REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE, 1981-85

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CERTIFICATE

This Dissertation entitled "REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY STRATEGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE, 1981-85" by Mr. ARVIND KUMAR for the Degree of Master of Philosophy is an original work and has not been previously submitted for any other Degree of this or any other University.

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

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To my Parents and the
Sweet joint family
for which I am proud .....

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(ARVIND KUMAR)

P R E F A C E

The Reagan administration was associated with the policy change as regards to military strategy and force structure in comparison with its predecessor. An analysis has been made in the first chapter as to what Reagan inherited when he took over on 20 January 1981, what policy did he adopt in containing the communism and finally his foreign policy choices as well as its goals have been discussed.

The second chapter deals with Reagan's strategies of National Security. This chapter attempts to examine the strategies which were made during his tenure to safe-guard the national security and promoted national interest. All the major strategies were adopted not only to safeguard its own interest but also the other countries which were being threatened by communist forces.

Undoubtedly, Congress plays a dominant role in the making of foreign policy as well as defense policy. In the third chapter, a brief survey of Congressional role vis-a-vis the executive branch has been made. It has tried to deal with the growing ascendancy of the Congress in the decision-making process.

An attempt has been made in the fourth chapter to assess the impact of Reagan's policy on U.S.-Soviet relations, the implications of security assistance in

general and implications of changing force structure in particular. The divergence of views between his first and second term and the wider ramifications of the policy have also been dealt with.

In the fifth chapter, a conclusion has been made by saying that the period since the end of World-War II was really unique for America. A general overview has been made by assessing the Reagan's priorities as well as its policies.

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The United States defense policy, before the Second World War, was expressed in somewhat ambiguous terms. Since then, a number of general statements with defense implications were made. These statements revealed the American perception of threat to its foreign policy goals and the military action it was willing to undertake to protect those goals. Implicitly, it also conveyed the American pursuance of its national interests. The end of Second World War brought about major changes in its threat perceptions. American military strategy since 1945 reflected the importance given to national defense by the policy makers. The linkage between the nation's foreign and its defense policies reflected the changing international situation and American reaction to it. The question of national security and protection of national interest became the main focus of a well defined national security or defence policy. The evolution of the organisational structure to carry out these objectives, can be traced to the Eberstadt report of 1945.[1] This report underlined the significance and the inseparability of the relationship between military services and other parts of the government (like the Department of State) responsible for national security. Even then, substantial improvements were required in the operations where military policy and

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1 For details, see, Brewster C. Denny, American Foreign Policy as a Whole (New Delhi, 1989), pp. 84-86.

planning came in contact with political, diplomatic, and economic activities.

After World War II, due to a largely bipolar security paradigm, with the Soviet Union as the focus of force planning, the United States had faced the need to build a force structure capable of responding to high levels of challenge. The nature of the international system was such that nations like the United States, to avoid being victimized by other power, maintained a relevant level of military force.[2]

Since the declaration of independence of America, its leaders have always felt a need to articulate concepts that capture the direction of their foreign policy. In the early days of the Republic, Jefferson borrowed ideas set forth in Washington's farewell address to emphasize the avoidance of "entangling alliances", encouraging the development of the new American State free of European intrigues. The Monroe Doctrine - enunciated in 1823, named in 1852, first invoked in 1895, and recognised by other nations only in the twentieth century, was a declaration that the United States expected the European powers to keep their "hands off" territory in the Western

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2 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Emerging Global Security Environment", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 517 (September 1991), p. 20.

Hemisphere. "Manifest Destiny", a phrase coined by a New York newspaper editor in 1845, provided political and theological license for the United States to possess the whole continent. Neutrality as espoused by President Wilson during most of World War I and Roosevelt's lend-lease formula prior to America's entrance into World War II each conveyed the fundamental thrust of U.S. foreign policy at critically important periods. Containment - "the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points" - emerged as the American response to the international Communist threat in the aftermath of the global struggle with fascism.

Containment rose to dominate American foreign policy from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s because it was interpreted in a reasonably consistent fashion and because it worked. Containment came to mean a network of formal military alliances and bases, and a tendency to use military force to prevent the expansion of Communist influence beyond those territories seized by the Red Army at the end of the World War II.[3]

America's traumatic experience in Vietnam, however, shattered public confidence in containment, at least as

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3 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925 - 1950 (New York, 1967), p. 383.

it had been applied in the 1960s. Even in the face of noticeably growing conservation in the American mood, consequences of the Vietnam experience remain vividly evident. Many Americans, mindful of the excesses of the South Vietnamese regime against its own people no longer believed that, support for authoritarian regimes against their communist challengers should be an automatic U.S. policy preference. The intensity of the conflict within the Communist world, principally Sino-Soviet as well as Sino-Vietnamese has broken down the American image of a monolithic Communist threat.[4]

The United States was confronted with several challenges to its foreign policy after Vietnam, both conceptually and in terms of tangible measures of effectiveness. Along with it came a decline in American self-confidence that led to a polarization of views about the future contour of U.S. policies abroad. The international order that prevailed from the late 1940s to the 1960s was marked by several distinctive characteristics. Of greatest significance was the domination by the United States over most facets of international military, political and economic life. In military terms, the United States enjoyed substantial qualitative and

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4 Michael Nacht, "Toward an American Conception of Regional Security", Daedalus (Cambridge, Massachussets), vol. 110, no. 1, Winter 1981, p. 2.

quantitative superiority over its principal rival, the Soviet Union, in intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, nuclear systems based in Europe, naval forces, and airlift and sealift capabilities. Most of the Presidents since 1952 attempted to create their own doctrine. The doctrines articulated by Toosevelt and Truman, in fact, established the precedent for future Presidents. The Eisenhower Doctrine dealt specifically with the Middle East. In the year 1957 President Dwight D. Eisenhower was granted authority by the US Congress to use American armed forces in the Middle East if it is being controlled by Communist power or if it has a threat from the Communist power.[5] However, in its broadest sense this doctrine was used by President Ronald Reagan in 1983, in Lebanon, and by President George Bush in the recent Gulf war.

President Richard M. Nixon, too had announced his own doctrine in an informal news conference in 1969. It was, however, not a joint Congressional resolution, like the Eisenhower's one. Nixon doctrine specifically dealt with Southeast Asia.[6] It is a fact that Richard Nixon became President at a traumatic period in American history, undoubtedly, Vietnam, a defense and foreign policy issue,

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5 Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Presidency and Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol. 70, no. 5, Winter 1991/92, p. 121.

6 Morton Halperin, Defense Strategies for the 1970s (Boston, 1971), p. 68.

underlay the trauma. During his period, the dominating influence on domestic and international policy was Vietnam. The Nixon's period was also one of great technological activity. On the strategic nuclear level, two mutually supportive technologies having a great impact reached completion. The first was multiple warhead technology. It was for the first time developed by the United States and, was, known as the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV). It was deployed in 1970, and entered the Soviet arsenal in 1975. The MIRV allows more than one warhead to be launched from a single rocket, which thus attacks multiple targets. The second technological influence was great improvement in missile and warhead accuracy.

The Carter Doctrine, specifically dealt with the Persian Gulf. His doctrine too, had no Congressional authorization. He in his doctrine enunciated that the United States would use military force to repel a Soviet assault in the Gulf. However, this doctrine was not cited by either Reagan or Bush when they sent U.S. armed forces to the region.[7] The Reagan doctrine had no specific wording as well as Congressional authorization. It was basically his policies in the third world. It meant covert U.S. military and economic support for those who were

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7 Stephen E. Ambrose, n. 5, p. 122.

indulged in wiping out the communist forces from their area. Reagan became the President at a time when there was a resurgence of interest in defense issues, due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Initially, Carter made his own "comprehensive proposal" to reduce U.S. and Soviet arsenals by 25 per cent. Strategic arms control reached its high mark after the signing of SALT II in Vienna in June 1979, by Carter and Brezhnev. However, the international events that took place in the late 1970s, served as the death knell for SALT II in the U.S. Senate.[8]

The major event that led to Carter's defeat in the 1980 election was the Iranian Revolution and the taking of American hostages by the revolutionaries. Carter had praised the Shah as an important ally, yet failed to support him when the revolution began. He failed to open lines of communication with the revolutionaries. He decided to allow the Shah into the United States despite clear warnings about the repercussions. After the fall of the Shah of Iran to the militant, anti-American Khomeini theocracy, the Persian Gulf area, which was in fact, the single largest source of the world's petroleum energy, was destabilized. After the invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. responded by suspending grain sales to the Soviets and boycotted the 1980 Summer

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8 For details, see, George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy (New York, 1982) pp. 152-58

Olympics in Moscow. The 1979 events in Iran and Afghanistan shocked Carter, who in an embarrassed mood said that he had learnt more about Soviet behaviour in the twenty-four hours surrounding the Soviets' landing in Kabul than he had in his previous three years in office.[9]

Carter's strategic policy which was adopted in 1978, was the "countervailing strategy". The main theme of this strategy was limited nuclear options. The idea behind it was that the United States must have appropriate and proportional responses to meet any Soviet provocation. The Soviets would be deterred by recognizing the futility of expecting to gain from any contemplated aggression. As Brown, his Secretary of defense, himself put it in his last annual report, "our countervailing strategy ... tells the world that no potential adversary of the United States could ever conclude that the fruits of this aggression would be worth his own costs".[10] It was obvious that, for atleast a decade, SALT I formed a partial security regime based on the acceptance of parity, recognition of mutual vulnerability, and agreements to limit both offense and defense. These principles and norms were supplemented by specific rules in a

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9 John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, 1985), p. 164.

10 U.S.A. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress and the President, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, 1980).

treaty form and an institutional framework calling for the Standing Consultative Commission to discuss issues of compliance. Both sides defined their short-term interests by adhering to such rules as not interfering with the national technical means of verification and by dismantling nuclear systems that exceeded treaty restraints.[11]

Several changes in the international setting and domestic political scene facilitated Reagan's harder line on defense. Internationally, there were changes. The first was an altered U.S.-Soviet relationship. The "spreading glow of detente" announced by Secretary of State, Kissinger, during Nixon's period, in the early 1970s had been replaced by an increasingly cool relationship, much of it created in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Carter's responses to that event. The failure to ratify SALT-II reflected Reagan's conviction of a hostile Soviet Union. Reagan committed his administration to a rapid buildup of U.S. military forces and to large increases in spending for defense. Hence, the President, recognized the need to move forward in controlling weapons of mass destruction.

Despite some criticism that Reagan was intractable in his opposition to any U.S.-Soviet accord on nuclear

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11 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Arms Control and International Politics", Daedalus, vol. 120, no. 1, Winter 1991, p. 156.

arms, his position during the election campaign struck a responsive chord with a majority in Congress and with a public disillusioned with the meager successes of the U.S.-Soviet detente, which were very much sought by Republican and Democratic administrations alike since the 1960s. For one thing, a series of international reverses in the late 1970s had eroded support for arms control as a solution for easing East-West tensions.

However, the ideas and institutions of arms control were shaped in a bipolar world. With the decline of Soviet power, and the Soviet withdrawal from many of its third world positions, had led greater implications for the future of arms control. For the last four decades the two Super Powers built impressive military arsenals. In the existing political scenario, they might begin dismantling those arsenals. Undoubtedly, arms control has crucial political roles. The first is to reassure the publics in democracies, arms control is an inevitable and important part of the domestic political power related to defense. The second political role of arms control is to provide reassurance among adversaries. Arms control is sometimes divided into structural arms control that deals with force postures, and operational arms control that deals with the operation of forces. Both these two dimensions are closely related. In a sense, all arms control is a confidence and security-building measure.[12]

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12 Ibid., pp. 158-61.

Several studies indicated that detente was a casualty of the rapid Soviet defense build up, undertaken initially while the United States had begun to slow down its military spending toward the end of the Vietnam war. That development gradually fed apprehension in Washington that Moscow would be emboldened to take political and military advantage of America's loss of nuclear hegemony. Despite such fears, the United States continued to lag behind the Soviet Union through the remainder of the 1970s in its commitment to defense. In the strategic area, President Reagan combined strategic force modernization with new arms control initiatives. In addition to continuing the Carter initiatives regarding air-launched cruise missiles, force modernization involved procurement of the B-IB bomber, limited deployment of the MX missile, research and development on the single warhead missile, Midgetman, and a revamping of the strategic command, control, communications and intelligence systems. Reagan in March 1983, directed the establishment of a comprehensive and intensive research program to develop a defense against ballistic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI or "Star Wars", added a note of uncertainty regarding the future of strategic nuclear deterrence.[13]

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13 Peter A. Clausen, "SDI in Search of a Mission", World Policy Journal (New York, N.Y.), vol. 11, no. 2, Spring 1985, pp. 253-54.

The Reagan Pentagon, however, did not, instantly adopt an aggressive pro ballistic missile defense stance, which was reflected in the statements of Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger in his Reports to Congress. In his first force statement, there is a note of caution on the subject:

> "For the future, we are not yet sure how well ballistic missile defenses will work; what they will cost; whether they would require changes in the ABM Treaty; and how additional Soviet ballistic missile defenses - which would almost certainly be deployed in response to any U.S. BMD system - would affect U.S. and allied offensive capabilities". (14)

In his second Report, issued in 1983 for FY 1984, Weinberger's message was to a extent optimistic. His statements were:

> "Our extensive work with Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) components has demonstrated that an active defense could protect some high value strategic assets from ballistic missile attack. The program is structured, therefore, to sustain our understanding of this technology so that we could field an advanced and highly effective BMD system quickly should the need arise". (15)

Reagan's announcement of SDI had been presaged by the commissioning of two studies on the subject in June 1983,

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14 U.S.A. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington DC, 1982), p. III-65.

15 U.S.A. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washingron DC, 1983), p. 227.

which were completed in October. When integrated, these studies recommended the expenditure of $ 18 to $ 27 billion between FY 1985 and FY 1989 for research and development, and for a total deployment by the year 200 of a system with a total cost estimated in the range of $ 95 billion.[16] President Reagan formally accepted these recommendations on January 6, 1984, in the form of national security decision directive No. 119. The SDI was thus born and was reflected in the enthusiastic advocacy of the program by Secretary Weinberger in his FY 1985 Report. In that document, he said:

> "The study concluded that advanced defense technologies could offer the potential to enhance deterrence and to help present nuclear war by reducing significantly the utility of Soviet preemptive attacks and by undermining an aggressor's confidence in the probability of a successful attack against the United States and its allies". (17)

To this end, the Secretary recommended $ 1.74 billion in research and development funding for FY 1985.[18]

This evolution during the first term clearly suggests that advocates of BMD have gained the overwhelming

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16 Keith Payne and Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and the Defensive Transition", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol. 62, no. 4, (Spring 1984), p. 821.

17 U.S.A. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington DC, 1984), p.58.

18 Ibid., p. 193.

upper hand in the Reagan administration. Since his reelection, President Reagan Continued his spirited advocacy of SDI as a centrepiece of both his strategic arms and arms control strategies.

It is the President who shapes the destiny of his administration. In the arenas of defense policy, nuclear strategy and arms control, a President's latitude is more constrained by systemic factors than it is in other policy arenas. In his first annual report to Congress, Defense Secretary Weinberger stressed "the long over-due modernization of our strategic forces".[19] He also noted that arms control was "a melancholy chapter in the troubled history of the last decade or two". Weinberger was specific about the source of US "disappointment". "Our land based deterrent forces have become highly vulnerable even though one of our main purposes in SALT was to prevent such vulnerability".[20]

The unsuccessful negotiations on both intermediate nuclear forces in Europe and strategic weapons between 1981 and 1983 provided the context in which the Reagan administration sought to define its own approach to arms control. In his first press conference after his

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19 U.S.A. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington DC, 1982), p. 17.

20 Ibid., p. 19.

inauguration, Reagan set a harsh tone to U.S.-Soviet relations:

> "The Soviets have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognise is what will further their cause (of promoting world revolution and a one world socialist or communist state), meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards".(21)

This very statement of Reagan in the press conference signalled the administration's intention to change the framework which had characterized previous arms control efforts. The immediate arms control agenda for the Reagan administration was not strategic nuclear weapons but long range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF). Having affirmed in February 1981, US support for the 1979 NATO dual track decision on LRINF, Reagan announced the US negotiating position in November. Dubbed the "zero option", the proposal envisioned cancelling Pershing II in exchange for Soviet dismantling of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 intermediate range missiles, including those SS-20s deployed in the Ural Mountains and the Soviet Far East.

Since his first inauguration in January 1981, and continuing through 1984 into his second term, President

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21 Ronald Reagan, News Conference, 29 January, 1981, <u>Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 17</u>, no. 5, pp. 66-67.

Reagan's policies on arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union have undergone a significant evolution. This evolution occurred in three areas: in his general policies and attitude toward the Soviet government, in his arms control policies and negotiations with the Kremlin to reduce strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and in his plan to introduce new defense technologies into the strategic equation.[22]

President Reagan's general policy towards the Soviet Union has been commonly called "hard line". This was reflected in his rhetoric, which also assumed a moral position of condemnation of Soviet conduct. After assuming office, Reagan in addressing the members of Parliament at London, remarked that democracy "will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and nuzzle the self-expression of the people".[23] In 1983 he called the Soviet Union "the focus of evil in the modern world" and labelled it "an evil empire".[24] In January 1984, President

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22 Charles R. Gellner, "Arms Control: An Evolving Record of Hope", in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., <u>The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment</u> (Wilmington, Del, 1986), p. 162.

23 Ronald Reagan, "Address to Members of Parliament, London", June 8, 1982, <u>Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents</u>, no. 23, p. 769.

24 Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals", March 8, 1983, <u>Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents</u>, <u>19</u>, no. 10, p. 369.

Reagan's rhetoric was softened; however, his hard-line policy remained substantially the same. In a milestone speech of January 16, 1984, he proclaimed his new approach:

> "Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible - a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship. Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies, but we should always remember that we do have common interests and foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms". (25)

This new approach can be attributed in part to the fact that 1984 was an election year, and that public opinion in the United States and in allied nations manifested a strong desire that the President's so far unfruitful policy in regard to arms control agreements should begin to achieve results. The President avowed that successful arms control was a favoured objective. For example, just before meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in September 1984, President

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25 Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation, U.S. Allies, and the Soviet Union", January 16, 1984, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 20, no. 3, pp. 40-41.

Reagan declared to the UN General Assembly: "we recognize that there is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues between our two nations, which have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it".[26]

After his reelection Reagan insisted upon his deep desire for controlling and reducing nuclear armaments. At his second inauguration he said:

> "There is only one way safely and legitimately to reduce the cost of national security, and that is to reduce the need for it. And this we are trying to do negotiations with the Soviet Union. We are not just discussing limits on a further increase of nuclear weapons; we seek, instead, to reduce their number. We seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth". (27)

The Reagan administration was intent upon moving its military build-up into high gear and initiating its domestic reforms. Because it was elaborating new proposals that departed substantially from the pattern of past proposals, the administration needed time to prepare. In November 1981, in part because of urging from NATO the administration began negotiations with the Soviet

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26 Ronald Reagan, "Address Before the U.N. General Assembly", September 24, 1984, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 20, no. 39, p. 1356.

27 Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985, ibid., no. 4, p. 69.

Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). These negotiations had been started during the final months of President Carter's administration. They proceeded under the aegis of NATO's "two-track" decision in December 1979 to pursue negotiations with the Soviets, while simultaneously fulfilling plans to deploy the first U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe in December 1983.

The Reagan administration's proposals for controlling nuclear armaments were constructed of substantially new components reflecting the philosophy of the President. In brief, they were heavily weighted in favour of achieving certain objectives, such as equality in the INF talks and deep reductions in the total number of inter continental ballistic missiles in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations, that they lacked much negotiability. President Reagan's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, termed the U.S. INF proposals as "not negotiable" and the U.S. START proposals as "flawed".[28]

With the blessing of NATO, the administration's program for deploying intermediate-range ballistic missile and cruise missiles in Western Europe for defense against already deployed Soviet missiles moved steadily ahead toward its announced goal of initial deployments at the

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28 Alexander Haig, Caveat - Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York, 1984), p. 223.

end of 1983. The Soviets had warned for some time that with the deployments, which they viewed as strategic because the warheads of the U.S. missiles would be able to strike Soviet territory, they would reappraise their policies. When the first missiles were landed in Europe in November 1983, the Soviet delegates walked out of both the INF and START negotiations.

The United States was commissioned by NATO to negotiate with the Soviet Union on limiting missiles. When the negotiations began in earnest in November 1981, the Reagan administration introduced its initial proposal, known as the "Zero Option". This proposal stipulated in brief that "the United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, SS-5 missiles". One of the notable features of the U.S. proposal was that it was global in its application, that is, it would have prohibited the deployment of intermediate range missiles all over the world by the United States and the Soviet Union.

This proposal was essentially nonnegotiable because it asked for a total trade between nonexistent promised missiles on the one side and actually existing missiles on the other. The Soviet Union had deployed intermediate range missiles for approximately twenty-five years. Former Secretary of State Haig wrote:

> "It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing force of 1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at the cost of billions of rubles, in exchange for a promise from the United States not to deploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that had aroused such violent controversy in Western Europe". (29)

The Soviet Union initially proposed that all intermediate-range weapons in Europe, including both missiles and aircraft, be reduced to 300 on each side. According to its proposal, the NATO side would include U.S., British, and French missiles. Since the British and French governments took the position, supported by the United States, that their nuclear forces were excluded from the negotiations, the effect of the Soviet proposal could have been to exclude completely all new U.S. missiles and many U.S. aircraft. It also would have considerably limited missiles and aircraft on the Soviet side.

It can be thus said that U.S. military strategy and force structure were shaped in large part by three key assumptions stemming from the strategic situation.

First, the most demanding contingency facing the U.S. conventional forces is a war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe and adjacent areas, and perhaps world wide.

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29 Ibid., p. 229.

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Second, the most demanding contingency for the U.S. strategic nuclear forces would be a full scale nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.

Third, the force requirements for any war short of a major war with the Soviet Union would be less than those for the broader contingency.

The Reagan administration generally agreed with its predecessor that maintaining essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons was essential for ensuring the nation's security. Both administration's pursued a strategic policy based on the development of the most advanced land-based nuclear missiles. And both placed particular importance on the theoretical ability of Moscow's very accurate multiple independently targetable reentry Vehicle (MIRV) ICBMs to destroy America's land-based missiles during a period in which U.S. nuclear weapons posed no equivalent threat to heavily protected Soviet missile silos embedded in tens of concrete and rock. The Reagan administration viewed the existing nuclear balance generally as much more favourable to Moscow than did Carter and his defense advisors. Reagan's nuclear program broke with the Carter approach in two important respects. First, Reagan's concept of deterrent credibility - being able to survive a Soviet attack with enough remaining nuclear warheads to inflict heavy damage on the Soviet Union - placed more

emphasis than Carter's on the need to build up defensive systems to wipe out incoming Soviet missiles and to minimize the civilian damage that would be incurred by a Soviet strike. Reagan's programme would contribute to deterrence by making the resort to war a more "credible" U.S. option. Reagan also accelerated development of defensive systems designed to provide early warning of incoming Soviet warheads.

It becomes clear that neither the nature of the Soviet threat nor the American understanding of that threat has remained constant. Undoubtedly, there have been some noted milestones along the path of the American policy response since the post World War II period. One was the China card, which inaugurated a more flexible and multilateral view of the problem U.S. security policy faces. Frustration over Vietnam spurred a search for responses going beyond a direct U.S. military involvement. At the same time, the inexorable increase in Soviet military strength has sobered American expectations about any optimistic detente. The result was that containment, remained the core of U.S. security policy.

At the conventional level, the main thrust was on rearmament to improve the quality of America's fighting forces. The Rapid Deployment Force was upgraded to the Central Command (CENTCOM) to place greater emphasis on its importance. It renewed interest in the special forces

and their unconventional warfare role; the deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe was designed to enhance NATO capabilities. The Reagan global strategy had important force planning and deployment implications. Because there were so many potential "out-of-area" contingencies to which the United States might have to respond, readiness needed improvement. Enhanced arms development and the changing force structure during his period were the main features of administration.

Chapter II

REAGAN'S STRATEGIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The inauguration of Ronald Reagan in 1980 as President brought with it a major shift in the philosophy of government, and a distinctly different ideology. Reagan emphasized the need to strengthen America's strategic nuclear defences to counter what he perceived to be a serious Soviet military threat. Reagan was elected on a platform that sounded a call to arms against what he viewed as a dire and immediate danger - an accelerating Soviet threat to America's national security. More than two years later, the President remained distrustful of the detente in U.S.-Soviet relations pursued by both Republican and Democratic administrations during the 1970s. He considered that policy disastrous, because, to him it ignored the harsh realities of Soviet expansionism and failed to deter the balance of strategic nuclear arms from tilting in Moscow's favour. In response, Reagan committed his administration to a rapid build-up of U.S. military forces and to large increases in spending for defence.

Reagan denounced the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiated by Carter, but never approved by the Senate, as "fatally flawed", since the treaty gave the Soviet Union certain military advantages over the United States. Responding to charges that his emphasis on a U.S. military build-up and opposition to SALT II would provoke a new round in a dangerous nuclear competition with the U.S.S.R., Reagan in August

1980 said, "we are already in an arms race, but only the Soviets are racing".

By the middle of Reagan's second year in office, there was increasing public anxiety that administration's policies were increasing the risks of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.[1] He also agreed to resume U.S. efforts to reach an arms control accord with the Soviet Union. He offered to begin a new round of talks with the Soviet Union, labelled the strategic arms reduction talks (START). As one scholar puts it, Reagan's first term Soviet policy was surprisingly moderate, when the record of the administration was examined. For instance, Reagan lifted the grain embargo on the Soviets imposed by Carter. Further he did not activate the Polish tensions to gain leverage in the East-West tensions. In a speech in Eureka Illinois on May 9, 1982, the President declared that the talks would be grounded in more "realistic" proposals than those submitted at the SALT II negotiations under Carter. Any arms agreement, the President emphasized, would have to preserve an "equitable" balance between the two super powers. The goal, he said, was not simply to freeze but to reduce the deployment of weapons capable

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1 Peter R. Zwick, "American-Soviet Relations: The Rhetoric and Realism", in William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington D.C., 1988), pp. 84-85.

of nuclear destruction without endangering U.S. security.[2] Reagan's START proposal included substantial cuts in the existing stockpiles of U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Each side would be allowed to deploy the same number of these weapons.

However, several inconsistencies were apparent in the American approach. For instance, Reagan's belligerent denouncement of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire", resulted in eventual compromise and even friendship with Soviet Union. He entered office aiming for a first-strike capability and ended up signing the first arms reduction agreement of the Cold War. He promised never to pay ransom for hostages, then secretly sold weapons to the Iranian government in return for the release of hostages.[3] Despite many inconsistencies, he had some success. His administration coincided with a number of arms reduction agreements, and it managed eight years without a major war. Reagan's foreign policy emphasized the following points: realism is more effective than idealism; a strong military is essential to implementing an activist foreign policy; Congress is less likely to sustain an

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2 Herbert Scoville, "Deterring Detterence", New York Times, 23 May, 1982. For the text of Eureka College Commencement address, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, (Washington, D.C.), pp. 599-604.

3 Stephen E. Ambrose, The Presidency and Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y), vol. 70, no. 5, Winter 1991/92, p. 134.

activist policy than the President; and consistency in foreign policy is difficult to achieve but immensely powerful when it happens. Its main concern remained on developing America's military might to an extent where the force structure of the US defence would be a power to reckon with. The main argument was that political and ideological conflicts notwithstanding, the US and Soviet Union shared a common interest in war avoidance and nuclear confrontation. Therefore, enhancement of national security could be achieved through a regulated strategic relationship, yet, differing geostrategic outlooks, pose different dilemmas to the US and Soviet Union. This inevitably reflected on their perspectives on the utility of nuclear weapons and military force in general, and force structures in particular. Thus, the Reagan administration attempted to redefine the arms control agenda from the policy framework of its predecessors.[4]

The context of Reagan's security strategies have to be viewed against the legacy it inherited. The administration's pursuit of substantial improvement in the U.S. strategic arsenal as well as reorientation of the arms control agenda has also to be evaluated against any incompatibilities that may emerge in the policy.

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4 Schuyler Foerster, "The Reagan Administration and Arms Control Redefining the Agenda, in Snyder and Brown, n. 1, p. 6.

Legacy of Nixon and Carter

The Nixon administration, faced with an unpopular war in Vietnam and domestic dissent at home, came to power at a particularly unpropitious time to launch new military initiatives. The Soviet's lead in conventional forces was growing, as quantitative disparities were maintained and America's technological edge decreased. Strategic nuclear parity was becoming a fact. America's fundamental national security objective remained to prevent Soviet expansion. Nixon and Kissinger nonetheless believed that through an adroit and prudent mixture of political and military instruments the Soviets could be restrained.

Nixon and Kissinger viewed arms control as part of the larger defense policy - foreign policy framework. The first round of U.S.-Soviet arms control discussions, the strategic arms limitation talks, or SALT I, was initiated by the Nixon administration in the fall of 1969.[5] That effort culminated in the signing in Moscow on May 26, 1972, of two major arms agreements: a treaty limiting strategic missile defense systems and an agreement setting ceilings on the number of offensive nuclear weapons each side could stockpile. The treaty, which easily won Senate approval, limited the United States and the Soviet

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5 For details about SALT, John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, 1973), p. 16.

Union to two anti-ballistic missile (ABM) sites - one for the defense of each nation's capital and the other for the defense of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) facility in each country. Subsequently, in 1974, the two sides signed a protocol restricting each nation to one ABM site. The second pact under SALT I was a five-year interim agreement limiting offensive missile launchers - land based silos and submarine missile tubes - to those under construction or deployed at the time of the signing. The Soviet Union had a greater number of missile launchers than the United States in 1972, but the United States had a numerical superiority in warheads and strategic bombers. However, the interim agreement proved to be controversial because the agreement on the number of launchers allowed the Soviet Union to retain considerably more offensive missiles than the United States had deployed.

The Interim Agreement was widely hailed as an effective compromise furthering detente. Although it "legitimized" the Soviet lead in launchers as well as Moscow's throw-weight advantages, as the United States was not going to build more or larger launchers. Almost as soon as SALT I was signed, talks began on a SALT II treaty, which was to take effect when the interim agreement limiting offensive nuclear missiles expired in October 1977. Like the SALT I accords, the SALT II

Treaty seemed to codify an emerging strategic balance that included the SS-17 and the SS-19. Nixon's policy of relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union received widespread public approval.

Legacy of Carter

If the 1970s opened with some optimism about the advantages of a policy of deterrence, East-West stability and arms control, it closed with considerable gloom. By mid-1972 it generally was believed by the U.S. defense experts, that Moscow had gained the lead in the number of missiles deployed: about 2000 compared to 1,700 for the United States. Each side's missiles were about equal in accuracy and reliability, but the Soviet's ICBMs were able to carry a larger payload (explosive charge).

While members of the NATO alliance, including the United States, had adopted a policy of arms restraint and reduced their overall military expenditures, the Soviet Union's defense budget showed a steady increase, according to Defense Department estimates.[6] The Pentagon projected Soviet spending for defense at about 12 to 14 per cent of the U.S.S.R's annual Gross National Product (GNP).

A major innovation in the early 1970s was the development of warheads called multiple independently

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6 USA, Department of Defense, Release titled, Comparative Study of Defense Budget of U.S.A. and Soviet Union (November 1972).

targeted re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs. This enabled a single missile to carry several nuclear warheads, each of which could be aimed at a different target. Accurate MIRVs that could be launched in minutes changed the numbers game dramatically. With MIRVs on each super power's missiles, a few launchers could deliver a devastating blow to the other side's ability to retalliate, and the attacked still would retain enough warheads to attack a second time. Carter's State of the Union message on 21 January, 1980, reemphasised the need to enhance national security and American military strength. He insisted that American must pay whatever price required to "remain the strongest nation in the world". That price has increased as the military power of our major adversary has grown and its readiness to use the power has been made ... evident in Afghanistan.[7] The speech also gave details on the U.S. defense programme which would involve a three per cent growth rate in 1981.[8]

At the end of the 1970s there was growing disillusionment with arms control measures. When Carter submitted SALT II to the Senate, arguments both for and against were raised. However, the merits or demerits of SALT II

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7 USA, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Carter's State of the Union Message", Current Policy, no. 131, (Washington, D.C.), 1980, pp. 5-6.

8 Ibid.

did not determine the treaty's fate. Ratification of SALT II was halted by growing public and Congressional disillusionment with detente, as Soviet actions in Africa, the Iranian crises, the "discovery" of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba, the continuing Soviet military buildup, and, most important, the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 belittled the SALT II treaty faced serious problems in achieving Senate ratification. Early in 1980 Carter withdrew the treaty from Senate consideration.

Maintaining the parity with the U.S.S.R. in strategic weapons had surfaced well before the final demise of SALT II. In 1980, after having conducted a comprehensive review of U.S. strategic policy, President Carter issued Presidential Directive 59 which formally codified a "countervailing" strategy. Highlights of PD 59 were made public by Defense Secretary in an August 20, 1980 speech at the Naval War College. Brown called for strengthening the U.S. war-fighting capability in order to provide an added measure of deterrence by demonstrating America's ability to respond in credible fashion without having to escalate immediately to an all out nuclear war. The goal of U.S. nuclear defense strategy, he said, was to convince the Soviets "that no ... use of nuclear weapons on any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict could lead to victory, however they may define victory. Seeking to incorporate flexibility and encompassing many options and target sets, the countervailing strategy continued

to be basis for U.S. strategic nuclear policy in Reagan period. Main aims as emphasised by the National Security Directive (NSDD 13) of President Reagan remained similar to certain strategy. Both of them primarily targeted Soviet political structure and command and control networks, as well as military targets in order to provide the President other options besides the destruction of Soviet society.[9]

Security Policy and Strategic Doctrines

The basic component of America's deterrent force has been its strategic nuclear arsenal. Since the 1960s, these forces consisted of ICBMs launched from underground silos or surface sites, submarine - launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range bombers, the B-52s. The principal purpose of maintaining this triad of strategic systems was to provide a hedge against Soviet technological breakthroughs that might nullify or limit the effectiveness of any one leg of that force.

By diversifying its weapon systems, the United States has sought to enhance the survivability of a sufficient portion of its missiles so that even if Moscow were to destroy a substantial number of missiles, the

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9 For a detailed analysis, see Jeffrey Richelson, "PD - 59, NSDD - 13, and the Reagan Strategic Modernizing Programme", Journal of Strategic Studies (Washington, D.C.), vol. 6, no. 2, June 1983, pp. 125-46.

United States still would retain enough weapons to retalliate. In addition to these long-range strategic nuclear forces, the United States has deployed tactical nuclear weapons, designed for short-range support on the battlefield, along with tanks, guns and men.

By the early 1960s, it was estimated that the United States had acquired an arsenal of more than 7000 strategic warheads, while the U.S.S.R. had fewer than 500. Meanwhile, technological advances continued to upgrade the firepower and accuracy of nuclear weapons on both sides. The Russian's success in launching the first orbiting satellite, Sputnik provided evidence that Moscow might be drawing even or possibly pulling ahead of the United States in technological know-how, thus achieving the super power status.

By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union had begun to develop long-range bombers and ICBMs. U.S. strategic doctrine had to be modified to take account of the new nuclear equation. What emerged was the concept of "mutual assured destruction" (MAD), or the state of "mutual balance of terror". According to this theory, the Soviet Union would be deterred from launching a first strike against America by the certain knowledge that the United States had sufficient capability to retalliate, even after absorbing a Soviet nuclear attack.

The MAD strategy was advanced by Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. It achieved its purpose in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, but only because the United States still retained a substantial lead in nuclear weapons development.[10]

The era of "peaceful coexistence" had begun after the approval of Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty by the Senate in 1969. During his tenure as Defense Secretary, McNamara also formulated the policy that came to be known as "flexible response". That concept had already been discussed in the 1950s by a well-known defense expert Paul H. Nitze. Adherence to the doctrines of flexible response and MAD continued into the late 1960s and early 1970s. The basic tenets of America's nuclear strategy during Richard Nixon's Presidency were contained in National Security decision contained in "Memorandum 242" of January 1974. That report stated that U.S. forces should have the capability to inflict limited damage to selected military or economic targets so that if a President faces a Soviet provocation less cataclysmic than a massive nuclear strike on U.S. cities, he could threaten a less than catclysmic retalliation. If deterrence

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10 For details on Criticism to MAD theory, see Schuyler Foerster, "The Reagan Administration and Arms Control: Redefining the Agenda", in Snyder and Brown, n. 1, pp. 12-13.

failed, nuclear weapons would be used in a selective way, according to the memorandum, in order to seek early war termination ... at the lowest level of conflict feasible".

The U.S. strategy and the defense plans of the 1980s were formed at a time when planners assumed that real defense spending would increase by 2-3 per cent a year, but in fact, real defense spending dropped by 1986 and 1991 and would certainly drop further in the future, Soon after winning the Presidency, Carter began to stress that his promise made during the election campaign to achieve savings of $ 5 billion to $ 7 billion in defense spending would be realized gradually through reductions in the rate at which defense spending would increase, rather than through an outright reduction in the $ 110.2 billion that had been appropriated in Ford's last year. The image that the Soviet military was gaining the upper hand over U.S. forces was reinforced by reports in late August 1979 that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba. And in November this issue was overshadowed by an even more disturbing indication by shipping U.S. influence in the world. The seizure by Iranian militants of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Carter's January 1980 budget earmarked $ 161.8 billion for the Pentagon in fiscal year 1981. This already represented an increase of almost $ 34 billion over the amount Congress approved the previous year. During that period, Defense Secretary Brown noted

that it had been drafted before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and he promised a supplemental funding request to keep pace with events.

Reagan's Nuclear Strategy

The Reagan administration generally agreed with its predecessor that maintaining essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons was essential for ensuring the nation's security. Both administrations pursued a strategic policy based on the development of the most advanced land-based nuclear missiles. And both placed particular importance on the theoretical ability of Moscow's very accurated MIRVed ICBMs to destroy America's land based missiles during a period in which U.S. nuclear weapons, according to some defense analysts[11], posed no equivalent threat to heavily protected Soviet missile silos embedded in tons of concrete and rock.

Throughout his first two years in office, Reagan emphasized the need to modernize and strengthen the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. But with demands increasing for Presidential action to contain the arms race, Reagan also initiated programs to eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe and to reduce the super powers arsenal of intercontinental

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11 Defense analysts like Donald M. Snow, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. posited this view. See their articles, in New York Review, 14 March 1984.

nuclear weapons. The failure to evolve an effective strategy for modernizing strategic forces throughout the mid to late 1970s and the entire 1980s was a product of resource problems, an absence of realistic and consistent goals for programs and an ability to obtain a political consensus for many key improvements.

The Reagan administration came to office, not opposed to arms control, but nevertheless convinced that the security needs of the United States could not be met by a policy in which arms control played the central element. Yet it was not in a position to undercut existing arms control agreements. As the Joint Chief of the Staff pointed out in 1981, there was nothing the US would do differently in the absence of SALT II restraints. Accordingly, the State Department announced that "we will take no action that would undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises the Lame restraint.[12] The approach to strategic arms limitations chosen by the Reagan administration was set forth in the acronym START, in which the principal criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of arms limitations proposals and agreements was their contribution to strategic ability. It further envisaged the possibility of substantial reductions - approximately one third reduction in U.S. and Soviet

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12 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York, 1984), pp. 224-26.

strategic arsenals. The overall strategic objective of U.S. nuclear strategy was to avoid nuclear attack, while preserving the other national interests.

First, to deter the Soviets from nuclear attack on the United States by convincing them that the outcome would be unacceptable to them. Second, to convince the Soviets that U.S. will attempt to preserve its national interests by means short of nuclear war; and third, to terminate nuclear war, if it cannot be avoided, at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms most favourable to U.S.[13]

Reagan's nuclear strategy, thus, placed high priority on strategic stability. The term stability stood for crisis stability, which described a situation in which, in times of crisis or high tension, no country would see the advantages of attacking first with nuclear weapons as outweighing the disadvantages. Crisis stability depended on the force structures and doctrines of both sides and on each sides perception of the other. The lower the degree of crisis stability, the greater the risk that a power would preempt if it perceived that it were likely to be attacked.

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13 US, Office of Technology Assessment, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy", in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, The Nuclear Reader, Strategy, Weapons, War (New York, 1989), p. 102.

The Reagan administration's original contribution to strategic nuclear strategy was the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This was also Reagan's primary contribution to the U.S. strategy and defense programs. The SDI or Star Wars program through a vastly expanded research effort, sought to increase the kill capability of an anti-ballistic missile system as to justify its deployment. The SDI was mainly projected towards three goals: defence of the entire population, end the "immoral balance of terror" system, and, restore the US strategic superiority over the Soviet Union while enhancing the credibility of US nuclear commitment to Europe.[14] The SDI envisioned an anti-missile system composed of four to seven layers. There are four flight stages. In the boost phase the missile is launched and its booster rocket burns. The boost phase for existing ballistic missiles ranges from three to five minutes. In the post boost phase, which lasts from two to ten minutes, a post boost vehicle separates from the burned out booster rocket and proceeds to release warheads - more than one for MIRVed missiles - and various "penetration aids" designed to fool the SDI system. In the mid-course phase, the warheads and penetration aids travel on a ballistic flight trajectory

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14 This view was shared by the President, Secretary of Defense and other defense analysts close to the administration. See Weinberger's remark that with the success of SDI, "we could be back in a situation we were in ... when we were the only nation with a nuclear weapon", quoted by George Ball, "The War for Star Wars", New York Review, 11 April, 1985.

through space. Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles require fifteen to twenty-five minutes to complete this phase of flight while submarine launched missiles need from five to twenty minutes. Finally, missiles enter the terminal stage of flight, in which they reenter the atmosphere and, in about one minute, descend upon Cities and military targets.[15]

On the one hand Reagan enhanced its defense buildups and on the other the Reagan administration sought a START policy providing for a substantial reduction in the numbers of warheads and launchers, as well as in the size of missiles, although the principal reductions were sought in numbers of warheads. Conceptually, the greater reduction in warheads, contrasted with launchers, would represent an increase in survivability. The administration sought symmetrical reductions in warheads, missiles, and throw weight based on an agreement that is verifiable.

The point of this overview of developments in U.S. nuclear programs is not to suggest that the United States failed to deter the Soviet Union, became vulnerable, or failed to pursue valid arms control initiatives. It is rather to suggest that the U.S. nuclear efforts succeeded

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15 Robert S. McNamara, "The Star Wars Defense System", in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene E. Wittkoff, ed., Strategy Weapons, War (New York, 1989), p. 213.

largely because of the internal strains in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and not because the United States is able to translate coherent changes in its strategy into force plans and thus fund and implement them.

Given the current strains on the erstwhile U.S.S.R., the United States seems equally likely to be successful in deterrence and arms control in the future. Given the strains of the budget and lack of any political consensus for any key aspect of strategic modernization, it also seems equally likely to portend a lack of coherent strategy and coherent programs. Nuclear policy and forces will be the product of a complex dialectic shaped by U.S.-Soviet relations, budget problems, and partisan domestic politics.

After reviewing both Reagan and Carter, and their defense programme, especially military strategy, it is quite clear that Reagan's nuclear program differed with the Carter approach in two important respects. First, Reagan's concept of deterrent credibility - being able to survive a Soviet attack with enough remaining nuclear warheads to inflict heavy damage on the Soviet Union - placed more emphasis than Carter's on the need to build up defensive systems to wipe out incoming Soviet missiles and to minimize the civilian damage that would be incurred by a Soviet strike.

Chapter III

DOMESTIC FACTOR: CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN REAGAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

The defense policy of U.S. has been a recurrent source of conflict between the Congress and the executive branch throughout U.S. history. Application of the constitutional system of checks and balances to the conduct of the nation's military affairs has never been easy or straightforward. Despite the clarity of words in the Constitution, the interpretation of these words has always been controversial. In considering the practicalities of decisions on various aspects of defense policy, the Constitution's allocation of powers is inherently contradictory, setting up conflicts between the legislative and executive branches in which the judicial branch is reluctant to intervene.

Accordingly, the relative power of the two branches of government in setting U.S. defence policy attained far greater significance. The march of military technology not only created weapons of mass destruction but also gave conventional military forces the mobility, flexibility, and firepower to be used anywhere in the world. This has raised the stakes of the conflict over the control of defense policy.

The Congress was slow to recognize the transformation of U.S. defense policy after the Second World War. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the legislature was content to go along with Presidential initiatives, ceding authority and postdating its approval of military

actions from Korea through the Middle East to the Gulf of Tonkin.[1]

It was the prolonged US involvement in the Vietnam war, that wrenched the Congress into reality. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the intensifying economic and social consequences of Vietnam, and eventually its impact on the basic fabric of American life, finally led the Congress to act. It began to lose patience with successive administrations' unwillingness, or inability, to stop the nation's losses.

Other events too, added momentum to the Congressional drive - the Watergate scandal, most importantly, but also the revelations of intelligence agencies' illegal intrusions into U.S. domestic affairs. Actions to cut off funding for the Vietnam war and to curtail U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia were soon followed by Congressional reviews of U.S. military commitments and deployments in other parts of the world. A sudden concern about the defense budget was symptomatic of the Congress's perception of its new authority in defense matters. Defense spending was scaled back substantially in the early 1970s, going beyond the so-called Vietnam

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1 Marc Smyrl, Conflict or Codetermination: Congress, the President, and the Power to Make War (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), p. 9.

Peace Dividend to cut deeply into the Pentagon's plans to modernize and expand other types of forces. It began to play an active role in shaping the structure of U.S. military forces. It was perhaps unfortunate that the Congress's ascendancy in defense policy coincided with an extremely difficult period in the United States' foreign relations. The fall of U.S. allies in Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975 had far greater effect on the American voters. Despite the nation's overwhelming relief with the removal of U.S. troops, daily televised images of South Vietnamese scrambling frantically to escape the victorious armies of the North, climaxed by the frenzied evacuation of the U.S. mission and its dependents from the roof of the embassy in Saigon, went home to the American consciousness.[2]

In 1978, the picture was repeated in Iran. As Americans watched the mobs overthrow the Shah, then viewed the rapid anti-Americanism of the Ayatollah Khomeini's supporters during the humiliation of the U.S. embassy staff in Tehran, and finally saw the miserable failure of the hostage rescue mission in 1980, it was wondered as to what was happening to the power and prestige of the United States. Although the Congress had done

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2 Thomas M. Franck, and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York, 1979), pp. 155-56.

nothing overtly that could be said to have hastened the fall of the Shah, there was again the coincidence of U.S. "defeat" abroad and the Congress's ascendance at home.[3]

A new Soviet assertiveness in the Third World contributed further to these perceptions. Only one specific incident was blamed directly on Congressional intervention in defense policy - the victory of the Soviet-backed popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) faction in 1976. But other visible Soviet involvements and alleged "gains" in Third World nations - Ethiopia in 1977-78, Yemen in 1978, Nicaragua beginning in 1979 - again coincided with Congress's more visible role in the formulation of U.S. defense policy.

Throughout his campaign Reagan stressed the theme that the Congress had crippled the United States' ability to defend its foreign interests. The defense budget was increased sharply with the full participation of the conservative Congress elected in 1980.[4] However, throughout the 1980s, Congress continued to become increasingly more assertive in determining the characteristics of U.S. military forces and weapons. Moreover, beginning

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3 John Tower, "Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol. 68, no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), p. 234.

4 Ibid., p. 238.

in 1985, the Congress first levelled off and then reversed the continuing defense buildup requested by the administration. And in 1986, against the administration's fervent opposition, Congress passed a sweeping reorganization of the U.S. military establishment that reduced the power of the individual armed services in favour of joint military institutions.[5]

The Congress's role in arms control was similarly expanded in the 1980s. Building on the Senate's treaty power, and the legislature's power of the purse, Congress at times compelled the administration to enter into certain negotiations or to modify its bargaining position. It is significant that the Congress was able to maintain, even expand, its role in defense policy against the wishes of a popular President and as a society that had become strongly conservative.[6] It demonstrated that the institutions and procedures legislated in the aftermath of Vietnam were not deviations from the mainstream of historic trends in the U.S. system of government. On the contrary, the new balance between the branches of government clealy reflected fundamental alterations in the nation's perceptions of the international system and the U.S. role in that system. The American people

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5 Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York, 1981), edn. 2, pp. 155-56.

6 Ibid., p. 158.

extended the system of checks and balances, always prevalent in domestic policy, to the realm of foreign and defense policy.

The Congress came under heavy criticism for its new role in defense management. Officials of the executive branch, retired military officers, and executives of defense industries attacked it for alleged "capricious interference" in the defense budget, for permitting parochial interests to sidetrack national objectives, for being too shortsighted, and for imposing restrictions that make it virtually impossible to protect the nation's security efficiently.[7] The changes in Congressional institutions and procedures that took place since the 1960s enabled the Congress to play an informed and independent role in the design and management of defense resources. Just as Congressional pressures forced the Carter administration to spend more for defense in the 1970s, they forced the Reagan administration to reverse its defense buildup in the 1980s.[8]

Congressional initiatives helped to shape the size and structure of the nation's armed forces, alter the administration's spending priorities, and reorganize

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7 Werner J. Feld, Congress and National Defense: The Politics of the Unthinkable (New York, 1985), p. 38.

8 Ibid., p. 46.

the Defense Department.[9] For the most part, these initiatives resulted in a more effective and prudent defense program, and a military force posture that reflected both the nation's objective interests and the public's subjective concerns.[10]

Since the mid-1970s, the Congress's role in defense oversight has continued to become more comprehensive, and there has been a continuing tendency for an ever larger number of members to take active stances on defense questions.[11] Jimmy Carter ran for President on the wave of anti-defense sentiment that followed Vietnam. He attempted to implement the defense cutbacks promised in the campaign, even though popular support for these initiatives was rapidly diminishing. By 1978, when the Carter administration had completed a major review of naval missions and force structure, the Congress was ready to assert its more accurate understanding of the nation's growing uneasiness about the United States' diminishing military capabilities.[12]

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9 Ibid., p. 54.

10 Ibid., p. 55.

11 James M. Lindsay, "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961-86", Armed Forces and Society (Chicago), vol. 13 (1978), p. 378.

12 Ibid., p. 380.

The election of a Republican Senate coinciding with prodefense sentiment advanced this need. For three years, the Congress endorsed sharp increases in defense spending requested by the administration.[13] The defense budget grew sixty-eight per cent between fiscal 1980, the last Carter budget, and fiscal 1983. By 1984, however, public opinion had swung against further increases, and the Congress reacted accordingly. Gallup polls showed that advocacy of increased defense spending dropped to forty-nine and fifty-eight per cent in two 1980 polls, to about twenty per cent in 1982.[14] In 1984, pollsters reported that fewer than one in five Americans wished to spend more for defense.[15]

The Congress generally acted constructively in the 1980s in asserting its will on the defense budget. It constrained total spending to a level that was supportable politically and economically. It helped redirect priorities from nuclear to conventional programs, from the navy to the army. The Congress was, in fact, a better budgeteer than the Defense Department during the mid - and late 1980s. Some have argued, however, that this was due to the fact

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13 "Opinion Roundup", Public Opinion (June/July 1985), pp. 34-35.

14 "Opinion Roundup", Public Opinion (June 1985), p. 32.

15 Ibid., p. 34.

that, Secretary Weinberger did not impose priorities and realistic limitations on the military services' and individual budget requests. According to them, Weinberger replicated in the Defense Department, the organizational flaws normally associated with the Congress.[16]

As Vietnam stimulated greater Congressional activism in defense policy in the 1970s, the stalemate in nuclear negotiations at the start of the 1980s led to renewed Congressional initiatives. In both cases, growing popular concerns about international events catalyzed grassroots political movements that, in turn, induced the Congress to change executive branch policies. In both cases, the popular political pressures overwhelmed the bureaucracy's resistance.

Many observers have stated that in the 1970s, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam induced radical changes in the Congress's view of its proper role with respect to U.S. military interventions abroad. New procedures and new institutions were established to ensure that Congress was aware of, and would thus influence, all forms of involvement of U.S. military power abroad - from "covert" paramilitary operations to full-scale military engagements.[17]

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16 Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security (Oxford, 1990), p. 55.

17 Ibid., p. 63.

Similarly, in the 1980s the seeming failure of administration efforts to control nuclear weapons induced the Congress to take a much more active role in the formulation of U.S. arms control policy. To achieve this, the Congress turned to its most powerful weapon - the power of the purse. In effect, it began "to appropriate arms control", which was a move that meant some reordering of its internal distribution of power. Within each chamber, real authority on arms control matters shifted from the Foreign Affairs to the Armed Services Committees. By linking demands for specific arms control initiatives to military appropriations, the Congress forced the Reagan administration, against its own preferences to continue to abide, more or less, by the terms of the much-scorned SALT II Treaty limiting offensive strategic arms, to continue to restrict testing of new technologies potentially useful for strategic defense systems within a traditional, narrow interpretation of the 1972 treaty limiting antiballistic missile defenses, and to maintain a moratorium on tests of antisatellite weapons.

In March 1981 the Reagan administration announced that it was reviewing arms control policy but that in the meantime it would not "undercut" existing agreements.[18]

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18 Heritage Foundation, News Release, 5 March, 1981.

The existing agreements denotes here that the two countries i.e., U.S.A. and Soviet Union will maintain their agreed arms control measures. Given the Reagan administration's repeated denunciations of SALT II as fatally flawed, there was considerable concern in the Congress in the early 1980s over the durability and rigor of these commitments. Given the growing strength of the antinuclear movement, there was also Congressional interest in promoting SALT II as means of playing to this newly vocal constituency, particularly by members who were reluctant to support the Nuclear Freeze Resolution.

Congressional concern about sharp increases in U.S. weapon sales abraod heightened perceptibly in the summer of 1973 when rumors circulated that the Nixon administration was planning to sell F-4 Plantom jets to Saudi Arabia. Although this transaction was never consummated - the 1973 war in the Middle East intervened - the Nelson amendment, giving the Congress its first role in arms sale decisions, was passed the following year. The legislation which was modified as the Arms Export Control Act in 1976, empowered the President to notify Congress thirty days prior to completing all sales valued at $ 14 million or more for single weapons, and $ 50 million or more for sales of "defense articles and services". During the thirty-day period the Congress was authorised to veto the sale by passing a concurrent

resolution of disapproval in both Houses.[19]

Following the Supreme Court's landmark Chadha decision (in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 1983) disallowing these so-called legislative vetoes, the act was amended in 1985 to require a joint resolution of both Houses to turn down a weapons sale. A joint resolution is subject to Presidential veto, which can be overruled only by two-thirds majorities in both Houses; the executive branch, therefore, only has to persuade one-third plus one of the members of either House to permit a sale to go forward. Nonetheless, the Congress has intervened more frequently in arms sales decisions since 1985 and has made a greater impact than ever before.

The only case dealt with under the Original Nelson amendment took place in 1974. The prospective sale of mobile Hawk missiles to Jordan generated opposition from members concerned about their potential use against Israel.[20] One of the controversial arms transaction in the 1970s - the proposed sale of airborne warning and control system (AEACS) aircraft to Iran - illustrated

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19 Barry M. Blechman, <u>The Politics of National Security</u> (Oxford, 1990), p. 121.

20 Thomas M. Franck, and Edward Weisbank, <u>Foreign Policy by Congress</u> (New York, 1979), p. 101.

some of the institutional aspects of the conflict between Congress and the President. Ford administration had initiated the sale of the AWACS to Iran and was left for Carter to conclude. Carther than began negotiations to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia, but it was left for President Reagan to complete the process. The issue was joined in 1981 when the Reagan administration notified the Congress of an $ 8.5 billion sale to Saudi Arabia, adding aerial tankers, air-to-air missiles, and improvements to the F-15 fighters acquired by the Saudis in 1978 to the prospective AWACS deal.

There are some other instances of Congressional interventions. One of these episodes stands as the sole explicit rejection of a complete arms package by the Congress. In September 1985, the administration made another attempt to sell previously denied weapons, including stingers, mobile Hawks, and advanced aircraft, to Jordan. Congressional opposition centered this time on Jordan's refusal to reach a peace settlement with Israel. Despite a personal visit to Washington by King Hussein to persuade Congressional leaders that the new weapons would not be used against Israel, the Congress remained unconvinced. Three days after formal notification of the intended sale, the Senate passed (97 to 1) a joint resolution to delay the sale until at least March 1986. The resolution was passed subsequently by the

House, and was signed reluctantly by the President.[21]

The second episode was in 1987 when the administration made it known informally, that it intended to sell another large arms package to Saudi Arabia, including a small number of F-15s to replace aircraft, some army equipment, and several sophisticated Maverick air-to-surface missiles. Despite the deepening military alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia at the time, overwhelming majorities in both Houses urged the President not to go ahead. After protracted negotiations, a compromise was struck: the most objectionable portion of the package, the Mavericks, was removed, and the sale went forward.

Critics of the Congressional role in arms sales maintain that the potential threat of intervention also prevents some arms transactions from ever being considered seriously by the recipient countries. The most prominent example of this is the Saudi decision in 1985 to acquire seventy-two British Tornado aircraft, instead of U.S. fighters, a deal valued at $ 6 - 8 billion plus another $ 20 billion in support contracts. According to a study by the Congressional Research Service, the Saudis returned to British suppliers only after concluding that the Congress would not permit the sale of an additional

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21 "Senate Deals Blow to Reagan, Hussein on Arms", Congressional Quarterly (Washington, D.C., 1985), p. 2135.

large number of F-15s. In addition, the Saudis believed the British would not place restrictions on the armaments and basing of these aircraft, as the United States had done in response to Congressional pressures at the time of the initial F-15 sale in 1978.[22]

Since the passage of the Original Nelson amendment in 1974, the Congress has voted to deny or has forced the withdrawal of two announced arms deals - the 1984 Stinger sale to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and the 1985 sale of advanced aircraft to Jordan. It has caused the removal of specific types of weapons from four additional transactions of which it was notified formally - mobile Hawks to Jordan in 1974, Stingers to Saudi Arabia in 1984, and Mavericks to Saudi Arabia in 1987 and Kuwait in 1988. It persuaded the administration to place restrictions on the specific equipment in at least four additional cases - Iranian AWACS in 1977, Saudi Arabian F-15s in 1978, Saudi AWACS in 1981, and replacement of F-15s for Saudi Arabia in 1987.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 concluded one of the largest and most successful covert operations ever mounted by the United States. Costing more than $ 2 billion over eight years, the

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22 Congressional Record, Sale of Advanced Fighter Aircraft to Saudi Arabia, vol. 28, no. 5, 25 August 1987, pp. 513868-69.

program to arm and train Afghani Mujaheddin achieved an objective that Congressman Charles Wilson (D - Tex.) characterised as being "completely beyond the realm of anyone's imagination" at its outset.[23] The successful Afghan operation is a demonstration of cooperation between the executive and the legislature at their best. Not only was the Congress able to review and discuss the operation over a protracted period of time without any breach of security, but it was the Congress that took the initiative to expand the program's ambition and scope.

The 1980s also witnessed one of the least successful covert para military operations the United States has ever mounted - support of the contra insurgents in Nicaragua. The operation was notably unsuccessful in the field. Moreover, it was extremely divisive for the United States, repeatedly the subject of recorded votes in the Congress and the source of heated disputes between the Reagan administration and the Democratic - controlled House of Representatives. The Congress involvement in covert operations was probably more traumatic than in any other aspect of U.S. defense policy, considering that for the first twenty-five post war years, the U.S. intelligence community had not notified the Congress about what it was doing, and the Congress had seldom asked. According

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23 *New York Times*, 18 April 1988.

to some observers, the virtual absence of Congressional oversight served the Congress's interests as much as it did the executive's. The first successful effort to gain greater Congressional oversight of covert operations was the Hughes - Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance bill. The bill is named after Senator Harold Hughes (D. - Iowa) and Congressman Leo Ryan (D. - Calif.); the bill stated that the CIA could not conduct covert operations abroad in peacetime unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.

The Iran - Contra affair raised anew the basic issues of Congressional oversight. The Congress was kept unaware of the sale of arms to Iran. The Justice Department's ensuing investigation of the arms sales revealed a second concer : that profits from the sales had been directed to assist the Nicaraguan Contras when the Congress explicitly had denied such feuds, a move that seemed to challenge the Congress's power over executive branch expenditures. However, political analysts argued that the requirement for Congressional notification might

have a useful deterrent effect. Executive branch officials might think of the need to notify the Congress as a sort of "red-face" test : if they cannot describe a covert operation to a group of Congressmen without becoming embarrassed, it probably should not be attempted.

It can be said that in each of the four dimensions of defense policy examined so far - defense budget making, arms control, arms sales, and covert operations - the balance between the branches has shifted toward the Congress. The Reagan revolution failed; the procedures and institutions created by the Congress in the 1970s not only held but were reinforced. In the 1980s the Congress has been a primary participant in the defense policymaking process, acting to curb and sometimes to reverse administration initiatives, and, on occasion, to initiate the general direction as well as the specific detail of U.S. policy.

The Congress's reluctance to enforce its legislated war powers is a very important exception to its general pattern of assertiveness, concerning the very heart of defense policy. In a sense, the vital center of defense policy lies neither in budgets nor in negotiations, but in the power to declare war. The political pressures that caused the Congress to become centrally involved in defense policy in the 1970s had little to do with defense budgets, and even less to do with arms sales. They stemmed from one fact: that the United States had fought an

undeclared war in Vietnam for more than seven years. Without direct authorization by the people's elected representatives, millions of U.S. troops had been sent to fight, more than 50,000 had been killed, and hundreds of thousands wounded, in a country halfway around the world that few Americans had ever heard of prior to 1964. The U.S. economy was wrecked by it, it took a decade to recover.

The War Powers Resolution requires the President to report to the Congress in three types of contingencies: (1) when the armed forces are introduced into situations of actual or imminent hostilities; (2) whenever combat-equipped forces are sent to foreign nations, except for certain specified routine purposes; and (3) when combat-equipped U.S. forces already in a foreign nation are "substantially enlarged". The first contingency is by far the most important; it sets the sixty-day limit to commitment of troops. Unless the Congress acts within that period to authorize continuation of the operation, it must be terminated within sixty days, or ninety days if the President requests an extension. Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan generally complied with the requirement to report to the Congress in a timely fashion.[24]

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24 Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security (Oxford, 1990), p. 177.

Scholars have pointed out that intra and inter-departmental constraints have also operated on the making of defense policy. For instance, although the Reagan administration succeeded in obtaining large budgets from Congress, the character of its policymaking machinery was influenced by key administration officials. The division of authority within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as among Office of the Secretary of State and other important institutional players in U.S. defense policy, limited the coherence of policy outputs. For instance, it was contended that the Secretary of Defense played the role of external fund-raiser and promoter rather than internal manager, with regard to the Pentagon. Further, frequency of change of the principal actors from key positions led to ill-suited policy judgements and unintended confusion. However, the Reagan defense program, according to one writer, probably fared neither better nor worse than its predecessors in its ability to impose coherent policy on a disjoined incremental process.[25]

The competition between State Department and Department of Defense has a long history. Right from the start it was exacerbated by a number of considerations over the years following 1947 when the National Security Act created the position of Secretary of Defense. Although

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25 Vincent Davis, "The Reagan Defense Program: Decision Making", in Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., The Reagan Defense Program (Wilmington, Del, 1986), p. 25.

the Constitution neither hinted at the concept of a cabinet nor mentioned any officeholders later regarded as cabinet members, the position of Secretary of State was originated in the earliest years of the Republic. It was thus the first such cabinet position and has accordingly continued to be regarded as the senior cabinet post in terms of protocol and prestige.

It cannot be denied that the budget is the most accurately revealing indicator of government policy and on this dimension the authority of the Secretary of Defense steadily has eclipsed that of the Secretary of State, as military force was increasingly viewed as the foremost instrument of statecraft following World War II. The DOD's budget rapidly approached $ 100 billion in the 1970s, while the Department of State's budget for the first time inched across the $ 1 billion threshold. The Secretary of Defense also came to enjoy other circumstances potentially convertible into political "clout" in making overall American foreign/defense policy. When contrasted to the vast size and scope of DOD, the Department of State and the CIA were quite small. Further, DOD possessed a grass-roots constituency that it could attempt to mobilise for political support in every state in the union: workers at all military installations and defense plants, plus leaders in the local communities where the installations and plants were located, and the veterans organizations.

In the rivalry between the State and Defense Secretaries, the former's stature has tended to rest on traditional intangibles, while the latter's assets have been the more practical tangibles. The factors usually tipping the scales were the President's predilections, his separate relationships with each of these two Secretaries, the mood of Congress, and the international situation. As a broad generalization, the scales tip toward the Secretary of Defense and support for DOD, to the same extent that public and political opinion has perceived a serious military crisis.

President Reagan and Secretary of Defense during his time, Weinberger preferred to operate at the level of broadly general themes, particularly in generating Congressional and public support for a military buildup. However, Weinberger's Pentagon never understood the differences among three key concepts - leadership, management and administration and therefore never provided adequate performance in any of these contexts. The appointment of Army General as key advisor to National Security Agency pointed to the fact that the position of Secretary of Defense was somewhat subdued.

The second implication of Weinberger's probable reduction in stature was a gradual continuing increase in the stature of senior uniformed officers. Congress had exhibited a long-standing tendency to pay more

attention to officers than to office of Secretary of Defense Civileins, but the same inclination was also increasingly evident in the White House during the final two years of the first Reagan Term. In terms of weapons it was likely that during Reagan's Second term, several major weapons systems, which had caused much controversy in his first four years, would be severely cut, if not totally eliminated, and then replaced only by a gradual increase in research and development (R and D) spending for future ideas.

However, the uncompromising anti-detente group in the Pentagon was able to dominate the U.S. decision-making process during Reagan's first term. It blocked various attempts by State Department officials and particularly by U.S. chief negotiator, Paul Nitze, to move the U.S. negotiating position toward concessions in order to reassure the allies. Soviet intransigence during the first phase of the INF negotiations also played right in the hands of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle.[26]

As the branch of government most directly attuned and necessarily most responsive to currents in public opinion, the Congress as well as the Department of Defense has a very special role to play in all aspects of defense

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26 Thomas Risse-Kappen, <u>Did "Peace Thought Strength" End the Cold War? International Security</u> (Cambridge, Summer 1991), vol. 16, no. 1, p. 182.

policy. It is in the best position to ensure that there is some conformity between the public's expectations and the government's actions. It is clear that the government most often errs when the executive exceeds the boundaries of public tolerance. Jimmy Carter's misjudgement about the public's acceptance of Soviet inroads in the Third World, and Ronald Reagan's misunderstanding of the public's concern about nuclear war, are two recent examples. In cases like these, executive policies have largely been based on ideological viewpoints, or an abstract conceptions of international politics, rather than on the realities of contemporary circumstances. In such cases, the Congress has an absolutely crucial role to play in articulating the public's concerns and if necessary, in compelling the executive to modify its course.

Chapter IV

IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS

After the World War II, United States pursued a global foreign policy due to the fact that the Presidents recognised that America's interests are global. The two world wars made clear its stake in Western Europe and the North Atlantic area. U.S. was also inextricably linked with the Far East - politically, economically, and militarily. In all of these, the United States has a permanent presence and security commitments. To assess the impact of Reagan's policy on U.S.-Soviet relations and the implications of the Reagan's security assistance in general and the implications of changing force structure in particular, it is important to analyze as to how the Reagan's first term adopted the policy, the circumstances in which these policies were made and hence, an analysis on U.S.-Soviet relations is made.

The United States passed through two security eras. The first was the geopolitical era, which lasted from 1789 to 1945; the second the Cold War era, lasted from 1945 to 1990.[1] During the Cold War era, the United States maintained a huge military establishment with: a large intercontinental strategic nuclear force having significant counterforce capabilities; thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Eurasia; a huge navy that dominated

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1 Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense", International Security (Cambridge, Mass.), vol. 15, no. 4, Spring 1991, p. 17.

the world's seas; a standing army of over 750,000 troops, a formidable and versatile air force, much of it overseas, capable of intercontinental bombing and deep interdiction, and a sea and air power projection capability that enabled the United States to move its conventional forces with relative ease around the globe.[2]

The strategic nuclear forces provided significant counterforce capabilities to bolster the credibility of extended deterrence of Soviet conventional attacks on U.S. allies. The tactical nuclear forces were intended to counter the Soviet Union's perceived huge advantage in conventional forces. The large navy, air force, and army were deployed to fight a long conventional war in Central Europe to stalemate and thereby dissuade a Soviet conventional attack there.

During Ronald Reagan's first term as President, his anti-Soviet rhetoric depicted Moscow as the "focus of evil", and revealed an intense hostile relationship between the two countries. Throughout his tenure in office, Reagan had an anti-communist commitment. Reagan did not simply revive Cold War "containment" policy, but he resuscitated the chimera of a "roll back" of Soviet power as the result of a shift in the "correlation of forces" in favour of the West. In support of the

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2 Ibid., p. 18.

"roll back" approach, Secretary of State Shultz wrote at the beginning of 1985: "The present political division of the continent (Europe) is artificial; it exists only because it has been imposed by brute Soviet power; the United States has never recognized it as legitimate or permanent".[3]

The enigma of Reagan's first term is that despite the intensity and content of his anti-Soviet rhetoric, his policy was neither reckless nor especially threatening to Soviet security. The Reagan's first term has been characterized as a "rhetorical Presidency". A few questions arise, as to what are the factors which explain the gap between Reagan rhetoric and policy toward the USSR? One of the other question is as to why there was a major shift from rhetoric in his second term and whether this shift portended a new realism in Reagan policy toward the USSR.

According to one estimate, the term "realism" implied less reliance on ideological explanations of Soviet behaviour and more reliance on factors associated with a real politik view of Soviet policy. Realism also meant a turn toward diplomatic engagement and negotiation to resolve outstanding differences. Hence, Reagan's rhetoric, according to this view, should be seen as

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3 George P. Shultz, New Realities and New Ways of Thinking", Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.), vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985, p. 711.

a manifestation of America's willingness to stand up to Soviet power. The gap between Reagan's "declaratory signals" (rhetoric) and "operational signals" (policy) reflected his recognition of the increasing importance of the perception of risk in American-Soviet relations. If Reagan could intimidate the Soviets through his rhetoric, they would be less likely to risk direct confrontation.[4] During his first term as President, increased expenditures for MX and Midgetman missiles, B-1 and Stealth bombers, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) signified Reagan's commitment to American military modernization.

In the post Vietnam era, America's belief in military solutions to international political problems had been abandoned in favour of detente. It was under Carter that the Iran crisis tested American military capacity and found it wanting. Defense spending was sharply reduced, which raised widespread concern over American security. In addition, the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua sparked fears of another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan convinced even President Carter that Moscow could not be trusted. The Soviet Union's attempt to subjugate an independent, non-aligned Islamic people was seen as a

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4 Coral Bell, "From Carter to Reagan", _Foreign Affairs_, vol. 63, no. 4, Spring 1985, pp. 502-3.

violation of international law and the United Nations Charter; and a threat to world peace. For the first time since World War II, the Soviets had sent combat forces into an area that was not previously under their control, into a non-aligned and sovereign state.[5]

Reagan initiated three new military challenges to Soviet power; the Reagan Doctrine of active support for "freedom fighters" against communism in the Third World; the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe (Pershing II and Cruise missiles); and the development of a new nuclear deterrence strategy known as the strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars".

The Reagan Doctrine specifically dealt with the containment of communism. It involved overt and covert aid to forces attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and the Marxist government of Grenada. Reagan's decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe was a response to the Warsaw Pact's previously unchallenged military preeminence over NATO, which guaranteed a political status quo in Europe. The Strategic Defense Initiative was a response to the perceived Soviet strategic advantage in offensive weapons. The Strategic Defense Initiative represented a fundamental

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5 USA, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Carter's State of the Union Message", Current Policy No. 131 (Washington, D.C.), 1980, p. 5.

change in America's strategy of deterrence through mutual assured destruction (MAD), to one based on a defensive anti-missile system. Whether the Reagan Doctrine, INF deployment, and SDI were intended as preludes to traditional diplomacy, or as long-term policies, they matched the public mood of the first term. As one writer put it:

> "The bulk of Reagan's first term, after the initial victories on the budget and taxes, was taken up in legislative stalemate, rhetorical posturing, and public relations gestures. The principal foreign relations initiatives of the administration consisted of a line toward the Soviet Union that varied from distrust to belligerence". (6)

This posture slowed and later halted arms control negotiations, placed American missiles in Europe, stimulated considerably higher defense expenditures, and increased US anti-communist military activity in Central America.[7]

However, abrupt and significant changes in foreign and domestic conditions at the outset of Reagan's

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6 Strobe Talbott, Time Magazine's Soviet specialist, wrote that not only did Reagan allow Soviet-American relations to deteriorate seriously, but he also conveyed the impression, certainly during his first two years in office, that the relationship ought to be bad. Further, competition and confrontation were the only appropriate forms of the relationship. For further details, see Strobe Talbott, The Russians and Reagan (New York, 1984), p. 70.

7 I.M. Destler, "The Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy", in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment (Baltimore, 1983), pp. 117ff.

second term altered that mood, which necessitated changes in both the style and substance of Reagan's Soviet policy. Some have attributed Reagan's extraordinary success in obtaining majority of public opinion towards his defense policy to his professional management of public relations, and despite his "rudimentary grasp" of the range and depth of the ramifications of public policy in general.[8]

The relationship between the two countries, i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union was changed when Gorbachev took over in March 1985. American domestic, political and economic factors influenced Reagan to engage Gorbachev diplomatically. Domestically, the lack of anticipated economic recovery announced by "Reaganomics" in 1981, was clearly revealed by 1985. The three pillars of Reagan's economic program, namely, simultaneous cut backs of taxes and Federal spending, a decrease in regulation and bureaucracy and curbing inflation by stringent control of money supply had, by 1985, proved to be less successful than planned. While a variety of factors such as, long and serious recession in 1982, dropping levels of production in key industries such as automobiles and construction, increasing unemployment, lower growth rate than forecasted amongst others, had made a

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8 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York, 1982), pp. 372-73. See also, New York Times, 31 March, 1983 and 15 August, 1984.

presidential budget of increased defense expenditures less attractive.[9] In consequence, criticism of Reagan's military strategy grew and arms control negotiations were once again envisaged as necessary to normalise the U.S.-Soviet military relationship.

The impact of Reagan's security doctrines has also been subjected to intense scrutiny by critics. According to one estimate despite substantial increases in American military spending, little evidence was available to suggest that the military balance, at both conventional and strategic levels had shifted in favour of the United States by 1985. His modernization programme had more effect on reviving the defence sector than on a shift in the "correlation of forces". The sustained support the President gave to increased military budgets also illustrated the fact that Washington had the political will to sacrifice domestic programs and a balanced budget for the sake of military defense. Others disagree and claim that the military plays an exceptional role as the guardian of national security at times of international tension. Combined with its traditionally secretive and enclosed organization, its mastery of its own complex

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9 For detailed economic analysis on how Reaganomics was plagued by contradictions, see Christian Stoffaes, "Reagonomics in Perspective: The New American Policy" in Christian Stoffaes, ed., The Political Economy of the United States (Amsterdam, 1982), pp. 11-37.

and technically demanding subject matter and its political and economic leverage as the largest purchaser of goods and services in the US, the military virtually assumed a position of autonomy. Therefore, Reagan policies had to be in coordination with the military's news. As one writer suggested, "the relationship between the executive branch and the military is a complex matter, often more like that between two branches of government than a straight-line chain of command.[10] In other words, Reagan's military strategy was a product of complex domestic and international factors, its impact correspondingly had varied implications. For instance, the implication on the international security assistance provided by the Reagan policies provides a major insight on the ramifications of the military strategy and force structure.

Implications of the Security Assistance Policies of the Reagan Administration

The role of security assistance in national security policy is a function of an administration's objectives and recipient state's demand for weapons

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10 E.F. Sherman, "Accountability and Responsiveness of the Military Establishment", in L.N. Rieselbach, ed., People Vs Government: The Responsiveness of American Institutions (Bloomington, 1975), p. 241.

and other forms of military assistance. The security assistance is usually provided directly, from suppliers to recipient; this is the primary mechanism through which an attempt is made to "influence" other states. Since the end of World War II, the United States had been actively engaged in almost every corner of the globe. It viewed threats to security and stability in every region as ultimately threatening to its stake in world peace, international trade and economic development, and progress toward individual freedom and social justice. The security assistance program began and was evolved primarily in response to events that threatened U.S. interests.

It has been generally believed that security assistance is an essential foreign policy tool. President Reagan expressed his belief in the importance of security assistance when he signed foreign-aid legislation in 1985: "At a time of defense reductions, we must pay particular attention to our most compelling international security needs".[11]

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11 Quoted by Mary Belcher, "Reagan Signs Foreign Aid, Complains of Limitations", Washington Times, 9 August 1985, p. 3; in Roy A. Werner, "The Burden of Global Defense: Security Assistance Policies of the Reagan Administration", in William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, D.C., 1988), p. 145.

The Reagan administration was committed to increase security assistance funds. It rejected the Carter administration's characterization of arms transfers "as an exceptional foreign policy implement" and instead emphasized the role of arms transfers as "an essential element of global defense posture and an indispensable component of foreign policy".[12] The administration believed in the efficacy of security assistance in promoting regional security. The cornerstone of the Reagan approach is the President's directive of 8 July 1981, which states that, "arms transfers can deter aggression, demonstrate US commitment, foster stability, and enhance US forces operational and production effectiveness if applied judiciously". This document dictates a case-by-case approach to approving arms shipments. These considerations include the nature of the military threat to the recipient state, the receiving state's participation in collective security arrangements, possible effect on U.S. allies that may be hostile to one another, and U.S. security interests.

Prior to the Reagan administration, administration of security assistance programs was based on a regional format with a country focus. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger argued that "this obscured the strategic

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12 Ibid.

goals we have been pursuing and substituted artificial global groupings for policy based objectives". The overriding priority of the Reagan administration was peace in the Middle East. According to World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985, between 1973 and 1983, 40 per cent of the world's arms imports went to six Arab nations. In terms of US security assistance, Israel and Egypt were the top recipients. The next priority was the Southern tier of NATO and the Persian Gulf, specifically Turkey, Greece and Pakistan. The Reagan administration's FY 1987 security assistance budget proposes $ 5.3 billion to the Middle East, and $ 2.8 billion to Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey. The two categories represent approximately 75 per cent of all funds sought. The Sudan, Oman, Djibouti, Morocco, and Somalia were presented as essential supporting elements, "making available a range of facilities to enhance the mobility and strategic reach of U.S. forces", according to Under-Secretary of State William Schneider, Jr., testifying before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on 6 March 1986. Northeast Asia and Central America are the next major focal points, especially South Korea and El Salvador.[13]

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13 Roy A. Werner, "The Burden of Global Defense", in William P. Snyder and James Brown, eds., Defence Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, D.C., 1988), pp. 152-53.

The main point to be noted here is that security assistance policy evolved as a military tool in support of containment policy and as political lever against other non-friendly nations. The Reagan military strategy continued to pursue the same goals. On doing so however, there were certain other factors to be considered. Amongst them the mounting budget deficit had a great impact on the American defense policy making.

Implications on Force Structure

The importance of geography, as well as demographics and economic potential are the important factors for force planners. From the late 1940s through the 1980s, the overriding national security objective was the "containment" of Soviet geographic and ideological expansion. Therefore, the force planners were to design a force capable of deterring both nuclear and conventional attacks by the Soviet Union against U.S. and its allies.

In theory, the military strategy entailed two key concepts: forward defense with U.S. allies and flexible response throughout the spectrum of conflict. In practice, these two concepts required that American troops be stationed far forward on and around the Eurasian continent, able to fight at all levels of conventional conflict and posing a credible threat of nuclear escalation. Because of the vast size, population and

defense economy of the communist coalition, this orientation demanded a high degree of preparedness for the industrial base, a significant capacity for mobilization, and powerful reserve forces.[14]

As the essence of the Reagan administration's Defense Guidance appeared in 1982, it was accompanied by projections of the conventional and strategic forces that the administration estimated as necessary to carry out its policies. Regarding strategic forces, the number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers available to the United States after the first Reagan term are not that different from when Carter left office. The contention that the Reagan administration has moved to a significantly more expansive and demanding national security posture is based on two apparent shifts in U.S. defense policy. First, at the conventional level there is the administration's horizontal escalation strategy and second, the apparent shift from a nuclear strategy of "countervailing" deterrence, under Carter, to the notion of "prevailing" in a "protracted" nuclear conflict, as articulated in the Defense Department's FY 1984-88 Defense Guidance.

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14 Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Force Planning for the Post-Cold War World: What can we learn from Geopolitics"?, Strategic Review (Washington D.C., 1991), p. 30.

One of the important implications of force structure during Reagan's first term was that it led a greater development of nuclear arms and arsenals. Due to this, the Soviet Union, too, enhanced its arsenals and arms and therefore there was a greater competition between the two countries. An era of uneasy peace, i.e., from 1981 to 1984, there was a lack of faith, mutual co-ordination, and hence, the two countries developed their arms to an extent that in international circles questions were being raised as to how the human lives will be saved. However, the two countries were yet confident that nuclear war can never be fought and can never be won. Mutual deterrence was still a major calculation in their policy making. During this second term, Reagan changed his approach and instead of enhancing the arms, the two countries started limiting the arms by signing accords. With the coming of Gorbachev in power in Soviet Union in March 1985, an era of uneasy peace was replaced by an era of peace, goodwill, friendship and mutual cooperation. Gorbachev ascendancy to power in the Soviet Union was one of the important factor which changed the strategies as well as the force structure of the United States.

However, the Reagan program for strategic offensive modernization was launched in 1981, with the expectation that it would bring U.S. forces into closer

alignment with Soviet capabilities in those areas in which the administration feared American inferiority. It was also expected during that time that the modernization program would induce Soviet interest in arms control on terms other than those which would have been ratified in the aborted SALT II. The environment for U.S. strategic offensive force modernization was changed by the beginning of the deployments of U.S. NATO long-range theater nuclear forces (LRINF), which were subsequently called intermediate nuclear forces in Western Europe. The U.S. Congress adopted its own notion of strategic stability and the weapons that would support U.S.-Soviet stability, and these notions were imposed upon the administration as a condition for the attainment of its weapons procurement objectives. Congressional approaches to stability favoured continuation of mutual vulnerability for both U.S. and Soviet societies. The MX/Peacekeeper ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) became the most famous hostage in the history of the U.S. arms debate, dependent upon Congressional approval of the administration's arms control proposals and its willingness to enter research and development toward eventual deployment of a small single warhead ICBM dubbed "Midgetman" by the press.[15]

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15 Jonathan E. Medalia, "Midgetman", Minuteman and Titan Missile Programs (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), 1984, p. 36.

Undoubtedly, American strategic offensive modernization programs have inconsistent implications for its relations with Europe. European perceptions of political priorities and military necessities differ from U.S. perception. From a political standpoint, the highest stake for the United States is preserving alliance cohesion to reinforce deterrence of Soviet conventional or nuclear attack on Europe. From a military standpoint, the problem is the "extended" deterrence supposedly provided by the linkage between U.S. force structure, U.S.-NATO theater nuclear forces based in Europe, and U.S.-NATO conventional forces.

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

The period since the end of World War II has been unique in the American experience. At that time the United States was thrust from the role of supporting character to that of leading actor on the world stage and was pitted against the Soviet Union, which was equally unprepared for the spotlight. The ruins of the old international order - characterized by the shrinking influence of the traditional European powers and the crumbling of colonial empires principally in Africa and Asia - formed the backdrop of this drama.

History did not prepare Americans especially well for this new role, especially since world leadership was now defined in terms of which nation was most secure from the threats of others. Before 1945, there had never been anything resembling a comprehensive American defense policy; the buffers of two broad oceans and friendly, weak neighbours had rendered the development of such a policy unnecessary.

The world was changed in many ways, three of which stand out. First, power in the international system became bipolar, with only the United States and the USSR retaining the capacity to significantly influence events. Each was drawn - either willingly or unwillingly - into power vacuums around the globe. In the process, Americans began to regard their national interests, including those that might potentially be defended with force, as global in nature.

Second, most nations of the world, including the United States and the USSR, signed the United Nations Charter, by which signatories renounced war as an instrument of policy. The result has been not a positive condition of peace but an era in which force continues to be applied under various guises.

Third, the nuclear age began. By unleashing atomic power, mankind created the means of its self-immolation and thereby altered the basic rules for defense and war. As nuclear arsenals achieved their current deadly levels, the result was to restrain the nations that possessed them. The informal rule that has emerged is that major nuclear powers - notably the United States and the Soviet Union - can no longer afford to confront one another in ways that could lead to violence and thus nuclear war.

There was obviously an important shift in American national security policy during Reagan's tenure. Emphasis was placed on the broader implications of particular priorities of the administration, such as its build up of U.S. naval power as well as its forceful rhetoric regarding U.S. strategic forces. The contention that the Reagan administration's defense programme represents a significant departure in U.S. defense policy is captured in Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera's following assertion.

"Insofar as the administration does have a strategy, it seems extravagent and dangerous. Fragmentary statements and administration procurement programs suggest that the administration has adopted a more demanding strategy than any since the Eisenhower administration, or perhaps earlier. The Reagan administration appears to have embraced more and harder missions than the original Cold War 'containment' strategy would require, and it puts more emphasis on offensive missions and tactics. All administrations since Truman have adopted military strategies that included more missions than a pure containment strategy would seem to require, but the implicit Reagan administration strategy departs further from containment than its predecessors".[1]

Two major themes have dominated the evolution of American defense policy. The first has been the question of where American interests are sufficiently vital to defend with armed force. The second theme has been the role of nuclear weapons and the balance between nuclear and conventional arms in American strategy.[2]

The Reagan package of proposals to modernize American strategic forces has served as an important focal

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1 Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, Reagan Administration Defense Policy (New York, N.Y., 1986), p. 69.

2 John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), p. 76.

point for the general public policy debate over nuclear weapon issues in the 1980s. At one level, the debate has focussed on the question of the need of modernizing at all, both in the context of continuing interest in arms control. At another level, there has been debate and disagreement on specific elements of the package, some of which are more controversial than others.[3]

President Reagan has served as one pole in the debate. He came to office as a strong believer in a robust defense posture, and he campaigned strongly in 1980 on the need to reverse the unilateral disarmament policies that had been followed in the wake of the Vietnam war.[4] He meant that defense spending had not grown relative to inflation during the balance of the 1970s, and that military procurement, including purchases for strategic nuclear defense, had lagged behind the efforts being put forward by the Soviet Union.

After the disastrous American military involvement in Vietnam, it became the vogue to view military force as nearly an anachronism in modern international relations. As military force passed from the scene, it would be replaced by the spreading fow of "complex interdependence".

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3 Robert J. Prauger, and Roger P. Labrie, Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 48.

4 Ibid., p. 77.

As all parts of the world became increasingly economically interdependent, increasing cooperative relations among nations would blossom. The view world interdependence is not without merit or truth; the levels of economic interchange confirms that interdependencies are growing.[5]

Undoubtedly, it is the U.S. President who formulates the defense policy. During his first term, Reagan made it clear that he was interested in the increase in the development of U.S. arms. According to him, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had already proved its dominant attitude and its capability of having more sophisticated arms in comparison to the U.S. Hence, Reagan argued for a bigger investment in the defense area. He gave the concept of strategic defense initiative and developed the plan at great length. However, during his second term of office, certain changes took place. He now claimed that nuclear war can never be won and can never be fought. Thus began a series of arms control measures which was envisaged as necessary part of overall defense strategy.[6]

The American Congress has been asserting a more intensive role in the determination of American defense policy for twenty years. The incentives provided by

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5 Donald M. Snow, The Nuclear Future: Toward a Strategy of Uncertainty (Alabama, 1983), p. 24.

6 McGeorge Bundy, President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control, Strategic Digest, vol. 15, no. 2, February 1985, pp. 121-22.

politics and personal ambitions support continuation of assertive Congressional roles. The Congress brings certain special perspective to the revolution of defense issues that permit it to make a unique contribution.

The final aspect of U.S. nuclear strategy that has continuously changed because of shifts in politics and money is U.S. plans to modernize theatre nuclear forces. These plans are now largely dead, and it is unclear what the United States and its allies will do in the future. The point of the brief overview of developments in U.S. nuclear programme is not to suggest that the United States failed to deter the Soviet Union, became vulnerable , or failed to pursue valid arms control initiatives. It did all of these things and did some very well. It is rather to suggest that the U.S. nuclear efforts succeeded largely because of the internal strains in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and not because the United States is able to translate coherent changes in its strategy into force plans and then fund and implement them. The United States has succeeded more through momentum and sheer willingness to compete than through anything else.

The future course of American defense policy is fraught with uncertainties and complications. The general goal is to provide for the physical security of the United States and to facilitate the achievement

of American interests. Defense considerations, i.e., military strategy and force structure, have become, in the years since World War II, central to internations relations and to America's foreign policy.

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