


**INDIAN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT: POWER
POLITICS AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS**

A STUDY OF THE NEHRU PERIOD

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Dedicated to

*Bapu, Mummy
and
Mili*

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Any omission in the study is my responsibility.

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INTRODUCTION

Non-alignment – the dominant diplomatic philosophy of the Afro-Asian nations – has never received the attention from informed students of international affairs which its importance deserves. It was both a widespread and an increasingly influential ideology during the cold war era. Indian foreign policy of non-alignment has not yet been studied within an explicit analytic framework. Although much scholarly work has been done on non-alignment, it has not been properly contextualized or coordinated within an explicit theoretical framework. Existing literature regarding non-alignment are descriptive rather than explanatory. Events are explained more in time sequence than in recurring patterns.

This research intends to study the foreign policy strategy of India, that is, non-alignment in the Nehru period by using a framework with a largely systemic focus. It will try to answer the question: why has India behaved as she has in international relations? The framework employed avoids the error of treating foreign policy as if it were an isolated, and even self-contained, enterprise; instead it will explain how the state's chief decision makers managed the challenges from the international environment through policies spanning the polity and economy, not just through foreign policy. The framework employed concentrates on explaining Indian overall foreign policy strategy or general foreign policy orientation.

Most of India's foreign policy decisions were taken and implemented within the general framework of the strategy of non-alignment, in much the same sense U.S. decisions and actions in Cold War were influenced by the general strategy of containment. A foreign policy strategy stems from the need to achieve certain objective in a certain way. The three main objective which were pursued through the strategy of non-alignment were :-

- (1) National Security
- (2) To achieve major power status
- (3) Improvement of operations of the international system

One of the purpose of the research is to explain how did the strategy of non-alignment generated the required capability to serve the objective of national security and

how far it was successful. Thus, national security as an objective is related to strategy within the framework of capability analysis, as it helps explain why power is needed by states in the anarchical system and how states manipulate it in order to maintain their survival through self help. The traditional assumption is that power gives states the ability to promote and protect national interest and to win in bargaining situation. A state if it participate in international politics is involved in generating power for itself. Power can be derived from the proper operationalisation of capacities in the international system. It appears that India's operationalisation of her capacities to generate power in pursuit of her objective of external security, lay either in taking advantage of, or through the adoption of suitable posture to the predominant conflict of the cold war. There was a stark divergence between ambition and material capabilities during the Nehru period. What is important here is that the concept of Balance of Power may held explain why, in spite of inadequate capacities, India was able to generate power to serve some of her central objectives in international politics. However, power analysis possesses a misleading explanatory character, as power resources are not fungible across issue-areas. What functions as a power resource in one policy contingency framework may be irrelevant in another. India employed 'soft power' resources and earned leadership role in the Third World while it source of power regarding superpowers was nuclear balance of terror. The power derived from non-alignment existed only in relation to superpowers, it was inapplicable to both China and Pakistan.

The central argument is that India's foreign policy behaviour has been driven by the desire to achieve major-power status, and that the sources of conflict between India and the major power system have been fundamentally systemic. It is argued that India's moderate posture in relation to role assertion has been a function of the policy of "regional containment" pursued by one or more major powers in relation to India. The aim to retain India's foreign-policy autonomy was the most fundamental aspect of Nehru's foreign policy. The scope and space for a future major-power role was created by a foreign policy of independence. This explains the thrust for self-reliance in economic and defense planning during Nehru's period.

In short, this research will examine the factors that made India assert a leadership role through the nonaligned movement while lacking in economic and military capabilities.

Regarding the third objective of Indian foreign policy, that is, improvement of the operations of the international system, an attempt will be made to analyse the normative impulses underlying India's foreign policy. To analyse these normative impulses, the political culture framework has been employed in this research. Nehru's doctrine of Panchsheel and peaceful coexistence has been analysed within the theoretical framework of constructivism that maintains that international relations are not only affected by power politics but also by ideas and norms.

Chapter one of this dissertation seeks to trace the evolution of the policy of the non-alignment right from the pre-independence period, with particular emphasis on Nehru's contribution to it. It will discuss various determinants of the policy of non-alignment like the threat from the cold war, impact of nationalist movement, economic development or self-reliance and Nehru's vision of Asian solidarity and area of peace.

Chapter two makes a modest attempt to understand the theoretical underpinnings of the policy of non-alignment. In the first section, neo-realists theories of power and balance of power are discussed. It attempts a critical analysis of India's approach to security under Nehru, the nature and patterns of threat, and the manner in which foreign policy responded to them within the framework of structural realism.

Section two intends to study the components of Indian foreign policy which help improve the operation of international system within the framework of liberalism. The last section deals with the role of norms in international relations within the framework of constructivism and seeks to relate the constructivists argument to Nehru's policy of panchsheel. It also emphasizes the role of norms in national security policies, often ignored by realists.

Chapter three deals with the practices of nonalignment in the world affairs with particular reference to the Indian diplomacy regarding the Suez crisis of 1956 with some reference to Hungarian crisis. The reason for dealing with these two crises is that the occasion involved the use of force by the powers in opposite camps of the cold war and thus was the test of the strength and validity of non-alignment.

Chapter four is a case study of Sino-Indian War of 1962 and it examines Tibet as the root causes of war. It traces the relationship between the two countries right from their independence upto 1962 war. It makes the point that Panchsheel was incompatible between the two nations because of their different world views, and widely divergent political cultures and approaches to power. Moreover, it examines the issue of the conflict within the framework of democratic peace.

CHAPTER - I

DETERMINANTS OF NON-ALIGNMENT

Presiding over modern India's destiny as the country's first Prime Minister and foreign minister for a long and continuous period of 17 years, Nehru played a pivotal role in shaping Indian foreign policy. Although deeply conscious of Indian severe constraints, Nehru was nonetheless convinced that India was destined to be a key player in international system. He believed that the country's future potential demanded that India play an activist role in international affairs to secure the interests both of India and of humanity at large. Analysts differ, however, as to whether Nehru was driven in his policy by realism or idealism.¹

K. Subrahmanyam holds, that Nehru had really been a practitioner of realism and balance of power policy.² It infers that Nehru must have considered India to be a major power to assume playing the role of balancer. As against this analysis, some scholars hold that Nehru's policy was governed by idealism. Nehru himself acknowledged during 1962 India-China War that "we had been living in a world of unreality".³ This shows that he paid less attention to the problem of national security in his foreign policy.

Nehru was in office for a long period during the formative stage of India's emergence from colonialism into independence, its consolidation as a new state after partition, and the founding and legitimizing of its institutional structures and policy frameworks in different fields. During his long stewardship, the world (cold war) underwent many changes, as his foreign policy. Any effort therefore to reduce the complexity of his foreign policy to make them intelligible in terms of the simple categories of realism and idealism is likely not to do adequate justice to his position.⁴

¹ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power - Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 115.

² K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China conflict of 1962", in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 102-30.

³ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: Volume V: March 1963 – May 1964* (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1968).

⁴ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power - Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 116.

Cold War

The major challenge to India's security during the Nehru era came from the politics of cold war. For a country which had just attained nationhood, preservation of independence was the most natural and cardinal objective. The cold war with its bloc politics threatened to take away that independence. The choice before India was either to accept a policy of alignment, join one of the power blocs and thus be under its protective umbrella or adopt an independent non-aligned foreign policy and stay away from bloc politics.

The policy of alignment was ruled out because that would have meant India giving up its identity and the right to judge issues of international politics on the merits of the case and its own national interest. Moreover, it meant undermining its own potentially great nation or big power role in the international system. Contrary to this unequal position, non-alignment represented assertion of national independence, emphasis on equality of relations based on mutual interest, and refusal to pre-empt the nation's right to examine the issues on their merits and national interests.⁵

Nehru became the head of interim government in early September 1946. Within days of assuming this role, even though still operating under the constraints of colonial rule, he declared the intent of his government to participate in international affairs: *as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom.*

More significantly, at that early stage of postwar history, he laid out the basis for what subsequently became the hallmark of independent India's foreign policy by adding:

*We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale.*⁶

⁵ Raheeduddin Khan (ed.) *Perspectives on Non-Alignment*, (New Delhi: Kalamakar Prakashan, 1981), p. 17.

⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, "Free India's role in World Affairs" in *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Second Series*, vol. I, 404-8

The timing of the 1946 declaration (of India's intent to remain aloof from aligned blocs) was particularly significant as much weaker states than India were likely to attain independence at a time when the cold war deepened. Such states in all probability would have had little option but to choose between the two rival blocs. But India's early resistance to such choice provided a salutary example to follow, so that this great power conflict began to be contained not only at its inception but also at its height.⁷

What underlay the refusal to join either bloc was the fierce determination to be independent and master of one's own foreign policy rather than handing over its management to the superpowers. The aim to retain India's foreign-policy autonomy was the most fundamental aspect of Nehru's foreign policy. A subordinate or satellite role was unacceptable to him. Indeed, so central was the aim of foreign policy autonomy that Nehru was initially dubious about any formal organizing of even a bloc of non-aligned countries.⁸

In the context of cold war, an open declaration by India of its intent to maintain its foreign policy independence was not only innovative but also daring. While India's challenge was addressed to both superpowers, in effect it was meaningful largely in relation to the U.S. The world immediately after the war was essentially a unipolar system with the USA as the hegemonic power. It is precisely in these circumstances of the US as hegemonic power and assertion by India of foreign policy independence that were sown the seeds of the largely conflictual relationship between the two states.⁹

The endeavor to foster an independent foreign policy was to create implicitly the scope and space for a major – power role, if not now, at least in the future, when capabilities matched the ambition. To proclaim an independent foreign policy was to declare one's capacity, howsoever derived, to stand on one's own, while to join a bloc

⁷ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-alignment: A conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 54.

⁸ S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), vol. III, p. 185.

⁹ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power - Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 125.

was to renounce before hand any future claim to such a role. An independent foreign policy was both a prerequisite to, and a marker of becoming a major power.¹⁰

To Nehru, an independent foreign policy was at the very heart of national independence; as he proclaimed:

*What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy. Once foreign relation go out of your hands into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent.*¹¹

If the safeguarding of future major power role can be regarded as implicit in the declaration of an independent foreign policy, where did the goal of an independent foreign policy come from? Can it be regarded as having issued, out of shrewd assessment of India's capabilities?

Bharat Karnad opines that "by the time the Second World War ended, India too had all characteristics of big power – size, natural resources, a large sterling balance, and above all, military heft. It had the capacity to project power' which was exceeded only by US, Soviet Union, Great Britain and perhaps Turkey."¹²

With 3.1 million sq km, India was seventh largest state in the world and was the second most populous country. More importantly, when India emerged into independence, China was in turmoil because of civil war, Japan was under US occupation and much of Asia and Africa was still under colonial rule. It was not surprising that India was seen even by US as the strongest power in Asia.¹³

Geopolitical considerations, which are often basic to a state's foreign policy, indicated the rationality of an independent and important role in world affairs on the part of India. India in 1947 had the power potential necessary for influencing the

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 127.

¹¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 – April 1961* (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1961), p. 240.

¹² Bharat Karnad, "India: Global Leadership and Self – Perception" 1999, cited in Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power - Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 128.

¹³ Rajendra K. Jain (ed.), *U.S. – South Asian Relations, 1947-82* (New Delhi: Radiant Publisher, 1983), p. 23.

course of contemporary world politics.¹⁴ There was self-conscious awareness of this aspect even by the Indian leadership.

Nehru perceived this geopolitical reality when he said: *I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or Asia being faced, by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater power and becoming practically satellites of those powers, because they cannot help it. The power opposed to them is so great that they have nowhere to turn. But I do not think that consideration applies to India --- India is too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it may be.*¹⁵

The strategic geopolitical location of India between the east and West has also a great significance for her role in international relations, and Nehru perceived this aspect well. In his own words:

*India becomes a kind of meeting ground for various trends and forces and meeting ground between what might roughly be called East and West.*¹⁶

What is interesting is that the Indian leadership was keenly aware of the country's potential and its relationship to the conduct of foreign policy. When Nehru became the head of interim government Nehru was very clear in his mind that India should run for a seat in Security Council. He wrote:

*Whatever the present position of India might be, she is potentially a Great power. Undoubtedly in future she will have to play a very great part in security problem, of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially in Middle East and South-East Asia. Indeed, India is the pivot round which these problems will have to be considered. It would seem to be obvious course that India, by virtue of her geographical and strategic position, resources and latent power, should be a member of Security Council.*¹⁷

¹⁴ J. Bandyopadhyaya, "Nehru and Non-Alignment", in B.R. Nanda (ed.) *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p. 171.

¹⁵ B.R. Nanda (ed.) *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p. 172.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Second Series*, vol. I, 439-40.

Further, in 1954, he noted significantly:

*Leaving these three big countries, the U.S., Soviet Union and China, aside for the moment, look at the world. There are much advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the future, and if nothing goes wrong – the obvious fourth country in the world is India.*¹⁸

This perception of India as a potential major power underlay India's activism in world affairs, more importantly in Asian affairs. It explained the activism by declaring that staying out of the blocs did not imply neutrality or indifference to world affairs. It sought to bring to world affairs what it thought was a distinctive voice and approach from a newly emergent Asia from colonialism.

As Nehru said in his address to the U.S. congress as early as 1949: *India cannot and shall not be neutral where freedom is threatened or justice denied. To be neutral would be a denial of all that we stand for.*

According to Nehru, non-alignment did not mean neutrality. Neutrality, as a policy, has little meaning, except in times of war. Hence, it was inapplicable to India's policy, as India had spoken clearly and with conviction on major international issues such as Korea war, Indo-China conflict, Suez and Hungary crisis, and Berlin and Cuban missile crisis. Besides, India had provided leadership to the Third World against colonialism, imperialism and racialism in and outside U.N.

Despite the determination to stay out of the two power blocs, Nehru was wary about any false notions of a durable equidistance from them; rather, as a realist, he underlined the importance of national interest as determining the nature of foreign relationships. In early 1947, he stated:

*We propose to avoid entanglement in any blocs or groups of Powers realizing that only thus we can secure not only the cause of India but of world peace. Every nation places its own interest first in developing its foreign policy. Fortunately, India's interests coincide with peaceful foreign policy, and cooperation with all progressive nations. Inevitably India will be drawn closer to those countries which are friendly and cooperative to her.*¹⁹

¹⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru. *Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches: vol. III: March 1953 – August 1957* (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1958). 264.

¹⁹ *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Second Series*, vol. 1, p. 409.

Further, he stated:

*It may be that sometimes we are forced to side with this power or that power. I can quite conceive of our siding even with an imperialist power – I do not mind saying that in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the two evils. Nevertheless, as a general policy, it is not a worthy policy.*²⁰

Even though India was not aligned with either bloc, its position on a wide range of issues nonetheless ran counter to that of U.S. This was not a consequence of India deliberately seeking to annoy or hurt the US, but because of the structural position of US in the international system as the hegemonic power.

India's activism and role regarding world peace and nuclear disarmament, decolonization, racial equality and restructuring the UN to give greater voice to Asia and Africa gave India a leadership role in the developing world. These were the normative issues close to India as well as Afro – Asian countries' experience of imperial oppression and economic backwardness.²¹

National Movement

Even though India was lacking in material capabilities, it had taken on a globally activist role. Behind that role lay patterns of thought and behaviour established during the nationalist movement. Since the 1920's the Congress had taken a very active interest in global affairs. Pandit Nehru's participation in February 1927 in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held at Brussels, as a representative of INC and his later participation in the Committee of the League of Nations against imperialism at Cologne shaped his thought process in international relations.²²

In the 1928 Calcutta session of the Congress, one of the resolutions declared: The struggle of the Indian people for freedom is part of the general world struggle against imperialism, and the Congress had decided to develop contacts with other

²⁰ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-alignment: A conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 104.

²¹ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power - Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 136.

²² J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p. 9.

countries and peoples who also suffer under imperialism and desired to combat it. Early in 1939 Tripuri session, the party affirmed that world peace and progress depended on the “imperative destruction of fascism.”

There was a deep internationalist undercurrent in Indian foreign policy preceding India’s becoming independent, and in the years immediately thereafter.²³

The political experience of the Indian national movement was one of the important determinants of Indian foreign policy. This experience and thinking was informed and inspired by a high degree of political idealism, inherited from the Indian renaissance of the 19th century. The moral high ground which figures such as Vivekanand and Gandhi envisioned for India influenced articulate sections of Indian public opinion in their perceptions of India’s position in the international community. Vivekanand had repeatedly stressed that India’s future role in the world was that of “messenger of peace, that of a catalyst for creating a just and moral world order. Gandhi’s idealist view of politics and power emphasized the role of non-violence in international politics. Nehru constantly referred to the influence of the Gandhian tradition on India’s international behaviour and to the ideal of one world as a basic goal of Indian foreign policy.²⁴

The ideological thinking of the Indian national movement was represented by equal rejection of both western capitalism and Soviet communism as guideline for India’s national development. By the early thirties the Indian national movement stood firm on its own ideological ground. In a world divided in two powerful blocs which coincided with the two dominant ideologies, both of which were repugnant to nationalist Indian thinking, the only rational strategy for foreign policy could be that of non-alignment. Nehru clearly perceived this ideological base of Indian foreign policy from the beginning of his career as Prime Minister. He stated in parliament:

The world seems to be divided into two mighty camps, the communist and the anti-communist and either party can’t understand how anyone can be foolish enough not to line up with itself. That just shows how little understanding these people have of

²³ Ibid, p. 16.

²⁴ J. Bandyopadhyaya, “Nehru and Non-Alignment”, in B.R. Nanda (ed.) *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p.176.

*the mind of Asia... Our thinking and our approach do not fit in with this great crusade of communism or crusade of anti-communism.*²⁵

Indian leadership was legitimately apprehensive about India becoming subject to extraneous and external influences, if the nation were to take sides in this ideological confrontation. Nehru's assessment was that India should keep away from cold war power politics, should remain committed to its own democratic terms of reference for national consolidation and should cooperate with all countries, regardless of their ideological or political affiliations in order to maintain international peace and stability and to meet India's national interest. This approach evolved into "non-alignment" becoming guiding principle of India's foreign policy, and ultimately, found manifestation in the creation of NAM.²⁶

A generally acceptable and dynamic foreign policy which made India an important actor on the international stage could provide a common focus for the nation as a whole and thus help the difficult process of national integration and state building. In a newly independent state of socio-cultural diversities, the policy of non-alignment was the only rational foreign policy which could easily balance the political forces onside as well as outside the Congress which could have been seriously disaffected by India's alignment with one of the two power blocs. Nehru recognized this influence of the domestic milieu on foreign policy when he said: *The internal policy and foreign policy of a country affect each other. They should broadly, be in line with each other, and have to be integrated. By and large, there has been in India an attempt at this integration.*²⁷

Economic Development

India's abysmal poverty made rapid economic development a categorical imperative of domestic policy, and made it necessary to link the broad orientation and strategy of foreign policy closely with those of domestic economic policy. An Nehru said: *Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until India has*

²⁵ Cited in B.R. Nanda (ed.) *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p.178

²⁶ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p.19.

²⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru. *India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi, 1961), 68-69, cited in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru years*, p. 179.

properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping.

The inevitable conflict between the needs of development and the needs of defence placed a serious limitation on the investment of resources in economic development. Due to the constraints of democratic set up, heavy dependence on foreign aid became inevitable. It was the natural function of foreign policy to ensure not only the availability but also the maximization of the quantum of such aid. It was also the function of foreign policy to avoid political pressure from the aid-giving states. These politico-economic objectives of foreign aid could be achieved only through a policy of non-alignment since such a policy alone could ensure the diversification of the sources of aid as well as prevent the exercise of political pressure by one of the super powers.²⁸

India benefited from the maintenance of its non-aligned posture as it gained the additional advantage of receiving economic support for its development programmes from the contenders in what came to be called “**competitive coexistence**”.²⁹ At the height of Indo-American policy conflicts over the conduct of the Korean War, in early 1951, the US Congress authorised for India the largest single grain allocation to any country; it enacted public law 480 loaning India rupees 90.3 crores for the purchase of 190 million tons of wheat. In 1952, US programme of economic and technical assistance to India (mutual Security Act) was worked out. By the end of Five Year Plan, US had made the largest foreign contribution to Indian development.³⁰

The US aid programme made important contributions to electric power generation and in 1963 India and US signed a 30 year agreement for cooperation in development of atomic power plants.

On the other hand, Soviet government offered assistance to public sector heavy industry in India which was denied by the US government. This was reflected in Indo-Soviet trade agreement of 1953 and 1955 agreement on setting up the Bhilai Steel Mill. Steel was frequently used as a symbol of Indo-Soviet friendship. India also

²⁸ J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants Institutions, Processes, Personalities*, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1970), p. 65-66.

²⁹ C.H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 64

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 367.

reaped indirect advantages from Bhilai in that it improved bargaining position that enabled it to set up two other steel factories in the public sector with British and German aid, offered at acceptable terms.³¹ By 1965, the Soviet Union had become the second largest national contributor to Indian development with an investment of 488.3 crore rupees.

The benefits reaped by India from the international milieu of 'competitive coexistence' and the logical connection between non-alignment and foreign aid was summed up by Nehru when he said: *Even in accepting economic help, or in getting political help, it is not a wise policy to put all our eggs in one basket. Nor should we get help at the cost of our self-respect.*

Nehru did not simply envision India as a future major power but his grand strategy encompassed economic planning precisely for that end. Nehru may have been an idealist, especially in the short term, but he was also a realist, particularly for the long term.³²

Nehru awareness of the operation of realpolitik in the world led him to place heavy emphasis on economic **self-reliance**. A fundamental aim with him was not just to raise standards of living, but also to assure India's political independence and foreign –policy autonomy. Autarky or self-sufficiency grew out of the desire of the political elite for autonomy or less dependence on outside powers. A state may pursue economic autarky partly because of its desire to become a major power, since the ability to withstand economic pressures from abroad is a crucial precondition for obtaining a leadership role in the international system.³³ It is this vision that forms the centrepiece of Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1961) based on the premise that India's industrialization required India to take the route of building local heavy industry in order to remove the constraints against long-term growth represented by the absence of capital goods.

Autarky is not a social necessity, but an instrument of political power. It is primarily a form of preparedness for war.³⁴ Consideration of realpolitik bore heavily

³¹ Ibid, p. 420.

³² Baldev Raj Nayar, *Globalization and Nationalism: The Changing Balance in India's Economic Policy, 1950-2000* (New Delhi: Sage, 2001), ch. 2.

³³ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the study of International Relations*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1946), p. 120-24.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 131.

with India's planners in launching the economic strategy for autarkic industrialization through building heavy industry. Nehru repeatedly emphasized that heavy industry was the key to national power and defense. He was far sighted in insisting on developing a defense production base in India.³⁵ As Nehru once said,

*But the Five Year Plan is the defense plan of the country. What else is it? Because, defense does not consist in people going about marching up and down the road with guns and other weapons. Defense consists today in a country being industrially prepared for producing the goods and equipment of defense.*³⁶

Asian Solidarity and Area of Peace

Apart from the challenges of cold war and the influence of the nationalist movement and the need for widening the sources of economic aid, Nehru's goal of building an area of peace and Asian solidarity impelled India onto the path of non-alignment.³⁷

As mentioned earlier, two factors made India strong in her foreign policy functioning. In the first place, as virtually the first and the biggest of the newly freed countries of Asia and Africa, her voice was bound to count where decolonization was on the agenda; and secondly, by itself, India represented a vast country with a huge population. In carrying out the post-independence task, the Prime Minister of India stressed two aspects: the crucial role of Asia in world affairs and, the pivotal position of India in Asia.³⁸

Inaugurating the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi on 23 March 1947, Nehru said: *We stand at the end of an era and on the threshold of a new period of history. Asia after a long period of quiescence has suddenly become important again in world affairs.*

³⁵ K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China conflict of 1962", in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: the Nehru Years* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p. 116.

³⁶ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.153.

³⁷ P.S. Jayaramu, *Indian National Security and Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987), p. 17.

³⁸ Sisir Gupta, "National Interest and World Reform", in Paul F. Power (ed.), *India's Nonalignment Policy: Strengths and Weaknesses*, (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967), p. 10.

India's Asia consciousness was charged with the conviction that after Asian nations attained freedom, Asia's weight would become a constructive factor of world politics. The very first statement on foreign policy indicated India's desire to devote itself "to the furtherance of the close associations of free countries" in Asia in view of her pivotal geographical situation in the continent with a view to preparing the background for the emergence of a zone of world politics disengaged from the active cold war, that being one of the aims of her non-alignment.³⁹

The policy of non-alignment was basically an instrument of pursuing the goals of India's national interests; it is, therefore not the negative aspect of this policy of remaining aloof from the cold war alignments but the more positive attempt implicit in this policy of emerging as the area of agreement between the great power of the world, which should be considered the core of India's foreign policy.⁴⁰

As a buffer state traditionally acts to maintain between opposing states, and by their consent, a zone where contending interests are kept from open conflict, so the non-aligned states maintained an area free from direct great power conflicts.⁴¹ This was Nehru's 'no-war zone' which he hoped to extend to all of south and Southeast Asia. In a manner analogous to a buffer against military and political conflict between more powerful states, India acted as an ideological buffer by refusing to commit its nearly 500 million people, to either of the two great global causes. From India's standpoint its refusal seemed to contribute vitally to the avoidance of world war.

India sought in this period to develop friendly relations with Asian countries, encourage Asian cooperation in the UN and other international bodies, stimulate Asia consciousness through Asian conferences and assert from time-to-time Asia's weight by voicing her point of view at the general international level. All this gave her strength in the UN and substantiated her non-alignment.

Nehru's "area of peace" was intended to have an area consisting of such countries in Asia who would decide for themselves not to enter the war in any case. The area would be based on their common opposition to cold war. No formal

³⁹ D. N. Mallik, *The Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy*, (Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1967), p. 57.

⁴⁰ Sisir Gupta, "National Interest and World Reform", in Paul F. Power (ed.), *India's Nonalignment Policy: Strengths and Weaknesses*, (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967), p.11.

⁴¹ C.H. Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p.29.

agreement among them be needed for their collective operation. Countries constituting the area would not be aligned among themselves in a military sense. Positive attempts would have to be made to prevent war. Peace endeavors of the area of peace would have to be carried on politically and diplomatically. Politically, the countries of the area would have to work collectively for reducing cold war tensions and for doing away with colonialism, racialism, economic backwardness but all without getting aligned with any bloc or among themselves.

Diplomatically, they would have to work in and outside the UN for nuclear disarmament and harmony between the rival power blocs.⁴²

India's protest against the US military aid to Pakistan, her advocacy of the five principles of co-existence (Panchsheel), her opposition to the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, her efforts towards disarmament and world peace, decolonisation, the way she steered the Bandung Conference and several bilateral treaty and diplomatic contacts were the channels through which she gradually helped the emergence and spread of the area of peace.

Purposes governing India's role in the Bandung conference (1955) were mainly two. She sought to bring about a climate of peace, cooperation and unity, in Asia and Africa and thereby, to establish the impact of Asia and Africa on the fabrics of international politics. Further, she aimed at spreading the area of peace by practicing and popularizing the Panchsheel.⁴³ The Panchsheel came as a logical growth in the development of India's non-alignment as an instrument with which the 'area of peace' might be promoted and depolarization might be achieved in world politics.

⁴² D. N. Mallik, *The Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy*, (Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1967), p. 279.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 175.

CHAPTER - II

POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT: POWER POLITICS AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

The improvement of the operations of the international system was the overarching objective which encompassed India's normative impulses in foreign affairs.¹ The International system in the more traditional view may be designated as the sovereign state system. When Nehru first propounded non-alignment, he appeared to be describing merely an altered policy orientation within the old framework rather than attempting to build another one altogether.²

Although Nehru found himself compelled to work within the framework of the nation-state system, the way in which this system had hitherto worked, was a source of profound dissatisfaction to Nehru. In this sense, he was a representative of a long standing liberal tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs, since the times of Grotius.

Throughout the history of the modern states system there have been three competing traditions of thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist, which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views international politics as taking place within an international society.³

Hobbesian view represent pure conflict between states and resemble a zero sum game. According to it, state is free to pursue its goals in relation to other states, without legal or moral restrictions.

According to Kantian traditions, the interests of all men are one and the same and international politics is a purely cooperative or non-zero-sum game. There are moral imperatives in the field of international relations limiting the action of states,

¹ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 134.

² John W. Burton, "Non-alignment and Contemporary World Politics", 1969, cited in A.P. Rana *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 213.

³ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical society: A study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 23.

but that these imperatives enjoin not coexistence and cooperation among states but rather the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society.

What has been called Groatian or internationalist tradition stands between the realist tradition & the universalist tradition. The Groatian tradition describes international politics in terms of a society of states. It accepts that states are the principal actors in international politics (rather than individuals) which are not always at war but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common norms and institutions.

Bull and Watson define international society as a group of states (or a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements. Given the inevitability of relations with other units a common desire for order is the minimum necessary condition to begin the evolution of international society. Bull argues that international society is closely associated with the idea of international order, where order means an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values.⁴ A minimal desire for order begins to emerge when leaders realize the disadvantages of permanent chaos if interstate relations remain wholly unregulated. The idea is that mutual self-interest will push leadership into pursuing common objectives and thus into constructing an international order.

The emphasis on society (however anarchical) seemed strange to realists who, around Morgenthau, studied international relations from the perspective of power-seeking and competing states, or to neo-realists who, following Waltz focused on the effects of the distribution of power in the international system on the inevitable contests of states. Bull, like realists, accepts the 'anarchy frame-work': international relations is the politics of autonomous states, without a common superior. It is the domain of self-help. But Bull's approach is richer when he examines the interaction among states, he is interested in things other than relations of power common concerns, rules and institutions. This allows him to examine wars not only as the

⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 4.

frequent outcomes of power clashes, but also as possible instruments of order. Unlike realist who maintains that order results only through balance of power, Bull's concept of order entails diplomacy and international law apart from Balance of Power.⁵ This approach has two great merits. It reintroduces into the study of international system three factors left out by Waltz own reductionism: transnational ideas, which can generate common norms and interest, international institutions and interdependence. Further, it looks not merely at the distribution of power among the units, but also at the units themselves.

Though Nehru was influenced by Kantian notion of One World or World Federation, Groatian tradition predominated his world outlook as exemplified in his **Panchsheel** (doctrine) reiterating basic norms governing international relations. One of the most important components of India's foreign policy objective of improving the operations of the international system was Panchsheel or peaceful coexistence. What Nehru considered most vital for the improvement of International system was the reduction of violent conflict in international relations. While it is true that the nature of nation state system itself generates the competitive security paradigm, the challenge is how to reconcile it with the imperatives of peace and security. It is in this context that the five principles of Panchsheel – mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence – provided the basis for such reconciliation.

Panchsheel was a direct and unqualified repudiation of the competitive security paradigm.⁶ The objective of Panchsheel was to create an international system which accepts and reflects the idea of coexistence, broadly defined as tolerance of differing ideologies, respect for the right of each nation to determine its own internal political and economic system, and reliance upon negotiations to resolve global and regional conflicts.⁷

Though the principles were articulated to govern the bilateral relations between India and China in 1954, from the very beginning they also had a wider

⁵ Stanley Hoffmann, "Foreword: Revisiting the Anarchical Society" in Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. (ix).

⁶ Jasjit Singh (ed.), *India, China and Panchseel*, (New Delhi: Sanchar, 1996), p. 183.

⁷ Cecil Crabb, Jr., *The Elephant and the Grass: A study of Nonalignment*, (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 80.

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international goal. Wider a year later, in 1955, Panchsheel became the basis for the Ten Principles of International Peace and Cooperation issued at the Bandung Conference of 29 Afro-Asian States. The UN has adopted the basic contents of these principles as the norms guiding the relations of the member nations of the UNO.

REALISM

Realism is the dominant theory of International Relations. because it provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war which is the regular condition of life in the international system. Taking power to constitute the central concept in International Relations, political realism argues its case in the following manner:

The international system represents an anarchy. It is devoid of a central authority, capable of attracting un questioned allegiance from all the system-participants. The central organizing principle of this anarchical order of sovereign states is the concept of national interest defined in terms of power. Though states, as rational actors, are solely motivated by their perceived sense of national interest, yet the probable consequences of an unrestricted interplay of sovereign wills in an environment of anarchy impels some to organize countervailing coalitions with an aim to achieve a balance of power amongst them. The whole scheme is under girded by means of two underlying assumptions. First, power maximization constitutes an eternal, universal and instinctive drive with all states, and second, the resultant balance of power amongst the dominant states secures the stability as well as equilibrium of the international system as a whole.⁸

Classical realists see power politics as a law of human behaviour. The drive for power and the will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature. The behaviour of the state as a self – seeking egoist is understood to be merely a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state. It is human nature that explains why international politics is necessarily power politics. Politics, like society in general is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.⁹

⁸ Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 42.

⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Knopf, 1948), p. 4.

Neorealists on the other hand try to explain patterns of international events in terms of the system structure –the international distribution of power-rather than the internal make up of individual states.¹⁰ The most powerful and influential statement of neo-realism has come from Kenneth Waltz. Waltz proposed to establish structure by abstraction from concrete reality by omitting from the permissible ambit of his approach certain vague factors like “environment, situation, context and milieu” and by refraining from raising basic questions dealing with the qualitative aspects of leadership, institutions and ideological commitments.¹¹

Waltz concept of political structure consists of three analytical components: (i) The principle according to which the system is ordered (ii) the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions; and (iii) the degree of concentration or diffusion of capabilities within the system.¹² Waltz maintains that it is the basic system structure that provides identity to states, not the other way round. For him, anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system. The units are functionally alike, and the placement of the units in the international system is arranged according to the distribution of capabilities among them rather than in terms of their qualities. For Waltz, international structure vary only through a change of the organizing principle or through variations in the capabilities of units.¹³ Systemic change-one that is produced by the substitution of the structure of anarchy by that of hierarchy- is prevented by the very structure of anarchy itself.¹⁴

The three core elements that we identify with Realism are statism, survival and self- help. Since, the treaty of Westphalia, realists consider the sovereign state as the principle actor in international politics. This is often referred to as the state-centric assumption of Realism. Outside the boundaries of the state, a condition of anarchy exists. By anarchy what is most often meant is that international politics takes place in an arena that has no overarching central authority above the individual collection of

¹⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979).

¹¹ Jim George, “Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/ Old World Order”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (London), Vol.22, no.2, 1993, p. 208.

¹² Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979), p.88.

¹³ *ibid*, p. 93.

¹⁴ John G.Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis”, *World Politics*, Vol.35, Jan. 1983, p. 271.

sovereign states. It, however implies not complete chaos or absence of structure and rules, but rather the lack of central government that can enforce rules.¹⁵

Realists draw a variety of conclusions about the effect that anarchy has on shaping the basic character of international politics. For them, it is self – evident that the incidence of violence is greater at the international than the domestic level. A prominent explanation that realists provide for this difference in behaviour relates to the different organizational structure of domestic and international politics.¹⁶ For realists, the first priority for state leaders is to ensure the survival of their state. Under anarchy, the survival of the state cannot be guaranteed. Hence, state with more power stands a better chance of surviving than states with less power.

Survival is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals, whether these involve conquest or merely independence. According to Waltz beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly by varied.¹⁷ There is however a controversy among realists over the question of whether states are in fact principally security or power maximizers. Defensive realists such as Waltz and Grieco argue that states have security as their principal interest and therefore only seek the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival. Offensive realist like John Mearsheimer argues that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic position in the international system..

Waltz maintained that international politics was not unique because of war and violence, since it was as familiar in domestic politics. The key difference between domestic and international system lies in their structure.¹⁸ In the international realm, there is no overarching agency to prevent and counter the use of force. Thus, in an anarchic structure, self-help is necessarily the principle of action.¹⁹ Each actor is responsible for ensuring their own well-being and survival. Realists do not believe it is prudent for a state to entrust its safety on another actor or international institutions like UN. For as Machiavelli recognized that today's friend might become tomorrow's enemy.

¹⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical society: A study of Order in World Politics*, (New York; Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 44-48.

¹⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York Random House, 1979), p. 88, 113-115.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 111.

But in the course of providing for one's own security, the state in question will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states. The term given to this spiral of insecurity is the **security dilemma**. The view that war is a constant historical feature of international politics and is unlikely to disappear is based on the notion that states face what has been described as a "security dilemma" from which it is largely impossible to escape. The idea of a security dilemma was first clearly articulated in the 1950s by John Herz. The terms generally used to denote the self defeating aspect of the quest for security in an anarchic system.²⁰

Security dilemmas exist when the military preparations of one state create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for "defensive" purposes or whether they are for offensive purposes to change the status quo to its advantage.²¹ This scenario suggest that one state's quest for security is often another state's source of insecurity. States find it very difficult to trust one another and often view the intentions of others in a negative light. Thus, the military preparation of one state are likely to be matched by neighbouring states. Insecurity will breed further insecurity, with the ever – present potential for war breaking out.

At the root of the security dilemma, therefore, are mistrust and fear. According to realists, this mistrust and fear is due to both human nature and structure of the international system, that is anarchy.

According to realism, the structure of international politics limits the co-operation of states. In the 1950's, as fear of the world's destruction in nuclear war grew, some concluded that the alternative to world destruction was world disarmament. Idealists told that the greater good requires states to act for the sake of the system and not for their own narrowly defined advantage. To them, international co-operation was a more rational option for states than resorting to war. The very problem according to realists is that rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted results as structure cause actions to have consequences they were not intended to have. With each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system.²²

²⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", *World Politics*, Vol. XXXVI, Oct. 1983- July 1984, p. 461.

²¹ N. Wheeler and K. Booth, "The Security Dilemma" in J. Baylis and N. Rengger (ed.), *Dilemmas of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

²² *ibid.*, p. 109.

The structure of international politics limits the cooperation of states. There are two main factors. The first is the prospect of cheating. States have always been fearful that others will cheat on any agreement reached and attempt to gain advantages over them. Cooperation is also inhibited because states tend to be concerned with 'relative gains' rather than 'absolute gains'.²³ Because all states will be attempting to maximise their gains in a competitive mistrustful, and uncertain international environment, cooperation will always be very difficult to achieve and hard to maintain.

A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more than itself. A state also worries lest it become dependent on others through co-operative endeavours and exchanges of goods and services. This is the second way in which the structure of international politics limits the co-operation of states. The larger a states import or exports, the more it depends on others.

Raymond Duvall provides two basic meanings of dependence.²⁴ In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. On the other hand, dependence is also used to refer to a relationship of subordination in which one thing is supported by something else or must rely upon something else for fulfillment of a need. Duvall points out that the two basic meaning of "dependence" correspond to the distinction often made between "sensitivity interdependence" and "vulnerability interdependence".²⁵ Whereas the first meaning implies mere contingency, the second implies need fulfillment that would be costly to forgo. The crucial difference between the first and second meaning of "dependence" has to do with the ease of breaking the relationship, "sensitivity interdependence" implies nothing about the cost of altering the relationship.²⁶

The high interdependence of states means that the states in question experience, or are subject to the common vulnerability that high interdependence entails. States seek to control what they depend on or to lesson the extent of their dependency. This simple thought explains autarchic strivings toward greater self-

²³ Ibid., p. 105.

²⁴ Raymond Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument", *International Organisation*, 32, 1981, pp. 61-68.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 62-63. The distinction is also found in an earlier article by Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence", in Charles Kindleberger (ed.), *The International Cooperation*, (Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1970), p. 210.

²⁶ David Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 176.

sufficiency.²⁷ If dependence is used with reference to self-sufficiency or autarky, the opportunity costs of forgoing the relationship would seem to be the underlying concern. Although Waltz does not refer to Hirschman, the concept of dependence he introduced was basically the same as the one that Hirschman explicated in 1945. Hirschman drew attention to the intimate conception between the concept of “gain from trade” and the concept of dependence:

*The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from the trade; the total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade. In this sense, the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, dependence on trade, now being studied are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon.*²⁸

Hirschman notes that the “gain from trade” refers to “that part of a country’s well being which it is in power of its trading partners to take away. Thus, vulnerability is necessarily implied by this type of dependence.

Nehru’s awareness of this ‘vulnerability interdependence’ led him to place heavy emphasis on economic self-reliance. Of the three component constituting a development pattern, the Mahalanobis model definitively determined the inward orientation of the economy and the powerful thrust for the basic investment goods industries. The closed nature of the economy was simply assumed. There was some reference to foreign trade but foreign trade as such did not figure in either the architecture of the model or in details. The main aim in the thrust for investment goods industries was not just to assure long-term development but also to cut-down, indeed eliminate, dependence on the outside world in the future. This stance of attempted autarky has been attributed to what has come to be characterized as export pessimism the same as articulated by Nuske in his “export-lag” thesis.²⁹

Chakravarty sees a direct link between these perception and planning through the medium of economic theory. He emphasizes the wide consensus then prevalent on

²⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979) p. 106.

²⁸ Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, (Berkeley: University of California, 1945), p. 18.

²⁹ Baldev Raj Nayar, *Globalisation and Nationalism: The Changing Balance in India’s Economic Policy, 1950-2000* (New Delhi: Sage, 2001), p. 62.

these perceptions among the economists of the world.³⁰ However, India's own political and social history also supported the case for an inward-looking strategy of industrialization, with the state in command.³¹ Moreover, foreign trade had only a small place in India planning because it was believed during the colonial period that the trade regime had a built-in-bias against underdevelopment countries. This Swadeshi strategy was also an aspect of the struggle for economic and political independence from the western nations. The apparent success of the Soviet Union in building up a strong manufacturing base, and its emergence as a superpower within a relatively short period of time, strengthened belief in the efficacy of the state as the primary agent of accumulation. The Mahalanobis model with its preference for the investment goods industries sector, was similar to the Feldman model Developed in the Soviet Union in 1928.³²

POWER

Power is an ambiguous concept.³³ The traditional assumption is that power gives states the ability to promote and protect national interests, to win in bargaining situations, and to shape the rules governing the international system. Power is often defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done.³⁴ This definition treat power as influence or control.

Power is a relational concept; one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another entity. Second, power is a relative concept, calculations need to be made not only about one's own power capabilities, but about the power that other state possess. The task of accurately assessing the power of states is infinitely complex. Kenneth Waltz tries to overcome this problem by shifting the focus from power to capabilities (or from power as influence to power as ability or potential to influence). He suggests that capabilities can be ranked according to their strength in the following areas: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic

³⁰ Sukhamoy Chakravarty, *Development Planning: The Indian Experience*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 10.

³¹ Bimal Jalan, *India's Economic Crisis: The Way Ahead*, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 13.

³² Baldev Raj Nayar, *Globalisation and Nationalism: The Changing Balance in India's Economic Policy, 1950-2000* (New Delhi: Sage, 2001), p. 55.

³³ Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, (New York: Random Hosue, 1962), ch. 2.

³⁴ Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 2nd ed. (Prentice Hall, 1970).

capability, military strength, political stability and competence.³⁵ Capabilities are easier to measure than influence and less circular in logic.

Power in the form of ‘capabilities’ or power resources, became the ultimate determinant of international outcomes in erstwhile dominant structural neo-realist theories of international relations.³⁶

For Gilpin, “political power is simply the military, economic, and technological capabilities of state,”³⁷ for Waltz, “to be politically pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of the “distribution of capabilities.”³⁸ This distribution of capabilities—the main ordering principle within the anarchic structure of the “Third Image” — yields the hypothetico –deductive models of the motivations and behaviour of states. Thus, Waltz argues that multipolar, not bipolar, distribution of capabilities lead states following the underlying motivation of self-help, to engage in power balancing.

A second neorealist understanding of power is present in the criticisms of Waltz and Gilpin put forward by Keohane.³⁹ He argues the distribution of capabilities cannot be used to yield accurate predictions of state behaviour and outcomes, because power resources are not fungible across issue – areas. His critique embraces the basic pluralist assumptions that agents have power only when they are able to cause things to happen and when the object is observable actions by other agents. Thus, Keohane and Nye employ Dahl’s “intuitive idea of power” defining it as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they would otherwise not do.⁴⁰

The frequent failure of power predictions (the failure of states with relatively high capabilities to prevail in conflicts with other weaker states) can be explained in two ways. First, failure to translate alleged “potential power” into actual power may be explained in terms of malfunctioning conversion processes. The would be wielder of power is described as lacking in “skill” and the “will” to use his power resources

³⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 131.

³⁶ Rodney Hall, “Moral Authority as a Power Resource”, in *International Organisation*, 51, 4 Autumn 1997, p. 592.

³⁷ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13.

³⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 192.

³⁹ Robert Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” in A. Finifter (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association), pp. 520-527.

⁴⁰ Keohane and Nye. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 13.

effectively.⁴¹ A relational concept of power assumes that actual or potential power is never inherent in properties of A, but rather inheres in the potential relationship between A's properties and B's value systems. Capabilities may be transferred into actual power through a conversion process in which crucial variables are B's perceptions, values and propensities.⁴² To make a difference, an adversary must know its enemys capabilities and willingness to mobilize them for coercive purposes. The mere possession of weapons does not increase a state's power if its adversaries do not believe it will use them.

During the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Nehru lacked the will to use Indian Air force to bomb the Chinese targets in spite of having considerable air force and airport infrastructure. He was under pressure from the western nations not to escalate the conflict by the introduction of air power. Moreover, as Air Chief Marshall Arjan Singh pointed out that there was an insufficient appreciation of the problems of operating aircraft from high altitude airfields.⁴³ He had the cards but played them poorly is the theme.

In the case of Goa too, Nehru lacked the will to use force for the annexation of it in the Union of India. Under the pressure of Indian public, he was forced to use military which took Goa in twenty-six hours in 1961. In the case of nuclear bomb, India had the potential to make it but Nehru lacked the will to make it even after the disastrous Sino-Indian war.

A second explanation for the failure of power prediction focuses on variations in the scope, weight, and domain of power. The capabilities of an actor must be set in the context of a "policy contingency framework" specifying who is trying to get whom to do what.⁴⁴

The so-called "paradox of unrealized power" results from the mistaken belief that power resources useful in one contingency framework will be equally useful in a different one. Planes loaded with nuclear weapons may strengthen a states ability to deter nuclear attacks but maybe irrelevant in rescuing hostage crisis or in dealing with

⁴¹ David Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 163.

⁴² David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics", *World Politics*, Vol. XXXI, (Oct. 1978- Jul. 1979), p. 171.

⁴³ John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute*. (London, 1968), p.160.

⁴⁴ Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environment Factors in the Study of International Politics", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (December 1957), pp. 309-28.

a guerilla warfare. The ability to get other countries to refrain from attacking ones homeland (say USA) is not the same as the ability to win the hearts and minds of people of West Asia.

What functions as a power resource in one policy contingency framework may be irrelevant in another. Gilpin, Waltz and Keohane all argue for an operational definition of political power, in which power can be precisely measured and then can be used to account for observable regularities in the behaviour of states. What these neo-realists ignore in the issue of fungibility of political power resources. If there were some generalized means of exercising political power just as money is generalized means of exercising purchasing power, the problem of conceiving and measuring political power would be much simpler.⁴⁵ Political power resources tend to be much less liquid than economic resources. Political power is quite different from purchasing power. There is no common denominator of political value corresponding to money in terms of which political debts can be discharged. The lack of fungibility of political power resources means that preparing to deal with the worst contingencies may hinder one's ability to deal with less severe ones.⁴⁶ Thus, preparing for nuclear war may weaken a country's ability to get one of its citizens elected secretary General of the U.N. or preparing for autarky may hurt a country's bargaining ability in international trade negotiations. Because political power is multidimensional and political power resources are low in fungibility, more power in one policy-contingency framework may mean less in another. In this context, one must concede some ground to Mao's view about 'paper tigers' if it can be shown that in certain circumstances the power cannot be used.

In the light of above discussion of multidimensionality of power and fungibility, India's source of power can be analyzed with respect to the superpowers and the Third World. Nehru was strongly drawn towards the effective use of what Nye has termed 'soft power' or Knorr's 'non-power influence'. Soft power resources are less coercive in nature and are derived from cooptive power, which is the ability of a nation to structure a situation so that other nations develop preferences or define their interest in ways consistent with one's own nation... This type of power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as the

⁴⁵ David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics", *World Politics*, Vol.XXXI, (Oct. 1978), p. 165.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

rules and institution of international regimes.⁴⁷ Similarly, Knorr define non-power influence as the ability of a nation to affect the behaviour of another society without any adversary resort to superior strength, military or economic. The presence of such influence does not restrict the other nation's choices, on the contrary, it tends to enrich them. Nehru preferred this sort of soft power or non-power influence because it does not entail security dilemma which according to him was the basis of mistrust in international relations.

Under Nehru, India insistently pushed on to the international agenda issues such as world peace and nuclear disarmament, decolonization in Afro-Asia, racial equality, aid for development and restructuring the UN to give greater voice to Asia and Africa. These were the normative issues that were closer to both India and newly independent country of Afro-Asia. Symbolizing, soft power, they earned India leadership role in the developing world.⁴⁸ But India as a owner of this political power resource (soft power) faced difficulty converting this resource into another resource that would allow his country to defend her northern frontiers in the 1962 war. This soft power was also inapplicable regarding the Pakistani threat in Kashmir.

India's strength in the cold war was derived form a host of very unconventional factors, but predominantly it was derived from the nuclear balance of terror.⁴⁹ Indian government gained the capability of influencing the policies of superpowers by its strategy of moving towards, the polarities of alignment on either side as circumstances demanded without any definite commitment. The power derived from non-alignment existed only in relations to those states (U.S. & Soviet Union) whose peculiar interest was affected when that posture was assumed by another state. However, in the period of détente and the establishment of direct lines of communications, the importance of India as an intermediary declined.

Moreover, the policy of non-alignment proved disastrous vis-à-vis China when India was attacked by a communist country in spite to India's non-commitment to the western nations. Thus, these examples illustrates the mistaken belief that power

⁴⁷ Joseph S.Nye, *Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 191.

⁴⁸ Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 136. Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nation*, p 314.

⁴⁹ A.P. Rana, "The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Non-alignment", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Feb. 1969, p. 309.

resources useful in one policy-contingency framework will be equally useful in a different one.

BALANCE OF POWER

Is there any escape from the security dilemma? Some realists maintain that it can be mitigated through the operation of balance of power. Waltz argues that balances of power result irrespective of the intentions of any particular state.⁵⁰ In an anarchical system populated by states who seek to perpetuate themselves, alliances will be formed that seek to check and balance the power against threatening states. Liberal realists emphasize the crucial role state leaders and diplomats play in maintaining the Balance of Power.⁵¹ In other words, Balance of power must be constructed.

Balance of power is identified as a policy of promoting the preservation of equilibrium.⁵² It refers to a process by which counterbalancing coalitions have repeatedly formed in history to prevent one state from conquering an entire region.⁵³ States behave this way because they recognize that the emergence of a hegemonic power will ultimately threaten their own survival. Balance of power theory emphasizes that the determinants of alignment come overwhelmingly from the structure of the international system, particularly the actual and potential external threats that states face.⁵⁴ Accordingly, the internal characteristics of the states are usually not considered relevant in influencing alignments.

This view is reinforced by the recurring formation of balances made up of states that have little more than a threat in common, like the alliance between democratic France and tsarist Russia before World War I. The apparent irrelevance of internal factors is reinforced by the fact that states with similar political system that might otherwise be expected to maintain an alignment do not in the absence of a

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 122.

⁵¹ Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 21.

⁵² Ibid., 18.

⁵³ Edward Gullick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, (Cornell, 1955).

⁵⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979), chapter 6.

common external threat.⁵⁵ The division of the communist bloc despite their common allegiance to communism illustrates this point.

The relevance of the balance of power system to the goal of preventing war is a matter of some disagreement among theorists. Critics of balance of power after first world war asserted that attempt to preserve a balance of power was a source of war and that it was carried out in the interests of the great powers at the expense of the interests of the small nations. Morgenthau concedes that the balance of power system has a poor record in terms of either the prevention of war or as safeguarding of the independence of weak states.⁵⁶ As a method to maintain international order, balance of power has been eminently successful throughout long stages of history; for it has prevented the rise of any one nation to such power as would have enabled it to destroy the independence of all the others. In short, the chief function of the balance of power is not to preserve peace, but to preserve the system of state itself.⁵⁷ What the perennial collapsing of Balance of Power System demonstrates is that states are at best able to mitigate the worst consequences of security dilemma but are not able to escape it. The reason for this terminal condition is the absence of trust in international relations.

One of the main objectives of Indian foreign policy after 1947 was the elimination of western presence in Asia and the establishment of a grouping of states which could powerfully sponsor Asian objective in the global arena. This came into direct opposition to US objectives and traditional policy. India was seeking close ties with the People's Republic of China and thus refused US proposal of containment of China. On a whole range of world issues – Korea, China Indo-China, the Japanese peace treaty – India was assertive in opposition to the U.S.

As a consequence, India's position became unacceptable to the USA. It is in this context that the U.S. launched a policy of military containment and neutralization of India through the military build up of Pakistan. It was not only containment that America applied to India, but also diplomatic isolation.

⁵⁵ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore, Md: John Hopkins University Press, 1962), p.29.

⁵⁶ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Knopf, 1948), p. 205.

⁵⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical society: A study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 103.

The massive military aid to Pakistan from US in 1954 constituted the first open intervention in the post-war period by a superpower in the affairs of the subcontinent. US gave assurance to India that military aid given to Pakistan was not anti-Indian act but was directed against the containment communism. However, to view it as containment aimed at India as the regional power followed as a logical conclusion from the theoretical argument of the realist scholar George Liska especially as India was a 'rebellious' middle power that refused to be satallized.⁵⁸ Nixon, vice-president of US regarded India and US as rivals for influence in Asia and argued for military aid to Pakistan as a counterforce to the confirmed neutralism of Nehru's India.

In 1954 SEATO was established with Pakistan as the anchor member in the north, and the next year Pakistan was brought into the Middle East defense system, the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan's persistent efforts to alter the balance of power in the subcontinent by attaining parity with India and the measure of success it achieved after joining the US sponsored alliance systems led to a heightening of the Pakistani threat to India.⁵⁹ Also by joining the alliance system Pakistan brought the cold war to the sub-continent vis-à-vis Kashmir problem and impaired Nehru's hopes for an area of peace in Asia.⁶⁰

Kashmir's geo-strategic importance coupled with the perception that a Pakistan supported by the western powers would pose a grave danger to India's security led Nehru to devise a strategy of preempting future Indo-Pak confrontation.

Once Pakistan had moved in the directions of a military alliance with the west, security against Pakistan had become a part of the general strategy of security against the encroachment of the big powers, and non-alignment was, after 1954, specifically as much a foreign policy strategy aimed against Pakistan as it was against the politics of the cold war.

The inauguration of the policy of the arms transfer to Pakistan should have been an instructive lesson in realpolitik to India. However, eager not to have defense

⁵⁸ George Liska, "The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order" in Robert E. Osgood (ed.), *Retreat from Empire*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). cited in John W. Mellor, *India: A Rising Middle Power*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 119.

⁵⁹ A. Appadorai, "Non-Alignment: Some Issues", in K.P. Misra (ed.), *Non-Alignment: Frontiers and Dynamics* (New Delhi, 1982).

⁶⁰ Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 355-56.

expenditure affect India's investment plans for economic development, Nehru attempted for the moment to ease the pressure by diplomacy rather than by acquisition of weaponry or by military alignment. The main thrust of India's response continued to be diplomatic in nature as seen in India's offer of a No-War Agreement and for dividing Kashmir on the basis of the 1949 cease-fire line.⁶¹

India also oriented its foreign policy towards seeking friendship with the communist countries - the signing of Panchsheel Agreement with China in 1954 and the strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union in the Post-Stalin era stand out in this regard - with the objective of preventing the sub-continental balance of power from shifting in favour of Pakistan.⁶² It demonstrated that; despite its rhetoric, balance of power policies were inescapable for India as they were for others. Even so, India's reaction to American containment was a measured and graduated one so that it did not move itself irretrievably beyond the reach of America's competitive counter-bidding.⁶³

In other words, Nehru attempted to create a balance of power, but through political rather than military means. It was this policy of friendship with the Soviet bloc without aligning with it that brought large amounts of economic aid from the US in order to prevent India from an even closer embrace with the Soviet bloc.

During this period, India won increased Soviet assistance for its development plans and Soviet support on Kashmir and Goa, without incurring open hostility on the subject of its border dispute with China. India maintained a non-aligned stance on 'cold war' issue vitally affecting the Soviet Union and was less critical publicly of Soviet policy in Hungary or on disarmament than were many other Afro-Asian countries.⁶⁴

However, India's gravitation towards Moscow during this period up to 1958, may be accounted for by other reasons as well. Nehru was not unaware of possible future trouble between India and China and the likelihood of Moscow and Peking drifting apart in the years ahead.⁶⁵ Chinese were bidding for a dominant leadership over Asian and African states in the mid 1950's. China was interested in keeping

⁶¹ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A study in India-Pakistan Relations* (Bombay, 1996), p. 299-305.

⁶² P.S. Jayaramu, *Indian National Security and Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1987), p. 23.

⁶³ Pran Chopra, *India's Second Liberation*, (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1973), p. 9-10.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 426-32.

⁶⁵ K. Subrahmanyam "Nehru and India China Conflict of 1962", in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, p. 111.

Russia from exerting an influence in Asia and Africa. Russia had found Indian non-alignment, and India's general collaboration, considerably useful in retaining its influence in Asia, and countering that of China.⁶⁶

The year 1960, added a new dimension to the Indo-Soviet link when India turned to Moscow for purchases of military equipment. Nehru defended this step by asserting its right to buy military good anywhere it pleased in order to demonstrate its independence. However, the move to Moscow was less of a symbolic gesture than a conscious attempt to obtain Soviet underwriting for Indian defense against China. It was significant that India decided on Soviet purchases in 1960 after its brush with China. It was equally important that for the first time USSR had refused to side with its ally in a dispute between a communist state and a non-communist state.⁶⁷

The possibility of a threat from China arose almost from the inception of the communist seizure of power in China in 1949. India saw the extension of the Cold War as gravely deleterious to her security in the long run. China shared an extensive and an extremely strategic frontier with India. China was very radical in her denunciation of democracy and non-alignment, and had a very viable, alternative model to offer Afro-Asian countries as they emerged into independence. Nehru was conscious of the inevitable long-run rivalry between Democratic India and Communist China for the leadership of Asia.⁶⁸

As for the policy towards China, it is clear that the foremost objective of India's China Policy was to have a friendly and peaceful relationship with that country. The imperatives of such a policy were the need for Chinese support in building an area of peace and Asian solidarity and to buy time in regard to China, and at the same time initiate a series of measures to strengthen India's defence against a Pakistani attack.⁶⁹

It is in this light that we have to understand Panchsheel agreement. The alignment with the west was ruled out vis-à-vis Chinese threat as India feared western

⁶⁶ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 72.

⁶⁷ Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 439.

⁶⁸ Michael Brecher, "*India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*", (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

⁶⁹ J. Bandyopadhyaya, "Dynamics of India's Strategic Environment", *International Studies*, Vol. 17, July-December 1978, p. 404.

pressure for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute on terms which were more likely to be favourable to Pakistan than to herself. Moreover, India could not take the risk of alienating Russia by developing hostile relations with Russia's Asiatic ally. The options open to Nehru were severely limited and Panchsheel, perhaps, represented as much diplomacy of desperation, as the fulfillment of a normative urge.⁷⁰ As a foreign policy posture it has the objective of containing the Chinese threat by involving it in friendly peaceful relationship and integrating China into the norms of international behaviour. As a foreign policy strategy, Panchsheel was essentially preventive diplomacy.⁷¹

One question is pertinent about the relationship between nonalignment and national security. If non-alignment was adopted as a strategy for the protection of national security, was the strategy capable of generating power for India in international relations?

India's nonalignment was the main source of its power in international political relations. The power derived from non-alignment existed only in relations to those states whose peculiar interest were affected when that posture was assumed by another state. That came to be the case with the US and the Soviet Union. Nehru while discussing national security once remarked. *The normal idea is that security can be protected only by arms. This is only partly true; it is equally true that securities can be protected by policies.* What Nehru meant by policies is not very explicit, it might be policies of coexistence and Panchsheel or it might be balance of power policy.

After discussing India's relationship with both the superpowers and its two neighbours, China and Pakistan, it seems that strategy of non-alignment represents the utilization by India, explicitly or implicitly, of the processes of the balance of power so as to generate power for the preservation of her national security.⁷²

⁷⁰ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 69.

⁷¹ D.N. Mallik, *The Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy*, (Allahabad: Chaitanya, 1997), p. 163.

⁷² For a detailed exposition of India's non-alignment as an exercise in BOP. See G.S. Bajpai, "India and the Balance of Power", *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs* (Madras), Vol. 1, 1952.

- M.M. Rahman, *The Politics of Non-Alignment* (New Delhi, 1969)

- A.P. Rana, "The Nature of India's Foreign Policy: An Examination of Indian Non-alignment in Relation to the Concept of Balance of Power", *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), Vol. 22, No. 2, April - June 1966.

In a penetrating analysis of the ultimate needs of India's functioning in world affairs, then Secretary General of India's External Affairs Ministry, wrote in 1952:

*India then has to develop her strength to support her foreign policy. Politics cannot be divorced from power holds true also for India. It is not power its misuse or abuse which is morally reprehensible... Thus viewed the ideal of balance of power is nothing evil or incompatible with India's highest ideals.*⁷³

Balance of power is a policy by which state attempts to divide the ability of other states to affect its own behaviour in directions desired by those states. It is sometimes identified as a policy of promoting the preservation of equilibrium.⁷⁴ Such a division of power of other states often implicates the generation of power for one's own, notably in conflict situation. Nehru demanded in 1930's a completely independent status for India in foreign affairs. He defended his position with fairly impeccable balance of power logic. In an article entitled, "**Defence of India**", Nehru discussed the possibilities of attack on India by the USA, Japan, China and Soviet Union and concluded that the only possible and threat attack could come from Russia, a typical British perception of thereat to India. Even that (USSR) he ruled out once India became independent.

Nehru looked upon big powers rivalry in world politics as a shield for India's security. In his article, defence of India, he wrote;

*It may be that some will covet her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining domination over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied, for so long. If any power was covetous enough to make the attempt all the other nations would combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry, would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India.*⁷⁵

Nehru appears to have decided to adopt a policy which would contribute to India's national security by bringing about a mutually countervailing balance of force in this part of the world. Given the American predilection in favour of Pakistan and colonialist forces, Nehru seems to have deliberately decided to cultivate the Soviet

⁷³ Paul F. Power (ed.), *India's Non-alignment policy: Strengths and weaknesses*, (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1967), p. 9.

⁷⁴ Inis Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 18.

⁷⁵ P.S. Jayaramu, *Indian National Security and Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: ABC Publishers, 1987), p. 12.

Union as a countervailing factor. Non-alignment was not merely a moral stand. It was a strategy by which he was trying to derive out the world balance of force for the maximum cover for India's security.⁷⁶

Nehru believed that in the Cold War politics, the pursuit of non-aligned policy would be not only beneficial to India but also enable her to play the role of balancer in world politics. India's policy during the early years of the Cold War in essence meant that India was trying to act as a balancer in world affairs. Nehru often looked upon the maintenance of the balance as a factor in favour of world peace. Echoing this Nehru said in 1955: As things stand, we have reached a certain balance. It may be a very unstable balance, but it is still some Kind of a balance – when any kind of a major aggression is likely to lead to a world war. That itself is a restraining factor.

If there is one generalization that can apply and make sense of Nehru security policy in the post-independent period, it is its predisposition to move towards polarities of alignment within a particularly favourable international political environment.⁷⁷ Non-alignment was effective as a policy because of the latent threat of alignment which it unmistakably holds out. This is a great deal similar to the policy England had pursued with regard to continental Europe for the greater part of 19th century. The so-called British isolation carried at all times a masked threat of intervention, and later, even of alignment, but at no time did they show willingness to enter into a permanent pact or alliance. India too, actively engaged in working the balancing process by refusing to be linked permanently to any other power or existing blocs; yet her non-involvement always carried a latent possibility, it not an actual threat of alignment. As Snyder maintains that, “strategy of strong commitment and support will have the undesired effect of reducing one's bargaining leverage over the ally. If a nation knows she can count on being supported, she is less influenceable. Conversely, bargaining power over the ally is enhanced to the extent she doubt's one's commitment because one can then make credible threats of non-support.

⁷⁶ K. Subrahmanyam “Nehru and India China Conflict of 1962”, in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, p. 113-114.

⁷⁷ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment : A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 100.

Alliance bargaining considerations thus tend to favour a strategy of weak or ambiguous commitment.”⁷⁸

Another negative effect of strong commitment, according to Snyder is that it tends to foreclose one’s own options of realignment. States want to keep their commitments tentative or vague as long as possible both to preserve opportunities for shifting partners in case the present one turns out to be unsatisfactory and to maximize bargaining leverage over the current partner by showing that they have alternatives. A strategy of weak commitment has the desirable effect of keeping alignment options open.⁷⁹

It seems that Nehru followed these realist prescriptions and had resolved the alliance security dilemma, the choice of strategy – by adopting the strategy of non-alignment through which India enhanced her bargaining power vis-à-vis superpowers. In the era of “competitive coexistence”, both sides were engaged in exporting assistance to India for basically the same reason, to try to influence the course of India’s future development in the direction of a certain structure of values.⁸⁰

Cold war in its strategic and political aspects was a struggle over power vacuums. However, in the circumstances of the balance of terror, an unattached power vacuum was a source of considerable threat to superpowers, because military measures could not be taken to eliminate it. A power vacuum continued to remain potentially attachable to either side constituting a grave risk to both.

Nehru knew very well India’s importance as a ‘power vacuum’ when he said: It maybe that sometimes we are forced to side with this power or that power. I can quite conceive of our siding even with an imperialistic power – I do not mind saying that in a certain set of circumstances that may be the lesser of the two evils.⁸¹

Because India’s policy on many issues could not be predicted, both the superpowers were induced to modify their policies in certain instances so as to better attract Indian support, mainly on the issues of colonialism and racialism. When India became the object of great power competition for ideological or moral support, Nehru

⁷⁸ Glenn H Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, *World Politics*, Vol. XXXVI, Oct. 1983- July 1984, p. 467.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 468.

⁸⁰ Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied pub., 1971), p. 64.

⁸¹ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India’s Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 104.

knew that India had the capacity to influence the outcome of that struggle by leaning to one side or the other. Indian government gained the capability of influencing the policies of great powers by its strategy of moving towards, the polarities of alignment on either side as circumstances demanded without any definite commitment.

In short, India's power rested on the acknowledgement by other states that India had something to offer and could be induced to supply it. The achievement of that acknowledgement, which occurred in the 1950's was the outstanding success of Nehru's policy of non-alignment.

LIBERALISM

Power politics is an idea which does affect the way state behave, but it does not describe all interstate behaviour. States are also influenced by other ideas, such as importance of rules, norms and institutional cooperation.

The era of idealism was motivated by the desire to prevent war. Although idealists differed significantly in their prescriptions for reforming the international political system, they generally fell into three groups.⁸² The first group advocated creating international institutions to replace the anarchical and war prone balance-of-power system. They sought to create a new system based on collective security. The second group emphasized the use of legal process such as mediation and arbitration to settle disputes. The third group emphasized arms control and disarmament in order to create climate of peace.

The First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a recognition that peace is not a nature condition but is one which must be constructed. Woodrow Wilson opined that peace could only be secured with the creation of an international institution to regulate the international anarchy. Security could not be left to a blind faith in the balance of power. Idealists rejected the idea that state behaviour is simply the product of the structure of the international system, ideas, they argued, also important.

Supporters of collective security, as a way forward to achieving greater international security accept that their ideas are not panacea for preventing war.

⁸² Charles Kegley, Jr. & E. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 21.

However, some of the worst excesses of the perennial competition between states can be avoided by it. According to this view, regulated institutionalized balancing is preferable to unregulated balancing under anarchy.⁸³ Collective security is seen as a way of providing a more effective mechanism for balancing against an aggressor as well as creating a more benign international system.

If we range through the entire gamut of India's foreign policy behaviour, it will be seen to have been worked out within the framework of peaceful coexistence. Apart from peaceful coexistence, the main components of India's efforts to improve the operations of international system was her participation in the Commonwealth of Nations and UN and her attempts to mediate in disputes between states and arrive at their negotiated settlement.

India's membership in the **Commonwealth** was representative of her anti-colonial and anti-racial stance, as well as her determination to extend the society of sovereign states in Africa and Asia. It was a platform, according to Nehru, of free states for voluntarily resolving their disputes through flexible means of negotiation and compromise.

As Prof. Mansergh observes, Nehru reinterpreted the idea of the Commonwealth to fit his own philosophy of international relations. The Commonwealth, in accepting the principle that nations, irrespective of their colour, their previous status and their present capabilities, could participate as equals with their former colonial overlords in a free association, provided Nehru with the best of all possible anti-colonial imprimaturs.

Indian membership to a considerable extent had been a catalytic factor in expediting the freedom of other British colonies and setting a constructive pattern of transfer from colonialism to freedom.⁸⁴

For Nehru, Commonwealth as a loose association was the epitome of civilized political behaviour, the repository of a certain 'content of democracy' and the provider of a "temper of peaceful discussion". From what Nehru said and implied about the Commonwealth, one can rationalize his thoughts about its potentialities for

⁸³ C. Kupchan and Kupchan, "The Promise of collective security", *International Security*, 20 (1), 1993, cited in Johan Baylis and Steve Smith (ed.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 264.

⁸⁴ B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p. 7.

system transformation through a number of intermediate approaches to the management of international conflict. Decisions in the Commonwealth were arrived at unanimously. This institutional arrangement implied consensus – formation between nations of varying cultures, ideologies and political interest: states were committed by the norms of the association to adjust their divergent outlooks so as to accommodate each other to the maximum degree possible.⁸⁵

As Nehru once remarked: of all the type of associations we have between nations, probably this rather invisible type of association is stronger than alliances or treaties. In his view, the Commonwealth was not important for what it periodically said, but for certain types of processes and exchanges, and for the correction of perceptions and the alternations of attitudes which it facilitated over broad spans of time. He hoped to see world in which all nation were associated in such friendly way each other, as in Commonwealth of nations.

The second component representative of India's foreign policy objective of improving the operations of the international system was her **participation in the United Nations**. The main aim of India's activism in the UN was to create a climate of peace by participating in the peace –keeping activities of the UN and also the promotion of disarmament and arms control negotiations. For India, the UN served as a stage on which a nation's role in world affairs could be enacted. Non – alignment though conceived earlier, was given birth in UN chambers in the late 1940's and early 1950. It was in UN debates and voting records, that India established the pattern of independence of action and activism to settle global disputes.

The most highly publicized Indian advocacy of its special interest in the UN appeared during the debates on colonial questions. Nehru argued that **colonialism** had to disappear in order for the world to achieve peace and a “friendly relationship” between Asia and Europe.⁸⁶

India's anti-colonial stand in the UN was, thus, intended to hasten the process of decolonization.

⁸⁵ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 223.

⁸⁶ Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 103.

Nehru thought **disarmament** as an urgent and vital problem and a prerequisite for the creation of an effective world order.⁸⁷ United Nations once again provided India a forum through which India could attempt to improve the operation of the international system by reducing the extent of danger posed by atomic weapons to mankind.

Among the non-nuclear armed states India was the foremost exponent of the danger of nuclear testing and Nehru was the first head of government formally to propose a test ban.⁸⁸

India sought to utilize the atmosphere of emerging detente to restart negotiations on disarmament which had come to a standstill in UN in 1960. It was due to India's efforts in the UN General Assembly that Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) came into existence, which had a mandate to undertake negotiations to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The pressure from the non-aligned countries in the committee upon the great powers was a major influence in producing the nuclear – test Ban accord to 1963 and in the UN agreement to prohibit military competition in outer space.⁸⁹ India welcomed the treaty without reservations and was one of the first states to adhere to it.

India's political credibility as an impartial and firm advocate of peace, and as a non-participant in the cold war was so high that Indian armed forces were invited to form the major element of U.N. peace keeping operations in Congo, Gaza, Lebanon, Cyprus and other where the UN was involved.⁹⁰

India took a notable part in two of the most important **peace-keeping activities of the UN**: in the UNEF after the Seuz conflict and in the UNOC during the Congolese crisis of 1960-62. India was motivated by two major considerations: the need to de-escalate and defuse violent conflict by the interposition of a buffer force of an 'international' nature and to prevent the entry and interference of the great powers

⁸⁷ B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p.101.

⁸⁸ Charles Heimsath & Surjit Man Singh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 93.

⁸⁹ Cicil Crabb, Jr., *The Elephant and the Grass: A study of Nonalignment*, (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 110.

⁹⁰ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Picus, 1998), p. 259.

into these areas.⁹¹ India clarified its position regarding her role in peacekeeping by stipulating certain conditions under which she was prepared to participate. The critical condition under which UN peacekeeping might take place, was the consent of a state to the presence of UN forces. It was to be confined to preventive peacekeeping activity and in no sense to be equated with an 'occupying force'. Once it had discharged its functions, it was to withdraw immediately from the host nation. Moreover, India was against the use of UN force to impose any specific political settlement. Its experience in the Kashmir dispute had demonstrated the possible dangers of allowing the UN to enforce its decision in the guise of maintaining peace. Therefore, India insisted upon the ad hoc character of the UNEF and its functioning with the compliance of Egypt.⁹²

Another method often adopted by India in working towards peaceful coexistence was that of **mediation of disputes between state**, and arriving at their negotiated settlement. Her mediatory efforts in the Korean and Indo-China disputes and good illustrations of showing India's concern for localizing conflict which arose from the confrontation between the rival bloc in the Cold War. It should be noted that during the Korean crisis period, India's relations with both blocs were not cordial due to its adherence to non-alignment. India had to prove that she was genuinely non-aligned during the crisis. By supporting the west in the UN India did not commit itself to western policy, as subsequent moves demonstrated like her effort to bring communist China into the U.N. despite US opposition, India's opposition to establish a unified command in Korea and her criticism of western move for 'uniting for peace' resolution, her criticism of the western proposal of crossing the 38th parallel and her support and defense of Chinese action in Korea.⁹³

Initially, India could not convince both sides of its impartial intentions. However, later India played a pivotal role in encouraging constructive communication between the rival blocs and in the final settlement of the conflict by her chairmanship of the Neutral Nation Repatriation Commission (NNRC) over the vexed prisoners of

⁹¹ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p.230.

⁹² Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 498.

⁹³ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual study of India's Foreign Policy strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p.239. & Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 67-68.

war question. It was a tribute to Indian diplomacy that neither side could escape recognizing the fact that India's main aim was to promote an acceptable peace settlement and that it has assumed a truly neutral attitude on the Korean episode.⁹⁴

At the Geneva Conference, the formally uninvited Indian representative, Krishna Menon, maintained close contact with all the parties and received official and unofficial praise for his constructive mediatory role.⁹⁵ The terms of Geneva accords on Indo-China reflected the earlier six-point proposal of Nehru. It established three International Commissions of supervision and control (ICSC) for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, each composed of an Indian Chairman. The composition of these commissions reflected acceptance by the international community of the importance and necessity of the Indian mediatory role in the Indo-China affairs.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Another liberal approach to international security is Democratic peace theory which argues democracy as a major source of peace. This theory has been associated with Michale Doyle and Bruce Russett, which has its seeds in Kant's 1795 essay, *Perpetual Peace*. They argue that wars between democracies are rare as they settle their disagreements by mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful diplomacy. Shared norms and institutional constraints will dampen down the security dilemma and contribute to a more peaceful world.

Joseph Schumpeter's ideas are labelled by Doyle as "liberal pacifism".⁹⁶ Modern imperialism, Schumpeter suggests, is based on the war machine and export monopolism, all of which are vestiges of absolute monarchism. Since only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from war, no democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism.

David Lake bases his analysis on the foreign policy of the rent-seeking state.⁹⁷ Democracies are constrained by their societies from earning rents. Since democratic

⁹⁴ Charles Heimsath & Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied publishers, 1971), p. 72.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁹⁶ Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, no. 4, Dec. 1986, p. 1151.

⁹⁷ David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 26, no. 1, March 1992, pp. 24-37.

states are less efficient in rent earning, they will tend to be fewer expansionist than autocratic states. War being a necessary by product of expansion, democratic states will be less war prone.

Schweller's argument is that uneven rates of growth are the fundamental cause of both war and change in the international system, since there is an assumption of potential future threat based on the irreversible decline of relative powers.⁹⁸ He argues that only non-democratic regimes wage preventive war against rising opponents as in authoritarian states, a large military force already exists for internal repression while the citizens are indoctrinated to sacrifice short-term individual gains for the advancement of long-term national goals.

Democratic states do not wage preventive war due to high domestic political costs of large scale war for politicians, civilian control over military planning and to the moral values of the democratic society. Extending the logic of Schweller's preventive war logic, it seems that China waged the preventive war in 1962 on India because China's relative power was declining in the mid 1950's due to the failure of "Great Leap Forward" causing death of 30 million people and the drastic economic slowdown in the second five year plan. Moreover, Soviet had withdrawn their technical support due to ideological battle within communist group and were neutral to the Sino-Indian border dispute from 1959 onwards. Eisenhower and Khrushchev both supported Indian non-alignment in the late 1950's and US openly gave assurance to India for the impending Sino-Indian war. China was isolated in the international arena and saw India as challenging her hegemony over the Third World. It could be argued that China was apprehensive of India's growing power and was thus forced to wage a preventive war. However, it can be seen that there is no scholarly consensus about democratic peace, as Mansfield and Snyder strongly suggest that the active "promotion of democracy", far from leading to a more peaceful world, could lead to a major instability in the international system, at least in the short run.⁹⁹

Liberals believe that rational actors are capable of forgoing short – term individual interests in order to further the long-term well being to a community to

⁹⁸ Randall L. Schweller, "Democratic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics*, Vol. 44, Jan. 1992, pp. 235-269.

⁹⁹ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, May/June 1995, pp. 79-97.

which they belong.¹⁰⁰ Such actions are rational because they contribute to the actor's individual well being, indirectly or over the long term. To Kant, international cooperation was a more rational option for states than resorting to war.

Liberal institutionalism stressed the importance of international institution in reducing the inherent conflict that realists assume in an international system. States achieve cooperation fairly often because it is in their interest to do so, and they can learn to use institution to ease the pursuit of mutual gains. This is not to say that institutions can prevent wars from occurring, but they can help to mitigate the fears of cheating and alleviate fears which sometimes arise from unequal gains from cooperation.¹⁰¹

State can create mutual rules, expectations and institutions to promote behaviour that enhance the possibilities for mutual gain. In a world constrained by state power and divergent interests, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity at least will be a component of any lasting peace. Reciprocity is an important principle in International Relations that helps international cooperation emerge despite the absence of central authority. Through reciprocity not a world government, norms and rules are enforced. Robert Axelord argues that strategies of reciprocity have the effect of promoting cooperation by establishing a direct connection between an actor's present behaviour and anticipated future benefits.¹⁰² Reciprocity is effective because it is easy to understand. After one has demonstrated one's ability and willingness to reciprocate – the other actor can easily calculate the costs of failing to cooperate or the benefits of cooperating.

The contemporary liberal solution to the problem of collective action in self-help systems in through the construction of regimes. An international regime is a set of rules, norms, and procedures around which the expectation of actors converge in certain issue areas.¹⁰³ The convergence of expectations means that participants in the international system have similar ideas about what rules will govern their mutual participation; each expect to play by the same rules. Regimes can help solve collective

¹⁰⁰ Joshua Goldstein, *International Relations*, (Pearson Education, 2003), p. 116.

¹⁰¹ John Baylis & Steve Smith (ed.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 262.

¹⁰² Kenneth Oye, "The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics", in Robert Art & Robert Jervis (ed.), *International Politics*, 6th ed., (New York: Addison – Wesley Educational Publishers, 2003) p. 88.

¹⁰³ Stephen Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

goods problems by increasing transparency by which cheating becomes more costly. Although states continue to seek becomes their own interests, they create frameworks to coordinate their actions with those of other states if and when such coordination is necessary to realize self-interest. Thus, regimes help make cooperation possible even within an international system based on anarchy.¹⁰⁴ Compliance with international regimes and its norms help states to efficiently address relative gain concerns. Consequently, this school argues, that even if the factors that give rise to a norm are no longer operative, norms and regimes continue to persist as effective and resilient expressions of institutions shaping state's behaviour. Since regimes are in effect institutions with embedded norms, states comply with these partly because the benefit of compliance outweighs the cost of violating them.¹⁰⁵

NEHRU AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? The debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by structure (anarchy and distribution of capabilities) versus process (interaction and learning) and institutions.

“Constructivists” theorists in the last decade has posed a serious challenge to the realists thinking by arguing that international relations are not only affected by power politics but also by ideas. The distribution of power may affect state's calculation but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectation, on the “distribution of knowledge” that constitute their conceptions of self and other. It is the collective meaning that constitutes the structure (shared knowledge, material resources and practices) which organize our action.

For both neo-realism and neo-liberalism, identities and interests of actors are given and processes such as those of institutions affect the behaviour but not the identities and interests of actors. Alexander Wendt claims that international institutions can transform state identities and interest.¹⁰⁶ He argues against the

¹⁰⁴Kenneth Oye, “The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics”, in Robert Art & Robert Jarvis (ed.), *International Politics*, 6th ed., p. 92

¹⁰⁵ Shah M. Tarzi, “Neorealism, Neo-liberalism and the International System”, *International Studies*, 41, 1, (2004), p. 126.

¹⁰⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics”, *International Organization*, 46, 2, spring 1992, p. 391-425.

neorealist claim that self-help is given by anarchic structure exogenously to process. He argues that self – help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. Structure has no existence apart from the process. He claims that there is no such thing as an “automatic security dilemma” for states, such a claim presupposes that states have acquired selfish interests and identities prior to their interaction. Instead self-help emerges only out of interaction between states. Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it.¹⁰⁷

If state find themselves in a self-help situation, this is because their practices made it that way, and if the practices change then so will the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes the systems. This leads constructivists to argue that changing the way we think about international relations can bring a fundamental shift towards greater international security. The ‘logic’ of reciprocity’ and policies of reassurance can help to bring about a structure of shared knowledge which can help to move states towards a more peaceful security community.¹⁰⁸ Constructivism also address the question of the social causation of ideas and their relation to social power. It argues that ideas are causally significant to the extent that they assist the development of new social institutions, which are sources of new power resources. Ideas, especially “principled ideas” serve as sources of new social identities for actors within a social system. This allows for change in the structure of actor identities and interests that provide the context for interaction. Here it is important to recall Wendt’s essential insight that actors who acquire new social identities may experience change in their interests (which are co-constituted with these social identities) within the system.¹⁰⁹ When ideas are successfully transmitted to the system, they stimulate the development of new norms and principles, which may become institutionalized into new conventions.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 391-425.

¹⁰⁸ Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁰⁹ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organisation*, 46, 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425.

¹¹⁰ Rodney Hall, “Moral Authority as a Power Resource”, in *International Organisation*, 51, 4 Autumn 1997, p. 597.

It we analyse Nehru's thought of "psychology of war" and Panchsheel, we can relate it to many strands of constructivism. Nehru relied more on the 'power of ideas' than sheer force and power in affecting the realm of international politics. Nehru also believed that institutions can change the identities of the actors and condemned the inevitability of war and the security dilemma thinking. He believed in the logic of reciprocity and argued like constructivists that unless we change our mode of thinking about international relations, other steps will remain ephemeral and cosmetic in bringing about greater international security.

The supreme question of importance before Nehru was how to avoid a World War in a nuclear world. International security has been governed by the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states for nearly four centuries. The autonomous search for one's own security has been at the root of the paradigm of competitive security. Balance of power and military alliance system are the manifestations of competitive security paradigm. According to Nehru, absence of trust and confidence was the root of the problem of security between the states and unless a serious effort is made to create a better environment of mutual trust and confidence, other steps will remain ephemeral and cosmetic.

Referring to the threat of another world war, he remarked: *The supreme question that one has today in the world is how we can avoid a world war. Some people seems to think that it is inevitable and therefore they prepare for it and prepare for it not only in a military sense but (also) in a psychological sense and thereby actually being the war nearer. To think in term of inevitability of a world war is a wrong and dangerous thinking.*¹¹¹

Nehru in his book "India and the world" wrote much about the 'psychological approach' and the need to change in "our habits and beliefs and instincts" so necessary for the avoidance of warfare.¹¹² Nehru denounced 'power politics approach' with its concomitants, the reliance on armaments and spheres of influences, alliances and balances of power because for him they heighten the world's war fever and charge the psychological climate of war.¹¹³ Although pacts may be designed to deter

¹¹¹ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p. 34.

¹¹² Nehru, *India and the World* (Allen and Unwin, 1936), pp. 218-224.

¹¹³ E. Malcolm House, "India: Non-committed and Non-aligned", *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar. 1960), pp. 70-82.

aggression, they create an opposite effect of mutual fear and distrust, and beyond a certain point they might well provoke a retaliatory war. He believed that armaments endanger peace and that peace can be preserved by peaceful means only.

What attracted Nehru in the Gandhian approach made him recoil from what he was to designate loosely as European power politics. It seemed to him that the usual way in which European powers had managed their international relations was devoid of any attempt at the transformation of their attitudes towards each other and towards the new forces that had emerged in the rest of the world. Nehru maintained that European wars will continue unless the very system of capitalist – imperialism was put to an end. Once this happened there would be little occasion for conflict between the European powers themselves and between the various independent units of international society in general; the era of power politics would come to end, to be succeeded by that of mutual cooperation on free and equal terms.¹¹⁴ For him, once this entire rotten paraphernalia of power politics was pulled down such institutions as a future league of Nations would stand a fair chance of succeeding.¹¹⁵

Constructivism maintains that by changing the practices among nations and the way we think about international politics, we can overcome the self-help and security dilemma situations. Nehru appreciated this thinking and propagated his celebrated Panchsheel doctrine, which entailed the ‘logic of reciprocity’ and the ‘policies of reassurance’. Panchsheel was inked during the 1954 Agreement between India and China over Tibet. To Nehru, principles of Panchsheel constituted a standard of international ethics under which she hopes for reciprocal affirmations from her neighbours.¹¹⁶ Nor do Panchsheel principles call for any heavy military expenditures. In Nehru’s view the agreement was a little short than a no war pact provided the principles of Panchsheel were observed by respective countries. In his view by subscribing to these principles one could create an environment wherein it becomes a little more dangerous to the other party to break away from the pledges given.¹¹⁷

Nehru was undeterred by the remarks of his critics that Panchsheel(esp. non-interference and peaceful co-existence) would be violated in the anarchical world of mighty nations. Nehru in a speech in Lok Sabha told that ‘*The fact that it will not be*

¹¹⁴ Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 511-12, 556.

¹¹⁵ Nehru, *A Bunch of Old Letters*, (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1960), pp. 141-43.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹¹⁷ Lok Sabha Debates, 1954, (Vol.VII, part II, Col.3683).

wholly acted upon here and there is really of little relevance. You make a law, and the law gradually influences the whole structure of life in a country, even though some people may not obey it. Even those who do not believe in it gradually come within its scope'.¹¹⁸ What Nehru thought was that Panchsheel would provide the context for interaction among nations, that may change the identities and interests of actors in the long run. If we desire peace, we must develop the temper of peace, we cannot seek peace in the language of war or of threats.

Nehru once wrote in the context of these principles. *In international affairs, we can never be dead certain and the friends of today might be enemies of tomorrow. That may be so. Are we then to begin with enmity and suspicion, and not give any other approach a chance? Surely, it is better with nations as with individuals, to hope for and expect the best, but at the same time to be prepared for any eventuality.*"¹¹⁹

This piece of writing shown the deep understanding of Nehru of the processes of international relations and his vision of a peaceful world as well as his negation of the myth of 'automatic security dilemma' which is much close to the constructivist vision.

ROLE OF NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Hedley Bull as a representative of Groatian tradition maintains that international system is a "society" in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas.¹²⁰ Scholars of post – World War II, especially in security affairs, consequently tend to downplay the role of norms. The neoliberal school argues that norms and institutions matter both at domestic and systematic level. They have conceptualized the difference that norms make in terms of their effects on the relative cost of specific forms of behaviour – for

¹¹⁸ S.Gopal and Uma Iyengar, *The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vol.II, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 163.

¹¹⁹ Congress Bulletin June-July 1954, pp.248-249, cited in B.R.Deepak, *India and China: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, (Manak Publications, 2005), p. 155.

¹²⁰ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical society: A study of Order in World Politics*, (New York; Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 103.

example, through lowering transaction cost and reducing uncertainty about other's behaviour.¹²¹

Realists focus primarily on material capabilities and argue that norms, where they exist, merely ratify underlying power relationships. And while neo-liberal theorists more often accord an independent role to norms, they nevertheless concentrate on explicit contractual arrangement, (such as those embodied in regimes) intended to resolve collective action problems. For them, norms are derived from rational egoistic choice.¹²² However, many neoliberal theorists have been reluctant to focus on informal structure and norms in the area of security studies.

Norms are collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity. Norms either define (constitute) identities in the first place or prescribe (regulate) behaviour for already constituted identities. Taken together, then, norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.¹²³

“New Thinking” in the Soviet Union was a norm, as was “hard realpolitik” in Mao's China. Both prescribe behaviour for national policy-making elites. The changing collective beliefs about the use of nuclear or chemical weapons, the legitimacy of military intervention are examples of widespread and enduring political norms. These norms prescribe and regulate the practice of agents in international politics.

The international relations theory cannot afford to ignore the impact of norms on the interests, beliefs, and behaviour of actors in international politics. Cultural or institutional elements of states' environment most often norms shape the security policies of states.¹²⁴ Japan's and Germany's anti-militaristic norms have made it very difficult for their governments to adopt more assertive national security policies since the end of cold war. Norms may even shape an actor's interests or preferences in ways that contradict the strategic imperative of the international environment. States may intervene to accomplish humanitarian objectives even when no obvious

¹²¹ Kenneth Oye, “*The Conditions for Cooperation in World Politics*”, in Robert Art & Robert Jervis (ed.), *International Politics*, 6th ed., p. 92.

¹²² Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

¹²³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 6.

¹²⁴ Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security” in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.54.

economic/strategic rationale is present like interventions made in Somalia or Cambodia. Similarly, Jeffrey Legro turns to the military's organizational culture to explain why during World War II, chemical weapons were not used.¹²⁵

Domestic-level norms may also shape state interests in ways that contradict the material international structure. Kier argues that the inter war preference of both civilian and military leaders for military doctrine were defined more by internal culture than by the external balance of power.¹²⁶ Strategic culture in China has produced a consistent set of Chinese interests despite changes in China's strategic position with respect to other powers. Strategic culture determined the character of China involvement in external politics, thus reversing the primacy that realism usually accords to the international system.

Norms affect not only actor interests but also the ways actors connect their preferences to policy choices. Norms, in other words, shape the instrument, or means that states find available and appropriate. Even when actors are aware of a wide array of means to accomplish their policy objectives, they may nevertheless reject some means as inappropriate because of normative constraint. The widespread tendency to distinguish chemical weapons from conventional weapons stems in from norms of civilization and thus realism can't account for the reluctance of states to use unconventional weapons, despite the military advantage they might have produced such as in case of Korea or Gulf War.

Variation in state identity affect the national security interests or policies of states.¹²⁷ Identities both generate and shape interests. Many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. This was certainly true during the cold war. The collapse of the Soviet empire as a dominant "other" occasions instability in U.S. self-conceptions, and hence ambiguity in U.S. interests. Security dilemma of the cold war was rooted in definitions of self and other that elites constructed politically in the late 1940's. The continuity in Germany's and Japan's security policy must be attributed to their domestic politics of identity, rather than to discontinuity in the structure of the

¹²⁵ Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

¹²⁶ Paul Kowert & J. Legro, "Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise" in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 463.

¹²⁷ Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 7.

international system. China's strategic culture and Japan's and Germany's politico-military culture have stronger effects on national security policies than international structure does.

States enacting a particular identity have profound effects on the structure of international system to which they belong. The forging of an identity as a western security community, for example, contradicts, the expectation of Europe's quick return to nineteenth-century balance of power politics.¹²⁸ Germany's and Japan's identities as trading states have important consequences for the international security conditions in Europe and Asia. And changes in Soviet identity helped bring about the end of Cold War.

Thus, in analyzing India security policy and strategy of non-alignment during the Nehru era, we have to discuss the impact of norms and political culture which shaped the ideas of policy-makers. Nehru very correctly remarked: *It is completely incorrect to call our policy 'Nehru's policy', I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during over struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today.*¹²⁹ Nehru was much influenced by the idealistic tradition of the Indian renaissance and the national movement, especially by Gandhi. Gandhi wanted to transform international relations through the power of nonviolence. In the land where Buddhism originated, non-violence as a method of social action was deeply rooted. Vivekanand had repeatedly stressed that India's future role in the world was that of "messenger of peace", that of a catalyst for creating a just and moral world order. In emphasizing the need for adopting the right means in the relations among nations, Nehru often referred to the legacy of Gandhi. His relatively idealistic view of internationalism is also proved by his frequent reference to the ideal of one World, his dedication to the U.N., and his vision of world peace.

Nehru's laid great emphasis on negotiations among the nations and had a conviction that non-violence could serve to lesson world tensions. Perhaps the most striking example was Nehru's restraint on the problem of Goa and Kashmir, where the

¹²⁸ John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security* 15, no.1 (1990), pp. 5-56.

¹²⁹ J.L. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches*, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1961) pp. 80, 83.

use of force could end the conflict in favour of India. Nehru's notion of peaceful coexistence can be traced back to the tradition of Hinduism which laid emphasis on tolerance and maintained that no system of thought and belief is capable of comprehending the complete truth.¹³⁰ Applied to the bipolarized society of nations, the world situation called for peaceful coexistence of both rival groups, with India not aligning with either of the blocs.

The most important element of Indian political tradition which vitally influenced Nehru's foreign policy in that of ideological independence.¹³¹ The ideological thinking of the Indian national movement was represented by equal rejection of both western capitalism and Soviet Communism as guideline for India's national development. Indian people would have regarded an alliance with either of the two power blocs as a betrayal of the Indian freedom movement. Had there been no cold war, India's foreign policy would probably have been the same – one of independence. Nehru always emphasized India's great civilization and appreciated India as a potential power. Thus, the policy of non-alignment and the urge for independence gave the people of India in general a certain role feeling and sense for purpose in world affairs.

Nehru's view of India's role in world affairs was strongly rooted in pacifism and a cooperative one world vision in which military power was not deemed as the central feature. Indian leadership had no experience in military affairs and deeply abhorred armed struggle to attain its political goals, including liberation of the nation.

The reason for India's security lapse are rooted in colonial history and anti-imperialist ideology. As an anti-colonial nationalists, policy makers considered "imperial defense" to be an unnecessary burden on the Indian economy, and they failed to visualize any external threat to an independent India.¹³² There was no systematic body of codified Indian defense doctrine which may help understand the role of power in Indian policy. To quote Pannikar. *Thus, India had till independence lacked an effective military tradition. She had developed no doctrines of warfare with a corpus of theory, no effective inherited organization, no knowledge of the progress*

¹³⁰ Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 214.

¹³¹ J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 317.

¹³² Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-India Relations", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 11, Nov. 1997.

*of warfare in other countries. India in fact did not have an effective system of defence.*¹³³

The level of correspondence between Indian military policy and diplomacy was such that it inhibited the growth of an Indian military posture.¹³⁴ Indian leadership did not involve the country's military in national security and foreign policy decision-making after independence. The leadership was suspicious of the political consequences of such involvement and kept the military out of the decision-making loop on all security and foreign policy issues with disastrous results.¹³⁵

India's military failure to hold the Chinese forces has been widely criticized for its lack of military and civilian preparedness. But the fatal flaw in Nehru's strategy lay elsewhere. It lay in his basic approach to the question of the territorial definition of India as an ex-colonial modern state and the failure to make it a priority goal of foreign policy.

Nehru's perception of India was essentially as a civilizational unity, indeterminate in space, umbilically inseparable from the other civilizations and cultures of Asia. His writings did not convey his concept of political India. Nowhere in his writings is there awareness of India as a spatially finite entity, or of the importance of delimiting its territorial extent.¹³⁶ His regard for continuity was responsible for the fault lines in his general approach to the territorial formation of the state. He did not alter the status of Tibet after independence and did not demand immediate return of the small enclaves that were still in the possession of war-defeated France and Portugal. It seems that Nehru did not perceive the fundamental necessity of establishing India as a distinct territorial unit. Only this can explain the lack of a supporting operational strategy or the failure to use the years of amity and opportunity to give serious considerations to the crucial question of the frontiers and the security of India.¹³⁷

¹³³ K.M.Pannikar, *Problems of Indian Defence*, (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), pp. 21-22.

¹³⁴ M.J. Desai, "Principles of Post-War Indian Foreign Policy" in the *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, August 1966, p. 228.

¹³⁵ Sujit Dutta & C.Raja Mohan, "In Search of Autonomy: Dealing with the Global Powers" in G.P.Deshpande & Alka Acharya (ed.), *Fifty Years of India-China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams*, (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 304.

¹³⁶ Mira Sinha Bhattacharjee, "1962 Revisited", in Deshpande & Acharya (ed.) *Fifty Years of India-China* (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 437.

¹³⁷ *ibid*, p. 441.

CHAPTER – III

THE PRACTICE OF NON-ALIGNMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE SUEZ CRISIS

By the end of 1955 Nehru was recognized as one of the few living men who made an impression on the world – ‘the man who’, in the words of Harper’s Magazine, since the end of the Churchill – Stalin – Roosevelt era, is the most arresting figure on the world political stage. The New York Times recognized in him one of the world’s most important politicians, and of the unchallenged rulers of the world perhaps the only one who rules by love and not fear.¹ This acceptance of Nehru was, of course, primarily because of the impact which the central strength and sanity of his foreign policy had achieved. He had made clear that India would participate actively in the world not merely because of his own international interests but also to promote peace and cooperation for the society of states. Moreover, foreign policy was also to him a way of safeguarding India’s newly won freedom.

After Bandung, Nehru continued to maintain contacts with the two blocs. He had criticized many aspects of American policy, while his opposition to creation of a circle of alliances and to the extension of spheres of influence in Asia brought him in line with the current policy of the Soviet Union.² Nehru’s visit to Moscow in 1955 shocked the western world as for the first time a neutral nation was invited. Nehru at Bandung refused to acknowledge the USSR as an imperialistic country. Yet, he regarded as unfair any suggestion that he was non-aligned more in favour of one side than the other. ‘I belong’, he had asserted at Bandung ‘to neither [bloc] and I propose to belong to neither whatever happens in the world’.³ However, by 1955 USSR had accepted the Indian aspirations to emerge as an independent decision-making center in Asia and even at the height of the Cold War, they had not tried to form hegemonistic military alliances involving

¹ Cited in S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 300.

² *ibid*, p. 243.

³ Nehru’s speech at the closed session, 22 April 1955.

the nations of Asia and Africa. Both countries therefore sought to enlist each others support for their basic policies.

The year 1956 marked the end of a bipolar world and the beginning of a polycentric one. There was a split in the western bloc due to the Suez crisis (as UK and France attacked Egypt against US wishes) and some fissures were appeared in the Soviet bloc due to the revolt in Hungary and Sino-Soviet conflict. The resulting erosion of the Cold War and the polycentrism which characterize the international system changed India's global strategic environment to a considerable extent. The most significant consequences of polycentrism for India were the dilution of the Cold War ideological rhetoric and the emergence of a triangular involvement of external powers in South Asia.⁴

India was very vocal in his criticism of western bloc, particularly U.K. & France during the Suez crisis but her stand regarding Soviet Union was ambiguous and less critical during the Hungarian crisis. A fair segment of world public opinion as well as western governments criticized this contradiction in Indian foreign policy. They asserted that India's contradictory views on the two issues negated New Delhi's claims that its foreign policy was based on moral principles. This criticism was valid at the apparent and normative levels, but it was the first major manifestation of India acting firmly to safeguard its perceived national interests. It also reflected the fact that India was realizing that international politics is essentially an amoral phenomenon governed by power equations and vested interests.

Apart from the fact that the Hungarian national uprising occurred more or less simultaneously with the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt, the two ostensibly unrelated questions need to be dealt with together. They had several features in common, even though they were not identical in nature – at least as viewed by the Government and people of India. According to Nehru, both the Hungarian and Suez crises were gross and brutal exercises of violence and armed might against weaker countries. However, there were certain differential features between the two cases which partly explained the slightly different Indian reactions to the two cases.

⁴ J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1970), p. 101.

Nehru viewed that Hungarian crises was really a case of 'continuing intervention' with Soviet armed forces based in Hungary under the Warsaw pact. There was no 'immediate aggression' in Hungary like in Egypt where the forces of aggression came from outside especially for the purpose and acted rather suddenly. Another difference noted by Indian government was that Suez crisis illustrated the revival of old style colonialism whereas Hungarian case highlighted the new evil of ideological domination.⁵ By the time Suez crisis took place India's interest in colonialism was waning. Thus, it shocked Nehru when he realized that colonialism was still a major force to be reckoned with in world politics. Some western scholars attribute the differential Indian attitude to the two questions to racial prejudice. Brecher maintained that an unstated belief of Indians was that violence is bad but white violence against non-whites is worse.⁶

The other reason that the Indian government could view events in Hungary dispassionately was because it had no sense of involvement with the people of Eastern Europe and had slight official contact with them in 1956. Moreover, the unfamiliarity of the Hungarian background and Nehru's doubt regarding the authenticity of newspaper reports mainly from western sources had refrained him from commenting on Soviet repressive measures.⁷

Another reason for India's more vociferous criticism of western powers in Suez crisis was that Indians knew very well that the policies and actions of these countries were capable of being modified by public criticism. On the other hand, few Indians believed that criticizing Russians was of any use – that it will not deflect them from their chosen course.⁸ However, Soviet Union greatly damaged its standing in the eyes of people of Asia and Africa who were neutral in the ideological 'Cold War'.

However, the crucial reason behind India's ambiguous response lay in its national interest. India and Soviet Union sought each other's support for immediate political objectives as well as for their longer-range policy goals, especially after

⁵ M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs (1954-1956)*, (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1966), 146.

⁶ Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: Oxford University Press,), pp. 555-6, 1959.

⁷ Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 428.

⁸ The Economist (London), "Delhi, Suez and Budapest" *Economist*, Vol. 181, No. 5902, 10 November, 1956, pp. 519-520.

Stalin's death. India's three territorial concerns were Kashmir, Goa and its northern borders bordering China. USSR gave open support to the idea of integrating Kashmir and the Portuguese enclaves into the Indian Union and had often used its veto power in the Security Council to prevent passage against India's wishes of any western sponsored resolution on either subject. Moreover, Russia's attitude on the Sino-Indian border was neutral and more sympathetic to India. Nehru would have thought Russia's importance in its conflict with China in the long run. Nehru had realized by the mid-1950's, that being clinically non-aligned and impartial in world affairs was not desirable. India needed friends to support its cause on certain issues in which other world power could get interested.⁹

On 9 November, 1956, India voted against a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and for elections in Hungary, under the auspices of the U.N.¹⁰ Nehru was widely criticized for this act both in India and abroad. Later, Nehru expressed that if India agreed to elections in Hungary, technically it would have also to agree in Kashmir though basically both the cases differed.¹¹

Moreover, Nehru was ready to accept the Soviet version of Hungarian crisis as civil war as he believed that liberalizing forces were at work in the Soviet Union after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party and to the developments in Poland.¹² Indeed, his whole approach to foreign policy (after 1953) had been based on his belief in the reality and permanence of the more liberal trends in Russia.¹³

However, it must be emphasized that it did not at all affect the degree of moral condemnation that the Indian people applied to both the cases of use of force by Great Powers on smaller nations – a very important fact that western critics unfortunately ignored, deliberately or otherwise.

⁹ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders*, (New Delhi: Picus Books, 1998), p. 66.

¹⁰ Escott Reid, *Envoy to Nehru*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 167.

¹¹ Hemen Ray, *Indo-Soviet Relations, 1955-71*, (Bombay, 1973), p. 71.

¹² Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in Foreign Office*, (New Delhi: Minerva Associates Publications, 1977), p. 179.

¹³ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders*, (New Delhi: Picus Books 1998), p. 66.

SUEZ CRISIS

The Suez crisis was the first international crisis which India faced where its own national interest was directly involved.¹⁴ The Suez crisis was qualitatively different from the earlier Asian crises like Korean and Indo-China where India played mediatory and constructive role to resolve conflicts peacefully. The victim nation was uncommitted and was not aligned with either of the military blocs and the superpowers interestingly, were not clearly arrayed against each other as was the case during earlier crises in Asia.

The Suez crisis seemed to have thrown up the issues which have challenged all that India as a leader of nonaligned and Third World stood for. The urge for redefining and reconstructing relations between the old and new states (weak and powerful) in the world constituted the broad motivation of India's involvement in the Suez crisis. There were also specific and domestic interests that determined the nature and extent of India's role in the crises.

India's dominant interest lay in keeping the canal open. It regarded an armed conflict as a threat to regional and world peace. But scarcely secondary in importance was India's support of Egypt, as a friendly state and as another example of a relatively weak country's subjection to immense pressures from greater powers.¹⁵ For India, Egypt was an important factor both politically and strategically. As Nasser's Egypt represented secularism and non-alignment in the Arab World, India had to explore possibilities of an amicable solution of the Suez crises.

One of the basic considerations governing India's policy towards the Arab world was the question of security. Valentine Chirol defined the "Middle East" as comprising those regions of Asia which extend to the borders of India, and which are consequently bound up with the problems of Indian political as well as military defences.¹⁶ This point was understood by Prime Minister Nehru in a statement before the Constituent Assembly in March 1949:

¹⁴ Savripada Bhattacharya, *Pursuit of National Interests Through Neutralism*. (Calcutta: Firma K.L.M., 1976).

¹⁵ Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 428.

¹⁶ Valentine Chirol, *The Middle East Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence*. (London, 1903), p. 5.

*If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably comes into picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also with Far East. While the Middle East may not be directly connected with South-East Asia, both are connected with India.*¹⁷

In the early phase of its relations with the region, India encountered a two fold challenge to its interests in the region: the British drive to bring about a military grouping of the West Asian countries which would safeguard its oil and imperial interests in the region and Pakistan's design to forge a Pan-Islamic alliance of Arab and Muslim nations vis-à-vis Kashmir issue.¹⁸ India strongly protested the creation of Baghdad Pact as it provoked USSR to enter the region and the inclusion of Pakistan in the pact which posed a serious threat to India security by bringing the Cold War to India's doorsteps. After the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, which deeply embittered Arab nationalist opinion, the concept of non-alignment found vigorous and widespread support in the Arab world. Thus, India's wanted to draw closer to the non-aligned Pan-Arabist forces, particularly Egypt.

The specific factors which formed a major portion of India's role during the crisis were mostly domestic like second Five Year Plan, the impending General Elections as well as Muslims in India. India had to appreciate the weight of Muslims in the formulations of its policies regarding Arab states. Abul Kalam Azad acted as Nehru's principal adviser on Arab affairs and favoured close cooperation with Arab nationalist movements.¹⁹ It was not coincidence that most of the Ambassadors of India in Middle East were Muslims. The Suez crisis coincided with the onset of the preparation of the forthcoming second general elections to be held in 1957. It may be borne in mind here that foreign policy

¹⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, September 1946-May 1947 (Delhi: Publication Division, 1967), p. 235.

¹⁸ M.S. Agwani, "India and the Arab World" in B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p. 76-77.

¹⁹ *ibid*, p. 68.

decisions are made keeping in view the effect that they would have on public opinion, especially Muslim minority group vis-à-vis Suez crisis.²⁰

The second five year plan played its part in the making of Indian policy towards the Suez crisis. The closure of the canal would diminish the chances in carrying out the plan successfully as India was dependent on the West for capital goods. The Suez Canal cut down the maritime distance between Bombay and London by 4500 miles and 23 days. The increase in the freight charges due to its closure was bound to have an impact on India's trade as 2/3 of India's trade passed through the Suez Canal.²¹ Hence, India's dual interests, the canal's normal functioning and support of Egypt, placed it in a unique position to attempt mediation.²²

The Arab world had been in great ferment in the fifties and its hub was Cairo, as on July 23rd, 1952 a bloodless military coup was staged in Egypt under the leadership of a young military officer, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. By the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of July 27, 1954 the British agreed to evacuate the Suez Canal base within two years. Western nations criticized and were infuriated against Egypt for its arms deal with Czechoslovakia and its opposition to Baghdad Pact. As the proposed Aswan High Dam on the Nile would cost a huge amount, Egypt approached the US and UK for financial assistance. However, U.S. withdrew the project on the pretext of Egypt's leaning towards the Soviet Union and her non-compliance to Baghdad Pact. Due to this refusal of U.S., Nasser conceived the idea of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company with its properties and assets.

Before Nasser announced its nationalization, the canal was under the management and lease of the compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez which in turn was owned by the shareholders of the company. The company enjoyed no political rights and the canal formed an integral part of the territory of Egypt. The company was to work as a private joint stock company registered in Egypt and was legally entitled to the lease and operation of the canal till 1968.

²⁰ For a detailed study of Muslims and their impact on elections. See Sisir Gupta "Muslims in Indian Politics: 1947-60", *India Quarterly*, New Delhi, vol. 18, no. 4, October-December 1962, pp. 355-81.

²¹ "Impact of Suez on India's Trade", *Eastern Economist*, vol. 27, no. 27, no. 19, 9 November 1956, p. 690.

²² Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 428, 283.

On the night of July 26, 1956 Nasser addressed a massive rally at Alexandria and announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal company. This action was highly resented by both France and Great Britain. They held that the Egyptian act of nationalization was not such an act, but an 'arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency'. They alleged that the act threatened freedom and security of the canal guaranteed by the 1888 convention.²³ British Prime Minister declared that they could not allow Egypt to expropriate the canal and exploit it by using the "revenues for her own internal purpose irrespective of the interest of the canal and of the canal users".²⁴

Nehru was surprised by the sudden Egyptian action and denied any previous knowledge of impending nationalization of canal company. Neither at Brioni, nor later at Cairo, did Nasser mention to Nehru that he was going for nationalization.²⁵

However, on this issue, Government of India adopted a neutral stance and its first statement neither supported nationalization nor spoke against it. India was not perturbed on the grounds that Egypt had nationalized the canal but rather the way it was done. Nehru remarked in Lok Sabha: The way Egypt took hold of the Suez Canal was not our way. We follow a different way, but who am I to criticize others?²⁶ He blamed not only West but also Egypt for the crisis. The crisis could be solved according to him only through negotiations. Hence the bitter reaction, the militant postures and the hostile actions of the West against Egypt were wholly incomprehensible and unjustifiable to the Indian government.²⁷

In August 1956, a conference was convened in London at the initiative of U.K., France and U.S.A. Twenty-Four other countries who were users of the canal were also invited to this conference. Nehru announced that India would attend the London conference on the basis of Eden's assurance that participation need not imply acceptance of the British demand for an international authority.²⁸ India, he

²³ *The Suez Canal Problem July 26 – Sept. 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication*, Washington, The Department of State, 1956, pp. 34f.

²⁴ Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London, 1960), p. 427.

²⁵ A Moncrieff (ed.), *Suez Ten Years After* (London, 1967), pp. 43-4.

²⁶ Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in Foreign Office*, (New Delhi: Minerva Associates Publications, 1977), p. 179, p. 160.

²⁷ See, "Suez and Sovereignty", *Economic Weekly*, 4 August 1956.

²⁸ Cited in S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 300, p. 280.

said, would not participate in an arrangement which infringed the sovereign rights of Egypt. Nehru advised Nasser to attend the London conference and cautioned him against any reference of the issue to the U.N., as Nehru was disillusioned by UN himself vis-à-vis Kashmir issue. However, Nasser rejected his advice to attend the conference.

Nehru was continuing his balancing act, assisting Egypt without standing forth as her unhesitating champion. For him, Suez crisis was the most difficult and dangerous situation in international affairs that India had faced since independence. There was no doubt in his mind as to who should represent India at the conference. His choice fell on Krishna Menon of whose negotiating ability he had the highest opinion and greatly relied on him to produce a formula which all sides could accept without loss of face.

The London conference on the Suez Canal began on August 16, 1956 with 22 out of the 24 invited nations attending. At the beginning of the conference, Menon successfully opposed the suggestion of the British Chairman, Lloyd that the conference should take decisions by majority procedures of the U.N. organs. Likewise, he successfully opposed at the end of the conference a proposal that the US sponsored majority-supported proposal should be conveyed to Egypt as the decisions of the conference, as Menon maintained that the conference could not take any decisions, but could only formulate the basis of negotiations with Egypt for the solution of the problem.²⁹

In presenting the Indian plan, Menon stressed the fact that while Suez Canal had an international character, the Suez Canal Company itself was an Egyptian concern and therefore subject to Egyptian law. He made it clear that user's interests should be associated with the Egyptian administration of the canal in an advisory and consultative capacity.³⁰ The Indian plan was based on these general considerations and was just an outline, a basis for negotiation, not the solution itself.

²⁹ M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs (1954-1956)*, (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1966), 146, p. 155.

³⁰ K. T. Varkey, *V.K. Krishna Menon and Indian Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Indian Publishers, 2002), p. 173.

He then unfolded the Indian Plan which was based on the following principles:

- 1) Recognition of the sovereign rights of Egypt.
- 2) Recognition of the Suez Canal as an integral part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance.
- 3) Free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations in accordance with the 1888 convention.
- 4) Tolls and charges should be equitable and the facilities of the Canal should be available to all countries without discrimination.
- 5) The interests of the users of the Canal should receive due recognition.

The Indian delegation formally proposed that a consultative body of user interests should be formed on the basis of geographical representation. This body would have deliberative, consultative and liaison functions. To give the new arrangements a suitable international status, it was proposed that the Government of Egypt should transmit to U.N. annual reports of the Egyptian Corporation operating the Canal.³¹

The alternative 5-Power proposal (U.S. sponsored) which received the support of 18 participants of the conference had for its object the international control and operation of the Suez Canal. The Dulles Plan put forward the idea of a Suez Canal Board to function in place of an Egyptian Corporation. This Board would comprise of all users including Egypt which would be given a return for the use of the Canal. In contrast to Indian Plan, Dulles Plan maintained that Suez Canal Board would have to make periodical reports to the U.N. Egypt would give necessary facilities to this Board and any dispute arising from the operations of the Canal would be settled by an Arbitral Commission.³² On freedom of navigation both the Dulles Plan and Indian Plan agreed but they did not agree on the procedure of its implementation.³³ The 18 Powers decided to appoint a 5-nation committee headed by Australian Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, to present their plan to Nasser. India, in spite of its disagreements with that plan, urged the

³¹ See, *The Suez Canal Crisis and India*, (New Delhi: Information Service of India, 1956).

³² Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in Foreign Office*, (New Delhi: Minerva Associates Publications, 1977), p. 179, p. 164.

³³ Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London, 1960), p. 451.

Egyptian government to receive the Menzies mission. Nasser rejected the plan saying that it was not in conformity with the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt. Nasser requested Nehru to get negotiations started on the basis of the legitimate concerns of user interests, but without acceptance of international control. Egypt proposed that all the nations which used the canal should meet and discuss the creation of a negotiating body to consider questions such as freedom of navigation, development of canal and review of the 1888 convention.

Meanwhile, with American support UK and France proposed to setup a Canal User's Association which would seek to operate the canal and collect transit dues paying an appropriate share to Egypt. This was a clear violation of Egyptian sovereignty and both India and Egypt denounced it. India was also critical of the west for encouraging the withdrawal of foreign employees of the old company, mostly pilots, in an effort to paralyse the operation of the canal by the nationalized company. Nehru urged the Indian port authorities to do all they could to spare the services of trained pilots for work in Suez and at short notice some pilots were made available from India.³⁴

However, the 18 Nations which supported the Dulles Plan met again in London in September (India was not invited) and participants issued a declaration proposing to set up a User's Association which was formally incorporated on 1 October. Criticizing this Association, Nehru said that the action proposed is not the result of agreement and cooperation, but is in the nature of an unilateral imposed decision. The firmness and promptness with which Nehru pointed out the risk of war inherent in the proposal of establishing a Users' Association was probably responsible for the Anglo-French decision to take the dispute to the United Nations.³⁵

The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Egypt who had gone to New York to participate in the Security Council's meeting established private contact amongst themselves and began direct talks. India not being a member of the Security Council, Menon engaged himself in intense diplomatic activity outside as well as with the UN Secretary-General. As a result, Menon presented revised

³⁴ Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in Foreign Office*, (New Delhi: Minerva Associates Publications, 1977), p. 179, p. 165.

³⁵ M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs* (1954-1956), (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 146.

Indian proposals for the settlement of the dispute to the UN Secretary-General. On October 12, three Foreign Ministers reported agreement on six principles as a basis for future negotiations. These were-

- 1) There would be free and open transit through the Suez Canal without discrimination.
- 2) The sovereignty of Egypt would be respected.
- 3) The operations of the Canal would be insulated from the politics of any country.
- 4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges would be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users.
- 5) A fair proportion of the dues would be allotted to development; and
- 6) In case of disputes, any unsolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government would be settled by arbitration.

Later, it was found that the six-point plan embodied the principles underlying the Indian plan which had been formally presented to the three Foreign Ministers by Menon on October 10. The Foreign Ministers were due to meet at Geneva on October 29 for further negotiations. It was exactly this day that Israel chose to launch a massive attack on Egypt. Two days later, England and France sent an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel "to stop all warlike action and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal, which was followed by Anglo-French invasion.

The invasion of Egypt was clearly no matter on which Nehru could refrain from taking sides. He publicly branded Israeli action as a case of 'clear, naked aggression'. Regarding the Anglo-French action, he remarked: After fairly considerable experience in foreign affairs, I cannot think of a grosser case of naked aggression than what England and France are attempting to do.³⁶

It is hardly necessary to say that all the Indian political parties, from the extreme right to the extreme left, condemned the aggression on Egypt in the strongest terms possible. It was now a matter of almost hourly activity for Nehru to obtain a cease-fire and prevent the spread of military action, to shelter the honour

³⁶ cited in *ibid*, p. 163.

of Nasser, to safeguard the sovereignty of Egypt and to save the Commonwealth. Nehru rejected as impractical the suggestion of the Soviet Union, Egypt and China for an immediate reassembling of the Bandung countries and thought it best to seek solutions at the special session of the U.N. assembly.³⁷ Soviet premier Bulganin suggested that the Soviet and U.S. forces should jointly intervene in the conflict to stop aggression. Nehru rejected the proposed intervention as he feared that it would complicate the situation and might enlarge the area of conflict. For the same reason, he disfavoured another proposal of Bulganin to send Soviet volunteers to Egypt. The security Council met on October 29 in New York on the initiative of the U.S. to consider the situation arising from Israeli aggression. It discussed a US draft resolution calling for immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of Israeli forces behind armistice lines and calling upon all members to refrain from the use of force in the area. Both UK and France vetoed the resolution. Thus, the Security Council passed on the 31st October a Yugoslav motion under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution calling for an emergency special session of UN General Assembly.

On 1st November 1956, Nehru's message of support reached Nasser. As a result of which Nasser kept in constant touch with Nehru throughout the crisis. In spite of India's closeness to Egypt and its all out efforts to stop the aggression, India did not offer military help to Egypt. India's effort were limited to cease fire, withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian soil and the settlement of the dispute in a peaceful manner.

Serious disturbances had already broken out in Hungary and the Soviet Union which was a strong champion of Egypt was itself on the docks. On November 2, General Assembly accepted a U.S. sponsored resolution which urged immediate ceasefire and asked all sides to withdraw behind the armistice line. The Assembly also passed on the 4th November a 19 nation Asian-African resolution piloted by Indian representative which noted that all the parties concerned had not agreed to ceasefire and urged full compliance with the earlier resolution. On the same day a resolution sponsored by Canada requesting the Secretary-General to submit a plan setting up a U.N. Emergency Force in the area to secure and

³⁷ Cited in S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 300, 286.

supervise the cessation of hostilities was passed by a large majority.³⁸ On November 5, Egypt announced the acceptance of the U.N. resolution for the establishment of an international police force. On the following day, Eden announced in the House of Commons that he was ordering a ceasefire at midnight. England and France completed the withdrawal of their forces from Egypt on 22 December, but Israel not before the first week of following March.

India was one of the ten members of U.N. from which forces were accepted for peace-keeping. This was in contrast to the earlier refusal to send combatants to Korea and Cyprus. Indian agreement to the stationing of UNEF in Egypt was contingent upon a few conditions.

The UNEF was to function with the full consent and invitation of the country (Egypt); it was to be confined to preventive peace-keeping activity and in no sense to be equated with an 'occupying force'. Once it had discharged its strictly limited mandate it was to withdraw immediately from Egyptian soil.³⁹ Its work would be supervision and not evacuation. Moreover, India made it clear that the parties to the aggression should not be included in the force.

Indian stand on the UNEF was meant to safeguard its own interests on the question of stationing of the UN troops in Kashmir. According to Geoffrey Murray, the Senior Counsellor in the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, "The sharpest disagreements probably revolved around India and Pakistan, both of whom were conscious of implications in the UNEF proposal for their dispute over Kashmir."⁴⁰

On 14 February, 1957, the U.S. put forward a resolution supported by U.K. asking for entry of UN forces into Kashmir to help in a UN supervised plebiscite in Kashmir. The resolution was vetoed by USSR.⁴¹

The Egyptian crisis and the role of western nations, particularly, U.K. vis-à-vis Kashmir issue in the U.N. provided habitual critics of India's Commonwealth membership with a golden opportunity to embarrass Nehru. The demand for

³⁸ M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs (1954-1956)*, (Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1966), p. 166.

³⁹ A. P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment*, (New Delhi, MacMillan, 1976), p. 231.

⁴⁰ Geoffrey Murray, "Glimpses of Suez 1956" *International Journal* (Toronto), vol. 29, no. 1, Winter 1973-74, p. 58.

⁴¹ J.N. Dixit, *Across Borders*, (New Delhi: Picus Books 1998), p. 61.

withdrawal from the Commonwealth came not only from left-wing parties and within congress but from even the conservative leader Rajagopalachari.⁴² Nehru said in Parliament that it should be wrong to cut away from the Commonwealth merely to show anger. In spite of differences, he said, the Commonwealth was an association helping mutual understanding and world peace.⁴³ Moreover, Britain had no monopoly of the Commonwealth, and India has been able to make her efforts more effective by acting in close collaboration with other member such as Canada. Former British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Nutting wrote that during Suez crisis Indians were seeking to bridge the gulf between their Commonwealth partner-the United Kingdom and their co-leader of non-aligned nations-Egypt.⁴⁴

Throughout the period when the Suez crisis lasted, the Government of India played a conciliatory and constructive role in furtherance of a mutually satisfactory settlement by negotiation. It was the only major crisis after the Second World War in which both the US and USSR had cooperated. It was interesting that US had cooperated with its Cold War rival against its allies, UK and France. India played a major role in bringing this about. In this context, Arthur Lall said that this was General Assembly diplomacy at his best.⁴⁵

The acceleration provided by the Suez crisis to the non-aligned movement found its culmination in the Belgrade Conference of 1961. The non-aligned movement prevented the division of the world into two or more antagonistic power blocs. This resulted in the de-escalation of conflict and international tensions.

⁴² Cited in S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 300, p. 288.

⁴³ S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. 1 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 300, 172.

⁴⁴ Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London, 1967), p. 71.

⁴⁵ Arthur Lall, "Some Thought on the UN General Assembly as a Forum for Mediatlional Negotiations", *Journal of International Affairs*, (New York, Vol. 29, no. 1, 1975, p. 65).

CHAPTER – IV

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: FROM PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE TO 1962 BORDER WAR

The Sino-Indian conflict which led finally to the border war of 1962 was a multi-faceted conflict. It was not limited to a clash of interest over a specific issue, such as territory, but was much more than that. It touched on a wide variety of issues, from the interpreting of the nature of the current and the preferred global system, through the analysis of the relations of both states with the super-powers, to relations with other states in the South Asian subsystem and the bilateral relations between China and India, and involved judgement of the characteristics of the other side's domestic arena. Thus, it was, in fact, a conflict between two different world views¹ which was externalized and focused on the conflict over territory and border claims and through demonstration of force and the actual use of it.²

India and China were unique among the new states which had emerged on the scene after the Second World War. Despite being economically less developed, they had relentlessly pursued the goal of becoming autonomous major powers in the international system. The apparent similarity between India and China in their strategic objectives is noteworthy, though the two states have been shaped by widely divergent political cultures, historical experiences, state systems, ideologies, nature of leadership, and approaches to power. Since the two states were so diverse in character, the strong urge for autonomy seems to be a function of the other apparent similarities between them – large and extraordinary size, ancient civilizations, experience of colonialism and nationalism and a sense of strategic importance.³

Before the independence of India, Nehru had visualized close friendship with China as a major element of India's Asian and global diplomacy. India's strong

¹ See Sujit Dutta and C. Raja Mohan, "In Search of Autonomy: Dealing with the Global Powers" in Deshpande and Alka Acharya (ed.), *Fifty Years of India – China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams* (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 402

² Yaacov Vertzberger, "India's Border Conflict with China: A Perceptual Analysis" in *Journal of Contemporary History* (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 17 (1982), p. 607.

³ See Sujit Dutta and C. Raja Mohan, "In Search of Autonomy: Dealing with the Global Powers" in Deshpande and Alka Acharya (ed.), *Fifty Years of India – China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams* (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 400.

opposition to imperialism and racism and to Western military alliances, her unwillingness to oppose the Chinese occupation of Tibet, her role in the Korean war and in the Indo-China crisis and her general opposition to big power hegemonism created an image of her global strategy which, though not identical with that of China, seemed to be consonant with it.⁴

India had been the second non-communist state, after Burma, to recognize the communist regime in China. India expressed its goodwill towards China by being one of its chief and consistent supporters in the matter of her UN membership, by refusing to sign Japanese peace agreement from which China was excluded, by taking the position it did in the Geneva conference in 1954, by signing the Panch Sheel Agreement in 1954 in which India relinquished its special rights in Tibet and by initiating the invitation to China to attend the Bandung Conference.⁵

Nehru became a consistent supporter of China and believed that stressing the idea of Asian solidarity would prevent China from becoming an integral part of the communist bloc. Furthermore, China's recognition of the principle of Asian solidarity seemed to Nehru a guarantee against the expansionist chauvinism which had characterized periods of strong Chinese centralist government in the past. For Nehru, friendship between both countries was an expression of the basic premises behind the establishment of the non-aligned bloc: Peaceful coexistence and Asian solidarity. On the other hand, friendly relations with the state considered by the US to be its most hostile and dangerous enemy in Asia would serve as a confirmation of India's political independence from the United States.⁶

Mao had already decided Chinese foreign policy well before the establishment of People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao relying on his *dada tantan* (fighting and talking) strategy picked up during civil wars made it an important component of his foreign policy.⁷ China developed hostility towards India as it adopted non-alignment and joined the British Commonwealth and inherited British duties and responsibilities in the Himalayan states, especially in Tibet that China considered its part. This

⁴ J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1970), p. 115.

⁵ A. Appadorai, "Chinese Aggression and India: An Introductory Essay" in *International Studies*, Vol. V, No. 1-2, July-Oct. 1963, p. 4.

⁶ Yaacov Vertzberger, "India's Border Conflict with China: A Perceptual Analysis" in *Journal of Contemporary History* (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 17 (1982), p. 618.

⁷ B R Deepak, *India and China: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005), p. 180.

confirmed China's suspicion of India's neutrality and she began to see India as an ally of imperialism and western bloc.

It is evident from Mao's telegram of 19th October 1949 sent to CPI that he essentially saw the Indian leadership as "collaborators of imperialism" and "reactionaries" who should be wiped out by the patriotic people of India. K. M. Pannikar, India's first ambassador to China admitted that he 'knew, like everyone else, that with a Communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of the question' but that he was optimistic about working out an area of cooperation by eliminating causes of misunderstanding.⁸ What was feared was the possibility of the Chinese threat to India and thus Indian diplomacy and policy of friendship were directed at pre-empting this possibility.

However, in the 1950's in the face of increasing international isolation and India's positive gestures, China's policy on surface took a change. The Chinese leaders attached enormous importance to India and Nehru during the critical period of their takeover of Tibet. Externally, though India was not in a military position to intervene by itself, Chinese calculated that if Nehru were to act in concert with American forces, they would constitute a probable threat to the takeover and occupation. Therefore, the essential functions of India in the communist scheme of things were not only to prevent external intervention in Tibet but also to seek India's legitimation of the communist takeover. The later had direct implications for the Sino-Indian boundary dispute of which Chinese leaders, but not Nehru, were fully aware.⁹ The main motive of China apart from promoting friendship was to secure India's neutrality in the Sino-US conflict, render the US encirclement of China bankrupt and create a peaceful environment for China's construction.¹⁰ Moreover, Mao knew that without friendship with India, the PRC could not become an Asian player.

INDIA, CHINA AND TIBET (1947-1954)

There has been, since the beginning, a wide gap in Indian and Chinese perceptions on the issue of Tibet. The critical question in 1950 was who should or

⁸ K. M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 102.

⁹ Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 11, November 1997, p. 1082.

¹⁰ B R Deepak, *India and China: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005), p. 182.

could occupy the strategic buffer region between the two? From 1946 to 1951, the Tibet policy of Nehru and his associates reflected that of the British: treating Tibet as an autonomous buffer state between India and China; recognizing Chinese suzerainty but not sovereignty over Tibet, and protecting Tibet's autonomy by recognizing its treaty making powers, especially in relation to India. Thus, in March 1947, a Tibetan delegation was invited to the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi and was assured by Indian government that all previous treaty commitments would be respected.¹¹

While in favour of maintaining its interests in Tibet, the Indian government, however, ruled out any direct military intervention in event of a Chinese threat as India did not have adequate military capability to act on its own as well as didn't want to be seen as seeking to inherit the mantle of British imperialism.¹²

Therefore, the very policy of inheriting British responsibilities in Tibet and non-commitment to Tibetan cause in the face of new communist threat ran counter to the spirit of Anglo-Tibetan Agreement of 1914 on which India had formulated its China Policy. Moreover, India on its part discouraged Tibet taking its case to the UN as she felt that making issue of Tibetan question at this juncture might prompt China to invade Tibet.¹³

Once the PLA was in full command of Tibet which Beijing sought to legitimate through the "treaty" with the Dalai Lama's government in May 1951 – Nehru completely changed his policy tactics towards the PRC New Delhi tried to befriend China in order to reduce or neutralize the security threat from the PLA stationed in Tibet, as well as to enhance Asian solidarity. The Panchsheel agreement (1954), which sacrificed Tibet's historical status at the altar of Sino-Indian friendship should be seen in this perspective.

The Chinese presence in Tibet, in 1950, changed the geo-politics of the region and made it imperative for India to address the issue of its frontiers and borders. Responding to the changed situation, Nehru took two important decisions regarding the security of Indian states. On 20 November 1950, the Government used the device of a parliamentary question to state its policy regarding the Mc Mohan line. Nehru

¹¹ *Tibet and Peace in South Asia* (New Delhi: National Committee for Tibet and Peace in South Asia, 1991), p. 46-47.

¹² C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2000), p. 26.

¹³ *Foreign Relations of United States 1949*: 1097, Vol. IX.

declared in Parliament, "Our maps show that the Mc Mohan line is our boundary – map or no map. That fact remains and we stand by that boundary, and we will not allow anybody to come that boundary".¹⁴

Nehru's second decision was to draw the Indian security perimeter along the Himalayan range. He was rushing through a series of defense treaties with Bhutan (August, 1949), Nepal (July' 1950) and Sikkim (Dec'1950). These countries constituted Nehru's definition of a security zone in which India would tolerate no foreign interference.¹⁵ The treaties represented India's strategic response to the communist takeover of Tibet. In public statements in 1959, Nehru offered open support in defense of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in case of Chinese invasion.¹⁶

The Chinese entry into Tibet was followed by a careful damage-limitation exercise as China needed Indian goodwill and support to acquire an Asian face. Mao chose not to question Nehru's claim to the McMohan Line (MML) as an international borders, despite Guomindang China's long refusal to recognize the legality of MML. He did not demand an end to the privileges in Tibet that India had inherited, especially in economic and cultural spheres.¹⁷

Irrespective of India's inconsistent Tibet policy that made China highly suspicious of India and its leadership, there were attempts to initiate bilateral negotiations over Tibet. Apart from India's trade consensus in Tibet, a hostile Pakistan on its western and eastern fronts that was part of America's anti-communism coalition and was receiving US military aid also forced India to initiate a friendly policy towards China. Besides, India did not want to take risk of alienating Russia, by developing hostile relations with Russia's Asiatic ally. The options open to Nehru were severely limited, and Panchsheel, perhaps, represented as much a diplomacy of desperation, as the fulfillment of a normative urge.¹⁸

¹⁴ Cited in , Neville Maxwell, "China and India: the Un-Negotiated Dispute" in *The China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July – Sept. 1970), p. 48.

¹⁵ Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 202.

¹⁶ A. Appadorai (ed.) *Select Documents on India's Foreign Policy and Relations 1947-1972* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 547-49.

¹⁷ Mira Sinha Bhattacharjya, "1962 Revisited", in Deshpande and Alka Acharya (ed.) *Fifty Years of India-China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams* (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 436.

¹⁸ A. P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment: A Conceptual Study of India's Foreign Policy Strategy in the Nehru Period*, (New Delhi: MacMillan, 1976), p. 69.

Negotiations on the formal settlement of the Tibetan issue between India and China led to the treaty of 24th April, 1954, in the preamble of which were enunciated the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panchsheel. It can be appreciated that Panchsheel was agreed to by China in regard to Southeast Asia on the assumption that Nehru would keep the west out of this area,¹⁹ as the presence of the western nations in South-east Asia was the major obstacle of the restoration of China's dominant position in this area. The treaty gained weight in Nehru's view because it enabled him to obtain China's adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.²⁰

There has been much discussion on why the Indian Ambassador to China in 1950, Sardar Pannikar, did not seek recognition of the Mc Mohan line from Chinese officials in return for India's acquiescence in China's actions vis-à-vis Tibet. Pannikar's explanation was that Peking would refuse to accept the 1914 Simla Agreement, in which Mc Mohan line had been set down, but would offer to negotiate about this, and in that case India could be put in a disadvantageous position. So, the best course of action if China raised the issue of the border in future would be to refuse to reopen the question and to take the position already declared by Nehru, that territory on the Indian side of the Mc Mohan line was not a subject for discussion.²¹

Nehru later elaborated on the thinking behind this policy. "The problem of the northern frontier had been before the Government from the very first day. The question was whether we should raise it in an acute form at that stage.....we decided not to Why should we go about asking China to raise this question when we felt sure about it? Why invite discussion on a thing about which we had no doubt?"²²

In accordance with this policy, the Indian side in the 1954 negotiations on trade and intercourse in Tibet did not raise the boundary question. The Chinese explained later that they had not sought to discuss the border question as it was not ripe for settlement.²³

It could be seen that the provisions of the Agreement were of least significance to India. Zhou Enlai was probably aware that Delhi had made the biggest

¹⁹ See Ton That Thein, *India and South East Asia, 1947-60*, (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963), p. 290.

²⁰ *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. V, No. 70, 15 May 1954, Col. 7495ff.

²¹ Cited in, Neville Maxwell, "China and India: the Un-Negotiated Dispute" in *The China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July – Sept. 1970), p. 50.

²² Cited in, *ibid*, p. 51.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 51.

concession to China in modern Asian history, not only by giving up India's extraterritorial rights in Tibet but, more importantly, by putting India's seal of legitimacy on the Chinese occupation of Tibet at a time when most nations were condemning it. It in principle made India to accept tacitly that there was no other treaty basis for India's relations with Tibet except the present one, as no mention of any previous treaty was made.²⁴ Moreover, it gave strong signals to other Asian countries that the PRC indeed could coexist peacefully with its neighbours.

While Nehru was deeply conscious of the extraordinary favour he was giving to China he expected gentlemanly reciprocity. That Nehru expected a quid pro quo on the border issue for his recognition of Tibet as a region of China appears clear from the change in the Indian maps. All political maps prior to 1954 marked the northern border extending from Kashmir to Nepal as 'undefined' and the northeastern frontier as 'undemarcated'. Following the 1954 Agreement, the Indian government extended to the other sectors of the Sino-Indian boundary the approach already formulated with regard to the Mc Mohan line.²⁵ In a memorandum in 1954 circulated to the ministries concerned, Nehru said that the agreement just reached marked 'a new starting point of our relations with China and Tibet,' and affirmed that:

*Both as flowing from our policy and as a consequence of our agreement with China, this northern frontier should be regarded a firm and definite one, which is not open to discussion with anybody. A system of checkpoints should be spread along this entire frontier. More especially, we should have checkpoints in such places as might be considered disputed areas.*²⁶

It is clear, then, that the agreement implied or represented more than what was explicitly stated therein, at least to Nehru. As far as Nehru was concerned, all the outstanding problems between India and China, particularly the border question and demarcation of respective spheres of special interest – China's Tibet and India's Himalayas – were resolved by 1954. This was accomplished more through a moral agreement with Zhou Enlai rather than what the Panchsheel Agreement explicitly stipulated. While the concessions China sought were stated explicitly in the

²⁴ B R Deepak, *India and China: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005), p. 153.

²⁵ Neville Maxwell, "China and India: the Un-Negotiated Dispute" in *The China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July – Sept. 1970), p. 52.

²⁶ Cited in D.R. Mankekar, *Guilty Men of 1962*, (Bombay: Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1969), p. 138.

agreement, those India sought were not. This was an error on Nehru's part, and he was outwitted by his neo-Confucian legalist counterparts in China.²⁷

Nehru defended the Panchsheel domestically as well as internationally. In Nehru's view the agreement was a little short than a no war pact provided the principles of Panchsheel were observed by respective countries. Nehru's overtures were rebuffed by his critics, who viewed the military occupation of Tibet by China as a threat to India. Kriplani remarked in Parliament that "China has demolished a buffer state; in international politics when a buffer state is abolished by a powerful nation that nation is considered to have aggressive designs on its neighbours."²⁸ He later described the 1954 agreement as being born in sin because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally.²⁹ There are numerous reverential references to Tibet in medieval Indian literacy documents and Hindu Tantric texts, and many Hindus consider Tibet as part of their "religious geography".³⁰ The emotional public support for the Tibetan cause in the late 1950's was due to the sacredness of the Himalayas for the Hindus, which Nehru could not control and which practically derailed his scheme of Sino-Indian friendship as the basis of Pan-Asianism.

As far as the MML was concerned, the Indian Government's approach had already closed off the possibility of formal agreement with China on that boundary alignment. China was prepared to accept that as the de facto boundary but not as de jure boundary because to have done so would have been to confer Tibet the status of a sovereign country. However, the MML was marked clearly on maps in the possession of both countries. But in the western sector the situation was fundamentally different. Nehru was to admit the ambiguities of the boundary in the western sector in 1959.

²⁷ Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 11, November 1997, p. 1081.

²⁸ *Lok Sabha Debates* 1954, Vol. V, col. 7547 – 48.

²⁹ P.C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 56.

³⁰ See Agehananda Bharti, "References to Tibet in Medieval Indian Literacy Documents", *Tibet Society Bulletin*, Vol. 3, (Bloomington, 1969), p. 46-70.

*It is a matter of argument as to what part of (Aksai Chin) belongs to us and what part belongs to somebody else. The point is, there has never been any (boundary) delimitation in that area and it has been a challenged area.*³¹

But that admission – soon retracted – did not modify his Government’s policy, which embodied his 1954 directive. That directive, with its stipulation that the northern border should be regarded as “firm and definite”, had been given cartographic expression in the same year. In 1954 Indian maps were changed to indicate a full and final international boundary in this area and one which categorically showed Aksai Chin as Indian territory. When the Government of India marked this claim of Aksai Chin on its maps in 1954, it confirmed the course for collision with China.³²

Barely six weeks after the conclusion of Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, the Chinese delivered a note to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs accusing intrusion of Indian soldiers in Wuje area of Tibet. Nehru visited China in (October 1954) the same year and raised the boundary question with Zhou Enlai. In Nehru’s account, Zhou replied that these maps were really reproduction of old pre-liberation maps and that they had no time to revise them. In Chou’s account, he had pointed out that since there had been no boundary delimitation between India and China there were bound to be discrepancies between the two countries maps.³³ Reassuring Nehru, Zhou said, “Once the conditions are ripe, we would produce new maps in accordance with the outcome of the negotiations.”³⁴ It could be discerned from Zhou’s remarks that China wanted to renegotiate the boundary issue especially after 1954 Agreement that gave China basis for such negotiations as India had tacitly accepted the “illegality” of the MML by recognizing Tibet as a part of China. In fact, China’s claims are primarily based on Tibetan – not Chinese – documents, which would be valid only if India recognized Tibet as part of China. Zhou Enlai himself acknowledged this in a letter dated November 5, 1962, sent to Asian and African leaders concerning the boundary dispute in which he cited only Tibetan evidence to support PRC claims. Zhou based

³¹ Cited in , Neville Maxwell, “China and India: the Un-Negotiated Dispute” in *The China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July – Sept. 1970), p. 56.

³² Ibid, p. 57.

³³ Ibid, p. 58.

³⁴ *Report of the Officials of India and China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1961), p. 87.

China's claims over the Aksai Chin by declaring that it was once part of Tibet's Zinjiang and Ngari District.³⁵

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (1955-1959)

Having just returned from his China visit, Nehru's unrelenting enthusiasm for China was once again exhibited at the Bandung conference when he became the main sponsor of Zhou Enlai to this conference irrespective of criticism from various countries. The opportunity provided Zhou to meet many nations and allay their fears about any Chinese expansionism. Nehru was among the few exceptions and took upon himself the task of convincing others of the new China's honourable credentials. Ironically, this was to become another source of misunderstanding. Zhou in his later comments expressed resentment at what he perceived as Nehru's patronizing attitude at Bandung.³⁶ Chou En-lai stated his Government's approach to the unsettled boundaries at the Bandung conference in 1955.

*With some of our neighbouring countries we have not yet finally fixed our border line, and we are ready to do this. As to the determination of common borders which we are going to undertake with our neighbouring countries, we shall use only peaceful means and we shall not permit any other kind of methods.*³⁷

China, while advocating peace and mutual trust at Bandung, was increasingly turning hostile to India. There were many incidents of Chinese intrusion in the Indian territory between 1954-1956. Towards the second half of the fifties, a series of events occurred which raised concerns about the Sino-Indian relationship. Developments in Tibet once again threatened to impose a fresh strain. The winter of 1955-56 witnessed a major rebellion in Kham which was put down with a strong hand.

The Dalai Lama arrived in Delhi in November 1956 in connection with the celebration of the 2500th anniversary of Buddha's birth. Chinese feared that the Tibetan émigré in India might press the Dalai Lama to stay back in India, where he under the Indian and American influence might repudiate the Sino-Tibetan Agreement

³⁵ Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 11, November 1997, p. 1083.

³⁶ C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2000), p. 31.

³⁷ Cited in , Neville Maxwell, "China and India: the Un-Negotiated Dispute" in *The China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July – Sept. 1970), p. 53.

of 1951 and engage in subversive activities to “split the motherland”. Nehru advised the Dalai to cooperate with the Chinese within the framework of 17 – point agreement and urged Dalai to return to Lhasa.³⁸

The Chinese scholars often cited the anti-China activities by the Tibetan émigré from Kalimpong as reason for Zhou’s second and third visits to India. Gyalo Thendup, the older brother of the Dalai, played a central role in the running of the spy ring in Tibet and had close relationship with the Indian representative in Sikkim and with Mullik, head of the Indian Intelligence Bureau.³⁹ Central figure in the organization of the training camps in US of Tibetan rebel groups and supply of arms was the CIA representative in New Delhi. All this seemed to the Chinese government a verification of the thesis of collusion between reactionary elements in India, the CIA and the regime of Chiang-kai-shek. Nehru’s attempt to assuage Chinese anger by forbidding the Dalai Lama to establish a government –in – exile on Indian territory and by refusing to raise the Tibetan problem at UN, did not convince the Chinese of his good intentions. It seemed to them that the subversive activities in Tibet were taking place with the full knowledge of the Indian government, and moreover because of imperialist intentions towards it.⁴⁰

Whatever truth there may be in the Chinese allegations of Indian involvement in the 1959 Tibetan revolt, that event and the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India certainly placed a strain on Sino-India relations from which they never recovered.⁴¹ The Revolt might have compelled the Chinese to try to close their border with India by establishing Chinese checkpoints along ill-defined territories which in turn produce more border incidents. In just six months (September 1959 – March 1960), 30 notes, eight letters, and six memorandum were exchanged between New Delhi and Beijing.

The Tibetan Revolt was a watershed in the bilateral relationship and one of the main causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. To the PRC, the revolt and alleged Indian involvement, as well as the Indian public’s warm reception to the Dalai Lama, violated a cardinal principle of the 1954 agreement; that is, non-interference in one

³⁸ B. R. Deepak, *India and China: A Century of Peace and Conflict*, (New Delhi: Manak Publications, 2005), p. 171.

³⁹ Manoranjan Mohanty and Mira Sinha Bhattacharya (ed.) *Security and Science In China and India*, (New Delhi: Samskriti and Institute of Chinese Studies, 2005), p. 5.

⁴⁰ Yaacov Vertzberger, “India’s Border Conflict with China: A Perceptual Analysis” in *Journal of Contemporary History* (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 17 (1982), p. 621.

⁴¹ S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. 2 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 89.

another's internal affairs. Equally, the revolt revealed to India that despite Chinese assurances, it did not respect Tibetan autonomy. Also, China's refusal to respect Indian border claim by constructing highway in Aksai Chin violated the Panchsheel principle of respect for each other's territorial integrity.⁴²

By 1958, the Indian government had learned of the road, the Chinese had build on the caravan route across Aksai Chin and Nehru brought up the boundary question into the open in a letter to Chou Enlai, where he emphasized that, as far as India was concerned, there had never been a boundary dispute with China. He declared that there was no question of large parts of India being anything but Indian. Zhou-Enlai's reply of January 1959 to this letter affirmed that border disputes did exist between India and China. In order that minor border incidents could be avoided, Chou proposed that as a provisional measure, the two sides temporarily maintain the status quo.⁴³ The clear implication of this letter was that the Chinese hold the entire border to be negotiable.

In a long rebuttal and restatement (26 September 1959), Nehru told Chou that "No Government could possibly discuss the future of such large areas which are an integral part of their own territory." He made discussions of the border situation conditional upon Chinese withdrawal from areas India claimed, including Aksai Chin which Nehru thought disputed until 4 September 1959.

By now there been two major border clashes at Longju and Kongka pass in the western sector, with nine Indians killed in the clash on 20 October, 1959. Nehru rejected Chou's proposal for reciprocal withdrawals all along the border and countered by proposing withdrawals only in the western sector and not for a common distance of 20 km, but behind the claim line of the other. The effect of this would have been the complete Chinese evacuation of Aksai Chin. Zhou rejected the Indian proposal and proposed a meeting in the future to discuss the border question.⁴⁴

⁴² Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations" in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 11, November 1997, p. 1087.

⁴³ Neville Maxwell, "China and India: the Un-Negotiated Dispute" in *The China Quarterly*, No. 43 (July – Sept. 1970), p. 60.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS (1960-1962)

Political opinion in India was vehemently against any discussions with China without Peking's prior acceptance of the Indian requirement. But the Indian government had to weigh other factors, too, notably international considerations. The Soviet position was that negotiations between India and China were necessary to solve the boundary question. Hence, continued refusal for a summit meeting, Nehru felt, may have weakened future Soviet support to India vis-à-vis China. Nehru invited Zhou to visit India but specifically stated that there could be no negotiations between the two countries on the Chinese premise that the entire Sino-Indian boundary was never delimited.

From most accounts of the Delhi summit, Zhou Enlai hinted that Chinese claims to Arunachal Pradesh would not be pressed in return for India foregoing any claims to the entire Western sector. Nehru rejected this barter and could not agree to the Chinese viewpoint of equating the Eastern & Western sectors for the purpose of a settlement.⁴⁵ Moreover, Zhou suggested six points but there was nothing new in these six points, both sides had raised them before in innumerable exchange of notes. The last and sixth point mentioned by Zhou was that in order to ensure tranquility on the border so as to facilitate discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary. This point was not observed by either side, particularly between 1961 and the 1962 armed conflict.⁴⁶ The 1960 summit meeting thus failed, leaving the dispute exactly where it had been. However, both leaders favoured an examination by officials of the two sides of the historical evidence on which each side based its case.

When the report was published in India in February 1961, two separate reports were appended in one document reflecting the major pre-existing disagreements that had not been bridged ever since the beginning. Thus the Indian appeal to use the official's report as a basis for opening negotiations did not succeed.

After the Indian team on the Sino-Indian joint committee on the subject had presented its findings Nehru concluded that '*the reliability and superiority of India's legal claims in both eastern and western sectors were beyond any doubt, ... it appears*

⁴⁵ C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War*, (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2000), p. 44.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 44.

*to us and I should imagine to any impartial reader, that the Chinese case had little substance, while our case was established beyond any possibility of doubt.*⁴⁷

Hoffmann shows that Nehru honestly believed that historical evidence supported India's border claims : "Only in February 1960 did Gopal take him (Nehru) through the evidence...and finally convince him that India's claim to Aksai Chin was sound...But not until the publication of the massive Officials' Report in February 1961, containing both the Indian and Chinese cases covering the entire border, did Nehru tell parliament that he considered the Indian case almost 'foolproof'.⁴⁸

The essence of Indian approach was that there has always existed a well-defined customary and traditional boundary with China, marked by the world's most impressive geographical features delimited for the major portion by agreements on treaties and controlled on its side by administrative jurisdiction.⁴⁹

The Chinese position in a nutshell, stated the McMohan Line to be illegitimate as imposed by British India on weak , and other portions of the border in the central and western sectors as never having been actually defined, both sufficient reasons to make a completely new agreements.⁵⁰ China also rejected India's claim of historical rights stemming from the de facto possession especially in the western sector where India was unaware of the Aksai Chin highway until late 1957, thus contradicting Indian claims that it had effective control in the area. Moreover, the purely legalistic arguments were of minor significance for the Chinese as they presented a very sloppy set of legal claims in the western sector.⁵¹ The acceptance of establishment of joint committee was merely a tactical step for China to project a certain image in Asia and the third world.

It seems that India and China had substantial historical claims to the disputed territories and it is possible to construct an excellent legal case for either side. However, the border dispute did not erupt into open warfare because of legal differences alone, for similar conflicts had been settled elsewhere in Asia. It was the

⁴⁷ Yaacov Vertzberger, "India's Border Conflict with China: A Perceptual Analysis", *Journal of Contemporary History* (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Volume 17(1982), p. 608.

⁴⁸ Steven A. Hoffmann. *India and the China Crisis*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 83.

⁴⁹ A.Appadorai, "Chinese Aggression and India: An Introductory Essay", *International Studies*, Vol.V,No.1-2, July-October,1963, pp. 6-14.

⁵⁰ Yaacov Vertzberger, "India's Border Conflict with China: A Perceptual Analysis", *Journal of Contemporary History* (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Volume 17(1982), p. 609.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 610.

belief in the strength of their legal positions that stiffened the resistance of both sides as the dispute ran its course, particularly the Indian side.⁵²

Legal claims alone do not often cause wars but both India and China had important strategic interests in the Himalayas. For China, the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh was a valuable piece of territory. The Chinese feared the United States use of Pakistan as a base for operations against Tibet and Xinjiang in the late 1950s. It is also why most of the 1959 border incidents, took place in the western sector, where the Chinese perceived the greatest danger of external intervention from India and Pakistan, backed by the US.⁵³ Conversely, India did have a substantial interest in NEFA. With difficulties mounting in what was then undivided Assam they could ill afford to have a hostile power in NEFA.

The Tibetan revolt in March 1959 and a clash between Sino-Indian troops in October 1959 brought about a radical change in attitudes on both sides. It pushed the boundary dispute issue, which was recognised before but never given major significance, into the open. Nehru now perceived China as arrogant revolutionary, and unsatisfied and an expansionist power on an aggressive path. Thus, his image of China was that of a 'hostile' country predisposed to harm India on the strength of deep-seated emotions. The border dispute was but a surface manifestation of fundamental Chinese motives.⁵⁴

FORWARD POLICY

After the Kongka pass incident of October 1959 a fixed belief system coalesced among Indian decision makers and structured Indian official perceptions right up to the major Chinese offensive of 20th October. According to this belief system China had long been a hostile adversary of India, but instead of engaging in war intended to encroach on Indian territory via infiltration and small unit 'pinpricks'.⁵⁵

⁵² Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cap, 1970), pp. 119-20.

⁵³ Dawa Norbu, "Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXVII, No.11, Nov. 1997, p. 1086.

⁵⁴ Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 55.

⁵⁵ Steven A. Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

It was not until November 1961 that the Indian government decided to add military pressure to its approach on the border. On 2nd June 1960, the Army Headquarter told the Western Command that the government policy was one of 'maintaining our positions firmly on our side of the international border under our control at present. So far as the disputed areas are concerned, the status-quo that has existed for some time is to be maintained.'⁵⁶

With regard to patrolling, Prime Minister Nehru approved the army's proposal to permit the despatch of regular patrols up to the frontier claimed by the Chinese according to their 1959 map.⁵⁷ On 30th December 1960, instructions to that effect were issued to the western command but remained unimplemented because of lack of resources. Meanwhile the Chinese had "spread even beyond the 1956 Chinese claim line in Ladakh" to establish important new posts and had constructed roads linking them with rear bases. This advance and India's apparent helplessness⁵⁸ (failure of pre-forward military policy) added to the mounting domestic criticism of Mr. Nehru's entire policy towards China. The 'forward policy' was devised in response to both the advance and the criticism.

The assessment of India was that wherever territory was not seen to be under Indian occupation in Ladakh, the Chinese wanted to come into their claim line. It was also assessed that where there was even a token Indian presence, the Chinese kept away. The Chinese intentions had to be tested by setting up a line of check posts which, with the exception of a few posts, mostly fell somewhere between their old and new "claim lines", and then by watching what the Chinese were up to this was the essence of the "forward-policy".⁵⁹ The presumption was that Indian presence in the disputed area would not produce major reactions from the Chinese.

The forward policy and especially its extension to NEFA in summer of 1962 has generally been regarded as the government's response to severe public pressure for action. This is the perception of many army officers who witnessed first hand the obvious contradictions between Nehru's public objectives and the Indian army's

⁵⁶ D.R. Mankekar, *Guilty Men of 1962*, (Bombay: Tulsi Shah Enterprises, 1969), pp. 139-146.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 145.

⁵⁸ L. J. Kavic, *India's Quest for Security*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 169.

⁵⁹ K. Subrahmanyam, "Nehru and the India-China Conflict of 1962" in B.R Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p.125.

actual capacity to overcome Chinese resistance.⁶⁰ A more common Indian interpretation holds that while public opinion was a critical factor in reducing the government's freedom to manoeuvre, Menon and Nehru had only themselves to blame. They had failed to take the public 'into confidence' over the years and any suggestion 'to yield territory to the Chinese even temporarily would have been interpreted by the public as another devious attempt to surrender further to Chinese.'⁶¹

A very different picture is presented by Neville Maxwell who views the pressure of public opinion as a self inflicted wound, originating in 1959 when Nehru hurled charges of 'aggression' at the Chinese. After 1959 public opinion was systematically cultivated by the Indian government, itself; the purpose of this was to push Nehru in precisely the direction in which he wanted to move.⁶² There is considerable truth in this argument, but Maxwell did not convincingly demonstrate that the Indians were bent on war or even on provoking a conflict.

One interpretation of above discussion is that Nehru knew the weakness of Indian army but placed primary trust in diplomatic pressure against the Chinese and thus deliberately fanned public opinion to make his own position more inflexible. Another interpretation is that Nehru was misled about the relative strength of Chinese and Indian forces and the forward policy was really designed to be militarily effective.⁶³ Nehru may have been deceived about China by overzealous bureaucrats and Generals as Menon disclosed later that Nehru's estimate of the situation was not realistic.⁶⁴

'Forward policy' dominated Indian decision-making up to the armed conflict in October 1962. This policy implied that India would violate the status-quo on boundary and move into the area India considered belonged to her. In this process, some of the posts established by India actually crossed the McMahon line, India ignored the line on the ground and followed the watershed principle. China reacted sharply to the Indian forward policy and in a note of 30th November 1961 threatened that if the policy was pursued, she would have every reason to send troops to cross the

⁶⁰ J.P.Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*, (Bombay: Thacker and Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. 68-69.

⁶¹ P.V.R.Rao, *Defence Without Drift*, (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1970), p. 85.

⁶² Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (London: Jonathan Cap, 1970), p. 134.

⁶³ J.P.Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*, (Bombay: Thacker and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 293.

⁶⁴ Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 153-154.

so-called "McMohan line". This was followed by a resumption of patrolling in the Western Sector in April 1962.

Meanwhile, India refuted Chinese charges and expressed that it was not averse to negotiations provided China vacate the Indian territory it occupied since 1957. India argued that the status-quo of 1957 would be an essential stop for the creation of a favourable climate for any negotiations on border by India & China. The stream of notes continued but both parties were reluctant to compromise on their stated positions.

From the summer of 1962, a version of the 'forward policy' was adopted in the Eastern sector by the Indian army. A decision was taken to establish a post in Dhola in July 1962, which was little to the north of McMohan line, but it was south of Thagla Ridge, which according to India, marked the high watershed boundary in this area. It could be gleaned from these facts that the collision course was set in a self-destruction move. It was foolish to think that the Chinese would not launch a massive strike in the territory they considered belonged to them.⁶⁵

On 8th September, a Chinese force estimated to be 600 strong surrounded the Dhola post. It was decided to repel the Chinese force on September 22, 1962 by K.Raghuramaiah, the Deputy Minister for Defence. Earlier, the chief of the Army Staff and the GOC-in-Cs of the eastern and western commands all warned of the consequences of an armed action in NEFA, but they were overruled. On 3rd October 1962, Lt.General Kaul who had no combat experience was made commander of the IV corps, a newly raised corps, who was given the responsibility of evicting the Chinese. The Indian attitude that China would not involve in large-scale offensive could also be gleaned from the absence of Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Menon from India in September.

On 20 October, China launched a major military offensive in both eastern as well as the western sector. The justification claimed was not one of response to Indian provocation, but of self-defence. Brigadier Dalvi takes the view that the Dhola post merely provided the Chinese with 'the excuse they wanted'. Its establishment was certainly a step fraught with grave consequences and was imprudent on political as well as military grounds, besides being of debatable legality. All evidence points out

⁶⁵ J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*, (Bombay: Thacker and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 136.

to the high probability that the Chinese action was not a response to the alleged provocation of Prime Minister Nehru (an airport interview on October 12 in which he instructed army to throw out Chinese) but was the result of a deliberate decision taken in Peking well in advance to humble India.⁶⁶

Chinese troops reached the foothill in the Kemang sector and other pockets of Arunachal Pradesh and overran all the Indian military posts in Ladakh. Having ousted India from her forward posts and reached the 1960 claim lines in the Western Sector, China all of a sudden announced unilateral ceasefire on 22nd November 1962. According to the declaration, China would pull back its troops from areas to the south of the McMohan line to positions 20 kilometres behind that line. In Middle and Western Sectors, Chinese troops would withdraw 20 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control. This was the same proposal made by Zhou Enlai on November 7, 1959. However, if India tries to restore the position of 8th September 1962, China reserved the right to strike back. The Chinese message was clear accept our claims in the western sector; we will accept the McMohan Line. However, with the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Arunachal Pradesh by early 1963 the return of captured Indian soldiers and equipment, and the Indian decision not to attempt an alteration of ground realities by force, a new de facto situation came into being and it has prevailed over the last 43 years. This situation has left India in complete control over Arunachal Pradesh and the Chinese over areas claimed by them in Ladakh.

It can be asked that what went wrong with the Indian strategy of 'forward policy' of why Nehru was so overconfident over his strategy. The answer lies in the international political milieu and Nehru's growing stature in the international community. Between December 1959 and February 1960 there took place visit to India successively by President Eisenhower and Soviet Party chief Khrushchev. Both these visits seemed to vindicate the foreign policy of Nehru and his contribution to a lessening of the cold war. President Eisenhower in late 1959 had declared that the U.S. backed in its dispute with China and he had intimated that the USA would come to Indian assistance in the event of military emergency.⁶⁷ Whether he intended or not, his tough stance vis-à-vis China earned him US support and financial aid.

⁶⁶ B.R Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976), p. 127.

⁶⁷ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), p. 127.

He was aware of the intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute and reasonably confident of Soviet neutrality in Sino-Indian dispute. Nehru was satisfied that the Soviets had not supported China's position on the Sino-Indian border flare-ups of 1959. The Soviet position was that negotiations between India and China were necessary to solve the boundary question. Their mutual disagreements with China gave India and the USSR an additional common interest and tipped the balance in India's favour. The border flare-ups were viewed by Khrushchev as a challenge to his policy of 'peaceful co-existence'. He in turn said that it was China that had led the cause of socialism down by quarrelling with India.⁶⁸ He saw the dispute as purely nationalist in origin, having nothing to do with ideology. The Soviets displayed continued willingness to assist India's economic growth in spite of China's displeasure. In vivid contrast to this, many Soviet technicians were withdrawn from China in 1960. Moreover, in 1961-62, the supply of Soviet military equipment to India and Russia's willingness to sell India MIG-21 fighter added a new complexity to the Sino-Soviet-India triangle.⁶⁹ Thus, Nehru thought that China had become pariah state, devoid of any friends whereas India could count on several powerful ones.

His persistent judgement that China would not resort to war, that it would not dare, was not altogether wrong, given his assumptions. He always maintained that an India-China war would be a world war, even a nuclear war. He did not anticipate that China might resort to a limited war. It made him issue even intemperate statements about 'throwing out the Chinese'. The victory in the war over Goa, (with full USSR support) also reinforced his confidence. Moreover, he knew that China was passing through extremely difficult times because of failure of the Great Leap Forward, the three drought years of 1959-61 and the withdrawal of Soviet aid. Thus for Nehru China was at its most vulnerable point and so it was simple realpolitik to press one advantage.

It seems however, that nobody told Nehru that Indian army was not prepared to take on China even if better equipped than the Chinese PLA. Nobody told him either that Mao regarded the territorial foundation of the PRC with utmost seriousness and took hard decisions in this regard.⁷⁰ The root of the problem was that Indian

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 140.

⁶⁹ B.R Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*. (New Delhi: Vikas, 1976).

⁷⁰ Mira Sinha Bhattacharya, "1962 Revisited", in Deshpande and Alka Acharya (ed.), *Fifty Years of India-China: Crossing a Bridge of Dreams*, (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 441.

civilian leaders had virtually no experience with military matters and were unable to sift the bad military advice from the good-and they did receive both. In contrast, senior Chinese political leadership was considerably more expert in evaluating military information and advice, having recently been engaged in operations in Korea and being able to grow upon the rich experience of their own civil war. The Indian leadership had delicately avoided contact with military affairs during the Indian struggle for independence.⁷¹ Moreover the army's morale had been weakened as a result of the Thimayya affair and Kaul, a politically attuned General, became very influential.

The senior civil servants seem to have acted to weaken the role of the military in decision-making and strengthen the position of civilians. This occurred despite their relative ignorance of military matters and was motivated by both fear and contempt of the military. The most glaring aspect was Indian army's failure to meet the most primitive standards of high-altitude warfare. They lacked automatic rifles, mortars, mountain guns, ammunitions, winter clothing, shelter, food and even such an apparently insignificant tool as powered chain saws.⁷² A second serious technological failure was the shortage of communications equipment. A hideous price was paid for there shortcomings.

There had been considerable speculations about the motives behind the Chinese actions in October-November 1962.⁷³ One was the immediate military situation in the border regions. Realizing that their comparative advantage along the NEFA and Ladakh frontiers was decreasing as time passed, Chinese probably felt it best to strike a decisive blow as soon as possible. Further more, with the deepening Cuban crisis the USSR could ill afford to act in any way on India's behalf.

There was China's growing assertion of exclusive leadership over Asian and African nations in the late 1950s. They appeared to be projecting their revolution as a model for coming revolutions in Asian and African nations and strongly decried nonalignment as reactionary and as a cover for its association with imperialism. Demonstration by China of Indian military weakness in 1962 was seen as a deliberate

⁷¹ Stephen P.Cohen, *The Indian Army*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), Chapter Four, "Defense Problems and the Nationalist Movement."

⁷² J.P.Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962*, (Bombay: Thacker and Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 315.

⁷³ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), p. 147.

step to eclipse Indian's international standing and prestige in an Asian power rivalry game.⁷⁴ It seems that China was intent on showing to the world the effectiveness of their own system of government and economic development.

Another important factor was that China wanted to show to the Soviet Union in particular that India's non alignment was a myth, that India was in reality a camp follower of the West and that therefore the Soviet Union policy of befriending non aligned India was mistaken.⁷⁵ Moreover, by humiliating Khrushchev's Indian friends, China could further assert its independence of the USSR.

Further, China has internal difficulties like failure of the Great Leap Forward, three years of man-made famine and, as has so often happened in history, dictatorial rulers try to divert attention and hold their peoples' continuing faith in itself by adventures abroad. Besides the rift with India, Indian support for the Dalai Lama, and India's refusal to renew the 1954 agreement on Tibet could be cited as reasons for the Chinese action. In order to divert the public attention from its poor governance and economic disaster, China resorted to armed invasion.

CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Peking wished only to discredit Nehru, not see him replaced. China, moreover, was in the position to show that she was magnanimous in victory and had no desire for territorial aggrandizement. The war had ramifications for India's relations with Pakistan as well as for domestic politics. As a by product of India's receipt of massive western assistance, Pakistan became amenable to joining China in common cause against a mutual enemy.⁷⁶

1962 war, however, enabled China to establish an international identity ideologically and politically distinct from the Soviet Union. Its military victory and its unilateral withdrawal enhanced its image and standing in the third world.

The U.S. and Britain, which were providing India with military assistance, applied strong pressures for Menon's dismissal from the Cabinet. Menon, thus, had to

⁷⁴ C.V.Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, *India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War*, (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2000), p. 54.

⁷⁵ A. Appadorai, "Chinese Aggression and India: An Introductory Essay", *International Studies*, Vol. V, No.1-2, July-October, 1963, p. 16.

⁷⁶ Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), p. 149.

resign from the post of defence minister as there was strong pressure on Nehru from within the Congress Party for his resignation.

For India by contrast, 1962 was traumatic. The collapse of India – China amity effectively destroyed the structure of Nehru’s foreign policy. After 1962, the two concerns which the Indian state should have addressed from its early years became its most pressing concerns. The one was territorial definition and consolidation which became the core problem in its relationship with all its neighbours, specially China and Pakistan. The other was an active search for security vis-à-vis China, now perceived as a predatory and hostile neighbour. During the last stages of war, Nehru requested massive – but indirect – American military intervention in the India – China war, in the form of the immediate delivery of fourteen squadrons of U.S. fighter planes to protect the northern Indian cities.⁷⁷ However, on the same day, China announced a unilateral cease-fire and the intention to withdraw Chinese forces behind the McMahon line. Ironically, it was that declaration which aborted massive U.S. air intervention in the war, a development which almost certainly would have marked the de facto end, and possibly the formal abandonment, of the core principles of India’s foreign policy. In short, it was China’s behaviour that ensured the continued legitimacy of India’s non-alignment.⁷⁸

As result of its military defeat and its appeal for US aid, both of which symbolized its failure to translate national potential into national power, India lost much of its international standing as an independent actor and its moral status. Not only was its leadership of the non-aligned world weakened, but the concept and policy of non-alignment appeared to have lost appeal and relevance. However, the term was retained but it become an empty-shell: the dynamic, activist spirit of the Nehru era was irrevocably shattered under the stress of the border war the China.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ C. Bowles, *Promises to keep* (New York, 1971), p. 474.

⁷⁸ Michael Brecher, “Non-Alignment under stress: The west and the India – China border war”, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 4, (Winter, 1979-80), p. 619.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 630.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of diplomatic nonalignment arose in response to a particular set of historical circumstances and causations. At the time of Indian independence, the political environment was dominated by the struggle between the West and the Communist world. Even before the end of World War II, tensions had developed among the major allies. In the early postwar period, the Cold War contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union dominated the international scene.

The diplomacy of the big powers, the logic of nuclear weapons, the United Nations, the emergence of Asia and Africa, and the rise of Pakistan and Communist China, all combined to make it imperative for India to play an independent role in international relations for promoting a better world order which would serve not only India's national interest, but also that of international system as a whole.

In September 1946, Nehru declared the intent of his government to participate in international affairs as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. The aim to retain India's foreign policy autonomy was the most fundamental aspect of Nehru's foreign policy. Nehru underlined the importance of national interests as determining the nature of foreign relationships, despite his determination to stay out of the Cold War politics. Autonomy in the international system is a function of national power. The urge for autonomy came from India's large and extraordinary size, the continuity of ancient civilization, ex-colonial nationalism and the self-perception of national and cultural greatness. For Nehru, an independent foreign policy was both pre-requisite to, and a marker of, becoming a major power. India's urge for autonomy and a leadership role in global affairs was implicit in its major diplomatic initiatives since 1947, such as holding of the Asian Relations Conference, the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, the Non-Aligned Conference in 1961, and in its activities within the organs of the U.N. All of these were driven by the desire to leave the imprint of India's worldview and establish its leadership and power status in the global community.

There are yet another reasons why India preferred independent action at the international level. Formal alignment on either side in the Cold War would predicate

signing a pact. This would be repugnant to India as pacts implied military aid, alliances, armaments, enmity-strange intrusions in India's tradition of pacifism-as they heighten the world's war fever and charge the psychological climate of war. Although pacts may be designed to deter aggression they create an opposite effect of mutual fear and distrust, and beyond a certain point, they might well provoke a retaliatory war. Nehru criticized European power politics as to him the usual way in which Europeans had managed their international relations was devoid of any attempt at the transformation of their attitudes towards each other and towards the new forces that had emerged in the rest of the world.

The improvement of the operations of the international system was the overarching objective that encompassed India's normative impulses in foreign affairs.¹ Colonialism, imperialism, racialism and resort to violence in the settlement of disputes between sovereign states are some examples of Nehru's malaise about the operations of the international system.

It would be, however, very difficult to show that India's policy of non-alignment operated in any sense to promote peaceful coexistence and disarmament among super powers. That was more the outcome of the fear of mutual annihilation than of a strong desire to cooperate. However, Indian policy of non-alignment contributed substantially to the effectuation of the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states, and importantly to the democratization of international society.

Nehru justified idealism in international politics as the 'realism of tomorrow' and observed that the question of foreign policy ought to be approached in a 'spirit of realism'. Nehru's attempt to combine idealism and realism was apparent from the beginning in his handling of the Kashmir issue. Kashmir had probably been the most important single factor that brought the Cold War to the Indian subcontinent. The failure to solve Kashmir question had seriously undermined the credibility of Nehru's effort at international peacemaking and made other nations suspicious of our policy of nonviolence and peaceful coexistence. It had embittered our relations with the U.S.A. and made us dependent on Soviet veto. Moreover, Kashmir issue made it difficult for India to follow a truly independent policy with regard to West Asia and Hungary.

¹ A.P. Rana, *The Imperatives of Non-Alignment*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan, 1976), p. 134.

Nehru was mainly responsible for making the accession of Kashmir to India unilaterally conditional. The idealistic element in Nehru's approach to the Kashmir problem was also revealed on the occasion of the reference of the issue to the UN and his promise of a plebiscite under U.N. in Kashmir. However, after the US-Pakistan military agreement in 1954, Nehru declared that plebiscite was no longer valid in the changed situation. By this sudden and controversial stroke of realism, he created serious misgivings in world public opinion regarding his earlier idealism.

Likewise in his Goa policy, Nehru made a firm commitment to certain high principles at the outset, but eventually retreated from the position, mainly owing to the persistent failure of the idealist approach against the inflexible Portuguese government. In 1961, Goa was liberated from Portugal by the Indian policy action despite Nehru's repeatedly declared policy of non-violence with regard to Goa. This was widely criticized and many felt that India had deliberately abandoned the policy of non-violence when it suited her interest.²

These incidents of Kashmir and Goa reflected realism in Nehru's personality that co-existed with a powerful idealism that had initially impelled him to make a firm commitment to a peaceful policy. A pure realist would not have made an unequivocal commitment to a particular line of policy at the outset, while a pure idealist would not have modified his position subsequently.

India's non-alignment was the main source of its power in international political relations, particularly regarding the superpowers. But it was powerless against such states as Pakistan and China whose interests vis-à-vis India would have been constant regardless of India's diplomatic stance. India's strength vis-à-vis superpowers was derived from the nuclear balance of terror-the inability of the superpowers to rely on war as a means for the resolution of their disputes. Non-alignment was effective as a policy because of the latent threat of alignment which it unmistakably holds out. India's power rested on the acknowledgement by other states that India had something to offer and could be induced to supply it. Hence, both blocs were engaged in exporting assistance for basically the same reason, to try to influence the course of India's future development in the direction of a certain structure of values.

² J. Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 309.

Nehru's soft approach towards power and absence of security cooperation with the West had a profoundly dampening impact on the global power's perception of India. A militarily soft India, not keen on global security or economic engagement was not seen as an effective element in the strategies of the western powers. As a result, India was unable to prevent the emergence of the US-Pakistan alliance in 1954.³

After 1954, security against Pakistan had become a part of the general strategy of security against the encroachments of the big powers and non-alignment was as much a foreign policy strategy aimed against Pakistan as it was against the politics of the Cold War. India relied on non-alignment as a general strategy in the Cold War to shield her military-oriented unilateral defence policy of the containment of Pakistan, especially over Kashmir issue. After 1954, the strain on non-alignment increased as a general strategy for these purposes.

While pursuing these objectives, India was able to win over both the superpowers as the Nehru period reached its close. In 1959, India was probably at the height of her diplomatic influence. Both US and Soviet appreciated Indian policy of non-alignment and were sympathetic to India regarding her dispute with China. The success of Indian containment of Pakistan probably led Pakistan to move, after 1959, in the direction of China.

However, it seems that good fortune rather than strategic potency was responsible for the favourable performance of Indian policy of non-alignment.⁴ The first favourable condition in India's external environment was Russia's espousal of "peaceful coexistence" and her diplomatic support to India which materialized after Stalin's death. By 1955, the Russian's had come around to the support of Indian nonalignment and also to the issues of Kashmir and Goa without demanding any damaging commitments from India. In the latter period, an additional sustaining factor was the emerging Sino-Soviet split. Soviet wanted Indian support to contain Chinese domination in South-East Asia. Their mutual disagreements with China gave

³ Sujit Dutta & C. Raja Mohan, "In Search of Autonomy: Dealing with the Global Powers" in G. P. Deshpande & Alka Acharya (ed.), *Fifty Years of India-China*, (New Delhi: Tulika, 2001), p. 412.

⁴ See Cecil Crabb, Jr., *The Elephant and the Grass: A study of Nonalignment*, (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 201.

India and Soviet Union additional common interest and tipped the balance in India's favour.⁵

In brief, both the changing nature of the communist threat and weapons available to the West due to steady advance in scientific and military technology combined to produce the realization that the U.S. needed allies much less than it had in the early postwar period. Both superpowers had largely come to terms with the idea of non-alignment in the late 1950's.

However, to some critics, the doctrine of non-alignment seems most indefensible as a means of safeguarding national security. By late 1962, an epochal event seemed to confirm the most dire predictions about the consequences of non-alignment. This was Red China's massive military incursion into India's northern provinces.

Sino-Indian war shows that Panchsheel or Peaceful Coexistence was hard to achieve between a democratic India and communist China. In other words, it vindicates the theory of democratic peace. Thucydides in 'The Peloponnesian War' argued that 'true cause' of the conflict "the growth of Athenian power and the fear this inspired in Lacedaemon" must not be viewed as a covering law explanation of systemic war. When Thucydides refers the disparities between the physical capabilities of Athens and Sparta, he refers as much, if not more, to the vastly different character of Athenian and Spartan political institutions and the rules and conventions under girding them.⁶

It is equally true about India and China. Both states have been shaped by widely divergent political cultures, historical experiences, state system and ideologies, nature of leadership, and approaches to power. They differed in their strategic thought, political practices and diplomatic style. Their conception of power has been different and rooted in entirely different politico-strategic traditions: realist for China and idealist-liberal-internationalist for India.

An error on Nehru's part was that he imagined that China accepted the Indian assessment of the international situation, on the global, subsystem and bilateral levels. He did not understand that what was for him were strategic goals on the international

⁵ See Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969), Ch. 5.

⁶ Daniel Garst, "Thucydides and Neorealism". *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 989, p. 22.

scene, such as détente, Asian solidarity and non-alignment, were for Mao mere tactical goals. The identity of purpose, therefore, was of necessity and not the result of affinity of principles. He did not see that from a Maoist point of view, unlike his own, war and peaceful coexistence were not opposing alternatives. Thus, it seems that war was inevitable between these two Asian giants who professed different worldviews and political institutions and were competing for establishing their dominance among the Third World.

The paramount question which the Sino-Indian crises posed was: Did India's military defeat at the hands of Red China vitiate the strategic arguments previously invoked to justify non-alignment vis-à-vis East and West? The Indian answer was negative. Nehru could still declare at the end of 1962: "I do not see any reason why we should not continue our nonalignment policy."

Would India's "alignment" with the West had prevented the Chinese military onslaught? And, after the aggression occurred, would its membership in a western-sponsored military alliance have contributed significantly to the liquidation of the Chinese threat?

Nehru knew it well that nothing was a guarantee against anything in the anarchic world. Belgian neutrality did not prevent German aggression against it during the First World War. Also, alignment was not, always and necessarily, a guarantee against aggression during Cold War, as evidenced from the examples of Laos and South Vietnam who were tightly aligned with western powers. Moreover, for Nehru to abandon the policy just when, both the blocs respected it was not prudent act.

The fact that the USSR had not supported China was used by the Indian government to justify the policy of nonalignment. It reasoned that the policy had not stood in the way of India receiving aid from the western countries. If India were a member of the western bloc, the USSR would have sided with China. Moreover, to have been in a position to obtain help from outside in an emergency of this sort without any political strings, and once this emergency was over to be able to "revert" to a nonaligned policy, is surely not a failure of such a policy, but appears almost a vindication of it!

All this is not to say that Indian Government had not committed any mistakes in formulating or implementing foreign policy which might have encouraged the Chinese to mount an attack against India. Nehru's foreign and defense policies had been criticized on the ground that the premises of his policy were not based on an objective assessment of the nature of the threat, and that consequently the Indian military structure was not adequately geared to the nature of the threat. The absence of a military background of the Indian leadership, unlike the Chinese, could have been compensated if the leadership had involved the country's military in national security and foreign policy decision-making after independence. As there was low level of correspondence between military posture and peace diplomacy, the military factor in Indian policy became counter-productive.

A major source of error in the fundamental premise of Nehru's policy was that he mistook India's potentialities for realities. Publicly Nehru had repudiated British India's "Forward Policy", although one cannot surmise from this repudiation that he rejected the theoretical validity of the balance of power approach to international relations. Rather the error was in assuming that a balance of power in fact existed and that India was protected by this balance.

In other words, his analysis of the international situation represented an underestimation of the nature of the threat of India, while overestimating India's potentialities. There is little doubt that India's political position vis-à-vis the great powers and its geopolitical importance in the Indian Ocean reflected India's importance. However, the error lay in assuming that the potentialities of India could be translated automatically into power and influence. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Nehru's policy was not devoid of balance of power and geo-political considerations. However, his strategic posture was based upon "peace" rather than "deterrence" and regarding the events of 1962 it was obvious that this posture was not adequate for the requirements of the situation.

It seems that these mistaken policies and actions have no inevitable and necessary connection with the policy of non-alignment as such. With its heritage of Gandhism, Indians had been slow to learn that there was no incompatibility between adherence to nonalignment and a condition of military preparedness. As a result of its near disastrous encounter with Red China, India had been made aware that any successful foreign policy requires the means and the determination to preserve

national independence. Non-alignment backed by adequate national power, could be a valid principle of statecraft; nonalignment accompanied by military weakness and the illusion that the doctrine itself would defend the nation's borders was a certain route to national defeat and humiliation.

Another mistake our foreign-policy makers seem to have committed is to confuse non-alignment, which is merely an instrument of our policy, for the very goals of our foreign policy. A rational stand should be that when non-alignment ceased to promote our national interests, we ought to switch on to any of the other alternative courses of policy available to us at any time. It seems that Nehru has treated the policy all along as not just a means to promote our national interests, but as the end itself.

However, the foreign policy of Nehru's India began to change in two respects after the 1962 border war: (1) from "equidistance", in relation to the superpowers, to "equal proximity" to Moscow and Washington; and (2) from an active, dynamic involvement in world politics, that is, neutralism in its original Nehru-Menon conception, to a more passive role, almost a withdrawal from conflicts external to India's narrowly-conceived national interests. Also, the concept of deterrence and defense found a respectable place in Indian planning after the Sino-Indian war. Thus, an emphasis upon diplomacy based upon a closer correspondence with a stronger military posture was to be found in post-Nehru planning.

After four decades of Sino-Indian war, it is possible to appreciate the intrinsic merit in Nehru's foreign-policy logic of independence and autonomy in international relations. The last half-century demonstrates that membership in a bloc not only makes for a truncated acquisition of national capabilities (witness Japan's and Germany's dilemma in the post-cold war era), but also renders difficult any subsequent ambition to break out of the straitjacket of bloc membership, which act is likely to be viewed as rebellious and illegitimate. There consequently has to be a prior and specific assertion to an independent foreign policy to safeguard a possible claim to a major-power role in the future. That, indeed, was the core legacy of Nehru's foreign policy.

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