

**Expansion of Shiv Sena in Western Maharashtra:  
a study of Kolhapur District**

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## Certificate

*This is to certify that the dissertation entitled, "Expansion of Shiv Sena in Western Maharashtra : A Study of Kolhapur District," which is being submitted by **Supriya R. Kanetkar** for the award of Degree of Master of Philosophy is her original work and may be placed before the examiner for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this University or of any other University.*

Prof. C.P. Bhambhri  
(Supervisor)

Prof. Balveer Arora  
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*Dedicated*

*to*

*Revered Prof. C.P. Bhambhri*

# *Contents*

<b>List of Tables</b>	...	...	...	...	<b>i</b>
<b>Acknowledgement</b>	...	...	...	...	<b>ii</b>
<b>Preface</b>	...	...	...	...	<b>iv</b>
<b>Map</b>	...	...	...	...	<b>viii</b>
<b>Chapters</b>					
1. Introduction	...	...	...	...	<b>1</b>
2. Expansion of Shiv Sena : Ideas, Issues and Personalities.	...	...	...	...	<b>13</b>
3. Socio-economic Parameters and Politics of Kolhapur.	...	...	...	...	<b>37</b>
4. Political Development of Shiv Sena in Kolhapur.	...	...	...	...	<b>63</b>
5. Conclusion	...	...	...	...	<b>89</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	...	...	...	...	<b>97</b>

# LIST OF TABLES

1. Maharashtra	ix
2. Population of Maharashtra	x
3. Social Composition of Maharashtra	xi
4. Chief Ministers of Maharashtra	xi
5. Lok Sabha Elections : 1984 and 1989	5
6. Lok Sabha Elections : 1989 and 1991	6
7. Main Crops and area under Cultivation in Kolhapur	40
8. Industries in Kolhapur by the end of 1994-95	43
9. General Elections : 1957 Legislative Assembly	52
10. General Elections : 1957 Lok Sabha	52
11. Bombay Corporation Election May 1957	52
12. General Elections : 1962 Legislative Assembly	53
13. Linkage between Politics and Sugar Co-operatives	57
14. Maharashtra 1990 Assembly Elections	64
15. Assembly Elections 1995	64
16. Lok Sabha results : A comparison (1989-1991)	75
17. Lok Sabha Elections : Kolhapur Parliamentary Constituency	78
18. Political Institutions - Local bodies	79
19. Position of Political Parties : Zilha Parishad Elections 1997	80
20. Zilha Parishad : Presidents and Vice Presidents (1997)	81
21. Distribution of MLAs : According to castes 1995	94
22. Shiv Sena : Elected candidates with number of votes they received.	94
23. Shiv Sena candidates distribution : According to castes : 1995	95
24. Shiv Sena MLAs distribution : According to castes 1990 and 1995	95
25. Shiv Sena : Distribution of MLAs according to district 1990-1995	96

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In March 1995, the first ever non-Congress government came to power in Maharashtra. Though the victory of the Hindutva combine surprised many it was in consistency with the emerging trends in Indian politics - the rise of the Hindu right. This new phenomenon generated a lot of interest amongst the intelligentsia especially the political scientists. As a student of Indian politics, it attracted my attention too. Though the study presented here carries only my name, it would not have been possible without the help and assistance from many. The discussions which I carried out over a span of three semesters with several academics, journalists, politicians and even the local population have helped me a great deal in writing this work.


First of them is **Prof. C.P. Bhambhri**, my guide who bestowed upon me his unstinted guidance and encouragement while carrying out my research. There were several obstacles in getting the material from secondary sources such as lack of published research work on the topic and problems in formulating my argument due to inconsistency in electoral performance of the Shiv Sena at the local level, etc. The research work also required me to be in the field for quite a long time. All this while Prof. Bhambhri promptly responded to my difficulties and gave me new insights. I am immensely grateful and indebted to him for all that he has done to enable me to make this dissertation possible.

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– Supriya R. Kanetkar

## PREFACE

The Shiv Sena-BJP alliance appeared to be in an upbeat mood as it geared up to commemorate its two years in the office on March 14, 1997. That was quite obvious. The parties had shown an impressive performance not only in the nine Civic Corporation elections, especially with a massive mandate that Sena received in the BMC (Bruhan Mumbai Municipal Corporation), where the urban voter in Maharashtra had reaffirmed its confidence in the ruling alliance, but also it succeeded in ending Congress party's thirty-seven year old monopoly over the Zilha Parishads covering the rural Maharashtra. The rupture in Maharashtra polity was then complete.

The resounding victory of the Hindutva combine surprised even the seasoned political observers who had been predicting a set-back for the alliance. In the months leading upto the election, the two parties had been weighed down by a series of problems ranging from internal tensions and differences over the sharing of seats to the numerous scandals that had tarnished the alliance's image. Factors such as Sena's alleged involvement in the Ramesh Kini murder (?), social activist Anna Hazare's campaign against corruption in the government and public criticism of Thackeray's style of functioning by members of the Maharashtrian intelligentsia were expected to weigh with the electorate. However, they did not make an appreciable difference largely due to the indifferent campaign conducted by the opposition. The Congress, which is the principal opposition party in the State, failed abysmally to cash in on the situation and present a credible alternative. Indeed the party appears to have failed to learn any lesson from its rout in the 1995 assembly elections, the last year's parliamentary polls and continues to present a picture of disunity and inertia. Apart from failing to reach a pre-poll agreement with the Republican Party of India (RPI) and Samajwadi Party (SP), the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC) virtually distanced itself from the polls. Barring Chagan Bhujbal and Suresh Kalmadi, none of the State-level



leaders took part in the campaign in a meaningful manner. In a sharp contrast, the BJP-Sena's senior leaders especially Thackeray toured round the State soliciting votes. Ever since the Hindutva combine came to power in the assembly polls in 1995, it has consolidated its position, notwithstanding the differences that have arisen between the partners.

The outcome of civic elections and the Zilha Parishad polls provide a representative picture of Maharashtra's political situation today.

Maharashtra, the fountainhead of modern India's ideological and political culture, today, appears frightfully sullen, even moribund. This was the State that triggered the modern Indian renaissance through Lokmanya Tilak, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Gopal Ganesh Agarkar, Justice Ranade, Jyotiba Phule, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, Achchut Patvardhan, Com S.A. Dange, Com. B.T. Randive, Minoo Masani and many later day stalwards.

The people of Maharashtra have historically displayed high levels of political consciousness, organization and activity.<sup>1</sup> Since its formation (the present day State of Maharashtra was formed on May 1, 1960), Maharashtra has shown remarkable political continuity, in the form of Congress rule. The Congress hegemony remained unchallenged until 1995 assembly elections. Even twenty-months of the Progressive Democratic Front (PDF) rule during 1978-80 was possible only on account of the defection of Sharad Pawar from the earlier uneasy coalition of Congress (U) and Congress (I). Unlike many other States, there has been only one instance of President's rule in Maharashtra, when the Pawar Ministry was dismissed in 1980.

The Congress rule has been synonymous with the domination of a single caste cluster, viz. the Marathas. Estimated at about 40 per cent of the population, the Marathas have controlled nearly 80 per cent of the positions

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1. For a recent account of the socio-political history of Maharashtra, see Lele Jayant (1990) "Caste, Class and Dominance : Political Mobilisation in Maharashtra" in Frankel Francine et al (eds) Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Vol. II, Delhi, Oxford University Press.

of political power.<sup>2</sup> The relative solidarity in the Congress party and the stability of its regime for almost four decades were a result of Maratha hegemony.

Maharashtra is one State, where grassroot democracy came into being a long before the CPI(M) lent in its ideological venaer to the system and Rajiv Gandhi picked up the concept of Panchayati Raj. Co-operatives here virtually control people's lives although in participative manner besides providing a strong base to rural economic self-sufficiency. Maharashtra boasts a commendable 69% rate of literacy, thanks to the co-operative's focus on education and child welfare. The system has been particularly advantageous to the Congress so far, because the party's organization at the grassroots mirrored the rural economic network.

The major casualty of the continuous Congress rule was arrested growth of viable opposition. The hegemony of Congress emphasises the fact that the non-Congress parties remained on the periphery of Maharashtra politics. But no longer in the 1990s, when the situation changed and the Congress baston was lost to the Hindutva combine, in the 1995 State assembly elections.

The Congress system which Y.B. Chavan put in place and his successors nurtured it, appears to have run its course. It seems to have exhausted the dynamism that made Maharashtra India's leading industrial State and placed Mumbai in the First Division of the world's commercial centres.

The defeat of Congress in 1995 assembly elections and saffronisation of the State are bound to change the politics of the State in the years to come. The debacle of Congress in the State, though is a part of the on-going process at the national level viz. the decline of Congress and emergence of


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2. Lele Jayant (1982), *Elite Pluralism and Class Rule : Political Development in Maharashtra*, Mumbai, Popular, see preface page xii.

coalition politics, the success and popularity of the Shiv Sena-BJP combine in the State cannot be undermined.

On this background, the Study of expansion of Shiv Sena, from a 'nativist movement' to a 'dominant partner' in the ruling alliance becomes important. Why was it that, only Hindutva Combine could challenge the hegemony of Congress and emerge as an alternative ? This Study, is an attempt to find explanations to the issue of expansion of the Hindutva, especially Shiv Sena's assertive and militant Hindutva in Maharashtra, in the broader context of Indian polity. The focus is on Kolhapur district of Western Maharashtra for more than one reason. Firstly, Kolhapur is a traditional stronghold of Congress. Congress has defended its base in Kolhapur through powerful sugar co-operatives and the Panchayati Raj institutions. Secondly, in spite of its strong position, it was in Kolhapur that the Shiv Sena registered its first electoral victory in Western Maharashtra in 1990, when Sena won the Kolhapur city and Shahuwadi assembly seats. Although, both the candidates defected to Congress later on with Chagan Bhujbal, in 1995 Sena recaptured the Kolhapur city constituency. Sena's electoral victory in Satara and Ahmednagar are only recent ones. (It won the Satara Parliamentary Seat in 1996 general elections to the Lok Sabha and Shirdi in Ahmednagar, in the recent by-election to the State assembly). The third important reason for choosing Kolhapur district is that, being a predominantly rural area, it will provide a picture of Shiv Sena's expansion in the rural heart-land and for its urban parts i.e. Kolhapur city, Ichalkaranji etc. how differently they have responded to the Sena compared to Mumbai. (However, please note that the Study is not a comparative one). Primary sources for this study include the discussions held at local level in Kolhapur District with local population, academics, journalist and politicians. I often visited the field to assess the situation and to hold these discussions. Secondary sources include the literature available on Shiv Sena and Kolhapur politics.

I have, thus, in this Preface, attempted to outline the political development in the State of Maharashtra, which I hope, will help understand the issues discussed in the further Chapters.



## 1. Maharashtra

Location	North Latitude East Longitude	1604' to 2201' 7206' to 8009'		
No. of Administrative divisions				6
No. of Districts				30.31
No. of Talukas				303
No. of Cities/Urban Agglomerations				307.336
No. of Village -- Inhabited/Uninhabited				39,354/2,479
Area (Sq. Km.)				3,07,690
Length of Coastline (Kms.)				720
	1961	1971	1981	1991
Total Population (Thousands)	39,554	50,412	62,784	78,937
Percentage of Population to Total				
Population in India	9.0	9.2	9.2	9.3
Rural Population (Thousands)	28,391	34,701	40,791	48,395
Percentage of Rural Population to Total Population	71.8	68.8	64.97	61.31
Urban Population (Thousands)	11,163	15,711	21,993	30,541
Percentage of Urban Population to Total Population	28.2	31.2	35.03	38.69
Population of Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Thousands)	4,624	5,980	10,252	16,076
Percentage of above to Total Population	11.7	11.9	16.3	20.4
Density (Persons Per Sq. Km.)	129	164	204	256
Literacy (Percentage)	29.8	39.18	47.18	65.05
Dedcadal Growth of Population (Percentage)	23.6	27.45	24.75	25.00

Source : *Handbook of Basic Statistics*, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay, 1986, p. 6, and Census of India, 1991.

## 2. Population of Maharashtra

	Area (Sq. km)	Population	Density (Persons/ sq. km)	Urban Population	Perce- tage	Literacy %	S.C.	Perce- tage	S.T.	Perce- ntage
Maharashtra	3,07,713	78,937,187	257	3,05,41,586	38.69	54.52	87,57,842	11.09	73,18,281	9.27
Bombay	603	9,925,891	16461	99,25,891	100.00	72.57	6,46,914	6.52	1,03,775	1.05
Konkan	30,125	9,450,151	314	39,23,053	41.51	57.68	3,92,616	4.15	12,03,898	12.74
W. Maharashtra	1,14,768	29,361,592	256	86,38,877	29.42	53.16	31,95,177	19.88	28,29,855	9.64
Marathwada	64,813	12,800,653	198	28,01,326	21.88	41.34	19,10,421	14.92	5,79,749	4.53
Vidarbha	97,404	17,398,900	179	52,52,439	30.19	54.53	26,12,734	15.02	26,01,004	14.95

Source : Computed from Census of India, 1991. Final Population Tables.

Note : Percentage of Literacy is derived from Provisional Figures, 1991 Census.

### 3. Social Composition of Maharashtra

Religion	Number	Percentage
Hindus	51,457,000	81.4
Muslims	5,805,000	9.3
Christians	795,469	1.3
Sikhs	107,255	0.2
Buddhists	3,946,149	6.3
Jains	939,392	1.5
Others	74,386	0.1
Parsis	56,866	--
Not Stated	6,283	--

Source : Census of India 1991.

### 4. Chief Minister of Maharashtra

Sr.	Chief Minister	From	To
1.	Y.B. Chavan	1 May 1960	20 No. 1962
2.	M.S. Kannamwar	21 Nov 1962	24 Nov 1963
3.	V.P. Naik	5 Dec 1963	20 Feb 1975
4.	S.B. Chavan	21 Feb 1975	16 Apr 1977
5.	Vasantdada Patil	17 Apr 1977	17 Jul 1978
6.	Sharad Pawar	18 Jul 1978	17 Feb 1980
7.	A.R. Antulay	9 Jun 1980	12 Jun 1982
8.	B.A. Bhonsale	21 Jan 1982	12 Jan 1983
9.	Vasantdada Patil	2 Feb 1983	9 Mar 1985
10.	S. Patil-Nilangekar	3 Jun 1985	7 Mar 1986
11.	S.B. Chavan	14 Mar 1986	24 Jun 1988
12.	Sharad Pawar	24 Jun 1988	25 Jun 1991
13.	Sudhakar Rao Naik	26 Jun 1991	22 Feb 1993
14.	Sharad Pawar	3 Mar 1993	Mar 1995
15.	Manohar Joshi	12 Mar 1995	Till Date

Source : Sirsikar, V.M., (1995), page 212.

# **CHAPTER - 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this introduction is to contextualise the emergence of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance in the broader context of Indian polity. My argument here is two fold : One, the tie up between the two rightist like-minded parties was a significant and calculated decision, rather than an accident, if one recollects the events that led to their alliance. Second, it uncovered the shortcomings in India's secular polity that led to the decline of secular pan-Indian identity and emergence of Hindu Nationalism. The first argument needs to be examined in the light of the second, as the understanding of the second would explain the very basis of the existence of the alliance.

## **PAN INDIAN NATIONALISM AND ITS ANOMALIES**

India represents a structurally heterogeneous society with a multiplicity of contradiction. Firstly, a large number of Indians live by the beliefs and social categories of the inherited past. They are yet to join the mainstream of the ongoing process of modernisation. Their social relations and status structures are effectively determined by caste and religious considerations. We are living with a social structure that reflects inequalities not only in its economy, but in every aspect of human existence. But India's heterogeneity was looked upon by Nehru as its abiding glory and strength. Every effort was made to ensure the preservation of her cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, while maintaining her political unity. In an attempt to create a sound foundation to this political unity, the western educated Indian elite led by, the likes like Nehru, propounded a secular nationalist identity widely known as 'Indian nationalism'. It represented reason, rationality and scientific temper with no place to religion in public sphere. A need was felt to accommodate the demands of religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities, which was essential to rise above the sub-cultural cleavages to avoid further division of India and her people.



But in practice, post Independence Indian State which constituted on the principle of universal suffrage and equal voting rights was unable to create a cohesive electorate guided by national self-interest and above the influence of its religious or caste identities. In a society where religious practices and identities are deeply rooted in the psychology of the common man, operation of a secular State was not an easy one. Congress represented the Nehruvian ideology of Indian Nationalism, "through its clear acceptance of the cultural plurality and its socio-economic reform programme it was able to build a widespread support base, effectively preventing the emergence of other major political organisation to challenge it."<sup>1</sup> Soon after the Nehruvian era, 'the practice of manipulative politics within both the party and the government became common.'<sup>2</sup> The subsequent domination of the party by Indira Gandhi and her centralised control over the party stifled both, independent party leadership and new and innovative ideas. Mrs. Gandhi relied on the mobilisation of minorities consisting of Muslims, Dalits, tribals, informal sector workers and the lumpen.<sup>3</sup> Her followers depended on her vote catching ability for winning elections and capturing power. Corruption and criminalisation became a norm of the day leading to decline and degeneration of not only Congress party, but also India's polity as a whole. The organisational decay of Congress led to the disintegration of the broad coalition on which, the Congress politics was based. Congress was a coalition of urban middle classes and the land owning groups of rural India. Urban middle class was fast getting alienated from the Congress. The Congress policy of creating a minority vote bank and the overall degeneration of ethics and morals in Indian politics made the common man search for an alternative.

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1. Nauriya Anil (1991), "Indian National Congress : Its place in Politics", Economic and Political Weekly, Nov 23, page 2675
  2. Malik Yogendra, (1988), "Indira Gandhi Personality, Political Power and Party politics," in Malik Yogendra and Vajpeyi Dharendra (eds), India : The years of Indira Gandhi, Leiden, E.J. Brill, page 7-21
  3. Lele Jayant (1995); Hindutva - The emergence of the Right, Chennai, Earthworm Books, See introduction.

## THE HINDUTVA WAVE IN THE 1980s

In the 1980s, the majoritarian Hindu community in India was undergoing a transformation, brought by religious revivalism in the country. Hindu politics which was marginalised during the Nehru era and had a subterranean existence within the Congress, was gaining ground outside the Congress in the form of organisations like VHP, RSS, BJP, Bajrang Dal etc. Though some of these organisations like the VHP and RSS have been working on the lines of Hindu Nationalism influenced by ideology of Savarkar, Hedgevar and others, they had a very limited following. Jana Sangha, the political wing of the RSS, as it was known till it renamed itself in 1978 as Bhartiya Janata Party, was also following Gandhian socialism as its ideological base. But Gandhian socialism did not prove to be electorally viable and the party had to be satisfied with two seats in 1984 Lok Sabha elections. BJP joined the Hindutva awareness programme launched by VHP in 1982. After becoming the party president in 1986, Advani skillfully used the Ram Janambhoomi (RJB) - Babri Masjid conflict to force the issue of the Congress policy of minority appeasement. Ayodhya issue, Advani argued, was not simply a dispute, but since 'it has become a symbol of pseudo secularism and appeasement of the minorities.'<sup>4</sup> Nehru's legacy of tolerating religious diversity came under attack. Their attacks gained credence with attempts by Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi to build "vote banks" along sectarian divides.<sup>5</sup> It is common knowledge that the centrist political parties, whether the Congress or the Janata Dal consider the religious and caste affiliations of a candidate before giving the party ticket.

It was the RJB-Babari Masjid agitation, the rathyatras, poojas and processions undertaken by the VHP - BJP leaders that accelerated the Hindutva wave in the 1980s.

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4. See for details, Malik Yogendra and Singh V.B. (1994) *Hindu Nationalism in India : The Rise of the BJP*, Boulder, Westview Press.
  5. Thakur Ramesh, (1993), "Ayodhya and Politics of India's secularism," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII No. 7, July, page 648.

Advani also followed another strategy of electoral alliance and seat adjustment with the like minded parties, alliance with Shiv Sena was a part of this strategy. This was an attempt to avoid the division of Hindu votes and consolidate its base in the remote areas with the help of strong regional ally.

Emerged in 1966 to protect the interests of native Maharashtrians in their capital city of Mumbai, Shiv Sena Chief Bal Thackeray's anti-Muslim rhetoric was not a 1980s phenomenon. His attacks on Muslims as agents of Pakistan were also not new, yet in the Shiv Sena hierarchy of enemies the Muslims were considered to be below the communists but on par with South Indians in the 1960s.<sup>6</sup> This perception gathered strength in the 1980s as the Hindu militant wave gathered momentum. The mobilisation of Hindus which had been initiated by the RSS family, gave the Sena an opportunity to revive its own rank and file which had been demoralised in the post-Emergency phase. Thackeray's speech at Chowpatty in Mumbai in 1984, where he raised the issue of a united Hindu front and spewed venom against the Muslims, marked the communal rebirth of the Sena. Sena projected its Hindutva as more militant and aggressive than that of the RSS-BJP.

Though, BJP was fast gaining ground in the North, its constituency in Maharashtra remained limited, confining mainly to the upper caste Brahmins and the middle classes. On the other hand, Shiv Sena was getting widely accepted among the OBCs of Marathwada and Vidarbha. The politics of Hindutva brought strange bed fellows together. The OBCs and the SCs who viewed the Hindutva as a Brahmin conspiracy were now working in close co-operation with each other. The admission of Chagan Bhujbal in the 'inner circle' of the Sena leadership, brought with him a large section of non-Dalit backward community into the party. As a Mali, the second most populous Backward community in the State after the Mahars, Bhujbal's electoral utility to the Sena was unsurpassed. Even with a Mumbai centric leadership, soon Sena emerged as a regional force.

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6. Sardesai Rajdeep (1995), "The Shiv Senas New Avatar : Marathi Chauvinism and Hindu Communalism," in Thakkar Usha and Kulkarni Mangesh (eds) Politics In Maharashtra, Mumbai, Himalaya. page 135

Realising the importance of Shiv Sena's growing strength among the OBCs and across the rural landscape in Maharashtra, the BJP leadership in the State accepted the alliance with Shiv Sena, in spite of initial hesitations. Though the RSS type of rank and file was sceptical about the alliance, leaders like Pramod Mahajan ensured its smooth functioning by working in close co-operation with the Shiv Sena leadership in Mumbai and the BJP national leadership.

Advani's strategy of electoral alliance with the Sena proved to be enormously successful. In 1989 general elections to the Lok Sabha, the alliance succeeded in getting 14 seats in Maharashtra, BJP 10 and Shiv Sena 4. Though Congress remained victorious, there was a decline in the number of seats it had won in 1984 elections, from 43 to 28. The number of seats gained by BJP-SS, though are not impressive enough, there was an increase in the popular percentage of vote secured by the alliance. Following table clearly shows a sharp rise in the BJP - SS seats and decline in Congress fortunes in Maharashtra.

#### 5. Lok Sabha Elections 1984 and 1989

Political Parties	1984	1989
Congress (I)	43	28
Congress (S)	02	-
Janata Party	01	-
PWP	01	-
Independent	01	-
Janata Dal	-	05
BJP	-	10
SS	-	04
CPI	-	01

Source : PTI Reports

The 1991 general elections to the Lok Sabha proved that while the BJP-SS had emerged as the main opposition force in Maharashtra, it was still nowhere close

to toppling the Congress. Of the 48 seats, the Congress won 38 (increase of 10 seats from 1989 elections) while the BJP won 5 (loss of 5) and Sena maintained its 4 seats. Whereas the Congress polled 46.64 percent of the vote, the BJP polled 20 percent and the Shiv Sena 9 percent. In percentage terms, the election results bear a striking similarity to the 1989 polls. This would suggest that the BJP - Sena alliance had consolidated a district vote bank. There is also some reason to believe that the alliance would have done even better in the 1991 polls, but for Rajiv Gandhi's assassination that led to a sympathy wave for the Congress, especially in Vidarbha and parts of the Konkan.

#### 6. Elections to Lok Sabha : 1989 and 1991.

Political Parties	1989	1991
Congress (I)	28	38
BJP	10	05
SS	04	04
Janata Dal	05	06
CPI	01	00
CPI (M)	00	01
Total	48	48

Source : PTI reports

It was evident from these elections that Hindutva with the support of Hindu revivalists had become a major political force in the country.

Political analysts claimed that it was an anti-establishment vote, some others said that Congress was humbled because of corruption, criminalisation and anti-poor economic reforms. But all these are partial explanations. The whole reason for these changed election results was the forward march of 'Hindutva.' 1989 general elections to the Lok Sabha brought a change in the mindset of both the political elite and the electorate. The earlier assumption that Hindutva cannot work electorally in the presence of powerful minority community had

to be changed, eg in the case of Maharashtra where Muslims account for 12% of the population, it was considered a key factor for electoral success. But politics of Hindutva brought a dramatic change in these electoral calculations.

## **POLARISATION OF POLITICS**

Politics in the 1990s is getting far more polarised than in 1970s and 1980s. Centrist politics of the Congress cutting across the caste and regional lines is fast disappearing from the Indian political scene. Two trends have clearly emerged from this polarisation : one, the politics of Hindutva came to acquire widespread legitimacy sending its message across the rural landscape and among constituencies that had formerly treated it as a Brahmin conspiracy. The BJP and Sena have captured a significant share of the votes of the oppressed, while the parties in the Third Force, like the Janata Dal, Samajwadi Party, Republican Party of India have failed to make a dent in Congress support. The other interesting phenomenon witnessed during the 1993-95 elections is the revival of the idea of Bahujana politics and effectiveness in mobilising the depressed classes, even though they remain highly fragmented and uneven. With all its internal contradictions and weaknesses, this majority of the poor has forced political parties to entertain significant changes in their tactics. Those who have been slow in adopting, such as the elite of the Congress party in major States like Maharashtra have been taught a lesson<sup>7</sup>. Besides the Muslims, the Dalit minorities are also getting increasingly alienated from the Congress. It is quite evident from 1995 assembly elections, in Mumbai region where Congress heavily depends on the minorities, both the Muslims and the Dalits, it was completely routed, out of 34 seats, it could manage to win only 1. In 1990 elections it had won 9 seats.

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7. Lele Jayant, (1995), *Ibid*, 3

## **TIDE OF REGIONALISM : A CHANGING PROFILE OF INDIAN POLITICS**

Besides the polarisation on religious and caste lines, there is also a swing in favour of regional parties. People have preferred the regional parties not only in their own State assemblies but also in the Eleventh Lok Sabha. For the first time, regional parties have taken the Centre stage, forming a 13 party coalition government at the Centre. Though led by Janata Dal, various regional parties like the Telgu Desam, Dravid Munetra Kazhagam, Tamil Manila Congress, Assam Gan Parishad are an integral and formidable part of the coalition. The persuasion of Tamil Manila Congress to join the government under I.K. Gujral in April 1997, clearly indicates that all regional parties of the coalition are indispensable. These regional parties have developed a close understanding, giving the coalition a great deal of clout.

It is quite clear that the Congress and the concept of pan-Indian party would no longer wash with the electorate. On the level of competitive politics, the Congress is losing ground - there is assertion of regional pride and identity within.

Regional parties champion the cause of the States as against the Centre which is, according to them aloof, unaware of and unresponsive to the aspirations and needs of the people at the grassroot level. It is the sense of being neglected that has enranged a majority in many States strengthening the regional parties.

In 1985 the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), the political wing of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) rode to power on the crest of the Pro-Assamese agitation. About the strong regional sentiments, Mr. Naren Beka, editor, The Assam Tribune says. "The people have a strong feeling that they are neglected, exploited and ignored by the rest of the country, particularly by the Centre."<sup>8</sup>

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8. Prasad Venkateshwar Rao (1991), "Receding tide of regionalism," Indian Express, Dec 15.

The people of Assam wanted assurance that Assam was not neglected. AASU first realised its strength when the Centre entered into an accord with it to find a peaceful solution to Assam problem. DMK with its arguments about Dravidian identity and culture, led the anti-Hindi agitation leading to the downfall of Congress in Tamil Nadu, as early as in 1967 general elections. The DMK supremacy was challenged only due to the rise of the AIADMK. During the elections in 1980s, Congress found it difficult to contest elections in Tamil Nadu without the partnership with the AIADMK. The Telgu Desam Party, formed in May, 1982 by popular matinee idol of the Telgu Cinema, N.T. Rama Rao, came to power in, January 1983, making 'Telgu-pride' an electoral issue, just six months after its formation. Though, the power and glory of the regional parties have gone through ups and downs, it has never disappeared from the political stage. In fact throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the growing clout of regional parties from Kashmir to Kanyakumari and from Assam to Punjab seemed to be progressively gaining ground, apparently constituting strong for the emergence of an alternate confederal regime at the Centre.

Besides the general elections to the Lok Sabha in 1996, in which people clearly showed their preference over the regional parties, the recent State assembly elections in Punjab and Kashmir also have gone in favour of regional parties, like the Akalis and the National conference. By electing National Conference people of Kashmir have given the verdict, that they feel more secure in the hands of Faruq Abdullah's National Conference, than in Congress or any other national party, when even Abdullah had been a helpless spectator to the secessionist onslaught.

The changing nature of Indian polity and growing strength of regional parties in the present decade to which Shiv Sena is no exception. The alliance between the BJP, a national party and the Shiv Sena underlines the growing strength of regional forces. The partnership with regional parties is so important that the ideological differences have received a backstage. It is evident from the tie ups between the BJP and other parties like Haryana Vikas Party in Haryana, Samata Party in Bihar and Akali Dal in Punjab. The Congress



leadership is also in search of regional partners to consolidate its losing base in various States.

The failure of the national parties to articulate the regional or local demands and the federal system biased towards the Centre are often held responsible for the emergence of regional parties. But one thing should be kept in mind that national parties cannot afford to strike radical and populist postures, when a strong local issue crops up and exactly here the regional parties score over them. Uneven economic development, regional imbalance and the cultural diversity leave wide scope for dissatisfied groups to emerge as political mobilisers and parochial appeals get wide acceptance than the national ones.

Reorganisation of States certainly tried to preserve the heterogeneous Indian culture, but at the same time it diversified the system throwing it open to various interest groups creating competitors for the Congress for political office. It is becoming increasingly difficult in recent years for any one party to accommodate too many and too different demands at one and the same time.

## **CONCLUSION**

The emergence of various assertive forces whether regional or communal, is a result of the social and political vacuum created by the indifference of the system to the problem of marginalisation. The inability of socio-political and economic institutions to fulfill the rising aspirations of the people is the basic reason behind the emergence of communal and regional forces, challenging India's secular democratic foundations.

The opportunistic compromises of India's political elite and the fallout of economic liberalisation may further promote local and religious sentiments. Dissatisfaction with the existing system, growing aspirations and anxieties about the future in the minds of millions of Indians have been skillfully manipulated by the parties like BJP and the Sena, by glorifying the past and restructuring the

history to suit their own political interests. Shiv Sena worked on the theme of the appropriation of popular dreams and evoking the image of Shivaji as a just and caring ruler. Advani and his VHP partners made the Babri Mosque symbol of invader's victory and deemed it necessary to demolish it.

While defining the place of BJP - Shiv Sena alliance in Indian politics, it was necessary to critically review the developments that led to the emergence of a powerful alliance in India's one of the most progressive, modern and industrially developed State of Maharashtra. If BJP's victory is the victory of Hindutva, then Shiv Sena's triumph in Maharashtra is the victory of 'asserative Hindutva'. The statements and declarations of the Sena Chief over the last decade confirm it. The turbulence witnessed during the Mumbai riots by Maharashtra on the Hindu-Muslim front has no parallel in any other State. In spite of the victory in Maharashtra, the Sena remains inherently unstable at the roots and essentially depends on the eerie charisma of its Supremo. Now, that the alliance is in power, for the last two years, some of its policies have been initiated with the intension of hitting the Congress base to create a stable and sustainable base for itself. I would like to summarise here, the theme of my further Chapters in this Study.

Chapter two, is an effort to underline the various issues that have been used by the Sena to expand its base. The discussion also deals with its ideology and leadership. The issue of leadership focuses attention on Sena Chief, Bal Thackeray as Sena till date remains an army, with one 'whole and sole commandant.' Nonetheless friction appears to have emerged between the younger generation of Thackerays, who are trying to take over the mantle from Bal Thackeray and the second level rank and file of the leadership in the older generation who have worked with Bal Thackeray since the early years of Shiv Sena.

Chapters three and four concentrate on Kolhapur district. "Socio-economic parameters and politics of Kolhapur", is a profile of Kolhapur district, which traces hegemony of Congress in Kolhapur politics much before Independence.

The rural Maratha elite, who controls all arenas of power finds itself anchorless with the decline of Congress at all India level and emergence of the BJP-SS alliance at the State level. Though synonymous to Congress system even today, there is a visible fatigue in the Congress of Kolhapur at present, giving rise to anti-establishment sentiments.

The fourth Chapter traces the political development of Shiv Sena in Kolhapur. Party's leadership in Kolhapur, its social base and various other issues handled by the party to create and consolidate its base in Kolhapur also figure during the course of the discussion.

The final concluding Chapter evaluates the actual standing of Shiv Sena after its two years in office. The recent Panchayati Raj elections in the State help us to assess the situation, if not wholly, at least partially. In the present political situation in Kolhapur, there is an ongoing struggle for power and the situation appears to be fluid.

Though this Study is primarily concerned with the expansion of Shiv Sena from a 'Mumbai - centric nativist movement' to a 'dominant partner' in the ruling alliance in the State; it also discusses the politics in Maharashtra, the absence of which would leave the Study of Shiv Sena incomplete.

## CHAPTER - 2

### EXPANSION OF SHIV SENA : IDEAS, ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES

On March 12, 1995, the second anniversary of the bomb blast in Mumbai, the political scene in Maharashtra underwent a major change when the Shiv Sena - BJP alliance ousted the Congress from power in the assembly elections. This is the first non-Congress government Maharashtra has had since Independence (in the real sense), till then it was a typical example of the Congress System.<sup>1</sup> But a layman in Mumbai is living with the 'Shiv Sena phenomenon' for the last thirty years, where it first emerged to protect the economic interests of the native Maharashtrian against the South Indians whom it considered as 'outsiders'. From its initial nativist and localised politics, it has gone far beyond to become a dominant partner in the ruling alliance, making Hindutva, a political reality<sup>2</sup> and acquiring legitimacy to the politics of communalism.<sup>3</sup>

My concern in this Chapter is to see the issues and ideologies handled by the party to achieve this success. The Chapter also makes an effort to find explanations for the ideological shifts the party underwent over these years by giving a panoramic view of the Shiv Sena as a whole. The Chapter also deals with the second level leadership in the party which is becoming prominent in the recent years.

The heterogeneous ethnic identity of Mumbai, the economic pre-eminence of non-Maharashtrians in the city and the continued economic difficulties faced

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1. Vohra Rajendra, (1996) "Shift of Power from Rural to Urban Sector", Economic and Political Weekly, Jan 13-20, Page 171.
  2. Panikkar, K.N., (1995) Forward for Dr. Jayant Lele's "Hindutva - the emergence of the Right" Chennai, Earthworm Books.
  3. Lele Jayant, (1995), in introduction to the same book above mentioned.

by the Maharashtrian population have been at the core of Shiv Sena's genesis. Although Shiv Sena appears to have risen overnight, the party is, in fact, an outgrowth of long standing historical process, the gradual strengthening of the Maharashtrian political position in Mumbai.<sup>4</sup> At the time of re-organisation of Bombay State, those who supported the claim of inclusion of Mumbai in Maharashtra had argued that Maharashtrian castes had been the true natives of Mumbai, Mumbai's wealth had been built on the back of Maharashtrian labour and they claimed, they were the largest linguistic community in the city.<sup>5</sup>

The Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti had vehemently fought for Mumbai and had successfully managed to resolve the issue in favour of incorporation of Mumbai into the newly created State of Maharashtra. Maharashtrians, though managed to come to power in the State, remained economically underprivileged in the city of Mumbai. With rapid industrialisation and the city getting the status of Commercial Capital of the country, there was a major influx of migrants which added to the problems of local population.

Shiv Sena emerged demanding more employment opportunities and job reservations for Maharashtrians especially in the white collar employment. Prosperous non-Maharashtrians were the obvious targets. Mainly it directed its attention on South Indians who were concentrated in the middle level, clerical and official positions, all such positions which the Maharashtrians would aspire for (known Maharashtrian attitude towards going in for a secured job). The other non-Maharashtrian communities like Gujarathies were excluded as they were mainly involved with business besides being politically powerful. The possibility of retaliation in the case of South Indians was remote. By drawing attention to the difficulties faced by Maharashtrians, Shiv Sena gained widespread sympathies among middle class Maharashtrians.

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4. Katzenstein Fainsod, Mary, (1979), *Ethnicity and Equality : The Shiv Sena Party and Preferential Policies in Bombay*, Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press, page 40.

5. *Ibid* , page 46.

Bal Thackeray, Shiv Sena supremo was politically quite unknown till then. A gifted cartoonist, Thackeray resigned from its Free Press Journal job after a dispute with its South Indian owner, editor and founded his own Marathi weekly, 'Marmik'. Thackeray used Marmik to passionately campaign for jobs for Maharashtrians who, he believed faced discrimination in Mumbai even after the creation of their own linguistic State on May 1, 1960. Thackeray's espousal of nativism struck a chord among both the middle class and working class Maharashtrians. A mammoth crowd showed up for the first Sena rally on Dussehra Day in October 1966. Though a Chandraseni Kayastha Prabhu by birth, Thackeray named his new party after the 17th century legendary Maratha King, Shivaji, who is revered by all castes in Maharashtra. The image of Shivaji evokes the golden age of regime that brought to the masses a stable, just and prosperous life based on care and consideration. The myth of Shivaji captures, for Maharashtrians, a shared memory and a cherished dream. Instrumental exploitation of such dreams and memories is at the core of the current popularity of the Shiv Sena.

The Sena leader dresses in saffron, wears more than one rudraksh mala, is a fervent believer in the Mother Goddess. The Snaring Tiger, vehicle of Mother Goddess is party's mascot. His virulent speeches invoke almost religious obeisance, not only from the Shiv Sainiks but also from ordinary peasants as he travels around Maharashtra. "He is well aware of his spiritual hold over people and genuinely reveres Shivaji", says an old associate.<sup>6</sup> As a leader he is essentially anti-democratic believing in the concept of a "benevolent dictator" and is even an admirer of Hitler, though he criticises the Holocaust.

The Sena is an amorphous organisation which neither enrolls members nor elects party leaders. It is more like a militant, cultish movement led by the mercurial Thackeray described by his old Free Press Journal colleague Behram Contractor as 'part godman, part godfather'.<sup>7</sup>

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6. India Today, Feb. 28, 1995, page 61.

7. *Ibid*

Thackeray is the supreme commander of the Sena. He alone makes all appointments in the party, from municipal ward-level Shakha Pramukh to the regional and district overseers and heads of Sena Trade Unions and other bodies, though, he has about a dozen senior leaders, all Mumbai based, available for advice and discussion. Differences and any kind of dissension from the opinion of the top leadership are heavily discouraged. But it is surprising and remarkable that party's authoritarian and extremist principles do not detract from its own willing participation in the parliamentary process.

Although its leaders declared Shiv Sena as a 'movement without political intention', it soon involved itself in political campaigning. In 1967, it participated in the general elections supporting the Congress candidate against the former Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon, whom it considered an outsider, a South Indian and a communist sympathiser. Six months later, the party contested the Municipal elections in Thana, a suburb of Mumbai winning seventeen out of forty seats and became the largest party on the Municipal Corporation. In 1968, it contested the Mumbai municipal elections and won an impressive 42 out of 140 seats. The party was just two year old at that time. Encouraged by the results of the 1968 elections, Shiv Sena tried to enlarge its political base. With an eye both on improving its political fortunes in Mumbai and to establish itself as a political force elsewhere in Maharashtra, the Sena endeavoured to broaden its ideology. It tried to down-play its image as a parochial, nativist party. In order to gain the support of non-Maharashtrians in Mumbai and of Maharashtrians in other cities where economic competition with "outsiders" had not been an issue, it recognized the need to divest itself of its xenophobic reputation.<sup>8</sup> After 1968, therefore, its attacks on migrant subsided. Instead it became a fierce critic of anti-nationalism, decrying both Muslims and communists, many of whom, it claimed owed primary allegiance to foreign governments. But this strategy

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8. Katzenstein F., Mary, (1979), *Ibid*, page 35.

did not help in boosting Sena's strength. In 1971, it was defeated in both parliamentary and State assembly elections. For nearly two decades even as it took on a stridently anti-communist and anti-Muslim character, the Sena's influence restricted mainly to Mumbai. The city remains the Sena's ballekilla (citadel) and supports a variety of legal and illegal activities by party members, from running ambulances and getting people jobs to extorting money from shopkeepers, builders and industrialists. "Mumbai is the only place where they have a strong popular base. The city gives them money, publicity, energy. Without Mumbai, the Sena will disappear," observes Prof. Dipankar Gupta.<sup>9</sup>

The rise and growth of the Shiv Sena cannot be studied in isolation from the overall political economy of India.<sup>10</sup> The anomalies of Nehruvian economic policies were becoming more and more evident around 1966. The discontent among workers turned them towards communist leadership. In 1967 assembly, there were three communist labour leaders. This became a cause of concern for both the Congress and the Shiv Sena. Both had an opportunity to exploit the Maharashtrian identity of workers with rural links. There was Congress affiliated and officially recognised Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sabha (RMMS) and the Sena started its own Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (BKS). BKS received little support as the powerful labour leader Datta Samant had an effective control over Mumbai's textile workers.

During 1970s, Shiv Sena wandered through a variety of alliances and enmities, in the pursuit of electoral success. It engaged in violent clashes against the Muslim League and the Dalit Panthers but also accepted their electoral support during the mayoral contests. Except for its persistent attacks on communist and communism, there was little consistency in the level of commitment and vehemence with which it pursued the other elements

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9. India Today, Feb. 28, 1995, page 57.

10. Lele Jayant, (1995), "The Saffronisation of the Shiv Sena and the Political - Economy of Bombay - Maharashtra" in Hindutva – The emergence of the Right, Chennai, Earthworm Books, page 14.



of its ideology such as Hinduism, nationalism and Maharashtrianism.<sup>11</sup> Shiv Sena opposed all shades of the left and supported all shades of the right making its allegiance quite clear.<sup>12</sup> It was supported, used and maligned by the established political parties at different times. It supported the emergency but switched over to Janata combine in 1977, only to go back to Congress in 1980. This time, it received Congress support for Municipal elections and managed to have two of its nominees sent to the State Legislative Council.

The greatest success towards the end of sixties was in mobilising under-employed and unemployed youth, across class loyalty and ethnic boundaries. This was accomplished through a constructive strategy of assistance with the needs and difficulties of families in poor neighbourhood. This helped Sena to gain sympathy and support in slums and poor localities. Although Sena's hold on the constituency of disenchanting youth continued to grow, in early 1980s it had an image of a 'network of gangs' which thrived on extortion of protection money from hawkers, businessmen and shopkeepers.<sup>13</sup> This image led to some decline in its support from the white collar and petty bourgeoisie elements whose sensibilities were injured by criminalization. Some sections in the middle class were disillusioned by Thackeray's support to Indira government during emergency. It became clear that most abiding core of Shiv Sena's activism was now located most firmly in Mumbai's lumpenized youth.<sup>14</sup>

These youthful cadres are drawn towards the party less because of ideological or material motivations than because of a phenomenon not easily described: the exhilaration of belonging, the excitement of being involved. The creation of the Sena's 'Shakhas' provides a focus for different activities. The

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11. *Ibid*, page 35

12. Gupta Dipankar, (1982), *Nativism in a Metropolis*, Delhi, Manohar, page 60.

13. The argument is taken from both Jayant Lele and Gerard Heuze, who accept that decline of social service functions of the Shakhas and its replacement by a sort of underworld element. The Shiv Sainiks are now more interested in personal material gains than the social service.

14. Lele Jayant, (1995), *Ibid*, page 27.

neighbourhood Shakhas are connected to informal networks, mostly of young men, who are linked through family, school, neighbourhood and through athletic clubs and mandals. <sup>15</sup> The Shakha atmosphere is full of enthusiasm and excitement. They organise various Hindu festivals like Ganesh Utsav, Shiv Jayanti, social service programmes like clean up drives, blood donation camps, providing books and study related material to the poor slum children. These activities also provide a sense of mission to the marginalized and restless young men of these localities. The party also runs another layer of organisations, the Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samiti (SLS), variously described as a cultural club and employment exchange.<sup>16</sup>

On one hand the Sena promised to wipe out gangsterdom and on the other hand created within itself a strong and dedicated following that gave the organisation its 'muscle power' and in return gave those in the underworld the benefits of its organisation and discipline.

Thackeray is well aware that his followers revere him because he conveys the image of militancy and absolute authority. "That's the cutting edge. The Sena attracts people, especially youth because of the message don't mess with these guys", observes Prof. Dipankar Gupta.<sup>17</sup>

But 1975-1983, it remained quite subdued. The come back of the Sena in 1980s should be seen in the light of different developments that were taking place in Maharashtra politics.

Since its formation, Maharashtra remained a Congress stronghold with elite Marathi dominating all State and para-State structures. They controlled the legislature, Panchayati Raj institutions, co-operatives and State-aided schools and colleges. Though the Maharashtra Congress remained united even after

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15. Heuze Gerard, in a lecture at S.N.D.T. University, Mumbai, on February 1996. The French labour sociologist was in Mumbai for five long years and has done a great deal of work on Shakhas and their actual functioning.

16. Koppikar Smruti, "Native Appeal" Feb 28, 1995, India Today, page 29.

17. India Today, February 28, 1995.

the 1969 first Congress split, by the time of second Congress split (1978), the younger generation of elite Marathas had started becoming disenchanted with the moribund Congress system. The older arenas such as Zilha Parishads, Panchayat Samitis and Co-operative Societies had stagnated with the change in agricultural policy.

Dalits and the other backward castes were becoming more aware of their rights because of educational opportunities available to them. They were realising the limitations of the reservation policy and were trying to organise themselves against social oppression and to get access to better economic opportunities. This was seen as an attempt to challenge the traditional authority structure and the hegemony of elite Marathas. In spite of these changes and challenges, the older Maratha elite preferred to work towards a nostalgic return to the pre-1971 Congress system.

In 1978, the coalition government under Sharad Pawar's Chief Ministership unanimously adopted a resolution to rename the Marathwada University after Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar. The decision to change the name of the University was itself a tactical move to woo the Dalit vote.<sup>18</sup> The competition between political parties and between factions within them had become so intense that <sup>no</sup> one could afford to openly oppose such a move. A largely unanticipated outburst of violence against Dalits came in Marathwada, victimising hundreds of innocent dalit households. Violence in all districts of Marathwada clearly showed the fears and concerns of the elite Marathas about their loss of hegemony in the region. There were different small militant organisations to fuel these fears further. The dominant caste elite became equally afraid of the increasing 'arrogance' of Dalits and Muslims traditionally constituting a subservient labour force.

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18. Lele Jayant, (1995), *Ibid*, page 33

The same Sharad Pawar government in 1994, implemented the fifteen year old decision to change the name after Dr. Ambedkar. There was a good deal of violence inspite of massive police force being deployed. Shiv Sena used this opportunity to consolidate its declining base among ORCs

Shiv Sena opposed the re-naming of the university, using this opportunity to consolidate the non-dominant Savarna castes who were alarmed by the dalit reservations (in urban areas reservations of jobs for Dalits were interpreted as the source of unemployment of educated Savarna youth). This section was equally unhappy with the political and economic domination of the elite Marathas. Here Shiv Sena got the opportunity to implement its project of homogenization and started using Hindutva to divide and conquer segments of subaltern classes from within the self-defined Hindu Community. It portrays itself as being opposed to caste hierarchy with claims that it violates the true spirit of 'Hindutva'. On one hand, it highlights the gains by the ex-Mahar community through education and militant action and on the other hand sympathises with the continued plight of the other Dalits such as Chambhar, Dhors and Bhangis. Since neo-Buddhist (mostly ex-Mahars) are numerically larger and socially better off, the Sena uses Hindutva to split the other castes from within the community.

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Both, in Municipal and Legislative elections in Marathwada, it nominated Mali and Vanjari candidates so as to broaden its base among these castes. In 1988, it captured the mayoral post in Aurangabad getting the final recognition to its popularity.

In November 1987, Shiv Sena mobilised the Savarna along with the Maratha Mahasangh in the condemnation of Dr. Ambedkar's remarks on Ram and Krishna and of the government of Maharashtra for publishing it. Copies of 'Riddles of Hinduism' were burnt in Mumbai by the Shiv Sainiks. Shiv Sena created its image as opposed to the Maratha hegemony and gave the other backward castes a new 'Hindu identity'. Thackeray subjected Maratha leaders to strong criticism for their 'political impotence' and as being "responsible for the humiliation suffered by Maharashtra".<sup>19</sup> The criticism of political leaders found resonance among younger generation, once

19. Lele Jayant, (1995), *Ibid*, Page 43.

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contemptuously dismissed as a conspiracy of clever Brahmins, the Hindutva ideology held a new promise then.

Shiv Sena's decisive turn to Hindutva came in 1984 when it established its political alliance as a dominant partner with BJP. The Hindutva wave helped the BJP maximum. Although, in 1980s after its initial separation from the Janata Party, the Jan Sangha leaders openly avoided taking stand favouring Hindutva, in order to widen its support base in rural Maharashtra. It systematically used the 'Hindutva' in 1980 to 1987-88. It was assisted by many neo-Hindutva organisations besides RSS and the VHP. It became quite known in rural areas mainly because of 'Ram Janam Bhoomi' (RJB) agitation. During these years, BJP systematically promoted the OBC leadership in the State, leaders like N.S. Parande, Suryabhan Vahande and Gopinath Munde came to prominence. This helped the BJP to wipe off its image of middle class Brahmins' party with urban bias.

Shiv Sena is neither newly articulating a linkage between nationalism and Hinduism, nor is party's warning of anti-national threat harboured among Muslims is a recent one. What is new is the conjoining of an old Shiv Sena theme with a broader discourse that has ranged across North India since the mid-1980s. Shiv Sena's 'Hindutva' is created on four conceptual pillars - anti-national Muslims, militancy, patriotism and religion.<sup>20</sup>

The threat of Islam and the targetting of 'anti-national' Muslims are seasoned themes within the party. The Sena depicts anti-national Muslims as destroyers of temples, as murderers of the police and as threat to the Indian State. Shiv Sena insists it is not anti-Muslim but just anti-national Muslims. Thackeray describes 'anti-national Muslims' as those who have their hearts in Pakistan. Issues like Congress pampering the minority, their exemption from uniform civil code are used to add fuel to the fire.

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20. Katzenstein F. Mery, Mehta Uday Singh and Thakkar Usha, "The Rebirth of Shiv Sena : The Symbiosis of Discursive and Institutional power," (unpublished)

'Use of force' is an accepted concept in Sena. Thackeray is a vehement critic of Gandhian non-violence. The party leaders have clearly tried to create the image that the party will not shy away from the use of violence. In its early years of 1970s, Thackeray has admonished the audience that the violence of the 'left' can only be countered effectively through reciprocal measures. These threats have been put into practice on various occasions, the murder of Krishna Desai, a communists MLA from Parel (Mumbai) in 1971 and a number of clashes and violence between Sena and communist personnel are only some of the widely cited examples. Recently, the editor of 'Mahanagar'<sup>21</sup> was beaten up (August 1993) and the office was destroyed because of the paper's anti-Sena stand. The Sena claims that riots are being used to identify and punish the anti-national Muslims and many a times neo-Buddhist Dalits. The 1984 Bhivandi riots and the recent December 1992-January 1993 Mumbai riots were in fact used to tighten Sena's hold over Mumbai.

Shiv Sena effectively used the 'politics of communalism' and violence to expand its outskirts.

The opportunism of the mainstream political parties professing secularism is often blamed for the continuing strength of proponents of 'Hindutva' such as Shiv Sena. As Rajdeep Sardesai astutely recounts the come back of Sena from its 1975-1985 exile with a strong showing in the 1985 Municipal election largely thanks to the fighting within the ruling Congress party.<sup>22</sup>

However, Dr. Jayant Lele argues, it would be inadequate to rest one's analysis on these factors as the explanation of the Sena's viability. He links the dominance of 'predatory capitalism'<sup>23</sup> in the 1980s in India's political economy and the ideology of Hindutva sustaining on it. Drug and arms trade

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21. Mahanagar is a local daily in Mumbai, equally popular among the same class as 'Samana' is. It is considered anti-Shiv Sena.

22. Sardesai Rajdeep, (1995), "The Shiv Sena's New Avatar : Marathi Chauvism and Hindu Communalism", in Thakkar Usha and Kulkarni Mangesh (eds), Politics in Maharashtra, Mumbai, Himalaya, page 135.

23. Lele Jayant, (1995), *Ibid* page 28.

are the prime examples of such capitalism. In recent years, Mumbai has become a favourite playground for such interests. They have multilayered links that extend from criminal gangs to movie tycoons, from real estate dons to respectable corporate and public sector executives, many even dominating the political scene. Names of men behind all these activities have surfaced from time to time and many of them happen to be Muslims staying away from Indian laws, in Dubai or other Middle East countries. Such stories have helped to create a false image of Muslims as the main perpetrators of criminal transactions in an otherwise fair market regime. The Shiv Sena has effectively used these images of individual Muslim dons of crime syndicates to convict the entire Muslim community as that of traitors, profiteer criminals, ruthless and aggressive propagators of faith and wanton producers of too many children. While keeping up such propaganda against Muslims, Shiv Sena itself is involved in fostering and being fostered by this form of capitalism, although hard evidence is impossible to come by, there are clear enough indications to support this argument.

For whatever may be the reasons, Hindutva helped the Sena to tighten its grip over Mumbai and in creating its own mass base in Vidharbha, Marathwada and some parts of rural Maharashtra.

Shiv Sena decided to join hands with the BJP for the 1989 Lok Sabha and 1990 assembly elections. In spite of the organised effort to challenge the Congress, the Hindutva forces landed up, being the opposition party in the State assembly in 1990. Though the Congress emerged as the single largest party with 141 seats, the popular vote for Congress was all time low, just 39.17 per cent. While the BJP-Sena alliance secured 27 per cent votes and gave an impression of being the ruling parties in waiting. But the alliance remained uneasy because of mutual suspicion and rivalries. BJP was aware of its inability to penetrate the lumpenized population in Mumbai and other cities and wanted to protect its urban petty bourgeoisie constituency. It wanted to project itself as a gentle parliamentary alternative to Congress,

which was tainted by scandals and dominated by self-serving and corrupt politicians. As a national party, it was mindful of maintaining a responsible image. In fact, Thackeray's more militant aggressive and anti-castist brand of Hindutva and his outrageous public postures such as the brazen claim of having taught the Muslims a "lesson"<sup>24</sup> in the January 1993 Mumbai riots or of exulting over the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya have often embarrassed the BJP.

But even as the two parties have flourished with each others help, they have often differed on big issues. Thackeray attacked reservations under Mandal in keeping with his uncompromising anti-castist stand, while the BJP saw it as an opportunity to gain support among the State's OBC's. Thackeray opposed the renaming of Marathwada University, while the BJP was keen to gather followers among the Dalits. Thackeray is unequivocally opposed to the dismemberment of Maharashtra, whereas the BJP supports the demand in Vidarbha for a separate State. Before the election results were out in 1995, Thackeray asserted that he will "keep the remote control"<sup>25</sup> in his hands, even if he has to accept a BJP Chief Minister.

During the years of 1990 to 1995, Congress regained its power at the centre, its strength in the legislative assembly increased numerically, but its image in public life was deteriorating very fast. Throughout 1995 assembly election campaign, it was on the defensive. The entire burden of Congress campaign was borne by Sharad Pawar alone without any assistance from the national leadership. The alliance systematically attacked Pawar leadership which was facing serious corruption charges, issues like Mumbai riots, Mumbai bomb blasts and serious lapses on the part of the State government to protect the people, misappropriation of funds during the rehabilitation of earthquake hit areas of Latur, stampede during the Govari agitation in Nagpur, were widely used against the Pawar government. The Deputy Chief

24. India Today, Feb. 28, 1995.

25. Sunday Times of India, Feb. 12, 1995.



Commissioner G.R. Khainar's, one man agitation against Pawar and his alleged underworld links helped the alliance further in generating anti-Pawar atmosphere. The factionalism in the party had reached its heights and the central leadership failed to hold back different sections of the party together. Differences between the Maratha leders like S.B. Chavan, Sharad Pawar and Sudhakar Rao Naik were no more hidden.<sup>26</sup> Congress lost the minority vote bank, mainly because of its failure to protect them during riots, failure of Congress at the centre to protect the disputed sight of Babri Masjid, implementation of TADA against many minority community members, turned the dissatisfaction against Congress into hatred.

Shiv Sena, openly accepted the responsibility of riots, claiming that it was protecting 'Hindu interest'. This gave it recognition even among the middle class Hindus in Mumbai. Shiv Sena was back with a massive popularity after riots.

Pawar government's economic policy of liberalisation, promotion of foreign investment and efforts to build industrial network in rural areas, distanced it from the Congress loyalist elite in rural Maharashtra, as these policies were viewed promoting the 'urban interest' at the cost of rural interesets. Pawar could not take this section of his party with him.

Tickets were denied to many Congress heavy weights, who in turn, contested election as independent condidates, even defeating Congress' official candidates. There are 35 Congress rebels in the present assembly, while 24 came second (dividing the votes). It mean, Congress lost total 59 seats. The rebel factor played a decisive role in Congress defeat.<sup>27</sup>

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26. For the various issues cited above I have seen different news papers clippings during the days of election campaign in 1995.

27. Vohra Rajendra and Palshikar Suhas, (1995), *Maharashtratil Sattantar*, Mumbai, Granthali, page 70. My translation.

The election results of 1995 assembly thus were not entirely unexpected ones. The Maharashtra Times opinion polls showed that even the minorities were ready to test the alliance, especially the business community among them to save their business.

This is for the first time the power has been transferred from rural to urban based politicians. Both Sena and the BJP still remain urban-centric parties. Sena's all prominent leaders come from high castes like Kayastha Prabhu, Pathare Prabhu and Brahmins, all Mumbai based. ("Sena has no leader outside Mumbai," says Moreshwar Save, party MP from Marathwada, now stands expelled.)

The 1995 election results, clearly show the Sena's growing popularity among young Marathas, but most of them have no backing of traditional Maratha power structure. It is also very popular among the other backward castes like Mali and Dhangar and the non-Buddhist Dalits like Chambhar, Matang, Dhor. But in any case, neither the Sena, nor the BJP, has made significant inroads into the Maratha dominated, sugar belt of western Maharashtra, which accounts for 75 seats and is vigorously defended by the Congress through a network of agricultural co-operatives.<sup>28</sup>

Now that the alliance government is in power, it has left no stone unturned to strike a blow to the Congress sugar empire. It seeks to do so by ensuring that the co-operative bye-laws of the State are strictly adhered to. The government is also enthusiastic to follow up on complaints of irregularities lodged by members. It is trying to woo power groups that have been denied support by successive Congress government to expedite their applications for sugar factories. The alliance has also made attempt to hit the Congress power base of Zilha Parishads. The State government has through an ordinance, changed the condition of a two-thirds majority for passing a no

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28. Abraham Maria, "Bitter Battle", The Week, Feb. 25, 1996, page 17.

confidence motion against Zilha Parishad office-holders. It hopes to displace Congressmen from them by exploiting factionalism in the Congress.<sup>29</sup>

One year in office has helped the Sena and the BJP to expand their party networks. "We want to assert the supremacy of the party over the government as is done by the Communists in West Bengal", said Sena leader Subhash Desai.<sup>30</sup> A Pune edition of the party daily 'Samna' was launched in January to provide readers in western Maharashtra a different view of the sugar barons and other influential Congress leaders in the co-operative movement. The idea was to work at the grassroot level to make inroads into sugar co-operative movement. Raj Thackeray's ambitious plan to set up employment exchanges in each district "to monitor and control employment opportunities and recruitment at the industrial and commercial units", is also seen as an attempt to score over the government efforts to provide employment in the State.<sup>31</sup> Keeping an eye over the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections, Shiv Sena did express its desire to go nationwide in its convention held in Mumbai the November 1995.

Differences did emerge between the two parties (BJP-SS) over the distribution of seats for the Lok Sabha election (1996), but with the Congress, the main opposition party, in a State of total disarray, there appears to be no political alternative to the BJP and Shiv Sena alliance in Maharashtra.

The entire description about the Sena's ideology and variety of subjects and issues handled by the party shows, how the Sena created its own constituency in a particular demographic area, each decade since its formation. Every time it targetted one particular section of the society. Its targets were selectively chosen, the defenseless and helpless. Once the attacks on migrant subsided, it was the Communists, Dalits and the Muslims, who were under

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29. Palshikar Suhas, "Maharashtra a triangular Contest?" Frontline, April 19, 1996, page 32.

30. Times of India, March 13, 1996.

31. Bombay Times, March 1, 1996.

attack. The concepts 'nativism', 'sons of the soil', and 'ethnic conflict' used in the literature while analysing Shiv Sena and the above description tells us how effectively the Sena has exploited the social and economic conditions to its best advantage. But the real question remains why only the Sena could do so and no other party or political force ? Why Shiv Sena expanded after all ?

The social, economic and political changes over the past three decades are responsible for the expansion of the Sena. Shiv Sena's roots lie in the economic competition between the natives and the other ethnic communities, the 'outsiders' in Mumbai. There was cut throat competition for middle class jobs in Mumbai. Shiv Sena upheld the 'native cause' and taking the law in its own hands, provided employment to Maharashtrians in various private sector jobs. The failure of the State to cope up with the unemployment problem and to providing more economic opportunities to its people, helped the Sena to run a parallel administration.

The successive Congress Chief Ministers used Shiv Sena, to control the other factions in the party and to curb the growing power of the Communist Unions in Mumbai. During the 1960s and the 1970s, Mumbai had a powerful trade union movement, which was systematically being destroyed by the mill owners, capitalists and even by the State. Sena received assistance from all these forces to counter communism in Mumbai. This gave it an opening to creat its base among workers.

The socialist leadership which was in front during the Samyukta Maharashtra Movement withered away after the separate State of Maharashtra was formed. Leaders like S.M. Joshi, Achchut Patvardhan, Madhu Dandavate were sidelined by the Congress leadership. Congress was at advantage, as it was the ruling party in the centre. The decline of the progressive socialist and communist forces helped the Sena to tighten its grip over the lower class, especially the working class native population in Mumbai.

But during the post-emergency period, the spontaneous radicalist dimension of the textile worker militancy was captured by Datta Samant.<sup>32</sup> With this new leadership, the textile workers over-threw the domination of RMMS (Congress recognised Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh). But after the historic strike of 1982, even Datta Samant's leadership was on the decline. This strike was fought under extreme uncertainty and the workers were fighting against a stagnant industry. The entire textile industry of Mumbai has become a 'sick industry', now. The Sena created its own constituency among these jobless workers, by giving them some hope for jobs (through its various schemes) and allowing them to use their 'muscle power'.

For the changed working environment, new professionalism is needed to build the labour movement, which the Communists have failed to do so far. There is an absence of a revolutionary trade union movement in Mumbai. Sena has tried to penetrate workers in different sectors, having spread its own Kamgar Sena branches in sectors like insurance, banking, teachers, traders, etc.

Another argument by Jayant Lele sees Shiv Sena's growth on the 'predatory capitalism'. Sena has used its underworld links to mobilise economic resources and controlling Mumbai's economy even further.

The third argument about Shiv Sena's growing popularity among the OBCs of the State, sees the dissatisfaction of these sections against the Maratha hegemony. The Sena systematically divided the Dalits as neo-Buddhists and non-Buddhists, consolidating the non-Buddhists, by giving them Hindu identity. Maharashtra's Dalit movement though progressive, is a house divided in itself. This division among the Dalits helped Sena to create a base in Marathwada.

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32. Lele Jayant, (1995), *Ibid*, page 27.

And the most important factor which helped Sena to grow was Congress decline in State during these years. The national leadership of the Congress saw to it that the State leadership remains factional ridden, its policy to debase the powerful Maratha leaders and forcing the leaders from the top, left Congress in a State of diarray. Although in 1980s, the farmers' movement emerged appealing the same support base as Congress, it could not withstand the complexities of politics. But in 1980s, it had a wide appeal among the young and the farmers in Maharashtra. How far the Hindutva politics would have sustained had the farmers' movement remained equally powerful, needs a careful study.

Finally, the alliance with BJP makes Shiv Sena's Hindutva more organised and united than any other force in the State at present. How long it will last, only time can say !

### **SHIV SENA AND ITS SECOND LINE LEADERSHIP**

For most of its existence, the Shiv Sena has been a dictatorship.<sup>33</sup> When the Shiv Sena-BJP government was installed in the State in March 1995, Bal Thackeray made it clear that the government would function under his 'remote control'. His sway over the Maharashtra population continues and on occasion of public speeches, Thackeray makes sure that his 'remote control' appears to be effective. Even after 30 years of its existence, no major party positions are reached without consultation with Bal Thackeray, including policy decisions that are taken by the Sena-BJP combine in the State legislature. But then a few years ago, a second line of leadership started emerging. It is more than a coincidence that the new leaders are related to Bal Thackeray. Moreover, in spite of Thackeray's authoritarian hold over the party, an intense power struggle seems to be on within the Sena. The younger Thackeray's score over those, who have been with the Sena since its inception. What is helping them

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33. Bhandare Namita, "Blood line," Sunday, Sept 1-7, 1996, page 12.

is the bloodline and close proximity to Sena Chief. It can no longer be denied that - Bal Thackeray's grip over his empire is not the same as it was before.

Our concern here is to see briefly, who are these leaders? Where do they stand in Sena hierarchy? How do they function? And what is their contribution to the party?

## **RAJ AND UDDHAV THACKERAY**

It is Raj and Uddhav Thackeray, on whom the eyes are fixed. Both are active in party politics and have kept away from electoral politics and governmental posts, like Bal Thackeray himself. Speculations are on that the Sena Chief is grooming the younger Thackerays to take over the party mantle.

Raj, Bal Thackeray's 28 years old nephew, who was recently in the eye of the storm with his name being linked to alleged extortionists, accused in the Ramesh Kini murder, bears an uncanny resemblance to his uncle. He carries himself with same slightly imperious air. Raj is virtually brought up by his uncle in a joint family set-up. He has almost identical voice, draws similar cartoons and has the same style of oratory. He is fiery and rabble rouser. He alone amongst the younger Sainiks has the potential to pack in crowds. He carries himself with same slightly aloof, slightly imperious air. Raj in many ways typifies the younger generation of Shiv Sainiks flashy, impatient and with a healthy disregard for technicalities.<sup>34</sup> This style is most manifest in his public rallies and speeches.

He has been active in politics ever since his college days. He is the Chief of Bhartiya Vidyarthi Sena (BVS) the student's wing of the party since 1988.<sup>35</sup> He has organised several morchas for the unemployed youth in the State. His close association with the industries sources has helped him to assure job for

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34. *Ibid*

35. Rattanani Lekha, "A family affair," India Today, Feb. 28, 1995, page 57.

the unemployed. He has drawn up an ambitious plan in the form of 'Shiv Udyog Sena,' (SUS), a paralled employment exchange scheme, "to monitor and control employment opportunities and recruitment at the industrial and commercial units" in each district.<sup>36</sup> The plan includes training youths for employment in the banking, tourism, insurance sector, etc., as well as for competitive examination in the public service commission etc. A close interaction with the industries will be maintained to ensure justice to local youth. SUS will also utilise expertise from Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samiti to fulfill its task. If successful, the scheme will help the party to fulfill its electoral promise of giving employment to the 27 Lakh unemployed youth in the State. His close associates from Bhartiya Vidyarthi Sena (BVS), like Rajan Shirodkar, Dilip Karande, Ashutosh Rane, Sanjay Ghadi and Praveen Darekar are working with him in the Shiv Udyog Sena. SUS was planned in March 1996 and was finally inaugurated in April 1997.

Uddhav, Thackeray's youngest son entered politics only to help his father and hence is a reluctant politician. He is mild-mannered but appears to be the 'heir apparent'. He took charge of the party's daily newspaper project, 'Samna', in January 1989 and since then, has virtually taken over the newspaper. He is also a cartoonist with an artistic streak. Till he entered politics, he was content with his muse, photography. He is the only son of Bal Thackeray, who lives with him and hence has an easy access to the Sena Supremo. Uddhav does not seem to possess of any spectacular oratorical talent. He is a strategist, who handles much of the back room manoeuvring and manages the Sena funds. People say his father trusts his sense of political acumen.

Raj and Uddhav, first emerged as political leaders in 1992, shortly after the party came to power in the Bruhan-Mumbai Municipal Corporation elections (BMC) elections.<sup>37</sup> Since then both of them have played key roles in the party's election campaign-selecting candidates, organising resources etc. Uddhav

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36. Phadke Suhas, "Sena plans employment exchanges," Bombay Times, Mar. 1, 1996.

37. Blood Line, Sunday, Sept 1-7, 1996, page 15.



does not see his ascension as part of dynastic rule at all. "I am not interested in power but doing service for the people", he says, "It is a part of our family tradition and dates back to my grandfather." <sup>38</sup> It should be noted that Thackeray's father was a reputed social reformer and had played an important role in the anti-Brahmin movement in Maharashtra, in spite of being an upper caste himself. Uddhav's wife is associated the women's wing of the party, but both of them have so far kept away from any controvercies.

### **LEADERS IN SENA OTHER THAN THE THACKERAYS**

Manohar Joshi, the State Chief Minister is Sena's number 2 rank leader. A Brahmin by caste, he comes from a very humble background and has gone up the hard way. He is popularly known as 'Sir', as he owns a chain of Kohinoor Technical Institutes. He has recently expanded his business into hotels and building construction.

Dadar, the middle class heart-land of Mumbai is Mr. Joshi's assembly constituency. He is associated with Sena and Bal Thackeray since the foundation of the party in 1966. After Sena's first electoral victory in BMC, he became the Mayor of Mumbai in 1975. He is known as an able administrator and a diplomat. Ironically all his administrative and diplomatic skills are presently being used in the balancing the act with the 'remote control'. Though loyal to Bal Thackeray, he has resented, the over bearing nephew and the son. He has good equation with the Congress leaders in the State. Though the Chief Minister of the State, none of the decisions are taken by him individually without consulting the Sena Supremo.

Sudhir Joshi, another important leader of the Sena, is presently the Minister for Education in the State cabinet. Sudhir Joshi was associated with Sena's sister organisation Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samiti, (SLS) for more them two decades.

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38. "Friends and Advisers of Bal Thackeray," Sunday, Sept. 1-7, 1996.

SLS was established to ensure employment for local people in public and private sector. Beginning as a unit in the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1968, the SLS now has 325 units spread across the State mostly concentrated in Mumbai-Thane commercial industrial belt.<sup>39</sup> Pramod Navalkar is another heavy weight in Sena. He too was associated with the SLS work and has a strong mass base in his constituency in Mumbai. In the recent cabinet reshuffle (on June 21' 1997) in an attempt to clip his wings, the important Transport portfolio was taken away from him. This is seen as Thackeray's way of expressing displeasure over Mr. Navalkar's handling of the department. He is now given the charge of Trade and Commerce Ministry, while retaining the Departments of Cultural Affairs and Ports.

It should be noted that all these above mentioned leaders belong to Mumbai.

A new coterie is emerging around the Sena Chief, in recent months. They include non-Maharashtrian businessmen like Mukesh Patel, Parvez Damania, Kanyaiyalal Gidwani etc. Mukesh Patel was allotted the Sena ticket for Rajya Sabha and is known as a 'power broker'. Parvez Damania unsuccessfully contested 1996 Lok Sabha election. Then there are others like Adik Shirodkar, a senior counsel and a personal friend of Thackeray; Sanjay Raut, editor of Samna, who also form a part of the coterie. Raut has increasingly taken to handling the press on Thackeray's behalf and has played an important role in giving the paper a 'militant image'.

Some erstwhile Congressmen like Sureshdada Jain, who have shifted their loyalties have also succeeded in getting close to Thackeray. Jain was a trusted colleague of Sharad Pawar and has a strong base in Jalgaon. This may help Sena to make a dent in that area, which <sup>is</sup> otherwise a Congress stronghold, Mr. Jain was the only beneficiary in the recent cabinet reshuffle, since he has been allotted the prestigious Department of Housing and Slum

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39. Koppikar Smruti, Native Appeal, India Today, Feb. 28, 1995, page 59.

Improvement. He will now be required to implement the Sena's ambitious project of providing free houses to four million slumdweller of Mumbai.<sup>40</sup>

The newly emerged businessmen coterie exercises a clout in Sena, though it does not have a mass base. It has also perturbed the old loyalists, who did not desert the Supremo even in his trying days.

The increasing influence of the younger Thackeray's and the clout of the new coterie has affected the party image in more than one way. Firstly, they have attracted criticism for making the Shiv Sena a 'family affair.' The younger Thackerays, officially declared as party leaders, have assumed a 'de facto' role in the government affair. Secondly, their names have been linked (particularly that of Raj and Jaidev - Bal Thackeray's second son) to alleged extortionists in the building trade, which makes it appear that the family is acquiring amazing property and assets. Though, the younger Thackeray's have disclaimed all the responsibility for such lumpen and criminal elements, they cannot entirely absolve themselves of all the blame. After all, Pramod Navalkar, the Sena minister for Culture says, ' "By using the Shiv Sena name, you can make easy money." <sup>41</sup> Shiv Sena's Kangaroo courts to avoid judicial process and people approaching them to get their work done is not a new thing in Mumbai. But this is increasingly getting a social base in the city which, beyond doubt, is harmful to the party and more importantly for the society as a whole.

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40. Sunday Times, June 22, 1997

41. Blood Line, Sunday, September 1-7; 1996, page 19.

## **CHAPTER - 3**

### **SOCIO-ECONOMIC PARAMETERS AND POLITICS OF KOLHAPUR**

Political behaviour of people is very often determined by their historical past and the socio-economic conditions they live in. Geographical factors also have a considerable impact on their lives. Hence, the Study which is concerned with the political development of Shiv Sena in Kolhapur, in the broader context of Maharashtra politics makes it necessary for us to understand the socio-political and historical past of Kolhapur, which has shaped its present status in every aspect.

The purpose of this Chapter is to portray a profile of Kolhapur district, which will help understand the ongoing political changes in the district discussed in the following Chapter. The first half, deals with the land and its people, historical facts about Kolhapur, agricultural and industrial development of the district. The second half, concentrates on the nature of Kolhapur politics, role of social and political movements, politics and economics co-operatives and political parties in the district (Congress hegemony over the political and economic life in the district through a network of co-operatives and Maratha caste-cluster) and the intense power struggle within the party, that has given a way to the emergence of new political forces in district politics.

#### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

Widely referred as 'Karvir' in the ancient history of Maharashtra, Kolhapur remained one of the important social and political Centres of Southern Maharashtra, in ancient and medieval period. The historical monuments, which stand intact even today, only reassert its historical legacy. The famous 'City Palace' and the 'town hall' are well-known tourists attractions. The religious

importance of Kolhapur is evident from its name 'Dakshin Kashi'<sup>1</sup>. The ancient Mahalaxmi temple has remained important religious site for the Hindus, for centuries.

During the medieval period Kolhapur was a princely State. It was established by Maharani Tarabai, wife of Rajaram, Chatrapati Shivaji's younger son. It remained the capital of divided Maratha kingdom (the Maratha empire was divided into two States, viz., Satara and Kolhapur, after Shivaji's death) from 1788 to 1949.<sup>2</sup> In 1949, it was merged with Indian Republic and became a part of bilingual State of Bombay.

## GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

Kolhapur is situated on the north-eastern plateau of Southern Maharashtra. It lies between latitudes 15<sup>0</sup> to 17<sup>0</sup> degrees north and longitudes 73<sup>0</sup> to 74<sup>0</sup> east. The mountain ranges of Sanhyadri guard its western boundaries, while the northern and the eastern boundaries are washed by the rivers Varna and Krishna respectively. On its south, it shares its borders with Belgaum district of Karnataka.

Kolhapur occupies 2.5% of the total land-mass of the State of Maharashtra and it occupies area of 7620 sq.km.<sup>3</sup> Areawise, it is the 24th largest district of the State. For administrative purpose, it is divided into twelve Tahasils and four revenue divisions. (see the map)

## CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

Kolhapur has pleasant climate throughout the year. It receives good rainfall, specially in the western ghats coming under the shadow of Sanhyadri ranges.

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1. See, Bhide G.R. and Deshpande P.L. (eds), (1971), *Kolhapur Darshan ; Shri Madan Mohan Lohiya, Abhinandan Granth*, Pune, International Publishing services.
  2. *Ibid.*
  3. Jilla Samajik ani Arthik Samalochan, Kolhapur district, 1994-95. Social and economic review, Kolhapur district, 1994-95 (Marathi), Economic and statistical administration, Maharashtra State, Mumbai.

Favourable climatic conditions and good rainfall have turned 55% land for cultivation, various cash crops like oil seeds, sugarcane, tobacco, rice, soyabin etc. are the important crops in the district. Milk production claims to be the second largest industry next only to agriculture. Jowar is the staple food of the local people in eastern Talukas while western side is rice eaters

## **POPULATION**

According to the 1991 census, the population of the district is 29.90 lakhs. Almost one third of its population lives in rural areas (22.03 lakhs live in villages i.e. 74% of the total population). Urban population counts for only 7.87 lakhs i.e. 26% of the total population. It is concentrated mainly in two cities viz. Kolhapur (52%) and Ichalkaranji (27%) another important urban Centre in the district known for its textile industries. The rest 21% is scattered in smaller towns. <sup>4</sup>

## **AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF KOLHAPUR**

Prior to Independence, there were only two Municipal Corporations in the area of Maharashtra, viz. Bombay and Nagpur (which as the capital of the erstwhile State of C.P and Berar got a Municipal Corporation in 1936).<sup>5</sup> As cities began to grow, it was necessary to establish more corportations. Kolhapur became a corporation in 1972. This included the old city of Kolhapur and nearby villages like Gokul Shirgaon, Shirol, etc.

To bring these villages into the mainstream of the urban life, the government is developing them as industrial Centres of the city. The State government has founded organisations like SICOM, MIDC, MSSIDC and MSFC, to promote industrial growth and entrepreneurship by providing various infrastructural

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4. *Ibid*

5. Gadkari S.S., (1995), "The politics of Municipal Govts. in Maharashtra", in Thakkar Usha and Mangesh Kulkarni, (eds), Politics in Maharashtra, Mumbai, Himalaya, page 102.

facilities.<sup>6</sup> Kolhapur being a district place has two MIDC sponsored industrial States. There are industrial estates in other parts of the districts also, viz., Ichalkaranji and Jaysingpur which are fast developing towns. In spite of these efforts, the region comes under 'D' category of industrial growth zone. A visit to these industrial estates clearly shows that a vast potential still remains underutilised or totally unutilised. Efforts are also on to facilitate the functioning of these industrial units by providing them with skilled workers besides financial assistance. The State government has established technical training institutes to achieve the target.

Due to the slow pace of industrial development, economy of Kolhapur has remained essentially agro-based. Three important factors which influence agriculture, viz the nature and thickness of soil, the quality of land and amount and periodicity of rain are favourable for the agricultural development in the district. The western ghats which come under the mountain ranges of Sanhyadri receive a good rainfall. The Western Talukas of Gaganbavda, Radhanagari, Ajra receive heavy rainfall, while Eastern Talukas of Shirol and Hatkanagale receive comparatively less rains. But the average rainfall is around 2657.67 mm which fulfills the agricultural requirements of the district. The principal crops in the district are jowar, bajra, rice, wheat, groundnut, and sugarcane.

#### 7. Main crops and area under cultivation in Kolhapur

Crops	Area production in per cent
1) Pulses	2%
2) Rice	22%
3) Wheat	2%
4) Jowar	1%
5) Cereals	7%
6) Sugar cane	15%
7) Groundnut (oil seeds, etc.)	15%
8) Non food crops (Tobacco etc)	33%

Source : Ibid 3

6. For more details about the assistance schemes launched by the government of Maharashtra, see Sirsikar V.M., (1995), Politics of Modern Maharashtra, Mumbai, Orient Longman, page 59-81.

Farmers in this area are aware about the scientific research and development in their field, and are known for their increased use of improved hybrid varieties of rice, wheat, jowar, maize, etc. With increasing commercial importance of soyabean, groundnut etc., we find these crops are also becoming popular with the farmers. Of late, the farmers are also taking interest in cultivating fruit crops like grapes, figs, citrus fruits and bananas. Canal irrigation has encouraged the cultivation of these crops.

There are four major dams in the district viz. Radhanagari, (Kalamma wadi) Tulsi, Dudhganga and Varna. The first two projects were completed in 1994-95. They have brought 18779 hectares of land under irrigation. The remaining two projects are still under construction and are due for completion in 1998-99. Besides these mega projects, there are some medium-sized projects being undertaken to improve the irrigation facilities further to facilitate the agrarian development of the district.

The two important cash crops in Maharashtra are cotton and sugarcane. The State is the second largest producer of sugarcane, next only to Uttar Pradesh and the third largest producer of cotton.<sup>7</sup> The Vidarbha and Khandesh regions are known for cotton, while Western Maharashtra is associated with sugarcane. Sugarcane has become the most lucrative crop and with the expansion of irrigation facilities, there has been a marked increase in the area under sugarcane cultivation. The entire economic and political structure of Western Maharashtra is known to revolve around the sugar co-operatives. These organisations have initiated many welfare measures, which have in turn induced developmental activities. The sugar co-operatives yield a considerable political clout that part has been dealt with separately under the title, politics of sugar co-operatives later in this chapter.

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7. *Ibid*, page 72



Besides the sugar factories, the other industries that are found in Kolhapur are manufacturing of oil engines, power-looms, production of equipment required for agriculture and several other small scale industries.

Inchalkaranji, another developing industrial and urban Centre, is known as Manchester of Maharashtra because of its textile industry. Power-looms are found at every doorstep and weaving is a traditional business of many households in the town. But with increasing acceptance of polyester and synthetic fabric and use of new machinery, these power-looms and hand-looms are experiencing a virtual shut down. Majority of the workers engaged in textile sector earlier, are in search of employment today. Co-operatives have also entered into the textile sector in Ichalkaranji. There are two successfully run co-operative spinning mills in the city.

The close proximity to Nipani, country's premier trade Centre of tobacco, has facilitated the growth of tobacco trade in Kolhapur district. It is a prosperous business in the district. Kolhapur has its own Tobacco Trade Centre at Jaysingpur, which is 40 km away from the main city. The town of Jaysingpur was established by Chatrapati Shahu in 1916, in the memory of his Late father, Chatrapati Jai Singh. Jaysingpur soon acquired a name in tobacco business, next only to Nipani.

Kolhapur is also a famous market place of 'Gur'. Historical records show export of 'Gur' to Kutch, Kathewad and Gujrat since 1845, at a time when transport facilities were quite primitive. Today 'gur' has been replaced by sugar and Khandsaries (where the production of Gur took place) have been replaced by sugar factories. Production of groundnut oil, soyabin and turmeric trade are on the rise in recent years, though, their contribution to growth is far below than the tobacco and sugar business, yet it is significant.

## 8. Industries by the end of 1994-95

Industries (in no.)

Industries	District	State
Registered Industries	1364	28404
Productive Industries	1183	24549
Sugar factories (including private)	13	155
Sugar production (in tonne)	1322	45048
Cotton Mills (no)	46	228
Co-operative societies	7672	134401
Primary agricultural co-operative soc	1167	19975
Milk production-indus	1913	19362

Source : Ibid, 3.

### THE NATURE OF KOLHAPUR POLITICS: ANTI-BRAHMIN MOVEMENT AND CHANGE IN THE POWER STRUCTURE

It was Shivaji, the great 17th Century Maratha King, who re-established and strengthened Maratha-hegemony at all levels in his kingdom. Shivaji successfully rode the rising tide of religious populism.<sup>8</sup> In the face of the growing danger of Islam he was able to reassert the hegemonic alliance between the Maratha and the Brahmins. The growing populist attack of the lower castes had been directed away from the established ritual and the political elites towards the Northern invaders. The outcome of Shivaji's rise to power was clearly the stabilization of the old village order and the regional system of tax collection, a system jointly run by the Maratha and the Brahmin elite.<sup>9</sup> It was the decline of the house of Shivaji and the effective take over of power by the house of Brahmin Prime Minister (Peshwa) that led to visible

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8. Lele Jayant, (1982), *Elite Pluralism and Class Rule : Political Development in Maharashtra*, Mumbai, Popular, page 49.

9. *Ibid*, page 50.

domination of Brahmins in almost every walk of life in the 18th and 19th Century Maharashtra. Brahmins became absentee landlords turning the Marathas to a secondary position. There was a substantial decline in Maratha hegemony and that gradually turned them into a formidable rivals of the Brahmins.

The Deccan riots of 1875 were an expression of the hegemonic consciousness of the Marathas. The riots were aimed, primarily, at money lenders some of whom were Brahmins. They spread from village to village with a remarkable speed. They showed the strong network of interaction and a shared sense of rulership among the Maratha elite.

The social situation, however, had not changed materially between 1890 to 1910. The Brahmins were still dominant in education, in professions, in government jobs, in administration, in journalism and now in increasingly 'radical' nationalist movement. The non-Brahmins, who were yet to be exposed to the process of modernisation, developed deep seated and intense feeling of resentment against the Brahmins. The logical reaction to Brahmin domination was found in the anti-Brahmin movement of 20th Century. Its pioneer was Jyotiba Phule, a low-caste Mali, educated by the English missionaries. He started the 'Satya Shodhak Samaj ('Truth seeking society' aimed at reducing Brahmin domination in education, politics and religion) in 1873. He exposed the exploitative nature of Brahminism and the pretensions of the elite Marathas. He had only a few followers and their symbolic performance of rituals without priests was often ridiculed by the village elite. He came heavily on the exiting caste system. The dormant non-Brahmin castes were aroused and were urged to challenge the hegemony of the Brahmins. Phule's work deeply influenced the socio-political life of Maharashtra and institutionalised the discontent prevalent against the Brahmins. Satya Shodhak Samaj made large gains in forming a united non-Brahmin front -particularly in the political arena. Initially the term Bramhanetar i.e those other than Brahmins was used to note the constituents of the movement, but it began to be felt that it emphasised a

negative identity or an identity in contradiction with Brahmins, a new term Bahujan Samaj- i.e. the wider community of many, which was suggested by V.R. Shinde came to be used.<sup>10</sup> Bahujan Samaj included both better off land owning castes of Marathas, Kunabis, Lingayats, Jains and even the lower castes like Salis, Malis, Kolis, Nhavis, Banjarans etc.

## THE CHATRAPATI SHAHU AND ANTI-BRAHMIN MOVEMENT

After Phule's death, the Satya Shodhak Samaj lost much of its vigour. It was revived with the council election in the 1920s and 1930s. If Jyotirao Phule was the founder father figure of the Satya Shodhak Samaj, Chatrapati Shahu of Kolhapur was the patron-sponsor of the second phase of the Non-Brahmin movement in Maharashtra, which then became intensely Anti-Brahmin.

Shahu, born in 1874, was adopted as the heir to the Kolhapur gaddi (seat) in 1884. He formally assumed power as ruler in 1894 at the age of 20 and ruled Kolhapur till 1922. Almost from the beginning of his rule, he showed great interest in promoting education among all his subjects, particularly those who had traditionally been denied education. Though aware of Brahmin domination in all walks of life and even in his own State service, he may not have been anti-Brahmin in the beginning. His non-Brahmin identity got sharpened by the vicissitudes of his life-particularly by the *vedokta* episode (refusal of the Brahmins to accord him 'twice-born' status), the mutual anti-pathy that developed between Tilak and the Chatrapati and by the need for him to appear to be unquestionably loyal to the British rulers.<sup>11</sup>

Among the first programmes, he adopted were the promotion of education among the intermediate landowning and backward castes by encouraging to build hostels for students from these communities and the gradual increase in

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10. Gore M.S., (1989), Non-Brahman Movement in Maharashtra, Delhi, Segment Book Distributors, page 52.

11. *Ibid.* page 54.

the number of non-Brahmins recruited to the State service. The success of the latter policy depended on the success of the first one.

These were matters of deliberate policy which is evident from the fact that in a letter much latter in 1918 to Robertson, Shahu said, among other things, "By createing hostels we have overcome the dominance of the Brahmins in the social and other spheres. And now, as a result of the Satya Shodhak and Arya Samaj movements we expect to overcome their religious dominance as well.<sup>12</sup> By adopting anti-Brahmin policies he had aroused the hostility of Brahmins in Kolhapur as well as outside in Western Maharashtra. For the same reason, he quickly came to be regarded as the champion of non-Brahmin castes. In Shahu, the Maratha elite found a strong regional leader, to whom the British regime accorded due respect. The middle and lower castes became the allies of the elite Marathas.

The tension between the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins did not fade as the years passed. The assasination of Mahatma Gandhi on January 30, 1948, by a Maharashtrian Brahmin from Pune was a spark, which ignited the underlying deep tensions and feelings of intense resentment against the Brahmins. There were widespread riots, looting, burning and killings of Brahmins. The anti-Brahmin explosion, which erupted was grim evidence of the culmination of more or less suppressed anger and desire of the non-Brahmins, especially, the Marathas, to assert themselves in public life. One of the consequences of these riots was the complete withdrawal of Brahmins from the political arena.<sup>13</sup>

## **NON-BRAHMINS AND THE EARLY NATIONALISTS**

The anti-Brahmin movement developed as a parallel to the nationalist movement led by urban Brahmins. It must be noted that the early nationalist leaders were

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12. *Ibid.*

13. Sirsikar, V.M., (1995), *Ibid*, 6, page 65.

predominantly Brahmin and more particularly, Konkanasta Brahmin (Justice Ranade, G.K. Gokhale, Tilak, etc.). Phule had no faith in the Congress leaders and denounced the Indian National Congress, as it was dominated by the upper class and in Maharashtra was identified with Brahmins. The Maratha elite ignored the nascent nationalist movement and worked in support of the British regime. The British administrators with good reason spoke confidently about the rejection of nationalists by the 'fine leaders of a sturdy peasantry'.

Shahu's anti-Brahmin stance also meant an anti-'nationalist' stand, so far as the Maharashtra political scene was concerned. Within Kolhapur, Shahu suppressed all nationalist terrorist activities. His actions were probably dictated by the imperative need for him not to lose credibility in the eye of the British rulers. They may also have served a purpose in putting down the efforts of Annasaheb Vijapurkar -a friend of Tilak to establish in Kolhapur a Lokpratinidhi Sabha (1907), Ganpatrao Modak and Damu Joshi, both nationalists located in Kolhapur were tried and sentenced to seven and eleven years imprisonment in jail respectively.

In Kolhapur the Satya Shadhak Samaj became increasingly a movement for mobilising non-Brahmins on a political platform. Since the nationalist movement in Maharashtra at this point of time was in the hands of Brahmins, the non-Brahmin movement largely took up a moderate, political stance. At the same time, the movement underwent a change from being a movement for 'cultural revolution' to being a movement for 'political power'. It got coopted into the non-Brahmin movement, which formally came into existence as a party around 1920, seeking economic and political gains for the non-Brahmin elite, in which the anti-Brahmin thrust itself became an ideology and the egalitarianism of Phule lost its appeal, or, at best served as a convenience in debate and in political mobilisation.

In all movements, at various stages of their growth, there seem to be a varying degree and area of agreement among its members. At this stage of its

development, there seemed to be total agreement in the non-Brahmin movement of Maharashtra that the social and material interests of the non-Brahmins needed to be protected and promoted.

## **NON-BRAHMINS AND THE CONGRESS**

After the death of Lokmanya Tilak, the leadership of Congress was taken over by Mahatma Gandhi. The Congress, now with its principles of social equality attracted all and sundry. Gandhi, though, a non-Maharashtrian, was a non-Brahmin and this may have appealed to the masses in Maharashtra. There was also an opinion growing up in nationalist circles that the Brahmin-non-Brahmin controversy should not be allowed to foment and create hurdles in the path of independence. One of the persons who felt strongly on this issue was Vitthal Ramji Shinde- a religious and social reformer. Gradually, the non-Brahmin leaders came to see the necessity of the non-Brahmins participating in the nationalist struggle for independence.

Tilak's followers did not approve of Gandhi's line of action and the Marathi press which was dominated by Brahmins severely criticised Gandhi. To get away from the Brahmin domination, the non-Brahmins preferred the Congress. Although leaders of the Maharashtra Congress, such as Shankarrao Deo, N.V. Gadgil, etc., were Brahmins, leaders like Keshavrao Jedhe, Shankarrao More with a strong background in the non-Brahmin movement joined the top leadership of Maharashtra Congress.

Owing to the efforts of Jedhe and Gadgil, non-Brahmins especially, the Marathas, entered the Congress *en masse*. This totally altered the social composition of the Congress in the State. At the time of Independence the Maratha and Kunabi castes came to form the major base of the Congress organisation in Maharashtra.

In 1927, the pro-nationalist, non-Brahmin leaders like Jedhe brothers, Vitthalrao Shinde, Shripatrao Shinde and Bhaurao Patil declared themselves in favour of

boycotting the all- British Simon Commission which had been appointed by the British Government to review the working of the 1919 Act giving a measure of autonomy to Indian legislatures.

Gadgil and Jedhe drew closer to each other during the period of their imprisonment in Civil Disobedience Movement in 1930-32. Gadgil at that time represented a pragmatic, socialist view-point which appealed to Jedhe. In turn Jedhe's sincerity and forthrightness impressed Gadgil. Gadgil succeeded in persuading Jedhe to lead the Satyagraha batch in Pune after a Congress leader was arrested. They were together for the entire period between 1930 to 1947. Jedhe provided the necessary mass base and he brought with him young, nationalist and progressive elements of the Non-Brahmin party into the Congress.

### **PRAJAPARISHADS AND THE CONGRESS**

Death of Shahu marked an end of a progressive and liberal era, in the history of Kolhapur politics. The successive rulers who came to power after him lacked the foresightedness and pro-poor and pro-backward image. Their anti-people ordinances created discontent among the people of all sections in society including the peasantry. The rising discontent resulted in the formation of 'Prajaparishads' in the princely State. These parishads were the revived form of 'Lokpratinidhi Sabha' (1906) that existed during Shahu's regime. Lokpratinidhi Sabha was suppressed easily as its leadership rested with the nationalist Brahmins in Kolhapur. The scenario had changed in the 1940s. Prajaparishads were led by a section of non-Brahmins who had then become politically conscious. To crush down the movement of 'Prajaparishada', public meetings were banned in the princely State of Kolhapur. But this did not affect the enthusiasm and momentum gathered by the agitators and their leaders. The prajaparishads not only served as a powerful platform to politically unite local people the against the rulers of Kolhapur but also helped increase the participation of local people in the freedom struggle. The Prajaparishad



leadership represented by Madhavrao Bagal, Dinkarrao Desai, Nanasaheb, Jagdale, Ratnappa Kumbhar, Raoka Minche were pro-nationalist and pro-Congress. Initiated with the demands for reduction of taxes and land revenues, the movement of Prajaparishads was soon drawn into the 'Quit India Movement' of 1942, and became a part of the wider agitation under Congress umbrella. After Independence when the princely State of Kolhapur was merged with the Indian Republic, Prajaparishads lost their political significance. Nevertheless the political consciousness which this movement created during its activism cannot be undermined. The leadership of Prajaparishads, then come to represent the Congress in the district.

### **KOLHAPUR POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE**

The nature of Kolhapur politics has not undergone much change since 1930s. The anti-Brahmin movement that brought down the Brahmin domination in the 1930s, was the last social movement that changed the social and political structure of the district. Total eclipse of Brahmins from democratic politics has become a permanent feature of the district politics since then. In the old city of Kolhapur and nearby villages Brahmin house-holds are very few and their contemporary influence is almost insignificant. Mindful of their weakness in this respect, they take non-controversial roles and seek to indentify with the dominant factions within the village or remain politically neutral.

In Maharashtra the universal franchise meant a total change in the power configuration. The leadership shifted from urban middle class Brahmins to rural elite Marathas. With the widening of the franchise the 'opportunity structures' for the new aspirants were also broadened. Utilising these opportunities, a new Maratha leadership emerged in Western Maharashtra who used local self governments and the co-operatives to satisfy the political appetite. But during the years of bilingual State of Mumbai, the rural leadership was sidelined because of the provincial leadership of urban Marathi Brahmin (Kher) and a Gujrathi (Morarji Desai) with strong links to the national

leadership of Nehru and Patel. The hegemonic Maratha elites of rural Western Maharashtra were frustrated by the lack of scope for their political ambition.

It was the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (SMM), which launched the agitation for the creation of linguistic State of Maharashtra with Mumbai as its capital. With its skillful use of mass agitation and elections the samiti had become a political force to reckon with. It made a major bid for power in the 1957 elections to the State assembly and nearly succeeded in defeating the ruling Congress party. The samiti won 11 out of 24 seats in Bombay city and 101 of the 135 seats in Western Maharashtra, giving the Congress the biggest jolt in its traditional strongholds.<sup>14</sup> Even though Samiti fell short of its objective the national leadership of the Congress party was now forced to recognise the truth that it was no longer possible to ignore the political aspirations of the people of Maharashtra. It should be noted that most of the Maratha leaders, despite their strong support for the cause of united Maharashtra, had chosen to remain with the Congress. Though, Samyukta Maharashtra Movement was a very popular movement, the demand for a Marathi State was granted only when the Maharashtra Congress party persuaded the national leaders that it could guarantee that the interests of the State capital would be fully safeguarded and that the dominant rural interest would be given its appropriate share of State resources. Such a solution alone was consistent with the national strategy of the Congress party. Y.B. Chavan who eventually became the Chief Minister of the new State, fulfilled that promise with astute management of the various interest groups in the State of Bombay, including the factions involved in the Maharashtra Movement. In the assembly elections of 1962, the State Congress under Chavan's leadership swept the polls winning 215 out of 262 seats with 21 out of 24 in the capital city of Bombay and 116 out of 135 in Western Maharashtra.<sup>15</sup>

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14. Joshi Ram, (1995), "Politics in Maharashtra : An Overview," in Thakkar Usha and Kulkarni Mangesh (eds), Politics in Maharashtra, Mumbai, Himalaya, page 2.

15. *Ibid.*

### 9. General Election 1957 : Legislative Assembly

Legislative Assembly	Congress			SMS	
	Total Seats	No. of Seats Won	Percent age	No of Seats Won	Percent-age
Bombay city	24	13	54.5	11	45.5
Marathwada	42	35	83.3	7	16.7
Vidarbha	66	55	83.3	11	16.7
Western Maharashtra	135	33	24.5	102	75.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>49.1</b>

### 10. General Elections 1957 : Lok Sabha

Area	Congress			SMS	
	Total Seats	No. of Seats Won	Percent age	No of Seats Won	Percent-age
Bombay city	4	2	50	2	50
Marathwada	6	6	100	--	--
Vidarbha	22	2	9.56	20	90.5
Western Maharashtra	9	9	100	--	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>54</b>

Source : Iqbal Narain (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut. 1967, p. 195.

### 11. Bombay Corporation Election (May 1957) Statement of Party Position)

Party	Contested	Elected	Percentage of Seats
Congress	110	54	41.2
S.M.S.	97	71	54.2
Independents	107	5	3.7
Lohia Socialists	5	--	--
P.S.P.	1	1	0.9
Jana Sangh	1	--	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source : Iqbal Narain (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut. 1967, p. 194.

## 12. General Elections, 1962 : Legislative Assembly

Area	Total Seats	Congress	% of Seats Won	SMS	% of Seats Won
Bombay City	24	22	91.8	2	8.2
Maharashtra	42	33	78.6	9	21.4
Vidarbha	66	55	83.3	11	16.7
Western Maharashtra	138	126	91.4	12	8.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>87.2</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12.8</b>

Source : Iqbal Narain (ed.), *State Politics in India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut. 1967, p. 194.

The traditional fortress had been recaptured by the Congress and the State once again joined the national mainstream.

Being on the border of Maharashtra and Karnataka, the SMM's demand for united Maharashtra with Belgaum gained wide support in Kolhapur. But the Kolhapur district Congress leadership, similarly like its State counterparts preferred to fight the issue from within the party which subsided the agitation and the issue remains unresolved even today. Presently it has lost all its political significance, except that, it still emotionally appeals the masses when used in public meetings.

SMM was dominated by the communist and the socialists both with very limited base in Kolhapur.

### CONGRESS HEGEMONY AT THE GRASSROOT

**Chavan's leadership :** Y.B. Chavan established an excellent rapport with diverse segments of society. He initiated steps to provide a strong institutional basis to politics and administration in the State. These steps opened up avenues for the people in economic growth as well as democratic functioning. Chavan spread a network of three basic grassroot level institutions in the countryside and this horizontal as well as vertical linkage made it possible for

the periphery to feel closer affinity to the political Centre. These three basic institutions were the **co-operatives, educational institutions and Panchyati Raj institutions.**<sup>16</sup> They provided opportunities to hundreds of social and political workers for constructive work among the rural people. Education spread rapidly and with it came the political awareness and a new rural leadership began to emerge from the co-operative societies and Zilla Parishad institutions. These institutions made a positive contribution to democratic decentralisation and strong party building. The success of Y.B. Chavan to create a strong base for the Congress at the very local level made Maharashtra politics synonymous to Congress system.

### **POLITICS OF CO-OPERATIVES**

With the encouragement of Y.B. Chavan, co-operative sector expanded rapidly in the 1990s in Western Maharashtra. Maharashtra stands first in the co-operative movement in the country with 83, 460 co-operative societies and more than 100 co-operative sugar factories. The sugar co-operatives in the State proved to be successful and they attracted attention of the rural elite, as it was through the ladder of these co-operatives they can climb up the heights of the State legislature and parliament. Nearly 30% of the legislatures are directly connected with co-operative sugar factories in Maharashtra. The co-operatives seek political influence as government policies can affect their interests significantly. Political leaders, in turn, seek to control the co-operatives as the latter can provide patronage, a network of supporters and material resources, all of which are vital political assets. The power of the co-operatives has become particularly evident in the last two decades. They have succeeded twice in securing the removal of S.B. Chavan from Chief Ministership for his hostile policies, while Vasantdada Patil who belonged to the sugar lobby, twice served as the Chief Minister. One of the major reasons for Sharad Pawar's political success is the solid backing of this sector.<sup>17</sup>

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16. *Ibid*, page 5.

17. See for details, Ravindranath, P.K., (1992), Sharad Pawar : The making of Modern Maratha, New Delhi, UBS.

In the co-operative sector, normally, two sets of co-operative institutions have attracted the attention of political leaders. The first set is the co-operative credit societies, whose power is symbolised in the district central co-operative banks and the second comprises of processing co-operatives such as sugar co-operatives, spinning mills and groundnut oil mills. They have neglected the co-operative institutions that market the agricultural produce of the farmers.<sup>18</sup> Political leaders are also getting increasingly interested in milk co-operatives.

Kolhapur has a powerful sugar lobby with a considerable political clout. It has thirteen well functioning and prosperous sugar factories, highest number than any other district in the State, except for Ahmednagar, which has equal number and an equally powerful sugar lobby. The processing co-operatives did not do well as far as cotton, groundnut and grapes were concerned. The co-operative spinning mills in district are surviving.

The impact of sugar co-operatives is obvious as one travels through the cane-producing district. A sugar co-operative serves as a 'mother' institute. Warana sugar co-operative is a good example. Starting with just one sugar factory (Warana Sugar Co-operative was started by Vishwanath alias Tatyasaheb Anna Kore in 1958 with a capital of 10 lakhs which he had gathered by wandering over more than 10 villages), the Warana name has changed the landscape of Warananagar with several educational and research institutes sprawled across the countryside. It is indeed surprising to see engineering and academic colleges in the village. Besides sugar, Warana's name is also associated with a number of milk products which range from pasteurized milk, skimmed milk powder to Shrikhand (the sweet delicacy of Maharashtra). Today the co-operative is headed by third generation of the Kores. V.S. Kore was closely associated with the Quit India Movement and then the Congress politics in the district. He was also a member of legislative assembly.

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18. Chousalkar Ashok, (1995), "Co-operatives - How far has their leadership affected Maharashtra politics," in Thakkar Usha and Kulkarni Mangesh (eds), *op. cit.*, page 33.

As one traverses the sugar belt, it is like travelling through separate kingdoms, where the undisputed king is always the leader of the sugar factory in that area. That is why these sugar barons are popularly known as 'Sakhar Samrats' (sugar emperors). There is little doubt that rural development in Maharashtra is inseparably linked to the co-operative movement. "Sugar co-operative is one industry which has concentrated completely on rural development. It is not possible for a government to do all this alone," says Kalappa Awade, Congress MP, former minister and chairman Jawahar Sugar Co-operative in Ichalkaranji in the district.<sup>19</sup> His family's influence in the area is not solely because of the factory which is just three four years old. He also has co-operative spinning mills including the first one managed by women and a technical education society. His son, Prakash Awade is a Congress MLA. Another veteran Congress leader Ratnappa Kumbhar, an MLA, is the chairman of Panchaganga Sugar Factory, in Ichalkaranji even at the age of 86. He is the chairman of the factory since 1957.

The list of politicians associated with sugar co-operatives is unending. H.B. Patil, G.T. Kalikate, Udaysingh Rao Gaikwad, Desai, Ghorpade, Sarojani Khanjire, J.G. Awale, S.D. Mutalik, Mahadevrao Mahadik all important politicians in the district are associated with one co-operative or the other. With a few exceptions all of them belong to Congress. (Mr. Appasaheb Patil, ex-chairman of Datta Sugar Factory in Shirol, is a staunch follower of the late socialist leader S.M. Joshi, he was an MLA in 1957). The sugar lobby is not a compact, cohesive whole. It is fragmented. It appears that there is a principle of power sharing and that multiple rather than single, power Centres operate. They compete, conflict and also co-operate to secure power.

(see the table 'Linkage between Politics and Sugar Co-operatives')

In Kolhapur, the politics of Panchayati Raj Institutions and sugar co-operatives is closely intertwined with the politics of the District Central Co-operative Bank

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19. Bitter Battle, The Week, Feb. 25, 1996.

### 13. Linkage between Politics and Sugar Co-operatives

Name of the District	No. of Sugar Co-op. Factories	Name of MLAs, MPs, etc. who are connected with one or more sugar factories
1. Ahmednagar	13	Vikhe Patil, Kale, Kothe, Tanpure, Patil, Kadam, Nimbalkar, Gadakh, Nagwade, Pachpute, D.M. Pawar, Rohanmare, Zaware.
2. Dhule	4	Shivaji Patil, P.K. Anna Patil, S.H. Naik.
3. Jalgaon	3	Bapusaheb Patil, G.T. Mahajan, B.D. Rathod, G.R. Sarode.
4. Nashik	7	Venkatrao Hiray, B.D. Kawale, Kakasaheb Wagh, Mrs. Pushpa Hiray, T.S. Mogal, M.S. Didhole.
5. Satara	7	Yeshwantrao Mohite, Naik, Nimbalkar, D.B. Kadam, Pisal and V.B. Patil.
6. Sangli	7	Vasantdada Patil, Dinkar Rao Patil, R.A. Patil, F.A. Naik, N.R. Naikwadi.
7. Pune	7	Mohol, Sambhaji Rao Kakde, Sharad Pawar, S.N. Taware, A.K. Tapkir, V.B. Tupe.
8. Kolhapur	13	Ratnappa Kumbhar, V.S. Kore, Ghorpade, H.B. Patil, G.T. Kalikate, Gaikwad, Desai, Mrs. Khanjire, J.G. Awale, S.D. Mutalik.
9. Solapur	7	S.N. Mohite-Patil, V.S. Mohite-Patil, B.R. Mahadik, T.S. Jadhav, A.N. Deokate, S.S. Patil, Paricharak, M.K. Patil, B.C. Chakote, R.B. Patil
10. Aurangabad	5	Balasaheb Pawar, R.J. Patil, S.P. Kasane, C.S. Ghodke, M.S. Palodkar, Shamrao Kadam, Shivajirao Deshmukh.
11. Jalna	2	S.A. Pandit, V.Y. Akat, A.S. Chavan.
12. Parbhani	3	S.G. Nakhate, A.D. Ghatge, V.Y. Akat.
13. Beed	4	S.P. Thorve, S.A. Pandit, B.A. Dhonde

**Source :** Sirsikar V.M., (1995), Politics of Modern Maharashtra, Mumbai, Orient Longman, page 214.



(DCC). DCC's activities are important, as it is involved in giving short term agricultural credit to the farmers, processing units and different developmental activities. The Kolhapur District Central Co-op. Bank is an arena of factional politics because the district Congress has been badly divided between two equally powerful groups. Three leaders from the bank, Ratnappa Kumbhar, Udaysingh Rao Gaikwad and Sripatrao Bondre, became ministers in the State government after 1975 and they developed their support structure and network of clients with the help of the Bank.<sup>20</sup> The roots of their support are so strongly rooted in the bank that any move to dislodge them ends in failure.

## **RULING CONGRESS**

Though, a traditional stronghold of Congress, Kolhapur district Congress leadership does not represent a united front. It is highly factional ridden. The happenings at the national and state level politics have a direct impact on the district politics. Various groups in the district prefer to ally with the dominating factions at the State level, who are well connected with the central leadership of the party. But they are known for their opposition to S.B. Chavan, known for his hostility towards the sugar lobby. During the years of Vasantdada Patil, Kolhapur Congress leadership was completely ignored. Vasantdada, being a leader from the neighbouring Sangli district, shared conflicting interests with Kolhapur leadership at the local level, which had a direct bearing on his policies towards the district. As a direct consequence of Vasantdada's policies, the various leaders were drawn close to Mr. Sarad Pawar. Many leaders have been consistently supporting Pawar and they were a part of his team when he led a government under PDF banner in 1978-79. These groups are known as Pawar followers. They joined and left the Congress with him.

Broadly speaking, two powerful factions appear competing who dominated Kolhapur politics during (1977-88). One, controls the grassroots institutions of

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20. *Ibid*, 18, page 36.

Panchayati Raj which was until recently led by late Balasaheb Mane, who had retained his Ichalkaranji parliamentary constituency seat even in the crucial election of 1977. The other faction is led by Ratnappa Kumbhar, who represents the powerful sugar lobby in the district. Easy access to economic resources through co-operatives, have often given an edge to Kumbhar loyalists in the district over the Mane group. Mane faction was aware of the power of co-operatives and often tried to make a dent into the co-operative sector, though its efforts did not yield much results. Mane rose to the position of an MP from a ZP president. (He was Kolhapur ZP president from 1977 to 82). But the election to the parliamentary seat distanced him from the local politics, though interestingly enough his virtual physical absence from the district, (throughout his term as an MP), never affected his fortunes in the next election. He defended his seat for almost twenty-years till he passed away in 1995.

Ratnappa Kumbhar has been an active participant in Kolhapur politics since the days of freedom struggle. His participation in the Quit India Movement and the Prajaparishads have helped him to claim the Congress legacy of Nehru-Gandhi era. He has a very wide mass base and great appeal in the rural areas of the district. He was the minister for Home affairs in years of 1978-80 and again in at 1982-84 and remains undisputed leader of his faction. He is presently a seating MLA from Shirol and is also the Chairman of Panchaganga Sugar Co-operative.

The decades long domination of these groups over the political and economic power structures has given rise to political nepotism, corruption and several other irregularities in the functioning of Congress at the district level. Both these factions have been successfully challenged by the Awade leadership in recent years. Kallappaanna Awade represents a serious threat to Kumbhar as he belongs to the same place of Ichalkaranji. Kumbhar's one time associate, Awade now has a separate sugar co-operative, spinning mill, some educational institutions behind him. Caste is another factor which favours Awade, being

Jain, he has the support of the trading and land owning community in the district. Mane was the representative of Maratha lobby, while Kumbhar, though a non-Maratha and a non-Jain had a support cutting across the caste-line.

The other parliamentary constituency of Kolhapur has also been strongly defended by Udaysingh Rao Gaikwad, an elite Maratha, who claims the royal lineage of Kolhapur since 1980s. He has always emerged as a consensus candidate for this seat, which includes the western parts of the district. He has support of various factions in the district, though, otherwise they are often conflicting with each other. More than the internal factionalism within the Congress, for Mr. Gaikwad, the real challenge comes from PWP, which has a considerable following in Western Tahasils of Kolhapur and the city itself.

PWP was established by Jedhe in 1947. During the war years, Jedhe began to feel that the Congress had become a party of the landed gentry and the urban elite and that the interests of the small peasantry and industrial workers were not adequately represented by it. He, therefore, started a peasants league within the Congress. But with the opposition from AICC to let an ideologically different political group exist within the party, Jedhe had to break away from the Congress and establish a new party. This party used Marxist language but its appeal was directed mainly at the Maratha peasant proprietors. The PWP's support came from rural Maratha elite of Western Maharashtra and in its initial years posed a serious threat to Congress. Party had a considerable following in the districts of Solapur, Sangli, Satara and Kolhapur. Party's anti-Brahmin and anti-urban attitude helped it to grow in Kolhapur. Though, serious splits have weakened the party over the years, in Kolhapur, it has often secured second number of votes for the parliamentary seat and has a couple of seating MLAs from the district. Its candidate, Dajiba Desai, had won the parliamentary seat in 1977.

The Ichalkaranji parliamentary constituency includes 6 assembly segments, viz. Shirol, Ichalkaranji, Vadgaon, Shahuwadi, Panhala, Radhanagari. While

the Kolhapur parliamentary constituency includes the remaining 6 segments, viz. Sangrul, Kolhapur, Karvir, Kagal, Gadhinglaj and Chandgarh.

The political scenario in Kolhapur towards the 1980s represented a picture, where power was concentrated in the hands of few and all spheres of activities were monopolised by them. This situation left little scope for the younger leadership, which was trying to emerge and expand. Those, who felt it would be difficult to expand their base through the existing power structure, were in search of other platforms, as displacing the heavy weights from within was a difficult task.

Though, the Communists, Socialists, Republicans and BJP-RSS did exist in Kolhapur, they had no mass appeal and also lacked a strong organisational support in the district. Except, for a leader like Com. Malabade, they do not have a rank and file of party workers to mobilise the people. The Republicans have a very limited appeal while the BJP - RSS have always been look upon as Brahmin conspiracy.

On this background, the dischanted lot among the ruling Congress and PWP (for that it was losing appeal faster than ever before) was in search of an alternative, which would provide them with a platform to mobilise the support and to create a mass base for themselves. The 1990 assembly elections were an indication that such an alternative was emerging. For the first time, Shiv Sena candidates from Kolhapur city assembly and Shahuwadi assembly constituencies emerged victorious. Both, the 1990 assembly and the 1989 parliamentary elections indicated a decline in Congress fortune. Shiv Sena with an alliance with BJP represented an organised force and emerged as a second runner, challenging the Congress monopoly in several parts of the State.

The political developments in Kolhapur were certainly a consequence of the changes in the state and national polity. But the question emerges why did people in Kolhapur prefer to vote for Shiv Sena, which had no ideological

ground in the district ever before? Was it a sudden change? What was the key to Shiv Sena's success? And does the electoral success mean an ideological change among the people?

Now that the Shiv Sena - BJP government is in power in the State for the last two years, it would be interesting to see that how far these parties have made inroads in the Congress heart-land of Kolhapur.

The following chapter discusses, the emergence of Shiv Sena in Kolhapur as a political force and its attempts to consolidate its base further. The Study of Kolhapur politics will help to provide an explanation to the changes that Maharashtra politics is undergoing in the present decade.

## **NOTES AND REFERENCE**

1. I would like to mention here that the local information about Kolhapur politics was gathered by personally visiting the place to get the feel of the situation. Secondary sources on Kolhapur politics were very limited except for some news paper articles, and the booklets published by Samaj Prabodhini, Ichalkaranji, etc. But most of the information is gathered by discussing the politics with local politicians, journalists and academics who have done some work on Kolhapur politics, co-operatives, etc.
2. The historical references have been gathered from various authentic sources published in regional language by State Government and others.
3. The statistical information is collected from the District Statistical Information office. The information in compiled form was available only upto 1994-95, though the inavailability of the data for 1995-96 and 96-97 (current) is regretted, it is hoped that it will not make much difference as there is no drastic change in the social - economic life of the district in those two years.

## **CHAPTER - 4**

### **POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SHIV SENA IN KOLHAPUR**

It was the 1995 assembly elections that brought a non-Congress government to power in Maharashtra but 1990 assembly elections were the dress rehearsal of this actual change in the governance. Though in 1990 Congress government was restored back to power it was a slipping victory for the Congress. The Shiv Sena - BJP alliance had successfully challenged the hegemony of Congress in various parts of the State winning 94 seats and reducing the Congress tally to 141. It was only with the support of 13 independents that Congress leader Sharad Pawar could form the government. But even this success was of vital importance for the Congress at a time when there was an anti-Congress and anti-establishment wave throughout the country and Janata Dal government was ruling at the Centre. But one thing was clear from these elections, Hindutva had got a wide support among the youth and the urban population in Maharashtra. Shiv Sena had crossed the boundaries of Mumbai and Konkan gaining electoral support in Marathwada and its electoral partner BJP had fared well in Vidarbha. To surprise many, the alliance had entered the Congress stronghold of Western Maharashtra winning 6 seats, BJP with 2 and Shiv Sena with 4. Though small in number the success in Western Maharashtra was considered significant as till 1990 Western Maharashtra was unbeaten Congress bastion. (see tables Maharashtra Assembly Election 1990 and 1995)

The purpose of this chapter is to closely examine the emergence of Shiv Sena in Kolhapur region and the various political developments that have helped the party to emerge as an important political force and a contender for power in a significant way. The chapter also attempts to answer the research questions posed at the end of the earlier chapter about Sena's ideological hold over the masses in Kolhapur region, its social base, its local leadership and issues regarding its political strategy to expand its base

#### 14. Maharashtra 1990 Assembly Elections :

	W.MH	Vidarbha	Marathwada	North MH	Mumbai	Konkan	Total
Cong.	54	25	23	21	9	8	141
BJP	02	13	05	08	9	5	42
SS	04	09	11	02	15	11	52
JD	07	10	02	03		2	24
PWP	02	-	03	-		3	08
CPI (M)	01	-	-	01		1	03
CPI	-	01	01	-		-	02
CPI (M-ch)	-	01	-	-		-	02
CPI (A)	-	01	-	-		-	01
Muslim League	-	-	-	01	-	01	
Independents	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cong (Rebels)	05	06	01	01	-	-	01
<b>Total</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>288</b>

Source : Vohra Rajendra, Palshikar Suhas, (1996), "Maharashtratil Sattantar, Mumbai, Granthali, page 38.

#### 15. Assembly Elections 1995 : Number of seats won according <sup>to</sup> region

	Konkan & Mumbai	North MH	Vidarbha	Marathwada	West MH	Total
Cong.	4	10	17	12	37	80
BJP	18	10	22	9	6	65
SS	33	5	11	15	9	73
JD	1	3	2	2	3	11
PWP	3	-	-	2	1	3
CPI (M)	1	-	-	1	1	3
SP	3	-	-	-	-	3
SBP	-	1	1	-	-	2
Naga Vidarbha				-	-	
Andolan Samiti	-	-	1	-	-	1
MH Vikas Cong.	-	1	-	-	-	1
Independents	2	1	2	-	-	5
Cong. rebels	-	5	9	3	18	35
BJP (rebels)	-	-	1	1	-	2
Sena (rebles)	-	-	-	1	-	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>288</b>

Source : *Ibid*, page 65.

further. The chapter also draws attention towards the limitations Sena is facing in its policy of expansion.

## **ESTABLISHMENT OF SHIV SENA IN KOLHAPUR AND HINDUTVA WAVE IN THE 1980s**

It was the Ram Janambhumi agitation started by the RSS family which swept the country in the 1980s that gave Shiv Sena its present ideological plank the 'Hindutva'. Though Sena officially did not participate in the agitation in its initial years (Sena joined the agitation only in 1991),<sup>1</sup> it indirectly supported the agitation to use it for its advantage. 'Hindutva' gave Sena a new lease of life and Sena returned to the political centre-stage with a vengeance. The 1985 electoral victory in Bruhan Mumbai Municipal corporation rejuvenated the party leadership and ended the political exile of Sena in the post emergency period. The 1984 Hindu - Muslim riots in Mumbai and Bhivandi did help Sena to regain its popularity in Mumbai and Konkan regions. But Sena leadership was no longer contented with its success in Mumbai, alone. It appeared that it was making an organised effort to spread itself throughout Maharashtra including the rural areas of the State. Sena realised its strength outside Mumbai for the first time when its candidate was elected as the mayor of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation in 1988. The decision of Sena leadership to go statewide which was taken in the Mahad session (near Raigarh) in 1985 had started yielding results.<sup>2</sup> Now Sena shakhas appeared not only in cities, but also in small towns and villages. Besides the main issue of Hindutva, it was through local leadership and local issues that Sena succeeded in getting an entry in the rural areas. For each of its constituency it had a relevant issue to garner its support. All issues like assertative Hindutva, anti-Muslim and anti-Dalit stand combined with anti-establishment stand and opposition to Congress helped the Sena to wider its domain.

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1. Vohra Rajendra, Palshikar Suhas, (1996), *Maharashtratil Sattantar*, Mumbai, Granthali, page 15.

2. Daryapurkar Rajesh, (1990), Senapati, Nagpur, Abhijit.



It would be wrong to consider that Shiv Sena was the first and only organisation who tried to mobilise the support of the rural youth on the ideology of Hindutva. Various other organisations like Patit Pavan Sanghna, Bahujan Yuva and Hindu Ekta Andolan were functioning in rural Maharashtra in the 1980s based on the same ideology. These organisations denounced the caste system and hence attracted the youth belonging to non-Brahmins, non-elite Marathas and other backward castes. They were equally aggressive and freely used their 'muscle power' against their enemy, the Muslims and the Dalits. Small issues in any corner of the State or even in any part of the country which these organisations considered as pro-Muslim or minority appeasement were enough reason to start a riot. But in spite of these efforts, these neo-Hindutva organisations remained highly localised both in terms of their leadership and mass appeal. Their Hindutva was known as neo-Hindutva for the very reason that it was different than the traditional RSS Hindutva ideology.<sup>3</sup> For the first time in Maharashtra this kind of aggressive Hindutva was being propagated and it was receiving massive support from the rural youth.

Patit Pavan was confined only to Pune-Ahmednagar districts while Bahujan Yuva was quite popular in Aurangabad and Nashik and in the southern Maharashtra it was the Hindu Ekta Andolan which had a considerable following. In Kolhapur - Sangli districts, the unorganised and disoriented youth was attracted towards Hindu Ekta in large numbers. The presence of Arab Muslims in Sangli-Miraj areas, their links with illegitimate activities and some sporadic incidents of conversion of Devsasis and others from the backward community to Christianity were used by the leadership to mobilise the support of the youth on Hindutva lines. These local instances helped Hindu Ekta to gain wide popularity. Another cause which is attributed to the strength of Hindu Ekta in Sangli - Kolhapur was the patronage it received from Vasantdada Patil to suppress his opponents in the local Congress unit. Vasantdada, who

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3. See, Vohra Rajendra and Palshikar Suhas, (1990), "New-Hindusm : A case of Distorted Consciousness," in Lele Jayant and Rajendra Vohra (eds), State and Society in India, Delhi, Chanakya, page 213-243.

was then the Chief Minister (Feb. 83 to June 85), had often viewed his local opponents as a threat to the stability of his government at the State. He often relied on the muscle power of Hindu Ekta to consolidate his base in his native district.<sup>4</sup>

It would not be wrong if one says, that the ground work was already created by these organisation unintentionally for Sena's entry in rural Maharashtra. With the charismatic leadership of Bal Thackeray, Sena could easily make a dent in rural Maharashtra. Thackeray had mooted the idea of forming a united Hindutva front in 1986 but the efforts to establish Hindu Maha Sangha did not materialise. Nonetheless all these attempts to mobilise people on the basis of Hindutva, helped Sena to consolidate its position in Maharashtra.

Shiv Sena was little known to the people of Kolhapur then. (i.e. before the 1980s). But the combined efforts of all these organisations brought the message of Hindutva to Kolhapur. A new leadership was trying to emerge at the Centre stage of local politics by using the platform of Shiv Sena. On May 6, 1986 Thackeray addressed a public meeting in Kolhapur city declaring the establishment of Party's Sena Unit in Kolhapur. Hypnotized by Thackeray's oratory and emotional appeal a huge crowd, especially the youth joined Sena *en masse*. It should be noted that the public meeting was organised on the very next day after the meeting of Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, demanding the inclusion of neighbouring Belgaum district into Maharashtra was held in Kolhapur. Suresh Salokhe a youth little known for his political leadership was appointed as the district chief (Zilha Pramukh). Very soon, a number of Shakhas were opened in other parts of the district. Today, the number has risen to 1250.<sup>5</sup> The issue of inclusion of Belgaum holds an emotional appeal for the people of Kolhapur, being a border district itself.

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4. Discussion with Vijay Kulkarni, District Chief, Shiv Sena, Kolhapur on political patronage Hindu Ekta received in Sangli-Kolhapur.

5. The factual information about Shiv Sena's establishment in Kolhapur was received from Shiv Sena's District office, Kolhapur.

## SENA'S SOCIAL BASE IN KOLHAPUR AND ITS LEADERSHIP

Sena's entry in Kolhapur politics served as a platform to all those who were in search of an alternative to effectively oppose the Congress domination in the district. As seen earlier it is the Congress which virtually dominates every aspect of political, social and economic life of the district. In recent years, there has been rising discontent against the existing Congress leadership in the district. The nepotism and corruption in the co-operatives and other areas of power have been resented by the non-elite younger generation, who is facing its consequences. It was only the powerful leadership at the State and Central level that had bound these various factions together under the umbrella of power. With the decline of Congress on national and state level, gaps started appearing at the district level, too. The contenders for power in the Congress were no longer satisfied with the mere promises of political office from the 'high command'. In Shiv Sena they found an alternative to serve their interests. This emerging trend was just a reflection of the on going activities at the State level.

The Congress in almost every Lok Sabha elections gave a dazzling performance. Even in the most difficult year 1977, the party could get as many as 20 Lok Sabha seats. Another bad year, 1989 gave the Congress 28 seats. In all other Lok Sabha elections the Congress could secure 37 to 42 seats out of 48. No wonder then, that when the other 'progressive' States like West Bengal and Kerala had succumbed to leftist fronts, the northern States to 'feudal' peasant parties and the States like Tamil Nadu to regional parties, Maharashtra retained the Congress culture with a vengeance.<sup>6</sup> The fissures started to develop in the party between 1975 to 1987 when the State changed its chief ministers like a cricket team suffering disaster shuffles its players. This almost bi-annual change in the leadership of the State considerably eroded political credibility of the Congress. The fissures in the Congress party gave rise to

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6. Ketkar Kumar, 'Shiv Sena's role after the elections will be interesting to watch, Economic Times, Mumbai, March 30, 1996.

many gaps. It is these gaps which are getting filled by the ranks and files of the Shiv Sena.

Another argument put forward by many, like Anant Dikshit, editor Kolhapur *Sakal*, is that the return of Sharad Pawar to Congress (I) in 1986, created a vacuum in Maharashtra's opposition parties, especially in the rural areas. Several groups had joined Pawar during his political separation from the mainfold of Congress in the years from 1975 to 1980. Pawar had united the opposition under the Progressive Democratic Front and had even acquired power in 1978-80. But with the change in the central leadership of Congress, Pawar preferred to return to Congress (I) and PDF lost its mass appeal. Some of the Pawar loyalists returned to Congress but there were others who preferred to stay in the opposition. Being in the opposition they wanted a strong and appealing leadership which was found in the charisma of Bal Thackeray and his Hindutva.

It was, not only the dissatisfied factions among the leadership which were getting increasingly attracted towards the Sena, but also the masses especially the youth, who were facing the problems of economic stagnation in rural areas, were drawn towards the Sena. In the last two decades, a number of institutions of higher education have been established in rural areas churning out hundreds of degree graduates. But with a very few employment opportunities being available, they are forced to take up low level jobs. As far as Kolhapur is concerned it has a network of educational institutions ranging from humanities to technical institutions but the arrested industrial development presents a dismal picture for the job seekers. Both the MIDC industrial estates in Kolhapur city lie highly underutilised in their potential for development. The situation in other towns in the district is not a very different. The entire district essentially remains agro-based. Agriculture also has its own fallouts. Fall in the sugarcane prices, increased rates for electricity, changes in the governments subsidy policy have all affected the agriculture adversely. Though Kolhapur district boasts about the well functioning and prosperous sugar co-operatives,

the constant production of sugarcane is adversely affecting the soil, increasing its salinity and making it unproductive. Agricultural experts say that if farmers are not cautioned against these effects at the right time there is every danger that the entire land under sugarcane cultivation in the district may turn infertile. With this alarming situation farmers are forced to turn their attention towards other sources of livelihood until they find an equally lucrative crop like the sugarcane.

Although, Shiv Sena does not have any constructive economic programme to fulfill the aspirations of the people at present, it holds a promise with its emotive and affirmative slogans. Hopes of the people are surrounded around Sena mainly because of its success in extending 'social service' network throughout Mumbai. In Mumbai, Sena's cadre works through Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samiti (SLS) to solve people's problems. People have hopes that even in the rural areas Sena will take the form of a 'social movement'<sup>7</sup> rather than being a mere political party interested in only electoral politics.<sup>8</sup> Shiv Sena could make a come back after its political exile in the 1980s only because, though politically inactive in those years, Sena's lower rung party cadre had kept its name alive through social service in Mumbai's lower and middle class area. This social service aspect greatly contributed in getting Sena the Marathi middle class constituency in Mumbai who preferred to overlook the use of muscle power, violence and use of vulgar language used by the Sena leadership.

A very important factor to Shiv Sena's 'instant' popularity in rural areas like Kolhapur is Sena Chief Bal Thackeray's, charisma and his 'no nonsense' attitude towards politics. The Sena chief is not particularly concerned about being 'politically correct' and is not bound by any ideological strings. He is

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7. For the discussion on Shiv Sena's 'social service network' and 'social movement' aspect see Heuze Gerard, (1995), "Cultural Populism : The appeal of the Shiv Sena," in Patel Sujata and Alice Thorner (eds), *Bombay-Metaphore for Modern India*, Mumbai, Oxford University Press.

8. This view about Sena extending its social service network in rural area came up in the discussion with Mr. Anand Kulkarni, a political journalist from Kolhapur.

able to express himself far more freely than any other political leader in the State. Most of the people particularly the intelligentsia, has already concluded that much of Bal Thackeray's ideological rhetoric is gibberish anyway. But no other leader is able to say it in so many words as Bal Thackeray does. It is his this style of functioning that has helped him to establish a direct rapport with the masses and with all those who have given up with wasteful polemics. To all such people who are overwhelmed by the existing political economic system in the country and are standing on the fringe of liberalised and modern industrial economy, Thackeray's loud language provides an identity. Thackeray, who knows this well, uses it to the fullest effect.

“And this is what attracted him towards Shiv Sena,” says Mr. Vijay Kulkarni, District chief of Shiv Sena. Being born in a middle class Brahmin family amongst the teachings of Gandhian non-violence and RSS type of Hindutva, unlike his family orientation, he was in search of an aggressive and militant ideological platform to give an expression to his ‘muscle power’.

Though, Mr. Kulkarni is popularly known as ‘Professor’ in the city, he is not a teacher by profession. After his short stint in Hindu Ekta in the 1980s, he joined Sena recently only to hold the responsibility of party ‘Zilha Pramukh’. There are many others who have joined the saffronisation cause owing to the charisma of Thackeray.

After the announcement of Shiv Sena's Kolhapur unit in 1986, Shakhas spread throughout the city of Kolhapur and in the other parts of the district, in its initial enthusiasum. Boards with Shiv Sena logo, the roaring ‘Tiger’ and the Sena Cheifs pictures and not to forget the slogans like ‘Jai Bhavani’, ‘Jai Maharashtra’ and ‘Garva Se Kaho Ki Hum Hindu hai’ appeared not only everywhere in the city but also in small villages of the district. The number of registered Shakhas in the district is at present 1250 and registered members are around 50,000.<sup>9</sup> To

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9. *Ibid*, 5

facilitate the communication between the Sena's leadership in Mumbai and the local leadership, Sena Chief appointed Suryakant Mahadik, who was then a corporator in BMC as the '*Samparka Neta*'. He was entrusted with the task of co-ordinating between the Sena's mainstream ideology and local issues to promote the organisational development of the party in the district. Sena leadership has considered Kolhapur district as an important area which is evident from the fact that its important leaders like Satish Pradhan, Vamanrao Mahadik, an MP were appointed as the '*Samparka Neta*' of the district in the next successive years. At present, Sharad Acharya is looking after the activities in Kolhapur. Besides the Samparka Neta and the district chief, the other important functionaries in the district are the District Organisar (Zilha Sanghatak), Taluka Chief, Divisional Chief, City Chief etc. At the lower hierarchical level it is the Shakha Pramukh who is responsible for the day-today functioning of the Shakha and the promotional work in that local area.

During the first few years, Sena organised various programmes like health camps, blood donation camps, agitations for political awareness, agitations for prohibition, environmental awareness etc. It also organised morchas against the poor water supply to the city, cleanliness drive etc. to mobilise supporters. Suresh Salokhe's leadership attracted the non-elite Marathas, other backward castes and huge crowds of unorganised and disoriented youth. Joining Sena gave them an identity and made them feel more self assured.

The leadership rank and file from other parties who joined Shiv Sena include Rambhau Chavan, a corporator in Kolhapur Municipal Corporation from Congress (I), B.R. Patil from Congress (S) who was Shiv Sena's leader in Kolhapur Zilha Parishad, Rambhau Phalke of the Congress resigned from the post of Mayor in 1990 to join Sena and was appointed as the district chief. It was during this period, the district was divided into two divisions, one division with 7 Talukas including the Kolhapur parliamentary constituency and other included 5 talukas in the Ichalkaranji constituency. Rambhau Phalke was appointed for the Kolhapur region, while Vikas Ugale was looking after the

Ichalkaranji part. But soon in 1992 Phalke returned to Congress and again the founding member Suresh Salokhe became the chief. But during all these days the party was more gripped with factionalism and had little time, energy and resources and not to mention the vital leadership to concentrate on effective measures for political mobilisation of the people.

## **ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE**

Electoral victory in 1990 State assembly elections where Sena won 2 out of the 12 assembly constituencies in Kolhapur district came as a shot in Sena's arm. The party organisation appeared to have spread in some parts of the district. Party's candidate Dilip Desai from Kolhapur city assembly constituency emerged victorious defeating his nearest Congress (I) rival Shankar Bhau Kharade by a margin of 7606 votes. Desai got 35, 889 votes, while Kharade got 28,282.<sup>10</sup> Shiv Sena's another successful candidate was from Shahuwadi assembly constituency. It was Babasaheb Y. Patil of Sena who defeated his Congress rival Sanjay Singh Gaikwad by a margin of 3889 votes in Shahuwadi.<sup>11</sup> Although, the margin of votes secured by the Sena candidates is not much impressive, what was important was that, it was for the first time in Kolhapur the party had succeeded in winning an election in just four years after its entry into the district politics. From the general analysis of 1990 elections, Shiv Sena's success in Kolhapur can be attributed to the internal factionalism within the Congress and the anti-establishment wave in the State rather than Shiv Sena's work in Kolhapur. But one must accept that Shiv Sena's campaign in 1990 assembly election (throughout the State) was highly organised and systematic. It was further intensified because of Sena's alliance with the BJP, preventing division of Hindu votes. Sena-BJP alliance had found the nerves of the people for electoral success. In May 1991 Lok Sabha elections Shiv Sena candidate, Ramchandra Phalke got second number of votes leaving behind the

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10. Shinde, Y.G., (1994), *Maharashtratil Vidhan Sabha Nivadnuka, EK Drushtikshep*, Pune, Chandan, page 84.

11. *Ibid*, page 82.



PWP's veteran leader Vishnupant Engavel on the 3rd number Though Congress candidate emerged victorious his number of votes were decreased. However, Sena's electoral victory in 1990 elections turned out to be a short lived one. Shiv Sena lost its twelve MLAs who defected to Congress with Chagan Bhujbal in December 1991. These twelve MLAs included two from Kolhapur. Shiv Sena lost a major chunk of its OBC (Other Backward Caste) vote bank with the defection of Bhujbal and 12 others who belonged to OBC sections from Vidarbha and Marathwada.

In 1992 Shiv Sena in an alliance with BJP contested the Zilha Parishad and Panchayat Samiti elections in the State including Kolhapur. These elections were considered important as it was after a gap of 13 years, after 1979, Local Self Government elections were being conducted in the State. Congress emerged victorious in all 29 Zilha Parishad asserting its commanding position in rural Maharashtra.<sup>12</sup> Shiv Sena's performance in Sindhudurg and Ratnagiri districts of Konkan regions was better than in other parts of the State. In Sindhudurg, Sena won 9 seats while in Ratnagiri 14, North Maharashtra 4, Western Maharashtra 2, Vidarbha 9 and Marathwada 8. The total number of Shiv Sena Zilha Parishad members all over Maharashtra could reach only 56.<sup>13</sup> Shiv Sena's performance in the Municipal elections held in the State around the same time was also quite poor. Though, Sena contested elections in various co-operatives, District co-operative Banks, market committees, its performance was not significant. From Kolhapur, now Sena had no representation in the assembly and the party organisation in the district. had become a symbol of lumpenisation.

During the five years of 1990 to 1995 Shiv Sena's political graph witnessed several ups and downs. One reason for party's inconsistency with success could be its little experience outside Mumbai. It was from two MLAs Sena had straight reached to the level of main opposition party in the legislature in 1990.

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12. Lok Satta, "Maharashtrat Congress Tikun Ka?" Diwali edition, 1993, page 62.

13. *Ibid.*

It was trying to get adjusted to its newly acquired status of a regional force from a nativist movement.

Though, Congress could not secure 2/3 majority in 1990 assembly elections, the next two and half years till 1992 Sharad Pawar's able efforts helped the Congress to regain its lost confidence among the votes. The break away factions from the Janata Dal (9 MLAs) and the Shiv Sena (12 MLAs) joined Congress in July and December 1991 respectively. Congress success in the local self government elections held in February 1992, reassured it the support of 'rural' voters. Congress appeared to be recovering from its loss. In the 1991 mid-term polls to the Lok Sabha, Congress succeeded in winning 38 out of 48 seats to the Lok Sabha from Maharashtra. It had recaptured its seats from the Janata Dal and the BJP.

#### 16. Lok Sabha results : A Comparison

Political Parties	9th Lok Sabha (1989)	10th Lok Sabha (1991)
Congress (I)	28	38
BJP	10	05
Shiv Sena	04	04
Janata Dal	05	00
CPI	01	00
CPI (M)	00	01
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>48</b>

Source : PTI Reports.

The demolition of Babri mosque on Dec 6, 1992 and the Hindu-Muslim riots that followed the tragic event came as a turning point for the Hindutva combine. The Congress which claimed to have checkmated the forward march of Hindutva was living in an illusion. Every important political event that took place afterwards had its mark. Politics after that was never the same. For the Sena, the post-Ayodhya riots in Mumbai provided it with the perfect opportunity to re-establish its credentials as the flag-bearer of the militant Hinduism. With the Muslims being targeted as the 'enemy' the Sena assumed the role as the

“protector” of the Hindus.<sup>14</sup> Even if, members from the minority community might have resorted to violent acts as an angry response to the demolition of the mosque, the Shiv Sena's counter - reaction was even more bloody.<sup>15</sup> The front page editorial in the party mouth piece, “Samna”, on January 8, 1993 was headlined : “The Nation Must Be kept Alive.” The tone and the language confirmed that instead of feeling guilty of causing such mayhem, the Sena leaders were taking pride in their aggressive postures.

The tragedy is that during the riots, it was not just the hardened Shiv Sainik who was carried away by the bombast, but even Mumbai's educated middle-class which began to see merit in Thakeray's argument. The collapse of the State machinery and the tendency of the State government to treat Thackeray with kid-gloves not only compromised public faith in the law and order machinery, but also placed the Sena Chief on a pedestal as far as his followers were concerned. They seem to be convinced that their leader is an extra-constitutional authority whose writ cannot be challenged in any way by the conventional instruments of the State.<sup>16</sup>

Mumbai riots had its repercussions in other parts of the Maharashtra, too. There were riots in Ahmednagar, Patherdy, Solapur, Kolhapur, Nashik, Malegaon, Aurangabad, Bid, Parali, Parbhani, Kandhar, Latur, Usmanabad, Jalna, Partur, Akola, Akot, Buldhana, Malkapur, Kamathi and Nagpur.<sup>17</sup> Though the nature of the riots in all these places differed, it underlined once again the animosity against the minority community among the majoritarian Hindus. While Shiv Sena was looked upon as the ‘protector’ of the Hindus, the Congress lost its minority support and Hindu votes as well. Pawar's efforts to regain the confidence of the people after his return as the Chief Minister on

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14. Sardesai Rajdeep, (1995), “Marathi Chauvinism and Hindu Communalism” , in Thakkar Usha and Kulkarni Mangesh (eds), Politics in Maharashtra, Mumbai, Himalaya, page 140.

15. For a graphic account of the Sena's role in the 1992-93 Bombay riots see when Bombay Burned (Reports and comments on the riots and blasts by The Times Of India, UBS, 1993).

16. Cases have been filed against Thackeray and his news paper 'Samna' under the Indian Penal Code, but nothing has materialised so far, says Rajdeep Sardesai.

17. Maharashtra Times, Dec 17, 1992.

March 12, 1993, did not yield much results. The March 1995 assembly elections were held on this background. Congress was surrounded by internal problems of factionalism and leadership crisis. Sena - BJP alliance appeared to be more organised than ever before and the Congress rebels helped these parties further to defeat the official Congress candidates.

“If Sena could recapture its Kolhapur seat from the defected Shiv Sena member, it was mainly because of the internal factionalism in the Congress”, local Congress leaders argued. But the Congress argument did not have much substance to explain the increase in Shiv Sena votes in Kolhapur. There was a significant rise in the votes Shiv Sena candidate, Suresh Salokhe received and the margin with which he defeated the PWP rival. In 1990 election the margin between Sena and Congress was just 7,000 votes; but in 1995 elections it went up to 32,000 and Congress was pushed behind on the third number with PWP getting the second number of votes. Shiv Sena could not recover its another seat at Shahuwadi, it was won by Congress rebel and independent candidate Sanjaysingh Gaikwad. But in another constituency in Wadgaon (reserved for Scheduled castes) Shiv Sena candidate received second number of votes and lost the seat only by a margin of 3,085 votes.

Though, Sena could not fare equally well in the remaining constituencies in the district, its presence was noticed once again. It had consolidated its position in the city constituency of Kolhapur and had also succeeded in gaining ground in backward areas of the district like Wadgaon. In the May 1996 Lok Sabha elections Shiv Sena chose to file the famous Marathi actor Ramesh Dev from Kolhapur. Dev, though a native of Kolhapur, does not live there anymore and has no experience of politics. The cinematic memories of Dev are over, since his career as a hero in films was over some two decades ago. In spite of these disadvantages he secured 1,68,414 votes, 93,000 more votes than what Sena candidate had secured in 1991. Shiv Sena candidate fared well in Kolhapur, Karvir, Kagal, Gadhinglaj, Chandgarh assembly segments of the Kolhapur parliamentary constituency. (see the table).

## 17. Lok Sabha Elections : Kolhapur Parliamentary Constituency.

Political Parties	YEAR					
	1977	1980	1984	1989	1991	1996
Congress I	1,85,912	2,45,757	2,77,303	2,74,676	2,69,508	2,36,739
PWP	1,86,077	91,314	1,28,169	2,33,548	58,273	1,17,163
Shiv Sena	-	-	-	-	75,177	1,68,414

Source : *Lok Sabha Nivadnuk purvpithika, 1996*

Shiv Sena's performance in assembly elections in 1995 and parliamentary elections in 1996 indicate significant increase in its popular percentage of vote, though it did not succeed in winning the parliamentary seat.

Meanwhile, the success in the 1995 assembly elections, which installed the BJP - Sena government in the State, boosted the morale of the party leadership and the party workers at the local level. Both the parties decided to contest the Municipal corporations elections separately on their party symbols. Kolhapur Municipal Corporation went for polls in October 1995. The 72 member KMC is virtually dominated by Congress since its formation in 1972. But the party has never contested elections on party symbol, nominating official party candidates. The candidates though active in politics as Congress supporters contest the elections as independents or forming local fronts. The locals groups use these elections to judge their own support base and their leaders look at it as a first step to enter the State and national level politics. It was the decision of Sena and BJP to officially contest elections on party symbols that brought the political parties into the fray of local politics. Shiv Sena being the winner in Kolhapur constituency in assembly elections, considered these election as a prestige issue. Though, party leadership campaigned rigorously, Sena could win only 11 seats while BJP was on 6.<sup>18</sup> The inability of the Sena to sweep the polls clearly indicates lack of lower level party cadre. The party argued that it was the loser,

18. From the reports of local newspaper in Kolhapur viz. Pudhari and Sakal, Oct 1995.

mainly due to the factionalism and division of Hindu votes as both the BJP, Sena fought the elections separately.

## **SENA IN RURAL MAHARASHTRA AFTER 2 YEARS IN POLITICAL OFFICE**

Maharashtra experienced a 'Mini General Election' when the State went for polls for the 9 municipal corporations and the 29 Zilha Parishads (ZP) in February and March 1997. The alliance succeeded in winning a clear majority in six corporations and a land slide victory in BMC (Braham Mumbai Municipal Corporation) came as a shot in Sena's arm. But these results did not come as a surprise considering the urban support to the alliance. But what surprised many were results of 29 Zilha parishads. The Shiv Sena - BJP for the first time had open its account outside the urban network from which it has been driving its political substance uptill now. Although, the alliance partners succeeded in winning only 4 ZPs, it was clear that the Congress has lost its earlier monopolistic position in rural Maharashtra. Congress won a majority in 14 ZPs while in rest 11 ZPs, it is the independents who are in a commanding position, as no party has won a clear majority. With a change in the rules, the party in power could engineer defections at a later stage and snatch away a couple of weak ZPs from the Congress which is the real fear of the Congress. Congress performed well in Western Maharashtra and got a clear majority in Pune, Satara, Sangli and Kolhapur. Shiv Sena - BJP have fared well in Konkan, Maharashtra and Vidarbha.

### **18. Political Institutions -- Local Bodies**

<b>As on 31.3.1986</b>	<b>Local Body</b>
11	No. of Municipal Corporations
216	No. of Municipal Councils
29	No. of Zilha parishads
298	No. of Panchayat Samitis
26,688 *	No. of Gram Panchayats
7	No. of Cantonment Board

\* Provisional

**Source :** Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai.

### 19. Position of Political Parties : Zilha Parishad Elections 1997.

District	Total	Cong.	BJP	Sena	CPI	CPI (M)	JD	RPI	Independents	SKP	BSP	Local Front	SP	Samata Party	Others
Thane	64/64	33	06	17	--	06	01	--	01	--	--	--	--	--	--
Raigad	59/59	23	--	16	--	--	--	--	02	18	--	--	--	--	--
Ratnagiri	58/58	07	07	37	--	--	01	--	06	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sindhudurg	50/50	15	05	25	--	--	05	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nashik	71/71	34	05	15	--	01	01	--	08	--	--	07	--	--	--
Dhule	64/64	45	06	--	--	--	01	--	12	--	--	--	--	--	--
Jalgaon	68/68	32	18	14	--	--	02	--	02	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ahmednagar	74/74	40	11	03	01	--	--	--	08	--	--	11	--	--	--
Pune	74/75	51	02	08	--	--	03	--	09	--	--	--	--	--	01
Satara	66/66	44	--	03	--	--	--	--	06	--	--	--	13	--	--
Sangli	61/61	40	--	01	--	01	02	--	--	--	--	17	--	--	--
Kolhapur	67/67	41	--	--	--	--	03	--	09	--	--	14	--	--	--
Solapur	66/66	39	03	05	--	--	--	--	11	08	--	--	--	--	--
Usmanabad	54/54	43	02	06	--	--	--	--	03	--	--	--	--	--	--
Latur	58/58	37	13	02	--	--	04	--	02	--	--	--	--	--	--
Aurangabad	58/58	28	11	11	--	--	--	--	05	--	--	--	--	--	03
Nanded	62/62	27	07	12	--	--	02	--	14	--	--	--	--	--	--
Parbhani	60/60	30	04	18	--	--	--	01	05	02	--	--	--	--	--
Beed	59/59	26	12	05	--	--	--	--	16	--	--	--	--	--	--
Jalna	55/55	20	11	12	--	--	--	--	07	--	--	05	--	--	--
Akola	59/59	22	05	10	--	--	01	07	06	01	06	--	01	--	--
Amravati	58/58	26	07	05	01	--	01	07	05	--	01	04	01	--	--
Yavatmal	61/61	33	06	03	--	--	04	02	13	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nagpur	57/57	10	19	04	--	--	01	01	22	--	--	--	--	--	--
Vardha	51/51	17	09	06	--	--	--	02	02	--	--	15	--	--	--
Buldhana	58/58	31	07	10	--	--	--	04	06	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bhandara	62/62	27	30	03	--	--	--	--	02	--	--	--	--	--	--
Chandrapur	57/57	22	16	03	--	--	01	03	08	--	--	04	--	--	--
Gadchiroli	47/50	15	--	09	--	--	01	--	12	--	--	10	--	--	--

Source : Lok Satta, March 6, 1997.

## 20. Zilha Parishad - Presidents and Vice-presidents

According to political parties - March 1997

<i>District</i>	<i>President</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vice President</i>	<i>Party</i>
Thane	Mrs. Manik Patil	Congress	Vittal Bhere	Congress
Raigad	Vitthal Lohakare	Cong	Narayan Thakur	Congress
Ratnagiri	Uday Khandke	Shiv Sena	Subhash Bane	Shiv Sena
Sindhudurg	Rajan Teli	Shiv Sena	Madhav Bhandari	BJP
Nashik	Pandurang Raut	Shiv Sena	Vishwas Devare	BJP
Dhule	Chandrakant Raghuwanshi	Congress	Subhash Devare	Congress
Jalgaon	Yashwant Mahajan	BJP	Babasaheb Pawar	Shiv Sena
Ahmednagar	Yogita Dhere	Congress	Vipin Kolhe	Congress
Pune	Mrs. Yogita Rajendra Kokre	Congress	Vitthal Gosavi	Congress
Satara	Shivajirao Mahadik	Congress	Chandrakant Jadhav	Congress
Sangli	Mohanrao Kadam	Congress	Vishwasrao Patil	Congress
Solapur	Baburao Jadhav	Congress	Baliram Sathe	Congress
Kolhapur	Mrs. Mandatai Pol	Congress	Sadhashiv Swami	Congress
Aurangbad	Mrs. Abhayabai Kaluse	Congress	Babasaheb Patil	Congress
Jalna	Aniruddha Khotkar	Shiv Sena	Babasaheb Akat	Local Front
Beed	Pandit Munde	BJP	--	
Nanded	Sambhaji Mandgikar	Congress	Pratap Chinlikar	Congress
Usmanabad	Babasaheb Patil	Congress	Ulhas Borgaokar	Congress
Latur	Mrs. Sohra Mirzabegam	Congress	Mrs. Jayashree Patil	Congress
Parbhani	Uttamrao Kachchane	Congress	Prabhakar Rohinkar	Congress
Amravati	Mrs. Usha Methekar	Congress	Haribhau Mohod	Congress
Buldhana	Mrs. Janabai Savde	Congress	Bhaskarrao Mali	Congress
Yawatmal	Mrs. Shubhatai Engote	Congress	Anilbhau Embadwar	Congress
Akola	Mrs. Shobhatai Gawande	Congress	Shrawan Engale	RPI
Nagpur	Mrs. Ratnamala Patil	Shiv Sena	Bandopatn Umarkar	Independent
Vardha	Shashank Godmare	Local Front	Suresh Waghmare	BJP
Bhandara	Shishupar Patke	BJP	Naresh Kumar Bhaleswari	Congress
Chandrapur	Maruti Parchake	BJP	Sanjay Ghote	Shetkari Sanghatna
Gadchiroli	Harish Mane	Shiv Sena	Tulshiram Patil	Congress

Source : Lok Satta, March 6, 1997.



In Kolhapur out of the 67 Zilha Parishad seats Congress won 41 while BJP-Sena could not even open their account, JD received 3, independents 9 and the local front 14.<sup>19</sup> These election results clearly indicate that though the Congress has lost power in the State, it is still in commanding position in Western Maharashtra. Besides Congress, it is the local front and the independents who are in a position to bargain for power. Sena has gathered a considerable support in the rural areas of Konkan, Marathwada and Vidarbha yet the Congress also has a considerable support base in the rural areas of these regions. Displacing the Congress completely from rural areas is a difficult task before the Shiv Sena in the years to come.

It may not be appropriate to judge the expansion of Sena or for that matter any other political party merely on the ground of its electoral performance at any level, be it local, State or national. But one cannot deny that electoral results do reflect the changing political trends and it is only through elections people can bring change in the governance. The electoral preferences of people certainly indicate their choices for a particular ideology and electoral success in turn gives legitimacy to the winning ideology. From the description of the political developments in Kolhapur it is clear that the Sena is trying to mobilise resources to challenge the Congress hegemony in the district. Its Hindu identity has helped it to spread itself into rural Maharashtra. But its attempts to consolidate its existing base and expand it further have met with several limitations. Unless we review the limitations on Sena to expand, we cannot make a judgement on its existing political nature in the region.

### **LIMITATIONS ON SENA'S EXPANSION AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THEM**

Firstly, limitations of Shiv Sena to expand in Kolhapur in particular or in rural Maharashtra in general are closely linked with the nature of Congress politics

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19. "Zilha Parishad Antim Nivadnuk Nikal", Lok Satta, March 6, 1997.

in Maharashtra. The flexible alliance and politics of accommodation followed by the Congress has meant that the space for an alternative formation has remained restricted. The sugar co-operative network, in particularly of Western Maharashtra has remained a traditional Congress constituency. The enlightened leadership of Y.B. Chavan and others in Congress consciously used the network of co-operatives to co-opt various interests groups. Congress leadership came from the traditional agricultural background and could easily establish a rapport with the rural masses. It was, through this rapport, Congress controlled the economy and polity of rural Maharashtra. On the other hand, the Shiv Sena is totally cut off from the traditional and non-traditional productive processes - cotton farming, sugarcane and sugar co-operatives. All important leaders of Sena come from Mumbai and have no experience of what agriculture is all about. While campaigning against the Shiv Sena - BJP, former Chief Minister and the Congress leader Sharad Pawar had emphasised the point as to how ignorant are these (Sena-BJP) leaders about agriculture. It is these agricultural connections that have given Congress an edge over the other parties so far. If one reviews the elections right from 1957, it appears that the limited support for the oppositon came only in the urban areas and Congress dominated the rural areas.<sup>20</sup>

Sena's success lies in dividing people on linguistic, regional and religious lines. In a place like Kolhapur where 87% of the population is Hindu and minorities consists of only 6% Muslims, 4% Jains, 1% Buddhists and only 0.6% Christains,<sup>21</sup> Sena has limitations in exploiting the majoritarian community's sentiments on the basis of 'minority appeasement'. In such areas Shiv Sena needs to have concrete economic proposals to capture the political power. And Sena has already started working on those lines. Power in the State has helped Sena enormously in this regard. The major policy decisions regarding the Zilha Parishad and the sugar co-operatives are an attempt to hit the Congress base

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20. Phadke, Y.D., (1982), "*Rajkarnache Badalte Rangroop*" in Mungerkar, S.G. (ed), *Parivartanache Pravah*, 1932-1981, Pune, Continental, page, 13, 14, 17.

21. "*Zilha Samajik ani Arthik Samalochan, Kolhapur district, 1994-95*". Social and economic review, Kolhapur district, 1994-95 (Marathi), Economic and statistical administration, Maharashtra State, Mumbai.

in the rural areas. To attract the Congress rebels and independents, the Sena-BJP government changed the Zilha Parishad, Panchayat Samiti rules eg., no confidence motion can be passed by simple majority, etc. similarly to suppress the sugar barons it adopted a hard stand in conducting elections to the sugar co-operatives.

The Sena-BJP government is also enthusiastic to follow up complaints of irregularities lodged by members of co-operatives. It is also trying to woo powerful groups that have been denied support by successive Congress governments, to expedite their applications for sugar factories. The Sena-BJP government has made it clear that it will not be supporting Congress applicants, for new sugar factories. The Sena-BJP government successfully captured the Congress controlled Chandrabhaga Sugar Factory in Solapur. The chairman and board of directors of Kadva Sugar Factory in Nashik district have also joined the Shiv Sena. The deputy Chief Minister Gopinath Munde has a keen interest in the Ambejogai factory in Beed district. Recently, Radhakrishna Vikhe Patil of the Pravaranagar Sugar Factory in Ahmednagar district joined Shiv Sena and was immediately allotted the State agriculture ministry in the State cabinet. None the less, the alliance will find it tough to make inroads into the sugar Co-operatives which are better administered, zealously managed and controlled by the Congress leaders in the Southern, Central and Western districts of the State.

The small and middle level farmers are not concerned with the ideology but with the money, they get for their produce. The Jawahar Sugar Factory, in Ichalkaranji controlled by Congress MP, Kallappa Avade, though the factory is just three years old is giving good price for the sugarcane, which is around Rs. 200 more than the previous factory. The farmer is obviously delighted. It is increasingly becoming difficult for the State government to ignore the demand of higher price for the sugarcane anymore, while the factories are growing with excess sugar, the State government blames the Centre for not increasing the export quota.

The government has also started giving permissions to establish various co-operative projects initiated by its own leaders in the rural areas. In Kolhapur, the Shiv Sena district Chief Vijay Kulkarni, informed that since the installation of the new government at least, hundred co-operative projects have been given the permission and also financial assistance. These projects include milk co-operatives, sale - purchase unions, spinning mills, co-operative credit societies etc. How far Sena will be successful in following the Congress pattern, will be known only when these projects take off!

Recently launched Raj Thackeray's 'Shiv Udyog Sena' an employment exchange scheme to provide material, financial assistance to the educated unemployed has induced some enthusiasm among the younger generation. But caught among several controversies the programme will take a long time before it reaches the interiors of rural Maharashtra.

The government is using the posts at various State corporations to attract local leaders. These positions of power have indeed proved to be useful in creating a base 'from above' in the Shiv Sena - BJP government. The appointments of Pundalik Jadhav and Subhash Vohra from Kolhapur region to Textile Corporation and State Transport Corporation respectively, who till recently, were known to be close to the Congress circles only underlines the Sena-BJP's above stated policy.

Not only there is a struggle to acquire posts in the government, but the posts in the Shiv Sena's local party unit have also acquired sudden significance. There has been intense power struggle within the Sena to acquire these party posts. The district was divided into two divisions of 5 and 7 talukas each, appointing two district chiefs and other party functionaries, for each division. The reason put forward by the leadership was that it was difficult for one person to manage the affairs of the entire district considering its vastness. But the real cause lied somewhere else. By dividing the district, the State leadership of the party could satisfy the different warring factions in the

district. One faction belongs to those who have crossed over from the Congress and the others are formerly Hindu Ekta activists. It should be noted that the organisations like Hindu Ekta merged with Sena after its establishment in the district.

Local factionalism and intense power struggle among the various leaders have sometimes taken even a violent form, distancing the party from middle class and the intellectuals. That has also prevented the party to create a mass base and cadre base for itself in Kolhapur region. Sena boasts of having more than hundred Shakhas in the Kolhapur city alone, but very few of them operate effectively and function regularly. Their presence is felt only on some occasional celebrations of Shiv - Jayanti and Ganesh Festival. Sena does not have a rank and file of Shiv Sainiks working regularly for the party carrying its name from door to door. In Mumbai, in 1970s and 1980s, 'joining the Shiv Sena' remained an important and emotional act, very different from other political commitments. "Each Shiv Sainik undertook some 'social service' and cultural activity before being integrated in the organisation," says Gerard Heuze, the French Labour sociologist.<sup>22</sup> The political commitment and emotional act of being an integral part of the party organisation is lacking, according to several local political observers. But some of the local Sena leaders like its seating MLA, Suresh Salokhe appear to be more than dedicated. He is working with the Sena since its establishment in 1986. The welfare programmes initiated by the likes like Salokhe and others are often sold as party's policies and programmes, especially at the time of elections.

Shiv Sena's local leadership in Kolhapur also lacks a firm stand on several local issues and a commitment to solve the problems of the local people. Sena's leadership is divided on the issues, like, which water supply project to be implemented for the city of Kolhapur, viz. Shingnapur or Kalambawadi. As the fate of the water supply project keeps hanging, people suffer in silence.

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22. Heuze Gerard, (1995), *Ibid*, 7.

Another issue, where Sena's urban i.e. the city and the rural leadership appear to be divided, is the issue of inclusion of another forty villages under the authority of the Kolhapur Municipal Corporation. While the urban leadership supports the inclusion, to please its urban voter, the rural population strongly opposes the inclusion fearing hike in taxation.

Several other issues, such as developing Kolhapur as a tourist Centre and promotion of trade and commerce have received a back seat since the election days are over, complained many citizens.

Shiv Sena's attempt to turn the Congress heavy weights in the district on its side have yet to yield much results, for two reasons, the Congress leaders are not yet certain about the stability and actual strength of the ruling alliance and secondly, Congress rebels who contested and won the elections as independents preferred to support the Hindutva combine from outside, the safest way to hold on to power. Supporting the government from outside helps them to make the government depend on them, thus increasing their bargaining power.

## **ROLE OF MEDIA**

Kolhapur's local media has always been seen as pro-Congress. With literacy rate of 67%, people are politically aware and are interested in political developments, particularly the local ones. The widely circulated daily newspapers in the district are Pudhari, Sakal (Kolhapur), Kesri, Tarun Bharat (Kolhapur), Satyawadi. Maharashtra Times and Loksatta, the well known Marathi newspapers of Times and Express groups have a selective and limited readership. The same is applicable to English dailies. The choice of the newspapers indicates interests of the people in local affairs than political debates on national and international subjects. The local dailies have also played an important role in forming a public opinion. The following box indicates the local newspapers and their ideological inclination. This is my observation through personal readings and opinions of local readers.

Pudhari	Congress (anti - Sharad Pawar)
Sakal	Congress (Pro-Pawar)
Tarun Bharat	BJP - RSS
Satyawadi	Congress (Neutral)
Kesri	Congress (Neutral)
Samna	Shiv Sena

At the local level, Sena has succeeded in winning over the popular Marathi daily 'Pudhari'. This newspaper has the largest circulation in Kolhapur district. Though, 'Pudhari' is traditionally considered as the pro-Congress newspaper, it belonged to the anti-Pawar camp. The present owner, editor of Pudhari, Pratap Singh Jadhav, is known to be close to the Thackerays. During the 1995 elections Pudhari carried a rigorous anti-Pawar campaign and systematically helped, the Sena in 'image building.'

Shiv Sena's mouthpiece Samna which started its deccan edition in 1995, has also picked up its circulation since then. Through 'Samna' Sena intends to create an ideological following among the people.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have, thus, scanned through Shiv Sena's political developments in the district, viz. Sena's emergence, its expansion in the following years, (from mid 1980s to 1995-97). In the 1980s Sena was struggling to become the main opposition party in the state, in early 1990s it succeeded in achieving its target and in 1995 it became the dominant partner in the ruling alliance, but even today, it faces the task of expanding its base in rural Western Maharashtra. The Shiv Sena's hopes about its expansion lie in the fact that the alliance government has survived two years in office in spite of several controversies and internal problems and the Congress shows no signs of having learnt a lesson from its past defeat.

## CHAPTER - 5

### CONCLUSION

#### SUMMARY FINDINGS

Three decades ago, when the Shiv Sena was formed in October 1966, Bal Thackeray could not have possibly imagined that it would rule Maharashtra one day. From a party whose sole reason for existence was to push an exclusivist agenda, it has become the ruling party of the most industrialised and progressive State in the country. Its *raison d'être* is no longer the advocacy of the preferential rights of the 'sons of the soil' but it is now propagating the virtues of Hindutva that have helped it to gain a wider mileage in the rural constituencies of the State. In the recent Zilha Parishad (ZP) and Panchayati Raj elections, the BJP - Sena alliance has made inroads in the rural areas. Now it will be easier for them to understand the socio-political situation in rural areas in a better manner and they can also use the levers of economic power through the ZP and Panchayat Machinery.

This Study has presented an analysis of the expansionist strategy of the Shiv Sena in Western Maharashtra, which until recently was a stronghold of Congress. We have observed, in the Introduction that the rise of the Hindu right in India and its phenomenal success in the country in the recent years is due to the anomalies of India's political economy and her secular nationalism. The failure of the Congress to reflect the aspirations of the people and material deprivation of the many combined with cultural degradation of the society have given rise to the popular eruptions like the Sena. The decline and degeneration of Congress and its secular credentials have benefited the rightist Hindutva forces to march ahead. The Hindutva forces which have organised themselves over the years have emerged as an alternative to the degenerating Congress and disoriented Third Force. The Introduction also attempted to contextualise the emergence of the Shiv Sena in the wider Indian context.



In the Second Chapter, we have explored the political journey of the Shiv Sena during the last 30 years and its changing profile. The Shiv Sena's appeal does not seem to lie in a coherent ideology and programme of political action. Though, its agenda tends to change, it seems to be clear about its enemies -- these being the communists and the secularists. Its success rests on its emotive appeals which evoke the nostalgic image of Shivaji and Bal Thackeray's ability to control and release the muscle power of angry mobs. Sena leadership has used a variety of tactics such as coercion and intimidation to build an aggressive and militant image.

Remained confined to Mumbai, Thane and Konkan regions for almost two decades after its emergence, Sena has gone beyond its traditional constituencies in recent years. With the Study of Kolhapur district of Western Maharashtra, we have tried to examine the reasons behind the rise of Shiv Sena in rural Western Maharashtra in general and Kolhapur in particular. Shiv Sena's decision to enter the rural scene by espousing the cause of the non-elite Maratha, non-Buddhist and non-Muslim youth in small towns and villages gave it a cutting edge. It attracted many of the disenfranchised and side tracked Maratha youth as well.

The Third Chapter, which is a vivid description of Kolhapur's historical socio-economic and political background, clearly shows the gaps left by the Congress decline and the fissures in the political economy of the district are being filled by the rank and file of the Shiv Sena.

The political development of the Shiv Sena in Kolhapur, discussed in Chapter four, underlines the increasing deprivation, unemployment and marginalisation of the people in the district. Without any concrete economic proposals Sena has made a dent in the rural Maharashtra. The revivalist slogans and militant postures against its enemies have helped Sena to attract the disgruntled lot.

In Kolhapur, the rise and popularity of the Sena is a result of the lack of political opportunities for the many in the existing Congress System. The co-operatives which were turned into 'private empires' of the sugar barons could no longer hold the various sections of the society together. Rampant irregularities, corruption, nepotism and the exploitation of the less-empowered have distanced the Congress from a vast majority. Congress which was on the commanding heights of the rural agricultural economy has proved incapable of facing the challenges of increasing urbanisation in the State. During the last decade with the liberalisation of economy, the private enterprises are on the rise and the co-operative movement which was the basis of Western Maharashtra's agricultural economy has come to an halt. Though, regions like Kolhapur in Western Maharashtra, have yet to reach the stage of complete urbanisation, they are influenced by this on going process in other parts of the State and can be called as semi-urban. Though parties like Shiv Sena-BJP have been branded as urban biased, in the 1980s they have worked consistently on the issues related to agriculture and more importantly the ideology of Hindutva helped them to capture the Congress base in rural Maharashtra. On the other hand Congress never consolidated its base in the urban areas and before it could realise, it had lost its rural base, too. Sena emerged as a platform for those, whom the Congress system was unable to accommodate and provide opportunities for the political office.

The rejection of Congress in its traditional strongholds of rural Maharashtra highlights the fact that the 50 years of Independence have brought political awareness in those who were considered a ploy in the hands of manipulative politicians. But this awareness has done very little to get them (the people) out of their deep rooted traditions, they are clinging on to their religion, caste, sub-caste as ever before. In fact the newly emerged political elite has thrived on these cleavages. The retreat of secular forces from the political arena is so sharp, that even in the remote areas like Kolhapur, it is quite visible. The division of votes between Congress and the PWP has paved the way for Shiv Sena in Kolhapur.

Shiv Sena's expansion in Kolhapur has faced with several limitations. These limitations arise mainly from two factors : Sena has no control over the local economy and in areas like Kolhapur the 'enemies' are not as easily available as they are in a metropolis like Mumbai.

For political parties to succeed and sustain in competitive politics, material resources are vital. Congress succeeded in Maharashtra's politics for almost 35 years, only because it could create a network of co-operatives, educational institutions and Panchayati Raj. Though, Congress' commanding position in these areas is slipping away, Shiv Sena has not yet succeeded in creating a parallel local base for itself in rural areas. It is interested in displacing Congress from its base by using the power in the State. It is operating the "negative-control" mechanism in rural areas.

Secondly, its emotive politics of attacking 'self created' enemies like, the South Indians, the communist, and the Muslims could easily appeal to the native Maharashtrian population of Mumbai because of the critical problems facing the city. "The Sena's growth parallels the emerging urban crisis of Bombay," says Dr. Sujata Patel. 'The Sena adopts, interprets, mediates transforms and negotiates, the symbols which arouse responses in a city largely populated by immigrants from the villages, packed densely in degraded areas like slums and subjected to feelings of a cultural angst', in her opinion.<sup>1</sup>

The continuity of Shiv Sena's popular appeal lies in the inability of the city's ruling class to solve the problems of the people. Areas like Kolhapur, where the 'urban crisis of Mumbai' does not appear, Sena finds it difficult to expand beyond a certain point. Its popularity in rural areas is mainly due to its strategy of combining the anti-establishment sentiments with the 'Hindutva'. Though, Sena has achieved electoral success at State level, the

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1. Patel Sujata, "Shiv Sena's base in Bombay," (Part I and II), Hindu, July 27, 1995.

task of political expansion is not an easy one. The party in the last Lok Sabha (1996) polls, in an alliance with the BJP, won 33 out of 48 seats and defeated the Congress in 222 assembly segments. Sena's popular appeal cannot be gauged only by the election results, though, they do constitute an important index.

So far political observers have preferred to discard Sena and its Supremo as 'irritant' and 'eccentric' factor in Maharashtra's polity. But now that the Sena is a dominant partner in the ruling alliance and its popular appeal continues to grow, we cannot afford to ignore the relevance of its victory or undermine its popular base.

The challenge to secularism in India has come from external sources and from within. With South-west and South Asia infected with Islamic revivalism, the task of delegitimising secularism in India became easier. Opponents could simply point to Islamic Fundamentalism as sufficient justification of the need for a 'Hindu Rashtra'. Hindu fundamentalism which is emerging to compete with the Islamic fundamentalism will continue to grow unless we redefine secularism and strengthen the secular credentials of our State and cater to the problems of the marginalised.

## TABLES

Following tables are provided for the understanding of Shiv Sena's social and districtwise composition in Maharashtra. The tabulation has been compiled mainly from Vohra Rajendra and Palshikar Suhas (1996), *Maharashtratil Sattantar*, Mumbai, Granthali and Palshikar Suhas (1995), *Shiv Sena : Nim Fascist Mohini Vidyecha Prayog*, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Academy, Satara.

### 21. Distribution of MLAs : According<sup>to</sup> castes 1995

	Cong- ress	Cong. rebel	Shiv Sena	BJP	JD	PWP	Others <sup>1</sup>	Total
Brahmin-Prabhu	2	-	5	5	-	-	-	12
Maratha-Kunbi	46	23	40	18	5	3	3	138
Middle Level Castes <sup>2</sup>	5	2	3	6	2	-	1	19
Other Backward Castes	12	3	11	9	2	3	5	45
Scheduled Castes	3	2	5	8	-	-	1	19
Scheduled Tribes	7	4	3	6	-	-	3	23
Muslims	2	-	1	-	2	-	38	
Non-Marathi	3	1	2	13	-	-	2	21
Unknown	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>288</b>

#### NOTES :

- Others include CPI (M) (3), Samajwadi Party (3), Swatantra Bharat Party (2), BJP (rebels) (2), Sena (rebels) (2), Maharashtra Vikas Cong (1), Naga Vidarbha Andolan Samiti (1) and independent's (5)
- The Middle Level Castes include lewa, Gujar, Kshtriya, Rajput, Lingayat, Komti etc.

### 22. Shiv Sena : Elected Candidates with number of votes they received

REGION	Less than 10 thousand		between 10 to 20 thousand		Between 20 to 30 thousand		More than 30 thousand		TOTAL	
	1990	1995	1990	1995	1990	1995	1990	1995	1990	1995
Konkan	06	01	02	04	01	06	02	04	11	15
Mumbai	08	00	05	05	02	08	00	05	15	18
North MH	01	00	00	03	00	01	01	01	02	05
Vidarbha	03	06	04	04	02	00	00	01	09	11
Marathwada	03	03	04	07	03	03	01	02	11	15
Western MH	03	02	01	04	00	02	00	01	04	09
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>08</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>04</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>73</b>

**23. Shiv Sena Candidates : Distribution according to castes : 1995**

	Mumbai	Konkan	North MH	Vidarbha	Marathwada	West MH	Total
Upper Castes <sup>1</sup>	04	01	-	-	01	01	07
Maratha-Kunbi	04	11	09	12	21	34	91
Other Backward Castes	07	05	02	10	06	03	33
Scheduled Castes	02	-	01	-	03	05	11
Scheduled Tribes	-	03	05	03	-	01	12
Others <sup>2</sup>	-	01	-	01	01	03	06
Unknown	04	01	01	01	01	02	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>170</b>

**NOTES :**

1. Upper castes include Brahmins, Prabhu, Sarasawat.
2. These include Marwaries, Rajputs, Muslims, Lewa, Komti castes.

**24. Shiv Sena MLAs : Distribution according <sup>to</sup> castes: 1990 and 1995**

Caste	1990	1995
Upper Castes <sup>1</sup>	06	05
Maratha-Kunbi	27	40
Other Backward Castes	13	11
Scheduled Castes	01	05
Scheduled Tribes	02	03
Others <sup>2</sup>	03	06
Unknown	-	03
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>73</b>

**NOTES :**

1. Upper castes include Brahmins, Prabhu, Sarasawat.
2. These include Marwaries, Rajputs, Muslims, Lewa, Komti castes

**25. Shiv Sena : Distribution of MLAs according to district.**

Sr.No.	District	1990	1995
1.	Sindhudurg	01	02
2.	Ratnagiri	04	05
3.	Raigad	02	03
4.	Mumbai	15	18
5.	Thane	04	05
6.	Nashik	01	04
7.	Dhule	00	00
8.	Jalgaon	01	01
9.	Buldhana	02	02
10.	Akola	03	02
11.	Amravati	02	03
12.	Warda	00	01
13.	Nagpur	00	00
14.	Bhandara	00	01
15.	Gadchiroli	01	01
16.	Chandrapur	01	00
17.	Yawatmal	00	01
18.	Nanded	01	03
19.	Parbhani	04	03
20.	Jalna	02	03
21.	Aurangbad	03	02
22.	Beed	01	01
23.	Latur	00	00
24.	Usmanabad	00	03
25.	Solapur	00	01
26.	Ahmednagar	01	01
27.	Pune	01	05
28.	Satara	00	01
29.	Sangli	00	00
30.	Kolhapur	02	01

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