

**A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN RESPECT OF  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATION FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTER-  
NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (1941-45)**

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Delhi Through the Indian School of International Studies

NEW DELHI

1960

## Preface

On 25 April, 1945 the victors of the Second World War assembled at San Francisco to create the United Nations Organization with a view to saving "the succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in their lifetime had brought untold sorrow to mankind" and to providing peace and security to the world. By establishing an international organization, the participating States agreed to co-operate on matter of common concern in the political, economic and social-realms. A great attempt was made to eliminate the use of force in international relations by individual States and resort to arms was declared illegal, except in self-defence and in furtherance of collective measures.

The United Nations Charter did not develop in a vacuum and though the Charter looked towards the future, it was conditioned by past events. American preparation for building a machinery for a post-war peaceful world had started as early as the outbreak of the Second World War. This study will trace the successive stages in the evolution of American policy towards the establishment of the United Nations organization primarily as an agency to maintain international peace and security. In a sense, such an ..

undertaking would have a bearing on the study of the growth of the United Nations itself, because of the lead taken by the United States in the formulation of plans and in the creation of agencies oriented towards the goal of international co-operation during the course of the Second World War. Furthermore, the period under study witnessed a remarkable change in both American governmental and non-governmental attitudes in foreign affairs. The American government began actively considering the peace and security of the world as a necessary condition for its own security. In this process, Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, like Wilson's in the First World War, started preparing the nation for active participation in an international organization. Would Roosevelt's efforts meet the same fate as Wilson's? This question mark appeared all through the war years and at the San Francisco Conference.

The emergence of the Soviet Union along with the United States as a major force in world politics in the course of the Second World War lent urgency to the question of finding ways and means of perpetuating the war-time collaboration between the Allies. Such a course of action appeared necessary to the American post-war planners for the simple reason that the co-operation of all nations, and particularly of the great nations, in the post-war period appeared to be the best possible means of ensuring peace.

and security in the world. Thus, the objective of achieving a consensus of opinion among the Allies, and particularly with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, during the war and, furthermore, of creating an instrumentality in and through which the concert of powers could function in the post-war period formed an important strand in the many currents influencing the evolution of American policy.

In keeping with the democratic tradition, following America's entry into the war, a great debate ensued on the nature of the post-war world. Although the defeat of the enemy was undoubtedly uppermost in the minds of the American people, questions such as Allied unity, the future of colonial peoples, economic and trade conditions and the treatment of defeated countries were also widely discussed. The importance of a study of the great transformation that came about in American public opinion during the war years need hardly be emphasized. (1)

The importance of a study of this nature is further enhanced if one considers the nature of war in the twentieth century. As an outgrowth of the great technological revolution, war has become 'total'. Consequently, war

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1. Donald F. Drummond in the preface of his book The Passing of American Neutrality 1937 - 1941 (Ann Arbor, 1955), wrote that "If this role i.e. of assuming a major responsibility in the guidance of world affairs becomes as permanent as now seems likely: its acceptance constitutes the weightiest development in the external relations of the United States since the adoption of the Constitution."

as a legitimate institution of settling international disputes has also become outdated. The 'total' nature of modern warfare has also obliterated the difference between national and international security. In the light of these and other changes, a study of the policy of the United States in the creation of a system of general security becomes significant and topical.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter I, certain issues are discussed which provide a historical background and perspective to a study of the main subject. Chapter II deals with the development of plans for a new collective security organization in the years 1941 - 1943. In this connection, in order to know the official stand on various problems concerning world peace and security, it becomes necessary to pay attention to the war-time conference of the Allied leaders. The views of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, on the subject under study are of especial importance. Likewise, the preparatory work undertaken by the Department of State on the subject of the desirability of creating an international organization for the maintenance of world peace and security and the United States participation in it is reviewed. Since the American Congress plays an important part in the foreign affairs of the country and has the power of ratifying the treaties negotiated by the executive, attitudes of important senators and congressmen toward the idea of U.S. participation in

an international organization have been duly recorded.

In the United States a great many non-governmental bodies are devoted to a study of international affairs and their views have a considerable importance in the formulation of public opinion. The views of some of the more influential groups among them such as the Commission to study the Organization of Peace, the Universities Committee to study the Organization of Peace, the Commission to study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace, are considered in Chapter III. The approach of pressure groups such as the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.), the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. is also reviewed in that chapter.

Although both the Democratic and Republican parties were committed to the idea of a league of nations to prevent future wars in the 1916 Presidential election, the issue of U.S. participation in such an Organization was fought on partisan lines. The net result was that the United States was unable to join the League of Nations in the creation of which it had played a prominent part. Similarly, during the Second World War, the Democratic administration was again taking the initiative for finding ways and means to secure peace and stability in the post-war world. The Roosevelt Administration's success in keeping the issue of American participation in a world organization on a non-partisan plane is studied.

In Chapter IV debate in government bodies and in national politics on the issue of creating a world security organization in the post-war period is traced. An important event in this period has been the Presidential election in 1944. A study will be made of the issues raised during the election which have a bearing on the projected study. The development of American policy in such major international conferences as the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and the Inter-American Conference on problems of War and Peace held in Mexico is discussed in Chapter V.

Chapter VI is devoted to considerations of issues raised during the San Francisco Conference organized to frame the Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII consists of concluding observations on the system of general security established after the end of the Second World War and the United States policy regarding it. An evaluation of American policy in the light of their war-time declarations with regard to the establishment of the United Nations will also be attempted.

Finally, a word about the thesis work would not be out of place here. The major portion of research on this subject had to be carried in India. Considering the limited type of facilities available in India for conducting research on American history, I am conscious of the fact that I might have done greater justice to the subject in more favourable conditions. I was, nevertheless, given an



opportunity by the Indian School of International Studies, albeit for a few months, to visit the United States and collect some useful material on the subject.

Several persons and institutions were of great help to me in the preparation of the work. More particularly, I wish to record my gratefulness to Dr. M.S. Venkataramani, whose valuable guidance at every stage of the work led to improvement in both the style and content of the thesis. To Professor D.F. Fleming I am deeply thankful for having read the final draft and made some useful suggestions.

During my short stay in the United States, Professor Leland M. Goodrich of the Columbia University was kind enough to help me in a number of ways. It was because of his active interest in my work that I was awarded a grant by the Asia Foundation to stay for three more months in the United States. I am also indebted to the librarians and staff of the Indian Council of World Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, New York and of the Columbia University for providing me facilities to conduct the research work.

If this work has some merit, it is primarily due to the assistance and help that I have received from

these scholars. It goes without saying that I alone am responsible for the errors of fact and judgement which may be found in these pages.

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### Bibliographical Foreword

For the period under study, published official documents are available only in certain fields. There is, however, much official literature available in the shape of memoirs, diaries, and books written by persons who played significant roles in the shaping of events. The records of the San Francisco Conference published by the United Nations office, the Diplomatic Papers relating to Conferences at Malta and Yalta published by the U.S. Department of State, are excellent source material for studying these international conferences. Winston S. Churchill has published his History of the Second World War which, apart from its literary merits, gives a first hand account of British policies on various issues raised during the war. President Truman has also published his memoirs. Robert Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins provides valuable insights to the policies of these two men during the war period. Stalin's speeches during the "Great Patriotic War" are available. The Soviet Union has recently published, from its foreign office files, the war-time correspondence between Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill and Truman.

The U.S. Department of State's publication entitled Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation 1939 - 1945

is a good source material for finding out the different phases of the work done in the State Department for the creation of a world organization. Also, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Edward Stettinius, Jr., James Byrnes and other leading public figures have published their books. The memoirs of important military officials are also available. Although the American tradition discourages participation of the services in the framing of American foreign policy, yet on certain matters, the military men's point of view was accepted by the administration. The Congressional Record, the various Hearings, and Reports, and Committee Prints of the Senate and the House of Representatives are indispensable source materials for studying trend of opinion in the legislative wing. Published papers of important Senators like Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally also contain useful material for the study.

The Council of Foreign Relations carried on studies of American interests in the war and the peace during the Second World War. Its memoranda were used by the Department of State in the preparation of drafts on various topics. The Commission to study the Organization of Peace published yearly reports on several subjects relating to world peace and security. Likewise, the Universities Committee to Study the Organization of Peace published its findings from time to time which were of

great use to educationists and public alike. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the A.F.L. and the C.I.O., the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and other public bodies published pamphlets and articles on subjects related to the present study.

Certain books of prominent authors proved of great help in the preparation of the dissertation. Mention must be made of Ruth Russell's A History of the United Nations Charter, Herbert Feis's Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin : The War they waged and the Peace they sought, William Hardy McNeill's America, Britain and Russia : Their Cooperation and Conflict, Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro's A Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations.

Among the newspapers and periodicals, New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, London Times, Christian Science Monitor, War and the Working Class, Daily Worker, New Republic, The Nation, The New Statesman and Nation should be mentioned for having provided useful informative details on various questions. The New York Times reports were particularly useful for many things related to my subject.

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**CHAPTER I**

**THE PRE-WAR ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES  
TOWARD WORLD ORGANIZATION**

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1. U.S. APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS BETWEEN  
THE YEARS 1914 - 1939

The fact that the United States right from the days of its inception till the end of the 19th century was largely concerned with domestic issues had its impact on the shaping of her foreign policy. It was busy with programmes such as expanding westward, in transforming itself from an agricultural economy to an industrial one and in building a civilization which was believed by many Americans to be different and superior to that of the old world. Such absorbing undertakings coupled with the consciousness of the uniqueness of America among her people made them all the more disinterested to participate in politics other than that of the Americas. No wonder, Washington's farewell message to the nation in which he warned the American people against permanent alliances with foreign powers continued, by and large, to guide the public attitudes of the Americans for decades to come. Henry Clay, who was the Secretary of State under John Quincy Adams, seemed to be expressing the prevailing belief of great many Americans when he said that the United States could make its best contribution to the freedom of the old world by keeping its "lamp burning brightly on this western shore

as a light to all nations" rather than hazarding its "utter extinction among the ruins of fallen and falling republics in Europe." (1)

Some American historians have even interpreted their country's cessation of imperial links with Great Britain as an expression of the American isolationist spirit. (2) Thomas Paine in his pamphlet, Common Sense, stressed, among other things, the fact that an independent United States would not have to participate always in the wars waged by Great Britain.

There were, however, various forces at work which, over a period of years, brought about great changes in the social, economic and political life of the United States. Consequently, the American people's attitude toward participation in the politics of the world also changed perceptibly. To begin with, at the time of the Revolution, the population of the thirteen colonies was approximately two and a half million. In the 19th century, however, there was a phenomenal growth of population partly due to the fecundity of the Americans and partly due to the influx of large-scale immigrants into the United States.

1. Quoted in Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1943) 661 - 2.  
2. Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1948) 40. For an explanation of the term 'isolationism' see appendix.

Obviously, the population growth was one factor that contributed in the development of United States as a world power.

By the end of the 19th century, industrialization had triumphed over an agricultural economy and the nation was preoccupied with capturing external markets for its surplus goods and products. (3) The national income of the country also showed steady progress. The following table gives the national income in the United States from 1850 to 1929 : (4)

| Year | National Income<br>(current prices in<br>billions of dollars) | Real Income<br>(per head of<br>occupied<br>population) | Real Income<br>(per worker) |
|------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| 1850 | \$ 2.38   | \$ 787   | \$ 846                      |
| 1870 | 7.18  | 959  | 1030                        |
| 1900 | 19.36   | 1388   | 1543                        |
| 1915 | 36.00   | 1409   | 1650                        |
| 1921 | 58.30   | 1465   | 1637                        |
| 1929 | 83.40   | 1636   | 1776                        |

3. Whereas in 1860 the five most important manufactures (according to the value of their products) were flour and meal, cotton goods, lumber planed and sawed, boots and shoes, and iron, in 1900, the most important five products were iron and steel, slaughtering and meat packing, foundry and machine shop products, lumber and timber products, flour and other gristmill products. Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire 1897 - 1917 (New York, 1951) 9.
4. Quoted in Allan Nevins and Louis M. Hacker, The United States And Its Place In World Affairs (Boston, 1943) 140.

Towards the end of the 19th century, the westward expansion of the United States came to an end. The end of the frontier era in American history was followed by a movement for territorial expansion and commercial gains beyond the Americas. The ideas of the social Darwinists, of Captain A.T. Mahan were readily accepted by such politicians like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. This new attitude explains partly the Spanish-American war, the annexation of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, Philippines and the development of a sphere of influence in the Caribbean.

The United States acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 was to lead her rapidly into the politics of Asia and through it of Europe. Since Philippines was acquired keeping in view the prospects of expanding the trade in the East, it was feared in the United States that should China be partitioned by the rival European powers, the prospects of her trade relations with China would be jeopardized by the restrictions of the partitioners. The United States, therefore, enunciated the doctrine of the "Open Door" in China. The U.S. was drawn further in the politics of the Far East when she expanded the scope of the doctrine to include the territorial and administrative integrity and independence of China. Thus, in the period of the twentieth century, before 1914, American foreign policy generally adhered to the following geographical distinctions

emphasized by Captain Mahan : Predominance in the Caribbean and its periphery; participation in the politics of the Far East and abstention from European political questions. (5)

However, the outbreak of the First World War challenged the basic assumptions on which U.S. foreign policy was then built. The balance of power in Europe was precariously tilted in favour of the Triple Alliance. Should Great Britain lose in the war, the Atlantic ocean would no longer remain as a safety zone to protect American national security. There was also the question of America's trade and her rights as a neutral country. President Wilson's declaration of American neutrality although conforming to old American tradition, did not, in fact, constitute an effective response to the imminent shift in the world structure of power at the outbreak of the First World War. The American entry in the war on April 6, 1917, though on the ground of protecting the neutral rights of its citizens to trade with the belligerents, was also due to the realization — albeit not explicitly — of the importance of maintaining European stability as a necessary condition for the national security of the United States.

The end of the First World War witnessed the

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5. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (New York, 1959) 298.

complete disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Russia was torn by internal revolution and Germany was enfeebled by defeat. At the peace table there were four major powers : Britain, the United States, France and Japan. All of the powers were conscious of the fact that it was the application of U.S. military might which broke the impasse and turned the tide against Germany. Little wonder, then, that the settlement which in 1919 was introduced in Europe was based on the assumption that the powers from outside Europe — Britain and the United States — which helped to make the peace would also enforce it. (6)

As the First World War broke out and American neutral rights became more and more difficult to protect, many American leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood increasingly realized that their country could not remain aloof from this conflagration for long. (7) Projecting their thoughts in the future, many American leaders visualized the advisability of forming an organization to study the problems of peace. The League to Enforce Peace was the outcome of a conference held in Philadelphia on June 17, 1915 in which nearly three hundred

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6. William T.R. Fox, The Super Powers (New York, 1944) 23.

7. Pressure for military preparedness was also exerted by the National Security League, a powerful organization financed mainly by munitions manufacturers and international bankers.

distinguished citizens participated. (8) The platform adopted called for a world court for the adjudication of justiciable questions, a conciliation commission for the hearing of all disputes not recognized as submissible to a court, and combined action by the nations against a member who embarked on war without first using one agency or the other. Interestingly enough, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Rep., Mass.), declared in one of the sessions of the Conference that he did not think that when Washington warned the country against entangling alliance he meant that "we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace." (9)

In other Allied countries too, public opinion was crystallizing to demand the formation of a world organization. After all, the trend towards the creation of international agencies for specific types of work in which many nations were interested was already present

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8. In fact, the League to Enforce Peace was a league to "enforce consideration," in as much as its platform did not include any guarantee of territorial integrity of states. Its plan compelled members to submit disputes to the judicial tribunal or the Conciliation Commission.

9. Quoted in Denna Frank Fleming, The United States And World Organization 1920 - 1933 (New York, 1938) 13.



in the nineteenth century. The river commissions created by the Congress of Vienna, the Universal Postal Union, the International Sugar Union, the Permanent Court of Arbitration and many other international organizations were concrete expressions of such a trend. By 1914, there were in existence thirty public international unions. (10) Furthermore, the requirements of war necessitated the Allied Governments to form international organizations, such as the Inter-Allied Shipping Board, and the benefits derived from them impressed the leaders and thinkers in their search for lasting peace after the war.

In the United States, when the First World War broke out, Woodrow Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality. However, he continued to ponder over the desirability of creating an association of nations bound together to preserve peace. The historical situation was favourable for the United States to participate actively in the power-politics of the world. Wilson, perceiving the trend of the world, tried to canalize it into higher standards of international morality. His "Fourteen Points" and his attempt at creating an association of nations to end wars were permeated by his unshakable idealism and world-vision. A narration of President Wilson's struggle both at the Versailles Peace Conference and at home to

10. Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., Organizing For Peace (New York, 1954) 41.

persuade the American people to accept his ideas is not warranted here. It should, however, be noted that the Senate's refusal to ratify the Treaty did not mean that the American people had been definitely opposed to the idea of the League of Nations. To wit, all during the war, numerous state legislatures adopted resolutions favouring an international association for permanent peace. In the years 1916 to 1918, labour unions, chambers of commerce, churches, federation of women's clubs, the American Bar Association, all approved the general idea of a league of nations to preserve world peace and security. In 1916, both the political parties approved the league idea but partisanship intervened later.

At the time President Wilson laid the treaties before the Senate, 10 July, 1919, there were four distinct groups on the League issue : (a) an all-out pro-treaty group which consisted of 43 Wilsonian Democrats and 1 Republican; (b) a group of 15 Republican "mild reservationists," ranging from Frank Kellogg of Minnesota, later Secretary of State to Charles McNary of Oregon which also supported ratification with certain safeguards; (c) a group of 20 Republicans led by Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts which favoured ratification with strong reservations; and finally (d) a group of "irreconcilables" representing about 12 Republicans and 3 Democrats, led by Republican Senator Borah of Idaho, which was opposed to

ratification under any circumstances. It should, however, be emphasized that all times during the prolonged debate over the Treaty more than three fourths of the members of the Senate were ready to accept membership in the League in some form or other. The pro-League Democrats had enough votes to reject reservations requiring action by other League countries; the "mild-reservationist" but pro-League Republicans had enough votes to reject the League unless qualifications were attached. This deadlock killed the League.

The man who made Wilson's dream come true nearly a quarter of a century later, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration and later the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for the Vice-Presidency in 1920. In the course of the campaign Roosevelt warmly supported the League, but his speeches, as James Burns has pointed out, lacked Wilson's fine moral fervour. Roosevelt's approach was more pragmatic, more experimental.<sup>(11)</sup> "It is important not to dissect the document," Roosevelt said in March 1919 — "The important thing is first to approve the general plan." Unless the United States came in, he warned, the League would become simply a new Holy Alliance. "The League may not end wars,

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11. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956) 70.

but the nation demands the experiment," Roosevelt asserted. (12)

Roosevelt was more willing to compromise than Wilson was in order to secure U.S. participation in the League. (13) As early as 29 March, 1919, he favoured an amendment for giving due recognition to the Monroe Doctrine, but he thought the League should be tried even if desired amendments were not forthcoming. Other reservations to the League Covenant would be necessary, he warned at the end of the year. "I have read the draft of the League three times," he said in July 1919, "and always find something to object to in it, and that is the way with everybody ... Personally I am willing to try out the present instrument." (14) Thus, a perusal of Roosevelt's speeches on the League of Nations lead us to think that his early support for that organization was more a matter of political expediency than that of firm conviction. No wonder, in 1932, he became the first Democratic candidate who explicitly repudiated the League when William Randolph Hearst threatened to use his powerful newspaper chain against internationalist leaders. (15)

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12. Ibid

13. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt : The Ordeal (Boston, 1954) 17.

14. Burns, n. 11, 70.

15. Roosevelt's address to the New York State Grange, 2 February, 1932. Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fortyeighth Governor of the State of New York, Second Term, 1932 (New York, 1939) 551.

Roosevelt, however, did not express any regret for having worked for the League in 1920 but argued that the world organization was no longer the instrument Wilson had designed. Instead of working for world peace, it had become a mere agency for the discussion of European affairs. Had the United States entered at the beginning, the League might have become what Wilson wanted, but since it had not, "I do not favor American participation." (16)

The statement greatly disappointed the internationalists. (17) "Roosevelt," wrote Henry F. Pringle in the Nation, "hauls down banners under which he has marched in the past and unfurls no new ones to the skies." (18) Examining Roosevelt's past political career, Hofstadter commented that "when the Second War elevated Roosevelt to a position of world importance, he had no consistent history

16. Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York, 1948) 338. Of relevance here is an article written by Roosevelt in 1928. Though praising the League of Nations for its work in the economic, social and humanitarian field, Roosevelt could not restrain himself from noting that the organization had already become too preoccupied with European affairs. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy, A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, (New York), 6 (July 1928) 580 - 1.

17. See appendix for the definition of the term 'internationalism'.

18. Hofstadter, n. 16, 339.

of either isolationism or internationalism." (19)

In the years following 1920, American foreign policy became more and more divorced from reality, so much so that Bemis characterized that period as "the Fool's Paradise of American history," during which "American foreign policy degenerated into five postulates : isolationism, anti-imperialism, disarmament, neutrality, pacifism." (20)

Such a trend in American foreign policy was perhaps due to the fact that public opinion in America could not keep pace with the changing material and technological situation by the end of the First World War. Whereas, America emerged from the First World War as a great world power and a large creditor nation, its people, in general, still thought in terms of the old conceptual image of the nineteenth century America. The Pact of Paris and the Stimson Doctrine, in retrospect, were essentially a negative response by Americans to the spreading anarchy between the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century. What was needed most was not a verbal disapproval of lawlessness but concerted action on the part

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19. Ibid., 338.

20. Quoted in Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, International Relations : The World Community in Transition (London, 1954) 964 - 5.

of democracies backed by force.

On 10 January, 1933, Herbert Hoover asked Congress for legislation to empower the executive to designate aggressor nations and to embargo arms shipments to them, while making arms available to their victims and to powers joining in sanctions. A day after the Hoover message, the new President-elect Roosevelt publicly approved it. (21) On 17 April, 1933, a resolution in conformity with Hoover's request passed the House of Representatives. (22) The Senate, however, on 28 February, 1934, amended the House resolution to take away the President's authority to discriminate between a victim and an aggressor and substituted a requirement that the President might lay an embargo only against all parties to a dispute. (23) This was the "new neutrality." It abdicated the rights of a neutral and served notice to the world that the U.S. would not be in a position to help the victims of aggression or to treat them any differently from their attackers. Thus, Roosevelt's first attempt towards greater participation in world affairs was frustrated by the Senate. In 1933, all goals in the field of foreign affairs were subordinated to

21. New York Times, 12 January, 1933.

22. US, Congressional Record, 77 (1933) 1850.

23. Ibid., 78 (1934) 3390.

the drive for lifting the United States out of the worst depression in its history. The ideal of achieving both was regarded as politically impossible by the administration. (24)

During the period from 1933 to 1939, United States policy towards general international organization was concerned with the quality and extent of its participation in the League of Nations. The change of administration in 1933 did not represent an alteration of policy on this point. The policy of "official cooperation" with the League inaugurated under President Coolidge, was continued. Coolidge's policy, it might be recalled, followed in the wake of the "unofficial recognition" policy pursued during the latter part of President Harding's term, which itself was a successor to the initial policy of "non-recognition." (25)

It was towards the end of his first term that President Roosevelt spelled out informally his conception of the "official cooperation," policy. Roosevelt appeared to harbour that cooperation with the League, in the political

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24. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948) I, 176 - 7.

25. L. Larry Leonard, Elements of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1953) 240 - 1.



climate of that time, would be beneficial in matters involving social and humanitarian issues, but dangerous in those involving high policy. The President said :

We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the Political activities of the League of Nations; but I am glad to say that we have co-operated wholeheartedly in the social and humanitarian work at Geneva. Thus we are a part of the world effort to control traffic in narcotics, to improve international health, to help child welfare, to eliminate double taxation and to better working conditions and laboring hours throughout the world. (26)

Along with American cooperation in social and humanitarian work of the League and its efforts at various disarmament conferences, the United States took active steps in implementing the good neighbour policy enunciated by President Roosevelt for the Western Hemisphere. The programme was initiated at the Seventh International Conference of American States at Montevideo, 3 - 26 December, 1933 and consisted of a series of agreements and arrangements for political and economic collaboration among the

26. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1938) V, 288. Welles has observed that "in the many talks I had with the President between 1936 and the summer of 1941 on the subject, he was never once willing to agree that an organization composed of all non-totalitarian countries was as yet feasible. Even less did he believe that the United States should or would attempt to participate in its construction;" and it was not until after Pearl Harbour that he changed his mind and began to see the renewed possibility of international organization. Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped History (New York, 1950) 181.

twentyone American republics on the basis of accepted principles of peaceful conduct.

## 2. AMERICAN RESPONSE TO FASCIST AGGRESSIONS

The dominant sentiment in the U.S. during the rise of Hitler in Europe was a militant type of isolationism with its battlecry : "keep out of war." (27) The Nye Committee report of the Senate in 1934 tried to prove that bankers and munitions makers had driven the United States into war in 1917. Such a judgement became very popular with a large number of American people as

27. Paradoxical as it might appear, the American policy of isolationism expressed through "non-entanglement" in the international controversies did have, on certain occasions, a direct and positive bearing on the outcome of such conflicts. For example, American non-membership in the League security system had one such positive adverse effect. One of the reasons that prompted America to enter the First World War was to protect the neutral rights of its citizens to trade with belligerents. Should the League powers commit themselves to an economic boycott of an "aggressor," they would face the alternative of seeing the boycott broken by American ships or of provoking sharp controversy with Washington by challenging the right of Americans to trade with a lawbreaker. This point was clearly brought out in a memorandum prepared by the US Secretary of State of his conversations with the British Ambassador on 5 January, 1925 on the question of US association in European Security Pacts like the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Agreement. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that " ... He did not believe any Administration, short of a treaty concluded and ratified, could commit the country against assertion of its neutral rights in case there should be occasion to demand their recognition." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1925 (Washington, 1940) I, 17.

it was in line with the existing bitterness with the industrialists and financiers who were considered responsible for the great depression. Thus, the findings of the report, the mounting disillusionment and cynicism among the people due to the great depression, the general feeling of war-weariness and a growing bias for revisionism of the European political arrangements made by the Treaty of Versailles were some of the factors that combined to give tremendous impetus to the militant isolationist impulse in the American domestic scene. (28)

The Neutrality Act of 1935 was the product of this mood. Fresh aggressions by the dictators in 1936 and 1937 brought new legislation, but the original determination to control the "cause" — the "war mongering"

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28. Ferrell has observed : "The coming of the world wide Great Depression should have brought home to the American people the close interrelations of the various nations of the world. To some Americans it did, but to many the economic blight on the world seemed only additional proof of the folly of participation in the World War in 1917 - 18, and the desirability, indeed necessity, of detaching the United States from further vicissitudes of Europe. This latter view — that the Depression stemmed from Wilsonian internationalism - was not an intelligent view, but it offered a scapegoat for economic distress and was more soothing to the mind than the hypothesis that the Depression showed only the need for more internationalism." Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy In The Great Depression (New Haven, 1957) 18

influence of private business — of being dragged into war remained unchanged. (29)

The principal features of these acts were as follows : (a) an automatic embargo on the export of arms and ammunitions to nations at war; (b) a similar embargo on extending private loans to belligerents; (c) a prohibition against American ships entering the ports of belligerents or navigating such sections of the high seas which the President should define as war-zones; (d) a prohibition against American citizens taking passage on ships of belligerents. (30)The inflexibility of the neutrality

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29. In the Spanish Civil War, however, an unusual positive measure was adopted by the US administration. Since the Spanish conflict came under the category of a civil war according to international law, the mandatory embargo on war supplies to the lawful and recognized government in Spain was not required according to the Neutrality Act of 1935. Still, the administration tried to maintain an informal embargo against both sides. When two American exporters insisted on their legal right to sell to the Spanish Republican Government, Roosevelt asked Congress to amend the Neutrality Act to cover civil wars, and the Spanish government was definitely cut off from American market while the fascists under Franco's leadership continued to receive large aid from Hitler and Mussolini. Such a course of action by the US administration was severely criticized by many prominent Americans. Even the Roosevelt Cabinet seemed to be divided on this issue as can be borne out by a study of the diaries of Harold L. Ickes in which he took strong exception to the stand taken by Roosevelt and his colleagues on the Spanish Civil War. Harold L. Ickes, Secret Diary of Ickes (New York, 1954) III, 217.

30. Richard Van Alstyne, American Crisis Diplomacy (New York, 1952) 42.

legislations and the lack of discrimination in the treatment to be accorded to victim and aggressor were opposed by the executive branch. (31) Roosevelt and Hull in their public utterances began in 1935 giving emphatic warning to the country that Americans could not "look without concern, on the darkening clouds around" and that dangers confronted the future of mankind as a whole. (32) As the Fascist threat spread in Europe and the Far East, Secretary Hull issued the following statement on 16 July, 1937 on the "Fundamental Principles of International Policy," which he communicated to all other governments in an effort to obtain universal acceptance of these principles :

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peace negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefore arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the

31. Address by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, 17 June, 1935, and by the President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 November, 1935. Department of State, Peace and War : United States Foreign Policy 1931 - 1941 (Washington, 1943) 259, 289.
32. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939 - 1945 (Washington, 1949) 12.

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rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armaments. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated. (33)

Although sixty nations, including Germany, Italy and Japan accepted these principles without reservations, the trend of events was such that Secretary Hull was constrained to record by August 1937 that Japan sought to dominate Eastern Asia and to extend her "control through the Pacific islands to the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere" and that Germany was "equally bent" on dominating continental Europe. (34) Along with accelerating the expansion of its navy and making the people conscious of the growing danger to world peace resulting from the Fascist countries' policies, the American government also took the lead in the defence of the Western Hemisphere. (35) In his 5 October,

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33. Ibid

34. Department of State, n. 31, 424.

35. Strengthening of hemispheric defence measure could be easily done as it was an issue on which perhaps all the factions in American politics were united.

1937 speech at Chicago, Roosevelt suggested a way to prevent further aggressions by "quarantining" aggressor nations. The speech attracted wide attention both at home and abroad. However, while advancing this mechanism, Roosevelt did not want to commit the United States to a system of international sanctions of any kind or even to a conference with other nations to consider combined action of any kind. (36)

To say that the President's views while making his famous "quarantine speech" were considerably in advance of the public temper would be to put it mildly. General editorial reaction in American newspapers, as summarized in the New York Times, revealed on the one hand, a general endorsement of the President's sentiments condemning aggressors, but on the other, showed a firm reluctance to support steps to do something about them. (37) Hull recorded in his memoirs that the speech had the effect of setting back by six months the Government's educational campaign to strengthen public opinion toward international cooperation. (38)

On 18 August, 1938, Roosevelt publicly associated

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36. Rosenman, n. 26, VI, 423 - 5.

37. New York Times, 5 October, 1937.

38. Hull, n. 24, 545.



his country with the defence of Canada. Also on 17 November, 1938, reciprocal trade treaties were signed with Great Britain and Canada. On 24 December, 1938, the American government entered into a pact of mutual consultation with its Latin American neighbours. Furthermore, on 14 April, 1939, the administration put a direct question to Hitler and Mussolini, in an effort to check and localize outbreak of hostilities, asking whether they would promise not to attack any of the independent States of Europe and the Near East for a period of ten years. (39) In exchange for such a pledge, the United States promised to sponsor an international conference at which the Fascist powers would have an opportunity to present their grievances and take part in the reduction of world tension. In reply, the dictatorships merely paid lip service to the American proposal.

The President, nevertheless, continued to think of the possibility of American sponsorship of an international programme in support of peace. He was considering a proposal for an international agreement to support certain principles of international conduct such as the expansion and stabilization of world economy, peaceful revision of treaties, reduction of the burden of armaments, the rights of neutrals, and the laws and customs of warfare. The idea was dropped as premature on the insistence of Hull. It was

39. Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New York, 1949) 595 - 8.

tentatively revived in early 1938, but was again laid aside after an unfavourable reaction from the British Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain, and was finally put away when Germany annexed Austria. (40)

With the Nazis' big advances in the low countries and with the downfall of France in mid-1940, the Roosevelt administration sensed the urgency of the situation. In this connection, two steps were taken which in the long run were to assume importance in terms of international organization for reconstruction and peace. One was the creation of the Emergency Committee for the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas. The Act of Havana adopted by the Second Meeting of the Ministers and Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Havana on 30 July, 1940 provided for a Committee composed of a representative of each of the American Republics which was to be constituted as soon as two-thirds of the American Republics would have appointed their members. The purpose of the Act of Havana in establishing the Emergency Committee was to give immediate effect to the main provisions of the convention. It included the setting up of a provisional administrative regime over any of the possessions then under the jurisdiction of a non-American government whenever an attempt might be made to transfer control or sovereignty thereof to another non-American government:

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40. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937 - 1940 (New York, 1952) 19 - 32.

A provision was also made for individual or joint action on the part of any of the American Republics should the need be so urgent that consideration by the Committee could not be awaited. (41)

The other step was the establishment of the Canadian-American Joint Defence Council on 22 August, 1940. (42) The United States had never before gone so far toward a military alliance with another country when it was not a belligerent. Closer association with Canada on military matters was inevitably followed by a realization of the need for close cooperation in the economic fields related to war.

When the war broke out in Europe, the administration renewed its attempt to repeal the arms-embargo section of the neutrality law. As Hitler's Blitzkrieg made many European countries fall under its sway, the question began to be asked urgently in the United States : How would the elimination of Great Britain as a world power affect American security? The threat of simultaneous attacks from the Atlantic as well as the Pacific also began to engage the serious consideration of the United States officials. Within the political and constitutional limitations, the administration sought to respond to the

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41. S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations (Boston, 1941) 96.

42. "Ogdensburg Agreement," ibid., 160.

situation by passing the lend-lease bill, by transferring fifty destroyers to Great Britain in return for bases in the Atlantic and also by persuading Congress to pass the Selective Service Act. The United States thus turned itself into an "arsenal of democracy." By such acts, the United States also drifted into an undeclared state of hostilities with the Fascist powers. (43) It resorted to unneutral action to prevent the defeat of Great Britain. (44) The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, 1941, however, decided the issue. Next day, in a tense atmosphere, the Congress listened to the President denounce the "unprovoked and dastardly attack" — a "date which will live in infamy" — and with only one dissenting vote declared war on Japan. Shortly afterwards, on 11 December, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States which the latter duly reciprocated.

43. For a detailed account see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (Boston, 1953).

44. For the orientation in American foreign policy discussed above, Dwan has given credit to Roosevelt's political leadership "which conceived of a German supremacy in Europe and a Japan predominant in Asia as direct threats to the United States, not merely in terms of some vague danger of economic competition, but in the sense that these nations would then be capable of jeopardizing our U.S. territorial and institutional integrity." John E. Dwan II, "Franklin D. Roosevelt : The Revolution in the Strategy of National Security," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1954, 3.

3. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES  
BEFORE HER ENTRY IN THE WAR  
ON THE ISSUE OF INTERVENTION

For more than two years prior to Japan's attack upon Pearl Harbour, the American public and its elected representatives argued the issues of intervention versus non-intervention. The "interventionists" in the foreign policy debate before December 7, 1941 were those who believed that it was more important for the United States to assure a British victory over the Axis than for the United States to keep out of the European war. The "isolationists" or "non-interventionists" were those who believed it was important for the United States to keep out of the war. (45) Also, both major contestants in this "Battle of the Committees" were composed of extremely heterogeneous elements. Each group drew support from all regions of the country; from different age, ethnic, and social groups; and from persons holding widely diverse economic and political views. The motivation for the support of each side in this foreign policy debate was exceedingly complex and diverse.

Thus, in the non-interventionist camp, there were many groups motivated by a variety of forces. There

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45. Wayne S. Cole, America First (Madison, 1953) 6.

was a very small group which because of its pro-Nazi and pro-fascist views advocated non-intervention. The American Communists were also against intervention till the time of the German attack against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, non-interventionist ideas had a special appeal for certain ethnic groups in the United States. For many the movement was identified with opposition to Roosevelt and the Democratic Party. There were, then, both liberals and conservatives in it, though motivated by different reasons.

There were also groups of pacifist organizations which supported the general stand of the non-interventionists. Opposition to intervention from groups such as the National Council for the Prevention of War, Women's International League For Peace And Freedom, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the American Friends Service Committee, the Keep America Out of War Congress stemmed generally and, in some cases, primarily, from their deeply ingrained pacifism. These persons were not "isolationists." For many years they were ardent supporters of American membership in the League of Nations and the World Court. It was not until 1935 that they abandoned their faith in collective security. The pacifist groups did so on account of their growing belief that war abroad could no longer be prevented and that America must therefore insulate herself by the established rules of neutrality. Their vigorous opposition to the breakdown of that neutrality was dictated "not by pro-Nazi sympathies,

or antipathy toward the British, but by a conviction that nothing could be worse than participation in war." (46)

When the war in Europe entered its second year, leadership in the struggle for non-intervention passed from these long-established pacifist organizations to new militant isolationist groups. For a brief period, there was the No Foreign War Committee headed by Verne Marshall, Iowa publisher. In a short time it disintegrated and there then emerged on the scene a powerful organization called the America First Committee. R. Douglas Stuart, Jr. a law student at Yale and General Robert E. Wood, Chairman of the Board of Sears, Roebuck and Company were the initiators. The Committee vigorously fought each measure of the Roosevelt administration for aiding the Allies short of war, measures which included the repeal for Arms embargo, the Destroyer Deal with Britain and the Lend Lease. Following the passage of the Lend Lease Bill, the Committee organized a big campaign which brought it widespread attention in the American press.(47) Its meetings were addressed by such public figures like Charles Lindbergh, Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Senator Gerald P. Nye, John T. Flynn, Kathleen Norris and General Wood. Some critics called it a Nazi agency, which was not the case.

46. John W. Masland, "Pressure Groups and American Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly (Spring 1942), 116.

47. Sherwood has commented : "I do not know how it was arranged to give the Lend Lease Bill the significant designation, 'HR - 1776,' but it sounds like a Rooseveltian conception, for it was the veritable declaration of interdependence." Robert Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1948) I, 227.

Although some local units were dominated by the Bundists and Coughlinites, on the whole, America First's membership represented the many separate segments of the population, each with different motives, which, for one reason or another, stood firmly against intervention. The original public announcement of the America First Committee included the following principles in which it believed. The United States must build an impregnable defence for America since no foreign power or groups of power could successfully attack a prepared America. American democracy could only be preserved by keeping out of the European war. Finally, the Committee believed that "aid short of war" would weaken United States capacity to defend her shores and might lead her in war abroad. (48)

Opposing the "isolationists" were the "interventionists" who were all united on the point that a British victory over the Axis was absolutely essential to American security. They were, however, not united on the means for accomplishing this objective. Many interventionists believed this could be done if the US would simply render all-out aid short of war to Britain. William Allen White, editor of the Emporia Gazette (Kansas) was of this opinion. With Clark Eichelberger and others he led a non-partisan Committee for Peace through the Revision of the Neutrality Law in the fall of 1939. This committee

48. Cole, n. 45, 15 - 16.



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vigorously supported Roosevelt's move to secure repeal of the arms embargo. After Congress repealed the embargo act in November 1939, the organization became inactive.

In May 1940, the formation of a new organization — the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies — was announced. (49) William Allen White assumed the Chairmanship of this Committee. Politically significant was the fact that he belonged to the mid-west region of the United States, traditionally the home of the isolationist sentiment. Furthermore, he was an outstanding liberal Republican who, at the same time, was on very good terms with the President. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was a private organization whose leaders through the years had kept faith in the Wilsonian principles of collective security. The Committee organized numerous local units throughout the nation. Reflecting the sectional differences in the country, its influence was greater in the Northeast, in the South and on the Pacific coast. The committee had support from some of the best known figures in American public life such as General John J. Pershing, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Admiral Yates Stirling Jr., and President James B. Conant of Harvard University.

There was another major element in the interventionist camp which gained increasing strength during

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49. Walter Johnson's The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago, 1944), describes in detail the activities of this committee.

1941. (50) This group believed that American aid short of war would not be sufficient to enable Great Britain to defeat the Axis. Therefore, the group thought it essential for the U.S. to intervene in the war against the axis as a full military belligerent. Even within the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, the influence of such a point of view was gradually increasing. This was one of the important reasons for White's resignation from the Committee. It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that the Committee did not support outright intervention and, up to the day of Japan's attack upon Pearl Harbor, it did not go beyond advocating breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany and Italy.

It was because of the failure of the aid-to-the-allies group to favour wholeheartedly a declaration of war that a new organization committed to U.S. entry into the war emerged in the name of the Fight For Freedom Committee in April 1941. Senator Carter Glass of Virginia was honorary chairman of this new committee and Bishop Henry W. Hobson, Episcopal bishop of Southern Ohio, was chairman. There were several other interventionist groups at both local and national levels, which advocated variations of the interventionist point of view. Notable among these was Union Now led by Clarence Streit.

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50. "Miller Group." Francis P. Miller Group or the Century Club Group.

Without going into the details of the various tests of strength which the interventionist and the non-interventionist segments of the American public opinion had on several issues-like the bill to revise the Neutrality Act, repeal of the arms embargo act, and the Lend Lease Act - one point emerges clearly. The non-interventionist strength which American First and other groups represented, definitely affected the strategy of President Roosevelt. He was determined, to avoid an "irrevocable act" which would give the non-interventionists an opportunity to defeat him.

To take a few examples which demonstrate the strength of the non-interventionist sentiment at that time, the arms embargo act was repealed in the fall of 1939 by a vote of 63 to 30 in the Senate and 243 to 172 in the House of Representatives. The draft extension was passed in the summer of 1941 by the House of Representatives by a majority of only one vote. Furthermore, less than a month before the attack on Pearl Harbour, the vital provisions of the Neutrality Act were repealed by a vote of only 50 to 37 in the Senate and 212 to 194 in the House of Representatives. Because of the vocal and determined stand of the isolationist bloc in Congress, prior to the Pearl Harbour attack, Roosevelt had, on several occasions, hesitated and even retreated in the face of their opposition. Thus, the sending of the American navy on convoy duty to British ports had been

agreed upon by the U.S. in March 1941. The agreement was however, not actually put into effect until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. (51) Furthermore, it was not without significance that in the 1940 President election, both Roosevelt and Willkie promised not to send American soldiers to fight outside the western hemisphere.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, 1941 ended the predicament in which the administration found itself placed in those crucial years. The Japanese action unified the American people. The America First Committee disbanded after issuing an appeal to its members to support the war effort. The isolationist opinion, however, was far from being subdued. The debate continued during the war period — though on different issues.

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51. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, 1948) I, 50, 84. Secretary of War Stimson has recorded that the President decided not to seek Congressional authorization for convoying in the spirit of 1941 because he feared defeat at the hands of the non-interventionists. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace And War (New York, 1948) 368.

**CHAPTER II**

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS FOR A NEW  
COLLECTIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION  
IN THE YEARS 1941 - 1943**

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1. GENESIS OF THE IDEA OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS DURING THE  
YEARS 1941 - 1943 (1)

The United Nations did not come into existence as a result of one single conference of nation-States fighting the Axis. Several international conferences, exchange of views among the great powers, intensive preparations for it by nations at home were necessary before a new world organization could be established after the end of the war for promoting international peace and security. The conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in August, 1941 was the first in the series of war-time conferences among the great powers which laid the foundations for the successful creation of the United Nations organization in 1945.

The Atlantic Charter was a by-product of the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in August (9 to 12) 1941. According to Sumner Welles, the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Roosevelt, before he left Washington for the Atlantic Meeting, had

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1. The "United Nations" was the name given by Roosevelt to the war-time coalition of States fighting the Axis who signed the Declaration of 1 January, 1942. Later on, this name was to be given to the international organization established at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

told him how he thought the approaching meeting with the British Prime Minister should be utilized, namely, "to hold out hope to the enslaved peoples of the world . . . ." Also, he wanted that the two powers should jointly bind themselves now to establish at the conclusion of the war a new world order based upon the principles of freedom and of justice. (2) The President was equally anxious to remove the danger that the British might enter into secret arrangements with their Allies as they did during the First World War, lest the task of writing a just peace should again be rendered difficult by the conclusion of prior arrangements. Furthermore, Roosevelt had felt that one of the chief factors that led to the ultimate breakdown of organized world society was the absence of an overall agreement between the Allied powers at the conclusion of the First World War. The President was convinced that any recurrence of a similar situation should be prevented by an agreement between Great Britain and the United States which would be acceptable to other States as well. (3)

At the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed several problems relating to future international organization, peace, security, and disarmament.

2. Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York, 1946) 6.
3. Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York, 1944) 174.

Roosevelt suggested to Churchill that a joint declaration should be prepared "laying down certain broad principles which should guide our policies along the same road." (4) A British draft prepared in accordance with the above suggestion became the basis for discussion and a foundation of the final declaration. The ensuing discussion revealed the different approaches of the two governments on many international problems. There was a difference of opinion with regard to the "non-discriminatory trade doctrine," the desirability of any commitment to the establishment of an international organization in the post-war period and the right of colonial peoples to self-government.

Roosevelt was unwilling to include in the declaration any reference to a post-war world organization. The drafts of Churchill and Welles included a reference to an "effective international organization." Roosevelt insisted on its elimination despite Churchill's explanation concerning its importance. Finally, in the Atlantic Charter, it was merely stated that the signatories hoped for "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security" in the post-war period. (5)

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4. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (London, 1950) III, 385.

5. Sherwood interprets that the phrase was "generally accepted as meaning exactly the same thing" (i.e.

... (continued on page 39 )



In discussing Roosevelt's attitude to an effective international organization, two factors that might have influenced him should be considered — (a) his appraisal of the League of Nations and (b) his estimate of the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States in 1941. As has been pointed out in Chapter I, Roosevelt seemed to have been greatly disappointed at the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in bringing about peace and security among nations. In 1941, the American public was hardly prepared to let its Chief Executive commit the nation to the establishment of an international organization in the post-war period. Besides, the U.S. was not technically at war with the Axis nations and, hence, the President did not think it proper to make any specific public pronouncements at that time.

Roosevelt's attitude concerning a post-war world organization was not shared by his principal advisers on foreign policy. Cordell Hull was concerned from the beginning of the desirability of having an international organization to promote peace and security in the post-war world. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest war-time adviser

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the future creation of an international organization). Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1948) I, 361. It is difficult to agree with this interpretation when one considers the opinion of other competent observers and participants, the foremost among them being Welles and Churchill.

and emissary was also in favour of establishing an international organization. Sumner Welles tried to convince the President during the conference that it would not be appropriate to overlook the smaller nations in any plans that might be drawn up for a world security organization.(6) The President, according to Welles, expressed full agreement with the suggestion but reiterated his belief that after the cessation of hostilities, a transitional period was necessary during which the task of international policing would have to be done only by Great Britain and the United States. (7)

On the question of armaments, Roosevelt frequently spoke of the waste resulting from the size of the military establishment of the smaller European powers. In times of war the armies of smaller nations would be unable to check the onslaught of a great power and, in times of peace, the burden of armaments would weigh heavily on their weak economies. The President believed that before any durable and effective international organization could be set up, some policing powers must undertake the

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6. Welles, n. 2, 5.

7. According to Welles, it was Roosevelt's "conviction" that "before any international organization could be effective, some policemen armed with the necessary force must undertake an extended cleaning-up job." Ibid., 4.

task of disarming the small countries. (8)

Welles wrote several years later that during the early years of the war, Roosevelt, in his attitude to the smaller countries outside the Western Hemisphere, was "unduly impatient." (9) The President was firm in his view that the small powers should be satisfied if the Anglo-Americans were able to assure them security from aggression. The small powers should, in turn, be willing to spend their national revenues upon education and in raising living standards rather than on armaments. Also, according to Welles, Roosevelt

... dismissed as of little account the argument that no responsible government of a small country could be compelled to liquidate the military establishment upon which it believed the safety of the nation depended, unless the self-appointed policemen were prepared to occupy that country by force. He occasionally spoke of his project for an Anglo-American policing of the world as being 'realistic.' (10)

Roosevelt had shown similar disregard of the sensibilities of small nations in the 1920 presidential campaign when he was the running mate of Governor James M. Cox of Ohio. He was reported to have said that in contrast to Great Britain having six votes in the League of Nations, the United States would be virtually controlling

8. Welles, n. 2, 4.

9. Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1950) 178.

10. Ibid

a dozen Latin American votes. Indeed, he went on to assert in a public speech that while in the navy he had written Haiti's Constitution himself. (11)

As regards Franklin D. Roosevelt's advocacy of the policemen concept to safeguard world peace and security he might possibly have been influenced in his younger days by the ideas of Theodore Roosevelt who constantly talked of the big and civilized nations having a duty to ensure that smaller nations did not misbehave and bring about conflict in the world. Also, the concept of America's duty to police the disorderly areas of the world was acceptable to Woodrow Wilson who did not seem to consider it as incompatible with his anti-imperialist sentiments. (12)

The implication of the Atlantic Charter that the aggressors — present and potential — should be

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11. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956) 75 - 6. Roosevelt later denied having made such a public remark.
  12. Merle Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1948) 679. Beard even asserts that "Mckinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge occupied the presidency in due succession, according to the chronology and accidents of politics, without making any sensational changes in the sailing charts i.e. toward imperialist adventures throughout the years of their service." Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York, 1956) II, 480.

disarmed while the U.S. and U.K. should remain fully armed, represented a new approach to the problem of disarmament and its relation to world peace. (13) Disarmament in itself and by all was not considered by Roosevelt and Churchill as a suitable means of ensuring peace. Such an attitude was presumably the outcome of the Anglo-American countries' tragic experiences in dealing with the Nazis. Following the conference, the emphasis in the Allied war-time declarations concerning the post-war period centered on the regulation of armaments rather than on disarmament.

Furthermore, the disarmament clause of the Atlantic Charter was based on certain assumptions. It was assumed that world peace is disturbed by "aggressor" nations whose disarmament is essential. The great powers would be acting in unison to police the world and would not themselves assume the role of "aggressor" nations. Although the Atlantic Charter called for an abandonment of the use of force it implied, at the same time, the maintenance of overwhelming force by certain powers to police the world. Disarmament itself was viewed within the narrow framework of weapons of warfare; no consideration was given to such underlying factors like natural resources and industrial potential which had a direct

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13. Section eight of the Atlantic Charter.

bearing on a nation's military strength. (14)

The U.S. isolationist's reaction to the news of the conference was, as was to be expected, very critical. The Chicago Tribune on 15 August, 1941 denounced what it characterized as the President's theatricality and questioned his right to meet with the leaders of a belligerent nation to discuss war and peace plans. The paper thought it inconceivable that the two statesmen had met merely to confer on these formal and "meaningless" eight points. Churchill would not have felt justified in making even a luncheon engagement to discuss a bit of rhetoric. What the Prime Minister was primarily interested in was to know "when are you coming across?", The Tribune asserted. Senators Hiram Johnson (Republican, California), Bennett Champ Clark (Democrat, Missouri), and Robert A. Taft (Republican, Ohio) charged the President with having made an alliance and with planning an expeditionary force to invade continental Europe. Section VI of the Atlantic Charter, they argued, obviously constituted a commitment, for its objective could be attained only through war. There was also criticism in certain quarters that freedom of religion had not been mentioned in the Charter out of deference to Soviet sensibilities. (15)

14. William L. Neumann, Making The Peace 1941 - 1945 (Washington, 1950) 15.

15. New York Times, 20 August, 1941 summarizing the debate in the Senate.

Notwithstanding isolationist attacks, the U.S. public, in general, supported the Atlantic declaration. The New York Times on 15 August, 1941 surveying the initial comments throughout the country observed:

The American people had a notorious weakness for high-sounding principles and were definitely more willing to participate in the making of peace than in the waging of the war. For the most part they saw in the Charter a means of giving "new heart to the oppressed nations" and were quite prepared to support a new system of collective security based on Anglo-American cooperation.

In perspective, one of the most striking features of this first major war-time conference of nations opposed to "Nazi tyranny" was its disregard for the role which the Soviet Union was to play in both the war and the peace. No consideration was given to the interests and ambitions of the Soviet Union during the drafting of the Charter and in the plans for policing the post-war world. This was all the more surprising since Harry Hopkins who attended the conference had placed before them his report based on his trip to Moscow which gave a much more optimistic view of the Russian military power than that held by the War Department on the basis of its own intelligence. (16) At the end of the conference,

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16. Sherwood, n. 5, 11. Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin : The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957) 13 - 14.

a cable was sent to Stalin to inform him of the meeting and Anglo-American interest in giving him all possible help in the conflict with Germany. That was not enough, however, to remove the Soviet suspicion that the Western allies might try to exclude the Soviet Union from the post-war settlement. (17) One might also agree with the criticism of John Foster Dulles that the Atlantic Charter envisaged a method which would freeze the world in the old, unworkable pattern. (18) Roosevelt and Churchill thought in terms of restoring the pre-war world conditions disturbed by the Axis alignment. There was not sufficient realization that the pre-war world "order" witnessed a succession of anarchic developments both in the socio-economic and political fields. The Atlantic Charter written in the shadow of the war, which was to expand in scope and purpose, was too early a document to anticipate the profound changes the war brought about in the world situation.

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17. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948) II, 1165.

18. John Foster Dulles, "Peace Without Platitudes," Fortune (New York) 26, (January 1942) 42 - 3, 87 - 8.



THE DECLARATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS,  
JANUARY 1, 1942

The next important step in the process of the formation of the United Nations was the Allied declaration of 1 January, 1942. The significance of the declaration signed by all the nations fighting the Axis powers who came to be known as the United Nations lay in the fact that the United States took a long and helpful step forward in comparison with its position during the First World War. By this arrangement, it tried to bind all the nations fighting the Axis to the acceptance of certain principles already stated in the Atlantic Charter. In the previous war, on the other hand, no effort was made to get the formal approval of the Allies to the war-time declarations and principles formulated by Woodrow Wilson. Various secret accords for territorial changes had been made by the Allied Governments during the course of the First World War. Furthermore, in the First World War, the United States considered and called itself an "Associate Power." By signing the Declaration of 1 January, 1942 the American government expressed in no uncertain terms its determination to join in a full alliance with the other nations fighting the Axis. Of added significance was the fact that it provided the struggle with a teleological content beyond the defeat of aggressors and restoration of occupied countries. There was to be a new order in the world,

not merely of abstinence from international conflict, but also of political freedom, economic advancement, and recognition of the common interest of civilization. Thus, the war on the part of the United Nations became, in fact, "a legal process, to break down organized brigandage and piracy." (19)

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19. Albert Shaw, International Bearings of American Policy (Baltimore, 1943) 4.

## 2. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW, 1943

Another important landmark in the growth of the United Nations was the convening of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1943. The Conference was to provide, among other things, a framework on which the coalition of nations fighting the Axis could agree to build a just post-war order.

A variety of factors were responsible for bringing the foreign ministers of the United States and Great Britain to Moscow. To begin with, since the Allies were not in a position to inflict quick defeat, the possibility existed that the enemy might attempt the break up of the United Nations coalition through friction or inducements. Also, another possibility existed that a rapid collapse of some one or other of the enemy could affect the stability of the United Nations coalition. A risk was also present that under certain circumstances,

... the national aims of any of the United Nations might adversely affect the general war effort jeopardizing, through alliances, territorial or other claims or fait accomplis, cooperative post-war relations as well as victory itself. (20)

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20. Department of State, Postwar Preparation 1939 - 1945  
(Washington, 1950) 160 - 1.

Aside from the fact that such potentialities were considerations to be weighed, there were actual strains discernible in the United Nations coalition that augmented the difficulties anticipated in establishing a sound peace. Thus, whereas the United States and Great Britain were at war with Germany and Italy and Japan, the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan. This factor inevitably necessitated a closer coordination of the war effort between Great Britain and the United States. The instrumentalities created for that purpose were many, such as the Combined British-American Boards on Raw Materials, Munitions Assignments and Shipping Adjustment, (January 26, 1942); the Combined Chiefs of Staff (February 6, 1942); and of the Pacific Council (March 30, 1942). It also meant, in the words of a Department of State publication, that "the United States and Great Britain, but not the Soviet Union, were waging a second gigantically difficult front -- the Pacific -- which Soviet leaders appeared to discount."<sup>(21)</sup> These and related conditions, including the doubts and mutual distrust continuing from the prewar years and the developments of 1939 - 1941 preceding the German attack on the Soviet Union, loomed large in the "second front" controversy, which had important repercussions on international relations during the war and the years that followed.

The measures taken initially to offset the friction

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21. *Ibid.*, 161.

engendered by the "second front" controversy were in substantial terms, economic and diplomatic. The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed on 26 May, 1942. Immediately afterwards, President Roosevelt and Foreign Commissar Molotov conferred on problems of Soviet-American relations in which "... full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942 ...." (22) Agreement was also reached to provide measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks and other kinds of materials from the United States to the Soviet Union. Most important of all, a fruitful exchange of views took place between Roosevelt and Molotov on the post-war period. Furthermore, the Lend-Lease agreement with the Soviet Union was reached on 16 June, 1942. Between August 12 and 15, 1942 Churchill conferred with Stalin in Moscow at which time a "number of decisions were reached covering the field of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe." (23) However, these conciliatory measures on the part of the

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22. Conference of the President of the United States (Roosevelt) with the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (Molotov). Leland M. Goodrich, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1941 - 1942 (Boston, 1942 ) IV, 243.

23. Conference of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Churchill) and the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. (Stalin), August 12 - 15, 1942. Joint Communique, August 17, 1942. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1942 - 1943 (Boston, 1944) V, 249 - 50.

Anglo-American countries were overshadowed by the intensity of German attacks on the Soviet front, while the British and the Americans expressed their inability to open a second front in Europe at that time. The Soviet Union took a very grave view of the situation. On 4 October, 1942, Stalin stated publicly that the second front occupied a place of "first-rate importance" in Soviet estimates of the situation, that Allied aid to Russia had been "little effective" in comparison with the Soviet contribution to the Allies in keeping engaged the German forces, and that "to amplify and improve this aid, only one thing is required; that the Allies fulfill their obligations completely and on time." (24)

On January 14 - 26, 1943, the first of the formal wartime conferences was held at Casablanca, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their combined staffs. The two leaders were anxious to come to some positive understanding with the Soviet Union on post-war policies. Stalin had refused to attend the Casablanca meeting on the ground that the military situation did not permit his absence from Moscow. Roosevelt sent another invitation to Stalin in May, 1943. This also brought no results because of the Anglo-American decision to delay the invasion of France until the spring of 1944.

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24. Andrew Rothstein, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy During The Patriotic War (London, 1944) I, 42.

Acrimonious exchanges between the Soviet Union and the Polish government situated in London began in January 1943 over the treatment of "Polish" citizens and conflicting territorial claims by the two governments over border areas led to the suspension of relations between the parties on April 25 of that year.

Taken as a whole, these conditions were indicative of the costly risks that would be entailed by any lack of preparation and any unnecessary delay in making policy decisions to meet the problems that victory would precipitate upon the victors. An evaluation of the existing conditions on the part of the post-war policy planners in the State Department necessitated their speeding up of plans for negotiations to convert the wartime United Nations coalition into an international organization to preserve peace after the war. (25) Besides, the "post-war" had already arrived in North Africa and Southern Italy and the Allied northward military advance was imminent. Taking note of the situation, Anglo-American opinion was united in assuming that while a new world security agency might fail even if all the great powers participated in it, it would certainly not succeed without them. It was not surprising, therefore, that Churchill and Roosevelt invited Stalin to attend the Quebec Conference held on August 11 - 24, 1943.

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25. The activities of the post-war policy planners in the Department of State is discussed separately.

Stalin, however, in refusing the invitation, suggested a preliminary meeting on the foreign office level. This took place in Moscow in October, 1943.

THE MOSCOW DECLARATION,  
30 OCTOBER, 1943

The meeting of the foreign ministers of the three principal powers, which was attended by Hull, Eden and Molotov at Moscow, was a preliminary to the meeting of the three heads of U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. at Teheran between 28 November and 1 December, 1943. In these two meetings the great powers wanted to knit together their respective war efforts into one effective joint strategy and to lay down, with as much precision as was possible and expedient at that time, the lines of their post-war collaboration to maintain peace and security.

The declaration issued at the end of the Conference solemnly stated that the Four Powers (U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and China) would cooperate in fighting the war to its end, and would continue to cooperate afterwards "for the organization and maintenance of peace and security." Three practical steps were promised :

They recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security ....



After the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

... They will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. (26)

The membership in the proposed organization was not to be universal. It would be open to all "peace-loving states," so that it signified that some procedure of admission in the future international organization was contemplated. Later, the Allies were to lay down the qualification that for a nation to be "peace-loving" it must, by a fixed date, declare war on the Axis.

It also became clear from the declaration that the future international organization would be based on the principles of juridical sovereign equality of all participating States. The reference by Hull to the Inter-American system in his address to Congress after his return from the Moscow Conference reinforced the conclusion that the forthcoming organization was to be based on purely voluntary collaboration among sovereign nations. Point 4 of the declaration (noted earlier as point 1) spoke only of the "maintenance of international peace and security," and the rest of the text added nothing to this objective.

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26. Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, 30 October, 1943. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 23, VI, 229 - 30.

Yet, in the joint note issued as an introduction to the Moscow declaration, the powers visualized a broader aim of the participating governments to promote "the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples," and to that end announced "a broad system of international cooperation and security."

As regards disarmament and its relation to collective security, the same trend was discernible in Allied thinking as existed during the time of the signing of the Atlantic Charter. The text was not, strictly, a promise to reduce armaments. It was rather a promise to work for conditions which would make reduction safe. (27) Such conditions would include the pooling of resources to check aggression and the prevention of competitive accumulation of weapons. More specifically, the Axis States were to be disarmed. If other countries were held to "threaten aggression," the Atlantic Charter stated, an attempt would be made to disarm them. Such a method would, it was contemplated, make it safer for the "peace-loving states" to

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27. Reflecting the general trend noted above Commander Smith-Hutton wrote, "It is to be hoped, however, that future naval limitations conferences are called after the political accords have been reached and after the naval powers are in such close harmony on political and economic matters that the size of their respective navies is no longer a controversial subject. The history of the attempts to regulate the size of the world's navies by treaty during the period 1921 - 1936 is sufficient proof that without the proper political accords and lacking an adequate and lasting economic basis, such attempts are almost certain to end in failure." Commander H.H. Smith-Hutton, "Post-War Problems and the Navy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Annapolis), 69 (June, 1943) 792.

reduce their armaments in some measure and check wasteful diversion of human and economic resources. Also, the four great powers were not only to regard each other as "peace-loving," but, the above mechanism rested on their capacity to reach agreement when deciding about the disarmament of nation or nations no longer "peace-loving." Thus, the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow declaration made the existence of security as a prerequisite for nations to disarm instead of treating disarmament, as was generally done during the inter-war period, as a step to security. (28)

The Moscow declaration also furthered the idea which had gained a considerable measure of support in Allied nations that in order to maintain future peace they would have to organize force internationally in some form which would be powerful enough to prevent aggressive States from launching an attack against other "peace-loving" States. Thus, the four great powers, signatories to the Moscow declaration, proclaimed their intention to maintain world peace and security by the collaborative use of their respective national forces pending the creation of a general international organization whose primary task would be the "maintenance of international peace and security."

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28. Percy E. Corbett, "Moscow, Teheran and International Organization," Yale Institute of International Studies, Memorandum no. 8, New Haven, 1 March, 1944.

Furthermore, the interim joint action by the signatories of the Moscow declaration (the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China) envisaged in the declaration was the product of their wartime thinking that power should be commensurate with responsibilities. (29) At the San Francisco Conference too in 1945, the great powers retained their special position in the field of maintaining international peace and security on the above principle.

The declaration had momentous implications. The association of the Soviet government in the declaration seemed good evidence of the willingness of the Soviet leaders to cooperate with Britain and America in the post-war period. Likewise, the association of the American government seemed equally to indicate the abandonment of a traditional policy of isolation from European affairs. The Allies were further assured of American willingness to participate in a universal security system when shortly thereafter the U.S. Senate passed the Connally Resolution, pledging the Senate to a new league of nations, by an overwhelming 85 - 5 vote. (30)

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29. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden declared: "Every state must have a right to make its voice heard in the discussion of the means whereby we shall arrive at our common ends. Let us admit that, though all states are equal in status, they are not equal in power, and consequently their duties must vary. The responsibility for the preservation of peace must fall in the first instance on the powers which signed the Moscow Declaration and, I hope, also on France when ... she resumes her place among the great powers." New York Times, 29 March, 1944.

30. Discussed in the section dealing with the U.S. Congress.

There was general satisfaction in the Allied countries over the publication of the Moscow declaration. The declaration went a long way in dispelling the mounting doubt and cynicism which had developed ever since the League of Nations machinery failed to provide an adequate bulwark against the aggressive policies of the Nazi governments. The institutions of international cooperation were, so to speak, submerged by the tide of nationalism — both political and economic — that spread throughout the world in the decade preceding the Second World War. The war brought uncertainties in its wake. People in the Allied countries were seriously questioning by this time whether the nations fighting the Axis symbolized more than a military alliance — so much as that competent observers estimated the value of the Moscow Conference for the conduct of war itself as the equivalent of at least one whole army at the front. (31)

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31. Fourth Report, Commission to study the Organization of Peace, International Conciliation, (January, 1944), 23. Also, the Political Group of the Council on Foreign Relations had as early as 9 July, 1942 suggested "An American Commitment On Peace Aims" The Group noted that "A fighting manifesto issued by the United States should take cognizance of our direct national interests as well as of our general aspirations for the postwar world ... Not only should the proclamation give eloquent expression to the hopes of freedom-loving men and women for a better world in which to live, but it must equally emphasize our determination to perpetuate the basic moral values of civilization. Lacking either of these qualities, the manifesto is hardly likely to engender that emotional dynamic which is as essential to the effective prosecution of the war as it is to the building of a just and durable peace." Council on Foreign Relations, "An American Commitment On Peace Aims," Studies of American Interests In The War And The Peace, No. P - B 44, New York, 9 July, 1942.

### THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

At the Teheran Conference (28 November - 1 December, 1943), for the first time in the course of the war, the heads of the three Big Powers (the U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K.) assembled together to discuss problems of mutual interest. It might also be pointed out that the coming together of the heads of States and the resultant opportunity which Roosevelt had for direct personal contacts with the other leaders was, in itself, a partial fulfilment of the President's schemes. As has been noted earlier, Roosevelt considered the policy of personal meetings between the heads of the major States as a good method for furthering better understanding of each other's policies and objectives.

Furthermore, it was only after the Teheran Conference that Roosevelt interested himself in the details of proposals that were being formulated in the Department of State. Soon after his return to Washington, he approved an outline of the departmental plan for international organization. Although the approved plan was far from complete and much still remained to be worked out before an official American position could be made firm, yet the President's approval made possible the international exchanges that ultimately led to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference

in the late summer of 1944.

Before the Teheran Conference started, one incident might be mentioned here as reflecting the difference between Roosevelt's and Churchill's approach towards their general policy of Big Power collaboration and their respective attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Roosevelt suggested to Churchill that if the Big Three were unable to meet at Teheran, the "genuine beginnings of British-Russian-United States collaboration" resulting from the Moscow Conference should be furthered by inviting Stalin to send "a Russian military representative to sit in" at the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, which was scheduled to be held at Cairo, who might be free to "make such comments and proposals" as Stalin might desire. (32) Churchill opposed Roosevelt's suggestion. He observed later on that he considered the suggestion to reflect "a strong current of opinion in American Government circles, which seemed to wish to win Russian confidence even at the expense of coordinating the Anglo-American war effort." (33) Roosevelt also seemed to visualise his role in these summit conferences to act as a sort of mediator and conciliator between Churchill

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32. Churchill, n. 4, V, 279.

33. Ibid., 276-7.

and Stalin. (34)

Although the questions relating to military strategy dominated the discussions, Roosevelt found an opportunity to express his ideas on post-war organization to Stalin. According to him, there would be, first, a world-wide Assembly comprising all the United Nations, meeting in various places at stated times to discuss world problems and make recommendations for their solution. Secondly, there would be a smaller Executive Committee, composed of the Big Four together with individual representatives of various groups of states: the British Dominions, the European States, the Latin American, Middle East and Far Eastern areas. The Executive Committee would deal with all non-military questions such as food, health, and economics. To Stalin's inquiry, whether the Committee would have

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34. Answering a query from his son, Elliott, Roosevelt said at Teheran that a lot of misunderstanding and mistrust of the past were going to be cleared up here. As for Stalin and Churchill, he added, "I'll have my work cut out for me, in between those two. They're so different. Ideas, temperament ...." Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, 1946) 176. Also, when on one occasion during the Conference Stalin and Churchill greatly disagreed on the treatment to be accorded to German war criminals, Roosevelt intervened: "Clearly there must be some sort of compromise between your position, Mr. Stalin, and that of my good friend the Prime Minister ...." Ibid., 189. Roosevelt's role as a conciliator between Churchill and Stalin was not uncalled for. Cordell Hull also told J. Farley that during the Moscow Conference "It was apparent that the Russians did not have much confidence in the British ...." James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story: The Roosevelt Years (New York, 1948) 362.



power to make binding decisions on all the nations, the President said that it would only make recommendations — for the peaceful settlement of disputes, for example — with the hope that the nations concerned would be guided thereby. Finally, there would be a four-nation enforcement body, the Four Policemen, with power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace or any sudden emergency. (35)

Stalin largely devoted his attention on this last proposal which Roosevelt termed as the "Four Policemen". The Soviet chief remarked that the smaller European nations would not like the plan and questioned China's right to act as a world policeman. He thought that instead of a single world-wide organization, it might be more practical to set up two bodies, one to exercise jurisdiction in Europe and a second in the Far East. Roosevelt remarked that this was like Churchill's plan announced in May, 1943. The great difficulty was that Congress and American public opinion would probably not support any arrangement

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35. Sherwood, n. 5, II, 780. It might be of interest to know that the President's plan was based on the Department of State's "Draft Constitution" which was, in turn, prepared under the supervision of Sumner Welles, n. 9, 189.

which involved America in a purely European organization. (36) To Stalin's observation that if the President's scheme were acted upon, American troops might have to be sent anywhere in the world, Roosevelt replied that American troops would not be available for such service. However, he believed American naval and air forces could be used to help police the world, but any land armies needed to quell aggression would have to be provided by Russia and Britain. The President thought that there might be two types of threats to the peace. Minor ones, arising out of difficulties between two small countries, could be met by the application of "quarantine" methods; but a major threat of aggression by a powerful State would have to be met by an ultimatum from the Four Policemen threatening, in turn, to invade or bomb the aggressive country. Significantly, in the discussion, the problem of what would happen should one of the policemen turn aggressor was never raised.

Another notable point which emerged out of the discussion was Stalin's deep seated fear of German

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36. Roosevelt was not perfectly candid here in presenting the American position. He did not mention the other argument against regionalism which Hull had impressed on him - the danger of rival spheres of influence and trade discrimination against the United States and, perhaps, the possibility of isolationists using this regional formula as a means to pin down American commitments only in the Western Hemisphere.

aggression. He constantly returned, then and on other occasions, to that issue: how to insure against another possible tide of German aggression. He did not believe that military defeat alone would, in future, keep Germany within its boundaries. He therefore suggested that the Allied forces retain the strategic points not only within and along the borders of Germany but also outside the area. He asserted that in a mere fifteen or twenty years Germany might again find herself able to attack Russia and, at a later stage of the Conference, he observed that any confederation of European States which could be devised would, in time, be dominated by the Germans if any part of Germany were admitted to membership in it. (37) One might therefore agree with McNeill that Stalin's immediate main reason for deciding to cooperate with the Western Powers in the setting up of what became the United Nations was his fear that, if he did not, Germany might be able to seize the opportunity offered by division between the victors to restore her strength. (38)

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37. Sherwood, n. 5, II, 789.

38. McNeill even ventures to suggest that "... it is even probable that he [Stalin] did not want to see the whole of Germany go Communist, believing that in such an event the Germans might well supplant the Russians as the dominant Soviet Group." William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941-1946 (London, 1953) 357.

On the question of the status of the Baltic States, the President had told Hull before the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference that while neither the British nor the Americans would "fight Russia over the Baltic States," he intended to appeal to Stalin, on "grounds of high morality," that it would be in the Soviet interest to agree to a second plebiscite in the Baltic States "two years or so after the war." On the boundary problem with the Soviet Union and Poland, he wanted the same idea to be applied to Eastern Poland, and that the new boundary should be somewhere east of the Curzon Line "with Lemberg going to Poland" and with a plebiscite held "after the shell shock of war had subsided." (39) The problem of the Baltic States and Soviet-Polish relations had its wider repercussions both in the progress of establishing a United Nations organization and on the domestic American political scene. Roosevelt, therefore, deemed it necessary to explain to Stalin the latter point emphasizing that "... there are six or seven million Americans of Polish extraction and others of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin who had the same rights and same votes as any one else ...." (40) However, the Roosevelt administration thought it prudent to postpone the settlement of boundary disputes till the end of the war.

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39. Hull, n. 17, 1266.

40. Sherwood, n. 5, II, 796.

3. THE IDEAS OF ROOSEVELT AND HULL  
ON PEACE, SECURITY AND  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,  
1941 - 1943 \*

During the years 1941 - 1943 which might as well be called the formative period of the United Nations organization, Roosevelt adopted an informal and non-committal approach to post-war planning. His ideas during the Atlantic Conference have already been surveyed and commented upon. In September, 1941, Roosevelt was toying with the idea of "reviving small states ... even if this has to be accomplished through plebiscite methods ...." as a means of preventing local conflicts between States. Although he did not say so specifically, such plebiscites would presumably be held under international auspices with the great powers exercising their preponderant role in any such undertaking. Pearl Harbour had demonstrated that even the strongest powers were not immune to attack from a determined aggressor. Disarmament of the proved aggressor should therefore be accompanied

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\* On recording Roosevelt's ideas during this period reliance is placed on Ruth Russell's book : A History Of The United Nations Charter in which are also found notes by Arthur Sweetser of a private conversation with the President in May, 1942. The observations are also based on a White House memorandum of a conversation with Clark Eichelberger in November, 1942, to be found in Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R. His Personal Letters : 1928 - 1945 (New York, 1950) II, 1366 - 7.

by some effective system of collective security, in which the police action of the great powers (the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China) would be brought in some fashion within a broader international framework. Thus, in a memorandum to Myron C. Taylor on 1 September, 1941, the President taking note of the "present complete confusion" did not think it advisable at that time to reconstitute a league of nations which because of its size would lead to "disagreement and inaction" among its members. He was not averse to the idea that there should be a meeting place where the countries of the world could discuss freely issues of common interest. The President, however, felt that the "four police men," presumably because of their combined strength and ability to take quick decisions would be better suited for the "management" of international problems. (41)

It should be noted that Roosevelt was equally concerned to emphasize the "trustee" aspect of the four policemen's role. He proposed to do that by placing the system of control and inspection of armaments in the hands of a commission of non-aligned States, who would report to the four major States whenever they found a violation of the armaments' prohibition. The police powers could then threaten first to quarantine the offending States and,

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41. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R., His Personal Letters : 1928 - 1945 (New York, 1950) II, 1371 - 2.

if that did not work, to bomb some part of it. (42) In view of the lack of armaments by other States, they would presumably have no means to defend themselves against these sanctions and, in the President's view, would therefore not dare risk the results. Having thus laid the foundations for security, the President was inclined to accept a general organization "something like the League," which would carry on all the non-security functions that the League of Nations was able to perform with a great deal of success. In this connection, he suggested that such an agency might remain located at Geneva, meeting each month or so to consider different fields of work like health, nutrition and economics. (43)

In April 1943, there appeared an article in The Saturday Evening Post which, the writer, on the basis of

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42. Moffat in his diary records President's ideas in 1942 thus : "The essence of President's ideas is that there should be few boundary changes and that the main emphasis should be placed on the complete disarmament of Germany, the constant and thorough inspection of their industry, coupled with an international police force, particularly an aviation bombardment police force of the four big Allied powers, U.K., U.S., Russia and China. He was toying with the idea of breaking up Germany into component states, though I did not gather that he was even mentally committed." Nancy Harrison Hooker, ed., The Moffat Papers : Selections From The Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat 1919 - 1943 (Cambridge, 1956) 387 - 8.

43. Later the President inclined to the idea that these activities should be handled by separate agencies located at various points around the globe, rather than being concentrated in Geneva. However, according

... (continued on page 70 )

his talk with the President, assured his readers, represented Roosevelt's thinking on international security matters. The writer cautioned, however, that the President's ideas were "subject to change without notice." (44) In this "trial balloon" article Forrest Davis emphasized Roosevelt's belief that although planning for future cooperation meant taking risks, he was, nevertheless, hopefully counting on the "common denominator" — the need for peace felt by every State. A "genuine association of interests" on the part of States and particularly the great powers, the article went on, was essential if the wartime military alliance was to be transformed into a "political society of nations." Davis further observed that in Roosevelt's opinion the future depended more on Stalin than on Anglo-American desires, since the Soviet Union would be the only first-rate military power on the continents of Europe and Asia after the war. If Stalin should decide to cooperate with the Western powers, the article added, a secure basis for a peaceful

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to Welles, the President gradually saw that his Big Power policing scheme would not work, that Britain would be too weak after the war to help much, that great new revolutionary forces were at work in the world, and that even the United States would not be able to cope with them. Welles, n. 9, 175.

44. Forrest Davis, "Roosevelt's World Blueprint," The Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia), 215 (10 April 1943) 20 - 21, 109 - 10.



society could be easily laid; if he chose otherwise, the Western Allies would be "driven back on balance-of-power system." (45)

According to Davis, the President although not favouring a revival of the League of Nations, nevertheless, desired retaining and developing certain of its instrumentalities. Thus, the mandate system, the plebiscite method for determining the sovereignty of disputed areas and the establishment of commissions to deal with specific problems -- all these ideas associated with the League of Nations were acceptable to Roosevelt.

It was also stated in the article that the President did not contemplate the creation of international forces or the internationalizing of the "great sea bases," most of which were already in Anglo-American control like Hawaii and Gibraltar, and in the case of Panama and Suez their canal zones were respectively in the hands of the U.S.A. and U.K. Davis also pointed out that the preventive use of air force would make it unnecessary to keep large American forces abroad for international security purposes. Besides, by establishing such an effective deterrent against aggression, the small countries which otherwise could not defend themselves against a powerful aggressor, might become more amenable to the idea of disarmament paving the way, thereby, for greater productive use of their national

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45. Ibid

resources.

Roosevelt's enthusiasm for carrying over the inter-American experience in international cooperation into a global framework could also be noted in his letter of 21 September, 1943 to former Senator George W. Norris (Republican, Nebraska). In it the President appeared to put before the post-war planners the task of disseminating the ideals of peace among very diverse nationalities in Europe who, over past centuries "... have divided themselves into a hundred different forms of hate." He felt the same situation existed among Latin American countries who, however, gradually began to cooperate through the instrumentalities of inter-American system and "... to-day there is a substantial accord." (46)

Roosevelt also seemed to consider the need for a "transitional period" lasting for about two or three years after the end of the fighting in order that people all over the world might find time for "recuperation" from the disaster and ill-will spread by the war. The transitional period should precede before the nations decided to take up such questions as the laying down of the final terms with regard to boundary, transfers of population and free intercourse, the lowering of economic barriers and planning for mutual reconstruction. During the proposed transitional period Roosevelt was visualizing that the Four

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46. Roosevelt, n. 41, 1445 - 7.

Great Powers would act as "sheffiffs" to maintain order in the world. In the mean time, he hoped, many special conferences could be held among the Allies to discuss the broad policies and ideals for the post-war period. (47)

HULL'S VIEWS ON A WORLD ORGANIZATION  
AFTER THE WAR

The President's strong leaning towards a regional approach generally coincided with Churchill's thinking, but was in sharp contrast with that of Hull. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, was firmly convinced that the world organization should be supreme over any regional association. He believed that regional organization should not be so constituted as to "interfere with the authority or work of the general organization." (48)

Thus, Hull while accepting certain advantages which accrued from the regional organizations felt that there

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47. Ibid. Reading William Hassett's records, one gets the distinct impression that Roosevelt's concept of the four policemen for the maintenance of world peace also had regional undertones. On 5 April, 1943, the President was of the view that "... the United States and China would police Asia. Africa will be policed by Great Britain and Brazil, the latter because of proximity to Africa, with other interested nations co-operating. The United States will see to the protection of the Americas, leaving the peace of Europe to Great Britain and Russia ...." William D. Hassett, Off the Record with F.D.R. 1942 - 1945 (New Brunswick, 1958) 166.

48. Hull, n. 17, 1640.

were certain other important factors which stood against it. On the side of the advantages, he believed that the regional organizations could facilitate peaceful adjustment of disputes locally and thus provide the universal organization with greater freedom to carry out its wider functions. Also, should any one of the great powers decide to leave the organization, the regional organizations "would offer something to fall back upon." (49) However, the Secretary of State feared that as regional organizations became solidified, it might be possible that conflicts would spring up between regions rather than between nations. The universal organization, in such a contingency might find itself incapable of dealing with those conflicts. Hull was, therefore, of the opinion that it would be easier for a future world organization to deal with a nation alone than with a nation tied into and supported by a region. Hull also doubted if the American people could reconcile themselves to the idea of non-American powers participating in the western hemispheric councils. Besides, he had reasons to believe that a purely regional plan, if adopted, would be "a haven for the isolationists" who would then advocate all out United States cooperation in a western hemispheric council on condition that the U.S. did not participate in a European or Pacific

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49. Ibid., 1643 - 4.

council. (50)

It would not be correct to conclude that regional organizations did not at all belong in Hull's scheme. To be sure, he felt that "subordinate to the world organization and within its framework," groups of nations located in a given area "might with entire consistency carry forward the policies we had adopted in our structure of Pan American system." (51)

Another important strand in Hull's thinking on the post-war situation was his strong advocacy that the United Nations should agree before the termination of hostilities upon a broad set of principles capable of world-wide application. That, in his opinion, would be the only means of establishing a new system of norms in international relations. Those principles would also

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50. Ibid., 1645. Thus, one could discern in the writings of Herbert Hoover a great deal of support for the principle of regionalism as a solid foundation to base a peaceful post-war order. Picking up the thread from Churchill's advocacy in 1943 of a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia (New York Times, 22 March, 1943), Hoover and Gibson in a joint article suggested the creation of a "Council of the Western Hemisphere." In the same article they voiced their support for "cooperative regionalism" -- the regional bodies of Asia, Western Hemisphere and Europe cooperating at the top relating to inter-regional or world-wide character. Herbert Hoover and Huger Gibson, "An Approach to a Lasting Peace," New York Times, 4 April, 1943.

51. Hull used an analogy to explain his position: "When a house catches fire, the nearest neighbours hasten there with the common objective of putting out or preventing the spread of fire until the Fire Department, which has been instantly notified, can arrive on the scene." Hull, n. 17, 1645.

provide, in the post-war period, valuable guidance in considering separate and specific questions. (52)

Furthermore, such a broad set of principles capable of world-wide application, he believed, could be found in the inter-American experiment of good neighbourly living. (53)

It should be recorded here that the Secretary of State by the time of the opening of the Quebec Conference was able to persuade the President to accept his view point as regards the relationship between regional and world organization. Despite his earlier views,

52. If one were to accept the opinion of Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister of Canada recorded in The Moffat Papers, Roosevelt in December 1942 took the point of view that in general principles at least the United Nations should come to an agreement during the fighting. Hooker, n. 42, 388. (9 December, 1942). In this respect Roosevelt therefore differed from Hull who was of the opinion that emphasis should primarily be laid on stating general and broad principles rather than on discussing precise post-war matters. Furthermore, in a visit to Washington in November, 1942, Moffat had noted in a memorandum of a conversation with Norman Davis : "He, the Secretary, is inclined not to discuss any post-war matter in concrete terms and to resent any speeches. Sumner Welles, on the other hand, says that the President has commissioned him to keep the issue before the public and to educate it now instead of confronting it, as was done last time, with a fait accompli." Ibid., November 13 - 17, 1942, 388.
53. Hull, n. 17, 1298. At the third meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Rio de Janeiro, January, 1942, the resolution No. XXV on post-war problems also reflected the above sentiment. In paragraph one, the signatories declared that, "World peace must be based on the principles of respect for law, of justice and of cooperation which inspire the nations of America and which have been expressed at inter-American meetings held from 1889 to date ...." Goodrich, n. 22, 325.

Churchill too accepted Hull's approach and, therefore, did not object to the Four Nation Declaration which was presented by Hull at the Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow in October, 1943. (54) The declaration expressed the agreement of the four major nations on the necessity of establishing at the earliest practical date "... a general international organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."(55)

No wonder, then, that after the end of the Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow in October, 1943, Hull was gratified when his ideas for world cooperation were accepted by the other major powers. On 18 November, 1943, addressing a joint session of Congress he declared that if the provisions of the Moscow Declaration were carried into effect, there would no longer be any need

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54. Churchill's faith in an effective European political unit began to fade away because of two reasons. First, because of the tension and ill feeling between the Russians and the British in 1943, it became clear that without Russian consent, a plan for federating Europe could hardly hope to succeed. Second, the Russians made it quite clear that they opposed any plan for federation which extended to central and eastern Europe. Hull, n. 17, 1298 - 9. Sherwood, n. 5, II, 711. Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (New York, 1947) 152, 184.

55. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 26, 229.

"... for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests."<sup>(56)</sup>

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56. Hull, n. 17, 1648.



4. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PLANNING  
1941 - 1943

American preparation for the postwar period grew out of the history and foreign relations of the American people; it also grew directly out of the experiences of the interwar years and out of the experiences of the war itself. A largely new and evolving policy was required, not a set of fixed dogmas or a hurriedly improvisation of plans at the close of the war. Continuous re-evaluation of the issues and revision of thought as events unfolded became essential. (57)

Although there was early agreement on the need for American participation in and leadership of a cooperative effort to maintain peace, it was not settled from the start that such a policy would centre on the formation of a single, general international organization designed to keep the peace. There was much difference of opinion in Roosevelt's and Hull's approach toward any future world organization. Added to this divergence of views between the two leaders was the fact that within the Department of State itself, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles's views were not identical with those of Hull. Until the resignation of Welles, Departmental planning generally continued on the pattern set by him. As for Roosevelt, he gradually became amenable to accepting

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57. Department of State, n. 20, 160 - 1.

Hull's views and, hence, after the Moscow and Teheran Conferences of 1943, American planning was solely in terms of a general organization of the type favoured by Hull.

The first step within the Department of State toward planning for peace was taken by Hull more than a year before Pearl Harbour. On 16 September, 1939, when he appointed Leo Pasvolksy for this work, the Departmental machinery for post-war planning was set in motion. On 8 January, 1939, the "Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations" was formed. (58) It was to function under the chairmanship of Sumner Welles. The committee was to "gather data on and study both the immediate and long range results of overseas war measures and the manner in which the problems arising from them may best be handled ...." (59) The main issues to which the Advisory Committee addressed itself were to limit and to end the war if possible, to clarify the requisite bases for a future world order, and, more immediately, to strengthen the defence of the Western Hemisphere. There were also established three subcommittees dealing with : (1) political problems including the organization

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58. It may be pointed out, at the outset, that the Department of State did not want to repeat the procedure adopted in the administration of Woodrow Wilson. Colonel House, Wilson's close confidant conducted his own inquiry and preparation for the Peace Conference of 1919 outside the machinery of the State Department.

59. Department of State Bulletin, (Washington), 2 (13 January 1940) 19.

of peace, (ii) limitation and reduction of armaments, and (iii) economic problems.

Many of those taking part in the Department's early preparatory work thought that American public opinion would go further in support of the United States participation in international economic cooperation than in international political arrangements. Consequently, the State Department planners decided to approach the problem of the restoration of peace first from the economic standpoint. At the same time, the subcommittee on political problems turned its attention to the proposed conference of neutrals. (60) It was, however, handicapped in its studies by the uncertainty of the war, American neutrality, and the state of American public opinion which appeared sceptical of such ventures requiring American cooperation with foreign governments. To achieve disarmament "and a force to make it effective," it was considered that "some machinery for political decisions must exist;" and that such a machinery should also be responsible for the operation of an international military force to enforce peace.

An official of the State Department, in a memorandum, suggested some curtailment of the sovereignty

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60. On February 9 and 10, 1940, the United States began diplomatic conversations with fortyseven neutral governments looking toward an exchange of views on "two basic problems connected with the establishment of a sound foundation for a lasting world peace; namely, the establishment of the bases of a sound international economic system, and the limitation and reduction of armaments." Hull, n. 17, 1628.

of States as would make it possible for any future international agency to act quickly and decisively. Such a step would have involved the abolition of the rule of unanimity. The memorandum, however, pointed out that the practical power would reside, as always, in the hands of the Great Powers unless, which seemed unlikely, one were to conceive of a Federated Union along the pattern of the United States. Hence in some form, perhaps in that of an Executive Committee, it was noted in the memorandum, the Great States must be able to consult at once and decisively. (61) The political organization for Europe was then envisaged on a weighted basis of representation, with one member from each of the following nine "groups" : Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, the Iberian Peninsula, the Oslo Group, the Eastern Baltic States and Poland, the Danubian States, and the Balkan States.

Advisory to this "Political Body" there would be a "Permanent Disarmament Commission" to supervise the operation of a basic disarmament agreement, and a "Permanent Group" with the following political functions :

There shall be established a permanent group whose duty it would be to watch over events in the various countries and to announce to the Political Body any situation, together with recommendations for its treatment, which in the judgement of the group is likely to become acute and to lead to disturbance. The group should

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61. Memorandum (by Huger R. Wilson) Arising From Conversations In Mr. Welles' Office. Appendix 5, 1 May, 1940. Department of State, n. 20, 458 - 60.

consist of selected individuals rather than governmental appointees, recognized for their wisdom, character and experience. The group should have wide powers for travel and investigation and perhaps for the maintenance of representatives in the various countries to furnish periodic reports of conditions. (62)

While the Department of State planning was proceeding on these lines, the political situation in Europe in 1940 changed drastically. Some of the most important neutral countries fell under the Nazi rule and the collapse of France caused the State Department to abandon its tentative thoughts on postwar organization and tackle more pressing and immediate problems. Sumner Welles who had been on a fact-finding mission to Europe in 1940 reported back to his Department that "important as the territorial, political, and economic problems were, security was the basic problem in Europe ...." (63) Taking note of this report and the continuing and deepening impact of war abroad, the planners focussed attention on "security as prerequisite for peace." (64) Thus, the first effort to make post-war preparation, arising out of the pressure of current problems, was largely on an ad hoc basis. Also, the Department's thinking seemed to be focussed primarily

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62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 27.

64. Ibid.

in terms of a policy designed for Europe, not on a world wide basis.

The year 1941 was of great significance for the organization of the preparation of post-war policy. At the beginning of the year organized research was instituted in the Department and the decision was also taken towards the end of the year to organize post-war preparation on a new and full-scale basis. In order to proceed with this preparatory work, a broad set of goals was provided by the President in his annual message to the Congress, 6 January, 1941, when in defining the objective of a secure future, he stated :

... We look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression — everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way — everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want — which, translated into world terms, means economic undertakings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants — everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear — which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour — anywhere in the world. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world

attainable in our time and generation. (65)

The Atlantic Charter proclaimed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in August 1941 provided the Departmental planners with a further basis on which to build a structure for a post-war world.

The political research studies under way by the fall of 1941 envisaged formulation of an integrated programme of policies and action for dealing with post-war problems in three stages or periods. The first was the period of transition from war to peace. It covered the problems that would arise immediately after the cessation of hostilities and prior to the conclusion of formal peace arrangements. The conclusion of such peace arrangements was to come under the second period; and under the third — the conduct of affairs in the critical period during which such arrangements would be put into effect.

Reflecting Hull's ideas in 1942, the State Department conceived of the idea of establishing a Supreme War Council composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China and "possibly the Netherlands." (66) About the role of this Council, Hull

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65. S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations 1940 - 1941 (Boston, 1941) III, 33.

66. Department of State, n. 20, 62.

wrote to Roosevelt :

... it seems essential to provide machinery which will effectively coordinate the use of resources and the military effort, making suitable allocation between theaters of war, keeping continuous check on the execution of war plans and, if possible, achieving unified command in theaters where this is feasible. (67)

The President rejected the proposal on the ground that it was "too complicated and also impractical, for the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan and therefore could not sit at the same council table with China, which was not in the war against Germany." (68)

During this period also, Hull, with the approval of the President, constituted a new committee consisting of several officials of the government and of several prominent persons from outside the government with special qualifications for contributing to this work. It was called the Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy. The Committee carried on its work under circumstances very different from those prevailing during the early organization for considering the post-war problems. The basic uncertainty about the outcome of the war was no longer present. Victory on the side of the United Nations could now be assumed. The nature of American participation in

67. Hull, n. 17, 1117 - 8.

68. Sherwood, n. 5, 467. Furthermore, according to Hopkins, "It was Roosevelt's conviction that only Britain and the United States could really co-operate in formulating and implementing global strategy, and most importantly, in determining the allocation of combined resources." Ibid



the creation of the international organization after the cessation of hostilities was no longer confined to questions concerning the influence that a neutral United States could or should exert. The planners were in a position now to think confidently in the words of the State Department publication that :

We, as a principal power among the victors, would share the heavy responsibility of all the victors in determining the character of the postwar world; we would decisively influence the nature of any organization of international peace to follow .... (69)

Six regular and three special subcommittees in the political, security, and economic fields were set up under the Advisory Committee. Shortly afterwards, the membership of the committee was raised to include 45 persons appointed from the public and several governmental agencies. True to the administration's determination not to make the same mistakes as those of 1919 - 1920, Hull invited members from the Senate and the House of Representatives on a bipartisan basis in the Committee deliberations. (70)

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69. Department of State, n. 20, 62.

70. Among the invited were, from the Democratic Senators Tom Connolly of Texas, Walter F. George of Georgia, Elbert D. Thomas of Utah and Republican Senators Warren A. Austin of Vermont and Wallace H. White of Maine. Likewise, invitations were sent to a number of Congressmen of both the parties including Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York), Charles A. Eaton (Republican, New Jersey) and Luther A. Johnson (Democrat, Texas).

The Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy began its work in 1942. Within two months, under Welles' chairmanship, it had considered the creation of an interim international political organization during the war, without waiting for the peace. This body, to be known as the United Nations Authority, was to consist of representatives not only of the four major powers — the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China — but some arrangement was also to be worked out to associate all the other Allies with the organization.

On 23 July, 1942, Secretary Hull publicly stated the gist of his thinking on post-war problems in a radio address, he said :

It is plain that some international agency must be created which can — by force, if necessary — keep the peace among nations in the future. There must be international cooperative action to set up the mechanisms which can thus insure peace. This must include eventual adjustment of national armaments in such a manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged, and that the burden of armaments may be reduced to a minimum. (71)

Here, one could notice the beginnings of the changed approach of the United States to the problem of world peace and security. No longer was there any talk about the renunciation of force in international affairs and disarmament; the future world body must be made sufficiently

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71. Hull, n. 17, 1638.

strong and, to that end, nations must pool their resources to deter future aggressions.

By the spring and summer of 1943, the Political Subcommittee took a clear stand on a number of basic questions relating to the creation of a post-war security organization. To begin with, a primary choice had to be made on whether a transitional or permanent international organization should be established. The Special Subcommittee On International Organization, under the chairmanship of Welles chose to prepare for the former. A choice had to be made between reviving the League of Nations and the setting up of a new international organization. The Subcommittee decided to work for the establishment of a world organization. Furthermore, when the Subcommittee began drafting a provisional outline of the international organization which later on was known as the "Draft Constitution of International Organization," a question arose whether or not to build upon the Kellogg - Briand Pact. (72) It was thought that a "completely fresh approach, devoid of rhetorical denunciations of war," was to be preferred. (73)

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72. The Pact with its emphasis on the repudiation of war as an instrument of national policy was originally signed by representatives of 15 States including the United States and France on 27 August, 1928.

73. Department of State, n. 20, 112.

The work of the Special Subcommittee on International Organization was naturally influenced by the appraisal of its members of prevailing and foreseeable world and national conditions and by many uncertainties with respect to American public opinion. While there was considerable support for the idea of a federalized international organization -- or government -- among a large section of American public, there was also at this period a possibility that "the dominating American opinion of the years before the war in favour of political isolationism might re-assert itself." (74) Furthermore, there was still uncertainty as regards the attitude of the Senate towards any proposals in this field. In the spring of 1943, Hull began the informal consultations with members of the Congress which have been discussed separately. (75)

The Subcommittee on Security Problem centred its attention in this period mainly on the following measures : (i) To maintain international security in relation to ex-enemy States in the period immediately after armed hostilities ceased. (ii) To provide for general security arrangements, including control of armaments, in the period before an international organization

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74. Ibid., 113. The existence of strong pressures in the direction of a federalized international organization or government has been studied separately.

75. See section on the Congressional Policies.

was established to maintain peace. (iii) To devise the security provisions to be contained in the basic instrument of that international organization. Also, the Subcommittee was aware of the fact that the "post-war responsibilities of the United States as a major power would be so different in degree, and presumably in kind, as to make imperative a thorough reappraisal of the world's and our own security needs ...." (76)

The Second World War had given a serious blow to all the pre-war arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security and the post-war political map of the world was bound to show some significant changes. The Security Subcommittee had, therefore, to think of post-war security arrangements in terms mainly of broad choices and assumptions. The Subcommittee chose the course of organized international action to maintain security on the basis of agreements among the United Nations. It assumed that necessary international political and judicial machinery for the settlement of international disputes would be established and that the international organization should have the means of enforcing compliance with its decisions when necessary for the maintenance of peace anywhere in the world. Also the Subcommittee assumed that in the transitional period, till the establishment of a permanent general international security organization, the

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76. Department of State, n. 20, 126.

four major powers would have to accept the principal responsibility along with the participation of other members of the United Nations, for the maintenance of peace and for the enforcement of compliance with treaty limitations upon armaments.

With regard to an armament treaty, the Subcommittee envisaged that the major powers might undertake by an agreement, which could be made effective as soon as practicable, to fix maximum and minimum limits for their armaments and military forces and that subsequently the stabilization of all armaments might be reached through agreement among the other members. The international organization, when established, should have forces, resources, and facilities made available to it by all members proportionately on the basis of their respective capacities. The Subcommittee was of the view that peace and security were dependent not only upon enforcement measures but that certain other essential conditions in the social and economic realms were also necessary to realize that end.

Considering the over-all security aspect the Subcommittee felt that a firm agreement between the principal powers before the conclusion of the war would provide a secure basis for post-war peace and security. Thus it advocated an understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union to facilitate the formulation

of a common policy with regard to future post-war settlements. The Subcommittee ardently hoped that, in future, the Great Powers would live up to their obligations in any system of collective security and that the smaller States would welcome the new role of the Great Powers. (77)

The tentative thinking that went on in different Subcommittees ultimately led to the stage of the preparation of drafts by the State Department to be used in negotiating with other governments for the establishment of a general international security organization. By 14 July, 1943 the State Department was able to prepare a "Draft Constitution of International Organization." (78)

THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION,  
JULY 14, 1943

The essential features of the Draft Constitution were as follows : The organization was to consist of seven main organs — the Executive Committee, the Council, the General Conference, the General Security and Armaments Commission, the Secretariat, the Judiciary. According to the preamble, the United Nations, having dedicated themselves to the principles of peaceful relations between States and to a common programme of human rights, were to "establish and agree to maintain the instrumentality by which peace and human rights may be assured." It should

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77. Ibid., 129.

78. Ibid., 472 - 83.

be noted that the Draft placed equal emphasis on the maintenance of peace and human rights by the comity of nations. (79) The organization was to "reflect the universal character of the international community" and to that end the Draft Constitution stipulated that "all qualified states and dominions" should be members of the organization.

The Executive Committee was to be composed of representatives of the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China. The Executive Committee was given responsibilities as laid down in Article 10 of the Draft Constitution pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security. Furthermore, powers reserved to the Council might, in emergency cases, when the Council was not in session, be exercised by the Executive Committee.

The Council was to be composed of eleven representatives of whom the four major powers, as permanent members, would be represented as individual nations. The other seven members would each represent a region of the world rather than any individual nation. (80) As regards the powers of the Council it was given authority "to supervise and coordinate the work of the various organizations, bureaus,

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79. The changing nature of war and the ever increasing urge of mankind to establish a code of behaviour between men and nations that would provide maximum scope and initiative for the enjoyment of human rights was recognised by the drafters as early as 30 October, 1942." *ibid.*, 113.

80. In this respect as Hull rightly pointed out "the draft reflects Welles' influence, since he was a convinced advocate of regional organization." Hull, n. 17, 1640.



committees or commissions which may be recognised or established under this instrument ...." Also, "it may ... deal with any situation or condition which may threaten an impairment of the good relations among peoples."

The General Conference which would be composed of representatives of all members of the international organization was given "authority to act upon any matter of concern to the international community, and such special matters as may be referred to it by the Executive Committee or the Council." Further, the General Conference, at the request of the Executive Committee, "shall give such assistance in the application of security measures as may be deemed necessary for the restraint of aggression and the maintenance of peace."

The General Security and Armaments Commission was to be established by the Council as a permanent advisory and administrative agency to assist the Council and the Executive Committee in giving effect to the provisions of this instrument relating to the application of security measures and the control of armaments according to the procedure of Article 10. It was to be composed of military, naval, aviation, and civilian representatives of the states and groups of States represented on the Council. Furthermore, it was designed,

(a) to study the quantitative limitations of armaments as provided in Article 10;

(b) to supervise and report to the Council on the execution and maintenance of armaments, stipulations as laid down by the Council, and to advise on any modifications;

(c) to study all technical matters pertaining to the application of security measures, and to take charge of the technical coordination of security measures instituted by the Council or the Executive Committee.

Provision was made for the establishment of an armaments inspection commission to be established by the Council to carry out the duties of armaments inspection laid down in Article 10, paragraph 7 of the Draft Constitution. On the subject of judiciary it said that "a permanent court of international justice and such additional tribunals as may be found to be necessary shall be maintained."

On the issue of machinery for peaceful change or, as the Draft Constitution puts it, "peaceful adjustment," the members were to agree to facilitate a settlement of all their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the procedure set forth below :

Any condition whose continuation might disturb the peace or the good understanding between nations, or any dispute which if unsettled might lead to a rupture, shall be settled by direct negotiation, by negotiation through intermediaries, by recommendation of the Council or the General Conference, or by judicial decision.

The Draft Constitution gave every State a "friendly right" to bring to the attention of the Council or the

General Conference any condition or dispute which in its view might disturb the peace or the good understanding between nations. Further :

If the Council or the General Conference decides that action should be taken, the Council shall cause an investigation to be made and shall cause such action to be taken as it may deem necessary to facilitate a settlement. If the Council fails to effect a settlement in this manner, it shall make a report on the whole case to the General Conference, including recommendations for a settlement which it deems just and equitable.

After the General Conference has taken account of the report to the Council, any opinion rendered at the request of the Council or otherwise by the Permanent Court of International Justice, and "any additional considerations," it should make such recommendations for a settlement as it might deem just and equitable. "If these recommendations are approved by a three-fourth (vote) of the Members present, exclusive of the parties, it shall be the duty of the parties to give effect to them." Thus, under the draft proposal, the parties were put under a definite obligation to accept the recommendations of the General Assembly.

Article Ten, which was the crux of the Draft Constitution on the matter of security and armaments, declared that any menace to the peace of nations, whenever it arises, was a matter of "vital concern" to all States. The international organization through its Executive

Committee or Council, should take any action necessary to safeguard or restore peace. The machinery to check the "breach or imminently threatened breach" of the peace between nations was simple enough. The Chairman of the Council, in consultation with such members of the Executive Committee as might be available, should request the parties to desist from any action which would further aggravate the situation and should forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. The Council was to "request" the parties to restore or maintain the position existing before the breach or threatened breach of the peace and to accept procedures of peaceful settlement. The State or States which failed to comply with this request within a specified time should be presumed to "intend a violation of the peace of nations" and the Executive Committee or the Council should apply all the necessary measures to restore or maintain the peace. The member States likewise undertook not to give such State or States assistance of a character which "in the opinion of the Council would aggravate the dispute." The members further agreed to make available for action "in the event of a breach, or imminently threatened breach, of the peace between nations" to restore or maintain peace :

such armaments, facilities, installations, strategic areas and contingents of armed forces, and to afford such freedom of passage through their territories, as the Council or the Executive Committee, advised by the General Security and Armaments Commission, may determine to be necessary for this purpose, having regard for the geographical position, regional or special obligations, and relative resources of member states.

Also, in order that action might be effective, the member States should agree to carry out such measures of an economic, commercial, or financial character as decided upon by the Council or the Executive Committee in accordance with this article.

On the armaments problem the Draft Constitution went much further in providing for machinery to see that actions of member States conform with their express declarations and to check any armaments race based on mutual suspicion. The Council was given authority to establish "the minimum and maximum limitations on armaments and regulations of previously agreed categories of armaments potential to be observed by all members." Such limitation and regulation was to be "enforced by a system of inspection" which should be carried out by the Armaments Inspection Commission under the direction of the General Security and Armaments Commission. The member States bind themselves to this end to accord the Commission "every facility for the effective discharge of its mission." One striking point in the Draft Constitution was that any action taken by the Council under this article (art. 10) should require a two-thirds majority vote "including three-fourths of the members of the Executive Committee." Thus, according to this Draft Constitution, security was not based on the premise that the Big Four could do no wrong and that, consequently, any action under this article should be approved by the major powers. Theoretically,

the Council could take action against a big power acting in disregard of its commitments.

Finally, on the matter of regional arrangements the Draft Constitution declared :

Nothing in this instrument shall be deemed to affect such regional arrangements, associations or agreements, now existing or which may be entered into provided these arrangements are not inconsistent with the aims and purposes of this instrument. The Council or the General Conference may encourage the establishment of such arrangements, associations or agreements, when deemed desirable to give effect to the general purposes of the International Organization.

#### THE DRAFT CHARTER

A month later, on 14 August, 1943, another full Draft Constitution of a general international organization, representing the views of a staff group in the Division of Political Studies of the State Department came up for consideration by the American planners. The staff draft bore the title, "The Charter of the United Nations." (81) This text, which was less than twelve pages in length, contained a number of provisions later incorporated in the proposals presented by the United States at Dumbarton Oaks the following year. The word "Charter" was first formally employed here in connection with the future general international organization, and the term "United Nations," coined by Roosevelt for the war-time coalition, was first

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81. Referred to in this section as the Draft Charter.

used here as the name for the future permanent organization.

The Draft Charter envisaged the establishment of a General Conference, a Council, an international court of justice, various technical organizations for economic and social cooperation and establishment of a "system of administration for territories which may be placed under the authority of The United Nations by treaty or other agreement." Unlike the Draft Constitution of International Organization, there was to be established under the Draft Charter only the General Conference representing all the members of the United Nations and the Council consisting of "representatives with indeterminate tenure whose special position devolves upon them exceptional responsibilities for the maintenance of international security, together with the representatives of an equal number less one of Members elected by the General Conference for annual term and not immediately eligible for reelection." The intermediate organization between these two, proposed in the previous draft, which was composed of permanent powers and of representatives from different regional groupings was now discarded.

Another noticeable change in the Draft Charter was the increase in responsibility of the General Conference in matters relating to the maintenance of peace while keeping the "exceptional responsibility for the maintenance of international security" with the Council. The General

Conference was made an important policy making body while providing the necessary control in the Council. Article 3, para 2 of the Draft Charter declared that "in the matters of international concern affecting the community of nations," the General Conference "shall determine the general policies of The United Nations and may initiate action where the initiative is not specifically reserved to the Council." The Council, under Article 4, para 3, although possessing "primary responsibility" for the maintenance of international security was enjoined to have "general responsibility for giving executive effect to policies determined by the General Conference." Furthermore, under Article 8, para 1, dealing with security and armaments provisions, the members declared that "any threat to international peace and security" was a matter of concern to all of them and undertook to support measures adopted by the Council and the General Conference for safeguarding or restoring peace. The General Conference's role in determining economic sanctions was evident in Article 8, para 5. Like the Draft Constitution, the Draft Charter placed great emphasis on the question of human rights. Article 9 of it declared "The Members of United Nations agreed to give legislative effect to the Declaration of Human Rights ...." It envisaged an organization on the universal pattern but did not preclude regional developments -- existing or future -- provided such developments were consistent with the



universal organization.

A significant provision incorporated in these two drafts of 14 July and 14 August, 1943 was the granting of initiative and enforcing powers to the international organization in the matter of pacific settlement of disputes. There were, nonetheless, some important differences between the two drafts. In the Draft Constitution the members of the international organization agreed "to facilitate a settlement of their differences by peaceful means ...." In the Draft Charter the members agreed to settle by peaceful means "any of their disputes which may threaten the peace and security of nations," thus circumscribing the nature of conflicts. The Draft Constitution declared "any condition" the continuance of which might disturb the peace or the good understanding between nations, or "any dispute" which, if unsettled, might lead to a rupture "shall be settled by direct negotiation, by negotiation through intermediaries, by recommendations of the Council or the General Conference, or by judicial decision." The Draft Charter, on the other hand, spoke only of "any dispute," the continuance of which might disturb the peace or the good understanding between nations and which could not be settled by diplomacy, should be submitted to procedures like conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. The deletion of "any condition" from the clause in the Draft Charter seemed to indicate that the planners — foreseeing the

possible extension of the "any condition" clause in the domestic realm of individual states — wanted to remove this ambiguity so as to make on acceptable to all the states.

In the Draft Constitution, the General Conference was given the final authority to recommend terms of settlement as it might deem just and equitable and it was the duty of the parties to give effect to them. The appropriate clauses defined the position of the General Conference as follows :

4. If the Council or the General Conference decides that action should be taken, the Council shall cause an investigation to be made and shall cause such action to be taken as it may deem necessary to facilitate a settlement. If the Council fails to effect a settlement in this manner, it shall make a report on the whole case to the General Conference, including recommendations for a settlement which it deems just and equitable.

5. The General Conference, taking into account the report of the Council, any opinions rendered at the request of the Council or otherwise by the Permanent Court of International Justice, and any additional considerations, shall make such recommendations for a settlement as it may deem just and equitable. If these recommendations are approved by a three-fourths (vote) of the Members present, exclusive of the parties, it shall be the duty of the parties to give effect to them. (82)

In the Draft Charter, the power of making recommendations

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82. Department of State, n. 20, 477 - 8.

to the parties was vested with the Council. The Council, however, could, if it so wanted, refer the dispute to the General Conference, which, in turn, was enjoined to make such recommendations for settlement as it deemed just and equitable. Significantly, in line with the preference of the planners to vest all powers of an executive character including security powers and its organization for effective action in a single organ, the Draft Charter, going a step further than the Draft Constitution, explicitly enjoined the Council that "in the event that any party to a dispute shall fail to observe or execute a recommendation by the Council or by the General Conference, the Council shall take steps to ensure compliance therewith." (83)

#### THE OUTLINE PLAN

By the end of the year 1943, the Department of State was able to prepare a more advanced plan entitled the "Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security." (84) The frame of reference and objectives before the planners were the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, the Moscow Declarations specially its point four,

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83. Ibid., 529.

84. ibid., 577 - 81. It was also referred to as the "Possible Plan" of 23 December, 1943.

and the Connally and Fulbright Resolutions. The significance of this Outline Plan lay in the fact that it received endorsement from the Secretary of State and was brought for the first time formally before the President for approval. The draftsmen were unable, however, to reach definitive conclusions on a number of crucial questions and thus they presented certain alternatives. It was felt that the differences were significant enough to warrant submitting the alternative views to the President for his final decision.

At the outset the planners declared in the memorandum submitted to the President that the entire plan was based on two central assumptions :

First, that the four major powers will pledge themselves and will consider themselves morally bound not to go to war against each other or against any other nation, and to cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in maintaining the peace; and Second, that each of them will maintain adequate forces and will be willing to use such forces as circumstances require to prevent or suppress all cases of aggression. (85)

85. Department of State, no. 20, 577. Five purposes were enumerated in the plan of the proposed international organization :

1. to prevent the use of force or threats to use force in international relations except by authority of the international organization itself;
2. to settle dispute between nations likely to lead to a breach of the peace;
3. to strengthen and develop the rule of law in international relations;

... (continued on page 107 )

One change of great importance for both the earlier plans was agreed on at once by the Informal Agenda group of the State Department. (86) The field of action by the Council was to be restricted solely to the security function — defined as including both pacific settlement and enforcement aspects — and was not to include executive functions in such fields as economic or trusteeship affairs.

"For the purposes of maintaining peace and security," the Outline Plan provided for an executive council, a general assembly and an international court of justice.

"For purposes of fostering good international relations and promoting general welfare," it was felt that the organization should have, in addition to the organs indicated, agencies for cooperation in socio-economic activities and trusteeship responsibilities. The organization's powers were listed as follows :

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4. to facilitate the adjustment of conditions likely to impair the security or undermine the general welfare of the peace-loving nations;

5. to promote through international cooperative effort the political, economic, and social advancement of nations and peoples. Ibid

86. Ruth Russell, A History Of The United Nations Charter (Washington, 1957) 245. The proximate beginning of the Informal Agenda Group could be traced to January 1943 when Secretary Hull first assumed the Chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Political Problems. Its members consisted of Sumner Welles, Isaiah Bowman, Norman H. Davis, Myron C. Taylor and Leo Pasvolsky. Department of State, no. 20, 169.

1. to examine and investigate any condition or situation the continuation of which is likely to impair the security or undermine the general welfare of the peace-loving nations;

2. to recommend measures for the adjustment of such conditions and situations;

3. to prescribe the terms of settlement of disputes referred to it when the parties to the disputes have failed to find other means of pacific settlement;

4. to take jurisdiction over disputes upon its own initiative;

5. to enforce its decisions with regard to the settlement of disputes;

6. to determine the existence of threats or acts of aggression and to take measures necessary to repress such threats or acts;

7. to establish a system of armaments regulation upon the basis of international agreement. (87)

The Executive Council should be composed of the Four Major Powers upon the principle that "certain nations have exceptional responsibilities for the maintenance of international security and therefore should have indeterminate tenure ...." It was also provided that other States should elect some States to the Council for limited periods. Alternatively, it was provided that the Council might consist solely of the Big Four Powers.

In keeping with the State Department's general approach, the Executive Council, which should be in

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87. Department of State, n. 20, 578.

continuous session, was given the primary responsibility with respect to the security functions and security powers. It was given the right to institute an investigation of any condition, situation, or dispute "the continuation of which is likely to impair the security of itself or of any other member of the organization, or to lead to breach of the peace ...." and to make "recommendations" to the States concerned. It was further stipulated that any member of the international organization was free to bring before the Council "for settlement" any dispute in which it might be involved. Also, the Executive Council was given a right upon its own initiative to take jurisdiction over such disputes which, in its judgement, might "lead to a breach of the peace." Furthermore, the Executive Council could

(a) prescribe the terms of settlement of a dispute within its jurisdiction,

(b) institute measures for the enforcement of its decisions,

(c) determine the existence of a threat or act of aggression, and

(d) institute measures to repress such threat or act. (88)

It should be pointed out here that the planners were undecided about the voting procedure to be adopted for the Council. One way was to stipulate that it would require unanimity of all the great powers, and, alternatively

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88. Ibid., 579.

(three-fourths vote of the members with indeterminate tenure)

- a) any abstaining or dissenting member being obliged by the decision; or
- b) any abstaining member being obligated, but a dissenting member not being obligated by the decision though bound not to obstruct action; or
- c) any abstaining or dissenting member not being obligated by the decision but obligated not to obstruct action. (89)

Although the Executive Council was empowered to ask the assistance of the General Assembly in the settlement of any dispute pending before it and in the enforcement of its decisions, yet, no elaborate machinery and procedure was devised to that end.

In pursuance of the policy noted above, the General Assembly and Executive Council's fields were clearly separated. The General Assembly was to be composed of all member States. Its principal functions and powers related to the setting up of a general frame-work of policy, the development of international law, and the promotion of international cooperation in general.

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89. Brackets merely indicate the alternative nature of the provision. However, in one of the paragraphs of the Outline Plan it is stated that "In no decision of the Executive Council should the vote of a party directly involved in a dispute and represented on the Executive Council be counted." Evidently, the plan shows signs of hasty drafting. Ruth Russell who got an opportunity to examine State Department records, writes that they show "no discussion of how this might affect the voting alternatives presented and the possibilities of conflict it created ...." Russell, n. 86, 249.



In the document attached to the Outline Plan were enunciated the "principal obligations of a member state." The member States were enjoined to refrain from use of force or threat to use force in their relations with other States except "in performance of its obligation to contribute to the enforcement procedure instituted by the Executive Council." They were to settle all disputes with other States by pacific means and to recognize the right of the Executive Council to examine, investigate and act upon any dispute, condition, or situation deemed by it as likely to endanger the peace. Decisions of the Executive Council were to be accepted as binding by member States in the settlement of a dispute which the Council should deem to be existing within its jurisdiction. "Justiciable disputes" were to be submitted to the International Court of Justice and its decisions were to be accepted as binding. The member States were obligated to render such facilities and means as the Council might require for the enforcement of its decisions or for the prevention or repression of aggression. Finally, they were to "enter into an eventual general agreement with other member states for the regulation of national armaments."

The President approved the Outline Plan along with the selection of alternative provisions on 3 February, 1944. Instead of adhering to his earlier "Four Policemen" concept, Roosevelt accepted the alternative of a Council composed of the Big Four plus some of the smaller States.

On the crucial question of voting procedure to be adopted in the Council when taking a decision, he wanted big power unanimity although he was aware that such a procedure might hamper Council action in an emergency. The President also felt that the right of voluntary abstention could be allowed even under the requirement of unanimous concurrence, so long as the decision was made binding on an abstaining member. According to Russell :

... the Political Agenda Group had contemplated that there could be no abstention allowed if four-power concurrence was to be required. The available records give no explanation of the President's reasoning in this matter, but it is clear that he was cognizant of the critical importance of the problem of resolving differences among the great powers themselves — or at least of not allowing them to come to the point of an open break — under a privileged voting system in the Council. (90)

Thus, with the series of international conferences that began at Quebec in August, 1943, the Department's work on post-war political problems began to move from the exploratory into the negotiating stage. By the end of 1943, the Allies had recorded a number of victories on the military front. The Three Power Conferences in the autumn of 1943 had resulted in two far-reaching developments. The strategic coordination of the future major offensive against Germany was decided on; and a general basis of

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90. Ibid., 251.

agreed objectives upon which the preparation of post-war policy could proceed toward definite recommendations was achieved. (91)

International discussions had started on various post-war issues such as the treatment of enemy states and fundamental economic problems. In addition, instrumentalities for further joint consideration of some post-war problems were created like the European Advisory Commission and the Advisory Council for Italy. The practice of Great Power discussions and meetings was also established. Thus, by the end of 1943, the preparation for the post-war period in the State Department which now expanded in its scope and purpose was no longer confined largely to the Advisory Committee and the research staff. The preparatory work now involved besides various operating units of the State Department, other departments, consultations with the Congress and President. It also required conducting negotiation among the major powers and exchange of views with the other United Nations with a view to establishing international agencies of both a transitional and permanent character in various specialized fields. One could thus foresee the period when final decision and action would be taken on the several issues pertaining to war and post-war period. This last and most important phase will be discussed in chapters four and five of the thesis.

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91. Department of State press release 240, 24 March, 1947.

## 5. CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES

Although the attack on Pearl Harbour united the country on an immediate policy of striking back at the enemy, the old foreign policy debate between the "isolationists" and "interventionists" continued intermittently during the war though on different issues. The rivalry prevailing between the two political parties also continued. Of significance was the fact that there was no suspension of elections, as in Great Britain, and Congress retained its partisan organizational base. (92)

In the early years of the war, Congress was reluctant to busy itself beyond the immediate issues of the war. By 1943, however, it began to take active interest in the matter of post-war security and world peace and congressional opinion began to crystallize around the creation of a new international organization for peace. The generally favourable attitude of the public toward creating an international agency for the maintenance of peace was reflected in the public opinion polls, and many legislators were now persuaded that nothing could be gained by deferring action on a statement outlining post-war

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92. Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War (New York, 1956) 8.

policy aims. The Roosevelt administration too was anxious to see Congress go on record as favouring participation in a future international organization.

To begin with, the President's affirmation of war aims expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms was not submitted to Congress and there seemed to have been no consultation with Congressional leaders on the content of these aims. Thus, the American Congress was not necessarily bound by these statements, although one could still maintain that the country was morally committed to them. The opposition was able to take both sides of the issue, opposing the goals when they seemed unrealistic and defending them when the administration seemed not to conform its politics to those declarations. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio expressed the attitude of many members of the opposition when he said that he did not believe that "... we [U.S.] went to war to establish the 'four freedoms' or any other freedom throughout the world," nor did he believe that "we [U.S.] went to war for the purposes set forth in the Atlantic Charter." (93)

The year 1943 was to record many advances both in the American public opinion and in the international conference on the question of organizing for peace and American participation therein. As the year progressed,

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93. US, Congressional Record, 89 (1943) 9095.

both public and Congressional opinion displayed increasing interest in future peace. The administration encouraged Congress to take concrete steps in this matter. It was thought in the Department of State that the position of its Allies on post-war problems, particularly that of security, was strongly influenced by their apprehension that the United States would not assume responsibility for the maintenance of peace after the war commensurate with its position as a great power. It was further recognized that the negotiating position of the United States in any discussions with its Allies was weakened by their fear that its proposals even if accepted by them, might later fail to obtain the endorsement of the American people and the Congress. It was therefore considered essential by the Roosevelt administration that widespread understanding and support of its objectives for the future be obtained both in the Congress and among the American people. However, in keeping with the administration's general policy the effort was confined to statements of broad policies and principles, so as to avoid public dissension and controversy on innumerable details of post-war settlement and organization.

Many resolutions were then pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs — the central theme being — the proposal to have Congress go on record as favouring post-war

international collaboration for world peace to be preserved by force, if necessary. Secretary Hull, throughout the spring and summer of 1943 held informal consultations with members of Congress from both the parties on those resolutions. (94)

The Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill (popularly referred to as the B<sub>2</sub> H<sub>2</sub> resolution) resolution submitted in the Senate on 16 March, 1943 by Senator Ball from Minnesota on behalf of his other three colleagues aroused great public interest and debate. (95) The Resolution read :

Resolved, That the Senate advises that the United States take the initiative in calling meetings of representatives of the United Nations for the purpose of forming an organization of the United Nations with specific and limited authority:

(1) To assist in co-ordinating and fully utilizing the military and economic resources of all member nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis.

(2) To establish temporary administrations for Axis - controlled areas of the world as these are occupied by United Nations forces, until such time as permanent governments can be established.

(3) To administer relief and assistance in economic rehabilitation in territories of member nations needing such aid and in Axis

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94. Hull, n. 17, 1258 - 63.

95. Interestingly enough, the four Senators Joseph H. Ball (Republican, Minnesota), Harold H. Burton (Republican, Ohio), Carl A. Hatch (Democrat, New Mexico), and Lister Hill (Democrat, Alabama) had not played an active role in foreign affairs, they were not members of the Committee On Foreign Relations and did not represent congressional leadership in foreign policy.

territory occupied by United Nations forces.

(4) To establish procedures and machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and disagreements between nations.

(5) To provide for the assembly and maintenance of a United Nations military force and to suppress by immediate use of such force any future attempt at military aggression by any nation.

That the Senate further advises that any establishment of such United Nations organization provide machinery for its modification, for the delegation of additional specific and limited functions to such organization, and for admission of other nations to membership, and that member nations should commit themselves to seek no territorial aggrandizement. (96)

Senator Ball, in his speech, emphasized three basic factors which guided the B<sub>2</sub> H<sub>2</sub> group in drafting the above resolution. To begin with, it was their conviction that an international organization of the peace loving nations of the world offered the best hope for maintaining the peace and stability of the world after the war. Secondly, the Senators considered it important and necessary to let the other United Nations know clearly what post-war plans the U.S. Senate would consider as good both for the country and the world at large. Lastly, the Senators were of the opinion that during the war period, the forces of cooperation among the United Nations were strong and dominant. After the end of the war, they feared, various forces such

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96. US, Congressional Record, 89 (1943) 2030.



as economic rivalry and nationalistic feeling might become strong and divide the United Nations apart. Therefore, the four Senators were greatly desirous of committing the nation to what they called a positive course of action during the period of war itself. (97)

The tabling of the B<sub>2</sub> H<sub>2</sub> resolution on the floor of the Senate touched a fundamental question which could not be ignored. The resolution, to a certain extent, sought to remove the difficulty arising out of the working of the American constitution namely, how the Senate could be enabled to play its part in the conduct of American foreign policy. Walter Lippmann noted that the resolution raised two issues. The first was that the Senate could not commit itself to approve treaties which had not yet been negotiated by the executive. The second issue was that the executive could not negotiate with the Allies unless at each critical step in the negotiations it felt sure that it was acting with the

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97. Ibid., 2031.

In a book written in 1943, Senator Ball stated that the Axis system glorified war as the highest destiny of man and preached the doctrine that might makes right. The democracies, on the other hand, he maintained, have been and are the chief proponents of peaceful settlement of international disputes. Senator Ball then went on to make this significant observation. "The fact that Russia, with its Communist dictatorship, is a major Allied power does not alter this fundamental proposition. I use democracy here in its very broad sense, meaning economic and social as well as political democracy. While Russia admittedly has no political democracy today, she probably has more economic and social democracy than many of her Allies ...." Joseph H. Ball, Collective Security : The Why And How (Boston, 1943) 10 - 11.

advice and consent of the Senate. For unless the Senate was somehow participating in the negotiations, Lippmann observed, "our whole diplomacy becomes a blind gamble as to what the Senate might some day do about them ...." (98) The test, therefore, of the action of the four Senators was not whether the Senate would commit itself now to ratify agreements drawn according to the five general propositions of their resolution. The test was, in Lippmann's opinion "whether the Senate will agree that a way must be found to associate the Senate continually" with the President before and during the momentous negotiations that have to be undertaken. (99)

The resolution, had it been debated in the Senate, might well have caused great embarrassment to the Executive in developing its future plans. It should be noted here that the changing temper of the opinion on the issue of international cooperation in the United States was such that

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98. Washington Post, 16 March, 1943. Undoubtedly, the Roosevelt administration was fully alive to this problem. Under the leadership of Cordell Hull it continually kept the important Senators and congressmen informed about their post-war plans and sought their advice and assistance while negotiating with other foreign governments. The establishment of the "Committee of Eight," and the selection of important Senators as members of American delegation to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco was in line with the above thinking. The Committee of Eight was the name given to the Senate consultative body with the Department of State on matters pertaining to peace, security and future international organization.

99. Ibid

the chief difficulties arose not from the resistance of the "isolationists" but from the enthusiasm of the "internationalists." (100) Senators Connally and Vandenberg — two men who were to play an important role in the American preparation of a post-war international security organization — were both in agreement with the President and Secretary of State, that these questions "required long and careful study beforehand by all our allies before we dared to commit ourselves." (101)

The matter was debated at length, in a special subcommittee as well as in the full Foreign Relations Committee. "In order to get rid of all the confusion," Connally finally introduced a simple text before the Senate. The Connally Resolution (Senate Resolution 192, as Amended), passed by the Senate on 5 November, 1943 by a vote of 85 to 5, with 6 abstentions read :

Resolved, That the war against all our enemies be waged until complete victory is achieved.

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100. Thus, the internationalist bloc in the Senate put up a strong resistance when the Connally Resolution came up for consideration. They attempted - though unsuccessfully - to replace the Connally Resolution with a "Pepper Resolution" along the lines of the B<sub>2</sub> H<sub>2</sub> resolution. H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics : Pearl Harbor To Korea (New Haven, 1955) 157.
101. Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952) 38 - 9, 44 - 6. Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York, 1954) 263 - 4.

That the United States cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace.

That the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world.

That the Senate recognizes the necessity of there being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of this resolution, on behalf of the Government of the United States with any other nation or any association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. (102)

The House of Representatives took action on a similar resolution, sponsored by Representative J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas. (103) There was very little opposition to his resolution although Representative Clare E. Hoffman (Republican, Michigan), did say that the adoption of the proposal would mean "that we repeal the

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102. Goodrich and Carroll, n.23, VI, 318.

103. Fulbright Resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 25), Passed by the House of Representatives, 21 September, 1943 : "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate Concurring), That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes." Ibid., 315.

Declaration of Independence." (104) The House adopted the resolution by a vote of 360 to 29; 98 per cent of the Democratic and 87 per cent of the Republican members voted for it. Representative Fulbright in an address before the American Bar Association on 26 August, 1943 explained that the phrase in his resolution "... power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace" not only envisaged the use of some kind of force but "... may also include the power, if necessary, to control the productive capacity of instruments of aggressive warfare." The traditional "police force," he observed, in this connection might not be nearly so important as control of strategic materials and productive capacity. (105)

If the Moscow Agreement of the three Big Power Foreign Ministers was the act of the governments, the votes of the Senate and House on the Connally and Fulbright Resolutions showed that the principles set forth in it had the support of the overwhelming majority of the elected representatives of the American people. Over ninety per cent of the total membership of Congress voted their adherence to the principles of international cooperation. In the representation of thirty four states, not a single vote in

104. US, Congressional Record, 89 (1943) 7649.

105. International Conciliation, 395 (December, 1943) 608.  
Evidently, this was the expression of his personal opinion which did not necessarily reflect the opinions of other representatives who voted for his resolution.

either house was cast against these Resolutions, and in eleven other states, there were only one or two who opposed. One could reasonably believe or at least hope, then, that this time the action of the government would not be subject to the hazard of partisan debate.

6. DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE  
REPUBLICAN PARTY : 1941 - 1943

During the period under study, the Republican party was not in office. Yet this fact did not diminish the interest of the party in the country's foreign policy. It could even be said that the attitude of Republicans had an important influence on the course pursued by the United States in world affairs. (106)

To glance back, briefly, in the first decade of this century, Republican administration had made suggestions for a world court and periodic conferences among nations to discuss common problems. The early movement for a league of nations had much Republican backing. William Howard Taft was the first President of the League to Enforce Peace and many prominent Republicans were among

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106. Since the Western democracies function on the principle that major political parties should agree on certain fundamental assumptions, it becomes incumbent on the majority and the minority parties to keep their differences of opinion and policy within reasonable limits. In the American democratic experiment, one notices that the majority party usually seeks the active support of at least a part of the minority party in the implementation of its programmes. Such a support is usually forthcoming because of the looseness of party discipline and the fact that Congressmen and Senators are more influenced by the constituency they represent than their party.

its leaders. The Republican administration in 1921, however, refused even to answer communications from the League of Nations. Although the extent of American participation in certain of the League's activities increased in the late twenties, the policy of non-membership in the League of Nations remained and was never questioned by the successive Republican administrations.

However, the three Republican Presidents from 1921 - 1933 favoured joining the World Court and each of them attempted to get the Senate to adhere to the protocol. Their efforts were not successful. In 1936, the Republican platform itself stated that the party was opposed to joining the Court. Thus, the party through its rejection first of the League and later on of the Court, became the symbol of opposition to international organization. Also, in the 1936 presidential election, following the Roosevelt "landslide," the party strength was noticeable only in those parts of the country which were traditionally the stronghold of the isolationists.

The outbreak of war in Europe posed several important issues before the American political parties which they could ignore only at the cost of forsaking America's vital interests. The Roosevelt administration, mindful of the fast-changing international situation and the repercussions of it on American security and national interest took several measures on which the Republican party had to



take a stand. However, during this period itself, the party was divided on the issue of 'isolationism' and 'internationalism' and the extent to which the U.S. should participate in international politics. William Allen White, the veteran Republican leader from Kansas, like many others of his party, was supporting several of Roosevelt's measures for aiding the Allies in their struggle against the fascists. On the other hand, the isolationist wing of the party had leaders like Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio who believed that the U.S. security was not endangered by the success of the fascist powers in Europe and, therefore, opposed Roosevelt's measures for supporting the war effort of the Allies. (107)

The Republican platform in 1940 stated that the party was "firmly opposed to involving this nation in foreign war ...." It added further that

the Republicans "declare for the prompt, orderly and realistic building of our national defense to the point at which we shall be able not only to defend the United States, its possessions, and essential outposts from foreign attack, but also efficiently to uphold in war the Monroe Doctrine. To this task the Republican party pledges

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107. William S. White has written that Senator Taft said to him as late as November of 1951 that "at no time had Germany menaced the security of the United States and that there would have been no menace even had the British fallen and particularly not after the Russians had entered the war against the Germans." William S. White, The Taft Story (New York, 1954) 151.

itself when entrusted with national authority. In the meantime we shall support all necessary and proper defense measures proposed by the Administration in its belated efforts to make up for the lost time; but we deplore explosive utterances by the President directed at other governments which serve to imperil our peace; and we condemn all executive acts and proceedings which might lead to war without authorization of the Congress of the United States ...." (108)

During the election campaign, however, the Republican Presidential candidate, Wendell Willkie, expressed himself in favour of as much aid to Britain as possible and supported most of Roosevelt's actions in this direction, so much so that it became quite difficult for Willkie to attack the President's foreign policy programme. He was often found criticizing the President for too little rather than too much intervention and preparation for war. (109)

It could be said that the significance of the Willkie nomination lay in the fact that it gave a great fillip to the internationalist wing of the party. Willkie

108. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms 1840 - 1956 (Urbana, 1956) 390. In comparison, the Democratic platform also declared "We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our army, naval and air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, except in case of attack. We favour and shall rigorously enforce and defend the Monroe Doctrine...." Like the Republican party declaration it also favoured giving material aid and assistance to "peace-loving and liberty-loving peoples wantonly attacked by ruthless aggressors ...." Ibid
109. Charles John Graham, "Republican Foreign Policy 1939 - 1952," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1955, 35.

had been a strong advocate of the League of Nations, and American participation in collective action for peace. According to Hopkins, Roosevelt thought of Willkie's choice as a "god send" for the country, because it eliminated the isolationists campaign and reassured the world of the continuity of American foreign policy. (110) After his defeat in the election, Willkie prepared himself in the role of what he termed as the loyal opposition to the Democratic administration. In that capacity he helped the executive by supporting several measures for the defense of the United States and for aiding the Allies in their war with the fascists. One might also say that Willkie's policy of loyal opposition to the government contained within it the germs of bipartisanship in foreign affairs which Cordell Hull was to develop in the later years of the war period.(111)

In the meeting of the Republican National Committee in Chicago held on April 20 - 21, 1942, there arose a conflict in the party ranks with regard to the resolution to be adopted as party policy in foreign affairs. Among the party leaders, Governor Dewey was for avoiding any struggle over the wording of the resolution and suggested that an effort be made to unite the party in support of the war and

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110. Sherwood, n. 5, 175. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism (New York, 1952) 670.

111. Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie 1892 - 1944 (New York, 1952) 260.

develop an "American doctrine for ... maintaining the peace thereafter." (112) Wendell Willkie, though not present in the committee, submitted a resolution which, besides pledging the party's support for the Allied war effort, sought to commit the party to "undertake now and in the future whatever just and reasonable international responsibilities may be demanded in a modern world...."(113) Such a course of action seemed necessary to Willkie in order that American liberty might be preserved and encouragement given to "free institutions" and a "free way of life" in the rest of the world. (114)

The final resolution of the Committee read:

We realise that after this war the responsibility of the nation will not be circumscribed within the territorial limits of the United States; that our nation has an obligation to assist in bringing about understanding, comity, and cooperation among the nations of the world in order that our own liberty may be preserved and the blighting and destructive processes of war may not again be forced upon the free and peace loving peoples of the earth. (115)

112. New York Times, 22 April, 1942.

113. Ibid., 20 April, 1942.

114. Ibid

115. Ibid., 21 April, 1942. Senator Vandenberg recorded on 21 April, 1942 that the nation-wide talk that the above resolution meant the death of isolationism was "... all sheer bunk. The statement is one of sheer generalities. Everything depends upon the ultimate 'bill of particulars' — and no one can foresee the future — until after the war itself is won ...." He was of the opinion that "... the National

Willkie hailed the declaration as an abandonment of isolationism by the Republican party, while Robert A. Taft asserted that the committee had successfully eliminated the reference in the proposal made by Willkie on international responsibilities which sounded to him like another League of Nations. Curiously enough, public men with divergent views like Representative Hamilton Fish (Republican, N.Y.) and Secretary of State Cordell Hull supported the resolution. By July 1942, the public opinion polls showed that 70 per cent of avowed Republican voters favoured the United States joining a league of nations after the war, and in December of the same year, 69 per cent favoured taking steps immediately to set up such an organization with the Allies. (116)

It might also be mentioned that side by side with the orientation of the GOP towards increasing participation in world affairs in the post-war world, the internationalist wing of the party headed by Willkie made attempts in 1942 to unseat certain isolationist Republicans from their constituencies. Willkie opposed the nomination of Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, but he was both

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Committee has no control whatever over 'party policies' and its resolution is sheer dictum. 'Policies' will be determined by elected Republican Senators and Congressmen until the Convention of 1944 ...." Vandenberg, n101, 30.

116. Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton), 6 (Winter, 1942) 491, 661.

nominated and elected. (117)

Another significant development was the Declaration of Policy adopted by Republican Representatives in the House of Representatives on 22 September, 1943. The forces of events and the climate of public opinion were increasingly putting pressure on the party leadership to face the issue of American participation in world affairs squarely. Nevertheless, even in 1942, the influence of the isolationist wing in the party could be seen in the following declaration in spite of its "internationalist" overtones. It read:

We recognize that the United States has an obligation and responsibility to work with other nations to bring about a world understanding and cooperative spirit which will have for its objective the continued maintenance of peace. In so doing, we must not endanger our own independence, weaken our American way of life or our system of government. (118)

The year 1943 was to be of momentous importance for the Republican party. During the course of the year the party took certain important and far reaching decisions in matters of foreign policy. In June 1943, the new party

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117. The special role of Willkie in his party should be mentioned here. All through the war, he fought tooth and nail with the strong and entrenched isolationist wing of his party, so much so that he, perhaps, increasingly spoiled his chances of Presidential nomination in 1944 election on the GOP ticket.

118. New York Times, 23 September, 1942.

chairman, Harrison E. Spangler, announced the appointment of a Post-War Advisory Council of 49 members to develop "a realistic peacetime programme for American progress." Harrison's announcement also contained a reference to the problem of world peace and declared that the United States "must approach this in a spirit of friendly cooperation with the other nations of the world, keeping in mind the welfare of our country." (119) Various subcommittees were established by the Post-War Advisory Council and plans were made for the meeting of the Council on Mackinac Island in September 1943. It was considered very likely that some of the council members would be greatly divided at the Mackinac Conference on the issue of world peace and security and the chief problem, therefore, would be one of reconciliation. (120)

119. Ibid., 1 June, 1943.

120. Just before going to Mackinac, Senator Vandenberg wrote on 24 August, 1943 : "It seems perfectly fantastic to me that we should attempt to pre-commit America in respect to a peace which as yet is totally in the dark ... I have no sympathy whatever with out Republican Pollyannas who want to compete with Henry Wallace.... On the other hand, I think it is entirely possible for Republicans at Mackinac to avoid all of these nightmares and still declare a forthright purpose to join in the termination (so far as possible) of international piracy- and thus end the miserable notion (so effectively used against us in many quarters) that the Republican Party will retire to its fox hole when the last shot in this war has been fired and will blindly let the world rot in its own anarchy ....

"Furthermore, it is my belief (and hope) that we can use the occasion to differentiate between Republican and New Deal foreign policy by asserting also in this connection (1) that we shall remain a totally sovereign country .... (2) that we shall make all of our own decisions for ourselves by constitutional process; and (3) that we intend to be faithful to American interests ...." Vandenberg, n. 101, 56 - 7.

There was a wide variety of proposals under consideration at the Conference. Senators Vandenberg and White were the sponsors of a resolution in the Senate which set three aims:

i) the prosecution of the war to conclusive victory;

ii) the participation of the United States in post-war cooperation between nations to prevent, by any necessary means, the recurrence of military aggression and to establish permanent peace with justice in a free world;

iii) the present examination of these aims so far as consistent with the United war effort, and their ultimate achievement by due constitutional process and with faithful recognition of American interests. (121)

There was another group in the party known as the Republican Post-War Association with approximately 300 members. It was headed by Dencen A. Watson, a Chicago lawyer who had been speaker of the Illinois House of Representatives. The group favoured strong internationalist statement. Watson's programme included the establishment of a Council of Nations with the United Nations as a nucleus, to prevent by force the rise of new forms of aggression and to solve by peaceful methods other problems of a world-wide nature. The group rejected adoption by nations of such methods as alliances and balance-of-power.

... The world is a large community of nations, approaching unity, but without

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121. Chicago Tribune, 5 September, 1943. Meanwhile the popularly called B2 H2 resolution of four Senators (Ball, Burton, Hatch and Hill) was also introduced in the Senate envisioning an international police force.



any practical form of government to handle world affairs. In the creation of such a Council of Nations, we must start slowly, with limited powers, and gradually develop permanent machinery....

The Watson group also suggested the establishment of a world court to adjudicate international disputes and the creation of an international police force to restrain aggression. Such force, the group suggested, should be composed of the armed forces of members of the Council of Nations, and subject to call of Council only when needed.(122)

#### THE MACKINAC CONFERENCE

On the eve of the Mackinac Conference, Republican Governor Dewey surprised the Council members by proposing a continuing military alliance between Great Britain and the United States to keep the peace after the end of the war. He said he hoped China and Russia might be brought into a four-way arrangement. (123)

Taft opposed Dewey's move and referred to his own previously announced stand against a British-American military alliance. (124) Governor John Bricker of Ohio expressed the view that the United States and Great Britain must keep on the closest terms after the war, but refrained from

122. New York Times, 5 September, 1943.

123. Ibid., 6 September, 1943.

124. Ibid

committing himself to the idea of an outright defensive military alliance. He said that the American sovereignty should be maintained at all costs — that the country must maintain complete freedom of action. Governor Earl Warren of California, on the other hand, took a view more in keeping with that of Dewey on the form and degree of international collaboration. He questioned, however, the idea that the organization of peacekeepers should be restricted to Britain and the United States or the Allies in the Second World War. He was in favour of including all nations which wanted to join in preserving peace. Warren also stated that any pledge to prevent war should be accompanied by a pledge to use military force if necessary to attain that end. (125)

As was anticipated, there developed a keen rivalry between the two extreme wings of the party in the conference. Senator Vandenberg set before himself the task of seeking "... a middle ground between those extremists at the one end of the line who would cheerfully give America away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation which had come to be an impossibility." (126)

The word "sovereignty" evoked a great deal of

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125. Ibid

126. Vandenberg, n. 101, 55.

discussion between the two factions of the party during the drafting of the resolution. Finally, the Republicans at Mackinac agreed on "responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." (127) While endorsing the plan for the creation of an international organization in the post-war period, the Republican leaders, however, emphasized that since both the foreign policy and the domestic policy of every country were closely related to each other, each member of the United Nations ought to consider both the immediate and remote consequences of every proposition with careful regard for two factors: (i) the effects which the adoption of a particular policy would have upon the vital interests of the nation; and (ii) its bearing upon the foreseeable international developments. Should a conflict arise between the above two categories, the Republicans suggested that

the United States of America should adhere to the policy which will preserve its constitutionalism as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution itself, and the Bill of Rights, as administered through our Republican form of Government. Constitutionalism should be adhered to in determining the substance of our policies and shall be followed in ways and means of making international commitments. (128)

127. New York Times, 7 September, 1943.

128. Ibid

The idea of an international police force which was widely being discussed in public during that time was impliedly if not specifically rejected:

In addition to these things this Council advises that peace and security ought to be ultimately established upon other sanctions than force. It recommends that we work toward a policy which will comprehend other means than war for the determination of international controversy; and the attainment of a peace that will prevail by virtue of its inherent reciprocal interests and its spiritual foundation, reached from time to time with the understanding of the peoples of the negotiating nations. (129)

The text of the declaration pleased both sections of the party. Governor Dwight H. Green had the satisfaction of seeing the passage which stressed constitutionalism and he regarded it as "an avowal of Americanism as Americans understand it." (130) Governors Raymond Earl Baldwin and Sumner Sewall of the internationalist wing, though expressing agreement with it sought assurances from Vandenberg that "cooperative organization" really meant a definite form of international council, and that the pledge for "organized justice" meant in fact some form of world court. Vandenberg gave these assurances. Willkie regarded it as "a step in the right direction." (131)

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129. Ibid

130. Chicago Tribune, 8 September, 1943.

131. New York Times, 9 September, 1943.

Although it might be true that both the wings in the party could still find statements suited to their view points, yet, considering the approach of the Republican Party before the Second World War, the Mackinac declaration was a great step forward toward the acceptance of U.S. participation in a programme of international cooperation. The political commentators of the time hailed it as the death of isolationism or a real turning-point in the Republican Party's foreign policy. (132) The Roosevelt administration could thus look forward more hopefully to a united America accepting world-wide responsibilities in the post-war period.

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132. Ibid

7. HIGH TIDES OF INTERNATIONALISM  
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE

While surveying the different strands of thought operating on the American political scene, a useful study could also be made of the great upsurge of internationalism which made itself felt in the various resolutions adopted by the state legislatures and the public opinion polls taken at that time. There were several reasons for it. To wit, people in the United States, as in other parts of the world, were sickened by the brutality and waste of the war and by the atrocities committed by the Nazis on the Jews in Europe. Earlier still, they had gone through one of the worst economic depressions in American history. It was, therefore, but natural that a generation which had experienced such things should have given to itself the liberty to speculate rather freely on a brave new world order to come.

The Second World War was perhaps the biggest single factor responsible for this great change in favour of internationalism in the American public opinion. No longer was it merely a 'European' war. It was a world war in which the United States was participating. Also, a great many Americans were increasingly realizing that only through the united action on the part of the Allies would victory over the enemy States become a possibility. Consequently, the

American people, in general, gradually became more amenable to the plea of the internationalists that only by world-wide cooperation in the post-war period — in which the United States would also wholeheartedly participate — would the chances of a peaceful world be ensured. (133)

Surveying this enthusiasm for internationalism, the New York Herald Tribune wrote:

A North Carolina lawyer named Robert Lee Humber has been stirring up state legislatures on the subject of a world federation to unite all nations under one government. The Humber resolution, with its philosophic preamble, has been an object of praise, sometimes ridicule, in the lobbies of almost a score of state capitals in the last two years.

Thirteen states — the same number that subscribed to the original Constitution of the United States — have taken some kind of affirmative action on the world federation idea and in almost all of them the North Carolina lawyer has been the chief instigator of the 'whereas'... spur .... (134)

133. Indeed, Berdahl has, with the help of a mass of historical materials, argued that isolationism was not a continuous theme of American history. He emphasized that in contradistinction to the policies adopted by the United States between the First and the Second World Wars, until the end of the First World War, "... the record of the United States was one of almost continuous leadership in respect to the problems of world organization and world order, with lapses on occasion ... with numerous failures in achievement, but leadership for all that ...." Clarence A. Berdahl, "The leadership of the United States in the Post War World," The American Political Science Review (Washington) 38 (April, 1944) 235.

134. New York Herald Tribune, 4 July, 1943. The thirteen states were North Carolina, New Jersey, Montana, Maryland, New York, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Alabama, Florida and Connecticut.

The legislature of North Carolina, in what was believed to be the first action by any legislative body recommending the formation of a world government, adopted on 13 March, 1941 a resolution declaring that "all peoples of the earth should now be united in a commonwealth of nations." The resolution also requested the state's Senators and Representatives to introduce and secure the passage of a resolution in Congress committing the United States to the acceptance of the principle of the Federation of the World and requesting the President to call an international convention to formulate a constitution for the Federation to be submitted to each nation for its ratification. (135) The legislature of New Jersey also adopted a similar resolution — the so called Humber Resolution — declaring that "all peoples of the earth should now be united in a commonwealth of nations to be known as the Federation of the World ...." (136) Irving M. Ives, majority leader in the New York legislature went on record as saying that if the United States was required to give up a portion of its sovereignty to a federation of nations to maintain peace, it would have to be done. The New York legislature passed a resolution declaring,

... its profound conviction that an international organization of all nations

135. Ibid., 6 April, 1941.

136. Ibid



to achieve these results viz., right for all peoples to worship as they please, protection of the inalienable right of minorities, elimination of rampant nationalism and economic and military aggression and assurance of prosperity and welfare for all peoples must be an essential condition of the peace .... (137)

There were many American scholars, publicists and statesmen who also raised their voices for "One World." Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota, a liberal Republican, urged in a speech on 22 June, 1942 that the United States should take the leadership in the "winning of the peace" as well as the war. In contrast to the traditional isolationism of his party in the Middle West, he proposed a post-war "world association" based upon the United Nations and modelled upon the relationships which exist among the states of the United States of America, in order to insure peaceful and orderly relations among the nations of the world in the future. Stassen said:

It appears to me the world association might well administer the great international airports of the future, the gateways to the seven seas; a program to increase the literacy of the peoples of the world; a code of justice for the relations between nations and a machinery to enforce it; temporary governments over the Axis nations; a program of increased trade regulations to prevent sharp fluctuations in volume which cause economic depression; and a world legion, to maintain stability in the administration of each of these responsibilities, to prevent the arming of non-participating nations, and to prevent

armament races or a return of the dangerous balance of power principle. (138)

It could be observed, in retrospect, that the Governor's advocacy in 1942 and 1943 for world government was, among other things, indicative of the remarkable change that had come in the political climate of the erstwhile "isolationist" America. It demonstrated, at least, that such utterances, likely to be almost suicidal politically in the pre-war period in certain regions, could be voiced publicly as an approach to the solution of the eternal problem of war and peace.

Public opinion polls taken in the United States during the period seemed to indicate that the American people strongly supported plans for future international collaboration for the maintenance of world peace. Thus a Gallup poll, taken in December 1942, indicated that 73 per cent of the American people favoured a policy of taking steps before the end of the war "to set-up with our Allies a world organization to maintain the future peace of the world." (139) The essentially non-partisan character of the response was shown by the fact that 75 per cent of the

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138. Ibid., 23 June, 1942.

139. Quoted by Percy E. Corbett and Grayson Kirk, "The Outlook for a Security Organization," Yale Institute of International Studies, Memorandum no. 10, New Haven, 15 June, 1944.

Democratic voters and 69 per cent of the Republican voters favoured this policy.

The idea of an international police force (IPF) to secure world peace and security was also gaining great popularity in the American public scene. The Department of State planners had also given due consideration to this idea. It received a further spur from the introduction in the Senate of the famous B<sub>2</sub> H<sub>2</sub> resolution which supported the idea of an international police force in the post-war world. Besides, the national polls, like those conducted by Gallup and Fortune, predicted that there was overwhelming support for IPF in the American public attitude. In August 1939, the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) posed the question: "Would you like to see the United States join in a movement to establish an international police force to maintain world peace?" The replies were: Yes - 46 per cent; No - 39 per cent; No opinion - 15 per cent. A similar question which was phrased thus: "Should the countries fighting the Axis set up an international police force after the war is over to try to keep peace throughout the world?" was asked in various polls and the answers were:

|            | July<br>1942<br>AIPO | March<br>1943<br>OPOR | April<br>1943<br>AIPO | October<br>1943<br>OPOR | April<br>1944<br>OPOR |
|------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Yes ...    | 73%                  | 80%                   | 74%                   | 79%                     | 77%                   |
| No ...     | 16%                  | 12%                   | 14%                   | 11%                     | 13%                   |
| No opinion | 11%                  | 8%                    | 12%                   | 10%                     | 10%                   |

AIPO - American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup);  
OPOR - Office of the Public Opinion Research  
(Princeton University). (140)

Thus, the most conspicuous indication given by the above polls was the increase in approval of the International Police Force idea between 1939 and 1942. A study on this subject conducted by a division of Princeton University concluded that there was a high probability that this increase took place at about the time of Pearl Harbour attack, when public opinion on all international issues was in a process of rapid change.

It may be pointed out that the concept of an international police force presented a variety of images to the public mind. Also, the attitudes toward an IPF tended very largely to be influenced by the phrasing and timing of the question which were put to the public. Likewise, as pointed out by Buchanan, questions which made reference to world peace contained a powerful emotional complex and were likely to evoke sympathetic response from the persons interviewed. Furthermore, the above questions asked by the various agencies subsumed that the creation of an IPF was intended to achieve world peace. Evidently, such a premise makes it difficult to judge how many "yes"

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140. Taken from a study by William Buchanan and associates, An International Police Force And Public Opinion in the United States 1939 - 1953 (Princeton, 1954) 15.

votes were really for an IPF or for its professed goal of maintaining world peace which, obviously, was a non-controversial subject. Finally, it would be erroneous to assume that all those who were in favour of an international organization and for international cooperation must necessarily have voted for the IPF idea. It could be that many extreme and moderate internationalists might have opposed the IPF idea on grounds consistent with their understanding of the best solution for promoting world peace and security.

Buchanan's studies also made one point clear.

A large number of Americans did not fully understand the implications of accepting the IPF idea. (141) Thus, in one of the public opinion polls during the war period,

|   |       |      |
|---|-------|------|
| Respondents favouring a larger IPF than U.S. Forces were      | ...   | 20%  |
| Respondents favouring a smaller IPF than U.S. Forces were     | ...   | 21%  |
| Respondents wanting the same size as that of U.S. Forces were | ...   | 23%  |
| No opinion were   | ...   | 21%  |
| Not in favour of IPF were                                     | ...   | 15%  |
|   | Total | 100% |
|   | (142) |      |

141. The same conclusion resulted from an inquiry initiated by the Council on Foreign Relations in Spring, 1944. Walter R. Sharp and Percy W. Bidwell, "American Public Opinion and Postwar Security Commitments : Results of an Inquiry Addressed to Twenty Committees on Foreign Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, New York, October, 1944. See Appendix.

142. Buchanan, n. 140, 29.

Furthermore, most people seemed to be endorsing the goal of an IPF rather than the mechanism for achieving it. Also there was a heavy falling off when the question went from the general to the specific which, he termed as "a normal occurrence ...." (143) Buchanan's conclusion was, nevertheless, significant. He wrote:

Those policy-makers who hold a firm internationalist position might find real encouragement in at least one result of the present study. It shows that most Americans do not automatically recoil from the extreme internationalist idea of an IPF, including the images called up by those words .... (144)

The Associate Press Poll to determine the sentiment in favour of an international police force posed the following question to the Senators of the United States: "Do you favour committing the Senate and Country now to a postwar course of preserving the peace through an international police force?" (145) Thirty-two Senators opposed committing the United States at that time to post-war participation in an international police force to preserve the peace. Twenty-four Senators, one fourth of the Senate, favoured such a commitment. Thirty-two additional Senators were not able to reach either a definite "yes" or "no" decision on the question.

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143. Ibid., 35.

144. Ibid., 39.

145. New York Times, 19 April, 1942.

Answers of the thirty-two in opposition ranged from a flat "no" by the veteran "irreconcilable," Senator Hiram Johnson of California, to the assertion by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio that it would be "as easy for an international police force to bomb New York as Berlin." Many of them, however, indicated their willingness to consider international collaboration at a later date when the specifications could be laid down more clearly. They said it was too early to make commitments.

The twenty-four favourable responses varied from the brief "yes" of Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, to a declaration by Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois that he was willing to go far beyond the action implied in the question - to the point of dismantling Axis factories after the war and putting embargoes on materials which they could use to make munitions.

Some Senators who favoured immediate commitments of this nature did so with reservations, as did some of those who opposed. Such of the replies from the Senators that indicated clearly their endorsement of the principle of immediate action to put the Senate and country on record for a course of this general nature, were recorded as favourable and, contrarily, as opposed.

Senator Tom Connally said :

I favour an international organization  
to preserve the peace in the post-war world.

I do not favour a separate army or police force, but believe that the various Allied armies and navies should furnish the necessary men whenever they are needed. (146)

Senator Vandenberg, who declined to commit, said he could not answer unless he knew what was meant by an international police force. He said:

If that means an integrated international constabulary in permanent world-wide activity, I am not in favour of any such agency... But if it means post-war cooperation in international sanctions, based on a satisfactory peace treaty, to make it impossible for military aggression again to curse the world, I favour this objective. Obviously, a specific answer or a specific commitment is impractical until we know the precise problem and the precise formula which will be involved. (147)

The Department of State, in discussing this problem in the "Committee of Eight," pointed out that it would be impossible in any event to create an international police force capable of coercing the major powers. Therefore no international organization could offer an absolute guarantee against another world war. Under these circumstances, in the view of the State Department officials, there were three important steps that should be taken: (i) get all the States to assume obligations to maintain the peace; (ii) get the great powers to adopt discussion and collaboration as a normal procedure among themselves; and (iii) prevent the situation from once again developing wherein some nations

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146. Ibid.

147. Ibid



were armed and prepared to fight, while other had disarmed and consequently, were unprepared to fight. (148)

Government officials also felt that such a force would presuppose the existence of a federated world State whose creation would involve a far more drastic pooling of national sovereignty than most of the members would be willing to contemplate. (149) Moreover, it was realized that the character of modern warfare was such that military effort demanded the closest coordination of a great array of industrial and technical facilities. Even if a permanent force were to be established, it would have to rely on the supplies emanating from a few great industrial centres. Thus, such a force would not be independent, in any meaningful sense of the term, of its powerful members who could, whenever they wanted, cripple it by withholding the supplies. (150)

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148. Russell, n. 86, 499.

149. Leo Pasvolsky, "The United Nations in Action," Edmund J. James Lectures On Government(Urbana, 1951) 88.

150. Grayson Kirk, "The Enforcement of Security," The Yale Law Journal (New Haven), 55 (August 1946) 1083. Later on, in the United Nations organization established in 1945, the following solution was worked out to the problem discussed above. Under the terms of the Charter, the member states were to conclude special agreement or agreements with the Security Council containing the pledges of the "armed forces, facilities and assistance" which they would make available to the Council "on its call." Thus at the San Francisco Conference, a compromise had to be sought between the logical dictates of collective.

... (continued on page 152)

Perhaps, in the public discussions, greater emphasis on force as an effective means to safeguard future peace was inevitable in the midst of war and also because of the general feeling prevalent then that the League of Nations had failed in its task of keeping the world's peace because it had been insufficiently endowed with physical means of coercion. Thus, following this line of thinking, to many observers, it seemed clear that the new international organization could have enough power to coerce States into the paths of peace only if it had at its disposal a permanently internationalized police force. This was widely regarded as the alternative to the League system of recommendation. (151) It was momentarily forgotten that the League had not been constitutionally incapable of using means of coercion against an aggressor. Had there existed the political will to unite forces in the defence

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security concept and the political realities and compulsions of the time — politics, being the art of the possible.

Also, Kirk pointed out a paradox inherent in the whole problem of international policing. "If the world community can be so thoroughly integrated that it is ready to support a police force along with the necessary accompanying political paraphernalia of executives, judges, and legislators, the nation-state unit will be so subordinate that police action against it would be as pointless as American federal coercion against individual states as such. And if such integration cannot be achieved, creation of any genuine police force may not be possible, and even it were attempted, such a force would find difficulty in dealing with fairly autonomous states ...." Grayson Kirk, "Some Problems of International Policing," Studies of American Interests In The War And The Peace, New York, January, 1944.

151. Kirk, "The Enforcement of Security," n.150, 1982.

of the peace, the Covenant would have served adequately as a mechanism to make such action legally and administratively feasible. As it was, "the League died more from political anemia than from organic failure." (152)

Also, under the pressure of the devastating war, the American public, in general, seemed more inclined to rely on the formula of the use of force as an effective means to maintain world peace and security. It was perhaps not sufficiently realized by the people then that the complexities inherent in the task of maintaining world peace and security would require greater imagination in planning for the instrumentalities necessary to maintain world peace and also a greater determination to pursue policies in collaboration with other States in socio-economic and political fields so as to lay a secure foundation for a just and peaceful post-war order. (153)

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152. Ibid

153. The Political Group of the Council on Foreign Relations taking note of the public opinion polls which showed increasing awareness that the United States must henceforth play a more active and responsible role in world affairs than it had in the past, nevertheless, observed that, "if public discussion is not consciously directed along the path of political realism, large sections of the community may be beguiled by illiconsidered panaceas, with the result that when such proposals fail to materialize disillusionment and cynicism are likely to follow." Thus, the Group suggested that Department of State take increasing positive steps to disseminate such factual and interpretative materials from official sources as might properly be publicized. "Public Understanding of Foreign Policy In the Present Crisis."

... (continued on page 154)

It should be recorded that the U.S. administration, in contradistinction to the limited and unrealistic approach contained in the IPF idea to preserve world peace, seemed to have better assessed the complexity of the situation and in its planning for the post-war period, the use of force formula was placed in the framework of a wider programme to provide international collaboration in political, social and economic affairs.

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Studies of American Interests In The War And The Peace, No. P-B36, New York, 3 February, 1942. William Orton referred to the establishment of international peace by an international police force as a dangerous illusion. He felt that those persons who adopt such an approach for the establishment of world peace think of law in Austinian rather than in social terms and consequently they tend towards "legalism, ideologies, and formulas ...." In practical application, their approach could become "reactionary and productive of further conflict." William A. Orton, The Liberal Tradition (New Haven, 1946) 246.

8. POST-WAR PLANNING AND  
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 1941 - 1943

Next to war itself, plans for the post-war period were widely discussed in scores of American associations, groups, committees, newspaper columns and by publicists all over the country. These could be broadly grouped into four categories: (i) An Anglo-American alliance; (ii) A revival of the League of Nations; (iii) Regional Blocs such as Inter-American regional system; and (iv) World Federal Government.

In the period between 1941 and 1943 there was a great deal of talk about an Anglo-American military alliance to be established either during or after the war to preserve future peace. In official pronouncement, too, there was occasionally some mention of this possibility. The British Prime Minister openly came forward with this idea in his public address at the Harvard University on 6 September, 1943. (154) The U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, on 6 December, 1943 said that the existing Anglo-American naval collaboration would constitute "the backbone of our post-war naval police force, already organized and functioning." (155) In non-official circles, Wendell Willkie

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154. Goodrich and Carroll, n.23, VI, 636-9.

155. New York Times, 8 December, 1943.

thought as early as 26 March, 1941, that, after the war, the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations might be joined in a great confederacy of States so that Hitlerism would never occur again. (156) Two years later, Governor Dewey called for an outright Anglo-American post-war alliance. (157)

While there was support and advocacy of the policy of continued American cooperation with the Soviet Union, there was also, in American public attitudes, concern and

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156. Ibid., 26 March, 1941. A memorandum prepared by Walter Sharp in 1941 for the Council On Foreign Relations also considered a tentative institutional scheme for long-term cooperation by the United States and the British Commonwealth countries. Walter Sharp, "Institutional Arrangements For Postwar American-British Cooperation," Studies of American Interests In The War And The Peace, No.P-B28, New York, 17 September, 1941.

157. New York Times, 6 September, 1943. Across the Atlantic, in England, public opinion was generally amenable to a close Anglo-American post-war collaboration. In a Punch cartoon, a school boy was asked to name the three most important things in the world. His reply, which apparently satisfied his teacher, was "God, Love, and Anglo-American relations." Quoted by William T.R. Fox, "Anglo American Relations in the Post-War World," Yale Institute of International Studies, New Haven, 1 May, 1943.

Walter Lippmann, the noted American political analyst, also pleaded for an immediate working agreement with the British Commonwealth of Nations on grounds that, once such bargain is struck, "other nations, particularly Russia, must find it more and more to their interest to develop good relations with us." New York Herald Tribune, 5 June, 1943.

doubt about the future course of Soviet foreign policy. For example, Wendell Willkie, in his article, "Don't Stir Distrust of Russia," observed,

Moscow and Teheran made plain to Russia that we sincerely want her to become a full associate in a new society of free nations. It is to Russia's interest to pursue that course, because she must genuinely want peace for reconstruction of her war-torn land and people and because the opposite course of conquest or world revolution would mean, eventually, war with all the non-communist world, including the British and ourselves. (158)

The New York Times in its editorial on 10 August, 1943 on the subject of Soviet-American interests noted that it ought to be possible to convince the Russians that American interests in Poland and the Baltic States stem not at all from a desire to use these small nations to threaten Russia's position in any way. It was, as the paper put it, because of "a sense of loyalty to the promise we have given, under the Atlantic Charter, and to a belief that generous treatment for these small nations will be to Russia's own advantage." The New York Times felt that the "real danger" was not that a cordon sanitaire would be established by Western powers, but that some settlement of eastern frontier question would be made by Russian forces, disillusioning, thereby, "American idealism" and driving the country once again to a course of isolationism. The editorial emphatically pointed out that,

158. New York Times, 2 January, 1943.

What American opinion urges is a settlement in a spirit of mutual accommodation between Russia and her small neighbours. And if such a settlement is to be reached, under American and British auspices, and with their full support, a beginning must be made now. (159)

Also, during public discussions, one could sometimes hear statements like: "Let's win the war first and then talk about the peace," or "Let's wait and see what the conditions in the world are after the war before we try to plan our course," or "Let's wait and see what Russia and Britain do before we decide what we are going to do about the peace." Such thinking was perhaps based on an unproven assumption that the post-war problems could not be foreseen then. It was, however, clear to many other people that, in the post-war world, the nations would have to encounter problems of tremendous economic reconstruction, boundary disputes, colonial problems and a host of other issues and for these matters, planning would be necessary before hand.

Finally, it could be observed that in the early periods of the war, there existed a great deal of confusion and vagueness of purpose about the future in the American mind. (160) The situation persisted as long as the Fascists

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159. Emphasis added.

160. Arthur Sweetser wrote in a memorandum of the Council on Foreign Relations that the most important question before the world, next to the war itself, was the

... (continued on page 159 )



were victories in the war. With the Allied powers' victory in North Africa, however, and with the landing of their troops in Sicily, the situation changed greatly. The Allies could then look to the future with more confidence and assurance. In 1943, the "post-war" problems had already manifested themselves in the case of Italy with the result that the Allied governments were obliged to be much more specific in their pronouncements about the post-war world. This helped a great deal to offset the confusion which existed in the public mind and met to a great extent the public demand: "What are we fighting for?"

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nature of the post-war world. This basic question, he noted, was not being discussed as the government officials were overwhelmed with the ceaseless impact of daily problems. As for the public, Sweetser observed that it "is partly bewildered, partly suspicious." Arthur Sweetser, "Approaches to Post-war International Organization," Studies of American Interests In The War And The Peace, No. P-B30, 17 September, 1941.

9. DEVELOPMENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES  
DURING 1941 - 1943

A study of the formulation of American policy towards the creation of an international organization cannot be made in isolation from the developments taking place in other parts of the world. Along with domestic factors, the changing world situation and the foreign policies of other countries also exercise their influence in the shaping and development of a country's foreign policy. In this section, therefore, a brief survey has been made of the important trends discernible in the foreign policies of Great Britain, the European States, the Soviet Union and Latin American States in so far as they are related to the ultimate goal of the creation of a post-war security organization.

EUROPEAN STATES AND REGIONALISM

In the period under study, the idea of a regional grouping of European States was gaining a considerable measure of support among European statesmen. Opinion was divided, however, between those who believed that there ought to be, after the end of the war, a general European regional system and those who favoured intra-European regional groupings.

During 1941 and in early 1942, Dr. Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia repeatedly expressed himself as favouring a general European Confederation made up of the following "blocs" of States: (i) Western Europe (Britain, France, Belgium, and Holland); (ii) Germany (as a decentralized State); (iii) Italy; (iv) Central Europe; (v) the Balkans; (vi) Scandinavia; (vii) Spain and Portugal; and (viii) the Soviet Union. Later on, with strained relations developing between the Soviet Union and Polish government exiled in London and the antipathy of Moscow an Eastern European Federation, Benes thought that the continental federalization would develop only piecemeal, gradually and along functional lines. (161)

On the other hand, the idea of grouping the North Atlantic States of Europe together politically and/or economically had some support in Dutch and Belgian quarters. The Prime Minister of the exiled government of the Netherlands, P.S. Gerbrandy, the Foreign Minister, E.N. Van Kleffens, and the Minister of Colonies, H.J. van Mook, suggested the association of Holland with its North Atlantic neighbours, along with Canada and the United States, on the ground that they are "countries of the same general

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161. Louise W. Holborn, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations (Boston, 1943) I, 416 - 20. Also, Eduard Benes, "The Organization of Post-war Europe," Foreign Affairs (New York), 20 (January 1942) 226 - 42.

structure of government, with identical or complementary economic interests, and with a common sphere of defence."(162) To the Norwegians, such a grouping was unacceptable. Their strong preference was for close and immediate cooperation between the principal United Nations — Britain, the United States, Soviet Union and China. (163) Significantly, no representative of anti-collaborationist French opinion had shown any interest in having France become a member of any regional grouping, whether with the Low Countries to the North or with the Latin States to the South. In an interview reported by the New York Times of 22 July, 1943, General de Gaulle referred to the possibility of a "Rhenish State including the Ruhr," with which France and the Low Countries might have close "economic" relations, but which France would not join. The leadership of the liberated France seemed likely to be motivated chiefly by the desire to restore France to the position of a great European power in its own right, and associated as fully as possible with the principal United Nations on a world basis.

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162. van Mook's address at Constitution Hall, Washington, as reported in the New York Herald Tribune, 26 January, 1943.

163. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway wrote in London Times on 14 November, 1941 that the "most important basis for extended international cooperation in the future is an amicable relationship between the British Empire, the United States, Soviet Russia, and China." He was of the opinion that it would have been possible to use the League of Nations machinery against Italian and German aggression if the leading powers in the League had seriously wanted to do so.

There were also certain developments taking place toward a confederation of the Balkan States. The Greek-Yugoslav Agreement of 15 January, 1942 stated that it "presents the general foundation for the organization of a Balkan Union," pending the adhesion of other Balkan States "ruled by governments freely and legally constituted." (164) The exiled governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia also came to an agreement for a Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation on 23 January, 1942. Point one of the agreement declared that "The two Governments desire that the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation should embrace other states of the European area with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up." (165) This should be read along with their earlier official communique issued on 11 November, 1941, according to which the confederation —

... is to be a nucleus of the political and economic organization of that European region, in the security and development of which both Poland and Czechoslovakia are interested, and therefore, the Confederation is to constitute one of the indispensable elements of the new, democratic order in Europe. (166)

#### SOUTH AFRICAN PROPOSALS

General Smuts of South Africa put forward a

164. Goodrich, n. 22, 277 - 8.

165. Ibid., 273.

166. The Inter Allied Review, 2 (15 January 1942) 8.

proposal for a post-war international organization with the United Nations "big four" as the back-bone and endowed with the power to fight aggressor nations. (167) He suggested that within the wider democratic organization of the United Nations, there should not only be a Council and a General Assembly on the League of Nations model but "a definite place assigned to the great powers in the leadership with specific responsibility for maintaining peace at least for the interim period while the new world organization is being built up." (168) The Premier emphasized the necessity for making provision for power to enforce action by the United Nations. Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, cautioned against stressing only the big power leadership in the post-war world for the maintenance of peace and security. He argued that, "A peace imposed on the small and medium-sized states against their will or without their full share in the discussion of all its terms would be a most absurd and fragile peace." (169)

#### CHINESE ATTITUDE

The Chinese government in many of its policy declarations emphasised that the Second World War should

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167. New York Times, 29 December, 1943.

168. Ibid

169. Paul Henri Spaak, "The Postwar Policy of the United Nations," Free Europe, (4 January 1943).

not lead to the restoration of the status quo. The Chinese hoped that the Allied governments would base their policies on the new dynamic forces unleashed by the war itself. T.V. Soong, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech on 9 June, 1942 asserted: "Political and economic justice go together. Asia is tired of being regarded only in terms of markets and concessions, or a source of rubber, tin and oil, or as furnishing human chattels to work the raw materials ...." (170) He was, however, optimistic about the emergence of an effective world instrument "to dispense and enforce justice" from the sufferings and sacrifices of the present war. He went on to say that for such an "international government," China, along with other Allies, would "gladly cede such of its sovereign powers as may be required." (171) Similarly, Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States pleaded for a "League to Enforce Peace" after the end of the war. The Ambassador said:

It must be an international organization based upon the principle of a threat of overwhelming power to prevent aggressive wars. It must command a sufficient amount of internationally organized and internationally supported force for the effective enforcement of its own law and judgement. (172)

He, therefore, approvingly supported Sumner Welles' speech

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170. Holborn, n. 161, 392 - 3.

171. Ibid

172. ibid., 396 - 7.

on Memorial Day in which Welles had declared that after the termination of the war, the United Nations should undertake "the maintenance of an international police power" until a permanent system of general security is fully established. (173)

BRITISH VIEWS ON POST-WAR SECURITY

The British government's views as formulated by Churchill leaned heavily on the principle of regionalism. The British Prime Minister stated his ideas to the President in a long message dated 2 February, 1943 which he entitled "Morning Thoughts : Note on Post-war Security." (174) On 22 March, 1943, Churchill made a radio speech in which he came out publicly in support of regional organizations in Europe and the Far East while assigning only a vague and secondary role to an overall world organization. On his visit to Washington in May, 1943, Churchill elaborated his ideas before the American administration. Saying that the first preoccupation in discussions of a post-war structure should be to prevent future aggression by Germany and Japan, he contemplated an association of the United

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173. ibid

174. Churchill, n. 4, IV, 636 . In the earlier period of the war, the American Government's reaction was indecisive to the pressure in favour of a regional approach towards the creation of future international organization. To be sure, President Roosevelt and Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles were amenable to the idea of adopting a regional approach in the creation of postwar organizations. By August 1943,



States, Great Britain, and Soviet Union. He was willing to include China in the family of big powers if the United States so desired, although China was not, he maintained, comparable to the other three.

Subordinate to this world council, he believed, there should be three regional councils, one each for Europe, the Orient, and the American Hemisphere. The European council, he thought, might consist of some twelve States or confederations. The European council would have its own high court and armed forces. In the regional council for the Americas, the Prime Minister thought, Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth. In the regional council for the Pacific he supposed Russia would participate.

Churchill's view was that the regional councils would be subordinate to the world council, and that members of the world council would sit on the regional councils in which they were directly interested. He hoped that the United States, in addition to being represented on the American and Pacific regional councils, would also be represented on the European council. He thought that to

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however, Roosevelt came round to accepting his Secretary of State's idea of a single world-wide organization and, thereafter, the American government firmly stood by the views of Hull on this matter. William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia : Their Cooperation and Conflict (London, 1953) 322.

the four powers on the world council, there should be added other members by election or rotation from the regional councils. His central idea of the international structure was that of a three-legged stool — the world council resting on three regional councils. Drawing lessons from the League of Nations experience, he attached great importance to the regional principle, because it was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute that could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement.

Another aspect of British policy — that of rivalry with the U.S.S.R. in Europe — would need to be considered here. In October, 1942, Churchill expressed his views on post-war organization to the British Foreign Secretary when the latter circulated to the War Cabinet an important document entitled "The Four-Power Plan." Under the plan, the supreme direction would have to come from a council composed of Great Britain, the United State, Russia and China. The Prime Minister later wrote in his war memoirs that he was "glad" that he found "strength" to put his own opinions on record on the above suggestion. He wrote on 21 October, 1942:

... It sounds very simple to pick out these Big Powers. We cannot however tell what sort of a Russia and what kind of Russian demands we shall have to face. A little later on it may be possible. As to China, I cannot regard the Chungking government as representing a great world-power ....

I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in Europe — the revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the modern nations and of civilisation. It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient States of Europe. Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council consisting of perhaps ten units, including the former Great Powers, with several confederations — Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc.— which would possess an international police and be charged with keeping Prussia disarmed. Of course, we shall have to work with Americans in many ways, and in the greatest ways, but Europe is our prime care, and we certainly do not wish to be shut up with the Russians and the Chinese when Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs, and Turks will have their burning questions, their desire for our aid, and their very great power of making their voices heard .... (175)

He also wanted, in line with the above thinking, a strong France in the post-war world because the "prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and

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175. Churchill, n. 4, IV, 504 . The Soviet authorities ever suspicious of Western nations and also because of their understanding of "capitalist" power's political attitudes, must not have missed the implication of Eden's remarks to the press that "The trouble with Hitler, for instance, was not that he was a Nazi at home. The trouble with him was that he would not stay at home." The Times, 3 January, 1942.

Russia was not attractive." (176)

It was Churchill's great desire to come to a close understanding with the United States in the post-war world. In his address at Harvard University on 6 September, 1943, he strongly pleaded for the continuation of British and United States Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in the post-war period "not only till we have set up some world arrangement to keep the peace but until we know that it is an arrangement which will really give us that protection we must have from danger and aggression — a protection we have already had to seek across two vast world wars." (177) Commenting on the post-war organization plans, he asserted that,

... Whatever form your system of world security may take, however the nations are grouped and ranged, whatever derogations are made from national sovereignty for the sake of larger synthesis, nothing will work soundly or for long without the united efforts of the British and American people. If we are together, nothing is impossible. If we are divided, all will fail. (178)

SOVIET POLICIES DURING  
THE PERIOD 1941 - 1943

In analysing the Soviet government's policies

176. Churchill, n. n.4, IV, 717.

177. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 23, VI, 638.

178. Ibid., 639.

during the war years as a factor influencing the development of American policy for the creation of an international organization in the post-war world, the following important points should be considered.

It should be stated at the outset that the Soviet Union did not wholly and unequivocally commit itself to the principles and purposes contained in the Atlantic Charter. To be sure, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to United Kingdom did declare his government's general agreement with the principles of the Charter in his speech at the Inter Allied meeting in London on 24 September, 1941. The Soviet Ambassador, however, pointed out that the "practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries ...." (179)

Another aspect of Soviet policy was the insistence by the U.S.S.R. on its war-time partners for an early understanding among them on the post-war world. In a personal message sent to Churchill on 8 November, 1941, Stalin mentioned the lack of clarity between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain due to two circumstances: First, that there was no definite understanding between our two countries concerning war aims and plans for the post-war organization of peace; second, that there was no treaty

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179. Holborn, n. 161, 356 - 7.

between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain on mutual aid in Europe against Hitler. Hence, it was Stalin's contention that "Until understanding is reached on these two main points, not only will there be no clarity in Anglo-Soviet relations, but, if we are to speak frankly, there will be no mutual trust ...." (180)

In reply, Churchill assured Stalin that it was his intention to fight the war in alliance with Stalin. Furthermore, after the end of the war Churchill expected that Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States would meet at the council table having their "first object" of finding means of preventing Germany from "breaking out upon us for third time." (181) Stalin agreed wholeheartedly with Churchill's suggestion regarding the need for the prevention of the renewed possibility of German aggression in the post-war period. It could also be noted here that this fear of the possible revival of German militarism after the war was to become an important motivating factor in the Soviet policy toward any future international organization.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union thought it necessary to enter into a series of bilateral security pacts with other

180. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The U.S.S.R. And The Presidents Of The U.S.A. And The Prime Minister Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War, (Moscow, 1957) I, 33.

181. Ibid., 35.

neighbouring European countries presumably to forestall any possible threat of German militarism in the post-war world. In so acting, the Soviet Union did not wait till the creation of a general world-wide system of security. Although the Soviet Union had entered into a series of bilateral mutual assistance treaties during the war, the American planners were encouraged by the existence of Article III in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 25 May, 1942. In that the two countries declared their "desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period." It meant, in the eyes of the American planners, that both the States were amenable to a creation of a larger system of general security for which the U.S. government was making plans.

Another phase of the Soviet policy at that time was the encouragement it was giving to the Pan-Slav movement in order to bring about a closer relationship among Slav countries. The Tass statement of 3 March, 1943 asserted the right of the "Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples to unite with their own blood-brothers" and added: "If the present war teaches any thing at all, it is in the first place that Slav peoples should not entertain enmity among themselves, but should live in friendship in order to rid themselves of the danger of a German yoke ...." (182)

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182. Rothstein, n. 24, 265.

The Soviet Union was also anxious to have "friendly" States on its Western borders. After the breach of diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile (26 April, 1943), a Union of Polish Patriots was established in Russia and a new Polish division was formed to fight with the Red Army. The Union on 17 June, 1943 took open issues with the Polish government-in-exile by assuring Stalin that "we will not allow these people who are trying to drive a wedge between the Polish people and the Soviet Union to disturb our relations." (183) At the end of 1943, Soviet activity was publicly extended to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. On 14 December, 1943 the Russian government announced that a Russian Military Mission would be sent to Tito's Headquarters. (184) Also a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war collaboration between Russia and Czechoslovak Government-in-exile was signed in Moscow on 12 December, 1943. One significant innovation in the treaty was that the two countries also visualized the possibility of other neighbouring countries joining the mutual assistance treaty.

The Soviet Union also gave clear-cut public demonstrations of her intention to regard Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, Karelia and the Ukrainian and White

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183. Quoted in McNeill, n. 174, 317.

184. This step was taken with British approval as decided at the Teheran Conference.



Russian sections of the pre-war Polish State as Soviet territories. (185) Stalin had earlier demanded in December, 1941 that Great Britain should recognize these territories as belonging to the Soviet Union, but on American insistence, the issue was postponed. (186) The American policy, in general, was that such specific issues which might bring about disunity among the Allies should be settled only after the conclusion of the war.

While the United States was disturbed by the implications of some of these Soviet actions, it viewed with favour the dissolution of the Comintern by the Soviet Union on 22 May, 1943. The American government, thereby, felt encouraged in pursuing its plans for the creation of a world organization based on the principle of cooperation among the United Nations and principally between the great powers. Welcoming the dissolution of the Communist International, Cordell Hull said on 24 May, 1943:

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185. Note of V.M. Molotov, People's Commissar For Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on the "Universal Robbery, Ruin Of Population And Monstrous Atrocities Of The German Authorities On Soviet Territory Occupied By Them." Rothstein, n. 24, 120.

186. Eden's dispatch to Churchill, dated 5 January, 1942, stated: "... M. Stalin was prepared to support any special arrangements for security bases, etc., for the United Kingdom in Western European countries — e.g., France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. As regards the special interests of the Soviet Union, M. Stalin desired the restoration of the position in 1941, prior to the German attack, in respect of the Baltic States, Finland, and Bessarabia. The "Curzon Line" should form the

... (continued on page 176 )

The elimination of that organization from international life and the cessation of the type of activity in which that organization has in the past engaged is certain to promote a greater degree of trust among the United Nations and to contribute very greatly to the whole-hearted cooperation necessary for the winning of the war and for successful post-war undertakings. (187)

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

The war time declarations of the Latin American countries were also carefully considered by the policy makers in the United States. The third meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics on January 15 - 18, 1942 in a resolution on post-war problems resolved, inter alia, "to entrust the Inter-American Juridical Committee with the formation of specific recommendations relative to the international organization in the juridical and political fields, and in the field of international security." (188)

The Inter-Allied Juridical Committee in its preliminary recommendation on post-war problems on 5 September,

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basis for the future Soviet-Polish frontier, and Roumania should give special facilities for bases, etc., to the Soviet Union, receiving compensation from territory now occupied by Hungary." Churchill, n.4, 558.

187. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 23, 530.

188. Holborn, n. 161, 584.

1942 proposed to the American Republics certain conclusions under the following headings:

1. Priority of the moral law and of the fundamental principles of international law derived from it;
2. Repudiation of the use of force;
3. Unqualified obligation to settle disputes by peaceful methods;
4. Solidarity in the presence of aggression;
5. Modification of the conception of sovereignty;
6. Necessity of a more effective international organization;
7. Character of the new association of nations;
8. A more effective system of collective security;
9. Abandonment of the system of a balance of power, limitation of armaments;
10. Abandonment of political imperialism;
11. Elimination of political nationalism;
12. Elimination of economic imperialism; and
13. Elimination of the social factors of war. (189)

On the repudiation of the use of force, the Inter-American Juridical Committee expressed its belief that, "War must be repudiated not only as an instrument of national policy, but also as a legalized procedure for the settlement of disputes." It suggested the community of nations, acting

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189. Pan American Union, Preliminary Recommendations On Post-War Problems (Washington, 1942) 17 - 22.

through its organized agents, must alone have the right to use force to prevent or resist aggression and to maintain order and respect for law. The committee, furthermore, was of the opinion that those acts which might be regarded as constituting aggression must be specifically defined as well as the conditions calling into effect the right of legitimate self-defence. (190)

On the subject of the pacific settlement of disputes, the committee advocated the organization of various procedures oriented toward that end in such a way as to operate automatically and progressively until a final and definite solution of the controversy could be found out. It also recommended the extension of jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Under point four of its programme the committee recommended that nations must assume collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. Drawing from past experiences, it was of the opinion that "when once the aggression has been determined by the competent organs of the international community, nations shall have no right to remain neutral between the parties in conflict and to treat them upon equal terms." (191) Thus, the members of the committee felt that all other nations should cooperate

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190. Holborn, n. 161, 586.

191. Ibid., 587.

in making effective the sanctions which the international community might adopt against an aggressor.

The committee wanted that the new organization should be so constituted as to reconcile the principle of universality of membership with the existence of regional groups formed by "natural bonds of solidarity and common interests." (192) Further, it was agreeable to the idea of "These regional groups or associations (adopting) ... special rules governing the relations of their members among themselves in matters in which the common interests of the whole international community are not involved." (193) Finally, another significant recommendation was that the "nations must recognize that social justice and the improvement of the conditions of life for the individual citizen have a relation to the maintenance of peace and for that reason must play an essential part in any plans of international reconstruction .... (194)

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192. Ibid.

193. Ibid., 588.

194. Ibid., 591.

Thus, the American planners during 1941-43 were faced with several alternatives to be pursued in their goal to ensure peace and security in the post-war years. To begin with, the top leadership in the United States was not sure whether efforts should solely be made towards the creation of a world-wide security system or should planning for the post-war period be based on a regional basis. The American public undoubtedly showed great change in its attitude towards plans for maintaining peace in the post-war years but was not, on the whole, able to draw a clear line between its enthusiasm to support certain measures advocated by the internationalists and its determination to preserve American "independence" and "sovereignty." Nevertheless, the trend was towards accepting increasing responsibility in international affairs which devolved on the United States by virtue of its becoming a great power. This change in public attitudes was also reflected in the foreign policy declarations of the Republican party and in the Congressional resolutions of this period.

The developments in foreign countries were also factors to be taken into account by the American post-war planners. The intensive preparation in the Department of State, consultations and meetings between the Allied powers and the decisive victories scored by the Allies over the Axis created a more opportune time to finalize the plans for establishing a system of general security in the post-war world.

Thus, in the years 1944-45, the United States, along with other Allies, could devote itself to taking concrete steps in the establishment of a world security organization.

**CHAPTER III**

**PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE  
SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE IN  
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

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In the following pages the opinions of some of the leading public organizations and agencies on the subject under consideration will be surveyed in order to provide us with a background — though limited — of the thinking that went on in these non-governmental organizations of the United States. Along with such organizations, there were scores of other agencies and pressure groups which were, throughout the war, propagating their views on matters relating to the post-war period and the creation of a world organization. Taken together, these agencies were instrumental in crystallizing American public opinion on post-war issues, and, as such, justified their role in the American political scene.

1. **THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY  
THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE**

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The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace was established in November 1939 — immediately after the outbreak of war in Europe — under the chairmanship of Professor James T. Shotwell, Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. The purpose of the Commission was to

study the reorganization of the world for peace and to make recommendations in preparation for the vast work of reconstruction which was to face the world upon the termination of the conflict. The Commission published annual reports embodying the results of its study and discussion.

In November, 1940, the Commission published the first "Preliminary Report" which dealt with the general principles of international relations designed to strengthen peace as the fundamental condition of international intercourse. (1) The recommendations of the report were widely accepted by various study groups throughout the United States.

The Second Report published shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December, 1941 dealt with those pressing problems which were to confront the United Nations after the end of hostilities : Problems of relief, the restoration of law and order, and economic reconstruction. It viewed the period of transition from war to peace as of "vital importance," not only because the problems of reconstruction themselves would be enormous, but because

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1, "Preliminary Report Of The Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace," International Conciliation, 369 (April, 1941) 195 - 203.

... it is then that the reorganization of the postwar world will be taking form. The institutions and the political and economic strategy of this period must be so shaped as to lead without break into the permanent system of world order. (2)

Thus, it visualized the post-war world problem in two stages : First, "... the tremendous problem of political, material, and spiritual reconstruction following the devastation of war; and second, the long range problem of building the permanent institutions of international order." (3) After narrating the magnitude and the complexity of the task, the Report pointed to the fact that after the end of hostilities, the responsibility of reconstruction would rest on the victors and mainly on the big powers. The members of the Commission, however, were apprehensive of the situation developing into such a state that the victors might refuse to exercise the authority which victory would bestow on them. "The American people may again bury themselves in isolation; others may be too tired to make the effort," they felt.(4) In the second place, they sensed a danger that States which might assume the burden and successfully administer

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2. "Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace, Second Report -- The Transitional Period," International Conciliation, 379(April, 1942) 149.

3. Ibid., 150 - 1.

4. ibid., 160.

the task of transitional period would not be willing to relinquish their position in favour of a world organization. A third danger, they visualized, could be that "the victors may fall out among themselves." (5)

For the first two "dangers," the members suggested advance preparation for proper agencies to be created and unequivocal declarations by States which would control the territories of their intention to transfer these to national, regional or world institutions as speedily as possible. For the third, they hoped that sacrifices in a common struggle would go a long way in removing the suspicions which nations had for each other. (6) Furthermore, the members clearly recognized that Soviet Union's contribution to war, her geographic position and her power could not be ignored. They took note of the fact that the Soviet Union was a strong supporter of the collective security idea in the League of Nations. (7)

The Report, furthermore, mindful of the effects of such slogans as the return to "normalcy" which had, in the past, beclouded the real issues facing the American

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5. Ibid., 161.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

people, drew attention to the changed situation which must await the American people after the end of the Second World War. In that situation, there would be no return to "normalcy," but to "permanent peace and order" meaning, thereby, that the United States would have to come forward and shoulder responsibilities in the international field in the post-war world. (8) The Report, however, pointed out that the conditions of common peace and order in the post-war period would only be possible if planning were to proceed not from the psychology of victors towards vanquished, but from the psychology of cooperation for mutual welfare.

In its third annual Report, the Commission offered the suggestion that the United Nations should formally address themselves to the issues of post-war policies and organization. (9) It supported this proposal by recalling the pledges in the Atlantic Charter and other pronouncements. It recommended that the "United Nations organize themselves, as soon as possible, as a continuing conference of the United Nations, with such subordinate agencies as are needed, to prepare programmes for the future and to develop agreement upon the principles and procedures necessary to build the better world to which

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8. Ibid., 163.

9. International Conciliation, 389 (April, 1943) 203 - 35.

they are committed." (10) It noted that the most urgent need of the future was that the United Nations be welded together so closely that their union could withstand the effects of the post-war reaction. Agreement of the four leading States — China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States — was essential.

The Report, furthermore, made it clear that the establishment of an international organization, would not mean the subversion of the institution of nation as such. The purpose of the international system, the Commission visualized, "is to aid the nation in its task, which it is now unable to accomplish alone, of protecting and advancing the welfare of its own citizens." (11)

The Fourth Report of the Commission, issued in November, 1943, came to grips with the precise functions of an international organization. The report unmistakably demonstrated the marked progress in the thinking of its members. It consisted of three parts under the following titles : Fundamentals of the International Organization — General statement; Security and World Organization; The Economic Organization of Welfare. A study of first two parts follows.

The Report in its general survey pointed out

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10. Ibid., 204.

11. Ibid., 234.

the need for more effective provisions for disarmament and international policing and for substitutes for war so that grievances might be redressed without the threat or use of violence. It also eloquently pleaded for the new organization to give expression

to the growing sense of international interest in all the major activities of nations and even (wanted the organization) no longer (to) remain indifferent to the suppression of human rights in what has formerly been regarded as the purely domestic sphere of government. (12)

It noted "the prime purpose" of an international organization to be the strengthening and maintenance of international peace. However, the peace to be established should not be to the detriment of human dignity and justice. (13) The inhuman crimes committed by the Nazis, the global nature of the war and the growing international community of interests were perhaps some of the important factors that might have led the members to regard matters pertaining to basic human rights and justice as falling within the purview of an international organization.

It welcomed the results of the Conference of the United Nations on Food and Agriculture which met at Hot Springs, Virginia from 18 May till 3 June, 1943 and

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12. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Fourth Report, International Conciliation, 396 (January, 1944) 6 - 7.

13. Ibid., 7.

the draft agreement establishing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Report recognized the fact that each of these interests and activities needed to have its own organization planned with reference to its own purposes. Nevertheless, it drew attention to one important factor :

Taken together, these ... elements furnish the vitality of the international community, but if planned without regard to their interdependence among themselves, they offer a most inadequate picture of international relations as a whole. (14)

The Report also noted that U.S. public opinion after having been confronted with a variety of proposals "has recently shown a growing appreciation of the central problem, which is the creation of a world-wide system of war prevention, economic cooperation, and guarantee of freedom." (15) On the question of the security of nations, it pointed out that the organization of peace must also be an organization of power, for power is essential to maintain law and order between nations. (16) The Pact of Paris ignored this fact. The belief that the public opinion of mankind without organized force at its disposal would be sufficient to enforce such a treaty against a

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14. Ibid., 8.

15. Ibid., 11.

16. Ibid., 12.



recalcitrant nation was, the members of the Commission opined, "one of the blunders in the history of American thought." (17) They also wanted more definite provisions in the new organization than those existing in the League of Nations Covenant for joint action. Thus, once the fact of aggression or the threat of it has been established, they pleaded in their Report, there should be a definite obligation on the part of the member nations to cooperate in carrying out the appropriate measures for the maintenance of peace. There should also be a small international force under the command of the combined military staff of the United Nations. To maintain peace effectively in all parts of the world, the United Nations should have access to a few well placed strategic posts along the highways of the world especially in those regions in which disorders might more likely occur. The members, however, were against any one belligerent nation controlling them. This, they felt, would lead to "rival efforts on the part of others." (18)

The Report pointed out the close relationship existing between security and disarmament. Limitation of national armaments would be both a contribution to and a consequence of, the establishment of an international

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17. Ibid., 13.

18. Ibid., 15.

police force in which nations had confidence, the Report maintained. It went on to observe that experience indicated that the problem of disarmament could not be treated apart from security. (19)

1944 - 1945 :

During this period the Allied nations took decisive steps in completing their plans for the creation of a world organization. By the middle of 1944, the plans had reached the blueprint stage. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was in the offing. Taking note of these changes, the Commission to study the Organization of Peace published in August 1944 its framework for a general international organization.

It was advocated in the framework that all nations must live "within the circle of international law and order." (20) This meant that all nations should be bound to (a) abstain from aggression; (b) join in preventing aggression; and (c) settle disputes only by peaceful means.

The framework envisaged by the Commission consisted of an Assembly, an Executive Council, a General Commission,

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19. Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace, A Ten Year Record 1939 - 1949 (New York, 1950) 24.

20. Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace, "The General International Organization : Its Framework And Functions," International Conciliation, 403 (September, 1944) 547.

a Permanent Court of International Justice and a Director General elected by the Assembly. The Assembly was to be composed of representatives of "all qualified states" which should meet at least once a year. The unanimity rule in arriving at decisions was to be replaced by a majority rule. The framework stipulated that the Assembly should be responsible for the maintenance of peace. It should coordinate the activities of international bodies established in connection with the General International Organization. Finally, it should recommend to nations policies agreed upon by the Assembly in support of their common interests.

The Executive Council was to be composed of not more than eleven members in which the major powers were to have continuing membership and the others were to be elected periodically by the Assembly. The Council's "chief duty" was to supervise the prompt settlement of disputes and to direct measures for the prevention of war. Action on these matters was to be taken by a majority vote including the concurring vote of all the continuing members voting. Furthermore, a General Commission composed of representatives of the Assembly and the heads of the non-political agencies was to be established "to advise on the solution of economic, financial, social, cultural and educational problems." (21)

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21. Ibid., 548.

Posing the question "How Shall Peace Be Maintained?" the Commission suggested that all States should be obligated to use their military and economic power to restrain aggression when called upon by the Council. The Council should take the necessary step to resist any sudden aggression. Should an aggression occur against a State, it was entitled to use force to defend itself. The attacked State should, however, immediately refer the matter to the General International Organization and secure its "approval and assistance." (22) The framework suggested that the General International Organization should be equipped with certain instruments of power under the direction of the Council, such as permanent international air patrol and strategic bases "jointly occupied in the name of the General International Organization by the forces of those States which have the greatest security interest in the areas." (23) The Commission thus leaned heavily on the principle of unanimity among the Big Powers and their preponderant role in maintaining world peace in the post-war period. It hoped that as confidence in security would develop among the nations, they could then embark on a programme of gradual reduction in national armaments. Specifically, the Commission suggested the creation of a permanent disarmament commission to bring about "practical

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22. Ibid., 549.

23. Ibid

general agreement on armament reduction." The disarmament commission was to have authority to inspect and report to the Council on national armaments establishments.

The framework of the Commission suggested that if international disputes could not be settled by ordinary methods of diplomacy, they should be settled with the help of the General International Organization providing such instrumentalities of pacific settlement like conciliation, arbitration and the good offices of the Council or Assembly. In case a dispute could not be settled by these friendly methods, and threatened the peace of the world, the framework provided that it should be brought to the attention of the Council. If the dispute was of a nature for which there existed a treaty or a law, it should be referred to the permanent Court of International Justice by either party or the Council. The decision of the Court should be binding.

In case all other methods of settling the disputes have failed, the framework enjoined the Council to "make an investigation and give a decision which should be binding on the parties." Furthermore, such decision should be given by majority vote provided there was no adverse vote from any continuing member of the Council. The vote of any State party to the dispute should not be counted. (24)

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24. Ibid., 550.

It should also be noted that the framework on the subject of "dependent peoples" recommended that the "Japanese mandated islands should be placed under mandate of members of the United Nations with the greatest security interest in the Pacific." (25) The Commission to study the Organization of Peace thus implicitly accepted to a great extent the demand voiced by many influential groups in the United States that the country should, for its national security interest, insist on keeping control of Japanese mandated islands in the post-war period.

A comparison of the framework with the Charter of the United Nations adopted at San Francisco in 1945 undoubtedly showed that a great many principles advocated by the Commission were incorporated at San Francisco. However, the Commission's views on issues like the proper sphere of domestic jurisdiction of States, the pacific settlement of disputes, ways and means of preventing war and conflict among States and the voting procedure to be adopted by an international organization could not be fully incorporated in the Charter drawn at San Francisco. It clearly demonstrated that the task of creating a world organization primarily meant seeking not perfect blueprints

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25. Ibid

for the future but of arriving at compromises and adjustments which would make the organization acceptable to States still zealous of safeguarding and asserting their sovereignty in the international arena.

The Commission supported the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals recognizing that the Proposals were not perfect and that certain gaps had to be filled in. Nevertheless, it recognized that they "provided a flexible framework within which the great and small powers may work together for security, justice, and economic and social cooperation." (26)

At the time of the San Francisco Conference, too, the Commission played a notable part. Fortyseven of its members were chosen to serve in an official or consultative capacity at the Conference. Its officers rendered useful service in the consultants' meetings and its Chairman, Dr. Shotwell was recognized as the "Dean of the Consultants" and presided at their meetings. (27) The Director gave leadership to a "core" committee of consultants representing the national organizations which had been meeting under his chairmanship since the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Policies advocated by this "core" committee included strengthening the Economic and Social Council, provisions on trusteeship both for dependent peoples and for strategic bases and a bill of human rights. (28)

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26. Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace, n. 19, 27.

27. Ibid., 31.

28. Ibid.

## 2. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN AMERICA

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The Church bodies in the United States do not merely confine their activities to religious fields but also take active interest in the social and political problems of the country. Many influential leaders from various walks of life like business, labour, education and politics also associate themselves with the work of the Church bodies thus enhancing the influence of such groups in the public field. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America set up in 1940 a Commission to study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace under the chairmanship of John Foster Dulles. (29)

Dulles saw the solution to the problem of the recurrence of war in the creation of a world organization

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29. There were scores of other church groups — Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and of various other denominations, individual religious leaders — who were giving thought and attention to the problems of peace and security and letting the American people know their points of view.

Attention is paid here primarily to the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America because of its importance felt by the U.S. government. Furthermore, the Federal Council is a federation of all Protestant Churches and so more representative than a single denominational group.



owing allegiance to all. Arguing that since world trade required a balancing of the needs of domestic economy against the needs of others for access to markets and raw materials, Dulles urged that there should be some impartial international authority to make a decision on this issue.

Analyzing the problem of disarmament, he stated that since the aggressor of today might be the victim of tomorrow, and vice versa,

We cannot assure peace by giving arms to some and withholding them from others. If we believe that peace requires sanctions, then such sanctions must be disposed of by, or under the direction of, some organization that will owe its allegiance to the entire community of nations. (30)

Dulles asserted that these issues brought out the need for a "Supernational Organization." Recognizing the need and utility of national governments, Dulles nevertheless felt that

... the system of national sovereignty cannot produce peace or order unless it can call to its aid an organism whose judgments will be entitled to a moral weight that is denied the judgment of man who have in law, a duty only to a small part of the whole. (31)

30. John Foster Dulles, "Peace Without Platitudes," Fortune, 15 (January, 1942) 90.

31. Ibid. Such thinking was not unique with Dulles. Many Americans seemed to think then, while projecting their thoughts on the future international organization, that the world organization would acquire a personality independent of the member-States constituting the organization and, therefore, would tend to arrive at an independent judgment beneficial and superior to the judgments of the constituting member-States' individual wills.

At their conference held in Delaware, the representatives of the Federal Council of Churches passed a series of "guiding principles" in March, 1942, which declared, in part, that

... the interdependent life of nations must be ordered by agencies having the duty and the power to promote and safeguard the general welfare of all peoples ... We believe that international machinery is required to facilitate the easing of such economic and political tensions as are inevitably recurrent in a world which is living and therefore changing. (32)

Significantly, the comprehensive statement emanating from the Conference rightly based its analysis on the political, economic and social factors necessary for a just and durable peace.

Another landmark in the development of the Church organization's thinking on problems of peace was their enunciation of "Six Pillars of Peace." They were :

1. The peace must provide the political framework for a continuing collaboration of the United Nations and, in due course, of neutral and enemy nations.

2. The peace must make provision for bringing within the scope of international agreements those economic and financial acts of national governments which have widespread international repercussions.

3. The peace must make provision for an organization to adapt the treaty structure of the world to changing conditions.

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32. Louise Holborn, ed., War and Peace Aims of the United Nations (Boston, 1943) I, 634 - 6.

4. The peace must proclaim the goal of autonomy for subject peoples, and it must establish international organization to assure and to supervise the realization of that end.

5. The peace must establish procedures for controlling military establishments everywhere.

6. The peace must establish in principle, and seek to achieve in practice, the right of individuals everywhere to religious and intellectual liberty. (33)

Presenting these "six pillars of peace" to the public, Dulles expressed the opinion that they were derived from moral beliefs common to all religions and could be safely espoused by Protestants, Catholics and Jews — indeed, by all men who have an enlightened view of self-interest. He further remarked that the American people must decide promptly on how they would answer this question : Will the American people now commit themselves to a future of organized international collaboration within the areas of demonstrated world interdependence? (34)

He declared that the Soviet Union and decisions affecting the future of Finland, the Baltic States, Poland

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33. New York Times, 19 March, 1943. In commenting on this proposition, the Church leaders pointed out that "wars are not due only to economic causes. They have their origin also in false ideologies and in ignorance ... It is, therefore, indispensable that there exist the opportunity to bring the people of all the world to a fuller knowledge of the facts and a greater acceptance of common moral standards ...." Ibid.

34. Ibid

and China were among the greatest post-war problems which the United States must face. "I see no hope," he added, "that such decisions will be generally acceptable if they crush human beings and human aspirations between the millstones of power politics. The only hope lies in building a world order under which such treatment may not seem a permanent harsh necessity.(35)

Another notable landmark in this period was the publication of the Moscow Declaration in November, 1943. It was hailed by John Foster Dulles, as Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace as "a notable step toward realizing international order as envisaged by our 'Six Pillars of Peace' and a general development from the Atlantic Charter." He, however, observed that at the end of the war there would in all probability be an overwhelming concentration of power in one or two nations the implications of which his countrymen should not avoid to face. Dulles saw the task before the nation to make that concentration of power "a beneficial reality." He wanted that the United States should not use its power to perpetuate itself but to "create and support and eventually give way to international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family of nations ...." (36)

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35. Ibid.

36. New York Times, 18 November, 1943.

On 7 October, 1943, a Catholic, Jewish and Protestant declaration on world peace was published. (37)

The text of the declaration contained these important points :

1. The moral law must govern world order.
2. The rights of the individual must be assured.
3. The rights of the oppressed, weak or colonial people must be protected.
4. The rights of minorities must be secured.
5. International economic cooperation must be developed.
6. A just and social order within each state must be achieved.
7. International institutions to maintain peace with justice must be organized.

On the last point, the declaration suggested that,

An enduring peace requires the organization of international institutions which will (a) develop a body of international law (b) guarantee the faithful fulfilment of international obligation, and revise them when necessary (c) assure collective security by drastic limitations and continuing control of armaments, compulsory arbitration and adjudication of controversies, and the use when necessary the adequate sanctions to enforce the law. (38)

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37. Released by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and printed in International Conciliation, (November, 1943) 586 - 8.

38. Ibid., 587.

Thus, as one reads over the many declarations by Church groups, one is struck by the great interest these groups took in the problems facing the world. Although the Church leaders primarily tended to view the crisis facing mankind as a reflection of the schism and malady existing within individual beings, yet, they were also conscious of the social and economic maladjustments existing "without" — which were also responsible for the then prevailing tragedy of the Second World War. Furthermore, the Church groups were quite mindful of the basic divergent ideologies that guided the policies of two of the most important members of the United Nations — the United States and the Soviet Union. They perceived that unless these two powers along with the other Allied nations agreed to base their future policies on agreed principles and purposes, the post-war might be "no more than a time for recuperating strength for another war." (39) The Church groups also expressed their disapproval of the balance-of-power and power-politics principles working on the international scene and feverently pleaded for a world order based on higher ethical and moral rules. Thus, the role of a future world organization to whose creation the Church groups gave their support was primarily seen by them as that of an instrumentality which could progressively

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39. Statement of John Foster Dulles while presenting the "Six Pillars of Peace" to the public. 18 March, 1943. Ibid., 19 March, 1943.

establish the rule of law and christian ethics on a world governed by such forces as imperialism, power-politics and rival economic policies.

1944 - 1945 :

The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace during this period continued to emphasize its desire for a peace based on spiritual principles. Likewise, there was general support for the creation of a world organization, not to maintain the status quo but as an agency which could deal constructively with the underlying causes of war. Those included, according to a statement of the Commission on September 22, 1944 "quest for power, economic and political maladjustment, exploitation in colonial relationships, racial discrimination, and the denial to individuals of spiritual and intellectual freedoms ...."(40) There was also a general understanding in the Church groups as regards the importance of the use of force to maintain world peace and security. The Church groups, however, continued to emphasize the fact that force per se could not achieve lasting peace. Force must be made the "servant of just law ...." (41) The U.S. administration's efforts in seeking the support of the opposition party in its efforts to plan for a post-war world organization also

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40. New York Times, 23 September, 1944.

41. Ibid.

drew appreciative comments from the Church groups in the United States.

On the political developments in Europe and the policies of United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in that region, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America in a statement dealing with the issue of peace-settlement in Europe on 31 May, 1944 observed :

... One necessary condition for world peace is a united policy with respect to Europe. If Europe is divided into independent spheres of influence without a significant agreement between the United States, Britain and Russia in the framework of a world organization, it will once again be the battleground, first in political struggles for power and then in war .... (42)

When the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were published, Church opinion in the United States generally responded favourably to the Proposals. There were certain groups like the National Study Conference on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace which recorded their unconditional support to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. (43) On the other hand, a view was expressed by the post-war world committee

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42. Ibid., 1 June, 1944. The U.S. Government's policy towards European problems came in for sharp criticism at the hands of John Foster Dulles. Speaking at the opening session of the National Study Conference on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles criticised the government's "aloofness" in the Polish and Greek situations as a "major setback" to effective international cooperation, and a threat to the effectiveness of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. ibid., 21 January, 1945.

43. Ibid., 18 January, 1945.



of the Catholic Association for International Peace that unconditional acceptance of the Dumbarton Oaks plan as formulated would seem to utter "a death sentence" on the cause of smaller nations. The committee went on to make the following specific criticisms of the proposals :

1. The General Assembly has no legislative power;
2. There is ambiguity about pacific settlement of disputes;
3. There is no direct provision for revision of treaties and peaceful change;
4. There is no arbitration machinery set up for settlement of non-justiciable political disputes, the council apparently being its own "court of arbitration," while it is a most partial body;
5. There is lack of explicit consideration to be given to minorities;
6. There is no explicit commitment to the principle of reduction of armaments, which collective security is said to make possible.

Lastly, the committee said that there should be a codified statement of international law and added : "we in the west should make clearly known to Russia what we hold." (44)

There was also an endeavour on the part of the Church groups to put forward constructive suggestions to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals so as to make them, as far as possible come near their principles and ideals. A plenary session of the National Study Conference on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace adopted a resolution

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44. Ibid., 2 February, 1945.

proposing eight measures to bring the Dumbarton Oaks plan for a world security organization into closer conformity to christian ideals as stated in the 'guiding principles' and 'six pillars of peace' previously affirmed by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and its commission on a just and durable peace.

We recommend that the churches support the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as an important step in the direction of world co-operation, which at the same time we urge the following measures for their improvement :

1. Preamble : A preamble should reaffirm long-range purposes of justice and human welfare which are set forth in the Atlantic Charter and which reflect the aspirations of peoples everywhere.

2. Development of international law. The Charter should clearly anticipate the separation of the organization under international law and should make provision for the development and codification of international law.

3. Voting power. A nation while having the right to discuss its own case, should not be permitted to vote when its case is being judged in accordance with predetermined body of international law.

4. Amendment. In order to permit such changes in the charter of the organization as may from time to time be necessary, the provision for amendments should be liberalized so as not to require concurrence by all the permanent members of the security council.

5. Colonial and dependent areas. A special agency or commission should be established wherein the progress of colonial and dependent areas to autonomy, and the interim problems related thereto, will become an international responsibility.

6. Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. A special commission on human rights and fundamental freedoms should be established in addition to the economic and social agencies proposed under the economic and social council.

7. Eventual universal membership. The charter should clearly specify that all nations willing to accept the obligations of membership shall thereupon be made members of the organization.

8. Limitation of armaments. More specific provision should be made for promptly initiating the limitation and reduction of national armaments. (45)

Finally, when the San Francisco Conference succeeded in drafting the Charter of the United Nations, the executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America adopted a statement on 26 June, 1945 urging its ratification by the United States. Bishop Oxnham, President of the Executive Committee in his "call" pleaded for "prompt ratification" of the Charter by the U.S. Senate and by the governments of other nations, which would "assure a favourable start along the one hopeful road to a better world order." He said, the delegates of 50 nations had placed the Charter before the people, "it is for the people to make their choice — to accept it with the possibility of peace or reject it with the practical certainty of a new and more terrible war." (46)

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45. Ibid., 19 January, 1945.

46. Ibid., 7 July, 1945.

### 3. THE UNIVERSITIES COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

This was a leading organization of American University teachers which included many outstanding scholars in the field of political science, international relations, philosophy, law, sociology and other allied disciplines. The Committee was organized in the summer of 1942 and began its activities in the following autumn. (47) Nearly twenty major post-war problems were discussed by the Committee and the cooperating groups set-up in different American Universities and Colleges.

Thus, members of forty-four cooperating groups discussed the problem : "Should The Governments of The United Nations At This Time Formulate and Announce A Common Strategy For Peace." There was substantial agreement among them that the official pronouncements thus far made by

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47. Its purpose summarized by its President, Professor Ralph Barton Perry of the Harvard University, was as follows:
- "1. To recognize, and to develop interest in, the grave international problems with which this nation and all nations will be faced in the post-war period, and which must be examined now if they are to receive a timely and intelligent solution.
  2. To provide a form of organized activity by which members of the faculties of American institutions of higher education can discuss the major international problems, and by which their reasoned opinions, and agreements and disagreements, can be brought to the attention of the public and of the responsible government officials."
- International Conciliation, 401 (June, 1944) 439.

leaders of the United Nations, such as the Atlantic Charter, should be supplemented by more specific announcements of mutually agreed upon policies for the settlement of outstanding post-war problems. (48)

A great majority of the cooperating groups regarded a system of collective security as essential to an enduring peace. Most of them also felt that special additional measures should be taken at least during the transitional period and also during the early years of an international organization — to offset the possibility of renewed German aggression. (49)

On the problem "Should There Be An International Organization For General Security Against Military Aggression And Should The United States Participate In Such An Organization," all the groups answered in the affirmative. The Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill Resolution (Senate Resolution, 114) was then before the Senate and all groups who commented on it endorsed it. Alternately, they desired a similar statement on the part of the United States which would express its readiness to participate in a world organization with power to use force to check aggression. Also, in this connection, emphasis was laid by many groups on the need for the creation

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48. The analysis which furnished the basis for the reports summarized here was issued in December, 1942. Ibid., 441.

49. The Analysis which furnished the basis for the reports summarized here was issued in two parts in March and April, 1943. ibid., 474.

of adequate international machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes among nations. Only then could the use of force against aggressors by an international organization be justified, they argued. As one group put it, "in addition to having a plan for extinguishing any burning international fuses before they cause an explosion, it is desirable to prevent so far as possible the storing up of explosive material." (50)

Furthermore, all the cooperating groups were in favour of developing strong moral condemnation of aggression in any satisfactory programme to prevent war. Disarmament or arms limitation was regarded as desirable provided an effective armed force was established with the international organization. In the absence of such international protection, it was generally felt that national disarmament per se would tend to invite aggression. The frequent use of economic sanctions was regarded as desirable either preliminary to or along with military sanctions, but as insufficient by itself. All the reporting groups regarded balance of power arrangements as "exceedingly dangerous." (51) Likewise, a great many groups considered special defensive alliances as dangerously resembling balance of power policies and associated with such alliance most of the evils of power-politics. The obvious danger of special military alliances,

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50. Ibid., 475.

51. Ibid., 477.

the cooperating groups pointed out, was that since they were formed against some nation or groups of nations, they provoked retaliatory action against members of an alliance.

The cooperating groups unanimously agreed that the existence of an international armed force would be useful to prevent aggressions. However, several groups mentioned the importance of regional organizations to prevent aggression within their own area. Such groups seemed to think that the psychological as well as physical conditions necessary for quick and effective action would be found easily on a regional basis.

All the groups agreed that the United States participation in an international organization for general security against military aggression was desirable specifically from the point of view of American interests. The Groups listed the following advantages which would accrue from U.S. joining a general security system :

1. Security against military aggression and freedom from war.
2. Freedom from the necessity of maintaining a large and strong armed force.
3. Maintenance of civil liberties and democratic political institutions.
4. Maintenance of conditions under which our American economic system can operate successfully and our prosperity and standard of living can be safeguarded and advanced. (52)

Finally, it should be noted that along with the University groups' enthusiastic support of the American government's plan for the creation of a post-war security organization, there was a general recognition of the fact that the future world organization would also be required to promulgate an International Bill of Rights along with its endeavour to maintain international peace and security. The active interest exhibited by such thinking groups on matters pertaining not only to the socio-economic and political fields, but also in the matter of human rights was symbolic of the significant change that had come about in public thinking regarding the scope and objectives of an international organization. The demand that the future international organization should concern itself with certain basic human rights was bound to affect the character of that organization. (53)

1944 - 1945 :

The Universities Committee On Post-War International Problems continued in this period to examine the specific issues having a direct bearing on the overall problem of the maintenance of international peace and security

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53. An analysis of this topic, prepared by Quincy Wright, Professor of International Law in the University of Chicago, was issued by the Universities Committee in December, 1943. International Conciliation, 405 (November, 1944) 711.



in the post-war period. (54) Thus, emphasizing the importance and close relation between the general economic well-being of the world and the problem of future peace, the thirty-two discussion groups assembled under the auspices of the Universities Committee On Post-War International Problems thought it necessary to join with other countries in an international organization and to cooperate to a greater extent than hitherto attempted in the economic affairs of the world body. Specifically, the faculty groups asserted that it was in the interest of the United States that the European economy should be revived as fully and as rapidly as possible. In this connection they added that Germany would have much of value which she could contribute to such reconstruction and urged that "we should promote rather than retard economic recovery in Germany." The educators also pointed out that the absence of an effective world organization made it necessary for the United States to produce all strategic war materials at home. It was the considered opinion of the educators that economic self sufficiency, even in strategic war materials, was probably an impossible goal even for such a large and diversified

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54. "Problems of United States Participation In The United Nations Organization," International Conciliation, 414 (October, 1945) 693 - 700. Issued in May, 1945. Replies were received largely during June, 1945, from 18 co-operating groups of faculty members located at Brown, California Institute of Technology, Colorado, Dartmouth, Holy Cross, Hood, John Carroll, Kentucky, Knox, Louisiana Polytechnic, Miami, Mount Holyoke, New Social Research, Notre Dame, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Sweet Briar and West Virginia.

country as the United States.

The next major question, on regional arrangements, was considered and answered by most of the groups before the final version of Chapter VIII of the Charter was agreed upon at San Francisco. The question examined was,

Should enforcement action under regional arrangements, such as is envisaged in the Act of Chapultepec, require advance authorisation by the Security Council? If so, are the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals satisfactory in this respect? (55)

The majority of the groups were in general agreement with the provisions contained in the Act of Chapultepec regarding regional enforcement action. Their support was based on an understanding that such regional enforcement action had the advantage of permitting quick and decisive action within a compact geographical area. It was because of this reason that many nations were not yet convinced of the effectiveness of a world organization in dealing with conflicts arising within a region. At the same time, the groups recognized the danger inherent in regional arrangements and preferred to see the global Security Council exercise control over such arrangements. They were also of the opinion that within a region one major power tended to assume a dominant position which could be used either to exploit or to protect smaller States. Furthermore, they

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55. Ibid

recognized that overemphasis on regional arrangements could easily lead to the development of interregional rivalries and possible conflicts. Hence, nearly all the groups agreed that the Security Council of the proposed world organization should be endowed with power sufficient enough to prevent regional arrangements from endangering rather than promoting world peace.

One could notice here that the University groups were virtually endorsing the reasoning of Cordell Hull on the issue of regionalism. Hull, as has been noted earlier, was not opposed to regional organization as such, but, wanted to assign preeminent role to the future world organization in maintaining world peace and security.

Another issue which had assumed great importance during this period pertained to the problem of revision of treaties and national boundaries. The political development in Europe and the actions of United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were coming in for a lot of criticism in the American press. Indeed, some politicians were publicly suggesting that unless the post-war peace settlements were known to them, they would not favour America's joining the world organization unconditionally. The educationists, therefore, asked themselves the following question :

Should the United States condition its participation in a general international organization for the maintenance of peace and security upon explicit provision for review and possible revision of existing

treaties and national boundaries which are regarded as unjust and oppressive? (56)

The groups overwhelmingly favoured explicit provision for review and possible revision of existing treaties and national boundaries, which were, or would be considered as unjust or oppressive. They, however, accepted the provisions adopted at San Francisco on these points, believing that they free the United Nations from the charge of guaranteeing the status quo against change.

When the Dumbarton Oaks plans were published, the Universities Committee announced that the educators of 41 American colleges had recommended the adoption of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and full participation of the United States in an international organization. The alternative to the Dumbarton Oaks plans was recognized by the educators as "not a better international organization, but none at all." A vast majority of the groups believed that under the Dumbarton Oaks plans "there will be greater approximation to certainty of decision" than under the Covenant of the League of Nations because "the present great powers have profited from the sad experiences of the last twenty-five years and will not again be so likely to fail to take preventive action in the threat to the peace or suppressive action in the face of a breach of the peace. The participation of the United States, they asserted, would

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56. Ibid

tend to make a decision to act more likely. (57)

The groups considered the machinery devised at San Francisco to promote international peace and security as the best that could be obtained at that time. A great majority of the groups were also of the opinion that it was an improvement on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on many points. Mindful of the imperfections inherent in the machinery, they, nevertheless, felt that it did not call for either a refusal by the United States to participate in the world organization or for further amendments on that matter. On the other hand, if the United States were to refuse to adhere to the United Nations Charter, various

57. New York Times, 9 March, 1945. When the Yalta voting formula was published, Leland M. Goodrich then Director of the World Peace Foundation and Executive Secretary of the Universities Committee on Post war International Problems, and Ralph Barton Perry, Chairman of the Universities Committee and of the American Defense Harvard Group, urged a change in the Yalta formula. The Security Council should be given specific power to recommend the settlement of disputes and the adjustment of situations brought before it, they said, and to do so by a vote which does not require the concurrence of all permanent members which are not interested parties. Christian Science Monitor, 17 April, 1945. Thus, the criticism did not centre on the Big Five veto over the use of force it centred on the ability each big power had under the Yalta formula to block decisions for peaceful settlement of disputes in which they were not involved. Edward S. Corwin in his study The Constitution and World Organization came to the conclusion which deserves mentioning here that the "maintenance of constitutional government in the United States becomes linked with the broader cause of its restoration and preservation elsewhere ...." and went on to assert that the "cause of peace abroad and the cause of constitutional democracy at home are allied causes ...." Quoted in James Shotwell, The Great Decision (New York, 1945) 231 - 2.

groups pointed out, such a step would retard the possibility of correcting injustices by peaceful means. It could also lead to a breakdown of the attempt to establish an international organization capable of developing its powers to such an extent that international conflicts would normally be resolved by peaceful means only, they felt. (58)

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58. "Problems of United States Participation In The United Nations Organization," International Conciliation, 414 (October, 1945) 699.

#### 4. ORGANIZED AMERICAN LABOUR AND THE CREATION OF A WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

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National federations of labour organizations came into existence in the United States only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This development resulted from the great growth of industrial combinations during that period. Although the American labour organizations had established contacts with international trade union organizations and had thus got an opportunity to know the problems being faced by labour groups in other countries, their chief interest, by and large, prior to the First World War, was centred on domestic issues.

The First World War was instrumental in making clear to American workers that their lives were being conditioned by world economy. It brought to them a realization that "the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve their own conditions in their own countries." (59) The establishment of the International Labour Organization not only facilitated the growth of uniform labour standards throughout the world, but also

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59. From the Preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization.

offered American labour representatives opportunity for direct personal contact with the workers of other countries.

During the early war years (1941 - 1943) American labour did not commit itself to a clear cut statement on future peace and security. On the other hand, discussions within the ranks centred mainly on these issues : social security, full employment, economic and social betterment, democratic participation and a federated world. Between the First World War and the Second, the international character of industry and commerce had become widely established. Certain industrial combinations had been able to evade the restrictions of laws passed to control them and even the requirements of international agreements when these were not made in their interest. (60) The effect of monopoly restrictions upon America's effort to mobilize her resources for war and peace was further made manifest in hearings before the Senate Military Affairs

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60. Henry Wallace, Vice President of the United States, in his address at Chicago on September 11, 1943 referred in great details to the harmful effects of international cartels and monopolists and observed that "... the peoples and the governments of the world had unwittingly let the cartels and the monopolies form a super-government by means of which they could monopolize and divide whole fields of science and carve up the markets of the world at their own sweet pleasure. The people must get back their power to deal with this super-government." Franklin Watts, ed., Voices of History 1943 - 1944 (New York, 1944) 355.



Committee, Sub-committee on War Mobilization of Senator Harley M. Kilgore (Democrat, West Virginia). (61) This new understanding by the American labour of the vast powers of international economic combinations made it clear to them that concerted action on the part of all nations was necessary to attain and preserve freedom for their peoples.

There was some desire to make the future world a federation of nation States as a goal of the American labour, though with many reservations which reflected their experiences with the League of Nations. For instance, one labour spokesman wrote :

Labour has never been loyal to the old League of Nations idea. It has considered it merely an international organization of international bankers without representation of labour and without social point of view. It does not want to see a revival of this instrumentality.

Further, he added :

Based on what thought labour has given to post-war problems I am convinced that it is demanding erection of some international superstructure with authority and that it stands for an international police force. (62)

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61. US, Congressional Record, 90 (1944) A3990 - 4.

62. M.H. Hedges, Director of Research, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and workers representative in the International Labour Organization. Quoted in Amy Hewes, Labour's Aim in War and Peace, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace Pamphlet (March, 1944).

Philip Murray, president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) put forward certain concrete proposals for the post-war period. They were :

1. Establishment of lasting world peace.
2. Eradication of fascism.
3. Extension of freedom and democracy in every part of the globe.
4. Expansion of our own social security system.
5. Application of a peacetime production programme which will assure jobs for all.
6. Affirmation of the right of workers in all countries to join free and independent unions of their own choice. (63)

In its annual report, the executive council of the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.) advocated the creation of international machinery to eliminate the causes of war. It expressed the hope that "procedures of consultation and cooperation" already developed by the United Nations could "be made permanent and broadened in practice to cover needs of interdependent responsibilities of democratic peoples." (64)

At a time when the Congress was deliberating on the various resolutions related to the subject of world peace and organization including the famous "B2 H2 resolution," American labour organizations exhibited keen

63. New York Times, 6 September, 1943.

64. Ibid., 4 October, 1943.

interest in them. William Green, President of the A.F.L. called on Congress to adopt a formal statement acknowledging America's share of responsibility for maintaining world peace and declaring America's willingness to participate in the development of agencies to enforce peace. In a signed editorial in the American Federationist, official organ of the Federation, Green said :

Experience shows that the use of police power is an essential condition to maintenance of order in any geographical division. This is equally true of international order.

Congress is our policy-making agency and has this responsibility for leadership. (65)

Likewise Philip Murray, President of the C.I.O. earlier in October, 1943 in an address before the national convention of United Automobile Workers of America said that labour would insist on concrete action by Congress making certain the participation of the United States in the maintenance of world peace. Said Murray :

... without further stalling, we the people of the United States must make plain that we do not propose again to attempt to secede from the world as we did after World War I and that, instead, we are determined to stay in the game after the war is over and to see to it that a just peace is organized and fairly administered in the interests of the peoples of the world. (66)

There was also a widespread feeling among American labour organizations that in the post-war

65. Ibid., 1 November, 1943.

66. Ibid., 7 October, 1943.

reconstruction period, labour should have a voice in all deliberations concerning such basic post-war problems as food, relief and trade relations. (67) Similarly, there was some apprehension in organized labour circles on the possibility of the victorious nations having an urge for territorial aggrandizement. In one of his speeches, William Green asserted that "we shall insist that peace conference shall not be transformed into a sordid, territorial grab-bag." (68)

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67. William Green's speech. ibid., 13 June, 1943.  
R.J. Thomas, President of the International Union of United Automobile-Aircraft-Agriculture Implement Workers of America, CIO also urged that labour be given "full representation and responsibility on all levels of post-war planning." He specifically included representation at the peace table and at treaty negotiations. ibid., 4 December, 1943.

68. Ibid., 7 September, 1943.

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During this period, labour organizations in the United States continued to reiterate their demand that organized labour should be represented "on all national delegations dealing with matters affecting post-war world organizations and programmes." (69) The report of the post-war planning committee of the A.F.L. took note of the fact that international conferences were held to consider such questions as world food, world finances and refugees. The U.S. delegation to these conferences comprised of only government officials and there was no representation of American labour in it.

The same committee, on April 11, 1944 expressed itself in favour of an international organization to maintain and enforce peace, together with a detailed programme for world and national economic reconstruction. The principal recommendations of the committee headed by Mathew Woll, Vice President of the Federation, were :

1. Transformation of the structure for the preservation of peace, with the participation of all nations, large and small. Pending establishment of such an organization, the United Nations should serve as an interim substitute.

2. The proposed international organization should use whatever means might be necessary, including an international police force, to prevent the outbreak of wars in the future.

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69. From the Report of the Post-War Planning Committee of the American Federation of Labour. ibid., 23 January, 1944.

3. Amelioration of international trade barriers to facilitate a freer interchange of goods and services between all nations based upon rejection of isolationism, expansionism and imperialism.

4. Rejection of any attempts by any nation to apply unilateral solutions to territorial and other problems affecting world peace.

5. Establishment of international organization to deal with problems of health and social welfare, the prevention of epidemics and traffic in drugs. (70)

The issue of isolationism and internationalism was still a live one in the American political scene. On this subject, Sidney Hillman, Chairman of the C.I.O. Political Action Committee in a press conference observed that their organization would favour the "nomination and election of men to Congress who support international collaboration." He also spoke in favour of "getting rid of post-Pearl Harbour isolationists." Hillman concluded his remarks by saying that in "international relations, we must assure the world that we will cooperate for lasting peace and are not seeking imperialistic advantages." (71)

70. Ibid., 12 April, 1944. It might be mentioned here that as regards the base of economic reconstruction, the A.F.L. report reaffirmed its adherence to the system of free enterprise as essential to the preservation of the democratic way of life.

71. Ibid., 25 January, 1944. Sidney Hillman was not only a well known leader of the American labour but also an influential force to be reckoned with in national politics.

During the presidential elections in 1944, the first national conference of the C.I.O. Political Action Committee, besides urging the people "to draft and elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt for another term in office" also issued a 4,000-word war and peace programme. The section devoted to foreign policy stated that the committee's objectives were the four freedoms, the good neighbour policy, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations agreements. To further these objectives, it was urged by the committee that a general international organization open to all peace-loving States be established, with the purpose of destroying "the basis of militarism and fascist power in Germany, Japan and their satellites and to maintain international peace and security by taking prompt collective action against any future aggression." (72)

Soviet policies with regard to the question of the territorial and boundary settlement in Europe also came in for criticism at the hands of the labour leaders. Both Mathew Woll, Vice-President of the A.F.L. and David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union voiced their concern at Soviet Russia's unilateral actions on the territorial questions pertaining to Europe which they

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He supported wholeheartedly Roosevelt's New Deal policies and during the 1944 presidential election, Hillman organized the C.I.O. Political Action Committee to support Roosevelt which brought him directly into the arena of national politics.

72. Ibid., 17 June, 1944.

considered as incompatible with the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations and the Moscow Declaration. (73)

When the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were published for public comments and criticism, the Political Committee of the American Labour Conference on International Affairs endorsed wholeheartedly the principles of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Nevertheless, the Committee suggested the following specific amendments to it :

1. After a period of transition the new international organization should become a universal one, unlimited by the present formula that "membership should be open to all peace-loving states."

2. The General Assembly, composed of all states, should be given more important functions as the basis of the whole international organization. It should be given the right to initiate proposals for action by the Security Council on all matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council should furthermore be made accountable to the General Assembly for any action it has decided to undertake and for their execution.

3. The Security Council in its projected form gave excessive dominance to four or at most five Great Powers. The Political Committee, nevertheless, admitted that it was entirely fair and proper that the greater responsibility of

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73. Ibid., 13 April, 1944. In a statement on 1 January, 1945, the A.F.L. chief said that in the interest of lasting peace, his organization would "insist" that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be respected and followed. Unless all nations get justice, he added, "another war is sure to follow." Ibid., 1 January, 1945.



the Great Powers in the prevention of war and aggression should be matched by a greater share in the leadership of the organization and its decisions. However, it was of the opinion that the people should emphatically reject any proposal which would exempt four or five Great Powers from the equal rule of law. The Political Committee, therefore, proposed that the rule of unanimity should be replaced by a two-thirds majority of all members including a majority of permanent members of the Security Council.

4. The Security Council should have as one of its functions the preparation of a continuous policy for the reduction of armaments. Provision should also be made for raising the living and cultural standards of dependent peoples, the colonies of the Axis countries, mandated territories, and semicolonial or backward areas not having reached the stage of self-government. (74)

In February 1945 the World Trade Union Conference held its session in London. From the United States, C.I.O. was represented at the Conference but the A.F.L. refused to attend on the ground that the meeting "was essentially political." (75) James B. Carey, Secretary of the C.I.O., addressing the Conference, observed that without the full participation by the United States, efforts to reconstruct Europe and Asia might be unavailing. In this connection, he referred to those "forces" in the United States that "are not interested in international collaboration to maintain peace." The C.I.O., he continued, has been waging "a

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74. Ibid

75. Ibid., 16 March, 1945. The C.I.O. felt that such associations, if carried into the post-war period, besides enabling Russian labour unions to come out of their earlier isolation, would also help in the establishment of a "United Nations of labour" — an effective supplement to the United Nations to be set up after the end of the war. Arthur J. Goldberg, A.F.L. - C.I.O.: Labor United (New York, 1956) 62.

successful struggle against these enemies of social security for the common man." Furthermore, the Conference decided to seek from the three Allied Governments a promise that accredited representatives of the trade union movements would be received into their councils at the forthcoming San Francisco meeting "in an advisory and consultative capacity." (76)

A few concluding observations need to be made here. The organized American labour did not speak in one single voice on the issues of war and peace. It was organized in two powerful national bodies -- the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. Furthermore, there were various factions within the two bodies which did not always see eye to eye with the parent body's declarations. There was the rising negro movement as also the vigorous pro-communist minority groups within the labour organizations.

Of added significance was the fact that there existed a friction between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. during the war years. It arose partly due to their relationship with labour movements of foreign countries. The A.F.L. had succeeded in keeping away the C.I.O. from full association in some important international labour organizations. During the war, however, the C.I.O. actively participated in several international trade union committees which included the

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76. New York Times, 17 February, 1945.

British Trade Union Congress and the unions of the Soviet Union.

Another factor to be kept in mind while studying American labour's approach to post-war peace and security problem was the attitude of labour leaders towards the Soviet Union. Most of them like Walter Reuther, Philip Murray were anti-communist and there were also those like Mathew Woll who had anti-Soviet bias in them. James Carey, although approving the war-time alliance between the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. was nevertheless firmly of the view that democratic principles were incompatible with the prevailing system in the Soviet Union. (77)

One could also notice concern and apprehension in the war-time statements of many American labour leaders that the future peace settlements might not conform to American ideals and goals and that the United Nations might be required to support an unjust status quo. However, they supported the Roosevelt administration's efforts in building a world organization in the post-war period. In spite of their serious misgivings regarding the policies of the Soviet Union, the American labour leaders, by and large, hoped that the war-time collaboration between America, Britain and Russia would be continued in the post-war period

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77. Max M. Kampelman, The Communist Party vs. The C.I.O. : A Study In Power Politics (New York, 1957) 31.

and would be an asset to the cause of world peace and security. (78) The American labour leaders were also generally united in lending their support to Roosevelt administration's struggle against the isolationists who were unwilling to commit the United States to a programme of international cooperation for maintaining world peace and security.

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78. Mathew Josephson, Sidney Hillman : Statesman of American labor (New York, 1952) 599.

## 5. THE ACTIVITIES OF BUSINESS GROUPS

The business groups in America during this period were favourably disposed to the idea of creating a general international organization in the post-war period. There were weighty reasons for the American business organization's support for such a plan. To be sure, with the ever expanding nature of business activities all over the world and with the growing realization that business prospers more in peace than in war, there was an earnest desire on the part of the American business groups to support the government's endeavours in creating a world security organization after the end of the war. The emphasis in their war-time declarations, however, was confined to matters such as the maintenance of "law and order" in the world, respect for "treaty obligations" and the strengthening of the role of the world court for "the interpretation of treaties and the application of accepted rules of international law."

Earlier still, prior to the creation of the League of Nations, when the American people were discussing the advisability of joining hands with other nations for the establishment of a world security organization, the members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had expressed themselves

clearly in favour of such an organization. By a vote of 96 per cent the Chamber of Commerce of the United States had supported "that this country take the initiative in forming a league of nations," while 77 per cent had voted in favour of enforcing the decisions of the proposed court and conciliation committee by economic pressure. Furthermore, 64 per cent of the chambers were for military enforcement of mediatory decisions. (79)

During the course of the Second World War, when issues of war and peace again assumed great importance, organized business groups in America, in general, confined themselves to general statements and expressions of broad ideas which they felt should act as guide posts for the country's post-war planners. Thus, Eric Johnston, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, in a speech on 27 October, 1943 observed :

... We should make it perfectly clear to ourselves, and therefore to the rest of the world, that America has an enormous stake in law and order, in peace and prosperity all over the globe. The mere fact that America is no longer simply indifferent, the mere fact that we are willing to assume our share of the responsibility for world order, will be a stabilizing and pacifying force. This seems to me to be the irreducible minimum of the responsibility which our Nation must accept. (80)

79. Denna Frank Fleming, The United States And World Organization 1920 - 1933 (New York, 1938) 13.

80. US, Congressional Record, 78 (1943) 8868.

However, he cautioned moderation in respect of American international commitments, saying,

After this war, we will still be living in a most imperfect world ... and under these circumstances our chief reliance should be upon our own strength ... and upon our cooperation with the United Nations. (81)

Also, because of the far-reaching and revolutionary forces set free by the great war, the business groups also exhibited a keen awareness in proclaiming that the "American way of life" and its basis — the free-enterprise system — should be preserved and strengthened as a bulwark of peace.(82)

Like the labour organization, some of the business associations too demanded a seat for their representative at the peace-table in order to participate in the post-war policy making decisions. Frederick C. Crawford, President of the National Association of Manufacturers warned that

81. Ibid. On the other hand, the Board of National Federation of Business endorsed the radical Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill bill for American participation with the United Nations in setting up a post-war world. New York Times, 10 July, 1943.

82. Again on October 27, 1943, Eric Johnston asserted that America cannot play the "major part in the great drama of post-war development ..." unless she is prosperous at home. Therefore, he hoped, "After this war, if we are an island of free enterprise and make it work here, then again by precept and example much of the rest of the world may follow us." US, Congressional Record, 78 (1943) 8868. Also, the United States Chamber of Commerce on 26 July, 1943 outlined a nine-point programme of action for itself in which one of the activities related to action to see that American enterprise is "safeguarded at the peace table" by analysis of proposals that may affect business in governmental discussion of peace conditions. New York Times, 27 June, 1943.

lasting peace depended upon international<sup>al</sup> trade and urged the inclusion of business men at the peace table to write a peace founded on what he termed as "international economic justice." (83)

The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) in a statement issued on 2 December, 1943 advocated participation by the United States in a world organization open to all nations that subscribed to the principle of judicial settlement of all disputes and agree to cooperate in putting down any nation that resorts to force. The association also advocated restoration of the World Court as an agency of reducing international friction and urged the creation of further organization in specific fields of wide international concern, such as the Universal Postal Union, International Labour Office and International Office of Public Health. The NAM programme would add to these agencies a commission to regulate international air transport :

"International machinery will be needed to supervise air transport in view of the world-wide nature of such transport and the risk that air power developed for commercial purposes may be used for war purposes," the statement read.

Furthermore, the NAM statement declared that the people of every country should have opportunity to seek prosperity under such internal governmental, cultural,

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83. Ibid., 26 October, 1943.



social and economic institutions as they may choose and that no nation should interfere with the internal affairs of any other nation or permit organization within its border of civil strife in other nations. The United States or any other nations' adherence to these principles would not be a surrender of their national sovereignty, the statement declared. (84) It should also be mentioned here that the views expressed in the above statement represented a cross-section of American business opinion after two years of study by a group of 150, headed by Wilfred Sykes, President of the Inland Steel Company, Chicago. Furthermore, the NAM statement was approved by its board of directors, including the leaders of American industry. (85)

Thus, by the end of 1943, one could notice that some of the influential business organizations were formulating certain concrete proposals on the issues of post-war peace and security. It must be recalled that this tendency was largely the outcome of the decisive victories registered by the Allies against the fascists on many fronts. The United States, together with her Allies, was on the offensive and hence the planning for future world order could no longer be confined to mere general statements of hope for a better world.

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84. Ibid., 3 December, 1943.

85. Ibid

1944 - 1945

A referendum conducted by the United States Chamber of Commerce and published on 9 January, 1944, exhibited that an overwhelming majority of the member bodies of the United States Chamber of Commerce favoured an international organization after the war with power to enforce its decrees. 803 of the 1,800 member bodies (each with one to ten votes) voted 1,848 to 6 for the following declaration:

An international political organization is necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and security among nations. Such an organization should be based upon the principle of reciprocal collaboration among nations and should not take the form of a super state. The principles upon which are based the Joint Four-Nation Declaration of Moscow of October 30, 1943, and the November 5, 1943, resolution of the United States Senate as well as the House resolution of September 21, 1943, are therefore approved. (86)

By 1,753 to 67 votes, the Chamber agreed with the Moscow declaration which dealt with international organization and recorded that

This peace and security may best be safeguarded through the use of the armed forces of peace-loving nations acting through the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization, developed to meet future conditions. (87)

86. Ibid., 9 January, 1944.

87. Ibid

Two months later, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce committee on post-war problems again urged the immediate formation of an international commission to draft a world peace plan, based on the principles of the Four-Power Moscow Declaration. The committee, headed by Harper Sibby of Rochester, N.Y., former President of the Chamber, first emphasized the need for prompt action and held that some "of those specific political, economic or social questions" could be solved "or at least definitely planned in advance of the cessation of hostilities." (88)

The other recommendations made by the committee to its 1,900 member organizations included the following points:

1. The United States and other United Nations exercise interim powers as "trustees of the peace" during the period between cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a general international political organization, "such powers to be designed to prevent further resort to arms by the defeated enemy and to restore and maintain a regime of freedom under international law and order."

2. The United States join with the other great powers to establish immediately an international commission to prepare, for consideration by the United Nations at the earliest practicable date, a plan for the structure of "a general international organization based on the principles of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." This was described as the core of the peace programme advanced in the Moscow Declaration.

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88. Ibid., 26 March, 1944.

3. The United States participate in the establishment "at the earliest practicable moment of instrumentalities for the Pacific Settlement of international disputes by means of conciliation and conference." This step was called essential because "some of the most important international problems are not susceptible of judicial settlement in a world of sovereign states."

4. The United States join the Permanent Court of International Justice, and that the court be strengthened "for the interpretation of treaties and the application of accepted rules of international law."

5. A permanent court of arbitration be maintained, with its services based on the principle of arbitration of international disputes and its facilities available to all nations.

6. Creation of a permanent international institute to study and report to international and national bodies on "the problem of developing the principles and procedures of international justice." (89)

Results of another referendum on foreign policy held by the Chamber of Commerce were announced to the public in May, 1944 in which the membership by a large majority went on record as in favour of the following objectives in foreign policy:

Early formation by the United States and "other great powers" of an international commission to prepare plans for a "general international organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security."

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89. Ibid

The members who participated in the referendum also were in favour of prompt consideration by the United States, along with other United Nations, of those specific political, economic, or social questions, the solution of which might be accomplished or at least definitely planned in advance of the cessation of hostilities.

The referendum pointed out that members showed their preference for an interim maintenance of peace and world security by the United Nations between the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a general international organization. Likewise, they wanted that the United States should become a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Maintenance and support of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and creation of a permanent international institute to study and report to national and international bodies "on the problem of developing the principles and procedures of international justice" was also advocated by the participating members in the referendum. (90)

Robert Gaylord, Chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers and a consultant of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference in a news conference expressed himself in favour of the creation of an

90. Ibid., 6 May, 1944. The Board of Directors of the Special Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of United States on International post-war problems also issued a statement endorsing the principles and suggestions contained in the results of the above referendum. Their statement was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pamphlet, June, 1944.

interim machinery to function between adjournment of the World Security Conference and ratifications of the new world organization. Like the labour group, he also pleaded for an international board to represent business in the post-war world organization. (91)

At the invitation of the U.S. Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Chambers of Commerce's Special Committee on International Postwar Problems represented the committee at the San Francisco Conference, acting as consultant to the U.S. delegation. After the end of the San Francisco Conference, the Board of Directors of the Chambers of Commerce of the United States expressed their approval of the U.N. Charter "in as much as this document clearly conforms in principle to the position taken by the chamber in ... referendum No. 76 ...." and urged that the members of the Senate should, without delay, consent to ratification of this Charter of the United Nations. (92)

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91. Ibid., 11 May, 1945.

92. US, Congressional Record, 91 (1945) 7344. On 3 January, 1944, the membership of the Chambers of Commerce of the United States in a referendum No. 76 took the affirmative position that "an international political organization is necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and security among nations." Ibid

**CHAPTER IV**

**DEBATE IN GOVERNMENT BODIES  
AND IN NATIONAL POLITICS**

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1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PLANNING :  
1944 - 1945

As noted earlier, this was a period of crucial importance in the Departmental planning for the post-war period. The earlier drafts had to be brought up to date and consultations with foreign governments for the creation of a world organization were in the offing. On April 9, 1944, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull delivered one of his major public addresses which provided the public a detailed account of the preparatory work going on in the State Department. In his address, the Secretary first drew attention to "three outstanding lessons" of recent years, which he described as follows:

... In the first place, since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, we and those nations who are now our allies have moved from relative weakness to strength. In the second place, during that same period we in this country have moved from a deep seated tendency toward separate action to the knowledge and conviction that only through unity of action can there be achieved in this world the results which are essential for the continuation of free peoples. And, thirdly, we have moved from a careless tolerance of evil institutions to the conviction that free governments and Nazi and Fascist governments cannot exist together in the world because the very nature of the latter requires them to be aggressors and the very nature of free governments too often lays them open to treacherous and well-laid plans of attack. (1)

1. Department of State Bulletin, (Washington), 10 (15 April, 1944) 335.



Furthermore, he declared that the United States could not "move in and out of international cooperation and in and out of participation in the responsibilities of a member of the family of nations," since the "political, material, and spiritual strength of the free and democratic nations not only is greatly dependent upon the strength which our full participation brings to the common effort but ... is a vital factor in our own strength." Stating that "agreed and united action" among the free nations was of "fundamental" importance which "must underlie the entire range of our policy," Hull asserted:

However difficult the road may be, there is no hope of turning victory into enduring peace unless the real interests of this country, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China are harmonized and unless they agree and act together. This is the solid framework upon which all future policy and international organization must be built.... (2)

He made it clear that this essential understanding and unity of action among the four nations was not being advocated in substitution or derogation of unity among the United Nations. The Secretary of State was emphasizing that point that great power unity was basic to all organized international action because upon it depended the possibility of enduring peace in the post-war period. He went

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2. Ibid., 340.

on to describe the way in which the American government proposed to proceed with the matter of an international organization to maintain peace and prevent aggression:

It is ... necessary both abroad and at home not to proceed by presenting elaborate proposals, which only produce divergence of opinion upon details, many of which may be immaterial. The only practicable course is to begin by obtaining agreement, first, upon broad principles, setting forth direction and general policy. We must then go on to explore alternative methods and finally settle upon a proposal which embodies the principal elements of agreement and leaves to future experience and discussion those matters of comparative detail which at present remain in the realm of speculation. (3)

Having thus described the basis of American foreign policy, the Secretary reviewed the stages of agreement already reached in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration and at the Moscow, Teheran, and Cairo Conferences. He, however, cautioned that such declarations could not provide "a detailed blueprint for the future."

We have noted earlier the Department's "Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security," of December 23, 1943. (4) The President approved the above plan on February 3, 1944. However, a later draft of the approved plan dated April 29, 1944

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3. Ibid

4. Also referred to as the "Possible Plan."

was prepared by the Department of State. This differed from the previous draft chiefly in improved organization of material and more detailed provisions on peaceful settlement. (5) Thus, the plan provided under its Chapter dealing with pacific settlement of disputes that "In case of a dispute involving a member and a non-member state, or non-member states only, and which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the executive council should be authorized to take jurisdiction either upon its own initiative or at the request of any party." (Ch. IV, 9.) Furthermore, under clause 11 of the same Chapter dealing with pacific settlement of disputes, the plan provided that "The executive council should be empowered with respect to any dispute referred to in the preceding paragraphs to take necessary measures to assure compliance with the terms of any settlement determined under the authority of the international organization." The power granted under the above clause to the Executive Council to impose terms of settlement, however, was to cause a great deal of discussion in the American delegation at the time of the San Francisco Conference. The American government's final position on this issue would be discussed in Chapter dealing with the San Francisco

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5. Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939 - 45 (Washington, 1949). 264.

Conference. (6)

As of June 6, 1944, the Agenda Group in the Department of State was working primarily on three aspects of the "Possible Plan", as it was still called. These were (a) the relation of regional to world-wide arrangements for pacific settlement of international disputes; (b) arrangements for dependent areas; and (c) refinement of the plan especially from the standpoint of the position of the major powers in the proposed organization. By July 6, 1944, the full draft was available, now entitled "Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization." (7)

THE TENTATIVE PROPOSALS :

While enumerating the general character of an international organization, the Tentative Proposals stated that

The Organization should be empowered to make effective the principle that no nation shall be permitted to maintain or use armed force in international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes envisaged in the basic instrument of the international

6. It was also intended in the "Possible Plan", that the international organization for specialized economic or other functions should be related to the general international organization in the sense that the latter would be an over-all organization with power to coordinate international activities in these functional fields. Ibid., 271.

7. Full text in Ibid., 595 - 06.

organization or to give assistance to any state contrary to preventive or enforcement action undertaken by the international organization.

Furthermore,

The Organization should be so constituted as to make possible the existence of regional organizations or other arrangements or policies not inconsistent with its purposes, and to enable such organizations and arrangements to function on their own initiation or by reference from the general organization on matters of security and peace which are appropriate for regional adjustment. The general organization should at all times be kept informed of the activities in matters of security and peace undertaken by regional organizations or under regional or other arrangements.

This concern for a proper correlation between the regional and the world organization became increasingly an important matter for the American planners in the preparation of their blueprint of a world security organization. Also, as was to be expected, the primary purpose of the organization was stated to be to maintain international peace and security and to foster through international cooperation the creation of conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.

As for the methods to be used for the maintenance of peace and security it is of significance to note that the first place was given to the clause stating that the organization should encourage peaceful adjustment of controversies by the parties themselves. In the final clause, however, the organization was

empowered to "provide for the use of armed force, when necessary in support of security and peace, if other methods and arrangements are inadequate."

The powers of the General Assembly were defined in consonance with the thinking of that time. The pattern of giving the Executive Council the powers to act and to the General Assembly to deliberate, to consider and to cooperate with the Council in its enforcement or preventive actions in the field of maintaining world peace and security was adhered to. This was in great contrast with the Covenant of the League of Nations in which such a sharp division of powers was not made. Thus, under the Tentative Proposals, the General Assembly was required to "refer to the executive council any such condition, situation, or controversy which it deems to require action to prevent an immediate threat to the peace or breach of the peace."

(Ch. V, para.6) Furthermore, it was obligated

to assist the executive council, upon its request, in enlisting the cooperation of all states toward giving effect to action under consideration in or decided upon by the council with respect to:

(1) the settlement of a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger security or to lead to a breach of the peace;

(2) the maintenance or restoration of peace;

and  
(3) any other matters within the jurisdiction of the council.... (Ch. II, para.6)

The Executive Council being the most important nucleus of the peace and security machinery of the plan

was to comprise of eleven member States in which U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China were to have continuing tenure. It was also stipulated that France should be added to the list of the preceding States as enjoying continuing tenure when "the executive council finds that a government freely chosen by the French people has been established and is in effective control of the territory of the French Republic."

The mechanism of the veto power in the voting procedure of the Executive Council was also provided in the Proposals. It was, however, left to the future to decide the voting procedure "in the event of a dispute in which one or more of the members of the council having continuing tenure are directly involved." (8)

In the realm of the pacific settlement of disputes, the Tentative Proposals stipulated, among other things, that the Executive Council

when it determines upon its own initiative that there exists between member states a dispute which constitutes a threat to security or peace, and which is not being adequately dealt with by other procedures, should be authorised to assume jurisdiction to effect a settlement. (Ch. V, para.8)

Also, the Executive Council was empowered with respect to any dispute referred to in Chapter V dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes to encourage and facilitate

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8. This issue is discussed while studying the Yalta and San Francisco Conferences.

the execution of the terms of any settlement determined under the authority of the international organization.

(Ch. V, para. 11)

The Tentative Proposals reflecting the experience of the time that world peace and security was one and indivisible, categorically stated that all States, whether members of the international organization or not, should be required "(a) to settle disputes by none but peaceful means, and (b) to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes envisaged in the basic instrument of the international organization." (Ch. V, 1) (9). Also, it declared that all States, whether members of the international organization or not, should be required to refrain from giving assistance to any State contrary to preventive or enforcement action undertaken by the international organization or with its authorization. (Ch. VI, B, 2) (10)

The Executive Council was further empowered to determine the existence of any threat to the peace or breach of the peace, and to decide upon the action to be recommended or taken to maintain or restore peace. Also, it was authorized to seek the advice and assistance of

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9. Emphasis added.

10. Ibid



the General Assembly in any matter in this connection, and of the International Court of Justice in any matter within the competence of the Court. In this field, the member States were under an obligation to support the decisions of the Executive Council both in the field of measures not involving the use of armed force and in measures involving the use of armed force.

In the field of the regulation of armaments and armed forces the Tentative Proposals made the Executive Council responsible for initiating negotiations for the conclusion of a general international agreement for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments and armed forces and for the regulation of the manufacture of and international traffic in arms. Reflecting the anti-fascist nature of the alliance and the temper of the war-time, the Tentative Proposals also empowered the Executive Council to take responsibility for assuring "the execution of stipulations governing the armaments and armed forces of the Axis states, to the extent that such responsibility may be assigned to it in succession to the authority established under the surrender terms." (Ch. VII, para. 3) With this the basic framework of American policy on post-war general organization for the maintenance of international peace and security had been completed. It should also be emphasized here that various important international

conferences held during this period were the concrete results of the elaborate planning done at the Department of State. Furthermore, the successful creation of the U.N. organization and the Senate approval of it was in no small way due to the enduring zeal of "the father of the United Nations" — Cordell Hull and his assistants like Leo Pasvolksy. (11)

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11. President Roosevelt in a personal letter to Cordell Hull, after the Secretary of State resigned his post wrote: "... when the organization of the United Nations is set up, I shall continue to pray that you as the Father of the United Nations may preside over its first session...." Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948). II, 1718.

## 2. CONGRESSIONAL POLICIES, 1944 - 1945 :

As mentioned previously, consultation with Congress and with members of the general public had occurred earlier under the Advisory Committee set up by the State Department. Talks of a more definite character were now needed. The earlier executive consultations in 1942 and 1943 had been generally in the nature of exploratory discussions and had involved no commitments on definitive views.

The object of Secretary Hull's consultations with Congress beginning in the spring of 1944 was to inform members of Congress of the specific proposals in contemplation for the general organization and of the progress toward negotiation with the other governments, to discuss the major questions that they or the Department foresaw, and to obtain their views and suggestions on those matters. (12) The Secretary discussed the matter with the President and then, on March 22, 1944, visited the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to survey with the Senators developments under way. On his request, the Chairman of the Senate Committee organized a non-partisan group to consider informally with Hull the

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12. Department of State, n. 5, 259.

possible plan being drafted for a general international organization. This came to be known as the "Committee of Eight" comprising of four Democrats, three Republicans, and one Progressive. Four had been members of the Advisory Committee -- Senators Connally of Texas and Walter F. George of Georgia, Democrats, and Senators Wallace H. White, Jr., of Maine, and Warren R. Austin of Vermont, Republicans. Those new to such discussions were Senators Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky and Guy M. Gillette of Iowa, Democrats, and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, Republican, and Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin, Progressive. It should be noted that all of them had been active in considering the "Connally Resolution" in the Senate, the preceding autumn. Hull also repeated the substance of his talk with the Senate Committee to twenty-four members of the House of Representatives when he met them on March 24, 1944 at their request.

In the second consultative meeting with the "Committee of Eight", Secretary Hull gave them a later draft of the "Possible Plan" dated April 29, 1944, which was used thereafter as a basis for discussion. One important question that arose during the discussion was that if secret commitments had been made on peace settlements, might the United States be obligated

to support a bad peace? (13) Following this question, ensued a discussion in the "Committee of Eight" on the advisability of a provisional international organization until the peace settlements were made. The Secretary of State, however, observed that such a course of action had already been considered and rejected as impractical. (14)

13. Senator Vandenberg, now the leader of the Republican wing favouring a policy of U.S. participation in the world organization, raised the issue of a "just" peace. Although the Senator recorded in his diary "The striking thing about (Hull's plan) is that it is so conservative from a nationalist view point...." he also felt that "... no matter how acceptable this program for a new league might be, everything depends upon the kind of peace -- whether it is a just peace -- which this new international organization will implement. We are all disturbed by Russia's unilateral announcements from time to time as to what she intends to do, for example, with Poland and the other Baltic States; and by Churchill's constant reiteration of restoring the British Empire intact. The peace will create a new status quo in the world. The new "League" will defend the new status quo. It is my opinion that the United States cannot subscribe to this defense, no matter how hedged about, unless and until we know more about what the new status quo will be...." Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), 95 - 6. Perhaps, the Senator's pronounced interest in the "just" peace was based on the fact that as 1944 was an election year, he had to take into account the general sentiment of his constituency (Michigan) which had large groups of Americans of central and east European origin.

14. "Secretary Hull expressed the view at this and subsequent meetings that for the United States to give up the idea of an organization to keep the peace, because of apprehension over the kind of peace that might be made, would be to give up the means whereby the making of a good peace could be facilitated and the peace itself progressively perfected thereafter. He pointed out further that such a decision would constitute a surrender of American leadership...." Department of State, n. 5, 264.

A new point was raised during Hull's talk with the Senatorial group at the start of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. Senator Vandenberg raised the question of the right of the Executive to agree to the use of American forces in any individual case under such a general agreement, even after its ratification. Hull's contention was that for practical reasons, the Executive should have considerable freedom of action in this matter if the Council was to be an effective enforcement agency. He pointed out that the Senate would have an opportunity to deal with the question when the contemplated agreement on the provision of forces came before it for "advice and consent", and that this was really a domestic affair. The Senator, however, wrote to the Secretary of State declaring:

It is my view that when our Delegate casts his affirmative vote... for (invoking military sanctions) it is a clear commitment on the part of the United States to promptly engage in the joint military action. Therefore it is tantamount to a Declaration of War. I believe our Constitution clearly lodges the exclusive power to declare war in the Congress....

There is, of course, a point short of war where our long-time practice recognizes the right of our Commander-in-Chief to use our armed forces without a Congressional Declaration of War. I do not know whether this distinction can be definitely described... It occurs to me, ... that the discrimination might possibly be made on a regional basis. In other words, we might accept North and South America (under the Monroe Doctrine) as our primary responsibility in respect to the use of military force (just as we have always done); and allow the President and his Delegate to act for us, without Congressional reference, in this primary field. But if the dispute discloses an aggressor who cannot be curbed on a

regional basis — if it takes another world-wide war to deal with him, I do not see how we can escape the necessity for Congressional consent. (Such a plan would involve similar regional responsibilities for other powers in other areas in the first instance.).... (15)

Considering Hull's ideas to plan security enforcement on a world-wide basis, the letter from the Senator must have caused great concern to him. Furthermore, Hull was alarmed at the prospect of "a lively controversy" developing over the possibility of Congress delaying, or even refusing, American consent to specific military action under the Council. In that case, he feared, "the Russians and British would be scared off"; they would believe that the United States could not implement its agreement on the security organization. (16) In order to emphasize once again the situation that would be created by such a reservation, and to point out the safeguards against any use of American forces without satisfactory authorization, Hull had a careful memorandum prepared on the whole issue, which concluded :

To summarize, under the proposed plan we shall always be represented on the Council. The Council cannot decide to resort to the use of armed forces against any country if we disapprove. In deciding the action to be taken by our representative on the Council in any serious situation of this kind, the President would undoubtedly take counsel in advance with the Congress or with appropriate leaders or committee of that body. Our

15. Vandenberg, n. 13, 117 - 8.  
16. Hull, n. 11, 1695.

representative on the Council would be designed with the advice and consent of the Senate. He would not be allowed to vote in favor of the use of force without instructions from this government. It would of course be possible for the Senate, when it approves the treaty, or for Congress, when it makes provision for our armed contingents under the treaty, to stipulate that the forces shall not be used outside the United States without the acquiescence of the Congress, to be given in such a manner as it may deem desirable. This would be bad from the international point of view, since the other countries would never know we could be counted upon in an emergency .... Considering that the President may now involve us in war in any one of a number of ways, either through the use of our military forces or without their use, the argument for safeguards against his doing so under a treaty would seem to lose much of its force. (17)

This was circulated to the Senators. In addition, the Secretary instructed a State Department official to inform Republican leaders like Dewey and Dulles that "this movement might endanger the whole peace program if it were not nipped in the bud", and that "it was up to the Republican leaders to do something about it before it was too late." (18) As a result of these combined efforts, Senator Vandenberg withdrew his objections. However, a subsequent addition was made to the draft so that the final text required the Council to approve, as well as the States to ratify, the special agreements.

17. Ruth Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington, 1958) 469 - 70.  
18. Hull, n. 11, 1695 - 6.



While not all the Senators commented explicitly on whether the United States should press onward her plans for international conversations with the other big powers, the consensus of opinion of the group was to that effect. The Senators themselves undertook to draft a statement accordingly. On June 15, 1944, President Roosevelt issued a public statement in which he emphasized "the entirely non-partisan nature of these consultations" devoting special attention to the "cooperative spirit" shown in the discussion of all aspects of the post-war programme. (19)

CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE  
DUMBARTON OAKS PLAN :

The Dumbarton Oaks Plans were published at a time when the changing political situation of Europe was creating serious misgivings in the Allied countries. The events in Italy, Greece and Poland were being watched anxiously in the United States and there was wide newspaper talk about the British and Soviet adopting "power politics" and "spheres of influence" policies. Roscoe Drummond reported the then

19. Department of State, n. 5, 268 - 9. It should, nevertheless, be emphasized that the executive was not able to get the precise Senate approval which it desired in this matter. The Senatorial suspicion of secret presidential agreements was too strong to permit an unreserved endorsement. Thus, whereas Hull wished the Senators to state that his draft plan was "suitable from their viewpoint" and that they favoured placing it before the other major governments, both Vandenberg and Connally felt that they were being asked to endorse formally these specific proposals and, therefore, refused to accede to the Secretary's request. Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York, 1954) 266.

prevailing climate of Congressional opinion thus :

The most persistent, the most easily adopted, the least debated opinion in Washington today, in Congress and out, is that the bad political news from Europe — from Italy, Greece, Poland — inevitably dampens, even imperils, the prospects of the Senate's approving Dumbarton Oaks, the proposed charter for a new League of United Nations. (20)

There were some suggestions made in Congress that unless conditions of the peace were as good as the American people expected, the Americans would not join the organization to prevent future wars. The administration had taken the stand that although it would strive to achieve the best possible peace yet the fact that it might be less than the best would not alter America's stake in a world organization to prevent another world war. Furthermore, the administration, learning the lesson from the League of Nations, was keeping the issues of terms of post-war peace settlements distinct from the question of creating a world organization.

In Congress, certain members proposed alternatives and changes to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals reminiscent of the League debate in the Senate by which they hoped to muster enough support to defeat the charter of the new world organization. The lead in this matter was taken by Senators Burton K. Wheeler (Democrat) of Montana and

20. Christian Science Monitor, 26 December, 1944.

William Langer (Republican) of North Dakota and in the House by Representative Karl Mundt (Republican). Their proposals could be summarized thus :

Senator Wheeler : A federation of European States, a universal bill of rights, and a general policy of wait-and-see. (21)

Senator Langer : The consolidation of North and South America, the United Kingdom and the bulk of the islands of the Pacific into a single political and economic unit for world peace. (22)

Representative Mundt : Immediate establishment of an international peace patrol of the air, with all the United Nations, invited to join on a volunteer basis - a plan that "neither demands nor denies the necessity

21. Although suggesting a federation of European States, the Senator advanced no proposals to organize peace elsewhere in the world. Also, he did not mention America's participation and, while proposing a world bill of rights, suggested no means to implement them. He seemed to be sure that the coming peace was going to be a 'bad' one and that he would have to be against it.

22. Senator Langer frankly aligned himself as an all out opponent to the United Nations organization. "I am prepared to say now", he assured the Senate "that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals not only cannot succeed, they will never be placed into effect even provisionally." US, Congressional Record, 91 (1945) 537. "The Wheeler and Langer proposals are a part of the strategy of the anti-Dumbarton Oaks isolationists", observed Rescoe Drummond, and their purpose was "to appear to be offering concrete alternations to a United Nations organization, when in point of fact their alternatives are manifestly unattainable even if desirable." Christian Science Monitor, 30 January, 1945.

of forming a comprehensive international organization to preserve the peace and to better international living conditions." (23)

SENATOR VANDENBERG'S AMENDMENTS :

After the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks plans, Senator Vandenberg submitted a detailed memorandum to the Department of State proposing eight amendments to the plan. He offered three reasons for doing so :

(a) Permanent peace is impossible if the new League is a straitjacket which attempts to freeze the status quo (as largely dictated by military expediency in the course of war) regardless of justice.

(b) The total lack of any reference to "justice" as a league criterion (except in the world court section) minimizes the moral authority of an enterprise which finally must depend far more upon moral authority than upon force.

(c) Senate ratification will be seriously jeopardized by our failure to disarm the critics who will magnify the flaws I seek to correct. (24)

The first of the Senator's amendments was for revising Chapter I by adding a newly numbered paragraph (among defined objectives) — "To establish justice and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental

23. US, Congressional Record, 91 (1945) 639.

24. New York Times, 2 April, 1945.

freedoms."

His second amendment was to strike out the following sentence from Chapter 5, Section B, Paragraph 1 -- "The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council." Vandenberg's argument for the deletion of the above sentence rested on his belief that the Security Council, in order to be able to function promptly and continuously, should be constituted in such a way that it remains the sole agency of action for the maintenance of world peace and security.

His third amendment consisted of changing Chapter 5, Section B, Paragraph 6 so as to read :

The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields; for establishing justice and for adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare, or to violate the principles of the United Nations as declared by them on January 1, 1942.

He pleaded for the existence of a "free forum" in the new organization in which to discuss the States' "aspirations and the ideals for which this war has been waged and the conditions of their subsequent health." He thought the General Assembly would become the "town meeting" of the world.

In his fourth and fifth amendments, he wanted to

insert the word "justice" along with the words "international peace" appearing in the Dumbarton Oaks plan.

The sixth Vandenberg amendment was on Chapter 8, Section A, Paragraph 1 (which stated that "the Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute ....") to eliminate the words "be empowered to." His reason for this was that by doing so it would be obligatory on the part of the Council to "investigate any dispute" which threatens "international peace and security." It would thus deny to the Council, according to him, the easy expedient of ignoring a problem which it might prefer not to face. By proposing the seventh amendment he wanted to add a new paragraph to Chapter 8, Section A - "If the Security Council finds that any situation which it shall investigate involves injustice to peoples concerned it shall recommend appropriate measures of adjustment which may include revision of treaties and of prior international decisions." Likewise, he wished to add a new paragraph in Chapter 8, Section B, Paragraph 1 reading as follows :

The Security Council shall not act, nor shall any member be called upon to act, to perpetuate a status which has been created in disregard of recommendations of the Security Council under Section A, or a status the adjustment of which has been recommended by the General Assembly or by the Security Council.

The Senator declared that the "sole purpose" of his amendments was to ensure that the organized strength of the world organization would not be blindly put behind either "(a) a postwar status which the General Assembly or the Security Council judge to be unjust, or (b) a new status which comes about through a permanent member of the Council vetoing measures of restraining against it," (25)

Some of the political observers then thought that no objection in principle could be raised to a clause in the covenant of the new organization providing for the revision of treaties in accordance with international justice. But they were in no doubt that Senator Vandenberg's amendments, if they were to be accepted by the American delegation, would meet with strong Soviet opposition. The Soviets were certain to see in them large marks of interrogation placed upon such "prior international decision" as the acceptance of the Curzon line by the Big Three. Still another of Vandenberg's amendments provided for the power of the Assembly to make recommendations on any issue discussed by the Security Council. In this, too, the Soviet Union would have seen another loophole which would enable "hostile capitalist powers" to place her once again in the dock. Furthermore, Vandenberg's advocacy of the principle of "revisionism" of treaties was also thought at that time by observers sure to meet opposition by many

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25. Ibid

European delegations— especially France. She might have feared that this would open the door for German "revisionism."

In spite of a great deal of criticism from certain quarters, the general Senatorial opinion was in favour of the proposals. Indicative of the large measure of support for the plan in the Senate was the letter addressed to the President by the so-called sixteen new Senators in which they supported the formation of a United Nations organization along the general lines drafted at Dumbarton Oaks. (26) The sixteen Senators were not members of the Senate when the Connally resolution was adopted and, therefore, their endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal was a significant development.

VANDENBERG'S SPEECH OF  
JANUARY 10, 1945

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Another notable development in the Senate was the speech of Senator Vandenberg on January 10, 1945. His

26. US, Congressional Record, 91 (1945) 467. The sixteen Senators were : Frank P. Briggs, Missouri; Homer E. Capehart, Indiana; Forrest C. Donnell, Missouri; J.W. Fulbright, Arkansas; Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa; Clyde R. Hoey, North Carolina; Olin D. Johnston, South Carolina; Warren G. Magnuson, Washington; Brien McMahon, Connecticut; Hugh D. Mitchell, Washington; Wayne L. Morse, Oregon; John Moses, North Dakota; Francis J. Myers, Pennsylvania; Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts; H. Alexander Smith, New Jersey; Glen H. Taylor, Idaho.



speech, "heard round the world", was widely quoted and commented upon in the press. (27) The New York Times reported on February 4, 1945 that more than two thirds of the members of the Senate had indicated their support to the Vandenberg's proposal, namely, the promulgation of treaties among the major United Nations to keep Germany and Japan permanently demilitarized.

The reason which presumably led the Senator to make this speech with concrete suggestions was his belief that as the Allies were approaching victory, various differences among them were also becoming visible. He asserted that the U.S. should, with honest candour, speak out on these differences as to where she stood without unduly worrying about the fear of disunity among the Allies. The Senator, therefore, suggested three concrete steps for the executive to take. First — "In a word ... to reassert, in high places, our American faith in these particular elemental objectives of the so-called Atlantic Charter ...." (28) In this connection he referred to "Russia's unilateral plan" which, the Senator felt — "appears to contemplate the engulfment, directly or indirectly, of a surrounding circle of buffer states, contrary to our conception of what we thought we were fighting for in respect to the rights of

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27. Vandenberg, n. 13, 126.

28. US, Congressional Record, 91 (1945) 164 - 5.

small nations and a just peace ...." (29) Furthermore, "Russia's announced reasons is her insistent purpose never again to be at the mercy of another German tyranny. That is a perfectly understandable reason", the Senator observed. (30) For that he suggested as a second point that the Soviet Union should opt for "full and whole-hearted cooperation" with the proposed world international organization in which all the Allies would participate to guarantee that Axis aggression "shall never rise again...."

In order to give the Soviet Union the added guarantee of firm U.S. commitment on the above point, he suggested "a hard - and fast treaty between the major allies" to assure United States military cooperation in the peremptory use of force, if needed, to keep Germany and Japan demilitarized. The President would have, as the commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed forces, instant power to take military action under this treaty without reference to Congress.

Lastly, Vandenberg observed that :

... We have the duty and the right to demand that whatever immediate unilateral decisions have to be made in consequence of military need - and there will be such even in civil affairs - that they shall all be temporary

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29. Ibid

30. ibid

and subject to final revision in the objective light of the post-war world and the post-war peace league as they shall ultimately develop .... (31)

We discussed earlier the implications of Vandenberg's last suggestion — that of providing the new world organization with powers to revise "unjust" treaties. Here, we would make a few observations on other problems to which the Senator made a reference in his speech of January 10, 1945. The appearance of disruptive tendencies among the Allies during the years 1944 and 1945 was due to many factors — some, having their roots in the historical past, others, arising during the war-period itself. It could also be said that during this period the United States and Great Britain on the one hand, and, the Soviet Union, on the other, became increasingly suspicious of each other's policies. The lack of ideological affinity between these powers was undoubtedly an important factor. The absence of full understanding among the Allies on the Polish question, the Anglo-American approach to the Italian question and, later on, the Soviet Union's attitude to the peace treaties with other East European countries, the British handling of the Greek situation and Stalin's apprehensions that the Anglo-Americans might negotiate a separate peace with the

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31. *ibid* The White House welcomed the speech on the following day but the President remained silent on the treaty proposal. Senator Connally expressed the hope that the Senate would not get involved in any discussion that might disturb the international situation on the eve of the Yalta Conference. Vandenberg, n. 13, 139.

Nazis were symptomatic of the widening gulf between the war-time alliance of U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R.

Thus, even if Vandenberg's suggestions were to be accepted — the theoretical power possessed by the American President to go to the aid of the Allies in case of future German and Japanese aggression without prior Congressional approval it could have had a great reassuring value only if there existed sufficient understanding of each other's policies among all the principal powers. Such was not the case. Then the question could be asked as to why the Roosevelt administration undertook planning on the assumption that the war-time unity between Great Britain, Soviet Union and United States could be carried further in the post-war period. The answer could be inferred from the speeches and thinking of men at the helm of affairs in the United States. The American planners were quite mindful of the serious threats to the establishment of the world security organization. However, as they were planning for the establishment of world peace and not another world-war, in making the organizational and legal provisions for peace it was a consistent policy to assume that conditions would be established that would make peace a possibility. (32) Or again, since the future

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32. It has been observed that the "threat of force by two of the great powers (U.S. and U.K.) against a third U.S.S.R. would have destroyed all chance of establishing any such organization. It was less disastrous to acquiesce in the drawing down of an 'iron curtain' and to hope that this curtain might later be raised than

organization, at least in its security aspect, would not be functioning without the active support of all the Big Powers, that in itself, it was hoped, might inculcate the habit among them all for combined consultation for reaching agreement on matters of common concern. Of further importance was the belief, then prevailing, that the Allies would busy themselves greatly in the post-war world with internal economic reconstruction and development programmes which would mean greater cooperation in the economic activities on the international plane. (33)

Above all, there was also the basic consideration of American national self-interest. The Roosevelt administration was convinced that U.S. security was not to be based solely on its own armed forces and armaments and they deemed it desirable to reinforce it through the creation of a new world organization. Grayson Kirk seemed to present succinctly the thinking of Roosevelt and Hull when he wrote

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to abandon the chances of Three-Power collaboration." Llewellyn Woodward, "Some Reflections On British Policy, 1939 - 45," International Affairs (London), 31 (July, 1955) 284.

33. Statement of W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, Regarding Our Wartime Relations With The Soviet Union, Particularly As They Concern The Agreements Reached At Yalta, US, Congressional Record 97 (1951) A5410 - 16. Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician (New York, 1946), 219. William H. Standley and Arthur A. Hgeton, Admiral Ambassador To Russia (Chicago, 1955), 498.

in 1944 :

Our interest in Europe and Asia, however, can be safeguarded and made to serve the highest considerations of national policy only if it is expressed through the instrumentality of the international organization, and if it is couched in general terms. Otherwise, the formation of the other state blocs to counterweight the position of the United States would be invited. (34)

34. Grayson L. Kirk, "Post War Security For The United States," The American Political Science Review (Washington), 38 (October, 1944) 955. Furthermore, as Roosevelt saw the Soviet Union reveal the strength of a super-power, he seemed also to have accepted the idea that the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union had become world-wide and therefore, for the cause of world peace, it became imperative for them to cooperate. This was the reason, Hopkins later told Stalin after Roosevelt's death, why the President had gone to such great lengths to arrange conferences with the Russians and to put their relations on a workable foundation. Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1949) - II, 877 - 8.

### 3. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1944

During the Presidential Election of 1944, two major policies of the Roosevelt administration were put to the test. One was the administration's great desire to maintain a broad political unity on international affairs between the two political parties while the war continued. The other, though related to the first, was specifically designed to assure that the plans for the creation of a future world organization should receive the support of both the national parties.

The intra-party conflict within the Republican party over the post-war foreign policy issues also became evident during this period — indicative of the gradual yet significant change in the Republican party's foreign policy declarations since the beginning of the war. It might be recalled that the Republican party had fared well in the congressional elections of 1942 and in the subsequent off-year elections. The stage was, therefore, set for a keen contest between the presidential candidates of the two parties. (35)

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35. Results of a poll published in the November 1943 issue of Fortune showed that 51.5 per cent of its cross-section of the voters favoured Roosevelt for President

... (continued on page 276)

The foreign policy planks of both the parties showed considerable similarity. The Republicans stated in their platform that they favoured --

... responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace, and they added that the peace organization should develop cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repeal military aggression. (36)

The Democratic plank, however, went further in defining the means by which peace should be enforced. The Democrats made it clear that they, too, favoured the creation of an association of independent sovereign States rather than the formation of a super-State police force, but, instead of talking about "peace - forces", as the Republicans did, or of "power" as used in the Connally resolution, the Democrats clearly stated that they pledged themselves to use military force if necessary

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if the war was still in progress at the time of the 1944 election, but that only 22.1 per cent would give him their votes if the war had come to an end. Furthermore, on May 12, 1944, George Gallup reported on his findings that one half of all the voters who want to see Roosevelt remain in the White House for another four years would, if he were not a candidate, prefer to shift and vote for a Republican rather than accept another Democratic candidate. New York Times, 12 May, 1944.

36. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms 1940 - 1956 (Urbana, 1956) 407.



to prevent aggression :

We pledge to make all necessary and effective agreements through which the nations would maintain adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war and of making impossible the preparation for war and which would have such forces available for joint action when necessary. (37)

The difference between the parties was succinctly described by James Reston of the New York Times :

Perhaps the greatest difference between the foreign planks of the two parties is that the main opposition to the plank written by the Republicans ... came from those who wanted to hold the party back from making too many commitments in the foreign field, while the opposition to the foreign plank adopted by the Democrats today came from those who wanted it to make more commitments in the foreign field. (38)

Among the probable Republican nominees, Willkie was committed to a general international organization of strong powers and openly attacked Dewey's proposal for an Anglo-American alliance as a sure way to divide the world in two and prepare for another war. Robert Taft, another possible candidate, decided to support rejuvenation of the old League, declaring, however, that the first step should be to write an international law by which the nations would agree to be governed. The world court should settle disputes over the law and decisions of the court were bound to create a climate of public opinion in which

37. Ibid., 403.

38. New York Times, 21 July, 1944.

the law would be enforced, Taft believed. He also favoured (in agreement with Churchill's proposals) the establishment of regional organizations and courts. Furthermore, Taft observed that, in future, the United States along with the other States would not have a "free hand" in deciding such issues as the declaration of war. He expected that the United States would agree to make war under circumstances found to exist by an international body and went on to assert that "I see no infringement of sovereignty in undertaking that obligation." He, however, wanted that obligation should be carefully defined. (39)

Taft was of the opinion that the formation of the new world structure should be delayed until the end of the war. This was also the position taken by some of the more isolationist members of the party, such as Governor John W. Bricker of Ohio, who stated that pending the setting up of the final international organization, the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China should agree to keep the world under control. (40)

John Foster Dulles, though not a prospective candidate of the Republican party, was the acknowledged mentor on foreign affairs of Governor Dewey and was also the Chairman of the influential Commission for a Just and

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39. Ibid., 6 February, 1944.

40. Ibid., 26 April, 1944.

Durable Peace. His conception of a post-war world organization to promote peace was the same in its broad lines as Secretary Hull had proposed to Great Britain, Russia and China after conference with a Senate Subcommittee. (41) Both leaders recognized the necessity, immediately after the war, of continuing armed alliance among the United States, Britain and Russia and hoped that eventually the creation of a permanent system of international law and order, based on a world consultative assembly and court in which all nations would participate equally, would constitute the most desirable and permanent arrangement in the post-war period. There was, however, marked divergence in the two leaders' approach when it came to practical attainment of these principles.

Before the elections, there developed a major controversy in the Republican fold on the question whether the use of force to insure international peace would be written into the party platform. Governor Bricker was opposed to such an insertion. Governor Sewall of Maine, on the other hand, was of the view that any declaration which failed to take account of the possibility of policing the peace would be meaningless. The text which was being circulated by Vandenberg and Austin, while more definite than the Mackinac Charter on the point of joining a new league, was yet ambiguous on this matter of an international

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41. Ibid., 14 June, 1944.

police force :

We shall achieve (our) aim through organized cooperation and not by joining a world state. We favor responsible participation by the United States in a post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world ... Such organization should develop effective cooperative means to direct peace forces to prevent or repeal military aggression. (42)

The Vandenberg - Austin text was adopted unanimously by the Republican Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on June 24, 1944. Before this action was taken, Senator Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota attempted to secure the deletion of the words "and not by joining a world state." He also wanted to substitute "free nations" for "sovereign nations." Further, Ball, in line with his extreme internationalist position, would have added to the statement about "peace forces" the following :

The surest way to achieve maximum justice in the peace settlement is to have the final decisions made by United Nations association organized for that purpose and applying agreed-upon principles. Failing that, we should strive for the widest degree of consultation among nations over peace settlements. (43)

42. Ibid., 23 June, 1944. The Public Opinion Quarterly, (Princeton), 7 (Winter 1943) 760 observed : "The remarkable fact, of course, is that any official Republican declaration could come this near to acceptance of the idea of an internationally controlled military force. It is striking evidence of how high the tide of internationalism was running. The public opinion polls showed in this period that 72 per cent of those who voted for Willkie in 1940 favored a police force in connection with the union of nations, which was favored by 82 per cent of them."

43. New York Times, 25 June, 1944.

On the other side, Senator Robertson of Wyoming offered a completely new plank which read as follows :

We pledge United States collaboration with world nations to prevent war. We pledge to protect the interests and resources of the United States. We pledge to maintain our position of supermacy on the sea, on land, and in the air, believing this to be the greatest factor for world peace. We pledge that any peace arrived at will be in accordance with the Constitution. We oppose an international police force. We oppose the international New Deal with the United States playing the role of Santa Claus. (44)

None of these proposed modifications were incorporated in the party platform. However, Wendell Willkie in a lengthy statement on 26th June announced that he considered the proposed resolution ambiguous and was thus disappointed in it. In Willkie's opinion, under the proposed platform a Republican President could, with integrity, adopt a policy which would debar the United States participation in a world organization in which the nations agreed to use their sovereign power to suppress aggression. The tenor of Willkie's statement was that the proposed resolution still weighed heavily on the isolationist side and could be interpreted that way. (45) However, Senator Austin defended the platform, saying that Willkie was mistaken in saying that the policy of the resolution would result in no international organization. He added :

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44. Ibid

45. Ibid., 27 June, 1944.

It expressly supports such an organization. It does not support an international integrated army. Its military resources are vested in a council with power to direct them in the right regions, to the right places, on the right occasion. (46)

On June 28, 1944 Dewey succeeded in securing the Republican party's nomination and his acceptance speech tended to confirm him as a member of the international wing of the party. He said, in part :

... We are agreed, all of us, that America will participate with other sovereign nations in a cooperative effort to prevent future wars. Let us face up broadly to the magnitude of that task. We shall not make secure the peace of the world by mere words ... There are only a few, a very few, who really believe that America should try to remain aloof from the world. There are only a relatively few who believe it would be practical for America or her allies to renounce all sovereignty and join a super state.

I certainly would not deny those two extremes the right to their opinions; but I stand firmly with the overwhelming majority of my fellow-citizens in that wide area of agreement. That agreement was already expressed by the Republican Mackinac declaration and was adopted in the foreign policy plank of this convention. (47)

At a press conference Dewey made one clarifying statement to supplement his acceptance speech. He stated that he was opposed to the establishment of any international police force — recruited from the forces of the

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46. Ibid.

47. Ibid., 29 June, 1944.

United Nations — that might operate under the aegis and direction of an international agency. Dewey also expressed his opposition to any surrender of the right of the United States to make war on its own.

The nomination of Governor Bricker for the post of Vice-President was perhaps to placate and carry along the isolationist wing of the party. Interestingly enough, the America First party headed by the Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith too nominated him as the Vice-Presidential candidate on their ticket. (48) However, while Bricker accepted the support of the America First, Dewey denounced it, calling Smith a Hitler-like rabble-rouser who was making a contemptible attempt to smear Governor Bricker. (49)

Dewey gave out a further statement of his views on foreign policy on August 16, 1944. In it he drew attention to the forthcoming conference at Dumbarton Oaks. He observed that the objective of creating a world organization was a bipartisan one and pointed out that this aim had been repeatedly urged by the Republican party. He then went on to say :

I have been deeply disturbed by some of the recent reports concerning the forthcoming conference. These indicate that it is

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48. America First, the party, which according to Gerald L.K. Smith "puts the interest of America ahead of the interests of any other nation on earth." *ibid.*, 16 May, 1944.

49. *Ibid.*, 2 August, 1944.

planned to subject the nations of the world, great and small, permanently to the coercive power of the four nations holding this conference ... The fact that we four have developed overwhelming power as against our enemies does not give us the right to organize the world so that we four shall always be free to do what we please, while the rest of the world is made subject to our cooperation. That would be the rankest form of imperialism ...

In the kind of permanent world organization we seek, all nations, great and small, must be assured of their full rights. For such an organization, military force must be the servant, not the master. (50)

Secretary Hull promptly denied the allegations made by Dewey. He also assured Dewey that the United States never contemplated establishing a four-power military alliance to coerce the rest of the world, and invited Dewey to come himself or send a representative to Washington "in a non-partisan spirit" to discuss the security problem with him. (51) Dewey, in accepting Hull's

50. Ibid., 17 April, 1944. Also, during the election campaign, several Democratic political leaders felt that Dewey was making "dangerous progress in his campaign to hang the Communist label on the Roosevelt Administration. It was said that the hatred and fear of Communism were much greater than any of the emotions inspired by Nazism or Fascism. There were charges that Roosevelt had secretly begun to sell out to Uncle Joe Stalin at Teheran and that after the war he would complete the process of delivering the American free enterprise system over to Communist control." Sherwood, n. 34, 820. Matthew Josephson has also observed that Dewey ended his election campaign by "centering his attention on the alleged 'Roosevelt - Hillman - Browder plot' to subject the United States to a Communist dictatorship." Matthew Josephson, Sidney Hillman: Statesman of American Labor (New York, 1952) 631.

51. New York Times, 17 April, 1944.



offer, designated Dulles as his representative. (52)

After their meetings, Hull and Dulles issued a statement on 25th August which said they had agreed that the subject of future peace should be kept out of politics. (53)

Dewey later told Vanderberg that the only major issue

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52. Cordell Hull, conscious of the danger that the issue of world organization was now being precipitated in the middle of the bitterly fought Presidential election, made great preparation for meeting Dulles. He later wrote in his memoirs : "I have seldom worked harder on any project than on the preparation for and conduct of the conversations with John Foster Dulles." Hull, n. 10, 1693. The President, Hull records, was "skeptical" of whether it would be possible to arrive at any non-partisan agreement with the leading Republicans. Ibid., 1960.

53. In his discussions with Dulles, Hull gave him the current draft of the Tentative Proposals and summary of their provisions dealing with subjects of special interest in the light of Governor Dewey's statement : position of small countries, pacific settlement and peaceful change, arrangements for provision of armed forces and regulation of armaments and control of Axis countries. However, "the substantive aspects of these discussions clarified need of having an explicit stipulation inserted in the Tentative Proposals providing for 'ratification by each country in accordance with its constitutional procedures' of the contemplated agreement under which armed forces would be placed at the disposal of the organization for enforcement of peace and security. A sentence to this effect was immediately written into the Tentative Proposals at the Secretary's direction." Department of State, n. 4, 288 - 9. Dulles' account of the meeting suggests that Hull wanted an agreement "broad enough to cover not only the creation of world organization but all subjects relating to the future peace ...." John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1955) 124. Governor Dewey was adamant against that, insisting on the right to debate generally all aspects of foreign policy. Furthermore, much in line with the prevailing Republican thinking, the party leaders were not prepared to "give a blank-check endorsement" to the new world organization "unless it was the right kind of world organization." Ibid

between him and the administration was on the use of armed forces by the proposed security council. (54)

In the Democratic party, the dominating personality of Roosevelt continued to loom large on the political scene. The last Gallup presidential poll of 1943 indicated that the President was the choice of more than 8 Democratic voters in every 10 for the 1944 nomination. Roosevelt had 85 per cent of the votes, Vice-President Wallace 6 per cent, no other candidate secured more than 3 per cent. (55) Thus, in 1944, the Democrats were generally willing to concede that the one leader who could easily secure the nomination of the party "if he wants it" was President Roosevelt.

However, there were some dissident elements within the party itself which were beginning to voice their opposition to Roosevelt's choice as a Democratic leader for the fourth term. Thus, Harry H. Woodring, Secretary of War in the Roosevelt cabinet until 1940 and a former Governor of Kansas, declared his opposition to a fourth term for President Roosevelt and proposed that the Democratic party nominate Secretary of State Cordell Hull for the Presidency. He made his declaration in an address before

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54. Vandenberg, n. 12, 112.

55. Richard M. Boeckel, ed., Editorial Research Papers (Washington, 1944) I, 5.

a meeting of the Chicago Executive Club attended by the anti-New Deal Democrats from several states in the United States. Later, the group formed the "American Democratic Committee," pledged to recover the party from what was termed the administration's "Palace Guard."

Woodring, in his speech, called for "a pro-American policy of world collaboration" at the peace table and declared that America "will not tolerate a post-war Hopkinized world-wide W.P.A. at the expense of the American tax payer." He also invited the Republicans to join in his movement, urging them to lay aside partisan politics "to save the republic." (56) Also, a "Draft - Byrd - for - President Committee" which, according to its sponsors, had affected considerable organization in the South, started — on March 1, 1944 — a movement to win the Presidential nomination for Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia with the objective of what they called purging the party of New Dealism. Spokesman for the movement which started in New Orleans in August, 1943 was John U. Barr, a manufacturer of hemp and sisal rope. (57)

In spite of such speradic symptoms of opposition, a conclusive demonstration that Democratic leaders

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56. New York Times, 5 February, 1944.

57. Ibid., 1 March, 1944.

considered President Roosevelt the only possible nominee for the 1944 presidential race was given at the meeting of the National Committee of the Democratic Party on January 22, 1944. The Committee unanimously adopted a resolution which stated that its members "do now earnestly solicit him to continue as the great world leader." (58) When, therefore, the President made it known in a letter to Robert E. Hannegan a week before the party convention that he would accept the nomination if offered to him, Roosevelt was unreservedly made the Democratic party's candidate for the 1944 presidential election. (59)

As the election day came near, it was becoming clear that Dewey was unable to hold together both the factions of his party. While many isolationists condemned him for his internationalist views, it was Senator Ball who put Dewey in great embarrassment. Senator Ball on September 29 declared that after reading Dewey's speeches and statements to date he had not been convinced "that Dewey's own conviction on the issue are so strong that he would fight vigorously for a foreign policy which will offer real hope of preventing World War III against the inevitable opposition of such a policy." (60) Later on,

58. Ibid., 23 January, 1944.

59. Current History (Philadelphia), 7 (September 1944)

60. New York Times, 30 September, 1944.

he went on to challenge both the candidates -- Roosevelt of the Democratic party and Dewey of the Republican party -- to give satisfactory answers to the following questions and promised his support to the one who would satisfy him most :

1. Will you support the earliest possible formation of the United Nations Security Organization and United States' entry therein before any final peace settlements are made either in Europe or in Asia?
2. Will you oppose any reservations to United States' entry which would weaken the power of the organization to maintain peace and stop aggression?
3. Should the vote of the United States' representative commit our quota of troops? (61)

On October 22, Senator Ball announced that while Dewey had answered only the first two of his questions satisfactorily, Roosevelt had, in his election speeches, met all three squarely, and, therefore, would receive his support. (62) It might be mentioned here that Senator Ball was considered an important spokesman for the independent wing of the Republican party which was generally identified as "the Willkie vote" and to which Roosevelt made repeated, direct appeals. According to Sherwood, Dewey's half hearted replies to the Senator's questions meant that he

61. Ibid., 13 October, 1944.

62. Ibid., 22 October, 1944.

evidently discounted Ball's political influence and felt that he should run no risk of losing isolationist votes. Roosevelt on the other hand knew that the isolationists were unalterably opposed to him anyway and that while Ball was personally not a major force in the political scene, he happened to be expressing the sentiments of large numbers of uncommitted voters who wanted a world organization equipped with "teeth and guts as well as with moral principles." (63) In his speech to the Foreign Policy Association, Roosevelt said :

The Council of the United Nations must have the power to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if necessary. A policeman would not be a very effective policeman if, when he saw a felon break into a house, he had to go to the Town Hall and call a town meeting to issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested.

It is clear that, if the world organization is to have any reality at all, our representatives must be endowed in advance by the people themselves, by constitutional means through their representatives in the Congress, with authority to act.

If we do not catch the international felon when we have our hands on him, if we let him get away with his loot because the Town Council has not passed an ordinance authorizing his arrest, then we are not doing our share to prevent another world war. The people of the Nation want their Government to act, and not merely to talk, whenever and wherever there is a threat to world peace. (64)

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63. Sherwood, n. 34, 817.

64. Ibid., 817 - 18.

The outcome of the elections was a triumph for the Democratic party and another presidential term for Roosevelt. Although the victory was not a "land-slide" compared with previous election returns, Roosevelt had a comfortable majority and the Democratic party succeeded in increasing its representation in Congress. Another characteristic feature of the elections was that instead of the great conflict which raged around the League of Nations in the 1920 campaign, there was a certain measure of political understanding arrived at between Hull and Dewey as regards the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. To be sure, there were differences of opinion among the leaders of the two political parties, yet, by and large, there was general agreement in the rank and file of the two parties as regards the necessity for creating a post-war world organization.

Furthermore, many Senators and representatives with isolationist background, notable among them were Senator Nye of North Dakota and Senator Davis of Pennsylvania, were defeated and a Senate and House returned to office far more favourable to international cooperation than at any time since this question assumed national importance. The 1944 elections also introduced the concept of non-partisanship into the American political scene. (65)

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65. Charles John Graham, "Republican Foreign Policy 1939 - 1952," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1955, 101.

The political climate, therefore, seemed propitious for the executive to continue and complete its task of building a post-war security organization.



**CHAPTER V .**

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY  
IN THE WAR-TIME CONFERENCES**

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## 1. THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE

### AMERICAN INITIATIVE :

At the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers' of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in October 1943, it was agreed to establish "at the earliest practicable date" an international organization for the maintenance of world peace and security. The reasons for American initiative in this sphere were various. The Roosevelt administration was committed to policies looking towards the creation of an international organization to deter aggression, by force, if necessary. There was also a wide-spread demand by various public organizations devoted to the study of the post-war world problems and the public, in general, for the establishment of an international organization in the post-war period. The administration was equally anxious to utilise this extensive public support and enthusiasm for the creation of such an organization while the war was still on, rather than wait till the termination of hostilities. The policy makers in the United States knew very well the change that occurred in the American political scene after 1918 and feared a possibility of similar reaction against "foreign entanglement" developing after

the end of the Second World War. (1)

THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS :

The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations held in Washington during August and October, 1944 were conducted in two phases. The first phase (from August 21 to September 28, 1944) covered talks between the representatives of the governments of U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. In the second phase, the Soviet Union did not join with the British and the Americans in their discussions with the Chinese. The talks with the Soviet delegation started first.

Secretary Hull, speaking before the delegates assembled at the Dumbarton Oaks, cited the "lessons of earlier disunity and weakness" and emphasized the need for unity among the Allies in view "of what modern war

I. Churchill, in his conversations with some important American officials on 22 May, 1943, has noted Henry Stimson's views. Stimson informed him that there would be a tendency in American public opinion to "relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experiments." Stimson was also of the view that the U.S. agreement on the creation of a post-war international organization could be easier to secure during the war, indeed, that, in his view, "it was a case of during the war or never." This view was held by many important Americans including Wallace, Ickes, Connally and Welles. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (London, 1951) IV, 721.

means." In his speech he also made a reference to the requirements for peace, including the institutions through which to act in preserving peace. He said :

Success or failure of such an organization will depend upon the degree to which the participating nations are willing to exercise self-restraint and assume the responsibilities of joint action in support of the basic purposes of the organization. There must be agreement among all whereby each can play its part to the best mutual advantage and bear responsibility commensurate with its capacity. (2)

He emphasized the point that these conversations were designed to reach a consensus on views to be recommended to the governments represented (U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.), and after similar consultations with China, the conclusions would be "communicated to the governments of all the United Nations and of other peace-loving nations."

Furthermore, "as soon as practicable," the Secretary continued, "these conclusions will be made available to the peoples ... of all countries for public study and debate." It was the duty of the governments of peace-loving nations, he concluded, "to make sure that international machinery is fashioned through which peoples can build the peace they so deeply desired." (3)

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2. Department of State, Postwar Preparation 1939 - 1945 (Washington, 1950) 304.

3. Ibid

BASIC AGREEMENTS :

As the initial proposals of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States had a great deal of similarity of approach on many points, the progress of the Conference, at first, was satisfactory. All the governments agreed that the new international organization should have four basic elements :

- (1) General Assembly in which all member States would be represented;
- (2) Security Council in which all the Great Powers would have permanent seats together with representatives of some smaller States elected periodically by the General Assembly;
- (3) a Secretariat and
- (4) an International Court of Justice.

The name of the new organization was also thought of as the United Nations. (4) Furthermore, agreement was reached soon among the representatives of the three governments that unanimous votes should not be required in reaching decisions either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. The member States, it was agreed, should pledge themselves in advance to accept the decisions of the Security Council. There was general agreement on the desirability of giving the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining world peace and security and in providing the

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4. President Roosevelt had first used it to signify the war-time anti-Fascist alliance.

great powers with permanent representation in that body. (5) The principle that power should be commensurate with responsibilities was also accepted.

DIVERGENT VIEW-POINT :

There were, however, many points on which there was a lack of agreement among the participants. One concerned the power of the Security Council to impose the terms of settlement of a dispute. The U.S. Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization, dated July 18, 1944, had granted the Council the right to impose the terms of settlement of a dispute. (6) This provision was not acceptable to the British and the Soviets. (7) Thereafter, the Americans agreed that the Council's functions "should be to promote peaceful settlement, to make recommendations to the parties to a dispute, and to settle disputes only on the request of those parties." (8)

5. Charles K. Webster, The Making Of The Charter Of The United Nations (London, 1946) 26 - 27.

6. Chapter V on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Department of State, n.2, 600.

7. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948) II, 1677. According to Russell : "Great Britain strongly opposed any idea of compulsory settlement by the Security Council, feeling that member States would not be willing to bind themselves always to accept its decisions or to enforce them on other States. This position undoubtedly reflected the concern of the smaller European governments lest the great powers attempt to set up a system that might subject them to future 'Munichs.'" Ruth Russell, A History Of The United Nations Charter (Washington, 1958) 458. In retrospect, little did the smaller powers realize that they will be, in future, threatened by disagreements between the major powers than by agreements.

8. Hull, n. 7, 1677.

Further, during the discussions, the U.S. raised the question of giving Brazil a permanent seat on the ground that her "size, population, and resources, along with her prospect of a great future and the outstanding assistance she had rendered her sister United Nations, would warrant her receiving a permanent membership." (9) Both Britain and the Soviet Union, however, emphatically opposed the American move and the matter was, therefore, withdrawn.

The issue with regard to the voting procedure in the Security Council gave rise to a serious controversy during the discussion. Since the Security Council was to be the principal security enforcing authority of the organization, the question of how it should make its decision was of great significance. To be precise, the issue was not the requirement of unanimity among permanent members in reaching decisions on substantive matters in the Security Council. There was full agreement in this respect. The issue was, as formulated in a Department of State publication :

Whether any permanent member when party to a dispute before the Council would be denied a right to vote in reaching the decisions on that dispute during the time its peaceful settlement was being sought by the Council -- namely, while the Council was performing its conciliatory and quasi-judicial functions in behalf of pacific settlement of disputes. When, however, the Council's functions of determining the

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9. Ibid., 1678.

existence of a threat to or breach of peace and of suppression of such a threat or breach were called into play, this issue was not involved, since these functions were of an enforcement character and need of unanimity among the major powers was regarded as controlling. (10)

The Americans and the British took the position that the rule of great power unanimity should not be applicable in cases pertaining to the pacific settlements and in which one of the great powers was a party to a dispute. The Soviets did not want any qualifications to the unanimity rule. Behind this, lay, the basic difference between the Soviet and the "Western" concepts of the role of the international organization. (11) According to the Anglo-American view, the international organization instead of being merely the continuation of the war-time alliance should be so devised as to regulate the relations between the juridical equal States on the accepted principles of

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10. Department of State, n. 2, 376.

11. This difference became clearly manifest when, during the conversations, the Soviet Union insisted that the new organization should deal only with the security enforcement problems. The Soviet representative suggested an independent body to deal with international economic and other technical agencies which could be connected by some sort of liaison arrangement with the security organization. Great Britain and the United States, on the other hand, argued in favour of adopting an integrated outlook according to which security matters could not be dissociated from the socio-economic conditions of the world. Finally, the Soviets came round to accepting the broader type of world organization.



justice and law agreed by all mankind. (12) The Soviet position, on the other hand, was partly conditioned by their feeling of isolation in a capitalist and potentially hostile world, and partly the product of their orientation to Marxist - Leninist principles. (13) Consequently, the Soviets were not willing to repose that degree of trust in their war-time capitalist Allies. (14) The matter could not

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12. As Roosevelt wrote to Stalin on September 9, 1944 "traditionally since the founding of the United States parties to a dispute have never voted on their own case. I know that public opinion in the United States would never understand or support a plan of international organization which violated this principle. I know, furthermore, that many nations of the world hold the same view and I am fully convinced that the smaller nations would find it difficult to accept an international organization in which the Great Powers insisted upon the right to vote in the Council in disputes involving themselves. They would most certainly see in this an attempt on the part of the Great Powers to set themselves up above the law. I would have real trouble with the Senate." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Correspondence Between The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The U.S.S.R. And The Presidents Of The U.S.A. And The Prime Minister Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War (Moscow, 1957) II, 159.
13. William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain and Russia : Their cooperation and conflict (London, 1953) 507.
14. The Soviet paper War and the Working Class discussing the issue of the veto power pointed out that the League of Nations was lenient with Poland when it seized Vilno and with the Italians when they invaded Ethiopia, but the League "voted for expulsion of the Soviet Union when it deprived Germany of a spring board (Finland) prepared for aggression." Quoted in Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 1944. Also, James Reston in one of his despatches from Moscow mentioned that the "... Soviet officials cannot forget that, even as recently as late 1939 and early 1940, the British and the French had

... (continued on page 301 )

be resolved in several meetings and was, therefore, put aside. (15)

Again, with respect to the security problem, the Soviets proposed (a) that an international organization should be set up which should be ready to act at a moment's notice on the direction of the Security Council and (b) that small countries which were unable to contribute armed forces in the Security Organization should be required to contribute territory for bases. The Americans were not willing to accept the above Soviet proposals. Instead, they preferred a series of special arrangements between each government and the Security Council by which each State would designate a portion of its armed services to be mobilized on orders from the Security Council. The

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prepared an expeditionary force to send to the aid of Finland against her ... 'the capitalist bogey' in Russia is still as strong as the 'Communist bogey' in the West." New York Times, 29 September, 1944. In a personal letter to Roosevelt, dated 14 September, 1944, Stalin observed, in connection with the Soviet insistence on absolute veto power for the big powers, that the Soviet Union "cannot very well ignore the existence of certain absurd prejudices which often hamper a genuinely objective attitude to the U.S.S.R. ..." Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., n. 12, 160.

15. Russell, who got an opportunity to examine the files of the State Department observes: "A curious confusion appears in the United States records on the exact Anglo-American position at this stage ... Some members of the American Group continued, for some time after Hull's decision otherwise, to discuss the United States position on Council voting in terms of the need to resist any infringement — even in enforcement decisions — of the principle that parties to a dispute should not

... (continued on page 302)

British, on their part, would have preferred the creation of a Military Staff Committee patterned on the war-time Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. (16) The Soviet Union, therefore, withdrew its proposal for an international air force. (17) In deference to the Soviet proposal, however, the conference accepted a clause that national air detachments should be held "immediately available ... for combined international enforcement action"(18)

As regards the second part of the Soviet proposal, the American group felt that the Soviet Union was, in effect, seeking a way for securing bases around its neighbouring countries. Roosevelt and Hull also expressed their opposition to the Soviet proposal. (19)

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vote in judgment on themselves ... They also interpreted the British proposal in these same terms ... It seems impossible, however, that Churchill, any more than Roosevelt, Hull, or the leading Senators, was prepared to relinquish the veto right on potential enforcement decisions ...." Russell, n. 7, 446.

16. Webster, n. 5, 28.

17. Before the conference convened, the Soviet Union had suggested that the world organization should not only have national contingents at its command but should also have an "international air force corps" for emergency purposes. Also, under the Soviet proposals, the member States would have been required to contribute to this corps from their national air forces, as determined by the Council in each case. Russell, n. 7, 470.

18. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Ch. VIII, 6.

19. Russell, n. 7, 468. Hull, n. 7, 1682.

In parenthesis, it might be observed that the American refusal to accept the Soviet proposal furnished an example, in the judgement of the writer, of a criticism that the American planners did not sufficiently take into account the Soviet security requirements in the post-war world. That the senior American officials were keenly alive to the future security requirements of the United States in the Pacific region against the possible revival of Japanese aggression could be borne out by a number of statements of U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox and the report by the House of Representatives' Sub-Committee on Pacific bases. (20) Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of War, Stimson, had advocated the acquisition by the United States of the islands that were under the control of the Japanese on the ground that they were necessary for the defense of the United States. "To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them," Stimson said. "They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world." (21)

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20. New York Herald Tribune, 7 March, 1943; U.S. House Committee On Naval Affairs, Sub-committee On Pacific Bases, 79 Congress I Session, Report (Washington, 1945).

21. The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State, Memorandum dated 23 January, 1945, Department of State, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington, 1955) 79.

Even granting that the U.S. was not bent on "colonization" of the Pacific islands, Stimson's argument missed the essential point. A question could be raised whether the United States was willing to rely for its post-war security on the creation of the world organization to the same extent that it expected its Allies and especially the Soviet Union to do? Furthermore, following Stimson's argument, should not the Soviet Union be entitled to create "outposts" in East Europe to forestall the possibility of future German aggression?

THE ROLE OF THE ASSEMBLY :

On the function of the Assembly in maintaining peace and security, the original Soviet proposal was that the General Assembly should have the right to consider questions of peace and security, including disarmament matters. This was, however, conditional upon the Assembly being allowed to discuss such issues only after they had been considered by the Security Council. Great Britain and the United States took the position that the Assembly should be able to discuss any question of peace and security without the permission of the Council; although they both agreed that only the latter should be authorized to make binding decisions and to take enforcement action. Great Britain also suggested that the Council might be empowered to take over a dispute from the Assembly on its own initiative, if it considered the situation serious enough to warrant

preventive or enforcement action. This latter suggestion of Great Britain made it possible for the Soviet Union to accept the provision for free Assembly discussion. The Formulation Group drafted the following text on this understanding (brackets indicating points not yet agreed):

1. The Assembly should have the right to discuss the general principles of international cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, including the principles governing pacific settlement of disputes and the regulation of armaments (and armed forces) (and disarmament) and any questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security brought before it by any member state or by the Council and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Council by the Assembly either before or after discussion. The Assembly should not on its own initiative deal with any matter relating to the maintenance of peace and security which is being dealt with by the Council. (22)

There was general agreement on the primary authority of the Security Council in the field. The wording of the last sentence in the above draft caused some confusion, however, until discussion clarified the common intention — that the Assembly could discuss (which meant without reaching a formal expression of corporate opinion) any question, even one before the Council, but could not vote to recommend action on a matter with which the Council was dealing. It could submit minutes of its discussions to the Council

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22. Quoted in Russell, n. 7, 441.

for information and could make recommendations when the Council asked for its opinion. The important thing, it was agreed, was to avoid having the two organs making divergent recommendations on the same question. Hence, the text of the paragraph was revised thus :

1. The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organization or by the Security Council; and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council. (23)

The inclusion of the term "disarmament" in the above paragraph was reluctantly agreed to by the British and American representatives to satisfy the Soviet suggestion.

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23. Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Chapter V, Section B. It may be pointed out that this extreme restriction of the authority of the General Assembly was modified to a large extent at the San Francisco Conference where the powers of that body were so redefined in such a language as to open the possibility of its assuming a role in the maintenance of international peace and security in case the Security Council is unable to take a decision. Thus, article 10 of the United Nations Charter was construed broad in scope.

The Soviet Union felt, according to Russell, that it constituted a useful slogan and should be retained in the paragraph. (24) As stressed earlier, disarmament was not the goal envisaged by the major powers. Member States were to undertake to negotiate a general international agreement for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments in order to fulfil their responsibilities and for local and self-defense purposes.

THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP :

During the conversations, there arose the problem of initial membership in the organization. The United States desired that all nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration of January 1942 should become members of the organization. Furthermore, the United States, supported by Great Britain, urged the inclusion of the "associate states" which had been invited to the United Nations economic conference but had not declared war on the Axis. Eight nations came under this category -- six of these belonged to the Latin American region. The Soviets were desirous of establishing the new organization primarily, if not exclusively, to prevent the recurrence of German and Japanese aggression and hence preferred a continuation of

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24. Russell, n. 7, 442. The United States stated its position that minimum, as well as maximum, armaments might need to be established. The British agreed particularly in relation to the quotas of armed forces that would have to be determined.



the military alliance. (25) This would have excluded those States which had not declared war on the Fascist Powers. Consequently, the Soviet Union opposed the admission of States which were not belligerent during the war. However, when the Americans persisted in their demand, the Soviet Union, in turn, suggested that each of the sixteen Soviet Republics should also be represented separately in the Assembly in view of the recent changes in the Soviet Constitution which gave each union republic the right to enter into direct relations with foreign States. (26)

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25. Stalin clarified his position on this issue in a speech delivered on 6 November, 1944 during the Dumbarton Oaks talks :
- " ... What means are there to preclude fresh aggression on Germany's part, and if war should start nevertheless, to nip in the bud and give it no opportunity to develop into a big war?
- There is only one means to this end, in addition to the complete disarmament of the aggressive nations: that is, to establish a special organization made up of representatives of the peace-loving nations to uphold peace and safeguard security; to put the necessary minimum of armed forces required for the averting of aggression at the disposal of the directing body of this organization, and to obligate this organization to employ these armed forces without delay if it becomes necessary to avert or stop aggression and punish the culprits ...
- Can we expect the actions of this world organization to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the great powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."
- J.V. Stalin, The Great Patriotic War Of The Soviet Union (New York, 1945) 141 - 2.
26. Andrew Rothstein, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy During The Patriotic War (London, 1944) II, 50.

The United States administration was greatly alarmed at this development and wished to keep it a closely guarded secret lest it should "blow off the roof." (27) Meanwhile, Roosevelt sent a message to Stalin dissuading him from such a course of action. The matter was, however, not settled till the convening of the Big Three Conference at Yalta.

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27. Hull, n. 7, 1680.

**THE CHINESE PHASE :**

After the end of the "Soviet Phase," the Dumbarton Oaks conversations entered the "Chinese Phase." The United States, United Kingdom and China participated in the latter phase of the Dumbarton Oaks conversation. Since the American planners were keeping in touch with the Chinese delegation during their discussion with the Soviet representatives itself, the latter talks did not continue for long. Furthermore, no important changes were suggested by the Chinese and none were incorporated in the approved text of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Three suggestions of the Chinese delegates were nevertheless duly endorsed by the United States and Great Britain and, later on, by the Soviet Union for consideration by other States at the San Francisco Conference. They were :

1. The Charter should provide specifically that adjustment by settlement of international disputes should be achieved with due regard for principles of justice and international law.

2. The Assembly should be responsible for initiating studies and making recommendations with respect to the development and revision of the rules and principles of international law.

3. The Economic and Social Council should specifically provide for the promotion of educational and other forms of cultural cooperation. (28)

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28. United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of The United Nations Conference On International Organization San Francisco 1945 (New York, 1945) III, 25.

**SUMMARY :**

It was apparent to the American post-war planners that the establishment of a general international organization envisaged in the Moscow Declaration could only be established after full and free conference and agreement among all peace-loving nations. It was also in keeping with the general approach of the American planners that the first step in the process of creating a post-war security organization would have to be further consultation among the four signatories of the Moscow Declarations as to the obligations and responsibilities which they would be willing to assume in creating and maintaining a just and secure post-war order. Next, it was envisaged that within the framework of that agreement a general conference could be convened of all the "peace-loving nations" with a view to bringing about a wider and more general understanding as to the responsibilities and obligations to be assumed by all the participating nations. Thus, the official communique issued simultaneously by each of the four governments which took part in the Dumbarton Oaks talks explicitly stated :

The Governments which were represented in the discussions in Washington have agreed that after further study of these proposals they will as soon as possible take the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a

full United Nations Conference. (29)

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals envisaged the task of maintaining international peace and security as being of a two-fold character. First, the States should assume an obligation that they would solve their controversies or disputes by peaceful means only. Accordingly they must pledge themselves to " ... refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization."

(Ch. II, 4) Having assumed these obligations, they must then join together in creating arrangements whereby the peaceful settlement of disputes and the adjustment of conditions which might threaten the peace or security of nations might be facilitated and made effective. They must also by concerted action remove threats to the peace and to suppress breaches of the peace — by armed force if necessary. (30) Second, it was thought that in so far as the nations would cooperate to create conditions conducive to the social and economic well being within the domains of each State, to that extent would the

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29. Department of State, n. 2, 335. Emphasis added.

30. Although the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals did not envisage that the proposed world organization would automatically include all the States, it was to have a universal character in one sense — the United Nations was to claim the whole world as its field of operation for security purposes. "So far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security," it would attempt to make every nonmember State comply with its principles. Percy E. Corbett, "The Dumbarton Oaks Plan," Yale Institute of International Studies, memo. no. 13, 25 November, 1944.

chances of preserving world peace and security improve in the post-war period. Thus, the proposals stipulated, as one of the purposes of the organization, the achievement of "international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems ..." (Ch. I, 3).

The General Assembly was to be the focal point for international discussion and action with respect to the second of the two great purposes, and the Security Council for the first. The General Assembly was to meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion might require. It was given the right, among other things, to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security including the principles "governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments," and to make recommendations to the nations as regards the advancement of their cooperative effort in the improvement of political, economic, social, humanitarian, and other relationships and in the promotion of observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, however, limited the authority of the General Assembly not to make recommendations on its own initiative "on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council." (Ch. V, Section B, 1)

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals envisaged the Security Council to be the focus for international cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The principal powers of the Security Council could be summarized thus :

(a) to investigate any dispute or any situation the continuance of which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute;

(b) to call upon states to settle their disputes by peaceful means of their choice;

(c) to recommend to states appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

(d) to determine whether any situation threatens the peace or involves a breach of the peace, and to take any measures necessary to maintain or restore peace, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization;

(e) to take diplomatic, economic, and other measures to give effect to its decisions; and

(f) to employ air, naval, or land forces to maintain or restore international peace, if measures short of force prove inadequate. (31)

In order to provide "teeth" to the decisions of the Security Council, it was stipulated that the member States would conclude a special agreement or agreements among themselves, subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The agreement or

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31. Department of State, Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization (Washington, 1944)  
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agreements would specify the numbers and type of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be made available to the Security Council. Armed forces thus placed at the disposal of the Security Council were to operate under its authority in accordance with plans made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Furthermore, the Security Council was to have responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments to be submitted to member States. The Military Staff Committee was to advise the Security Council on questions relating to the regulation of armaments and to possible disarmament.

All member States and even non-member states, it was proposed, should have the right to bring to the attention of either the Assembly or the Security Council any dispute or situation which in their judgement threatened peace and security. Although the General Assembly could discuss any such matters, it was obliged to refer to the Council any matter on which action might be necessary.

Regional systems or arrangements whose principles and purposes were to be consistent with those of the United Nations organization would not be prohibited under the proposals. More specifically, these systems and arrangements were to be encouraged, either on the initiative



of the States concerned or by reference from the Security Council, to undertake the peaceful settlement of such disputes as might be deemed appropriate for regional action. Regional arrangements might also be used in enforcement actions, but, and, significantly, only with the authorization and under the supervision of the Security Council.

As was pointed out by Pasvolksy, there were thus envisaged a series of three steps in the setting up of a general system of collective security under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In the first instance, there would be the negotiation of an agreement on the charter of the proposed international organization. The charter, besides providing for a suitable machinery, would also lay down the obligations and responsibilities to be assumed by the member States. The second step would be the negotiation of an agreement or a series of agreements by which the member States would place their armed forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council in the performance of its duties in connection with the maintenance of peace and security. In the third step, there would be the negotiation of international agreements for the regulation and, as far as possible, the reduction of armaments. Each of these instruments would be negotiated subject to approval in accordance with the constitutional processes of each member State. The essential idea being that out of all this would emerge a flexible instrumentality which would be capable

of growth and adjustment to meet the requirements of changing world conditions. Evidently the world organization could not be expected to solve all the difficulties and international conflicts, but, in so far as the nations would be resolved to establish it and use it, the proposed international organization would represent, it was believed, a great advance toward the realization of man's cherished ideals — a peaceful and prosperous world order. (32)

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32. Address by Leo Pasvolsky on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals at Cincinnati, 18 November, 1944, Department of State, Publication 2232 (Washington, 1944) 11 - 12.

## 2. THE YALTA CONFERENCE

According to Harry Hopkins as early as the middle of September, 1944, the President was contemplating a second conference with Stalin and Churchill. A variety of reasons impelled the leaders to agree to the holding of the Conference. There were no firm agreements as to what was to be done with Germany once she was defeated. The reparations question equally deserved careful attention. The machinery of the European Advisory Council was also not functioning properly. Soviet entry in the war against Japan needed to be clarified as to precise dates and extent of her participation; and the U.S. Far Eastern policy needed a thorough-going understanding with the other powers concerned. Likewise, there was the important issue left over at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference -- the question of voting procedure in the Council. (33)

Furthermore, the situation in East Europe and particularly in Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland was creating serious complications in Allied relationships. The local resistance forces fighting against the Nazis were also getting divided among themselves. The problem of the exiled

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33. Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1949) II, 835 - 6.

governments wanting to return home, the issue of communism and western democracies' attitude towards the Soviet Union had become a serious matter deserving the most earnest deliberation on the part of the highest authorities in Great Britain and the United States.

AMERICAN PREPARATION FOR THE CONFERENCE :

In the light of these and several other factors, the Department of State prepared proposals with respect to liberated Europe to be used at the Yalta Conference. The Deputy Director of the office of European Affairs (Hickerson) wrote to the Secretary of State on "Liberated Europe and sphere of Influence" as follows :

I urge that consideration be given to a recommendation to the President that he make a proposal along the following lines at his forthcoming meeting with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill :

1. There shall be established forthwith a Provisional Security Council for Europe to supervise the reestablishment of popular government and the maintenance of order in the liberated states in Europe and in the German satellite states, pending the establishment of the proposed general international organization of the United Nations.

2. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall be composed of representatives of the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States and France.

3. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall remain in continuous session. On the motion of any one of its members the Council will consider the situation in any of the countries over which it shall have

provisional jurisdiction. In case of necessity, the Provisional Security Council may arrange itself to meet in or to send special representatives to convene in any country where difficulties are occurring or are threatened.

4. If there is doubt concerning the status of the government in a liberated country or in a satellite country, the Provisional Security Council for Europe may, in its discretion, inquire into the situation. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall have the authority to require in such a case the establishment of a coalition government, broadly representative of all elements in the population. Such a coalition government shall be constituted under the direct supervision of the Council or a panel of special observers representing each of the four countries.

5. The coalition government thus established shall be regarded as a provisional or care-taker government which, with the support of the Provisional Security Council and the four countries represented thereon, shall maintain public order, take such emergency measures as may be required to care for the population and to make arrangements for a free election to be held on a date which in the judgment of the Provisional Security Council for Europe is a satisfactory date.

6. This free election shall take place under such national and local supervision of the Provisional Security Council for Europe as may in the Council's judgment be necessary. This free election shall take the necessary form as to determine the type of government for the country and the choice of the leaders of the government.

7. The Governments of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States and France should agree to recognize the governments formed following the free elections described in the foregoing paragraph.

8. The Provisional Security Council for Europe shall deal with questions involving actual or potential threats to the peace and aggression in Europe until the establishment of the security council of the United Nations organization; the Provisional Security Council for Europe shall thereupon cease to exist. (34)

The Deputy Director hoped that the proposed Provisional Security Council for Europe could be established immediately to deal with the situations in Greece and Poland. He also advocated acceptance of Soviet objectives in East Europe because

"we must have the support of the Soviet Union to defeat Germany. We sorely need the Soviet Union in the war against Japan when the war in Europe is over. The importance of these two things can be reckoned in terms of American lives. We must have the cooperation of the Soviet Union to organize the peace. There are certain things in connection with the foregoing proposals which are repugnant to me personally, but I am prepared to urge their adoption to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in winning the war and organizing the peace ...."(35)

Ultimately, the Department of State drafted a joint four-power (the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France) declaration on Allied policy towards the liberated countries and on the intention of the signatory States to establish an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe, thereby "to concert their action ...

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34. Department of State, n. 21, 93 - 4.

35. Ibid., 95.

in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and its satellities to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." (36) In explanation to the President, an accompanying memorandum argued that establishment of such a Commission would "reassure public opinion in the United States and elsewhere" that "pressing problems" would continue to be solved by allied cooperation while "further steps are being taken toward the establishment of the General International Organization." The importance attached to easing the European situation as a prerequisite to obtaining the full support of American opinion for the United Nations organization was underlined in another memorandum for Secretary Stettinius prior to his departure for the Yalta Conference. The memorandum again highlighted the necessity in view of the growing opposition in the U.S. to the Dumbarton Oaks idea of reaching an agreement on the creation of an Emergency High Commission for liberated Europe. The establishment of such a Commission, the memorandum added, would effectively silence those critics of the world organization who were portraying it as merely a device to underwrite a system of "unilateral grabbing." (37)

Stettinius discussed the American proposals for the Yalta Conference with British Foreign Minister Eden on

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36. Ibid., 98 - 100.

37. Ibid., 101.

his way to Crimea. He told Eden that the President had misgivings that the proposed European High Commission might prejudice the prospects of a world organization. (38) The President expressed his disappointment to Secretary Stettinius with the working of the European Advisory Commission and expressed his preference for having meetings of the Foreign Ministers to handle the necessary work regarding liberated areas. (39) A further objection to the proposed High Commission was that, "the United States would

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38. Preparatory to the Yalta Conference and on the basis of suggestions made by the Office of European Affairs on 8 January, 1945, proposals were drafted for the immediate establishment, as a joint temporary agency, of an emergency High Commission for liberated Europe, together with the issuance of a Four Power Declaration of policy towards liberated areas by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of France. The purposes of these proposals, in the words of the recommendation formulated, were to meet the "... urgent need for these four nations to achieve unity of policy, and joint action with respect to :

"1. Political problem emerging in the former occupied and satellite States of Europe, such as the return of certain exiled governments, the setting up of provisional regimes, the maintenance of order within countries, and the arranging of early elections were necessary to establish popular and stable governments;

2. Immediate economic problems such as the care for the destitute populations and the restoration of functioning economic life of particular countries." Department of State, n. 2, 372 - 3.

39. Ibid., 394.



be loath to assume the responsibilities in regard to the internal problems of the liberated countries that such a standing high commission would unavoidably entail. This in the circumstances, was a view applicable predominantly to East European countries." (40)

### THE YALTA CONFERENCE : THREE ISSUES

In this section, three broad issues will be discussed which had a direct bearing on the growth of the American policy for the creation of a world security organization. They relate to the problems regarding the voting procedure in the Security Council; the post-war settlement in Europe according to the United Nations declarations and the Soviet desire for the admission of her sixteen republics as members in the world organization.

### THE QUESTION OF VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On the question of voting procedure in the Security Council, as noted earlier, agreement could not be reached at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In the course of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, in order to meet the conflicting views of the participating countries, proposals were tentatively made by the U.S. that decisions of the Security Council should require the affirmative

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40. Ibid

votes of seven members, rather than of six members, as would be the case under a simple majority rule, or of eight members, as would be the case under a two-thirds rule; and that unanimity of the permanent members should be required on all substantive matters, except that in decisions of the Council relating to the pacific settlement of disputes (Section A of Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals) parties to a dispute should not vote. These proposals, though favourably received by the representatives of Great Britain and China, were not accepted by them. Thereupon, the Department of State, urged on the President to seek to obtain the acceptance of the following formula on voting by the Soviet Union and United Kingdom at the Yalta Conference:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Section VIII A and under paragraph 1 of Section VIII C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting." (41)

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41. Department of State, n. 21, 51. The President declaring that it was "unlikely ... in the final analysis," that the United States "would agree to our not having a vote in any serious or acute situation in which we may be involved," now accepted the formula as the official American position, and undertook to press for its adoption by Great Britain and the Soviet Union." Ibid., 56.

Under the proposed formula it was provided that the parties to a dispute should abstain from voting in those decisions of the Council which relate to the investigation of disputes, to appeals by the Council for peaceful settlement of disputes and to recommendations by the Council as to methods and procedures of settlement. The American formula retained the unanimity rule for decisions relating to the determination by the Council of the existence of the threats to the peace or breaches of the peace and to the suppression of such threats or breaches.

The American adherence to the principle that in matters concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes, a party to it — big or small — should refrain from voting was explained by the President in a letter to Stalin dated 5 December, 1944. After mentioning that the American formula called for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace and to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of peace, he drew Stalin's attention to the fact that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals

"... also provide in Chapter VIII, Section A, for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which the Security Council may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. Here too, I am satisfied that recommendations of the Security Council will carry far greater weight if they are concurred in by the permanent members. But I am

also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice, and, therefore, by accepting a provision under which, with regard to such procedures, all parties to a dispute should abstain from voting. I firmly believe that willingness on the part of the permanent members not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace, without in any way jeopardizing their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests the Great Powers must act unanimously. It would certainly make the whole plan, which must necessarily assign a special position to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace, far more acceptable to all nations." (42)

The question of voting procedure had also to be considered by the American government in the light of domestic reactions to it. The Department of State in "The Briefing Book Paper on Problem of Voting in the Security Council" prepared for President's use during the Yalta deliberations noted that their talks with members of Congress and with many individuals and groups throughout the country indicated that failure to provide for at least this much of modification of the unanimity rule would be profoundly deplored by many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. (43) The State Department also drew the President's attention to the possibility of such

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42. Ibid., 58 - 9.

43. Ibid., 87.

an issue becoming a "powerful weapon in the hands of both the perfectionists and the isolationists." Moreover, the Briefing Book Paper prepared by the staff of the State Department for the use of the President added, the acceptance of a straight unanimity rule by the U.S. would "inevitably be interpreted as surrender to Russia." The above factors might, the President was informed, "jeopardize our chances for adequate public and Congressional support in this country." (44)

The matter was finally settled by the Soviet Union's acceptance of the American proposals on the voting procedure. On 7 February, 1945, Molotov said in the meeting that after listening to U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius's explanation and Churchill's remarks, he felt that the American proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the great powers in the matters of preserving peace. (45)

**THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO WORLD ORGANIZATION  
AND THE "SPHERES OF INFLUENCE" POLICY**

There was another question to be discussed at the Conference which had a special bearing, for the United States, on the issue of the creation of a world organization. The American desire as interpreted by Hull after his return from the Moscow Conference was that with the establishment

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44. Ibid., 87.

45. Stettinius's explanatory note in Appendix - I.

of a world security organization there would not be any need for nations to develop "spheres of influence" and "balance of power" which tended to divide the world and endanger world peace and security. (46) The American government had become aware of a deal by which Churchill and Stalin had divided the Balkans into separate areas of responsibility. (47) Roosevelt, while acquiescing in their action, did not want it to become permanent and hence accepted Churchill's suggestion for a three month trial period to the arrangement for the Balkan countries. (48) Furthermore, while the Red Army was rapidly advancing towards Germany, the need for establishing a system embodying the principles of the Atlantic Charter and other Allied declarations was increasingly felt in Britain and the United States. This was necessary, the Anglo-American governments felt, to forestall the possible development of

46. Hull, n. 7, 1314 - 5.

47. The British Prime Minister suggested Soviet "predominance" in Roumania of 90 per cent and in Bulgaria of 75 per cent; and a 50 - 50 division in Yugoslavia and Hungary; and British "predominance" in Greece of 90 per cent. Stalin accepted the deal. Churchill, n. 1, VI, 198. There is some discrepancy in the various percentages quoted in some other sources. Hull, for instance, wrote that the Anglo-Soviet agreement reached in October, 1944 assigned to the Soviet Union 75/25 or 80/20 preponderance in Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary, while in Yugeslavia Russia was to share influence with Britain on 50/50 basis. Hull, n. 7, 1458.

48. Hull, n. 7, 1458. In accepting Churchill's proposal, Roosevelt did not consult Hull or the State Department. Ibid.

disunity among the great powers which, in turn, might threaten the very existence of the projected world organization. The Declaration On Liberated Europe was the solution which the Yalta Conference found for the above problem. It provided, inter alia, for "concerting the policies of the three powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles." (49) In this connection it should be mentioned that the Americans conceived the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed to at Yalta as a sort of an antidote to the 'spheres of influence' policy which both Churchill and Stalin were following in the Balkans. (50)

Also, it should be mentioned that the difference between the British and American approaches to the future role of the international organization became obvious here. Whereas the British wanted the immediate problems such as Allied policy toward Germany and Poland, the role of France in the post-war Europe, the future of the British position in the Balkan and Iran to be settled before the establishment of the United Nations organization, the Americans, in general, approached the problem by postponing the decisions on these controversial issues and by laying down general principles

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49. Department of State, n. 21, 971 - 2.

50. McNeill, n. 13, 559.

which should guide the powers concerned while taking action on specific issues. They hoped that the United Nations organization would become an agency through which, by mutual cooperation, international disputes of the present and the future could be amicably settled by the great powers. (51)

There were several factors which were responsible for the American adoption of a policy of not making specific commitments on "local" questions of post-war settlement and of postponing discussions on territorial claims till the convening of the peace conference. To begin with, the United States Chiefs of Staff feared that American involvement in

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51. For example, President Roosevelt in his Annual Message to Congress on 6 January, 1945 stressed the predominant concern of the Government that the "establishment of permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace" should not be delayed by "the many specific and immediate problems of adjustment connected with the liberation of Europe." US, Congressional Record, 91 (1945) 68 - 9. This does not, however, mean that the American government was still under the spell of the isolationist impulse or that it wanted to remain aloof from the world beyond the Western Hemisphere. It signified that the American Government's general approach or strategy for meeting the problems of the world varied from that adopted by United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It is worthwhile to recall Roosevelt's assertion in a letter to Churchill and Stalin at the time of the meeting of Churchill, Eden and Stalin at Moscow where the British wanted to clarify their position in Poland and the Balkan area with the Soviet leaders. Roosevelt wrote: "... in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United State is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense.... I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks ... as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here ...." Department of State, n. 21, 6 - 7.



the territorial quarrels connected with these security claims (by Britain and the Soviet Union) would result in a diminution of such Soviet military cooperation as existed and might, above all, affect the issue of preponderant importance, namely, Soviet cooperation in the Pacific war. The Joint Chiefs, therefore, continued to consider "the maintenance of Russian good will" of "vital importance." (52) Furthermore, even as Hull spoke about the desirability of doing away with the "balance of power" and "spheres of influence" approach in international relations, military necessities on different Allied fronts had already created a "spheres of responsibility" concept — precursor of the post-war "spheres of influence." (53) The Eastern front was the primary "sphere" of Soviet action which advanced westward along with the victorious march of the Red Army. As pointed out by Philip E. Mosley, while the other fronts were, in concept, Anglo-American in direction, the spheres-of-responsibility principle was also applied there. (54) Thus, on 8 March, 1942, Roosevelt proposed that

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52. Department of State, n.21, 533. Russell, n.7, 480, 487.

53. Philip E. Mosley, "Hopes and Failures : American Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1941 - 1947, Review of Politics, 17 (October 1955) 469. Mosley served during the war in different capacities. He was in the Department of State's planning committees and from the summer of 1944 served as Political Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador in U.K. (Winant) in his work on the European Advisory Commission.

54. Ibid., 469

... the British alone should assume the responsibility for the Middle East, the Americans the responsibility for the Pacific, while both nations should operate in the critical Atlantic theater. (55)

Again to quote Mosley, by the end of 1943, the Mediterranean area, including Italy, Greece and Turkey was regarded by the Americans as a British responsibility. (56) Similarly, the war in the Pacific was conducted primarily by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, with only a limited coordination with the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. This special responsibility, it was assumed by the U.S. Secretary of Navy, James Forrestal, was to continue into an indefinite future. He noted in his diary on 17 April, 1945 :

I take it as a premise about all discussions of world peace that the United States is to have the major responsibility for the Pacific Ocean security, and if this premise is accepted there flows from it the acceptance of the fact that the United States must have the means with which to implement its responsibility .... (57)

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55. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York, 1948) 416.
56. Mosley, n. 53. William D. Leahy, I Was There (London, 1950) 206, 311.
57. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (London, 1952) 60 - 1. Furthermore, "The 'special responsibility' of the military commander covered the entire range of political and economic activity in 'his' theater: from public order, justice, punishment of war criminals, labour regulation, supply of food, fuel and raw materials, and the use of property, upto the appointment or removal of high officials ...." Mosley, n. 53, 470.

It has been observed by some American scholars that the United States reluctance to settle, during the war, questions relating to frontiers and forms of government was because, as McNeill puts it, Roosevelt and Hull hoped that, by the end of the war,

... a new international organization would be in operation, and by its operation quite transform international relationships, substituting law and majority rule for the anarchy of traditional politics. In such an atmosphere they hoped and believed that particular problems in Poland, Italy, and elsewhere would become easily soluble in a fashion that could satisfy all reasonable demands for national security, liberty and justice. (58)

Such an observation by McNeill, however, does not appear to be wholly correct. It does not highlight many other important reasons which also influenced the American policy makers to postpone decisions on territorial questions till the end of the war. Thus, the American planners then believed that after the end of the war, the United States and Great Britain would be in a better position militarily to back up their arguments with the force of strength in their peace settlement

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58. McNeill, n.13, 403. McNeill's reference to "majority rule" principle appears to be a mechanical implanation in international relations of the democratic procedure of voting applicable in individual countries' parliaments. The United States government was not thinking in terms of creating a United Nations General Assembly as a world legislative body having its representatives directly responsible to the peoples of the world. It was to be a forum of discussion of representatives of the sovereign member States.

talks with the Soviet Union. As Mosley pointed out :

The reluctance of the American government, during hostilities, to discuss the "details" was reinforced by an awareness of its unfavourable military posture. By the time of Pearl Harbor it had to train and equip tremendous forces, on land, on sea and in the air, as well as providing a large part of the needs of its allies. All this took time and tremendous exertions. While the Soviet Union, fighting on its own territory and suffering tremendous losses, was carrying, as Churchill said, the "main burden" of the war, the United States was not in a good position, it seemed, to bargain hard with it over the "details" of a postwar settlement .... (59)

Of relevance here is the military assessment of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff whose views were set forth in Admiral Leahy's letter of 16 May, 1944. The Department of State was in "full accord" with the Joint Chief's stand. (60) The Joint Chiefs felt that after the end of the Second World War there would be, in the foreseeable future, only three great powers — the United States, Britain and Russia. They felt it as extremely unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States while "it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps." Furthermore,

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59. Mosley, n. 53, 463. The reference here is obviously to the persistent fear entertained in official American circles of a risk of a separate Soviet peace with Germany.

60. Department of State, n. 21 , 106.

In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength — a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politics — military international relationship, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent ... Having due regard to the military factors involved ... we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation .... (61)

Other factors mentioned by Mosley related to the peculiarity of the American constitutional procedure by which the executive could not commit the government as a whole on the terms of peace. Added to this was the apprehension shared by Roosevelt and Hull as to the extent, after the war, American public opinion would be willing for its government to remain involved in the problems of Europe or to commit its power to the enforcement of specific settlements.

Also, during 1944 - 1945 it became apparent that the great powers were, so to speak, substituting the word "regionalism" for "spheres of influence" with regard to

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61. Department of State, n. 21, 107 - 8.

policies pursued by them. (62) The United States made clear its interests in the Western Hemisphere region by adhering to the Act of Chapultepec and by supporting the admission of Argentine to the San Francisco Conference. Furthermore, the United States' advocacy for giving a great power status to China in a post-war world organization was regarded by the British and the Russians as an attempt on the part of the United States to increase her own influence in that body. The American interests in China, her desire to make it a "principal stabilizing factor in the Far East" and the presence of the American General Joseph W. Stilwell as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek in China were bound to be interpreted differently by the other great powers. (63)

Likewise, the Soviet insistence on the rectification of her western frontiers and on friendly governments on her western flank, and the British attempts to create a friendly bloc of powers along the west coast of Europe and through the Mediterranean were factors which the United States policy makers had to reckon with. Thus, one of the immediate tasks which American diplomacy faced was not, in fact, to do away with the "spheres of influence" policies

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62. Raymond Dennett, "U.S.S.R. In Asia : Problem of Regionalism," Far Eastern Survey (New York ), 14 (20 June, 1945) 153 - 6.

63. Department of State, n. 21, 356.

pursued by the great powers but to arrive at a political understanding with other great powers with regard to the areas of "overlapping regionalism" -- areas in which more than one power extended or wanted to extend its influence. Such a step was necessary in order to make it possible for each of the great powers to cooperate in the future world organization to maintain international peace and security on the basis of their agreements regarding the post-war peace settlements.

THE ADMISSION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS :

As regards the Soviet request for the admission of her sixteen Republics at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, it might be recalled, that the request became a lively political issue in American politics. Senator Vandenberg, on knowing the proposal, said that it would "raise hell" in the domestic scene. (64) At Yalta, however, the Soviet Union retreating from its earlier demand of the admission of her sixteen republics, asked for the admission of two or three of them. When Roosevelt accepted the Soviet claim, James Byrnes, the then U.S. Secretary of State, thought it as "very unwise" and reminded Roosevelt both of his January talks with the Senators and of the effective argument in 1920 against the League of Nations -- that the British would have five votes, because of the Dominions, while the United States would have only one. He feared

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64: Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952) 159.

a repetition of that argument, the Soviet Union this time taking the place of Great Britain. Keeping all this in view, he urged the President "at least to ask that the United States be granted a number of votes equal to those of the Soviet Union." (65) Thereupon, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Stalin and Churchill asking for additional votes for the U.S. in the Assembly "in order to give parity to the United States ...." (66) His request was readily agreed to by Churchill and Stalin. (67)

After the end of the Conference, the Big powers announced in a public communique that,

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples. (68)

After the necessary consultations with the French and Chinese governments about their joint sponsorship of

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65. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (London, 1947) 40.  
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians : The Yalta Conference (New York, 1949) 282 - 3.
66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., n. 12, 191.
67. Later on Roosevelt, on the advice of the Department of State decided that the United States would not request for additional votes in the Assembly of the proposed world organization. Department of State Bulletin, 12 (8 April, 1945) 600 - 1.
68. Department of State, n. 21, 971.



the meeting, the communique declared, the proposals on voting would be made public. The text of the invitation suggested that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, supplemented by the agreed provision for Security Council voting, should be considered "as affording a basis for" the Charter of a "General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security," which the conference was to prepare. (69)

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTION  
AT THE END OF THE CONFERENCE :

The official American reaction showed clear marks of satisfaction with the results of the Conference. President Roosevelt's report to the Congress generally reflected this sentiment. (70) Hopkins, who was with the President at Yalta later told Sherwood that,

We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory of the peace .... The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and far seeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far the future as any of us could imagine ....(71)

69. Ibid., 976.

70. Department of State Bulletin, 12 (4 March, 1945) 321 - 6, 361.

71. Sherwood, n. 33, 859. Leahy has recorded the mood of the President after his return from Yalta thus :

... (continued on page 341 )

The American press, in general, supported the communique released on 12 February, 1945 after the end of the Yalta Conference. (72) There were favourable editorials in important newspapers such as the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune and Chicago Daily News. Much criticism came from the Republican party leaders although, it was, by no means, universal. Not only Senator Warren Austin a Republican who generally supported a great many measures of the Roosevelt administration on foreign affairs, but also an important isolationist leader like former President Hoover had kind words for the Yalta meeting. Hoover said he believed that it laid "a strong foundation on which to build the world." (73)

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"His confidence in the decisions reached at Yalta, especially as regards the United Nations, was illustrated when he said that the actions taken spelled of the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, spheres of influence, balances of power, and all the other expedients which had been tried for centuries and had failed." Leahy, n. 56, 385.

72. A collection of extracts from 17 leading American newspapers showed the favourable reaction of them to the Yalta Decisions published then. New York Herald Tribune, 14 February, 1945.
73. New York Times, 13 February, 1945.

### 3. THE MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE

The success of the American Government in reaching agreements with other great powers on post-war issues at the Yalta Conference did not diminish its responsibilities in the matter of establishing a world organization. The United States, on its part, was anxious to appraise the largest single bloc in the future world organization -- the Latin America States -- of its own thinking in various matters of common interest. Both, the intention to have further exchanges and the belief that the inter-American system "must play" a "strong and vital role" within the world-wide framework being envisaged, were repeated by President Roosevelt in his address three days after the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were published. (74)

The impetus for the convening of a conference of American republics sprang from several sources, some regional in background and objective, others broadly international in origin and scope. Problems raised by the war in the political, social, and economic fields which were of common interests to the nations of Western Hemisphere required joint consideration. The issues concerning

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74. Address on Columbus Day, 12 October, 1944, Department of States Bulletin, 10 (15 October, 1944) 397 - 8.

relationship of the inter-American system with the future world organization had assumed importance and required inter-American consultation.

Under the system created by the various resolutions, declarations and conventions made at the Inter-American Conferences of the past, acts of American States capable of disturbing the peace of the region were matters of common concern to all American States and called for the procedure of inter-American consultations. Furthermore, any act on the part of a non-American State against the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of an American State was considered an act of aggression against all the American States. Three important points, however, were not sufficiently covered under the previous declarations of the inter-American system. They were : (a) action in case of an attack by one American State on another; (b) a definition of aggression; and (c) provision for sanctions. These questions were discussed in the Mexico City Conference to which we turn our attention now.

The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, which met from 21 February to 8 March, 1945, was attended by all the nations who were members of the Pan American Union — formed in 1890 — with the exception of Argentina which was in disrepute because of its Nazi-Fascist leanings during the war.

The assembled representatives discussed a wide range of subjects, including cooperative measures for the prosecution of the war; economic and social problems related to the transition period from war to peace and long-range improvements in the economy of the American nations; international organization for the maintenance of peace and security, as outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals; steps to strengthen the inter-American system and coordinate it with the United Nations organization. The problem of bringing Argentina back to the Pan-American fold and eventually in the family of nations was also discussed.

Out of the several documents that emanated from the Conference, the Resolution on Reorganization, Consolidation and Strengthening of the Inter-American System, the Declaration on Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity, known as the Act of Chapultepec, deserve special consideration. In this act the American nations reaffirmed certain fundamental principles which they had been incorporating into their international law since 1890 by means of conventions, resolutions, and declarations. Among these principles were the following :

**The proscription of territorial conquest  
and the non-recognition of all acquisitions  
made by force;**

**The condemnation of intervention by a State  
in the internal or external affairs of another;**

The recognition that every war or threat of war affects directly or indirectly all civilized peoples, and endangers the great principles of liberty and justice which constitute the American ideal and the standard of its international policy;

The procedure of mutual consultation in order to find means of peaceful cooperation in the event of war or threat of war between American countries;

The recognition that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation;

The resolution that any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or unrestricted arbitration, or through the operation of international justice;

The recognition that respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of each American State constitutes the essence of international order sustained by continental solidarity, which historically has been expressed and sustained by declarations and treaties in force;

The affirmation that respect for and the faithful observance of treaties constitute the indispensable rule for the development of peaceful relations between States, and treaties can only be revised by agreement of the contracting parties;

That in case of the peace, security or territorial integrity of any American republic is threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, coordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation, using the measures which in case the circumstances may make advisable;

That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or

inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty, or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against all the American States. (75)

One of the most notable features of the Act of Chapultepec was the statement that "the security and solidarity of the Continent are affected to the same extent by an act of aggression against any of the American States by a non-American State, as by an American State against one or more American States." (76) This was perhaps due to the realization that American States like pro-fascist Argentina which did not seem to disapprove of the philosophy of violence and the negation of fundamental human freedoms adopted by the fascist countries might also endanger peace in the Western Hemisphere.

The endorsement of those fundamental principles enumerated above by all the American nations which in the beginning were unilateral declarations of the United States was a significant development. It was asserted by many scholars that "The Act of Chapultepec was the most recent of a series of agreements which tended to make the Monroe Doctrine a multilateral rather than a unilateral policy ...." (77) However, there does not seem to be any

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75. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1944 - 1945 (Boston, 1946) 717 - 9.

76. Ibid., 718 - 9.

77. John C. Campbell, The United States In World Affairs 1945 - 1947 (New York, 1947) 213.

expressly prohibitive clause which could debar the U.S. from acting unilaterally in the Hemispheric affairs in conformity with her established Monroe Doctrine. (78) Mention here might be made of the fact that unilateral action by any of the American States (including the United States) for the main purpose of the Doctrine, the defense of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression, was specifically authorized by one of the inter-American acts adopted by the meeting of American Foreign Ministers at Havana in 1940. (79)

The delegates of some of the American nations, notably Columbia, Brazil, and Uruguay, were desirous of concluding binding agreements of a much more specific character. They wanted agreements — directed at potential aggressors either outside or within the Western Hemisphere — to provide not merely for consultation but for collective action against the aggressor State. The United States delegates, on the other hand, were not prepared to go so far, mainly for two reasons: As the proposals required

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78. According to one authority on Latin American affairs " ... the unilateral Doctrine has never been explicitly abrogated or disavowed by our Government [U.S.] ...." Arther P. Whitaker, "The Role of Latin America In Relation To Current Trends In International Organization," The American Political Science Review, 39 (June, 1945) 507.
79. "Should the need for emergency action be so urgent that action by the Committee cannot be awaited, any of the American Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the Continent requires ..." Act of Havana concerning the Provisional Administration of European Colonies And Possessions In the Americas, 30 July, 1940, Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations 1939 - 1940 (Boston, 1940) 95.



commitments of a far-reaching character, the American delegates refrained from forwarding such suggestions to the Senate before that body had had an opportunity to consider the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, some of the United States delegates were apprehensive of the fact that the proposals for collective action by the nations of the Western Hemisphere might jeopardize the projected world organization and foster the creation of regional arrangements in other parts of the world — notably in Eastern Europe. (80)

According to the compromise formula, the signatory States recognized that during the war, threats and acts of aggression against any one of their numbers, whether from within or outside the Western Hemisphere, "constitute an interference with the war effort of the United Nations, calling for such procedures, within the scope of their constitutional powers of a general nature and for war, as may be found necessary ..." (81)

80. Vera Micheles Dean, The Four Cornerstones Of Peace (New York, 1946) 44. Thus, the United States position on Resolution IV directed toward the creation of a permanent military agency was that "... it would be well to wait until after the San Francisco Conference in order that there might be no action taken that might conflict with the plans for the world organization." Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference On Problems of War and Peace (Washington, 1946) 11. Furthermore, at the Yalta Conference the U.S. had agreed to the proposition when read in conjunction with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, that no peace enforcement action could be taken under regional arrangement without a vote of the Security Council in which all five of the Permanent Members concurred.

81. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 75, 719.

Looking beyond the war, however, the Conference recommended that, for the purpose of meeting threats or acts of aggression against any American Republic following the establishment of peace, the American nations should consider the conclusion, in accordance with their constitutional processes, of a permanent treaty establishing procedures by which such threats or acts might be met. (82)

THE ISSUE OF REGIONALISM :

Regarding a regional arrangement for the Western Hemisphere, the Conference declared in Part III :

This declaration and recommendation provide for a regional arrangement for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this Hemisphere and said arrangements and the activities and procedures referred to therein shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization, when established. (83)

Doubts were, nevertheless, expressed in the United States and other American countries as to the compatibility of the regional measures, in practice, with the general security provisions of the proposed international organization. Furthermore, the complexity involved in the

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82. The conflict between the Dumbarton Oaks — Yalta formula and the Chapultepec was not fully seen until after the San Francisco Conference was under way. It will be dealt in detail while studying the San Francisco Conference.

83. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 75, 720.

above issue could be seen clearly by visualising the following instances. What would happen if the American nations decided to take steps to counteract threats to or breaches of the peace not approved by the Security Council of the proposed world organization? Conversely, a solution had to be found in a situation arising from the decision of the Security Council to take enforcement action against an aggressor in the Western Hemisphere which met with opposition on the part of one or more American States. Would Latin American nations be ready to take military action in the event of aggression in some other continent? The matter was shelved to be decided at the San Francisco Conference.

"NON-EXCLUSIVE" CRITERION  
FOR DETERMINING AGGRESSION :

Another important point which emanated from the deliberations of the Conference was that the Act of Chapultepec provided a "non-exclusive" criterion for determining aggression — the crossing with armed forces of the established boundaries of another State — and expressly stipulated the application of diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions. (84) However, "in case acts of aggression occur or there are reasons to believe that an aggression is being prepared by any other State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against

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84. Department of State, n. 80, 74.

the sovereignty or political independence of an American State ..." each State was left to decide for itself the existence of such a state of affairs. The act merely spoke of agreement among the signatories to "consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measures it may be advisable to take." (85)

THE INFLUENCE OF ARTICLE TEN OF  
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT :

One could also discern the influence on the Act of Chapultepec of Article 10 of the League of Nations which obligated the League members to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of member States. To be sure, at the second meeting of the American Foreign Ministers' meeting at Havana in 1940 the American States had declared that an act of aggression against the territorial integrity and political independence of an American State by a non-American State would be considered an act of aggression against all of them. But, never before had they combined to guarantee the boundaries of the hemisphere against an American aggressor. Indeed, the Latin American countries had often in the past emphasized that no American State should interfere in the "external affairs" of another American State for any reason whatever. In this light, therefore, the Mexico Conference had broken

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85. Goodrich and Carroll, n. 75, 719.

new ground. (86)

LATIN AMERICAN OBJECTIONS TO THE DUMBARTON  
OAKS PROPOSALS :

As was to be expected, the Latin American countries, which were also to form the largest group in the new world organization had various objections to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In a sixty page document prepared by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela, they put forward their suggestions many of which reflected the opinion of other small nations of the world as well. While agreeing that the world organization should have as its purpose the maintenance of peace and security to the end that the essential liberties of human beings are respected, according to Uruguay "it should not require of its component States a certain form of government, but simply good faith and compliance with international obligations." On the powers of the General Assembly, it was said in the document that

The General Assembly should have powers to deal with any question affecting the peace and security of the world, and to examine any problem brought to it by the governments or the Security Council, and make recommendations on it. Any question requiring action should

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86. It should be pointed out that the Act of Chapultepec did not commit the United States to support the boundaries indefinitely, but instead provided that the frontiers be protected first under the wartime powers of the President for the duration of the war, and then a treaty among the American States should be drafted to extend the guarantee into the postwar period. This treaty should then be presented to the U.S. Senate for ratification.

be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly which, however, reserves the right to review the decisions taken.

It further wanted the Assembly to be empowered "to admit new members on its own initiative, or by recommendation of the Council, and to suspend any member of the organization against whom the Council shall have taken preventive or enforcement action."

The Latin American countries wanted to enlarge the membership of the Security Council so as to have greater representation of their region. Some of them wanted a permanent seat in the Council. Some wanted a specific number of Latin American countries to be always represented in the Council as non-permanent members. On the role of the Security Council the document said:

The Security Council should have primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, and the members of the organization should obligate themselves to carry out the decisions of the Council.

In a joint statement, however, Chile and Peru proposed that in the event a conflict arose outside this hemisphere, which affected another continent or region and did not constitute a threat to world peace, the American States should not be obliged to participate in operations of a military character. (87)

Finally the resolution "On Establishment of a General International Organization" (resolution XXX) based

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87. Dean, n. 80, 48 - 9.

on a Mexican proposal declared the determination of the American republics to cooperate in the establishment of a world organization "based upon law, justice and equity." While generally supporting the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, it, nonetheless, set forth the following points which, in the opinion of the participating Latin American governments, should be taken into consideration in formulating the charter of the world organization at the San Francisco Conference :

(a) The aspiration of universality as an ideal toward which the Organization should tend in the future;

(b) The desirability of amplifying and making more specific the enunciation of the principles and purposes of the Organization;

(c) The desirability of amplifying and making more specific the powers of the General Assembly in order that its action, as the fully representative organ of the international community may be rendered effective, harmonizing the powers of the Security Council with such amplification;

(d) The desirability of extending the jurisdiction and competence of the International Tribunal or Court of Justice;

(e) The desirability of creating an international agency specially charged with promoting intellectual and moral cooperation among nations;

(f) The desirability of solving controversies and questions of an inter-American character, preferably in accordance with inter-American methods and procedures, in harmony with those of the General International Organization;

(g) The desirability of giving an adequate representation to Latin America on the Security Council. (88)

To conclude, two observations need to be made here. In the first place, the development of the inter-American system was one of the important factors influencing the policy of the United States toward the creation of the United Nations. During the San Francisco Conference, for instance, on certain issues, the United States' policy was influenced by its consideration for the Latin American viewpoint. Secondly, there was also noticeable during the Mexico Conference a significant change in the attitude of the Latin American Republics in their appraisal of the United Nations vis a vis the inter-American system. As noted earlier, the main preoccupation of the Latin American States was to preserve the inter-American system as the primary means of settling American questions, without interference or vetoes on the part of non-American powers. Behind this insistence was their changed outlook of not worrying to be left alone in the Western hemisphere with one great power, the United States, without being able to call other great powers, as balancing factor, into the settlement of hemispheric controversies. (89) Some have asserted this change to the Latin American States' "growing fear of the Soviet Union" and the fact that their governments, in most cases,

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89. John A. Houston, Latin America in the United Nations (New York, 1956) 4.



represented oligarchies which were greatly apprehensive of the communist creed. (90) Some others might also interpret it, on the positive side, as a tribute to the success of the "Good Neighbour Policy" enunciated during Franklin Roosevelt's administration.

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90. Campbell, n. 77, 216.

#### 4. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND PRIOR TO THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

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As the end of the war was becoming more and more evident, the policy makers of Allied countries became increasingly concerned about the concrete issues of the post-war period. Furthermore, Roosevelt was constrained to admit in his annual message to Congress on 6 January, 1945 that the "... nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among victors."(91) The same feeling could be discerned in the writings of many influential American government officials about the events of 1944 - 45. Thus, in the Forrestal Diaries a succession of entries (from January 1944) showed the extent to which the problem of peace -- which was more and more becoming a problem of peace with the Soviet Union -- began to preoccupy the minds of the American leaders. Although Forrestal's most direct interest in the subject, as Secretary of the Navy, was to preserve the strategically vital Pacific island bases in the peace settlements as American "outposts" for post-war security in the Pacific, he was also giving thought to the larger world-power relationships. He felt, for instance, that a

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91. US, Congressional Record 91 (1945) 69

policy of "unconditional surrender" which would lead to the destruction of German and Japanese power would seriously unbalance the international system in the face of Soviet power. (92)

On 4 April, 1945, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averrel Harriman had this to say :

We now have ample proof that the Soviet government views all matters from the standpoint of their own selfish interests ... The Communist Party or its associates everywhere are using economic difficulties in areas under our responsibilities to promote Soviet concepts and policies and to undermine the influence of the Western Allies .... (93)

Also, during that period, Harriman was advocating bolstering the economies of the Western Allies as a positive deterrent to "Soviet expansion in Europe." (94) Harriman went on to say that the U.S. willingness to accept a general wording of the declaration on Poland and liberated Europe, her recognition of the need of the Red Army for security behind its lines, and of the predominant interest of the Soviet Union in Poland as a friendly neighbour and the continued "generous and considerate attitude" adopted by the United States was regarded in the Soviet Union as

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92. Millis, n. 57, 53.

93. Ibid., 39 - 40.

94. Ibid.

a sign of weakness on the part of Americans. (95)

The ascendancy of Harry S. Truman to President-ship inaugurated a shift in American policy towards the Soviet Union. As Truman later wrote in his Memoirs, he adopted the policy of getting "... firm with the Russians and to make no concessions from American principles or traditions in order to win their favour...."(96)

BRITISH POLICIES DURING 1944 - 45 :

The British response to the developments in Europe could be expressed by quoting Churchill. He sought to implement the following strategy:

First, that the Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world.

Secondly, that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep.

Thirdly, that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible.

Fourthly, that Berlin was the prime and true objective of the Anglo-American armies.

Fifthly, that the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the entry into Prague of American troops was of high consequence.

Sixthly, that Vienna, and indeed Austria, must be regulated by the Western Powers, at least upon an equality with the Russian Soviets.

95. ibid.

96. Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (London, 1955) 73. Harry S. Truman's past political life was not particularly spectacular. Nevertheless, after service overseas in World War I as a lieutenant and captain of field artillery and a brief business career, Truman rose rapidly in

... (continued on page 360)

Seventhly, that Marshal Tito's aggressive pretensions against Italy must be curbed.

Finally, and above all, that a settlement must be reached on all major issues between the West and the East in Europe before the armies of democracy melted, or the Western Allies yielded any part of the German territories they had conquered, or, as it could soon be written, liberated from totalitarian tyranny. (97)

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politics. Under the sponsorship of the Pendergast political organization in Kansas city, Truman became judge of the Jackson country court in 1922. In 1934, he was elected to the U.S. Senate from Missouri on the Democratic Ticket and was reelected in 1940. During the second term, his work as Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate National Defence Programme brought him national fame. As a Senator, he was regarded as more middle-of-the-road than some of the more ardent Roosevelt supporters.

In 1944 Presidential elections, he was chosen the running mate for Franklin D. Roosevelt. The death of Roosevelt elevated Harry Truman to the most coveted political post in the United States. Evidently, when Truman became the President, he had little experience in foreign affairs. As Vice-President also he was not kept well informed of all the most important decisions taken by his government. No wonder, as late as 13 February, 1945, Truman publicly declared, "We're going to look forward to the most glorious peace in the history of the world." New York Sun, 14 February, 1945.

97. Churchill, n. 1, VI, 400.

Earlier still, there was great speculation and comments in the western press about the desirability of creating a "western bloc" in the post-war period as a safeguard to their security and peace. (98) Churchill, in his message to Stalin dated 25 November 1944 did not repudiate the idea outright. On the contrary, he admittedly favoured it as a second and subordinate alternative to the closer British, Soviet and American cooperation to "ensure and compel peace upon the tortured world." (99)

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98. The London Times advocated in a forthright editorial on 20 November, 1944 a Western European security bloc, despite the possible French objections to such a move on the ground that the Soviet Union might be offended. It said: "Great Britain has the urgent task of building up a common organization of national defense in cooperation with France, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian Kingdoms...." Furthermore, "These countries form a single buttress of security in Western Europe, corresponding to the buttress in the East of which Russia will be the main support." The Times urged that prompt decisions be made without waiting for final victory. "The time has come to concert practical measures for particular areas and to work out the regional arrangements foreseen in the Dumbarton Oaks plan under the general superintendence of the Supreme Security Council," the editorial said.
99. Churchill, n. 1, VI, 222. The Prime Minister wrote to Marshall Stalin on 25 November 1944 : "... There has been some talk in the Press about a Western bloc. I have not yet considered this. I trust first of all to our Treaty of Alliance and close collaboration with the United States to form the mainstays of a World Organization to ensure and compel peace upon tortured world. It is only after and subordinate to any such world structure that European arrangements for better comradeship should be set on foot, and in these matters we shall have no secrets from you, being well assured that you will keep us equally informed of what you feel and need." Ibid., 222 - 3.

Also, it was admitted by Churchill that on 4 December, 1944 the British Cabinet "met to survey the possibilities of a Western Bloc and de Gaulle's talks in Moscow." (100)

During the time of the crisis arising from a deadlock with the Soviet Union in the Big Power talks in 1944 concerning the veto principle, Field Marshal Smuts wrote a letter on 20 September 1944 to the British Prime Minister. Smuts was of the opinion that in the immediate post-war period, the principle of unanimity among the great powers had much justification for support. He observed that if that principle were to prove unworkable in practice, the situation could subsequently be reviewed. "A clash at the present juncture should be avoided at all costs," he maintained. Smuts concluded by saying :

"The principle of unanimity will at the worst only have the effect of a veto, of stopping action where it may be wise, or even necessary. Its effect will be negative; it will retard action. But it will also render it impossible for Russia to embark on a course not approved of by the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom...." (101)

Yet in another letter to Churchill, Smuts on 26 September 1944 while discussing the situation in Greece wrote that the position of the U.K. in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe must be strengthened rather than

100. Ibid., 224.

101. Ibid., 183 - 4.

weakened. He felt that a new situation in Europe would emerge after the elimination of German power and observed that

"while a World Organization is necessary, it is equally essential that our Commonwealth and Empire should emerge from this ordeal as strong and influential as possible, making us an equal partner in every sense for the other Big Two." (102)

A report of the Chatham House study group also came to a similar conclusion and recommended strengthening of the bonds of commonwealth which it considered vital to keep up the powers of U.K. along with that of U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. (103)

Also, the realization in British official circles that their country would have to face the prospects of a relative diminution of political and economic power in the post-war period made them perceive that it would make her "more a 'consumer' than a 'producer' of security." (104) It was, therefore, in her interest, more so because of the change, to do everything possible to build a more peaceful

102. Ibid., 185.

103. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Security : The Position of the United Kingdom, Report by a Chatham House Study Group (London, 1944) 4. In the words of a leading London journal, The Economist, Britain emerges from the War as a "conditional Great Power." The conditions, according to The Economist, are three. The first is "that the British Commonwealth and Empire continue to act together as a unit." The second, "that the communications between them remain open." The third that Britain does not incur the active hostility of the United States. If these conditions are met, Britain still ranks with the strongest. The Economist, 11 March, 1944, p. 331.

104. Geoffrey L. Goodwin, Britain and the United Nations (London, 1957) 46.



and secure world order. The 'League approach' (creation of a world organization to maintain international peace and security) thus had many powerful adherents both in the official and non-official ranks in Great Britain.

Another aspect of the British policy was her support for the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance similar to the Anglo-Soviet Pact of May, 1942. The British were also favourably inclined to the conclusion of a tripartite security pact among U.K., U.S.S.R., and France. (105) On this latter proposal, however, Roosevelt observed that he felt "somewhat dubious" as to the effect of such an arrangement on the question of an international security organization to which he attached "the very highest importance." (106) He also added that he realized that "this is a subject which is of primary concern to the three countries involved." (107)

SOVIET SUSPICION OF WESTERN POWERS :

The period under study was also characterized by deep Soviet suspicion of her principal western Allies. Thus, the question of the "second front" played an

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105. Churchill, n. 1, VI, 225.

106. Ibid., 226.

107. Ibid

important part in the Anglo-American and Soviet war-time relations. Indeed, Stalin from the very beginning made it an issue to judge Anglo-American friendship toward the Soviet Union. Thus, when he was informed by Churchill that the proposed invasion of Western Europe in August or September 1943 would have to be postponed and plans carried further, Stalin wrote, in part, to Churchill :

"... You say [referring to Churchill's message] that you "quite understand" my disappointment. I must tell you that the point here is not just the disappointment of the Soviet Government, but the preservation of its confidence in its Allies, a confidence which is being subjected to severe stress ...." (108)

Likewise, on the issue of the Berne negotiations conducted between the German General Wolff and the U.S. and British Army representatives in March 1945 to discuss the surrender of German armed forces in Northern Italy, the Soviet reaction was one of anger born out of a deep distrust of the British and American bonafides. (109)

The Soviet policy towards Poland, likewise, had its impact on the shaping of American policy for the post-war period. The question of setting up a "new" Polish government "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with

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108. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., n. 12, 138.

109. Letter of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated 16 March, 1945 to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow. Ibid., 297. Leahy has recorded "... we were aware that a fear the Russians always entertained was that the Germans would make a separate peace with the United States and Britain...." Leahy, n. 56, 353.

the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad" agreed upon at Yalta between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin was not being resolved to everybody's satisfaction. (110) Indeed, day by day, it was increasingly becoming a strong factor in the deterioration of understanding between the Anglo-Americans, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. In a message transmitted to Marshal Stalin, the American government observed that

"... The Soviet Government must realize that the failure to go forward at this time with the implementation of the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously shake confidence in the unity of the three governments and their determination to continue the collaboration in the future as they have in the past." (111)

Furthermore, Truman pointed out to Molotov who had come to attend the San Francisco Conference, that "in its larger aspects the Polish question had become for our people the symbol of the future development of our international relations ...." (112)

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110. Department of State, n. 21, 973.

111. Truman, n. 96, 80 - 1.

112. *Ibid.*, 76. At the Yalta Conference, the U.S. Secretary of State also referred to the larger implications of the Polish question when he observed that "There had been quite a struggle in the United States on American participation in World Organization. From the standpoint of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of great importance at this time to the United States ...." Department of State, n. 21, 803.

EUROPEAN STATES AND  
THE WORLD ORGANIZATION :

On 9 June, 1944 Dr. Eclo van Kleffens, acting on behalf of the Belgian, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Norwegian Governments-in-exile, submitted a memorandum to the American government. The above mentioned countries expressed their interest to participate with other States on the settlement of the issue of imposing conditions on Germany and of devising political safeguards for their future security possibly within a world-wide international system. This memorandum, it was stated, expressed also the views "of a large number of occupied countries" and it was being conveyed to the British and the Soviet as well as the American Government. (113)

TRENDS IN REGIONALISM :

Another significant development during this period was the convening of a conference between the representatives of Australia and New Zealand in Wellington between November 1 and 6, 1944. The statements issued after the end of it were indicative of the special concern which each regional group felt in the plans being discussed for a world security organization. In a statement issued on 29 November, 1944, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Herbert V. Evatt explained that,

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113. Department of State, n. 2, 277.

The Australian — New Zealand Agreement contemplates international agreements for future security and welfare in the South-West Pacific, arrived at on a basis of discussion and consultation between all powers concerned. All these matters are treated in agreement as matters for settlement through consultation between all governments concerned. Only thing we have consistently claimed is that in this region, which is more directly vital to us than to any other nation, and where our destiny lies, these things should be determined only after full prior consultation with us .... (114)

Furthermore, he declared "We feel a special responsibility for non-self-governing territories in the region in which we live, and in neighbouring regions...." and went on to propose the establishment of a commission to advise the various governments responsible for territories in the Pacific islands. Also, the two countries felt that there should be a South Seas Commission in order to "provide a suitable forum for discussion of Pacific islands problems." (115)

Also, in keeping with the above trend was the formation of the League of Arab States. Upon the initiative of Egypt exploratory conversations with regard to Arab unity were begun and, in September, 1944, delegates of the Arab States held a meeting to explore the possibilities in that

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114. United Nations Review (15 January, 1945)  
Italics inserted.

115. Ibid

direction. (116) They agreed to sign the pact of the Arab League on 22 March, 1945. Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen formally agreed to conclude the pact. Any other independent Arab State was given the right to become a member of the League.

The Pact of the League itself stressed the regional nature of the organization. According to Article I, the primary task of the League was to

strengthen the ties between the participating states, to coordinate their political programmes in such a way as to effect a real collaboration between them, to preserve their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in general the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. (117)

Furthermore, the main purposes of the League, as embodied in the pact, were to coordinate the domestic and foreign policies of the member States, to settle their internal disputes without "recourse to force" and to submit inter-Arab disputes to the League Council, whose decisions would be "executory and obligatory." (Article IV) It should be noted, however, that the powers of the League, were not

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116. The Arab League was also born as a result of British encouragement during the war for plans of "a greater degree of unity" among the Arab States. British Foreign Secretary Eden's statement on 29 May, 1941 outlined the British policy on this issue. The Times, 30 May, 1941.

117. Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States, In The Near And Middle East (Durban, 1953) 527 - 33.

very broad. Its member States were forbidden to "take any action tending to alter the regime" of any other member (Article VIII). Decisions of the supreme organ of the League, on which all member States were to be represented, were to be "obligatory on all States participant in the League" only when such decisions were unanimously made (Article VII). Decisions taken by a majority vote of the Council would "be obligatory (only) on those who accept them." (118) Thus, it could be said of the Arab League that it was designed to be a loose confederation of sovereign States. The formation of such a regional organization by the Arab States was also designed by them to strengthen their position during the San Francisco Conference particularly when the issue of regionalism would come up for consideration.

#### FRANCE AND POST-WAR SECURITY :

The French government's attitude to the programmes and proposals for the maintenance of world peace and security that were being advanced prior and during the San Francisco Conference was largely conditioned by the following factors. To begin with, the possibility of renewed German threat in the post-war period to her security weighed heavily in her thinking. Furthermore, her past experiences with the League of Nations' security machinery and the reluctance of Anglo-American powers to support

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118. Ibid

French endeavours in strengthening her security pacts during the inter-war period also conditioned her thinking at the time of the establishment of the United Nations organization. Thus, in advancing amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the French government seemed primarily interested in insuring that her mutual security pact with the Soviet Union should operate independently of the world security system. (119)

There was another significant innovation proposed by France to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. On the question of the voting procedure in the Security Council, the French

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119. The French, therefore, suggested in paragraph 2 of Chapter VIII, Section C, which stipulated that enforcement actions taken under the regional arrangements must have the authorization of the Security Council, the following words: "... except the measures contemplated in the regional arrangements directed against the renewal of the policy of aggression by States which have been the aggressors in the present war. The signatory States should give an account to the Security Council, as soon as possible, of the measures they may have been led to take to fulfillment of the stipulations of the said arrangements." United Nations Information Organizations, n. 28, 392. Further, in Section B of Chapter VIII, which dealt with determination of the threats to peace and the action to be taken and specifically under paragraph 5, which described the facilities to be placed at the disposal of the peace organization, the French would stipulate notably "the right of passage." *Ibid.*, 386. The Soviet troops could, thereby, legally pass through Poland to counteract future German aggression under the Franco - Soviet mutual assistance pact.

The Soviet Union seemed to support the French move noted above. As Nikolayev in War and the Working Class pointed out that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not preclude the working of the Soviet-French, Anglo-Soviet Soviet-Czech treaties. As for the Soviet-French treaty, it should be regarded, Nikolayev said as "a special obligation to combat German aggression," a "special form of promoting the aids of the world security organization." Quoted in Daily Worker, 5 April, 1945.



amendment, inter alia, suggested that "Should the Council not succeed in reaching a decision, the members of the Organization reserve to themselves the right to act as they may consider necessary in the interest of peace, right and justice." (120) One could, perhaps, detect a certain measure of fear in the French government that the United States might again put obstacles to the collective security system which would be worked out at San Francisco. (121)

The French position on the question of pacific settlement of disputes was equally the product of her past experience. Recalling the way in which the Germans systematically violated the Versailles and later treaties, France now wanted that the Security Council "while bearing in mind that treaties must be respected" should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. (122)

The French position on disarmament in the post-war period was explained by a statement issued by the French

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120. Ibid., 385.

121. New York Times, 23 March, 1945.

122. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 28, 385.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 March, 1945. It declared :

... The new organization should exert care not to weaken this preoccupation (by member state to cooperate effectively in the common defence) by spreading a false feeling of security and exhorting the nations to disarm without taking proper precautions. On the contrary, the Organization must be able to recognize that those United Nations which will make, inspite of the needs of their reconstruction, the sacrifice, after the war, of maintaining a strong army and of remaining vigilant, will be performing their international duty well. (123)

Continuing her accent on assuring the perfect-ability of the post-war security organization, the French wanted that the membership of the organization should be open to all peace-loving States "which give proof of it by their institutions, their international behaviour and the effective guarantees which they furnish that they will respect their international obligations. Participation in the organization implies obligations which are incompatible with the status of neutrality." (124) Further, as regards the allocation of non-permanent seats of the Security Council, the French were of the opinion, and in this they assumed a position which was close to that set forth in the proposals of the Belgian, Canadian and Dutch Governments, that it would be admissible to assign at least one half of them to those States "which would guarantee the

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123. Ibid., 381.

124. Ibid., 383.

active defense of international order and would have the means to participate to a substantial degree in it." (125)

To sum up, the French government was strongly disposed toward proposals for enlarging and strengthening the new world organization and, on her part, was willing to go further than the Dumbarton Oaks plans in permitting "greater limitations of sovereignty in exchange for a better international organization." However, France was equally mindful of the fact that the maintenance of peace, during the period that would follow the war, would depend principally on the agreement among the great powers. Thus, she was prepared to abstain from proposing anything during the San Francisco Conference which might compromise such an agreement. (126)

These, along with several other political developments, were bound to influence the decisions taken at the San Francisco Conference. It is hoped that a brief survey of the developments noted above would provide a political background to evaluate and understand the precise stand taken by the participating States and particularly by the great powers on several political issues raised during the San Francisco Conference to which we would turn our attention in the next chapter.

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125. Ibid., 378.

126. Ibid., 376 - 7.

Also, even a cursory glance at the political events prior to the convening of the San Francisco Conference would indicate that the attempt to establish a world organization to maintain peace and security had to be worked out under many limitations. Certain historical facts, certain past mistakes, fear and prejudices of nations going to the San Francisco Conference were bound to influence the course of the Conference. Nevertheless, there was also a strong current of optimism among the participating States that the area of agreement at the Conference would be greater than the area of disagreement and that the unique opportunity to build a viable framework for a better and more harmonious world-order would instil in the Allies with a zeal to "fight" unitedly for achieving that goal.

**CHAPTER VI**

**THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE**

THE AMERICAN DELEGATION

The American delegation for the San Francisco Conference included Secretary Stettinius, former Secretary Hull, Senators Connally and Vandenberg, Representatives Bloom and Eaton, Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, and Harold Stassen. John Foster Dulles's appointment as a senior adviser to the delegation together with the representation of the Republicans highlighted the Roosevelt administration's well-established practice of maintaining a bi-partisan approach towards the creation of an international organization. Senator Vandenberg had appraised President Roosevelt of his general approval of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as a basis for the development of a world organization and had expressed his desire to cooperate with the administration to that end. The Senator accepted the invitation to serve as a member of the U.S. delegation after receiving an assurance from the President that he could "freely" present his views to the delegation and "reserve the right of final judgement upon the ultimate results of the Conference." (1)

On the whole, the delegation approved continued American support for the substance of the Proposals and accepted the obligations to maintain the basic system outlined in them, except where four power agreement could

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1. Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952) 149.

be obtained for significant changes. They were amenable to considering at the Conference, changes and amendments put forward by other countries provided the basic framework agreed to at Dumbarton Oaks by the major powers was retained. The delegation, however, during the course of its detailed study of the Proposals, suggested some changes to the President.

The provisions of Chapter VIII of the Proposals dealing with the peaceful settlement of disputes gave rise to lengthy discussion. The chief concern of the delegation was to see that the Council was not given authority to impose settlement terms. (2) The first paragraph of Chapter VIII - B of the Proposals dealt with the determination of threats to, or violations of, the peace. Representatives of the State Department explained to the delegation that the Council would be authorized (though not required) to recommend terms of settlement if it found that the dispute threatened the peace. (3) The members of the delegation, however, expressed their concern over this sweeping interpretation. It could, they argued, permit the Security Council to concede the territory or the political rights of a State ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining peace, but in effect, to a great power. The delegation was of the

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2. Ruth Russell, A History Of The United Nations Charter (Washington, 1958) 609.

3. Ibid., 602 - 3.

view that the opening paragraphs of Chapter VIII needed rephrasing in order to make sure that the Council could not impose settlements.

On the powers of the General Assembly, too, there was much discussion among members of the delegation. As noted earlier, Vandenberg, in his amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, had highlighted the importance of increasing the powers of the General Assembly so that, as he put it, the Assembly "qualified to be the conscience of mankind and ... should not be stilled at the behest of a few great powers." (4) There was also a great deal of criticism both inside and outside the country that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would, in fact, mean great power tyranny over the weak nations in the post-war world. The Department of State felt that the criticism largely stemmed from a misconception of the role of the General Assembly envisioned in the Proposals. The American delegation, however, made five suggestions in a memorandum prepared for the President as regards the powers and functions of the General Assembly:

1. Clarify to show that the General Assembly can at all times discuss any question bearing on the maintenance of peace and security, and that the limitation on its power to make recommendations concerning matters which are being dealt with by

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4. New York Times, 2 April, 1945.



the Security Council should be confined to specific recommendations.

2. Give the General Assembly power to determine the qualifications of membership, and to admit new members by its own action unless the Security Council interposes objections for reasons of security.

3. Apportionment by the General Assembly of expenses among the members should be on the basis of an appropriate proportion.

4. Add to recommendatory powers, so can make recommendations relative to the promotion of measures to establish justice, to foster the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to encourage the development of rules of international law.

5. Extend power to recommend measures for peaceful adjustment to include situations likely to violate the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and situations arising out of any treaties of international engagements. (5)

Among other changes suggested by the delegation, the following should be noted. The delegation sought to eliminate the provision that would have permitted the establishment of regional subcommittees of the military staff committee. Also, it proposed that

... the exclusion from the scope of the Security Council in peaceful settlement of matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state should be stated without the present qualification that those matters must be ones which 'by international law' are 'solely' within domestic jurisdiction. (6)

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5. Department of State, Postwar Preparation 1939 - 1945 (Washington, 1950) 678.

6. Ibid

The delegation also declared in the memorandum that "We will reserve our final position on all these, of course until we learn the views of other governments...."(7)

The delegation proceeded to the San Francisco Conference at a time when the nation, in general, was full of hope and confidence in the ability of the Allied nations to organize a world organization for maintaining a just and peaceful post-war world. Senator Vandenberg's diary record the feelings prevalent in the Senate just prior to his and Connally's departure for San Francisco.

As the Senator Vandenberg ended his remarks there was sudden stirring of emotions such as the staid old Chamber had seldom witnessed. On both sides of the aisle men were getting to their feet, clapping their hands in violation of the Senate rules, and, after a moment, surging across the Chamber to shake hands, to put their arms around the shoulders of the two delegates and wish them well. America was going to San Francisco — to the second great international effort to establish lasting peace in the world — in a manner far removed from the lonely pilgrimage of Woodrow Wilson to Paris hardly a generation before. (8)

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7. ibid., 677.

8. Vandenberg, n. 1, 171. It should be added that Wilson carried the hopes of mankind with him to Paris, though not those of the Senate Republicans.

UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF THE  
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Before proceeding with an analysis of the security system as established at the San Francisco Conference, it would be worthwhile to describe the underlying assumptions of the Charter of the United Nations. To begin with, it was evident to the participating States that the United Nations ought primarily to concern itself with the task of maintaining world peace and security. The report of the Chairman of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference also pointed out to this underlying necessity and went on to observe that the fundamental freedoms could be enjoyed by mankind only if international peace and security were assured. As an extension of the above assumption, nation States generally agreed that there should not only be concerted action in dealing with threats to or breaches of peace and acts of aggression but that they should also cooperate in the creation and furtherance of such political, economic and social conditions as would enhance the chances of peace the world over.

Taking note of the existing political reality, the world organization was established to facilitate the voluntary cooperative action of the member States. Nevertheless, and significantly, the member States agreed at San Francisco "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Thus, the

preeminent role of the great powers as permanent members of the Security Council in the maintenance of world peace and security was conceded to by the participating States. The small powers, in granting this special privilege to the Security Council, made certain assumptions. They assumed, and quite logically, that their assistance in enforcement actions would be required by the Security Council on condition that (a) all the major powers would be in agreement as to the advisability of the proposed enforcement action; and (b) that such action would be taken against small powers thus precluding the possibility of their action leading to a major war. (9)

9. This observation becomes significant in the light of the passage by the General Assembly of the U.N. of the Uniting for Peace resolution on 2 November, 1950 whereby the General Assembly, inter alia, resolved that "... if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security...." United Nations Bulletin (New York), 9 (15 November 1950) 508 - 9.

The Uniting for Peace resolution, in other words, reflected a basic change in the assumption of the member States than that prevailing during the establishment of the U.N. organization in 1945. Arnold Wolfers, "The Role Of The Smaller States In The Enforcement Of International Peace," Proceedings Of The Academy Of Political Science (New York), 21 (1944 - 1946) 295.

The enforcement mechanism of the new world organization also rested on the assumption of the continued possibility of big power collaboration in the post-war world for maintaining international peace and security and in their faithful observance of Charter purposes and principles while discharging their obligations. It was widely believed in the Allied countries that suffering in a common cause would unite the peace seeking nations in support of the preservation of world peace and security and, to that extent, would make enduring peace a reality for each of them.

Furthermore, it was assumed that "... after the war, each of the major nations would maintain sufficient forces of its own to make sure that, in combination with other nations desiring peace, they would be in a position to make it too risky for any recalcitrant nation to enter upon the path of aggression and violence ...." (10) It might be recalled that the Department of State planners in their "Plan For The Establishment Of An International Organization For The Maintenance Of International Peace And Security" dated 23 December, 1943 had based it on a similar assumption.

Finally, though not explicitly stated or discussed was the implied assumption which underlay much of the

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10. Leo Pasvolsky, "The United Nations in Action," Edmund J. James Lectures On Government (Urbana, 1951) 81.

planning for the establishment of a world security organization. This was the assumption, as was pointed out by Goodrich that "the world after the Second World War would be essentially a continuation of the world of the League period, a world dominated by the values, interests, and power of the West ...." (11) Although the emergence of Soviet Union as a great military power was foreseen and recognized and, to a lesser extent, the great political upheaval in Asia and Africa was taken note of, it was, nevertheless, assumed that —

... this development would be guided by the West and that it would not in the foreseeable future radically alter the balance of power and influence between the Western World and the East, between those nations heirs of Judaic - Greek - Roman culture and the world of Islam, Buddhism, and Confucianism .... (12)

11. Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (New York, 1959) 41.

12. Ibid., 42. It should, nevertheless, be emphasized that in the historical perspective, the United Nations Charter was a little more influenced by the hopes and fears, values and norms of the non-western world than the Covenant of the League of Nations. To be sure, the Covenant for all its professed world-wide applicability was basically a European creation if the United States was to be considered as an extension and development of the European civilization. At San Francisco, the representation of the European States was very meagre. H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a political institution (London, 1959) 39. William E. Rappard, "The United Nations From A European Point of View," The Yale Law Journal (New Haven), 55 (August 1946) 1036 - 48.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE  
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

To begin with, the Charter system for the pacific settlement of disputes rests on the assumption that members of the Organization voluntarily accept an obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. In order to observe the primary purpose of the United Nations "to maintain international peace and security ..." the member-states have pledged "to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment of settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." (Article 1:1). Furthermore, they undertake to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals did not require that States should settle all their disputes. Encouragement and means were nevertheless provided to that end in Paragraphs 2 and e of Chapter VIII, Section A; but the only disputes which States were obliged to settle were those whose continuance was likely to endanger the peace. Furthermore, in the Proposals, the major powers had assigned the Council primarily the role of a policeman rather than that of an

arbiter or mediator concerned with the merits of the disputes or situations. Thus, if the parties failed to reach a settlement by such means as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, they were obliged, under the Proposals, to refer the dispute to the Security Council which, however, could do no more than recommend methods or procedures of adjustment. During the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the American view was, in this field, to encourage and assist the parties to settle their disputes through their own efforts.

At the San Francisco Conference, however, the British delegation introduced two amendments in the light of decisions taken at the British Commonwealth meeting in April 1945. The first, which was readily accepted by the other Sponsoring Powers, related to allowing the Council to recommend terms of settlement when the parties in effect chose "arbitration" by it. The second amendment that the Council not only suggest procedures and methods of settlement of disputes but also recommend terms of settlement, evoked United States opposition. The United States maintained that it was undesirable for the Council to recommend that it was not empowered to enforce. Some of the members of the U.S. delegation felt that the British amendment would permit the Council to impose the terms of settlement, for, it could be argued, that a failure by a State to abide by the recommendatory terms of settlement of the Council



constituted a threat to the peace obligating the Council, thereby, to undertake enforcement action. However, the United States finally decided to support the British amendment on the understanding that there was no intention of empowering the Council to impose settlement. (13)

The United States was able to secure the support of the Soviet Union in its stand that the Council should not be precluded by virtue of its voting procedure from deciding to discuss and consider a dispute by a simple vote of any seven members of the Council. Furthermore, the United States stand was again vindicated when the Conference concurred that the rule requiring a unanimous vote of the permanent members of the Security Council, plus at least two other members, would operate in relation to any decision to make an investigation of the matter, and to subsequent decisions under this Chapter (Chapter VI) of the Charter, provided that a party to a dispute would not cast its vote.

The General Assembly was also assigned, under the Charter, a part in the peaceful adjustment of situations likely to impair the general welfare. Specifically, Article 14 empowered the Assembly, subject to the provisions of Article 12, to recommend measures "for the peaceful settlement

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13. Thus, the United States gave assurance while speaking against the Belgian amendment (Doc. 2, G/7 (K) (1) that "no compulsion or enforcement was envisaged" under section VIII-A of the Proposals. United Nations Information Organization, Documents Of The United Nations Conference On International Organization San Francisco 1945 (New York, 1945) XII, 66.

of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations ...." This article was the result of an amendment proposed by the United States along with the other Sponsoring Powers and it gave the Assembly "widest possible latitude to its initiative and statesmanship."(14)

In general, in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security, a choice had to be made by the delegates assembled at San Francisco between giving the new organization the authority to settle international disputes and to enforce its decisions, or empowering it only to promote and facilitate the settlement of international controversies and disputes by the nations themselves. The U.S. policy planners, according to Leo Pasvolksy, came to the conclusion that it was not possible to go beyond the second alternative. Thus, the representatives of United States and other countries participating in the conference formulated the charter of the United Nations in terms of vesting in the Organization authority only to promote and foster peaceful adjustment and pacific settlement of disputes, rather than of providing for enforceable settlement

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14. Department of State, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States delegation (Washington, 1945) 58. It has been observed that this article represents "a modest approach to the problem of "peaceful change" in a dynamic world ... since no recommendation made by the General Assembly has any binding force." Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations : Commentary and Documents (Boston, 1949) 178.

of such disputes. (15)

Furthermore, there was another facet to the above problem pertaining to whether or not the organization should be empowered to use armed force, not to enforce the settlement of international disputes, but to prevent the nations from using force individually as a means of international action. There was agreement between the U.S. policy makers and those of the other countries that to this extent the new international organization should be endowed with the authority and the means of keeping the peace. Such an approach was adopted on the supposition that if resort to violence could be eliminated, the process of peaceful adjustment and pacific settlement could be made operative. (16)

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE AND SECURITY

Many amendments were proposed at the San Francisco Conference with a view to enlarging the role of the General Assembly in security matters, some even to the extent of associating it with the Council in enforcement decisions. Most of the smaller States, however, were generally interested in increasing the role of the Assembly in the more peaceful aspects of maintaining international security.

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15. Pasvolsky, n. 10, 78 - 81.

16. Ibid

There were two controversial issues as regards the political authority of the Assembly in the field of maintaining international peace and security : (i) its general right to discuss freely any international problem that might impair the peaceful relations among nations; and (ii) its specific right to consider and to make recommendation on treaty revision. (17)

There were also amendments directed towards making the General Assembly participate in the enforcement measures undertaken by the Security Council. A few of them were directed towards giving the Assembly the right to review and judge Council's actions. (18)

The Sponsoring Powers, on the other hand, struck to their position that the Council should be the sole enforcing authority under the Charter. However, they accepted the Canadian amendment that States not members of the Council should participate in decisions on the use of their armed forces.

With regard to the first controversial point, there took place a great debate on the Dumbarton Oaks text which had confined the rights of the General Assembly to discussion and recommendations on matters concerning "international

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17. Russell, n. 2, 750.

18. cf. Amendments proposed by New Zealand.

peace and security." On 29 May, 1945, Committee 2 of the second commission voted by roll-call to extend the General Assembly's jurisdiction to include "any matter within the sphere of international relations," (with the exception, which was always recognized, of any matter relating to the maintenance of peace and security being dealt with actively by the Security Council). Twenty seven countries voted for the new formula which included several "little forty five" nations, eleven voted against which included all the "Big Five" and there were two abstentions. Nearly a month later, however, on the insistence of the U.S.S.R. delegation and after discussion in the Steering Committee, this matter was reconsidered by Committee 2. The Soviet Union wanted to insert (and, later on, insisted on retaining it) a clause which would grant the Assembly the right to discuss and recommend on any matter "within the sphere of international relations which affects the maintenance of international peace and security." The other sponsoring powers agreed that technically the limiting phrase ought similarly to go in this paragraph, as well as in the original Dumbarton Oaks text of V - B-1. Nevertheless, they also felt that it would be highly impolitic to reopen the issue with what would look like a great power attempt to limit the freedom of speech in the Assembly. (19) Thereupon, Australia submitted a revised draft to the disputed paragraph which read:

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19. Russell, no 2, 770 - 2.

The General Assembly shall have the right to discuss matters covered by the purposes and principles of the Charter or within the sphere of action of the United Nations or relating to the powers and functions of any of its organs or otherwise within the scope of charter; and, except as provided in paragraph 2(b) of this section (that is, except on a case actually before the Council), to make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or both on any such questions or matters. (20)

Such was the importance attached by the United States to this issue that Stettinius informed Ambassador Harriman in Moscow of the latest crisis. The Ambassador was told that all the great powers save the Soviet Union were convinced that the Conference would not return to the Dumbarton Oaks language, and that the Ambassador should therefore urge the Soviet Foreign Minister to accept the Australian phraseology. However, this crisis was at last surmounted by the Soviet acceptance of the phrase "within the scope of the Charter" -- treaty revision per se having, of course, been specifically excluded from that scope of the article. (21) The final paragraph which ultimately became article 10 of the Charter read:

The General Assembly has the right to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the Charter, and, except (as cases actually before the Security Council) to

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20. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, V, 533.

21. Russell, no 2, 772.

make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or both on any such questions or matters. (22)

On the second important issue of the General Assembly's role in treaty revision, there were many amendments before the Conference to provide the General Assembly with powers to recommend the revision of treaties. Article 14 of the Charter had provided that subject to the limitation contained in Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment or any situation regardless of origin which it considers likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations. The U.S. delegation was of the view that any explicit reference to the revision of treaties would encourage tendencies toward revisionism much beyond the limits warranted by particular situations. Consideration was given to the fact that it would be extremely difficult to establish an international organization without sufficiently taking into account the important role which treaties play, to wit, as the "principal instruments through which international integrity functions." (23) The U.S. delegation, nevertheless recognized that there might arise situations

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22. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, IX, 234-5. Interestingly enough, this solution follows closely the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which stipulates that the Assembly may deal with "... any matters within the sphere of action of the League ...." Article III : 3.

23. Department of State, n. 14, 58 - 9.

under existing treaties which impair the general welfare or tend to jeopardise friendly relations among nations or to conflict with the purposes and principles of the Charter. In that case, "such situations shall be open to discussion or recommendations by the General Assembly." The U.S. delegation, therefore, took the stand that the General Assembly should not interest itself in treaty revision as such but rather in the "conditions and relations among nations which may impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations ...." (24)

To conclude, then, one could notice that there was a change in the emphasis of powers of the General Assembly from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to the San Francisco Conference. At the San Francisco Conference, the powers of the General Assembly were redefined in such language as to open the possibility of the role of the General Assembly in maintaining international peace and security in case the Security Council was unable to take a decision. The United States, in contradistinction to the Soviet view point, seemed to be more amenable to the position of small nations in the world organization. The American position might have been largely influenced by the growing tension and discord between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Throughout their wartime alliance and especially in the years 1944 and 1945, many American politicians were

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24. Ibid



not taking for granted the continued friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union. (25)

Indeed, President Truman, before the San Francisco Conference convened, decided to adopt a "firm" policy towards the Soviet Union. (26) Therefore, it is conceivable that one of the reasons for the United States support for the shift in emphasis of the powers of General Assembly might have been due to the developing distrust between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and the realization by the U.S.A. that the Security Council could not be expected to function in a smooth way. Later writings of John Foster Dulles also testify to the above observation. Writing about the San Francisco Conference, he commented:

Already, the United States Delegation saw that it was unlikely that the United Nations could be a means for "enforcing peace" by using the military and economic might of the great powers to impose policies upon which they agreed. We saw that the only kind of power that could be counted on at this stage of world development was moral power and the power of world opinion. That is why we attached the utmost importance to provisions for insuring

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25. In particular, the records of following leaders might be cited with reference to the above observation — James Byrnes, James Forrestal, Senator Vandenberg, John Foster Dulles and President Truman.

26.

Also, at the same time, recorded President Truman, Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union felt that "we (U.S.) were faced with "a barbarian invasion of Europe." He was convinced that Soviet control over any foreign country meant not only that their influence would be paramount in that country's foreign relations but also that the Soviet system with its secret police and its extinction of freedom of speech would prevail ...." Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (London, 1955) 73-4.

freedom of discussion in the General Assembly and at the Security Council. We wanted the United Nations to become, in Senator Vandenberg's words, the "Town Meeting of the World." We knew that, as such, it could exert an influence for peace. That was the possibility which, above all, we sought to develop in San Francisco, and which we did develop. (27)

THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY

The participating States at the Conference readily accepted the premise of the "Big Five" that power should be commensurate with responsibilities and, therefore, the leading role of the Security Council for maintaining world peace and security was acceptable to them. Thus, the right of the Council to decide enforcement action and the concomitant obligation of member States to accept Council's decisions and to supply it with armed forces and facilities, the establishment of a Military Staff Committee, the provision for the future system of the regulation of armaments — all of these were accepted by the Conference.

The "little forty five," or the smaller States, however, were equally conscious of their numerical strength in the Conference and wanted to devise ways and means by which their weight could also be felt in the cause of peace and security. There were two major attempts made to limit the authority of the Council. By the first, some States (principally from Latin America) sought to remove regional

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27. John Foster Dulles, War Or Peace (New York, 1955) 38.

and other special security arrangements from its control and, by the second, the right of permanent members to veto pacific settlement of disputes in which they were not involved was sought to be limited. (28) These two issues have been discussed at length separately. Furthermore, attempts were also made to obliterate the basic difference in the powers and functions of the General Assembly and Security Council. Since this touched the core of the security plan, the major powers were all agreed to resist any attempts to alter the essential feature of the Charter — the primary role of the Council in maintaining international peace and security. Finally, since the Council was to have a great amount of flexibility in the exercise of its powers in this field, the small States were keen to define the purposes and principles of the organization in such a manner as to ensure that the Council would not act arbitrarily. The Egyptian representative therefore suggested an amendment to article 1 of Chapter I of the Proposals. It proposed a clause to read that the purposes of the organization are:

To maintain international peace and security, in conformity with the principles of justice and international law; and to that end to take effective

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28. Australia and New Zealand took the lead in the second move to exclude the veto from decisions relating to peaceful settlement by regarding them as procedural.

collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which may lead to a breach of the peace. (29)

The American delegate, Harold Stassen, opposed the amendment. Stassen viewed the functions of the Security Council as falling under two broad heads in the matter of the future peace of the world. One being that of a policeman to check aggression and also to check nations from preparing to commit aggression. On this score, argued the American delegate, if the Egyptian amendment were to be accepted, then the Council would have to say to the disputing parties: "Stop fighting unless you claim international law is on your side." This would provide a loophole for questioning any specific action of the Organization. (30) However, when the Council was required to perform the functions of a jury — the second broad category according to Stassen — then that function must be done in conformity with justice and international law. (31) Thus, the United

29. Department of State, The United Nations Conference on International Organization : Selected Documents (Washington, 1946) 534.

30. Ibid., 540.

31. ibid., 541. At the San Francisco Conference, in accordance with the agreement reached at Dumbarton Oaks, the Big powers officially adopted the Chinese amendment to add that peace settlement of disputes must be brought

... (continued on page 399 )

States and other great powers did not want that the primary function of the organization should be bogged down by precise and intricate codes of procedures. They preferred to lay down general purposes and principles under which they were to act leaving ample scope for flexibility and adaptability to meet new and unforeseen threats to the peace, breach of peace or acts of aggression.

Canada, voicing the sentiments of the "middle powers," wanted greater recognition of their role by the organization in comparison with that of smaller powers. It submitted a new paragraph for Chapter VIII specifically providing for ad hoc participation by any State not on the Council when the use of its military force was under consideration. It read:

Any member of the United Nations not represented on the Security Council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Security Council which is discussing ...

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about "with due regard for principles of justice and international law." The Rapporteur of Committee I/1 noted that "The situation that may arise may be conceived in this way. Peace is threatened by disputes or by situations that may lead to a breach of the peace. A breach of the peace may ensue. At the first stage, the Organization should insist and take measures that states do not threaten or cause a breach of the peace. If they do, the Organization should, at the second stage promptly stop any breach of the peace or remove it. After that, it can proceed to find an adjustment or settlement of that dispute or situation. When the Organization has used the power given to it, and the force at its disposal to stop war, then it can find the latitude to apply the principles of justice and international law, or can assist the contending parties to find a peaceful solution." ibid., 534.

the use of the forces which it has undertaken to make available to the Security Council in accordance with the special agreement or agreements provided for ... above. (32)

The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union opposed such an extension of privileges to the non-member States, arguing that the interest of such States were adequately safeguarded under Chapter VI of the Proposals. There was, however, considerable support for the Canadian suggestion and hence the amendment was referred to a sub-committee. It prepared the following draft for the consideration of the big powers (deletions crossed out, additions underlined) on condition that Canada withdraws its amendment on ad hoc membership.

When a decision to use force has been taken by the Security Council, it shall, before calling upon any Member not represented on it to supply armed forces in fulfillment of its obligations under the preceding paragraph, invite such Member, if it so requests, to send a representative to sit as a member participate in the decisions of the Security Council when that body is considering the question of the supply of concerning the employment of contingents of its armed forces by such Members. (33)

The purport of the above draft was finally incorporated in Article 44 of the Charter. The essential thing to note here is that the membership of the Security Council remained unchanged for all decisions leading up

32. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, III, 591.

33. Quoted in Russell, n. 2, 654.

to and including the decisions to impose military sanctions.

To conclude then, at San Francisco, the Security Council was assigned two-fold responsibility — to induce, in every conceivable method, peaceful solutions of international disagreements and, to use force, if necessary, in order to maintain peace or to suppress any breach of the peace. Even as in Dumbarton Oaks it was taken for granted at San Francisco that world security could be ensured only by the continuing cooperation of the war-time Allies. United States' policy makers were also convinced that they could not base their national policy solely on independent action. In order to support effectively American interests in Europe and Asia, recourse had to be taken to consultations through which the U.S. could extend the area of agreement among the great powers. The report of the American Secretary of State on the San Francisco Conference unequivocally declared that "only by such discussions will our influence be felt." (34)

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34. Department of State, n. 10, 68. Similar sentiments were voiced by Clement Attlee during the course of his speech in the House of Commons. He said that the British delegation to the San Francisco Conference sought successfully to make the Security Council a place "... where the policies of the States, and especially the greater States, could be discussed and reconsidered for the time, especially when they showed signs of such divergencies as to threaten the harmony of international relations. Collective security is not merely a promise to act when an emergency occurs, but it is active co-operation to prevent emergencies occurring ... What, I think, is required is a continuous discussion of international affairs, not spasmodic

... (continued on page 402 )

THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE  
TO THE YALTA VOTING FORMULA

The United States had to operate on two fronts on the question of the Yalta voting formula at the San Francisco Conference. On the one hand, it had to join the other great powers in a great debate with the majority of small States over this issue. The small States wanted to obtain a relaxation of the requirement for great power unanimity in Council decisions on pacific settlement. Furthermore, they also drew a detailed questionnaire and addressed it to the Big Powers for their definite views on each of the suggested contingencies that might arise in future. The United States joined with other Sponsoring Powers in preparing their interpretation of the Yalta voting formula and in making it clear to the small powers that unless they accepted it, the very existence of the projected world organization might be jeopardized. (35)

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action at times of crisis." UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 413 (1945) col. 665.

35. The key clauses in the statement of the Sponsoring Powers were those which affirmed, "No individual member of the Council can alone prevent consideration and discussion by the Council of a dispute or situation brought to its attention ... Nor can parties to such dispute be prevented by these means from being heard by the Council ... Beyond this point, decisions and actions by the Security Council may well have major political consequences and may even initiate a chain of events which might, in the end, require the Council under its responsibilities to involve measures of enforcement ... This chain of events begins when the Council decides to make an investigation, or determines that the time has come to call upon states to

... (continued to page 403 )



On another plan, yet, the United States had to take a strong stand against a great power— the Soviet Union — in maintaining the position that the veto should not be applicable to initial discussion in the Council. There was full agreement among the Sponsoring Powers that the rule of unanimity of the permanent members should apply to decisions of the Security Council during the stage of peaceful settlement as well as during enforcement. The Soviet Union maintained, in contradistinction to the viewpoint of other Sponsoring Powers, that any one permanent member, not a party to a given dispute, could prevent the consideration and discussion of such dispute by the Council. It took the position that the discussion and consideration of a dispute should be considered as substantive, rather than procedural matter and hence falling within the purview of the great power unanimity rule. As regards the U.S. position on this issue, it should be mentioned that the Department of State had even before the convening of the San Francisco Conference issued an official statement interpreting the Yalta voting formula in the sense that no member could prevent such discussion in the Council. (36) Indeed,

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settle their differences, or make recommendations to the parties. It is to such decisions and actions that unanimity of the permanent members applies, with the important proviso, referred to above, for abstention from voting by parties to a dispute."

36. Statement by the Acting Secretary of State (Grew), 24 March, 1945.

the United States felt so strongly about it that Harry Hopkins, who was sent to Moscow to solve the deadlock, was authorized to tell Stalin that if he did not yield on this point, Stettinius would recommend the dissolution of the Conference. (37) Upon Stalin's intervention, the Soviet delegation finally accepted the U.S. stand.

At the time of the San Francisco Conference and later on, there has been much criticism of the Security Council's voting procedure on the ground that under such a system any one of the major powers would be in a position, not only to stop action against itself, but, to stop any collective action. (38) The United States, mindful of the limitations of such a voting procedure, nevertheless, supported it on the premise that if one of the major nations were to disregard the Charter provisions and endanger world peace and security, a situation would be created in which that power might have to be coerced. Obviously, such a

37. Robert E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (London, 1949) II, 900. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians (New York, 1949) 320 - 1.

38. Some of these critics perhaps ignored that there could, in fact, be two types of veto. The one, already discussed, belonged to the great powers. In the other type, the veto power could as well be exercised by the small powers elected to the Security Council, since non-procedural decisions of the Council require seven votes, two of which, obviously, must be cast by non-permanent members. The non-permanent members of the Security Council were to be six in number. Accordingly, if as many as five of these vote "no" on a non-procedural decision, they could exercise a veto as effective as a veto cast by a permanent member.

course of action could only be undertaken by the combined forces of the other major powers which would, in turn, amount to a world war. It was clearly understood that a decision to embark upon such a war would necessarily have to be made by each of the major powers for itself and not by any international organization. (39)

Furthermore, while discussing the post-war criticism of the veto concept embodied in the Charter, another factor should be emphasized in order to put this controversy in a proper perspective. The legal power given to the great powers to veto any substantive decision of the United Nations in the security field was primarily an institutional recognition of the underlying reality of the post-war power situation. The super-powers like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were and are possessed of a veto power which arises essentially from their status in the power equation of the world and which would remain with them even if the world organization did not contain any specific clause conferring on them this privileged position. In a world governed by the principles of national sovereignty and independence, the United Nations could not embody all the provisions of the collective security principle. In a

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39. Pasvolsky, n. 10, 78 - 81. The speech of Prime Minister Fraser, Chairman of New Zealand's delegation to the San Francisco Conference at the fifth meeting of Commission III, 20 June, 1945 tends to confirm the above observation. Department of State, n. 29, 817.

true system of collective security all powers — great or small could be equally coerced by the overwhelming force at the disposal of the world body. Such a condition could not have been possibly created at the time of the establishment of the United Nations and hence the veto provision of the Charter was perhaps the only practical solution under the given circumstances.

Finally, it should be mentioned that at the San Francisco Conference, the veto concept was conceived in positive terms — an outgrowth of the belief and determination of the great powers that they could act in unison even on vital matters pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security in the post-war world. That their belief was to prove wrong in the subsequent years does not detract from the usefulness of this mechanism for the smooth functioning of the United Nations if the assumptions on which the world organization was based remain valid today.

OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO  
AMENDMENTS SUGGESTING DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION

Various amendments and proposals were submitted to the Conference with a view to determining the existence of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and the consequent application of automatic sanctions by the Council. All the permanent members of the Council with the exception of China spoke against the

principle involved. They pointed out that it would be impossible to enumerate all the acts that amounted to aggression. Furthermore, the tendency, in the case of an incomplete list, would be to exclude the omitted acts from consideration by the Council. Besides, any attempt to make the Council action automatic would be dangerous for it might force premature application of sanctions. The safest course, therefore, would be, argued the major powers, to give the Council the discretion to decide when an act of aggression had been performed. (40) The Committee on enforcement arrangements also decided to adhere to the text drawn up at the Dumbarton Oaks and left with the Council "The entire decision as to what constitutes a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression." (41)

The United States also opposed an amendment offered by New Zealand to paragraph 4 of Chapter II in the Committee deliberating on the preamble, purposes and principles of the Charter (Commission I, Committee 1). The Committee had unanimously adopted, the delegate of Norway abstaining, paragraph 4 to read as follows:

All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

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40. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, 342.

41. Report of Paul-Boncour, Rapporteur, On Chapter VIII, Section B. Ibid., 505.

independence of any member or state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.

The amendment suggested by New Zealand was that "All members of the Organization undertake collectively to resist every act of aggression against any member." The United States while opposing the amendment, nevertheless, agreed that it was necessary to arrive at agreement on the minimum obligations that members could accept and for this reason it felt that paragraph 4, as adopted, as adequate. It seemed undesirable, the U.S. delegate pointed out, to include too narrow a concept of aggression in the Charter. He pointed out that in the future there would be many kinds of aggression and that these would be covered in the Charter by the words: "threats to the peace." Finally, he noted that the Chapter on Regional Arrangements provided for regional handling of disputes. If the proposed amendments were adopted it could mean the use of European forces in the Western Hemisphere and the forces from the Americas in many parts of the world, which would not be acceptable to many nations. (42)

Likewise, the proposal (to be added to the New Zealand amendment) by the delegate from Panama "... and to preserve against aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all Members" was opposed by the U.S. delegate. One, that the essential principle was already in paragraph 4, and, second, that the form in which

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42. Ibid., VI, 344.

the amendment was stated was reminiscent of certain features of the Covenant which had made the document unacceptable to the United States. (43)

#### THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

The provisions on pacific settlement, peace enforcement, and the regulation of armaments formed the core of the Charter security system. Of this, the future regulation of armaments received scant attention at San Francisco. This was not surprising then, in view of the fact that nothing specific could be done about the matter before the war was over, and, that the general provisions in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals seemed to provide the necessary machinery for later handling of the problem. In the second place, the fact that under the Charter the matter of arms reduction was intimately related to the system of general security further complicated the problem.

However, the Charter provided for the General Assembly to "consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments ...." (Article 11) The Security Council was made responsible under article 26 for formulating "plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the

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43. Ibid., 346.

regulation of armaments." Significantly, in recommending the ratification of the Charter, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pointed out that the Security Council could submit "only recommendations to the governments — and every country, including our own, will be free to accept or reject them according to its conception of its national interest." (44) It should also be noted that except for the reference in Article 26, referred to above, to the relationship between armaments and resources available for human and economic needs, the Charter did not mention disarmament as a desirable goal.

The question has been raised whether such a situation could be attributed to the fact that the delegates were not aware of the atom bomb and its horrifying power of mass destruction. Writing several years later John Foster Dulles expounded such an interpretation and asserted that if the delegates had any idea of the implications of atomic fission "... the provisions of the charter dealing with disarmament and the regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic." (45) It is difficult, however, to agree with the underlying assumption

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44. US Senate, 79 Cong., 2 Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Report, The Charter of the United Nations (Washington, 1945) 11.

45. John Foster Dulles, "U.S. Constitution and U.N. Charter: An Appraisal," Department of State Bulletin, 29 (7 September 1953) 310.



contained in Dulles' statement. The American planners would, in all probability, not have been willing to run the risk of submitting the Charter for the Senate ratification requiring the United States to relinquish to an international organization the decision on what was to be done with the atomic bomb. (46) Furthermore, the complexity of adequate international control and inspection was anticipated by the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, as early as 25 April, 1945. He observed, in part, in his diary:

No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated. (47)

The successful explosion of the bomb a few months later clearly brought to the fore these considerations without, however, changing them. One might, therefore, agree with Russell that to assume that those problems would have been overcome by somewhat different provisions in the Charter simply had the delegates known about the atomic menace, would be to over-simplify a complex situation, as

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46. Russell, n. 2, 686.

47. Henry Lewis Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947) 638.

later events were to prove. (48)

U.S. POSITION WITH REGARD TO MEASURES  
FOR ENSURING PEACEFUL BEHAVIOUR FROM  
"ENEMY STATES" AND INTERIM CONTROL  
OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT

The sixth principle of the Charter stated that the organization should ensure that non-member States act in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter in so far as might be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. The report submitted to the U.S. President on the results of the San Francisco Conference pointed out that the predominant sentiment at the Conference was that unless the United Nations undertook this responsibility with regard to non-member States, the whole security structure of the Charter would be "seriously jeopardized." (49) The delegates had not forgotten the fact that Germany and Japan, ex-members of the League, had systematically menaced the peace to the extent of precipitating another world war.

The problem of ensuring control over the possible revival of militarism in the enemy States was of crucial importance to the United Nations. Many States in Europe had concluded special bilateral mutual assistance pacts to this end. Therefore, the problem of integrating the special

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48. Russell, n. 2, 687.

49. Department of State, n. 14, 42.

mutual assistance treaties within the framework of the Charter was one of particular significance. The Four Sponsoring Powers and France introduced an amendment which was approved by the Conference to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Article 53 of the Charter was the outcome of this amendment. Under that article, an exception was made to the general rule that no enforcement action could be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. In case of measures directed against an enemy State (any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter) pursuant to Article 107 of the Charter, or in the operation of regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such State, the authorization by the United Nations was not called for until such time as the organization might, on the request of the governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a State. Article 107 specifically stated that nothing in the present Charter would invalidate or debar action against enemy States taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action. The U.S. agreed to the exemption of measures taken under these mutual assistance treaties from the general rule because "... this was in accord with United States policy toward the enemy

state." (50)

There was also recognition of the fact that interim enforcement of security throughout the world would have to be provided for since it was known that the Security Council would not be in a position to function effectively immediately after the coming into being of the United Nations. Chapter twelve of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals was devised to meet such a situation. It included the clause of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 binding the signatories to "consult with one another and as occasion arises with other members of the organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization" as might be necessary to maintain international peace and security. Furthermore, it specified that no Charter provision "should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war" by the governments responsible for such action.

The other participating States although generally accepting the principle underlying these provisions nevertheless expressed great dissatisfaction with the language of the clause in question which, they felt, was susceptible to various interpretations. In the opinion of the Mexican

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50. Ibid., 106. It was also pointed out that "The four powers which signed the Moscow Declaration never intended that the world organization to be created should be charged with control over the defeated enemy, at least for a considerable time." ibid., 163.

delegate, "the substance of Chapter XII, the liquidation of the war and joint interim action, had no place in a Charter which was to establish a new Organization." (51) The Canadian delegate pointing to the phrase "joint action on behalf of the Organization" stated that it covered a wide range of action and posed the following questions in order to clarify paragraph 1 of the Chapter dealing with transitional arrangements:

a) Would the Security Council during this period be responsible for the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VIII, Section A?

b) Does paragraph 1 mean that all the special agreements would have to come into force before the Security Council took full responsibility?

c) What would be the role of the Security Council during the period between the establishment of the Organization and the coming into force of the special agreements?

d) Is it appropriate to mention the Moscow Declaration in the Charter?

e) Should this paragraph be included in a separate protocol rather than in the permanent Charter? (52)

In respect to the second paragraph of Chapter XII, he observed that the language was so broad as to enable any action relating to the surrender terms and the peace treaties to be removed from the scope of the organization for an indefinite period.

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51. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, 401.

52. Ibid., 402.

In response to the Canadian questions, the U.S. delegate stated that the "Pending" phrase in paragraph 1, presupposed the coming into force of the Council and Organization. He admitted, however, that the language of paragraph 1 might need some clarification although it appeared to him clear and unmistakable. The American delegate specifically offered the following answers to the above questions:

a) The Council would of course be responsible during the interim period for the pacific settlement of disputes. This responsibility in no way hinged upon the Council's ability to take military action.

b) It was not necessary for all the special agreements to come into force before the Council took full responsibility. Some of these agreements might never come into force.

c) The role of the Council during the interim period would include all its functions listed in the Charter in so far as the Council could perform those functions. Use would be made of forces supplied under special agreement only in so far as they were made available.

d) There was no objection to a reference to the Moscow Declaration. The point of paragraph 1 was that the Four Powers should consult in order that there should be no recurrence of military aggression by present enemies.

e) There was no occasion to encumber the Charter with a separate Protocol to Chapter XII.

f) In respect to the temporary responsibility of the Four Powers for enforcement action, he explained that pending the availability of forces at the disposal of the Organization, the Four Powers themselves

would have to furnish the forces needed to take action. (53)

Also, in respect to paragraph 2 of Chapter XII, the U.S. delegate felt that the organization had no responsibility in respect to surrender terms or peace settlements, and that no steps should be taken in the Charter to hinder action against the enemy on the part of the victors in this war. (54)

The Greek delegation proposed in the committee an amendment which would prevent the enemy States from having recourse to the Security Council or the Assembly. Although the delegates who took the floor expressed their agreement on the principle of the proposal, the committee rejected, by a vote of 17 - 5, the insertion of the Greek amendment into the Charter. However, at the instance of the United States delegate, the committee voted unanimously to insert the following text into the report: "It is understood that the enemy states in this war shall not have the right of recourse to the Security Council or the General Assembly before the Security Council grants them this right." (55)

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53. Ibid., 403.

54. Ibid

55. Report of Rapporteur of Committee III/3 to Commission III On Chapter XII. ibid., 559 - 60.

THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
IN A GENERAL WORLD SECURITY SYSTEM

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals while giving the proposed world organization genuine and overall authority to deal with the problems connected with the maintenance of international peace and security also recognized the value of regional arrangements in this field. Thus, behind Chapter VIII, Section C of the proposals, lay the principle that regional instrumentalities which promote peace and security, if properly integrated within the general framework, would also serve to strengthen the organization and further its purposes. (56) It was also stipulated that the Security Council could utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action, provided that such enforcement action should be undertaken only when authorized by the Council and that the latter should be kept fully informed of all action taken or contemplated under regional arrangements or by regional agencies. The supremacy of the world organization was maintained at Dumbarton Oaks while allowing sufficient flexibility for the Council to authorize regional agencies to undertake enforcement action. It also meant that such regional arrangements would not be able to pursue independent ends outside the general and overriding authority of the Council in the realm of international peace and security.

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56. Department of State, n. 14, 102.



At San Francisco, several amendments were presented by the participating States on the regional provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Thus, the States belonging to the inter-American system, mindful of the resolutions passed at the Mexico City Conference in 1945, wished to enhance the general autonomy of regional organizations, and, particularly, to eliminate the requirement of prior authorization by the Security Council before the regional agencies could take enforcement action. An Egyptian proposal, voicing the general desire of the members of the League of Arab States for a separate chapter to deal with arrangements of a permanent character contemplating international cooperation on a comprehensive basis among States of a region, was also in line with the Latin American thinking. Similarly, Australia proposed an amendment whereby the parties to regional arrangements would be authorized to take measures for their peace and security if the Security Council failed to act and did not authorize regional enforcement action.

Another set of amendments was concerned with the specific problem of pacts of mutual assistance like the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 26 May, 1942 and similar treaties and of their integration within the framework of the world organization. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, taking cognizance of the Soviet and European countries' anxiety to ensure that the victors would have full freedom of action against

any renewed aggression, particularly by Germany; provided in Chapter XII that nothing in the Charter would preclude such action against the enemy States. The relationship of Chapter XII and regional provisions was not clear to many States and amendments were hence proposed by the Soviet Union, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey for adequate safeguard for the right of immediate action, without prior approval by the Council against aggression by Germany.

#### AMERICAN RECONSIDERATION OF REGIONALISM

As noted earlier, at Yalta the United States had agreed to the proposition when read in conjunction with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, that no peace enforcement action could be taken under regional agreements without a vote of the Security Council in which all five of the permanent members concurred. Apprehension was growing strong in the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference that the hopes and promises of the Act of Chapultepec would be nullified by subjecting American regional action to possible Soviet veto. Dulles has recorded that on 5 May, 1945, Senator Vandenberg on being appraised of this feeling by Nelson Rockefeller "dictated a letter to Secretary Stettinius, urging most strongly that a way be found to permit an American regional association to act

free of Russian veto." (57) During the Conference itself the U.S. delegation was greatly divided over the issue of "regionalism." The Sponsors had jointly presented to the Conference the following amendment keeping in view the French and Soviet apprehensions about the possibility of the renewal of German militarism:

... no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against enemy states in this war provided for pursuant to Chapter XII, paragraph 2, or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of such states, until such time as the Organization may, by consent of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by a state now at war with the United Nations. (58)

Some prominent members of the U.S. delegation felt that the Soviet Union under the cover of the above amendment (which substantially became part of Article 53 of the Charter) could act, irrespective of Security Council

57. Dulles, n. 27, 90.

58. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, III, 688. The U.S. delegate in support of the above text stated that "... This exception was based upon the conviction that existing instruments for the permanent and effective demilitarization and control of the enemy states should be utilized to the fullest extent, until such time as it should prove mutually agreeable, both to the Organization and to the Governments concerned, that the Organization should take over the responsibility. The failure to establish any permanent control over the ex-enemy state was one of the tragedies following the first World War. It was essential not to repeat this error ...." He made it clear that the

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approval, to negotiate non-aggression pacts with other European nations such as Poland and Yugoslavia. Under those circumstances, the United States would not have any veto power over Soviet action in what the delegation considered a zone of special Soviet concern. (59) Senator Vandenberg, at first, suggested to the other members of the delegation additional language to the above amendment:

... and with the exception of measures which may be taken under ... the Act of Chapultepec of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of Peace and War, signed at Mexico City on 8 March, 1945, until such time as the Organization may, by consent of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, be charged with this function ...." (60)

When the amendment was circulated among the U.S. delegates, 'Hell' broke loose, the Senator subsequently recalled. (61) Those who disagreed with him felt that the U.S. ought not to carve out any further exceptions to the rule of the Security Council. They felt that if the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta proposals were further opened up to

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paragraph under consideration related solely to the problem of the permanent control of enemy States. Ibid., XI, 702.

59. Dulles, n. 27, 90.

60. Vandenberg, n. 1, 187 - 8.

61. Ibid

permit independent, regional enforcement action, then the world organization would never come into effective being and that the world would be divided into spheres of influence of large States surrounded by groups of smaller States. The view was even expressed that "these regional groups would take on the character of armed camps, and the possibility of a universal order would vanish." (62) The matter was further complicated by the fact, recorded by Vandenberg that

... not only are the South Americans hot about protecting Chapultepec but the Australians are equally anxious not to be left unprotected in their far corner of the earth. They want liberty of regional action if some one of the Big Powers vetoes Organization action on the Council. Other potential regional groups are forming and they could be highly dangerous -- particularly the Arabian bloc in its impact on Palestine. Our great problem is to find a rule which protects legitimate existing regional groups (like Pan-Am) without opening up the opportunity for regional balance-of-power groups. (63)

The differences within the U.S. delegation were such that Stettinius thought it necessary to refer the matter to President Truman along with a memorandum listing the pros and cons of the issue. The President's response was to instruct the delegation to try to work out a formula "which would permit of an Inter-American system that could

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62. Dulles, n. 27, 90 - 1.

63. Vandenberg, n. 1, 190.

act for peace free of Security Council veto." (64)

In the discussions with the Latin American delegates, the United States agreed to some of their proposals. Thus, it was recognized that the Charter reference to "encouraging" pacific settlement through regional arrangements (in Section VIII-C) should be strengthened, and that the United States should guarantee the continued validity of the Act of Chapultepec. Also, after discussing with the other major powers this whole complex issue of regionalism and the U.S. ideas on it, the Secretary of State, Stettinius made a statement to the press announcing that "proposals will be made to clarify in the Charter the relationship of regional agencies and collective arrangements to the world organization." (65) These proposals would, the statement continued,

i) Recognize the paramount authority of the world Organization in all enforcement action.

ii) Recognize that the inherent right of self-defense, either individual or collective, remains unimpaired in case the Security Council does not maintain international peace and security and an armed attack against a member state occurs. Any measures of self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect the authority and responsibility of the Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or

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64. Dulles, n. 27, 91.

65. Department of State Bulletin, 12 (20 May, 1945) 930.

restore international peace and security.

iii) Make more clear that regional agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means. (66)

The proposals on the above lines indicated, would, the statement declared "make possible a useful and effective integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world system of international security." (67) The United States also announced that after the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference, it would invite other American States to negotiate a treaty as provided for in the Act of Chapultepec.

With the five power agreement, the following paragraph was submitted to the technical committee which eventually became, with minor changes, article 51 of the Charter:

Nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member state, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action

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66. Ibid

67. ibid

as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. (68)

The delegate of Columbia made a statement on the implications of the adoption of the above article to the Inter-American system. He noted that the Latin American countries understood that the origin of the term "collective self-defense" was identified with the necessity of preserving regional systems like the Inter-American one. He put on record that "the approval of this article implies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in contravention of the Charter." (69) The delegates of Mexico, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Honduras, and Cuba associated themselves with his observations.

68. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, 680. An important change to note is the replacement of "in the event of the Security Council failing to take necessary steps to maintain ... security" found in an earlier text submitted to the Big Five with "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary ..." Russell has observed: "A narrow interpretation of the first phrasing could have held it to mean that self-defense measures could not properly be resorted to until the Council had considered acting to repel the armed attack in question and had failed — because of either a major-power veto or lack of the necessary majority for a decision — to agree on any action. In effect, however, the intention of the negotiators was to recognize that, as Stettinius declared in another public statement, the inherent right of self-defense would remain unimpaired if the Council "does not maintain peace and security and an armed attack occurs." U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 12 (27 May, 1945) 949. The fact of attack, in other words, would show that the Council had already "failed" ...." Russell, n. 2, 703.

69. United Nations Information Organizations, n. 13, 680 - 1.



To conclude, then, the San Francisco text dealing with regional arrangements made a clear distinction between the prevention and the repression of aggression. So far as prevention of aggression was concerned, the Charter vested in the Security Council the task of making the necessary provisions and taking whatever measures were necessary to that end. It rendered obligatory the authorization of the Council for the measures which the States concerned would take, with an exception in the case of the application of treaties for the prevention of fresh aggression by the then enemy States. Furthermore, the validity of mutual-protection pacts to prevent a resurgence of Axis aggression was recognized pending the time when the signatories thought that the Security Council was in a position to take over the task. As far as the repression of aggression was concerned, the Charter recognized the inherent right of self-defense, whether individual or collective, which permitted any sovereign State or any regional group of States to ward off armed attack pending adequate action by the parent body. (70) In this way, at San Francisco, the total subordination of the regional organization to the Security Council expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks text that "No enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council" (Chapter VIII, C,2) was modified by the new provisions of the Charter.

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70. Speech by Paul-Boncour of France. Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission III. Department of State, n. 29, 789.

AMERICAN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
AND SUPPORT AT THE  
SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

The convening of the San Francisco Conference to create a Charter for the establishment of an international organization to maintain world peace evoked great enthusiasm in the American public scene. (71) There were already hundreds of public associations which were in existence studying specifically the problems of the post-war world and also mobilizing public support for wholehearted American participation in world affairs. Also, they were, by and large, keenly desirous of seeing the Conference succeed and, if possible, place the results of their studies and deliberations for the benefit of the U.S. delegation. The Department of State, too, wanted that at least the more important among these organizations should be represented as Consultants to the U.S. delegation thus setting a new pattern, though in a limited way, of direct participation by the people in the universal struggle for peace.

Forty-two national organizations were invited to send representatives to the San Francisco Conference to serve as Consultants to the United States delegation.

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71. As could be discerned from the study of the various public opinion polls taken at the time of the San Francisco Conference, an overwhelming majority of the population approved the minimum commitment of joining the proposed organization. See Appendix.

They included leading national organizations in the fields of labour, law, agriculture, business, and education together with principal women's associations, church groups, veterans' associations and civic organizations generally. The purpose of inviting these Consultants was to keep them informed of the work of the Conference and of the United States delegation and to secure their opinions and advice. (72)

The points of view which the Consultants expressed covered a wide area of Charter provisions — human rights, disarmament, non-self-governing territories and trusteeships, economic cooperation, education, the specialized agencies, interim secretariat, arrangements for permanent consultation. On the question of human rights and fundamental freedoms various agencies and individuals in the U.S. had engaged in extensive preliminary work with the hope that the Charter of the proposed international organization might contain adequate provisions for the protection of human rights. The efforts which had been made between the Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conferences were carried forward during the earlier part of the U.N. Conference and by many it was thought that the case had been presented with sufficient urgency. This, however, proved not to be true. Thereupon, the Consultants met and sent a letter dated 2 May, 1945 to the Secretary of State

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72. Department of State, n. 14, 27 - 8.

earnestly urging upon the delegation that it sponsor the following amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals:

1. New purpose to be added to Chapter 1 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals: "To promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

2. All members of the Organization, accepting as a matter of international concern the obligation "to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands, shall progressively secure for their inhabitants without discrimination such fundamental rights as freedom of religion, speech, assembly and communication, and to a fair trial under just laws."

3. Addition to Chapter V, Section B, 6, after "economic and social fields" : "of developing and safeguarding human rights and fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms."

4. Addition to Chapter IX, Section D, 1, after "social commission" : "a human rights commission." (73)

The signatories in pointing out the principles involved opined that "the ultimate inclusion of the equivalent of an International Bill of Rights in the functioning of the organization is deemed of the essence of what is necessary to preserve the peace of the world." Furthermore, they contended that

... the dignity and inviolability of the individual must be the corner stone of civilization. The assurance to every human being of the fundamental

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73. Quoted in the remarks by O. Frederick Nolde at the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of Consultants to the United States delegation in San Francisco 1945, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, press release, 20 June, 1955.

rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is essential not only to domestic but also to international peace .... (74)

The U.S. delegation tried to obtain acceptance of the point of view urged by the Consultants. The extent of success attained in the pursuit of this objective is shown by the fact that the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all had been added to the major purposes of the U.N., and that that objective had been appropriately assigned to various organs. The Economic and Social Council was required to set up among various commissions a Commission on Human Rights.

Under the leadership of Professor James Shotwell, proposals were devised whereby the U.N. Charter would authorize arrangements for permanent consultation, particularly between the Economic and Social Council and major non-governmental organizations, national and international, which are concerned with matters within the competence of the Council. Article 71 of the Charter was the answer of the conference to this proposal. It read:

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Members of the United Nations concerned.

### CONCLUSIONS

In spite of the stresses and strains to which the San Francisco conference was subjected, there was ground for optimism since the two super powers — the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. were taking part in it, unlike the Geneva experiment when both were out of it. Thus, for the first time in the history of the whole State system an organization was being set up with all the great powers in it. Another reason for the then prevailing optimism and belief in the success of the new organization was in no small way due to the realization that technically the U.N. Charter was an improvement upon the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Thus, despite the fact that the framers of the Charter relied heavily on the experience of the League of Nations, unlike the League the United Nations adopted a political approach to the problem of maintaining world peace and security. The Charter gave the Security Council wide discretionary powers and procedures to adopt for fulfilling its assigned tasks.

Although the powers and functions of the General Assembly were broadened at San Francisco, at the same time, a basic choice had to be made by the United States and other participating countries between the respective roles of the General Assembly and the Security Council in the

general field of maintaining world peace and security. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not rest on a sharp dividing line between the powers of the Assembly and the Council. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and, to a large extent, in the U.N. Charter, the principle was accepted to separate the functions and powers of the two organs. (75)

The framers of the U.N. Charter were keenly desirous of avoiding what was generally considered as a blunder committed in 1920 when the League of Nations was organically linked with the Treaty of Versailles. In 1945, the task of creating a world security organization was

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75. Leo Pasvolksy testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during the hearings on the Charter that there were two primary sets of functions that would have to be performed by the Organization: "In the first place, there is the function related to the maintenance of peace and security; that is, the function of doing everything possible to bring about peaceful adjustment of disputes that arise, of removing threats to the peace when threats arise, and of suppressing breaches of the peace, if in spite of the preventive action, peace should be broken. It was the opinion that those comprise one great function of the new Organization.

The second great function of the Organization, it was thought, was the creation of conditions which would be conducive to the maintenance of peaceful relations among nations, which would make for stability, friendship, and good neighbourliness.

It was thought that as between those two functions, the first one should be given to the Security Council as its primary responsibility; that the second function should be given to the General Assembly as its primary responsibility." US Senate, 79 Cong., 1 Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Charter of the United Nations (Washington, 1945) 243 - 4.

separated from that of post-war peace settlements.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals referred to the United Nations as a "general security organization." At San Francisco, the functions of the United Nations were widened to cover social and economic fields. Along with the Anglo-American desire to enlarge the scope of the world organization, the smaller States and, particularly, those that belonged to the underdeveloped regions, also exerted pressure to build an organization which might provide "some of the benefits of an international welfare state." (76) Thus, the United Nations could as well be regarded as an agency created not only, to use Aristotle's phrase, to protect the "life" of its members, but, much more than that, to promote "good life" among them all.

#### SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE CHARTER

The most important task which the executive faced after it had successfully been able to write the U.N. Charter with the support and cooperation of other Allies was the issue of the Senate ratification of the Charter. To emphasize the importance which the executive attached to this question, President Truman personally delivered the Charter to the presiding officer of the Senate on 2 July, 1945. Urging early ratification by the Senators

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76. Eugene P. Chase, "The United Nations : After San Francisco," Current History, 22 (January 1952) 10.



and reminding them of the tremendous responsibility resting on their shoulders, the President declared: "The choice before the Senate is now clear. The choice is not between this Charter and something else. It is between this Charter and no charter at all." (77) Senators Connally and Vandenberg lent their powerful support to the President's appeal; while readily acknowledging that the Charter was by no means perfect, they emphasized that ratification of the Charter would be a constructive approach to the problems of world peace and security.

In the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations — besides the Secretary of State and the experts of the Department of State, many individuals representing scores of public organizations also appeared before the committee to record their views on the Charter. The general sentiment as expressed in the hearings was quite favourable and, therefore, the Senate Committee recommended without amendment ratification of the Charter:

... the Charter represents a remarkable accomplishment in the process of developing international cooperation. While it may be that this is not a perfect instrument, the important thing is that agreement has been reached on this particular charter, after months and years of careful study and negotiation between the representatives of 50 nations. The virtual unanimity with

which the results of the Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conferences have been approved by the people of the United States and now by this committee, is the best proof now available that a sound and practicable foundation has been achieved on which to work for peace and security. (78)

The Committee, however, hastened to point out that neither the U.N. Charter nor any other document that might be devised could, on its own, prevent war. The establishment of the United Nations would, at best be, the Committee observed, a beginning "toward the creation of those conditions of stability throughout the world which will foster peace and security." (79)

The debate in the Senate on the U.N. Charter although lasting for a week did not produce any deep cleavage of opinion among the participants. To be sure, there were some individual Senators who took extreme positions, but on the whole there was general agreement among the Senators that, under the circumstances, the United Nations offered the best chance to organize the post-war period on the basis of agreed purposes and principles. By an overwhelming vote (89 to 2) the Senate recorded its approval of the Charter.

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78. US Senate, 79 Cong., 1 Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Report Of The Committee On Foreign Relations On The United Nations Charter (Washington, 1945). Reprinted by the Senate Subcommittee On The United Nations Charter in Review of the United Nations Charter : A Collection of Documents (Washington, 1954) 68.

79. Ibid

The Senate approval, viewed in the historical context, was an event of great significance in the diplomatic history of the United States. The Treaty of Versailles in which was included the Covenant of the League of Nations had earlier produced deep cleavage in the American Senate resulting, ultimately, in the American refusal to join the League of Nations. Thus, when the United States embarked on its second attempt to organize a world-wide security organization, the earlier lessons connected with the issue of U.S. joining the League of Nations were well remembered by the Roosevelt administration as well as by members of Congress. Furthermore, in the preparation of various drafts for a post-war security organization, the Department of State planners drew heavily from the experiences of the League machinery in its handling of various concrete problems.

The overwhelming Senate approval in favour of the Charter of the United Nations was also due to certain other important factors. The American Senate was presented with the Charter that did not include commitments which could have raised great controversy and debate in that body. It was clearly recognized in the Senate that American sovereignty and her national interests were not endangered by the U.S. membership of the United Nations. (80) Also,

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80. Russell, n. 2, 942.

the Senate's appraisal of the above political reality was buttressed by favourable climate of public opinion toward the establishment of the United Nations. (81)

Finally, it could be argued that at the end of the First World War, the emergence of the United States as a major power in world affairs was only dimly perceived by the American public and politicians. (82) The political, social and economic upheavals following the end of the First World War and the world engulfing nature of the Second World War brought, among other things, the realization in American people of the inter-dependence of nations and the important role which the United States as a great world power would have to play in the post-war period. The American leadership backed by strong support from the public, was thus prepared for the new role in world affairs.

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81. See Appendix.

82. Brookings Institute, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1950 - 1951 (Washington, 1950) 29.

## **CHAPTER VII**

**CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEM  
OF GENERAL SECURITY ESTABLISHED AFTER  
THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND  
THE UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING IT**

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## I

The leadership of the big powers in planning the post-war world was maintained throughout the war years. Beginning from the Atlantic Charter to the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the big powers, in their statements, emphasized the preeminent role which devolved upon them for the post-war planning. Thus, the Atlantic Charter, though the joint declaration of Great Britain and the United States, was accepted by the other United Nations in their declaration of 1 January, 1942 as a "common programme of purposes and principles ...."

At the San Francisco Conference where all the nations — big and small — had assembled to create an international organization for the post-war world, there was a clear recognition of the fact that if the big powers took a position and firmly stood by it, the smaller powers would have no alternative except to yield. (1) Thus, despite the assertion in the Charter that the "Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members," the big powers were granted many special powers. Their case for having special prerogatives for themselves was ostensibly based on the belief that the League security system had failed because it did not contain strong legal provisions on the basis of which the organized

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1. cf. Leland M. Goodrich's observation, Columbia University Oral History Research Project, Group Discussion Regarding the United Nations Conference, San Francisco 1945, 40.

will of mankind could be exercised against aggressor nations. Such, however, was not the case, in the opinion of the writer. As noted earlier, if the members of the League of Nations and particularly the great powers had the political will to curb aggression they could have succeeded in their endeavours, granting the fact that the League instrumentality was defective.

In the writer's opinion, behind the assertion by the great powers that power should be commensurate with responsibilities and that, therefore, they should have special powers and privileges in the new world organization, one basic political reality could be seen in operation. The great powers at San Francisco were not willing to abrogate their "sovereign" right to take independent decisions based on standards not necessarily and not always conforming to those embedded in the Charter of the United Nations.

## II

The hopes and aspirations that animated the participants in the San Francisco Conference were tragically vitiated by the speedy onset and intensification of the Cold War. The U.N. envisaged at the Conference was a far cry from the U.N. of the Cold War era. One could well speak of the "old" and the "new" United Nations. The "old" United Nations was based on the fundamental premise of

great power unanimity; the "new" United Nations rejected this dependence and even provided for institutional machinery to counteract an action of a great power which it considered as a threat to the peace, breach of the Peace, or an act of aggression.

In order to highlight the assumptions and aspirations of the member States present at San Francisco, it might be useful to consider the case of the clarification and enlargement of the powers of the General Assembly in the general field of the maintenance of international peace and security. It is true that many amendments were tabled at the Conference because of dissatisfaction especially of the "small" and "middle" powers, with the predominant role of the Security Council and with the special position of the permanent members of the Council. However, this concern was partly due to their fear lest the great powers should proceed to deal with questions relating to the maintenance of world peace and security without duly taking into account the interest of the smaller States. (2) Behind this lay the assumption in the minds of the "little forty five" of the continued possibility of great power unanimity in the post-war period.

At the San Francisco Conference, there was a

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2. Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Washington, 1955) 221.



substantial number of States which felt that the veto should not be extended to Chapter VI of the Charter where the Security Council was authorized to act rather in a mediating capacity. (3) Nevertheless, it should be emphasized here that there was no support at the Conference for the elimination or restriction of the veto under Chapter VII of the Charter. (4) In other words, the contest between the "Big Five" and the "little forty five" at San Francisco largely centred on other aspects of the problem of maintaining world peace, there being present among the participating States a general consensus of

3. Thus, the amendment proposed by Australia which would have eliminated the veto under Chapter VI (dealing with pacific settlement of disputes) though receiving ten affirmative votes despite the opposition of all the big powers had the moral support of great many small powers during the discussion of the amendment in Committee III/1.
4. "... In general the delegates participating in the discussion were agreed that the voting provisions while not perfect in theory, especially with reference to procedures of pacific settlement, were probably necessary for purposes of enforcement action. The points were raised that the voting procedure was consistent with political realities; that its acceptance in whole or in part was a necessary condition for the creation of the Organization; and that the Organization would break down in the event of enforcement action were undertaken against a permanent member. The progress which had been made over the rule of unanimity in the League Covenant was mentioned." Summary Report of Ninth Meeting of Committee III/1, 18 May, 1945. United Nations Information Organizations, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization San Francisco 1945 (New York, 1945) XI, 306. US House of Representative, 81 Cong., I Sess., Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, Background Information On The Soviet Union In International Relations (Washington, 1950) 30.

opinion as regards the desirability of the preponderant role of the big powers in the maintenance and enforcement of international peace and security. In the post-war period, on the other hand, as a result of the Cold War, the contest in the political field largely appears between one great power and some other small powers supporting it versus the other great powers and their allies among the small States. This trend, to a large extent, has also conditioned the aims and objectives of the United Nations in the post-war period. (5)

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5. Morgenthau has observed : "... Conceived as an instrument of great power government against aggression, whatever its source, the United Nations has become, by dint of political necessity, an instrument of many powers, great and small, against the aggression, actual and potential, emanating from an identified source. According to its Charter, the United Nations was to be a weapon against certain individual aggressors, identified as such only by their deeds. Thus, when in March, 1953, the Russian delegate to the General Assembly, during the discussion of the report of the Collective Measures Committee, declared that the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution and the work of the Committee was a plot, fostered by the United States against the Soviet Union, he pointed in demagogical language to the fundamental change in the structure and purpose of the United Nations. And when the American delegate replied that the Resolution and the work of the Committee were not directed against "any one," but against aggression, he paid verbal tribute to the spirit of the Charter rather than to political reality, using the Charter as an ideological disguise for the reality of international politics ...." Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New United Nations and the Revision of the Charter," The Review of Politics, 16 (January 1945) 7 - 8. Bentwich and Martin have also observed, "What was to be an instrument of world peace has proved to be a forum of world conflict. The General Assembly as well as the Security Council has been freely used not to solve disputes, but to stimulate and exacerbate them ...." Norman Bentwich and Andrew Martin, A Commentary On The Charter Of The United Nations (London, 1951) viii.

## III

It has been pointed out in the course of the earlier chapters that there were serious misgivings in the minds of American leaders concerning the aims and intentions of the Soviet Union before the war and even during the war. Similar misgivings undoubtedly coloured the views of the Russian leaders, but a discussion of this aspect is outside the scope of the present work. The result was that even during the war certain measures were adopted which cut at the root of the concept of big power consultation — the very basis for the successful functioning of the proposed world security organization.

Thus, in the matter of political settlement in Italy after the Allies had gained control over it, the question arose about the Soviet Union's part in the Allied direction of Italian affairs. From the beginning, Churchill and Roosevelt, while making an effort to keep Stalin informed of their dealings with the Italians and soliciting his approval on major decisions that were being taken, yet, were not prepared to accord the Russians an equal share with the British and American officials in directing Allied policy in that country. It has been suggested by Herbert Feis that the Soviet government did not "seriously attempt" to interfere in the development of Allied policies with regard to Italy. Also, the Soviet Union had perhaps decided that "... if it left the Americans and the British alone

in Italy, the better the chance they would leave the Soviet government alone in areas falling under its military control — Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary." (6)

However, a study of the war-time correspondence between the heads of Allied governments published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and other data on this issue leads one to a different conclusion. In a message to Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin observed on 22 August, 1943 :

... I think time is ripe for us to set up a military-political commission of representative of the three countries — the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. — for consideration of problems related to negotiations with various Governments falling away from Germany. To date it has been like this : the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement between themselves while the U.S.S.R. is informed of the agreement between the two Powers as a third party looking passively on. I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer. I propose setting up the commission and making Sicily its seat for the time being .... (7)

Also, the Soviet Union wanted to invest in the military-political commission — in which she was likely to be represented — many important powers of control and

6. Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin : The War they Waged and the Peace they Sought (Princeton, 1957) 425.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., The Chairman Of The Council Of Ministers Of The U.S.S.R. And The Prime Minister Of Great Britain During The Great Patriotic War (Moscow, 1957) II, 84.

supervision. (8) One further evidence of Soviet seriousness about the Italian situation was the appointment of no less a person than Andrei Vyshinski, Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs to the Political Military Commission to be set up at Algiers. A perusal of the following extract from the records of the former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William H. Standley, would also be relevant to assess the issue under consideration. The news that the Soviet Union would not have representation on the Allied Control Commission for Italy because "they had not fought against the Italians," the U.S. ambassador recorded, "produced an unexpectedly violent reaction in the Soviet official circles ." Standley sent a telegram to the State Department urging his government to reconsider and "agree to permit the Soviet Government to have a place on the Allied Control Commission for Italy as this is the first intimation on the part of the Soviet authorities that I have observed which indicates that the Soviet government intends to work and cooperate with the Allies in the post-war rehabilitation period." (9) However, since the Anglo-American armies were in Italy, their preponderant role and policy decisions ultimately had to be accepted by the Soviet Union.

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8. Molotov's note dated 14 October, 1943 to the U.S. Charge d' Affairs in Moscow. Ibid., 290.

9. William H. Standley and Arthur A. Hgeton, Admiral Ambassador To Russia (Chicago, 1955) 473.

It could be said, therefore, that the American and British policy on this issue militated against their professed commitments to Three Power consultation and cooperation in all major questions. Furthermore, it set "a bad precedent for common action by the Big Three elsewhere." (10) Thus, even during the course of the war itself the seeds of post-war division of the world into hostile blocs were planted -- a factor that had a great impact on the evolution of the United Nations.

#### IV

During the war period, one could also notice a great many publicists and newspaper columnists in the United States presenting the projected world organization as an alternative to the "traditional" game of power-politics and of spheres of influence operating in international relations. The Roosevelt administration too, on certain occasions, harped on this theme. Thus, Cordell Hull, after his return from the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1943 assured the nation that the creation of a general international organization in the post-war period would mean the end of power-politics and usher in a new era of international cooperation. Hull's statement,

10. John C. Campbell, The United States In World Affairs 1945 - 1947 (New York, 1947) 54. William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain and Russia : Their Cooperation and Conflict (London, 1953) 310.

curiously enough, received favourable response among both the isolationists and the internationalists among the American people. Many isolationists felt satisfied that since the creation of an international organization would mean an end of the era of power-politics and balance-of-power, a major source of war would thereby be eliminated and the Americans would have plenty of time to cultivate their own garden in peace. The internationalists were gratified to note that a world organization would be created in the post-war period which would provide member States with opportunities to cooperate and coordinate their policies on vital matters concerning the peace and security of the world. It also signified to them that the Roosevelt administration had accepted their premise that national security can best be preserved by establishing a system of world-wide security.

Little wonder, then, that those sections of the American public which supported the creation of a new world organization enthused by such sentiments must have had a feeling of 'let down' and general disillusionment with the United Nations in the post-war period. To be sure, the United Nations provided a new medium for the traditional methods of international politics. It could even be argued that, historically speaking, the creation of the United Nations represented an advance over older instrumentalities at the service of nation-States to conduct inter-State

relations. One might also add that in so far as nation-States were obliged to define their policies and actions in the light of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the organization did and continues to influence the foreign policies of member-States. But to assume, as some Americans did, that the world organization would acquire a personality independent and superior to that of its constituent members and, consequently, would set in motion such forces in international relations which the member-States themselves did not support in their individual capacities, meant chasing shadows in search of reality.

Furthermore, there was a tendency in the American public attitude towards post-war peace to regard it as a "state" of existence which would automatically come into being after the Fascists were defeated. The emphasis seemed more on regarding peace as a state rather than as a process. The latter approach meant viewing the world events in dynamic terms and in recognizing the changing world situation due to the interactions of several factors in the political, social and economic fields. The acceptance of such a dynamic approach by a large number of American people would have, thereby, demanded from them an ever new willingness to understand the changing political reality of the world and to ceaselessly strive for creating conditions that would ensure a process of peaceful change in the world.



## V

The American planners, it should be emphasized, were wedded to the concepts of western democracy and liberalism. Consequently, their frame of reference and conceptual orientation was invariably turned towards those ideals. The Soviets, on the other hand, were seeing the world from the standpoint of the Marxian ideology and viewed the unfolding of human history from the dialectical materialistic angle. Thus, although both the Americans and the Soviets talked about and agreed to establish a world security organization on the basis of justice to release progressively human freedom all over the world, concepts like "justice" "human freedom" and "democracy" had different connotations for both of them. To take one example, for the Americans it must have been an enlightened policy to adopt in encouraging "democratic thought through the press, radio, cinema, and schools," in post-war Japan and to use such measures as would "most effectively strengthen liberal political elements ... in Japan and assist the development of a civil government actually responsible to the people." (11) The significance of such statements to an

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11. "Japan : The Post-War Objectives of the United States in Regard to Japan," 4 May, 1944. Department of State, Postwar Preparation 1939 - 1945 (Washington, 1950) 591 -2. Churchill's following message to Stalin can also be quoted as indicative of the same mode of thinking described above. On the Polish question, he wrote

... (continued on page 451 )

objective observer is that the American planners greatly desired to further the establishment of "civil governments actually responsible to the people" in as many countries of the world as possible as a bulwark for peace and security. They also expected, at best the cooperation of the Soviet Union, or, at least, her acquiescence in such a goal. (12) Furthermore, as discussed earlier, one of the major factors responsible for the determination of the general American advocacy of postponing agreement till the end of the war on territorial changes was the belief held by the United States that the western powers would by that time be greatly equipped militarily to strengthen their demands for a post-war settlement with the Soviet Union much more on their ideals and interests. (13) That the

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to Stalin on 29 April, 1945, "... I can assure you that we in Great Britain would not work for or tolerate a Polish Government unfriendly to Russia. Neither could we recognize a Polish Government, that did not truly correspond to the description in our joint declaration at Yalta, with proper regard for the rights of the individual as we understand these matters in the Western world." Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (London, 1954) VI, 432. Emphasis added.

12. Even at the time when the foundations were being laid for U.S. — U.S.S.R. cooperation, William C. Bullitt, former U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R., wrote that "when the President was urged in the summer of 1941 by myself and others, to give Lend-Lease aid to Stalin," the Ambassador insisted that it should be given, "only after the Soviet dictator had given formal, written, public pledges to respect the eastern boundary of Europe as it existed in August, 1939, and to raise no objection to the formation of a confederation of European States, and to make no demands in China ...." William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," Part I, Life (Chicago), (30 August 1948) 91.

13. Charles Burton Marshall, who was from 1950 to 1953 a

... (continued on page 452)

Soviet Union should have considered the spread of "bourgeois democracy" and the existence of capitalist countries around her frontiers as not only a threat to her grandiose plans for socialist reconstruction within the Soviet Union, but also as tantamount to a denial of human freedom and exploitation of the proletariat class in those countries was not adequately comprehended by the American planners.

The American post-war planners were faced with another dilemma. Many Americans had come to believe that they had erred in not properly evaluating the danger to their nation and to world peace of the ideology and aims of the Fascist powers. (14) The American "neutrality legislation" was the concrete expression of their inability to realize adequately the magnitude of the threat posed by the Fascists. Consequently, there grew up a determination among the Americans not to be either physically or spiritually disarmed in the post-war period. Such a determination, combined with their fundamental disagreement with the Soviet

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member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, has, in recalling the "facts and mood of the time," observed that a factor in the American approach to peace in the immediate sequel to World War II was the assumption — due to prove unfounded very soon — of a long-term monopoly on atomic capabilities as a source of strength both in military terms and for international bargaining purposes. Charles Burton Marshall, The Limits of Foreign Policy (New York, 1954) 75 - 80.

14. Statement by Cordell Hull on 9 April, 1944. Department of State Bulletin, 10 (15 April 1944) 335.

ideology and practices, was to lead them, logically, after the end of the war when the necessity to collaborate with the Soviet Union was not so compelling, to the era of the "Cold War."

Furthermore, in spite of the detailed planning that went on in the Department of State for the post-war period, a criticism could still be levelled against the American planners. The Western Powers seemed to have made the Soviet actions in East Europe a test case for continuing friendly relations with her. Also, they seemed to have thought of Soviet policies largely in the ideological framework, namely, the desire of the Soviet Union to expand communism in the world. Consequently, there was a tendency in the American post-war planners to discount whatever legitimate concern the Soviet Union might have had for her national security. (15)

## VI

Roosevelt's faith in personal diplomacy as an instrument of easing world tensions became very obvious in his utterances at the various war-time international conferences. On the one hand he felt that as the representative of the United States, he was called upon to mediate between the disputes of Great Britain and the

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15. Goodrich and Simons, n. 2, 30.

Soviet Union on "European matters," and, on the other hand, he wanted to establish a deep personal friendship with the heads of other major powers with a view to creating an atmosphere of amity and good will which would then permit the leaders to see one another's point of view in a better frame of mind. Behind this approach of Roosevelt lay his conception of the nature of man. He told Frances Perkins that "If you treat people right, they will treat you right — ninety per cent of the time." There would always be a minority, in every walk of life, who would be selfish and take unfair advantage. But "ninety per cent" or more would want to do right, just as ninety per cent of the world's population want peace. (16)

In an informal address to the delegates attending the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Roosevelt narrated the method of Alfred E. Smith, former Governor of New York, in settling labour-management disputes, thus implicitly suggesting the usefulness of that idea to the Dumbarton Oaks delegates.

He said :

If you can get the parties into one room with a big table and make them take their coats off and put their feet upon the table, and give each one of them a good cigar you can always make them agree. Well, there was something in the idea. (17)

16. Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I knew (New York, 1946) 5 - 6. Elliot Roosevelt, ed., The Roosevelt Letters (New York, 1950) III, 259. Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1941) IX, 574.

17. US, Congressional Record, 90 (1944) A3715.

In the same address, talking about the usefulness of his friendship with Churchill and Stalin, Roosevelt remarked "... you cannot hate a man that you know well." (18) Consequently, it was Roosevelt's belief that in order to establish normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, he should dispel what he considered as prejudices and suspicions in Stalin's mind about the United States. The trouble with Stalin, Roosevelt told his associates on the way to Teheran, was that his whole life experience had made him suspicious of every thing and every body. If, therefore, Roosevelt could convince Stalin that the cooperation offered by the United States was "on the square," that the United States really wanted to be friends rather than enemies, he hopefully believed that Stalin would come round. And Stalin was the only man in Russia he had to convince; "He's the whole works." (19)

One might venture to suggest here that Roosevelt had an exaggerated sense of his ability to make people of extremely varied temperments to work together. His success in American domestic politics in making men like Harold Ickes, .

18. Ibid. In his Fourth Inaugural, Roosevelt said, "We can gain no lasting peace if we approach it with suspicion and mistrust or with fear ... We have learned the simple truth, as Emerson said, that 'The only way to have a friend is to be one.' Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., "Documents On American Foreign Relations 1944 - 1945" (Boston, 1946) 18.

19. Ross T. McIntire, White House Physician (New York, 1946) 170 - 1. Rexford G. Tugwell, The Art of Politics (New York, 1958) 267.

Henry Wallace, Louis Johnson, Rexford Tugwell, the Southern Democrats, the city bosses, and the labour leaders to work with him might have led him to believe that he could deal successfully with Churchill and even "charm" Stalin.

Furthermore, it appears to the writer, that Roosevelt's perception of the world reality during the war period subsumed that the existing hatred and fear among different States of the world originated primarily in the "minds of men." He did not seem to have sufficiently realized that in so far as different States do have incompatible and mutually exclusive values, goals, and aims they might well constitute threats to one another. Roosevelt's ardent belief in the continued friendship and cooperation among the Big Powers culminated in the creation of the United Nations organization with its security structure built on the assumption of the continuance of "the unity of those nations which formed the core of the grand alliance against the Axis ...." (20) The events since 1945 have, unfortunately, not fully justified that assumption.

20. Department of State, Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference (Washington, 1945) 68. Near the end of 1944, for example, Roosevelt declared that the new world order would depend not only on the peace machinery created, but also on "friendly human relations, on acquaintance, on tolerance, on unassailable sincerity and good will and good faith." The Allies he thought had already achieved a great deal of this and he felt that "it is a new thing in human history for allies to work together" so closely; and he warned that if it were not continued there could be no enduring peace. Rosenman, XIII, n. 16, 351 - 2.

## VII

For a critical assessment of the role of the United States in the formulation of the United Nations Charter, it is desirable that one tries to understand the political background of those leaders who had a major role in it. Earlier, we surveyed and commented upon the views of such leaders like Roosevelt, Truman, Hull and Welles. Senator Vandenberg, apart from playing an important role in the San Francisco Conference had also established himself as a leader of the Republican party. He was also one of the active members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

As regards Vandenberg's attitude towards the Soviet Union, it should be noted, at the outset, that he had on several occasions before the outbreak of the Second World War protested that the Russians were violating the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement upon which United States recognition of the Soviet Union was based. Also, the Senator had urged in 1939 that the United States should break off relations with the Soviet Union. Reading Vandenberg's papers covering the period 1944 - 1945 one gets the distinct impression that he was envisaging an organization to "fight" the "Soviet menace" rather than build an organization based on the cooperation of all nations including the Soviet Union.

At San Francisco, there was the issue of the right of permanent members of the Security Council to veto decisions



under Section VIII - B of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals even when involved in dispute before the Council. Senator Vandenberg, on this occasion, felt that this "would immunize all the major powers against military discipline" and would turn the organization into a great-power alliance. Earlier he had praised the administration's plan for the post-war organization for precisely the opposite reason. He approvingly recorded in his diary :

... Hull's whole theory is that there must be continued agreement between the Big Four or the post-war world will smash anyway. Also, to his credit, he recognizes that the United States will never permit itself to be ordered into war against its own consent. He has even gone so far as to suggest that we require this consent to be given by an Act of Congress ... it is a frame-work (without passing upon details) to which I can and do heartily subscribe .... (21)

Such a drastic change in the Senator's attitude could perhaps become intelligible if one were to realize that Vandenberg, at the end of the war, became more preoccupied with the disadvantages of being unable to act against the Soviet Union in the United Nations.

Senator Vandenberg's policies cannot likewise be understood properly without remembering that he was a staunch political opponent of President Roosevelt and his "New Deal". Also, the Senator had on several occasions,

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21. Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952) 95 - 6.

recorded what he termed as the failure of the executive in not keeping Congress sufficiently informed of its policies and agreements. (22)

One could make a general observation here that the persons who had a share in the formulation of American foreign policy were not thinking in terms of "peace at any price." To be sure, all great powers including the United States had their own concepts and images of "world peace and security" which they keenly desired to establish in the world through the instrumentality of the United Nations. Consequently, despite their adherence to the general goal of achieving world peace, since the great powers were unable to find a common agreement in the post-war period as to the precise factors and conditions necessary for it, the coming of the epoch of the "Cold War" was the inevitable result under the given circumstances. (23)

## VIII

While studying the role of the United States in the formulation of the U.N. Charter an important question

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22. Ibid., 159.

23. "The wording of the Yalta voting formula makes it obvious that 'the preservation of peace and security' means the preservation of peace and security so far as it is consistent with the interests of all the great powers." Wellington Koo, Jr., Voting Procedures In International Political Organizations (New York, 1947) 117.

that engages the attention of an observer is — How far did the United Nations Charter, in whose framing the United States played a leading part, anticipate the revolutionary changes of the post-war period that were just round the corner? An inquiry into this aspect of the problem becomes more meaningful if one were to accept Quincy Wright's observation that the accomplishments and failures of past efforts at world organization should be judged by their success (i) in meeting the political and economic problems arising from the impact of new discoveries and inventions on customary modes of thought and (ii) in changing those modes of thought to modes of thought better adapted to contemporary conditions." (24)

The Second World War set in motion a variety of forces which were bound to exercise great influence in the post-war period. The shrinking of the world by the rapid advancement in technology and, towards the end of the war, the explosion of the atom bomb in Japan which startled war-weary humanity with its unbelievably devastating power, heralded the dawn of a new epoch in human history. Furthermore, the decline of Europe as a centre of power — nay, of the world, and the rise of two gigantic power-centres in Washington and Moscow meant a drastic change in the balance

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24. Quincy Wright, "Accomplishments And Expectations of World Organization," The Yale Law Review, 55 (August, 1946) 873.

of power of the world. The tremendous upsurge of nationalism and the assertion of the right of self-determination sweeping across Asia and Africa together with a "revolution of rising expectations" in the shape of determination to have better housing, clothing, and food conditions in the vast areas submerged by poverty, misery, disease and death — all these forces asserted themselves strikingly and immediately in the post-war period.

So far as the advent of the atomic age was concerned, the statesmen assembled at San Francisco did not know that soon after they were to adjourn an atomic bomb would be dropped which would profoundly change the security calculations on which the Charter was based. The Charter was thus pre-atomic in its conception.

With regard to the break up of the colonial system and the awakening of Asia and Africa which resulted in the liberation of six hundred million people since the war ended and considering the intensity of demand for independence by the remaining two hundred million non-self-governing people, it is doubtful, in retrospect, whether the rapidity of this development was anticipated at San Francisco. However, the eventual doom of the colonial system was foreshadowed in a number of liberal provisions of the Charter. The dignity and worth of human personality irrespective of class, colour, race or sex recognized in the preamble of the Charter, the creation

of a commission to formulate an international bill of rights, the trusteeship council and the injunction imposed upon and accepted by the colonial powers to regard their non-self-governing area as a "sacred trust" of civilization and to consider the material and spiritual welfare of the people of those areas as of paramount interest and concern to them were steps in the right direction. Article 73 of the Charter set forth the general principles applicable to all colonial areas governed by members of the United Nations. It declared that the "interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount," and bound the imperial nations, inter alia, to develop "self-government" and "to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples."

Institutionally, the U.N. Charter made significant improvements in the field of economic and social activities of the international organization. Thus, whereas the Covenant of the League of Nations conferred upon the Council and the Assembly a general and undifferentiated role to deal with any matter "within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world," the U.N. Charter, on the other hand, gave specific jurisdiction to each of its principal organs. Furthermore, in recognition of the importance of economic and social well-being all over the world as a necessary prerequisite for the existence of world peace and security, the Economic and Social Council was made one of the principal organs of the United Nations.

Because of the nature and diversities of the problems facing the world, various specialized agencies were created covering such matters as labour, food and agriculture, meteorology, telecommunications, postal services, science, education and culture, international monetary affairs and problems related to international finance. Besides, many commissions were created to study such matters as those pertaining to regional economic planning, human rights, transportation, the status of women, population problem, and freedom of information.

While discussing the economic problems of the post-war world it could, however, be said that the members who framed the constitution of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) made certain assumptions about the economic situation that would emerge after the end of the war. Thus, they seemed to have believed that the balance of payments difficulties in the post-war period would be of transitory nature and that exchange depreciation should be resorted to by nations only to correct the fundamental disequilibrium. (25) The definition of the concept "fundamental disequilibrium" was not undertaken anywhere in the constitution of the I.M.F. In retrospect, one could

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25. "The members shall not propose a change in the par value of its currency except to correct a fundamental disequilibrium." I.M.F. constitution Article 4, Section 5 A.

make an observation that there was inadequate appreciation of the problem of balance of payments in the context of the economic development needs of the under-developed countries. By its constitution, the I.M.F. was authorized only to make short term loans. The concept of planned deficits which the under-developed countries have now increasingly accepted as necessary for their economic development was not visualized at the time of the framing of the constitution of the I.M.F.

Also, because of the constitutional limitations, the I.M.F. proved to be an inadequate mechanism to cope up with the problems of European economic recovery in the post-war period. The balance of payments difficulties faced by the European countries had to be solved with the aid of special programmes like the Marshall Plan.

Likewise, the I.B.R.D. established to serve the twin purposes of helping in the reconstruction of war devastated areas and their general economic development was inadequately equipped to face the economic needs of the under-developed countries. (26) To be sure, the I.B.R.D. gave priority to the problem of reconstruction in the early

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26. The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau addressing the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods said that the chief purpose of the Bank was "to guarantee private loans made through the usual investment channels. It would make loans only when these could not be floated through the normal channels at reasonable rates ...." Department of State Bulletin, 11 (30 July, 1944) 113. Emphasis added.

years of its working and it was only after the year 1950 that the I.B.R.D. began considering the requirements of the under-developed countries. Like the I.M.F., the I.B.R.D. was also chartered to follow certain rigid principles as guides to its activities. The adoption of such cautious policies meant that the pace of development of economically backward countries could not be as rapid as they might be had a more liberal outlook prevailed. (27)

The problems of the under-developed countries have been given additional emphasis by the writer for obvious reasons. The "population problem" in an age where men's scientific and technological advancements have recorded unique achievements and the growing contrast between the standard of life among the developed and the under-developed countries has become a vital issue of the post-war period. (28) It can even be asserted that world peace, in future, largely depends to the extent the nations

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27. For example, the I.B.R.D. is directed to assist specific economic projects undertaken by a State which it approves. The I.B.R.D. is also run on such business principles as high interest rates and commission for its work. The following citation may be given in which the above problem is discussed and commented upon. Speech by Ramaswami Mudaliar, Chief Indian Delegate to the Economic and Social Council, 1950. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, Tenth Session, 353rd Meeting, 16 February, 1950. 57 - 8.

28. J.D. Bernal, World Without War (London, 1958) ix. Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions (Bombay, 1958) 18.



of the world try to find an adequate solution for the above problems.

The U.N. Charter explicitly lays down as one of its purposes and principles — "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character ...." (Article 1, 3) In addition, members pledged themselves "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" and "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." (Preamble of the Charter)

It can, nevertheless, be observed that as long as the economic problems of the world are not considered as the collective responsibility of all the member States and so long as members are not required to contribute specific amounts for the large-scale economic programmes to be implemented under the aegis of the international organization, the problems of implementing the economic and social objectives of the U.N. would be determined to a large extent by the political relationship existing between the different member States. (29)

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29. Raymond F. Mikesell, "Barriers to the Expansion of United Nations Economic Functions," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia), 296 (November, 1954) 37.

The UNESCO with its multiple purposes covering scientific, educational and cultural fields attempted to respond to the challenge emanating from what Arnold Toynbee called "a conservative Psyche and a revolutionary Technology." (30) The physical annihilation of distance did not all by itself bring about a closer relationship and understanding between the humanity spread all over the globe. The UNESCO's projects is bringing out studies on the life and culture of different peoples, its dissemination of scientific literature on the race question and a host of other programmes and activities could, at best, be oriented towards the inculcation of a spirit of tolerance and mutual respect for the divergent cultures and value-system of its members. It appeared doubtful if the UNESCO could go beyond this goal and attempt to create universal and enforceable norms of international ethics which alone seem to be capable of bringing about lasting peace and

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30. Toynbee's reference is to a social phenomenon that men's habits and attitudes do not usually keep with the fast changing technological innovations. Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1954) IX, 471. Referring to this "cultural lag," Ogburn has presented a thesis that "... the various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing much more rapidly than others; a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture." William Fielding Ogburn, "The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag," in V.F. Calverton, ed., The Making Of Society (New York, 1937) 719.

security in the world.

## IX

It has been noted earlier that the United States, along with other great powers, took and maintained her leadership in formulating plans for the creation of a post-war world organization. However, the Charter was the outcome of the meeting of minds of fifty States and, as such, represented not the ideals and aspirations of any single nation but the general agreement among all to base their policies and actions in conformity with the Charter purposes and principles. Nevertheless, the compromises and adjustments to the national interests of the participating States weighed heavily, in general, on the side of the great powers. That seemed inevitable in the context of the then prevailing political reality. The task of creating a world organization, it should be recalled, did not consist in scaling down the strength of the great powers. It meant, politically, to seek a definition of the national interests of each in such terms that each would find it possible to collaborate with others in the maintenance of a stable and just post-war order. (31) The willingness of the States to adhere to the Charter of the United Nations signified that the world was ready to embark on its second experiment, in the first half of the twentieth century, in organizing itself for peace.

31. William T.R. Fox, The Super Powers (New York, 1944) 9. -

**APPENDICES**

## I

Stettinius's explanatory note on the American Proposal  
on voting procedure in the Security Council :

(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated....

Reasons for the American Position :

From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small ...

Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members :

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

1. Admission of new members;
2. Suspension of a member;
3. Expulsion of a member;
4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions :

1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member States.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party :

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council's attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy. (1)

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1. Department of State, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington, 1955) 661 - 3.



## II

Note on the terms "isolationism" and "internationalism"

Without intending any complete definition of the two terms it could be explicitly stated that in this study they have been used both in the descriptive and judgemental sense. My bias has been for policies and programmes oriented towards "internationalism".

Broadly speaking, the term isolationism has been used in the light of Beard's definition which includes such programmes as involving rejection of membership in an international organization, nonentanglement in the political controversies of Europe and Asia and adoption of neutrality in case war should break out in those regions; reliance on American national strength together with collaboration with other Latin American States for the defence of the Western Hemisphere; and a general policy of friendship toward all nations willing to reciprocate. Furthermore, in Beard's opinion, "An isolationist may favour promotion of good-will and peace among nations by any and all measures compatible with non-entanglement in any association of nations empowered to designate 'aggressors' and bring engines of sanction and coercion into action against them." (1)

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1. Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making (New Haven, 1946) 17.

Internationalism is used here to signify policies which favour multilateral action preferably through a permanent international organization to solve international problems in the socio-economic and political fields, and which implies that national security can best be preserved by establishing a system of world-wide security.

## III

Public Opinion polls about United States' participation in the United Nations : April - July, 1945 : (1)

|                         | April<br>1945<br><u>OPOR</u> | May<br>1945<br><u>OPOR</u> | June<br>1945(a)<br><u>OPOR</u> | July<br>1945(b)<br><u>NORC</u> | July<br>1945(c)<br><u>AIPO</u> | <u>Column X</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| U.S. should<br>join     | 80%                          | 85%                        | 79%                            | 81%                            | 64%                            | 73%             |
| U.S. should<br>not join | 9%                           | 6%                         | 4%                             | 8%                             | 3%                             | 3%              |
| No opinion              | 11%                          | 9%                         | 17%                            | 11%                            | 21%                            | 24%             |
|                         | <hr/> 100%                   | <hr/> 100%                 | <hr/> 100%                     | <hr/> 100%                     | <hr/> 88%                      | <hr/> 100%      |

Figures in column X denote the percentages for the portion of the total sample that was asked the question; that, since 12% of those questioned had not heard of the Charter, they were not asked for an opinion about it. Thus, while 64% of the total sample favoured U.S. approval of the Charter, 73% of those who had heard of the Charter, and were asked for an opinion, favoured U.S. approval.

1. AIPO - The American Institute of Public Opinion,  
Princeton, New Jersey
- OPOR - The office of Public Opinion Research,  
Princeton, New Jersey
- NORC - The National Opinion Research Centre, Chicago,  
Illinois

... (continued on page 476)

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Questions asked were :

- April 1945 : "Do you think this country should join the international peace and security organization worked out by the United Nations at the San Francisco even if we don't like some part of it?" (OPOR)
- May 1945 : Same as above.
- June 1945 : "Do you think the United States should join the new United Nations Organization which has just been worked out at San Francisco?" (OPOR)
- July 1945 (a & b) : "Would you like to see the United States join the world organization set up at San Francisco, or would you like to see us stay out?" (NORC)
- July 1945 (c) : "Should the United States Senate approve the United Nations Charter for a world organization as adopted at the San Francisco Conference?" (AIPO)
- Quoted in William A. Scett and Stephen B. Withey, The United States and the United Nations : The Public view 1945 - 1955 (New York, 1958) 15.

## IV

National Organizations and International Policy Analysis  
 from published statements prepared by Catherine Berger,  
 Member of Staff, Division of Intercourse and Education,  
 Carnegie Endowment, February, 1945

| Names of Organizations                                | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|   | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| American Association<br>for the United<br>Nations ... |   | x |   |   | x |   | x |   |   |
| American Bar Associ-<br>ation ...                     | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   | x |
| American Farm Bureau<br>Federation ...                |   | x |   |   |   | x |   |   |   |

... (continued on page

\* The numbers indicate as follows :-

1. Favour International Organization with force.
2. Support Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
3. Consider Dumbarton Oaks Proposals a beginning.
4. Oppose Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as first presented.
5. Urge ratification of final Proposals.
6. Advocate Eventual Universal membership.
7. Favour Delegated powers to American Representative to the United Nations.
8. Criticise Unanimity Rule in Security Council.
9. Favour continuance of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

| Names of Organizations                                | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Federation of Labour ...                     | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| American Labour Conference on International Affairs.. |   | x |   |   |   | x |   | x |   |
| American Legion ...                                   |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Americans United for World Organization ...           |   | x |   |   | x |   | x | x |   |
| Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ...        |   | x | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Catholic Association for International Peace ...      |   |   | x |   |   | x |   | x | x |
| Catholic Bishop's Statement on International order... | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Chamber of Commerce of the United States ...          | x |   | x |   |   |   | x |   | x |
| Church Peace Union..                                  |   | x | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Commission to Study the Organization of Peace ...     |   | x | x |   | x |   |   | x |   |
| General Council of Congregational Christian Churches  | x |   |   |   |   | x |   | x |   |
| Congress of Industrial Organizations ...              |   | x |   |   |   |   | x |   |   |

... (continued on page 479)

| Names of Organizations                                | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union ...         | x |   | x |   | x |   |   |   |   |
| Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. |   | x |   |   |   | x |   | x |   |
| Federal Union ...                                     | x | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Federal World Government, Inc. ...                    | x |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| General Federation of Women's Clubs..                 |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| National Grange ...                                   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| National Jewish Welfare Board ...                     |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| National Council of Jewish Women ..                   |   | x | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| National Lawyers Guild ...                            |   | x |   |   |   |   | x |   | x |
| National League of Womens Voters ...                  |   | x |   |   |   |   | x |   |   |
| National Congress of Parents and Teachers ...         |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| National Council for the Prevention of war ...        |   |   |   |   | x |   |   |   |   |
| National Council of the YMCA'S of the U.S. ...        |   | x | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| National Board of Y.M.C.A. ...                        |   | x | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |

... (continued on page 480)

| Names of Organizations  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non-Partisan Council<br>to win the Peace..                            | x |   | x |   |   |   |   | x |   |
| Post-War World<br>Council ...   |   |   |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |
| Rotary International  |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Synagogue Council of<br>America ...                                   |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Universities Committee<br>on Postwar Inter-<br>national Problems.     |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Women's Action Commi-<br>ttee for Victory and<br>Lasting Peace ...    |   | x |   |   |   | x | x |   | x |
| Woodrow Wilson Founda-<br>tion ...                                    |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| World Alliance for<br>International Friend-<br>ship through Churches. |   | x |   |   | x |   | x |   |   |
| World Government<br>Association ...                                   |   | x |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

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Council On Foreign Relations Inquiry

In March 1945 this Organization initiated an Inquiry on Minimum Commitments to a Post-war Security System addressed to the twenty regional Committees on Foreign Relations which had been set up since 1938 by the Council. (1) Composed of forty or fifty representative citizens each, these Committees were organized on a non-partisan basis.

The inquiry which dealt with minimum commitments in a post-war security system, had two purposes; (1) "to secure a resume of the views of these Committees as to the specific obligations which the United States should be prepared to assume in order to implement the security provisions of the Moscow Four Power Declaration and the Connally Resolution, and (2) to get an estimate of the probable acceptability of such obligations to community opinion in the various regions."

Seventeen Committees replied to the security questionnaire. Geographically, the seventeen Committees submitting reports were distributed as follows : New England, one; Middle West, five; South, four; Southwest, one;

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1. American Public Opinion and Post-war Security Commitments : Results of an Inquiry Addressed to Twenty Committees on Foreign Relations, Spring, 1944 compiled by Walter B. Sharp and Percy W. Bidwell Oct. 1944. Published by the Council on Foreign Relations.

Rocky Mountain, two; and Pacific Coast, four. Total membership approximately 750. Roughly a third of the membership consisted of businessmen; about a sixth represented educational and scientific research; another sixth was drawn from the legal profession; editorial writers and bankers accounted for an additional sixth; while the remaining sixth included government officials, churchmen, physicians, labour leaders, farmers, Army and Navy Officers, radio commentators and motion picture representatives, miscellaneous occupational groups.

"Although the Committees may fairly be said to reflect the considered opinion of an informed community leadership, they do not pretend to be an accurate cross-section of occupational or income groups. Business and the liberal professions were rather heavily weighed, while organized labour and agriculture had comparatively little voice in the inquiry. It would be wrong to think that it was a group of wholly 'internationalists.' Not only were the Committees not 'packed' with internationalists, but nearly all of them included men who, prior to our [U.S.] entry into the war were of pronounced isolationist persuasion."

#### Summary and results of the Inquiry :

"1. There was virtually unanimous support for American participation in a general security organization empowered to use military as well as other forms of coercion against

aggressors.

2. The military obligations of the United States, as a member of such an organization, should apply wherever a serious threat to peace may arise and not merely to the Western Hemisphere and its oceanic out-posts.

3. While a substantial majority of the Committees considered the creation of a permanent international police force to be desirable in principle, the preponderant view was that, within the foreseeable future, our contribution to the maintenance of the world security should be limited to such national air, naval, and/or land contingents as may be requested by the security organization to meet specific emergencies. Such contingents, however, would be subject to international command while acting on behalf of the organization.

4. A decided majority of the Committees took the position that the United States should be bound to support the decisions of the Security Organization calling for forcible action against an aggressor only when the representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and this country concur therein. Only four Committees were willing that we should forego the right to "vote" such decisions.

5. In the opinion of most Committees, a multilateral agreement laying down minimum as well as maximum limitations on national armaments, including international inspection

thereof, was held to be advisable, probably not immediately after the war, but as soon as world stability permits. The United States should adhere to such an agreement only if all the principal military powers consent to do so.

6. Opinion was fairly evenly divided as to whether the treaty or joint resolution method should be used to legalize our membership in the new security organization, a slight majority favouring the former procedure unless and until the Constitution can be amended so as to provide for treaty ratification by majority vote of the two Houses of Congress.

7. Finally, such divergence of opinion as was revealed by the Committee reports followed in no sense a regional or geographical pattern. Interestingly enough, the most advanced internationalist position taken by any of the Committees was that of Des Moines, in the heart of the corn belt.

Relation of Committee's Views  
to General Community Opinion :

"On the whole, the Committee rapporteurs were inclined to believe that local public opinion, in so far as it had crystallized, was somewhat less internationalist than that of the Committee members, but most of them were sure that isolationism in the traditional sense was either dead or dying. It is significant that two Committees (Detroit and Houston) felt that their membership tended to "lag behind .

public opinion." ... The prevalent view seemed to be that community opinion, while favouring American participation in a programme of international collaboration, had not yet become articulate on the specific ways and means of implementing such a programme. This confusion of mind may perhaps best be illustrated by reference to whether there should be an "international police force." Most people, it was felt, had only the vaguest idea of what this would imply. The sovereignty fetish is still so strong in the public mind that there would appear to be little chance of winning popular assent to American membership in anything approaching a super-state organization. Much will depend on the kind of approach which is used in further popular education. Should the approach be specific or general? The Committee rapporteurs divided ratherly sharply on this question. A statement made by one rapporteur (Los Angeles) is worth reproducing :

"If we are too specific, we may get a purely isolationist point of view from everybody!" The need of sustained mass education on the concrete implications of American participation in a general Security system was unanimously stressed.

"A comparison of the results of this specialized inquiry (of the Council on Foreign Relations' Committees) with the findings of sample opinion polls on American postwar security policy held during the winter and spring months of 1944, would suggest that an appreciable lag of general community opinion behind that of any group of well-educated community leaders may be expected. The differential, however,

is probably not very great. According to the summary of popular attitudes given in The Public Looks at World Organization (National Opinion Research Centre, Report No.19, April 1944), over 70 per cent of the American people then favoured our active participation in some type of general security system. Almost as high a proportion also advocated the establishment of an international police force. Nearly 90 per cent were convinced that the United States would need to maintain larger armaments after the war than before. Close to 80 per cent expressed themselves as willing to have the world Security Organization set limits on the size of national armaments that each country, including the United States, should be allowed to maintain, only 22 per cent taking the position that we should be permitted to keep as large an army, navy and air force as we like."

"This summary significantly concludes that, while popular attitudes had crystallized regarding some aspects of world organization, uncertainty, division, and confusion of thought still prevailed relative to the powers that any such organization should possess. In principle, an over-whelming majority of Americans appeared to think that it should have "the power to make laws about problems which may come up between member countries." Yet only a small minority, for the sake of world cooperation and the prevention of war, were willing "to allow foreign goods to come into the United States and compete with things grown or made here, even if

the prices were lower." Nor was there the slightest indication that the American public then understood what would be involved in the establishment of any kind of internationalized force strong enough to prevent aggression by a major power - that the direct control of any such force by an international organization would require that it be endowed with independent executive authority .... "

" ... Many of the problems relating to the development of an effective world security system are so technical and so complex that public opinion on them cannot be gauged with clarity by the usual type of sample poll. Nor can such polls, in and of themselves, contribute much to the general public enlightenment on such problems. What the sample polls do show is that " the more education a person has, the more likely he is to favour international cooperation." In general, the results of the Council's inquiry support this conclusion."

"While 15 - 2 favoured U.S. participation in a international police force the meaning of the phrase was not interpreted in the same way by all the fifteen committees voting for American participation. A few had in mind the establishment of a force strong enough to police one of the major powers, but most of the others envisaged, to quote from the Los Angeles report, "a small force which would engage in holding operations until national contingents could be brought into action." Even so, the prevalent view was that the

creation of a force of this type, while theoretically desirable, would not be practicable or advisable in the immediate future. The following excerpt from the Denver report illustrates the dilemma in which most of committees found themselves : "We favour a permanent police force only if the super-state element of surrender of sovereignty is not involved and if the contributions are equitable as among all participants in the general international organization." There was implicit recognition of the fact that the creation, control, and operation of a permanent international police would probably call for an international authority endowed with far greater powers than this country would be willing to stand for. Evidently, it showed not sufficient understanding of the proposals which most of the committees seemed to support.



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