

INDIA AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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TO
MY PARENTS



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
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
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CERTIFICATE

Certified that the dissertation entitled, "INDIA AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA" submitted by MANORANJAN NAYAK in partial fulfilment of the award of the Degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (M.PHIL) in Jawaharlal Nehru University, is a product of his own work, carried out by him under my supervision and guidance.

It is hereby certified that this work has not been presented for the award of any other degree or diploma by any University in India and may be forwarded to the examiners for evaluation.


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PREFACE

The liberation struggles in the twentieth century in ASIA and AFRICA has invited lot of political discourse in the academic field. And the struggle against colonial and other forms of white-minority rule in Africa in the second half of the twentieth century which took place in its specific geographical, historical and social contexts, has been the leading theme in such discourse. The focus of this study is on India's role in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. As such it is desirable to analyse why India was interested in Africa? Certain key issues can be taken into account on this score; (i) Both India and Africa have experienced colonial rule by British, French and Portuguese; (ii) As far as the leadership matter is concerned, the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity itself was a sign of the emerging new relations between India and Africa. The Indian leader Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru's visit to Brussels Congress on February 1927 had provided him with an opportunity to meet many African delegates. Moreover, he had a personal commitment to the Afro-Asian resurgence. Mahatma Gandhi had for the first time used the method of 'passive resistance' against racism of South Africa. The African leaders like Kenneth Kaunda, K. Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and others were influenced by Gandhian methods; (iii) Economic and political developments constitute twin objectives of both India and African countries. Moreover, both have stakes in New International Economic Order (NIEO); (iv) India was also interested in protecting the interests of overseas

Indians living there; (v) Non-alignment has been the the main plank of the foreign policies of India and most of the African countries. Besides, the support to disarmament talks, detente between super-powers and the urge to transform Indian Ocean as a 'Zone of Peace' have tied them together.

This dissertation is branched out into six chapters. In the first chapter an attempt is made to describe the nature of liberation struggles in Africa. The decolonisation process in various colonies, viz; British, Belgium, French, Portuguese has been briefly dealt with. And the Southern African movements are highlighted too.

The second chapter is primarily concerned with the colonial situation in Angola and Mozambique. It includes the people's (natives') resistance and the emergence of mass-parties, internationalisation of the issue following the intervention of external powers, and the transfer of power. India's stand is also analysed.

In Rhodesia the settler White minority, defying all international laws, had declared Unilateral Independence. In order to bring 'majority rule', the various actors like FLS (Frontline States), Commonwealth, UN have played significant role. India's contribution in such struggle is discussed in the third chapter.

The fourth chapter deals with the Namibian colonial history, UN special responsibility to free it from the South-Africa's domination and India's role in it.

'Apartheid Policy' is perhaps the most intriguing fact of our time, The fifth chapter highlights how it became institutionalised, the various factors leading to the gradual end of such policy and the role played by India in the whole process.

In the conclusion, all the liberation struggles in Southern Africa have been briefly assessed. Inter-connections of these struggles are discovered, and the role of India as a whole has been critically dealt with.

The discussion has been of a general kind. It has just been some sort of a patchwork connecting various liberation struggles in the Southern Africa taking particular care to underline India's role in each of these separate movements keeping in background India's overall approach to the question of colonial struggle in African context.


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

ANC	- African National Congress
BSAC	- British South-African Company
CIA	- Central Intelligence Agency
CODESA	- Convention for Democratic South-Africa
DTA	- Democratic Turnhill Alliance
EPG	- Eminent Persons' group
FLS	- Frontline States
FNLA	- Front for the National Liberation of Angola.
FRELIMO	- Mozambican Liberation Front
ICJ	- International Court of Justice
ILO	- International Labour Organization
INC	- Indian National Congress
MPLA	- Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola
MRM	- Mozambican Resistance Movement
NAM	- Non-aligned Movement
NDP	- National Democratic Party
NIBMAR	- No Independence Before Majority African Rule
NIC	- Natal Indian Congress
OAU	- Organisation of African Unity
OPO	- Ovamboland People's Organisation
PAC	- Pan-African Congress
PF	- Patriotic Front
PLAN	- People's Liberation Army of Namibia.

- RF - Rhodesian Front
- SACP - South-African Communist Party
- SACTU - South-African Congress for Trade Unions
- SADCC - Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
- SWAPO - South-West-African People's Organization.
- SWANU - South-West-African National Union.
- UN - United Nations
- UNITA - Union for Total Independence of Angola
- UNTAG - UN Transition Assistance Group
- ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union
- ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union

AFRICA





Southern Africa

C H A P T E R - I

NATURE OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The year 1960 has been described as the 'Year of Africa' as some 16 countries* attained independence in that year. The decolonisation process was not uniform. It depended on the colonising power and the nature of the colony itself - size of the European populations. The 'indirect policy' of Britain aimed at the ultimate attainment of complete independence by each of her colony. But France, Portugal had maintained a system of 'direct rule', the long-term aim of which was to assimilate Africans.

The liberation struggle in Africa is essentially a politically organised group of blacks. They either have resorted armed-attack or have mass-movement through non-violent means to resolve their differences with the established authority of the state. Three consequences of African liberation struggle can be drawn: (i) the lives and property of aliens are affected; (ii) the conflict is of such a magnitude as to disrupt international peace and security; (iii) there is the intervention by any other state or institution in support of the liberators or colonial authority.¹

* Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville (Congo), Zaire, Benin (Former Dahomey), Gabon, the Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Upper-Volta.

1. Ucheg Bu Amechi, "Armed Struggle for National Liberation and International Law", The African Review (London), vol. 7, no.1, 1977, p. 61.

Generally, the process of decolonisation was based on four stages; (i) "Confrontation between the colonial and nationalist forces; (ii) rising popular pressures within the metropolitan countries against adventurist military policies in the colonies; (iii) phased concession to the nationalists following negotiation; and (iv) election or referendum for independence or transfer of power".²

The nature of decolonisation in Africa needs to be analysed. In British overseas colonies in West-Africa and elsewhere in the continent, there were no sizeable whites. So the process became a gradual transfer of power to an emergent "middle class" (lawyers, teachers, doctors, journalists etc.) who spearheaded the nationalist movements. Political parties were formed e.g.: Kenya African National Union (KANU), Conventional People's Party (CPP) in Ghana, UPC in Uganda. The movements of such parties led to the broadening of the franchise and granting of internal self-government. Finally, complete independence and sovereign status came to the colonies.

In Belgian Congo, the Political progress was systematically denied by the colonial authority. Belgium

2. Anirudha Gupta, "Struggle against colonial and Racial Domination: A Historical Perspective", Mainstream (New Delhi), Republic Day Special 1982, p. 43.

was a reluctant colonial power. It had assumed the charge of empire out of a sense of national obligation and moreover, had no habits of imperial rule to draw upon. As far as the economy is concerned, Belgium was economically weak unlike other European counterparts. The Belgian Policy could be determined, if one knows the characteristics of Belgians. Prof. Malengreau says, "Belgians are people without imagination, people do not dream, people whose thoughts are fined on reality and do not go beyond it, but who do not make reality yield up useful fruits. People who do not create but who utilise, who invent little but make better use of the inventions of others than inventors themselves".³ Though Belgium hastily gave Congo independence in June 1960, the appearance of a state did not begin to emerge because of civil war and tribal massacre. The attention of the UN and other powers was drawn. The experience of Congo marks "an extreme case of an approach to independence by an African state".⁴

Portugal, unlike Britain and Belgium, saw her African territories as an extension of Portugal itself. The features concerning the decolonisation of Lusophone Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) are: first,

3. Roger Anstey, "History of Belgian Africa until Independence" in Africa: South of the Sahara (1983-84), Europa Publications Ltd. (London), p.33.

4. For details see Crawford Young, Politics of Congo (Princeton, 1965).

the Portuguese-held territories did not attain independence through legal-constitutional means like other African countries. Rather they did so by waging protracted armed struggle. In some ways, this was inherent in the situation. The Salazarist regime entertained no intention of granting civil liberties to the people of Portugal - let alone to its colonial subjects.

Because of ruthless suppression, Africans thus choose to resort armed-struggle. So they resorted organised-violence to entrap nearly 500,000 Portuguese soldiers in marshes and forests and drain Portugal's material resources. The war lasted nearly ten years. The result was the 'dissension' among army-men. It turned against the regime, staged a coup and began precipitately withdrawing from the colonies. This linkage between African freedom and establishment of democracy or end of an authoritarian rule (fascist) in Portugal was another feature of Portuguese decolonisation (Details in Chapter 2).

Another feature was that the increasing penetration of 'Lusophone Africa' by international capital. The process was a mutual one. In lieu of military and economic aid, Portugal yielded to its Western allies larger shares of its colonial plunder in terms of foreign investment. In Angola, business boomed just as the colonial war engulfed more and more areas of the country: the Americans invested in Coffee

production and oil exploration, the West-Germans in the Commercial sector, and South-Africans mainly in diamond mining. Also for energy generation, the South Africans collaborated with the Portuguese to set up two hydro-electric projects on the borders of Angola and Mozambique. The revenues of Portugal raised from its foreign earnings thus not a large part of its military costs. They also helped transform its imperial role into that of an 'absentee Landlord' auctioning land for commercial profit. In the process, the binding tie between metropole and its overseas 'provinces' vanished.⁵

In other countries of Southern Africa viz. Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, the majority blacks were suppressed by the white minority which attract world attention.

Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) represents "a unique blend of two conflicting models - decolonisation by means of armed struggle and by ballot to establish majority rule".⁶ Some important features of the 'Rhodesian model' could be drawn. First, the 'internationalisation' of the issue following the Britain's apathy to sort out the matter in

5. Anirudha Gupta, "Revolution, Luso-phone Africa and Cabral's Contribution" (Review Article), International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 23, no. 2, (1986), pp.172-3.

6. Anirudha Gupta, "Decolonisation: Zimbabwe Model", World Focus (New Delhi), Vol.4, (1980), p. 13.

either way. So this turned out the involvement of UN. As a result, Britain's role got diminished. Moreover, the involvement of external parties added a new dimension. The help extended by South Africa and Portugal provided moral support for Smith regime to hold strong position. K. Kaunda said, there existed "an unholy alliance" ⁷ between Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury i.e. racism, backward economy and minority regime respectively. The role of FLS can't be ignored here. It is essential to know about the definition of FLS. The neighbouring countries were affected by the racist policy of Smith regime. In Rhodesian case, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania are FLS. These FLS wanted to lessen their dependence on South Africa. South Africa - a rich country in the region-extended help to Salisbury. FLS were also depending on South Africa's economy. So FLS did invite the Chinese to build up the Tan-Zan railway for trade. In fact, the Chinese entry into the area added an important dimension to the crisis. The Sino-Soviet competition began in the region which resulted in the 'dissension' among Black political leaders. (Mr. NKomo's ZAPU enjoyed special backing from Moscow while ZANU had connexion with Beijing).

Second, the armed struggle, launched by ZAPU and ZANU got accelerated following the collapse of Portuguese

7. Ibid, p. 11.

empire in Angola and Mozambique. The selective and mandatory sanctions were imposed by UN. And the pressure from US and commonwealth Nations finally brought Ian Smith to come out with 'negotiated settlement'. As far as the role of Commonwealth is concerned, the diplomacy of African Nations within Commonwealth concentrated on persuading Britain to accept its colonial responsibility in order to decolonise Zimbabwe and delimit the role of external powers. Finally, the popular election took place under the aegis of Britain, established 'majority rule'. What was unique was that the barrel was thrown out and the ballot own.

South-West Africa (presently Namibia) presents another interesting model of decolonisation. Politically insecure and economically rich South Africa illegally subjugated Namibia since the end of first World War. The basic rights of blacks were denied. Certain features could be underscored. First, the Namibian issue became the UN's direct responsibility. Hence, UN took steps including imposing sanctions against South Africa, passing resolutions for independence of Namibia. Second, refusal of whites to give political share to blacks resulted in the 'armed-attack' by SWAPO. Third, situation got changed following the independence of the bordering states. South Africa had to suffer from economic drainage because of incessant war with SWAPO forces. The changing policies of Western Powers (contact group), the reforms of South African President, Mr. De Klerk

paved the way for 'negotiated settlement'. Like Rhodesia, ballot played the final role for victory.

The apartheid policy of South Africa has become world concern. The dimensions of South African Liberation Struggle' are: First, there was no metropolitan power to exercise pressure on the racist power. (like Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe).

Second, public opinion from within the white community was not infavour of 'decolonisation'.

Third, international capitalism continued to support a fascist-cum-racist regime in South Africa against the nationalist forces.

Fourth, South Africa was little bothered about antagonism from the Third World countries because of its technology, military organisation and management.

Finally, the role of FLS, NAM, Commonwealth and UN in liquidating the 'apartheid' in South Africa has been one of the important developments in the late 20th century.⁸

South Africa's white regime has defied world opinion for quite a long time. But as the FLS, after

8. n.2, p.46.

independence, have played pivotal role in ending the apartheid (details in 5th Chapter). The unconditional release of Dr. Mandela and other ANC leaders, liberation of Namibia, whites support in favour of De Klerk's reformist policies (referendum took place 19th March, 1992) are the signs of apartheid crumbling.

From this brief survey, we can draw certain conclusions, First, there exists certain commonalities among the black Nationalist Parties, viz: (i) All these parties namely, MPLA, FRELIMO, PF, SWAPO & ANC have been backed by Socialist Nations, especially Soviet Union. (ii) Though the final stage of liberation was different, all have resorted to 'armed violence' against colonial and racial regimes. For instance, armed struggle granted independence to Angola and Mozambique while in Rhodesia and Namibia final victory came to the black majority by ballot-box.

The sequences of Southern African Liberation Movements starting from the fall of Portuguese empire to the dismantle of apartheid in South Africa could be seen in this context. The decolonisation process in Portuguese Africa brought closer the realisation of the goal of liberating the continent from racial and colonial domination.⁹

9. Anirudha Gupta, "Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the dialectics of Liberation of Southern Africa", International Studies (New Delhi), January 1975, p.1.

Therefore, the changes that took place in Southern Africa are as follows; (i) the forces of African liberation which had been kept at bay on the borders of Angola and Mozambique advanced and encircled the territories under white-domination (South-Africa and Rhodesia); (ii) for the first time, the white regime in South Africa got a fear psychosis with a view to averting any possible attack by the SWAPO forces operating in Southern Angola. It cost South a lot to maintain nearly 48,000 strong army in Namibia; (iii) In late 1970s, the emergence of FLS also changed the situation. They provided moral and military support to the Nationalist forces, imposed sanctions on the salisbury and Pretoria regimes and gave a wide hand to world community for 'negotiated settlement'. (iv) the external intervention i.e. Western powers supported the colonial authorities because of their economic interest. On the other hand, Soviet Union backed nationalist forces who won the battle. This made the Western powers aware of the strategic interests in the region, finally (v) the world community as well as other third world nations increased their support to the nationalist forces.

The subsequent chapters deal with the factors leading to the liberation of individual states in Southern Africa and India's involvement in these struggles.

C H A P T E R - I I

INDIA - ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Angola and Mozambique represent two 'classics' of Lusophone Africa. The history of these colonies independence has been a fine example of Mao's principle, "Power comes through the barrel of the gun." In this chapter an attempt is made to discuss about the colonial situation, people's resistance and emergence of mass parties, involvement of external powers and the end of the struggle and finally, India's role in the struggle.

The overseas colonies have been treated as an indispensable part of Portugal. Dr. Salazar, by an Act of 1951, converted these colonies into 'provinces' of Portugal. Because of poor economy of the metropole and rich resources of the colonies, there increased the exodus of white settlers to the colonies. "By 1969, the European population was estimated to have grown to around 250,000 due to strenuous Portuguese government efforts to settle white farmers in the African land."¹

The colonial situation, during the authoritarianism of Dr. Salazar (1926-1974) was very worse. The trend towards decentralisation from Lisbon was stopped and was

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Abshine & Samuels, The Portuguese Racial Legacy, (New York, 1969), P.5.

reversed in some extent. The interests of the colonies were made more directly subject to the immediate interests of the Portugal. So whatever might be thought good for Portugal would also be good for the colonies and their people. So the discussion of liberal policies or attitude came to an end.

Moreover, there was a clear demarcation between 'natives' or 'uncivilised persons' and 'settlers' or 'civilised persons'. The natives were available for impressment to forced labour, or else to migrant labour under contractual conditions over which they had no control of any kind. Education was not given to them. The colonies were obliged to grow cash-crops for sale on the Portuguese markets, but once again at prices which lay beyond their control.

Emergence of Mass-parties and their resistance :-

Because of economic exploitation, political subjugation and cultural humiliation, there came the emergence of mass organisations in Angola and Mozambique (As in the case of India i.e. INC in 1885). Regarding the mass-organizations, Angola differs from Mozambique in some respect. In Angola, the MPLA was founded in December 10, 1956 "as a clandestine nationalist party."²

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N.K.Krishnan, "The story of Angola's Freedom",
New Age, (New Delhi) Jan. 1, 1978, P.14.

But the rival nationalist organisations received support from a variety of international sources. The FNLA was formed on 28 March 1962, "by the Bakongo Peasantry settled both sides of the Angolan-Zairian borders"³ and Holden Roberto was the leader. "For ethnic and ideological reasons, FNLA received Portuguese from Mobutu's despotic regime in Kinshasa."⁴ The UNITA was founded in March 1966, headed by Jonas Savimbi and received help from South-Africa, as it was operated in Southern Angola.

In case of Mozambique, FRELIMO was formed in June 1962 by the merger of three African nationalist movements viz. UDENAMO (The Uniao Democratica Nacional de Mocambique, formed on 2 October 1960 among Mozambican exiles in Rhodesia and Nyasaland), MANU (The Mozambican African Nationalist Union, founded by Mombasa, Kenya during February 1961) and UNAMI (Uniao Africana de Mocambique Independente, founded in 1961 by Mozambican exiles from Tete district), "under the pressure of

³ Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements, Oxford (London, 1972), P.229.

⁴ Anirudha Gupta, "Revolution, Lusophone Africa and Cabral's Contribution" (Review Article), 'International Studies', Sage publications (New Delhi) vol. 23, 1986, P.173.

Pan-African demands."⁵

Armed-resistance was not started immediately after the formation of parties. (In Angola it was in 1961 and Mozambique in 1964). The reason for armed resistance was that, the Portuguese dictatorship continued to refuse all real concessions to African sovereignty, whether in the field of politics, culture or economics. The Portuguese had to deploy its army to suppress the armed nationalists in Angola and Mozambique. "The war in Portuguese colonies could not have continued had Portugal been a democratic country - for nine out of ten in Portugal would then have opted out of the war."⁶

As a poor nation, the question arises here, from where Portugal did find strength to fight in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau for nearly 10 years? As a member of NATO, sophisticated armaments were supplied by US, West Germany. In lieu of that Dr. Salazar had nothing to give back except inviting

⁵ Gibson, *ibid*, P. 276.

⁶ Anirudha Gupta, "Struggle against colonial and Racial domination: A historical perspective", Mainstream (New Delhi), Republic Day Special, 1982, P.43.

the foreigners to invest in the economy of the colonies. So here comes the 'external involvement'. On the other hand, the nationalist parties were getting support from USSR, China and Chechoslovakia and other Third world countries. The neighbouring countries like Tanzania (President Julius Nyerere) provided major bases of his country to FRELIMO to launch its struggle. The material support was materialized through African Liberation Committee of the OAU. In Angola, however, the armed struggle failed to unite the 3 rival organisations. As a result of the flow of military aid from outside Africa, the split among freedom fighters and inter-state tensions in Africa took place. Even there was bitter nexus between those who received aid from Moscow and Beijing (because of Sino-Soviet rivalry).

While the FRELIMO (leaders like Dr. Mondalane, Samora Machel) and the MPLA (Dr. Augustino Neto) received military aid from Moscow, in Angola, the CIA, Beijing, South - Africa, Zaire supported the puppet organisations i.e. FNLA and UNITA. Mercenary bands were trained and armed to fight against MPLA. Reactionary elements were mobilised to support FNLA and UNITA and confuse international public opinion. The motif behind the acts

of imperialists and South Africa was to disrupt the unity of Angolan Liberation Movements so that the liberation will be difficult and their economic interests will be preserved.

What made Portugal to withdraw from Angola and Mozambique? The dramatic events in 1974 i.e. Lisbon Coup D'etat which is the most important reason for the fall of Portuguese empire in the colonies. It is now necessary to have the brief analysis of the event. "In some ways, the Coup d'etat in Lisbon was itself a product of colonial war."⁷ The war too initially benefitted the Salazar regime in some ways. First, the colonial territories were opened through the construction of infrastructures, discovery of mineral resources by Western Powers, for direct and systematic exploitation. This helped the Portuguese immigrants to settle in the colonies (around 500,000 Portuguese in Angola and 240,000 in Mozambique were settled by the end of 1970). Second, the war aroused a nationalist sentiment among Portuguese of all classes, both in Portugal and in the colonies.

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Anirudha Gupta, "Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the Dialectics of Liberation of Southern Africa", International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 14, Jan. 1975, P.3.

As David M. Abshire notes:

"The 1961 challenge of what the Portuguese took as an external invasion ... involved, for the first time, not only the governing class or the economic elite but much of the Portuguese nation, in defence of a new nationalism that turned out to be more militant and active than Black nationalism in Angola. Between 1961 and 1968, thousands of Portuguese from the streets of Oporto, Coimbra and Lisbon and from the fields of the Ribatejo and the Algarve for the first time gained a first hand experience in the African possessions for which they previously had cared little."⁸

On the other hand, the following elements gave rise to, viz. (i) The availability of infrastructure i.e. the construction of roads, bridges helped the guerrillas on finding an easy way to attack the Portuguese army; (ii) The war caused rapid demoralization in the army. Most of the army people argued in favour of a political rather than a military solution to the war. But the regime suppressed these elements. Moreover, the

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Abshire and Samuels, eds. Portuguese Africa: A handbook (London, 1969), P. 451.

soldiers saw no victory in sight since for most part the enemy remained invisible. Their frustration bred indiscipline and caused great anxiety among the top echelons of army officers. Other anti-war elements, that Portuguese faced were such as, hardships in the shape of inflation, scarcity of essential goods, dislocation of families and military conspiracy. Hence, the pressures maintained by the guerrilla forces provided a rallying point to military officials, church dignitaries, university professors and students to work together to overthrow the regime. (iii) to maintain 400,000 strong army in the colonies is surely a drainage in the Portuguese economy. On an average, the war has consumed annually 40% of the country's national budget and total, according to British strategic Institute studies estimation, stood in 1971 at 398 million US dollars.

The colonial war became a national debate in Portugal by 1972 as it concerned the future of the Portugal itself. Within the army, the officers who started the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) pressed for a radical change in favour of ending the war. It was

supported by the majority of the Portuguese people, then the coup d'etat took place in 25 April 1974. Merely Coup d'etat did not solve the problems of the colonies. The future developments have important role in the change at home and abroad. However, Basil Davidson says, "the Coup d'etat aimed at "democratization at home and decolonization in Africa."⁹

The 'provisional government' was set up with General Antonio de Spínola as the President. Though he was a centrist, still the confrontation between conservative and progressive elements could not be avoided. From amongst the AFM, some supported the Spínola's leadership, while others did want a change of leadership with a view to radicalizing political goals. The large number of settlers, those who were sympathizers of ancient regime, wanted the continuation of war for the protection of their lives and property. So the paradox situation existed. The colonial issue which united all the sections and classes against the ancient regime, became the divisive factor. Those who were critical of

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Basil Davidson, Independence of Portuguese Africa in Africa: South of Sahara, Europa publications Ltd., (London, 1978-79), P.138.

the war, found such tendency as a threat to their existence. So they formed the radical Left-wing of the AFM, as opposed to 'Rightists' who were really in support of Spinoia. The first Spinoia's Cabinet split took place in July 1974 where Colonel Vasco Goncalvez, an officer having leaning towards Leftist became new Prime Minister with the Foreign Minister, the Socialist Mario Soares who declared, Portugal would respect "the principle of self-determination with all its consequences, including national independence."¹⁰ Besides, some external factors are responsible for the end of the colonial war. Firstly, the uncertainty of the war caused a further demoralisation of the army. In some places the racial riots took place and the army did not protect the settlers from the guerrilla attack. They helped the guerrillas to intensify the war and create the havoc in the army. Secondly, international opinion also supported for an early settlement. The visit of the then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to Portugal and talk with the provisional government for troops withdrawal from the colonies was welcomed by the people. This paved the way for the

¹⁰ Africa Diary (New Delhi), 20-26 August 1974, pp. 7094-5.

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'transfer of Power' to Angola and Mozambique on Jan. 1975 and 25 June 1975 respectively. Such liberation is termed as "the Africa's gift to Europe."¹¹ A great Socialist leader of FRELIMO became the President of Mozambique, but in Angola the war did not come to an end. The popular MPLA headed by Dr. Augustino Neto had to fight the second liberation war to defend the Angolan revolution when racist South - Africa and Zaire sent their interventionist forces openly into Angola to wage an open neo-colonialist war. While MPLA was getting aid from Soviet Union, Cuba and other countries including India, the rival organisations like UNITA & FNLA were backed by South-Africa, Zaire and CIA. This was a crystal clear of the external involvement. The National and ideological differences of the OAU members further complicated the Angolan crisis.¹² Hundreds of heroic Cuban fighters gave their lives on Angolan soil defending the African National Movement. By March 1977, MPLA had finally triumphed and the enemy (external and internal)

11 Anirudha Gupta, "Implications of the Lisbon Coup", Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 25, Nos. 582-3, July 5-20, 1974, P.25.

12 Anirudha Gupta, Politics in Africa: Personalities, Issues & ideologies (New Delhi) 1988, P.73.

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decisively crushed and expelled from Angolan territory. Hence People's Republic of Angola (PRA) was installed by Dr. Augustino Neto as the President.

INDIA'S ROLE:-

Indian armed action in Goa led to a shift in her support to Africa. Nehru's government made it clear that everything is not expected to keep with the Gandhian philosophy, rather must be handled on its own merit. The anti-imperialists were happy with Nehru's decision. India, thereafter started approving the use of force and violent struggles in Africa, particularly in the Portuguese colonies. Nehru was convinced that the primitive and uncivilised nature of Portuguese colonialism was not amenable to dialogue and negotiations. Indian opposition to colonialism was severest for Portugal in UN. Nehru at the first Non-aligned Summit at Belgrade (1961) highlighting the horror of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and demanding its end said, "Our mind go out and we need not only sympathize. We want to do what we can to put an end to this."¹³

When in 1960 Nehru was suggested to join African fight against Portuguese colonialism which India had to fight at home, he refused to do so, saying that, "Liberation

¹³ Belgrade Conference, n.27, "Speech of Jawaharlal Nehru".

of Goa is a separate problem of India and similarly Angola and Mozambique are exclusive African problems."¹⁴

Nehru's voice against Portuguese was admired by the African Nationalists. He helped to build up 'international opinion' against Portugal, even inside Portugal. While the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) condemned Portuguese imperialism till its end in 1975, India kept the issue alive in the United Nations and in the NAM.

In the UN Trusteeship Committee in November 11, 1963, an Indian delegate told that 'only a combination of measures including economic sanctions and pressures would persuade Portugal to abandon its colonial policies.'¹⁵

The Indian delegation along with the delegates of the African countries walked out of the UN General Assembly session in December 1964 in protest against a speech by the Portuguese delegate Bonifacio Miranda. There Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh spoke about Portugal's ruthless administration and suppression.

14 Jawaharlal Nehru, 'India's Foreign Policy' (New Delhi, 1961), P. 173.

15 Times of India (New Delhi), 12 November 1963.

India expressed its grave concern over Indian residents in Mozambique by the Portuguese authority soon after the Goa Liberation. India welcomed the 'transfer of power' to FRELIMO from Portuguese in June 1975, as the culmination of an era of liberation struggle. Moreover, India's recognition to MPLA government was announced by the External Affairs Minister Mr. Y.B.Chavan in Parliament on Feb. 6, 1976. He said, 'MPLA government alone seemed committed to preserve Angola's integrity and independence and fight racist South Africa's arm intervention'. Reinstating anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, Mrs. Indira Gandhi remarked "We strongly condemn the continuing aggression by the racist regime in South Africa against Angola and fully support you (Dr. A.Netto) efforts to repulse the aggression."

Hence, it is clear that, India's support to FRELIMO and MPLA was pro-Soviet. The reasons could be put-forth like this (i) The MPLA and FRELIMO represented the majority of the Africans. The commitment was to preserve integrity and unity by fighting against imperialism, colonialism which coincided with the Soviet foreign policy; (ii) Soviet Union along with 34 countries (including India) have assisted MPLA in conformity with UN decisions; (iii) The fact that the Soviet Union came in support of the MPLA demonstrated that, 'in the face of imperialist opposition,

the non-aligned movement (NAM) could find a reliable ally in the Socialist World.'¹⁶ (iv) the USSR approach to African problem tallied with that of India's, because of the following ingredients; a) extension of support to the legitimate central government; b) pledging commitment to the territorial integrity of the African states; (v) another important reason was that, since Soviet Union vetoed 'Kashmir issue' in UN, India supported Russia's stand on the African issue.

This chapter reveals that; (i) violent armed-struggle has successfully triumphed over imperialism, but it deepened 'Cold-War' in Africa. (ii) Foreign intervention in Africa took place when an erstwhile colonial power failed to establish viable relationship with the territory to which it granted political independence; (iii) In African context, the nationalist leaders learnt a lesson that rival organisations of any country and external intervention could delay independence; (iv) As to the India's role, there came about a shift in Foreign policy (as in case of Goa liberation) in approval of armed-struggle in Africa.

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Anirudha Gupta, "Angola: Historic Victory of Non-alignment", Mainstream (New Delhi), vol. 6, n.2, February 1976, P.12.

C H A P T E R -III

INDIA AND RHODESIA

In post-war era, the Rhodesian crisis is perhaps a landmark in the history of colonial struggle. In Rhodesia, it is a fact that the native black majority were humiliated, and deprived of the basic rights by the 'settler white minority'. The present chapter is primarily concerned with the 'growth of the Rhodesian crisis, the role of various actors in the course of liberation struggle, the 'transfer of power' and finally, the India's contribution to the struggle.

Evolution of the crisis

On September 12, 1890, the British flag was hoisted at Harare Kapje (Salisbury) by the Cecil Rhodes, the British representative (The territory was named as "Rhodesia" after his name). As soon as Cecil Rhodes got the monopoly over all the natural resources in the region, he established the British South-Africa Company (BSAC), which was given the Royal Charter by the Queen of England in October 1889. This enabled the company to exploit the concessions. The Shona and Ndebele tribes of Southern Rhodesia rose against the rule of whites as their respective interests were affected. But such resistance was successfully put down by the Chartered company. As a result, in 1893-98 the whole territory was conquered.

After the expiry of the company's charter in 1924, referendum was taken place. Accordingly the self-government came into existence with Sir Coglán as the Prime Minister. The settlers were given to formulate own Constitution, to exercise executive, legislative and judicial powers. Such imperialist design was first of its kind, i.e., 'indirect rule' by Britain. Since then the settler government has introduced many laws which were against the interests of the Blacks. Especially the creation

of 'federation' ^{*} caused a great resentment among black-leaders. With the Chairmanship of Mr. Chitepo, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was founded in 1960. He was critical of Federation and all discriminatory policies. Addressing a public meeting at Harare, Mr. Chitepo told, "We are dissatisfied with the second-rate citizenship in our own country. We feel a great deal of resentment we are tired of living like strangers in our own land."¹

Robert Mugabe, the Party's Public Secretary, declared in July 1960: "One man- one vote is not a parrot cry. It is the cry of the African will, determination and their demand for the restoration of the motherland."²

Though the 1961 constitution provided Blacks the right to vote, there were still many discriminations. In June 1963, a conference was convened at the Victoria Halls for the dissolution of the federation of 1953. The two territories viz; Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) accordingly became independent in 1963 except the Southern Rhodesia. What was the problem in Southern Rhodesia? The situation was different there.

* In 1953, three territories were created such as: Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia.

¹The Times (London) ,6 June 1960.

²The Times, 5 July 1960.

Wide disagreements cropped up between the leaders. Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU), was founded in 1962 by Mr. Joshua Nkomo who played a dominant role inside the party. But outside it, he was very authoritarian and never submissive. So this attracted criticism which is perhaps 'the central issue that led to the breakaway of several leaders to form an alternative party',³ the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963, headed by N. Sithole. So the rival organisations brought a critical situation.

In the meantime, the then Prime Minister of the Rhodesia Ian Smith took the advantage in preparing the grounds for UDI. In May 1964, he stated that, "if in my life time we have an African nationalist government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have failed in the policy that I believe in."⁴

Most of the OAU members, after its existence in 1963, called on Britain the colonial power "not to transfer the powers and attributes of sovereignty to a minority government imposed on African peoples by the use of force and under cover of racial legislation."⁵ Britain, in response to the call, arranged talks with the leaders of the Rhodesian Front in London without any result. Although the Rhodesian leader Ian Smith left Sir Alec Douglas-Home (British Foreign Minister) in no doubt that if no

³Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, "Zimbabwe : Politics, Economics and Society", Printers Publishers (London, 1989), p.19.

⁴Research Report No.53, Howard Simson, Zimbabwe - A Country Study (Stockholm: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1979), p.61.

⁵Adekunle Ajala, 'Conflict and Co-operation in Southern Africa' in Timothy M. Shaw & others (eds) 'Africa and the International Political System': University Press, (America, 1982), p.231.

agreement was reached, Rhodesia would go ahead with a UDI. The British took no steps to pre-empt such a move. So Smith saw this trend as a green light to go ahead. The Britain's move was such for two reasons; (1) Firstly, Britain was confident that, even after the protest the White minority could easily take care of the African 'agitators' in the territory; (ii) secondly, **the** military and economic weakness of the OAU was known to Britain. Therefore, Britain reckoned that the whites in Southern Rhodesia would easily get away with UDI of the British Government gave spurious reasons for non-intervention. But she was probably not aware of the repercussions of the UDI in the later years.

Finally Smith declared UDI on 11 November 1965 which is the turning point in the Rhodesian history.

Role of various actors

A large number of countries denounced to recognize the illegal regime. A special session of Commonwealth was held in January 1966 in Lagos to discuss the Zimbabwean issue and urged for the establishment of majority rule. Harold Wilson (British Prime Minister) stressed to point out that, " the cumulative effects of economic and financial sanctions might well bring the rebellion to an end within a matter of weeks rather than months".⁶

⁶H.P.W., Hutson, "Rhodesia -Ending an era" (New Delhi, 1978).p.61.

But he had opted out of a military solution because of the 'kith and kin' relations, Owing to Britain's inability to solve the matter by any means, the matter passed on to the UN which imposed selective (1966) and mandatory (1968) sanctions. It is a fact that after the UN involvement in the issue, Britain began to lose primacy in Rhodesian Affairs. In this context, Britain's position vastly differs from that of the French vis-a-vis Algeria. The Algerian war wrecked havoc with the economy and political stability of metropolitan France. Despite this, de Gaulle refused to accept third party mediation in colonial affairs. Hence, he could negotiate Algeria's independence unilaterally. In contrast, as Britain's role diminished in Rhodesian affairs, "there was a corresponding increase in the role of external parties".⁷

UN imposed 'selective/mandatory sanctions' (Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter) against the Smith regime, which was for the first time imposed in UN history, were not effective. Several reasons are there for it, viz; (i) the long period of time that elapsed between UDI and the imposition of full-scale mandatory sanctions in May 1968 which enabled the Smith regime to make adjustments and arrangements for their evasions: (ii) South-Africa and Portuguese-held territories extended full help/assistance to Smith. South-Africa supplied required goods to Rhodesia and acted as an intermediary to sell Rhodesian products in the world market. Even it sent troops to patrol in

⁷Anirudha Gupta, "Decolonisation: Zimbabwe model", World Focus (New Delhi), 1980, p.11.

Rhodesian borders. The Portuguese, on the other hand, kept the 'Beira route' open in order to break the oil sanctions. So Kenneth Kaunda says, "there existed an unholy alliance between Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon". The reasons for such alliance are: (i) though the policies of three are different e.g. altruism^{*} said to be the basis of Portuguese racial Policy, while 'apartheid'^{**} is the basis of South African Policy, (ii) both Portugal and Rhodesia were threatened by the Liberation struggle. They had no other alternative but to seek assistance from their powerful neighbour i.e. South-Africa. There was hence, a tacit understanding amongst them that an attack upon any of these territories should be regarded as an attack upon them all.

While there was "alliance" among the three regimes, the liberation movement in Rhodesia - ZAPU and ZANU, were in open conflict with one another. The salisbury regime capitalized on these differences and banned both of them. All the OAU initiatives to unite them met with no success. They had to operate from exile and by August 1967 a combined force of ZAPU and South-Africa ANC liberation fighters had started operations in Rhodesia. The reason for 'armed fare' is because of the 'refusal of white minority to share political power'.⁸

* in its psychological sense, means the disposition of an individual to further the welfare or happiness of other individuals or groups.

** is a newly coined Afrikaner term literally meaning 'Apartheid' or separateness. In other words, it is the racial discrimination by whites over blacks (natives) in every realm of life.

⁸n.3, p.20.

To make the sanctions effective, the independent African states, especially, the FLS tried to lessen their dependence on Southern neighbours. To have an alternative supply and transport routes from countries like Zambia and Botswana, a decision was taken i.e. the Chinese help in building the 'Tan-Zan railway'. But the involvement of China in the region took a different dimension in the Rhodesian crisis. It disturbed the Soviets who had been giving active military support to several liberation movements in Southern Africa (e.g. MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, ANC in South-Africa). Moreover, since the late 60s, USSR had started helping Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. While the ZAPU was backed by Moscow, the ZANU was backed by Beijing. So the Sino-Soviet rivalry took a different mode in Rhodesia.

The involvement of outside powers preceded the concretisation of the African resistance movement in Rhodesia. The armed struggle was not successful initially because of the lack of consensus of the two political parties.

The situation in Rhodesia took a different turn following the liberation of Mozambique and Angola. The changes that took place were: (i) after the establishment of FRELIMO in 1945, a new front was opened for the guerrilla activities as they (guerrillas) stepped up attack from the bases in Mozambique, (ii) the port traffic through Beira route (Mozambique) was closed which was a great set back for Smith regime. Only South-African railway link was opened for them through Botswana; (iii) Angola also helped the nationalist forces of Rhodesia; (iv) The South-Africa's Rhodesia policy underwent

certain changes too. The economy of the South Africa had to face a lot of crisis to maintain its troops in Namibia's border because of SWAPO guerrillas attack from the Angola's border:

(iv) Moreover, Portugal was no more ready to extend help to Rhodesia for her internal instability; (v) As to the nationalist parties, the FLS pressurised them to reconcile because of the Angola's incident where three rival organisations invited the External powers to intervene which aggravated the situation. So in order to get rid of that, in 1977 the ZAPO and the ZANU got united into Patriotic Front (PF).

South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster started his 'outward policies' i.e. keeping good relations with the neighbours because of the economic reason. South Africa's economic products were marketed in the neighbour states. The Mozambican economy proved to be more complimentary to South Africa than that of Rhodesian economy. So South-Africa started initiating a 'detente' only for Rhodesia whose position was being deteriorated. The FLS also gave helping hands to Vorster because they thought that 'negotiated settlement' is better than the armed struggle. It is not only the whites affected by the sanctions, but the FLS also faced serious problems. K Kaunda of Zambia entered into secret negotiations with Pretoria⁹, which is known as 'Pretoria agreement'. It was not successful because of the refusal of Smith to grant diplomatic immunities to exiled ANC leaders to attend the meeting. Anyway, such talks paved the way for another secret conference at Lusaka (6 November 1974) which was attended by the 'African nationalist groups, heads of 3 African states, and representatives of Rhodesian government'.¹⁰

⁹The Guardian (London), 28 October 1974.

¹⁰The Statesman (New Delhi), 8 December 1979.

As a result of such Conference, the agreements were: (i) the different nationalist leaders had agreed to have ceasefire in Zambian-Rhodesian border and to merge with ANC*, (ii) release of ZANU and ZAPU leaders and (iii) withdrawal of South-African troops from Rhodesia.¹¹ Though the Conference was not all successful, still it cleared the way for 'Constitutional talks' in later years.

The US policy towards Southern Africa also got changed. As a benefactor of both South-African and Rhodesian resources, US thought that there was more to gain by negotiation than by confrontation. The reasons for such policy changing are: (a) the defeat of US-backed factions in Angolan war; (b) refusal of US Congress to vote supplies for a vietnam-type involvement in Africa; (c) a realisation that until white power made concessions to the African demand for political advancement, the threat of a Soviet and Cuban intervention in the area would increase'.¹² Hence, US President in 1976 took initiative in appealing South-Africa to influence the Ian Smith for bringing about majority rule. In doing so, Kissinger had consulted with Britain and member states of EEC. The principles of 'Kissinger plan' are: (i) Majority rule within 2 years; (ii) agreement between the regime and African leaders to organise an 'interim government'; (iii) lifting of sanctions

¹¹ ibid.

*The nationalist groups which decided to merge with the ANC were the ZANU and the ZAPU and FROLIZI, a smaller organisation.

¹² Anirudha Gupta, 'Issues in Southern Africa', International Studies (New Delhi) Vol.17, no.1, Jan.-Mar. 1978, p.14.

and ceasefire of guerrilla-war, and (iv) establishment of an international trust fund to assure the country's economic development.

Ian Smith agreed to such proposal. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, appreciated Smith's action and said, "The acceptance of the proposals by Mr Smith's Cabinet and his party represents a decisive step forward..... It offers a real hope of bringing peace to Rhodesia".¹³ But the FLS* - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia rejected the proposal stating that the Kissinger's plan would legalise the colonialist and racist structures of power by "interim government". Rather they called up British Government to hold a conference outside Rhodesia. The Rhodesian issue thus was passed on to 'Commonwealth'.

The Lusaka Commonwealth Summit of 1979 was an important breakthrough to the Smith-Rhodesian leaders' tussle. African members exerted pressure to reason out with Britain the immediate need for sorting out the Rhodesian imbriglio on the broadly based consensus. Two important issues were put forward (i) agreement on a ceasefire or truce, and (ii) withdrawal of sanctions. Mrs. Thatcher was assured to get help from African leaders in carrying out these promises. The restructuring of 'armed force' was not highlighted, though it was a major issue on which the previous conferences failed.

¹³Daily Telegraph(London), 25 September 1975.

*Frontline States are those states which are directly affected by the Rhodesian crisis viz; Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania.

Such agreement led to the voluntary withdrawal of armed struggle in favour of 'consensual model'. This is the turning point of the Rhodesian decolonisation. This aspect differs from the Algerian and Portuguese-held territories where no 'consensual model' could reach.

The reasons for the PF's desire to withdraw the 'armed struggle' may be ; (i) the survival of PF was linked with the FLS who were not in favour of 'armed conflict' because of adverse impact on their economy and lessening of their own role in the situation due to foreign involvement; (ii) still they had hope that Britain could peacefully settle the issue.

Thus, the FLS were willing to risk an election under British aegis. The subsequent London and Lancaster conferences, attended by the PF leaders, Muzorewa and Smith, for peaceful constitutional measures.

The elections took place under the auspices of the Commonwealth observer group. It gave an opportunity to the black Rhodesians to exercise their political right and elect a government of their choice. Out of 100 seats, the party position was like this;

- (1) ZANU (PF)- (Mugabe) - 57
- (2) ZAPU (PF)- (J. Nkomo) -20
- (3) United African National Council (UANC) - 3
- (4) Rhodesian Front (Smith) - 20

So on 17 April 1980 the formal power was transferred to Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF) who became the President of

Free Zimbabwe.

Therefore, for 'majority rule', 'Rhodesia represents a unique blending of two conflicting models -- armed struggle and consensual model'.¹⁴

India's Role in the Rhodesian Crisis

India's role in Rhodesian crisis was predominantly political -- by way of providing stimulation or inspiration to the Africans to advance on the path of independence. It supported the initiatives taken by the African nations (F.L.S.) to have solution of the crisis.

India opposed the British stand on the Southern Rhodesian issue. In the view of India, Britain should have used its political power to settle the crisis. India did not recognise the minority government of Ian Smith which was not elected by the majority people of the country and did not represent the wishes of the people.

Indian government labelled the UDI as an illegal and outrageous act and urged other nations not to grant recognition to this regime. It did not view the 'Rhodesian crisis' as an isolated event but related it to the whole Southern African situations. India blamed Britain that due

¹⁴n. 7, p. 13.

to her indifference, the UDI came into being. G.

Parthasarathy, Indian representative, speaking in the Security Council meeting that, "Only the other day the United Kingdom Government dismissed the constitutional government in Aden. Why is it hesitating to take a similar step in case of the white Rhodesian regime?"¹⁵

India condemned the South-Africa's and Portugal's assistance to Smith regime despite UN sanctions.

At the Security Council meeting in 1966, the Indian delegate suggested 6 point-programme: (1) Persuasion by UK to Ian Smith to stop the illegality;

- (2) Use of force to curb the minority-rule;
- (3) The Government of Britain should declare unequivocally that the discriminatory and reactionary constitution of 1961 would be abolished;
- (3) Britain should set a definite date for the attainment of independence under a freely chosen government;
- (5) Britain should make it clear that, the elections would take place after the establishment of constituent Assembly; and
- (6) India proposed that an interim government consisting of all sections of the community in proportion to the strength of their population, should be established to rule over the territory in the intervening period.

¹⁵Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 15 November 1965.

The September 1966 Commonwealth Summit was taken place in a tense and angry atmosphere. The Rhodesian issue was the focus of the meeting. Britain's lukewarm attitude towards the crisis had enraged the memberstates who wanted concrete and positive action. The internal divergencies had endangered the very existence of the Commonwealth. The two controversial and sensitive issues, such as the use of force and Universal suffrage tended to split the Commonwealth. Swaran Singh, Indian delegate expressed the view that, "India had all along strongly felt that the illegal regime must be suppressed. It is Britain's responsibility to do so."¹⁶

Years passed on without any concrete success to establish 'majority Rule'. Southern Rhodesia in 1970 was declared as a Republic, thereby breaking age-old ties with Britain. Promptly reacting to the situation, India's Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, stated on 4 March 1970.

"The Government of India considers the decision of the breakaway regime to declare itself a republic as totally illegal. The government will continue to support the measures taken by the world community and African States against the racist regime. We maintain our firm belief that any constitution for this colonial territory must ensure that principle of 'one man one vote' in a multi-racial society. We also hold the view that the world action should be concerted with a view to taking effective steps leading Rhodesia towards independence; based on the principle of NIBMAR (No independence before Majority

¹⁶Times of India (New Delhi), 6 September 1966.

African Rule".¹⁷

Though India in early phase was in favour of peaceful negotiations for averting crisis in Rhodesia, but owing to Smith's reluctance to accept any proposal and Britain's lukewarm attitude to solve the problem, it welcomed the 'use of force' by the nationalists. The Afro-Asian countries had time and again demanded the use of force from Britain, but the consistent refusal of the British Government had provoked them to criticise its stand; India was no exception to it. However, India refused to condemn the British Government in the Security Council in September 1972, for three reasons; First, condemnation is a divine prerogative and Indians do not claim to be Gods or anywhere near to that position; Secondly, defending the British Government's stand, the Indian representative said that UK Government had always denied the use of force to overthrow the Smith regime. Thus, in this circumstance, it would be difficult for any delegation to say that the British Government should be condemned. Thirdly, Indian delegate Samar Sen, argued that it was not only the failure of a country's Government. But the Council had also failed to agree on measures that could bring an end to the regime. Therefore, it is not good to condemn the British alone.

¹⁷Times of India, 5 March 1970.

Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi at Lusaka (November 1976) met Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Muzorewa of ANC and advised them to fight unitedly and promised India's help and support in their freedom struggle.

Even after the Janata time, India's attitudes remained in tact. The new Prime Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, speaking at the Commonwealth Conference held in London in June 1977 said, it was inevitable that commonwealth should deliberate upon various problems, with one specific aim, namely, to serve mankind in a meaningful manner by saving humanity. He too emphasized on the principle of 'one-man-one-vote' and the majority -rule in Zimbabwe^{we}. And then foreign minister, Mr A.B. Vajpayee said;

"Whether it is from the standpoint of decolonisation, self-determination, principle of human rights, racial equality or just the international obligation peace and co-operation, it is incumbent upon us to persuade if possible or throttle if necessary, the white minority regime, and to do so quickly.... if the Smith regime continues to defy the world, can there be any alternative to a better or more extensive conflict which could only end in a racial war".¹⁸

¹⁸Foreign Affairs Record, vol.23, 1977, p.108.

After the failure of the Anglo-Saxon proposal, an internal settlement was announced by Ian Smith and a black puppet regime, led by Bishop Muzorewa came to power in March 1979. The Britain was prepared to recognise the puppet government. The Afro-Asian nations including India criticised such decision on the ground that it (puppet regime) did not represent the majority opinion. The recognitions would have meant the lifting of sanctions and no chance of black majority rule in the foreseeable future. India claimed for the participation of PF in the elections.

The Commonwealth conference of 1979 held at Lusaka was very significant in the sense that, the 'one-man, one-vote; end of struggle, holding election under the British supervision were the principles, discussed there.

Indian delegate, Mr Rajeswar Dayal, was appointed the Chairman of the 'Commonwealth observatory group' to supervise the elections. The ZANU (PF) won with overwhelming majority and became the president. Indian Prime Minister along with a 12-men high-level delegation (including external-affairs minister Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao) attended the independence day celebrations on 17 April, 1980. On that occasion, Mrs. Gandhi stated: "The winds of change had been blowing all over Asia and Africa, but did not serve as stop to time. The wind therefore, turned into a gale and eventuality became a

tornado".¹⁹

In the conclusion, certain issues can be drawn viz;(i) It is Britain's silence, South-Africa's influence and Rhodesian nationalists mutual confrontation that brought about the UDI by Smith.

(ii) Though 'guerrilla struggle' was spearheaded, but the FLS did not want the type of Portuguese-held territories situation in Rhodesia. In the former case, there was no question of 'consensus' because of authoritarian rule of Lisbon which wanted to suppress the struggle by force. And moreover, for economic interest the external powers like South-Africa, West Germany, US etc. consistently helped the Portugal to stop granting independence. But in Rhodesia, the FLS were equally affected by the sanctions. Rhodesia, being a land-locked country, was the worst sufferer where blacks constitute majority. As far as the external powers 'role' is concerned, the changing policies of South-Africa, US, Britain towards negotiated-settlement is worth-mentioning. The Commonwealth conferences which brought the real hope of the end of minority rule. The Head of Commonwealth i.e. UK was pressurised strongly through the Afro-Asian members to sort out the matter;

(iii) In order to avoid Angolan -type situation, the rival groups got united for smooth transfer of power (ZANU+ ZAPU = PF).

¹⁹Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 18 April 1980.

C H A P T E R - I V

INDIA, UN AND NAMIBIA

No case in the history of law-- national or international has evoked such universal interest as the South-West Africa case.¹ It represents a unique type of colonialism -- political subjugation and racial discrimination, which has been a world concern for over four decades.

Going back to the history of the South-West Africa it is Germany which colonised in 1884 during the European "Scramble for Africa". Among Germany's African colonies, "South-West Africa was the only unfortunate one, regarded as suitable for white immigration² because of her rich mineral and natural resources. Africans were virtually wiped off from the rich lands.

During the World War I, the neighbouring South-Africa occupied it on behalf of the allies. The allies asked the League of Nations to let South-Africa have the territory as a mandate (see the appendix i) and South-Africa was given the territory to administer with the condition that the administration reports to be submitted before the League. With the fall of 'League of Nations, and birth of UN after Second World War, the mandate system gave way to trusteeship (see the appendix ii). Defying the UN norms , South-Africa declared South-West Africa as the 5th province on the ground that 'the mandate had

¹M. Hidayatullah . "The South-West Africa case" (Bombay), 1967, p.1.

²Narendra Bharadwaj, 'Namibia's struggle for freedom', The Call (New Delhi), June 1978, p. 18.

expired with the demise of League and hence, it was not accountable to UN. Such stand of South-Africa led to the UN and other countries to take initiatives.

In 1946, during the second part of the first session of the General Assembly in New York, a proposal was submitted by the South-African Government for annexation of the mandated territory with South-Africa instead of placing it under the UN trusteeship system.

It was Field Marshall Jan Christian Smuts, darling of the West and a great racist; appeared before the 4th Committee of the General Assembly on November 1946 to move the proposal in favour of South-Africa. His arguments were :

- (i) the mandate agreement had allowed the territory to be administered as an integral part of South-Africa;
- (ii) the wishes of the people had been ascertained, and that the Europeans and the majority of "Natives" (2,08,850 against 33,520) favoured integration.³ Hence, he was hopeful of getting UN recognition which would be mainly a formal one of a unity that already existed.

Though the UN was dominated by Western and colonial powers, still Smuts got surprised after listening the foremost concern of India.

³E.S. Reddy, "India and Namibia", Mainstream (New Delhi), Vol.24 no.38, May 24, 1986.pp.7-8.

During the Prime Ministership of Pandit Nehru, India at that time was the only country to get independence. So the concern of India gave a solid challenge to South-Africa in General Assembly.

Sir Maharaja Singh of India (assisted by V.K. Krishna Menon in the 4th Committee of General Assembly on 1946) pointed out that, 'Sovereignty resided in the people and that the purpose of UN trusteeship was to enable the people to accede to independence as soon as possible'.⁴ He asked the assembly to demand that South-Africa must place the territory under the UN trusteeship system. India's statement encouraged many Asian, Arab and Latin-American countries to reject the South-African proposal.

Hence, South-Africa did not get the approval of UN. A sub-committee was set up to deal with the matter. The US - sponsored resolution in the sub-Committee was agreeable to South-Africa. It stated that the "date before the General Assembly does not justify action of the General-Assembly approving the incorporation...." India and Soviet Union moved resolutions to reject the incorporation and to call on South-Africa to submit a trusteeship agreement. Because of the composition of the sub-Committee (most of the members were Western powers),

⁴Times of India, 7 November 1946.

the Indian resolution was rejected by 11 votes to 6, with 2 abstentions, and the Soviet resolutions by 12 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions. While the US draft was adopted by 12 to 6 votes, with one abstention.

It was evident that South-Africa was getting support from Britain. Its delegate Sir Hargy Shawcross argued that, "the measures taken by the South-African government to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants... as complete and satisfactory as practicable and the results genuinely represent the wishes of the inhabitants".⁵ In such case, though India could not hope to obtain a 2/3rd majority for her draft, yet it embarrassed the Western powers and they too became uncertain of a 2/3rd majority of their draft .

A compromise was reached to add to the US draft. India proposed a recommendation that South-Africa should place the territory (South-West -Africa) under the UN Trusteeship system. It was adopted as UN Resolution 66(1)^{*} on December 10, 1946. But South-Africa, Britain and other Western Powers abstained it.

The advice of International Court of Justice (ICJ) was sought, which also revealed ... that the South Africa should leave the territory which is entrusted as an UN trust. But defying it, Pretoria regime went to the extent

⁵n.3,p.8

^{*}Demanding the placing of South-West Africa under the UN Trusteeship system.

of governing the territory as its de-facto 5th province. In 1955, South Africa officially brought the policy of "apartheid" to the territory. Moreover, as per the 'Odendaal committee' proposal, the policy of 'Bantustanisation' was started. Accordingly, South-West Africa was divided into whites and non-whites. Natives who constitute 90% of the population were given only 40% of the land which was further divided into 11 Bantustans. The whites were given 43% of the land area. And the rest came under the direct control of Pretoria. All the mineral resources and even most important Walvis Bay came under whites.

UN special role and the course of Freedom Struggle:

When South-Africa defied all the international law, UN took the direct responsibility of South-West Africa in 1966. It was a new event in UN history. Moreover, it was a unique and historic responsibility of the UN because South-West Africa was the only non-self-governing territory for which the UN rather than a member-state, assumed control and authority.

In 1967, the United Nations Council for South-West Africa (renamed Namibia on the request of its people in 1968) with a Commissioner, was set up to administer the territory until the independence and 'with the maximum people's participation of the people of that territory'. In 1969, the Security Council "described the continuous presence of South-Africa in Namibia as illegal, and called on South-Africa to withdraw its administration immediately. In

1970, due to South Africa's intransigence, SC declared all acts taken by it, concerning Namibia, illegal and invalid.

In order to resist such exploitation by the whites in Namibia, it is natural that some mass-base organisations came into being. So in 1960, a broad-based organisation i.e. SWAPO (South-West African People's Organisation) emerged. Defiance of all international law and refusal to share political power with the blacks, the SWAPO had no alternative except going for the armed-struggle as in the cases of Portuguese-held territories. With the help of FLS and other socialist states, SWAPO started 'armed struggle' on 26 February, 1966. In 1973, UN General Assembly voted to recognise SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibians'. By 1976, the General Assembly declared its support for 'armed struggle' of the SWAPO and PLAN* (People's Liberation Army of Namibia). Moreover, the struggle of SWAPO got accelerated after the fall of Portuguese rule on Angola as the guerrillas started attacking the whites from Southern Angola. On the request of MPLA leader Dr. Angustino Neto, the deployment of Cuban forces (approximately 15,000) also created fear-psychosis for the whites.

The 'Internal arrangement' declared by South-Africa was reflected on 'Turnhale Conference' (1975-1977). No non-white representative was invited except the puppet representatives of eight Black tribes. According to the proposals of the conference, elections took place without the

* an extension of SWAPO, usually insurrected 'armed struggle' against Pretoria regime.

participation of the popular SWAPO. The Democratic Turnhill Conference (DTA) comprising some black stooges, won the elections with 82% of the votes cast.⁶ Under the leadership of Mr. Dirk Mudge, constituent Assembly was set up. But such 'internal arrangement' was not accepted to either the UN or the OAU. However, following the resignation of Mr. Mudge, the Pretoria's phoney scheme of independence disappeared. But the emergence of 'Contact group' (Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, UK and US) in 1977 salvaged the situation by helping the Pretoria to continue subjugation as these powers had economic interests in these areas.

Commenting the so-called contact-group Mr. Sam Nujoma stated that, 'they (Contact-group) are in League with South-Africa to satisfy their own selfish interests.'⁷

The Contact-group initiated some proposals. These are: (i) Free and fair elections under the aegis of UN (Constituent Assembly for the enactment of the constitution); (ii) the appointment of a UN special Representative; (iii) the establishment of a mixed military and civilian UN Transition Assistance Group(UNTAG); (iv) a cease-fire; (v) the restriction of South-African and SWAPO forces to their respective bases; (vi) the release of political prisoners.

⁶ Africa: South of Sahara, 1978, p.728.

⁷ The Patriot (New Delhi), 29 August 1980.

These proposals could not be implemented because of South-Africa's reluctance. Washington did not oppose the Pretoria's Policy because there is a genuine fear among the Western powers that their larger economic interests in Africa can be jeopardised by South-African actions'.⁸

However, before Zimbabwe's settlement, this 'contact group' was interested in holding some elections in Namibia under UN supervision, with a view to, and in the hope of placing some Muzorewas in power in Namibia. But after the Zimbabwe's elections which gave a decisive victory to Robert Mugabe, these powers lost all interests in holding any elections in Namibia at all because they fear a repetition of Zimbabwe in Namibia.⁹

Why was not South-Africa interested in 'negotiated settlement' like Smith regime? The guerrilla-warfare insurrected by Patriotic Front (PF), unlike SWAPO, was both extensive and intensive, and hurting the whites' interests. Moreover, Rhodesia, as a land-locked country, was severely affected by the sanctions while South-Africa was not affected by the sanctions because of its mineral and natural richness, and the support of the Western countries.

The Security Council Resolutions no.385 (1976) and subsequently no.435 (1978), (see Appendix iii and iv respectively) were watershed in the Namibian Freedom Struggle.

⁸Anirudha Gupta, 'Major powers: Washington-Pretoria Axis', World Focus (New Delhi), June 1983, p.20.

⁹The Patriot, 29 August 1980.

Resolution 435 was accepted by South-Africa. SWAPO announced its intention to sign a cease-fire agreement with it. Now the question arises, why South-Africa is suddenly so anxious to bring a modus vivendi by proclaiming unilateral cease-fire with SWAPO? The main reason appears to be economic. The Namibian War has helped to do to Pretoria what three African colonial wars did to Lisbon.... Prime Minister Mr P.W. Botha describing Namibia as 'a financial liability for the white-ruled Republic, told Parliament on January 31, 1984 that South-Africa is no longer prepared to shoulder the tremendous financial burden alone'.¹⁰

America and other Contact group members persuaded South-Africa to delay the independence. This was reflected in South-Africa's opposition to the size of UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group) which was fixed by UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim. The Geneva meet, attended by the representatives of SWAPO, South Africa, contact Group and FLS (Front Line States) was ended in failure because of South Africa's remarks on the partiality of UN towards SWAPO which would prejudice the chances of other political parties in a UN-supervised elections. Another proposal of contact group was that the vote would be counted twice, once on a national basis and again in the ethnic basis which was outrightly rejected by SWAPO and FLS.

¹⁰Kuwait Times (Kuwait), 3 March 1984.

Linkage Doctrine : In 1982, US and South-Africa advanced with a totally extraneous and unrelated 'linkage theory'. It referred to the linking up the Namibian question with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from neighbouring Angola. The reasons for US initiated 'doctrine' are:

- (i) to delay the grant of independence;
- (ii) to contain 'communism' in Southern Africa which was the only way out for US after the defeat of UNITA/FNLA in Angolan Civil war.¹¹

Political Analysts in Washington are fascinated by the similarities between the Namibia issue and the West-Bank and Gaza -trip issue in West-Asia. South-Africa and Israel have similar systems of government, based on racial and religious supremacy respectively.¹²

The other four powers of Contact group dissociated themselves from 'linkage theory'. The dilemma that Reagan administration faced in Southern Africa thus became apparent. On the one hand, his pledge to bring about a speedy settlement of Namibian issue within the UN framework was frustrated by South-African obduracy and on the other hand, the determination of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.¹³

¹¹Deccan Chronicle (Hyderabad), 9 March 1983.

¹²The Statesman (New Delhi), 28 February 1984.

¹³Anirudha Gupta, 'The Struggle against Pax Pretoriana: Strategic retreat or pragmatic accommodation?' The Non-aligned World (New Delhi), Apr-June 1984, p.311.

Such 'linkage doctrine' was opposed by Security Council and other countries. Security Council declared that the independence of Namibia could not be 'held hostage to the resolution of issues that are alien to the UN plan (Resolution No.530-1983).¹⁴ The Security Council vote on the October 1983 ... on Namibia was, 14 in favour, none opposed and one abstention (US).

Early in 1984, a significant development took place following the South Africa's cease-fire agreement with Angola (The Luanda pact) and a mutual non-aggression pact with Mozambique (the N-Komati Accord). The agreement called on Angola to prevent SWAPO guerrillas from crossing the border into Namibia, and on South Africa to withdraw its armed forces from their long-standing occupation of parts of Southern Angola. The Nkomati Accord with Mozambique requires both countries to prevent their territories being used to launch attacks against the other.¹⁵ The reasons which persuaded Mozambique to sue for peace with South Africa were mainly internal, (i) the MRM (Mozambique Resistance Movement) guerrillas who blow off railways, burnt small towns to the ground, and wrecked the FRELIMO'S administration in the bordering areas;

¹⁴Rasheeduddin Khan, "Namibia: A Symbol of NAM's struggle against colonialism", 'Mainstream' (New Delhi) August 30, 1986, p.25.

¹⁵Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa and its neighbours: the dynamics of regional conflicts", Adelphi papers (London), Summer 1986, no.209, p.3.

(ii) the worst drought that Mozambique faced ⁱⁿ 50 years, coupled with a sudden flood which starved 4 million or 1/3rd of the population and caused the death of an estimated 100,000 people and

(iii) Unlike Angola, Mozambique has no resources to depend on in hard times -- its economy being wholly dependent on South African flow of capital, tourists and trade.¹⁶

The pulling out of South-African troops from especially Angola and Mozambique marked the way for the US mediated talks in London in May 1988 between South-Africa, Cuba and Angola on the withdrawal of an estimated 50,000 Cuban forces from Angola and independence of Namibia under UN Resolution 435. The talks culminated in agreement signed in New York in December (1988) by South-Africa, Cuba and Angola.

Thus, independence process set in. UN-sponsored elections were held in November 1989. Like the Rhodesian election, ballot triumphed over bullet in Namibia. SWAPO in the elections got overwhelming majority (41 seats out of 72-member Constituent Assembly). Finally, exactly at midnight (3-30 A.M. IST), on March 21, 1990, the South-African flag was lowered and the Namibian standard hoisted at Windhoek Stadium. In the presence of a galaxy of international leaders, the South-African President

¹⁶n. 13, p.309.

Mr. Deklerk transferred the power to Dr. Sam Nujoma and the latter was sworn in by the UN Secretary-General Mr. Javier Perez De Cuellar. Hence, the UN responsibility to liberate Namibia came to an end and then Namibia became 159th member of the UN.

India's Involvement:

It has been India's policy from the very beginning that Namibia should be wrested from South-Africa's hold and that UN should assume responsibility of the territory and lead it to independence. When in 1966 the UN General Assembly decided finally to terminate South-Africa's mandate over the Namibian territory, and later when it became the direct responsibility of the UN, the Government of India welcomed the development calling it a 'unique, historic and sacred responsibility.'¹⁷

New Delhi has worked by all means within the UN framework to bring about a solution to the Namibian problem. In other words, India has whole-heartedly supported all the resolutions put forth by UN. It has worked efficiently in the standing Committee III of the UN Council for Namibia as a leading member.

India too has welcomed the 'guerrilla war' by SWAPO which was the only way out for SWAPO in their liberation movement. It has extended full support at the UN for the demand made by SWAPO i.e. 'complete and

¹⁷n.6, p.15

unconditional withdrawal of all South-African troops from Namibian territory before the electoral processes are set in motion preceding independence'. Speaking in the General Assembly on 20 October, 1977, Mr M.V. Kamath, a member of Indian delegation, said that free and fair elections were impossible in the hostile presence of South-African forces. The SWAPO demand was fully in accordance with UN resolutions on Namibia.¹⁸

India's material help was materialised when Indian High Commissioner to Zambia Mr. Natwar Singh donated a consignment of blankets and medicines to the SWAPO President, Mr Sam Nujoma at the Lusaka on 28 November, 1977 for the ongoing liberation movement.

After the Resolution 435 adopted by Security Council, India joyed with the view that finally a draft has come out for a 'negotiated settlement' of Namibia's independence acceptable to SWAPO, the international community and South-Africa.

Mr. Brajesh C. Mishra, Permanent Representative of India to General Assembly, urged western capitals to reappraise their South-Africa policies in the light of Pretoria's action in scuttling the Western-backed independence plan for Namibia at Geneva and to stop all actions that indirectly encouraged the pretoria regime to defy

¹⁸The Hindu (Madras), 21 October 1977.

world opinion'.¹⁹

Besides UN, India has raised its voice regarding 'Namibia' in NAM summits. In the 'Algiers meet on Namibia', the then Foreign Minister Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao highlighted the following aspects:

- (i) the situation of Namibia calls for a new strategy and a new effort on the part of the NAM to wage a final struggle against pretoria regime, encompassing socio-economic, political, diplomatic and military fields. The first priority is to strengthen the hands of SWAPO which has had to resort to an armed struggle in the face of the threat of genocide from an unscrupulous colonial regime. India has, to the limit of capabilities, extended moral and material assistance to the SWAPO's struggle;
- (ii) The Havana summit in 1979 of Non-aligned countries established a special Fund for Namibia of the movement of Non-aligned countries. The New Delhi Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned countries called for increased assistance to SWAPO; in February 1981. India has contributed \$ 20,000 to the special Non-aligned Fund for Namibia as a token of continuing commitment to this cause. And India has also decided to make an annual contribution of \$10,000 (Rs.90,000) to this fund in solidarity with the oppressed people of Namibia;
- (iii) Serious attention should, therefore, be given forthwith to drawing up a program of assistance to the independent countries of Southern Africa to enable them to stand

¹⁹The Patriot, 6 March 1981.

up to the challenge posed by the sanctions.²⁰

The six-member consultation mission of the UN for Namibia, of which India was a member, visited India from 2 to 6 August, 1981. India took the opportunity to reaffirm its total support for the legitimate struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination and friendship under the leadership of SWAPO. India and the mission disapproved the moves of certain countries to pose the Namibian question as a regional conflict and denounced the attempts by South-Africa and its friends to call the liberation struggle in Namibia as an East-West confrontation.²¹

Another significant development took place when the Government of India decided to receive a resident representative of SWAPO in the capital which is a clear indication of India's recognition of SWAPO as a sole representative of the Namibians. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, as the Chairman of NA countries said in the Paris meet on Namibia in April 1983;

"The nefarious attempts of the Western contact group to link Namibia's independence with various extraneous and unrelated issues. The Conference should renew its strong support to the Council for Namibia in the discharge of its

²⁰"Algiers meet on Namibia: India Calls for renewed efforts, 'India and Foreign Review', 1 May 1981, p.21.

²¹Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 19 August 1981.

responsibility for independence and to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South-Africa. She revealed that the international conference in support of the Namibian independence is meeting at a time when the Pretoria regime had escalated its acts of aggression, intimidation and terrorism against the people of Namibia and the FLS. Emphasising India's consistent help, Prime Minister said, 'Freedom is indispensable and the denial of it in any place is bound to create concern everywhere else. We affirm our total support to the Namibians' right to sovereignty and express our solidarity with the struggle led by the SWAPO'.²²

The External Affairs minister Mr. Eduardo Faleiro, in the UN-sponsored International Conference on Immediate Independence for Namibia, held in Vienna on 7 July 1986, read out the message sent by Prime Minister Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, "Namibia summons up the image of a heroic fight against exploitation, inhumanity and international double-dealing".²³

The pact between Pretoria, Angola and Cuba for pulling out Cuban troops and South-African troops, and subsequently the UN-supervised elections in Namibia was welcomed by India. And also the Freedom day celebration on 21 March, 1990 was

²²Veena G. Sharma, "India's Role: A New Mandate", World Focus (New Delhi), June 1983, p. 29.

²³Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 July 1986.

the attended by the then Prime Minister Mr V.P. Singh and former Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi. For India, it is a matter of Pride as having supported Namibian struggle all through, it also acted as the midwife which delivered independence.

In the conclusion, it may be said that:

(i) the change in Namibia is largely an achievement for the multi-lateral UN which has a few diplomatic success to show. In Rhodesian case, however, the Lancaster House Agreement (Commonwealth meeting) which saw the dismantling apartheid regime was largely executed under the British influence; (ii) Once again like Rhodesian case, the FLS came forward to 'negotiated table' with pretoria to avoid more foreign intervention and to stop the loss of life and economy; (iii) the independence of Namibia was also an outcome of the strong support of world opinion except a few Western powers; (iv) the Namibian independence has an impact on the racist South-Africa which then has taken positive steps to dismantle apartheid.

C H A P T E R - V

INDIA AND SOUTH-AFRICA

Growth of Apartheid in South-Africa:

It is the Boers (the Dutch farmers) who first settled in the cape of Good Hope (presently cape town) in 1652. This period marks the beginning of colonialism in Africa. The cape of Good Hope was used as refreshment station for the ships of the Dutch East India Company on their way to the rich spice trade with the East. The Britishers arrived in Natal and Cape Colony. Boers, too, as early as 1839, reached Natal and fought a war i.e. "Battle of Blood River" with Zulu King, Dingane, in which the Zulus were defeated.

At the end of 19th century, the British had established colonies in Natal and cape, while the Boers had two independent republics; the Orange free State and Transvaal. The Africans were deprived of their own land.

Despite many heroic wars fought by nationalists, the colonial power was able to subjugate, and establish their stranglehold over the vast areas. The reasons for the consolidation of white power are:

- (a) Superior weapons;
- (b) internecine rivalries and conflicts amongst the people and
- (c) clever device of 'divide and rule'. Here question arises why the Europeans got interested in settling down in South Africa? Europeans were attracted because of the geographic location of South-Africa and the abundance of gold, diamand and other precious minerals. They started

exporting resources through the cape of Good Hope, a largest port in South-Africa.

The 31 May 1910 was a very significant date in South-African history as the colonial authority abdicated its responsibility and handed over total power to a white minority -- comprising Boers and Britishers. In spite of having internal conflicts and dissension (Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902), the whites were united in their objective of maintaining their economic, political and military domination over the natives. The black rights and aspirations were completely ignored. The constitution was framed by the whites, of the whites and for the whites. Thus, the policy of racialism ^{was} formally written in South-African Statute Book and White supremacy was recognised by law.

The actual power to decide the fate of non-whites i.e. Africans, coloured and Indians whose number is 22 million, 3 million and 1.5 million respectively (where they should live and work, what job they should do and how much should be paid, and to which educational institutions they should send their children....etc.) was left to the 4 million whites. South-Africa today is boast of having the largest discriminatory, oppressive, inhuman, immoral, unjust and reprehensible pieces of legislation that no other country in the world has.

Institutionalisation of apartheid:

Apartheid or Racial discrimination was institutionalised in 1948 by the 'Ruling Party' (founded by Dr D.F. Malan) whose main election planks were 'anti-communism' and 'apartheid'. 'Apartheid' is a newly coined Afrikaner term meaning literally 'Separateness'. In every realm, white supremacy did prevail. The suppression of communism Act was passed in 1950 which happened to be the cornerstone of all subsequent repressive legislations. The other laws/legislations were the population Registration Act of 1950, the group Areas Act (1950), the Race classification Act, the Mixed Marriages and immorality Acts (to consolidate business and residential segregation). The inter-racial marriages or sexual co-habitation across the colour line was not permitted.

The ruling National Party (NP) through the system of apartheid consciously worked to promote the interests of the white Afrikaner community. 'There was an evident connection between proletarianisation and even paperisation of the Black masses and the growth of white Afrikaner capitalist classes.'¹

INTERNAL RESISTANCE:

Colonialism -- whatever the form may be - must face 'internal resistance' by the natives through the

¹Rajen Harshe, "Dismantling Apartheid: Problems and Prospects", Economic and Political Weekly, Feb.23 1991, p.439.

Well-organised, mass-based party. As in the case of **India**, INC (Indian National Congress) emerged as a mass-based party in 1885 to challenge the British oppression, so also in 8 January 1912 the African National Congress came into being. It was founded at the historic inter-tribal conference of Black leaders at Bloemfontein in Transvaal. ANC was a mass-party comprising the representatives of all sections such as Zulus, Xhosas, Tswanas, Sothos, Vendas, Shangaans, Tongas and others. Other small organisations like the South-African Congress of Trade Union (SACTU), the South-African Indian Congress, the South-African coloured people's congress came together to strengthen the hands of ANC.

The year 1913 witnessed the first resistance movement by the ANC. In the same year the pass laws, regarded as the most derogatory and inhuman for Africans (Males), were extended to African women as well. As a result, the women also began demonstrating against the government. In 1980s, the 'disenfranchisement' of Africans was another phillip to the nationalist movement. A 'whites only' Parliament was set up.

With the advent of dynamic leaders like Mrs. Z. Gool, G.R. Baloyi, Moses Kotane, Dr Yusuf Dadoo and H.A. Naidoo, the movement of ANC gained momentum. In fact, ANC had followed a strategy of non-violent resistance for almost 50 years. But in 1961, it adopted the

'armed struggle' as its principal strategic method.

Why did ANC shift from non-violent to violent path?

The reasons are:

- (i) the banning of ANC, and PAC (Pan-African Congress) which was formed in 1959, said to be a split-away faction of ANC;
- (ii) the imposition of state emergency which increased the oppression of whites;
- (iii) the sharpeville massacre of 1960 in which 167 unarmed people were killed; and
- (iv) the Pretoria's method of 'Kagadadigheid' (forcefulness) which implies brutal suppression of blacks by police terror, attack by hired mercenaries and inciting inter-tribal war; refusal to decolonise Namibia and defiance of international opinion; clubbing the neighbouring countries into submission.

Mr. Nelson Mandela explained in his speech at the 'Rivonal Trial'^{*} in 1962, the ANC shifted from its policy of non-violence to accepting 'properly white-minority government'. In June 1961, the ANC's military organisation, called Umkhonto We Sizwe (the spear of Nation) was founded. The early actions of Umkhonto We Sizwe were based mainly on sabotage attacks against state installations. In the subsequent years 'guerrilla warfare' started with the external assistance viz; OAU, FLS, USSR and India.

^{*} Along with Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrudi and others were brought to court in the 'Rivonal Trial'.

The main demands of the 'Freedom Charter' were follows:

The People shall govern
All National Groups have Equal Rights
The People shall Share in the Country's Wealth
The land Shall be Shared among those who work it
All Shall be Equal before the Law
All Shall enjoy Equal Human Rights
There Shall be work and Security for all
The Doors of Culture and Learning Shall be opened
There Shall be Houses, Security & Comfort
There Shall be Peace and friendship.²

Factors Responsible for Gradual end of apartheid:

The National Liberation Movement gained momentum as the year passes and it became continental and international concerns. The following factors are responsible for the change of scenario;

(1) The intensification of 'armed-struggle' could be possible following the liberation of Mozambique and Angola. The guerrillas began attacking from across the border as the latter states provided bases and ammunitions.

(2) As to the sanctions imposed by the United Nations, initially though South Africa was not much affected, because of some reasons; viz; (i) for South-Africa's long coast-line, the Western helps could easily reach to South-Africa's; (ii) the dependence of FLS on South-Africa's economy. For example, 'Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania and Angola are economically dependent on South-Africa. Nearly 60% and 90% of Zambia's and

²Robert Davies and Others, "The Struggle for South-Africa", Zed Books Ltd. (London), 1985, p.286.

Mozambique's trade respectively pass through South-Africa'.³ Hence, sanctions also hunted blacks more than whites; (iii) sanctions did not persuade the whites to give up power without a fight; (iv) the most important reason is that 'the Western support to Pretoria'. The reasons could be : first, the geographic location of South-Africa attracted the foreign investors especially the Americans, Germans, Britons , French, Portuguese (South-Africa became the investor's paradise). Diamond and Gold became the fuel of Western economy. Second; the intension of US was to contain communism which was being disseminated in Southern Africa like anything. So 'the Western Capitali-sm found South-Africa as an ally to strengthen its position in the region like 'Israel' in case of 'West-Asia'.⁴

However, the sanctions could be effective following the restriction in the selected areas such as crude oil, Gold; (ii) the FLS are given military assistance by NAM/OAU members to protect their countries from South-Africa's attack; (iii) establishment of 'SADCC'(Southern African Development Co-ordination Committee) in 1979 to boycott South-Africa in economy matters, and establishment

³The Statesman (New Delhi), 16 March 1987.

⁴Anirudha Gupta, 'The Gathering Storm', World Focus (New Delhi) , April 1986.p.5.

of 'AFRICA' * Fund in 9th NAM summit to help FLS to meet their needs in order not to depend on South-Africa; and (iv) 'on 15 August 1986, the Senate, in defiance of President Reagan's wishes, voted (by 84 votes to 14) to impose economic sanctions on white-ruled South-Africa.⁵

(3) The Third factor was the 'Botha's reforms which proved to be counter-productive'. He had proposed a "constellation of Southern African states" for ensuring the economic dependence of neighbouring countries and providing security buffer zone. His hopes for these plans were shattered by two related events in early 1980.

First, 'there was the Zimbabwean independence election in which Mr. Robert Mugabe's Party(ZANU) won majority seats. Zimbabwe commanding access to the regional hinterland was key to 'constellation scenario, but Mugabe refused to participate. Second, formation of SADCC, excluding South-Africa, with the stated aim of reducing dependence on the apartheid regime". Another reform was that, the introduction of 'tri-cameral legislature' to co-opt coloureds and Indians in the power system. But the non-white voters rejected his offer. In the meantime, Botha's reforms broke the ranks of Ruling National Party. The extreme wing joined hands with African Conservative groups to whip up a campaign of vilification against Botha. Hence, it gave rise to Broedertwis (a fight among brothers).

* Action for Racism, Imperialism, Colonialism and Apartheid.

⁵Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 16 August 1986.

⁶International Herald Tribune (Paris), 16 July 1980.

On the contrary, the blacks were critical of Botha's policies because the 'tri-cameralism' which pushed down the position of Blacks in a racially structured society.

(4) The Soweto massacre of 1976 in which innocent School children were shot down and the police firing of 1984-85 which resulted the killing of more than 1,000 blacks shook the foundations of 'apartheid'. The 'international communities' condemned such incidents severly. The 1978 was declared as 'International Anti-Apartheid Year'. Moreover, "Carter's emphasis on 'human rights' provided a new dimension to the UN sponsored campaign against apartheid."⁷

The Reagan's policy was marked by certain changes. The 'Constructive engagement',⁸ became America's Foreign Policy towards South-Africa, having the tenents such as;

(i) a friendly and non-confrontational approach via negotiations; (ii) Collaborations at all levels -economic, military, political and technological;

(iii) sanctions undermine black interests as also the viability of the "Reform crusade" and (iv) South-Africa is strategically important to the US.

⁷Anirudha Gupta, "Southern Africa" in Satish Kumar, ed. 'The Year Book of India's Foreign Policy' (New Delhi), 1979, p.59.

⁸George Klay Jr. Kieh, 'Beyond the Facade of Constructive Engagement: A Critical Examination of US Foreign Policy towards South-Africa', Africa Quarterly (New Delhi), 1980, p.2.

(5) As far as Britain's policy towards South-Africa is concerned, due to mounting pressure from African Commonwealth Countries and OAU countries, Britain helped the process of decolonisation in South-Africa. Kenneth Kaunda accused Britain of 'Kissing apartheid and conspiring to give aid and comfort to Pretoria'.⁹ Following the pulling out of the Biggest British Bank and third largest British Firm (Barclays) which had divested 40% holdings in Barclays National Bank of South-Africa, 'apartheid' got a serious blow. Moreover, '20 US multinationals including Coca-Cola, Phillips, Petroleum etc. have been withdrawn from South-African soil'.¹⁰ The South-African economy thus, faced a severe 'Crisis' for these reasons.

(6) The continuation of apartheid -war against ANC, SWAPO, giving assistance to puppet regimes (such as DTA in Namibia), and the policy of 'destabilisation' -- giving help to UNITA to destabilise MPLA government and Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM) to blow up bridges, railways and Government installations so as to cripple FLS to the extent that they fell in line with its demand to stop giving support to SWAPO and ANC -- etc. were becoming more expensive for the government. ' A report brought out by the ILO(International

⁹Times of India (New Delhi) , 29 November 1986.

¹⁰The Times , 25 July 1986.

Labour Organisation) in the May 1989¹¹ mentioned that disposable income per capita had fallen by 14% since 1980. It has been said that, without apartheid, South-Africa's Gross National Product (GNP) could have been 50% higher than it was. Hence, the private farms tended not to invest in view of the unstable situation within the country. Businessmen had already started meeting with leaders of Liberation Movements. Unemployment had risen to 10 million.

(7) After the installation of Mr. F.W. Klerk as South-African President in September 1989, the scenario of South-Africa is changed. Certain welcome steps have been taken viz; unconditional release of ANC veteran leader Dr. Nelson Mandela and other leaders, granting independence to Namibia, lifting of state emergency and sanctions (partial), negotiations for one-man one-vote (the whole world awaits when the free democratic election will take place), reinclusion of South-Africa in sports world. Moreover, the 'referendum' of 19 March 1992 clearly showed the willingness of whites for the President De Klerk's reforms.

But in recent times, violent clashes between ANC and Zulu-based Inkatha Party have tunned into an intra-racial civil war. In Natal, where the Inkatha is strong, over 5,000 people have lost lives so far in

¹¹UN Chronicle, September 1989.

fighting. Lines are drawn on tribal considerations. Inkatha supporters are Zulus (the largest tribal/ethnic group) and most ANC workers are Xhosa. The ANC's refusal to give Inkatha any place in the liberalising processes has enraged Zulus. India is no stranger to this phenomenon; during the final phase of British withdrawal, thousands were killed and different communities were uprooted from their ancestral lands simply because political leaders failed to resolve their differences. In the African context, Mandela represents Gandhiji, Buthelezi stands for Jinnah. Gandhi failed to reconcile with Jinnah primarily because the congress opposed him, Mandela has perhaps better chances because on him depends not only the ANC, but the future of the whole South-Africa-white and Black.¹²

India's Contribution to South-African Liberation Struggle:

India's struggle against 'apartheid' dates back to the later part of the 19th century when Mahatma Gandhi started 'Satyagraha' (internal struggle) against South-African Government. In fact, Gandhi had been to there as a lawyer for his client Abdulla Sheth in May 1893. It was the plight of Indians there which made Gandhi to change his thinkings. The state of racial discrimination itself in South-Africa against the immigrant Indian labour in 4

¹²Anirudha Gupta, 'Mandela: Coping with Changes', Frontline (Madras), Vol.7, no.7, March 31 - April 15, 1990, p.45.

colonies -- Natal, Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Cape Colony (which later constituted the Union of South-Africa) was horrible. Around 50,000 indentured (labour-contact) labour had been migrated to South-Africa from 1860 onwards for Sugar production etc. Living in pittance, the immigrant labourers helped to generate sugar and agricultural boom in South-Africa. Yet they are treated like slaves or worse --'called as semi-barbaric Asiatics or persons belonging to the uncivilized races of Asia'.¹³ Gandhi was also a victim of racial policy. He was prevented many times to attend white-meetings, thrown out the train even though he was having valid ticket. In addition, an ordinance was promulgated which imposed a tax of £300 per person (annually). It was impossible for Indians to pay. In protest against all these cruelties, Gandhi launched his "passive resistance" (later called satyagraha) in 1906. It culminated in the Gandhi-Smuts agreement in January 1914, which largely redressed these wrongs. Gandhi's biographer D.G. Tendulkar says, "Satyagraha was first, South-African legislation calculated to redress the grievances of the Indian settlers".¹⁴ So Gandhi's Satyagraha has had tremendous influence on the subsequent movements in South-Africa and India. Nelson Mandela in his letter from Robben Island Prison in 1980 said, "Gandhi's ideas and methods of struggle have exerted

¹³S.C. Gangal, "Gandhi and South-Africa", Gandhi Marg (New Delhi), Vol.8, n.3, June 1986, p.133.

¹⁴ibid, p.135.

an incalculable influence on the history of the people of India and South-Africa".¹⁵

During our struggle for independence, INC developed a strong international outlook for eliminating colonialism and racialism all over the world under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru. They have stressed the solidarity of Asian and African people and advised Indians in South Africa to identify themselves with the African majority.

Discrimination against Indians in South-Africa was one of Nehru's first concerns when he became the head of 'interim Government' in 1946. India was also the first country to raise the issue of racial discrimination in the General Assembly in 1946 even before the establishment of a national government. The reasons could be, such as, South-Africa's continuing discrimination against the people of Indian origin, the basic tenants of India's foreign policy are anti-racialism, anti-imperialism.

On July 17, 1946, India prohibited exports to or imports from the Union of South-Africa. At that time South-Africa accounted for 5.5% of India's exports, and about 1.5% of India's imports.¹⁶

'The Independence of India which posed a threat to European possessions in Africa'.¹⁷ The time when India became independent, the African liberation movements were

¹⁵E.S. Reddy, "India and Struggle against apartheid", Mainstream, (New Delhi), 1985, p.23.

¹⁶Opp. Cit. p.25

¹⁷Anirudha Gupta, "India's struggle against Apartheid", India and Foreign Review, (New Delhi), 1 March 1979, p.11.

not started. The Indian leaders had great influence on the African Counter-parts in carrying out their struggle. The South-African issue was internationalised by India. Hence, the Western countries certainly became hostile to India.

As an active member of UN special Committee on Decolonisation, India demanded stronger measures against racism. In the meantime, Government of South-Africa had started a campaign against India's "imperialist ambitions" in Africa. At a Press Conference held in London in 1954, South Africa's High Commissioner in London stated that, "if Nehru could weaken European influence in Africa, then it will mean Africa for Indians".¹⁸

Nehru, in Rajya Sabha on December 5, 1958. said, "The Question of people of Indian descent in South-Africa has really merged into bigger questions where not only Indians are affected but the whole African population along with the chinese people, the Japanese people who happened to go to South-Africa and who do not belong to European or American countries."¹⁹

The Sharpeville massacre of 1960 wherein 68 civilians were killed, shook the entire world. Speaking at a public meeting in New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru

¹⁸ V.Makay, "Africa in World Politics" (New York), 1963, p.170.

¹⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches (Publication Division, New Delhi, 1964), p.313.

compared such incident with the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre of 1919. Between 1946 and 1962, UN General Assembly passed twenty-six resolutions directing against the practice of Racial Discrimination.

The UN General Assembly established the special Committee against apartheid in 1962. In its formation India played a leading part. So speaking at the special meeting of the Committee at the UN headquarter in New York on 5 October 1976, which was called to pay tribute to India for its contribution to the struggle against apartheid, Ambassador Harrman (Nigeria) said, "We in this special Committee own particular appreciation to India for the consistent co-operation when the Committee began its work on 2 April 1963, the very first document before it was a letter from India offering full-support. When this Committee appealed in 1974 for assistance to political prisoners and their families in South-Africa, the very first contribution came from India. We found a response from India for every request made in the course of liberation of South-Africa".²⁰

When the General Assembly decided to observe 1971 as the 'International Year for action against Racial Discrimination; India, through various publicity media, carried out a comprehensive programme to draw attention to the evils of apartheid and the need to

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Bhagat Vats., "India's Pioneering Efforts Against Apartheid", Peace and Solidarity(New Delhi), Vol.9 n.4, April 1978, p.23.

combat it by all possible ways. Moreover, India refused to play Davis Cup with South-Africa in 1973.

Anti-apartheid has been a main pillar of Non-alignment. As a founding member of NAM, India played a notable role in mobilising world opinion against racial Discrimination. In various NA summits it raised the voice against Pretoria's oppressive rule. In 1986, at Harare Summit, under the Chairmanship of Mr Rajiv Gandhi AFRICA (Action for Racism, Imperialism, Colonialism and Apartheid) Fund was established in which India's contribution has been \$40 million.

The role of Indian settlers in the struggle cannot be ignored. The movement for defiance of unjust laws (1952), showed the unity of the African, the Indian, the coloured and the other democratic forces of the country -- in which over 8,000 people of different racial origins were imprisoned. Leaders of Indian origin like G.M. Naika, Yusuf Dadoo, Ahmed Kothrada, Billy Nair and Shanti Naidoo have played crucial role.

India's direct support to the liberation struggle has been in the form of moral and material assistance to ANC and its military wing. India has recognised ANC as the sole and authentic representative of South-Africans and has permitted to open the Asian Mission of it in New Delhi in 1967. Many delegations of ANC have come to New

Delhi to consult with Indian government for their struggle. Vice-President had represented Indian Government at the special Convocation, where Mandela was conferred a doctorate degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University. The gesture of India's support to ANC was seen in the context of conferment of India's prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Award for Peace and International Understanding to Mandela in 1979 when he was in prison.

In a message to the "International Conference on sanctions against South-Africa held in Paris in 1981, the then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, has called upon the Western powers to stop supporting the Pretoria regime and to uphold the human Rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. She pleaded for the compliance of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 418 (1977), imposing an arm embargo on Pretoria. Her successor, Mr Rajiv Gandhi also continued India's unflinching help for quick end of racial oppression.

India has welcomed the positive steps, taken place in South-Africa during De Klerk's presidentship. After the release of Dr.Mandela, the whole world congratulated him. His visit to India is a significant development in Indo-South-Africa ties. India has shown cordiality and sympathy by conferring the country's highest civilian award 'Bharat Ratna' to Dr Mandela for 1990. Moreover,

the South-African Cricket team's visit (to play 3 one day international) to India for the first time in November 1991 has been a sign of closeness/cordiality. South-Africa has turned down the Pakistan's request for the same.

C H A P T E R - V I

C O N C L U S I O N

In the foregoing chapters the different forms of colonialism in Southern Africa has been discussed. While the authoritarian portuguese had domination in Angola and Mozambique, the white minority had stronghold in Rhodesia subjugating the wishes of majority natives. In Namibia, the South-African illegal occupation pictures a unique type of domination. The 'apartheid' policy of South-Africa is the most intriguing political phenomena of our time.

Although some colonies in Africa got independence by 'peaceful means', but in Southern Africa 'armed struggle' did matter a lot. Let us have a brief survey on the 'national movement' in each country of Southern Africa.

Minerally rich and strategically important Angola and Mozambique had been treated as an extension of Portugal. Because of ruthless administration by the military dictator (Salazar regime), the colonial people had to protest sharply. In as early as 1964 the 'guerrilla war-fare' began by MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique.

Waging war for more than a decade for Portugal was a great economy drainage (Portugal had a very weak economy). So it had to seek assistance from other NATO members. In lieu of that she invited western powers to invest in these territories. Such offer paved the way for foreign intervention in Africa. In addition to economic interest, they found favourable to support rival groups

(FNLA/UNITA in Angola) to contain communism in the region. In fact, the MPLA and the FRELIMO were backed by Soviet Union. In the meanwhile, 'resentment' among Portuguese soldiers (because of less success at war in unacquainted place with guerrillas) marked a great change in both the colonies and metropolys. So despite their resentment, the military regime was not willing to stop the war nor to go for any compromise. So the April Coup d'etat (1974) in Lisbon brought about the democratisation in Portugal and liberation in the colonies.

Transfer of power in Mozambique was not a problem since the single mass-based party, FRELIMO could well managed to form popular government. But in Angola situation was quite different. The developments in Angola led to an international crisis. Some factors are responsible to it. The first was the abrupt withdrawal of the Portuguese from Angola on 11 November, 1975. Portuguese failure to evolve a mechanism for power transfer led to violent disputes among Angola's different liberation groups. The MPLA which was strong in the coastal region, formed a government of its own in Luanda, the capital. The two other organisations, the FNLA which had support from the predominant Bakongo Speaking People of the north and UNITA which claimed to have a strong base in Southern region formed a rival government. The involvement of the neighbouring African countries in the crisis could be the second

factor. Since the middle of 60s, the government of Zaire had been supporting the FNLA (Holden Roberto of FNLA being Mobutu's brother-in-law) with regular consignment of American arms. Other governments, particularly that of the Congo-Brazzaville, supported the MPLA. South-Africa too supported UNITA Forces. Hence, the third factor is clear that the involvement of global powers in purely domestic affairs worsened the situation. While US support to FNLA through Zaire and Chinese support to both UNITA/FNLA was accelerated, Soviet Union openly supported the MPLA which was channelled through deployment of 5,000 strong Cuban troops in Angola.

With the heroic fight of Cuban forces, the MPLA put down the UNITA and FNLA, and formed popular government with Dr Augustino Neto as President. So : a new era began in Southern Africa. It had a tremendous impact on the Smith regime in Rhodesia and apartheid regime in South-Africa.

In Rhodesia the vast majority of native, black people, were humiliated and kept under subjugation by a handful of entrenched 'whites'. The consolidation of power in the hands of the minority rulers was at its Zenith when, in 1963, the demand for independence was raised under the existing constitution of 1961. It was the refusal of Britain to do so that led to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965 by Ian Smith. This development within Rhodesia had far-reaching impact.

Because of all sorts of discriminatory policies, the

political party began armed-struggle. Though following the collapse of Portuguese colonies, the guerrillas in Rhodesia accelerated their attack, but split of the party into the ZAPU and the ZANU widened the crisis. The intervention of external powers in Rhodesian crisis attracted the global attention. The Sino-Soviet rivalry (ZANU was backed by Beijing while ZAPU was by Moscow) took another turn. However, the emergence of FLS salvaged the situation. These countries wanted for 'negotiated settlement' because of certain reasons. First , a decade long fight in Portuguese-held territories costed heavy damage of life and property. So they did not want a war like this. Second, being a land-locked country, following the stiff sanctions by UN and FLS, the blacks in Rhodesia also suffered a lot. So in order to avoid an Angola-type situation they pressurised the two rival groups to get united. African countries within the Commonwealth put tremendous pressure on Britain to resolve the crisis amicably. The various conferences; Lusaka, Lancaster House finally paved the way for 'general elections' under the supervision of Britain (Commonwealth observatory Group). 'Majority Rule' was established by Mr Robert Mugabe (ZANU-PF) as the President.

Namibia's case is very unique. It was under the domination of racist South Africa for more than seven decades. With the defiance of all international law, South-Africa instead of handing over the territory (South-

West-Africa) to UN as a trust territory after second World War illegally occupied it. As per the policy of 'Bantustanisation' the white minority got lion's share in land, resources and important ports, while the majority natives got a little. Like the neighbouring countries the mass-based political parties, SWAPO resurrected armed-attack against the whites because of oppression and exploitation.

The changes in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia created fear-psychosis among the whites in South-Africa. The guerrilla war-fare gained momentum as the neighbouring countries offered bases. However, because of Western powers support (for their economic interest), the racist regime seemed recalcitrant. Several resolutions were passed by UN particularly after 1966, when UN took direct responsibility of this territory , regarding the installation of popular government. Imposition of economic sanctions, diplomatic break off, economic independence of other Southern African countries etc. forced the government to change its policy. The 'linkage doctrine' ^{moved} ^{was} by USA ^{to} contain communism after the defeat of America-backed UNITA/FNLA forces in Angola. Such doctrine pertains to the linking of Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angolan territory. Moreover, the conservative President Mr De Klerk's reforms were welcome. As far as the economy is concerned, fighting with SWAPO forces costed heavy burden to South-Africa . The members of OAU and FLS too pressurised for quick transfer of power.

Finally, under the supervision of UN, popular election took place which brought about the 'majority rule'.

The apartheid policy of South-Africa is the most intriguing event in the late 20th century. Since 1948 (after the policy is institutionalised), various repressive measures were promulgated against blacks. The broad-based ANC was initially putting mild pressure. But after the legal ban of PAC/ANC and Sharpeville massacre, the modus operandi got changed. The guerrilla struggle became the means of ending apartheid. Mineraally and strategically rich South-Africa was getting support from Western powers because of latter's economic interest. However, the efforts of FLS/OAU/UN/NAM/Commonwealth and other Third World Countries the President of South-Africa Mr. De Klerk has taken some measures for bringing about 'popular government'.

As to the India's role, it has been the very basic thrust of India's foreign policy that she has raised voice against any Form of domination. In the case of Southern Africa, it is seen in the foregoing chapters that India has given political, material, moral, diplomatic support to the nationalist forces. Here we can analyse one fact that, why did not India support militarily? the reasons could be: (i) after waging three wars with China and Pakistan (1962, 1965 and 1971), India did not send because of her own problems; (ii) Had India sent troops to Angola like Soviet-backed Cuban troops, the Sino- Indian rivalry could

have been intensified. As a result, the peace and tranquility in the Subcontinent could have been in jeopardy. Moreover, Soviet Union did not want Indian troops to be deployed there, as the Cuban-troops were doing well job; (iii) In other states except Angola, there was more guerrilla war-fare than direct war. So India's non-military help was quite welcomed.

After the perusal of the above discussions, some of the issues can be drawn. First, the oppressive rule showed the path for resorting armed-violence. So in all the states in Southern Africa, the armed-struggle had pivotal role in the attainment of independence. Second, the colonialism in Angola and Mozambique has brought about a great transformation in metropolis i.e. from the authoritarianism to democracy (Africa's gift to Europe). Third, the rivalry between different fractions of liberation movement in Angola further delayed the independence and invited the foreign intervention. Fourth, in Rhodesia and Namibia, though armed-struggle was on, at the end it is ballot which threw out bullet and established majority rule. Fifth, with the efforts of FLS, in order to avoid Angola-type situation, the ZAPU and ZANU got united into PF. Sixth, while the grant of independence to Rhodesia was due to the Commonwealth members efforts, it is UN which played important role in Namibia Independence. Seventh, Namibian independence has been an outcome of the strong

support of world opinion. And it had a great impact on South-African government. Eighth, the recent developments in South-Africa are due to certain factors, such as, the independence of neighbouring countries, strong world criticism, imposition of sanctions, President Mr. De Klerk's reformative measures like granting independence to Namibia, releasing ANC leaders and lifting ban on political parties, holding 'referendum' for whites to welcome his reforms etc. and lastly, the economic drainage because of incessant guerrilla attack by SWAPO and ANC forces. The last, India's role has been praiseworthy. To liquidate all forms of colonialism, India has given enough assistance directly and also through various organisations.

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A P P E N D I C E S

A P P E N D I X -1

Mandates system (League of Nations): The arrangement whereby the colonial territories of the defeated central powers of World War I were placed under the guardianship and tutelage of Allied Nations. Each mandatory power was responsible to the League of Nations in the administration of its mandate. Mandated territories were classified into 3 groups according to their relative stages of development. Class 'A' mandates (Arab territories formerly under Turkish dominion) were regarded as ready for independence and self-government after a minimal period of tutelage. Class 'B' mandates (German East and West Africa) were given no compromises of early independence and were to be governed as colonies with certain fundamental rights guaranteed. Class 'C' mandates (German South-West Africa and Pacific Islands) were to be governed as "integral portions of the (mandatory powers) territory," with no promise of eventual independence.

A P P E N D I X 11

UN: Trust Territory: A former league of Nations mandate or a non-self-governing territory placed under the UN trusteeship system. All mandates that had not achieved independence became 'trust territories' in 1946, with the exception of South-West Africa. Only one additional territory -- Italian Somaliland was placed under trust as a consequence of World War II. Each trust territory was brought into the arrangement by a special agreement drawn up by the administering state and approved by the General Assembly. Supervision over administration of 'trust territories' is carried on by the 'Trusteeship Council' , using annual reports, petitions from trust peoples and visiting missions.

A P P E N D I X -111

Resolution 385 (1976)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1885th meeting,
on 30 January 1976

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the
United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr. Moses M.
Garoseb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa
Peoples Organization (SWAPO).

Recalling general Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI)
of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's
mandate over the territory of Namibia, and resolution
2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United
Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other sub-
sequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution
3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399(XXX)
of 26 November 1975,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245(1968)
of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264(1969)
of 20 March and 269(1969) of 12 August 1969, 276(1970)
of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and
284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October
and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of
4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the interna-
tional Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South
Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence
from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971.

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation regime of South Africa,

1. Condemns the continued illegal occupation of the territory of Namibia by South Africa;
2. Condemns the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;
3. Condemns the South-African military build up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;
4. Demands that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

- 5. Further condemns South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;
- 6. Further condemns all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;
- 7. Declares that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
- 8. Further declares that in determining the date, time-table and modalities for the elections in accordance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be adequate time to be decided upon by the Security Council for the purposes of enabling of United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections, as well as to enable the people of Namibia to organize politically for the purpose of the elections;
- 9. Demands that South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting the foregoing provisions for the for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertaking to comply with the resolutions and decisions of United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to

Namibia, and recognizing the territorial integrity and Unity of Namibia as a nation;

10 Reiterates its demand that South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969) , 269 (1969) and 366 (1974), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

11. Demands again that South Africa, pending the transfer of powers provided for in the preceding paragraph:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly bantustans and home-lands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return in their country without risk of arrest, detention intimidation or imprisonment.;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to meet

on or before 31 August 1976 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of this resolution and, in the event of non-compliance by South Africa, for the purpose of considering the appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter.

A P P E N D I X -iv

Resolution 435 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting
on 29 September 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431(1978),
and 432 (1978);

Having considered the report submitted by the
Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution
431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made
in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from
the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-
General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September
1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary General
(S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United
Nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General
(S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a
settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his
explanatory statement (S/12869),
2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal
of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and
the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the

assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976),

3. ~~Decides~~ to establish under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;
4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report including expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);
5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;
6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 432 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX - VCHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 1652 The first colonisation in South Africa (Cape-town) by Dutch.
- 1839 The Battle of Blood-River between Boers and Zuluking, Dingane.
- 1884 -85 Berlin Conference took place.
- 1893, May Arrival of Gandhi at South Africa.
- 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War.
- 1906 Passive resistance by Gandhi against racism in South Africa.
- 1910, 31 May White minority rule began in South Africa.
- 1912, 8 Jan. Birth of ANC.
- 1914, Jan Gandhi-Smuts agreement.
- 1946, September Nehru became the Prime Minister of interim government in India.
- 1948, 10 December Resolution 66(1) of Security Council demanding the placing of South-West Africa under TN Trusteeship system.
- 1948 Institutionalisation of 'apartheid' in South Africa.
- 1955 South Africa officially brought the policy of 'apartheid' to the South-West Africa.
- 1956, 10 Dec. Formation of MPLA in Angola in clandestine.
- 1959 Banning of ANC and PAC in South Africa.

- 1960 National Democratic Party was formed in Rhodesia.
- Sharpeville massacre in South Africa.
- Emergence of SWAPO
- June Formal grant of independence to Congo by Belgium.
- 1961 ANC started armed struggle.
- New Constitution for Rhodesia was set up.
- Armed struggle by Angola.
- 1962 ZAPU was founded by Mr. Joshua Nkomo
- June FRELIMO was formed.
- 1963 ZANU was formed as a break-away group.
- OAU came into being.
- Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasland (Malawi) got independence.
- Indian delegate's statement in UN Trusteeship Committee i.e. only economic sanctions and pressures would persuade Portugal to abandon its colonial policies.
- 1964, 25 Sept. Guerrilla war started by FRELIMO
- 1965, 11 Nov. UDI was declared by Ian Smith in Rhodesia
- 1966 Indian delegate suggested 6 point programme for Rhodesia in Security Council meeting.
- UN took direct responsibility of South-West Africa.

- 1966, 26 Feb. Armed struggle by SWAPO
- 1967 India opened Asian mission of ANC in New Delhi.
- 1968 South-West Africa was renamed as 'Namibia'
- _____ May UN mandatory sanctions against Smith regime.
- 1971 'International year for Action against Racial discrimination', declared by General Assembly.
- 1973 UN General Assembly voted to recognise SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibians'.
- 1974, 25 April Coup d'etat in Lisbon.
- 1975, June Transfer of Power to FRELIMO
- _____, 11 Nov. The abrupt withdrawal of Portuguese from Angola.
- 1976 UN Security Council resolution No. 385 concerning the independence of Namibia.
- _____ General Assembly declared its support to armed struggle by SWAPO and PLAN.
- _____ Soweto massacre in South Africa.
- _____ 6 Feb. India's recognition to MPLA.
- _____ Nov. India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's meeting with Joshua Nkomo and Muzorewa at Lusaka.

- 1977 Security Council Resolution 418 imposing arm embargo on Pretoria.
- _____ ZAPU and ZANU got United into PF.
- _____ Emergence of 'contact group'
- _____ June Mr. Morarji Desai, former Prime Minister emphasised the role of Commonwealth for Rhodesian crisis in London.
- _____ 28 Nov. India's material help to Mr. Sam Nujoma at the Lusaka summit of Commonwealth.
- 1978 UN Security Council Resolution No. 435 regarding Namibian independence.
- 1979 Lusaka Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesian crisis.
- _____ Jawaharlal Nehru award for Peace and International Understanding to Mandela.
- 1980, 17 Apr. Independence of Zimbabwe.
- 1981 International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa held in Paris.
- _____ Feb. Non-aligned Foreign Ministers meet at New Delhi on Namibian Freedom.
- _____ 6 Aug. 6 member UN mission for Namibian arrived in New Delhi.
1982. USA came out with 'Linkage theory'.
- 1984 South Africa's cease-fire agreement with Angola and Mozambique.

- 1986 'AFRICA' fund was set up under the Chairmanship of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi at Harare NAM Summit.
- 1988, May US mediated talks on London between South Africa, Cuba and Angola.
- ___ Dec. Another talk in New York on the withdrawal of Cuban troops.
- 1989, Sept. Mr De Klerk became President of South Africa.
- ___ Nov. UN sponsored election was held in Namibia
- 1990, 11 Feb. Release of Dr. Nelson Mandela.
- ___, 21 March Independence of Namibia.
- ___, Conferment of 'Bharat Ratna' to Dr. Mandela.
- 1992, 19 March Referendum in South Africa regarding the De Klerk's reforms.