

INDIA AND THE SOUTHERN RHODESIAN CRISIS

INDIA AND THE SOUTHERN RHODESIAN CRISIS

SUNITA BATRA

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

of the

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
School of International Studies

New Delhi

1981

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work has attained its present form due to the valuable suggestions and assistance provided by all those, who were either directly or indirectly connected with me.

I would like to express my gratitude for the continuous guidance and proper channelization of ideas, given by my teacher and supervisor Dr S.C. Gangal, Centre for International Politics and Organization, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. It was because of this, that I could complete the study. Needless to say, he was always available to resolve problems that arose from time to time.

I am greatly indebted to Professor K.P. Misra, Dean, School of International Studies, who broadly suggested the subject -- The Role of India in the Southern Rhodesian Crisis -- for my research work.

I am obliged to Professor Anirudha Gupta, Centre for West Asian and North African Studies, for his advice and co-operation.

I am also grateful to Professor K.P. Saksena, Head of the Centre, for his keen interest in my work.

As this study was primarily based on desk work, I would like to thank the staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, and Indian Council for World Affairs Library, where most of my time was spent.

My dissertation could proceed smoothly and has reached its final stage only due to the encouragement and inspiration of my family members.

I would, indeed, like to acknowledge the help of my friend, Miss Regina Mulay, who time and again enriched the work with her critical appraisal.

I would like to thank Smt Sudershan Pahwa who helped me in preparing the final copy of the dissertation. However, I take all responsibility for any error of facts or judgement.

New Delhi,
23 January 1981.

Sunita
(Miss) Sunita Batra

C O N T E N T S

		Pages
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i - ii
INTRODUCTION	iv -viii
MAPS	ix - x
CHAPTER I	EMERGENCE AND ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS	1 - 46
CHAPTER II	INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRING AND THE RHODESIAN CRISIS	47 - 68
CHAPTER III	INDIAN VENTURE IN CRISIS RESOLUTION: CENTRAL AFRICA	69 - 84
CHAPTER IV	INDIAN EFFORTS IN THE POST-UDI PERIOD - AT THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE UNITED NATIONS	85 -110
CHAPTER V	INDIA'S ROLE AT THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCES ; THE NON-OFFICIAL AGENCIES	111-125
CHAPTER VI	CONCLUSION	126-135
APPENDICES	136-139
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	140-146

*

INTRODUCTION

The Rhodesian crisis is perhaps a landmark of the national will to independence or liberation on the part of a dependent, exploited people in the post-war world. It is well known how the vast majority of the native, black people, were humiliated and kept under subjugation by a handful of entrenched 'whites'. The struggle for liberation in Rhodesia passed through a grim and protracted course. It culminated in Rhodesian independence very late in the day - in March 1980. However, throughout Rhodesia's prolonged freedom struggle India stood firmly by its side and vigorously supported its cause in various international forums and otherwise. The present work is concerned primarily with the unfolding and growth of the Rhodesian struggle and India's consistent support and concern for it.

It is a critical-analytical study in the historical perspective, and its broad objectives are as follows:

- (1) To establish a link between Zimbabwe's past and present or, as it were, to look into the springs or genesis of the Rhodesian crisis over the years and analyse the factors that led to its escalation in recent years and eventual resolution.
- (2) To identify those domestic conditions which led to the black uprising and struggle.

- (3) To analyse the international environment which created the atmosphere favourable to final settlement.
- (4) To study the patterns of behaviour and to gauge the extent of involvement of the Great Powers, international associations and organizations.

The interplay of diplomatic manoeuvring, and political action which helped in internationalizing the issue led to increasing interest and involvement of India. The Indian involvement, and the successive Indian responses issuing from it, constitute the specific objectives of our study, which are as follows:

- (1) Indian perception of the crisis in terms of India's foreign policy goals and precepts;
- (2) The extent of Indian involvement in solving the crisis;
- (3) India's stand on the creation of a federation in Central Africa;
- (4) India's political stand after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in the Commonwealth and the United Nations forum;
- (5) To examine the collective action of the non-aligned nations with special reference to Indian efforts in the non-aligned forums to evolve a unified stand which might serve as a catalyst in shaping larger international responses and the eventual resolution of the crisis.

It is with these aims and objectives in view that the present study was undertaken. We seek to conduct an in

depth analysis of the dynamics of political and diplomatic moves that underlay the final freedom of Zimbabwe. In particular, it is sought to study India's role and response to the Rhodesian crisis, from the perspective of India's international position and prestige and her membership of the Commonwealth and the non-aligned movement.

India has been ceaselessly fighting against colonialism, imperialism and racism. Mahatma Gandhi had begun his struggle, not in India, but in South Africa. The policy of non-alignment adopted by an independent India has continued to guide the course of her foreign policy, even in the post-Nehruvian era. One of the main aims and principles of the non-aligned movement has been to oppose the subjugation of one people by another. It is with this perspective that the entire liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia and India's response to it should be seen.

The subject matter of the dissertation has been so arranged as to provide a broad background of the Rhodesian problem which tended to escalate as years wore on. The chapterization has been done in a manner so as to be able to move from the general to the particular - namely from the Rhodesian struggle in general to India's role and response in particular.

The first chapter forms the broad historical base of the emergence and consolidation of foreign rule in Southern Rhodesia. The consolidation of power of the white

settlers was at its zenith in 1965 when, under the leadership of Ian Smith, the UDI was launched. It was this illegal and atrocious move that internationalized the issue.

Any crisis, it seems, leads to the intensification of diplomatic and political activities not only at home or in the neighbourhood, but also in the larger international forums and in distant regions of the world. The chapter on "International Diplomatic Manoeuvring And the Rhodesian Crisis" projects the cause effect relationship of the involvement of the Great Powers, various regional powers, the Commonwealth and the United Nations in resolving the Rhodesian crisis.


As the study is geared chiefly to weigh the extent of Indian involvement and its impact, the third chapter is entitled "Indian Venture in Crisis Resolution : Central Africa". It deals with the Central African Federation which was created in 1953, and Southern Rhodesia was a part of it. It also deals with the post-Federation and pre-UDI phases which were the most critical points in Zimbabwe's journey to independence.

During the long period of liberation movement in Zimbabwe, the post-UDI period is full of negotiations, deliberations and other efforts aimed at the amicable settlement of the issue. The fourth chapter on "Indian Efforts in the post-UDI period - At the Commonwealth and the United Nations" tries to estimate India's role in these international organizations and associations.


An international crisis of such wide-ranging impact is not confined to one or other regional or international organizations but is deliberated upon in various other forums. In the contemporary world, the non-aligned conferences are yet another effective forum where solutions for many problems are sought or attempted. So, the last chapter is entitled "India's Role at the Non-aligned Conferences: The Non-official Agencies". It also deals with the non-official agencies like the mass media which helped to build or influence public opinion.

Thus this study endeavours to critically analyse India's role in the management of the Rhodesian crisis not only from an international perspective, but also at regional and at bilateral and multilateral levels.

.....



Map. 1



SOUTHERN AFRICA

Map 2

CHAPTER I

EMERGENCE AND ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS

Genesis of the Crisis

Southern Rhodesia, now called Zimbabwe, attained independence after a long and tedious struggle against the mighty white minority regime. The grand finale of the resistance, spread over two decades, came on 17 April 1980, when Zimbabwe became the newest republic of the modern age, thereby, crumbling one of the vestages of old colonial era.

The achievement of sovereignty by the people of Zimbabwe was a historical event with a story of great sacrifice and bloodshed. This event, when viewed from a historical perspective is an evolutionary and at times revolutionary process of formulation, consolidation and precipitation of power in the hands of a few white people, which led to the resistance by the oppressed black minority in order to regain and re-establish the lost right of self-rule.

Southern Rhodesia came under the yoke of British imperialism as early as 1890, when the British flag was hoisted at Harare Kapje (Salisbury) on 12 September 1890. Cecil Rhodes, representing the British interest in the region, became the chief architect of expansion of imperialism to the north Cape of Colony. His services were recognized by naming the entire territory as 'Rhodesia'. His greatest ambition was to

enlarge the British influence from Cape Colony to central Africa and ultimately linking it up with Egypt by a Cape to Cairo railway.

The first territory to join the fleet of British colonies was the territory of 'Bechunaland'. The manner in which this area was occupied by Cecil Rhodes and his men has been aptly described by Le Bengula, Chieftain of the Matabele and Mashona tribes, which inhabited the North Zone of Bechunaland. In the context of granting 'mineral concessions' to the British in October 1888, he wrote to Queen Victoria:

Sometime ago a party of men came to my country. They asked me for a place to dig gold and said they would give me certain things for the right to do so. I told them to bring what they would and I would show them what I would give. A document was written and presented to me for signature. I asked what it contained and was told that in it were my words and words of the men. I put my hand to it. About three months afterwards I heard from other sources that I had given by that document the right to all minerals of my country. 1

As soon as Rhodes got the monopoly over all the natural resources in the region, he established the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which was given the Royal Charter by the Queen of England in October 1889. This enabled the Company to exploit the "concessions". It was clear that "Company Rule" had come in this territory. The Shona and Ndebele tribes of Southern Rhodesia rose against the rule of the whites as their respective interests were conflicting.

1 K.N. Hasan, "The Scramble for Africa", African Quarterly (New Delhi), vol. , no. 2, July-September 1961, p. 26.

This armed struggle was completely put down by the Chartered Company. As a result of the war in 1893-98 the whole territory was conquered.

With the end of the First World War, the future of Southern Rhodesia was in doldrums. The Company's Charter was to expire in 1924, thereby throwing the governmental machinery haywire. The question of future form of government in the region came in for discussions and two options were given to the settlers: either, merger with South Africa, or, establishment of self-rule. Referendum took place on this issue and they decided by 8,774 votes to 5,989 for self-government. Sir Charles Coghlan, who opposed the amalgamation with South Africa, became the first Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. The colony was provided with Letters Patent with a written constitution. This Constitution gave the settlers the legislative, executive and judicial powers. It gave them the right to have their indigenous police, army and civil service. Britain retained veto power over the legislations. In this way, a new type of imperialist design was set up in Southern Rhodesia. For the first time, Britain, a colonial power, established an indirect rule over its colony.

The 1923 Constitution was jointly framed by the British and the Settlers. The Africans were completely ignored in the making of their own constitution. When they raised their voice against this, it was suppressed by the ruling power. Not only this, but the successive governments passed discriminatory and oppressive laws, which were against the interest of the black people.

The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 divided the country into two parts. It demarcated the boundary lines. Under this Act, the Africans were not allowed to have homes in towns or in undefined European areas. This Act was passed with due approval from Britain.² Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) raised its voice against this act in the following words:

If the white people did not believe in uplifting the native they should have left us in darkness. We are workers suffering. You must all understand that your perspiration is coming out for nothing. Everything is worked by natives. You are digging gold out of the earth and are making holes in mines....All roads are made by natives but if you walk there you are arrested. 3

After this, there was a chain of alienating acts. The Land Husbandry Act of 1951 introduced stringent conservation measures to enforce African farmers to destock and modify land tenure practices. It increased robberies of cattles and other livestock from Africans. The Industrial Conciliation Act barred Africans from specified jobs. These acts were based on the policy of the so-called two-tier system.

Federation : 1953-1963

The partnership policy replaced the "two-pyramid policy" in 1953, when a federation of three territories,

2 See Appendix I (Table 1) for detailed Land Allocation.

3 Ference Ranger, "African Politics in Twentieth Century Southern Rhodesia", in T.O. Ranger, ed., Aspects of Central African History (London, 1968), p. 9.

Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, was formed. Huggins, the first Prime Minister of the Federation tried hard to convince the people that the three territories were interdependent, and, a strong federation would bring economic and industrial progress for them. He said that the whites and the black would be partners in it. He established the relationship of a horse (the black) and a rider (the whites) between the two. In 1953, the referendum took place and the Federation was approved by 25,570 votes to 14,729 votes. Only 429 Africans were eligible to vote. Thus the decision was primarily taken by the white settlers.

During the Federation period, as it were, the rider controlled the reins of the horse, and passed several acts. The Registration and Identification Act of 1957 gave "advanced" Africans an identity card for which they had to pay £1.00 each. In the same year, the New Franchise Act was passed, which introduced a "special roll", under which Africans could marshal only 20 per cent of the total European voting power. It introduced the 'two-tier system'.

The African National Congress (ANC) founded in 1957, resisted these discriminatory laws. The major task of this organization was to seek the abolition of these laws which served the interests of a minority. It demanded universal suffrage or 'one-man one-vote'. The first congressional session of the ANC declared: "The greatest crimes are committed by the rulers of this country, through the legislative

monopoly and power which they have and regulations that are of a discriminatory nature".⁴ The ANC was banned in 1959 and an emergency was declared in the whole Federation. In order to prevent the political activities of nationalist leaders, the Preventive Detention Act was passed. This Act provided for detention without trial. Thus it can be said that the Federation did not bring any change for the Africans. The evils of racialism and discrimination were strongly prevalent in the Federation. On the other hand, the merger of the three territories opened new opportunities and increased prosperity for the whites.

The government, in order to tighten its control, passed three discriminatory laws in 1960: first, the Vagrancy Act, which provided for control over the so-called trouble makers; second, the Emergency Powers Act, which gave the government the right to declare an emergency, and Third, the Law and Order Maintenance Act. This Act restricted the political freedom of nationalist leaders. Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead defended these Acts on the plea that the country was on the brink of a major breakdown of law and order.

The National Democratic Party (NDP), which was formed in 1960, was against the Federation and the discriminatory legislation. In their opinion, there could not be any partnership between unequals, between the senior and the junior,

⁴ Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia - The Struggle for a Birthright (London, 1972), p. 118.

between the rulers and the subjects. In June 1960, Mr Chitepo told a public meeting at Harare: "We come here because we are dissatisfied with the second rate citizenship in our own country. We feel a great deal of resentment....We are tired of living like strangers in our own land."⁵

Robert Mugabe, the Party's Public Secretary, declared in July 1960: "One man one vote is not a parrot cry. It is the cry of the African will, determination and their demand for the restoration of the motherland."⁶

As it happened, the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) could get this right after two decades of armed struggle. Millions of people sacrificed their lives in order to restore their basic political rights, from the hands of the white minority government, which had enlarged its powers through the revised Constitution of 1961 in which a new franchise system was introduced. In theory, the new system abolished the racial discrimination but, in practice it was the continuation of the past and with provisions for domination of the whites in the Legislative Assembly. The country was to be divided into 50 constituencies and 15 electoral districts. Qualifications (property, income or education) were higher for "A" roll, which was basically meant for the white people. "B" roll had lower qualifications, which enabled the African population to participate in the voting system. The

5 Daily News, 6 June 1960.

6 Ibid., 5 July 1960.

Constitution provided a system of 'devaluation' of votes. It meant that in "A" roll constituencies "B" roll voters did not count for more than 25 per cent of the "A" roll votes cast.

The (White) Rhodesian Government wanted to abolish the British veto power over its legislation, through this Constitution. Their efforts did not succeed and Section III was included in the Constitution of 1961. This part gave the Queen the power to amend, add or revoke certain sections by order in the Council. It was not included in the white paper. Thus it was unknown to the electorates when they voted for it.

The National Democratic Party (NDP) was banned, as it refused to recognize the Constitution. The NDP reconstituted itself by giving its organization a new name, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

Paradoxically, the black Africans, were being exploited by foreigners within their own native land, and the world community regarded them as citizens of an independent, self-governing state. The reality was unknown to the outside world till the sixties.

The British argument was that Rhodesia was an independent territory with its own constitution of 1923, hence she never transmitted any information about this territory to the UN.⁷ The fact was that the majority was

7 According to Chapter XI (Declaration Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories) Art. 73(c) of the UN Charter, "Members of the UN which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have

ruled by the minority, larger population was suppressed by the small elite group.

Rhodesia remained in the twilight position of dependence and independence till 1962, when for the first time the Afro-Asian nations raised the issue in the United Nations. The first concrete step in highlighting the fact was taken up in February 1961, when 11 nations requested the United Nations Trusteeship Committee, to form a committee of 17 members, which would investigate, and, then determine whether Southern Rhodesia was a Non-Self-Governing territory or an independent state.

Resolution A/742 of 27 November 1953 was useful for this purpose. This resolution established the factors which would help in determining the status of a territory. The factors were divided into two parts - Section (a) was concerned with the international status. Any territory would be labelled as self-governing if it was free to enter into treaties and agreements with the other government, could execute its international obligations and was free to join the

(fn. 7 contd.)

not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present charter, the well being of the inhabitants of these territories and to this end: to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

United Nations. Section (b) of the resolution dealt with the internal or domestic status. According to this, a state would be recognized as self-governing if the people of a territory had the freedom to choose a government of their own choice, if it was free from external control of any other government or if it had the sovereignty or rights over its own social, economic and cultural affairs.

If we analyse the situation in Southern Rhodesia, we find, that it could hardly be considered as a self-governing territory. Southern Rhodesia did not meet the specifications of the "Guiding Principles For Determining Obligation to Transmit Information To United Nations On Non-Self Governing Territories". The 12 guiding principles were passed by the General Assembly on 15 December 1960. Britain supported the 12 principles, with the exception of principle IX, which further expanded on Articles 73 and 74 of the UN Charter, that there was a prima facie responsibility to give information under Art. 73(e) on territories geographically separate and ethnically and/or culturally different from the administering country. Britain always objected the Principle IX of the resolution.⁸

⁸ Principle IX: Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73(e) of the Charter of the UN IX. Integration should have come about in the following circumstances:

(a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its people would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes;

(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status; their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes.

She argued that self-government could be established even without the universal adult suffrage.

The Nigerian representative argued that British objection to this principle would provide an escape route for members to transmit information. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly. Thus, the principles did not leave any loophole in the Southern Rhodesian case.

The case of Southern Rhodesia was taken up by the Committee of Seventeen (later known as the Committee of Twenty Four) in 1962. Britain tried to stop it, but the move was defeated. Britain tried to convince other nations that it was a self-governing territory. The sub-committee in its report contended that the 1923 constitution was not accepted by the indigenous people of their own will but was forced on them.

It also said that Southern Rhodesia had not fulfilled the requirements of the Resolution A/742 VIII and 1541 XV. The sub-committee in its report brought into focus the discriminatory laws, the two-tier franchise system, the Land Apportionment Act, banning of political parties, and the detention of African leaders.

Report of the sub-committee made the nations aware of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. Thus, in 1962, the Southern Rhodesian crisis became an international issue. The world community came to know about the evils of colonialism in this part of the world and the process for getting rid of it was set in motion.

On 22 June 1962, the General Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian group. The member nations requested Britain to call a new constitutional conference and to arrange for free elections in the country on the basis of "one man one vote". Britain voted negatively but could not get the support of other nations. The next step was taken up in April 1963, when the "colonialism" sub-committee was sent to London to inform the British government about the dangerous situation that prevailed in Southern Rhodesia.

In September 1963, Ghana raised the question in the Security Council and was of opinion that Southern Rhodesian crisis was a threat to international peace and security. Britain vetoed it. British stand was, that the UN did not have the right to intervene in this situation as Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory.

At this point of time, major changes took place in the domestic structure and situation of the country, which had its repercussions at the international level.

Dissolution of Federation

In June 1963, a conference was convened at the Victoria Falls for the dissolution of the Federation which was formed in 1953. It was decided that the Federation would cease to exist from 31 December 1963. It gave a setback to the cause of independence of Southern Rhodesia. The other two territories became independent as Zambia and Malawi in 1964. But in Southern Rhodesia the intensity of atrocities

on the local people increased. The time was ripe for demanding the dissolution of imperial or minority rule. The nationalist leaders could have demanded for the independence. Unfortunately, wide disagreements cropped up between the leaders. As a result two organizations emerged on the scene in 1963, namely, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed and led by Rev. Ndabaning Sithole (August) and the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) led by Joshua Nkomo.

The Rhodesian Government wanted that independence should be granted on the basis of the 1961 Constitution. The British Government's policy was to negotiate a new constitution so that independence could be given on the basis of it. It took 17 years to negotiate a new constitution. Wilson, the British Prime Minister had written a letter to a Rhodesian African, Dr E.C. Mutasa, in which he said:

The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the government of that country remains under the control of white minority. We have repeatedly urged the British Government to negotiate a new constitution with all of the African and European parties represented in order to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule. 9

The Commonwealth discussed the Southern Rhodesian crisis in its conference, which was convened in 1964. The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, was not invited to this conference. The conference decided that a new

9 Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence : A Study in British Colonial Policy (London, 1967), p. 171.

constitutional conference should be convened and all the national leaders should be allowed to participate in the conference.

Britain could not completely ignore the decision of the Commonwealth conference, and insisted that the Rhodesians as a whole should accept the constitution, which would bring majority rule. On the insistence of the British Government, Ian Smith held an indaba: 622 African chiefs and headmen were invited between 20 and 26 October 1964, to Dambashawa, near Salisbury. They unanimously supported Rhodesian independence under the 1961 Constitution. But this was rejected by Sir Alec Douglas Home on the grounds that the chiefs did not represent the African majority. A referendum also took place in the same year. The proposal was whether the voters were in favour of independence based on the 1961 Constitution. In the referendum 58,091 voted in favour of this, and 6,096 voted against it. But the majority of them were white voters.

The Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, stated in May 1964 that "if in my lifetime we have an African nationalist government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have failed in the policy that I believe in."¹⁰ He made it clear that he could visualize circumstances which might drive to do

10 Research Report no. 53: Howard Simson, Zimbabwe - A Country Study (Stockholm: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1979), p. 61.

something else; if the negotiations failed to give them independence. Smith started preparing the ground for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from this time onwards, which was announced on 11 November 1965. One of Smith's first acts was to arrest and imprison the national leaders. The People's Caretaker Council and Zimbabwe African National Union were banned. He urged the white voters to prepare to fight physically for the maintenance of white supremacy in Rhodesia. The main obstacle was the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who had enunciated the five principles for granting independence to Rhodesia, called NIBMAR.

NIBMAR Principles

"No Independence Before Majority African Rule" principles were as follows:

- (1) The principle of unimpeded progress toward majority rule;
- (2) Guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the Constitution to retard African advancement;
- (3) An immediate increase in political representation of Africans;
- (4) An end to racial discrimination; and
- (5) Evidence to the satisfaction of the British Government that any basis of independence was accepted to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

To these five, Wilson added a sixth in January 1966:

- (6) Assurance that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority by the minority or the minority by the majority.¹¹

These were the founding principles for future negotiations. The Rhodesian Government contended that these principles did not represent the basis for negotiations and compromise, but called them as an ultimatum. From July 1965 onwards the number of talks between the British and the Rhodesian governments for compromise increased. Ian Smith visited Britain in October 1965. But no agreement was reached between the two parties.

Wilson, accompanied by Arthur Bottomley (Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations) went to Rhodesia on 25 October 1965. The British Prime Minister suggested that a Royal Commission, consisting of Commonwealth members, should be appointed to recommend the constitutional arrangements, under which Rhodesia could rapidly attain independence. These constitutional arrangements should be acceptable to the people as a whole. In Ian Smith's view, the Commission's function should only be to ascertain whether the people wanted to attain independence under the 1961 Constitution. This proposition was not acceptable to Wilson. Thus they failed to reach any settlement.

By this time the white minority regime of Ian Smith was firmly in the government saddle, but had also become the

not
only

11 Ibid.

main centre of power. This feeling of strength had prompted Ian Smith to say that if talks failed he would resort to an entirely new strategy. With the stalemate in the Anglo-Southern Rhodesian talks, the stage was set for the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI). The Emergency was declared on 5 November 1965. Six days later, on 11 November, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence was announced by Ian Smith. This declaration was a turning point in the history of Southern Rhodesia.

Internationalization of the Crisis

Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence made the Rhodesian question a critical and vital problem of international relations. A large number of nations denounced and criticized the illegal UDI. Britain's quick response was to pass an Act declaring the UDI illegal. She sought the help of Commonwealth countries in suppressing the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia. Britain changed its previous position with regard to the United Nations. The illegal act of Ian Smith left no alternative for Britain but to go to the United Nations. She immediately called a special meeting of the Security Council. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart said in his address that his government was opposed to the use of military force. He recommended certain measures which had to be adopted to bring about the downfall of the Smith regime. Immediate measures to be taken were: the cessation of British

aid to Rhodesia, to stop the export of arms and amunitions, restrictions on the purchase of tobacco from Rhodesia and expulsion of Rhodesia from the sterling monetary area, simultaneously not to recognize the illegal regime and to implement economic sanctions.

With the universal call for economic blockade of the illegal regime, the Rhodesian crisis not only entered the United Nations, but also was deliberated upon in other multi-lateral forums and regional associations. The problem was discussed in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in the Commonwealth. Members of the OAU were of the opinion that all measures including force if necessary, should be used for bringing down the illegal regime and protecting the self-determination right of the Africans. They implemented the sanction measures in total.

A special Commonwealth conference was called in January 1966 in Lagos, only to discuss the Rhodesian crisis. It was observed in the conference that the situation of violence, oppression and discrimination prevailing in Zimbabwe, was a threat to peace. Members came to the conclusion that there should be no independence before majority rule. Economic sanctions should be implemented effectively by all states. Harold Wilson stressed the point that "the cumulative effects of the economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months".

12 H.P.W. Hutson, Rhodesia - Ending an Era (New Delhi, 1978), p. 61.

The underlying purpose of the economic sanctions was that the illegal rule promulgated through the UDI should be brought to an end. However, it did not intend to give Rhodesia the right of self-determination.

In December 1965, the economic sanctions were extended to oil and other petroleum products. In 1966, the mineral products were also included in this. Britain wanted to prohibit export of oil to Rhodesia only through the Port of Beira. The Afro-Asian nations demanded that it should also be stopped through the land routes. This proposal was not acceptable to the British Government, as it did not want to get involved with South Africa, whose land routes were being used by Rhodesia.

British policy was criticized at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in September 1966. The members demanded that either Britain should use force to put an end to the illegal, authoritarian regime or should hand over the matter to the United Nations. The British Prime Minister gave assurance to the members that if his negotiations with the Rhodesian Prime Minister (which had to take place in December 1966) failed to throw up a settlement, then he would seek for UN mandatory sanctions.

After the UDI, for the first time the talks began between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith on board the HMS Tiger off Gibraltar on 2 December 1966. The outcome of the negotiations was the emergence of a draft settlement proposal under which the British Government agreed to grant independence

to Rhodesia with Ian Smith as Prime Minister. It was also decided that Rhodesia would suspend its Declaration of Independence temporarily. Some changes were made in the 1961 Constitution in order to meet some of the requirements of the NIBMAR principles. In this process, major concessions were given by the British Government.

Ian Smith refused to accept the Tiger proposals after returning to Salisbury. He contended that it would be irresponsible to abandon the 1965 Constitution and to adopt a new constitution which might prove to be misconceived for Rhodesia. The idea of an interim government was also negated by him because it would give the Governor the power to control the Security forces and the right to appoint the ministers.

The British Government reacted to his statements by a House of Commons resolution to ask the UN to apply the mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. A UN Resolution was passed on 16 December 1966 which imposed selective mandatory sanctions. It was for the first time in the history of the United Nations that Articles 39 and 41 were evoked for the implementation of mandatory sanctions.¹³

¹³ Chapter VII: "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression"

Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and

The Afro-Asian countries again tried for comprehensive mandatory sanctions and particularly called upon South Africa to stop the transportation of oil to Rhodesia. But this was not accepted by Britain. Only a few products were taken up for sanctions, namely asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides, skins, and leather. The Afro-Asian nations found this list incomplete and insufficient. On their insistence oil and oil products were also included in the list.

At the time of the meeting of the Special Committee on Decolonization in Zambia in 1967, it seemed as though the Smith regime was unruffled and unaffected by the sanctions imposed against it. The Committee proposed that the comprehensive mandatory sanctions should be imposed and the force should also be used in bringing down the illegal Smith regime. Portugal and South Africa, which had ignored the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and had not observed the sanction imposition, were condemned. Portugal argued that those nations should be held responsible who either export their goods to Rhodesia or import from Rhodesia, and not Portugal which only allowed the goods to pass through its territory.

(fn. 13 contd.)

TH-610



DISS
320.9689103
B3213 In



TH610

it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

The economic sanctions did not prove to be quite effective for the overthrow of the Smith regime. On the other hand the socio-economic condition of people in the country was deteriorating.

If we look at the lessons of history, we find that a people does not remain passive and docile for a long time. Even if the ruling power is strong, the weaker party always puts up struggle and resistance. The people of Southern Rhodesia were no exception to this. In August 1967, the guerrilla activities began. Armed African nationalists made clandestine entry in August 1967 across the Zambezi. Zimbabwe African People's Union and African National Congress (ANC) joined hands and made a military alliance to fight against the authoritarian rule. Their opponent, the white regime, was helped by the South African Government. South African Prime Minister, Vorster, publicly admitted on 8 September 1967 that South African police was present on Rhodesian soil.

Zambia, whose peace and security was threatened due to the infighting between the guerrillas and the white Rhodesians, requested Britain to intervene and settle the dispute. Britain replied to the request after three weeks. The note asked for Zambia's assurance that it was not giving support to the guerrilla forces. Zambia criticized the British policy. She said that Britain failed to control the deteriorating condition of Rhodesia.

There was a great uproar in the world community when three nationalist leaders Victor Mlambo, James Dhalamini

and Duly Shedreck were hanged on 6 March 1968. The issue was once again raised in the Security Council in May 1968. The Security Council passed a resolution in which it recommended that member-nations should implement the comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. This resolution was passed unanimously with the concurring votes of all 15 members. France, for the first time, voted positively. She also recognized that this issue was not domestic and the UN had the right to discuss and intervene it.

Three years had already passed after the UDI and sanctions did not prove to be effective in solving the problem. The underlying reason for this was that the sanctions were never implemented by some nations, like South Africa and Portugal. The United States also did not implement them in toto. Aid and trade continued through the back door.

Another factor which was in favour of the Rhodesian regime was the 'kith and kin' affinity. The 'kith and kin' ties were so strong that Britain always opposed the use of force and tried to seek a solution through negotiations. After twenty months of the HMS Tiger talks, both parties decided to resume the talks on board HMS Fearless, which was anchored in the Gibraltar harbour. They decided that the six principles of NIBMAR were not negotiable and the Tiger proposals were to be followed with one exception concerning the return to constitutional government. The draft proposed that a Royal Commission would be established to ascertain whether the Constitution was acceptable to the Rhodesians as a whole.

British Prime Minister Harold Wilson said that there would be a 'blocking quarter' of directly elected Africans; and the function of this quarter would be to prevent the retrogressive amendments to the Constitution. The proposal talked about the future plan of action. It said that if the Royal Commission found the settlement acceptable, then a Rhodesian Independence Constitution would be introduced.

Final appeals rested with the Privy Council and not with the Rhodesian High Court. Smith found it as a limitation to the regime's sovereignty, and he rejected the Fearless proposals. On 19 November 1968 Smith said that "under no circumstances can we accept a second class independence, a constitution that will mean in the end that we are not the masters in our own house".¹⁴

Once again the British efforts to reach a settlement through peaceful negotiations failed. The British delegation sacrificed the basic NIBMAR principles. On the one hand Britain could not achieve anything out of the negotiation and on the other hand she had to face the criticism of the Afro-Asian nations. Fearless proposals were opposed by the members of the Commonwealth in a conference, which was held in 1969 in London. The members argued that in practice the proposals would lead to the perpetuation of power in the hands of the minority regime. They pressurized the British Prime Minister to withdraw these proposals. The British Prime Minister

14 Patrick O'Meara, Rhodesia - Racial Conflict or Co-existence? (London, 1975), p. 33.

stated in his defence that these proposals remained only on table in a paper form. These proposals had already been rejected by Ian Smith - Britain was still against the use of force.

Ian Smith had once again failed to resolve the crisis internationally as he rejected the settlement proposals. As the negotiations broke down, he tried to bring internal changes in the constitutional arrangements of the country. He published a new constitution in June 1969 and put it to referendum. This was approved by 72 per cent of votes. The new constitution provided for a bicameral legislature which consisted of 66 members, out of which 50 members would be elected by the whites, coloured and Asian voters. Remaining 16 seats were given to the Africans - out of which 8 were African Chiefs and headmen. The other eight members were elected by the predominantly urban African people. The white settlers wanted to exploit the tribal element and to split the country into tribal groups, so that they could not get united and resist. It was because of this reason that they formed the senate in this way -- ten whites, ten chiefs (five from Mashonaland and five from Matabeleland), and three persons of any race appointed by the Head of the State.

The 1969 Constitution gave the whites the amending power, but in the case of the entrenched clauses, the concurrence of three African chiefs was needed, who were loyal to the Smith regime.

A new Declaration of Rights was introduced in the Constitution, which prohibited suppression of one class by the other. It said that an individual should be saved from unjust discrimination. Ironically, it allowed for social, economic, political or cultural discrimination, if it could be justified. The 1969 Constitution allowed preventive detention and arrests in the safety of public interest. It also authorised the regulation of press and the media and the suppression of the freedom of expression.

On 20 June 1969, 72.5 per cent voters approved the Constitution, and 84.5 per cent approved that Rhodesia should delink itself from the United Kingdom.

Ian Smith claimed that his new Constitution would "entrench government in the hands of civilized Rhodesians for all time" and that it would "sound the death knell" for the principle of majority rule. In a radio and television speech at that time, he declared that it "would reconcile radical differences of race, culture and society...and...sought to allow development of conditions under which the two main races could live in harmony without fear of dominance or subjugation".¹⁵

Smith declared Rhodesia a Republic at midnight on 1-2 March 1970, by severing its eighty-year old links with Britain.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

The immediate response of the British Government to Smith's action was the announcement of its severance of the diplomatic relations with Rhodesia.

Continuing with the past practice, this time also the issue was once again raised in the United Nations. And Britain was put in a difficult position by the Afro-Asian nations. Lord Caradon, the British Foreign Secretary, asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to condemn Rhodesia's 'purported assumption of republican status'. The previous measures were reaffirmed that member-nations should not recognize the illegal regime and should not provide the Rhodesian Government any assistance (under Article 41). Non-permanent members of the Security Council wanted that force should be used and sanctions should also be extended against Portugal and South Africa. Britain, together with the United States, vetoed the Afro-Asian resolutions.

The Conservative Government headed by Edward Heath (with Sir Alec Douglas-Home as Foreign Secretary) also tried to bring about a solution through negotiations.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home visited Rhodesia along with a High Power delegation. He consulted leaders of various racial groups and also met the African nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, then a political prisoner. Nkomo expressed the view that the NIBMAR principles were a precondition for any future settlement.

Sir Alec conducted bilateral talks with Ian Smith. The agreement that was reached between Douglas-Home and

Smith was a mid-way between the two extremes. It proposed unimpeded progress towards a majority rule, which could be brought about only through an evolutionary process. Douglas-Home did not object to the continuation of nation-wide state of emergency and the land apportionment system. The proposal did not rule out the continuation of the political trials and detention. The settlement proposal was approved by the British Government and they were hopeful that it would be accepted by the Rhodesian people as a whole. But it was rejected by the OAU on the ground that it was an outright sell out of five million Africans to 243,000 white Rhodesians for generations to come.

The Security Council discussed the Rhodesian crisis in the light of the new proposals which were agreed upon by the illegal regime and the British Government. A draft resolution was sponsored by the Afro-Asian nations, who were opposed to this settlement proposal. They discarded the agreement as it did not guarantee the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Rhodesia. The agreement did not meet the requirements of the attainment of the right to self-determination for the black people. The Security Council resolution stressed upon the principle of 'one man one vote'. Once again Britain used its veto.

The Home-Smith deal was rejected by the General Assembly. It passed a resolution on 20 December 1971, which said that the settlement constituted a flagrant violation of

the inalienable rights of people of Rhodesia to self-determination and independence.

The pact was not only opposed by the external powers, but also within the country. The African National Congress, headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, opposed the settlement proposal. The ANC mobilized opposition to the proposal.

The unfavourable attitude of the majority of nations prompted Britain to appoint a commission (known as The Pearce Commission) whose function would be to test the acceptability of the proposals. The visit of Pearce Commission precipitated significant African political activity. At the same time Britain made major concessions in NIBMAR principles.

Ian Smith agreed to the British proposal on the Pearce Commission mainly because of two reasons. He considered the Chiefs as the true representative of Africans and the Chiefs were in turn faithful to him. He thought that nationalist leaders would have lost their influence by now. But this proved to be a false notion.

Secondly, the Rhodesian economy was in a chaotic condition due to economic sanctions for the last seven years. Thus he wanted to reach on an agreement.

The Pearce Commission, consisted of 21 members headed by Lord Pearce, was to propagate the proposal and collect first-hand reactions of the people, which was then to be

reported to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.¹⁶ The African National Council tried hard to convince the people that it was against their interest. They urged the people that a 'no' would lead to the fall of the Smith regime and the non-participation of British Government in the Rhodesian politics. Their efforts brought the desired results.¹⁷

The Pearce Commission released its report in the last week of May 1972. It said in its report that the members of the Commission after contacting the people had come to the conclusion that the people of Rhodesia were against the proposals. Smith's reaction to the Commission's report was that intimidation and ignorance had made it impossible for members to come to the right conclusions. The Pearce Commission refuted the allegations of Smith and said that they had made people fully aware of the provisions of the proposals and it enabled them to give their judgment.

The Pearce Commission summed up its findings in the following words: "The least requirement for democratic government is that there must exist adequate communication

16 Lord Pearce was a distinguished British Judge who had been involved in a number of important Royal commissions. Of the four deputy chairmen, three had had a significant experience in Africa. Sir Maurice Dogman had been a former Governor of Sierra Leone. Sir Glyn Jones had been a former Governor of Malawi. And Sir Frederick Pedler had been a former deputy of the United Africa Company. The fourth deputy Chairman was Lord Harlech, who had been British Ambassador in Washington.

17 For African opinion see Appendix II (Table II).

between those who govern and the governed. It is here that the Pearce Commission exposed a fundamental weakness in Rhodesia."¹⁸

Ian Smith's response to the findings of the Commission was that it "had, had the wool pulled over its eyes".¹⁹

The Pearce Commission report boosted the morale of the black Africans. It proved to be a psychological turning point for African minds. They got encouragement through the report of the Commission. As a result of this the armed resistance got intensified and gathered momentum from 1972 onwards. The roots of imperialism started weakening from this year.

Bishop Muzorewa emphasized a non-violent approach for the settlement of the dispute. His party kept an open door for further constitutional negotiations. The Smith regime was afraid of banning the organization as it would have lost the opportunity for further talks. The ANC was the only political party in the country which was prepared to hold talks with the Smith Government. In March and April 1973, discussions took place between Muzorewa and Ian Smith.

The success of any negotiation lies in the political will of both the parties to reach an agreement. In the case of Rhodesia, it was apparently lacking. Ian Smith did not

18 Patric O'Meara, n. 14, p. 54.

19 The Star, 27 May 1972.

agree to Muzorewa's proposals because they were a prelude to the majority rule. The ANC demanded immediate parity for African and white members of parliament, the release and granting of amnesty to all held in detention or engaged in guerrilla activities, repealing Land Tenure Act, repeal of all discriminatory legislations, granting Britain the right to veto certain sections of the Constitution, the broadening of the franchise.

Following the failure to reach an agreement, the Smith regime took further steps to put down the activities of the ANC. In July 1973, six of ANC's top officials were detained. Despite all this, ANC leader Muzorewa was prepared to enter a dialogue with the Prime Minister. The Anglo-Rhodesian series of negotiations, which took place from 1966 to 1972, were now replaced by the ANC-Rhodesia talks. A number of meetings took place between Ian Smith and Muzorewa and ultimately they reached an agreement in 1974. The settlement proposal provided for parity in the Rhodesian Parliament in forty to sixty years. But this was unanimously rejected by the ANC Central Committee in June 1974.

The establishment of the radical Front For the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in 1975, had a dual advantage for the foreign-based black nationalists. A new front was opened for their guerrilla activities. It increased considerably during and after mid-1974. Military aid to ZAPU and ZANU was channelled through OAU. The

guerrillas were trained in Tanzania, Algeria, Egypt, Cuba, the USSR and China. The other advantage was that it closed an important sanctions-violating route. The railway link to the Port of Beira, where 80 per cent of the port traffic was made up of Rhodesian cargo, was through Mozambique. The only remaining railway link with South Africa ran through Botswana. The Rhodesian regime anticipated a total blockade of traffic through the Port of Beira because it completed a short new railway line from the town of Rutenga in Rhodesia to Beit Bridge on the South African border in six months.

A significant shift took place in the policy of South Africa after the coup in Portugal and the establishment of FRELIMO. South Africa revived its policy in the light of military security. A. Grobbelar, the visiting South African Secretary-General, declared that it would be wise on the part of South Africa, to adopt a neutral position regarding the Rhodesian problem, since Rhodesia would no longer constitute a buffer state between South Africa and the North. The change in policy was best illustrated when South Africa pointed out that the capacity of the railways and ports in South Africa was not sufficient to cope with any large increase in Rhodesian cargo.

South Africa also joined the bandwagon of the rest of the world, and began to make efforts for African majority rule. Mr Vorster, the Prime Minister of South Africa, started pursuing secret diplomacy with the leaders of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana in an attempt to call for a

majority rule conference with the government of Ian Smith. The ground was prepared for future talks, in which all the parties would be represented in Lusaka.

Participants in the Lusaka conference of 6 November 1974 included the heads of State of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, the FRELIMO President Samora Machel, and the ZANU and ZAPU leaders, Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, and Rev. Ndabanihgi Sithole, who were paroled from prison to attend the discussions. ANC leader Bishop Muzorewa was also present.

The Conference proposed a five-stage programme to bring majority rule in the country by 1975. It suggested the following measures to achieve a settlement between Britain and Rhodesia:

- (a) The unification of ZANU and ZAPU;
- (b) Agreement on a ceasefire;
- (c) The convening of a constitutional conference;
- (d) Raising the African representation in the Parliament by appointment to parity; and
- (e) General elections according to the principle of 'one-man one-vote'.

On 7 December 1974, all the nationalist parties agreed to merge into the ANC as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe. At the beginning of 1975 it was evident that no effective ceasefire had been implemented. The Rhodesian authorities also stopped releasing political prisoners. ANC leader, Rev. Ndabanihgi Sithole, was arrested on 4 March 1975 and on 18 March, the acting ZANU President,

Herbert Chitepo was killed by a letter bomb in Lusaka. As a consequence of these events, the guerrilla activities were once again resumed.

FRELIMO President Samora Machel told the twenty-fourth session of the OAU Liberation Committee in January 1975 that an independent Mozambique would help the black armed forces in the cause of self-determination, if the present negotiations failed to lead to an agreement. It was also the official policy of the OAU. Negotiations did not bring any fruitful results. Smith and the ANC reached a deadlock over the venue of the proposed constitutional conference.

The deadlock was broken by the South African Prime Minister, Vorster. Despite the setbacks and lack of progress, he once again took the initiative towards the process of normalization of relations between the minority and the majority in Rhodesia. As a result of it, the Pretoria Agreement was signed on 9 August 1975. It was signed by Vorster, Dr Kaunda's personal representative and Ian Smith. It was backed by Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique.

In order to practically implement the agreement, delegations from the regime and the ANC met at the Rhodesia-Zambia border on the railway bridge spanning the Victoria Falls, in coaches supplied by the South African Government. President Kaunda of Zambia and Vorster met at the bridge and presided over the opening session of talks. But the negotiations broke down as Ian Smith refused to grant diplomatic immunity to the exiled ANC leaders to attend the constitutional

conference which would be held inside Rhodesia. Smith said that he would now open talks with other representative groups of Africans. This paved the way for discussions with Joshua Nkomo, which began on 15 December 1975. A series of thirteen formal meetings took place with no settlement. Smith called upon Britain to help in resolving the constitutional crisis. The British Government proposed a two-stage plan based on the following principles: (1) Acceptance of majority rule by the parties concerned; (2) Elections to take place in eighteen-months to two years; (3) No independence before majority rule; (4) The negotiations must not be long drawn; and (5) a smooth and orderly transition to independence. Smith, who did not want to bring majority rule and wanted to remain in power, rejected the British proposal.

The United States had been supporting the British policy in general and of the United Nations in particular. Thus it was indirectly involved in the peace-keeping operation. After the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Angola, the United States Government became more conscious and henceforth tried to stop the Russian influence in Rhodesia. In order to avoid a civil war and related eventualities, the US Secretary of State went on a two-week tour of African countries -- thus getting directly involved in the settlement of the Rhodesian dispute. In a major speech delivered in Lusaka, Henry Kissinger said that the British proposals had United States' backing and appealed to South Africa to use its influence to bring about the majority rule. He met Ian Smith in Pretoria

on 19 September 1976 and announced that they had come to an agreement to bring out a peaceful settlement. Smith announced his acceptance of the settlement package in a television and radio broadcast. The main points of the package deal were:

- (1) Agreement by the Smith regime to majority rule within two years;
- (2) An immediate meeting between the regime and the African leaders to organize an interim government;
- (3) The interim government was to consist of a council of state and a council of ministers, comprised of both black and white members but organized in such a way as to leave the whites with an effective veto;
- (4) the Ministries of Defence and Law and Order to remain in the hands of the whites during the interim period;
- (5) Sanctions to be lifted and all acts of war including guerrilla warfare would cease;
- (6) The establishment of an international trust fund to assure the country's economic development.

The United States was successful in its maiden attempt at settlement, whereas Britain had been trying for a decade.

The British Prime Minister, Mr Callaghan, appreciated Smith's action and said: "The acceptance of the proposals by Mr Smith's cabinet and his party represents a decisive step forward....It offers a real hope of bringing peace to Rhodesia and of averting the threat of intensifying warfare and bloodshed."²⁰ The American President, Mr Ford, hailed it as an

²⁰ Daily Telegraph (London), 25 September 1976.

act of realism.

The reaction of the front line states - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, was not favourable to the proposal. The major point of disagreement was that they wanted a Black interim government in Rhodesia. They stated that the acceptance of the Kissinger Plan would tantamount to legalizing the colonialist and racist structures of power. They called upon the British Government to convene a conference outside Zimbabwe, with the legitimate representatives, to establish a transitional government, before holding a full constitutional conference. Three days later, Britain announced the convening of such a conference. ZAPU and ZANU formed the Patriotic Front and sent a joint delegation to the proposed conference. The delegation put forth certain preconditions for final settlement, such as the lifting of the nationwide State of Emergency, abolition of the protected villages, lifting of all restrictions on political activity, release of all those sentenced to death, other political prisoners, and detainees; the suspension of all political trials, and the safe return to Zimbabwe of all members of the liberation movements.

The first step to work out the Kissinger deal was taken up on 29 September 1976, under the chairmanship of Sir Ivor Richard, Britain's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The four nationalist delegations participating were led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe (Patriotic Front) Bishop Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, and Ian Smith (Rhodesian

Front). Much of the first month of the talks was taken up by discussion of an independence date, eventually set by Britain as 1 March 1978. The Geneva talks were adjourned by the British Government until 17 January 1977. Mr Mugabe said on 5 December 1976:

The present Western Government must be brought to trial for its injustice, illegalities and atrocities. Ian Smith was the head of the criminal gang. The existing Security forces and police must be demolished. The guerrillas would form the Zimbabwe army and take care of the security of the country. 21

Ian Smith refused to consider any other proposal, but his own version of the Kissinger Plan.

Ivor Richard visited Southern Africa for consultations with the five frontline states, the South African Government, Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and the Smith regime. The frontline states declared that they would give political, material and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front was in favour of getting independence without any equivocation or precondition. In accordance with the demands of the frontline states, Sir Ivor Richard presented a new proposal to Ian Smith in January 1977 which stated that a British resident commissioner would chair a majority black council of ministers and a National Security Council. The commissioner would have a casting vote. Ian Smith rejected the British proposal on 24 January 1977.

After the failure of the Kissinger plan, the USA and Britain mounted joint efforts for future negotiations. The British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, announced after his talks with the US President Jimmy Carter, that Britain was prepared to resume talks with Smith. A new proposal was worked out with the co-operation of South Africa to the effect that Smith would accept a majority rule in two years.

In international politics, words can be interpreted or twisted according to a nation's interest. Smith rejected the British proposal which he had previously accepted. He rejected it on the ground that he never accepted a majority rule in two years as such, but only as a part of the comprehensive package deal offered to him by Kissinger.

Innumerable discussions and negotiations had taken place by 1977, but without any solution. The deterrent factor would have been the use of force or the threat to use force. Britain strongly opposed it and once again proposed the Anglo-American settlement proposals, published in the form of a British white paper. The proposals for the restoration of legality in Rhodesia and the settlement of the Rhodesian problem, were based on the following principles:

- (1) The surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality;
- (2) An orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978;
- (3) Free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage;

- (4) The establishment by the British Government of a transitional administration, with the task of conducting the elections for an independent government;
- (5) The United Nations presence, including the UN force, during the transitional period;
- (6) An independent constitution providing for a democratically elected government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of individual human rights, and the independence of judiciary; and
- (7) a Development Fund to revive the economy of the country which the UK and the USA viewed as predicated upon the implementation of the settlement as a whole.

The British Government nominated Field Marshall Lord Carver as resident commissioner-designate. In this post, Lord Carver would exercise the legislative, and executive powers during the transitional period. Smith announced that he would carve out his own internal settlement plan while keeping under consideration the Anglo-American proposal. The United Nations Security Council approved the proposals and appointed Major-General Prem Chand of India, as the UN Special Representative to work with Lord Carver to secure a ceasefire in Rhodesia.

Exploratory talks on the Anglo-American proposals were held in Malta between Mr Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr Young, the US Ambassador to the UN, and Major-General Prem Chand on the one hand, and a Patriotic Front

delegation headed by Nkomo and Mugabe on the other in January 1978. They ended in deadlock because of the disagreement over the control of armed forces during the transition.

The negotiations continued with no progress towards the independence of the country. The most adversely affected nation was Zambia, whose economy had received a setback as a result of the blockade of land routes. The failure in the negotiations prompted them to reopen Zambia's border with Rhodesia on account of economic necessity.

In January 1979, a revolutionary change took place. A new draft constitution was published naming the future republic "Zimbabwe" - Rhodesia. Bishop Abel Muzorewa was made the Prime Minister, the first black Premier of the country.

Bishop Muzorewa who had lived under house arrest for ten years, found himself unwelcome in any of the neighbouring territories. He had disagreements with FRELIMO on the issue of the armed struggle. To the FRELIMO, revolution seemed to be an end in itself. Muzorewa, a deeply religious man wanted to use primarily nonviolent means for the struggle. He was of the view that beyond a certain point the armed struggle would become self-defeating, as it would be a loss to African economy and technology.

The objectives of the Smith Government were to gain recognition and the lifting of economic sanctions against the country. Smith also got disillusioned with South Africa and the Western Powers. These powers wanted that majority

rule should be brought in the country. Thus, the marriage of convenience and mutual advantage took place between the white racist regime and black Africans led by Bishop Muzorewa. The Whites manoeuvred to retain power through the puppet government, and Ian Smith joined the 17-member cabinet.

The Patriotic Front intensified the guerrilla activities against the illegal regime. Neither the newly-elected British Conservative Government, nor the Carter Administration in USA recognized the new regime. But it got the support of the South African Government.

In July 1979, the OAU members, in their meeting, reaffirmed their support to the Patriotic Front and considered it as the sole representative of the peoples of Zimbabwe. At the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference in September 1979, the Rhodesian issue dominated the proceedings of the eight-day conference. Britain was criticized by the Commonwealth countries for her sympathetic attitude towards the Muzorewa Government in Rhodesia. President Kenneth Kaunda described the type of government as the "white power clad in black habiliments". Mrs Margret Thatcher acknowledged the validity of their criticism and assured them that a constitutional conference would be called to give the Africans' genuine majority rule. Fresh elections would be held under British or international supervision in which all parties including the Patriotic Front would be given a chance to participate.

The significance of these principles was that they became the founding proposals for the final settlement.

Independence was granted to Southern Rhodesia on the basis of these principles. The Commonwealth conference paved the way for the future constitutional conference which took place in London in January 1979. The Lancaster Conference was the result of agreements reached later at the Lusaka Conference. None of the parties were keen to attend the Conference. The Patriotic Front agreed to attend due to the pressure put by the frontline states. Muzorewa attended it because he was assured by the British Government that the economic sanctions would be lifted with the change in the existing Constitution of Zimbabwe.

Till now, Britain had appeared to be a weaker party while negotiating, for she always gave major concessions to the Smith regime. But for the first time she exercised her decision-making powers. She asserted herself in the capacity of the colonial power, conducting the deliberations for the transfer of power of one of its colonies, namely, Rhodesia.

The participants in the Lancaster Conference were Bishop Muzorewa with his 12-men team, including Ian Smith, the Patriotic Front represented by Mugabe (ZANU), and Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and the British representative, Lord Carrington. After over three months of negotiations an agreement emerged envisaging an independence Constitution, a ceasefire and a transitional period leading to elections.

Once again, the British flag was raised in Salisbury on 12 December 1979, thus representing the end of an illegal

regime, which was established on 11 November 1965. It denoted a conspicuous event in history as Britain retained the colonial authority over the territory.

The Lusaka Accord and the Lancaster Agreements were eventually implemented and fresh elections took place under the auspices of the Commonwealth Observer Group. It gave an opportunity to the Africans to exercise their political rights and elect the government of their own choice. The Commonwealth Observer Group headed by India's Rajeshwar Dayal gave their approval to the elections. They announced that "the elections up to the end of polling can be considered to have been free and fair to the extent that they provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner".²²

Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF) won 57 seats of the 80 seats reserved for Africans in the 100-seat parliament. Joshua Nkomo's (ZAPU-PF) got only 20 seats and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) captured three seats. Twenty seats under the Lancaster House Agreement had been reserved for the country's quarter million white community, and these were won by Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front in an earlier and separate election.

Thus, the colonial history of Zimbabwe came to an end on 17 April 1980. The sacrifice of twenty thousand

22 Commonwealth Currents (London) April 1980, p. 1.

lives of the people of Zimbabwe brought home to them their cherished destiny. The liberation of the country was the result of an armed struggle as well as peaceful negotiations extending over a decade.

.....

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRING AND THE RHODESIAN CRISIS

Great Power diplomacy in the post-war era has been to keep all the conflicts away from their part of the world. In fact, they have tried, and often quite successfully, to shift the hot-bed of disputes to the Third World area. The newly emerging third world nations, due to their socio-economic and political backwardness, provided suitable conditions for these powers to intervene and expand their sphere of influence. They would so manipulate a crisis as to keep the avenues open for intervention and extension of their influence. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dominance was established by colonising a particular territory. New imperialist designs emerged in the twentieth century, which used to make alliances or establish puppet regimes in the third world countries, which would dance to the tune of the Great Powers. The political dominance would enhance the economic and strategic interests of the industrialized nations.

The old pattern of colonialism, imperialism and dominance tended to pass away by the mid-twentieth century as most of the Afro-Asian nations became politically

independent, with some exceptions like Southern Rhodesia and South-West Africa.

After a brief resume of the genesis, growth and consolidation of colonialism in Southern Rhodesia, we find that right from the days of imperialism, power -- political, economic and social - has been the guiding force of the white settlers. A peep into the history of resistance and armed struggle by the black majority against the whites brings to light certain underlying or basic factors of the white citadel in Southern Rhodesia.

The final solution of the Rhodesian crisis was the culmination of joint efforts and pressure tactics of various nations -- the Great Powers, international organizations and associations. One can draw a clear line of demarcation between the early stages of bilateral settlement, and the internationalization of the issue. The struggle for majority rule by the people of Zimbabwe received world acclamation and attention in the middle sixties, i.e., after the UDI. Due to lack of political will on the part of the Great Powers for settlement, the rule of white settlers survived in Southern Rhodesia till 1980.

The activities, the statements and behaviour of various Great Powers weaved a distinct pattern in terms of the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis. The role of various nations and Great Powers was the outcome of their national interests. Linked with the organic and material needs, were

also the security and related factors that clearly grouped them in different categories.

There was, indeed, a three-tier situation in which a group of nation was strongly opposed to the Smith regime and said so in the most emphatic manner as, for example, Britain and the United States.

The second group was diagonally opposite to the first and included staunch supporters of the illegal regime, namely, South Africa and Portugal.

The third, and the most active layer, consisted of nations which not only gave verbal support to the people of Zimbabwe, but unequivocally advocated the use of force to achieve the liberation of Rhodesia.

The Great Powers' involvement in the Rhodesian crisis provides a glimpse of a high-level overt and covert diplomacy. Each of the powers, being guided by its own perception, and presumed move of the other took different stand and acted differently at a given point of time.

Britain

The imperialist power, Britain, had been actively participating in the crisis since the nineteenth century when this territory was turned into a colony. In order to serve its economic, political and strategic interests, Britain transferred power to the white settlers of Rhodesia, ignoring the rights and interests of the majority Africans. It did not object to the discriminatory laws. It did not use its political

power, and thus legitimized all the racial and oppressive laws. Not only this, the British Government violated the provisions of the UN Charter by not providing the information to the UN about this territory under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter. It tried to hide the reality on the ground that Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory with its 1923 Constitution. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it misused its power.

The major concern of Britain was to safeguard its economic interest and investments in Southern Rhodesia. Britain was the major importer of tobacco and also of chrome, asbestos, and iron ore. Its interests could have been better served through her "kith and kin".

The national interest of Britain was affected when Ian Smith made the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 without consulting it. At that time Britain took the issue to the UN. Although the issue was internationalized, the ultimate responsibility was bestowed upon Britain, which in turn agreed to remain responsible without any power.

Since the precipitation of the crisis it was Britain's constant endeavour to solve it through peaceful negotiations. The kith and kin affinities were so strong that she did not want to use force against the Smith regime. On the insistence of Afro-Asian nations, comprehensive and mandatory sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia, but were never implemented effectively and in toto. It was suggested by the Afro-Asian

nations that the sanctions should also be extended to South Africa and Portugal, who were the ardent supporters of the Smith regime. But Britain did not favour it, as it would have adversely affected its relations with South Africa, which was economically and strategically very important. South Africa occupies a strategic position in the Indian ocean commanding the sea routes that carry oil and minerals from across the ocean to the US and other Western countries. Besides this, it has mineral wealth, including gold, diamonds and other strategic materials needed by the United States and the Western Europe. Thus keeping in view its strategic and economic interest, it opposed the recommendations of the Afro-Asian nations for the blockade of land routes for trade which were being used by South Africa.

In order to save the Commonwealth from breaking asunder, Britain made several promises to the Commonwealth Members in various conferences. But while negotiating with the Ian Smith regime, it gave major concessions to the other party. It acted as a weaker party. It did not adhere to its basic NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule) proposals. Series of negotiations failed, but they could not bring the change in the British policy of not using force against the illegal regime. The declaration of Rhodesia as a 'Republic' by Ian Smith in 1970, did not bring any alteration in the British attitude. The ineffective role played by Britain made it possible for the Rhodesian illegal regime to continue

to rule for such a long period. The use of force or threat to use force could have been an effective weapon for the immediate fall of the illegal regime. Even if the sanctions had been extended to South Africa and Portugal, or had been implemented effectively, it could have made an impact on the Rhodesian economy and the illegal regime.

We cannot simply ignore the positive role played by Britain. The ultimate settlement was reached with the help and co-operation of Britain. It used its political power and emerged as a strong party at the Lancaster Conference in which the future of Rhodesia was decided; that free and fair elections should take place for the majority rule in Rhodesia, which led to the final transfer of power on 17 April 1980.

United States

The USA stood by its ally Britain at all levels of activity. Indeed, Britain was morally, diplomatically, and politically supported by America. Till the mid-70s the United States played an important role behind the screen. American diplomatic tactics were at their best in the UN, where it could influence the voting pattern of member states. It opposed the UDI and severed its diplomatic relations with Southern Rhodesia in 1970, when Smith declared it a 'Republic'. It did not completely break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, even after the imposition of economic sanctions. Due to the continuation of trade with Rhodesia, it was condemned by the Afro-Asian nations in the UN.

As a major industrialist-capitalist and military power it had its vested economic and strategic interests in the area. The United States of America was a major importer of chrome. In order to gain the strategic and economic benefits from South Africa, the US favoured the British stand and proposals in the UN.

Keeping in view its national interest, the US Government sent Henry Kissinger to Southern Africa to try his favourite 'shuttle diplomacy'. He proposed a settlement plan, which was in the beginning agreed upon by Smith. The United States' direct involvement was due to the intensified guerrilla activities in Southern Rhodesia. The motive behind it was to stop Soviet interference in the territory. Their apprehension was that the fighting between the nationalists and guerrilla forces would give the Soviet Union an opportunity to interfere on the pretext to help the Africans, who were fighting for self-determination. America had already witnessed the case of Soviet intervention in Angola; therefore it wanted to prevent the future prospects of Soviet intervention in Rhodesia. Thus it offered good offices to solve the Rhodesian crisis. The African nationalists were prepared to accept the American Plan of settlement on certain conditions, e.g. release of political prisoners and detainees, universal adult suffrage etc., but these conditions were not acceptable to the Smith regime. Thus the American efforts were all in vain. The success in political sector would have naturally led to economic and strategic benefits. The industrialized USA

did not wish to lose the chrome-rich country. Its economic and investment interests were not merely restricted to mining and industrial activities but also covered agriculture and communications.

With the establishment of Robert Mugabe's Government with its known pro-Chinese inclinations, the United States at the moment is in quite comfortable position.

Soviet Union

The socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union played the sophisticated game of covert power diplomacy. It joined hands with the Afro-Asian nations in all their efforts and resolutions, thereby adding weightage to its leverage at the United Nations.

Right from the beginning, the Soviet Union took a stance in favour of the black majority. All its actions were tilted in the direction of expediting the establishment of popular rule. It condemned the UDI of 1965 and refused to recognize the illegal regime. It criticized the Anglo-American proposals on the ground that they would perpetuate the white minority rule.

The Soviet Union helped the guerrilla forces to fight against the white minority regime. It trained the guerrilla forces of ZAPU group and would have liked to see Nkomo as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. The motive behind the training of guerrilla forces was to extend its sphere of influence by helping to establish a pro-Soviet regime. The

entire game of its power politics revolved around the attainment of greater dominance and thereby facilitate its national interest. It has been recognized that if one of the nations, in a region falls into the orbit of a super power, as per the 'Domino Theory', other neighbouring nations gradually tend to move under the yoke of that super power. The underlying interests behind the Soviet action was to carve out a route for expansion through Rhodesia and extend its network in other parts of the region and spread its area of power accumulation.

Thus we find that both the Super Powers, by backing either Britain or Afro-Asian nations, were trying to checkmate each other's moves. It was this pursuit of their interests or the Super Power rivalry, that inspired them to participate in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis in a manner that would protect their own designs and interests.

China

China's entrance into the Rhodesian crisis was made possible by Zambia. Zambia was predominantly dependent on South Africa for its trade route. In order to enforce the economic sanctions, an alternative trade route was needed. Zambia asked for Chinese help to build up a railway link between Zambia and Tanzania. On 5 September 1967, an agreement between China, Tanzania and Zambia was signed in Peking. The railway link was estimated to cost around \$400 million. And, to this end, China granted an interest free loan for twenty-

five years. The Tanzam railway link was the most important single project of foreign aid undertaken by the People's Republic of China. The significance of this project aid has been given by George A. Tu as follows:

The estimated cost of 5,402,000 million will double China's aid commitments to Africa. In view of China's own development needs, the cost is negligible. China's own railway development, for example, has been poorly served. It has been estimated that China has added only 10,000 miles of railway since 1949 to the mere 12,500 miles which the regime inherited. It could be said that China will be deprived of the 1060 miles of railway being contributed to Tanzania and Zambia's development. ¹

Not only economic devices, but political methods were also adopted by China to establish its influence over the area. After the Sino-Soviet rift and especially after the Sino-American detente, the objective of both powers had been to combat Soviet expansionism and influence. China trained a separate group of guerrilla forces (ZANU) and gave military help to them. It has had considerable success, in as much as the pro-Chinese regime led by Robert Mugabe won the elections and established its rule in Zimbabwe.

France

France did not get directly involved, as it considered Rhodesia to be within the jurisdiction of its ally

¹ George A. Tu, China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction (China Research Monographs, No. 5, Berkeley: University of California, Centre for Chinese Studies, 1970), p. 58.

Britain. The French Government's opinion was that the crisis should be settled by the British authorities and no other Power had the power to interfere in it. Their view was that as they settled the Algerian crisis, Britain should solve the Rhodesian crisis without any other power's help. France did not favour the internationalization of the crisis and this was evident through their voting behaviour in the UN. They supported the British stand that the UN did not have any authority to intervene in it.

But after the UDI in 1965 France changed its stand and supported the UN resolution on economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. France did not take keen interest in the Rhodesian crisis and generally supported the British stand from the beginning till the end.

Afro-Asian Nations

The Afro-Asian nations represented in the OAU, the Commonwealth, the Non-aligned movement, and the United Nations; played the role, so to say, of a pressure group or lobby within the international system. The Afro-Asian nations, who have had the common experience of colonialism, imperialism and exploitation, strongly opposed the illegal regime. The pressure for settlement on Britain was mounted up by them. These were the nations who brought to the surface the truth that Southern Rhodesia was a 'non-self-governing territory'. They refuted the British argument and contended that the majority was ruled and oppressed by the minority in Rhodesia.

The world community came to know that the African majority were deprived of economic and political rights.

After the UDI of 1965, other nations also agreed with Afro-Asian nations that it was a threat to world peace and security. The Afro-Asian nations played the most creative, constructive role in the establishment of peace and order, through the various associations and the UN. Thus it is important to analyse the role of various associations in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

One of the basic principles of OAU was to help in the freedom struggles of those African peoples who had not yet attained independence. The OAU consisting of various nations could not take a strong and united action immediately due to the divergent views and interests of member-States. But in general, it opposed the rule and activities of illegal Smith regime. The OAU opposed the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime and urged Britain to use force against the illegal rulers. When Britain refused to use force, the member states criticized the British stand and some of them broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.

It would have been more forceful if all the member nations of the OAU had broken off diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom.

The OAU called upon Britain several times to hold a constitutional conference in which all the parties to the

Rhodesian dispute should be invited to participate. And on the basis of a new constitution emerging from the conference, independence should be granted to the people of Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian crisis was a test case for the OAU. Success in the resolution of this crisis would have created an image of the OAU as a united, coherent, active and constructive association. As it was, it gave military, economic and political support to the nationalist forces. Several OAU member states trained the guerrilla forces. The major achievement of the OAU was to unite the two nationalist groups -- (ZAPU AND ZANU) -- into one single entity, the African National Congress (ANC) in 1970. The OAU's efforts were always geared to bring into existence a strong, united group to fight against the white illegal regime. It did not take initiative only at the regional level, but also at the international level. Right from the beginning the OAU supported the UN actions against the Smith regime and demanded stronger action. It strongly opposed the internal settlement of 1979, whereby Bishop Muzorewa became the Prime Minister of Rhodesia through an unfair election. It extended its political and material support to the Patriotic Front of Mugabe and Nkomo. Its goal was ultimately achieved when majority rule was established in Zimbabwe.

Frontline States [Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
and Zambia]

The frontline states were the master craftsmen of the demolition of colonialism in Southern Rhodesia. Their

participation in the crisis was not just restricted at the political-diplomatic level but extended to personal and economic sufferings. They gave wide-ranging economic and military assistance to the struggling people of Zimbabwe.

It was not only the Rhodesian economy that got stagnated due to international economic sanctions, but Zambia's national economy was also hampered. Due to her geographical position of a land-locked country, Zambian trade with the outside world is dependent upon Rhodesia. Not only do the land routes run from Rhodesia, but its main lines of access to the sea is from the same territory. Its oil comes through Rhodesia from Beira (in Mozambique), while the Rhodesian railways carry Zambia's copper out to Beira, via Bulawayo and Salisbury. Therefore sanctions designed to isolate Rhodesia would also isolate Zambia. Thus Zambia had a good reason to object to a policy of sanctions. In the Zambian view the only effective strategy against Rhodesia would have been an armed invasion. Indeed, the Government of Zambia offered the British military the use of its territory to face the serious situation in Rhodesia. But on the insistence of Britain, the UN agreed to impose sanctions against Rhodesia, however partial and ineffective, Zambia tried its best to comply with them.

The first major blow to the economy of Zambia was in December 1965, when the oil pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia was closed. This did not affect Rhodesia very much

because it turned to South Africa but it had serious repercussions on the economy of Zambia. In 1968, a new pipeline was opened, running from Dar-es-Salaam to the copper-belt; it was built by Italians after Britain had refused to build it. Meanwhile, Zambia tried to reduce its dependence on Rhodesia for exporting copper. Half of Zambia's copper continued to go south to Beira, but the rest went north: a quarter by road to Dar-es-Salaam, and another quarter along the Benguela railways, through the Congo and Angola to the part of Lobito on the west coast.

Thus within one decade of UDI, Zambia snapped almost all its economic links with Rhodesia. It also managed to reduce its reliance on South Africa.

In spite of such odds against it, Zambia did not back out, and supported the African stand on the freedom struggle in Zimbabwe. It provided an important area for the guerrilla activities. Several nationalist leaders took refuge in Zambia; and continued their freedom struggle. Zambia was the victim of aggression from the white regime of Rhodesia. Therefore, it was directly involved in the Rhodesian crisis and proposed for an immediate settlement of the issue in the UN, the Commonwealth and the OAU. It always supported the proposals of the UN and urged for stronger action to bring the majority rule in the country. The independence of Zimbabwe was a happy situation for Zambia.

Mozambique provided an advantageous area for the guerrilla activities in the mid-seventies. With the establishment of the FRELIMO Government in Mozambique in 1975, the whole situation took favourable turn (for Zimbabwe), and it became a significant factor in toppling the Smith regime. FRELIMO whole-heartedly supported the black nationalists and provided them with an area to fight against the white settlers. The other major advantage was that an important sanction-breaking route got blocked. Moreover, the change in the situation compelled South Africa to revise its policy towards Southern Rhodesia.

Tanzania trained the guerrilla forces and gave them military weapons. It sponsored resolutions in the United Nations and always demanded stronger and urgent action against the oppressors. It supported the other African nations stand in the United Nations and imposed the economic sanctions effectively. It helped Zambia in reducing its dependence upon Rhodesia and South Africa. Thus it played a positive role in the freedom struggle of the Rhodesian people.

The Rhodesian crisis was not merely a regional issue confined to Africa. Owing to its international dimensions and ramifications, it was also discussed in the inter-regional and international associations like the Commonwealth and the United Nations. It is worthwhile to examine their roles in the crisis.

Commonwealth

The Commonwealth composed largely of Afro-Asian nations, got naturally involved in the Rhodesian crisis. It was used as a forum or force to pressurize the British Government for the immediate settlement of the crisis. For the first time in January 1966, at Lagos, a special Commonwealth conference was convened to discuss a particular political problem. The special conference was called to discuss the Rhodesian crisis. Due to the ineffective role of Britain in the solution of the crisis, the very existence of Commonwealth seemed to be in danger. The member states recommended the use of force against the Smith regime. They supported the 'No Independence before Majority Rule (NIBMAR)' principles. Whenever Britain tried to depart from the NIBMAR principles, it was criticized by the Commonwealth members. British policies and plans which tended to benefit the white minority were opposed by the Commonwealth members. It opposed Britain's bilateral talks with the illegal, unrepresentative regime. It also opposed the Douglas-Home-Smith agreement of 1971, which was according to the Commonwealth members, a sell-out of Africans to the white minority. It demanded elections based on 'one-man one-vote'. It urged that every individual irrespective of race, colour or creed, should be given the right to vote. Initially, Britain tended to ignore the opinion of the Commonwealth members. But fifteen

years later, in 1979, it was again at the call of the Commonwealth that Britain performed its last and long-overdue function as the erstwhile responsible imperial power in Rhodesia.

Thus the major achievement of the Commonwealth is that the ultimate settlement of plan was decided at the Lusaka Commonwealth conference in 1979. On the basis of its plan, independence was granted to the people of Zimbabwe. Fair and free elections took place under the supervision of a Commonwealth Observer Group. Thus the Commonwealth played a creative, constructive and -- shall we say -- a conclusive role in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis.

United Nations

Although the final Rhodesian settlement was the result of the Lusaka Accord and the Lancaster Agreement, the UN had actively participated in the resolution of the crisis. It had adopted various measures from time to time to bring black majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

The status of Southern Rhodesia as a 'non-self-governing territory' was determined by the UN in 1962, through a General Assembly resolution. As it was vetoed by Britain in Security Council, the UN could not take any action against the white settler government. After the UDI, when the imperialist power, Britain, itself brought the issue to the UN, economic sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia. In

1968, the selective sanctions were extended into mandatory and comprehensive sanctions. The UN functions effectively to the extent that the major powers co-operate with it. It is used as a tool of diplomacy by the Great Powers. They generally misuse the power and authority given to them by the UN. In the case of the Rhodesian crisis, only those recommendations and resolutions were passed, which were acceptable to the Great Powers. Giving priority to their national interest, some of the resolutions like the one on the imposition of economic sanctions were not implemented effectively by member-States.

The General Assembly which predominantly consists of the Afro-Asian nations and the Trusteeship Committee discussed the issue several times and put pressure on the major actors of the international system to resolve the crisis as early as possible. They called upon all the nations to break off diplomatic and economic relations with the illegal Smith regime of Rhodesia.

As one of the major powers happened to be the imperial power in this territory and was thus directly involved in the crisis, the UN assigned the ultimate responsibility in the matter to it.

South Africa and Portugal were the nations who openly and shamelessly violated the UN Charter and resolutions. They helped the white regime in centralization of power in Southern Rhodesia. These nations did not oppose the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on the ground that it

fell into the domestic jurisdiction of Rhodesia and they did not have any right to interfere in the affairs of another country. With the help and co-operation of South Africa and Portugal, the Smith regime could survive for so long and could face the challenge of economic sanctions.

National interest is usually the most important determinant of foreign policy. The change in the international environment in the mid-seventies changed the perspective of South Africa towards the Rhodesian problem. The alteration in South Africa's policy took place after the coup in Portugal in 1974 and the establishment of FRELIMO in 1975. The change was in accordance with the strategic and security position of the country. Prime Minister Vorster made it clear in public statements that he had no intentions of involving his country into the endless war. He put considerable pressure upon Ian Smith to come to an agreement even though it would lead to a black majority rule in the near future. The South African strategic view was that a ring of poor and militarily weak black countries would serve its economic and strategic interests. But it did not completely withdraw its support from Smith. South Africa and Portugal favoured the internal settlement of 1979, as the whole authority was still in the hands of white settlers. South African and Portuguese attitude towards Rhodesia crisis was a reflection of their racist and apartheid policies.

Nationalist Forces

The people of Zimbabwe attained their sovereign rights after a long and tedious battle with the minority regime. They struggled for many years and sacrificed thousand of lives to gain their right of self-determination. The oppressed people got wider recognition in the mid-sixties, especially after the UDI. Their conditions caught the attention of the world community.

As the decolonization process began, it heightened political consciousness of the oppressed African peoples all over Africa including Southern Rhodesia. However, the major weakness of the nationalist movement in Rhodesia was that the nationalist groups were not united. They got divided at the time of the dissolution of the Federation in 1963. Thus they missed a golden opportunity for pressing the demand for independence. As the ZAPU was banned in 1962 by Sir Edgar Whitehead, Joshua Nkomo decided to establish a government in exile. Some of the members opposed it and formed a new party called Zimbabwe African National Union. Thus for the first time structural and ideological divisions led to the formation of two parties which was beneficial for the white minority. The purpose of both parties was identical, i.e., to liquidate imperialism and colonialism and to work for the freedom of Zimbabwe. They fought for the same cause separately.

Another reason for their low success was the presence of what may be called domestic colonialism, and not historic colonialism. The colonial ruler was within the boundaries of the country and not an overseas power. It was more difficult to overthrow the internal colonial power as the police, army and the administrators had a greater commitment to the maintenance of the status quo; and it had a wider sphere of influence.

In the early seventies, major developments took place in the African political movement. The leaders became more active and they intensified the guerrilla activity in 1971. It was a landmark in the history of the political movement in Southern Rhodesia as the African National Congress was formed in this year to mobilize the African opposition to the settlement reached between Sir Alec Douglas Home and Ian Smith. As a consequence of their campaign against the settlement proposal, it was overwhelmingly rejected by the Africans in Zimbabwe. This success provided the fillip to the guerrilla activities. In 1977 both ZAPU and ZANU merged themselves and formed the new Patriotic Front to fight against the Muzorewa Government. Both parties contested elections under separate banners and the ZANU party led by Robert Mugabe got the majority seats. He formed the government in co-operation with the ZAPU party. Thus, in a nutshell, their strong and united efforts eventually gave them the long-sought majority rule.

....

CHAPTER III

INDIAN VENTURE IN CRISIS RESOLUTION : CENTRAL AFRICA

The patterns of behaviour among nations are guided by their domestic and foreign policies, which, in turn, are the end-product of their historical experiences, events and cultural heritage. Indian foreign policy, too, is a blend of the remnants of the long colonial rule and India's subjection to another race. She could not but take a firm anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance in her foreign policy and offer unstinted support to all the liberation movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America or elsewhere. However, this opposition to racial discrimination is not just a feature of independent India's policy, but goes way back into history -- where under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian National Congress denounced human subjection and degradation and supported the contemporary liberation struggles, despite their own innumerable problems.

The Indian nationalist struggle had kindled patriotism among the Africans, and many of the African leaders were deeply influenced, inspired and motivated by the Indian leaders. Mahatma Gandhi's efforts to consolidate various forces within South Africa, and his experiments with his newly discovered technique of satyagraha or non-violence provided an added impetus to the struggle. Gandhiji often told the British that

Indian independence will be a help to noble efforts throughout the world and a promise of relief to all its exploited peoples. After independence, India extended support to all Afro-Asian nations struggling for freedom. It may be recalled that the liberation of subject peoples and the elimination of racial discrimination and domination are among the notable principles of India's foreign policy based on non-alignment.

In accordance with the principles of non-alignment India has given moral, political, diplomatic and material support to all the liberation movements in the world. Having tasted the bitter fruit of political subjugation, it was natural for India to do its utmost to help eliminate all traces of colonialism and imperialism from the face of the earth. As Africa was a late starter in the march towards freedom, it specially attracted Nehru's sympathy. Thus he declared at Bandung:

Everything else pales into insignificance when I think of the infinite tragedy of Africa ever since the days of when millions of Africans were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, half of them dying in the galleys....We must accept responsibility for it....It is up to Asia to help Africa to the best of her ability because we are sister continents. ¹

India, which was the first Afro-Asian nation to become independent after the Second World War could very well be regarded as a catalyst in the post-war era of decolonization

¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy : September 1946- April 1954 (New Delhi: The Publication Division, 1961), p. 272.

and liberation. Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India asked for freedom for the peoples of Africa and other areas under colonial or imperial domination. To this end, as early as 1947, Nehru declared at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi:

The freedom we envisage is not to be confined to this nation or that or to a particular people, but must spread over the whole human race....It must be the freedom of the common man, everyone, and full opportunities for him to develop. 2

India firmly believes in equality and justice, which are the basic prerequisites of a peaceful world order. It believes that individuals in every nation should possess the basic human rights, and that there should be no subservience of one class to the other. These moral and political principles form the infrastructure of India's anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-racist stand.

India has not only given theoretical form to these principles but has also pursued them in practice to the best of her will and capacity. It has also sought to implement it in so many ways and in different forums: in the United Nations, in the Commonwealth, at the non-aligned meetings, and elsewhere. India not only reasserted her determination to follow

2. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: The Publication Division, 1961), p. 253.

them but also asked for their adoption by all freedom loving peoples including the Great Powers. In respect to the Rhodesian crisis, India consistently maintained that it was like a test case for the non-aligned nations. Hence they must unite to give all possible support to the people of Zimbabwe against the atrocious white minority regime. This is the crux of the nature and direction of India's contribution to the struggle for freedom in Rhodesia. But in view of the main focus of our work we shall deal with it in greater detail in the following pages.

The case of Southern Rhodesia cannot be studied in isolation. The situation was influenced by the international environment and the response of various nations. As we have already analysed the role of various components of the international system in the crisis in Rhodesia, India's role would be highlighted, keeping in view the international atmosphere. In the Rhodesian crisis, where there was a power struggle among the Great Powers, India had a limited role to play. Moreover, the increasing demand of her resources at home put considerable restraint on her capacity to assist the liberation movement in Rhodesia. But it would be going to another extreme to underestimate or ignore the support provided by India to the nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia. It is widely recognized that India's role was predominantly political and by way of providing stimulation or inspiration to the Africans to advance on the path of independence; even so it was of great

importance and significance. It always supported the initiatives taken by the African nations for the settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. The Africans also always sought Indian help and co-operation in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis and accepted India's Rajeshwar Dayal as the Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group for fair and free elections.

India opposed the racist and discriminatory policies of white settlers of Southern Rhodesia as early as the fifties of this century. The federation of three territories which came into existence in 1953, was opposed by India. In its opinion the establishment of the Federation would perpetuate the white minority rule and it would benefit only to the whites of Southern Rhodesia. The Federation was formed on the pretext that the three territories were interdependent and a strong federation would foster their economic and industrial development. But the fact was that the two principal architects of the Federation -- Huggins and Roy Welensky -- were aware of the reality that Britain would not grant independence to the territory under a minority regime and the adoption of a new constitution would assist the goal of independence. In terms of economic benefits, the copper resources of Northern Rhodesia and the African labour reservoir of Nyasaland were basic incentives to the merger of the three territories. The creation of a federation was in compliance with the policy of British Conservative Government. The apprehension of India, that it would lead to the consolidation of white regime, came

true as it only gave benefits to the white settlers economically as well as politically. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, denounced Roy Welensky's (Prime Minister of the Federation) idea of 'partnership' on the ground that there could be partnership only among equals and not among 'unequals'. And in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the blacks were treated as slaves and inferior to the whites. India criticised the British Government's policies on the Southern Rhodesian issue, which helped in the continuation of white settler rule. Britain supported the Federation's right to join international organizations and receive diplomatic representatives. In India's view, the minority government, which was not elected by the majority of the people of the country, and did not represent the wishes of the majority, should not be given recognition. In its view the racial and discriminatory laws passed during the Federation period, like the Restrictive Public Order (which authorized troops to break up strikes), African Representation and Identification Act and Native Council Acts, clearly implied the subjugation of blacks by the white minority. These laws and policies were opposed by several Afro-Asian countries including India. India did not favour the separate development of two races in one country.

In the early sixties, when the federal structure was on the breaking point, Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of the Federation, started negotiating with the British Government

for the adoption of a new constitution. On the basis of this new constitution, independence would be granted to Southern Rhodesia. The purpose of these negotiations was to extirpate the powers of British Government over certain clauses of legislation. As a result of this, a new constitution was adopted in 1961 which created a two-tier franchise system. The elections were held in the territory, while the major political parties were banned by the white minority. The newly-elected party under the leadership of Winston Field affirmed its loyalty to the Queen but refused to accept the domination of another government, for they wanted independence from British rule.

India opposed the 1961 Constitution as it would make African majority rule impossible for several years. India criticized it on the ground that the Constitution clearly discriminated between two races and classes and, through this Constitution, the minority class was given authority to rule over the majority. It was against the basic democratic principles as it did not provide for the universal suffrage.

India did not only oppose racialism in Central Africa, but also played a significant role in determining the status of Southern Rhodesia. India was given responsibility to decide the future of the territory as its delegate C.S. Jha was appointed chairman of the Sub-committee of Seven on Colonialism. The Indian delegate, A.B. Bhadkamkar, while speaking on the issue in the special committee on colonialism in March 1962,

reaffirmed the stand taken by C.S. Jha that it was a non-self-governing territory. Therefore, the British Government had the responsibility to give information about this territory to the United Nations under Article 73(e). The British argument was untenable and was refuted by the Indian delegate. The Indian representative tried to demolish the British idea on legal grounds and, for that, he brought into focus the 1923, the 1953 and the 1961 constitutions. These constitutions clearly defined the powers of the British Government over this territory. They also indicated the white man's supremacy over the black African.

The ratio of the indigenous inhabitants to European settlers had gradually declined from 44 to 1 in 1901, to about 8 to 1 in 1960. The British argument was that under the 1923 Constitution, all powers were transferred from the South Africa Company to the elected representatives of the Legislative Assembly and Council. The Indian delegate was not convinced as Britain had not given information about the strength of the electorate in proportion to the total population. Due to the high electoral qualifications, the majority of whites fulfilled the electoral qualifications; and therefore most of the electorate consisted of the whites. Hence, it can be deduced that the so-called referendum expressed the opinion only of white settlers (who were not more than 2 per cent of the whole population), whereas the referendum means a process by which a question is submitted to the direct vote of the whole electorate.

As Britain was the imperial authority and was trying to hide the reality, the Indian arguments and criticism were directed against its policies and principles. The British Government had contended that the autonomous status of Southern Rhodesia had been recognized internationally. This contention was based on the fact that the Government of the Colony was given the power to negotiate trade agreements with neighbouring territories such as the Union of South Africa and foreign colonial territories. It was also allowed to participate in General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), and certain international technical organisations such as the International Trade Union (ITU), African Postal Union and World Health Organization (WHO). The Indian argument was that the participation in these technical organizations and WHO was without vote. However, many other recognized non-self-governing territories were allowed to participate in international organisations. Hence Rhodesia's participation in these associations/organizations had no significance in this context.

In order to demolish the British notion, the Indian delegate threw light on other facts, which highlighted the reality that Southern Rhodesia was not a self-governing territory. Those articles of the 1961 Constitution, which clearly showed the racist and discriminatory character of the Southern Rhodesian regime were brought into focus. This constitution tried to serve and safeguard the interests of

a minority class. Unlike the other democratic constitutions, its Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not provide for universal suffrage. The higher qualifications of voting had made it impossible for most of the Africans to acquire voting rights. Though the Rhodesian society was called multi-racial, it was not so in fact. Multi-racialism denotes the harmonious development of a nation consisting of various races. It implies that all citizens of a nation would be given equal political rights and opportunities irrespective of caste, class or colour. The equality and dignity of the people of Rhodesia was undermined by the fact that the electorate was divided into two categories, namely 'A' category and 'B' category.

The Indian delegate gave more reasons to prove his stand. In his view, Southern Rhodesia did not fulfil the prerequisites enumerated in the General Assembly Resolution 1541 of the XV session which envisaged that a non-self-governing state could be said to have reached full measure of self-government by -

- (a) emergence as a sovereign independent state;
- (b) free association with an independent state;
- (c) integration with an independent state.

If we apply these elements to the Southern Rhodesian situation, we find that it was a non-self-governing territory as it was not eligible to join the United Nations. The indigenous people did not have any say in entering into

agreements or treaties with foreign nations, and the native people possessed limited economic and political rights. Britain had the veto power over its legislation. It was a different matter that they did not use it. That did not make the powers inoperative.

According to the Indian view, Britain should have taken the responsibility and should have used its political power to settle the problem. And it was the British Government's duty and responsibility to give information about this territory to the United Nations. A.B. Bhadkamkar said in the Special Committee of Seventeen on Colonialism on 9 March 1962:

...if we sounded critical it is not toward the policies of the Government of the United Kingdom but more against the present situation in Southern Rhodesia in the development of which the UK Government have played a role more passive than what is really warranted. 3

This view was reaffirmed and reasserted time and again by the Indian delegates in various sessions of the United Nations. In their opinion the status of Rhodesia as a 'non-self-governing territory' was a self-evident fact. But the need to examine and to investigate this question arose as Britain did not transmit information to the United Nations. Indian delegate J.N. Khosla, in a statement in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on

3. Foreign Affairs Record (India: Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division), vol. 8, March 1962, p. 81.

26 October 1962, made clear the Indian stand:

Whether one examines the Southern Rhodesian constitution of 1923 or the federal constitution of 1953 or even that of 1961; the territory in question is described as a 'colony' and in fact remains so in character and competence. 4

Once the status of Southern Rhodesia was accepted by most of the nations, India, in co-operation with other Afro-Asian nations, began to make efforts to help this territory gain the status of independent, sovereign nation. She could realize the plight of the Africans who were subject to oppression, subjugation and discrimination.

When the Federation was dissolved in 1963 and the two territories, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, were given independence Southern Rhodesia still remained dependent under the white minority rulers. As Britain refused to grant independence to it, the white settlers started preparing ground for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

India was the first country to break diplomatic relations with the illegal racist regime of Southern Rhodesia. India severed its relations with the Smith regime even before the declaration of the UDI. The Indian Government had made its stand clear repeatedly to the effect that Rhodesia should be granted independence on the basis of universal suffrage.

4 Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 8, October 1962, pp. 188-9.

The decision to break diplomatic relations with the illegal regime was taken when the white regime decided to hold elections on 7 May 1965 (not based on one-man one-vote basis) which was a step towards the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. It means that India was not prepared to accept any semblance of constitutionality achieved through the spurious elections.

Dinesh Singh, the then Deputy Minister in India's Ministry of External Affairs, declared in the Rajya Sabha on 7 May 1965:

To demonstrate our strong disapproval and as a mark of solidarity with the people of Southern Rhodesia struggling for the vindication of their rights and in conformity with enlightened world opinion, the Government of India have decided to withdraw their Mission in Salisbury as from to-day. 5

Although the Rhodesian issue had been discussed in the United Nations, India, like many other nations, considered it as a child of Great Britain. In its view the ultimate responsibility for defusing the crisis devolved on the British Government. Swaran Singh, then External Affairs Minister, while speaking in the Trusteeship Committee of the United Nations in October 1965, asserted that as long as the full freedom was not attained by Southern Rhodesia, Britain

5 India, Rajya Sabha Debates, vol. 2, session 52, col. 1088.

should not abdicate its responsibilities. It was also made clear by the Indian Government that if UDI had been declared by the Smith regime, it would be an illegal and unconstitutional act and it would not be recognized by India. Moreover, if Ian Smith could get success in the illegal act, it would mean that Great Britain failed to fulfil its responsibility of liberating the majority of Africans of Rhodesia. India recommended that political rights should be extended to the deprived people of Rhodesia. She also suggested that immediate steps should be taken for holding a constitutional conference, in which all parties including nationalists, should be allowed to participate. The Conference would lead to the elections based on 'one man-one-vote'. And the new government appointed after this election would not favour a particular class or group but would be for the welfare, progress and peace of all the people of the country. India suggested that the initiatives for such a move should be taken by the British Government.

India was in favour of giving authority to the British Government to repeal all repressive and unjust laws. British should use the power to release all political prisoners and detainees so that a healthy and sound atmosphere could be created for holding a constitutional conference. It expressed its point of view in the Commonwealth conferences and on the floor of the United Nations.

India and other Afro-Asian member-nations refused to give permission to Ian Smith to attend the Commonwealth

Conference of 1964. The criticism against the British Government (which was more or less soft in 1964) tended to harden by the time of the Commonwealth Conference of June 1965. It was due to the fact that Britain did not respond to the critical situation alertly and swiftly. The major development that had taken place in Southern Rhodesia was the victory of the Rhodesian Front in the 1965 elections so that the Afro-Asian nations could foresee the UDI in the near future.

President Nkrumah of Ghana accused the British Prime Minister for not taking immediate steps to solve the issue. He was supported by India, Pakistan, Canada, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Nigeria. The Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, while speaking in the Commonwealth Conference, asked Wilson: "Should not the United Kingdom be the first to appreciate the desirability of majority rule, since it was from the United Kingdom that the idea of democracy had spread in the world?" And he warned, "if the majority in Rhodesia was denied its due rights, disastrous results would follow".⁶

The issue was also discussed in the United Nations several times between 1962 and November 1965. The resolutions supported by India stated that Britain should take responsibility to prevent the UDI. It was also stated that the Constitution of 1961 should be suspended and a constitutional

6 The Patriot (New Delhi), 23 June 1965.

Conference of all parties should be convened immediately. In early November 1965, the Afro-Asian nations (including India) once again raised the issue in the United Nations and expressed their concern at the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. They recommended that Britain should not hesitate to use force against the illegal Smith regime. They brought up a draft resolution in the Security Council. Rafique Zakaria of India co-sponsored the draft resolution and sought the support of all nations. He called upon Britain to take "immediate steps to avert a situation in Southern Rhodesia which can have most tragic and bloody consequences, which all of us are so anxious to avoid".⁷

⁷ UN, Security Council Official Records, Doc. 1267, Plen. Mtg., November 1965.

CHAPTER IV

INDIAN EFFORTS IN THE POST-UDI PERIOD : AT THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Ian Smith made the pre-emptive move (the UDI) on 11 November 1965 by delinking his nation from all British ties and by unilaterally declaring Rhodesia as an independent sovereign state. The Indian Government, which had long before discontinued diplomatic relations with the white racist regime, labelled the UDI as an illegal and outrageous act and urged other nations not to grant recognition to this regime. Throughout the period of the continuation of UDI, India took a consistent stand and opposed the racist, discriminatory policies of the Smith regime in all national and international forums.

There were sharp and spontaneous reactions to the political developments in Southern Rhodesia and a strong voice of opposition was raised by the Government of India in Parliament, in the Commonwealth forums, and at the United Nations.

India did not view the Rhodesian crisis as an isolated event but related it to the whole Southern African situation. Hence it criticized the role of various powers like South Africa and Portugal, which had been helping the illegal Smith regime. In its view, the issue was closely and directly linked with the phenomena of racism and colonialism

in South Africa and South West Africa. The South African and Portuguese governments had been giving support to the Smith Government with the intention of strengthening the hold of the whites on the power centres in Rhodesia. However, India identified the genesis and precipitation of the crisis with the British refusal to shoulder their due responsibility. It felt that Britain had not promptly reacted to the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia. Though India, alongwith other African nations, had informed Britain about the fast-deteriorating conditions within the country, the British Government had turned a deaf ear to their urgings. The unmistakable outcome of this 'masterly' inactivity of the British Government was the UDI by Ian Smith.

The international community immediately responded to this event by convening the Security Council meeting on 12 November 1965. In addition to the regular members, 17 other states attended the Security Council meeting. India and Pakistan were the only two Asian countries that participated in the discussions that followed. The Indian representative, G. Parthasarathi, called the UDI as a rebellion against the government of the United Kingdom. Therefore he urged that the United Kingdom Government should take all necessary measures to put an end to the illegal regime. He proposed the use of force (if necessary) to bring down the rebellion. He said in his speech:

Only the other day the United Kingdom Government dismissed the constitutional government in Aden. Why is it hesitating to take a similar step in case of the White Rhodesian regime. 1

India assured the United Nations community and the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe that she would extend all necessary moral and material support to the freedom fighters.

The Indian delegate expressed the opinion that the selective mandatory sanctions were not enough to meet the challenging situation which had emerged in Southern Rhodesia. In his view, the UN should take more concrete and effective measures to curb the illegal regime. It should use political, economic and even military measures to deal with the crisis. G. Parthasarathi said in the debate:

The situation is very serious. The time for debate and discussion is over. It is now time for urgent action....The threat of the UDI has become a reality. The determination of the international community not to allow the act of piracy must also become a reality....The question is now one of threat to the peace. 2

The same day, the Indian Parliament, too, condemned Smith's action and expressed its full solidarity with the freedom fighters of Southern Rhodesia.

1 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 15 November 1965.

2 Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 11, November 1965.

India reasserted and reaffirmed its stand in the Commonwealth Conference of January 1966, which was held in Lagos. India called upon Britain to take immediate and effective measures to solve the Rhodesian crisis. It supported the African nations' proposal to use force against the illegal regime. The final communique was drawn with the active help and co-operation of Indian delegate, Asok Sen, and it was acceptable to most of the member-nations.

India implemented the economic sanctions in toto. It meant considerable loss to its economy and trade.³ But in this sensitive and crucial matter, India did not think in terms of profit and loss and implemented the economic sanctions effectively. But due to the non-cooperation of various powers, the Smith regime was not greatly affected and remained unshaken. The Indian representative, in the UN Security Council session of 1966, highlighted the causes of the failure of the economic sanctions. India was dissatisfied with the measures adopted by the United Nations as they were inadequate both in content and practice.

The failure was chiefly due to the fact that some nations had economic investments in Rhodesia and the implementation of sanctions would have harmed their national economic interests. They were basically concerned with

³ See Appendices 3 and 4 for Exports to and Imports from Rhodesia by India.

their investments, and not with the political and human issues involved. Many white people had vast land holdings in Rhodesia, which was churning all large profits and other benefits for British (and other) investors.

Apart from the agricultural and industrial fields, the sanctions were also not effectively imposed against oil and oil products. Indian representative G. Parthasarathi quoted paragraph 140 of the Secretariat Working Paper, which says:

On 18 April 1960, the Rand Daily Mail, estimated the extent of the oil flow from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia as being between 140,000 and 160,000 gallons daily. This would be about Southern Rhodesia's consumption under rationing. The daily total was made up of about 45,000 gallons by road tankers via the Beit Bridge and about 10,000 gallons by rail. 4

The major oil suppliers continued to supply oil to Rhodesia. They did not even put pressure on them to stop the supply of oil. In India's view, the oil embargo could be effective only if it was applied to all the areas surrounding Southern Rhodesia. It should be extended to South Africa and Portugal.

India demanded more forceful and concrete action to deal with the Rhodesian crisis. It supported the memorandum of the African states that the negotiations between the

4 Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 12, May 1966, p. 127.

British Government and the illegal regime would entrench the white supremacy in the country. Opposing the idea of negotiations between the two parties, India's External Affairs Minister stated on 9 March 1966:

Any attempt by the British to negotiate with the existing illegal regime in Rhodesia to bring about the imposition of another period of white-minority rule in that country would also not favour any delay in the convening of a constitutional conference, representative of all sections of the people of Rhodesia, or the reimposition by the British of the 1961 Constitution after the termination of the rebellion. 5

At the Security Council meeting in 1966, the Indian delegate suggested a six-point programme.

First, the UK Government should try to persuade Ian Smith that the UDI would not give him any benefits; secondly, it should create an impression that force would be used to curb the illegal regime. Threat to use force or use of force should not be simply ruled out by the British Government. It should make it clear that the continuation of the illegal regime would make the use of military measures a necessity.

Thirdly, once again, fixing the authority and responsibility on the British Government, India proposed that the Government of UK should declare unequivocally that the discriminatory and reactionary constitution of 1961

5 Ibid., p. 128.

would be abolished; fourthly, instead of proposing any time limit, India recommended that Britain should set a definite date for the attainment of independence under a freely chosen government;

Fifthly, the British Government should make it clear that the elections would take place after the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly. The function of this Assembly would be to frame a constitution which would safeguard the minority; sixthly, India proposed that an interim government consisting of all sections of the community in proportion to the strength of their population, should be established to rule over the territory in the intervening period.

If these six steps were not implemented, then the situation was likely to deteriorate leading to violence and lawlessness.

At the Commonwealth conference in January 1966, Premier Harold Wilson had announced that the sanctions would put an end to the illegal rule within a matter of weeks. But even after six months of economic sanctions, when the issue was discussed in the Committee of Twenty-four in May 1966, it was found that they did not have any impact on the Rhodesian regime, India maintained that the British Government's liberal and flexible attitude towards the whole situation was responsible for it. It charged that Britain had been intentionally prolonging the illegal regime. India,

once again, criticized the policies of South Africa and Portugal, who had been violating the UN Charter and economic sanctions imposed by the international community against the illegal regime. On 30 May 1966, Indian delegate, Prem Bhatia, expressed India's opposition to South Africa and Portugal in the Committee of Twenty-four on Rhodesia, as follows:

The Governments of South Africa and Portugal are in the vanguard of all movements which want to put back the clock of history. Whenever the voice of reaction, racism and crude self-congratulations for inhumanity is heard these two Governments are cheer leaders.... They are the unashamed, unrepresenting proud Al Capones of our times. They are our international leaders whose touch pollutes, whose neighbourhood brings disgrace to the neighbour, and social, commercial and political intercourse with whom is a crime against man. 6

Months were passing away without any improvement in the situation. In fact, the situation had become more grave and serious as the atrocities of the whites increased. Therefore, the September 1966 Commonwealth Conference was held in a tense and angry atmosphere. Britain's lukewarm attitude towards the crisis had enraged the member-states who wanted concrete and positive action. The internal divergencies had endangered the very existence of the Commonwealth. The two sensitive and controversial issues of use of force and the introduction of universal suffrage before independence tended to split the Commonwealth. However due to the deft and delicate handling of the explosive

6 Ibid., pp. 130-32.

issues by Britain and others this danger was averted. The Indian delegate, Swaran Singh declared at the Conference: "India had all along strongly felt that the illegal regime must be suppressed. It is Britain's responsibility to do so."⁷ He further suggested that Britain should use force.

India played a constructive role in reconciling the divergent points of view and was able to suggest an arrangement which would be more or less acceptable to all the member nations. The Indian delegates worked in close co-operation with the Afro-Asian delegates, who had appointed the Indian External Affairs Minister as the Chairman of their group. The Indian representative's careful understanding and handling of the situation brought out an acceptable communique on this controversial difficult question, incorporating both the majority and the minority views. The communique, inter alia, said:

The goal of future progress in Rhodesia should be the establishment of a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment. To this end, several principles were affirmed. The first was the determination of all present that the rebellion must be brought to an end. All those detained for political reasons should be released. Political activities should be constitutional and free from intimidation from any quarter. Repressive and discriminatory laws should be repealed. 8

7 Times of India (New Delhi), 6 September 1966.

8 Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), vol. 12, September 1966, pp. 217-19.

It further reaffirmed that "the principle of one-man one vote" was regarded as the very basis of democracy and this should be applied to Rhodesia.

India recommended that as the voluntary sanctions had failed to put down the rebellion, the mandatory sanctions of a general and comprehensive nature should be applied under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42) of the UN Charter, covering both imports and exports.

India proposed this in the UN Security Council, too, on 16 April 1968, the Indian representative, in collaboration with four other Afro-Asian nations, proposed a resolution which called for comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, against the usurper authority. It also envisaged that immediate and strong action should be taken by the administering power, including military measures. India was primarily in favour of peaceful negotiations to solve the crisis, but in her opinion the negotiations should take place with the true representatives of the people and not with the illegal regime. Thus it opposed the British Government's 'Tiger talks' with the Smith regime. Moreover the talks showed that the NIBMAR principles were not being followed. As Britain played for time and was busy in fruitless negotiations with the illegal regime, India called upon Britain (at the Security Council in 1968) to adopt strict and forceful methods to solve the crisis.

As this proposal was not acceptable to Britain, a revised and new resolution which was compatible with British attitude, was passed. The resolution called upon the states (under Chapter VII of the Charter) to stop the export, import, sale or supply of all commodities to or from Southern Rhodesia except medicine and educational materials. It further provided for a committee of seven to observe and report on the implementation of the resolution. India, who had strictly followed the UN measures of economic sanctions, was once again given a position of responsibility as its delegate was appointed a member of this committee.

At the international level the criticism against the continuation of the white rule was mounting, on the other hand the atrocities against the black Africans, in Rhodesia were becoming more intense and intolerable. Several people were killed by the white rulers in utter secrecy. The assassination of three important nationalist leaders in 1968 shocked the conscience of the world community. India condemned the action of the Rhodesian Prime Minister and expressed its sympathies to the freedom fighters of Rhodesia. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, speaking on this subject on 6 March 1968 stated:

We have learnt with expressible horror that Southern Rhodesian regime has perpetrated a heinous crime by executing three Africans. The world has followed their fate with great

anxiety in the last few days. This monstrous deed of the white racist clique evokes our wrath and condemnation. 9

This action indicated the strength of the Smith regime and futility of the efforts to solve the issue by half-hearted measures. It was evident that the British Government had failed to find any solution to the crisis and was not able to safeguard the legitimate rights of the 4.5 million African people. It was suggested by the UN General Assembly that Britain should not enter into bilateral discussions with the illegal regime as it would perpetuate the white authority in Southern Rhodesia. But recommendations of the General Assembly were not taken into consideration. Smith regime got encouraged as it knew that Britain would not use force and economic sanctions could not be successful because South Africa and Portugal were not implementing them.

Indian representative G. Parthasarathi (in the UN Security Council session of 20 March 1968) reminded the British Government about its promise. Prime Minister Wilson had made a statement in the British Parliament on 11 November 1965 that the solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem was not one that could be dealt with by military means, save in order to avert any tragic action such as

9 Indira Gandhi, "Statement in the Lok Sabha Regarding the Execution of Africans by the Southern Rhodesian Government", India, Debates : Lok Sabha, vol. 13, no. 7, 6 March 1968, cols. 2045, 2047.

subversion or murder of the nationalist forces. Indian delegate argued that the murder of three nationalists was an evidence and provided the justification for the administering power to intervene with force. Britain once again refused to use force and stressed upon conference diplomacy. India was firmly opposed to bilateral talks with the illegal regime. Hence it turned down the Fearless Proposals, concluded by the Smith regime and British Government. In India's view it was a different matter that the Smith regime changed its position and refused to abide by these proposals, but it did not rule out the fact that unjust methods were adopted to solve the crisis situation. The Afro-Asian nations got an opportunity to raise their voice against these proposals at the Commonwealth conference of 1969, which was convened after two and a half years of interval. The Rhodesian crisis had lost its vigour and urgency, as more serious questions came up before the Commonwealth Conference. The most critical issue was concerned with the arms sale of Britain to South Africa, and if South Africa became militarily stronger then it would indirectly add to the strength of the white racist regime of Southern Rhodesia. As far as the Rhodesian issue was concerned the old positions were reiterated by the various nations. India endorsed the Tanzanian proposal which called upon Britain to follow the NIBMAR principles and to intensify the economic sanctions.

Years were passing by without any progress in the direction of achieving peace and just rule in the territory.

The Smith regime remained unruffled and continued to rule the territory with the help and co-operation of South Africa and Portugal. Samar Sen, the Indian delegate, said in the UN:

The time has come to stop shadow boxing and come to grips with the real problem. Reality demands that we accept the hard fact. We are not dealing with the Smith regime but with a collusion and offensive pact and philosophy forged by Mr. Smith and his merry men, together with South Africa and Portugal. 10

The majority world opinion was ignored by the Smith regime and was evident from the fact that Southern Rhodesia was declared a 'Republic' in 1970. Thus by a single stroke, the territory broke off all ties with Britain. Promptly reacting to these events, India's Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, stated on 4 March 1970:

The Government of India consider the decision of the breakaway regime to declare itself a republic as totally illegal. The Government will continue to support the measures taken by the world community and by the African states against the racist regime. We maintain our firm belief that any constitution for this colonial territory must ensure the principle of 'one man one vote' in a multi-racial society. We also hold the view that the world action should be concerted with a view to taking effective steps leading Rhodesia towards independence; based on the principle of no independence before majority rule. 11

10 Security Council Official Record, Doc. S/PV.1478, March 1970.

11 Times of India (New Delhi), 5 March 1970.

India once again appealed for stronger action and the use of force to overthrow the illegal regime. It called upon all nations to sever their diplomatic, economic and communication relations with Southern Rhodesia. India expressed its regret that although the UN had adopted certain measures, they proved to be ineffective, thus no improvement or progress had taken place. It was clearly said that India would appreciate and support the African course of action on this issue.

Britain continued to hold the liability for the territory. It claimed to be accountable for the territory but disclaimed all responsibilities. The Afro-Asian nations got disillusioned and disappointed with the politics of the British Government. In June, in tune with its non-aligned policy, India criticized the Home-Smith agreement of 1971, which was concluded between the British Government and the illegal regime and was not in accordance with the NIBMAR principles. Indian delegate, Samar Sen, speaking at the UN Security Council, emphasized that the proposal had been refused by the Rhodesian people as a whole. He said that whatever may be the findings of the Pearce Commission, the fact was that it was not acceptable to the majority. In his opinion it was a wrongly conceived plan and as such it was against the interests of the majority people. Thus it could not be accepted.

A series of fruitless talks (e.g. Tiger, Fearless) changed the opinion of various Afro-Asian countries and also

of India. The Indian point of view was that Britain had neither the power nor the machinery to enforce any decision. Thus it was advisable for Britain to relinquish the legal notion that it was responsible for that territory.

India recommended in the UN, in 1972, that sanctions should be widened and tightened. Moreover, they should be given wide publicity and the governments should abide by the UN resolutions and not violate the sanctions.

India also proposed that communications should be completely cut off to and from Rhodesia. The ban should be enlarged to passports, visas, postal services and transport and communication system of all kinds. The boycott should be extended to all cultural, social, sports or religious activities. And these strict measures should be adopted not only against Southern Rhodesia but should also be extended to South Africa and Portugal. Mr Samar Sen said in his speech: "He (White man of Rhodesia) is a pariah and should be treated as such unless he mends his ways".

It was recommended by the Indian delegate in the same session (of February 1972) that ways should be found for the withdrawal of the South African forces from the Rhodesian territory as it was an army in disguise; and would kill the black nationalists. It wanted that the so-called police force should vacate the Rhodesian territory as the victim of their attack was the nationalist forces.

The discussion and debate over the Rhodesian crisis had taken place in several UN sessions and in various Commonwealth conferences, but all in vain. The Afro-Asian nations had time and again demanded the use of force from Britain, but the consistent refusal of the British Government had provoked them to criticize its stand; India was no exception to it. India had also accused Britain for not acting quite swiftly and effectively, but it refused to condemn the British Government in the Security Council in September 1972 for three reasons:

First, the reason given by the Indian delegate was that condemnation is a divine prerogative and Indians do not claim to be Gods or anywhere near to that position;

Secondly, defending the British Government's stand, the Indian representative said that UK Government had always denied the use of force to overthrow the Smith regime. Thus in these circumstances, it would be difficult for any delegation to say that the British government should be condemned.

Thirdly, the Indian delegate, Samar Sen, argued that it was not only the failure of a single country's government. But the Council had also failed to agree on measures that could bring an end to the illegal rule in the territory. It was equally responsible for that failure. Therefore, why to choose the UK Government for special condemnation?

This shows that India took a softer attitude towards the British Government. It overlooked the factor that the Council could not work effectively due to the non-cooperation of Britain and Western powers. A resolution was passed which called for the sanctions to continue. For the first time, it did not hold the British Government responsible for the overthrow of the illegal regime. India recommended that the UN measures should be implemented by all nations.

The Rhodesian crisis had its repercussions in the neighbouring states, with the Rhodesian Government's act of sealing off its borders in 1973, especially on Zambia. Zambia's economy got a blow. India expressed its sympathies and support to the Zambian Government. It pledged its material and financial help and assistance to Zambia, in the Commonwealth Conference of 1973 and the UN session. The plan proposed by the Afro-Asian members at the Commonwealth Conference reiterated that the basis of Rhodesian settlement should be majority rule. It once again called upon the nations to implement the economic sanctions effectively.

India was named for the first time in the Sanctions Committee in 1974 as a violator of sanctions imposed against the illegal regime. It was charged by Donald J.A. Morton of the Centre for Social Action of the United Church of Christs, New York, that the apparent violation of sanctions

was by means of inter-line traffic and cargo agreements between various international carriers and Air Rhodesia. Air Rhodesia was an integral and beneficial part of the Air Rhodesian Act. According to this act, the aircraft and services and total resources of the Air Rhodesian Fleet were under the control of the illegal regime and as this was a public utility, the profits were to be taken by the illegal regime.

According to him the violations entitled other types of agreement too like the carriage of commodities to and from Southern Rhodesia as well as direct commercial dealings with Air Rhodesia, and the interline pass agreements. Three aspects of interpass agreements were brought into focus: First some deals were concluded by individuals in airlines with authorization from headquarters. Morton suggested in the report that this should be stopped by instructing employees not to deal with Air Rhodesia at all. Secondly, employees of almost all airlines were permitted to travel free or at reduced rates to Southern Rhodesia. Thirdly, airlines had given the facility of free services such as free travels, to the representatives of the illegal regime. Violations of interline pass agreement, therefore, involved multiple violations of sanctions; and it worked in favour of the illegal regime in one more very important way as it saved the foreign exchange which it would have to spend on the purchase of transportation at standard rate.

Indian Airlines was also reported to be indulged in such activity. But Indian Permanent representative refuted it and said in its reply on 31 July 1974 that -

the Permanent Representative of India to the UN...has the honour to state that Indian Airlines and Air India has already withdrawn their concurrence in the IATA interline agreement with Air Rhodesia. 12

Keeping in view India's stand in various international forums one doubts whether it was carried with the consent of the Indian Government. Moreover, manifestly, it is a very remote and indirect violation of the sanctions.

The continuation of the illegal rule led to the intensification of guerrilla activities. Indian commended the Rhodesian nationalists for stepping up their guerrilla activities in general and particularly in the north-eastern part of the territory.

As there were no signs of settlement till this time, India suggested that a time limit should be fixed for the settlement of the question of self-determination by the people of Zimbabwe. V.N. Gadgil, who spoke for India in the Decolonization Committee of the UN pointed out that the racist regime had successfully evaded a settlement of the

12. Security Council Official Records, vol. III, year 35, Special Supplement, no. 2, p. 77.

question for so many years. He said:

India will support any proposal made in this committee which would help in finding a just solution to the problem. We are convinced that it is better to find a peaceful solution. But the time is fast running out and if the problem cannot be resolved peacefully, then the inevitable consequences will be bloody racial war which could spill over the borders of Zimbabwe and create a major point in history. 13

He reiterated that the principle of 'one man one vote' must apply in the case of Zimbabwe to bring on majority rule.

The need at that point of time was to unite the nationalist forces and to make them more coherent and forceful. This view was expressed by the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, when she met Joshua Nkomo in November 1976, in Lusaka, during her visit to Zambia. He gave his assessment of the developments in relation to Rhodesian problem. James Chinerama, representing the Muzorewa group of the ANC, also met Mrs Gandhi to discuss the problem. Mrs Gandhi advised them to fight unitedly and promised India's help and support in their freedom struggle.

Since its independence, India had been ruled by the Congress Party till March 1977. After the election of

13 Vijay Gupta, "India and Africa" Africa Quarterly, vol. 16, January-March 1976, p. 109.

1977, for the first time, the newly formed Janata Party came into power. But it did not diverge from the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy and continued to support the subject peoples who were fighting for their right of self-determination in Africa and elsewhere, chiefly in Zimbabwe.

The new Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, speaking at the Commonwealth Conference held in London in June 1977, said it was inevitable that the Commonwealth should deliberate upon various problems with one specific aim, namely, to serve mankind in a meaningful manner by saving humanity. He also emphasized on the principle of 'one-man one-vote' and for majority rule in Zimbabwe. And Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the new Minister of External Affairs, said:

Whether it is from the standpoint of de-colonisation, self-determination, principles of human rights, racial equality or just the several international obligations of peace and cooperation it is incumbent upon us to persuade if possible or throttle if necessary, the white minority regime, and to do so quickly....If the Smith regime continues to defy the world, can there be any alternative to a better and more extensive conflict which could only end in a racial war. 14

The international situation was changing very rapidly since the Second World War and many developments had taken place in the international system, but no progress had registered in the Rhodesian situation. The Anglo-American settlement plan was proposed in the form of a British white

14 Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 23, 1977, p. 108.

paper which envisaged the surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality. It also said that the British Government would establish a transitional administration with the task of conducting the elections for an independent government. It also provided for a United Nations presence, including a United Nations force, during the transitional period. India, which is known as a peace-loving and anti-imperialist country, was given the responsibility to implement this plan. The UN Security Council approved a resolution appointing Major-General Prem Chand (of India) as the UN Special Representative to work with Lord Carver to secure a ceasefire in Rhodesia. After the failure of the Anglo-American plan, an internal settlement was announced by Ian Smith and a black puppet regime, led by Bishop Muzorewa came into power in March 1979. The British Government was prepared to recognize the puppet government, but it was opposed by the Afro-Asian nations on the ground that it did not represent the majority opinion. India, too, refused to recognize the Muzorewa Government. It argued that the only political parties which represented the African people, remained banned and were not given a chance to participate in the elections. The recognition of this regime would have meant the lifting of sanctions and no chance of black majority rule in the foreseeable future. The whites had all the powers in their hands with sole control over the civil services and army, the police and judiciary. The stand of India was that

Rhodesian problem could be solved only if the Patriotic Front was allowed to participate in the elections. It also once again made it clear that all the detainees or political prisoners should be released and elections should take place on the basis of universal suffrage.

These principles were accepted in the Commonwealth Conference of 1979 held at Lusaka and the Lancaster Agreement was signed in December 1979. Following in the steps of the UN, India lifted economic sanctions against Zimbabwe. The action was deferred, as many thought it should not be until Mr Nkomo signed the ceasefire. But he had started preparing for the March 1980 elections, thus the Africans were on their way to majority rule.

The Commonwealth Observer Group was sent to observe and check on the elections so that they were free and fair. India, which had been supporting the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and had been practising democracy successfully at home, was given a honourable and responsible part to play in it. Indian delegate, Rajeshwar Dayal, was appointed the Chairman of this group. Under the supervision of this group, elections were held and majority rule came to Zimbabwe. The Indian Government hailed the victory of Mr Mugabe in the general elections.

Mrs Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, accompanied by a 12-member high-level delegation (including the External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narsimha Rao) went to

Zimbabwe to attend the independence-day celebrations on 17 April 1980. On this occasion, Mrs Gandhi said:

The winds of change had been blowing all over Asia and Africa but did not serve as a warning to those who wanted to put a stop to time. The wind therefore turned into a gale and eventually became a tornado. 15

She congratulated the people of Zimbabwe for the well-deserved triumph they had won after a prolonged struggle.

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, said that the presence of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the independence-day celebrations in Salisbury was "a true reflection of the special relationship that exists between India and Zimbabwe". 16

But the attainment of political freedom is not enough. Zimbabwe has come out of one type of crisis situation, but will have to face severe problems in order to preserve its freedom, and unity. Economically it is an underdeveloped and backward country and needs the help and support of developed or near-developed countries like India, to progress economically and industrially. India which had also faced these problems after its independence can realize the problems of the newly independent country

15 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 April 1980.

16 Umashanker Phadnis, "Special Ties with India, Says Mugabe" (editorial) The Hindustan Times, 14 May 1980.

and can help it in raising the standards of living of Africans by providing economic and technical assistance. As India herself is not a developed country and is facing the problem of population growth, having her own limitations, it can help only to a limited extent. It had been helping in the past by giving them educational and technical assistance. It is an indirect but more useful economic assistance as it helps a country to surge forward to the stage of self-sufficiency.

Like all the erstwhile colonies, Zimbabwean economy, too, remains dependent upon and linked with the Western countries. With the strong centre-periphery relations it would be impracticable for the newly independent Zimbabwe to delink its economy from that of the Western Powers. In the existing international economic situation, where the entire third world is still striving to uplift itself from the dependent economy to an independent one, India has only a limited role to play in the short run.

However, it is only through slow and steady help of India and the other non-aligned nations that Zimbabwe can erect new economic structures that would facilitate the national development and lead the country towards self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

...

CHAPTER V

INDIA'S ROLE AT THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCES : THE NON-OFFICIAL AGENCIES

The non-aligned movement is perhaps one of those international forums where all the contemporary problems come up for discussion or consideration. The range varies from economic questions to political problems, from independence of a nation to self-reliance of the Third World countries. These wide-ranging operations have emerged as the movement has grown steadily since the early sixties.

Indeed, 'struggle' is the motto of the movement. The theoretical form of the concept of non-alignment emerged as an answer to the need to resist the power blocs and to maintain national independence of the newly independent nations. India, the pioneer of the policy of non-alignment, had set in motion, as it were, the chain of independence and freedom struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As India was the first country to gain independence in the post-war era, when the cold war was in full swing, it was felt that in order to survive and maintain one's independent status in a world where bipolarity was fast turning into a permanent feature, there was an urgent need to develop a new

technique of conducting foreign relations. From this felt need and the consequent efforts emerged the policy of non-alignment.

Non-alignment or non-attachment with either of the power blocs was not similar to the legal term 'neutrality'. This policy (non-alignment) was adopted by the newly-independent nations in order to resist external pressures and dictates. It was visualized as a policy which would ensure that decisions on international issues were taken independently and were based on the merits of each issue. It was, in fact, a step taken to conduct foreign policy in an environment free of foreign intervention. Non-alignment is a dynamic policy---it is the culmination of the common experiences of colonialism, imperialism and subjugation of the new, independent nations. It has taken a firm stand against exploitation, hegemonism, and expansionism. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, and one of the founding fathers of non-alignment, declared in his first broadcast (as Vice-Chairman of the Interim Government), on 7 September 1946:

We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races. We repudiate utterly the nazi doctrine of racialism, wherever and in whatever forum it may be practised.... 1

1 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy : September 1946-May 1949 (New Delhi: Publication Division, 1949), vol. 1, pp. 2-3.

The known Indian stand against colonialism, imperialism, racism and zionism, was carried to the conference table at Belgrade. At the first summit conference of the Heads of States and Governments of the non-aligned countries held in Belgrade in September 1961, there was a limited stand on this question. The Belgrade Summit was, indeed, the founding meeting where the basic tenets of non-alignment were laid down. India, along with the other participants, declared itself strongly against subjugation--subjugation of one people by another people. It was stated that colonialism and expansionist tendencies were the root cause of wars which shattered world peace. Due to the common heritage of the exploits of foreign rule, the participating countries actually felt the need to accelerate the attempts to dismantle structures of domination, colonialism and imperialism. In the early sixties the major parts of Africa and Latin America were still under different forms of colonialism. Hence the Conference resolved "to make concrete efforts to put an end to all types of new colonialism and imperialism, domination in all its forms and manifestations",²

The Cairo summit (1964) of the non-aligned nations, too, made a similar effort to expedite the process of de-colonization.

2 "The Final Communique of the Belgrade Summit", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 13, 5-20 September 1961, p. 44.

However, between the first summit and the third summit of the non-aligned nations, nearly a decade was coming to an end. The international scenario had undergone considerable change. As the process of decolonization, which had begun at the end of the Second World War was hopefully nearing its end, the picture of the remaining colonies was very clear. During the past decade the problem of the people of Southern Rhodesia had become acute. There was gross violation of human rights in the country. Especially, the declaration of the UDI in 1965 by Ian Smith had thrown the international community into angry reaction.

The policy of non-alignment, which had by now taken the shape of a world-wide movement, stood as the symbol for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, racialism and expansionism. It was natural for the member-states to express views independently as well as take a joint, consolidated stand on the issue. The need was not just to condemn the illegal regime, but also to chalk out a plan of action.

India was the first non-aligned country to withdraw diplomatic services from Salisbury and to isolate or ostracise the Smith regime. The denial of freedom and human dignity by the white minority regime, and the policy of racial discrimination, had humiliated the majority of the black Africans in Rhodesia. Indian sympathies reached out to them through declarations of extensions of all out support. Indian Foreign Minister, Dinesh Singh, expressed India's

position as follows:

It is now absolutely essential for us to consider what active help we can give to the peoples of South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the territories under the Portuguese domination, which are struggling for their freedom from alien domination and racist rule. 3

The Third Summit Conference of the non-aligned nations which was held in Lusaka in 1970, was deeply concerned over the deteriorating conditions within Southern Rhodesia. As the summit was meeting in one of the African countries, greater attention was naturally paid to various liberation movements in the region. The Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in her address to the summit pointed to the vibrant struggle in Zimbabwe and its international repercussions. She said:

We can feel the vibration of the struggle against the minority government in ZimbabweThese freedom fighters are engaged in the same battle as we were only recently. They are risking their lives for the same principles that we hold dear. We extend our support to these brave men and women. 4

The Indian Government was of the opinion that the minority rule in Southern Rhodesia had survived only because it was getting help from its imperialist allies. At the fourth Summit Conference in Algiers, it was suggested by

3 Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 14, April 1970, p. 83.

4 Ibid., vol. 16, September 1970, pp. 165-6.

the members that an African Liberation Fund should be created to assist the liberation movements in the continent. The Indian delegation reiterated its stand and the Prime Minister felt that "ways must be found for giving more effective support to the liberation struggles of the people of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia".⁵

India, and the other participants at the Conference, called upon all the member-states to obey the UN measures strictly and not think in terms of material loss. They opposed the racist policies of Ian Smith and urged the British Government to use force to pull down the illegal regime.

There were many historical changes in the world and many African states had obtained independence when the Colombo Summit was held in 1976. This development had provided an impetus to the struggle for freedom, justice and human dignity in Africa, as was reflected by the escalated armed struggle in Zimbabwe. India was seriously concerned over the unresolved problems and the continuing conflicts in the African region. It was sympathetic towards the oppressed black majority with whose struggle India has had historical association or links. The conference unequivocally declared its support for the people of Zimbabwe and felt that the tension-ridden atmosphere of Southern Africa endangered world peace. It reaffirmed the inalienable right

5 Ibid., vol. 19, 1973, p. 332.

of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination who were fully justified in fighting for this right. The conference further reiterated the principle that -

there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlement related to the future of the territory must be worked out with the full participation of the African National Council of Zimbabwe. 6

It was in 1979 that the non-aligned forum for the first time decided to hold a special meeting to concentrate upon the problems of Southern Africa in general and Zimbabwe and Namibia in particular. The ministerial level Co-ordinating Bureau meeting of the non-aligned countries was convened in Mozambique to deliberate upon the action programme of the movement.

The Indian Government was of the opinion that the world community should take concrete action to pull down the racist minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. India fully supported the review of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia so as to tighten and extend them under Article 41 of the UN Charter,⁷ and imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions. India felt that there was need to seriously implement the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa by plugging all loopholes. Atal Bihari

6 Colombo Summit : Documents and Selected Speeches of the Fifth Conference of the Heads of States/Government of the Nonaligned Countries (New Delhi, 1976), p. 97.

7 UN Article 41. N13, P20

Vajpayee, then India's External Affairs Minister, pointed to the importance of the oil embargo and said: "An oil embargo not only on Salisbury but also on Pretoria must be vigorously imposed if effective pressure was to be applied on these racist minority regimes."⁸

The non-aligned nations felt that in order to hasten the process of liberation of Zimbabwe, there was need to adopt a two-pronged policy in which negotiations at the diplomatic level were to be simultaneously backed by intensification of armed struggle within the country. The meeting resolved to intensify the moral, political and material help, not only to the struggling people of Southern Africa, but also to the frontline states, who were bearing the major brunt of the armed attacks.

The Sixth Non-aligned Summit, held at Havana (in September 1979), ratified the decisions of the Bureau meeting and at the same time condemned the 'so-called election' of Peter Muzorewa, who was regarded as the puppet of Ian Smith.

If we make an overall analysis of the Indian role within the movement, and the role of the non-aligned movement with regard to the Rhodesian crisis, we find that an attempt was made to build up public opinion on the issue. Aid was promised to the liberation movements and moral support was rendered at the diplomatic level.

8 Patriot (New Delhi), 1 February 1979, p. 3.

We cannot isolate the five frontline members from the movement; hence their active participation has to be viewed as that of the movement.

However, the non-aligned countries had failed to establish the African fund, which was supposed to aid the liberation struggles.

All the countries of the world are ultimately members of one or other international forum and play an inter-linking role, when one tries to study the role of one forum or one country (in this case India), it has to be viewed in its totality.

The non-aligned movement, in general, and the Indian Government in particular, took a very concrete and constructive stand on the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis. Their efforts were not just limited to verbal sympathy, but were extended to actual material help.

One can be critical of the movement's activity in this regard, as it failed to establish the African Fund to support the liberation movements. However, we have to bear in mind the fact that it is largely the cumulative process of building up pressures that finally leads to transfer of power in any given case. No single factor is ever responsible for such a historic event; it is the end-product of all the pulls and counter-pulls. Similarly, the non-aligned forum provided a platform from where a united opinion of the major third world countries was voiced.

When it comes to the formulation of a policy or a public stand there are many inputs that go into it. It is at this point that the role of public opinion and the non-governmental agencies comes to the forefront.

Non-Governmental Agencies

The decision-making mechanism of every country, and the foreign policy planning of a government is usually influenced by the public opinion or the views of its citizens. The mass-opinion is primarily built up by and mobilized through the activities of the non-governmental agencies and the mass media.

Till now we have discussed the official stand of India on the Rhodesian crisis. However, if we make a micro-analysis of the functioning of a democratic system in general, and the Indian system in particular, we find that the non-governmental and autonomous agencies and the press played a creative role in shaping the Indian policy on this question.

On the Rhodesian crisis, which was related to the colonialist and imperialist policies, there was no divergent opinion. As the African continent does not occupy a position of priority in the Indian view or policy, the urgency and delicacy of the Rhodesian crisis was appreciated largely by the elites, scholars, politicians and persons who were involved in African affairs. Though it had a limited circulation - the concerned people supported the Indian Government's

stand - which extended diplomatic and political support to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe. The activities of these agencies show that the people of India were also sympathetic towards the African nationalists and wanted the Indian Government and other nations of the world to take strong and immediate action to liquidate the white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

Associations like the Indian Council for Africa, press, radio and television showed deep concern over the Rhodesian problem throughout the years of crisis.

The activities of the Indian Council for Africa indicate that it tried to educate public opinion in India and abroad about the crisis, so that an amicable and early solution of the crisis could be found. It arranged for the visits of nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe to India, from time to time, so as to improve the Indian people's awareness of the critical implications of the Rhodesian problem. It organized several seminars to discuss the various dimensions of the crisis and to explore ways to resolve it.

The Indian Council for Africa organized the visit of George Silundiko, Public Secretary of the ZAPU, during 7-18 May 1965. It was during this period that India announced its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Ian Smith's Rhodesia. Silundiko came with a view to acquaint Indian leaders and officials with the developments in Rhodesia. He met and discussed the problem with the officials

of the Ministry of External Affairs and leading Members of Parliament.

As members were informed about the economic condition of Africans, which was deplorable, the Council sent two bales of clothes to the ZAPU office in Lusaka for distribution among the families of political sufferers. It also gave economic aid worth \$100 to the ZAPU for the welfare of those of its members who were in detention. It helped the freedom fighters of all groups, but had given special consideration to the ZAPU group backed by the Soviet Union.

The ICA supported the action of the Indian Government in severing diplomatic ties with the white regime. It reacted to the political developments in Rhodesia which took place in November and passed the following resolution:

It is evident that Smith has received encouragement and support from other racist regimes, notably the Governments of South Africa and Portugal. We strongly condemn these forces endangering world peace.

It felt that the major responsibility of undoing the past lay on the British Government. Therefore, it said:

We strongly urge and appeal to the Government of the United Kingdom to use all measures to establish a lawful government based on universal adult suffrage which will give an opportunity for growth and development of the African people of Rhodesia. 9

9 "Activities of the Council", Africa Quarterly, October-December 1965, p. 265.

To express its (and the Indian people's) solidarity with the people of Southern Rhodesia, the ICA, in collaboration with the Zimbabwe Students Union, organized Solidarity Day on 11 November 1975.

The ICA did its utmost to educate and influence the opinion of politicians, government officials, scholars and academics. The scholars' views were expressed at various seminars. They were of the opinion that the military measures were a strong and forceful weapon in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis. The scholars also felt that the root cause for the continuation of white rule in Rhodesia was due to the violation of the United Nations Charter and the economic sanctions by some nations of the world community.

The year 1978-79 was declared by the UN as the year to combat the evils of apartheid. The Indian National Committee for the Observance of the United Nations International Anti-Apartheid Year, held various seminars in the country. Through the India-wide seminars, discussion forums and educational programmes on the evils of apartheid and the plight of the black masses, the INC created an awakening among the Indian people. There was a fresh and fuller understanding among the people on this crisis and of the steps being taken by the liberation movements.

The non-governmental agencies thus activated the mass opinion and provided an impetus and support to India's governmental efforts.

No governmental policies really become effective till they receive the mandate and support from the people. Especially on an issue like this, the will of the people provides a solid backing to the actions of its government. The Indian mass opinion was built up through the wide propaganda given by the national mass media. Particularly after the UDI of 1965 and the declaration of the Rhodesian Republic in 1970, the press, the radio and the television through their features, comments and programmes gave wide coverage to the events in Rhodesia and to their implications for the Afro-Asian and Indian people.

Apart from the detailed coverage of the important events of the crisis, the newspapers published feature articles and editorials that presented in-depth analyses of the crisis. They also helped to articulate the Indian point of view on the Rhodesian crisis and suggested the steps that could be taken by India.

As we know, radio and television have brought the world to our homes in India as elsewhere. The news regarding happenings in Zimbabwe reached every nook and corner of the country through radio and television broadcasts, talks, discussions and interviews on the subject. They were able to epouse the interest of their audience to the extent that

people enthusiastically looked forward to the final transfer of power to the Rhodesian people, i.e. the installation of the Mugabe Government in Salisbury.

Thus, we can say that India, both officially and non-officially, supported the struggling people of Zimbabwe and tried to render every possible help, to the best of its resources -- moral, material and otherwise.

....

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

For the past few decades, or for that matter for centuries together, international politics and relations have been conducted on the basis of the pursuit of national interest. In the atmosphere of competing and conflicting national interests, crises and crisis-management are a familiar feature or problems of international politics. These may vary from the liberation movements to wars among nations and from social problems to economic conflict. All these problems not only turn into acute crises, affecting the nation or nations concerned, but also parties other than those directly concerned, far and way over the globe.

A crisis originates as a small problem, which due to inefficient handling escalates and extends to larger areas. All major crises tend to provoke global reactions and involvement at some level or other. The Rhodesian question, too, originated as a local dispute between the rulers (i.e. the white settlers) and the ruled (i.e. the native black majority). However, it was due to many twists and turns within the national situation, that the problem attained the magnitude of a crisis affecting or attracting the interest and involvement of the whole world community.

In terms of power politics, the seeds of conflict were sown centuries ago, during the colonial era, when the white colonizers came and occupied the territory of Southern Rhodesia. It was, however, in 1923 when the white minority legally attained control of the reigns of administration from Britain, that an unadulterated reign of discrimination and exploitation began.

The consolidation of power in the hands of the minority rulers was at its zenith when, in 1963, the demand for independence was raised under the existing Constitution of 1961. It was the refusal by Britain to do so that led to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 by Ian Smith. This development within Rhodesia had far-reaching impact. Not only were the neighbouring front-line states affected, but it also attracted the attention of the entire world community. It showed gross violation of the United Nations Charter and total disregard of basic human rights. The heightening of the struggle within the country denoted the extent of mass awakening which further intensified the crisis. This acuteness of the situation needed, as it were, an emergency operation and the immediate fashioning of viable strategies for conflict resolution.

It would be reasonable to say that the dynamics of crisis resolution functions at three levels and has three categories of managers. They may be graded according to the degree of their involvement and influence over the crisis.

These 'Powers' (not in the sense of the term 'Super Powers' or 'Great Powers') can be termed as: First grade powers (a country or a group of countries which has the maximum influence both as regional powers and collectively as the most effective pressure group); second grade powers (those countries who have a fairly high status in international relations and whose open support acts as a catalyst in the process of finding a solution); and third grade powers (the remaining effective members of the world community, who provide and create the necessary environment and play a supporting role).*

When we apply this pattern to the actual exercise of resolution of the Rhodesian crisis, we find that, France and other European powers which did not take much interest in the crisis situation supported the active participants in the management of crisis. All along the tension-ridden path, France supported Britain in all its actions.

Now that we have identified the general trend and attitude of tertiary powers, and have already dealt with their role, it would be easier to analyse the part played by the second grade powers. In this category, we include America and China. As has been previously discussed, the Chinese active support to the guerrilla fighters put the very existence of the minority rulers into jeopardy.

* This gradation has been done by the present scholar for the purpose of this study.

On the one hand, the nationalist forces of the country had shaken the foundations of the government and, on the other, the appearance of America around the mediatory tables changed the very nature of the negotiations. In the post-war era, American involvement in any field has been looked upon with some apprehension and scepticism. The moment this Super Power entered into the management of this crisis, new dimensions were opened and the whole issue attained the status of a 'real international crisis'. Though the Kissinger Plan and his 'shuttle diplomacy' failed to solve the problem, its weight and prestige on the side of the nationalist forces gave moral and political support to the first grade mediators.

Apart from those frontline African states, who were neck-deep in the crisis the other Afro-Asian countries (minus, we may say, China) were apparently led by India in the management of the crisis. India was, in the African context, not merely a regional power, but was also an important and effective member of various international organizations. Being in this advantageous position, India played a significantly constructive role in finding means and ways to advance the cause of the liberation of Zimbabwe. India, well-known in the world community for its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stand, strongly supported the cause of black Africans in their freedom struggle in all world forums and through bilateral and regional diplomacy.

India's role in this management has to be seen from the perspective of a leading member of the Third World. She is the representative of a world which is neither developed like the West nor too far behind in the fields of science and technology. Thus being a developing country with an increasingly large population India had her economic and strategic constraints as far as free participation in crisis resolution was concerned. The per capita consumption of the country at times exceeds its resources so that she has very little surplus to offer the other third world countries. In the realms of politics and diplomacy, however, India has been able to carve out a place for herself. And it was in these fields that India could contribute her utmost towards the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis.

If we analyse India's involvement in the Rhodesian crisis from this point of view, we find that its contribution was most satisfactory. It extended all its political, moral and diplomatic support to the African peoples in various international forums. It always spoke on their behalf and urged upon the white minority to liquidate its illegal rule without delay. India wanted that Britain should take ultimate responsibility to settle the dispute. She believed in the peaceful resolution of the crisis, and wanted that a constitutional conference of all parties should be convened to frame a new constitution. A democratic government should

be elected on the basis of free and fair elections. India, time and again, clearly expressed its opinion. It did not offer mere lip sympathy to these ideas and principles but some of its delegates actively participated in various United Nations efforts. Indian delegate C.S. Jha was appointed Chairman of the Sub-committee of Seven on Colonialism for the determination of the status of the territory. It was the time to test India's faith in anti-colonialism as its opinion was in contrast with the Great Powers. Chairman Jha refuted the British stand and revealed the fact that the minority was governing over the majority; therefore it was a 'non-self governing' territory.

This fact, which was denied by the Western Powers, was later on accepted by them after the UDI in 1965.

India took the lead in breaking off diplomatic relations with the illegal regime. The Indian delegates spoke in innumerable UN sessions, the non-aligned conferences and the Commonwealth meetings against the continuation of the illegal rule.

The failure of Britain and the United Nations' measures convinced India that the use of force or threat to use force would be an effective deterrent for the illegal regime. Thus it favoured the use of military force.

India consistently supported the United Nations measures and resolutions. It was against bilateral talks

between the British Government and the illegal regime, as the Rhodesian Government did not represent the majority opinion. But, at the same time, it always welcomed and applauded the initiatives taken by the Western Powers for the settlement of the crisis. Major General Prem Chand was appointed as Observer of the ceasefire in 1976 with Western support.

It was due to India's constant political and diplomatic support that the Indian delegate, Rajeshwar Dayal, was selected as the Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group for the 'Observance of free and fair elections' in Zimbabwe. It was due to India's image as a non-aligned, independent democratic nation that she was given the significant responsibility to oversee the ultimate transfer of power in Zimbabwe.

Unlike some other powers, India, always supported all factions of the nationalist parties, for they collectively represented the spirit of liberation of the territory. Although India openly maintained its 'all party support' stance, one notices a slight tilt or soft corner towards the ZAFU unit of the Patriotic Front supported by the Soviet Union. No doubt, this was kept in a low key, yet it does indicate the intricacies of diplomatic moves. The probable motive behind this attitude was to counter the Chinese influence, which was fast growing due to China's indirect but active help to Zimbabwe through

arms aid and through the facility of training for the guerrillas of the ZANU unit of the Patriotic Front.

Apparently Indian diplomacy in this direction was not quite deft and skilful. As it happened she failed to control or contain the China-supported group which ultimately came to power.

The consequences of this slip in practical diplomacy in Zimbabwe will take time to wipe off. In the meantime, India has also not been able to give any substantial economic assistance to Zimbabwe. The Rhodesians felt that India though a developing country, was in a position to give considerable economic help and assistance to the freedom fighters. But they appreciated the political support given by an important non-aligned country.

As this crisis involved the issue of basic human rights and self-determination, non-official agencies too supported the policies of the Indian Government. Non-official agencies which expressed the public opinion were also interested in an immediate solution of the crisis.

India's role was more of supporter and backer than an initiator in the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis. India welcomed and supported actions of the leading African actors in general and Zambia in particular. This was due to the fact that various changes had taken place in the world situation and environment.

In the early sixties the decolonization process began on the African continent, too, and many African nations gained independence. Thus Africa as a whole had emerged as an independent and strong force, to help the remaining colonies in Africa in their freedom struggle.

During this period, India had a somewhat a low profile, especially after the India-China war of 1962. It was a great debacle for India. As a consequence of this India started paying more attention at its domestic defence and the relationship with neighbouring countries. After three years India had to fight another war with Pakistan. It was natural for a country to focus more attention and effort on its domestic problems as it fought two wars within the span of three years. India regained its lost prestige and creditability after the Indo-Pak war of 1971. The 1971 war also showed that India fought for those people who were struggling for their right of self determination and independence.

The entire Rhodesian crisis and all the people and forces who actively participated in its resolution really began their efforts due to British attitude of refusing the responsibility to order their colony. No doubt, there were underlying interests, both commercial and otherwise, that restrained Britain from taking any military action against the minority regime. However, it was due to the mounting

up of internal and external pressures, which was the handiwork of nationalist forces and international pressures that ultimately compelled Britain to comply with the popular demand for the establishment of majority rule in Zimbabwe.

It was only as a result of the collective efforts of all the prominent managers of crisis that the people of Zimbabwe could reach their cherished destiny. All the involved parties effectively played their given roles and were able to resolve the Rhodesian crisis which had for long defied all solutions.

Thus, we can say that the game of crisis resolution is not played by a single player. Its management involves a large number of people, nations, organizations and pressure groups, so that their united and wide-ranging efforts may together take care of the different interests and dimensions of an international crisis. Likewise, in the Rhodesian crisis, India played a significant and consistent role towards the resolution of the crisis. But it was only one (an important one though) of the members of the comity of nations who were aghast at the 'white' outrage and who had pooled all their efforts and resources to wipe the scourge of white minority rule off the face of Zimbabwe.

.....

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

TABLE 1

ALLOCATION OF LAND AFTER 1931 ACT

	1931 (Acres)	1962 (Acres)
European Areas	49,149,000	35,384,000
Native Reserves	21,600,000	21,020,000
Native Purchase Areas	7,465,000	4,216,000
Special Native Areas	-	19,150,000
Unassigned or Unreserved	17,793,000	5,416,000
Wankie game reserve	-	3,324,000
Forest Area	591,000	6,650,000
Undetermined	88,000	--
Total	99,686,000	96,610,000

Source: Eshmael Mlambo, Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birth Right (London, 1972), p. 17.

APPENDIX II

Table 2

AFRICAN OPINION REGARDING THE HOME-SMITH SETTLEMENT
PROPOSAL(i) Public Meetings and Groups of more than 20

Area	Acceptance	Rejections	Undecided/ Abstaining
Mashonaland North	50	11,600	420
Mashonaland South	30	16,500	40
Salisbury	100	9,000	700
Midlands	10	16,400	70
Victoria	240	18,400	140
Manicaland	70	18,300	70
Matabeleland North	110	2,500	180
Matabeleland South	30	5,000	200
Bulawayo	30	100	10
Totals	670	97,800	1,830

(ii) Groups of less than 20 and Individuals

Area	Acceptance	Rejections	Undecided/ Abstaining	Total
Mashonaland North	366	853	690	13,979
Mashonaland South	245	688	165	17,668
Salisbury	401	2,974	287	13,462
Midlands	175	1,107	151	17,913
Victoria	221	579	170	19,750
Manicaland	93	347	67	18,947
Matabeleland North	236	467	690	4,183
Matabeleland South	226	1,205	54	6,715
Bulawayo	301	1,289	187	1,917
Totals	2,264	9,509	2,461	117,534

Source: The Times (London), 24 May 1972.

APPENDIX III

EXPORTS TO RHODESIA REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS COMMITTEE BY
74 NATIONS, 1965-1972
(in thousands of US dollars)

Exporting Countries	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
United States	22,982	7,491	3,757	2,024	455	514	652	700
Canada	3,625	575	89	22	2	16	-	17
France	3,850	4,246	3,976	2,380	200	286	337	488
Germany	10,903	11,186	12,305	12,974	1,234	1,176	1,552	2,004
United Kingdom	88,808	9,648	2,877	1,946	1,958	1,206	1,698	1,796
Botswana	-	-						
Zambia	15,317	7,018	2,850	1,332	613	1,032	970	1,792
Malawi	4,359	2,951	2,735	2,872	3,804	5,148	5,315	4,297
Mozambique	3,247	2,698	3,818	-	-	-	-	-
India	4,526	16	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Sixth Report of the Security Council Sanctions Committee, United Nations Document S/11178/Add. 2.

APPENDIX IV

IMPORTS FROM RHODESIA REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS
COMMITTEE BY 75 NATIONS : 1965-1972
(in thousands of US dollars)

Importing Country	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
United States	14,056 ^a	9,359	6,463	1,599	68	115	807	12,480
Canada	3,152	1,087	4	2	1	1	2	5
France	2,873	1,865	1,059	1,171	50	61	130	907
Germany, Federal Republic of,	35,112	30,525	15,966	13,298	1,720	572	485	367
United Kingdom	83,711	12,809	405	215	163	117	129	222
Botswana	5,432	--	826 ^h	-	-	-	-	-
Zambia	99,507	64,904	45,129	31,602	30,081	32,473	29,429	25,719
Malawi	20,805	17,267	14,732	12,588	12,534	15,505	15,896 ^j	21,077
Mozambique	2,991	5,862	4,458	-	-	-	-	-
India	6,503	166	1	nil	-	-	-	-

139

a Refers to trade with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

h January September

j 1971 Figure has been recorded on a c.i.f. basis.

Source: Sixth Report of the Security Council Sanctions Committee, United Nations Doc.
S/11178/Add.2.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Colombo Summit, Documents and Selected Speeches (New Delhi, 1976).

Conference of the Heads of States and Governments of the Non-aligned Countries (Cairo, 1964).

Foreign Affairs Record (Ministry of External Affairs, External Publicity Division), 1961-1979, vols. 7-20.

Lok Sabha Debates, 1962-1979.

Rajya Sabha Debates, 1962-1979.

United Nations Documents, Security Council Official Records; General Assembly Records, 1960-1979.

Secondary Sources

Books

Ajala, Andekunle

Pan Africanism : Evolution, Progress and Prospects (London, 1973).

Andemicael, Berhanykun,

The OAU and the UN (New York/London, 1976).

Barber, James

Rhodesia : The Road to Rebellion (London, 1967).

Berke, Lardner

Rhodesia : The Story of the Crisis (London, 1966).

Cartey (Wilfred) and Kilson (Martin), ed.

The Africa Reader : Independent Africa (New York, 1970).

Crozier, Brian

The Masters of Power (London, 1969).

Davidson, Basil

Report on Southern Africa (London, 1952).

- Franklin, Harry Unholy Wedlock : The Failure of the Central African Federation (London, 1963).
- Gailey, A. Hary History of Africa : From 1800 to Present (New York, 1972).
- Gangal, S.C. India's Foreign Policy (Janata Phase) (New Delhi, 1980).
- George, A. Tu China and Tanzania : A Study in Cooperative Interaction (Berkeley, 1970).
- Goods, Robert C. UDI : The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London, 1973).
- Gunther, John Inside Africa (London, 1955).
- Hutson, H.P.W. Rhodesia : Ending an Era (New Delhi, 1979).
- Kapungu, Leonard T. The United Nations and Economic Sanctions : Rhodesia (Boston, San Francisco, 1973).
- Karunakaran, K.P., ed. Outside the Contest (New Delhi, 1963).
- Lumb, S.V. A Short History of Central and Southern Africa (London, 1962).
- Mates, Leo Nonalignment : Theory and Current Policy (Belgrade, 1972).
- Mazrui, Ali A. Africa's International Relations : The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (New York, 1977).
- Mckay, Vernon, Africa in World Politics (New York, 1963).
- Methuen, Eyre South Africa : An Historical Introduction (London, 1972).
- Misra, K.P. Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1969).

- Mlambo, Eshmael, Rhodesia : The Struggle for a Birthright (London, 1972).
- Mtshali, B. Vulindlela Rhodesia : Background to Conflict (London, 1967).
- Nehru, Jawaharlal India's Foreign Policy : Selected Speeches (New Delhi, 1961), vols. 1 and 3.
- Oakes, B. John The Edge of Freedom (New York, 1961).
- O'Meara, Patricia Rhodesia, Racial Conflict or Coexistence? (London, 1975).
- Potholm (Christian P.) and Dale (Richard), ed. Southern Africa in Perspective : Essays in Regional Politics (New York, 1972).
- Rajan, M.S. Nonalignment : India and the Future (Mysore, 1970).
- Ramachandani, R.R., ed. India and Africa (New Delhi, 1980).
- Ranger, T.O., ed. Aspects of Central African History (Heinemann, 1970).
- Roberts, Andrew A History of Zambia (London, 1976).
- Rooney (D.D.) and Halladay (E) The Building of Modern Africa (London, 1966).
- Simson, Howard Zimbabwe : A Countryside (Stockholm, 1979) (Research Report No. 53).
- Todd, Judith The Right to say No (London, 1972).
- Vajpayee, Atal Bihari New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1979).
- Wilfred Burchet Southern Africa Stands up : The Revolutions in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa (New Delhi, 1980).

- Willets, Peter Nonaligned Movement : The Origins of a Third World Alliance (Bombay, 1978).
- Wills, J.A. An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London, 1964).
- Windrich, Elaine Rhodesian Problem - A Documentary Record, 1923-73 (London, 1975).
- _____ Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London, 1978).
- Young, Kenneth Rhodesia and Independence : A Study in British Colonial Policy (London, 1967).
- Zacklin, Ralph The UN and Rhodesia : A Study in International Law (New York, 1974).
- Articles
- Adebisi, O.B. "Alliance for Oppression : Pre-coup Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa versus Blacks", Africa Quarterly (New Delhi), 1976-77.
- Bains, J.S. "Rhodesia and the UN", Journal of African and Asian Studies (Leiden), vol. 2, no. 1, Autumn 1968, pp. 1-16.
- Barber, James "Zimbabwe's Southern African Setting", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (London), March 1980, pp. 69-84.
- Chhabra, Hari Sharan "Issue and Prospects", World Focus (New Delhi), April 1980, pp. 3-6.
- Clarke, O.G. "Zimbabwe's International Economic Position and Aspects of Sanctions Removal", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, March 1980, pp. 28-54.

- Day, John "The Significance of Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, March 1980, pp. 85-109.
- Delap, Mick "The 1979 Elections in Zimbabwe Rhodesia", The Journal of Royal African Society (London), vol. 78, no. 313, October 1979, pp. 431-8.
- Gangal, S.C. "A Political Analysis of the UDI in Rhodesia", Africa Quarterly, 1965-66.
- Gopal, S. Ajit "Zimbabwe's Future Problems", World Focus, April 1980.
- Gregory, Martyn "Rhodesia : From Lusaka to Lancaster House", The World Today (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London), January 1980, pp. 11-18.
- _____ "The 1980 Rhodesian Elections : A First Hand Account and Analysis", The World Today, May 1980, pp. 180-88.
- Gupta, Anirudha "Rhodesia : The Problem", Now, vol. 3, no. 14, 6 January 1967, pp. 9-10.
- _____ "Rhodesia : The Problem", Now, vol. 3, no. 18, 3 February 1967, pp. 11-13.
- _____ "The Rhodesian Crisis and the O.A.U.", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 9, no. 1, July 1967, pp. 55-64.
- _____ "Rhodesian Lessons", Mainstream (New Delhi), vol. 6, no. 31, 30 March 1968, pp. 25-27.
- _____ "Rhodesian Confrontation" Mankind (Edinburg), vol. 12, no. 3, May 1968, pp. 17-19.
- _____ "Decolonization - Zimbabwe Model", World Focus, April 1980, pp. 10-14.

- Hasan, Nural K. "The Scramble for Africa : 1875-1914 A.D.", Africa Quarterly, 1961-62, pp. 12-29.
- Le Melle, Tilden J. "Winning Against a Stacked Deck : The Elections in Zimbabwe", Africa Today (Denver), vol. 27, no. 1, 1980, pp. 5-16.
- Luthera, V.P. "Is Southern Rhodesia Self-Governing?" Africa Quarterly, January-March 1962, pp. 79-80.
-
- "Britain and Rhodesia", Afro-Asian and World Affairs, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1967, pp. 112-22.
- Mufuka, Nyamyaro K. "Rhodesian Internal Settlement : A Tragedy", The Royal African Society, October 1979, vol. 78, no. 313, pp. 439-50.
- Rai, B.K. "Africa in the Indian Parliament", Africa Quarterly, April-June 1965, p. 20.
- Rao, Chandrashekhara "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Use of Force", Africa Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4, January-March 1967, pp. 285-96.
- Ray, Vanita, "The Lusaka Commonwealth Conference", Africa Quarterly, July-September 1979, p. 216.
- Riddle, Roger "Zimbabwe's Land Problem", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, March 1980, pp. 1-13.
- Sadiq Ali, Shanti "Rhodesia Tangle", India Quarterly, January-March 1975, pp. 82-85.
-
- "Southern Africa : Hopeful Signs", World Focus, April 1980, pp. 7-9.
- Shamuyarira, N.M. "Last Choice in Rhodesia : Britain Must Negotiate with the Africans", New Africa, vol. 6, no. 1, March 1967, pp. 3-4.

- Shamuyarira, N.M. "The Pattern of Negotiation is Unacceptable to Africans", Commonwealth Journal, vol. 10, no. 5, October 1967, pp. 215-18.
- Wilkinson, A.R. "The Impact of War", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, March 1980, pp. 10-12.
- Williams, Richard Hodder "Political Scenarios and their Economic Implications", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, March 1980, pp. 55-68.

Journals

"Southern Rhodesia : Making Amends", Eastern Economist, no. 39, 19 October 1962, p. 716.

"Another South Africa", Economic Weekly, 13 April 1963, pp. 618-19.

People's Democracy, April, September 1970.

Socialist India, vol. 6, no. 13, 17 February 1973, p. 20.

"Rhodesia : A Nominal Independence", Weekend Review, vol. 1, no. 45, 14 October 1967, p. 22.

Young India, vol. 5, no. 7, January 1975.

Newspapers

Daily Telegraph (London)

Daily News (New York)

Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

The Times (London)

Times of India (New Delhi)

The Patriot (New Delhi).

*

