

REFUGEE PROBLEM IN AFRICA

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DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled
"REFUGEE PROBLEM IN AFRICA" submitted by
RENU MODI in partial fulfilment of six credits out
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is her original work according to the best of my
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PREFACE

P_R_E_F_A_C_E

The problem of refugees is global. What makes the problem acute is that the refugees have in most cases sought asylum in countries that are among the least developed in the world. The magnitude of the problem is striking in the case of Africa which has more refugees than any other continent. Here, there are some five million refugees in all. Somalia and Sudan, the worst affected States, have 10,000,000 and 70,000 refugees respectively.¹ The African countries have shown a hospitable record in receiving the refugees. The fragile economy of the African States is unable to bear the burden and therefore the need for urgent international action.

The purpose of my study is to analyse the nature of the refugee problem in Africa. While the area affected is Africa, the concern it evokes should indeed be global. Concerted efforts by international agencies, voluntary organizations and individual countries should continue on a regular basis to alleviate the refugee problem in Africa.

¹ International Conference on Assistance to Refugees, (ICARA) Report, UN Doc. A/C.106/1, 9-10 April (Geneva, 1981), p. 4.

The introductory chapter deals with a brief definition of who constitutes a refugee. It analyses the causes of the refugee problem in Africa. The second chapter deals with the problem of the host countries due to the constant influx of refugees. The following chapter looks into the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its efforts to solve the problem. The fourth chapter elaborates upon the international response to the refugee problem in Africa. The major international actor for the protection and assistance to refugees is the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The concluding chapter presents a summary of the findings.

The work is based on primary and secondary source material. Primary sources include publications such as the UNHCR reports, the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) reports, the Africa Research Bulletin and the Africa, South of Sahara. Secondary source material includes articles from journals like the International Migration Review, Africa Report, Africa Today etc.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to my guide Professor Anirudha Gupta,

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Date: 21 July 1988.

Renu Modi
RENU MODI

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CERTIFICATE

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CHAPTER I

CHAPTER I

REFUGEE PROBLEM - AN OVERVIEW

An analysis of the refugee problem calls for a definition of who constitutes a refugee. Since this dissertation deals with Africa, let us start from the definition adopted in 1969 by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).¹

"The term refugee is applied to any person who reasonably fearing persecution on account of his race, his religion, his nationality, his membership of a social group or his political opinions is outside the country of which he has the nationality but cannot, or will not, because of this fear, claim its protection. It also applies to any person who, possessing no nationality and being outside the country in which because of such events, cannot or will not (because of fear of persecution) return there.


The term refugee is also applied to any person who, following an aggression, the occupation of exploitation

¹ Article I of the 1969, OAU Convention on the Status of Refugees in Africa. CIMADE-INODEP-MINK, Africa's Refugee Crisis, What's to be Done (Zed Publication, 1986), pp. 112-13.

by a foreign power, or other events which seriously disturb public order in a part or the whole of his native country or the country of which he possesses the nationality, is obliged to leave his usual dwelling to seek refuge in another place outside the country of which he is a citizen."

In short, refugees can be defined as persons whose presence abroad is attributable to well founded fear of violence - which may be initiated by some internal agent, such as the government, and directed at specified target groups. Violence could arise out of a social conflict that fosters refugee movements. Such a conflict could arise in the event of an abrupt change of regime. In fact there are a multitude of factors including internal conflict, racist domination, oppressive governments, foreign invasion and natural disasters which cause massive displacements. A permanent solution requires an elimination of the causes and therefore the initial phase of the study will focus upon an analysis of the causative factors.

First, there are the refugees due to civil conflicts. Civil conflicts in Ethiopia, Chad, Angola, Zaire, Sudan, Burundi and Nigeria have caused people to leave their country of origin. The Horn region has the largest number of refugees in Africa. The cause of this problem is to be



CEUTA MELILLA

Tunis Algiers

MOROCCO Rabat

ALGERIA

WESTERN SAHARA

MAURITANIA

SENEGAL Dakar

THE GAMBIA Banjul

GUINEA BISSAU Bissau

SIERRA LEONE Freetown

LIBERIA

GUINEA Conakry

IVORY COAST Abidjan

GHANA Accra

TOGO Lome

EQUATORIAL GUINEA Malabo

SAO TOME E PRINCIPE

CAMEROON Yaounde

GABON Libreville

CONGO Brazzaville

ANGOLA Luanda

ZAMBIA Lusaka

NAMIBIA Windhoek

BOTSWANA Gaborone

SOUTH AFRICA

LESOTHO Maseru

SWAZILAND Mbabane

MAURITIUS

MADAGASCAR REUNION

YORK

Tripoli Benghazi

LIBYA

EGYPT Cairo

Upper Volta Ougadougou

NIGER

CHAD

Nigeria Porto Novo

Central African Republic Bangui

Yemen Aden

SUDAN Khartoum

ETHIOPIA Addis Ababa

DJIBOUTI Djibouti

SOMALIA Mogadishu

UGANDA Kampala

RWANDA Kigali

BURUNDI Bujumbura

TANZANIA Dar es Salaam

ZANZIBAR

SEYCHELLES Victoria

MORONI COMORO IS

LILONGWE MALAWI

MOZAMBIQUE

Maputo

SAO PAULO

MASERU

sought at the political level. The principal factors which provoke large movements of people are violation of human rights, political and military conflicts within a country, tribal and religious repression, frontier disputes and armed conflicts between neighbouring states; rivalry between the super powers and regional powers, natural calamities and economic crises. All these factors exist in the Horn of Africa.²

This brings up the question as to why Ethiopia has spawned more refugees than anywhere else in the world. An answer to this can be found in what may be termed as competitive nation formation. "This occurs when the national model adopted is such that the objectives it entails cannot be achieved except by violating the integrity of another state. A first instance of competitive nation formation is separatism, i.e., when an ethnic minority usually concentrated within a particular territorial space seeks to establish a state of its own in defiance of the larger entity. A second, is irredentism, i.e. when a state tries to incorporate under its jurisdiction an ethnically cognate group, that is presently under the jurisdiction of another state. This

2 CIMADE-INODEP-MINK, *ibid.*, p. 86.

usually involves conflict between the few states over the territory inhabited by the group in question. The two processes sometimes occur in complementary fashion within a given situation."³ [e.g. Ogaden⁴ to Eritrean⁵ separatism within Ethiopia and Somalian irredentism in relation to the Ogaden.]⁷

In the Horn refugees have always been a one way movement. The people of the Ogaden region form the largest

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- 3 Aristide Zolberg, "International Factors in Formation of Refugee Movements", International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 1986, p. 163.
- 4 The Ogaden area is in South Eastern Ethiopia. It is inhabited by the Somali speakers. The Somalis demanded the decolonization of the area, arguing that the area had been colonized when conquered by the Ethiopians in the late nineteenth century. For Ethiopia the issue was and remains that of undefined borders which Somalia refuses to accept. Border clashes have continued over the sixties. In 1964 the OAU ceasefire was accepted, but the clashes continued. Somalia continues to give support to the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) operating inside Ethiopia for the liberation of the Ogaden. Africa South and Sahara (Europa Publications, 1987), p. 424.
- 5 Eritrea is Ethiopia's northern province. Sudan has maintained its support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), especially after 1976 when President Nimeri of Sudan accused Ethiopia of assisting an attempted coup in July 1976. The Sudanese government allowed Eritrean guerrillas base facilities inside Sudan. Relations between Sudan and Ethiopia did appear likely to improve after Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Meriam met Lt. General-Swar-al Dahab, the Sudanese head of State in January 1986. Sudan pronounced that it regarded the dispute over Eritrea as an internal Ethiopian problem. Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 426.

section of the refugee population in Somalia. By the new constitution of 1979, Somalia gave up its claims at least on paper to Ethiopia's Ogaden region. But in reality the idea of a greater Somalia remains. The Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) is fighting for the independence of the Ogaden region from Ethiopian domination. 'Thereafter the WSLF maintained guerrilla campaigns against the Ethiopians, resultingⁱⁿ a large number of refugees streaming into Somalia'.⁶

In 1986, Col. Mengistu Haile Merian of Ethiopia and President Siad Barre agreed to set up a joint committee to explore the solution to the border problem and to the issue of self-determination to the Somalis.⁷

The country with the most to gain from any agreement would be Djibouti which has been most unfortunately situated in this confrontation. Due to the 1977-78 Somalia-Ethiopia war 30,000 refugees poured into Djibouti.⁸

6 Ray Vanita, "African Refugees - An Analysis", India Quarterly, vol. 46, no. 2, April-July 1984, p. 193.

7 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 426.

8 Voluntary repatriation under the UNHCR report was started in 1983. 15,000 refugees did return to Ethiopia under UNHCR scheme, but the rest continue to stay in Djibouti. Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 424.

In Ethiopia there are several regional/ethnic movements - Eritrea,⁹ Tigre¹⁰ and Afars,¹¹ pressing for freedom from Amhara hegemony, through rebellions and traditional guerrilla hit and run tactics. The Ethiopian state has countered the separatist movements by repression. This creates a refugee situation. There are a number of Eritreans in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan. At the start of 1978 the number of refugees registered in Somali camps was 80,000. By 1981 it has touched the one million mark. Additional Ogaden refugees live in Somali villages, where they have been taken in by their clansmen.¹²

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- 9 In Eritrea a series of Ethiopian offensive including the large scale 'Operation Red Star' in 1982 have failed to dislodge the liberation front. Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 51.
- 10 The Tigre province is south of Eritrea. The Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) came into prominence when the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) decided to arm and train it. In 1985 a split occurred between the EPLF and TPLF. This has weakened the TPLF. In 1985 a large number of TPLF members were driven out into Somalia, Kenya and Sudan. Ibid., p. 426.
- 11 The Afars are an ethnic group of the Eastern desert in Ethiopia. In 1975 after an unsuccessful revolt led by their traditional ruler, ex Sultan Ali-Mirah, an Afar Liberation Front was set up. It split into two sections. The more progressive faction calls itself the Afar National Liberation Front (ANLF). This section has been pressing for regional autonomy of the eastern desert region. Ibid., p. 426.
- 12 Ray Vanita, op. cit., p. 192.

Apart from border clashes and incursions leading to refugee migrations, this part of Africa also suffers from famines which have dislocated large sections of the population.

In the states neighbouring the Sahara, the refugee exodus is largely due to inter-ethnic rivalries. Inter-ethnic disputes are due to the artificial boundaries imposed upon the African states.

The boundaries of most African States are artificial, owing to the partitioning of the continent by the colonial powers in the nineteenth century. The political boundaries have been drawn without keeping in mind the ethnic boundaries, i.e., the two do not coincide. Rival ethnic groups were placed together in a single nation State¹³ or major ethnic groups were divided¹⁴ and placed in several different States. The conditions for a civil war had already

13 For example, in Rwanda and Burundi, the Tutsi and the Hutus, two diverse ethnic groups have been placed together. This has been the cause of the serious tribal strife between the Hutus and the Tutsi's in the two States.

14 For example, the Somali speaking people have been placed in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The secessionist movement led by the Western Somalian Liberation Front (WSLF) for the liberation of Somali speaking Ogaden region from Ethiopia has caused a large number of refugees. Somalian irredentism is symbolized by the five pointed star on its flag. Somalia's irredentist claims to the above mentioned territories is on the basis of ethnic homogeneity.



been created at the time of independence. Such wars have been the major cause of refugees in Africa. Thus the legacy of colonial rule still weighs heavily on the African continent. The civil wars in Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Rwanda and Burundi are illustrations to support the above mentioned point.

In Sudan a civil war has intermittently flared up since independence between the Islamic Northern Sudan and the non-Islamic Southern Sudan. In 1972 the civil war was suspended temporarily by the Addis Ababa agreement.¹⁵ The members of the Anya Anya¹⁶ guerrilla army were integrated into the regular Sudanese forces. In 1983 armed conflict flared up again over the issue of regional autonomy to the Southern Sudan. The military government of Lt. Gen. Abdul Rehman Swar-al-Dahab which came to power in 1985 has failed to reach an accommodation with the SPLF, allowing the country to drift further into civil and political disorder.¹⁷ Due to

15 The Addis Ababa agreement gave the South a degree of regional autonomy within the framework of national identity.

16 The rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Front (SPLF) had formed the Anya Anya guerrilla army to achieve regional autonomy for Southern Sudan.

17 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 49.

the civil war in Sudan thousands of refugees from that conflict continue to live in Ethiopia. According to the ICARA reports there are about 11,000 refugees of Sudanese origin¹⁸ who have been living in the Gambella and the Ganduar refugee camps in Ethiopia.¹⁸

In Chad religious/ethnic difference between the North and the South has been the major cause of the civil war since independence. The North is predominantly Islamic and the people are mostly Arabs. The major tribe of the North is that of the Tobou.¹⁹

The South has about ten major ethnic groups - the Sara, the Goulaye, Mouroum, Doba, Ngambaye, Kaba, Ngama Mbaye, Gor and the Nar.²⁰ A large proportion of the population belongs to the Sara tribe. The people of the South are Christians and more literate.

By contrast the North has shown a certain reluctance towards education. As a result the bulk of the civil servants who were recruited after independence in August 1960 were from the South. Similarly the majority of the army

18 ICARA Report, "The refugee situation in Africa; Assistance measures proposed", UNHCR (Geneva), A/CONF 106/1, 1981, p. 26.

19 Ray Vanita, op. cit., p. 188.

20 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 352.

officers were from the South, though the bulk of the army itself came from the North.

The Northerners have refused to accept a state dominated by Southern civil servants which represents the interests of the Sara tribe.²¹

The Frontde liberation national de Tchad (FROLINAT) was formed in 1966 by the Northerners in protest against the single political party of the Party progressiste tchadien (PPT) formed by President Tombalbaye, a Southerner.²²

The involvement of external powers in the country on behalf of different ethnic factions further complicates the problem. France²³ supported the Southerners but never decisively enough to put down the uprising. By 1979 the FROLINAT forces were strong enough to sweep through the country and seize the capital and government. Libya had since 1977 extended extensive aid to the FROLINAT. In 1980 the FROLINAT split into rival factions. Libya supported²⁴

21 Ibid., p. 352.

22 Ibid., p. 353.

23 France supported because it had an important military base in Fort Lamy (now N'Djamena).

24 Libya has a dual attraction in the country - access to the country's minerals and extending its influence to the Sahara.

the Goukounei Oueddi, against Hissen Habre's faction. But in June 1982 Hissen Habre with the help of Egypt and the USA²⁵ took over the capital N'Djamena and displaced Goukounei. Supported by Libya however in 1983, Goukounei recaptured the Northern part of the country. A stalemate resulted in the period between 1983-87 when the country remained partitioned between the two major factions of the FROLINAT and their external supporters.²⁶ In 1987 finally Goukounei's faction, supported by Libya, was defeated. Due to the frequent shifts in power some losers from each struggle fled into the Cameroon, Sudan and Nigeria.²⁷

In Nigeria, six years after independence the people of Ibo origin resented the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani from the North. After independence the majority recruits of the Nigerian army were from the North. The Ibos resented the Hausa Fulani dominance. A group of young army officers mostly of Ibo origin led a coup and succeeded. The government was handed over to Major General Ironsi, an Ibo. The Hausas were dissatisfied with Ibo dominance. In July 1966,

25 Egypt and USA supported Hissen Habre's faction motivated by their dislike for Quaddafi.

26 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 50.

27 Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa", Africa Today, 2nd quarter, 1982, p. 6.

the Northerners staged a military counter coup. Major General Ironsi was killed. Gowon, a Northerner (but not from the Hausa Fulani majority) was appointed the supreme Commander of the army.

The Ibos of the East then pressed for an independent Ibo State, styled the 'Republic of Biafra.'²⁸ Nigeria plunged into a bloody civil war from 1967 to 1970.

This conflict rendered many homeless and many refugees from this conflict still continue to live in exile in the neighbouring states. Thus we see that Nigerian civil war is yet another example of a conflict due to ethnic differences.

In Rwanda and Burundi too, rival ethnic groups were put together in a single state. Here too, like in Nigeria the boundaries of the post colonial state came into question.

In Rwanda, one year after independence tribal strife broke out between the Hutus and the Tutsi.. The Tutsi fled to neighbouring Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania.

In October 1982 Rwanda closed its borders with Uganda after an influx of 45,000 refugees, most of whom were Rwandan exiles fleeing Ugandan persecution during the

²⁸ Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 49.

regime of Milton Obote. Rwanda refused the entry of these refugees who were the Tutsi's who had fled Rwanda twenty years back during the civil strife.²⁹

In Burundi a violent clash took place between the Tutsi ruling elite and their Hutu subjects. Here the strife was resolved in favour of the former after the repression of the Hutus.

Such armed conflicts in the continent have led to massive movements of population. The number of refugees who had fled across national frontiers is estimated at 2.5 m - 5 m, accounting for roughly one half of all the refugees in the world.³⁰

✓ Second, there are the refugees due to liberation struggle. All the problems in the Southern African region are more or less a consequence of the regime of South Africa and the institutionalized policy of apartheid. The word itself means 'separateness'. The theory requires that each racial group should have a part of South Africa as a homeland in which it can develop its own culture. The native Africans have been discriminated against. The resident African populations have been forced into overcrowded reserves

29 Ibid., p. 49.

30 Ibid., p. 51.

designated as 'Bantu Homelands'. These homelands were developed as 'labour reserves' for industries situated in the white areas.³¹

The Africans resented to be thus discriminated against. Their resistance to apartheid took an organized form after the formation of the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan Africanist Conference (PAC). The struggle for liberation launched by these organizations is met with retaliatory action by the Pretoria regime.

South West Africa (Namibia) has been illegally controlled³² by South Africa. South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed in 1966. It has launched a guerrilla struggle for the independence of Namibia. The South African government claims that its neighbouring states harbour 'terrorists' of the liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) the Pan Africanist Congress

31 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 899.

32 Namibia a former German colony was placed under the administration of South Africa as a mandate territory by the League of Nations. The Trusteeship system came to an end after the First World War. The right to self-determination of the erstwhile mandated territories was recognized. But South Africa continued its illegal occupation of Namibia, despite international criticism at the United Nations.

(PAC) and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), who allegedly use their territories as launching pads for attacks inside South Africa.³³

Over the years there has been a continuing influx into neighbouring countries of political refugees from South Africa. Most of them have been members of either the ANC or the PAC. The tides of refugees from South Africa and Namibia (which is still illegally controlled by South Africa) move towards Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola. But these states cannot practise a policy of reception because they fear military attacks from South Africa.

With the moral and technological support of the Western countries, especially the United States under the Reagan administration South Africa is heavily armed.

South Africa destabilizes the region through military attacks. In 1983 Mozambique sustained two attacks by South African forces on alleged ANC bases. In Angola South Africa provided increasing support for the anti-government guerrilla movement, the UNITA.³⁵ In Zimbabwe, South Africa

33 Joe Molefi, "Few Safe havens for Apartheid Exiles", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 14. (Joe Molefi is a political refugee from South Africa who fled to Lesotho in 1961, after having been acquitted, alongwith 195 others on charge of treason. As a journalist he has reported for international press and radio.)

34 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 905.

35 Ibid.

was suspected of having helped to promote unrest and terrorist activity in Matabeleland.³⁶

"With its military and economic power it has smashed the liberation movements and intimidates the front-line states which support them. It has provided arms and logistical support to UNITA. In Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique it has supported dissident movements.³⁷ This erodes their determination to accept political refugees. South Africa is greatly preoccupied with what it terms 'a total onslaught' by Marxist forces who are seen to have a base in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa is not willing to countenance guerrilla presence in neighbouring black states - hence repeated South African Defence Forces (SADF) military attacks on SWAPO positions inside Angola and raids on ANC's refugee homes in Maputo and Maseru."³⁸

Besides military pressure, it also exerts economic pressure on the 'front-line' states. In Angola the Benguela Railways remains closed. With South African help UNITA has struck at economic targets in the North, including the

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., p. 48.

38 Joe Molefi, op. cit., p. 15.

diamond mines. The country's petroleum revenue has to be used for war rather than for development.³⁹

In Mozambique South Africa supports the anti-government guerrilla movement, the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (MNR, also known as Remano). The racist regime has cut the petroleum and rail links through Mozambique to Zimbabwe thus weakening the economies of both the countries.⁴⁰

The migrant labour of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland are dependent on South Africa for employment. Therefore they have yielded to pressure of the racist regime.

In sum, all the front line states remain vulnerable to South African economic pressure. The system of apartheid has become probably the most important single impediment to the sub-regions development.⁴¹ All South African states have had to increase their military expenditure. Their economies have been further weakened by drought and reduced agricultural production. The refugee population adds to the economic burden of the neighbouring states.

39 Ibid., p. 48.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

The refugee population of Angola is estimated by the government at 73,000 of which 18,000 are Zairians, 50,000 are Namibians and 5,000 are South Africans.⁴² Even after flight they continue to live in fear of persecution or mass attacks. "South Africa's military raids have violated international standards of civilized conduct wreaking destruction and death in the camps."⁴³

Third, there are refugees due to internal oppression. The Ugandan is an illustration. It developed as a result of internal conflict which had its root in ethnic rivalry, foreign invasions and an oppressive government.⁴⁴

In 1971 Milton Obote's regime was toppled and that of Major General Idi Amin was established. Amin belonged to the Kawaka tribe. Between May 1971 and January 1972, the majority of Langi and Acholi recruits in the army were killed.⁴⁵ To gain popularity among the Ugandans Amin declared an 'economic war'⁴⁶ against thousands of Asians and

42 ICARA Report., op. cit., p. 4.

43 Tedweiss, "American Policy and African Refugees", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 19.

44 For instance when Idi Amin Dada was deposed.

45 The recruits from the Langi and the Acholi tribe formed the support base for Obote.

46 Amin's 'economic war' was an effort to replace all business and industries primarily in the hands of his cronies in the army.

they had to flee and find new homes in neighbouring Kenya, Tanzania or further away in Britain and Canada.

"The political history of Amin's regime was largely a history of factional quarrels, followed by bloody purges of the pro-Obote members of the army and the police."⁴⁷

The political exiles in Tanzania formed a united political front to replace the Amin government. The Tanzanian People's Defence Forces (TPDF) assisted by the Ugandan exile volunteers formed the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA).⁴⁸ The UNLA army which invaded Tanzania was welcomed as a liberator. Amin's demoralized army was too weak and disintegrated. The soldiers loyal to Amin now formed the refugee population and fled into Kenya, Zaire and Sudan. At this time when one group of refugees was returning to the country, another group was fleeing.

On the Uganda-Kenya border traffic became a two way affair as anti-Amin exiles began returning and some of the richer 'fat cats' who had kept Amin in power were fleeing into Kenya with expensive cars.⁴⁹

47 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 1042.

48 Ibid.

49 Alistair Matheson, "Uganda's two Decades of Turmoil", Africa Report, January-February 1984, pp. 41-42.

With the overthrow of Amin and the resumption of power by Obote, governmental abuses once again began.

Obote's regime did not bring back military or political stability to the rest of Uganda. The legacy of a government by terror and corruption continued.⁵⁰ In the Southern part of the country a guerrilla campaign was launched against the government by the National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni. The government's attempt to suppress this along with the indiscipline of its troops, resulted in a wave of killings and refugee movements that exceeded the horrors of the Amin period.⁵¹ In the midst of the turmoil, 80,000 refugees suddenly began leaving Uganda to cross in Rwanda.⁵²

Rwanda was reluctant to accept the entire 80,000 or more not only due to its already high population density, but also due to the fact that those of Tutsi origin were not welcome. In fact, the original exodus had been caused by the attempt at genocide against other Tutsi by the Hutus twenty years back.⁵³ The shocking fact that is that the

50 Ibid., p. 1043.

51 Ibid., p. 49.

52 These were not Ugandans but Tutsi people who had fled from Rwanda two decades before.

53 Alistair Matheson, "Uganda's two Decades of Turmoil", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 42.

Rwandan government refused to accept the refugees of Rwandese origin. The Rwandese ministers interviewed the refugees to determine 'who is who'.⁵⁴

In March 1983, Rwanda agreed to settle only about 30,000 Rwandan refugees. Ugandan persecution of the ethnic Rwandans continued.⁵⁵ In December 1983 it was reported that thousands of these Rwandese refugees had crossed into Tanzania.⁵⁶

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An oppressive political regime was also responsible for massive displacements in Equatorial Guinea. It was during the administration of President Macias Nguema from 19 July 1972 to August 1979. It is believed that over 100,000 Equatorial-Guinea refugees have remained in exile in Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, and Spain.⁵⁶ This is the most

54 Ibid.

55 Tanzania has about 150,000 refugees of whom some 133,000 are Burundis, concentrated mainly in the rural settlements at Katumba, Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Kigamo (see Appendix A-4). Many refugees have been fully integrated into Tanzanian society. However, not all have been indefinitely settled in rural settlements. Some 2,000 Ugandans and 500 Zimbabweans were voluntarily repatriated. ICARA Reports, op. cit., p. 995.

56 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 9.

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shocking example of human rights violation by a government - where over one fourth of the entire population fled as refugees.⁵⁷ The overthrow of the Nguema in August 1979 led many Equatorial Guineans to return home.⁵⁸

Though Uganda and Equatorial Guinea have been selected as illustrations of cases in which oppressive political regimes contribute to the influx of refugees, they do not stand alone. Throughout Africa, there are numerous instances in which governmental acts of repression have been responsible for increasing number of refugees on the continent.

✓ Fourth, there are refugees due to natural disaster. "The most disturbing feature is that the agricultural output of the continent has failed to keep pace with population growth during the past decade. Production per capita, both of export crops and food staples, declined by 1 per cent per year between 1970 and 1982. By 1984 the situation had reached disaster proportions. According to FAO, up to 24 African countries were suffering emergency conditions. In some areas such as the Horn of Africa⁵⁹ and the Sahel, the

57 Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 16, 1-31 May 1979, p. 5256.

58 Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 9.

59 The famine in Ethiopia caused a massive exodus of refugees into the neighbouring states.

crisis was the consequences of several years of drought."⁶⁰
 The causes of famine are long spells of drought due to ecological degradation, changing climatic patterns (e.g. in the Sahel), and governmental neglect of the rural agricultural sector due to the civil wars in the country.

Therefore, besides political, refugees, there are refugees due to economic factors also. Renewed famine in Ethiopia and the Sahel, as well as the continents ongoing wars and political repressions have created the world's biggest refugee problems. "The large scale influx of refugees in Sudan is because of the unstable situations in Eritrea and Tigray. Famine has struck again some parts of Tigray this year thereby adding to the devastation and danger wrought by interminable conflicts".⁶¹

The refugee problem brings into focus three regions - the Horn, where war and drought have joined in a deadly combination, Southern Africa where apartheid has forcibly relocated some three million people, and the territories across Africa from Zaire to Uganda where due to a combination

60 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 56.

61 Ronald Pierre-Paringaue, in "Crisis in Sudan", Refugees (UNHCR Publication), April 1988, p. 14.

of civil conflicts and internal oppression, communities
of people have been displaced.

The African States with their limited resources
make an effort to solve the refugee problem which plagues
the continent.

....

CHAPTER II

CHAPTER II

PROBLEMS OF THE HOST COUNTRIES

This chapter deals with the problems that the host countries face due to the influx of refugees. What makes the problem worse is that the burden has not been shared by all the African countries equally. The least developed countries in Africa are the worst affected.

According to a survey undertaken for the 1981 International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA), there were 1,540,000 refugees living in Somalia, 490,000 in Sudan and 400,000 in Zaire. Other countries which reported more than 100,000 refugees were in Cameroon (266,000), Burundi (234,000), Tanzania (140,000), Uganda (112,400) and Nigeria (110,000).¹

The number of refugees in a particular country may be misleading as an indicator of the strain imposed upon it. The percentage of the refugees in the total population, the density of population and the economic status of the country

¹ Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa", Africa Today, second quarter 1982, p. 12.

perhaps can better serve as determinants. Unfortunately, the burden of caring for the refugees has fallen disproportionately on the shoulders of the poorest countries in Africa. "The irony of the refugee crisis is that the refugees have sought refuge in the poorest countries in Africa. Sudan has 490,000 refugees, Zaire has 400,000 and Burundi 234,000, all countries with severe economic problems of their own. Sudan and Somalia are arid zones with unreliable water resources, Djibouti is the smallest country in Africa, has little agriculture or industry and is chronically short of water."² According to a report of the World Bank, Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and Uganda, all of these are listed among the poorest countries in the world. Population growth has been on a rise while agricultural production is declining. The food dependency of Africa has increased with an estimated one in every five Africans on an average, now being fed by imports. By 1984 the situation had reached disaster proportions. Famine and malnutrition affect many African countries. According to the FAO twenty four countries were suffering emergency conditions.³

2 Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 18, 1981-82, p. 6010.

3 Africa South of Sahara (Europa Publications, 1987), p. 56.

The area worst affected by the refugee problem is the Horn of Africa. Due to successive years of drought, the area is in a general situation of economic collapse. The largest number of refugees are in this region which suffers due to famine. Mass arrival of refugees further aggravates their economic condition.⁴

The problem is that of massive arrivals of refugees in low income countries where no durable solutions are at hand. Refugees from the developing countries are primarily rural. Approximately ninety per cent flee from rural areas to like areas in the country of asylum. A massive refugee influx into a low income country can have a severe impact on the host country and on its local population.⁵

No durable solutions are at hand, because the asylum countries only let the refugees stay temporarily in their territories. Political or ethnic factors lead to a decision against permanent acceptance of a refugee group.

South Africa has made open use of its military power to intimidate the front-line States which support the African

4 Ibid.

5 Barry N. Stein, "Durable Solution for Developing Country Refugees", International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 264.

National Congress (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). For example, in March 1984 a mutual security agreement was signed at Nkomati by President Machel of Mozambique and P.W. Botha, the then Prime Minister of South Africa. Under this agreement South Africa was to withdraw its assistance to the MNR (the anti-government guerrilla movement). Mozambique undertook that ANC guerrillas (who took refuge in Mozambique) would no longer be allowed to use its territory as a base for military activities. Small States like Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland too have denied base facilities to political refugees from South Africa under economic pressure from the latter.⁶

In October 1982 Rwanda closed its border with Uganda after an influx of 45,000 refugees. Most of whom were Rwandan exiles fleeing Ugandan persecution. The reason for closing the door to its own people was that the refugees from Uganda were of Tutsi origin, while the power in Rwanda lies with the Hutus. The Government representing the interest of the Hutus did not wish to accommodate the people of Tutsi origin.⁷

6 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 88.

7 See Chapter I, supra p. 13.

Low income hosts⁸ may be hesitant about allowing refugees to remain due to a concern that sufficient jobs or arable land are not available even for their own people.

In seeking asylum, Africans usually turn first to their neighbouring countries,⁹ since the journey is shorter and less hazardous. Secondly, since ethnic groups in Africa tend to 'spill over' national boundaries, the refugees often find that in the country of asylum, they are among people of a similar culture and language.¹⁰

While there are advantages for the refugees in an adjacent country the host nation does not enjoy corresponding benefits. Caring for the refugees is a major task.

In the early stages of any emergency influx, refugees are likely to deplete local supplies and drive up

8 For example Djibouti is hesitant to accept permanently all the refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia because the refugee population is too large in proportion to the size of that host country. 40,000 refugees in tiny Djibouti are equivalent to 23% of its population. Barry N. Stein, op. cit., p. 274.

9 e.g. Refugees from Ethiopia move to Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya.

10 For example, the ethnic Somalis of Ethiopia were among their own kin when they took refuge in Somalia, and the Fangs of Equatorial Guinea experienced a similar situation when they fled into neighbouring Gabon and Cameroon.

the food prices. This occurred with the influx of Mozambiquan refugees into the Eastern Province of Zambia in December 1965. Not surprisingly hosts presented themselves together with refugees for food rations.¹¹

Sometimes, the rural refugees are welcomed because of the cheap labour they provide. To say this is not to undervalue the tradition of hospitality. But it is to recognize the fact that labour conditions have been a dominant factor. But such welcome based on labour requirements could be shortlived. In 1976, in Cabinda, the refugees were accepted for their labour and those hosts who benefitted opposed the removal of the refugees. However, as soon as drought made the refugees a liability, the local hosts expelled them.¹²

The sheer magnitude of the problem is overwhelming. The adverse impact on some affected countries has become

11 Robert Chambers, "Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programmes on Poorer Hosts", International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 245.

12 Ibid., p. 251.

especially severe because of three factors - first due to the economic plight of these countries. It has already been mentioned that the burden of the refugees falls disproportionately on the poorest countries in Africa. The cost of refugee care is very high. The asylum countries have little to share. Food, tents, blankets, medicines and all the basic necessities have to come from abroad,¹³ either because the asylum country does not have them or they could not be made available through local markets.

As evidenced in the current African famine crisis, refugee populations cannot be helped in isolation when the surrounding population is also suffering. Local villagers have at times settled in large numbers around refugee camps to share refugees' food and water.

13 The UNHCR recognizes its responsibility. For example, the UNHCR has been supporting rural refugee settlements in Africa. In Sudan the World Food Programme (WFP) has been supplying food rations to the Ugandan and Ethiopian refugees.

UNHCR supports the Rwandan, Ugandan and refugees from Burundi which are in Tanzania. UNHCR has made substantial investments to provide basic infrastructural facilities. See Chapter IV, *infra* p. 63, 64

Tony Hodges, "Africa's Refugee Crisis", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 9.

The second factor which aggravates the refugee crisis is the fact that the influx of refugees caused by unstable economic and political conditions is continuous. At times the host country may not be able to help the refugees due to political consideration. For example, Cameroon did not recognize refugees fleeing from Equatorial Guinea for political considerations.¹⁴ Cameroon did not want a deterioration of its relationship with Equatorial Guinea.

Some refugees may be supporters of deposed rulers and may not be reconciled to their loss of power. Political and military activities, if tolerated by the host nation, may result in strained relations and may lead to retaliatory action.

For example, Ugandan exiles in Tanzania during Amin's repressive regime mostly were pro-Obote (they were from the Acholi and the Langi tribes, the support base of Obote). They joined the Tanzanian People's Defence Force

14 Ved P. Nanda, "The African Refugee Dilemma - A Challenge for International Law and Policy", Africa Today, second quarter, 1985, p. 62.

(TPDF) to form the Ugandan National Liberation Army (UNLA). The UNLA invasion of Uganda, in January 1979 met with little resistance from Amin's demoralized army. But the granting of asylum by Tanzania to anti-Amin Ugandan refugees led to deterioration of relations and eventually to war between the two East African neighbours.¹⁵

Amin took the case to the OAU. According to him Tanzania had interfered in the internal affairs of another State and thereby violated the principle of the OAU, which upheld the sanctity of State boundaries. Tanzania justified the invasion on the ground that it was Amin who had contravened international law by invading Tanzania the previous year. Most of the African States - Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, Rwanda, Angola, Malawi and other States saluted the defeat of Amin's regime and the formation of the new government as 'a tremendous victory for the people of Uganda and a singular triumph for freedom, justice and human dignity'.¹⁶ The inability or unwillingness to regulate

15 Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 16, 1978-80, p. 5222.

16 Ibid., p. 5257.

activities led to strained relations between Ethiopia and Sudan during the early 1970s. Ethiopia was accused of sympathizing with Sudanese refugees who supported the Anyanya¹⁷ rebellion and Sudan was blamed by Ethiopia for encouraging the Eritrean Liberation Front.¹⁸

Third, the nature of the refugee problem in many instances is not seen as a temporary phenomenon. It is a long lasting challenge, which requires durable solutions and long term assistance from the receiving countries. In a recent study on voluntary repatriation programmes for African refugees, published by the British Refugee Council the author Jeff Crisp criticized the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees from Djibouti, Sudan and Zaire. The study notes:

"Host countries are no longer able to tolerate the indefinite presence of large refugee populations.¹⁹ Countries of origin would like the

17 The Anya Anya was a guerrilla movement for the grant of regional autonomy to South Sudan.

18 The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) is a secessionist movement within Ethiopia. See Chapter I, p. 4.

19 For example Djibouti has 42,000 refugees, which constitutes 23% of its population. It is unable to bear the strain imposed on it by refugees from Ethiopia. It is unlikely that it can integrate all the refugees on the most productive land because of insufficient water reserves.

Barry N. Stein, op. cit. p. 274,

refugees to return, as it confers legitimacy on their government and provides a basis on which to appeal for additional economic aid. The donor countries looking for a means of limiting their long term commitment to refugee assistance, are keen to promote the return and reintegration of refugees in their country of origin."²⁰

Sometimes when unable to bear the burden the host country in complete disregard to Article II²¹ of the 1969 convention on the status of refugees in Africa have expelled refugees en mass. For example, the expulsions from Nigeria took place in 1983. This expulsion took place under the regime of Shemu Shagari. During this period due to a slump in the world oil prices, a foreign exchange crisis and financial panic gripped Nigeria. Nigeria expelled two million illegal immigrants most of whom were from Ghana. Immigrants from Cameroon, Niger and Chad too were expelled. "This was done under the pretext that foreigners were undermining the

20 V.P. Nanda, "The African Refugee Dilemma, a Challenge for International Law and Policy", Africa Today, 1985, p. 63.

21 Art. II of the 1969 Convention on the status of refugees in Africa states: "The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act, by any member State. Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa", Africa Today, second quarter, p. 22.

economy, were taking jobs from Nigerians and were responsible for the alarming crime rate."²²

Expulsions took place again in 1985. On 10 May 1985 the deadline was set for the departure of the 'unauthorized foreigners' on the pretext that they were to blame for Nigeria's economic plight. The countries affected by the expulsion were Chad, Niger, Benin and Ghana.²³

The situation of the countries bordering the white-ruled South is somewhat different. As members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) all support the liberation movements seeking to end the minority rule in South Africa. But extensive economic ties with and the overwhelming military superiority of South Africa limits the degree of overt support. Botswana provides the best illustration of a host nation's effort to avoid frictions with its neighbours. Botswana's actions towards South African refugees has sometimes included the raiding of homes of refugees in search of arms.²⁴

22 Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 20, 1983-84, 1985.

23 Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 22, 1985, p. 7599.

24 Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 14.

As a result of its support for South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), Angola has incurred the wrath of South Africa. South African forces have repeatedly crossed the border from Namibia and raided Angolan territory, the victims of which were innocent refugees. In spite of repeated condemnations by the United Nations Security Council, South Africa has continued to penetrate Angolan territory.²⁵

Thus, it is appropriate to ask whether the existing principles, policies and mechanisms ensure adequate protection of the refugees. Are the needs of the refugees met with? As Gaim Kibreab has forcefully argued that traditional tribal hospitality no longer holds true in the 20th century Africa, for in his words, "hospitality in a state of poverty is inconceivable".²⁶

In its efforts to solve the refugee problem the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has drawn up a number of 'guiding principles' to help the refugees and to provide them with adequate protection. This has been dealt at length in the following chapter.

25 See Chapter I, *supra* p. 15

26 Ved P. Nanda, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER III

A CONTINENTAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM - THE ROLE OF
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)

The refugees of Africa are an African problem. No amount of international assistance would be of any help, if the African countries did nothing to help themselves. Opening the Arusha Conference, President Nyerere of Tanzania said that "the refugees of Africa are primarily an African problem and an African responsibility".¹

In 1964, the OAU Council of Ministers founded an ad hoc Commission on Refugee problems in Africa which drew up a number of guiding principles for solving the problem of refugees on the continent. The most important of these principles related to

- (i) "The promotion of voluntary return to countries of origin;
- (ii) Settlement of refugees away from the frontiers of the countries of origin;
- (iii) Prohibition of subversive activities by refugees; and recognition of granting of asylum as not constituting an

¹ ICARA Report, A/Conf.106/ Geneva, 1981, p. 4.

unfriendly act by the country of asylum against the country of origin;

- (iv) Encouragement of bilateral negotiations between involved parties with a view to solving the problem by peaceful means."²

It was realized that the African Refugees who numbered 850,000 in 1969 lacked legal status.³ To fill in the gap a Convention on the Status of Refugees in Africa was held at Addis Ababa on 30 June 1969. The countries present were Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, UAR, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia.⁴ The Convention defined⁵ who constitutes a refugee and spelt out other guidelines the interest of African refugees.

The 1969 Convention mentions that "the problem of our continent must be solved in the spirit of the Charter of the OAU and in the African context".⁶ In confirmity

2 Ibid., p. 6.

3 Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 6, 1969, p. 1316c.

4 Ibid., p. 1316c.

5 See Chapter I, supra p.1.

6 ICARA Report, op. cit., p. 5.

with this spirit the African States have through various initiatives established the material framework for a positive and constructive approach to the refugee problem in Africa. This chapter deals with the Continental approach to the problem.

Refugee status is viewed by nations of asylum as temporary. It is anticipated that refugees will be eventually repatriated, integrated into a host nation or resettled in a third country.

Voluntary repatriation is, if possible, the simplest and most desirable. If truly voluntary it satisfies both the refugee and the country of asylum. As indicated by the OAU Convention, the country of origin "on receiving back refugees, shall facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the country and subject them to the same obligations. It is also anticipated that the country of origin should not penalize the returning refugees for having left".⁷

Realizing the importance of voluntary repatriation, the OAU convention assigned the Administrative Secretary

7 Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa", Africa Today, second quarter 1982, p. 16.

General of the OAU with the duty of conducting a 'national information campaign as a means of assuring the refugees that the new circumstances prevailing in their country of origin will enable them to return home without risk and to take up a normal and peaceful life without fear of being disturbed or punished'.⁸ Voluntary repatriation programmes have been undertaken in most of the countries with the help of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). While voluntary repatriation is the happy ending UNHCR always welcomes, this seldom happens in Africa, except in special cases such as Zimbabwe, where 250,000 former freedom fighters returned home after independence.⁹

Assimilation of a refugee is preferred as an option where repatriation is not feasible or desired. African nations have sought to integrate refugees into their communities.¹⁰ Due to the ethnic 'spill-over'¹¹ refugees in the neighbouring country feel at home as in the country of

8 Ibid., p. 16.

9 Alistar Matheson, "Uganda's two Decades of Turmoil", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 43.

10 See Chapter IV, *infra* p.61

11 The Rwandese refugees in Burundi were of Tutsi origin. After a strife between the Tutsi and the Hutun the conflict settled in favour of the former. Due to an ethnic affinity between the Rwandan refugees and the majority community in Burundi, the latter sought to integrate them into the national community. Jake C. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

origin. Refugees have also in many instances settled permanently in their countries of first asylum. Many have settled in Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. During the summer of 1985, for example, Tanzania formally accepted the settlement of 35,000 refugees from Burundi in the highlands of Western Tanzania at Mishamo.¹²

At times countries of asylum are hesitant to grant refugees a permanent residency even when it is clear that repatriation is far off or unlikely.¹³ Host hesitancy towards permanent settlement is due to many factors:

A refugee group may be too large either in absolute terms or in proportion to the size of the host.¹⁴ 40,000 refugees in tiny Djibouti are equivalent to 23% of its population. Due to scarce water reserves Djibouti has little arable land on which it can settle the refugees.¹⁵

...a fear that local settlement would encourage more refugees to flee to the host

12 See Appendix IV

13 For example Cameroon did not grant residency to refugees from Equatorial Guinea because it did not wish to strain its relations with the latter. V.P. Nanda, op.cit., p. 62.

14 Barry N. Stein, op. cit., p. 274.

15 "Africa's Refugee Crisis, What's to be Done?" Zed Publications, 1986, p. 143.

country. It is very difficult to determine whether or not a magnet effect actually exists, but the fear expressed is plausible and genuine.¹⁶

...unwillingness or inability to make financial contributions from their own scarce resources,¹⁷ or by, going into debt for the sake of refugees. It is only with the help of international assistance that the problem can be alleviated.

...concern that the ethnic¹⁸ or political background¹⁹ of the refugees might make them unacceptable to segments of population and therefore they are unable to integrate them.²⁰

Past experience with international refugee integration assistance which established services and infrastructure but did not cover long term recurrent costs of maintenance.²¹

16 Barry N. Stein, op. cit., p. 274.

17 Sudan is one of the least developed countries and its problems are compounded by approximately half a million refugees causing further strain on the infrastructure and government services. ICARA Report, op. cit., p. 71.

18 For example the unwillingness of Rwanda to accept the refugees of Tutsi origin from Uganda, Tanzania.

19 For example the political background of the refugees from South Africa makes them unacceptable in States like Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. See Chapter II, supra p.47.

20 Barry N. Stein, op. cit., p. 274.

21 Ibid.

Often the assimilation of refugees into the community can be useful both to the country of origin and the country of asylum. Once the refugee has secured employment, the country of asylum benefits by utilizing the talents and skills of the newcomer.²²

For instance, the assimilation of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi in Tanzania has been useful to the refugee generating countries. Rwanda and Burundi are overpopulated and the integration of refugees from these two States, lightens the population pressure on them.

The country of asylum, Tanzania has benefitted from refugee settlement at Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Mpanda.²³ These settlements grow cassava, maize, beans and cash crops. They are not only self-sufficient but produce a surplus for sale in the open market. Therefore the country of asylum too benefits.²⁴

22 To utilize the talents and skills of the refugee the UNHCR has funded handicraft activities programme in Djibouti benefitting some 1,500 refugees. ICARA Report, op. cit., p. 23.

23 See Appendix IV

24 Tony Hodges, "Africa's Refugee Crisis", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 9.

For some refugees neither voluntary repatriation nor assimilation has been the solution. Instead they exist in a state of suspension hoping to return home some day, but as the goal appears more and more remote these displaced persons take on the attributes of 'permanent refugees', residing in camps throughout Africa.²⁵ For example the South African and Namibian refugees in Angola hope to return home some day. Voluntary repatriation is not possible because the refugees are mostly political exiles. They are unwilling to return for the fear of being persecuted by the racist regime.

Assimilation in Angola of 91,500 refugees has not been feasible because of the severe economic problems that the country faces. The problem has been compounded by civil strife, instability on its borders and the constant threat to attacks on the refugee camps by the South African Defence Forces (SADF). The UNHCR aid merely covers the emergency relief and immediate requirements like transport, sanitation, medical, educational and water supply needs.²⁶

25 Jake C. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

26 ICARA Report, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Resettlement in a third country is yet another alternative encouraged by Article 28 of the OAU Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in Africa. It requests contracting parties to issue to refugees who are lawfully in their territory permits²⁷ to travel outside the country.

In describing the situation in Sudan, Victoria Brittain, of the Washington Post observed that a large number of UN documents had enabled many refugees to go to the Gulf States to seek employment. According to the UNHCR, resettlement is the "least desirable and most costly and is reserved as a measure to be pursued only for compelling humanitarian reasons".²⁸ For instance, due to the serious tribal strife in Rwanda, Uganda was faced with a large refugee population.²⁹ Milton Obote's government by terror and corruption in 1980, caused the Rwandan exiles to flee from Uganda. Rwanda was not willing to

27 These travel documents which permit a refugee to move from one country of asylum to another are published by the UNHCR.

28 W.M. Symser, in an interview to Tony Hodges in Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 11.

29 See Chapter I, supra p.12

accept the refugees of Tutsi origin, therefore they were resettled in Tanzania for humanitarian reasons.³⁰ W.R. Smyser says that Resettlement, which means that the refugees move to a third country usually to North America or West Europe, is the most difficult culturally for the refugees. It is not a solution we advocate very strongly in Africa because it can create a brain drain".³¹ Since the lives of South African refugees is threatened in the countries of asylum many of them have moved on to North America and West Europe creating a brain drain.³² The refugee camps of South African exiles are vulnerable to military attacks by the South African defence forces. For example, the massacre at Kassinga refugee camp in Southern Angola in May 1978 when 600 Namibian refugees were slaughtered. In 1982, 32 South African refugees were gunned down in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. In 1982 Ruth First, a prominent South African exile was assassinated at Maputo in Mozambique by a mail bomb.

30 Africa South of Sahara, Europa Publication, 1988, p. 808.

31 W.M. Smyser in an interview to Tony Hodges in Africa Report, op. cit., p. 11.

32 Ibid., p. 7.

The OAU protects the rights of an individual to seek and obtain asylum when persecuted.³³ The 1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees in Africa, contains provisions designed to prevent the development of strained relations among member nations of the OAU because of the refugee issue. Article II of the Convention on the Status of Refugees expressly states:

"The grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member state."³⁴

The host nation in an effort to maintain friendly relations with its neighbouring country is expected to prevent the refugees from attacking³⁵ the country from which they had fled by any activity and in particular, by arms, through press or by radio (Art. III, section 2 of the 1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees).³⁶

33 Art.XII(3) of the Charter of 1969 Convention on Refugees provides, "Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the laws of those countries and international conventions." Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 22.

34 Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 22.

35 When Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979 Amin considered the invasion as a plot to depose him. But most of the African States justified the Tanzanian invasion on humanitarian grounds.

36 Nanda (Ved Prakash), "African Refugees Dilemma : A Challenge for International Law and Peace", Africa Today, vol. 32, nos. 1-2, 1985, pp. 61-76.

The special features contained in the African instruments - the 1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1981 African Charter - as they apply to the protection of African refugees are (1) inclusion of the right to asylum in the 1981 African Charter; (2) prohibition against mass expulsion in the 1981 Charter on Refugees.

These African instruments complement the 1951 Convention, the 1967 protocol and the UNHCR status which establish international standards for the treatment of refugees. The most significant contribution towards protection of refugees is provided under these instruments by the inclusion of the principle of non-refoulment.³⁸ Further a refugee is not to be expelled to countries of persecution.³⁹ The only exception to the non-refoulment principle is that there are 'reasonable grounds' for

37 This principle was reiterated by the OAU after Nigeria expelled two million illegal immigrants in 1983 and again in 1985. See Chapter II, supra p.35

38 The principle mandates that a refugee shall not be expelled or returned "in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". V.P. Nanda, op. cit., p. 67.

39 The Rwandan exiles in Uganda were not expelled to Rwanda, because the refugees were being persecuted by the Hutus in Rwanda. Instead they were resettled in Tanzania.

regarding a refugee as a danger to the security of the country⁴⁰ of asylum, or if the refugee having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. Under these instruments, the refugees are guaranteed minimum standards of treatment enjoyed by aliens generally in the country of asylum. They have rights to property, freedom of association, gainful employment, welfare, freedom of movement, religion and administrative assistance.⁴¹ States are not to impose penalties on refugees illegally entering their territory, provided the refugees present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence [Art. 31(1) of the Convention on the Status of Refugees]⁴²

Thus we see that the OAU's existing principles, policies and mechanisms have been devised to ensure adequate protection to the refugees. The 1979 Arusha

40 Nigeria justified the expulsion in 1983 on the pretext that 'refugees were responsible for the alarming crime rate'. See Chapter II, p. Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 20, 1983, p. 6698.

41 V.P. Nanda, op. cit., p. 68.

42 Ibid.

Conference⁴³ in Tanzania from 7 to 17 May was yet another initiative to solve the refugee problem within the African context. The purpose of the Conference was to see, what had been accomplished up to 1979, and on this basis map out a strategy for a constructive approach to the problem.

Among the most important recommendations were the principle of international solidarity,⁴⁴ effective integration of the refugees into the economic structure of the host countries and promotion of voluntary repatriation.⁴⁵

Paul Hartling, the UNHCR Commissioner for Refugees, applauds the African hospitality noting that the refugees have become the responsibility of those

43 OAU in collaboration with the UNHCR and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) held the Conference.

44 The Arusha Conference called up the international community to impose sanctions against South Africa and urged the international voluntary agencies to do their utmost to educate, inform and mobilize public opinion, as well as their respective people and Government on that matter.

Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, vol. 20, nos. 83-84, p. 67924.

45 ICARA Report, op. cit., p. 7.

countries, least able to provide for them. Nevertheless, they are willing to share their meagre resources.⁴⁶

In accordance with the principle of 'burden-sharing' outlined by the 1979 Arusha Conference and in keeping with the tradition of hospitality, the African countries have followed a generous policy of refugee acceptance, in spite of their severe economic constraints. For humanitarian reasons the response to Africa's refugee problem has been global. The major international actor for the protection and assistance to refugees is the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Its role has been elaborated upon in the following chapter.

⁴⁶ Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 23.

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

For humanitarian reasons, the refugee problem has been viewed as of international concern. On behalf of the international community, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) acts as a coordinator for the protection and assistance to refugees. The UNHCR was formed in 1951 as a successor to the International Refugee Organization (IRO) which functioned from 1946-1951. The IRO¹ had been conceived as a short term emergency organization to deal with the European refugees. It was abolished in 1952 and replaced by a permanent structure, the UNHCR.² The UNHCR was established to ensure the legal and political protection of refugees previously under the IRO mandate and to promote permanent solutions to the problem. As laid down in the Statute of the Office, one of the two primary functions of the UNHCR is to provide international protection to refugees. In the

1 The IRO was successful in resettling repatriating, transporting and maintaining more than a 1,000,000 European refugees.

2 Encyclopaedia of Britannica, vol. 18, p. 899.

exercise of this function, the UNHCR seeks to ensure that the refugees and asylum seekers are protected against refoulment (forcible return).³ It ensures that they receive asylum and that they are treated in accordance with the internationally recognized standards of treatment.⁴

The UNHCR pursues these objectives by a variety of means which include promoting the conclusion and ratification by States of international conventions for the protection of refugees, particularly the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees, extended by a protocol adopted in 1969.⁴ The UNHCR also encouraged further accessions to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problem in Africa.⁵

The UNHCR is also responsible for coordination efforts to assist the refugees materially. The material assistance is designed to guarantee for refugees the basic

3 See Chapter III, supra p. 49.

4 To ensure the physical safety of refugees in asylum the UNHCR gives attention to the problem of military attacks against refugee camps and settlements in Southern Africa. See Chapter III, supra p. 47.

5 Africa South of Sahara, Europa Publication 1986, p. 165.

economic security and opportunity which law alone cannot provide.⁶ The assistance programmes are implemented by the UNHCR in association with other members of the United Nations as well as intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The UNHCR aims at providing both short-term relief assistance and long-term solutions. Assistance can take various forms, including the provision of food, shelter, medical care and essential supplies. Services like education and counselling are also provided. The UNHCR encourages maximum self-reliance among the refugee population.⁷

The major statutory responsibility of the UNHCR is to identify and implement durable solutions to the refugee problem. Such solutions generally take one of the three forms: voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement in another country.⁸ Wherever voluntary repatriation is feasible the UNHCR assists refugees to overcome obstacles preventing their return to their country

6 Shelly Pittman, "A Comparative Survey of two Decades of International Assistance to Refugees in Africa", Africa Today, first quarter 1984, p. 27.

7 See Chapter III, supra p. 44.

8 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 163.

of origin. "This may be done through negotiations with governments involved, or by providing funds either for the physical movement of refugees⁹ or for the rehabilitation of returnees¹⁰ once back in their own country".¹¹

Over the years, the UNHCR has been able to coordinate large scale voluntary repatriation programmes in several parts of Africa. The earliest UNHCR sponsored repatriation programme in Africa was launched for 200,000 Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia. With the independence of Algeria all the refugees returned to their country.¹² Throughout the seventies, hundreds of thousands of former refugees returned to their countries of origin under the large scale repatriation/rehabilitation programmes coordinated by the UNHCR. Some of the prominent examples are:

9 Refugees: persons identified as such by the relevant international legal instruments. (Convention of 1951, Protocol of 1967, OAU Convention of 1969). See Chapter I, supra p. 1.

10 Returnees: 'Persons who have crossed an international border as refugees or externally displaced persons and who have returned to their country of origin or habitual residence voluntarily.' ICARA Report, UN Doc. A/CONF.106/1, Geneva 1981, p. ix.

11 Africa South of Sahara, op. cit., p. 163.

12 ICARA Report, UN Doc. A/CONF.108/1, Geneva 1981, p. iv.

- The return of 194,000 Sudanese refugees from the Central African Republic, Zaire and Uganda following the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 that ended the war in Southern Sudan and brought peace to the area.¹³¹⁴
- In 1974-75 the UNHCR arranged for several hundred thousands of refugees to return home to Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola after independence from Portugal. Likewise 250,000 Zimbabweans were repatriated in 1980-81.¹⁵
- The respite in the infighting in Chad in 1982 enabled 200,000 Chadians to return from exile in Niger, Cameroon and the Central African Republic.¹⁶

The UNHCR has made concerted efforts to solve the refugee problem in the worst affected area - the Horn of Africa. Over half of the African refugees are of the

13 This agreement was between the Government of Sudan and the members of the Anya Anya guerrilla army. By the agreement the civil war was suspended temporarily. Peace and normalcy in the region prepared the background for the return of refugees.

14 Tony Hodges, "Africa's Refugee Crisis", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 7.

15 Ibid., p. 7.

16 Ibid.

various conflicts in the Horn.¹⁷ In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is the major refugee generating country.¹⁸

"Successive years of drought which affected the Horn of Africa and particularly Ethiopia provoked a dramatic new crisis in late 1984 as large numbers of people entered the Central African Republic, Somalia, Sudan in search of food, water and shelter."¹⁹ Refugees from Ethiopia go to neighbouring Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti. According to the government there are some 1.3 million refugees from Ethiopia. The majority of the refugees come from the Ogaden²⁰ region due to the ongoing conflict.²¹ Sudan has 400,000 refugees from Ethiopia.²² Djibouti accounts for 42,000 Ethiopian refugees.²³ According to Jama Mohammed Ghalib, the Minister in Charge of refugees in Somalia, the key to a 'political solution' to the problem was needed, including the withdrawal of all the external forces²⁴ from the Horn.²⁵

17 See Chapter I, supra p.6

18 See Chapter I, supra p.4 See Chapter II, supra p.27

19 UNHCR Report, Assistance Activities in 1984-85 and proposed voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for 1986, Geneva, 36th session, A/AC.96/657, p. 6.

20 See Chapter I, supra p. 4

21 ICARA Report, op. cit., p. 65.

22 Ibid., p. 71.

23 Ibid., p. 22.

24 See Chapter I, supra p. 10

25 Africa Research Bulletin, Political Social and Cultural Series, vol. 18, 1981-82, p. 6011.

The affected countries are unable to bear the economic strain imposed on them.²⁶ The UNHCR in its efforts to find a lasting solution to the refugee problem in Africa, stresses upon the strictly voluntary character of repatriation.

The Ethiopian government has declared a general amnesty. Its relief and rehabilitation commission, with the help of the UNHCR has set up reception centres on the Ethiopia-Somalia border.²⁷ The UNHCR has been assisting spontaneous returnees. "It ensures that the returnee population receives the necessary relief and rehabilitation assistance to enable them to reintegrate into their traditional communities of origin in Ethiopia."²⁸

The Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti, in the camps at Dikhil and Ali Sabieh²⁹ constitute one eleventh of the territory's population. Given the arid climate, the sparse natural resources, and the lack of infrastructure,^{one} cannot hope to achieve self-sufficiency there. Therefore, voluntary repatriation is the only viable solution.

²⁶ See Chapter II, 26

²⁷ Tony Hodges, "Africa's Refugee Crisis", Africa Report, January-February 1984, p. 97.

²⁸ UNHCR Report, *ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁹ See Appendix, III and IV

Though the Ethiopian government has granted a general amnesty, the political exiles have not volunteered to be repatriated. The war in Eritrea and Tigre continues. "The insurgent movements discourage repatriation, not only because the refugees form a part of their population base, but also because their return would be hailed as a victory by the Addis Ababa government."³⁰ Of the 1.2 million refugees from Africa only a minority have been repatriated. A registration camp of returnees in Hararge region concluded that 317,000 Ethiopians had returned in April 1985."³¹ The UNHCR has assisted 72,000 refugees, by the end of May 1985 in the Gambella, and Itang region.³² The refugees receive basic relief and self-sufficiency assistance³³ pending the implementation of durable solutions.³⁴

Where voluntary repatriation is impossible, the UNHCR favours integration into the host country. It tries to help the refugee communities become self supporting so

30 Tony Hodges, op. cit., p. 8.

31 UNHCR Report, op. cit., p. 6.

32 See Appendix, I

33 For a break up of the assistance in Ethiopia see Appendix, II

34 UNHCR Report, op. cit., p. 6.

that instead of being a burden on the country of refuge they contribute positively to these countries economic development. The UNHCR's experience also reflects a common view of technical assistance and development. An old proverb says:

'Give a man a fish, he will
eat for a day;
teach him how to fish;
and he will eat for the rest of his life.'³⁵

With the help of the UNHCR Sudan has tried to integrate the refugees and make them self-sufficient.**

Although Sudan is the largest country of Africa, much of its land is not suitable for cultivation. It is one of the least developed countries and the refugees are a strain on the infrastructure and government services. The Sudanese Government follows the spirit of international and regional conventions, and the refugees have been well received.³⁶ The Sudanese Government has a clearly spelt out refugee policy:

35 Barry N. Stein, "Durable Solutions for Developing Country Refugees", International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 1984, p. 279.

36 ICARA Report, op. cit., p. 71.

** See Appendix VII, VIII.

- (a) It discourages spontaneous settlements and accommodates all refugees, rural and urban, in organized settlements equipped with infrastructural settlements that would lead to self-sufficiency.³⁷
- (b) It provides vocational training for students so that they can be self-sufficient.³⁸
- (c) It pays special attention to the needs of the old and handicapped who are unable to support themselves.³⁹

By the end of 1980 some 80,000 refugees were settled with the assistance of the World Food Programme (WFP)⁴⁰ and the UNHCR. There are three basic types of settlements:

- (a) Rural land settlements where refugee families receive a large allocation of land (10 acres) to become self-supporting through farming.
- (b) Small plots of land are given for cultivation. The additional income can be derived from work on private farms.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

(c) Refugees with an urban background are settled in the outskirts of towns, so that they can seek employment opportunities in the town.⁴¹

In all these settlements with the help of the UNHCR,⁴² basic infrastructural facilities like provision of water, primary health centres, schools, agricultural service centres are provided. ✓

The UNHCR has been supporting rural refugee settlements in Africa since the mass exodus of Rwandan refugees in 1963. Sometimes settlements are created spontaneously by refugees in which case UNHCR's role is to help them attain self-sufficiency by providing seeds and agricultural equipment. Whereas UNHCR started 1984 with hopeful prospects for desirable solutions in most regions in Africa, the lack of rain adversely affected rural settlement programmes based on agriculture.⁴³ In Tanzania the UNHCR helped in the selection of the site and made substantial investments⁴⁴

41 Ibid.

42 For a detailed break-up of resources allocation by the UNHCR see Appendix, IX

43 UNHCR Report, op. cit., p. 3.

44 For a detailed break up of UNHCR expenditure in Tanzania see Appendix, VI

to provide basic infrastructural services. Today at Ulyankulu⁴⁵ where 5,000 families live in ten villages, the refugees run cooperative shops, a hotel, a maize mill and a carpentry workshop. Some of the refugees in Tanzania have been granted full citizenship.⁴⁶ The story of South African refugees settled on a Zambian farm is that of success. "Nearly 3,500 South African refugees who live in Zambia are members of the ANC. On 1,300 hactres of land at Chongella a farm has been developed which is a success, its an agricultural show piece."⁴⁷

Acheving self-sufficiency is just as difficult for Africa's urban refugees. Most of the South African refugees and the Ethiopian refugees come from an urban background. About one-third of African refugees, including 155,000 Ethiopians in Sudan, live in urban areas, where they rarely succeed in finding jobs. A recent study done in Khartoum revealed that only 5-10 per cent of the refugees living there were regularly employed.⁴⁸ In many parts of

45 See Appendix, V

46 Tony Hodges, op. cit., p. 8.

47 Refugees (UNHCR Publication), February 1988, p. 15.

48 Tony Hodges, op. cit., p. 9.

Africa, the UNHCR has funded income generating schemes designed to help urban refugees^{to} be set up in business as artisans, craftsmen or small shopkeepers. Only a small minority can be assisted in this way. Where the refugees do succeed in finding jobs, either in urban areas or as farm labourers, they are employed as cheap labour.

The gravity of the refugee problem in Africa prompted the UN General Assembly to vote unanimously in November 1980 for the convening of the International Conference on the Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA). The High Commission for Refugees noted: "Traditional African hospitality was being strained to the extreme as large number of refugees who drew on limited resources. The efforts of the African countries must evoke a vigorous response from the international community and the conference offered a unique opportunity to bind efforts together."⁴⁹ The ICARA met in Geneva on 9 and 10 April 1981 under the joint auspices of the United Nations, the OAU, the UNHCR, the ICARA succeeded in raising \$ 560 million.⁵⁰ The United

49 Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 24.

50 The Conference had aimed to raise \$ 500 million, so the garget was exceeded. But the money pledged falls short of \$ 1.2 billion which is estimated to be needed for the complete rehabilitation of refugees. Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vo. 18, 1981-82, p. 6010.

States was the largest contributor and pledged \$ 285 million.⁵¹ The other donors were the European Economic Community, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Canada and Italy.⁵²

According to the budget submitted by the ICARA and UNHCR the five countries with the greatest need were:

Somalia	\$ 271,806,800
Sudan	\$ 226,639,000
Zaire	\$ 88,016,400
Burundi	\$ 68,671,688
Cameroon	\$ 64,078,430

It can be seen from above that refugees from the Horn of Africa continue to be in the greatest need.⁵³

51 Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 24.

52 EEC contributed \$ 68,000,000
 FRG contributed \$ 34,523,000
 Japan contributed \$ 33,000,000
 Saudi Arabia contributed \$ 30,000,000
 Canada contributed \$ 18,823,529
 Italy contributed \$ 17,000,000

Source: Ibid.

53 Ibid.

The ICARA concentrated on providing essential emergency relief and assistance for gaining self-sufficiency to the refugees. The development related constraints that the asylum countries themselves have borne as a result of a generous policy of asylum has largely been ignored. This concern led the General Assembly of the United Nations to call for the convening of the Second Conference on the Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) from 9-11 July 1984. The report said: "Refugees and returnees have placed a considerable economic burden on the socio-economic infrastructure of the affected country."⁵⁴ The ICARA II sought to overcome the shortcomings of ICARA I. As expressed in paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution 37/197 the purposes of the ICARA II were three-fold:

- 5(a) to review thoroughly the results of ICARA I.
- 5(b) to consider providing additional international assistance to refugees and returnees in Africa for relief, rehabilitation and resettlement.

⁵⁴ Africa Research Bulletin, Political and Social Cultural Series, vol. 21, 1984, p. 129.

- 5(c) To consider the impact imposed on the national economies of the concerned countries and to provide assistance to strengthen their socio-economic infrastructure to cope with the burden of refugees and returnees.⁵⁵

The difference between ICARA II and its predecessor ICARA I is that the former recognizes not only the needs of the refugees but also of their hosts, whose economic and social infrastructure must be able to cope with the added burden of a large number of refugees. The United Nations has adopted a multilateral strategy for the implementation of the ICARA II projects. The Steering Committee of the ICARA II includes representatives of the UNHCR, the Secretary General, the OAU and for the first time the UNDP.⁵⁶ The UNHCR has the responsibility for assistance to refugees, while the UNDP is responsible for the coordination of development assistance to recipient countries. Both at the

55 Robert F. Gorman, "Beyond ICARA II : Implementing Refugee Related Development Assistance", International Migration, vol. 20, no. 2, 1984, p. 284.

56 Shelly Pittman, "A Comparative Survey of Two Decades of International Assistance to Refugees in Africa", Africa Today, first quarter 1984, p. 52.

headquarters and in the field this unprecedented level of cooperation between the UNDP and the UNHCR has been one of the encouraging outcomes of ICARA.⁵⁷

The UNHCR remains the focal point for assistance to refugees. It cooperates with other bodies of the UN system and voluntary agencies to achieve its objective. There are various kinds of voluntary organizations:

(a) Denominational Organizations that extend support to refugees of their own faith, such as the World Council of Churches (for Protestant refugees).⁵⁸ (b) The world-wide non-denominational organizations like the International Red Cross society.⁵⁹ (c) Private organizations working on a large scale. The UNHCR maintains a close linkage with more than a hundred voluntary organizations through such voluntary organizations like the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).⁶¹ "Voluntary agencies provide the human element including moral support, orientation, practical advice and friendship which help refugees to face

57 Robert F. Gorman, op. cit., p. 285.

58 Encyclopaedia of Britannica, op. cit., p. 571.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 The ICVA was formed in 1962. By 1969 it had a membership of a hundred organizations.
Encyclopaedia of Britannica, op. cit., p. 571.

and overcome the challenge of rebuilding their lives."⁶²

Non-governmental bodies are not restricted by political considerations, often they can go into troubled areas in which no governmental unit would dare to penetrate. Thus, voluntary groups have made vital contributions to displaced persons during crisis period. For instance, the Lutheran World Service (a voluntary organization) on the request of the UNHCR and the Zambian government, served as an implementing agency to Zimbabwe, in 1980.⁶³ Thus the UNHCR in coordination with the voluntary agencies, has to a large extent, succeeded in providing assistance to the refugees. Notable agencies like the OXFAM, the Catholic Relief Services and the Church World Service, have performed a selfless service due to the inherent advantages that such agencies have.⁶⁴

No matter how well coordinated the UN agencies are the ultimate success of the ICARA II will depend on the availability of resources. In this regard it is the donor governments rather than the international agencies

62 Jake C. Miller, op. cit., p. 26.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

that exercise ultimate control. A survey of the UNHCR reports shows that over the years there has been a decline in the inflow of financial resources.

"Funding difficulties affect the general programmes. This projected shortfall was due to the absence of growth in the dollar value of the financial contributions to the UNHCR, combined with steady decline of sources of income other than direct contributions, such as interests and carry-overs, refunds and cancellations from prior years programmes. The revised 1985 general programme target of some \$ 314 m. and proposed 1986 general programme target of \$ 330 m. are both significantly lower than the actual level of general programmes expenditure in 1984 which stood at \$ 346 m."⁶⁵

After analysing the UNHCR reports one finds that the number of refugees and the UNHCR funds stand in an inverse relationship. The number of refugees continue to rise. "The second half of the year 1981 and early 1985 saw major flows of refugees and drought victims is the Horn of Africa from Sudan and from Chad into surrounding countries, necessitating new large scale relief programmes."⁶⁶ But

65 UNHCR Report, op. cit., p. 3.

66 Ibid.

the funds are on the decline. "In '84 the UNHCR had to launch a special appeal to the international community for a basic survival programmes for refugees and displaced persons in the countries mentioned. The appeal had to be updated on several occasions."⁶⁷

The figures below show the manner in which the UNHCR allocates its funds:⁶⁸

<u>1985</u>		<u>1986</u>	
38% Durable Solution		42% Durable Solution	
5%	57%	5%	53%
services	Care and Maintenance	Services	Care and Maintenance

Source: UNHCR Report, Geneva, 1986, A/AC/90/657, p. 3.

On the financial side, decisions of donors to finance ICARA II projects for long term developmental assistance are constrained by several factors. To put it simply, they are concerned whether the scarce resources are put to their best use. "Most of the donors prefer

67 Ibid., p. 2.

68 For a country-wise break up the UNHCR expenditure in Africa, see Appendix, IX

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direct bilateral strategies using voluntary organizations or ministries of host governments as implementing agencies."⁶⁹

Finally, perhaps the greatest obstacle to ICARA II has been the massive drought emergency in Africa. Donors, host governments, UN and private agencies alike have been overwhelmed since ICARA II with these emergency needs. As a result long-term development assistance has suffered.

With the limited resources the UNHCR and the various agencies of the UN have made concerted efforts to find 'durable solutions' to the refugee problem in Africa. It has organized meetings, seminars to increase the international awareness of issues relating to the international protection and assistance offered to refugees in Africa. "The UNHCR organised two regional seminars directly related to the follow up of the Arusha Conference in 1979. The theme of the first seminar held in Addis Ababa at the end of January 1984 was international protection of refugees in Southern Africa. The second seminar was held in Yaounde in February 1985 on international protection and assistance as related to

69 Robert F. Gorman, op. cit., p. 289.

West and Central Africa."⁷⁰ Increased international awareness has led to greater global concern of the refugee problem.

After a careful analysis one finds that the efforts of the UNHCR and the related UN agencies alone will not suffice. It seems imperative that concerted efforts by international agencies, voluntary organizations and individual countries continue on a regular basis to alleviate the refugees p[er]light in Africa.⁷¹

70 UNHCR Report, op. cit., p. 7.

71 Ved P. Nand, op. cit., p. 25.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, Africa today shelters five million refugees, i.e. half the refugee population of the whole world. The refugee generating causes recur, and therefore the problem of refugees continues to exist. The failure to resolve refugee situations has led to what is characterized as the 'crisis in durable solutions'.¹

The refugee generating causes are multiple. Internal conflicts, colonial or racist domination, repressive governments and natural disasters are the major causes. Africa would get rid of the refugee problem only if these refugee generating causes could be eliminated.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has made an effort to eliminate conflicts and tensions, which generate the movement of refugees. The charter of the OAU clearly spells out:

- * the African States are rigorously equal to one another.
- * any effort to create subversion is forbidden.

¹ Dennis Gallagher, Introductory chapter in the International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 2, summer 1986, p. 141.

- * the borders of African States cannot be changed.²
- * African differences must be settled in Africa and by African organizations.³

Tensions and conflicts which arise and contribute to the existence of refugees seem to have sprung from the failure to observe these principles of the OAU.⁴

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has supported the liberation struggle of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) for the Liberation of Namibia, and the African National Congress (ANC) to bring down the racist regime. The elimination of Apartheid could, to a large extent, solve the refugee problems in Southern Africa. But, the efforts of the OAU alone will not suffice, the OAU has time and again renewed its appeal to the international community for their support.

Refugees are also caused by natural disasters like floods, droughts and famines. Clearly this can never be

2 Wars between the countries of the Ogaden, especially Ethiopia and Somalia, conflict between Libya and Chad, was between Morocco and Mauretania spring from the failures to respect the intangibility of frontiers.

3 CIMADE-INOSEP-MINK, 'Africa', Refugee Crises, What's to be Done? (Zed Publication, 1986), p. 78.

4 Ibid.

completely eliminated, nor its recurrence be predicted. The economies of most of the African States are fragile. They have little resources to spend on the restoration of ecological balance. Besides, the adverse ratio of agricultural production to population, plus the foreign exchange pressures are a strain on the meagre resources of the African countries.⁵ Therefore the refugee problem due to natural disasters is beyond human control and will continue for many decades to come.

Neither has the OAU been successful in preventing internal conflicts. More often than not these internal conflicts have an external dimension.⁶ Both the insurgents and the incu^mbents secure support from various African States. In addition, the OAU has been reluctant to take action in such cases, fearing that it might be accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of its member nations.⁷ The same rationale has prevented the OAU from pursuing actions designed to discourage forceful regimes and human rights abuses.

5 See Chapter I, supra p. 22

6 See Chapter I, supra p. 10

7 Jake C. Miller, "The Homeless of Africa", Africa Today, second quarter 1982, p. 29.

The 1969 OAU Convention on the Status of Refugees in Africa defined as to who constitutes a refugee.⁸ The explicit affirmations by the agreement that 'giving asylum is a humanitarian and peaceful act prompted numerous African countries to give a generous welcome to refugees.⁹ Thus Sudan has opened its frontiers to more than 500,000 refugees. Djibouti has received more than 30,000 refugees, Uganda has about 116,000 refugees and Tanzania has near to 160,000, while Angola has admitted a little less than 100,000 and Zaire more than 300,000.¹⁰

When refugees arrive suddenly and no organizations are ready to receive them there is only the local community which, in the spirit of African solidarity, shares its poverty and becomes as poor¹¹ as the refugees themselves.¹²

International assistance for the refugees does arrive though much later. The UNHCR and affiliated United Nations Organizations, voluntary agencies notably the Oxfam,

8 See Chapter I, supra p.1.

9 See Chapter III, supra p. 48.

10 CIMADE-INOSEP-MINK, op. cit., p. 131.

11 See Chapter II, supra p. 26.

12 CIMADE-INOSEP-MINK, op. cit., p. 131.

Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service have performed a valuable and selfless service.¹³

Though the refugees' immediate survival needs are met with there remains the problem of finding long term durable solutions. Since 1983 durable solutions has been on the agenda on the UNHCR's executive committee. In 1984, the second International Conference on the assistance to refugees in Africa had the 'time for durable solutions', but only modest results have been achieved.¹⁴ The ICARA II sought to overcome the shortcomings of the ICARA I. The ICARA I looked into the needs of the refugees. The ICARA II also sought to evaluate the burden imposed on the countries which host the refugees.¹⁵ It seeks to strengthen the socio-economic infrastructure of the host country which shoulders the burden of these refugees. Limited funds is a severe constraint with which the UNHCR functions.¹⁶

W.M. Smyser, UNHCR's Commissioner points out that 'solutions to the problems will not be found quickly or easily, since they have arisen out of a combination of

13 See Chapter IV, supra p. 69.

14 Barry N. Stein, "Durable Solutions for Developing Country Refugees", International Migration Review, vol. 20, no. 2, p. 260.

15 See Chapter IV, supra p. 67.

16 Ibid., p.

political, sociological or technical realities that are not likely to be altered soon. Therefore the currently available measures cannot solve the problem but they should at least offer some hope for alleviating human distress.¹⁷ Among the steps recommended are cost effective expenditure, improved coordination between agencies involved in refugee relief and those involved in other forms of assistance from emergency to development, within and outside the United Nations

- expanding efforts at voluntary repatriation, local settlement or third country resettlement. As parts of this effort, the proportion of assistance budgets devoted to such solutions should be increased.
- introducing more productive activities for refugees where such solutions are not available, in ways that support rather than undercut the economies of the asylum countries.¹⁸

These steps cannot by themselves solve the global refugee problem. They can however reverse the current trends and offer some confidence that we are moving in the right direction to help those in need.¹⁹

17 William R. Smyser, "Refugees, a never ending Story", Foreign Affairs, 1984, p. 167.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

On the whole, it is probably safe to predict that most of the refugees in Africa will be refugees for yet a number of years. Moreover, as the combined effects of drought and civil strife in a host of African countries continue, the prospects that even more refugees will be generated in the future is a real one. They may very well outnumber those who opt for voluntary repatriation over the recent few years, leaving Africa with even more refugees than it has now. Hence it is all important that the African countries and the international community at large continue to explore creative solutions to the refugee problem.²⁰


The refugee problem should be viewed as of international concern. A nation, in accepting refugees, and the international community, in responding to the challenge which they pose are acting in accord with a major provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human rights which emphasize that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in the spirit of brotherhood".²¹

20 Robert F. Gorman, "African Refugees", World Today, October 1984, p. 443.

21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article I.

APPENDICES

A-I



■ Capital
 ● Town or village
 ▲ Shelters/Reception Centres
 ★ Settlement of refugees or displaced persons.
 ▨ Region comprising a population of refugees
 Areas covered by the Special Programme for voluntary repatriation from Djibouti

Recent influx of spontaneous returnees

SOURCE:
 UNHCR REPORT, A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

A-II

(in thousands of United States dollars)

1984 AMOUNT OBLIGATED	1985		SOURCE OF FUNDS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION	1986			
	APPROVED ALLOCATION/ INIT. ESTIM.	REVISED ALLOCATION/ ESTIMATE			NEW	CONTINUED	HANDOVER	PROPOSED ALLOCATION PROJECTION
			<u>GENERAL PROGRAMMES</u>					
3,806.1 ^a	3,846.0	4,130.0	<u>Local integration</u> Rural settlement	Initial development of rural settlement in Itang area and care and maintenance of 72,000 Sudanese in nearby refugee camps		X		9,257.0
25.2	26.0	24.0	Individual refugees	Promotion of training and income-generation activities		X		23.0
117.3 ^b	60.0	60.0	Lower secondary education	Scholarships for 60 refugee students		X		60.0
99.6 ^c	143.0	149.0	Resettlement	Regional resettlement co-ordination activities with OAU Bureau for African Refugees		X		122.0
5.0	5.0	5.0	Voluntary repatriation	Voluntary repatriation of individual cases mostly to the Sudan		X		5.0
64.9	57.0	87.0	Counselling	Operational costs of counselling services in Addis Ababa		X		169.0
250.0	150.0	300.0	Supplementary aid	Temporary subsistence of destitute refugees mostly in Addis Ababa		X		300.0
303.7	373.1	350.5	Programme support and administration	See next table				362.6
-	-	2,000.0	<u>Emergency Fund</u>					
4,671.8	4,660.1	7,105.5	Sub-total (1)					10,298.6
			<u>SPECIAL PROGRAMMES</u>					
22.9	-	-	Education Account					
1.0	-	-	Trust fund for handicapped refugees					
0.5	-	-	United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa					
3,656.2		318.7	Other trust funds					
-	44.5	21.7	<u>Programme support and administration</u> Junior Professional Officer					

contd...

SOURCE:
UNHCR REPORT, A/AC.196/657.(Geneva, 1986)

UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN ETHIOPIA

contd...

A-II


(in thousands of United States dollars)

1984 AMOUNT OBLIGATED	1985		SOURCE OF FUNDS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	1986			
	APPROVED ALLOCATION/ INIT. ESTIM.	REVISED ALLOCATION/ ESTIMATE		SUMMARY DESCRIPTION	NEW	CONTINUED	HANDOVER
2,357.8	-	500.0	<u>Assistance to Ethiopian returnees</u>				-
567.2	179.4	-	Operations				-
			Programme support and administration				-
			<u>Repatriation of Ethiopian refugees from Djibouti</u>				
1,000.0	-	-	Operations				-
		258.3	Programme support and administration				-
			<u>Emergency relief assistance to returnees in Ethiopia</u>				
2,037.6	-	4,731.7	Operations				-
		308.2	Programme support and administration				-
			<u>Special programme for the rehabilitation of returnees to Ethiopia</u>				
		7,830.0	Operations				15,350.6
		-	Programme support and administration				319.4
9,623.2	223.9	13,968.6	Sub-total (2)				15,695.9
14,295.0	4,884.0	21,074.1	Sub-total (1-2)				25,994.5
144.8	133.7	119.7	REGULAR BUDGET (3)				130.8
14,439.8	5,017.7	21,193.8	GRAND TOTAL (1-3)				26,125.3
3/ Of which US\$ 27,865 incurred against overall allocation. 2/ Obligation from overall allocation. 1/ Of which US\$ 5,858 incurred against overall allocation.							

SOURCE:

UNHCR REPORT, A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

A-III



SOURCE:
ICARA REPORT, A/CONF 106/1 (Geneva, 1981)

UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN DJIBOUTI


A-IV

(in thousands of United States dollars)

1984 AMOUNT ALLOCATED	1985		SOURCE OF FUNDS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION	1986			PROPOSED ALLOCATION/ PROJECTION
	APPROVED ALLOCATION/ INIT ESTIM	REVISED ALLOCATION/ ESTIMATE			NEW	CONTINUED	HANDOVER	
			<u>GENERAL PROGRAMMES</u>					
2,095.3	1,550.0	1,651.0	Multipurpose assistance	Multisectoral care and maintenance assistance for 14,300 Ethiopian refugees in rural areas		X		1,249.0
30.5 ^a	15.0	13.0	Lower secondary education	Scholarships for lower secondary students in Djibouti		X		13.0
7.8 ^b	-	-	Resettlement					-
472.7	20.0	10.0	Voluntary Repatriation	Assistance to refugees repatriating voluntarily to Ethiopia		X		10.0
50.7	40.0	40.0	Legal assistance	Assistance to the Djibouti Government for refugee status determination		X		40.0
278.9	307.0	360.0	Counselling	Counselling services for urban and rural refugees		X		374.0
-	-	-	Handicapped	Assistance to handicapped refugees	X			20.0
84.4 ^c	80.0	60.0	Supplementary aid	Temporary assistance for individual urban refugees		X		70.0
344.8	374.0	435.5	Programme support and administration	See next table				443.3
3,365.1	2,386.0	2,569.5	Sub-total (1)					2,219.3
			<u>SPECIAL PROGRAMMES</u>					
25.3	10.0	8.2	Education Account					9.8
9.1	-	-	Trust fund for handicapped refugees					-
			<u>Other trust funds</u>					
40.4	-	-	Multipurpose assistance					-
278.8	-	-	Food					-
		374.0	<u>Emergency relief assistance to persons of concern to UNHCR</u>					-

SOURCE:
UNHCR REPORT, A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

A-V



SOURCE:
UNHCR REPORT, A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

A-VI


(in thousands of United States dollars)

1984 AMOUNT DELEGATED	1985		SOURCE OF FUNDS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION	1986			PROPOSED ALLOCATION/ PROJECTION
	APPROVED ALLOCATION/ INIT. ESTIM.	REVISED ALLOCATION/ ESTIMATE			NEW	CONTINUED	HANDOVER	
			<u>GENERAL PROGRAMMES</u>					
	75.0	150.0	<u>Local integration</u> Individual refugees	Small income-generating projects		X		25.0
451.0	4,327.0	1,684.0	Rural settlements	a) Strengthening of health and educational facilities at Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu settlements b) New settlement at Kagera and refurbishing of the settlements at Kigwa, Tabora district		X		3,077.0
415.9	1,813.0	1,121.0	Kigoma	Various types of settlement assistance to spontaneously settled refugees in various villages in the Kigoma area	X			1,155.0
1,155.4	1,206.0	977.0	Multipurpose assistance	a) Promotion of self-sufficiency of South African refugees at ANC farm in Dakawa and the PAC farm at Masuguri, plus international transport of donations (\$293.0) b) Care and maintenance and income-generating activities at Kigwa settlement (\$192.0)		X		485.0
932.0	1,134.0	1,110.0	Lower secondary education	a) 300 scholarships for refugee students (165.0) b) Completion of the Mpanda vocational training centre (\$361.0)		X		526.0
	10.0	10.0	Resettlement	Documentation and travel costs		X		10.0
60.0 ^a	205.0	105.0	Voluntary repatriation	Repatriation of individual refugees of various origins		X		5.0
155.0	167.0	205.0	Counselling	Running costs of counselling services		X		236.0
60.0 ^a	400.0	380.0	Legal assistance					-
110.0 ^a	90.0	86.0	Assistance to handi-capped refugees	Completion of a rehabilitation and training centre for handicapped		X		83.0
110.0 ^a	120.0	130.0	Supplementary aid	Care and maintenance of individual refugees		X		130.0

SOURCE:

UNHCR REPORT, A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

A-VII



SOURCE:
 ICARA REPORT: A/CONF 106/1 (Geneva, 1981)

UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN SUDAN

A-VIII

(in thousands of United States dollars)

1984 AMOUNT OBLIGATED	1985		SOURCE OF FUNDS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	SUMMARY DESCRIPTION	1986		
	APPROVED ALLOCATION/ INIT. ESTIM.	REVISED ALLOCATION/ ESTIMATE			NEW	CONTINUED	HANDOVER
			<u>GENERAL PROGRAMMES</u>				
116.6	225.0	150.0	<u>Local integration</u> Individual refugees	Individual self-sufficiency projects in urban areas		X	
32,471.3	31,644.0	16,348.0	Assistance to Ethiopian and Ugandan refugees	Multi-sectoral assistance to settlements in Eastern Sudan (Ethiopians) and Southern Sudan (Ugandans)		X	
-	1,180.0	-	Multipurpose assistance				
2,188.9	2,365.0	1,794.0	Lower secondary education	Scholarships for over 4,000 refugee students and upgrading of standards of instruction		X	
293.8 ^a	67.0	76.0	Resettlement	Travel and related costs for resettlement cases		X	
350.0	400.0	400.0	Voluntary repatriation	Pre-departure assistance to voluntary repatriants to Uganda, Ethiopia and Zaire		X	
450.0	380.0	100.0	Legal assistance	Refugee identity cards		X	
679.3	602.0	520.0	Counselling	Counselling services in Khartoum, Juba, Gedaref and Port Sudan		X	
540.0	440.0	400.0	Supplementary aid	Temporary assistance to up to 20,000 refugees in urban areas		X	
1,248.1	1,330.4	1,210.3	Programme support and administration	See next table			
2,400.0	-	2,000.0	<u>Emergency fund</u> Procurement and shipment of relief items for new arri- vals in Eastern Sudan				
40,738.0	38,633.4	22,998.3	Sub-total (1)				
			<u>SPECIAL PROGRAMMES</u>				
307.6	301.3	220.0	<u>Education Account</u> Secondary, technical and university education				

CONTD...

SOURCE:
UNHCR REPORT: A/AC/96/657. (Geneva, 1986)

UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN SUDAN

contd...

A-VIII

(in thousands of United States dollars)

1984	1985		SOURCE OF FUNDS AND TYPE OF ASSISTANCE	1986			
	APPROVED ALLOCATION/ INIT. ESTIM.	REVISED ALLOCATION/ ESTIMATE		SUMMARY DESCRIPTION	NEW	CONTINUED	HANDOVER
1,937.8	-	4,049.8	<u>Other trust funds</u> Assistance to Chadian, Ethiopian and Ugandan refugees				-
5.0	-	-	<u>Trust Fund for Handicapped refugees</u>				
5,555.3	-	64,553.9	<u>Assistance to persons of concern to UNHCR in Somalia and Sudan</u>				
	-	94.6	Operations				-
			Programme support and administration				91.2
1,135	358.4	353.3	<u>Programme support and administration</u> Junior Professional Officer				298.8
3,144	659.7	69,271.6	Sub-total (2)				610.0
5,524	39,293.1	92,269.9	Sub-total (1-2)				22,295.9
1,105	230.3	196.0	REGULAR BUDGET (3)				224.1
5,529	39,523.4	92,465.9	GRAND TOTAL (1-3)				22,520.0
of which US\$ 33,831 from overall allocation.							

SOURCE:

UNHCR REPORT; A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

**UNHCR EXPENDITURE IN 1984, 1985 AND 1986 - ALL SOURCES OF FUNDS
BY REGIONAL BUREAU/COUNTRY OR AREA**
(in thousands of US dollars)

A-IX

Regional Bureau/ Country or area	1984 Expenditures			1985 Estimates			1986 Projections		
	Operations	Programme Support and Administration ^a	Total	Operations	Programme Support and Administration ^a	Total	Operations	Programme Support and Administration ^a	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
I. AFRICA									
Algeria	3,543.7	44.6	3,588.3	3,556.0	328.0	3,884.0	3,542.0	362.6	3,904.6
Angola	6,050.2	659.6	6,709.8	4,026.5	682.2	4,708.7	3,681.0	667.6	4,348.6
Botswana	1,232.6	177.1	1,409.7	1,361.7	201.2	1,562.9	969.0	220.1	1,189.1
Burundi	974.4	254.5	1,228.9	694.7	198.8	893.5	744.2	228.6	972.8
Cameroon	747.9	322.3	1,070.2	1,548.9	407.0	1,955.9	1,346.2	462.3	1,808.5
Central African Republic	5,764.0	195.0	5,959.0	1,988.6	274.8	2,263.4	2,031.0	308.5	2,339.5
Djibouti	3,307.9	560.6	3,868.5	2,516.2	570.0	3,086.2	1,785.8	590.9	2,376.7
Egypt	2,379.1	253.7	2,582.8	1,910.0	238.1	2,148.1	1,994.0	278.0	2,272.0
Ethiopia	13,424.1	1,015.7	14,439.8	20,135.4	1,058.4	21,193.8	25,286.6	838.7	26,125.3
Kenya	3,319.3	473.9	3,793.2	2,855.1	521.4	3,376.5	2,334.0	538.5	2,872.5
Lesotho	682.4	180.1	862.5	511.0	204.0	715.0	408.0	239.5	647.5
Mozambique	312.8	231.2	544.0	383.0	277.7	660.7	534.0	302.6	836.6
Nigeria	992.1	234.5	1,226.6	876.0	209.2	1,085.2	992.0	227.3	1,219.3
Rwanda	4,249.9	188.7	4,438.6	4,291.3	224.9	4,516.2	3,775.0	274.4	4,049.4
Senegal	999.5	484.3	1,483.8	771.0	536.8	1,307.8	727.0	633.3	1,360.3
Somalia	42,459.3	1,620.5	44,079.8	37,391.1	1,169.5	38,560.6	21,717.0	1,468.4	23,185.4
Sudan	47,290.8	1,872.1	49,162.9	90,611.7	1,854.2	92,465.9	20,484.0	2,036.0	22,520.0
Swaziland	1,284.8	177.3	1,462.1	864.0	200.5	1,064.5	488.0	266.7	754.7
Uganda	5,420.9	575.0	5,995.9	5,980.5	590.9	6,571.4	3,280.0	649.0	3,929.0
United Republic of Tanzania	5,376.1	461.8	5,837.9	6,038.0	490.7	6,528.7	5,812.0	547.8	6,359.8
Zaire	9,039.2	889.1	9,928.3	10,581.6	915.3	11,496.9	8,358.0	1,079.4	9,437.4
Zambia	3,255.2	453.8	3,709.0	1,984.7	442.6	2,427.3	1,828.5	512.4	2,340.9
Zimbabwe	3,075.3	260.0	3,335.3	928.4	206.7	1,135.1	846.9	270.3	1,117.2
Other countries	4,064.1	149.5	4,213.6	2,271.1	91.5	2,362.6	2,504.6	96.5	2,601.1
Global allocation for follow-up on recommendations of pan-African Confe- rence on refugees	224.2	-	224.2	172.0	-	172.0	262.0	-	262.0
Sub-total (1)	149,419.9	11,734.8	161,154.7	204,248.5	11,894.4	216,142.9	115,730.8	15,099.4	128,830.2

SOURCE:
UNHCR REPORT, A/AC/96/657 (Geneva, 1986)

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
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