

**KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS SINCE 1991 :  
THE ISSUE OF RUSSIAN MINORITY**

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DEDICATED  
IN MEMORY OF  
MY MOTHER

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*Needless to say, however, that error, if any, are mine.*

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## PREFACE

Kazakhstan, the newly Independent state, represents a Multi-ethnic society. The present dissertation has tried to analyse the Russian-Kazakh ethnic relations in the new political situation since 1991. The impact of ethnic crisis on domestic politics, economic and social conditions and relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan on issue of Russian Minority have been examined in my subsequent chapters.

In the First Chapter, the relationship between Russians and Kazakhs that had existed during Soviet era and the various movements taken by Kazakh people against Soviet regime has been discussed.

In the Second Chapter, the problem of Russian minority in Kazakhstan and it's impact on the various Social, economic and political developments inside Kazakhstan has been explained.

The Third Chapter has examined the steps taken by Kazakhstan government towards the protection of minority rights and how Russian Minority as an obstacle to the nation building process of Kazakhstan.

The Fourth Chapter has examined Russia's reaction towards their minority in Kazakhstan as Kazakhstan government handling the whole issue.

The Last Chapter has concluding observation.

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**CHAPTER I  
HISTORICAL BACK-GROUND  
KAZAKH - RUSSIAN RELATIONS  
DURING SOVIET ERA**

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Kazakhstan presents an interesting panorama of multi-ethnic society, Kazakhs 44.3 percent, Russians 35.8 percent, and remainder minorities are - Ukrainians, Chechans, Hungarians, and Turks who constitute 19.9 percent.<sup>1</sup> Total population is 16.5 million making Kazakhstan the only post-soviet State in which the titular ethnic group is not a majority. The split is exacerbated by a geographic distribution as Kazakhs are concentrated mostly in rural areas and in the central and southern parts of the country, while Russians are predominantly Urban dwellers and constitute a majority in northern part of the country.

In the post-independence period, the multiplicity of nationals, languages and cultures has become a very sensitive and significant issue for the observers of international arena. The unanticipated independence has had a dramatic impact on the psyche of people themselves, especially the Russian and Kazakhs. Accustomed to be the citizens of a Russian majority state, the Russians suddenly woke-up as foreigners in an independent Republic and have essentially become the members of a national minority. The ethnic issue is particularly acute as many Russians are unwilling to accept their new minority status - as President Nazarbaev's nation building scheme has had at its core a policy of Kazakhization : reviving the Kazakh language, restoring traditional names to cities and land marks, revising history to reflect a Kazakh national perspective and observing Kazakh and Islamic holidays.

Nazarbaev coupled a policy of 'harmonization' which encourages the participation of Russians in all facets of Kazakh life and seeks, if not their assimilation,

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1. Anatoly M., Khazanov, The Ethnic Problems of contemporary Kazakhstan, *Central Asian Survey*, 14(2), 1995, p. 244.



then at least their tacit acceptance of Kazakh rule.<sup>2</sup> Apprehensive Russians have started demanding an autonomous republic in Eastern Kazakhstan as a guarantee to their protection and identity. They are also considering options like merger of Russian dominated northern regions with Russia's federation which might render Kazakhstan divided. After the August coup, Boris Yeltsin, who was then President of RSFSR, threatened to re-open the inter-republic border question in order to incorporate the ordering Russian majority districts of Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine into Russia. President Nazarbaev thereupon warned him that any re-opening of the border question would lead to inter-republican wars. Nazarbaev proposed some adjustment market transformational measures for getting out of the economic crisis. To adopt a new law on languages and eliminate any discrimination against Russian language. Anyone who insults some one else on the basis of nationality should be punished severely.

The highly diverse ethnic composition of Kazakhstan has a long and sometimes tragic history and is connected with the Russian migrations to the country at the expense of the indigenous population. Russian government began to take away Kazakh's summer pastures and sometimes even winter quarters and replaced them first with Cossack and then with peasant settlers from the European part of the empire. New colonists from European Russia came to Kazakhstan at the end of 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, particularly after the Stolypin reform. Many Kazakh pastoral nomads were gradually pushed to the arid areas of central and southern Kazakhstan, which resulted in the over-grazing of the pastures they still

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2. Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, "The Trouble with Democracy in Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, 15(2), 1996, p. 182.

possessed and in their impoverishment. Many had to migrate to other regions, settle on the lands and cultivate crops or even work for new colonists. The conflict between the indigenous population and slav settlers became acute.

The Great October Socialist Revolution provided to the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the possibility of transition to socialism by-passing capitalism. Industrialization, the re-making of the countryside on the basis of Lenin's co-operative plan and the cultural revolution brought about radical socio-economic and cultural changes in the life of the people of the Kazakhstan. The specific conditions of Kazakhstan which was in the pre-capitalist stage of development and was colony of Tsarist empire, influenced the forms of operations of the general laws governing socialist construction. Kazakh - Russian relations became intimate because the assistance they assumed from Russian in the form of equipment and materials, financial priorities in financing joint participation in economic construction and also for the training of national personnel.

The Kazakhs flirted with a short spell of independence in the chaotic wake of the 1917 revolutions, but were incorporated into the Russian federation in 1920 and awarded the status of union republic 16 years later, in 1936. In some ways, communist rule bolstered Kazakh national identity, as soviet nationality policy dictated the creation of a geo-political structure for Kazakhstan and nominally supported the development of Kazakh language and culture.<sup>3</sup> After 1920, the ethnic

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3. Ibid., p. 180.

conflicts in Kazakhstan polarised every issue such as land tenure, economic development, class truce vers' class war. The New economic policy (NEP) of 1921 only imparted a greater urgency to their resolution, since these became priority issues of soviet nationalist policy after the 10th party congress in 1921.<sup>4</sup>

In 1922, the first conference of Obkom secretaries in Orenburg observed that - some districts in Kazakhstan suffered from a total absence of Marxist trained cadres who could lead the masses and raise their consciousness. It demanded that the obkom persistently press Moscow for such cadres.<sup>5</sup> As secretaries increasingly fell under stalin's apparat, they readily paid the price of increased control from Moscow, since that facilitated their control over local affairs. The conference also pointed out the lack of proletarians, the generally low level of political development of existing cadres and the influence upon them of petty bourgeois emotions such as religion or belonging to a Kulak family.

The hapazard enforcement of the central policy of nativisation was derived from a general realization, not limited to Kazakhstan, of the threat - posed by Nativization to Russian or Russified cadres. Kazakh authorities therefore developed their own vision of the programme. Though Kazakhization of the apparat was a high priority policy, nativization simply did not mean that. Administrative divisions within the republic favoured national lines of demarcation and there was also a probable pattern of pronounced residential segregation, one could easily foresee the outcome of Kazakh nativization.<sup>6</sup>

4. Stephen Blank, "Ethnic and Party Politics in Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 10, 1991, p. 91.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

By 1926-27, ethnic violence over the disposition of the lands occurred and promoted brave party members to approach Trotsky and alert him to their victimization by Moscow. They claimed to suffer from discrimination, exclusion from policy making and general suspicion by Stalin and his acolytes. The crisis substantially contributed to the rise of stalinism, by reflecting the general crisis of the system and by virtue of the solutions that Lenin and Stalin devised to meet them. They came to a head in 1923 with the confluence of the Georgian succession, formation of the USSR and Muslim cries within the party and the country as a whole.

The USSR government built up industrial centres at Kazakhstan by restoring or providing equipment for the existing enterprises and also by moving factories and plants from the central regions. These measures played an important part in consolidating the alliance of the working people in the central regions and borderlands, and also in accelerating the development of the productive forces in Kazakhstan. This enormous transformation was undertaken by large scale transfer of skilled professional workers from European regions to Kazakhstan. Skilled workers in industries were mostly Russians and it constitutes 75.8 percent of all industrial workers.<sup>7</sup>

The socialist remaking of agriculture was a major requisite for the socio-economic and cultural progress of the people of Kazakhstan. This task was accomplished on the basis of Lenin's co-operative plan which became the highroad to socialism for the peasantry in the East as well.<sup>8</sup> The land-water reforms in 1920s were

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7. Ajay Patnaik, in Sashikanta Jha (ed.) *Reform, Conflict and Change in the CIS and Eastern Europe*, New Delhi 1998, p. 257.  
8. M., Goncharuk, in G. Abramov and M. Goncharuk (ed.) *Soviet Union, A Communist of Fraternal Peoples, 1922-72*, Moscow, 1989, p. 110.

the main link in the chain of such measures of a transitional nature in conditions of Kazakhstan. Lenin emphasised that "what is needed most is irrigation, for more than anything else, it will revive the area and regenerate it, bury the past and make the transition to socialism more certain".<sup>9</sup>

The consistent struggle against the exploitative elements, the success of industrialization and of the Leninist nationalist policy prepared the main conditions for the radical socialist transformation of agriculture in Kazakhstan. A new stage in Leninist co-operative plan was reached in early 1930's with the gradual establishment of collective farm system in Kazakhstan known as collectivization.<sup>10</sup> The forced collectivization and the denomadization of the Kazakhs met with wide spread resistance. Thousand of nomadic families were forced into collective encampments where their animals often starved to death for the lack of adequate grazing. During only three years of the collectivization period, in 1929-1933, nearly 2 million or 52 percent of total Kazakh population were lost in Kazakhstan, 42 percent were killed by hunger and 10 percent of Kazakhs fled to other regions.<sup>11</sup> For the Kazakhs to be successful in the soviet system meant accepting a high level of Russification and forsaking Kazakh culture, values and language for Russian (Soviet) ones.

In 1928, there were 30,350,900 head of livestock in Kazakhstan, by 1933, their number decreased almost 85 percent to 4,800,600. The political aims were

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9. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, P. 318.

10. M., Goncharuk, in G. Abramov and M. Goncharuk (ed) *Soviet Union, A communist of Fraternal Peoples, 1922-72*, Moscow, 1989, p. 119.

11. Dr. Gulnara Mendikulova, "The Kazakh Diaspora : From Central Asia to the West", Presented in International Indo-Kazakh cultural Seminar, J.N.U., New Delhi, p. 3.

achieved. The traditional nomadic way of life ceased to exist, and the Kazakhs were domesticated and became a minority in their own country. The "Industrialization" and "Virgin lands campaign" brought to Kazakhstan another 1.5 to 2 million new settlers from the European parts of the USSR. By 1939, the number of Russians in Kazakhstan had doubled compared with 1926. By 1979, this number had doubled again.<sup>12</sup>

In 1930's and 1940's, Kazakhstan became one of the Gulag areas and one of the main territories for resettlement of various departed groups and peoples' like the Poles, Koreans, Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Meskhetian, Turks, Kurds, Greeks and many others. By 1949, there were 820,165 exiles in Kazakhstan including 393,537 Germans, 302,526 Chechen and Ingush, 33,088 Karachi, 29,497 Meskhetian Turks and members of other ethnic minorities deported from Georgia, 28,130 Poles and 17,512 Balkans.<sup>13</sup>

By 1962, the number of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan dropped to 29 percent within 3 years, their overall proportion in the republic began to increase again because of their high birth rate and a decline in the influx of non-indigenous groups, above all of Russians. This imparted confidence in the ethnic future of the Kazakhs after the period when their very survival as a people was in jeopardy, contributed to a growth in their nationalism, which in the post-war decades was at a rather low level.

Cultural revolution was a major link between Kazakh and Russians. It was

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12. Martha Brill Olcott, "The Kazakhs", Stanford, 1987 p. 18.

13. Se, No. 1, p. 247.

impossible to build socialism, while preserving illiteracy and ignorance, because socialism is created by the conscious, energetic creative effort of the masses under the guidance of the communist party, on the basis of utilising the objective laws of social development. The need for training a new national intelligentsia called for the specific use of the cultural heritage of a scientific socialist ideology and the presence only of a democratic ideology in it. From this followed the struggle not so much against bourgeois as against patriarchal - feudal ideology. The cultural revolution led to the solution of a common problem - the wiping out of illiteracy. Approximately, half of all the pupils and students in all the links of the educational system are girls of local nationalities. The creation of national academies of sciences in Kazakhstan was an important landmark in the cultural revolution, in the advance of science and technology. The peoples of Kazakhstan could study the great works of Marx, Engels, Lenin in their native language. The number of cinema's is systematically grew and the radio and television became part and parcel of the people life.

The position of women radically changed in Kazakhstan during the building of socialism which altered the way of life in the family. Disgraceful customs as polygamy, the giving in marriage of minors and the wearing of Yashmak, Paranja, or Chichavan were abolished and the marriage procedure was also changed.<sup>14</sup>

Nazi Germany's attack against the European part of the USSR was seen in Kazakhstan as a threat to the motherland and though the invasion was not a direct threat to Kazakh territories, but the spirit of patriotism was very strong among all

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14. See No. 8, p. 121.

the Soviet people and that thousands of Kazakh fought on the front during the Great patriotic war.<sup>15</sup> As prisoners of war, Kazakhs were first sent to concentration camps and subsequently, were dispersed into smaller work camps in Germany and German occupied territories.

Nationalism became more conspicuous during the later years of Kunaev's rule, who until his dismissal in December 1986 held for 24 years, the position of the first secretary of communist Party of Kazakhstan. Although Kunaev was no less corrupt than other soviet politicians of the Brezenov period, he tried to advocate the interest of Kazakhstan in the central government, to give preference to Kazakhs over Russians in the Republic, and to move them into many key positions in administration. Contrary to the expectations of the Soviet leadership and assurances of Soviet Scholars, the complicated ethnic composition in Kazakhstan did not evoke 'internationalism' and the rapprochement between the Soviet people. On the contrary, ethnic tensions increased socio-economic competition among ethnic groups.

By the end of 1970's, when the Moscow leadership became worried about the immigration of Soviet Germans to west Germany, it tried to solve this problem at Kazakh expense. Moscow toyed with plans to create a German autonomous formation in Kazakhstan, on the territory of Tselinograd oblast. The Kazakh leadership prevented this formation by making this information public. Anti German rallies followed in Tselinograd and the plans for German autonomy had to be revoked.

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15. See No. 11, p. 5.



During the Soviet Period, the modernization process in Kazakhstan involved minimal participation by the native population, and none of the following were fully implemented there : Industrialization, urbanization the demographic revolution, revolution in education, and occupational mobility. With respect to European Russia, Kazakhstan was always a peripheral region. The limited industrialization of Kazakhstan conducted by Moscow centre involved the attraction of a work force from a European part of the USSR and not the creation of indigenous skilled working class.<sup>16</sup> Kazakhstan attracted immigrants from European Russia to occupy those positions in industry that demanded skilled labour and they become a labour aristocracy. People of European origin were the main backbone of the skilled workforce and scientific-technical personnel Engineers, technicians, and skilled workers of Slavic, German, or Caucasian origin operated most large enterprises, electric stations, oil Wells, Mines, railroads, and air routes created during Soviet period. Higher wages, the possibility of receiving an apartment and good promotion possibilities attracted, with exception of German exiled to the republic by Stalin during World War-II.

Of Kazakhstan's industries, 93 percent was directly subordinate to the all-union ministry in Moscow. 71 percent districts with a predominantly Kazakh population were economically the most backward and the highest number of unemployed. The developmental lag and the ethnic division of labour that hinder Kazakh participation in modern sectors of economy, contributed to a growth in ethnic competition. The violent disturbances and inter-ethnic conflicts of summer 1989 in Novi Uzen'

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16. M. Hechter, "Ethnicity and Industrialization : on the proliferation of the cultural division of labour", *Ethnicity* Vol. 2, 1976, p. 216.

Munaishi, Dzetybai, and other centres of oil industry in the Mangyshlak Peninsula in western Kazakhstan demonstrate where this situation may go.<sup>17</sup> In order to build schools, hospitals, and day care centres, they brought in temporary workers from the north Caucasus and other parts of the Soviet union. The central organisation viewed the local Kazakh population as a burden. The Kazakhs remained without work and with no where to go. Every three months, airplanes brought a new shift of 12 thousand people to Mangyshlak. These shifts included not only skilled oil industry workers, but also secretaries, cooks and even office cleaners while 18 thousand Kazakh youths remained unemployed.<sup>18</sup> As a result, the latter began to demand the expulsion of migrants of Caucasian origin and the provision of jobs for unemployed Kazakhs. Mobs went on the rampage which lasted for several days and resulted in several deaths, serious injuries, and great damage to various consumer enterprises and services.

The ethnic division of labour exists also in agriculture. Ethnic minorities such as Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Koreans and others prefer to be occupied in more Mechanised and better paid branches of agriculture demanding more skilled labour for pastoral production and in cotton cultivation. The amalgamation of collective farms into larger state owned farms during the Brezhnev period again affected Kazakh Peasants and pastoralists in a negative way.

The state confiscated about 20 million hectares of traditional Kazakh grazing and arable lands for numerous military grounds and testing ranges, the nuclear site

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17. See No. 1, p. 249.

18. Ibid., p. 250

at Semipalatinsk and the satellite and missile test centres at Baikonur. There were virtually no Kazakhs among their employees and the state ousted indigenous population from these lands. Although the anti-nuclear movement in Kazakhstan unites people from different ethnic groups, some Kazakh intellectuals claim that ethnic Kazakhs suffered more than other groups as a result of the nuclear weapon tests. They refer to Kazakh villagers who were used as human guinea pigs to test the effects of nuclear tests in the 1950's, and to those who for the decades were suffering and dying from the consequences of radiation leaks.<sup>19</sup> But the Soviet Military and Health service always denied this fact. The over-populated Kazakh rural regions of the republic also suffer from erosion, salination and desertification, the results of erroneous agro-technology, overgrazing, and a trend from multispecies toward monospecies herd composition.

Educationally and professionally, the new migrants from the rural areas were at a disadvantage and encounter strong competition from other ethnic groups. Social advancement and career promotion for the urban population required and still requires a good command of Russian. This puts Kazakhs in an underprivileged position in comparison to Russian-speaking urbanities and intensifies ethnic competition. At best, indigenous people can find only unskilled jobs in the cities. They have little sympathy for the Russians whom they tend to associate with foreman, team-leaders, and superiors of different ranks. Both groups have different incomes, values, lifestyles and maintain few contacts with each other. At worst, the new Kazakh migrants remain unemployed and often homeless and constitute a new and growing

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19. Ibid.

underclass in the cities of Kazakhstan. Often they are hostile towards the Russians and other ethnic minorities and prove to be particularly prone to extremism, violence and crisis. In Summer of 1990, when some of these desperate people lost any hope for government assistance, they unwarrentedly seized plots of land near Alma-Ata, which created on explosive situation in the capital.<sup>20</sup> The movement of rural groups into urban sectors dominated by distinctly linguistic and cultural ethnic groups, precipitates ethnic conflict and ultimately nationalism.

However, political opportunities for social advancement are better for the Kazakh than for other ethnic groups in republic. Through various kinds of official and unofficial affirmative actions, they are represented in virtually all republican foci of power. In the 1979-1989 period, the ratio of Russians in the administration decreased by 8.2 percent in science 12.3 percent in trade and services by 8.7 percent.<sup>21</sup>

The Kazakh political elite's privileged positions in the local power structure depended on their compliance with all of Moscows demands and goals, and with their capabilities to implement policies dictated by the centre. In addition, they had to embrace the Russian language and at least in public - some of Russian culture and life style. In return Moscow gave them the right to run internal affairs in Kazakhstan and to distribute preferential treatment and high level jobs. In order to secure their support, the Soviet regime reserved a significant percentage of jobs for Kazakhs.

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20. Ibid., p. 251.

21. Ibid., 252.

During the restructuring (Perestroika) period inter-ethnic tensions in Kazakhstan, particularly, relations between the Kazakhs and Russians become even more salient. When ethnicity is salient in social structure, different ethnic groups contest for political participation, power sharing, economic opportunities, and cultural status, and tend to incline, in Connor's terms, towards ethnic nationalism.<sup>22</sup> During the disturbances in Alma-Ata, in December 1986, the blue collar Russian civil population participated in putting down Kazakh demonstrations. In several parts of the city, particularly in the working class neighbourhoods, they organised hunts for all Kazakhs appearing in the streets.

Perestroika sought to change the orientations of people. The political leadership of Kazakhstan attempted to move from a collectivist and unitary set of motivating principles to individualistic and pluralistic ones. V.A. Medvedev stated that a fundamental political Principle of socialism, full power by the working people and their political participation in all state and local affairs at both central and local level. This means that socialism must create a political system which would take into account the real structure of society and the multitude of interests and aspirations of all social groups and communities of people.<sup>23</sup> The dominant ideology from Stalin to Brezenov was one of consensus, collectivity and social harmony between Kazakh and Russia. Socialist pluralism led to the recognition of much greater differences not only in the distribution of resources, but also in relation between national groups.

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22. Walker Connor, "The Politics of ethnonationalism", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 27(1) 1973, p. 10.

23. David Lane, *Soviet Society under Perestroika*, Assen : Van Gorcum, 1991, p. 93.

The effect of the policies like perestroika, Glasnost were manifested in a way that regional leaders attributed as the cause of ethnic feelings, mass meeting and demonstrations in Alma-Ata in support of national and regional rights. The Kazakhs also demanded concessions from the centre in favour of their region.

Kazakhstan's stability and ethnic peace remain fragile. In October 1990, when president Nazarbaev persuaded, or rather forced, some leaders of the Kazakh major opposition groups in Alma-Ata to declare two year Moratorium on demonstrations in the Capital, others promptly staged a demonstrations against the Moratorium. The paramount motivation behind Kazakh organizations is to provide ethnic Kazakhs the privileged positions in the country and to preserve its territorial integrity. Solzhenitsyn's proposal to annex Northern Kazakhstan, published in, how we should build Russia, led to the protests from a wide spectrum of Kazakh intelligentsia and youth and to led demonstrations in Alma-Ata on 21-23 September 1990.<sup>24</sup> Kazakhs reminded the Russians that the Omsk oblast in the Russian federation was once Kazakh territory.

In 1990, several emerging parties and movements were openly demanding complete independence for the Republics and secession from the Soviet Union. When the republic's parliament made a declaration of sovereignty, many Kazakhs picketed it carrying the slogan, "Don't sign the union treaty", and saying that "we bid farewell to Germans and shake hands with them, we burn Russians by kicking their back".<sup>25</sup>

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24. See No. 1, P. 254.

25. Ibid.

The language law of 1989, declared Kazakh to be the state language of Kazakhstan and required its widespread use in public life while the Russian language was granted the ambiguous status of being language of inter-ethnic intercourse. This led to the protests from the Russian-speaking population.<sup>26</sup> Some Russian deputies of the new parliament have already stated that they are going to demand that both languages be declared the state language of Kazakhstan.

All political arguments boil down to whether the republic should evolve into a Kazakh ethnic state or a multi-ethnic national state, just like Assam, Malaysia, Srilanka, Fiji and some other countries. Kazakh nationalities use the indigenous question as an argument for providing them priority and special political status.

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26. Ibid., p. 250.

**CHAPTER II  
RUSSIAN MINORITY IN A CHANGING  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL  
CONTEXT IN KAZAKHSTAN**

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After the disintegration of Soviet Union, 'Russian Question' is on the agenda in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs comprise 40% of the population and the Russian numbered 6,228,000 at the time of 1989 census—a hefty 38%. As it is well known, the republic's southern tier is largely Kazakh, while sections of its northern tier are compactly settled by Russians. Like Ukraine, the Kazakhs have begun to put political pressure on Russians living in the republic's southern regions and especially in the capital city of Alma-Ata. In the capital, ethnic Kazakh control 64 percent of the city council though they constitute less than one quarter of the city's populace. Increasing pressure is also being placed on Russians to learn Kazakh language since only 53,000 out<sup>of</sup> more than 6 million Russians living in the republic were able to speak Kazakh, according to the result of 1989 all union census. In August-September, 1991, VTASIOM Poll, 33 percent of Russian speakers residing in Kazakhstan stated that the position of Russians in that republic had worsened over the past two or three years.<sup>1</sup>

According to Graham Fuller, "over the long run, the outlook for Russian-Kazakh relations is not good. Nationalist policies in Alma-Ata are destined to increase, perhaps rapidly, hastening the day of confrontation on a whole range of issues, including state - language policy, privatization, democracy and the representation of non-Kazakh nationalities, land ownership, control of Industry and natural resources. On balance, it is hard to imagine how the issue of Russian position in Kazakhstan can be resolved without the ultimate loss of heavily Russian populated northern region."<sup>2</sup>

1. John B. Dunlop, "Will a Large - Scale Migration of Russians to the Russian Republic, Take Place Over the Current Decade", *International Migration Review*, Vol.xvii, No. 3, 1995, p. 618.

2. Ibid.

According to Laitin, minority group in Kazakhstan Republic is threatened by two problems - firstly, the titular elite whose positions are secured by membership in the named group of republic, are administratively responsible for instituting jobs and favours to a wide patronage network. This problem became especially great with the prospect of Privatization towards the end of Gorbachev era. The minority may have feared that government controlled by the titular groups would distribute to its own group land and other factors and discrimination against the former secondly, the minority might fear, justifiably or not, eradication or forced assimilation by the local majority as the latter gains more power. The pattern in early 1988 in USSR showed that as soon as Gorbachev raised the question of decentralization of power to the republics, extremely emotional uprisings began occurring among ethnic groups within the republics. The strength of the reaction and even violence in those suggested that the minority population was concerned not just about patronage, but also about its security.<sup>3</sup>

However, on both counts, the Russians had little to fear in Kazakhstan. The nature of their professional position ensured against any discrimination and being a culturally distinct group, they were not in danger of being assimilated by the titular group. Instead, the non-European minority groups were more in danger of being assimilated due to inter-group marriages and linguistic similarity with the titular groups. Among Russians in Kazakhstan, however, knowledge of local language is poor.

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3. David D. Laitin, "The Four Nationality Games and Soviet Politics", *Journal of Soviet Nationalities*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1991, p. 20-21.

Nevertheless, feeling of cultural alienation and the fear aroused by the Almaty riots, left their mark on the Russian population in Kazakhstan. The changing social context in the newly independent state Kazakhstan creates insecurity. Robert A Lewis suggested, "as indigenous group succeeded in gaining a privileged status in their homelands, the non-indigenous groups felt increasingly discriminated against."<sup>4</sup> Symbolic of the new cultural policy is the adoption of the new language law by Kazakhstan in 1989, that elevated the titular language to the status of official language. The new language laws are perceived by many Russians as the future basis for job discrimination. Among Russians, including those who were born and brought up in Kazakhstan, knowledge of local language is limited to a few. The new language law is unaccompanied by necessary and inevitably lengthy work to help Russians to master the local language.<sup>5</sup>

The impact of emigration by Russians can be so detrimental to the economy of Kazakhstan that it is difficult to visualise any language based <sup>on</sup> discrimination in the near future. Essentially, Russian remains the language of inter-ethnic communication and it would be unrealistic to expect that it would cease to be so in near future. It is also likely that Russians will continue to play an important role in the educational system of Kazakhstan, if Kazakhstan is to create a large local skilled cadre to take care of her future requirement. As it is, the recently adopted language laws would take sometime to come into force and their strictest implementation under the present political set up is doubtful.

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4. Ajay Patnaik in Sashikanta Jha (ed.), "Reform, Conflict and Change in the CIS and Eastern Europe", New Delhi, 1998, p. 252.  
5. *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, Vol. XLIV No. 42, 1992, p. 8-9

In Kazakhstan, the second largest number of schools in which classes are conducted in Russian. About 1.9 million students are attending these schools and constitute more than half of all school children in the state.<sup>6</sup> In 1993-94, 57.2 percent of the students in Kazakhstan were studying in Russian schools compared to 40.1 percent in the Kazakh schools.<sup>7</sup> The law of Kazakhstan requires a fluent knowledge of the Kazakh language only for the President, the Vice-President, the Chairman of the supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the constitutional court.<sup>8</sup> The Kazakh constitution accords Russian language the status of the language of inter-ethnic communication and lack of knowledge of the state language can not be the basis of denying any citizen the rights conferred by the constitution on all citizens.<sup>9</sup> A compromise to allay the fears of the Russian minority regarding the new language law was reached in September-1990, which stipulated that areas with an overwhelming Russian population would only provide Kazakh language services by 1995 and switch to fully bilingual administration by January 2000.<sup>10</sup>

Russian language and culture is still important in Kazakhstan in its nation-building process. In modern Kazakhstan, the situation in the cultural sphere looks complicated and contradictory. Kazakh nationalistic elites demanding Kazakh ethnic culture as the only cultural basis of sovereign Kazakhstan and count on the state as the main lever for realization of such cultural policy.

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6. Robert Kaiser and Jeff Chinn, "Russian-Kazakhstan Relations in Kazakhstan", Vol. 36, No. 5, 1995, p. 263.

7. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLV, No. 18, 1993, p. 26.

8. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVI, No. 13, 1994, p. 10.

9. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVI, No. 13, 1993, p. 15.

10. See No. 4, p. 258.

A Russian sense of Kazakh favoritism and feelings of relative deprivation has increased since 1989, along with adoption of a new language law that proclaimed Kazakh, the official language of the state, a new citizenship law that allowed the Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan to be citizens of the state but refused to allow dual citizenship to Russians, and a new constitution that proclaimed independence in the name of Kazakh nation.<sup>11</sup>

In Kazakhstan, substantial migration has been taking place recently. In 1994, more than 400,000 people left Kazakhstan. In a sociological study conducted by Giller Institute in 1995, of the 1,000 persons questioned, 47.4 percent showed a willingness to leave Kazakhstan.<sup>12</sup> However, according to Nazarbaev, the emigration in Kazakhstan is not a Russian-related phenomenon. It is mostly because of the departure of Germans, 300,000 of whom left Kazakhstan in 1993. According to him, 154,000 Russians came to Kazakhstan in 1993.<sup>13</sup>

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An important factor in Russian emigration could be the ongoing industrial recession in Kazakhstan. Due to insufficient deliveries of energy sources and raw materials from Russia, and absence of centralised orders, union enterprises, whose work force are made up mainly of Russian speakers, are closing down. Economic instability and loss of political control have created a sense of insecurity among most Russians living in Kazakhstan. Several kind of surveys also shown that a willingness among many Russians to emigrate to Russia. What prevents exodus on a larger

11. See No. 6, p. 260.

12. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVII, No. 10, 1995, p.15.

13. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, 1994, p.15.



scale at the moment is equally worsening situation in Russia, where unemployment, poverty, and higher cost of living has discouraged Russian minorities outside to look to their eponymous state as a better alternative.<sup>14</sup> There are no laws in the Russian federation "on refugees" or "on forced migrants". As a result, is no official definition of refugee status either.

With introduction of price reform at the beginning of 1991 by President Nazarbaev, a potentially disastrous confrontation soon ebbed, which has been more regional and isolated friction, and is often sparked by competition for material resources and or by "human rights" violations. Kazakhstan's turn to a "market economy" in an experimental level led to unavoidable mistakes that invited strong resentments from both Russians and Kazakhs. While achieving little to reform decaying industry, it did help a minority class amass wealth by relocation of the money flowing in form privately set prices.<sup>15</sup> A potential class confrontation replacing ethnic tension came out. Russians who have no fortune to link up with the political hierarchy have nevertheless managed to form power basis in the lower layers. On the other side, Russians, particularly, retired pensioners, devastated by inflation and the drastic cuts in welfare, are increasingly trapped in poverty.

The progress on privatization of state property, especially, land has given rise to ethnic conflicts. The Kazakhs are nervous that a rapid distribution of state properties into the hands of non-indigenous groups would make the latter prosper-

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14. See No. 4, p. 258.

15. Jiger Janabel, "When National Ambition Conflict with Reality : Studies on Kazakhstan's Ethnic Relations", *Central Asian Survey*, 15(1), 1996, p. 11.

ous at their expense, given that all these nationalities have already gained an economic edge. The natives argued that they are the proper heirs of Kazakhstan's wealth. Representing this nationalistic views, a group of Kazakh people's deputies insisted at the fall session of 1992 that Kazakhstan's new constitution should legitimise Kazakhs permanent and exclusive ownership of the land and that land should not become the target of privatization. All the Russians, and even some Kazakh people's deputies stood against the proposal. President Nazarbayev intervened and the item was modified to placate both groups: "land of the republic of Kazakhstan is the exclusive property of the state".<sup>16</sup>

According to Ajay Patnaik, Russian emigration has been less influenced by ethno-cultural factors, at least for the present. The very process of economic decline and recession has made the positions of Russians vulnerable. Without control over any political and administrative structures, there is very little chance for the Russians to influence decision making and protect their economic status at the cost of others.<sup>17</sup> Kazakh elections in 1994 illustrated the declining influence of Russians in the political and administrative structures. Though Russians constitute 37 percent and Kazakh 42 percent of the total population, the former had only 49 deputies in the new parliament as compared to 107 Kazakh deputies. The difference is more flowing in high state positions or bodies of power. There <sup>is</sup> no non-Kazakhs out of the five state advisors and six out of seven deputy Prime-ministers are Kazakhs. In certain ministries, the ratio of non-Kazakhs to Kazakhs are respectively 1:6 in the ministry of

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16. Ibid., p. 13

17. See No. 4, p. 253.

education; 3:5 in the ministry of finance; 2:4 in the ministry of transportation; 1:4 in the ministry of press and public information; 1:7 in the ministry of economic; 1:4 in the ministry of justice; 1:6 in the national security committee; 0:5 in the state of television and radio committee.<sup>18</sup> Post-Soviet organisation of local government apparatus has witnessed a KAZakhzization of political elites even in the northern oblasts which are predominantly Russian areas.<sup>19</sup>

The Russians of Kazakhstan are characterised by a balance between their educational level and income level (both are higher than the average). The main reasons of poverty among the Russians are related to sharp reduction of their access to medical service, rest, dwelling and incomes of the workers of military production factories.<sup>20</sup> Occasional marches organised by the Russian radical movements draw little attention from the Kazakhs.

Russians in Kazakhstan, in their every step severely opposed Kazakhstan's national parties. Azat, a civic movement, organised in the summer 1990, was accepted by the Kazakh communities when it championed internationalism. Its influence on the Kazakh government was even viewed by other ethnic groups as a channel for communicating their concerns to high officials. The party strictly opposed a violent approach to inter-ethnic relations.<sup>21</sup> Jeltokshan Party, a officially registered with the Kazakhstan government on 29 March 1990 and headed by a anticommunist

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18. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLIV, No. 51, 1992, p. 22.

19. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLV, No. 13, 1994, p.10.

20. Dina Eshpanova (Kazakhstan), A Forecast of Ethnic conflicts in Kazakhstan in their Social Aspect, Presented Indo-Kazakhstan International Cultural Seminar, New Delhi, 1998.

21. See No. 15, p. 16.



activist, Hasen Akhmedov, is a highly radical and controversial organization, which arms the Kazakhs with anti-Russian ideologies and its famous naked slogan as "Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs" and "the Russia for Russians".<sup>22</sup> Alash party believes that violence was the only effective way to gain the final goal, which is to restore the independent Islamic state of Alash Orda which will include all the Turkic peoples living in CIS.

The policy of nationalizing the Kazakh language brought about a massive resistance from the Russians; Because the Russians felt inconvenient to learn the Kazakh language. They contend that nearly all Kazakhs know Russian and almost no Russians know Kazakh. Russian is an international language where as the utility of Kazakh is limited to Kazakhstan; and the need to know Kazakh is minimal for day to day life in northern oblasts where Russians comprise the majority. The central government has delayed the original implementation deadlines to avert a confrontation with the Russians, but this postponement will only delay a seemingly inevitable clash on the language issue.<sup>23</sup>

Russian resistance to what is perceived to be forced linguistic Kazakhization is particularly intense in the northern oblasts, which Russian nationalists consider part of their homeland. Although one reaction to linguistic Kazakhisation has been Russian emigration, the dominant response has been Russian migration from southern to northern oblasts, where both Russian authorities and the Russian population

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22. Ibid.

23. See No. 6, p. 264.

generally thus far have refused to learn Kazakh. The "forced acculturation" that Russians perceive in the law on languages is likely to serve as a catalyst for rising irredentism in the north. As an example of this, the law on languages was one of the factors cited by the "Organization for the Autonomy of Eastern Kazakhstan", in its decision to press for the conversion of East Kazakhstan oblast into an autonomous republic.<sup>24</sup>

In Northern Kazakhstan, where Russians have lived for generations, remain in the majority, and have developed a strong sense of homeland. The relatively longer term residence among Russians in Kazakhstan and the sense of homeland that has developed in the north suggest that irredentism is likely to become available alternative to emigration as Russians increasingly react to exclusionary Kazakh nationalism. Russians felt more helpless when Kazakhs returned from the other countries. The citizenship law which grants automatic citizenship to Kazakhs returning from outside Kazakhstan. These Kazakhs are permitted to have either dual citizenship, or they can alter Kazakh citizenship upon their emigration to Kazakhstan. In addition to providing for the unobstructed return of all Kazakhs, the law provides funding for Kazakhs, previously forced to leave the republic as a result of persecution and who now wish to return. Most of these emigrants are being settled in northern Kazakhstan in what Russians perceive as a deliberate effort by the Kazakh government to "Kazakhize" the population in north.

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24. Martha Olcott, in Ian Bremner and Ray Taras (ed.), *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor State*, Cambridge, 1993, p. 322-323

The Russian concentration in the north reflects geographic variations in the phasing in of the law on language, which already has been delayed in Kazakh minority Northern Oblasts. The implementation of the language law and similar pro Kazakh legislation undoubtedly have exerted a northward pull on Russians living in Kazakhstan's south.

The law on citizenship, passed on December -20, 1991, and enacted on 1st March, 1992, provided a further cause for Russians to perceive discrimination in independent Kazakhstan. The "citizenship law" adopted a "zero option" approach that automatically conferred citizenship on all permanent residents of Kazakhstan at the time. However, several clauses in the law were objectionable to Russians. First, the law rejected dual citizenship for Russians in Kazakhstan, but permitted Kazakhs living inside Kazakhstan and holding citizenship in another state to become citizens of Kazakhstan. Second, the law provided automatic citizenship to Kazakhs living outside the state upon their immigration to Kazakhstan regardless of their place of birth.

The republic of Kazakhstan creates the conditions for the return to its territory, of persons who had been forced to leave the republic in periods of mass representation, because of forced collectivization and as a result of other inhumane political acts, of their progeny, and of Kazakhs living in former union republics.<sup>25</sup>

Russians in Kazakhstan favour dual citizenship arguing that it would provide security against what they view as a troubling Kazakh-centric government in

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25. *FBIS - Sov*, No. 29, February 16, 1993, p. 55.

Almaty. Kazakh political elite and nationalists believe that dual citizenship is an issue fabricated in Moscow and that nearly all Russians would opt for Kazakhstan citizenship if forced to choose. However, the Russians' growing sense that they are becoming an excluded minority in independent Kazakhstan indicates the reverse. If forced to choose, they might opt for Russian citizenship. Because of the geographic concentration of Russians in the north, this eventually would present Almaty with de-facto secession, since a majority of the population in the region would be citizens of another state. Thus, the citizenship issue could precipitate civil conflict between Russians and Kazakhs and ultimately inter-state conflict between Russia and Kazakhstan.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Russians were leaving primarily because greater economic opportunities existed in Russia than in Kazakhstan. In addition, Russians and other non-indigenous groups increasingly commented that ethnic favouritism toward Kazakhs put them into a comparative disadvantage, and that this change in the ethnic stratification system was also causing out migration. Kazakh over-representation in higher education and political representation and the dramatic shift during the 1980s toward higher Kazakh participation in all sectors of the economy provided an added incentive for Russian emigration.<sup>26</sup>

Kazakhization is not enough to secure the success of Kazakh nation building, as it threatens to provoke a backlash from the state's substantial Russian minority, faced as it is with political disempowerment and social disorientation. In the

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26. See No. 6, p. 259.

administrative sphere, Kazakhs have come to dominate the top positions in most major ministries and including agriculture, defence, education, foreign affairs, internal affairs, oil, gas and justice).<sup>27</sup> More dramatically, administrations of regions heavily populated by Russians have become increasingly Kazakh dominated, like for example the Karaganda oblast. With a population that is less than 20 percent Kazakh, Karaganda had six of its top eight administrative positions filled by Kazakhs in early 1994. In Pavlodar, Kazakh outnumbered Russians in top administrative positions 6 to 3; and in the city of Almaty, the ratio was 9 to 2.<sup>28</sup>

In line with the constitution, during the pre-election months, candidates were forbidden to promote racial or national exceptionalism, or violation of the country territorial integrity. This was enforced by a decree from the ministry of justice suspending the activities of mono-ethnic organisation which were harassed and forced by the government to provide personal data on their members. There were also side spread accusation that election commissions had arbitrarily denied registration to candidates, including the members of the Russian organisation Lad and the Independent Trade Union, which supported rapid economic reform. In all, 218 candidates were disqualified. The ethnic breakdown of those that remained revealed a clear anti-Russian bias- out of 756 candidates, 77 percent were ethnic Kazakhs, only 18 percent were Russians.<sup>29</sup>

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27. Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, "The Trouble with Democracy in Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 15(2), 1996, p. 184.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

Following the declaration of sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR in October 1990, and later independence of the republic in December 1991, the first post-Soviet constitution of the republic of Kazakhstan (January - 1993), was adopted under the deep social and economic crisis. The politics of ethno-nationalism was followed by the rise of ethnic competition and inter-ethnic tension, that resulted in mass exodus of the Russians from Kazakhstan to Russia.<sup>30</sup>

Exclusionary "ethno-demographic", "socio-cultural" and "political Kazakhization" policies and processes have the objective of re-defining multinational Kazakhstan as a Kazakh national state. These policies and processes have resulted in increasing Russian uneasiness within Kazakhstan and also have drawn Russia into the picture as the "defender of Russians in the hear abroad".<sup>31</sup> Kazakhstan is on the verge of a crisis as the relation between Russians and Kazakhs has the potential to broaden the ethnic conflict into an inter-state conflict between Russia and Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan's political stability will depend much on existence of a harmonious ethnic relation chiefly between the Kazakhs and the Russians. The republican demographic pattern also necessitates a harmonious relation between the two balance.<sup>32</sup> The various state policies, which have a very negative impact on Russian minority in Kazakhstan, resulted in the Russian emigration process. Russian net emigration to Russia more than trippled from 25,578

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30. Rustem Kadyrzhonov (Kazakhstan), "Kazakh Ethno-Nationalism and Problems of Nation-building in Modern Kazakhstan" Paper Presented Indo-Kazakh International Cultural Seminar in J.N.U., New Delhi, 1998.

31. See No. 6, p. 158.

32. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 45, No. 48, 1993, p. 20.

to 802,371 from 1991 to 1992 and increased to 104,4000 in 1993.<sup>33</sup> This trend toward increasing emigration is likely to continue :- a 1994 public opinion poll found that approximately one-third of all Russians wished to leave Kazakhstan. This finding held true not only for Russians in southern oblasts of northern Kazakhstan.<sup>34</sup> Several analysts have concluded that Russians in Kazakhstan will emigrate rather than stay and fight 'Kazakhization' either through political opposition or by attempting to secede.

The 1994 parliamentary elections further exacerbated relations between Russians and Kazakhs and also between Russia and Kazakhstan. Almaty's Kazakhization of local political organisations in northern oblasts and Rayons, coupled with lack of Russian representation at the centre, further encouraged Russians to reorient themselves northward toward Russia.

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33. See No. 6, p. 261.

34. Ibid.

**CHAPTER III  
STATE POLICIES AND MINORITY  
RIGHTS IN KAZAKHSTAN.**

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The Russian emigration is not a result of state policy and their presence is in the interest of Kazakh nation itself. This has been highlighted by Kazakh President Nazarbaev. He clarified when speaking to the '*Komsomolskaya Pravda*', that there is no state policy to change the demographic situation in the state by resettling Kazakhs from Mongolia and border regions of China, as has been alleged in some quarters.<sup>1</sup> The chairman of opposition Republican Party of Kazakhstan, S. Akatayev, during a rally of the national democratic parties and movements in front of Parliament building in Mid-June 1992, said that his party was not advancing any anti-Russian slogans, rather his party is asking the Russian population of Kazakhstan for help and support.<sup>2</sup>

On accelerating market transformation and measures for getting out of the economic crisis, Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev clarified in great detail about the sensitive issue of migration. Among several causes, he gave first place to mistakes in language policy and in determining the status of state language. He maintained, it is necessary, without delay, to adopt a new law on languages and eliminate any discrimination against the Russian language which Kazakhs and other people need for their development just as much as the Russian speaking population itself does". According to the Kazakh President, "bias in personnel policy" and imbalances in admission of applicants to higher and specialized secondary educational institutions" have also played a negative role. He called for firm measures against manifestations of everyday nationalism.<sup>3</sup>

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1. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLV, No. 20, 1993, p. 25.

2. Ajay Patnaik in Sashikanta Jha (ed.), *Reform, Change and Conflict in the CIS and Eastern Europe*. New Delhi, 1996, p. 254.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

In 1980s, Kazakh political and cultural elites began to reverse the socio-cultural and particularly linguistic-russification that had occurred during the Soviet era. Although nearly 99 percent of all Kazakhs in Kazakhstan proclaimed Kazakh to be their native language. Kazakh cultural leaders such as Olzhas Suleymenov and even Nursultan Nazarbaev complained throughout the 1980s that the Kazakh language was dying out. Kazakh elites were particularly concerned about the status of Kazakh in the primary schools, which increasingly had been replaced by Russian during the previous two decades.<sup>4</sup>

The language law passed in 1989 made Kazakh a mandatory subject of study and a concerted effort has been undertaken to convert the language of instruction from Russian to Kazakh. The first step was to install changes in the Russian language schools by divide classes into Kazakh and Russian language instructions. During the 1990s, Russian language schools increasingly have been converted to Kazakh language schools, particularly in the south.<sup>5</sup>

A 'Kazakhization' of students, faculty, and administrators in higher education already was taking place by 1980s. The fact that Kazakh college students were at the forefront of 1986 demonstrations in Almaty was not lost on the new regime that replaced Kunaev. Speeches and articles by political elite in 1987 decried both the favoritism shown Kazakhs in gaining admission to higher education and the lack of "internationalism" among college students and within the educational system. Higher

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4. Martha Olcott, "Perestroika in Kazakhstan", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. 39(4), July-August 1990, p. 73.

5. Martha Olcott in Ian Bremer and Ray Taras (ed), *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, 1993, Cambridge, p. 322-323.

educational attainment, even in an educational system dominated by the Russian language, had not resulted either in Russification or Sovietization.

Reflecting Nazarbaev's belief that the Kazakh language "should be preserved, enriched, and developed without encroaching on all the others which we have", the law proclaimed Kazakh be the state language, but accorded the Russian the status of language of international communication.<sup>6</sup> Under the provision of law, study of Kazakh is mandatory and competency in Kazakh is required for admission to higher education and for governmental employment. The implementation of these requirements varies by oblast, with the earliest dates in the southern oblasts, where Kazakhs are the majority, and later implementation in northern areas with Russian majorities.

Kazakhs continue to be overrepresented among students in colleges, and Russians, in faculty and administrative position in the universities and within the ministry of education increasingly were replaced by Kazakhs. Between 1989-1992, the share of Russian executives in the ministry of education had declined from 47 percent to 19 percent. This 'Kazakhization' has continued in 1993 and 1994.<sup>7</sup>

Kazakh nationalist are pressurising the Nazarbaev government to proceed more rapidly with Socio-cultural 'Kazakhization'. Nazarbaev's attempt to protect the status of the Russian language and to emphasize the equality of languages have angered Kazakh nationalist. Organizations such as Alash, Whose members

6. *FBIS-SOV*, No. 201, October-17, 1990, p. 73.

7. *FBIS-USR*, No. 147, November-14, 1992, p. 92-93.

favour an exclusionary "Kazakhstan for Kazakhs" political agenda and advocated the expulsion of Russians, staged demonstrations in 1992 calling for Nazarbaev's removal for being too internationalist and for pandering to Russians. But Nazarbaev proclaimed that a only unity can ensure peace and prosperity for Kazakhstan the common mother land of all citizens of the republic regardless of ethnic origin. He also argued against blaming Russians for Kazakhstan's problems :-

"The Russian people have suffered most of all. During the great patriotic war who suffered the heaviest loss? The Russians. And in the thirties more Russians died from famine and repressions than any other nationality. That is why I say to my opponents : Do not identify the Russian people with the empire".<sup>8</sup>

In 1993, Nazarbaev advocated the formation of a new civic nation-a multinational Kazakhstani people-which sounded strikingly similar to Soviet people concept. But this approach seems out of step with the rising tensions between Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, and reminds one of Gorbachev's mistaken belief that a Soviet people had emerged and that Soviet patriotism had successfully supplanted nationalism in U.S.S.R.<sup>9</sup>

Nazarbaev's attempt to find common ground between the Kazakh nationalist revival and Russian interests have assuaged neither Kazakhs intent on gaining national hegemony nor Russians worried about their loss of standing in the face of

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9. Robert Kaiser and Jeff Chinn, "Russian Kazakh Relations in Kazakhstan", *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1995, p. 264.

8. *FBIS-SOV*, No. 29, February 16, 1993, p. 55.

'Kazakhization'. Nationalists want socio-cultural Kazakhization to proceed more rapidly to overcome post Russification. Russians perceived 'Kazakhization' as forced acculturation and a means of replacing Russians with Kazakhs. Russians thus, felt that they have no future in an independent and increasingly nationalists and exclusionary Kazakhstan.

'Kazakhization' is not enough to secure the success of Kazakh nation-building, as it threatens to provoke a backlash from the state's substantial Russian minority, forced as it is with political disempowerment and social disorientation. Therefore, Nazerbaev has coupled it to a policy of 'harmonization' which encourages the participation of Russians in all facets of Kazakh life and seeks, if not their assimilation, then at least their tacit acceptance of Kazakh rule. Automatic citizenship, wide tolerance of Russian language and culture, and government subsidies to the Russian-dominated industrial sector are all components of the policy.

To address the first deficiency of the Kazakh nation, Nazerbaev's Nation building scheme has at its core the policy of 'Kazakhization' : revising the Kazakh language, restoring traditional names to cities and landmarks, revising history to reflect a Kazakh national perspective, and observing Kazakh and Islamic holidays. Reminiscent of Lenin's nationalities policies of 1920s, this post-soviet nationalization policy also entails a process of social mobility for ethnic Kazakhs and seeks to keep the reins of government firmly in their hands. <sup>10</sup>

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10. Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, "The Truble with Democracy in Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 15(2), 1996, p. 182

Kazakhstan has undergone a series of political reorientations. In their wake, 'inter-nationalism' became the official policy in Kolbin's Kazakhstan; overt nationalism was suppressed, though cultural 'Kazakhization' did continue during this period. Incidentally the 1986 events became a catalyst for further 'Kazakhization', since it was effectively argued that Kazakh students reacted so strongly to the removal of Kunaev and replacing him with Kolbin as first secretary of the Kazakh Party because of a history of linguistic Russification, and also because there were "blank pages" relationship with Russians and Moscow.<sup>11</sup>

Nazarbaev first became party secretary in 1989, but did not immediately adopt a nationalist political action programme. As a Gorbachev supporter and apparently inter-nationalist himself, Nazarbaev attempted to fulfill the Kazakh nationalist desire for greater socio-cultural, economic and political 'Kazakhization', while at the same time reassuring the Russians that their status would be protected. However, this formula proved unworkable, since increasing Kazakh privileges necessarily restructured the national stratification system to the detriment of Russians. Even inter-ethnic equalization in a republic where Russian language and culture had been dominant would result in a loss of Russian status.

Following the declaration of sovereignty adopted in October 25, 1990, there were attempts to maintain a balance between Kazakh and Russian position that existed during the pre-independence period, but, nonetheless, there was the dominance of the nationalistic political action program. In the preamble of Kazakh

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11. See No. 9, p. 266

constitution, for international equality and "consolidating and strengthening the friendship of the people" intermingled with the need to take "responsibility for the fate of Kazakh nation".<sup>12</sup> In Article-2, sovereignty is declared for the protection, defense, and strengthening of national statehood, with the revival and development of distinctive culture, traditions and language, and the strengthening of the national dignity of the Kazakh nation that was proclaimed as the primary task of the sovereign republic. Only in Article - 12 is guarantee of international equality provided. Yet the labeling of non-Kazakh as "outsiders" and the concern expressed for Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan provides strong indications that Kazakhs are "first among equals".

After independence and the dismantling of communist party, Nazarbaev removed local political appointees throughout the country and installed his own personnel. The reappointment process resulted in Kazakhization of political elites in the northern oblasts. Kazakhs appointed by the centre often had no ties to local Russian communities, thus widening the rift between Russians and Kazakhs and between the northern periphery and central authorities in Almaty.

At the same time, the political elite in Almaty began to treat nationalist organizations differently. In the past, Nazarbaev regime suppressed both Kazakh and Russian extremist groups equally. Beginning in 1992, the government increasingly tolerated Kazakh nationalist organizations, but Russian nationalist and Cossack organizations were denied registration or had their registrations revoked for engaging in anti-state or pro-separatist demonstrations.<sup>13</sup>

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12. FBIS - SOV, No. 245, December 20, 1990, p. 70.

13. See No. 9, p. 268.

Representatives of nations and national groups living in the Kazakh republic outside their national state and autonomous formations or without such on the territory of the the republic are guaranteed legal equality and equal opportunities in all spheres of life. The Kazakh republic displayed concern for satisfaction of the national cultural, spiritual and language requirements of Kazakhs living outside of the republic.<sup>14</sup>

Consistent with the policy of tentative democratization, the government has tolerated a wide variety of ethnically neutral social movements, such as veteran and youth organizations, the workers' movements, the peasant's union, association for lawyers and entrepreneurs, and various environmental groups. While many have received their share of criticism, the only requirement the government has imposed is that they maintain a Pan- Kazakhstan posture, i.e., that they do not, in any way, favor one ethnic group over another.

Nazarbaev has used the constitution's prohibition on promoting ethnic intolerance to deny registration to several ethnically based organizations. The Kazakh nationalist party 'Alash', with it's slogan of 'Islam', 'Turkish', 'Democracy' and a political agenda supporting the expulsion of Russians from Kazakhstan, was the first party to be banned. The other Kazakh movement, Zheltoqsan, was also denied registration as a result of it's policy towards inter-ethnic relations which, while not advocating mass expulsion, did call for tight restriction on Cossack activities and sought to "encourage Russian emigration."<sup>15</sup>

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14. *FBIS-USR*, No. 54, May 5, 1992, p. 67.

15. See No. 10, p. 186.



Pro-Russian groups have also faced tight restrictions. The communist party was banned following the Soviet collapse and was denied the right to re-register in 1992 for its open opposition to Kazakh independence. Edinstvo (unity), an organisation established to promote Russian culture, also had its registration rejected that year on the same ground. In June 1994, the Kazakh government registered the first Cossack organization - the society for assistance to semirechye Cossacks - since an earlier union of Cossacks had its registration revoked in 1991. But the semirechye Cossacks were warned that if they crossed the boundary between cultural, political and military affairs, they too, would be shut down. Following a Cossack protest in the streets of Almaty, the government carried out its promise.<sup>16</sup>

Refusing registration has only been the tip of the government's assault on ethnic organizations. Leaders have been prevented from leaving the country to shore up international support, peaceful demonstrations have been broken up by local authorities; and supporters have been arrested. The first political detainees in independent Kazakhstan were several members of Alash, who were charged in early 1992 with holding unauthorized rallies, "insulting the honor of the President and hooliganism".

The conflict between Government and Russian Cossacks came to a head in October-November 1995 with the arrest and conviction of the ataman head of the banned semirechye Cossacks, Nikolai Gunkin. Temporarily detained the year before

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16. Ibid.

at the demonstration which led to the Cossack ban, Gunkin was again arrested while registering as a candidate in parliamentary elections. Accused on tenuous charges of organizing an illegal demonstration, Gunkin was sentenced to three months in prison. Following the incident, there seemed to be little chance that the conviction would be overturned. Nevertheless, the 'soft-authoritarian' pattern, which Nazarbaev used to deflate conflict was upheld, eight days after Gunkin's conviction, the semireichye Cossacks were permitted to register.<sup>17</sup>

Mikhail Gorbachev was responsible for the relaxation of controls on livestock properties, though private ownership of small plots and a limited number of animals already existed before being formally legitimized in the later 1980s. In turn, it gave a rise to a Soviet type of individualism and small group oriented communities that began to distance themselves from large government work units and carry on trade by means of barter. The collapse of a command-administrative system shook the foundation of collective social organization as Kazakhstan's government pushed for a more privatised economy.

As the privatization policy led to growing ethnic tension between the Kazakhs and Russian minority, Nazarbaev modified it to placate both groups - "Land of the republic of Kazakhstan is the exclusive property of the state". A presidential decree issued on 12 April 1994, reflected his firm commitment to the acceleration of private land ownership, within the framework of the constitution. The Decree granted

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17. Ibid., p. 187.

citizens of Kazakhstan the right to possess and lease parcels of land for a lifetime period, but does not mention any commercial transactions of these lands. The development of Kazakhstan's land privatization has appeared to be encouraging :

Over the past seven months of 1994, the actual number of privatized state farms totaled 328 against 257 planned under the republican privatization programme. The number of newly privatized forms rose by 3,7,000, surpassing the benchmark of 20,000.<sup>18</sup>

The law on citizenship passed on December 20, 1991 and enacted on March 1, 1992, was a discriminatory towards the Russian minority. The citizenship law adopted a 'zero-option' approach that automatically conferred citizenship on all permanent residents of Kazakhstan at the time. But several clauses were objected by the Russians. It was a discriminatory as it rejected dual citizenship for Russians in Kazakhstan, but permitted Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan and holding citizenship in another state to become citizens of Kazakhstan and the law also provided automatic citizenship to Kazakhs living outside the state upon their emigration to Kazakhstan, regardless of their place of birth.

The Kazakh right of return is an area in which the government has taken an active role. Despite the economic difficulties inherent in such a venture, it has encouraged the immigration of Kazakhs not only from other CIS states, but also from Mongolia, Turkey, Iraq, and China. Further more, it has attempted to entice these

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18. Jiger Janabel, "When National Ambition conflicts with Reality : Studies on Kazakhstan's Ethnic Relations", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol, 15(1), 1996, p. 14.

new immigrants along with Kazakhs living in the south of Kazakhstan, to settle in the north of the country with offers of subsidized housing, work, and Kazakh - language schools. Absorption efforts cooled due to financial problems, Russian opposition, and lack of interest or ability to emigrate on the part of the diaspora. Kazakhs became indifferent, but official enthusiasm for the policy remains strong.<sup>19</sup> As symbols of ownership can be just as important as actual physical presence, the state has also encouraged the construction of Mosques - a much visible symbol of Kazakh sovereignty - in the north and throughout the country, and government officials regularly refer to northern territories as "original Kazakh lands" when questioned as to Kazakhstan's right to continue possession of all territories in the country.

In the few years of Kazakh independence, Kazakhstan's a state building process appears to have had decisive advantages. While confronted with political, economic and social crises similar to those of all post Soviet states. Kazakhstan has remained largely free from the ethnic conflict and virulent nationalism plaguing many. Kazakhstan has ranked high on the western world's list of potential CIS partners.

Kazakhstan's first post-Soviet constitution ratified in January 1993 gave democratic principles the centre stage. Life, liberty, and the inalienable rights of the individual are of the highest value to the state. Citizens are guaranteed a basket of civil liberties including freedom of speech, freedom of media, freedom to demonstrate peacefully and freedom to create social organizations. International human

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19. John Dunlop, Will the Russians Return from the Near Abroad? *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol. 35, No. 4, April 1994, p. 120.

rights agreements signed by Kazakhstan even have precedence over state law.<sup>20</sup>

The constitution spends as much time establishing the government's fundamental nation building strategy. It declared Kazakhstan was created on the basis of Kazakh self-determination. At the same time, the constitution was accommodating towards non-Kazakhs. It guarantees equal rights for all citizens, regardless of race, nationality, language or religion. And while Kazakh was the state language, the 1993 constitution afforded Russian a prominent position as the language of inter-ethnic communication and prohibited any discrimination on the rights of citizens who did not speak Kazakh.<sup>21</sup> Taking into consideration, the sustained opposition of ethnic Russians to their language's secondary, if protected, status, the 1995 constitution conferred official government status upon it as well. Most notably, the constitution grants automatic citizenship to all who desire it, with no language or residence requirements whatsoever.

The constitution does not rely solely on soft persuasion to encourage and maintain national unity. In line with the constitution's declaration that Kazakhstan is a unitary state, regional governors are appointed directly by the president. This ensures that local development follows Nazarbaev's wishes and prevents the ascension of power of extremists who could arouse nationalist discontent.

One clause of the constitution, which was reflected in its move from Article 55 to Article - 5 in the new draft, expressly forbids the establishment of any social

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20. See No. 10, p. 183.

21. Ibid.

organization which seeks to forcibly change the constitutional order, undermine state security, or promote social, racial, national, religious, class or tribal discord.

The primacy of nationalization in Kazakh state building has also been visible in the governments's efforts to transform constitution ideals into concrete facts on the ground. Most successful has been it's extensive drive to popularize the Kazakh language and culture. Place names have been changed from Russian to Kazakh; Kazakh-language books, newspapers, radio and television programs have been actively promoted, Kazakh has been introduced in all schools, and new Kazakh schools have been opened.

At the sametime, the government's reluctance to enact a mass linguistic transformation, as reflected in it's dual language policy, has so far ensured a balance between Kazakh and Russian culture. In summer of 1995, Russian language newspapers still outnumbered Kazakh ones, if barely, and Russian - language television continued to dominate the airwaves. The central government did not push the issue when the city administration of petropavlovsk refused to acknowledge a directive to change the city's name to it's Kazakhs variant.<sup>22</sup>

The most assertive of the government's nationalizing measures has been to move the capital of Kazakhstan from Almaty, nestled in the south-east corner of the country, to Akmola, in the middle of the Russian populated north. Proposed by Nazerbaev in June 1994, ratified by parliament the month after, and signed into law

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22. Ibid., p. 184.

by the president in September 1995, the move (which is to take over several years) was justified on the grounds that it would provide the state capital with physical growth, clean air, and geographic accessibility, three things which Almaty sorely lacks.<sup>23</sup> But what Nazarbaev failed to mention was the fact that with Akmola as the state capital, the central government would be able to exert far greater control over the whole of the country and, especially, oversee the political development of the north.

The freedom of the media has been similarly circumscribed. While there are numerous independent media sources in Kazakhstan, virtually all television and radio facilities, along with printing facilities and supplies, are owned by the government. As with social organizations, media organs are free to level criticism at the government as long as they do not foster ethnic discontent. News-papers with questionable content have found themselves without access to paper or printers, while blatantly intolerant ones, such as the Kazakh nationalist '*Kazakhskaya Pravda*' and '*Orda*', have been banned.

It is the intelligentsia and educated middle strata in general, who, even more than the former communist political elite, are now the main promoters of ethnic nationalism in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Thus, the rights of all citizens regardless of ethnic membership, began to be considered detrimental to the interests of politically strong but economically disadvantaged ethnic groups.

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23. Ibid., p. 185

Kazakhstan's demographic situation seriously dampens the country's democratic prospects. Most Russians in Kazakhstan, especially in the north, have shown little sign of reconciling themselves to life under Kazakh rule. In December 1991, thousands of ethnic Russians in east Kazakhstan oblast demonstrated in an effort to seek official status for the Russian language, the adoption of dual citizenship, and extensive autonomy for the region. Following the March 1994 election, the question of regional autonomy was publicly raised by Russians in numerous northern oblasts. Such vocal protests, coupled with nearly universal Russian demand for dual citizenship and continued Cossack calls for secession in the north, gives the government little reason to believe that Russian will come to accept Kazakh political rule anytime soon. As free speech and unrestricted political participation encourage opposition activism, the government has steadily tightened the reins.<sup>24</sup>

In 1994 parliamentary election, a quarter of parliamentary seats were reserved for candidates from the slate list - a state of 64 nominees personally drawn up by President, from which 42 deputies were to be elected. Justifying this manoeuvre, the president insisted that, as the constitution did not allow him to dissolve parliament, it was imperative that the Supreme Kenges contain at least one group of deputies that supported him wholeheartedly.<sup>25</sup> The state list also allowed him to manipulate the new legislative body's ethnic composition, in many cases, forcing the election of at least one Kazakh from a Russian dominated oblast and vice-versa, and putting up for election representatives of other ethnic groups that would be unlikely to otherwise gain representation.

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24. *Ibid.*, 194.

25. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 14, December, 1993.



Despite manipulating the election process, the Kazakh government remained eager to project the elections as 'unconditionally democratic' and invited over 100 international representatives to monitor them. The government thus welcomed with surprise and indignation a post-election press conference organized by CSCE observers, who declared that the elections did not meet international standards and could be considered neither free nor fair.<sup>26</sup>

Despite strong national feeling is in Kazakhstan, even the most nationalistic Kazakhs know that they are no match for the formidable slavs in numerical terms. Population increase and decrease among ethnic groups in this slav dominated Central Asian republic weighs so heavily that a handful of Kazakh demographers are constantly asked by the Kazakh media and government for their precious advice to increase the native population. Nazarbaev's government has actively pursued a carefully designed policy aimed at significantly boosting Kazakh's share of the republic's population.<sup>27</sup>

On President's initiative, a standing committee was set up to accelerate the pace of Kazakh's migration from abroad to Kazakhstan. The resolution declared that a member of the indigenous nationality who has left Kazakhstan, for any reason is automatically recognized as a refugee and has preferential status with regard to returning and finding a home and a job in the republic. This resolution was imple-

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26. See No. 9, p. 189.

27. See No. 17, p. 7.

mented by a series of immigration laws.<sup>28</sup> It also allowed free college admission for a Kazakh born outside of Kazakhstan and free accommodation for a Kazakh from abroad to travel within the territory of the republic.

While the Kazakhs are still trying to reconstruct their national memory, lost to Sovietization and Russianization, they are now being dragged into a more powerful whirlpool as western philosophy sweeps across every corner of the former Soviet realm, propelled by the influx of overseas capital. Even the most nationalistic Kazakhs have realized that their campaign against Russian influence had been easier than combating the new western ideology, which is so promising and absorbing.

In the beginning of 1992, activists of the Kazakh organizations 'Azat' and 'Kazakh tile' forced Chechans and Ingush living in the Novyi Mir settlement in Taidy - Kyrghn oblast to sell their houses for a mere trifle and to leave Kazakhstan immediately. Anti-chechan demonstrations also took place in the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, in September -1992. President Nazarbaev promised that nobody would be compelled to leave Kazakhstan by force but their voluntary departure would be welcomed. In 1992, a total of 370,000 people including about 250,000 Russians left Kazakhstan.<sup>29</sup>

The multi-ethnic composition of Kazakhstan was one of the reasons why President Nazarbaev argued for civil accord and inter ethnic accommodation in the republic, and even in 1991, still wanted the preservation of the Soviet Union. He also

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28. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 45, No. 48, 1993, p. 20.

29. Anatoly M. Khazanov, "The Ethnic Problems of Contemporary Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 14(2), 1995, p. 254.

declared his allegiance, not to 'nationalism by blood', but to 'nationalism by soil'. His official goal is to make Kazakhstan a nation - state. He stated again and again that the discriminatory practices against Russian speaking population should be stopped and that more Russians should be admitted to the institutions of higher education in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh intelligentsia appealed to him 'to help his own people' and reproachers him for 'neglecting interests of the Kazakh people'. But in other side, the Russian reproach him for being led by Kazakh nationalists; they claim that although Nazarbaev avoids publicly favouring Kazakhs, this is just what he is doing in his practical measures.<sup>30</sup>

Nazarbaev's policy is aimed at the marginalization of the extreme Kazakh and Russian organizations. To achieve this goal, he sometimes does not hesitate to resort to police methods. At the sometime, apparently in an attempt to widen his support base, he indicates his desire to reach rapprochement with more moderate Kazakh parties and organizations and accepts in practice many of their demands. On 16 December, 1991, Kazakhstan's parliament declared that all ethnic Kazakhs wherever they are living, have the right to acquire Kazakh citizenship and/or to return to this country. The law on migration promulgated on 26 June, 1992, has promised the state's support to those Kazakhs who are actually immigrating to the country. On 17 July, 1992, the then Vice-President of Kazakhstan, Eric Asanbaev, clearly stated that Kazakhstan's statehood will be built on ethnic principles.<sup>31</sup>

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30. Ibid., p. 257.

31. Ibid., p. 258.

A poll commissioned by the Russian language Kazakhstan newspaper 'Karran' sought to elucidate why so many Russian - speakers were contemplating leaving the republic : 29.2 percent of those contacted cited"; fear of ethnic conflict 25.6 percent mentioned the economic situation, and 14.2 percent cited the law on language.<sup>32</sup> In Reacting to this news, Nazarbaev in a press conference in January - 1994, briefly lifted the ban that his government had imposed on the release of migration statistics. Nazerbaev reported that 200,000 Russians had left Kazakhstan in 1993, but added that 160,000 Russians had arrived to take up permanent residence in the republic.<sup>33</sup>

The rising fear of worsening inter-ethnic relations and the potential for the inter-ethnic conflict accelerated the pace of Russian emigration in the 1990s. In 1991, only 10.9 percent of out-migrants from Kazakhstan named "worsening of international relations", as the reason for their departure. This reason ranked behind "family circumstances" (33.6 percent), "changed workplace" (14.1 percent) and "studies" (11.1 percent).<sup>34</sup>

Though Kazakhstan continued it's earlier policy of language and citizenship, but in latter part of 1995, changed it, because of the growing pressure from Russia on it's minority problem. Kazakhstan government changed this policy to a consolidating one because, as skilled Russian labours are willing to leave Kazakhstan

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32. See No. 19, p. 210.

33. Ibid.

34. See No. 9, p. 260.

which will put Kazakhstan's economy & industry in a very difficult position. The threat of the secession of North Kazakhstan to Russia is another problem for Kazakhstan. The fear of the strained relations with Russia in handling of ethnic issue, where ethnic conflict reached in its peak point-developed a policy of "harmonization" and "consolidation" in order to satisfy both groups & to keep neighborly relations with Russia.

**CHAPTER IV  
RUSSIAN MINORITY AND  
KAZAKHSTAN-RUSSIA  
RELATIONS SINCE 1991**

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There are over 10 million Russians living in the five central Asian republics, or 40 percent of the 25 million Russians living outside Russia in the so-called 'near abroad'. Their status is taking on an undeniable political and strategic significance for Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian republics, as well as for Ukraine and other newly independent republics of the CIS. Many Russians fear they will become second class citizens or persecuted minorities. The ending of straightforward Russian dominance means they are having to think hard now about their Russian identity, something they always took for granted.

For the Yeltsin government, the problem of the 25 million Russians outside Russia has grown steadily in importance since 1993. Even if it wanted to, Russia can not simply shake off responsibility for their welfare. The nationalist backlash in Russia can not be ignored. Claims that Moscow is abandoning the Russian minorities, or ready to make deals at their expense, have to be countered. In nationalist circles there are calls to reassert Russian rights and power over states which are often described in Russia as, 'newly independent but not entirely foreign'.

During 1993 parliamentary election in Russia, public statements by Vladimir Zhirinovski, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, provoked furious criticism in Kazakhstan and other central Asia republics. The ultra-nationalist politician had urged much more vigorous protection of the civil rights of Russian-speakers living outside Russia's borders, pouring scorn on the existence of Kazakhstan in

particular as on independent state, and urging the need for Russia to reestablish control.<sup>1</sup>

Zhirinovskiy's contemptuous references to the Central Asia republics led Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry to state bluntly in November 1993, that his remarks were an open provocation aimed at instigating ethnic strife and destabilising the internal situation.

There are, however, good reasons other than Zhirinovskiy's outbursts that denials or restrictions of civil rights to various minorities became a bigger issue in 1993. Much more forceful demands were made by local level community leader for government to recognize dual citizenship, i.e., the right of ethnic Russians; many of them born in Kazakhstan; to take up dual citizenship; in Kazakhstan as well as Russia.

In Kazakhstan, emigration of Russian-speakers has often been attributed to nationalist policies and zealous promotion of the Kazakh language. An organization calling itself 'Kazakhstan congress of Russian communities' declared that Russians in northern Kazakhstan had become 'outcasts as a result of Alma-Ata's nationalist policies', went on to warn: 'wars begin with breaches of human rights..... (Kazakh) towns are becoming deserted. Russia is choking from a growing wave of refugees.'<sup>2</sup>

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1. Anthony Hyman, "Power and Politics in Central Asia's New Republics", *Conflict Studies*, No. 267-76, 1994, p. 23.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 24.



There are no laws in the Russian federation "on refugees" or "forced migrants". There is also no official definition of refugee status either. According to modest official data, there are about half a million refugees and unofficial sources put the figure at one million. In addition, there are about 700,000 forced migrants. Finding jobs for the refugees is the most difficult problem in the present situation. According to Tatyana Regent, Director of Federal Migration Service, migration of Russians from other CIS countries is exacerbating the social and economic problems related to re-settlement, employment and psychological adaptation of the new arrivals. She argued for linking Russian aid to the status of Russians in other CIS states and advocated for bilateral agreements that would guarantee the rights of nationalities other than the eponymous ones.<sup>3</sup> The problem of using economic aid as a weapon of negotiation is that it might be counterproductive for Russia as well. A reduced budget for aid to Kazakhstan in 1993, had a boomerang effect on Russian enterprises whose partners in Kazakhstan were unable to pay their debts due to restrictions on aid and credit from Russia. Victor Chomomyrdin, the then Russian Prime-minister commented that Russia has to tread a very cautious path while dealing with Kazakhstan. One major effort of Russia has been to get dual citizenship status for national minorities in the CIS countries, a provision which exists in the new Russian constitution (Art-62).<sup>4</sup>

The rising fear of worsening inter-ethnic relations and the potential for inter-ethnic conflict have accelerated the pace of Russian emigrations in the 1990s. In 1991, only 10.9 percent of out-migrants from Kazakhstan named "worsening of

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3. Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLV, No. 46, 1993, p. 21.

4. Ajay Patnaik in Sashikanta Jha (ed.), Reform, Conflict and Change in the CIS and Eastern Europe, New Delhi, 1998, p. 259

inter-national relations”, as the reason for their departure. This reason ranked behind “family circumstances” (33.6%), “changed work place” (14.1%) and “studies” (11.1%)

During the pre-independence period, political elites in the Russian Federation and Russian nationalists outside Kazakhstan played little role in the development of Russian-Kazakh relations in Kazakhstan. At the end of 1991, a close aide to Yeltsin declared that if Kazakhstan sought complete independence, Russia would reserve the right to review inter-state borders between them. However, Yeltsin immediately and publicly reiterated his support for the bilateral treaty signed with Kazakhstan that accepted the existing borders between the two republics. Kazakhstan’s support for the strong relations with a renewed “union of Sovereign states” and later with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States” kept inter-state tensions under control.

However, neither Kazakh nationalists nor Russians were satisfied with either the language law or the declaration of sovereignty. Russians and Kazakhs were moving to more extreme positions between 1989-1991. Few anticipated that independence would result either in rising inter-ethnic conflict or in a revision of borders with Russia. ‘Kazakhization’ was apparent in the republic prior to independence and accelerated between 1989 and 1991. Nevertheless this period marked an accommodative phase in Russian - Kazakh relations with Kazakh political elite’s sensitivity to Russian concerns about their loss of privileges, and to local Russians

remaining moderately optimistic about their future in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan was the last republic to declare independence and waited until Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created the Commonwealth of Independent States. One reason for Kazakhstan's hesitation was concern that such a declaration would further alienate Russians in the north.<sup>5</sup>

{ Since the collapse of the USSR and Kazakhstan's independence in December 1991, Kazakh political elites has become less accommodative as they have become more intent on reconstructing their state to serve primarily if not exclusively the interests of the Kazakh nationals. This more exclusionary political action programme has further alienated Russians in Kazakhstan, who have responded in a variety of ways, including : emigration from Kazakhstan, internal migration to the more Russified northern oblasts, political resistance to further 'Kazakhization' of the north, and increasing calls for the territorial autonomy in Kazakhstan or secession from Kazakhstan and accession to Russia. Political elites in Russia also have responded to the more overt attempts by Kazakh nationalists to gain hegemony in Kazakhstan with call for dual citizenship for Russians in Kazakhstan. Both inter-ethnic relations and inter-state relations between Kazakhstan and Russia have thus deteriorated since independence. This trend is certain to continue into the near future, despite Nazarbaev's call for a recentering of society around a multinational Kazakhstan identity. }

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5. Martha Olcott in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (ed.), "Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States", Cambridge, 1993, p. 326.

During 1993, inter-ethnic relations between Russians and Kazakhs deteriorated further. Nazarbaev and other Kazakh political elites contended that there were no national problems in Kazakhstan. However, Russians increasingly felt that the government in Almaty was pursuing an evermore exclusionary nationalist political agenda. Adding to the growing tensions in the state, Russian federation political elites and nationalists openly sided with Russians in Northern Kazakhstan. Where as nationalist such as Vladimir Zirinovskiy talked about the reincorporation of lost territories. Then Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev promoted the dual citizenship agenda of the local Russians. Russia's defense of Russians in the "near abroad" provoked an angry response from Nazarbaev, who compared it with Hitler's defense of the Sudeten Germans, which led to the conquest of Czechoslovakia.<sup>6</sup>

(The economic degradation in Kazakhstan is bound to worsen social discontent. Nazarbaev in a press conference said that economic growth in Kazakhstan would likely improve Russian conditions as it is focusing on the industrial sector, concentrated primarily in the north which is dominated by ethnic Russians. For this reason, government might be willing to grant them wider political rights, as Russian participation in state politics would be less threatening.<sup>7</sup>)

In the long run, Kazakhstan will continue to maintain close economic links with Russia, with which it conducts over 60 percent of its trade. Kazakh industry is deeply dependent upon Russian suppliers and consumers. Kazakhstan's extensive natural resources are tightly connected to Russian infrastructure. )

6. Robert Kaiser and Jeff Chinn, "Russian - Kazakh Relations in Kazakhstan", *Post-Soviet Geography*, Vol 36, No. 5, 1995, p. 269.

7. Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, "The Trouble with Democracy in Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol 15, No. 2, 1996, p. 195.

Kazakhstan has been comparatively fortunate in its relations with Russia. While the Russian government has not shied away from supporting revanchist movements throughout CIS territory, it has so far left Kazakhstan alone, desisting from claims on Kazakh territory and ignoring the requests of ethnic Russians for assistance.

The right wing in Russia has impelled Nursultan Nazarbaev to reshape his policy toward some ultra-Russian organization in the republic. After Zhirinovskiy's call to the Russian Government to take control of the whole of former union, it is easy to see why Nazarbaev's is determined to bring the increasingly ultra-Russian forces under his control. Following Zhirinovskiy's call, Nazarbaev, through his minister of justice, suspended the activities of all ultra-Russian organizations in the republic, and a criminal proceeding was even brought against Boris Suprunyuk, the leader of the Russian community of north Kazakhstan.<sup>8</sup> Increasing fear of Ultra-Russian activity eventually propelled Nazarbaev to make his proposal to the parliament to transfer Kazakh capital to the north.

Nazarbaev also denied Russia's request to grant dual citizenship to Russian in Kazakhstan because this would mean that almost one half of Kazakhstan's population could become Russian citizens. He also made quite clear that any territorial claims on Kazakhstan by Russia would imply unavoidable bloodshed.<sup>9</sup>

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8. Jiger Janabel, "When National Ambition Conflicts with Reality: Studies on Kazakhstan's ethnic relations", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 15(1), 1996, p. 18.

9. Anatoly M. Khazanov, "The Ethnic Problems of Contemporary Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1995, p. 257.

The Russian representative in Kazakhstan said that - "Russian side is ready for an immediate dialogue with Kazakhstan in order to normalize the situation around Cossack, taking into account their legitimate interests and help consolidation of friendship and co-operation between Russian and Kazakh people."<sup>10</sup> Nikolai Gunkin, hetman of the Semi-rechensk Cossacks, was sentenced by a Kazakhstan court to three months in a corrective labor colony for organising unauthorised rallies in defense of the rights of Cossacks living in Kazakhstan territory. Grigory Karasin, director of the Russian foreign ministry's department of information and press, expressed his regret over the sentence. "This decision was made despite protests by broad strata of our compatriots in Kazakhstan. "He said 'it is regrettable', that the sentenced was handed down just when Russia and Kazakhstan had reached an agreement in principle to begin a dialogue on the problems of the Cossacks in Kazakhstan".<sup>11</sup>

In reaction to the language policy adopted by Kazakhstan government, the lower house of the Russian Parliament passed a resolution, with 243 members voting in favor, two remaining neutral and one abstaining, on 26th April 1995, calling on Kazakhstan President Nazarbaev to support the republic's Russian-speaking population by making Russian an official language in Kazakhstan. The Chairman of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots, Konstantin Zatulin, said, the rate of immigration of ethnic minorities from Kazakhstan was among the highest in CIS, and further stated that "granting Russians the status of the second language could help to solve their pressing problems, concerning both their involvement in

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10. Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 9 December, 1994.

11. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVII, No. 26, November 20, 1995, p. 27.

public life and the prospects for the young generations".<sup>12</sup> But Kazakh authorities refused to give Russian the Status of a second language in the republic.

Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement 27 May, 1994, signed by President Yeltsin and Nazarbaev. The accord will envisage relaxing procedures governing migration of citizens of the two countries from each other's territory and obtain citizenship there. Abdualat Mikitayev, the chairman of the Commission on Issues of Citizenship, said despite certain differences on separate issues, government's of both countries, above all, are guided by the idea to create most comfortable conditions for their citizens. The flow of migrants, among which there are large number of residents of Kazakhstan, have during the past two years stormed into Russia. This does not at all help in stabilizing the economy and life in both states. The agreement will be to help ethnic Russians to calmly settle down on an equal footing with the entire people of Kazakhstan and participate in building a civilized society on a land which has long ago became their motherland.<sup>13</sup>

But the agreement on dual citizenship did not reach on the agenda despite pressures from Russia. The Kazakhs officials' main argument against dual citizenship was that it could affect the evolution of the young state. Alma-Ata also maintained that in this event, more than half of the population of Kazakhstan would be placed in a privilege position compared to the indigenous population. But according to Mikitayev, all those problems could be settled through bilateral agreements.

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12. *Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 28 April, 1995.*

13. *Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 27 May, 1994.*

The lower house of Russian parliament, the state Duma, ratified the Russia-Kazakhstan treaty on the legal status of citizens living on their respective territories on 24th May' 1996. The ITAR-TASS said that, according to the treaty citizens of Russian living in Kazakhstan and Kazakh citizens living in Russia enjoy the same right and freedom and have the same duty as citizens of that country, but can not be elected to senior official post or representative bodies in their country of residence. The treaty also regulates legal issues, including the adoption and guardianship of children and compensation for damages.<sup>14</sup>

Kazakhstan's "upper echelons" are continuing to pursue a policy of transforming more than one half of the republic's population into second class citizens. They are sweeping aside the demands to give Russians the status of second state language and they do not want to hear about dual citizenship, although Kazakhs have this right.

Tair Mansurov, the Kazakh ambassador to the Russian Federation, gave his assurance that there are no inter-ethnic problems in his native country and that the state shows touching concern for all it's people. But since, "every thing is fine and dandy", the ambassador had absolutely no idea what these "trouble makers" are dissatisfied about. His answers to the questions from Duma deputies, Cossack hetmans, and activists of Kazakhstan's Russian organisations were so equivocal that they could not satisfy any body.<sup>15</sup>

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14. *Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 28 May, 1996*

15. *Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 24 April, 1995*



The Kazakh foreign ministry has issued a statement criticizing Russia's decision in March' 1997 to deploy Cossack volunteers on the border between the two countries. The ministry of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan said that the strengthening of friendly relations with Russia is a priority area of the Republic's foreign policy. In this context, some actions by certain leaders of Federal Russian bodies are deplorable.<sup>16</sup>

The Russian side has been told repeatedly that the experimental guarding of the border by irregular troops - Cossack formations - contravenes the existing agreements between both countries on the border patrol procedure, Russia's minister for CIS, Aman Tuleyev, interfering in Kazakhstan's affairs gave a biased view about the economic development of Kazakhstan and about the domestic policy of Kazakh leaders.<sup>17</sup>

Russia's plan to include Cossack volunteers among units patrolling in border with Kazakhstan was announced on 24th March 1997, by a Deputy Director of the Federal Border Service, who said that it was a response to a growing threat from the drugs trade and illegal immigration. The Russian officials said that local volunteers were being deployed as an experiment in four border regions and that the scheme would be extended to cover the whole border after the trial period ended in June' 1997.<sup>18</sup> Kazakh Government reacted as it was a breach of existing agreement.

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16. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 19 April, 1997.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

Despite of these difference between the two countries on languages, citizenship and immigration issues, they came closer in order to develop inter-state relations by signing and cooperating in various spheres like, economy, trade, military, foreign relation and even for the re-integration of CIS states. While signing of the Baikanour cosmodrome development, agreement, the then Prime Minister of the Russian Government, Viktor Chernomyrdin, said that the interest of the Russian and Kazakh sides have been protected and the social problems of the specialists who live in the town of Leninsk and work at the Cosmodrome have been resolved.<sup>19</sup> The treaty on renting of the Baikanour ratified by the Russian state Duma on 21st April 1995 provided that Russia rents the Baikanour complex for 20 years and reserves rights over movable property and real estate, created or, purchased by Russia or, supplied by Russia to the Baikanour complex after 31st 1991. It also has the rights over products and income received as a result of its use, has the guarantee of taking to and from the cosmodrome space equipment and equipment necessary for ensuring the functioning the complex without obstacles, free of tax and other duties.

Russia in accordance with the treaty, enjoys jurisdictions regarding service men and civilian personnel, stipulates regulations, ensures security, a special regime, and protection of the Baikanour complex and has the opportunity to cancel, on a compensation basis under the agreement between the government of Russia and Kazakhstan part of the rent amounting to US dollar 115 million annually.<sup>20</sup>

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19. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 14 December, 1994.

20. See No. 15.

Russia - Kazakhstan relation aims to develop cooperation on an inter-parliamentary basis and to promote resumption and development of economic relations to a mutually beneficial economic partnership. Russian representative in Kazakhstan, Vladimir Ispravnikov, said that a common approach had emerged between the two countries on the issue of forming a legislative base in the areas of defence, trade and social protection. It also agreed to develop inter-parliamentary cooperation and the Russian side has offered to help train Kazakh parliamentary staff.<sup>21</sup>

On the issue of trade between two countries, Nazarbaev said "trade confederations will not give us anything", but he acknowledges that trade and economic integrations with Russia can provide a basis for political rapprochement. If Russia continues to advance on the path of democratic changes kind feeling will follow from it, and then unity will become a reality.

On the subject of mutual debt, between Russia and Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev said, "Kazakhstan does not owe anything". However, Russia owes Kazakhstan 350 million US dollar and for the last three years' rent on the Baikonour Cosmodrome and another dollar 110 million for military test sites on Kazakh territory.<sup>22</sup>

The treaty on military cooperation which was signed in 25th May 1992, was ratified by Kazakh parliament on 6th October 1994. This treaty related to cooperation, mutual assistance, and interests of ensuring collective security, proceeding

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21. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 25 June, 1993.

22. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 3rd January, 1997.

from the necessity of a strict and consistent fulfillment by the two sides of their obligations arising from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on 31st July' 1991 and Lisbon protocol on 23rd May 1992. Expressing the aspiration to attach a new quality to and guarantee a legal basis for legal cooperation between the two parties. Article-1 of the treaty says that "unified military formations" - units and formations of the armed forces of the republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian federation are deployed by the two parties to solve joint defence issues. "Defence installations" - test grounds, military installations, sites of battle fields located on land on the territories of the parties which may be used by the parties jointly or, transferred by one party, including on lease terms, to another party, to be used for military purposes with the aim of consolidating the defence capabilities of both parties.

Article-2 of the treaty, states that the two parties confirm their obligations on a friendly basis for inter-state relations on principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat of its use, equality of rights and non-interference in the internal affairs, good neighbourly implementation of treaty obligation in accordance with treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. Article-23 specifies that the parties will not allow their territory to be used by third states with the aim of carrying out activities aims against the other parties.<sup>23</sup>

The first detachment of the very latest fighter aircrafts flew to Kazakhstan from the airfield of the Russian Air force training centre in Lipetsk. Several dozen

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23. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 29 October, 1994

combat aircrafts have been handed over to Kazakhstan's air force on the instructions of the Russian government. The ITAR-TASS correspondent reported that the famous Su-27s and Mig-29s and some training aircraft entered combat service with the fraternal republic.<sup>24</sup> Russia has begun the transfer of around 30 Su-27 and Mig-29 fighter planes to Kazakhstan as compensation for strategic bombers previously handed over by Kazakhstan to Russia.<sup>25</sup>

Russia has agreed to allow the US-Kazakh joint venture developing the Tengiz oil field in Western Kazakhstan to pump more oil across Russia. They also agreed that Chevroil would be allowed to pump 4.5 times more than the previous quota of one million tonnes of oil per year across Russia. The oil will be pumped via the pipeline from Atyrau, in Western Kazakhstan, to Samara, in Russia and than on to Europe using a system of pipelines belonging to Russia's Transneft company.<sup>26</sup>

According to the ITAR-TASS, Kazakhstan does not yet have its own pipeline to delivery Kazakh oil to world market and has to rely on Russian pipelines. "It goes without saying that Kazakhstan has to take into account Russia's interest while preparing to construct its own pipeline".<sup>27</sup>

Russia and Kazakhstan also signed an agreement on pension rights guarantees for residents of the space launch centre Baikonour, an agreement on setting

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24. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 5 April, 1996.

25. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 8 April ,

26. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 20 April 1996

27. *Summary of World Broadcast*, Former USSR, 20 April, 1996

up a financial industrial group and an agreement on setting up a joint venture to produce diesel engines.<sup>28</sup>

Both countries also signed a document on the "Declaration on Expanding and Deepening Russian-Kazakh co-operation", 'creation of a common market for goods, services, capital and manpower', 'the attainment of co-ordination in foreign economic policy', 'the condition of tax and pricing policy', 'state support for the development of direct ties between economic entities'. The declaration established that the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan share common approaches to the problem of forming a system of collective security for the CIS.<sup>29</sup> They also signed a treaty defining the legal status of Russian citizens who are permanent residents of Kazakhstan and an agreement on simplified procedures for such people's "cross - acquisition" of citizenship in another state. Among the other things, they stated that Russia and Kazakhstan are willing to abandon tariff and non-tariff restrictions and that customs control will be eliminated on their common border if 'single customs space' will be effectively and reliably protected.<sup>30</sup>

The two countries are also planning to draw up a long term agreement defining ways of establishing a 'unified information zone' and also have decided to prepare a long term agreement to determine the ways and the means for the existence of a unified television space. Stressing the usefulness of Russian public television, Nabzarbaev commented, "it provides our people with a lot of information, and

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28. *Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR*, 29 April, 1996.

29. *Current Digest of Post Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVII, No. 23, November 20, 1995, p. 27.

30. *Ibid.*

my citizens, especially Russian - speaking ones, are very interested in this. That is why my desire now, at this difficult time of transition, is that television, which is most influential media form, should bring our people close together".<sup>31</sup>

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin signed a package of documents on bilateral co-operation during latter's brief stop over in Kazakh capital Alma-Ata, on 27 April, 1996. The Presidents, fully resolved to develop relations of strategic partnership, friendship, neighbourliness, and a mutually beneficial cooperation based on the generally recognized rules and principles of international law, and confirming their commitment to the values of the freedom, democracy, supremacy of the law and respect for human rights. They declared that the signing of the 29th March 1996 in Moscow of the treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Republic of Belarus on intensification of integration in the economic and humanitarian spheres, testifies the transition of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia and other states of the CIS to a new level.<sup>32</sup>

Both the leaders also expressed that, they will continue the line of interaction in the sphere of foreign policy, meaning the concordance of positions on international and regional problems of mutual interest and also the co-ordination of action in international organizations.

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31. See No. 15.

32. Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 7 May, 1995.

Realizing their right to self-determination, the people's of Kazakhstan and Russia have formed free and sovereign states. The will of the people's of the two countries and their understanding of historic destiny are expressed via participation in the process of representative democracy. The democratic transformations and economic reforms being pursued in Kazakhstan and Russia are important for the future of the people of the two countries. An intensification of integration based on respect for sovereignty, independence; observance of the principles of territorial integrity, and non-interferences in each other's internal affairs, is an important factor of the socio-economic development of Kazakhstan and Russia.

They also came to an agreement that both Kazakhstan and Russia will strictly observe the rights and liberties of the individual, preventing discrimination on a nationality basis , and will also contribute to the development of contacts between citizens of the two countries and scientific and cultural exchange. Both states will continue to emphatically oppose all manifestations of national extremism, chauvinism, and separatism. Particular attention will be paid to a broadening of co-operation in the sphere of social protection of the population, the leveling of pension, allowances, and privileges for veterans of war and labour, and support for the handicapped and needy families.<sup>33</sup>

Russian President Boris Yeltsin has ruled out any territorial claims on Kazakhstan and reaffirmed his commitment to a policy of respect for the independ-

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33. Ibid.



ence of other states. He stated that a respect for the independence and sovereignty of states is the main priority of our foreign policy. To a question whether Ukraine and Kazakhstan should be incorporated into Russia, he replied, "Kazakhstan and Ukraine are indivisible as is Russia". He called for closer integration among the countries of the CIS, but said, this would have no effect on their independence. They are independent and sovereign for ever.<sup>34</sup>

Kazakh President's congratulation letter to the newly elected President of Russia - Boris Yeltsin, mentioned that Yeltsin "will continue to encourage integration initiatives" and give the Kazakh - Russian relations a "fresh-boost".<sup>35</sup>

There are various difference have been existed between Kazakhstan and Russia regarding issue like language, citizenship, military bases, Baikanour cosmodrome. They will minimise this in near future through the process of bilateral negotiations, and with the development process within the framework of CIS. Both the country expressed their confidence on the treaty of the 29th March 1996, in Moscow among Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyz Republic and the republic of Belarus, will impart new impetus to the further integration of participants in the common wealth of Independent states. This is the aspiration of the people and states of the commonwealth to the more efficient realization of material and intellectual potential for an upturn of the economy, rise of people's living standard and stable democratic government. The relation between Russia and Kazakhstan will be more cordial and interac-

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34. See No. 28.

35. Summary of World Broadcast, Former USSR, 6 July, 1996.

tive if they develop a relation of friendship, neighborliness and mutually beneficiary co-operation which is a fundamental issue in the interests of the multinational peoples' of both states. The guarantee of the successful progress of the interaction processes within the framework of commonwealth of Independent states would minimise the inter-ethnic tension and develop a good relationship.

**CHAPTER V**  
**CONCLUSION**

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Russian position in Independent Kazakhstan, and the relation between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding the minorities issues show that though there is some normalisation of ethnic issue, but it is still playing a vital role which is in one sense, an obstacle to the process of nation building, progress of democracy and transformation to a market economy. In another sense the presence of Russian minority is essential and beneficial in Kazakhstan as they occupy higher skilled positions in every field in kazakhstan. Also Kazakhstan has to accommodate it's Russian minority, because of the republic's strategic relations with Russia.

Kazakhstan is geographically connected with Russia and its northern part is a Russian majority area ,which always poses the threat of secession from Kazakhstan and accession to Russia. That is why, Nazarbaev wants kazakhstan to be a motherland for both Russian and Kazakhs and who have been staying side by side, sharing each others culture, language and other activities since a long time.

During the Soviet era, the basic values and their way of life of Kazakhs was diluted, though they were free from Czar's colonial rule in 1917, they again remained in the political space under Soviet Union's socialistic rule. Lenin's promise of self determination couldn't materialise due to Stalin's policy of collectivization and sedentarization. They even lost their physical existence in Stalin's policy of industrialization and resettlement of other nationality in Kazakhstan.

During Stalin's policy of Collectivization, many people died due to famine, mass killing and many were forced to leave their homeland for trying to resist his policy. Industrialization brought many skilled and unskilled workers from Russia and other European parts of the country, thus making the Kazakhs a minority group in their homeland.

The growth of Industry in Kazakhstan was a positive factor which led to the development of their basic pattern of life. But its negative side was that it resulted in what Marx said alienation from their own resources as these were supplied to the cities of Russia and Abroad. It created a social class hierarchy between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs. Generally, the Kazakhs were unskilled, illiterate and ignorant in the modern work process. The non-Kazakhs occupied the higher positions and were mainly urban dwellers, whereas the Kazakhs were concentrated in agriculture and rural areas.

The Cultural Revolution in Kazakhstan made the indigenous people conscious; through the spread of Russian culture, language, art films etc. It also helped the growth of literacy rate in Kazakhstan. The cultural revolution had also changed the position of women. Disgraceful customs as polygamy, the giving in Marriage of minors and the wearing of Yashmak, Paranja, or Chichvan (veil) were abolished. The cultural revolution had also led to the development of their position as compared to non-Kazakhs and this intelligentsia started protesting against Moscow's policy

Though various nationalist sentiments had been expressed against the Soviet regime, the local leaders suppressed them in order to ~~owe~~ their positions as long as they could by satisfying the central rulers. The nationalist sentiments exploded into action with the implementation of Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost and Perestroika. The dominant ideology from Stalin to Brezenov was one of the consensus, collectivity and social harmony between Kazakhs and Russians. Giving vent to their subdued feeling calls for national self determination, independence and religious radicalism etc. became apparent.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an independent state placed the Russian minority in a very complicated position. Russians in Kazakhstan are generally skilled workers. Many of them occupied higher position in various industrial enterprises. But with the changing situation in Kazakhstan, they felt more deprived. Kazakhs with less qualified background came to occupy higher positions. Though the constitution of Kazakhstan prohibits any discrimination against the minority groups, Kazakhs nationalist groups, with the aspiration for power, pressurized the government to take effective steps against the Russian minority.

Kazakhstan's policy of 'Kazakhization', implied nation building at the cost of Russians. Russians are affected by the language policy and citizenship law. The language policy elevated Kazakh as the state and official language and Russian as the language of inter-ethnic and inter-state communication. This law was resented by the Russian from whose point of view most Kazakh's know Russian but few Russians know Kazakh language. The scope of using Kazakh language is limited to

Kazakhstan only. The language of instruction has also changed in various schools from Russian to Kazakh. The granting of dual citizenship to Kazakhs who are living outside Kazakhstan, and the provision for Kazakh emigration with settlement of the immigrants with free house job and admission to schools and settling them basically in the northern oblast (Russian majority area) while denying dual citizenship to Russians, is perceived as proof of a discriminatory policy towards Russians.

On the whole, however, Kazakh government's, policies towards the Russian minority are aimed to allay their fears. Kazakhs President has observed that Russians are not suffering in Kazakhstan as most of the industries and commercial sectors are located in the north of Kazakhstan which is a Russian majority region. His policy aims at the protection of minority rights and any breach is punishable. His policy of not granting dual citizenship to Russians is aimed to a present situation where half of the population would be citizens of another state.

Nevertheless Russian emigration to Russia remains high, which may be due to Kazakhstan policy of domestication. Russia's relations with Kazakhstan are good as Kazakh State is not taking any discriminatory step against its Russian minority. Kazakhstan, in various spheres, like economy, trade, technology, technical workers, scientific equipment and in military and security is still dependent upon Russia. Various agreements between the two countries also help in solving of the minority problems in both the countries. In order to bring closer the relationship between the two countries and to normalize the inter-ethnic relations, they are signing various facts like military treaties, economic and trade agreement, Baikanur sta-

tion lease, agreement on sharing Caspian sea resources agreement on export of Kazakhstan's oil through Russian pipeline. They are also minimizing the feeling of separateness through the process of re-integration of the CIS.

In short, over the long run, Russo-Kazakh relation will not be jeopardized, if both countries work in a consensual manner. The minority in Kazakhstan will not face any difficulty and will not be treated as foreigners, as Kazakhstan, though independent, not fully, but partially dependent on Russia. The emigration process is not an easy task for both Russia and Kazakhstan. To settle the emigrants in their territories is not easy as both the countries are not financially sound after the collapse of the command economy. Through the process of negotiation, bilateral discussions and the integration process among the CIS countries, both Russia and Kazakhstan can solve their minority problem.

In conclusion one can say that ethnic issue is of paramount importance in Kazakhstan-Russia relations. The relation between the two countries depends to a large extent on the ethnic issue. In the case of Kazakhstan and Russia, both are always discussing and trying to find out some way to solve it. The inter-ethnic issue has undermined the transition process towards democracy, nation building and market economy.

It is also true that-Russian minority in Kazakhstan remains an important factor in the development process of Kazakhstan. Handling of the ethnic issues by Kazakh government has left much to be desired and in the initial period following



independence the policies created a gap between the Kazakhs and the Russian minority by placing Kazakhs in a privileged position. If this type of favouritism will continues, then the relation between Kazakhs and Russians will be deteriorated, leading to demands for secession of the Russian majority areas.

However, lately the Kazakh government has taken steps to amend it's earlier lapses and has been reassuring the Russians about protection of their culture, language and so on and reaffirmed the state's commitment to protect the Russians against any form of discrimination. Hopefully this will restore the sense of belongingness among Russian and strengthen Russia-Kazakhstan relations as well.

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