

Towards a Concept of Power in International Politics : An Analysis of the Non-Socialist World

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Many writers point out that the problem of 'power' in politics and in international politics has been essentially of a conceptual dispute.¹ In this sense, the dispute is not over its relevance to observable reality, rather upon the various possible extensions of the concept subsumed under it.² The conceptual confusions have given these to varied scholarly concerns.

1. See (i) William E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology, (Newyork, 1967) pp. 17-8.

(ii) Jon Elster, "Some conceptual problems in Political Theory", in Brian Barry, ed, Power and Political Theory, (1976) pp 249-50.

(iii) R.J. Mokken and F.N. Stokman, "Power and Influence as Political Phenomena," in Brian Barry, *op. cit.*, pp 33-4.
2. William E. Connolly, op.cit., p.17.

Some writers,³ express a significant concern as to why we should not give up such concepts as 'casuality' and 'power' in social science. While most have tried to deal with these concepts with utmost rigour and persistence. In international politics, except 'Realism' no other theories would give central importance to the concept of power. Realists think that 'power' is at the core of international politics, while other theorists either give it a limited role in their analysis or ally power with other aspects to explain international politics. They believe that 'International Theory' around 'power' as its central category will leave out other important aspects, from a total view of the empirical reality in the relations among nations. One can place broadly the 'Systems Theory', the 'Global Order Approaches' and the 'Dependency and the world capitalist system theories' within this perspective. However, while saying this, one is not saying that all these theories keep themselves blind to the relevance of 'power' in the relations among nations. In fact all these theories, either explicitly or implicitly, believe that in the

3. See, W.H. Riker, "Some Ambiguities in the notion of Power" American Political Science Review, V. 58, 1964, pp. 341-9.

international level characterised by the absence of a single authority to guide or conduct nations' activities , 'control or dominance', 'influence' and 'persuasion' (all taken as associated power-terms although with difference between power and each of these associated power-terms) in some form or other will result in the interact^{-ion} among nations. The systems theory sees 'power' in the international systemic perspective as pre-eminence of an actor within a horizontal hierarchical structure of nations. The Global order approaches see power as a characteristic feature of relations among nations involving conflict of interests. However, it is their perspective, which takes into consideration co-existence and cooperation among nations, tells them, that power-politics is an evil and it is better that nations give up conflicts among one another and imbibe the more purposive aspect of 'survival' lying within cooperation. The problematic for the globalist, as we can see, is different from that of a realist's concern with 'diplomacy', 'alliance' and 'war', as the substance of international politics; all that are traditionally associated with the mechanisms of power-politics. The Dependency and the world capitalist system theories see 'power' as belonging to one actor or a part within the system.

In Dependency and the world capitalist system theories 'power' is ^{as} seen/belonging to one actor of a particular group actors within a system. Their occupation is to study the problem of underdevelopment of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which they feel is due to capitalism and has to be seen within the history of development of capitalism. The relations among nations are seen within the structure of capitalism, characterised by unequal exchange. The underdeveloped countries remain structurally dependent upon the system of capitalism, where they are reduced to mere raw material producing areas. Here power is seen in the relations between the developed capitalist countries on the one hand and that of the underdeveloped countries on the other. In this relation, the developed capitalist countries have an upperhand in dictating the terms and policies of development for the underdeveloped countries.

Thus, in all the major theories in international politics there is a pre-occupation with power in its varied versions; varied because of the different perspective, as we will see gradually, that each theory brings upon reality.

Two aspects of the 'concept of power' are to be kept in mind before seeing its analytical efficiency as far as observable reality is concerned. First, there is no absolute notion of power. Second, power is mainly seen as an attribute in a relation. Regarding, the first, our attempt does not have any ambition of providing an absolute notion of power. We will like to see power within a relation. And it is here that the controversy over power lies, in identifying specific relations that can be grouped under the label 'power'. The theories in international politics differ in this aspect of specifying a 'power relation', as they differ in their perspective towards international politics. Thus in a realist's version of international politics a 'power-relation' has no other way than to be a 'relationship of control'. This is logically deducible to the view of international politics where security threats are permanent and inevitable. The systems theory, on the otherhand, sees 'power' as a relation lying within its view of politics as an area of voluntary compliance and disobedience and the threats to enforce compliance. Politics involves substantial conflict and power belongs to whosoever prevails over a conflict situation in overcoming obstacles. And one can prevail by one's ability which is again deducible

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theory of power. We have not explained the relations among the socialist countries. In our attempt at definition of power, the relations among the developed (primarily western capitalist countries) the developing and the underdeveloped countries can be best explained. In other words our view of power can only explain the relations among the countries of the non-socialist world. By the 'non-socialist world' what is meant here, are the countries to the exclusion of those countries that have undergone a successful socialist revolution. In other words, this view of power will exclude the countries of East Europe, USSR, China, etc. The extensiveness of the area of international politics debars us from a holistic view at the moment. At the same time, constraints of time do stand as an obstacle. We intend to pursue it in further research. Hence, in the beginning we bear in mind the limited and partial nature of this analysis of the concept of power.

In the chapters that follow we have first, dealt with the theories and have seen the concept of power 'as used therein. The reason is simple. Although a concept exists independently of theory, the interlinkages between the concept and theory has to be borne in mind.

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The 'concept' is a tool to explain reality independently. At the same time, the possible extension to which the concept is subjected is done only within the parameters of the theory. In Chapter-I the theoretical exposition of political realism is first explained to see the meaning i.e. of that can be ascribed to the 'concept of power' within it. Chapter II broadly deals with the systems theory in international politics . In chapter-III we have examined the Global order Approaches and the Dependency and the world Capitalists System Theories presenting a viewpoint opposed to the concept of national power . Chapter-IV attempts for a possible outline to define and demarcate a power-relation.

CHAPTER - I

POLITICAL REALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF POWER

- POWER AS A RELATIONSHIP OF CONTROL

The concept of 'power' is central to International politics. The claim that a theory of international politics which can explain its mechanisms rationally, can be constructed around the 'concept of power', is the core of the theoretical formulations of the realist school.¹

1. Among the chief exponents of realism in international politics one finds Hans J. Morgenthau, John H. Herz, Alfred Schuman and E.H. Carr. The ideas of realism however, are traced from Machiavelli through Spinoza to Hobbes and Hegel. In international politics Morgenthau seems to be the most ardent realist while Carr, Herz, will seek for certain qualifications within which to be branded as realists. One may prefer to call them reluctant realists, for while analysing reality as it is, they will add a purpose to it, they will speculate for the future. For example, Carr says, politics is power-politics in one sense and he will juxtapose power and morality to have a total picture of the reality. Herz's account will be something like a recognition of a competition for power as universal, but to deduce it to human instinct will be wrong.

Reality embodying the practices as manifested in the inter-relationship of nations and the major events occurring in the field, they believe, testifies to this. Any theory, which does not take cognisance of the power-phenomenon is liable to be redundant and realistically indefensible.²

At the level of theory such a view is seen as deducible to the assumption that reality is supposedly rational, thus can be studied objectively; can be subsumed under the general explanatory form of cause and

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2. Some realists like John H. Herz will be saying that politics in this sense should not be misunderstood as power-politics in the crude sense. "The human cause will be lost if the liberal ideal is forgotten, even as surely as it is lost if left to the Utopian political idealism".

Quoted from , John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago , USA, 1951) preface, P.V.

effect.³ This assumption about reality is seen justified in taking human nature or human interests and needs, as the motive force, behind all human thought and action, as giving a shape to the institutions of his creation. Human nature, as the realists will say, is something very specific; something inherent in the very existence of human beings in a civilized society; it is something an outcome

3. One feels, the assumption that reality has a rational essence, is a mere supposition for the simple reason that reality is not rational in an absolute sense. Man tends to act irrationally at times, which is contingent upon the circumstances of time and situations. For example 'war'. No one can claim if war is rational. We know that debates among sociologists if war presents a rational element in human psychology are unending and often inconclusive. Even hardcore realists like Morgenthau, accepts this when he says that force is irrational or for that matter, the use of nuclear weapons as a means of power is irrational. But at the same time he bears with this when both USA and USSR used it. In 1956, USSR used it in the Suezcrisis and USA used it in the Berlin crisis of 1961.

of the very social living. Social living here is essentially a security-survival dilemma; human relations, as an outcome of this, is ^{of} conflict and competition, and human nature is inclined towards control and domination over other human beings.⁴ This is seen in a typical way, that is of death-consciousness in a social man.⁵ Man knows that he will die

4. In fact, it is the elementary human nature that is considered as accruing to politics, the shape of a struggle for power. Morgenthau says, "The drives to live, to propagate and to dominate are common to all men". Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1976), p.34. In another place he says, "It is human nature that is unchanged since the classical philosophies of ancient Greece, China and India tried to understand it". Ibid., p.4. Of course, while saying this he does not dismiss change in human society . What he simply means to say is that all human political actions are in a broad continuum because of the elementary human nature.
5. This position is taken by John H. Herz, which can be considered akin to other realists. It is the consciousness that, the other human being can pose a threat to man's life, shapes man's social and political life. For a detailed study See Herz, op.cit. , Chapter 1, pp. 1-7.

One day, but does not know when and how. The death may occur to him naturally, over which he does not have any control or through other factors, such as, diseases, animals and other human beings. It is this last factor that is the possibility of death from other human beings that sets off suspicion and fear in the mind of man. Thus man tries to safeguard his life and looks for means of security. In addition to pure physical strength, (which consists of his own and that of others available to him), these means consist of food, clothing, shelter and such other goods as necessary for safeguarding his life against external attack. Further man is a social animal which means that there will be a social competition for the means of security. It is the means of security and possession of it, that is commonly considered 'power' in the bulk of realist writings. The question of security presents a vicious circle for it never reaches complete security, thereby makes the accumulation of means and competition for more, a perpetual effort. Thus, struggle for power is considered as something central to politics in ordinary social life, not merely in the life of nations.

At the level of practice, the realist will find history as testimony to his theory of power struggle. The immediate point of reference for the realist are the two

world wars and then the period of cold war showing mutual political aggression between the super-powers. With the world wars, the belief that power-politics is only a historic accident , or that it is something avoidable got seriously undermined. Any speculation that nations have a choice between power politics and other kinds of foreign policy not tainted by the desire for power got wholly discredited.⁶ The realist belief got confirmed that no fundamental change is possible in the policies and relations of nations. It is something universal in

6. It is the characteristic expression of the 19th and early 20th century view of, "The Depreciation of Power Theory". Among the chief exponents of this one finds the American president Woodrow Wilson, who champions the cause of democracy and representative government as the only way to peace. Power politics was associated with autocratic government. Point as discussed here is taken from Morgenthau. See,
See , Morgenthau, op.cit. , pp. 33-39.

~~time and place~~ and an undeniable fact of history. The theory of depreciation of power has two roots. One, it is derived from the general philosophy of international affairs that dominated the better part of the nineteenth century and the other is the particular political and intellectual circumstances that determined the relations of USA to the rest of the world.

Political opinion in the nineteenth century was led to its depreciation of power politics by its domestic experience. The distinctive characteristic of this experience is the domination of the middle class replacing the older, more direct rule by the aristocracy. The domination by the aristocracy is a case of direct domination by its division of the citizenry into the governing and the governed classes and by the military method of open violence. The decline of the aristocracy by the middleclass change the nature of domination from a direct form to an indirect one. The military method of open violence characteristic of aristocratic domination got changed to a domination by means of economic dependence. The formally egalitarian rules through which the economic system operated concealed the very nature of power-politics. "The struggle, then, for political power - in domestic as well as in international affairs - appeared to be

only a historic accident, coincident with autocratic government and bound to disappear with the disappearance of autocratic government."⁷ An outright dismissal of idealist beliefs about the bases of politics was advanced solely on the basis of a doctrine of reality. Idealism may stand self-defeated in reality as a realist will very often claim. But the idealist belief is not just meaningless. It is based upon a strong conviction as to the purpose of human life. No doubt, idealism is a vision, a speculation for the future of human society, but this again is not unfounded. It is not merely escapism from the reality, for it is based upon a purpose to seek a better life, taking into consideration the inadequacies in human nature and reality. Thus the failure of idealism is not because it professes something that is impossible to achieve, rather something that

7. Morgenthau, op.cit., p.37.

is not actually realised.⁸ In political reality one very often finds, efforts being made to approximate to the idealist belief . The League of Nations was established with the highminded purpose of eliminating war and preaching for peace. We find its failures not in its capacity to fulfill the ideals for which it stood, rather, it being made a tool in the hands of vested interests. What one wants to say here is that pure realism is limited in itself, for it divests itself of a purpose, that is so characteristic of human actions. It is true that a human being's actions are guided by self -interest. At the sametime man is a social animal. A realist thinking in terms of politics as power-politics, will

8. Plato says in "Republic", we are inquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal..... And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described.

Quoted from Herz, op.cit. pp. 17-18.

See human nature's tendency to control, to dominate in absolute terms and as immune to change. Those advocating the socialness of human beings will assert that man is inherently a gregarious animal. In man, thus, one will find a combination of both the pictures, of egoism, self-interest and sense of community. Thus a realist version of power will result in a Hobbesian state of nature of war against all. The question of existence of international society will be precarious with chaos, anarchy and unceasing fragmentations, constantly endangering it. Carr says, "We can not find a resting place in pure realism ; for realism though logically overwhelming, does not provide us with the springs of action necessary even to the pursuit of thought. Indeed, realism itself, if we attack it with its own weapons, often turns out in practice to be just as much conditioned as any other mode of thought. In politics , the belief that certain trends are irresistible or certain facts are unalterable, commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of interest to change or resist them. The impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is one of the most certain and curious lessons of political science. Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to

to be essential ingredients of all effective political thinking; a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgement and a ground for action".⁹

POLITICAL POWER IN POLITICAL REALISM

as
 In a realist version of the world, politics will be identified with that specific area of human activity and group living, which is essentially of conflict and competition. Political power is seen as residing in a relationship of conflict and competition, which is an inevitable outcome of social living or social contact. In other words, power is a political phenomenon at a societal level. This further involves a conflict of interests.

"Power" as a realist will view it, means control. It is control not in a physical sense, for that will reduce it to mere force. "Power" refers to a psychological relationship where it will mean control over the actions and minds of other actors. Political power resides in a relation between two minds.

9. E.H. Carr, Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939, (Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1939), p.113.

"Thus it won't mean man's power over nature or over an artistic medium such as language, speech, sound or colour or over the means of production or consumption, or over himself in the sense of self-control.¹⁰ The difficulty here is the imprecision and all-inclusiveness of a relationship of control. For example, a policeman A orders B to pull over to the side of the road and B obeys. This is obviously an act of control. There may be situation where A gives a suggestion and B obeys. There may be still another situation where A orders and B disobeys and A in turn goes on to destroy B. It is in this last case that it will be difficult to say if power-relations are necessarily control-relations.¹¹ A control relationship would have difficulty in explaining the political relationship between USA and Canada.

10. Morgenthau, op.cit., p.28.

11. Theodore A coloumbis and James H. Wolfe,
Introduction to International Relations: Power & Justice,
(Prentice Hall of India, Pvt. Ltd., (New Delhi, 1981),
pp 56-57.



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Further power won't mean any and every relationship between or among men or nations, for all relationships are not necessarily political. Thus a country may exchange goods and services with another one, it may cooperate with others in providing relief from natural catastrophe, it may participate in the dissemination of cultural achievement throughout the world. Similarly, many technical cooperations can be non-political for they may not be involving a direct conflict of interests. Above all, a nation may define its goal in terms of a religious, moral and economic ideal. Thus in an understanding of political power a strictly political relation has to be isolated from relations of other kinds. The realist position is that politics is an autonomous area, though one may doubt if such a strict compartmentalisation of politics from other types of social activity is possible. Among realists one does find an identification of politics in a sense of general autonomy, which means politics deals with a whole lot of variables which fall under other branches of social science. Its difference from other branches of social science is this sense of general autonomy of political science.¹²

12. See , Stanley Hoffman, ed., Contemporary Theory in International politics, (Prentice Hall of India, Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1964), p.30.

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Carr speaks of three divisions of power, such as military power, economic power and power over opinion. All of them, as he rightly feels, are interlinked and interdependent. Economic power separated from military power can be hardly fruitful and successful in its purpose. Carr explains the failure of economic sanctions of the League of Nations in 1936 as primarily due to lack of the backing of military power behind economic sanctions.¹³ Although, Morgenthau vociferously argues for a strict autonomy of the political sphere, elsewhere in his book, one finds a juxtaposition of both the senses of general autonomy and specific autonomy of politics. He writes, "A real man is a composite of the political religious and moral man. A man who is nothing but moral would be a fool, for he would be lacking in prudence and a man who is nothing but a religious man would be a saint for he would be lacking in wordly desires."¹⁴

13. For a detailed argument regarding the fallacy of separating economic power from military power See, Carr, op.cit., pp. 117-120.

14. Morgenthau, op.cit., p.14.

In other words, an understanding of the political man is possible by integrating him with such other aspects, as the economic man, moral man and the religious man.

Power has to be made distinct from influence, although power does come through influence. This is simply because of the fact that^a necessary outcome of power is control over others. Thus the American President can be influenced by the suggestions of the Secretary of State with regard to the formulations of foreign policy. But the Secretary of State cannot have power over the President since the President cannot be compelled to obey him.¹⁵

Political power, as already stated, is not military power or something that can be equated with overt force since that will substitute or destroy the psychological relation characteristic of political power. However, an increase in military power, realists would argue, is conducive to an increase in political power.

15. Morgenthau, op.cit., p.29.

Morgenthau distinguishes between usable and unusable power. This distinction is made keeping in mind the development of nuclear weapons. One of the paradoxes of nuclear power is that it is no longer true that an increase in military power is complementary to an increase in political power. For the use of nuclear weapons is completely irrational, since it results in total destruction of the country against whom it is used with commensurate destruction of the country using it. Its rationality lies only in its threat, but not in its use, for its use surpasses the limited purpose of influencing the will of others by making an all out destruction imminent and inevitable.

Further a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power is made, the characteristic feature of the former being legality and morality which the latter lacks. In legitimate power, Morgenthau makes a distinction between power as a social fact and political power whose source and nature is legitimate because it can be effectively exercised. for example pressure groups and lobbies etc. They have power in the sense that their preferences influence the actions of public officials, but they cannot impose power.

The control that is the very characteristic of power is derived through a certain kind of impact which the mind can have upon another. The impact is derived from three sources: the expectation of benefits or advantages, the fear of disadvantages and the respect for man and institutions.

National Power

In discussions of political power, the question of aspiration for power in collectivities called nations appears quite natural. This is so because of the very fragmented nature of international society in comparison to domestic politic, with the multiplicity of states-as-actors; sovereign and independent in their own right, having their own interests and needs; each pursuing more or less an independent policy of his own and recognising no supreme authority upon him with legitimacy to guide and control his actions. In domestic politics, a realist feels, the individual urge for power gets restrained and controlled, although he will not accede to a view that in international politics power of a nation in fact, has restraints upon its use. As in

domestic politics, in international politics one can think of various norms of states' behaviour, international organisations and the very imperative of an international society with interdependent states and impossibility on the part of a single state to achieve self-reliance; acting as a check upon the growth of an absolute national power. Otherwise power unchecked will result in chaos, making the very existence of a nation-state precarious. The realist will say that the individual urge for power which gets controlled in domestic society through various norms of social living and a privileged power position of a particular group in that society, gets transferred to an unquestioning identification with national power. Identification with national power is a projection of the frustrated aims for power urge in a domestic society. But hereagain one can point out that national power can be and is, in fact, an expression of interests of a particular group that is the dominant group at the helms of a state. In other words individual power does not get affected by the vicissitudes of

national power. ¹⁶ Thus it seems that the realist conclusion that International politics is a struggle for power is just an assumption about states' behaviour, rather than a demonstration as to why it will be so.

Another reason that is strongly felt and appears quite obvious for the identification of individuals with national power, is nationalism, reflecting a bond and commonality within a particular national community.

National power, in international realism, means both an urge of nation-states for power, an embodiment of national interest for survival and self-prosperity, and a means, that is a capability mobilised for further goal-seeking. It is an urge, which is natural and that way it is an end. This is apparent from the anarchical order of international society. It is a means in the sense that a nation will always try to accumulate more and more power, because of the vicious circle of security which means that a state never reaches complete security, thus abetting the desire for more and more power. As a capability, power

16. Morgenthau says, "The power or foreign policy of USA is obviously not the power or foreign policy of all the individuals who belong to the nation called USA.....
 ... It has, however, affected the power of all those individuals who administer the foreign affairs of the USA..... It is to them that we refer when we speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign policy of a nation."

will reside in some mobilisable resources, both tangible and intangible. Among the tangible factors one can mention geography, that is a nation-state's location which will make its position distinct from other powers,¹⁷ natural resources that consist of food, raw materials,¹⁸ potential human resources,¹⁹ military capability and industrial capacity etc. Among the intangible factors one can mention

17. Geographical position as a factor of power can be explained in relation to the rise of Great Britain as a Great Power, which is largely attributable to its insular position.
18. The rise of Britain is explainable in its economic prosperity and through economic exploitation of the other parts of the world.
19. Population in itself would not account for great power, since it was to be seen in relation to other factors such as, industrial development, education, national character of the vast citizenry itself. A country like India has vast human resources. But its rate of illiteracy, its level of economic development do affect its power position. In contrast a comparatively less populous country like Japan can be much powerful because of its economic development (what Carr calls economic power).

leadership, national character, national morale etc. Except geography, all other factors are susceptible to change or are in a constant flux influencing each other and influenced in turn by the unforeseeable intervention of nature and man. It is through the variation in composition of the national power, that realism accounts for the shifting power-positions of nation-states.

Linked to the instability of factors of national power, is the factor of the capability or incapability of decision-makers of foreign policy. The body in charge of foreign policy decision making may be well-informed or may claim to be wise, but it may not be assured of control over so many unstable factors of national power, which may ultimately affect its power-position.

Patterns of Struggle for Power in International Politics

A realist visualises typically two patterns in which the struggle for power is perpetuated.²⁰ They are:- of opposition and of competition. Opposition will depict a situation where the policies of nations are at strict opposition to one another. One nation tries to have power

20. Morgenthau, op.cit., pp. 167-71.

over another which does not yield and in turn challenges its ascendancy. Thus a particular nation may embark upon a policy of imperialism with regard to another nation which in turn may counter that policy with a policy of imperialism or status quo.²¹ Competition on the other hand, speaks of a situation where two nations try and seek for domination over a third nation.²²

It is in situations such as these that the balance of power operates and fulfills its typical functions. The balance is a necessary outcome of one nation's attempt at ascendancy being met with opposing forces from other nations against such an ascendancy. The balance of power fulfills two functions. It is supposed to ensure stability in power positions and power-relations among nations. But these relations, as one sees, are by nature

21. Morgenthau gives the example of France and its allies opposing Russia in 1812, Japan opposing China from 1931 to 1941, the UNO versus the Axis powers from 1941 onwards as instances of direct opposition. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67.

22. This is visible in the competition between Great Britain and Russia for the domination of Iran. *Ibid.*, p.167.

unstable and subject to continuous change. Thus whatever stability, the balance of power will achieve must be precarious. Another function of the balance of power is to ensure freedom of one nation from domination by another. Owing to the essentially unstable and dynamic character of the balance, which is not unstable and dynamic by accident, but is always so by nature, the independence of nation remains in jeopardy.

Morgenthau visualises three patterns of foreign policy and accordingly three patterns of power-relations in international politics. A nation can seek either to keep power, or to increase power or to demonstrate power. A nation whose policy is towards keeping power and not towards changing the distribution of power, follows a policy of status-quo. A nation whose policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power-relations, whose foreign policy in other words seeks a favourable change in power position, pursues a policy of imperialism. A nation whose foreign policy seeks to demonstrate power it has, either for the purpose of maintaining or increasing it, pursues a policy of prestige.

However, the power of one nation in international politics is relative; it is not absolute. In fact no nation since the emergence of modern nation state in the 17th century can claim to have supreme unchallenged power. In other words, not a single nation in international politics can have a permanent power-position.

Some points as to the inadequacy of Realism and its Version of Power:-

The simplest objection to realist theory would point to the obviousness of what it offers as theoretical propositions. Realist theory of international politics is not only ambiguous in its concept of power and account of reality, but also partial so far as it attempts to provide a general theory of international politics.

Realism, in trying to treat power as something central to politics and especially international politics turns it into an absolute. One doubts, if power does explain the whole of international relations in the way realism maintains. In the present international system, which is one of inter-dependence and close cooperation among nations, much of nations' behaviour is not motivated by a craving for power. A realist, and more particularly Morgenthau, hardly notices this change in the international system. Another problem

that comes, is the realist ascription of precise meaning to the concept of 'power'. Besides, being an imprecise account of power which treats it as equivalent to a control relationship, a realist tends to ascribe different meanings to power in different contexts. At one place it is considered as a means (Morgenthau considers national power as residing in the elements of national power), at other places it is considered as an end. Even, in his account of the sources of national power, Morgenthau does not take into consideration such other factors, as, the ideology or beliefs of the masses or of statesmen of a particular country as the decision-makers, their values motives and above all the national outlook of the individuals comprising a nation as to its interests. To realists motives of statesmen will be most elusive as to the determination of national interest. National interest definitely resides in the consciousness of collectivities rather than mere individuals. At some places power is considered as a criterion of policy, while at others, it is considered as a condition of policy. For the most part, it is considered as lying within the behaviour of nations towards one another. Such varied meanings of the crucial concept of power, make it ambiguous. It raises doubts, as to the validity of its claims as a serious analytical tool. Closely attached to the concept of power in international politics will be the idea of 'national interest'. A realist, and here one is speaking of Morgenthau, assumes that national interest is objective.

It is something rational and moral. But the idea, that national interest is something improblematic and objective could be seriously questioned. The assumption as to rationality of national interest is relevant, as Stanley Hoffman points out,²³ only in stable periods when a nation's policies are for adjustment of means to fairly limited ends. In periods involving the very determination of ends, the definition of national interest is not only arbitrary, but also subjective. For example, revolutionary periods and times of war often involve a strongly subjective interpretation of the national interest. Morgenthau assumes that national interest of all nations is uniform, because fundamentally this is the interest of survival. What he forgets is that the interpretations of national interests vary between political and social groups and from statesmen to statesmen. The British policy of support towards the Ottoman empire from 1887 to 1897 during the period of Salisbury, got changed during the time of Disraeli. This variation is due to the changed interpretation of the British interest, during the time of Disraeli.²⁴

23. See, Stanley Hoffman, (ed., op.cit., pp 64-73.

24. Mahendra Kumar, Theoretical aspects of International Politics, (Shivalal Agarwala & Co., Agra, 1978), p.104.

Similarly the assertion that national interest is something moral, can be challenged on the ground that a nation's interest lies in eliminating other nations, which could hardly constitute a moral objective.

In the present day international system, when the basic question of survival is at stake, and which is more due to the technological developments and emergence of nuclear weapons which have upset the stable set of variables determining nation's survival, the interpretation of national interest has become very subjective. For example, the official theory of the British government that the security of Britain lies in deterring armament, is contested by the large movement which sees Britain's security in unilateral nuclear disarmament.

At a more theoretical level, the limitation of realist theory is evident on two grounds. One, the supposition that reality should be taken as it is for analysis of politics and the other the assumption that a realistic view can offer a moral theory in politics.

The realist theory supposes that reality is rational. More specifically, it provides for a very deterministic picture of reality, by taking a deterministic view of human nature. Regarding human nature, if the

realist assumption as to its absoluteness and unchangeability is true, then politics as an area of human actions reflecting human nature, will be the same in all historical periods. But such a static picture of politics is hardly acceptable, for one notices a whole lot of changes in the structure of international politics. Further the realist version of human nature as something naturally aggressive and based upon self-motivation for security, imparting an unpleasant quality to politics is equally questionable. Man has the element of self-interest in his nature. But at the same time man has a sense of fellow-feeling within him.²⁵ As a social being, man is as moved by the concern for survival, as by the sufferings of his fellow-men. Thus a realist version of human nature is partial. Very similar things could be said about the realist assumption about political reality. Reality is both varied and complicated in its ramifications. Reality never comes fully unfolded before every one and in a uniform manner, as a realist will suppose. Rather, reality becomes what it is, only on the basis of what interpretations

25. See , Herz, op.cit., pp. 1-7.

are being given to it. And human interpretations of reality are apt to vary as human interests, needs and outlook vary.

From another point of view too, realism can be considered inadequate. This pertains to the role of morality in politics.²⁶ The mere analysis of the existing state of things, and to assume that, they existed for all times and will go on unchanged, is a grossly unsatisfactory theory of historical change. Carr says, "We can not find a resting place in pure realism; for realism though logically overwhelming does not provide us with the springs of action necessary even to the pursuit of thought..... In politics, the

26. Some realists like E.H. Carr admits the role of morality in politics. Carr says, "politics are made up of two elements - utopia and reality - belonging to two different planes which can never meet..... Every political situation contains mutually in compatible elements of utopia and reality, of morality and power".

See, Carr, op.cit., p.118.

belief that certain trends are irresistible or certain facts are unalterable, commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of interest to change or resist them".²⁷

Treitschke, writing on Machiavelli, comments that the "terrible thing" about Machiavelli 's teaching " was not the immorality of the methods he recommends , but the lack of content of the state which exists only in order to exist".²⁸ Similarly with Marx. His way of looking human history as a progression in a dialectic way, though , it attempts to explain reality rationally, does not do so in the establishment of the classless society or the withering away of the state. It merely recedes into a vision about the future, a speculation about future possibility and a desirable state of society. Realism, is not reckoning with moral principles in politics, lacks a content, a purpose which is required for the onward march of humanity towards a better world, a safer world. Its version of international politics as struggle for power, divested of a moral purpose can see politics only as an evil, as something detrimental to human existence itself.

27. Carr, op. cit., p.113.

28. Treitschke as quoted in Carr. Ibid., p.114.

CHAPTER - II

SYSTEM THEORY AND POWER

- POWER AS SYSTEMIC BEHAVIOUR

SYSTEMS THEORY¹ AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In Realist theory of international politics 'power' is an analytical tool that can explain international politics conceived in essentially ahistorical terms. In Idealism the 'power-phenomenon' is considered, as something pervasive, but it is an

1. In international politics, as in the more general discipline of political science, systems theory is an offshoot of the behavioural revolution in politics. It developed out of the anxiety of the new social scientists to evolve a general body of knowledge by integrating the various disciplines of social science in a positivistic compendium. Among its exponents in international politics one finds a good number of scholars writing after the second world war and gaining large acceptance in the academic sphere in the 50s' and 60s'. The chief exponents of the systems theory in international politics are Morton Kaplan, Karl Deutsch, Charles Mclelland, George Liska, Oran young, James Rosenau, John Burton, Kenneth E. Boulding, Inis L. Claude etc.

evil to be kept aside and eliminated, otherwise the very existence of nation-states becomes precarious, the question of peace a distant unfounded hope. Unlike realism, systems theory does not see power as the theoretical core of international politics. Unlike idealism it would not aspire for the rather unpractical and difficult task of doing away with the power-phenomenon. It would accept power as something purposive, something not to be neglected for a scientific theory of politics. It is purposive for it serves as a function for the political system, although one does not find in systems theories a clear account, as to how power serves as a function for the system. On the contrary, a view is often held that 'power' should be viewed and kept within the bounds of the system, for unbridled power will be necessarily dysfunctional for the system leading to its collapse.

The basic assertion behind the General Systems Theory is that society constitutes a unified whole; it is a whole comprising certain parts, inter-related and inter-active with one another as well as with the whole and altogether this system of interrelations constitutes a structure. The part and the whole are

interdependent upon each other and the part functions for the maintenance of the whole.² The justification the theory seeks behind it is rooted in the regularities in the structure and processes of a social system. The structure pertains to the configuration of the

2. The system analysts' terms for maintenance are equilibrium or stability or pattern-maintenance. Some scholars within them, however, differentiate equilibrium from stability, the former meaning partial stability, or instability at times, because in the equilibrium the variables are arbitrarily arranged, for an arbitrary length of time. The chief exponent of equilibrium in international politics is George Liska.

For a detailed study see, George Liska, International Equilibrium : A theoretical essay on the politics and organisation of security(Cambridge, Mass, 1957).

system while processes refer to the behaviour of the variables of the system towards one another as well as towards the system as a whole. The regularity is manifest or latent in the systemic behaviour, but in both cases it is undeniably present. It is conspicuous in the System -actions of integration and inter -dependence contributing towards system maintenance.³

3. This point becomes clear if one sees how a human body functions. As we know the General Systems Theory developed out of biology. The origin of General Systems Theory can be traced to the ideas of Ludwig von Bertalanffy who was a biologist, and expounded for the unification of the sciences. In a human body the different parts of the body are as integrated with the whole body, as they are interlinked with one another in functioning for the maintenance of the human body as a whole. A change in a single part of the body affects the other parts as well as the whole system of the body. The truth about a system will be how it envisages the regularities in the systemic behaviour as to system maintenance.

'Power' is seen as an aspect of the systemic behaviour, an aspect of the affectual relationship, which is fundamentally towards integration and interdependence . This is a fundamental characteristic of variables , units or different elements of a system. Political power is to be seen within the systemic behaviour of integration and interdependence Thus the role, a system analyst is to ascribe to power, what must be a rather limited role.⁴

4. Stanley Hoffman says, while analysing Morton Kaplan's book, 'Systems and Processes in International Politics,' "However, it would seem just as surely that power is not the individuating or distinguishing element of the political; otherwise family relations either would be political or would not involve power or influence relations".

Stanley Hoffman, ed., Contemporary Theory in International relations, (Prentice Hall of India, Private, Ltd., New Delhi; 1964), p.117.

In systems theory, politics is seen as an area of compliance which is habitual and voluntary.⁵ For example, in a family one obeys one's parents and this obedience is transferred to the society through the family. Here, however, one may tend to disagree for in a family obedience is more voluntary and moral, whereas in politics it is forced rather than voluntary. Sanctions are attached to compliance in case of disobedience. And what is more true about politics is that in politics a particular group always elicits obedience from the masses, through a system of concealed exploitation of the masses, through coercion and by constituting public opinion as to its legitimacy. Thus politics is an area of

5. This is a typical position taken by Karl Deutsch. For a detailed study see, Karl Deutsch, An Analysis of International Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, New Delhi, 1968) Deutsch says, a "Politics is one of compliance and enforcement in a more or less incomplete manner," p.21.

command and obedience rather than of voluntary compliance alone. What follows from this is that politics approximates an area of decision-making. 'Power' as a political phenomenon is seen as manifest in decision making situations, involving a conflict over issues as revealed through policy preferences. Power belongs to whosoever is prevailing in decision-making or for that matter, who can initiate resolutions with the maximum probability of success. The person with the maximum number of successes in a good number of situations is considered as powerful. The success of a decision-maker is derived from and dependent upon his own prowess, ability, his physical capabilities as well as upon his power position in a political system. In systems analysis, as in realism, power will be a means; a means to further goal-seeking, to enforce favourable decisions; as well as a relationship, involving conflict of interests. As a means power will consist in a quantity, a capability reducible to certain material and human resources (what the systems analysts usually say as constituting a power-base). However, as a capability, its effectiveness lies in how efficiently it is being mobilised in pursuit of a goal, or for more power.

In a global system, one notices enormous disparity and unevenness with regard to physical

capabilities of nations. Thus, the distribution of power as manifested results, in a whole range of configurations of the global system from super powers, to big and major powers, to middle and small-scale powers, and finally to some non-state corporate actors, bloc actors like NATO, Cominform etc. and supranational actors, such as, the UNO. The only difference between the states-as-actors and the other non-state actors is that while the former has the power to coerce to acquire obedience and influence, the latter type of actors limit themselves only to persuasion, to negotiation or to raise key issues, to mobilise their members to fight for a common cause. The power-position of the superpowers, the systems analysts will say, is relatively stable in comparison to small powers. However, it is subject to fluctuations contingent upon circumstances and time. Take, for example, Great Britain. The great power position of Great Britain till the first world war and to some extent till the second world war, was largely attributable to its superior naval power and its predominant economic position. But afterwards it declined with the emergence of USA as an economically developed and militarily superior power. Besides, no

big power can forget restraints upon its power in the form of interdependence which is the inescapable reality of the international society. Very often a view is held that superpowers have an upperhand in international politics. In the UNO what one notices, is that, it is often only an instrument in the hands of the superpowers to serve their interest. Opposing this, the systems analysts will speak of superpowers' spheres of influence.⁶ Big powers and major powers do wield influence over large numbers of national actors. However, most actors within the system will have relative power or can have influence over a relatively small portion of the total system. Small powers do enjoy power in the form of regional groupings and bloc politics etc. Further, no power can enjoy absolute preponderance in international politics and it is more so because of the very interdependent nature of

6. See, James E. Dougherty, "The Study of the Global System" in book James Rosenau etc., ed., World Politics: An Introduction, (The Free Press, New York, 1976), p.604.

the international system. At the same time no power wants to give up its already acquired power-position. Superpowers are usually more sensitive to real or imagined changes in international power-relations. At the same time not all actors at any given time use their power in the same proportion as divided between external and internal purposes.⁷ But all actors whether strong or weak have an abiding interest in projecting a favourable image of themselves throughout the system.

Another version of power in systems analysis is that, it is a relation. As a relation, it is a process, that is the interrelated behaviour of the variables which stretch over a whole lot of human relationships such as influence and persuasion, promises and threats, rewards and punishments. In the bulk of the system analysis writings one finds an interchangeable use of the two terms, power and influence. Power as a relationship has four aspects such as 'Weight', 'Domain', 'Range' and 'Scope'⁸.

7. Dougherty, op.cit., p.605.

8. Karl Deutsch points out these four aspects of power. See, Karl Deutsch, An Analysis of International Politics, (Engle wood cliffs; Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 22-33.

Weight is closest to the intuitive notion, which most of us have, when we think of power.⁹ It resembles a situation approximating a power contest, involving observable conflict. It lies in one actor's ability to prevail in a conflict situation, its ability to affect an outcome in its favour or its ability to prevent an undesirable outcome.¹⁰ The 'weight' power

9. Ibid., p.24.

10. The observability of weight power with certainty is possible, as Deutsch points out, in situations which comprise repetitive class of similar outcomes. For example, voting behaviour patterns in UNO. If a motion moved by USA is getting passed in three out of every four situations, then the weight power of USA is determined by this. It spreads over an average of 50 percent points, since motions not moved by USA have only 25 percent possibility of getting passed. But in case of analysis of Single events such as the dropping of an atom bomb the weight power is difficult to determine. Ibid., p. 44.

of most governments and especially the Great Powers, is declining ever since 1945.

The 'Domain' of power means indicating over whom power is exercised or whose behaviour has the maximum probability of getting changed or affected by the exercise of power. The domain of power of a country extends over population within its territory and over its citizens abroad, over its resources and its territory.

20' The 'Range' of power, however, refers to differences between the highest reward and the worst punishments, that a country can sanction against another, subjected to its control or influence, or, for that matter, an actor whom the country seeks to influence. "In so far as modern states rely upon power, they normally govern not through the range of power, rather through its weight - that is through the high probability of the enforcement of their orders. Tyrants who rely mainly for their domestic power on the range of their staggering rewards and cruel punishments are not likely to last very long under

present day conditions.¹¹

Another aspect of power that has expanded in recent decades is its 'Scope.' By the scope of power what is meant, is the collection of all particular kinds or classes of behaviour or relations or affairs that are effectively subjected to it. The scope of power increases with the capabilities of the persons or nations included within the domain of power, in respect to kinds of behaviour subject to it.

Systems theory in international politics will assign a limited role to 'power' in international relations. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, the system analysts' obsession for continuity and regularity in the pattern of interactions between or among nation-states, and secondly, the theoretical belief that power is functional for the system. Speaking of the second point first as we know, the systems analysts speak of relative power of states. It is relative to their capabilities as well as to the distribution of power in the field of international politics. In saying so, they only mean that unchecked power will operate against the system itself. This way, they will add a purpose to

11. Deutsch, op.cit., p.32

the pure form of power-analysts. They will envisage mutual exchanges among states in an international environment. But they won't explain how power functions for the system. They will only explain it as part of the mechanism of politics, where nations will definitely uphold their national interest and seek its fulfilment. But they will see it as a part of the two-way activity of nations'behaviour of taking from the system and giving to the international system.

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Taking the first question, one doubts if the international system is a static one. History shows that the present day international system is an evolution of the European states-system, but it varies in many important respects from the past states-system. In comparision to the former states-system, the modern system, is more widened, more varied, both in the number of nations comprising it, as well as in the more varied and unrestricted patterns of interactions between nations. The traditional state-centric model, as every one will accept, does not explain much of the present day international system. Besides the state, one notices

a whole lot of Universal actors, bloc actors and regional and functional organisations, functioning and interacting with states. They have objectives of their own which are equally global in their implications. The systems theorists will visualise a limited role for them, a role more of persuasion rather than of legitimacy like the state. Unlike states, they can not coerce states or individuals to follow their objectives. This argument carries much validity in itself, for, as we know, the modern state is more powerful and commands more loyalty.¹² This is more so

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12. Some Scholars like John Herz speaks of the obsolescence of the state in modern days due to technological and military development which has ensued in its train, probability of enormous destruction for the states and has made the question of peace precarious . It is thought that only some form of internationalism or universalism can bring peace to state. This approach pins hope upon international organisations to serve as universal actors. But later on Herz himself changed his stand reckoning with the birth of new nations from the clutches of colonialism, inebriated with a vigour of nationalism and a resolve of economic self development, through providing protection to their peoples and pursuing welfare of their people. This made him to think that the disappearance of a nation-state is a myth and that modern state claims maximum loyalty. For a detailed study see, John H. Herz, "The Rise & Demise and Demise of the Territorial State", in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, (New York, 1961), pp. 80-86.

because of the emergence of newly independent states, faced with the task of nation building after achievement of independence from imperialist control. The modern state commands much loyalty because of its task of guaranteeing peace, protection and welfare to its people. Thus it is hardly surprising that states will disappear. In fact state will continue to be the most important actor in international politics. But at the same time the modern world has become increasingly inter-dependent and interconnected. Now-a-days any event in any corner of the world will have its repercussions felt in the most distant corner. In the modern age of technological development and growth of communication the whole world has become a family, either to swim together in peaceful cooperation or to sink together in case of war, which has every probability of escalating into a global nuclear war. The growth of different non-state actors has to be understood in this context and this will show why they would not have a less important role. The systems approach, in fact, is concerned with both the past and present of the international system. It does reckon with the changes in the present international system. However, while explaining change, it would see it from a very specific perspective, from a limited perspective of transformations

within the system which have occurred more or less due to some factors affecting the interaction process among nations. In other words the process of change is seen as determined by the extent to which the area of interaction has been affected. This will mean further, that in the study of systems, international phenomenon is conceived in the context of the main variables of the field and the focus is on the actions of nations as the components of the system, on the structure and functioning of the system resulting from the interaction of nation, or on the environmental factors which condition not only the actions of nations but also the interaction between them and the working of the system."¹³ Thus the systems theory in international politics will explain change in a very specific sense. It does not have much to say as to what a desirable change would be or should be. Morton Kaplan visualises six systems in international politics, out of which two that is the balance of power and the loose bipolar system are actual. The others are merely anticipated. Thus a theory of power within system theory inevitably becomes a theory of statue-quoism. In it, continuity in power position of nations, acquires a predominant moral value.

13. Mohendra Kumar, Theoretical Aspects of International Politics, (Shivalal Agarwala and Co., Agra, 1978), P.145

CHAPTER - III

AN OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL POWER

SECTION-IAPPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER¹

In the late 60's and early 70's one sees a remarkable resurgence² in the literature of international relations theorisations, in the form of world order Approach. Such a theorisation bears a remarkable shift

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1. One can discern the development of 'World Order Approach' to international politics in the post-world war II period, although its acceptance has been most fitful and controversial during that time. It is only in the beginnings of 70's that, it is being taken seriously for teaching and academic research in most of the universities in America, in the form of world order models project (WOMP). The problem, one faces, is in finding a proper classification of worldorder approach. As an academic pursuit its scholarshi is not only vast, but also diverse. The diversity, however, lies in discerning steps for the realisation of a just world order. It is not so in theirperspective. Among the chief exponents, one finds Richard Falk, Herbert J. Spiro, Saul H. Mendlovitz, Roy Preiswerk, Andrew M. Scott, Rajni Kothari and a whole lot of research undertaking associated with WOMP. Among others sharing the world order perspective, one can mention Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez, James N. Rosenau, Kehoane & Nye, J.W. Burton, etc.

from the early theorisation; a shift that is radical³ in both theoretical and practical senses.

2. One feels, this is a resurgence for one reason. That is, the ideas of world order approach can be seen more directly in the stoic idea of opposing the city-state system which causes fragmentation in the political order, in the Idea of Unity of Christendom in the mediaeval times and in the 18th century Kantian vision of peace. For a detailed study see, K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline : Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, (Allen and Unwin, Inc., Newyork, 1985) Chap.3, pp. 41-4.
3. The world order approach is very often acclaimed to be radical in both theory and practice. One feels it to be more radical in theory than in practice, simply because, the values emphasised in it for a just world order are not fully attainable in practice. Besides, there is no uniformity among such theories as to the possible steps for a global transition. It is radical only in emphasising upon the present human predicament as an outcome of the present system, hence, advocating for its dismantling.

The world order approach to international politics is based upon an altogether different conceptualisation of politics. Such a conceptualisation sees the entire globe in a holistic perspective. It visualises a global identity, where the entire world is viewed as a community of individuals, united together by common human needs and interests; common human aspirations for freedom, economic well-being, social justice and above all possessing common faculty of reason. The entire humanity is viewed as a family and international politics as a collectivity of nations rather than a mere collection. Thus a resurrection of the stoic idea of doing away with the city-state system, for it leads to war, strifes and mutual conflicts; an invigoration of the long tradition of the idea of unity of christendom of Europe, reinforced with a vision of the family of European princes, a reincarnation of the Dantian idea of a Universal (Christian) Empire and a rejuvenation of the 18th century Kantian doctrine of universal peace for without it the social living will be at stake, the human potential for creativity will be crushed.⁴

4. See K.J. Holsti, op.cit., pp. 41-44.

Such a view of politics is essentially derived from two grounds. One, it is a theory as to the importance of a global order and a reorientation of political actions towards the construction of a just global order around certain values. The other, is from a more practical ground of analysing the emerging trends in global politics; trends that are thought to have really ushered in the beginnings of a global society.

Theoretically, it is the view of global integration, which encompasses the broader question of social living, both of the individual being as well as of the humanity at large. The social living is of co-existence and a minimum order for existence.⁵ This boils down to the analysis of an individual in a global society, as an individual being as well as a social being. In world order approach, the individual is seen as a victim of the system; the system that is characterised by domination

5. In fact most of global theorists ascribe to such a view. For a detailed study see,

(i) Rajni Kothari, Footsteps into the Future; Diagnosis of the Present World and Design for an alternative, (Orient Longman, 1974), Chap.1, pp. 5-19.

(ii) Richard Falk, Samuel Kim and Saul Mendlovitz, ed., Towards a Just World Order; vol.1, (Westview Press, Inc., USA, 1982) Chap.1, pp.1-9, and section 3, pp. 141-216.

and assymetrical dependence, of fabulous richness on the one hand and miserable poverty on the other, which is an inevitable product of the industrial society. The genesis of all international problems is seen in this basic human predicament of poverty and social injustice. One, however, does not see a uniformity among the global theorists, as to how to go with the world problems as far as their solutions are concerned. Most of them will only agree upon a regeneration of values in political life, such as freedom, justice and individual autonomy with a self-restraint as the guide-lines for a just world order. They will only say that all political actions should be oriented towards values and broadly shaped to guarantee social justice and economic well-being. They won't say how effectively this value-orientation

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will come.⁶ Among the most agreeable steps most of them will argue for a growth of individual consciousness for the global problems and dismantling of the state-system with its replacement by a universal order. But, they won't see how the idea can be implemented. Quite contrary to this, one sees the state-system to be much durable in the modern days. Now-a-days the state enjoys much loyalty, because of its tasks of guaranteeing the socio-economic well-being and the general welfare

6. Mendlovitz says, "The World order images and change strategies presented in the WOMP books are strikingly diverse, reflecting the different methods, intellectual styles and cultural/political backgrounds of their authors. Although, we were able to agree on a way of stating world order problems and establish a framework of value criteria for what we considered to be appropriate solutions, as well as devise a common methodology, it certainly would be premature to provide a consensus statement for these various books."

See Mendlovitz's Introduction, in Kothari, op.cit., P. XIII.

of its people. This applies more to the third world countries where their past colonial experience and the tasks of politico-economic development, assign the state a role, of primary importance as a viable instrument in nation-building. The less-likely obsolescence of the state-system in modern days international reality, renders the globalest version, a mere speculation, an impression.⁷

Associated with world order approach will be two assumptions. One pertains to the malleability of human nature and the order, a hope that values can be realised. Regarding the first, 'it rejects the idea that any one feature of human nature is decisive for adequate explanation of the past or anticipation of the future. The complexity and plasticity of human nature, emphasising the importance of political and normative context (including education and religion),

7. For the argument in favour of the less-likely disappearance of the state see, John H. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited : Reflections on the future of nation-state," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, (Newyork, 1961), pp.76-81.

is one of the central foundations of hope for the future!⁸
Hence, it will strictly oppose the realist notion of human nature and emphasises the element of fellow-feeling, sympathy in human nature, as necessarily providing a motive force for effective cooperation in the socio-political sphere.

Regarding values, the typical assertion of the world order approach will be that values can be real. This is so, on the ground that values underlie, 'positive responses to human predicament.'⁹ They are based upon a realisation of the problems in reality and accordingly a search for a future desirability. In other words, what is desirable, can be considered as falling under being realistic, for this is inspired by the problems

8. Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz, ed., op.cit., p.143.

9. Ibid., p.1.

in reality. It springs from reality as a prescription for the future.¹⁰

From a practical point of view a globalist, will observe the emerging trends, changes in world politics, as providing the framework for a global society. This is seen in two aspects. The first pertains to the growth of interdependence in international politics. The modern world, as will every one agree, has become increasingly interdependent¹¹ both materially that is

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10. This position will be an insertion of the Platonic idea. Plato says in the Republic, "We are inquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of perfectly just and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an ideal..... And is our theory a worse theory only because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described." Quoted in John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951), Chap.2, pp.17-8.
11. For a detailed study on interdependence see, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, 1977). Chap.1, pp.3-22.

economically and technologically and spritually. Economically, interdependence is quite self-evident in the modern age of technological innovation and each state's craving for development which can not be possible in isolation, in absence of assistance from other states. In a spiritual sense, the world was become interdependent in the sense of a common human interest and common human aspirations for justice, freedom and well-being. What needs, to be mentioned is that the global community has become integrated. It is an integration in both a practical and theoretical sense. In the process of interdependence, what happens, is obviously the recognition of common interest or at least a transcendence of state interest.¹²

What is attached to interdependence as a side effect, though not necessarily so, is the emergence of many non-state actors in the international field. They are growing in numbers and have a distinct purpose and objective of their own. Besides the usual multinational corporations, transnational organisations or supranational organisations operating side by side the state, in the modern days one sees a growth in number of informal organisation in the form of religious

12. Rosenau especially takes this position.

See, James Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence

group, some atheletic society, scientific organisation, etc.¹³, having allegiance of people all over the globe and having an effective say in the matters of international politics.

All these instilled in the minds of a globalist as to the possible usherance of a global society in the near future.

POLITICAL POWER :

In approaches to world order, one does not see a clear conception of power as to what it is and in what way it is significant for the rubrics of international politics. One can only derive a view of power from the medley of theories.

A globalist will consider power-politics as an evil. It is old-fashioned and outdated.¹⁴ In international politics, it will advocate against national power and appeals for a universal power. This is due to one reason.

13. See, J.W. Burton, World Society, (Cambridge University Press, London, 1972), pp.19-21.

14. Hence, it will take a position opposing the Realist version that power is something central to international politics.

This is the globalist's concern for common human interests, where power will be seen as something antagonistic to the international system. This is also due to the fact that in course of history, what is most conspicuous is the wielding of power by a microscopic group in a society. A particular group because of its acquired socio-economic position, dominates over the large section in the society, who are deprived and whose deprivation is solely due to the political actions of the privileged group which always engages in the fulfilment of its own interests to the detriment of society. It perpetuates its domination in more or less, direct or indirect manner. And in most cases its means of oppression and exploitation remains concealed because of the very nature of social or political system, in which the ordinary individual gets victimised.¹⁵

15. This is a typical position noticeable in both Rajni Kothari and Richard Falk to some extent in Saul Mendlovitz. This version of power comes closer to a Marxist notion. Its only point of difference from the Marxist however, lies in that it does not specify its conception of the 'oppressed', by reference to a part that is a class or race, or religion, or gender or party. In this sense its conception of oppressed becomes not only broad, but also elusive in so far as a solution to this can be sorted out.

See Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz, ed., op.cit., pp.141-2.

As an alternative to this the globalists speak of universal power. It is broad both in its denotation and connotation. It will denote both, the power of all in a broad sense and power to none in a specific sense. Its source will be moral and its tasks are the assurance of common well being, social justice and the 'maximum autonomy'¹⁶ of the individual.

16. Autonomy, as used, in world order approach has a special meaning. Rajni Kothari vociferously argues for individual autonomy where he means both maximum freedom to the individual and self-restraint. By autonomy he means the guaranteeing of maximum to all and after that is achieved, transfer of the rest to those who do not have the minimum and then again the diversion of the rest to production of non-material goods. One finds this to be quite peculiar, because it guarantees maximum to all and presupposes a portion of society that has a minimum. In case of individual it will mean both maximum freedom as well as minimum freedom. One can say, it is an idealisation.

The autonomy of an individual that the globalists speak of is both of maximum freedom to ensure individual well-being and creativity as well as self-restraint.

One finds this notion of 'universal power' elusive, a mere idealisation, for the globalists do not specify as to how it can be established. They only, imagine that with the general well-being, with a considerable amount of freedom to an individual being and with a general prevalence of social justice and the idea of a 'Universal power' can be realised.

In the specific case of international politics, such a view of power will find a constant opposition to the prevailing state-system. The state-system in the bulk of WOMP is considered as both in-human and irrelevant. It is in-human because, state power is power of a specific privileged section, at the helms of state affair. National power is parochial. It is considered irrelevant, because of its inadequacy to meet with the needs and its interests of the humanity and its problems. It is irrelevant also in the evolution of the system towards an interdependent and integrated one. In the global politics the WOMP, thus appeals for a universal power or a universal empire. The steps for establishment of such a power, are mainly an extension in the normative domain. However, the globalists will outline some objective criteria by

which values can be realised in international politics towards the establishment of a universal power. Some of the steps suggested are growth of transnational relations, contexts or coalitions, more international intercultural relations and maximum individual participation in global politics.¹⁷ Some steps will involve a redefinition of the scope of the study of international relations by indicating problem areas which need to be given special attention. This pertains to the recognition of the basic human needs such as food, health, habitat, finding out the causes of growing inequalities, building an effective cooperation between the overdeveloped and developing countries, guaranteeing human rights and its protection, by providing alternative ways of life to the population of rich countries afflicted with the many evils of over-development¹⁸ and guaranteeing more self-reliance to the third world

17. See, Roy Preiswerk, "Could we study International Relations as if Peoples mattered", in Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz, ed., op.cit., pp. 186-188.

18. For evils with which the population of rich countries are afflicted with, see, Ibid., p.193.

countries not in the sense of ensuring a third world solidarity against the developed countries, rather through emphasising again and again the solidarity of humanity at large.

Some points Regarding the World Order Approach

One tends to sympathise with the world order approach not only in its conceptualisation of politics, but also in its emphasis of global change. Today's humanity is oppressed from all grounds. It is almost on the brink of a disaster, on a dangerous path or on a pathological direction as most globalists say. Any research undertaking, in this sense, must be based upon a conscious attempt, as to how to do away with the malaise of the present system. In this sense a pure realist research enterprise, in its professed belief that reality as it is, is the only guide to its objective understanding is meaningless; is insufficient, is devoid of the purpose of bringing change in reality. A mere description or explanation or prediction of future course of events based upon the analysis of reality will simply present the lack of seriousness, a lack of conviction on the part of the researcher. The globalist will say that this will be the madness of humanity. The globalist, as already

seeks to change the present dehumanised system, dehumanisation which is a product of an unjust order. To this the realist will reply by saying that the reality is deficient in this aspect. Reality unfolds eternally before us. The human predicament is thus real. There is no way out of this. But this will be too cynical, too despairing in the name of science. For no one will denounce the fact of dehumanisation in history. But at the same time, to accept dehumanisation as 'historical vocation'¹⁹ will be absolutely despairing. For the very fact of dehumanisation presents the 'Ontological possibility'²⁰ of thinking of humanisation

19. The term is of Paulo Freire.

See, Paulo Freire, 'The Pedagogy of the oppressed,' in Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz, ed., pp.47-56.

20. Ibid., p.47.

Paulo Freire says, "..... as man perceives the extent of dehumanisation, he asks himself if humanisation is a viable possibility. Within history, in concrete, objective contexts, both humanisation and dehumanisation are possibilities for man as an uncompleted being conscious of his incompleteness."

as possible, as something viable. Any scientific enterprise, in the name of objectivity, thus will be self-defeating and insufficient. Besides, "the value neutrality of science is a stubborn myth",²¹ A scientist is to a very great extent guided in his research by certain values, a belief as to a claim of scientificity and objectivity of his research.²² Thus a globalist will say that science may be useful, but it is not sufficient. On the otherhand, we will oppose an outright dismissal of his theory on the ground that it is utopian or idealistic. One feels, the globalist, in pointing out the factors of human sufferings, and injustice does a great service to humanity. One feels, however, its steps to bring a just world order as impressionistic, though most of the globalists will claim that their alternatives of a future world are nothing but relevant utopia or are reflections of preferred worlds for 1990's. Doubts come in mind not in regard to the globalists' claim but, with

21. Roy Preiswerk, op.cit., P.178.

22. Fayeraband says, scientific method is a product of constant idealisation that such a method actually exists. See, Fayeraband, Against Method : Outline of An Anarchical Theory of Knowledge, (London : Verso, 1975)

regard to the viability of a just world order. The doubt is both theoretical and real.

Taking the first, let us assume (which in most cases so) that human actions are the products of human nature. Here one faces problems mainly with regard to the objectivity of human nature. A realist will say that human nature is bad. A globalist, on the otherhand, will affirm that a realist description of human nature is inadequate and partial. Human nature to a globalist is social or can be modified towards the interests of society.

One does not intend to go into the unending debates as to what specifically is human nature or which aspect of human nature, that is, whether a realist or globalist version prevails over human actions. One sees, the problem as lying within the interpretation of human actions. Here it is to be borne in mind that interpretations of human actions will vary. They may be scientific, but the relevance of a particular interpretation as the true explanation of human action in a particular situation is doubtful. Thus all interpretations of human actions are true in degree only, but not in an absolute sense.²³ But

23. This argument is a typical position of an 'Intentionalist' in social science. One, however, does not accept this position in toto for knowledge on this basis will be totally difficult to achieve, or knowledge is altogether impossible.

an argument of this sort won't serve any purpose for this will be too cynical as far as achievement of knowledge is concerned. Now, coming back to the question of human actions, whether it is guided by what aspect of human nature or not, one can safely say that human actions are guided by human wants. And while speaking of human wants, one will see this as basically residing in the satisfaction of basic human needs, such as food, habitat, etc. Beyond this all other human wants are unlimited. But here again a problem arises. We know that a man can have unlimited wants. But man by himself can not satisfy all his wants. On the onehand he has the restraint upon his wants from society. He faces societal competition for the means of his satisfaction and on the other his individual capacity to satisfy his wants is insignificant. Hence, it is impossible on his part to satisfy all his wants. From this point, the superior power position of a man is explainable not in his individual capacity, rather in his identification with some group or his belonging to some group that enjoys a privileged power position and fosters it by some overt or covert means. In this sense 'power' can be explained in the specific context of a community or group in society. Thus any attempt for change in a society, will mean a radical struggle on the part of the deprived section in a society against the privileged power position.

The globalists will only visualise that a global change can be possible through the revolution of oppressed section. But at the same time he will say that the struggle should present, not the concern for solidarity of the oppressed sections, against the privileged few, but a concern for humanity at large. Thus, the globalist method is for global participation to increase awareness of global problems. In this sense it will mean a compromise with the privileged few, but not a radical protest against them.

From a practical stand point reality confounds one's misgivings about the possibility of a just global order. In taking some examples from the globalist writers themselves, one can say, to what extent their ideas can be mere speculation. According to the 1976 SIPRI year book the nuclear equipments of the whole world amounted to 50,000 megatons, which means 15 tons for each of an individual and 60 tons for each of the inhabitant of NATO or WARSAW pact countries. During the period between 1945 and 1975 the total expenditure on defence amounted to 7000 billion dollars, whereas only 200 billion dollars or only 3 per cent of it was spent on developmental aid.²⁴

To take another example , Switzerland imports 1.4 million tons of wheat annually and feeds one million to animals for meat production. The meat thus produced, contains

24. Roy Preiswerk, op.cit., p.175.

a quantity of proteins equivalent to only 0.2 million tons of wheat. With the 0.8 million tons of wheat lost in the process a 6 million people would be fed for a year in other parts of the world.²⁵ To take another example, fifteen per cent of US consumption of fertilizers is used for growing lawns, cultivating golf courses and adorning cemeteries. In absolute quantity this is the amount of fertilizers at the disposal of farmers of India.²⁶

All these examples point to one sad state of affairs. This is the growing diversity in global politics with still less concern for humanity at large. At the same time some examples can be cited in favour of world order approach. These may be the Amnesty International as an instrument of human rights, the Cocoy Doctrine, the European Peace Movements, the UN resolution as to the exploitation of sea-bed resources for the benefit of the poorer countries.²⁷ But no one can be sure, if these developments are genuinely motivated towards a global change. For example, the US countered the Third World proposal for the exploitation of sea-bed by setting up special military units to protect the activities of US private corporations in the seas.²⁸ This is an incongruent

26. Ibid., pp.191-192.

27. Ibid., p.192.

28. Ibid., p.192.

development keeping in mind the UN resolution. This makes clear that the super powers are yet to be prepared in a global consciousness for justice and betterment of the world, much less to speak of Third World countries whose underdevelopment and lack of self-reliance does legitimately operate against such a consciousness. In fact most of the Third World leaders feel the global order approach to be a western tactic at cultural imperialism.

In this background, the world order approach recedes into an imagination though most of them claim, and one does feel, that this may not be dismissed just like that as a utopia.

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Section- IIDependency Theory & World Capitalist System Theory

The preceding section on the global order approach incites one to look into a different group of theorists in international politics who shares the globalists' concern for a universal social order, but who differ fundamentally from them in their perspective of international politics. The discussion is imminent primarily for one reason. For a globalist, as we see, the framework for a universal order in international politics has ushered in. This is seen in political reality in which interlinkages and interdependence (political, cultural and economic) among the nations have grown considerably. However, while speaking of universal order a globalist only speculates so, for nowhere in the bulk of globalists' writing the steps to go about it are found. The globalist thinks the present world as an antecedent stage of a universal system or is on the verge of a universal order. A question arises why after all to speak of a universal system or a global system. It is one thing to think of society as a unified whole, where all its parts are interrelated to each other. It is another thing to say that a system will grow out of the growing interdependence and interlinkages among its parts or units. In other words the question that can be asked specifically is whether it is the system that is primary or its units.

differences between these two theories, for the reason that we intend to examine their usefulness for research in international politics. And more particularly, both are united by the common assumptions as to exploitation, dominance and inequality in the international level. Here, we see the occupation of these theorists with a similar problematique like that of a globalist.

The Dependency Theory and the World Capitalist System Theory developed as a reaction to the western theories of economic development that informed both inquiry and policy during the 1950's and 1960's. The western theories of development argued that the barriers to development in the non-European societies are mainly internal. The western theorists see the misery of the Third World countries in their socio-political structure, where factors like 'frequent regime instability, lack of rational decision-making, lack of capital, dogmatic religious practices lack of education, corruption etc. are identified mainly responsible for their underdevelopment. Supplementing their analysis the western theorists would argue for export-led industrialisation, sound taxation policy, private foreign investment, foreign aid, a general growth in the level of education, efforts for efficient bureaucracies, steps to curb corruption and broadly social reforms, as

a thinking that a global system can be thought of to be existing actually, having both historical and logical meaning that we come across the Dependency and the world capitalist system theories.

Dependency and the world capitalist system theory are only terminologically the different variants of the application of Marxist analysis . . . understanding of international politics.¹ We do not intend to go into the

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1. About Marxism, it is most commonly agreed among scholars that in international politics the application of Marxism is a recent development. Some scholars like K.J. Holsti, for example, points out that Marx and Engels were occupied more with analysis of domestic societies and hence, had little to say on international politics. Holsti says, except colonialism Marx had little to add to the incisive writings of Hobbes, Rousseau, Grotius and many others in international politics. Some scholars like Gellie, points out that in the 19th century, Europe was having a period of relative diplomatic calm, so that the questions that perturb analysts of international politics in the 18th century were hardly of any relevance in the period of Concert of Europe. For a detailed study as to the late application

- of Marxism to international politics see,
- K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline : Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, (Allen and Unwin, Inc., Boston, USA, 1985) pp.61-5. On a possible Marxist theory of international relations through an integration of the basic ideas of Marxism, see,
- (i) V. Kubelkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism - Leninism and the theory of International Relations, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980), Chap.1 to Chap.3 and Chap.5.
- (ii) Arun Bose, "The Marxist theory of International Relations", in K.P. Mishra and Richard Smith Beal, ed. International Relations Theory : Some Western and non-western Perspectives, (Vikas Publishing House, Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1980) pp.158-183.
- (iii) E. Krippendorff, International Relations as a Social Science, (Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1982), pp.69-95.
- (iv) Samir Amin, Class and Nation : Historically and in the Current Crisis, (H.E.B. Limited, USA, 1980) Chap. 1.

The answer lies in scrapping off the word or and seeing both to be related. For, we feel, that in a system the parts of it are as dependent upon the system as the system is upon its parts. The globalist in thinking that a system will gradually grow out of the interdependence of its parts, is thereby committing ahistoricism. For, it will appear in his analysis, that the parts exist independently and have certain streak of arbitrariness about their existence and functioning. Thus a globalist will only point out that the growing interdependence among nations should better awaken nations in acknowledging the reciprocity and mutuality of nations. Hence, the much asserted emphasis of a globalist is upon a consciousness or a realisation in the greater cause of humanity. The question that is asked specifically, how shall an arbitrary collection of nations grow into a universal system, only on the reckoning that the parts in it have the characteristic of interdependence. In the absence of an analysis as to the existence of a system, the globalists assertion, thus, becomes an assumption only. It lacks a logical meaning on the ground that a system refers to a totality, 'a totality' in which all its units stand in close relation to each other which is functional. A globalist will commit ahistoricism for not thinking that a 'world system' actually exists. It is on the basis of

steps for development of these countries.²

It is on an opposition to this view of development specifically, that we find the Dependency and the world capitalist System Theories. These theories like the western ones would ascribe underdevelopment to internal factors. But these internal factors, unlike the western theorists, are internal to the social system.³

'Social System', as viewed in most of the neo-Marxist theory⁴ refers to a totality of the social structure.

2. K.J. Holsti, op. cit., p.66.

3. A characteristic expression of the social system is by Immanuel Wallerstein. For a detailed study see, Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and future demise of the world capitalist system : concepts for comparative analysis", in Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz, ed., Toward a just world order, vol.I, (West view Press, Inc., USA, 1982), pp.113-139.

4. The Dependency Theory and the World Capitalist System Theory are very often named Neo-Marxist theories. Hereafter we will use the term interchangeably.

The 'totality' is both in terms of the development of the social structure extending over time in history, as well as relationship among the units of the social system. The neo-Marxists will see both dialectically related. The system determines actors' behaviour and choice of actions. However, the contradictions within the system over time, gradually give rise to a qualitative change within the system. Thus any explanation of a social system and its developments, has to reckon with two factors. First, any explanation of social change is possible only through an examination of various factors in a society which together, provide a conjuncture. However, it is ^{the} primary factor that can, in combination with other factors, cause change. Secondly, the development of a social system has to be seen in the context of long-term history. History offers the stages of development through which a particular society has passed over fragments of time. And while viewing stages, the stages are, however, to be seen as stages in the continuity of the system; stages which arise from the contradictions inherent to the system.

The stages constitute the development of social structure.⁵ The development of capitalism is explained through the view of society passing in stages. It is seen in the context of history from the 16th century onwards, where it is traced to the introduction of free market trade in world economy. The stages deciphered are stretched over agricultural capitalism, giving rise to mercantile capitalism and finally to industrial capitalism in the late 19th century. To the neo-Marxists, the functioning of the socialist state has to be comprehended within the world economy of capitalism. For the success of socialism, to the neo-Marxists, lies essentially in its becoming a world socialist system rather than in

5. It is on this view of stages, that the neo-Marxists differ from many Marxist scholars who, in their understanding of social change apply the Marxist models arbitrarily to any society, without seeing how far they are fit to be applied. The neo-Marxists, however, do not question the genuineness of the Marxist models. They only point out the ahistoricism of their application to any and every society.

remaining restricted to one country only.

Defining the Social System

The neo-Marxist version of a social-system is similar to the General Systems Theory's thrust of looking at the factors of systemic survival. As opposed to System Theory they do not advocate for system persistence. They analyse the general characteristics of a system, where all the system variables stand in a certain relationship (a relationship that is functional) to each other. Through the general characteristics of the system variables they try to locate a central factor. The variables in the system revolve round the central variable. In other words the basic fact of system maintenance is attributable to certain factors which offer a conjuncture, but in that conjuncture a single factor stands out primary. A change in the system is possible only around this basic systemic factor.

6. Wallerstein says, "There are today no socialist systems in the world economy any more than there are feudal systems because there is only one world-system. It is a world-economy and it is by definition capitalist in form. Socialism involves the creation of a new kind of world-system, neither a redistributive world-empire nor a capitalist world-economy but a socialist world government". Immanuel Wallerstein, op.cit., p.136.

To the Neo-Marxists a social system is characterised by a single division of labour and a mode of exchange corresponding to it. Exchange is central to any system for through this the actors act in providing for the needs of each other as well as the smooth functioning of the system. All 'Social developments' in neo-Marxism are explainable through the division of labour and the mode of exchange. The neo-Marxists characterise the modern world as a single system. They identify it as the capitalist system. It is characterised by a single division of labour albeit, with cultural dissimilarities. They speak of two variants of the present world system; One, is identified with a common political system and the other without. They are respectively the world empire and the world economy. The world economy has been historically unstable and has the tendency to grow into a world empire either through disintegration or conquest by one group.⁷ The neo-Marxists say that the development of all world empires from the pre-modern times of Rome and China to modern days are the instances of world economy growing into a world empire. On the otherhand, the so-called nineteenth century empires, such as Great Britain or France were not world empires at all, but national-states with

7. Immanuel Wallerstein, op.cit., p.116.

colonial appendages operating within the framework of a world-economy.⁸

What will be its view of International Politics:-

The Neo-Marxist's account of international politics, follows from their view of 'World System', where states are not seen as basic actors.⁹ For the reason, that a state's role in international politics is seen deducible to its structural position in the world-capitalist system. A neo-Marxist visualises two variants of the state-system. They are inherent to the capitalist world economy. They are identified as the group of producers states and a group of producing-states. (The Neo-Marxist's terms for

8. Ibid., p.116.

9. Hence an opposition to the traditional state-centric model of international politics.

this are respectively the cores and the peripheries.)¹⁰
 This division of states into cores and peripheries is both historical and logical. Historically capitalism developed in few west European countries and gradually spread over to other European and non-European societies. However, this spread was not a spontaneous explosion of capitalist activity all over the world. It had been mainly a spread engineered by the developed west to meet with the requirements of its own capitalist activities. In other words it was a spread at the will and in the interests of the capitalist centre of the world. The capitalist west super-imposed itself on the other societies and set out the development strategies of other societies to meet its

10. In between the cores and peripheries Wallerstein will add a further group of Semi-peripheries which remain close to the core. They have the historical possibility of growing into core countries. But the peripheries, in any case, can not grow into cores or semi-peripheries, and this is precisely because of the persistence of the division of labour characteristic of capitalism. Regarding the semi-peripheries Holland rose to the status of 'centr ' in the 17th century whereas Spain and Portugal declined to semi-peripher status.

own requirement. Wallerstein says, "Capitalism involves not only appropriation of the surplus-value by an owner from a labourer, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole world-economy by core areas". It is on this point of the spread of capitalism that the neo-Marxists tend to differ from many Marxist scholars. Marx and Lenin studied on the non-European, societies. Marx made a special study of 'Oriental Despotism'. However, Marx was quite optimistic as Holsti says, about the spread of capitalism to other non-European societies, because to him the technological progress and scientific advancement associated with development of capitalism. World result in progress of these societies.¹² In any case Marx did not attribute underdevelopment of non-European societies, to capitalism, for these societies remained conspicuously away from a commercial nexus with the developed west. 'Lenin shared Marx's optimism and predicted that in rearingly the centres of production would shift to the colonial areas as wage rates and other factors of production there would become increasingly advantageous. If anything, it was the industrial centres of the world that would stagnate'.¹³ Quite contrary to this the neo-Marxist's vision for the

11. Immanuel Wallerstein, op.cit., p.124.

12. See K.J. Holsti, op.cit., pp.64-5.

13. K.J. Holsti, op.cit., p.64.

spread of capitalism to these countries is pessimistic. The neo-Marxists see the emergence of state-systems in international politics, in the capitalist mode of production, in the division of labour and in the process of exchange between the cores and peripheries. The cores technologically advanced mainly set out the policies of world development. The peripheries face a restrained choice to frame a policy of their development. They are reduced to merely a group of raw-material producing states with no say in economic matters. They are compelled by their position in the system to follow the policies laid down by the developed west.¹⁴ In such a view, international politics is seen as of that specific relations among nations which is of asymmetrical dependence, exploitation, dominance and inequality. Most of the neo-Marxists, thus, are occupied with a different problematic from the classicists in international politics (their problematic is of exploitation, inequality in the international level). Thus, they will question the relevance of the classical approach in which international politics is viewed as purely of power-politics. However, a view of power can be derived from the theoretical formulation of neo-Marxism. It can be derived from its view of seeing

14. Most of the neo-Marxists like Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Immanuel Wallerstein, Paul Baran etc. hold such a view.

the world as a single system of capitalism, the characteris of which is unequal exchange between nations. The relations among nations is of an unequal relationship, where the core countries of capitalism enjoy a superior power-position in relation to the peripheries.

International politics is purely a machination of the capitalist countries or at best bears a competition among the core countries of capitalism for superior power position. The power of England upto the early 20th century from late 18th century, or of US after the second world war, or that of competition between USA and USSR after the 50's, are explainable within this broader framework of capitalist world economy. One wonders, how will neo-Marxim, explain the practice of socialism in the world which is no more an oppositional doctrine. Many countries, (as Wallerstein himself admits that at present one third of the globe are socialist countries) practise socialism in the present day international politics and they are quite developed. Hence, an analysis of the socialist countires is essential. To this the neo-Marxist will reply by saying that 'socialism' functions within the capitalist world economy and its purpose remains defeated until and unless there has been a world socialist system.¹⁵

15. Wallerstein, op. cit., p.113.

But, one feels, in the absence of an analysis, as to the practices of socialist countries in the international politics, the neo-Marxist approach can give only a limited account of international relations.

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CHAPTER - IV

"A COMPARISON OF THE THEORIES AND A POSSIBLE
WAY TO DEMARCATATE A POWER-RELATION"

In this chapter, we will attempt at a possible definition of power. In this attempt, we may not be mistaken for giving an altogether new paradigm of international politics. We will, rather, try and glean from the different theories in international politics, some common points as to the nature of international politics and relations among nations which can best be explained under the label 'power'. In other words, our attempt is purely an examination of the point as to what specifically is a power-relation. In our attempt we do not claim any distinctiveness as to a definition of 'power'. We may simply seek to substantiate an already held view and see its analytical efficiency as far as observable reality is concerned.

Before coming to power two related and persistent problems in social science need to be stated. One pertains to the question as to how far reality is intelligible. The other, more closely related to the first, is the scientificity

of theories about reality.¹

Regarding reality debates stretch over, reflecting the varied attitudes of scholars towards it. Thus to some reality is incomprehensible. The scholars here generally believe in the singularity of events in nature and hence in the impossibility of discovering any

1. The necessity of pointing out this seems relevant to our purpose for we believe that a concept is meaningful within reality. It does not exist independently of reality. In this sense the varied interpretations of reality become a problematique. In social science this has not gone unnoticed.

See, (i) Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970).

(ii) Dennis J.D. Sandoz, "subjectivity of theories and action in world society," in Michael Banks ed, conflict in World Society," (Wheatsheaf Books, LTD, Great Britain, 1984), pp. 39-54.

(iii) William E. Connolly, Ideology and Political Science, (Atherton Press, New York, 1967). Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

general law. Some believe that reality is partially intelligible. This is partial because of the incomplete way in which reality manifests itself. The scholars here will generally believe that in reality certain pattern can be discovered. Some events in reality can be seen to have inter-relations or at least share some common properties with one another. However, this group of scholars would not shed their scepticism if reality unfolds completely before man. Many aspects of reality are bound to remain hidden to man. The other aspect of reality pertains to its total intelligibility. Scholars here generally believe that the universe is ordered; is rational ; can be understood through the rational hypotheses in human mind. In reality certain general laws can be discovered so as to enable explanation, interpretation or prediction of a particular phenomenon.²

2. These three positions are stated by V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank.

See, V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations,

(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980), pp.1-11.

Against this there is another position on reality which will point out that reality is something "a stable given."³ This becomes a problematique when we raise a question, 'why interpretation about the same reality or the same world then vary?' This raises particularly the scientificity of theories about reality. We will agree with many writers in saying that there is as such nothing absolute about scientificity.⁴ Scientific truths in the sense of pure physical sciences are relative. They are relative to the very claim to scientificity. They are also relative to the systems of values and beliefs in the researcher's mind that he brings upon an understanding of reality. Thus a realist in international politics will emphasize the conflictual aspects in relations between nations which will preempt him to say that

3. This is the position of Descartes on reality.

See, Sandole, op.cit., pp. 39-42.

4. For details see, Thomas Kuhn, op.cit.,

Chapter III to Chapter IX.

human nature is evil. While doing this one does not say that the realist's analysis is irrelevant to reality. The reality before the realist, as we know, is of two world wars and subsequently the cold war between the super powers. This will predispose him to make a conclusion that security threats in international politics are permanent and that nations have to meet with it effectively in guiding their mutual relations. But the realist forgets one important point, that is, the coexistence of nations. The efforts of one nation to increase its defence leads to another country's defence preparedness, for the former acts as an offensive to the latter and vice-versa.⁵ In the end what happens is that conflicts are only perpetuated in reality.

The globalist, on the other hand, will have other preferences in his mind. He will notice both the fact of conflict and cooperation in human existence. But the belief, as to the futility of conflicts, will incite him to emphasise that it is better men and nations shun conflicts for that is antagonistic to the real interests of humanity i.e. survival. Here, however, the reality for a globalist has not changed substantially from that of a realist. It is true that the globalist is correct in recognising the increasing growth of

5. Sandole, op.cit., pp. 42-44.

interdependence among nations and the globalness of problems which can be solved only by concerted efforts of all together. But while saying this the difference is not much of reality, as of emphasizing a particular aspect in reality more and above all, superimposing a belief that a gradual consciousness of the cooperative aspect of existence will heal the world of much of its problems.

This aspect of varying interpretations of reality, we feel, still persists and will continue to persist as a problematique. This is more so, because the researcher is himself a product of society. Certain social influences get internalised within him in the very process of existence which predispose the researcher to explain reality in a particular way.⁶ Thus the realist in defending realism is just defending a particular belief. The belief pertains to the security threats to USA.⁷

6. See, Connolly, op.cit., Chap.1 and Chap. 2.

7. Kehone and Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Little , Brown and Company, Inc. Boston, USA,1977), p.6.

It is anticipated in the two world wars and subsequently in the period of cold war. This can also be presenting a particular belief to establish US superiority and dominance in world politics and meeting at all efforts to keep off the presumed socialist threat in form of Soviet union and its increasing alliance.

Similar **is** the case with the globalist. He is aptly noticing the evolution of the globe towards more interdependence among its units in the economic , technological and ecological sphere. But while doing this he is merely stating so without taking into cognisance the subtelties in the very relationship of dependence among nations. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S Nye says, " Vulnerability is particularly important for understanding the political structure of interdependence relationships."⁸ Keohane and Nye will distinguish between two kinds of interdependence relationship. They are of sensitive dependnece and vulnerable dependence.⁹

8. Ibid., p.15.

9. Ibid., pp.11-19

All cases of dependence are sensitive in the sense that any external change in a relationship sends ripple through the other dependent country. For example, price-hike by OPEC countries in 1971, 1973-74 and 75 which caused disadvantage to all the oil importing countries.¹⁰

All the oil importing countries remained sensitive to such an external change. But some countries, for example, USA could implement alternative policies (this ranges from reducing oil consumption in the domestic sphere to find out and increase domestic oil production) to meet with such a crisis. Whereas Japan could not make any alternative policy changes, hence, remained more sensitive.¹¹ In other words, sensitive dependence will refer to the immediate costs of dependence to any country due to some external change before actual policy changes were made to meet with this. Vulnerable dependence on the other hand, refers to the costs of suffering dependence in case of external change whether policy changes are already effected or not. Hence, under the Bretton Woods monetary regime during the late 1960s, both the United States and Great Britain were sensitive

10. Ibid., p.12.

11. Ibid., p.12.

to decisions by foreign speculators or central banks to shift assets out of dollars or sterling, respectively . But the United States was less vulnerable than Britain because it had the option(which it exercised in August,1971) of changing the rules of the system at what it considered tolerable costs. The underlying capabilities of the United States reduced its vulnerability and therefore made its sensitivity less serious politically.¹²

Thus dependence involves costs and disadvantages. In one case the disadvantages can be met with alternative policies, whereas in the other the dependent country is bound to suffer. The purpose of saying all this is to bring out the socio-political and economic costs of any interdependent relationship. In the modern world what one notices more , unlike a globalist, is assymetric dependence between nations. The history of development of nations clearly points out a single fact. The fact is of uneven development of one part of the globe(here one can speak of the Western World) and that too at the expense and exploitation of the other nations. In dependence relationships, it is the Western developed capitalist countries that enjoy an upperhand in dictating the terms and policies of development for the other non-Western countries. What

12. Ibid., p.13.

happens in the end, is that, most of the non-Western societies remain vulnerable to such dependence. They suffer such dependence. The Neo-Marxists are right in pointing out that in a world capitalist system, it is the developing and underdeveloped countries that suffer. They suffer because of the very logic and philosophy of capitalism of on unequal development. The globalist, thus, superficially adumbrates a view that increasing interdependence leads to cooperation among nations and operates against national barriers for a global order. But what sort of global order? The globalist does not give answers to what shape a global order will take. His superficial reckoning of increasing cooperation among nations without seeing its internal mechanisms conceals the most important aspect, without which a global order is simply impossible to think of. This aspect presents the parochial interests of the developed west towards the non-western underdeveloped countries. The globalist notices cooperation as something positive, as something bearing the real interests of nations, without seeing to what extent an asymmetrical cooperation with so many internal inconsistencies can bear positive results. In the absence of this, the globalist's assertion becomes only a hope. It presents the futility of his

belief that more cooperation among nations will usher in a better world, a more peaceful world. In the end, it boils down to a single point. This can be that, whatever is existing, is perfect, is just and only men's realisation of this can bring in a better world.

The purpose of saying all this is to assert the ideological under currents in the researcher's approaches to reality. The researcher approaches reality with a system of beliefs and values in his mind having reference to a cross-section of equal-minded groups which predispose him to explain reality in a particular way. In other words interpretations about reality will tend to vary and they are bound to remain relative. We do not intend to go deeper into this aspect, for we believe that this problem will persist and debates among writers on this question will remain unending. Ideological dimension of the researcher will continue to have "central significance in contemporary political inquiry."¹³ "Whether we are scientists, politicians or lay persons, inference is involved at all stages of the perceptual process and not just at the levels of explanation and interpretation. To perceive anything at all there

13. Connolly, op. cit., Preface, p.VII.

must first be some corresponding theory , model hypothesis or concept among our beliefs and values. Without these constructs, nothing can be identified; without them, we can not have perceptions. So, there are no 'givens , 'no facts', except in terms of the meanings provided by these constructs.¹⁴ Keeping all this in mind, it will be very difficult to say in the so-called assertion of scientificity and objectivity, if social science research can be free of ideological undercurrents. Even the claim 'of scientific', itself has a carefully hidden ideological bias.¹⁵ "Only by keeping ideologies and the different value systems in mind can we hope

14. Sandole, op.cit., p.42

15. It will be worthwhile to quote Kubalkova and Cruickshank here. They say, "But does not the fact of trying so hard to ignore ideologies in the name of science itself reveal a carefully hidden ideological bias?"
Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op.cit., Preface, p. XI.

to set up a meaningful theory of social phenomena."¹⁶

In our understanding of reality, we will like to bear this in mind before proceeding to know how far reality is intelligible. We won't dispense with certain bias in mind as being the product of society and certain social influences. At the sametime we do not intend to get lost over the debates in reality, for that will be surely sceptical of us as dismissing all acquired human knowledge, or else to think that human knowledge of reality is altogether impossible. What we will see is, if and how a meaningful way to understand reality and particularly international politics is possible.

Keeping in mind the three positions on reality (stated in the beginning of this chapter) we will feel in line with the third position that reality is intelligible or to put it in other words a meaningful social theory is possible.¹⁷

16. Ibid., p.11.

17. This position on the general intelligibility of reality can be attributable to Marxism.

On reality, certain of its important aspects can be noted to enable a meaningful understanding. Reality is not something fixed, something not immutable. "It is in constant movement, change and development!"¹⁸ This is evident in the history of development of reality. A uniform law is internal to the development of nature and subsequently of 'history and thought'.¹⁹ The law presents the 'internal necessity' of reality; the internal necessity in the form of development of reality as well as in the form of interconnectedness between objects and phenomena in reality. The law exists objectively, although independently of human consciousness. At the same time it is discernible to human reason and man does employ this in his practical

18. V.G. Afanasyev, Marxist Philosophy, (Moscow, 1980), p.71.

19. Kubalkova and Criuickshank, op.cit., p.27.

activity.²⁰

Keeping such an account of reality a meaningful theory of international politics is possible, around discovering certain general and uniform laws in its development. In international politics, as we feel, a general law has to be accounted for in the emergence of modern nation states for a meaningful understanding.

Before dealing with this, let us see a general pattern²¹ that can be deciphered from the major theories

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20. This can be broadly the Marxist notion of explaining reality and society through dialectical materialism and historical materialism. See,
- i. Ibid., Chap. 1 and Chap. 2.
 - ii. Afanasyev, op.cit., Chap V and Chap. IX.
 - iii. Yuri Popv, Essays in Political Economy : Imperialism and the developing countries , (Moscow, 1984), pp. 5-34.
21. Michael Banks, for example, will say that all theories in international politics 'together hold out the promise of forming a pattern.' Banks, op.cit., p. XII.

in international politics as to its nature which can give us some inkling in that light to an assertion about the general law of development in international politics. Two points of relevance for us, in this general pattern are noticeable. One pertains to an 'Euro-centric' view of the world expressed in two broad variants, nonetheless expressing this common attitude of Euro-centrism. One way of expression makes an explicit assumption in this regard by attributing to a classical account of international politics. This sees the development of the system of international politics as it emerged in Europe in the beginning of modern times and got replicated over other continents. To this the European character of the emergence of states-system is fundamental and enduring.²²

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22. See, Martin Wight, Power Politics, (Penguin Books, London, 1986). Martin Wight's work gives a classical account of international politics. See, the introduction by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad in Martin Wight, op. cit., pp. 9-22.

In a different way, this view gets expressed by many scholars in pointing to the hitherto the Western intellectual domination in the bulk of the academic circle of international politics. "International theory has so far been an almost exclusively West-European, American and Australasian Enterprise."²³

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23. Kubalkova and Cruickshank, op.cit., Preface, p. X. Such a view can be found among many scholars. Natural, although, it seems from the non-west, in the western academic circle such a view is very often made.
- See, (i) Wight, op.cit., pp.9-14.
- (ii) Banks, ed., op.cit., p.5
- (iii) William Zimmerman, Soviet perspectives on International Relations; 1956-1967. (Princeton, 1973), p.25.
- (iv) E.H. Carr, Twenty year crisis:1919-39. (Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1939), p.29.

The other relevant point is the unevenness of the globe both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Besides size, territory, population and its composition, natural resources, this ^{can} also mean the unequal economic development of nations. Some theories ²⁴ make an explicit reference to the fact of unequal economic development of the world. In some other theories, though an explicit assertion of this point is not made, an imputation of this aspect is possible in a variant way. To a realist and especially Morgenthau national interest means national power and an aggrandisement of it despite resistance from other nations. Further it is a means in nation's goal seeking and prosperity. The setting in which Morgenthau writes (that is the period of continuing Second World War and subsequently the cold war) makes one to think, besides Morgenthau's

24. Here one can bear in mind the theoretical exposition of the 'Global order approach', the 'Dependency theory' and the 'World Capitalist System Theory'.

persuasive support to United States' supremacy (threatened in the form of newly liberated countries pursuing a foreign policy of their own and the increasing alliance in the socialist bloc) another point of importance which he conceals or to which he does not make a reference at all. What we intend to say is besides the U.S. interests (which Morgenthau is directly attributing to in his analysis) at that time it will also speak of another point of interest. It pertains to the anguish of the newly liberated countries (who are primarily underdeveloped). In other words if Morgenthau is not taking this aspect of reality into consideration, then his assertion of 'taking reality as it is' for making a meaningful understanding of it becomes ineffective. In other words, the presumed threat to US is not purely 'military and security' threats as Morgenthau feels. The threat is more of a substantial nature. One can think in the light of Neo-Marxist analysis that this threat may be speaking of the interests of the underdeveloped countries, whose underdevelopment has been so far due to their subjugation to colonialism or to broadly the capitalist countries' interests. And this sounds more threatening in the growing alliance in the Socialist bloc, which received world-wide

attention through its propaganda ^{to} /upturn capitalism.

On the other hand, the globalists and the neo-marxists will see more explicitly the unequal economic development of the world. To them, it is pronounced in both theoretical and practical grounds. The globalists see it deducible to the evils of industrialisation . They will notice the discrepancies between the developed west and the underdeveloped nations. However, they would not examine the causes of underdevelopment as possibly due to the practices and policies of the developed nations.

The neo-Marxists will primarily occupy themselves with this and they see it historically and logically lying within the world capitalist system. To them, Global economic unevenness is due to structural dependence within the world capitalist system.

The fact of unequal economic development of the world can be seen more buttressed within the rise of modern nation -state system wherein a certain economic argument can be made in its emergence. The rise of modern nation-state system can be seen in history in the development and emergence of a middle-class economically based in trade and commerce.²⁵

25. E.H. Carr, op.cit., pp. 145-6.

The political supremacy of Italy during the Renaissance period is due to its prosperity in trade and industry. In 19th century, Britain's political supremacy is largely attributable to its being the financial centre of the world. USA's prominence as a political power is due to its role as a lender to both the countries of Latin America and Asia.²⁶ The purpose of saying all this is to drive home the point of the Eurocentricism of the nation-state system, associated with a certain level of economic development (that is capitalism) in the region, subsequently leading to the subjugation of other countries as a necessity for the further development of capitalism (what Lenin means by saying that imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism). This is reflected in the capitalist countries search for new markets, cheap labour force and raw material. By assuring the development of the colonised countries they perpetuated underdevelopment. Our purpose of saying this is not strictly to examine the factors

26. These points are from E.H. Carr, op.cit., pp.113-164.

of underdevelopment, rather to assert that any meaningful analysis of relations among nations (with which we are concerned in explaining power) would not be possible without noticing this unequal economic development of the world which has been a fact in the history of development of nations. Thus while seeing relations among nations we do not have equal nations, (in economic terms and hence in military and strategic terms also) bound in a more equal relationship with one another. The underdeveloped countries are more at a disadvantage in their relations with the developed countries, and especially capitalist countries. The relationship particular between them has to be of assymetric dependence ²⁷ and as Keohane and Nye says, of vulnerable dependence.

27. The Neo-Marxists occupy themselves with examination of **structural** dependence within the Capitalist System.

TOWARDS A CONCEPT OF POWER

'Power' as a political relation between nations has to be seen in this particular perspective as far as its analytical efficiency to explain observable reality in international politics is concerned. We will visualise three aspects in relationships among nations that can be seen in the present day international level. At the one end, we have the relations between the developed and the underdeveloped, while on the other we have the relations among the developed themselves as well as between the two Super-powers. In between, we can juxtapose the developing countries. 28

Taking the first, we can brand this relationship as a typical case of exercise of political power of the developed over that of the underdeveloped. Here

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28. This categorisation will come closer to the Neo-Marxian category of core, peripheries and semi-peripheries. See, Immanuel Wallerstein, "The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts for comparative analysis" in Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz, ed, Toward a just world order, Vol. I, (West view press, Inc., USA, 1982), p.124.

'power' will be of all power to the former and nothing to the latter.²⁹ This is due to the structural position of the latter in the world capitalist system, where its action-alternatives are mainly determined within the system. The latter is at a disadvantage due to its comparatively inadequate economic development. This is evident in the history of development of capitalism. Capitalism developed in few west European countries initially and gradually spread over to other parts of the world, by its necessity for development. The spread of capitalism was not an outcome of capitalist activity all over the world. On the other hand it spread out of the interests of the metropolitan centres of capitalism to meet their own interests. In the process of its expansion what resulted in was the subjugation of the other countries of the world those were, remote to capitalism. The underdeveloped countries lack a freedom of choice as to pursue their course of development. They remain structurally dependent upon the developed west. It is the latter that guides the course of development

29. Jon Elster identifies this as the typical Marxian notion of power. See, Jon Elster, "Some conceptual problems in political theory," in Brian Barry, ed., Power and Political Theory, (London, New York, Sydney, Toronto), pp 249-254.


in the underdeveloped countries in its own interest. In the end it is the developed west that enjoy power over the underdeveloped countries. Here power will mean a specific relationship between two actors where one determines or fixes or changes the action alternatives of the other actor.³⁰ One can think of a slightly variant example here. This pertains to the Indo-US agreement on the computer deal. Some newspapers in India stated that USA might have refused to give India the sophisticated Cray XMP-24 computers because India does not follow US wishes. Of course, India may not be strictly branded as an underdeveloped country. But this may speak of the developed west's attitude towards the non-western countries. Similar will be also the case of relation between the developed and developing countries where the latter

30. This is taken from R.J. Mokken and F.N. Stokman. See, R.J. Mokken and F.N. Stokman, "Power and Influence as political phenomena," in Brian Barry, ed, op.cit., pp. 33-54.

is subjected to the indirect control of the former. The Neo-Marxists will best explain this by equating the developing countries with the semi-peripheries in the world capitalist system. Without them, the world capitalist system would be hardly stable. In fact, it would have disintegrated faced with the organised opposition of a larger stratum. This does not happen because the semi-periphery functions as an exploiter as well as the exploited. It is exploited by the upper-stratum, that is the developed. The developed countries by giving the developing countries limited access to the surplus buys off their support. But the 'developed' takes all steps of confiscatory measures towards the developing when their economic profits have become swollen to create for themselves a military strength. By this they control them.³¹ On the other hand, the developing

31. Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 126-128.

nations do get the opportunity to exploit the peripheries thereby ensuring the homogenisation of superiority of the core.



However, such a definition of power becomes a problematique when it comes to the relations between the capitalist countries on the one hand and the Socialist countries on the other. This becomes a problem because the socialist countries are equally developed to have dependence on the west. On the other hand both are based upon discordant ideologies. The relationship between them can be best explained within the label 'influence'. Both determine partly the actions or choices of other within the set of action or choice alternatives available to each other.³² Here one can think of superpowers' rivalry so far as arms race between the two are concerned. In 1945 USA went nuclear. As a reaction in 1949 USSR went nuclear. In 1952 both became thermonuclear powers and produced hydrogen bombs.³³ Similarly,

32. See Mokken and Stokman, op.cit., pp. 36-39 and pp 46-51.

33. See Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament,

is the US programme of star wars, which is a reaction to the Soviet ICBM superiority.

However, in such an analysis of power and influence what is excluded is the relationship among the socialist countries as well as between them and other underdeveloped countries. In this sense, this view of power lacks its general applicability. The relations among the socialist countries and their relations with the underdeveloped countries, are as we feel necessary for a total theory of power. In the relations of the Socialist countries to that of the third world countries, one important point of the former has to be noted. It pertains to its professed belief of socialism and corollary to this, the task of bringing about 'world socialism'. One can think here of its support to the liberation movement of the newly liberated countries. Further its propaganda is that the misery of the underdeveloped countries is due to their earlier subjugation to colonialism i.e. the capitalist countries' interests. At least this may speak for an insinuation of a good reciprocal relations between socialist and other developed countries. Here, however, some anomalies are to be noted. Take for example, the sino-Indian relations. Recently, it

was alleged in some of the newspapers in India that China had deployed ninety missiles along the western and eastern Himalayan border aimed at India.³⁴ In sino-Indian relations , the border issue stands out primary without which a good relationship between the two is impossible to think of. But at the same time, the deployment of missiles of China, a Socialist country, may point to its aggressive attitude towards India. Here , one may bear in mind the sino-Indian war in history of their relations. Hence, in our exclusion of the socialist countries , we will bear in mind the partial nature of such a view of power.

34. Times of India, 12th July, 1987.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, what we have been doing in our analysis of power in international politics, the following points can be mentioned. Like in ordinary social life, in the reality of international politics, states are bound up with one another in some sort of relation. Like that of human society, the relations among states are of varied nature. Besides a relation involving power, the relations among states can be of influence, persuasion, suggestion, advice etc. Each of this aspect of relation has a certain characteristic property by which they are distinguishable from one another. Thus power and influence though, are interchangeably used in political science (can be noticed among many writers), are different from each other. Both involve a relation between two actors or a group of actors. But, in one case (i.e. of power) one actor is not free, as not to adopt to the policies and directions of the other actor (i.e. the power-holder). In the other case (i.e. of influence) both the actors can determine or change the action-alternatives of the other actor within the sets of action-alternatives available without directly affecting the other actors freedom. The purpose behind saying this is to bring out the difference of 'power' from other political relations and to see what specific relation power carries in it. In international politics we have

tried to study the specific relation among states that can be grouped under the level power. In doing so we have taken two valid arguments from the theories in international politics. One is the Euro-Centric nature of the emergence of the nation-state system, in which one can account for a western dominance in international politics. Other, through a study of unequal economic development of states and the factors giving rise to it, one can possibly get an insight into the general nature of relation among states. On the basis of such an analysis we have tried to understand the possible nature of relations among nations that can be explained through 'power'. However, in our view, it can not be a general theory of power in not explaining the relations among the socialist countries. In this sense, we keep in mind the limited nature of our analysis in so far as a general theory of power can be accounted for.

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