

**CAMBODIA'S SEARCH FOR PEACE AND
DEMOCRACY**

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by

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
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
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Preface

Cambodia is presently faced with the problem of establishing peace and bring about reconciliation with warring groups. The entire international community is interested that there should be permanent peace and an end to civil war in that country, but the turmoil and conflict lingers.

Cambodia became controversial ever since the military intervention of Vietnam in December 1978. Thereafter all efforts towards establishing peace and order failed. The United Nations attempted to demobilize warring factions and establish democracy in 1992-93, but it succeeded only in establishing a representative government. but could not demobilize Khmer Rouge. It failed to demobilize Khmer Rouge which is still challenging the government and indulging in guerrilla warfare.

The developments in Cambodia are very challenging and this dissertation has tried to analyse them in six chapters. The first chapter gives an analysis of internal

and external threats to Cambodian peace and democracy. It deals with historical background of Cambodia and analyse the political developments emerging especially after Vietnam intervention in 1978.

Second chapter focuses on the nature and role of the UN role and its peace mission (UNTAC) in Cambodia, including its role as a catalyst in the transition of Cambodia as a democratic state.

Third chapter analyses the structures and functioning, ideologies and political leadership of the political parties in Cambodia, their mobilization strategies in pre and post election period of May 1993.

Fourth chapter gives an analysis of the Khmer Rouge and examines its activities. It also analyses the motives behind the Khmer Rouge for not participating in the elections of 1993.

Fifth chapter analyses the continued clandestine arms transfers to the rebel forces. Thai army has continued to cooperate closely with the Khmer Rouge and are trading by providing arms and ammunitions in exchange of logs and gems.

Sixth chapter has concluding observations.

Many people gave me help in writing this dissertation and here I express my gratitude to all of them. It would be impolite, however, if I do not mention the name of some of them. First of all, I am indebted to my supervisor, Dr Ganganath Jha, Associate Professor in the division of Southeast Asia and South West Pacific Studies, who encouraged me to complete this dissertation in time. Professor B.D. Ghoshal, Chairman in the Centre, Professor P.K. Das and Dr B.D. Arora, were always very kind to me in giving their advise and suggestions.


I would like to thank my friends for their love and affection and also moral support extended to me for the completion of this dissertation.

I am also grateful to Mr Baleswar Pahwa for his meticulous typing and to the library staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University, IDSA, Nehru Museum Library and Austrian University Library, Vienna, who extended me the material needed for this study (during my short visit there).

In the end, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my family members, for with their constant support,

endurance and encouragement this dissertation was finally written.

The responsibility for any shortcomings in this work, however, is solely mine.



Ms Renu Bhagat

Date: 15 July 1996.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Cambodia has never been a country at peace.¹ Chroniclers from the very beginning of Khmer Rouge civilization have documented a "warrior heritage" e.g. battles with neighbours Siam (Thailand), Annam (Vietnam) and Champa (integrated by Vietnam) in the fifteenth century. Internal divisions of Cambodia have allowed its neighbours to take advantage of its instability to divide and conquer the country time and again. Cambodians are over-burdened with a brutal history of fratricide, torture, summary justice, banditry, decapitation, and human liver eating.² The UN peace-keeping operations from 1992 to 1993 could not rectify the fundamental roots of conflict in Cambodia and

1 Sheri Preso, "Cambodia : A Heritage of Violence", World History, vol. 11, no. 3, fall 1994, p. 71.

2 Ibid.

that the result is a government wrecked by infighting in a country still at war.

Democracy was established in Cambodia after the United Nations supervised elections in 1993, whereby the FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party formed a coalition government. Khmer Rouge, an important party, with sizable followers, neither participated in the elections, nor collaborated in the peace process. It remained belligerent against Vietnamese nationals in Cambodia and posed challenges to the evolution of democracy and establishment of peace in the country. Besides Khmer Rouge, there are some institutional factors which needs to be attended to in order to establish democratic polity. However, it is necessary first to understand Cambodia's geographic location and recent history.

Cambodia comprises a relatively small and compact territory on the Indo-Chinese peninsula and covers an area of 181,035 square kilometers, bordered by Thailand to the west and Laos to the north, and Vietnam to the east. According to an official estimate in 1992, its population

was 9.1 million and density of 500 per square kilometers.³

The Paris Agreement on Cambodia in 1991 helped in facilitating the process towards the establishment of democracy in Cambodia by bringing the warring parties to negotiating table and making them agree to peace in their country before the United Nations machinery could conduct the elections as envisaged in the agreement. For what Cambodians needed first and foremost was a government strong enough to protect them from the Khmer Rouge. Without the institution necessary for reconstructing civil society, a vote by itself would do little to solve this tragic nation's most pressing problems.

Elections were held under the supervision of the United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia from 23 to 28 May 1993. The endeavour of the UNTAC was to end nearly twenty years of war, terror, foreign influence, chaos and dictatorship.

The UNTAC, in accordance with the Peace Accord of 23 October 1991 (Paris Agreement), was entrusted to the

3. The Far East and Australia Europe Publication, 1996, p. 176.

international community with the objective of ensuring that the terms of elections would take place and the terms of the agreement would be observed.⁴

Although the elections did take place in spite of many obstacles, peace has not returned to Cambodia. Though election results showed the slight advantage on behalf of the FUNCINPEC, it did not in actual reality reflect the conditions within the country. The FUNCINPEC secured more votes on account of a negative attitude towards Cambodian People's Party, then in power, as well as indirect pressure and propaganda of the Khmer Rouge.⁵

FUNCINPEC was essentially an urban based party and lacked cadre in rural areas where the administrative machinery was still controlled by Hun Sen's Cambodian People Party because of years of control over those units. This itself created a certain imbalance within the party equations that formed the government in the past election period and contributed to unstable political situation. The

4. Jarat Chopra, "United Nations Authority in Cambodia", Oceanic Papers, Brown University, 1994, p. 1.

5. Ibid.

UNTAC did not manage to bring the Khmer Rouge to join the peace process, resulting in the virtually splitting of the country into two parts, namely the areas under Khmer Rouge and that of the government respectively.

The Khmer Rouge remains militarily active and still controls the 15 per cent of the country. Its gem-rich west and northern zones along the Thai border which Khmer Rouge has declared an autonomous state.⁶

The Government in Phnom Penh not only felt threatened from the outside but also from the inside by the Khmer Rouge. Besides there has been increase in corruption, inept administrators, an inadequate and undertrained army that rarely receives its wages and secretly sells its ammunition to the enemy, a loose and uneven application of law and order and destabilizing divisions between its leaders, who put personal interests before national ones in their continuing struggle for power.⁷

6. Emilie Casella, "After the Elections in Cambodia", Peace Magazine, vol. 9, nos. 4/5, September/October 1993, p. 1.

7. Presso, n. 1, p. 72.

There are several challenges that are yet to be tackled. The government in Phnom Penh does not only feel threatened by the Khmer Rouge but also from other dissent forces. The main problem today is to establish a polity and order which had been non-existent ever since the fall of Prince Narodam Sihanouk from power (1970).

In addition to the ongoing fights between the Khmer Rouge and government troops, mines represent another danger for farmers and people in villages and present rehabilitation of the country. Reintegration of returnees has not yet been achieved and also the socio-economic needs of most other Cambodians are still not addressed. There has been an increase in banditry, prostitution, sexually transmitted diseases, such as AIDS. Cambodia still remains one of the world's poorest countries, despite all efforts of the International Community to give the Cambodian people a chance to begin reconstructing their homes in peace. The question therefore arises if the US \$ 2 billion spent for United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) was a waste of money that could have been used for other

purposes.⁸

Under the Paris Agreement, UNTAC was to create the two key prerequisites for free and fair elections in Cambodia - a peaceful situation on the ground and politically neutral environment. To carry out these two tasks, the following seven components were established within UN: military, civil administration, civilian police, repatriation, human rights and electoral components.⁹

In order to understand the contemporary issues and challenges to peace and democracy in Cambodia, it would be in order to analyse its recent history - Cambodia's recent past and economic backwardness. Since 1970 the country has experienced the military overturning of the royalist regime of the Prince (now king) Sihanouk; a civil war (1970-75), followed by the doctrinaire revolutionary experiment led by Pol Pot (1975-78).¹⁰ The toppling of that regime by a

8. Far Eastern Economic Review, "Cambodia's Nightmare", 9 June 1994, p. 5.

9. Trenor Findley, "Cambodia, The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC", SIPRI Research Report No. 9, Oxford University, 1995, p. 29.

10. The Economic Intelligence Unit, Indo China, Vietnam & Laos, Country Profile, United Kingdom, 1994-95, p. 92.

Vietnamese invasion (1978) and the organisation of a new communist party regime under the protection of a Vietnamese occupation force (1979-89) Cambodia, endured one of the country's great tragedies - the slaughter of the millions or more people, including ethnic Vietnamese population during April 1975 to December 1978. The transformations and continuities came under systematic and variegated attack in the 1970s, particularly after 1975, when Cambodia's entire historical experience was attacked vociferously by the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, which worked hard to dissolve continuities, real or imagined, between revolutionary Cambodia and anything that had happened before.¹¹

When the communists under Pol Pot came to power in 1975 as the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, millions of Cambodians were displaced, and hundreds of thousands starved to death or were assassinated by supporters of the new regime. The entire society was mobilized, under frequently

11. David P. Chandler, "Seeing Red : Perception of Cambodian History in Democratic Kampuchea", in Chandler and Kiernan, Revolution and its Aftermath, p. 7.

foresome conditions to 'build and defend' the country, first against class enemies, "feudal remnants" of the Lon Nol period, and then against the outside world, in particular against Cambodia's traditional enemies, "the Vietnamese". The Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot regime was responsible for these deeds.

However, in the final years of the Vietnam war Sihanouk was accused by his own army of collaborating with Vietnam and of allowing his own entourage to destroy the national economy. He was deposed by a parliamentary vote in 1970. The monarchy was abolished in a republican constitution promulgated in 1971. The new Khmer Republic of General Lon Nol was, nevertheless, quickly overwhelmed in 'Liberation' war mounted by a coalition, led by Sihanouk was refused to accept his deposition and who remains popular among the peasantry, and which included the underground communist party of Kampuchea (CPK). Although the US Government sought to defend its ally, at first by a joint US-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and then by saturation bombing of rural Cambodia for six months in 1973, the republican regime was defeated by the communist-

dominated coalition in 1975.

Under the Khmer Rouge, the state was renamed Democratic Kampuchea. A new constitution promulgated in 1976 proclaimed Cambodia a worker-peasant revolutionary state. It had few national institutions other than a National Assembly, elected in 1976, which met twice a year to give formal approval to decisions taken by the secret Communist Party of Kampuchea, known until 1977 only as Angka (the Khmer term of "organization").

Advocating development based on self-sufficiency, agricultural modernization and use of indigenous technologies and materials in industry, Pol Pot's regime evacuated the towns and forced Cambodians to work in large rural cooperatives or in large teams at industrial work sites. The drive to produce food surpluses and manufactured goods without foreign assistance or raw materials was a catastrophic and inhuman failure. Several hundred of thousands of people died of illnesses stemming from malnutrition and physical exhaustion. As the economy collapsed, tens of thousands more were purged from the ranks of the revolutionary administration for alleged conspiracies

of the party's revolution and for acts of disobedience judged as "treason". Concurrently, the CPK pursued a policy of confrontation with Vietnam in an ill-judged attempt to protect the independence of its revolution and of the country. Harmed by domestic reverses of its own in southern Vietnam and by menacing gestures from China, and fearing that China was about to launch a "war on two fronts", Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978. The Democratic Kampuchea government and army were forced to retreat to mountainous redoubts in the north, west and south-west of the country. A new Cambodian communist government was installed in Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese in January 1979 under Heng Samrin leadership.

In December 1978, Vietnam announced formation of the National United Front for National Salvation (NUFNS), under Heng Samrin, a former Democratic Kampuchean division commander. It was composed of Khmer Rouge communists who had remained in Vietnam after 1975 and Khmer Rouge officials from the eastern sector like Heng Samrin and Hun Sen who had fled to Vietnam from Cambodia in 1978.

The Vietnamese army continued its pursuit of Pol

Pot Khmer Rouge forces. At least 600,000 Cambodians displaced during the Pol Pot era and the Vietnamese invasion began streaming to the Thai border for search of refuge.¹² Vietnam's occupation army of as many as 200,000 troops controlled the major population centres and most of the countryside from 1979 to December 1989.¹³ The Heng Samrin regime's 30,000 troops were plagued by poor morale and widespread desertion. Resistance to Vietnam's occupation continued and there was some evidence that Heng Samrin's PRK forces provided logistic and moral support to the guerrillas. A large portion of the Khmer Rouge's military forces eluded Vietnamese troops and established themselves in remote regions.

The communist resistance, consisting of a number of groups which had been fighting the Khmer rouge after 1979 including Lon Nol era-soldiers coalesced in 1979-80 to form the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces

12. Cambodia, United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, December 1990, p. 4.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

(KPNLAF), which played loyally to former Prime Minister Son Sann, and Moulinaka, loyal to Prince Sihanouk.

In 1979, Son Sann formed the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) to lead the political struggle for Cambodia's independence. Prince Sihanouk formed his own organisation FUNCINPEC, and its military armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS) in 1981.¹⁴ In 1982, Vietnam launched a major offensive against the main Khmer Rouge base at Phnom Penh Melai in the Cardamom mountains. Vietnam switched its target to civilian camps near the Thai border by armour and heavy artillery against camps belonging to all three resistance groups. Hundred of civilians were injured in these attacks, and more than 80,000 were forced to flee to Thailand.¹⁵

Vietnamese succeeded in eliminating the camps in Cambodia and drove both the guerrillas and civilian refugees into neighbouring Thailand. Within Cambodia, Vietnam had only limited success in establishing its client, Heng Samrin

14. Ibid., p. 5.

15. United States, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Cambodia, December 1990, p. 5.

regime, which was dependent on Vietnamese advisors at all levels. Security in some rural areas was terror, and major transportation routes were subject to interdiction by resistance forces. The presence of Vietnamese throughout the country and their intrusion into nearly all aspects of Cambodian life alienated much of the populace. The statement of Vietnamese nationals both former residents and new immigrants, further exacerbated anti-Vietnamese sentiments.

By the end of this decade, Khmer nationalism began to reassert itself against the traditional Vietnamese enemy. The Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian rebels were given shelter in Thailand. The rebel forces were given aid, logistics and weapons to fight against Vietnam and Phnom Penh regime by China, the US and the ASEAN countries. The rebel forces led by the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and Phnom Renh regime became engrossed in complex conflict and perpetual tension. Soviet Union and Vietnam supported Phnom Penh. Thus the security environment of the region became conflictual. Cambodia became an arena of cold war. The rebels were supported by China and the western world.

In 1986, Hanoi claimed to have begun withdrawing parts of its occupation forces. At the same time, Vietnam continued efforts to strengthen its client regime, the PRK, and its military arms, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF). These withdrawals continued over the next two years, although actual members were difficult to verify. After the sixth party congress of communist party in Vietnam, in December 1986, Vietnam decided to withdraw military from Cambodia.

Thus the path towards the settlement of the Cambodian dispute was cleared. Vietnam's proposals to withdraw its remaining occupation forces in 1989-90. The result of ongoing international pressure forced the PRK to begin economic and constitutional reforms in an attempt to ensure future political dominance. In April 1989, Hanoi and Phnom Penh announced that final withdrawal would take place by the end of September 1989. The military organizations of Prince Sihanouk (ANS) and of former Prime Minister Son Sann (KPNLF) underwent significant military improvement during the 1988-89 period and both expanded their presence in Cambodia's interior. These organizations provide a

political alternative to the Vietnamese supported People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the murderous Khmer Rouge.

After two regional peace efforts, Prince Sihanouk, Son Sann and Hun Sen met in Jakarta in May 1989 to try to find a formula for national reconciliation. The Jakarta informal meeting I and II broke who grounds to bring together the warring factions and enable them to talk to each other for an agreement during 1987-1991. These diplomatic meetings were held at Jakarta, Paris, Beijing, Pattaya and New York for establishment of peace.


The peace makers received positive response from the international community. Hun Sen proposed including key leaders of the resistance group under the PRK mantle, through their participation in a most cosmetic National reconciliation council to oversee eventual elections. Prince Sihanouk and the other resistance leaders rejected this proposal as legitimizing the Phnom Penh regime and allowing the continuation of its unilateral control, which they felt was not likely to result in a free and fair election process.

From 30 July to 30 August 1989, representatives of

18 countries, the four Cambodian parties, and the UN Secretary General met in Paris in an effort to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. They hoped to achieve those objectives seen as crucial to the future of post-corruption Cambodia; a verified withdrawal of the remaining Vietnamese occupation troops, the prevention of the return to power of the Khmer Rouge, and genuine self-determination for the Cambodian people.

Between 1979 and 1989, Central Cambodia was occupied by Vietnamese army and administered by Vietnamese-promoted Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party in 1991. The KPRP-CPP authorities initially named their state the People's Republic of Kampuchea but changed the name of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989.

FUNCINPEC is now headed by Prince Narodom Ranariddh, Sihanouk's oldest son. The KPNLF and FUNCINPEC formed a coalition of Democratic Kampuchea (CGPK) in 1982, permitting it to occupy Cambodia's seat in the General Assembly. Although international diplomatic resistance to the Vietnamese occupation was mounted under the banner of the new CGOK, the military and political struggle inside

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Cambodia continued to be by the remnants of the Democratic Kampuchea revolutionary movement.

The Paris Conference on Cambodia was able to make some progress in such areas as the working of an international control mechanism, the definition of international guarantees for Cambodia's independence and neutrality plans for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, the eventual reconstruction of the Cambodian economy, and ceasefire procedures. However, complete agreement among all parties on a comprehensive settlement remained elusive. In early 1990, the negotiating process continued through consultations with a view towards finalizing a comprehensive solution by reconvening the Paris Conference in the future.

The agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict which entered into force on 23 October 1991, invited the Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to provide it with the mandate set forth in the agreement. The Council fully supported the

Agreement in its resolution 718 of 31 October 1991, and requested the Secretary General to prepare a detailed plan of implementation.¹⁶

Between 1979 and 1991 efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict founded because of the legal and moral dilemma. Moreover, until 1987 the USSR provided generous military and economic assistance to Vietnam and to the PRK-SOC agreement in Phnom Penh. Thus, while there was near universal diplomatic agreement that the Vietnamese-installed regime could not be recognized, there was no way to remove it and to desire for or obligation to restore power to a Democratic Kampuchea coalition.

The first tentative efforts to secure a negotiated settlement came only in 1987 after the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, had firmly informed his allies of the need to pursue a settlement based on national reconciliation. The USSR persuaded Vietnam and the CPP to accept a "limited" UN role in a settlement and UN-supervised

¹⁶. Tarat Chopra, United Nations Authority in Cambodia, Occasional Paper no. 15, 1994, p. 1.

elections, thereby paving the way for the signing of the Paris agreement in October 1991. In February 1992 the UN Security Council approved the largest peacekeeping operation in UN history.

Since the end of the UN mission in October 1993, Cambodia's relations with ASEAN countries have been expanded, although the government has been divided on whether to pursue ASEAN membership. Cambodia has been unresolved border dispute with Vietnam and Thailand.¹⁷ Relations with Thailand have been difficult because of continuing allegations of their support for the Khmer Rouge. China appears to be maintaining its commitment to see the political process in Cambodia's work.

In the wake of May 1993 elections, the government moved to form a unified armed force, comprising the former Society of Cambodia (SOC), Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF), the royalist National Army of Independent Cambodia (NAIC) and defectors from the Khmer Rouge's National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). Initially Khmer Rouge, was

¹⁷. The Economist Unit, Indochina, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, 1994-95, UK, p. 8.

most reluctant to join the peace talks if Hun Sen was invited there. But when China announced that it would not supply weapons to the Khmer Rouge in future, they also joined the peace talks. The Molinaka (Khmer National Liberation Movement) army was not included, but was to be disbanded. Plans to reduce the size of the armed forces, which numbered around 140,000 in August 1993, have been largely put on hold because of the uncertain security situation and a desire to avoid unemployment.¹⁸

Creating a unified, effective fighting force is proving problematic, however. Morale is poor and there are serious shortage of military equipment. Troops are paid irregularly and corruption is widespread. Its performance on the battlefield during 1994 has reflected these deepseated problems.

UNTAC was successful in the field of separation and elections, where UNTAC did not require the cooperation of 4 warring groups, the state of Cambodia and its Cambodian People's Party (CPP); the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, and the

¹⁸. Ibid., p. 9.

Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The voters turn out was placed at 85 per cent in the elections which was certified by UNTAC as free and fair. "The electorate had given Prince Norodom Ranadiddh's pro-royalist FUNCINPEC party more than 45% of the vote, a 7.25% edge came over the 38% taken by the ruling Cambodian People's Party. The republican Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) received slightly over 3% of the votes."¹⁹

The voters translated into 58 seats for FUNCINPEC, 51 for the CPP, 10 for the BLDP, and one for Moulinaka, an offshoot of FUNCINPEC.²⁰ In June 1993, Prince Sihanouk reinstated as head of state by Constituent Assembly at its inaugural session. On 1 July, provisional government was accepted by constituent assembly. Khmer Rouge continued to fight because it still received the support of the Thai business circles which has continued to cooperate closely with the Khmer Rouge.²¹

19. The Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 June 1993, p. 10.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

The Thais violated UN embargoes by trading with the Khmer Rouge and providing in exchange of logistic support by the Thai Army, the Khmer Rouge would have quickly dissolved and been forced into total isolation. The border has also turned into a free way for hundreds of cars stolen in Thailand and slipped over the borders into Cambodia, where they are openly sold in Phnom Penh. More than 100,000 Thais have crossed the border to seek their fortunes in Khmer Rouge controlled by Ruby mines - a major source of income for the faction. The mines they say can carry out hands full of guns worth millions of baht in their pockets.²²

The Thai MP Thanit Traivut, who represented the border province of Trat adjoining the Khmer Rouge-controlled mines, said that 57 Thai companies are now operating nearly 1000 earthmoving vehicles in the ruby bearing region.²³ In addition, the Thai government had sold the rights to 17

22. Ibid.

23. Far Eastern Economic Review, "The Pol Pot Trail", 26 November 1992, p. 13.

entry points to Thai companies in 1992, who in turn were given the right to tax boys coming into the country. Senior officials in Bangkok were reportedly on the receiving end of some of the projects.

According to traders, Thailand's secret 838 intelligence unit which was responsible for all covert liaison and weapons during the 13 years war against the Vietnamese - received baht 40 for each cubic metre of timber that crossed into Thailand.²⁴ Cambodia is a country of tremendous natural resources, and most important to its neighbours, vast empty stretches of arable land. Overpopulated and expansionist, Thailand and Vietnam cannot help but be tempted by Cambodia's ongoing vulnerability, particularly given the historical context both countries had occupied large portion of Cambodia within the last 50 years.

Moscow-backed Vietnam invaded to oust the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge from power in 1978 and occupied the country for next decade. "Thailand continued to carry out annual, 12 days military exercises on its border with

24. Ibid.

Cambodia, training against the threat of Vietnamese invasion.²⁵ Thailand has its own interests in keeping a buffer between itself and Vietnam by using that buffer to develop its own economic interest.

Sihanouk's spokesman announced on 16 July 1993 that Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen would be co-chairman of the provisional National Government of Cambodia, pending a new constitution because of poor health and problems with certain foreign figures. Sihanouk said that he would not accept the premiership of the new government but would remain head of state while FUNCINPEC and the CPP would provide deputy prime ministers. The defence portfolio was offered to FUNCINPEC, finance to Son Sann, head of KPNLF, while the key interior and national security ministries would be shared between FUNCINPEC and CPP. Sihanouk's attempt to arrange a settlement between the PDK and state of Cambodia failed.

On 21 September 1993, the FUNCINPEC, CPP controlled constituent assembly adopted a new constitution

25. Sheri Presso, "Cambodia - A Heritage of Violence", World Policy, vol. 11, no. 3, fall 1994, p. 71.

with 39 articles. It was signed and promulgated on 24 September 1993. As a 'pluralist liberal democracy' Cambodia is to adhere to a state-guided market economy, a social system that is accompanied by a "bill of rights" pertinent to the economic, social, cultural and educational rights of every Khmer citizen. The challenges facing the new state of Cambodia remains fundamentally the same. On 26 September 1993, Yusushi Akashi left Phnom Penh, formally ending the UN operation. On 15 November, military withdrawal was completed.

The lack of professional and technical skills and descript infrastructures are the greatest obstacles to progress. The new region continues to face the threat of Khmer Rouge, though reduced in strength. "The government produced by 1993's election is beset by massive corruption, thuggery and in fighting among the coalition partners, leaving it unpopular and precariously weak."²⁶ The continuing instability deters crucial international

²⁶. Naty Thayer and Nayan Chanda, "Things fall Apart", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 May 1994, p. 16.

development aid, undermines long-term private investment, threatens essential revenue from tourism and discourages efforts to reconstruct the country's infrastructure. Without a firm economic foundation, the prospects of building political stability are dim indeed. Even though UNTAC supported the formation of new parties in the transitional period, the time available was much too short for the strengthening and institutions that had not been involved in the armed conflict and wished to take part in the elections. That is why, the general public had very little or no influence on the process of democratization and no structure had been created to promote this democratization process.

Former Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, Cambodia's leading opposition voice, disagreed, that Cambodia is a success story, he said, "If you are satisfied with cosmetics, everything is okay, like some Americans tell me. But if you scratch nothing democratic about the government, the government is a rubber stamp. The Press is being killed

and jailed. The judiciary is far from independence."²⁷

The foreign backers, notably China and Thailand, have distanced themselves from the Khmer Rouge since the faction boycotted the elections. Almost a couple of years after the 22,000 UN peacekeepers have returned home, Cambodia is arguably further away from a normal society than when the troops arrived. The problem goes back to the 1991 Paris Peace Accords themselves, and especially its dubious supposition that a free and fair election would magically transform the Khmer Rouge from a genocidal band of outlaws into respectable parliamentarians. To the contrary, what we see now is that the Khmer Rouge, which was itself a signatory to a peace accord it then did everything to undermine its territory expanded and its weaponry intact.

The UN plan might have worked had it struck to its original, if unrealistic, proposal to disarm all the Cambodian factions. But the die was cast when the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia refused to make them. If UNTAC's weakness

²⁷ Naty Thayer, "Hostile Climate", Far Eastern and Economic Review, 8 June 1995, p. 19.

guaranteed that the new Cambodian government would inherit a more intractable Khmer Rouge, neighbouring Thailand bears much responsibility for making them stronger. Financially, the Thai military's logging and gun-mining contracts along the Cambodian borders has brought Pol Pot & Co. millions.

Cambodians are divided among themselves and the government is losing popular support each day due to corruption and infighting, Cambodia's new government is even less equipped than its predecessor to take on the Khmer Rouge despite its public mandate. Certainly the appeal for more military support from the west deserves support.

CHAPTER II
THE FORMATION OF UNTAC AND
1993 ELECTIONS

The agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict invited the United Nations Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and to provide it with the mandate set that the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) is "the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined".⁴ The SNC consisted of the four Cambodian factions and was under the chairmanship of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The transitional period began when the agreement entered into force, on 23 October 1991. It ended after an

4. Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information pp1/1218-9242 - June 1992 - 10 M.

elected constituent assembly approved a new Cambodian constitution and transformed itself into a legislative assembly and thereafter a new Cambodian Government had been created. The SNC had delegated to the United Nations "all powers necessary" to ensure the implementation of the agreement.

The Secretary General submitted a report containing his proposed implementation plan on 19 February 1992. His report was approved by the Council and by its resolution 745(1992) of 28 February established UNTAC under its authority for a period not exceeding 18 months. UNTAC's strength was estimated at approximately 15,900 military personnel, 3,600 civilian police monitors, and 2,500 international civilian personnel, who was present on varying schedules. In addition, tens of thousands of locally recruited staff was required to supplement UNTAC international staff, most of them during elections. UNTAC was headed by the special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr Yasushi Akashi.²

2. Ibid.

UNTAC consisted of seven district components: Human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, police, repatriation and rehabilitation.

Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement of 23 October 1991, which was signed by the five permanent members³ of the Security Council and the four contending Cambodian factions: Party of the state of Cambodia (SOC), the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea ("Khmer Rouge"), and which was the result of many years of negotiations, invited the Security Council to establish UNTAC and to provide it with the mandate set forth in the Agreement. It comprised four documents:

- (a) The Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.
- (b) The agreement on a comprehensive political settlement

3. These agreements were made possible because Vietnam former patron of the state of Cambodia (SOC) and China, former patron of KR had normalized relations in 1991. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, furthermore, removed another powerful faction of state of Cambodia.

of the Cambodia conflict.

(c) The agreement concerning the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia, and

(d) the declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.⁴

All these entered into force upon signature. The two agreements had treaty status; the Declaration of Rehabilitation was not binding.⁵ James Shear, former adviser to the head of UNTAC, emphasized that, contrary to popular myth, the mission was never designed to 'run' Cambodia but rather to 'prevent or correct for action impending UNTAC's operation' and to 'neutralize political

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4. Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, Paris 23 October 1991, Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of Cambodian Conflict, Paris, October 1991; Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia, Paris, 31 October 1991; A Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, 23 October 1991, all published as annexes to UN Doc. A/46/608, S/23177, 30 October 1991.
5. S.P. Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements", American Journal of International Law, vol. 87, no. 1, January 1993, p. 8.

bias in bureaucratic behaviour that could skew the environment for a free and fair elections'.⁶

The International Community's acceptance to the SNC's unusual status was a new phenomenon in international law, since the SNC would not become the Government of Cambodia or control any territory. Its purpose, in the absence of reconciliation between the factions which might have produced a single Cambodian voice was to embody the will of the Cambodian nation. This would permit the UN to obtain Cambodian authorization to do what was necessary to implement the Paris Accords. Article 78 of the UN Charter 33otherwise prohibits the UN from placing a sovereign member state under trusteeship. UNTAC would not administer the country comprehensively, but it would exercise 'direct supervision' or control over those aspects of government which could most readily influence the outcome of an election and 'supervision' of any aspects of administration that would ensure a return to 'normal day-to-day life'.

6. J.A. Schear, 'Beyond traditional Peacekeeping : The Case of Cambodia', paper presented to the workshop on Beyond Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, US Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 24 February 1994, p. 9.

The UN would do only that which is necessary to bring about a free and fair elections in a neutral political environment and thus establish a legitimate government - the most basic expression of Cambodia's sovereignty. Between SNC and UNTAC the balance of authority overwhelmingly lay with UNTAC. UNTAC was to be the new ambitious operation in the history of UN peacekeeping. UNTAC's mandate included:

- (a) Supervision, monitoring and verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign military forces;
- (b) Containment, disarmament and demobilization of the four factions;
- (c) location and confiscation of caches of weapons and military supplies;
- (d) the conduct of free and fair elections;
- (e) promotion and protection of human rights;
- (f) oversight of military security and civil administration and of the maintenance of law and order;
- (g) repatriation and settlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons;
- (h) assistance with mine clearance (de-mining) and establishment of training programmes in mine clearance

and mine awareness; and

- (i) rehabilitation of essential infrastructure and the commencement of economic reconstruction and development.

The Paris accord established a Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) composed of senior military representative of each faction, chaired by the chief of UNTAC's Military component and supported by a Secretariat. In the event of violation or threat of violation, the 33Accords simply provided for the two co-chairs of the Paris Conference, France and Indonesia, to engage in consultations with a view to taking appropriate step.⁷ To a great extent the Accords were pressed on a mostly reluctant Cambodian political elite by an International Community eager to be rid of the Cambodian problem. The factions, particularly the Khmer Rouge, were instinctively suspicious and emotionally unprepared for a settlement which they felt had been imposed on them.

⁷. Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement, n. 3, Article 29.

Among the external powers involved the prime motivation was national self interest in removing the Cambodia issue from their domestic, regional and international agendas. From an international perspective the Paris Accords represented an unusually robust and unified commitment to peace in Cambodia which was followed through the end of the transitional period and beyond. Under the Paris Agreement, UNTAC, was to create the two key prerequisites for free and fair elections in Cambodia - a peaceful situation on the ground and a politically neutral environment. Although UNTAC, like Namibia, was a multidimensional and second generation peacekeeping mission, being unique in many respects in the history of UN peacekeeping. The two tasks of UNTAC which has never been entrusted to any other United Nations peacekeeping mission before: the organization and conduct of elections and the supervision of the civil administration of a member state. In order to carry out its task of civil administration, all administrative offices in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information - the five most important areas for creating conditions for

free and fair elections - were placed under the direct control of UNTAC, which was an immense task and likely to fail, given the limited time-framework.

UNTAC was most successful in the fields of repatriation and elections, which were mainly in those areas where UNTAC did not require the cooperation of the four factions.

Repatriation

The repatriation operation organized by UNTAC in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was itself successful.

The UNTAC repatriation programme brought back 360,000 refugees to Cambodia, who had been in several Thai border camps for years, separated from their families by war. The programme attempted to address both the immediate assistance needs of the returnees and, in conjunction with UNDP, longer term development and reintegration issues.⁸ In

8. UNDP created a special unit called CAREERE (Cambodia: Resettlement and Reintegration). CAREERE coordinated and programmed multilateral, bilateral and NGO activities, with particular attention to the district, commune and village

addition, the Cambodia Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme initiated by UNDP/UNHCR tried to consider both the long-term reintegration needs of the returnees as well as the development requirements of the area they returned to. For example, the programme included the construction/repair of roads, bridges, water supply and buildings, the provision of medicines for clinics, primary health education and assistance to the old and homeless children.

Election

UNTAC's biggest success certainly was the organization and conduct of the elections for which it was solely responsible and which included the drafting of an registration/electoral law. This task was immense and required for its execution thousands of people. Therefore the electoral component of UNTAC was charged with the selection and the training of more than 50,000 local staff who worked as polling officers, under the supervision of an

...Continued...

levels. In cooperation with UNHCR, CARERE provided support for all UN resettlement projects.

3International Polling Station Officer (IPSO), during the elections.

Despite intimidation and violent threats during the registration and campaigning periods, the Cambodians went to polls by millions. More than 96 per cent of the eligible population registered to vote, and 89 per cent of those registered turned out cast their ballots in the election. This can be seen as a proof that the electoral component's civic education programme had succeeded in promoting the awareness of the polling process and human rights, and in convincing the people that secrecy would be observed. The UN Military and Civilian Police (CIVPOL) played crucial roles in protecting electoral materials, electoral staff and the voters. Even in the areas in the north where fighting was continuing on election day, the election turnout was 80 per cent.

Long term Achievements : Inclusion of Cambodia into the International Community

After the holding of democratic elections, Cambodia has become a recognized member of the International community which has facilitated the country's access to

foreign aid and technical assistance. This, in turn, has promoted international trade, rehabilitation and employment and has prevented the collapse of the Cambodian economy after the withdrawal of the aid from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) following the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

Despite many attempts to include the Khmer Rouge in the peace process and to achieve reconciliation and parties by, for example, creating the Supreme National Council in which all four factions were represented; the Khmer rouge decided not to cooperate and to disturb the peace process. In this way, however, the Khmer Rouge have isolated themselves and are now viewed by the most governments as political outcasts, which also diminishes the Khmer Rouge's chance of return to power.

A public awareness programme educated Cambodians about human rights, the elections, especially ballot secrecy, and mines. From April 1993 onwards, the UNTAC radio station broadcast for 15 hours every day, conveying to the people messages of human rights, democracy and local news in an interesting and entertaining way. Radio UNTAC

soon became the most popular and credible radio programme in Cambodia. Cambodians working for UNTAC, both in the administration and for the elections, gained valuable work skills that they can apply to the construction and development of the country. Electoral officials have now sufficient experience to organize future elections. Police, immigration and custom officials, magistrates, defenders, prosecutors, and human rights workers received training from UNTAC programmes organized by the civil administration component. Many others received on-the-job training as administrators, computer operators, and traffic police.

Because of the lack of Khmer Rouge co-operation in disarmament and containment, the UN had the choice of suspending the process or proceeding with it. Finally it decided to proceed with the three factions that were cooperating, but with safeguards to ensure that they would not be disadvantaged militarily - an acknowledgement that such a process could not proceed indefinitely without surrendering the country to the Khmer Rouge. With the failure of the disarmament and cantonment phase of the peace plan and the threat to the neutral political environment

which UNTAC was supposed to establish, the UN Security Council now had to decide whether or not to proceed with the election in May 1993. The alternatives were to proceed, to postpone it until the Khmer Rouge's co-operation was secured or to cancel it and effectively scuttle the Paris Accords.⁹ On 13 October 1992 the Security Council unanimously accepted the General Secretary's recommendation of holding the elections.

Diplomatic efforts were made to convince the Khmer Rouge to co-operate, first by France and Indonesia, the co-chairs of the Paris Conference and then by Japan and Thailand.¹⁰ But the Khmer Rouge continued to violate the accords and denigrate UNTAC and Khmer Rouge criticized Akashi and demanded his resignation. In February 1993 UNTAC reported numerous and large scale violations of all the

9. The option of conducting by-elections in contested areas after the main elections was later considered but rejected. See UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992), UN document S/24800, 15 November 1992, p. 7.

10. See UN, Report of the Secretary-General, 15 November 1992, which includes documents prepared by Japan and Thailand and the two Paris co-chairs respectively on their negotiating efforts with the Khmer Rouge.

embargoes by both land and sea routes.

For a brief period, the Thai Government closed the border completely and restricted border traffic, but its enforcement of the embargoes was erratic at best. Thai Government also refused to allow UNTAC to establish checkpoints on Thai territory. Khmer Rouge started exploiting the long history of Vietnamese-Cambodian enmity and began attacking Vietnamese civilians as part of an anti-Vietnamese campaign apparently designed to win popular Cambodian support. FUNCINPEC and KPNLF leaders - Prince Ranariddh and Son Sann, also engaged in verbal attacks. Prince Sihanouk, in January 1993, announced that he was ending his support or co-operation with UNTAC and resigning from the SNC because of spreading violence. Sihanouk continued to criticize UNTAC, saying that "in order to be able to tell the UN and the world that they have succeeded in their mission, UNTAC is going to have an election despite the fact that none of the conditions for the election have been met. None. It is a hideous comedy".¹² Civpol

12. International Herald Tribune, 2-3 January 1993, p. 2.

started involving in corrupt activities. Law and order deteriorated steadily in early 1993 as local bandits and criminals began taking advantage of the hiatus in state power caused by UNTAC's presence. A confidential UNTAC report of 18 January 1993 obtained by the Far Eastern Economic Review noted "a very serious erosion of public confidence in UNTAC and the peace process in general". It stated that Khmer Rouge return is seen as a serious threat, especially after UNTAC departs and people believes that the state of Cambodia/Cambodian People's Party have undertaken a full-fledged campaign of violent repression, thereby making it impossible for other registered political parties to conduct legitimate political activities. Cambodian referred to UNTAC soldiers as 'mercenaries' who came here only to collect their salaries. Over 100 people were killed in anti-Vietnamese incidents throughout Cambodia during March. Sihanouk declared that the only reasonable alternative left for Vietnamese is to leave Cambodia straight away and go and line in Vietnam. During March and April the Khmer Rouge also stepped up its attacks, abductions and murders of UN peacekeepers and others.

UNTAC implemented several new security measures, including a ban on the possession and carrying of firearms and explosives by unauthorized persons and the guarding of party offices and officials by UNTAC Civpols. The number of violent incidents fell markedly by the end of April.

The 1993 Election

On 7 April 1993 election campaign began officially. The election campaign was marked by numerous violent incidents, murders, intimidation and undemocratic practices. These mostly took place out of sight or in remote areas beyond UNTAC's reach. Such occurrences, which clearly jeopardized the prospects of the election being free and fair, were mostly perpetrated by SOC government personnel against FUNCINPEC and to a lesser extent against the Buddhist liberal democratic party (BLDP). 1500 political meetings and rallies, involving 1 million people, took place without a single incident and nearly 20 registered political

parties established 2037 offices throughout Cambodia.¹³

Radio UNTAC had become most popular. Japan dispatched its peacekeepers to Cambodia for the first time since World War II on 8 April. After the killing of Japanese district electoral supervision and his Khmer interpreter, Japanese Defence Minister threatened to withdraw all Japanese personnel from Cambodia if any more were harmed. On 10 April Akashi solemnly warned:

No party has the right to stop these elections. The Cambodian people have made it clear that they want election, and UNTAC is going to give them one. That election will begin on 23 May, and all the preparations for it are going forward as I speak. There is no question of cancellation or postponement... (the Khmer Rouge) and its leaders will be responsible for all the attacks it has carried out against UNTAC so far, as well as any further attempts it makes to disrupt... by killing or injuring UNTAC personnel. Let us be clear what this means; nothing less than international or internal isolation. The world will not forgive the Party of Democratic Kampuchea for disrupting the Cambodian elections. There should be no more sanctuaries for the party and no more

13. N. Thayer and N. Chanda, "Cambodia : Shattered Peace", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1993, p. 11.

chances.¹³⁴⁾

Australian foreign minister Evans declared that even Canberra would also withdraw troops if there were continuing attacks on UN peacekeepers or on the parties to the peace accord. So western countries, expressed doubts about the validity of the election process given the security situation because of the fear of Khmer Rouge attacks mounted panic. All these incidents caused division within UNTAC because they lacked to protect the UN personnel. All United Nations volunteers in central Cambodia and western Cambodia were withdrawn from the countryside and counselled in Phnom Penh while an inter-component security plan was devised involving armed escorts and ready reaction forces.¹³⁵⁾ Most of the UN volunteers did not turn back to their posts.

On 23 April, all the signatory states to the Paris Accords, including China, issued a declaration of support

¹³⁴⁾ UNTAC XII, information/education Division, Brief No. 31, 20 May 1993, p. 2.

¹³⁵⁾ UN, The United Nations in Cambodia : A Note for Peace, p. 10, note 6.

for the election and for UNTAC. On 6 May, China, France and Japan held a meeting of Supreme National Council (SNC) without the participation of Khmer Rouge. The three Cambodian parties represented agreed to proceed with the election despite pressures with both FUNCINPEC and the BLDP to withdraw.

Another threat of withdraw came from Japanese Prime Minister, Kiichi Mayazawa, when a Japanese policemen was killed and several wounded by Khmer Rouge. Chinese, Polish and Pakistani peacekeepers also came under attack. China requested a meeting of the Security Council, which called on the parties to refrain from violence during the elections.¹⁴ UN headquarters in New York ordered families of UNTAC's International Staff to leave the country until after the election - a move which did nothing to boost the morale in Cambodia.¹⁵ According to UNTAC report which was issued on the eve of the election, since 1 March there had

14. UN, Fourth Progress report of the Secretary-General, 3 May 1993, p. 8.

15. UN, Security Council Resolution 826, UN Document S/RES/826, 20 May 1993.

been 200 deaths, 338 injuries and 144 abductions as a result of pre-election violence.

In the event, the voting period 23-28 May was the greatest victory of the entire Cambodian operation. Despite the threat from Khmer Rouge, Cambodians turned out in their million to cast their votes freely. An estimated 89.5 per cent of the 4.6 million enrolled voters cast their vote. Invalid votes were less than 4 per cent of the total number cast. UNTAC personnel, journalists and others were surprised by this display of civic commitment, determination, bravery, consciousness. Cambodian polling took place in remarkably free and fair atmosphere. Forty six per cent of registered voters (2.2 m) voted on the first day. The entire period of polling was one of the quietest and least violent in Cambodia for years.¹⁶ In spite of few incidents the polling was efficient and well organized. Measures to prevent multiple voting included the UN identity card and the use of a chemical marker on the voter's person visible only under

16. The Independent, 21 May 1993, p. 13. This was reportedly done without much consultation on an article in the New York Times predicting violence during the polling period.

ultra violent light and impossible to remove for a week. Nearly 1,400 fixed polling stations operated, 200 mobile ones in remote areas.¹⁷ Fixed polling was concentrated in the first three days and mobile polling took place over all six days. Akashi records that UNTAC's Electoral Component 'stubbornly protectionists' to the end, resisted the reduction in the number of polling stations from 1900 to 1400. Mobile polling stations consisted of UN trucks which served as polling booths. In some cases they were protected by a cordon of UNTAC military and weaponry. In Paris, New York and Sydney, polling stations were also located to allow overseas Cambodians to vote.

17. Bangkok Post, 27 May 1993, p. 7.

May 1993 Election Results

Party	Number of seats	Percentage of valid votes cast
1 FUNCINPEC	58	45.47
2 Cambodians People's Party (CPP)	51	38.23
3 Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP)	10	3.81
4 Molinaka Party	1	1.37
5 Other Parties	-	11.37

Khmer Rouge's soldiers had also come to cast their votes in the final day of polling. As Khmer Rouge had announced that they would recognize the Government if the 'Sihanouk Party' comes to power, and Sihanouk had promised that the Khmer Rouge could have a role in any coalition government formed under his leadership.¹⁸ The UN confirmed that the Khmer Rouge had sent hundreds of officials and

¹⁸. UN, United Nations Focus : Cambodia, p. 12.

civilians living in western and north western guerrilla zones to the nearest polls with instructions to vote for FUNCINPEC.¹⁹ Counting was allowed to proceed the same day. It was done only by the international personnel and on a provincial basis in order to avoid the identification of voting patterns in particular areas or villages. The election results in terms of numbers of seats in the 120-seat constituent assembly and percentages of valid votes cast are shown in the above given table. Voters were cast for parties. On 29 May Yasushi declared 'free and fair' and counting proceeds.

On 14 June Prince Sihanouk was reinstated as head of state by Constituent Assembly at its inaugural session, and on 15 June UN Security Council endorsed the election results, the Khmer Rouge later announced that it also accepted the results.²⁰ Sixty senior officers of the state of Cambodia security services, led by the Minister of

¹⁹. Phom Petnh Post, 6-12 June 1993, p. 3.

²⁰. UN, report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 840(1993), UN document S/26090, 16 July 1993, p. 2.

Defence, pledged their support for Sihanouk's efforts to construct an interim administration, and the commanders of the CPP, FUNCINPEC and BLDP forces reached agreement within UNTAC's Mixed Military Working Group on the formation of a united Cambodian Armed Forces. However Hun Sen (CPP) refused to accept the result of the elections owing to alleged irregularities.

Although Khmer Rouge declared that it accepted the election results, and supported the formation of coalition government, it continued to pursue its armed struggle as a warning that it should not be excluded from the new government. Sihanouk tried to involve the Khmer Rouge in the process of national reconciliation, inviting Khieu Samphan for reaction from US administration to Sihanouk's suggestion of a Khmer Rouge role in the new government. CPP did not object to 'advisory role' of Khmer Rouge. Ranariddh reported that he had invited the Khmer Rouge to include its armed forces in the new, unified, national army. The Khmer Rouge subsequently accepted this invitation.

On 1 July 1993, the constituent assembly unanimously approved the interim government and elected Son

Sann (BLDP) as its chairman, with Chee Sim (CPP) as first and Ing Kieth (FUNCINPEC) as second vice-chairman. Later in July, Sihanouk abandoned plans for talks aimed at allowing the Khmer Rouge to join the interim government, owing to a US threat to suspend economic aid if this were to take prior to the Khmer Rouge renouncing violence, disarming and allowing international access to areas under its control.

The efficiency and capability of UNTAC's electoral component and the effectiveness of the UN volunteers were major factors for the smooth functioning of the electoral process. The presence of International Polling Station officers contributed to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the election. UNTAC military and civilian police played the major role in protecting polling stations, voters and in transporting and guarding ballot boxes. Prince Sihanouk's arrival home in Phnom Penh from Beijing the day before the election began and his call for a peaceful atmosphere seems also to have calmed tensions and contributed to the large turn out. The solid support for the electoral process by the international community was another factor for success and the courage, dedication and enthusiasm of the Cambodian

people, many of whom risked their lives or livelihoods to assist the registration process, participate in the campaign, work at polling booths and cast their ballots.²¹

In the context of election, Boutros-Ghali had said:

Given Cambodia's recent tragic history, it would probably be neither realistic nor fair to hold it to prevailing standards in stable democratic countries. Conditions for an election in Cambodia have never been perfect and may not be so for a long time, any more than they are in many other countries. That is no reason to hold back an election which, after all, is not the end of the process of Cambodia's renewal but the beginning.²²

UNTAC's Deficiencies

Although the organization of the elections was itself a success and subsequently the elections were declared free and fair by the special representatives, they were not representatives. They only legitimized old parties

21. Over 50,000 Cambodians were employed during the voting period to assist in the election. See UN, The United Nations in Cambodia : A Note for Peace, p. 74.

22. UN, Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General, 3 May 1993, p. 29.

which, before, had been prepared to seize and hold power by the use of force. Even though UNTAC supported the formation of new parties in the transitional period, the time available was much too short for the strengthening of parties and institutions that had not been involved in the armed conflict and wished to take part in the elections and wished to take part in the elections. Therefore, the general public had little or no influence on the process of democratization, and no structures had been created to promote this democratization process.

As Boutros Boutros Ghali already suggested in his Agenda for Peace,²³ future peacekeeping missions similar to the scope of UNTAC should be accompanied by a post-election peace building process. While peacekeeping aims to create the conditions needed for the achievement of peace, through,

23. In his agenda for peace, Boutros-Ghali described the concept of "Post-conflict peace-building", which he defined as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen the solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict." An Agenda for Peace (1992), pp. 6 and 16-17. He argued that to prevent future conflict, the international community should create a new political, economic and social environment for states devastated by war, through the strengthening of Government institutions and demilitarization.

for example, the holding of elections, peace-building entails much more. It makes, for example, people realize that the use of armed force is only allowed on the basis of democratic decision-making.

In case of Cambodia, although UN programmes under the coordination of UNDP have continued after the elections, it would have been of advantage if UNTAC have stayed longer, since the situation after the elections has remained tense and national reconciliation has occurred slowly. UN officials, for example, could have remained in the Government administration to work with governmental officials and to make sure that, for example, a judicial system is established in Cambodia to law and order is strictly observed and that human rights violations are persecuted. However, any decisions would have, of course, only been made by the government and would have based on consent by all parties involved.

UNTAC's Deficiencies

Agreement among the factions were only reached because of outside pressure and not because of outside

pressure and not because of genuine reconciliation. The Cambodian objection against the UN's biggest peacekeeping/peace making/peace building operation to date, was also most utopian. Its intention was to help long-standing warring operants achieve a cease-fire, canton and disarm their forces, and involve themselves in a democratic process never before experienced in the country, with the aim of establishing a united, stable, pluralistic state based on constitutional law.

There was a lack of advance planning, although there would have been sufficient time to prepare for the mission from the 1989 Paris Conference onwards. Although several fact-finding missions had been sent to Cambodia between 1989 and 1991 hardly anybody involved in the missions had later any role in UNTAC. Only little background material from these previous fact-finding mission was available, and planning of most component had to be carried out with minimum guidance. Although UNTAC managed to recruit some experts on Cambodia to fill senior posts, most UNTAC personnel knew little about Cambodian history, culture or politics. Large sections of the population had

been killed, and many others had fled. Recruitment of skilled local people and experts on Cambodia therefore turned out to be a difficult task within the limited time given.

The Paris Agreement was signed on 23 October, however, UNTAC was only created on his duties two months after the signing of the Peace Agreement and the special representative even three months after. It took five months to start the deployment of the UNTAC military of UNTAC military forces, which became only fully operational nine months after the signing of the Agreement. These delays were disruptive and gave the Cambodian factions the time to change their minds and violate the agreement.

Future missions should therefore be deployed immediately after signing of the settlement agreement. In order to make this possible and not risk any delay caused by the Security Council's indecision over the mission's budget, financial procedures for peacekeeping missions should be changed including delegation of financial authority from New York to field missions in order to allow more flexibility and adapt to changing situations on the ground.

This would prevent that because of complicated financial and procurement procedures, civilian and military personnel arrive before the equipment, as was the case in Cambodia and therefore cannot function properly from the very start. The UNTAC, it took months until computers, telephones and fax machines had been installed in the main offices, especially in the district offices.

In future missions, it would be of advantage to involve future senior officers of UN operations already in the negotiation and planning processes. The local parties involved in the peace process should be also consulted with regard to the appointment of the special Representative and Force commander. Moreover, during the mission, it should be avoided that the top senior officials rotate every six months, causing a serious disruption of work.

Conclusion

Without doubt, the first democratic elections in Cambodia were not only an important step for a new kind of politics, which included the participation of the people, but also represented an important basis for the

consolidation of peace and national reconciliation. However, the elections should have been the beginning rather than the end of the transitional process in Cambodia.

In my opinion, the building of a democratic society requires much more than the successful organization of elections since elections may only legitimize parties that, in the past, maintained themselves in power by the use of force instead of leading of the democratization of a country. Peacekeeping therefore should be accompanied by peace building. Planning of any future United Nations peace missions should therefore include peace -building as a vital part. However, attention should be paid to the fact that peacekeeping and peace-building require different time frameworks and therefore also different budgets. Peace through socio-economic and political development would, for example, be impossible to achieve within eighteen months, which was the duration of UNTAC's peacekeeping mandate. Enough time and funds should therefore be allocated for any future peacekeeping mission and its subsequent peace-building process. Although, it would be expansive, it might be still cheaper than refugees aid and humanitarian

assistance. However, if a post-electoral peace-building programme should not show serious programme, after, for example, two to three years, then the government and the international community should reassess the question of political viability, through the security the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Without peace-building there can be socio-economic and political development. Creation of peace through development and peace-building should be given at least the same, if not more, importance, as the maintenance of peace through peacekeeping.

CHAPTER III

PARTY POLITICS IN CAMBODIA

Democracy is that institutional arrangement which ensures free participation of the people in the process of controlling ultimate power. In a democracy the people control the government. But this does not imply rule by all the people or by the majority. By counting the heads of the adherents we cannot discover the essence of democracy. The rule by all the people is a political because unanimous decision is impossible. Nor is majority rule the essence of democracy.¹ "Democracy", as MacIver observes, "is not a way of governing, whether by majority or otherwise, but primarily a way of determining, who shall govern and, broadly to what ends".²

1. Bryce defined democracy as a government by the majority of the qualified citizens. See Modern Democracies, vol. 1, p. 36.

2. The Web of Government, p. 198.

Hence, democracy is traditionally associated with co-existence of ideas, with the right to differ and with the resolution of ideological differences not by bullet but by ballot. Parties are the vehicle of ideas. Plurality of ideas, to which democracy is by its nature hospitable, involves plurality of parties. Parties are the instruments through which ideas arising in the arch of society pour into the area of the state. Thus parties act as the bridge between social thought and political decision in democracy. The necessary conditions on which the democratic methods of government depend are: (i) co-existence of ideas and of parties, (ii) the right to free discussion, (iii) universal adult suffrage, and (iv) periodical elections. "A democratic society is a society of free, equal, active and intelligent citizens, each man choosing his own way of life for himself and willing that others should choose theirs".³

3. Amal Ray, Mohit Bhattacharya, Political Theory (Calcutta, 1994), p. 437.

Democratic ideals may thus be supposed to be a composite of individualism, socialism, nationalism and pluralism. For, democracy is antithetical to dogmatism.

Conditions Essential for Successful Working of Democracy

- (1) People should possess a spirit of tolerance and co-operation.
- (2) People should be educated so that they can fully understand and appreciate the national and international problems.
- (3) There must be gross economic inequality in the society. Presence of extremes of wealth and poverty in the society hampers the proper working of democracy.
- (4) Democracy upholds the dignity of the human personality, and gives various kinds of rights to the individual.
- (5) It is built on the foundation of liberty and equality.
- (6) In actual practice, democracy means rule by the majority with full safeguards for the rights of

minorities.

- (7) The presence of an independent press which provides accurate and unbiased information to the people regarding the various domestic and international issues.
- (8) Successful working of democracy presupposes the existence of peaceful conditions.
- (9) The existence of healthy and well organized political parties is also vital for the successful working of democracy. These political parties should be organised on political and economic basis rather than religious or communal basis. Certain conditions are necessary for the formation of political parties: Democracy, keen interest in politics, common political objectives and aims, individuals should have national interests at heart, common agreement to play the game of politics decently, ultimate aim of capturing power.

There are 3 types of political parties:

1. **Mono party system:** There is only one candidate in whose favour all the citizens have to vote. The ruling party rules on the basis of dictatorship, e.g.

communist countries: Russia, China, Spain, East Germany etc.

2. **Bi-Party System:** In countries where there are only bi- or two parties, one of them forms the government, and the other in the form of opposition party, checks the government from following the path of dictatorship. England, Canada and USA are the examples.
3. **Multiple Party System:** Where there are many political parties, it is called multiple party system. France and India are the example of multiple party system.

Cambodia is also a multi-party system. The political parties in Cambodia are - umbrella organization of the three including FUNCINPEC led by the Prince Ranariddh, KPNLF led by Sonn Sann, and Cambodian People's Party, led by Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge remains outside the government and has been offering opposition. All these political parties have got different political ideologies, structures and functioning and their mobilization strategies in pre and post election period of May 1993 have been different.

The Royalist FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and co-operative Cambodia)

party was founded by Sihanouk, is now headed by Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, follows the path of national reconciliation and peace laid down by Sihanouk, a central figure in Cambodia. It believes in liberal democracy and reconciliation with Khmer Rouge and establishing peace in Cambodia was the prime objective of FUNCINPEC party.⁴ By national reconciliation, Sihanouk and FUNCINPEC meant inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia's future political leadership. Liberal Democracy is a system of power by which people can be governed, by which power is exerted by the state over individuals and groups and by which a certain set a relations are enforced between individuals through their right of property. These relations themselves are relations of powers as they give different people in different capacities power over others. History shows that liberal democracy and capitalism go together.

FUNCINPEC, although it had won largest number of parliamentary seats in 1993 election, seemed unable to

4. "Voice of the People", Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 June 1993, p. 10.

retain sufficient internal unity and sense of purpose to capitalize on its victory.⁵ Most of the compromises within the coalition seemed to be made by Ranariddh. Julio Jeldres remarked that the party had -

operated since its inception more a royal court than a political party, a trait that heretofore has worked its advantage in Cambodian society, which retains an enduringly feudal character that not even the horrendous political experiments of the past 20 years have been able to eradicate. The courtier's style, however, is not likely to be much help in a power struggle against the hard-bitten cadres of CPP.⁶

There were also structural barriers to FUNCINPEC translating its electoral and international support into political power.⁷ There had been a formal 50/50 division of

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5. M. Vickey, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, "The Cambodian People's Party", South East Asian Affairs (Singapore), 1994, pp. 111-14.
 6. J. Jeldres, "The UN and the Cambodian Transition", Journal of Democracy, vol. 4, no. 4, October 1993, p. 113.
 7. J. Brown, "FUNCINPEC's evaporating Mandate", Phnom Penh Post, 25 March-7 April 1994, p. 6.

provincial governorships between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) in December 1993.⁸ Each governor provided by the one party was given two deputies of the other, with the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) providing third deputy governorships in two provinces. However, without an established political base in these provinces, and with corruption and nepotism/rife, FUNCINPEC appointees faced difficulties in asserting their authority.

The 1993 election showed that there were narrow margin in the percentage of votes that the FUNCINPEC and CPP received. FUNCINPEC obtained 45.47 per cent of the votes cast. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) received 38.23 per cent. The Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), led by Son Sann, emerged as the country's third party.⁹ For an interim period between June and September FUNCINPEC and CPP jointly held power while a constitution was produced. This arrangement was confirmed with the approval of Sihanouk and the Constituent Assembly. Cambodia became a constitutional

8. Phnom Penh Post, 31 December 1993- 13 January 1994, p. 3.

9. "Indochina : Vietnam Laos and Cambodia", The Economist Intelligence Unity(London), 1994, p. 93.

monarchy in September 1993. However, there are doubts about the stability of the government in view of the frictions between FUNCINPEC and CPP and divisions within FUNCINPEC itself - particularly over economic policy - and because of uncertainty because of Sihanouk's health. The alienation of the Khmer Rouge from the political process, and continuing fighting, is another source of instability. Cambodian People's Party lost the UN-sponsored elections to FUNCINPEC. In 1994 Hun Sen, leader of CPP flatly turned down a proposal by Sihanouk for the formation of a national unity government under the king's control, the first time since United Nations sponsored elections in 1993 that a member of the ruling party coalition has opposed the sovereign wishes. The move laid bare deep divisions between the government and exposed rifts within the other main coalition partners, the royalist FUNCINPEC party, that could result in the departure of a number of top party officials and government ministers. The CPP rejection of the king's offer left FUNCINPEC, and its leader Norodom Ranariddh, with the difficult choice of either choosing to break openly with their government partners or opposing the king, on whose name and reputation

the party was founded and elected.

The CPP had also accused FUNCINPEC members of being bandits and collaborators of the feared Khmer Rouge in the past. Yet the CPP itself was criticized to have used violence in an attempt to influence the election result. UNTAC's human-rights special representative Danis McNamara said his team's investigations showed that the CPP were responsible for at least 15 politically motivated killings since 1 March and possibly many more.¹⁰

Bringing Sihanouk back to power was exactly what many Cambodians thought they were doing when they voted the royalist FUNCINPEC party to victory in the United Nations - sponsored elections of May 1993. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Sihanouk's son, became first prime minister. The new National Assembly changed the country's name to the kingdom of Cambodia and elevated Sihanouk from prince to Constitutional monarch. But the reality was different. The formally Communist CPP, which had ruled the country for 13

10. "Voice of the People", Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 June 1993, p. 10.

years, emerged as a dominant half of the ruling coalition.

Since then, amid frustration over the government's inability to defeat the Khmer Rouge insurgency and bring prosperity to the country, a movement had emerged that wanted to see the king take the helm. Its members included students and parliamentary deputies, many of them disaffected FUNCINPEC supporters. That is exactly what CPP leaders fear the most. Their best weapon was the constitution, which clearly stated that the King "shall reign but not rule". It also makes the monarch's office elective, rather than hereditary, leaving the choice of a successor wide open to political interference.¹¹

The Royal Council to the Throne, which was changed with naming an heir within seven days of a king's death, was a jumble of rival factions. It was composed of the two prime ministers, Ranariddh and Hun Sen, the National Assembly President, CPP chairman Chea Sim; the Supreme monks of two Buddhist orders, and the two National Assembly vice presidents. As Sihanouk's battle with cancer and other

¹¹ "End of the Line", Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 March 1995, p. 21.

afflictions stretches on, so does the list of pretenders manoeuvring to succeed him. About half-a-dozen princes are considered serious candidates. The problem, royal watchers say, is that none of the candidate is acceptable to all the political factions. The deep mistrust between FUNCINPEC and CPP continued to divide the two parties, and the CPP had successfully manoeuvred to retain real control over the military, state administration, provincial structures and security services. Senior FUNCINPEC officials, long frustrated by their party's inability to capitalize on its election victory, refused to continue to support their nominal coalition partners and some had broken with their party leaders like Ranariddh. The move by Hun Sen and his CPP threatens a breakup of FUNCINPEC and a reorganization of the government leadership.

A comparison and despite its electoral success, the FUNCINPEC party remained weak lacking a nation-wide organization or a disciplined mass of followers or access to significant state patronage, the basis for modern royal largesse and paternalism. Within the party there were serious differences of opinion over how best to resolve

Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) problem alongside the urgent problem of hunger, unemployment, social inequality and rising racial tensions. Although the King, gravely ill in Beijing, indicated that he would not sign the measure (which was signed into law by Chea Sim as acting head of State), it was zealously supported by Prince Ranariddh who appeared by this gesture to be assuring both factions of the CPP that he would not challenge their vision of reconciliation and their system of power and control as others in FUNCINPEC were determined to do.

The pragmatic alliance of convenience between Ranariddh and Hun Sen was strengthened in July in the aftermath of an alleged coup staged by Prince Chakkrapong, who is among Ranariddh's rivals for power, and Gen. Sin Song, and allegedly involving Sar Kheng, who was momentarily identified as part of the conspiracy. The alleged coup was 'aborted' by Hun Sen, who, by using generals and forces loyal to Ranariddh, succeeded in discrediting and exiling Prince Chakkrapong, who protested his innocence. Hun Sen imposed controls on the press and succeeded in embarrassing, though not eliminating, Sar Kheng.

KPNLF (the Khmer People's National Liberation Front) was founded by the ex-prime minister, Son Sann (now leader of the BLDP). An anti-communist republican movement, the KPNLF embraced many important personalities from the Khmer Republic Regime and the old Democratic Party.

Another political party which is very important, and outside the government, is Khmer Rouge. This party was in power during 1975-1978, and was largely responsible for Cambodian genocide and imbroglio from mid 1970s onwards. Khmer Rouge believed in revolutionary socialism and tried to emulate Chinese model of communism for Cambodia. It also tried to reserve Cambodia for ethnic Khmers and pursued anti-Vietnam policies. It wanted to bring complete equality in the society and therefore it had abolished the currency system, land ownership arrangements and exhorted urban people to settle in rural areas and vice-versa. However, the most suicidal step was to throw out ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia and pursue militant and hostile relations with Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

After it was overthrown from power in January 1979, it went into exile to offer resistance against pro-

Vietnamese regime in Cambodia. That posture has not changed even at present though the regional and international environment is completely transformed. Its present political agenda and conditions to join in the government is based on factors opposed to Vietnam. It is critical of CPP and is willing to see them isolated from Cambodian power politics. According to Khmer Rouge leaders CPP is closely associated with Vietnam and Hun Sen is acting as the surrogate. Thus if CPP is in power, Khmer Rouge would oppose it.

Cambodia is poised to open a new chapter in its long history. It is a fragile, barely viable nation embroiled in the multiple agonies that have engulfed it over the past quarter century: the ferocious bombing by the US Air force in 1973, the infamous killing fields of the Khmer Rouge regime and the vicious 13-year civil war that followed the eviction of Pol Pot from the capital by the Vietnamese Army in January 1979. Yet within the bosom of every Cambodian resides both the glory of their ancient civilization, and the pain of centuries of humiliation by larger neighbours. The god kings of Angkor pursued a

foreign policy that extended Khmer suzerainty over what is today Southern Vietnam and eastern Thailand. But since its zenith in the 13th century, Cambodia has been mercilessly squeezed by its former vassals.

Recovering lost territory is a popular theme in Cambodia. It is exploited to the full by the Khmer Rouge. Such irredentism is occasionally mouthed even by supporters of the CPP.¹² Cambodia has lost the Mekong delta permanently to the Vietnamese, though a Khmer minority survives there. Mr Son Sann, leader of the weakest of the four factions that attended the Paris peace accords, demanded that "stolen provinces" be returned.¹³ It was no doubt only a vote-getting strategy for his group, contesting the election as the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party. In Bangkok and Hanoi the reaction was predictable: just let them try. Though there may be historical justice in

12. "Welcome Back", Asia Week, vol. 19, December-June 1992-93, p. 22.

13. Ibid.

adjusting borders to incorporate Khmer speaking territory into Cambodia, neither neighbour would concede so much as a silver. It would be a tragedy if Phnom Penh became obsessed with trying to vindicate past wrongs just when it must consolidate recent gains and concentrate on a strategy for the future.¹⁴

To summarize party politics in Cambodia, it can be clearly stated that it is vibrant and dynamic. Democracy has come to Cambodia after decades and the institutions of democracy are at the evolutionary stage. Though there is some challenge from the Khmer Rouge but it is also likely to see reason in due course. There has been increasing defections in the Khmer Rouge cadres. Pol Pot is no more and people are tired of war. So these developments will surely influence Khmer Rouge to participate in power politics and join the electoral politics.

14. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHALLENGES THROUGH KHMER ROUGE

On 17 April 1975, Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, fell to the communist Khmer Rouge. It was in power till December 1978. Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot tried a brutal, uncompromising revolution in Cambodia, isolating the country from the outside world. Between April 1975 and the beginning of 1979, over a million Cambodians, or one in seven, died from malnutrition, over work or untreated illness. The deaths in Cambodia between 1975 and the beginning of 1979, when a Vietnamese invasion drove out the Khmer Rouge from power, were apocalyptic in scope.¹⁰ Before 1975, Cambodia enjoyed relative peace. Although life was

10 Estimates of the number of regime-related death in the Democratic Kampuchean period vary widely and no exact figures will ever become available. For a cautious estimate, see Micheal Vickery, "How Many Died in Pol Pot's Kampuchea", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 22, 1988.

difficult in the extreme, but that after mid-1976 conditions nearly everywhere deteriorated sharply. By then, the Khmer Rouge had embarked on an ambitious economic policy, a Great Leap Forward that had disastrous effects. By the end of 1976, the regime was also drifting into a suicidal war against Vietnam.

In 1979 the Vietnamese had installed a government composed of former Khmer Rouge, who had defected to Vietnam in 1977-78 and some Cambodian communists who had been held hostage in Vietnam since the 1950s. Vietnamese military units fanned out into the countryside, but were unable to cut off the Khmer Rouge troops retreating raggedly into Thailand. As Cambodia struggled to its feet, the Vietnamese encouraged pre-revolutionary institutions to re-emerge - including schools, markets, Buddhism, towns and money. A more benign communist party now administered the country, guided by Vietnamese cadres and by technical experts from the Soviet bloc. By the late 1980s, agriculture production had reached the level achieved in the late 1960s, but the country's infrastructure was in worse condition, and there were now more mouths to feed. Although millions of Khmer

resumed something like the lives they had been living before the 1970s, they had little voice in the government and the Vietnamese did little to introduce democratic reforms.² Among most Cambodians, anti-Vietnamese feelings were muted but widespread. Many Cambodians fled to Thailand in 1979-82, filling up refugee camps administered by the United Nations. The Thais were fearful of Vietnamese intentions and Thai military supported Khmer Rouge troops and enclaves as a buffer on their eastern border. In doing so they received clandestine support from China and United States, both spurred on by their hostility towards Vietnam. Support from Thailand was more overt. By the early 1980s over twenty thousand Khmer Rouge soldiers had been refitted and rearmed in Thailand, and had begun to engage Vietnamese forces in Cambodia in guerrilla actions, retreating to safety when pursued.

Following the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978, and military occupation in January 1979, the monarchists and republicans were left with no other choice

2 David Chandler, "Epitaph for the Khmer Rouge", New Left Review, nos. 203-208, 1994, p. 98.

than to join the Khmer Rouge in an uneasy coalition in June 1982.³ The coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, recognized by the United Nations, was united only by the determination of its individual members to fight the Vietnamese occupiers and their offspring, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

The non-communist Republic of Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF, the republican faction), repulsed efforts to bring them into the coalition with the Khmer Rouge until the final hours of negotiations. The coalition never functioned as a united entity. The US International Security and Development Co-operation Act of 1985, which authorized up to US \$ 20 million in non-lethal aid to the non-communists from fiscal year 1986 through 1990 under the Solarz programme funds "with the effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge or any of its

³ Washington Post, 17 November 1991.

members to conduct military or paramilitary operations".⁴
On 10 April 1991, the United States announced the suspension of at least US \$7 million in aid to the Cambodian non-communist because of their battlefield co-ordination with the Khmer Rouge.⁵ In the field, the non communists claimed that they had actually stopped receiving US funds in February 1991.

The UN recognized the new coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGOK) in the autumn of 1982, permitting it to occupy Cambodia's seat in the General Assembly, when the internationally condemned Khmer Rouge were resuscitated. The Khmer Rouge had been roundly defeated by 1980-81, but were revised by CGDK. The United States is a co-author of the UN peace plan incorporating Khmer Rouge representatives in the transitional planning for

4 United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, Statement of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the UN on Cambodia and framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, A/45/472 and S/2 1689, 31 August 1990.

5 Hearing of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on "Fiscal Year '92 Cambodia Aid Request", 10 April 1991.

Cambodia's future prior to general elections. The end of the cold war turned the tables on the Khmer Rouge, and on other major actors. In 1989, Vietnam withdrew the last of its troops from Cambodia following the collapse of Soviet economic assistance, which had bankrolled the protectorate. Vietnamese advisors departed at the same time. The stage was set for negotiations between the Phnom Penh regime, no longer seen as foreign creation, it had been, and the coalition government in exile which remained exactly that. China unexpectedly withdrew the military support from the Khmer Rouge and agreed to cooperate with the negotiations. The Khmer Rouge, in turn, who had always stonewalled negotiations, participated in the conference held in Paris in October 1991, hoping somehow to return to power.

The Khmer Rouge, which had only agreed to the Paris Agreements under massive pressure from China, accused the UNTAC of violating against the spirit and content of the peace agreements. Instead of dissolving the administrative and power structures of the Government in Phnom Penh, the UNTAC was afraid of tackling these structures. This meant that the UNTAC was increasingly becoming the financial

sponsor of the government in Phnom Penh, which was even able to extend and consolidate its apparatus of power and control with the help of UN money. The situation worsened dramatically after summer 1992 when the disarmament of the civil war parties was scheduled to begin on 13 June 1992, the Khmer Rouge refused to surrender their weapons and fired on UN workers and units. Head of the UNTAC mission Akashi and his assigned military leaders, General Senderson from Australia, tried to resolve the problems through negotiations, but they were not even allowed to enter Khmer Rouge territory. The Khmer Rouge had thus exposed the weakest point of the UN mission. The Paris Agreement was based on the promise by all parties to the conflict that they would cooperate. The refusal by the Khmer Rouge to play its part reverted the UNTAC powerless. The 16,000 UN troops stationed in Cambodia had no mandate, if need be, implement the Paris Agreement by force. The UNTAC, therefore, had to give in to violence and withdraw its workers from Khmer Rouge territory. The obvious helplessness of the soldiers and police on this UN mission induced the Khmer Rouge and then the CPP and CPP (Communist

Party of Kampuchea) backed government to flout the peace agreements more and more openly and, at the same time, to justify their own violations of the agreements with infringements by the respectively other side. The government in Phnom Penh, for example, which had initially agreed to the disarmament of 4000 of its soldiers, declared that, in view of the refusal of the Khmer Rouge, it would not agree to any further disarmament and demobilization of its troops. The latter, the Government claimed, was the only force which prevented a further penetration by the Khmer Rouge. Any attempt to limit its power apparatus would be tantamount to supporting the Khmer Rouge. The CPP also turned to brutal suppression against other parties, especially the Royalists and Republications and did not even refrain from also murdering political opponents.

In fact, the Paris Agreement cheated the Khmer Rouge. In 1992, Cambodia came under a UN trusteeship which undermined the Phnom Penh regime's unchallenged hold on politics while marginalizing the Khmer Rouge. The UN allowed political parties to campaign openly in Cambodia for the first time in the country's history. In the run-up to

the elections, the Khmer Rouge massacred over a hundred civilians, nearly all of them unarmed Vietnamese residents whom they accused of being 'secret agents'. They also threatened to disrupt the voting and ordered people not to vote. Khmer Rouge by not participating in the elections the Pol Polish indirectly accepted the people's verdict against their abominable genocide record. But the irony of Cambodia's was ravaged history in that the Khmer Rouge still remains a force to reckon with. It controlled nearly about 15 per cent of the country's territory. It has its own havoc with the UNTAC personnel during the elections. The Khmer Rouge also opposed Sihanouk's idea of national coalition which did not make any space for radical rebel group. On the other hand it warned that it would step up attacks if power is not handed over to the party of prince Ranariddh.

The major challenge to peace is being posed by the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge's refusal to disarm its fighters or permit the UN peace keeping force in the areas controlled by it, had hampered the UN efforts. The UNTAC had to disarm, demobilize and control the Cambodian factions

till the elections were held. While the three factions - The Cambodian Government, the KPNLF and the FUNCINPEC - had allowed the UNTAC the freedom of movement in the areas controlled by them. The Khmer Rouge had refused the same to the peace keeping force on the ground that Vietnam is still keeping thousands of its troops in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge had made it clear that until all the foreign troops are withdrawn from Cambodia, fighting would continue and the other terms of peace accord would also not be implemented. It was quite clear that the prospects of a UN monitored elections in 1993 had excited the Khmer Rouge. It wanted to delay the peace plan so that before elections it is able to strengthen its foothold in Cambodia. Following the Paris peace agreement in October 1991, which supported the voluntary repatriation of civilian zones of their choice in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge began to force all the refugees in their three "open" camps of O'Trao (18,000), site 8 (43,000), and site K (14,000) into areas under control.⁶ They refused to allow the UNHCR to register any of the

⁶ Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia : 1991 Yearbook, January 1991, p. 92.

refugees or allow them to move freely into Cambodia. For a number of reasons, the Khmer Rouge managed to retain the peasant base that is essential to it. An agrarian society is still the basis of Khmer Rouge political-economic ideology.

An insurgent guerrilla force in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Khmer Rouge may have received their arms from the Vietnam and the Chinese, but they fought and won a civil war on their own with considerable popular support, especially from the peasantry. It gave land to peasants, purchased rice from farmers at above-market rates, and helped the farmers in their daily lives. The NADK is a peasant army that was indoctrinated in the belief that urban dwellers were class enemies and impediments to revolution. As Pol Pot said in a December 1988 speech to leading PDK cadres:

Our troops previously did not know how to conduct popular work because they did not have faith in the people and instead relied exclusively on bullets. We fashioning an army that knows how to do popular work. A clarification here: our army is not going to defeat the Vietnamese enemy by fighting them. These days our army goes into the interior to

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build up popular support.

Khmer maintained very tight control over both their army and civilian population. In practice, villagers donated half of their harvest to Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge currently control at least 2,000 out of Cambodia's 8,000 villages.⁸ Politically the Khmer Rouge fared no better. There was evidence of a bitter internal split within the party over the outcome of the Paris Peace Accord. Attempts by King Sihanouk to negotiate Khmer Rouge participation in government in Phnom Penh in return for disarming and integrating its forces into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) led nowhere. To CPP's consistent opposition to power-sharing with the Khmer Rouge was now added that the FUNCINPEC, flush from electoral victory. There were now also constitutional barriers: the new constitution would require amendment to enable the Khmer Rouge to be admitted to government. The Government's confidence in dealing with

7 Nation (Bangkok), 26 October 1991, and 28 October 1991, pp. 42-43.

8 Zachary Abuza, "The Khmer Rouge Quest for Economic Independence", Asian Survey, vol. 33, 1993, p. 1014.

the Khmer Rouge appeared to stem partly from the extent of the international support it was receiving and from its economic performance.

Since May 1993 election that brought the Cambodian people's party, led by former SOC premier Hun Sen, and FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Ranariddh (Sihanouk's son), there has been great concern over the role, if any, that the Khmer Rouge would have in the new provisional government of Cambodia. Whether the Khmer Rouge would eventually cooperate with the new Government and true national reconciliation emerge is open to question. The new government has been internationally recognized, and if the Khmer Rouge remain outside of it, they will also lose all legitimacy. In such a case, it would be difficult for the Thai government to continue to allow official contacts, including commercial exchange, with the Khmer Rouge. Second, the international community is willing to support the new government, both morally and mentally, against the Khmer Rouge. This would be costly both militarily and in financial terms as the Khmer Rouge will have to purchase weapons at international prices.

According to the sources, FUNCINPEC secretly promised the Khmer Rouge, both before and after 1993 to push for the faction's inclusion in the new government. The Khmer Rouge which boycotted the elections but not seriously disrupt them, now feels betrayed by its former ally. "Up to now we have misunderstood the true nature of the participation of FUNCINPEC in the two-headed government", says the Khmer Rouge internal document. "During the elections process, we gave full support to FUNCINPEC, saying it should be granted full state power. Even when FUNCINPEC attacked us in Tinar Puok in August 1993, we were very careful not to blame them, considering that they were forced to do so. This analysis was false. Actually, FUNCINPEC has fully accepted to join hands with the Vietnamese, the puppets, and the alliance (of western countries) in the strategic objective of destroying the DK", as the Khmer Rouge is officially called.⁹

The Khmer Rouge document confirmed the diplomats fear, saying the guerrilla have found they can depend on

⁹ Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 June 1994, p. 15.

buying or capturing ammunition from government troops. "What our successes in Anlong Veng and Pailin have clearly demonstrated is that we can continue this struggle under the current circumstances, that is without external support. It is similar to the situation in 1973, after the peace agreement signed by the Vietnamese. At that time we were isolated from external support. We had to rely on the people and we had to get our ammunition from the enemy."¹⁰

After the Khmer Rouge more and more openly declared its willingness to use violence on the eve of elections and the number of armed attacks on the Cambodian civilian population and on UN workers increased dramatically, there was a growing call not to hold elections as planned. The arguments in favour of the election campaign was anything but fair. 400 of the 1,800 polling stations planned could not be set up because they were located too close to Khmer Rouge territory. As the parties to the Cambodian conflict had not been disarmed, there were also fears that the elections would lead to a further

¹⁰ Ibid.

escalation of civil war in which those who lost the election would not accept the outcome but take up armed struggle. After over 50 UN workers had already been killed, the elections threatened to lead to even more killings, without taking the country any closer to peace.

Despite all opposition, therefore the polling stations opened at 8 a.m. on 23 May. To the surprise of all the skeptics, many voters already turned up during the course of the morning, almost half of the Cambodians voters cast their votes on the first of the three polling days, without letting themselves be intimidated by the extremely charged situation. By the time the polling stations closed, 4.2 of the 4.7 million registered voters had handed in their ballot papers. This figure would have undoubtedly been higher if the elections had been carried out in the territory controlled by the Khmer Rouge. The fact that contrary to reported announcement, the Khmer Rouge kept quiet and that there was not a single armed incident during the entire election was an even greater surprise and, at the same time, the source of growing relief. In the provinces of Battambang, even 220 Khmer Rouge soldiers, in

uniform but unarmed, cast their votes.¹¹ Although the Khmer Rouge had not entrusted with ministerial portfolios, all Cambodian parties agreed that "in the spirit of national conciliation, "the Khmer Rouge should be integrated into the activities of government as advisers".¹²

The government suffered humiliating military defeats at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, which easily retook Anlong Veng and Pailin in May and threatened Buttambang, accentuating the dire need for restructuring and reforming the Royal Cambodian Armed Force (RCAF). The Government forces appeared to have treated their earlier victories as opportunities for looting, compounding this by failing to plan for the defence of their newly won territory and exhibiting disorganization and cowardice in the face of the Khmer Rouge counter offensive. Corruption appeared ripe at all levels of the force, with military supplies even being

11. Gerhard Will, "The Elections in Cambodia : Taking Stock of a UN Mission", Aussen Politik, vol. 44, 1993, p. 399.

12. "Rote Khmer wider in Phnom Penh", in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Fuer Deutschland, 2 July 1993.

sold to the khmer Rouge. The amnesty programmes for Khmer Rouge defectors were failing because of corruption and mishandling by the government. While many expressed fear at the possibility of a revival of the Khmer Rouge, most observers believed the battlefield reserves revealed RCAF weakness rather than Khmer Rouge strength.

Peace talks between the Khmer Rouge and the Government continued to fare badly. After refusing the king's initial proposal for a 'round table' in Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge eventually agreed in May 1994 to talks in Pyongyang. These failed to produce any result except an agreement to continue working committee talks,¹³ which also collapsed. Moreover, Khmer Rouge demands seemed designed to scuttle any agreement. As the government noted, if the Khmer Rouge had declined to cooperate with UNTAC there seemed little prospects of its treating a smaller, less capable group of observers without UN backing any more respectfully. The Khmer Rouge office in the capital was

¹³ B. Harris, "Gloomy PM Warns of more Fighting", Phnom Penh Post, 3-16 June 1994, p. 1.

closed when the round table talks on 15 and 16 June failed. In July the National Assembly passed a bill outlawing the Khmer Rouge. It was widely criticized as likely to be ineffective.¹⁴ In response the Khmer Rouge announced the formation of a "provisional government of national union and national salvation", based in Preah Vihar province and led by the Khieu Samphan.¹⁵ Relations between Thailand and the Government also deteriorated following accusations from Phnom Penh that Thailand was still supporting the Khmer Rouge - as evidenced by the discovery of huge Khmer Rouge arms cache on Thai territory in December 1993.¹⁶

The Khmer Rouge and Security

The inability of both the coalition government and the Khmer Rouge to alter the military balance has reopened deliberations on the integration of the Khmer into the

¹⁴ N. Cumming-Bruce, "Futile bill to ban Khmer Rouge", The Guardian, 6 July 1994, p. 5.

¹⁵ Financial Times, 12 July 1994, p. 7.

¹⁶ S. Prasso, "Cambodia : A Heritage of Violence", World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, fall 1994, p. 75.

government, which would require a constitutional amendment. The Khmer Rouge insisted upon simultaneous discussion of terms without preconditions, including a proposal of for 15 per cent representation in state ministries, co-positions into national army, and a ten-country force to monitor the ceasefire. As the contending parties scrambled for leverage at the negotiating table, fighting resumed with the characteristic thrust and party over strategic areas in the North and West. In the face of this intensified military challenge, the Phnom Penh government has solicited external military assistance but with limited response. The ASEAN states, having worked hard to produce the fragile settlement, are not keen on the military option, which would be tantamount to acknowledging a regression if not outright failure of peace efforts. Thailand, in particular, is weary of the spill over effects that would result from escalated conflict across the border. The most recent forced repatriation of some 25,000 Cambodian refugees from Thailand into Khmer Rouge controlled zones had drawn an embarrassing condemnation from the UN High Commissioner for refugees.

Internal security has had a visible impact on the

national reconstruction effort as scarce resources are diverted from social and economic programmes. Individual profiteering aside, the government's decision to grant logging rights to the Ministry of Defence, in direct contravention of IMF guidelines, was compelled in part by the military's claim that it needs to augment its budget to meet the Khmer Rouge challenge. Rural terrorism in the form of abduction and killing of foreigners, with corresponding negative publicity, impeded the development of the tourist industry and could ultimately jeopardize Cambodia's foreign relations. At the height of fighting in the North West, some 2,000 families were displaced, bringing to 50,000 the total number of people driven from their homes in the area.¹⁷ The flow of refugees into Thailand during the contest for Pailin was the heaviest since 1985, putting pressure on bilateral relations that were already strained by criticism of Thailand's continued ties with the Khmer Rouge.

Khmer Rouge remains a force to be reckoned with in

17. Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1994", Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 1, January 1995.

the future, much depends on the ability of the Phnom Penh government to root out corruption, transform the demoralized and frequently impaired army into a professional force, and address fundamental issues of social and economic equity. One of the most pressing issues is land ownership. Without a valid legal framework and its enforcement, land speculation will continue unabated, with evictions and physical dislocation becoming progressively more common. Among the most vulnerable are returnees from the border camps, who are often without the personal or political connections necessary to buffer them. The Khmer Rouge problem cannot be effectively managed without the active support of neighbouring countries. Despite Phnom Penh's distress over the continued relationship of certain elements of the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge and suggestions of Thai involvement in the recent coup attempt, bilateral relations between Thailand and Cambodia are showing some signs of improvement.

Bangkok's expressed willingness to work collaboratively with Phnom Penh in following access from the Thai side to goods that would otherwise have eluded

Cambodian taxes, as well as access to Khmer Rouge assets in Thai banks, are among the positive steps toward promoting good bilateral relations. Ultimately, the country's greater security will come through its re-integration into the regional community, which will have an interest in coupling Cambodia's security concerns with efforts to promote regional stability. Regardless of the political situation in Phnom Penh, in the short term the Khmer Rouge will remain strong for the reasons that they have always been strong. They champion the peasantry and they don't tolerate corruption. For the new Government in Phnom Penh, economic rehabilitation with a solid rural development programme and an attack on corruption would be the greatest weapon against the Khmer Rouge. If the new government cannot provide some degree of economic development in the countryside, the Khmer Rouge will be able to continue their battle. One year after the dawn of democracy in Cambodia, the country is sliding towards anarchy as the Khmer rouge go on the war path against a demoralized government army.

Alarmed Cambodian leaders say parts of Cambodia are facing a collapse of government authority, this time

with no one to come to the rescue, "we really are struggling alone", first Prime Minister said in an interview." Not one foreign country agrees to help us, not even to sell us munitions. We ordered Chinese ammunition through a Singapore company, but the Chinese government blocked the delivery. I am not accusing China, but the Khmer Rouge are using Chinese tanks - the tanks that Akashi, with all his helicopters and photographs, did not manage to discover," he said. I want to know, where do these tanks come from?"¹⁸ asked Ranariddh, implying that the Khmer rouge was still receiving outside aid.

The Khmer Rouge military success in Baltambang says less about the weakness of the guerrillas than about the weakness of the government army intelligence sources say the attack was mounted by a force of less than 500 guerrillas. Instead of making a stand, the provincial governors and scores of officers fled their command posts for Phnom Penh. On seeing their officers panic, several

¹⁸ "Thing Fall Apart", Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 May 1994, p. 17.

thousand troops simply abandoned positions that were confronted by the guerrillas. The mood of the Khmer Rouge is confidence mixed with anger over the government's decision to fight, rather than talk during the dry season. Most of the observers agree that the Khmer Rouge is using military pressure strictly to force an eventual political solution that would give the faction maximum influence in a new coalition government. The Khmer Rouge is still widely feared for its murderous 1975-79 rule over Cambodia. The latest fighting had an alarming impact on the economy of Cambodia's west and north. Many essential commodities were imported from Thailand, but the main trading route through the border town Poipet had been served for weeks.

"We have nowhere to go", said a vender in a village along highway 5 near Baltambang. "We are scared of the Khmer Rouge. We are scared of government soldier". A blown-up bridge in the centre of town testifies to a recent Khmer Rouge attack, while the vender said a detachment of government soldiers sent to provide security had looted the market that morning. They both hurt the people. Where we can go. Every body steps on us", he said. Life looked to

grow only bleaker for villagers and refugees in the contested areas. The Khmer Rouge sources said that they need "one more rainy season" of fighting to force the government to meet their demands, while the government vows to reverse its defeats with a more concerted military push. According to the government, the Khmer Rouge rapped and beheaded 10 soldiers' mines in the border village, though independent confirmation of the report was unavailable. Sihanouk said that that Khmer Rouge are 3000-4000 in number and Khmer Rouge problem is a miner problem. But the presence of Khmer Rouge is like a leopard's spots. They are in Kampong, Cham, Spen, Kampot and even in Sihanouk ville - they are everywhere. Even near Phnom Penh they have sancturies. They have at least 20,000 men.

The Khmer Rouge seems to have not forgotten its ideology that power comes out from barrel of gun. Therefore, it has never abandoned any opportunity to mount an attack against the Phnom Penh regime. Due to this reason Hun Sen had again warned that the Khmer Rouge was stockpiling weapons which it planned to use in an offensive

during the dry season.¹⁹ UNTAC remained unable to restore confidence among the warring factions or impose ceasefire. Khmer Rouge do not know that the whole world condemns them. They know that only too well. As to the Khmer Rouge, Leng Saly had already said, "one more book against us, one more article against us, one more condemnation, what could that do to us? There are already thousands of articles, thousands of condemnations. That does not change a thing. We will pursue our ideology, that's all. The Khmer Rouge strategy is to capture power by force".²⁰

In short, any real solution to Cambodia's woes remains a long way off. But however difficult and complicated a resolution may be, it is far preferable to pretending that one vote by itself has or could persuade the lions to lie down with the lambs. Whatever else may have changed in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge remains a murderous content. And until this boil is launched, all bets are off. Still it remains a constant challenge to peace and democracy

¹⁹. Newsweek, 13 April 1992, p. 9.

²⁰ "Isolate Khmer Rouge", Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July 1992, p. 18.

in Cambodia.

Former foreign backers, notably China and Thailand, have distanced themselves from the Khmer Rouge since the faction boycotted the elections. And with the depletion of the Pailin gun fields and fighter restrictions on cross-border timber trade, the movement is losing its main source of revenue. But those who know the Khmer Rouge warn against underestimating its silence. With its fighting strength diminished, the faction may soon turn to terrorism, including urban attacks. Intelligence officials say they have hard evidence that the Khmer Rouge leadership has sanctioned hits on western officials, particularly Americans. Hundred of Khmer Rouge fighters still formed and wearing their Chinese-army style uniforms, lounge around flirting with vendors as they ostensibly provide security against their former comrades now hunkered in the surrounding jungle.

The Khmer Rouge no longer has a political programme of significant credibility in the countryside, however. Its forces are fighting, literally, for survival, resembling warlords more than revolutionaries. Defectors

speak of a hierarchy that is isolated, demoralized, and split over what kind of tactics to pursue. Intelligence sources and detectors say that more moderate elements who favour a political solution to the conflict have waned in influence and more hardline field commanders are on the ascendency. Intelligence officials now put the fighting strength of the Khmer Rouge at between 5000 to 6000 regular troops. Approximately 2000 of them are up in the sparsely populated jungles of the far north, with the remainder in the mountainous western provinces of Baltambang and Pursat. Small pockets of guerrilla fighters - usually numbering less than 100 - remain in numerous jungle outposts in other areas of the country collecting "taxes" at gun point, generally posing more of a criminal problem than a political threat.

The faction is short of ammunition, according to Khmer Rouge detectors and intelligence officials. In recent months Khmer Rouge radio has repeatedly called for villagers and soldiers to produce quotas of "punji sticks" to defend guerrilla base. At the same time they are stepping up efforts to buy supplies from corrupt government commanders.

In 1973, the Khmer Rouge had a clear political

goal : the overthrow of Lon Nol's visibly corrupt US-guided government. Today, clandestine radio broadcasts focus on the baseless claim that millions of Vietnamese troops and civilians have flooded Cambodia as part of a massive plot by Hanoi to 'swallow' the country. Those who know the Khmer Rouge movement, however, warn that it won't disappear overnight. "The first priority of the DK (Democratic Kampuchea, as the Khmer Rouge calls itself) has always been to defend and preserve their leadership and forces", notes a source close to the Khmer Rouge leadership.

Government corruption and military abuses also provide rich fodder for the armed opposition. "I think it will take 10 years to get rid of the Khmer Rouge now", says Toan, the Siem Reap Governor. "Contain them, isolate them, then development. It is a political strategy."

21. "Rebels without a Cause", Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1995, p. 26.

CHAPTER V

CLANDESTINE, ARMS TRANSFERS IN CAMBODIA

Khmer Rouge continued to fight because it still received the support of the Thai business circles which has continued to co-operate closely with the Khmer Rouge. The Thais violated UN embargoes by trading with the Khmer Rouge and providing in exchange of logs and gems-ammunition and money. Without financial and logistic support by the Thai army, the Khmer Rouge would have quickly dissolved and been forced into total isolation.

In order to hold on to power, Cambodian leaders throughout the centuries have appealed to outside powers for help in conquering their internal enemies, without realizing, or perhaps without caring, that foreign domination is a double-edged sword: it makes the whole

divided in the face of neighbours Thailand and Vietnam, countries that throughout history have attempted to divide and conquer the Khmer people, had led to an irreparable loss of territory, contributing to the Cambodia's present-day sense of wounded pride and fear of racial extinction. A realistic concern about encroachment by neighbours is one of the key factors motivating Cambodia's foreign and domestic policies today.

Thailand has every interest in keeping a buffer between itself and Vietnam and then using that buffer to develop its own economic interests : the logging of Cambodia's hardwood forests and mining of its gems through concessions with the Khmer Rouge. The resulting overlap of political and economic interests frequently leads to accusations by Cambodian government officials - backed by US diplomatic pressure - that Thailand is still supporting the Khmer Rouge in the ongoing civil conflict. Without recourse to Thai territory from which to regroup in order to mount new attacks, a recurring event within the last year, the Khmer Rouge would have quickly dissolved. In response to a new law passed by the Cambodian National Assembly in July

1993 that declared the Khmer Rouge illegal and their passports invalid, Thailand pledged to stop allowing Khmer Rouge leaders to leave Cambodia through Thai territory.

The government in Bangkok has made such claim about full support for the Phnom Penh government before, only to have been caught red-handed helping the Khmer Rouge. Thailand's generals exert enormous power, particularly in business dealings, along the country's borders with Burma, Laos and Cambodia. Thai diplomats concede that central control over the military fringes is tenuous at best. Foreign correspondents were invited by the Thai Foreign Ministry to the Thai-Cambodian border in 1994 to clarify Thailand's position; they were briefed with a map showing Cambodia as "Democratic Kampuchea".⁴

Out of anger and to deflect criticism of their own mismanagement, Cambodian officials usually make their allegations against Thailand. Thai support for the Khmer Rouge was uncovered in December 1993 when Thai police

1. Sheri Prasso, "Cambodia, A Heritage of Violence", Policy, vol. 11, no. 3, fall 1994, p. 75.

(rivals of the Thai military) found 1500 tons of Chinese-made weapons, enough to defend a small country, stockpiled and guarded by the Cambodian guerrilla inside Thailand. The seizure came during routine police checks as some of the weapons were being transported in rice sacks by Khmer Rouge driver who admitted he had been ordered to truck the weapons across the border to Pailin. Pailin is the symbolic Khmer Rouge headquarters in western Cambodia, a pretty town in a cardamom mountains valley full of ruby and sapphire mines that keep the guerrilla operation funded through Thai business concessions. It was captured by the Cambodian army in March and subsequent recapture by the Khmer Rouge in April were the highlights of the 1994 dry season offensive, which ended in May. As a result of their military victories, the Khmer Rouge now hold more territory than during the UN peacekeeping operations, most of it along the border with Thailand. The Khmer Rouge have declared their zone a separate country.²

When the Khmer Rouge captured a government-held

2. Ibid.

crossing point into Thailand on Cambodia's northern border in August 1993, the attack was launched "from three to four directions, including the Thai side of the checkpoint", and during the attack UN peace keepers assigned to the check points were "detained in Thai territory by the Khmer Rouge", according to the UN. From this same checkpoint witnessed and photographed the crossing of 140 trucks carrying an average of five logs each in violation of the UN moratorium of 2 January 1993, on log exports from Cambodia. During a government offensive against the Khmer Rouge in the northwest province of Banteay Meanchey in August 1993, "there was absolutely no doubt that Khmer Rouge forces and civilians were allowed by Thailand to cross the border and seek refuge on its territory."³

The Thai arms dealer expressed experience of running weapons across Thailand's border with its neighbouring countries. In addition to the Khmer Rouge the Cambodian-Thai frontier is also home to a plethora of well-connected businessmen, rebel groups warlords, smugglers and

3. UNTAC interoffice Memorandum, 24 August 1993.

assorted adventurers who have operated for generations in the region without serious hindrance. In addition, there were scores of warlord armies that control the network of Thai-Cambodian trade routes.

Since 1979, the frontiers have had been home of three anti-Vietnamese guerrilla groups - the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF and the National Army of Independent Kampuchea - all of whom continued to control separate zones along the borders. Since 1991 Paris Accord, all had embarked on an orgy of lucrative trading. Dozens of separate and uncontrolled military units had carved out their own fiefdoms in Cambodia, where they dealt in everything from toothpaste to surface to air missiles.

With the peace plan mandating that the guerrilla armies had to disarm and turn their weapons over the UNTAC without any payment, most of the soldiers opted for what - in their view - was a more sensible alternative. The frontier is now one of the biggest arms bazars in Asia, with thousands of weapons sold in last few years. Arms traders for example offered one journalist a selection of Sam 7 surface-to-air missiles at Baht 280,000 (US \$ 11,200) each.

Tanks artillery pieces and assorted light weapons and ammunition were also available.⁴

Intelligence officials and black market arms dealers said the border had attracted representatives of a number of Asian groups looking for weapons. They said the notorious drug warlord Khunsa purchased two surface-to-air missiles, as did Karen rebels fighting the Rangoon government.

The border has also turned into a free way for hundreds of cars stolen in Thailand and slipped over the border into Cambodia, where they are openly sold in Phnom Penh. Some had been seen supporting Phnom Penh regime military licence plates, which eased their journey through checkpoints in western Cambodia. More than 100,000 Thais have crossed the border to seek their fortune in Khmer Rouge controlled ruby mines - a major source of income for the faction. The miners said that they can carry out handfuls of gems worth millions of baht in their pockets. They laughed at the thought that UN peace keepers would be able to stop

4. The Pol Pot Trial, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 November 1992, p. 12.

them. The Thai Government had sold the rights to 17 entry points to Thai companies, who in turn were given the right to tax logs coming into the country. Senior officials in Bangkok were reportedly on the receiving end of some of the profits.

According to traders, "Thailand's secret 838 intelligence unit - which was responsible for all covert liaison and weapons supplies to the Khmer Rouge during the 13 year war against the Vietnamese received Baht 40 for each cubic metre of timber that crosses into Thailand". One Thai weapons trader, reflecting on the reaction of the Khmer Rouge if the UN attempted to cut into purse strings, said: "Right now the Khmer Rouge do not hurt UN. but if the UN does that, they will have to kill them. You know they don't like foreigners."⁵

Prime Minister Ranaridh told the Review that Thailand has refused to hand back weapons that FUNCINPEC received from China and stored in Thailand during the anti-Vietnamese resistance.

5. Ibid., p. 13.

Cambodia suffers several problems with arms: the flow of arms from outside supplying the armed inside, the gun trade fuelling the gun crime, often self-serving armed police more than community police, the dependency of the state's armed forces from arms aid and trade internationally, the prevailing notion that the best or only way to defend a country or a government is armed defence".⁶ The situation is paradoxical! It is unreasonable to expect disarmament as long there is a political armed fight and growing armed delinquency in the country, and it is unreasonable to expect an end to political armed fighting and the armed delinquency as long as there's no disarmament in the country.

Arms from Thailand

All the attempts for negotiated settlement between government and Khmer Rouge have failed and the only reality is that of war. The Peace Agreement of 1991 could not succeed militarily, but it would in some respect be considered still valid and a tool for armed conflict

6. "Disarming Cambodia", Eduardo Marino.

resolution. As long as the least one foreign country/state continues to be instrumental in the armed conflict in Cambodia the UN collectively and the other individual state parties to the 1991 'Peace Agreement' have an enforcement co-responsibility under the agreement.

In the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (25 October 1991) it is found:

Article VII. Cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian parties.

2) The signatories whose territory is adjacent to Cambodia, namely, the government of the Lao people's Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam undertake to:

a) prevent the territories of their respective states, including land territory, territorial sea and air space, from being used for the purpose of providing any form of military assistance to any of the Cambodian parties.

b) Provide written confirmation to the commander of the

military component of UNTAC that no force, arms, ammunition or military equipment of any of the Cambodian parties are present on their territories;

- c) Receiving an UNTAC liaison officer in each of their capitals and designate an officer of the rank of colonel or equivalent...in order to assist UNTAC in investigating, with due respect for their sovereignty, any complaint that activities are taking place on their territories that are contrary to the provisions of the comprehensive political settlement.
- 3) The parties agree that upon signatures of this agreement, they will provide to UNTAC any information available to them about the routes and means by which military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment have been supplied to any of the parties. UNTAC will investigate allegations of supply of arms of any of the parties.

Article VIII Caches of weapons and military weapons.

- 1) In order to stabilize the security situation, build confidence and reduce arms and military supplies throughout Cambodia, each party agrees to provide to

UNTAC all information at its disposal, including marked maps, above known or suspected caches of weapons and military supplies.

- 2) On the basis of information received, the military component of UNTAC shall deploy verification teams to investigate each report and destroy each cache found.

Thailand's businessmen violated the "Peace Agreement" provisions just transcribed and the UN and the other countries parties to the agreement have not been up to their commitment and mandate in this regard. "There are a lot of red faces around Army command following the seizure of war weapons being smuggled to the Khmer Rouge. What started out as a routine follow up on the seizure of truckload of war weapons by the police ended up giving the public one of the most sensational disclosures of military secrets in years. The wide publicity with the police raid on an arms depot in Chantaburi's Makham district was carried out in 1994 compelled Army Commander in Chief Wimol Wongwanich to cough up information that shed light on the nature of army secret service and inevitably, some of its

dirty jobs."⁷ The General Wimol told reporters that the weapons that police found in a raid on the Makham depot following the arrest of seven alleged armed smugglers were part of a stockpile held by the army after the four warring Cambodian factions signed the Paris Peace Accord in 1991. The weapons were sent by third countries via Thailand to support the three Cambodian factions fighting the former Vietnamese-installed Phnom Penh government, he said.

The weapons could be transferred to any of the border stockpiles without approval from the army. The General believes the truckload of weapons intercepted by police was stolen from the largest depot. The army chief also promised to impose stricter controls on arms stockpiles set up for Cambodian factions and punish officers in charge who allow any weapons smuggling. When the police came across a virtual warehouse full of war weapons they turned out to belong to the military. The credibility of the military and the Thai government was seriously damaged by the police raid which kept on insisting that it had long

7. The Nation (Bangkok), 12 December 1993.

since stopped assistance to the Khmer Rouge which continues to hold part of Cambodian territory in defiance of the UN-sanctioned peace government.

Military sources in Chantaburi said that after the weapons were found, the alleged arms smugglers showed the highway police a "permit" allegedly issued by a local military commander that said the weapons belonged to the military and were to be delivered to the Khmer Rouge. The location of the December 1993 arms raid, the Thai reported, was a jungle arsenal at Wangean village in Chantaburi province, just a stone's throw away from the Khmer Rouge stronghold of Palin, across the border in Cambodian territory.

"The size of arms cache, there were more than 15,000 tonnes including 15-130 mm artillery pieces, as well as numerous anti-aircraft guns, mortars, rocket launchers, light and heavy machine guns, rifles, hand grenades and millions of rounds of ammunition - a Thai army officer was guarding the warehouse along with 22 suspected Khmer Rouge

officials."⁸

One of the most prestigious world newspapers wrote that "not far from here, less than a mile east across the border into Cambodia along a well-maintained dirt road, is a compound of spacious wooden homes and starhouses built by Thai contractors for a demanding client. Foreign diplomats and UN peace keepers say the client was Pol Pot, the leader of Khmer Rouge. Khmer Rouge defectors say that one of the largest houses set on a scrub-covered hill side with a small garden and a panoramic views across the border to Thailand - served as Pol Pot's home during visits to the compound earlier this year. His wife and daughter were reported to be occasional guests. Nearby is another large, air wooden house. The defectors say it was used as officers by Thai army's task force 838 which worked secretly among the Khmer Rouge and acted as the rebels' liaison with the Thai military. The compound, in the village of Phnom Penh, which was still under construction when it was overrun by the Cambodian army this summer, is only part of the evidence of

8. Ibid., 9 December 1993.

close ties between Thailand - through elements of its military, police and business community, and the Khmer Rouge guerrillas."⁹ The Thais remain the life line for the Khmer Rouge and the victims are the Cambodian people. It is believed that Khmer Rouge has deposited millions of dollars in Thai banks and they continue to fight indefinitely. In fact the Thai military has arranged army trucks to transport Khmer Rouge soldiers, they provided support, including food, fuel and medical supplies to Khmer Rouge soldiers.

The UN spent \$ 3 billion to buy the foundation for peace and democracy in Cambodia. Now the country's fragile democratic institutions are being subverted by the wealth of drug lords. The civil war is still not over. Although the Khmer Rouge has been weakened by recent defections, it continues to control mainly a fifth of the Cambodian countryside and an estimated 8000 to 10,000 troops.

Diplomats and UN peace keepers warn that Thailand could again serve as a staging area lend weapons supply route if the Khmer Rouge decides to step up the war.

9. "Thai Army Hand in Glove with Pol Pot, The Guardian (London), 23 December 1993.

Interviews with dozens of diplomats, UN personnel and Cambodian and Thai officials, and a review of classified reports from the UN and foreign embassies, show that the relationship can now be documented to a degree and possible before and that it threatens Cambodia's future. On 5 August 1993 the special representative of the SG, Yashushi Akashi, addressed the Thai Government with a complaint about its "breach of article X and article VII of annex 2" of the Peace Agreement, and on 4 November 1993 the Security Council issued resolution 880 which, simply echoing some of the most general terms of the Peace Agreement", called "upon all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability, independence, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia. The resolution did not mention any specific critical situation or culprit country in particular nor it referred to any sanction in case of non-compliance or necessary measures of enforcement as included in SC resolution on countries where the powers want to make sure that its resolution will work. Reportedly at the request of the Cambodian Government and, for reason unknown to us, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, the Security

Council, under the same resolution, extended for mission of a contingent of 20 military liaison officers - a left over from the 2200 strong UNTAC operation just concluded - for another six months with the task of reporting on matters affecting security in Cambodia.

The Thai National Security Council convened a high level government-military conference on the future of Thai-Cambodia relations at Paltaya during the last week of September. Reporting on this conference, Kalachuda Chaipipat wrote in the Bangkok nation on 3 October that the Thai government believes it is too risky to cut the Khmer Rouge off. According to their Government sources, the new Cambodian government is 'just old wine in a new bottle'. Chaipipat says the view of the Thai government is that there will be no peace for Cambodia unless the question of Khmer Rouge participation in Government is satisfactorily resolved."¹⁰

Cambodian second Prime Minister Hun Sen had said:

10. Commentary on Cambodian Affairs, by Craig Etcheson, Indo China Interchange, United States, December 1993.

"I would like to clearly stress that we will not use military force to attack the Khmer Rouge on Thai territory. We will settle issue through the UN Security Council."

In addition to arms as a military problem - internally and internationally - in the context of defending or subverting political power, Cambodia has a rapidly expanding problems with arms as tools for gain and crime. Now the new government and community organisations have to deal with the threat of political armed conflict and social violent crime. The crime wave emanates from government personnel itself. Massive illegal logging going on undisturbed. Prime Minister Hun San made a surprising statement that "Cambodian security forces are behind much of the violent crime sweeping the country".⁴¹

There were many reasons for all these violent crimes:

- 1) "Money, mostly international, was plentifully spent as an incentive for many, including Khmer Rouge, to fight

41. The Morning Star (London), December 1993.

the war only partially ended in 1991; in the place of the wages of war of the recent past some fighters are now plundering the people;

- 2) the breakdown of state socialism had demoralized many among those previously attached to socialist non-profit values, and widened the space for those only profit making motives;
- 3) Cruel rule in a war conditional social;
- 4) To a large extent the new competitive open frontiers open-market economy is working in practice as an open-for-grabbing all economy;
- 5) the recent massive presence of relatively highly paid, well fed well clothed well housed and well motorised foreigners and foreign agencies has driven local prices up (close to 25 per cent by mid-93 according to a Phnom Penh resident foreign bankers), driven the Cambodian riel currency down, and given to many Cambodians a show and to a few Cambodians a taste of cosmopolitan modern society and its costs;
- 6) arrival of hard drugs to the country;
- 7) salaries remain absolutely low at a time of increasing

- consumer expectations, \$ 1 per day for a policeman;
- 8) there is legal and institutional disorder, vacuum and uncertainty with regard to land tenure and land use, and growing pressure on the land also from the 300 thousand war returnees, all this promoting land lawlessness and coups remain in the countryside.¹²

Cambodia now engaged in a quite spectacular arms race which is more a part of a grotesque idea and business reality of "modernisation" than of any understandable concept and need of defence or security. With the progress in arms race, the insecurity has widened. The arms race comprises large arms purchase, development of national military production capabilities and setting up of high-tech military industries. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in South East Asia and Japan, China, Taiwan, Koreas and Indonesia beyond these are the participants in next Great Arms Race.

"The acceleration of a regional arms race is made

12. Eduardo Marino, "Disarming Cambodia", a chapter from Cambodia : Year One, Report of a Non-Expert Visitor (New Delhi), 21-23 October 1995.

more worrisome by the absence of any regional arms control talks, and by the growing technological powers of the leading Asian powers. These countries are developing domestic arms industries that are expected to compete on equal terms with those of the more advanced western countries early in 21st century. It has the emphasis on technological imports that sets the East Asian arms race apart from those in the Third World. While the nations of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East tend to import finished weapons system from their major suppliers, the Pacific Rim countries generally seek the technology with which to manufacture many of the communication, electronics and surveillance system used by their militaries.¹³ The permanent members of the UN Security Council continue to be all procedures of these weapons, and some of them have chosen the Asian Pacific as their main nuclear-weapon testing-theatre. Only the South East, East and Pacific Asian people, targetted and victimised by these weapons produced, tested and used on them by others in the past,

¹³ Michael Klare, "Next Great Arms Race", Foreign Affairs, US summer edition 1993.

have the real authority and most immediate need to oppose and resist and current armamentist trend promoted by the military-industrial conglomerates in their own countries.

The armamentist regional scenario propelled by industrial economic growth threatens Cambodia. Cambodia's natural reserves of raw materials and its capacity for inexpensive good-food production lie exposed to the veracity of those neighbours, and the sovereignty of its air-space and sea-platform Cambodia cannot physically guarantee King Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge, in different ways, have received China's support.

In a report on narcotics Cambodia issued in March, it said "involvement of some leading businessmen with access to the highest levels of Government is a known concern. We are not aware of any prosecution for narcotics that some high-level military officials and powerful businessmen who give financial support to politicians are involved in heroin smuggling".¹⁴

Cambodian sources, international law enforcement

14. Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 November 1995, p. 25.

officials and diplomats say numerous senior military and police officers are involved in transporting the traffic. The drug originating in the Burmese segment of the "Golden Triangle", arrives by land from Thailand, Laos or aboard small boats from Thailand. Then most of it is shipped out of Cambodia through ports in the south-western province of Koh Kong, destined mainly for the US. About a third departs through Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport, often destined for Europe.

"It is clear that Cambodia is a new and rapidly increasing trafficking route", says Beng Juhlin, deputy head of the UN International Drug Control Project regional office in Bangkok. He points to the absence of an effective legal system, lack of resources to combat drug smuggling, and official corruption. "The presence of the three makes Cambodia very vulnerable". An added attraction for international criminals is the ease of laundering money in Cambodia. A confidential report prepared in 1995 for the Interior Ministry says that 19 of Phnom Penh's 29 banks are suspected of being fronts for cleaning tainted cash. As the BCCI scandal showed a few years ago, crooked banks pose a

special risk to the international financial system. But it does not take a bank to launder in Cambodia's cash economy, it is easy to unload dirty dollars at restaurants, night clubs, luxury goods dealerships and the casino.

Cambodia is presently a disturbed state because there are groups of businessmen who consider themselves above the law, who have unfiltered all spheres, all aspects of Government, the judiciary, the parliament, says Rainly, who was sacked from his Government post in September 1994 and has just formed an opposition political party. "These people - these politicians - are at least protecting and at worst working for the mafia".¹⁵ Those who highlight the links between crime bosses and government officials are doubly at risk. In August, after Phnom Penh's popular 'Morning News' published reports about military complicity in heroin smuggling, a hand grenade was thrown in the house of the paper's publisher. A year earlier, the editor of "The Voice of Khmer Youth" was shot dead at midday at a busy Phnom Penh intersection. The attack came just days after

15. Ibid.

the newspaper published a detailed biography of Theng Bunma, accusing him of heading a large criminal syndicate whose activities included drug trafficking. No body dares to speak out because they will be killed.

Police Gen. Nouen Soner, the former head of the national police anti-drug unit, is one of the few Cambodian officials to have spoken out publicly about government corruption and the drug trade. After his remarks were published in an August 1995 newspaper interview, he received death threats. He has been silent since then. He said that 600 kilograms of heroin a week were coming through Phnom Penh. "I knew about this but I couldn't do anything." "The smugglers are rich and have high-ranking officials behind them". Cambodian sources, international law enforcement officials and diplomats have several wealthy and well connected Cambodian businessmen as suspected heads of criminal syndicates. but none is better connected than Theng Bunma, a master at playing both sides of the fence.

To letting suspected Cambodian drug traffickers into the US appears to directly contradict post cold war US foreign policy, which calls for "public diplomacy" to expose

foreign officials who participate in or protect international crimes such as drug trafficking. It is drug trade's interest to remain behind the scenes working through corrupt government officials who can maintain a facade of probity and respectability. One of the best ways to routing out drug corruption is to expose it to public scrutiny, said the US Government. Narcotics control strategy report released by the state department in March. Corruption is a threat to any nation's security, for it allows criminal elements to undermine the legitimacy of the state from within.

US President Bill Clinton in a speech making the 50th anniversary of the UN, announced that the US was identifying and putting on notice to countries that tolerate laundering of drug money, and threatened economic sanctions against governments that failed to crack down. Zeo Baird, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence advisory board, wrote on 25 October, "The US may stop supporting a leader who is tolerant of drug cartel though it previously supported him because he was a staunch anti-communist. The US may risk embarrassing or destabilizing a government that

is weak in rooting out - or protects - terrorists or organized crime".¹⁶

The Cambodian Government assures it is fighting against the crime. On 15 September it set up a special committee chaired by the Prime Ministers to combat drug-related crimes. It says that it is closely cooperating with international organizations - such as the UN and Interpol and with countries such as the US and France - in implementing measures aimed at ferreting out and apprehending criminals, seizing drugs and sending them to the courts.

But unless concrete results are visible soon it may be too late to protect US aid to Cambodia. American officials say it is only a matter of some time before Cambodia is placed on the major Narcotics country list. US would require that Phnom Penh demonstrate measures to prevent and punish public corruption, especially by senior government officials that facilitates the production, processing or shipment of narcotic drugs, or that

¹⁶. Ibid., p. 27.

discourages investigation or prosecution of such acts. If Cambodia cannot satisfy these terms, the US is obliged to consider halting most forms of bilateral assistance and voting against multilateral assistance programmes such as those of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank - the financial lifeblood of the Canadian Government.

Attempts are made to stop illegal transfer of arms. It has been proposed that the UN mission in Phnom Penh be requested and supported to organize a regional UN Register of conventional Arms under the broad resolution 75 of the General Assembly of 1988 on International Arms transfers and the specific Resolution of 46/36L of the General Assembly of 1991 regarding a UN Register of conventional Arms. UN for the first time undertook to seek transparency in these transfers including the arms trade, by the latter resolution originally introduced by Britain, it adopted a mechanism to start doing it a universal and non-discriminatory Register of "conventional Arms" in the words of the resolution itself, to record arms national production

and international transfers.

The authoritative Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI Yearbook 1992 contains a description by researcher Herbert Wulf:

UN member countries are requested to report, voluntarily and on an annual basis, their arms transfers - both imports and exports in the following categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

If the Register is adequately implemented, this will be a significant step forward towards transparency and confidence building. Although it is not designed to control the flow of arms, the mere fact that it will increase publicly available information on which weapons are destabilizing accumulation of arms as stated in the UN resolution. For the first time since the reports of the League of Nations, official government information on global arms transfers will be made public. Currently available data on arms transfers are either not comprehensive or are based on unofficial sources.

The General Assembly drew the consequences of the realization that arms buildups can pose a threat to security. The Register's stated goals include: increasing openness and transparency, reducing mistrust and tension, enhancing confidence, promoting peace and stability; assisting in resolving conflicts; and supporting member states in restraining their imports and exports. The Register is thus seen as part of a larger family of International arms control and conflict function measures. Effective as of 1 January 1992, the first reports of UN member governments on exports and import of conventional arms are due by 30 April 1993.¹⁷

The Register was planned to be implemented in two stages. During the first stage, governments was to report their arms exports and imports. In the second stage, a possible expansion of the Register was on the agenda, to include data on the stock of military equipment, production, technology transfer and weapons of mass destruction. In judging the relevance of the Register, however it should be

17. Herbert Wulf, SIPRI Yearbook, 1992, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

observed that international arms transfers were a taboo subject for a long time, and the concept of registration of conventional armaments was considered to be a 'non-starter' in the United Nations. The Register is nonetheless a modest step for several reasons. According to Eduardo Marino the following points are pertinent in this connection:

- 1) Register would not significantly facilitate a judgement about a military capacities of countries. There is no obligation to report on an entire range of weapons: small arms, bombs, munition mortar s, guns below a certain calibre, missiles below 25 kms range, support ships, non combat planes and helicopters and others.
- 2) The register will be of no assistance in understanding the economics of the arms trade since the value of given transactions and the details of their financing are outside its scope.
- 3) The Register and its aim of transparency are not synonymous with a restriction on arms and were not intended to be. Whether the Register will be an 'action-oriented tool' and an 'instrument of preventive diplomacy', in the words of the Secretary General in

his foreword to the report, has to be proven in practice.

- 4) It is a voluntary exercise of member states which will not be controlled or verified. The panel of governmental experts made it clear that the task of the UN secretariat is to file and distribute the incoming reports from member states but not to check or verify them. This shortcoming should, however, not be overestimated since, if importers and exporters report reportedly on the same deal, this will provide a signal of discrepancy and a reference point for cross checking. Furthermore, a research community will certainly thoroughly scrutinize the reports.

The future of the UN Register depends on government's sincerity and willingness to participate. It is a worthwhile exercise but this can be a restraint on the behaviour of the state and not insurgents. The international community and the United Nations will have to do something more drastic to check the clandestine supply of arms to Khmer Rouge.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To conclude, it can be stated that Cambodians are desirous to establish democracy and they believe that democratic polity would open the path for peace and development. The various means have been adopted to promote reconciliation amongst warring factions and they have agreed to be the coalition partners. Only one faction, the Khmer Rouge, remains intransigent. The Khmer Rouge is in possession with a chunk of Cambodian territories on their borders and they in secret collusion with some Thai generals, are getting clandestine supply of arms from across the borders. Its armed forces are still strong and it will be long and arduous to bring them to agree for sharing governmental powers and participate in mainstream politics.

The international community has shown sympathy for the Cambodians. In order to establish peace and end civil

war, they influenced the United Nations to intervene and take action. The UN announced the formation of two bodies, i.e., the United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to cope with the crisis, but they could get only partial success in their endeavours.

The UNTAC was unable to end Cambodian civil war as intended by the Paris Peace Accords (1991), but it helped to de-internationalize the conflict, isolate the Khmer Rouge, begin the tortuous process of national reconciliation and permit the Cambodian people for the first time in almost 40 years to choose their government in the comparatively free, fair and democratic manner.

Following the May 1993 election, a new constitution was written, a new government was formed, King Sihanouk was restored to the throne as Cambodia's constitutional monarch and a national army was established. In addition the UN repatriated all Cambodian refugees from the Thai border and closed the camps there, freed the press, alleviated conditions in Cambodia's prison, started the gargantuan task of mine clearance, imparted new skills to

thousands of Cambodians, fostered the rapid growth of human rights consciousness and other civic values and began restoring Cambodia's shattered infrastructure. Perhaps most important, UNTAC gave hope to the people of Cambodia that the cycle of war and dissolution that had plagued their country for decades had been broken.

The mission was troubled from the outset by non-compliance of the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen government, which threatened to unravel the Paris Peace Accords together. While this was obviously not the fault of UNTAC, the way the authority handled these threats, unanticipated in the Paris Accords, was a key determinant of the outcome of the Cambodia operation. The UNTAC skilfully managed to prevail over these challenges, but its own organizational flaws, especially its late deployment, poor advance planning, lacklustre civil police, cursory co-ordination between UNTAC's components, and a lack of consultation with Cambodians and NGOs at times also jeopardized the peace process.

The Cambodian operation exposed significant defects in the management of peace keeping mission by UN

headquarters in New York and in the field, some of which are now being attended to. The monetary cost of UNTAC was high - approximately \$ 1.5 billion. The human cost was also great. Among UNTAC personnel there were, as of 31 August 1993, 142 casualties, including 84 killed and 58 seriously injured. Overall, the UN can legitimately claim the Cambodia exercise as its first major success of the post-cold war era and one that establishes benchmarks for similar UN operations in future. As Butros-Ghali told in April 1993; "a new system of international co-operation for peace-building has been launched here. It is only the future of Cambodia which hangs in the balance. This operation will influence UN mandates and operations all over the world".⁴

As with other second-generation operation in Angola, Central America, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Mozambique, the deployment of UNTAC took place in a situation of civil war rather than inter-state conflict, moreover in a situation where the civil war never entirely ceased. Even the Khmer Rouge never renounced the Paris

4. UN, The United Nations in Cambodia : A Vote For Peace, p. 110.

Peace Accords (although it did denounce particular aspects of them) or called for UNTAC's withdrawal (although it did call for Akashi's resignation). UNTAC's political and military leadership also attempted valiantly to adhere to the traditional peacekeeping doctrine of impartiality, despite many provocations from all the parties. This was particularly difficult in a situation where one party - the Khmer Rouge -- was responsible for the most blatant violations of the accord and when an embargo was placed on that party despite the fact that UNTAC needed its continued co-operation in the peace processes.

Finally, UNTAC adhered strictly to traditional peacekeeping doctrine of the minimum use of force and its use only in self defence. It did not attempt to use military force to induce the recalcitrant parties to adhere to the peace process or to punish their leaders. Even in self-defence its use of force to defend its carrying out of its mission, particularly to protect the electoral process, in practice it did not need to do so.

In its genesis the Cambodia operation was not typically a second generation one in that it was deployed in

a situation which did not represent a current threat to international peace and security. Even the threat to regional security which the Cambodian situation posed was not particularly pressing. The civil war was sputtering on, its ebbs and flows conforming more to the patterns of the seasons than to political or strategic imperatives.

The main aim of Cambodia's peace settlement was to resolve a long-standing regional quandary which was preventing the normalization of interstate relationships throughout the region and more broadly. That the international community agreed so readily to fund and participate in the most expensive and comprehensive multilateral operation ever mounted in a situation which did not feature the emergency conditions that had propelled other peacekeeping operations into existence is remarkable. Whether the Paris Accord and UNTAC were the correct response to Cambodia's ill is difficult to judge - although the alternatives at the time all seemed worse than the prospect that an internationally supervised and supported peacekeeping effort might conceivably break the long-jam of history and allow Cambodia to move forward.

The most impressive aspect of UNTAC was that it got crucial right: it correctly estimated the depth of Cambodians desire for peace; it compounded those who argued that any attempt to introduce a democratic mechanism like voting was absurd in a culture like Cambodia's; it believed in the ability of ordinary Cambodians to understand the concept of a secret ballot; and it persisted, despite tribulations, in supporting the one Cambodian who could help deliver a national renaissance and unity, Prince Sihanouk.

The international community can continue to assist Cambodians in nurturing their fragile democracy and in rehabilitating and reconstructing their country, but the future now essentially lies with the Cambodians themselves. Their ability to take advantage of a new beginning - rarely afforded to any nation, much less through such concerted, costly international effort - will be a true test of UNTAC's legacy.

Without doubt, the first democratic elections in Cambodia were not only an important step for a new kind of politics, which included the participation of the people, but also represented an important basis for the

consolidation of peace and national reconciliation. However, the elections should have been the beginning rather than the end of the transitional process in Cambodia.

It may be emphasized that the building of a democratic society requires much more than the successful organization of elections since elections may only legitimize parties that, in the past, maintained themselves in power by the use of force instead of leading to the democratization of a country. Peacekeeping therefore should be accompanied by peace-building. Peace through socio-economic and political development would, for example, be impossible to achieve within eighteen months, which was the duration of UNTAC's peacekeeping mandate. Even time and funds should therefore be allocated for any future peacekeeping mission and its subsequent peace-building process.

The road to liberal democracy in Cambodia seems to be long and difficult. The altering of traditional constraints and methods to achieve a balance with the new requires education, and the development of greater political awareness among the population. The hope of Cambodia's

future lies with younger generation, who can be expected to throw off the burdens of the past and make strides towards national reconciliation, modernization and true democracy. The UN peace plan was a necessary bridge to arrive at this goal. Peace of course, is the prerequisite.

Moreover, the Khmer Rouge problem cannot be effectively managed without the active support of neighbouring countries. Regardless of the political situation in Phnom Penh, in the short term, the Khmer Rouge remains strong for the reason that they have always been strong. They champion the peasantry and they do not tolerate corruption. For the new government in Phnom Penh, economic rehabilitation with a solid rural development programme and an attack on corruption would be the greatest weapons against the Khmer Rouge.

For the stability and development of Cambodia, the coalition government will have to take necessary steps and establish immediate governance with shared objectives and centralized mechanism of administration. The government should be capable enough to deal with the Khmer Rouge's violent and destructive activities, which is a real threat

to democracy. The party system, bureaucracy, information media and democratic ethos are yet to be developed to suit the interest of democracy.

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