

**CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE**

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DECLARATION

Certified that the dissertation entitled  
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is for the award of the degree of Master of  
Philosophy of this University. This dissertation  
has not been previously submitted for any other  
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## P R E F A C E

The problem of security has always been an important issue in the study of international relations. It has been defined differently by various scholars; though some have defined it as purely military security others have emphasized the economic aspect. But what is common to all is that they define security with a positively state-centric view. The present international situations highlights the paradox. Nations have increasingly become dependent on each other economically, socially and militarily. Imports of raw material, superior technology and military and industrial hardwares enhance their dependency. Yet what most academicians and statesmen do, is to define security along military lines akin to their own peculiar circumstances.

Though, in essence, security has various manifestations: the absence of dangers to fundamental values of any nation; absence of fears and uncertainty among individuals and nations; the absence of danger of aggression or domination through the direct and implied use of military force and the absence of fear of hunger, disease, ecological catastrophe and foreign exploitation of human and natural resources, yet what is emphasized most is the security from aggression or domination. Power, and therefore, armament, is thus used to define security. Nations amass weapons, nuclear weapons and sophisticated equipments to gain parity

(ii)

or superiority over a potential adversary. Arms race and nuclear weapons are thus linked up with the security of the nation and military security becomes the means by which a nation defends its physical, economic and political integrity and security. Such unilateral efforts breed suspicion, fear and mistrust among nations increasing the probabilities of war and thus insecurity.

What has become essential, therefore, is to define security in more definite terms, shifting its emphasis from the war issue. Mere winning or loosing of war does not essentially mean security. Since the second World War, armament level has reached an 'overkill' capacity. Nuclear weapons, possessed by nuclear weapons powers, can destroy the world many times over. There is high level mechanization of these nuclear weapons. Thus there exist a constant fear of human error or threat of human irrationality or international terrorism. Deterrent theory has brought us to the brink of what scholars call, 'mutual assured destruction'. There is super imposition of East-West tensions on a variety of indigenous conflicts and problems of the Third World. In such case, these nations become hostage to super power hegemony and thus also the target of their conflicts. Can we allow ourselves to allowing such a development to come about spontaneously? Can we adopt an attitude of 'passive fatalism'?

The recent changes in international relations has brought our very existence to a stake. What is threatened is survival of mankind. No nation can claim of an absolute nuclear umbrella. Nuclear fall out will adversely affect the survival of human civilization. A distinctive feature of present international scene is that despite their differences and idiosyncracies, mostly all nations are increasingly bound together by ties of interdependence. Thus their survival and security too becomes interdependent on each other. Here, international security, security common to all nations, is the plausible alternative. Alastair Buchan has defined international security as "a state of affairs in which the inhibitions and disincentives to waging war are stronger than the incentives and operates with equal force on all important parties to any of the manifold disputes which conflicting ambitions and ideologies created between nations".<sup>1</sup> The extremely militarized view of security has been criticized by Hedley Bull, Stanley Hoffman, Richard Ashley and Ken Booth. Even the Brandt Commission has called for 'a new concept of security which would transcend the narrow notions of military defence and look more towards conditions conducive to peace relations'.<sup>2</sup>

1. c.f. John Garnett (ed.), Theories of Peace and Security (London: Macmillan, 1970), p.34.
2. "North-South: A Programme for Survival", Report of the Brandt Commission (London: Pan, 1980), p.147.

International security in an interdependent world, cannot be achieved without full co-operation and efforts of the world community. This has been the emphasis of the first chapter. It tries to analyse security as it transcends through individual, national and international level and its changing emphasis in the dynamic interdependent international relations. Thus in the process it also deals with the Idealist-Realist controversy of security and how interdependence has gained prominence under the present conditions. What has become essential is the pursuance of international security through multilateral efforts so that it is security for all.

Traditionally security has been strengthened by national and international measures, which, at present, are influenced by global nature of society. In the next four chapters we discuss the various means or approaches to international security which are referred to as 'concept'. An attempt has been made to discuss their historical perspective, the prerequisites of the concepts and how far do they help us towards our final goal of international security.

Second chapter deals with the concept of 'balance of power'. It is an international system which legitimizes force and defines security in terms of power. It is a

system where states, in the absence of a higher authority regulating the relations between them, seek security by creating power arrangements that reduce the risk of attack upon them. The third chapter concentrates on concept of 'collective security'. Based on a global commitment to international peace and security, it implies acknowledgement of the belief that security is indivisible. It may also be called the first sincere effort, by nations of the world, to institutionalize peace and security of all the nations through the United Nations Organization. In a broader sense, it has, as its objective the absence of war, by taking into account the wider requirements of peace and security.

Chapter four deals with 'concepts of disarmament and control'. In strict literalness, disarmament is a simple means to peace. It considers arms as the sole cause of war and insecurity and thus tries to strike at the roots of the problem by eliminating weapons as a means of conflict. Arms control, on the contrary considers arms as one of the several causes of insecurity and thus tries to limit them, qualitatively and quantitatively. Along with it tries to eliminate fear of international insecurity, through 'confidence building measures' and 'crisis stability'. 'Concept of deterrence' is the next approach to security in the fifth.



It deals with the primary objectives of a nation to dissuade a potential adversary from instigating war through a cost-gain hypothesis. Arms race, and notions like 'balance' or 'parity' play an important role in deterrence. This approach has gained more importance in the nuclear age. The issues raised in the different chapters find consistent and analytical evaluation of the concept of international security in the concluding section.

Different scholars have presented varied views of international security and thus have rendered it cumbersome to be defined in lucid terms. In the above mentioned chapters an attempt has been made to analyze the different approaches about international security in a comparative perspective. For this we have adopted a descriptive - analytical approach in our study.

To complete this work I am indebted to Prof.K.P.Misra, my Supervisor, without whose regular, timely and affectionate guidance, this work would not have been possible. I am also grateful to Prof. M.L. Sondhi, Chairman and all other teachers of the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament for their encouragement. I have also sincere regards for all my friends and well wishers for their time to time help.

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## Chapter I

### CONCEPT OF SECURITY

#### I

Security is an elusive concept that is quite difficult to define in absolute and definite terms. It is both a relative and an uneven notion. In the 'state of war' that nations live there will always be a modicum of insecurity as all the nations pursue the policy of power aggrandizement and national interest. Although security is a universal experience and constant preoccupation of mankind in its individual, social and corporate experience, the acute sense of insecurity in all spheres, however, reflects not only the ineffectivity of the means adopted to ensure security or the relative authority of the magnitude and sources of insecurity, but also the elusiveness in the conceptualization of security problems.

The American Heritage Dictionary defines the term 'secure' as 'to be free from risks or dangers' and security means anything that 'ensures safety'. Security being a relative concept, its referent threats are very vague and subjective feeling of safety has no necessary connection whatsoever with actually being safe. Security in any comprehensive sense is beyond reasonable possibility of attainment.

### Individual Security

Individual lies at the very root of the international system. He faces threats from all sides from among his fellow beings, from nature, and moral and psychological threats. Barry Buzan states that four basic types of threats an individual perceives.<sup>1</sup> These are physical threats (pain, injury, death); economic threats (seizure of property, denial of access to work and resources); threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of civil liberties); and threats to status (demotion or public humiliation). The existence of these threats to individuals within the context of human society points to a great dilemma - how to balance the freedom of action for the individual against the actual threats which such freedom poses for others. Individuals or collective human behavioural units, existing with others in an anarchical relationship, find their freedom maximized at the expense of their security. Kenneth N. Waltz puts it this way, "States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted insecurity should be accepted".<sup>2</sup> According to the social contractualists

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1. Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Sussex, England: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1983), pp.19-20.
  2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Massachusetts: Addison, Wesley, 1979), p.112.

like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke "the states becomes the mechanism by which people seek to achieve adequate levels of security against social threats". The paradox is that the state itself becomes a source of social threats to the individual. A rather serious level of threat can come to individuals directly from state institutions what Johan Galtung calls "structural violence".<sup>3</sup> Yet much of it is direct as well. The persecution of Jews by the Nazis in Germany, legal discrimination against Blacks in South Africa, and police atrocities in India are examples of such threats that individuals face.

Political terrorism, is also a threat to individual's security as the latter face risks of random victimization. Terrorism, like any other form of political violence, not only undermines individual security directly, it undermines security at every level: individual, national and international. Another aspect where individual security gets linked up with that of state is foreign policy. The nature of modern war, high risks and heavy casualties, makes the decision about what constitutes a threat to security of a state, a matter of considerable public concern as it puts individual security too at stake. The logic of deterrence

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3. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Journal of Peace Research (International Peace Research Institute, Norway), Vol.2, (1969), pp.166-91.

theory is a thin thread on which to hang national security. The deterrence theory displaces the divorce between individual and state security at the highest and most visible level. Though, the individual, does not generally cause national security concern, there are also other range of individually oriented security concerns and policies which have substantial implications for national security in various ways.<sup>4</sup>

### National Security

The term 'national security' has long been used by politicians as a theoretical phrase and by military leaders to describe a policy objective. It refers to it both as an analytical concept and a field of study. By national security, the modern social scientists mean the "ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats". One of the first scholars to define national security, explicitly was Walter Lippmann. He stated "a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice his interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war".<sup>5</sup> Arnold Wolfers pointed out a simple translation of the national

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4. See Barry Buzan, n.1, pp.32-33.

5. Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), p.51.

interests into "national security interests"<sup>6</sup>. In objective sense, it measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values might be attacked. Wolfers states that Lippmann's definition implies that "security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in accord with the common usage of the term".<sup>7</sup> Michael H.H. Louw argues, national security includes traditional defence policy and also "the non-military actions of a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal and international objectives."<sup>8</sup> Ian Bellany defines it as a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.<sup>9</sup>

All the above definitions point to one thing - their bias towards great powers in their security definitions. Discussion is usually associated with great powers, who by

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6. Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", Political Science Quarterly (New York), 67, 1952, pp.481-502.
  7. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962) p.150.
  8. Michael, H.H.Louw, National Security (Pretoria: Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria), 1978.
  9. Ian Bellany, "Towards a Theory of International Security", Political Studies (Surrey, England) 29:1 (1981), p.102.

definition are more able to approach perfect security than their lesser counterparts. Thus, explaining the concept of security as a protection of core values, in the context of small states, Talukder Manuruzzaman states, "By security we mean the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation; political independence and territorial integrity".<sup>10</sup> Traditionally speaking, security in international relations means immunity, to varying degrees, of a state to threats emanating from outside the boundaries. The concept of security among nations is very complex and open to varying interpretations. It can be defined differently due to the basic contradictions present in the international system. The dilemma of universal cold war and the growing complexity of the system makes things even more difficult.

### International Security

In the regional context, nations try to achieve national security through alliances and regional security systems. Some level of security can be achieved by entering into cooperation with other nations. Disarmament and arms control agreement between the super powers and other powers have contributed to enhance security. The widening economic and social co-operation among nations and military inter-

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10. Talukder Maniruzzaman, "The Security of Small States in the Third World", Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, No.25 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1982), p.15.

dependence among states hope to bring them together towards a more necessary objective namely: international security. However, scholars have also differed significantly from the exclusively state-centric view. Many of them view it in its international perspective, as a problem of security in international system and thus have tried to mitigate some of the more Hobbesian characteristic of a realist position. Martin Wight argues, "If there is an international society, then there is order of some kind to be maintained, or even developed, it is not fallacious to speak of a collective interest, and security acquires a broader meaning - it can be enjoyed or pursued in common... It becomes possible to transfer to International Politics some of the categories of constitutionalism".<sup>11</sup>

Mortan Kaplan in the post war trends of behaviourism and System Analysis, did attempt a conceptual analysis. His work tends to study all aspects of human behaviour as a part of total pattern which constitutes a behavioural system.<sup>12</sup> National interest and national security are treated as simply one aspect. Further, security of the national system is closely linked with the security of sub-system which makes

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11. Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations", in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p.103.
  12. Mortan Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1957).



up the national system. Systems approach to security argues that security of the parts of the system is inextricably intertwined with that of the whole. The earliest of the modern systemic analysts of security - the idealist of inter-war period - refused to distinguish the security of the parts from that of the whole. These scholars have argued that various segments of the international system are interlinked and that they are called 'inter-dependent'.

✓ The oil and energy crisis of early 1970s have made this interdependent nature of nation states all the more explicit. The meaning of the term 'security' can be as diverse as the condition of different states to which it applies. This not only adds to our difficulties in analysing the concept but also adds a hazard to its use in a general sense. Due to its fragmented nature, national security cannot be compared with more stable and rigorously definable concepts like wealth, and it cannot be pegged to any single indicator like military capability. However, what is common among all these contending schools of thought is that they tend to define the concept of security in external or outward directed terms, i.e., external to the commonly accepted units of analysis in international relations namely, the state.

✓ The security of the units below the level of states are rarely, if ever, been an important point of issue in most western discussions and analysis of the concept of security.

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 One must remember that we owe this world, not to our ancestors, but to our descendents. For them we have to leave a world in which they can exist, just as we had inherited from our forefathers. This view underlies the basic necessity of preservation of the international system. Today, when nobody can escape a nuclear holocaust, whether it be a nuclear power or not, we cannot think of security of just one nation. The development and inventions in science have shrunk the globe, making all of us vulnerable to same threats. Mechanization of weapon system have brought us to the precipice, where even a human error causing war will send all systems out of control. A nuclear war, once initiated, knows no end - it would be an endless game of destruction, extinction "the death of death", to borrow a phrase from Jonathan Schell.<sup>13</sup> In all, what matters is security. Security, that is indivisible, universal and equal for all. The universal system of international security is not merely a theoretical issue. It encompasses all sphere of human life; military, political, economic, cultural and humanitarian. Expressed in concrete terms, the concept of security perceived is multi-dimensional and inter-dependent. As a noted scholar has remarked, "this age of interdependence

13. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of Earth (London: Pan Books, 1982), p.119.

has robbed us of most of the realities which justified a medieval fortress like approach to politics and security". )

The present day circumstances are such that military and technological superiority is not only no guarantee to security, but really amounts to a threat to security by transferring decision making, in the final analysis, from human beings to machines. There has been an emerging realization that absolute security cannot be guaranteed by any nation, not even by the super powers. The new weapons like the Inter Continental Ballestic Missiles (ICBM) and the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) have transcended the national boundaries.

The dangerously fractured international system can be restructured only on the basis of mutual cooperation and interaction at global and inter-state level for preservation of peace. Security at national level is a relative term. Robert Osgood notes, "national security like danger, is an uncertain quality; it is relative not absolute".<sup>14</sup> Efforts to secure one nation are seen as a source of insecurity by another. This is quite evident from the case of Pakistan and India. Efforts by one to reconstitute and

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14. R.E.Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1942), p.443.

strengthen its military system hastens a similar action on the other side of the border and thus bring them unnecessarily to the brink of war, the acceleration of political tension and instability, the persistence of conventional military conflict, the rising danger of nuclear wars, the growing economic and social burdens of arms will not be eased if nations persist in pursuing the security option along familiar avenues. As long as nations pursue their security unilaterally, it is usually bound to fail. Military competition is a blind alley towards peace and security. The external directedness of security which has its origin virtually in the systemic concept encompasses not only an ideology, but also a group of states subscribing to ideology.

✓ To be precise, security being indivisible, cannot be approached piecemeal; if security is threatened any-where, it poses a threat everywhere. Even when we view security in a bipolar world, the security of large number of bloc states is endangered in spite of super power guarantees. This is because over the decades the theatre of war has shifted from Europe to the Third World.

Hence it would be appropriate to look at security in an inductive sequence, i.e. security of components leading to that of the whole. Robert Jervis argues that, "attempt of one state to achieve security precipitate a feeling of

insecurity in other states. All states tend to assume the worst of others and respond accordingly. Their collective action unintentionally generates a spiral of insecurity".<sup>15</sup>

[In an anarchical situation, there can be no solution to this security dilemma. This is further exacerbated by the inflexible images that it generates in the mind of decision makers both of their own intentions and that of their opposite members. The search for 'great power linkage' and the "strategic consensus' by many developing states creates problems of regional security. It is important to remember that a clear distinction must be made between 'state security' and 'regime-security' because more often than not, external linkages are sought more for regime security.

Post war developments have strengthened the western notion of what security is all about. Dividing the world into two halves and stabilizing the division by means of balance of terror, the cold war has frozen the predominant western notion of security in a bipolar mould. The concept of "alliance security"<sup>16</sup> - whether of the Atlantic alliance or the Warsaw Treaty alliance - has, therefore, been super-imposed on the concept of national and state security, while

15. Robert Jervis, "The Spiral of International Security" in The Perceptions and Misperceptions of the International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp.63-76.

16. Mohammad Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn," International Affairs (London), Vol.60 No.1 (Winter 1983-84), pp.41-51.

its externally oriented thrust remains unchanged. The three major emphasis of western security orientation are - its external orientation, strong linkage with system security and its virtually indistinguishable nature from the security system of the two major alliance bloc. But we cannot expect national security to exhibit much unity of meaning in any general sense. The meaning of security will be nearly as diverse as the conditions of different states to which it applies. (One of the paradox of contemporary international relations system is that war has frequently resulted not simply from perception of insecurity but from the very initiatives taken by states to preserve their security.)

The concept of national security as prevailing among the members of Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) is "a direct reflection and adaptation of the Soviet concepts and theory of national security in the Soviet Union. The theory of national security, quite unlike the Western practice, is encapsulated in strict, officially endorsed concepts and doctrines".<sup>17</sup> The essence of Soviet military doctrine is that the war of future is going to be decisively armed collision between the two contrasting or opposing socio-political and economic systems. Marxist ideology has produced guide-

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17. F.Rubin, "The Theory and Concept of National Security in Warsaw Pact Countries", International Affairs (London), Vol.58, Autumn (1982), pp.648-57.

lines of 'inseparable unity' to cement the relationship between theory and practice. The practice of national security should be firmly based on its theory and its operational feasibility must be proved in practice. The fundamental principle underlying the Warsaw Pact's collective perception of national security is the 'inseparable unity of the external and internal security of the state and the nation of workers, peasants and intelligentsia.' High level of security consciousness is a highly desirable quality among the communists. Despite absence of the term 'national security' in Soviet terminology, the excessive level of 'national security consciousness' is constantly apparent. Soviets desire to achieve strategic superiority is expressed in present Marxist-Leninist doctrines. The Soviet political leadership as a collective entity also identifies itself and its feeling of its own personal and collective security with the security of socialist state and nation.

✓ The Third World, particularly the small states, differ still in their perception of national security. They lack external orientation and strong linkages with system security. Here, uneven economic development, growing disparities in wealth and income, communal and ethnic tensions contribute to lack of consensus of societal

issues. In many Third World states the core values of the regime, with self preservation at the very core, are often at extreme variance with the core values cherished by large segment of the masses.<sup>18</sup> The emergence of numerous independent states in the wake of decolonization has added new dimensions to international security. Most of these nations are by all standard small and, therefore, vulnerable to instability. They lack stability at home and sometimes their internal threats are 'externalized' by regimes which are targets of such threats. "The history of state formation in these Third World nations and the pattern of their elite recruitment are responsible for their different perceptions of security. This has been termed as the 'Third World syndrome' in which nations are subjected to a stigma of smallness in terms of their total capacity to deter their security irrespective of their land area, population and wealth.<sup>19</sup> There is also a remarkable difference in the way which Third World security relate to the security of the whole - the international system. Unlike the developed states' security concerns, which are firmly inter-

18. Mohammad Ayoob (ed.); Regional Security in the Third World (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p.11.

19. M.Abdul Haziz, "National Security and Small States: A Third World Perspective", in BIISS Journal (Dhaka), Vol.7, No.3, July 1984.



linked with those of the system as a whole, the third world security concerns do not readily effect the international balance".<sup>20</sup>

The term security, in the context of the Third World, is quite different in its connotation. Issues of regional security in the developed world are defined primarily in cold war terms and thus largely indivisible from the issues of systemic security. On the other hand, most of the salient regional internal security issues of the Third World have a life of their own, independent, in most cases, of super power rivalry. Yet very thin thread divides the inter-state dimension of regional security conflict from its intra-state dimensions. Thus the integral strifes are always more prone to transformation into international dispute. Regional security is seen as an antidote for intra-state and inter-state conflicts, especially since the two sets of conflicts in the Third World are quite often interlinked.

#### Interdependence Among Nations

The analysis of security points out that security at no level can be achieved unilaterally.. The existence of

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20. Disturbances in states like Israel being an exception, as Israel is not regarded a third world state for this analysis.

one hundred and fifty-nine political units organized as nation states and acting as such on the international scene, makes security itself interdependent. Interdependence has been made to mean almost any sort of active relationship between states and any other entities. It represents a very major problem of definition. However, there is some meaning: when states are said to be interdependent it is because their actions affect one another, whether these effects are symmetrical or asymmetrical. Interdependence may be in fact independent of the government or created by the government or both. The phrase 'era of interdependence' expresses a wide spread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing. The power of nations have become more elusive and "the calculations of power are even more delicate and deceptive than in previous ages."<sup>21</sup>

Henry Kissinger, a deep rooted classicist has stated, "the traditional agenda of international affairs among the major powers, the security of the nations, no longer defines our perils, ...now we are entering a new era, old international patterns are crumbling... the world has become interdependent, in economics, in communications and in human aspirations".<sup>22</sup>

21. Stanley Hoffman, "Notes on Elusiveness of Moder Power," International Journal (Toronto), 30: (Spring 1975), p.184.

22. "The New National Partnership", Speech by Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at Los Angeles, January 24, 1975. News Release, Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Media Service, p.1.

Economic interdependence is taken to mean a high degree of mutual need arising from trade and investment within the international economy.

Some modern scholars divorce economics from politics to a great extent. These Modernists see scientific and technological advancement as creating 'a global village' and believe that burgeoning social and economic transactions are creating a "world without borders".<sup>23</sup> The Traditionalists call these assertions 'unfounded globaloney' and point out to the continuity in world politics. Military power still remain dominant; witness nuclear deterrence, Vietnam and the Middle East. The prevalence of nationalism casts doubts upon the modernist preposition that nation state is fading away.<sup>24</sup> The theory of 'classical' territoriality and the factors threatening its survival still stand. There are indicators pointing in another direction; not to 'universalism' but to retrenchment; not to interdependence but to self-sufficiency... in short, trends towards a "new territoriality".<sup>25</sup> The modernists fail to understand that

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23. Lester Brown, World Without Borders: The Interdependence Among Nations (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, 1972).

24. This is reflected in the article by John Herz, "Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of Nation States" in his book, The Nation State and the Crisis in World Politics (New York: David McKay Camp Inc., 1976).

25. Ibid.

change in technology and increase in socio-economic transactions will lead to a new world, where state and their control of force will be no longer important".<sup>26</sup> The traditionalists fail to perceive and interpret present days' multidimensional social, economic and ecological interdependence. In short, neither have the framework for understanding the politics of 'global interdependence'.<sup>27</sup> The era is marked with both continuity and change in which no one model can explain all the situations.

"What are the major patterns of world politics, when interdependence, particularly economic interdependence, is extensive".<sup>28</sup> Interdependence affects world politics and behaviour of the states; but governmental actions also influences patterns of behaviour. By creating rules and accepting procedures for certain kinds of activity, government regulates and control transnational and interstate relations. System of interdependence is variable, both in the sense that some countries obviously benefit more from it than others. Gregory Schmid ~~had~~ argued in mid seventies

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26. Robert Angell, Peace on the March: Transnational Participation (New York: Von Nostrand, 1969).

27. The term is derived from Stanley Hoffman, "Choices", Foreign Policy, (Washington), 12 (Fall, 1973), p.6.

28. See Richard Rosenance and Arthur Steim, "Interdependence: Myth and Reality", World Politics, (Princeton, New Jersey), October 1973; and Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Interdependence: Some Long Term Trends and Recent Changes", International Organisation, (Cambridge), 29, No.4.

"We have reached the end of thirty years period of growing interdependence. The trend has always reversed itself with national controls issuing elsewhere. We are entering for better or for worse, an era of new mercantilism".<sup>29</sup>

As an analytical concept 'interdependence', most simply defined, means mutual dependence. But we do not limit the term to situations of mutual benefits as it would exclude from interdependence, cases of mutual dependence such as strategic deterrence between the USA and the Soviet Union. The rising tide of interdependence has created a brave new world of co-operation to replace that of international conflict. The difference between traditional international politics and politics of economics and ecological interdependence is not the difference between the world of 'zero-sum game' and the 'non-zero sum game'.<sup>30</sup> In the wake of concepts like global interdependence, the traditional maximax - state will act in their national interest and that they will attempt to maximize power - become more or less ambiguous.

Beginning with the early nineteenth century, certain trends became visible which tended to endanger the functioning

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29. Gregory Schmid, "Interdependence Has Its Limit", Foreign Policy (Washington), No.21 (Winter 1975-76) p.188.

30. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown Company, 1977), pp.9-10.

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of the classical system. The traditional relationship between war and territorial power and sovereignty were altered considerably. The possibilities like economic blockade emerged during World War-I and became more significant during the Second World War. The myth of economically 'self contained state' was shattered by the Industrial-Revolution whereby countries like Britain and Germany became dependent for imports. Therefore, to survive economically in major wars, big powers ought to have control over the whole continent. Now, defence meant defending more than a nation, it had to extend around half the globe. With the emerging trends of political beliefs, nations became more susceptible to undermining from within. Loyalties towards nation came to be supported by ideologies like Bolshevism, Nazism and Fascis. Aerial and atomic warfare adversely affected the territoriality of nations radically. Warfare has now changed "from a fight to a process of devastation".<sup>31</sup> Today, not even the two halves of the globe remain impermeable. It is no longer a question of enlarging an area of protection and of substituting one unit of security for another. "The scientific revolution has been so fast moving as to make, almost impossible, the task of military men, whose responsibility it is, to

31. See Julius Stone, Legal Control of International Conflict (New York: 1954), p.611.

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anticipate the future".<sup>32</sup> Military planning cannot make fact of this future stay long enough to analyse. But the re-analysis of 'territorial state' by John Herz in his article "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on future of the Nation State", brings him to the conclusion that 'urge of nationalism' was invincible as is evident from the struggle of Vietnam against USA and that of Israel against the Arab World. The 'territorial urge' and the urge to maintain one's 'sovereignty' and 'independence' have not diminished overall these decades of nuclear peril. The second strike capability of nuclear states and the nuclear multipolarity has made war dangerously dangerous. Thus what the states now try is to avoid war. Over the years the super powers, the US and the Soviet Union have emerged as conservative, both intent to consolidate the status-quo. In short, "the dangerousness of war has reduced the dangers of war".<sup>33</sup> All this makes us reconsider the validity of the state system that has been questioned earlier by John Herz.<sup>34</sup> The real position is that "In fact, States can and do co-operate with one another, both on a regional and a global

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32. Rogen Hilsman, "Strategic Doctrines for Nuclear War," in K.Kaufmann (ed.), In Military Policy and National Security (New Jersey: Princeton, 1956), p.42.

33. Inis, L.Claude, Jr. The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p.9.

34. John Herz, n.24, pp.99-123.

level... It is the system of states that is, at present, the only political expression of the unity of mankind, and it is to co-operation among states, in the United Nations and elsewhere, that we have chiefly to look if we are to preserve such sense of common human interests, as there may be, to extend it and to translate it into concrete action".<sup>35</sup>

The debate regarding security emerge at various levels in various forms. Generally, the contest took the form of see-saw struggle, as outlined by E.H.Carr, between the idealist security oriented views on the one hand and the realist power oriented view on the other. It is a struggle between the system-centric and state-centric views on security. The debate is most clear in Seyom Brown's book.<sup>36</sup> It casts doubts about the utility of the state-centric view as transnationalism and interdependence at their way into the central parameters of state - centric view. During early 1970s, it was widely proclaimed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye that "nature of world politics was changing" and interdependence became one of the most prominent ideas. But in more general terms, "interdependence was considered to denote both greater complexity and greater element of common

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35. Hedley Bull, "The States Perspective Role in World Affairs", Daedalus (Cambridge) (Fall 1979), p.120.

36. Seyom Brown, New Forces in World Politics (Washington: Brookings Institutions, 1974).



common fate in international relations".<sup>37</sup> Realist model, it was argued, was responsible for generating inaccurate images of world politics and giving rise to counter productive policies. It was unable to explain interdependence in terms of power and national interest. The disjunction between realism and interdependence misrepresents the role of power in realist thinking. C.F.Doran has insisted that interdependence implies the comparative absence of power politics.<sup>38</sup> Interdependent relations, unlike power relations are characterized by co-operation and consensus. They generate reciprocity and thus exercise of power is excluded from amongst such relations.

Even the scholars among the realist school are divided amongst themselves as the Reductionists and the Holistics.<sup>39</sup>

- (a) Reductionists regard human society as an 'aggregate of human action' and explanation couched in terms of language and concepts of individuals who make up the society.
- (b) Holistics argue society is a 'whole' or a 'totality' and explanations are couched in terms of properties which describe the whole.

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37. J.N.Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence (London: Francis Pirters, 1980).

38. C.F.Doran, Oil Politics and the Rise of Co-dependence (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p.198.

39. This is based on, A.Levinson's, Knowledge and Society (New York: Pegasus Publishers, 1974), p.2 where he used the term 'Individualism' and 'Collectivism'.

The realist study of international security occupy the twilight zone between the two. State is considered and treated as a rational actor. The Reductionists are cast in terms of the characteristics and motivations of the state. On the other hand, the Holistics treat the interaction in terms of properties of the system.<sup>40</sup> But both the schools, of course, criticised the new wave of interdependence literature. They were well aware of the false dichotomy established by writers as C.F. Doran, who presuppose that while interdependence generates cooperation power must precipitate conflict.

Kenneth Waltz has provided us with the most important Holistic attack on interdependent school of thought. From his perspective it is inappropriate to describe the contemporary international relations in terms of interdependence only. A political conception of interdependence emerges only when it is defined in terms of mutual dependence which thereby precipitates reciprocity among the interdependent parties. Although, he acknowledges the operation of interdependence in international relations, he refuses to accept that only growth and decline of trade, can by itself, tell us about interdependence. The central structural feature

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40. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addison-Wisely, 1979).

is the distribution of capabilities among states.<sup>41</sup> It is accepted by the realists that there is a link between power and interdependence, but it is asserted that the character of power cannot be accommodated by realist after its transformation by interdependence. Reductionists argue that there is a complex relationship between conflict and co-operation and that both processes are influenced by power. The Holistics, coming to a more dramatic conclusion, argue that far from becoming the dominant characteristic, interdependence is diminishing in importance.

Here, one should take note of the point that the position taken by Kenneth Waltz, as regards the realists, have been exaggerated. This dissociation between interdependence and realism is a myth. They have co-existed. T.C. Schelling argues that "even wars, almost invariably require a degree of co-operation. Conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and requires some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation".<sup>42</sup> Schelling defines interdependence not by co-operation but by the idea of common fate. For him, interdependence also involved power, because strategy, the main product of

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41. Ibid., p.97.

42. T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.83.

his theory of interdependent decisions, invokes mutual attempts which has been interlinked to interdependence. Of this, one is associated with symmetrical relationships and the other with asymmetrical ones. Keohane and Nye acknowledge the need to distinguish further between two dimensions of powers.<sup>43</sup>

- (i) Sensitivity, is associated with demonstration effect, where behaviour in one country is copied by another.
- (ii) Vulnerability, arise when interdependence is asymmetrical, when one state is able to influence the behaviour of the other, a more vulnerable or dependent state. The idea of asymmetry encourages the idea that power is a one way phenomenon, while interdependence pre-supposes that power can be exercised by either party in relationship.

Keohane and Nye base these analysis on the fact that power is defined as the "ability to get others to do something they otherwise would not do". This equates power with a cause and effect relationship. It gives rise to another problem of 'unintended consequences'; if a state increases its military budget in an attempt to increase its security the obvious result would be unintended - the nearest rival taking up similar actions. The study of realist theory of

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43. R.Keohane and J.Nye, n.30, p.11.

interdependence reveals that they start from the premises that relationship amongst state are characterized by interdependence; e.g. to end a war requires the co-operation of all or most of the parties involved in the conflict. Realists, being sensitive to this issue, have recognised the need to define power in terms of mutual reciprocal relations. Yet it has been argued that "there is a one to one relationship between power measured by effects on outcome".<sup>44</sup>

The attempt to dissociate realism from interdependence has an important consequence which is apparent when attention is paid on the concept of power. The theory of interdependence which accepts that power continues to play an important role, argues that analysis of power becomes more complex as relationship becomes more interdependent. For the realists, power is not merely associated with capabilities but also victory and dominance. When parties are interdependent, the intersection of their independence dictates the outcome and determines whether or not exercise of power has been successful.

Interdependence has come under attack from many scholars on various issues:

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44. Ibid.

(a) In spite of the fact that economic issues today form far more a part of foreign policy than before, yet rise of economic factors do not displace military factors altogether. States, and only states, are responsible for military decisions.

(b) The interest in interdependence may be seen as a temporary phenomenon arising out of particular security issues and have their basis in specific historical circumstances. Once they vanish, traditional military concern once again assume the dominant position.

(c) The view that interdependence and transnationalism reduce the centrality of states, is an illusion of the 1950s. The number of new states that emerged as a result of nationalism are themselves an example. F.Northedge disputes the view that state is under attack. For him, it is an illusion that transnationalism reduces the centrality of state. "In fact, state is not declining in importance, it is growing".<sup>45</sup> Hedley Bull states it is wrong to speak that demise of State can be predicted and gives reasons for it. "(i) States have quite often come under attack by other organisations but have still survived and continues domination in the international system. Some of the characteristics - monopoly of legal force - will always allow it a dominant

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45. F.Northedge, "Transnationalism: An American Illusion", Millennium (London), 5(1976), pp.21-28.

position. (ii) State has become common political form for the whole international political system. (iii) The functional extension of the State has actually increased its power. Though ethnic groups, transnational political parties and international organization have edged their way closer to the centre-stage, yet there are no agreed rules which define their place in universal political order".<sup>46</sup>

Interdependence is not a unitary phenomenon either in terms of the issue areas to which it applies or to the actors in the system. Two actors may be interdependent in an issue area but not in the other; while the same actors may be dependent in one period, it might not be the same in other. Therefore: Is security possible, individually, for all the states? If not, what is the way out to ensure security? Can security be thought of in terms of economic, social and political aspects or should it be analysed only in terms of military aspect? Should we take a reductionist or a holistic view of security - a state-centric or a system centric view? Do state still continue to dominate the international political system? And, is military policy still the central focus for the study of international relations?

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46. Hedley Bull, "The Structure that Prevent Collapse into Anarchy, Times Education Supplement (London), 30, September 1977, p.13.

Obviously the answer is: we should pursue the goals towards international security. Rapid transformation in international relations has changed the whole picture. Though, international relations allow no futurology, some statements can be made. Transnationalism and interdependence have brought other actors into prominence and it has made it nearly impossible to explain international relations solely by referring to states. But still, states have been expanding both internationally and domestically. They are becoming more responsible for the needs of its population. Interdependence, per-se, does not remove the explanatory theories of power; it only does so if those theories are still seen as dealing with all that is to be explained. The problem faces those foreign policy analysts who continue to see the world as only composed of states or who see international relations inexplicable by reliance on State behaviour. Interdependence may reduce the ability of foreign policy analysts to explain the central aspects of international relations; but does not remove it. For those who cling on to the state centric view of the world, the current complexities will remain unfathomable.

International insecurity can be defined as "the sum total of all the factors that can lead to serious confrontations between the major powers, to increases in the threat



or in the reality of contagious or uncontrolled violence and to such a deterioration of, or such an increase in the predictability of, international economic transactions as to threaten the economic lives of a large number of people".<sup>47</sup> Pressures of defense dilemma makes a very good case for an international security strategy, since high risks of mutual deterrence need to be offset by sufficient management of relations to ensure that the probabilities of major conflict remain as close to zero as possible. Where a power struggle is in operation, the basic conditions for an international strategy cannot be met. States often loose control over the factors which provide security. An international security strategy depends on the management of relations among states and these are notoriously unstable. The foundations of a stable order is relative security - and therefore the relative insecurity of other members. The conditions of relative security is seen by realist to provide a solution to what they refer to as security dilemma. The dilemma exists for so long as any party in the arena persist in trying of absolute security, instead of common security. Relative security can be achieved only if all parties cooperate in the endeavour. The structure of dilemma is

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47. Stanley Hoffman, "Security in the Age of Turbulence: Means of Response", Adelphi Papers 167 (IISS-London), (Summer 1981), p.1.

clearly revealed when expressed in matrix form as:<sup>48</sup>

A MATRIX OF SECURITY DILEMMA:

	Antagonistic search for absolute security	Co-operative search for relative security
Antagonistic Search for absolute security	Absolute insecurity for both states A & B	Absolute insecurity for state B Absolute Security for state A
Co-operative search for relative security	Absolute insecurity for state A Absolute security for state B	Relative security for states A & B

John E.Mroz, states "security is a relative freedom from harmful threats".<sup>49</sup> This definition avoids an absolutist bias. But all these definitions do, to some extent, point out the criteria for national security and focus primarily, on security at national level. But they leave

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48. R.D.Mckinlay and R.Little, Global Problems and World Order (London: Francis Pinters, 1986).

49. John E.Mroz, Beyond Security: Private Perceptions Among Arabs and Israelis (New York: International Peace Academy, 1980), p.105.

out crucial questions: what are the core values - a fixed or a floating focal point? Does 'victory' mean anything in the contemporary conditions of warfare? Are subjective and objective meaning of security separable in any way. What right does the state have to define its security values in terms which require it to have influence beyond its territory, with the almost inevitable consequences of infringement of other's security interests which thus implies. This brings us back to the point that national security cannot be considered in isolation from the whole structure of international system.

The definitions of security given by Lippmann, Wolfers and Bellany tend towards an absolutist view of security, a great power orientation. The logic of national security strategy by itself leads to a militarized and security obsessed society. But at the international level the strategy leads to a highly charged dilemma when we take up international security strategy. The security policies focuses on the sources and causes of threats, the purpose being not to block but to reduce and eliminate threats by political actions. This makes an attractive alternative to the costly and competitive security seeking of unregulated national strategies. "To ensure security to all nations, big and small, the most feasible alternative is common

security, which has been the contribution of the Palme commission".<sup>50</sup> What the commission has tried to do is something idealistic and optimistic. Therefore, international security must rely on commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction. What is the principle of common security need is that their application must be tailored to realities of political and military circumstances in specific situations. The close relationship between progress towards political accommodation of arms negotiations has been one of the guiding principles of an approach to security principles. All nations will be united in destruction in case a nuclear war occurs. Recognition of this interdependence means nations must begin to reorganize their security policies in co-operation with others. It is essential to create an irreversible process. Nations must understand that the maintenance of world peace must be given high priority than the assertion of their own ideological or political positions. Today, no unilateral security can be obtained. Economically, politically, socially and militarily we live in an increasingly interdependent world. Peace cannot be achieved through military confrontation, the same as

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50. Common Security: A Programme of Disarmament, The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues Under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme (London: Pan Books, 1982).

international security cannot be reached without military cooperation. However, security still remains a relative rather than an absolute term. It is imperative for the nations that they should reconcile the contradictions between individual national security interests and overall interests of international peace and security. Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, noted that the "two super powers are condemned to co-exist in a nuclear age". The idea of international security is often linked up with the idea of 'one world' which inspired the world community after the Second World War. As long as we keep thinking in terms of the first, second and third world or in terms of the developed, developing and underdeveloped worlds, no basis for common security will be achieved. To be international, security has to be achieved in terms of one and only one world. It will not be possible unless all the nations perceive in its, equal stakes for all the nations.

No clearcut distinction can be drawn between 'a concept' and 'a policy' in so far as security is concerned. Concepts on which states and international community as a whole rely for their security have various manifestations. The 'Balance of Power' may describe the general character

of international system where states, in absence of high authority regulating the relations between them, seek security by creating power arrangements that reduce the risk of attack upon them. The difficulty with this is that no hegemonic power can sustain the role indefinitely. It might also refer to a situation where equivalent power is held by two or more nations or group of nations and to a policy of promoting the creation and preservation of such equivalence of power. Such a bipolar system, according to Kenneth Waltz, is the safest in security terms. The other concept is of 'collective security' - efforts by all the nations to pursue security by collective means. It ensures that security threatened anywhere is security threatened everywhere. Yet another is 'concept of deterrence' - the objective being to deter a potential adversary from instigating war, by threatening the use of force in order either to deny an adversary from gaining his objective by military means or to punish the adversary if he seek to do so. Disarmament and Arms control, though they form security policies, will be considered as concept for our study.

To achieve this target, we have to stop thinking in terms of East-West relations. Nations will have to abandon the thought of the North and the South-South

affluence and national interest can be of no consideration if the survival of humanity itself is at stake. Global economic crises will shake earlier alignments and thus do away with the power structures that exist. The crux of emerging 'global problematique' is simply survival. Peace and security are multilateral goals to be pursued unani-  
mously in all the regions of the world. The much talked about issue of interdependence, shorn of all rhetoric and hypocrisy, is based on a high degree of insecurity. While survival of civilization and life remained the focal point of all endeavour, a new enlightenment is necessary, without which survival cannot but be a losing battle. Even if the final holocaust was never to take place, the sheer cost of pursuing it is bound to lead to massive misdirection of resources which will mean suffering, even without a nuclear war. Richard Rosecrance has rightly judged the security dilemma when he wrote "one of the fundamental reasons for tensions in the international system is the formulation of objectives and policies on a purely domestic basis".<sup>51</sup>

To sum up, our study reveals that security can only be relative and cannot be absolute as it hampers the security of others. It can be analysed at various level: individual, national, regional and international level. But the most important levels involved in our study are national security

and international security. This has given rise to the debate between the state-centric and system-centric view of security. In short, it is the realist-idealist dichotomy, the former emphasizing the power factor and the latter the concept of common international security. The debate is further strengthened during the analysis of concept, like 'interdependence' and its relevance to modern times. In the meantime, several factors point towards a decline in the absolute dominance of concept of power. Scholars like Kenneth Waltz and F.Northedge support the realist proposition while T.C. Schelling stands for the increasing interdependence among states. Having ramifications at all levels - individual, national and international, - interdependence affects all aspects of life-economic, political, social and military. Influence of security and interdependence is at all strata, in all areas. Man, a social animal, cannot live in isolation. He lives in a society, a State and in an international system. Therefore, no one can think in terms only one man or one nation, it is a blind alley directed towards self-destruction. No unilateral efforts can be effective. Individual has to think in terms of all creations and of the international system. International security is an effort towards this direction, for which we have to mould the entire psychology of human



beings on a new and rational line of common survival. With jet speeds and telex communications, distance has lost importance and modern warfare has made humanity more vulnerable to threats of death and extinction. Nevertheless, it has become necessary to think in terms of a joint existence, one world and international security.

## Chapter II

### CONCEPT OF BALANCE OF POWER

The concept of 'Balance of Power' has been used, since the days of Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), to explain the relations among states. It was familiar to the political theorists and the statesmen of the ancient time. Thucydides has given a vivid description of the principle, during the war between Athens and Sparta. After the decline of Athens, Hiero of Syracuse sought to maintain a balance and check against the rising power of Rome by sending assistance to Carthaginians. Polybius pointed out "Power should be able, without let or hindrance, to execute every purpose and understanding". David Hume states, 'Balance of Power' was a fact of politics in ancient history and that 'Xenophon', in his institution of Cyrus, represents the combination of Asiatic powers to have arisen from jealousy of the increasing forces of the Medes and the Persians.<sup>1</sup>

As a phrase in current international relations, balance of power means a 'just equilibrium' in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others and thus endanger their security. It

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1. David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power", quoted in Norman N.Hill, International Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p.293.

differs from other concepts of security most fundamentally in the degree of centralization of power and authority which it implies. Balance of power represents the extreme form of decentralization, a kind of laissez-faire arrangement, in the sphere of power politics. It is power that is the basis of the theory of balance of power. 'Power' like 'security' is a very relative term. In an 'anarchic society' of nations that live in a condition of troubled peace or in 'a state of war' there will always be a modicum of insecurity. The realists argue that all states desire an enlargement of their territories and enhancement of their prestige. It is only the power in the hands of others that restrains them. The economic determinists emphasize interdependence among states while the legalists support the rights and duties fixed by international law. On the other extreme the idealists argue that goodwill and harmony must be attributed to religion and world 'public opinion'. To state a broad definition, power is a relationship of influence between two parties, i.e., 'A has power over B when A can influence B to do something that B would not otherwise do'. Though in most cases the relationship is mutual, it does not denote that power is symmetrical. It can be asymmetrical relationship. But such ability to make credible threats depends on existence of real capabilities and power potential of the state. Apart from this there

are other factors which contribute to power of State as - geographical position and territorial expanse.

Alfred T. Mahan, a theorist of nineteenth century described control over sea as 'decisive for global balance'.<sup>2</sup> Another scholar found the frequency of war correlates with the number of borders a nation shares. This he calls the theory of 'Geography Opportunity'.<sup>3</sup> Natural resources, though they reduce dependency and vulnerability of state, cannot now be judged as the prime factor as is clear from the position Japan occupies as a major economic power even in the absence of resources. Industrial capacity as assumed importance due to improved sophisticated technology of warfare. Indigenous technology and production is a prime determinant of power. Population, over the years lost importance due to modernization but is still not entirely irrelevant.

Now what matters is quality instead of quantity, there is more emphasis on managerial and other skills. The support a national government commands and quality of leadership can change the equation of international power and history. Apart from contributing to power these factors also

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2. Cited Alfred T. Mahan in Steven Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of International Politics (Massachusetts; USA: Winthrop Publishers Inc., 1974), p.142.
  3. James Paul Wesley, "Frequency of War and Geographical Opportunity", Journal of Conflict Resolution (California) VI, No.4 (December 1962), pp.387-89.

contribute to economic, political, national security. Whatever a nation does, according to Hans Morgenthau can be termed as national interest which in turn is defined in terms of power. Power and security are complementary to each other - increasing the power of nation means enhancing national security, which in turn does create insecurity for other nations. Although other factors are used as instruments of power, yet force remains of overriding importance. The disparities in power perceptions insure conflicting political demands. Some scholars argue, if it were not for the disparity in power perceptions, it would not be necessary to fight war at all. War ends when the parties are able to agree on the common picture of their relative power and a common assessment of what settlement of claim is appropriate.<sup>4</sup> War usually begins with the determination of each group to convince the opponents of its version of power ratio, it is not to simply destroy or wipe out the opponent. What has resulted in war and thus bred insecurity in international relations, are major shifts in power capabilities of nations. Alongwith industrial development, invention - military and industrial - resource discovery correlate the frequency of international conflict. In all, statesmen and scholars,

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4. William T.R.Fox (ed.), "How Wars are Ended?", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia, November 1970).

both have given primary emphasis on force as a means of influence and thus generating insecurity. The dilemma that continues to exist even today, more than in ancient times, is that nation finds military capabilities useful and necessary instrument of diplomatic action.

The concept of balancer is an effective modernization of the theory of balance of power model. It has special characteristics and thus follows that the balancer state must be an effective powerful state, whose strategic options enable it to make major impact on the international system. It should support the equilibrium and stand for safeguarding the system and equilibrium. George Liska describes the balancer as "both at the focus and outside it; otherwise it would not be free to withdraw and engage its weight in function of the system's requirement and thus manipulate the balance... A sufficiently powerful balancer of this kind might check the irrational derives and the miscalculations jeopardizing the balance of power and promote realization of its objective norm".<sup>5</sup> A good illustration of a balancer is the role of Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which by virtue of its sea power, its semi-detachment from the continent, its industrial and

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5. George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp.36-37.

political strength, its astute diplomacy, was able to develop an effective balance of power policy on the continent. But in modern times, due to shifts in international system, the balancer has disappeared and no state has stepped into the shoes of Britain. Thus, scholars who believe that a balancer is essential to the model would argue that the system has lost its effectiveness.

Coming to the whole concept of Balance of Power, it is neither precise nor an easily measurable concept. Ernst Haas has criticized it as vague.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps no concept has been so widely held as that of 'balance of power' in international relations. The concept has been stated and restated. It has also been severely criticized for being meaningless and a figment of imagination, yet it exists and explain much 'game theory' and the attitudes of political leaders. The fact remains that somekind of balance of power is a reality because both the politicians and the academicians regards some balancing as a basic of foreign policy. Arnold Wolfers questions those who challenge existence of balance of power whether there is any other practical course open to nations.<sup>7</sup>

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6. Ernst Haas, "Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propoganda?", World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), Vol.5 (July 1953), pp.442-77.

7. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (John Hopkins University Press, 1962).

On the same line Ernst Haas asserted that "Statesman who is anxious to preserve his state, must have recourse to balancing principles in averting the hegemony of his rivals".<sup>8</sup>

In its purest form, balance of power is one characterized by several powerful states in which no one is dominant. States seek to maintain security by preventing anyone state to become dominant. It means the maintenance of an equilibrium, so that no state or states can, without good cause, be an aggressor. Stanley Hoffman, states the characteristics of balance of power system as follows:<sup>9</sup>

- (1) Five or six major actors;
- (2) Central balancing mechanism in which actors would coalesce to prevent the expansion of one or more power;
- (3) Existence of common language or code of behaviour among major actors;
- (4) Hierarchy in international system is relatively simple.

In theory, as also in practice, this system did not exclude war as an instrument of foreign policy. It is one

8. Ernst Haas, reprinted in D. Mclellan, Olson and Sondermann (ed.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970).

9. Stanley Hoffman, Primacy and World Order: American Foreign Policy Since Cold War (1978).



in which power was deliberately and objectively employed to maintain peace and stability with all regard to legitimate national goal. The balance of power system in the eighteenth century, by no means, prevented war, but then it worked just because no one was ready to challenge it. It assumes that there is a continuous <sup>o</sup>maneuvering among states in competition for power. The structure of international relations being dynamic, it necessitates shifts in power balances and changes in security arrangements among the nations.

Sidney Fay spoke of balance of power as "such a just equilibrium in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent anyone of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon others".<sup>10</sup>

Inis L.Claude observes, "The trouble with balance of power is not that it has no meaning, but that it has too many meanings".<sup>11</sup> It has been described by Schwarzenburger as an "equilibrium" or "a certain amount of stability in international relations, produced by alliance under favourable conditions".<sup>12</sup> Hans Morgenthau has called it as "only a

10. Sidney B. Fay, "Balance of Power," The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol.I, pp.395-99.

11. Inis L.Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p.13.

12. George Schwarzenburger, Power Politics, 2nd edition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1951), p.178.

particular manifestations of general social principle".<sup>13</sup>  
 Some scholars view the balance of power from the perspective of individual actors within the system.

The concept assumes the constancy of force and yet seeks to deter aggression by confronting it with superior force. But contrary to this view, balance of power principles are not the immutable and universal law of internal politics, but at best the policy guidelines which statesmen, consciously and unconsciously, adopt to preserve the independence and security of their states. The system rests on the premise that there exists within the framework of interstate relations an essential dispersion of power, and that this fragmentation feeds the interaction of competing and conflicting wills. There are constant shifts in the nature and distribution of power, to which states must respond rapidly and flexibly so as to establish an adequate balance.

Despite historical refinements of the balance of power theory, skeptics like A.F.K. Organski conclude, "power is only one of the objectives of states", thus deprecating the assumption that power is of foremost national value. He even interprets that the British foreign policy was based not on

13. H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960), p.167.

the balance of power but on the theory of national self-interest. There was no objective whatsoever of the Britishers to play such a role. Organski concludes that "imbalance of power is a characteristic pattern, particularly since the Industrial Revolution, with major states and their coalition actually trying to maintain equilibrium".<sup>14</sup> What E.D.Vattel meant by balance of power is "a state of affair such that no power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the laws to others".<sup>15</sup> Vattel differentiates and speaks about the various ways of realizing balance of power:

- (a) A simple balance of power is one like the world experienced during the cold war between USA and Soviet Union. A complex one is the situation of multipolarity as today when the super powers have been joined by China, Japan and West Europe as potential powers. The simple balance requires parity in power among the balancing powers and thus the only means to maintain such system is augmentation of one's relative strength. On the other hand, in the complex balance there exists additional resources of exploiting the existence of other powers, either by absorbing or allying them.

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14. A.F.K.Organski, cited in Steven Rosen and Walter Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers Inc., 1974), p.211.

15. c.f. Hedley Bull, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in F.A. Sondermann, D.McLellan and W.Olson (eds.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1970), p.105.

- (b) The general balance of power can be distinguished from a local one as the latter is the balance in a particular segment or a region - as in the Middle East or the Indian sub-continent. Both systems are consistent as the international system as a whole is a general balance of power.
- (c) In order to exist, the balance of power should not only exist but also there should be a belief in the system. The system must exist not only objectively but subjectively too. A balance not based on will and capacity to withstand is sure to be fragile and impermanent.
- (d) A balance can emerge on its own, unconsciously, among the community of states. This is fortitious balance. But there are situations when balance is contrived at i.e. efforts are made on the part of the members of world community to give effect to such system.

Balance of power as a system, since ancient times, was contrived to provide security to member states of world community. In this task, the system has emerged as a fight for dominance in the name of maintaining a balance.

What statesmen understand as a balance is nevertheless a situation of dominance with regard to their nation. Two features form basis of the international society - one is

multiplicity and the other is antagonism of its elements i.e. among the individual nations. Scholars views vary on the issue of balance:

- (1) George Lisaka discussed it in terms of equilibrium, concerned with international disequilibrium as well as equilibrium.<sup>16</sup>
- (2) Karl D<sup>e</sup>utsch and David Singer are of the view that no balance of power system has stayed on for very long. The system has proved to be temporary.<sup>17</sup>
- (3) Nicholas Spykman defines the system as a "contrived" one and "not a gift from gods".<sup>18</sup> The system itself being dynamic cannot wait for adjustments and shifts to survive; they have to fight to maintain the system.
- (4) Though the balance of power has tended to be status-quo oriented; to be effective, the policy must be changing and dynamic adjusting to changes in international environment.
- (5) In practical terms, the absolute balance, like absolute security, seldom exist. In fact it cannot exist due to changing nature of power politics.

16. George Liska, n.5.

17. Karl W.Deutsch and David Singer, "Multipolar Power System and International Stability", World Politics, XVI (April 1964), p.403.

18. Nicholas Spykman, cited in N.Palmer and H.Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition, (New Delhi: CBS Publishers, 1985), p.213.

- (6) Offering a distinction between the objective and the subjective approach to balance of power, Martin Wight offers the difference in perception of the system by a historian and a statesman. While the former perceive it as a one to one situation, the latter understands it as a position of superiority in its favour.<sup>19</sup> Nicholas Spykman too is of the view that states are interested only in balance of power which is in their favour. Thus what they seek is not balance but imbalance in their relations. The result, according to Palmer and Perkins is "political as well as mathematical absurdity".
- (7) The system is not primarily a device for preserving peace. In order to maintain the balance, force may also be needed, thus "in the final analysis it rests upon war".<sup>20</sup> It has been recognised that the primary purpose of the system is to maintain independence of states and not to preserve peace. If so, can the system provide security without providing for war?
- (8) Balance of power game is played primarily by big powers. It often happens that small states emerge as victims in the big power politics as a satellite in the security alliance. Though collectively they can hope of bringing

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19. Martin Wight, Power Politics, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 'Looking Forward,' Pamphlet No.8.

20. Edward V. Gulick, "Our Balance of Power System in Perspective", Journal of International Affairs, (New York), XIV, 1960, pp.10-11.

about some change in international affairs, individually they land up only as weights to be used by others in power politics. In regional balances they can be much sure of their power and capacity to meet the power rivalries.

- (9) The policy seems unsuitable for both democracy and dictatorship, as the former is a weak disinterested leader, the latter is more interested in dominance.
- (10) It seems, the system is largely inoperative under present conditions of space and nuclear age. The expansion of state system into an international one, where balance is bipolar and emergingly multipolar, no one nation or international organization can play the traditional role of balancer.

There are inevitable inner contradictions inherent in the balance of power system. Yet its functions as stated by Hedley Bull are:<sup>21</sup>

- (i) To prevent the system from being transformed, by conquest, into a universal empire.
- (ii) To protect the independence of states in particular areas from domination by a locally preponderant power.
- (iii) To provide the conditions in which other institutions on which international order depends, have been able

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21. Hedley Bull, n.15, p.107.

to operate. These functions are dependent on relations, that are by nature very unstable, and subject to continuous change. Also the independence of respective nations can rest on no other foundation than the power of each individual nation to prevent the power of other nations from encroaching upon its freedom.

The origin of the phrase 'balance of power' lies in the late fifteenth century when the first explicit statement was made by Bernardo Rucellai (1449-1514) and was further elaborated by Niccolo Machiavelli. In the sixteenth century it came to be applied to a larger theatre, but still remained limited to European till the rise of non-European powers in the present century. Morgenthau states "alliances between Francis I, Henry VIII and the Truks, to prevent Charles V of Habsburg from stabilizing power, was first modern example of balance of power operating between an alliance and one nation intent upon establishing a universal monarchy".<sup>22</sup>

The golden period of the classical balance of power system came with the end of the Thirty Years War and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which firmly established the nation state system. The ambitious threat of Louis XIV of France were met by opposition from England and the Netherland, when the former tried to threaten balance of

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22. Morgenthau, n.13, p.188.



power in Europe. The period between Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the partition of Poland (1772), firmly established the system by a maze of alliances and frequent shifts in alignments. Writers like Edmund Burke and David Hume, while stating its merits, linked the idea of balance of power with natural law.

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic era destabilized the classical balance of power. But it was reestablished by the Congress of Vienna (1815) and England, due to several factors, assumed the role of balancer. The system again came under strain from the impact of Industrial-Revolution, use of imperial armies, and increasing differences in national interests among the ruling elites. In early twentieth century, the system was more characterized by alliances, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente (1891-1907) between England, France and Russia. In the inter-war period, ideology assumed a dominant role, revolutionary nationalism came to occupy centre stage; thus generating conditions which led to the decline of the classical balance of power. During this period balance of power came to be identified with the collective security system.

The Second World War resulted in the sharp division of the world into capitalist (American) and Communist (Soviet) Blocs.. The cold war on rigid ideological lines, led to rigid bloc-politics. The security of smaller nations also

came to be identified with super power world. The period from early sixties to late seventies was of comparative peace during which certain agreements on conventional and nuclear weapons were signed among super powers to control arms race. But it was followed by the new cold war - a period of yet more uncertainty and instability. Today, the system is neither strictly bipolar nor strictly multipolar due to emergence of other power centres like China, West Europe, Japan. The rise of international governmental and non-governmental organization and state actors on the international scene has obviously changed the whole situation. Can all these changes ensure security? The classical mode requires at least four or five big powers for a balance, can the balance of power system work with such varied and different types of actors? To this we will come later when we analyze the relevance of balance of power system to a nuclear age.

It seems necessary to survey the various methods employed by balance of power to create equilibrium and provide security, so that it is possible to see whether the system can help to maintain stability under modern conditions.

(a) To maintain a favourable balance, alliances are necessary. Ad-hoc alliances of constantly shifting character have been a standard practice in European history. The balance

of power should be distinguished from a balance of power alliance.<sup>23</sup> Quite unlike pure alliance, simple balance of power could use methods of disarmament, arms control and strategies of deterrence. Alliances are necessary function operating within a "multi-state system". By forging alliances, nations seek to increase their own power; they add to their own power or to withhold power of other nations from their adversary. Alliances can be formed as a protective device by nations, anxious to maintain their independence, against another nations' designs for world domination and thus maintain a balance of power. This has happened in the past as is illustrated by efforts of allied powers against Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. The balance of power considerations, whether regional, hemispheric or international, are a controlling factor in virtually every alliance of states. But 'Strategic Alliance', was a joining of unequals, kept together only due to desperate urgency.

(b) To maintain a balance, most power place great emphasis on military preparedness as a means of national self-defense. Its necessary corollary is the constantly increasing burden of arms race and military preparedness. The naval competition before World War I, between Germany and England, illustrates

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23. M.V.Naidu, Alliances and Balance of Power: A Search for Conceptual Clarity (Macmillan Company Ltd., 1974), p.179.

this point. Proportionate disarmament, the technique of stabilizing balance of power, is quite similar to territorial compensation. Both these techniques involve evaluation of the influence that the arrangement will exert on power of individual states. A Spanish scholar, and statesman, Salvador de Madariaga suggests, "The problem of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It is really the problem of organization of the world community".<sup>24</sup> In short it is a problem of maintenance of balance of power.

(c) Compensation of territorial nature were a common device for maintaining balance of power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is illustrated by the partition of Poland in 1772, 1793, 1795 which marked the ultimate end of classical balance of power period. There were also territorial losses inflicted on Axis powers after the first and Second World War, which is quite against the classical paradigm of balance of power - no state was to be destroyed to maintain a balance.

(d) The policy of divide and rule is the method of altering the distribution of power by detaching the allies from the opposite side, compelling them into neutrality or isolation. The Soviet Union from the mid twenties has consistently

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24. Palmer and Perkins, n.18, p.226.

opposed all plans of European unification on grounds that this will strengthen the western bloc and thus undermine Soviet security.

(e) Neutral states or buffer zones have quite recently assumed much importance, especially in the bipolar world and thus prevented rival powers from coming into direct contact with each other. While providing a cushion to the superpower conflicts, they reduce the possibility of war. Today the most important among such zones is the one dividing Soviet Union from the non-Communist world - an area of never ending interests to the geopoliticians and constituting the inner crescent of power security dilemma.

(f) Intervention is based on the policy that nation always choose partners and allies to pursue its national interests. It may range from neutrality to full scale military participation in a major war. It is particularly emphasized by small states seeking means of protection or even survival in a world dominated by great power.

These methods have been time and again employed by statesmen to maintain balance of power in international relations. The whole idea of balance of power is essentially anticipatory and precautionary in nature because it demands greater skill in winning antagonism and alienating allies. The balance theory also postulates that if power at global

level is distributed almost equally among the contending states and groups of states, then power becomes balanced. Such a situation neutralizes power by creating one of power parity. Yet balance of power shares some of the characteristics of alliances. Both are arrangements for continued co-existence of sovereign and armed states determined to preserve their security and identity and thus prevent military expansion that may threaten the balanced coexistence and the status quo. It is an ad-hoc, decentralized association without effective superstate institutions and controls. In theory, the units of this system should not be ideologically oriented as it hampers flexibility and change in association. But in the post World War era, alliance like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) exist on rigid ideological lines. Here the two super powers are engaged in grim contest for prestige and strategic advantage, which established their presence in almost every corner of globe and involved them in nearly all major crisis of post-war era.

All efforts have been made during the last and present centuries to ensure security through balance of power. Under the Concert of Europe, that emerged out of Congress of Vienna (1815), the European states played the power game according to traditional rule. But it was primarily

concentrated on the continent, and was not successful in avoiding the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war (1877-78). The League of Nations, emerging out at the end of first World War, was based on the Wilsonian concept of collective security. The League implied universality and also implied that if authority was challenged, enforcement machinery will be automatically invoked and members will abide by the obligation. It emphasized on the need to balance power through collective action of all nations against the aggressor. The League could not, yet, achieve much of success, though balance of power has been stated as condition for an effective League of Nations. The United Nations stepped in the same shoes of the League after the Second World War, but ensured all major powers of the world became a signatory to the charter. This was to avoid the problem faced by the League. Article 51 of the UN Charter sanctioned steps for 'individual and collective self-defence'. Yet the basic contradiction existed. The UN, like the League, is based on sovereignty of nation-state system, and does not operate in a vacuum. The contemporary international society profoundly affect the nature of great power relations.

Uptil now we have dealt with the concept of balance of power, its evolution as such and how nations, since

older times, have tried to manage interstate relations by maintaining a balance and thus avoid conflict. But with new forces of nationalism, industrialization, techniques of warfare, development of international law and organization, economic interdependence, can we still say balance of power has come to stay as a means of security under contemporary situation? How far does balance of power hold a validity today? The armsgeddon of the super powers and of other nuclear powers makes security very doubtful for international community. The arms race has gone out of bonds and the scholars now rightly call it - the balance of terror. Is it really a balance or mutually assured destruction; death for one and all? This makes us reassess the relevance of balance of power today. Its various dimensions as have emerged under the bipolar and multipolar world.

Inis L.Claude remarked, "all the fundamental tendencies affecting the political realm in recent generation run counter to the requirements of a working model of balance of power".<sup>25</sup> Often a question is asked whether the effect of nuclear weapons defeat all efforts at calculations and comparisons of power, in which case it would be futile to aim at any particular kind of power distribution. On this

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25. Inis L.Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp.42-93.



as been said that balance of power has become an option in international affairs. Among these are Hoffman and Ernst Haas who state nuclear weapons ended the world and nature of war.<sup>26</sup> But still in place, it is <sup>a</sup>balance, but balance of deterrence important. The strategic nuclear capabilities of Soviet Union can be balanced to some extent, but balance of power will depend upon power relations: field of war, conventional war and ideological appeal. Those who believe that the age of imperialism and sovereignty has come to an end may logically reject "concept of balance of power in an outworn form of a dying phase of world history". It seems that cutting across national boundaries, effective dominance of super powers over their allies, makes the flexibility of the rest of states very difficult and ineffective. The complexity of power calculations is inherent in the nature of power itself. It will thus come into play even in the old pattern of balance of power. But the growing complexity lies in the fact that one cannot always be very clear about allies or opponents. Quincy Wright has positively defined the balance of power, as a structure of world

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, n.6, pp.442-77.

politics, is incompatible with democracy, with free enterprise, with welfare economy and with peace".<sup>27</sup> Yet, being a realist, he acknowledges power and balance of power as basic elements in international relations. The reason why balance of power exists even today as a means to security is that nations have found no effective substitute to it. So at times status quo is desired just out of description as a temporary respite from expansionism or as a political necessity. A fundamental contradiction exists within the theory of balance of power as regards the presupposition of fluidity of international relations. The theory recognizes great flux in the actions and aims of the state, it demands unquestionable and everlasting dedication of all states towards balance of power. Balanced power implies equal power, while states might desire more power. Here lies the contradiction and results in instability. The margin of safety for one state could become the margin of danger for another. The arms race, in the bipolar cold war, has, and may in future, spread weapons to a greater extent among nations, thus setting up the problem of so called nth state possessing nuclear arms. The mutually retaliatory postures of the super powers is so balanced that

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27. Quincy Wright, "International Law and Balance of Power", The American Journal of International Law (Washington), XXXVII (January 1943), p.138.

any miscalculation or accident can trigger off chain reaction of destruction. Thus arms race and alliance, the two operating forms of balance of power, are contradictory to the goal of establishing a balance. Classical system has relied primarily on political-diplomatic instruments for realignment; alliances do not form part of balance of power system as they focus only on military aims.

The cold war was a period marked by tensions, hostilities, power struggles and small armed conflicts. It stopped just short of direct armed conflicts between the two super powers. At least four times during this period (the Korean War, the Berlin Blockade, the Suez Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis) the world has come to the brink of World War. Yet the super powers had indulged in proxy wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Uptil 1955, the international system could be regarded as what Morton Kaplan defined as 'the Tight Bipolar System'. The kind of relationship that the super powers have striven for has been a surplus variety of power; the communists need the surplus power in order to push forth the world revolution, while the West seek balance in its favour to protect the free world. The balance is not of equal scales, but a balance tilted in favour of the power desiring the balance.

Since both the powers are nearly equal in power it results in a security dilemma. Herbert Butterfield believes that, "in international affairs it is this Hobbesian fear, which so far has hitherto defeated all endeavour of human intellect".<sup>28</sup>

The American distaste of balance of power was well known since the time of President Woodrow Wilson. In a short statement in 1945, Francis Sayre, a State Department Officer argued, "We must abandon the nineteenth century conception that road to peace lies through a nicely poised balance of power. Again and again world experience has told us that no peace dependant on balance of power lasts".<sup>29</sup> There are grounds for believing that the Soviet Union too was unconcerned about the need to establish and maintain a new global balance of power. The Soviet leaders seem to dislike mechanistic assumptions associated with the balance of power. "The balance represented an impediment to change and was anti-thetical to Marxist teachings".<sup>30</sup> Hans Morgenthau states that their policies were dictated by 'Nationalistic Universalism'. Bipolarity has created difficulties, even for the

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28. Herbert Butterfield, cited in R.D. Mckinley and R.Little, Global Problems and World Order (London: Francis Pinters, 1986), pp.234-35.

29. Cited in M.W. Graham, American Diplomacy in International Community (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1948), p.271.

30. N.H. Wassell, "Soviet Views of Multipolarity and the Emerging Balance of Power", Orbis (Philadelphia), 23 (1979), pp.785-813.

super powers, to restore a balance as the classical balance model necessitates around four or five big powers. Big power is a very relative term and super power is powerful beyond the scope of comparative scale. It can influence in its own capacity, the conduct, policies and even the very existence of states. With the presence of super powers no amount of reshuffling is going to make a significant change in power position of the super powers. This is not balance of power but a super power hegemony as no strength of other state can match that of the super powers. This is a new consequence of World Wars. Thus instead of referring to it as bipolar balance of power we can call it "Bipolar Super Power hegemonism". What has made global balance of power even more difficult is the formation of regional alliances like NATO and WTO. Kennan believes that such a balance is "unthinkable as long as Germany and Japan remain the power vacuum".<sup>31</sup> The term 'power vacuum' is usually applied to area inhabited by weak nations not tied to great power. The power is of creating power than of reviving power. Whatever its nature or location, a power vacuum imposes a heavy strain on any existing balance. Also prior to this, the theatre of power struggle was Europe but

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31. J.L.Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.39.

now it encompasses the Third World - Africa, Asia. Thus to threaten a balance anywhere is to threaten security everywhere. The very nature of balance of power has become truly globalized during the last four decades.

Morton Kaplan has presented a useful array of models of global political organization.<sup>32</sup> Here we will mention only the important ones.

(1) Tight Bipolar Balance of Power Model

The Second World War has changed international politics more than any other occurrence. International security is no longer governed by classical factors. The advent of nuclear age with the division of world strictly on the bipolar lines and strong ideological hostilities ensured an era of conflict, competition and distrust. The Tight Bipolar System is marked by world's effective power being encompassed into two competing bloc. It existed between 1945-55, witnessing establishment of various regional organization, the Korean War and the Berlin-blockade. International equilibrium is the second best objective and government usually belong to the dominant coalition. It renders massive retaliation quite logical as a strategic

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32. Morton Kaplan, System and Process of International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

foundation. It need not emphasize absolute equality of each bloc, as nuclear disparity forms part of the system. "Bipolarity can exist without absolute equality in military strength and without absolute equality in total relative influence".<sup>33</sup>

(2) The Loose Bipolar Model

As the super power alliances loosened in mid-1950s, the system became loose. The Hungarian revolt (1956) in the Soviet bloc and De Gaulle's demand of 'de-Americanization' of Europe explained what nations wanted - flexibility in their relations with their bloc. Each super power acts as ally and protector of weaker nations in its bloc. The non-aligned states are, in contrast, characterised by a variety of ideologies and governmental systems. These nations which emerged into independence during 1960s, shared poverty, underdevelopment and racial differences. They formed a multi-state group - the third world - which further loosened the bipolarity. It might be said that it gave rise to multipolarity which postulated a number of power centres, not too equal in power, therefore, was able to affect level of collaboration and conflict among nations. Under polycentrism, the big power can play the role of balancer of

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33. Wolfram F. Hanreider, "The International State System: Bipolar or Multibloc?" Journal of Conflict Resolution IX, pp.299-308.

balance of power. Multiple balance under polycentrism is what classical theory of balance postulates. Some other changes did take place after that. China broke away from Soviet bloc and this resulted in the emergence of another power centre. Though still not the match of super power, it can create international imbalances. Rise of Japan as an economic power economically shook even the US; it lately demanded devaluation of the Japanese currency. The West Europe too emerged with nuclear potential and was no longer simply dependant on the US. The most remarkable feature was the rise of 'Third World'. Due to potential man power and mineral resources, it could achieve sufficient status to manage events between the present major powers, though militarily it still remains dependant on super powers.

### (3) Collective Security Model

This is a system of voluntary regulation. There are no alliances and aggression by one nation is punished by economic and military sanctions imposed collectively against the aggressor. This is too idealistic and impractical. It is expected to function effectively without watering down the sovereignty of states. Nation states are expected to abide morally to the legal restrictions.



(4) Unit Veto Model

This model is highly unstable and potentially deadly style of international relations. Nearly all major powers under this system are nuclear, thus it is post-proliferation model. It is dangerous because nuclear war at times can be caused much by error than by intent.

Scholars are opposed on the view whether in contemporary international relations there exists any balance of power which fulfils the same functions as in other periods. Hedley Bull is of the view that whereas in the 1950s the balance was a simple one, in 1960s it was in transition and during the 1970s it took a turn to be a complex balance. The relative position of states in terms of overall power nevertheless makes itself apparent in bargaining among states, and the conception of power is one or the same.

We cannot do without it. The balance of power prevents the system of states from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire. The local balance serve to protect the independence of states in a particular area from domination by the locally preponderant power. All this helps to create conditions in which institutions, on which international order depends, are able to operate. As regards the preferability of the system Kenneth Waltz is of the view that global

bipolarity of powers will minimize international conflicts.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, Karl Deutsch and David Singer argue that a multipolar balance of power system allows for less conflict than a bipolar one as the attention of nation state is not focused on a single source of threat.<sup>35</sup>

Bridging the difference between the two views, Richard Rosecrance calls it bi-multipolarity in which he believes there is the least possibility of violent conflict.<sup>36</sup> John Herz has noted that "the security dilemma, while always existing, could be accentuated. There are always a variety of competing powers from which one could select... allies and with which one could always try to balance would be hegemony power".<sup>37</sup> But this sense of balance and reciprocity which generates relative security and has traditionally ensured the survival of the international state system must, according to the realist, be based upon a political settlement which is mutually acceptable to the members of international community.

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34. Kenneth Waltz, "International Structure, National Force and the Balance of World Power", Journal of International Affairs (New York), 21 (1967), pp.215-31.
35. Karl Deutsch and David Singer, "Multipolar Systems and International Stability", World Politics (Princeton, N.J; 1964), 16, pp.390-406.
36. Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future", Journal of Conflict Resolution (California), 10 (1966), pp.314-27.
37. John Herz, International Politics in Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp.239.

With the quantitative jumps in the destructive power of weapons, especially the nuclear weapons, the realist conviction of redundancy of balance of power has been reinforced. With the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon balance of power has become, in the words of Winston Churchill the 'balance of terror'. What is this balance of terror, or the relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence? Is their really a balance of terror? How is it related to balance of power? To explain this we will first consider deterrence. It outlines three conditions. There should be threat conveyed by the deterrer to the deterred. There has to be a possibility that the deterred undertakes a course of action from which deterrer wishes to desist. The threat that is conveyed to the deterrer has to be 'credible' to the country deterred; and it has to be judged by the latter to render the course of action contemplated, unacceptable. The two powers in the arena, the Soviet Union and the United States, have reached a nuclear stalemate. Herman Kahn is too optimistic about effects of total warfare on national survival and human future and speculates, with intelligent planning, that consequences would be limited to losses no more than twenty-five per cent of national population.<sup>38</sup>

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38. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

In the nuclear age, peace is found on principle of mutual deterrence - a military political - coupled with the state of mind which, when sufficient to be a credible threat, makes it clear to a potential aggressor that the cost of his attack will be more than he is willing to bear. Thus deterrence involves not repulsion but retaliation, mutual deterrence implies equal offensive capability. It is a system of keeping peace by mutual threat of horrible death and destruction. The logic of nuclear strategy involves the first strike potential and also a second strike capability. To remain undetected, such nuclear forces should be in the form of mobile missile force supported by airborne nuclear cargo of strategic air-command. Another device for second strike force is the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) which were restricted to two in number by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I) in 1972. In spite of all protective devices accidental war potential still exists, though the possibilities of deliberate attacks have been substantially reduced. It is held that greater deterring capability results in lesser nuclear blackmail. Apart from being simply the possession of weapons of arms destruction, deterrence is reciprocal psychological factor through which parties signal one another about their commitments and intention. Therefore, deterrence should be able to carry with it its credibility.

In the jargon of nuclear era, danger of uncontrolled escalation of commitments is called 'brinkmanship'. Herman Kahn refers to it as 'the rationality of irrationality', because if both sides play the same tactics, issues and threats become magnified. In the last two decades a number of nuclear weapon and conventional weapon agreements were signed by major powers. But this, has not been done to maintain a balance or ensure security but out of fear of nuclear holocaust.

As per definition, terror is extreme fear in the presence of great danger or evil. Terror sets up only a one way system as the terrorized does not retaliate and just receives the impact of terror. On the other hand, power is reciprocal relationship and a conscious attempt to achieve influence or control. Thus, terror and power could not be equated. Terror implies an instinctual and irrational impact, while power is a rational and conscious effort. Even in the hands of a super power, terror, on the analogy of balance of power, does not guarantee security to the whole world. If power politics of today was based on balance of power and balance of terror, how can the twin object of power aggrandizement and balance of power be explained. Clearly the object is to maximize power not balance it. Though it is true that upto now the super powers have averted a

nuclear war, yet it does not hold their commitment to a total abandonment of nuclear war.

A deterrent relationship only requires that each party has sufficient nuclear striking capability for the purpose of deterring nuclear attack. For each party there is a threshold level, it need not require a parity of military strength. Till mid-1960s, the US had clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, yet it was referred to deterrence. Bernard Brodie had argued in 1946, nuclear arsenals transformed the very nature of strategic thinking. "Thus far the chief purpose of our military arrangements has been to win wars. From now on it would be to avert wars. It can have almost no other useful purpose".<sup>39</sup> Another view is that the emergence of bipolarity and deterrence did not constitute a negation of balance of power but a continuation of balance of power, in an 'altered form' and elevated on a global scale.<sup>40</sup> During the early 1960s, many realists agreed that ironically nuclear weapons and bipolarity had produced a more stable and peaceful world than had ever existed in the past. The system of bipolar deterrence, not only conditioned the behaviour of the two

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39. C.S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1982), pp.31-32.

40. I. Clarke, Reform and Resistance in International Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.168.

super powers, it also provided a framework which circumscribes and influences security activity of every member in the international arena.<sup>41</sup>

Hedley Bull states, whereas the balance of power is an objective phenomenon, a deterrent relationship is basically subjective. The balance of power is defined as actual absence of a preponderant power whereas mutual nuclear deterrence is essentially a state of belief. He also states that the primary function of balance of power is preservation of the international system as well as independence of states. Preservation of peace is only an incidental consequence. The preservation of mutual nuclear deterrence has preservation of nuclear peace as its primary function. But all this has not served the problem well; the super powers still pursue the policy identified as 'globalism' which is over-extension of commitments and inflated conception of national security threats. Globalism has thus prompted a vacillating and dangerous policy of intervention in the Third World.

It has been often argued that nuclear balance of terror has helped to balance relations between the two major nuclear powers and thus have helped to neutralise relations

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41. De Porte, Europe Between the Super Powers: The Enduring Balance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p.2.

among its allies. But although the deterrence doctrine provide for conditions that make nuclear war unlikely, it does nothing to limit a nuclear war that has broken out. The question 'what if deterrence fails' always exist, putting the security of the whole system at stake. Thus the presence of nuclear weapons though it lessens chances of super powers conflict, does not avert it altogether.

In the present circumstances, attempts to achieve security through force, either unilaterally and multilaterally, is manifestly self defeating as it negates the end itself - security. The balance of power model depends, for its success, not only on far reaching assumptions of doubtful validity but on a specific set of conditions which may not currently apply. It is an expression with many political meanings. In global context it is an analytical concept for assessment of overall power capabilities of states and groups of state and serve as a generic title for a host of specific power distribution. In the interstate context, balance of power is a device for measuring bilateral and small group power relativities. It may also express equilibrating or disequilibrating objectives of national arm policies.

To conclude, balance of power has over the years existed in its various manifestations - from the classical



model to the collective security model and to the balance of terror in the post War era. The point it has continued to exist inspite of all the changes, makes sure that the system will exist as long as nation-state are the units of international system and play a major role. Its contribution to world security has been debated by various scholars, but the point that it remains an all enduring system is itself an achievement.

### Chapter III

#### CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Due to the complex nature of the present international system, crisis management has become an essential feature of the present day international relations. This has been primarily directed to save the world from the scourge of interstate military conflicts and confrontations. The search for a panacea to establish peace and security in the world has been one of the principal objectives of the propounders of crisis management. Collective security, with its traits, is one of the many variations of management. In contemporary international relations, the concept of collective security has evoked interest in the minds of both statesman and academicians. The idea that a group of like minded entities would be more effective collectively, rather than individually, in safeguarding its security is neither new nor original. If we look over the pages of history we do find the Hobbesian concept of human nature which inevitably leads to the search for security. This concept believed in the innate aggressive nature of man which created a sense of insecurity and this search for security leads to the establishment of a kind of social and political system. The social contractualists, as they have been primarily known in history, believed in setting up a state as a kind of agreement on the part of the

constituting inhabitants to solve the problem of insecurity. The need to refer to the social contract theory arises from the fact that it is relevant to the concept of collective security. It refers to the need of collective agreement to achieve political, economic and social stability. Hence, by referring to the social contract theory and relating it to the collective security concept, one basically tries to compare the behaviour of states in an unregulated community of political units with that of individuals, in conditions of anarchy in the state of nature.

It should not be forgotten that with the growth of the States in the international arena there has been a preponderant growth in the number of power theories. These theories have disregarded the community of nations as viable political units, but that they do believe in the dictum that prevails in the law of the jungle - 'might is right'. This would be a rather lop-sided view of the contemporary international relations. But most of the practitioners of the bloc-politics unfortunately do believe and act according to the given dictum. Hence humanity has suffered, time and again, due to breaches of peace and threat to security suffered under the scourge of interstate military conflicts and confrontations.

Security is an essential precondition of an ordered human existence; it is natural for men to take precautions

against dangers. The concept of security, covering every facet of life, makes it difficult for the government to meet any contingency that arises. States have to meet both internal and external security. Though the task of maintaining external security would seem to be a simple one; its application is incredibly complex. The community of states, though theoretically and legalistically equal, is in fact an hierarchy, the order of which is determined by the capability and power potential of individual states. Only in the exceptional cases, do the weaker nations find it possible, to maintain their integrity, when challenged by the super power.<sup>1</sup> States find security in combining with other states, which on the whole share some of their values and interests. Ideally, a world-wide combination of all states, directed against all potential aggressors could create a global system of collective security. "Collective security is a method of managing the power relations of nations through a partially centralized system of security arrangements."<sup>2</sup> The second best solution has been attempted in Europe as a result of perception of threats and confrontation which developed after the Second World War. This was

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1. As was the case with Yugoslavia in 1948 when she broke away, independent of the Soviet Union.

2. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol.II, p.65.

the system of regionalized collective self defense, which has grown out of alliance institutions on both sides of the divide in Europe, have served to stabilize the military and political position and thus contributed to consciousness of security in both the camps. Marshall Shulman states "without this equilibrium force would dominate politics".<sup>3</sup>

Collective self-defence has provided Europe with a framework for exploring a new range of negotiating options.

### Meaning and Nature of Collective Security

Collective security has emerged as one of the networks of crisis management to prevent the growth of the law of the jungle in the international arena. The tradition of contending nation-states is not the only historical model. It is opposed to the universalistic view of the world. The Roman empire virtually included the entire political world known to its inhabitants and in that sense was universal; and thus the task of 'global' peace keeping was essentially a 'national' problem. In fact, security was never complete. The nations of Europe, providing for the framework of the civilized world, became strongly rooted in the political sub-consciousness of Europe. The end of religious wars in Europe in mid-seventeenth century saw the beginning of the modern state-system. Though

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3. See Marshall D. Shulman, "What Does Security Mean Today?" Foreign Affairs (New York), July 1971, p.618.

the ideal of 'one world' lingered on it was largely ignored by the nation states, intent on pursuing power interests. Security must be maintained and the quest for security puts a premium on power, which too often becomes an end in itself. "The hard core of necessity in the choice of goals in the international environment consist of 'survival', the self-perpetuation of the State and its security; its traditional, instrumental goals are concerned with power especially military power".<sup>4</sup>

States are not the only actors on the international scene. Nevertheless, the rise of the modern nation-state with its claim to absolute external and internal sovereignty and to complete freedom of action on behalf of the nation has coincided with the growth of power theories in international relations. Yet, whatever its limitations, the nation-state can be a very powerful organism indeed. To meet the external threats it becomes necessary to face the challenge collectively. Broadly speaking, collective security is a method of managing the power equations between states through a partially centralized system of security arrangements, while the ultimate power remains diffused among independent sovereign states. The authority, in specifically designed spheres of maintenance and enforcement of peace, lies vested in the

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4. J.J. Frankel, National Interest (Key Concepts in Political Science), (London: Pall Mall, 1970, Macmillan), pp.131-32.

international body. The desire for establishing an international organisation to pursue the collective security principles has held a central place in the orthodox thinking about international organizations since the first World War.

Due to increasingly changing power equations it has become imperative to evolve a viable collective security network. It has nonetheless, become a major preoccupation with international organizations. Hence it was observed, "The twentieth century hope that international organizations might serve to prevent, or, failing that, to defend states subjected to armed attack in defiance of organized efforts to maintain the peace, has been epitomized in the concept of collective security".<sup>5</sup>

The anti-war orientation became increasingly evident after the First World War, by the time, when most of the states had suffered under destructive impact of warfare. It gathered support to some extent as a reaction against the failure of the balance of power; the concept of Europe, an attempt by European powers to contain international conflict after 1815, had simply failed. Most states favoured the idea that States should collectively undertake to abstain from war to provide time for attempts to resolve a crisis by means of peaceful procedures. Moreover, the

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5. Inis L. Chaude, "Collective Security as an Approach to Peace," in Swords into Plowshares (4th edn.), (New York: Random House, 1984), p.245.

desire for collective security stemmed from the fact that most of the nations had become disillusioned with the apparent inability of military alliances and balance of power system to protect their security and prevent war. Hence, collective security is supposed to be one of the approaches to peace. It is a devise to maintain peace and deter aggression. It is believed to be a better alternative to the balance of power system for maintaining world peace, for the latter involves the idea of alliances, counter alliances, burdensome armaments, shady territorial deals, political rivalries and instability often resulting in war.

Considering the concept of collective security, Inis L.Claude States, "Since the Second World War, the concept of collective security has been persistently advocated and attacked, depended and criticized; it has figured prominently in the theoretical and ideological debate concerning the management of international relations. Moreover, there has been recurrent movement toward and away from translation of the collective security principle into a working system".<sup>6</sup>

If we take the term collective security together, it can be seen that it denotes two words; the word 'security' implies the goal that has been set forth and the word 'collective' implies the nature of the means that has been

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6. Inis L.Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p.150.



employed over here. Hence it can be defined as "machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against any established international order".<sup>7</sup>

As it is used in vague ways, Charles B. Marshall observes collective security is a "generalized notion of all nations banding together in undertaking a vague obligation to perform unspecified actions in response to hypothetical events brought on by some unidentifiable state".<sup>8</sup> Another US Representative to the United Nations, Ernest A. Gross, states: "There is no alternative to collective action for the achievement of security. The opposite of collective security is complete insecurity. Yet not all collective actions are collective security".<sup>9</sup>

The necessary assumption of collective security is simply that wars are likely to occur and that they ought to be prevented. These conflicts may be the fruit of unreflective passion or of deliberate planning. The fact is, the theory of collective security is not unvalidated by varied causes, functional purposes and initiatory mechanism of war. The core principle that constitutes the concept of collective security is that an attack on any one state is an attack on

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7. George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1951), p.454.
8. Cited in N. Palmer and H. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition (New Delhi: CBC Publishers 1985), p.241.
9. See Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense Versus Collective Security", in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1959), pp.49-74.

all. Henceforth the conclusion drawn in respect of collective security remains to be essentially that it aims not at the mere elimination of power, but rather at the management of power.

When we do analyse and talk of collective security in the realm of contemporary international politics, it was the name given by its planners to a new world order after the First World War. The name was given to the system that was necessary to maintain international peace, after the failure of the balance of power mechanism to ensure peace and security in the world.

The new system as it was envisaged involved the establishment and operation of complex scheme of national commitments and international mechanism designed to prevent aggression by any state against another, by presenting to the potential aggressors, the credible threat, and potential victims of aggression, the reliable promise of effective collective measures ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressures to military sanctions, to enforce the peace. Hence, collective security aimed at power management with firm obligations and commitments obtained in advance. To the system of collective security, security remained the end, collectivity remained the means and the system was the institution that made the means serve the end. To establish

a basic continuity in the concept of collective security, it was believed that the collective security system was based on the presumption that peace was indivisible.

The collective security system should be regarded as simply a revised version of the balance of power system and not the substitute of one by another. The collective aggression occurs. "The principle of collective security requires that states identify their national interests so completely with the preservation of the total world order that they stand ready to join the collective action to put down any aggressive threat by any state, against any other state anywhere".<sup>10</sup> It is a specialized instrument of international policy in the sense that it is intended only to forestall this arbitrary and aggressive use of force, not to provide enforcement mechanisms for the whole body of international law. It involves acceptance of the view that national interest of states can be defended by collective action, even by limiting freedom of decision of individual state. As a scholar states, "A successful system of collective security does not necessarily presuppose a complete abandonment of national independence or individuality. It does, however, require the submission of individual national

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10. Ibid., p.146.

will to collective decisions".<sup>11</sup> Inis Claude is of the view that the doctrine requires "a more thorough going renunciation of the free hand in foreign policy".<sup>12</sup>

However, collective security should not be confused with collective defence. No doubt both involve collective action and are committed to deter an aggression, but the former implies far reaching commitments and obligations on the part of the majority of the nations while the latter mean limited collaboration of few states on an ad-hoc basis. Collective Security is aimed against any aggression, whereas in collective self defence the nature of aggressor is determinate. The two do not function through the same institutional complex. Collective defence, in the form of military pacts, goes against the spirit of collective security, which is opposed to any kind of group making.

After laying down the broad outlines of the concept of collective security, it would be appropriate to evaluate the theory of collective security. The analysis would include - components of ideal theory of collective, the assumptions and pre-requisites for an ideal collective security system, an analysis of the objective prerequisites of an ideal collective security system and principles concerning organized intervention and success.

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11. W.Friedmann, An Introduction to World Politics (Toronto: 1951), p.57.

12. Inis L.Claude, n.5, p.204.

To begin with, one can safely assume that collective security depends less heavily on, than the concept of pacific settlement, upon the precision of a set of assumptions about the nature and causes of war. The core idea is collective security remains, by and large, a specialized instrument of international policy in contemporary international relations. Its main purpose is to forestall the arbitrary and aggressive use of force, not to provide enforcement mechanism for the whole body of international law. Like any theory of contemporary analysis, collective security is the hotbed of discussions. Taking into account the vast canvas it covers, more than one theory has been proposed by Ernst Haas. He suggests, the "Ideal theory, the diplomatic theory, and the operational theory of collective security".<sup>13</sup> But such typology adds to the prevailing confusion with regards to collective security.

It was not until the 1950s that the concept of collective security was clearly and comprehensively, identified and the analytical components defined. In his book Swords into Prowshares published in 1955, Inis L. Calude was the first writer to specify the elements of collective security system and delineate its characteristics. Later on, in another book, he expanded his earlier theorization of system of collective

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13. Ernst B. Haas, Collective Security and Future International System (Denver, 1968).

security.<sup>14</sup> As mentioned earlier, fundamentally collective security is based on the belief that collective action global action, or threat of action, or through preponderant physical power, can and must deter or defeat actual or potential breach of peace and security anywhere in the world. For the establishment of an ideal type of system it is imperative to establish and identify the analytical components on which the system is based.<sup>15</sup>

### Components

(1) **Prohibition of Force:** The use of force stands opposed on two grounds. The potential threat of the use of force by any state or the actual use of force is definitely morally wrong and politically unwise. Collective security system shares the idea of pacific settlement, that people may be in a position to influence their government, are amenable to moral appeals against the misuse of power. It invokes the idea of reason and goodness being dominant in man and its belief that all the disputes are subject to a peaceable, just and satisfactory settlement.

(2) **Collective Guarantee of Security:** This is advocated primarily by taking into account the interdependent nature

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14. Inis L. Claude, n.6.

15. M.V. Naidu, Collective Security and the United Nations: A Definition of the UN Security System (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), p.17.

of world polity. War is no more a bilateral affair, it spills over one and all nations. In the scheme of collective security every member stands legally and morally bound to render assistance in preventing aggression anywhere and restoring peace everywhere because peace is indivisible.

(3) Collective force as Deterrence: To make prohibition an effective principle along with the system of collective guarantees, collective security has to rely on principle of deterrence or sanctions. It is important for inhibiting designs of potential aggressor, as aggression would not pay against collective security system.

(4) Automatism in Collective Action: It is another mechanism to ensure effectiveness of deterrence. Automatism implies three aspects - guarantee of response against aggression, the quickness of response, and impartiality of response. Along with this it also implies the implicit belief that collective security maintains the anonymity of aggressor and victim at the same time.

(5) Assignability of Guilt: The occurrence of aggression determines the operation of the principle of automation of sanctions. However, one has to determine the nature of aggression before the medium of sanctions are released. Hence first of all a clear conceptual clarity regarding the conception of aggression has to be established. Along with this is

the need to establish or designate an impartial institution that is entrusted with the responsibility of determining the aggression or the aggressor.

(6) **Permanency and Generality of the System:** The collective security system, unlike the previous mechanisms, created to establish security, is neither an ad-hoc management, nor is it expedient and neither it remains particularistic. To be short, system of collective security is a permanent and institutionalized arrangement for international security against all dangers. Hence it remains permanent, abstract and general. An ideal system to be successful demands loyalty and faith of governments and people towards the ideal. To be operative, the idea demands certain prerequisites.

#### Subjective Prerequisites

(i) **Faith in rationality/goodness of man:** Faith forms the bedrock for establishing a firm working democracy in the international arena.. To be operative, there should be inherent belief and commitment vis-a-vis human nature and the system.

(ii) **Faith in world community:** In order to make collective security work, the concept of world community has to be established. It rests upon the conviction that there exists a world fraternity of human beings. Hence, the merger of



particular national interests with the general interests of mankind. Sir Arthur Salter's once observed, "Friends are we with all, enemies are we to none, except of any who break the peace".<sup>16</sup>

(iii) Faith in indivisibility of Peace: It is based on positive commitment to world peace. The fabric of human society is so interwoven that a breach anywhere threatens disintegration everywhere. Emmanuel Kent's prophetic insight "The intercourse... which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it" must be universally acknowledged.

(iv) Faith in Collective Guarantees: The repercussions due to the act of potential or actual aggressor have to be taken into consideration. The victims of aggression have to be convinced regarding the guarantee of support and help. It follows that guarantees implies a sense of follow up commitments. It also implies the pooling of resources for creation of preponderant power status.

(v) Faith in the Impartiality of the System: "The principle of anonymity (of aggressor and victim) is founded upon the

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16. Cited in M.V. Naidu, n.15, p.21.

faith in the honesty (i.e. morality) or the objective, (i.e. rationality) of the decision makers in charge of the operation of the security system. The principle of assignibility of guilt presumes the existence of certain objective and universal codes of ethics and positive law, on the basis of which system can adjudicate complaint or crises in an impartial manner. Thus the objectivity of the security system demands impartiality".<sup>17</sup>

(vi) Faith in 'Status-quo': Collective security system necessitates the willingness of nations to fight for the status-quo. It is not inherently an attempt to perpetuate an existing state of affairs, but believes that concept of change should be compatible to a peaceful one by all accounts.

#### Objective Prerequisites

Collective security also depends upon the establishment of a number of basic conditions in the external sphere of life. In the power situation, the legal situation and in the organization situation the varied external manifestations of objective prerequisites of collective security are:

(i) Universality of Membership: Collective security has always believed in the concept of totality, which if not

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17. Ibid., p.22.

adhered to would convert collective security into a mere alliance system or a balance of power system. Thus, almost all states of world community should be made members of collective system. The extension of a preponderant power outside the collective security system implies the inherent ineffectiveness in the functioning of the system and reduces it into a series of alliances or balance of power system. There should be an equilibrium maintained in the relationship of nation states. Security offers this level of equality and harmony.

(ii) **A World Diffused Power:** An ideal collective security system would not imply a concentration of power. Hence, states with equivalent power status should function in the international arena. A single super power is antithetical to concept of collective security. The purpose of initiating a collective security system is to expect the system to possess for greater superior power that acts as a deterrent against the potential aggressor.

(iii) **Approximation of World Government:** The nation's faith in the effectiveness of the global community is quite explicit. World peace is desired through collective international operations. Hence, from here stems the desire for a substantial world government.

(iv) Legality of Concepts, Procedures and Institutes: The institutional vehicle of the collective security system also requires a legal basis for their functioning.

To be effective within the complex arena of contemporary international relations, it has to be endowed with the power and status to determine aggression. A critical review of the concept of aggression is important primarily because it is a starting point for bringing the security system into operation. The reason for advocating a legal character to the collective security system is that one has to identify the aggressor, determine the aggressions only in a legal modes and procedures. The meaningfulness and effectiveness of the collective security system is also dependent upon the capacity of the organizational mechanism to exercise these vital functions without obstruction.

Analysing the ideal collective security system, one can draw conclusion that the system implies.

- (a) All actors for one attitude,
- (b) Mutual confidence among powers,
- (c) Favourable distribution of power,
- (d) Overwhelming strength to deal with any combination of power,
- (e) Members have an ideal concept of security,
- (f) Substantial disarmament,

(g) Breadth of membership, i.e., universality of membership.

Taking account of all the manifestations of the system, one can conclude in the words of Inis L.Claude, "It is my firm conviction that those who threat collective security functions other than and in addition to the institutionalization of joint sanctions against any or all aggressors have altered its meaning to the point of destroying the possibility of meaningful and valid longitudinal analysis of collective security".<sup>18</sup>

The alliance system centred in the Quadruple and Holy alliance, which was called by the name of 'Concert of Europe'. It lasted from 1815 to 1914. The concert was quite successful in dealing with the Balkan wars. However, in the late nineteenth century the system collapsed. The earlier attempts to establish collective security were made by William Pitt (1805) who suggested that all European powers should jointly support a new status-quo against any attempt to trouble tranquility. Besides the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and its horrifying impact (1914-18) convinced many that a new conceptual structure was needed to regulate the lawlessness of community of states.

The efforts of such perceptions lead to the establishment of the League of Nations with President Woodrow Wilson

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18. Inis L.Claude, The United Nations and Collective Security p.111.

emerging as the main protagonist of 'collective security'. He argued, that balance of power has been "found wanting for the best of all reasons that it does not stay balanced inside itself, and a weight which cannot hold together cannot constitute a make weight in the affairs of men".<sup>19</sup> In his view, collective security was a better way of management "There must now be, not a balance of power nor one powerful group of nations set off against another but a single overwhelming group of nations who shall be the trustee of the peace of the world".<sup>20</sup> The root cause, for any war, to Woodrow Wilson, remained a result of pitiless manipulation of power by immoral men, acting behind closed doors, in defiance of the democratic process to which they are committed. To him, the principle of national self-determination has been utterly disregarded.

#### Collective Security Under the League of Nations: Covenant

The proposals for the establishment of the League was at the Versailles Conference in 1919. It was suggested that if all nations could be persuaded to act collectively, the world would be much safer place to live in. An apparatus was imperative to give an institutional expression to the

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19. Ray Stannard Baker and Willian E.Dodd (eds.), Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace (New York: Harper and Bros., 1927), Vol.I, p.364 cited in Harold K.Jacobson, Network of Interdependence: International Organization and the Global Political System (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1979).

20. Ibid., p.343.

concept of collective security. This approach to international organisation was known as 'functionalism'. It held that political integration among states can best develop from more limited attempts at co-operation in specific functional area, principally in economic welfare. But this was not fully developed till the work of David Mitrany appeared in 1930s.<sup>21</sup> It was however accepted that 'collective security requires the creation of a legal and structural apparatus'. The League of Nations was created to perform the institutional function and its lofty principles were summed up as:

Article 11: 'Any war, or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any member of the League, or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League...'

Article 10 incorporates a classic statement of fundamental legal concept - the obligation of every state joining the system 'to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.' It acknowledges the question of mutual territorial integrity, along with the perceived threat of external aggression and thereby laying down the basic guidelines of collective security system.

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21. David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics (London, 1975).

The Covenant contained provisions for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, but it was Article 16 which dealt with the problem of collective action to preserve collective security against armed aggression and thus spelled out the positive responsibilities of participating states. Apart from economic sanctions, the article also provided for possibility of collective military sanctions, to be initiated upon the recommendation of the council'. With the League came the view that a new world order had been established. Ernst Haas has remarked, pointing out an inherent flaw, "Ever since its inception in 1919, international organization somehow has been expected to operate above and beyond politics".<sup>22</sup>

Article 10 of the Covenant gave an implicit belief in the existence of fundamental legal concept, while article 11 laid down the ideological premise of the new regime. Article 16 spelled out the positive responsibilities of the participating states and also provided for the possibilities of collective military sanctions to be initiated on the recommendation of the Council. However, the basic flaw remain that members retained the right to abstain from this system of enforcement programme. The Covenant, under Article 19 gave formal expression to the conceptual relationship

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22. Ernst, B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts", American Political Science Review, Vol. 49 (March 1955), p. 40.



between peaceful change and collective security by authorizing the consideration by the Assembly of demands, for alteration of the legally established status quo.

Surveying the working of the League of Nations we find that its ideal of collective security was destroyed as early as in 1921 by the resolutions of Assembly of the League, which stated "it is duty of each member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been committed".<sup>23</sup> Like all the important treaties, the success of the League depended essentially on the signatories. With time gaps, the League's covenant exposed its weaknesses, as the ideal of automatic co-operation in defence of collective security was never achieved. The League was weakened by USA's retreat into isolationism as the Senate refused to ratify the League's Covenant. Initially, defeated Germany was excluded as was Bolshevik regime in Russia. By the time USSR could join in 1934, Nazi Germany had left. The Covenant, theoretically opened the way for States to resist the arbitrary use of force without violating the law. It is also stated that the League lacked teeth. This was predominant primarily because of the lack of positive obligation on the part of the participating states in military sanctions. The League also

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23. League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement, No.6, October 1921, pp.24ff.

suffered from structural defects primarily because of the presence of universal veto mechanism. Hence, with the passage of time, the strongest sections of the League Covenant concerning collective security had been watered down. Britain and France tried to reconcile balance of power politics with the concept of collective security through various facts: The Kellogg Briand Pact (1928) which was to outlaw the use of force, Locarno Treaty (1925) created an illusion that the League had been strengthened than weakened.

Two major crises that the League faced and will be considered here are the Manchurian crisis (1931), where limitation of the league were perhaps demonstrated the most; and the Ethiopian crisis (1935). The Manchurian issues brought into sharp focus the range and complexity of problems faced by collective security in general and the League in particular. The dispute involved the Japanese and the Chinese and confusion concerned whether Japan could be 'identified' as a clearcut aggressor. A variety of larger political considerations outweighed the immediate issue, and personal reasons came in between the implementation of the League's Covenant. It revealed essentially the Euro-centric view of the League. There was considerable delay in implementing the various stages for the League's consideration of the matter.

During the Ethiopian crisis and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the initiative taken by the League of Nations did not present a genuine rededication to the principles of collective security that had been enshrined in the Covenant. The spirit of the resolution portrayed the League as a dying body. George Schwarzenburger has commented on the nature of sanctions in the following words, "The sanctions were not applied automatically, simultaneously and comprehensively. They were applied only hastingly, gradually and piecemeal".<sup>24</sup> In other words the sanctions were gradual, voluntary and partial and hence remained ineffective. The Ethiopian crisis also demonstrated some of the inherent problems of the central theme of collective security - that states undertake a general and open-ended commitment to unite against an aggressor - in a situation where actions against one state could jeopardise the balance of power against another, far more dangerous aggressor.

Another illustration of the problems faced by the League in its efforts to promote international security is to be found in its pursuit of disarmament. It required an atmosphere of mutual trust - a distant prospect for Europe in 1930s. Apart from structural problems, the concept of

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24. George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics Praeger (New York: 1951).

collective security contains a paradox: if peace is to be maintained, how can force be used to limit aggression?

Henry Kissinger States "whenever peace conceived of avoidance of war, has been primary object of a power, the international community has been at the mercy of most ruthless member".<sup>25</sup>

Though its original propounders had hoped that co-operation by all states would generate a greater volume of mutual benefit and every one would be better off. But collective security could not work as threat could not be specified. Only the small powers took it seriously, yet the outbreak of Second World War demonstrated that even the big powers were not immune from it. Another aspect of the collective security system, clearly illustrated by origins and policies of League of Nations, was its utility in maintaining the status quo. During the inter-war period, most powers, especially France and Britain, stood for the preservation of the territorial status quo. Thus, inherently this collective security status quo oriented system ignore the dynamics of political, social and economic change. Most members of the League sought to find security in this era through traditional devices of national policy and diplomacy.

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25. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), p.1.

Hence the conclusion can be drawn, that due to lack of political will, the western bloc reverted to the old balance of power game and the League was regarded more as a problem in this paradigm. Without producing much more advantages, the League reduced the flexibility of international relations. Due to the lack of its coercive power, the collective security framework could not be preserved in the wake of a determined challenge.

#### Collective Security Under the United Nations Charter

Although the exuberent expectations of the League were soon belied by its failure and non-compliance of members with the system, yet a belief in the intrinsic value and necessity of collective security was firmly held among the big powers. Thus most of the powers excluding the Axis powers, had met, even before the end of second World War and entered into negotiations to create a new collective body in June 1945 - the United Nations.

The provisions of the UN Charter do remain to be more extensive and far reaching. Article 1 calls for effective collective measures for the prevention of aggression, Chapter-VII gives details of the collective measures to be applied. The provisions of the article from 39-51 of the UN deal with the concept of collective security. It provides for both

economic and military sanctions. Moreover the system is buttressed by regional arrangements for defence and is further strengthened by the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' that was signed in 1950. Collective action by the United Nations stands ensured even when a Security Council resolution is vetoed. But it was more likely that without inclusion of Great powers, it was likely to share the fate of the League. As Roland Stromberg States: "Rising on the ashes of League, the UN accepted more frankly the apparent truth that collective security is no good against the great powers. It strengthened the power of the organization to intervene any where against a 'breach of peace' but at the same time it necessarily strengthened the veto power of the Great Powers. It relied on Great Power unanimity."<sup>26</sup>

Article 24 states, "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf". Article 39 is even more explicit stating, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or

26. Roland Stromberg, "The Idea of Collective Security", in Joel Larus (ed.) From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p.276.

act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with the provision of Article 41 and 42 to restore international peace and security". Article 41 gives the Security Council authority "to decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions" and Article 42 states "should the Security Council consider that the measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". The provisions of article 43, 45 and 47 provide for availability of troops, assistance and facilities to the UN for combined international enforcement action and assist the Security Council on questions relating to military requirements for maintenance of international peace and security. In theory, therefore, the world's states handed over the task of maintaining peace to the UN Security Council dominated by five permanent members namely USA, USSR, England, France and China. These members have the power to veto decisions of Security Council on matters of substance. The proper functioning of its peace keeping machinery depends on the unanimous consensus of the great powers. It has believed that the veto provision would prevent direct confrontation between the world organization and its major powers.

In practice, the UN has refrained from following the pattern laid down in its basic document. The UN, in the quest for realising world peace, realised the importance of threats by great powers. In its infrastructural framework no bulwork had been created, hence it adopted the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution'.

Article 51 recognises "The inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations". The uniting for peace plan represented an effort to institutionalize the reversal of that assumption, to provide a regularized means for doing what had been done by improvisation in Korea. It was a move to create a system of collective security applicable, as the original system had not seen, to aggression by or under the auspices of, a permanent member of the Security Council. The scheme was marked by deficiencies, the General Assembly, the operative organ was only a recommendatory authority; too big and slow and diffused in its political composition to constitute an ideal instrument for collective security. The uniting for peace resolution fell short of guaranteeing collective security as it drew no firm commitment by any state and thus offered no potential victim of attack any real assurance of collective assistance. Collective security would be meaningful only if applied to both great and lesser power and only if all or most great powers



co-operated fully in supporting it. Schwarzenberger observed "as understood at Dumbarton Oaks; Collective Security" meant "security against dangers to peace from the middle powers and small states and collective insecurity in the face of any aggression by any of the world powers".<sup>27</sup> Also Inis L.Claude rightly states "the League failed to establish a universal security system; the UN began by declining to make an effort... In the final analysis, the United Nations has never been intended or expected to apply the principle of collective security on a universal scale".<sup>28</sup>

A more realistic interpretation would be, despite the rhetoric of collective security with which the debate was embellished, the scheme was actually intended less to equip the General Assembly to preside over collective security operations than to facilitate and regularize the utilization of that body as an agency of collective legitimization in cases involving the use of military force. From its very inception, UN was handicapped by the illusions of the founders and by its remoteness from the everyday world of realpolitik. The uniting for peace resolution was typical of American policy and in this view of the matter, the General

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27. George Schwarzenberger, n.24, p.510.

28. Inis L.Claude, n.6, pp.165, 172.

Assembly moved to reduce collective security to collective legitimization. In June 1950, following the North Korean aggression by the South Koreans, a hurriedly summoned Security Council meeting was able to take first step towards a US-led UN intervention in Korea in the absence of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet representative returned, it was too late to halt any action. In November 1950, the General Assembly passed the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' which authorized General Assembly to consider crisis situations and make recommendations under article 42 when Security Council found itself paralysed by disagreement among permanent members. This resolution was in three parts. Resolution A had four provision; it called for immediate consideration by General Assembly of any situation involving an act of aggression or threat of peace; establishment of Peace Observation Committee of fourteen members including Soviet Union; recommended that members of the UN should fulfil their obligations under Article 43 of the Charter; and establishment of Collective Measure Committee of fourteen members. Resolution B urged Security Council to "devise measures for the earliest application of Article 43, 45, 46 and 47 regarding placing of armed forces at the disposal of Security Council".

Resolution C recommended that all permanent members of Security Council should meet and discuss collectively or otherwise all matters that are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the UN activities.

Although, at the time it appeared to many that the UN had successfully fulfilled its collective security obligations, it inevitably took the UN still further away from the role that had been originally been intended for it in 1945 as an organization that would be founded upon great power consensus. The role that UN played in evolution of Israel, also undermined the position of the UN. But following this, US preponderance in the UN witnessed steady deterioration due to decolonization phase in international politics.

In spite of all the above discussion, we cannot undermine the importance of other successful efforts of the UN. The UN role in Cyprus, the UN peace-keeping force helped to keep peace in East Mediterranean. Ivor Richard argued "that during 1974 Cyprus crisis the prospects for war would have been much greater if the UN had not provided a forum to Greece and Turkey where they could pursue their argument non-violently".<sup>29</sup> The recently concluded Afghanistan Accord,

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29. D.A. Kay, The Changing United Nations (New York: 1977), p.3.

though brought about the support of both Super Powers as they were involved directly or indirectly in it, is a major result of UN diplomacy and mediation to maintain peace and security in the world. Such a situation, however, could not be evolved in the Iran-Iraq war where war is ravaging for the last eight years and threatens peace and security of the world at large.

When we analyse the United Nations collective security system within the parameters of the 'ideal' type we find that the Charter emphasizes the avoidance of arbitrary use of force by states. Article 51 permits self defence to resist 'armed attack' and this can be pursued collectively. This right is available only till Security Council has taken necessary step for international peace and security. It also imposes collective military obligations on member states. But the veto power to permanent members destroys considerably, the possibility of measures against Big-Five. Thus, prevention of arbitrary national use of force and promotion of responsible international force becomes ineffective against them. In short, Article 51 aims to keep the individualized and decentralized measures of self defence under the control of collectivized enforcement through the Council. None of the provisions under Article 39-42 gives specific guarantee of immediate response or automation. By implication, UN sanctions cannot be applied against the permanent powers.

Collective security should not be an ad-hoc arrangement or else it would be another military alliance. The veto power and lack of army of the UN makes the UN ineffective. Inis L. Claude has rightly stated "In half the century that has elapsed since the concept of collective security gained ...for reforming the international system, it has largely lost its clarity and specificity."<sup>30</sup>

Now we will deal with regional security system to clarify that they are not collective security system as often insisted upon by statesmen. Dealing with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is a selective security system for joint resistance to possible aggression stemming from a particular power bloc. It does not constitute an advance towards the formal regime required by collective security. In fact it represents a twentieth century elaboration of the alliance concept. The NATO has become an organizational web expressing and reinforcing the political determination of the US to align itself with free European nations in resistance to Soviet expansionism. Similarly, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) has remained ideologically bound group guided by Soviet Union.

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The other major regional organizations are the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Both of them are based on a distinct identity for themselves. The OAS was inspired by Pan-Americanism as an expression of Latin American opposition to the US general intervention in Latin American affairs. Not much could be achieved by the organization against the US. The OAU was also a result of Pan-Africanism, the sentiments of Arab-nationalism. But it different as its principal aims are neither collective security nor economic integration. Its classical functions was peaceful settlement of dispute. It has functioned as a neutral meeting site and forum of widely held opinions. These organizations are basically rooted in the nationalistic sentiments and a desire for individualistic identity. They do not come anywhere near achieving the high ideal of collective security.

Concluding this discussion on collective security, system, we must quote George Schwarzenburger's statement, "until the day when Western and Eastern World's no longer consider each other as potential aggressor, collective security, as envisaged under the charter of the UN, must remain a dead letter."<sup>31</sup> Haas, Butterworth and Nye wrote, "These organizations are little more than governments linked

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31. Schwarzenberger, n.7, p.529.

in permanent conclave. They have no power and personality beyond the collective will of governments".<sup>32</sup> Even Claude has referred to them as 'tools' that do not have clear 'purposes' that commit them to particular course of action.<sup>33</sup> Collective security has been regarded by Mor-genthau as not only dangerous but unwise as under it no war could be localized and all wars would become a world war.<sup>34</sup>

Due to presence of super powers, aggression launched by such a power might be defeated but not frustrated as conceived by the theorists of collective security. The world in which all the aspects of collective security can be fulfilled simply does not exist. Therefore, Walter Lippman contends "an inadequate collective security system is worse than on 'system' at all". Collective security was a conceptual scheme for dealing with eighteenth or nineteenth century kind of world, doomed to irrelevance in the twentieth century because of disappearance of the multiplicity of great powers in favour of the duality of super powers. The most important feature here is to speculate the future of world security system and the United Nations under the impact

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32. E.B.Haas, R.L. Butterworth, Joseph Nye, Conflict Management by International Organization (New Jersey: General Learning Corp., 1972), pp.8-9.

33. Inis, L.Calude, The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p.xvii.

34. Hans J.Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964), pp.417-18.

of 'multipolarity'. The multipolar global system would exhibit the following characteristics: "there would be three or more major power centres; the international security configuration would be distincts from the configuration based on other issues... the major coalitions would have both conflicting and common interests with each other and with other groupings... and the coalition would be less cohesive than in a bipolar system".<sup>35</sup>

Speaking about conflict management in multipolar system, Rosecrance stated, "In a multipolar system it may be difficult to persuade nations to engage in regulative action ...In a multipolar order it is not clear whose interests are primarily affected by disruptive act".<sup>36</sup> Thus, there would be a group of uncommitted states in the multipolar international security system.

Yet security policies and issues remain central to the interests of the State, and it is only states that possess the military and political capabilities to make or threaten war. Thus, to present day, collective security is an unquestioned ideal.

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35. Louis Rene Beres, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Reliability of Alliance Commitments", The Western Political Quarterly (Utah), 25, December 1972, pp.702-10.

36. Richard Roscrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973), pp.116-18.



With the existence of more than one hundred and fifty states; big and small, developed and underdeveloped, and with all other forms of variation, collective security still remains the means to ensure security to all nations. It seeks to provide a deterring effect upon potential aggressors and reassuring effect upon potential victim. "It is based upon the proposition not that the international moral spectrum is limited to black and white, but that differential shading of gray are more significant than the universality of gray".<sup>37</sup> The concept of collective security is conceived as legal, rather than a moral, system. It has to stay in spite of changes in world politics, power relations and deterrence to ensure survival of all and enforcement of international security.

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37. Inis L.Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p.280.



## Chapter IV

### CONCEPT OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

Weapons have long been developed by nations to enhance what statesmen call 'national security'. Fear and mistrust have resulted in nations increasing their own armaments on the pretext of safeguarding their security. As a result, military confrontation continues to rise to more dangerous levels, undermining the very purpose for which the new weapons were said to be acquired: security. Due to the development of nuclear arms and the nations' 'overkill capacity', what is threatened today, is not security of a nation or two but the security of humanity in general, namely international security. Poisoning the international atmosphere, arms race adversely affects the process of peaceful co-existence, mutual understanding, co-operation and equality among the nations of the world. Breeding mistrust and suspicion about the objectives of others, it also affects the 'confidence building measures' among nations. Quite often it results in inflation of a local dispute and involvement of big powers in these conflicts, especially those of the Third World. Guided by the 'worst-case syndrome', arms race promotes anxiety and secrecy, all of which adversely effects the efforts towards a harmonious international atmosphere. The existence and

perpetuation of underdevelopment and inequalities and injustices in economic relations also represent a threat to international peace and security. The halting of arms race and the progress towards substantial disarmament would help to create an entirely new international environment and would release resources for economic and social development of all countries.

'Disarmament' and 'arms control' are the twin processes through which the world community intends to stop arms race. Disarmament proposes to deprive nations of anything to fight with. In a straight forward way, it purports to eliminate war by eliminating the means by which war can be conducted. On the other hand, the curx of the arms control theory is the belief that mutual interest can exist in the mutual regulation of arms between adversaries. At first instance disarmament and arms control appear straight forward approaches to the problems of peace and security, but in essence they are highly complex. The most widely held definitions of the two concepts are those of Hedley Bull.<sup>1</sup>

- Disarmament is "the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be unilateral or multilateral; general or local; comprehensive or partial; controlled or uncontrolled."

- Arms control is "restraint internationally exercised upon

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1. Hedley Bull, The Control of Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (Weidenfeld and Nicolson for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1961), p.ix.

armament policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use."

From the point of view of international peace, disarmament and arms control are complementary to each other. A reduction or abolition of existing weapons may not ensure peace if nations are left free to acquire and develop new weapons in future. Mere arms control will also be a negation of disarmament theory as reduction of existing armament is as necessary as the check on arms race. Therefore, arms control is extension of the very logic inherent in the theory of disarmament. It is no alternative to disarmament theory but a natural requirement of world order. Disarmament is viewed as a continuation of a strategy by a reduction of military means, whereas arms control is continuation of the strategy by a mutual restraint on military means.

Although the two terms are sometimes used synonymously, it will be better to preserve a distinction between the two. Based in the two objectives 'reduction' and 'restraint', the theory of disarmament and arms control can be explained thus: disarmament always refers to a lowering of the number of weapons, arms control can embrace an increase in the level of armaments, as long as it is mutually restrained by the parties to the agreement. As total disarmament is nearly impossible,

the shift is towards arms control which is quite realistic. Thus what disarmament and arms control imply under present situation is 'reduction' versus 'management'. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems negotiation and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) brings out the distinction in two approaches quite clearly. What was discussed under ABM talks was limiting the number of missiles and the deployment sites and not uncontrolled arms race. What the ABM Treaty (1972) did was to preserve the super power nuclear deterrence and not disarm them. Contrary to this, disarmament as a direct approach to peace rests upon the assumption that armaments make war not only physically possible but also probable.

### Analyzing Disarmament

The Theory - Its Growth and Evolution: The term 'disarmament' is taken as encompassing a broad spectrum of measures relating to the regulation, limitation, reduction and elimination of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures. The concept - including control and virtual abolition of instrumentalities of war - has occupied a prominent place in peace thinking since long. Immanuel Kant included elimination of standing armies as the third of his "Preliminary Articles of Perpetual Peace Between states".<sup>2</sup> Towards the end of nineteenth century,

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2. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, p.4.

Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, called upon other governments to hold a peace conference at The Hague in 1899 and a similar one followed in 1907 at The Hague.

The proposition put forward by the disarmament theorists is that, that only the elimination of national armaments and limitations of competitive military development alone can offer hope to survival of mankind. In strict literalness, disarmament appears an appealingly "direct and simple means" to peace.<sup>3</sup> Franklin Roosevelt supported the concept by defining it as "Fourth Freedom" in terms of "a world wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour - anywhere in the world".<sup>4</sup> Though not the only factor, military factor occupies a position of considerable importance in the two basic assumptions of disarmament theory; they are: armament causes war and that disarmament contributes to international security. But here it might not be correct to deduce arms race as an autonomous process following its own logic. Contrary to this is Bull's view who see arms race itself as a manifestation of inherent tension.<sup>5</sup> Tension

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3. Inis L. Calude, Swords into Plowshares (4th edn), (New York: Random House, 1984), p.287.

4. Ibid.

5. Hedley Bull, n.1.

produce armament, armament breeds counter armament; and competitive armament increases tension. The truth is that it is a circular process in which causes and effects revolve and are blurred into indistinguishability.

As the word 'disarmament' is utilised in an extremely general sense, it can be stated that it gets a precise connotation only when a proper adjective is suffixed to it. Thus there might be:

- (a) Total disarmament: It proposes to eliminate any weapon system or military capability that is beyond necessity for maintaining domestic order. Though such efforts were made in the Soviet and American draft proposals of March and April 1962, no negotiations have henceforth appeared among the super powers.
- (b) Partial disarmament: This covers three categories:
  - (1) incomplete reductions in all weapon categories;
  - (2) complete reduction in some categories;
  - (3) a combination of the two stated above.

Generally it refers to a plan of disarmament under which nation is allocated its military resources within a limited budget to whatever weapons it deems fit. It can also take the form of a manpower ceiling. This is called 'quantitative disarmament'. But the partial reduction

leaves the prospective signatory free to arm in unrestricted categories. These efforts can be made unilaterally, negotiated or imposed to avoid unnecessary expenditure on expensive weapons, compensate for geographical or technological security needs and their asymmetries. Such provisions are also referred to as 'quantitative disarmament'.

- (c) **Multilateral Disarmament:** These are embodied in bilateral or multilateral formal education. It can also be called conditional disarmament as one nation reduce upon the condition of reduction by other(s). It might also be said that such agreement occur because there is inevitable lack of trust among nations who normally have parity in strength.
- (d) **Unilateral Disarmament:** There can be several objectives for it - moral, economic, political, social or military. A nation might consider war as morally wrong or its economy does not allow persuasion of arms race. Politically, the world environment may be harmonious for war to occur or the public opinion might be against war.<sup>6</sup> Or else, alternative approach, as non-violent approach of Gandhi appear as effective means of resistance.

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6. This was the reason behind America's withdrawal from Vietnam. The public opinion at home, was against such a long military involvement and the expenditure it incurred.



War is a possible outcome of competition between states. The tendency of the international system is to make a general and comprehensive disarmament agreement of this kind impossible. There are chances of an imposed disarmament agreement on the defeated nations while bargaining with a dominant power. The case of disarmament of Germany, after the first world war, by the Allied powers a good example.

Disarmament has been propounded by its supporters on various grounds. Considering the basic postulates of theory one comes to the conclusion that only arms are responsible for the growth of conflict in the world. This proposition appears flawed as arms give rise to fear and mistrust, which is only one of the reasons of war. Thus, basically the problem lies not with arms but in human psychology. A reorientation of man's thinking towards a disarmament approach is a long process to achieve. Thus it is unsound to say that a halt to arms race will contribute to international security. One might say that disarmament is not wanted by the realities of international politics. It has even been suggested by Quincy Wright that "disarmament would probably tend to increase the frequency of war".<sup>7</sup> The dynamics of international politics make prospects of success

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7. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: 1965), 2nd edn., p.811.

of any theory of disarmament limited. No theory can forever rule the affairs of the world. The principle of 'balance of terror' and 'deterrent theory' both rule out any chances of elimination of war and suggest, at least for the present, a continued stalemate.

On the economic front, the theory has been supported by the view that the amount spend on military expenditure would be spend on developmental purposes by these nations.<sup>8</sup> Barbara Ward in the 'Home of Man' - setting the basic requirements against actual level of military expenditure concludes, "If we take the World Bank's estimates of basic needs, we reach a remarkable conclusion that the entire proposed spending of work for peace for an entire decade would amount to no more than half the world's annual bill for weapons".<sup>9</sup> According to a United Nations publication it is estimated that, at present approximately twenty five per cent of world's research and development personnel is engaged in military related pursuits and the world military expenditure has increased to around 1000 billion dollars in 1986 from 500 billion dollars in 1980. Also current estimates show that nuclear weapon states possess a total of over 50,000 nuclear

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8. See A.Kadachenko, "Disarmament and the Under-Developed Countries", International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.6, March 1960, pp.26-34.

9. Inga Thorson, "Ways and Means to Generate the Political Will", in Richard Jolly (ed.), Disarmament and World Development (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970).

weapons and six arms producing states account for 90 per cent of such transfer. It has been stated that armaments cause war. Instead, it is symptom rather than the cause of war and mistrust.

It has been pointed out by the critics of disarmament that the logic of disarmament on economic ground does not hold good as it is possible that disarmament may not save money. Inspection and monitoring system, especially if general and comprehensive, entail huge expenditure in expensive hardwards and veritable controllers. On the ethical grounds such one sided reduction might not be possible as they destroy the military balance and destabilize world politics. It is also pointed out that disarming nations will not produce trust among nations as the real problem is of politics and not of armament. War, though considered evil is not the worst of its kind. The critics also argue that such disarmament might halt or slow down scientific and technological progress, affecting other areas of development. There are two problems with disarmament - it should begin at some point in time and no time seems opportune enough for the process of disarmament to start. Also disarmament on a massive scale is not feasible nor possible as some kind of force behind the authority has to be maintained to sustain order. On the other hand, Alva Myrdal, a nobel laureate

considers arms race as a 'global folly' in which "nations are buying greater and greater insecurity at higher and higher costs".<sup>10</sup>

The various types of agreements on disarmament point out to different approaches as stated by J. David Singer.<sup>11</sup> It considers war as inevitable with an emphasis on winning war. Armaments are necessary and permanent source of man's existence. The terror implicit in modern weapons make war today unthinkable and one of the super powers will forego imperialistic designs thus making war unthinkable. Three approaches emerge from these premises:

- (1) The tensions-first approach: It emphasizes on educative and psychological factors. It states that tension can be reduced among nations by changing national attitudes. This approach does not appear very appealing due to the time factor and instability in international affairs. The three conditions that seem relevant in considering this approach are: (a) the elite is preoccupied with a dominant feeling of national security; (b) there should be public support for any preparedness programme; (c) there is relative ease with which this support may be introduced.

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10. Alva Myrdal, "Game of Disarmament", in Richard Jolly (ed.) Disarmament in World Development (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978).

11. J. Garnett (ed.), Theories of Peace and Security (London: Macmillan Ltd., 1970).

- (2) The political settlement approach: It states that, so long as politically unresolved issues exist, nations will pursue war on the pretext of their being important for national security. Salvador de Madariaga, Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau are among those who support this approach. George Kennan refers to disarmament as 'utopian enthusiasm'.<sup>12</sup> The approach has been criticized for not giving due consideration to weapons and mistrust arising out of their possession.
- (3) The armament first approach: It points out that for disarmament to be effective, the process itself should start first, although the tension due to political problems might continue. In short, disarmament should precede resolution of political tensions. There exist two types of thinking on the issue. First is that the elimination of weapons should be gradual, thus building up trust among nations. This is the view of David Singer<sup>13</sup> often referred to as the 'gradualist view'. Opposite to this is the view that "the way to disarm is to disarm". States should pursue disarmament if they are serious about the issue.

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12. Ibid., p.157.

13. Ibid., p.158.

### Negotiating Disarmament

Prior to the First World War, 'The Rush-Bagot Agreement' of 1817 between Britain and United States brought about the non-militarization of the Canadian-American frontier. This was followed by the two conferences on peace at The Hague, convened by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, in 1899 and 1907 respectively. The War was followed by Treaty of Versailles which led to unilateral disarmament of Germany by the Allies. The most significant progress in disarmament came in 1922 with 'The Washington Naval Treaty' which attempted to balance the quality and quantity of naval armaments, primarily between United Kingdoms, USA and Japan. Soon followed the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which renounced war as an instrument of national policy.

Quite like the League of Nations Covenant after the First World War, the United Nations enshrined the disarmament ideal in its charter. Disarmament, in its process involve the community of nations and thus it should be collective efforts of nations towards international security. The UN ethos goes on to state that a disarmed world will be more secure and this shows its preference for disarmament over arms control. In the early years, the discussion focussed primarily on atomic energy control and moved on to frequent negotiations among big powers during 1950s. Still

deadlock ensued and no result was forthcoming. In December 1953, President Eisenhower of US put forward his "Atoms for Peace" proposal - a joint endeavour to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The idea of establishing nuclear weapon free zones had attracted the international community in 1950s as a means to limit the areas of nuclear weapon deployment. The first of such proposals came from Poland's 'Rapacki Plan' (1957) calling for the permanent absence of nuclear weapons from territories of several central European states. More concrete results appeared in the form of:<sup>14</sup>

- Antarctic Treaty (1959) - denuclearization to an uninhabited area.
- The Outer Space Treaty (1967) - states principles governing activities of states in exploration and uses of outer space.
- The Seabed Treaty (1971) - Prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on Seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.
- Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) - Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

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14. The United Nations and Disarmament (1945-85), (New York: United Nations, 1985), p.89.

The goal of general and comprehensive disarmament (GCD) was proclaimed by UN in 1959 as an ultimate aim of disarmament. In spite of plans proposed by both USA and Soviet Union, no agreement was reached to various differences and since 1965 GCD had become, as Hedley Bull states, a 'perfunctory affair'.<sup>15</sup> Efforts were made in late 1960s to reduce military power on budgetary lines, but failed. In 1968-69, Secretary General of UN, U. Thant, after a resolution from the General Assembly, declared the 1970s as the 'First Disarmament Decade'.<sup>16</sup> During its regular review of the problems of strengthening international security, the UN General Assembly, at its twenty fifth session in 1970, adopted a declaration on the strengthening of international security.<sup>17</sup> The first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) was convened as late as in 1978 which accepted large scale disarmament as a distant goal, a more realistic approach.

On the nuclear front, a major achievement was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricting nuclear testing to be conducted underground. What followed was Nuclear

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15. Hedley Bull, "Arms Control: A Stocktaking and Prospectus", Adelphi Papers, No.55 (March 1969), pp.15-16.
  16. United Nations and Disarmament..., n.14, p.20.
  17. United Nations Study Series on Disarmament-8, "Relationship Between International Security and Disarmament", (New York: United Nations).



Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) preventing rise of further independent centres of nuclear power. One recent achievement of disarmament has been the conclusion of Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) between USA and Soviet Union in December 1987. The INF disputes mainly involved the deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union in Europe and, in response, the deployment of Cruise and Pershing IIs in the West European sector by the US. The treaty aims at eliminating these forces over a fixed period of time.

Apart from this, talks have also been held between 1973-84 on the issue of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. Thus it appears that while considering disarmament, one should also keep in mind the state of balance of power. At no stage should the states seek to possess military superiority which would indeed, violate the process itself. Adequate verification and mutual co-operation are always necessary. Yet, disarmament can only remove the fear of present insecurity, it provides no guarantee against future insecurity.

#### Arms Control: The Theory

The main impulse of the arms control theory resulted from the debate concerning the ban of nuclear weapons tests during late fifties and early sixties of the present century. The process appeared in more clarity with the fading away of

the cold war as Washington and Moscow developed a common interest in preserving their hegemony. It was the body of ideas Hedely Bull called "new thinking".

The theory of arms control was developed mainly by the West but eventually assimilated in the East. Its definition ranges from its aims: (a) to reduce the probability of war, (b) to reduce the costs of preparation for war, (c) to reduce death and destruction if arms control fails and war comes;<sup>18</sup> to Henry Kissiner's versions which are especially applicable to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.<sup>19</sup>

- (i) To make it 'less likely for either side to achieve a decisive advantage in strategic weaponry'.
- (ii) to ensure that these weapons will be used in most extraordinary circumstances.
- (iii) in case of war 'non-nuclear means would always be preferable'.

Hedley Bull has described the central ideas as follows: a concern about the dangers of nuclear war and a dissatisfaction with existing policies, a suspicion of the goal of a negotiated general and comprehensive disarmament agreement; an insistance upon the unity of strategy and

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18. F.A. Long, "Arms Control from the Perspective of the Nineteen Seventies", Daedalus (Cambridge), Summer 1975, p.1.

19. H.Kissinger, an interview in the US News and World Report, March 16, 1976.

arms control; a broadening of the scope of the subject and an appreciation of the links between varieties of military activity hitherto thought separate; a criticism of the assumption that disarmament should be the objective of arms control policy; and a determination to destroy the illusions of disarmament while remaining optimistic about the contribution of strategic theory to improving the prospects of peace and security.<sup>20</sup> Arms control has been the result of mutual accommodation between America and the Soviet Union to contain horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1960s, especially to China. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968) was a step to achieve this objective. Several factors in the new international constellation make for the new security equation. They are as follows: the growing importance, on the international scene, of the antagonistic triangular relations between the US, Soviet Union and China; the post-colonial international fragmentation among nations and the heightened aspirations of the intermediate and the Third World; the growing international interdependence; the consequences of the second technological revolution and the spread of nuclear know-how. This has resulted in more nations likely to enhance seriously the risks of instability and introduce additional ones.

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20. c.f. K.Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control", in K.Booth, J.Baylis, J.Garnett, Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy Vol.I (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987), p.157.

The theory of arms control is based on a simple insight: despite their deep rooted antagonism, East and West shared a critical interest in avoiding war, particularly a nuclear war. The crux of the theory is the belief that mutual interest can exist in the mutual regulation of arms between adversaries. Due to the ideological, political and economic differences, antagonism, at no point, could be resolved. In the political debate concerning arms control, the West tends to stress more on technological and control aspect while the East emphasizes political aspect. The most that prior agreement can offer to contain war is either a degree of 'crisis stability' or 'partial disarmament'.<sup>21</sup>

The principle underlying 'crisis stability' is that no war should be allowed to start because of some military imperative before all diplomatic options have been exhausted. Victory in nuclear war can be achieved only by destroying the enemy's retaliatory capacity. Avoiding war more often depends on judgement of the key decision makers at a critical moment and thus efforts should be made to reduce risks of accidental launches of nuclear weapons. The other objective of arms control lies with 'arms race stability'. Its primary goal is to stop arms competition getting out of hand on the pretext of other side gaining an advantage. There is no close relation-

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21. Lawrence Freedman, "Arms Control", The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Routledge and Paul, 1986), p.6.

ship between arms race stability and crisis stability, yet both co-exist. This is a complex phenomenon. Arms control, according to the classical theory, is solely to adjust the strategic relationship in order to restore equilibrium, or prevent it from being lost.

Apart from this, in the political context, arms control can put the East-West arms race into the reverse. Since arms race is seen as the source of super power antagonism, put the arms race into the reverse and reduction in antagonism should follow. Inconsistencies and contradictions appear in the current policies of arms control. They are: the contradiction between the urgent need for comprehensive disarmament and the narrow framework of arms control on the other; the variance between the basically status quo oriented arms control provisions calculated to sustain a bipolar world order and the necessity to adopt disarmament scheme to a dynamically changing multipolar international environment; the disparities between requirements of reduction of armaments and overkill capacity and constant moving up on the deterrence ladder; the incompatibility between the urgency for diminution of international tensions and the perfection of the threat system.

There appear two alternative approaches to arms control, the 'reformist approach' and the 'managerial approach'.<sup>22</sup> The

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22. Ibid., p.2.

reformers consider arms control as worthwhile only if it brings substantial changes in international system. Thus they regard the status quo oriented strategic arms limitation talks as pointless. The managers argue that the East-West antagonism derives from a genuine conflict of ideology and interests. Thus it is essential to resolve the conflicts first. They emphasize that the situation should not be allowed to go out of hand. This can also be viewed as an idealist versus traditionalist approach or disarmament versus strategic thinking. In this dilemma between the preferable and the feasible, it is the idealists who become resigned and arms control, with time, became explicit. T.C.Schelling says, arms control is "a breakout of the traditional confinement of disarmament".<sup>23</sup>

The arms control issue overlaps with that of disarmament - it is a debate of degree rather than of kind. Donald Puchala criticises arms control on several counts: it is unrealistic as security lies in maintaining military superiority; arms control may prove worthless in case one is tempted to cheat thus putting the opponents at high risks; the insignificance of agreements reached demonstrates the irrelevance of the undertaking; arms control, leading to reduction

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23. T.C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," in Donald Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York: George Brasiller, 1961), p.169.

of arms, will bring economic recession; arms being the reflection of political mistrust and not the cause would mean putting the cart before the horse; and it is said that military power of a nation brings her respect and status in the world community.<sup>24</sup> Other flaws follow from the theoretical framework. The central notion of arms control - strategic stability - evades approximate evaluation. Stability and balance are vague concepts. The centre of gravity in co-operative dealings rests mainly in political and economic linkages. But there are limits of the mastery of co-existence and relations of partnership. The most serious flaw is manifest in the doctrine of deterrence - an essential ingredient of arms control philosophy. Though a limited number of strategic nuclear warheads should be sufficient, in practice it knows no limit. These inconsistencies hamper the negotiating process between USA and the Soviet Union who 'find themselves locked in dispute about the ways and means of compromise'. Against all these critics it might be argued that: arms control should be practiced irrespective of tensions to reduce destructiveness of war; it is in mutual interest of nations to pursue arms control agreement; the idea of having superiority is meaningless when we have reached a stage of 'overkill'; and the cumulative effect of

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24. D.J. Puchala, International Politics Today (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1971), pp.294-96.

all arms control agreements make a substantial contribution towards humanity. The policy of arms control has been pursued more seriously by nations, nevertheless, in the 1980s it has come under radical criticism.<sup>25</sup>

### The Arms Control Negotiations

Broadly, these can be categorised into three;

- (a) those concerned with prohibition of deployment of particular weapons in new areas;
- (b) those primarily concerned with crisis management; and
- (c) those restraining horizontal and vertical proliferation both quantitative and qualitative.

Under the first category lies the Antarctic Treaty 1959, prohibiting any measure of military nature including weapon testing in Antarctic area; the Tlatelolco Treaty 1967 leading military denuclearization of Latin America; the Outer Space Treaty 1967 prohibiting placing of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies and in outer space; the Sea-bed Treaty 1971 prohibiting emplacement of nuclear arms or weapons of mass destruction in seabed, ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.<sup>26</sup> The main weakness of these treaties appear that they do not touch upon the essential:

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25. Leslie Gelb, "The Future of Arms Control: A Glass Half Full", and Richard Burt, "The Future of Arms Control: or Half Empty," Foreign Policy (Washington) No.36, Fall 1979, pp.21-48; Christoph Bertram, "Rethinking Arms Control", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.59, no.2, Winter 1980-81, pp.352-55.

26. United Nations and Disarmament..., n.14.



armament: as the outer space Treaty does not prevent development of spacecraft and weapons - a means to expand military conflict in outer space.<sup>27</sup> All the treaties also contain provision for withdrawal from the treaty (article VIII of the Seabed Treaty).

An offshoot of the 'new thinking' of 1950s and 1960s crisis management provides a means to properly handle a situation. One agreement on such line has been to install a 'hot line' between Washington and Moscow (1963) - an effort to avoid war due to misunderstanding or accident. Another agreement appeared in 1971 to 'Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War' and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973). Efforts were also made in 1982-83, to have advance information about Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) ballistic missiles which failed due to break down of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Since the early 1970s, confidence building measures gained significance, which resulted in the Helinski Final Act through the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. These measures reduce the risk of miscalculations and avoid many routine military activities being mistaken as an actual attack. Today, security might be better enhanced away from

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27. "Wars Fourth Dimension", Newsweek (December 8, 1976).

the classical number game towards what Christoph Bertram called the "mission approach" which deals with specific "military outputs".<sup>28</sup>

The most important issue in negotiating arms control has been the negotiations on nuclear arms control. The first agreement to this effect was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) prohibiting nuclear weapons' test in atmosphere, outer space and under water. This was followed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968), it prohibits transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers and commit the non-nuclear power states to self denying pledge. It was described as discriminatory by China and France and not signed by India which tested a nuclear device in 1974. Thus the treaty was meant to lock the emerging multipolar character of the nuclear world and limit its monopoly to few powerful nations. By mid-1980s NPT had been signed by one hundred and twenty countries, yet it continues to exist in what Alva Myrdal has called, "a twilight zone". The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), limited underground nuclear weapons test to yield not exceeding 150 kilotons.

The step towards negotiating vertical proliferation started in 1969 with the opening of SALT between USA and

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28. Christoph Bertram, "The Future of Arms Control, Part II: Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of a New Approach," Adelphi Papers No.146 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978).

Soviet Union and SALT I agreement was reached in May 1972. It contained two agreements: The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 1972 followed by ABM protocol in 1972 limiting ABM deployment; and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Missiles (1972) - a five year freeze in aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMS of both parties. The SALT II negotiations started in 1972 at Geneva but faced wintery weather in spite of the fact that a Treaty was signed by the two Premiers at Vladivostok. The treaty remained unratified due to changes and imbalance created in international environment, yet the two powers did nothing to undercut its provision. The START took off from SALT II to further negotiate the reduction of nuclear arsenal in July 1982, but talks broke off due to US deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in West Europe in December 1983. The ballistic missiles superiority of Soviet Union was what USA perceived as 'window of vulnerability' to herself. Here it must be stated that, out of the proposals put forward, Soviet Union appeared less inclined towards 'balances'.

The INF talks began in Geneva 1981 to limit weapons in the range one thousand to fifty five hundred kilometers. They were result of NATO's 'twin-track' decision to modernize yet negotiate intermediate nuclear forces. The first major

US proposal on INF was the "zero option".<sup>29</sup> It was rejected by Soviet Union. The talks broke off in 1983, but resumed again in 1985 at Geneva under the new leadership of M.Gorbachov from Soviet Union. Since then till December 1987, major summit meetings took place between Soviet Union and USA till the INF treaty was signed at Washington by US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary M.Gorbachov. Under the provisions of the treaty, US will, over three years, scrap 396 Pershing II and Cruise missiles deployed in West Germany, Belgium, Italy and Great Britain and Soviet Union will eliminate 683 SS-20s, SS-4, SS-12 and SS-23 missiles. Within three months of ratification of the treaty, by the Senate and Supreme Soviet respectively. It contains provisions for on-site inspection and verification.

A survey of the process of negotiations for both disarmament and arms control bring out the extent of overlapping in the two theories. No clear line of distinction can be drawn to distinguish a fully disarmament agreement from an arms control one. Both of them contribute towards enhancement of security. Yet no plan can be effective or dependable unless it continues to serve the national interests of each party. Both disarmament and arms control

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29. The proposal was, NATO would forgo its modernization plans in turn for the Soviet Union dismantling all its SS-20s, including those in Far East. Short range missiles would be frozen and other nuclear systems would be dealt in later negotiations.

can be more effective when pursued multilaterally which necessitates collective action by all nations. From this view, most important precondition of change is greater openness in the question of security. Imagination in security matters must be shifted from war scenarios to enhancing security by disarmament and arms control. The solution to national and world security cannot be sought in upward parities and a rush to higher levels of deterrence. These build-ups can only increase vulnerability of all concerned.

But no theory can meet the needs of international affairs for ever which is very unstable, although it might remain useful in one sense or the other. The problem of disarmament today is 'the problem of the non proliferation of nuclear weapons'.<sup>30</sup> It has enhanced the danger of accidental warfare and nuclear blackmail. Disarmament and arms control, both the issues, have their limitations too: disarmament can control only present fear of war but nothing it can do will inhibit the future fear of conflict; arms control as all negotiations show, mostly limit the quantitative aspect. The provisions of arms control treaty leave room for vertical proliferation. In absence of a superior authority to impose such agreement nations tend to cheat

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30. K.E. Birnbaum, "Sweden's Nuclear Policy", International Journal (Toronto), Vol.20 (Summer 1964-65), p.297.

breeding fear, suspicion and mistrust. Problems of inspection and verification still persist. The whole issue remains thus; how long can we last with nuclear weapons of overkill capacity, mutual assured destruction? Should we live under the fear of death every day, just because the decision makers will have it so? The answer is obviously no. Change will come with change in direction of thinking. Arms control and disarmament, given a new meaning and content, consistent with their goal, will eventually move towards peace.

## Chapter V

### CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE

Deterrence had emerged as a security concept in the post Second World War era. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that it did not exist before this. It is worth emphasizing that the principles and practices of deterrence are not confined to international politics nor peculiar to post war era. It is a mode of behaviour common to all walks of life - both human and animal - and one with a long history. It is present in social relationships and may be important in domestic political systems. Acknowledging the universal relevance of deterrence, it can be said that it intrudes into every day life and personal relationships to such an extent that it can be understood without reference to nuclear scenarios. The functioning of deterrence seems essential to civilized society, as it provides one of the major basis of law enforcement.

"Deterrence" refers to the attempt by decision makers in one nation or group of nations to restructure the set of alternatives available to decision makers in another nations or group of nations by posing a threat of their key values. The restructuring is an attempt to exclude armed aggression from consideration.<sup>1</sup> Deterrence as an element in national

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1. Richard A. Brody, "Deterrence", International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. IV, pp. 130-33.

strategy or diplomacy is certainly nothing new. The threat of war has always been an instrument of diplomacy by which one state deterred another from doing something which the former did not wish the latter to do. The operation of deterrence has been dynamic; it acquired relevance and strength from failures as well as success. However, deterrence, as we refer to it today, is quite different in meaning. Due to development of nuclear weapons, the term has acquired a special emphasis and a distinctive connotation. Today, the threat should be absolutely effective, allowing no room for breakdowns whatsoever. Thus deterrence is meaningful as a strategic policy only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies must not be called upon to function at all. It is primarily in the nuclear context, that deterrence will be referred to here.

"Deterrence is an attempt by one government to prevent an adversary from undertaking a course of action that the government regards as undesirable, by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon the adversary in the event that the action is taken."<sup>2</sup> It rests on coercive influence i.e. the 'threats of deprivations and sanctions.' In short, deterrence

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2. Phil Williams, "Nuclear Deterrence", in J. Baylis, Ken Booth, J. Garnett and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy, Vol. I (2nd ed.), Croom Helm (London and Sydney), 1987, p.115.



is an attempt to threaten an adversary into inactivity. But this is based on 'worst-case syndrome' about the adversary's intentions and actions, as one cannot be absolutely sure about the actions of the adversary. There might be other factors that are more compelling.

The fundamental deterrence hypothesis is: 'if the threat to values is sufficiently large, the exclusion of armed aggression from consideration is probable.'

There are three central assumption that underlie this concept:

- (i) It is based on the presumption that a rational decision maker tends to avoid the resort to war in those situations in which the cost anticipated from aggression is greater than the gain expected from such an action. Based on avoidance behaviour, it tends to reject alternatives where costs exceeds gain.
- (ii) The unidimensionality of threat and of response to threats: threat is presumed to be a simple function of destructive capability, greater the destructive capability greater the threat. Albert Wohlstetter, while refining on the conception of destructive capability has pointed out that "deterence is more properly conceived of as a function of the amount of

capability potential remaining after an attack has been absorbed."<sup>3</sup>

- (iii) Policy alternatives that are available: there should be alternatives, other than war, available and perceived by decision makers, irrespective of the international situation.

Deterrence involves the threat rather than the applications of sanctions, and the threat is contingent. It will be carried out only in case the undesirable action is taken. But the success of deterrence depends not only on threat of punishment but also on the incentives for the adversary to take action. Certain actions might not be deterrable at all. Therefore, Alexander George and Richard Smoke suggest, "deterrence strategies often need to be combined with positive inducement, thereby not only maximizing the costs of action but minimizing costs of inaction to the challenger."<sup>4</sup> Deterrence is mostly equated with the defense policy of the Western security system, that is, the members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan and countries closely associated with them. They accredit the forty years of peace, in the post war era, to deterrence and thus consider it indispensable to their security. But for others, deterrence invoke the spectre of arms race to maximize

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3. A. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, (New York) 37, pp. 211-34.

4. A. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

nuclear terror, which threatens to end into a global catastrophe. These two views run antagonistically in an analysis of concept of deterrence, specially nuclear deterrence. Though the doctrine of deterrence may be based only on certain beliefs, it could not, however, be ignored since the doctrine formed the basis for the defense efforts and philosophy of most powerful countries on earth. Thus, it was not relevant whether other nations subscribed to the doctrine of deterrence or not. So long as powerful countries (USA and NATO group) subscribe to it, others will have to take note of it. Today deterrence is looked upon mostly as an operational strategic doctrine. The result of this approach is that instead of politics influencing the strategy of deterrence, the latter tends to dominate the relations among nations. However, deterrence is principally associated with the defence policies of the Western security system, as they have most acutely felt the need to prevent aggression. Thus mostly western theorists have explicitly elaborated and refined the concept and articulated the strategies to implement it. Its critics concentrate on the undeniable horror of nuclear war and competition for nuclear strength without taking account of the international political context of deterrence or the full meaning and consequences of deterrence within this context.

Deterrence is a fact of life. As a concept it is as old as the ability of the human beings to inflict pain on fellow human beings and to anticipate the other persons capacity to inflict such pain. Military deterrence is intrinsic to international conflict and prospect of force throughout history. It is a means by which one state dissuades an adversary from taking a hostile action by convincing it that risks and costs imposed by counteraction will exceed any expected gains. Nations calculate the costs, risks and gains of their actions before an aggressive action. The West views deterrence as an important kind of relationship among armed adversaries, which exerts a moderating effect on the provocative and tension producing aspects of the adversarial relationship. Emphasizing the political context of deterrence, western strategy is predicated upon both the prevention of war by deterrence and credible defence, and the pursuit of a political dialogue aiming at a more stable and cooperative East-West relationship. The inordinate destruction of nuclear war and the prospect that any East-West military encounter would turn into a nuclear war, created a situation of mutual deterrence, and restrained nations from taking even slight risks. The stability of mutual deterrence depends on both sides having a kind of non-provocative weapons posture, effect command and control system, and safeguard

against war that reassures them against the danger of unprovoked first strike.

Phil Williams states three basic requirements for deterrence:<sup>5</sup>

- (a) The first requirement for an effective deterrent policy is that the adversary should be aware precisely what action is prohibited and of the price to be paid for disregarding the prohibition. Thus clear and precise communication becomes a necessity. During the Korean War, it was China's failure to communicate its deterrent threats, explicitly and clearly, to the United States which led to failure of its threats.
- (b) It is essential that the state attempting to deter an adversary has the physical capacity to inflict harm or deprivation upon it. There is presumption of challenges making rational calculations and acting according to outcome of cost-gain or cost-cost calculus. An obvious and overwhelming military preponderance was essential.
- (c) It is necessary to influence the adversary's expectations regarding one's likely behaviour in the event of a transgression. It must make potential challenger

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5. Williams, n.2, p.117.

aware not only that the costs of taking prohibited action could exceed the gains to be made but that the probability is that they would do so.

Similar factors - intentions, credibility and capability - have been enumerated by R. Brody which he regards as necessary for deterrence.<sup>6</sup> The Western allies perceive the Soviet intentions and military capabilities as a threat to their own security. These nations want to defend what they have and let others live. The strategy of deterrence is essential not only for deterring aggression and preventing war but also resisting nuclear intimidation and avoiding the brink of war during severe crises. The effectiveness of deterrent policy rests heavily on each side having sufficiently vulnerable second strike forces and the command, control and communication capabilities to avoid being the perpetrator or victim of a pre-emptive strike. It is often said that in the post Second World War era the deterrence strategists have played a major role, that "they have laid down clear principles to guide the men who have to take decisions", in the way Clausewitz and A. Mahan did to their contemporaries.<sup>7</sup>

It is a disputed fact as to whether the Soviet bloc nations base their foreign policy or their security on concepts

6. Richard Brody, "Some Strategic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study Through Stimulation of a Multi-nuclear Future", Journal of Conflict Resolution (California) no.7, 1963, pp.663-753.
7. Michael Howard, "The Classical Strategists", in Richard Head and Ervin Rokke (eds.), American Foreign Policy (3rd ed.) (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), p.57.

of deterrence and nuclear deterrence. The controversy centres on whether Soviet leaders accept such western concept as deterrence based on 'mutual assured destruction' (MAD) or whether they reject these concepts and seek to acquire a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning capability. On one side are analysts like Fritz Ermarth, Benjamin Lambeth and Richard Pipes who claim of all indication that Soviet Union was determined to achieve a superiority in both offensive and defensive weapons which would enable it to fight and win a war. On the other hand, analyst like Raymond Garthoff dismissed Soviet doctrinal statesman about war fighting and war winning. On the basis of indirect evidence as Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972, they contend that Soviet Union was not embarked upon a quest for "a winning capability in a potential nuclear conflict".<sup>8</sup>

While attention has focused on Soviet rejection of MAD, it is less frequently recalled that American acceptance of MAD was never total and has been challenged during 1960s and the 70s, drifting still further away under the 'Schlesinger Doctrine'. Experts from Warsaw Treaty countries state that the essence of their security policy lies in the prevention of war by political means and peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with all states, irrespective of their social systems. Although vocabulary on deterrence is not uniform in Soviet literature,

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8. R.Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy", International Security (Harvard, Cambridge), Summer 1978, Vol.3, no.1.

it employs two different words. The concept of deterrence has often been defined as "ustrashenie", which implies terrorization or intimidation, while Soviet concept is at times registered by the word "Sderzhivanie", which conveys the less threatening notion of restraining an opponent.<sup>9</sup> It is stated that Soviet emphasis on deterrence by denial and absolute security has generated forces of a nature and magnitude that provoke a feeling of permanent threat and intimidation on part of those who are supposed to be deterred. The Soviet doctrine rejects the Western concept of intra-war deterrence and strict limitation of intra-war operations.

For the non-aligned nations deterrence constitutes disuasion of an adversary by another from undertaking hostile action, by persuading him that such an action would risk being unsuccessful or too costly.

The Western bloc nations emphasize deterrence as a rational response to a real threat of a hostile armed attack that might otherwise occur. In the nuclear age, use of nuclear weapons would result in damage to both the adversary and will be catastrophic for civilization as well as ecology. The proponents of Western deterrence doctrine emphasize that it is entirely defensive politically and prohibits military

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9. Robert E. Osgood and Henning Wegener, in Barry Buzan (ed.), The International Politics of Deterrence (London: Francis Printers Ltd., 1987), pp.49-94.



offensive action. The Soviet bloc view deterrence as a wholly western concept having its origin, development and implementation in the West. The non-aligned nations regard deterrence as an age old concept and nothing that has emerged with Hiroshima or nuclear weapons. The origin of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence can be traced to 1940s and 1950s, when USA developed a significant nuclear arsenal and formulated doctrines to justify its deployment vis-a-vis a perceived Soviet threat in terms of conventional superiority.

### Nuclear Deterrence

In most simplistic terms nuclear deterrence can be defined as the ability, through the nuclear threat, to make an opponent refrain from what he might otherwise want to do. The United States doctrine of deterrence led quickly to one absolutely fundamental requirement for her strategic forces: they must be such that they would credibly be able to inflict totally unacceptable retaliatory damage even after the strongest foreseeable first strike by the adversary.<sup>10</sup> The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) viewed that effective nuclear deterrence rests on the ability of either side to assure the destruction of the other, even after

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10. McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What has Changed?" The Future of Strategic Deterrence Part I, Adelphi Papers-160 (Autumn 1980), IISS London.

having been attacked with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon state can make itself secure against attack from another state by threat of nuclear retaliation. Hedley Bull is of the opinion that "the system of mutual deterrence is fulfilling its promise as there has been no war between the super powers, their allies or the fully industrialized powers, though by no way we can prove that these happy results are due to nuclear stand off".<sup>11</sup> What this stresses is that big powers practice a new version of the old doctrine of 'no peace beyond the line'.

Deterrence and mutual deterrence theory was formulated in the setting of the cold war and reflects the assumptions that there are two actors, that these actors are roughly comparable and are very hostile to one another, yet have certain common conception of what constitutes 'rational action'. If we are to apply deterrence theory to a host of international political situations other than that of the Soviet-American conflict at the time of cold war, we might come out with conception of a genuinely universal 'strategic man' or abandon the concept. In short, nuclear deterrence has originated in the US-Soviet cold war relationship and still continues to have importance in the same reference. Examining from an American perspective, nuclear deterrence

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11. Hedley Bull, "Future Conditions for Strategic Deterrence", in "The Future of Strategic Deterrence", Part I, Adelphi Papers-160 (Autumn 1980), (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies).

has three levels that can be considered: deterring an attack on the American homeland, deterring an attack on America's major allies, especially western Europe and deterring lesser Soviet actions in the "gray areas". No doubt nuclear weapons have contributed to deterrence, there is nothing to prove these weapons as sole factor in exercise of deterrence.

What distinguishes deterrence in nuclear and non-nuclear area is the extent of damage suffered by the aggressor together with the victim. The resulting climatic catastrophic consequences will engulf all the aggressor, the victim and the bystander. There are different views as regards, nuclear deterrence, they are:

- (i) deterrence emphasizes the factors of certainty needed to project our image of capability to inflict punishment on the adversary after absorbing his first strike.
- (ii) It envelopes strategy in some factors of uncertainty to reinforce deterrence and is followed by the second most advanced power.
- (iii) This advocates proportionate and minimum deterrence, arguing that deterrence is generated when an adversary perceives that the damage he will suffer will not be worth the stake if the victim resorts to nuclear weapons in self defence.

- (iv) Another emerging trend does not exhibit overt nuclear weapon capability but leaves it to the inferred. The reason underlying the strategy is analogous to that of minimum deterrence.

The widespread belief in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is based on a series of unprovable "assumptions that one's adversary had certain hostile intentions, but did not pursue them because of one's initial nuclear superiority, which was sustained for about two decades."<sup>12</sup> The assumptions themselves are derived from certain perceptions. Strategists who believe that they were able to exercise deterrence though nuclear arsenal were, in turn, bound to be deterred by nuclear arsenals of others.

Despite all these academic and diplomatic efforts to explore the phenomenon of deterrence, some students of national security display little confidence in it. Morton Halperin writes that, deterrence depends on influencing the decision of other governments. We have a very poor understanding of how our force structure is perceived by potential adversaries and how it affects their decisions. He writes, even with the valuable, experience of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, "we still have no real basis for determining how

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12. K.Subramanyam, in Barry Buzan (ed.), The International Politics of Deterrence (London: Francis Printers Ltd., 1987), p.96.

our strategic force decisions, effect the probability of a nuclear war".<sup>13</sup> Treading the same path another scholar states "we do not know with any confidence (a) what will deter the Soviet Union, (b) whether the Soviet Union needs deterring".<sup>14</sup> Yet another analyst contends "strategic thought has made little progress since Schelling's strategy of conflict",<sup>15</sup> thereby stating that there has been a decline in interest in deterrence theory.

Alexander George and Richard Smoke in their study have set forth what a competent and useful theory of deterrence should do:<sup>16</sup>

- (1) identify the variables that may determine the behaviour of an opponent in a deterrent situation.
- (2) identify the variables for the deterrer.
- (3) describe the difficulties involved in practicing deterrence under various conditions and circumstances, so that
- (4) it is possible to describe patterns of deterrence failure,

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13. Morton Halperin, "The Good, the Bad and the Wasteful," Foreign Policy (Washington), No.6 (Spring 1972), pp.75,81.

14. Colin Gray, "The Arms Race is About Politics", Foreign Policy, No.9 (Winter 1972-73), pp.123-24.

15. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little and Brown, 1971), p.252.

16. A.George and R. Smoke, n.4, p.512.

- (5) the theory should say something about the utility and limitations of deterrence in foreign policy indicating the degree to which it can be relied upon.

Deterrence: Various Manifestations

A. Immediate or Pure Deterrence: It concerns the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it. It is rather uncommon. It exists only where sharp crisis develops and war impends. But before making a distinction between pure and general deterrence, it should be taken care of that deterrence should never be confused with use of threats to prevent or paralyze opposition to one's aggressive objectives, for this promises attack and not retaliation. To elaborate, deterrence is almost always thought of as a conscious, deliberate policy to take steps that influence the consciousness, deliberate policy of another state so that it will refrain from making an attack. One of the classics in our literature asserts that if we are to deter, "the enemy must be persuaded of our ability and intent to react".<sup>17</sup> The

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17. William Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence", Centre of International Studies Memorandum, No.7 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p.7.

objective, according to Andre Beaufe is "to prevent an enemy taking the decision to use armed forces". This is why deterrence is so frequently described as a psychological relationship - the focal point being the perception and decision process of the opponent.

Pure deterrence exists under certain conditions. To make sense it should concern the relationship between two opponents, at least one of which is considering attack on the other or on an area the opponent deems important. The key decision makers of the opponent should be aware that a particular adversary is seriously considering to launch an attack. To deter, a state must threaten not just verbally but with specific and appropriate military preparations. The leaders of the state planning to attack must decide to desist primarily because of the retaliatory threat(s) of the opponent. Unless, the first three conditions exist, it cannot be said that deterrence is being attempted and without fourth, it cannot be said to be working. Simple possession of some defense capability - an ability to shoot back - may contribute to pure deterrence but seldom constitute one by itself.

3. General Deterrence: is a situation typical of international politics. States often operate in the context of insecurity, suspicion and hostility. Arms and threats are

among the many responses to such context. It relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is near mounting an attack. It is a lengthier relationship of conflict and hostility bolstered and shaped by presence of military power on both sides. It involves a possibility of resort to force thus making neighbours nervous. Yet it is opposed to quarrel between armed states. The other side might also respond by "preparedness" - armed forces, various contingency plans, mobilization and other emergency plans. It has been pointed out as typical of deterrence theory that commitments are "non-situational".<sup>18</sup> The decision makers at whom the general deterrent threat is aimed, do not go beyond preliminary consideration because of the fear of corresponding resort to force by the opponent. States acquire arms and issue threats primarily to avoid crises, in hopes of avoiding having to practice immediate deterrence.

As the probability of using nuclear weapons is higher in situations of assymetry, there is pressure on non-nuclear weapon states, that are in a position to do so, to acquire nuclear weapons to deter interventionalist nations armed with such weapons. Thus viewed, the 'Doctrine of Proportionate Deterrence' is both rational and attractive

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18. Franklin Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Relations", Journal of Conflict Resolution (California), Vol.13, No.1 (March 1969), pp.39-56.



to nations with medium level resources. The contrary view is that the risks of a nuclear war breaking out increases with increase in the number of decision making authorities. Murphy's Law states that anything that can go wrong in a system is bound to go wrong some time or the other. Applying all these laws of probability to the present situation there is greater probability of nuclear war.

There are strategists who argue for 'specific weapons for specific mission' - a strategy usually called "graduated deterrence".<sup>19</sup> Its proponents argue that absence of military capability to counter a particular lower level or non-nuclear threat creates an unstable situation fought with the danger of escalation to strategic nuclear war. The strategist advocating graduated deterrence generally argue for the limitation of strategic capability at the minimum needed to deter. Its logic relies heavily upon the invulnerability to attack of individual units of the deterrent force. The advocates of 'minimum deterrence', like Herman Kahn argue that sustained efforts in producing weapons beyond the minimum is itself a stimulus to the search for counter measures and to the uncontrolled stockpiling of arms, that is, to arms races. Rationally one can logically conclude, that there should be no nuclear war between military blocs

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19. Richard A. Brody, n. 1.

armed with large stockpiles of highly sophisticated nuclear weapons and deterrence should be operative. But here the real problem is likelihood of irrationality and miscalculation thus jeopardizing international security.

Understanding the difference between the first and second strike capability is crucial to understanding arms race and deterrence theory. The first strike capability means - that one can attack and destroy the other's retaliatory (second strike) capability and suffer only minimal damage. It can thus become very tempting to make the attack. Under conditions of stable deterrence each side has only a second strike capability, not the first strike force. None is tempted to attack each other as each has enormous capability, to inflict destruction on the aggressor. Thus considerable emphasis has been placed on the need of invulnerable strategic forces. What is important is the residual capability of forces that can survive a surprise attack. One analysis of the dangers of nuclear war has suggested that anti-submarine warfare could invalidate the very foundations of the basic strategy of nuclear deterrence. Strategic stability at the level of passive deterrence depends not only on the acquisition of an invulnerable retaliatory capability but on the adversary developing and maintaining a similar capacity. To deal with the paradox

of failure of deterrence, Patrick Morgan states, we should "abandon the notion of rationality, which is held central to deterrence, and replace it with the notion of sensible decision making".<sup>20</sup>

Strategic deterrence, i.e., deterrence of strategic nuclear attacks by threat of strategic nuclear retaliation, is only a particular case of general deterrence, which includes deterrence of other kinds of attack. Though the prime concern of all nuclear powers is deterrence of nuclear attack they pointedly refuse to cut the links between nuclear and general deterrence. At present, however, the prospects of further separating nuclear from general deterrence are not favourable due to Soviet conventional superiority. The environment in which it was originally formulated and implemented was dominated by hostility between western powers and Soviet Union.

#### Extended Deterrence

In the past, super powers have been prepared to extend nuclear deterrence to provide protection to other states not only against nuclear but also non-nuclear threats due to strong alliance system. This has been on the decline recently due to contraction of alliances and disenchantment

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20. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1977), p.19.

of Third World states with practices of super power hierarchy. It is still to be seen whether new nuclear powers will also think in terms of 'extending deterrence' or will it disappear completely due to consolidation of world into either of the two nuclear blocs. With the increase in number of nuclear powers, resulting in multipolarity of world affairs, the key issue is whether the United States would be prepared to take greater risks in order to maintain the integrity and independence of Western Europe than Moscow would be willing to take in order to subjugate it. The critics of NATO strategy argue that super powers have a vested interest in keeping hostilities limited to Europe, but they tend to ignore the enormity of the task. Escalation is generally treated as if it were invariably deliberate, conscious and intentional and not as something uncontrollable. T.C. Schelling points out, "violence is a hot-headed activity in which actions and commitments can take on a logic and momentum of their own".<sup>21</sup> Augmenting conventional forces and raising the nuclear threshold may be necessary politically, but it does not suggest that such actions are essential for restoration of extended deterrence under the circumstances in which both super powers deploy defensive systems, however, the guarantee

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21. T.C.Schelling, Arms and Influence, quoted in P.M.Morgans Deterrence, n.20.

might actually be weakened. Thus paradoxically, extended deterrence might be more effective in a world of mutual vulnerability than in a strategic system dominated by defenses.

The mechanism whereby inter-continental nuclear deterrence is extended to offer protection to allies and forces overseas is, of course, the mechanism of escalation. It addresses the total potential scope of weakness at conflict levels, making it obvious enough that protection obtained from extended deterrence must always be second best solution. The actual scope of extended deterrence is defined by interaction of two quite different balances: 'the balance of relative inter-continental nuclear vulnerabilities' on one hand and 'balance of perceived interests' on the other. In any case, therefore, credibility of escalation determines the scope of extended deterrence. Error is, indeed, unavoidable. The intensity of given interest may increase sharply and precisely in response to a challenge. If extended deterrence remains as credible and reliable as before in the presence of a deteriorating military balance, it is the stability of the system that is being compromised.

#### Deterrence in Bipolarity and Multipolarity

Strategic deterrence has been the central military doctrine in the era after the second World War. The cold war

hostilities and tension made nuclear weapons the main instrument of deterrent strategy. Though the fundamental notions continue to be the same since then, political, strategic environment has changed a lot. West European policies are often different from those of USA, China emerged as totally independent force in international relations moving rapidly towards nuclear capability. Japan has emerged as world's third economic power. USA and Soviet Union had found a wide range of common interests. Meanwhile, strategic changes appeared in nuclear capabilities. By 1949, Soviet Union too exploded its nuclear device. Testing its first inter-continental ballastic missile in 1956, it was by 1965-66 that Soviet Union could match USA's rapid ICBM deployment and nuclear submarines. Fred Ikle has stated, "such transformation cast doubts about the state of the nuclear balance and efficacy of deterrence in contemporary conditions".<sup>22</sup>

Under 'bipolarity', the doctrine of deterrence applied almost to two antagonistic blocs seeking to restrain one another and thus had only implicit references to wider system of power. They rested largely upon high and continuing levels of political hostilities between major protagonists. The doctrines were unclear about the kind of capabilities

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22. Fred Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?", Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol.51, no.2 (January 1973), pp.267-85.

that were in fact needed to 'deter'. Strategic equality was sufficient to deter attacks but for the purpose of extended nuclear deterrence, some degree of superiority was necessary.

Reiterating many of the concerns of Herman Kahn, US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara stated a decade later "The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues, to be, to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon United States and its allies. We do this by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first attack. This can be defined as the assured destruction capability. It is important to understand that the assured destruction is the very essence of the whole deterrence concept".<sup>23</sup>

By 1967, Soviet Union too attained a reliable 'assured destruction' capability against US, making the US deterrence of certain Soviet actions more difficult. By 1967-68, attempts at damage limitation had largely shifted to proposals for ballistic missile system defense. By 1970s

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23. Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p.52.

and 80s, the competition has reached extremes with development of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) which remain, upto now, the most invulnerable missile targets. The situation has changed in the meantime due to entry of many other nuclear powers into the world arena. The world has turned multipolar; problems of strategic bipolarity seem simple compared to uncertainties of multipolar world.

There are problems that have emerged with multipolar deterrent capability. Political disputes in a wider world context may be more serious. It will be a serious challenge to the general stability of the system, especially in context of issues like Arab-Israel conflict. Multipolar strategic environment poses new questions of deterrent theory and practice. Along with this, deterrence will come to depend even more upon political factors and alignments than in the bipolar case. The super powers may gradually begin to lose influence among newly emerging major actors.<sup>24</sup> Multipolar stability cannot technically be attained unless each state or bloc is able to deter other from attacking. Realistically speaking, it requires that the state have capacity to destroy or hurt any combination of its likely enemies. If some nuclear forces were much larger than others, some more vulnerable than others, and if target systems are larger it would be much more

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24. John R. Swanson, "The Super Powers and Multipolarity," Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. XV, no. 4, Winter 1972, pp. 1035-50.



difficult to get mutual deterrent stability. Multipolar deterrence rule out tight bipolar alliances. Alignments must be flexible and loose to permit reformulation and realignment. This poses a difficulty in reconciling political and strategic requirements of deterrent stability in multipolarity.

The expansion of the nuclear club will probably not be inconsistent with the maintenance of system-wide deterrence. Super powers will lead over other powers in absence of deterrent alliances, and vulnerability will increase among small power forces. The small nuclear power might use its weapons to destroy or humble his neighbouring adversary. In such cases, dissociation of big powers becomes necessary if they want to be away from local conflicts. Theoretical possibility of anonymous threat is greater in a multipolar world leading to heightened prospects of nuclear instability. Identification of protagonists become difficult. Governments would not be held responsible for outrageous threats, though it might be secretly supporting it. Thus multipolarity can give rise to nuclear blackmail.<sup>25</sup> However, the real world, of course, is not usually as malevolent as the worst case projections of strategic analysts.<sup>26</sup>

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25. Richard Rosecrance, "Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered," in Christoph Bertram (ed.) Strategic Deterrence in a Changing Environment (New Jersey: Gower and Allanheld, Osmun, 1981), p.36.

26. A.J.Wohlstetter, "Is there a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy, No.15, Summer 1974.

Assessing the contribution of deterrence to the post-war era, we might tend to conclude that it has taught the major antagonists to avoid and mitigate crises that might escalate into war. Although it has not been the only factor, it has been indispensable to avoidance of war on East-West axis. The western analysts feel that East-West relations have become safe and relatively controlled due to deterrence. Moreover, there does not appear any evidence to prove that deterrence by itself enhance hostilities or existing antagonisms. Contributing to stability, it makes aggression extremely unlikely and for full effectiveness of deterrence both the military systems would have to contribute to achieving and maintaining a military equilibrium. The West is convinced that deterrence can effectively fulfil its war preventing function. Yet, should deterrence ever fail, they believe, there is reasonable chance that control and early war termination would be possible. Thus they have no place for the technically conceived worst case scenarios frequently advanced to question or denigrate deterrence.

Quite contrary to this is the Soviet assessment of contribution of deterrence to peace, stability and its effect upon the Third World security. Soviet scholars think it impossible to strengthen security and peace by constantly threatening its very existence and thus regard

deterrence as unviable security concept. There should be conditions of international tension for deterrence to develop and prosper, thus aiming at deterioration of political climate of the world. Soviet view is that, for stability, it is necessary to look for security for all and not for oneself. Deterrence goes quite contrary to this as it mostly cares exclusively for oneself. Scholars disagree with oversimplified western views as regards risks and dangers of failure of deterrence which can result under all probability. Deterrence is unethical and absurd as it makes the whole world a hostage of nuclear weapons. To an extent it hinders sovereignty of nations; the setting up of an all embracing system of international security makes it necessary to refrain from global claims, to take into consideration the legitimate interests of all. Deterrence undermines the stability of Third World by involving them in military competition.

The very fact that the two major powers do not have the identical interpretations of deterrence highlights risks of possible deterioration in the relationship. Though nuclear deterrence may contribute to stability of sorts in the industrialized world, applying Murphy's law, we cannot be very sure about it. Deterrence, as practiced by major nuclear powers in this age, has led to ever increasing nuclear arsenals and their wider deployment, thus increasing risks of accidental and unauthorised release of nuclear weapons.

Deterrence: Its Effects on Arms Control, Arms Race  
and Disarmament

Taking into consideration the present international situation, further nuclear proliferation is widely anticipated between now and the end of the century. Two competing doctrine appear about relationship between the strategic deterrence policies of super powers and nuclear proliferation.<sup>27</sup>

(1) 'High Posture' Doctrine - Super powers can best discourage proliferation by maintaining a wide margin in military nuclear capacity between themselves and other competitors. What underlies this doctrine is that hierarchial structure of power in today's world can be sustained indefinitely.

(2) 'Low Posture' Doctrine - Super powers are likely to stem the tide of proliferation and thus undermine the argument that nuclear weapons are a necessary status symbol of source of security. Thus it severe links between nuclear and general deterrence, extended deterrence and leads to nuclear disarmament.

The prospects for the 1980s and 1990s are that the stability of balance of terror will depend primarily upon

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27. Hedley Bull, n.11.

unilateral measures adopted. It states that relatively high nuclear force levels enhanced the stability of the mutual deterrence relationship.<sup>28</sup> Deterrence in the western interpretation - not only facilitates arms control but aims at lower equilibrium in nuclear as well as conventional forces. The primary purpose of arms control is to make mutual deterrence less likely to result in war. The West also believes in arms-control objective of reducing the reliance of both sides on nuclear retaliation provided that a non-nuclear balance can be preserved at the same time. Quite opposite view is that 'the whole logic of deterrence concept, however, turns the whole mechanism of negotiations on nuclear disarmament into system of so-called control over nuclear weapons. The corner stone of concept of deterrence has been the goal of attaining military superiority. Therefore, as a whole, deterrence undermines strategic equilibrium and strategic stability. There is pessimism, in the present world, as regards the position of arms control.<sup>29</sup> The stability of the strategic balance is in any case assured for the foreseeable future, without help of arms control. According to Hedley Bull,

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28. Yehezkel Dror, "Nuclear Weapons in Third World Conflict", The Future of Strategic Deterrence, Part II, Adelphi Papers, No.161 (London: IISS, 1980).

29. Hedley Bull, n.11, p.21.

arms control has become too closely identified with the 'attempt to stabilize the Soviet-American balance'. The option available is that we should continue pursuing numerical ceilings of launchers and re-entry vehicles on the basis of parity and hope of reduce them.

In spite of the fact that Western strategists claim that deterrence propounds parity at the minimum level, nevertheless, it has resulted into arms race among the deterrents. Graduated deterrence and efforts to make deterrence foolproof has resulted in mutual assured destruction. To sustain deterrence as a strategic posture a basic adversarial relationship became a prerequisite. Unless vigorously counterbalanced by improved political relations, deterrence sustains distrust and suspicion. Exclusively geared to the weapon systems, the deterrent strategy continuously derives the arms race. This doctrine views the entire international system as a two person zero sum game, in which the two immense nuclear arsenals control everything, and every event is viewed as a move or counter move one one major nuclear weapon power or the other. Hence every failure is judged as failure of efficacy of one's own global deterrence. Thus in no way, in practical terms, it seem that deterrence contains arms race. Armaments by themselves do not lead to tension among nations but the adversarial politics inherent in the deterrent posture does so.

Disarmament and deterrence, too, are related. As presently we have referred to deterrence in nuclear context, the support of deterrence to disarmament cannot be ruled out is nuclear disarmament. The recently concluded Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, December 1987, between the two super powers has been the result of deterrence posture reached by the two powers making it necessary for them to disarm. Yet most analysts have regarded it as a hindrance to disarmament, as nations too often indulge in gaining a superiority over its adversary - a fact that has been further accentuated by concept of 'extended deterrence'.

#### Deterrence: Its Future

As early 1973, an American analyst posed a question, "Can nuclear deterrence last out the century?"<sup>30</sup> Due to the fundamental changes in attitudes of super powers there was growing pessimism about the prospects for avoiding nuclear war in the 1980s. Nuclear deterrence has been rejected by many critics..

The strategic Defense Initiative announced by the US President, Ronald Reagan, posed conceptual or philosophical challenge to strategies of deterrence, the specter of nuclear proliferation added another layer of danger and doubt. Yet

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30. Fred Ikle, n.22.

Robert Osgood argues, "deterrence in its present form is currently the best available policy of war prevention".<sup>31</sup> Its ethical acceptability has one important requisite: no opportunity be lost in conscientious search for ways to diminish reliance on nuclear weapons. Opposed to this are views of Soviet experts: no restructuring of the concept of deterrence can change the dangerous and offensive substance of the doctrine, with all its negative consequences. The only correct way to deal with deterrence is to replace it with the peaceful and constructive concept of security - common security, peaceful co-existence and disarmament.

In light of all the discussion, one question still looms large which makes the whole doctrine of deterrence questionable. It is, "What if deterrence fails?" The fact, that we are considering primarily nuclear deterrence makes it obvious that there will be no one to put up an answer once nuclear deterrence fails. Perhaps this is, therefore, the most tragic paradox. Nuclear deterrence, which has provided a relatively high measure of peace and stability up to now, is based upon foundations that are becoming increasingly fragile. It is with this question in mind that one assesses the doctrine of deterrence as a concept of international security.

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31. Osgood and Wegener, n.9, p.87.



Security, as ever, has remained an elusive concept. There appears no unanimity among the academicians and the statesmen about its meaning. No absolute security can be guaranteed to an individual or a nation. It is at the national level that security manifests itself best. But under changing international relations - the emergence of new independent states, the destructibility of nuclear weapons, the division of world community along ideological lines and the economic-military interdependence of nations - has made it very necessary for us to think beyond national security. The advent of nuclear arsenal and the nuclear arms race have put the human civilization at stake. Thus what we want is survival and that can be achieved only when all nations pursue it jointly. A common effort has to be made towards a common goal namely, international security. For this it would be necessary to have consensus among nations about the definitions of security. We will have to stop thinking in terms of 'the North' and 'the South', the 'developing' and the 'developed'. All differences between the East, the West and the Third World would have to be liquidated. A programme of joint survival should exist. The world has to exist as one and a whole. The threats we face from our own inventions, threats that grow out of our own

mistrust and suspicion about others, are a hindrance to think in terms of international security.

Can the various approaches mentioned help us in our efforts?

Balance of power over the years has changed its nature. Earlier it was a balance of conventional power between two states which during medieval times existed among a number of nations. Existence of a balancer used to equate the situation between two unequal powers. But in the post-second World War, the system had again emerged as pure balance in the nuclear bipolar world. With time, the balance has changed into a 'balance of terror' due to the level of destructibility achieved by the nuclear weapon nations. Thus we see that, though the balance of power has been able to sustain itself with the change of time, it has maintained security of only few nations. Earlier it was the security of those who had resources to maintain a balance and now the nations who can sustain a nuclear balance. Seldom it has helped to promote international security. Today, the balance of power follow a deterrent policy. The race to parity of nuclear arms among the United States and the Soviet Union has brought us to a stage of self destruction. With the emergence of more nuclear power states, the threat to international security increases. Can security rest on such

a fragile base? Today no nation can assure security to another nation as the security of the former state itself is not absolute. No guarantee of nuclear umbrella can afford absolute security. The system affords security to those nations who sustain the balance of power. In the process, it is the weaker and the smaller nation that gets threatened.

'Collective security' had emerged with much ethos in the period following the first World War. It was the basis of the Covenant of the League of Nations and later that of the United Nations. In spite of the fact that we cannot rule out some of the achievements of these organizations, they could contribute little to the goal of international security. Some provisions of the League's Covenant and the United Nations Charter make it difficult for the international organization to pursue its goal. The veto power of the permanent members is a major hindrance as the resolutions of the UN demand unanimity. In the UN, all nations irrespective of their size, wealth or population are assigned an equal status, i.e. one vote on a resolution. But this provision proves to be a farce in face of a permanent member's veto. Yet it provides all nations with an international forum. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the basic problem with United Nations lies in the 'lack of will' among nations. The big powers want to sustain their hegemony in international

affairs. Armed with a veto power, they are most of time successful in their goal. But one cannot rule out the contribution made by United Nations to international security through disarmament. Although, the treaties on disarmament have been signed outside this forum, yet it was at the UN that the efforts were made in initiating the process. This emphasizes that disarmament is a multi-lateral and collective effort towards international security. But as history provides a nation cannot be perfectly assured about a collective security action. Thus concept of collective security can pursue its high end of international security only if all the nations have the will to do so.

Concept of deterrence as stated earlier is based on arms race. Drawing its logic from the balance of power system it aims to achieve security through threat to an adversary that the cost of an action will far out do the gain. It is based on notions like 'parity' and 'balance' with the opponent. But as the history of international relations, prove, the parity in absolute terms means a superiority. This leads to unrestricted arms race among the antagonistic powers. The problem has worsened under the present nuclear world order. Deterrence under bipolarity has resulted in a situation where the world can be destroyed several times over.

Deterrence is based on the threat to dissuade an adversary from doing an action. Thus there is always a doubt about the success of the threat made and doubt whether the threat has been properly conveyed. Another condition, as stated above, is the capacity to deter a threat. Therefore, in all possibility there is perpetual condition of absolute readiness for war, in case deterrence fail. Moreover, though deterrence, as the policy states, can be maintained at the minimum level, in actual practice the deterrent level is maintained at the maximum. Hence it is not the theory that is flawed but the changes of politics make it so. The difference between theory and how it is actually carried out makes all the difference. In an earnest desire to follow the approach, nations often fell prey to such temptations. As armament cannot be completely eliminated the need of the hour is to maintain it at the minimum level possible. Pursuing it at a higher level leads to fear and insecurity.

The policy of disarmament and arms control have arms as their target. The difference lies in the approach. While disarmament proposes to eliminate arms as the root cause of conflict, arms control presupposes that their control itself will eliminate the threat to international security. Disarmament, through unilateral and multilateral negotiations, proposes to do away with weapons, both conventional and

nuclear. It is based on the idea that mere possession of arms is enough causes to arouse suspicion. With arms, even good friends cannot remain good friends as there will be mutual clash of interests. The theory hopes to ensure international security by ridding the world of all existing armaments. Here a basic flaw should be pointed out.

Disarmament removes the threat of only the existing armament but it does not propose to restrict future armaments.

Arms control generally control the quantitative and qualitative increases in weapons. Treaties are arrived at through negotiations so that nations restrict the number of arms to the limit agreed upon. Here emphasis on 'graduated arms control' bringing the 'issue of parity' to centre-stage. No nation accepts a level of inferiority, due to mutual distrust. Can under such conditions the verification and inspection of arms control measures be carried out? Moreover there should be some higher international body who has the authority to enforce such agreements as in the community of nations, each nation is a sovereign, and thus has a right to pursue its own policies. Yet disarmament and arms control has remained to be one of the effective measures to pursue international security.

Concluding an assessment of all the concepts international security, it appears that the various concepts are themselves interdependent in the world today. In the

international community various approaches to security have been proposed. The balance of power concept is related to the concept of collective security in the sense that against a super power aggression the whole world has to take collective measures. In the same way collective security becomes balance of power when the collective action of the United Nations is opposed by a big power. Balance of power has been under present circumstances, been termed as, balance of terror - a virtual explanation of deterrence theory at its maximum. Similarly, the measures agreed upon by concept of disarmament and arms control can be pursued properly, more through collective action. No unilateral measure to arms control can exist indefinitely as nations are constantly face threats from others. Deterrence, viewed from a lens of parity or equality is, in a way, a balance of power. Thus in all, no concept alone can contribute to absolute international security. It remains a relative term as ever. But to be anywhere near 'the ideal', international security should be pursued through all means, <sup>by</sup> <sub>λ</sub> all concepts. It is the efforts that matter. Balance of power, collective security, deterrence, disarmament and arms control are the present roads to international security which is the meeting point for all.

Today, when a nuclear disaster in one country can adversely affect other nations; when a crash at one of the stock exchanges brings about world-wide imbalances; when a war at sea or in air can affect the territoriality of other states and when a nuclear test by a nation can have fall-outs at other nations, one can seldom rule out the need of international security. One of the primary causes of insecurity lies in mutual suspicion and how one understands security. Thus our objective should be to generate more confidence among nations and that needs a reorientation of human psychology. It is a long process and will not produce any immediate result. We must understand that the problem lies not with the various concepts of international security but the way they are carried out in actual practice. Both, power and interdependence are important issues. Yet, one should not be over-emphasized so as to out do the other. A common effort by the world community will help us to achieve international security and our primary objective - SURVIVAL.



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