

AN ASSESSMENT OF KARGIL: SOME PERSPECTIVES

*Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

AMIT KUMAR



**SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES DIVISION
CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH EAST ASIA
AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES.
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES.
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY.
NEW DELHI-110067
INDIA**

2002



JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
NEW DELHI-110067

**CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTH EAST
ASIA AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES
SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES DIVISION**

Phone: 6107676 } Ext.2338
6167557 }
Fax : 91-11-6165886
91-11-6162292
91-11-6198234
Gram: JAYENU

July 22, 2002

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled **An Assessment Of Kargil: Some Perspectives** submitted by **AMIT KUMAR**, Centre for South, Central, South East Asian & South West Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, for the award of the Degree of Master of Philosophy is an original work and has not been submitted so far in part or in full for any other degree or diploma of any other university. *He shall be solely responsible for inaccuracy and imperfections in his dissertation.*

This dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy.

Kwarikoo
Prof. K. Warikoo (Chairperson) East and

Uma Singh
Prof. Uma Singh
(Supervisor)

Acknowledgement

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Uma Singh, for her critical comments on the draft. Her patience, her sagacious advice, and her thought-provoking arguments helped me in giving this dissertation its present shape. Without her suggestions and intellectual insights, this work would not have seen the light of the day. She has also been a constant source of encouragement me, Mam, Thank you very much.

Next, I would like to thank, staffs of various libraries and institutions, especially, Nehru Memorial library, IDS library, IDSA library, British Council, American Centre library, SAARC Documentation Centre and the JNU library for their assistance. The staff at these libraries has been utmost cooperative and has always did the needful.

I would be failing in my duties, if I do not thank my friends. Deepu, Vivek, Sanjay, Raju, Vibanshu, Mukesh, for always being there and the assistance they provided in writing this dissertation. Without their constant encouragement, it would have been difficult to finish this work. I would also like to thank everyone else who chipped in their own way, in giving the final shape to this dissertation. And last but not the least I would like to express my gratitude to Mummy, Papa and other members of the family without whose endurance and support I could not have delved into the territory of serious research. Only, I would be responsible for any mistakes in this dissertation.

22 July, 2002

Amit Kumar

CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgement	i
<i>Chapter 1</i> Introduction	1-28
<i>Chapter 2</i> Pakistan's Strategic Motives and Assumptions Behind Kargil Misadventure	29-54
<i>Chapter 3</i> India's Retaliation and War in Kargil	55-85
<i>Chapter 4</i> India's and Pakistan's Diplomacy and International Reaction during Kargil War	86-115
<i>Chapter 5</i> Conclusion	116-130
Select Bibliography	131-142
Appendix	143-145

Chapter-I

INTRODUCTION

From May to July 1999, India fought an intense localised conventional war in Kargil against Pakistani regulars who had intruded across the Line of Control (LoC). It was yet another manifestation of Pakistan's continued obsession with the Indian state. Kargil war 1999 was a significant development that had both immediate and long-term implications. It turned out to be one of the fiercest battle ever fought between the two countries at the high Himalayan altitudes. It attracted global attention and helped in changing the perspectives of international community towards the subcontinent.

The Kargil war turned out to be an important landmark in Indo-Pakistan relationship. It took place in the background of overtly nuclearised subcontinent. In May-June 1998 India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear weapon powers. Although India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, it was for peaceful purposes. Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme started in 1972 after its humiliating defeat in 1971 war over Bangladesh. This programme was anti-India and was intended to neutralize India's conventional military superiority. By 1990 both India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons and a kind of nuclear deterrence was working in the subcontinent. The Pokhran and Chagai tests of May 1998

made overt a well-established covert deterrent equation. It introduced an increasing necessity for friendly and peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan.

Another contexts, which make Kargil war important, were the improving relationship between India and Pakistan since the nuclear tests of May-June 1998. The meetings between the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on July 29, 1998 in Colombo and again on September 23, 1998 in New York started a composite dialogue process between the two countries. The Joint Statement of September 23, 1998 spoke of the need for a “peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir” and for creating “an environment of durable peace and security”.¹ Another step forward was Prime Minister Vajpayee’s trip to Lahore and the signing of Lahore Declaration by the two Prime Ministers. The Declaration committed both countries to resolve outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir through a composite and integrated dialogue. It reiterated the determination of both parties to implement the Shimla Agreement “in letter and spirit”. The two parties agreed to discuss confidence Building measures in the nuclear and conventional fields.² It was also noticed that in the post-Lahore period, Pakistan sent out a number of signals indicating its desire to move forward on

¹ *The Hindu*, September 24, 1998.

² Text of Lahore Declaration in *The Hindu*, 22 February, 1999.

several fronts. All this created favourable environment and aroused expectations for a better India-Pakistan relationship. However, Pakistan did not give a chance to the Lahore Declaration. The Kargil intrusion constituted a cynical breach of the trust on which the Lahore process was posited.

The war in Kargil belied two important prevailing theologies. First, that the democracies do not fight each other. Both India and Pakistan were under democratic rule. The 1947-48 war and the 1965 war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir were fought when Pakistan was not a democratic state. It was for the first time that India and Pakistan fought Kargil war under democratic rule. Secondly Kargil conflict revealed that nuclear weapons in theory, deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and large - scale conventional conflicts. But nuclear weapons could not deter limited conventional conflicts or sub-conventional conflicts like proxy wars, or support to cross-border militancy and terrorism. In the contrary the presence of nuclear weapons make sub-conventional conflict safer for the aggressor.³

Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil marked a qualitative change in its strategy of proxy war in Kashmir followed for more than a decade. It was a sheer attempt to annex others territory militarily. But the Indian political and defence establishment faced the challenge of Pakistan's intrusion bravely and competently. They finally succeeded in getting back their territories from the

³ P.R. Chari, "Indo-Pak Relations: Uncertain Future" in Major General Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari (ed.), *Kargil: The Tables Turned*, (New Delhi, 2001), pp.261-262.

intruders. The nature of existing literature on the various aspects of Kargil war is quantitatively less and qualitatively inadequate. The recent occurrence of the event might be one of the reasons. Jasjit Singh's (ed.) book "*Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth war for Kashmir*" was the first descriptive account of the Kargil war. It gives a good background of the Kargil war and Pakistan's assumptions and politico-military objectives for Kargil intrusions but talks little about the military dimension of the Kargil war and the international responses. P.R. Chari and Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (ed.), "*Kargil: The Tables Turned*" deals with the various aspects of Kargil. But with the availability of more information and the changing international environment, it needs to be updated and revised. "*From surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*", is a report of the committee appointed by the Government of India to examine the sequence of events leading to Kargil and make recommendations for the future. It gives details of the historical background of Indo-Pakistan relationships, Pakistan's assumptions and motives behind Kargil intrusion etc. but talks little about the military dimensions of the war and the international reactions. Moreover, the deletion of certain crucial information by the Government of India for security reasons sometime turns out to be disappointing. Therefore, there is an urgent need to delve into various aspects of the Kargil war in May-July 1999. This paper, an attempt has been made to look into the politico-military aspects of Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan.

Nature of Kargil War

The Indo-Pakistan military engagement at the strategic heights of Kargil has not been officially termed as 'war' by the official establishments of the two countries. Pakistan's reluctance to call it a 'war' was because of its official denial of any kind of involvement in Kargil misadventure. However, the facts proved contrary to its official position and later on Pakistan did accept the dead bodies of its soldiers killed in Kargil. The Indian establishment variously classified Kargil conflict as 'undeclared war' or 'kind of war' or 'an unofficial war' or 'war like situation'. It might have been because of domestic compulsions. Nevertheless, war in Kargil has been a major defining moment in the tortuous history of Indo-Pakistan relations. Given, the quality of weapons used including air power and anti-aircraft missiles, the strategic involvement, number of casualties and the high human and economic costs involved. Kargil episode can be called as 'intense localised conventional war'.

Moreover, the scholars argue that the dynamics of warfare has transformed. From the 1980s due to technological and political changes, the world witnessed the emergence of a new form of warfare, which is termed by the military theorist as 'Post-modern warfare', or 'Information age warfare'. Post-modern warfare is dispersed, sporadic and scattered. It can occur everywhere simultaneously: along the information highways, in cyberspace, and also

in deep space. This new form of warfare first manifested itself in the Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s. The objective of such combat is to engage limited number of soldiers for limited duration to derive limited political leverages.⁴ The insurgents take advantage of the cheap revolutionary technologies, which are easily available. The shoulder carried anti-tank missiles could easily destroy the most advanced tanks available to the armies of the world. Recently, with these weapons the Chechen guerrillas gave hell to the Russian tank. Similarly, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (like the stinger) fired even by less trained militias could hit an advanced fighter plane. This has been demonstrated in Afghan war of 1980s and recently in Kargil war when a stinger missile destroyed a MIG-21 aircraft of Indian Air Force. Insurgency in Kashmir for over a decade is the latest manifestation of this kind of prevailing warfare. Kargil conflict was another logical step of post-modern warfare.⁵

But why Kargil war took place? The answer to this question has to be found in the tortuous history of Indo-Pakistan relationship since independence from the colonial rule in 1947, the Kashmir tangle and the Pakistani military adventurism.

⁴ Kaushik Roy, "The Battle for Kargil: Post-Modern War in South Asia", in Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Mattoo and Afsir Karim (ed.), *Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy*, (New Delhi, 2001), p.93.

⁵ Ibid.

Tortuous relations between India and Pakistan

The relationship between India and Pakistan has been marked by mistrust, animosity and conflict ridden in the last fifty-five years of the existence of both the countries. There had been several reasons for this nature of relationship i.e. the existence of two competing ideological forces on the subcontinent, irredentism on the part of Pakistani leadership, the lack of sufficient institutional arrangements by the British to ensure an orderly transfer of power the domestic problems and internal power structure of Pakistan, the presence of complicating issues like Kashmir etc.⁶ Sisir Gupta argues that the origin of the conflictual relationships between India and Pakistan can be traced back to the days before the division of the subcontinent i.e. the fundamental conflict of the ideological views embodied in the vision of the Congress and the Muslim League.⁷ Since Congress was motivated by the notion of a secular state, Muslim league was committed to the establishment of an Islamic state. Congress initial unwillingness to accept the partition of the subcontinent on communal lines, on the other hand Muslim League's resolve to create a separate state for Muslims set the stage for ideological competition between the two. The success of one party would have meant the undermining of the other. "August 15, 1947 had not ended all

⁶ Sumit Ganguly, *Origin of War in South Asia: Indo-Pak Conflicts since 1947*, (Lahore, 1988), p.45.

⁷ Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in Indo-Pakistan Relations*, New Delhi, 1967, p.440.

rivalries between the congress and the Muslim League; on the other hand, they now tended to take more serious forms after being transformed into an international rivalry”.⁸

Apart from ideological incompatibility, there were other factors which influenced India – Pakistan relationships since 1947. The proponents of Pakistan failed to provide a stable and viable foundation of Pakistan nation state. Given the magnitude of problems faced by Pakistan after its formation, a competent and visionary leader would have adopted honest and visionary approach. But the leadership in Pakistan resorted to gloss over these pressing problems and instead of showing their competence, they relied on creating external anti-India phobia to keep their power safeguarded and territory integrated.

The foundation of democratic institution was weak in Pakistan from the beginning. The attitude of Muslim League leaders further aggravated its weakness and forced it to crumble within few years of independence. The nature and extent of the influence of the Muslim League Organisation over the areas of subcontinent, which constituted Pakistan, were relatively weak. The mass base of Muslim League was in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) and the province to Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in the pre-partition India. At the time of partition a large segment of people in Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were not enthusiastic

⁸ Ibid., p.128.

about the creation of Pakistan.⁹ Moreover, Muslim League failed to resolve internal contradictions in the party and did not pave way for the growth of other parties in the country. A ban on the Communist Party of Pakistan and arrest of its leaders in 1951, the detention of Congressite Muslims like Ghaffar Khan and Khan Sahib, general discouragement of Socialist forces made it impossible for them to function as safety valves of popular discontent. Added to this was the licence given to extreme religious elements which began to function as the only vehicle of public opinion. The resulting instability and recurrence of crisis in Pakistan politics ultimately led to the abolition of the Parliamentary system and the introduction of Martial law. Thus, there was lack of tolerance on its first-rank leadership and “logic of partition of the country on a religious basis was allowed to be carried a little too far”.¹⁰

The structure and composition of the powerful elites were also different from that of India. The nature of power structure in Pakistan to this day remains elitist, feudal, militaristic and unrepresentative of the Pakistani masses. About eighty percent of government jobs, both in civil and military are held by the people of Punjab. This region also accumulates majority of resources. This kind of regional imbalances have left other regions in acute crisis. The most vivid reflection of the regional imbalances has been in the

⁹ J.N. Dixit, "Pakistan's India Policies: Role of Domestic Political Factors", *International Studies*, vol.32, no.3, (July-September, 1995).

¹⁰ Sisir Gupta, "Political Trends in Pakistan", in Verinder Grover (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of SAARC Nations, vol.2 (Pakistan)*, (New Delhi, 1997), p.280.

composition of Pakistan military and civil bureaucracy about which we will discuss later. It was one of the important reasons for the secessionist movements in Pakistan and creation for Bangladesh. These narrow based elite barked on anti-India propaganda from the very beginning. They have developed a vested interest in maintaining a posture of hostility towards India and any rapprochement with India is seen as a threat to their privileged position. Also, India is often made scape-goat by these ruling elites to divert the public attention from mismanagement of resources and poor governance.

The other divergent policies of India and Pakistan, which had a direct bearing on Indo-Pakistan relations, are those pertaining to foreign affairs and state ideology. In India, the declared goal of the state is to safeguard its secular characters and to exclude religion from all questions of politics. As against this, Islam, became the most important single element in the concept of Pakistan nationhood and it has been regarded as essential for the viability of Pakistani nationalism. In the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1999, Islam was greatly emphasised. In 1953, a report of the Basic Principles Committee envisaged a system in which Parliament would not be able to pass a law if a body composed of Ulema declared it to be repugnant to the Quran. The state itself was to be known as 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan'.¹¹ Right since Partition, all the rulers have emphasised the 'Islamic character of Pakistani state'. Time and again they

¹¹ Ibid.

have used Islam to legitimize their rule and have a separate identity for Pakistan. Moreover, it has made persistent attempt to deride Indian secularism. "The continuous emphasis on Islam in Pakistan after its establishment is a measure of its inability to eliminate the rest of India from its consciousness and settle down as self-contained nation. The truth is that Pakistan is Islamic only in order to prove the fact of a separate Muslim nationhood and the solidity of the two-nation theory which has been the justification of India's partition".¹² Thus, instead of seeking a different basis for the national identity of the new state, the negative non-and anti-Indian aspects of Pakistan have been stressed.

The other important element in Pakistan's policy making is the assumed threat perception from the "Imperialist Hindu State (India)". Important discussions in Pakistan on her external problems have started on the assumption that India still does not accept the partition of the subcontinent, and if circumstances permit her, would undo the partition and the existence of Pakistan as a sovereign state. The policy makers and intelligentsia believe that 'India is her enemy and the only enemy'.¹³ Thus, to get parity vis-à-vis India became their prime motive. Initially this got manifested in Pakistan's attempt to prevent India's integration. Pakistan's behaviour in regard to Jodhpur, Travancore, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and

¹² Ibid., p.412.

¹³ J.N. Dixit, op.cit., no.7, p.231.

Kashmir were interpreted in India as such attempts. Only a further Balakinization of Peninsula could ensure parity between the two countries.

Failure in this attempt, Pakistan started seeking external aid, particularly military aid, to counter 'Indian threat'. It joined Western led alliances – SEATO, CENTO and Baghdad Pact-essentially for this purpose. In 1960s and 70s Pakistan developed close relations with China. After the war of 1965, when the US stopped military aid to Pakistan on grant basis, the bulk of military hardware acquired by Pakistan came from China. According to the 1971 foreign policy report by the then US President Mr. Nixon, China supplied Pakistan military hardware worth \$133 million between 1965 and 1971.¹⁴ All this brought cold war to the Indian subcontinent and further complicated India-Pakistan relationship. Given this kind of divergent perceptions of India and Pakistan towards each other and the prevailing mistrust and animosities, any single issue had the potential to hijack the relationship between them. It is in this context that the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan has to be seen.

The Kashmir Tangle

Kashmir since 1947 has been the battle ground for the two competing nationalism of India and Pakistan. Apart from its geo-strategic location. Kashmir presented a peculiar case of being a state with majority Muslim

¹⁴ Mhd. Ayoob, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, New Delhi, 1975, p.11.

population and a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. As per the provisions of India Independence Act, 1947, Hari Singh wanted to maintain independent status of Kashmir. This was not acceptable to Pakistan as it could have challenged the very basis of two-nation theory. As a result Pakistan sent a band of tribal raiders initially and army regulars later on to annex Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh, desperate to protect his people from the barbarism of armed raiders and army regulars joined Indian union. The Treaty of Accession signed between Hari Singh and Government of India on October 26, 1947 was as per the provision of India Independence Act, 1947. It legalized India's possession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Indian troops were airlifted to defend Srinagar and they successfully thwarted Pakistan's nefarious designs in Kashmir.

Enraged by the news of Kashmir's accession to Indian Union, Pakistan's Governor-General Mohammad Ali Jinnah termed it "a treachery" and described Pakistani tribal and army regulars' invasion in Kashmir as "a local uprising against an unpopular Hindu ruler". However it needs to be noted that the Kashmir's accession to India had the complete support of National conference, the primary political party enjoying overwhelming popularity in the state. Thus, Pakistan's first attempt to annex Kashmir by force was thwarted by the timely intervention of Indian army and since then Kashmir has been a part of India. Pakistan has been making claims over Kashmir and calls it "an unfinished agenda of partition".

Possession of Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, assumed significance greater than a mere territorial claim between India and Pakistan. For Indian nationalists, such as Nehru and Gandhi, the integration of Kashmir to India was critical because it would demonstrate that all faiths could live under the aegis of a secular state (in order to prove Pakistani ideology and its creation wrong). Secondly, its integration had always had considerable psychological import for key members of the Indian elite many of whom feared setting a precedent that might lead to essential 'Balkanization' of India. For Pakistan Kashmir with a Muslim majority state joining Indian union was a big blow to the Islamic nationhood they pursued. Jinnah called Pakistan 'incomplete' without Kashmir.¹⁵ This made Kashmir the 'nerve-centre' for the two competing nationalist forces and made India-Pakistan relationship increasingly conflictual. The major elements in this conflict were the images that India and Pakistan have created of each other right since partition. The interference of other parties mainly the United Nations, United States, and Britain, during the cold war era further complicated the problems.

For the last fifty-five years Kashmir issue remains intractably complicated and India-Pakistan relationship increasingly bitter. Its not that India and Pakistan have not been able to solve any of the problem because of the suspicious perception of each other. Infact, many intricate problems like

¹⁵ Uma Singh, "India Pakistan relations in historical perspectives", *World Focus*, vol.22, no.10-12, (October-December, 2001), p.32.

sharing of assets of undivided India, the divisions of Indian military store and Indian army, sharing of Indus waters etc. have been solved with much ease. But over the years, Kashmir became for the two countries the symbol of this rivalry – a rivalry which has been traced to deeper factors than the dispute over Kashmir.¹⁶

Pakistan's claim over Kashmir has been more ideological and tactical. It never had a consistent policy on Kashmir. It demands plebiscite in the Kashmir valley but denies the same to the occupied Kashmir (PoK). On the one hand, it has been consistently demanding third party intervention in resolving Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, on the other hand, policy makers in Pakistan signed agreements emphasizing bilateralism in the resolution of all contentious issues (including Kashmir) between them. The Shimla Agreement of 1972 and the recent Lahore Declaration is an example in this context. Infact Kashmir issue has turned out to be a major uniting force in Pakistan and an outlet of the frustration and discontent of Pakistan as a state. The narrow social base and exclusive regional character of Pakistan's ruling elite has successfully perpetuated anti-India phobia down to the masses. Earlier statements from responsible personalities in Pakistan about waging 'thousands years' war with India and the recent confession by the Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that even if Kashmir issue is

¹⁶ Sisir Gupta, op. cit. no. 7, p.439.

solved, Indo-Pakistan relation will remain far from normal proves the symbolic aspect of Kashmir issue. Thus, it is in the interest of the ruling elite of Pakistan to keep the Kashmir issue prolonged and anti-India character of Pakistani state preserved. The Pakistani Army, the most dominating component of ruling elite, has championed the cause of Kashmir and has launched anti-India tirade since 1947. Here, it is important to discuss some details of army's role in Pakistan domestic politics and its anti-India character.

Army in Pakistan and its Adventurism against India

Army in Pakistan has been one of the most important components of Pakistan's political system. As we have seen in the earlier subsection that the foundation of democratic principles in Pakistan had been weak since 1947 and the democratic institutions had been very incohesive and ineffective. In contrast, army emerged as the most cohesive institution over the years. It has ruled Pakistan for over 25 years directly and has remained a dominant partner in national governance for an equal number of years. Apart from weak democratic foundations there has been several other reasons that gave army a major say in Pakistan's politics.

The ethnically and regionally imbalanced representation in government jobs and ruling elite had been most vividly reflected in Pakistani Army. Over eighty percent of officer's post in Pakistan army had been held from Punjab.

In 1955, East Pakistan, which constructed fifty-four percent of total population, representation in officer cadres of the army was a mere 1.57 percent. By 1963, the proportion of Bengalis in the army had increased to 5 percent for the officers and only 7 percent of the troops were a Bengali.¹⁷ The proportions of other ethnic groups were much less. The same trend has continued till today. Stephen Cohen argues that “the history of Pakistan Army was the history of the Punjabi Muslim and the Pathan; this seemed entirely natural in as much as there were hardly any other Muslims in the army.”¹⁸

Very soon after the creation of Pakistan the identity of “the Muslim nation” dissolved, giving way to sectarian, ethnic, and other group pressures and demands for a fairer distribution of the expected rewards of independence from the British as well as the perceived domination of the Hindu majority. To counter such demands, the privileged groups (Punjabis and Urdu – speaking Mohajirs from U.P and Bihar in India) decided to deploy Islamic ideology in Pakistan for the first time, in a manner in which it had never featured in the Pakistan movement itself.¹⁹ The creation of Pakistan on the basis of religion also led to its army having to “adapt to Islamic principles and practices”.²⁰ To make its identity different from India, the army derived the

¹⁷ Jasjit Singh “Army in Pakistan”, in Jasjit Singh (ed.) *Kargil 99: Pakistan’s Fourth War in Kashmir*, (New Delhi, 2001), p.26.

¹⁸ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, (New Delhi, 1984), p.43.

¹⁹ Jasjit Singh, op.cit. no. 17. p. 24.

²⁰ Stephen P. Cohen, op.cit. no. 18, p. 34.

military tradition of Pakistan from their ancestors who helped establish and expand Muslim rule in the subcontinent during medieval period.

The political structure of Pakistan, built on tenuous ideology and lacking in established norms and political culture, started to degenerate fairly rapidly. The deterioration of conditions inside Pakistan gave rise to “two closely related trends in Pakistan. First, the calls to the army to help the civil government in the maintenance of law and order gradually increased. Second, the military became an important factor in the decision making process of Pakistan”.²¹ Strong nexus grew between civil bureaucracy and the military. They were appointed to the cabinet posts. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief of the army was concurrently appointed as the defence minister in 1953. Gen. Ayub organized the first army coup in Pakistan in 1958, and took over as martial law administrator and President. The constitution in 1962 institutionalized the military’s role in power structure. His rule lasted till 1969 and in 1970 a general election was held which brought to the forefront the issue of ethnicity and later creation of Bangladesh.

Z.A.Bhutto took over a President, with a mandate of the 1970 elections to his credit, set about establishing civil political supremacy. However, his attempts at re-arranging the power structure in Pakistan were only partially

²¹ Quoted in Jasjit Singh, *The Army in Pakistan*, op. cit. no: 17, p.32.

successful. He managed to greatly weaken the bureaucratic hold but his reliance on the army for internal security duties increased. He was displaced by a military coup organized by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. "The regime of Gen. Zia had the distinction of being the first unmitigated military regime in Pakistan".²² To secure his rule, Gen. Zia brought Eighth Amendment to the constitution under which the Prime Minister was to be 'appointed' by the President. His policies greatly increased orientation toward radical religious indoctrination of the country in general and armed forces in particular. This further widened the ideological gulf between India and Pakistan. He also encouraged growth of drugs and narcotics in the frontier regions and drug trafficking.

Gen. Zia's death in a air-crash in 1988, led to general election in Pakistan and the return of civilian government led by Benazir Bhutto and later Nawaz Sharif. But the army continued to have the dominant say beyond the area of defence. It set terms and conditions under which civilian head had to work. Benazir Bhutto once complained pathetically, "I am in office but not in power".²³ The latest army coup in October 1999 by Gen. Pervez Musharraf once again demonstrated military's firm clout over the power structure in Pakistan. This continued dominance of military in Pakistan's politics since 1947 has a significant bearing in its relationship with India.

²² Ibid., p. 37.

²³ Ibid., p. 41.

The Pakistani military has championed the cause of Pakistan and launched anti-India tirade right since 1947. The army in Pakistan sees itself as the guardian of the country's ideological frontiers as well as its border. Stephen P. Cohen rightly argues that "There are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three".²⁴

Hostility towards India has its roots in ideology, but it has also been fostered in Pakistan by the dominant groups, particularly the army. "The idea that a country has a foreign enemy is easy for the people to understand. It also provides a powerful stimulus to national unity. For Pakistan, this role was filled by India."²⁵ The army claims a special responsibility and status for national survival and as defender against the Indian threat. It has been in the interest of Pakistan military to maintain high tensions with India, to safeguard their hold in power structure and justify large proportion of budget spent on defence. The Pakistani military has always professed to pursue a strategic doctrine of "offensive defence". In conventional terms the doctrine was applied almost every time, and "Pakistan has not hesitated to be the first to employ the heavy use of force in order to gain an initial advantage."²⁶

²⁴ Stephen P. Cohen, op.cit. no. 18, p.105.

²⁵ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (2nd ed.), Lahore, 1976, p. 64.


²⁶ Stephen P.Cohen, op.cit. no.18, p. 145.

One of the first acts of Pakistani military after Pakistan was created was to plan and try to take over Kashmir by force. It disagreed with the civilian government's policy on Kashmir and believed that a military solution to the Kashmir issue was feasible. The strategy was to send armed tribal raiders in the beginning and army regulars later to harness their gain. Subsequently, its failure to grab Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by force rankled, and this intensified the hostility towards India. Added to this had been Pakistani military perceptions about "Hindu India" that affected the relationship between them, Pakistani military takes pride of its aggressive ethos. Gen. Ayub believed almost as a creed that "the Hindu has no fight in him" and "a single Muslim soldier being an equal of four Hindu soldiers."²⁷ It was on such myths and illusions that the ethos of the Pakistani relationship with India was symbolized. Pakistan's attack on India in 1965 was because of the same military ethos. After India's humiliating defeat in Sino-Indian war of 1962, Pakistan thought it a favourable moment to capture Kashmir. Similar kind of strategy was applied. Armed irregulars were sent to create havoc in the valley, while conventional forces attempted to cut communication and supply lines. It is worth noting that in both the above-mentioned operations (1947 and 1965) and the recent Kargil operation the objectives were same, with Kargil and Drass sector received adequate attention, even as conventional operations sought to cut off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of the country.

DISS

355.0310954095491


K9602 As



TH9967

TH9967

²⁷ Uma Singh, op.cit. no.15, p. 52.



MAP 2: JAMMU AND KASHMIR SHOWING AREAS OCCUPIED AND CEDED.

Source: P.R. Chari and Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, (ed) *Kargil: The Tables Turned*, 2001, p.43.

The 1971 war between India and Pakistan was fought over Bangladesh, but Pakistan did open a front in Kashmir. The humiliating defeat of Pakistan in these wars had not dampen military's anti-India spirit and quest for Kashmir. On the other hand, the Islamization process of Pakistan military started by Gen. Zia brought the Kashmir issue to the forefront of Pakistans policies (which it had not been from 1966 to 1984).²⁸ It embarked on nuclear weapon programme to neutralize India's conventional military superiority and

²⁸ Jasjit Singh, op.cit. no. 17.

by 1987 Pakistan possessed nuclear bombs. Emboldened by the prevalence of nuclear deterrence Pakistan formulated a strategy of Proxy war in Kashmir and other parts to bleed India.

Pakistan's strategy of launching a 'Proxy war' in Kashmir under code name 'Operation Topac' was brilliantly conceived by the then Pakistan's President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and skillfully executed by the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). It was a well-crafted strategy to keep India engaged in internal squabbles and impose a heavy burden on the Indian economy. With CIA assistance, the ISI gained rich experience in covert operations during the Afghan war. This helped in developing infrastructural facilities for conducting cross-border terrorism. Pakistan Army and ISI Directorate provided military training, weapons, military equipments, ammunitions and explosives to the militants, besides financial support. The policy of Proxy war by Pakistan has continued till today. It is estimated that the ISI spends approximately Rs. 5 crore per month for its Proxy war campaign.²⁹ The Human Rights Watch Arms Project Report of September 1994, notes, "the diffusion of vast quantities of weapon to militants in Punjab and Kashmir is linked to the so-called Afghan pipeline: massive, covert transfer of arms by the US CIA through Pakistan's ISI to the Afghan Mujahideen in 1979.... (These) weapons have made their way into the hands of Sikh and Kashmir militants."³⁰

²⁹ Gurmeet Kanwal, "Ten years of Proxy war", *Seminar*, July, 1999.

³⁰ *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, New Delhi, 1999, p.72.

In the first few years of militancy in the Kashmir valley, upto 1992-93, the militants had received local sympathy due to the Kashmiri Peoples perceived grievances against the Indian state. However, it was never a grassroots movement and the Kashmiri people were soon disillusioned by the brutal un-Islamic terror tactics of the militants. With little support left for militancy in the valley from 1994 Pakistan started injecting foreign mercenaries *Mujahideen* to wage a *Jihad*. These mercenaries were from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan etc. They created terror among the local people through their barbaric activities. This caused immense resentment among the people. By 1995-96, the internal security situation in Kashmir seemed to be brought under control.

Frustrated in their efforts to create a popular uprising in Kashmir, the Pakistan Army – ISI – Jaamat-e-Islami combine evolved a plan to spread the area of militancy to other parts of J&K and the neighbouring states. Their move was quickly thwarted by the Indian army and other security forces. Till end-March 1999, the army had killed 7,994 militants and another 24,251 had been apprehended in Jammu and Kashmir. Another 1,858 militants surrendered. Army casualties included 1,005 killed and 3,017 wounded. 23,817 weapons of various sorts had been recovered from the militants. Pakistan – sponsored terrorism has claimed the lives of our 29,000 innocent

civilians and rendered about 2,80,000 persons homeless. The loss to public and private property has been estimates at Rs. 2000 crores.³¹

Throughout this prolonged period of Proxy war, India has shown tremendous restraint and immense tolerance in the face of grave provocation to its security. By mid – 1998 the security forces were in complete control of the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the state was rapidly returning to normal. Tourism was flourishing, industrial activity was gaining momentum, schools and colleges had once again opened up and political activity was being gradually revived. On the other hand, the Pakistan Army and ISI were becoming increasingly frustrated. They found it hard to accept that the Indian Army could conduct a successful counter-insurgency campaign using minimum force and showing an unprecedented tolerance in the face of mounting casualties.

Moreover, India-Pakistan relationship seemed to have taken positive turn from mid – 1998. Even during the 1997 election in Pakistan, Kashmir and India was not on the main agenda. After the elections, democracy appeared to have strengthened and many expectations were raised. Mian Nawaz Sharif as the elected Prime Minister with a two-third majority in the Parliament had acquired dominance over the presidency, which had been the fountain head of power for the military since the early 1980s, the Eighth

³¹ Gurmeet Kanwal op.cit. no. 29.

Amendment was repealed, the Judiciary was tamed and even an Army chief (Gen. Jahangir Karmat) was forced to resign in October 1998. Never before in the history of Pakistan did the elected political leaders enjoy such powers. But all this signified the tensions inherent in the power structure of Pakistan. In addition to it, the Lahore Declaration sidestepped Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. This was not liked by the Pakistan army and other fundamentalist forces. The Kargil intrusion of Pakistani military has to be seen in this contexts of declining militancy in Kashmir, the internal imbalance in the power structure caused by the strengthening democracy in Pakistan the presence of nuclear deterrence and the side-stepping of Kashmir issue.

While discussing the war in Kargil several key questions comes to mind-What was this operation all about? Why it happened at that time? Who was its real mastermind? When was this operation planned and what kind of forces were used to take control of the strategic heights and ridges in the Kargil-Drass region? What was the strategic importance of this region? What were the problem faced by Indian army and how they succeeded in evicting the infiltrators? Why this war at the high attitude of Himalayas attracted world attention? What was the diplomatic fallout of Kargil on India and Pakistan? And what is the significance of Kargil?

My study is based on primarily answering the above-mentioned questions. An attempt has been made to look into the politico-military dimensions of Kargil episode. For the sake of convenience and clarity, three

main chapters apart from Introduction and Conclusion have been made. Chapter II titled "**Pakistan's strategic motives and assumptions behind Kargil misadventure**", gives a briefs introduction and survey of the strategic importance of the Kargil Drass regions. Then it discusses in detail about the extent of intrusions, assumptions and motives behind the intrusion, the timing of intrusions and the people involved in the planning of intrusion. I submit that the nuclearisation of the subcontinent and the existing nuclear deterrence, the declining state of militancy in Kashmir etc. were the prime factor that influenced the minds of the planners for Kargil. Gaining strategic territorial heights and the internationalization of Kashmir issues were their prime motives. This chapter establishes that the Kargil misadventure plan was mastermind by Pakistani military but civilian government was informed about its broad framework. At the end, the legality of the Kargil intrusion has been judged from the international law perspective.

Chapter III titled "**India's retaliation and war in Kargil**" talks about Indian intelligence failure, ill equipped defence, Indian army strategy to evict the intruders and the important role played by Indian Air Force and Indian Navy. I submit that despite initial surprise and hardships, our armed forces displayed remarkable courage and extra ordinary bravery and finally succeeded in evicting the intruders. An attempt has also been made to look into the humanitarian aspect and legality of India's retaliation from international law perspective.

Chapter IV titled "**India's and Pakistan's Diplomacy and International Reaction to Kargil**", gives the diplomatic efforts of India and Pakistan to win international opinion in their own favour. The reactions of various countries have been analysed. It concludes that Pakistan's assumption of intervention of international community in their favour backfired. All the major powers and their groupings asked Pakistan to restore the sanctity of line of control. Pakistan became isolated within the international system, whereas India gained praise for exercising an utmost restraints and behaving as a mature and responsible power. Domestic reactions in India and Pakistan about Kargil have also been discussed and the role of media analysed.

The conclusion talks about the immediate and long-term impact of Kargil. The derailing of Lahore process, military coup in Pakistan, spurt in terrorist violence in Kashmir etc. were all off-shots of Kargil. In the end it believes that the normalisation of India-Pakistan relation is must for the socio-economic developments of the region. Some confidence -building measures (CBMs) and utility of economic cooperation has been listed. At the end it submits that there is no military solution to the Kashmir problem and Kargil like episode has to be avoided. India-Pakistan must clear their misunderstandings and resolve their outstanding disputes through dialogue in a peaceful manner.

Chapter II

PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC MOTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND KARGIL MISADVENTURE

Topography of Kargil and its Strategic Importance

Until May 1999, Drass, Kargil, and Batalik were relatively unknown places. However, things changed drastically by the beginning of May 1999 and Kargil, Drass, Batalik, Tiger Hill etc. became much talked about subject not only in India but also in many other countries and at various international fora. Geographically these areas are marked by harsh terrains, dominating peaks and extreme weather. It would be interesting to discuss more about their geography, inhabitants and strategic significance for India.

Kargil, situated in the Greater Himalayan range is the second largest town in Ladakh after Leh. In 1979, it was made a separate district carved out of the erstwhile Ladakh district. It covers a geographical area of 19,836 sq. kms. and a population of 1 lakhs (estimated). The majority of population is Shia Muslim. It presents a composite culture of Balti, Ladakhi, Purkhi, Dardi, Zanskari and Sinha cultures.³²

³² Paul Beersmans, The Kargil Conflict :An Eye Witness Account, in *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*; vol.3; nos.3-4 (July-Dec.1999); pp.65-66.

Zojila is the only pass which links Kashmir valley with Kargil (and rest of Ladakh). But this pass remains snowbound for six months in winter every year, cutting off territorial link between Kargil and Kashmir valley. However, the Indus valley route from Gilgit - Skardu to Leh remains open for most of the year and can be used by Pakistan army even in winter.

The Kargil war encompassed the area from Turtok in the north to the Mushkoh valley in the South, covering an area of about 150 kms. This long stretch is of immense strategic importance for India. Turtok lies on the Shyok river. While other sectors of the conflict are approachable from the Srinagar - Leh highway, to reach Turtok, Indian troops have to travel up to Leh from where they are transported across the 5,800 meters high Khardung La (pass) to the Shyok valley. Over two-thirds of the route to Turtok is the same as that for Siachen. Any Pakistani advance up to the Shyok valley would put pressure on the flanks of the route to Siachen and make the 3,000 m high Thoise airbase vulnerable.³³

Chorbat La is 5,200 m high and is accessible from the Indian side along the Hanuthang valley. This area is treated as part of the Batalik sector for operational purposes.³⁴ The Batalik sector comprises number of high altitude mountain peaks. Some of the important peaks are Jubar Hills

³³ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, *The Kargil War* in op.cit., n. 3, p.91.

³⁴ Ibid.

(4,924 mt), Point 4268, Point 4927, Point 4821, Point 5287, Point 4812, Point 4100, Point 5000, Point 5203 etc. Batalik ridges are less steep from the Pakistani side but from the Indian side these positions had to be approached from heights of 3500 to 3650 m.³⁵

Point 4151 dominates Kargil town and is the key to the town's safety from Pakistani guns; artillery observers located here can dominate the entire area on the Indian side. Likewise, Indian artillery observers can watch deep into Pakistan enabling their detachments to fire on Pakistani targets. This height remained with Pakistan till 1965, when it was captured by India. However, it was returned to Pakistan after the Tashkent Agreement. Indian troops recaptured it in 1971.³⁶

The Drass sector is dominated by the Tololing heights to the north and the Tiger Hill complex to the north-west. The Tololing complex virtually sits on the Srinagar -Leh highway. The main heights on the Tololing ridge are: Point 4590 (lower Summit) and Point 5140 (the highest point). Tiger Hill (4965 mt) is a single peak dominating the Srinagar - Leh highway from where accurate artillery fire can be directed. It stands all alone and rises steeply into a conical shape with few spurs or ridges on either side. It is a very difficult objective to assault.³⁷

³⁵ Ibid., pp.91-92.

³⁶ Ibid., pp.92-93.

³⁷ Ibid., pp.93-95.

The Mushkoh valley is reached from Pakistan side through the 5,353 m high Marpola pass. Hence control of this pass cuts off access to the Mushkoh valley.³⁸ All these areas including the important heights in the Indian side of the LOC were intruded by Pakistani mercenaries along with 'mujahideen' from various militant organisations trained in Pakistan. But before we discuss the extent of intrusion, it is important to talk about LoC.

LoC and its Delineation

The term Line of Control (LoC) owes its origin to the Shimla Agreement in 1972 between India and Pakistan. The Cease Fire Line (CFL) between Indian and Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of 1971 in Kashmir was converted to LoC. There is a considerable significance in this change of nomenclature. While the former defined border in military terms, the later did so in purely factual manner.³⁹

The methodology of delineation was highly scientific and mutually agreed by the two parties. The LoC was produced on two sets of maps prepared by each side through an intense process that involved meetings between sub-sector commanders of both sides between August 10 and December 11, 1972 at Suchetgarh and Wagah. At each meeting, the ground inputs were discussed and the differences resolved. Besides the maps, there

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Manoj Joshi, Kargil War: The Fourth Round, in op.cit., n.4, pp.34-35.

were 19 annexures consisting of 40 pages giving details of each feature, landmark and coordinates of the LoC.⁴⁰ Through this process, four sets consisting of 27 map sheets were formed into 19 mosaics. Each individual mosaic of all four sets was signed by the representatives of the two Army Chiefs viz. Lt Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan and Lt. Gen. Prem Bhagat. They were formerly exchanged on December 11, 1972 and approved by political authorities the same day.⁴¹

The Shimla Agreement also established the inviolability of the LoC. Article 4 (ii) of the Shimla Agreement 1972 clearly states that the LoC should be respected and neither side should seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.⁴² However, Pakistan resorted to the violation of LoC regularly after 1988 in supporting the cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The May 1999 intrusion of Pakistan was the most cynical violation of LoC and the spirit of Lahore Declaration (February 1999) where Pakistani army regulars along with Islamic militants captured the dominating heights of the Kargil region on Indian side of the LoC.

⁴⁰ Manoj Joshi, The Line of Control in India-Pakistan Relations, in *The Kargil War*, New Delhi, 1999, p.10.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ayesha Ray, International Law and Cross-Border Terrorism, in op.cit., n.4, p.369.

Magnitude and Extent of Pakistan's Intrusion

Pakistan's Kargil intrusion was meticulously planned and brilliantly executed. The most important element in this intrusion was the utter surprise they had given to the Indian army. Only by mid-May 1999 Indian army was able to know about the actual magnitude and extent of intrusion. Violating the LoC, the Pakistani army regulars along with Islamic militants had encroached about 7 to 10 kms inside the Indian side of LoC along a stretch of about 150 kms, occupying the high points of Drass, Kaksar, and Batalik area of Kargil.⁴³ The main groups were split into a number of smaller subgroups of thirty to forty each for carrying out multiple intrusions along the ridge lines and occupying dominating heights.⁴⁴ The strength and the location of the Pakistan forces were estimated to be as follows:

- A composite group of 250 at Batalik
- A composite group of 100 at Kaksar
- A composite group of 250 at Drass.
- A composite group of 300 in Mushkoh valley.⁴⁵

⁴³ Editor's Page - *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.3, nos.3-4, July-Dec. 1999.

⁴⁴ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, op.cit., n.33.


⁴⁵ Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim, Pakistan's Aggression in Kashmir: 1999 in *Aakkrosh*, vol.2, no.4, July 1999.

However, there are some differences in the estimates of the actual strength of the intrusions in the four main sub-sectors. Various agencies have indicated that a total of 1,500 troops, both regular and irregular were deployed. As per estimates of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, about 1,700 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops were deployed in Kargil.⁴⁶ The Kargil Review Committee on the basis of various intelligence reports, captured documents, interrogation of Prisoners of War (POW) reports and signal intelligence also indicate that the intrusion plan envisaged creating four independent groups from four Infantry Battalions and two companies of Special Service Groups (SSG). There were:

- (a) 5 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) Battalion located at Hamizigund
- (b) 6 NLI Battalion located at Buniyal
- (c) 8 and 12 NLI Battalions located at Skardu and Gultari respectively
- (d) In addition, some elements of 3, 4, 7 and 11 NLI Battalions were also deployed.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, op.cit., n.33, p.102.

⁴⁷ *From Surprise To Reckoning*, op.cit., n.30, p.94.



MAP 2: JAMMU AND KASHMIR SHOWING AREAS OCCUPIED AND CEDED.

Source: Jasjit Singh's (ed.) *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir*, 1999, p.150.

Logistical support was carried out by personnel of the Biyaur and Chitral Scouts, who functioned as fighting porters, besides supplementing the post suffering from deficiencies. The routes for supplies were along ridgelines and nullahs.⁴⁸ The weapons/equipments used by the intruders were numerous and highly sophisticated. Among these include:

- (a) Personal weapons: G3 rifles and AK 47s.
- (b) Battalion support weapons: Medium machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, RPGs and 82 mm mortars.

⁴⁸ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, op.cit., n. 33, p.102.

- (c) Air Defence weapons: ANZA anti-aircraft missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and 12.7 mm KPVT.
- (d) Artillery: 20 mm mortars, 105 mm mountain guns and 130 mm. Medium guns.
- (e) Helicopters: 'Puma' and 'Lama' (MI-17) helicopters
- (f) Special Equipment: Gas masks, Passive Night Vision Devices (PNVDs) and snow scooters.⁴⁹

A total of 18 artillery fire units provided fire support to the intruders from the Pakistani side of LoC opposite the Kargil sector, ensuring that each intrusion area was supported by three to four fire units.

These battalions were augmented by Afghan war veterans and Islamic militants trained by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Badr etc. Despite the massive build up and well equipped intrusions, Pakistan denied its involvement in the Kargil affair. It termed the intrusion as 'local', 'sporadic' and the persons involved were described as “genuine freedom fighters”. The then Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said in a public meeting "Mujahideen battling Indian security forces in Kashmir were neither militants, nor infiltrators, but 'genuine freedom fighters'. These freedom fighters were struggling for their right of self determination which

⁴⁹ *From Surprise To Reckoning*, op.cit., n.30, p.95.

was their inalienable right accepted by the UN resolutions on Kashmir. India's sole objective was to obliterate the Kashmiri struggle."⁵⁰ He also continued to trot out the usual excuse that it had no control over the 'mujahideen' operating across the LoC. However, there were few takers of the Pakistani contention and ultimately Indian military advance and international community forced her to submit.

The ground reality also spoke a different version than that of Pakistan's official contention. As we have seen that these massive arms build up across the LoC and the well equipped intrusion in this kind of geographical terrain could not have been carried out without Pakistan's active support and involvement. The conversation between the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen Parvez Musharraf and Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen Mohammad Aziz tapped by the Indian intelligence clearly reveals that Pakistan was not only aware of the Kargil intrusion, but also, was heavily involved in it. The identity cards and personal diaries of soldiers (Pakistani) involved in the intrusion also reveal the same point. Pakistan also trained various militant organisations who infiltrated into Kargil. This comes out from a report where speaking to the *Washington Post*, Lashkar-e-Toiba admitted that its cadre had undergone months of high altitude training in the run up to the Kargil infiltration. "The infiltration in Kargil is

⁵⁰ *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 1, 1999.

our most ambitious operation".⁵¹ Moreover, the logistics and material supplies to the infiltrators were massive and could not have been possible without state's support. An army captain involved in an assault on Tololing heights had made a very startling revelation. He said "The infiltrators had carved out three storied bunkers in Tololing. They had an arsenal that would last them an entire year. They had food for one full year and they also had a generator. They lived in style. They had women with them. When we finally reached the bunkers after an entire night of artillery pounding, we found the bodies of four women - all of them armed".⁵²

The Genesis of the Intrusion Plan

Though Pakistan's involvement has been well established, a few questions remain unanswered: When was the intrusion planned? When was it executed? Who all were involved?

Given the amount of evidence, it is very difficult to exactly point out when this plan was construed. Altaf Gauhar, the once-powerful information secretary to President Ayub Khan in the 1960s writes in *The Nation* that the Kargil intrusions were first authorised by Gen Zia-ul-Haq (along with Operation TOPAC) in 1987. But at the formal war committee meeting at which Zia was to approve the Kargil plan, then Foreign

⁵¹ *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 8, 1999.

⁵² *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), June 15, 1999.

Minister, Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan opposed it on the plea that these posts were very difficult to hold and it would be extremely difficult to justify Pakistan's military action to the international community.⁵³ The context in which the plan was formulated is still not clear. Probably, it was originally motivated by the desire to avenge Siachen.

Subsequently, it was reportedly, presented twice to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who rejected it outrightly. It appears to have been further refined by Gen Pervez Mushrraf when he was Director -General of Military Operations (DGMO) in 1993-95. This fresh plan was again presented to Nawaz Sharif but the then Army Chief Gen Jahangir Karamat was not willing to endorse it. This might have been one of the reasons for his dismissal. General Karamat has, however, reportedly denied that the plan came up for his consideration.⁵⁴ Altaf Gauhar states that the same plan was put up before Mr. Sharif in 1998 (after Gen. Prevez Musharraaf took over as COAS on 7th Oct) assuring him that the Indians were totally unaware of the strategy and would not be able to offer any adequate response to the Pakistan offensive. Through this operation, he was told, he would have a military victory to his credit after the courageous decision to explode the nuclear bomb despite international pressure.⁵⁵ It is believed

⁵³ Altaf Gauhar, Four Wars, One Assumption, in *The Nation* (Islamabad), Sept. 5, 1999.

⁵⁴ From Surprise to Reckoning, op.cit., n.30, p.94..

⁵⁵ Altaf Gauhar, op.cit., n.53.

Sharif gave the go-ahead to this plan before signing the Lahore Declaration with his Indian counterpart in February 1999.

The Kargil Review Committee Report on the basis of interrogation of Prisoners of War and the personal diaries of the slain Pakistani soldiers indicated the sequence of execution of the plan. According to it, the reconnaissance of the Batalik sector may have been carried out in November - December 1998. This may or may not have been done in other sectors. A small group primarily consisting of officers, moved across the LoC in the Mushkoh sector in February - March 1999. They carried out subsequent reconnaissance and created a few additional posts in the vicinity. In April 1999, a further build-up of advance elements was effected with the support of the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts in the Batalik and Mushkoh areas. The main body of troops commenced occupation of the heights across the LoC in the later half of April 1999. By early May 1999, intrusions by Pakistan army had been effected in the Batalik, Kaksar, Drass and Mushkoh sectors.⁵⁶ From the above analysis it seems that the Kargil intrusion plan was pending in the minds of Pakistani military right from 1987. It was modified and implemented after Gen Pervez Musharraf took over as Chief of Army Staff (COAS).

⁵⁶ From Surprise to Reckoning, op.cit., n.30. pp.95-96

Amidst Kargil conflict a controversy was created by the media and some Indian leaders regarding the rift between Pakistan's civilian government and the military. Defence Minister George Fernandes giving a clean chit to Nawaz Sharif stated, "In this entire episode, the Pakistani Army has hatched a conspiracy to push in infiltrators and the Nawaz Sharif government did not have a major role. The ISI which we know to initiate such activity has not played any role".⁵⁷ Even the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee said during the early days of conflict that this was an army operation and that the civilian Government was left out of the loop.⁵⁸

However, the sequence of events preceding Kargil intrusion and its aftermath shows that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was very much in the picture. He had complete control over the situation. With two-third majority in Parliament, control over Judiciary and President, and the apparent control over the military establishment, Nawaz Sharif emerged as the most powerful civilian authority, that ever ruled Pakistan. The top ranking officials, including the Chief of Army Staff and the Director of ISI were handpicked by Nawaz Sharif superseding many others. Besides to aid an intrusion of this magnitude could not have taken place without the knowledge of Pakistani Prime Minister. There are indications that the plan was approved by Nawaz Sharif as early as October 1998 when it was

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Kargil, *The Asian Age* (New Delhi), June 17, 1999.

proposed to him by Gen Musharraf. Subsequently, in January 1999, Nawaz Sharif was briefed at General Headquarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi.⁵⁹ Presumably, the final go ahead was given at this stage.

Indian Intelligence Failure

One of the concerning aspects of Pakistan's Kargil intrusion was the element of surprise it inflicted on India. The Indian civil and military intelligence failed to warn the nation about Pakistani game plan in Kargil. The Kargil Review Committee has blamed the method of intelligence collection, co-ordination between various intelligence agencies and the follow-up action. It is primarily for the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) to provide intelligence about a likely attack, whether across a broad or narrow front. Intelligence Bureau (IB) got certain inputs on activities in the Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) region. But this information was not addressed to Secretary (RAW), Chairman JIC, and Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI). Instead, it was communicated to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Home Secretary and Director General Military Operations.⁶⁰

There were many bits and pieces of information about activities within FCNA region. Most of them tended to indicate that Kargil was

⁵⁹ *From Surprise To Reckoning* op.cit., n.30, p.95.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

becoming a growing focus of Pakistani attention which had been clearly demonstrated by the marked increase in trans-LoC shelling in 1998. The Indian side also resorted to heavy firing since it was necessary to suppress Pakistani fire aimed at disrupting the traffic on NH-1A from Srinagar to Leh. While the intelligence agencies focussed on ammunition dumping on the other side, they appeared to lack adequate knowledge about the heavy damage inflicted by Indian artillery which would have required the Pakistani army to undertake considerable repairs and restocking. The Indian Army also did not share information about the intensity and effect of its post firing with others. In the absence of this information, RAW could not correctly assess the significance of enemy activity in terms of ammunition storage or construction of underground bunkers.⁶¹ The failure to detect the intrusion of this magnitude is of grave concern to the Indian security. There is a need to revamp our intelligence system. The processing of information should be systematised and closer co-ordination among the intelligence agencies is needed.

Assumptions and Objectives of Pakistan's Kargil Intrusion

Having discussed the magnitude and extent of Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil, it is important to understand the assumptions and objectives of the intrusion.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp.234-35.

A series of fundamental factors seem to have propelled Pakistan for Kargil misadventure. First, it is the continuing ideological conflict with India. This has often been interpreted as Pakistan's search for identity. The creation of Bangladesh, the continuing ethnic division in Pakistan etc. have exposed the hollowness of Islamic nationalism propounded by the founding fathers of Pakistan. Najam Sethi, the editor of Pakistan's *Friday Times* wrote recently, "After 50 years Pakistan is unable to agree upon who we are as a nation, where we belong, what we believe in, where we want to go".⁶² As has been discussed in the previous chapter that Kashmir has become the battleground for competing ideological rivalry between India and Pakistan. There seems to be deepening of a self-perpetuating belief of Kashmir being the 'core-issue' and 'unfinished agenda of partition'. Secondly, the tensions in the internal power structure in Pakistan i.e. the tensions between civil and military establishment. The balance between civil and military establishments has existed in Pakistan ever since 1947. This balance appeared to be altered by the increasing power to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. It became imperative for Pakistani military to reassert its authority. Kargil plan was construed to make the civilian establishment dependent on the Pakistani military. Thirdly, the deep desire of Pakistan to take revenge against India for earlier defeats in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and in Siachen in 1984. The fourth, factor seems to be

⁶² *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), June 10, 1999.

Pakistanis military's aggressive ethos. "The overwhelming proportion of Punjabi-Pathan officers (over 84 per cent) in Pakistani military, prides itself in its offensive aggressive approach".⁶³ In 1989, the army formally claimed the adoption of a doctrine of "offensive-defence". This doctrine implies fighting the battle inside Indian territory. Thus, we see that the basic factors which propelled Pakistan to undertake Kargil misadventure were similar to that of earlier wars.

Pakistan constructed the plan of Kargil invasion on the basis of certain assumptions. First, it assumed that the nuclear 'umbrella' allows offensive action without risks.⁶⁴ In other words, Pakistan's nuclear capability would forestall any major Indian move particularly across the international border involving the use of India's larger conventional capabilities. It appears to have persuaded itself that nuclear deterrence had worked in its favour from the mid-1980's. Delving into the history of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, the Kargil Review Committee is of the opinion that the basic objective of Pakistan's nuclearisation was to counterbalance India's conventional superiority.⁶⁵ A report published in 1984 indicated that Pakistan had obtained from the Chinese the design of its fourth nuclear weapon tested in 1966. In fact in 1987, Pakistan conveyed a nuclear threat to India at the time of Operation

⁶³ Jasjit Singh, 'Pakistan's Fourth War' in *Strategic Analysis* (Aug. 1999), p.690.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ *From Surprise To Reckoning*, op.cit., n.30, p.239.

BRASSTACKS. Hence, it is convincingly argued that the mutual nuclear deterrence is deemed to have been established much before the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998. Without nuclear deterrence, it is inconceivable that Pakistan could sustain its proxy war against India since 1980's, inflict thousands of casualties, without being unduly concerned about India's "conventional superiority." In a speech on April 12, 1999 General Musharraf stated that though the possibility of a large scale conventional war between India and Pakistan was virtually zero, proxy war was not only possible but very likely.

The second assumption of Pakistan was that the international community would intervene or stop the war at early stage, leaving it in possession of at least some of its gains across the LoC, thereby, enabling it to bargain from a position of strength. Embedded in it was the belief that the coalition government in India, weak and indecisive, will either under-react or over-react. If the Indian government under reacted, Pakistan will gain the new strategic position in Kargil, whereas its over-reaction will lead to escalation, putting the onus of escalation on India.⁶⁶

Pakistan expected international reaction in its favour. This international intervention seemed more likely because of recent overt nuclearisation of the two countries. Pakistan deliberately intended to make Kashmir the 'nuclear flash point' of the subcontinent. With a section of

⁶⁶ Jasjit Singh, *op.cit.*, n.63, p.690.

analysts believing that any small clash between 'immature India and Pakistan' would eventually result into a nuclear holocaust, Pakistan expected that global pressure will increase on India to immediately solve the Kashmir issue, and she will bargain from a position of strength.⁶⁷

Pakistan's nefarious attitude towards Kargil was also emboldened by some international happening at that period. Because of the increased interest of the USA in Central Asia and of NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the Pakistani leaders were of the opinion that the politico-diplomatic climate was favourable for internationalising the Kashmir issue and forcing India to negotiate on Kashmir. The deteriorating relationship between India and China since May 1998, made Pakistani strategists believe that China will adopt a stance favourable to Pakistan. Also to be noted is that the USA President Clinton's statement in China assigning a role to that country in South Asia must have encouraged Pakistan to undertake Kargil misadventure. The US also tilted in favour of Pakistan in not imposing hard sanctions following the nuclear tests on the ground that its economy was weaker.

Another assumption Pakistan made was regarding Indian army. It believed that India was militarily weak and unprepared. It had lost its efficiency and was tired and frustrated fighting militancy inside Kashmir. Hence Indian army would not be able to respond adequately. Moreover, it

⁶⁷ D. Subachandran, Motives behind Kargil, *The Pioneer* (New Delhi), June 16, 1999.

would not be able to muster adequate forces with high altitude training and acclimatization to fight at Kargil heights.⁶⁸ Lt Gen Javed Nasir, former head of the ISI and the chief intelligence advisor to Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif wrote in early 1999, “The Indian army is incapable of undertaking any conventional operations at present, what to talk of enlarging conventional conflict”.⁶⁹ However, these Pakistani assumptions were belied and Indian army made a heroic effort and finally succeeded in defeating Pakistan's nefarious design. Their assumption regarding Zojila pass which links Kashmir valley with Kargil and remains snow bound for more than six months was also belied as it was opened for regular traffic and induction of troops in early May itself, on account of the unseasonal melting of snow.

Pakistan had certain motives for undertaking this large scale, well planned Kargil intrusions. Its politico-strategic motives included to alter the LoC and disrupt its sanctity by capturing unheld areas of Kargil and to achieve a better bargaining positions for the possible trade off against the positions held by India in Siachen.⁷⁰ However, the most important politico-strategic motive seems to be internationalizing the Kashmir issue and facilitating third party intervention.⁷¹ The immediate reaction of Pakistan,

⁶⁸ *From Surprise to Reckoning*, op.cit., n.30, p.91.

⁶⁹ Javed Masir, *Calling the Indian Army Chief's Bluff*, Defence Journal (Rwawalpindi), Feb. March, 1999.

⁷⁰ *From Surprise To Reckoning*, op.cit., n.30, p.90.

⁷¹ D. Suba Chandran, *Why Kargil? Pakistan's Objectives and Motivations*, in op.cit., n.3.

after Indian efforts to get rid of the militants from its soil proves this point. Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz requested the UN secretary General Kofi Annan to send a special representative who could 'reduce the ongoing tensions'. And this would lead to increase in the presence of UN military observers. Later Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a letter to U.N Secretary General stating that the rejection of third party involvement in the Kashmir dispute negated the global trend for peaceful settlement of conflicts.⁷² The second part of the strategy was embedded within the first one - provoke India to retaliate, so that the issue would automatically get internationalized. The fact that the infiltrators were armed with stinger missiles proved that they had anticipated air strikes as well.

The other motive of Pakistan was to sabotage the Lahore Declaration of February 1999.⁷³ The Lahore Declaration signed between the two countries was not liked by many in Pakistan particularly the fundamentalist organisations and the military. They believed that this Declaration has put the Kashmir issue on back burner. The Pakistani military establishment has vested interests in prolonging the Kashmir issue and has been opposing a peaceful and negotiated settlement. It is not a new phenomenon that Pakistani artillery shelling along the LoC increases whenever, peace negotiations start between India and Pakistan. Former

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Paul, Beersmans, *op.cit.*, n. 32, p.72.

Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto, on July 10, 1999 in a Star Television interview, accused Prime Minister Sharif of being party to the Kargil intrusions only to deflect public focus to an external issue and away from his mis-rule. She also said that Prime Minister Sharif was the political face of Islamic militancy but sought to project himself as a moderate to the U.S. leadership. The Pakistani press had also been critical of Sharif over various issues which include: the Karachi problem, the post-nuclear economic crisis, the Kalabagh Dam Project, the army chief's removal from office and the 15th Constitutional Amendment to impose Islamic rule and Governor's rule in Sindh.⁷⁴ Pakistani motives also included putting high financial burden on India and giving a setback to the revival of tourism in Kashmir. Besides these politico-strategic motives, Pakistan also had certain military/proxy war related motives.

The foremost military strategic objective of Pakistan was to interdict the Srinagar - Leh road by disrupting vital supplies to Leh.⁷⁵ This would outflank India's defences from the South in the Turtok and Chalunka sectors through unheld areas thus rendering its defences untenable in Turtok and Siachen. The bulk of supplies to the greater Himalyan region (Ladakh) come from Srinagar - Leh road (NH - IA). Possessing the mountains overlooking this road means possessing the control over the use

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.1076.

⁷⁵ *From Surprise To Reckoning*, op.cit., n.30, p.90.

of it and at the same time over the transport of the winter supplies for the whole region including Leh and the remote areas with a total population of about 200,000 inhabitants.⁷⁶

The other objective of Pakistan by occupying Drass and Kargil heights was to open up the LoC issue and get control over the Mushkoh valley near route for fresh infiltration, which would give boost to the insurgency in Kashmir.⁷⁷ In the recent past, the insurgency in Kashmir has been brought well under control, through continuous army operations. Life in Kashmir was returning to normal and the tourism industry in the state has been picking up steadily in the recent past. If the situation in Kashmir remained clam for long it would have been difficult for Pakistan to win global support on the issue. Hence it became essential for them to create trouble inside Kashmir.

Kargil Intrusion and the International Law

Pakistan's aggression in Kargil had a clear motive of occupying territories within the Indian side of line of control (LoC). This kind of action not only is totally unacceptable in civilized world, but also involves a disrespect for international agreement like the one of Shimla Agreement of 2nd July 1972, which highlights the absolute inviolability of the LoC.

⁷⁶ Paul Beersmans, *op.cit.*, n.32, p.68.

⁷⁷ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, *op.cit.*, n.33, p.98.

Article IV (ii) of Shimla Agreement (2nd July 1972) explicitly states "In Jammu & Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of this line".⁷⁸ This Agreement had been ratified by both countries. The only permissible way of altering or 'clarifying' is primarily by bilateral negotiations and peaceful means as may mutually be agreed (Article I (ii) of the Shimla Agreement).

Acts of use of force by Pakistan seeking to alter the LoC was a material breach of the Shimla Agreement (within the meaning of Article 60(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1970) and a grave violation of the principle of prohibition of force under Article 2(4) of the UN charter as well as under general international law.⁷⁹

Further, Pakistan was guilty of acts of unlawful use of force. The principle of prohibition of the threat of use of force is well enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN charter and reaffirmed in Article I (vi) of the Shimla Agreement and further elaborated by the 1970 Declaration on the

⁷⁸ V.S. Mani, Kargil Conflict: International Law Perspective in *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.3, nos. 3-4, (July-Dec. 1999), p.79.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, and the 1974 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression. It postulates the principles of inviolability of boundaries and the duty of every state "to refrain from organising or encouraging the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries for incursions into the territory of another state".⁸⁰

From the above analysis it becomes clear that Pakistan violated the well established international law and convention by unilaterally violating the LoC. The Kargil intrusion plan was construed by Pakistani military establishment but civilian government was also in picture. It had a well calculated military strategic objectives like-interdicting the National Highway IA, gaining territorial heights, giving boost to insurgency in Kashmir etc. It has been clearly established that the intruders involved were army regulars, irregulars and mercenaries and not 'freedom fighters' as claimed by Pakistan. The Indian intelligence agencies failed miserably to detect the intrusion in Kargil However, the heroic efforts of Indian Armed Forces forced Pakistan to withdraw its regulars and vacate the illegally occupied terrain of Kargil. But it took ten weeks long time and around 700 precious lives of our brave army personnels.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p.80.

Chapter - III

INDIA'S RETALIATION AND WAR IN KARGIL

India's Initial Reaction and Threat Assessment

As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Indian intelligence system failed miserably to detect Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil. The infiltrators were able to gain commanding heights and inflicted complete surprise to the Indian military. Three residents of Garkhun village were the first to spot the Pakistani intrusion on the morning of May 3, 1999 when through a pair of binoculars, they saw a group of men in pathan attire digging up bunkers. They immediately informed to a local detachment of the Army (3 PUNJ-AB). The Indian Army hastily sent up patrols to gain more information and evict the intruders. These patrols were ambushed and soldiers returned injured.

Initially the Indian establishment presented a confused picture and often gave contradictory statements. The army's initial assessment in early May was that Pakistan army regulars and trained *mujahideen* had infiltrated across the LoC and were occupying certain remote and unheld areas. Their number at this stage were unclear, estimated at about 200 to 300.⁸¹ The Defence Minister, George Fernandes, visited

⁸¹ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, "The Kargil War", in op.cit., n.3, p. 104.

forward areas on 12 - 14 May 1999 and was apprised of the situation. Defence Minister described the intrusion as sporadic and announced that army was well prepared to meet the situation. On May 16, 1999 he went on to assert that 'intruders will be evicted in 48 hours'. Next day he again asserted that army had cordoned off the area entirely and that military objectives would be realised within next two days.⁸² But the gravity of the ground situation was unknown to the Indian establishment. On May 21, 1999 New Delhi issued a strong warning to Pakistan to stop violating the LoC in Kashmir. In the first government reaction to the developments in Kargil, a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesman said that Pakistan's allegations that India had violated the LoC is a "brazen attempt by the Pakistan government to obfuscate the truth and camouflage its true intention".⁸³ In an attempt to carry out air survey of Kargil sector, one Canberra aircraft was dispatched. It was shot at and its engines damaged but it landed back safely at Srinagar. It reported that upto eight helipads could be seen on the Indian side of the LoC and there were a number of pockets of intrusions. It was perhaps then that the gravity of situation became evident.⁸⁴ On May 25, 1999, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen

⁸² Defence Minister George Fernandes Interview to *Sunday*, 13-19 June, 1999, Vol. 26, no.24, p. 24.

⁸³ *The Hindu* (Chennai), May 22, 1999.

⁸⁴ Vinod Anand, "India's Military Response to the Kargil Aggression", *Strategic Analysis*, October 1999, p. 1057.

V.P. Malik and Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis briefed the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and requested for the permission to use army and air power. The CCS agreed to it and it was ordered that the Armed Forces can take any action necessary to evict the intruders.⁸⁵ Operation Vijay was formally launched but it was to cover all the events from May 1, 1999. Meanwhile, on May 24, 1999, the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan spoke on telephone but the matters could not be resolved. Prime Minister Vajpayee told his Pakistani counterpart that “the situation is totally unacceptable to us and all possible steps will be taken to clear our territory of intruders”.⁸⁶

Kargil: A War with a Difference

Kargil war was different from the earlier war fought between India and Pakistan because of the enemy build up and harsh geographical terrain. The enemy was well positioned and firmly equipped and the geographical terrain was harsh on Indian side. The severing of the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh artery (NH-1A) that facilitated build-up of supplies and troops would have not only effected Leh and Siachen but also prevented side stepping of military resources to the

⁸⁵ Manoj Joshi, "The Kargil War: The Fourth Round", in op.cit., n.4, p. 44.

⁸⁶ *India Today* (New Delhi), June 7, 1999, p. 22.

Kargil sector once the battle was joined with the Indian forces.⁸⁷ When the battle commenced, the total Pakistani force level in Batalik, Kaksar, Drass and Mushkoh valley was assessed to be 800-900 regulars with 1,000 or so fighting porters. It was also believed that a similar number was waiting on the other side of the LoC to join the battle. This force was being provided with artillery support from across the LoC. The artillery component consisted of 25 pounders, 105 mm howitzers, 155 mm howitzers, 5.5 inch howitzers, 120 mm mortars and some 122 mm multi-barrel rocket launchers. However, the most potent force multiplier was the use of gun locating radar ANTPQ-37 that directed accurate counter-bombardment against Indian artillery gun positions in Drass and Kargil.⁸⁸

The level of preparedness of the Indian side, on the other hand, was extremely poor. Army lacked battlefield surveillance and gun-locating radars. This would have permitted accurate counter-bombardment of Pakistani artillery positions across the LoC and saved our troops from heavy casualties due to shelling.⁸⁹ Moreover, there were critical shortages of other equipments and essentials as well.

⁸⁷ Praveen Swami, "A Long Haul Ahead", *Frontline* (Chennai), July 2, 1999, pp. 11-13.

⁸⁸ Vinod Anand, "Politico-Military Dimensions of Operation Vijay", *Himalyas and Central Asian Studies*, Vol. 3, nos. 3-4, July-Dec. 1999, p. 6.

⁸⁹ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, "Lessons, Precepts and Perspectives", *op.cit.*, n.3, p. 148.

Indian army lacked critical aids like night vision devices (cost about Rs. 2 lakh a piece; shortfall about 700), commando equipment (worth Rs. 11 crore), Snowmobiles (Rs. 2 crore for 10) and rocket and grenade launchers (requirement: 5000 and 2000 costing Rs. 10 crore). Reports from the front suggest that the deficiencies included other mundane items like light-weight rucksacks, snow goggles, all-weather rucksacks and tents and hand-held thermal imagers. About 10 percent of the Bofors FH 77B medium guns were dysfunctional for want of spares.⁹⁰ This has never been the case between earlier Indo-Pakistan wars. Even in 1965 war India was in the process of modernisation of arm forces after the shock it received from Indo-China war in 1962.

This kind of acute scarcity, was because of the mismanagement of the country's defence spending in the past decade. There has been severe defence cuts, from 3.6 percent of India's GDP in 1987-88 to 2.33 percent of GDP in 1998-99. Vice Adm. (retd.) K.K. Nayyar, a member of the 1990 Arun Singh Committee on Defence Expenditure, claims, "The Kargil crisis is directly attributable to the starvation of funds for the armed forces during the 1990s".⁹¹ Since 1985, defence has been on virtual plan holiday. The Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 147.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 146.

90) for the Indian Armed Forces was cleared by the Cabinet only in 1989, rendering it ineffective. The Eighth Plan (1991-95) was never cleared and even the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) is yet to be approved. The situation had reached such a sorry state that an army requisition for low-intensity conflict equipment worth less than Rs. 50 crores had been awaiting approval of both Ministries of Finance and of Home Affairs since 1997. However, Kargil Review Committee does not feel that a paucity of resources was per se responsible for any lack of preparedness for the Kargil conflict. "Most items needed for the Kargil war were affordable within the available outlays. Such Operational voids as did indeed exist are attributable primarily to procurement procedures and cycle (which includes exploration of indigenous options before imports, finalisation of technical specifications, vendor identification, trials, etc.), prioritisation and the element of surprise in Kargil".⁹² Nonetheless, the Committee does concede that the actual defence expenditure has been below the amount required by the defence forces to perform efficiently the tasks allotted to them. "The inadequacy of resources has had an adverse impact on the modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces. The Committee feels that there is need to give a high priority to properly equipping infantrymen

⁹² *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report*, op.cit., n.3, pp. 181-182.

with weapons, equipment and clothing, suitable for the threats they are required to face in the region. Attention needs to be given to reducing the weight of weapons and stores they have to carry".⁹³

In addition to the military ill preparedness, another element that made the Kargil war different from the previous Indo-Pakistan war was the hardships posed by the harsh geographical terrain. The terrain had peaks with very steep gradients, which were difficult to climb even for mountaineers. The well-trained and well prepared and initially well motivated enemy in the four areas of Drass, Batalik, Kaksar and Mushkoh valley held these heights. At the commencement of operations, forces were inadequate in strength. To launch a deliberate attack against well prepared defences in the mountains, the attacker needs a favourable force ratio of almost 9:1 as against 3:1 in the plains.⁹⁴ Because of the heavy firing and artillery shelling of the well entrenched and well fortified enemy movement was only possible during bad weather or on moonless nights. Due to the difficult nature of the terrain, one could not even estimate the time it would take to conclude the operations. In the meantime, however, two favourable events occurred, which contributed to our military success. The

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Vinod Anand, *op.cit.*, n. 84, p. 1058.

opening of Zojila pass earlier in May and the availability of two infantry battalions which had been relieved from Siachen, enabled the Indian Army to contain the intruders initially and thus stabilise the situation.⁹⁵ All this had a bearing on military plans which were made to tackle the situation.

India's Military Plans, Aims and Objectives

India's military strategy in Kargil was based on three objectives. The first was to contain the enemy's pockets of intrusion and prevent their further build-up and consolidation. After having achieved this objectives, the second step was to evict the intruders and restore the LoC. The third and final step was to hold the ground so vacated and deny the same to the enemy. Indian Military planned to address the pockets of intrusions sector by sector in order of priority to threat to Kargil. The Drass Heights which dominated a very long section of the Kargil road and camping ground in Drass where the Brigade H.Q. is located, were the centre of gravity of the entire Kargil region. The clearance of the Drass Heights was, therefore, the first priority. Although Batalik did not pose any immediate threat to Kargil, it would have opened the route for further intrusions into the Nubra and Shyok valleys, thus, turning the flange of the Siachen sector. Therefore, this

⁹⁵ Ibid.

was allotted second priority. The last priority was allotted to the Mushkoh and Kaksar intrusions as they were considered less important and could be tackled once the Drass heights had been captured.⁹⁶

While clearing the objectives, the tactics were to soften up the enemy with fire assaults, carry out multi-pronged thrusts, surround the enemy and thereafter deliver the final strike in the shape of infantry assault. As a normal part of the battle procedure, a quick reorganisation at captured objectives was to be undertaken to ward off expected counter-attacks by the intruders.⁹⁷

Dialectics of Crossing the LoC and Military Options

While order was given to the Armed Forces to take any action necessary to evict the intruders, a boundary line was drawn of not to cross the LoC. Initially, the predicament prevailed of 'to cross or not to cross' but eventually, the government's carefully calibrated and ambiguous strategy of stating that "the LoC will not be crossed but it would be crossed if it became necessary in the supreme national interest" paid handsome political and diplomatic dividends.⁹⁸ There

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 1059.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Lt. Gen. (retd.) V.R. Raghavan, "The True Line to Defend", *The Hindu* (Chennai), July 30, 1999.

were three military options open to the planners for making the enemy recoil from its intrusions in Kargil. These were:

- (a) Cross the LoC in a suitable area anywhere along the length of 720 km.
- (b) Cross the LoC in the vicinity of the Kargil area of operations.
- (c) Open up another front along the international border as was done in the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965.

A critical examination of the military implications of the above possible courses of action would reveal that as the time passed, the military utility of crossing the LoC also diminished in direct proportion. By the end of May, Pakistan had started moving its reserve formations opposite the LoC. One division of the central strategic reserve and one division of the GHQ reserve were moved in to augment the Pakistani defensive posture all along the LoC.⁹⁹

The second option of crossing the LoC in the vicinity of the Kargil intrusions was also military unsound. The pockets of intrusions had a depth of 5 to 10 km. and were spread almost all along the entire sector. Pakistan had already sealed the gaps between intrusions across

⁹⁹ Vinod Anand, *op.cit.*, n.84, p.1060.

the LoC. Our penetration would have had to go through or in the near vicinity of the intruders. This would have invited heavy casualties, stretched our lines of communications and logistical resupply chain and compromised the element of surprise. Chief of Army Staff, Gen. V.P. Malik in an interview refuted the contention that had the army been allowed to cross the LoC, the casualties would not have been lesser. He further said "The option to cross the LoC was always open. Had our plans in Operation Vijay not borne fruit the way they did, we may had to consider that option".¹⁰⁰

The third option of opening up another front across the international border was also unsuitable at that time. In the earlier section we have discussed about the acute shortages of defence equipments. Further the cryptic remark of the COAS, Gen. V.P. Malik, that in case war is thrust on us, "We will fight with whatever we have" had a number of military implications and is a reflection on the state of defence preparedness.¹⁰¹ Thus, we lacked any significant conventional edge. Further, Pakistan having anticipated our moves, had also moved its defensive formations along the international border, which prevented the Indian Army from achieving an element

¹⁰⁰ Internet site - <http://www.redif.com/news/2001/July/26Enter.htm>.

¹⁰¹ Vinod Anand, *op.cit.*, n. 84, p. 1061.

of surprise. Any incursion across the international border would have most likely escalated the conflagration to such an extent that it would have invited the intervention of the international community. Crossing of either the LoC or international border, would have also changed the international community's perceptions about India being a mature nuclear power, which exercised utmost restraint in the face of extreme provocation by Pakistan. Thus not crossing the LoC turned out to be a sound decision not only politically and diplomatically but also militarily. By not crossing LoC India tried to mobilize the opinion of international community in its favour and sought to put pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its troops from across the LoC.

Nuclear Dialectics

During the course of conflict, particularly during the initial period, there were lots of nuclear rhetorics emanating from Pakistan. The course of events shows that nuclear factor played an important role in the military strategy planning in both the countries. As noted down in the earlier chapter, nuclear deterrence did work in the subcontinent since mid-80s. Nuclear deterrence was one of the important factor which prompted Pakistan to undertake Kargil misadventure. It also forced them to avoid escalation in the shape of either Pakistan using its air force or launching any other misadventure

anywhere along the LoC or international border. Talking about nuclear deterrence, Pakistan's Information Minister Mushahed Hussain said, "We hope India will not go beyond a point of no return. If we did not have the bomb India would have occupied Kashmir by now. That is what the bomb means: deterrence for security, for survival, for self defense".¹⁰² The statement seems exaggerated but it underlines the importance of nuclear factor in the minds of policy-makers.

The nuclear factor also imparted an impetus to the efforts of the international community in diffusing the situation by dealing firmly with the perpetrator of Kargil aggression. Throughout the conflict, India behaved as a mature nuclear power. However, India on its part, was also restrained from escalating the situation, perhaps, because of the nuclear factor in the background. The only incident of armed conflict between two nuclear nations was that of the Sino-Russian intense border clashes on the River Ussuri in 1969. This conflict also remained localised and did not progress beyond a point, perhaps because of the nuclear factor.

Highlights of Operation Vijay

The battles fought at Kargil rank among the most magnificent combat actions in the annals of war. The Indian Army made a heroic counter-attack operation which was supplemented by Air Forces and


¹⁰² "India Loses Helicopter Gunship in Kashmir", *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), May 29, 1999.

the Indian Navy. The first important battle in course of Operation Vijay was the battle of Tololing in the Drass region. Due to Tololing's domination over NH 1A, it was vital to capture this complex as early as possible, not only to prevent interdiction of the highway, but also to provide a launch pad for further operations. After initial setbacks, 18-GRENADIERS succeeded in establishing a firm base near the Tololing feature. The 2 RAJ RIF launched a multi-directional attack on Point 4590 and recaptured it on June 13, 1999. Soon thereafter, the unit recaptured Barbad Bunker. 18 GARHWAL RIF, 13 JAK-RIF and 1 NAGA were the tasked to recapture Point 5140.

The recapture of point 5140 was a turning point and set in motion a string of success. 18 GARH RIF recaptured Point 4700 on June 28, 1999, in the fiercest battle ever fought in this sector. Although 40 Pakistan's were killed, the casualties on the Indian side were quite high.

The next important battle was of Tiger Hill. Being conical in shape with few spurs and ridges Tiger Hill is the most dominating feature in the Drass sector. From here the well-entrenched intruders had directed precise artillery fire on the NH 1A and had restricted the movement of Army convoys carrying troops, ammunition and supplies. Three pronged attacks were launched. Three companies of 18 GRENADIERS began their climb, two from the eastern slope and one from the southeastern side. By 9 O'clock in the morning of July 4,


1999, the battle for Tiger Hill was over and the Indian Army had captured the peak. COAS Gen V.P. Malik said in an interview, "It was a tremendous achievement because Army was making simultaneous attacks for point 4875 and Tiger Hill and secondly, on the same evening Pakistani Prime Minister was to meet U.S. President Clinton at Washington".¹⁰³ He further adds that "once Tiger Hill was captured, it was clear to everyone that our victory was a matter of days. We were determined to win and our morale was high".



MAP 15: BATTLE OF TOLOLING.


Source: Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari (ed.), *Kargil: The Tables Turned*, 2001, p.111.

¹⁰³ Internet site, Crossing LoC V.P. Mallik. [http://www.redif.com/news/2001/July/26 Enter.htm](http://www.redif.com/news/2001/July/26%20Enter.htm).



MAP 16: TIGER HILL.

Source: Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari (ed.), *Kargil: The Tables Turned*, 2001, p.117.



MAP 17: BATTLE OF POINT 4875.

Source: Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari (ed.), *Kargil: The Tables Turned*, 2001, p.121.

Point 4875 is a strategically important feature which dominates a 20-25 km. stretch of the Srinagar-Leh road. Further, any move into the Mushkoh Valley from the east is dominated by it. The task of recapturing this strategic feature was given to 79 Mountain Brigade unit of 17 JAT, 13 JAK RIF, 2 NAGA, 12 MAHAR and one team of 21 PARA Special Force (SF) under command. The point 4875 was captured by 7/8 July. This sealed the fate of Pakistan Army's operations in the Mushkoh Valley and hastened their withdrawal from this sector.¹⁰⁴

In Batalik sector, the Pakistanis had intruded in large numbers and secured three main ridges. The early capture of these ridges was essential to dominate the Batalik-Leh route and prevent any realignment of the LoC. The point 4812 offered a foothold on the formidable khalubar ridge. 12 JAK LI was pressed into the attack on 30 June/1 July and they succeeded in capturing it on 6 July. Pakistan Army lost 26 soldiers. Next task was to take Khalubar complex where Khalubar summit is 5,287 m. high. The attack was launched by 1/11 GR less two companies on 2/3 July.

Khalubar was captured by 1/11 GR by 04:30 hours on 7 July after clearing 43 enemy-held bunkers. The Pak Army lost 34 soldiers

¹⁰⁴ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, "The Kargil War", op.cit. n. 3, pp. 120-25.

and many more wounded. On 7/8 July they also captured point 5287.¹⁰⁵ This major gain in the Yadar sub-sector led to the crumbling of Pakistani defences in this area. LADAKH SCOUTS was assigned the task of capturing Point 5000, Dog Hill and Padma Go. This was brilliantly carried out by the Indus and Karakoram wing of Ladakh Scouts and by 9th July, these features were once again under Indian control.¹⁰⁶

The attack on Jubar complex comprising point 4268, Jubar O P, Jubar Top and point 4927 was tasked to 1 BIHAR. They first took Point 4268. The Jubar Top was recaptured on 6/7 July and by 10.00 a.m. on 7 July Point 4927 was captured. By this the entire Jubar complex came under Indian control. This was a major blow to the enemy and led to the complete collapse of the Pakistani defences on the adjoining Kukarhang ridge. On the night of 8/9 July, 1 BIHAR captured Tharu, 1/11 GR captured point 4821 and Kukarhang, and 5 PARA took Point 4100 and Muntho Dhalo (Pakistan's principal supply base for the Batalik Sector).¹⁰⁷

The people of Turtok area had ethnic similarities with those living across the border. Pakistan had been making subversive

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 128-29.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 128-29.

attempts over a period of time to initiate insurgency in these areas and finally to integrate these areas with Pakistan's northern areas. Success would have cut off Siachen and the bases supporting it. A large cache of arms and ammunition was recovered and about 22 personnel taken into custody. Further Pakistani army attempted to intrude in this area and came upto 1 km. within the LoC. However, timely action taken by the Indian troops pushed back these intrusions and failed the Pakistan plans.

With the Nawaz Sharif-Clinton pact on July 4 at Washington, Pakistan announced the withdrawal of its troops on 11 July 1999. By the time 95 percent of area had been cleared off of the intruders due to relentless military action against the intruders. But except from the area of Kaksar, Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from the other sectors, therefore, every inch of territory had to be fought for. It did not pull out its troops from the following three positions: 1.

Mushkoh: a height called 'zulu'; 2. Batalik: a Ring contour near the LoC; 3. Drass: location called 'saddle'. Hence, relentless military operations had to be resumed with effect from 16 July and its troops had to be physically evicted. These three positions were captured by 25 July and Operation Vijay terminated on this date.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, "The Kargil War", op.cit., n.3, pp. 131-32.

Air Operations

The Indian Air Force (IAF) joined the Army in the conduct of Operation Vijay to destroy the Pakistani forces which had surreptitiously infiltrated across the LoC into the Kargil sector. The Air Force code-named its part of offensive 'Operation Safed Sagar'. At the very outset, it is important to understand the various inhibiting factors in launching air strikes during the Kargil conflict. The first was the location of battlefield in high mountains with rocky and snow-covered ridges where the enemy was not only deeply entrenched but has natural camouflage to his advantage. Furthermore, target acquisition in terrain interspersed with mountain tops, valleys, ridge lines, rocky saddles, gorges, rivulets and steep inclines was a most difficult task for an air force pilot flying a combat sortie at near - supersonic speed. Problems of identification between friend and foe and restraints on crossing the LoC were an added disadvantage.¹⁰⁹ The roar of the engines, provided the intruders with sufficiently 'early warning' for taking cover in the abundant niches in the rugged mountain face. Besides, the intruders possessed snow scooters and were highly mobile, making targeting difficult.¹¹⁰ The turning radius of the available aircraft was too great and the lowest speed too high. Moreover, the high attitude and the anti-aircraft missiles possession of

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Atul Aneja, "IAF Campaigns Enters New Stage", *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 10, 1999.

the enemy compelled the pilots to fire their weapons at the intruders bunkers while flying as high as 30,000 ft. about the mean sea level, considerably lessening the impact of the bombs, rockets and missiles.¹¹¹ The requisite intelligence inputs, essential for planning the air strikes, were also lacking, especially in the first few days of the aerial combat.

It was because some of these reasons that the Indian Air Force received certain setbacks during the initial period of operation. On 27 May, a MIG-27 piloted by Flt. Lt. K. Nachiketa crashed due to engine trouble forcing the officer to bale out. Sqn. Lt. Ajay Ahuja's MIG-21 that went to its aid was shot down, proving fatal for the daring pilot. The next day, a MI-17 freighter helicopter converted into a gunship was lost to a shoulder-fired stinger missile, killing its three crew members.¹¹² However, the Air Force recovered from these initial setbacks and from May 30, the IAF stepped up its air campaign by pressing into service state-of-the-art Mirage 2000 air craft for air strikes against the intruders.

The air strikes carried out by IAF played a vital role in supplementing the ground attack carried out by Indian Army. It softened the enemy positions, interdicted the lines of communications and destroyed logistic bases such as at Muntho Dhalo and Point 4388 in

¹¹¹ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, *op.cit.*, n. 3, p. 132.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

the Batalik sector, Tiger Hill, and the Tololing heights. It was perhaps for the first time that battlefield air strikes were carried out at night, thus, engaging the enemy relentlessly during both day and night.¹¹³ In its attempt to block the intruders logistic lines, IAF innovated and tried to create natural obstacles in the logistic pathways. For instance, the IAF painstakingly looked at cracks in the mountains, which when targeted from the air caused landslides in the target zone. Similarly, by probing soft zones, which when attacked, generated avalanches along the intruder support lines.¹¹⁴

The IAF played a remarkable role. During the entire operations, the Air Force flew 550 strike missions, 50 reconnaissance missions and over 500 escort sorties without mishap. At the same times IAF's campaign was extremely cost effective, in that it utilized only 25 percent of the assets under its western Air command.¹¹⁵ Kargil Review Committee feels that the operations of IAF had a far reaching consequences for the intruders. Not only did it send a strong signal to Pakistan that India would use all available means to evict the intruders, but it also had a strong impact on the course of the tactical battle in terms of the interdiction of Pakistani supply lines within

¹¹³ Vinod Anand, *op.cit.*, n.84, p. 1063.

¹¹⁴ Atul Aneja, *op.cit.*, n.110.

¹¹⁵ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, *op.cit.*, n.3, p. 134.

Indian territory, the damage inflicted on the Pakistani defences and the lowering of the morale of the intruders.¹¹⁶

Naval Operations

Once Operation Vijay got under way, the Indian Navy employed its satellites, reconnaissance planes and other modes of intelligence gathering to monitor the movements of the Pakistan Navy. This deployment was to ensure that there was no surprise at sea, as also adopt a deterrent posture. By early June 1999, units of the Eastern Fleet had joined the Western Fleet.¹¹⁷ Pakistan was surprised by the Indian Navy's deterrent deployment and cautioned its units to keep well clear of Indian Naval ships. The Indian Navy thereafter remained fully alert, oscillating from an "offensive" to an "offensive defence" posture. The Indian Navy also resorted to psychological operations by deploying units along the Makran Coast, which further put the Pakistan Navy on the defensive by making it escort Pakistani oil tankers between Karachi and Gulf.¹¹⁸ It is believed that the naval formations included all Ranjit class destroyers, some Godavari class frigates, one Kachin class destroyer, and Kilo class submarines.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ From Surprise to Reckoning, op.cit., n.30, p. 105.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 101.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, op.cit., n. 3, p. 137.

Thus, while the Indian Navy's endeavour was in consonance with the national effort to prevent escalation of the Kargil conflict, a high level of deterrence was maintained at sea by keeping the maritime front under close watch.

Casualties during the Conflict

The Indian forces suffered heavy casualties during the Kargil conflict. According to the official figures presented by the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes in Lok Sabha, there were about 594 Army personnel killed which includes 5 personnel from the Air Force; around 1,365 army personnel injured/wounded and 1 army personnel is missing.¹²⁰

There are various estimates of Pakistan Army casualties. Based on published material in Pakistan and Indian calculations, the lowest estimate of Pakistan Army casualties is 735 personnel killed, including 71 officers, 69 of whom have been identified by name. In addition, about 68 SSG and 13 ISI personnel were also killed. The dead bodies of 271 personnel were found, of which 8 were returned and the

¹²⁰ *The Hindu* (Chennai), Dec. 3, 1999.

remaining buried in the battle zone. The Pakistan Army authorities even refused to accept the dead bodies of their fallen soldiers.¹²¹

Human Dimensions and Displacement of Population

With the Kargil misadventure by Pakistan and the Indian retaliation, the worst sufferer has been the local population living all along the LoC in Kargil and Turtuk region. With the start of war and heavy shelling by the Pakistani forces, the people had fled leaving behind their standing crops, livestock and valuables. As has been noted in the previous chapter, the source of economy of these displaced areas is mainly dependent on agriculture, horticulture, livestock, tourist industry and labour work for defence personnel. The growing season is restricted to five months - May to September - due to severe winters and heavy snowfall.

The main affected areas were Garkon Valley, and National Highway between Baltal-Kargil. About 1848 and 3007 households were displaced respectively from these areas.¹²² A large proportion of displaced population included women and children. The total displacement during the Kargil conflict - 1999 was of 31,982

¹²¹ Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, *op.cit.*, n. 3, pp. 137-38.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

persons.¹²³ Their inhabitants were forced to shift to safer areas in the villages falling in the middle of the Surn valley, thereby forcing them to live as refugee for the whole producing season. When these people returned by September 1999, they found majority of the houses broken and dilapidated due to heavy shelling and the remaining houses developed cracks which were unsafe and unfit for living especially during extreme cold winter months. Livestock too perished, crops dried up and people had no income to purchase essential food items. "We just do not know what will happen. We have been assured help but whether this will be adequate to keep us going is doubtful", said Ali Musa a resident of Yourbattik. Mohd. Iqbal of Trankuchen village said, "I had 25 goats, two cows, one ox and one yak, when I fled the village on 13th May, now I have been able to recover only three goats and one cow from the mountains".¹²⁴

The Government of India tried to give some compensation to the victims of displacement in these areas. It provided them 7 kgs of rice 2 kgs of flour wheat and ten liters of Kerosene per family per month. The unemployed was to be provided with Rs. 200 per month and each family to get 10 quintals of wood.¹²⁵ But these

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ *Times of India* (New Delhi), September 18, 1999.

¹²⁵ Bupinder Zutshi, "Kargil Conflict – 1999: Human Dimension and Displacement of Population", in *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.3, nos.3-4, (July-Dec. 199), p.57..

rehabilitation measures were not sufficient enough to meet their requirements and a lot needs to be done. The most important is to improve transport facilities to get access to the remote areas of these regions.

Indian Retaliation and International Law

Kargil intrusion was the deliberate design of Pakistan to capture territory under India's possession and alter the status quo of LoC. In the last chapter we looked at the legal perspective of Pakistan's quest for others' territory. Here we will discuss about the international law perspectives of Pakistan's use of mercenaries for subversive activities in foreign land and India's right of self-defence in the wake of Kargil intrusion.

For indulging in subversive activities in foreign land, both the mercenaries and their employer state bear criminal responsibility under international law. The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1989, substantive provisions of which have since become part of general international law, interdicts states from recruiting, using, financing or training mercenaries. States have duties with respect to extradition or prosecution of mercenaries. All these are in addition to the fundamental duty of a state to ensure that

its territory is not being used to the detriment of another state.¹²⁶ However, Pakistan's involvement in the recruiting, training, financing and use of mercenaries across the LoC and the international border into the Indian territories has been a decade-old. But for the first time since the beginning of the Pakistan - engineered cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, the evidence of overt Pakistani involvement in the recruitment, training, financing and deliberate use of mercenaries across the LoC is overwhelming. Thus Pakistan bears both a delictual and criminal responsibility for employment of the mercenaries. Its Government has an obligation to bring to book not only the mercenaries but the high functionaries of the state (including the army) who used the mercenaries against India.

Now, comes the question of right of self-defence. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter speaks of "the inherent right (of every state) of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs" against it. The right of self-defence is fundamentally conditioned by the customary international law principles of necessity (of warding off attack), and of proportionality (the force to be used in self-defence not to be out of proportion with the danger to be warded off), besides

¹²⁶ V.S. Mani, "Kargil and International Law-II", *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 30, 1999.

respect for the principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.¹²⁷ "An armed attack", as the International Court of Justice held in the Nicaragua case, "must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force of such gravity as to amount to "an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces" or its substantial "involvement therein". It further rules that "in customary (international) law, the prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a state of armed bands to the territory of another state, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular forces".¹²⁸

The Declaration on Definition of Aggression also includes in the definition of aggression: (a) "The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the territory of another state, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack". (b) "Use of any weapon by a state against the territory of

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

another state", and (c) "an attack by the armed forces of a state on the land, sea, or air forces -- of another state" (Art. 3(a), (b) & (c)).¹²⁹

In view of the above, the acts of unlawful use of force by Pakistan against and on the Indian territory amount to acts of such sufficient gravity as to constitute "armed attacks" and India was well within its "inherent right of self defence" to take the necessary forcible measures to push out the Pakistani infiltrators and the accompanying mercenaries. These defensive measures include aerial bombardment of the posts occupied by these intruders on the Indian side of the LoC. It would have been within India's right to self-defence, had it decided to go across the line to destroy the supply bases that sustain the infiltrators on the Indian side of the line. The right of self-defence extends to the complete routing of the present danger, even keeping in mind the principle of proportionality.

The Indian Armed Forces responded magnificently to Pakistan's challenge and evicted the well-entrenched Pakistan Army from Indian territory. The young officers in particular and their troops did a splendid job on the ground. They displayed exemplary courage and extraordinary bravery. Some of them were awarded prestigious medals like *Paramvir Chakra*, *Mahavir Chakra* etc on account of their

¹²⁹ Ibid.

bravery. The Army units were given Unit Citations from Chief of Army Staff. It was these young officers and their troops that turned the tables in Kargil and paved the way for the grand success of Operation Vijay.

Chapter IV

INDIA'S AND PAKISTAN'S DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL REACTION DURING KARGIL

The May-July months of the year 1999 were marked by intense diplomatic efforts by both India and Pakistan to win over the international community in their own favour. Given the nuclearisation of the subcontinent and danger of Kargil war escalating to nuclear level, the concern of the international community was obvious. Both India and Pakistan placed their respective viewpoints about the Kargil crisis and tried to gain international support. But the international community led by major powers made an objective assessment of the crisis and pressurised Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. This chapter intends to make an analytical study of the diplomatic efforts of India and Pakistan and the reactions of international community, particularly the major powers. The reaction of Kargil crisis in India and Pakistan has also been dealt with.

Pakistan's Diplomacy during Kargil War

Emboldened by the international support and sympathy of the major powers, particularly the United States (US) and the West European nations in earlier Indo-Pakistan wars. Pakistan expected a favourable international response during the Kargil crisis. Infact, one of the important motives of

Pakistan behind undertaking Kargil misadventure was to seek international intervention in Kashmir. It made intense diplomatic efforts to convince world leaders about her viewpoint and seek their support. Some of the main contentions that Pakistan wanted international community to recognise were - that those occupying the strategic heights in Kargil were not Pakistan's army regulars but "Kashmiri freedom fighters"; that Pakistan had no control or influence over them; that the LoC is not demarcated; that the Indian military retaliation in Kargil posed a threat to Pakistan's security; that the Kashmir issue had to be resolved through the effort of international community; that any steps for easing the tension should start with India halting military strikes in Kargil etc. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif maintained close contact with the world leaders by writing letters, sending special envoys, talking over phone, and through foreign tours. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen Pervez Musharraf, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself visited China to discuss and convince Chinese leaders about the Kargil crisis and the prevailing tensions along the LoC. Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz visited Africa to brief the conference of Foreign Ministers of Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries in Burkina Faso regarding the escalation on the LoC. Special envoys were sent to foreign countries. Prime Minister Sharif wrote letter to all the G-8 leaders before their meeting at Colonge (Germany). However, all these active diplomatic

efforts proved futile. Given the irrefutable evidences of Pakistan's involvement in Kargil intrusion, international community refused to accept the Pakistani version of the crisis. In turn, they put heavy diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to withdraw its forces from across the LoC. As a result Nawaz Sharif rushed to US and signed Washington Agreement with President Clinton on July 4, 1999, committing himself to withdraw from Kargil.

Indian Diplomacy during the Kargil War

Indian diplomatic efforts were also intended to gain international support in the Kargil war. Government of India also maintained close contacts with the main leaders through telephone, envoys and letters. Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote letters and talked over phone to world leaders several times explaining India's position on Kargil. India's National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra travelled to Geneva to brief G-8 leaders. He also visited Paris for consultations with US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger.¹³⁰ India's Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath talked to his British and French counterparts in London, during which he made it clear that the Indian military action at Kargil was intended to restore the status quo ante on the LoC, and that western worries about escalation should be addressed to Pakistan.¹³¹ India made it clear to the international community

¹³⁰ *The Times of India* (New Delhi), June 19, 1999.

¹³¹ *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 10, 1999.

that her sole objective was to force back the intruders and get her territory vacated, either militarily or diplomatically. Exercising utmost military restraint in not crossing the LoC and successfully exposing Pakistan's direct involvement in Kargil intrusion, India gained the sympathy and favour of international community. Indian diplomacy was Kargil specific and twin edged. At the one hand, it sought international pressure on Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil, on the other hand, it stressed the need for bilateralism in resolving Kashmir issue. C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Analyst of *The Hindu*, argues that the Indian readiness to explore non-military options to vacate the infiltration, even as it stepped up its military offensive, has been a key element in influencing international perception on Kargil.¹³² In the following pages we would delve into the reasoned account of the response of major powers to the Kargil conflict.

International Response to Kargil Conflict

US Response

One of the most significant development during the Kargil conflict was Washington's surprisingly positive attitude towards India. Being the sole superpower and major international player, US played a vital role in influencing the opinion of international community about the Kargil conflict. It was not for the first time that Pakistan has committed blatant

¹³² C.Raja Mohan, 'The US and Kargil', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 10, 1999.

aggression in Kashmir by initially dispatching groups of trained and equipped 'intruders' and subsequently using its military force. Similar was the Pakistani tactics in 1947-48 and in 1965. The United States approach on both these occasions was to project an image of neutrality and imposed arms embargo on both the parties. In the 1971 war the US even threatened India to intervene in war on behalf of Pakistan.

Unlike in the past, the Clinton Administration took up a position on the Kargil issue clearly acknowledging Pakistan's hand in it. US insistence, that Pakistani forces should withdraw to the LoC, had in many ways altered the international dimensions of the Kargil crisis. "For once, the US has put world peace above its geopolitical compulsions".¹³³ It undercut one of Pakistan's principal assumptions in embarking on the misadventure.

In the initial reaction to the Kargil crisis, US said that 'the Pakistani's are plainly to blame for having started the fighting. Karl Inderferth, then Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, in an interview on May 30, 1999 said "clearly, the Indians are not going to cede this territory that militants have taken.... They have to depart and they will depart, either voluntarily or because the Indian take them out."¹³⁴ The US considered those who had infiltrated as 'militants' and not as 'freedom

¹³³ *The Indian Express* (New Delhi), June 7, 1999.

¹³⁴ Quoted in N.C. Menon, 'Ultras will have to Go: Inderfurth', *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), May 31, 1999.

fighters', as Pakistan preferred to call them. It also believed that removal of the militants from the Indian side of the LoC was essential to bring back peace.

Perhaps US was not aware of the extent of infiltration initially, in terms of numbers of the infiltrators and the area that they held on the Indian side of the LoC. Besides, it wanted the issue to be sorted out between the two countries based on the Lahore Declaration.

The US several times refuted the Pakistani contention that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has no control over the forces which crossed the LoC at Kargil. At the very outset it acknowledged the fact that the genesis of the crisis lay in Pakistan's adventurism. US State Department spokesman James Foley said that the US believes that Mr. Sharif and his government had control "over the Pakistan guerilla fighters, who are on the wrong side of the LoC".¹³⁵ Another official maintained that there "may be a handful of the Islamic militant irregulars known as 'mujahideen' with the troops, but most of the invaders are regulars from the 10th corps of the Pakistani Army".¹³⁶

Regarding Pakistani contention on LoC American official, Mr. Bruce Riedel, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the

¹³⁵ Internet site. US acknowledges Pakistan Control over the infiltrators.

¹³⁶ Chintamani Mahapatra, 'US Approach to Kargil conflict', in *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.3, nos. 3-4, (July-Dec. 1999), p.88.

Near East and South Asia at the National Security Council, refuted the Pakistan's contention that LoC is not fully demarcated. He said, "We think LoC has been demarcated over the years. The two parties have not previously had significant differences about where the LoC is. We think that means in practice that the forces which have crossed the LoC should withdraw to where they have come from". He said the reaffirmation of LoC was 'very-very important!'.¹³⁷ Regarding Pakistan's charges that India was using Chemical weapons in the Kargil conflict, the US State Department spokesman, Mr. James Rubin said "we have seen press reports of Pakistan accusing India of using Chemical weapons in its fighting. We have no evidence to support this assertion'.¹³⁸

By June 20, 1999, the US decided to send General Anthony Zinni to Pakistan. The Zinni and Lampher mission marked the beginning of serious efforts by the US to defuse the crisis in Kargil. It might be because of the US realisation of the gravity of situation, rising military temperature along the LoC and international border, growing evidence of Pakistan's direct involvement, Pakistan's unrelenting attitude and increasing public pressure on Government of India to give a befitting response to Pakistan's intrusion. All this had the potential to escalate conflict and situation spin out of control.

¹³⁷ Sridhar Krishnaswami, 'LOC demarcated long ago, says US', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 9, 1999.

¹³⁸ 'US reject Pakistan claim on Chemical arms', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 17, 1999.

The main objective of the Zinni-Lampher mission was to ask Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators from the Indian side of the LoC. While Zinni and Lampher were in Pakistan, James Rubin said, "we want to see withdrawal of the force supported by Pakistan from the Indian side of the LoC". They met the Chief of Army staff, Gen. Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. After the meeting Gen. Zinni said, "Pakistan should withdraw the Kashmiri freedom fighters from the mountain peaks they have occupied across the LoC."¹³⁹ There were two significant outcomes of this mission. First, the announcement by Gen. Musharraf of a meeting between Nawaz Sharif and President Clinton. Second, the sending of the former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Naiz A. Naik, as a special envoy to India on a secret visit. Lampher then came to India to brief the Indian Government on what had transpired in Islamabad between the American delegation and the Pakistani government.

The next significant event was Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's sudden visit to US for a meeting with President Clinton. The following factors would have contributed to Sharif's sudden visit to the US. First, the increasing military pressure from the Indian side because of their successful operation in capturing majority of the heights. Second, the failure of Pakistan on the political front. Third, the increasing economic

¹³⁹ Quoted in D.Suba Chandran, 'Role of United States: Mediator or Mere Facilitator', in op.cit., n.3, p.206.

pressure on Pakistan. By the end of June, according to a Washington Post-report, the US had plans to withhold the \$100 m. disbursement that the IMF was planning to release in the next few days if Pakistan failed to make serious efforts for pulling out its troops.¹⁴⁰ Fourth, the international isolation of Pakistan on Kargil issue.

The Clinton-Sharif meeting lasted for almost three hours, and ended with a Joint statement. According to it (i) The president and the Prime Minister agreed that respecting the LoC in Kashmir in accordance with the Shimla Agreement was vital for the peace in South Asia; (ii) Concrete steps to be taken for the restoration of the LoC; (iii) Immediate cessation of hostilities; (iv) The Lahore process was the best forum for resolving all issues dividing India and Pakistan, including Kashmir; (iv) The President would take 'personal interest' in resumption of bilateral dialogue; and (v) The President would pay an early visit to South Asia.¹⁴¹

This agreement was the turning point in two-month-old crisis. Clinton succeeded in defusing the crisis by making Pakistan agree to the withdrawal of troops from the Indian side of the LoC. Even more significant was the decision to resolve all issues between India and Pakistan (including Kashmir) on the basis of the "bilateral dialogue begun in Lahore". With the signing of the Washington Agreement, Government

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.214.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.216.

of Pakistan contradicted its earlier stands. In agreeing to restore the LoC's sanctity, Sharif conceded that there was an LoC which had been breached. By signing the pull-out agreements Sharif too in effect acknowledged that an intrusion had taken place and that he had authority over the 'infiltrators'. The other myth shattered was that of the autonomy of the intruders. Later Pakistan awarded medals to personnel of the 12 Northern Light Infantry, which amounted to acceptance of the fact that its Army regulars were involved in the intrusion.¹⁴²

A clear cut stand taken by US in Kargil and successfully exerting pressure on Pakistan to withdraw from the Indian side of the LoC was one of the most significant development during the Kargil conflict. While actively involving itself in diffusing the Kargil crisis, US repeatedly made it clear that it was not 'mediating' between India and Pakistan but merely 'facilitating' both the countries to bilaterally resolve their disputes. Reacting to media's apprehensions regarding President's 'personal interest', a senior administration official said '.... The President is going to take a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of these bilateral efforts'.¹⁴³ There had been several reasons for the apparently significant change in US attitude towards India during the Kargil crisis.

¹⁴² Arpit Rajan, 'India's Political and Diplomatic Responses', op.cit., n.3, p.283.

¹⁴³ Quoted in D. Suba Chandran, op.cit., n.3, p.217.

Firstly, keen desire of the US to build a new strategic relationship with India. The preparedness to treat India and Pakistan differently and its relations with each country on merit, Kargil provided the basis for building new confidence between New Delhi and Washington.

Secondly, with the advent of nuclear weapons, the Clinton administration believed that the rules of engagement in the subcontinent had fundamentally changed. The US believed that a 'nuclear flash point' in South Asia could only be prevented through stability of Indo-Pakistani relations and anything that undermines this process must be dampened. Third, the Clinton administration had high expectations from the Lahore Process to end the extended bitterness in India-Pakistan relations. It believed that the Kargil aggression undermines the Lahore Process and must be quickly resolved.¹⁴⁴

Many analysts argued that the recent stand of US on Kargil marked a 'paradigm shift' in Indo-US relation. However, it would be inappropriate to term a 'paradigm shift' of Indo-US relation on a singular instance. Washington's response to New Delhi was event specific and it always encouraged India to exercise restraint in evicting the intruders. According to Kanti Bajpai, "Washington's reaction to Kargil is basically concerned with stability in the region. It wants to ensure that the current conflict does

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

not snowball into a full-fledged war in which either side opt to use nuclear weapons. US realises that Kashmir as an international issue is fast losing its importance and so it has stopped showing extra interest and has reverted to its position of asking both sides to exercise restraint and settle the issue through negotiations".¹⁴⁵ Yet Kanti Bajpai feels that US has not been as critical to Pakistan as it could have been. J.N. Dixit, former Foreign Secretary of India, points out that "American support of India is event-specific. If the conflict in Kargil escalates, Washington will be as harsh on us as it has been on Pakistan".¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, US played a very vital role in influencing world opinion in favour of India in diffusing the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan.

The Kargil crisis and the G-8

The stand taken by the G-8 countries was also in the line same as that of Washington. The G-8 stand had also a significant effect in diffusing the Kargil crisis as it confirmed Pakistan's isolation. Moreover, the Pakistani economy was kept afloat by support from the G-8 countries and from the International monetary institutions in which they have a decisive say. The G-8 communique relating to Kashmir released at Cologne on 20 June 1999 states, "We are deeply concerned about the continuing military confrontation in Kashmir following the infiltration of armed intruders

¹⁴⁵ Ashaya Mukul, 'It' no big deal', *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), June 13, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

which violated the line of control. We regard any military action to change the status quo as irresponsible. We, therefore, call for the immediate end to these actions, restoration of the line of control and for the parties to work for an immediate cessation of the fighting, full respect in the future for the line of control and resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration".¹⁴⁷

One of the very important significance of the G-8 communique was that it made the LoC inviolable like any international border. This is in line with the Simla Agreement, where Bhutto had not only agreed 'to change the ceasefire line into a line of control ... but also agreed that the line would be gradually endowed with the characteristics of international border.'¹⁴⁸ Although the G-8 communique did not name the aggressor, it clearly implied who the aggressor was. Also, the public statements made by individual members of the G-8, particularly France and Russia, clearly stated Pakistan as the aggressor. There has been multitude of reasons, particularly the recent developments in the subcontinent, which made G-8 to take a clear stand on Kargil favourable to India. Three most important of them are:

First is the issue of nuclearisation of the subcontinent. Pokharan II and Chagai forced the global community to reconsider its policies towards

¹⁴⁷ 'G-8 Condemns' Violation of LOC', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 21, 1999.

¹⁴⁸ Sunil Narula, "Bordering on the Impossible", *Outlook*, vol.V, no.26, (July 12, 1999), p.42.

nuclear proliferation, more particularly in the subcontinent. Second, the bus diplomacy and the Lahore Declaration was a significant initiative. That a Hindu hardline party like the BJP could strive to do this was remarkable to many Western analysts. This laid the foundation for subsequent change in Western reaction. The world chose to support India only because it was sincere in its efforts to bring peace and was stabbed in the back. Thirdly, the undeniable role of Pakistan in the entire Kargil operation like the release of taped conversation between Pakistan's COAS Gen. Pervez Musharraf and the Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Muhammad Aziz, recovery of identity cards of Pakistan's soldiers etc. This accentuated global disenchantment with Pakistan and led to its isolation.

Chinese Response to Kargil War

China was one of the countries whose views had great significance for both India and Pakistan. It was the centre of high level visits of both India and Pakistan. Both countries' Foreign Ministers visited Beijing in June, although the visit of Pakistan's Foreign Minister was sudden, that of Indian Foreign Minister was planned much before the Kargil intrusion was detected. Later on Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also visited Beijing for consultations. But throughout the conflict China adopted a balanced and neutral stand on Kargil issue and advised both India and Pakistan to maintain restraint. "It was China's continued posture of

neutrality that seem to provide the most decisive input in convincing Pakistan leadership of futility of armed intrusion in Kargil and their attempt to internationalise Kashmir, that paved the way for Clinton-Sharif accord in Washington on July 4, 1999".¹⁴⁹

Chinese position on Kargil was perhaps most aptly summarized by a reported statement by China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan during his meeting with his Pakistani counterpart Sartaj Aziz during later visit to Beijing on June 11, 1999. Tang said: "The Kashmir issue is a complicated affair with a long history and should be, and could only be, solved through peaceful means China hopes Pakistan and India will find an effective approach to bringing about a political solution to the Kashmir issue through negotiations and consultations".¹⁵⁰ In his meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji described Kashmir as a "historical issue involving territorial, ethnic and religious elements which require to "be solved only through peaceful means" and the initiatives for this were expected to come from Islamabad and New Delhi.¹⁵¹

Jaswant Singh's Beijing visit did not come in the context of the Kargil crisis, but was intended to undo the strained Sino-Indian relation after the Pokhran II test. He, discussed number of issues including

¹⁴⁹ Swaran Singh, 'China's response to Kargil conflict', in *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, vol.3, nos. 3-4, (July-Dec. 1999), p.98.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.33.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

confidence Building Measures (CBMs) along the Line of Actual control with his Chinese counterpart. Only a passing reference was made to the Kargil conflict.

The Chinese stand of neutrality during Kargil War was in contrast to the Chinese stands during earlier Indo-Pak wars. China issued veiled threats to physically intervene in Indo-Pak war in 1965. Similarly, during the Indo-Pak war of 1971, China had called India adventurist, expansionist and aggressor and both Gen. Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had publicly declared that, if need be China could militarily intervene in support of the Pakistan. Till mid-80s China asked for 'self-determination' of Kashmiris. But in Kargil conflict Chinese stand surprised everyone.

There are many reasons that determined Beijing's posture of neutrality while dealing with Kargil issue. First, with the end of cold war, Pakistan had lost its strategic place in the global power equations. It had also repeatedly defied Beijing's advice on its foreign and defence policies and initiatives like nuclear tests in 1998, missile tests etc., which has caused embarrassment to Beijing. Secondly, given China's own recent diplomatic stand-off with the United States following congressional allegations of Chinese stealing US nuclear and missile technologies, the growing Chinese suspicion of such a conflict like Kargil would lead to a possible western intervention on its southern frontiers. Thirdly, the renewal

of US military alliances in Asia, most notably with Japan and Australia, the new American engagement with Korea and its dominance in promoting reconciliation in Korean Peninsula, and fresh US military arrangements in South East Asia raised Chinese fears of 'US westward progress' in containing China. This was reinforced by US led NATO expansion close to Beijing border in Eurasia and Pakistani support to it. Fourthly, on the security front, the huge American lead in advanced conventional military technologies, and new US focus on building theatre missile defence that could downgrade the effectiveness of Chinese nuclear forces, generated new concerns in Beijing. Fifthly, Pakistan's failures to curb the activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups who have been reportedly involved in ethnic problems in China's Xinjiang province. Sixthly, given the Chinese aspiration to become a superpower and its growing urge for a multipolar world, it required a balanced and responsible approach compromising short-term gains. Seventhly, Chinese fear that an anti-India stand would tilt India in favour of US. Further, the American influence in Pakistan could enhance its ability to encircle China.

United Nations and Kargil War

Pakistan, while planning for Kargil, expected UN to intervene in Kashmir. At the very initial stage of the conflict, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wrote a letter to Secretary General Kofi Annan, stating that

“India's reckless actions along the LoC have created a dangerous situation in the region”, whilst adding that the United Nations should immediately send observers to monitor area and strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan.¹⁵² India got assurance from the US, Russia, France and UK that they would not raise the issue in United Nations Security Council. Kofi Annan admitted that Pakistan had crossed the LoC and volunteered to send observers. He also spoke to Prime Minister Vajpayee, whose response was, "we are the aggrieved party as our land is being occupied. We have not started the war".¹⁵³

Reactions from other Countries

Russia was the first country to come out openly in support of India by a categorical declaration that it would fail Pakistan's bid to internationalise the Kashmir issue, whilst reiterating its supports for New Delhi's action against the infiltrators in Kargil. The Russian Foreign Ministry said, "we insistently urge Islamabad to refrain from the violation of the terms of well known bilateral accords relating to agreed LoC between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Any attempt to change this line may lead to serious consequences. Under the circumstances the withdrawal of armed groups beyond the LoC and the restoration of status quo ante

¹⁵² Quoted in Arpit Rajan, India's Political and Diplomatic Responses, op.cit., n.3.

¹⁵³ 'Pakistan Crossed LOC says UN Chief', *The Hindu* (Chennai), May 30, 1999.

would contribute to lowering tension in the region to a considerable extent'.¹⁵⁴

France firmly rejected the idea of foreign intervention and an external solution to resolve the flare-up in Kashmir. Rejecting the idea of Kosovo type solution to Kashmir, French External Affairs official said, "There can be absolutely no comparisons between the crisis in Kosovo, which involves over one million refugees... to the situation in Kashmir, which is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. We cannot superimpose the solutions that we have for Kosovo in Kashmir".¹⁵⁵

The Japanese reaction was not the same throughout the conflict. Initially, on June 1, 1999 Japanese Foreign Minister called India and Pakistan to 'promptly cease their hostilities', which meant endorsing Pakistan's position to stop fighting even if intruders were across the LoC. On June 8, this changed to Japan seeking a 'halt the hostilities as soon as possible'.¹⁵⁶ Later on, at G-8 meeting, Japan sided with other leaders, with some reservation but unanimously passed the G-8 communique on Kargil. The other day Japanese Embassy in New Delhi clarified, "as a genesis of the escalation of fighting since last month, the militants have crossed the

¹⁵⁴ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Recall militants, Russia Tells Pak", *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 18, 1999.

¹⁵⁵ 'Kashmir is not Kosovo: France', *Pioneer* (New Delhi), May 30, 1999.

¹⁵⁶ F.J. Khergamvala, "Sino Indian ties enter crucial stage", *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 15, 1999.

line of control to the Indian side. Japan, however, does not have sufficient means to verify whether these militant which have infiltrated into the Indian side are backed by the Pak regular forces".¹⁵⁷

The reactions from Muslim world were also not favourable to Pakistan. Apart from initial offers of mediation by Egypt and Iran and the usual performative statements of concern at escalating tension, there has not been much of the reaction from Muslim world to the Kargil developments. The Iranian offer of mediation was because of it being the chairman of Organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) and Kargil contains large Shia population. Egypt offer probably stemmed from its perception that both India and Pakistan considers Egypt a friend. But Saudi Arabia played an important role in persuading Pakistan to swallow the bitter pill of retreat. The highly influential Saudi Ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan is believed to have played a key part in the consultation between Washington and Islamabad that led up to the US -Pakistan Joint statement on July 4.¹⁵⁸ Vice President Mr. Krishna Kant on his visit to South Africa briefed African leaders about the Kargil crisis and India's rationale behind the use of military operation. Thus, the reactions of major powers and organisations belied Pakistani assumptions of gaining international intervention in its favour. Hardly any sympathy was shown for Pakistan's

¹⁵⁷ 'Japan Clarified on Kargil', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 17, 1999.

¹⁵⁸ C.Raja Mohan, "Saudi Role in Kargil Endgame", *The Hindu* (Chennai), July 9, 1999.

cause and it became diplomatically isolated. Apart from indulging in proactive diplomacy to gain international favours, India and Pakistan also remained engaged with each other. The Indo-Pakistan's diplomacy towards each other is also an interesting aspect of the Kargil conflict.

India and Pakistan's Diplomacy towards each other

The diplomatic channels in India and Pakistan remained open throughout the Kargil conflict. The sole motive of the Indian establishment was to get vacated the Pakistan occupied territories inside the Indian side of LoC whether through military means or diplomatic channels. At the very beginning of the army operation in Kargil. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee called his Pakistani counterpart and said, 'the situation is totally unacceptable to us. All possible steps will be taken to clear our territory of intruders.'¹⁵⁹ The Director General of Military Operations also talked to each other over phone, but the matter remained unsolved.

With the growing military pressures from India and the international pressure to call back its troops, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif offered to send his Foreign Minister Sartar Aziz to New Delhi to defuse the tension, provided India agrees to stop air-strikes. India made it clear that Aziz was welcome for talks, but air strikes in Kargil would not stop. However Sartar Aziz visit to New Delhi did materialise but he came with

¹⁵⁹ *India Today* (New Delhi), June 7, 1999, p.22.

inflexible attitude. Foreign Office Spokesman, Brig Rashid Qureshi, said that 'the LoC is delineated on map but not fully demarcated on ground'.¹⁶⁰ Questioning the existence of LoC was a part of a larger Pakistani game plan to first claim that the LoC was not delineated and then alter it to suit its strategic interests. This was strongly refuted by India and other powers. India said, "LoC is well defined and fully settled. We would like to make it clear that the comments relating to LoC made by Pakistan Foreign Minister cannot be subject for discussion".¹⁶¹ Moreover, Mr. Aziz said that the Jihad for Kashmir had been going on for ten years and that these things "keep happening". He added, "it is a local problem and should be locally handled".¹⁶²

In his meeting with Indian foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, Mr. Aziz gave a three-point formula to defuse the crisis - (i) a cease-fire, (ii) a joint working group to review the LoC and demarcate it on the ground, and (iii) an invitation to Jaswant Singh the following week for further talks.¹⁶³ India promptly rejected these suggestion which would have altered the LoC to Pakistan's advantage and question the Shimla Agreement which is one of the foundation pillars of Indo-Pak relations.

¹⁶⁰ 'Pak. Officials echo Aziz remarks', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 8, 1999.

¹⁶¹ 'LoC is fully Settled Issues', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 5, 1999.

¹⁶² 'India Rejects Pak Proposal, Refuses to Halt Strikes', *Statesman* (New Delhi), June 13, 1999.

¹⁶³ Arpit Rajan, India's Political and Diplomatic Responses, in op.cit., n.3, p.192.

Thus, Mr. Aziz's visit to New Delhi failed to break the stalemate over Kargil. However, analysts point out that the real agenda of Pakistan behind Mr. Aziz's visit was to publicise its benevolent intention of 'peace' and putting the blame of 'trouble-makers' on the Indians. In fact, with the failure of Aziz's visit Pakistan expected the international community to intervene in Kashmir.

India and Pakistan also remained involved in 'back-channel diplomacy' during Kargil conflict. According to media reports, two Indian envoys - R.K. Mishra, Editor -in-chief of Business and Political observer, and Mr. Vivek Katju, Indian Foreign Ministry Official, made a secret visit to Lahore and met Pakistani Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Pakistan reciprocated these steps by sending former Foreign Secretary, Niaz Naik to New Delhi who met Prime Minister Vajpayee and National Security Adviser, Mr. Brajesh Mishra. But some-how the news of this secret visit was leaked to the press from Islamabad and this 'back channel failed to achieve its end'. Nevertheless these formal and informal engagements made significant contribution in convincing Pakistan of its folly and India's determined resolve to evict the intruders.

Domestic Reaction of Kargil in India

Kargil intrusion was seen in India as a betrayal and breach of trust that was established by India and Pakistan in recently concluded Lahore

Declaration. Prime Minister Vajpayee told Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartar Aziz during latter's visit to New Delhi, "we will get back our territory, but the trust is gone for ever".¹⁶⁴ However, after the initial surprise and setback major political parties and people rallied behind the Government's attempt to evict the intruders. The Congress-I, main opposition Party, supported the military action in Kargil and the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution pledging its support to the government efforts to rid 'our sacred motherland' of infiltrators as well as condemned the 'naked aggression' by the Pakistani forces. It also criticised the government of being 'astonishingly negligent and complacent' in allowing national security in this sector (Kargil) to be breached.¹⁶⁵

The Communist Party of India (CPI) and its associates also criticised government of being complacent but supported military strikes. Almost all the Opposition Parties wanted the government to call a session of the Rajya Sabha as the Lok Sabha was dissolved. The Prime Minister kept the political parties informed about the developments in Kargil through All-Party meetings and press briefings.

Indian population also backed the government in its endeavour to evict the intruders. Gradually, the ambience became charged and peoples' reaction became more vocal with the rising number of casualties of Armed

¹⁶⁴ *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 14, 1999.

¹⁶⁵ 'Congress supports strikes, slams government', *News Time* (Hyderabad), June 2, 1999.

Forces. Pakistan's unapologetic attitude, increasing evidence of Pakistani regulars involvement, the return of mutilated bodies of 6 member patrolling team led by Saurav Kalia, cold blood murder of Sq.Ld. Ajay Ahuja etc.–all these put intense pressure on Government of India to give a befitting reply to Pakistan.

There were no communal riots in India and the minority community was equally vociferous in condemning Pakistan's aggression in Kargil. People across the country took out procession and held mass prayer and burnt the effigy of Pakistani leaders. Many volunteered to go to Kargil to help Indian Armed Forces. Government employees contributed their one day's salary to the Kargil Relief Fund and Blood Donation camps were organised. Star shows and events like football matches etc. were organised to collect funds for the relief of Kargil victims. Days were observed as 'national awakening day' to rouse patriotic feeling.

Role of Media

Kargil conflict was India's first war in media society. It played a very important role. The Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik lauded media's contribution to the war effort and for generating national resurgence. Twenty four hour satellite news channels brought the images and sounds of war in real time to our drawing rooms. The media gave minute by minute breathless coverage of the battle for Tiger Hill and other heights. It transformed the popular mood. The mass media's impact on boosting

morale, national resurgence and patriotic fervor, saw the armed forces stroke up a chorus of praise for media's role as 'force multiplier'.¹⁶⁶ Commercial break recited poignant tributes to brave soldiers. Newspapers and magazines reported the war and became participants, running war funds, providing food and drink and satellite phones for the valiant soldiers. Events like the relatives of soldiers receiving the bodies of their dead, airing the interviews of war widows, the Sardhanjali procession etc. were endlessly relayed on television.

However, media at certain time indulged in irresponsible reporting. It unleashed a force of jingoistic nationalism and fizzy patriotism. It humanised and glamourised war. Whole Pakistan became the enemy whereas Kargil Plan was construed by very few in Pakistan. Moreover, Coordination between media and armed force was not always fair. Facilities and briefing arrangements were limited. There was no media cell to assist reports. The Kargil Review Committee feels that 'more regular and wider high-level background briefings to editors, senior reporters and military commentators should be planned in future for a war situation, and these briefings should be heed from time to time, even in Proxy-war situation'.¹⁶⁷

Domestic Reaction of Kargil in Pakistan

¹⁶⁶ Rita Manchanda, 'Covering Kargil: South Asia's First 'Meida War', in op.cit., n.4, p.74.

¹⁶⁷ *From Surprise to Reckoning, The Kargil Review Committee Report*, op.cit., n.30, p.216.

The reaction of Pakistani people was mixed. The radicals lauded the Pakistan's government's intrusion in Kargil while moderates were apprehensive. Similar to what had been the case of earlier wars between India and Pakistan, myths about low Indian morale and Indian reverses at the battle front created by Pakistani establishment made its people believe that the *mujahideen* who occupied strategic heights in Kargil were Kashmiri 'freedom fighters'. It was publicised that the *mujahideens* were fighting a heroic battle and were inflicting reverses to the Indian army. Some in media tried to portray Kargil as 'Siachen in reverse'. Pakistan Television indulged in anti-India propaganda and hyped war psychosis, created panic in the border lying areas, resulting in exodus by a larger number of people from these areas. According to the migrating people, Pakistan had been claiming major success by the infiltrators backed by it in Kargil sector. PTV and radio came out with horrifying details about the intensity of conflict and heavy casualties on the Indian side. "This has caused some weak hearted people to vacate their homes as the memories of 1965 and 71 wars, which caused major damage here (Punjab), are still alive among the people", said a resident.¹⁶⁸

Gradually, with turn of events, people and media in Pakistan became critical of the Government of Pakistan in handling the Kargil issue. Most irritating was the military reverses in Kargil and diplomatic isolation

¹⁶⁸ 'Pak. Propaganda sparks exodus in Punjab border', *The Hindu* (Chennai), June 19, 1999.

of Pakistan. The exposure of irrefutable involvement of Pakistan in Kargil, news of Indian army winning back their posts, isolation at the diplomatic fronts, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rushing to US to sign Washington Agreement etc., brought dismay to the Pakistani people. Intelligentsia, retired military officers and media became critical of the Kargil operation and Sharif's immature handling of the situation. Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistan's ambassador to US and the then Chief Editor of the *Newsline*, wrote, "The ill-planned adventure in Kargil comes to an ignominious end. The Kargil affair has exposed systematic flaws in a decision making process that is impulsive, chaotic, erratic and overtly secretive"¹⁶⁹. Air Marshal Noor Khan, former Chief of Air Staff, told the *News*, "There is no justification for this operation having taken place at all. Pakistan has continued to make similar mistakes (since 1947) and has not learnt any lesson from the blunders that its ruling cliques have been committing."¹⁷⁰ Air Marshal (retd.) Asghar Khan, former Chief of Air Staff told *The Nation* that, "In fifty-two years of its existence Pakistan has fought four wars with India without a clear objective"¹⁷¹.

The Washington Agreement between Nawaz Sharif and President Clinton was particularly criticized in media. The day after this agreement

¹⁶⁹ Quoted in Jasjit Singh (ed.), *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War in Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1999, p.285.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.286.

was signed, Pakistan dailies were flooded with the Government criticism in its handling of the Kargil affair. *The Nation* in its editorial wrote, “The point to ponder for our policy makers in Islamabad is: why was Kargil initiative taken in the first place if it had to be abandoned in such a hasty and humiliating manner?”¹⁷² Veteran journalist Ayaz Amir, in the *Dawn* wrote, “The Kargil adventure was ill conceived..... In planning it the army high command substituted fantasy for a sense of reality.... As an attempt at permanently occupying the Kargil heights, it was madness if only because no country, whether India or Pakistan, would tolerate such a naked trespass into territory under its control”.¹⁷³

Pakistan People's Party, the main opposition party, in a very strident statement decried the Sharif regime for its 'foreign policy failure' and for Pakistan being named intruder. Jammāt-i-Islami members observed that day (July 6, 1999) as a 'black day'. The militant organisation slammed the international community for its 'unbalanced approach. Hafiz Muhammad Sayeed, Chief of Lashkar-e-Toiba, one of the 'Jihadi' group that infiltrated in the Kargil-Dras Sector said, "we are not going to withdraw even an inch from Kargil at the request of [the] United States or Pakistan".¹⁷⁴ However,

¹⁷² Amit Baruah, “Pakistan Press Flays Joint Statement”, *The Hindu* (Chennai), July 7, 1999.

¹⁷³ Ayaz Amir, “Victory in Reverse”, reproduced in *The Hindu*, July 12, 1999.

¹⁷⁴ 'No retreat from Drass or Kargil: Militants', *Asian Age* (New Delhi), June 8, 1999.

because of intense international pressure Pakistan was forced to swallow the bitter pill of retreat from Kargil in India.

All these decreased the credibility of Nawaz Sharif government and made it unpopular. The “Nawaz go” movement started to gain momentum. It was this Kargil fiasco that provided the background for the military coup in Pakistan.

Thus, we see that Pakistan’s motives to annex some territories in Kashmir and seek international intervention were proved unrealistic. The Kargil war helped in changing the perspectives of the international community towards the subcontinent. It also brought international recognition of the inviolability of the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.

Chapter - V

CONCLUSION

The Kargil war in May-July 1999 manifests Pakistan's continued obsession with the Indian state. It was a concerted plan by Pakistan to annex Kashmir valley on the basis of religious affinity. Pakistan's intrusion in Kargil was the continuation of the same strategy adopted by it since 1947. Soon after independence Pakistan sent armed tribal raiders backed by Pakistani military to capture Kashmir. Encouraged by the achievements of the minimal objectives of putting the question of the state on the negotiating table and retaining some 86,023 sq. km of territory (known as Pakistan occupied Kashmir), Pakistan embarked on the same strategy in 1965. This time also armed irregulars were sent to create havoc in the valley, while the conventional forces attempted to cut communication and supply lines. The strategy of proxy-war and support to militancy in Kashmir since 1989 has also been intended to create terror in the valley. The intrusion in Kargil intended to annex the valley was the next logical step of a decade old proxy-war in Kashmir. The objectives of all the three above mentioned operations (in 1947, 1965 and 1999) were the same- Kargil and Drass received adequate attention and the conventional

operations sought to cut off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of the country.

While planning and executing the Kargil intrusion Pakistan made certain assumptions. These assumptions were practically the same in all the wars that Pakistan had waged against India since 1947. Altaf Gauhar focuses on one of them which seems to run at the core of the military minds and reinforces their ethno-religious superiority syndrome, that “the Indians are too cowardly and ill-organised to offer any effective military response which would pose a threat to Pakistan” if Pakistan attacks India.¹⁷⁵ The Indo-centric mindset of the Pakistani Strategists, particularly the military, has continued since 1947. Partition on the basis of the two-nation theory and the creation of Pakistan, much smaller than the unrealistic grandiose visions and much bigger India, created a crisis of identity which fuelled frustration. Kashmir’s accession intensified the identity crisis. Failure to grab it by force in 1947 and in 1965 when India was seen to be demoralised and weak, exacerbated the frustrations. Inability to establish a sound political system, an equitable social economic order and the perpetuation of self-interest of the ruling elite, particularly the military, added to distorted perceptions. The break-up of Pakistan in 1971 intensified the grievances

¹⁷⁵ Altaf Gauhar, “Four Wars and one Assumption”, *Nation*, September 5, 1999.

against India to the extent of generating a deep desire for revenge. The battle for Siachen and failure to achieve its objectives through Proxy-war added to their frustrations. Thus, strong feelings in Pakistan over Kashmir since 1947 is the manifestation of Pakistan's frustration as a nation that has yet to achieve conceptual fulfillment. Kargil operation was intended to avenge the earlier defeats, gain some territory and boost insurgency in Kashmir.

The Kargil war was the first war fought between India and Pakistan over Kashmir when both the state were under democratic rule. Nawaz Sharif became the most powerful elected political leader in the history of Pakistan after 1997 election. No doubt Kargil operation was the mastermind of Pakistani military, but the civilian government was informed about it and the final go-ahead was given by Nawaz Sharif. This shows that democratic Pakistan would not be less militant than the military ruled one simply because the army still remains the most vital component of Pakistan's political system. It has been in their self-interest to keep the anti-India propaganda perpetuated down to the masses and Kashmir issue at the forefront. Pakistani military has reconstructed its status as the guardian of the frontiers and of the ideology of the state. Through its regular intervention, military has thwarted the attempts of democratic governance

to take roots in Pakistan. Any accommodation towards India is interpreted by the military as a 'sell out' to India. Similar interpretation was made about Lahore Declaration and Kargil operation became imperative for Pakistan's military to maintain its dominant status over the ever increasing power of Nawaz Sharif.

The Kargil operation was meticulously planned and brilliantly executed. Pakistan armed forces along with the armed mercenaries intruded upto 7 to 8 kms in the areas of Drass, Kargil, Batalik and Mushkoh valley and captured the strategic heights. The total number of armed regulars were believed to be 900 and 1000 fighting poters. This intruded force was provided with artillery support from across the LoC. But the Indian army gave a heroic fight. They displayed rare courage, bravery, grit, determination and commitment and successfully evicted the intruders within ten weeks period. The heroic fight of our armed forces belied Pakistan's strategic assumptions and motives. Under the prevailing nuclear deterrence India proved that the limited war was not only fightable but also winnable, particularly if the other side was willing to keep it limited and win under those circumstances. The nation remained united and stood behind the efforts of armed forces.

Pakistan's bid to internationalise Kashmir issue and international intervention in its favour received a major set back during the Kargil war. The overt nuclearisation in the subcontinent did brought international attention to the Kargil war, but it worked against the Pakistani game plan. The Kargil episode exposed Pakistan's nefarious designs and its role in promoting insurgency in Kashmir. The major powers including United States, Britain, France, Russia, G-8 countries refused to accept the Pakistani version of the Kargil and asked Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the other side of the line of control (LoC). China also refused to support Pakistan and demanded inviolability of the LoC. The international community maintained unrelenting diplomatic pressures on Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil. The military reverses at the battle front and substantial international pressure forced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to rush to United States and sign Washington Agreement on 4 July 1999- promising to restore LoC and ease tensions with India. This was a very significant event. Never before has the international community, particularly the major powers, made such an objective assessment of Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. The Kargil war helped to change the perceptions of international community towards the subcontinent. India gained the impression of mature, peace-loving and responsible nuclear

power. International community appreciated the restraints observed by India during the Kargil conflict. On the other hand, Pakistan's hobnobbing with fundamentalist groups and terrorism was exposed. It stood diplomatically isolated and its credibility as a mature state drastically decreased.

The Kargil conflict had a significant and lasting impact within India and Pakistan. It clearly exposed Pakistan's agenda and its direct involvement in the ongoing militancy in Kashmir for more than a decade. The Kargil fiasco intensified the tussle between the political system and the military leadership. The ever increasing power of Nawaz Sharif was seen by Army as creating 'imbalance' in the internal power structure of Pakistan. As the war at the heights of Drass-Kargil-Batalik area commenced, Pakistani establishment started creating myths – that the *mujahideen* had occupied territory across the LoC in Ladakh; that the Pakistani army had no involvement except on the Pakistani side of the LoC where it was valiantly defending Pakistan; that the *mujahideens* are fighting heroic battle and giving hard blow to Indian armed forces; that Pakistan had won a “great victory” in Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir etc. They tried hard to sustain these myths. However, in due course of time as the truth filtered out, a strong condemnation of all those responsible started to

emerge. The irrefutable evidence of the involvement of Pakistan regulars in Kargil, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rushing to Washington and agreeing to withdraw militants from Kargil, the Director General of Military Operations of Pakistan negotiating the disengagement of militants in Kargil, Pakistan authority first denying and then accepting the bodies of any personnel killed in Kargil etc. - all these contradicted the official position of Pakistan. It dismayed its people. Eminent people in Pakistan started to question the very rationale of the Kargil operation. Senior retired military persons were highly critical of the adventure. As the negative reaction started to build up, the army, on the one side, and the political establishment, on the other, started to pass the responsibility to each other, with both claiming that they had been correct. This caused intense fissures in the civil-military relationship in Pakistan. The Kargil debacle, Pakistan's isolation in the international system, the increasing economic hardship of the people – all these made Nawaz Sharif's régime unpopular in Pakistan. This provided the backdrop against which the attempted civilian coup and military counter-coup then unfolded. As a result, today Pakistan is under military dictatorship of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the mastermind of Kargil.

It is worth noting here that similar kind of myths had been created by the Pakistani establishment in earlier Indo-Pakistan wars over Kashmir

and the consequences had been of same nature. Pakistan's defeat in 1965 war and the consequent signing of Tashkent Agreement made Gen. Ayub's regime unpopular and he was forced to abdicate. Similarly, after Pakistan army debacle in 1971 war and the consequent signing of Shimla Agreement, Prime Minister Bhutto's hold over Pakistan steadily eroded and Gen. Zia seized power in 1977. All this reveals the fragility of civilian power in Pakistan.

The Kargil war also had a significant and long lasting impact in India. It once again demonstrated the unity of Indian nation against several diversities. People across the wide spectrum stood firmly and unitedly behind armed forces' attempts to evict the intruders. However, Kargil war also exposed several flaws in the working of our system. There was gross intelligence failure. Indian civil and military intelligence failed to warn the nation about Pakistani game plan in Kargil. The intelligence agencies work at the level of news gathering and news assessment. Our discussion in Chapter Two shows that the evidences of Pakistan's growing attention in Kargil sector had been available with the military intelligence agencies. However, its significance was not assessed properly and the information was not delivered to proper agencies. The Kargil Review Committee

rightly talks about the overhauling and systematisation of our intelligence apparatus.

The Kargil conflict also exposed our ill-equipped military. It showed the total unpreparedness of India against a very well equipped enemy. Indian Air Force flew across the globe to make emergency purchases worth about Rs. 2000 crore such as winter clothing, snow shoes, snow goggles, thermal clothing, snow mobiles, bullet proof vests, gun locating radars, surveillance equipments, spares and even huge quantities of ammunition for various calibres of artillery guns.

The Kargil episode has left many lessons to learn, particularly in defence field. The level of defence preparedness and modernisation of armed forces remains unsatisfactory. There is an urgent need of hike in defence budget and speedy modernisation of armed forces and technical equipments. Technical monitoring of line of control is imperative. Acquisition of high altitude unmanned air vehicle (UAV), which would enable aerial monitoring of the LoC, is extremely important. UAVs are far less constrained by weather conditions. Institutional arrangements should be made to ensure that the UAV imagery generated is disseminated to the concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible. Ground sensors

could be used for technical verification. We need to place optical, video, motion and thermal sensors in the camps and posts vacated during the winter months to ensure the lack of human presence in them. Radar, seismic and acoustic sensors would have to be employed to verify Pakistani air activity.

There is a need to set up an integrated defence intelligence agency to co-ordinate the activities of different intelligence agencies in our country. Their working system to be examined and improved. Our defence budget needs to be raised upto 3 to 3.5 percent of GDP and the money available to be efficiently used. This is high time to revamp national security, we must have a long term perspective of national security needs and an holistic approach. Key ministries should set up strategic planning division and should be well co-ordinated.

As has been discussed in chapter I that sub-conventional conflict - proxy war - low intensity war, terrorism etc. proceeding at multiple levels below the conventional threshold under the nuclear umbrella are likely to continue. Our army had been engaged in counter-insurgency operations for over a decade in Kashmir and for many years in other parts of India. According to Defence Ministry sources, at present, 72,000 defence

personnel are directly employed in counter insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir, while about 97,000 are deployed in north-eastern states. This is not good for armed forces and national security in the long run. The armed forces should be relieved from such policing tasks and the para-military forces and police services must be revamped for this purpose.

Kargil war was the first media war in South Asia. Media played a crucial and positively supportive role. It served as a force multiplier leading to a national upsurge. The wide television coverage brought the war to our drawing rooms. It was because of media that the billion-strong population of the country, from the urban centres to the remote rural hamlets, shared the triumph and tragedy of this war, and associated themselves almost individually with those fighting an almost impossible war and winning it. But in the process it also unleashed a force of nationalistic Jiongism. Kargil war proves that there is a need for greater interaction between the armed forces and the media. Military men, especially the Officer class, need to be oriented in the means and methods of sharing information with the media without creating awkward situations.

As has been noted in Chapter One Kashmir has always been a symbol and not the basic cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict. Gen. Pervez

Musharraf's recent admission that even if Kashmir dispute is resolved, Indo-Pak relations will remain far from cordial proves this point. Pakistan's hostility towards India is rooted in its deep internal divisions, crisis of self identity, incoherence as a state, divergent process of nation-building, politics of revenge etc. The elite and the ruling sections of the society has perpetuated this anti-India feeling to the psyche of masses.

The aftermath of Kargil conflict has seen rise in terrorist activities in Kashmir. Paramilitary and military headquarters have been attacked. The targets on innocent civilian has increased. The fidayeen attacks have become more common. It has been reported that a number of new militant organisations had mushroomed in Pakistan during Kargil conflict, and an alliance of some fourteen such groups has been formed. Pakistan's deep involvement in spreading terrorism in Kashmir continues. However, the dangers for these developments are to Pakistan itself. The empirical evidence reveals that countries in South Asia which have supported terrorism and militancy in their neighbours have discovered that these adventurous policies have ultimately recoiled upon themselves. Therefore, it is imperative for Pakistan to shun these activities.

The Kargil conflict has left its imprint on the future of Indo-Pakistan relationships. The Lahore Peace process had been derailed and an atmosphere of mistrust and animosity prevails. An attempt was made at Agra between leaders of India and Pakistan to clear their misunderstandings and put Indo-Pakistan relations back on track, but it remained inconclusive and till today Indo-Pak stalemate continues. India wants Pakistan to stop active arms support to militants operating in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts in India, dismantle terrorist camps located in Pakistan and end cross-border terrorism. But Pakistan on the other hand, refuses to fulfill these conditions. It wants India to recognise Kashmir as a 'disputed territory' and the 'core issue' between India and Pakistan. Moreover, it expects India to accept the solution of Kashmir dispute on the basis of plebiscite referred in UN Resolution on Kashmir, 1948. The situation has become increasingly alarming in the last few months, particularly after the terrorist attacks on Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly on October 1, 2001 and on Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. The armed forces of both the countries are on high alert and at eyeball-to-eyeball contact along the international border and Line of Control. The road, rail and air traffic remains suspended. Their

ambassadors has been called back and the strength of staff in High Commission reduced to half.

The current Indo-Pak impasse is not good for the region. So, the problem is how to dilute this atmosphere of mistrust and animosity. It is a well said dictum that one can change his friend but cannot change one's neighbour. Kargil conflict is the latest reminder of the dangers, costs and risks of war. Cordial and friendly relationship between India and Pakistan is a must for the socio-economic development of this region. Both countries should take steps to clear their misunderstandings.

There are ways to resolve Kashmir issue peacefully and bilaterally. Scholars from both the countries have provided many alternatives to resolve this issue. It can be implemented provided mutually agreed by both sides. But for this India and Pakistan have to restart the dialogue process. The prevailing atmosphere of mistrust and hostility has to be cleared. Certain confidence building measures (CBMs) should be resorted to in order to restore trust and confidence on each other. Some of these can be:- conventional force reduction treaty, particularly along the border areas; promotion of Track II diplomatic efforts, widening interaction between professional group in the two countries like doctors, lawyers, teachers, and

legislators, easing of visa restrictions and more people to people contacts and search for ways to enlarge bilateral trade relations.

Both India and Pakistan should find ways to increase interdependence on each other which could be beneficial in their socio-economic developments. For example, by construction of oil and gas pipelines from Iran and Central Asia to India and other SAARC countries through Pakistan could entitle Pakistan significant income from transit charges and reduce the transportation cost for India. Sale of surplus power from Pakistan to India could solve the chronic shortage of Northern Grid in India and can help in establishing industries and factories in this region. In the long run it could be extended into a power generation and sharing arrangement by the construction of hydro power projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgystan. Large schemes for power generation in Nepal and Bhutan are also possible, which could be shared by India and Pakistan.

Thus, the list of socio-economic and political benefits of cooperation between India and Pakistan is very large. What is required is sufficient will and determination to pursue the path of peace and friendship with honesty and sincerity. Only this can thwart the occurrence of any other Kargil in future.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

- India, Government of, *From Surprise to Reckoning, The Kargil Review Committee Report*, (New Delhi: Sage Publication, December 1999).
- India, Government of, *Pakistan's War Propagation's Against India*, (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1951).
- India Government of, *Twelve Months of War in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1948).
- India, Government of, *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1948).
- Pakistan, Government of, *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute* (Karachi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990).

Secondary Sources:

Books:

- Akbar, M. K., *Kargil: Cross- Border Terrorism* (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 2000).
- Amin, Shahid M., *Pakistans's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Ayoob, Mohammed, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh - Search for New Relationship*. (New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1975). .

- Bajpai, Kanti, Afsir Karim and Amitabh Matto, *Kargil & After: Challenges for Indian Policy* (New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 2001).
- Baweja, Harinder, *Kargil: The Inside Story*, (New Delhi: Books Today, 2000).
- Biju, M.R., *India's Foreign Policy: Towards a New Millenium* (Jaipur: National Publishing House, 2000).
- Bindra, S.S., *Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkant to Simla Agreement* (New Delhi: Deep&Deep Publications, 1981.)
- Chakraborty, A. K., *Kargil: The Inside Story*, (Noida: Trishul Publications, 1999).
- Chari, P.R. & Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema *The Simla Agreement: Its wasted Promoses* (New Delhi :Manohar Publications , 2001).
- Chaudhary, Srinjoy *Despatches from Kargil*, (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000).
- Choudhry, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India* (New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1971.)
- Cohen, Stephen P., *India: The Emerging Power* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).
- Cohen, Stephen P., *The Pakistan Army* (New Delhi: Himalyan Books, 1984).
- Col. Nanda, Ravi, *Kargil: A Wake up Call* (New Delhi: Lancer's Book, 1999).
- Col. Nanda, Ravi, *Kashmir and Indo- Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi: Lancer's Books, 2001).
- Col. Sarkar, B., *Pakistan Seeks Revenge and God Saves India: A Study of Indo- Pakistan Conflicts*. (New Delhi: Batra Book Services, 1997).
- Dixit, J.N., *Across Borders: Fifty Years of India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Ltd., 1998).
- Dixit, J.N., *Indian Foreign Policy: And Its Neighbours* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2001).
- Dutt, Sanjay, *War and Peace in Kargil Sector* (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 2000).

- Dutt, V.P., *India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984.)
- Gangualy, Sumit, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pak. Conflicts Since 1947* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1988).
- Gen. Krishna, Ashok and Chari, P. R., *Kargil: The Tables Turned* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2001).
- Grover, Verinder(ed) *Encyclopaedia of SAARC Nations*, vol.2 (Pakistan), (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1997.)
- Grover, Verinder and Rajnath Arora (ed), *Partition of India, Indo-Pakistan Wars and the UNO* (New Delhi :Deep & Deep Publications, 1999.)
- Grover, Verinder and Rajnath Arora, (ed), *World Community and Indo-Pak relations*, (New Delhi :Deep and Deep Publications 1999.)
- Gupta, Sisir, *Kashmir: A study in Indo-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House; 1967).
- Harrison, Selig S., Paul H. Kreisberg, Deunis Kux (ed.) *India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years* (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.1998).
- Hewitt, Vernon, *The New International Politics of south Asia*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press U.K. 1997.)
- Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers).
- Jha, Prem Shanker, *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- Kadian, Rajesh, *Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1992).
- Kargil: The Crisis and its Implications, The Current Debate-I* (New Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1999).
- Kumar, D. P., *Kashmir: Pakistan's Proxy War* (Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001).
- Lt.Gen. Kaul,.B.M., *Confrontation with Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971).
- Maj. Gen. Verma, Ashok Kalyan, *Kargil: Blood on the Snow- Tactical Victory Strategic Failures* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2002).

- Margoles, Eric S., *War at the top of the world: The struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet* (New York: Routledge, 2000).
- Mizaumi, Haider K., *The Roots of Rhetoric! Politics of Nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2001).
- Mukherjee, Amitava, *India's Policy towards Pakistan*, (New Delhi: Associated Book Centre, 1983.)
- Prasad, Rajendra (ed.) *India's security in 21st Century: Challenges and Responses* (New Delhi: Dominant Publishers and Distributors: 2002).
- Rajan, M.S., *Studies in India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1993).
- Rikhye, Ravi, *The Fourth Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1984*(New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1982.)
- Rizvi, Hasan Askari, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (2nd ed.) (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1976).
- Sahni, Sate, *Kashmir Underground* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publication, 1999).
- Saksena, Ajay, *India and Pakistan Their Foreign Policies* (Delhi: Amol Publications, 1987.)
- Sawant, Gaurav C., *Dateline Kargil*, (New Delhi: Mac Millan India Limited, 2000).
- Sharma, R.N, V.K. Sharma & R.K. Mishra, *The Kargil War: A Saga of Patriotism* (Delhi: Shurbhi Publications, 2000.)
- Shivam, Ravinder K., *India's Foreign Policy Nehru to Vajpayee* (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2001).
- Singh, Jasjit (ed.) *Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Knowledge world, 2000).
- Singh, S.Nihal, *India, Pakistan and the USA*, (New Delhi: The New Statesman Press , 1989.)
- Sreedhar and Bhagat Nelesh, *Pakistan: A Withering State* (Delhi: Words Smites, 2001).

Surjit Manshingh, *India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi Foreign Policy 1966-82* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984.).

Swami, Praveen *The Kargil War* (New Delhi: Left word Books, 1999).

Talbot, Ian, *India and Pakistan* (London : Arnold Publication 2000.)

Wani, Gull Mhd. *Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects* (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1993).

Articles:

Ahmad Ejaz, "Towards Normalisation: India-Pakistan Peace Process 1997-98", *Occasional Papers, South Asian Affairs* (New Delhi), Vol.III, No.3 December 1998.

Anand, Vinod, "Military Lessons of Kargil", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), Vol. 23, No. 6, September, 1999, pp.1045-50.

Anand, Vinod, "Poitico-Military Dimensions of Operation Vijay", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 3-4, July- December, 1999, pp.3-47.

Bahadur, Kalim, "India Pakistan Relations in the 21st Century", *World Focus* (New Delhi), Vol.19, No. (10-12), October-December, 1998 pp.33-37.

Bahadur, Kalim, "Kargil and Pakistan's Domestic Politics"; *World Focus* (New Delhi), Vol. 20, No, 6-7, June-July 1999, pp.35-37.

Beersmans, Paul, "Kargil Conflict: An Eye Witness Account", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 3-4, July-Dec. 1999, pp.65-75.

Chandha Behera, Mavnita, "State making, Weak States and Foreign Polcies: A comparative Perspective of India and Pakistan", *BISS Journal* (Bangladesh), Vol.17, No.8, January 1996, pp.75-95.

Chandola, Harish, "Kargil Crisis: Why the Delay in Repossessing Pots After First Skirmishes", *Mainstream* (New Delhi), Vol. 37, No. 25, 12th June 1999, pp.7-8.

- Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, "Kashmir Dispute and the Peace of South Asia", *Regional Studies* (Islamabad), Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1996-97, pp.170-88.
- Deshpande, J. V., "After the Conflict: Focus on Kashmir", *Economic and Political Weekly* (Mumbai), Vol. 39, No. 29, 17-23 July 1999, pp.1984-86.
- Dixit, J.N., "Pakistan's India Policies: Role of Domestic Political Factors", *International Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.32 No.3, July-September 1995, pp.229-36.
- Dubey, Muchkund "Kargil Crisis: Limits of Diplomacy", *Mainstream* (New Delhi), Vol.37, No. 30, 17th July 1999, pp.7-8,30.
- Ganguly, Sumit, "Oppurtunity for Peace in Kashmir?" *Current History* (Philadelphia), Vol. 96, No. 614, December 1997, pp. 14-19.
- Gilmartin, David, "Partition, Pakistan and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.57 No.4, November,1998, pp.1068-95.
- Gujral, I. K., "South Asia: The Coming Decade", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol. 38, No. 6, January 20, 2000, pp.7-9.
- Haider , Ejaz, "India Pakistan and Kashmir: Dramatic Reversal", *World Today*, Vol.58 No.2, February, 2002, pp.5-6.
- Hasan, Mubashir, "Pakistan, India and the US", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol.40 No.9, February 16, 2002, pp.34-35.
- Hasan, Mubashir, "Kargil: Scattered Realities", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol. 37, No. 32, July 31, 1999, pp.9-12.
- Helsbourg, Francois, "Prospects for Nuclear Stability Between India and Pakistan", *Survival*, Vol.40 No.4, Winter 1998, pp.77-92.
- Hilali, A.Z., "Kashmir: A Dangerous Flash Point in South Asia", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol.31, No.2, April-June 1999, pp.65-74.
- Huque, Mahmudul, "US Relations with India and Pakistan: The Post-Cold War Trends", *Regional Studies*, (Islamabad), Vol.15 No.2, Spring 1997, pp.67-85.

- IDR Research Team: "OP Topac: The Kashmir Imbroglio", *Indian Defence Review*, (New Delhi), July 1989, pp.35-48.
- Jafar, Dabal "Kargil Cliffhanger", *Himal*, (Kathmandu), Vol.12, No.7, July 1999, pp.14-16.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, "Kargil", *Seminar*, (New Delhi), Vol. 479, July 1999, pp.15-19.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, "Pakistan's Strategic Blunder in Kargil", *World Focus*, (New Delhi), Vol. 20, No. 6-7, June-July 1999, pp.837-42.
- Kanwal, Gurmeet, 'Proxy War in Kashmir: Jihad or State Sponsored Terrorism', *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), Vol. 23, No.1, April 1999, pp.55-83.
- Karim, Afsir, "Pakistan's Aggression in Kashmir, 1999", *Aakkrosh*, (New Delhi), Vol. 2, No. 4. July 1999, pp.3-21.
- Karim, Afsir, "Rise of Terrorist Culture in South Asia", *Aakrosh*, (New Delhi), Vol.2 No.2, January 1999, pp.3-16.
- Karnad, Bharat, "Key to Peace in South Asia: Fostering Social Links Between the Armies of India and Pakistan", *Round Table*, (338), April 1996, pp.205-29
- Karnad, Bharat, "Using LoC to India's Advantage", *Economic and Political Weekly*, (Mumbai), Vol.34, No.28, 10-16 July 1999, pp.1869-71.
- Kidwai, Saleem, "U.S. Approach to Kargil: Non-Paradigm Shift in South Asia Policy", *Journal for Peace Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol. 6; No. 3, May-June, 1999, pp.9-12.
- Madan, Vijay, "Pakistan's Strategic Thrust into Afghanistan and Kashmir", *Aakkrosh*, (New Delhi), Vol. 2, No. 5, October 1999, pp.58-74.
- Mahapatra, C. "U. S. Approach to Kargil Conflict", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.3, No.3-4, July-December, 1999, pp.87-96.
- Mahapatra, Chintamani, "US Factor and the Kashmir Issue", *Journal of Peace Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.8 No.4, July-August 2001.

- Maj. Gen Karim, Afsir, “*The J & K Problem: An Interpretative Study*”, (Forum For Strategic and Security Studies (FSS), Occasional Paper-Two).
- Mani, V. S., “Kargil Conflict: International Law Perspective”, *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.3, No.3-4, July-December 1999, pp.76-86.
- Maroof, Raza, “Pakistan Sponsored Insurgency in Kashmir: A Case Study”, *Aakkrosh*, (New Delhi), Vol.2, No.4, July 1999, pp.31-53.
- Marriott, Alan, “Nationalism and Nationality in India and Pakistani”, *Geography*, Vol.8 No.5(2), April 2000, pp.173-77.
- Mattoo, Amitabh, 'Kargil and Kashmir', *World Focus* (New Delhi), Vol.20, No.6-7, June-July 1999, pp. 25-27.
- Mavalakha, Gautam, “Demilitarising Kargil: Urgent Tasks”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, (Mumbai), Vol.34, No.29, 17-23 July 1999, pp.1979-81.
- Mavalakha, Gautam, “Kargil: Costs and Consequences”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, (New Delhi), Vol.34, No.27, 3-9 July 1999, pp.1747-81.
- Mohammad, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Pakistan and India”, *Pakistan Horizon*, (Karachi), Vol.48, No.3, July 95, pp.81-100.
- Mohan, Saumitra, “India's Nuclear Doctrine and Pakistan's Reaction”, *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol.37 No.43, October 16 1999, pp.9-12.
- Nautiyal, Annpurna, “India, Pakistan and the United States in the Post Cold War Era”, *Asian Studies*, Vol.15, No.1, January-June 1997, pp.1-20.
- Nayar, U. K., “Low Intensity Conflict: Jammu & Kashmir”, *USI Journal*, (New Delhi), Vol.128, No.533, July-September 1998, pp.403-24.
- Panigrahi, P.K., “Indo-US Relations: A Critical Analysis of Arms Supply to Pakistan”, *India Quaterly*, (New Delhi), Vol.52, No3, July-September 1996, pp.81-96.
- Paranjpe, Shrikant, “General 'Musharraf's Pakistan and India”, *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol.39 No.17, April 14 2001, pp.7-9.

- Parasher, S.C., "America, India and Pakistani", *India Quarterly*, (New Delhi), Vol.52, No.4, October-December 1996, pp.19-60.
- Prasad, Kamla, "Kargil, National Security and Electoral Politics", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol. 37, No. 38, September 11 1999, pp.5-9.
- Punjabi, Riyaz., "Kargil Agression: The Continuum of a Strategy", *Journal of Peace Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.6, No.3, May-June 1999.
- Puri, Balraj, "India's Pakistan Policy in the Post Nuclear Phase", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol.36, No.38, September 1998, pp.7-8.
- Puri, Balraj, "India's Kargil Policy: Serious Flaws", *Economic and Political Weekly*, (Mumbai), Vol. 34 No. 28, July 10-16, 1999.
- Puri, Balraj, "Kargil in the Perspective of Indo-Pak. Conflicts", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol. 37, No. 32, July 31 1999, pp.11-13.
- Raja Mohan, C., 'U.S. and Kargil'; *World Focus*, (New Delhi), Vol.20, No.6-7, June-July 1999, pp. 26-37.
- Rappai, M. V., "Post-Kargil Analysis: A need for Border Management Mechanisms", *Strategic Analysis*, (New Delhi), Vol.23, No.6, September 1999, pp. 1035-38.
- Ray, A. K., "Kargil and Beyond", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.3, No.3-4, July-December, 1999, pp. 117-25.
- Sharif, Mhd. Nawaz, "For Peace and Stability in South Asia and Beyond", *Mainstream*, (New Delhi), Vol.35, No.44, October 11 1997, pp.16-21.
- Singh B.R., "Jammu and Kashmir: A Re-examination of the Issues", *Journal of Peace Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.7, No.4, July-August 2000.
- Singh, Swaran, "China's Response to Kargil Conflict", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies*, (New Delhi), Vol.3, No.3-4, July-December 1999, pp.96-116.
- Singh, Uma, "India Pakistan Relations in a Historical Perspective", *World Focus*, (New Delhi), Vol.22, No.10-12, October-December 2002, pp.32-37.

- Sreedhar, "Terrorism: Changing U. S. Perception of South Asia", *World Focus*,(New Delhi), Vol. 21, No. 6-7, June-July 2000, pp.18-19.
- Talwalkar, Govind, "Nehru, Kashmir and UNO", *Radical Humanist*, Vol.64 No.5, August 2002.
- Thomas, M. "Saichen After Kargil", *USI Journal* (New Delhi) Vol. 131 No.543, January-March 2001.
- Verma, Virendra Sahai, "Continued Confrontation: Impact on Lives of People of India and Paksitan", *Radical Humanist*, Vol. 64 No.5, August 2000.
- Vinod Anand, "Future Battle Space and Need for Joint manship", *Strategic Analysis*,(New Delhi), Vol.23, No.10, 2000.
- Vinod, "Kashmir and India -Pakistan Relations: Problems and Prospects" *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi), Vol.18, No.8 November1995, pp.1141-55.
- Viswam, S. "Media and Kargil" *World Focus* (New Delhi), Vol.20, No.6-7 June-July 1999, pp.38-41.
- Warikoo, K., "Kargil Conflict: View from Kashmir", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies*,(New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 3-4, July-December, 1999. pp.28-43.
- Weinbaum, Marvin G., "Afghan Factor in Pakistan's India Policy", *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), Vol.1, No.2, July - September 1997,pp. 3-17.
- Zutshi, Bhupender, "Kargil Conflict 1999: Human Dimensions and Displacement of Population", *Himalyan and Central Asian Studies* (New Delhi), Vol. 3, No. 3-4, July-December 1999, pp. 46-64.

Periodicals and Newspapers.

- Aakrosh (New Delhi)
- Asian Age (New Delhi)
- BISS JOURNAL (Dhaka)
- Economic -Political Weekly (Mumbai)
- Front Line (Chennai)

India Today (New Delhi)
Indian Defence Review (New Delhi)
International Studies (New Delhi)
Journal of Peace Studies (New Delhi)
Outlook (New Delhi)
Pakistan Horizon (Karachi)
Strategic Analysis (New Delhi)
The Hindu (Chennai)
The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)
The Indian Express (New Delhi)
The Pioneer (New Delhi)
The Times of India (New Delhi)
USI Journal (New Delhi)
World Focus (New Delhi)

Websites:

<http://iecolumnists.expressindia.com>.

http://india_resource.tripod.com.

<http://inic.utexas.edu>.

<http://orbat.com>.

<http://www.bharat-rakshak.com>.

<http://www.bharat-rakshak.com>.

<http://www.biharonline.com>.

<http://www.defencejournal.com>.
<http://www.expressindia.com>.
<http://www.flonnet.com>.
<http://www.hinduonnet.com>.
<http://www.india-today.com>.
<http://www.ipcs.org>.
<http://www.jainnet.com/vcbothra/kashmir>.
<http://www.jammu-kashmir-facts.com>.
<http://www.jammukashmirinfo.com/Kargil/Default>.
<http://www.kashmir-information.com>.
<http://www.mastindia.com>.
<http://www.maxpages.com>.
<http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex>.
<http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/28>.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com>.

APPENDIX

Highlights of the Kargil Review Committee Report.

The Kargil Review Committee was set up to examine the sequence of events leading to Kargil crisis and make recommendations for the future. It was a four-member committee headed by Mr.K.Subrahmayam. The other members were Mr.K.K.Hazari and Mr.B.G.Verghese.Mr.Satish Chandra was the member secretary. The committee submitted its report on 15 December 1999. Its main recommendations are as follows:

1. There must be a full time National Security Adviser and second line personnel are inducted into the system with higher responsibility.
2. The nation's surveillance capability, particularly through satellite imagery should be improved. Adequate funds should be provided to ensure that a capability of world standards is developed and put in place in the shortest possible time. Efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude UAVs. Institutionalised arrangements should be made to ensure that the UAV imagery generated is disseminated to the concerned intelligence agencies as quickly as possible.
3. The centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency should be set up. The working of the intelligence system, which includes the system of collection of, reporting, collation and assessment of intelligence, should be thoroughly examined. The role

and place of JIC in the national intelligence framework should be upgraded. The committee feels that it is necessary to establish think tanks, encourage country specialisation in university departments and to organise regular exchanges of personnel between them and the intelligence community.

4. The role and tasks of the para-military forces have to be restructured particularly with reference to command and control and leadership functions in the light of proxy war and large-scale terrorism that the country faces. They need to be trained to much higher standards of performance and better equipped to deal with terrorist threats.
5. The present structure and procedures for border patrolling must be improved. It would lead to reduction in the inflow of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms. The defence budget should be hiked to a bearable limit and infantryman is equipped with superior lightweight weapons and clothing suited to the threats they are required to face in alpine conditions.
6. The structural reforms should be brought out for a much closer and more constructive interaction between the Civil Government and the Services.
7. There should a publication of White Paper on the Indian nuclear weapons programme. This would bring out the stark facts of the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear capability with assistance from

countries who tirelessly decry proliferation, and the threats posed to India through nuclear blackmail.

8. Media relations and the techniques and implications of information war and perception and management must form a distinct and important module at all levels of military training. The Government should seriously consider dedicated radio and TV channels to entertain and inform their armed forces deployed overseas. This would avoid misleading reports and rumours.
9. A true partnership must be established between the Services and the DRDO to ensure that the latter gets full backing and funding from the Services and the former, in turn, get the indented equipments they require without undue delay.
10. The establishment of a civil-military liaison mechanism at various levels is most necessary to smoothen relationships during times of emergency and stress, like war and proxy war, and to ensure that there is no room for friction and alienation of local population.
11. More attention should be given to monitoring and analysing developments and trends in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas. The Kashmiri diaspora overseas must be kept better informed about the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and what happened in Kargil.