

**SOME ASPECTS OF ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS,
1969-1976: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES**

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page.</u>
Preface ..	1
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ..	1 - 30
1) Historical background	1
ii) British Zone of Occupation ..	5
iii) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ...	9
iv) Berlin Question	13
v) European Defence Community ^o	19
vi) West European Union ..	22
vii) European Coal and Steel Community ...	24
viii) European Economic Community ...	25
CHAPTER II: POLITICAL ISSUES	31 - 57
1) British Membership in the EEC	32
ii) FRG's OSTPOLITIK ...	49
CHAPTER III: MILITARY ISSUES ...	58 - 81
1) North Atlantic Treaty Organization ...	58
ii) Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe	68
iii) Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction ...	72
iv) Co-operation in the Nuclear Field ..	76
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION	82 - 89
BIBLIOGRAPHY	90 - 105.

PREFACE

The relationship between Great Britain and Germany is centuries old. And all along it has been of a mixed nature - friendly and hostile. That was the pattern of relationship existed between them till the end of the Second World War. But after 1945, their relationship has been marked by an unbroken record of amity and cordiality with an underlying element of mutuality. While the British attitude in general was sympathetic to the re-establishment of Germany as an important actor in the politics and security of continental Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany, wherever possible, had adopted an attitude helpful to Britain.

But, from 1969 onwards, especially after the assumption of Willy Brandt as the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the relationship between Great Britain and the Federal Republic entered a new phase of exceptional warmth and cordiality that on almost every important issue in world politics their attitude was almost identical. The present study covers an important seven year period of their relationship between 1969 and 1976. And the focus of the study is limited to the political and military aspects of their relationship.

The study has been prosecuted with the help of the English source material available in different libraries of Delhi. In this connection, special mention may be made to the libraries of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Council of World Affairs, the British Council, the British High Commission, the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany and the American Library. I am thankful to the staff of all these libraries for the cooperation and courtesy extended to me during my research for this dissertation.

Also, I would like to express my profound and special gratitude to Dr. E. Vivekanandan, my Supervisor, for encouraging me to undertake this fascinating study. Without his patient and invaluable guidance this dissertation would not have been complete. I am also grateful to Dr. H.S. Chopra for his good-will and encouragement.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the relationship between Britain and Germany was that of intense interaction between the two. The British royal family was of German origin and the dynasty itself bore the name the House of Hanover and William Kaiser, the German monarch who declared war against Britain in 1914, was a great grandson of Queen Victoria.

The role of Britain in the mainland Europe had undergone significant change after the emergence of Germany as a unified nation following the creation of the German Empire by Otto Von Bismark in 1871. Before Germany's emergence as a great military power in the European Continent, the British role in the continent was that of a mediator in European politics. While doing so it generally stood by the weak against the strong in the controversies in Europe. But this role was not available for Britain following Germany's emergence as a major military power. Indeed, towards the close of the 19th century, in 1897, Joseph Chamberlain, did speak of an alliance between Britain, Germany and the United States.

During the 20th century, the European continent in general, and Germany in particular, was a source of sorrow for Britain as they fought between them two World Wars. And to contain the aggressive nationalism of Germany and

1. D.C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany: British Opinion and Policy Towards Germany Since 1945 (London, 1965), p. 15.

its expansion by use of force, Britain had to pay heavily in terms of human lives and resources. As a root cause these wars were the schism between Germany and France, after the end of First World War many in Britain thought that it was still possible for Britain to play a balancing role between the two major continental powers. But these hopes were dashed by the re-militarisation of Germany, under Hitler in 1930s, and the German occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. In fact, Hitler firmly believed that although Britain would not promote his expansionist schemes, it would not stand out to deter him from doing so. But this was a mis-calculation. Britain stood up against the German expansionist line when Hitler attacked Poland in 1939. In the words of D.C. Watt:

Thus, although at the time of Halifax's visit, Hitler was frightening his generals by talking of the inevitability of war with Britain; although in May 1938 after the diplomatic rebuff achieved by the Czech semi-mobilisation, he ordered his Navy to prepare a new armaments programme to enable them to challenge British maritime power; although in the aftermath of Munich, he issued orders for military planning to defeat France and deprive Britain of her only major ally in the Continent; he was to spend the following year assuring both his military planners and his Italian ally that Britain would not intervene in his plans against Poland. (2)

2. Ibid., p. 27.

This, again, was a miscalculation. Britain resisted Germany throughout the Second World War until Hitler was finally defeated.

But the relationship between the two countries underwent metamorphic changes after the Second World War. Although the relationship between the two immediately after the War was that of a victor and the vanquished, Britain had adopted a more constructive and helpful attitude towards Germany. It may be pointed out that at the last stages of the Second World War Britain did not want a complete surrender of Germany and favoured a negotiated settlement. But this did not materialise mainly because by the time Germany was defeated, Hitler had destroyed every representative political organisation in the country, making a negotiated peace settlement impossible.³

The first post-war talks at the Potsdam Conference⁴ produced an agreement to which France did not accede till later. This agreement contained certain provisions for the disarmament, demilitarisation and denazification of Germany and for the payment of reparations and more important still, and of greater significance for the future, were two further points relating to the restoration of political

3. F.S. Northedge, Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (London, 1974), p. 68.

4. For the text see B. Ruhn Von Oppen, Documents on Germany under Occupation (London, 1955), pp. 40-50.

life in Germany on a democratic basis and to the preservation of her economic unity.⁵

The final declaration of the Potsdam Conference did, it was true, embody the principles of uniformity of treatment of the German population, political decentralisation, the development of democratic institutions, the treatment of Germany as an economic whole, the re-establishment of Central German administrative machinery, and priority for exports to pay for imports over reparations deliveries.⁶

In the debate on the German question in Britain one finds the presence of four main schools of thought; (a) the Churchillian traditional-chauvinist conviction that the roots of the German problem were to be found in Prussia; (b) the Attleesian populist reformist conviction that the problem was of social reform, of breaking the alliance of the Prussian land-owners and West German industrialists; (c) the Foreign Office's overriding concern to avoid a disruption of war-time coalition from which Germany could only benefit; and (d) the instinctive feeling of the Chiefs-of-Staff that the main problem in the post-war balance of power was not to prevent a German revival but an excessive access of power to Soviet Russia.⁷

5. Herman Proebst, "German-British Relations since the War: A German view", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., Britain and West Germany: Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy, (London, 1971), p. 191.

6. D C. Watt, n. 1, p. 50.

7. Ibid., p. 34.

British Zone of Occupation

The future of Germany became the bone of contention between the three Western allies and Soviet Russia. They came out open regarding the treatment of Germany. The British Zone which included the coal and steel centre of Ruhr was the highly industrialised one. Britain started reconstructing the political and economic life of her zone. Dr. Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Chancellor, had acknowledged the genuine endeavour of Britain when he said:

In the part of Germany they occupy the three Western powers, and especially the United States and Great Britain, have furthered German economic development - a fact we gratefully acknowledge. Within their zones the territory of German Federal Republic, they began and promoted political democracy. (8)

During 1946 and 1947, in the midst of dollar crisis, Britain was contributing some £ 100 million, mostly for supplies of food, one third of this had to be paid in dollars.⁹

Before the negotiations began on the German question in 1947 the British position was made clear in a series of statements. On 5 June 1946 Clement Attlee, Prime Minister, told the House of Commons:

We desire that Germany should be treated as an economic whole. We have been placed in a terribly difficult position in having an area which was always a deficit area
(contd...)

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8. Konrad Adenauer, World Indivisible (London, 1956), p.18.
9. F.S. Northedge, no. 3, p. 75.

front the point of view of food and, as I see it, in changing what were intended merely to be lines of occupation into rigid divisions of Germany into zones with separate systems of administration. Our endeavour is that Germany should be treated as an economic whole.

As for the political future of Germany, the British Govern-
ment adopted a federal approach.¹⁰

Britain clearly expressed its reluctance to shoulder the total economic burden of her zone. On 2 December 1946, an agreement was reached in New York between the United States and Britain by which the zones of these two countries occupied in Germany were fused to form a single economic unit.¹¹ Subsequently, in May 1947, Britain and the United States had created a central economic administration at Frankfurt. Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons in January 1948 that Economic Council was only an interim measure pending the establishment of a West German government, if agreement with Russia and Germany became difficult.¹²

The West German politicians were unhappy over the occupation of Ruhr and expressed against the establishment of a separate West German State which, they feared, might postpone indefinitely the hope of a united Germany.

10. U.K., House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 423 (1946), Col. 2036.

11. Cmd. 6984 (1946).

12. U.K., House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 446 (1948), col. 404.

Consequently, they decided at a three-day Conference of their own in early August 1948 not to proceed for the moment with the drafting of a definitive West German Constitution. They preferred to create the somewhat more provisional instrument of a Basic Law for the administration of West Germany.¹³

At a meeting in Warsaw on 8 June 1948, of Central and East Europe and Russia, the well-known Soviet positions on Four Power control over the Ruhr, reparations and the 'historic decisions' of Potsdam were reaffirmed with seemingly little dissent from Russia's neighbours. The Constitution was approved in March 1949 and the German Democratic Republic based on this Constitution came into being in October of that year.¹⁴

Britain, France and the United States, on the other hand, while announcing that they, being precluded German reunification under Four Power sponsorship, had no alternative but to write off East Germany after the failure of the four Foreign Ministers in London in November-December 1947.

However, the rigours of the war suffered by the Germans had evoked sympathy in some sections of the British people and Britain, no less than the US, was responsible for bringing into existence the Federal Republic and helping

13. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (London, 1950), pp. 409-11.

14. Beate Luhm Von Oppen ed., Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945-54 (London, 1955), pp. 412-22.

the Germans to restore their economy. The Labour Ministers favoured the aim of re-educating and converting the Germans to democracy before granting them responsibility for themselves.¹⁵ Earnst Bevin, Foreign Secretary, who had intense resentment, believed that the Germans must pay for what they had done before they could begin to have a say in matters again but Winston Churchill wanted to give Germans a chance.¹⁶

After the Second World War, the British were notable, in their zone of occupation, for putting much goodwill and effort into setting an example and gaining support for their political ideas of liberal democracy. From then on Britain treated the newly created Germany not as an object of its policy but as its partner.¹⁷ Indeed, in the occupation zone, Britain not only took care not to wreck the economic life and industrial infrastructure of Germany, but also took interest to put back the living conditions in Germany to normalcy - making industry working, houses built, and schools and hospitals repaired.¹⁸

There was close cooperation between Britain and West Germany on security matters. It may be recalled that the Morgenthau Plan for post-war Germany, provisionally approved by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in September 1944, envisaged that Germany should be reduced to

15. Herman Proebst, n. 5, p. 194.

16. Ibid.

17. Exactly one year later the western Powers agreed to end the State of War with Germany.

18. F.S. Northedge, n. 3, pp. 72-73.

19
a pastoralised state. But Britain did not pursue this plan in any serious manner. On the other hand, it saw the danger of keeping Germany as a bankrupt and weak estate of Europe especially in the context of the general decline of power of Europe after the Second World War and also in the context of growing military threat from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. As Britain was concerned about the Soviet threat to the security of free Governments of Western Europe, it took interest to commit the United States to continue its military presence in Western Europe (West Germany included) beyond 1947, the year stipulated for the retreat of the US military establishments from Europe. This was done. It secured the US support for the Brussels Treaty in 1948, and in 1949 got the NATO established with full and indefinite US commitment to the security of Western Europe.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

The Vandenberg resolution, in June 1948, provided a political basis for a formal alignment of the United States with the countries that felt threatened by the aggressive Soviet policy. On 4 April 1949, the United States put her signature on a multilateral pact, NATO. Permission of the

19. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (London, 1954), vol. VI, pp. 135-9.

20. Josef Korbel, Detente In Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton, N.J., 1972), p. 28.

21. F.S. Northedge, N.3, p. 94.

Western powers for West Germany to establish the Federal Republic of Germany, with limited rights of sovereignty, in September 1949, and the Soviet reaction to it in the following month elevating East Germany to the status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), led to an indefinite postponement of the most crucial European problem, the reunification of Germany.

The British attitude to the North Atlantic Treaty was pragmatic. When the Four-Power Cooperation failed that was the only alternative left to ensure security against any future war. Moreover, it was aimed to be a temporary arrangement. Explaining the British attitude Philip Noel-Baker, Minister for Commonwealth Relations, told the House of Commons on 12 May 1949 that the treaty was a "stop-gap and a stop-gap" only. "We want a world security system as soon as ever we can, but we do believe that if we are having a collective pact at all it should be as strong as possible in order that its restraining effect on the mind of the aggressor may be as great as possible."²²

Since 1945 the Germans ceased to be a mere object of international politics. With the recovery of sovereignty Germany was treated as an important power and hence the West Europeans wanted to keep Germany within their fold.

22. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 464 (1949), Col. 2127.

This had increased the stock of Germany in the eyes of other countries of western Europe. This changed image of Germany was not without effect on Anglo-German relations and this compelled the British to keep West Germany permanently tied up with the West. Therefore, Britain thought that Germany could only be re-built within an Atlantic system and would be able to realise her true position. Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor, had promptly agreed to British line and West Germany became a member of NATO in 1955.

When Britain and the United States had contemplated rearmament of West Germany, it was based on five different considerations. Firstly, there was disparity in Soviet Land force in East Europe and that of the NATO allies. West European countries had clearly expressed their inability to maintain forces for Germany due to economic constraints. Therefore, Germany had to share the burden. Secondly, the Soviet Union went on increasing the armed forces pretending that they were merely to police. Thirdly, there was the need of German rearmament within a European framework, logically from the steps taken to integrate West Germany into West Europe in the economic and political spheres. Fourthly, there was the necessity of an equalization of burdens between West Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Otherwise Germany would achieve economic preponderance in Europe

at the expense of those who were defending it. Lastly, German participation in Western defence was necessary.

The British agreement to German rearmament had been given only 'in principle'. Prime Minister Clement Attlee laid down some conditions in February 1951 to be satisfied by the Britishers before the government finally agreed. Firstly, in the provision of arms for Europe, Germany must come at the end of the queue. Secondly, Germans would not be allowed to work on their own in Western defence. Thirdly, there must be agreement with the Germans themselves.

After September 1951, the British policy continued to be governed by their conviction of the political need to bind Germany to the West and the economic need of not adding to the economic burdens of Britain's own rearmament programme. The German rearmament was to take place with the proposed European Defence Community, with which Britain announced its intention of establishing "the closest possible association". Britain in the meantime ended the state of war with Germany by a unilateral declaration on 9 August 1951.

In the field of nuclear armament the Federal Republic of Germany was not allowed to produce nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic was only allowed to peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy within a cooperative partnership. As the security of West Germany was totally in the hands of the alliance, the Germans were also convinced of this fact.

Explaining the German position on the nuclear front Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister, said in a speech at the Conference of non-Nuclear Nations in Geneva on 3 September 1968:

The Federal Republic of Germany has, in compliance with the wishes of its Allies, denied itself production of atomic weapons and accordingly subjected itself to international controls. The Federal Republic of Germany does not aim to achieve for itself any direct authority over atomic weapons and does not aim to possess them.(23)

In 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany renounced, in an international treaty, its right to produce not only atomic weapons, but also biological and chemical weapons.

Berlin Question

The war time planners of post-war Germany planned to divide Berlin into four zones of occupation and administering it through the Allied Kommandatura.²⁴ Of course, it would have been a demonstration of victory of the Big Four Powers. The European Allied Council in London prepared all arrangements of access and administration of the city. However, it was meant to be a temporary arrangement till Germany got united and till Berlin would become the capital of the whole Germany again.

Events took an entirely different turn. Berlin became the hotbed of cold war. The Kommandatura functioned smoothly

23. Willy Brandt, Peace: Writings and Speeches of the Nobel Peace Prize Winner, 1971, (Bonn, 1971), p.40.

24. Josef Korbel, n. 20, p. 213.

until October 1946, when the municipal elections gave overwhelming victory to non-Communist parties. On 20 March 1948, the Soviet member of the Allied Control Commission walked out of it. Indeed the Soviet authorities had already started harassing the British rail link with Berlin and on 30 March 1948 they introduced rigorous personal and documentary controls over Allied personnel and their baggage passing between Berlin and West Germany.²⁵

Western Powers had all the rights to move to and from Berlin being unchecked but there was no documentary proof to support it. According to Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary:

There is a clear Four Power agreement for the occupation of Berlin, of the validity of which there can be no doubt ... the regulations for travel to and from Berlin are not so clearly specified. When the arrangements were made a good deal was taken on trust between the Allies. (26)

At first these restrictions were said to be due to technical difficulties. But this pretext was at once discarded. In their reply to a British note of 6 July 1949, protesting against these infringements of Allied rights (identical notes were sent by the French and the United States Governments), the Soviet authorities made clear that their actions were intended as retorts to alleged Western

25. D.C. Watt, n. 1, p. 63.

26. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 449 (1948), Cols. 34-35.

contraventions of Four Power agreements on Germany, especially²⁷ the Western currency system.

On 16 June 1948, the Soviet representative walked out of the Kommandatura in Berlin. Three days later the Soviet authorities suspended all road traffic between Berlin and West Germany. Rail traffic followed suit on 23 June and water traffic on 10 July. By 10 July 1948, the blockade of Berlin by road, rail and canal was complete.

The Russians could not believe that Westerners would be able to maintain the supplies to the Berliners by airlift alone.²⁸ They thought that the blockade would force the west either to abandon Berlin or to make some concessions over the larger German issues. During the ten and a half months until the blockade was lifted on 12 May 1949, the British share of the effort was estimated at 40 per cent²⁹ and the Americans 60 per cent.

During the talks in Moscow on the situation Britain gave emphasis to four main requirements. First, there could

27. Cmd. 7534 (1948), Annex IIIA, pp. 50-2.

28. In the words of L.C. Watt: "If there were those on the British side who doubted the ability of Berlin to keep going on the air-lift alone, their doubts were swamped by the feelings of sympathy for the embattled population of Berlin aroused in Britain and the ties of Social Democracy between the Labour Party and the Social Democratic administration in Berlin". See L.C. Watt, n. 1, p. 66.

29. See Evin's speech in the House of Commons on 22 September, 1948. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 456 (1948), Col. 903.

be no concession in the matter of Britain's right to a military position in Berlin. Secondly, Britain, in common with its two Western partners, refused to abandon its position in relation to West Germany. As a result of forceful arguments by Frank Roberts, the British representative, V.M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, agreed that the matter should not be pursued further until the four military Governors in Berlin had carried out the directive for producing a currency agreement which was to be drafted during the Moscow talks.³⁰ Thirdly, the Western Powers insisted on the unequivocal removal of all restrictions on communications and transport. This seemed to have been secured in the agreement reached in Moscow on 30 August 1948.³¹ Fourthly, if the Soviet Mark was to be accepted as the currency for the whole of Berlin there must be adequate arrangements for quadripartite control of its issue and continued use.

For Britain the significance of the Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union was that it showed to what extent Britain could go for the defence of its responsibility in Germany, even at great cost, that too as far east in Europe as Berlin. Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, made this point clear when he told Parliament on 30 June 1948: "We cannot abandon those stout-hearted Berlin democrats who

30. Cmd. 7534 (1948), p. 40.

31. See Cmd. 7534 (1948), p. 56.

are refusing to bow to Soviet pressure".³² When in the autumn of 1948, the crisis was at its height, he said at the Labour Party's annual conference: "We intend, whatever the provocation may be, to stay in Berlin".³³ He was able to hold this position partly because he knew that it was fully endorsed by the United States, with that country's immense resources and unmatched atomic striking power.

Stalin's blockade failed beyond his expectation. Normalcy to some extent was restored. After a long spell, America's defeat in toppling Castro raised some hope in Nikita S. Khrushchev, to opt for a unilateral solution of the Berlin Problem. He seems to have been determined to annex Berlin, in the East German territory, and end the western domination, which would result in a Communist stronghold in that area.³⁴ Russians had clearly stated that, "as the East Germans are our allies and would only be defending their sovereign rights, we would have to protect them".³⁵

32. UK., House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 452 (1948), Col. 2232.

33. The Labour Party, Report of the 47th Annual Conference (London, 1949), p. 195.

34. Josef Korbel, n. 20, p. 216.

35. Nora Beloff, Transit of Britain: A Report on Britain's Changing Role in the Post-war World (London, 1973), p. 148.

Ultimately the Berlin Wall was constructed in August 1961. From 1961 until December 1969, only 28,711 East Germans succeeded in penetrating the wall, and in the process many died on the electrified barbed wires or from bullets.³⁶

The revival of Berlin crisis compelled the West European countries - Britain and Germany in particular - to seek firm American commitments in that region. The crisis also brought Britain closer to West Europe and Britain got more involved in German affairs.

In 1950, Britain and other Western Powers - France and the United States - decided to end the State of War with Germany and in March 1951 the Federal Republic was authorised to establish its own Foreign Ministry and maintain direct diplomatic representation abroad. In effect, gradually, Britain supported the move to restore the authority of a nation State to Germany.³⁷ The British Army Of Rhine was also stationed in West Germany. But, the most difficult problem was how to provide Germany with a functioning army. The solution was not easy since there was deep suspicion in France over the desirability of such an army. Indeed, in a joint declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers of Britain (Bevin), France (Schumann) and the US Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) on 19 September 1950, it was stated

36. FRG., Ministry for Intra-German Relations, 3035-214, 15 January 1970, p. 1.

37. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 2 October 1950, p. 530; Cmd. 8252 (1951), p. 12.

that the creation of a German national army was undesirable. The French solution for the dilemma of German rearmament was put forth by the French Prime Minister, Rene Pleven, in October 1950, in the form of a European Defence Community (EDC). France thought that a European army, with German contingent in it, and under the joint control of the EDC would be less dangerous since the German army would not be under the exclusive control of Germany.

European Defence Community

Jean Monnet professed the idea of European army which would help in furthering European unity and also block the revival of German militarism. The idea, came to be known as European Defence Community (EDC), was endorsed by Rene Pleven, the French Premier. Advancing the idea he suggested that Germany should contribute to the European defence without having a German army or general staff.³⁸

The British government did not subscribe to the idea of a European Defence Community. This was clear from Ernest Bevin's speech in the House of Commons shortly after Rene Pleven had announced his plan. He stated that if the other Governments, with French support, were ready to put

38. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963 (London, 1964), p. 13.

that idea to practice the British government would not stand in the way.³⁹

Soon after the election in 1951, Anthony Eden, the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, in a speech in Rome in November 1951, and Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in a speech in the House of Commons on 6 December 1951, rejected the possibility of British membership in the EDC but would remain a benevolent spectator. It was feared that the British refusal meant the collapse of the whole scheme.⁴⁰

Shortly after the French Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary met in December 1951, in Paris, and resolved that EDC was an encouraging effort leading to unity in Europe, Britain assured help to the EDC at all stages of its political and military developments.⁴¹ But, even then, Eden was convinced that the EDC was bound to be doomed.⁴² However, he explained the British response by saying that: "we have established a formal and special relationship between the United Kingdom and EDC. This

39. See UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. (1950-51), Cols. 1170-4. In his comments on the French proposal Bevin made very clear his own strong attachment to and belief in an "Atlantic Community", which strongly coloured his own attitude towards all European proposals.

40. The Times (London), 7 December 1951.

41. The Times, 19 December 1951.

42. Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London, 1960), pp.33-4.

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clearly shows that although we cannot join that Community,
we are linked with its future and stand at its side".⁴³

The German outlook was explained by Konrad Adenauer,
the Chancellor:

If we enter the European Defence Community
we will be required to supply a certain
number of Germans for the European army.
And this European army - we are all agreed
on that - will be subordinated, so long as
present tension continue, to the organisation
of the Atlantic Pact. I have not slightest
doubt that if we enter the European Defence
Community, we shall some day also a member
of the Atlantic Pact. (44)

Adenauer's objective seems to have been to join NATO by
which Germany could get security.

The French Prime Minister, Mendés -France, saw
Churchill and Eden on 22 August 1954 and informed them about
the failure of the EDC. The British Ministers told the
French Prime Minister that Germany must receive political
equality and preferably must be included in the defence
framework of NATO.⁴⁵ In the same meeting it was decided that
Britain was to keep its forces in Germany and must check
them in obtaining ABC (Atomic, Bacteriological, Chemical)
weapons.⁴⁶

43. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 449
(1952), Col. 24.

44. Konrad Adenauer, n. 8, p. 58.

45. Anthony Eden, n. 42, p. 148-9.

46. Nora Beloff, n. 35, p. 89.

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The 'Attlee Conditions' of February 1951 to integrate German military units in Western defence, in order to obstruct a recurrence of German militarism, got general agreement in Britain. Indeed, America and Britain were interested for German rearmament because of security reasons. According to Nora Beloff:

The British Government made two massive errors: firstly, in order to impress the Americans it agreed to a ruinous rearmament programme of its own. Secondly, though it did not offer to join the EDC, it cajoled and encouraged the Europeans to go on without Britain for four years prolonging the agony of indecision before alternatives had to be found. (47)

Britain's refusal led to the French rejection of the EDC and finally the idea had to be shelved. Adenauer, who was strongly supporting EDC, failed to convince the Labour Ministers, and subsequently the Conservatives too, in favour of British Participation in the EDC. He was well aware of the fact that unless Britain joined the French would reject and that was what exactly happened. The idea of the EDC was finally aborted and Britain got fed up with the European plans of regrouping.

West European Union

After the rejection of EDC, Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, took the initiative to deal with the German problem through another defence arrangement which

EDC was supposed to do. In two Conferences, one in London in September 1954 and another in Paris in October 1954, a series of agreements (known as the Paris Agreements of October 1954) were concluded by the nine participating countries - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the FRG. The agreements were related to the termination of the occupation regime in West Germany to the admission of the FRG to NATO, and the transformation of the Brussels Treaty and the Brussels Treaty Organisation into a new treaty and a new Organisation to be known as the Western European Union.⁴⁸

Konrad Adenauer, West German Chancellor, emphasized the need to strengthen the ties among France, Germany and the United Kingdom. On 25 September 1956, in Brussels, and again a few days later in Hamburg, Adenauer spoke publicly of the need for strengthening the Western European Union and transferring it into a Confederation or Federation. He said that the federation must not suffer from any sense of perfectionism. He also clarified that those institutions need not be always supranational in character - it was primarily aimed at Britain which was averse to any kind of supranational organisation. He made it abundantly clear that any European system must include Britain.⁴⁹

48. See Cmd. 9304 (1954), p. 56.

49. See New York Times, 26 September and 2 October 1956.

Other problems were discussed as well and the leaders (Adenauer and Guy Mollet) called for the active participation of the United Kingdom in building of a united Europe. To this end they announced their intention of striving to give new meaning to such organisations as the OEEC, the Council of Europe and, in particular, WEU.⁵⁰

European Coal and Steel Community

Although from 1948 onwards the German Government played an increasing role in European affairs, it did not regain its sovereignty until 1954.

Robert Schuman gave a proposal to pool the Coal and Iron and Steel resources of France and Germany, and of any other European countries willing to join, in putting them under the control of an independent high authority.⁵¹

Konrad Adenauer agreed to this proposal as he thought that it would do special benefit to West Germany. But, Britain did not become the member of the ECSC, because it was against joining any supra-national organization which would have infringed upon its sovereignty. Though Britain ended up making a Treaty of Association with the European

50. See New York Times, 30 September 1956.

51. An excellent and comprehensive account of ECSC is given by William Diebold, Jr., The Schuman Plan, A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959 (New York, 1959).

Coal and Steel Community,⁵² it was not the same thing as joining.⁵³

European Economic Community

The Messina resolution which dealt with the formation of the Common Market became the text from which the Speck Committee worked and the key features of the Treaty of Rome were accepted by the Six - France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries. In the early sixties the British Government made it known to the Six about its willingness to enter into the Common Market. Edward Heath's statement on 10 October 1961 clarified that the British intension should not be doubted because it was born out of the conviction that "our destiny is intimately⁵⁴ linked with yours".

The Six were greatly satisfied on the positive tone of the British statement and felt that Britain was prepared to negotiate the terms of joining the Community. By 14 January 1962, the Council reached agreement and the way was clear to the second stage of negotiations. Herr Lahr, Under-Secretary of State in the West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the agricultural agreements

52. Treaty Series No. 51 (1956), Cmnd. 13 (1956).

53. Miriam Camps, n. 38, p. 278.

54. Edward Heath's speech was published as a White Paper, The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, Cmnd. 1565 (1961), para 3.

reached at this time as "a new Treaty of Rome" and Adenauer called the settlement as one of the most significant occurrence in the European history of the last few hundred years.⁵⁵

In January 1962, Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister, met Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn and Ludwig Erhard, West German Minister of Economics, made a visit to London towards the end of January in the same year. Erhard was anxious to see the negotiations between Britain and the EEC concluded as soon as possible and predicted that Britain would be a member of the Community by January 1963.⁵⁶

The French feared that Britain, in collaboration with Germany would seek modification of the Treaty of Rome after joining the European Economic Community. The much criticised levy system was the basis of French fear.⁵⁷ At the Chateau de Champs meeting on 1 and 2 June 1962 Harold Macmillan convinced de Gaulle about the genuine interest of Britain in joining the Community and assured him of devoting all efforts towards European unity. But de Gaulle was doubtful about Britain's readiness to effect consequential changes in its relationship with the United States and

55. The Times (London), 18 January 1962.

56. Miriam Camps, n. 38, p. 395.

57. See, for example, the discussion of the levy system in Political and Economic Planning, Occasional Paper, No. 14, Agriculture, the Commonwealth and EEC, pp. 52-53.

Commonwealth and give prime importance to Europe in the British policy.⁵⁸ However, de Gaulle's concern seems to have been more on the implications of an expansion of the Community on France. The meeting, in retrospect, was not a success as it seemed to be at that time.⁵⁹

In September 1962 the "Great Reconciliation" was achieved between France and Germany and by January 1963 General de Gaulle had made his decision clear to Adenauer to exclude Britain from the European Community.⁶⁰

Before Adenauer's visit to Paris from 20 to 23 January 1963, though after de Gaulle's announcement vetoing British membership in EEC, he was loaded with appeals from various groups to influence de Gaulle for a favourable attitude towards Britain's entry. The Social Democrats suggested to postpone his visit to Paris, that would induce the General to change this mind. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) wanted him to visit Paris, but like social Democrats they urged him to use his influence on de Gaulle in favour of British membership in the Community. Jean Monnet strongly requested Adenauer in like manner. John F. Kennedy also sent a personal message to Adenauer.⁶¹

58. See Financial Times (London), 10 June, 1962.

59. Ibid., and also The Times, 14 June, 1962.

60. Miriam Camps, n. 38, p. 433.

61. See The Times and Financial Times, 21 January 1963.

Schroeder, speaking for Germany, expressed his disappointment at the outcome - in particular, the French rejection - of the negotiation. He emphasized that at the time when the Treaty of Rome was ratified, the German government had promised the Bundestag that it would try to widen the membership and that this policy remained unchanged. He expressed regret that a proposal for a Commission report had not been acceptable.⁶² He promised that the German Government would not give up the idea of British entry but admitted that for the time being he did not see anything to be done. He concluded:

The only hope I can express is that the movement towards us which has started in Great Britain will not die suddenly as a result of this event, and that, despite today's setback, the movement may stay alive. If so I - and I say this on behalf of my Government - am convinced that the day will come when we will be able to settle this problem. (63)

Britain could have become the member of the Community but for the intervention of General de Gaulle. Still Britain did not maintain a low profile - it persisted in its attempt to become the member of the Community. Hence it applied for EEC membership again in 1967.

62. Commission was to submit a report on the negotiation and the things still to be discussed with suggestion - which will be carried on in the next round of negotiations.

63. EUROPE: Documents, No. 186/187, 5 February 1963.

The Federal Chancellor Ludwig Erhard had never made any secret of his sympathy for Britain and he expressed his fear of a new division in Europe which might arise from economic rivalry between the Six of the EEC and the Seven of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) outside it. ⁶⁴ With the formation of the German Cabinet under the Grand Coalition in 1965, prospects for thriving Anglo-German relations seemed bright.

Three factors seemed to have played their part in the tactics followed by the British Government. Firstly, there was the conviction that a second French veto would not be forthcoming. Secondly, the application needed bold and direct statement of unswerving intent. Thirdly, there was the belief that France's partners in the EEC, especially ⁶⁵ Germany, could swing Paris into accepting British entry.

Willy Brandt, arguing in favour of British entry into the Common Market on 30 November 1967, put forth some economic reasons:

Great Britain is a market of 55 million consumers, which compares with 180 million in the EEC, and 60 million in the Federal Republic of Germany. The gross national product of Great Britain amounts to more than that of France, but some what less than that of West Germany. The entrance
(contd..)

64. Herman Proebst, n. 5, p. 199.

65. D.C. Watt, "Britain and Germany: The Last Three Years", International Journal, (Toronto), Vol. 23, 1966-67, p. 565.

of Great Britain would increase production and economic efficiency in the EEC by one-third. If the other EFTA countries joined with the EEC, the economic potential of the Community would increase by more than fifty per cent. (66)

In January 1967, Prime Minister Wilson declared at a press conference that Great Britain, if it should become a member of the EEC, would take part fully in the political discussions of the Community.⁶⁷ But, France did not yield. In 1968, Brandt also made it clear that the present dimensions of the EEC are insufficient to do justice to the needs of future cooperation. Without Great Britain, for example, the existing problems of Europe could hardly be solved.⁶⁸

With this attitude of the leaders the negotiation went on further on British entry and a favourable chance was on the offing for an agreement between Britain and the Six.

Thus, in 1969 the relationship between Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany was poised for a new phase of greater friendship and Cooperation.

66. Willy Brandt, n. 23, p. 54.

67. Ibid., p. 55.

68. Ibid., p. 69.

Chapter II

POLITICAL ISSUES

1969 was a turning point in the history of relationship between Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. On 12 February 1969, The Times wrote: "The sharp deterioration in Anglo-German relations that followed has now been got over. All is forgotten and forgiven The lessons for the British government in all this is that the Germans must be treated as equals".

The Anglo-German relations entered a new era following the assumption of Willy Brandt, a Social Democrat, as the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1969. Six months after the assumption of Brandt Government to office, and two months after his visit to London, the Anglo-German relationship was firmly set for cordiality than ever before. As a result, the problems, which had overshadowed their relationship ever since the Federal Republic was established, became relatively minor in comparison with the growing convergence of interests between them in the laste sixties. Indeed, during this period the British and the German approaches to the international environment also became increasingly identical.

An important factor which reinforced a more harmonious relationship between Britain and the Federal

1. See The Times (London), 12 February 1969).

Republic of Germany was that both the countries had social Democratic Governments, for the first time after a lapse of about forty years. The statesmen, who were discussing social and economic policies in Socialist gatherings earlier, had become the ministers responsible for formulating policies, and therefore, on many questions the British and the German perceptions became strikingly similar. Indeed, both the countries started seeing each other as members of the same category of West European medium powers, with an increasing area of concern in the organisation of Western Europe.²

The two major political issues around which the Anglo-West German relationship between 1969 and 1976 can be analysed are the British membership in the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Germany's Ostpolitik.

BRITISH MEMBERSHIP IN THE EEC

The British membership in the European Economic Community was one important question which was awaiting solution, and which needed the support of the FRG also, in 1969. Of course, President de Gaulle's exit from the French political scene had considerably helped to create a climate conducive to Britain's entry into the European Economic

2. Roger Morgan, "The New Germany: Implications for British Policy: A Case of Convergence", The Round Table (London), No. 239, July 1970, p. 254.

Community. Pertinently, the British daily, The Times, wrote that there was now an opening of "a third and successful attempt by Britain to enter the Common market, and a political development of the Common Market along federal lines".³ However, when Kurt George Kissinger, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of Britain, met in February 1969, Kiesinger assured Wilson that Germany's object still was Britain's full participation in the Common Market. In response, Wilson told Kiesinger that the British people were politically and psychologically disappointed at their continuing exclusion from Europe and that their interest would revive only should they be offered something concrete.⁴

The British ruling circles were convinced that through political and economic partnership with the FRG, Britain's entry into the European Economic Community would be easier. According to a French newspaper: "The French veto on Britain's entry into EEC ... made inevitable Britain's change of front in choosing the FRG as the mainstay of future united western Group".⁵ It wrote: "Wilson wants to draw Bonn into his game in the hope of creating around London a political European nucleus independent of Gaullism".⁶

3. See The Times, 30 April, 1969.

4. "Do the British Even Want to Know?" The Economist (London), 15 February 1969, p. 23.

5. Combat (Orleans, France), 15 February 1969.

6. Ibid., 13 February 1969.

A British magazine, Spectator, wrote that the British diplomatic manoeuvres had only one aim: "To convince Bonn and the other four EEC members that "France was so intolerable that they must break up the Common Market and create a new one with Britain in France's place"⁷. Another British Daily, Daily Telegraph, sketched out more clearly the range of questions which could constitute the basis of an Anglo-German bloc:

In fact the Common Market is only one aspect of the European Question. Defence, and the political institutions that would be needed for a European defence policy, to include a European nuclear weapons system, are just as important as the economic side, if not more important This country should now offer a political lead to the rest of Europe, regardless of what de Gaulle does or says". (8)

Apparently, London and Bonn made some progress in getting France isolated in Western Europe. The statesmen in London clearly expected to see Bonn eager to play the "anti-American card" of Paris against Paris itself, in an effort to convince President Nixon of the United States that he should in no sense rely on General De Gaulle and that the "best Europeans, the only ones the United States could really trust, were in London"⁹.

7. Spectator (London) 28 February 1969.

8. Daily Telegraph (London), 6 February 1969.

9. Le Monde (Paris), 23 February 1969.

Certainly, to claim the role of the spokesman of other European nations, it was imperative for Harold Wilson to forge a united Anglo-German front, even at the cost of some concessions to Bonn. It was conceded that Britain's role in Europe would increase only through its membership in greater West European gatherings like the European Economic Community. The change of governments in the two major countries of the Continent - France and West Germany - raised a positive hope in Britain to secure membership in the European Economic Community.

Meanwhile, when the European political climate was becoming more favourable to Britain's entry into the Common Market, the people at home were divided on this issue. The British people gave significant second thoughts about joining the Community on questions like its impact on food price,¹⁰ uncertainty over the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the entry fee. A White Paper the British Government issued in February 1969 observed that the entry might cost to Britain anything between one hundred million and one thousand million pounds - adding that neither extreme seemed¹¹ likely". Wilson and his colleagues had rightly foresaw

10. Estimated in a British White Paper at a 3 to 5 per cent increase in the cost of living and on 18 to 26 per cent increase in food prices. See Pierre Henri Laurent, "A Milestone for the European Community", Current History (Philadelphia) Vol. 58 (345), May 1970, p. 263.

11. See Nora Beloff, Transit of Britain: A Report on Britain's Changing Role in the Post-war World (London 1973), p. 242.

that the entry cost might increase to five hundred million pounds, but got consoled that the entry would stimulate business expansion. Therefore, they accepted this cost as "an investment in growth".¹² Clarifying these issues Michael Stewart, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, spoke at the Annual Labour Party Conference on 1st October, 1969:

There will of course be some increase in food prices, There will indeed be increases whether we join the communities or not. Otherwise speaking, we can't predict what the future details of the Common Agricultural Policy will be we certainly can't assume if we look at past experience that food prices would remain static into the 1970s if we were outside the community.(13)

Michael Stewart insisted on the British membership in the European Economic Community because Britain would gain politically and economically. He realised that it was difficult to have a meaningful say in the world politics while remaining alone. He said: "We have to recognise that no state in western Europe can now exercise by itself all the influence for good which it could exercise as part of a great group working together".¹⁴

12. Ibid., p. 243.

13. Michael Stewart, "Economic Policy: EEC Entry", Vital Speeches of the Day (New York) Vol. 36, 1969-70.

14. Ibid., p. 61.

However, in the early 1970 the cost of Britain's entry appeared to be quite high. But the Government tried to minimise its impact on the public by stressing the plus points. At that time the main concern of British, as expressed by the Bow Group, a left-of-centre study group of Young Tories, was how to get "fair terms" for Britain to join the European Economic Community.¹⁵

During the 1970 elections in Britain the leaders of both major political parties - Harold Wilson and Edward Heath - were committed to the British membership in the European Economic Community "if the terms were right".¹⁶ After the election Edward Heath became the Prime Minister of Britain. He selected his closest friend and colleague Geoffrey Rippon as the chief negotiator to negotiate with the Six for the British membership. Heath firmly believed that the United Europe with Britain would be able to play the world role which Britain could hardly afford to play alone.

At the Conservative Party's Annual Conference in 1971 Heath made it clear that the American partnership was no longer reliable, and that in comparison to the danger of isolation, entry into the Common Market was an important option to them. "I must tell you plainly", he warned,

15. The Times, 11 February, 1970.

16. Nore Beloff, n. 11, p. 245.

"that if, in this challenging world, we had been forced to stand alone, the prospect for the jobs and livelihood of our people would be bleak indeed".¹⁷

In the House of Lords, Lord Crowther, on 27 July 1971, said:

It has always been clear, ever since we committed our biggest political mistake for 20 years by refusing to be one of the founder members of the Common Market, that we should have to pay a price to get in, and the price is very much less than I expected. But, in any case, you do not huggle over the subscription when you are invited to climb a lifeboat, you scramble aboard where there is still a seat for you. (18)

In the House of Commons, the Labour leader Harold Wilson warned, in October 1971, that a future Labour Government would immediately declare that it could not accept the "terms negotiated by the Conservatives, and in particular, the burdens arising out of the CAP, the blows to the Commonwealth, and any threats to our essential regional policies".¹⁹

Gradually it was realised that these problems could be best tackled after Britain's entry into the EEC, and

17. Ibid., p. 264.

18. Quoted in Britanicus, "Britain Without Group", Political Quarterly (London), Vol. 45, 1974, p. 287.

19. See I. Login and I. Yegorov, "Britain and the Common Market", International Affairs (Moscow), September 1974, p. 73.

not before that since in important questions like the Common Agricultural Policy and the budget contributions there remained an underlying common interest between Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany to force a review of the CAP and the budget contributions of the member countries. However, France had already given her way. The other five were ready to welcome Britain much before. Therefore, what remained was the necessary adjustment of the economies of Britain and other new members - Denmark and Ireland - with that of the EEC. On 22 January 1972 Britain and other new members signed the historic Treaty of Accession in Brussels enlarging the 'Six' into a group of 'Ten' (including UK, Denmark, the Irish Republic, Norway). On 31st December 1972 Britain withdrew from the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and joined the EEC on 1 January, 1973.²⁰

In 1974, there was another election in Britain, and the Labour Party formed a government with Harold Wilson as the Prime Minister. By that time Britain had started disenchantment with its membership in the EEC. The first thing the Labour Government after assuming office did was

20. Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London, 1973), p. Later on in a referendum held in Norway, the Norwegian people refused to ratify Norway's accession to the EEC. As a result, Norway withdrew from the EEC.

to instruct, Fred Peart, the Minister of Agriculture, who attended the meeting of Agriculture. Ministers from the EEC countries in March 1974, not to enter into any agreement, which would increase food prices in Britain. Meanwhile, the EEC had agreed for the continuation of subsidising (till February 1975) the producers of Britain's most important agricultural products - pork, beef and butter in order to hold the prices down.²¹

At the beginning of April 1974, a meeting of EEC Foreign Ministers was held in Luxembourg, where British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, made explicit Britain's official policy relating to the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, Britain's contribution to the Community Budget, trade with the commonwealth and developing countries, and to grant Britain the power to pursue effective regional, industrial and fiscal policies. He hoped that these problems could be solved within the framework of the EEC. "But", he pointed out, "we shall have to reserve the right to propose changes in the terms of the Treaties if it should turn out that essential interests cannot be met without them". On the following day, in the House of Commons, Callaghan added that, if the EEC countries did not accommodate Britain, then "the question of withdrawal is on the agenda".²²

21. See Financial Times (London), 25 March 1974.

22. I. Login and I. Yegorov, n. 19, p. 74.

In April itself, The Guardian wrote about a report, submitted to Whitehall by Britain's permanent representative to the EEC Commission in Brussels, which contained the negative reactions of the other eight countries and their unwillingness to change the conditions of the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Accession whereby Britain joined the community.²³ However, renegotiations took place subsequently between Britain and other EEC members. After the completion of the renegotiations of the terms, Britain held a referendum on 5 June 1975 on the question of Britain's continuation in the EEC as a member on the renegotiated terms.

Results of the Referendum on UK's Membership
in the EEC²⁴

	<u>For EEC</u>	<u>Per cent</u>	<u>Against EEC</u>	<u>Percent</u>
England	14.92 mn.	67.2	6.81 mn.	31.3
Wales	0.87 mn.	64.8	0.47 mn.	35.2
Scotland	1.33 mn.	58.4	0.95 mn.	41.6
Northern Ireland	2.26 mn.	52.1	0.24 mn.	47.9
Total	17.38 mn.	67.2	8.48 mn.	32.8

23. See The Guardian, (London), 11 April 1974.

24. Josselyn Hennessy, "The Aftermath of the British Referendum", Eastern Economist (New Delhi), Vol. 65(14), 2 October 1975, p. 645.

The verdict of the referendum was overwhelmingly in favour of Britain's continuation in the EEC as a member. It appears that the British people were not much concerned about the details of the renegotiations but had reflected rather on the fact that no country could manage its affairs in isolation in the modern world and therefore must work in a community. In the words of George Thomson:

The Referendum result, with its decisive two-in-one majority, was in fact a massive instinctive display of common sense by the British people. I am not claiming in any way that it revealed the British people with a positive enthusiasm for the concept of a European Union, but it reflected the sound commonsense attitude that our future lay in the community, that having become part of it, it would be frivolous and irresponsible to pull out of it, and finally that whatever was wrong with the community, it was for better to work to improve things from the inside. (25)

What was the attitude of the Federal Republic to the whole question? It may be borne in mind that in the late sixties, the Federal Republic of Germany had become an "economic giant" which it had proved by its unyielding response to the British and French requests to revalue the West German Mark (DM) in order to save their currencies from inflation. ²⁶ Pertinently, The Times commented that "the

25. The Rt. Hon. George Thomson, "Europe After the British Referendum", Studia Diplomatica, (Brussels), vol.28, p.622.

26. The New York Times wrote: "The struggle over the Franc and the Mark that rocked the West's monetary system this week has altered the political outlook of the Atlantic world, The New York Times, 28 November 1968. See also B. Izakov, "Britain backs Bonn", New Times (Moscow), 26 February 1969, pp. 7-9.

primacy of power in western Europe had moved from Paris²⁷ to Bonn".

At the same time France also began to realise that it now needed the economic and monetary support of the more stable members of the European Economic Community. This realisation of France had provided the other five members of the EEC with a chance to insist on a lenient approach towards admission of Britain and others - Denmark, Norway and Ireland - to the EEC. And the FRG was taking the lead in this direction. With that sense of good-will and enthusiasm, on 23 February 1969, Baron von and zu Guttenberg, de Gaulle's most ardent supporter among Chancellor Kiesinger's entourage, was authorised to broadcast a statement declaring that there existed "substantial differences" between the views of Bonn and Paris, and also that there was agreement with Britain on "most essential questions".²⁸

Willy Brandt's assumption as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1969 furthered the FRG's support to Britain: Germany favoured the expansion of European Economic Community with the active participation of Britain. On 28 October 1969, Willy Brandt told the West German Bundestag:

The enlargement of the European Community must come. The Community needs Great Britain as much as the other applicant
(contd...)

27. The Times, 12 February 1969.

28. The Times, 24 February 1969.

countries. In the chorus of European voices the voice of Britain must not be missing, unless Europe wants to inflict harm on herself. We are gratified to note that the decisive forces in British policy continue to be convinced that Great Britain in turn needs Europe. It is time to initiate the no doubt difficult and probably time consuming process at the end of which the community ²⁹ will find itself placed on a broader basis.

Two dramatic developments took place in West Germany - (1) the revaluation of Mark upward by a little above 9 per cent; and (2) the FRG's accession to the NPT - which prompted the Brandt government to maintain a close relationship with the West. Willy Brandt insisted on a swift expansion of the EEC and argued that Britain's and other non-members exclusion would be dangerous for the existence of the organisation, would check the moves for European unity and would put the EEC at an economically and technologically disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the major powers. ³⁰ Therefore, he suggested a gradual increase in the political cooperation within the EEC; a policy for economic and monetary union, strengthening of EURATOM, a reform of the agricultural policy to eliminate farm surpluses, the establishment of a European Youth Organisation

29. Willy Brandt, "West Germany: Policies for the Future", Vital Speeches of the Day (New York), Vol. 36, 1969-70, p. 113.

30. Gerhard Braunthal, "West German Foreign Policy in Ferment", Current History, Vol. 58 (345), May 1970, p. 293.

on the model of Franco-German Youth Organisation and an expansion of development aid.³¹

The Conference of the European Economic Community, held on 2 December 1969 at the Hague, had decided to start negotiations with the applicant countries at the firm insistence of West Germany. Uwe Kitzinger explains how, following his opening speech at the Hague Conference, George Pompidou was confronted by Willy Brandt in a way that would have been most improbable when de Gaulle faced Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, and Karl George Kiesinger. Pompidou had made a short, cautious speech in which he appealed for negotiations to be taken up "in a positive spirit but without losing sight of the interests of the Community".³² Brandt argued firmly for the enlargement of the Community underlining four main reasons. They included an indirect threat that Germany would not co-operate in agreeing to finalise the agricultural financing arrangements from which France stood to gain much. "Experience has shown", said Brandt, "that putting of the question of enlargement threatened to paralyse the Community".³³ If the applicant states were not accorded an unprejudiced chance of joining the Community, Germany might organise a veto on the completion of Community agricul-

31. News from Germany (Bonn), December 1969.

32. Uwe Kitzinger, n. 20, p.

33. Willy Brandt, Peace (Bonn, 1971), p. 88.

tural financing arrangements³⁴ - a move that none of Brandt's predecessor would have dared to make with de Gaulle. Brandt stated unequivocally at the Conference: "At any rate, I want to say that without Britain and the other countries desirous of entry, Europe cannot become what it should and can be"³⁵.

Thus, Britain got the strong support of West Germany which till then remained a more or less passive supporter of Britain at the negotiating table. Not only that Brandt supported Britain but he felt also that unless French goodwill was obtained Britain's entry into the EEC would not be easy. Therefore, tactfully he promoted the Anglo-French understanding on a bilateral basis and became a strong advocate of a Summit Meeting between Edward Heath and Georges Pompidou where he wisely counselled the British against hurrying up negotiations or attempting to apply pressures on the French.³⁶ Paradoxically enough, Brandt made the same point at the Hague in calling for enlargement of the community. He said: "Anyone who fears that the economic strength of West Germany could cause an imbalance in the Community ought to favour enlargement for this very reason"³⁷.

34. D. Rudnick, "An Assessment of the Reasons for the Removal of the French Veto to UK Membership of the European Economic Community", International Relations (London), Vol. 4 (6), November 1974, p. 662.

35. Willy Brandt, n. 33, p. 88.

36. D. Rudnick, n. 34, p. 663.

37. Ibid., p. 664.

The other five members of the EEC also favoured the expansion of the Community. It appears that Brandt strongly supported Britain entry in order ^{to} vigorously pursue his Ostpolitik, which needed the close co-operation of Western allies, and, eventually, the union of Western Europe. Brandt assured, the Benelux countries and Italy, that the regional growth, with the presence of France and Britain in the "new Europe", would not result in the emergence of a new bloc. Indeed, Brandt's declaration had provided the general outlines of the Europe of the future. ³⁸ However, the Federal Republic of Germany extended full support to Britain throughout its final round of negotiations with the Six for membership in the EEC.

In April 1974, when James Callaghan, British Foreign Secretary, emphatically stated about the renegotiations at the Luxembourg meeting of the EEC Foreign Ministers, Walter Scheel, Foreign Minister of the FRG, who was chairing the meeting, categorically denied that Britain was accorded the treatment as a special case. The pro-Atlantic Press expressed surprise and opined that "the British Government has put a question mark over the further integration of the

38. See Alastair Buchan (ed.), Europe's Future, Europe's Choices (London, 1969). Also Franz Josef Strauss, Challenge and Response: A Program for Europe (New York 1970); and Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation (New York, 1970).

European Community and its transformation into a political union", and "that a British withdrawal from the Community would mean the end of all attempts to unite Western Europe".³⁹

Britain's rigid stand on renegotiation alarmed other members who were not ready to allow Britain for a renegotiation. On 2 December 1974, Harold Wilson, Prime Minister and Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor, met and discussed the situation which made a very substantial contribution towards the promotion of mutual understanding. The central point of Schmidt's speech was:

All I really want to say ... is that your comrades on the Continent want you to stay and you will please have to weigh this. If you talk of solidarity you have to weigh it. Your comrades on the Continent believe that it is in their interests as well as in yours too. (40)

It was a formal request of Helmut Schmidt to the British not to fluctuate over the EEC membership issue, let alone withdrawal. In 1975 a referendum was held in Britain and the people supported membership in a large majority. Hence Britain accepted the verdict of the people and continued in EEC. In post-referendum period Britain and Germany proposed several changes in the Community and were trying thereafter to make it a stronger one.

39. I. Login and I. Yegorov, n. 19, p. 74.

40. Dan Vander vat, "Need for Co-operation Emphasised at Schmidt-Wilson Talks", The Times, 2 December 1974.

FRG's OSTPOLITIK

With Brandt's elevation to West German Chancellorship in October 1969, a new policy named Ostpolitik, a policy towards East, was evolved and put into action. For the SPD-LDP coalition Ostpolitik had been an all-out effort for the normalisation of relationship with Eastern Europe. An astute student of German foreign policy, Lawrence L. Whetten, observed that the Federal Republic had been, until 1969, "the economic giant and the political dwarf" due to its limited options in the East.⁴¹ That characterisation of West Germany was no longer true. Brandt's multi-dimensional initiative found a new basis for dealing with the reality of Ostpolitik. Through Ostpolitik, Brandt aimed at the normalization of relationship with the East without offering the GDR legal recognition and was ready to drop even the bothersome Hallstein doctrine, which proclaimed FRG's enmity with any country which established full diplomatic relations with the GDR.⁴²

While speaking in Bundestag on 28 October 1969

Brandt said:

The Federal Government will advise the USA, Britain, and France to continue energetically the talks begun with the
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41. Lawrence L. Whetten, Germany's Ostpolitik (New York, 1971).
42. Felix E. Hirsch, "Ostpolitik in Historical Perspective" Current History, Vol. 62-63, 1972, p. 232.

Soviet Union on easing and improving the situation of Berlin. The status of the city of Berlin under the special responsibility of the Four Powers must remain untouched. This must not be a hindrance to seeking facilities for traffic within and to Berlin. (43)

Berlin had been constantly on the boil and even sometimes led to tense confrontations between the West and East. In March 1970, talks on West Berlin finally got under way between the representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France. On 12 August 1970 Brandt signed the celebrated West German non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union; and in November 1970, he also concluded another treaty with Poland.⁴⁴ Brandt took another year and a half to ratify these treaties and faced a hard challenge from the CDU-CSU combination at home for their implementation.

The Four-Power talks which started in 1970, despite all the difficulties and complexities, commonsense and goodwill ultimately triumphed. On 3 September 1971 the Quadripartite Agreement was signed and "conditions have been created to turn West Berlin from a source of disputes into a constructive element of peace and detente".⁴⁵ Under

43. Willy Brandt, n. 29, p. 106.

44. Norman A. Graebner, "Germany Between East and West", Current History, Vol. 62-63, 1972, p. 228.

45. G. Kirillov, "West Berlin: Past and Future", International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 7, July 1976, p. 75.

the Agreement: (a) The Soviet Union has accepted responsibility for maintaining Western access into West Berlin; (b) They agreed also to the West German Government's presence in Berlin, including 23,000 civil servants; (c) West German officials and political parties would be permitted to meet in Berlin; (d) West Berliners would be also able to travel with West German passports rather than with Berlin identity cards; and, (e) The agreement provided for increased contacts⁴⁶ between the people of East and West Berlin.

The Berlin Agreement of 1971 became the most significant achievement of the Four Powers to calm down the spirit of cold war which Berlin dispute had started shortly after the Second World War. The FRG recognised the reality in Europe by accepting the Oder-Neisse line as the dividing line between Germany and Poland and thereby Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

Brandt declared in the Bundestag on 28 January 1971, much before the agreement was reached: "Our policy is not off balance. It still rests on the progress of Western European co-operation, the further development of the NATO Alliance, and the fostering of proven friendships". These policies would not "prevent us from developing better relations with the East, but on the contrary, are a basic

46. Norman A. Graebner, n. 44, p. 228.

condition of this, as we feel, necessary effort"⁴⁷. Though Brandt had improved FRG's relation with the East and settled the Berlin dispute, still he had never neglected FRG's relations with the West European countries.

But the crowning achievement of Brandt's Ostpolitik was the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, signed on 8 November 1972. Coming after a number of agreements between the two countries on travel, communication, and steps for better relations, the treaty finally ended the unnatural situation existed since the end of the Second World War. The most important of them was the FRG's recognition of sovereign state status to the GDR and the acceptance of the international frontier between the two countries.

Dietrich Schworzkopf, in his analysis of the Basic Treaty observed:

This treaty is a particularly illuminating piece of that dialectic policy, which started with the thesis that the status quo has to be recognised in order that it may be overcome. In the Basic Treaty, the nation is being denied, so that it may be together based and the responsibility of the Four Power is being played down to be preserved as a unifying factor. (48)

47. Press and Information Office of the Government of Federal Republic of Germany, "Report on the State of Nation", Supplement to The Bulletin (Bonn), 2 February 1971.

48. Dietrich Schworzkopf, "The Nation is Denied", Deutsche Zeitung/Christ and Welt, (Duesseldorf, Germany), 17 November 1972.

It was criticised that the Basic Treaty did not mention about the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers in the whole of Germany. But both the Governments in different agreements had expressed that the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR would not hamper the bilateral or multilateral treaties relating them or between them which were agreed upon earlier.⁴⁹

The FRG pursued its eastern policy vigorously. On 11 December 1972, the FRG signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Bulgaria as well.⁵⁰ The real thrust of FRG's eastern policy seems to be not on the normalization of its diplomatic relations with other countries of Eastern Europe but on the sorting out of urgent problems with the GDR.

The Federal Government continued its policy of conciliation with the East European nations and the treaty with Czechoslovakia had completed the circle. The objective of the FRG was to make peace safer and along with in that its outstanding problems also would be solved. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the FRG, spoke in

49. Jens Hacker, "The Basic Treaty", Central Europe Journal, (Bonn), Vol. 21 (3/4), March/April, 1973, p. 61.

50. Gerhard Merzin, "Enlarging the Scope of Germany's Eastern Policy", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. 25 (571), 20 January 1974, p. 13.

the Bundestag, on 18 September 1974, with due emphasis on the responsibilities of the Western Powers:

Something else we treat as a matter of course is our close coordination of policy with the three powers who exercise supreme authority in West Berlin and carry the corresponding responsibility. I wish to emphasize the fact that this process of coordination on the basis of mutual confidence has proved its value particularly in these last few months, as has the Quadripartite Agreement in that period. (51)

Great Britain had always extended full support to the FRG in its Ostpolitik. This was mainly because Britain believed that Ostpolitik would promote peace and stability in Europe - a necessary condition for the prosperity of Europe, including Britain. Since the Second World War, Britain was supporting every move which helped this process. On the reunification of Germany, Britain had favoured the attitude of other NATO members with the knowledge that they were unable to do anything to improve the situation. Hence it stressed that peace in Europe depended on such reunification and affirmed the position of the government of Bonn that it was the sole representative of the whole German nation.⁵² The British people were convinced, of late, about the FRG's dedication to peace.⁵³ According to Michael

51. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Federal Republic of Germany - Foreign Policy Statement", Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 41(2), 1 November 1974, p. 44.

52. Josef Korbel, Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton, 1972).

53. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 1966-67, Vol. 737, Col. 1, 172.

Stewart: "The German reunification and the old line that the Polish-German boundary could be finally determined only at a peace conference"⁵⁴.

However, Ostpolitik was no way a denunciation of Westpolitik. The leaders of France, Britain and the United States had all endorsed Brandt's Ostpolitik, thereby helping to refute charges of the CDU-CSU Opposition in the FRG that Ostpolitik would undermine Western confidence in West Germany.⁵⁵

On the Berlin question and German unification the British Government had all along warmly supported Brandt's effort to improve the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union and other East European countries.⁵⁶ On all these matters the Federal Government also kept in close touch with its allies, including Britain. This kind of basic British understanding of Bonn's Ostpolitik and Bonn's own awareness of its limitations helped the Anglo-German relationship to flourish all through the 1970s.

Thus, it may be found that on political questions, the relationship between Great Britain and the Federal

54. Daily Telegraph, September 23, 1965.

55. Carl G. Anthon, "Germany's West Politik", Current History, Vol. 28, 1972, p. 265.

56. Michael Stewart, "Britain, Europe and the Alliance", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 48, July 1970, p. 658.

Republic of Germany during the period under review was one of understanding and cooperation. This has been reflected in their approaches to the two main issues discussed above. It may be recalled that the attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany towards the British membership in the European Economic Community was quite favourable ever since Britain sent its application for it in 1961. But the support Britain got from the Federal Republic in 1969 for its move to join the EEC was more vigorous than ever before. This support was constant both at the final negotiations in 1971 and 1972 and also during the renegotiations in 1974. For the FRG the British membership in EEC was a step which could strengthen the voice of Europe and also an important step in the direction of harnessing a political union within the framew of the EEC so that the EEC can, if necessary, balance both the super powers in world politics and maintain peace.

Similarly, although Britain all along maintained deep suspicion about the Soviet intentions in Europe, it supported West Germany's Ostpolitik partly to test how far the East European countries and the Soviet Union desired peace with Western Europe and partly to promote reconciliation, if possible, between the two German states. In

addition to this, it would entail a viable and durable solution to the Berlin question and also a viable solution to the problem of German reunification. Moreover, from the British point of view, peace in Europe was essential to the prosperity of Europe. Therefore, Britain supported Ostpolitik of the FRG thinking that it might also contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe, although it maintained its faith in the deterrent capacity of the NATO as the guarantor of peace in Europe.

Chapter III

MILITARY ISSUES

The West European democracies with their attempt to harmonise foreign policies made efforts to harmonise their defence policies as well. The revised Brussels Treaty, which was binding on the seven members of the Western European Union (WEU) provided the fundamental basis for an integrated approach among the West European countries on defence matters. North Atlantic Treaty provided the bedrock of co-operation between Britain and West Germany on security matters.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 brought the West European democracies together that their response to the Soviet intervention in Prague was a united one. Their condemnation was total and, indeed, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany became the exponents of that condemnation. They were very critical of the Soviet action and demanded the Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia occurred at a time when West Germany was trying to promote Detente

1. Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

in East-West relations through its policy of Ostpolitik. But, the Soviet action in a neighbouring country had raised many eyebrows in West Germany that although developments in Czechoslovakia did not result in a reversal of the process of detente in Europe, it had led to deepen the conviction of the West German Statesmen that the North Atlantic Alliance should remain the bed-rock of the security of the Federal Republic. Willy Brandt, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of West Germany and the country's Foreign Minister, said: "In our own policy, we still strive for strengthening the Atlantic Defence Alliance and promoting West European unity"². Therefore, it may appear that the West German foreign and defence policy was thus accentuated to considerate the political and military policies of NATO. Obviously, Bonn seems to have hoped that by its pronounced loyalty to NATO, the FRG would gain greater influence in the Atlantic Alliance.

The British attitude to NATO during the period under review was also, more or less, similar. Indeed, the primacy Britain gave to NATO in its security perspective could be seen from the fact that it was reiterated, year after year, in every defence White Paper the Government

2. Siegfried Schworz, "West Germany's Particular Role in NATO", German Foreign Policy (Berlin) Vol. 8(2), 1969, p. 92.

had issued during the period under review. Not only that, about 90 per cent of Britain's Defence expenditure was devoted to support NATO in Europe.³

In general, the official West German and British reaction to the occupation of Czechoslovakia was one of painful and righteous anger, as well as an awareness of their inability to remedy the situation. Statesmen like Franz Josef Strauss, Baron Von Guttenberg and Walter Hallstein in West Germany, and Harold Wilson and Michael Stewart in Great Britain gave a call "for increased vigilance and for strengthening of NATO defenses"⁴.

Thus assessing the significance of Czechoslovak crisis and its influence on NATO, Heinz Barth wrote in Die Welt:

The Czechoslovak crisis is a turning point in NATO. It confronts the alliance with a vital problem The time has come to speak up and not practice any easy self-deception If Bonn does not act, the Prague crisis will but hasten the decline of the alliance instead of halting it. Only if Europe shows that it no longer depends entirely on the USA, will America adjust its own military contribution to the new situation. (5)

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3. B. Vivekanandan, "British Outlook for West European Security", Indian Quarterly (New Delhi), Oct.-Dec. 1973, p. 308.
 4. Josef Korb, Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton, N.J., 1972), p. 96.
 5. Die Welt, (Hamburg), 14 September 1968.

Thus, NATO became a matter of prime concern for Britain and West Germany in Western Europe as France had already withdrawn herself in 1966 from the NATO military command and ^{as there} appeared a marked shift, by the beginning of 1969, in the foreign policy of the United States of America. Moreover, around that time, the era of cold war also was gradually giving way to a new era of detente.

In 1969, the Government of West Germany had decided to earmark a substantial portion of its budget towards the military expenditures of a total amount of DM 19.865.4 million marked for that purpose in 1969, DM 18,800 million was to be diverted to the Bundeswehr (German Army), DM 633 million for foreign armed forces stationed in West Germany and DM 432.4 million for civil defence purposes. Together, they covered 24.1 per cent of the total West German budget. ⁶

Willy Brandt spoke in the Bundestag on the importance of NATO in West German Foreign Policy:

The Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of our security. It also provides the backing for our policy of detente towards the East. The political and military presence of the United States is indispensable for keeping a balance of power in Europe. At the same time the Federal Government will endeavour to make the European pillar of the alliance stronger, the Eurogroup providing a realistic basis for such efforts. (7)

6. See, Handelesblatt (Dusseldorf), 9 September 1968.

7. Brandt's Policy Statement: "We Want a State of Affairs Where the Shooting Will Stop", Central Europe Journal (Bonn.) Vol. 21, 1973, p. 66.

Despite their identical attitude to the importance of NATO to their national securities, there was a slight difference in the perceptions of Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany towards the Soviet Union, the principal source of threat to their security. The Federal Republic, in its enthusiastic pursuit to promote detente, preferred to pursue a relatively conciliatory line towards the Soviet Union, while the British attitude to Moscow remained quite hardened. In fact, Britain was quite suspicious over the Soviet motives in Western Europe. Whitehall viewed that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was an affirmation of the Russian readiness to use force to promote its interests. Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, said that the lessons to be learnt from the events were that it was necessary not only to maintain the NATO alliance, but also to continue to its determination to create the "conditions of detente" and to be ready to respond to the opportunities for detente and to move positively in the direction of European unity. However, in the British eyes, Western Europe remained under the shadow of potential threat from the Soviet Union. It was viewed that Moscow's sympathy for detente was only a tactical manoeuvre to establish its own military superiority

8. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 769, 1967-68, Cols. 1274-84.

over the West. Edward Heath, Prime Minister, said in 1972: "It would be foolish to disregard the constantly increasing armed strength of the Soviet Union and the old-fashioned class ridden views still so predominant in the speeches and writings of communist ideologues. We must not therefore ignore our defences. Fundamental to this is the continued alliance between Europe and North America"⁹.

The West German government proposed the reorganisation of Bundeswehr (which is committed to and integrated in NATO) in 1974 after consultation with NATO. George Leber, West German Defence Minister, explained the need to reform to the Bundeswehr in 1974:

The development of costs for investment and the operation of fighting forces is leading to a continuous shrinking of the proportion of the defence budget spent on investment, and thus the necessary modernization of equipment could no longer be achieved in the future. (10)

The Federal Budget for 1974 on defence expenditure was DM 27,555 millions (£ 4,590 million) compared with DM 27,100 mn. (£ 4,510 mn.) in 1973. The Federal Government

9. British High Commission in India, British Information Services (New Delhi), B 19, B 142, p. 17 March 1972, p. 3.
10. Dan van der Vat, "West Germany Trims Non-Combatants", Strategic Digest (New Delhi), Vol. 4(3), March 1974, p. 85.

spent 21 per cent in 1974 which was 3 per cent of its gross national product on defence.¹¹

Britain established its European links through its collaboration in the sensitive area of defence technology with West Germany. France was highly disturbed over the British, German and the Dutch venture to produce enriched uranium by the gas centrifuge method and Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) which was being developed by Britain,¹² Germany and Italy.

Britain and other member nations' contributions to NATO was on the decrease due to their economic crises which apparently gave West Germany a much sought-after chance to exert influence on NATO. After the successful pursuit of Ostpolitik West Germany wanted to play a political role commensurate with its economic strength.¹³

At the twentieth Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly, held in London in November 1975, which was attended by parliamentary delegates from fourteen NATO countries.

11. Ibid., p. 86.

12. D. Rudnick, "An Assessment of the Reasons for the Removal of the French Veto to UK Membership of the European Community", International Relations (London) Vol. 4, November 1974, p. 665.

13. William Wallace, "Europe: The Changing International Context: Implications for British Policy", World Today (London), Vol. 31, 1975, p. 208.

Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, explained his country's inability to contribute huge amounts to NATO.

He said:

As you know the British Government is now carrying out a thorough review of our defence commitments and priorities. We have made it clear from the outset that we regard NATO as the cornerstone of our security, and that NATO will remain the first charge on the resources available for defence. We shall continue to carry our share of the Alliance defence burden. But - to repeat the point I made earlier - the share must be a reasonable one. At a time of severe economic strain we cannot continue to carry a burden proportionately greater than that of our European allies. Our aim is to provide modern and effective forces at a cost the British economy is capable of supporting. 14

The West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had opined that economic instability in Western Europe could play havoc with the alliance policy. "Our capacity to defend ourselves". Schmidt said, "depends on two ways in the economic situation of the Alliance members: not only do the reductions in economic strength affect the extent to which members are able to fulfil their commitments to the Alliance, but also, and this is the most important point, economic instability brings about social unrest and political instability in its wake". 15

14. Keith Williams, "20th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly", NATO Review (Brussels), vol.23, 1975, p. 20.

15. Peter Jenner, "NATO Summit - Leaders Reaffirm Commitment to Alliance and Collective Security", NATO Review vol. 23(3), 1975, p. 4.

In 1975 West Germany became the second largest contributor to NATO, next only to the United States in absolute terms and per head of the population. In terms of defence expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product (at factor cost) as of 30 September 1975, the FRG was outstripped¹⁶ by the United States, Britain and Portugal. This was accounted for by the size of her Gross National Product which was the largest among the NATO countries.

The Federal Republic of Germany became an active advocate of equipment collaboration as a means to promote Alliance-wide standardization, which would add to NATO's defence capability. Britain supported this view of Germany, hence they became most important partners with the United States of America in manifold bilateral cooperative activities. Besides EURONAD (Eurogroup National Armaments Directory), another defence equipment cooperation was being promoted through the joint talks of the Army Chiefs of Staff of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom on standardization of command and combat procedures and tactical concepts.¹⁷ In order to strengthen the tactical nuclear capability five European nations - Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and

16. "FRG White Paper on Defence, 1975-1976", Strategic Digest, Vol. 6(9), 1976, p. 65.

17. Ibid., p. 26.

the United Kingdom - purchased the US Lance surface-to-
18
surface missile (a tactical missile system).

Trilateral collaboration between the FRG, Italy and
the U.K. proved itself to be a success. These three
nations had collaborated on the development of MRCA (Multi-
19
Role Combat Aircraft) and the Field Howitzer 70. In
addition to this these three nations were also engaged in
developing the self-propelled howitzer 70.

Defence Expenditure of NATO for the
Year of 1975 (20)

	<u>Defence Expenditure</u> <u>(US \$ 1,000 mn.)</u>	<u>Per head</u> <u>(US \$)</u>
USA	92.7	432
FRG	16.2	264
France	13.0	244
U.K.	11.3	200
Italy	4.7	84
The Netherlands	3.0	216
Canada	2.9	128
Belgium	1.9	193
Turkey	1.4 88	35
Norway	0.9	219
Portugal	0.9	103
Greece	0.9	93
Denmark	0.8	161
Luxembourg	0.02	63

18. Ibid., p. 27.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 68.

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(CSCE)

The close and identical approach of Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany on military matters could be seen in their attitude to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the preparatory talks of which was begun in Helsinki on 22 November 1972 and continued upto 8 June 1973. And, the Conference of 35 European nations (33 + USA and Canada) at the Foreign Minister level began from 3 July 1973 at Helsinki, and continued at Geneva, reached its culmination in the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki by 35 heads of Governments on 1st August 1975.²¹

At the Conference, the Federal Republic of Germany put forth the three principles. They were: (i) refraining from the use of force; (ii) inviolability of frontiers;²² and, (iii) territorial integrity.

21. Polish Institute of International Affairs, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: A Polish View (Warsaw, 1976), p. 32-62. The participating countries were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the United Kingdom, the USA.

22. Ibid., For the Final Act, See NATO Review, vol.23, 1975, p. 6.

Britain's general approach to the Conference was one of extreme caution and was suspicious of the Soviet objectives behind the Conference. The British approach to the CSCE was outlined in what Edward Heath said in March 1972. He said:

We have two objectives in our policy to the countries of Warsaw Pact. We work to preserve our freedom to pursue in our own way the political, economic and social goals, which we believe to be in the best interests of our people. And we wish develop contacts and cooperation with the countries of the Warsaw Pact in a practical way, so that gradually we may dissolve the unnecessary barriers between us. What I want to see emerge from a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is a Europe which is more secure. We all of us want to live in a continent in which attempts inspired from abroad to undermine the society and institutions of each nation are brought to an end. And we want to see genuine measures of practical cooperation. (23)

Subsequently, on 5th July 1973, Sir Alec Douglas-Home British Foreign Secretary, explained the British approach at the CSCE meeting in Helsinki. The basic position he took was that the relative stability between the two security system of Europe (i.e. NATO and Warsaw Pact) must not be disturbed. He said that to promote greater cooperation in Europe, the most important step must be in the humanitarian and other fields so that it promote trust among the people,

23. British High Commission in India, British Information Services (New Delhi), BIS, B. 142, p., 17 March 1972,
p. 3.

24
movement of people and exchange of ideas. In essence, Britain wanted that the iron curtain in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union should be lifted in order to promote confidence among the people of Europe. This was broadly the line the FRG also had adopted at the CSCE Conference.

Despite these talks, the British suspicion over the Soviet intention behind these negotiations remained undiminished. According to Edward Heath, Prime Minister: "Where the Soviets consider that their interests are served in a particular field by an agreement, they will negotiate hard and long to get it Elsewhere in other fields they are constantly probing their opponents' weakness, to get through their guard, always on the lookout for means of bringing pressure to bear upon them.²⁵ Therefore, Britain had advocated a continuous policy of defence and detente, that while the West would engage the Soviet Union and its allies in discussions to achieve a real and lasting relaxation of tension between the East and the West, the military strength of NATO should be maintained at levels sufficient to deter aggression. In Britain's Defence Estimates of 1973 it was observed:

24. Ibid., BIS, B.288, 6 July 1973, p. 2.

25. UK, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 1970-71, Vol. 812, 1970-71, Col. 1415.

There is no sign that the Soviet Union is anticipating the outcome of negotiation (in CSCE) by a slackening of its defence efforts. The Soviet Union's defence expenditure continued to rise year after year in real terms Despite the substantial and still increasing military strength deployed on the border with China, there has been no decrease in Soviet forces facing NATO". (26)

Of course, West Germany also never contemplated the idea of weakening the deterrence for the sake of CSCE negotiations.

At the CSCE Summit in 1975 the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt highlighted his country's policy for peace in Europe. He stated:

Decades of confrontation are not replaced overnight by an era of cooperation and it is not enough to give a single impetus to the process of detente; it requires the steady action of all of us so as to progress continuously. The FRG has always regarded the renunciation of the use or threat of force as the basis of its policy. This also applies particularly to changes of frontiers. Frontiers are inviolable, but one must be able to change them by peaceful means and by agreement. It remains our aim to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination. (27)

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26. UK, Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1973, Cmnd. 5231 (1973), pp. 1-2.
 27. "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Ends - Some Views of Alliance Leaders", NATO Review Vol. 23(5), 1975, p. 5.

Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister said:

We are all of us determined to the utter most to defend not only our frontiers but our right to live under the political system each of us chooses for himself. The preservation of the integrity of each of us is the key to the future of all of us. Detente has become possible only because of that mutual determination. And detente will be maintained only by the continued assertion of vigilance, vigilance based on strength, vigilance based on solidarity. (28)

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION
(MEFR)

Similarly identical was the outlook of Britain and West Germany towards the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks held in Vienna, in 1973, between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies. When the talks on MEFR was agreed upon, it was emphasised that reductions should not only be "mutual" but also "balanced", a line which was found essential to NATO in its objective for the MEFR.²⁹

The basic premise of these talks was that if neither side deployed conventional forces to overwhelm the other side in a rapid thrust, it would reduce the chances of war in Europe. It was in this context that the West, in view of the geographical advantage and superiority the Warsaw Pact

28. Ibid., p. 9.

29. Kurt Birrenbach, "Europe's Security in the Changed World", Strategic Digest, Vol. 4, March 1974, p.55.

countries enjoyed in the East, put forth the suggestion to establish military balance of conventional forces at a lower level in order to achieve "more security at less expense"³⁰. The Federal Republic was the champion of this line and other West European countries subscribed to it. The area carved out to bring under the purview of the MBFR talks was the Central Europe, which otherwise was known as "Reduction Area", which embraced the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg in the West and the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia in the East.

As in the case of the CSCE, Britain was quite sceptical about the outcome of the MBFR talks. In the British calculation MBFR was fraught with major risks as it once taken place it may not be possible to maintain the balance between the two security systems of Western Europe.

However, from the very start the MBFR talks was facing difficulties. The two sets of proposals which were put forth both by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact for force reductions were quite divergent that it was difficult to bridge the difference. Of course, there was no separate proposals from either Britain or West Germany. Their proposals formed part of the NATO proposals. However, during the MBFR talks

30. Ibid., p. 54.

in Vienna, Britain proposed that the negotiations should initially focus the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States - said to be about 4,30,000 and 190,000 respectively - in the Central Europe.³¹ While the NATO's proposals contained reduction of both American and Russian forces, limiting the reduction to ground forces and conventional arms and bigger cut by the Warsaw Pact countries in manpower and armour the Warsaw Pact proposals contained force reductions of both ground and air forces, nuclear arms and equal reduction from both sides.³² In addition to this, while the Warsaw Pact had proposed a three stage force reduction spread over three years from 1975 to 1977, NATO had proposed a two stage force reduction. The Warsaw Pact proposed that in the first stage each side should reduce its forces by 20,000 men along with their equipment, followed by a reduction of 5 per cent in the second stage and a further reduction of 10 per cent in the 3rd stage. And the NATO proposed that in the first phase the US and the USSR should each reduce its forces by 15 per cent and bring down, at the second stage, the level of forces on each side to a common ceiling of 700,000.

31. The Times (London), 9 November 1973.

32. Times of India (New Delhi), 29 November 1973.

From the British point of view the entire MBFR exercise would ultimately result in to Moscow's advantage, if it was not pursued with great caution. This was partly due to the fact that, in view of the geographical situation, any forces the USSR might pull out from Eastern Europe might move only 100 to 700 miles on land routes to West Russia and could be reintroduced much more easily and quickly than those of the United States whose forces would have to cross 3000 miles Atlantic. Moreover, Britain's view was that prior to any troop reductions, sufficient progress must be made in the direction of developing confidence building mechanism and greater human contacts. West Germany shared this cautious British approach, although it wanted to promote detente through its Ostpolitik, which according to Chancellor Willy Brandt, could serve as the building material in the construction of a balanced all-European peace system.³³ Thus, it is obvious that the West German perspectives on the overall security of Europe was closely linked with the FRG's pursuit of Ostpolitik.³⁴ However, there was no agreement on the MBFR during the period under review.

33. See his speech at the SPD Party Conference held in May 1970.

34. Christoph Bertram, "West German Perspective on European security; continuity and change", World Today (London) Vol. 27, 1971, p. 123.

Co-operation in the Nuclear Field

The Federal Republic of Germany is one country committed by the international treaty not to produce nuclear arms.³⁵ The Treaty says that "the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons (and) agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organisation to ensure that these undertakings are observed".³⁶

Referring to the West Germany's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chancellor Willy Brandt said: The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany have always refused to seek control over nuclear warheads. Therefore, our signature under this treaty does not constitute any new renunciation.³⁷ He described the FRG's accession to the treaty as a contribution to its "comprehensive peace policy and called upon the nuclear powers to "make the world safer by agreements on the reduction of their nuclear and conventional potential".³⁸ Of course,

35. This commitment is contained in the Paris Treaties of 1954 with the United States, Britain and France, in which the Federal Republic of Germany gained its sovereignty from the three post-war occupation powers, acceded to the Western European Union and NATO, and accepted the stationing of allied troops.
36. NATO Information Services, NATO Facts and Figures, (Brussels, 1969), p. 287.
37. Press Conference, November 28, 1969, reprinted in the Bulletin des Presse and Information Santes der Bundesregierung (Bonn), 29 November 1970, p. 1236.
38. Ibid., 14 November 1969, p. 1183.

West Germany's independent nuclear armaments even if it has, would be heavily sufficient to meet an attack from the Soviet Union. Therefore, for the FRG it was safe to be under the protective umbrella of its allies. "Up to now, the FRG has endorsed even sought, this kind of nuclear status, i.e., the defence of the country by way of a deterrent posture through nuclear arms controlled by its allies. It has, however, rejected and continues to reject autonomous German nuclear armament".³⁹

As the FRG has been banned from the manufacture of nuclear weapons, Britain's is the only European nuclear strategic force committed to NATO. Denis Healey, Britain's Defence Secretary, time and again spoke out the need for the use of nuclear weapons at an early stage in the event of war, which was promptly agreed by the West German Defence Minister Schröder. On 7 January 1969, in the NATO Defence Planning Committee meeting Healey-Schröder team was assigned the task of elaborating the rules of using tactical nuclear weapons within the framework of a NATO strategy.⁴⁰

In view of the growing Soviet capability in nuclear armaments, the West European countries had underlined the

39. Horst Mendershansen, "Will West Germany Go Nuclear?" Orbis, Vol. 16(2), Summer 1972, p. 411.

40. S. Beglov, "Bonn-London: New Axis", International Affairs (Moscow), January-June, 1969, p. 69.

need to equip NATO with nuclear weapons. Otherwise, if the Soviet Union launched an attack "one half of West Germany is likely to be lost because of this 'nuclear shyness', the delayed tactical nuclear engagement will become infinitely more difficult, if at all possible, and the subsequent nuclear counterstrike will be made on allied territory and among allied population".⁴¹

The non-nuclear members of NATO were not showing much interest in the development of individual nuclear capability and as Germany had been banned by treaty for undertaking one, it was left with Britain and France to take up the responsibility for equipping NATO with nuclear weapons in consultation with the United States.⁴²

In terms of nuclear power capacity, West Germany is next only to Britain in Western Europe.⁴³ The British-Dutch-German consortium provides the FRG with facilities to enrich uranium by centrifuge. Though Germany lacked raw material it was never a point with it to have nuclear arms. They^{also} had noticed that nuclear arms programme had not brought any political gains either to France or to Britain. In 1972,

41. For a discussion of this very important problem See, Marc E. Geneste, "The Fence and the Defence", Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1963.

42. Marc E. Genegeste, "Britain, France and the Defence of Europe", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol.13, 1969-70, p.180. But France withdrew from the NATO command in 1966.

43. As of mid-1970, the megawattage of nuclear power plants, operating and on order, was 5,407 for the FRG, compared with the UK's 10,531, France's 3,218, Japan's 6,949, (contd....)

Willy Brandt gave a call for ban on nuclear weapons and for the destruction of all stockpiles if the human civilisation was to be saved from self-annihilation and suggested that creative co-existence would ensure not only peace but a fuller life for everybody.⁴⁴

The people of Germany had amply demonstrated their desire against nuclear arms by protesting against the building of an atomic power station at Brokdorf in Schleswig-Holstein and made the world aware of the strength of their feeling.⁴⁵ The protest movement of November 1976 compelled the authorities not to opt for atomic weapons anymore.

Thus, it may be seen that the relationship between Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in the military field between 1969 and 1976 was quite close. Since their national securities were parts and parcel of an integrated security system, on important security issues they followed an identical line. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation constituted the hub of this identical approach. Both the countries considered NATO as the bedrock of their national security and was opposed to any measure which might weaken NATO. Both of them considered the Soviet Union as the

43. (contd...) the USSR's 8,006, and the USA's 83,484, Atomwirtschaft, September-October, 1970, p. 426.

44. Gordon Schaffer, "Britain and European Security", New Times (Moscow), May 1972, p.9.

45. Hugh Latham, "Protest Against Nuclear Power in West Germany", Labour Monthly (London), Vol. 59(5), 1977, p. 222.

source of potential challenge to their security although the vehemence in their approaches to combat the threat varied between them. While Britain continued to favour stiff responses to the Soviet threats by increasing the efficacy of the deterrent mechanisms of the NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany had adopted a more moderate attitude towards the Soviet Union and its east European allies through a policy of detente. FRG's Ostpolitik was attuned mainly to that direction.

The Conference on the Security and Cooperation in Europe showed the extent of agreement and divergence in the perceptions of both the countries especially towards the Soviet Union. Despite the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany followed a cautious line on the question so that it did not result in any set back to its Ostpolitik and the resultant detente process, although it, by and large, agreed with the British assessments of the potential danger from the Soviet Union to Western Europe.

Similar was their approaches towards the question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in the Central Europe. Their line was broadly to follow simultaneously a policy of Defence and Detente.

Britain's present nuclear weapons capacity is also reassuring for the security of the Federal Republic of Germany since the British nuclear force is also committed to the NATO. It is important especially in the context of the FRG's resolve not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Britain's continued commitment to the defence of the Federal Republic is quite clear in its decision to station the British Army Of the Rhine in the Federal Republic of Germany. During the period under review, the two countries were planning for collaboration between them on defence production, especially the production of fighter air-craft.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing analysis clearly brings out the fact that Anglo-German relationship during the period under review had reached a stage of maturity and mutuality. That does not mean that the relationship between the two countries prior to 1969 was not close or cordial. Although Germany was a source of sorrow for Britain twice during this century - they fought two world wars between them. The relationship which developed between them after the Second World War was relatively free from rancour. It is true that Britain was a victorious nation against Germany in the Second World War; yet, it did not wish Germany's downfall as a nation. Indeed, after 1945 Britain had shown interest to get Germany re-established as an important nation in Europe so that it could develop partnership with it on economic, political and security matters affecting them, and the Continent as well. However, by late 1960s the Federal Republic of Germany had already become an economic giant with forebodings of its increasing political importance in future. As the relationship developed between the two countries over the years was one of understanding of each other's problems, by the time Willy Brandt became the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,

there existed already a great deal of sympathy and goodwill for each other in London and Bonn.

Therefore, what was conspicuous in their relationship after 1969 was the determination the leaders of both the countries had displayed to further strengthen their ties by extending support to each other on international forum especially on political and security questions. To a great extent, this was facilitated by the assumption of the SPD leader, Willy Brandt, as Chancellor of the Federal Republic in 1969. Of course, Harold Wilson, the British Socialist Leader, was already there as the British Prime Minister. As partners in the Socialist International - Willy Brandt representing the SPD of the Federal Republic of Germany and Harold Wilson representing the British Labour Party - the two leaders had maintained close relationship between them. Moreover, both of them were looking forward to strengthen between their ties between their countries through regular partnership in a common institutional framework like the European Economic Community. But, France stood in the way of such a partnership developing between the two countries for obvious political reasons.

It may be pointed out that although the Federal Republic of Germany had extended support to the British

application for membership in the European Community as early as 1961, when Britain first applied for membership, the French President General Charles de Gaulle's stubborn opposition to the British entry kept Britain out from the European Community for about a decade. And the West German leaders who were in the helm of affairs then on the other, did not press, beyond a point for Britain's admission to the EEC. But, notably, Willy Brandt, as Chancellor, had shown readiness to go beyond the hitherto followed passive support. As a happy coincidence, General de Gaulle also stepped down from the French Presidency, in 1969, making the task of British membership in the European Economic Community a little more easier. Perhaps, De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou had correctly read the mood of the new West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, on the question of British membership in the European Economic Community and quickly agreed, at the Hague summit in December 1969, for the expansion of the European Community. Brandt's speech at the Hague summit, holding out even veiled threat that if France did not agree for expansion of the Community with Britain in it he would not co-operate to finalise EEC's agricultural financing arrangements from which France was expected to gain much, indicated that he was determined to see Britain in the European Community. Therefore, it appears that if Brandt

did not take such a tough line, perhaps, France would not have yielded so quickly and agreed for the expansion of the Community with Britain in it. The change of Government in Britain in 1970, with Edward Heath as Prime Minister, did not affect any change in the Federal Republic's attitude to the question of British membership in the EEC. In fact, throughout the final negotiations for EEC membership the West German attitude remained helpful to British. How keen the FRG was on Britain's membership in the European Community could be seen from the fact that when Britain proposed the renegotiation of the terms of entry and a referendum following the return of Harold Wilson as the British Prime Minister in 1974, the West German leaders like Chancellor Helmut Schmidt openly pleaded with Harold Wilson not to think in terms of withdrawal from the EEC.

Similarly, the British support to the FRG's Ostpolitik was partly responsible for the success of that policy under Willy Brandt. Britain's support to Ostpolitik was based on its traditional line as a promoter of reconciliation in Europe. Further, it was based partly on the realisation that there was little chance of a military solution to the German problem and also to the Berlin question and that the vexatious problem like the Berlin

question could be solved through peaceful means by Germans themselves. Added to this was the imperative need to defuse tensions surrounding the German problem - fountain head of tensions in Europe. So, it was perceived the solution to these problems should necessarily be a political one - a peaceful one. Therefore, Britain was keen to utilise any opportunity which was available to promote genuine east-west detente - one of the principle objective of the FRG's Ostpolitik. Various treaties the Federal Republic of Germany had concluded with its neighbours, including the Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic and the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, had certainly helped to reduce tension in Central Europe.

Moreover, as the United States showing increasing reluctance to shoulder the full burden of European defence, it was also necessary to strengthen the European pillar of Atlantic defence adequately and reduce dependence on the United States. Even for that, promotion of detente in Europe was a prerequisite. Therefore, Britain found Ostpolitik conducive to the promotion of these objectives. At the same time, it may be pointed out that while Britain supported Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany it did not want to do it at the cost of the deterrent power of NATO, a line which in effect combined both defence

and detente, a line which subsequently the Federal Republic of Germany also had accepted.

On security matters also the period under review had witnessed greater co-operation between Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is true that the basic framework of this cooperation between the two countries was already there in the NATO. And both the countries had kept NATO as fundamental to their security. British commitment to the Federal Republic's security is also unequivocal as Britain stations the British Army of Rhine in the West German soil itself. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which was viewed in London and Bonn as an expression of Soviet determination to use force to safeguard its narrow interests, had only strengthened the resolve of Britain and the Federal Republic to rely more on the deterrent capacity of NATO as a bulwark against any threat to their national security. Although this was the basic position the two countries had adopted, there was a little difference in their approaches to the Soviet Union, that compared to Britain, the Federal Republic had pursued a more conciliatory approach to Moscow, may be to harness the success of Ostpolitik.

However, the two countries had adopted indential lines towards the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Both the countries had adopted a cautious approach

that both of them believed that any meaningful co-operation among the European nations could be built upon the foundations of greater human contacts and exchange of ideas as measures to develop mutual trust and confidence among the people. Therefore, while carrying out the negotiations at the CSCE, they did not want to relax the military preparedness of NATO which they wanted to be maintained at levels enough to deter aggression. The fact that the CSCE Final Act, signed by 35 Heads of States in 1975 in Helsinki, has provided room for peaceful change of borders among the European countries indicates that the German re-unification could eventually be possible in a peaceful manner.

There was also identical approach on the question of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. Here also, the Federal Republic had shared the cautious British approach in the matter that before any serious move towards reduction of forces in Europe there should be meaningful progress in the confidence building measures. They insisted that the forces reductions should be both mutual and a balanced one so that it would not result in a situation advantageous to the Soviet Union.

Other questions on which Britain and the Federal Republic had pursued a commonline was during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in which, under the pressure of threat from the

oil producing countries of West Asia Britain and West Germany had adopted an oblique line, which could very well be interpreted a pro-Arab line, to the great chagrin of the United States.

Thus, the period under review was one marked by close and cordial relationship between Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany both on political and military matters. During this period there was hardly a significant political or military issue on which they showed notable difference. However, towards the end of 1976 the two countries were found on the threshold of new ventures of collaboration in defence production, especially in the military aircraft.

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