CONGRESS PARTY POLITICS IN UTTAR PRADESH

(1969 - 74)

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A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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New Delhi

SEPTEMBER 1981

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY

DECLARATION

The dissertation entitled - " Congress Party
Politics in Utter Pradesh (1969-74) " submitted
by Udai Pratap Singh for the Degree of Master
of Philosophy has not been previously submitted
for any other of this or any other University.
We recommend that this dissertation should be
placed before the examiners for their consideration
for the award of M.Phil. Degree.

SUPERVISOR

CHAIRMAN

PREFACE

In modern times, the emergence of democratic forces
has brought forth political party as an indispensable
factor in every political system. It plays a vital
role between state and society and largely determines
the political process in a particular system. The long,
chequered history of the Congress Party in India speaks
volume for its significance in the political development
of India. Numerous scholars have contributed a lot for
the understanding of the Congress Party, but a woefully
little attention has been paid to its branches in
operating in states. At state-level the immediate
surroundings, existing socio-economic realities lend
it an exotic flavour which cannot be realized from
centre level as the majority of works have tried to do.
Keeping all these nuances in the mind, I have decided
to take up the study of Uttar Pradesh Congress Party
politics. According to best of my knowledge, the only
authoritative work done on U.P. Congress is that of
Mr. Paul R. Brass who explored new possibilities in
this area through his seminal work. But his work has
remained confined only upto the period of 1964; moreover
he has left certain issues untouched. My effort, as I
have explained it at length in the chapter entitled
'Conclusion', will be to look at the things slightly in

a different manner and take up a different period of
time for the study.

The present work runs from 1969 to 1974. This
period holds a crucial role in the history of U.P.
Congress. It is characterized by intense factionalism;
'split'; emergence of new forces with a new label and
eclipsed various other elements etc. A clear under-
standing of this watershed period may provide a deep
insight for the future study of period upto 1980 which
I wish to take up at/the Ph.D. level research work.

I have drawn the blueprint of present dissertation
scheme with a view to switch it over for Ph.D. work too.
In keeping with this plan I have devoted first chapter
to a comprehensive understanding of the concept, nature
and characteristic of the political party in general.
Further, existing approaches to the study of political
parties have been discussed in detail. The discussion
of approaches has helped to evolve the idea of
conceptual frameworks which have been adopted by
various scholars in their study of the Congress Party.
The second chapter of the dissertation deals with the
problem of understanding Congress Party with the help
of existing volume of literature on it. The bulk of
work carried on Congress Party can be divided into two

broad categories - Marxist and non-Marxist conceptual
frameworks. These theoretical frameworks help a lot
to carry out a survey like chronological discription of
political process taking place in the broader framework
of the state Congress Party.

Chapter third and fourth are full of analytical
and chronological delineation of events. Efforts have
been made to locate the all activities in the context
of two broader themes - first in terms of structural
relation among the constituents, say, Legislative, wing
Organization and High Command, of the party and second
in relation to factional schism of various groups
operating within the structure of the party. Without
endangering the flow of the discription, cautiously,
critical appraisals of various crucial events have been
made at certain places.

At last, the fifth chapter records the conclusions
and findings arising out of the application of the
theoretical frameworks discussed in the second chapter.
Certain emerging trends stand at variance with the work
of Paul R. Brass. These differences have been explained
in brief. Since the scope, purpose and nature of the
research at M.Phil. level is short and limited,
suggestions and optimism have been discussed for further

research at Ph.D. level where one may go more intensively
and extensively too. Despite all these efforts put into
the work, in all its fairness I shall admit that there
is always the nagging doubt that one could have done
better.

Now I would like to record my sincere gratefulness
and indebtedness to my savant Supervisor, Dr. (Mrs.) Kiran
Saxena, who affably rendered unstinted help to me at
every stage. In addition to her knowledgeable suggestions
and guidance, she bestowed always a good amount of
kindness and affection on me which helped me to get
through. Thanks are also due to the Centre for Political
Studies where I learnt a lot to improve my knowledge.
At last, I humbly wish to state that I alone, not others,
owe for whatsoever failings or inadequacies have been
left unnoticed in the work.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL

PARTIES

Stasiology[1], the science of Political Parties, has always been an important topic of debate among the political scientists right from the ancient time of Aristotle. The beginning of twentieth century witnessed a refreshingly new type of attempt in this field.[2] However, the real breakthrough occurred in early sixties with the notable work of Duverger on political parties. It was Duverger who brought an end to the "Political-biography-cum-political ideology phase",[3] and sincerely tried to "sketch a preliminary general theory of parties."[4] His work prompted other scholars to try to bring forth some acceptable general approaches to the study of political parties. Since that period, the "stasiology" has advanced greatly.

Before reviewing the existing approaches to the study of political party, it is desirable to be fairly clear about the concept of "political party". There are two ways of looking at the party. The first one is essentially political perspective. Here, political party is defined in terms of the political order of which it is an integral part. Precisely speaking party is taken "as a

part of a whole."[5] This association calls our attention
to the subtle link between a part (party) and its whole
(political system). However, the idea of part does not
necessarily rule out the consideration of parts (i.e.
parties or political system complete), but it is implied
within. According to Neumann,[6] the concept of part and
whole relationship suggests three salient characteristics
of party. First, it signifies the idea of "partnership"
within the boundary of a particular organisation and
secondly, the "separation" from other by a set of specific
demarcations. Next comes the idea of "participation" in
political process or decision making which facilitates
the party to "organize the chaotic public will."[7] Thus,
party is considered as a political entity within the
framework of political system where it represents and
articulates the demands of people.

The second perspective provides a sociological
interpretation of the term 'political party'. Here
political party is viewed as a social group, a system
of meaningful and patterned activity within the larger
society. Party appears as a group which consists of
a set of individuals performing specific roles and
behaving as member-actors of a boundaried and identifiable
social unit. Besides, the goals, tasks, means of

communication are clearly defined and maintained by its
members. In this sense party looks like a "social
organism."[8] The meaningful organizational framework
of the party provides a system of interpersonal relation-
ships, governed by established rules and norms. Thus,
we see, that party, more or less, reflect the nature of
a group as it is defined by Herbert Simon who takes
group as a system of -

> "interdependent activity encompassing at least
> several primary groups and usually characterized..
> .... by a high degree of rational direction
> of behaviour towards ends that are objects of
> common acknowledgement and expectation."[9]

Keeping this expostulation in view, if we analyse
political party as a social organism cum political body,
we shall come across a startling resemblance. Henceforth,
party appears as a miniature political system with an
authority structure distinctive patterns of power
distribution, electoral system to recruit leaders and
a decision making system to make authoritative decisions.
In short, one can say that political party may be viewed
as a 'social group' and a 'body-politic' both with a
subtle paraphrase and transposition of meanings and
definitions.[10] Moreover, this dual-political and
sociological- perspective to understand the concept of

political party helps to realize two salient determining characteristics of party. First, party may be treated as mainly responsive to larger or other aspects of politics; secondly, it can be taken as a creation of social structure and culture of a particular society.

After a brief clarification of the concept of party, one can safely proceed to discuss the issues related with approaches to understand 'political parties'. A brief discussion on approaches may help to evolve a meaningful theory of political party which poses a dilemma because it could not be expected that party system in each country will necessarily show signs of major similarity. There is something special about each party. David Apter[11] opines that since parties are invariably linked with the combination of social, economic, political and historical life of an indigenous society, it becomes extremely difficult to compare them with parties of other societies in any effective manner. Confronted with such an amazing number of diversities, the task of systematizing our knowledge in the form of 'approaches' to evolve a general theory of political parties becomes extremely difficult. As a fact, no theory of political party can encompass such diverse notions of parties under one ruberic.[12]

In the face of existing diversities, only compre-
hensive study of approaches may help to evolve theoretical
frameworks in stages which may be fragmentary and
tentative, at best presenting only a useful working
hypothesis for a deeper penetration into an ever changing
reality. Thus, we see that conceptualization of
political parties becomes a constantly renewed efforts.
Being fully aware with all these complexities, Neumann
has aptly put it -

> "Most definitely, it (theory building) can never
> be a one-man job; it must be the work of proved
> experts, who by pooling their substantive
> findings in their special areas can contribute
> to the laying of the foundations for a concrete
> theory of the modern political parties."[13]

Despite all these problems various scholars have
developed certain analytical approaches on their way to
formulate theories to study the phenomenon of political
party. The existing volume of approaches can be broadly
categorized under four divisions or models:

1. Organizational Approach

2. Developmental Approach

3. Ideological Approach

4. Sociological Approach

All these approaches study the political parties
from different perspectives. No approach is single
handedly capable enough to encompass the all characteristics
of the parties. There is some drawback in each approach
but it can be fairly minimized by the evolution of a
comprehensive 'eclectic approach', emerging out of the
fusion of these four approaches. Here one must be aware
of one another's complementarity. Before taking up the
idea of eclectic model one should try to get the clear
picture of each approach separately, which in a long
run will itself suggest the attempt for a combined
analytical approach. Henceforth, this paper will
discuss the each approach separately in detail.

1. Organizational or Structural Approach

Maurice Duverger[14] discusses party in terms of
organizational pattern. His analysis of party structure
and leadership introduced a new dimension in the field
of organizational study of political parties. Duverger
uses the term of structure strictly in the sense of
form that suggests an elaborate network of relationship.[15]
Duverger thinks that party belongs to such structural
complexes as combines the structural qualities associated

with each group, association, organization, institution and system. Eventually, he studies the structural issues of political parties in three distinct phases which are as follows -

1. Internal Structure of Party

2. External Structure of Party

3. Leadership Patterns in Party.

Now, we shall discuss each dimension one by one.

1. <u>Internal Structure</u>:- The idea of internal study involves two inter-related problems. The first one is 'technical', which suggests the extent of implantation (spread) or expansion of party in a purely geographical sense. In other words, we can say that it requires to locate the structural expansion of party organization in the political system; whether it is a peripheral or all-encompassing party physically spreading all over nation. Next comes the 'ideological' determinant of political structure which suggests the impact of a particular ideology which either favours or decries the 'centralization' or 'decentralization', of power-pattern operating within the framework of political structure. There is lack of refined techniques to

ascertain these characteristics of a particular party. Often, students of political parties look into the constitution of the party, decision-making process of the party and the financial arrangements of the party to verify the centralized or decentralized characteristic of party structure. There is lack of any systematic study on this aspect of party organization. However, Jean Blondel[16] makes an attempt to study European and American political parties in this respect but his conclusions are only impressionistic and unsubstantiated by concrete evidences. Next comes the study of 'External Structure'.

2. Exterial Structure:- The external structure of the party organization encompasses the idea of members, supporters and associated groups. The concept of external structure suggests the relationship between party organisation and polity, society as well. In relation to external structure, Duverger talks about 'Direct' and 'Indirect' party system.[17] He delineates that if membership is direct through individual, the party may be called 'direct party'. On the other hand, if membership happens to be through union or group it is 'indirect party'. The most common example, according

to him, is the British Labour Party which sustains its support and membership through trade unions. Under this category comes religious, ethnic parties too which claim their membership through the primary associations based on religion and ethnicity.

Coming to the third aspect of organizational model of political parties, we shall discuss 'Leadership pattern'.

3. **Leadership-pattern:-** Leadership structure poses a great controversy. The work of Weber, Ostrogorski and Michels still hold a considerable control over the debate on leadership. Structurally speaking leaders and leadership are generally one of the main channels through which the parties are linked to people. Besides, the nature of leadership is not a thing to be engineered but as a fact it emerges in a particular social-political milieu which shapes its nature. For example, the chances of emergence of charismatic leadership are fairly high in a party structure where norms and mores of leadership succession are not deeply institutionalized. Blondel cites the example of Gaullist Party in the Fourth and Fifth French Republics. Contrary to it bureaucratic-legalistic leaders emerge

from such a party organization where structures of
hierarchy, succession, displacement are clearly defined
and observed. Duverger[18] talks about different types
of leadership emerging in different sorts of party
structure and societal milieu. More often than not his
study lapses in subjective evaluation of the things.

At the end, to sum up organizational approach to
the study of political party, one can safely assert that
the proponents of this theory, unnecessarily let them
remain pre-occupied with merely one variable i.e. party
structure. Other important factors, such as social,
economic structure, national history, culture institutional
traditions, geography are either neglected or relegated
to peripheral roles.

Secondly, we see, as pointed out by Aaron B.
Wildavsky[19] that the work of the champion of organi-
zational framework, Duverger suffers from over-generalization
when he proceeds for classification of parties based on
the study of U.S. and European countries. Thirdly, his
general theory fails to make distinctions between
institutions and practices which have identical or
similar labels and yet manifest significantly different
behaviors. For example, Falange party of Spain and

Communist Party of U.S.S.R. both represent single party but their activities differ largely. Furthermore, multi-party systems in Australia, Denmark differ from multi-party system of France but find some resemblance with British two party system. After a fair amount of discussion on 'organizational theoretical framework', the debate calls for the review of second model, namely 'Developmental Approach'.

2. Developmental Approach

Samuel Huntington, Joseph Lapalombara, Myron Weine Gabriel Almond and Powell[20] are the leading theorists of 'Developmental approach'; they believe that the study of political parties should be carried out through the clear understanding of the process of political development. These scholars view the emergence of party system as a sequence of political development. They opine that what power dam or steel mill is to economic development, political party is to political development.

Lapalombara and Myron Weiner have brought out four salient features of political development that account for the birth of political parties and sustain its relevance in the system. These four dimensions

are - national integration, political participation, legitimacy and the management of conflict.[21] Let us discuss each problem in short.

First, comes the idea of 'political participation'. In the wake of modernization forces viz. urbanization, technical innovations, mass communication, spread of education - masses think with an increased desire to participate in political process. Here comes the role of political party to regulate and articulate that desire. The party may either attract limited admission (cadre based party) or full admission (mass party) to carry out the task of political participation.

Next figures the idea of 'Legitimacy' where in early phase each political party is confronted with the problem of legitimizing the authority. A party which replaces previous patterns of governance - aristocracy, monarchy, colonial bureaucrary or praetorian rule - makes attempt to legitimize its new role and authority by winning popular support for its new government and new system of government.

Next stands the issue of 'National Integration'. Lapalombora and Weiner[22] talk about two dimensions of national integration. First is the capacity of government

to control its territorial jurisdiction and persuade masses
to link their allegiance to nation above local concerns.
Second is, regularisation of structure and process which
facilitate meaningful participation for all discrete
elements of the nation. These two factors cannot be
achieved by Government itself, it requires the support
of political parties which will create conducive ground
for emergence of a nation-state. Here, party or parties
may play constructive or destructive both roles because
it can either ask for national unity or separation too.
The example of Muslim League in pre-independent India comes
closer to separationist role of political party. However,
according to development theorist, this attribute will
help to determine the position of a party or party system
in a wider context of polity.

Lastly comes the term of 'conflict' management, which
calls for the efficacy of political parties to cope with
the existing conflicts of society and polity both. The
survival and relevance of party depends upon its capacity
to manage the conflict and contribute the march of political
development. All these attributes discussed so far,
according to developmental theorists, may help to find
out co-relation between political party and political

development; one cannot study modern party system without taking political development into account.

To sum up the discussion on 'developmental approach', it is quite pertinent to briefly highlight its drawbacks. As it appears, developmental model is positively an evaluative concept generally applied for comparative study. Since there are systems and systems all over the world, it cannot be safely argued that the characteristics of a particular system - particularly that of American or European system - must be applicable to all. It provides a very close, limited and parochial model which refuses to conceive the possibility of other workable models. Besides, the characteristics suggested by the developmental model, at best, suggest only a particular set of indicators through which one may measure a system. Here the question arises if these indicators are universally applicable to all types of system. The answer will be definitely in negativebecause these indicators are precisely representative of Western political system not that of global ones.

The most serious flaw of this theory lies in its refusal to consider the importance of "context" and "environment". This model tends to overlook the impact of historical, social, cultural legacies of a particular system. In addition, it conveniently avoids the socio-

economic dynamics of the system that shape it in the present form. Since it refuses to consider the role of time and space, it evaluates the system in its static or "as it exists" condition which frustrates the cause of scientific study of any social phenomenon. Next, the whole framework of this model operates within the framework of functionalism which has already been proved inadequate to analyse the dynamics of a changing society.

Lastly, this model reflects the over-burden of ethnocentric values and norms which are essentially derived from Western countries. This value-laden model brings out concepts of 'developed', 'undeveloped' or 'underdeveloped' which negate the feasibility of any scientific as well as objective study of the newly independent, emerging states. A critical scientific study never calls for value judgement that a particular phenomenon is "bad" or "good"; it only strives for objective projection of the truth and nothing else. Hence calling a country "underdeveloped" forcloses the possibility of fair and neutral study of its political system. After a critical appraisal of developmental theoretical model, now I should proceed to the third framework namely, 'Sociological approach'.

3.   Sociological Approach

Some recent developments have rejected the conventional explanation of nature and activities of parties based on institutional exposition. Influence of Marx, Weber and Freud has tilted the analysis in favour of social, cultural and psychological explanations.[23] Max Weber asserts -

> "In any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through 'class situation' or 'status situation' and they may recruit their following respectively from one or the other. But, they need be neither purely 'class' nor purely 'status' parties. In most cases they are partly class parties, partly status parties sometimes they are neither."[24]

Taking this one other writers also tried to study linkages between party and society. First, it was R. Michels who in his study of political leadership traces the pattern of recruitment and supports forthcoming from society.[25] Some recent writers[26] find out the relationship between party and society as a result of inherent societal conflict and cleavages, that's why sometimes some scholars refer sociological theory as 'cleavages theory', according to which, political party represents social, economic and political cleavages of society but the importance of parties lies in forgoing reconciliation between existing conflict and cleavages.

The main thrust of sociological theory is that party systems are obvious expression of social structure and culture. The party in this image, exists as an intermediary group or mechanism representing and articulating multiple interests for the achievement of direct control over the power apparatus of society. As we plainly state the susceptibility of party to the structure of society, in fact, the relation between party systems and social structure and culture are far from simple or readily apparent.[27]

The first pre-requisite for a fairly accurate appraisal of the intricate web of social relations within modern parties must be located in terms of relationship among leaders, followers and society members. It requires the study of authority structure, socio-political culture, function, selection and mobilization of masses etc. The relationship between party and populace starts with the process of recruitment and mobilization. In the broader framework of political system this political mobilization may itself prove to be a function of social mobilization. This social mobilization in the form of political mobilization will reflect the societal structure of that particular society.[28] The idea of mobilization establishes two way traffic between party and the populace -

the party makes conscious and determined attempts to
penetrate ever new strata of society if it has to maximize
its chances for acquiring public office; on the other
hand the growing saliency of party in the life of community
forces individuals and groups to seek its support for
the articulation of their demands upon the political
system, thus a mutually needy relationship is established.[29]
This criterion of mobilization will help one to understand
the nature of political party whether it is "open" party
recruiting and reaching to all sections of society or
it is a "closed" party exposed to a very limited section
of society.

As it is generally observed that all institutions of
society represent its characteristics in microscopic form so
does political party symbolize. Hence a complete under-
standing of societal structure is necessary to understand
the structural relationship of party. But to be cautious,
one must keep himself aware of the fact that often
profoundest socio-cultural cleavages are not reflected
in existing party system, or are only imperfectly reflected.
Sometimes socio-cultural splits find political outlets other
than parties. They may have to find such alternative
outlets, if parties are, as they well may be, unresponsive

to socio-cultural divisions and changes of society. Such discrepancy can be detected in transitional societies where societal cleavages and pattern of relation keep on changing.

Having discussed 'sociological' approach, let us discuss the last approach which is generally least represented in debate over approaches to the study of political parties.

4.   Ideological Approach

American politics has for some time been characterized as "non-programmatic"; "The end of ideology"[30] for the American political scene has often been proclaimed. But, as a fact, it cannot be denied that ideology, in some form or the other always makes its presence felt in the party through its member-leaders' orientations, policies and programmes.

Recently historians have stressed the role of 'ideology' in the development of parties. To them emergence of Parliament, sufferage, party all are related to the gradual emergence of democratic ideologies. R.R. Palmer[31] forcefully argues that concepts (ideology) which justified

placing limitations on authority of kings and nations
which facilitated the creation of Parliament and expansion
of sufferage and the establishment of civil liberties,
predated the emergence of political parties. Besides,
his argument we see in modern world that wide variety of
ideologies have in fact, served as vehicles for the
justification of political process which nurtured the
growth of political parties. Socialist doctrines reinforces
the point. Now coming to point of relationship between
party and ideology, we shall discuss some issues which
legitimize the existence of party.

Ideology plays important role to understand political
parties as it is rightly suggested by Dr. Bhambri.[32] In
modern times, generally Communist countries and Third World
countries which want to bring change in existing relation-
ship, float such parties which are ideologically committed
to certain ideals to achieve the goal. As a fact, ideology
perform two important psychological functions:

1. It enables to surmount or to reconcile member's
interest group loyalties by giving an overarching framework.

2. It evolves a code of conduct and a standard of belief
that gives meaning and purpose to activeparticipation in
politics as well as to more intimate group association.

In practice we see that scope of the demands that party ideologies make upon the individual with respect to the obligations of political citizenship, constitutes a fundamental clue to the character of the party. For example, generally people call an ideology 'totalitarian' when the party's demands upon the individual are exclusive that is, when the party calls for unquestioning obedience and loyalty to its tenets, its programme and its orders over and above the claims of any other institution. German National Socialism, Italian Fascism come under such 'totalitarian' type of ideology. Contrary to it, Western countries claim that their parties are governed by 'Liberal' or 'pragmatic' ideology which does not ask such exacting claims and commitments. Some writers, especially socialist thinkers, believe that this kind of political belief is not an 'ideology' at all, because it does not have any concrete shape and tenet. Comparison of ideologies - socialist or liberal - is an value loaded question. The present discussion will not be proper forum to discuss over it at great length.

In spite of its polemical nature, 'ideological' approach for the study of political party helps us to get the clear picture of a party. For an investigative

study to know the ideological impact one should try
to study the functions of party - whether all functions
of the party are guided by a rigid ideology or occasional
freedom from ideology.

To bring the whole discussion on approaches to an
end, we see that party system cannot be characterized
or studied by a single approach. Numerous conditions
are involved in determining the origin and nature
of political party. No approach, as we have seen,
encompasses a comprehensive account of all the
influential elements. Hence, one is obliged to suggest
that fusion of all the four approaches will help to get
a complete picture of political parties or party system.
In this present work, the issues related with the
typology of political parties have been omitted. Generally,
scholars divide party-systems in one party, two-party,
multi-party and one-dominant party system. But such
simple typologies do not cover the whole gamut of existing
party systems. The fault with typology is that its all
postulates are essentially based on criteria which are
inferred from Western political party systems. The
issue of typology is such an intricate problem that it
requires a detailed discussion which is neither
desirable nor feasible to take up right now at this stage.of
research. Since existing typologies are highly vulnerable

to empirical verification and there is no technical
precision to clearly define the numerical classification
of parties, the work on the typology or classification
of parties demands for fresh thinking and re-evaluation
of existing frameworks. A clear justice to such a complex
problem can be done during the higher research programme,
say, at the level of Ph.D.

Last, one can easily state that not a single approach
is sufficient enough to explain all the activities of
political parties of various persuasions. These approaches
put together may yield certain theoretical frameworks,
fairly viable to provide a meaningful study. Scholars,
studying Indian political parties have drawn their
theoretical frameworks heavily from the fusion of these
approaches. In the following chapter, I shall take up
the study of the Congress Party in reference to the existing
theoretical frameworks.

1. The term 'Stasiology', derived from the Greek 'Statis', meaning 'faction', is suggested by Maurice Duverger in his book, 'Political Parties: Their Organization And activity in the Modern State', (Lowe and Brydone, London, 1954), p. 422.

2. The Works of Ostrogorski, 'Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties' (2 Vols., London, 1902), and of Robert Michels, 'Political Parties' (London, 1915) brought a break from the past and tried to evolve some degree of generalization and systematization. Their approach was novel in the sense, they tried to move from particular to general and study political parties in their wider perspective. Next came the studies of Finer, 'Comparative Government' (Allen Lane, London, 1925), and of Ernest Barber, 'Reflections on Government', (Oxford University Press, 1942), which gave a further fillip to this area of study.

3. Here, I have quoted the title, dubbed by Alfred Diamont, to describe the situation of political party's study during pre-Duverger era. For detailed study, please see, 'Alfred Diamont -'A Survey of Literature on Political Parties'; in 'The Journal of Parties', No. XI, 1951, and Frederick C. Engelmann, 'A Critique of Recent Writings on Political Parties', published 'The Journal of Politics', Vol. XIX, 1959, pp. 423-440.

4. Please see, Maurice Duverger, 'Political Parties', op. cit. p. XIII. Before Duverger, the studies in this field was confined largely to histories of parties, accounts of their electoral fortunes and discussions of their programmes and ideologies.

5. Please see Giovanni Sartori, 'Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis' (Cambridge University Press, London, 1976), pp. 25-27.

6. This point has been discussed at full length by Neumann in his book, 'Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics' (ed.) (University Press of Chicago, Chicago, 1956), pp. 395-421.

7. In S. Neumann (ed.), 'Modern Political Parties', op. cit., p. 397.

8. The idea that political party is a "social organism", is developed and discussed by S.J. Eldersveld in his book, 'Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis' (Rand and Mcnally, Chicago, 1964), pp. 1-4.

9. Quoted from, Herbert Simon, 'Comments on the Theory of Organisations', published in American Political Science Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, December 1952, pp. 1130.

10. Please see, Jean Blondel, 'An Introduction to Comparative Politics' (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969), pp. 99-101.

11. For an interesting discussion on this issue please see, Harry Echstein and David Apter (eds.), 'Comparative Politics' (The Free Press, New York, 1963), pp. 327-332.

12. S. Neumann has discussed at length on the problem of theorising of political parties in his article 'Toward a Theory of Political Parties', published in 'World Politics', Vol. VI, July, 1954, pp. 549-563.

13. Quoted from S. Neumann, 'Modern Political Parties', op. cit., p. 394.

14. Please see, Maurice Duverger, 'Political Parties', op. cit.

15. After talks about the concept of structure in the work of Duverger. For detailed inquiry, please see 'Comparative Politics', op. cit. pp. 428-30.

16. Please look in the work of Jean Blondel, 'An Introduction to Comparative Government', op. cit., pp. 108-124.

17. See M. Duverger, 'Political Parties', op. cit., pp. 5-17.

18. Please see M. Duverger, 'Political Parties', op.cit., pp. 133-202.

19. For a detailed study of Duverger's critical appreciation, please see 'A Methodological Critique of Duverger's Political Party', by Aaron B. Wildavsky, published in 'The Journal of Politics', Vol. XXI, 1959, pp. 303-318.

20. The works carried by developmental theorists are, Samuel Huntington 'Political Order in Changing Societies' (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1968); Lapalombara and Weiner 'Political Parties and Political Development' (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1966); Almond and Powel, 'Comparative Politics: A developmental Approach' (Little Brown, 1966).

21. Please see Lapalombara and Weiner, 'Political Parties and Political Development', op. cit., pp. 399-435.

22. Ibid, pp. 413-415.

23. David Truman, in his introductory chapter of the book, 'The Governmental Process' (Knapf, New York, 1951) briefly discusses the influential factors that have tilted the trend of studies.

24. Quoted from Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in H. Gerth and Mills Wright (eds.) 'From Max Weber: 'Essays in Sociology', op. cit.

25. See R. Michel, 'Political Parties', op. cit., pp. 339-344.

26. Recent work on political parties through sociological perspective has been carried out by E. Allardt and S. Rokkan (ed.), 'Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology' (New York, Free Press, 1970), Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (ed.), 'Party Systems and Voter Alignments' (The Free Press, New York, 1967); Downs Anthony, 'An Economic Theory of Democracy' (Harper, New York, 1957) and S. Neumann, 'Modern Political Parties', op. cit.

27. On the problem of locating sociological factors in party structure, please see Harry Eckstein, 'Party Systems', published in 'International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences', Vol. XI, pp. 428-453.

28. For detailed study on social mobilization and its impact on political behaviour please see Karl W. Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', published in American Political Science Review, September 1961, pp. 493-514.

29. Please see, S. Eldersveld, 'Political Parties', op. cit. pp. 5-7.

30.   See Daniel Bell, 'The End of Ideology', Penguin
      Books, New York, 1956.

31.   Please see R.R. Palmer, 'The Age of Democratic
      Revolution', (Princeton University Press, 1959).

32.   On the role of Ideology, Professor Bhambri has
      written a~very good article 'Ideology and Political
      Parties in India', published in 'Economic and
      Political Weekly', April 29, 1968, pp. 643-46.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE UNDERSTANDING
OF THE CONGRESS PARTY

In the previous chapter I have discussed the various approaches to the study of political parties and tried to give a critical appraisal of them. -As I have concluded there that not a single approach alone is sufficient enough to provide a framework for the understanding of Indian political parties, the least say, of the Congress. These approaches altogether give a broader perspective to understand the concept, nature and characteristic of political parties in general. Literally application of these approaches to the study of a single party involves much hazard precisely due to non-consensus among the scholars over the efficacy. However, perceptive students of political parties have tried to evolve certain frameworks for the analysis of a single party by drawing inferences from these approaches. Thus, their efforts in this direction have yielded the emergence of various frameworks - like Marxist framework, Liberal framework or non-Marxist framework.

Generally scholars who have worked on Indian political parties, particularly on the Congress Party, are confronted with a society which is transitional and where

the existence of different social formations is one of
the existing realities of the society, rapidly undergoing
a process of conflict and change. This very fluidity
of social forces has made them to adopt broader
frameworks which may help to understand these forces
for the analysis of the party. Commonly these frameworks
may be categorized under two sub-titles - Marxist
framework and non-Marxist framework.[1]

Since my dissertation deals with the Congress Party
in Uttar Pradesh, it is necessary to understand the very
nature of Congress Party as a whole. Congress Party is
a unified party with its spreading organs in various
States of the country. All the parts are invariably
linked with the body in terms of structure, ideology
and composition. The only difference is the impact of
immediate social surroundings in which it works and that
vary from State to State. Hence, before taking up the
case study or survey of the U.P. Congress, it is
essential to clearly understand its parent organization.
Because parts cannot be known properly till one does not
know the whole.

Now, to open the discussion, on the nature of the
Congress Party I shall present the views of both perspectives,

say Marxist and the non-Marxist. First, I take up the Marxist framework. According to this viewpoint, State, in essence, is a state of one class, though that class has its allies.[2] This compact group is usually called the "Ruling Class" of the State. In a capitalist society it is bourgeoisie along with landed interests which constitute the 'ruling class' whereas in a socialist state the 'ruling class' consists of working class and the toiling peasantry.

In a capitalist society the relationship between the ruling class and its political representatives lumped under the shelter of political party is very complex and mediated. Marx clearly stated in the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' that political representation does not mean complete uniformity of the perception of interests of a class by its representatives:

> "Only one must not form the narrow minded nation that the petty bourgeoisie on principle wishes to enforce an egoistic class interest. Rather it believes that the specific conditions of its emancipation are the general conditions within the frame of which alone modem society can be saved and class struggle avoided..... What makes them (democratic representatives) the represen-tatives of the petty bourgeoisie is that fact that in their minds they do not get beyond the limits which the latter do not get beyond in life, that they are consequently driven, theoretically, to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and social position drive the latter

practically. This is in general the relationship
between the political and literary representatives
of a class and the class they represent."[3]

This lengthy paragraph quoted from Marx suggests
that the relation between the ruling class and its
political representatives is apparently very deceptive
and subtle. In appearance they hardly behave as agents
of the ruling class; they show a fair amount of autonomy
and choices but in practice they follow, or to say, they
are obliged by objective constraints to follow the
policies which essentially serve the interests of the
ruling class. To make itself more illusory, it works
out some measure of reforms and welfare for the benefits
of the ruled majority which take the actions of the
political representatives as universal and catholic.
This illusion helps to sustain the class dominance.[4]
Precisely this illusion is another version of false
consciousness.

Now one can easily understand the affairs of
party politics - decisions of the party, precisely
because it is more diffuse in membership, movement
organizers, institutional leadership, actual makers
of decisions, lobbyists, individual leaders are less
directly related to the requirements of a class than

its collective function. Party always has a dual function
vis-a-vis its determinant class: a function of reflecting
or rendering effective its interests, but also in the
process of realising this function, it must perform a
mobilisation function, organizing support inside other
classes for its demands, so that it does not appear
sectional. Here it takes the help of false consciousness.

Since a pattern of general relation between the
ruling class and political party has already been
described from Marxism angle, this essay will proceed
to study the dominant position of ruling Congress Party
in the context of Indian ruling class. First, let us
locate who are the members of the Indian ruling class,
next their relationship with the Congress Party and the
role of the Congress Party in terms of its relation with
the ruling class. The Communist Party of India speaks
about the class character of the ruling class in India,
as follows:

> "The state in India is the organ of the class rule
> of the national bourgeoisie as a whole, in which
> the big bourgeoisie holds powerful influence.
> This class rule has strong link with the landlords.
> These factors give rise to the reactionary pulls
> in the state power."[5]

Communist Party of India points out the national
bourgeoisie at the driving seat while landlords sitting

at the back-seat serve as the allies of national
bourgeoisie. The inclusion of landlords introduced a
curious mixture of feudal or semi-feudal temperament
which renders the state function essentially reactionary.
On the other hand, CPI(M) makes a little different
observation of Indian ruling class -

> "The present Indian state is the organ of the
> class rule of the bourgeoisie and the landlord,
> led by big bourgeoisie, who are increasingly
> collaborating with foreign finance capital in
> the pursuit of capitalist path of development.
> This class character essentially determines
> role and function of the state in the life of
> the country."[6]

There is a subtle distinction between the two
characterisations, but the same classes are involved
in the class structure of the state, besides CPI(M)
makes special mention of a collusion between indigenous
bourgeoisie and the foreign finance capital. But the
aim of both the definitions is to assert the class-
character of Indian polity.

Since Congress Party has been the major political
party of the Indian polity with a long experience of
ruling over the state machinary, it becomes rather
essential to study the relation between the ruling class
of the country and the Congress Party. According to

various leftist scholars, the Congress Party has always
been the vehicle through which the interests of big
business and feudal elements were served. Instead of
making any sweeping remark on the nature of the Congress
Party, briefly let me discuss its two determining
elements, to say, agricultural and industrial policy.

The first text on economic and social reform which
was adopted by the Congress Party after Independence was
a resolution passed in November 1947 by the AICC. It
contained the following Passage:

> "The land with its resources and all means of
> production as well as the means of distribution
> and of exchange should belong to the community
> and be administered in its own interest."[8]

To give an expression to this feeling, the Congress
passed various land legislations but unfortunately its
efforts showed obvious lack of enthusiasm. Scores of
study carried on its topic have amply proved that the
legislations in any case did not lead to an actual change
in land relations in the countryside.[9]

Coming next to industrial policies of the Congress
Party, Marxist scholars view it full of contradictions
since it claims for the establishment of a "mixed-economy"
where supposedly private and public enterprises are

lying side by side.[10] Apparently public sectors were
established to check the avaricious practice of private
sector and lead the society towards the avowed goal of
socialism.[11] But, as a fact, the institutions of large
public sector provided infrastructure, facilities and
raw material for private controlled industry, scrupulously
leaving the greener pastures for profit to private
businessmen.[12] Besides, the deficient functioning of
public sectors take-over of "sick industries", only went
a long way to help the Indian bourgeoisie. While Marxist
scholars attack the policies of Indian government for
its pro-bourgeois policies, they do not fail to take
into account the reformist policies of the government
aiming at the welfare of the people. However, they
view the measure of welfarism as essential instrument
to conceal the nature of state and enlist support of
masses for the system.

So far the whole debate centred around the
postulates propagated by leftist thinkers on the body
politic of India. The crux of their argument aims at
suggesting that the Congress Party is essentially a
bourgeois party. Besides committing onself to any
particular ideology, one can share – if not wholly but
to some extent – the common view that the Congress Party

does not sincerely serve the interest of the poor
always. Its economic policies, its agrarian reforms
and its method of taxation have in practice favoured the
propertied classes. Of course, theoretically it has
never admitted its adherence to bourgeois policy but its
record in the office amply reveals which part of the
population it serves first.

Looking at theCongress, on its surface it looks
placid and compact, but, time and again, internal
differences of the Party have been in the news. This
internal bickering can be understood in terms of economic
differentiation of the different owning classes in India
(the industrial bourgeoisie, the big financial groups,
the commercial bourgeoisie, the landowners and the
rural and urban petty bourgeoisie).[13] Naturally enough,
the various sections and interests of the bourgeoisie
are represented within the Congress Party; this is
precisely why there have been conflicts of opinion
inside the Party. The success of Congress Party lies
in containing the factions of the bourgeoisie and
preventing upon conflict between them. But this make-
shift forged compromise gave way in 1969 in the face of
crisis of economic stagnation and rise of a few other
upwardly mobile classes. It resulted in the 'split' as
a response to the new situation while subsequently it was
justified solely as an ideological conflict between

those with a vested interest in the status quo and those committed to socialist change.[14] Political rhetoric emphasizing slogans of class struggle replaced the earlier pragmatic language of accommodation. The consequence of this upheaval was - first it ostensibly radicalized the party politics of the 'New' Congress. Second, it made it very clear that an accommodative party ideology and organization aimed at conciliating the propertied classes cannot go hand in hand with the plans and institutions designed to accomplish social reform in the wake of rising social discontent.[15] However, the subsequent policies of the 'New' Congress barring a few measures of social welfarism, showed little evidence that it really went beyond of a certain limit. Presently, the pledges of the party appear a total failure because it could not achieve economic development and reduction of disparities in the absence of basic institutional changes which might have led towards the goal of growth and social justice.[16]

So far our discussion exclusively dwelt on the Marxian perspective of the Congress Party. To make the understanding of the Party more comprehensive and complete, it is rather pertinent to take up the viewpoint of non-Marxist studies too. Instead of

looking into the nature of socio-economic interests or
class-constellation of Indian political affair, this
approach begins with the study of structural set up of
political institution and its relation with the political
process. Starting from this basic premise non-Marxist
scholars have pointed out two main characteristics of
the Congress Party which may be described in the
following lines:

1. The Hegemonic or one party dominant position
   of the Congress Party.
2. The nature of factionalism within the
   dominant party.

These two factors constitute the essence of the
whole studies carried out on non-Marxist framework. To
begin with, let us take first, the hegemonic issue
associated with the Congress. Strictly speaking, the
characterof a party system of any modern state is
substantially determined by the manner in which political
forces are organised in that party system. Looking from
this perspective, various perceptive students of the
Indian party system have characterized it as "Hegemonic
or one party dominance system."[17] All these scholars
have unanimously distinguished it from 'one party system',

which operates in a closed, non-competitive political system. Lucidly Morris-Jones[18] points out the pertinent issue of finding out the relation between dominance, alternation and competition. In context of India we find dominance coexisting with competition with an occasional trace of alternation. He further observes that the system over which Congress presides is characterized by the three inter-related factors. First the party itself is "open" in terms of recruitment; second the system is open to other parties to enter the competition for power, it is confirmed by their ability to collect 55 per cent of votes in various elections. Finally there is marked openness between the Congress and other parties with positive communication and interaction between them.[19] Rajni Kothari describes its dominance in terms of its openness and competitiveness. He points out that Indian party system consists of a 'party of consensus' and 'parties of pressure'. The latter function on the margin while the former in centre. Inside the margin, where consensus-party operates, there are various factions coexisting within it. Outside the margin are several opposition groups, parties and dissidents from the ruling party and other internal groups and important individuals. The groups

which are outside the margin constitute occasional alter-
nation (as it happened in 1967, 1969 and 1977) to the
ruling party. In addition their role is to constantly
pressurize, criticise and influence it by mobilising
masses.[20] Gopal Krishna notices that in spite of its
dominance, Congress Party with its inherent factionalism
and competition with other parties in electoral field
does not refute the Western theories of Liberty that
a democratic political system must have a fair amount
of plurality of opinions and interests characterized
by free and open competition.[21]

The opinion and views expressed by these scholars
more or less articulate similar postulates. The burden
of their premises is that Congress represents the
dominant position in Indian Party system. To me this
description appears accurate for describing the national
scene before 1967 but even then it cannot be applied
to all the states because a few, particularly Kerala,
Orissa, Andhra, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, witnessed
the failure of Congress Party to win a majority of seats
subsequently, it either entered coalition to form
government or failed to form a government. Moreover,
after 1967 it suffered many setbacks in various states

and ultimately met its Waterloo in 1977. The whole argument put forth to explain occasional failures of Congress Party aims at not repudiating the theory of one party dominance but to drive the point home that Congress is confronted with increasing opposition and competition making considerable dent in its dominant position. In other words, the dominant position of Congress cannot be taken for granted for ever.

However, piecing together all records of General Elections, held after Independence, one will arrive at a simple conclusion that the position of Congress has substantially been premier with an element of dominance. Its dominant position attracts us to look into the factors which contributed for its pre-eminence and the subsequent consequences arising out of its dominant position. As a fact, no single factor can be accounted for the existence of its dominance. Historical, social structure and political style all have to be called upon for clear picture. Instead going into deep, we shall take up a few salient factors for discussion here.

Historically looking at the phenomenon of dominance, one will see that the legacy of National

Movement gives a considerable amount of importance to
the Congress Party.[22] Generally it has been observed
all over the world, that political party emerging out
of a National Movement assumes the position of monopoly
and dominance. In such situation, nationalist political
parties elicit emotional support by projecting itself as
emancipator of the country.[23] This point certainly lends
some importance to Nationalist party but it cannot be
applicable to all over world because Kumintang in
Nationalist China, United National Party in Ceylon,
Nationalist Party in Indonesia and Muslim League in
Pakistan could not succeed in their respective free
countries in spite of their long association with National
Movement. Historically importance is attached to
"charismatic leadership" that it strengthens party system
on the pattern of one party dominance. In the case of
India, the role of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru cannot be
obviated. His charisma, undoubtedly attracted many
followers to the fold of Congress Party in post-independent
period. But again some scholars have tried to make this
theory universal and the sole determinant of the success
of a party's dominance.[24] Charismatic leaders like U Nu
in Burma, Sukarno in Indonesia, Kotelawala in Ceylon failed
to build the dominance of their parties in their respective
countries.

Now coming to political factors for hegemonic
condition of a particular party, let us discuss the case
of India. Basically there are two political factors
which apparently contribute for the dominance of
Congress. First, it is the nature of electoral system
which sometimes aids and abets fragmentation of opposition
and domination of one party. In India, the single-
majority vote yields such a result which is not
proportional to real representation. For example,
the election results of 1952, 1957 and 1962 show that
though the Congress Party polled 42.2, 45.5 and 44.4
per cent of votes all over India but it secured 68.4,
68.6 and 61.6 per cent of total seats in the country.[25]
Here, we clearly get the impression that to some extent
electoral system in our country has helped Congress
Party to maintain its dominance. The second important
factor is the ruling-party-status of Congress Party.
Congress is after all the ruling party. In the
competition for support, the ruling party possesses a
great advantage over its adversaries by virtue of its
command over distribution of patronage, the allocation
of privilege and funds for development, and control
over administrative machinery. Political aspirants
along with their supporters are, therefore, likely to

seek power within Congress which will help it to
increase its electoral base and consolidate its
dominance.[26]

Lastly we shall discuss the social factor which
speaks for the success of Congress dominance. Sociolo-
gically we find that Indian society tends to accommodate
various sub-groups into a loose, amorphous organizational
structure of society.[27] This "accommodative" and
"agglomerative", not "aggregative" nature of Indian
society can be seen in the field of politics.[28] Congress
party as a true representative of the society exhibits
itself as an "adaptive structural arrangement" to
co-opt diverse forces of the society within itself.
Myron Weiner points out that the most important factor
in the success of Congress-hegemony is its adaptive
capacity i.e. whatever is necessary for survival of
the party, it has tried to adopt itself to the immediate
environment.[29] Truely we see that Congress, at local
level adopts itself to the local power structure
essentially based on edifice of caste, language,
religion etc., whereas at the national level it attempts
to accommodate modern socio-economic forces. Accordingly,
Congress has tempered and tailored its structure and
goal. Though in a long run its very lose and amorphous

nature may prove harmful for its integration but in a
short run it has given Congress the position of dominance
by accommodating diverse sections of society under one
"umbrella like organisation".[30] Now let us consider
the subsequent result emerging out of the dominant
position of Congress.

Generally two main characteristics have been
noticed in a dominant party system. First, the role
of dominant party has been to evolve a two pronged
consensus - first between ruling elites and masses;
second between the dominant party and other parties on
the normative, procedural and policy matters. In such
a system the dominant party becomes a norm setter for
all other parties, and the model set by the Congress
has in fact been spreading, both in terms of policies
and programmes and in terms of coalition styles and
consensus making.

Secondly, it is a system in which one set of
coalitions is opposed by another set of coalitions. The
dominant party itself is a coalition of factional and
ideological groupings. So are the multiparty anti-
Congress coalitions that came to power in 1967 in various
states and in 1977 at centre and States as well. Whenever

the other coalitions cease to be viable, the dominant
party either re-adjusts its internal-factions into the
form of a new coalition or develops another kind of
coalition with the support of others. Rajni Kothari
has observed -

> "The upshot of all this is the continuance of
> a party system and a pattern of dominance and
> dissent that derive characteristics from a
> polycentric opposition to a dominant centre."[31]

FACTIONALISM

Having discussed the issues related with the
dominance of Congress Party, let us take up the second
distinct feature of Indian party system known as "factio-
nalism". Factionalism is an inevitable by-product of
one dominant party system. Factually, factionalism is a
specific aspect of political behaviour manifested by
rival groups, within a political party Duverger,[32] opines
that political parties have eventually emerged out of
factions and cliques. In sociological analysis the
term 'faction' is used in two senses.[33] Firstly, it
is a certain condition which takes place when sub-group
or groups are formed from members of a larger group
and separate themselves from the rest. Lipson points
out five salient component parts of a faction which
are as follows -

1)   a definite personnel and leaders are clearly known
      even if the boundary of membership is blurred.

ii)   Enough organisational structure is there to provide
      sub-groups a minimum of structure and cohesion.

iii) A common set of interests prevails which bring
      them together.

iv)   There is always a similar pattern of objectives to
      hold them together.

v)   Existence of an apparent (or rival) faction or group
      regarded as competitors.

Secondly factions denote to an attitude towards
them, implying feeling for their existence. Now in short
one can summarize that a faction is a group with an
articulated set of goals, operating within a larger
organization but not created by or with the approval of
the parent body. Factions, in fact, have been found in
every political party whether it is a democratic, liberal
party in Western countries or it is a totalitarian party
in a Communist country.[34] The only thing that makes
difference between factionalism of these countries and
that of India, is the very different nature of Indian
society. While these countries have already passed the
phase of modernization and development, India is a
transitional society undergoing modernization and rapid

social change where the line of differentiation between
traditional (kinship and community structures) and
modern structures (parties, bureaucracies etc.) is not
very clear and distinct. In such a society, the
explanation of factionalism in terms of external
manifestation cannot sufficiently throw clear light
until all the social forces are taken into account.
Talking about factionalism in Indian party system Myron
Weiner opines that those who join political party in
India, invariably become the members of a faction; a
person who joins a political party in India apparently
feels the need to be a member of a tightily knit face-to-
face group.[35] This compulsive desire to join faction in
any organization, including political party, may be
traced from socio-cultural background of Indian society
which inspires man to develop factional group of
traditional (viz. caste, joint family, village) order
within the structure of a modern organization like
political party.[36] Now gradually moving to concrete
analysis of factionalism, we will discuss each important
factor contributing for it.

Socially looking at the phenomenon of factionalism
we come closer to the reality of our society. Indian
society, in every sense, is a "plural society". Professor

Rasheeduddin Khan observes that ramification of its plurality can be seen in its ethnicity, culture, religion, region and other aspects of social life.[37] This plurality gives the society a great variety and heterogencity. In absence of any unifying theology or unifying secular tradition, a highly differentiated social system sprang up "which has brought functional hierarchies, spatial distinctions into a manifold frame of identifications and interdependence."[38] The result of all this has been co-existence of diverse systems and life styles: persistence of local subcultures and primary loyalties. After independence, Sonfronted with the task of integration and development, Congress Party tried to reach out the all sections of society. All the diversities of society got aggregated into party structure at various levels. The heterogeneity of society assumed the form of intra-party struggle between the diverse interests of society. Two factors - openness of Congress Party and dominant position of the party - encouraged all sorts of political aspirants to get place in it. The party at this stage did not have enough time or skill to reorganise its internal structure, hence it ultimately resorted to accommodation of various forms, lobbies and cofteries within it. Gopal Krishna has noticed that the capacity of Congress to

draw into its fold all the socially powerful elements,
was so strong that it brought various interest
organizations like working class, landed aristocracy -
within its boundary.[39] Congress tried to hold all these
groups within a loose structural framework, by avoiding
conflicts, balancing interests, blurring ideological
distinctions and allowing social and intellectual pluralism
to find a place in its own ranks. Its success lies in
forging workable consensus between ruling elite and masses
but within party it could not stop fight between power-
elites which always existed there. Angela Burger has
pointed out that ruling elites within Congress unlike
other developing countries, allowed emerging elites to
join the organisation which often became a perpetual
source of inner conflict and competition.[40] Professor
Rasheeduddin Khan has summed up the whole scene in a
very lucid narration while the party provides the
structure and an ideological base to institutionalised
public opinion, factions give interest-orientation to
intra-party politics and thereby provide party politics
with societal realism.[41]

Historically looking at factionalism, we see that
Congress emerged out of National Movement, which like
any broad oppositional movement permitted within its fold

existence of several splinter groups with differing emphasis on ideology and strategy.[42] Thus the traditions of dissent, tolerance and accommodation were already part of the Congress ethos long before it came into power after independence.

The present time conflict and factionalism of the party can be understood in terms of changing patterns of social power structure and stratification which are in a process of flux and change. One important aspect of social change in Indian-individual as well as group social mobility- has fairly changed the complexion of Congress Party and political scene of the country. Myron Weiner in his case studies of certain areas of India points out that already established castes of dominance are being replaced by new emerging castes of power. This replacement process is taking place within the local structure of Congress party where various castes of dominance are pitted against each other to dislodge.[43] As a fact, factionalism is a permanent feature of Congress Party, though occasionally either dissidents leave the party or they are purged out. We have clearly seen the situations of 1969 and 1977 which speak for boiling point of internal dissent and factionalism bursing out in the form of split.

To sum up the issue of factionalism, we can generalise its certain trends which are as follows -

i)   In one dominant party system, factionalism serves as in-built corrective to check the monalithic nature of governance and improve the resilience of party to cope with emerging forces.

ii)   The competition within the local governing elite - whether it is within a single party or between parties - and subsequent desire to strengthen their position by enlisting support speaks for "integrative" and "disintegrative" feature of factionalism within Congress Party.[44]

iii)   Corollory to this proposition is that the competition within the aspiring elite also facilitates the admission of new forces into the party and furthers the circulation of elite. Thus it disproves the theory of "iron law of oligarchy", suggested by Robert Michels.[45]

At last we can say that the study of centre level politics will be incomplete till we take into consideration the function of party politics at state level. Factional and other political activities at state level are different from the central level. The issues involved

at centre are of national level while at state they are of regional or local importance. At state level, politics is more earthy and closer to the reality of society. In order to understand the nature of state politics one will have to take into consideration the following factors:

i)   Sub-regional conflict among the discrete sub-cultural regions are found in every state. It flares up over the distribution of posts within government, allocation of fund for education and development.[46]

ii)   Caste-conflict exists in every state. Caste identification take many forms of pressure group. In practice all parties follow ethnic arithmatic for balancing among a variety of castes.[47]

iii)   Occupational lobby or interests play a greater part in state than in national politics. Trading and rural interests often clash; rural landlords, especially the middle peasantry are actively concerned with Community Development programmes, the government sponsored cooperatives with their control over the allocation of credit, fertilizer and seeds, and on the legislative side, the land

reform and agricultural taxation policies of the state governments.[48]

iv) There is often fight between organizational and governmental wings of the ruling party. The role of central machineries - like Central Working Committee and Parliamentary Board - in resolving the conflict is a quite interesting exercise.

Keeping all these factors in mind about state politics, the next chapter will start with a critical study of Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh.

1. The term 'non-Marxist' suggests those studies which are carried out by any perspective but the Marxist one. Scholars belonging to this category try to avoid the use of Marxist paradigm and its attendant jargons.

2. For a lucid study of the concept of 'State' in the context of Indian scene, please see 'Dialogue With the CPI(M)', Communist Party Publication, July 1981, No. 5, p. 17 to 28.

3. Cited from Marx and Engels, 'Selected Works', Vol. I, Moscow, 1969, p. 424.

4. Marx and Engels have clearly described the ways and means through which bourgeoisie succeeds in creating perceptions which give a ring of universality and common interest. For a detailed discussion please see - Marx and Engels, 'The German Ideology', Moscow, 1976, page 62-69.

5. Cited from the essay 'Class Character of the Ruling Class in India', by Biplab Dasgupta in 'India: State and Society: A Marxian Approach', (ed.) K. Mathew Kurian, p. 115, Orient Longman, Madras, 1975.

6. Ibid., p. 117.

7. For a historical treat, please see Bipan Chandra, 'Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India', Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1979; Ulyanovsky, 'Socialism and the Newly Independent Nations', Progress, Moscow, 1974; Mohit Sen, 'The Indian Revolution', P.P.H., Delhi, 1970. For a present assessment please look into the works of Max Zins - 'Crises and Dominance in the Congress System', a paper for the European Conference on South Asia, Paris, 1978; Mohit Sen, 'Congress Socialism: Appraisal and Appeal', C.P.I., Delhi, 1976.

8. Instead of going into details about the programme of Congress Party, here I have quoted a passage from 'Land Reforms in India', by H.D. Malaviya, New Delhi, 1955, p. 79.

9. For an interesting study please read Bhowani Sen, 'Indian Land System and Land Reforms', Delhi, 1955; H.D. Malviya, 'Land Reform in India, New Delhi, 1955.

10. See, the 'Introduction' of the book entitled 'India Independent', by Charles Bettelhein, MacGillon and Lee Ltd., London, 1968.

11. See the Chapter VII, in the book entitled, 'India Independent', by Charles Bettelheim, MacGibbon and Kee Ltd., London, 1968, p. 145-175.

12. See Michal Kalecki (ed.) 'Selected Essays on the Economic Growth of the Socialist and the Mixed Economics', Cambridge University Press, 1972.

13. For a detailed study, please see 'India Independent', Charles Bettelheim, op. cit., page 344-351.

14&15. This issue has been discussed at length by Francine Frankel in her book, 'India's Political Economy, 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution', Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1980, p. 434-490.

16. Ibid, p. 491-510.

17. Rajni Kothari, "The Congress System in India", Asian Survey, Dec. 1964, Vol. IV, No. 12, p. 1161-1173; W.H. Morris Jones, 'Parliament and the Dominant Party: Indian Experience', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1964, p. 296-307; Gopal Krishna, 'One Party Dominance: Development and Trends', 'Perspective', Indian Institute of Public Administration, Vol. XII, No. 1, Jan.-March 1966, p. 1-65.

18. Morris Jones, 'Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-Relations in the Indian Political System', in his, 'Politics Mainly Indian', Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1978, p. 213-232.

19. Ibid, p. 214-217.

20. See Rajni Kothari, 'The Congress System in India', published in his book 'Party System and Election Studies', op. cit., p. 1-3.

21. Gopal Krishna, 'One Party Dominance - Development and Trends', published in Perspective, I.I.P.A. Journal, op. cit., p. 1-4.

22.   This point has been elaborately discussed by Myron
       Weiner in his book, 'Party Building in a New
       Nation: The Indian National Congress', The
       University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967.

23.   Lucian Pye in his article, 'Party Systems and
       National Development in Asia', lays emphasis on
       the role of National Movement in bringing about
       dominant party system. The article is published
       in the entitled, 'Political Parties and Political
       Development', (ed.) by Joseph La Palombra and
       Myron Weiner, Princeton University Press, New
       Jersey, 1966, p. 369-398.

24.   Fred R. Mehden in his article 'Political Parties
       in the Developing Nations', in his book 'Politics
       of the Developing Nations', Prentice Hall, New
       Jersey, 1964, p. 53-76, has given undue weightage
       to this point.

25.   See, Myron Weiner (ed.), 'State Politics in India',
       Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1968,
       p. 42-47.

26.   Myron Weiner, in a case study of Kaira district
       in Gujrat has amply proved the benefits accruing
       to Congress Party from its ruling position. See
       his book - 'Party Building in a New Nation',
       op. cit.

27.   For a deep insight on 'accommodative' and
       'agglonerative' nature of Indian society, please
       see Iravaki Karve, 'Hindu Society: An Inter-
       pretation', Deccan College, Poona, 1961.

28.   See an essay of Rajni Kothari entitled, 'India:
       Oppositions in a Consensual Polity', in Robert A.
       Dalil (ed.), 'Regimes and Opposition', Yale
       University Press, London, 1973, p. 305-340.

29.   See, Myron Weiner, 'Party Building in a New Nation',
       op. cit.

30.   It is a term which is frequently used by Morris
       Jones in his book 'Politics Mainly Indian', op. cit.,
       to express the all-encompassing nature of Congress
       Party.

31.   Quoted from Rajni Kothari, 'India: Oppositions in
       a Consensual Polity', in Robert Dahl (ed.), 'Regimes
       and Oppositions', op. cit. p. 321.

32. Maurice Duverger, 'Political Parties', Wily and Sons, London, 1954, p. XV.

33. See Leslie Lipson quoted in Julius Gould and William L. Klob (ed.), 'Dictionary of Social Sciences', Tovistock Publications, New York, 1964, p. 255-256.

34. See Giovanni Sartori, 'Politics and Party Systems: A framework for Analysis', Cambridge University Press, London, 1976, Vol. 1, p. 105-106.

35. See, Myron Weiner, 'Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi Party System', Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1957, p. 224-238.

36. This conclusion refers to the case study carried out by Oscar Lewis to understand the factional nature of Indian villagers essentially based on kinship lines. See his report, 'Group Dynamics in a North India Village: A Study of Factions', submitted to Programme Evaluation Committee of Planning Commission in 1954.

37. Professor Rasheeduddin Khan has provided a deep insight in the plural nature of Indian society in his essay, 'National Integration', Seminar, 128, April 1970, p. 20-25.

38. Cited from Rajni Kothari, 'India: Oppositions in a Consensual Polity' in R. Dahl, 'Regime and Oppositions', op. cit. p. 305-306.

39. See Gopal Krishna, 'One Party Dominance - Development and Trends', op. cit., p. 4.

40. See Angela Berger, 'Opposition in a Dominant Party System', University of California Press, California, 1969, p. i - xi.

41. See Dr. Rasheeduddin Khan, 'The Indian Political Landscape', in 'India Quarterly', XXIV, Oct.-Dec., 1968, p. 301-310.

42. The amorphous nature of National Movement, the pparent body of Congress Party, can be ascertained from the existence of various groups like Swaraj Party, Socialist Party etc. within its framework. Besides, Justice Party in 1917, C.P.I. in 1924, Hindu Mahasabha in 1925 arose with the help of a few individuals who once had been Congressmen.

43. Myron in his book, 'Party Building in a New Nation', op. cit. points out that local case study of Guntur, Belgaum, Madurai and Kaira districts amply shows that dominant castes of yesteryear are facing tough pressure from emerging castes within the power structure of Congress Party, p. 468-74.

44. A lucid analysis of this aspect has been carried out by Paul Brass, 'Factionalism and the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh', Asian Survey, September 1964, p. 1037-1047.

45. Robert Michels in his book, 'Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy', Free Press, 1962, asserts that in all parties there is tendency in higher echelon that a miniscule minority of elite govern the whole structure of the party.

46. See Iqbal Narain (ed.), 'State Politics in India', Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967; Introduction.

47. See L.I. Rudolph and Susan Rudolph, 'The Political Role India's Caste Associations', in Eric A. Nordlinger (ed.), 'Politics and Society', Prentice Hall, 1970.

48. See Myron Weiner, 'State Politics in India', op.cit.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE U.P. CONGRESS
PARTY - PHASE I (1969-73)

Before making any attempt to understand the
Congress politics in Uttar Pradesh, it is essential to
know a general background of the state which will
facilitate a better appreciation of the reality.

In 1834 the 'Upper Provinces' from the Bengal
Presidency was separated and created as the 'Agra
Presidency' with a Governor for a short time. Again in
1930 it was reconstituted as 'North West Province' and
placed under a Lieutenant Governor. In subsequent
period 'Oudh' was also annexed into British jurisdiction
by 1856 and was placed under the Chief Commissioner. In
1877 these two provinces were placed under one adminis-
trator i.e. Lieutenant Governor. In 1902 this joint
administrative territory was named as 'United Province
of Agra and Oudh'. In 1935 its name was shortened to
United Provinces. On Independence, the states of Rampur,
Binares and Tehri Garhwal were merged with United
Provinces. In 1950 the name of United Provinces was
changed to Uttar Pradesh. Historically speaking U.P.
is essentially an artifact put together by the British

with a little administrative historical background. It has significant impact from the political point of view.[1] While people still consider themselves as belonging to Oudh and Agra, they have no political history to bind them as a single administrative unit. U.P. has never had a district personality like Tamil Nadu, Bengal or Punjab, hence it lacks a term like 'Upiyites' which may evoke an emotional response symbolizing regional, linguistic, cultural loyalties. However, in recent times, its people are gradually becoming aware of their political clout which they jointly wield as a result of numerical preponderance in Indian federal state.

The state of Uttar Pradesh occupies a central place in the vast area of the great gangetic plain lying between northern Himalayan slope and the southern Vindhya hills. In the north it is bounded by Himachal Pradesh, Tibet and Nepal, east by Bihar, south by M.P. and west by Rajasthan, Haryana and Delhi. The area of the state is 294, 413 square kilometer and is adminis_ tratively divided into 56 districts.[2] There is no clear demarcation of regions or sub-regions in the state but in terms of geographical contiguity and dialects it can be easily divided into four regional entities, say,

Eastern U.P., Central U.P., Western U.P. and Hill area.
Among these four regions two regions, Eastern U.P. and
Hill area, represent the economically backward regions.
According to one estimate[3], the per capita income in
Hill area is Rs. 205 and in Eastern U.P. is Rs. 229 as
compared to Rs. 273 for the state, Rs. 300 for the
Western zone and Rs. 308 for the Central zone. According
to Census of 1971, the population of the state accounts
for 88, 341, 144, with a density of 300 per square
kilometer. However, the areas of highest density are
Eastern U.P. and Western U.P. claiming 855 and 808
per square mile respectively.[4] In Eastern U.P. and Hill
area a higher proportion of persons are engaged in
agriculture and have a lower degree of urbanization
than the Western and Central U.P. The settlement
pattern of villages also differs, with groupings of
hamlets in the east, a cluster and hamlet pattern in
the center and compact villages in the West and in the
Hill area a dispersed settlement pattern is found.[5]

One of the most important elements of the social
structure is religion and caste. According to Census
1971, Hindus numbered 73,997,597; Muslims 13,676,533;

Sikhs 369,672; Christians, 131,810; Jains 124,728;
Budhists 39,639. The state is predominantly inhabited
by Hindus accounting for 82 per cent of the total
population, followed by 15 per cent of Muslims.[6] Though
Muslims are second in number but there is no district in
which Muslims hold a majority over Hindus. The
fascinating aspect of ethnic life is Caste-system.
One can enumerate the castes under three broad groups
based on divisions recognized by government and society.
The lowest grouping consists of Scheduled Castes,
prominent among them areChamars, Pasis and Bhangis.
This grouping is defined, protected and given advantages
in education and government employment. The middle group-
ing consists of the backward castes who are defined by
law and given some advantages fewer than those of the
Scheduled Castes. They are generally 'peasant castes'
as were described in the District Gazetteers of British
days as the "backbone of the cultivating community".
The three most important are - Kurmi, Yadav and Lodhi
castes. Other backward castes less prominent but of
some importance in politics, include the Gujars,
Gadariyas, Kachhis, Koeris, Muraos, Sainthwars etc.
After late sixties, particularly after the 'Green
Revolution', most of these backward castes, on the basis

of netly acquired economic power, aspire to higher status and upward mobility. Besides, it has come to stay as a powerful force in the state politics.[7]

In the third grouping are all castes not listed as either scheduled or backward. These are 'elite castes'. Among them the prominent position - in terms of ritual and status - is occupied by Brahmins followed by Rajputs, Kayasthas, Jats (a cultivating caste but not listed as backward), Bhumihars etc. Jats, Bhumihars and Kayasthas are not numerically important but wield considerable influence in the areas in which they are concentrated. According to one study[8], Census 1931 records that Brahmins numbered 9.18 per cent, Rajputs 7.57 per cent, Ahirs, 7.85 per cent, Kayasthas, 4.51 per cent and Kurmis 3.54 per cent. Based on this record, the author has roughly calculated the present caste situation in U.P. as follows - High Castes account for 20 to 22 per cent, Backward castes for 40 to 42 per cent and Scheduled Castes 20.8 per cent.[9]

In short, U.P. is a multi-caste state, having in most districts several castes of approximately the same size. Furthermore, the larger castes tend to be state wide rather than regional in distribution whereas a few

castes loom in importance because of geographic concen-
tration in some areas. Generally, there is smooth,
structured and hierarchical relation among the castes
but late sixties and early seventies, in the wake of
greater consciousness and subsequent assertion, have
brought caste conflict with economic and political
undertones.[10]

Economically viewing U.P. is a backward state and
underdeveloped as well. The average annual growth rate
of state's income was 2.28 as against 3.14 per cent of
the country during 1975-76.[11] It is predominantly an
agricultural state, it provides 51 per cent of the total
income of the state but its production in per hectare
land is less than that of Punjab, Haryana in wheat and
Andhra and Assam in rice. On the other hand, industry
provides employment to only 3.8 per cent of the
population and contributes only 9 per cent of the total
income of the state as compared to corresponding All-
India figures 5.8 per cent and 19 per cent respectively.[12]
Low industrialization has led to an excessive burden of
population on land reducing the per capita production
of grain and entailing acute ruralization. Consequently,
the urban population forms only 13.5 per cent of the

total population as against the national percentage of 19.9.[13]
Though majority of its population stay in the countryside
but their control on rural holding is very meagre. Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Act 1952 and Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act of 1960 have rendered little service
in the area of equitable distribution of land. According
to one study,[14] the pattern of land distribution is so
skewed that 60 per cent of the cultivable land is in the
hands of rich farmers who constitute the microscopic
minority accounting for 7 per cent of the population
engaged in cultivation. Consequently, many of these
rich farmers generally former Zamindars or Talukdars or
big landlords, still retain considerable influence in the
countryside. The continued influence of these big farmers
is an important factor in contemporary politics in Uttar
Pradesh.[15]

On the basis of economic situation of Uttar Pradesh
one can easily envisage the class-structure of the state
in two categories. First, the urban class structure may
be discussed as a composite structure with four tiers
viz. big bourgeoisie comprising industrialists, petty
bourgeoisie comprising shop owning merchant class, service
seeking educated middle class and the working class.

Second, class-structure exists in village where the big farmers (mostly ex-Zamindars), peasant cultivators (intermediate peasantry), poor farmers (in other words subsistence farmers), rural merchants and landless agricultural labourers constitute the system of class composition. Francine Frankel has observed a close inter-connection or overlapping between class and caste hierarchy in the countryside of the state.[16] But the pulls of communal and particularistic ties have obfuscated the polarization of economic interests and class consciousness in the state.

Economic backwardness of the state is confounded by low level of literacy and education which speak for a corresponding low level of political culture and socialization. The literacy rate in U.P. is 31.50 per cent as compared to 66.42 per cent in Kerala, 42.81 per cent in West Bengal and 38.29 per cent in poverty stricken Orissa.[17]

Behind this backdrop one should try to understand the process and nature of politics in U.P. As a fact these factors play a decisive role in state as well as national politics. One should cautiously try to locate causal nexus between these forces and political process.

At the same time it is desirable to be very clear that
no one should read too much in these characteristics and
take them as ultimate determining factors of political
life. Such a mistake is liable to lead to a vulgar
acceptance of "reductivism" and "determinism" where
every political action is viewed as corresponding result
of those social forces. Such a standpoint amounts to
the denial of "relative autonomy of politics" where a
dialectical relation between politics and objective
forces of the society is envisaged.[18] Having been
clear on theoretical premise let us start discussion
on party politics in U.P. Congress.

Congress Party in U.P. like its sister branches
in other states and parent central organization has
functioned over a long passage of history as a coalition
of individuals, groups and interests. Interestingly
enough, the politics of coalition pervaded even the single
party dominance system of Congress, in that, the various
intra-party factions interacted in order to bargain for
the satisfaction of their specific needs.[19] After fourth
General Election, held in 1967, Congress lost its dominant
position which led to a shift from intra-party coalition
to inter-party coalition. However, in both ways of

coalition arrangements, the process of bargaining operated
to determine the value, goals and politics in such a way
that while senior partners exercised a greater role, the
hand of the junior partners could not be dismissed as
quite non-influential. This very nature of coalition
of interests, aspirations and needs often consummated
in uneasy alliances of sheer convenience and opportunism
within and without the fold of the Congress Party. This
amorphous pattern of relationship was aptly described as
"malaise of factionalism", which has been the bone of
U.P. Congress right from late thirties upto this date.
Before independence if it was between Acharya Narendra
Dev and Mr. Purushottam Das Tandon, after independence
the light focussed on discussion between Pandit Govind
Ballabh Pant and Mr. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai.[20] The legacy
was zealously carried out by leaders of subsequent years,
namely Mr. Sampoornanand, Mr. C.B. Gupta, Mr. Kamlapati
Tripathi and Mr. Hemavati Nandan Bahuguna. In short, the
only common characteristic which runs through the whole
history of Uttar Pradesh Congress Party, is nothing but
perpetual bickering. This constant struggle for formu-
lation and dissolution of power equations within the
framework of a heterogenous party constitutes the basic
theme of the study. The issues, viz. - split in the party

in 1969 at state level, relationship between Legislative and Organisational wing, the role of High Command and political development upto the period of state Assembly Election 1974 - will be discussed in the light of the conspicuous phenomenon of rabid factionalism. To analyse the events chronologically and giving it a possibly meaningful consistency let was start with the result of mid-term-election of 1969 leading to Presidential Election in Delhi and 'split' taking place there and consequent repercussions in the state causing a 'split' on the pattern of Centre.

Mid-term poll of 1969 ushered three major blocs in the state Assembly - Congress with the strength of 208 M.L.As, Bhartiya Kranti Dal (led by Mr. Charan Singh) with 98 M.L.As and Jana Sangh with 48 M.L.As.[21] Congress Party managed to increase its strength from previous position, when the Assembly was dissolved, of 199 M.L.As to 208 M.L.As - a gain of nine members. But still, Congress lacked desirable majority of 213 M.L.As in the House of 425 members, by 5 members only. However, the leader of the Congress Legislature Party Mr. C.B. Gupta with help of some independents succeeded in forming a Congress Government in the last week of February in 1969.

During the phase of forming government two factional
leaders Mr. C.B. Gupta and the U.P.C.C. Chief Mr. Kamlapati
Tripathi struck a note of compromise for the sake of power
which had eluded them when S.V.D. government was in
power previously. The compromise never meant cessation
of hostility between the two 'Big'. The inner strength
of the Congress seemed to had been impaired by a lack
of collective leadership and the over-vaulting ambition
of a host members for ministerial post. The appointment
of the first batch of Ministry had already created
considerable stress and strains in absence of balance
between the conflicting claims and interests.[22]

The simmering discontent got its clear expression
in the month of August when the Presidential Election was
held in Delhi. The official Congress candidate, Mr.
Sanjiva Reddy polled only 138 first preference votes as
against 181 of Mr. V.V. Giri in the U.P. Assembly. It
provided an opportunity to both, the warring groups to
exhibit their strength. But, left to themselves, barring
any eventual interference from Delhi, the stateCongressmen
were not in a mood to have a showdown at Lucknow because
of the instinct of self-preservation because they
enjoyed a razor thin majority in the Assembly and knew
too well that without each other's support they could not

survive. The premise of "survival instinct" can be
substantiated by the utterances of the then U.P.C.C.
Chief Mr. Tripathi who, reportedly, was leading the
faction opposite to that of Mr. Gupta -

> "It is time we ponder over what has happened
> and evolved methods to improve the situation;
> for party unity is necessary for its survival."[23]

In spite of superfluous attempts to patch-up the
exposed drift by leaders, the election of the President
revealed the stark truth that group loyalties - since
Mr. Gupta and Mr. Tripathi were almost openly ranged on
opposite sides of Reddy and Giri group - within the party
were put under a severe strain and brought it near the
point of no return. Only one factor which apparently held
them together was the keen awareness by both groups that
breaking apart meant dismissal from the positions of
power.

The split at the centre caused by three crucial
factors - interparty elite conflicts reflecting diverse
interests; social mobilization of hitherto submerged social
groups and the nature of the Congress Party system.[24]
The catalyst behind the Congress split seemed to have
been conflicts over power among the post-Nehru Congress
elites, which, in addition to purely personal differences,
also came to exhibit elements of socio-economic interests

coupled by ideological and generational differences which got reflected in infighting between parliamentary and organizational sectors of the party. If the crisis originated in power conflicts among the national leaders of the party representing diverse socio-economic interests, it soon spread to mid (state) and lower (district) level of the party. Pitted against the formidable group of adversaries, Mrs. Gandhi took the initiative to take the whole issue to a broader arena than the party. Consequently, a series of populist tactics - bank nationalization, abolition of privy purses and other princely privileges, the slogan of 'Garibi Hatao' etc. _ succeeded in mobilizing a popular upsurge within party as well as society in her favour. This upheaval at the Center drew states within the vortex of turmoil. Since the majority of state Congress Parties were already ridden with factional schism, the signal from Delhi was well responded by latent or overt warring groups of state party. U.P. Congress Party was no exception to this phenomenon. Since a war of attrition had been raging between Mr. Gupta and Mr. Tripathi from early sixties, they conveniently sided with the 'like-minded' groups of Center. Allegation and counter allegations were hurled upon each other. Ultimately, in the third week of November, 1969, Mr. Tripathi along with eight other

Ministers broke away from Gupta's Ministry.[25] Resultantly, three prominent groups - one led by Mr. Gupta, the other by Mr. Tripathi and another by Mr. Charan Singh (in the form of B.K.D.) - started fishing in the troubled water of shifting alliances. Basically, these three leaders represented an extension of the differences of three old factional leaders of the Congress Party, now operating under the banner of different party colours. Each group was trying its best to woo the support of one major bloc in addition to the backing of other numerically minor political parties.

Meanwhile, the meeting of All-India Congress Committee called by Pro Mrs. Gandhi group, was held in New Delhi on 22nd and 23rd of November 1969. It formally gave birth to a "New Congress Party" known in political circle as Congress (R). In response to the political development of Delhi, pro-Mrs. Gandhi group convened U.P.C.C. Executive meeting on November 29, 1969 where Mr. Tripathi was elected its leader and a call to all Congressmen to support the policies of "New Congress" was given. Interestingly, first time in its history U.P. factional warfare brought the idea of "progressive policies" in its arsenal.[26]

Taking its cwe from the 'policy programme' of "New"
Congress, the "Old" Congress, better known as Congress
(Syndicate) led by Mr. Gupta in the state also declared
the concept of "policy oriented politics". The general
secretary of "Old" Congress, Mr. Banarsi Das briefed the
newsmen that -

> "All democratic, progressive and nationalist
> parties which have no extra-territorial loyalties,
> with much common ground between Congress and
> them should come together to serve the common
> cause."27

This statement brings forth two interesting things
for a greater discussion. First the idea of "nationalist
parties with no extra-territorial loyalties", suggest a
trenchant criticism of Mrs. Gandhi for relying on the
support of Communist Parties of the country. It aimed to
arouse "nationalist" sentiments and denounce the policies
of Communists who talk about "communism international".
The implicit motive behind the statement suggests a call
for rightist forces. with enthusiasm. It might have
directed towards Jana Sangh, Swatantra Party and B.K.D.
Second, the emphasis on the word "Congress" symbolises
the intense zeal of both the factions which were trying
to drive the point have that it is only they who repre-
sented real Congress. Congress as an institution still
has an appeal to the electorate. That's why both the

groups were trying hard to maintain the identity of
Congress in its pristine sense. More than this, one can
see this conflict as a typical characteristic of a family
feud where rival claimants were so intent on destroying
or dishonouring each other that they could have joined
hands of anyone. However, though they continued the
slanging watch, neither section could not develop a
distinct positive personality by the end of the year.
They remained constellations of factional leaders holding
shakily together to preserve or to secure power, without
the support of a meaningful policy platform.

The beginning of new years, say, 1970 and the
announcement of Governor Mr. Gopala Reddy to summon state
Assembly in the third week of February activated the
power-struggle and opened new levels of conflict. The
month of January was marked by a frequent visits of Mrs.
Gandhi going through the length and breadth of the state
at least three times.[28] Here the role of central leader
in boosting the image of the party at state level is quite
significant. On the other hand, importance of the state,
in the political game of number also prompted Mrs.
Gandhi's steady visits. Uttar Pradesh was vital particularly
for Mrs. Gandhi; it sent the largest contingent of the
M.Ps. with the majority elected on the Congress ticket.

Besides, it was her home state too and assured support
of the M.Ps and M.L.As from her home state would have
provided her leverage against "Old" Congress at Center
and against Mr. Gupta's lame-duck Ministry at state, who
incidentally happened to be bitterest critic of "New"
Congress policies. Sensing the threat of impending
danger, Mr. Gupta resigned on Febrruary 11, 1970 in a
move to prevent "New" Congress to topple his Ministry in
the forthcoming Assembly session. Now both Mr. Gupta and
Mr. Tripathi struggled to enlist support of Mr. Charan
Singh who heading the second largest party with 98 M.L.As
in the Assembly. For a considerable time Charan group
kept its option open whereas Mr. Charan Singh between
11 February and 15 February made contradictory statements
of joining hands of Mr. Gupta or Mr. Tripathi. Here
one can easily notice the strength of power-lust which
compelled old factional leaders to negotiate and
compromise in order to get into power. When these three
were in the Congress, they pulled in different directions.
Ultimately, on the basis of all possible calculations,
Mr. Charan Singh announced to go along with the "New"
Congress on 16th of February, 1970.

Pausing for a minute, let me explain the nature of
alliance between manifestly two different groups

particularly 'New' Congress which vociferously professed
the path of 'socialist development'. Only a study of the
attitude and policies of B.K.D. and its leader Mr. Charan
Singh would clarify the issue. Craig Baxter describes
Mr. Singh as the -

> "Spokesman of the middle farmer and individual
> ownership, representing especially the Jat (as
> well as other cultivating intermediate) caste
> of peasant proprietors. He strongly opposed
> proposals in Congress for cooperative farming,
> wrote several tracks on the subject and at one
> time appeared to come to be a potential member
> of the right-wing Swatantra Party."[29]

After his departure or defection from the Congress
in 1967 he headed a coalition government known as Samyukt
Kidhayak Dal. During the mid term poll of 1969, he
formed a party named 'Bhartiya Kranti Dal' which emerged,
after the Congress, as the second largest party in the
state with the command of 98 M.L.As in its fold. The
success of the party can be seen in its untiring attempt
to provide a social recognition and political expression
to the economic power of emerging agricultural communities
often symbolised with intermediate castes. The blend of
these two gave a curious flavour of caste and class
politics to the policies of Mr. Charan Singh.[30] The rise
of B.K.D. gave a new twist to the politics of state. It
created a dent in the stronghold of the hitherto rightist

party of Jana Sangh. The rightist policies of Jana Sangh
were a good draw for vested interests but the stigma of
"communalism" associated with it deterred many. The
arrival of B.K.D. brought a new message for right-
oriented interests without any communal tinge. Francine
Frankel has shown in her study that Jana Sangh was replaced
from its position of number two to three by B.K.D. Its
total vote declined from 21.7 per cent in 1967 to 17.9
per cent in 1969 and its strength was reduced from 98 to
49 M.L.As. Conversely, B.K.D. starting from scratch,
secured 21.3 per cent of vote and 98 seats in the
legislative assembly.[31]

Now again reverting back to the issue of coalition
between 'New' Congress and B.K.D. we see that the policies
of B.K.D. were at variance with the professed policies of
"New" Congress which openly denounced the role of caste
politics and advocated equitable distribution of land
among the underprivileged masses. In the face of such
contrary pulls, it can be easily guessed that the thing
that brought 'New' Congress and B.K.D. closer, was
nothing but the hope of power and privilege by forming
a government.[32]

Reverting back to the internal politics of the
Congress Party, I shall take up the party politics of

"New" Congress only because it emerged as the leading group while "Old" one slided to a position of relatively less importance. Besides, the subsequent political developments amply proved the viability of "New" Congress only. As we see the formal support of "New" Congress was extended to Mr. Charan Singh who formed the government in the last week of February decided to stay out of the government. This action helped "New" Congress to create an impression that the alliance is essentially on the basis of ideology and programme rather than opportunism or power seeking. As a fact, behind the scene from the date Mr. Charan Singh was sworn in to 18 April when 'New' Congress joined the Cabinet, elaborate discussions went on to sort out the problems regarding the inclusion of 'New' Congress ministers. The main issue centered on the percentage of ministers' quota because 'new' Congress enjoyed the support of 108 M.L.As whereas B.K.D. with defection of 4 M.L.As commanded the strength of only 94 M.L.As.[33] Eventually, 'new' Congress joined the Cabinet on April 18, but its leader Mr. Tripathi stayed out because of "organisational demand to strengthen the party".[34] His refusal not to join the Cabinet throws an interesting light over the internal situation of the 'new' Congress. This decision was reportedly taken at the directions of High Command to avoid any complexities.[35]

The reason behind Tripathi's omission was to avoid stress and strain within the 'new' Congress because at the time of joining the coalition government, many aspirants for ministerial post had staked their claims. It was impossible to satisfy all. In case of refusal they might have tempted to join the hands of Mr. C.B. Gupta who was already looking for such opportunity. Hence Center, for the sake of unity requested Mr. Tripathi to opt out so that he might persuade "dissatisfied" elements by giving example of his own sacrifice.[36] This mechanism, however, failed to stem the tide of discontent. Rumblings of discontent and frustration came from those who felt that they deserved berth in the coalition Cabinet. Here we see if the power is great cementing force to bring to strangers together, it is also disruptive in nature because failure of equitable share in the spoils of the office leads to discussion and open confrontation. A group of "dissatisfied" M.L.As under the leadership of Mr. G.D. Bajpai called on party President Mr. Jagjivan Ram and Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi on May 24, 1970. The delegation apprised the senior leaders that

> "The ministry will survive only after it is
> revitalised.... the present team of party
> Ministers in the coalition had to be
> reconstituted."[37]

Besides complaining about the nature of composition of cabinet, it also expressed its concern over the

"bossism of a coterie" within the organisation of the party. Gradually, the dissidence acquired the respectable gloss of ideology when dissident M.L.As Mr. Mustafa Kamal Kidwai, Devkinandan Vibhav and labour leader Mr. Ganesh Dutt Bajpai attacked Mr. Charan Singh's policies in the Assembly for blaming him to delay the nationalisation of sugar industries which was prominently on the agenda when 'new' Congress supported and joined Charan's ministry. As a fact, "sugar politics" has been a convenient weapon among the opposition parties or dissident groups to embarass those who are in power. When Mr. Gupta was in power it was B.K.D. and 'new' Congress which repeatedly asked for nationalisation of sugar mills.[38] To avoid frontal attack Mr. Gupta had sought the legal advice of Advocate General of the State who held the opinion that only Center was competent to take over the industry. Thus, Mr. Gupta while supporting the issue, had thrown the ball in the center's Court. Now Center, on the reports of the Attorney General and Solicitor General, gave clearance to State government to go ahead. While 'new' Congress leaders publicly stated that they were in favour of an immediate take-over of the sugar industry, its ministers who constituted the majority in Charan's Cabinet, did not protest against Charan's vascillation.[39]

Meanwhile Mr. Charan Singh introduced 'Preventive Detention Ordinance', to maintain law and order, in addition to it, he brought a bill securing the withdrawal of statutory recognition of state University's Students' Union. Furthermore, on August 5, Mr. Singh announced the government's decision to postpone the issue of take-over of sugar mills for one year. All these policies evoked sharp reaction within 'new' Congress. This time dissident leaders with the support of "Socialist Young Turks"[40] became more vocal and strident in their criticism of Congress Ministers as well as the coalition Ministry.

On August 22, 1970, M.Ps State Congress Legislators (new) assembled for a meeting over the issues causing strain between B.K.D. and the 'new' Congress and between Congress Ministers and organisational leaders. The meeting was characterized by frayed tempers and exchanges between the two (Ministerialists and organisationists) groups of 'new' Congress. Young turk leader Mr. Chandrasekhar, M.P., criticised the Congress Ministers as "bonded labour" who were "doing naokri" (earning livelihood) in Charan's Ministry which was following "reactionary policies". It irked one senior minister Mr. Chaturbhuj Sharma who threatened to resign from ministry as well as party.[41] This meeting brought a few

things for special notice. First time 'new' Congress
was confronted with the stark reality of raging hostility
between Ministerialists and organizationalists. Second,
the forum of discussion aimed more at criticizing the
Congress Ministers rather than the policies of Mr. Charan
Singh. It suggests the personal confrontation was more
acute than the concern for "progressive policies".[42]
Third, the important thing to notice was reticence of
Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi and a lukewarm central response
to the discussion. This non-chalance can be interpreted
in terms of the proposal coming from center for the
merger between B.K.D. and 'new' Congress. Center was
toying with the idea that Mr. Charan Singh could be
induced to join 'new' Congress by merging B.K.D. with it.[43]
That's why it did not openly criticize some conservative
policies of Mr. Charan Singh nor did it allow the senior
leaders of the state Congress to give an expression to
their displeasure. But, Mr. Charan Singh was aware of
the possible hazard of merger. He had already seen that
with the connivance of senior leaders, "New Blood" and
"dissidents" were vehemently dubbing him as "right
reactionary". The merger might aggravate the situation.
Besides, he wanted to decide the issue of leadership
before merger because he was suspicious of his old

factional opponent Mr. Tripathi who might replace him.
All these mutual suspicious frustrated the attempt of
merger.[44]

Later on, B.K.D. M.Ps voted against 'Privy Purse'
Bill mooted by Congress Government in Rajya Sabha on
September 5, 1970. It marked parting of ways which had
its repercussion in the state.'New' Congress withdrew its
support, Governor recommended for Presidential rule which
was promulgated on October 1, 1970. Mr. Charan Singh
blamed 'new' Congress for pressurizing the Governor to
recommend the Presidential rule. However, our concern
is not to look into the question of constitutionality of
the President rule. At the best, we can say that this
was an act which reflected the supremacy of Delhi to
intervene and give a new turn to the factional politics
of the state. In the meantime, all the forces became
active to form a government, ultimately B.K.D., 'Old'
Congress and Jana Sangh succeeded in installing a coalition
government under the leadership of Mr. T.N. Singh[45] on
October 18, 1970.

Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi failed to form a government.[46]
It led to some frustration in the Congress camp. Curiously
enough, the failure to come into power was not accepted in
good grace, the factional leaders of 'new' Congress

subduedly blamed Mr. Tripathi for the debacle. The thesis
that struggle for power generates factional feud is
clearly applicable to this situation. If one succeeds,
discontent arises over the composition of Cabinet; if
the leader fails to achieve power, his potential adver-
saries make a capital out of it. The politics of 'new'
Congress can be seen in this light.

Tripathi's failure led to a renewed attack on his
leadership. Congress M.Ps like Mr. Ram Dhan, Mr. K.N.
Singh, Mr. Arjun Arora accused that under his (Tripathi)
leadership the performance of U.P. Congress had been
"very dismal".[47] Embittered with the open attack
Mr. Tripathi in an interview to a journalist accused the
"leftists" of the party trying to "isolate" the Prime
Minister from her supporters and friends so that she
should entirely "depend" on them. Furthermore, he dropped
a hint for "young Turks" that he would not take it lying
down; he asserted that it was the prerogative of the party
to elect its leaders. This meant that only a person
acceptable to the State Congress Party could get elected.[48]
In that sense Mr. Tripathi enjoyed the support of majority.
Realising the tension, High Command intervened to avoid
any headon clash. It summoned a joint meeting of U.P.C.C.
executive and Parliamentary Board which reaffirmed its faith
in the leadership of Mr. Tripathi.[49]

The lull within 'new' Congress remained till the
election result of Maniram Constituency - from where
S.V.D. leader Mr. T.N. Singh, Chief Minister, was seeking
election for state Assembly - was announced in January
1971.[50]   Mr. Singh lost to 'new' Congress candidate
Mr. R.K. Dwivedi.   His defeat changed the whole scenario.
Defection started from other parties to 'new' Congress.
Again, the result of Lok Sabha election 1971, augmented
the process of defection further.   It was so rapid that
'new' Congress became capable of forming a government.
Eventually Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi became Chief Minister
on April 4, 1971.   It heralded a new era for internal
bickering, confrontation between legislative and organi-
zational wing and the intervention of High Command.   We
have seen in the past that when the radical exuberance,
after the split, subsided new factions sprouted centring
around personalities and castes.   But this time a new
sort of factional element emerged since 'new' Congress
opened its gate to defectors principally coming from
'Old' Congress, B.K.D. and Socialist parties.   These
defectors formed new factions within the Party and were
labelled by their old party affiliations.   These factions
often met formally and informally and were zealous of
maintaining their separate identity which they felt

would give them more weightage and a better say in collective bargaining and competition with the ruling leadership.[51] Besides, there was a fair amount of animosity between "genuine Indiraites" of 'new' Congress and these new entrants who were considered "fair-weather birds". On the other hand, they, by leaving their parent organization had become rootless as far as party-support was concerned and were being treated with "second class status".[52] The defectors felt another humiliation when they found themselves "unwelcome guest" at district level organization like District Congress Committee. All these disillusionment deepened after the expansion of Cabinet on May 21, 1971 when various groups clamoured for under-representation. The history of Congress records that every time factional differences become vocal and articulate when any opportunity for grabbing the spoils of office arises or individuals are denied the place of power, privilege and patronage. However, all the time efforts are made to maintain balance by pacifying factional claims.

Mr. Tripathi omitted a senior leader and former Minister Mr. Chaturbhuj Sharma who was also Vice-President of U.P.C.C. from the Ministers' list when he expanded the cabinet on May 21. Whereas two known rivals of Mr. Sharma,

in Mr. Swami Prasad Singh and Mr. Udit Narain Sharma -
were inducted into the cabinet. Besides, A.I.C.C. general
secretary Bahuguna's nominee Mr. Raj Mangal Pandey was
also excluded from the Cabinet.[53] This act of inclusion
or exclusion was bound to have its repercussion. Conse-
quently, on June 12 a pressure group of M.Ps, M.L.As and
M.L.Cs held a meeting at the residence of Mr. Chaturbhuj
Sharma, the notable exclusion of the Cabinet; the meeting
was attended by former Union Minister Mr. A.P. Jain, now
a M.P., Triloki Singh, M.P., Mr. Rajmangal Pandey, former
State Minister and Mr. Anwar Ahmad, former minister of
health who had recently joined 'new' Congress, a few
months ago. The prominent members of the meeting and
the "host" of the meeting reflected that they all were
aggrieved of their omission because once they had been
in power so desired again.[54] These leaders raised the
issue of the age-old principle of the Congress Party -
"One-man, one-post", against Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi who
was holding both the posts namely that of Chief Minister
and Party Chief.[55] They demanded for a "free" election to
the post of U.P.C.C. Presidentship. To further cloak their
design they utilised the catch words of "radical programme"
by asking for nationalisation of sugar industry, lowering
down the ceiling on land and imposing ceiling on urban
property.

These two sets of demands had larger ramifications.
First the hold of a Chief Minister on P.C.C. is vital for
his survival and sustenance. If the control of P.C.C.
goes into the hands of his potential rival these will be
no smooth sailing for him. Besides, P.C.C. has a
dominant say in the distribution of party tickets in
state elections. It is the importance of the organi-
zational control that prompted dissatisfied members to
raise voice for the election of organizational posts.
Second, the demand for "progressive policies" reflected the
position of "leftists" within the fold of the Congress.
Commonly it was held that Mr. Tripathi represented the
so-called rightist leadership of the 'new' Congress.
It was chiefly because of this that the leftists of
different shades who considered him a necessary evil
for some time after the split in the Congress in 1969,
because of his dominant position, were now eager to
dislodge him from the position of prominence. Mr.
Chandrajeet Yādav, A.I.C.C. general secretary, who was
formerly in the Communist Party of India, was reportedly
of the view that U.P.C.C. chief should be a person with
"dynamic and leftist" image.[56]

As the pressure built-up, Mr. Tripathi resigned
from the post of party Chief before the general body of
U.P.C.C. assembled to discuss party matters on July 4, 1971.

This session was attended by Mrs. Gandhi who paid rich
tributes to Mr. Tripathi for his services during a
difficult period of time. At the same time U.P.C.C.
general body authorised Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Tripathi
to select a new incumbent for the office. Interestingly,
the idea of "free" election was dropped in presence of
Mrs. Gandhi who was there to check any possible proli-
feration of factionalism.[57] Mrs. Gandhi in consultation
with Mr. Tripathi selected, Mrs. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai,
Health Minister in Tripathi's Cabinet, for the post of
U.P.C.C. Chief. Without any election - a clear case of
domineering say of Center in the state level organization -
Mrs. Bajpai was unanimously accepted as U.P.C.C.
President. In persuance of 'one-man, one-post' policy
she resigned from the Cabinet.

Relation between Mr. Tripathi and Mrs. Bajpai
remained amiable for considerable period of time; but
afterwards it was strained by some actions taken by
Mrs. Bajpai. First, in order to consolidate her
position in the organization she nominated a few men
in the U.P.C.C. Executive, majority of whom were
Tripathi's denigrators, for example two general
secretaries, namely, Mr. Ramendra Varma and Mr. Agha
Zaidi. Second, she dissolved many D.D.Cs of several

districts and formed ad hoc Committees there comprising her own men. Finally, in January 1972, she dissolved U.P. youth Congress headed by Mr. Mayapati, son of Mr. Kamlapati. Rumour went round that Mrs. Bajpai was doing all these things with the backing of Mr. Chandrajit Yadav, general secretary of A.I.C.C.[58] Mr. Yadav belonged to the State and was known for "leftist" image. In order to get hold in the policies of home-state he was using ideology and a few dissident fellows to dislodge Mr. Tripathi.

Again, gradually battle-lines between Ministerialist and organisationalist were drawn up. Both the groups started approaching Delhi to denounce each other. A handful M.L.As under the leadership of former Socialist Party leader but now a Congressman Mr. Saligram Jaiswal met Mrs. Gandhi and apprised her about the "corrupt" Ministers of the State. Prominent M.Ps known to be young Turks, Messers Ram Dhan, R.K. Sinha etc. echoed the voice. Furthermore, two general secretaries of U.P.C.C. Mr. Ramendra Varma and Agha Zaidi openly criticized the policies of the government and labelled charges of corruption against a few ministers. Mr. Zaidi even named them, say, Messers Balram Singh Yadav,

Transport Minister, Baldev Singh Arya, Agriculture
Minister.[59]   In counter allegation Ministerialists
accused leadership of U.P.C.C. for creating confusion
in the rank and file of the party and creating a poor
image of the party by denouncing the government publicly.
Besides, pro-Ministry group lodged complaint with the
High Command for various irregularities and case of bogus
memberships in at least 21 District Congress Committees.
For unknown reasons, Congress Parliamentary Board, for
a considerable time kept silence and neither took any
action against dissidents nor did it suggest Ministry to
mend its ways. Center's indifference only aggravated
the situation.[60]   Ultimately, leaders from Delhi inter-
vened, Mr. Agha Zaidi was asked to resign for calling
the government "anti-socialist and reactionary". On the
other hand a central Committee, headed by Mr. Sitaram
Kesari, came to Lucknow to enquire into the issue of
bogus membership. The Committee found allegation
substantial in 19 Districts. This new war of attrition
can be seen in relation to the dominant role of the
Center. Mr. Chandrajit Yadav was trying to form a group
of leftists while the former Congress President and
senior leader Mr. Jagjivan Ram was opposed to such
populist rhetoric of Mr. Yadav. Mr. Ram supported
Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi in common war against the 'left'

force of the Party. U.P.C.C. chief Mrs. Bajpai was
close to Mr. Chandrajit Yadav for his support from
Delhi. Since, Mr. Hemavati Nandan Bahuguna, Minister
of State for Communication was not friendly with Mrs.
Bajpai for the reason of their home district (Allahabad)
politics, he, in spite of his 'socialist leanings'
preferred to join the hands of Tripathi's group.[61]
Progressively Yadav's group weakened and resultantly
Mrs. Bajpai lost the battle to Mr. Tripathi. It was a
victory of Ministerialists over organizationalists as
well as success of a powerful lobby at the center which
was fighting a proxy war in the state. However, to avoid
any open showdown, Mrs. Bajpai stepped down from the
post of U.P.C.C. Chief in the second week of December 1972.

Since there was no consensus among the party men,
a direct appointment of the Party Chief could not take
place. Ultimately, Tripathi's group fielded Mr.
Baijnath Kureel as a claimant for the post. High Command
also tacitly blessed his candidature with the idea that
being a Harijan he would be a draw for Harijan votes in
the forthcoming elections.[62] As a mark of protest to
Tripathi's group Mr. Saligram Jaiswal fought the election
and secured 87 votes against 717 votes of Mr. Kureel.
Later on, Mr. Jaiswal alleged that central leaders like

Messers Bahuguna, K.C. Pant, U.S. Dixit canvassed for
Mr. Kureel.[63] After the election, the U.P.C.C. executive
and Parliamentary Board were re-constituted; Mrs. Bajpai
and Mr. Jaiswal were made Vice-Presidents in the Executive
and included in the Parliamentary Board. This act shows
that an attempt was made to reconcile the dispute and
begin a new phase.

The new year of 1973 began with a low key note in
terms of factional fight. Occasionally, voices of
protest were heard regarding lawlessness or deteriorating
image of the government but such mild tremors were not
powerful enough to rock the government. But to
Tripathi's misfortune, Provintal Armed Constabulary,
an armed police force of the state, staged a mutiny in
the second week of May, 1973; it continued week-long and
took a heavy toll of policemen's lives. When the rebellion
was quelled with the help of Army, Mr. Tripathy was
summoned to Delhi to apprise senior leaders about the
prevailing situation in the State. However, the revolt
revealed the sorry state of affairs in U.P. and lent
weight to Tripathi's detractors' view that the authority
of the government had already touched the rock-bottom due
to corrupt and inefficient administration. Former Union
Food Minister Mr. A.P. Jain, A.I.C.C. general secretary
Aziz Imam and several M.L.As and M.Ps met Mrs. Gandhi in

the first week of June and requested her to remove Mr. Tripathi. Mr. Tripathi came to Delhi on 8th of June and was reportedly suggested by High Command to drop a few Ministers who earned notoriety for their corruption in recent time; Mr. Tripathi on the other hand denied to drop them but suggested that he himself would rather quit.[64] It was clever move on the part of Mr. Tripathi because ouster of a few ministers, on whose support he earlier survived might have incurred the antagonism of those ministers. Their frustration would have undermined his position, provided there was any further infighting with the dissidents.[65] Sensing the reluctance of Mr. Tripathi to drop a few ministers from his Cabinet, at last High Command advised Mr. Tripathi to tender the resignation of his Ministry. Eventually Mr. Trivathi resigned along with his colleagues on June 12 and recommended the President's rule. The Governor duly promulgated it.

Now, I shall take up the study of subsequent events leading to the arrival of Mr. Bahuguna as Chief Minister and the victory of the Congress Party in the Assembly election held in February 1974, in the next chapter.

Footnotes

1. See K.V. Rao and L.V. Venkataraman, 'Uttar Pradesh Politics - A Socio-Political Interpretation', in Iqbal Narain (ed.) 'State Politics in India', Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1967, pp. 286-91.

2. The Statesman Yearbook, 1980-81.

3. See an article written by Dr. C.L. Srivastava, 'Viability of Eastern Uttar Pradesh as a State' in 'Northern India Patrika', Jan. 1, 1969.

4. Ibid.

5. An interesting study has been done by Enayat Ahmad, 'Rural Settlement Types in the Uttar Pradesh State', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, XLII, 2 (June 1952), pp. 223-246.

6. The Statesman Yearbook 1980-81.

7. For a detailed study, please see Francine Frankel, 'India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs', Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1971.

8. For a statistical data please see the work of 'Saraswati Srivastava, 'Uttar Pradesh: Politics of Neglected Development'; in Iqbal Narain (ed.) 'State Politics in India', Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut 1976, pp. 323-369.

9. Census of 1931 was the last Census which took into account the caste factor of Indian population. Based on that study Mrs. Saraswati Srivastava has calculated the approximate present proportion of various castes in the state.

10. See K.K. Singh, 'Patterns of Caste Tensions: A Study in Intercaste Tensions and Conflict', Asia Publications, Bombay 1967.

11. Source - 'Statistical India', 1978.

12. Source - 'Economic Review of Uttar Pradesh', a booklet issued by Information Department of Uttar Pradesh, 1978, p. 9.

13. Source - Manorama Yearbook, 1981, p. 338.

14. See Baljit Singh and Shridhar Mishra - 'A Study of Land Reforms in Uttar Pradesh', Oxford Book Company, 1964, pp. 24-29.

15. See an article written by Paul R. Brass, entitled 'Uttar Pradesh: A Case of Factional Politics', in Myron Weiner (ed.) 'State Politics in India', Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 66.

16. See, the essay written by Francine Frankel - 'Problems of Correlating Electoral and Economic Variables: An Analysis of Voting Behaviour and Agrarian Modernization in U.P.', published in the book edited by Johnorgoofield and Myron Weiner - 'The Electoral Politics in an Indian State', Vol. III, Manohar Book Service, 1980, pp. 149-181.

17. Manorama Yearbook, 1981, p. 337.

18. Even Lenin once reprimanded orthodox Marxist scholars for belittling the importance of dialectical law, relative autonomy of politics and dogmatically adhering to determinism. For an interesting study see Lenin, 'Once Again on the Trade Unions: The Current Situations and the Mistakes of Tratosky and Bukharin', in Selected Works III, Moscow, 1977, pp. 474-79.

19. A lucid analysis of the issue is done by B.L. Maheshwari, 'Politics of Coalition', Economic and Political Weekly, Annual No. Jan. 1970, 3, pp.117-123.

20. A reporter of the Statesman observes that tacitly there was a personality clash between Pandit Pant and Mr. Kidwai. However, their confrontation never came to the foreground except maintaining and strengthening their support-bases respectively. Please see 'The Statesman', November 8, 1973.

21. See Hindustan Times, 18 Feb., 1969.

22. See Hindustan Times, 5 April, 1969.

23. Quoted from the interview given by Mr. Tripathi to a press interview, Hindustan Times, 21 August, 1969.

24. These points are well propounded by Mahendra Prasad Singh in his book 'Split in a Predominant Party: The Indian National Congress in 1969', Abhinav Prakashan, New Delhi, 1981.

25. See 'Indian Express', Delhi, 19 November, 1969.

26. See 'Times of India', Delhi 30 November, 1969.

27. See 'Hindustan Times', Delhi, 5 December, 1969.

28. See 'Hindustan Times', Delhi, 28 January, 1970.

29. Quoted from the article of Craig Baxter, 'Caste and Factional Cleavages: The Rise and Fall of Bhartiya Kranti Dal in U.P.', in Johuorgoodfield and Myron Weiner (ed.) 'Electoral Politics in the Indian States', Vol. IX, Manohar Book Service, 1975, p. 118.

30. See 'Emerging Caste Politics: Main problem in Uttar Pradesh', by Girish Mathur in the newspaper 'Patriot' Delhi, 15 February, 1970.

31. Please see Francine Frankel, 'Problems of Correlating Electoral and Economic Variables: An Analysis of Voting Behaviour and Agrarian Modernization in Uttar Pradesh', op. cit., p. 167.

32. See 'The Times of India', Delhi, 27 February, 1970.

33. See 'The Statesman', Delhi, 12 April, 1970.

34. See 'The Times of India', Delhi, 19 April, 1970.

35. See 'The Times of India', Delhi, 23 April, 1970.

36. See 'Northern India Patrika', Allahabad, 24 April, 1970.

37. See 'Hindustan Times', May 25, 1970.

38. When Mr. Tripathi along with other eight Cabinet Ministers walked out of Gupta Ministry in November, 1969, Mr. Gupta did not resign but inducted a few more in his Cabinet. He remained in power till 11 February, 1970, the day when he tendered the resignation of his government.

39. For an interesting analysis of 'sugar-politics', please see the 'Commentary' in 'Hindu', Madras, August 5, 1970.

40. During the split at Center, a group of young Congressmen emerged there which ideologically chaimed to be "socialists" and canvassed for the "socialist path of development". These youngmen were popularly known as 'Young Turks'. Prominent among them were - Mr. Chandrasekhar, Krishna Kant, Mohan Dharia, Ram Dhan etc.

41. See 'The Statesman', Delhi, August 23, 1970.

42. Ibid.

43. Since Mr. Charan Singh formed the Government with the support of the 'New' Congress, several times High Command leaders persuaded him to merge his party with the 'New' Congress. Their plea was that since both parties stood for common issues, it would be politically useful if they merged into one.

44. For an interesting analysis of the problem, please see the article, 'Dilemma in U.P. Congress', by a special correspondent of Indian Express, 'Indian Express', August 28, 1970.

45. When these three parties agreed to form a coalition government, the issue of leadership created much wrangling. Mr. C.B. Gupta and Mr. Charan Singh both offered their candidatures. Since none was willing to accept either of them, Mr. T.N. Singh, a M.P. from 'Old' Congress was accepted as consensus candidate.

46. During the President's rule in the State Mr. Tripathi tried to install a government with the help of other parties but he could not succeed in gathering required majority behind him.

47. See, 'The Times of India', Delhi, October 21, 1970.

48. See 'The Hindustan Times', Oct. 22 and 24, 1970.

49. See 'Northern India Patrika', October 27, 1970.

50. Since Mr. T.N. Singh was an M.P., it was constitutionally imperative upon him to seek membership of State Legislature within the period of six months coming into power.

51. For a significant analysis of this aspect, please see 'The Politics of Power: Defections and State Politics in India' by S.C. Kashyap, National, Delhi, 1974

52. Since defectors left their original party, they had no moorings in the organization of the 'new' Congress. They were facing tacit opposition from already entrenched Congressmen of the organisation. See 'What Next in Uttar Pradesh' in 'The Hindu', 15 June, 1971.

53. Ibid.

54. See 'The Times of India', Delhi, June 13, 1971.

55. The concept of 'one-man one-post' was drafted in the Congress Party in late fifties which envisaged that any leader who holds post in the Cabinet cannot hold any post simultaneously in the organization. He will have to relinquish any one of them.

56. See 'The Statesman', June 17, 1971.

57. See 'Hindustan Times', July 5, 1971.

58. See 'Times of India', January 22, 1972.

59. See 'Patriot', Delhi, 23 August, 1972.

60. See 'The Statesman', September 23, 1972.

61. See 'The Statesman', October 22, 1972.

62. Please see 'The Times of India', December 8, 1972.

63. Mr. Jaisawal wanted to assert the point that though High Command leaders were apparently neutral but a few covertly supported Mr. Kureel to strengthen the position of Mr. Tripathi. However, on the surface, High Command never favoured any candidate in the election for U.P.C.C. Chief held on 23 December. Please see 'Times of India', December 24, 1972.

64. See 'The Times of India', June 9, 1973.

65. See 'The Hindu', Madras, June 14, 1973.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT...PHASE II (1973-74)

As it has been observed in the previous chapter that on the recommendation of outgoing Chief Minister Mr. Tripathi, Mr. Akbar Ali Khan, the Governor of U.P. put the State Assembly under "animated suspension".[1] This action of the Governor was seen by opposition leaders as an "inspired move" carried out at the behest of the Central Government.[2]

Normally the Constitution provides for the imposition of President's rule in the event of the Constitutional breakdown in any State. At that time there was no such crisis in the state. The Congress Party enjoyed and continued to enjoy absolute majority in the State Assembly which was not dissolved but put under the "animated suspension". In terms of the spirit of the Constitution, one can say that it was not a purely justifiable case because President's rule was apparently imposed to solve the internal differences in the State Congress, and improve the image of the authority since it was seriously eroded by the outburst of the P.A.C. rebellion. A correspondent of Indian Express rightly observed -

"The imposition of President's rule in Uttar
Pradesh for a brief spell may be on keeping
with the letter of the Constitution but is
certainly not keeping with its spirit."[3]

Instead of going into the constitutional niceties,
let me say in all its fairness that the brief imposition
of President's Rule left the people thinking whether what
suited the ruling party's strategy was also consti-
tutionally proper. Another curious factor in the
context of relation between state party and High Command
was that State Congress Legislature was not given a free
hand to have its say on the next move after the resig-
nation of Mr. Tripathi's Ministry. It could have
happened that the party was able to locate a new leader
and to get him to help the party fulfil its responsibility
to the electorate.[4]

Regarding the internal differences of the party
it shows two factors - First, the inability to select
any popular leader to replace Mr. Tripathi and second,
the strong position of Mr. Tripathi within the structure
of State Congress because he could not be summarily
dismissed by the High Command when he resisted its
proposal to drop a few allegedly corrupt ministers from
the Cabinet. At the same time it was also clear that
Mr. Tripathi would not be able to hold out for a long

time in the face of his ministry's dismal record in
the office. As a fact, his administration was considered
as one of the inefficient and corrupt one ever seen in
U.P. Without making any prejudicial observation I shall
only quote a lengthy passage, script by Mr. Kala, which
will throw light on the common view held by many a few
about his administration:

> "The Congress image has been tarnished in the State
> by corruption, nepotism and favouritism at all
> levels of administration. In fact, the State
> has never been governed so badly as under the
> Tripathi Ministry. Several allegations made
> against his ministers were never investigated
> and Mr. Tripathi consistently refused to order
> a probe by a High Court judge..... Allegations
> were also made about Tripathi's own relations
> making recommendations to officials. The wife
> of one, popularly known as 'Bhuji' earned
> particularly a bad name...."[5]

In short, his administration had brought the
prestige of the Party to a sorry pass. Though situation
in the State was by no means enviable, various factions
of the Party were involved in lobbying at High Command
to corner the Chief Ministership in the State. Messers
Chandrajit Yadav, Uma Shankar Dixit, Hemavati Nandan
Bahuguna and even Kamlapati Tripathi were being
considered among the possible claimant to the post.
The President rule in the State gave ample time to all
aspirants to try their lucks.

Mr. Tripathi was willing to stay in the State;
he tried to mend his fences with his old time detractor
Mrs. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai. Both had common motives -
the reigns of U.P. should not be allowed to go in the
hands of those who were no longer active in U.P. politics,
although they represented the State at the Centre. This
situation was prompted by two incidents - first, Mr.
Dixit, an aspirant for the post, had been to Lucknow
in the last week of September and addressed a meeting
of the workers stating, "I am not willing to become Chief
Minister but if Prime Minister wishes so I may have to."[6]
This alarmed Mr. Tripathi and forced him to stay from
the meeting and his supporters too. On the other hand,
Mrs. Bajpai was suspicious of possible arrival of
Mr. Bahuguna in the State from High Command in case
State partymen failed to put forth any suitable
alternative for the Chief Ministership. Mrs. Bajpai
was reportedly not on good terms with Mr. Bahuguna, hence
she decided to favour Mr. Tripathi, consequently both
together met Mrs. Gandhi on October 11 to apprise her
the situation in U.P.[7]

Meanwhile Mr. Chandrajit Yadav and Mr. Dixit
visited Lucknow separately to assess the situation. In
the political circle it was assumed that both of them

came to ascertain the possibility of their chances for
the post of Chief Minister but they found that the
majority of Congress M.L.As were still behind Mr. Tripathi
and not any other person.[8] Whereas various factions were
busy for exploring their possibilities, Mrs. Gandhi kept
consulting the leaders of the party who were concerned
with the U.P. politics. During this fluid situation,
various deputation of U.P. M.L.As came to meet Mrs.
Gandhi and convinced her that Mr. Tripathi was the only
person desirable. Seeing his stronghold among the
M.L.As Mrs. Gandhi in consultation with Congress
Committee announced that Mr. Tripathi should continue
as the leader of U.P. Congress Legislature Party.[9]

All these activities show two trends of the
Congress Party. First group loyalties shift according
to the fortunes of group leader. Second the final say
rests with the High Command because all approach there
to seek its blessing. More or less, after the thumping
victory of 1971 which was fought on the basis of
personality 'Indira Hatao' or 'Indira Lao'; the power
of High Command came to/be/personalised in the form of
Mrs. Gandhi. On the advice of Mrs. Gandhi, Mr. Tripathi
prepared the list of Ministers and came to Delhi to get

approval. But he was confronted with the dictum of
High Command -

> "Ministry will be composed of only those who
> reflect a clear record."[10]

In fact, High Command wanted to present a clean
picture of the Ministry in the State which was badly
mutilated after the P.A.C. rebellion. Though Mr. Tripathi
was allowed to return to power due to solid support of
State M.L.As, it was clearly stated that he should not
induct those who were previously criticized publicly
for their dubious reputation. But Mr. Tripathi refused
to delete the names of those fellows - Messers Balram
Yadav, Baldev Singh Arya etc. - because they stood by
him in thick and thin. Since Mrs. Gandhi was intent
upon giving a new image to the Congress in the State
keeping in view the February Assembly Election, after
noticing predicament of Mr. Tripathi asked him to come
to join Cabinet at Centre. Consequently, he announced
on November 1, 1973 to join Cabinet at Centre and
proposed the name of Mr. Bahuguna for Chief Ministership.[11]
The ouster of Mr. Tripathi and arrival of Mr. Bahuguna
on U.P. scene was interpreted in political circle as
a "distinct ideological tilt to the left", because
Mr. Tripathi was taken as "rightist".[12] The whole

episode throws light on the internal politics of the
Congress Party. A sudden change from Mr. Tripathi to
Mr. Bahuguna showed the importance of High Command,
particularly that of Mrs. Gandhi in disposing the matter
decisively. The supremacy of Central leadership was
nothing new to the Party. Example after example can
be cited to show that in final analysis the choice
of Chief Minister rests with Central leader. Even when
there was fight between Mr. Purushotam Das Tandon and
Mr. Narendra Dev to form a first popular Ministry in
the State in 1937, it was central leadership which
selected Mr. Govind Ballabh Pant to lead the Ministry.[13]
Moreover, the main factor behind Mr. Bahuguna's
selection was that he represented a young dynamic
figure in the State politics and earned lot of repu-
tation for his skillfull handling of the situation during
1971 Lok Sabha election in the State.[14]

At last, Mr. Bahuguna was ushered into the office
of the Chief Minister on November 7, 1973. He was
confronted with the main task to build up a new image
of the Congress Party so that it could win a majority
in the Assembly Election scheduled to be held in February
1974. First of all, Mr. Bahuguna tried to give adequate
representation to all segments of society in his

Ministry.[15] Besides, in forming the Ministry cautious
efforts were made by him to satisfy all the interests
of the party to avoid dissension within it. Thus,
Mr. Salig Ram Jaiswal who raised the banner of revolt
against corruption among ministers in Tripathi's Cabinet,
Mrs. Bajpai who had vowed to fight Bahuguna's ascendancy
to power and her lieutenant Mr. Agha Zaidi had been
inducted in the Ministry. Mr. Sheonath Singh who headed
a pressure group of former B.K.D. men within the fold
of Congress had also been found a berth.[16]

Since the main task before Mr. Bahuguna was to
reverse the trend of appalling degeneration in order to
win the impending Assembly election, it will be relevant
to study the party politics of the Congress in terms of
election manoeuvering delivered by Mr. Bahuguna.
Undoubtedly Mr. Bahuguna was known for his organizational,
trade union and administrative experiences. It was
expected that he would certainly improve the situation
in the state to refurbish the image of the party. To
quote Mr. Bahuguna himself, I take up following lines -

> "I must get results quickly and I must carry
> the people with me."[17]

First of all Mr. Bahuguna exhorted for an increase
in power supply to village. He ordered the Electricity

Board of the state to supply power to villages from
previous 9 hours to 13 hours. Besides, he called upon
to raise thermal generation from the previous 66 percent
to 80 percent of the installed capacity.[18] All the
attempts were directed to create an impression that
the government was determined to improve the situation
of the state. His next step involved sanction of
economic concession to various quarters of the state.
He announced that there would be parity of 'Dearness
Allowance' between state and central employees. The
subsequent rise in D.A. of state employees benefitted
six hundred thousand government servants. Next came the
equalisation of pay and allowances of teachers and other
employees in aided schools and those of government
schools. It affected 80,000 teachers and employees.
Besides, he persuaded sugar magnets to increase the mill
price of sugarcane from previous Rs. 11.50 per quintal
to Rs. 12.50 per quintal. It brought benefit for 18 lakh
kissan families or roughly one crore farmers.[19] All
these measures created a favourable image for the party.
Besides, Mr. Bahuguna with much fanfare reshuffled the
bureaucracy in the state to streamline the activities
of the government.[20] In addition to it, Mr. Bahuguna
addressed the meeting of I.C.S.-I.A.S. association and

called upon them to "work for a socialist society", it helped him to establish his image as a socialist rather than rightist Chief Minister.[21]

Before the arrival of Mr. Bahuguna the condition regarding the supply of essential commodities was very acute and miserable. People were disgusted with the maladministration of the government. In order to stem this ret, he went from ministry to ministry in Delhi to get more allocation of essential articles. Curiously centre was not even half-generous to state as it became after the third week of November in supplying the essential goods. Within a few days of Bahuguna's installation in the office, the foodgrain quota was increased per unit in ration shops - from three to eight kilos; from half a litre kerosene oil per family per month to as much as one could buy. Cement and Hydrogenated oil which were not available before could be had in plenty. Even in respect of fertilizer, the situation had turned much better than what it was almost a month back.[22]

After attending the problems in this sector he tried to woo the Muslim electorates. Muslims constituted 16 to 44 percent of total votes in 97 constituencies in

the state.[23] Their swing must have affected the fortunes
of the party. Hence, he first appointed 4000 teachers
in primary schools to teach Urdu in those schools. He
favoured the idea that Urdu should become the second
official language in the State. Three Conferences
between November and December were held in Lucknow to
promote the cause of Urdu.[24]

In this programme of influencing mass psychology
next came a series of implementation of various schemes.
To enumerate a few - Shahdra-Saharanpur Railway line
work started from December 2; Some Pump Canal project
was inaugurated by Mrs. Gandhi at Mirzapur on January 16;
foundation stone was laid by her for the creation of
Faizabad Agricultural University on January 15; the
status of Kashi Vidyapeeth was raised to that of a full-
fledged University on January 15; announcement was made
to open two more Universities - Rohilkhand and Avadh -
in the state in January 29; foundation stone for a
fertilizer plant, I.F.F.C.O. was laid by Mrs. Gandhi on
January 16 at Phulpur in Allahabad district; similarly
did she lay the foundation stone for a B.H.E.L. complex
in Jhansi on January 9; before all this, Mrs. Gandhi had
already laid foundation stones for a linkage project

between Gomti and Sharda-Sahyak Canal and for the establishment of a branch of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited in Lucknow on November 17.[25]

I have digressed a little from the internal functioning of the (party politics) Congress Party to its external governmental activities. Such a digression is desirable to show the emerging pattern of party politics. All the issues discussed above clearly suggest two broader implications - first, all these activities were an exercise for wooing the electorate; second, first time in its history the organization of the party was relegated to the background in the context of election. For the sake of refurbishing the image of the party the channels of the government were being used rather than the organizational grass roots of the party. Mr. Kureel, the U.P.C.C. Chief was totally eclipsed by the personality and policies of Mr. Bahuguna. All these activities help us to project a clear picture of relationship between organizational and governmental wings of the Congress Party.

Now again reverting back to the internal politics of the party, one can notice that after the arrival of

Mr. Bahuguna the overt tone of factionalism was subsumed under the issue of preparation for winning the election. But when the question of selecting the candidates for the election arose, various groups within the party became active to corner larger share of tickets. According to normal procedure District Congress Committee prepares a list and sends it to Pradesh Election Committee which in turn forwards it to the State Parliamentary Board in Delhi, with maximum three names for per constituency. Now, it is upto Parliamentary Board to announce the final list. In Uttar Pradesh after a long spell of wrangling at Lucknow the list was forwarded to the Parliamentary Board. Here Mr. Bahuguna was keen on inducting as many new faces as possible as this would alone give him sufficient weightage in the state politics. Mr. Tripathi who favoured the going of Mr. Bahuguna to Lucknow as Chief Minister was making every effort to ensure that sitting M.L.As, majority of whom were his supporters during his tenure at Lucknow, must be given adequate representation. Now, it was clear that Mr. Bahuguna and Mr. Tripathi were pulling in different directions.[26] In addition to these two prominent groups, another group was being led by Mrs. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai with a tacit support of Mr. Chandrajit Yadav. The

most interesting thing about this pre-election jostling
was that unlike the past, the U.P.C.C. Chief Mr. Kureel
was maintaining a very low key posture, perhaps due to
his little standing in the organization.[27]

Confronted with all these counter pressures the
Parliamentary Board was appearing very indecisive to take
any final step. Historically looking, such a precarious
situation was not a new one, election had always
generated much tension and activated factional pull in
the Party. This time again the whole drama was being
reenacted. The gravity of the situation can be under-
stood by the fact that it took four postponement and
five sittings for the Congress Central Election Committee,
to finalise the list of U.P. whereas the lists of Orissa,
Pondicherry and Manipur were finalised in a single day.[28]
After the finalisation of list, a few unsatisfied smaller
groups might have felt dejected but bigger groups appeared
more or less satisfied. Afterwards the party seemingly
remained united till Mr. Bahuguna led the party to the
victory in the election and formed the government in the
first week of March, 1974.

Now I shall stop the discussion here itself. So
far I have tried to give a picture of the chronological

development of political process in the Congress party, coupled with necessary analysis of crucial events. The effort has been to bring out the major trends and tendencies of the political activities taking place in a dominant party. I have limited my discussion within the framework of the scope of my dissertation which is limited upto the State Assembly election of 19 74.

To wind up the whole discussion, I would like to say that factional dispute dominates the affair of party politics. However, its severity and intensity is not same all the time but varies from time to time. There are certain occasions when it becomes more volatile and explosive. One can enumerate those situations as follows - first, the arrival of election with its accompanying issue of ticket distribution creates a propitious situation for factional squabble. Next comes the time when Cabinet formation or its expansion takes place. Thirdly, party meetings provide a good platform for intense group fighting. Fourthly, the fortunes of the party in the election - preferably when there is a debacle or rout - serve as a convenient weapon for the internal warfare. Lastly, all these activities are carried under the over-arching framework of High Command which either intervenes or issues decree to perform

the role of an external catalyst to the whole
drama.

Now switching over to the last chapter of the
dissertation I shall try to arrive at certain conclusions
which are amply borne out by the events discussed so
far.

Footnotes -

1. Mr. Khan did not dissolve the Assembly and put
    the state under President's rule. But he only
    'suspended' its session for an indefinite period
    and brought the charge of the administration under
    his supervision. Please see 'Hindustan Times',
    June 13, 1973.

2. Please see statement of Mr. C.B. Gupta in 'Assam
    Tribune', June 13, 1973.

3. Please see 'The Indian Express', June 14, 1973.

4. Please see the editorial of 'The Hindu', June 14,
    1973.

5. A long article was written by Mr. S.C. Kala in an
    investigative survey, entitled 'None in U.P. Mourns
    the Exit of Tripathi', Times of India, Delhi,
    June 26, 1973.

6. Please see 'Patch-up in Uttar Pradesh', by Vidya
    Sagar, Hindustan Times, October 12, 1973.

7. Ibid.

8. Please see 'The Times of India', Delhi, October 17,
    1973.

9. See 'Hindustan Times, October 28, 1973.

10. See 'National Herald', Delhi, November 2, 1973.

11. See editorial of 'The Statesman', November 2, 1973.

12. See editorial of 'The Statesman', November 2, 1973.

13. See an article entitled, 'The Change in U.P.:
    Clearing the Decks for Elections', by Dilip
    Mukherjee, The Times of India, November 3, 1973.

14. See 'National Herald', November 4, 1973.

15. See the 'Table No.

16. See an article written by Mr. Kapil Varma, entitled
    'A New Scene in U.P.', Hindustan Times, November 16,
    1973.

17. For a detailed study, please see the article of Mr. M.B. Lall, 'The Chief Minister's Rare-Show', The Times of India, Delhi, November 22, 1973.

18. See, 'The Statesman', November 11, 1973.

19. All these informations are gathered from an article - 'Election-Eve Bonanza', published in Hindustan Times, November 28, 1973.

20. See, The Times of India, Delhi, December 7, 1973.

21. In contrast to Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi, his sincere effort was to give an impression through various media of communication that he stood for socialism, please see 'The Patriot', Delhi, December 24, 1973.

22. All these inferences are taken from the article, 'Wooing the U.P. Electorate', The Hindu, Madras, December 28, 1973.

23. See, 'The Role of Communalism in Uttar Pradesh', Indian Express, December 29, 1973.

24. See the article, 'Urdu as an Election Issue', National Herald, Delhi, January 21, 1974.

25. An interesting article regarding the spree of inaugurations was brought in two serials by Hindustan Times paper with a caption, 'Some Precious Stones: A Special Report', Hindustan Times, February 6 and 7, 1974.

26. For an interesting analysis of election squabble see 'The Times of India', January 5, 1974.

27. Ibid.

28. See 'National Herald', January 21, 1974.

CONCLUSION

The previous two chapters provide a survey like
description of the crucial events taking place within
the framework of party-politics in Uttar Pradesh
Congress. The political process of the party has been
discussed behind the backdrop of two main themes - the
pattern of structural relationship among its constituents
(say legislative wing, organizational wing and High
Command) and the nature of factional schism. The
second issue is more crucial because it goes a long
way to shape the nature and pattern of the relation
within the structural constituents of the party.

Now analysing the whole phenomenon through the
theoretical framework, discussed in the second chapter,
I shall try to bring out the salient trends and tendencies
of the party politics. First I shall take up the study
of structural relation among its constituent parts.
Stanely Kochanek[1] has extensively dealt with the
organisational framework of the Congress Party. But
his emphasis is only at Centre-level structure rather
than at state level. Here my study is related with the
statelevel politics, hence efforts have been made to
throw light on the structural relation taking place

within the framework of the U.P. State Congress. The
role of High Command will be perceived as an external
catalyst occasionally participating, intervening and
regularising the political forces of the State Congress.

Recapitulation of events from 1969 to 1974 brings
forth certain truth about the structural relation of
the stateCongress. The relation between legislative
and organizational wings always fluctuate; in the face
of a dominant leader conflicting interests are reconciled
but the presence of weak leadership aggravates the
conflict. Generally, party-government interaction
becomes a camouflage for group conflict. In normal case,
pro-government and anti-government groups try to capture
the control of the party organization. But when dissidence
strengthens its activity; it becomes imperative for
dissident group to capture the party organization for
two reasons - First, party organization is an excellent
form from which the group can gain leverage against the
majority group and attack the ministry. With this
levarage there is possibility to win over enough
supporters in the legislative wing to take over the
Ministry. Second, failing this, a second alternative
is available. Control of the party organization means
the dominance over the party election machinery, which

can be used to ensure the selection of legislative candidates from its own group. This, in turn guarantees that this group will eventually emerge as the dominant legislative group after the elections. The intensity of the struggle within the party proves the theory of Paul R. Brass that conflict is unmistakably bound to develop over the distribution of power and status.[2]

As a result of this intra-party manoeuvering it is necessary for any group desiring to remain in power to secure control of both party and government. The situation badly deteriorates when the emergence of a dominant leadership fails and continual dispute of the party assumes the characteristic of the conflict raging between two party systems of alternating elites within the dominant Congress Party.[3] To avoid such a sorry state of affair at provincial level, the Congress Working Committee has instituted a sub-Committee, the Central Parliamentary Board, which plays the role of arbiter in the case of dispute between two wings of the party and affects reconciliation as well as coordination.

Judging from the scene of U.P. Congress the hitherto discussed premise became substantiated. Dissident groups always pressurised the legislativeleader to resign from the post of party chief. The case of Mr. Kamlapati

Tripathi is too evident. On the other hand, the
legislative leader always made attempts to hold sway over
the organisation. Mr. Tripathi had a great say in the
appointment of Mrs. Rajendra Kumari Bajpai and successful
election of Mr. Baijnath Kureel as the Presidents of
U.P.C.C. Later on when Mrs. Bajpai wished to strengthen
her position she brought, as we have seen in previous
chapters, a few of her lieutenants in the organization.

The relationship between state and central party
organization suggests the metaphorical relation between
trunk and the branch of a big tree;[4] the latter
sustaining power from the former. However, the
intensity of relation varies from time to time. If
there is strong leadership at thestate with a larger
base it can resist the attempts of High Command to
humble it. For example, in its early history, the U.P.
State Congress had seen the sustaining power of Mr. G.B.
Pant not to yield before centre. Later on, in recent
times, Mr. Tripathi, precisely on the basis of support
enjoyed by him from State Congress legislators, managed
to hold out against the advice of the Centre to drop a
few allegedly corrupt ministers or to shift to Centre
after the P.A.C. rebellion. Only after a long persuasion
and continued effort of High Command Mr. Tripathi agreed

to come to Delhi to join Cabinet there. Moreover, his support was solicited for Mr. Bahuguna to ensure his smooth stay in the State.

The other trend regarding the relation between High Command and State branch comes forth is that of relative autonomy of the state organization. However, this autonomy fluctuates in correspondence with changing situation. For example, after 1969 split when the High Command of 'New' Congress itself was in a precarious situation, it allowed a greater amount of freedom to the state leadership to chalk out its strategy. But this situation changed progressively with a gradual strengthening of the High Command. After the massive electoral victory of 1971 it became stronger and tightened its hold over the state leadership.

Looking through theoretical framework, discussed in the second chapter, the structure of the state Congress is loose and flexible. The relationship changes according to shifting power position of various components. The assertion of Morris Jones[6] that the structure of Congress party is 'open' for recruitment, competition for power and interaction with other parties is well

borne out by the present study. As it has been
observed that after 1971 victory, M.L.As from various
parties made their way to the fold of the 'new' Congress.
They were accommodated in the party irrespective of
their background. Secondly, the 'new' Congress or the
Congress before the split was always pitted against the
Jana Sangh, B.K.D. and Socialist Parties to achieve
power. Thirdly, the 'new' Congress supported the
coalition government of Mr. Charan Singh formed in
February 1970. It shows its occasional interaction
with erstwhile opposition party too.

The next important element of theoretical frame-
work about the structure of the Congress Party is, in
the words of Myron Weiner, its "adaptive structural
assignment"[6]. It suggests that adaptive capacity of
the party, in other words, whatever is deemed essential
for the survival of the party, it has attempted to
adopt itself to the immediate environment. It is true
in the case of the U.P. Congress as it has been clearly
borne out by the study of the period between 1969 to
1974. After the split 'new' Congress appeared a compact
group but a desire to come into power slowly made it
throw open its gate for political leaders of all hues.
As we have seen that at the time of split in November

1969, the 'new' Congress enjoyed support of only 108 M.L.As but by the beginning of 1971 it had enough M.L.As to install its own government in the month of April. In that way it more than doubled its strength by its accommodative and adaptive structure conducive to defection from outside. It is clear now that it has always tempered and tailored its goal and structure according to the changing environment.

The next main theme of the discussion is factional schism continually operating in the fold of the Congress Party. Viewing this problem through the theoretical framework (Marxist, Non-Marxist both), discussed in the second chapter, the salient idea emerges is that the Congress Party is a coalition of interests.[7] In U.P. Congress, we see that rich farmers, middle peasantry, urban middle class and big industrialists in the form of ideological orientation of various party leaders find expression in the policies of the party. The issues discussed among the various Congress factional leaders have always involved the nationalisation or non-nationalisation of sugar industries, lowering down or limiting the ceiling of land holdings, exemption or non-exemption of land revenues to a particular group of land holding, subsidy on the supply of fertiliser and

131

pesticides etc. All these issues have been clearly
brought out in the previous two chapters. Besides,
economic interest, various social realities have also
got reflected in the garb of factional schism. Wooing
of Harijan and Muslim sentiments are clear suggestions
of the party. Before election of 1974, Mr. Baijnath
Kureel was made President to win over the Harijan votes
whereas the cause of Urdu was ostensibly championed just
before the election to influence the Muslims. Moreover,
these issues were often raised within the framework of
the Party to fight factional battle in the government
and the organization.

As Lipson[8] has pointed out that there are certain
pre-conditions for the emergence and continuity of the
factionalism, it is amply palpable that those conditions
are more or less available in the U.P. Congress. First
there is always a factional group with its distinct
leader. For example, before the split, it was Mr. Kamapati
Tripathi in the Congress who was heading the most
prominent faction against the leadership of Mr. C.B. Gupta.
Afterwards, under the stewardship of Mr. Tripathi, the
Party saw the existence of factional groups with either
state leaders like Mrs. Bajpai or Mr. Salig Ram Jaiswal
or Central leaders like Mr. Chandrajit Yadav and others.

Second, a common set of interests i.e. to come into position of power and privilege - always held such groups together. However, in the face of offerings from other groups various members occasionally changed their loyalties. Thirdly, certain situations like Cabinet formation, ticket distribution, Cabinet expansion have always galvanized the factional activities as it has been proved by the events taking place between 1969 and 1974.

The reason for the existence of such a factional strife can be located in the diverse, more particularly, in the heterogenous nature of the socio-economic realities of the Uttar Pradesh State. The discussion related with the general background of the State in the beginning of the third chapter briefly emphasizes the variegated mosaics of the society in U.P. The representation of those forces is not only in the Congress but in otherparties too; the difference is only that the dominant position of the Congress makes its diversities more apparent and articulate.[9] The most interesting feature of the factional dispute within the fold of the U.P. Congress is that it gives an impression of competition within the party to control power. It provides an in-built mechanism to check the bossism

of any dominant factional leader because all the time
he is exposed to the contrary pressures and pulls.

Having discussed all these things, I wish to
draw contrast between my findings and that of Mr. Paul
Brass who has done an important work on the nature and
function of the U.P. Congress. I wish to suggest some
supplementaries or alternatives to his seminal work on
this issue. Paul Brass devotes his whole work on the
issue of factionalism in the U.P. Congress only upto
1964 and draws some conclusions. The motif of his work
can be best expressed in his own narration, which I am
penning down verbatim -

> "Alliances develop and splits and defections
> occur wholly because of the mutual convenience
> and temporarily shared power-political
> interests of the group leaders."[10]

He further goes on to conclude that factionalism
is devoid of ideological or socio-economic content and
is linked exclusively to a matter of power and patronage.
Here my contention is that though lust of power and
privilege clearly characterizes the nature of factional
politics in the U.P. Congress Party, there are a few
socio-economic factors too which contribute for it.
As a fact, politics cannot operate in vaccum out of its
social context. Caste represents as one of the important

social structural reality in the political process of
the state. Unfortunately no authentic study has been
done on the role of caste in U.P. Congress but cursory
studies carried out by various newspapers suggest that
U.P. Congress has provided a good battle ground for two
dominant castes of the state, namely Brahmins and Rajputs.
Recently backward castes have also impressed upon the
system. In absence of a case study on U.P., I am taking
recourse to the seminal work of Dr. Ramashray Roy,[11]
who in his study of Bihar Pradesh Congress Party
emphasises in unequivocal terms that factionalism in
Bihar must be understood in terms of the long standing
conflict between Kayasthas, Rajputs and Bhumihars.
Though caste-conflict in U.P. is not as acute as it
is in Bihar, factionalism in U.P. may be seen as a
partial reflection of the conflict between dominant
castes and various regions. After 1969 election state
Congress saw slow emergence of backward lobby within
its fold as the various journalists and scholars had
observed in their articles during that period. It has
been discussed in chapter III and IV. Naturally, it
might have caused a dent in the stronghold of other
dominant castes in the party. Since there is absence
of any well documented thesis on the caste-lobby within

Congress Party. I wish to take up this investigative
study for my Ph.D. programme.

Regarding the economic interests working behind
factionalism, Mr. Brass maintains a clear silence. He
does not even bother to look into any possible even-
tuality of any vested economic interests. Mary C.
Carras in her study of district councils (Zila Parishad)
in Maharashtra[12] finds out factionalism as a result of
socio-economic interests. She points out that sugar-
cane politics holds the sway in certain areas of
Maharashtra whereas some other agricultural interests
are quite decisive in other areas of the state. Likewise,
any perceptive student of Congress politics will not
deny the covert existence of 'sugar lobby' and 'land
ceiling and revenue lobby' in the state. It will not
quite out of place if I briefly highlight the sugar and
land politics of the Congress Party here.

Uttar Pradesh is primarily an agricultural state,
most of its factional conflict has centred round the
issues dealing with land and agricultural development.
It usually manifests itself in two ways - First, factions
operating in the form of ministry providing concessions,
incentives to this sector. Second, factions in the form
of dissident groups pressurizing the cabinet to do the

needful. Sugar politics has been a favourite pastime for factional groups in the party to invoke certain sensitive issues associated with it to embarrass the Ministry. Sugar-cane is a crash crop. Out of an all-India total production, U.P. produces roughly 40 per cent of the total output. According to agricultural census during 1977-78 there were 288 sugar factories in India out of which 89 were installed in U.P.[13] As a fact, sugar production is the first and foremost industry of the state. Sugar politics involve three major groups - cane-growers, sugar manufacturers and the government - which indulge in bargaining and generally government acts as arbiter. Government plays a crucial role in affecting the fortunes of the cane-growers as well as the sugar manufacturers in the following ways:- First, it is government which fixes the minimum price for the supply of sugar-cane to the factories. Second, licensing to regulate expansion or establishment of new factories is done by the government. Third, the fixation of ex-factory price of sugar and quota regulation is carried out by the order of the government. Fourth, Government is engaged in distribution of sugar for domestic consumption and the export.

Such a crucial importance of the state government makes it a target of external as well as internal pressure.

Looking at the political development during 1969 to
1974, we see that all the time dissident M.L.As of the
Congress Party raised the voice for the nationalisation
of the sugar mills to criticize the government. However,
the nationalisation of sugar-mills, though an economic
issue, was used as political weapon against the
Ministerialists. Curiously enough, in pursuance of
Bombay Resolution of A.I.C.C. in 1970, all the Congress
leaders reiterated their decision to nationalise the
sugar industry at no time a comprehensive economic
survey was done to find out its possible implications.

During 1971-72 there were 72 sugar mills in the state;
majority of them had worn out machinery; at least 10
were declared sick by the government. Nationalisation
would have meant government investing nearly Rs.200,000,000
for its rehabilitation.[14] If one is to go by the previous
record of the government - a few private sugar mills
were taken over by government for a brief period - he
will find the deteriorating result shown by the state
officials who were running it.[15] In such a case the
mere populist rhetoric of nationalisation echoed by the
then Congress M.L.As might have brought disastrous
result. Here my attempt is not to defend or deny the
issue of nationalisation but to bring out the logical

inconsistency of the demands of congress leaders who
for the sake of sectional interests often indulged
in such a demagogy without considering its financial
implications. Interestingly enough whenever these
clamouring leaders were absorbed into cabinet they
shied away from the issue obviously under pressure of
sugar magnates Several times Mr Kamlapati Tripathi
himself criticized Mr C.B. Gupta and Mr Charan Singh
for tacit collusion with industrialists for not
enforcing the industrialization, but after becoming
Chief Minister he himself dragged his feet on this
issue. On the other side of this sugar-politics
one will notice hectic attempts of the Congress
M.L.A.s to pressurise the government to increase the
rate of minimum prize for the supply of sugarcane to
the factories. More often than not, farmers'
lobby of the party succeeded in getting prize increased.
Mr Kamlapati Tripathi and Mr Bahuguna both asked
the mill-owners to increase the price for sugarcane
they dutifully did it and cane-growers were benefitted.[16]
But mill owners also extracted their demand by
increasing the price of sugar. The ultimate
casuality of this lobbying was none other than the
poor consumer.

Now coming to the other economic aspect of

factionalism, I shall discuss the politics of land
ceiling and revenue. The debate between Ministerialists
and Organizationalists in the Party often took place on
lowering the level of land ceiling, imposing ceiling
on urban property and exempting small holding from the
revenue taxation. The ceiling on land holdings was
imposed in Uttar Pradesh by the U.P. Imposition of
ceiling on land Holdings Act 1960, which came into force
on January 3, 1961. Since then two factions, big
farmers and small farmers, wrangled over the propriety
of the Ceiling Act. In February 1970 Mr. Charan Singh
had moved a Bill to bring down the level of land ceiling.
His party was then in coalition with the 'New' Congress;
but owing to pressures from a large section of Congress
M.L.As, Mr. Charan Singh had to give up the idea. This
was projected by detractors of Mr. Kamalapati Tripathi,
in the party meeting "as a sign of feudalistic approach."[17]
This constant pressure within the party forced Mr.
Tripathi to bring the U.P. Imposition ofCeiling On Land
Holdings (Amendment) Bill in 1972 when he himself was
in the seat of Chief Minister. This Bill sought to
remove the loopholes in the existing laws of land and
slightly bring down the level of land ceiling. Its
introduction gave an opportunity to his detractors in
the party to allege him for his discrimination against

rural land in favour of urban property. This issue
gave dissidents to make much against the vascillation
of the Ministry.[18] Besides, ceiling issue, the dissident
group of the party has always asked about the exemption
of land revenue upto the holding of 6.5 acre in the
State. First, this issue was raised by socialists
leaders but later on Congress Party also made it a bone
of contention. During its coalition with the Government
of Mr. Charan Singh, a good number of Congress M.L.As
and M.L.Cs pressurised their party leaders to bring
influence on Charan's government to exempt the land
revenue of the holding amounting upto 6.5 acre. Next
when Mr. Tripathi, himself became Chief Minister,
Mr. Saligram Jaiswal, a former Socialist leader who
had lately joined 'New' Congress after 1971 Lok Sabha,
vociferously claimed for abolition of land revenue on
the holding of 6.5 acre. A group of Congress M.L.As
made it a point and even met Mrs. Gandhi under the
leadership of Mr. Jaiswal to tell about the failure
of Tripathi's government and issue of land revenue too.[19]
Now, I close the discussion on the economic dimensions
of factionalism in the Congress Party. As a truth, the
points raised by above argument are quite sketchy and
sweeping, a deep, detailed study is required to carry
out the veracity of the premise more intensively. My

aim is to take up this problem at greater length during
my Ph.D. work, so that a hitherto untrodden path of
linking economic interest with factionalism can be
explored in U.P. Party-politics.

Moreover, my purpose to refute the postulate of
Mr. Brass that factionalism in U.P. Congress Party is
free from economic implications, can be borne by the
earlier argument in a moderate sense. The argument
put forth in favour of socio-economic interests shows
a possibility of deeper linkages of these interests
with the nature of factional conflict in the party. My
submission is only that if Paul Brass had included these
factors too in his study, his theory of power and
privilege might have appeared more appealing and
convincing.

Now, I shall briefly discuss another premise
which stands contrast to that of Paul Brass. In his
study, Paul Brass has tried to mix-up, without making
separate conclusion, the study of district level party
politics with that of state level. It is important
to clearly designate which political level we are
talking about when discussing the factionalism. Unfor-
tunately Paul Brass often makes inferences from local
factionalism and imposes them on state factionalism.[20]

I think it is better if one makes distinction between micro level and macro level factionalism. By micro-factionalism generally it is meant competition between factions which are tightly knit-groups of leaders and followers. By macro-factionalism, is meant competition between intra-party groups which can be related to specific socio-economic interests. Unlike the micro faction which is relatively closed the macro-factionalism is relatively open and diffuse in terms of its recruitment and policies.[21]

As a fact mixing of levels of analysis leads to certain inconsistencies. Andre Beteille rightly points out -

> ".... the conclusion that local politics in India is factional and centres around personalities should not surprise us because that seems to general characteristic of local politics in all parts of the world. Where Brass acts with insufficient caution is when he projects this finding on to the state level....."[22]

From the above discussion it is clear that generalisations are difficult to transfer from one level of analysis to another. If a per-ceptive student points out that at local level factionalism is highly personalized, non-ideological, patronage oriented, at the same time, without making a proper analysis he need not say that likewise trends characterise the state and

national level too. Because factions at these two
higher levels tend to be, in addition to local traits,
identifiable in terms of ideology and interest as well.
At last, I humbly want to say that the issues which my
work has raised should not be treated as refutation of
the theory suggested by Paul Brass. These issues should
be taken as supplementary to his monumental work.

Now, to wind up the dissertation I shall frankly
admit that this work is essentially carried out on the
basis of available secondary sources. It is still
incomplete in the sense that it has not taken up the
investigative, first hand study of the socio-economic
interests skulking behind the scene. Secondly, the
present work needs extension of the period of study
from 1974 to 1980 so that a broader spatiotime scale can
be applied for a more comprehensive understanding of the
problem. Since time and scope was limited at the M.Phil.
level study, I hope that I shall take up the left-part
of the study at Ph.D. level.

1. A perceptive study on the structural relation of
    Congress Party is carried out by Stanley A.
    Kochanek, 'The Congress Party of India: The
    Dynamics of One-Party Democracy', Princeton
    University Press, New Jersey, 1968, ~~~~~~~~.

2. Paul R. Brass has lucidly discussed the issue in
    his book, 'Factional Politics in an Indian State:
    The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh', Oxford
    University Press, Bombay, 1966, pp. 228-236.

3. A perceptive study on the structural relation of
    Congress Party is carried out by Stanley A.
    Kochanek, 'The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics
    of One-Party Democracy', op. cit. P 232 - 239

4. See, M.P. Singh, 'Split in a Predominant Party',
    Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 1981, p. 28.

5. See 'Dominance and Dissent' in his 'Politics Mainly
    Indian', Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1978,
    pp. 213-232.

6. The issue has been raised and thoroughly discussed
    by Myron Weiner in his book, 'Party Building in a
    New Nation: The Indian National Congress', The
    University Cicago Press, Chicago, 1967.

7. This view is accepted by both brand of scholars -
    Marxist and non-Marxist. The difference is only
    where the former sees it in terms of class the
    latter looks at it through elite and mass
    perspective.

8. Leslie Lipson, quoted in Julius Gould and William
    L. Khob (ed.), 'Dictionary of Social Sciences'
    (Tavistook Publications, N. York 1964, pp. 255-256)
    suggests about various existing conditions about
    the viability of factionalism. These points have
    been enumerated in the second chapter.

9. This idea is discussed by Angela Burger in her
    book 'Opposition in a Dominant Party System',
    University of California Press, 1969.

10. Cited from Paul R. Brass, 'Factional Politics
    in an Indian State', op. cit., p. 54.

11. See, Ramashray Roy, 'Politics of Fragmentation: The Case of Congress Party in Bihar', in Iqbal Narain (ed.) 'State Politics in India', Meenakshi, Meerut, 1967, p. 418.

12. Marry G. Carras has done a very excellent study on the issue of factionalism in context to Maharashtra. Her work is entitled, 'The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Council in the State of Maharashtra', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1972.

13. Compiled from 'India-80', p. 313.

14. See 'Northern India Patrika', Allahabad, 22 April 1971.

15. See, 'The Hindu', Madras, June 30, 1972.

16. See, 'The Times of India', November 16, 1974.

17. See, 'National Herald', Delhi, May 27, 1972.

18. See an article written a staff Correspondent, 'Scepticism On Ceiling: Land Records in U.P. in Mess', 'Patriot', Delhi, June 13, 1972.

19. See, 'Trying Time for U.P. Chief Minister', by Lucknow Correspondent, 'The Hindu', Madras, 21 September 1972.

20. For such a general conclusion, please see the last chapter of Paul Brass, 'Factional Politics in an Indian State', op. cit., p. 232.

21. This idea of 'Micro and Macro' factionalism is taken from 'Factions and Fronts: Party System in South India', by James Walch, Young Asia Publications, New Delhi, 1976.

22. Cited from Andre Beteille, 'Caste Class and Power', Berkeley, 1965, p. 142.

TABLE NO. I.   Result of Mid Term Election 1969

		% of votes secured
Congress	211	33.68
J.S.	49	17.93
B.K.D.	98	21.29
S.S.P.	33	7.78
C.P.I.	4	3.05
P.S.P.	3	1.76
C.P.M.	1	.49
Swatantra	5	1.25
Republican	1	3.49
Independent	20	9.28

Source: Newspaper compilation.

TABLE NO. II.   Result of Assembly Election 1974

		% of votes secured
Congress (R)	215	32.95
Congress (O)	10	5.68
J.S.	61	15.87
C.P.I.	16	2.35
C.P.M.	2	0.51
Social Party	5	1.92
Swatantra	1	0.43
B.K.D.	106	20.51
Muslim League	1	1.14

Source: Report of Election Commission of
         India, 1974, p. 21.

TABLE NO. III.   Formation of Congress Ministry
in terms of Caste - Cabinet
Ministers.

	Brahmins	Rajputs	Kayasth	Muslims	Backward	S.C.
Mr. Gupta's Ministry (26 Feb. 1969)	5	2	2	1	2	3
Mr. Tripathi's Ministry (April 4 and May 21, 1971)	6	3	1	1	3	2
Mr. Bahuguna's Ministry (November 8, 1973)	4	2	2	1	2	3

Source : Newspaper Compilation

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