new forms of armed conflict and new sources of insecurity that came to prevail in the international system after the Cold War. The changed international context brought about new challenges and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy development. In the past, Canada's stature in diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives was attributed to its designation as a "middle power". Traditional Canadian peacekeeping was generally limited to third party intervention in wars between states, such as mediating between hostile parties, bringing them to the negotiating table, and helping to monitor a negotiated settlement.

Contrastingly, the Post-Cold War Canadian initiatives differ both in scope and context. First, they address not only protracted armed conflicts that take place between states, but also conflicts of an ethnic/community and/or tribal nature that occur within and across state borders. Second, they involve not only the military aspects of conflicts, but also the socio-political issues related both to conflict and peace negotiations in post-conflict situations.⁴⁷

The Post-Cold War Canadian foreign policy is characterised by two major paradigm shifts. The first shift is the transition from peacekeeping to "peacebuilding", while the second is defined by a shift from national security to a human security agenda. Both peacebuilding and human security have emerged as prominent paradigms of Canada's as well as international diplomacy and both the initiatives draw from a long

⁴⁶ Abiew and Keating, n. 24, p. 82.

⁴⁷ Jacoby, n. 23, p. 83.

history of human rights and development practices as they have evolved over many years through such organisations as the UN and other development agencies.⁴⁸

The first shift in Canadian foreign policy i.e., moving from peacekeeping to peacebuilding came out of an attempt to move away from the traditional Cold War doctrine of deterrence, whereby Canada contained, managed or moderated hostilities through the threat to use military force. By way of contrast with conventional deterrence, in the Post-Cold War period, Canadian foreign policy *vis-à-vis* international conflict resolution relies on the notion of peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. Canadian efforts to prevent a renewal of hostilities in conflict zones have extended far beyond cease-fire agreements between states, to such activities as participation in broad-scale democratic institution building, civil society empowerment, inter-communal cooperation, and the promotion of long-term stability in ethnically divided societies.

The second paradigm shift in Canadian foreign policy characterised by the move from national security to a human security agenda was also brought about by the dramatically changed international context. In acknowledging the dramatic changes in the international security environment, the concept of human security came up to embrace a broader definition of security that placed the individual or human security above state security. The emphasis on human security, at the expense of state sovereignty, when human rights are threatened or abused has been evident in Canadian foreign policy statements since the early 1990s.⁴⁹

Human security has come to represent a broad policy and philosophy of engagement for Canada in the international arena seeking to develop in tandem with the new peacebuilding concept. Human security is defined as a 'shift in analysis from states to human beings, taking individuals and their communities, rather than states and national boundaries, as the central point of reference for global peace and security. It seeks to

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

enlarge the agenda of security by including non-military issues such as human rights, sustainable development, gender equality, cultural diversity, and the environment.⁵⁰

Canada's then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, the man with whom the concept is mainly associated with, explained that in the Post-Cold War period, the face of war was transformed. The majority of conflicts occurred inside states rather than between states. He pointed out that regardless of where these conflicts happened, civilians increasingly became the main targets, as a result of which the world came to witness human tragedies of devastating proportions – massive refugee flows and the grossest violations of humanitarian law, including genocide.⁵¹ Thus he clearly articulated in January 1996 that: 'at a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament.'⁵² Giving importance to all these issues would enable societies in conflict in the transition from war to long-term peace.

The human security agenda was linked to Canadian foreign policy traditions such as peacekeeping and development assistance. Lloyd Axworthy also drew direct links between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, noting that the concept of the former was evolving to incorporate aspects of the latter in an effort to provide longer-term solutions to conflicts. In pursuance of the agenda, the Canadian aid policy was also harnessed to promote human security in the developing world through varied programs such as food security, income generation, judicial training, support for health care etc.

The paradigm shift in Canadian foreign policy was influenced to some extent by the publication of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, which redefined threats to global security. There Boutros Ghali stated: 'a porous ozone

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵¹ Robin Jeffrey Hay, "Present at the Creation: Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century", in Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart, And Martin Rudner eds., *Canada among Nation's 1999: A Big League Player?* (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 215.

⁵² Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership", *International Journal* 52(2), 1997, p. 184.

shield could pose a greater threat to an exposed population than a hostile army. Drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war...the efforts of the organisation to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterised the past.’⁵³

This type of thinking was reflected in the Canadian foreign policy circles as well. Even before the *Agenda for Peace* was brought out, the Mulroney government recognised the new threats that had come to gain prominence after the Cold War. On 29 September 1991, Mulroney observed that ‘re-thinking the limits of national sovereignty in a world where problems respect no borders’ is appropriate in light of new threats to international stability and order.⁵⁴ Some new policy objectives were drawn which were outlined by then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall in November 1992 ⁵⁵ - (1) the promotion and protection of basic individual human rights; (2) the development of democratic values and institutions; (3) the establishment of good governance or responsible decision-making supported by a responsive public service; and (4) the removal of trade barriers.

Thereafter, the foreign policy review launched by the newly elected Chrétien government in 1994 also revealed continuity in policy adhered to by the outgoing government. In late 1994 and early 1995 the Chrétien government issued white papers on defence and foreign policy and both the white papers made reference to non-traditional threats to security. The government’s statement on foreign policy reflected the type of language used by the UN Secretary-General in the *Agenda for Peace*. The government noted that the international context has changed, bringing with it threats to security that transcended borders and affected whole regions or even the globe, such as Crime, diseases, mass involuntary migration, social inequity, environmental degradation, overpopulation, and the lack of economic opportunity. Thus, security needs were changing, moving away from concerns about the security of the state and focusing on the

⁵³ Hay, n. 51, p. 219.

⁵⁴ Cited in Andrew Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 183.

⁵⁵ Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, The ‘New Look’ In Canada’s Foreign Policy, *International Journal*, Vol. XLVIII, Autumn 1993, pp. 725-726.

economic, social, and political needs of the individual.⁵⁶ The foreign policy White Paper called for a response to security issues beyond those of a strictly military nature. The promotion of democracy and good governance, of human rights and the rule of law and of prosperity through sustainable development were seen as the appropriate kinds of responses to new international threats.⁵⁷

In addition, the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future* (November 1994), also noted the new types of security threats in the Post-Cold War period such as ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, and globalisation. The report placed emphasis on the need to address, on Canada's part, the new security threats that had emerged.⁵⁸ Also, in the foreign policy White Paper, *Canada in the World* (1995), a complex range of security threats were identified: mass migration, epidemics, overpopulation, underdevelopment, global warming, and humanitarian tragedies. The paper argued that 'all of this demands a broadening of the focus of security policy from its narrow orientation of managing state-to-state relationships, to one that recognizes the importance of the individual and society for or shared security.'⁵⁹

Peacebuilding also fell into the category of a number of major foreign policy initiatives that were being emphasised upon by the newly reoriented Canadian foreign policy. Thus, the Peacebuilding Initiative to assist war-torn societies to rebuild after civil war was started. Along with this, the other initiatives include the Ottawa initiative that led to the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines in December 1997; the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC); a sustained campaign to promote the rights of the child; and efforts to prevent the proliferation of small arms.⁶⁰

Thus, at a time of change in both the external and internal environments in which rapid and dramatic changes took place, the Post-Cold War period represents a paradigm

⁵⁶ Hay, n. 51, p. 219.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Hevina S. Dashwood, "Canada's Participation in the NATO-led Intervention in Kosovo", in Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot eds., *Canada among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 278.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p. 279.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

shift in international relations as well as in Canadian foreign policy approaches to international conflicts. The response of the Canadian government to trends that set in after the end of the Cold War suggests a profound change in Canada's foreign policy, one that adopts a radically different approach to civil wars and human rights violations in other countries. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, civil conflict in Somalia, the risk of civil disorder in the republics of the former Soviet Union, and the continuation of serious conflicts in many other parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa demonstrated the urgent need for action by the international community.

Canada realised the need for immediate action and responded to the needs of the changed situation. There were repeated calls from Canada and many others for responsive action, suggesting that at least something should be done to ease the suffering of the victims of these conflicts. Based on an examination of the diplomatic efforts and peacekeeping activities of Canadians and of the statements of the country's political leaders, it is clear that the government began supporting a more interventionist approach to conflict resolution.⁶¹ In the changed situation, peacekeeping no longer remained a sufficient response and peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding became required and Canada rightly embraced and assumed the required roles.

Events in places such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti acted as a catalyst for Canada's political leaders to reassess past practice and to lay the groundwork for a significantly different approach to civil conflicts and human rights violations in other countries. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in the spring of 1993 expressed the desire to dispense with 'debating the niceties of "this" principle or "that" concept' and getting 'on with the job of building peace and prosperity.'⁶² In an effort to build peace, Canada has also attempted to embrace a new foreign policy doctrine – the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and has undertaken a more interventionist approach as far as protecting victims of civil wars and resolving international conflicts are concerned.

The change in Canadian foreign policy emphasis is not merely rhetorical, but has actually been practised. Among other places, Canadian troops have been actively

⁶¹ Keating and Gammer, n. 55, p. 720.

⁶² *ibid*, p. 721.

involved in a humanitarian operation in Somalia and the Mulroney government supported interventions with a humanitarian component in Bosnia and Haiti. Canada was at the forefront of UN humanitarian missions in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, committing, in March 1992, 1,200 peacekeepers to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia, and, in April, 750 troops to the United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1). Starting from 1991, Canada began to place an increased emphasis on peacebuilding and has tried to focus on how to support post-conflict rebuilding with resources comparable to what was spent on the peacemaking actions. In Kosovo, over 220 million dollars over two years were dedicated to peacebuilding activities, with special emphasis on education, corrections, and police services. In Sierra Leone, Canada's priority was on the demobilisation and rehabilitation of combatants, especially child soldiers. In Haiti, Canada's efforts focused on the justice system.

These actions are an indication of a new approach in Canadian foreign policy, one that became evident as early as 1990 and which reflected a change in foreign policy priorities of the Canadian government. Presently, Canada's foreign policy priorities include protecting civilians, war-affected children; promoting democracy; humanitarian relief; establishing market based-economies; dealing with the threat posed by terrorism; drug trafficking; forced migration; de-mining and demobilisation; repatriation and reintegration of refugees; police and justice training; support for an independent media; election and human rights monitoring; reconstruction of schools and health centres; among many others. The overriding objective of Canada's peacebuilding policy is to 'support the emergence of participatory and pluralistic societies, with a well-functioning and responsible government administration acting under the rule of law and respect for human rights.'⁶³

2.4 The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative⁶⁴

As part of the new foreign policy reorientation, the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative was formally launched by then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, in

⁶³ Canadian International Development Agency, 'Canadian Peacemaking Experience,' 6 November 1998, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida.ind.nsf>

⁶⁴ The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative is a joint project of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

October 30, 1996. It laid down a broad framework of principles intended to coordinate Canadian peacebuilding capabilities, and strengthen Canadian peacebuilding abroad and was designed as ‘a package of measures to strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure of human security.’⁶⁵ Lloyd Axworthy described peacebuilding as “casting a life line to foundering societies struggling to end the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet. After the fighting has stopped and the immediate humanitarian needs have been addressed, there exists a brief critical period when a country sits balanced on a fulcrum. Tilted the wrong way, it retreats back into conflict. But with the right help, delivered during that brief, critical window of opportunity, it will move towards peace and stability.”⁶⁶

Axworthy could see the political prospects of peacebuilding becoming a cause which would delve into Canadians’ traditions of internationalism and idealism, and which could serve as a civilian counterpart to peacekeeping. Also, peacebuilding fitted the type of “niche diplomacy,” which characterized his initial thinking about how and where “Canada could make a difference” in global affairs. Thus was born the idea of launching a Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative.⁶⁷ Two objectives which are interactive and interdependent and of equal importance underpin the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative – to assist countries in conflict in their efforts towards peace and stability, and to promote Canadian peacebuilding capacity and Canadian participation in international peacebuilding initiatives.⁶⁸

The Peacebuilding Initiative suggested a concern for the multidimensional and integrated causes of civil war and thus acknowledged the need to address the economic, social, and political aspects of reconstruction and reconciliation. Rooted in a concern for human security, the initiative also identified the need to address these issues at the level of individuals and groups within what is now commonly called civil society. The peacebuilding initiative has focused on providing direct assistance to countries at various stages of civil conflict. It has also been designed to support the capacity of the Canadian

⁶⁵ Quoted in, Abiew and Keating, n. 24, p. 88.

⁶⁶ Small, n. 22, p. 77

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Regehr, n. 21, p. 258.

government and of individual Canadians to participate effectively in peacebuilding initiatives.

The Peacebuilding Initiative owe its origins to a convergence to a number of trends in the early 1990s. The rapid succession of bloody, intrastate conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Croatia, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia etc caught the attention of international agencies in the immediate Post-Cold War period. In dealing with these conflicts, the international agencies involved in these countries encountered the limits of their standard responses. They discovered that increasingly their core clientele in the world's poorest countries were also societies in conflict. An eruption of civil war in any of these places could wipe out years' worth of investment in economic development and human capital. Humanitarian workers found that delivering humanitarian assistance in conflict zones, as in Somalia or Angola, could provide protection and save lives, but could do nothing to bring the conflict to an end in the first place.⁶⁹

The ethnic conflicts that cropped up gave the lesson that peacekeeping was simply not enough in conflict situations and they required complex and highly-integrated missions. The conflicts showed that military force can win the war, but it cannot win the peace, at least not alone. They also demonstrated that the selective application of military force, in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, can be key to bringing internecine conflict to an end.⁷⁰ Peacekeepers sent in to enforce an immediate post-conflict settlement, as in Haiti or Bosnia, found that the provision of security could not, in itself, lead to an "exit strategy," and that responsible, accountable local security forces could not be expected to emerge to take over from the peacekeepers without a different kind of international stimulus. Finally, diplomats discovered that negotiating a peace agreement to terminate an intrastate conflict (as in Nicaragua and Cambodia) required not only external assurances of support for the agreement and an end of outside intervention in the conflict. It also required a package of positive incentives to keep the internal parties to the conflict

⁶⁹ Rob McRae, "Human Security in a Globalised World", in Rob McRae and Don Hubert eds., *Human Security And The New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), p. 22.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

committed to the terms of the settlement, and to give them new roles to play in a new national administration. Something was clearly missing from the standard arsenal of international responses to complex emergencies. They found out that what was missing was “peacebuilding”.⁷¹

Thus the need for peacebuilding grew dramatically. Consequently, there was a realisation that peacebuilding in post-conflict situations, whether or not a peace support operation is in place, also required the rapid mobilisation of financial and human resources if the entire effort is not to be undermined. Without reconstruction, without even minimal salaries for local police, doctors, judges, or civil servants, former combatants and civilians would have no stake in the future. This would particularly happen when the international community asks war-traumatised people to relinquish the certainties of clan allegiance for an uncertain future based on democracy, the respect for human rights, and a free economy. Thus only economic and political development could lead war-torn societies from recrimination to reconstruction.⁷²

In Canada, this concept captured the interest of a cross-section of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and policy makers in the government who were looking to find a shared agenda at the intersection between security, diplomacy, and development.⁷³ A coalition of Canadian development NGOs interested in peacebuilding, with the assistance of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) formed a “Contact Group” in 1994 to convene an informal government-NGO forum on peacebuilding issues. Within CIDA, several geographic programs – most notably those dealing with Haiti and Bosnia – made peacebuilding the over-arching focus of their programming. CIDA’s policy branch became one of the principal advocates within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee of a new Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development, delegated with developing a set of guidelines for undertaking development programmes in conflict contexts. At the same time, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) created a Global Issues Bureau to focus on emerging, trans-

⁷¹ Small, n. 22, p. 75.

⁷² McRae, n. 69, p. 23.

⁷³ Small, n. 22, p. 76.

boundary issues. The DFAIT Global Issues Bureau was also given a mandate to consider emerging political and security issues through the creation of a small “Peacebuilding and Democratic Development” division.

After the launch of the initiative, a new 10 million dollars a year Peacebuilding Fund was announced. It was to be managed by CIDA on behalf of the initiative; and two domestic initiatives were put in place: a roster of human rights and democracy experts, which would help identify Canadians with the skills needed for peacebuilding; and a new process of annual peacebuilding consultations, which would be convened with the Canadian NGO community, which would serve as a joint stock-taking and priority-setting exercise for the initiative between the Canadian government and the Canadian NGO community.⁷⁴

The public launch of the initiative was followed by an intensive process of negotiation between the DFAIT and CIDA regarding a shared strategic agenda for the initiative, and agreed project approval mechanisms for the Peacebuilding Fund. The fund, in its first year of operation, identified four geographic priorities: Guatemala, the great lakes of Africa, Former Yugoslavia, and Cambodia. By the end of its first fiscal year, it had been able to support a number of innovative, largely NGO-led projects, in each of these regions. In the summer of 1997, DFAIT was able to, put into operation a small complementary funding mechanism of its own, the Peacebuilding Program, intended to focus on areas that fell outside of CIDA’s priorities, such as domestic capacity building in Canada, initiatives in non-ODA (official development assistance) countries, and multilateral mechanisms for peacebuilding led by diplomatic or political institutions. Both departments established a close policy dialogue with the International Development Research Centre, which had sponsored the early work of the Peacebuilding Contact Group, and which had decided to consolidate its activities in Cambodia, Palestine, Central America, and southern Africa into a new Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 77.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 78.

Canada also forged broad partnerships with Canadian civil society groups, donors, and international organisations so as to innovate and expand further the impact of Canadian peacebuilding initiatives. Various consultative and partnership mechanisms with the Canadian NGO community was created through the peacebuilding initiative. Correspondingly, a firmer partnership was established between the Canadian government and the Canadian NGO community with the launch of an annual process of peacebuilding consultations, and the provision of program funding to the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. In mid-1997, around 135 Canadian NGOs working in 86 different countries came up with a “Peacebuilding Activities Chart” (see below)⁷⁶

Peacebuilding Activity	Examples
Early warning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - intelligence and monitoring - data collection and analysis - transmission and early action
Environmental Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - conflict assessment and resolution related to resource depletion, human migration, etc.
Physical Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - demobilization, disarmament, and de-mining - protection of civic population - police and security force reform/training
Individual Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - gender-specific, sexual orientation specific, and racial/cultural-specific violence.
Human Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - field operations, investigation, and reporting - training and advocacy
Conflict Resolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - community-based initiatives - second-track diplomacy - mediation and negotiation
Social Reconstruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - psycho-social trauma counseling and social services (health, education) - reintegration of refugees/displaced persons/combatants - peace education and access to information
Governance and Democratic Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - electoral assistance - civic education, judicial reform, media development, and training
Institutional/Civic Capacity Building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - government and NGO capacity building - implementation of peace accord - probity/corruption (transparency/accountability)
Policy Development, Assessment, Advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - research, assessment/evaluation - lessons learned - public consultation
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - peacebuilding training in above activities of trainers

⁷⁶ Chart given in *ibid*, p. 79.

This chart provided an “operational definition” of peacebuilding divided into eleven categories of activities which illustrated what the concept meant in practice. This chart came to be widely used by Canadian government officials in the early months of the initiative to explain to others what was meant by the concept.

The institutional focal points of the Peacebuilding Initiative were a new Peacebuilding Unit within the International Humanitarian Assistance Unit in CIDA – a working level committee between DFAIT and CIDA to coordinate peacebuilding initiatives – as well as a committee of senior officials in both departments to provide policy direction.⁷⁷ The DFAIT and CIDA also used their respective funding mechanisms to support a number of important projects. Some projects involved quick response to international appeals, as for example, from the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia for budgetary support for a new pro-Dayton government in the republic Srpska, or for a radio campaign to counter propaganda against the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).⁷⁸ While some projects were more carefully designed through consultation with Canadian NGOs active in the field, some were intended to push the envelope of peacebuilding policy development, such as the drafting of the first set of guidelines for the UN on how to conduct disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants.

Later, the start of Canada’s tenure on the Security Council in 1999 provided it with an opportunity in encouraging a fresh look at the challenges of peacebuilding in the context of peace support operations. The decision to make “the protection of civilians” the broad theme of Canada’s Security Council presidency in February 1999, and the follow-up report requested from the Secretary-General, also encouraged more thinking about how UN forces, both military and police, should be trained and mandated to protect civilian populations in the early phases of a peace support operations. Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s increasing emphasis on human security as the overarching theme to many of his initiatives, including peacebuilding, encouraged the ministry to use its Peacebuilding Program to support a greater range of multilateral instruments, such as

⁷⁷ Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, “Introduction”, *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership And Dialogue* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 18.

⁷⁸ Small, n. 22, p. 80.

the UN Special Rapporteur On Freedom Of Expression, and the ratification of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As part of the initiative, in 2000, the issue of the impact of armed conflict on children, which had been on the peacebuilding agenda from the very outset, was also effectively made as a highest priority for the initiative in 2000.

The Canadian peacebuilding approach co-ordinates the work of various government departments. Apart from DFAIT and CIDA, other state agencies such as Justice Canada, Elections Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are also actively involved in conflict resolution activities at the international level as part of second-generation peacekeeping operations. The Canadian approach also supports work on a bilateral basis or in cooperation with international and regional INGOs and Canadian and local NGOs.

2.5 The Role of CIDA and DFAIT in Peacebuilding

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) play a fundamental role in the peacebuilding activities that Canada undertakes. Particularly, CIDA has been a vital player in supplying the needed resources for peacebuilding activities. CIDA defines peacebuilding as: “the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. Ultimately, peacebuilding aims at building human security, a concept which includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security.”⁷⁹

Its six programming priorities are: basic human needs; the environment; the situation of women; infrastructure services; human rights; democratic development and good governance; and private sector development. Through its NGO division, CIDA has a working relationship with nearly 500 NGOs, to which it provides funds through a number of different methods.

⁷⁹ Quoted in, Sarah Tarry, n. 18, p. 113.

The DFAIT and CIDA each contribute towards the promotion of peace in conflict countries. While the two departments use different instruments and approaches to support the building of peace, their combined efforts are recognised as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Other government departments and agencies, such as Justice Canada, Elections Canada, and the RCMP, are also involved in the planning and delivery of peacebuilding programmes.⁸⁰

In its management of Canadian bilateral and regional political relations with countries entering or emerging from conflict, DFAIT exercises preventive diplomacy and undertakes initiatives designed to strengthen political solutions to disputes, governmental crises and situations of acute societal instability. DFAIT also manages Canada's participation in the multilateral political fora that coordinate international peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. In certain instances, DFAIT has initiated or led regional or international peacebuilding effort. Through the Centre for Foreign Policy Development, the Department also sponsors public involvement in the peacebuilding policy-making process. DFAIT and CIDA both consult on a regular basis with Canadian civil society groups on issues related to peacebuilding practices, lessons and priorities.⁸¹

In the area of peacebuilding, CIDA's overall goal is to support the emergence of participatory and pluralistic societies, with well-functioning and responsible government administration acting under the rule of law and respect for human rights. CIDA works in partnership with developing countries to strengthen the long-term foundations of peace, human security and sustainable development, by promoting strong civil society, representative governance systems, economic opportunity, and the participation of women in the development process. These efforts help build a tradition of conflict avoidance as well as effective institutions of conflict resolution in societies undergoing rapid economic and social change. The reduction of poverty and disparity, which are deep-rooted causes of conflict and instability, particularly in multi-ethnic countries with exclusionary habits of governance, also requires long-term efforts directed towards policy reform and capacity building.

⁸⁰ CIDA, "Canadian Peacebuilding Experience", Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida-ind.nsf/>

⁸¹ *ibid.*

All of CIDA's channels development cooperation (geographic, partnership and multilateral programs) contribute to the reduction of conflict. Many ongoing geographic programs aim at consolidating fragile societies recovering from conflict (e.g. Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala etc). Other programs (e.g. Sri Lanka, the West Bank and Gaza) support activities designed to help reduce conflict among social groups and strengthen the search for peaceful solutions. Partnership programs support organisations whose activities are oriented to building local capacity in civil society, while multilateral programs have supported de-mining and demobilisation efforts, repatriation and reintegration of refugees, and dissemination of the principles of international humanitarian law in conflict-prone countries.⁸²

Within DFAIT, major bureaucratic reforms were introduced by Gordon Smith, the former Deputy Minister, which led to the establishment of a bureau for global issues that has helped Lloyd Axworthy's human security agenda to be put into action. This bureaucratic reform reflected a growing awareness within senior ranks of the bureaucracy about the importance of a whole new set of functional issue-areas – human rights, rule of law, peacebuilding, terrorism, drugs, governance – that were not easily addressed by existing departmental structures. These new structures came to be critical importance to the implementation of foreign minister Axworthy's human security agenda.⁸³

2.5.1 The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework:

Further, the Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework initiated by the DFAIT and CIDA reflected a common understanding by both the departments of the aims and approaches to peacebuilding that was to be undertaken within the framework of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative. It responded to the desire of Ministers for a strategic approach to Canadian peacebuilding – one that reflects a coherent and well coordinated inter-departmental partnership, and the full involvement of Canadian civil society, in

⁸² *ibid.*

⁸³ Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart, And Martin Rudner, "A Big League or Minor League Player?", in Fen Osler Hampson, Michael Hart, and Martin Rudner eds., *Canada Among Nation's 1999: A Big League Player?* (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15.

order to most effectively address the peacebuilding needs of countries where violent conflict undermines sustainable development and human security.⁸⁴

The Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework aimed at mobilising Canada's expertise and resources systematically to respond to peacebuilding priorities, in countries at risk of, or emerging from, violent internal conflict. It also planned to have an integrated approach would bring together concerned Government departments, academia and the NGO community. It wanted Peacebuilding to be developed as a foreign policy priority within DFAIT programmes and peacebuilding activities to be mainstreamed into regular CIDA programming as much as possible so as to develop a sustainable approach to peacebuilding. The Strategic Framework also desired that other governmental priorities, such as the Canadian International Information Strategy and the protection of children, are taken into account when developing Peacebuilding interventions. In addition, it placed emphasis on integrating lessons learned from past peacebuilding experience into the Canadian approach to peacebuilding. It desired that Canada would not only take a coherent approach to its peacebuilding programmes, but also work towards achieving coherence in the peacebuilding responses of the international community, through coordination with other donors, with the United Nations, and with regional organisations.

More specifically, the strategic approach to the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative composed of three main elements – preparedness, partnership and implementation, which are discussed as below:⁸⁵

a. Preparedness: Identifying and assessing Canadian peacebuilding capacity and training skills through studies which are underway. Enhancing and promoting peacebuilding knowledge in Canadian academic and research facilities; developing a stand-by Canadian peacebuilding capacity, ready for deployment; conducting ongoing analysis of conflict situations to allow Canada to define priorities and pinpoint interventions on a proactive basis.

⁸⁴ CIDA, "Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework", Available at <<http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca>>

⁸⁵ *ibid*

b. Partnership: (i) In Canada, by establishing an inter-departmental peacebuilding network to consult and work with Canadian NGOs and NGIs involved in peacebuilding; by sharing information with the Canadian public;

(ii) Multilaterally, by coordinating with other donors and co-funding with them specific initiatives; by strengthening international mechanisms for peacebuilding;

(iii) In countries in conflict, by identifying those individuals, communities and groups most likely to assume leadership roles and to build peace; by facilitating the emergence of local peacebuilding capacity to take over from external actors when feasible.

c. Implementation: Funding innovative, rapid-response peacebuilding activities through the Peacebuilding Fund; taking part in regional/international peacebuilding initiatives; advancing peacebuilding through Canadian skills and know-how, including transfer of Canadian technology (e.g. information systems); developing Canadian peacebuilding skills and deploying Canadians as peacebuilders; integrating peacebuilding features into regular CIDA programming; developing mechanisms to incorporate lessons learned from Canada's peacebuilding interventions into the ongoing development of a Canadian approach to peacebuilding.

The types of results that were expected to be obtained by the Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework through the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative are:⁸⁶

Assisted countries/regions improve their ability to resolve internal and regional conflicts; local institutions in conflict-affected countries develop indigenous consensus-building and conflict-resolving capabilities through Canadian interventions; countries affected by conflict are assisted in developing new leadership to consolidate peace; Canadian peacebuilding capacity is identified and mobilised to respond to acute needs in conflict-affected societies; international organisations formulate specific policies and develop more effective instruments to promote peacebuilding; Canada provides a rapid

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

response to peacebuilding challenges while situating its interventions within a context of longer-term peacebuilding and sustainable development.

As peacebuilding lessons are learned and operational experience acquired, adjustments were to be made to the structure of the Initiative to optimise the achievement of these results.

2.5.2 The Canadian Peacebuilding Fund:

The Peacebuilding Fund, which is drawn from the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget and administered by CIDA, is also a funding mechanism under the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative for peacebuilding activities in ODA countries. Projects supported by the Fund are approved by the Minister for International Cooperation. The Fund is intended to augment and build upon CIDA's considerable experience in peacebuilding-related activities and DFAIT's international political expertise. By providing a rapid response mechanism, the Canadian government will be able to address urgent needs in conflict-affected countries and regions, while promoting Canadian peacebuilding expertise.

The activities to be funded goes in tandem with the strategic approach for the Fund as mentioned below:⁸⁷

The strategic approach of the Peacebuilding Fund is designed to serve as a catalyst which will stimulate local sustainable initiatives toward peace. It responds quickly to urgent peacebuilding situations in ODA countries by supporting targeted, short-term (maximum 18 months), one-time interventions at a critical juncture in the peace consolidation process. Where possible, it utilises Canadian peacebuilding capacity directed at selected geographic and sectoral places. The Fund limits itself to supporting activities which cannot be funded through other CIDA mechanisms for reasons of speed, level of risk or type of intervention. Optimally, the Fund intervenes at the point of convergence of several criteria: urgent peacebuilding needs, rapid response, selected niches, geographic focus and availability of appropriate Canadian capacity. Short-term

⁸⁷ *ibid*

interventions under the Fund assist in creating an environment in which sustainable peace and longer-term development becomes possible.

The Peacebuilding Fund recognised that the answers to conflict cannot be developed externally but have to respond to local dynamics. Peacebuilding projects should aim, wherever possible, to support and strengthen locally-generated peacebuilding initiatives so as to make them more effective and sustainable. The Fund stresses on supporting people-centered peace initiatives.

The Peacebuilding Fund has certain focuses on its ambit viz., geographic focus, sectoral focus, timing, risk, type of intervention and, implementing partners, which are discussed in some detail below:⁸⁸

Geographic Focus: While the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative retained broad geographic scope, the Fund was to focus its peacebuilding efforts on those ODA countries with the most pressing peacebuilding needs. During its first year of operation, the Fund was supposed to be principally involved in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Guatemala, Former Yugoslavia and, as conditions permit, in Cambodia.

Sectoral Focus: The Fund was designated to support local initiatives aimed at enhancing the peace dialogue and to develop local leadership for the consolidation of peace. The Fund also sought to strengthen Canadian capacity and to enhance international peacebuilding machinery. Sectoral priorities, or Canadian niches, were to be further defined, based on experience and forthcoming data.

Timing: While peacebuilding is a long-term and complex activity, in certain conflict situations rapid action is critical in order to restore or maintain peace. By closely following developments in conflict-affected areas, the Fund sought to intervene at the most effective moment possible in order to serve as a catalyst in the peace process.

Risk: While rapid action often carries a higher risk factor, it may outweigh the high costs of inaction. Therefore, the Fund was to undertake risk assessment in cooperation with substantive desks and posts.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

Type of Intervention: The Fund was to support activities, up to a maximum of 500,000 dollars per project, aimed at conflict prevention and resolution, as well as post-conflict situations. It was likely, however, that the Fund would focus its activities on well-targeted interventions that could help encourage a sustainable peace and restore social equilibrium. Creative approaches, including those promoting dialogue and communication was to be sought. Whenever possible, emphasis was to be placed on responding to peacebuilding needs that had been locally identified and defined.

Implementing Partners: Canadian Government departments, NGOs/NGIs, the United Nations, regional organisations and other relevant entities was to be called upon, whenever necessary, to implement a peacebuilding intervention and to accompany the peacebuilding process. Joint undertakings with other donor governments and multilateral agencies, was also likely to take place under the Fund.

Thus the Canadian government has tried to carve out a unique role for itself in the area of peacebuilding, engaging itself more fully in the efforts at preventing conflict and reconstructing war-torn societies. Canada has come to acquire a rich variety of expertise in fields related to peacebuilding. The study of its interest and role in peacebuilding in societies in conflict aptly suggests that Canada has indeed moved on from simple peacekeeping to peacebuilding in conflict ridden societies. It has demonstrated that through its peacebuilding activities, it is interested in assisting countries in conflict to meet their peacebuilding needs. In the process, it has also provided opportunities for Canadians to mobilise their available resources and utilise their talent and skills in stopping, moderating, or preventing violent conflicts.

Canada's long-standing democratic tradition, respect for humanitarian values, leadership in human rights and historic commitment to peacekeeping operations has placed it in a strong position to respond to international peacebuilding needs. As discussed, many Canadian diplomatic and development assistance activities have already taken on the challenge of peacebuilding. The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative has and will further mobilise Canadian expertise and experience to meet the future challenges posed by peacebuilding.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY: CANADA'S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

3.1 A Background of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia

The fall of the Austria-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, led to the birth of Yugoslavia which was composed of more than twenty ethnic groups. However, just over seventy years later, Yugoslavia disintegrated and war broke out between the units which comprised it. Subsequently, the countries of Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina came up in the place of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian leader Marshall Tito was the force who held together dissenting south Slav nationalities with links to different religions, like the Croats (Roman Catholics), Serbs (Orthodox), Bosnian Muslims, Slovenes, Albanians, and others, together).¹ Following his death in 1980, Yugoslavia began to face acute political instability. The ethnic groups in Yugoslavia became agitated and demanded more autonomy. Following that, wars and "ethnic cleansing" became the norm in the new countries which led to the deaths of many people.

The Yugoslav state under Tito opposed identity politics, and endeavoured to close the era of nationality bitterness by closing all debate on the issue, and focusing instead on brotherhood and unity. Tito's political sagacity, his break from Stalinism in 1948, his ability to maintain Yugoslavia as a geo-political buffer between the west and the east, his leadership in the non-aligned movement, his personal popularity, and the fact that the communist system in Yugoslavia was not imposed from outside but had support from within, kept this regime going until Tito's death in 1980.² It was after Tito's death that Yugoslavia went into a cycle of political and economic crises, which started tearing it apart.

¹ Anuradha Chenoy, "Crisis in Bosnia and UN Peacekeeping", in Lalima Verma ed., *United Nations in the Changing World* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1997), p. 86.

² *ibid.*

The inter-ethnic divisions in the Former Yugoslavia developed over a long history in which the region served as a battleground for a succession of competing and ethnically and culturally diverse empires such as the Byzantine, Roman, Ottoman empires. However, the complex political, social and economic relations in the region over the decades became the primary causes of the Yugoslav war. After the birth of Yugoslavia, a federal structure was developed which allowed the six republics constituting the new state to build and largely control their own political, economic and military institutions. Through this structure, Tito sought to balance the competing claims of different ethnic groups, but he was unable to reconcile the divergent interests of the Yugoslav republics. After his death in 1980 no new leadership emerged which had the strength to hold the disparate groups and interest together. The lack of political leadership was compounded by general economic difficulties and the decline of the communist party rule.³

The confederal nature of Yugoslavia, which had been marginalised because of Tito's unlimited power, now became competitive and combative between units. Ideas like the collective presidency, failed to curb the dissident movements which arose amongst the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Marketisation, the World Bank-IMF initiated privatisation programme turned the communist elite into nationalist elite. It began to seek power and legitimacy by popularising communal sectarian/ethnic and separatist sentiments.⁴ The coming to power of Slobodan Milosevic in 1987 represented this development. With a coup within the party, Milosevic turned the party into one representing the national chauvinism of the Serbs.⁵ Meanwhile other ethnic nationalities of Yugoslavia like the Croats, the Muslims etc arose to counter this threat.

In the republics of the Yugoslav federation, campaigns against the minorities began to take place. The election held in 1990 was used to further dissipate the confederal nature of the republic. It was here that Milosevic in his campaign drew freely from past historical experience to put down the Croats, and build the image of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Franjo Tudjman, leader of the Croats, meanwhile expressed the intentions of

³ A. B. Fetherstone, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1994), p. 72.

⁴ Chenoy, n. 1, p. 87.

⁵ *ibid.*

an independent Croatia. Slovenia likewise expressed a desire for independence. The space for compromise between the various groups kept narrowing. In a post-communal situation, where inflation in the region touched 2,600 per cent, identity politics gained legitimacy. This led to the end of Yugoslavia.⁶

The republics began challenging the federal structure, and although talks were convened, they failed to reach any agreement. During the course of these unsuccessful constitutional discussions all six republics held multi-party elections where the results heavily favoured nationalistic parties. A more ominous sign of things to come was a move in some republics to form their own territorial militias independent of Yugoslavia's only military force – the Yugoslav National Army (JNA).⁷ Yugoslavia was soon fractured as the various ethnic nations broke away and formed independent states. The states formed militias comprised of people with scant training and devoid of military discipline and organisation. As one historian aptly states: “Rival militias fired weapons in the vicinity of opposing troops, more often than not, intent on killing civilians. The result was to create a pattern of combat where military casualties were few. The new armies knew how to kill, but not how to wage war against other soldiers properly. Unprotected civilians were a different matter. And so, the objective in these wars was not to defeat the opponent's combat power but to consolidate new ethnic nation-states by killing or driving out those who did not fit.”⁸ Such ethnic cleansing, as these tactics came to be known, was practised by all parties in the civil wars that erupted in 1992. The result of these civil wars was thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of political refugees.

At the same time ethnic tensions in some republics had risen to alarming proportions. By 1991 the republics were so deeply divided that the possibility of compromise on some form of a unitary Yugoslav state appeared remote. At this juncture the largest gap existed between Croatia and Slovenia's position which favoured some form of sovereignty (possibly within a confederal system), and Serbia's determination, led by Slobodan Milosevic's position (strengthened and supported by the European community and the United States) which strongly discouraged the breakup of

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Fetherstone, n. 3, p. 72.

⁸ <<http://www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/1945topresent/yugoslavia.html>>

Yugoslavia.⁹ The frail peace in the region was shattered at the end of June when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and the JNA sought to restore federal authority. While the Slovene declaration resolved itself relatively peacefully after an initial few weeks of fighting the JNA, Croatia was less fortunate. Not only did the JNA, directed from Belgrade, fight the declaration, but, in the absence of assurances that the minority Serb population would be allowed some degree of autonomy and ensured protection from discrimination within a Croatian state, inter-ethnic war became inevitable. The conflict in Croatia subsided in early 1992, after the acceptance of a ceasefire by both sides, and a UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) was installed there. However, there were fears about the possibility of war spreading throughout the whole republics and outward into the region.

Fears of a spreading civil war turned out to be well founded and although Bosnia did not succumb immediately, it began to slowly and stealthily escalate into violence. The temporary peace in Croatia was followed by the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Populated by about 49 per cent Muslims, 32 per cent Serbs, 17 per cent Croats (1981 census), Bosnians reflected the perceptions of inter-community threat.¹⁰ It became a victim of aggression by Serbian and Croatian militias who were bent on partitioning the country and was supported by neighbouring kindred states in this endeavour.¹¹

The onset of war was dramatically accelerated in early 1992 by the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the Bosnian referendum on independence. The Bosnian government held a referendum on independence at the end of February 1992, where 64 per cent of the Muslims and the Croats of Bosnia voted in favour of secession from Yugoslavia. The Serb communities boycotted the poll, proclaiming their own independence from Bosnia. This sparked off war throughout the region and immediately following the vote, some amount of violence got started by Serb militias. This initial violence marked the beginning of the end for any hopes of a peaceful solution to Bosnia's

⁹ Fetherstone, n. 3, p. 72.

¹⁰ Chenoy, n. 1, p. 89.

¹¹ Robert H. Jackson, "Armed Humanitarianism", *International Journal*, Vol. XVIII, Spring 1993, p. 600.

constitutional crisis.¹² By mid-march violence had broken out between Serb and Croat/Muslim militias, particularly in northern Bosnia and Sarajevo such that a series of European community-sponsored ceasefires had practically no effect. Between March and July, the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia had worsened considerably. Reports of atrocities in prison camps and widespread ethnic cleansing caused an even greater stream of refugees seeking to escape the war. Meantime, The European Community (EC) and the United States recognised Bosnia as an independent state on 7 April 1992 and on 22 May Bosnia became a member of the United Nations.

Given the multi-cultural nature of its settlement, the conflict in Bosnia was intense and unlimited. The bombing of the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo and other cities, ethnic cleansing and untold atrocities on the civilian population was just one feature of this war.¹³ Thousands of people were killed or wounded and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes and turned into refugees through the practice of ethnic cleansing.

While the American promoted Dayton accord of November 1995 stabilised the situation in Bosnia and ended the civil war there, the Kosovo problem crept up. Kosovo is a province of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia. It is a region where 90 per cent of the population were ethnic Albanian while the rest were Serb. In historical terms, this represented a shift from the 50-50 ethnic balance which prevailed in the province at the end of the Second World War. Apart from the normal demographic and migratory factors, the Serbs alleged that they were the victims of a silent campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' in which Albanian officials in Kosovo gradually made it more and more difficult for Serbs to live in the province.¹⁴ Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions were the foundations for the conflict, as was the unresolved political dispute over political control over Kosovo.¹⁵ Ever since Milosevic withdrew the autonomy of this province in the late 1990s, the potential for unrest among its Albanian majority began to grow, with the predictable result of strengthening those who advocated violence to achieve

¹² Fetherstone, n. 3, p. 73.

¹³ Chenoy, n. 1, p. 89.

¹⁴ Siddhart Varadarajan, "The Politics of Military Intervention: NATO's Operations in Yugoslavia", *India International Centre Quarterly*, Vol. 26(2), Summer 1994, p. 103.

¹⁵ Wayne Nelles, "Canada's Human Security Agenda in Kosovo and Beyond: Military Intervention Versus Conflict Prevention", *International Journal*, Summer 2002, p. 464.

independence. Over the course of 1998, fighting between the Kosovar Albanian and the Serb forces grew, with the latter adopting a strategy that increasingly resembled the kind of ethnic cleansing seen before in Bosnia.¹⁶

3.2 The Response of the International Community to the Conflict

In response to the disintegrating situation in Yugoslavia, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in early 1992 as an interim measure to create the conditions of peace and security required for the EC-initiated negotiation of an overall settlement to the Croatian crisis. It was established for an initial one-year period and was headquartered in Sarajevo, the Capital of neighboring Bosnia. The force was authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 743 on 21 February 1992. The plan called for the deployment of just over 13,000 troops (twelve battalions), civilian personnel and civilian police. The main purposes of the UNPROFOR were to alleviate the consequences of war through the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to promote prospects for peace by negotiating local cease-fires and other arrangements. It was deployed to stabilise the situation, creating conditions of peace and security within which negotiations for an overall solution could take place.

Although the force was conceived as a classical peacekeeping mission, operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and ‘with the full compliance of all parties’, that mandate was subjected to repeated changes over the next three years. Eventually, the operation evolved into three distinct but closely interlinked missions: traditional disengagement mission in Croatia – the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), a humanitarian support mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), and a small preventive deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP).¹⁷ The operation was expanded into Bosnia Herzegovina with the assumption by the UN of responsibility for the operation of the Sarajevo airport. That role was further expanded and formalised as a humanitarian relief operation and simultaneously transformed into an enforcement operation by UNSCR 770 of 13 August 1992.

¹⁶ Javier Solana, “NATO’s Success in Kosovo”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78 (46), 1999, p. 51.

¹⁷ David B. Carment, “Rethinking Peacekeeping: the Bosnian and Somalia Experience”, in Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot eds., *Canada Among Nations 1996: Big Enough to be Heard* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996), p. 228.

The operations of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia did not begin as humanitarian operations. The original mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia was very similar to that of past peacekeeping operations. It was only with the decision to proceed with UNPROFOR II in Bosnia that humanitarian considerations came to the fore.¹⁸ Over the months following the deployment of peacekeepers in Croatia, the attention of the Security Council and the world shifted away from Croatia towards the troubles of Sarajevo and Bosnia. In response to international pressure and the obvious threat to regional peace and security posed by the conflict the Security Council progressively stretched UNPROFOR's mandate, which was originally confined to certain areas of Croatia, to include Sarajevo and eventually to include a large-scale humanitarian relief effort throughout Bosnia.

The UN came into Bosnia as peacekeepers through UNPROFOR. However, the nature of their role was dogged in controversies. In practice they were restricted to giving humanitarian relief. In many cases they were unable to stop atrocities, or stop the gross violation of agreements by the Serbs.¹⁹ There was passivity and complacency on the part of the UN in the face of Serb attacks. The Serb areas continued to be heavily armed and there were continued violations of ceasefire agreements by the Serbs. The stalemated peacemaking process served to fan the flames of increasingly adamant demands for enforcement action.²⁰

The weakened UN mission, its weak mandate, the non consensus among its members and given the strangulation of the powers of the UN mission in Bosnia, it was not surprising when NATO stepped in. The immediate provocation for NATO intervention was a bomb attack in a Sarajevo market by the Serbs, killing dozens of civilians. With this the UN ceded key powers to NATO. It was evident that the weakening of UN authority was linked to NATO intervention. NATO command being unified, necessitated much less democratic or transparent decision-making than that of

¹⁸ Tom Keating and Nicholas Gammer, "The 'new look' in Canada's Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, Vol. XLVIII, Autumn 1993, p. 733.

¹⁹ Chenoy, n. 1, p. 90

²⁰ Fetherstone, n. 3, p. 181.

the UN. This made it a preferable form of intervention for the US and the west.²¹ Consequently, a confidential NATO-UN “MOU” came about, which gave NATO the authority for air strikes in Bosnia. Thus there was a shift of responsibility from the UN to the NATO and the UN troops came to be replaced with NATO combat troops. The UN also ultimately joined, however uneasily, the NATO in an air campaign in Bosnia.²²

Later, the 1995 Dayton accord was signed, wherein Bosnia-Herzegovina was turned into a virtual protectorate of NATO along with the European Union and international financial institutions like the IMF.²³ The Bosnian Serbs were granted a degree of autonomy for their ‘Republic Srpska’ but not allowed to secede. A heavily armed NATO-led force (known as Stabilization Force or SFOR) came to be stationed in the country with wide ranging powers.

As for the conflict in Kosovo, when the issue resurfaced on the international agenda in early 1998, efforts by the UN and the OSCE to promote a political solution to the conflict failed. The experience at Bosnia had demonstrated that peacekeeping missions under UN auspices, if not backed up by sufficient force, can fail, and even be counterproductive to resolving conflict.²⁴ As the efforts of the UN and the OSCE did not yield fruitful results, NATO came in to play the primary role in the conflict. Thereafter the NATO-led military intervention in Kosovo came about.

The UN peacekeeping operation in the Former Yugoslavia and particularly UNPROFOR faced a unique set of circumstances vis-à-vis NATO’s. NATO, as an alliance with its own consultative and decision-making system and a particular interest in European affairs, was able to closely monitor events in the Former Yugoslavia from the onset of the conflict. Its direct involvement in the conflict at the request of the Security Council began, because resolutions to enforce the arms embargo and the no-fly zone

²¹ Chenoy, n. 1, p. 92.

²² Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 131-132.

²³ Varadarajan, n. 14, p. 102.

²⁴ Hevina S. Dashwood, “Canada’s Participation in the NATO-led Intervention in Kosovo”, in Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot eds., *Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 283.

required sophisticated naval and air forces of a sort that could not be provided or operated by the United Nations.²⁵

However, the UN mission was able to make some positive contributions in the Former Yugoslavia. The United Nations, together with the European Union, created the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), an organisation intimately involved in broader peace negotiations since the beginning of the conflict. In the post-conflict period, while the UNHCR acts as the lead agency for humanitarian assistance in Former Yugoslavia, other UN agencies and international and non-governmental organisations make substantial contributions in this field. The UN also works closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Former Yugoslavia; the latter's work with prisoners of war is often inextricably linked to the UN's effort in the same field, rendering diplomatic and field co-operation between the two organisations absolutely essential. Further, a special International Tribunal was established by the Security Council's Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 in order to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991.²⁶

3.3 Canada's Response to the Conflict

While the Yugoslavia federation started to disintegrate and consequently as the violence escalated, the European community (EC) and the CSCE (with Canadian participation) made attempts to arrange a series of ceasefires and to bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution. These attempts met with no success, and by October, Canada and a group of other middle powers were pressing to have the issue placed before the Security Council and were urging the establishment of a United Nations force for the region.

The Canadian government was the first state to request action by the United Nations and to indicate its willingness to send a battalion to support this peacekeeping effort.²⁷ The commitment came at the same time that Canada recognised Croatia and

²⁵ Yasushi Akashi, "The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation", *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, p. 95.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁷ Keating and Gammer, n. 18, p. 730.

Slovenia on 15 January 1992. The government in Belgrade denounced the decision to recognise the breakaway republics, but Mulroney took the view that “the Yugoslav federation as we have known it no longer exists and cannot be reconstituted by force.”²⁸ The government waved aside suggestions that there was a contradiction between recognition and participation in a peacekeeping operation which in principle is supposed to be neutral. It also appeared undaunted by the potentially perilous situation into which the peacekeepers might be plunged and the possibility that the operation could drag on indefinitely.²⁹ Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall took the view that Western inaction and non-involvement could no longer be justified and that there was now a strong commitment on the part of the warring parties to a ceasefire, a view that appeared to minimise the difficulty in actually reaching a ceasefire and the numerous failed efforts of the past.³⁰

The Security Council finally gave its approval for a UN peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) on 21 February 1992. The initial contingent of 13,000 troops included nearly 1,300 Canadians who were deployed in Krajina, one of the more strongly contested areas between Serbs and Croats. As the conflict got underway, over 3,600 Canadian troops served in the two United Nations Missions in Krajina and Bosnia. About 900 patrolled the demilitarized zone in Croatia another 1,300 escorted humanitarian envoys in Bosnia. Canadian troops also participated in a United Nations-sponsored effort in the border regions of Macedonia to prevent the spread of conflict. The hesitation on the part of the United Nations in sending a peacekeeping force into Yugoslavia was premised on the belief that doing so would be taken as intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. From the UN’s point of view the conflict in Yugoslavia was an internal affair and therefore did not fall within its remit. On the part of Canada, the fact that it had supported United Nations intervention as early as October 1991 clearly reflected a tendency to place less emphasis on sovereignty and more on humanitarian considerations.³¹

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ *ibid.*

The policy rationale for Canada's participation in the UN operations in the Former Yugoslavia was somewhat different from the UN's, but was substantive. The Canadian government saw in the civil wars in Yugoslavia not only a series of humanitarian issues, but also a threat to the security and stability of Europe, which successive Canadian governments had identified as being in the Canadian national interest. And in this broader security context, the Canadian government regarded its continued involvement in Yugoslavia as part of its commitment to NATO and its NATO allies. The actual implementation of the mission, however, represented a singular departure from traditional Canadian policy and criteria.³² There was a dilution in applying traditional Canadian peacekeeping policy and practice.

The original UNPROFOR mandate was to deploy along the Serb/Croat ceasefire line, and the Canadians, who were one of the first contingents on the ground, slowly familiarised themselves with their new mission in May and June 1992, while a full-scale civil war was raging in Bosnia. UNPROFOR was instructed to open a way for convoys of food and medical supplies. Owing to the Canadian forces robust and sophisticated equipment, the UN was able to accomplish this task. The primary aim of the Canadian contingent's participation in UNPROFOR II, the UN force in Bosnia, was to escort humanitarian relief convoys, but it quickly became involved in trying to mitigate the impact of the civil war.

However, as the civil war spread, accompanied by ever greater violence and inhumanity, into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the inadequacy of the UN in dealing with the conflict came to the front. Although the UN had provided some measure of relief to the beleaguered civilians, United Nations peacekeeping operations in Croatia and Bosnia had a limited success in containing conflict. By May of 1992 the Prime Minister Mulroney – frustrated by the lack of progress in the peace process in Yugoslavia, the intolerable levels of violence, and evidence of ethnic cleansing – lamented that it was ‘painfully obvious ... that the United Nations capability to intervene effectively on behalf of the innocents is inadequate’ and suggested that the organisation would have to consider

³² Louis A. Delvoie, “Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales”, in Michael J. Tucker, Raymond Blake, and P. E. Bryden eds., *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium* (Ontario, Canada: Irwin Publishing Ltd, 2000), p. 23.

alternatives.³³ He also expressed regret that the United Nations had failed to act sooner and argued for a more coercive operation by the organisation. Similar views were expressed at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) where Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall lamented the lack of action by that organisation and argued that the CSCE ... 'has to be able to act – to intervene.'³⁴ She also put forward the view that it was necessary to have the means to deploy 'interposition forces, before or during a conflict' and that for this reason there should be closer collaboration between the CSCE and NATO.³⁵

From this, it became clear that Canada in the face of the humanitarian catastrophes in the Former Yugoslavia could not bear to be a bystander only while gross violations of human rights and inhuman practices were going on. Canada wanted to take a proactive role in bringing about peace and respite to the region at whatever cost or practice. Thus, the most intense period of peacekeeping for Canada came about in the 1990s when it became involved in the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. In Bosnia, it initially committed a battalion-size battle group for duties in Croatia, but within a few months, Canada deployed a second one to Bosnia. Subsequently, its role and contribution expanded. When the UN mission gave way to a NATO enforcement mission, Canada also participated. Canada was initially opposed to a NATO role in Bosnia, preferring to provide humanitarian assistance under the UN. Canada, nevertheless, "constantly upheld the idea of NATO participation in a comprehensive peace plan under the auspices of the UN."³⁶ At the NATO summit in January 1994, Canada (along with Greece) opposed NATO-led air strikes to protect UNPROFOR. But when NATO decided to go ahead with the air strikes in the event of the tragic failure of the UNPROFOR, Canada under the Chrétien government, in April 1994, reluctantly came to support the NATO-led air strikes in Bosnia.³⁷

As the UNPROFOR transferred authority to NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, Canada on 6 December 1995, announced that it was

³³ Quoted in Keating and Gammer, n. 18, pp. 731-32.

³⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ Quoted in Dashwood, n. 24, p. 281.

³⁷ *ibid.*

committing 1,000 logistical and combat forces to Bosnia to participate in the IFOR. A year later, on December 4 1996, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy announced that Canada would contribute 1,200 troops to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) follow-on force. Thereafter, Canada went on to assume more front-line responsibilities and a larger area of operations and also began to stress on the need for peacebuilding activities.³⁸

Along with the mission in Bosnia, Canada kept peace in Kosovo when it attempted to break away from Yugoslavia and endured the wrath of the Serbian military and the ethnic cleansing campaigns of Serbian politicians. When NATO carried out the international military intervention in Kosovo, Canada also joined in the efforts. Canada fully committed itself to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and provided the forces necessary to help create a self-sustaining peace there. In Kosovo, Canada strongly supported the Alliance's efforts and working closely with it helped to end the cycle of violence and to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. It also demonstrated how humanitarian concerns began providing the impetus for Canada to intervene in outside societies without explicit UN sanction. The decision to intervene in Kosovo represented a coming together of Canada's policy priorities in promoting humanitarian values. This came through with the gradual acceptance of the need for a more robust military role with an explicit role for NATO which could not be provided through traditional UN peacekeeping.³⁹ In the conflict in Kosovo, the Canadian government clearly determined that it was appropriate for NATO to play the robust role it did and for Canada to be an active participant.⁴⁰

3.4 Peacebuilding Initiatives of the International Community in the Former Yugoslavia

The Former Yugoslavia received much attention from the international community through the Post-Cold War period, with the region being wrecked by series of wars, ethnic cleansing and forced population movements. The violent conflicts related to the breakup of Yugoslavia represented the first outbreak of war in Europe since the end

³⁸ *ibid*, p. 282.

³⁹ *ibid*, p. 276.

⁴⁰ *ibid*, p. 288.

of World War II and erased the widespread assumption in the early 1990's that war on the continent was unthinkable. Moreover, the conflicts signaled that the form of war in Europe had shifted from interstate war to intrastate war.⁴¹

The region has an importance that goes well beyond the region itself. Events there have an impact on relations between the West and Russia, and with the Islamic world, and for multilateral organisations important to Canada, including NATO, the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the G8, which have invested heavily in restoring the region's peace and prosperity.⁴² In light of the region's significance, the international community has made a major investment in the region's stability and prosperity which includes initiatives such as -⁴³the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993; the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999; the Office of the High Representative (OHR), mandated to oversee implementation of the 1995 Dayton Accords in Bosnia- Herzegovina; NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Stabilization Force: SFOR) in Kosovo, and in FYROM (task Force Allied Harmony); (Kosovo Force: KFOR); the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, launched in mid-1999, which brings donors and Balkan countries together to secure long term peace and prosperity; donor conferences, including one in March 2000 at which 9.08 billion dollars were pledged for reconstruction and peacebuilding in the region. Currently, over 5 billion dollars in assistance is provided annually to the region.⁴⁴

Of all the states of the Former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered the most in the post-Cold War period. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fought from 1992 to 1995, resulted in the death of over 200,000 people; half the population fled or got expelled from their homes; the economy collapsed, leading to the empowerment of those extremist forces who launched the violence. Because of the wartime destruction, it has

⁴¹ Peter Andreas, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004, p. 30.

⁴² DFAIT, "Canada and Southeastern Europe (the Balkans)", Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/canada-balkans-en.asp>

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

got the maximum attention from the international community who are focused on building peace and promoting reconstruction and reconciliation in the region. Bosnia represents the single largest post-Cold War international effort to confront and contain intrastate conflict and promote reconstruction.⁴⁵

Bosnia-Herzegovina has the largest number of international NGOs (INGOs) operating there. In addition to INGOs, it is also host to numerous international organisations and to over 20,000 NATO and other troops, and is the focus of attention of the United States and the major European powers. Bosnia-Herzegovina is in many ways under a kind of protectorate, with international actors making crucial decisions, setting electoral laws, running the central bank, sitting on the constitutional court, deciding where the inflow of money should go.⁴⁶ The international community has a strong stake in rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic, democratic country and preventing the outbreak of conflict, goals shared by the vast majority of Bosnians. It has the aim of rebuilding civil society and community as the framework for a stable future.

The Dayton Accord brokered by the international community which brought the conflict in Bosnia to an end, called for free and fair elections, and gave refugees the right to return to their prewar homes. Under the Dayton Accord, the international community has achieved some success in peacebuilding in areas of military aspects – opposing forces have been separated, troops returned to barracks, heavy weapons have been stored and supervised – all within the time limits specified under Dayton.⁴⁷

NATO and other troops, under the name SFOR (Stabilization Forces) have been present in Bosnia since January 1996: 60,000 troops in the first year, now down to about 20,000. The civilian side of implementation is under the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which has the authority to impose decisions on the country if the country's institutions are unable to come to agreement, and to remove local officials who

⁴⁵ Andreas, n. 41, p. 30.

⁴⁶ Chip Gagnon. "INGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina", Draft Report for the Carnegie Project on "Evaluating NGO Strategies for Democratisation and Conflict and Conflict in the Formerly Communist States", Available at <<http://www.ithaca.edu/politics/Gagnon/articles/Carnegie/bhreport.htm>>

⁴⁷ Pauline Neville-Jones, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia", *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996-97, p. 53.

block the implementation of Dayton. The OSCE is responsible for running elections, and the UN runs a civilian police force – the International Police Task Force (IPTF) made up of officers from around the world who work unarmed as advisors to Bosnian police. Under the IPTF the Bosnian police forces operate in accordance with internationally recognised legal and human rights standards. Through the IPTF Canada has also focused on helping Bosnian police forces assume greater control over domestic security.

Since Dayton, the challenge for the international community has been how to implement the agreement given the fact that those political forces responsible for the war and for the atrocities are still dominant in parts of the Serb and Croat held areas, and that the political institutions and electoral rules in Dayton tend to favor those same forces. Although elections have been held (in 1996 and in September 1998), they were far from free or fair, and took place in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation that led to the victory of the nationalist parties.

On the part of Canada, since the beginning of conflicts in the early 1990s, the Canadian public has consistently supported efforts to restore peace in the region. The Former Yugoslavia engage many Canadian foreign policy interests, including the need to: maintain security and stability in Europe; reinforce strong trans-Atlantic relations; support multilateral institutions (e.g., UN, NATO, OSCE and G8), which are deeply involved in the region's issues; advance human security and democratisation; strengthen the international counter-terrorism coalition; address transnational issues, such as organised crime; promote economic prosperity; and develop mutually beneficial bilateral ties with the region etc.⁴⁸

As for Canada's role in the region, the region has witnessed one of Canada's largest peacekeeping operations. Canada has deployed to the region an average of 1500-2000 peacekeepers at any given time since the early 1990s. In 2003, approximately 1200 Canadian forces personnel were concentrated in the northwestern sector of Bosnia. The NATO campaign to protect Kosovars in 1999 was the largest Canadian involvement in a

⁴⁸ DFAIT, Canada and Southeastern Europe (the Balkans)", Available at <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/canada-balkans-en.asp>>

military campaign since the Korean War in the early 1950's.⁴⁹ Canada is also active in a range of diplomatic activities aimed at restoring the region's stability (e.g., NATO, Stability Pact, Bosnia's Peace Implementation Council, OSCE, G8). Canada has also involved itself in one of the largest refugee programs in the region: over 30,000 refugees have come to Canada from there since 1996. Canadian non-governmental organisations and individuals outside government have played significant roles in reconstructing the region.

Since 1999, Canada has provided over 200 million dollars for peacebuilding, which includes:⁵⁰ humanitarian aid; helping re-establish security and rule of law, through civilian policing, mine action, support to forensic specialists gathering evidence for ICTY, support to human rights and free media projects; economic co-operation, including regional energy co-operation, support to the Kosovo budget, and to small and medium enterprise development; social development projects in health care and education; deployment of civilian experts; an increased presence in the region with the temporary establishment of small offices in Skopje⁵¹ (Macedonia) and Pristina (Kosovo), in addition to embassies in Sarajevo (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Zagreb (Croatia), and Belgrade (Serbia & Montenegro). Working with the people of the region, Canada's efforts are making a positive impact. All countries of the region have had democratic elections and peaceful transition of powers; the region is committed to greater integration with the international community and co-operation among countries there is underway; better security and rule of law is being established, reflected in the increase in the numbers of refugees returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

3.5 Canada's Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Former Yugoslavia

3.5.1 Peacebuilding Initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Canada as part of the international community has, since the beginning of the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, contributed significantly to the efforts for a

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ *ibid.*

⁵¹ The temporary office in Skopje closed in February 2004.

sustainable peace by encouraging reconciliation, promoting democracy, and supporting efforts to build multi-ethnic societies in the region.⁵² Canada has consistently demonstrated its support for the people of the region as it works to create a sustainable peace throughout the region. As Lloyd Axworthy stated at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1998, Canada's priority is "to ensure that Bosnians play their own central role in rebuilding their country, and that a culture of dependency does not take root" and also that Canada will not simply be "monitoring a stagnant process but facilitating durable political solutions."⁵³ Canada's assistance program for reconstruction in the Former Yugoslavia focuses on democratic development – institution building – elections, media, human rights, arms control – as called for by the Peace Agreement. Thus, Canada is actively involved in building peace through these activities.

Some of the initiatives undertaken by Canada, which help in building a sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are discussed as follows:

a. Legal and Constitutional Assistance: Canada continues to play an active role in Bosnia concerning legal and constitutional assistance. Canadian involvement is evident in a number of fora. Canada has assisted in the development and the implementation of the Guiding Principles of the Civilian Consolidation Plan 1997-1998 – considered to be the first step towards a sound legal and constitutional foundation for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Accordingly, Canada provides assistance primarily through multilateral efforts and continues to emphasise a focus on peacebuilding, capacity building, and work towards stronger democratic institutions (reconstruction). It plays a role, both direct and indirect, in all the international organisations and international financial institutions that work with the joint presidency in order to successfully implement the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

b. Economic Reconstruction: After a slow start, economic reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina has gathered pace. The road to economic recovery and reconstruction has become wider and life has returned to normal. There has been a good

⁵² CIDA, "Canada Announces \$100 Million in New Initiatives for Kosovo and the Balkans",

⁵¹ News Release, November 1 1999, Available at <<http://www.acdi-cida.gac.ca/cida-ind.nsf>>

⁵³ NATO, Address by Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the North Atlantic Council Meeting, 8 December 1998, Available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981208i.htm>>

deal of infrastructure rehabilitation, in which IFOR has played an important start-up role, and Bosnia is once again slowly being connected to the outside world. The agricultural cycle and local commerce have started resuming on a greater scale.⁵⁴

c. The Elections: Despite the shortcomings of the electoral process – packed voting, exploitation of the rules and outright cheating, the nationalistic tone of the election campaign, harassment, restricted access to the media for opposition candidates and lack of genuinely free movement and speech, the first ever elections in Bosnia took place on genuinely democratic lines accompanied by a relatively low level of violence.⁵⁵ Under multilateral frameworks such as OCSE, Canada has played a leading role in election planning and observation in the region. The initiatives undertaken by Canada through the OSCE are wide in number. Canada has provided 30 experts to the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) for the September 14, 1996 elections. Besides it also committed itself to continue with an active role in 1997 municipal elections planning and observation.

d. Creating New Government Structures: Canada also opened the Office of the High Representative (OHR) headed by Carl Bildt and fully extended its support to the actions of the High Representative and has provided technical and legal experts to assist the OHR – effectively assisted by the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC). As Lloyd Axworthy stated, Canada supported “the High Representative in his work of preparation with the Parties of the establishment of new institutions: the Collective Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank. We shall provide the future authorities with the necessary constitutional and legal assistance.”⁵⁶

Under the PIC, Canada and all other PIC members continued to meet regularly to assist Bosnia’s joint presidency in implementing its new institutions – in monitoring, coordinating and facilitating the implementation of all civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. Lloyd Axworthy in a speech in the Peace Implementation Council on

⁵⁴ Neville-Jones, n. 46, p. 55.

⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 56.

⁵⁶ <<http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/1997denver/compliance/canada/caneur.htm#compliance/canada/caneur.htm>>

December 4, 1996 laid down that “by the end of 1997, national and entity governments in Bosnia should be functioning and assuming more responsibility; municipal elections should be completed; economic recovery should be taking hold... both towns and countryside should be safer because land mines are being cleared; because the International Task Police Force (ITPF) and the local police forces are cooperating; because war criminals are being brought to justice; and because gradually, refugees and the displaced are returning home.”⁵⁷

Under the impetus of the High Representative, civilian implementation of all the tasks deriving from the peace agreement have been carried forward by the relevant international agencies. The many bodies called for under the agreement – covering a wide range of activities – have been set up, on time and are functioning. In – sometimes reluctant – compliance with their commitments, the parties were brought to attend the Joint Civilian Commissions and the Joint Interim Commission, a key body which, before the elections, brought together the entity leaderships under the chairmanship of the High Representative to prepare the common policies and new structures of the country.⁵⁸

e. De-Mining Efforts: Canada has made significant progress to mitigate the devastating effect of landmines in the region, especially through new partnerships with other countries. Through a joint initiative providing insurance to de-miners, Canada along with Norway has been able to nearly double the number of de-miners working in Bosnia. In addition, it is also a part of the Slovenia Trust Fund, an innovative mechanism established by the United States, working towards Bosnian de-mining efforts.⁵⁹

In addition, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Nova Scotia offers training for a “Neighbourhood Facilitators Project” in Bosnia. The government has also put together CANADEM, a roster of Canadian experts on human rights and democracy, and it also expressed its willingness to give 500,000 dollars to establish a non-governmental

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Neville-Jones, n. 46, p. 55.

⁵⁹ NATO, Address by Lloyd Axworthy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the North Atlantic Council Meeting, 8 December 1998, Available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981208i.htm>

organisation (NGO) foundation in Bosnia to develop civil society on the basis of multi-ethnic co-operation.⁶⁰

3.5.2 Peacebuilding Initiatives in Kosovo:

Canada, through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has played an important role in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Kosovo. Canadian aid initiatives have had a positive impact on the hundreds of thousands of displaced people affected by the humanitarian crisis.

One such Canadian initiative teamed up CIDA with the Canadian Forces (CF) based in Kosovo. The aim of this partnership was to initiate small-scale rehabilitation projects in the Canadian Area of Responsibility (AOR) in Kosovo. In addition, the Canadian Forces also cooperated with CIDA and humanitarian organisations to distribute relief supplies to people in need. Such projects constitute an important confidence-building measure within the area where the Canadian Forces are located.

Also, CIDA provided 750,000 dollars in funding to the cause of Kosovar civil society rehabilitation, to be managed by CF civil affairs liaison officers in Kosovo. Several projects were also developed in the Canadian AOR, with the immediate focus on school repair. These repairs, conducted by local workers and supervised by Canadian soldiers, were to go a long way toward improving the lives of many students. The use of local contractors was also to help in adding to economic revitalization in the affected areas. Besides these, Canada's Emergency Education Reconstruction Program – was also designed to build government implementation capacity at the Entity, Canton, and Municipal levels.

In an announcement on November 1999, CIDA announced a package for Kosovo in the following areas:⁶¹

⁶⁰ J. L. Granatstein, "What's Wrong With Peacekeeping?", in Michael J. Tucker, Raymond Blake and P. E. Bryden, eds., *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium* (Ontario, Canada: Irwin Publishing Ltd., 2000), p. 46.

⁶¹ CIDA, "Canada Announces \$100 Million in New Initiatives for Kosovo and the Balkans", News Release, November 1 1999, Available at <<http://www.acdi-cida.gac.ca/cida-ind.nsf>>

Health, Education and Shelter in Kosovo:

Throughout the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, CIDA played an active role in attending quickly to basic human needs such as food, clean water and shelter. In the post-conflict situation, there are many challenges in these areas and some of these extend beyond humanitarian assistance. While CIDA continues to provide this assistance in these areas, it has increasingly turned its attention to peacebuilding and reconstruction. To help the people of Kosovo return to a normal life, CIDA has worked to rebuild physical infrastructure and ensure peace and human security through education and health care.

a. Health and Education: Almost half of the schools and many of the hospitals and clinics in Kosovo were in dire need of repair. Many suffered damage as a result of the conflict, but others needed major improvements following decades of neglect. As per the initiative announced, beginning from November 1999, CIDA was to contribute up to 5 million dollars over the next 18 months for health and education. The focus was to be on activities that support primary health care and provide help to those who were physically injured or emotionally affected as a result of the conflict. This was to include working with traumatised children. In addition, the assistance announced, was also to be used to provide training in family medicine and nursing. Rebuilding the social infrastructure was also identified as an area of key importance for the establishment of peace and stability in the region.

b. Winter Shelter and De-mining: One of the most pressing humanitarian needs in Kosovo was the need for warm and safe shelter with the onset of winter. With a 6.2 million dollars contribution from CIDA, CARE Canada, the Centre canadien d'étude et de coopération internationale (CECI) and World Vision Canada were to help in providing shelter for the winter to an estimated 5000 families. These three organisations were to supply emergency shelter packages containing tools and building supplies, such as wood and plastic, as well as winterisation materials consisting of stoves for cooking and heating, windows, doors and insulation. In addition, CARE Canada, CECI, and World Vision were to assist in minimising the threat of landmines, by training mine action teams

who would be responsible for de-mining in the area where the shelter work was to occur. During the conflict, landmines were planted in houses, gardens, wells and farmlands and on roads, making it dangerous for many Kosovars to return to their homes.

c. Mine Action: On December 3 1999, Canada announced 3.4 million dollars worth of initiatives to help reduce the threat of landmines in Kosovo, Cambodia, and Africa.⁶² The initiative announced by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and Canada's International Co-operation Minister, Maria Minna, brought CIDA's total commitment on mine action initiatives to 15 million dollars that year, up from 9 million dollars the previous year.

While announcing the initiative, Maria Minna said that "the presence of mines, and especially the threat posed by unidentified mine fields is an enormous obstacle to development," and that "It's the children and women who suffer the most from these deadly and indiscriminate tools of war."⁶³ Axworthy also said that "Canada's efforts, less than a year after the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention's entry into force, have led to the adoption of a new global norm with respect to these weapons" and also added that Canada "will continue to make a difference in the lives of people in mine-infested regions so that they too can have a chance to live with hope and without fear."⁶⁴

Under the initiative announced, CIDA was to provide 2 million dollars to a Canadian organisation, 400,000 million dollars to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 500,000 million dollars to the World Health Organisation (WHO), and another 500,000 dollars to the UN Mine Action Service. These agencies were to undertake surveys of mine-affected areas and target the most affected areas in order to reduce mine accidents; enable essential de-mining operations in identified mine-affected communities; enable the three identified countries to develop better documentation of fatal and non-fatal landmine-related injuries as well as the circumstances in which these injuries occur so as to improve assistance to landmine victims; also work with the

⁶² CIDA, "Canada Announces \$3.4 Million to Help Reduce the Threat of Landmines in Kosovo, Cambodia, and Africa" News Release, December 3 1999, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vlookupNewsEn>

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

Ministries of Health in these countries to improve the emergency and post-emergency management of mine injuries, as well as the rehabilitation services available for landmine victims.⁶⁵

In Kosovo, the UN Mine Action Service was to assist the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UN MACC) and to provide support to the centre's landmines database and minefield mapping facility, quality assurance and operations departments.

3.5.3 Peacebuilding Initiatives in the Former Yugoslavia in General:

In the republics of the Former Yugoslavia in general, Canada has also undertaken a number of initiatives which would contribute to building peace and stability in the region. An initiative announced by the government of Canada in November 1999 gave a package of initiatives worth up to 100 million dollars in support of the rehabilitation of Kosovo and the Balkans in 1999 and 2000. The new programs announced was to focus on internationally recognised areas of Canadian expertise such as community-based assistance, humanitarian aid, good governance, democratisation, human rights, mine action, peacekeeping training, support for war crimes investigations, police peace support and police training to fight organised crime.⁶⁶

This initiative which was announced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of National Defence and the Solicitor General of Canada was to assist the peace process in the region through the provision of human and financial resources. A significant portion of the package was to be devoted to supporting the efforts of Canadian and international organisations involved in the peace process and in the delivery of assistance. These organisations include the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁶⁶ CIDA, "Canada Announces \$100 Million in New Initiatives for Kosovo and the Balkans", News Release, November 1 1999, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gac.ca/cida-ind.nsf>

Under the initiative, the Canadian government also opened an office in Pristina (capital of Kosovo) to co-ordinate the implementation of the initiatives announced and to liaise with international organisations involved in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which established an international framework for peace efforts in Kosovo including UNMIK and KFOR.⁶⁷ The key functions of the office in Pristina was to supervise the disbursement, and ensure the effectiveness, of the 100 million dollars in funding of new initiatives in support of the rehabilitation of Kosovo and the Balkans, announced by the Government of Canada on November 1, 1999. After the inauguration of the Pristina office, Axworthy also met with senior officials of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) "to discuss progress made on issues such as the timing of elections, implementation of the winterization program, the interim civil administration, and the status of the UN Mission's deployment and operations."⁶⁸

Many of the new initiatives were in sync with the objectives of the South Eastern Europe Stability Pact, a process launched in July 1999 and designed to promote stability through regional economic development by integrating the Balkan region economically, socially and politically with the rest of Europe, as well as with Euro-Atlantic institutions. It brought under one roof the initiatives that were being undertaken to foster regional co-operation in the Balkans, thus promoting sustainable peace, prosperity and democratic governance.

The newly announced initiatives added to the commitments that were made to the region in the early part of 1999, which included Citizenship and Immigration Canada's refugee program which provided safe haven to over 7000 Kosovar refugees. The package added strength to Canada's ongoing technical assistance and training programs in the Balkans and demonstrated that Canada would continue to support the rehabilitation of Kosovo and peacebuilding in the region.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ DFAIT, "Axworthy to Visit Kosovo and Inaugurate Canadian Office in Pristina", News Release, November 16 1999, Available at
<http://www.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?publication_id>

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ *ibid.*

In the spirit of the Stability Pact, the Canadian government also approved new initiatives intended to contribute to security and development in the region. One such project was the establishment of the Canadian Regional Training and Support Project (CRTSP) which would provide language and peacekeeping training, as well as specialised police training.⁷⁰

The aim of the CRTSP was two-fold: to reinforce the capacity of national armed forces and police to carry out their legitimate functions, and to preserve the secure and democratic nature of the societies they represent. Romania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were to participate in this project. An overall budget of \$12 million over a five-year period was committed by the Canadian government for the project. The CRTSP consisted of two main elements: the military dimension and the police dimension.⁷¹

a. The Military Dimension: The bulk of the CRTSP budget, 11 million dollars over five years, was allocated to support the professional development of regional armed forces. The aim was to enhance the capacity of armed forces to carry out their legitimate defence responsibilities, in keeping with democratic norms and accountability.

The main components of the military dimension of the project were:

- English and French language training: Such training provided to the regional armed forces would assist partner countries in working closely with NATO and UN missions in the field, and facilitate future training that might be provided by other countries.
- Peacekeeping training: Military and civilian personnel were to be provided with professional training in peacekeeping-related disciplines such as refugee issues, human rights, international humanitarian law and civil-military co-operation.

⁷⁰ CIDA, "Canada Announces \$100 Million in New Initiatives for Kosovo and the Balkans", News Release, November 1 1999, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gac.ca/cida-ind.nsf>

⁷¹ *ibid.*

The professional training was to be undertaken through the Canadian Forces Training system and the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

b. The Police Dimension: Countries recovering from conflicts are subject to rapid organised crime infiltration because of the length it takes to establish or reform police services to meet international professional standards. The growth of organised crime in the Balkans would have serious repercussions globally, including for Canada. Thus the police dimension of the CRTSP was to focus on developing regional capacity to effectively and impartially counter organised crime activities in accordance with international human rights standards.

A regional training approach was to be developed for the six participating countries. Courses were to be given simultaneously to investigators from several of these countries. This approach would not only help in ensuring that students receive the same course content, but also help build cross-cultural police teamwork. All the courses were also to include a "train the trainers" element to ensure program sustainability. The police dimension of the CRTSP was to be implemented through the Solicitor General of Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), in co-operation with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

Thus the regions of the Former Yugoslavia have entered into a new phase in which prospects for consolidating peace with the assistance of the international community, including Canada, appear much better than before. However, although the situation in the region has stabilised, there remains complex political issues which has to be dealt with in a consistent manner over a long period of time. The region still continues to pose challenges to human and transnational security which include justice for crimes against humanity; resettlement refugees and internally displaced persons; organised crime such as trafficking of narcotics, human beings, small arms etc and, corruption; removal of land mines and destruction of small arms, light weapons and ammunition; respect for minority and individual human rights; low standard of living and very high

unemployment; public order in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo, where an international security presence is still necessary.⁷²

Canada has accepted that, for there to be overall success, the primary peace missions needed to be accompanied by accomplishing the agreed subordinate task: help in connection with civilian implementation including humanitarian work; return of refugees; freedom of movement; and conducting the elections etc. In other words, peacekeeping missions must be accompanied by peacebuilding efforts. Carrying out these tasks have not been easy on Canada and her resources, but her contribution to building lasting peace and stability in regions of the world embroiled or on the verge of embroiling in violent conflict has been immense. In the case of the Former Yugoslavia, Canada has undoubtedly built effective peace to a very large extent through its various initiatives.

In its involvement in the conflicts in the countries of the Former Yugoslavia, Canada like a true peacekeeping nation, responded positively, and made significant contribution of military, technical and logistical personnel. In addition to contributing troops for keeping peace in the region, Canada also embarked on the mission of peacebuilding in the region. Even in the post-conflict period, it continues to be involved in these countries, building peace and helping and aiding these countries in making the difficult and painful transition from war to peace. Canada's roles in Bosnia and the Kosovo crisis are evidence of its peacebuilding efforts. Canada began to encourage reconciliation and started socio-economic and political reconstruction of the countries through various government sponsored initiatives and through the activities of its various NGO's. Through its peacebuilding initiatives, Canada began empowering the countries of the region to build the local capacity at acquiring lasting and stable peace so that violent conflicts that were witnessed in the past, do not ensue again.

⁷² DFAIT, "Canada and Southeastern Europe (the Balkans)". Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/canada-balkans-en.asp>

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

As is apparent, peacekeeping in both its traditional sense of monitoring ceasefires, as well as, maintaining lines of disengagement, has come to be replaced by expanded and extensive missions of peacebuilding, peacemaking and peace enforcement in the post-Cold War period. Consequently, Canada's traditional role in peacekeeping has also witnessed an unprecedented level of change. It has come a long way from the times of the Suez crisis to crises in Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, former Yugoslavia etc, where the changed nature of violent conflicts necessitated peacekeeping operations to have fundamental peacebuilding components. Within the changed context, Canada has added new set of functions to its peacekeeping role such as building institutional capacity of states in conflict, promoting democracy, promoting stability, protecting civilians, promoting human rights, justice and development, election monitoring, police training etc. This clearly illustrates that Canada's traditional peacekeeping role has evolved in the Post-Cold War period and has come to acquire new and broader dimensions.

While peacekeeping per se has not been abandoned, and Canada continues to send troop deployments to parts of the world embroiled in conflict and turmoil, these are often "multilateral operations" consisting of civilian police and other experts with aims of not only keeping peace but to provide humanitarian relief, protect civilians, and help in long-term socioeconomic and political reconstruction. Presently, the Canadian military who are allocated for peacekeeping purposes now often find themselves functioning with military allies, civil authorities and non-governmental organisations to coordinate peace enforcement, humanitarian aid, and to secure the foundations needed to rebuild societies. With such responsibilities, it is obvious that Canada's peacekeeping operations no longer remain exclusively military-led. It has now come to involve a multiplicity of actors which include NGOs, humanitarian agencies, police, civilian administrators, legal, electoral and constitutional experts etc, and mandated to perform civilian duties such as electoral observation, police monitoring and training, and civilian administration. Thus the trend that has come about in the Post-Cold War period has been the emphasis on

peacebuilding. Canada on its part has also caught up with the trend and has promptly expanded its peacekeeping role to incorporate aspects of peacebuilding.

As discussed in the second and third chapters, Canada's initiatives in the Post-Cold War Period reveal a profound interest and commitment to peacebuilding. Many Canadian diplomatic and development assistance activities have taken on the challenge of peacebuilding. Some few examples being the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative Strategic Framework, the Canadian Peacebuilding Fund etc, coordinated by CIDA, DFAIT, and other government departments and agencies. Along with these, other initiatives like the Anti-Personnel Land Mines campaign and treaty, the creation of the International Criminal Court, efforts to prohibit the proliferation of small arms, efforts to prevent the participation of children in armed conflict and addressing the plight of war affected children etc also reveal Canada's interest in building stable peace. All these initiatives are ample proof that Canada has recognised that for there to be lasting peace, peacekeeping efforts must be accompanied by peacebuilding initiatives which helps in mitigating or preventing violent conflicts and nipping the sources of violent conflict in the bud. Thus Canada has rightly transformed and re-equipped its peacekeeping into peacebuilding exercises.

Many conflicts erupt as a result of long-standing social, economic, and political reasons which lie obscured over a long period of time. Canada, recognising the relation between socioeconomic and political setup and eruption of violent conflict, has begun to check the underlying causes of conflict by providing economic assistance, social and political reconstruction etc through its peacebuilding initiatives. For the purpose, Canada has greatly mobilised its financial and human resources so that its peacebuilding efforts are not undermined. Its aid programme has been reigned in to enhance the efficacy of the peacebuilding initiatives it undertakes.

Through peacebuilding Canada endeavours to strengthen the prospects for internal peace. It intends to achieve this by way of building the capacity of local governments to sustain peace without erupting into violence and also obtain greater input from them in diplomatic resolution of conflict. Its interest is also in encouraging and

building accountable and responsible local governments who will maintain and promote peace and not perpetrate or abet violence. This is done through cooperation with local communities, moderate leaderships, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), youth, and women in areas of Canada's peacebuilding focus. The Canadian government support for peacebuilding is also a reflection of its desire to do something in response to the violence and oppression that many civilians suffer when violent conflicts occur.

The emergence of the human security paradigm in Canadian diplomacy has further added strength to Canada's peacebuilding role. Canada has thus linked human security to its peacekeeping and peacebuilding role so that it would create a better impact and provide the desired results. Peacebuilding has been posited as a means to build human security in societies torn by conflict. Through peacebuilding Canada has aimed at building its greater goal of human security which concerns itself with issues of democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, environmental security etc – all of which have relation to violent conflict. Human security has indeed become a touchstone for effective peacebuilding.

Among the conflicts that erupted in the Post-Cold War period, the Former Yugoslavia was one place which acted as an eye-opener for Canada. The conflicts that erupted in places such as the Former Yugoslavia in the Post-Cold War period led Canada to the realisation that simple peacekeeping was insufficient and a different approach was needed in dealing with them. Thus the 1990s became the period for Canadian foreign policy reassessment in which peacebuilding emerged as one of Canada's main priorities and subsequently gained primacy in the government's policies. From then, Canada's foreign policy priorities came to include protection of civilians, war-affected children; promotion of democracy; humanitarian relief; establishment of market based-economies; rule of law; dealing with the threat posed by terrorism; drug trafficking; forced migration; de-mining and demobilization; repatriation and reintegration of refugees; police and justice training; support for an independent media; election and human rights monitoring; reconstruction of schools and health centres and so on.

Thus the analysis of Canada's involvement in the Former Yugoslavia suggests interest in peacebuilding. In the Former Yugoslavia, as the case study reveals, Canada is taking the lead in undertaking the massive task of peacebuilding in the region. Canada, as a leading member of the international community, has assumed a larger role in the international community's peacebuilding efforts in the region. In addition to contribution of troops to the UN and NATO operations, Canada has simultaneously involved itself in peacebuilding efforts there. Beginning from the onset of the conflict, Canada consistently supported efforts to restore peace in the region and began to place an increased emphasis on peacebuilding and has tried to focus on how to support post-conflict rebuilding with resources comparable to what it was spending on the peacekeeping and peacemaking actions. As is revealed in the case study, Canada has dedicated millions of dollars to peacebuilding activities in the region with special emphasis on education, health care, police services, extensive mine clearance, language and peacekeeping training refugee return etc.

Canada's assistance program for reconstruction in the Former Yugoslavia has also focused on democracy, institution building, elections, media, human rights, arms control, investigating mass graves and pursuing the investigation of war crimes and criminals, legal and constitutional assistance. All these initiatives undertaken by Canada point to the fact that Canada is substantiating its peacekeeping role with effective peacebuilding exercises. Aside from the government's initiatives, Canadian non-governmental organisations are also playing a significant role in building peace in the region. In its peacebuilding efforts, Canada has increasingly focused on civil society and non-governmental organisations as allies in the attempt to establish peace in the region.

Owing to its peacebuilding initiatives, Canada is genuinely bringing peace to countries in conflict including the Former Yugoslavia. There are many positive signs which show that peaceful transition to peace taking place in the Former Yugoslavia – elections have been held democratically, rule of law is being established, good governance has started, many displaced persons have returned to their homes etc. All these point to the fact that Canada is fully interested in working towards building peace and bringing stability to the region. Canada is well placed to undertake peacebuilding in

the region and is assisting divided communities to move past the recent horrors through conflict resolution techniques. Canada is encouraging the development of human security by supporting institutions which upholds and promotes the rule of law, such as indigenous human rights institutions. Canada is also working with local communities to build a stronger civil society which seeks cooperation, not division. It is also assisting academics, officials, and institutions of the Former Yugoslavia to build a better future through the reform of the primary health care system. Besides, Canada is also committed to the development of an integrated approach to mine clearance. Further, Canada is making efforts to develop the media to make it less likely that it could be used as a tool of the unscrupulous and ill-intentioned.

The countries of the Former Yugoslavia have begun to experience peace and stability owing to assistance from Canada and the international community. Scores of development agencies are now involved in the Former Yugoslavia, and an expensive long-term commitment from Canada and the international community is anticipated. But even though peacebuilding efforts are underway, the region still lacks a viable peacebuilding plan. Though stability to the region has returned to some extent, peace remains fragile. Therefore Canada should continue to make long-term investments in peacebuilding in the region so that the chances of violent conflict erupting again become minimal.

Undeniably, investing in peacebuilding activities have fallen heavy on Canada's resource reserves. It is not easy to reconstruct out of chaos, ethnic strife and enmity, and the breakdown of local capacity. However, Canada should see the peacebuilding task in the former Yugoslavia to its completion, and sustain it with material and human resources. Leaving before the job is done or failing to recognise the repercussions of actions undertaken can often become a source of future conflict rather than an appropriate and effective contribution to lasting peace.¹ To meet with success in its efforts, Canada should look beyond self-interested foreign policy rationale. This can be said so, because even though Canada's aid programme now includes several countries of the Former

¹ Francis Kofi Abiew and Tom Keating "Outside Agents and the Politics of Peacebuilding and Reconciliation," *International Journal*, Winter 1999-2000, p. 104.

Yugoslavia, self-interested national security rationale has been increasingly used as a basis for its development assistance.²

In addition, despite Canada's foreign policy reorientation from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and the latter's impressive record in building peace, things do not seem to be smooth sailing for Canada. As the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding took place, Canada began to face severe financial crunches and this has been a big impediment to Canada's peacebuilding role. Canada's resources have become scarce to the point of debilitation, particularly money, police, and other civilian expertise, while the military building blocks of any mission – logistical support, equipment, and communications – have become the object of constant pleading.³ While new aid pledges were promised to the Former Yugoslavia, Canada's aid budget came to be slashed every year since the mid-1990s. In 1993-4 official development assistance (ODA) spending was .44 per cent of GNP, by 2000 it had fallen to 0.25 per cent, a 30-year low.⁴ Precisely when peacebuilding and human security concerns have been most forcefully articulated... as key to advancing international peace and security, funding for development and for non-military approaches to human security has been in precipitous decline.⁵

Thus, as Canada prepared to take on the task of peacebuilding, it began to face the problem of heightened conflict abroad and tight fiscal restraint at home. Its need and desire to do more was thus severely constrained by depleting and shrinking resources. Even when Canada remains committed to peacebuilding, the Canadian government agencies responsible for allocating resources for peacebuilding – CIDA and DFAIT have faced severe budget restrictions. In the recent years, the persistent erosion of resources available to Canada has undermined its ability to practice what it preaches. The long succession of budgetary and personnel cuts, has dramatically reduced its ability to

² Wayne Nelles, "Canada's Human Security Agenda in Kosovo and Beyond: Military Intervention versus Conflict Prevention," *International Journal*, Vol.57 (3), Summer, 2002, p. 463.

³ Patricia Fortier, "The Evolution of Peacekeeping," in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal & Kingston: Queen's University Press, 2001), p. 45.

⁴ Nelles, n. 2, p. 472.

⁵ *ibid*, p. 463.

undertake new and more comprehensive peacebuilding activities. Thus, human security and peacebuilding remain marginalised and weak priorities with limited resources.

However, having committed itself to the peacebuilding agenda, Canada now has to demonstrate its seriousness. It should work out a grand strategy whereby Canada can undertake a number of meaningful initiatives. For that, Canada needs to strategise and reprioritise its resources. Before Canada embarks on large-scale peacebuilding, it must re-think its capabilities and criteria and know where and when to divert its limited resources. Peacebuilding efforts can produce effective results only when supported by adequate funding. Hence, Canada should increase its budget for peacebuilding purposes because any peacebuilding initiative must have a major economic component, with considerable resources devoted to it. Canada must settle the question of resource allocation effectively and should utilise its resources prudently and judiciously for sustainable peace and development.

In addition, it is imperative that Canada should also look into those other areas where Canada can improvise its peacebuilding strategy. Canada should ensure that there is closer collaboration and cooperation between the Department of National Defence (DND), DFAIT and, CIDA so that there is greater policy coherence between these departments responsible for Canada's peacebuilding activities. There must be more coordination and policy coherence in the Canadian foreign, defence, and development debate. Presently, peacebuilding initiatives seem to be still minor, piecemeal, and ad hoc responses. Thus, Canada still has to make a high-level commitment to a long-term interdepartmental strategy on human security and peacebuilding that emphasises non-military, development-led approaches to preventing war and deadly conflict.

Moreover, Canada should give more stress and importance to the role NGOs, especially development groups, who are well-suited to play the peacebuilding role. Canada should cooperate and coordinate with its NGOs in order to maximise the collective prospects for peacebuilding success. This is important because NGOs are not only familiar with the social, political and economic context within which peacebuilding must be undertaken, but they also possess a hands on local expertise in activities which

are crucial to the peacebuilding process, such as infrastructural development, education, and cooperative projects. For this, more funds should also be provided to the NGOs so as to maximise success. Of late, the Canadian government is increasingly turning its attention to the NGO sector, asking it to undertake tasks previously performed by governments, such as the delivery of significant portions of humanitarian and development assistance.

While it is understood that NGOs play an important and constructive role in bringing about the peace, it is also true that overemphasis on this sector may help weaken the capacity of government to fulfil its necessary functions, and may prevent the development of problem-solving and self-governance capabilities in communities. The challenge for Canada, therefore, is to develop a set of skills that will bring together government actors, NGO workers, and appropriate representational levels of the community. This will lead to negotiated objectives which have relevance for the community they affect and will increase the chances of building a sustainable peace.

Canada should also educate the Canadian public about the development, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping work being done by various government departments and NGOs, because such actions require political and public support for sustained involvement. Also, securing the cooperation of the local community in the place where peacebuilding is taking place is vital in the peacebuilding efforts. Of central significance to peacebuilding and reconciliation is local involvement because ‘resolution and reconciliation are ultimately processes that must be designed, implemented, and sustained by and through the local participants in conflicts.’⁶ Also Canada should have a better knowledge of the local situation before it undertakes peacebuilding. A clearer understanding of conflict at local and regional levels is required before international action takes place. There should be a continued involvement in the social dimension of peacebuilding with extensive knowledge about, and cultural sensitivity to, the indigenous context in which the peace process takes place. A greater appreciation of the locally driven, personal, social and psychological dimensions of peacebuilding is also required. Conflicts also emerge as a result of distrust in social relations. Therefore Canada should

⁶ Cited in Abiew and Keating, n. 1, p. 103.

seek to rebuild trust with activities directed at both the collective and the individual levels.

Canada must also emphasise on civil-military cooperation so that military and civil planning are effectively harmonised and military support to civilian implementation is ensured. Canada must pay special attention to the military's role in helping to promote civil law and order in a society where the local police are incapable or unwilling to do so. More thinking and resources need to be devoted to filling the conceptual and capabilities gap between military forces and civil police advisers in peace support operations. Otherwise, future peacebuilding efforts will falter in the absence of law and order, and military forces will, be required to remain in theatre well after their military tasks are complete. Effective peacebuilding can help reduce the need for long-term commitment of peacekeeping forces and can help ease the eventual departure of the international force.

Canada should also include successive generations and all levels of leadership in the peacebuilding strategy. Shaping the values and attitudes of the younger generation must be the goal because until attitudes have adjusted, it is unlikely that reintegration of communities could be successful. In this endeavour, Canada should enlist the cooperation of existing community leaders whenever possible. More importantly, reaching grass-roots leaders should be a priority. It should also attempt to integrate engagement of grass-roots community leaders, mid-level leadership, and high-level leaders. In addition, religious leaders of the different ethnic groups play an important role in forming political opinion. Therefore, Canada should also reach out to this section of leaders. Canada should also encourage cooperation and bridge-building across ethnic lines, not only in politics, but in other fields of endeavour. Besides, monitoring of the perceptions and actions of extremists on all sides is necessary to prevent the resumption of hostilities. Also, close monitoring of mass media and direct action to reduce the individious effects of nationalist propaganda campaigns are essential.

Canada should also see to it that the new governmental institutions it helps create are in a functioning state. Municipal elections must take place and their results should be implemented, the local police must be retrained and re-equipped, progress must be made

in returning refugees and displaced persons, rebuild vital infrastructure and establish effective, market-based economic policies and institutions. Arms reductions must be completed and most crucially, Canada should make certain that local governments assume their responsibilities and promote reconciliation between conflicting groups within the state.

Broadly, a sustained Canadian presence, massive economic aid and attitudinal change among the belligerents are all important to ensure success over the long run. Another task for Canada is to focus on establishing a stable and secure internal environment in order to create the conditions for a negotiated settlement and lasting peace. The CIDA, DFAIT and DND, as well as Canadian NGOs, have a significant role to play in this regard. Canada should ensure that peacekeeping is not used as the main instrument of conflict resolution, but as one of the instruments which will lead towards creating a stable environment whereby a long-term peace process can be nurtured. Here, peacebuilding can be made a logical extension of Canada's peacekeeping commitment, progressing toward an end to military commitment. Both military and development structures have a role to play in this regard because peacebuilding is a process which requires a holistic approach involving a full range of political, diplomatic and military instruments.

Thus, the Post-Cold War period represents a time of change in Canada's foreign policy related to peacekeeping which has come to imbibe aspects of peacebuilding. The examination of Canada's initiatives in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo is proof enough of the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, and from national security to human security. It has become evident that Canada is undoubtedly making meaningful contributions to political reconstruction and democratic development in war torn societies through peacebuilding.

As the study shows, Canada is a major booster of peacebuilding efforts in different parts of the world. Owing to this fact, it has become one of the forerunners of a concept that is quickly gaining popularity and coming to be a viable tool for conflict resolution and conflict prevention. Canada's leadership role in undertaking peacekeeping

in the past has again placed it in a very strong leadership position in popularising and taking the concept further. The UN has also come to recognise the importance of peacebuilding in maintaining and bringing peace. Thus, being a part of and working closely with multilateral institutions such as the UN and coupled with its vast experience in peacekeeping, Canada should again take the lead in promoting peacebuilding as an effective tool of conflict resolution and conflict prevention. While the end of the Cold War has not made peacekeeping irrelevant, it has meant that new issues of concern have emerged that necessitate the international community to find new and innovative way of dealing with these issues. In this case, Canada has rightfully done so and has found the right approach. Over the years there has been a maturing of peacekeeping and out of that maturity Canada has come to place an intense focus on peacebuilding and its role in alleviating and preventing conflicts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Primary Sources

- CIDA, "Canada Announces \$100 Million in New Initiatives for Kosovo and the Balkans", News Release, November 1, 1999, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida-ind.nsf>>
- CIDA, "Canada Announces \$3.4 Million to Help Reduce the Threat of Landmines in Kosovo, Cambodia, and Africa", News Release, December 3, 1999, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida-ind.nsf/vlookupNewsEn/>>
- CIDA, "Canadian Peacebuilding Experience", Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida-ind.nsf>>
- CIDA, "Canadian Peacemaking Experience", 6 November 1998, Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ind.nsf>>
- CIDA, "The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative – Strategic Framework", Available at <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida-ind.nsf>>
- Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations 1945-1975 (Department Of External Affairs, 1977)
- DFAIT, "Axworthy to Visit Kosovo and Inaugurate Canadian Office in Pristina", News Release, November 16, 1999, Available at http://www.international.gc.ca/minpub/publication.asp?publication_id>
- DFAIT, "Canada and Kosovo", Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.ca/foreignp/kosovo/text/back3-e.asp>>
- DFAIT, "Canada and Peace Support Operations", Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu.asp>>
- DFAIT, "Canada and South Eastern Europe (the Balkans)", Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/canada-balkans-en.asp>>
- DFAIT, "CARE Canada Reach Programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/geo/europe/care.htm>>
- DFAIT, "Crisis in Kosovo – Chronology of Events in Kosovo", Prepared by the South European Division, July 1999, Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.ca/foreignp/kosovo/text/chrono-e.asp>>
- NATO, "NATO and Kosovo: Historical Overview – NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo", Available at <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>>

NATO, Address by Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs to the North Atlantic Council Meeting, 8 December, Available at
<<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981208i.htm>>

B. Secondary Sources

Books:

- Blanchette, Arthur E., ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy (1977-1992): Selected Speeches and Documents* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994)
- _____, *Canadian Foreign Policy (1945-2000): Major Documents and Speeches* (Ottawa: The Golden Dog Press, 2000)
- Cooper, Andrew F., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough & Ontario: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997)
- Cox, Arthur M., *Prospects for Peacekeeping* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967)
- Durch, William J., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993)
- Eayrs, James, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972)
- English, John and Norman Hillmer, eds., *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1992)
- Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule eds., *Canada Among Nations 1990-91: After the Cold War* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991)
- Fetherstone, A. B., *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1994)
- Girard, Charlotte S. M., *Canada in World Affairs (1963-1965), Vol. XIII* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979)
- Granatstein, J. L., ed., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1986)
- Hampson, Fen Osler and Christopher J. Maule, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1992-1993: A New World Order?* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992)
- Hampson, Fen Osler, Michael Hart and Martin Rudner, *Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player?* (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1999)

- Hampson, Fen Osler and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1996: Big Enough To Be Heard* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996)
- _____, *Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership And Dialogue* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998)
- _____, *Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000)
- Hillmer, Norman and J. L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s* (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994)
- Hunt, B. D. and R. G. Haycock, eds., *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1993)
- James, Alan, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990)
- _____, *The Politics of Peacekeeping* (London: Chatto and Windus Ltd., 1969)
- Jeong, Ho-Won, ed., *The New Agenda for Peace Research* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999)
- Keating, Tom, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto & Ontario: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1993)
- Lehmann, Ingrid A., *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999)
- Manwaring, Max G and John T. Fishel, *Towards Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operation* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998)
- McRae, Rob and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001)
- Melakopides, Costas, *Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy (1945-1995)* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998)
- Molot, Maureen Appel and Harald Von Riekhoff, eds., *Canada Among Nations 1994: A Part of the Peace* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994)
- Munton, Don and John Kirton, eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases* (Scarborough and Ontario: Prentice Hall Canada, Inc., 1992)

- Reychler, Luc and Thania Paffenholz, eds., *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)
- Rikhaye, Indarjit and Kjell Skjeloback, eds., *The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects, the Lessons of 40 Years of Experience* (Houndmills: MacMillan in Association with the International Peace Academy, 1990)
- Rikhaye, Indarjit, *Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974)
- Thakur, Ramesh and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Adhoc Missions, Permanent Engagement* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001)
- Tucker, Michael J., Raymond Blake and P. E. Bryden, *Canada and the New World Order: Facing the New Millennium* (Ontario: Irwin Publishing Ltd, 2000)
- Verma, Lalima, ed., *United Nations in the Changing World* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1997)
- Wainhouse, David W., *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support Experience and Prospects* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973)
- Wiseman, Henry, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983)

Journal Articles:

- Abiew, Francis Kofi and Tom Keating, "Outside Agents and the Politics of Peacebuilding and Reconciliation", *International Journal*, (Toronto, Canada), Winter 1999-2000.
- Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, "Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Towards a Training Model for Interreligious Peacebuilding", *Journal of Peace Research*, (London), Vol. 38, No. 6, November 2001.
- Ahmed, Ismail I. and Reginald Herbold Green, "Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace, and Development: Towards Reconceptualisation", *Third World Quarterly*, (Oxfordshire, UK), Vol. 20, February 1999.
- Akashi, Yasushi, "The Limits of UN Diplomacy and the Future of Conflict Mediation", *Survival*, (London), Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1995-96.
- Andreas, Peter, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia", *International Studies Quarterly*, (Malden, USA), Vol. 48, 2004.

- Appathurai, James and Ralph Lysyshyn, "Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, (Ottawa, Canada), Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1998.
- Arneil, Barbara, "Gender and Peacebuilding: Report on a roundtable", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No.1, Fall 1997.
- Arneil, Barbara and Kimberly Manning, "Engendering Peacebuilding", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No.1, Fall 1997.
- Austin, Robert C., "Albania and Kosovo: Roots of Instability", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 6 (1), Fall 1998
- Axworthy, Lloyd, "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership", *International Journal*, Vol. 5 (2), 1997.
- Bardalai, A. K., "Role of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention in Maintaining Global Peace and Human Security", A Brief Report on "International Conference for the UN High Level Panel (1-3 July 2004)", Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.
- Belloni, Roberts, "Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 2, March 2001.
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, "An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later", *Orbis*, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), Vol. 37 (3), Summer 1993.
- Caspersen, Nina, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar Bosnia", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 5, 2004.
- Chapin, Paul H. and John W. Foster, "Peace-building Policy Consultations and Dialogues: A Study of the Canadian Experience", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 9. No 1, Fall 2001.
- Dawson, Grant, "Bad Times and Good: Recent Literature on Peacekeeping", *International Journal*, Spring 2000.
- De Soto, Alvaro, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding", *Foreign Policy*, (Washington D. C), No. 94, Spring 1994.
- Dewitt, David B., "Directions in Canada's International Security Policy: From Marginal Actor at the Centre to Central Actor at the Margins", *International Journal*, Vol.55 (2), Spring 2000.
- Dobbie, Charles, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping", *Survival*, Vol. 36, Autumn 1994.

- Dobell, William M., "A Sow's ear in Vietnam", *International Journal*, Vol. 29, Summer 1974.
- Doxey, Margaret, "Constructive Internationalism: A Continuing Theme in Canadian Foreign Policy", *Round Table*, (London), Vol. 311, July 1998.
- Doyle, Michael W. and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis", *American Political Science Review*, (Washington D. C), Vol. 94, 2000.
- Fortna, Virginia Page, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, 2004.
- _____, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars", *International Studies Review*, (Malden, USA), Vol. 5 (4), 2003.
- Fraser, John M., "Evaluating the Peace Process: Can all NATO's Forces and all Dayton's Men put Bosnia-Herzegovina Together Again?", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1998.
- Geislerova, Marketa, "Lessons Learned from the Kosovo Crisis", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 1999.
- Gellman, Peter, "Lester B. Pearson, Collective Security, and the World Order Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, Vol. 44, Winter 1988-89.
- Gilligan, Michael and Stephen John Stedman, "Where do the Peacekeepers go?", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5 (4), 2003.
- Godhand, Jonathan and David Hulme, "From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peacebuilding in the New World Disorder", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999.
- Gordon, Nancy and Bernard Wood, "Canada and the Reshaping of the United Nations", *International Journal*, Vol. 47, Summer 1992.
- Goulding, Marrack, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping", *International Affairs*, (Oxford, UK), Vol. 69, July 1993.
- Hampson, Fen Osler, and Chester A. Crocker, "Making Peace Settlements Work", *Foreign Policy*, No. 104, Autumn 1996.
- Hampson, Fen Osler, and Dean F. Oliver, "Pulpit Diplomacy: A Critical Assessment of the Axworthy Doctrine", *International Journal*, Vol. 53 (3), 1998.

- Harbottle, Michael, "Lessons for UN Peacekeeping", *International Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 4, October 1974.
- Hoddie, Hartzell C. M. and D. Rothchild, "Stabilising the Peace After the Civil War", *International Organisation*, (Cambridge, New York), Vol. 55 (1), 2001.
- Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell, "Signals of Reconciliation: Institution-Building and the Resolution of Civil Wars", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7, Issue 1, March 2005.
- Howard, Peter and Reina Neufeldt, "Canada's Constructivist Foreign Policy: Building Norms for Peace", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 8, No.1, Fall, 2000.
- Jackson, Robert H., "Armed Humanitarianism", *International Journal*, Vol. XVIII, Spring 1993.
- Jacobsen, Peter Viggo, "Multilateralism Matters, But How?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, (London), Vol. 30, 1995.
- Jacoby, Tami Amanda, "Canadian Peacebuilding in the Middle East: Case study of the Canada Fund in Israel, Palestine and Jordan", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2000.
- James, Alan, "Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era", *International Journal*, L. 2, Spring 1995.
- Jockel, Joseph T., "Canada in the Post-Cold War World", *Current History*, (Philadelphia, USA), Vol. 90, December 1991.
- _____, "Dandurand Revisited: Rethinking Canada's Defence Policy in an Unstable World", *International Journal*, Vol. XVIII, Spring 1993.
- Keating, Tom, "The 'new look' in Canada's Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, Vol. XVIII, Spring 1993.
- Kirton, John, "Canada's New Internationalism", *Current History*, Vol. 87, March 1988.
- Knight, Mark and Alpaslan Ozerdem, "Guns, Camps, and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 4, July 2004.
- Langville, Peter H. and Tania Keefe, "The Future of Peacekeeping", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Fall 2004.
- Last, D. M., "Defeating Fear and Hatred through Peace-Building: Multiplying the Impact of a Military Contribution", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1998.

- Leurdijk, Dick A., "Before and after Dayton: The UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997.
- Malone, David M., "The UN Security Council and Peace Operations, 1990-96", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Winter 1998.
- Martin, Pierre and Michael Fortman, "Canadian Public Opinion and Peacekeeping in a Turbulent World", *International Journal*, Spring 1995.
- Massip, Marie Isabel, "UNPKOs: A Canadian Perspective," ARF Peacekeeping Seminar: Best Practices and Lessons Learnt, New Delhi, March 20-21, 2002, United Service Institution of India, Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping.
- McDougall, Barbara, "Meeting the Challenge of the New World Order", *International Journal*, Vol. 47, Summer 1992.
- _____, "Canada and the New Internationalism", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 1, Winter 1992-93.
- McKenna, Peter, "Canada and the Haitian Crisis", *Journal of Canadian Studies*, (Ontario, Canada), Vol. 32 (3), Autumn 1997.
- Moens, Alexander, "Lessons for Peacekeepers: Srebrenica and the NIOD Report", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 10. No. 3, Spring 2003.
- Molotchkov, Sergei, "Canada as a Peacekeeper in the Post-Cold War Period", *Social Sciences*, Vol. 27 (4), 1996.
- Neack, Laura, "UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?", *Journal Of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1995.
- Nelles, Wayne, "Canada's Human Security Agenda in Kosovo and Beyond: Military Intervention versus Conflict Prevention", *International Journal*, Vol. 57 (3), Summer 2002.
- Neville-Jones, Pauline, "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia", *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996-97.
- Paczulla, Jutta, "The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina", *International Journal*, Vol. LX, No. 1, Winter 2004-2005.
- Pankhurst, Donna, "Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies: Conceptualizing Reconciliation, Justice and Peace", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, February 1995.
- Paris, Roland, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism", *International Security*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts), Vol. 22, No. 2, Autumn 1997.

- Potter, Evan H., "Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, Vol. L11, Winter 1996-97.
- Prakash B. S. and K. Nandini, "Issues and Challenges in Modern Peacekeeping Operations", *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), Vol. 29, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2005.
- Report from the Roundtable, "Cyprus: Living together in the New Century", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Spring 2000.
- Report from the Roundtable, "Expert Deployment to International Peace Operations", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter 2001.
- Roberts, Adams, "The United Nations and International Security", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Summer 1993.
- _____, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping", *Survival*, Vol. 36, Autumn 1994.
- Sabrina, Ramet P., "War in the Balkans", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 1992.
- Sanderson, John, "Changing face of peace Operations: A view From the Field", *Journal of International Affairs*, (Columbia University, New York), Vol. 55 (2), Spring 2002.
- Sarty, Leigh, "Sunset Boulevard Revisited? Canadian Internationalism after the Cold War", *International Journal*, Vol. XLVIII, Autumn 1993.
- Schulte, Gregory L., "Former Yugoslavia and New NATO", *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 1, Spring 1997.
- Singh, Vanita, "NATO Intervention in Yugoslavia: The Test of Western Credibility", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), May 22 1999.
- Solana, Javier, "NATO's Success in Kosovo", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78 (46), 1999.
- Spencer, Metta, "Science for Peace roundtable on the Lesson of Yugoslavia", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Fall 1997.
- Stein, Janice Gross, "Living with Uncertainty: Canada and the Architecture of the New World Order", *International Journal*, Vol. 48, Summer 1992.
- Tarry, Sarah, "Sleeping with the 'Enemy'? Canada Government Funding of NGO's in Bosnia-Herzegovina", *Canadian Foreign Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Fall 2000.
- Varadarajan, Siddhart, "The Politics of Military Intervention: NATO's Operations in Yugoslavia", *India International Center Quarterly*, (New Delhi), Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1999.
- Weller, Marc, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo", *International Affairs*, Vol. 75 (2), April.

Whitworth, Sandra, "Where is the Politics in Peacekeeping", *International Journal*, Spring 1995.

Wilmer, Franke, "The Social Construction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia", *Social Justice*, Vol. 25, Winter 1998.

Zametica, John, "The Yugoslav Conflict", *Adelphi Paper*, (New York), Vol. 270, Summer 1992.

Internet Sources/Websites:

Berman, Mark, "CIDA and the Canadian Human Security Strategy Conflict, Peace and Development", Draft for Consultation, 11 October 2001, Posted at <http://www.liucentre.ubc.ca/liu/evnts/conferences/140202conflict.dev/documents.htm>

Gagnon, Chip, "INGOs in Bosnia-Herzegovina", Draft Report for the Carnegie Project on "Evaluating NGO Strategies for Democratisation and Conflict and Conflict in the Formerly Communist States", Available at <http://www.ithaca.edu/politics/Gagnon/articles/Carnegie/bhreport.htm>

Sisk, Timothy, "Peacemaking in Civil Wars", Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, March 2002, Available at <http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op-20-2.PDF>

"Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World", Available at <http://www.sumit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm>

"Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Part Two, International Power in Bosnia", 30 March 2000, Available at <http://www.esiweb.org>

<http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/1997denver/compliance/canada/caneur.htm>
<http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/1997denver/compliance/canada/caneur.htm>

<http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/hsi-en.asp>

<http://www.ipacademy.org/publications/Reports/Training/publRepoTraiViennPrint.htm>

<http://www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/1945topresent/yugoslavia.html>

<http://www.reliefweb.int>

Journals:

Adelphi Paper (New York)

American Political Science Review (Washington D.C)
Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Canada)
Cooperation and Conflict (London)
Current History (Philadelphia: USA)
Foreign Affairs (New York)
Foreign Policy (Washington D.C)
India International Centre Quarterly (New Delhi)
International Affairs (Oxford, UK)
International Journal (Toronto)
International Security (Cambridge: Massachusetts)
International Studies Review (Malden: USA)
International Studies Quarterly (Malden: USA)
Journal of Canadian Studies (Ontario: Canada)
Journal of International Affairs (New York)
Journal of Peace Research (London)
Mainstream (New Delhi)
Orbis (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
Round Table (Canterbury, UK)
Strategic Analysis (New Delhi)
Survival (London)
Third World Quarterly (Oxfordshire: UK)

