

**INDIAS' NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES  
IN THE NINETIES**

**COL SUDHIR KUMAR**

**Dissertation submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirement for  
the award of the Degree of  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY  
NEW DELHI—110067, INDIA**

**1989**



SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,  
ORGANISATION AND DISARMAMENT



C E R T I F I C A T E

*This is to certify that the dissertation entitled  
"INDIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVES IN  
THE NINETIES", submitted by Col Sudhir Kumar in  
fulfilment of nine credits for the degree of  
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY [M.Phil] of this University  
is his original work according to the best of my  
knowledge and may be placed before the examiners for  
evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted  
for the award of any other degree of this University  
or of any other University.*

[Prof. S.C. Gangal]

Chairman

[Prof. K.P. Misra]

Supervisor

## C O N T E N T S

	PAGE NO.
PREFACE	i
CHAPTERS	
1. Introduction	1 - 9
2. Internal Environment and threat to India's Security	10 - 21
3. External Environment and threat to National Security	22 - 67
4. Suggested National Security Strategy	68 - 85
5. Conclusion	86 - 89
6. Tables	90 -100
7. Bibliography	101 -105


## Preface

The concept of national security is much wider than that of defence. It involves safeguarding not only territorial integrity but also sovereignty. Sovereignty and abridgement of it are admittedly sophisticated concepts, while defence of territory is simple enough. It requires a comprehensive view of various political, economic technological and strategic aspects. Such an approach has been more or less lacking in our country resulting in lopsided thinking on the subject.

In this dissertation an endeavour has been made to examine the concept and structure of India's security, internal and external threats and to suggest a strategy for the nineties. It is not possible to do justice to all the aspects of national security in the limited scope of this dissertation as such external factors and defence aspects have been selected for an indepth study.

I owe my indebtedness and profound gratitude to Prof. K.P. Mishra, my affable supervisor for his encouragement, guidance, constructive criticism and patience at all stages of this work. I am extremely grateful to Lt Gen B C Joshi, AVSM for encouraging me to undertake this assignment and Lt Gen V K Singh for providing me opportunity, valuable suggestions and help at various stages.

Finally, I must add, that without the assistance and co-operation of my wife, Beena, this work could not have been completed in time.



(Col Sudhir Kumar)

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

There is a widespread impression among our elite that the concept underlying the term 'national security' is self-evident and it involves safeguarding of our territorial integrity, political unity and sovereignty. Sovereignty and abridgement of it are admittedly sophisticated concepts while defence of territorial integrity is simple enough.<sup>1</sup> Those belonging to industrialised western world would define it as 'the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats'. In Walter Lippman's words "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war".<sup>2</sup>

While these definitions are adequate to cover the concepts as applied to stabilised nation-states of the industrialised world, these are inadequate to encompass the entire area of the problem of national security faced by such a heterogeneous and developing nation state as India. For example, in 1971, when millions of refugees were being pushed into India, it threatened the communal harmony of our country, and but for the timely action by the government and the restraint displayed by the people, it could have resulted in tearing the very fabric of our nation.

---

1. K. Subrahmanyam, *Our National Security* (New Delhi, 1972), P.1

2. *Ibid*, P.1.

The concept of security embraces the totality of the determination of a nation to secure its unity and integrity against external and internal threats, to enable it to protect its legitimate national interests and to achieve its rightful place in the community of nations. The armed forces are an important instrument of national security policies aimed at achieving this objective, though by no means the only one. It is embedded in the consciousness of the whole people, their will, cohesiveness and resolve, their just cause, their willingness to sacrifice using all sectors of economy, science, technology and industry. It is best illustrated in the tribute paid to the Vietnamese people and Nation : -

" You cannot win over a nation whose  
People refuse to accept defeat."<sup>3</sup>

In the present day world of rapid communication and transportation, the distinction between internal and external security threats gets eroded. The central Intelligence Agency of the USA claims a number of coups to its credit, and though these were physically executed by indigenous forces only, they had the support and inspiration of an external source. The crisis in Afghanistan, Kampuchea,

---

3. Prof. O.P. Kaushik & Others, *National Security Study* (New Delhi, 1986), P. 1.

Angola, Nicaragua are all inspired and aided by foreign agencies. Such developments are serious threat to the security of a nation.

The concept of aggression' will differ from nation to nation. 'While smaller and weaker developing nations are inclined to include various kinds of pressures exercised by bigger countries, the industrial nations consider such pressures as legitimate instruments of diplomacy. If aggression cannot be defined candidly, threats to security' would present formidable problem of definition and understanding.<sup>4</sup>

There is an ongoing discussion amongst non-aligned countries about the domination and hegemonistic policies of big powers posing threats to international security. It is easy for an Indian to understand that Pakistan could not have posed the threat it did to India over the last four decades, on its own strength without the active support they received from USA and China. The threat to India's security arose not merely from Pakistan but from policies pursued by the two big powers over the years. Pakistan's attitude and behaviour were only a 'Symptom of a more fundamental security challenge posed to India by the two big powers .<sup>5</sup>

---

4. *Subrahmanyam, n.1, p.2.*

5. *Ibid, p.2.*



The Chinese confrontation with India was not simply a border dispute as innocuous looking but a foreshadow of a major show-down vis-a-vis USSR. The subsequent arms supply to Pakistan, active support to Naga hostiles and Bangladesh would tend to reinforce the point that the border dispute with India was only a tip of the ice berg.

The events in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Angola and the Gulf are truly indicative of the complexity of the concept of national security where it involves military response which is comparatively overt. However, there are innumerable contingencies a nation faces where the threats are essentially non-military. The former US Ambassador to India, Mr. Chester Bowles, has recorded in his book *Promises to keep* how the US President was attempting to use the wheat shipments to India for famine relief as a lever to pressurise India to modify its stand on issues like Vietnam. When India was looking for arms aid from the Western powers in 1962, there was an attempt to pressurise India to arrive at a settlement with Pakistan on Kashmir.

History is full of examples that no nation has been able to develop its power without facing the problem of security from the rest of the international system. While smaller nations are forced to seek security in the international system if a major nation attempts such an approach

it will in the process cease to be a major nation. Even smaller countries who value their rôle as independent decision-making centres have always invested heavily on their security. Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia are some examples to quote. India cannot devote itself to its development without paying adequate attention to its national security.

A country of India's size and population with all its potential, is not going to be allowed to develop its own model of combining democracy with centralised planning to transform it into a technological society in a short time. Unfortunately, in India, an integrated approach to the issue of national security has been missing. There has been no clear understanding amongst our elite that national security, like economic development, ultimately rests on political decisions on the role the nation is to play in international politics.

Our concept of national security is defending our borders. We have never asked the question 'national security' against what threat, to defend what values.<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, there was no deep political understanding of the implication of the task the country had undertaken. So long as USA and China considered India as a soft state

---

6. *Subrahmanyam, n.1, p.9.*

they tried to interfere in our internal affairs and attempts to influence our economic, political, social and foreign policies and to use proxies in and around against this country. It is therefore, totally unrealistic to view compartmentally our objectives of political, social and economic developments and the needs of our national security.

#### AIM

The aim of this dissertation is to examine the concept and structure of India's security, internal and external threats and to suggest a strategy for the nineties.

#### SCOPE

While the security of a nation encompasses many components, it is not possible to carry out any indepth analysis of all the aspects, of this vital subject in one dissertation. At best, only some of the aspects can be looked at any one time. The scope of this work, therefore, has been confined to external and defence aspects only. There is no doubt that the domestic issues are as important, if not more, than the external ones ; however, it is well known that domestic issues are widely and frequently discussed in the media and various other fora , while relatively much attention is not given to the external

environment as it affects India's security - hence this bias. The following major aspects have been discussed in this dissertation: -

- a) India's National Goals and Objectives.
- b) Internal Threats.
- c) External Threats.
- d) Suggested National Security Strategy.

Although the dissertation covers a period of one decade, the suggestions have been based on long term interests and perspectives of our country.

#### INDIA'S NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The values and principles dear to India's nationhood are enshrined in the preamble to the constitution. Briefly these are :-

- (a) Democracy, socialism and secularism.
- (b) Promotion of welfare of the people based on just social, economic and political order with special emphasis on the less privileged sections of society.
- (c) Cohesion amongst its people and integrity of the nation.

Besides, we are committed to promoting peace and security in the international environment and striving to maintain just and honourable relations between the

nations. Struggle against imperialism, colonialism and exploitation, apartheid and to promote non-aligned movement.

## OBJECTIVES

India's size, population and geographic location places her in an enviable position in the world polity. This was realised by the British as early as the nineteenth century when they created security ring around India to guard their land and sea routes. Nehru realised the continued role India was likely to play in the post independence era when he wrote 'Aside from the United States, the Soviet Union and China, India would at some future date be the obvious fourth country in the world'.<sup>7</sup> It would be fair to assume that India could aspire to be a regional power by the end of the century and play a significant role in the arena of international politics in the 21st century in a truly multipolar world.

Some of the achievable objectives for the next decade could be as follows : -

- (a) Maintain national unity, stability and territorial integrity within parliamentary democracy.

---

7. George Timothy, *South Asia : India and The Great - Powers, Sino Indian Relations* (Hampshire, 1984), P. 60.

- (b) Make special efforts for social, economic and political emancipation of the poor and backward classes.
- (c) To apply latest scientific and technological developments to strike rapid improvements in agriculture and industry.
- (d) Develop military power which should be adequate to ensure national security and to achieve effective deterrence against likely aggressors.
- (e) Protect our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Other legitimate interests in the island territories.
- (f) Continue efforts to promote international peace and security; to establish just and honourable relations with neighbours and other nations of the world, our continued struggle against imperialism, colonialism and exploitation.
- (g) Promote Non-alignment and SAARC movements.

The objectives enunciated above though appearing ambitious, are achievable. However, they face challenges from internal and external environments prevailing which will have to be overcome to achieve the desired results. These threats are discussed in the succeeding chapters.

## CHAPTER - II

### Internal Environment and Threat to India's Security

India's liberation struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi was a unique event that heralded the beginning of worldwide decolonisation. The building up of the Indian nation state thereafter was a stupendous task. One sixth of humanity, unified by the millenia-old concept of Indian civilisation and culture but divided in languages, ethnicities and religions had to be welded together into a democratic, federal, secular, multilingual and multi ethnic Republic. It was a task comparable to uniting the whole of Europe. India today is the world's largest democracy and the second largest nation state. The future of democracy in the world as a whole and particularly in the developing world depends on how it will fare.

India, with its large size and population is experimenting with a democratic polity after an exploitative and divisive hold of colonial rule. There are various positive and negative forces working at cross purposes. The positive forces can be summarised as nationalism, urge to higher quality of life, democratic aspirations, industrialisation of the countryside and a desire to become strong and self reliant. The negative forces are ; fissiporous tendencies, a pre-industrial caste-based society, regional chauvinism and religious separatism, a legacy of pre 1857 period. At the root of these developments lie latent discontent exploited by external forces, religious and caste



based fundamentalism, to grab political power encouraged materially and politically by outside agencies whose prime objective is to weaken and truncate the country. The more significant causes for this would be the steady erosion in the respect of law, acute politicisation of police and other norms of morality in the socio-political environment.

#### ECONOMIC

India's economic progress and industrial growth in particular has tremendous significance for economic integration on which will depend the emotional integration of the people. The effect of the development of the railways and nascent industrial growth in pre-independence India indicated how common interests cut across caste barriers. The market for labour, raw material, agriculture produce, power and industrial products is country wide. This nation wide territorial economic integration has resulted in deep rooted linkages between different region of the economy. Today we swim or sink together-this is a reality.

The crucial factors affecting the Indian economy which have a direct bearing on the national security are:

- a) Mass poverty which blights the lives of hundreds of millions of Indians living below the poverty line.
- b) Unemployment and under employment which sags the morale of our vast population.

- (c) High population growth rate which neutralises the economic growth in the national economy.
- (d) Widespread inequities in the distribution of wealth and economic power leading to social tensions.
- (e) Decline in productivity as reflected in low profitability of our industrial undertakings, high capital input-output ratio and low productivity of our working population.
- (f) A low economic growth rate with inflationary pressures nibbling away the marginal improvements in per capita incomes.
- (g) The malaise of black money which has attained menacing proportions in the form of a parallel economy affecting every aspect of our day to day life.

#### POLITICAL

The eminent sociologist M.N. Srinivas had pointed out in the fifties the existence of the vote-banks on the basis of caste groups. These vote banks were available to any political party that was willing to give some recognition to the demands of these groups.<sup>1</sup>

-----  
 1. Anil Sethi "India : Economic Development and Unity", in Darbara Singh and others, ed., *India's Unity and Security Challenges* (New Delhi, 1984), p. 215.

By the sixties the situation had changed somewhat and the vote-banks then were formed on regional or linguistic loyalties. Those losing their social and economic status, consequent to modernisation seek refuge in religion and regional sentiments. Modernisation is considered an evil and traditional values are stressed. Conservative groups come together to exploit issues like language, river water disputes, interstate boundary problem, religion etc. Exploitation of these issues by diverse political parties for tapping the vote banks gives legitimacy to the demands and thereby to the sectarian groups. As this tendency to exploit sectarian issues is common to most political parties, it becomes difficult to separate genuine grievances from regressive demands.

Such agitations also prevent alignment of forces on lines of more meaningful social categories. The under privileged instead of uniting at the national level on the basis of their genuine needs get divided on caste, communal or regional issues. Thus, unity of progressive forces at the national level becomes almost impossible. This is now posing in serious proportions a challenge to the unity, peace and security of the country.

## COMMUNALISM

Selig Harrison, the author of the much publicised book, *India : The Most Dangerous Decades* (1960) posed sharply the question whether a united and democratic Indian state was at all viable.

"Minds conditioned by India's hopeful achievement in her Decade of Confidence will adjust easily to an India that might at times have to postpone achievement for the far more urgent business of secession here or rampant tyranny there. The adjustment will be discomfiting if only a reminder of the British Colonial argument that "there is not and there never was an India, no Indian nation, no people of India", that India is "a mere geographical expression like Europe or Africa". When the British denied India's capacity for national unity, Indian nationalists rose to the insult and denied, in turn, that any importance at all could be attached to India's internal diversity. Yet the colonial insult holds within it the bedrock issue in India; can a unified Indian state infact survive, and if so what will be the political price for survival?"<sup>2</sup>

-----

2. P.C. Joshi, *Communalisation : A challenge to National Security* in *India's Unity and Security : Challenges* (New Delhi, 1984) p. 173.

In Selig Harrison's words - "The Indian nationalism will most probably survive at the price of a series of authoritarian political forms, a conclusion which suggests that we are riding for a fall."<sup>3</sup>

The history of India for more than 28 years following the publication of this much-advertised book provides eloquent confirmation of India's capacity for national survival as well as of her viability and continuity as a united and democratic state. Selig Harrison's question, and not his answer, is however, as relevant today as it was three decades back. We must ask today whether the new trends during the 80's in India have the ominous potential of undermining the viability and continuity of Indian democracy. Religious pluralism with its consequent cultural and social divisive tendencies creates a problem for national unity, communal riots are on the increase. Communal appeals are being used extensively for electoral purposes and for inciting violence by vested interests. Ayatollah Khomeini's call for Salman Rushdie's murder results in communal riots engulfing the Indian subcontinent from Kashmir to Kanyakumari claiming innocent lives in its murderous sweep. An unequivocal support from Abdullah Bukhari in Delhi is indicative of the serious dimension such a communal frenzy can attain undermining the secular edifice thus seriously threatening the national security.

-----  
3. *ibid*, p. 174.

'It is not a communal exercise of the familiar brand; it is a deliberate attempt to fuse religion with politics. This is a highly significant development in the contemporary history of India because both overtly and covertly an attempt is being made to bring about a synthesis between socio religious ideology and modern polity. This is the foundation of fundamentalism of today.'<sup>4</sup>

More than four decades ago, Jawaharlal Nehru had said :-

"A Secular State does not mean that people should give up their religion. A secular state protects all religions, but does not favour one at the expense of others and does not itself adopt any religion as state religion.....No modern civilised State can be other than a secular State. Communalism is more dangerous for the future of India than any armed attack from any foreign country. We can meet an attack from a foreign country because we know exactly that the foreign country is attacking us and is the enemy. We fight it with all our strength. But the other attack is vicious, because it gradually

---

4. V.D. Chopra, "Religious Revivalism", in Darbara Singh and others, ed., *India's Unity and Security Challenges* (New Delhi, 1984) p. 124

creeps into our minds without our understanding its full significance or its full danger".<sup>5</sup>

#### INSURGENCY

Political aspirations apart, the cause of insurgency has been abetted by other factors such as loss of identity, ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, lack of economic and social developments, geographic isolation, ignorance of the tribal ethos and above all inept and corrupt officials of the local government. Stale of turmoil in Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and other states like Punjab in the recent past has been fuelled and accentuated due to geographic contiguity and covert support from neighbours. The Assam, Mizoram and GNLFF accords notwithstanding, deep rooted apprehensions amongst minorities and secessionist tendencies are surfacing in these regions which go against the unity of a strong and stable India.

#### DOMESTIC TURMOIL AND INSTABILITY

Internal political upheaval occupies a unique place in security concerns. Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state consequent to such internal upsurge. The Tamil problem and the JVP threat in Srilanka,  
-----

5. *Hindustan Times*, 15 March, 1948

the sikh, the Gurkha and the TNV insurgencies in India, the Chakma revolt in Bangladesh and the Baluch, Pathan and Sindhi movements in Pakistan are some of the present day live problems having direct bearing on the national security. 'The objective behind these conflicts vary from the change of political order to creation of separate state or nation entities in order to ensure better economic and political future for a given community'.<sup>6</sup>

Basically, in the third world, such conflicts are developmental as a result of distorted and imbalanced strategies of development and nation building. Though the Punjab problem may be an outcome of sudden and unregulated prosperity, those in Darjeeling, Assam and Tripura have been the product of economic backwardness and political neglect. In all other neighbours of India, a determined and conscious approach to build a national identity based upon dominant community, dominant language and dominant religion drove minority groups to desperation, alienation and revolt.<sup>7</sup>

Invariably, the areas of revolt have been adjacent to international boundaries. This has involved neighbours

---

6. S.D. Muni, *South Asian Security Issues* (paper presented at Indo US Seminar New Delhi 1988) p. 18.

7. Urmila Phadnis & Others, ed., *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration* (New Delhi 1982).



in each others internal problems, not only because of geographical proximity and refugee burden but also because of socio-cultural identities and political linkages among the affected people across the border. The impact of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict on India, through Tamil Nadu politics, may be recalled as the recent example.

India's socio-cultural identities with its neighbours are so extensive that it has been affected every time there is a problem in any of the neighbouring country. Reverse has also been true. However, the nature and extent of involvement has always been influenced by the degree to which India's various interests are affected. Pakistan's involvement with the Sikh trouble in the Punjab is mainly because of its adversary relationship with India. Otherwise there is no socio cultural <sup>or</sup> ~~religious~~ <sup>religious</sup> identities. Strategic interests also prompt extra regional powers to exploit internal situation.

If we closely examine the internal threats to national security it would be clear that ultimately development is the best security, but there is no magic wand that can bring about development through short cut. This has to aim at the provision of social, economic and political justice. Economic offences which are eating into the vitals of our economy are resulting into con-

centration of wealth in a few hands.

In conceptual terms, internal threats are best met through harmonisation, balancing and economic development with distributive justice. However, in concrete terms, the negative political factors including organised international terrorism often gain the upper hand, albeit temporarily. Often, political parties have sacrificed larger national security interests for short term partisan gains. This strikes at the credibility of the state's institutions and administrative mechanism which has to deliver the goods on the ground.

Lawlessness and corruption are also gradually eroding people's confidence in the polity. People are losing faith in police which has in the past given evidence of its autonomous, indisciplined and irresponsible behaviour. Law enforcement at the state level is extremely poor on account of which the central police and military are being increasingly used in rescuing the civil authorities. There is a growing tendency amongst the governing authority to adhere to new instrumentalities to deal with law and order situations than by decreasing the peoples' faith in the existing laws of the land and the judiciary. Politicians have done significant damage to value system and confidence of an ordinary citizen. They have exploited state for their personal ends and their action, therefore,

have failed in motivating the masses for a national cause. This devaluation in the credibility of politicians and erosion in cherished values of public life have done grave harm to internal strength of our society.

#### CONCLUSION

As mentioned earlier, any discussion on security has to take into consideration the internal, political and economic situation in a country. Political cohesiveness and economic strength are vital matters in defining the security concerns of a country, for it would be difficult to fend off external threats if internally the fabric of a nation and its society were being torn to shreds. In the present work these aspects have been dealt with briefly. Each of these issues merit an in depth analysis independently. An examination of external environment and threat posed to the national security together with suitable counter measures would be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

TH-2632



DISS

355.033054

K9606 In



TH2632

## CHAPTER - III

External Environment and  
Threat to National Security

## INDIA'S GEOGRAPHICAL IMPORTANCE

The geographical significance, almost uniqueness of India's situation places her at the cross-roads of the major maritime links in the world today. It is also at the cross roads of historically important land communication in the Eurasian continent through which the races, armies and religions migrated. The developments in Afghanistan have highlighted the continued importance of this region.<sup>1</sup> This geographical uniqueness places India far ahead of other prospective middle powers like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or Nigeria.

India's geo-strategic significance has been of considerable attraction to the great powers in their over intensifying competition and rivalry. Besides being situated under the soft belly of the giants Soviet Union and China, India is also central to the Asian continent and its ocean spread. Being flanked on its west by oil rich gulf/and politically volatile West-Asia, on the East by economically dynamic but ideologically divided South-East and East Asia, the Indian sub continent overlooks sea lanes of communications between the Orient and the Occident. However, if one looks at the globe the Indian sub-continent is in the midst of things. It is not at the edge. This decides for us a certain destiny as a target for great

---

1. U.S. Bajpai, ed., *India's Security : The Politics of Strategic Environment* (New Delhi, 1983). P. 42.

power influence unless we are able to resist it by national strength.<sup>2</sup> The relations of super powers with the sub continent become inevitably linked with Indo-Pakistani equation, which is already complicated enough.

In order to appropriate India's position in the world today it would be imperative to understand its historical experience of industrial imperialism of over two centuries as against very brief period of foreign domination in Africa, Indo-China, Indonesia etc. Many of the later colonies were infact, by-products of or atleast influenced by the needs of British imperialism in India.

#### INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The developed world has come to realise that 'force as an instrument of policy' is becoming increasingly difficult to use in international relations. French, US and later Chinese experiences in Vietnam have proved this aspect beyond doubt. However, for the Vietnamese, force has not been of decreasing utility. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that appropriately used, force is highly effective in safeguarding their values and interests. In 1971, while

---

2. *Ibid*, p. 43.

the rest of the world was paying lip sympathy for the refugee burden, it was the force combined with diplomacy which brought about the end of genocide in erstwhile East Pakistan.

Predicting growing importance of India internationally, the former US secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger has said that India will be impelled to 'assume some of the security functions now exercised by the United States' in the region. India will seek to be the strongest country in the sub-continent and will attempt to prevent major power in the Indian Ocean or South East Asia.<sup>3</sup> An odd report by some foreign group published in the west or elsewhere certifying that India would emerge as a medium level or regional power by the year 2010 gets prominence in the media, but little indigenous analysis is carried out or published on the vibrant profile of Indian society. It is necessary for us to understand the inevitability and imperatives of this profile to develop our own sense of identity, and more so to prepare the rest of the world to India in the next century.<sup>4</sup>

There is a certain uneasy balance at the very top of the world hierarchy which makes it inevitable for

---

3. *Hindustan Times*, 13 September 1988.

4. R.K. Pachauri, *Emerging Edifice of India in Hindustan Times*, 30 March, 1988.

conflicts to take place only in the lower echelons of the global hierarchy. It is against this historically unprecedented background of crisis management leading to detente between the two super powers and their alliances that we have to examine the realistic prospects for freedom of action and protection from external intervention, for the members of the third world. Any study of India's security will have to take into account the implications of this reality.

#### SUPER POWERS

The contradictions in the international system arise primarily from the conflict of national interests and ideological differences between the two super powers and their alliances. Small and medium countries are seen from Moscow and Washington as allies, adversaries or comparatively unimportant outsiders in the great questions of strategy, economic power and political influence. There has always been conflicting pulls between the genuine ideological zeal and the vested interest each super power has in the essential continuity of the present equilibrium. There are clear cut examples of Cuba and Nicaragua on the one hand and Yugoslavia, China and Albania on the other

In such a system, it is the Third world the former colonies, the inchoate societies not yet jelled into viable nation states which have provided a fertile but



safe playground for ideological and strategic rivalry between the great powers.<sup>5</sup> It is thus that we have today the intersection of super power rivalry and regional conflicts all over the world in degrees of varying importance. The post colonial phase provided enormous potential for the exercise of influence by the Super powers. The conflicts in South East Asia and West Asia have historically ideological origins, even though at times accusations of ideological influence have been made by Washington or Moscow. However, India has been an exception in that it had functioned in an ideologically neutral climate as far as struggle between two political systems is concerned. The countries of the sub-continent and their security are of relevance to the super power arena of conflict, but as a significant, secondary hinterland region. This applies to super power interests in Gulf region, struggle between ASEAN and Indo-China as related to China & super powers. Arabian Sea has become a scene of naval competition due to submarine launched missiles. It is this central geographic situation of the Indian subcontinent between these two regions of direct superpower confrontation, which has led to the qualitative deterioration of our security environment lately.

---

5. Bajpai n.1. p. 36

6. *ibid*, p.38

In some form or the other all small and weak countries share their relationships with the three giants of this world. However, the unique geo-political fact is that China and USSR occupy a huge land mass adjacent to us in the Asian continent. The US is represented through its naval power. This makes our region the most sensitive area of great power conflict.

The rise of Iranian revolutionary wave and Islamic fundamentalism on one hand and the socialist ideology of the industrial societies on the other are seen at cross roads in today's changing environment. These forces which have already emerged in some countries of the region could become powerful revolutionary instruments for change in the next two decades. There is also the risk of religious revivalism being made a potent instrument for suppressing the inevitable movement for change in these societies by reactionary ruling groups. India with its vast population of believers in different faiths has successfully avoided revivalist dangers by participatory democracy and a successful secular tradition but the threat to our society from such developments is always there.

It is necessary for Indian security Planners to evaluate the prospects of our relationship with the two

super powers and china. One has to begin with the platitude that ' there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies in international relations, but only permanent interests of countries'. No country is committed to another totally, temporary appearances to the contrary. Within these confines our experience since independence shows that the Soviet Union has a certain attitude towards India which could, at best, be described as one of friendliness and willingness to help when help is needed. The Soviet Union on the other hand benefited from a friendly India by breaking out of naval encirclement which the western allies tried to impose upon her. Apart from the very early years of India's independence, ideological divergence vis a vis USSR, has not been a major obstacle between the two countries. On many global and regional issues, the Soviet union has been a positive factor in our diplomacy even though as a leader of the non-aligned movement we took up position on many matters divergent from those of the socialist bloc. The Soviet Union has gone out of the way to create heavy industrial infrastructure and essential weapon systems obtainable nowhere else. The Indo-Soviet Treaty has withstood the test of time. Because of these reasons, the Soviet factor should be considered a positive one in our assessment of threat to our national security.

the  
Our relations with United States are much more complex. The enormous influence which Washington has on developments in our country both through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and the problems created by roughly similar political institutions make the Indo-American relations extremely complex. In strategic terms, however, the relationship is of utmost clarity. It has been of benign neglect as a low priority area in its global calculations or as an unfriendly nuisance in its attempts to encircle Moscow. The US has been befriending Pakistan and China at our expense. Strategically, Pakistan and Afghanistan are seen as part of West Asia (South West Asia to the US). Here Pakistan and Iran are the key nations or lynchpin states as described by the U.S., to counter Soviet influence. Politically, the fact that India is the largest democracy in the world is of little practical relevance to Indo-US relations. At a practical level it is easier to interact and influence single point political leadership rather than a diffused democratic polity. No matter who came to power in Pakistan, USA has been able to do business with him/her and retain its links with the military which at least has been the ultimate arbiter of authority.

The most palpable manner in which super-power interest in the region would be demonstrated is in the

attitude of our immediate neighbours towards us; Here Pakistan Occupies a central role. Pakistan's attitude towards India affects her receptiveness on hostility to the super powers ; conversely the super powers know that their most effective way of influencing us would be through the exercise of some authority in decision making in Pakistan.

The peace in the world after the end of world war II, had become the continuation of war by other means. The two super powers had followed one-point programme in international politics- to outmanouver each other with a view to dominating the world. In this chess game, smaller and under-developed nations were often used as pawns, ignoring the troubles and tribulations that such gameplay creates in the affected regions. Economic power is at the root of aspiration for power. The strong and prosperous nations brook no competition current or potential and "use unobtrusive, indirect and fairly effective methods of gaining and maintaining economic domination over the nation"<sup>7</sup> Manipulation of pliant elite is an effective technique in this game.

If the Indian sub continent becomes a non-manipulative economic monolith then the threats being perceived by industrialised societies from the develop-

---

7. H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (calcutta, 1969) P.56.

ing countries would vastly increase. The struggle of the third world countries for economic development and emancipation is viewed by them with concern. The RAND Corporation study of 1977 titled 'Military Implications of a Possible world Crisis in 1980s' had concluded that the world order might break down due to the - "Sharpening confrontation between the third world and industrial democracies." It prompted USA to raise 'Rapid Deployment - Joint Task Force' now operating in the Indian Ocean. There is a similar conclusion in the 1983 Atlantic Institute Paper titled 'Internal fabric of western society'. It says that "the new challenges threaten more directly the economic security of the west rather than its politico-military security".<sup>8</sup> In their perception a faction ridden sub-continent would also not be contrary to the interest of communist movement in its conviction that enduring peace can come to the world only after communism prevails in the entire world. In this vision, the well known declaration that communism will travel to London Via Calcutta, still has relevance ; the march will be speedier through a sub continent in turmoil.

After the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the US interest in

---

8. Gregcry Flynn, "A Sombre Outlook", in *Internal Fabric of Western Society* (Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 1983), p 231.

Pakistan to build it up as a front line state is a reinforcement of the old policy. Pakistan proved a useful base to bleed the Russians in Afghanistan as also to secure bases in Pakistan. It serves as a secure flank for Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force of the Central command should it become necessary to translate the Carter Doctrine proclaimed in January 1980. "Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persial Gulf region will be regarded as assault on the vital interests of the USA, and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military forces."<sup>9</sup>

Pakistan has been cultivated as an ally, a front-line state by the USA for a cogent reason. "Pakistan has succeeded to much of India's responsibility, for the Gulf opens directly on Karachi ---- India is no longer an obvious base for Middle East defence. It stands on the fringe of defence periphery".<sup>10</sup>

#### CHINA

Any meaningful discussion of India's security should inevitably take into account China as a critical

---

9. *Indian Express* , 24 Jan 1980.

10. *Sir Olef Caroe, The Wells of Power (Calcutta 1951), P. IV.*

factor. China and India on the Asian continent present identical models because of the similarity of their size, population, geo-political importance colonial background and so on. Since their regional perspectives and security perceptions differ, relations between China and India have interacted with other issues, notably the security of Pakistan, East-West relations and Sino-Soviet dispute, and have at times become inseparable from these issues. India shares a common border of over 2000 miles with China which became alive in 1962 when China launched an attack in North East and Ladakh not only to attain its territorial ambition but also to undermine India's potential and credibility to play a dominant role in South Asia. Her support to the insurgents of Nagaland and Mizoram is clear indicator of her intention <sup>to destabilise</sup> India as and when considered worth while in her design of things.

China has an important role to play in determining the climate of security in South Asia. If relations between India and China are good, India would have that much flexibility and independence in exercising her role as a regional power and in her dealings with super powers. The need for such flexibility has prompted Rajiv Gandhi to visit China and start a process of normalisation of relations progressively. But, if the



Sino-Indian relations deteriorate - as they could ... and if Pakistan's links with China appeared to threaten legitimate Indian interests - the tilt towards Moscow might become more pronounced.<sup>11</sup>

China's emergence as a nuclear power and its drive to enhance its international image by the choice of strategic linkages with one super power or the other in accordance with its perceived national needs, constitute the critical component of China's security framework which exercise an impact on India's Security. In order to undertake an objective analysis of china's security framework and its implications for India, it is imperative to examine their national ethos and security perceptions. The following issues are relevant in Indian context :-

- (a) China's perception of India and her strategic objectives.
- (b) India's options in the context of China's involvement in the 'core area' of India's security.
- (c) China's role in the global system.
- (d) China's military modernisation and its impact on India.

---

11. Timothy George, *"Sino Indian Relations in Security in South Asia 2 : India and the Great Powers (London 1984), p.2.*

## CHINA PERCEPTION OF INDIA

Chinese perception of India has undergone changes in the last four decades since the days of 1950's when it was termed as 'a running dog' of the western imperialism. However, the basic real-politik aspect of containing India in South Asia and in the neighbouring regions of interest to China has remained a constant factor in the midst of several variables. This aspects seeds to be kept in mind while analysing various stages in China's perception of India.

China adopted a tactical line of peaceful interaction with India in order to carry out internal consolidation, as India shared a common border with turbulent Tibet and was in close proximity to the province of Xinjiang. However, even during the<sup>e</sup> period of 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' days the real - politik aspect was not ignored. China's perception of the usefulness of Pakistan for its long term strategy was evidenced by the late Premier Zhou - Enlai's acceptance of Pakistan's explanation at the Bandung Conference (April, 1955) that its alliance with the <sup>US</sup> ~~US~~ was not directed at China. The fact that Beijing accepted such an explanation in the cold war phase indeed demonstrated its firm commitment to real-politik.

Sino-Soviet dispute, which had its beginnings as far back as the Korean war, began to dominate China's actions. The Chinese were critical of the Soviet aid to India in 1957. Moscow's attitude in 1959 Sino-Indian <sup>clashes</sup> was neutral. Soviet military equipment began to arrive in India in 1961 and Mig 21 contract was concluded in 1962 much to the Chinese dislike. While the Soviet Position of neutrality in 1962 war did not favour India, anything less than total support would have been quite unacceptable to China in the then prevailing State of Sino Soviet relations. The upshot was that Indo-Soviet relations were left in one piece as a result of the war but Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated.

In the post - 1962 phase Beijing adopted a militant posture with a view to consolidating its military gains and initiated a positive strategy of the containment of India by exercising the options of cementing relations with Pakistan. The shifting of China's hitherto ambivalent posture towards the Kashmir issue to one which favoured Pakistan, the signing of the border agreement with Pakistan in 1963 and the threat to open a second front against India in 1965 and 1971 operations against India, were geared to consolidate Pakistan as a check against India. In May 1970, when the famous 'Mao's smile'

was reported in the Indian press as an indication to improve bilateral relations with India, was in fact to create a certain degree of suspicion in Indo-Soviet relations at a time when China was still considering alternative linkages - preceding the Kissinger era.

The events of 1971, when India committed moral, diplomatic and military pressure to help the liberation of Bangladesh against Pakistani genocide which resulted in destabilisation of Eastern India, prove in Beijing's eyes that India was no Status - quo power willing to accept a threat to its security. This was also evident from absence of any criticism of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971. In the middle and late Seventies Beijing having realised that tactics of confrontation won't work in South Asia, the validity of the process of reconciliation was adopted. The Soviet intervention of Afghanistan further reinforces China's perception of achieving her goal of dominating South Asia by tactics of conciliation. India took the initiative to raise the level of representation to the ambassadorial level on 5 April, 1976. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan accelerated the process of normalisation of relations with India. China's hope of playing a bigger role

amongst Non aligned nations further prompts her to develop closer relations with India.

The bilateral matters between China and India are not confined to border dispute only. They include status of Sikkim which has an indirect bearing on its relationship with Nepal and Bhutan. The Kashmir question and China's agreement with Pakistan have tactical as well as strategic implications for India. Lately China has accepted <sup>ed</sup> that Kashmir is a bilateral problem between Pakistan and India. However, there is no reason to believe that China has surrendered its options.

#### CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CORE AREA OF INDIA'S SECURITY.

China's involvement from Durand line to the borders of Burma, which indeed is core area from India's point of view, is intense. China's close interaction with Pakistan, construction of Karakoram highway, insurgencies of Nagaland and Mizoram and fuelling of anti Indian sentiments in neighbouring kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan are some of the indicators in this direction. Beijing has endorsed

King Binendra's concept of Nepal as a "peace zone", primarily with a view to projecting the image that China is Nepal's ally and a factor strengthening its independence.

China's policy towards Bangladesh is power-oriented. Beijing did not recognise Bangladesh initially to put pressure on India through Bangladesh for post 1971 war reconciliation with Pakistan as also to indicate to Pakistan that it continued to value its relationship even during disaster. Secondly, it threatened Bangladesh to stay clear of closer relations with India. The current phase of cordiality of relations between China and Bangladesh are due to mutuality of interest. Whereas China wants her presence in Bangladesh military establishment the military regime wants to consolidate its hold by attributing everything and anything going wrong in Bangladesh on India.

As regards South East Asia, Indian and Chinese interest clash. In fact Jawaharlal Nehru had observed that China's and India's interests clash in the region of South East Asia. From China's point of view, South East Asia particularly Indo-China, constitutes China's soft under belly from which all external powers have to be excluded. In nineteen fifties and sixties we saw the Chinese struggle to support the Vietnamese in their liberation struggle against <sup>the</sup> French and later the US. She tried to forge a common ground with Indonesia, Burma, Laos and Kampuchea.

China encouraged insurgency activities in countries opposed to her in this region like Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. However, this underwent a change in the post Kissinger era of normalisation with the U.S.

Developments in late Nineteen Seventies in this region prompted China to 'teach a lesson' to Vietnam where they failed miserably. Beijing therefore, focussed its attention on the ASEAN countries to encircle Vietnam. However, the ASEAN countries are more suspicious of Chinese long term strategy than the lesser Vietnam evil. Burma shares a common border with China and India, has witnessed Chinese support to Burnese Communist Party activities, posing a considerable threat both to Burma and India.

With regard to the Indian Ocean area, China has virtually subscribed to the US view viz the increased Soviet threat. It is likely that in the ensuing decade China may show its presence in the Indian Ocean in a modest way. She may seek port facilities possibly in Burma. Roy Wernen in his presentation on its implications of US China military co-operation' sponsored by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations said that "In the future China's naval expansion may include ' Presence missions'

to the South near the old tributary states. Given the Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean and off Vietnam, the Chinese are likely to expand into this area. Once China develops SLEB's the Indian Ocean will assume strategic importance to her.

#### CHINA'S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM.

China's strategic postures and its interaction with the Super powers too have an impact on India. However, India's policy of non-alignment has withstood the test of time right through the periods of deterrence, the cold war and todate. China's linkages with <sup>the</sup> Soviet union followed by antagonism to that of leaning towards US have not deterred India's faith. There has been no need of counterwailing linkages as such. Notwithstanding this the famous strategic triangle Washington - Beijing - Islamabad has become a cause of concern for India's defence planners.

China's strategic behaviour has been and continues to be dictated by the geostrategic reality of sharing a common border with a super power. However, it needs to be emphasized that Chinese linkages with USSR in early ninteen fifties cannot be compared with those with the US today. As against a shattered nation in 1950s today China is brimming with confidence. It is a nuclear power with modest industrial base. It has enhanced



its room for flexible response . India's primary concern is that China's linkages do not have an adverse effect on India in the region. Our experience in the past has shown that it is so - Pakistan was a leading beneficiary in both the cases, against India's security interest. The Sino US parallel commitment at present, to strengthen Pakistan, is a case in point.

#### MILITARY MODERNISATION

Modernisation of military apparatus is one of the four modernisation undertaken by the Chinese in the coming decade. Though this is the last of the four modernisations yet its far reaching implications for India must be anticipated now. For whatever the intentions of Beijing, its growing capabilities have to be taken into account appropriately. The Chinese leaders learnt several lessons from the PLA's attack on Vietnamese forces in 1979, the Chief among them was that the PLA had become flabby, inefficient, faction ridden and a centre of leftism. Also its strategy, tactics, weapons systems organisational structure and logistics were outdated. In conventional terms, Chinese equipment like T-59 tanks, self propelled guns / <sup>and</sup> transport aircraft were obsolete by super power standards. They possess serious limitations in transportation system and logistic sustainability capability.

For plains warfare they are no match to Soviet equipment. In the decade since Vietnam war (1979) the PLA has worked hard to turn itself into a modern professional military. They have pruned down the overall strength by one million men to effect a qualitative improvement in their weapon systems.

Chinese Navy continues to remain essentially a coastal defence force and its patrol boats and submarines are vulnerable to electronic counter measures (ECM) and anti submarine warfare. Further, Chinese aircraft are poor because these are equipped with out dated avionics. Compared to advanced countries the Chinese conventional equipment is atleast twenty years behind.

PLA researchers have completed a paper on China's Defence strategy for 2000 AD which revamps basic strategic principles and doctrine, and ranges from platoon tactics to "Star wars" development. The report is likely to become operational by late 1989. It stresses the development of mobile, well equipped forces, able to react rapidly to a wide range of situations backed up by a strong well trained reserve. The three - pronged modernisation programme involves maintaining high priority on areas such as electronics, strategic missile developments, space research, better logistics, modern command, control and

communications, nuclear submarines and helicopters; a cut back on redundant non-operational staff and aged soliders.<sup>12</sup> Import of technology for joint production of weapons and R & D for weapon development has been stepped up. Money saved from restructuring of forces and cut back as also earned by selling arms in the world market.

The PLA is concentrating on space-based defence research. A Chinese shuttle and space station "have been put on the order of the day", according to China's Ministry of Aeronautics, "China has capability," the ministry said in November 1987. PLA is acquiring rapid deployment capability; the first visible signs of army helicopter group were known. The effort to build up a blue water navy with power projection capabilities, has been receiving major attention. China possesses one of the largest submarine fleet in the world. The US has agreed to transfer technology for manufacture of Mark 46 anti submarine warfare helicopters. China's new destroyers and escort vessels will be equipped with an operational command system. China's forward looking naval strategy is evident in naval operations in South China Sea and visit by PLA ships to Karachi, Trincomalee and Chittagong ports a

---

12. Sujit Dutta, "China and the Security of India", in *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi ), Vol. XII No. 2. (1988), p. 138

year ago. Amphibious manoeuvres were conducted around Spratleys island.

China's Strategic aims, its nuclear weapons programme and growing missile reach, its "Strong border" ideology and the goal of attaining not only a major power status in Asia but in the world, have serious implications for security environment in South Asia in general and Indian subcontinent in particular. Chinese territorial claims on remote historical grounds have little place in present day international relations. Yet these claims are very much alive and seriously affect India, Vietnam and Soviet Union. This is a serious threat to international security and militarisation.

Four decades of Sino-Indian interaction suggests that India will continue to be an important factor in China's strategic calculation whatever tactical line it might assume at given point of time. The current trend in China towards normalisation of relations with India is not an isolated event but part of an overall strategy of regional needs and global compulstions.

#### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's historic vist to China from 19 to 23 Dec. 88 was the first one by an Indian Premier

after a gap of 34 years. Set against the backdrop of the strains and tensions that have shaped Sino-Indian relations for a greater part of the past three decades, this visit evoked great expectations and apprehensions. His mission was complex and delicate. The wounds inflicted by the Sino-Indian war in 1962 may have healed but the traces of the scars remain. The most meaningful agreement relates to the new framework of consultations envisaged by the two countries to try and reach negotiated settlement of their border dispute. The emphasis in the joint statement on a fair and reasonable settlement which would be mutually acceptable makes it quite clear that the discussions on the border question would now be different in tempo and substance than was the case in the past. The agreements and co-operation in the fields of science and technology, culture and civil air transport would go some way to build up mutual trust and confidence. Taken together, these agreements do add up to an approach that contrasts singularly with the one the two countries adopted in the past; an approach imbued with pragmatism and a more lucid appraisal of each country's vital interests. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has gone as far as to suggest that the boundary question must be settled "within a realistic time frame. India is prepared to proceed accordingly"<sup>13</sup>

---

13. *Hindustan Times* 20 December 1988.

The impact of the Gandhi's visit outside the bilateral framework is certain to be watched with interest. The visit may not have produced a breakthrough - none was expected - but its outcome would never - the less contribute to changing perceptions about both the countries. China will appear more eager than in the past to better balance its relations with the Soviet Union. This prospect is already on the cards when Mr. Gorbachov has already declared that Indo-Soviet relations are not an impediment to Sino-Indian relations. He has said that peaceful settlement of bilateral issues will be conducive to peace in Asia and the world as a whole. Mr. Li Peng has pointed out that China is ready to work together for a fair and reasonable settlement of the outstanding boundary question between the two countries through friendly negotiations in a spirit of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation<sup>14</sup>. He further suggested maintenance of peace and establishment of a new international political order on the basis of five principles of peaceful co-existence.

The knotty Kampuchean problem is in the process of being resolved and the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is creating an environment of impending peace in the the region. It is hoped that India will have less

---

14. *Times of India*, 20 December 1988.

reason to view its relations with the outside world in terms of Washington - Islamabad - Beijing axis. Indeed India's neighbours, too, would now find it more difficult to play a China card as they have done with alacrity so far. A sustained Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet dialogue might tempt some to brandish the spectre of a ganging-up of India - China and the Soviet Union. At any rate New Delhi and Beijing, like Moscow and Beijing, still have serious differences on some of the international issues. Mr. Gandhi's visit must be viewed as a first but major effort to guide Sino-Indian relations along lines that take fully into account the adjustments that the two countries need to take into account to adapt to a world order which is no longer dominated by power equations based on East-West rivalries or expansionist ambitions. The Chinese leadership has responded in a cautious but positive way.

The China-Pak two front security challenge to India has for years been a cause of tension in South Asia. Separately and together they have led to wars, distrust and a growing arms race. China's new strategic plans will not lessen the threats and in fact will create far reaching implications for India's security. There have been positive indications of a rapprochement and peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes. The strong negative traits must be overcome if Sino-Indian friendship is to truly materialise and genuine peace in Asia is to be achieved. However, both in short and long terms the security problems of India, China and other states cannot

be solved through individual state actions with increased reliance on military means. A collective security arrangement in Asia, on the lines of the Helsinki agreement, may bring genuine security to all.<sup>15</sup> It is hoped that China in its own interest and in the interest of peace in Asia would come round to this view, and refrain from a unilateral military-based search for security and strategic superiority.

#### PAKISTAN

Due to perversity of history and her psyche Pakistan's national aim appears to be to achieve parity with India. Kashmir has been and will continue to remain the bone of contention between the two countries. Pakistan's active involvement with the separatist elements in Punjab has further compounded India's apprehensions about Pak's intentions. Her friendly ties with China and efforts to subvert communal harmony in India have created further complications in the already complex problems. Since her very inception Pakistan has played an important role in the US global strategy and has been referred to as a front line state by the US. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Shah's overthrowal in 1979 proved a blessing in disguise for the military

---

15. Dutta, n, 12, o, 144,



rulers of Pakistan. It provided an excuse to Pakistan to project a dual threat from India and Russia and to seek arms aid to counter Soviet threat. Consequent US arms flow into Pakistan has further aroused her thirst for parity with India. The security ramifications are obvious. Mrs. Gandhi's expressed fear was that transformation of Pakistan into a Sino-American 'arsenal' against the Soviet Union would only lead to a dangerous intensification of the cold war in South Asia. This rationale behind a more fundamental apprehension that any arms supplied to Pakistan under the pretext would one day be turned against India. When US gave 3.2 billion US dollar aid to Pakistan Mrs. Gandhi asserted: 'Do you seriously think that Pakistan is going to stand up to Soviet Union? I don't think that anybody would take that at all. Certain American officials themselves have said ----- these (arms) would be used against India'.<sup>16</sup>

During the visit of India's foreign secretary Ram Sathe in February 1980, President Zia was told that 'normalisation of relations between the two countries could be achieved only if Pakistan promised not to build up its forces. The regional solution to Afghanistan problem foundered since two sides had divergent perceptions of the Soviet

---

16. *Far East Economic Review*, 25 September, 1981.

occupation of Afghanistan. This perception will change with the return of democratic government in Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto who had stated that Soviet have no aggressive intentions against Pakistan, but that General Zia had 'blown up' "the Afghan situation" to attract attention ----- we would never forget that whenever we have had wars with India, the Afghans have never made use of that excuse to attack us from their side. We should not pay them back by allowing these people who call themselves Mujaheddin to use our territory to attack their's ----- . If the Soviets came to Pakistan in hot pursuit it will be the fault of the government here.

#### MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Pakistan would have us believe that it faced a Soviet threat and hence the need to build up its military capabilities. The truth is that the over whelming proportion of Pakistani military expansion took place before the soviet intervention in Afghanistan (see Table 1). What Zia managed to extract from the US and its friends was qualitative improvement of that vastly expanded military machine with a quantum jump in technology consequent to sanction of \$ 3.2 billion military and security related economic aid. This not only created an adverse balance for India but

also complicated its options and forced reactive response which are bound to prove costly. Equipment replacement became imperative due to life expiry and obsolescence in the context of Pakistani acquisition. This resulted in rapid growth of defence expenditure. While Zia acquired these capabilities through aid programmes India had to make a reasonable response by diluting developmental activities.

Pakistan armed forces have undergone four stages of modernisation, the fourth one in the post Afghanistan crisis. The versatility and the resilience of the armed forces, their ability to adopt a variety of new patterns of equipment and at the same time achieve high degree of standardisation and coordination, is remarkable

Table 2 gives a balance of forces available with India and Pakistan. It shows that eventhough in aircraft India enjoys a clear cut superiority, it is evenly poised on the ground. At present India does not enjoy the kind of superiority over Pakistan militarily which would warrant a complacent attitude as regards our ability to deal with a Pakistani aggression. On the other hand, Pakistan has certain advantages. Pakistan's military doctrine is based on "offensive - defence". This would allow Pakistan to choose place and time of attack thereby

giving surprise to the aggressor. The added advantage of close' to border location of her cantonments provides quicker mobilisation as compared to India. Therefore the reaction time is more with Pakistan. In any future conflict, two factors will have to be borne in mind. One is the kind of international environment and amount of pressure which would be brought to bear on India and Pakistan to ceasefire as happened in 1965. The second factor is acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan which will create a situation of nuclear asymmetry which would have a decisive influence on the outcome of the conflict. India has to cater for not only a conventional threat from Pakistan but also a nuclear asymmetry and guerilla warfare.

In the defensive posture, nuclear weapons would not merely enable them<sup>em</sup> to deter a nuclear threat/attack but also forestall a conventional break through. In offensive role, they could be employed as a back up for a conventional military thrust against enemy territories and to strike terror into the enemy's heart, in the situation of politico-military confrontation.

Stephen Cohen, a well known South Asia scholar comments on Pakistani nuclear capability - "it will neutralise an assumed Indian nuclear force". Others feel that it would paralyse not only the Indian nuclear decision but

also Indian conventional force and a bold Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive.<sup>17</sup>

Considering the past behaviour of the Pakistani military, an active nuclear weapon policy on its part cannot be discounted.

The Indian planners, thus will be facing a new military situation vis-a-vis Pakistan in the early nineties created by nuclear asymmetry. Firstly, it will neutralise the conventional superiority it is expected to achieve by them. Secondly, it will be in a position to make a bid for Kashmir by effectively deterring a counter attack by holding out a nuclear threat. The most important decision which the Indian planners will have to make is not whether India can afford to permit a situation of nuclear asymmetry in favour of Pakistan but more crucial issue is if India can survive with a hostile Pakistan. It cannot be compared with nuclear asymmetry vis-a-vis China with whom we have co-existed for last twenty three year since geo-political compulsions are different.

Pakistan's geo-strategic classification has been aptly summed up by Stephen Cohen. According to him,

---

17. Bajpai, n. 1, p. 76.

18. *Ibid*, pp. 76-7.

"Pakistan belongs to that class of states whose very survival is uncertain, whose legitimacy is doubted and whose security related resources are inadequate. Yet, these states will not go away nor can they be ignored. Pakistan (like Taiwan, South Korea, Israel and South Africa) has the capacity to fight, to go nuclear, to influence the global strategic balance (if only by collapsing), and, lastly is in a strategic geographical location surrounded by three largest states in the world and adjacent to the mouth of the Persian Gulf -----"19

A comparison of deployable forces of the three countries, India-Pakistan and China is shown at Table 3. A close scrutiny of the force levels deployable by India is indicative of the fact that whereas China is far superior numerically, Pakistan too will be fielding force levels almost at par notwithstanding the nuclear asymmetry in her favour.

Militarily what we are visualising in the coming decade is a nuclear armed Pakistan, conventionally well equipped and evenly matched against India. It is fair to assume that the geo-strategic compulsions will bestow <sup>on</sup> Pakistan the continued status of a 'lynchpin state' by

---

19. *Ibid*, p. 76.

the US as well as China. The strategic triangle will continue to weigh in Pakistan's favour-recent developments in Beijing and SAARC conference notwithstanding. Pakistan will get its pound of flesh in the shape of sophisticated arms and economic aid. India will have to counter this by cutting short the developmental projects till we can convince the Pakistani people that a strong stable and united Pakistan is in India's interest as much as it is in Pakistan's. A beginning has been made in recently concluded Rajiv - Benazir dialogue. How far it will contribute in confidence building measures time only will tell. As of now we have to judge by capabilities and actions, not intentions alone.

#### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS

The year 1988 ended by all accounts on a note of unprecedented optimism over India-Pakistan relations. The coming to power of a democratic regime in Islamabad under Benazir Bhutto seemed to have brought a fresh wind of change to a relationship that had for long been characterised by bitterness and mutual suspicion. The Islamabad summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC) provided the opportunity for Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi to give substance to the expectations of the improved ties between their

countries. The three agreements signed during the process would usher in 'a process that could gradually replace suspicion and hostility with trust and good will!'<sup>20</sup>

How realistic is the widespread feeling that India-Pakistan relations have been set on a new course which if undisturbed by sudden negative changes, will usher in an age of cordiality.' Nikhil Chakravarty has written of "the emergence of the age of cooperation and dialogue, in which contradiction between states and systems are sought to be resolved."<sup>21</sup> However, a note of caution has to be sounded particularly with regard to Pakistani's nuclear programme and the role of the army in Pakistani Politics.<sup>22</sup>

These developments require careful evaluation in the context of its history and evolution, and within the framework of a broad analytical perspective that places the bilateral relations within the larger patterns of international politics. Considerations of power and national interest have not yet ceased to occupy pride of place in thinking and calculations of policy makers. It follows that

---

20. *The Times of India*, 3 January, 1989

21. *The Times of India*, 28 December, 1988.

22. *Indian Express*, 2 January, 1989.



any analysis which neglects the primacy of power politics in determining the nature of an inter-state relationship will miss the bus. The anarchic nature of the international political system and the distribution of capabilities in the politics of South Asia are of essence in shaping the basic nature of the conflictual relationship between India and Pakistan. The history of violence between them makes this conflict even more intense because it is inextricably linked to the raison d'etre of Pakistan.

Any major improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations seems unlikely in the absence of a structural change. The likelihood of a common threat emerging from the larger structure of the world system is at present remote. A second possibility is that if power distribution in the region becomes highly asymmetric, Pakistan will cease to pose a challenge to India power altogether. This too is not foreseeable. In any case, a much weaker country like Bangladesh has been able to maintain a 'hands-off' and periodically hostile posture towards India without much concern. One can hardly envisage the India - Pakistan power equation coming to resemble that between India and Bhutan. Notwithstanding economic restraints Pakistan will continue to remain a major security concern for India. Should the subcontinent be nuclearised, tension will very likely escalate before some kind of mutual adjustment process

is worked out. Bilateral agreements such as arrived at SAARC Summit and multilateral arrangements can have some positive effect. Better communications coupled with measures to prevent the escalation of tension would help. At the same time, Indian policy need not shy away from the judicious exercise of power as one analyst puts it "an elephant trying to behave like a rabbit or a deer will not get accepted by them as such".<sup>23</sup>

#### THREAT OF TWO FRONT WAR

Considering the convergence of interests of China and Pakistan vis-a-vis India, there is a high probability of a collusion between the two countries against India. A sample of such a threat was visible in 1965 and 1971 operations when China gave clear signals of her intentions. It is a different matter as regards her ability to influence the events at that point in time due to other international pressures. The US interests in the region also favours the two major adversaries China and Pakistan, thus making the relation triangular. India may be forced to deploy a major part of her mountain force level against China in case the two front war takes place. This would substantially erode her forces against Pakistan.

---

23. K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspective (New Delhi, 1982) pp 230-1

However, it is very likely that in the coming decade, China may acquire more global interests thus having larger stakes in international Affairs. Therefore, she may not actively intervene in the event of Indo-Pak war. Pakistan has nothing to lose by abetting any Chinese aggression against India, by opening another front in order to capitalise on the disadvantageous position of India. A comparative analysis of the force levels deployable against India is shown at Table 2. The adverse situation for India in terms of deployable force levels is evident in the table.

#### OTHER NEIGHBOURS

Although there is no direct<sup>t</sup> military threat from these countries, however being underdeveloped and lacking in resources, are an attraction for involvement of outside powers. In some of these countries, political authority has narrow bas<sup>e</sup> and thus lack credibility and stability. Unstable neighbours are a matter of concern to India.

#### SRI LANKA

Strategically located, Sri Lanka is of significant security interest to India. Serious ethnic problems in the country threaten her stability and made her vulnerable to outside adventurism. The Indo-Sri Lanka peace accord

resulted in positioning of Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka which has in turn brought about peaceful conduct of elections and normalcy to the State. The first phase of de induction of troops has already commenced in consonance with the peace accord. When viewed in the overall context of super power rivalry in the Indian ocean an unstable Sri Lanka could have serious security ramifications for India.

#### BANGLADESH

While Bangladesh is the most homogeneous country of South Asia she had some ethnic problems which spilt over to India. The Farakka water dispute and refugee problems have further created bitterness in the relation between the two countries. Bangladesh perceived India's pre-eminence in the region as eroding or under mining to manoeuvrability and therefore, relied upon extra regional linkages. It had developed particularly close relations with the USA China and Islamic countries particularly the rich Gulf area. The strategic importance of Bangladesh is obvious with regard to its location dividing the north-eastern territory from the rest of India and could also provide refuge to insurgents from this country. It is true that Bangladesh armed forces by themselves did not constitute any danger due to its size and politicisation; never-the-less one could not ignore the possibility, however remote or far fetched, of a common China - Pakistan - Bangladesh axis against

India given the cordiality of relationship existing at present. It is, therefore necessary to resolve outstanding issues amicably. India could afford to be magnanimous in accommodating some of the not so reasonable demands of its small neighbours to wean her away from outside influence affecting India's security

#### NEPAL

India remained Nepal's dominant foreign policy concern, due to a variety of geographical, historical, economic and political factors. Indo-Nepalese relations, which were marked by great intimacy and cordiality during King Tribhuvan's era, had greatly eroded in the post 1955 era. India's role in liberating Bangladesh and her reaction to dismissal of Koirala government in Nepal created apprehensions in the mind of the palace politics. The roots of Nepal's proposal for establishment of a Zone of Peace can be traced back to such apprehensions. India remained Nepal's major trading partner as well as aid giver. However, the proportion of Indian trade as well as aid had declined in comparison with the overall trade and aid figures. Recent differences on concluding trade and transit treaty have surfaced to the detriment of the bilateral relations between the two countries. Her growing relationship with China and Pakistan are viewed in India as ominous and a matter of serious concern to the South Block.

## BHUTAN

Bhutan and India are obliged by clause 2 of 1949 treaty to undertake mutual consultations in matters of foreign affairs. Lately, Bhutan has chosen to ignore this treaty by pursuing an independent policy. The monarchy and royal circles had established commercial and financial interests which impelled them to seek a distance from India. By and large there are no fears or apprehensions in the minds of the people of Bhutan about India's intentions. Every criticism of government is treated as being of Indian origin and there were many instances of deliberate efforts to exaggerate the bogey of Indian domination. The strategic location of Bhutan, sandwiched between two Asian giants, India and China, occupies a significant place among India's neighbours.

India's foreign policy makers should try to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of this tiny kingdom without compromising the security imperatives.

## BURMA

As the future unfolds to a scenario of a weak and politically unstable Burma, with massive military build up and modernisation in South East Asian Countries, it is likely that Chinese aided insurgency would gather momentum aimed at destabilising the country. This would have

serious repercussions on Burma's neighbours, especially India. The long term interests in India would be best served by a neutral, independent stable and prosperous Burma. The time may now be ripe to provide the requisite political and economic assistance to Burma to enable it to withstand the internal pressures and external threats. Northern Burma could provide a land route for Chinese incursions; it was also the route through which China had provided help to Indian insurgents in North Eastern India in the past. China could very well work in future toward acquiring facilities in the country for its growing naval forces. There are fruitful opportunities for trade notwithstanding her reservation with regard to joining SAARC.

#### MALDIVES

There are three possible scenarios for the Maldives that could constitute a threat or a danger to India. It could get caught up in the vortex of super power rivalry. A second possibility was that it might fall a prey to Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, the potential for the Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean had to be considered. Recent case of prompt Indian help to the Government of Maldives when it was threatened by a coup with the help of some

mercenaries, will go a long way in strengthening mutual relations. In the light of its importance to India as well as its vulnerability, both economic and strategic, no effort should be spared to see that to the extent possible, India should meet its demand and not allow non-regional powers to do so. India's role should be unobtrusive but ready.

#### FOREIGN AID

India is one of the world's major aid recipient nations which makes it vulnerable, even at the best of times, to economic changes at the global level and in the donor nations. India's fundamental security interests can also be affected by political and economic changes in the rest of the world. We have to plan against the possibility of adverse economic developments, or changes of governments. This could lead to political vulnerabilities in our body politic. The cessation of remittances from abroad and the return of these immigrants in an un-controlled flood could lead to domestic insecurity.

Straight economic aid, food assistance, military aid and the transfer of technology are all instruments of foreign policy used by the strong against the weak in the contemporary world. Even a country of India's size cannot escape the adverse effects of these factors.



Foreign investment has been a traditional instrument in dominating a less developed country. The influence exercised by American companies in South American Countries, Belgians in Congo and Anglo-Iranian Oil companies is well known. To retain their control over Suez Canal Britain and France resorted to war against Egypt.

The industrialised countries are extending aid in pursuit of their national interests and foreign policy. A realistic assessment of the international situation will lead to the conclusion that it is the dynamics of conflict (not necessarily military) and competition in the international system that is responsible for the present aid policy and such technological transfers as are taking place. This in turn necessitates our formulating a total national security policy which will optimise the gains for India.

#### SUMMARY

Though Pakistan due to her international compulsions constitutes an immediate and a serious threat to India, in the prespective period China constitutes a bigger threat. The existing Pakistan - China - US nexus has compounded India's security problems. External threat to India can be summarised as follows :-

- (a) Pakistan - presently conventional but would acquire nuclear weapons by early Nineteen Nineties.

- (b) China - Primarily conventional which may be escalated to nuclear under exceptional circumstances.
- (c) Both China and Pakistan in collusion, which would manifest itself more in Sino-India conflict than in Indo-Pak conflict
- (d) Threat to Indian Ocean based interests on account of super power rivalry and presence in the Indian Ocean.

It is time that India starts looking at her security environment from a new perspective. Till recently, India's security doctrine was confined to the narrow focus of its confrontation with its two old antagonists, Pakistan and China. Other international actors, whether regional or extra regional, were viewed from that narrow spectrum. That perspective needs to be re-evaluated.

Recent events in Sri Lanka and Maldives Islands on the periphery of India, have shown that India's security perimeter is much wider than its immediate neighbourhood. Destabilisation in these areas can affect India's security. India should be sensitive to such developments in the offing. We shall discuss these imperatives in the next chapter.

CHAPTER - IV

SUGGESTED NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

## INTERNAL

It is a truism in the contemporary world to say that the security of a country ultimately rests on the morale and material welfare of its people and not merely on the armed personnel and military hardware; modern warfare demands a strong and stable rear to support the front. No discussion of national security could be complete without taking into account the state of the nation as a whole - its political stability, economic viability and socio cultural integration. Since the internal factors have been analysed briefly in the earlier chapter, we shall confine ourselves to the salient aspects of the security strategy as applicable to the internal problems. Each one of these issues could be taken separately for indepth study.

## POLITICAL

By and large India can claim to have a stable political system which has withstood the test of time both for succession of the government leaders and change of ruling parties. However, there is a deterioration of cherished values in public life. There is a need for the restoration of internal democracy, open functioning and accountability of political parties, non-interference

in the administrative machinery once directions have been issued, goals defined and targets set. The federal polity has to be more responsive to give fairplay to local minorities and initiatives. Serious consideration may be given to the creation of small states. Where no foreign exchange is involved the states should be permitted to establish industries in public, private or joint sectors. Local and Panchayat Raj institutions should be given greater financial autonomy. What is required is a strong centre capable of being benevolent to the states and at the same time should be able to take a state to task for failing to discharge its constitutional and economic responsibility. However, the centre will have to be more careful in making use of its powers to impose President's rule in the states and in the appointment of State Governors who, in the past have been used for narrow political interests.

Law and order is the weakest element in the state machinery. Police and administrative set up in the states needs to be overhauled to ensure smooth and fearless functioning. The structuring of the law and order echelons needs to be modified to include external recruitment to the tune of fifty percent or so. Politicisation of crime and money power should be ruthlessly curbed. Frequent transfers of officials on political considerations have

eroded the hierarchical system of police. This needs to be set right in order to repose faith in the governmental machinery.

Numerous cases have piled up in our judicial counts. This has led to corruption in the judicial system resulting in lack of faith in their functioning. This needs to be corrected. Judiciary should be made accountable for its functioning. Perhaps the Lok adalats and Nyaya Panchayats may be an answer to clear the back logs.

#### ECONOMIC

With a large continental economy, India's programme of self reliant growth fits in with the requirements of security. Infact, the country's size and resources make feasible a large element of self sufficiency in economic planning. The country's impressive economic growth notwithstanding, there is no foreseeable end to the conditions of abject poverty under which almost half of the population lives. While we wage war on this front we should keep fighting communal separatist forces. The growing population of the younger generation provides manpower resources which must be tapped usefully otherwise they may be swallowed by the cult of militants. No security planning can ignore this aspect. The competing needs of defence and development must be analysed rationally without compromising either

aspect. Land reforms have to be implemented faithfully, spread of bank credit to artisans , small farmers and fishermen to reinvigorate the system. Better water management at national, State and local level, soil conservation, afforestation, environmental protection, dry land agriculture are just a few examples of areas where our vast rural manpower assets can be made productive on a large scale. Rural development programmes will have to be undertaken more vigorously.

We have been able to achieve growth rate of 3.7% with our own efforts. This is far below that of advanced countries. We need to remove economic ills and evolve better growth rate. Our capital needs to be put to better use, administrative machinery geared up for the task, huge black market eliminated and functioning of public sector undertakings reviewed for better resource management.

Our industry would have to be modernised to achieve better productivity and withstand foreign competition. We have trained manpower for this purpose. We have suffered on account of policy syndrome of close economy in which internally there was no competition. This resulted in poor quality of goods and reduced trade. Our policy on trade, finance, industry and export should be in tandem and not contradictory.

Development of energy is core to our rural and industrial development. We must exploit our hydel resources and hidden gas resources for the purpose. Our scientists must be tasked to research in areas where efficiency can be increased in energy consumption. We need to get more service from each unit of energy as generation of additional is very expensive. This is possible by introducing better machinery. Efforts should be made to reduce transmission and distribution losses.

#### SOCIAL

We should harness all available media and reach the masses with themes highlighting evils of communalism and regionalism. Baseless religious leaders who are exploiting the sentiments of innocent people must be exposed. Educational institutions must be involved to implement youth programmes. Our education system needs to be over hauled. There should be uniformity of educational programmes all over the country and emphasis on vocational and technical training. More money would have to be allotted to education to spread literacy in the rural areas.

#### FOREIGN RELATIONS AND POLICY.

Our foreign policy is firmly founded on the tenets of non-alignment, anti colonialism and anti racialism. These coincide with the extension of our national interests.



Similarly, geo-strategic considerations govern the fundamental foreign policy which co-relate in ensuring national security and peace conducive to development. The necessity of institutionalising foreign policy making, in order to insulate it from dependence on individual personalities, should be given priority.

India's relations with US have been far from close, the reasons have been discussed earlier. We should avoid simplistic assessment of our relations with the US, but on the other hand learn to take advantage of its liberal democratic traditions and pluralistic nature of its political set up. India's relations with the other super power, the USSR have been characterised by the absence of any major or continuous misunderstanding. USSR has always sided India on most major issues of foreign policy because Soviets need India's friendship and vice versa. Our interests happen to be of mutual benefit. However, the two countries have differed on number of issues due to their own reasons which has not come in way of their relations - non-alignment is one of them.

In the changing international environment when peace offensive has been initiated by Gorbachev - when peace is dawning on all continents, it is in our interest to set the process of normalisation of relations with the two neighbours Pakistan and China without compromising our

vital interests. We must keep in mind the capabilities of countries and be prepared to face these capabilities notwithstanding the intentions, for intentions can be changed in no time whereas capabilities take long time to create.

India's position as a leading and founding member of the NAM, her efforts to foster economic co-operation, North-South and South-South dialogues, her support to the struggle against apartheid gained her increasing respect and friendship. We have a substantive technical and economic cooperation programme with our neighbours and independent island nations of Indian Ocean and the littoral states. We must continue with these cooperative ventures.

We must ensure success of SAARC. India being the dominant partner has to play a leading role for confidence building amongst other smaller states who are apprehensive of big brother bully attitude from India. We must take some unilateral initiatives also to infuse confidence in our neighbours.

The INF treaty is a good beginning, but far from the cherished goal of total disarmament. We must be pragmatic in our approach to nuclearisation keeping our options open while complete disarmament is brought about globally. Indian diplomacy will have to make special

efforts to win the confidence of smaller neighbours in order to neutralise the adverse effects of negative Chinese and Pakistan influence. Impediments towards trade and transit irritants with Nepal and Bhutan must be resolved amicably. Peace accord with Sri Lanka should be honoured keeping in view the aspirations of democratic norms of Sri Lanka. A diagrammatic depiction of our foreign policy options to counter the threat to India's security is at Table - 4.

In the long term India's security lies in building of her internal health and strength and economic development to overcome internal threats to the national security. However, the external threats will have to be countered by our diplomacy initially and should this approach fail then militarily. A defence strategy for this scenario of the nineties is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

#### DEFENCE STRATEGY

The basic military strategy to be adopted should be to maintain a viable defensive parity against Pakistan and China together with some counter offensive capability.

## EXISTING DEFENCE STRATEGY

Our present defence strategy is one of deterrence by conventional forces. While maturing with time, it has failed to prevent conflicts with China and Pakistan due to following short comings:-

- (a) It has been reactive in nature inhibiting development of adequate potential of our defence forces and exercise of military power.
- (b) A situation of parity in deployable land forces vis-a vis Pakistan has invariably lead to a 'no-win' 'no-lose' situation with each side seeking to off-set territorial losses in one area by similar gains in another area.
- (c) The strategy of deterrence against China is in name only, as we have basically been on the defensive since we lack a credible offensive capability in mountainous terrain.
- (d) The nuclear factor has not been taken seriously, and it is only of late that its importance has been underlined.
- (c) The strategy has been by and large land based and inward-looking. Realisation has set in

of the importance of our offshore interests, friendly countries and island states, EEZ, Ocean resources and to be more outward looking.

- (f) We depend for our important weapon systems on foreign sources. Our inadequacy in force multipliers, electronic medium and space dimension need serious consideration in our planning.

#### DEFENCE STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT DECADE

In order to change our concept from reactive strategy to 'pro active' we will have to pay the price and the political will to do that. A reactive response could at best, meet our security requirement of next 8 to 10 years but it will not be in keeping with our security perspective and long term national interests.

#### PAKISTAN

Against Pakistan a situation of marginal edge would suffice to deter that country taking into account its involvement with Afghanistan and its internal problems. Alternatively, India could have a strategy of creating such military capability that Pakistan is compelled to face realities and realise that it would be fool hardy to initiate hostilities against us. India's potential

will automatically steer us towards the latter course.

#### CHINA

Against China, we have the option of retaining our present defensive strategy, or gradually work towards creating a viable deterrence. Taking into account the future long-term conflict of interests with China it would be prudent to opt for the latter course.

The defence strategy for the next decade should be a 'pro-active' as opposed to a 're-active' defence strategy. It should discard the conventional strategy in favour of a combined strategy with maritime interests. Deterrence against Pakistan should be so effective as to convince that country that we seek a stable Pakistan living in peace with us. We must work towards achieving a viable deterrence against China. If Vietnam could humble China, India could certainly reach a state which would convince China that a military adventure against India would be at a very heavy price.

On the nuclear question we should keep our options open, outwardly maintaining a state of ambivalence. However, in the long run we have little option but to develop our own nuclear deterrence against Pakistan and China.

We must accelerate the process of self reliance in military hardware to meet our immediate needs, as also build up the capability to fight a war of longer duration if forced upon us. The latter would call for not only greater self - reliance, but an ability to mobilise the nation for war, and holding more reserves of weapons and equipment. Till we reach a satisfactory level of self-sufficiency, we may have to seek assistance of friends to augment losses of weapons and equipment to the extent our adversary receives external assistance.

A right balance must be retained between qualitative and quantitative considerations. While restructuring our forces, we should also look towards effectively using the fourth dimension i.e. space, with available resources. we must ensure that our political enemy knows our military capability and is convinced that we have the will to use it. Finally, in the event of a Sino-Indian conflict, we must be prepared to fight a two front war, as Pakistan may seize the opportunity.

#### MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE DEFENCE STRATEGY

##### General

Within the constraints of Defence Budget we will have to choose force multipliers rather than increasing

the manpower. Overall systems of communications and Electronic warfare capabilities would have to be improved and priorities of defence equipment drawn taking all the three services together. Our R & D efforts to boost indigenous production would have to be accelerated. Improvements suggested in respective services are discussed subsequently.

#### STRUCTURE OF FORCES - ARMY

The army should continue to have a strategy of dissuasion based on a strong and viable defence, and deterrence in terms of a strong and viable offensive capability. A credible offensive capability in mountainous terrain, lacking at present, must be built up. There is also a need to improve upon the dissuasive capability against China. The structure, organisation and tactics of the Army should undergo the following changes:-

- (a) The army must be prepared to fight against a nuclear backdrop. The organisation and tactics must ensure that the damage caused by nuclear weapons is minimised.
- (b) The offensive capability must be improved. In the plains it would mean an air assault component, greater mechanisation and improving the mobility of infantry formations. Means



of quickly crossing artificial and natural obstacles, having greater real time surveillance and degrading enemy's surveillance, means and provision of tracked/wheeled logistic capability. In the mountain, offensive capability will be based on rotary wing aircraft, troops trained and equipped to conduct specialised warfare.

- (c) There is a projection for an enhanced force level to match the assessed threat in the earlier part of this dissertation. This should be found from within the existing manpower ceiling with a better 'man-machine' mix and by improving teeth to tail ratio. To cater for fast mobile battle in the plains/desert areas, Army would need armed helicopters in anti tank role.

#### AIRFORCE.

India's air power is purely tactical in nature, and relies on a strategy of strong defences against the usual first strike by a potential adversary, while swiftly launching retaliatory strikes against military and logistic targets in the enemy's hinter land to restrict his capability to fight a successful battle in the air, on land and at sea. Support of our ground and naval forces in

the tactical close support mission is an important task of our airforce. Our airforce is a balanced force to take on the assigned role. The following changes are envisaged in the perspective period -

- (a) Need for strategic capability to support the requirement of the blue water role of the navy.
- (b) Provision of mid air refuelling facilities
- (c) AWACS or equivalent system to match likely Pakistani acquisition.

#### NAVY

The development of Navy is proceeding along balanced lines in all three dimensions i.e. air, surface and underwater. To this can be added the fourth and fifth dimensions i.e. the active and passive use of electronic medium and use of space for surveillance and communication. India should undertake construction of different types of submarines to provide optimum sea based conventional and strategic deterrence. In order to achieve self reliance we should expand manufacturing facilities for submarines and ships. The existing dockyard facilities should be optimally utilised with better management. For existing and proposed force levels see Table 5.

## HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION.

The need for an integrated approach to long term planning for defence and for having a suitable organisation for the control and conduct of war once it breaks out, has been realised. A beginning has been made with the institution of the strategic planning group, the services planning committees, Defence planning staff and perspective planning staff at respective service headquarters. The need for chief of Defence staff has been appreciated as a single advisor to the Government and one responsible for overall command and control and coordination of strategic defence policies, planning and conduct of operational plans. Such a system would bring with it a joint inter service command structure and enable better functioning.

Our defence organisation provides for political control over the defence services. Tight bureaucratic control however, hampers the efficient functioning of the defence machinery. There is a case for manning of the Defence Ministry by both service and civil officers with specialised knowledge of defence matters as a first step towards exercising such controls, besides providing appropriate defence representation at the decision making level. Beside the appointment of National Security.. Advisory

Body with a secretariat it is recommended that the Ministry of Defence and Service Headquarters should be merged. A proposed organisation is at Table 6.

#### RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R & D)

There is a definite requirement to define clearcut objectives and priorities after taking into account our capabilities and limitations. Some of the suggested measures are : -

- (a) Increasing outlay for R & D in defence .
- (b) A closer coordination between defence and civil R & D to take advantage of industrial base.
- (c) A project approach be adopted to give continuity of personnel connected with a particular project from its inception to production.
- (d) Certain selected areas be chosen for confidence building and production based projects.

#### RESERVES

Though India has a large standing armed forces yet it is insufficient to meet our defence needs. We have a vast reservoir of trained manpower which can be used to

assist in the defence of our border areas. This would release the regular forces for offensive operations and other front line tasks. Some of the suggested measures are :

- (a) Selective conscription for three to four years period of all government employees.
- (b) Revising the terms of service of defence Services for an early deinduction and lateral movement to civilian jobs.
- (c) Creation of volunteer defence forces in sensitive areas who would be ideally suited for undertaking guerilla operations behind the enemy lines.

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

The national security primarily depends upon inner health and strength of the country. Forces of separatism, sub regional identities, ideological vacuum, partisan attitude of politicians, disparity in economic development, subversion by foreign forces are major threats to national security, unity and integrity. Major threats to our security are internal. Top priority should be given to economic development, education of masses and clearing of corrupt administrative climate.

Externally Pakistan and China will continue to remain a threat to our security. We need a peaceful environment for economic development of the country. A new opportunity for peace has emerged in many parts of the world. Within a short span of one year, some major conflicts in Asia, Africa and central America are drawing to a close. These include Geneva accord on Afghanistan, ceasefire in the Angolan conflict and eight year old Gulf war, momentum in resolving the Kampuchean problem and nearer home, there have been fresh developments in search for peace in Indo-Pakistan and Sino-Indian relations. Is this peace offensive an happy accident or is it a new phenomenon in international relations? An important element shaping the process of peace is indeed the changing Soviet-US relationship. The four

decades old cold war may be drawing to a close. The focus of the renewed dialogue has been on issues of arms limitation. It goes to the credit of Gorbachev that he has understood the great importance of ending the stalemate in the third world. Gorbachev's optimism that the Geneva accord on Afghanistan could lead to chain reaction of ending other conflicts has proved right. 'The story of international relations in the past few years is about the irrelevance of bipolar framework. It is about the relative decline of Soviet and US weight in the global power distribution.<sup>1</sup> Gorbachev now postulates importance of right of choice for each third world society<sup>to</sup> choose its own path of development without fear of external intervention.

----- the right of people's sovereignty to choose the roads and forms of their development revolutionary or evolutionary, is an imperative conditions of universal security.

This too is exclusively an internal matter ----<sup>2</sup>

What opportunities does the changed international environment offer to India? Our foreign policy planners

---

1. C. Raja Mohan, "Great Power Relations" in *Strategic Analysis*, Nov. 1988 (New Delhi 1988) p. 831.

2. *Pravada* 17 September 1987.



should try to achieve peace in our neighbourhood by peaceful negotiations and settlements. This would in turn give boost to industrialisation and economy, reduce expenditure on defence thus improving the quality of life of the vast multitude of people of this region.

It is difficult to predict the future security environment particularly 20 or more years from now. However it is certain that the concept of biopolar world would be in the process of being replaced by multipolarity with a number of middle powers. India will be competing with Asian Giants, China and Japan, in the coming decades. Pakistan will continue to be an eyesore periodic rehotaic notwithstanding. We need to develop a 'pro-active' strategy and adequate muscle power for 'dissuasion' and deterrence. The security environment of the coming decade warrants responsive and cohesive higher defence direction organisation.

In the 1990's India has to contend with a growing power profile. Its military capabilities and national power have at present the potential to extend beyond the region. Dr. Henry Kissinger condescends to equate India with Japan and China as the major Asian power of 21st century. India's geographical size and population gives her a great power profile. The potential has yet

to be realised in full largely because of the internal problems that continue to plague its polity. India is bestowed with adequate resources and capabilities to take its rightful role in South Asia and the world at large with a determined and mature leadership.

TABLE 1

PAKISTAN'S PROGRESSIVE MILITARY BUILD- UP

ARMY	1970 - 71	1979- 80	1987- 88
Manpower	300,000	400,000	450,000
Infantry	11	16	17
Armoured Divisions	2	2	2
Independent Armoured Brigades	1	3	4
Independent Artillery Brigades	-	3	8
Air Defence Brigades	-	2	3
Artillery Brigades	-	-	8
Armoured Recce Regiments	-	-	6
Special Service Group	-	-	1
Army Aviation Squadrons	-	5	6
 NAVY			
Manpower	9,000	12,000	12,000
Submarines	3	6	8
Destroyers	2	7	7
Frigates	5	16	29
 AIRFORCE			
Manpower	15,000	17,000	17,600
Combat Aircraft	250	256	381
Operational Trainers	10	104	127
Total	----- 260	----- 360	----- 506
Fighter Squadrons	12	14+3	20+4 (Combat trainers)

Source: Military Balance 1987 IIIS, London.

Note: In addition 500,000 reserve troops are maintained.

TABLE -2

## BALANCE OF FORCES; INDIA PAKISTAN CHINA

<u>ARMY</u>	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>PAKISTAN</u>	<u>CHINA</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Armoured Division	2	2	10	
Mechanised Division	1	-	-	
Infantry Division	20	17	85	incl 5 Arty Division
Mountain Division	11	-		
Independent Brigades	17	12		
Independent Artillery Brigades	3	8		
Air Defence Brigades	6	3		
Engineer Brigades	4			
Special Service Group	-	3 Battations		50
NAVY				
Submaines	14	6		115
SS	13			
Carriers	2			
Destroyers	5	8		19
Frigates	24	-		34
Patrol and Coastal	32	29		850
Mine Warfare	17	3		128
Mine Counter measure	17	-		
Amphibious	10	-		76
Support and -				
Miscellaneous	18	4		104
Naval Airforce	28 aircraft	3 aircraft		900
	53 Armed- Helicopter	9 Armed Helicopter		aircraft 12 Armed Helicopter 4500
AIRFORCE				
Bombers (medium)	-	-		
Bombers (light)	10	-		120
Fighers	424	122		4000
FGA	275	209		
Racce	18	13		130
Transport	143	38		420
Helicopters	94	6		400
Trainers	383	167		NK
PARA MILITARY	6,55,000	1,64,000		12,000,000

Souce:- The Military Balance (IISS London 1988)

TABLE 3

DEPLOYABLE FORCES INDIA PAKISTAN CHINA


	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>PAKISTAN</u>	
Armoured Division	2	2	
Mechanised Division	1	-	
Infantry Mountain	19@	15*	@Exce IT Border *Incl 1xDivision Afgan.
Independent Armoured Brigade	7	7	
Independent Infantry Brigade	9	4	
	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>CHINA</u>	
Air Mobile Division	Nil	1	
Infantry/Mountain Division.	10	20	
Independent Armoured Bridge	1	2	

---

Source;- Military Balance 1987/88 (IISS London)

TABLE-4

INDIA'S EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIROMENT



FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS TO TACKLE FOREGOING THREAT  
PERCEPTIONS

---

FENCE MENDING WITH  
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURS  
IN SOUTH ASIA

---

RESOLVING OUTSTANDING  
BORDER PROBLEM WITH CHINA

---

GREATER UNDERSTANDING  
WITH BOTH SUPERPOWERS

---

BILATERAL  
INITIATIVES

Bilateral matters to be undertaken individually with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal & Bhutan

MULTILATERAL  
INITIATIVES

Through SAARC which must be nurtured and nourished meticulously.

- (1) Border settlement. On the basis of give & take with both sides recognising each other's vital security interests.
- (2) Consolidation of our military potential in general and defence against China in Particular including rethinking of our nuclear option in the light of the emerging situation

- (1) Stand-off on issues not of vital interest to us but which are of vital interest to the super-powers, be it Libya, or Afghanistan, Grenada or Hungary. Best to remain totally silent or at most record our proforma opinions.
- (2) Non-alignment to be total and real, not virtual and selective & devoid of any tilt, howsoever slight, to give absolute credibility to the movement and to our ideology.

TABLE - 5

## FORCE LEVEL - ARMY

Sl No.	Nomenclature	Existing Level	Reqd.by 1996	Addn.	Cost (approx. in Crores Rd)
1.	Regional Command	5	5	-	-
2.	Corps HQ	8	8	-	-
3.	Armoured Division	2	2	-	-
4.	Mechanised Division	1	2	1	200.00
5.	Infantry Division	19	19	4	-
6.	Mountain Division	10	13	3	360.00
7.	Indep Armoured Brigade	7	-	-	--
8.	Indep Infantry <i>Bde</i>	10	10	-	--
9.	Parachute Brigade	1	1	-	--
10.	Indep Artillery <i>Bde</i>	8	8	-	--
					560.00

## Notes

1. SL.No.2 Reqd for Western Sector.
2. SL.No.6 Reqd for Eastern and Northern Sectors to augment the existing force level to improve defensive capability.
3. Tactical mobility of the army needs to be improved as part of modernisation.
4. Also suitable E W and C<sup>3</sup>I equipment of current state of the art need to be inducted.

Source; SK Das and others, *national security study* (National Defence - College New Delhi) 1986.



## FORCE LEVEL - NAVY

S.No.	Nomenclature	Existing Level	Reqd by 1996	Addn	Approx. Cost (crores)
1.	Submarines	9+3	16	8	1,000
2.	Carriers	1+1	3	1	500
3.	Destroyers (Kashin)	4+1	12	7	1,150
4.	Frigates	24+3	25	6	600
5.	Corvettes	3+2	12	7	200
6.	OSA Missile Boats	14	10	-	-
7.	Mine Sweepers/ Hunters	16	20	4	160
8.	LST, LOU	10+4	20	6	90
9.	Support Ships	18	20	2	100
10.	Patrol Craft	8	16	12	120
11.	Modernisation	-	-	-	500
Rs. (crores)					4,420

## Notes

1. These carriers would ensure operational availability of 2 carriers at any time, one in each fleet.
2. Where figures in "Addn" column are greater than Required minus existing, it caters to requirements of replacements.
3. Modernisation of existing ships include E W and C 3 Iretrofits, upgradation of sensors and weapons.

TABLE


FORCE LEVEL- AIRFORCE

Sl. No.	Nomenclature	Existing Level	Reqd. by 1996	Addn.	Cost (Rs. in crores)
1.	Commands	5	5	-	
2.	Deep Strike Bomber Sqn.	3	6	3	1260.00
3.	Shortstrike FGA Sqs.	12	12	-	-
4.	Air Defence Sqn	20	20	-	-
5.	Recee Sqn.	2	2	-	-
6.	Tpt Sqn.	11	11	-	-
7.	Communication Sqn	1	1	-	-
8.	AWACS	-	5	5	2500.00
				Total	3760.00

Notes

1. Additional 3 Squadrons of Deep Strike aircraft are required to augment the strike capability which has been rendered on account of the improved throw weight of PAK Air force with the induction of 4 sqdn of F-16 (projected purchase of 80 aircraft).
2. The projected 5 x AWACS aircraft caters for the Western Sector only during the interim period. Ultimate reqt beyond 1996 with approximate 12-14 aircraft.
3. Modernisation programme should include induction of E W,C31, computerised data handling and automatic target selection & control capability for Air Defence and state of the art weapons.
4. Low looking radar defences need to be built up at the earliest through indigenous resources.

TABLE - 6



ABBREVIATIONS

- CGPA - Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs
- CDS - Chief of Defence Staff
- COAS - Chief of Army Staff
- CNS - Chief of Naval Staff
- CAS - Chief of Air Staff

NOTES

1. CDS
  - (a) Principal Military Adviser to the Govt.
  - (b) Chairman, Defence Ministry Board
  - (c) Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee
  - (d) Head of Deptt. dealing with joint strategy, force and operational planning, training, intelligence, personnel and logistic matters.
2. COAS, CNS, CAS  
To be heads of respective services and their departments within the Ministry of Defence, and final authority all departmental matters.
3. Defence Secretary
  - (a) Financial Planning and advice
  - (b) Liaison with State Govts.
  - (c) Parliamentary questions
  - (d) Military lands and cantonments
  - (e) NCC
  - (f) Public Relations
  - (g) Resettlement of ex servicemen
4. Secretary, Defence Production. No change from present duties.
5. Secretary, Defence R & D. Chief Scientific Adviser and head of defence R & D.

TABLE - 7

COMPARATIVE DATA INDIA - PAKISTAN- CHINA

<u>GDP</u>	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>PAKISTAN</u>	<u>CHINA</u>	
1986/7	228.78 bn	33.45 bn	273.98 bn	Us Dollars
1987/8	253.88 bn	32.08 bn	293.57 bn	Us Dollars
<u>GROWTH</u>				
1985/6	5.9%	7.5%	7.8%	
1986/7	4.4%	7.7%	9.4%	
<u>INFLATION</u>				
1986	8.7%	3.5%	6.0%	
1987	8.8%	4.7%	7.3%	
<u>DEBIT</u>				
1985	36.7 bn	15.2 bn	25.7 bn	Us Dollars
1986	41.1 bn	16.6 bn	31 bn	Us Dollars
<u>DEF BUDGET</u>				
1987/8	9.65 bn	2.53 bn	5.83 bn	Us Dollars
1988/9	9.89 bn	2.74 bn	5.64 bn	Us Dollars
Population	799,727,000	102,844,000	1,072,000,000	
<u>ARMY</u>	1,200,000	450,000	3,200,000	
<u>NAVY</u>	52,000	16,000	300,000	
<u>AIRFORCE</u>	115,000	17,600	4,70,000	



TABLE 8

## COMPARISON OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY MANPOWER

	DEFENCE EXPENDITURE						% OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING			% OF GDP		NUMBERS IN ARMED FORCES (000)			ESTIMATES RESERVIST (000)	PARA MILITARY (000)
	\$ MILLIONS			\$ PER CAPITA			1984	1986	1987	1984	1986	1984	1986	1987		
	1984	1986	1987	1984	1986	1987										
China	7790	5830	5636	8	6	5	11.9	9.4	8.9	3.2	2.6	4000	2950	3200	4400	12,000
India	7225	7970	9648	10	6	12	17.2	17.1	19.9	3.8	3.5	1120	1260	1262	240	371
Pakistan	1956	2266	2543	21	23	25	35.9	31.8	33.8	7.1	6.5	478.6	480.6	480.6	513	164

SOURCE - The Military Balance 1988 - 89 (IISS London 1988)

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

## PRIMARY SOURCES

Foreign Affairs Record, 1963-1988 (New Delhi : Ministry of External Affairs).

India, Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence, 1963-88 (New Delhi).

India, Annual Reports of the Ministry of External Affairs : 1963-88 (New Delhi).

India, Lok Sabha Debates, 1952-88.

India, Rajya Sabha Debates, 1952 - 88.

Pakistan National Assembly, Debates.

Paper presented on South Asian Security Issues at Indo-US Seminar New Delhi by S.D. Muni, 1988.

Study prepared for the National Defence College, New Delhi on National Security, Brig. O.P. Kaushik and Other, 1986.

U.N. Security Council Official Records, Meetings 1963-1985.

## SECONDARY SOURCES

## BOOKS

Addy, Premen, Tibet on the Imperial Chessboard (New Delhi, 1984),

Aggarwal, R.K., Defence Production and Development (New Delhi, 1978).

Appadorai, A. and Arora, V.K., India in World Affairs 1957-1958 (New Delhi, 1975).

Arkin, W.M. and Fieldhouse, R.W., Nuclear Battlefields (Massachusetts, 1985).

Bajpai, U.S., ed., India's Security : The Politico Strategic Environment (New Delhi, 1983).

Bandopadhyaya, J. The Making of India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1979).

Banerjee, B., India's Aid to its Neighbouring Countries (New Delhi, 1983).

- Bell, S.C., Tibet Past and Present (London, 1968).
- Bhasin, V.K. (Capt.), Super Power Rivalry in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi, 1981).
- Bhat, Sudhakar, India and China (New Delhi, 1967).
- Brecher Micheal, India in World Politics : Krishna Menon's View of the World (London, 1968).
- Canoe, O., The Wells of Power (Calcutta, 1951).
- Chakravarti, P.C., India's China Policy (Bloomington, 1962).
- Chopra, V.D., ed., Studies in Indo-Pak Relations (New Delhi, 1984).
- Cohen, Stephen Philip, ed., The Security of South Asia; America and Asian Perspectives (New Delhi, 1987).
- Cohen, S.P. and Park, R.L., India : Emergent Power ? (New York, 1978),
- Condesman, Anthony H., U.S. Strategic Interests and the India - Pakistan Military Balance (New Delhi; 1988).
- Copper, J.F., China's Foreign Aid (Massachusetts, 1976).
- Donaldson, R. H., The Soviet Indian Alignment? Quest for Influence (Denver, 1979).
- Fitzerald, C.P., China and South-East Asia Since 1945 (Delhi, 1975)
- Ganguli, Shivaji, Pakistan - China Relations: A Study in Interaction (Illinois, 1977)
- Gupta, Vinod, Anderson Papers : A Study of Nixon's Blackmail of India (New Delhi, 1972).
- Hsueh, Chun - Tu, ed., Dimensions of Chinese Foreign Relations (New York, 1977).
- Jain, J.P., Nuclear India (New Delhi, 1974).
- Kamal K.L., Pakistan : The Garrison State (New Delhi, 1982).
- Kapur, Harish, China in World Politics (New Delhi, 1975).
- Kathpalia, P.N. National Security Perspectives (New Delhi, 1986).



- Kaul, Ravi, India's Strategic Spectrum (Allahabad, 1969).
- Kaul, T.N., India, China and Indo-China (New Delhi, 1981).
- Kaushik, B.M., and Mehrotra, O.N., Pakistan's Nuclear Bonds (New Delhi, 1981).
- Khera, S.S., India's Defence Problem (Bombay, 1968).
- Lin Leo Yueh Yun, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics (London, 1972).
- Mansingh, Surjit, India's Search for Power (New Delhi, 1984).
- Misra, K.P., ed., Readings in India's Foreign Policy (Faridabad, 1976).
- Morgenthau, H.J., Politics Among Nations (Calcutta, 1969).
- Muni, S.D., Foreign Policy of Nepal (Delhi, 1973).
- Noorani, A.G., Brezhnev Plan for Asian Security : Russia in Asia (Bombay, 1975).
- , India, Super Powers and the Neighbours (New Delhi, 1985).
- Pahdnis, U., Muni, S.D., and Bahadur, K. ed., The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration (New Delhi, 1982).
- Panikkar, K.M., India and the Indian Ocean (London, 1945).
- Poulose, T.T., ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi, 1978).
- Rajan, M.S., India in World affairs : 1954 : 56 (Vol. III) (Bombay, 1964).
- Ranft, B. and Till, T., The Sea in Soviet Strategy (London, 1983).
- Richarelson, H.E., Tibet and its History (London).
- Rose, L.E., The Politics of Bhutan (Ithaca, 1977).
- Sarhadi, A.S., India's Security in Resurgent Asia (New Delhi, 1979).
- Satish Kumar, ed., Year Book on India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 1986).
- Shukla, S.P., India and Pakistan, The Origins of Armed Conflict (New Delhi, 1984).

- Singh, Darbara and Others ed., India's Unity and Security Challenges (New Delhi, 1984).
- Subrahmanyam, K., India's Security Perspective (New Delhi, 1982).
- , Our National Security (New Delhi, 1972).
- Sukhbir Choudhary, Indo Pak war and Big Powers (Delhi; 1972).
- Timothy, George, Security in South Asia : India and the Great Powers (Hampshire, 1984).
- Tully, Mark and Masani, Z., From Raj to Rajiv (New Delhi, 1988).
- Turnev, B.G. and Challener, D.R., National Security in the Nuclear Age (London, 1960).
- Wilcox, W., India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York, 1964).
- Zanegin, B., China and the Arms Race (Moscow, 1978).
- Zinkin, Tayer, Challenger to India (London, 1960).

#### ARTICLES FROM THE PERIODICALS

- Ahmed, Samina, "Indian Ocean Peace Zone Plan", Pakistan Horizon (Karachi), Vol. 32, nos. 1-2, 1979, pp. 98-141.
- Bhutto, Z.A., "Pakistan Builds Anew", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 51, no. 3, 1973, pp. 541-54.
- Chari, P.R., "China's Nuclear Posture : An Evaluation", Asian Survey (Chicago), Vol. 18, no.8, 1978, pp. 817-28.
- Chopra, Pran, "East Bengal : A Crisis for India", World To-day (London) Vol. 27, no. 9, 1975, pp. 372-9.
- Deshingker, G.D., "India - China : The Security Dimensions", China Report (New Delhi) Vol. 15, no. 2, 1979, pp. 69-76.
- Dutta, Sujit, "China and the Security of India", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi) Vol. XII, no. 2, 1988, pp. 135-44.
- Gandhi, Indira, "India and the World". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, no.1, 1972, pp. 63-72.

- Gopal S., "Sino-Indian Relations", Round Table (London), no. 245, 1972, pp., 113-8.
- Hussain, M.A., "Third World and Disarmament : Shadow of Substance", Third World Quaterly (Lonodn), Vol.2, no.1, 1980, pp. 76-99.
- Lal, Arthur, "Charge and Continuity in India's Foreign Policy", Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 10, no.1, 1966, pp. 91-105.
- Mishra, B.R. "U.S. Strategy in the Indian Ocean India's Perseption and Response", Asia Pacific Community (Tokyo), no. 18, Fall 1982, pp. 64-79.
- Narayanan, K.R., "New Perspectives in India's Foreign Policy" Round Table no. 248, October,1972, pp. 453-64.
- Poulose, T.T., "The Politics of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Soth Asia", Pacific Community, Vol. 8, no. 3, 1977, pp. 541-60.
- Sondhi, M.L., "Peace and Diplomacy Between India and China, Pacific Community, Vol. 8, no.1, 1976, pp. 131-48.
- Subrahmanyam, K., "India's Security Perspective," Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. XI, no.5.
- Swamy , Subramaniam, "A Weapon's Strategy for a Nuclear India" India Quaterly (New Delhi), Vol. 30, no.4, 1974, pp. 271-5.
- Thomas Raju, G.C., "The Indian Navy in the Seventies", Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), Vol. 48, no. 4, 1975-76, pp. 500-18.

## NEWS PAPERS

Hindustan Times (New Delhi).

Indian Express (New Delhi).

International Herald Tribune (Singapore).

New York Times.

Pravada (Moscow).

The Telegraph (London).

The Times (London).

Times of India (New Delhi).

Washington Post.