

PAKISTAN - INDIA RELATIONS : 1977-1988

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


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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the dissertation titled
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PREFACE

Since 1947 Pakistan-India relations have been characterized by mutual distrust and disharmony. Pakistan - India relations have been governed more by historical legacies than any other factor. At times, mutual suspicions between these two neighbouring countries have assumed the shape of war. Zia regime was unique and different from his predecessor because he wanted to break the power asymmetry in South Asia. The significance of his policy was that he posed a psychological threat only to create an impression of deterrence with India.

India always tried to improve or maintain friendly attitude towards Pakistan but Pakistan did not show any interest instead, it aligned itself with the extra - regional powers to destabilise India. Taking advantage of the changed international situation (the Soviet interference in Afghanistan) Pakistan offered a 'No-War Pact' to India, just to show the US Government that it is interested in improving relations with India, while continued to interfere in the internal affairs of India especially in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, tried to occupy Siachen Glacier and vigorously pursued its nuclear programme.

Military rulers of Pakistan always took resort to anti-India bogey in order to legitimise their rule which created many problems for them.

It is in this general background that an effort has been made in the following chapters to analyse Pakistan - India relations during 1977-1988.

In Chapter I some of the major events in Pakistan - India relations before 1977 has been analysed.

Chapter II deals with the various factors which determined Pakistan's foreign policy under Zia.

Chapter III deals with the various issues of discord and efforts made to normalise them during Zia.

In Chapter IV Pakistan - U.S. security relationship and its impact on the peace of South Asia have been dealt with.

Chapter V comprises the Conclusion.

In the course of this work my teacher and supervisor Dr. Uma Singh has been a continuous source of help and encouragement. Without her cooperation and guidance, this work might not have been completed in time. I am immensely grateful to her.

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(ASHOK KUMAR)

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter an effort will be made to analyse various factors which shaped Pakistan-India relations till 1977. Main focus will be on various issues which determined Pakistan-India relations just after partition. Indo-China war and its impact, role of super power in Pak-India relations, Pak-Indo war of 1965 and Tashkent Agreement, the domestic compulsion of Pakistan; the 1971 war and the Simla Agreement and the Post-Simla Pakistan-India relations.

(Since 1947 Pak-India relations have been characterized by mutual hate and distrust, Michael Brecher had rightly said:

"The relations between India and Pakistan since the partition of 1947 have been characterized by extreme tension much of the time, tension almost all the time, economic blockde on one occasion... periodic threats of war and continuous ideological and political warfare which have produced to put it, mildly, a shambles in the relationship between these two countries".¹

1. Michael Brecher, "The Roots of Indian Foreign Policy" in Selig S. Harrison (ed.). India and the United States, (New York, 1961), p.53.

(Right from its inception, Pakistan followed a policy of confrontation with India through various stages which became manifest in various ways. Despite a common past and a common heritage with India, Pakistan soon indulged in such acts which created problems for India. These acts embittered. relations and led to antagonistic political attitudes of the two countries which were not harmonized in spite of bilateral negotiation and third party intervention.²

Most important factor which was responsible for creating a lot of badblood was the continued rivalry between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Before the partition of the subcontinent, the Muslim League propagated that Muslims and Hindus formed two separate nations and the Muslim League only had the right to speak for the Muslims of the subcontinent and the subcontinent must be divided accordingly. They started to work for the Islamic ideals and to establish an Islamic state under the name of the Pakistan. The Muslim League demanded for a separate house for the Muslim named Pakistan in 1940. But this was against the secular and multi-religious ideology of India. This was further aggravated by the fanatic Muslim leaders who

2. V.P. Verma, India's Foreign Policy and the Opposition Parties : 1957-67, Ph.D. Thesis, (Ranchi, 1971), p.15.

tried to capitilize on the widening gap between the Hindus and the Muslims. Jinnah regarded the Congress party as purely a Hindu party³ and was of the opinion that the Hindu and the Muslim differed in ideas and outlooks, belief and habits and conducts and mode of behaviour.⁴

The rejection of the Muslim League's demand for the partition of the Sub-continent by the Indian National Congress and acceptance of the partition plan led the Pakistan leader to feel that India had not reconciled to the very existence of Pakistan. Jinnah lamented "It is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on ... that Pakistan is... hereby a temporary madness and that Pakistan will have to come into the union as penitent, repentent erring son."⁵

It is true to say that the Pakistani leaders failed to realise that India after independence was

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3. Keith Callard, Pakistan - A Political Study, (New York, 1957), p.1.
 4. Humayan Kabir, "Muslim Politics (1942-47)" in C.D. Phillips and M.D. Main Wright (eds.) Partition of India - Policies and Perspectives (1937-47), (London, 1970), p.404.
 5. As quoted in S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, (Minneapolis, 1974), p.8.

never in favour of disturbing the status-quo of the sub-continent. Nehru made it clear in his vigorous speeches and writings. In course of his convocation address to the Muslim University of Aligarh on 24 July 1948, he declared, "If today by any chance I was offered the reunion of India-Pakistan, I would decline it for obvious reasons. I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan's great problems. I have enough of my own."⁶

The mutually irreconcilable positions of the Congress and the Muslim League went beyond any negotiable settlement, and it finally unleashed a series of communal riots in different parts of the country resulting in the killing of hundreds of Hindus and Muslims. Amidst widespread communal violence, arson, looting and massacre, the demand for a separate state of Pakistan was conceded. This also strained the relations between the two countries.

This makes it amply clear that Pakistan's attitude towards India was determined much by its domestic situation - lack of legitimacy, identity and image - then by any more on the part of India. There have been certain factors which had always made

6. Ibid. No. 6, p.89.

Pakistan war of India like its size; population, resources and military strength.

Just after partition certain problems arose which created badblood in Pakistan -India relations. These problems were fresh sources of political and economic frictions between these newly emerged countries. First of these was the problem of communal massacre and mass migration.

Both Jinnah and Gandhi made joint efforts to stop killing which broke out just after partition. But the joint efforts to safeguard the lives of minorities could not succeed and the communal bloodshed and mass migration produced fear and distrust in both the countries, threatening the peace and stability of the sub-continent. In 1948, the two governments entered into two inter-dominion agreements for the protection of the lives and properties of the minority communities and to assure the citizens of equal rights irrespective of religion.⁷

This culminated into another agreement known as the Nehru-Liaquat Pact on the treatment of minorities. But, the communal problem continued to hang fire. From

7. D.C. Jha, Indo-Pakistan Relations (Patna, 1972), pp.10-19.

1956 onwards there was a heavy exodus of the Hindu minority from East Pakistan. The problem persisted and, in 1959, 1961, 1962 and 1964 there were communal riots of a serious nature in India and East Pakistan, resulting in large scale movement of minorities from one country to another.⁸

Another important problem was the problem of evacuee property. This problem arose because of communal holocaust resulting in large scale migration of the Hindus from Pakistan to India and of the Muslims to Pakistan. A number of meetings were held between the leaders of the two countries without any fruitful result. Finally, 'In April 1955, the Indian Minister for Rehabilitation met his Pakistani counter part in Karachi. They resolved the outstanding issues pertaining to movable evacuee property and bank accounts. In Jan. 1956 the two countries further agreed to the transfer of evacuee's bank accounts, lockers, and safe deposits.⁹

Sisir Gupta wrote that despite all the intentions and declaratory statements, Indian policy had in actual

8. W. Norman Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, (Cambridge, 1963), p.172.

9. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Indo-Pak relations : 1947-58, (Amsterdam, 1958), pp.202-203.

practice always followed the potently unproductive middle course that Nehru despised. Mahatma Gandhi manifested one such approach when he undertook a fast in Jan. 1948 to force the Government of India to pay the 550 million rupee cash balance which they had withheld from Pakistan on the valid ground that the refused cash would be used to finance Pakistan's war against India. The other approach was evident when powerful voices were raised in India in favour of police action in East Bengal in Feb. 1950, when serious communal disturbances in that province of Pakistan threatened to affect the law and order situation in the whole eastern region of India.¹⁰

✓But the issue of evacuee property could not be solved to the satisfaction of both the countries and it also added to the tension in the relations between the two countries.✓

✓Canal waters dispute was the only dispute which could be resolved amicably between the two countries.✓ This dispute arose over the distribution of waters from the Indus Water System which composed six rivers i.e., the Sutlej, the Beas, the Ravi, the Chenab, the Jhelum

10. Sisir Gupta, "India's Policy Towards Pakistan," International Studies, (New Delhi), July-Oct. 1966, Vol.8, No.1-2, pp.30.

and the Indus. Although the agreement had been signed over the distribution of water between the two countries but they were not happy with the agreement.

The situation remained somehow under control and in 1954 the world Bank President Enginor Black sent some experts to study the problem. The experts submitted a plan which was formally accepted and signed by Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan on 19 Sept. 1960;¹¹. This agreement was known as the Indus Water Treaty of 19 Sept. 1960 and accordingly Pakistan was given the waters of western rivers and India was given the three eastern rivers of the Basin. It had put one of the most serious obstacles to Indo-Pakistan amity out of the way.¹²

A controversy also arose when India decided to construct a brrage at Farrakka in 1951 to solve the problem of choking of the Culcutta port. Pakistani objection was based on its apprehension that Farrakka barrage would have as adverse affect on East Pakistani economy. The issue could be resolved only in April 1975

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11. S.S. Bindra, India and her Neighbours : A study of Political, Economic and Cultural Relations and Interactions, (Delhi, 1984), pp. 45-47.
 12. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir : A study in India-Pakistan Relations, (Delhi, 1966), pp. 343-4.

through an interim agreement between Bangladesh and India, known as the Mujib-Indira Agreement. But in March 1976 a great concern was again felt by the Bangladesh leader Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani over the sharing of Ganga water during the lean season¹³. Even then the issue of water distribution continued to pose threat to Pak-Indo relations.

/A delicate problem created by the partition was that of the integration of princely states. After the lapse of the British paramountcy in Aug. 1947, it had become optional for the princely states to accede to India or to Pakistan or to remain independent. Slowly and gradually all the princely states decided their future but the rulers of Junagarh, Hyderabad & Kashmir created difficult situations, generating a war-like situation in the Indian sub-continent. Following the partition both India & Pakistan wanted to secure the accession of the princely states, particularly Kashmir, Junagarh & Hyderabad.¹⁴

Junagarh was a Hindu majority state ruled by a Muslim. Pakistan tried to pressurise the Nawab of

13. Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 17 May, 1976.

14. K.P. Karunakaran, India in the World Affairs, 1947-50, (New Delhi, 1952), pp. 121-123.

Junagarh to accede to Pakistan. India reacted to it with the result that the Nowab fled to Pakistan. In his absence, the Dewan of the state invited the Indian government to take over the administration, and finally, on 9 November 1947, India took over the administration of Junagarh.

(A similar situation developed in Hyderabad which was a Hindu majority state with Muslim ruler.) On 27 November, Indian government and Hyderabad signed a Stand Still Agreement and it was expected that the agreement would ultimately be followed by accession of Hyderabad to India. [But the Nizam of Hyderabad wanted to remain independent and intended to accede to Pakistan, if pressurised by India. 'The Razakars, members of an organisation of Muslim fanatics, who were also supported by the Nizam, "looted Hindu shops, raided railways trains, molested women & generally took law into their own hands."¹⁵ X This forced Indian government to take police action and it finally took over the administration of Hyderabad on 13 September 1948.]

X / Kashmir issue is one of the most important irritants between Pakistan - India relations and it

15. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, p.72.

still continues to be a bone of contention. Soon after attaining the status of an independent state Pakistan invaded Kashmir with a view to resolve the Kashmir issue by force^{16/}

Pakistani thought that under the principle of the Muslim majority areas, Kashmir would join Pakistan. The Maharaja of Kashmir could not take immediate decision regarding its accession. In such a situation Pakistani authorities sent Pathan raiders to Kashmir to create an uprising in favour of accession to Pakistan. Maharaja had no other option but to seek help from the Indian Government.

Pakistani's invasion of Kashmir on 22 October 1947 compelled its Maharaja to accede to India and sign the Instrument of Accession. The decision was endorsed by the people's representative, Sheikh Abdullah. To save people from death and destruction, inflicted by the Pakistani raiders, Indian troops landed in Kashmir which enraged the Government of Pakistan who alleged that Kashmir's accession to India was based on fraud and violence.^{17/}

16. Sisir Gupta, pp. 117-19.

17. Ibid. P.129.

Ignoring Pakistan's acts of aggression, the Government of India decided to solve problems through negotiations. An attempt of this nature was made on October 29, 1947 when Prime Minister Nehru desired to negotiate with his Pakistani counterpart on the Kashmir issue. Nehru's illness, however, obliged the Indian Governor-General Lord Mountbatten to go to Lahore on 1 November 1947. His talks with Pakistani General Jinnah were of no consequence for the latter put forward some unrealistic proposals for India to implement. His proposal asking India to withdraw its troops from Kashmir before law and order was restored in the state was not acceptable to India. India did agree to conduct plebiscite under the U.N. supervision after the restoration of law and order in the state.¹⁸

[In pursuance of its objectives of ensuring peace and solving problems bilaterally, India initiated an Inter - Dominion Agreement which was signed by the two countries on 8 November 1947. However, there was no tangible outcome as Pakistan was not serious about bringing a conciliation with India. Talks between the delegates of the two countries also failed. Ultimately, the matter was referred by India to the

18. Ibid. p.130.

U.N. on 1 January, 1948.¹⁹

✓ Pakistanis always launched such operations whenever they considered the Indian Government to be weak or indecisive. Pakistan's claim to Kashmir issue is not based on ethnic or linguistic affinity. It is also not based on the Indian Independence Act of 1947 nor on the legal stand taken by Jinnah on the issue of lapse of paramountcy. The only ground advanced is that the population of the Kashmir valley is Muslim.²⁰

This war was not the result of the rulers' desire of territory nor for the strategic value. But ideology was the dominant factor for both the countries. For Pakistan- the possession of Kashmir was important to her ideology i.e. religious ideology can be the basis of the state. To India, strategic value was not the only important factor but the possession of Kashmir showed that a Muslim state could develop & stay in peace in a Hindu dominated state. They giving strength to its concepts of secular & democratic state.

✓ In his book "The origins of war in South Asia", Sumit Ganguly has traced the origins of the Kashmir war

19. Ibid. pp. 260-3.

20. K. Subramanyam, "Kashmir", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No.2, May 1990, p.131.

to four major sources. They are: (1) the existence of two competing ideological forces on the sub-continent; (2) irredentism on the part of the Pakistani leadership, (3) the strategic location of Kashmir & finally (4) the lack of sufficient institutional arrangements by the British to ensure an orderly transfer of power.²¹

~~These~~ were some other problems which created ill-feelings between the two countries. They were: the problems related to distribution of assets, debts, liabilities, military stores of the pre-partition Government of India, the common use of the Reserve Bank of India & the trade relations.

Pakistan's quest for military parity with India also played its role in Pak-Indo relations. From the very beginning as a state, Pakistan was awed by the size & population of India. It had a feeling that it would not be in a position to survive as an independent sovereign state in the vicinity of its giant neighbour.²²

21. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia - Indo-Pakistani Conflict Since 1947, (London, 1986), p.45.

22. John Muttam, U.S., Pakistan and India : A Study of US role in the Indo-Pak Arms Race, (New Delhi, 1974), pp. 5-6.

~~///~~The Pakistan's quest for parity with India was a legacy of the pre-partition days when the Muslim League was seeking partity with the INC. Pakistani elite perceied India to be their foremost enemy. Pakistan's main intention in joining various pacts & military alliances with the other countries was to achieve parity with India in the military field & to solve outstanding issues by force. Some of the major considerations in Pakistan's quest for parity with India were the identity crisis, the small power psyche & the threat it perceived to its security from India. Pakistani elite always took rescart to anti-India bogey whenever it felt politically insecure. ~~/~~Nothing could perhaps be more percise & authentic to show the Pakistani Government's desire to adopt threatening military postures towards India than President Ayub's statement:

^ India's military strength would always be greater than ours. Our aim should be to build up a military deterrent force with adequate offensive and defensive power, enough at least to neutralize the Indian army. ~~/~~²³

~~///~~There were some domestic compulsions of Pakistan which dictated Pakistan-India relations. First & -----

23. Mohd. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography, (Lahore, 1947), p.47.

foremost was the domination of Western wing over the Eastern wing. Within West wing of Pakistan, there were problems of sub-nationalities. Sind, Baluchistan & North West Frontier Provinces always demanded for more autonomy. But their demands were never met often resulting into violence. Such riots threatened to destroy the very fabric of Pakistani society. There were struggles between Shias & Sunnis on the one hand & Sunnis & Ahmediyas on the other. These conflicts were used by the Pakistani ruling elite to stabilise its regime by raising anti-India tirade. A demand for separate homeland to Pashtu speaking peoples on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line had been raised. The people of this area are more akin culturally, linguistically & ethnically to the Afghan people. Pakistan has not been able to solve its problems of sub-nationalities & instead it blamed India for creating troubles in Pakistan./

/Apart from this, some extra- regional powers have also played their role in Pakistan-India relations. Pakistan's entry into the western military alliances effected the politics of the sub-continent & brought cold war at its doorstep. Pakistan allied itself with the US in the containment of communism. Pakistan's relationship with the US provided it with important

political & military support over India. Fear was expressed by the then Indian leadership over the formation of two blocs. Nehru again repeated his offer of 'No-War Pact' to Pakistan in order to frustrate Pakistani attempt to use its newly acquired might against India. But it was rejected by his counterpart on the ground that until all the issues were solved, the offer of no war pact was of no use. /

From 1954 till the outbreak of Indo-China war, many efforts were made by India through different diplomatic channels to shortout Kashmir issue. And Pakistan did not show much interest to come to any settlement. Hence, the issue of Kashmir could not be resolved & Pakistan-India relations continued to be without any change.

/Chinese aggression of 1962 changed the prevalent atmosphere of the sub-continent, which, in turn also affected Pakistan-India relations. /

/The outbreak of Sino-Indian war and the subsequent western military aid to India brought about a drastic change in the situation on the sub-continent and a process of normalization of relations between the government of China and Pakistan was accelerated. And

when United State and Great Britain began to recognise that India now formed the kingpin in their strategy for the containment of communist China and began to supply India with military aid during and after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the pace of the Sino-pakistani detente speeded up.²⁴

Sino-Pak relations developed at the cost of Sino-Indian friendship. Sino-Pakistan relations were flourishing in the light of the deteriorating relationship between India and China since 1959. S.H. Suhrawardy was the first Prime Minister to visit Beijing in Oct. 1956 followed by a return visit by Zhao, but it did not bear much fruit. Earlier China was also doubtful about Pakistan because of latter's affiliations with the U.S. The war of 1962 between India and China changed this perception of China. Pakistan became also fearful about U.S. support. U.S. provided military assistance to India during war and not to its ally Pakistan. This paved way for forging intimate ties between China and Pakistan and an important agreement was concluded between them by which Pakistan ceded a large chunk of its territory to China.

24. Mohd. Ayub, "India and Sino-Pakistani Relations", International Studies, (New Delhi), Vol.9, July 1967 - April 1968, p.291.

This agreement was known as the Border Agreement of 1963./

China and Pakistan supported each other on various occasions. For instance, China supported Pakistan on Kashmir issue while Pakistan supported China during its war with India and declared India; to be an aggressor. In the later years, China became one of the major arms supplier to Pakistan. This relationship posed a security threat to India and it also affected Pakistan-India relations.

✓ Pakistan wrongly perceived India to be a source of national threat after the war of 1962 when India decided to modernise its armed forces against a possible Chinese attack or threat. It was this fear of Pakistan coupled with its domestic compulsions and the perceived weakness of India which forced Pakistani leadership to initiate an armed attack against India in 1965./

✓ The leaders of the two countries signed in 1960 a joint communique known as the General Rules of 1960 pertaining to the Kutch and Sind boundary. Since Pakistan was little interested in the settlement of the issue, it violated the agreed Rules of 1960, and

launched aggression in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965.²⁵

At the time of Pakistan's aggression on the Rann of Kutch. India was facing some internal problems. Widespread language riots took place in the south in 1965 and many parts of India were also facing acute shortage of foodgrains. Pakistan misperceived this situation and thought that it could solve Kashmir issue by the use of force.

Pakistan's leadership was also facing some domestic tensions. In order to stabilise his position at home and to resolve internal disturbances Ayub Khan announced an attack on India. Wayne Wilcox had rightly said -

"Weakened in the elections (in East Pakistan) and order pressure from Bhutto and the militants, Ayub Khan needed real success to restore the confidence of his government and of the attentive public. Since the base of the regime was in West Pakistan, that success had naturally to appeal to the values and goals of that region of the country where Kashmir and relations with


25. Ratna Tikoo, Indo-Pak Relations : Politics of Divergence and Convergence, (New Delhi, 1987), p.23.

India were the most powerful emotional issues."²⁶

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/In such a situation Pakistan had no other option but to take resort to anti-India tirade. When boundary lines were drawn-up in the western sector by Radcliff Commission, it could not draw any line in the Rann of Kutch area. So it had been an area of hostility between these two neighbours. Conflicts started in Jan. 1965 but in the later months it became acute. By the good offices of Britain this conflict could be brought to an end at Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference. Both countries agreed to return to December 1965 conflict positions./

/ But border clashes continued in June and July even after ceasefire. This compelled Indian Government to declare war in August on the ground of Pakistan's continued infiltration into Kashmir and firing across the border in violation of the ceasefire. On September 6, Indian forces crossed the international border near Lahore to relieve its pressure in Kashmir. Another contingent entered into West Punjab from Jammu and at Sialkot, a major battle took place./

26. Wayne Wilcox in K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan : The transfer of Power, (Karachi, 1966), p.167.



Some of the Indian scholars opined this battle to be a major opportunity of show of strength for Pakistan. It also provided an opportunity to Pakistan to assess the strength of Indian army.

When war escalated, the Soviet Premier Alexie Kosygin invited President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri to the Soviet Union talks on September 4, 1965. The Indian leaders were willing to accept the Soviet mediation after military engagements had ended and normalcy was restored. They desired ceasefire to restore the status-quo-ante without prejudicing India's political approach towards Kashmir. On September 17, 1965, the Soviet Union renewed its offer of good offices and India conveyed its acceptance which was immediate and positive.²⁷

But Ayub Khan expressed doubts over the success of the meeting. The Pakistan was not keen on accepting the ceasefire without obtaining a settlement of the Kashmir issue. On 16 November 1965, Ayub Khan accepted Soviet offer without any pre-condition. In response, Shastri conveyed his willingness for talks on Indo-Pak relations in general but ruled out negotiations on

27. G.S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender : The Simla Summit, (New Delhi, 1972), p.33.

specific issue, including Kashmir.²⁸

India accepted the proposal because it wanted to improve relations with Pakistan. It desired to restore pre-war normalcy by resumption of diplomatic, trade, commercial and other relations with Pakistan. Thus, its had two motives in accepting the Soviet offer :

- (a) to clear up the after effects of the 1965 war and;
- (b) to improve the totality of relationship between the two countries.²⁹

India had both short term and long term goals before signing the Tashkent Declaration. The long term objective was that the negotiation at Tashkent should cover the totality of relationships between India and Pakistan, so that the two countries could live on the basis of durable peace in the sub-continent. The short term objective was to avoid the escalation of conflict. Immediately, after the signing the Tashkent Declaration Prime Minister Shastri said -

"The meeting was held in order to see that there is no escalation of conflict between India and -----"

28. Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Record, (New Delhi), Vol. 11, 1965, pp. 371-2.

29. Lok Sabha Debates, Series 3, vol. 50, 16 Feb., 1966, Cols, 611-2.

Pakistan. If there had been no agreement (here in Tashkent) tension would have led to further conflagration".³⁰

✓Pakistan showed little interest in long term objective i.e., durable peace in the sub-continent. Its main objective was to keep alive the Kashmir issue. In order to facilitate an early normalization of the post war situation in the sub-continent, Indian government agreed to relax its previous stand on strategic posts like Haji, Pir, Tithwal and Kargil that it had captured in the war of 1965 with Pakistan as an insurance against future Pakistani infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. It showed India's intention of bringing peace in the sub-continent.³¹

President Ayub also gave an important concession by not to reopen Kashmir issue in the Summit and to renounce force to settle the pending problems.

✓The Tashkent Declaration created scope for ushering in an era of peace and the settlement of disputes through conciliation. ✓The basic objectives safeguarded by this Declaration were :

30. Asian Recorder, (New Delhi), Vol. 12, 1966, pp.6896-7.

31. Kuldip Nayar, Distant Neighbour : A Tale of the Sub-continent, (New Delhi, 1972), p.122.

- (a) to remove the irritants which caused conflict and bedevilled the relations of the two countries;
- (b) to eradicate complications that had cropped up as a result of the September 1965 war;
- (c) to uphold its stand that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India;
- (d) to bring Pakistan to accept the renunciation of force and the adoption of peaceful methods to solve outstanding problems on a bilateral basis;
- (e) to bring Pakistan to accept the principle of step-by-step approach in the solution of complicated issues;
- (f) to bring Pakistan to agree to the principle of non-interference in the internal affair of each other; and
- (g) to ensure that the ceasefire terms were observed.³²

✓The Tashkent Declaration was a remarkable achievement as it reversed the trends of the past 17 years and marked a new era in the relations between the two countries.³³✓

32. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 12, 1966, pp. 10, 49, and 50.

33. G.S. Bhargava, p.26.

✓ But this Declaration which was signed on 10 January 1966 could not break much ice and tension continued to crop-up between Pakistan and India and another war was fought in 1971 which finally resulted in the cretion of a new state i.e., Bangaladesh. After 1965 war East Pakistan thought that Kashmir was essentially a West Pakistani issue and they were unnecessarily made vulnerable.✓

✓ From 1965 to 1970, there was intense struggle in East Pakistan for more autonomy. Actually Pakistan was facing the problem of national integration. West Pakistan's leadership could not fulfil the hopes and aspirations of East Pakistan people. East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan by thousand miles of Indian territory. The people of East Pakistan had different culture, language and tradition. The only binding force was their common faith i.e., Islam. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman intensified the autonomy struggle based on six-point programme after the war of 1965. The year 1965 was marked by anti-Ayub regime demonstrations all over the country. Cultural divisions and economic disparity and west Pakistani leadership's attitude towards rising Bengali nationalism created the ground for the final break-up of Pakistan.✓

To quell the rising tide of nationalism in East Pakistan and in the hope that the hold of Awami League (the party of sheikh Mujibur Rahman) on East Pakistan was not firm, Yahya Khan ordered elections on 7 December 1970. Awami League fought the elections on the basis of six-points programme and to the surprise of West Pakistan military regime, won decisively. In East Pakistan, out of 162 seats, Awami League won 160 seats, in West Pakistan Awami League did not secure a single seat while Z.A. Bhutto's Pakistan's Peoples Party won 81 out of the total 138 seats.³⁴

Election results showed the polarization of Bengali nationalism. In order to maintain West Pakistan's superiority over East Pakistan. General Yahya Khan in connivance with Bhutto declared indefinite postponement of the meeting of National Assembly. Bhutto tried to reconcile it with Mujibur Rahman. But he refused to agree. Meanwhile, Yahya announced a meeting of all parties on 4 March, 1971. But Mujib refused to attend it, and he gave a call for non-cooperation which was a great success. Branding Mujib's this action as an act of treason, Yahya ordered

34. G.W. Chowdhary, The Last Day of United Pakistan, (Bloomington, 1974), p.127.

military crackdown in Dacca without the support of the regional military rifles.

It had wide ranging implications for India. It led to the flow of several hundred thousand of people into India. This continued flight of people into India posed domestic as well as security threat. India expressed its grave concern. In the initial stage India wanted to solve this problem by peaceful means of negotiation and deliberations and by putting international pressure on Pakistan to solve its internal problem. Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi sent her Foreign Minister, Swarn Singh on an international tour. Singh's primary object was to focus on the situation facing India and to mobilise international support to put pressure on Pakistan to settle its internal problem so that India might be relieved from the refugee burden. But it could not put much pressure on Pakistan. So as a last effort Mrs. Gandhi herself visited many countries to draw the attention of these countries on the problems of India. But again it could not succeed and when Pakistani army attacked important Indian strategic posts on 3 December, it had no other option but to retaliate./

U.S. - China - Pak. axis had also developed during the war, it forced or compelled India to sign a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union. It ensured the support of the veto-holding power in the Security Council as well as offered protection to India in the time of attack by a third party.

The initial objectives in the eastern sector were limited, Prime Minister Indra Gandhi stated in the Lok Sabha after the liberation of Bangladesh, that "our objectives were limited to assist the gallant people of Bangladesh and their Mukti Bahini to liberate their country from a reign of terror and to resist aggression on our own land."³⁵

The Indian army with the help of the Mukti Bahini liberated Bangladesh from Pakistan on 16 December 1971.

With the emergence of Bangladesh as an autonomous and sovereign nation state in the sub-continent, the map of South Asia changed substantially and the geographical structure has acquired a new dimension.³⁶

35. Lok Sabha Debates, Series 5, Vol. XI, 16 Dec. 1971, Cols. 145-6.

36. Mohammed Ayoob, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh : Search for a New Relationship, (New Delhi, 1975).

"The New Political Structure of Pakistan", International Studies, (New Delhi), Vol. 12, No.2, April-June, 1973, pp. 183-206.

✓ The war of 1971 changed the strategic equation of the sub-continent in India's favour. It brought certain changes in the politics of South Asia. First, it further increased the imbalance between Pakistan and India. Second, Pakistan was forced to give up its aspiration of achieving parity with India and championing the cause of the Muslims on the sub-continent. This war, in fact repudiated the 'two-nation theory', Third, it changed the image of India as the only external threat and deterrence to Pakistan's territorial integrity. Lastly, for the first time in almost two decades an elected leadership came to power in Pakistan.

✓ On 14 February 1972 India asked the UN Secretary-General of its intention of holding talks with Pakistan, 'at any time, any level and without any pre-conditions'. As a result, on 2 July 1972 Simla Agreement was signed between Mrs. Gandhi and her counterpart Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Basic provisions of the Simla Agreement were as follows:

- (1) The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan resolved that the two countries put on end to the conflict and confrontation, that had

hitherto marred their relations, and work for the promotion of a freindly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energis to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their peoples.

- (2) Both governments would take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Again both countries would encourage the dissemination of such informtion, as would promote to the development of friendly relations between them.
- (3) In order to progressively restore and normalise realtions between the two countries step-by-step, it was agreed that :
 - i) Steps would be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land inlcuding border ports and airlinks including airflights
 - ii) Appropriate steps would be taken to promote travel facilities for the national of the other country;

- iii) Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields would be resumed, as far as possible;
- iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture would be promoted.

In this connection delegations from the two countries would meet from time to time, to work out the necessary details.

(4) In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the governments agreed that :

- i) India and Pakistani forces should be withdrawn to their sides of the international border;
- ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971 should be respected by both sides, without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side would seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertook to refrain from the threat of the use of force in violation of this line.

iii) The withdrawal would commence upon entry into force of this Agreement and shall be completed within a period of 30 days, thereof.³⁷

Sardar Sawarn Singh, the then Indian External Affairs Minister said that this agreement was different from the Tashkent Agreement of 1966 on these points :

- i) Tashkent Agreement was achieved through the good offices of a third party, the Soviet Union, while the Simla Agreement was the result of bilateral negotiations, without the interference of any third party.
- ii) Under the Tashkent Agreement the parties had agreed to withdraw their forces to the 1949 cease-fire line in Kashmir, whereas according to Simla Agreement, the Indian forces would hold the actual line of control.
- iii) Under the Tashkent Agreement Pakistan insisted on the use of some of the United Nations machinery for conciliation, but there was no such provision under the Simla Agreement.³⁸

37. G.S. Bhargava, No.22, pp. 123-125.

38. Ibid., p.66.

✓ Pakistan-India hostility was reduced after the Simla Agreement whereby both the countries agreed to follow the principle of bilateralism in conducting their relations and thereby eliminating external factor in the affairs of the sub-continent. ✓

✓ Several other agreements were signed between Pakistan and India after Simla Agreement. An agreement was signed which enabled the people of one country to visit another country including important religious places. In December 1974, Pakistan and India signed a trade protocol, specifying the exchange of goods on a Government-to-Government basis with payment in international currency. Shipping services were also reopened in 1975; in 1976, both the countries agreed to resume private trade resulting in a more comprehensive trade agreement. ✓

✓ Democratic governments in both the countries also paved way for the improvement in there relationship. But democratic institutions could not play much vital role in countries for a smooth realtionship where historical legaces and mutual distrust played dominant role. This was clear when India's first peaceful Nuclear Expolosion at Pokharan took place. Pakistan vehemently protested about it and the intension of

Indian Governemnt. India repeatedly tried to convince Pakistan about its peaceful intention behind the Pokharan explosion. But it could not bear much fruit.✓

✓ Regretting Pakistan's reaction. Mrs. Gandhi reaffirmed India's commitment to developing firendly relations with all neighbouring countries on the principles of sovereign equality and repudidated the suggestion that India had any ambition to dominate or exercise hagemony over any country.³⁹✓

✓ Pakistan was not satisfied. Bhutto himself was busy in pursuing his clandestine nuclear weapon programme. If has been proved that Pakistan's nuclear programme was in reaction to India but it had started before India's nuclear explosion.✓

✓ Pakistan India relations during Bhutto era were neither too good nor too bad. Although there was some improvement after the Simla Agreement but India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 again led to the deterioration in the relationship between Pakistan and India. Other old issues also remained unresolved. In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in Pakistan by coup. India, being democratic country did not like

39. Asian Recorder, 4-10 June 1974, p. 120-35 .

it. So Pakistan - India relations reached a standstill the during the initial years of Zia regime./

/It is clear from the above mentioned events that Pakistan-India relations have been governed more by historical legacies and mutual distrust, its desire for parity etc. than by any other factor. India always tried to have peaceful relations with Pakistan but it was Pakistan which always disturbed the status quo in the sub-continent. Pakistan India relations have been neither too hot nor too cold./

CHAPTER II

BASIC DETERMINENTS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER ZIA

Foreign Policy should perhaps be defined, as the management of a country's relations with other states, in a manner, calculated to enhance its own security and prosperity, without jeopardising its sovereignty and national ethos. Of prime importance, therefore, are relations with states which pose a threat to or can be of assistance in promoting a country's integrity and way of life. It would not be wrong to say that foreign policy is to some degree an extension of internal policies and cannot but be influenced by a country's domestic stability and performance.

It is generally recognised that states in international relations are bound to be guarded by, the concept of a permanent and universal goal, namely that of national interest. 'The content of national interest is widely accepted as a goal of foreign policy, but the actual national interest of every state is always specific, clear and dynamic, and that transforms into an extremely plural and complex phenomenon, defying a single and universally valid definition which must be understood and analysed in all its implications unless

the goal value of national interest is to be treated as a more truism without any operational significance'.¹

It is not possible to separate national interest from foreign policy because both are interlinked. It is the national interest which reflects the foreign policy objectives of a country. The development of national interest is accepted by the scholars and diplomats as the first step in formulating a foreign policy, even though it remains an abstract and vague concept.

✓ Generally, five different versions of "good" are usually combined in a single foreign policy. They are :

1. "The good of the individual citizen : primarily the wish to be secure in his person, beliefs and property as they become threatened by forces outside his society.
2. The good of the society at large : collective values; normally including preservation of social system, augmentation of his prestige protection of its ideology and so on.
3. The good of the state as such : The more common ingredients include self-preservation, security,

1. J. Bandyopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1980), p.3.

well being, and the strength of the political unit.

4. The good of "special interest groups" in the state/society, these tend to be included to the maximum extent possible within the operative notion of the general interest, and contribute largely to the shaping of public policy on specific issues.
5. The good of the government itself and of its personnel values peculiar to membership in a public community that inescapably find expression in the actualities of policy².

The base of any foreign policy is state mission to maximise its value synthesis. Once it makes a place in the international scene and generally interacts with other states, each struggling for the accomplishment of its own value derived goals.³

The foreign policy of Pakistan has been determined by national self-interest as decided by her leaders. The geo-political factors, political aspirations and the need for economic development have played their

2. Charles O. Lerche Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics, (New Jersey, 1970), Vol. 12. p.24.

3. Ibid.

role in determining the foreign policy of Pakistan. Of much importance have been the special factors viz. the ideology and commitments made during the struggle for Pakistan. Besides, the foreign policy was tailored to Pakistan's domestic needs.⁴

The geographical setting has a greater direct implication on Pakistan's foreign policy. Half of present Pakistan land borders meet with India. Secondly, Afghanistan which shares about one-third of Pakistan's land border lays claim to a big chunk of Pakistan territory and has supported the Pakhtunistan idea in more than one ways. Thirdly, China has a 2,400 mile long boundary with India, with whom China had certain inherent conflicts⁵ Fourthly, Pakistan's location near the Persian Gulf, attracts the USA as also China to it. To the United States Pakistan becomes important because it is very close to the USA's most important rival, the Soviet Union and also it could become a link between Non-Arab Muslim world and USA. Pakistan's membership of CENTO and SEATO explains this geographical fact.

4. Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Appraisal, (Bombay, 1970), pp. 3-4.

5. See Govt. of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Sino-Pakistan Agreement, 2 March 1963 : Some Facts, (New Delhi, 1963).

Historical legacies and traditions have also played very important role in the making of Pakistan's foreign policy. When the struggle for throwing off the colonial yoke entered a crucial stage in the thirties and early forties, a section of the Muslim leadership began to talk about the future of the educationally backward yet sizeable minority, the Muslims population, in a free India where the Hindus would form the overwhelming majority. They thought, rightly or wrongly degraded existence for themselves. Thus, Muslim League began to work for carving out a separate state for the Muslims and ultimately Pakistan came on the political map of South Asia.

A general sympathy of the Muslim League for other Muslim countries before partition and its demand for the establishment of an Islamic state in the subcontinent forced Pakistani ruling elites to forge intimate ties with the Muslim countries, esp. of West Asia and form a Union of the Islamic nations. However, Pakistani pan-Islamic notion is always conditioned by its desire of fulfilling its interest, particularly against India.

Since Partition Pakistan - India relations have been marred by mutual distrust and discord. The

Pakistani govt. thought that India would not allow her free existence and undo it whenever it had opportunity to do so. Ayub Khan wrote in his autobiography that, "India's ambition was to absorb Pakistan or turn her into satellite."⁶ It is true that India has been the central or most important factor in the making of Pakistan's foreign policy. It will also not be wrong to say that, since 1947, Pakistan's relationship with India had determined her outlook to most of the international issues. This Pakistani fear of India is further aggravated by Pakistan's "crisis of identity" and "fear of absorption - political, intellectual and economic by India".⁷

Another factor which had played dominant role in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy was its religious ideology. The first and foremost "strain" in the words of President Ayub "was ideological" and Pakistan was "involved in the paradox of almost losing its ideology in the very act of trying to fulfil it."⁸ Pakistan in the words of Keith Callard, was in "a

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6. Mohd. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Biography, (London, 1967), p.115.
 7. Harbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis : Pakistan 1962-1969, (London, 1972), No.17, p. 126.
 8. Keith Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study, (New York, 1957), p.256.

prodigious mental effort to accept the transforamtion that occured on August 14, 1947, when a Muslim comrade in the struggle for Pakistan became a foreigner because he lived in Lucknow, while a Hindu Congressman living in Decca became a loyal fellow citizen."⁹

The Indian leaders have always rejected Pakistan's 'two-nation theory'. It was against the secular ideology of the Indian National Congress. This led Pakistani leaders to believe that India had not reconciled to the creation of Pakistan. Even Zia's repeated references were in accordance to the 'two-nation theory'. In his interview to a reporter of 'The Times of India', President Zia-ul-Haq further repeated that the Simla Agreement or no Simlm Agreement, Kashmir is a live and a "burning issue" and that he is free to raise it at the U.N. and even at the Islamic conferences and to equate it with the highly emotive problem of the Muslim world, the Palestine problem.¹⁰

The concept of Islam has always been central to the ideology of Pakistan. Since 1947, the relevance and application of Islam in the governance of the state has -----

9. Mohd. Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective", Foreign Affairs, (New York, July 1960), p.547.
10. See President Zia-ul-Haq's interview in the Sunday Review of The Times of India, 1 March, 1981.

undergone changes. During Ayub, some aspects of Islamic ideology were incorporated into the affairs of the state, but at the same time, a movement for modernization was there. The Bhutto era saw the extension of these modernist values. But during elections, Bhutto's Pakistan's People Party (PPP) realised the value of Islamic principles in Pakistani society.

The military regime of Zia stressed on the Islamic values in Pakistan. Meaning of Islamic state, i.e. Nizam-i-Mustafa, which literally meant the "Order of the Prophet", will become clear by referring to Zia's interview to 'Kayhan International' from Tehran in which Zia said, "The Islamic system doesnot mean only amputation of the hand of the thief but it also presupposes the creation of a social system in which all sectors of life, including the administration, the judiciary, banking, trade, education, agriculture, industry and foreign affairs are regulated in accordance with the Islamic principles. This task can be accomplished only by a duly constituted government."¹¹

11. Defence Journal, No. 9, 1980.

In pursuance of his Islamisation policy he brought about many changes in the domestic laws and policies in accordance with the principles of Islam. But this policy of Zia also had effect in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy. He tried to establish cordial relations with the other Islamic countries especially of the Middle East. He made many visits to various Islamic countries to mobilise support in favour of his Islamic policies and he was able to secure financial support and intellectual assistance from Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan played a significant role in the establishment of the Organisation of Islamic Conference in 1970 and hosted the second Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974. In October, 1980, the president of Pakistan was accorded the unique honour of addressing the UN General Assembly on behalf of the entire Islamic world. President Zia-ul-Haq also called for a collective defence of Islamic nations at the Islamic conference on 17 January 1980.¹²

There have been certain external factors which played a crucial role in the formulation of Pakistan's

12. The Times of India, editorial, "Pak-Saudi-US Link", 28 January, 1980.

foreign policy. Most important of these is the Pakistan's close ties with the USA. The initial American involvement in Asia was primarily the product of its global policy of the containment of communism. In the early years Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO in order to balance the perceived Indian threat and to get much required economic and military assistance mainly because of its sense of insecurity and helplessness. The American never thought the use of U.S. - supplied equipments against India. But it was proved wrong as U.S. supplied arms were successively used against India in all wars.

"The Pakistanis expected that the Americans would not only extend full diplomatic support to Pakistan's case on Kashmir but would also actively back Pakistan in the event of a war with India. Although a little on the high side, Pakistani expectations were somewhat natural because Pakistanis thought that the Americans were not only fully conscious of the Indian threat to Pakistan's security but also realized that this had been major factor in Pakistan's decision to join the Western Camp."¹³

13. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "American Policy in South Asia : Interests and Objectives", in Stephen P. Cohen's, The Security in South Asia, (New Delhi, 1987), p.121.

Thus, Paksitan became America's "most allied ally in Asia". Sino-India war of 1962 brought a turning point in US-Pak relationship when US promised to give both economic and military aid to India. The wars of 1965 and 1971 between India and Pakistan and US stand during these wars created a feeling in Pakistani leadership that it was not useful to solely rely on U.S.

But two important events took place is the late 70s i.e., Saur revolution of April 1978 and later the Soviet intervention in Afgahanistan on 26 December 1979 and the fall of Shah of Iran in January 1979 which made Pakistan a "Frontline State" in the strategic perceptions of USA. On the one hand, these events posed a security threat to Pakistan and on the other hand, 'the US was forced to take this step because of Pakistan's strategic location i.e., Pakistan could serve as an ideal spy base for the U.S. from where it could keep a check on the communist powers, China and Soviet Union and also safeguard its oil interests in the Persian Gulf',¹⁴

14. H.C. Arya, "A Study of Some Aspects of the Relations of the United States with Pakistan", (unpublished Ph.D. thesis), Indian School of International Studies, (New Delhi, 1966), p.2.

At the initial stage Carter administration did not give much importance to Pakistan because of its dubious human rights record but later, in pursuance of its earlier policy of containment of communism, Carter administration came forward with an aid package of \$ 400 m. but it was rejected by General Zia by calling it "peanuts". There were some reasons behind General Zia's rejection of Carter's aid package. Firstly, Pakistani leadership became suspect of USA's support because of its past experiences. Pakistan's main intention in joining Western alliances was to get diplomatic support on Kashmir issue and to achieve parity with India in the military field. But as happened during 1965 war USA did not support its ally and there were some other domestic compulsions also.

Later US policy towards Pakistan was part of Reagan Doctrine to "roll back" the "Evil Empire", establish strategic linkages with China, Pakistan and the Arab States and prop up Pakistan as the alternative to lost Iran. General Zia's main objectives were to establish parity with India in military field and to get support of Islamic countries of the Gulf mainly to legitimise his rule. Thus, it will not be an exaggeration to say that Afghanistan crisis provided lifeblood to General Zia.

The Afghanistan problem has helped Pakistan in getting an unprecedented flow of arms on concessional terms. American strategic interest were so important that it adopted an ambivalent attitude towards Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. General Zia was not in favour of an early settlement of Afghan crisis because of his fear of losing "Frontline State" status.

In later years, General Zia's Afghan Policy proved very costly to Pakistan because it posed a threat to Pakistan's internal peace and stability. Drug trafficking illicit arms and ethnic conflicts etc. threatened to destroy the very fabric of Pakistani society. In the last months he adopted hardline against Kabul regime and identified himself more closely with Mujahiddeen victory and he extended full support of them even in violation of the Geneva Accord which was signed on 14 April 1988 between Pakistan and Afghanistan with USA and Soviet Union as guarantors. He did so because of domestic compulsions. Afghan crisis also created many problems for Pakistan like refugee problem and other related problems. It is true to say that Zia used Afghanistan card mainly for his domestic purpose especially to legitimise his rule.

Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan also effected Indian security interests, but Indian options were very limited to quiet diplomacy to seek early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Another external factor which had influenced Pakistan's foreign policy is China. While Chinese foreign policy shifted from isolationism in the 1950s to selective non-alignment in recent past, Pakistan has always perceived its foreign policy as an extension of its strategic phobia vis-a-vis India. The China - Pakistan military linkages forged in 1963 under the Border Agreement is and will remain a major cause of concern for security planners in New Delhi. The relationship between these two, during Zia, has attained a new dimension owing to the extent of involvement of China in Pakistan's search for nuclear weapon programme. China objective in forging relationship with Pakistan was to contain the influence of India in South Asia and to make good relations with Middle East through Pakistan, while Pakistan's interest was to achieve parity with India.

China became the major arms supplier to Pakistan during Zia. The involvement of China in Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme and other modernizations

programmes indicates the level of commitment of China to beef up Pakistan to confront India. It is to the credit of General Zia that he gave greater momentum to Sino-Pak military linkages. "Sino-Pak military collaboration has been growing steadily through the decades of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s because of the identical perceptions they held about India's role and position in South Asia."¹⁵

Other important factor which had influenced Pakistan's foreign policy is its linkages with Islamic countries of the Middle East. Zia could develop good relations with the Middle East countries which earlier leaders like Ayub and Yahya Khan were not able to do so. Religion also played an important role in the establishment of close ties between Pakistan and Middle East countries. Zia was able to get diplomatic support and economic assistance from the countries - especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - hitherto unimaginable. These countries had been able to secure diplomatic influence after the oil crisis of 1973 because of the dependence of Western European countries as well as USA on the energy resources of these oil producing countries.

15. Aabha Dixit, "Enduring Sino-Pak Relations : The Military Dimension", in Strategic Analysis, December, 1989, Vol. XII, No. IX, p.989.

Zia government has certain advantages in the Middle East. 'A number of Pakistani financial officials and administrators have served in the Gulf region, as have Pakistani military officers, pilots, aircraft maintenance teams, and logistical specialists. (Zia himself was stationed in Jordan at the time of the expulsion of the PLO in the 1970 and was the staunch supporter of King Hussain). Pakistanis bolster the police force in Bahrain and Oman.'¹⁶

Zia was the President of the Islamic conference when Iran-Iraq war started. In his capacity as President of Islamic conference he tried to mediate but without any success. Pakistan, under Zia, also extended its material and moral support to Palestine and called for the establishment of a joint and durable peace in West Asia on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab lands and the restoration of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

Other important factor is Soviet Union. Pakistan's ties with Soviet Union had never been cordial except for a very brief period, sometime during 1968-70, when Pakistan even received military assistance from USSR.

16. M.G. Weinbaum & Gautam Sen, "Pakistan Enters the Middle East", Orbis, 22, No.3, (Fall 1978) : 595-612.

With the beginning of Sino-Soviet rift in the 1960s. Pakistan became important to both of them in their strategic perceptions. Due to Soviet objective in the sixties to detract Pakistan from US, Pakistan could be able to get economic aid from the USSR.

After analysing the role of the above mentioned external factors, it becomes pretty clear that they all had played a very significant role in the formation of Pakistan's foreign policy under Zia.

There are certain domestic factors which are central in the formulation or making of the foreign policy. Pakistan is not an exception in this regard. Some factors like political economic, military, decision - makers and ethnic are very important in the case of Pakistan.

Since Pakistan's inception political institutions had been very fragile. The Muslim League lacked certain important features which are very essential for a state like historically shared experiences, procedures of internal debate and collective leadership. It mainly relied on the charisma of one man, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. 'The creation of Pakistan itself as a nation state on the basis of only religion contained additional vulnerabilities aggravated by Muslim sectarian riots as

early as 1953 reaching a climax of erosion with the secession of East Pakistan in 1971'.¹⁷

The military, always found it easy to take the reins of political leadership in its hands in the absence of strong political institutions. Army had always played a very dominant role in Pakistan's politics and from the very beginning, it started to influence the national decision - making, foreign policy and internal political and administrative structure. Once the Generals assumed power, in each of the three cases. (Ayub, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq), the transfer of power back to a civilian political system was a painful one, with heavy costs to the country.

The role of the military in Pakistan's politics, during Zia, became so powerful and stabilised that it dominated government and policy making, civil administration and court system throughout the country. It did not mean that military had no say during civilian government. Even then it had a major, if not determining voice in security policy formulations. 'Military leaders have become the arbiters of how internal and external aspects of security, and other

17. Jasjit Singh, "Pakistan At the Crossroads", Strategic Analysis, October 1988, Vol. XII, No.7, p.653.

political economic and social values of the state, are balanced and integrated.¹⁸

Zia lacked legitimacy so in order to legitimise and stabilise his regime, he adopted various policies like Islamisation and democracy (of course fake). In this process he relied heavily on military and bureaucracy.

Another important domestic factor is the social and ethnic fabric of Pakistani society. Conflicts between East and West Pakistan until the final breaking away of the East Pakistan in 1971. East Pakistan was separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory from Western wing and differed ethnically culturally and linguistically. After 1965 domination and exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan became very acute. Henceforth, Pakistan had tried to resolve problems of nationhood" in terms of its conflicts with India".¹⁹

In west Pakistan, there were the problems of sub-nationalities. Its various provinces i.e., Baluchistan,

18. Craig Baxter, Zia's Pakistan : Politics and Stability in a Frontline State, (ed.) (Pakistan, 1985), p.66.

19. Sisir Gupta, "Indo-Pak Relations", International Studies, Vol. 5, 1963-64, p.177.

North-West Frontier province and Sind, always demanded more autonomy and better share in the national cake. Even during Zia, problems of these provinces continued without any relief. Often these problems led to ethnic clashes.

The Shia Muslims constitute a very small portion of the total population of Pakistan, and some of the important figures in the Pakistan establishment have Shia affiliations, but the major part of the establishment - the bureaucracy, the businessmen and the army - are Sunnis. So there is a religious conflict between Shias and Sunnis and Sunnis and Ahmadiyahs in Pakistan. These conflicts often created an anti-Indian posture. Pakistan has not been able to sort out its problems of nationalities and instead blames India for creating and supporting such subversive activities in Pakistan.²⁰

Zia's Afghanistan policy created intra-sect, inter-regional and ethnic tensions in Pakistan which put great strains on the fabric of Pakistan's society. With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a large number of refugees took shelter in Pakistan and slowly and

20. For details See G.W. Chowdhary, The Last Days of United Pakistan, (Bloomington, 1974), pp. 125-30.

steadily they got hold of some important business areas like transport and construction. They benefitted at the cost of local people. Free availability of arms often led to frequent violent clashes. Here it will be correct to say : "By using one community against another, one province against another province and one sect against another sect, Zia stayed in power but with disastrous consequences to the unity of the country".²¹

Generally, the pattern of economic development in a country is determined by the dominant class. This is more true in the case of an underdeveloped country like Pakistan where in the absence of proper infrastructural development and in the absence of any indigenous industrial base, economic policies are generally made in favour of the traditional dominant classes of feudalists and traders.

Landlordism is still a respected and influential institution in Pakistan. There is also Sardar System in which the Sardars, the hereditary chiefs exercise a paternalistic authority. There is a wide gap between rich and poor.

21. Aabha Dixit, "Between Scylla and Chrybdis : The Legacies of Zia-ul-Haq", Strategic Analysis, April 1989, Vol. XIII, No. 1, p.20.

Economic policies of Zia were meant to gain support from those classes whose interests were lessened by the Bhutto government. Heavy industrialisation could not get much support while private sector came into prominence. General Zia's economic policies were made to fulfil the needs of the big industrial houses and the west. Mushahid Hussain wrote very correctly in this regard :

"If one word can describe his rule, it would be ad-hocism. These were no long term, well thought out policies for specific sectors like industry, agriculture, education or health. He followed a caution moment to moment reactive, one step at a time approach that was guided more by his instinct for political survival rather than a well defined vision for Pakistan."²²

During Zia the economic structure of Pakistan was changed in favour of the Punjabis and Pathans from the Sindhis and Mohajirs. His lop sided policies could not bring any change in the country, instead, it worsened the situation. Pakistan also came under the heavy debt burden. "Once even the salaries of government employees were paid through a loan."²³

22. Mushahid Hussain, News Analysis, The Nation, August 23, 1988.

23. Ehsan (Pakistan), August 31, 1988.

Last but not least is the role played by the elites in determining Pakistan's foreign policy formulations. It is decision - makers who formulate and give effect to the foreign policy of a country. Since 1947, the beliefs and opinions of Pakistani decision - makers were reflected in their speeches and writings. India had been the central factor in the formulation of Pakistan's foreign policy. It had been based on its hatred and fear - psychosis of India - Pakistani decision - makers continued to harp on their bitter feelings against India. Ayub Khan talked of India's "Brahmin Chauvinism" and India's ambitions to acquire territories and to establish "a Hindu State extending from Afghanistan to Indonesia."²⁴ Bhutto called India a "cancer of Asia". Even President Zia-ul-Haq perceived India as "the principal threat to" and "the enemy of Pakistan" and for this he refers to "records" and "history"²⁵. Pakistani decision - makers perceive their objectives to be "to accommodate, control, channelize the forces of Islam so as to serve the interests of the entire Islamic World". President Zia-ul-Haq also wanted to transform Pakistan into "a strong fortress of

24. Anjam, Karachi, 21 June, 1963.

25. President Zia-ul-Haq's interview, The Times of India, 1 March 1981.

Islam".²⁶

By and large, there has been an absence of opposition parties with progressive ideology and whatever political parties are there in Pakistan, they keep on harping on anti-India tirade.

Pakistan's foreign policy is based upon its feeling of insecurity, both economic and political, in which India had been the main factor. Pakistan's attitude towards India has been determined by her own reading of India's intentions, motivations and aspirations.

General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in Pakistan in July 1977. There was hardly any change in the foreign policy. Zia imposed martial law soon after coming to power, which again brought military into the Pakistani politics. Zia had arrested Bhutto, convicted him and sentenced him to death. He was hanged in 1979 ignoring worldwide appeals for his clemency. Nuclear weapons programme started by Bhutto was used as a bargaining counter by Zia, so there was no change in the foreign policy after the coup of July 1977.

26. Dawn Overseas, 29 December 1979.

Zia blamed India to be a major source of threat to Pakistan's security. He affirmed it and advanced three reasons still valid for such concern : Firstly, India dismembered Paksitan in 1971, secondly, the Kashmir problem was still alive and thirdly, India's attitude remained unfriendly as evidenced in India's hostility whenever Pakistan wanted to strengthen itself.²⁷

Zia always took resort to anti-India feelings whenever there was any threat to his regime. Conflicts within Pakistan often resulted in the almost total breakdown of law & order in Sind, Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan. Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) also played active role during these movements. In such disturbed situations Zia had no other option but to divert the people's attention towards the dangers from India to its security.

In the late 70s : some very important changes took place in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan which posed a security threat to it. First was the Saur Revolution of April 1978 and a year later the fall of Shah of Iran who had been one of the important pillars of US strategy in West Asia. Muslim fundamentalism was

27. Interview with Kuldeep Nayar, Indian Express, 31 January, 1980.

at its peak with Zia in the helm of affairs of Pakistan and Khomeni in Iran.

The Pakhtunistan problem which is closely inter-linked with the Durand Line issue, has been a source of immense bitterness between the two countries. Afghanistan demands have been that there should be a separate state for the Pashtu speaking people on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line. It stretches from Chitral in the North to Baluchistan in the South. Afghans have also stressed that the Pakhtuns were more akin to Afghanistan from the ethnic, linguistic, historical and traditional point of view.²⁸

With the coming to power of a new revolutionary regime in Kabul, Zia apprehended that it might support the nationalist movement in Frontier and Baluchistan. The new Afghan leadership had extended its support to the Baluch and Pakhtun people's struggle.

With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the last quarter of 1979, situation became more grave. Earlier US interests were served by Shah of Iran in lieu of adequate supply of arms. Shah regime was blamed

28. Kulwant Kaur, "Pak-Afghan Relations", Punjab Journal of Politics, Vol. 16, No.1, January-June, 1982, p.124.

to play the role of a 'policeman' for the Gulf which guaranteed adequate supply of oil to western countries.

But with the fall of Shah of Iran the vital US interests in the Gulf area along with the oil lanes passing through the straits of Hormuz were threatened. Here came Pakistan. For Pakistan, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan presented a major or unique opportunity to closely link itself with the West in order to get massive doses of aid - military and economic - to restore its old equation vis-a-vis India. It also gave enough reasons to the West to give legitimacy to the military regime of Zia'.²⁹ Pakistan's return to US camp was hardly surprising in the background of continued hostilities between Pakistan - India relations, resulting from the 'parity syndrome' of Pakistan.

Zia used the external threat to garner domestic support and in this process gave Pakistan's foreign policy a new dimension.

29. Aabha Dixit, "Pak-Afghan Relations", Strategic Analysis, vol. XII, No. 7, October, 1988, p. 696.

CHAPTER - III

PAKISTAN - INDIA RELATIONS 1977 - 1988

Pakistan - India relations is a never ending story of chaos, conflict and confusion. The two neighbours are virtually in a state of perpetual cold war since their inception. The basic determinants of their relation has been the psychological malaise which has many historical, domestic and external contributory factors. Their relation has witnessed many ups and downs with the change of the governments in their respective countries. Starting from the time of Mohammed Ali Jinnah to Zia, the tupsy - turby history of Pakistan - India relation has come across with many events which contributed to the growth of their friend and foe relationship in the subsequent years. The Zia regime can be singled out as a unique of its own. It was the regime during which the two neighbours had developed a sweet and Sour relation. Zia regime with a different political system and different ideological approach tried to develop a balance relation with India. Unlike his predecessors he did not underestimate India's superemacy in the region. On the other hand he did not lose patient in persuading his interest in the region in dealing with certain problems on Kashmir

issue, military arms acquisition and nuclear policy. During his tenure a peace initiative was made in terms of a 'no war pact' and it was his regime which geared up arms race in the subcontinent./

/The arms acquisition by the two followed countries and the modernisation of their armed forces flew out of a sense of insecurity emanating from each other's threat perceptions. Both feared the repetition of the armed conflicts any time and wanted to remain prepared. This resulted in huge spending on defence. A regional arms race was exacerbated by the interests shown by the external powers with ulterior motives. (Pakistan on the other hand adapted the external powers more for its gain.¹ In the 1950s the United States succeeded in enrolling Pakistan in its scheme of global anti-communist alliance system - the SEATO in 1954 and the CENTO a year later. Huge quantities of arms were pumped into Pakistan as part of this system. As later events proved, Pakistan's motive in joining these alliance was not any enmity towards communism, but to confront its declared enemy, India.² The 1965 Indo-Pak

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1. Surendra Chopra, "Indo-Pak Relations" in Pandav Nayak (ed.), Pakistan - Society and Politics (New Delhi, 1984), p. 225.
 2. G.W. Choudhary, Pakistan Relations with India 1947-66, (London, 1968), p. 216.

war was a testimony to this when Pakistan used American arms freely in spite of U.S. assurances that these weapons would not be used against India in any future confrontation./

/A repetition of the 1950s could be discerned in the 1980s. The emergence of the Afghan problem and the consequent elevation of Pakistan as a 'frontline state' in the strategic perceptions of the United States helped Pakistan in getting an unprecedented flow of arms on concessional terms, Immediately after coming to power, the Reagan administration granted \$ 3.2 billion military and economic aid for a period of five years.³ In that amount, the military grant was for a period of six years. When the first deal came to an end in 1987, the Regen administration again granted a military and economic aid package of \$ 4.2 billion for a period of six years. The supply of sophisticated arms and military hardwares strengthened Pakistan's military capability in the region. /From the very beginning General Zia was under the impression that only arms acquisition can provide a military leverage to Pakistan vis-a-vis India. He had thought of making Pakistan militarily strong. He wanted to get mobility in the

3. Surendra Chopra, No.1, p. 225.

stratified international power structure along with India. For that matter he had conceded arms as best means for the desired end,⁴

✓Pakistan's arms acquisition in the likelihood of the conflict alarmed India on two grounds. Firstly, as it happened on an earlier occasion, Pakistan is not likely to use these arms against the intended targets. ✓President Zia, as on record said that the threat from the Soviet Union is "Zero". Moreover, in the eight years of hostilities with Afghanistan, marked by allegations and counter allegations of airspace violations and cross-border artillery firings running into Monsands, in a direct confrontation with that country, Pakistan had seldom employed its Army or Air Force on a regular basis. Pakistan's force deployment on the Afghanistan border had not undergone any significant change. ✓Most of her troops continued to be deployed on the eastern sector.⁵ ✓

✓Secondly, some of the weapons and other sophisticated weapons which Pakistan had received under

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4. John Knnyalil, "India & Pakistan Mutual Threat Perceptions", Strategic Analysis, (New Delhi), Vol. XII, No.4, July 1988, pp. 663-4.
 5. P.M. Pasricha, "Indian Defence Policies", Strategic Analysis, Vol. IX, No.7, October 1985, pp. 689-90.

the U.S. package deal were not suitable for the Afghan terrain. The Air-borne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is an example in this regard. So is the Harpoon missile for the Navy.⁶

The Zia regime had a strong reservation against the phenomenal growth of the Indian defence expenditure. It was his argument that all its defence preparedness is against Pakistan. He feared that, if India gets an opportunity, won't hesitate to dismember Pakistan once again. On the contrary the Indian defence build up was not meant against Pakistan only rather it was catering to its northern frontiers against hostile Chinese intentions.⁷ India can not be caught unaware there to repeat a 1962 as long as the territorial disputes remains unresolved. It was all the more relevant in view of the close friendship and military cooperation that exists between China and Pakistan.⁸ Again, India had to guard its long sea coast and face the growing threat from a militarised and nuclearised Indian Ocean.

6. Ibid., p. 690.

7. Sareen Tahir Kheli, "The Foreign Policy of New Pakistan", Asian Survey, (Berkeley), Vol. 20, No.3, Fall 1986, p.753.

8. Davidra Issar, "Conflicting Trends in Pakistan", Link, (New Delhi), Vol. 25, No.24, January 26, 1983, pp. 81-84.

/India's closeness with the Soviet Union spelled out a fear of insecurity to Pakistan.// The Soviet Union, of course, has been consistent in its support to India whenever the latter faced crises, and traditionally she has been the main and reliable arms supplier, so much so that almost 75% of India's arms acquisition is from the Soviet Union. Moscow allowed India to acquire the latest weapons in its armoury at concessional terms.⁹

/ Whether the Pakistani concern was on account of the traditional Indo-Soviet friendship or on account of India's access to the latest arms supply in Moscow's inventory, in either way it was misplaced. For one thing, the experience of the last eight years in Pakistan - Afghan - Soviet dealings did not warrant any such misgivings. As for the arms, India's requirement was acknowledged as being in proportion to her threat perceptions, taking into consideration, as noted earlier, the Chinese factor as well as the long sea coast and the Indian Ocean front, besides Pakistan.¹⁰

(/ The superpowers involvement in the region especially during the late 1970s brought a hostile

9. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) I.A. Akram's five-part Article in Nation (Lahore), February 26 to March 1, 1988.

10. K. Subramanyam, "India's Security Perspectives", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XI, No. 5, August 1987, p.515.

environment in the subcontinent. Their involvement further geared up their arms race in the subsequent years. Their presence took the form of increased offers of security assistance, acquisition of naval and air base facilities. These activities produced a drastic change in the security environment of the subcontinent's two military powers and, of course, in threat assessments made by them.¹¹ /

By the early 1950s the two cold war rivals were both heavily involved in the transfer of arms to the sub-continent. During this phase, in contrast to the early period, the USA and the Soviet Union were engaged for the first time in simultaneous, massive, and directly competitive arms supply with their respective South Asian clients. India's position of prominence in the hierarchy of Soviet's arms customers was already well established at the beginning of the present decade. Between 1970 and 1980, the Soviet Union supplied 82% of Indian arms imports. (\$ 2.3 billion of \$ 2.8 billion), giving India the fourth largest share (after Libya, Syria and Iraq) of total Soviet arms exports to non-communist countries.¹² Washington's

11. Ibid.

12. US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, 1971-1980. (Washington D.C. March, 1983), pp. 117-120.

resumption of a security relationship with Pakistan in June 1981 raised Pakistan to a position of similar prominence in the hierarchy of America's arms clients.

✓ For fiscal year 1985, the fourth installment of Washington's Six year \$ 3.2 billion military and economic assistance package came to \$ 326 million, placing Pakistan fourth in the world (after Israel, Egypt and Turkey) among nearly 100 recipients of US security assistance.¹³✓

✓ The arms acquired by India and Pakistan from the superpowers were advanced in terms of technological sophistication and deadliness. Consequently, the impact of any future war felt more widely than were the encounters of 1965 and 1971. (Thus, by the late 1980s, the superpowers had become direct competitors in a South Asian arms race that had strategic implication extending well beyond the sub-continent! On the contrary, any number of military and non-military factors could plausibly be introduced into the equation to lessen the obvious qualitative disparity between overall Indian and Pakistani military strength.¹⁴✓

13. US Department of State, Congressional Presentation FY 1985 (Security Assistance Programs), (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 13-14.

14. Harpreet Mahajan, Arms Transfer to India and the Third World, (New Delhi, 1982), p. 213.

/ Much was made, for example, of Pakistan's tactic-
visible in its purchase of highly acclaimed F-16
fighter aircraft - of seeking qualitative advantage to
offset its quantitative inferiority.¹⁵ Another argument
was that Pakistan forces are concentrated in garrisons
adjacent to the India - Pakistan border to a much
greater extent than are Indian forces, and that at
least in the initial stages of another outbreak of war
with Pakistan, would give numerical advantage. This led
India to consolidate its military power in the western
border causing tension with Pakistan. /

China's strategic motivation for competing in the
South Asian arms market was, of course, equal to that
of the USSR. Indeed, according to Vertzberger it was
fear of Soviet penetration in Pakistan in the wake of
the Tashkent Conference that largely prompted Beijing to
initiate a military assistance programme with Pakistan
in 1986.¹⁶ Thereafter, (China quickly became and
remained the principal supplier of arms to all the
branches of Pakistan armed forces. Between 1980-88, it
provided Pakistan with most modern weapons in its

15. K. Subramanyam, No. 5, p. 516.

16. Yaacor Vertzberger, The Enduring Entente : Sino-
Pakistan Relations 1960-1980, (New York, 1983), p.
88.

inventory, by then, weapons of Chinese manufacture constituted 75% of Pakistan's tank force and 65% of its air force.¹⁷ (The Chinese involvement in arms dealing with Pakistan brought much speculations in the Indian security. Zia's desire for power parity with India geared up an arms race with the involvement of extra-regional powers.) ✓

(A common concern which dominated the Zia period in determining Pak-Indo relations was the nuclear dilemma. This constituted the biggest element in the two countries threat perceptions at that moment, overriding the concern for conventional arsenals.) It may be mentioned here that it is the US's acquiescence arising out of geo-strategic compulsions which enabled and encouraged the Pakistani to go ahead with an advanced nuclear weapons programme. (As for the Pakistani concern for the Indian nuclear programme : the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 1974 is viewed with suspicion; Islamabad thought it was anything but peaceful. Zia levelled a serious charge against India that the latter is raising the scare about "Islamic Bomb" with a view to using it as a justification for its policy, already made, of making nuclear weapons.) "Pakistan Times", the mouthpiece of Pakistan's military dictator, said that

17. Ibid., p. 90.

India is about to produce atom bombs and the nearer it is approaching that day, the more loudly it is talking about Pakistani bomb.¹⁸ With the proclaimed object of 'eliminating the nuclear menace' from the subcontinent, Pakistan had floated, from time to time with some proposals. One of them was to declare South Asia a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. India opposed to this proposal on the ground that South Asia is strategically not a closed system. The strategic realities on its periphery would impinge upon it. India's concern over the nuclear clout of China was understandable in view of the unsettled dispute between them since late 1950s. Further, the deployment of nuclear ships in the heavy waters of the Indian Ocean by the major powers - particularly of the Big Two - was a constant source of threat to the security of the South - Asian States. Thus, according to New Delhi, the declaration of South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone would be meaningless without making the Indian ocean a Peace Zone.¹⁹

Other nuclear related peace proposals of Pakistan were the simultaneous adherence by Pakistan and India to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the

18. Pakistan Times (Rawalpindi), 4 June 1981.

19. K. Subramanyam, "Our Nuclear Predicament", Strategic Analysis, Vol. IX, No.7, October 1985, pp. 647-668.

acceptance by both countries of full scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a declaration by India and Pakistan jointly renouncing the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons and reciprocal inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. India did not accept these proposals on the ground that it would amount to an acceptance of the discrimination in favour of 'nuclear haves' - especially China.²⁰ On the other hand, India was quite aware of the clandestine effort of Pakistan in getting nuclear technology. The declaration by Dr. Abdul Quadir, the father of Pakistani nuclear bomb, in regard to their capability of producing nuclear bomb further aggravated the situation in the nuclear field. Although [Pakistan developed a nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, on records they made it clear that it would be used more as a deterrent against a possible Indian attack]²¹ The Pakistani programme was indeed aggressive by nature.] The quest for Islamic Bomb brought much thoughts to the Indian policy makers in regard to their decision in the making of nuclear weapons in India.

20. Ibid.

21. K. Subramanyam, "Nuclear Factor in Security Issue can not be Evaded", The Times of India, April 22, 1985.

X Pakistan - India relations were also marred because of different attitudes, they adopted over Agghanistan crisis. X

/ On the Afghan crisis, India and Pakistan adopted different attitudes because of their divergent perspectives and perceptions. India viewed the Afghan crisis in the context of overall situation, as the then Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi remarked that the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan should be judged in the context of outside interference."²² /

/ India, unlike Pakistan, refused to accept the US and the Chinese versions, because she viewed that an assessment of the Afghan crisis on the basis of out-of-date theories and devoid of new realities would serve no useful purpose. The acceptance of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy as the sole or even the major factor would be a simplistic analysis of the situation. (Though India wanted immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops, Yet she recognised the geo-political and strategic compulsions which motivated the Soviet action in Afghanistan.²³ /

22. Hindustan Times, 7 January, 1980.

23. For details See Kulwant Kaur, Pak-Afghan Relations, (Delhi, 1985).

Brajesh Mishra made a brief speech in the General Assembly while participating in the debates on a resolution presented by Pakistan on behalf of its twenty four sponsors made six points :

- i) that Moscow, sent troops to Afghanistan on 26 December, 1979, at the request of Kabul;
- ii) that India was opposed to the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country;
- iii) that the Soviet Union had assured India that it would withdraw when asked to do so by Kabul and India had no reason to doubt the assurance given by a friendly country like the Soviet Union;
- iv) that India hoped that the Soviet Union will not violate the independence of Afghanistan and that the Soviet troops will not remain there a day longer than necessary;
- v) that India disapproved of the attempts made by certain "outside power" in encouraging disturbances and subversions inside Afganistan; and
- vi) that construction of military bases and pumping of arms into countries of the region posed a threat to India's security.²⁴.

24. For details See General Assembly Res. A/ES-6/PV,3, 11 January, 1980, pp. 13-16.

✓ Pakistan called the Soviet action in Afghanistan an act of blatant, open and naked aggression. This provided a legitimational bonanza to Zia, for his call for national unity to face the Soviet threat was partially successful. Zia succeeded in getting a favourable response from the Muslim countries, serious attention from the US and concern of the Chinese, Zia wanted all the three parties to take Pakistan's strategic scenario seriously and provide aid to him. He said "if you visualize the map of the region and if you extend the Hammer and Sickle over Afghanistan and then see from there onwards", and then mentioned Iran, the Gulf, the straits of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim world as the future victims of Soviet expansion.²⁵

✓ Afghanistan proved a boon to Zia. Large quantities of arms were pumped into Pakistan on concessional terms, which later paved way for arms race in the sub-continent. (India complained vigorously and publicly about the American aid to Pakistan, but it also protested diplomatically to Soviet Union of its invasion.) India and Pakistan officials maintained an inconspicuous dialogue. Indian efforts in this regard

25. Pakistan Times, 16 January, 1980.

were very limited because of its interest with Soviet Union. / These different perceptions by both the countries regarding Afghan crisis also played its role in the Pak. Indo relations. /

/ Another irritant which had been determined by the psyche of both the countries is the divergent perception about the retention of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. / After the Pokharan ~~ex~~ explosion Pakistan used every forum to highlight threat from India including the one dealing with the problem of Indian Ocean. / Pakistan's Indian ocean policy has been in accord with its broad foreign policy i.e. its intra-peripheral relations, core - peripheral conflict and peripheral intrusive system interactions. / Since Pakistan was prepared to allow one of the global actors to intrude into the Indian subcontinent by allowing its territory to be used by it, naturally it could not oppose its presence in the Indian Ocean. In this regard first reference was made by President Ayub.²⁶ /

/ While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea, the life-line of its survival, and India had

26. Surendra Chopra, Post Simla, Indo-Pak Relations : Confrontation to De-escalation, (New Delhi, 1988), p.142.

the biggest stake in its waters. When the peace of the Indian Ocean is disturbed it is bound to have an impact on India. When some hegemonic attempts are made, India naturally feels perturbed & has to mobilise opinion against making this region a theatre of war or even cold war and seek cooperation of like - minded countries. India had all along opposed the establishment of foreign military bases.^{27/}

Samina Ahmed had correctly pointed out Pakistani view on Indian Ocean. It was based on the following grounds :

- i) that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was desirable because it could form an effective way of ensuring the security and stability of a majority of littoral and hinterland states against threats from within or outside the region;
- ii) The proposal could be realised only if the regional states eschewed the development of nuclear weapons;
- iii) Unless such a commitment is undertaken by the regional states, foreign power are bound to

27. T.N. Kaul, "Indian Ocean Must be an Area of Peace", Socialist India, Vol. 7, No.8, 1973, p.7.

take advantage of the situation within the region, to increase their influence and interference there; and

- iv) Proper conditions of security and self-restraint were needed at the regional level in order to pave the way for the establishment of the Indian Ocean peace zone proposal.²⁸

/During Zia these divergents perceptions over Indian Ocean became more acute resulting in the further worsening of Pak-Indo relations./

/Besides this, Pakistan on her part suffers from an obsession of certains non-military threats from India, mainly in the economic & cultural spheres. It has been turing a deaf ear to India's suggestions for expanding trade and economic collaboration out of fear that Indian will uweep the country's markets./

✓/Despite these unhealthy developments during Zia period, efforts were taken in building a healthy relation between these two neighbours in the region. Zia took many peace initiatives in bridging the gap

28. Samina Ahmed, "Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposal", Pakistan Horizan, (Karachi), Vol. 32, No.2, 1978.

between India and Pakistan. His proposal for mutual reduction of forces and offer of 'no war pact' are two important examples. /

/Zia's peace package contained the proposal that both India and Pakistan should sit together to determine their 'force ratio'. He conceded that India being the bigger country would need a larger force, but Pakistan should be allowed to maintain enough military capability for meeting its legitimate defence needs.²⁹ (This proposal was not as simple as it appears to be. India did not accept the proposal on few grounds. First, it conceded that mutual trust should be preceded by mutual suspicion which was very much there during that period. On the other hand, India can not go by this term on the ground of its security problem in the North. If it reduces its force, it cannot meet a challenge from the hostile communist giants China in the Northern border.)³⁰ /

It has been observed from the past that in Pakistan whoever comes to power can not neglect the

29. Trevor Fishlock, "India and Pakistan Begin New Search for Trust", The Times, (London), 25 January, 1982.

30. J.K. Baral, "Indo-Pak Diplomacy Since 1981 : Motivations, Strategies And Prospects", Foreign Affairs Reports, (New Delhi), Vol. XXXV, No.4&5, April - May 1986, p.31.

Kashmir problem. The Kashmir problem has become a basic plank of Pakistan's foreign policy since its inception. Even during Zia regime it remained a major irritant in the normalisation of Pak-Indo relations. Zia manipulated the issue to gain legitimacy from the people on a very emotional ground. From 1977 to 1979 his stand in regard to the Kashmir problem was covert rather after that he became a vociferous pleader of Kashmir issue both at the national and international level. For the first time, Zia raised the question at a special session of an Islamic Foreign Minister Conference on Afghanistan, held in June, 1980³¹. In that meeting Zia linked up Kashmir with Palestine. In the regular session of the conference in May, Zia went a step further and described Jammu and Kashmir "as yet another vital issue" facing the Islamic "Ummah". Again, in the UN General Assembly Zia raised this problem as an international issue. This stand of Zia annoyed Mrs. Gandhi who openly condemned Zia's action as violation of Simla Agreement. Agha Hilaly, the brother of Agha Shahi, during the deliberations of the Human Rights Commission at Geneva, equated the Kashmir issue with that of Palestine and Namibia.³²

31. Surendra Chopra, P.175.

32. Ibid. p. 175.

/In the Non-Aligned summit level, Zia raised Kashmir question for an international response. He raised this question both at New Delhi and Havana summits. /In the New Delhi summit, he stated that "we should find a just solution to the problem of Jammu and Kashmir," hit headlines in India and evoked a sharp official response. At Havana he said that Pakistan was actively engaged in the task of "developing relations with its neighbours on the basis of peaceful coexistence". Further he added that a Pakistan is determined to seek the resolution of the dispute in accordance with the relevent UN resolutions and the spirit of Simla Agreement".³³ /Even at the (Harare summit) Pakistan did not neglect to highlight Kashmir issue. [The most important thing which the Indian side raised was Zia's consistent efforts to instigate anti-India feelings in Kashmir] [Zia's potitical and economic support to JKLF was another major irritant which fouled relations bitterly.]

The Zia regime left no table unturned for a bargaining over the long standing problem of Kashmir. In the begining his emphasis was not vigour but gradually he capitalised the issue as bargaining tool

33. The Tribune, (Chandigarh), 22 March, 1983.

to champion the cause of Islam in the world. The hobnobbing attitude of Pakistan in the Siachen Glacier were the grim reminders of Zia's commitments to Kashmir problem. In April 1984 the sporadic incidents in the glacier increased discontentment in India and again opened the unresolved Kashmir issue in the region.

/ Dispute over Siachen, was another tirade thrown by General Zia, which disrupted its relations with India. This area is strategically very important both for Pakistan and India. Access to glacier is difficult to Pakistan but a little easier to India. The problem arose because the boundary between Pakistan and India was never demarcated in that region. What is surprising is that the area was left undemarcated even after almost sixteen months grim war in Kashmir. (India thought that since there was no war in that region, demarcation would be done at a later date when the final decision regarding Kashmir takes place. Inaccessibility to the region and lack of knowledge of the technicalities of demarcation at such a high altitude could be other possible reasons for leaving the area undemarcated.)

// (For almost about thirty years the border in the region remained peaceful, even during the 1965 and 1971

wars the area remained more or less unaffected. But the orographic warfare started immediately when Pakistan started sending its Army mountaineers for scaling the peaks to traverse Indian territory. Alarmed by these Pakistani activities India also started her own expedition in this region. The direct confrontation started over this region in 1983-84 when Pakistan established military posts manned by some of the elite units of Pakistan army, fully armed with high altitude kit and tents. After having won the orographic and castrographic battles particularly in the West Pakistan began to plan a physical occupation of the region. (In order to avoid repetition of Aksi Chin, India on 29 May 1984 deployed its men on the worst terrains of the world.³⁴ Pakistan's sinister design of sneaking into Indian territory made this region crucial. In 1984 when Indian army was engaged in "Operation Blue Star", Pakistan made its first attempt. On 23rd June 1984 a serious clash took place and Pakistani forces were beaten back. In the same year again in December another Pakistani attempt was foiled. The activities of the Pakistani army were confirmed by Pakistan's Defence Secretary in the Parliament. Pakistan's hobnobbing

34. P.M. Paricha, "The Siachen Glacier : An Orographic Offensive by Pakistan", Strategic Analysis, Vol. IX, No.9, December 1985, p.855.

activities in the region continued during Zia. [The important thing which vitiated the Pak-Indo relations during Zia was his military practices on the border.] This raised serious concerns on the Indian front and equally retaliated by a major military exercise known as 'Operation Brasstacks'. Zia was the initiator of the border military exercises. In March 1984 Pakistan has massive military exercise on the border. Military exercise with all sophisticated arms was a regular practice with the Zia's military administration.^{35/}

Zia offered a historic proposal of 'No War Pact' to India in the pretext of deteriorating ^{or} relations of Pakistan and India. Though it was perceived as meaningful and hopeful for an Indo-Pak rapproachment is the subcontinent, later it did not produce the expected result. It is important to note that shortly before Islamabad offered the 'No War Pact' proposal, President Zia himself had told 'Rajendra Sareen', an Indian journalist on 7th June 1981, that there was no need for the conclusion of a 'No War Pact' between the two countries, as the Simla Agreement itself was virtually a 'No War Pact'³⁶. Nearly eight months before that he told 'India Today' that a 'No War Pact' ws "Not Worth

35. Ibid., p.856.

36. J.K. Baral, p.31.

the Paper on which it was written. Hence India had reasons to suspect that Islamabad's proposal aired in 1981 was aimed at influencing the American public, some of them were opposed to the then proposed American aid package of \$ 3.2 billion to Pakistan. / New Delhi suspected that Pakistan's proposal was a 'propaganda ploy' and was also meant to provide some legitimacy to the Zia regime which lacked it, as it had come to power in July 1977 through a military coup. New Delhi had some "genuine reservations about Pakistan's sincerity". It is there India proposed two other provisions in addition to the 'No War Pact'. One is "bilateralism" and the other "no base or other military facilities to other powers". Zia refused to accept these provisions on the ground that it would amount to 'an infringement on its sovereignty' /

/ Zia's frequent interferences in India's internal affairs was another cause of unfriendly developments between Pakistan and India. Zia played a crucial role in inflaming the emotion and anger of Sikhs over the Blue Star Operation. The Pakistani Embassies in Western countries were allegedly active in instigating Sikhs settled there against India. / Pakistan's ostensible supports to Punjab terrorists is a case in the point. Training camps in Pakistan for the Punjab terrorists

brought much resentments to the Indian government in regard to Pakistan's ill intentions. One thing may be said about Pakistan's India Policy on the basis of the above accounts that it raised many serious problems to destabilise Indian security and to gain a power symmetry with any possible means. /

CHAPTER IV

PAKISTAN - U.S. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA

Since early 1950s South Asia has always been an area of peripheral and derivative interest to United States. This area's importance has always fluctuated with the changes in USA's global policies. From the very beginning, America's main interest had been and still is to prevent communist expansionism. Other important U.S. interest in the region has been to get assured access to the Persian Gulf. Other important American concerns have been to prevent the spread of nuclear proliferation, maintenance of regional stability and economic and commercial interests. Although latter ones have always been of secondary importance to USA.

Stephen P. Cohen has correctly mentioned four important features of the Pakistan - U.S. relationship. They are ;

- i) U.S. - Pakistan security relations are partial. In the case of the United States, the Soviet Union remains more important than Pakistan itself. For Pakistan, India remains

the chief security threat, and this threat overshadows relations with both the United States and USSR, the overall U.S. Pakistan security relationship is thus forever subject to buffeting by other relationships and events;

- ii) the security relations between the two states are asymmetrical. The relationship has been, and may remain, more important to Pakistan than to the United States. The latter's involvement in South Asia has been intermittent, and it can withdraw from the region with little loss. Pakistan can not withdraw; its very survival is continuously at stake;
- iii) the security interests of the two states are noncongruent. For Pakistan, the US represents an important source of weapons and political support, useful in a whole range of diplomatic and military fronts. For the United States, Pakistan's position as a counter to the Soviet Union that makes it important, and
- iv) the security relationship remains burdened by an extreme degree of distortion,

misperception, misrepresentation, and stereotypes on both sides. American's still see Pakistan as everything from a nation of "little brown brothers" staunchly defending the ramparts of the free world against communist onslaughts to a nation run by a crazed religious fanatic. Pakistanis see the United States as alternatively omnipotent and incompetent in its involvement in their own vital affairs.¹

From its very inception, Pakistan's foreign policy has been based on anti-India tirade. It will be more correct to say that Pakistan's world outlook was determined by its relationship with India. One of the most important reasons behind Pakistan's joining of Western military alliances had been to achieve parity with India especially in the military field.

Other forces which seemed to draw Pakistan towards the West was the elite in Pakistan drawn mainly from the feudal and military classes trained in Western education and the political instability in Pakistan.²

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1. Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain (ed.) United States-Pakistan Forum : Relations with the Major Powers, (Lahore, 1987), pp. 15-16.
 2. Shaheen Irshad, Rejection Alliance : A Case Study of US-Pak Relations 1947-1967, (Lahore, 1972), p.28.

In the 1950s the United States succeeded in enrolling Pakistan in its scheme of global anti-communist alliance system. First, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in May 1954 with the U.S., under this treaty the latter undertook to give military equipment and training to Pakistan's armed forces.³ Later Pakistan joined SEATO in September 1954 and the Baghdad Pact later known as CENTO a year later. A bilateral agreement of cooperation with the United States was signed in March 1959, which declared that the "government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interests and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan."⁴ This led to the provision of substantial amounts of military and economic assistance to Pakistan during the 1950s.

But this relationship got a setback in the late 1950s when the United States took a sympathetic attitude towards Indian concern over Chinese threat and later emergency military assistance to India by the U.S. annoyed Pakistan. Pakistan criticised the US for

3. See Arif Hussain, Pakistan : Its Ideology and Foreign Policy, (London, 1961), p.93.

4. See Documents on American Foreign Relations : 1959, (New York, 1960), p. 97.

treating "allies and neutrals similarly". Again, during 1965 Indo-Pak War President Johnson took a neutral stand and banned all aid to both Pakistan and India which created an anti-West furore in Pakistan. In 1975 arms sale to Pakistan was renewed on a limited basis under which Pakistan received only a small number of weapons. Ultimately, all military assistance was terminated in 1979 by the Carter administration because it thought that Pakistan was engaged in pursuing clandestine nuclear weapons programme. But with the Soviet military intervention in the later half of 1979 Carter administration resumed its arms supply to Pakistan on a limited basis which was rejected by Pakistan. It accepted larger economic and military offer of Regan. Thus, there have been ups and downs in U.S. Pak-relationship.

With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 the whole security environment of the region changed drastically, the U.S. which had shifted its attention towards the Persian Gulf in the mid-70s once again turned its attention towards Pakistan. But it goes to Pakistan's credit that it used its new found status of a "Frontline State" in the U.S. strategic perceptions with such adroitness and astuteness that it became the receipient of large quantities of the U.S.

military and economic aid. Once again it appears that Pakistan acquired ambitions of parity with India which got a setback in 1971 war with India, although by the early 80s Pakistan had come to acquire a more mature kind of diplomacy.

The formal basis of this relationship was the 1959 agreement because Pakistan withdraw from SEATO and CENTO in the early 1970s. This relationship provided for American arms sales to Pakistan without any public promise of reciprocal support for particular U.S. foreign policy objectives, the provision of bases, or a U.S. Presence in Pakistan. Further, there has been no public change in Pakistan's position with regard to nuclear proliferation.⁵

It was felt that this "new relationship" was likely to be more durable and credible than the old one, not because it was more informal and flexible but because it was based on greater commonality of perceptions and interests. Both of them realized that South Asia had been transformed to a battleground of cold war because of tensions emanating both from within and without. Most of the countries of the region were

5. Stephen P. Cohen, p. 19.

faced with internal disturbances of various degree and intensity. Situation was further complicated by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and the deterioration in East-West relations.

One of the important studies made by Francis' Fukuyama of the Rand Corporation need to be mentioned here with regard to Reagan Administration's decision to rearm Pakistan. His study conceded that "Pakistan's major pre-occupation was, and would remain India," and that despite Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the bulk of Pakistan's forces were deployed against India. Pakistan's thrust was that "India acting as a soviet proxy, might attack Pakistan in the East", in the event of Soviet pressure on Pakistan from the West, or "India and the Soviet Union could mount a coordinated attack from both east and west".⁶

Pakistan's geo-strategic location once again made it a "Frontline State" in the strategic perceptions of USA. But location also makes it a centre of super power rivalry as well, President Ayub was right when he said : "History has placed us in the pathway of the

6. Girish Mathur, "Secret Document Exposes", Blitz, 7 March 1981.

conflicting interests of major powers"⁷. President Zia exploited this situation to his benefit. President Carter in a interview on 7th January 1980 said." This is a commitment that I am ready to make. We have already assured President Zia, who is the leader of the Pakistan, directly with a telephone communication from me the day very shortly after the invasion, and since than through emissaries, that were willing to join other nations in giving necessary protection to Pakistan and meet their legitimate defensive and military needs."⁸

Washington also realized that the fall of Shah of Iran ended that regime which used to protect giant oil tankers passing through the Persian Gulf to the United States, Europe, Israel and Japan, kept vigil on radical Iran bound with the USSR as well as the local radicalism and Soviet communism. It also meant the loss of American total oil import and loss of the arms and weapons sold to Shah, so in 1980 President Carter declared that the Persian Gulf was a vital interest of the United States and that any attempt by any outside

7. Mohd. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters : A Political Autobiography, (London, 1967), p. 115.

8. Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 23 March 1980, p. 436.

power to gain control of the region would be repelled by any means necessary, including the use of force. Thus, President Carter lifted the ban imposed on the basis of "Symington - Glenn Amendment". He used the provision of the amendment to the "Foreign Assistance Act" to impose economic sanction against Pakistan on the basis of intelligence report that Islamabad was constructing an uranium enrichment plant. He decided to lift the ban on the excuse that Pakistan could protect itself against Soviet expansionism. In January 1980 Carter Administration approved a package of \$ 400 million of U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan. General Zia realistically calculated his bargaining leverage and rejected contemptuously the peanuts offer of President Carter.

Here Zia exercised his shrewdness and he realized that the aid was too small for the purpose for which it was being provided to face the threat from Afghanistan backed by the Soviet Union and instead demanded \$ 2 billion to rebuild the Pakistani armed forces. Unlike his military predecessor Ayub Khan, Zia twisted America to extract maximum aid. Moreover, he found that the offer of United States of America was devoid of credibility. He also realized the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan in the eyes of the American

policy makers and in an interview he said," The United States of America must first consider whether her interests are served better by the protection or by assistance or by cooperation or collaboration with Pakistan or not. I can assure you that in this turbulent world and in this region particularly, which at present moment has the germs of a lot of trouble, Pakistan today represents an island of stability. And it is this, I think, the United States of America in pursuance of their interests must exploit because if Pakistan goes then from Turkey to Vietnam , the name of United States of America will be hard to hear ----- We strongly expect that the United States of America would assert herself and prove to be a superpower because in my opinion, the United States of America cannot afford to hibernate and go back into the shell".⁹

However, Zia also felt highly vulnerable from the Soviets. As he believed that Soviet could manipulate the ethnic separatism in Baluchistan and North West provinces of Pakistan. Consequently he felt that any security relationship with the United States would have to guarantee Pakistan in some new measure against the

9. Pakistan Affairs, 1 January, 1980.

entire spectrum of threats that Pakistan face. Numerous high ranking Pakistani officials have stated clearly that all their country needs or wants from the United States is a credible Political guarantee of its territorial integrity, such as the upgrading of the 1959 Executive Agreement into a full fledged treaty.¹⁰ The existent agreement was deemed insufficient because the absence of congressional ratification was used as a loophole to avoid commitment during the 1971 Pakistan - India war. But the U.S. was not prepared to transform the 1959 mutual security agreement into a full fledged treaty. Hence Zia had been effectively neutralized by Soviet warnings against aligning totally with the U.S.¹¹

Zia's refusal to accept this aid offer pointed towards the decline in the U.S. influence in Pakistan. So Brzezinski and his colleagues from the State department and Pentagon assured Pakistan that the previously announced offer was "only a beginning". Later large grants were extended by Western countries and others such as Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia and West

10. Pakistan Affairs, 16 March, 1980, pp. 4-5.

11. Uma Singh, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy Under Zia", in V.D. Chopra (ed.), Studies in Indo-Pak Relations, (New Delhi, 1984), p. 286.

dominated international financing institution and these helped in giving a new lease of life to the Pakistan's economy.

Of late, in the wake of Ronald Reagan's victory in the US Presidential elections, an impression was created in Pakistan's official and non-official circle that a return to that 'good old days' of the 1950s in Pakistan - American relations was on the cards. This came true with the change of American government from the Democrats to the Republicans. The change of the government also brought change in the priorities of the American foreign policy from human rights situation in Pakistan and its nuclear programme to the new strategic reality. In 1981 a new era in Pak - U.S. security relations began as the Regan administration realized that "somewhere, somehow, U.S. foreign policy will have to find a way of rewarding friends and penalizing opponents".¹²

Regarding Pakistan's geo-strategic reality, Francis Fukuyama prepared a report entitled "The security of Pakistan" in 1980. It seems that Reagan administration had considered the Fukuyam's emphasis on

12. Henry Kissinger, Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, Printed in the New York Times, April 11, 1980.

Pakistan geo-strategic importance and offered loans to Pakistan. Advocating the close security relationship between U.S. and Pakistan, Fukuyama foresaw certain American advantages which were :

- i) denial of Pakistan's territory to the Soviet Union,
- ii) the possibility of aiding the Afghan rebels militarily so as to raise the cost of the intervention for Soviets and divert their attention away from the Persian Gulf,
- iii) the use of the Pakistani facilities in connection with the planned Rapid Deployment Force; and
- iv) the demonstration of American reliability, especially with respect to the People's Republic of China.

Alongwith these American advantages he also highlighted variety of security threats Pakistan faced as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Those included :

- i) Afghan and Soviet support for separatist movements among the Baluchi and Pathan peoples of Pakistan;

- ii) Soviet air and artillery strikes at refugee camps across the border;
- iii) An attempt by Soviet and Afghan forces to seize Pakistani territory in the Frontier;
- iv) A Soviet sponsored attack by India against Pakistan; and
- v) A coordinated Indo - Soviet - Afghan attack designed to fragment Pakistan along ethnic lines.¹³

The importance Pakistan occupied in the American policy making process enormously boosted - up the President Zia's regime, which was struggling to attain legitimacy in the troubled waters at home and in neighbouring countries of Iran and Afghanistan. The convergence of foreign policy objectives relating to resistance in Afghanistan became the firm basis for new freindship between President Reagan and President Zia. R.G. Sawhney was right when he said, "U.S. - Pak relationship is a cause of mutual interests and needs"¹⁴.

13. Mohd. Waseem, "U.S. Factor in Pakistan's Politics", Strategic Analysis, (New Delhi, March, 1981), p. 1792.

14. R.G. Sawhney, "U.S.-Pak Security relationship", in V.d. Chopra's, Studies in Indo-Pak Relations, (New Delhi, 1984), p. 153.

Zia also felt that America's connection was central to Pakistan's security and was keen to ensure that this connection not only survives because of Afghanistan, but also sustained and strengthened in future. On the other hand, Regan administration also felt it was urgent to signal Moscow and others that, unlike its predecessors, it could make tough security decisions and get on with the business of supporting its friends.¹⁵

In this backdrop in April 1981 the United States reportedly offered a five year \$ 2.5 billion package to Pakistan. But in June 1981 it was raised to \$ 3.2 billion spread over till 1987 was justified by James Buckley, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1981, primarily in the context of the Afghanistan situation.¹⁶ The aid offer also included 40 F-16 aircraft.

Besides, the United States some other countries of NATO also came forward with help. On the advice of the -----

15. Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan and Changing Regional Scenario", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 34, No.4, 1981, p.2.

16. R.G.Sawheny, Zia's Pakistan, (New Delhi, 1985)p.30.

United States some countries completely wrote off their loans and some rescheduled their payments according to Pakistan's convenience. Later large grants were extended by Western countries and others, such as Japan, Australia and Saudi Arabia.

In this bargaining process with USA. General Zia had shown certain sophistication and shrewdness which General Ayub Khan and his associates in the fifties lacked. Zia had successfully exploited the U.S. need for it in its global strategic concept to convince the U.S. administration to upgrade the avionics. In this context it may be recalled that Zia reiterated Pakistan's importance by pronouncing the importance of the Gulf region.

Zia's diplomatic success also revealed from the fact that despite objection from Congressmen like Senator Glenn to the upgrading of avionics to AN/ALR 69, the US administration decided to accede to the Pakistan demand, leading some to believe that Pakistan was almost blackmailing the USA in getting whatever it wants. Moreover the dispute over the fitment of avionics on the Pak F-16 was resolved to General Zia's visit to USA in December 1982, with the US administration agreeing to supply AN/ALR 69 RWR (Radar

Warning Receiver) in place of the AN/ALR 46 (V), which had earlier been cleared by the US Congress.¹⁷

Besides this aid, U.S. administration kept on supporting the Zia regime in stabilizing itself in internal politics of Pakistan. "During his visit to Pakistan, the US defence secretary, Casper Weinberger assured Pakistan of the continued U.S. support in his hour of trial when the country was passing through domestic turmoil. Understandably Washington helped Zia in his bid to suppress the agitation in Sind.¹⁸

Undoubtedly, in U.S. strategy, Zia had a major or even vital role to both vis-a-vis Gulf region and possibly in Iran. Not less important was U.S. - Pak collaboration in other fields. Jack Anderson, the famous US educationst, revealed that ;

(a) President Zia had promised to allow US planes to use Pakistan airfields should the Soviet bombers threaten the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan,

(b) In return for the above facility, in addition to the \$ 3.2 billion aid already announced,

17. Ibid., p.36.

18. Uma Singh, p. 287.

the US shared intelligence informations with Pakistan,

(c) General Zia had agreed to let US weapons to be sent to the Afghan rebels through his special forces, and

(d) The US has agreed to train the Pakistan Presidential body guards.¹⁹

In addition to the above strategic alliance between Pakistan and U.S., the later created central command to protect its interests worldwide and counter any move by the Soviets; particularly in South West/West Asian region. Being strategically located, Pakistan offers an attractive base of operations for such U.S. forces in contingency situations. Pakistan, therefore, assumed a high place in the U.S. "strategic consensus" of the region. Hence despite Pakistan's denials about the grant of bases/facilities to U.S., the Pak - US relationship was based on a reasonably substantial quid pro quo from Pakistan. Despite repeated refusals about grant of bases to US, it is not a secret that America has set up a naval base in Baluchistan's Gawader port.²⁰

19. R.G. Sawheny, pp. 38-39.

20. Uma Singh, p.287.

The security relationship between Pakistan and the USA, with its fluctuating fortunes, over the last three decades, it was an all time high during Zia's rule in Pakistan. The importance which the US administration attach to Pakistan is role in pursuing its global interest, the share of intelligence report etc. facilitates the continuance of Zia's policy towards America.

The six - year Pakistan - U.S. military package provided Pakistan by 1986 with 100 M-48 Tanks, 64 self-propelled guns of 155 mm calibre, 40 self-propelled howitzers of 8-inch calibre, 75 towed howitzers of 155 calibre, 1,005 TOW (tube - launched, optically - tracked, wire - guided) anti-tank missiles, and about 20 assault helicopters. It also included some Harpoon SSMs. and a variety of miscellaneous equipment.²¹ In 1984, Pakistan also made a request for AWACS.

The mutuality of interests in regional security and development between Pakistan and the US shaped their multifaceted relations. Economic relations between these two countries form one aspect of cooperation in their convergence of interests.

21. Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain (ed.), p.8.

In the wake of Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, America perceived that "a strong and independent Pakistan is in the mutual interest of the United States and Pakistan as well as the entire world" so America stepped up with offering new aid package to Pakistan. Until 1981, when a 'new relationship' was established, Pakistan had been the sixth largest recipient of US bilateral economic assistance. The bulk (around 40 percent) of this assistance (more than US \$ 2 billion) had been in terms of food aid under US Public Law 480, about one third was commodity assistance and some one-fifth was project assistance (primarily for agriculture and infrastructure).²²

In the changed situation both Pakistan and USA were forced to reassess their position and review their mutual relationship. The two countries negotiated a six-year (1982-87) \$ 3.2 billion military sales and economic aid package whose nature and dimensions were spelled out in the joint US - Pakistan statement of June 15, 1981.²³ "The package offered to US --- clearly

22. Ibid., p.57.

23. Ibid., p.57

envisages an extended programme of economic assistance and military sales over a period of five years beginning with fiscal year 1983. In the meantime Pakistan would enable to make such purchases of the most urgent needed items for its defence forces."²⁴

The ongoing economic assistance and military sales programme initiated in 1981 entered its final phase. "The original package of \$ 2.5 billion had been raised to three billion dollars because of the inclusions in later stages of 500 billion dollars worth of commodity assistance to the package."²⁵ The US government also disclosed in March 1986 that it would offer the new economic assistance and military sales package amounting to \$ 4.2 billion for the period of 1987-93, as against Pakistan's projection of approximately \$ 6.5 billion. The economic assistance package valued 2280 million dollars, offered partly as a grant and partly as a loans at 2 percent interest rate. Thus the new offer was made at highly favourable concessional rates. Besides the political motive of United States, the new aid programme was designed to achieve four major mutually agreed economic objectives :

24. Dawn, (Karachi), 16 June, 1981.

25. Ibid.

- i) provision of substantial balance of payments support for a period in which major defence and economic investment were to take place;
- ii) assurance of stable and relatively fast disbursing capital flows to facilitate orderly planning over a longer time than usual for aid programmes;
- iii) a commitment to an agreed list of high priority investment that would contribute to long term, self - sustaining economic growth in Pakistan; and
- iv) sectoral concentration of investment in two major areas : agriculture, irrigation and energy.²⁶

In addition to the above programme, the U.S. agreed to provide about eleven million dollars for development of energy resources and another five million dollars for regional development activities in NWFP. Two agreements for exchange of scholars and for enabling Pakistan to buy sensitive technology were signed.

Pakistan's effort to acquire nuclear bomb hea
moderated the growing US - Pak military allianes.

26. Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain, p. 57.

General Zia pretended that Pakistan was not making nuclear bomb; but covertly engaged in acquiring nuclear producing materials. This created great concern to the United States policy makers because it indicates the chronic failure of American policy.

For more than a decade Americans have tried unsuccessfully to contain the Pakistani efforts to acquire nuclear bomb. This indicates the failure of American policy towards Pakistan in dissuading to refrain from efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Carter administration came with determination to contain nuclear proliferation. In pursuance of its policy it imposed Symington - Glenn Amendment to restrict the flow of American aid to Pakistan. The imposition of this amendment did not change the ambitious intentions of General Zia to pursue its nuclear policy. Regarding Pakistan's intention, America's Deptt. of State provided an information that, "President Zia has provided assurances that Pakistan would not develop nuclear weapons, and that Pakistan would not transfer sensitive nuclear technology as equipment to other states. I accept those assurances at face value. As you know the United States sees no differences between a nuclear weapon test and a peaceful nuclear explosion and we have made our position clear to Pakistan. We believe

that Pakistan nevertheless does not make such a distinction and that it may develop the capability to explode a device."²⁷

After 1979 President Zia realised that America cannot lose Pakistan due to Soviet presence in Afghanistan and losing of its ally in Iran. Moreover, Pakistan also provided America with intelligence gathering opportunities to monitor strategic programmes in the Soviet Union and only through the Pakistani territory USA can supply military hardware to the resistant movement in Afghanistan so Zia engaged with America in a "cut - and mouse game". In 1981 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended to allow U.S. President to waive section 669 in order to provide assistance to Pakistan if the President determines that to do so was in the national interest of the USA.

Neither India nor Pakistan has signed the NPT, as both intend to keep their nuclear option open. India felt that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty and that it can not afford to be a signatory because of the China factor; Pakistan did not sign it because of India factor. On the other hand, the Americans are committed

27. Pakistan Affairs, 16 October, 1981, p.3.

to cutting off not only nuclear assistance but also economic and military aid, inclusive of military sales credits to any recipient country that refuses to accept IAEA's full safeguards.²⁸

However, the Americans have thrice deviated from their position :

- i) When carter supported the shipment of fuel to India;
- ii) just before the signing of an economic aid cum - military sales package between the United States and Pakistan, when the administration secured an exemption for Pakistan from the Symington amendment :
- iii) When Reagan persuaded France to provide nuclear fuel to India after Mrs. Gandhi's visit of USA in 1983.²⁹

This clearly shows Pakistan's importance in the strategic perceptions. Regan administration adopted an ambivalent attitude towards Pakistan's nuclear

28. For details See Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in Legislation on Foreign Relations through 1981 (Washington : US Govt. Print Office, 1982), pp. 177-81.

29. Stephen P. Cohen, The Security of South Asia : American and Asian Perspectives, (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 126-27.

programme, mainly because of its global interests. General Zia exploited this situation and continued to pursue his nuclear weapons programme.

Pakistan - US security relations have been mainly based on the mutuality of interests. South Asia is a subsystem of the global system. The South Asian subsystem has been highly vulnerable to outside intervention because of its internal disturbances. Pakistan - US security relations were at their peak during Zia regime. It had far reaching consequences for the sub-continent. This relationship expedited arms race in the sub-continent.

India was greatly disturbed over the US's decision to rearm Pakistan in the wake of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. India did not object to Pakistan's legitimate needs of arms. But it feared that ultimately these arms would be used against India. As has happened on earlier occasions, Pakistan is not likely to use these arms against the intended targets. Moreover, Pakistan's force deployment on the Afghanistan border has not undergone any major change. Americans have always assured India that these weapons were not to be used against India. They again came out with the same reason after its decision to supply arms

to Pakistan. Some of the weapons and other sophisticated items under the military aid package are not suitable for the terrains of Afghanistan like Harpoon missiles & AWACS.

The Ministry of Defence in its annual report 1985-86, observed :

"The second negative development is the untrammelled flow of arms into Pakistan from the United States on ground that these are required by Pakistan in view of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Most of the land-based weapon systems inducted cannot be used in Pakistan's northern or western theatres and are obviously meant for use against India. The strengthening of Pakistan's Navy by supplies of sophisticated weaponry can have no relation to the situation in Afghanistan".³⁰

In fact, the Regan administration did not appreciate India's grave concern with US sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. The Foreign Relation Committee Staff in report to the US Senate. Committee on foreign relations, observed that "Indian foresee a Pakistan armed with sophisticated American equipment and

30. Annual Report 1985-86, (New Delhi : Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1986), p.3

possessing nuclear capabilities as upsetting the present regional balance and as potentially treating."³¹

US nuclear policy towards the subcontinent has been one of nuclear non-proliferation. But both India and Pakistan have been pursuing their nuclear programmes. They have kept their nuclear options opened. Pakistan did not sign it because of India factor while India did not sign it, not only because of Pakistan but also of China. India has also rejected NPT because of its discriminating nature towards the third world countries. But during Zia regime USA adopted an ambivalent attitude towards Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. USA had to waive Symington amendment in order to provide military & economic assistance to Pakistan. It also affected the security environment of the subcontinent.

Renewal of US interest in the region was manifested in its willingness to provide the latest military equipments to Pakistan. Its implications are as follows :

- i) It might tempt other South Asian nation's to step up their defence budgets.

31. B.M. Jain, South Asia, India And United States, (Jaipur, 1987), pp. 119-20.

- ii) It might induce smaller countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal to go in for US aid on a much vaster scale.
- iii) It might intensify the Soviet strategic role in the region. For the continued US military aid and the flow of the latest weaponry into Pakistan has serious security implications for the region.
- iv) China may not like the American influence to the extent that could wean away Islamabad from Beijing. The Beijing leadership will have to think of pros and cons of increased flow of US arms to Pakistan which involve its own strategic status and military interests in the subcontinent.
- v) The affected country of the region, due to transfer of the latest US weaponry to Pakistan, is obviously India. This has created irritants in the bilateral relationship of India and U.S.³²

Thus, it is clear that Pakistan - US security relationship has been based on commonality of interests. It has also passed through many ups and downs. With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in

32. Ibid. pp. 126-27.

1979 this relationship got a new fillip. Hesitant Americans came forward with large amount of economic and military aid at very concessional terms. Zia fully exploited this situation to fulfil his designs against India resulting in a threat to the security of the sub-continent.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

① Since India's independence and the birth of Pakistan forty two years ago the relations between these two countries have mostly been conflictual and acrimonious. Mutual suspicions between the two countries have at times assumed the shape of war. The basis of such a volatile scenario in South Asia has been the contrary perceptions of national interest which both the countries have had. (Despite the close proximity of the people, geographically, historically, culturally and organically, various types of motives and different security perceptions of the two countries have inhibited the development of cordial relations between them.) ②

// In the pre -1947 period the British policy of "Counterpoise and Balance" among the Hindus and Muslims had created mutual mistrust among members of both the communities. On the eve of partition this Hindu - Muslim divide was transferred to the national level. It remains the single most important issue in Pakistan - India relations till date and has prevented the evolution of a confidence building mechanism between the two countries. /

Another aspect which needs special mention and which prevented the growth of cordial and orderly relations between Pakistan and India was the policy of projecting an external threat to paper - over cracks in domestic policy or to gain regime legitimacy and stability. / In India, Pakistan was projected as a threat and in Pakistan it was India. Such a policy was bound to adversely affect their bilateral relations and till date is an important factor. /

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/ Last but not the least is the differing security perceptions of both countries. Right from independence it has been Pakistan's ambition to achieve parity with India. For India, such a parity would have meant the abdication of a manifest destiny. India had right since 1947 perceived itself as a leader of all South Asian and Third World affairs. / But since Pakistan was suspicious, of what it referred to as India's "hegemonic designs". Paksitan joined the various Western military alliance systems which came into existence under U.S. auspices in the late 1950s. It perceived such alliances as the only means of achieving parity with India and safeguarding and promoting its national interests.

Pakistan became a recipient of large quantities of arms from the West though given under the pretext of preventing communist expansionism were time and again used in wars against India. /

✓ / The year 1971 constitutes a watershed in the International Politics of the sub-continent. East Pakistan broke away and the new state of Bangladesh came into existence. This war largely achieved due to Indian intervention and Pakistan was forced to give up its aspirations of achieving parity with India and championing the cause of Muslims on the sub-continent. The 1972 Simla Agreement froze the status - quo on the Kashmir issue and India came to be accepted as the dominant power in South Asia. /

✓ (X) / The emergence of India as a regional power in South Asia, alarmed the Pakistani rulers to whip-up their power to challenge Indian hegemony in the region. In this context the Zia regime was an exception. ✓ Although his predecessor Z.A. Bhutto tried his best to bring Pakistan at par with India. But Zia's strategy was unique and different. As a military ruler he wanted to strengthen his power militarily vis-a-vis India. That is why the period between 1977 and 1988

witnessed a different type of relationship between Pakistan and India. /

④ The Indo-Pak relations during Zia were vitiated because of his military build up in Pakistan. He wanted to portray himself as the leader of the Muslim Ummah through an established military strength. Initially for two years the Zia regime had a very normal attitude towards India, rather he was very submissive in his stand in the regional politics. He had the belief that dissatisfaction of democratic India would bring problems for his regime in Pakistan. But the changed strategic situation in the late seventies brought about a change in Pakistan's relations with India. It was the Afghan crisis which opened Zia's real intention in the region vis-a-vis India. Pakistan's elevation to a 'frontline state' in American strategy, gave him the impetus to regulate Pakistan's relations with India to his own advantage. ✖

④ An unprecedented flow of arms to Pakistan after the Afghan crisis antagonised their relations in the subsequent years. The Pak - US relation after the crisis was indeed aggressive in design to safeguard their respective interests in the region. The sanction of two six year economic and military packages in 1981

(\\$ 3.2 billion) and 1987 (\\$ 4.2 billion) respectively perpetuated their conflict to a greater extent. These sanctions resulted in an arms race between India and Pakistan in the sub-continent. ~~X~~ The rising suspicion of India about Pakistan's arms acquisition took her on the same path to consolidate its military power against a possible Pakistani threat in the region. In its perception, Pakistan's intended targets of these arms would be India, though it was sanctioned by the USA for its security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in South-West Asia. Again India's fear psychosis enhanced because of reasons. Firstly, because of Pakistan's intention behind the arms acquisition, secondly, some of the weapons and other sophisticated items under the military aid packages were unsuitable for the terrains of Afghanistan like AWACS and Harpoon missiles. ~~X~~ (X)

Pakistan's clandestine effort to develop nuclear technology consolidated Indian speculation about its future implications in the region. Although the Pakistani nuclear policy was carried through a peaceful purpose, but its motive was quite suspicious. Open declaration of Prime Minister Bhutto and General Zia in regard to their need to nuclear technology, leaves no ground for any assumption. Their nuclear policy was to check the nuclear monopoly of India. The China -

Pakistan military linkages forged in 1963 under the Border Agreement was remained as a major area of concern for the security planners of India. The relationship between Pakistan and China, during Zia, reached its peak owing to the extent of Chinese involvement in Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The nuclear association between China and Pakistan became known to the world in 1982, when several intelligence reports leaked to the American press said that China has made available the designs of an atomic test to Pakistan. In June 1981 there was an agreement between Pakistan and China regarding a Pakistani nuclear test in China. There were reports that China had agreed to supply uranium hexafluoride which would enable Pakistan to produce enriched uranium. The silent support of the USA to Pakistan's nuclear policy created a fear - psychosis in the Indian mind that at any moment Pakistan might get a nuclear superiority over India. A nuclear Pakistan was not acceptable to India because of its inferior technical facilities in the nuclear field. Its nuclear facility would endanger the security of both Pakistan and the South Asian region. The objective behind the nuclear programme was to attain parity with India in the nuclear field where the

Indian military forces would not look at Pakistan as a simple walkover.

X Zia's reaffirmation of the Siachen Glacier aggravated the Indo-Pak tensions in the disputed glacier of the Himalaya. This area is strategically very important for both the countries because it adjoins the large chunk of Kashmir territory that was ceded by Pakistan to China as a part of Border Agreement. The Aksai Chin area under the illegal occupation of China is also close to the glacier. In the event of the combined pressure of Pakistan and China in the area, India's access to the Karakoram pass could become difficult. Zia claimed that no demarcation of the line of control in the Siachen Glacier area had taken place. He also alleged that the presence of Indian troops in this area is violation of the Simla Agreement. To make his grip strong he established four military posts in this strategic area of the Himalaya. The dispute in the border areas escalated their tensions in the region. Many a times they went nearer to open conflicts on the border. In January 1987 a war like situation was created between the two countries when annual Indian military exercise named "Brasstacks" took place. Military exercises on the borders by both the countries did not leave them to live in peace. X

⊕ / The interference in each other's internal affairs perpetuated the mutual vellification of these countries during the period 1977 to 1988. Pakistan's support to the Khalistan movement in India and India's support to the MRD in Pakistan was a major area of dispute.

✓ Pakistan under Zia did not leave any table unturn to distabilise India's internal polity. Zia's support to the JKLF movement is another case in the point. His emphasis on the Kashmir problem in international forums like, UN and NAM invited Indian discontent in violation of the Simla agreement. /

The supply of US arms to Pakistan further fuelled the the fear of insecurity in India. The Indian policy makers perceived that 'The US design of Soviet containment in South West Asia is a direct threat from Pakistan to Indian security in the region'. Pumping of arms to Pakistan was conceded as an American initiative of arms race in South Asia. The supply of sophisticated arms, ammunition and military hardwares through aid packages was indeed a step to create an irrational power balance in South-Asia. The American perception of a temporary military balance between India and Pakistan resulted in a conflictual relations between these two neighbours. Increased military expenditure by these ⊕

two countries further ruined the prospects of their economic relations during this period.

Further, the mutual antagonism between these countries went upto the optimum level in regard to their respective stands in the questions involving Indian Ocean and Afghanistan crisis. In case of the former Pakistan's attitude was quite compromising with the USA. During Zia, on records it was perceived that he might provide base facilities to the USA navy in Pakistan. The fuelling facility to the American navy in emergency was a major factor responsible for raising Indian suspicion towards Pakistan's role in the sub-continent. The Afghan crisis brought about serious differentiation between these two countries during 1977 to 1988. The neutralistic attitude of India in regard to the Afghan crisis annoyed Pakistan, and further propelled its fear of a combined attack if necessary from India and Soviet Union.

Though the period witnessed a bitter relations between India and Pakistan. Efforts were there to develop rapproachment in their relations. Zia's "no war pact" and Indian offer of "peace and friendship treaty" were the examples in this regard.

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