

US Policy Towards South Africa During Reagan Administration

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C E R T I F I C A T E

Certified that the dissertation entitled
"US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA DURING REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION (1981-1989)" by Mr. KUNDAN KUMAR
for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY is an
original work and has not been previously submitted
for any other degree of this or any other
University.

We recommend this dissertation to be placed
before the examiners for evaluation.


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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

South Africa and its politics of apartheid has been one of the most debated issues in international politics since the World-War II. It is hard to believe that when the whole world is moving toward, democratization of political systems, South Africa remains firmly entrenched in its brand of racial politics based on segregation and discrimination. For this perpetuation of apartheid, the intellectuals of the worlds and other Political forces working against the apartheid structure, believed that the Western countries and the United States in porticular, have not been very keen to exert political and economic pressures against South Africa for dismantling the much-abhored apartheid structure. It is only in 1980s that the United States, particularly the Congress and the media, have actively pursued economic and political measures against South Africa. In this regard, the comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 impose a variety of economic sanctions against South Africa.

In the light of these facts, and also the need to end apartheid system of South Africa, this dissertation, " U.S. Policy Toward South-Africa : The Reagan Administration (1981-89)", is an effort to analyse the developments in South Africa and the policy-decisions taken by the Reagan administration in this regard.

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C H A P T E R - I

Segregation & Discrimination: Historical Overview

History of segregation and Discrimination
in South-Africa:

The politics of apartheid was established in South-Africa way back in 1910. The succeeding minority White rulers passed numerous legislations thereby strengthening the structure of apartheid in South-Africa. In 1913, the Native land Act was passed under which 87 per cent of the land was exclusively reserved for the Whites, and the remaining 13 per cent was to be shared by the rest of population. The immorality Act of 1927 penalized for having extra-marital relations between Europeans and Africans. By the Native Act of 1936, the non-Whites were disenfranchised. By the same Act, the non-Whites were to send three Whites in the lower house and four whites in the senates as their representatives. The Native Act (amendment) of 1937 placed restrictions on the entry of non-whites to urban areas. Municipalities were instructed to provide separate areas in which the non-whites were to live. The Malan administration legalized the apartheid system in 1940. The issue of apartheid was the most important electoral plank in the general election of 1948. After the election, the National Party government passed a legislation in 1949 which prohibited mixed marriages and ⁱⁿ

1950, amended the Immorality Act to extend its prohibition to relations between Europeans and coloured. In 1950 itself, the Group Areas Act was passed authorising the government to proclaim an area reserved for occupation by the members of a specified racial group. The violators of these acts could be imprisoned upto seven years. By another Act of 1959, the government adopted a policy of complete segregation in higher education, and separate universities were established for different racial groups. The government also passed the suppression of communist act under which persons and organizations could be banned for furthering the aims and ideals of communism. Under the Terrorist Act of 1967, the government was granted the power to detain persons for indefinite period for interrogation. The Act defined terrorism so broadly as to include by including the terms such as "embarrassing the administration of the affairs of the State." The White government also passed the Population Registration Act. The vertical division of South-Africa's political society was further corroborated by the fact that, every black was to pay a tax of 3 Rands at the attainment of 10 years of age, whereas if a white was bachelor and had an income of 750 Rands or if he was married and has an income of less than 2000 Rands, his income was not to be taxed. Besides, under the General Law Amendment Act of 1963, the 90 days' detention clause was replaced by 180 days imprisonment. By the criminal

procedure amendment Act of 1965, the Minister of Justice was authorised to order the arrest and detention of a person upto six months, on the interest of administration of justice. And finally, in 1969 the so-called Boss Act made communicating anything about the affairs of the Bureau for State Security, an offence punishable with a maximum of seven years confinement in jail.

These were the institutional arrangements established by the White regimes over the decades to perpetuate apartheid. In all, these laws were a reflection of the state of affairs in South Africa where the 75 per cent of the total population's, the blacks, were ruled and exploited by a minority of about 7 per cent, the whites.]

Opposition to Apartheid: Domestic and International:

It was under these circumstances, that the ANC and other political organization, though established in 1912, emerged as a rallying force for the blacks and other deprived sections of the South African political society. Upto the Sharpville incident of 1960, the ANC and its allied organizations believed in peaceful atmosphere and adopted political means to attain equality of all people, and also the universal adult franchise.

On 28th March 1960, in the black township of Sharville, a peaceful demonstration against the

imposition of pass laws, was attacked by the police who shot and killed 89 Africans and wounded another 178. In its response the African National Congress organized a general strike that paralysed the country for three weeks. The government retaliated by cracking down on the African opposition movement. A state of emergency was declared, thousands were detained, and the main African political organizations including the ANC were banned.

Images of the Sharpville massacre carried abroad by the news media, galvanized international attention on the system of apartheid in South Africa and also on the effects of resistance and repression that followed in its wake. Pretoria found itself diplomatically isolated, and faced with threats to its future security as well as economic growth. At the United Nations, the General Assembly by a majority of 96 to 1 passed a resolution that requested all states "to consider taking such separate and collective action as is open to them... to bring about the abandonment of racial policies".¹ This resolution represented the first occasion on which the General Assembly called for action against Pretoria, in contrast to its earlier resolution which had merely

¹Jack Spence, "South Africa and the Modern World", in Oxford History of South Africa, ed., Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.2; 513.

condemned apartheid and exhorted the South African to change course. This resolution initiated a three-year period in which repeated attempts were made to persuade member states to move against the White regime. In 1962, a resolution asking for economic and diplomatic sanctions and arms embargo was passed by a vote of 87 to 16 with 23 abstention.

Although, not binding on member states, this resolution produced efforts that led in early 1964 to a partial embargo on sale of weapons to Pretoria".²

On the economic front, the 1960 Sharpville episode created a crisis in South Africa's access to foreign capital outflow. In 1960 and the early part of 1961, the capital loss was at the rate of R.12 million per month, creating a balance of payment crisis more severely than any experienced since 1932.³ Total capital outflow reached R.183 million in 1960 and averaged R.101 million per annum through 1964.⁴ In contrast, during the eight years after the World War II (1947-54), South Africa had experienced an average annual capital inflow

²ibid, p.2: 513-15.

³Dr N Houghton, "The South Africa Economy (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.180-81.

⁴ibid, p.184.

of R.176 million.⁵ The security measures adopted by Pretoria after the Sharville massacre had its own impact on on negative economic growth.

The next decade after the Sharville massacre witnessed a period of domestic disquiet though the apartheid system was flourishing despite much avowed international condemnation. With the tacit support of the Western powers, the flow of foreign investment in South Africa continued at a high level during the first half of 1970s. Net capital inflow averaged over Rs.700 million per year.⁶ However, in the spring of 1976, the political tranquility that had existed since the Sharpville days was abruptly shattered. Beginning in the black township of Soweto, and rapidly spreading to the townships of South Africa's larger white cities, the urban black youths rose in rebellion demonstrating against apartheid policy and attacking symbols of government authority. The Soweto uprising lasted throughout the spring of 1977 and was countered by brutal state repression similar to that of the Sharville massacre. Approximately 1000 urban Africans mostly youths were killed by the police; black student and cultural organizations were outlawed; and, black leaders were detained, imprisoned, tortured, or driven into exile.

The international response to the Soweto uprising (1976) proved to be more intense than at the time of the

⁵Houghton, "South African Economy" (1964), p.242.

⁶Quarterly Economic Review, Annual Supplement (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 1971-76).

Sharpsville massacre. South Africa was once again thrust into a diplomatic deep freeze. " And the greatest diplomatic estrangement of Pretoria from the West was witnessed in South Africa's political history so far."⁷ The UN arms embargo was expanded and made mandatory-with the approval of Western governments. The American government under the newly-elected President, Jimmy Carter, took the lead in condemning Pretoria, and for the first time, demanded a system of majority rule in South Africa. On the economic front, the flow of direct investment into South Africa slowed to a trickle. The multinational corporations no longer considered South Africa particularly attractive for investment purposes. Some of the largest foreign corporations announced that they would not expand their South African investments and explicitly linked their decision to the country's domestic political and social arrangements. The General Motors Corporation, in announcing that it had no intention of further expanding its South African facilities, stated, "The single most important factor in the creation of a more promising investment ~~climate~~ in South Africa is a positive resolution of the country's press-social problems which have their origins in the apartheid

⁷Robert M. Price, "Apartheid and White Supremacy: The Meaning of Reform in the South African Context" in, The Apartheid Regime, ed. Robert Price and Caal Roseberg (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1980), p.133.

system."⁸

U.S. Policy Toward South Africa:

The serious American interests in South Africa began to rise only in 1960s. These were the years when the United States was making major advances toward racial equality at home, which automatically called for attention to South Africa's growing racial tensions. It was also a period when newly independent African states began to raise their voices in the UN and elsewhere, complaining about apartheid.

Before 1960s, the American foreign policy toward the Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular, has been characterized variously as "benign neglect", "minimal engagement", and, "weak and non-reactive"⁹. Before and after decolonization, the United states assumed that Africa was primarily the responsibility of the former colonial powers. In the words of an Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in 1989:

We support African political aspirations when they are moderate, non-violent, constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with

⁸Quoted in Timothy Sirith, "US Firms and Apartheid; Belated Steps Analyzed", Africa Today, vol.24, No.2, 1977, pp.29-33.

⁹Robert M. Price, "US Policy Toward Southern Africa: Interests, choices, and constraints" in International Politics in Southern Africa, Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, ed., (Bloomington, Indiana: Indian University Press, 1982), p.203.

western Europe.¹⁰

South Africa itself was seen as an informal extension of NATO. Washington saw South Africa as the South African elites saw themselves. To Nagorski,

South Africa's ruling classes saw themselves, and were largely seen by others until the 1950s, as a snug Western enclave at the top of Africa. Faithfully Christian, they staunchly opposed communism and governed themselves according to a Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy.⁽¹¹⁾

Both Truman (1945-195³) and Eisenhower (1953-61) maintained good relationships with all the minority regimes of Southern African States. State Department spokesmen periodically expressed U.S. abhorrence of racism, apartheid and colonialism. The U.S., occasionally voted for mild UN resolutions condemning apartheid. South Africa's racial laws were, however, seen as largely as a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

After 1961, President Kennedy projected a new foreign policy image. The U.S. began a two-track policy of both rhetoric and action toward South Africa in particular. Kennedy and his advisors like Chester Bowles, C. Mennen, Williams, and Adlai Stevensson,

¹⁰Donald Rothchild, "US Styles in Africa: From Minimal Internationalism to Liberalism", in Eagle Entangled: US Foreign Policy in a Complex World: Keaneth Oye, Donald Rothchild and Robert J, Creber, ed., (New York: Longman, 1970), p.307.

¹¹Andrew Nagorski, "US Options vis-a-vis South Africa", in Africa and the United States: Vital Interests Jennifer S Whitaker, ed., (New York Uni. Press, 78), p.188.

made a conscious effort to identify with black African's aspirations and maintained a dialogue with most African leaders, including some radicals. Kennedy's rhetorical efforts were largely successful. These efforts cost little politically and as a result "the Kennedy administration was generally regarded as representing the most pro-African presidency so far"¹². Within Africa Kennedy's public image of concern influenced a whole generation of African school children and secondary school students. Prior to the exploits of Mohammed Ali, Kennedy was the most widely known American in Africa. The European countries regarded the American concern for Africa as likely "to foment colonial revolt so that U.S. could replace European predominance in the region"¹³.

The minority-ruled states in Southern Africa were largely excluded from Kennedy's rhetoric about majority rule, although lip service was given to criticism of South Africa's racial policies. The United States supported an UN arms embargo against the

¹²George W. Shepard, "Comment" in Arkhurst: U.S. Policy Toward Africa", p.44.

¹³Vernon McKay, "Changing External Pressures on Africa", in Walter Goldschidt, ed., The United States and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1963), p.102.

Republic and also voted in favour of a number of anti-apartheid resolutions in the United Nations. But Washington did little to discourage investments in South Africa. Both policy-makers and academicians continued to view South Africa as separate from sub-Saharan Saharan Africa and a part of the European Community.

~~Rupert~~ Emerson spoke for many of that period when he argued, " ... the Republic of South Africa... is for present purposes a predominantly European country".¹⁴

The American press and other agencies of the government continued to sympathize with the plight of black South Africans and tended to take their sides during incidents of repression and violence. Among other gestures, President Kennedy's State Department required for the first time the American embassy in South Africa to invite blacks to officials functions, and in 1964, the President's brother, Robert Kennedy visited South Africa as an important gesture of solidarity with those forces who were fighting apartheid.

President Johnson (1963-69) continued with Kennedy's policy of publicly criticizing South Africa, placing it within the context of his commitment to civil rights in the United States. But U.S. investment

¹⁴ Rupert Emerson, "The Character of American Interest in Africa", in Walter Goldschmidt, ed., The United States and Africa (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 7.

in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa, continued to increase throughout the period. Major loans and credit arrangements were encouraged by Commerce Department officials. However, on the issue of South-West Africa (Namibia) the United States took a pro-Majority position, arguing that Pretoria had no right to occupy the territory in defiance of the UN resolutions. In 1966 the United States called for the United Nations to supervise self-determination for the territory. The politics of apartheid in South Africa however, remained at low on the foreign policy agendas of the United States because there appeared to be a stable government in that country, whereas there was dangerous instability elsewhere.

The Nixon administration (1969 -74) belonged to the Republican Party and hence he viewed the foreign policy concerns of the United States differently from his two immediate predecessors, Kennedy and Johnson. President Nixon therefore ordered a major review of US-South African relations. In all six years of his presidency, Nixon had a very astute advisor in Henry Kissinger, first as the National Security Advisor and then as the Secretary of State to shape US policy toward South Africa. The Nixon administration viewed the South African problem as a part of East-West conflict. The Nixon Doctrine called for strengthening of regional

forces which would cooperate and collaborate with the US in order to contain communism and also the communist assisted insurgencies. In Southern Africa only the White minority-ruled states and particularly South Africa was in a position to take up this role. Reasoning that white power in South Africa was stable and invincible. Nixon and Kissinger opted to work with Pretoria rather than encourage its opponents.¹⁵ They ended US support for condemnatory resolutions at the UN ; the arms embargo was partially lifted; and the US embargo was partially lifted and the US business was encouraged to increase its investment in the South African economy".¹⁶ In this regard, National Security Council Memorandum 39 was completed by August 15, 1969, and approved by the National Security Council in January 1970. The NSCM 39 called for: a partial relaxation of American measures against minority regimes; increased aid for black African states in the region such as Botswana and Zambia; and, a series of diplomatic efforts to resolve tensions between the white governments and their black neighbours. This option concluded:

"The whites(in southern Africa) are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain political rights they seek through violence, which will only

¹⁵NSCM39, reprinted in the Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, ed., Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (New York: Lowerence Hill, 1976), p.105.

¹⁶D. Rotheild and J Ravenhill,"From Carter to Reagan", in Eagle Defiant, K Oye ef al(Boston: Little Brown, 1983), p.340.

lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."¹⁷

US policy toward South Africa upto 1974 was based upon the major tenets of National Security Council Memorandum 39. Strategists assumed that South Africa did not contain any vital strategic or political interests for the U.S., although the region and particularly South Africa held an important business interests. It was because Southern Africa was a zone of political stability to be controlled by pro-western regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola. Because of these regimes, South Africa fell outside of the East-West conflict area, and the United States could afford to maintain a low profile in the region.

The 1974 military coup in Mozambique and Angola fundamentally altered the nature of political conflict in Southern Africa, and with this, US policy also came under review. South Africa was witnessing increasing political unrest; guerrilla activities in Namibia was increasing; and, the talks between the Smith government and the African nationalists were deadlocked. In June 1975, a Marxist government came to power in

¹⁷The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, Mohammed A Khan and Barry Cohen, ed., (Westport, Conn: Howerence Hill, 1971), p.105

Mozambique, Angola collapsed in a three-sided civil war, and "Dormant's fears came to a head; fears of radicalization, major revolutionary violence and deepening Soviet involvement"¹⁸ By August 1976, according to a former chief of the CIA task force in Angola:

We were mounting a major covert action to support two Angolan liberation movements about which we had little reliable intelligence. Most of what we knew about the FNLA came from (Holden) Roberto, the Chief recipient of our largesse, and it was obvious that he was exaggerating and distorting the facts in order to keep our support. We knew even less about Savimbi and UNITA".(19)

U.S. covert assistance to the FNLA and UNITA was no match for overt Soviet assistance and Cuban combat-involvement on the side of the MPLA backed by over 12000 Cuban troops, was able to secure control of the country. By February 1976, the war was over in favour of the MPLA. The abortive U.S. involvement in Angola had a significant impact both in the United States and in South Africa as well. The U.S. stood without a foreign policy in Southern Africa in the wake of the Angolan debacle. This happened despite the fact that the Kissinger policy of containment carried into the conflict. For Kissinger,

¹⁸Karis, "United States' Policy", in Carter and O'Meara, Southern Africa: The Continuing Crises, p.337.

¹⁹John Stockwell, "In search of enemies", (New York, W.W. Norton and Co., 1978), p.90.

"Angola might be far away but .., it was a test case of the superpower relationship. The Kremlin was seeking unilateral advantage from the several relaxation of tensions".²⁰ After Angola, a new policy for the region would have to take into account the domestic and regional origin of a conflict.

The Kissinger policy had several goals. It assumed that the Soviet Union, having "imposed their solutions on Angola", would entrench their forces there and perhaps look for new opportunities to expand their influences. The U.S. could preempt this by seeking an overall reduction in tensions in the region and by searching for a peaceful settlement to the conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia. Kissinger hoped to ensure that when majority rule did come in Southern Africa, moderate African leaders would come to power. In the spring of 1976, Kissinger began his last effort at Shuttle diplomacy, a widely publicized series of meeting with both the frontline states and South African and Rhodesian leaders, in a search for a peaceful settlement to the civil war in settlement to the civil war in Rhodesia. The U.S. approach to Southern Africa shifted from a

²⁰John Spanier, "American Foreign Policy Since World War II", 8 ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980), p.205.

direct confrontation to crisis management. The Kissinger mission achieved one major breakthrough when the U.S. with the cooperation of South Africa, pressurized the leader Ian Smith into agreeing to a two year time-table to majority rule. However, the Shuttle diplomacy which was aborted by the Ford loss of Presidency in November 1976, failed in its ultimate goal to end the conflict and construct a constitutional arrangement. The Kissinger plan was rejected by both the Rhodesian nationalist leaders and the frontline states because they felt substantial power still remained in the hands of the Whites during the transition period.

The Ford/Kissinger period, (1974-76), however, saw a new era of active involvement in the Southern African region. After 1976, US diplomats following Kissinger's lead assumed the role of mediator between the frontline states on the one hand, and the African nationalists on the other. While Carter's approach might provide a sharp break from the past in terms of public rhetoric the new regime inherited many of the assumptions and techniques of the last two years of the Kissinger period. When President Carter assumed office in 1977, he was determined to put increasing pressure on South Africa. He called for the American support to all forces to all forces pledged to majority rule in

South Africa. Richard Moose, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, described U.S. interests in South Africa as "preserving our national consensus on foreign policy goals relating it to human rights and human dignity, assuring long-term access to strategic minerals in South Africa and surrounding countries both for our own and our allies' economic and defence; force losing opportunities for expanded Soviet influence that come with protracted violent conflicts."²¹

President Carter (1976-81) himself presented a new policy style on South Africa. In a December 1977 interview, President Carter put it this way: "We... believe that our overall conduct of foreign relations will be strengthened by the moral premise inherent in our stance on (Southern Africa) questions.... we have made it very clear that we oppose apartheid. We think that because the South African system is unjust, it may well lead to increasing violence over the years".²²

The new rhetoric was somewhat moralistic in tone and more pro-African than any other administration upto that point. For many of the Carter's

²¹South Africa: US Policy, Current Policy No.175
(Washington D.C.: Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs) April 1980.

²²Rothchild in K. Oye, Eagle Entangled, p.317.

advisors including Andrew Young, who was mostly identified with this faction, the conflict and unrest in the region was caused not by Cuban and Soviet aggression, but by the inherent injustice in the apartheid system itself. The Carter administration openly identified with the aspirations of Black Africa and other Third World states against South Africa in order to force South African government to relent its policies and institutions of apartheid, the Carter administration took several tough measures. The United States refused to recognize the Transkei State (nominally an independent 'Bantustan' within the South African framework). The American recognition would have given legitimacy to the misdeeds of the Pretoria regime and according to the policy makers in South Africa, the other Western States would have followed suit in such farcial divisions in South Africa, thereby containing the forces opposed to the White government. The Carter administration decided to further intensify the arms embargo and tax credits were refused to the American corporations doing business in both South Africa and Namibia.

In may 1977, the US Vice-President Mondale (Walter) met the South African Premier, Vorster and called for majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Besides, he also asked for a "progressive transformation

of South African Society to the same end -- equal participation in the election of its national government and its political affairs".²³ As a result, "The strategic bond between South Africa and U.S.... snapped in 1977".²⁴

Beyond the rhetoric, however, the substance of the Carter approach showed a remarkable continuity with the Kissinger policy on Rhodesia and Namibia. Washington's efforts continued to be focussed on Rhodesia in an effort to contain the escalating violence and to find a solution of the crisis acceptable to all parties. Hence, "The newly elected Carter administration... adopted the essentials of the Kissinger policy, now modified into the Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia".²⁵

Andrew Young, along with the British Foreign Secretary, Dr David Owen, continued with the Kissinger

²³Gwendolen M. Carter, "Which Way is South Africa Going?" (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p.124.

²⁴Colin Legum, Western Crisis Over South Africa(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), p.127.

²⁵Robert M. Price, US Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), p.3.

plan of using South Africa as a conduit to bring about changes in Namibia and Rhodesia, and like Kissinger, they approached each problem separately. The Carter administration stressed the tactical nature of their contacts with Pretoria and reiterated that it was not meant to downplay the need for change in South Africa itself.

The Carter administration was also committed to an over trading system in Southern Africa. All the Carter advisors saw U.S. investment as a positive force in South Africa and the region. US business by following the Sullivan Principles was expected to moderate the harshest element of the South African system.

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Carter and his staff expended a great deal of efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts. Young and Owen took the Kissinger Shuttle diplomacy role. From 1977 to 1978 they made an effort to get both Anglo-American Plan for Rhodesia. The Plan included a transitional arrangement for the country, an end to the illegal status of the regime, an interim UN force during the transition period, and a free election on the basis of Universal Adult Franchise.

In Namibia, the US encouraged the development of a "Western Contact group", Much of the efforts to



← N81



negotiate a Namibian settlement laid with Young's deputy and his successor, Donald McHenry. Proximity negotiations were held in 1978 between the two sides and an agreement was reached on a number of issues relating to the establishment of a UN authority, a ceasefire and UN supervised election. South Africa then abruptly broke off the talks, and any further negotiations on the Angolan issue proved to be inconclusive. By 1979 the South Africans had begun to withdraw from negotiations. As the 1980 election approached they began to anticipate the possibility of a Carter defeat.

US efforts with Rhodesia met with little success. The Anglo-American plan was rejected by the Smith regime in 1978, and at the same time, Smith established an internal transitional government to be headed by the Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Two more years of war and the efforts of the Thatcher administration, and without any direct US involvement, led to the emergence of an independent Zimbabwe in 1980.²⁶

In South Africa, the death of Steve Biko, a black nationalist leader in the police custody caused

²⁶Arthur Gavshon, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981), p.161.

a massive political uproar inside and the international community condemned the killing in the severest of terms. The Pretoria regime responded with a clampdown against its critics. In September 1978, P.W. Botha replaced Vorster as the Prime Minister of the Republic. As Botha spent the greater part of 1979 consolidating his position, there was little progress on regional negotiations.

The year 1979 marked a turning point in Carter Policy toward Southern Africa. Throughout the Carter years, there was an internal conflict between the regionalists who saw internal factors in Southern Africa as the key to dealing with the problems of the region, and the globalists who felt that US policy toward Southern Africa should be viewed in terms of the US-Soviet relations. Andrew Young and Zbigniew Brzezinski represented the two ends of the policy spectrum. According to Gavshon, "the tussle between Young and Brzezinski began almost as soon as the Carter Team took office. As Young freely acknowledged after resigning, the issue centred on the Cuban role in Africa".²⁷

By mid-1979, elements in the US Senate were pressing for recognition of the Smith-backed

²⁷Gavshon, p.161.

Muzerewa-government. Having lost his job in the UN, his departure sighted the return in the US policy-matters, of the globalists who viewed that "an increasing assertive Soviet Union was the primary problem for the United States in Africa and thus the principle target of US policy."²⁸ This shift on policy back toward globalism, while never complete, provided a greater continuity with the incoming Reagan administration than the political rhetoric of the election campaign suggested. The Carter policy which had shown great promise in 1977 ended the same as the rest of his foreign policy efforts: confused, ambiguous and guided by the paradigms of the earlier administrations.

As the 1980 election campaign suggested, the US policy toward emphasised on the elimination of injustice based on race. But for Reagan, "The basic issue was a power struggle and the Soviet Union".²⁹

²⁸ Robert Price, "US policy toward Southern Africa", in Carter and O'Meara, International Politics in Southern Africa, p.32.

²⁹ Richard Deutsch, "Reagan's African Perspectives", Africa Report, vol.25, No.4, July-August 1980, p.4.

C H A P T E R -II

U.S. Policy Toward South Africa During the Reagan Administration (1980-84)

Since the early 1980s, [the U.S. policy toward South Africa has revolved around two important factors. Firstly, South Africa has always been a major sub-imperial power in its struggle with the former Soviet Union for having a control over strategic points and vital minerals for trade in the Southern African region. Secondly, [South Africa has remained a powerful regional leader to provide stability and development in this region for the West.] Hence, the United States' foreign policy -makers tried to influence the process at political transition in South Africa from apartheid to majority rule without jeopardising their interests in this region.

According to the policy-makers, the strategic interest of the United States in South Africa could not be ignored because of its two dimensions. In the first place, South Africa has been supplying the United States with several minerals, critical to its defence industry. Secondly, the region of Southern Africa in which the Republic of South Africa has been a dominant state, remained exposed to the then super-power rivalry for influence either directly or through their proxies. The

countries , vulnerable to this Soviet Union's influence, included Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. In this confrontation, the US was depending heavily upon the survival of South Africa as a bulwork against possible Soviet threat.

South African Minerals and U.S. Security:

South Africa possesses enormous natural resources and production capacities in a number of important non-fuel minerals, such as chromium, manganese, vanadium and platinum-group metals-minerals which play an indispensable role in modern industrial production. From South African viewpoint, the West and the United States in particular have been critically dependent on the supply of these minerals, the interruption of which can cause enormous problems to the American national defence and civilian economy.

Secondly, in the context of early years of U.S. - U.S.S.R. rivalry, it referred to the importance that the United States attached to the geopolitical location of South Africa and to the question as to how the latter's capitulation to the Soviet power would have been disastrous to the strategic interests of the United States. This element of vulnerability has been exemplified by the fact that "each Jet engine that powers an F.15

fighter plane requires over 1600 pounds of chromium almost all of which comes from South Africa and the rest from Soviet Union".³⁰

These two countries "hold some 95 percent of the world's vanadium reserves, 94 percent of maganese, 90 percent of platinum-group metals, 84 percent of its chromium and significant proportion of other strategic minerals".³¹ The West always feared that in a crisis situation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. the dependence of the former on South Africa would be near total and any uncertainty about the outflow of these strategic minerals would be calamitous. On the other hand, unstable political situation in South Africa resulting primarily out of the policy of apartheid in South Africa might itself cause supply disruption. And too stringent an anti-apartheid policy pursued by the United States could provoke South Africa to restrict its export of strategic minerals to the West. Besides, it could even sabotage Western efforts to develop alternative sources of supply in the region, as the frontline states in possession of these resources are vulnerable to the South African military power and transportation facilities.

³⁰ Rhoda Plotkin, "The United States and South Africa: The Strategic Connection", Current History (Philadelphia), vol.85, no.511, May 1986, p.201.

³¹ "Strategic Minerals in South Africa (paper presented by W.W. Malan, the Vice President of South African Cahmber of Mins, Rome, 25 November, 1980), Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 85, no.511, May 1986, p.201.

The Communist Factor:

The presence of Cuban troops in Angola, the Communist rulers in Zimbabwe, and the forces of nationalism operative in Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa were viewed with suspicion as they were believed to be amenable to communist influences and manipulations. All these forces were at loggerheads with the South African government in one form or another and the United States was aware of the working of these forces inside and outside South Africa.

The Cape Route:

The Cape route had been playing an important role in depending the American and its other allies' interests in Southern Africa. "Since the 1950s, the Cape Route had remained essential for Western the shipping and its oil supplies".³² Since the Soviet squadron entered the Indian Ocean in the early 1960s South Africa has maintained that "the Soviet Union might try to interdict stripping off the Cape and the Reagan administration was realistic about this notion."³³ While the United States might

³² Patrick Wall, "The Indian Ocean and the Threat to the West", Stacey International(London), 1975, pp.21-2.

³³ Larry Bowman, "The Strategic importance of South Africa to the United States: An Appraisal and Policy Analysis", African Affairs (Oxford), vol.1, no.323, 1982, p.112.

not directly use South African bases, South Africa could however, project its power into the Indian Ocean along with the Eastern Coast of Africa. Accordingly to Chester Crocker, the US Assistance Secretary of State for African Affairs, the security of the Cape route is by far the most important Western interest in the African region.

Keeping all these factors in mind, the Reagan administration in order to devise its policy towards South Africa viewed the latter as central to the American objectives throughout the region despite South Africa's parish status. The United States wanted to make South Africa a prime security zone in the global security system in the southern African region.

Constructive Engagement:

In order to shape a coherent American policy towards South Africa, the Reagan administration came out with a policy of "constructive engagement." The's constructive engagement policy had four components:

- (a) to work out a settlement in Namibia;
- (b) to make the Cuban troops leave Angola;
- (c) to foster regional security in Southern Africa;
and
- (d) to dismantle the apartheid structure in South Africa.

This constructive engagement policy was formulated by Chester Crocker, Director of African Studies at the

Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown, who was subsequently appointed as the Assistant Secretary of States for African Affairs under the Reagan administration. In an article published in the winter issue of Foreign Affairs in 1980-81, Crocker suggested that the United States would strive for a diplomatic solution of the South African imbroglio without altering the basic foundations of its South African policy. In conclusion, he wrote:

(The prime ingredient in an effective policy is to maintain a close, ongoing watch on the situation while carefully assessing our own bargaining position. American power should be kept dry for genuine opportunities to exert influence. As in other foreign policy agendas for the 1980s.(34)

The idea of constructive engagement was coined to counter the proposals for disengagement from South Africa. It was assumed that the forces of reforms in South Africa must be strengthened by continuing stronger economic ties and cultural links. One of the intellectual supporters of constructive engagement Programme, M.C. Dowd maintained that "South African industrialization was key to modernization and racial

³⁴Chester A Crocker, "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol.59,no.2, Winter 1980-81, pp.323-51.

equality"³⁵ This programme was also to counter the disinvestment campaign in the West which was opposed to economic collaboration with the agents of apartheid regime in South Africa. The Reagan administration since coming to power, decided that American business in South Africa should be strengthened and encouraged to remain there and to assist in the process of gradual change in the South African society.

[On the issue of South Africa, President Reagan bestowed his faith in Prime Minister Botha's steady reform measures.] The Reagan administration quiteely lifted several restrictions on the U.S. -South African economic and military links in 1981 in order to strengthen bilateral ties as they had deteriorated during the Carter Presidency. At the same time, the American trade and investment in South Africa increased to some extent, and the Ragan administration committed the expansion of cooperation with the South African government and its agencies. It lifted previous restrictions on the export of military equipment and equipments with potential military uses; permitted the sale of American computers to the police, military and other agencies of the South African

³⁵M.C. Dowd, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Future of South Africa" in Schlemmer, L., and Webster, E., "Change, Reform, Economic Growth in South Africa", Raven Press, (Johansberg), 1974, p.45.

government that administered apartheid, and also approved the sale of shock batons to the police.

The Administration also allowed the return of South African military attaches to the United States and otherwise expanded diplomatic military and intelligence relationships between the two countries - including the establishment of several new South-African honorary consultes around the United States, the provision of American training centres for the South African coast guards, and the resumption of official nuclear advisory contacts.

In addition, the Reagan administration frequently stood alone on South Africa's side in the UN Security Council resolution condemning South Africa for the internal repression against the forces fighting for the end of apartheid system as well as the military attacks and destabilizing tendencies against the neighbouring states in league with the anti-apartheid parties inside and outside South Africa. The United States, in the initial years of Reagan Presidency, lent all these cooperation on the basis of its understanding to coax and cajole South African government to moderate its policy of apartheid to bring about a democratic political society and majority rule.

The second basis of President Reagan's constructive engagement programme, "the independence of Namibia" was taken up in all seriousness by forcing the South African government into an agreement to move Namibia

toward independence under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 435. The United States under President Reagan gave top priority to the Namibian independence. Chester Crocker believed that a settlement in Namibia would boast American credibility throughout Africa. It would give Prime Minister Botha's government a confidence to move faster with the domestic "reforms" programmes and to clear the political way for an improved relationship between the United States and South Africa. The administration's official also believed that they could deal a major diplomatic blow to the Soviet Union in the Southern African region. For granting independence to Namibia, the United States offered South Africa, " a more positive and reciprocal relationship -- based upon shared strategic concerns of Pretoria." And to extend further solidarity with the South African government, the United States decided to link the independence of Namibia with a "parallel" withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. The Pretoria government however, seemed reluctant to play along with the U.S. lines, deeply suspicious of the United Nations and skeptical of any transition to independence in Namibia that would have operated in favour of the South-West Africa People's Organization, which had been designated by the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the territory's inhabitants. Also, SWAPO was believed to be aided by the Soviet Union and

other communist countries , and as an organization it followed a Marxist political line. Even the linkage of the Cuban troops' withdrawal from Angola 'as a condition to Namibian independence did not cut much ice as far as the South African government was concerned. However, Chester Crocker in particular and the Reagan administration succeeded in bringing South Africa on a negotiating table on the Namibian issues upon which the modalities of the process of independence could be worked out in the years to come.

The Reagan administration also gave political and strategic significance of Angola in its designs to get rid off the Soviet influence in the Southern African region as well as to give its ally, South Africa a free hand in the politics of domination in this region. Since its independence in 1975, Angola ruled by the MPLA was believed to be collaborating with the Communist countries in opposing both South Africa and the United States. On the other hand, the Angolans believed that the United States was bent on destabilizing their government by providing military support to the UNITA rebels of Jonas Savimbi via, i.e., South Africa. Earlier in the 1970s, the American Congress had passed the Clark amendment in 1975 thereby banning all covert military aid to the Angolan rebels. In 1989, the

coordination campaign to repeal the Clark Amendment by the Reagan Administration and the UNITA leader Jonas Javimbi's visit to the United States in May 1981 seemed to confirm the tough posture of the Reagan administration to Angola. A visit of the American advisors was reported and the United States also decided not to condemn the South African invasion of Southern Angola in 1981. And finally the linkage of the Cuban troops withdrawal from Angola in return of the Namibian independence was intended to expose Angola the joint military power of the US and South Africa or to fall in line with the Western policies in the region.

Regarding Mozambique, the Reagan administration adopted less than a confrontationist approach. Mozambique, a financial and trading dependence of the United States and South Africa was forced to accept Western policies in return for military, and financial and food assistances. Before the Nkomati accord of 1984, the South African forces attacked the ANC residence in Maputo in October 1983, and the South African support for the MNR rebels against the Mozambique government was well known. Under the terms of Nkomati Accord, signed by President Samora Machel of Mozambique and P.W. Botha, the South African President and brokered by the United States, Mozambique was to

withdraw all facilities such as political asylum and military bases for guerrilla activities and the South African military was to stop all assistances to the MNR rebels. However, as the political sabotage in Mozambique in the later years proved, the U.S.-South African combine failed to keep their words.

Lastly, on the Zimbabwe issues, the Reagan administration expressed its genuine desire of cooperation. The United States even promised \$225 million over three years period, but the assistance was withdrawn when Zimbabwe decided to disengage from its economic dependence on South Africa by joining the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1983. The United States wanted Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries to become members of the Constellation of states, an organization created by South Africa for the development of the South-African regions. Besides, Zimbabwe had refused to support the American position in the U.N. Security Council on Grenada and Nicaragua. The U.S. Under-Secretary of States, Lawrence Eagleburger, then persuaded the Congress to cut the financial assistance to Zimbabwe by fifty percent.³⁶ Tanzania and other countries were also made to suffer by the Reagan administration's decision to cut the economic aid, despite their

³⁶Africa News, October 24, 1983.

increased need of the food stuffs in the face of continuing draught.

The fate of all these Southern African countries, i.e. Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and others was made to hang in balance under the constructive engagement programme to the extent of their support or opposition of the American foreign policy in the Southern African region, along with the interests of South Africa. The Reagan Administration strongly believed that peace and development in the Southern African region could be worked out only in an environment of cooperative and mutual cooperation between the United States and South Africa on one side and the other front line states, on the other sides. And secondly, the United States under the Reagan administration was bent on minimising the ideological influence of the Soviet Union from this region.

Constructive Engagement and the Administration's Efforts Toward Achieving these Goals upto 1984.

As stated earlier, the United States provided all moral and material assistance to South Africa to help out the latter to abandon its apartheid structure. Throughout 1982, the US officials parried criticisms of their refusal to condemn apartheid strongly. The Reagan administration was alleged by all black organizations and forces opposed to the apartheid system, for

taking side of the 'white' minority population. Though President Reagan reiterated from time to time that, "Apartheid policies are abhorrent to our multiracial democracy".³⁷ However, the South African black population wanted the United States to take side of the oppressed blacks and in March 1981, Bishop Desmond Tutu, then Secretary General of the South African Council of Churches, warned that -- "a United States' decision to align itself with the South African government would be on unmitigated disaster for both South Africa and the U.S.". Tutu cautioned that the appearance of reconciliation between Pretoria and the the most influential government in the world negate years of struggle of black South Africans to achieve a peaceful realization of their political ambitions",³⁸ Another well-known academician of South Africa, N. Chabani Managanyi called upon the Reagan administration to fulfil its moral obligations to the people of South Africa and the international community by applying pressure for change; he said that whereas the Carter administration had given

³⁷"Regional Security for Southern Africa", Document 50, The United States and South Africa: Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977-85, pp. 79-84.

³⁸Sunday Times (Johannes Burg), March 12, 1981, p.2.

blacks hope, "It could well be that President Reagan is preparing us for despair".³⁹

For the U.S. policy-makers, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) were abhorrent because of their communist links and on the basis of the allegation that they were financed by the communist countries including the Soviet Union . Secondly, the United States viewed that the ANC-led South Africa would be detrimental for the Western economic and military interests because it would nationalize all industries. Thirdly, the United States was opposed to the guerrillas activities, political murders and sabotages and other destabilizing activities of the ANC and other anti-apartheid organizations. And according to the Reagan administration, the United States would talk to these organizations only after they would have renounced violence and communist overtures. Despite these public pronouncements, one black South African newspaper claimed that between January 1982 and December 1984, Crocker had met formally with only 15 South African blacks, and that all of those meetings took place in the United States.⁴⁰

³⁹N. Chabani Manganyi, "The Washington-Pretoria Connections: Is there a Black Perspective?", The US and SA: Continuity or Change? (Johannesburg : South African Institute of International Affairs, 1981), pp.50,53.

⁴⁰City Press (Johannesburg), May 19, 1985, p.2.

The American support to the new Constitution of South Africa adopted in 1983 further alienated the South African Blacks. The Constitution which provided a tricameral parliament representing the whites, the Indians and the coloured was welcomed by the United States as a step forward in the process of political transition. The narrow and the vested interests of the powers of this constitution was reflected by the fact that the blacks who constituted 29 million of the 35 million population of South Africa were not given any representation at all. Reactions against this new constitution was widespread and violence, lootings, arson and murders took place in all the major townships of South Africa. The South African police and military forces wecame down heavily upon the demonstrators and some 3000 people were reported to be killed by the police.

It was under this changing dimension of apartheid politics in South Africa that the Reagan administration decided to give a second thought over its South African policies since 1980-81. A year back, even the Congress was putting up pressure on the administration that the Congress might pass limited sanctions against South Africa. The US under Secretary of State for political Affairs tried to put the US policy toward South Africa in a proper perspective. Eagleburger said:

The political system in South Africa is morally wrong. We stand against injustice and, therefore, we must reject the legal and political premises and consequences of apartheid. We reject unequivocally attempts to denationalize the black South African

majority and relegate them to citizenship in the separate tribal homelands. Neither can we countenance repression of organizations and individuals by means of administrative measures like banning and detention without the due process of law. By one means or another, South Africa's democratic racial system will be changed.

At the same time, he added that by proposing to include representatives of the mixed-blood "coloured" and Asian population in a new tricameral constitutional structure, the South African government took the first decisive step toward extending political rights beyond the white majority. The Eagleburger speech marked a watershed in the American policy toward South Africa under the constructive engagement programme.

In early 1984, encouraging signs appeared on the Namibian-Angolan front. On February 16, 1984, South Africa and Angola signed an agreement at Lusaka in Zambia, thereby establishing a ceasefire in Southern Angola and creating a mechanism for the withdrawal of the South African troops from that area. This agreement accepted the legitimacy of the existing governments in South Africa and Angola so long as they would not provide support to the African National Congress and the South-West African People's Organization by Angola, and to the UNITA rebels by South Africa. The US Officials played important role in bringing about the strategic shift by clearly warning South Africa that a continuation

of destabilization as was pursued by South Africa in December 1983 against Angola, could jeopardize the American-South African ties.

The Mozambique aspect of the constructive engagement programme was also successful upto 1984. Since 1981, the US- Mozambique relationship was improving. By 1983, events had progressed to such a point where the United States and Mozambique were involved in an intensive dialogue that resulted in a tacit understanding over the role of the United States in this region. The Reagan administration resumed normal diplomatic relations with the Machel government; agreed to provide Mozambique with economic and some non-lethal military assistance; encouraged the U.S. companies to invest in Mozambique in building up the transport and communication facilities; and lastly, persuaded South Africa to halt the destabilization campaign against Mozambique. In return, Machel reduced anti-American rhetoric, undertook internal economic reforms, urged Angola to accept the withdrawal of Cuban troops and negotiated with South Africa over the presence of ANC activities. This rapproachment laid the ground work for the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique to be signed on 16 March 1984.

And Lastly, the Namibian problems were eluding a final settlement under the constructive engagement

programme upto 1984 despite several deadlines. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola was acting as a bulwark against the might of the powerful South African defence forces, and secondly, the Southern African region did not have a regional security structure which could have bailed Angola out of any military attacks launched by South Africa as it had happened in 1981 and 1983. The Namibian solution was hard to come by since different parties had their own strategic interests in keeping the Namibian problem on boil.

By the time of the Presidential election of 1984, the constructive engagement programme was deemed to have failed to work. The political repression on the black majority in South Africa had escalated under the partial emergency of 1984; the South African forces were consistently attacking the frontline states on the pretext of aiding and abetting the ANC guerrillas in their terrorist activities in South Africa; and , the negotiation on Namibian-Angolan issue had stagnated. Beside, the public opinion in the United States was getting restless for the failure of the Reagan administration to take any punitive measures against South Africa for its violation of human rights and the numerous attacks on the poor, neighbouring states. By 1984, it came to be realised that although the dismant-

ling of apartheid was one of the primary objectives, it, however, was not given the priority it deserved.

Evaluation of the 'Constructive Engagement Programme' :

The Protagonists of the constructive engagement concluded that it was intended not merely as a policy toward South Africa, but as an effort to deal with the entire Southern African region and its promoting, with an enhanced reputation of the United States at the cost of its Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union. But as the picture of the Southern African region presented itself at the end of 1984, the failure of the constructive engagement was a foregone conclusion of the region was in as much political turmoil as ever, the Cubans troops were still in Angola, the Namibian independence was still far away and the most importantly, the South Africa was gripped in political anarchy with the majority blacks and the white regime locked in a fierce battle over status quo or change. In spite of the fact that the Reagan administration failed to pursue its South African politics of bringing the reign of apartheid to an end in a non-partisan matter, the constructive engagement programme's critics failed to acknowledge the administration's efforts to maintain a positive relationship with Zimbabwe; to

normalize relations with Mozambique; and to develop an operative dialogue with Angola and Namibia. In all these issues, the Administration officials demonstrated a willingness to take seriously the legitimate security concerns of radical-Socialist governments. And, except in the Angolan case, positive results were achieved to an extent.

(By the end of the first term of President Reagan, the constructive engagement programme was deemed to have failed to achieve any result. This failure on the Administration's part was followed by the evolution of anti-apartheid sentiments in the United States.) Firstly, televisions were for the first time bringing the black challenge and accompanying violence into millions of American homes. Secondly, the possibility of President Reagan's election had left the Democrats' in disarray and anti-apartheid movement was perhaps the only issue to revitalize the party cadres. Thirdly, the increasing mobilization of the American blacks around the issue of apartheid began to worry the Republican office holders at the city, state and federal level. Younger Republicans in particular felt sensitive to the charges of siding with South Africa by not being more forthright in opposing apartheid. In December 1984, 35 conservative republicans

of the House of Representatives delivered a letter of the South African ambassador in Washington saying that they would be compelled to support sanctions against Pretoria if there was not an early end of apartheid. At the same time, by 1984, the growing public disenchantment with the policies of the Reagan administration had come to centre around disinvestment and economic sanctions. "The demand for disinvestment was based on the fact that American capital had gone on to strengthen the apartheid system".⁴¹ and was tied to force the South African withdrawal from Namibia and a broad concern for fundamental redistribution of economic and political privileges within South Africa. Legislation was passed in the House of Representatives to mandate compliance with the Sullivan principles and to restriction the importation of Krugerrands, and similar bills were introduced in the Congress. Representative William Grey introduced legislation that would ban any new investment in South Africa. The House also sought to prohibit any further IMF loans to countries that follow any discriminatory policies against its people. However, in the United States, a broadbased disinvestment was underway since 1970s in numerous state legislatures and through universities and churches to withdraw investment from corporations and banks dealing with

⁴¹Wolfgang Saxon, New York Times (New York), Jan.9,1985.

South Africa. In 1978, the city of Catati in California passed a legislation that prohibited investment of public fund in companies with South African interests. In 1980, Nebraska was the first state to take similar action. In 1982, connecticut Massachusetts and Michaignan followed suit. By the end of 1984, the campaign had taken the shape of a national movements. By the end of the same year, the Free South Africa movement was formed to coordinate the efforts of political, labour , church and academic organisations and to give leadership to the campaign".⁴² This movement had some 3000 people, 22 congressmen and many other prominent persons in its ranks. The members of the organisations courted arrest in front of the South African embassy in Washington. By the end of 1984, six state governments and a twentysix cities had passed some form of dis-investment legislation; whereas such legislation was pending in another twenty five states and numerous other cities".⁴³ However, at the political level, the dis-investment issue was generating heated debate between its supporters and opponents on different grounds.

⁴²Desmond Cosmas, "Sanctions and South Africa", Third World Quarterly (London), vol.18, no.1 January 1986, pp.76.

⁴³Desmond Cosmas, "Sanctions and South Africa", Third World Quarterly, vol. 18, no.1, January 1986, pp.79, 97-8.

~~In the ultimate final analysis,~~ [the President Reagan's first term which had began on the hope of optimism on the basis of its constructive engagement programme,] ^{and} was at the end, the most condemned initiatives of the Reagan Administration. And, only a radical shift of the American policy toward South Africa would have endeared the public opinion and other opponents of apartheid system in South Africa. The eventual re-election of President Reagan in November 1984 was expected to bring about this perceptive change regarding South Africa.]

C H A P T E R - I I I

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SECOND TERM (1985-1989)
AND THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA:

The initial months of the second -term of President Reagan though did not bring any substantial change regarding its South African policies, the apartheid politics in South Africa, however, had become the foremost agenda at the public opinion level in the United States. (Sensing the displeasure of the people, the media and Congress, the President in his December 7, 1984, Human Rights Day speech stated, "The United States regards racism with repugnance" and called on South Africa to end its unjust black policy".⁴⁴)

Back in South Africa, the Botha regime clamped a partial emergency in South Africa against all the forces opposed to its apartheid policies. The political demonstrations were banned, the military and police were given substantial powers to deal with the political activities, the activities of the organizations were severely restricted and the movement of the media was restricted and its reporting censured. Besides, the South African forces launched a decisive attacks against the frontline states like Zimbabwe, Botswana,

⁴⁴Africa News, December 7, 1984.

Mozambique, Angola and others to destroy the ANC hideouts and these attacks were also intended to teach countries a lesson for their unflinching support to the nationalist organizations in South Africa. Similarly, by early 1985, the South African government admitted to have violated the spirit of the Nkomati agreement with Mozambique.

All these activities of the South African government, and the world-wide demand for disinvest made and sanctions was weighing on the conscience of the people -- the intellectuals the Congressmen and others. There was a general agreement in the United States at the intellectual level that the United States' policy was far from tough and indecisive in relations to the white regime in Pretoria. In this regard, the examples of the other countries were cited. "India was the first country to sever all economic and cultural links with South Africa way back in 1947. By 1962 boycotts of South Africa was imposed by the USSR, China, Malaysia, Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, Surinam, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Laose and Sudan".⁴⁵

⁴⁵C. Childs, 'Apartheid, economic collaboration and the case for UN Comprehensive Sanctions Against SA', UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1984.

Norway decided in 1976 not to grant foreign exchange licences for investment in South Africa; Sweden banned new investment in 1979. Following the declaration of state of emergency on 20th July 1985, Canada, Australia and all the members of the European Economic Community with the exception of Great Britain and West Germany took substantial action. Brazil prohibited the export of arms, crude oil and cultural contacts. France took the most significant action so far by withdrawing its ambassadors and also banned new investments.

In the light of the growing isolation of South Africa in the international community, it was being said that the South African problem could be brought to any meaningful and only after the firm support of the United States and its allies in favour of disinvestment and sanctions.

Disinvestment campaign in the United States:

Since the 1960s, a number of multinational corporations were contributing in the process of industrialization in South Africa by investing significant amount of capital. The MNCs were contributing in the mining industry, metalurgy and by providing technology in extraction of natural resources at cheap cost. These MNCs were dependent upon the capitals generated in the United States from the pensioners, the churches, the

Universities and other donors like banks. Though the American capital amounted to only a small proportion of new fixed capital formations in South Africa, the President Botha duly recognized its strategic importance when he said that, "because it supplemented domestic savings to financial investment, it favourably affected the balance of payments and often involved the transfer of technological know-how and sometimes the immigration of managers and highly qualified technical people"⁴⁶

The white population of South Africa, the political parties and other sections of the society were also aware of the economic and political importance of foreign If the Western capital in the form of bank loans and direct investment remained tied up in South Africa, the Western political support would naturally be greater. It was their concern for protection of these economic interests which forced the United States, Britain and France to veto any punitive actions against South Africa in the United Nations. It was for this reason that disinvestment by companies of North America, British and French origins was being given primary thrust. At the same time, disinvestment despite its relative insignificance in narrow economic terms would have removed an

⁴⁶South Africa Institute of Race Relations
(Johannesburgh) Survey of Race Relations, p.109.

essential prop to the system and allowed blacks a greater opportunity to exert pressure for political change because of the system's increasing dependence on the foreign powers for its development. Disinvestment might not have brought radical political changes in South Africa, but it would have certainly paved the way for other meaningful actions on the part of the United States and others, since they would have less to lose in terms of retaliation by South Africa. On the psychological level, it would have been a gesture of solidarity and a morale booster to the South African blacks as they were the prime victims of inequality, injustice at the hands of the white minority rulers. On the other hand, those who were opposed to the disinvestment campaign, argued that it might affect the pensioner's funds. Secondly, it was said that in the situation of disinvestment and withdrawal of the American companies it would be the black workers to suffer the most. The blacks were to lose jobs as well as the other facilities provided by the American companies under the Sullivan principles signed by 12 American companies on March 1st, 1977 were to use their economic and social clout to help end apartheid. The principles required the US companies to end all racial discrimination in their operations;

to train and elevate blacks to all levels of technical and supervisory positions in large numbers; to recognize an integrated black trade union and to work at improving the quality of workers both life of inside and outside their workplace. These principles were later modified to require them to work for total socio-economic and political justice. By 1982, more than 150 American companies had become signatories of the Sullivan principles. They built schools and health facilities and helped change property rights for the blacks.

Thirdly, it was argued that disinvestment from South Africa might lead to recession in South Africa and this recession would negatively stagnate the development process and the will of South African government to change its political systems on democratic lines.

(This disinvestment campaign resulted in a substantial fall in the American investment by 1985. In absolute term, the American investment which was \$2.2 billion in 1982, had come down \$ 1.2 billion in 1985. The American banks which accounted for 27 percent of loans to the private institutions of South Africa decided not to lend fresh loans to the South African government and its agencies. The city bank, the world's

largest private bank and the largest donor of the United States announced in February 1985 that it would not be giving fresh loans to the South African government nor would it sell Krugerrands. Wells Fargo the First National Bank of Boston went further and announced that on they would not make any loans to the private sector in South Africa. Partly as a result of the campaign there was a fall in the U.S. bank loans to the public sector from \$623 million in 1982 to \$343 million by September 1984. There was, however, a dramatic surge in loans to the private sectors; the U.S. lending to private institutions other than banks increased from \$496 million in June 1981 to \$1.1 billion in September 1984 and lending to banks from \$1.08 billion to \$3.55 billion over the same period.

The disinvestment campaign also helped to create a political climate in which it was possible for both the Houses of Congress to pass legislation which would prohibit new investments and also provide some form of sanctions. In the House of Representatives, 56 Republican members joined the Democrats in supporting an anti-apartheid bill which would prohibit new loans to South African government and state corporations, any new investment, sale of computer and other technologies, Krugerrands. The Senate also

passed a bill asking for milder package. By mid-1985, the South Africa became vulnerable to divestment and other measures like sanctions. In 1982 and 1983, the economy of South Africa experienced negative growth. Despite some growth in 1984, the index of leading indicators fell by 17 percent in January and by 13 percent in February 1985; the prime borrowing rate of interest was .25 percent in June 1985, while inflation was at 16 percent. The international financial community's disappointment with South African President Botha's policy speech in August 1985 was reflected in the fall of the Rand to a record low \$0.38 compared to \$1 a year earlier. On 27 August 1985, the South African Finance Minister announced the closure of foreign exchange and share market. Four days later, South Africa froze repayments for four months of \$ 12 billion of short term loans out of a total foreign debt of \$17 billion. As the financial times (25 September 1985) commented, the crisis was brought almost entirely by political rather than economic pressure. Other factors like, the 27 percent expenditure on its defence out of the budget, the high cost of the occupation of Namibia, 18 percent expenditure on oil because of its high cost from coal-process, and the incentive payments it had to make to circumvent the OPEC oil embargo, the prolonged draught, the fall in gold price and that of

rise of dollar also contributed to the slide in South African economy. Meanwhile, the success of the divestment campaign and the supporters of the Free South Africa Movement and the Trans Africa Movement in the Congress urged the Reagan administration to bring about a substantial change in its South African policy. Richard Lugar, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Ms Nancy Kassebaum, the Republican Chairman of the Senate sub-committee on Africa spoke out against pretoria and the administration's policy of constructive engagement. Throughout 1985, political turmoil continued in South Africa and domestic pressure against the Reagan administration was mounting.

Thus the immediate issues which forced a drastic change in the Reagan administration's attitude toward South Africa in 1985 were: (a) the establishment of an interim administration in Namibia which was promptly rejected by the Reagan administration;

(b) the May 1985 attempt by the South African commandos to blow up the Gulf oil corporation facilities in Angola's cabinda provice;

(c) the June 1985 raid in Botswana to destroy the ANC offices which forced the U.S. to recall its ambassadors to South Africa, Mr. Herman Nickel;

(d) the South African forces September 1985 invasion of South Angola;

(e) the June 1985, President Botha declared a partial state of emergency banning all political activities against the apartheid system.

In the midst of these political incidents and in order to placate a growing demand of punitive sanctions against South Africa, President Reagan, on September 9, 1985, announced his Executive Order: No.12532 in which he outlined restrictions on trade and investment in South Africa.

President's Executive Order, No.12532, 9 Sept. 1985:

The President declared a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the policies and actions of the government of South Africa to the foreign policy of the United States. In his executive order, he prohibited:

The making of approval of bank loans to the South African government, with certain narrow exceptions.

The export of computer and related goods and technology to certain government agencies and any apartheid enforcing entity of the South African government.

Nuclear exports to South Africa and related transactions with certain narrow restrictions.

The impact into the United States of arms, ammunitions, or military vehicles produced in South Africa.

The extension of export marketing support to the American firms employing at least twenty-five persons in South Africa that did not adhere to certain fair labour standards.

Consultations with other parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with a view toward adopting a prohibition on the import of Krugerrands.

The completion of a report on the feasibility of minting gold coins.

An increase in the amount for scholarships in South Africa to the victims at apartheid and an increase in the amount allocated for South Africa in the Human Rights Fund.

The establishment of an Advisory Committee to give recommendations and other measures to encourage peaceful change in South Africa."

President Reagan issued another Executive Order, No.12535 on October 1, 1985 by which he prohibited the importation of South African Krugerrand into the United States to be effective from 11 October 1985. The office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury issued South African Transactions regulations

on 9 October 1985 to implement the Krugerrand. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the Department of Treasury issued regulations on the importation of the articles on the United States Munitions Import list on 7 October 1985 implementing the prohibition of certain arms imports contained in the Executive Order No.12532. The Department of State issued the final regulations on South Africa and Fair Labour provisions of the Order. The office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department issued South African Transactions Regulations on November 6, 1985 implementing the Order's bank loan prohibition. The International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce issued regulations of Export controls on the Republic of South Africa on 14 November 1985, implementing the nuclear and computer export prohibitions of the Order. With the publication of a notice in the Federal Register, the Department of State established the Advisory Committee on 22 October 1985. The Committee met several times before submitting a report on the feasibility of minting U.S. gold coins, and on 17 December 1985, President Reagan signed the Gold Bullion Coin Act of 1985, requiring the minting of such coins.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Executive Order No.12532, 50 Federal Register, 36861 (Washington), 1985.

The President's Executive Order No. 12532 and No. 12535 proved to be an act to appease the growing public opinion in favour of economic sanctions against South Africa. On the other, the Pretoria regime's announcement on 1 June, 1986 to impose a state of emergency and also to give unrestricted powers to South African military and forces to deal with the anti-apartheid forces did not help the Reagan administration to espouse further support to the South African government. The South African government, in 1986, locked up around 10,000 opposition leaders, suspended civil rights, put the security forces above the law and gagged the press, the Reagan administration was still opposed to sanctions as it would have been too 'blunt' an instrument to use. In his 22 July 1986 speech on South Africa, President Reagan argued that sanctions "would destroy America's flexibility, discard our diplomatic leverage, and deepen the crisis", The President, however, responding to the domestic criticism, authorised an interagency working group on South Africa which was to focus on tactics and not its basic policy, approved an increase in foreign aid to the South African blacks, appointed a high-powered bipartisan advisory committee on South Africa to build a domestic political consensus and also decided to send a black ambassador to South Africa.

Besides in 1986 itself, the Sullivan principles were further modified requiring the American companies to actively support actions that would help eradicate all apartheid laws. The principles also required that the U.S. companies to practice "corporate civil disobedience" by refusing to comply any apartheid laws or requirements within their corporations and to use their full legal and financial resources to assist blacks in obtaining equal access to all public and private amenities. These included parks, beaches, hospitals, schools, transportations and housing.

Another version of the principles called for the corporate support for equal political rights to all blacks. Despite these political and moral support to the South African blacks in their struggle against apartheid, the American government's relations with the black population had reached an all-time low by 1986 because of inadequate and half-hearted support so far. The Reagan administration made only a few official contacts on a meaningful level, and also on a regular basis with the black organizations and leaders including the ANC. During the investigations conducted by the members of the official American Advisory Committee on South Africa, most of the blacks turned their back on any one associated with the American administration. To show their hostility to the

constructive engagement programme, the most prominent black leaders refused to attend U.S. functions, or to meet the Congressional delegation. In June 1986, the American Foreign Aid Official Mark Edelman stated that nearly half of the black organizations approached by the U.S. government turned down such assistances.

The disillusionment of the blacks was based on the failure of the Reagan administration to give primacy to the rights of the blacks, while lending total support to the white regime of South Africa. For instance, Washington described the 1984 constitution which denied black any representation in the new parliament as a step in the right direction. Secondly, US brokered the Nkomati Accord of 1984, between South Africa and Mozambique, which not only deprived the ANC of sanctuaries but also failed to provide Mozambique with an enduring security. Thirdly, in 1985, the United States repealed the provisions of Clark Amendment to provide military aid of \$30 million and other supports in collusion with South Africa, whereas it maintained distance with the ANC. And lastly, the Reagan administration refused to meet with the ANC Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo while he was in America on a private visit in June 1986.

In South Africa, the Pretoria regime decided to repeal pass laws under which blacks were no longer subject to

arrest for not carrying an identity document.

Blacks were also allowed to buy house but only in the segregated areas of "White South Africa" available to them, such as the Black townships. The regime also made central business districts theoretically open to all races, but in practice only where the white-controlled municipal authorities permitted it.

During early 1986, the government also seemed to be seriously considering releasing Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. The other reforms included the legalization of black trade unions, virtual abolition of the Mixed Marriages and the Immorality Acts, elimination of job reservations, repeal of the prohibition of political interference Act which banned multi-racial political alliances; and the blacks' and admissions to formally all white private schools universities. The rays of political changes in South Africa were, however, aborted by the South African raid on the ANC installations into Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. This time, the United States supported the UN Security Council resolution condemning these South African strikes. But the United States made an uncharacteristic turn about by vetting a UN Security Council resolution calling for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa in response to the 19 May raids against the front line states of Southern Africa.

In the later half of 1986, the need for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa for its unabashed institutionalization of apartheid system intensified to such an extent that both the houses of the Congress were about to reach on a consensus over its modalities. On June 18, 1986, the House of Representatives passed a bill which have ended virtually all trade with South Africa and forced the American businessmen to leave that country within six months. In his response to the House action, President Reagan publicly urged Congress to resist the "emotional factor" for punitive actions. In his July 22, 1986 address to the Congress, President Reagan recognized advances made by the South African government toward changing the apartheid structure. He condemned apartheid generally and maintained that "the constructive engagement remained the most viable policy toward South Africa."⁴⁸

President Reagan in his speech outlined the basic objectives of the administration's policy toward South Africa;

- (a) a time-table for elimination of apartheid law should be set;
- (b) all political prisoners should be released immediately;
- (c) Nelson Mandela should be released to participate in the country's political process;
- (d) all black political movements should be unbanned;

⁴⁸Department of State Bulletin, February 1987, pp. 36-40.

(e) both the government and its opponents should begin a dialogue over constructing a political system that rests upon the consent of all, where the rights of majorities and minorities and others are protected by law.

The Secretary of State, George Schultz in his address to the Congress on 23 July 1986, reiterated President Reagan's stated objectives and the degree of American involvement in it. On 21 July 1986, the US ambassador to Zambia, Paula Hari met the ANC leaders as part of the US efforts to promote negotiations among all the parties concerned with a peaceful outcome in South Africa. On August 12, 1986, the US President, Ronald Reagan while attending a press conference in Chicago, called for the dismantling of apartheid. On September 4, 1986, the US criticized the South African government's decision to further restrict the media coverage in South Africa.

All these efforts of President Reagan and his staff to placate the demand for sanctions failed, as on August 15, 1986, the Senate by a vote of 84 to 14, passed a bill imposing economic sanctions against South Africa. Senators Lugar and Kassenbaum, the main architects of the bill appealed to the President to accept it. On September 12, 1986, the House of

Representatives passed this bill by a vote of 308 to 77. On 26 September 1986, President Reagan vetoed the bill and returned it to the Congress, arguing that the main victim of the bill would be the South African blacks as well as the frontline states and its economies. According to him, this bill aimed directly at the labour intensive industries upon which the black majority was depending for their survival. He cited that banning the import of sugar would effect the livelihood of 23,000 black farmers. Banning the import of natural resources were directly targeted directly at the mining industries of South Africa which provided livelihood to more than half-a-million black labourers.

Impact of Sanctions on the Frontline States:

The imposition of such sanctions would also delivered a devastating blow to the Frontline states that depend on South Africa for transportation, energy, market and food. An estimated 350,000 foreign workers stayed and worked in South Africa. Remittances from these workers had great economic importance for Mozambique, Lesotho and other countries. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were dependent upon South Africa for the import of their basic requirement including half of the foodstuffs consumed in these countries. Two-third of the total government revenues of Swaziland, and one-third of that of Botswana and Lesotho came from tariffs

collected from imported goods by South Africa. All electricity used by Lesotho, and most of that by Botswana, Swaziland and Maputi in Mozambique was supplied by South Africa. And Lesotho, Zimbabwe Botswana, Zambia and Zaire had been relying heavily on South Africa's rail network and port system. All these factors made these countries extremely vulnerable to the retaliation by South Africa against any sanction measures against it. And lastly, President Reagan arguing against sanctions, also pointed out that any South African counter-sanction would badly affect the military-industrial complex of the United States, the South Africa could even stop naval facilities and other logistic supports to the US navy in the East of the Indian Ocean-via-the Cape route. The President informed the Congress that if it sustained his veto, he will impose a limited sanction against South Africa.

President Reagan's Executive Order, Sept. 20, 1986:

President Reagan wrote a letter to the Majority leaders, Bob Dole (Republican) in which he outlined his new Executive Order as an alternative to the sanctions. This Executive Order imposed:

A ban on new investments other than those in black-owned firms or companies applying the fair labour standards of the Sullivan Principles.

A ban on bank accounts of the South African government and its agencies.

A requirement to identify countries taking unfair advantage of the US measures against South Africa with a view to restricting their exports to the United States by the amount necessary to compensate for the loss of American companies.

A requirement to report and make recommendations on means of reducing dependence on strategic minerals from South Africa.

A requirement to provide at least \$ 25 million in assistance for scholarships , education, community development, and legal aid to disadvantaged South Africans with a prohibition on such assistance to any group of individuals, engaged in gross violation of internationally recognized human rights.

A wide-ranging criminal and civil penalties under several statutes for violation of the provisions of the Executive Order.

A requirement to consult with allies in order to coordinate policies and programmes toward South Africa.

A requirement to report on whether any of these provisions have the effect of increasing US or allies' dependents on the Soviet bloc for strategic or other critical materials , with a view to make appropriate modifications of US measures should such dependency is realistic.

A clear statement that this Executive Order constitutes a complete and comprehensive statement of US policy toward South Africa, with the intent of pre-empting inconsistent and local laws which under the provision of American constitution may be pre-empted.

All these rhetorics and the new Executive Order of President Reagan was nullified by Congress which the House of Representatives voted to override the veto by 313 to 83 on September 29, 1986; and the Senate by 78 to 210 on 8 October 2, 1986. President Reagan then was forced to issue another Executive Order ordering the different organs and departments to enforce the provisions of the comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act, 1986. These Act marked a radical departure from President Reagan's constructive engagement and this particular term had to be dropped from all official documents from this Act onwards. It further demonstrated the extent of Congress's dissatisfaction with President Reagan's earlier policies, when even his own Republican Congressmen supported the provisions of the Act. It was also for the first time since the war powers Act of 1973 that the President's veto was overridden. With the swift passage of the Act, the Congress also sent this message that the early passive policies were no longer relevant and the US must act decisively to end apartheid in South Africa.

Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986:

The Act's stated purpose was to stimulate reforms that would ultimately lead to the establishment of a non-racial democratic society in South Africa. The Act listed numerous objectives to serve as evidence of good faith by the South African government to implement reforms which included: repeal of the present state of emergency, release of all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Goran Mbeki; granting of permission to all South Africans to form political parties and permission to participate in the political process; establishment of a time table for the elimination of apartheid; negotiation with leaders of all racial constituents of South Africa; and, implementation of a policy to implement military and para-military activities aimed at the neighbouring countries.

The Act restricted various financial and economic activities of all American nationals doing business in South Africa. First, it prohibited US nationals from making or approving any extension of credit to the South African government or any organizations owned or supported by it. This restriction did not forbid loans to any educational, housing or humanitarian benefit which have been available to all South Africans on a non-

discriminatory basis. Second, the Act prohibited new investments in South Africa by any US national. Third, the Act forbade any US depository institutions from accepting or holding any deposits from the South African government or any agency controlled by it. Fourth, the Act instructed the American Export-Import Bank to encourage South African blacks to use its facilities and to guarantee credit or business to the black-owned industries.

In addition, the Act prohibited the export of numerous goods to South Africa. The Act prohibited exports of computers to the South African military police, prison system, national security agencies and other apartheid-enforcing agencies. It also prohibited the export of petroleum goods produced in the United States. The Act precluded the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission from issuing any licence for the export of nuclear materials to South Africa. The Act also terminated landing rights for South African Airways in the United States. Similarly, the Act also prohibited the import of certain goods produced in South Africa. Such goods included coal, uranium, textile, steel, iron and agricultural products, arms, ammunitions and military vehicles. Additionally, the import of Krugerrand was also banned by this Act. Finally, the Act provided funds to support black South African

students by establishing a scholarship fund for black students attending universities, colleges and secondary schools in both the United States and South Africa. With a minimum annual endowment fund of four million dollars, the scholarship fund was to be distributed among the recipients selected by a panel to be appointed by the Chief of the American diplomatic mission in South Africa.

The Act also called upon the African National Congress to re-examine its communist ties and mandated a report on the activities of the communist party of South Africa and its infiltration into the important South African political organizations. The Act urged the ANC to renounce violence and asked it to renounce the practice of "neckle c-ing" of its political opponents, and other terrorist activities and to state firmly that it would support a free and democratic post-apartheid South Africa.

Though the comprehensive anti-apartheid Act of 1986 was tough by its pronouncement, it failed to shake the South African government and its apartheid politics in real terms. Firstly, the export-restriction aspect of the Act did not prohibit the U.S. based companies from entering into lucrative agreements with the South African Companies. Secondly, the prohibition of new loans to South Africa did not affect much since the

number and volume of such foreign loans had already decreased over the last couple of years. In response to these sanctions by the United States, the South African government suspended indefinitely the repayment of all foreign loans. On political front, the Act failed to dismantle apartheid because the policy of sanctions was not pursued with commensurate diplomatic moves in other spheres of the South African politics, and internationally too. For example, hardly any thing was done by Washington to influence its Western allies and Japan to adopt similar measures. In the South African context, the American diplomacy was actually used at cross-purposes. For example, the United States continued to provide military aid to the UNITA rebels in Angola which only doomed the Namibian initiative, one of the central goals of the constructive engagement programmes of the Reagan administration. The other measure events of 1986 included the appointment of a black career foreign service officer as the American ambassador to South Africa (November 3, 1986). On November 28, 1986 the U.S. supported the recommendations contained in document S/18474 of November 24, 1986, adopted by the consensus of the Security Council Committee established by Resolution 421(1977) to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa. Before this one, the

U.S. had also supported the arms embargo recommended by the Security Council resolution no.558 of December 13, 1984. On December 4, 1986, the Secretary of State George Schultz recognized "the existence of South Africa as the only American hope in the African continent".⁴⁹ The contradiction of the American foreign policy continued in 1986 as well. It decided to oppose the UN General Assembly resolution which called the Security Council to impose a comprehensive, mandatory sanctions, similar to that of the comprehensive anti-apartheid Act of September 1986 enforced by the American Congress. The U.S. mission in the United Nation explained its opposition to the resolution by saying that it condemned the activities of all transnational corporations in South Africa. The resolution also called for the exclusion of South Africa from all organizations with the UN system as well as it was critical of the U.S. administration's policy toward South Africa.

Important points of U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa in 1986:

[The U.S. supported regional solutions to the problems of peace and stability in the Southern African

⁴⁹ Department of State Bulletin, February 1987, pp.36-40.

region. The Reagan administration's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Namibian independence and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola was continued. The UN condemned the South African threat against Botswana and other neighbours. The Reagan administration also affirmed its condemnation of cross-border attacks and other destabilizing actions by South Africa. The administration reiterated its support for the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique. And lastly, the Reagan administration condoled the untimely death of President Samora Machel of Mozambique and acknowledged his support for promotion of peace and development in Mozambique and Southern Africa in general.

By early 1987, the United States- South Africa relations had reached to an all-time low. The embittered relations between these two countries was underscored by the January 1987 report of an independent, presidentially appointed advisory Committee on U.S. policy toward South Africa. The report concluded that circumstances in South Africa had "moved in a direction sharply at odds with the hopes and expectations of the architects of American policy".⁵⁰

⁵⁰The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, Washington D.C., January 1987.

Bitter and defiant, the African government severally restricted foreign news media and restored order in the townships by using the police, army and a succession of 'state of emergency'. The United States opposed to the tactics of military solutions of the internal problems in South Africa, kept up its diplomatic pressure through rigorous enforcement of the sanctions. Besides, in actions unprecedented by any major western leader, Shultz held a meeting with the ANC leader Oliver Tambo. In September 1987, he delivered an address asserting America's vision of a post-apartheid, democratic South Africa.⁵¹ The United States promised more aids to the front line states in 1987 and recontacts with various black organizations and its leaders were revived and expanded to make a decisive break through in changing the political structure of South Africa. By the year 1987, the apartheid politics of South Africa had become a foreign policy issue in the United States with a powerful domestic resonance. Robert Dole, the Republican leader of the Senate, observed that "South Africa had become a domestic civil rights issue. It will be on Congress's agenda every year for the next decade."⁵²

⁵¹George P. Shultz, "The Democratic Future of South Africa", an address before the Business Council of International Understanding, NY, Sept. 29, 1987.

⁵²The New York Times, NY, October 3, 1986.

The year 1988 proved to be the most successful year as far as the U.S. policy toward South Africa was concerned. The independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was the most important agenda of the U.S. foreign policy to be resolved. The US-brokered agreement was signed by the Republic of South Africa and Angola on December 13, 1988 at Brazzaville, Congo. Chester Crocker, the Assistance Secretary of State for African Affairs, dubbed the Brazzaville agreement as "the culmination of many years' hard work".⁵³ Before this final agreement, the negotiation was carried out in London, Cairo, Geneva and New York for over eight months in 1988 itself. The Brazzaville protocol also marked the fulfilment of President Reagan's determination to seek removal of all foreign troops from Angola, implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 related to the independence of Namibia, and support to the UNITA freedom fighters in Angola.

Regarding South Africa, the United States regretted the South African government's announcement on 24 Feb. 1988 to outlaw the activities of a large number of anti-apartheid organizations', and accepted

⁵³Department of State Bulletin, Washington DC, February 1989, p.10.

the fact that these affected organizations were representing the aspirations of a broad cross-section of the South-African population. On 29 February 1988, the US strongly condemned the South African government's forceful repression of peaceful demonstration. On 2 March 1988, the US described the proposed South African prohibition of Foreign Funds by any political organizations in South Africa as unfortunate. On 8 March 1988, the vacillating policy of the US was once again affirmed when it voted against the UN Security Council resolution which called for mandatory sanctions, explaining that such sanctions would not only harm the very people it intended to help, but also affect the economies of Southern African states. However, on March 10, 1988 the Secretary of State George Schultz accepted the fact that 'apartheid was at the very heart of South Africa's problems', and the US sought to the creation of a democratic society with equal rights for all. The United States strongly believed that a permanent solution could be accomplished only through a mix of diplomatic and political pressures on the one hand, and series of punitive sanctions on the other. At the same time, the US continued its programmes designed to assist victims of apartheid and also to empower black South Africans to achieve their peaceful liberation through higher education and

growing economic leverage. The United States also intended to work with other countries to exchange data on assistance programmes and to explore ways of assuring a free-flow of information to South Africa in the face of rising censure and repression.

On 22 June 1988 the US Congress proposed a new sanction against South Africa (Senate bill No.2378). If enacted, the legislation would have importance bearing on the future of America diplomatic leverage with South Africa and in the whole southern African region as well. The new list of sanctions envisaged cutting off all trade links, selling of assets and relinquishing all contacts with South Africa. The Reagan administration rejected these sanctions saying that South Africa has enough resources to resist an economic siege and was prepared for such a contingency for many years. Although heavily dependent on international trade, South Africa possessed domestic deposits of virtually every key raw-material needed for an industrial economy with the major exception of crude oil and bauxite. The South African government and its private sector spent billions of dollars stockpiling such strategic imports, ranging from crude oil and bauxite to computer and aircraft parts. From the American point of view, such sanctions would have proved

costly. S.2738 would have required the US businessman to find new markets for over \$1.2 billion in annual exports of mainly manufactured and high-tech goods. The forced liquidation of over \$ 1 billion in direct US investment would have changed little in South Africa except to consolidate the position of local business interests acquiring these assets at well below the market value. On the other hand, sanctions would have seriously affected the US industries and its overall economy. Studies indicated that the US coal industry was already losing an estimate of \$ 250 million over the last three years. A sizeable portion of this loss was due to market distortions caused by existing American sanctions against South Africa. The United States would have lost another \$ 350 million a year in uranium enrichment business, for all uranium was coming from South Africa. Besides, the possibility of counter-sanctions by South Africa would have been catastrophic for a broad range of US industries. Most of the strategic and critical minerals like platinum and rhodium were imported from South Africa. The administration also clarified that while South Africa never threatened the US with a disruption or a cut off in strategic minerals supply, Pretoria, however, has had the option of slapping counter-sanctions on the neighbouring black states all of whom have been dependent on

South African trade or transport routes or both.

Similarly, if the comprehensive international sanctions against South Africa were to be imposed, the South

African blacks would be the main losers. They would lose jobs and face decreased government spending on black housing, black education and other services provided to black township. And the forced withdrawal of US corporations from South Africa would end funding to a wide range of programmes designed to promote black economic empowerment, fostered to black self-reliance, and to build professional and leadership skills. The US and other Western corporations have been playing an important role in sustaining an estimated 2000 such programmes at the grass root levels. In the face of mounting restrictions on the most form of political activities, these programmes have provided a vital organisational network and fall-back position for those blacks working to build the powerbases necessary for challenging the apartheid structured in South Africa. The strong disapproval by president against any more sanctions forced the Senate to abandon the bill no.2738.

On 13 July 1988, the South African government announced the postponement of sharpville six, and the United States welcomed it. On 13 July the US appealed for an unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners as it would contribute greatly to

create an environment leading to a broad based negotiations for the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial society in South Africa. On 14 October, the United States reaffirmed its abhorrence of racism, racial discrimination and apartheid and urged the South African government to dismantle such institutions. On 24 October 1988 President Reagan submitted his Report to the Congress evaluating the impact of the working of the comprehensive anti-apartheid Act of 1986 and stated that sanctions have gone a long way in weakening the system of apartheid in South Africa. On 25 November 1988, the United States welcomed the South African government's decision of not sending Nelson Mandela back to prison again.

The other notable events of the year 1988 included the renewal of emergency in South Africa, under which the government widened its already extensive controls over black opposition groups with new regulations which severely curtailed all but the administrative activities of 17 anti-apartheid organizations. The important newspapers like 'The New Nation' were banned to stifle the flow of information and to control the black opposition. Bombings and other forms of political violence became a daily feature of life in major townships. In an apparent effort to counteract these activities,

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the South African government proposed legislation that would strictly enforce residential segregation. The government also proposed to amend the Group Areas Act to include provisions for the mandatory eviction of blacks who had moved into housing in areas reserved for whites. In the economic aspect, the impact of sanctions proved to be telling on South African economy. The economic growth had reached to a non-growth stage. Whereas unemployment particularly among blacks increased to an all-time high - Figures issued by the United States Department of Commerce indicated that exports from South Africa to the United States dropped by more than 40 percent over the last two years. For much of 1988, the price of gold was considerably down from its peak of \$500 an ounce at the end of 1987.

All these factors contributed in bringing South Africa on the verge of a catastrophe inside, and an international isolation over its apartheid; and the United States, despite its divestment and sanction measures was unable to rid itself from the allegations of being the chief collaborator of the Pretoria regime till the late 1980s.

C H A P T E R 1 V

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND AFTERWARDS :

A CONCLUSION

As it has been analysed in the previous chapters, the last few months of President Reagan were the most tumultuous one as far as the US policy toward South Africa was concerned. Though the constructive programme was dropped two years back, one of its main tenets, the Namibia-Angolan tangle, was resolved in December 1988, with an agreement over the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola, the passage of the Namibian independence was cleared under the UN Security Council resolution 435, and the election in Namibia was to be conducted under the UN's auspices on 1 November 1989. The independence of Namibia not only salvaged the reputation of the United States as the true friend of the Southern African countries, but the simultaneous withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola also provided South Africa a new lease of life and an enhanced prestige in the Southern African politics. The threat to confront the Cuban troops as a distant reality, South Africa became free to pursue its political, economic and military interest, as well as that of its long-time ally, the United States, in this region.

Regarding Angola, as it remained one of the few communist states in this region, the American policy to support the UNITA rebels and its leader Jonas Savimbi, was continued by President Reagan's successor to the office, George Bush. As the funds for other anti-Marxist insurgencies was being cut sharply, the US assistance to the UNITA rebels was increased manifold. The President-elect, George Bush, not only welcomed Mr. Savimbi in the United States, but also described him as a true democrat.

On the other hand, during the last few months of the Reagan administration, Mozambique, by moving away from socialism, won the sympathy and an increased financial assistance from the United States. The administration withdrew its moral and material support to the RENAMO rebels of Mozambique. The Bush administration committed more aid in the development of Mozambique and other SADCC States particularly in the areas of transportation, communication facilities and others.

Other states of this region i.e., Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana were also able to win constructive support of the United States for their economic development and other infrastructural facilities.

By the last days of the Reagan administration the South African politics seemed to have moved in the direction of a substantial change. In February, 1989, the South African President, P.W. Botha stepped down and was succeeded by Mr F.W. de Klark, considered to be one of the pro-changers in the Botha regime. Aware of the effects of sanction and disinvestment, and of a prolonged international isolation, President de Klark committed himself to steady reforms in the political system of South Africa.

On February 11, 1990, Nelson Mandela, the longest serving political prisoner after serving 27 years in gallow, was released within 100 days of taking office. He released eight political prisoners of Mandela's generation, Seven of whom were leaders of the African National Congress, and one who belonged to the break-away Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). He also permitted mass demonstrations to celebrate the freedom of these leaders. He desegregated beaches; and he designated four undeveloped areas as mixed residential zones. However, the most important action taken by the South African President was the dismantling of the state security management system. This secret organization was build up by his predecessor as part of the counter-revolutionary strategy the government adopted to confront

black unrest dominated by the security and intelligence forces, this apparatus of control had multiple functions; including citizen surveillance, welfare distribution and the counter-organisation of the black population to create an alternative leadership willing to cooperate with the state.

In addition, de Klerk shifted decision-making control back into civilian hands by cutting in half the two-year compulsory military service for Whites. He decided to reduce the military budget, ended cross-border raids against neighbouring states and suspended military assistance to rebels groups in Mozambique and Angola. These measures reduced the power of the "securocrats", the political class of military, police and intelligence chiefs who, together with an inner circle of ministers and functionaries, were in charge of crushing the revolutionary uprising of 1984-87. His other important political decisions included the announcement on February 2, 1990, to legalize the ANC and the PAC, both of which had been banned for 30 years, and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which had been banned for 40 years. Restrictions were also ended on 33 other anti-apartheid organizations operating within South Africa. President de Klerk also announced the release of many political

1989 to delay pressing for more punitive sanctions for a period of six to eight months to "give de Klerk a realistic chance". The conciliatory approach adopted by the Bush administration was also based on its recognition that South Africa had become a domestic political issue. The grass-root, constituency of the United States was now seeing the South African issue not only economic or strategic terms but also as a human rights problem. Besides, the black population of the United States was now playing an important role in formulating the US policy toward South Africa. Jesse Jackson who had visited South Africa, called the 12 percent blacks and coloured to identify themselves as African American.

Despite these conciliatory overtures by the Bush administration, the apartheid institutions, alongwith the agents of its enforcement, have not been dislodged. President de Klerk's reform measures have only created a political environment in which further talks could be held and the long-standing issues to be resolved. The reluctance on part of the Whites to shed their political, economic and other dominations have only aggravated the tensions between the blacks and whites. And, the black-versus blacks violence in major townships of South Africa have also complicated the political realities of South Africa. The disagreement between the ANC and

prisoners, a selective relaxation of media censureship, the intended repeal of the Separate Amenities Act (which segregated public facilities) and the suspension of executions until new regulations make the death penalty more difficult to impose.

These changes in South Africa were welcomed by the Bush Administration and it invited both the South Africa President de Klerk and the ANC leader, Nelson Mandela to the white House. President Bush realizing public sensitivity over the South African issue always wished to avoid confrontation with the Congress. The administration appeared to be more willing than his predecessor Ronald Reagan, to cultivate a sustained and high level contacts with the anti-apartheid leaders, and through the US embassies in the Southern African region and in Washington. One of the first moves of the Bush administration was to invite Albertina Sisulu, the wife of Walter Sisulu to the White House.

The Bush administration also realized the impact of sanctions on the White South Africans. Hence, according to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, the administration was also aware to establish a working relationship with the South African whites. The most concrete result in this direction was an agreement between the Executive and Congress in June

INKATHA Party, the two predominantly black organizations, over the nature of political and economic structure in the post-apartheid South Africa would only help in lingering the chaos and anarchy. In the light of these realities, the United States under the Bush administration could play a non-partisan role in resolving the South African imbroglio and to bring about a political society on the basis of an universal adult-franchise, majority rule, protection of minorities and economic development of all particularly the blacks, the most oppressed of the South African population.

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