

THE COGNITIVE MAP OF WESTERN MARXISM : A Critical Inquiry.

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
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
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
C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that this dissertation entitled "The Cognitive Map of Western Marxism: A Critical Inquiry", submitted by Mr. Sharad Kumar in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) degree, has not been previously submitted for any degree of this or any other university. This is an original work of Mr. Sharad Kumar.

We recommend this dissertation be placed before the examiners for their evaluation.


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INTRODUCTION

The history of idea tells us that Marxism is a scientific dialectical discourse and a revolutionary philosophy of political praxis which aspires to secure ultimate emancipation of the dehumanized-masses and repressed-cum-fractured self from the iron laws of capital along with all forms of coded in-human circular chains of the capitalist statecraft. It seeks to usher in a domain of the 'Socialist Paradise' whose condition of existence generates an eternal organic bond between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. But when we read the commentaries of the Western Marxists' epistemological construction and agenda of political tabulation, we immediately get a dialectical shock in the house of connotative ideological discourse and revolutionary intellectual entrepreneurship whose negative effect consists of the dislocation of the well-established intellectual tradition of Marx and Engels on the one hand, and the over production of dramatic political illusion and rhetoric in the court of labour movement on the other. To be sure, Lukacs, Gramsci, Althusser, Marcuse, Habermas, Adorno, Della Volpe, Colletti, Sartre, Goldman and others belong to the lineage of Marx and seem to have, at least, a family romance; but the fact remains that their mutual theoretical confrontation, hidden prophecy and, sometimes, mutual silence enable them to form a group of hostile-brothers. The sustained internal division among the hostile-brothers can be manifested in the reconstruction of the Marxian

epistemological discourse, the revaluation of the mode of articulation of modern capitalist social formation, the determination of political option and tactic, either by compulsion or by choice, in order to overthrow the structure and logic of exploitative relations of the capitalist production system. They are also different from one another in terms of the creation of the design of socialist social formation and the question of ideological justification or rejection of Stalinism and the Soviet state authoritarianism.

(A) The Ideological Structure of Modern Capitalism and the Rise of Western Marxism

The ideological universe of capitalist state, which ensures us the political goods and services of 'democratic-accountability', 'self-management', 'piecemeal social engineering', and 'universalization and institutionalization of political participation', forces the Western Marxists to oppose the economistic and deterministic theoretical models of the 2nd International and, eventually, they, through their specific interpretative master code, open up Marx's textual apparatus to multiple meanings, writings, overwritings and offering supplementary interpretations which, in turn, produce a crisis in the Union of Marxism and Workers' movement at the global level and, thereby, create a sea of ideological troubles.

The voluminous production of philosophical, political and cultural writings of the Western Marxists - for example,

Lukacs (humanist model of Marxism), Gramsci (historicist model of Marxism), and Althusser (structural model of Marxism) - suggest that the birth of their mutually exclusive polemics reflects a sense of historical pessimism and defeat of the workers' movement in the modern capitalist system which maintains and reinforces its dynamic equilibrium, despite the appearance of frequent crisis-ridden situations, on the basis of a fusion of ideological moment (consensus through legitimization/persuasive discourse) and the institutional moment (force/domination). The consolidation of political power through democratic institutions, universal participatory process and the parliamentarization of government comes into existence when "the hegemonic class absorbs and neutralizes the ideological contents of the dominated class in its fold on the one hand and articulates different visions of the world in such a way that potential antagonism is reduced to that of a simple difference on the other hand."¹ The world-wide recomposition of capital and creation of economic boom during 1950s and 1960s by replacing the old machine and smoke-stack industries with the new micro-electronic method of production-control, operated by a new breed of technocrats and managers who create and regulate the systems of economic planning and nationalized industries and services, have created this euphoria that the industrial

1. E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, LONDON: NLB, 1977, pp. 61-62.

democracy stands for the values of social justice, egalitarian order and humanism. An egalitarian social order can be achieved by the conscious intervention of the Welfare State in the organization, ordering and distribution of national property; though, at the existential level, "the central problem of liberal democratic theory is how to reconcile the claims of the free market economy with the claims of the whole man of individuals to some kind of equality."² The formulation of numerous ideological notions such as advanced democracy, meritocratic social order, possessive market society, welfare state, mass society, post-capitalist society and industrial society, the enforcement of ideologies of possessive individualism, fair justice, practical equality, economic liberty and politico-moral obligation; and the positive and functional conceptualization of the existence of the model of multipolar and complex pattern of contradictions, conflicts and collectivities which are constituted by the prevailing modes of social integration, have been intentionally and consciously evolved by the politico-jural agents of the economically dominant class in order to provide a new grammar of politics. The new grammar of politics is based on the key processes and logic of routinization of conflict, mediation, reconciliation and integration of the opposing tendencies of capital and labour,

2. C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory : Essays in Retrieval (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.173.

for sustaining a new condition of existence and the structuration-process of the capitalist bloc and the bourgeois ideology which conceals the real exploitative relationship between men and their conditions of existence.

It is through new political ideology and technology coupled with the paradigm of welfare economics that the revolutionary potential of the working class was damaged in such a manner that the issue, locus, terms and condition of the workers' movement remained confined to the "thesis of conflict within regime", not to the "thesis of conflict over regime" in which the fundamentals and rules of the game are challenged. This has happened because "a new balance of class force is supposed to have been created, since the proletariat's deficit in social power is compensated for by an advantage in political power."³ Thus, domination through inclusion of contradictory force appears to be the central tendency of the modern capitalist social formation. The whole structural and normative indexes of the post capitalist society can be identified with the emergent tendencies of "the decomposition of capital, the decomposition of labour, the emergence of new middle class, high rate of social mobility through educational achievement, expansion of the notions of equality, liberty and citizenship in theory and

3. Claus Offe, Disorganized Capitalism : Contemporary Transformation of Work and Politics (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985), p.265.

practice and the institutionalization of class conflict".⁴ These elements have induced the utopia of continuous economic progress and continuously extended political participation which produces negative effect in the domain of labour. The chief manifestation of this negative effect can be seen in the breakdown of unity, homogeneity and solidarity of the working class due to the mutual repulsion and mutual confrontation of interest between the productive labour/manual labour and the service labour/mental labour in which the latter becomes an agent of the conscious synthesization of social systems and process by generating the efficient condition for establishing a nexus between efficient production and effective maintenance of order.

The regulated capitalism of the west, grounded into the discourse and institutional-materiality of the "scientist state"⁵ has formulated numerous ideal policies, programmes and laws for the reduction of social inequality, eradication of poverty and implementation of social reforms and thereby, to dissolve the "inherent tension between the system of labour and the system of capital, between the civil society

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4. R. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), For a detailed explanation see pp.36-71.
 5. Nicos Poulantzas, State Power Socialism (London: NLB/ Verso Editions, 1980), p.56.

and state"⁶ and between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom in order to maintain equilibrium even in the face of crisis and tension. The old demand of establishing congruence between possessive individualism and possessive market society has been fulfilled by the managed capitalism through the equalization of "need-theorization" and "ability-theorization". However, the dilemma of liberal-democratic theory remains: "it must continue to use the assumptions of possessive individualism - an individualism which refers to this fact that man is free and human by virtue of his sole proprietorship of his own person and that human society is essentially a series of market relations - at a time when the structure of market no longer provides the necessary conditions for deducing a valid theory of political obligations from those assumptions".⁷ In fact, there is no change in the basic structure of the liberal democratic state which operates in the class-divided possessive market society; there are changes between the pre-democratic liberal state and the liberal democratic state of the 20th century which initiated the process of constitutional development or political modernization or democratization, in which the mass-based polity compelled the structure of state to assume the status of relative autonomy from the interest of capital.

6. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (London HEB, 1974), p.195.

7. C.B. Macherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism : Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1977). pp.270,275

However, the main function of the ruling class is not to create an equalitarian social order but to constitute and reproduce the relations of production so long as it is organically linked to "the structural condition and the institutional form of political power for the successful regulation and reproduction of the processes of capital accumulation and socialization"⁸ and the universalization of commodity form.

The state is structurally and instrumentally biased towards the interest of capital, at least, in those situations when the operation of economies entails recourse to organized violence and, in this circumstance, state performs the function of "repression through four modes: prohibition of opposition, restriction of intra-systemic opposition, harassment and terror and surveillance"⁹. The state in class societies is inevitably the guardian and protector of the economic interests and its function is to ensure their continued predominance, not to prevent it,¹⁰ even at the cost of erosion of civil liberties and constitutional guarantees in the name of maintaining national interest, financial stability, social reforms and law and

8. Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. John Keane, (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp.13-14.

9. Goran Therborn, What the Ruling Class Does When it Rules (London: NLB, 1978), p.222.

10. Ralph Miliband, State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p.266.

order problem. In normal period, the legitimation crisis is put under effective suspension by developing new political technology of state-monopolized science-knowledge, parliamentary politics, managerial technocracy along with different ideological formations like religio-cum-moral code, patriotism, freedom, competitive individualism, and functional nationalist emotions stirred by an accumulation of symbols in order to obscure class-relations. The manifestation of adaptive behaviour, complex modes of legitimization and effective enforcement of compliance of the modern capitalist state has enabled it to construct such ideological universe in which any threat - whether real and anticipatory-is sealed off by integrating the working class through the process of embourgeoisement, and by eliminating political explosions through the legitimate use of physical coercion within the boundary of capital-zone. Thus the capitalist state is a net balance of dictatorship plus hegemony and, for all purposes, ideological hegemony and coercive power complement one another in the exercise of class power. State Welfare policies should be regarded neither as an expression of supra-class benevolence nor as a shrewd ruse of the ruling class; rather they are a manifestation of the inevitably contradictory and conflictual tendency of class-rule.

In the 20th century capitalism, a new form of domination came into existence with the appearance of modern science, technological manipulation, scientification of politics and

power knowledge industry in which research process is used for economic exploitation and, in this situation, the word "democracy simply means the institutionally defined and normatively regulated system of general - public communication that deal with how men can and want to live under the objective condition of objectified labour".¹¹ The whole practices of philosophy and techno-science are grounded into the logic of what Derrida calls the unquestioned authority of the principle of reason which, as a form of dominance, induces an element of politics in "end-oriented" scientific resources. Bureaucratic and scientific instrumental rationality gives rise to authoritarian institutions such as the state, the army and the joint corporation which are instrumental in the development of multi-national military-industrial complex.

The modern high-tech society ensures its survival condition by using political discursive practice, mental manipulation and discipline, communication network and the electronic mass-media by which the loyalty/consent of a depoliticized population is achieved. What we note, in modern times, is that through diachronic construct it is revealed that there is "a shift from the construction of the bourgeois subject in emergent capitalism to its schizophrenic disintegration in multinational capitalism".¹² It is through

11. J. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society (London: HEB, 1977), pp. 55-57.

material organization and practical technique or what Foucault would like to call "political technology of body and sex" through which the capitalist order tries to maximize economic profit by making us believe that individuals are nothing but contractual association of isolated legal subjects. Poulantzas has rightly asserted that "state enters into the constitution of the social division of labour by constantly producing social- fracturing-individualization through materiality of ideology: the state consecrates and institutionalizes by constituting the socio-economic monads as judicial and political individuals-person-subject".¹³

The technologically advanced capitalism has established its centre of gravitation by we can call "consumer terrorism" through which direct social exploitation has been replaced by mental manipulation of needs and pseudo satisfaction of human instincts in commodity market, communication structure, and in the domain of sexuality in which sex is reduced to commodity; and free expression of instinctual drives is turned into controlled aggression in such a manner so that optimization and consumption of sexual objects must make an accord with the objective needs of system. In late

12. Fredic Jameson, Political Unconscious (London: Methuen & Co., 1983), pp.11-12.

13. Nicos Poulantzas, op. cit. pp.65-66.

capitalism, commodification of bodily sexuality and politically-regulated sexual apparatus are manifested through the institutional-materiality of sexualization of films, dances, fashion, music, advertisement, TV series, the so called paraliterature with its airport paperback categories of romance and murder mystery. The youths and students are directed to believe in direct satisfaction of sexual drives and objects whose demonstration effect can be realized by slogans like "Love In", "Make Love Not War"; and a demand of a qualitative increase "in permission to kiss" which gets reflected in a mass kissing session on the Campus.¹⁴ The multinational capital or late capitalism has given rise to the phenomenon of post modernism in culture in which aesthetic production has become integrated into commodity production and is dominated by euphoria within a totalizing dynamic.¹⁵ Thus, the theory of cultural hegemony of late capitalism announces this principle that in consumer society the ideological mission is not associated with the primacy of industrial production and the omnipresence of class-struggle, but to construct a cognitive mapping of a pedagogical political culture and art in order to justify the existing interest of capital in the last instance.

14. Reimut Reiche, Sexuality and Class Struggle (London:NLB, 1977), p.47.

15. F. Jameson, Post Capitalism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. For a detailed explanation see New Left Review, 146, 1984, pp. 53-92.

At the economic level, the post-war economic boom led to a new revolution in the system of production, technological structure and communication set which resulted into centralization of capital and the internalization of economic production coupled with the international division of labour among the imperialist countries. The accumulation and reinvestment of capital, aided by rapidly expanding state capitalist expenditures on research and development, revolutionized technology in the core capitalist countries. There is a quantum leap in the evolution of machinery and power technology from the initial phase of machine production of steam driven motors (since 1848) to machine production of electronic and nuclear power apparatuses (since the 1940s) via machine production of electronic and combustion motors (since 1790s). In the modern capitalism, which is a combination of organization and anarchy, "from the stand point of functional capital the surplus value is created by multinationals in several different countries",¹⁶ because of this fact that there is an existence of decentered global interlocking network of economic order, whose complex articulation depends upon its uneven internal division into "the mature, dominant central formation on the one hand and the immature, dependent peripheral formations on the other hand"¹⁷ in which, on the basis of inscribed unequal exchange

16. E. Mandel, The Second Slump (London: NLB, 1978), p.11.

17. Samir Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development (Sussex: The Harvester, 1977), p.40.

between parts of the global economic system, the surplus flows from the latter zone to that of the former zone. The universal nature of commodity production and accumulation of capital along with the emergent tendencies of the politico-jural state formation and deformation, in the context of inter-state relations and relations of imperialism, has come to form this view that "the development of the capitalist world-economy has two tendencies (i) the extension of (a) the interrelation of production (b) the state systems (c) the capital-labour relations converging to form definite alternative periods of the system of overall expansion-stagnation, (ii) the inherent contradiction between the development of the 'one economy' and the development of the 'multiple states' jurisdictions".¹⁸ Thus we can notice that the compulsion towards the creation of a supra-national imperialist state in Western Europe springs from the immediate economic function of the state in what Ernest Mandel calls "Late capitalism associated with the phenomenon of over-capitalization",¹⁹ which, on the basis of the introduction of semi-automatic and automatic production techniques, technological rationality and omnipotence of technological profit, constitutes the principles of generalized universal industrialization, internationalization

18. T. Hopkins and I. Wallenstein, World-System Analysis: Theory and Methodology (London: Sage Publications, 1982), p.12.

19. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: NLB, 1975), pp. 387-406.

of commodity production, mechanization, over specialization and parcellization of labour force.

It is the emergent structures of a pedagogical political grammar, cultural-industry and the world-space of multinational capital which strive for the unparalleled objective consolidation of economic profit on the one hand, and the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany and Stalin's despotism coupled with a new breed of a strong and repressive monolithic power structure (in the name of twilight ideologies of democratic centralism and the dictatorship of proletariat) on the other, that provided an impetus for the inauguration of Western Marxism's reevaluation of the course of historical materialism. The unbroken record of political defeat in Europe and Stalinization of the Communist parties throughout the whole world compelled Western Marxists "to initiate a prolonged and intricate discourse on 'Marxian Method' and to make a move from economics and politics to philosophy".²⁰ Its emergence can be seen as a response to the theoretical limitations of the theoretical postulations of Engels' natural dialectic, Lenin's materialist epistemology and Stalin's institutionalization and dogmatization of Marxism as an instrument of power. The main features of Western Marxism include the revival of philosophical interrogation about the working of

20. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976), pp.52-53.

superstructure, explanation of a profound crisis in traditional bourgeois culture and society, critical examination of the organic bond between economic structure and ideological structure in the light of dialectic of history, and the establishment of a close affinity between objective factor and subjective factor.

Under the constant presence and influence of European idealism and non-Marxist theories, Western Marxism constituted a new intellectual configuration within the development of historical materialism in which, due to the absence of the magnetic pole of a revolutionary class struggle, the needle of the whole tradition tended to swing increasingly away towards contemporary bourgeois culture. In the age of hypertension, political paralysis and future interminancy, the intellectual current of Western Marxism has become a pluralism of ideological universe which can be expressed by "Sartre's theory of the logic of **scarcity**, Althusser's insistence on the performance of ideological illusion, Benjamin's fear of the confiscation of the history, Lukacs' theory of reification, Marcuse's vision of social one dimensionality"²¹ and Gramsci's obsession with the theory of hegemony and intellectuals. The historical facts, which Western professional Marxists have produced in their reinterpretation of Marx-Hegel relation, include the

21. P. Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (London: Verso, 1983), p.17.

production of the constant disjunction between theory and practice, a poverty of strategy and the decomposition of Marxism into various contradictory currents—such as structure versus subject, structure versus history, natural science versus social science and totality versus whole - and the revolutionary political ramances. After the 1956 (pointer of crisis in the international communism) "the intellectual left had been in a state of overheated paronia in which theory and practice have become two entities; theory has been presented in even more doctrinaire and intellectualized forms as resurgent 'Marxism'; but practice operates under anti-intellectualism and the cult of violence of intellectuals".²²

It must be noted that with the reception of Hegel by the French and Italian philosophers, and reinterpretation of his book such as "The Phenomenology of Mind" by the prominent thinkers like Lukacs, Hyppolite, Kojeve, Hebermas, Althusser, Colletti and the others, become the other major source for the birth of Western Marxism in which Althusser and Colletti became hostile to the Hegelian interpretation of Marxism; while the Humanist and Historicist Marxists like Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas and Sartre have sought to present the revolutionary character of Hegelian dialectic which Marx has used in his explanation of historically-determined material condition of existence of

22. E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Merlin Press Ltd., 1978), pp.i-iii.

human social order. The genesis of the "Historical Hegel" can be located in the works of Italian philosophers such as Antonio Labriola, Gentile, Croce and Rocklfo Mondolfo who presented the theses of the philosophy of praxis, dialectical union of objective movement and subjective moment, historical consciousness and the role of human agency in the revolutionary transformation of social order. In opposition to Engels' apriori dogmatic natural science method, the Hegelian-Marxists of Italy highlighted the theorem of revolutionary philosophy of praxis and a critical consciousness of the social totality.²³

After the appearance of events like two great world wars, fascist force, Russian Revolution, the collapse of the Second International and the founding of the Third International and the new Communist parties in particular, it was the latent political choice which infused the apparent philosophical debates and discussions about the destiny of Marxism between the Western Marxists who did everything for the potential ideological manipulation of the works of Marx in order to satisfy their respective interest within national boundary. Having dissatisfied with Engels' dialectical law - a law which is a "reductive system" in which all events from the movement of the solar system to the origin of human thought are explained by the science of the general laws of

23. Russel Jacoby, Dialectics of Defeat : Contours of Western Marxism (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.57-58.

motion of matter - all Western Marxists, except the hard-core Althusserians, established the logical validity of dialectic of history and thought as a genuine property of Marx's concepts of Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism. It can be noted that each Western Marxist, with the aspiration of claiming himself to be more Marxist than Marx, received and produced a plurality of determinations derived from different horizons and levels of the social and ideological structure of his time. For example, Lukacs was influenced by the works of Hegel, Dilthey, Weber etc.; whereas Gramsci operated under the positive influences of Croce and Machiavelli and Althusser surrendered before the works of Spinoza, Bachelard, Freud and Lacan. Habermas was schooled in the thought-processes of Hegel, Weber, Parsons, Freud and the modern linguists; Colletti took his shelter in the Kantian philosophy. The Frankfurt School nurtured a certain nostalgia for the reason in-History that suggested a longing for a pre-Hegelian and Hegelian anchor, and Sartre seemed to have inherited the intellectual legacy of Heidegger and Husserl.

We know that in opposition to the idealist and metaphysical tradition, Marx, for the first time, gave the systematic and integral explanation of historical materialism in his book 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' published in 1859 in which he came with the propositions about the hierarchical construction of social

structure, laws of contradiction and the inevitability of structural transformation through revolution:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformations of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such task as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs making progress in the economic development of

society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs making progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production - antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence - but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism.²⁴



On the role of technology Marx writes:

Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the immediate process of production by which he sustains his life and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations and of the mental conceptions that flow from them.²⁵

Further, on the relationship between men and their history and between the material structure and the human subject Marx asserts:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under the circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.²⁶

In the first thought-provoking passage, Marx has presented a hierarchical two-tier model of society: the first is the material base which consists of forces of production and relations of production; and the second is the

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24. K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), pp.20-21.
25. K. Marx, Capital, vol.I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), p.352.
26. K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p.10.

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ideological superstructure constructed out of religious, political, legal and ideological elements which are conditioned by the base. Then he explains the emergence of a revolutionary change within a mature social formation through the increasing contradiction between the dynamic forces of production and relatively static relations of production; and the whole processes of historical change from one mode of production to another must be precisely measured by the method of natural science. In the second passage, Marx tries to locate a double relationship - between man and nature and between man and society - on the basis of material social relationship. In the third passage, Marx talks about the construction of history through the creative human praxis whose existence does not depend on the subjective volition of an individual-subject but on the pre-given historical circumstances and determinations.

It is an irony of Marxist revolutionary thought that how base and superstructure interact with each other, what relation exists between material objective structure and creative role of human agency and how many manifestations of contradictions are inscribed in society, are subject to numerous contradictory interpretations and over-interpretations, depending on the historical-cum-political conjectures of society, and the social conditioning of intellectual apprenticeship. The traditional Marxists like Plekhanov and Bukharin give rise to the material deterministic thesis and the predominant role of natural

science model of dialectic which has been also attested by Engels' natural dialectic and Lenin's materialist epistemology and dialectic; whereas the Western Marxists like Lukacs, Gramsci, Korsch etc. speak the language of primary of social being over consciousness, organic bond between base and superstructure and the laws of historical dialectic of subject and object. The Frankfurt School makes an effective explanation of the historical totality and the historical reason which constitute the raw material of social formation. Another line of interpretation is given by Althusser's anti-historicist and theoretical anti-humanist interpretation of Marxism in which society is conceived in terms of "pre-given unevenly structured whole articulated in dominance", subject is negated by the structural causality of mode of production and history is suspended and subverted in the service of structure. In short, the traditional Marxists emphasize the fundamentalist model of Marxism in which economy, as a real structure, is the only determinant factor; and superstructure is an expression and reflection of the economic essence. But the historicist and humanist Marxists like Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci, Sartre and Colletti develop a thesis of mutual conditioning of base and superstructure; and the structural Marxism of Althusser is obsessed with the theses of over-determination of superstructure and the determination of society by economy in the last instance. So far as the Frankfurt school is concerned, it is one of the variants of the Hegelian invariant societal model of linear evolutionism

which takes place in the historically-conditioned-rational totality through the law of negativity of the existing reality.

The main function of Western Marxism as a whole is to point out that the traditional model of Marxism does not provide an all encompassing analysis of the (modern) social formation which survives more on the ideological structure than on the repressive force. The birth of Western Marxism announces this fact that ideology is not a false consciousness, rather it is a positive element in so far as it generates and sustains the existential condition of the historical life of society. Further, there is a mediation between the economic structure and the ideological Super-structure. These kinds of interpretations of Western Marxism are directly associated with the changing character of the modern socio-economic formation of society.

Since the Western Marxism has emerged as a reaction to the deterministic thesis and the ontological natural dialectic of Plekhanov, Engels, Bukharin, Lenin and Stalin etc., it is imperative to explain the model of traditional Marxism in order to show the points of homology and difference between the traditional Marxism and the Western Marxism on the one hand; and between the different mutually hostile species of the Western Marxism as a whole on the other.

(B) THE MODEL OF TRADITIONAL MARXISM

The precursors of traditional Marxism are Plekhanov, Engels, Bukharin, Lenin and Stalin who have an unqualified absolute faith in the theses of economic determinism and homology between dialectic of nature and dialectic of man; and these elements, taken together, make an attempt to discredit the principles of idealism, voluntarism and subjectivism. The whole scientific terrain of economic determinism involves this proposition that the forces of production and relations of production constitute an "essential sphere" or "core structure" or "terrain of necessity" that determines and regulates the superstructural elements of ideology, mentality, law, consciousness, culture etc. which jointly form the terrain of contingency or peripheral domain. As a result of this, there arises a dualism between matter/being/concrete and ideal/knowledge/abstract in which the former category is ontologically prior to the latter category and hence it is asserted that base determines superstructure²⁷ and superstructure is supposed to be a mere reflection of the economic base. Lenin's epistemology, as a reflection of material reality existing outside of consciousness, is subordinated to materialist ontology which refuses to recognize the hybrid project for the reconciliation between materialism and idealism. That is why, he maintains that Marx's materialist conception of

27. G. Lukacs, Ontology of Social Being, vol.II Marx (London: Merlin Press, 1982), p.147.

history consists of two facts: (1) ideological motives in the historical activities of human being can be ascertained by the objective laws governing the development of the system of social relations and the degree of development reached by material production, and (ii) the life of masses and change in material condition can be measured with scientific accuracy and natural precision.²⁸ What his materialist ontology, based on the law of "matter in motion", asserts is that all ideas, tendencies of various opposing classes etc. stem from the definite objective material forces of production whose dynamic dimension can be explained through objective natural laws. By struggling against the smuggling of bourgeois ideology into the working class movement, and rejecting the revisionist thesis of Bernstein and the "eclectic theory of factors" of the neo-Kantians such as Wolf and Sombart, Plekhanov underlines this determinism that "being determines consciousness"²⁹ and goes on to say that "material philosophy reduces law, morality and philosophy to one economic factor; and ideologies are merely multiform reflections in men's minds of the single and invisible history".³⁰ In fact, for him thinking is conditioned by being

28. Lenin, Selected Works, vol.I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp.24-25.

29. G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, vol.II (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp.7-13.

30. G. Plakhanov, *ibid.*, p.250.

and being is conditioned by itself and it has its foundation in itself; whereas for Hegel thinking is being, thinking is the subject and being is the predicate. While explaining the base-superstructure relationship, Plekhanov strongly argues that the state of the productive forces and the economic relations of a given society, at a given point of time, constitute basis over which the socio-political system is erected; and the mentality of social man, the properties of which are reflected through ideology, is determined in part directly by the economic condition and in part by the entire-socio-economic system that has developed on the economic foundation."³¹ Thus, we find that ideology, mentality and socio-political relations are directly reducible to economic relations of production; and logically it implies that ideological superstructure has no system of even relative auto-regulation and self-determination, because "ideas and ideologies rise over the economic base of society whose intricate internal structure is deeply rooted into material things like tools, institutions, forces of production and labour relations".³² Influenced by the objective laws of natural science, Bukharin's materialist position claims that the existence of matter is prior to that

31. G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works, vol.III
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p.168.

32. N. Bukharin, Historical Materialism (The University
of Michigan, 1969), see. pp.90, 207-8.

the existence of mind or idea; thought does not exist without brain and desires without organism; and, hence, the structure of consciousness and psychic phenomenon are simply a property of matter organised in a certain manner or a function of such matter. If we apply that materialism to society, then we will have to argue that the inner structure of society, at any given moment, is determined by the material productive forces; and the change in form of society depends on the movement of the productive forces. Society is based on objective regular laws of material force, not on teleological natural laws of theology and voluntary human action and choice. Thus, in the economic deterministic model of traditional Marxism, society is seen as a system consisting of two distinct layers: (i) the economic base - a real foundation which can be identified with matter/essence/terrain of necessity - which combines forces of production and relations of production; and (ii) superstructure - a structure which can be known as the order of idea/appearance/terrain of contingency - which consists of (a) the legal and political superstructure, and (b) forms of consciousness and mentality. And then this model presupposes an unidirectional casual determinism in terms of the determination and conditioning of the heterogeneous parts of superstructure by the economic base, not vice-versa.

So far as the uniqueness of Marxian dialectic is concerned, it has to be pointed out that it was not Marx, but Engels, Lenin and Stalin who counterpose materialism and

idealism or proletarian philosophy and science and bourgeois philosophy and science or the philosophy of Left and the philosophy of Right, as Lenin tells us that the genius of Marx and Engels lies in the fact that there is a material line and an idealist line; and between them are various shades of agnosticism. In reaction to philosophical materialism, Engels' dialectic of nature, Lenin's materialist dialectic and Stalin's ontological natural dialectic share the common point that there is a primacy of nature/matter/physical and external world over mind/spirit/subjective consciousness. Engels' work of "Dialectics of Nature" and Lenin's work of "Materialism and Empirio Criticism" try to establish an anti-positivist and anti-dualist natural materialist epistemology which is identically applicable to the spheres of nature, history and human being; though it can be maintained that the dialectical movement of natural and material world, based on "the motion of matter", becomes a prior referential point to understand the dialectic of history and human thought.

By pursuing his realism through natural-scientific materialism Engels says that dialectic; which consists of three interrelated laws: (i) the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice-versa (doctrine of Being), (ii) the law of the interpenetration of opposites (doctrine of Essence), and (iii) the law of the negation (fundamental law for the construction of the whole system), is the materialist science of the general laws of motion and

development of nature, human society and thought. In "Anti-Duhring" Engels sketches the essential nature of dialectical laws of development of natural order on the basis of two things: (i) things and thoughts present themselves in interconnection; and (ii) there is a dynamic and moving character of thing, because the matter is in motion and "motion itself is a contradiction or the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of contradiction is precisely what motion is."³³ There are interconnections, contradictions and complexities not only between the processes in a particular sphere, but also between sphere themselves. Motion of matter is characterized by the forces of attraction and repulsion. Materialist philosophy of Engels is opposed to metaphysical mode of thought which regards things and concepts as rigid and fixed objects of introgation, given once and for all, in terms of Yes/No category. It also rejects the Hegelian teleological dialectic of Idea which considers reality as a temporal manifestation of the unfolding character of the universal Spirit. Instead of explaining the history of Ancient Greece out of its inner interconnection, Hegel maintains that it is nothing more than the working out of the forms of beautiful individuality that is realization of a work of art; whereas for Marx the driving force of history is the development of productive force leading to the formation

33. F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p.148.

of two antagonistic classes of property-holder and non-property holder, and it is the class struggle that is a motor of change of the course of history in an ever more superior direction.

In the scientific material dialectic, matter and motion are interlinked; and they do not require and different spheres requiring separate and different study and action and, above all, these cannot be destroyed and eliminated in terms of quality and quantity. Engels also points out that "equilibrium is inseparable from motion and all equilibrium is relative and temporary".³⁴ In the domain of matter equilibrium means predominance of attraction over repulsion. The dialectic of the world, says Engels, is only the reflection of the forms of the motion of the real world, both of nature and history. He is so preoccupied with the materialist philosophy that even life is defined as "the mode of existence of protein bodies, the essential element of which consists in continual metabolic interchange with the natural environment outside them; and which ceases with the cessation of this metabolism, bringing out the decomposition of the protein".³⁵ Engels' homogenous dialectical movement of natural world and material history, whose regularity and order in a given time-space dimension can be linked to the

34. F. Engels, Dialectic of Nature (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p.246.

35. F. Engels, *ibid.*, p.301.

dialectical view of cause-effect relationships within interconnected parts of a whole, tries to dissolve the positivistic dualism between being and thinking, between matter and mind, between lexis and praxis, between physical world and mental world, between man and nature and between nature and history; and it is because of the fact that laws of thoughts correspond to the laws of nature. We can say that reason and consciousness are product of human brain, and man is a product of laws of nature and the necessities of nature.

In conformity with Engels' thesis, Lenin rejects the metaphysical definition of matter as constellations of ideas and sensations that runs through from Berkeley's writing to that Machians, and then he off-repeatedly says that "there is nothing in the world, but matter in motion; and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time".³⁶ The concept of matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given in our sensations. To divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective reality. Development of objective reality is the result of the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites. There is no absolute unfolding idea and universal will, because idea, sensation and thought change with the changing character or objective material condition of existence of society.

36. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio Criticism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p.158.

Dialectic, as a science of material interconnection and contradiction of parts of natural universe and social universe, involves a series of motion that belong together and pass to one-another in the course of development of objective reality. For Lenin the acceptance of materialist epistemology is a case of partisanship; and a communist is a partisan who speaks dialectically regulated objective truth while negating metaphysical-cum-idealist pseudo science which mystifies the objective law of nature and history by producing so many absolutes and fixed principles about the existence of reality.

Stalin was so ambitious about the formulation and codification of scientific-cum-materialist theory that his "revolutionary productionist ideology" of socialist economy, in the light of the dictatorship of proletariat, convinced him to eliminate the category of negation from the grammar of Marxian dialectic. Negation of negation is supposed to be the central point of the Hegelian evolutionary dialectical movement of reality; whereas "the materialist philosophy of Lenin, says Stalin, forms an identity between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice".³⁷ The dogmatization and politicization of Marxian method forces Stalin to adopt the crude materialist interpretation of nature which embodies three principles (i) world is by its nature material, and

37. Stalin, Leninism, English translation by Eden and Cedar Paul (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928), pp. 94-95.

all phenomena are forms of matter in motion, (ii) the matter is an objective reality i.e. independent and outside of thought; and (iii) everything is knowable. He bases these points on the following assumptions of the ontological conception of dialectical materialism: (i) all phenomena are interlinked and determined by time and space, (ii) everything in nature is in a state of change, movement and development, (iii) the change takes place as a forward and upward movement, as a transition from the old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from lower to the higher; and (iv) everything is characterized by the struggle of opposites, which constitutes the internal content of the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative changes. This is seen in the fact that all phenomena have a positive and a negative aspect, a past and future, so that the struggle takes the form of a conflict between new and old. These theses, according to Stalinist's ontological interpretation of dialectical materialism, are turned into the "general law" because it is held to be theoretically homogeneous with the laws stated by the sciences of nature and is conceived with them as the model. The negation of the negation thesis, rejected by Stalin's obsession with mechanical scienticism, was accepted even by Engels' natural dialectic and Lenin's materialist

38. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol.III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.7.

dialectic. Despite this fact we can argue that Stalinism, as a self-contained political, economic and ideological systems identifiable with "totalitarian character of a regime which believes in the progressive **destruction** of civil society and absorption of all forms of social life by state",³⁸ is an extension of the materialist epistemology of Engels and Lenin which informed Stalin that material world is primary and mind is secondary. The conviction that economic production and relations of production is everything helped Stalin in advocating the productionist ideology in terms of the policies of absolute industrialization and commercialization of USSR during the phase of socialist construction.

If we closely examine Stalin's self-claimed conception of revolutionary materialist dialectic, then we find that it has become the victim of a principle of "evolutionist conception of dialectic"³⁹; because it understands development as an onward and upward movement, as a development from simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher etc. It is argued by Djilas that the struggle of opposites in material objects and natural phenomenon is encountered only as a human mental process and experience; and forward and upward movement in natural world do not exist; rather they are a reflection of the limitless powers of human cognitions.⁴⁰ One can easily

39. D. Lecourt, Proletarian Science, (London:NLB, 1977), p.7.

40. Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (Great Britain: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), p.55.

argue that the dialectic of nature is not confirmed by modern science and, therefore, it does not contain scientific truth but plays a revolutionary political epoch-making role in changing the contemporary capitalist society. The main aim of Stalin's rejection of negation of the negation and the inauguration of proletarian science and philosophy was to show the ever-intensifying crisis in bourgeois science, economics and culture which was associated with idealist, simple materialist, metaphysical and positivist outlook. Stalin makes an identity of revolutionary lexis and revolutionary-cum-practical praxis in order to establish a scientific socialist politics and ideology. His theory of socialist humanism, derived from an effort for intermixturing of ideology and politics under the ontological interpretation of dialectical materialism based on science like laws, gave us a mechanistic conception of man and nature. However, we notice that after the fall of Stalin, the identity of dialectics of nature, history and politics has been negated by the continuous presence of difference between science and politics or between Truth and power in order to maintain peaceful co-existence of two political orders - the American capitalism and the Russian socialism-within the same universal science and technological order.

In fact; Stalin's genius lies in the formulation of three laws: (i) socialism in one country, (ii) class struggle must become fiercer as the building of socialism progressed, and (iii) before the state withers away under

communism, it must, for dialectical reason, first develop to a point of maximum strength. The second and third principles are meant for justifying the system of police terror and institutionalization of monolithic power structure, forced dogmatism and authoritarian voluntarism/personal despotism/cult of personality. Though the thesis of "socialism in one country" was directed towards socio-economic transformation, "it had a deep repercussions which shock the entire communist movement"⁴¹ primarily because (i) it entailed a revision of the concept of revolution and the whole theory of the imperialist epoch, (ii) it dictated a sub-ordination of the interests of the international revolution to the supposed interests of the defence of the Russian proletarian state, (iii) it compelled the Communist parties of the world to act according to pre-established rules of the Soviet-fortress and the zigzags of Kremlin diplomacy; (iv) it inevitably provided the status 'guiding state', to the Soviet Union and, consequently, led to evolve a bureaucratic monolithism within the communist 'International' and the communist parties; and (iv) it created a condition for the bureaucratization of communist parties which could not respond to the interest of proletarian of their respective countries because of their material dependence on Kremlin and their view of medium-term national and international political perspective.

41. E. Mandel, From Stalinism to Euro Communism (London: NLB, 1978), p.14. For a detailed explanation see pp.14-15.

(c) THE PROJECT OF WESTERN MARXISM

It was the theses of dogmatic scientific law or the monopoly of dialectic of nature and economic-determinism that could not satisfy the instincts and drives of Western Marxists who came to realize that the capitalist order survives not only on the basis of economic force; but also on the basis of ideological and intellectual force. It was maintained by the Western Marxism that history of society could not be paralleled to the derminate laws of physics; and to think materialism exclusively an analysis of matter and its motion is to run the risk of omitting ideas and consciousness as causal forces in history. That is why, the neo-Marxists, except the Althusserians, put stress on the theses of dialectics of history, negation of negation as a central law of dialectic, consciousness and ideology as a constitutive element of society, reciprocal relationship or mediation between base and superstructure, creative role of human praxis and agency in the transformation of society and the primacy to concrete economic structure over the structure of consciousness in the last instance. Traditional Marxian models of technological determinism and economic reductionism suffer from numerous limitations when we find that production is socially determined and property rights are legally ascertained which belong to the domain of superstructure. Similarly, if politics is a part of superstructure and an agency of class conflict and social change, then we fail to understand how the traditional Marxists establish a

congruence between their professed science of economic determinism and the thesis of transformation of economic base by political superstructure. In this situation, the idea which strikes our mind is that we cannot separate productive forces from the totality of social and political conditions because both of them feed each other, condition each other and transform each other in the course of societal development. For Marx the term 'determine' simply means "setting bounds" or "setting limits"⁴² that is to mean that the forces of production simply 'block' or 'select out' all features of superstructure that do not correspond or comply with it. We must justify the casual primacy of productive forces conjoined with this observation that the rationality of human beings, independently of social and historical circumstances, compels them to improve and conquer the conditions of material scarcity. To say that being determines consciousness, means at least in larger part: the character of the leading ideas of a society is explained by their propensity, in virtue of that character, to sustain the structure of economic roles called for by the productive forces.⁴³

42. Raymond William, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.84.

43. A.G. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.279.

In brief, the thesis of economic determinism and dualism between being and consciousness have been rejected by the concepts of "complex-organic-expressive totality" (Lukacs), "unevenly structured complex whole articulated in dominance" (Althusser), "historical bloc of base and superstructure" (Gramsci), "dynamic totalization" (Sartre) and "unity of heterogeneous parts" (Della Volpe). But it can be mentioned that, at the time of a collective project of annihilating the logic of traditional Marxism in the same historico-political conjecture, the Western Marxists developed their mutually antagonistic epistemological construction and politico-ideological practice in order to understand the complex mode of mediation of the capitalist society and its inevitable self-destruction in the course of progression.

The main purpose of a research on 'Western Marxism' will be to make a critical and comparative analysis of various contradictory philosophical discourses within the orbit of Marxism in general. Western Marxists are united in so far as they reject the traditional model of Marxism. But within a broader unity, there is a philosophical war of all against all among the Western Marxists in so far as they conceptualize Hegel-Marx relation in different ways and consequently give different interpretations of Marx's theory of dialectico-historical materialism in the age of modern capitalist social formation. In order to understand homology and difference between different theoretical positions we have, analytically and heuristically, deconstructed the

complex-cognitive map of Western Marxism into numerous currents such as the humanist-cum-philosophical epistemology, the historicist epistemology, the critical rationalist epistemology and the structuralist epistemology.

In the first chapter, designated as 'The Humanist Marxism', an attempt has been made to understand the theoretical formulations of Lukacs and Sartre who have defined society in terms of "Concrete economic complex totality" and "dynamic totalization" respectively. Though Lukacs is neo-Hegelian and Sartre remains an existential-Marxist philosopher, they justify some common postulates like 'the philosophy of man', 'intentional and conscious human action', 'the dialectic of history', 'interpenetration of objective reality and subjective reality in which the former has primacy over the latter', the processes of mediation and reciprocity etc. Lukacs' theorization of dialectic of "identical subject-object" is similar to Sartre's "dialectical nominalism". In the Marxism historical materialism (science) is reduced to dialectical materialism (philosophy).

The Second Chapter is concerned with the epistemological construction of the "Historicist Marxism" which aims at covering the thoughts of Gramsci and Colletti who tell us that Marxism believes in the concepts of "sensuous-practical human being", "human praxis as an agency of transformation", "single-homogeneous evolutionary time scale of all parts of

historical society", "socially and historically determined economic production", "unity between the science of historical man and the science of nature", "historicization of political, economic and ideological practices", and "experimental and demonstrative dimension of historical totality". However, instead of becoming the followers of materialist revolutionary philosophy of Engels and Lenin, they latently pursue the Feuerbachian anthropological problematic of abstract humanism and the philosophical problematic of the Young Marx, though Gramsci settles his relationship with Marx via the Italian neo-Hegelian philosopher like Croce who adheres to the principle of contemporaneity of the historical present; and Colletti comes closer to Marx via Kant who treats reality as an independent and objective entity. We can also notice in the works of Gramsci and Colletti that they have reduced dialectical materialism (philosophy) to historical materialism (science) and, also reduced all practices/levels of society to one master practice of philosophy of praxis (Gramsci) or experimental history (Colletti) which, in turn, is related to the mother practice of politics.

The third chapter known as "The Frankfurt Marxism" deals primarily with the theoretical paradigm of Marcuse and Habermas who announce the phobia of German idealism within the Marxian intellectual place. The Frankfurt School considers Marxism as a critical method by which we can explain the logic of modern techno-scientific totalitarian

social order; be it capitalism of the USA or Stalin's socialism of the USSR. This School believes in "the Hegelian theory of negation of negation" which can be applied to historical totality of society, and nurtured the theses of "teleological labour", "rational totality", "philosophy of human subject", "individual rationality" and "species character of man". Intellectually speaking, Marcuse has been influenced by Hegel, Heidegger and Freud; whereas Habermas operates under the philosophical indexes set by Hegel, Weber, Parsons, Freud and the modern communication theorists.

The fourth chapter will address itself to the "Althusserian Revolution" which consists of the formulation of numerous law-like propositions such as "epistemological break" which identifies the young Marx as a "humanist" and the mature Marx as a "scientist", "structural causality of mode of production" which induces the theses of relative autonomy of superstructure on the one hand and the determination of society by economy in the last instance. On the other, "identification of Dialectical Materialism with philosophy and the Historical Materialism with science", "conceptualization of society in terms of pre-given unevenly-structured-complex-whole articulated in dominance" and "materialist ideology". The anti-historicist and anti-humanist problematic of the Althusserian structural Marxism announces the death of philosophy of man and the suspension of historicism once and for ever.

The fifth and last chapter will make an attempt to give a critical evaluation of mutually contradictory epistemological positions of the Hegelian Humanist-cum-Historicist Marxism and anti-Hegelian Structuralist Marxism. This chapter would like to fix up the points of homology and difference between different Marxisms while focusing its critical attention on the categories of dialectic, base-superstructure relationship, history and subject.

CHAPTER I

THE HUMANIST MARXISTS

The main project of the humanist Marxists such as Lukacs, Korsch and Sartre is to denounce the theses of the hyper-empirical character of natural dialectic and the duality of being and consciousness by reintroducing the Hegelian evolutionary dialectic of identical subject-object into the Marxian discourse. The common elements which unite Lukacs (neo-Hegelian) and Sartre (existential-Marxist) include the conceptualization of Marxism as a single science of humanized nature and naturalized-man, identification of society with the term totality or totalization constructed out of economic and non-economic forces, the definition of man as an embodiment of historical-reason and socially-ascribed intentional acts of consciousness, consideration of history as a man-made project and the development of history in terms of homogenous flow of linear time, and, above all, the description of dialectic of history through the overemphasis on the Hegelian law of negation of negation. The philosophical problematic of methodological individualism of the humanist Marxism has generated the notions of totality (Lukacs) and totalization (Sartre) by which the gap between subject and object is abolished, all contradictions are reduced to single contradiction between essence and existence; and a manifestly homogeneous order is established

as it is a case with the Hegelian homogeneous Absolute Spirit.

In reaction to the principles of intellect and materialism¹ Lukacs and Sartre tried to establish the hegemonic position of concepts like socially-processed economy or worked-matter, dialectical relationship between objective reality and subjective reality, complementary relationship between holism and individualism, between causality and teleology and between society and man; and reinforcement of the self-conscious and critical philosophy of self-emancipation from the bondage of alienation of the capitalist order. Despite their vacillation between Marxist tradition and non-Marxist tradition, the humanist Marxism assigns primacy to totality of social structure over its heterogeneous constitutive parts, and professes the philosophy of revolutionary political praxis of collective subject; though it refuses to accept the logic of "dictatorship of proletariat"² under socialist society due to

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1. L. Colletti, Marxism and Hegel (London:NLB, 1973), p.175.
Note: Colletti says that Hegel has criticized the principles of intellect and materialism in order to establish his theses of dialectic of matter and reason-principle. Since Lukacs represents a neo-Hegelian version of Marxism, it implies that he is equally compelled to criticize the principles of intellect and materialism (my emphasis).
 2. Due to the experience of Stalin's dictatorship in the Soviet Union, Lukacs advocates for democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in place of the term dictatorship of proletariat; while Sartre rejects the term dictatorship of proletariat by calling it absurd and meaningless.

its association with terroristic method, conspiratorial politics and curtailment of individual freedom and liberty. In realist term, we can say that the anthropological problematic of the humanist Marxists generates nothing but a philosophy of utopian messianism and a politics of progressive revolution-restoration; thus they are the philosophers of mediation and imagination par excellence.

In order to give a comprehensive philosophical diagnosis of the modern age, we will separately deal with the Hegelian-Marxism of Lukacs and the existential-Marxism of Sartre who attack the laws of dialectics of nature and materialist reductionism through different routes and epistemological visions.

The Construction of Marxism : Lukacs

Lukacs' intellectual formation is complex one because it is a synthetic product of the philosophical formations of Hegelian dialectic of identical subject-object, Dilthey's life philosophy, Weber's rationalization-theory and Marx's formulation of the fetishism of commodity. But an internal arrangement of Lukacs' ideas from his works "History and Class-consciousness" to that of "ontology of Social Being" can be seen as a movement from an acceptance of epistemological vision of idealism, rooted into the category of social consciousness, to that the epistemological vision of social realism, grounded into the concept of social production and reproduction of concrete historical economic

totality through labour-teleology and humanly-constructed alternative projects. His whole evolutionary developmental order of thought is always characterized by a dialectical tension between the ideas of dictatorship and democracy, between necessity and freedom and between determinism and voluntarism. Analytically, we can deconstruct Lukacs into two parts: (i) the young Lukacs and the mature Lukacs. The young Lukacs of "History and Class-Consciousness" is concerned with the epistemological problematic of social consciousness; whereas the mature Lukacs of "Ontology of Social Being" develops the materialist epistemology on the basis of Marx's entire works. However, it can be noted that Lukacs' mature work does not fully disconnect itself from the edifice of Hegelian philosophy.

(A) The Young Lukacs

In "History and Class Consciousness" Lukacs' methodological investigation of Marx's historical materialism generates three principles: (i) denial of the possibility of dialectic of nature or positive science method to our understanding of social totality; (ii) proletariat as the head and the heart of social consciousness; and proletariat as an identical subject-object of history, and (iii) identification of reification with objectification whose source lies in the fetishism of commodity of the capitalist society which considers every relationship as a relationship

between material things, not as a relationship between actual men.

By registering a protest against the one-sided formal, objectivistic and naturalistic dialectic of Engels, which is concerned with the total quantification of facts at the cost of an erosion of even an interaction between being and consciousness, Lukacs' historical dialectic pleads for a dialectical union of natural science and social science and, moreover, establishes the "dialectical interactional relation³ between subject and object in the historical process". The unity of theory and practice can be achieved by saying that "it is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought".⁴ Theory and practice are united only when consciousness stands in relation to reality. For Lukacs the rigid causality of empirical science is unable to assume the standpoint of the social totality; precisely because of the fact that it only explains facts, not meaningful human action, through certain determinate objective laws and calculative and manipulative techniques. The natural science model approaches human reality not as a totality - a totality that refers to not only a system of things but also a relationship between things - but as a sum of partial facts governed by objective laws. The loss of totality means at the same time

3. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press, 1983), p.3.

4. G. Lukacs, *ibid.*, p.2.

the abolition of historicity. The irrational and unscientific nature of the so-called scientific method consists in its failure to see and take account of the historical character of the facts on which it is based.⁵ In the eyes of Lukacs, Engels has reduced dialectics to the general laws of motion, equally applicable to the external world of nature and the internal human thought; and, in this dialectic, subject of knowledge is not man himself but identity or original unity between thought and beings. The chief demerit of Engels' dialectic, says Lukacs, is that it does not establish the historical character of facts; and even it does not talk about an interaction between subject and object in the historical process. That is the reason, Lukacs writes with full authenticity that "a situation in which the 'facts' speak out unmistakably for or against a definite course of action has never existed, and neither can⁶ or will exist."

In fact, the historico-dialectical epistemology of Lukacs assumes that knowledge is derived from a constant interaction between reality and thought, between the objective social forces and the subjective meaningful human force, and between economic structure and ideological structure within socially-processed complex organic totality. However; in opposition to idealism, Lukacs simply

5. Ibid., p.6.

6. Ibid., p.23.

asserts an ontological priority to social whole over its parts. But his conception of social whole seems to have a Hegelian cast when we see that concrete reality appears as a process of synthesis of many particular determinants. The concrete historical totality is nothing but a synthesization and constellation of numerous particular abstract consciousnesses or ideas; though the whole knowledge of social totality is identified with the proletariat class consciousness and action, since "the superiority of the proletariat must lie exclusively in its ability to see society from the centre, as a coherent whole".⁷ Thus, the proletariat occupies the center of the man-made universe, having created it in the first place but being excluded from its immediate knowledge and enjoyment. The proletariat is the living contradiction of capitalist society; and it must come to understand its class position and class consciousness in total dialectical terms in order to overthrow the tyranny of capitalism and its associated positive science of facts. Lukacs tells us:

Only when a historical situation has arisen in which a class must understand society if it is to assert itself; only when the fact that a class understands itself means that it understands society as a whole and when, in consequence, the class becomes both the subject and object of knowledge; in short, only when these conditions are all satisfied the unity of theory and practice, the precondition of the revolutionary function of the theory, becomes possible.⁸

7. Ibid., p.69.

8. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

Indeed, it is through the privileged class-consciousness of proletariat as a historical subject-object that we can grasp the meaning of totality; and it is through praxis, based on unique class consciousness, that the proletariat becomes able to overthrow the bourgeois material world. For Lukacs, Hegel and Marx share common logic so far as both of them conceive theory as the self-knowledge of reality; but, unlike Marx,⁹ Hegel fails to overcome the duality of thought and being. In capitalist society man must be conscious of himself as a social being as well as the subject and object of the social being. The revolutionary praxis of proletariat, under capitalism, depends on the identification of its growing class consciousness in relation to changing course of historical totality; and growing class consciousness comes into being through the awareness of common objective economic situation by which proletariat surpasses immediacy. The basic characteristic of historical totality is that it is a dynamic entity; because it contains an inherent historical contradiction or tension between essence and existence which can be resolved by "human praxis associated with¹⁰ knowledge".

Thus, Lukacs says that the proletariat is an identical subject-object of history whose class consciousness overcomes the problem of the social relativity of knowledge

9. Ibid., p.16.

10. Ibid., p.177.

and the tendency to conceive alienation as an external objectification of human objectivity. Lukacs makes an analysis of reification with reference to the socio-historical conditions of modern capitalist generalized commodity production. He, frequently, explains reification through the concepts of objectification. The error of Lukacs' interpretation lies in the fact that he has confused two ideas (a) Hegelian conception in which alienation is identified with the objectivity of nature and thus with the externality or heterogeneity of being in relation to thought, and (b) Marx's conception whereby, in contrast, the object is estranged not in that 'it is external', but in that it takes on character of commodity and capital, of wage-labour".¹¹

But it can be said that Lukacs in his 1962 edition of "History and class consciousness" has accepted his error which consists of his "failure to acknowledge the existence of objective reality existing independently of consciousness and his mistake to identify objectivity with alienation".¹²

Whenever Lukacs explains the theory of alienated consciousness, he reduces it not to the Marxian world of commodity economy but to a specific Marxian concept of commodity-fetishism which itself is narrowed down to the conscious phenomena. In other words, he deduces the theory of reification from commodity fetishism and then considers

11. L. Colletti, op. cit., p. 176.

12. G. Lukacs, op. cit., pp. xxi-xxii.

the entire society in terms of a common homogeneous alienated consciousness structure. Lukacs tries to give a Marxian thrust to his Hegelian dialectical principle of identical subject-object when he claims that the moment revolutionary class of proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the existing order, it discloses its secret of existence. The theory of identical subject-object organically associates its survival conditions with the notion of material production of social consciousness. The identical subject-object thesis must be related to the proletariat social class; and the proletariat becomes an identical subject-object in so far as it becomes self aware and class conscious; so far as proletariat knows itself, it changes not only itself but also transforms society as a whole. Social consciousness is nothing but the expression of historical knowledge of the proletariat "which begins with knowledge of the present, with the self-knowledge of its own social situation and with the elucidation of its necessity (i.e. its genesis)".¹³ The course of historical totality is essentially dialectical because of the fact that before men become conscious of the decline of socio-economic formation, its contradictions are fully realized in the objects of its day-to-day action of human subjects. The driving force of history is the proletariat whose class consciousness coincides with the totality of historical knowledge; but it is the revolutionary

13. Ibid., p. 159.

praxis of proletariat through which the actual meaning of reality can be deciphered. The Kantian dualism between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' is resolved by the (Lukacsian) Marxism; because it is an expression and self-knowledge of a social process by which the world is revolutionized, and thus, the subject of that self-knowledge i.e. the proletariat comprehends reality in the very act of transforming it.¹⁴ It is through praxis that we can comprehend, internalize and revolutionize the total volume of social consciousness of a given historical society which entails the element of contradiction between essence and appearance.

We must also note this fact that Lukacs extends the concept of reification much further when he sees the development of modern rationalism in terms of reification.¹⁵ The various branches of rationalism assume that there is something given and hence inexplicable - an impenetrably dark "content" which the form of philosophy cannot illuminate; and "the Kantian thing-in-itself is the best epitomization of this impotence of rationalist philosophy".¹⁶ The thing-in-itself, says Lukacs, is but a reified form of appearance of the commodity of capitalist production-relation. Reified conceptions can be located in the conceptions of an

14. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol.III (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.271.

15. Lukacs, op. cit., p.110.

16. Ibid., p.114.

immutable human nature and fixed economic and social laws. Due to the fragmented character of knowledge, the ruling class of the capitalist society can generate only partial knowledge because of the fact that this class cannot advance its class position due to its immediate relationship to this world. That is why, Lukacs says that meaning of totality can be explained by the consciousness of proletariat which culminates in its recognition of the identity of "subject" (the human being) and "object" (the man-made-world). It is very curious to note that Lukacs attributes the legacy of Marxian historical dialectic of identical subject-object to Hegel who, as some scholars think, gives a different picture while saying that subject and object would remain separate while, at the same time, being united in the dialectic. However, Lukacs, like Hegel, has formulated the dialectic of consciousness and unity of theory and practice within the boundary of historical materialism; and he induces the notion of historical necessity apart from conscious identical subject-object.

By combining Weber's rationalization with Marx's category of fetishism of commodity, Lukacs has introduced the notion of reification which reduces human relations to relations between things. According to Althusserian Marxism the theories of alienation, commodity-fetishism and identical subject-object reflect the ideological presentation of Marxian scientific theory. Althusser relates the theory of exploitation to the concept of surplus value which operates

within the structure (hidden) of mode of production. He goes on to argue that the humanist-Marxists' theorization of the identical subject-object has arisen due to a tendency of identifying the object of knowledge with the real object. Lukacs follows the instruction of Hegel in presenting modern history as a process of self-externalization and objectification of human essence; but he aspires for the recovery of consciousness, a process which moves from the loss of meaning to a broader historical understanding through a revolutionary union of theory and practice. Through historico-dialectical epistemology Lukacs has constructed the notion of concrete totality whose essence lies in the commodity structure and the class-consciousness of proletariat; and it is the class consciousness that makes possible insight into the situation as a whole. The class consciousness, as a potential capacity for insight into the structure of society, plays a constitutive role in terms of the simultaneous processes of understanding and transformation of totality which is "an interesting economic and social totality".¹⁷ Reification of the capitalist society can be overcome "only by constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating it to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions

17. G. Lukacs, *ibid.*, p.15.

for the total development".¹⁸ What Lukacs tries to assert is that the mere existence of the objective expression of historical contradiction between essence and existence within the commodity producing society cannot produce an automatic revolution unless there is an effective intervention by the self-consciousness proletariat in the historical task of that society. In the dialectical totality, the individual elements incorporate the structure of Whole. But it can be noted that the progressive intellectual formation of Lukacs makes a shift from the discourse of reified consciousness to the theory dialectic of history; and from class consciousness to class unconsciousness in terms of historical unconsciousness.

The mature Lukacs

In "the Young Hegel" Lukacs studies the relationship between dialectic and economics through the concept of labour and, at the same time, argues that it is the labour through which a subject is mediated to an object in a given historical setting. Here he is trying to construct a concrete structure of totality on the basis of terms like human praxis, labour and work. He tries to equalize the position of the Marxian dialectic and the concept of externalization with the Hegelian problematic of objective idealism and the concept of externalization by saying that

18. Ibid., p. 197.

"Hegel's maturing philosophy eliminated the concept of 'positivity' and retained the thesis of dialectical relation of the praxis of man in society to the object he has created".¹⁹ Externalization, for Hegel, can be explained through the dialectic of complex subject-object relationship inseparably bound up with economic and social human works, which, in Marx's work, becomes a matter of fetishism. The Hegelian dialectic, which conceives work as the self-creating process of man and labour as a tool for the creation of the history of human species, became instrumental in the development of the immediate proto-type materialist dialectics. According to Lukacs, theoretical formulation of the Hegelian dialectic of matter silently couched Marx in such a manner that he finalized the incomplete fate of the (Hegelian) dialectic by applying it to the concrete historically-specific economic production of society; and by placing the concept of alienation, derived from commodity fetishism, in the centre of materialist philosophy.

But, as we move from the works of the early objective idealist Lukacs to that of the mature realist Lukacs, we find that a distinction is made between the revolutionary premise of the Hegelian dialectic of method and its conservative system i.e., the structure of Idea within which dialectic operates. In "ontology", social production and reproduction

19. G.Lukacs, The Young Hegel, London Merlin Press, 1975, p. 538.

of life is explained by labour-teleology which mediates relationships between man and nature and between man and society. Thus Lukacs recognizes a double determination of human beings - in part by natural necessity and in part by man's ability to rise up the challenges of nature and to choose between alternatives. The ideology, involved in labour process, means that although the aim is set and determined by the human being, the result always brings with it an element of unrecognized and unintended objective consequence. Further, contradictions of human development are ontological and not simply the effect of reified consciousness.

In fact, after having dissatisfied with his early formulation of epistemological approximation of consciousness-structure, Lukacs in his text "The ontology of Social Being" seeks to identify the notion of totality as a complex structure consisting of the process of mediation and reciprocal interaction between economic base and ideological-cum-cultural superstructure. According to him the traditional Marxist like Plekhanov has given us a mechanistic and fatalistic over-extended of economic necessity by counterposing social being and social consciousness; whereas Marx has never done this; and he has simply, in reaction to idealism, asserted "the ontological priority of social being over consciousness".²⁰ In the social production and

20. G. Lukacs, The Ontology of Social Being 2. Marx (London: Merlin Press, 1982), p. 150.

reproduction of totality, the economic base (content) and the ideological superstructure (form) cannot survive without taking a support from each other. Consciousness does not have an epiphenomenal character but a decisive socio-ontological relevance. All human societies have to consider economic sphere (terrain of necessity) as the essence of the process of reproduction of human species, however; they can vary from one another in their respective domain of phenomenal ideological structure (terrain of contingency). The reason for phenomenal variation between human societies lies in the construction and fixation of naturally-limited alternative teleological projects which refer to "a goal positing consciousness"²¹. Even in socialism there is an ontological priority of economic sphere whose alternative teleological project strikes a balance between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. The organic totality of social beings, which emerge out of an interaction between the natural necessity and the social necessity and work through institutions and ideology (forces of mediation) on the one hand, and "indissoluble intertwined categories of labour, speech, co-operation and division of labour"²² on the other hand, is an objective economic reality which supposes the construction of heterogeneous parts and relationships coupled with the laws of uneven development of parts.

21. Lukacs, The Ontology of Social Being 3 Labour (London: Merlin Press, 1980), p. 5.

22. Ibid., p.i.

The supposed mediation between the science of man and the science of nature, on the basis of teleological labour, further gives us this instruction that there are two ontological positions for the construction of sociality of human beings (1) there is a humanization of man through labour as 'necessity in reality' and the essential sphere of economy is realized through human mediations; and (2) the continuity of human history is assured by the objectifications of needs, abilities and activities. But, at the same time, the field of conscious human operation determines alternative possibilities whose solution decides the course of development of the historical totality. This is the point where Lukacs criticizes the traditional Marxism which has replaced the alternative teleological model of labouring human being by a mechanical conception of necessity and economic reductionism. Lukacs' rejection of the naturalistic conception of economic growth helps him in the theorization of historical determinism of totality in which the range of movements of human beings, born into ready-made conditions, is limited by a narrow or broad circle of possibilities and alternatives. The self-formation and self-regulation of social beings must rely on this fact that it is not the natural determinations that are important, but an ontological mixture of naturalness and sociability. And it is the internal and immanent historical contradiction between essence and existence and between the forces of production and the relations of production which must be treated as the

motor for the movement of always dynamic complex totality in which the "real complex has ontological priority over its components"²³. On the developmental character of social being, Lukacs has asserted that "the economy is the only basis, only what is ontologically primary, and that it gives rise to the human capacities and the forces of social complexes that actually produce the realization of what is economically necessary, which accelerate, reinforce, promote its development as social reality, and in certain circumstances can also inhibit or divert it"²⁴. It is though the ideological consciousness and organized political class struggle that the alienated labourers of capitalist order can assert their action for the formation of an alternative teleological model of economic structure through the socialist revolution.

But in "The ontology of Labour" Lukacs seems to have told us that the goal of the labour process always appears as something given; and the alternatives for the working individual are restricted to a choice of means and method for achieving the pre-established goal, and in this situation the social consciousness and alternative may or may not correspond to the objective social possibilities. Economic practice within a complex totality is so dynamic and powerful that it determines the movement of other elements of the same totality and thus, the development of economic essence is

23. G. Lukacs, 1982 op cit, p.139

24. Ibid., p. 161.

independent of human activity. If ideology is determined by the circumstances of its origin, as Lukacs would like to say, then it is identical with sociability or with reality itself. One of the central problems with Lukacs is that he fails to analyse the relation of law and property, apart from his inadequate explanation of political economy of Marx. The whole concept of division of labour remains unclarified when we find that Lukacs has explained several sources of division of labour such as the origin of the division of labour with the origin of handicrafts, with the technical division of labour, and with the separation of mental and physical labour.

Lukacs is so influenced by the Hegelian philosophy that he makes this proposition that "Hegel's logic which Marx took is based on an inseparable intellectual union of logic and ontology"²⁵ and goes on to say that the "identical subject-object and the transformation of substance into subject are the vehicles of the transformation of the ontological totality into a system of logic"²⁶. The relationship between subject and object is mediated by labour; and it is the model of labour as social practice that becomes the referential point of Marx's materialist philosophy. Hegel has dissolved the old rigid opposition in ontology between the transcendently directed teleology and an exclusive dominance of causality by founding the concept of labour-

25. G. Lukacs, *The ontology of Social Being: Hegel* London: Merlin Press, 1978, p.20

26. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

teleology as the existential condition of social being. The Hegelian ontology considers reality as a totality of complexes whose absolute development and concrete synthesization can be explained by the dialectical laws of fusion, fission, the identity of identity and non-identity. Marx's materialist treatment of ontology gives a more scientific explanation of social reality by considering it as a heterogeneously constructed complex-economic-whole which has an ontological priority over the structure of consciousness. In fact, "Marx's economics always starts from the totality of social being and always flows back again into it."²⁷ However, it can be pointed out that the parts of totality cannot be separated out analytically and studied in isolation, but are bound to one another by mutual and irreducible interdependence. The category of totality is also tied to the idea of mediation which establishes structural homology between the economic base and the ideological-cum-social superstructure.

Thus, we find that the whole intellectual enterprise of Lukacs creates the theoretical ground for the rejection of dialectic of nature, mechanical materialist explanation of reality and positivist-cum-empiricist epistemology; and, at the same time, the acceptance of theses like the historical dialectic of social consciousness, mutual conditioning of

27. G. Lukacs, op cit, 1982, p.12

base and superstructure, labour as a model of social practice, the Hegelian laws of identical subject-object, negation of negation and the simple contradiction between essence and appearance, and consideration of ideology and culture as a real constitutive practice for the social production and reproduction of economic structure. For Lukacs, Marx's "single science of history",²⁸ which embraces the whole of human history (politics, economics, ideology, laws etc.) and establishes a bond between epistemology and ontology by considering the social being as an objective heterogeneously-structured complex whole where there is an ontological priority of whole over its constitutive parts. However, it can be pointed out, in the final analysis, that Lukacs tries to convert his intellectual consciousness and moral commitment into the realization of the Marxian goal of achieving revolutionary union of theory and practice through expressing himself with the help of Hegelian problematic of absolute idealism. On the political side, Lukacs moves towards the pole of revisionism which consists of his thesis of reform and the consolidation of existing gains, not a thesis of revolutionary transformation of the capitalist order and, at the same time, the creation of hegemony of the dictatorship of proletariat under the socialist construction of society. Lukacs' adherence to the principles of romantic

28. Ibid., p. 10.

subjectivism and the Hegelian dialectic of matter comes, as Althusser would like to say, from his tendency to overemphasize the early works of Marx which remain a prisoner to the anthropological problematic of abstract humanism. The agenda of an abstract personal humanism is also attested by the Sartrean existential Marxism.

The Model of Existential Marxism: Sartre

In opposition to a priori existence of Engels' dialectics of nature, Sartre, like Lukacs, explains social reality as a totalization which is based on an intersection between a plurality of individual consciousness and praxis. The entire demonstration of the intelligibility of every human reality can be made by the phenomenological-cum-historical epistemology which explains consciousness in relation to the object of external reality. As a philosopher of "the philosophy of man and his liberation", Sartre does not consider Engels' epitomization of the dialectics of nature and Stalin's unqualified faith in the dictatorship of the proletariat as the genuine message of the Marxian libertarian philosophy; because their philosophy suppresses the categories of dialectics of history, intentional acts of consciousness and the proletariat as the collective subject of History. The construction of collective subject stems from a synthesization and collectivization of a multiplicity of reciprocal communications and relations between the concrete persons; and the self-evidential and intelligible

character of history can be understood in terms of a double movement of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality. If we look at the dynamic thought-process of Sartre over a historical period of time, we immediately grasp this point that his intellectual entrepreneurship progressively moves from "struggle of consciousness" in human subject to that of "totalization of praxis" by worked-matter, from "Hell is other people" to that of "Marxian humanism", from "the philosophy of man" to that of "the dialectic of history and society"; and from "the passive contemplative thought" to that of "the revolutionary politics of violence."

Sartre starts his philosophical discourse from the philosophy of man which we find in his the most celebrated existential text, "Being and Nothingness" and, eventually, he comes down to the theories of dialectical interpenetration between things and men and between ideological order and concrete socio-economic reality which can be explained in terms of the logic of objective possibility, totalization, social class and material scarcity which we come across in his existential-Marxist text "critique of Dialectical reason". Sartre's early works are obsessed with the cognitive experience of the repressive world in the form of sickness, bad faith of mediocrity, contrast between the world as imagined and the world as experienced; and the philosophy of liberation of the essence of man from the dehumanized-existence of social order. In his book 'Psychology of

Imagination' Sartre tries to postulate the theory of phenomenological psychology where consciousness is inevitably associated with the intersubjective discourse of the world; and the formation of a specific image corresponds to and is determined by consciousness in social situation. Positing of the image is an exercise of the freedom of consciousness to transcend the situation in which it finds itself, as Sartre has pointed out that "in order to imagine, consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a "being-in-the-world which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world".²⁹ The whole business of the intentional imaginative act moves towards the constitution, isolation and nihilation of the existing unreal world. The unreal world is doubly annihilated in a sense that the freedom of consciousness negates the world in relation to self and self in relation to the world. Similarly; the fundamental philosophical corpus of Sartre's text "Transcendence of the Ego" is grounded into the ontology of existing individuals, although he claims that there is no such thing as subjectivity; there is only interiorization of exteriority.

In fact, what we visualize in the early writings of Sartre is that his entire conceptual apparatus is encircled by the crown of Hegelian, Heideggerian and Husserlian

29. Jean Paul Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p.269.

philosophical discourses. The structuration of Sartre's text "Being and Nothingness" emerges under the instruction of the Hegelian dialectical philosophy which assumes an atemporal antithesis between consciousness and external world, a contrast between subject and object; and an antinomy between what Sartre calls the two modes of being the "in-itself" and the "for-itself". The category of the 'for-itself' signifies pure consciousness and free-subjectivity; whereas the concept of the "in-itself" corresponds to substance considered as a self contained objective world. In Hegel, being and nothingness are dialectically opposed to each other; Hegelian being and nothing are contraries, the extremes of logical series going all the way from affirmation to denial; whereas Sartrian Being and Nothingness are contradictories³⁰ and thus it implies that, logically, nothingness is subsequent to being since it is being, first, posited then denied. Nothingness is a function of being not the other way round, because "consciousness is prior to nothingness and "is³¹ derived" from being.

It can be also pointed out that it is through mediation that human situation establishes the relationship between the "world of objects" and the "order of consciousness" which coincides with the relation between being and nothingness.

30. Peter Caws Sartre (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p.69.

31. J.P. Sartre. Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p.16.

From the angle of consciousness, the objective world appears as a world of pure possibility and boundless variability; and consciousness must be able to posit the world in its synthetic totality or totalization from which freedom can be achieved if consciousness is free. In Heideggerian twist Sartre describes human existence as a continual project of self-realization; because man is what he does and man is free because he exists not in-himself but for-himself and "respect for the other's freedom is an empty world"...³²"for-itself abandons its claim to realize any union with the other".

For Sartre freedom and responsibility are inscribed in human existence and consciousness and, virtually, man's freedom consists in his nature as world-constituting, world-nihilating and world-surpassing capacities. The revolutionary existential philosophy of Sartre establishes this premise that the power of nihilation and negation of repressive reality is projected by human praxis, project, and sustaining choice whose essence lies in a complex of reason and intentional consciousness. By treating freedom and responsibility as the alternative description of consciousness itself, Sartre says that responsibility means consciousness as authorship and freedom signifies consciousness as nihilating choice; and the mediation between these two is done by propounding the theory of human reality as presence to self. This existential-phenomenology

32. Ibid., pp. 531, 532.

in Sartre's early work presents a world view in which 'in-itself' and 'for-itself', objective objects and human freedom clash directly. Freedom is considered as an essence of existence.

The humanized and privatized Sartrean world, as a totality of beings, underlines this argument that man is so master libertarian that he is condemned to be free with a permanent human nature. The determination of Sartre's moral posture appears when he tells us that man alone is responsible for what he is/does, since to blame someone is to deny his ability to change the course of history. Thus, there arises a new thesis what Althusser explains by saying that 'it is a man who, by projecting himself-into-the future, transcends his place in a world by the liberty of his project'.³³ In brief, "Being and Nothingness" is based upon the existential-cum-phenomenological treatment of the ontology of individualism which gives immense strength to a little-god-man to liberate, first, himself and, then, the others through praxis. In this book Sartre cannot be treated as a precursor of Marxism because he provokes only the theory of solitary individual and consciousness which cannot be incorporated within the Marxian scientific knowledge based on the concepts of the materially structured social whole, the class struggle, the state, the proletariat; and the science of history. when concrete political questions are posed, his

33. L. Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism (London: NLB, 1976), p.59.

philosophy takes an academic refuse; for Sartre never joined politics, but had been pushed towards politics by events and chances. We constantly fail to understand as to how his philosophy of individual's lived-experience can help us to our retrospective understanding of an incomplete historical totality.

The turning point, Sartre represented in the formation of Marxian philosophical corpus, can be located in his methodological text "critique of Dialectical Reason" in which he generates the theses of historical totality, dialectical nominalism, contradiction inherent in the system of production, collective praxis, social dimension of existential anthropology and social class. However, he gives a humanist critique of scientific-economic reductionist model of historical materialism which creates the problem of reconciling freedom and necessity; and ultimately suppresses the questions of ethics, individual-freedom and human-values in the service of objective-rules and procedures about the orders of facts. Sartre ridicules the project of the traditional Marxists' model of material reductionism or economic monism by commenting that "the supreme paradox of historical materialism is that it is, at one and the same time, the only truth of History and a total indetermination of the Truth; the totalizing thought of historical materialism has established everything except its own

existence".³⁴ The chief demerit of this model is that it reduced the dialectics of thought and history to the structure of irreducible material condition of existence; and its economic monism results into "the dualism of Being and Truth".³⁵ The ideological support of the dogmatic materialist epistemology stems from Engels' natural dialectic which operates within the domain of facts, understands the emergence and evolution of Being according to its own legal protocols; and determines the scientific casual relationship between facts, not a historical causation between man and matter as well as between man and man. If dialectic is divorced from thought and historical action, then the formulation of a mere experimental dialectics of nature can be treated only as what Sartre phrases "an external, apriori, hyperempirical and non-dialectical"³⁶ method; and it is because of the fact that it provides us with a positivistic game which sees an opposition between facts and values; and, by rejecting values, it sees objective connections between facts on the basis of procedures like comparison, analogy, abstraction etc. Necessity is expressed through dialectical hyper-empiricism and apriorism within the domain of being, and it is claimed that human history has to comply with the determinate mechanical laws of natural history. This mode of

34. Jean Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason (London: NLB, 1976), p.19.

35. J.P. Sartre, *ibid.*, pp.25-26.

36 *Ibid.*, pp.34-35.

scientific explanation of crude facts and the logic of analytical philosophy are totally rejected by Sartre's dialectical rationality which prescribes a permanent dialectical unity between necessity and freedom, between man and matter, between man and history and, above all, between being and knowledge which "elucidates the movement of the real and that of our knowledge and it also elucidates the one by the other".³⁷ Further, Sartre elaborates his position by saying that "if dialectical Reason is the Reason of History, then it means that man must be controlled by the dialectic in so far as he creates it and creates it in so far as he is controlled by it."³⁸ Thus what we find in the works of Sartre is that there should not be any dualism between being and knowledge; rather the movement of knowledge-formation and the movement of object are dialectically united with each other under the body of historical totality. It is possible to argue that being is both prior to and identical with knowledge so long as knowledge is understood to reside within being. The historical dialectic is based on this proposition that the existence of material world and human world entails a homogeneous equal status in a sense that both of them mediate, influence and condition each other. Thought must discover its existential necessity in its material world dominated by scarcity and necessity and, at the same time, it

37. Ibid., p. 20.

38. Ibid., p. 36.

must discover itself in so far as it is itself a material being.

In Sartre's dialectic, negation of negation is a master code for comprehending and transforming the world of material scarcity; but it cannot be done unless there is a provision of human praxis. Sartre's humanly constructed historical world gives this formulation of the recovery of man's power in the construction of history; and it entails this law that the movement of history must be explained in terms of a shift from one objectivity to another objectivity through subjectivity which refers to a moving unity of subjectivity and objectivity. The wheel of history is turned by totalizing human project which strikes a balance between collective praxis and individual praxis. Every praxis both affirms and negates the other, in so far as it transcends it as its object, and also causes itself to be transcended by it.

Sartre always tries to resolve the assumed tension between the methodological individualism and methodological collectivism or between the dialectic of individual praxis and the constituted dialectic of institutional ensembles on the basis of conceptual formulations of the notions like totalization, comprehension, negation, mediation, temporalization and the logic of praxis. Dialectical thinking does not consider society as what Durkheim calls, collective consciousness/hyper-organism but as a meaningful

totality constructed by individual praxis; and a balance between individualism and holism is established by the concept of "dialectical nominalism",³⁹ as long as it is a conflation of the individual and collective subject.

The concept of totalization refers to a practical synthesizing activity. It transforms a multiplicity of elements into an emerging dynamic whole which, in turn, serves the goal of understanding of a historical action by multiplying the mediation between the meaningful elements. According to historical materialism if totalization is a historical process, it comes to men through matter. Sartre's focus is on totalizing whole, not on totality; because "a totalizing praxis cannot totalize itself as a totalized element".⁴⁰ The process of totalization can be comprehended by human awareness and knowledge that is itself totalizing. Totalization is a concrete, historical, positive and meaningful entity, since its birth depends upon a multiplicity of reciprocal actions between actual persons having common intends, project and praxis. However, it can be asserted that "the dialectical rationality of common praxis⁴¹ does not transcend the rationality of individual praxis". As an existential Marxist, Sartre assigns primacy to praxis and worked-matter over materialism and tries to manage the affairs of Marxism by saying that the maturation of the

39. Ibid., p. 37.

40. Ibid., p.373.

41. Ibid., p.538.

objective contradictions between the forces of production and relations of production is resolved by the praxis of a collective subject i.e. the proletariat. The whole matrix of dialectical reason is encircled by the Hegelian principle of negation of negation which pursued Sartre to observe that the problematic of negative activity of matter is the basis of those objective, negative exigencies whereby "machines create men" i.e. in which man becomes the product of his own product. There is dynamic negative dialectical relationship between "action as the negation of matter and matter as the negation of action",⁴² and it is the material conversion of consciousness into organic praxis that becomes a driving force of the homogeneous historical expressive totalization in which "man is mediated by things to the same extent as things are mediated by man".⁴³ In fact, there is an eternal bond between constituent dialectic and the constituted dialectic through mediation in history.

In Sartre's dialectic, temporalization is a crucial concept because it is said that dialectic as a movement of reality collapses if time is not dialectic, and time, as a concrete quality of history, is made by men on the basis of their original temporalization. In fact "totalization is temporalization"⁴⁴ and it advances in a spiral movement: the part is continuously reinterpreted in the light of future as

42. Ibid., p. 159.

43. Ibid., p. 79.

44. Ibid., p. 53.

intended but unrealized totality. The logic of dialectical reason assumes an "identity between dialectic itself and praxis" and, at the same time, asserts that the language of totalization is an expression of an identity between an individual lived-experience and the total volume of historical knowledge. Sartre gives this argument that "the dialectic, as the practical consciousness of an oppressed class struggling against its oppressor, is a reaction which is produced in the oppressed by the divisive tendency of oppression"⁴⁵. But the fact remains that Sartre's concept of the generalizing synthesis - a thesis developed by dialectic reasons - fails to reconcile the epistemology of vision and epistemology of praxis, if we pose the real, concrete economic and political problems as a basic source of knowledge-formation and articulation.

In Sartre's universe of an objective possibility and impossibility, the concepts of praxis and mediation play a significant role in a sense that they act as a master concept through which human history is created and transformed; and, hence, a world is supposed to be an internally connected whole-in-the-making but a product of intentional energy. The praxis philosophy explains inter-connecting relationships among human beings in both ontological context, related to the concept of practico-inert mediation, and the historical

45. Ibid., p.803.

context, related to (either natural or induced) material scarcity. Practico-inert is the domination of man by worked-matter; and it is at this point where Sartre linked practico-inert necessity to the Marxian thesis that man is a product of his own product. The story of dehumanized man is like this that man produces tool and technology with an intention to create a beautiful civilization; but an unintended effect of an intended action comes when the man-made technology dominates a man's cognition and negates his existence by throwing him out of the production process. In fact, Sartre is concerned with alienation as necessity in the material world of scarcity. The reign of necessity is the domain of reality in which inorganic materiality envelopes human multiplicity and transforms the producers into its product. In this situation, social relationship between the collective subject is mediated by both: unity and separation principles in the domain of interest. Otherness or alterity is the essential feature of practico-inert. While explaining the dialectic of interest/destiny of a socio-economic class as a part of practico-inert, Sartre explains interest as being-outside-oneself-in-a-thing in so far as it conditions praxis as a categorical imperative. Need of the atomic individuals becomes interest when it involves a collective subject. For example, the unity of the property ownership class (the capitalist class as a collective subject) lies in the institution of private property, and this interest of the capitalist class generates a counter-interest of the working

class. Property constitutes the unity-in-exteriority of the bourgeoisie, at once its strength and its vulnerability, thus we ultimately come to this point that the interest of the bourgeois is the destiny of the proletariat.

So far as the thesis of material scarcity is concerned, it is affirmed that it constitutes a fundamental fact of human history which unites men in their actions to overcome it, and divides them in their competition over limited resource. For Sartre scarcity determines nature as the negation of man from the start and history as the anti-nature. The struggle against scarcity generates the division of labour and the struggle between classes. Under the conditions of material scarcity and practico-inert, the relationship of man to nature as well as to his fellows has been the relationship of constant struggle and violence. Violence is interiorized scarcity. These relationships are characterized by implacable opposition or what Sartre calls "alterity" and the relation of alterity gives rise to serialized ensembles in which individuals are indifferent or hostile to the aims of their neighbours. The alternative to the series is the group-in-fusion whose members have common purpose and project; and on the basis of common project and praxis workers form a group-in-fusion during the historical time of mass revolutionary upheaval and transformation of society. Thus, Sartre defines the concreteness of social whole through the concept of praxis and the notion of practico-inert which, in turn, give rise to social relations

of sameness and otherness respectively. Group-in-fusion is an example of praxis mediation. He considers class struggle as an object of history and explains the theory of emerging class struggle by a dialectic of interest/destiny in a practico-inert field of scarcity. In opposition to his early thesis of the identification of seriality with unfreedom, Sartre in his "Critique of Dialectical Reason" defines individual freedom in terms of freedom-in-situation or freedom-in-the-group. Men are united on the basis of a common object and objective; and the whole electric current of mediation operates when an individual attempts to unify and internalize the multiplicity of others' expectations and interests in his practical action. The interiorization of multiplicity is a practical accommodation of one's project to our project; and this is the ethos of dialectical nominalism. Praxis gives rise to quasi-object and quasi-subject, and the reciprocal relationship between them is mediated by group-in-a-given-situation. The whole experience of an individual in-a-group represents an expression of a materialized effect. Hell is the society which can be overcome by collective human action and co-operative enterprise of creative human beings.

An entire survey of sartrian philosophical diagnosis of the modern world informs us that he focuses his attentions on the concepts of "facticity leading to scarcity",

"inauthenticity to sociability", and from the instability of
 the 'for-itself', 'in-itself' to that of the fused-group".⁴⁶

He also moves from the philosophy of Cogito to that of materiality of existential anthropology. His dialectic is a progressive-regressive method. The method is progressive because it looks at the specific aims, intentions and projects which human agents form and which they give meaning to their actions. It is regressive because it incorporates the material conditions within which those objectives are pursued. But his existential Marxism does not pay much attention to the alienated and contradictory social life of all class-divided societies; since his theoretical premise remains confined to the circle of the isolated individuals, individual's despair and philosophy of solipsism and subjectivity. Sartrean philosophy of consciousness, it seems, is threatened by solipsism; and his emphasis on the individual and the problematic of individual existence blocks⁴⁷ the way to a treatment of concrete social structures.

In Sartrean Marxism the philosophy of man becomes more important as compared to the science of social structure. After the end of World War-II, Sartre, however, explains the proletarian revolution as a transcendental project of the workers' movement, a project whose opposition to the

46. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976), p.57.

47. Bernhard Waldenfels, Jan.M. Broekman and Ante Pazanin (ed.), Phenomenology and Marxism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p:18.

capitalist exploitative and reified-relations of production opens the way for human self-determination. But there is a provision of a collective responsibility without a collective subject.

Of course; the Marxian humanism of Sartre highlights the concepts of objective possibility and material scarcity as the decisive factors in the construction of human history and treats contradictions within economic conditions as a driving force of history. But he, soon, translates contradictions into 'obscure constraints' and 'exigencies' in order to maintain the primacy of individual praxis over the ethos of economic determinism coupled with natural dialectic. His theory of history assumes that history is the work of men if they are free; and it is the free and conscious men who replace the fractured meaning (interest/destiny) of oppressive and exploitative praxes of contemporary capitalist society within the ethical and social humanism of socialism. The basic building bloc of ethical socialism will be erected by the philosophy of liberated individuals' will not by the dictatorship of proletariat. In the final tabulation, Sartre appears as a philosopher of transcendental mediation and imagination who, though he does hard labour to strike a virtual alliance between individualism and holism through dialectical nominalism, ultimately fails to link the Marxist thesis of economic determinism of the society, in the last instance, to his most celebrated philosophy of individual's absolute freedom and gospel of responsibility. Sartre tries

to transform his early theory of human liberation into a philosophy of individual practical violence. But in the actual sense, an individual praxis, dissociated from an organized scientific politics of a party, can create only the romanticization of violence. However, Sartre tries to maintain his Marxist position by claiming that the reconstruction of dialectical intelligibility of the material mediation can be made out of individual praxes; and it is the intelligibility of historical process by which an individual can be seen as the alienated agent of history. If an individual is fully passive and explained by materially structured whole, then socialism as the socialization of man can never coincide with socialism as the humanization of the social. Despite his presentation of humanist breed of Marxism, Sartre suffers from various dilemmas, contradictions and ambiguities in his own theory of existential Marxism. Dilemmas and contradictions can be reflected in the perpetual tension between determinism and voluntarism, between historical subject and isolated individual subject, between social structure and man, between collective praxis and individual praxis; and between necessity and freedom. This has happened because he is himself a product of contradictory mixture of Marxism and existentialism in which the former is considered as a mechanism to overcome the perennial problem of material scarcity, and the latter is treated as a philosophy of liberation of man in a situation where material scarcity disappears. But we must counter Sartre's Malthusian postulate of material scarcity by saying that

scarcity is the product of the capitalist exploitative production system; it is not a fact of nature.

The common bonds, which Lukacs and Sartre share, include the dissociation of the Hegelian-Marxist revolutionary historical dialectic from the ethos of economic determinism and natural philosophy of the classical Marxists, the recovery of the status of man and his consciousness within the orbit of Marxism, creation of reciprocal relationship between being and consciousness and affirmation of the law of negation of negation. However, the humanizing character of Marxism is developed by Lukacs through his association with Hegel, Weber and the young Marx; whereas Sartre claims himself to be a master of dialectical humanism by making a romantic alliance with Hegel, Heidegger and Husserl. Indeed, both of them are committed humanists; even their intention is good. But what counts much in the domain of workers' movement is not an intention but an effect of theoretical construction. When the concrete political and economic questions are posed against their philosophical discourses, Lukacs and Sartre quickly shift their areas of operation from the revolutionary political practice to that of the transformative political manifesto. They are basically concerned with personal humanism and an ethical individualism, not with the class humanism and the dictatorship of proletariat.

In sum, the humanist problematic of Lukacs and Sartre is basically grounded into the master theoretical codes of negation of negation identical subject-object, expressive simple dynamic totality, anti-dualism between being and consciousness, dialectics of history and thought, human rationality and creative consciousness of human agency. Liberty, individuality, autonomy, praxis, project, goal-positing labour, consciousness and reason constitute the basic constitutive elements of the humanist problematic of Marxism. We can infer four interrelated propositions from the complex structure of the humanist Marxism: (i) social structure is represented as a homogeneous entity in which all parts are bound together with one another through the concept of mediation (ii) all contradictions of social structure are ultimately reduced to a simple contradictions between essence (freedom of man) and existence (unfree-world of matter) (iii) the developmental character of man-made-history can be explained through the concept of simple homogeneous flow of evolutionary linear time-continuum, and (iv) there is a dilectical interaction between the science of man and the science of nature, between objective factor and subjective factor, and between holism and individualism. All these theoretical formulations are opposed to the Althusserian Marxism which proposes the theories of unevenly-structured complex whole, multiple contradictions, complex multidimensional historical time scale and the structural casuality of mode of production.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICIST MARXISTS

Radical affirmation of the various modalities of historicist Marxism has been the most pronounced feature of the Italian intellectual tradition which was originated by Labriola and Croce; and strengthened in more scientific form by Gramsci and Colletti. The major concern of this school is to represent a radical version of theoretico-practice of Marxism by interpreting the dialectical movement of consciousness in the concretized-historical existence of social formation. Historicist Marxists criticize the philosophy of natural science and the mechanical theory of matter in the most rigorous forms by asserting this argument that it is not the mechanical forces that can comprehend the dynamic character of concrete, real and practice-historical existence of human society; rather the dialectic of history can be logically ascertained by mediating a relationship between the science of man and the science of society through conscious human will. Although historicism has been expressed in different variant forms, its invariant theoretical structure can be deduced into certain analytically distinct premises. First of all, like the essential feature of the Hegelian totality, the historicist Marxists like Gramsci and Colletti have narrowed down the 'essential' distinction between different levels or practices such as philosophical, scientific, political and economic by reducing them into one master practice of concrete history.

The concept of philosophy of praxis (Gramsci) or experimental structure of history (Colletti) assumes a homogeneous circular relationship between philosophy, real historical politics and economics which manifest themselves in an identical way, since they are the different expressions of the same historical content of a given society at a given point of time. Secondly, the historicist Marxists profess the thesis of the contemporaneity of the historical present and go on to say that the present real history must give its own critique of consciousness so that one can read the truth in the empirical apparent character of history. The science of consciousness contains a real criticism of the present concrete history. In fact science of history and the structure of consciousness are one and the same. The structure of science exists in the visible part of experience, for there is no distinction between the object of knowledge and the real empirical world. **The** different levels of society ^{are reduced} to one-another in such a way that the present of each of them coincides with the presents of all the others. Unlike the Althusserian Marxism, the historicist Marxists reduce dialectical materialism (philosophy) to historical materialism (science) and try to build up a systematic theory by real and concrete experimental structure of the historical reality. The whole problematic of the historicist Marxists is characterized by a strong demand of the historicization of philosophy, science, ideology, politics and economic production. Truths are "time-bound" and "space-bound"; since

as human consciousness changes with the movement of real history, truth also changes its form. Since the historicist Marxism explains reality in terms of the concepts of human nature, human need and human rationality, what necessitates the acceptance or the rejection of some knowledge-claim is ultimately whether it fulfills or helps fulfill the human need that motivated the endeavour from which the claim arose. It is important to note that the liberal sociology of Max Weber also provokes the logic of historicism when it relates the emergence of rationality in all sectors of western society to the demand of historically induced human need and necessity. However, the historicist Marxists, unlike the liberal socialologists' preoccupation with meaningful social action and rational consciousness, give a concrete version of social reality by saying that human consciousness has a material base. But the material structure of society (i.e. system of economic production) is itself historicized since the movement of material life is organically associated with the movement of concrete history of society. Thus in opposition to metaphysical and idealist version of history, the historicist Marxists present a realist version of history by establishing a union between economics, politics and philosophy. Further historicist Marxists develop this thesis that all parts of society follow the logic of identical simple evolutionary historical-time. On the epistemological design of historicist Marxist, Althusser has pointed out that the reduction and identification of the peculiar history of science to the history of organic ideology and politico-

economic history ultimately reduces science to history as its "essence". The collapse of science into history here is no more than the index of a theoretical collapse: a collapse that precipitates the theory of history into real reality; reduces the (theoretical) object of the science of history to real history; and therefore confuses the object of knowledge with the real object. This collapse is nothing but a collapse into empiricist ideology, with the roles in this presentation played by philosophy and real history.

Thirdly, Gramsci and Colletti have used the terms 'historical bloc' and 'determinate totality' respectively to show this fact that base/economic structure and superstructure/social stage of economic structure are organically linked to each other; mediate each other; condition each other and direct each other. This assertion goes against the ethos of either economic determinism or technological determinism of the 2nd International which conceives revolution as an automatic expression of the mature economic contradiction between the forces of production and relations of production. A counter-signature against the protocol of the economistic/deterministic model of Marxism is laid down by the historicist Marxists when they announce that Marxism, as a science of history, is basically concerned with the theses like philosophy of concrete-historical man, creative role of human praxis, historically-conditioned economic production, revolutionary political practice and a judicious combination of objective factors and subjective

factors for the generation of revolutionary transformation of society. The other major premises of the historicist Marxism include the construction of homogeneous evolutionary time-scale reflected in all parts of social formation, the establishment of a theoretical identity between the works young Marx and the works of old Marx i.e. an identity between "1844 Manuscripts" and "Capital", and an explanation of capitalist social relationship in terms of the concept of alienation.

The best expression of the historicist epistemology has been made by the two Italian Marxist philosophers: Gramsci and Colletti, the former has consciously or unconsciously pursued the legacy of 'the Historical Hegel' via Croce; whereas the latter has adopted a hostile attitude to the Hegelian dialectic of matter which aims at the annihilation and destruction of the real world. However, both of them, latently, try to provide a historical version of Marxian discourse in which society becomes a homogenous expressive historical totality.

THE GRAMSCIAN MARXISM

The genesis of the Gramscian historicist epistemological discourse announces its most sustained polemical dialogue with Engels' dialectics of nature, Bukharin's sociologism and Croce's idealist philosophy of praxis. Gramsci's hostility to positivism and natural science model of Marxism on the one hand; and to pure voluntarism and solipsism erected by

idealist philosophers on the other, led him to formulate that Marxism has no association with the metaphysical origin of matter; rather it is a revolutionary philosophy of praxis associated with practico-historical role of ideology and science. Gramsci's obsession with the scientific theory of history gives this idea that there is a homogenous identical relationship among philosophy, politics, economics and history. In other words, Gramsci stresses a dialectically regulated historical relationship between the science of man and the science of matter; and goes on to establish the credential of twin interrelated concepts of the concrete-historicization of philosophy and an identity of philosophy and practical politics which constitute the polished seed of the philosophy of praxis, whose speciality consists in an organic bond between theoretical practice and practical action.

In the light of the operation of concrete economic, political and ideological orders of the Italian society in particular and the most complex and troubled world situations, Gramsci attempted to reconceptualize the destiny of Marxism through certain determinate theses - though they are fragmentary, provisional and, sometimes, contradictory in nature - which include the conceptualization of society in terms of historico-organic bond between base and superstructure, the codification of historico-social science of consciousness, the formulation of the concept of intellectual and moral hegemony and definition of dialectic

by combining the objective social moment and the subjective moment of human will. The historicist epistemology of Gramsci assumes two things: (i) it is through the critique of the contemporaneity of the historical present that the science of consciousness develops and truth can be seen openly in the concrete reality; and (ii) hence the genesis of scientific concept must be seen in the light of objects of empirical reality. He immediately realized that it is through the ideo-structures of ideology, culture, ethics, law and politics through which the capitalist society produces and reproduces its material condition of existence. And it is the moving unity of economic structure (content) and ideological structure (form) that helps us in our understanding of the emergent objective contradictions of the capitalist social formation which can be translated into revolutionary situation with the help of revolutionary philosophy of praxis whose articulation can be realized by injecting a critico-political concrete social activity and consciousness among the masses.

That a firm conviction that the capitalist order maintains its cohesion on the basis of institutionalized repressive violence (predominantly manufactured by the political industry) and codified effective ideological hegemony (predominantly manufactured by the civil industry) compelled Gramsci to give an expression that the proletariat's struggle against capitalism must conceive this idea that "the economic struggle cannot be separated from the

political struggle, nor can either of them be separated from the ideological struggle".¹ The immediate politico-economic events, that forced Gramsci to reformulate the revolutionary theory of Marxism for generating the existential possibility of revolution in a more advanced capitalist societies, include the defeat of the factory council movement in 1920, the success of Russian Revolution and the dictatorship of proletariat, the crisis of the liberal state and the growth of fascism, the factional and strategic problems of the PCI and the Comintern, the impact of the economic crisis of 1929-32 on the political situation in Europe and America and the implication of technological and bureaucratic structure in the capitalist relations of production.

While struggling for power through counter-hegemonic apparatuses, Gramsci's outlook was sharpened by the intellectual legacy of Machiavelli and Croce. He learnt from the Machiavellian Prince how to create a political manifesto to understand the science and art of politics. Machiavelli schooled Gramsci in such a manner that he came to realize that the acquisition of legitimacy and the mechanism of political stability of bourgeois rule are made through the dual guises of force/coercion and fraud/consent. Gramsci identifies the Machiavellian Prince - no matter whether a historical myth or a reality - with the modern revolutionary political party which provides "the first cell" for the

1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings (1921-26) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), p.287.

concrete expression of workers' hegemony and collective will whose function will be to damage the balancing social force of the capitalist order. Gramsci makes this point that "the Modern Prince must and cannot but be the preacher and organizer of intellectual and moral reform, which means creating the basis for a later development of the national popular collective will towards the realization of a higher and total form of modern civilization"². Thus Gramsci accepts the positive contribution of Machiavelli in a sense that he tells us as to how a revolutionary party i.e. the modern Prince should create an intellectual and moral terrain in which masses acquire their consciousness, move in and struggle with the hegemony of capital, first, in moral and ethical field and then in political domain. The political party is the nuclear generator of hegemony, and it performs a policing function for the birth of new civilization.

Despite his radical critique of Croce's philosophy of praxis which gives rise to a philosophy of the pure act of voluntarism twisted with religio-ethical structure, Gramsci agrees with him [Croce] in so far as he accepts the role of ethico-normative structure of history in maintaining social order. But Gramsci's anti-voluntaristic political philosophy tries to overcome the weak axis of Crocean philosophy of

2. Antonio Gramsci, Modern Prince and other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p.139.

praxis which entails basically three themes: (1) unity of distincts and conceptualization of the identity of history and philosophy in order to reduce the canon of historical materialism to ethical-political history; (ii) politics of passion and passive revolution for moderation of structure through progressive restoration; and this nostalgia operates under the evolutionary/reformist Hegelian dialectic which advocates a cleverly masked form of pre-designed history under the illusion of consciousness, sharpened by history, (iii) a segregation between theory and practice and a construction of metaphysical world view.

Gramsci points out that through the dialectic of distinct, Croce reduced the real movement of history to the struggle involved in a conceptual dialectics, instead, to concrete forces with opposite interests, namely classes. Croce's dialectic of distincts is based on an extra-historical practice; it may be applied to classless society, not in class-divided societies where the concrete historical economic structure has a primacy over the structure of consciousness and class struggle is motor of revolution. Croce's radical separation of theory and practice bifurcates reality, making practice without theoretical justification and vice-versa. Croce's thesis, says Gramsci, is grounded into non-rational, extra-historical and speculative thought-processes. Thus, Croce's distincts are hypostasized into an extra-historical and, therefore, an anti-historical noumenon which conditions history. His passive political struggle

comes from an idealist temptation of evolutionary dialectic which sees concrete reality as a mirror reflection of spirit. The concept of philosophy of praxis, in the Gramscian historicist problematic, is related to the immanentist conception of reality as well as the historical subjectivity of social class as a real fact which converges with a practical act. It forms a concrete social content which has a connection with politico-economic praxis, and it unites the theory of dialectical materialism and historical materialism under the unity expressed through the "conception of the world". Gramsci defines society in terms of a historical bloc in which there is "reciprocity between structure and superstructure, a reciprocity which is nothing other than the real dialectical process".³ That is to say that structure and superstructure reflect the conditions of existence of each other in the historical development of society. It is through ideologies that we grasp the nature of objective contradictions of society and, thereby, create an objective conditions for revolutionizing of praxis. By launching a theoretical war against the pre-established materialist and naturalist causality, Gramsci forms this ideal that the historical science of consciousness is constructed on the basis of four interrelated and mutually reducible concepts of

3 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p.366.

history, economics, philosophy and politics. Knowledge can be derived by analysing the concrete relationships and forms of life of the historical individuals. The science of consciousness of Gramsci tells us that "all concepts by which our knowledge of the world is organised, are related primarily not to 'things', but to relations between the users of those concepts."⁴

Gramsci is so dissatisfied with the problematic of materialist epistemology that he develops a philosophical problematic with its utmost polemical role and practical designation, in which the term of 'history' is highlighted at the cost of the term 'matter' which is supposed to have a metaphysical origin. Gramsci writes "the philosophy of praxis thinks of itself in a historicist manner"⁵ and continues to say that "the philosophy of praxis is absolute historicism", the absolute secularization and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of history; it is along this line that one must trace the thread of the new conception of the world"⁶. These two statements imply that a union of Marxian Science and real history must be analysed through an organic

4. L. Kolàkowski, Main Currents of Marxism vol.III (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.230.

5. A. Gramsci, 1971, op. cit. p.404.

6. Ibid, p. 465.

ideology. The critical function of Gramsci's absolute historicism, in opposition to all idealist inspiration of the philosophy of passive politics and conceptual reformist dialectics, has to indicate a site where the consciousness of historical task and necessity is outlined by organic intellectuals and organic ideologies.

Philosophy of praxis makes a direct political appeal to masses by forming a unity between concrete political philosophy and history of concrete social formation and between theory and practice. The terrain of philosophy of praxis is also loaded with a homogeneous orders of philosophy, politics and ideology. Gramsci makes a powerful voice when he claims that all men are philosophers so long as all actions are political. Gramsci theorizes that if philosophy is divorced from politics and history, it takes a shape of metaphysics. The philosophy of praxis must be seen as the concrete historicization of philosophy and its identification with history. An idea, which we get from it, is that the science of historical dialectics assumes an organic unity between History, philosophy, economic and politics.⁷ Unlike Althusser's distinction between the dialectical materialism (philosophy) and historical materialism (science of society), Gramsci makes a ruthless attempt to reduce the existence of dialectical materialism to that of the historical materialism, as he writes that "theory of praxis ought to mean a logical and coherent systematic

7 Ibid., p.431.

treatment of the philosophical concepts generally known under the title of historical materialism".⁸

According to Gramsci, the full meaning of the identical relation of history and philosophy can be realized if it leads to an identity of history and politics and, consequently, to an identity of politics and philosophy. If a politician is critically interpreting the past history while acting in the present, then he is a historian having a tool to redesign the flow of historical society; and in this sense history is always contemporary history, that is politics. It implies that it is the present history that determines the past history, not the vice-versa in so far as all consciousness is reflected through the contemporaneity of present history. An immanentist conception of reality is related to realist immanence, not to static anthropology, and it is primarily because of the fact that philosophy of praxis deals with all historical contradictions of human society. It can be asserted that "the conception of the world, contemplation, philosophy become "real", since they aim to modify the world and to revolutionize praxis".⁹ In doing so it formulates a determinate political will to resolve all objective contradictions in favour of creating a new

8. Ibid, p.425

9 Ibid., p.369.

harmonious social order. Another major idea in Gramsci's historicism is that the scientific historicism is open to the necessity of the historical process, not to the subjective disposition of professional philosophers. This is so because the regularity and objectivity of social reality can be explained by the objective historical laws of social formation, not by an individual's personal knowledge of the universe.

The wheel of human history is determined neither by mechanical forces alone as Engels and Bukharin have highlighted, nor by spontaneity alone as pointed out by Croce. In fact, the dynamic character of concrete history tries to strike a balance between reality and thought, between objective forces and subjective and between discipline and spontaneity.

Gramsci makes the telling point that 'pure' spontaneity does not exist in history; it would come to the same thing as "pure" mechanicity, rather spontaneity must be united with conscious leadership as a precondition for the real political action as opposed to an adventure by the groups claiming to represent the masses.

Gramsci generates philosophical sophistication of his historicized-materialist philosophy of praxis by questioning the fundamental treaties of positivistic conception of

10 A. Gramsci, pp. 196, 198.

Bukharin's Marxism and Engels' dialectics of nature. Both of them, as Gramsci asserts, fail to recognize a dialectical relationship between man and society; and in doing so they have presented a metaphysical version of matter divorced from history. It is also interesting to note that Engels and Bukharin argue that materialist dialectic has been proved by protracted development of philosophy and natural science; and for all purposes the dialectic of matter should be considered as a priori referential point to understand the dialectics of history and thought. The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and matter exists independently and objectively of human mind. In 1931 Bukharin changed his position a little bit when he said that "cognition, considered historically, is the more and more reflection of objective reality and the fundamental criterion of the correctness of cognition is therefore the criterion of its adequateness, its degree of correspondence to objective reality"¹¹. Here Bukharin underweighs materialism. However, he has not discarded his habit of separating sociology from the concrete content of economics and history. His sociologism is identical to Marxist materialism as a general (abstract) laws of the evolution of society. The fundamental error, on which materialist philosophy has been constructed,

11 Nikolai Bukharin, "Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism", in Science at the Cross Roads (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1971), p.18.

consists in Bukharin's mechanical fragmentation of Marxism into two constitutive parts: (1) the evolution of society based on the natural-scientific criteria (divorced from historical process) and formulation of empty typology of historical forms of society; and (i) identification of philosophy with crude materialism. Gramsci dismisses this contemplative philosophy of matter by highlighting the logic of praxis and the logic of man's activity as a basis for the realization of historical needs of society. The conditions of praxis are also the conditions of the objectivity of possible knowledge; since through praxis the world is presented to us. Gramsci also feels that, like Bukharin, Engels has distorted Marxism; therefore "there is no need either to identify the second with the first [Engels with Marx] nor should one think that everything attributed by [Engels] to [Marx] is absolutely authentic and free from infiltration".¹² For Gramsci when Marx used materialism, he used it simply against the cultural background of the early nineteenth century; and its main aim was to exclude transcendence from the domain of thought by philosophy of praxis. The philosophy of praxis is historical materialism in which one should put accent on first term (historical), not on second term (materialism) which is of metaphysical origin. Gramsci argues that the ensemble of the material forces of production is at the same

12 A. Gramsci, 1971, op. cit., p.385.

time a crystallization of all past history and the basis of present and future history".¹³

Gramsci's absolute historicist dimension of philosophy of praxis gives an effective opposition to the extra-historical character of Croce's theories of dialectic of distincts and a division between theory and practice. The Gramscian historicism deals with the contradictions and struggle of the concrete social reality. Matter and nature find explanation within the context of man's absolute activity and consciousness. There is nothing like the 'thing-in-itself' existence of the external world in so far as external world is manipulated by human cognition and praxis. Gramsci points out that one of the basic shortcomings of Crocean historiography lies in the fact that it only reduces history to ethical-political history; consequently, it excludes all other types of history such as the concept of hegemony, the role of intellectual in society and the role of the political party as a bearer of history's progressive forces. In fact, these things, taken together, constitute a complete and integral history in which the domain of things and the domain of social relations mutually condition each other at a given point of time. Maturation of progressive contradiction between labour and capital can be translated into a revolutionary moment by creating a unitary bond between

13. Ibid., p.466.

economic struggle, political struggle, and ideological struggle. In other words, it is through historical contradiction between two opposed forces and interest constellations, outlined by the philosophy of praxis, that we move from necessity to freedom which takes place through the society of men, not through nature or mechanical laws. The philosophy of praxis, thus writes Gramsci, "can only be conceived in a polemical form and in the form of a perpetual struggle"¹⁴ between classes whose meaning can be "realized through the concrete study of past history and through present activity,¹⁵ to construct a new history".

The Gramscian concept of historiography explains not only the economic structure of society (particularly capitalist society) and the development of historical forms of society in relation to one another, but also combines the political order philosophical order to that of the economic order in order to constitute a homogeneous circle between them. The philosophy of praxis, "which can only present itself at first in a style of polemic and criticism, as overcoming preceding modes of thought and actual existing thought; hence above all as a critique of common sense"¹⁶, has emerged out of an interaction between three immediate sources: (i) German

14 Ibid., p. 421.

15 Ibid., p. 427.

16 A. Gramsci, 1968, op. cit., p. 65

idealism, (ii) English classical political economics, and
 (iii) French politics.¹⁷ The synthesization of three sources
 must appear as anticipatory moments; the unitary moments of
 synthesis of three currents by Marxism is to be identified in
 the new concept of realist immanence. A new realist
 conception of immanence came into existence when the
 speculative form of immanence, put forward by classical
 German philosophy, was translated into a historicist form
 with the aid of French politics and English classical
 economics. There is a unity and translatability between
 economics, philosophy and politics within the synthetic
 design of Marxism. Each of these elements is an aspect of the
 dialectical development of the contradictions in the man-
 matter, man-nature and man-man relationship. Further, each
 element has an essential core which can be translated into
 the other two cores. In economics the core is value, that
 is, the relationship between the worker and the industrial
 productive force; in philosophy it is praxis, that is, the
 relationship between human will (superstructure) and economic
 structure, and in politics it is the relationship between the
 state and civil society, that is, the intervention of the
 state (centralized will) and to educate the educator, the
 social environment in general.¹⁸ By opposing the materialist

17. A. Gramsci, 1971, op. cit., pp. 395, 399.

18 Ibid., pp. 02-3.

orthodoxy of Plekhanov and Bukharin, Gramsci has given us this interpretative master code that the concepts of economic laws and matter cannot be situated in the rigid boundaries of natural laws and speculative materialism, but should be defined through the historical zone of society in so far as the horizon of law of works is transcended by the Marxian passage from economics to general history. Unlike the Althusserian Marxism, the Gramscian Marxism underlines this proposition that regularity and necessity of laws of the forms of historical development of social formation can be explained by the terrain of political economy, not through natural science model of cause-effect relationships between elements. The political economic premises of Marxist historical thought are realized on a subject level through self-conscious acts; though subjects may be unconscious in relation to the total result to which they contribute. For Gramsci, the term "matter" has an association with an economic element and it, ultimately, refers to "socially and historically organized production".¹⁹ Thus the system of production entails essentially a historical and social conditioning. The variability of the ensemble of the material force can be measured accurately by historical objectivity and historicized materialist theory of knowledge.

One peculiar thing in Gramscian synthetic historicist Marxism is that it choose the term French politics over Lenin's

19. Ibid., p.465.

choice, French socialism. He rejects the concept of French socialism because it is a historical source of positivist inspiration in theory-construction. The importance of French politics can be asserted by relating it to the revolutionary political apparatus. By recognizing the positive elements of Machiavellian science of politics, Gramsci asserted that Machiavelli had anticipated Jacobinism which, in turn, must have inspired Marx, in the positive sense, for the realization and creation of a cohesive political party of masses with an iron conviction and organizational capacity for creating a new social order. In fact, Gramsci aspires for establishing an alliance between philosophy and politics and goes on to say that "a scientific politician feels himself free from idols of his age and his group and treats²⁰ concepts with more immediacy and with total originality".

The philosophy of praxis forms a historical trinity of politics, history and philosophy, because the philosophy of historical epoch is nothing but the history and politics of that epoch itself and mass of variations that the leading group has succeeded in imposing on preceding reality. As a critical enterprise, it involves neither spontaneity nor mechanicity; it entails the relationship between things and practical human will in such a manner so that objective

20. Ibid., p.403.

historical possibilities could be realized by human agency. Our capacity to think and act depends on the subjects and objects of history, as Gramsci informs us that the critical dimension of philosophy of praxis "teaches that reality does not exist on its own, in and for itself but only in an historical relationships with the men who modify it".²¹ The history of philosophy is equal to history and the history of philosophy is equal to philosophy; thus, for all purposes, there is a historicization of philosophy. Philosophy is also related to politics. Since action is undertaken by individuals and masses in order to bring some new state of affairs into existence, all action is essentially a political action. Philosophy becomes politics when it appears as a tool of revolutionary class struggle. Here Gramsci and Althusser become identical in a sense that both of them have related philosophy to politics in order to change the exploitative ideological map of the capitalist social formation. To be more precise, philosophy's content emerges from creative political action and the social structure which seeks to construct it. But the historicism of Gramsci also maintains that the categories of philosophy of praxis go on changing with the changing actual social relations. Thus, it seems that it generates not an absolute knowledge, but a contingent categorical analysis of a mutable social systems.

We are taught by Gramscian philosophy of praxis that all men are philosophers and intellectuals in so far they are

21. Ibid., p.346.

practically engaged in the construction and reconstruction of social reality. People differ from one another in terms of possession of quantity, not in terms of quality; the trained/specialized and professional men have maximum degree of homogeneity, coherence and logicity in grasping the meaning of essential reality as compared to the (general) masses. A man of philosophy is, at the same time, a man of science and politics who modifies social reality by turning the wheel of history with an iron conviction towards humanity -"the humanity which is reflected in each individuality is composed of various elements: (1) the individual, (2) other men, and (3) the natural world"²². The relationship between human world and natural world is not a mechanical one, but a historically-regulated conscious and an active, reciprocal and dialectical relationship between men and things. Under the circle of historicism everything depends upon the realization of a new hegemonic ideological terrain which regulates and reforms our consciousness and method of knowledge. Gramsci is basically concerned with a critico-practical activity and political practice of the concrete social whole and social forces behind this structure. A critique of philosophy, which is built on (i) common sense and good sense, (ii) language, and (iii) popular religion, is at the same time a critique of the history of philosophy.

22. Ibid., p.352

Gramsci gives a radical critique of the domains of commonsense, religion and materialism which make us only able to perceive social reality in an uncritical, meta-physical and unconscious manner. Commonsense enriches itself with notions and opinions from the more coherent conceptions of times, basically shared by all of us within a society. The elements of common sense are manufactured by religion and defended by the professional philosophers' philosophy. In opposition to Marx for whom the negative criticism of "religion is the premise of all criticism, Gramsci says that "religion is the most gigantic utopia, that is the most grandiose attempt to reconcile, in mythological form, the real contradictions of historical life".²³ Gramsci assigns a positive critique to religion by saying that religion cannot be identified with false consciousness and philosophy of the infancy of mankind; rather it has a positive role in cementing social whole, and its rationality and historical necessity will remain operative so long as man's social reality remains contradictory. In the world of contradiction it unifies hostile social groups in a single thread.

The world can be demystified by the revolutionary philosophy of praxis which presents itself in the form of good sense as a practical activity. Scientific philosophy cannot be divorced from politics; because both of them

23. Ibid., p.405.

constitute the basic speciality of Marxism. As a socio-economic activity, the philosophy of praxis makes a reciprocal relationship between thought and action on the one hand and between organic philosophers and masses in order to raise the level of critical consciousness of the people for creating a new order of humanized-civilization on the other. In short, a union between masses and organic intellectuals is an essential condition for the construction of an intellectual-moral bloc which can make, politically, possible the intellectual progress of the mass. It enables the active man-in-mass to develop an enormous capacity to pose a counter-hegemonic force to the hegemonic position of the ruling class and its repressive ideology. In a sense, the philosophy of praxis becomes an agent of partisanship in the class-divided society, since "critical understanding of self takes place through a struggle of political hegemonies and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in the political field in order to arrive at the working out at higher level of one's own conception of reality".²⁴ It is the political consciousness that leads to progressive self-consciousness in which the theoretical consciousness of reality and the practical articulation of that consciousness are united in a logical, coherent and dynamic manner through historical laboratory that is party. The party must be

24. Ibid., p. 333.

characterized by an organic and powerfully centralized leading apparatus, disciplined forces and a whole range of services and instruments essential to the supervision, activity and propaganda. It is the party which works as an initiator, discoverer, think-tank and generator of a new collective consciousness among the workers, as Gramsci puts that "the communist party is the instrument and historical form of the process of inner liberation through which the worker is transformed from executor to initiator, from mass to leader and guide from brown to brain and purpose".²⁵

While dealing with ideology Gramsci seriously challenges Marx's pejorative and negative connotation of ideology in which it is treated as a passive reflex, false consciousness and illusionary structure. Like Althusser, Gramsci considers ideology and religion as a basic force by which the contradiction between labour and capital is sealed off. But the point of difference between Althusser and Gramsci lies in the fact that the former has presented a materialist theory of ideology; whereas the latter talks about the importance of historical ideology. For Gramsci, "ideology must be analysed historically, in the terms of philosophy of praxis, as a superstructure"²⁶ and it is the historically-organic ideological structure that creates a sufficient condition in

25. A. Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings. 1910-1920 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), p.333.

26. A. Gramsci, 1971, op. cit., p.376.

which men try to acquire consciousness and thereby launch a historical struggle for building up a new egalitarian social order. Historical organic ideology is different from the arbitrary and rationalist ideology which is constructed out of an individual's subjective cognition and choice. Historical organic ideology is formulated on the basis of a long historical knowledge of the material reality. Historical ideology gives rise to revolutionary political practice; whereas the arbitrary and rationalist ideology creates only a feeble spontaneous movement. Historical-organic-ideologies cannot be separated from philosophy because they set forth philosophical 'popularizations' which instruct the masses as to how to transform the existing reality through concrete actions. Gramsci's historicism also places science in the domain of superstructure, for science is a superstructure is also demonstrated by the fact that it had been absorbed or, at least, conditioned by another dominant ideology that is religion. In fact, science and ideology are fused together in such a manner that they together construct the same history. Further, Gramsci builds up this strong argument that the development of superstructure is directly related to the development of structure, and base and superstructure, taken together, form a single historically-regulated social totality free from dualism between being and consciousness. At this point we can see how Gramscian historicism speaks of the language of homogeneous time-scale of all parts of society. The opposite of Gramscian homogeneous simple time-scale is the Althusserian conception

of heterogeneous simple time-scale of social structure in which the movement of superstructure is not identical to the movement of the economic base. Althusser also rejects the Gramscian superstructural theory of science by saying that science is an autonomous entity and it is different from ideology. In brief, Althusser makes an opposition between science and ideology in so far as science has an object, history and age; whereas ideology has no object, no history and no age.

In the hand of Gramsci, the Marxist theory corresponds only to the historical level of man's confrontation with nature. The philosophy of praxis, in rejecting metaphysics, is that systematic formulation which not only invokes 'class-consciousness' but also 'time consciousness'. The construction of time-consciousness depends upon man's labour and praxis through which we come to recognize the difference between the present and the future. For Gramsci to think of dialectic of nature independent of man and society is, at worst, erroneous and, at best, partial because it will be applied to inert matter apart from man. There is a dialectical unity between nature, man and society and the general concepts of history, politics and economics are interwoven in an organic unity within the dialectic of history. Gramsci talks about the dialectical interpenetration between intellectuals and masses, between base and superstructure and between economic structure and religion as a demonstrative proof to the principle of organic

totality. So far as the principle of negation of negation is concerned, Gramsci asserts that the objective course of history does not proceed through an evolutionary process but through negation and negation of the negation. Thus entire Gramscian historicist epistemology comes to this terms of condition that the laws of dialectics can be realized through their equal movement in both: the domain of consciousness and the domain of nature, since man and nature are inseparably linked and the bounds of man are also the bounds of nature.

In sum, the Gramscian epistemological structure entails four basic themes: (i) the construction of an identical homogeneous circle of philosophy, ideology, history, politics and economics having a similar law of development and time-scale; (ii) the conceptualization of historical bloc out of a dialectical interaction between the economic base and the ideological superstructure, (iii) the announcement of the dialectic of history and man in opposition to Engels' dialectics of nature and Bukharin's sociologism; and (iv) establishment of the historical science of consciousness and an identity of science and consciousness.

Apart from these master theorizations, Gramsci generates some secondary ideas which include the concept of collective historical man, labour-teleology, creative human praxis, humanly-mediated nature, and socially and historically regulated economic production. One can think of this idea that the Gramscian formulation of Marxism, unlike the

Althusserian structural Marxism whose entire edifice is based on Marx's Capital, highlights the problematic of the young Marx's work like Manuscripts (1844) in which it has asserted that "society is the complete unity of man with nature - the true resurrection of nature - the consistent naturalism of man and the consistent humanism of nature"²⁷ and "thinking and being are certainly distinct, but at the same time they are in unity with each other"²⁸. Gramsci conforms to the early problematic of Marx's works that establishes an organic historico-dialectical relationship between being and consciousness, between society of things and society of man and, above all, between objective condition and concrete subjective realization of knowledge. The progressive historicization of epistemology does not make any dualism between matter and idea as it has been formulated by the metaphysical materialism of Engels, Plekhanov and Bukharin in which objective rules are disclosed by assigning an ontological independence to the dialectic of matter. For Gramsci objective always means human objective which can be held to correspond exactly to historical subjective; in other words, objective would mean 'universal subjective'. Man knows objectivity in so far as knowledge is real for the whole human race, historically unified in a single unitary

27. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p.98.

28. Ibid., p.100.

cultural system. Here one can say that Gramsci is tempted to introduce the philosophy of objective idealism within Marxism. But a critical examination of his works directs us to believe that Gramsci's historicism explains objective reality by the category of "praxis of collective-concrete-historical subject", not by the epistemology of isolated individual or transcendental subject. However, the idea that haunts our mind is that he, either by choice or mistake, does not explicitly construct the historical life of human societies in terms of the concepts of mode of production and class struggle. We are simply informed that the objective and givenness character of reality can be explained by claiming that material condition is historically constituted through practico-theoretical praxis. Since truths are time-bound and space-bound, Marxism is subject to historical alteration and moderation. Further since the philosophy of praxis is a conscious manifestation of historical contradictions of the class-divided societies, it latently implies that a homogeneous society without class will not require the master code of philosophy of praxis. It seems that the classless society inheres an absolute truth; whereas the class societies present a wide range of contradictory truths which have to be discovered by philosophers.

Althusser has rightly assessed Gramsci by saying that "if Marxism is an absolute historicism, it is because it historicizes the theoretical and practical negation of


history for Hegelian historicism: the end of history, the unsurpassable present of Absolute Knowledge.²⁹ The absolute knowledge has been itself historicized. Gramsci's absolute historicism is indeed absolute because even the claim that all knowledge is historicized, is itself historicized. It is the given concrete history that regulates the trinity of economics, politics and philosophy. Perhaps the ideological strength of Gramsci's historicized materialism comes from Marx's German Ideology in which Feuerbach has been criticized for his failure to connect materialism (i.e. real-sensualmen) to history. In "German Ideology" Marx says "as far as Feuerbach is the materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist; with him materialism and history diverse".³⁰ For Gramsci history has a primacy over material structure; Whereas for Althusser the case is just reverse. In brief, the Gramscian historicism is tempted to think the relation between real history and philosophy as a relation of expressive unity. The only job which Gramsci has done is that he has inverted Croce's speculative historicism into concrete and real philosophy of politico-economic praxis. Despite the fact that Gramsci falls into the trap of the Hegelian evolutionary

29. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital (London: NLB/Verso Editions 1986) p.132

30. Karl Marx, German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p.47.

dialectic of consciousness, he has generated some new concepts like hegemony, historical bloc and organic intellectuals within the Marxian discourse. Now, most of the western Marxists quickly absorb these concepts into their theoretical-constructions for analysing the integrative forces of the advanced capitalism. From this angle Gramsci must be treated as an intellectual father of the Western Marxists. But, in the final analysis, he appears as a revolutionary politician with an utmost obsession with the phobia of Hegelian historicism and science of consciousness. Consequently, Gramsci deserves both: a pole of attraction and a pole of repulsion; a centre of recommendation and a centre of challenge.

Restructuration of Marxism: Colletti



In the process of restructuring of scientific Marxism, Colletti represents another form of historicist epistemology. He evolves the concept of experimental structure of history which involves a mutual reducible relationship between political order, economic order and social order. By criticizing the dualism between being and consciousness Colletti explains social structure in terms of a determinate totality based on unity of heterogeneous parts. As opposed to the Hegelian totality, Marxian totality is grounded into the system of economic production and collectivity of empirical formation such as social classes. Marxian revolutionary dialectic is itself derived from the "unity of heterogeneous elements in which the objective factors of production are simultaneously

presented as subjective agents or social class". Theory and practice, economics and sociology and nature and man are inseparably united in a dialectical movement of an empirical social reality. Thus, Colletti channelizes his entire method of philosophical investigation of Marxism in a direction which consists of five things: (i) rejection of the Hegelian dialectic of matter and rational totality; (ii) assertion of Marxism as both: a science of social formation and a revolutionary ideology of proletariat; (iii) conceptualization of society in terms of a concrete determinate totality based on a reciprocal conditioning between the material forces and the socio-ideological forces; (iv) definition of the specific essence of man in terms of an empirical embodiment of socio-economic relationship and (v) the explanation of capitalist social formation through the notion of total alienation of man from species-being, nature, system of production and society.

The main intellectual pursuit of Colletti has been to undermine the ideological legacy of the Hegelian dialectics of matter over the theoretical codification of scientific Marxism. His hostility to Hegel takes the form of an

31. L. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society (Delhi:Oxford University Press, 1978), p.16.

intense fire when he claims that Hegel is a religious philosopher who, through dialectic of matter, strives to annihilate the finite material world and denounce the principle of intellect in order to establish the credential of an infinite world of unfolding absolute spirit. Hegel's idealism starts from an absolute spirit or self-knowing/self-manifesting universal Idea and comes back to it. Man's idea and image is a temporal manifestation of the self-sustaining eternal Idea. Against materialism and scientific dogmatism, Hegel explains the fabrics of truth in terms of divine logos and spiritual notion regarding the reality. Before establishing his province of dialectics of matter, Hegel criticizes the half-materialist (in terms of method) and half-idealist (in terms of substance) philosophy of early idealism. He says that early idealism divides the universe into mutually non-interactive domains: (i) infinite world and (ii) finite world; and goes on to identify the infinite world (the world of ideological content/substance) as a real absolute whole and the finite world (the world of material discourse) as a false reality. Its mode of explanation is guided by the principles of non-contradiction and mutual exclusions of opposites. Hegel takes a great pain in establishing a dialectical relationship between the infinite world and the finite world by asserting that both worlds are real and distinctively united on the principles of first, separation and, then, combination. His dialectic treats material world as a real world; therefore real is supposed to be rational. But, further Hegel qualifies the status of

finite world by saying that it is one of the momentary representations of the infinite world and it is temporary because it contains the seed of self-destruction, self-negation, self-contradiction and self-annihilation at the very moment of its birth. The motion of reality is grasped by assuming that everything of world is inherently contradictory, as Colletti finds in Hegel's "Science of logic" that the self-development of "rational totality"³² is based on this principle that something is self-contained, deficient, the negative of itself; something is alive because it contains contradiction within it. Since the finite world of material reality is a momentary expression of the eternal and self-contained infinite world of universal spirit, the finite is infinite. The Hegelian rational totality is based on the unity of subject and object; of thought and reality and it incorporates being into thought and the finite into infinite. By excluding matter from the principle of reason Hegel sees the development of history as a progressive realization of an unfolding universal Idea i.e. Christian logos or God. The dialectics of matter expresses the dialectical conception of the finite, the conception of the finite as ideal and therefore idealism for establishing God as the unconditional and the absolute thing in a coherent fashion.³³ It gives an essential moment of all religious consciousness. Therefore, Colletti suggests that it is

32. L. Colletti, Marxism and Hegel (London: NLB, 1973), p.35.

33. L. Colletti, *ibid.*, p. 26.

futile to make a search for the material instance in Hegelian philosophy as it has been done by Engels and Lenin. Colletti warns us that we should not mediate any alliance between Hegel and Marx. It is due to the fact that Hegel, through his metaphysical critique of intellect and science, tries to establish a philosophical deconstruction and annihilation of matter in the supreme service of religious consciousness. The Hegelian rational totality obliterates the intellect and the principles of reason excludes that of matter. The Hegelian 'rational' philosophy makes an identity of reason and reality. It assumes that everything comes under reason; nothing is outside of it. It defeats the project of conceiving the externality of being in relation to thought that is the central logic of materialism. Therefore there is no reason to bring Hegel in the domain of Marx's materialist philosophy. In fact, both are antithetical to each other.

Instead of Hegel, Colletti shows the influence of Kantian philosophy of 'thing-in-itself' over Marx's formulation of materialist thesis of the irreducibility of being to thought via Feuerbachian philosophy of sensuous-practico human beings. The Kantian philosophy - a philosophy which locates truth in "thing-in-itself" which is an objective and independent determinate reality inscribed in noumena - inspired Marx to formulate that material world of existence is an objective and determinate reality which shapes our cognition and knowledge. For Colletti, Marxian materialism is a science that deals with three things: (i)

commodity-money-capital of capitalist mode of production, (ii) the deductive passage from the abstract to the concrete in which the concrete or the particular is only a particularization of the universal and not something heterogeneous in relation to that universal, (iii) the actual passage from the abstract to the concrete is not a passage 'within the abstract', but goes from the latter to the concrete of reality.³⁴ Unlike Hegelian metaphysical relationship of 'thought-being' within thought, Marxian science of materialism formulates the relationship between reality and thought in which the former has primacy over the latter. The substance of capitalist society lies in the independent motion of capital and surplus value of which commodity and money are merely different forms. The contradiction of capitalist mode of production arises with labour-power in the passage from the money to the commodity form within the zone of capital.

According to Colletti the Marxian science attempts to discover the fundamental governing objective rules, laws and mechanism of capitalist production and social regulation in particular and the other social formations in general. It explains as to how capital moves; how surplus value is created and how labour is exploited in the course of generalized commodity-production. Marxism takes a form of

34. Colletti, *ibid.*, pp.133-4.

ideology when the revolutionary class of proletariat realizes, actualizes and transforms the material condition of existence, embedded in objective contradiction between labour and capital. Transformation of exploitative relations of production is realized by political and ideological struggle. Consciousness and action stem from the subjugated class position of the working class. The class does not become a class only on the basis of economic criteria, but also when it develops the 'consciousness of being' to liberate itself as well as whole society through revolutionary political party and political action.³⁵ In fact, class encompasses economic criteria, political action and social consciousness; and all these elements are themselves derived from capital. The organic unity of economic factors and social factors lies in the concept of social class which expresses two things: (i) objective conditions of production, and (ii) the political agents of the whole human process.

Marx's scientific explanation of society demands a constant interaction between economic modalities and non-economic modalities, between natural/material relationships and spiritual/ideological human relations and between matter and idea. If we divorce idea from matter and the vice-versa, we can only create crazy materialism and naturalism. The

35. L. Colletti, 1978, op. cit. p. 236.

true dimension of materialism rejects dualism between matter and idea and it explains everything through an interpenetrative relationship between man and nature, between man and man and between society and economics. In Marx's capital we have to study socio-economic formation as a whole in which the material modalities and ideological modalities influence each other in the developmental pattern of society. Colletti's construction of a concrete material society calls for a unity of production and distribution, of the relations of production and social relation; of economic structure and the ideological-political level and of structure and superstructure. In the objective historical process of development of society, in which capitalism represents the most mature and varied form, subject and object, thought and reality and being and consciousness are organically related to one another in such a manner so that to divorce one from another will mean a distortion of reality, for Marx subject and object are part of an objective. Materialism implies that there is a unity of being and consciousness as well as an interrelation between them in which being has primacy over thought. Thus we can say that superstructure is itself a mode of being; and articulation of structure and consciousness, as a mode of being, is bound to reflect the material being and thus embraces society as a whole within itself.³⁶ There is a union between history, economics and society and this union is established by the concept of

36. Ibid., p. 10.

social classes. The capitalist mode of production is not only a structure of commodity production but also gives rise to two antagonistic classes of capitalist and workers. Society can be conceived as a "determinate totality" based on unity of heterogeneous parts³⁷ in which subject is a historical-natural entity, a species or collectivity of empirical formations such as social classes.

In particular, Marx's capital is an intensive study of the particular-historical and materially determined capitalist society, not a study of society in general which invokes only an ideological explanation of society. In opposition to false mobility of the Hegelian dialectic based on negation of negation, the dynamic character of Marx's analysis demands a simultaneous interaction between objective factors of production and the actualization of objective production through social class. Colletti first criticizes the materialist epistemology of Plekhanov and Kautsky for whom "matter/nature appears prior to idea/history",³⁸ and then he establishes a true character of materialism by claiming that being and thought are separately united. Materialism brings a unity of being and consciousness, of theory and practice; however it assigns primacy to being over thought in the last instance. Colletti's materialism also

37. Ibid., p. 14.

38. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

expresses an essential unity or identity of history, sociology and economics within a determinate totality through the concept of social class. Althusser makes an attack on the epistemological construction of Colletti by calling it a variant form of the invariant historicist problematic in which all practices/levels of social formations are reduced (like Hegelian expressive totality) to an experimental structure of history which is related to political practice, and unity between practices is ensured through the negation of differences of practices. The major effect of this historicist interpretation of Marxism results in the negation of difference between the science of history (historical materialism) and Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism)³⁹. In the eyes of Althusser Colletti and Sartre have transformed the Marxian totality into Hegelian totality in which single essence gets manifested in the various levels of reality. Various levels of society form a homogeneous circle and express necessarily one-another in their respective mode of operation.

In fact, Colletti's construction of Marxism gives rise to the problematic of sensuous materialism and this has happened because he mediates his relationship with Marx with Kant and Fauerbach. Colletti glorifies the project of Kant against Hegel by making this powerful statement that "for Kant human

39. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, 1986, op.cit, p.136.

thought is not identical with divine thought, but with sense-world or matter which is given to man; thought is the quality, the attribute of finite being that receives impressions from objects existing outside itself".⁴⁰ Then, Colletti relates Feuerbach to Marx for the development of his concept of sensuous human activity. But Feuerbach is criticized for his failure to generate a relationship between sensuous human activity and human history which conditions man's consciousness. There is no doubt about it that Feuerbach was the first materialist philosopher who opposed Hegel's philosophy - a philosophy in which the object is the objectification of subject (self-sustaining idea of absolute spirit) and alienation is identified with objectification of spirit - by recognizing man's naturalness through language and production. But Feuerbachian man remains an abstract man or isolated man, because he is divorced from historical conditioning and social conditioning. The total effect of Feuerbachian philosophy is that it only creates an ethical theory of intersubjective communications and interhuman discourses.

By detecting a disjunction between history and matter in the Feuerbachian theoretical manifesto of materialism, Marx gave a new thrust to materialism in which there is a dialectical relationship between nature and man, between man

40. Colletti, 1973, op.cit. p.214.

and society and between matter and history. This whole series of relationship is determined by an object of labour which a man creates in the process of his adjustment with natural forces and social beings. Work is man's self-production both as creativity and adaptation. In Marx's economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Colletti finds two things: (i) man's relation to objective otherness is a manifestation of his relationship to other men, and (ii) in order to relate himself he must relate to a being that is other than human⁴¹. Thus materialism envisages a structure consisting of natural being and social being and an interaction between them. Marx's theory of historical materialism does not accept any separation between economics and sociology, between nature and history and between production and social relationship so long as a mode of production is explained in terms of social stage.

"German Ideology" and "Capital" can be seen as a continuation of the same thesis of historico-anthropological critique of alienation of man from species-being and nature which Marx had established in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In conformity with his early text Marx in 'German Ideology' (1845-6) highlights the philosophy of historico-natural man who, in the process of producing,

41. Colletti, *ibid.*, p.229.

produces his own species with an association with other men and, at the same time, produces his relationship with natural objectivity. 'Capital' volume one gives the same impression when we find that capitalist production produces not only 'commodities' but also a relationship between the capitalist and the wage-labourer. Thus nature, history and man are three equal partners which have become hostile to one another in the capitalist relations of production. It is the function of historical materialism to explain as to how and under what circumstances man has lost his connection with his essence (genus), with other fellow beings, with nature and with objects which he produced. In brief it has to explain the condition for genesis of alienation and, at the same time, it has to point out those routes by which alienation can be overcome. As a science, Marxism has to deal with those forces and mechanisms which produce alienation of man and exploitation of labour by capital; and as an ideology, it has to give a direction to revolutionary political consciousness by which human alienation can be replaced by a new form of humanism i.e. socialist humanism capable of generating a free interaction between man, nature and society.

Thus, for Colletti the course of historical materialism strikes a judicious combination of material causality and idealcausality, of economic forces and social forces and of causality and teleology in the domain of human labour. The function of idea, under the umbrella of historical

materialism, has to ensure two things: (i) fixation of goal, praxis and ideology and (ii) determination of historical truth. The concepts of labour and idea are objective dimensions of human practice and they are opposed to anthromorphism. In the last tabulation, Marxism becomes both: (i) "a theory of situated thoughts, and (ii) a theory of thought as truth".⁴²

The entire theoretical construction of Colletti's Marxism is grounded into the historicist problematic which highlights the principles of dialectics of history and man, human-labour, human praxis and man as a generic being. Man is a generic natural being where materialism and humanism are combined through social practice. The historical problematic of materialism denies the existential condition of crude materialism and naturalism. For Colletti and Gramsci materialism and naturalism are the two concealed forms of idealism and metaphysics. Although Colletti and Gramsci belong to different lineage-systems and blood-groups, their historicist epistemology forces them to accept some common ideas such as that there is no dualism between being and consciousness, that there is dialectical relationship between man, nature and society; and that there is an interaction

42. Ibid., p. 230.

between objective economic condition and human agency. They are committed to the philosophy of concrete-historical man and humanism on the one hand and the revolutionary political praxis on the other. The historicist Marxists have used the problematic of human nature and human labour in order to show an identity between the works of young Marx and the works of old Marx. The entire theoretical operation of the historicist Marxists is deeply rooted into what Althusser calls the anthropological problematic of Feuerbach and the objective idealist problematic of Hegel.

CHAPTER III

THE CRITICAL MARXISTS OF FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The core members of the Frankfurt school are Max Horkheimer, Teodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas who have used the term critical theory in place of the term historical materialism through which they give a radical philosophical critique of modern science, positive philosophy, totalitarian politics (fascism plus Stalinism), instrumental bureaucracy, and technological order. In the period of historical pessimism, intensified by crisis in Marxism, rise of fascism as a dominant socio-political force and birth of Stalin's repressive socialism which led to the defeat of working class movement on a world-wide scale and damaged the cognitive emancipatory potentiality of man, critical theorists gave us a Hegelian ideological medicine and political manifesto by asserting that the restoration of the emancipating power of historical human reason demands a critique of the myths of instrumental rationality and oppressive material world which have created a dualism between real and rational, between man and nature and between history and nature. Horkheimer and Adorno express their deep-rooted pessimism when they write that "we are wholly convinced...that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought, nevertheless, mankind, instead of entering a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism; thus critical theory aimed at the redemption of

the hopes of the past".¹ Critical theorists criticize bourgeois class-politics and positive philosophy of science from a completative philosophical discourse divorced from any political anchorage and party-politics. They argue that human reification from nature and society can be explained by modern science and technology, not primarily through Marxian theories of private property and social division of labour.

Critical theory tries to discover the various levels of historical repression and resistance of the modern industrial society by accepting the optimistic vision of Hegelian philosophy of history, hermeneutic-epistemology and psycho-analytical method. It seriously believes that the fundamental opposition between human reason and unreasonable empirical world, between fact and value, between public and private, between theory and practice, between scientists and citizens and between nature and society can be overcome within a rational society by two things: (i) historically-induced revolutionary reason and (ii) rational-purposive human labour and revolutionary praxis. By rejecting Lukacsian theories of an identity of subject-object and theory and practice, this school holds this idea that theory is not an expression of class-world views, insisting that theoretical discourse cannot be reduced its social conditions of production. It believes that there is no absolute subject of knowledge, and that subject and object do not yet coincide

1. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), p.xv.

in the process of thinking about society, although that process is, in fact, society's self-knowledge. The critical attitude of social theory is implicitly built upon the Marxian conceptual apparatuses such as class exploitation, surplus value, economic production and alienation. For critical theorists Karl Marx's critique of political Economy was paradigmatic as an analysis of liberal capitalism that was critical in the sense that he analysed the system of production from the standpoint of the objective possibilities of change inherent in its basic structure and present in latent form in pre-revolutionary conditions. They reject positivist and empiricist epistemology because it presents social reality in terms of dimensional surface observation of facts. They argue that there is a need to underline the form of intentional meaning structure beneath the empirical manifestation of reality in terms of historical strategies of domination and liberation of human beings.

In opposition to determinate scientific laws, critical theorists highlight the roles of human consciousness and human project in order to change reality; and consider theory as a self-reflection of the unfolding character of historical truths. As a whole, they constitute a group of left-Hegelian whose main business is to highlight the dialectic of consciousness and the philosophy of the "here" and "now" as a political tool for the emancipation of man from the repressive world in which freedom and humanism have been cancelled by the modern industrial-scientific complex.

Realization of Hegel's philosophy, based on a presumed contradiction between revolutionary dialectical method and the conservative system, has been the major problem of left-Hegelians' theoretical construction. For them it is through political revolution that Hegel's identity of the Real and Rational can be realized.² Marcuse and Habermas definitely advocate the Hegelian philosophy of dialectic and history within the orbit of Marxism. Perry Anderson has rightly pointed out that the entire Marcusean philosophy has been influenced by objective idealism of Hegel³ which aspires for progressive deconstruction of finite material world through the liberal-radical idea of political resolution or politics of "Great Refuse". In "reason and Revolution" Marcuse highlights the principles of negative reason and negative dialectic by which political revolution can be generated. Marcuse's obsession with the dialectical law of negation of negation shows his tendency of falling into the trap of Hegelian philosophy of history. Habermas is also guided by Hegelian objective idealist epistemology because his major focus is not on Marx's concepts of the forces of production and relations of production, but on the concepts of labour and interaction for constituting a philosophy of the self-constitution of the history of human species. Labour (equivalent to Marx's concept of economic base) of species is

2. L. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.116.

3. P. Anderson, Considerations of Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976). p.62.

related to Weberian-Parsonian purposive rational action; and interaction (equivalent to Marx's concept of ideological superstructure) is tied to the domains of symbolic communicative discourse of labouring human beings. Habermas' theories of species history, teleological labour and communicative action do not make an exact agreement with Marx's capital. His political manifesto is basically concerned with the problems of distorted political communication which can be solved by the enlightened efforts of critical public and critical reason which take place in a "republic of letters".

Among the critical theorists Adorno is the only theorist who tries to declare a war against Hegelian theodicy in both its original and Marxist versions in order to liquidate the idealist philosophy within the area of Marxism. Like Benjamin, Adorno explains social reality in terms of its internal multiplicity and difference or a constellations and configurations of elements drawn from the world of experience but arranged through their structure by the mind's power of seeing resemblance between things. The concept of whole as true structure is false; and total contradiction is nothing but the manifested untruth of total identification. However, what we find in the work of Adorno is that, ultimately, the concept of "whole" is based on this assumption that everything depends upon everything else even though the whole is internally contradictory. Despite this Hegelian tilt of philosophy, Adorno does much labour in proving this

epistemology that the dialectic of difference operates within the structure of differentiated matter reflected through consciousness. It is the consciousness that possesses photographs of objectivity and it is knowledge that conceives objects as it conveys them. Material consciousness sees the objectivity of reality without any prior image, and that historical materialism must ensure the spirit's liberation from the primacy of material needs in their state of fulfilment.

Adorno argues that it is false to make an opposition of object and subject, of matter and idea and of concrete and abstract, and then to give primacy to one over other in order to constitute a homogeneous language of philosophy. The true philosophy negates the dualism between body and mind and between matter and idea, because the phenomenology of facts of consciousness does not allow their separate definition and existence. For Adorno materialism is no longer counter-position of idealism, rather it is a critique of idealism in its entirety and of the reality for which it opts by distorting it.⁴ He agrees with Horkheimer's theorem that critical theory seeks not to make materialism acceptable, but to use it to make men theoretically conscious of what it is that distinguishes materialism from traditional theory of science. Critical theory is never regulated by pre-fabricated politico social interest-constellation; instead it

4. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p.197.

has to struggle against false objectivity and false subjectivity of existing matter of facts. While explaining being thought relationship Adorno, like Lukacs, accepts "an ontological primacy of being over thought";⁵ though he rejects Lukascian notion of identical subject-object and primacy of practice in which theory is dissolved and losses its autonomy. Adorno is anti-totalitarian and anti-system in a sense that he is opposed to all ideas that serve to perpetuate a particular form of domination and reduce the human subjects to reified forms. Negative dialectic is anti-science because it identifies rationality with measurability; reduces everything to quantities and excludes qualitative differences from the scope of knowledge. He also makes this point that "thought is not image of reality, rather it aims at the thing itself",⁶ and it is due to the reason that if thought is related to image, then it will deny the spontaneity of subject and a movement of the objective dialectics of productive force and conditions. Materialism has to declare a war against image-theory that conceals the objective movement of reality within its distorted forms. Having rejected the principle of reduction of difference to identity, Adorno points out that the concepts enter into a constellation. The constellation illuminates the specific

5. Ibid., p.200.

6. Ibid., p.205.

side of the concept, the side to which a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden. Language itself proceeds in such a manner where it becomes a form of representation. It provides objectivity to concepts by the relation into which it puts the concepts centred about a thing. Without establishing an affinity between concepts and reality, it is not impossible to know truth. Location of this is a matter of consciousness which, in turn, knows as much as about its otherness as it resembles that otherness.

In fact, Adorno accepts the concept of totality not in the sense of the absolute subject-object, but rather because commodity fetishism produces a totality reducing the qualitative diversity of the real to a single homogeneous dimension of abstract social labour. This is a point where we can argue that even Adorno's conception of totality entails the principle of ultimate identity of elements; and, as a consequence of it, history becomes a homogenous unity of continuity and discontinuity of social consciousness.

In brief, the main thrust of critical theorists is to give an ideological reaction against the modern positive science, repressive ideology, authoritarian political grammar and materialist epistemology which have decomposed a man into numerous contradictory atomized entities; and increased the process of forced social integration through the domination of man over nature which ultimately turns as a domination of man over man. In the absence of the objective possibility of structural transformation of industrial domination, the

institutional philosophers of Frankfurt school attempt to uphold the notions of critical reason and the transcendental norms of rationality as a major apparatus to realize the popular ideology of global revolution in the form of political consciousness and political violence. Progressive realization of historical reason is a precondition for the constitution of human freedom and happiness in a rational society in which reason will obey its self-constituted protocol, inner law and voice. In order to give a comprehensive understanding of the rationalist epistemology of the critical theorists, Marcuse and Habermas can be selected as the chief representaives of Frankfurt school who speak the language of German idealism and psycho-analysis method within the kingdom of Marx's historical materialism.

MARCUSIAN MARXISM

Marcusian Marxism, if it is a correct name, involves a double reduction of science and politics to the philosophy of rationalism, particularly a negative philosophy whose main target is to annihilate the unreasonable materialism world embedded into technological and scientific rationality and sanctified by positive philosophy. Marcuse explains the modern industrial society as a repressive order which progressively, first, keeps society, nature, mind and soul in the stage of permanent mobilization and, then, it produces a historical contradiction between the human essence and the existential make-up of social constraint. Technology is the source of reification, and irrationality of rationality is

the source of mystification of always-already mystified world. The world is characterized by repression, domination-subjugation relationship, alienation, irrationality and a triple conflict - man vs nature, man vs society and history vs nature. In a tension-ridden society, repression has become so effective that for the repressed it assumes the form of freedom (illusion), the abolition of such freedom appears as a totalitarian act.⁷ It can be pointed out that for the latter Marcuse, the categories of libidinal rationality and sexual revolution are more important than historical reason and political reason which were his early obsession. In his texts "one Dimensional Man" and "Reason and Revolution". Marcuse formulates a historico-dialectical epistemology in which positive thought/philosophy is contrasted with negative thought/philosophy. "Positive thought" corresponds to the principle of intellect i.e. to the principle of non-contradiction as a material principle of common sense and science which, in turn, justifies the existence of factual and material reality; whereas the "negative thought" is twisted with the principle of contradiction which aims at the negation of common sense world and finite material reality. Negation of the finite material reality can be made by collective political praxis grounded into historical reason. Violence is the demand of the day so long as the modern industrial system is itself based upon institutionalized-violence. Violence is justified

7. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970), pp.180-1.

if its aim is to realize human emancipation from the authority of facts and tyranny of material objects. The existential structure of material world has left us with no choice, but to change it through revolutionary philosophy of praxis so that we can restore the original identity of subject and object, essence and existence, naturalism and humanism, and ideal and real.

In the process of resolving contradictory existential condition of human beings, Marcuse sketches a composite structure of hyper-radical philosophical medicine emerging from his Heideggerian-Marxism (from 1920-1933) to Freudian Marxism (from 1945 onwards) via Hegelian-Marxism (1933-1944). In fact; he has generated an eclectic theory, and he is himself a man of combination. Having dissatisfied with Communist Party dictatorship, Stalin's cult of personality, materialist orthodoxy etc. Marcuse made a heroic attempt to regenerate the emancipatory power of human reason and defended the democratic and liberal socialism. During his early period Marcuse gave a Heideggerian solution to human problems by claiming that the main function of a theory is to make a search for the fundamental structures of human existence, society and history, In his book "Ontology" (1931) Marcuse tries to bring Hegel, Marx and Heidegger under the same platform by saying that the need of philosophy emerges from existential necessity for the construction of subject; but philosophy, as he extends, has to transform reality with the collaboration of revolutionary praxis. But as we move from

Marcuse's 'ontology' to his "Reason and Revolution" (1941) what we find is that he becomes mainly an exponent of the Hegelian-Marxian revolutionary dialectics. Here he highlights the law of negation of negation as a basic key to understand the movement of concrete-historical society. Marcuse attacks positivism and crude materialism, and formulates the structure of historical dialectic which encompasses all realms of human and social existence in which the contradiction between essence and existence is expressed and resolved. For Marcuse dialectic is a category of negation in terms of human practice whose basic modality is the truly creative and transformative negation of material objects and socio-material conditions of life. Dialectical negation is rooted into human labour, praxis and goal.

Marcuse expounds the theory of historical truth as a 'think tank' which guides human reason and human practice in such a direction so that they could become able to realize the unactualized potentialities of human beings. The vitality of a theory of critical dialectic/reason cannot be damaged by the oppressive reality, manufactured by positive-science because it is a 'thinker in a time of need'. In conformity with historical epistemology Marcuse in his book "One Dimensional Man" writes:

When historical content enters into the dialectical concept and determines methodologically its development and function, dialectical thought attains the concreteness which links the structure of thought to that of reality. Logical truth becomes historical truth. The ontological tension between essence and appearance, between "is" and "ought" becomes historical

tension, and the "inner subjectivity" of the object-world is understood as the work of the historical subject-man in his struggle with nature and society. Reason becomes historical Reason. It contradicts the established order of men and thing on behalf of existing forces that reveal the irrational character of this order."⁸

Here, we clearly see that for Marcuse dialectic operates within the structure of concrete historical-totality whose contradiction between essence and existence is resolved by a concrete historical man loaded with the task of getting the goal of rational society realized by negating the capitalist society which creates alienation and exploitation. It is man who constructs social reality; and history is a continuous movement of creative subjects. The serious limitation of Marcuse's thesis of creative individual praxis is that it relegates the theories of mode of production and organized class struggle to the background of Marxian theory-construction. Its message is that the revolutionary subject with predominantly emancipatory interests has to launch an eternal war against the integrative powers of the one-dimensional society. Marxism is neither a body of empirical propositions nor a dogmatic method but a theory of "the universal individual" who tries to annihilate the unreasonable material world until it comes into a conformity with the universal reason.

Marcuse also criticizes the repressive social order of USSR, more particularly Stalin's USSR. Though the Soviet

8. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964,) pp.141-2.

structure is characterized by collective ownership of means of production, collective welfare ideology and economic planning, its monolithic repressive statcraft has not as yet dissolved the tension between idea and reality, between intellectual and material culture and between theory and practice. The whole concept of peace, freedom and rationality are defined in terms of behaviour/formal science with a pragmatic instrumental intent to legitimize the irrationality of political domination. Autonomy, reason and individuality can only be realized at the level of cognition, not at the level of reality. Thus, thought and reality have become two distinct entities; man and nature have become hostile to each other and theory and practice move in opposite directions. The question as to why socialism has become identical to authoritarianism, is quickly answered by Marcuse with his raising finger on Stalin's constant distortion of the materialist dialectic and idea of socialist democracy.

In order to protect his iron monolithic political regime, Stalin arbitrarily converted Marxism into scienticism in which everything is supposed to follow the pre-fixed mathematical laws and regulations. Subjectivity has no place in theory, and the law of negation of negation has no use under Stalin's materialist philosophy. Everything is based on a priori formal logic which cannot be contradicted by the human subjective disposition. It assumes a theory of universal material outlook with rigid rules and regulation

which converts the critical revolutionary dialectical thought into a mere ideological-philosophical system. This type of codification of Marxism by Stalin was based on Engels' overemphasis on dialectics of nature as the general laws of the material world and his underemphasis on dialectic of history (i.e. interaction between man and nature); and it is this raw material which inspires Stalin to divide Marxism into two disciplines of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, the latter being the extension and application of the former to the study of society and its history.⁹ Hypostatization of dialectic by Soviet Marxism is negated by the historical dialectic of Marcusean Marxism which considers this fact that supra-historical force has nothing to do with Marx's dialectic and dialectical materialism and historical materialism are one and the same. Marcuse does not legitimize the thesis of naturalistic realism, propounded by Engels and Lenin, in which nature and history comply with same universal scientific system; and this philosophy was quickly manipulated by Stalinism which minimized the transition from necessity to freedom and assimilated freedom to necessity in ideology as in reality.

Marcuse dismisses the "single vision" of mechanical materialism and, in the same moment, recognizes the hitherto-unrecognized Hegelian dialectic as a tutor of Marxian

9. Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 137-8, and 144.

dialectic. A new mode of apprehension is evolved by Marcuse when he transmits the revolutionary potential of Hegelian dialectic to the Marxian theory of social contradiction in order to understand history, society and human existence. The historical dialectic deals with the philosophy of human life in a concrete manner; it does not posit a subject-object dualism, and it understands the movement of historical existence of society in terms of the principle of constant negativity. The transformation of class society into classless society involves the praxis of conscious revolutionary class. The maturation of contradiction between essence and existence is an expression of historical objectivity, and the effective intervention of human agency to transform reality is a moment of historical subjectivity; and these two things, taken together, form the essence of dialectical method. Dialectical method, which operates within social totality, is not a private property of Hegel but a common aspiration for both Hegel and Marx for whom truth can be discovered by adhering to the norm of negation of negation. In his book "Reason and Revolution" Marcuse provides a theoretical foundation of critical theory whose origin lies in the philosophy of nineteenth century. The basic premise of critical theory, in opposition to positivism, is that it is negative in character in a sense that it denounces conformist mode of thought and challenges an established authority of facts. However, he makes a point of difference between Hegel and Marx by saying that former

has applied dialectic in "rational totality" whereas that latter has connected dialectic to the "concrete historical totality" as Marcuse boldly points out that "the totality that the Marxism dialectic gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity that underlines its contradictions and shapes its every content is the negativity of class relations."¹⁰

Hegel's method is revolutionary because it provokes a critical employment of reason; but the system, in which dialectic operates, is conservative because it makes a compromise with the prevailing conditions of life. Hegel confuses thought and reality; he makes an identity of thought and its object, and thus he becomes the prisoner of existing socio-political interest of society. Marx inverted Hegel in a sense that he links dialectical process to historical process of class-divided society and remained committed to resolution of contradiction of the capitalist society through revolutionary union of theory and practice. Marxian dialectic is historical in a sense that it deals with a particular stage of the historical process; whereas for Hegel dialectical method generalizes the dialectical movement into a movement of being, of being as such and getting merely abstract and speculative expression of the movement of being. For Hegel resolution of contradiction leads to the realization of free subject and the restoration of human

10. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p.314.

essence; whereas for Marx the negation of contradiction in class-divided society means the liberation of the historically specific proletariat.

As a Marxist-theorist, Marcuse considers the class-consciousness of proletariat as a constitutive factor in the objective realization of human liberation. But Marcusean Marxism faces a serious dilemma when it, first, recognizes the dissolution of the proletariat as a class and, then, it provokes a pessimism by recognizing the internal process of instinctual repression which hampered liberation. Marcuse becomes a little-revolutionary-master when his man refuses to conform more with critical reason as compared to libidinal rationality. In this situation, hyper radicalism is converted into passive conformism and revolution becomes a matter of recognized utopia. Further, the covert system of repressive tolerance prevents the growth of a critical public central to the notion of critical theory. Thus there is only a philosophical manifesto for the transformation of society without any revolutionary agents and party politics.

The theatrical show of the dignified part of Marxism begins at a time when Marcuse announces that the concept of dialectic, as a necessary expression of class-divided society, attempts to resolve all contradictions on the basis of a judicious combination of a totality of objective conditions as well as intellectual culture and self-conscious and organized working class. But his working class makes a

leap from factory to university campus and his philosophy of economic freedom is converted to a sexual liberation. After all, it is a revolution and revolution is a matter of negative reason of self-realizing and self-determining subject. The subject as a mode of existence possesses the quality of reason ((for Hegel it is mind or spirit) by virtue of which it is able to transcend nature and society and to gain the comprehending knowledge which constitutes its real subjectivity.¹¹ Freedom is inscribed in critical reason which, as an objective historical force, distinguishes between existence and essence of entity, and becomes a motor for the construction and reconstruction of history. The essence of an entity refers to a stage of full realization and optimization of its inner potentiality, and provides standards which can be used to criticize deficiency of actual world of operation. Objective reality has to be realized by the substance (freedom) of subject. If there is an antagonism between subjective world of cognition and objective world of material life, then freedom of reason makes a call for revolution by condemning existing reality as a bad form of reality, a realm of limitation and bondage. True existence begins only when the immediate state is recognized as negative, when beings strive to overcome their deficiencies and develop their potentialities.¹²

11. Ibid., p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 66.

Negativity is inherent in all finite things. It forces the historical subject to denounce the material existence of social order. In brief, dialectics explain the movement of reality and the movement of reality takes place because it contains the seed of its self-destruction, since "all forms of being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that this negativity determines their content and movement".¹³ Marcusean dialectic is associated with the philosophy of life, analysis of labour, theory of proletariat consciousness and the construction of socialist revolution. His dialectic is always negative in a sense that it conceives reality as a historical process of development in which change takes place through overcoming contradiction and through negation of material world. Negative philosophy is antithetical to positive philosophy which does not see contradiction in reality and justifies material world and common sense knowledge. The main function of social theory is to explain the truth of changing concrete historical conditions and to generate revolutionary practice for creating a free-rational society. Theory is a guardian, thinker and master in a sense that it determines the course of political practice. Marcuse restricts the function of dialectical thought to only class-divided society in which there is a tension between essence and existence, and consciousness is determined by social and material existence. But in the socialist society

13. Ibid., p.27.

dialectical-historical materialism is self-negated because here reason will be determined by itself"¹⁴ and freedom equalizes the relation between consciousness and social existence. Thus the whole theoretical postulates of Marcuse move around the concepts of dynamic historical totality, negative philosophy, negative reality, unity of theory and practice, philosophy of objective man, and creative role of consciousness. His philosophical movement from Hegel to Marx is nothing but a passage from philosophy to social theory in which all the philosophical categories are at the same time social and economic categories. Marcuse sees a continuity in the economic and social theory of Marx, since "even his early writings express the negation of philosophy".¹⁵ Marcuse develops a theory of revolution by combining Hegel's concept of reason with Marx's analysis of alienated labour.

As a radical humanist, Marcuse tries to preserve the scientific character of historical materialism from the delirium of idealism; he swiftly jumps from Hegelian philosophical circle to that of Marxian economic prison-gate. From the gate of historical materialism he thinks of/aspires for scientific socialism leading to stage of communism which will connect naturalism to humanism in such a manner that contradiction between essence and existence, between self-confirmation and objectification, between freedom and necessity and between individual and species will resolved.

14. Ibid., p.319.

15. Ibid., p.258.

He bases his revolutionary political agenda on Marx's "Economic and philosophic Manuscripts" in which a theory of total alienation has been explained in terms of private property and division of labour of capitalist order. Alienation can be removed only by revolutionary practice of the working class. In this book Marx builds up the theory of historical materialism as a revolutionary critique of bourgeois political economy. In doing so Marx has borrowed the notions of essence, labour, objectified labour etc. from Hegel and applied them to concrete socio-economic condition so as to produce a scientific anthropologic problematic "which becomes the science of the necessary conditions for the communist revolution and this revolution itself signifies - quite apart from economic upheaval - a revolution in the whole history of man and the definition of his being".¹⁶ For Marx man stands for a set of social and practical relationships; man is a total being; but under the capitalist order, based on the concepts of profit, surplus, wage, social division of labour, competition and above all private property, man has become an alienated entity and "his sensuousness is essential practical objectification, and because it is practical it is essentially a social objectification."¹⁷

16. Herbert Marcuse, From Luther to Popper (London: Verso Edition/NLB, 1983), p. 5.

17. *Ibid.*, p.21.

By developing a critical confrontation with the categories of Hegelian philosophy and classical English political economists like Smith and Ricardo, Marx explained capitalism through the concept of alienation; and this theory has been basic concern for Marx's historical materialism which originates from "Manuscripts of 1844" and penetrates throughout his latter successive writings. The continuity of Marx's intellectual culture, as Marcuse says, is established through an inter connection of philosophy, political economy and revolutionary practice. The science of revolutionary historical materialism demands not only an economic transformation of capitalist society but also a revolution of the whole history of human species. The present history is a history of total human alienation and devaluation of human reality. Alienation is not only an economic fact but also a social fact consisting of denegation of life, loss of human value and loss of human sensitivity. The target of Marx's critique of political economy is to show how private property and social division of labour produce alienated labour under the historically-constituted capitalist mode of production. Alienation can be abolished if capitalism is overthrown by revolutionary practice. Revolution is the product of the contradiction between one's essential human needs and creative powers and the historical conditions of capitalist exploitative relations of production. Contradiction involves opposition between the need to be human and the objective expression of alienated labour or a labour, associated with

the tendencies of objectification, being-a-burden, and constraint and forced activity which are the features of wage-labour under capitalism. On the basis of Marx's "Capital" III Marcuse divides human activity into two domains: (i) a realm of freedom which contains **possibilities** for creation of an authentic self, and (ii) a realm of necessity in which labour appears as a bondage in the **domain** of material production. Marcuse's overemphasis on the category of self-constitution of subject by denouncing the realm of material production, which appears as a bondage and imposed necessity, gives this impression that he is more close to Hegel and Heidegger than Marx.

Marcuse has developed a historico-anthropological problematic in which historical materialism makes a unity of man and nature, an identity of humanism and naturalism and a union of history and man. This mode of representation of historical materialism is diametrically opposed to both: idealism and vulgar materialism. Marcuse does not reduce Marx's scientific anthropology only to economic sector but explains it with the category of many-sided beings with a wealth of needs and powers that are at once individual, social and historical-many sided human being. But when we closely look at Marcuse's ambitious plan for the reconstruction of Marxism, we find that he has invited various idealist philosophers like Hegel, Dilthey, Heidegger, Freud etc. to make a secret treaty with Marx for the achievement of human liberation. The overall picture of

Marcusian Marxism is like this: alienation is equal to the objectified labour (Hegelian touch) emerging from the privatized economic production (Marxian cast) which can be overcome by negative philosophy of dialectic (Hegel-Marx alliance) along with politics of Refuse (Marcusian self-reflexion) through a critical self-constituting subject (Heideggerian influence) possessing human sensuousness (Feuerbachian problematic's influence on Marx). Thus Marcusian Marxism is not a simple homogeneous structure, but a complex heterogeneous structure consisting of a plurality of contradictions and ambiguities, silences and violences and mutual degeneration of constitutive elements and mutual annihilation of those elements. We can fully agree with Kolakowski's observation that Marcuse's thought is a curious mixture of feudal contempt for technology, the exact science, and democratic values plus a nebulous revolutionism devoid of positive content.¹⁸ His closest association with the idealist philosophers has surrendered Marxism either to historical pessimism and defeat or to self-love or self-romance. The major consequence of this type of interpretation of Marxism is that the science of historical materialism has become a helpless governor of reality because it has lost its universal vision, direction and goal. This applies not only to the Marcusian philosophical discourse but also to the Habermasian intellectual production-technology.

18. L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Vol.III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.416.

HABERMASIAN MARXISM

Too much love is bad. Too much hate is equally bad. Beauty of everything depends upon a dialectical relationship between the balanced-love and the controlled-hate. Habermas does the same when he constructs the design of revolutionary humanism by mediating his amity with Marx via Hegel, Weber, Parsons, Freud etc. Having shown his commitment to the emancipatory philosophy of Marxism, Habermas tries to reconstruct the empire of historical materialism in the contemporary advanced capitalism by borrowing the concepts of labour-interaction from Hegel, rationality from Weber, dynamic equilibrium of system from Parsons, ego-identity and science of unconscious from Freud and symbolically mediated institutional setting and grammatical theory from Chomsky and others. His critical theory, associated with emancipatory knowledge-constitutive-interest, gives a critique of positivism and materialism in which things and persons are seen in terms of mathematical rules and regulations and scientific knowledge is used for the maintenance of political domination. The major demerit of positivism and materialism is that they produce and reproduce an opposition between truth and power, between fact and value, between man and nature and between determinism and voluntarism. As against materialism and positivism, critical theory tries to discover the governing laws of self-constituting history of human species by making a dialectical relationship between subject and object, between being and consciousness, between nature

and man and between social labour and human interaction. Habermas explains the developmental model of human society in terms of the historical strategies of domination and liberation. Liberation comes into existence when the labouring subjects concretize their consciousness in relation to objective reality and keep themselves involved in revolutionary praxis. Truth, reason, freedom and justice cannot be realized by completative thought itself, but by critical self reflection and enlightened political practice. Thus the progressive transformation of society requires a holy alliance between theory and practice.

By criticizing the attempt to unite science and politics for the creation of domination-subjugation relationship in society, Habermas establishes the emancipatory power of historico-hermeneutic epistemology whose knowledge-constitutive-interest is to show the objective possibility and fundamental condition for the possible reproduction and self construction of human species. Reproduction of human history is based on the purposive intentional action and goal of human subjects who symbolically communicate with each other in the given socially-determined economic production. Knowledge-constitutive-interest emerges in the course of man's natural history during the period of self-constituting evolutionary process which is both our past and our present condition. Habermas presents this view that constitutive-knowledge-interests cannot be considered entirely by thinking of 'reason as an organ of adaptation' or knowledge as an

instrument of adaptation to a changing environment; rather it is derived both from nature (biologically evolved cognitive capacities) and from the cultural break with nature.¹⁹ On the basis of diversity of interest-constellation Habermas talks of two sciences: (i) empirical-analytical natural science, and (ii) historical-hermeneutic science. The first category of science serves the guiding interest of domination of man over man; it facilitates instrumental operation of things and persons, and produce distorted communication and objectified reality. But the guiding interest of the latter category of science is to arrive at an 'unconstraint consensus' through the notion of free and critical dimension of inter-subjectivity; it also establishes critical consciousness on the basis of man-nature-society interaction through labour teleology. The emancipatory power of critical hermeneutic knowledge involves the autonomy, responsibility, freedom, choice and goal-fixation of historical subjects in the process of production and reproduction of determinate social order. The historico-hermeneutic science does not divorce theory from value; it mediates relationship between social objectivity and natural objectivity and it produces knowledge in relation to the history of human race. It also understands an identity of ego and social group. It can be noted that unlike Marcuse, Habermas is not so hostile to

19. J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (London Heinemann, 1972), pp.312, 196-97.

science that he will demand a total annihilation of scientific knowledge. He simply says that the scientific knowledge has become a major source of distorted political communication and manipulation of power, which can be disclosed and checked by the inter subjective communicative discourse of historico-hermeneutic method. Instrumental action can be overcome by communicative action so long as it attempts to free us from the internalized pressure of obsolete legitimations. The recognition of distorted communication leads Habermas to develop a theory of communicative competence which he relates, under the influence of psychoanalysis, to the emancipatory effect of critical theory. Habermas stresses the notions of 'emancipation' and 'autonomous' which are critically imported from the Enlightenment, thus he revives the philosophy of bourgeois revolutionary humanism in the ideological discourse of Marxism.

The consistent effort of Habermas' critical theory is to point out that the instrumental conception of knowledge is morally indifferent; it does irrational evaluation of reality divorced from social context, and considers people as an object to be exploited and manipulated so as to produce the phenomenon of reification. On the other hand, critical philosophy of social science explains the totality of reality through meaningful thought, science explains the totality of reality through meaningful thought, action goal and

consciousness which are context-dependent. It generates human communication and free discussion about existing power systems and fights against the depoliticization of life.

In order to include the normative, cognitive and moral force in his critical theory, Habermas argues that the self-creation of human species cannot be reduced to the process of productive work. For Habermas practical and theoretical knowledge, cognition and will; knowledge of the world and movement to change it are identical. He sees an intersection between the objective world (reality) and the subjective world (thought). If we have to discover historical truth, then historical materialism must be reconstructed in such a way so as to include the normative order of modern society. The normative dimension of society sketches the picture of homologous structure of consciousness. Consciousness is explained in terms of three structurally-homologous orders: (i) the rationality structure in ego development and in the evolution of world views; (ii) the development of ego and of group identified and (iii) the development of moral consciousness and the evolution of moral and religious representations.

Under historical materialism there is a union of theoretical interest and practical praxis, as Habermas claims that "theory is involved in two interrelated processes - investigation of the constitutive historical complex of the constellation of self-interest on the one hand and historical

interaction of action in which it becomes theory in action-oriented social praxis and political praxis"²⁰ on the other for changing the existing order. For Habermas the mediation of theory and praxis and especially the institution of their unity does not take place on the level of cognition, but rather in language, work and interaction, for the subject is always-already socialized i.e. constituted by praxis, and thus there is no provision of neutral subject. The implication of this argument is that reality is experienced within an accepted subpublic mediation between theory and praxis.

Critical theory bases its conditions of existence on the normative basis of social interaction; and further maintains this proposition that the developmental logic and organization principle of society sees an interaction between material production and social interaction, though the former has primacy over the latter since the reproduction of human species takes place in the reproduction of material condition of existence. Habermas says that Marx's dialectical logic fails to highlight the normative basis of social theory with practical intent.²¹ Critical theory is antithetical to scientific-rigidity and transcendental philosophy because it rests on inter-subjectively determined and historically specified human communicative, intentionality, consciousness and praxis as is the case with class. Knowledge is not only

20. J. Habermas, Theory and Practice (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974), p.2.

21. Ibid. p. 16.

derived from forces of production but also from moral learning and insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and consensual regulation of action conflict.²² Thus the total volume of knowledge is produced on the basis of self-sustained interaction between forces of production and relations of production.

For Habermas relations of production are associated with moral representation, identity formation and legal structure embodied in institutional system which, in turn, becomes instrumental for the creation of new productive forces. Social system maintains its integrative power so long as there is continuity between the developmental patterns of forces of production and relations of production and between ego-development and the developmental logic of society. Equilibrium of system is disturbed when these two structures diverge in two directions or develop unequal speed of evolution and expansion. The gradualist developmental model of society is determined by its own rationalized-institutional core which plays the dual role of linking the various developmental levels of society into a whole and of circumscribing a range of variation within which objective social change can occur. The institutional cores of primitive society, feudal society and capitalist society are age-sex criteria, class domination in the form of political

22. J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp.97-98.

hegemony and relation of wage labour and capital respectively. It is the institutional core itself that explains both social integration and social crisis. Thus Habermas is a theorist who equalizes the logical competence of productive action and praxis-oriented communication. However, as a Marxist he makes it clear that the developmental logic of social evolution is materialist in a sense that it makes its reference to crisis-producing system problems in the domain of production and reproduction and remains historically oriented, because it has to underline the causes and conditions of societal evolution both in the fields of normative/interactional order and economic order.²³ Crisis in the capitalist order can be located in the domains of antagonistic relation of labour and capital, class structures, surplus-value and instrumental ideological structure. Here Habermas rejects the reductionist short circuiting models of base-superstructure and material determinism of Plekhanov and accepts the notion of social totality in which there is mediation between economic force and ideological force, so long as the developmental logic of historical materialism is grounded into the normative structure.

23. Ibid., p.123.

For Habermas Marx's historical materialism is a comprehensive theory of evolution of human species and their associated structural patterns in which capitalism appears one of its stages. Social evolution is conceived as a bidimensional learning process (cognitive/technical and moral/practical); the stages of which can be described structurally and ordered in a developmental logic. Here emphasis is laid down on the institutionalized embodiment of structure of rationality which makes learning possible at each level for socialized individuality. The result of learning process is to form a cultural tradition and creative cognitive potential that can be used for social movements in the tension-ridden social system. It seems that Habermas has used Parsonian model of evolutionary universal in order to understand both the limited adaptive and innovative capacity and crisis-ridden situation of social system. But he gives a Marxian explanation of societal crisis-ridden situation by saying that it emerges due to an inconsistency between rate of development of social cohesive forces and the rate of development of productive capacity of social system. If we compare Althusserian model of contradiction with that of Habermasian model of contradiction, we immediately come to this point that the former explains society in terms of a plurality of contradictions; whereas the latter has only talked about a simple contradiction between productive system and normative system.

Habermas conceptualizes the reconstruction of historical materialism in terms of socially-organized labour and the self-constituting history of species. Labour is socially processed; and it is socially processed labour that regulates a reciprocal relationship between man and his external environment. Labour is always social, co-operative and purposive in terms of fixation of socio-political goal of society. Social labour, as a form of reproduction of human life, is grounded into materialist epistemology which does not assign primacy of the spirit over nature, idea over interest, but defines man as the ensemble of social relationships.²⁴ The concept of labour-teleology is opposed to crude materialism in which matter determines idea on the one hand and to idealism in which spirit determines the movement of material world on the other. In brief; it refuses to accept the theories of methodological materialism and methodological individualism. Against idealism Habermas relates the developmental model of human species to the concept of mode of production and its associated normative order. A mode of production consists of two things (i) a specific productive forces, and (ii) specific social intercourse. The productive power of society consists of labour power of producers, technically useful knowledge and organizational structure; and the relations of production are those

24. Ibid., p.133.

mechanisms and institutional orders that determine ways in which labour power is combined with available means of production. Relations of production also determine the mechanism by which interest groups (classes) are created out of unequal distribution of economic wealth. The stability and instability of social order can be explained through correspondence and non-correspondence between productive forces and productive relations. Construction and reconstruction of a developmental logic of society does not take place automatically but involve rational praxis of subjects sharing linguistically-established common communication. Historical materialism explains this fact that with the developing character of productive forces over a long historical period, the nature of social intercourse, first, matures and then, becomes a complex order. One of the crucial points, Harbermas makes, is that it is only in capitalist mode of production where base is identified with economy that determines other systems. Class, in the true sense of term, is found only in the capitalist market economy. Class like phenomenon may appear in other modes of production through which social inequality and exploitation can be explained. The reason behind this is that integrative forces of other social formations (except the capitalist formation where economy plays a crucial role) like primitive social formation, feudal social formation and post-industrial social formation are based on the non-economic criteria such as systems of kinship structure, political domination and

educational and scientific order respectively.²⁵ Thus historical materialism defines society as a moving unity of productive power and normative power; it explains that the structural patterns of the different stages of development can be ordered in a developmental logic that is, in a hierarchical sequence of increasing complexity and encompassing forms of rationality.

Habermans' version of historical materialism operates under the positive influences of Hegelian notion of labour-teleology, Parsonian notion of system analysis and Weberian notion of meaningful intentional action. His dialectic of history is associated with the notion labour-interaction model. The developmental model of society is guided by evolutionary method along with the theory of functional compatibility or functional incompatibility of parts. In his historical materialism, labour covers all rational instrumental action which, in turn, can be identified with Marx's concept of productive forces. Marx's notion of relations of production is replaced by Habermasian theory with a new term designating the institutional framework of society that is equivalent to the notion of symbolically mediated interaction. By doing this, Habermas does commit violence to the author of capital. Throughout his whole works Habermas does not explain whose interest state serves when it intervenes in the domain of economic organisation.

25. Ibid, p.144

Habermas joins the camp of functionalists when he sees development of society in terms structural differential and functional specialization of socially-regulated economic order within which cultural, ideological and political orders create and sustain their respective conditions of existence. For Habermas, conflict-zone of society is not class-antagonism but masking and unmasking of the difference between rationalization in the instrumental sphere and emancipation in the institutional framework. As a consequence of it, he only gives a simple radical ideological critique of society and thereby pleads for political movement in order to raise the critical political consciousness of the people. Habermas says that the relation of history to social and political theory can be conceived at the levels of interpretation, practical orientation and philosophical foundation. In fact, he is preoccupied with third so long as he reduces science and politics to philosophical discourse, too timid about the second, and too, single mindedly abstract about the first. Under the impact of idealist philosophers, Habermas has presented the dialectic of enlightened will and self-conscious potential

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26. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Oxford: Polity Press, 1984), p.10.
 27. R.W.Bologh, Dialectical Phenomenology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p.236.

and "the idea of a cybernetically self-regulated organization of society as the highest expression of the technocratic consciousness".²⁶ Habermas also discusses the insufficiency of dialectical logic when he recognizes its historical specificity to a form of life that produces distorted communication²⁷. However, he plans to formulate the possibility for negation of dialectic of distorted communication by the critical consciousness, undistorted language communication and creative praxis. Thus Habermas' self-righteous theoretical tone simply presents a radicalized version of Hegelian-Freudian Marxism. Marcuse belongs to the same Marxian theoretical construction.

In brief, the critical epistemological construction of Marcuse and Habermas involves seven projects: (i) rejection of dialectic of nature and materialist epistemology and acceptance of dialectics of history and thought, (ii) the construction of society in which social order and economic order are organically related to each other, (iii) formulation of the categories of labour-teleology, creative praxis, historical rationality, philosophy of concrete labouring man and man-nature-society interaction model, (iv) codification of the ideology of liberal-radical political revolution in opposition to the concept of dictatorship of proletariat central to the thought of Marx-Lenin, (v) conceptualization of the law of negation of negation as a central theme of the revolutionary dialectical method of Hegel and Marx (vi) explanation of societal contradiction between

essence and existence and (vii) consideration of modern science and technology as a basic source of domination, repression and alienation which can be overcome by the revolutionary human praxis and the critical consciousness of enlightened people.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALTHUSSERIAN REVOLUTION

The radical methodological analysis of historical materialism by Althusser's philosophical discourse can be seen as an attempt to establish the scientific character of Marxism. It involves use of master code of symptomatic reading of a text's underlying unconscious problematic about which even the author is not fully conscious. The greatest theoretical claim of Althusserian Marxism is to damage the ideological mirage of the Hegelian problematic of objective idealism and Feuerbachian problematic of anthropological humanism which have penetrated into the scientific problematic of Marxism through the epistemological construction of economistic, historicist and humanist models of Marxism. Althusser's uncompromising attitude to economism, historicism and humanism led him to assert that Marxism has nothing to do with the philosophy of man, human, nature, individual needs and personal humanism which originate from the liberal ideology of possessive individualism, as he points out that "economism and humanism are the manifestation of Bourgeois Law and ideological practices of the capitalist relations of production".¹ He explains social formation from the viewpoint of Spinozist

1. L. Althusser, *Essays in Self-Criticism* (London: NLB, 1976), pp.86-88. (Althusser's this text hereinafter referred to as ESC).

mathematical model in which subject is decentered; history becomes anti-teleological and ideology is identified with illusion. The basic demerit of historicist and humanist models of Marxism lies in the fact that society is explained as a circular homogeneous expressive totality and history is supposed to follow a simple homogeneous flow of linear time-scale.

Althusser argues that it is Hegel, not Marx, who has presented a historicist model of society in which all manifestly complex phenomenal elements are reduced to the single universal essence of Spirit or Idea; consequently all parts necessarily express similar essence in different forms and thereby mutually reducible and transferable to one-other. Since all elements are identical in the domain of self-sustaining and self-expressing essence, they follow a continuous evolutionary homogeneous pattern of development. Althusser's basic thrust is to show that the anti-teleological scientific problematic of Marxism has been degenerated by humanist and historicist Marxists' application of closed ideological problematic of the idealism of essence and the empiricism of subject within the boundary of historical materialism. The theoretical regression - a regression whose effect consists of the dissolution of organic bond between revolutionary theory (Marx-Lenin) and revolutionary practices of masses - can be seen in the formulation of reductionist approach to Marxism in which social structure is interpreted by reducing its different

practices/instances into a single master practice which can be located in the constructs of material monoism (Plekhanov), commodity fetishism as a source of reification (Lukacs), the concept of "praxis" (Sartre), philosophy of praxis (Gramsci) and experimental history (Colletti). These Marxists have reduced the demarcation line between dialectical materialism (philosophy of science) and historical materialism (science or society and history) on the one hand, and forget to distinguish the object of knowledge from the real object on the other further Gramsci, Lukacs, Sartre, Colletti and Marcuse have identified society with the terms "historical bloc", "totality", "totalization", "unity of heterogeneous parts" and "historical totality" respectively which represent only the radicalized different variants of the Hegelian invariant ideational expressive totality. Thus economism and historicism-cum-humanism are the two different forms of the radicalized Hegelian interpretation of Marxism, so long as "the theoretical mechanism of economism sees in consciousness and politics only the economy while the theoretical intention of historicism and humanism imbues the economy with politics and consciousness".² These two models of Marxism annul the essential differences among political practice, economic practice, philosophical practice and scientific practice of social formation by establishing a homogeneous circle of politics, economics, philosophy and science. Althusser says

2. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital (London: NLB/Verso Edition, 1986), pp.138-9. (This text will be hereinafter referred to as RC).

that the voluntary suppression of the distinction between dialectical materialism (philosophy) and historical materialism (science) within Marxism gives rise to two deviations: (i) the rightist deviation in which philosophy is negated in order to generate a positivist science; and (ii) the leftist deviation in which science is negated in the service of subjectivist philosophy.³ The positivist science produces fatalist political discourse; whereas the subjectivist philosophy can give rise to only voluntarist political discourse. These political practices are ultimately bound to damage the immense revolutionary potential of working class; for they have their center in the revisionist and reformist theoretical problematic. Thus humanism and historicism are those Marxian ideological intellectual currents which explain reality by highlighting the notions of teleological history, liberating essence of man whose reverse is alienation and slavery, personal humanism, subject as an Absolute centre, man-made history, mutual conditioning between base and superstructure in which both express and sustain each other, dialectics of history, and intentional act of consciousness.

By making a radical attack on the left-Hegelian Marxists, Althusserian Marxism makes the following contributions in order to revolutionize scientific protocol of Marxism by annihilating all forms of epistemological

3. L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: NLB, 1971), p.18. (This text hereinafter referred to as LP).

Obstacles and theoretical regressions, produced by humanist and historical Marxists over a long historical time.

First of all, Althusser defines society as a pre-given-unevenly-structured-complex-whole consisting of four distinct practices of politics, economics, philosophy and science which have their own respective law of development, history, condition of existence, mode of articulation and law of combination. The unity of complex structure is ensured by two complementary principles of specific effectivities of the parts of superstructure and the determination of whole by economy, in the last instance. The determination of parts by whole does not rule out the possibility of relative autonomy of parts.

Secondly, in opposition to expressive circular causality of history, he formulates the concept of structural causality of mode of production whose presence within the society can only be seen in "effects."

Thirdly, a distinction is made between dialectical materialism (philosophy) and historical materialism (science). Dialectical materialism is identified with the materialist philosophy and ideology which generates and preserves those conditions in which scientific problematic is produced with a break with its previous ideological problematic and further it is safeguarded from ideological intervention. The science of history and society (historical materialism) explains the various practices of social

formation, their function, their interrelationship and their pattern of development. Historical materialism is based on the concepts of mode of production, surplus value, class struggle, masses etc.

Fourthly, Althusser introduces the master concept of epistemological break in order to show how the old scientific Marx has settled his relationship with his previous Hegelian-F Feuerbachian ideological problematic based on the notions of man, essence, alienation, freedom and reason.

Fifthly, science develops through dialectical mutation or epistemological rupture. In the construction of scientific problematic object of knowledge is not confused with the real object. Science has a self-referential protocol which does not require a validation from the external phenomenal reality.

Sixthly, history is a process without a subject and goal. In fact there is a primacy of the scientific structure over the ideological history.

Seventhly, revolution in the structure takes place when all historically-accumulated contradictions converge together and form a ruptural unity.

Eighthly, Althusser's announcement of the concepts of dictatorship of proletariat and concrete class humanism denounces the revisionist theses of peaceful transition to socialism through democratic and parliamentary road, peaceful

co-existence between socialism and capitalism, and personal abstract humanism.

The above-mentioned mutually related theoretical innovations are the explicit expression of Althusser's philosophical intervention in Marx's works; and his intervention in a political and ideological conjuncture was produced by a constellation of factors like the presentation of Marxist theory in non-Marxist way, the split in the International Communist Movement, R. Garaudy's attempt to establish a virtual bond between communists, socialists and Christians for the construction of an advanced democracy in France, and the denunciation of Stalin and cult of personality on the one hand and announcement of the thesis of "Everything for Man" for the peaceful co-existence between capitalism and socialism on the other by the 20th CPSU.

Althusser says that the scientific revolutionary theory of Marxism has been put under effective crisis by petty-bourgeois intellectuals and practitioners who highlight the principles of philosophy of man, anthropological realism, socialism with human face, individual liberty and abstract personal humanism which are related to the ideological/non-scientific problematic of the young Marx. Demagogically produced political criticism by Khrushchev on Stalin's authoritarian voluntarism and political crimes and his evaluation of Stalin's personality with psychological indexes such as persecution mania and brutal instincts followed by mass repression and terror can be seen as a bourgeois

ideological reaction or right wing critique, because it denounces "certain facts about legal superstructure without reference to the rest of the Soviet superstructure such as the state and party on the one hand and infrastructure such as the relations of production, class relations and the forms of class structure on the other."⁴ The 20th CPSU should have criticized Stalin's violation of socialist legality in terms of (i) the State and party, and (ii) the class struggle, not in terms of cult of personality which is alien to Marxist theory. Althusser also underlines those conditions under which the theoretical non-revolutionary philosophy emerged in France. Those conditions are nothing but the consolidation of bourgeois power through three revolutionary moments of 1789, 1830 and 1848 which assimilated intellectual force and agency in the favour of liberal ideological order which soon became associated with the production of philosophies of idealism, reformism, spiritualism, cultural provincialism, the politics of activism and neo-Hegelian movement; and in modern times the "French misery" has appeared due to the proclamation of the idealist writings of the young Marx.⁵ Now, the ideologies of the Communist Party of France are deeply rooted into progressive democratic socialism in terms of maximalist interpretations of social progress implicit in measures such

4. Althusser, ESC, p.75.

5. L. Althusser, For Marx (London: NLB/Verso Edition, (1986), pp.25-28. (This text hereinafter referred to as FM).

as nationalization of property, redistribution of income, democratic and rational planning and curbs on authoritarian political practices.

Thus the ever-increasing tendency of the production of neo-Hegelian caricature of Marxism and acceptance of the politics of democratic road to socialism by the enlightened communist philosophers forced Althusser to regenerate a theoretico-practice through which materialist philosophy is contrasted with all forms of idealist philosophy. In the wake of crisis in Marxism and workers' movement at the global level, Althusser reads Marx's works as a philosopher in order to identify the specific object of study and the specificity of its relations to that object by picking up the developmental character of problematic of texts through the discourse of unconscious. For him Marxism is a science of society and politics based on the concepts of mode of production, surplus value, class struggle etc. and it is, at the same time, a materialist philosophy which enables ideologists of the working class to accept the proletarian class position in theory as well as in practice. In the course of reconceptualization of Marx's entire works, he always makes a confrontation between Hegel and Marx in the theoretical terrain; and consequently he tries to identify the young Marx (EPM, 1844) as a practitioner of Hegelian-Feuerbachian closed ideological problematic coupled with liberal political practice and the old Marx (capital) as a theoretician who denounced his all philosophical/ideological

consciousness. The difference between the Young Marx and the Old Marx can be explained by the term epistemological break i.e. a change in problematic of theory construction.

Althusser's scientific model of Marxism emerges from his filial association with various idealist theorists such as Spinoza, Bachelard, Freud, Martine and Lacan who generated the concepts of structural causality, epistemological break, science of unconsciousness, problematic and decentered subject respectively. Althusser's 'structural Marxism',⁶ if the title is correct, applies all these concepts for the restructuration of materialist philosophy and science which, in turn, will negate the unfortunate Hegelian ideological baggage within the dictionary of Marxian discourse. Bachelard, a materialist philosopher of science, rejects the schema of incremental advancement in ever advancing scientific knowledge and proposes this thesis that the growth of scientific knowledge can be explained through epistemological break through which the scientific ideas are disconnected with their previous ideological ideas. In fact;

6. Note: Althusser says that he is not a structural-Marxist because structuralism believes in formal idealism and assigns primacy to process over contradiction; while his method, under the influence of Spinoza's structural causality, can be known as dialectical materialist causality which assigns primacy of contradiction over process; it attests the thesis of revolutionary science based upon revolutionary theoretical class positions and uses the terms like determination of structure by economy in the last instance, domination/subordination among the parts of the decentered totality, and multiple contradictions. For detailed explanation see Essays in Self Criticism. pp.126-31; and also Foreword to Italian Edition of RC.

he speaks of reorganization and mutation of scientific knowledge by highlighting the importance of 'epistemological value' established by the philosophy of scientific culture.⁷ The idea of pre-scientific knowledge gives rise to a theory of lapsed history; whereas the status of scientific knowledge is associated with the history of rupture. Once scientific knowledge comes out from ideological knowledge, its legitimacy is not attested by empirical reality but by its own institutions, cohesion and laws that together constitute a scientific city. Science develops through a rationally organized critique of previous illusionary idea embedded in the closed space of philosophical immobalism; and then it lays bare new horizon of open space of scientific knowledge which "has no object outside its own activity; that is, in itself, in its practice, its own productive norms and the criteria of its existence"⁸. Thus science is a self-referential and self-validating entity. The process of progressive objectification of scientific knowledge presupposes a double movement in a sense that, first of all, it breaks its association with apparent obviousness of connotative ideological articulation of discourse and then it purifies its concept in opposition to early idea. Science survives not through a magical force immanent in reality but

7. D. Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology, NLB, London, 1975, p.10.

8. Ibid., p.26.

through a rational force immanent to scientific mind. Like Popper, Bachelard (though he rejects analytical philosophy) believes that scientific error plays a vital role in constituting an essential moment in the production of scientific knowledge. Kuhn's discontinuist model of the history of science belongs to the same rationalist epistemology of Bachelard. Kuhn says that normal science is replaced by revolutionary science through paradigm switch. But the problem with his model is that once revolutionary paradigm is institutionalized, it becomes a conservative force which further generates its condition of negation; thus it falls in the trap of Hegelian evolutionary process of negation of negation. Bachelard tries to give a "materialist cast of his philosophy through the concepts of scientific city which constitutes its own norms in material form reflected through institutions, meetings, colloquia, not in the pure space of disembodied minds".⁹ However; his transcendental idealism mounts its face by highlighting the concept of mind, not the concept of scientific culture. Despite this weakness, Bachelard's thesis that science develops through reorganization, ruptures and mutations of the critical point of theory-construction, inspired Althusser to apply it to Marx's political economy in which there was a break in 1845, a break that signified an absolute difference between the closed ideological problematic of the young Marx

9. Ibid., p.82.

who explained reality through the notions of man, essence, alienation, liberty and reason on the one hand, and open scientific problematic of the mature Marx who discovered the concepts of mode of production, class-struggle, relations of production, surplus value, exploitation etc. as the new tools to grasp the axis of reality on the other. Althusser, thus, writes that the theoretical practice of science is always completely distinct from the ideological theoretical practice of its prehistory and this distinction takes the form of a qualitative theoretical and historical discontinuity which he would follow Bachelard in calling an epistemological break.¹⁰

Spinoza is another tutor of Althusser. For him Spinoza was the first philosopher who developed the thesis of anti-teleological theory of history by conceiving God as immanent cause of the world of all things; God is given, prior, total, independent and immanent and His presence can be seen in the effects. He produces the effects within the whole structure.

In calling God the immanent cause of all things, Spinoza may mean either that God is Nature as the totality of things or that He is Nature as the totality of facts. The concept of structural causality of Spinoza subsumes that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, because universe is constructed on a

10. L. Althusser, FM, pp.167-8.

single substance of God who is an absolute reference point for its object of Knowledge. Althusser finds in Spinoza a concept of structural causality capable of accounting for the relationship between a structure which is a 'hidden' or 'absent cause' and its effects within the order of things. Following the message of Spinoza, Althusser explains structural causality in terms of mode of production. The concept of mode of production, to be sure, is a secular version of the Spinozist conception of God as the immanent cause of all things. Mode of production can be seen through its effect; it functions as the absent cause behind the appearance of commodity on the market place. Production of knowledge must recognize a theory of the opacity of immediate based on the realization that the manifest does not present the latent and, at the same time, unlike Hegelianism, but like Spinoza's philosophy, it must make this assertion that "the object of knowledge or essence is distinct from the real object such as the idea of the circle which is the object of knowledge must not be confused with the circle, which is the real object".¹¹ In fact, Spinoza's distinction between idea and ideatum corresponds to Althusser's instruction to make a distinction between object of knowledge and the real object. For Spinoza the criterion of truth is determined by self-referential system and internal coherence between concepts; because "the idea of truth and the idea of the Jurisdiction

11. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.40.

of a criterion always go together because the function of the criterion is to identify the Truth of what is true..."What is true" identifies itself not as a Presence but as a Product as it emerges in its production".¹² Taking this clue from Spinoza, Althusser considers this fact that the production of scientific knowledge is internal to theoretical practice itself which has its own criteria of validation, legitimation and proof-value, and it does not sit on the door of empirical world to get its sanction. In opposition to pragmatism and empiricism, Althusser maintains that "it has been possible to apply Marx's theory with success because it is 'true'; it is not true because it has been applied with success"...."the whole matter is non problematic because theoretical practice is its own criteria, and contains in itself definite protocols with which to validate of its product"; the established sciences themselves provide the criteria of validity of their knowledge."¹³ Thus Althusser's extreme hostility to empiricism and Hegelianism forces him to mediate his relationship with Marx via Spinoza. In conformity with the mechanical model of history of Spinoza's natural philosophy, he gives this idea that structure is immanent in its effects; that subject is the centre of illusion, that ideology is an imaginary representation of reality, and that theory is a practice independent of external/phenomenal world of facts.

12. Althusser, DP, p.137.

13. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, pp.56-59.

Althusser's advocacy for no-unified center - whether it is spiritual or material - provides him an arm to fight against theoretical-humanism which keeps "man" at the center of history and assigns autonomous action to human subject. Althusser's theorem of history, as a process without subject and goal, derives its strength from Lacan's concept of decentered subject. For Lacan subject is not an entity with an identity, but a being created in the fissure of radical shift. The main thrust of science of unconscious, based on reorientation to psychoanalysis of Freud, is to show how subject is constructed and deconstructed, as Lacan has pointed out that "if the unconscious has taught us anything, it is firstly this, that somewhere, in the other, it knows and it knows precisely because it is upheld by the signifiers through which subject is constituted".¹⁴ It is through material signifier through which the discourse of unconscious knows more than what a being does and believes to be true in the ideological world of conscious knowledge. Influenced by Lacan, Althusserian Marxism tells us that subject is an agent or bearer of a fixed relation of production and his role is already-always determined by the structural causality of mode of production. Althusserian determinism is the reverse side of Sartrean decisionism and teleological history of Comte, Hegel and Young Marx. Derrida also supports the thesis of

14. Jacques Lacan, Feminine Sexuality, ed. by Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1985), p.158.

decentered subject when he says that "centre has no fixed locus, natural site; it is a function, a sort of nonlocus in which infinite number of sign-substitutions, repetitions and transformation come into play."¹⁵ Derrida's discourse on deconstruction thesis assumes this fact that everything begins with structure, configuration or relationship, at the same time, it abandons its all reference to a centre, to a subject, to an origin etc. Thus there emerges the notion of decentered subject within structure.

In order to combat Hegelian model of the immediate reading of essence Althusser surrendered himself before Freudian science of unconscious discourse where truth is discovered by symptomatic reading of an object of knowledge. Althusser's commitment to a passion of science forces him to write that "only since Freud we begun to suspect what listening and hence speaking (and keeping silence) means; that this meaning of speaking and listening reveals beneath the innocence of speech and hearing the culpable depth of a second, a quite different discourse, the discourse of unconscious".¹⁶ Freud's analysts' symptomatic reading of patient's utterances is used by Althusser to discover the underlying problematic of Marx's texts. He believes that reading of texts is a matter of competence because the truth

15. J. Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. Writing and Difference (Chicago, 1978), pp.279-80.

16. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.16.

of history cannot be read in the manifest discourse of text, rather truth is located in the silent unconscious theoretical discourse whose effect can be seen in the production of knowledge. It is not psychological vision of a subject but a determinate theoretical labour that can understand as to how discourse moves by a double movement of exclusion and inclusion of concepts. For example, on the eve of epistemological break, Marx's theoretical problematic made an attempt to negate the ideological notions of alienation, man and negation of negation; and sought to evolve the concepts of mode of production, surplus value etc. for the inauguration of scientific theory. Further, it is also noted that Freud applied the concepts of condensation, displacement and over-determination to his understanding of the complex mode of articulation of dream-structure. Althusser has used all these concepts in order to understand the structure and function of the unevenly-developed heterogenous contradictions of social formation. Althusser believes that, in stable time, the essential contradictions of complex social formation are neutralized by the displacement of one contradiction by another contradiction such as the dominant role of economy can be replaced by the dominant role of polity. It happens because in a normal time the various levels/contradictions of complex social formation are relatively autonomous or overdetermined. But, in revolutionary situation, all contradictions are reduced to economic contradiction and form a ruptural unity in the process of condensation.

The concept of problematic plays a master role in the theoretical formulation of Althusserian Marxism. Problematic - whether philosophical or scientific in nature - consists of a set of problems, questions and terms as well as set of possible answers and solutions to the problems posed under any problematic all questions and problems are put into interrelational form in which the nature, locus and function of each concept can be explained in relation to other concepts of the same problematic. Two isolated concepts, derived from two antagonistic problematics, cannot be compared because such clecticism will be, at best, superficial and, at worst, misleading. Sighting of a problem is no longer an act of individual subject and his psychological vision, it is the relation of immanent reflection between the field of the problematic and its objects and its problems.¹⁷ Thus it is not the faculty of vision that sees, chooses and determines the range of problems. Rather it is the self-constituted field of problematic that determines what it has to see and what it has not-to see, what it has to include and what it has to exclude, what object it has sight and what object it has to oversight, and what it has to make visible and what it has to make invisible. In the development of a theory invisible is inscribed in the inner darkness of exclusion made by

17. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.25.

conscious and critical visible. Thus theory-production is internal to the practice of determinate labour which acts and reacts on the developmental pattern of problematic.

Althusser's attack on Hegelian expressive totality and teleological history of reason led him to recognize certain positive discoveries in the works of Montesquieu, "probably the first person before Marx who undertook to think history without attributing to it an end i.e. without projecting the consciousness of men and their hope onto the time of history".¹⁸ According to Althusser, while explaining the typology of principles and functions of state/government Montesquieu gave the concept of "concrete dynamic totality" based upon the principles of laws of identity and contradiction. Montesquieu's theory of determination of concrete totality of state by its determinate principle is related to Marx's determination of society, in the last instance, by economy. The positive discovery of dialectics of concrete history by Montesquieu stimulated Marx to construct his theory of scientific history. Thus we see that Althusser's untranscendable provocative celebration of Marxian discourse has been manufactured on those conceptual raw materials which have been supplied by idealist philosophers: Spinoza, Montesquieu, Freud, Bachelard etc. In

18. L. Althusser, Politics and History: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx (London: NLB/Verso Edition, 1982), p.50. For a detailed explanation see pp.50-53. (This text hereinafter referred to as PH).

conformity with Leninism, Althusser says that there cannot be a revolutionary practice without a revolutionary theory. By a revolutionary theory he means a theory that has no connection with the various forms of idealist philosophy. If it is so, then logically it implies that probably he cannot manufacture a scientific theory of Marxism so long as he is schooled in the idealist philosophy. But, for better or worse, we have been convinced that Althusser's Marxism is a scientific revolutionary discourse the western Marxism has ever produced.

Althusser's Marxism = Philosophy + Science

Althusser's Marxism tries to delegitimize the two principal variants - historicism and humanism - of the single invariant ideological problematic of Hegel or young Marx and, in the same stroke, it revolutionizes this theoretical position that Marxism consists of two separate disciplines: (i) materialist philosophy (Dialectical Materialism), and (ii) materialist science of society and history (Historical Materialism). The object of dialectical materialism is concerned with the theory of the history of scientific knowledge production; whereas the object of historical materialism aims at the explanation of various modes of production, their structure, constitution, articulation, conditions of existence and contradiction leading to structural transformation. Both disciplines have to be separated in Marxism. If we reduce dialectical materialism to historical materialism, as it has been done by Young

Lukacs and Korsch, then history becomes an originating and basic category rather than a concept to be constituted, and reflection on the structures gaining consciousness of their meaning is a function of the structures themselves which are interiorized in process of mediation; and if historical materialism is reduced to dialectical materialism, then a positivist-empiricist interpretation emerges which dilutes the proper object of historical materialism by subsuming all historical objects under the same universally valid abstract law and a model regulating all historical concretization.¹⁹ For Althusser philosophy and science are not mutual mirror-recognition structure; rather philosophy deals with the history of the production of knowledge; while science deals with the existing content of knowledge. He argues that there are only three major global scientific revolutions or ruptures such as the celebration of the "continent of Mathematics" by the Greeks, the inauguration of the "continent" of physics" by Galileo, and the opening up the "Continent of History" by Marx, and these three scientific revolutions respectively induce the birth of three forms of philosophy: (i) idealist philosophy announced by Plato, (ii) materialist philosophy created by Descartes, and (iii) revolutionary political philosophy of class struggle established by Marx's 11th thesis on Feurbach and implemented by Lenin and Mao. Accordig to this Schema what we note is

19. Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB/Verso Edition, 1978), pp.11-12.

that the birth of science is prior to the evolution of philosophy, thus philosophy is always late; it is always postponed and it lags behind science. One of the remarkable points in Althusser's works is that there is no royal road to science, since the production of scientific knowledge requires a long painful theoretical labour conditioned by political problems. Similarly, establishment of the hegemonic position of materialist philosophy demands a constant struggle against the idealist philosophy. Thus the construction of a bond between Marxist theory and workers' movement is a number one theoretical and practical problem in the present as it was in the past.

Now, first of all, let us deal with the conception of philosophy and then the conception of scientific knowledge separately. It is remarkable to note that Althusser has not given a homogeneous definition of philosophy. In his early texts like "For Marx" and "Reading Capital" Althusser defines philosophy as a "Theory of theoretical practice"²⁰ or "Theoretical practice of science".²¹ Here Althusser argues that the main object of philosophy (Marx) is to produce a knowledge; thus it has an epistemological and theoretical status like a science. Its structure and function can be located in the constituted thought-process. For Althusser dialectical materialism is a "Theory" with capital T which refers to practice in general whose main job is to transform

20. L. Althusser, FM, pp.171, 173 and 256.

21. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC p.31.

the ideological practice of existing empirical practices into knowledge of scientific truth. But later on he recognizes his theoreticist deviation and argues in the texts "Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays" and "Politics and History" that philosophy has to do more with socio-political function than with theoretical function. Now philosophy is recognized as a "class-struggle in theory", or a "case of ideological partisanship", though it still defends Marx's scientific theory of historical materialism from the ideological contamination so long as philosophy is linked to Marxist science. But Althusser quickly points out that "philosophy lags behind science in Marxist theory".²² However, Marxist philosophy will continue to exist so long as the production of scientific knowledge exists. Althusser argues that philosophy is a site where a continuous ideological struggle exists between the idealist dialectic and the materialist dialectic. Philosophy enables us to take a class position in theory and practice, thus it is a class struggle in theory. To do philosophy means to do politics and vice-versa in the field of theory. In the eyes of Althusser, Lenin related revolutionary politics to materialist philosophy. Thus he is a philosopher-politician. Materialist philosophy helps us in taking a proletarian class position on the basis of which we create and defend the proletarian science of society. Since philosophy is an ideological structure, it has no object, no history, no age in a sense in which a science has an object,

22. L. Althusser, LP, p.19.

history and age. It simply deals with the construction, reconstruction and repetition of the inherent antagonistic relationship between idealism and materialism which represent two contradictory world views about the natural and social universe.

The total function of materialist proletarian philosophy is to make a double intervention in the domain of science and in the domain of politics; thus it links Marxist science to workers' movement for the generation of structural transformation of social formation in which the materialist philosophy (representing truth) will denounce the idealist philosophy, which produces an illusionary lived-relationship between men and their conditions of existence. The materialist philosophy understands the world through and in the theoretical and practical struggle with the idealist-philosophical discourse. In short, it denotes a number one revolutionary politics against the restorative politics of idealism. When the Marxist science and the Marxist philosophy work together, the effect becomes apparent; class-struggle for the transformation of the world.

Philosophy follows the scientific revolution. Since dialectical materialism was theorized by Engels and Lenin, not by Marx, it remained and still remain in the state of unconstituted and implicit manner. The materialist philosophy is a revolutionary philosophy which develops a practicability of business like attitude in order to change the world of exploitation of labour by capital. Lenin does not

believe in the philosopher's philosophy of mere communication and interpretation; rather he is believer in the scientists' philosophy of the transformation of the world so long as "it represents class struggle i.e. politics which presupposes an instance of the science".²³ The practical existence of Marxist philosophy as a critical and ideological consciousness appears when we become ready to understand and defend the interest of the working class in the history of philosophy as a whole. Idealist philosophy defends those world views in which knowledge is produced and justified in advance by religious, ethical and political interests. Here no distinction is made between the object of knowledge and the real world. The consequence of this schema is that since questions and problems are formulated in the light of empirical world, knowledge production simply becomes a matter of representation and reflection of that empirical world. If the world is false, then the knowledge-production is also false. Thus in the ideological problematic both the questions and their answers are false and represent "dual mirror relations". It happens due to the fact that the "ideological problematics" of "the Cartesian circle, the Hegelian circle and Husserlian ideological Reason"²⁴ do not distinguish the object of knowledge through which knowledge

23. L. Althusser, LP, p.64.

24. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.53.

is produced from the concrete real object of empirical world which always represents a problem-ridden socio-political interest of a class. By assuming the autonomy of theory Althusser tells us that the true representation of knowledge can be produced if its object of knowledge is separated from the real concrete world. For Althusserian Marxism the assumed identity of the object of knowledge and the real object has been the main thrust of idealism and empiricism which constitute the philosophy of idea or the history of idea or the philosophy of subject. The philosophy of history starts its philosophical trade with the notions of man, the economic subject, human need, spirit, liberty, generic human nature and empirically concrete human individuals, and then it produces a closed space of circular knowledge in which the same essence is reproduced in different forms. The ideological problematics of "essence" of idealism and "subject" of empiricism represent this closed circle of knowledge in which the "knowing consciousness" produces everything in the lightening flesh of actual material world.

Marxist philosophy serves as a materialist reminder to "theory" of practice i.e. historical materialism which functions as a conceptual apparatus of the science of history and society. Unlike rationalist's and positivist's construction of dualism between truth and error, it aspires for provincial truth for the endless conquest of new knowledge. It can rectify its mistake; it can eliminate its error and it can check its limitation. That is why, the

mature Marx's scientific problematic eliminated the immature Marx's illusionary ideological problematic. The materialist science defines matter with its attribute of motion and conceives knowledge in relation to the historical stage of science. It was Lenin who defined materialist philosophy in a more rigorous manner and linked materialist philosophy to scientific politics. In fact, his materialist philosophy seeks to know as to what happened in scientific practice. Thus we can see that Althusser has given two definitions of philosophy. First of all, he defines philosophy as a "Theory of theoretical practice" i.e. the general theory of scientific knowledge. Here he confuses philosophy with science. But he soon realized that the identification of the similar theoretical status of philosophy and science is a matter of "theoreticist mistake in conceiving the birth of philosophical revolution and scientific revolution in a single epistemological break and in regarding philosophy as a science which has an object, a beginning and a history".^{24a} In the second stage, Althusser assigns more practical/political function than theoretical function to philosophy. It is a battle field in which a war takes place between the idealist tendency and the materialist tendency. Its development of revolution as it happens in the scientific knowledge. Philosophy has no history and age because of the fact that it is a cognitive/ideological world which has a tendency to "appear and reappear" or "come back".

24 a. L. Althusser, ESC pp.67-68.

that is to say that even the oldest philosophy, given the historical conjecture, may reappear in a new guise in the modern time. Thus the domain of philosophy deals the ideological/ political struggle between idealist philosophy and materialist philosophy in which one tries to establish its hegemony over the other. Determination of hegemonic position depends upon the given historical conjecture in which theoretical, technical, social and political practices come together. Like science nothing happens in philosophy. What happens in the domain of philosophy is the repetition of the war between the hostile worldviews; thus it leads nowhere because it is going no where since "the history of philosophy is nothing but the nothing of this repeated inversion".²⁵

Philosophical battlefield is not concerned with the production of scientific knowledge; rather "it is a class struggle in theory because it is to give both the class struggle (the last instance) and the other social practices (scientific practice in particular) their due in their "relation" to philosophy".²⁶ If philosophy is a matter of ideological/political partisanship in theory, it cannot become a science; it can simply create raw material for the production of scientific knowledge which, in turn, will be defended by the materialist philosophy itself. Thus Althusser revised his early definition of philosophy in the following ways.

25. L. Althusser, LP, p.56.

26. L. Althusser, ESC, p.150.

- (i) Philosophy is not a science and it has no object in the sense in which a science has an object;
- (ii) Philosophy is a practice of political intervention carried out in a theoretical form;
- (iii) Philosophy makes a double intervention first in the political domain as the effect of class struggle, and then in the theoretical domain as the effect of scientific practice;
- (iv) It is itself produced in the theoretical domain by the conjunction of the effects of the class struggle (political practice) and the effects of scientific practices, and
- (v) It expresses a class opinion, a partisanship in the entire philosophical discourse of the history of philosophy.²⁷

Thus philosophy, unlike science, is simply an ideological position which people maintain in the entire history of class-divided societies. The difference between the bourgeois idealist philosophy and the materialist revolutionary proletarian philosophy lies in the fact that the former justifies the existing hierarchical order of things and simply gives the interpretation and reinterpretation of reality; while the latter, by combining

27. L. Althusser, LP, p.105.

the effects of the Marxian scientific practice of material conditions of existence (as given by Marx) and the effects of scientific political practice (as it is the case with Lenin), tries to bring out a revolutionary transformation in the logic, structure and mechanism of the capitalist society. The fusion of the effects of Marxist philosophy and Marxist science and their articulation by Lenin and Mao have produced the Russian socialist Revolution and the Chinese Socialist Revolution. In Althusser's Marxism there is a division of philosophy into two camps: (i) the idealist bourgeois philosophical philosophy of consciousness (ii) and the materialist proletarian scientific philosophy of politics. Similarly, science is also divided into two sectors: (i) the bourgeois science and (ii) the proletarian science. The theory of two sciences came into existence when Lysenko (the Soviet scientist during the despotic rule of Stalin) argued that the classical genetics, based on the invariant theorization of gene which is not even affected by hybridization, is incompatible within the spirit and letter of dialectic of Engels.²⁸ In Althusserian Marxism science has also got a class character. The proletarian true science has to be counterposed to the bourgeois pseudo science. From the door of proletariat class position, the Marxist science

28. Dominique Lecourt, Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko (London: NLB, 1977), p.108. For a detailed explanation see Chapter 5 (pp.100-27), and Introduction by Althusser (pp.7-16).

explains the development of society by detecting the tendential crisis of the capitalist social formation. It can be noted that the theory of proletarian science, as a theoretical touchstone and functional model for all scientific and economic development, had been attested and legitimized by the Soviet state ideological system during the tenure of Stalin's rule. We can feel that the materialist dialectical theory of science (given by Lysenko), which opposes a poor man's Hegelian evolutionism of things, is simply a reflection of the technicism of Stalinist politics. In the contemporary world socialism and capitalism follow the same universal science. Althusserian Marxism argues that though Marxist philosophy and Marxist science are distinct, they should be understood together.

For Althusser historical materialism is a science that deals with the condition of existence, mode of articulation and mode of dissolution of complex social formation of society. The complex social formation consists of four practices: economic practice, political practice, philosophical practice and scientific practice whose "forms" are identical but "essences" are different. Historical materialism can be identified with "theory" in inverted commas whose major function is to provide a determinate real science of society and history. The production of ever developing scientific knowledge takes place in a constituted thought-process which is not affected by the constraint of real and concrete empirical world. This implies that the

production of scientific knowledge, first of all, makes a distinction between the object of knowledge and the real object, and then it imposes its internal effects over the structure of real world. The scientific knowledge develops its own conditions of existence, its own protocol, its own proof value and its own demonstrative effect. It is an autonomous practice which has no socio-political conditioning. Every theory is, in essence, a problematic i.e. the theoretico-systematic matrix for posing every problem concerning the object of theory.²⁹ The production of knowledge deals with the construction of problems and problem-solution mechanism in order to explain the concrete specific developmental situation of social formation.

Production of knowledge is always polemical in a sense that it, first, gives a radical critique of illusionary idealist ideology and then it tries to see a marked difference between the scientific character of knowledge and the pre-scientific knowledge. Further, theoretical production is one of the autonomous practices of social totality; but its survival condition is ensured by the separate production and reproduction of economic practice, political practice and ideological practice. The unity of theory and practice is first achieved within each practice by which Althusser means "any process of transformation of a determinate given raw material into a determinate product, a transformation effected by determinate human labour using

29. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.155.

determinate means (of practices)" and he continues to say that "in any practice, thus conceived, the determinant moment (or element) is neither the raw material nor the product, but the practice in the narrow sense: the moment of labour of transformation itself, which sets to work in a specific structure, men, means and a technical method of utilizing the means".³⁰ Scientific practice, like other practices of social formation, produces knowledge by following three successive stages what Althusser calls Generality I, Generality II and Generality III. Generality I is identified with the abstract theoretical raw material; Generality II is concerned with the instrument and means of determinate theoretical labour and Generality III is related to the "concrete-in-thought" or knowledge-production. Knowledge is produced when Generality I (abstract structure) is transformed into Generality III (concrete structure) by Generality II (which refers to the stage of scientific abstraction produced by human labour). In opposition to empiricism, Marx says that knowledge does not proceed from the concrete to the abstract, but from the abstract to concrete which takes place in thought; while the real object, which gives rise to this whole process, exists outside of thought and in opposition to Hegel, Marx maintained that the movement from the abstract to the

30. L. Althusser, FM, p.166-7.

concrete is not manner of producing reality, but of coming to know it.³¹

In the dialectic of practice, Generality I and Generality III are not identical because the former is merely a theoretical raw material to be manipulated; while the latter is a finished product i.e. knowledge. Generality II is not at all the simple development of Generality I, rather its passage is from the "in-itself" to the "for-itself" because it is a science under consideration. It is the process of real transformation whose forms are rooted in mutation and reconstruction of given raw materials which induce real qualitative discontinuities in theoretical production. True, in the process of transforming Generality I into Generality III, the transformative function of Generality II is itself transformed. For example the scientific knowledge (Generality III) of Marx's Capital is a product of the use of Hegelian dialectic (Generality II) on labour theory of value of Ricardo and the class struggle of French socialism (Generality I). Marx's makes Hegel work on Ricardo in which the theoretical instrument of labour, which transforms the theoretical raw material, is itself transformed by its work of transformation. That is to say that "the Hegelian dialectic has been transformed in the theoretical work it has carried out on Ricardo";³². Thus in the very process of producing scientific knowledge production

31. L. Althusser, ESC, p. 190.

32. L. Althusser, PH p.173.

the terms and conditions of Hegelian dialectic were changed by the emerging materialist dialectic. To change the Hegelian dialectic is not a matter of simple inversion but a matter of opposition between idealism and materialism. Althusser, further, points out that a new science does not emerge from a sudden rupture with its pre-scientific knowledge, the rupture in science must be understood as opening up a new terrain of problems and concepts with which a new scientific theoretical system might be produced. At this point Althusser rejects his previous position of positivist epistemology in which ideology (false) is counterposed to science (truth). Now he accepts this fact that even after scientific break the ideological problematic may work as an epistemological obstacle in the development of scientific problematic. The basic characteristic of ideological problematic is that like empiricism, it does produce truth by establishing a congruence between subject and object, between thought and thing and between concrete-in-thought and the concrete-real. Here knowledge becomes a reflection of reality and it is guided by the extra-theoretic practices of religious and political interests of a given class i.e. minority ruling class. Its terms, conditions, problems and questions are constructed in such a manner so as to resolve the inconsistency of the real worlds by a slight theoretical displacement. Preconceptualization of problem-structure by the ideological problematic can be seen in

Durkheimian problem of social order. Thus the ideological problematic gives a closed knowledge structure, embedded into extra-theoretical practices of religio-political interest of society which represent only the ideological problems. Ideology is guided by 'interests' beyond the necessity of knowledge alone.³³ It takes its meaning from the current interests in whose survival it is subjected. The ideological problems do not provide us any means to verify the knowledge and its effect simply by interests which tells us neither its point of beginning nor its point of maturation. As opposed to the ideological problematic, the scientific problematic makes a distinction between the concrete-in-thought and the concrete-real; it is not governed by the external theoretical practice, interest and problem-structure of concrete-real and, above all, its object produces a demonstrative effect in terms of changing the concrete empirical world. The cognitive validity of a scientific theory is derived from its ability to assist in the formation of world views of the groups in question. More particularly the validity of a theory is maintained by its own immanent criteria, internal coherence, internal critique and self-proof. In Althusser schema, epistemological break refers to the phenomenon of emerging scientific knowledge from the ideological knowledge. But the major question that haunts our mind is: how does the closed ideological problematic allow itself for the generation of scientific problematic? Since Althusser does

33. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.141.

not give any attention to this problem, his claim that the foundation of science emerges out of mutation in theoretical ideology, becomes problem-ridden and unintelligible. Further Althusser argues that science is an autonomous, neutral and objective practice. But we constantly find that whenever there is a struggle between classes, the state apparatus of dominant class uses scientific-knowledge in order to annihilate its enemy. Then how can science be neutral if politics regulates it?

Althusser's self-attested internal theory of science is close to Bhaskar's realist theory of science. According to Bhaskar science is produced by the imaginative and disciplined work of men on what is given to them and the criteria of science are internal to thought; thus science presupposes the ontological independence and the possible disjunction of the domain of the real.³⁴ Althusserian Marxism, it seems, joins issue with Hegel and Wittgenstein in saying that all thoughts, even science, emerge ultimately out of ordinary perceptual judgement and the criteria of reflective acceptability. For Althusser a fact cannot be used to test the adequacy of a theory, because it is only within the problematic of a theory that facts are brought to light. This apriorism that truth is the inward criterion

34. Roy Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science (Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited, 1978), pp.185-6.

both of itself and falsehood, states that an idea is false if it does not fit in or cohere with other ideas of the same sort. Really the internalist science of Althusserian Marxism is based upon the coherence theory of truth.

Althusser always tells us that knowledge is manufactured "only within knowledge in the process of knowledge, not in the development of the real concrete".³⁵ This means that the important domain for the production of knowledge is the order of constituted-thought, not the order of the real. But, at one place, Althusser himself confuses the knowledge with the real when he writes that "the real is identical to the means of knowing it, the real is its known or to-be-known structure".³⁶ In this way he becomes the prisoner of idealism and empiricism to which he has registered a protest. We fail to understand as to how Althusserian Marxism understands the relationship between social being and consciousness. To fix an autonomous status to cognitive/abstract knowledge and to treat self-extrapolative theory formation in complete isolation from reality look like the theorization of a species of idealism, truism and what E.P. Thompson calls "theoreticist solipsism".³⁷

35. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.108.

36. L. Althusser, FM, p.246.

37. E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (London: Merlin Press, 1981), p.17.

Althusser's theoretical project attempts to put a counter signature of the structuralist claim against the Sartrean philosophical idealism and it makes a sacrifice of the pole of human agency (subjectivism) in the service of the pole of structure (objectivity). The sustained hostility of Althusser's theory to subjectivism or methodological individualism requires a form of realism in social theory; but it cannot adopt either of the historical poles - subjectivism (agency) and objectivism (structure) which are the legacy of the nineteenth century either absolute idealism (Neo-Platonism) or materialism. One can suppress the polarity of agency and structure and the fixation of the supremacy of structure over agency on the basis of this argument that all agents have practical knowledge or what Anthony Giddens calls "discursive consciousness"³⁸ about the social structure. However, the unintended consequence of an intended action and the tacit rules of structure limit individual's understanding of social world. The duality between voluntarism and determinism, between subject and object and between the conscious mode of cognition and the unconscious mode of cognition can be resolved by the "theory of structuration"³⁹ which makes a powerful balance between functionalism (emphasis on structure), hermeneutic sociology (actor's

38. Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979), p.5.

39. Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), p.5.

meaningful action which has an unintended consequence) and Althusserian structuralism (structural contradictions).

Althusser's science is antithetical to idealist problematic. But when he announces that the raw material of theory is given, then his enlightened theoretical formulation cannot deny its self-imprisonment within the classical rationalist epistemology of apriorism, at least, at the levels of Generality I and Generality II. That is why E.P. Thompson registers a criminal case against the self-attested internal beauty of the Althusserian queen of theoreticism whose clothes are tailored on the instrument of "scholasticism, intellectual freaks, bourgeois elitism and static structuralist ideology a -historical theoreticism disclosed itself as idealism and consequently it is only a means for the justification of theology and reason".⁴⁰ In the course of disciplining the petti-bourgeoisie instinct of humanist-Marxists, Althusser develops the thesis of the autonomy of science-in-general and Marxism-as-science in particular which progresses through epistemological rupture or dialectical leap. This model of science seems to be identical to Feyerabend's concept of theoretical anarchism and Kuhn's paradigm switch. For Feyerabend theoretical anarchism is the best medicine for epistemology and the

40. E.P. Thompson, op.cit. pp. 3-4

philosophy of science.^{40a} Theoretical anarchism promotes the progressive movement of science by challenging the hegemonic position of law-and-order science and by undercutting the authority of reason. But unlike Althusser, Feyerabend accepts the importance of facts and says that incompatibility or mutual negation between facts and theories creates the ground for the revolutionary development of objective scientific knowledge which contradicts the established metaphysical world view. The ruptural model of science gets its legitimacy even though Kuhn's concept of "paradigm shift"⁴¹ which refers to this point that science is not an evolutionary process but a revolutionary process in which the old paradigm is displaced by the new paradigm in order to achieve maximum objectivity of knowledge. Like Feyerabend, Kuhn also accepts the world of facts and argues that revolution takes place when there is an immense crisis in normal science's paradigm. Crisis results from the sustained inconsistency between old theories and new facts. In order to show the logical validity of his theory and new facts. In order to show the logical validity of his theory of scientific revolution, Kuhn cites an example from astronomy in which there took a major upheaval when Copernicus replaced the "theory of earth-centered universe by

40a. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso Edition, 1979), pp.17 and 27.

41. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.85.

the theory of sun-centered universe⁴² in order to develop more simplicity and accuracy about the planetary motion of the natural universe. In the science of natural universe, the language of reconstruction-thesis has been attested even by Alfred Kuhn's statement that "the transformation of the structural and functional plans of species in the course of evolution comprises the reconstruction of the organs accompanying complex functional changes; it requires a change in the norm of reaction affecting the individual developmental processes which, in turn, must change and must be integrated in a new".⁴³

The reconstruction thesis of science, advocated by Feyerabend's theoretical anarchism and Kuhn's paradigm shift, does not question the validity of empirical factual world. Unlike Althusser internalist science, these intellectuals mediate a dialectical relationship between the ~~order~~ of facts and the order of thought. In the eyes of Althusser's self-referential cognitive model of science, this kind of knowledge schema is associated with the pragmatist and empiricist-epistemology, since it derives its energy from the immediately apparent empirical world of facts. Althusser points out that the socialist-proletarian science is not brought into existence simply by the needs of society or by

42. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1971), p.1.

43. Alfred Kuhn, Lectures on Developmental Physiology (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1971), p.4.

the interest of any class. This view is consistent with the Leninist judgement that it would be necessary to bring Marxist science to the working class from the outside. The other major point, made by Althusser, is that science is produced by events and criteria which are internal to the theoretical practice. What Althusser goes on to say is that Marxism is a science like the Newtonian science; there is difference between Marxian science and bourgeois ideology and there is an epistemological break between the humanist Marx (EPM) and the scientific Marx (Capital). But when we look at Althusser's attempt to transform the Young humanist Marx into the mature scientific Marx through epistemological break, we visualise a process that entails a tacit leap which depends on some quality of leaper. We can also point that it is Althusser's suppressed voluntarism that is one of the grounds for his association with Maoism and his apologetics for Stalinism. Althusser's interpretation of two different Marxes does not only sacrifice material history to theoretically constructed history but also it signifies an ontological regression because it dispenses with the fundamental insight of the historicity of natural and human social existence.⁴⁴ The production of rigid dichotomy between fact and idea and the presentation of history as a process without a subject do not make us understand as to how

44. Alfred Schmidt, History and Structure (London: The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1983), p.66.

Marxian historiography deals with the interaction of socially organized individuals and their connection with both human and non-human external nature. In fact, capital represents a scientific work of Marx; but the scientific/objective laws of economics do not ignore the existence of constitutive/creative human praxis which Althusser does not recognize in his scientific Marxism.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL BREAK

The scientific workshop of Althusserian Marxism introduces the concept of epistemological break for dislodging the historical teleology of human immanence and anthropological humanism. To be sure, the functional necessity of the theoretical category of epistemological break in the works of L. Althusser is to identify the existence of two mutually opposed problematics not only for the construction of a set of problems and questions but also for the realization of solutions to problems posed. The discontinuity between the closed ideological theoretico-systematic matrix of the young Marx and the open scientific theoretico-systematic matrix of the old Marx cannot be explained by a superficial reading/innocent reading but by a symptomatic reading of texts. The main demerit of superficial reading is that it reads the text through psychological vision; it sees the product of knowledge as something immediately visible to direct observation and it takes the visible presence of certain terms at their face

value without attempting to penetrate to the le**o**b f the problematic which determines its own field for posing problems and, consequently, getting their answers. Though the symptomatic reading of the textual discourse of Marx's texts, Althusser comes up with this observation that there was an irreversible epistemological break in 1845 in which Marx displaced his early theoretical terrain of humanism by a new theoretical terrain of science. Epistemological break is defined in terms of "changing terrain and terms of problems".⁴⁵ In 1845 Marx tried to liberate his problematic from Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian sensuous materialism so that he could provide new answers to reality on the basis of a new way of posing questions. This break was a continuous break not only in terms of additions and codification of new concepts like mode of production, exploitation, surplus value, class struggle etc. and but also in terms of the continuous negation of old notions such as man, liberty, human nature, alienation, negation of negation etc. on the eve of epistemological break Marx became opposed to Smith, Ricardo, Hegel and Feuerbach. In fact he made a double rupture: first with the Hegelian concepts of teleological simple idealist dialectic and simple expressive ideational totality; and then with Feuerbachian concept of theoretical-humanism i.e. a concrete-sensuous "Man". Marx's new theoretical discovery of mode of production, surplus

45. L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p.155.

value, masses, class-struggle, base-superstructure etc. discredited the construction of theories of society (from (Hobbes to Rousseau), political economy of homo oeconomicus (from Petty to Ricardo) ethics (from Descartes to Kant) and also theory of idealist and materialist knowledge including pre-Marxist knowledge (from Locke to Feuerbach via Kant).

Epistemological break of 1845 did not establish the logical coherence of scientific problematic over a night by a magical force. Rather it simply constructed the map of the "Continent of science" which was subjected to its further codification, elaboration and verification through the demonstrative effect. Its extension and proof required a very painful theoretical labour or theoretical struggle in which the continuous appearance of new scientific categories compelled the old ideological notions to make their progressive disappearance. What is required under the thesis of epistemological break is to identify the progressive stages of Marx's intellectual formation from the initial stage of contemplative radical idealist epistemology (EPM) to that of the final stage of revolutionary materialist epistemology (capital). In between these two opposite poles/stages, we find a transitional stage encircled by a war between the dying ideological problematic and the emerging scientific problematic. Thus there are three Marxes: (i) the "Young Marx", (ii) the "Transitional Marx" and (iii) the "Mature Marx".

1. The Young Marx

According to Althusser the whole theoretical problems and terms of question of the young Marx were based, first, on rationalist epistemology of Kant and Fichte (1840-42) and, then on realist anthropological problematic of Feuerbach which itself entails the terms and conditions of the Hegelian objective idealism (1842-45). Marx's theoretical obsession with idealism of essence and empiricism of subject could not make him able to give a different set of answer to the problem of exploitation of labour by capital. Althusser believes that since the works of Young Marx such as "Doctoral Dissertation", "The Holy Family", and "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" tried to look at reality with the notional/philosophical conceptual apparatuses of "reason, liberty, man, the economic subject, need, the systems of needs, civil society, alienation, theft, injustice, spirit" etc.,⁴⁶ it was not possible for Marx to come out with a revolutionary solution. To be more precise, the conservative philosophical problematic cannot generate a revolutionary materialist solution unless the terms, conditions and relations of this very problematic are displaced by the terms, conditions and relations of a new scientific problematic. The young Marx did not do so. That is why he gave the manifestoes for a radical critique of law and state

46. L. Althusser, ESC, p.153.

and radical transformation of society without realizing that his theoretical concepts of "Man" and dialectic stem from the philosophical problematics of Hegel and Feuerbach. Thus the young Marx's construction of theoretical question and practical solution remained essentially committed to the Hegelian-Feuerbachian questions-answers matrixes.

During 1840-42 the young Marx was predominantly fascinated by Kant and Fichte as compared to Hegel and Feuerbach. In conformity with a liberal-rationalist humanism of Kant and Fichte, the young Marx defined the essence of man in terms of freedom, reason, rationality etc. Politically speaking, he professed the ideology of bourgeois radical humanism and his object of thought was associated with the political demand for the abolition of irrational censorship of press and the despotic rule of the Prussian state for the realization of human freedom, autonomy and reason. For the young Marx, man is only freedom as reason and human freedom is neither caprice, nor the determination of interest, but as Kant and Fichte meant it, autonomy, obedience to the inner law of reason.⁴⁷ Thus, at this stage, the Young Marx was committed to the philosophy of reason which can be realized if the State and laws are rational. The irrationality of state can be restored to its rational character by free reason of humanity. That was why Marx in his 'Die Rheinische

47. L. Althusser FM, P.224

zeitung" gave this opinion that philosophy demands that the state be the state of human nature.

During 1842-45 the Young Marx moved progressively from the rationalist epistemology to that of the Feuerbachian problematic of "theoretical humanism" where the union between the proletariat and political philosophy of liberation is sealed in the essence of man. The non-reformist attitude of the Prussian state made Marx ready to reject the rationalist political appeal. Marx soon realized that the abuses of state cannot be explained as a deviation from its essence (reason), and its existence (unreason). In "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" (1844) Marx criticized the Hegelian idealism and the political economy of Smith and Ricardo through the Feuerbachian problematic of "Man". Althusserian Marxism dubs Feuerbach as a philosopher who, indeed, inverted Hegelian idealism into his materialism of sensuous human being; but he could not change the terms and conditions of Hegelian dialectics. The consequence is that Feuerbach only transformed the Hegelian "Idea" into the notion of "Man" but retained the Hegelian simple contradiction between essence and existence. The transformation of term, as Althusser believes, does not make any sense unless the whole problematic of Hegelian dialectic and its system of operation is altered by a powerful scientific oppositional force. Hegelian dialectic is teleological because it attempts to realize the goal of "universal spirit"; it gives a simple contradiction between essence and existence and it is

conservative because it restores the simple original essence of change in society and its constitutive knowledge-structure. Further, the system in which the dialectic operates is also simple and conservative. It is wrong to maintain that the Hegelian dialectic is revolutionary but its system is conservative, as the Hegelian-Marxists have projected in their discourse on Marxism. Dialectical method is itself conservative so long as it is regulated by the concepts of negation of negation, law of identity, supersession, fusion, fission, etc. Althusserian Marxism's anti-Hegelian war argues this point that the existence of dialectical method in Hegel's philosophy of idea presupposes the existence of simple expressive totality and its simple homogeneous history. In other words, dialectic, social structure and history are organically interrelated in such a manner that we cannot divorce one from another.

The apparent complexity of the Hegelian expressive totality conceals an essential simplicity in a sense that all diverse phenomenal realities are reducible to/temporal manifestation of the simple inner essence of unitary Idea/spirit i.e. abstract ideology whose development can be seen through the evolutionary dialectical process of encompassing-encompassed. The histories of concrete historical realities are reducible to the single history or one all-embracing history of Universal Idea. The parts of totality follow singular identical linear time-continuum and uniform dialectical mutation in which the Idea unfolds its

potentialities in its successive moments; and the several totalities which follow one another are merely the successive expression of these successive moments. Thus, Hegel's philosophy of idea formulates the concepts of "simple dialectics, simple homogeneous-circular-expressive-totality, simple homogeneous history linear time-continuum"⁴⁸ which together provide the existential condition to one-another in the evolutionary transformation of reality that is nothing but a progressive realization of the universal spirit of humanity. Althusser forcefully points out that "Hegelian philosophy of History is teleological because from its origins in pursuit of a goal of the realization of Absolute Knowledge and the Hegelian dialectic, too, is teleological in its structures, since the key structure of the Hegelian dialectic is the negation of negation, which is the teleology itself, within the dialectic".⁴⁹ Thus the whole Hegelian problematic of objective idealism ensures its survival-condition by professing the notions of simple homogeneous social structure, and linear homogeneous historical time-scale which, in turn, formulate the conservative ideology of isolated legal-cum-jural individualism and the restorative political discourse coupled with conservative political movement. The crucial point which Althusser makes during the second phase (1842-45) of the young Marx's ideological

48. For the detailed interpretation of these concepts see Althusser's FM, pp.101-4, 202-4; and Althusser and Balibar, RC, pp.93-97, 103.

49. L. Althusser, PH, p.181.

problematic is that Marx's critique of Hegel and Ricardo was basically a Feuerbachian critique of Hegelian philosophy and Ricardian political economy. According to Althusser Feuerbach was himself the prisoner of Hegel's problematic; though he tried to invert Hegelian idealism into his theory of materialism. The consequence is that the Young Marx criticized Hegel by accepting unconsciously all terms and conditions of the Hegelian philosophy. Thus Marx's project of "liberation of humanity" can produce only philosophical manifesto of the liberation of reason from the unreasonable world. Under the influence of Feuerbach, Marx fell into the trap of the ideology of petty-bourgeois communism and idealist contemplative philosophical discourse divorced from any organized class-struggle.

There is no doubt about it that Feuerbach injected his materialist needle in the philosophy of idea for the dissolution of Hegelian idealism in particular and German idealism in general. He did it by inverting Hegel's notion of "Idea" into his concept of "Man" i.e. concrete-sensuous-ethico human being. But he retained the edifice of Hegelian dialectic which is based on the theories like negation of negation, identical subject-object, "alienation" (loss of freedom) as an objectification of "human essence" (freedom, freedom⁵⁰ Feuerbach tries to denounce the philosophies of

50. L. Althusser, PH, p.178.

reason) etc. It is the impossible "unity of Man and Nature" through which Feuerbach tried to resolve the Kantian tension between Pure Reason and Practical Reason and between Nature and Idea or Spirit by his concept of Man and the theory of the intersubjectivity constitutive of the human species. His theoretical-humanism considers man as the unique, primordial and fundamental concept. But for Althusser there is no distinction among the notions of the Cogito (Descartes), the Transcendental subject (Kant) the Idea (Hegel), the concrete-sensuous Man (Feuerbach) and Human Species (the Young Marx) due to this fact that all these notions are merely variant forms of the invariant ideological problematics of idealism of essence and empiricism of subject which assume "that there is a universal essence of man; and that this essence is the attribute of 'each single individual' who is its real subject".⁵¹

The theoretical humanism of Feuerbach became the master code of Marx's 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' (1844) in which history was conceptualized as a process of alienation of man and alienation was defined as an objectification of the essence of man. Marx says that objective reality is nothing but an objectified structure of human essence (i.e. freedom) in the capitalist society of generalised commodity production. Althusser's theoretical anti-humanist epistemology believes that, under the impact of theoretical humanism, Marx's entire terminologies such as

51. L. Althusser, FM, p.228

"alienation", "species being", "total being", "inversion of subject" and "predicate" etc. were closely connected with Feuerbachian sensuous materialism. Althusser extends his argument by saying during 1842-45 the young Marx's famous expression such as 'philosophy's world-to-be, 'the inversion of subject and predicate', 'the suppression and realization of philosophy', 'philosophy is the heart of human emancipation and the proletariat is its heart, etc. etc., are expressions directly borrowed from Feuerbach, or directly inspired by him'.⁵² Thus we can say that the idealist humanism of the young Marx is the result of his adherence to the Feuerbachian anthropological problematic. In "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts" Marx, under the trap of Feuerbachian philosophy, believed that capitalist society produces reason in unreason; commodity production is the source of alienation and that the true essence of man lies in the alienated product of his labour. The Young Marx also theorizes that man's freedom/reason is grounded into a communal being or species being which has been decomposed by the ever-extending composition of capital and the emergence of a dualism between civil man and political man. Alienation of man from his essence can be overcome by the politics of practical reappropriation of the lost-essence. Ultimately, Althusser's Young Marx comes to this conclusion that "the practical revolution must be the common work of philosophy and of the proletariat, for, in philosophy, man is

52. Ibid., p.45.

theoretically affirmed; in the proletariat he is practically negated"...."the revolution is the very practice of the logical immanent in alienation: it is the moment in which criticism, hitherto unarmed, recognizes its arms in the proletariat".⁵³ Thus it is through practical revolution through which the proletariat will negate its own negated-history and thereby, it will secure its essence by becoming a communal being. Since in EPM Marx criticizes Hegel from the Spseudo materialism of Feuerbach, his conscientious experiment, at best, can result into the synthesis of sensualist materialism and ethical historical idealism.

In fact, for Althusser the Young Marx was the victim of closed ideological problematics of Hegel and Feuerbach. However, he admits:"The Manuscripts are an explosive text; Hegel, reintroduced by force into Feuerbach, induces a prodigious acting out of the Young Marx's theoretical contradiction, in which is achieved the rupture with Theoretical Humanism".⁵⁴ The epistemological break took place in 1845 (in German Ideology) in which the determinate theoretical labour of Marx announced the birth of scientific problematic or "a historico-dialectical materialism of praxis"⁵⁵ which consists of the theses of theoretical anti-humanistic epistemology (theory), revolutionary materialist

53. L. Althusser, *ibid.*, pp.226-7.

54. Althusser, PH, p.176.

55. Althusser, FM p.229.

proletarian philosophy (philosophy) and revolutionary politics of class struggle (politics). In "German Ideology" Marx contrasted ideology with science and said that humanism is an ideology which produces mystified world-view by injecting false consciousness in the cognitive map of masses. This text is polemical which creates the positive condition for Marx's scientific problematic to make a double rupture first with Hegel and then with Feuerbach who are associated with all forms of philosophy of consciousness and ideological misrepresentation of reality.

The new scientific problematic is based on involvement of the concepts of mode of production, exploitation, class-struggle, surplus value masses and base-superstructure. But the death of the notional categories of man, essence, freedom, alienation, negation of negation etc. and denouncement of the theories of Hegelian dialectic and classical political economy were silently announced in Marx's text 'A critique to the contribution of Political Economy' and manifestly legitimized by his scientific text "Capital". In between 1845 and 1857 Marx's works can be seen as a critical consciousness and negative operation through which a logical coherence between new theoretico-scientific concepts was being articulated in such a way so as to establish a bond between the revolutionary theory and the revolutionary practice.

The Transitional Marx (1845-1857)

The works of the transitional Marx include "The Communist Manifesto", "The Poverty of Philosophy", "Wage, Price and Profit" etc. which are characterized by the discovery of new terms like forces of production, relations of production, class struggle as a motor of change, history as a work of masses etc. on the one hand, and survival of some of the old Hegelian theses such as "negation of

negation",⁵⁶ "simple contradiction between the forces of production and relations of production"⁵⁷ etc. on the other. The transitional Marx has not established the well-integrated system of scientific problematic, but simply his theoretical labour progressively settles accounts with all forms of philosophical consciousness/idea for the positive articulation of newly-created scientific conceptual formulations. According to Althusser, the transitional Marx rejects the notion of man as a conceptual tool for the comprehension of reality. The question about 'how man makes history' disappears altogether; Marxist theory rejects it and sends it back to its birth place: bourgeois ideology. Marx started looking at social reality through the concepts of forces of production and relations of production, and he explained the theory of social transformation by the concept of class struggle. It is not man, but masses who make history; it is not man who changes history, rather it is the class struggle that is a motor of revolution. The scientific

56 Note: The thesis of "negation of negation" is found in Marx's text "The Poverty of Philosophy", where he writes that the modern monopoly, bourgeois monopoly is synthetic monopoly, the negation of negation, the unity of opposite. He puts it as follows: Thesis - Feudal monopoly before competition; Antithesis-Competition, and Synthesis-Modern monopoly; see Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p.139.

57 If this is simple Hegelian contradiction as Althusserian Marxism maintains, then it survives in the texts of Marx, see "The Poverty of Philosophy", 1975, p.114; and also "A critique to the contribution of Political Economy" Progress Publication, Moscow, 1978. Indeed, Althusser has himself accepted the existence of the simple contradiction in the works of Marx up to the 1st chapter of Capital Vol. 1, See Althusser, LP, p.71.

problematic announces its hegemony in "The Communist Manifesto" where two interrelated concepts of class and class struggle have occupied the pivotal position in theoretical formulation, as Marx reiterates that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle"⁵⁸ and "the bourgeois society has but established new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in the place of old ones"⁵⁹. According to Althusserian Marxism, the revolutionary theory of Marx assigns primacy to the term class-struggle over the term class which has been asserted by Marx and maintained by Lenin and Mao in so far as "there is primacy of contradiction over the terms of contradiction"⁶⁰. For the revolutionary class struggle exists before classes; whereas for the reformist the case is just reverse. Revolutionary maintains that it is the exploitation of one class by another class and, hence, class struggle at the level of production that constitutes the division of society into classes. Classes emerge out of the antagonism in the distribution of production relation. Men are treated as the supports/bearers of the function in the production process determined by the production relation. To treat individuals as bearers of interchangeable functions with capitalist exploitation is to mark class struggle.⁶¹ We also find

58 Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p.40.

59 Ibid., p.41.

60 L. Althusser, ESC, p.50.

61 L. Althusser, Ibid., p.203

that, during the phase of epistemological break, transitional Marx in his "XI Thesis on Feuerbach" demands a transformative revolutionary philosophy in place of an interpretative philosophy of idealism.

In "Holy Family" Proudhon was treated as a man who had presented a scientific manifesto of the French proletariat. But the ever-developing scientific problematic of the transitional Marx treated Proudhon through various negative connotations such as "ideologist of the petti-bourgeoisie" and "pettibourgeois sentimentality."⁶² By believing in the sacred history of idea, Proudhon has explained the theory of inequality through the concepts of machine, credit and division of labour by silently underrating the basic concepts of forces of production and relations of production. Thus the whole works of the traditional Marx are highly polemical and critical for locating a stable site of the scientific theory and revolutionary materialist philosophy. During this phase Marx rejected the political position of bourgeois-radical humanism or petti-bourgeois communism and, in the same stroke, made an announcement of the political position of the revolutionary materialism in theory and practice for both: the interpretation of the world and the transformation of the world. The theoretical elaboration of new conceptual apparatus made its progressive organization and reorganization

62 K. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1975), pp.5, 177.

by declaring the progressive disappearance of old erroneous notions such as man, alienation, liberty etc. During this phase Marx, by following negative method, was simply introducing the new concepts such as mode of production, relations of production, class struggle etc. into the blank-space of scientific map of knowledge. At every step, the production of knowledge proceeds by the constant transformation of its conceptual object for the reorganization of the object of knowledge i.e. posing new problems, questions, terms and conditions for getting new revolutionary answers. During this phase even if old ideological notions such as alienation, negation of negation etc. survived, their meaning, position and functions are, at best, changed and, at worst, undermined in the new scientific conceptual system.

3. The Mature Marx (1857-83)

The codification of determinate scientific problematic by the mature Marx has demonstrated its functional specificity which refers to the existence of three principles: (1) a non-Hegelian conception of social structure, (ii) a non-Hegelian conception of dialectic, and (iii) a non-Hegelian conception of history. In opposition to ideological interpretation of society, the mature Marx makes a scientific surgery of the exploitative capitalist society by underlining those objective forces and mechanism which

keep the system intact on the one hand, and those objective forces which produce, first, tendential crisis and then, the dissolution of system on the other.

In order to understand society in a more scientific manner the mature Marx's discovery of historical materialism defines society in terms of pre-given unevenly structured whole articulated in dominance; explains exploitation through the concept of accumulation of surplus value; conceptualizes contradiction in terms of unevenly-developed multiple contradictions; visualizes historical time as complex heterogeneous time-scale; formulates a theory of structural causality in terms of mode of production, and it gives a materialist definition (positive) of ideology whose function consists in the interpellation of individuals into subjects. True, the new theoretical-practice of the mature Marx is related to/correlated with a transformation in the definition of the object of knowledge or a differential definition of the novelty of the object of knowledge. For example, as a result of scientific revolution in the field of object of knowledge, Marx discovered the new theory of surplus value which was invisible in the problematic of classical political economists like Smith and Ricardo. The functional use of surplus value was to show the effect of capitalist relations of production; the effect was being reflected through the exploitation of labour by Capital. Marx also developed the concepts of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value in order to underline the mechanisms of exploitation. The

invisibility of the concept of surplus value and its effect was itself inscribed in the blinding visibility of anthropological problematic of human nature and human need of the classical political economists. As opposed to it, the old Marx's scientific problematic of mode of production came to develop this thesis that "the unity of the material and social condition of capitalist production is expressed by the direct relationship between variable capital and the production of surplus value".⁶³ The visibility, presence and measurability of surplus value can be seen in "effects": the exploitation of the majority of men by a minority in the social relations of economic production. It (surplus value) is present in the totality, in the total movement of its form of existence.⁶⁴ For Althusserian Marxism "surplus value" is not a word but a theoretical concept which explains the emergence of a new object of knowledge in the scientific problematic of the mature Marx. This new object revolutionized Marxist theory and Marxist politics with an aim to overthrow the exploitative capitalist relations of production.

While defining social structure in terms of mode of production which refers to both: production and reproduction of things and social relations, Althusser has produced a

63 L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, p. 180.

64 Ibid, p. 181.

powerful oppositional current against the Hegelian expressive totality and expressive causality where all levels of social structure are same and so many modulations of one-another. He also rejects the classical Marxism's model of economic reductionism which perpetuated this impression that economy is the only determining instance; and thus it defined mode of production as the narrowly economic structure. For Althusser the concept of mode of production refers to the entire system of relationship among the economic practice, political practice, philosophical/ideological practice and scientific practice within a global decentered-structure. Structure is an absent cause in a sense that it has no fixed absolute centre and it is nowhere empirically present as an element. Its presence can be seen in "its effects". Against the expressive causality (Hegel) and the transitive causality (externally mechanistic) Althusser's mature Marx speaks of mechanical structural causality as a preferred mode of explanation which has two chains: relative autonomy of superstructure and determination of the whole structure by base/economic practice in the last instance. Structural causality is a form of complex and multidimensional causal chains of mediation and reciprocal effects among the instances/practices of society which is an "ever-pre-given unevenly structured complex whole articulated in dominance⁶⁵ of one levels over the other levels. The global

65 L. Althusser, FM, pp. 199, 202.

decentered social structure is characterized by complexity, heterogeneity and unevenness, not by simplicity, homogeneity and evenness.

The global structure has four instances/levels such as economic, political, ideological and scientific which have produced and reproduced their respective condition of existence, mode of articulation, specific effectivity and law of development. Consequently, they constitute a complex heterogeneous historical time-scale since the history of one level is not identical to/reducible to the history of another level just as one contradiction is not reducible to/identical to another contradiction within the asymmetrical whole. Thus in opposition to Hegelian simple homogenous historical time, Althusser generates the thesis of a complex heterogeneous historical time, constituted by the differential times of the different levels/practices/instances within the invariant social structure. The diversity of the different temporalities, their continuities and discontinuity cannot be reduced to or measured by a single ideological linear time-continuum.⁶⁶ However, it can be pointed out that since the parts of superstructure are relatively autonomous, they cannot have an absolute and independent historical time-scale. Their independence is the relative independence

66 L. Althusser and E. Balibar, RC, pp. 104-5.

compatible with and complementary to their determination of social formation, in the last instance, by the economy. For Althusser economy is never operative in pure form; it is dominant in a sense that it tells us which instance/level of social structure will occupy the position of dominance at a given point of time. But in a revolutionary situation economy becomes the determinant factor when all parts of superstructure have lost their respective specific effectively and conditions of existence.

In the field of dialectic, Althusserian Marxism believes that epistemological revolution did not consist in a change from idealism to materialism, for this would have taken place with Democritus or in modern times with Hobbes. Nor did it consist in a change from metaphysics to dialectic as this would have taken place with Heraclitus or Hegel. Marxian materialist dialectic is not an inversion of the Hegelian teleological simple idealist dialectic; rather it is complete antithetical to it. The materialist dialectic annihilates the terms and conditions of the Hegelian idealist dialectic as well as its system (i.e. the structure of idea) with whose association this dialectic maintains its survival conditions. According to Althusser, Engels rejected the idea of a pure and simple non-overdetermined contradiction by calling it meaningless, abstract and senseless. Only a

67 L. Arthusser, FM, p.113.

simple whole can think of a simple contradiction as we find in the theoretical discourses of humanist and dogmatic Marxism. By linking his association with Engels, Lenin and Mao, Althusser seriously believes that the specificity of the materialist dialectic lies in the fact that it formulates the designs of a complex heterogeneous contradictions originating from various practices of the invariant complex whole. The complex whole cannot exist without maintaining the uneven relations between various contradictory contradictions. The rates of development of multiple historical contradictions are not identical. Althusser points out that "unevenness is internal to social formation because the structuration in dominance of the complex whole, this structural invariant, is itself the precondition for the concrete variation of the contradictions that constitute it, and therefore for their displacement, condensations and mutations".⁶⁸ Each contradiction is itself an accumulation of various concrete circumstances and situations. In normal situation, all contradictions are over-determined; but one contradiction has to assume the position of dominance in relation to other contradictions. But this domination is momentary rather than permanent. In the revolutionary period all historically accumulated contradictions - social, political, legal, religious etc. - merge together and form a ruptural unity in which the economic contradiction becomes

68 Ibid, p.213.

determinant, as this happened on the eves of the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolution. Thus, on the presupposition of three interrelated ideas of multiple practices, multiple historical times and multiple unevenly-developed contradictions, Althusser's mature Marx generates the thesis of structural causality in terms of the concept of mode of production which entails two complementary principles: the relative autonomy of superstructure (in the normal time) and the determination of structure by economy in the last instance (in the revolutionary situation). In the last analysis, the mature Marx gives us an anti-reductionist, anti-essentialist and anti-economic model of the science of history and society. According to the rules of Althusserian theoretical revolution the mature Marx has generated the thesis of methodological dehistoricization and theoretical de-humanization of historical materialism.

Althusserian Marxism has used the master concept of epistemological break to show how Marx's determinate theoretical labour has displaced the closed ideological problematics of Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian anthropological humanism by a scientific problematic of mode of production whose truth can be demonstrated by "its effects" on the structure of reality. The rupture in the field of theoretico-problematic was generated by Marx's philosophical evolution (from subjective-neo-Hegelianism of a Kant-Fichte type to Materialist revolutionary philosophical discourse via theoretical humanism of Feuerbach) which is, in

turn, was conditioned by his political evolution (from radical bourgeois-liberalism to that of Proletarian Communism via petty-bourgeois communism). The entire progression of the object of knowledge, in the texts of Marx, makes a shift from the Hegelian teleological idealist dialectic to the materialist dialectic, from closed ideological knowledge to open scientific knowledge, from history of idea to history of science, from theoretical humanism to theoretical anti-humanism, from reformist politics to revolutionary politics, from philosophers' philosophical communication to scientists' philosophical communication and from abstract personal humanism to that of concrete class humanism i.e. dictatorship of proletariat. In fact, Althusserian revolution has discredited the epistemological discourses of humanism and historicism by introducing the master theoretical concepts of epistemological break, philosophy as a class struggle in theory, self-referential scientific practice, and unevenly structured complex-whole embedded into multiple heterogeneous contradictions. In brief, the revolutionary philosophical discourse of Althusserian Marxism has induced the two fundamental discoveries within Marxism: (i) recognition of the separate existence of dialectical materialism (philosophy) and historical materialism (science of society and history) and (ii) the formulation of the theory of structural causality of mode of production which entails two chains: relative autonomy of superstructure on the one hand and determination of society by economy in the last instance on the other. The latent interest behind the application of the

concept of epistemological break is to provide a mechanical model of social sciences, based on a combination of a limited number of variables which can be mathematically manipulated and demonstrated within the invariant social structure. The high degree of scienticism of Althusserian Marxism has mercilessly damaged the theses of voluntarism, individualism and consciousness in the service of structure in such a manner that, ultimately, it gives an oppositional current to the humanist epistemological discourse, the historicist epistemological discourse and the economic epistemological discourse. Althusser's mechanical model of epistemology is associated with the Newtonian world view which has been outmoded by the indeterminacy principles of modern physics.

In this situation, we can only say that Althusser's self-claimed scienticism is the product of negative emotional reactions and unjustified disturbance symptoms which it has developed in its perpetual war with the neo-Hegelian Marxism.

CONCLUSION

Whenever any serious reader reads the epistemological discourse of Western Marxism he, sooner or later, is bound to come up with a single conclusion that the objective manifestation of a plural character of Marxism is a product of an infinite mutually-contradictory philosophical volitions which the enlightened academic philosophers choose, either under the pressure of suppressed volition or under the pressure of objective historical force, in order to maximize their claim of being more faithful Marxists than anybody else under the sky. The conflicting epistemological discourses of structural Marxism, historicist Marxism and humanist Marxism have discredited the 'single gravitational vision' of Marxism by launching a relentless war of all against all, the resultant effect of this war is being reflected into the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of the entire texts of Marx in the light of the idealist philosophers' conceptual apparatuses. In the theoretical court of western Marxism, Marx mediates his associational tie with multiple contradictory liberal thinkers such as Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Weber, Freud etc. As a result of it, the pole of Marxism and the pole of liberalism, particularly Hegelism are systematically articulated in such a way so as to produce innumerable intersecting forces between them. The result of this kind of tendency is: the production of sophisticated theoretical manipulation, polished ideological illusion and historical pessimism in the court of labour movement and the intellectual factory of proletariat. In fact, the

philosophical issues of Western Marxism do not create a terrain of revolutionary politics, rather they formulate the charters of "possibilities" and "hopes" of the liberatarian political movement in the modern capitalist order which achieves a high degree of integrative power through ideological-cum-cultural system.

The humanist, historicist and structural Marxisms, despite their philosophical, political and ideological antagonistic interests/options, share some common action in their collective opposition to the classical models of economic determinism and natural dialectic. First of all, they refuse to accept that economic structure is the only determinant factor in the social structure; and superstructure is a mere expression of the existential objective laws of the economic structure. Instead, they forcefully and logically claim that the objective economic base and the determinate ideological superstructure are mutually bound with each other in such a manner that they, taken together, produce and reproduce the condition of existence of society as a whole. In other words, the relationship between the economic base and the ideological superstructure is a relationship of mediation, not a relationship of opposition or dualism. Society is not only an economic structure, but also a system of social relationship between human beings, since the production of commodity takes place through socially-determined and legally-regulated objective social relationships.

Secondly, the Western Marxists, either by taste or temperament, are basically superstructural theorists who have invested their energy for the conceptualization of the mode of formation and deformation of the heterogeneous ideological structures such as art, culture, law, ideology, religion, politics and state of the modern capitalist social formation. Their intricate philosophical operation does not put the system of economic production and social relations of production in the forefront of Marxian theoretical-construction. For them the revolutionary transformation of capitalist exploitative social relations of production demands not only an economic struggle, but a fusion of ideological/cultural struggle, political struggle and economic struggle so long as exploitation has a complex structure consisting of socio-economic dimension, sexual dimension and mental dimension.

Thirdly, they develop this thesis that the modern capitalist system maintains its equilibrium on the basis of a fusion of the coercive physical power and the manipulative/persuasive ideological power. This thesis is basically pronounced by the Gramscian and Althusserian Marxisms. Gramscian Marxism underlines this principle that the modern capitalist order secures its integration and cohesion by combining dictatorship with moral and intellectual leadership. The same theoretical language is established by Althusser when he claims that the perpetual condition of existence of the modern statecraft is secured by a judicious

combination of "Repressive State Apparatus" and "Ideological State Apparatus", in which the former performs the function of management of violence and the latter produces and reproduces the obedient and conformist trained-labour force for the effective maintenance of motion of capital production. The humanist-Marxists like Lukacs have also noted this fact that there is an increasing tendency of the ideological rationalization of the economic commodity production in the bourgeois social order. Marcuse and Habermas argue that it is the modern scientific-cum-technological order and professional-cum-technical competence that have become the major source of domination and repression in the advanced capitalist society. Thus the Western Marxists, though they are the production of differential social and historical conjectures and ideological expressions, make an intensive inquiry into those constitutive ideological apparatuses which maximize the integrative power of the modern exploitative capitalist relations of production. Thus the deconstruction of ideological force is a number one problem for the realization of revolutionary political upheaval in the zone of capital-formation.

Fourthly, the codification of this thesis that net the balance of forces of social order depends more on ideological universe as compared to the coercive universe, becomes itself a ground for the construction of this argument that ideology is not a false consciousness or an illusionary structure - a

negative connotation, fabricated in classical Marxism - but a positive reality which works as a cementing force in the class divided society. The historicized-ideology creates those favourable conditions in which the class-antagonism is silently obscured for the peaceful operation of system as the Gramscian Marxism believes. For Althusser ideology is a representational structure grounded into the institutional materiality by which individuals are interpellated into "subjects" and imaginary relationships are translated into the actual relationships so as to force men to mediate their lived-relationship between them and their conditions of existence. It is through the material ideological discourse that subject (subject with small 's' refers to living men) is subjected to Subject (Subject with capital S refers to "Creator" of something) to Subject, through Subject and for Subject. It can be noted that although Gramsci and Althusser have assigned the integrative socio-political function of ideology, they sharply differ from each other in the conceptualization of the content of ideology. Gramsci understands ideology as a historical construct; whereas Althusser explains it through its material construction. The humanist-Marxists identify ideology with human consciousness and mode of thought. Habermas bases ideology on the structure of knowledge-constitutive-interest be it emancipatory or technical.

Fifty, the Western Marxism registers a protest against Stalin's dogmatization and politicization of Marxism for

justifying his authoritarian regime in which the realm of necessity was highlighted at the cost of the realm of freedom. As a result of this experience, the entire hope of western Marxism gradually converted into the future indeterminacy and impossibility. However, as champion of human liberation, the western Marxists' hyper-sensitivity compelled them to restructure the hallmark of historical materialism and dialectical materialism by introducing the revolutionary facet of Hegelianism into the Marxian discourse in order to catch the underlying governing principle of contemporary society and politics. One of the basic consequences of this trend was that the entire production of knowledge remained basically a complex philosophical discourse based on a lot of new jargons, terminologies and concepts incomprehensible to the working class and its sympathizers. In the course of re-examining the Hegel-Marx relation, the Western Marxism in general degenerated itself to the level of wider philosophy divorced from any organized concrete political practice. By maintaining their institutional affiliation the Western Marxists worked as various isolated monads within a particular regional and national boundary having no connection with the outside world. Their mutual philosophical silence or mutual philosophical hostility has more damaged than it contributed anything positive to the revolutionary bond of Marxist theory and the working class movement after the end of the First World War. Thus the results, which they have produced, are: historical pessimism,

political apathy, ideological confusion, and moral defeat among the potential revolutionary proletarians throughout the whole world.

Beneath their sustained political antagonism there is an irreconcilable philosophical antagonism between the humanist-cum-historical Marxists (neo-Hegelians) such as Lukacs, Gramsci, Sartre, Colletti, Marcuse etc. on the one hand and the theoretical anti-humanist and anti-historicist Marxism of Althusser (anti-Hegelian) on the other. But it has to be noted that even the humanist-cum-historicist Marxists do not constitute a complete single homogeneous group since they derive their libidinal energy from a plurality of heterogeneous intellectual currents. However, in opposition to the Althusserian Marxism, they make some common tentative theoretical protocol by undermining their manifest divisive interests to ensure a stable and cohesive intellectual community. The marked differences between the Althusserian Marxism and the rest of Western Marxism can be seen in the conceptualizations of society, dialectic, man, history and Hegel-Marx relationship etc.

First of all, humanist and historicist Marxists have used the terms of totality (Lukacs), totalization (Sartre), historical bloc (Gramsci), determinate structure (Colletti) and historical totality (Marcuse) in order to explain the relationship of mediation between economic force and non-economic forces of society. Since these terms have some basic structural similarities, we can identify all of them

with a single term "totality". The theoretical category of totality entails the following logics:

1. Totality is characterized by mediation between the science of man and the science of nature through teleological human labour and creative collective historical praxis;
2. It is constructed out of an interaction between the economic force and ideological force in so far as it annuls dualism between social being and consciousness.
3. It is homogeneous in a sense that its various constitutive parts are reducible to/transferable to one another; thus logically all parts necessarily express the similar essence;
4. The constitutive parts of determinate totality follow a single homogeneous evolutionary linear time-continuum;
5. It is a determinate concrete economic structure which asserts its primacy over the structure of consciousness;
6. It is an evolutionary dynamic order since it inheres a contradiction between essence and existence or between subject and object or between the forces of production and the relations of production;
7. It is characterized by the circular expressive causality as it is a case with the Hegelian absolute homogeneous ideational totality.

As opposed to the theoretical terms "expressive totality" and "expressive causality" which are associated with the master concept of mediation, Althusser has used the theoretical concepts of "whole" and "structural causality". The concept of "whole" has the following analytically separable characteristics:

1. It is a determinate ever-pre-given structure since it is not created by human praxis.
2. It is not a homogeneous or symmetrical structure but a heterogeneous or asymmetrical structure consisting of four irreducible practices/instances/temporalities of economics politics, ideology and science.
3. Its instances are unevenly structured in which one instance has to dominate over the other instances in a given historical time;
4. The different instances have their own relatively autonomous laws of development, history, contradiction, condition of existence and specific effectivity.
5. The unevenly-structured complex whole survives on the basis of the existence of a multiple heterogeneous contradictions originating from heterogeneous practices of social formation.
6. The complex-whole entails the principle of complex multiple historical time-scale.

7. The structural causality of "whole" is explained through the scientific concept of mode of production which entails five invariant elements such as the labour, means of production, non-labour (forces of production), property connexion and real or material appropriation connection (relations of production). The mode of combination by which these five invariant elements are integrated, varies from the specific law of combination of one mode of production to that of the specific laws of combination of another mode of production.
8. The structural causality of mode of production, seen in the process of "effect" production, generates two chains of the same principle: (a) the relative autonomy of ideological superstructure; and (b) the determination of society by the economic base in the last instance.

Thus we see that the concept of simple homogeneous expressive "totality" is opposed by the concept of "pre-given unevenly structured complex-whole articulated in dominance" within the philosophical tradition of Western Marxism. Althusser argues that the concept of "totality carries the element of radicalized Hegelian problematic of objective idealism within the Marxian discourse. Therefore; the scientific problematic of Marxism has to reject it for ever and send it back to its birth place: bourgeois philosophy and ideology. But in the cultural studies Althusser's model of mechanical structural causality is negated by mediation and expressive organic

casuality. Moreover, if we make a critical examination of Althusser's Marxism, we immediately witness this fact that even his anti-teleological scientific Marxism incorporates the concept of mediation in terms of mutual inventionist patterns of different practices. Althusser's conception of structure follows the principle of structural difference between four interrelated practices of social formation. But difference is here understood as a relational concept, rather than as the mere inert inventory of unrelated diversity. Therefore, we can infer that his structural casuality is just as fundamentally a practice of mediation as it is the "expressive casuality" to which it is opposed. However, we should not forget that the different practices of social formation mediate or intersect one another by maintaining their separate "essence" and "effectivity".

Secondly, the humanist-cum-historicist Marxists have recommended the "historical dialectic" as a real method to understand the relationship between man and society and between man and nature. Their historical dialectic gives an effective oppositional current to Engels' natural dialectic and Stalin's ontological natural dialectic which presuppose the existence of an independent and objective matter divorced from human thought and history. The thesis of negation of negation, rejected by Stalin, has become the major theoretical orientation of humanist-cum-historicist Marxists. They explain the dynamic character of social reality by introducing the thesis of simple contradiction between

essence and existence or between subject and object or between the forces of production and relations of production. In brief, these Marxists generate and sustain the dialectics of thought, consciousness and history which operate within the socially-processed and historically-conditioned concrete system of economic production. Further, historicist humanist-cum-historicist Marxists do not make a distinction between dialectical materialism and historical materialism. They also see a dialectical mediation between thought and reality. As opposed to historical dialectic, Althusserian Marxism reestablishes the scientific character of materialist dialectic established by Engels and Lenin. Althusser maintains that the law of negation of negation is the central structure of Hegelian teleological and evolutionary idealist dialectic. Therefore, it cannot generate the favourable condition for the revolutionary transformation of social formation. The basic theoretical construction of Althusserian Marxism is associated with this radical position that dialectical materialism and historical materialism constitute two separate disciplines. Dialectical materialism is a materialist philosophy; whereas the historical materialism is a science of society and history. Though they are studied together, they cannot be identified with each other since they have different statuses within Marxism discourse. Thus we find that the Western Marxists' bone to contention is basically grounded into the conceptualization of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. This is the point where Hegel-Marx relation is rigorously examined

by the Western Marxists' intellectual scholarship. Althusser restructures the design of material dialectic by arguing that the scientific problematic of Marx is directly opposed to the Hegelian closed ideological problematic. Colletti also makes a war on Hegelian philosophy by announcing that Hegel is a religious philosopher who tries to annihilate the finite world for rendering his service to the Christian Logos. Marxist scientific theory, says Colletti, has no connection with Hegelian religious philosophy. On the other hand, Lukacs, Habermas and Marcuse have introduced the Hegelian philosophy and dialectic within the Kingdom of Marxian theoretical construction. They argue that the Hegelian dialectic (as method) is revolutionary but the structure of idea (system) in which this dialectic operates, is conservative. That is why Marx accepted Hegelian method and rejected its system. Marx applied the logic of Hegelian dialectic to the system of concrete reality i.e. material production of society. Contrary to this position, Althusser writes that both method and system of Hegelian dialectical philosophy are conservative and teleological in their aspiration and operation.

Thirdly, for humanist cum historicist Marxists, there is a continuity between works of the Young Marx and the the works of the mature Marx. The theses of humanism, man, history, alienation, human praxis etc. have been the central ideas of Marx's entire theoretical protocol. According to them the materialist theory of history involves an

interaction of socially organized-individuals and it is the historical process that connects socially-organized individuals to both human and non-human external nature. Further, Marx's theory of history represents object in its totality. Marx's entire conceptualization of political economic theory was meant for representing radical historicization of history that occurred with the development and existence of capitalist production. The project of Althusser is quite different. He argues that the Young Marx was the victim of closed ideological problematic of Hegelian objective idealism and Feuerbachian anthropological humanism; whereas the mature Marx developed theoretical anti-humanist and anti-historicist scientific problematic. In short, the Young Marx was a humanist and the mature Marx was a scientist. The notions of alienation, human nature, man, negation of negation etc. are associated with the theoretical-humanist epistemology of the young Marx; whereas the concepts of mode of production, class struggle, surplus value etc. are grounded into the scientific (theoretical anti-humanist) epistemology of the mature Marx. For Althusser history is a process without a subject and goal; it has no centre but possesses a structure which has no necessary center except in ideological misconception. Theory invents history not the vice versa. His theory of structural causality of mode of production has discredited the Marxian versions of teleological philosophy of history. Further, there is no place of individual praxis in the Althusserian

Marxism, because man is considered as an ideological being whose knowledge does not provide us with any means to demonstrate and verify it. Unlike the humanist Marxism, the scientific epistemology of Althusser refuses to legitimize the theses of 'man', 'human praxis', 'creative consciousness' and 'human agency' within the scientific experimental practice of Marxism. Althusser's Marxism makes a muscular attack on the philosophy of idea, science of consciousness, history of idea and philosophy of man or theoretical humanism by arguing that they are the different variants of a single problematic of idealism of essence and empiricism of subject. Thus, in this situation of philosophical war of all against all, if the international court of historical materialism wills to express its revolutionary necessity, then it must create the condition for growing 'ethos of mutuality' between the hostile-brothers by reintroducing the debate on the following theses:

1. Relationship between totality and whole
2. Relationship between structure and history
3. Relationship between structure and subject
4. Relationship between history and subject
5. Relationship between necessity and agency
7. Relationship between Hegel and Marx

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