

**SUPER POWERS' INTERVENTION
IN THE THIRD WORLD :
A CASE STUDY OF NICARAGUA
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
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PREFACE

Among various changes which took place after the second World War, decolonisation of the Third World caste immense impact on the international system. The emergence of the two superpowers led to the polarisation of the world. In spite of the fact, that there is a formal freedom of making policy-decisions in the Thirld World, unavoidable pressure of the superpowers' policies has been experienced. Inherent weaknesses of factional politic, and political instability in the Third World countries were exploited by the superpowers to enhance their areas of influence in which sometimes they showed tacit understanding between them.



In this work an attempt has been made to prove that there is a tacit understanding between the superpowers.)

International law which lacks a coherent theory of intervention has been interpreted differently so as to suit their interests. The third world states encredited with instable societies fell victim to the nefarious designs of superpowers.

In the present work we have chosen one nation from each continent of the Third World for the analysis of superpowers' intervention. However, our major thrust in this study is on the US interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua. In this context an attempt has also been made to explicate the the problem of theorising intervention as a unique phenomenon in international relations. In the course of our analysis, it

has been observed that definitional and theoretical explanation of intervention in international politics have varied from scholar to scholar. Even the United Nations stand on this issue does not provide a consensus.

In the first chapter the phenomenon of intervention has been dealt with from the definitional and theoretical point of view. It shows a contradictory viewpoint of different authors. Moreover, the factor of moral convictions seems to be a major impediment in the way of theorising intervention.

Superpowers' interference in Cuba, Congo and Afghanistan has been discussed in the second chapter. Internal instability and internecine war between different factions in the nations of the Third World has aggravated the scourage of intervention. Moreover, the conflict between the newly independent countries of the Third World time and again have provided ground to be manipulated by the superpowers.

Since the major thrust of the study on the US intervention in Nicaragua, an attempt has been made in this regard to comprehend the geography history economy and the polity of Nicaragua in the third chapter. It provides certain clues for the understanding of U.S. intervention and its implications for the rest of Central America.

The last chapter of the present study deals with different forms of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua since 1979

(iii)

to 1984. This period has particularly been chosen because there was a revolution in Nicaragua on 19 July, 1979, which overthrew Somoza dictatorship and democratic government was established. It was in 1984 that people's verdict legitimized the existing government by bringing it into power through democratic process.

Finally, the preceding analysis has been synthesised in the conclusion, in the light of various issues raised in the study.

In the end I hereby acknowledge my earnest gratitude to Prof. K.P. Misra under whose enspiring guidance, I am in a position to finish this work. I am also indebted to Prof. M.L. Sondi, the Chairman of the Centre, for guiding me from time to time.

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CONTENTS

	Page(s)
CHAPTERS	
ONE: THEORISING INTERVENTION	1 - 29
TWO: SUPERPOWERS INTERVENTION IN THE THIRD WORLD	30 - 57
THREE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NICARAGUAN GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS AND ECONOMY	58 - 86
FOUR: US MILITARIZATION, ECONOMY AGGRESSION AND POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA (1979-84)	87 - 133
BIBLIOGRAPHY:	134 - 141

Chapter One

THEORISING INTERVENTION

Intervention has been one of the most important aspects of international politics. In the process of fast growing integration, interaction and involvement at various levels among the nations of the world, it has assumed gradually wide and historical significance. It is becoming more and more dynamic and complex, rendering any attempt at its theorisation a difficult task. Although a recurring phenomenon in the past too, since the second World War, with the emergence of two superpower poles in the world, it has acquired newer dimensions in its dynamics of growth specifically in relation to the swinging third world in between.

Attempts have been made by various scholars to comprehend and conceptualize this process. Leaving minor variations, two basic schools of thought have prominently figured out in this respect. One school which has endeavoured to be too specific, opines that the direct concrete, physical intervention or threat of it should be taken "Intervention" as such. The essence of intervention is force or threat of it.

It implies dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of maintaining or altering the prevailing conditions.¹

It is obvious as a case that the use of brute force or its threat on the part of belligerent nation visibly the content and form of "intervention" as well as its dynamics. But at the same time this very understanding fails to incorporate various other factors which work in entirety in effecting intervention.

There are various other ways like negotiation, mediation, suggestion which are seemingly non-intervening in appearance, but an effective one, in actuality. These aspects have been well taken care of by another school of scholars. For example calvo-de Droit says:

"Certain publicists give the name of intervention only to (armed intervention), objecting that if the interposition, or good offices on the part of one state in the affairs of another is not violent but peaceful, limited.

1. T.J. Lawrence, Principles of International Law (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1913), 5th Edn., p. 124.

i) I. Oppenheim, International Law (London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1948), pp. 272-73.

ii) Ellery C. Stowell, International in International Law (New York: Honey Hold And Co., 1921), p. 318.

iii) Hans Kelren, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952), p. 68.

purely to advice, it resolves itself into an amicable interposition, or good offices, or even in mediation, which is not intervention. This is according to my view, to take the result for the act itself. The form under which intervention takes place does not alter its character. Intervention which is produced by the employment of diplomatic process is no less intervention; it is intervention more or less direct, more or less dissimulated which is very often merely the prelude of armed intervention".²

Intervention in this sense may be forcible or non-forcible.³ It may be direct or indirect.⁴ It may be open or clandestine.⁵ The outside party may be a state or a group of states, but at the same time it may also be an international organisation, a business corporation, or a political party. "Interferences by a nation in the territorial jurisdiction of other nation in its rights to determine its internal affairs

2. Quoted in Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr. Non-Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas (DALLAS: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956), p.69.

1) Edward G. Miller, Jr. "Non-Intervention and Collective Responsibility in the Americas" Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXII N.567 May 15, 1950, pp.768-70.

3. As when it takes the form of economic coercion.

4. As when the major power uses minor power as its agent or proxy.

5. As when the instruments being employed are under the control of secret intelligence agencies.

or to conduct its external relations is termed as intervention".⁶

The evolution of the international system, has transformed intervention from an incident to a structural aspect of international relations. The traditional inter-state pattern of relations has today been transformed into a global conception. "The conceptional universe of the early nation state system has become too narrow to encompass the phenomenon of interference which are a structural characteristic of contemporary international system".⁷

Classical definition do not serve the purpose of these days.⁸ Whatever may be the theory, the conception that only force or its threat thereof can constitute intervention, has really circumscribed the wider dimensions of the intervention phenomenon in the contemporary international relations. At the same time, it has overlooked several types of interferences that have often occurred or occur particularly in modern time.

6. Hedley Bull, "Intervention", in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.1.

7. Karl Kaiser, "The Political Aspects of Intervention in Present Day International Politics". International Spectator (Haque), Vol. 25, 8 January, 1971, p.76.

8. Classical definition means those who hold that intervention is a 'dictatorial interference'.

It has found newer ways and levels to operate upon and concretise itself. By flexing the muscle of economic power, exhibiting political threats as a force to curb freedom of speech, press, and radio, fifth column activities and; aiding and fomenting uprisings against the running government and host of other things like it; have succeeded in strengthening and proliferating its indirect tentacles interference substantially. Thus the actions taken by one state to impose its will upon another - against the latter's right to organise its government as it sees fit, to regulate the rights and duties of its population, and to provide for the needs of its people, all should come under the category of intervention, whether backed by force or a mere threat of it.

Today, it seems, that the rule of non-intervention and the rule of mutual respect for sovereign jurisdiction, are remote from the facts of international life. Paradoxically, the hands of the Third World are getting strengthened because of the majority it enjoys in the political organs of the United Nations inducing multiplication...in the provisions of legal prohibition of intervention but simultaneously interventionary activities of one kind or another of superpowers are increasing so much so, that, it seems to certain scholars to be endemic or structural in nature. Thus, a new process has begun where the deterrent and prohibitory measures are undertaken by U.N.

and its worth being nullified by newer and confusing types of interventionary activities.

In the sphere of economy, the force and motive of intervention can be realized in the negative sense through various sanctions, trade and credit sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, etc. and in positive through subsidies and aid to revolutionary groups or to opponents of a regime that one wants to unseat. This practice is much prevalent in modern times; in the form of aid to unstable governments, designed to make them less unstable and more favourable to one's own point of view. A wealthy state can resort to bribery on a large scale, as the United States has practised this, sometimes with virtuosity sometimes with mixed results.⁹

It seems that deeper one's delves into the literature of intervention, the more, he gets confused in its understanding. The discrepancy between the importance attached to the problem of intervention and the bases on which solutions to it are to be found, is so striking that at first instance one wonders

9. As America supported the Shah of Iran and at present is providing aid to Pakistan. Aiding a shaky government is intended to bring the same to toe the line of patron nation. Like Soviet Union and Cuba aiding Angola and Ethopia. Also, in the protracted Lebanese Civil War, Israel support to Major Haddad in Southern - Lebanon in order to exert influence on the latter.

whether an adequate sample of the relevant literature has been examined, or not.¹⁰

Types of Intervention

After analysing different opinions on intervention and various cases of intervention in international relations, let us now deliberate over the forms of intervention.

1. Military Intervention

It is the most drastic as well as legally most vulnerable form of intervention.

It takes place when troops are despatched to maintain order or support a revolution, in a foreign state. Such kind of assistance is either made available to the government of a state, which is internally insecure or in conflict with a neighbour, or to the opponent of a government within the state. Military intervention has been prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations. It can be classified under the following heads:-

- (a) Arms sales or grants.
- (b) Making available military training at home and abroad.

10. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p.273.

- (c) Making available military advisers to troops engaged in military operations.
- (d) Making planes and Crew available for air observation.
- (e) Providing transportation assistance to troops engaged in military operations.
- (f) Limited support for military operations by artillery, air and navy.
- (g) Participation in military operations through combat units which can either be proxy or regular one.

Owing to this diverse variety of means through which intervention can be effected, different authors have defined this phenomenon in various ways.

Military intervention, termed as 'aggression', has been defined as "a resort to armed force by a state when such resort has been duly determined by a means which that state is bound to accept, to constitute a violation of an obligation".¹¹

"An act of aggression", says Quincy Wright, "is the use of armed force across an internationally recognised

11. Rights and Duties of States in case of Aggression", Philip Jossup, Reporter, 33, American Journal of International Law Supp. 827 off., 1939, p.267.

frontier, for which a government, de-facto or de-jure, is responsible because of act or negligence, unless justified by a necessity for individual or collective self-defence, by the authority of the United Nations to resort international peace and security, or by consent of the state within whose territory armed forces is being used".¹²

Military intervention also affects the balance of domestic forces. It improves the ability of regimes to check extreme form of domestic opposition. At the same time this ability - to deal with such opposition may make the regime overlook the legitimate and reasonable domestic grievances.

These grievances if ignored for a longer time may lead to the organisation of a revolutionary insurgent political movements aimed at overthrowing the government through forcible means or even secession from the State.

"Paradoxically a less secure domestic power base would have imposed a more timely political response to what might have been at the outset, politically manageable resentment".¹³

12. Quincy Wright, "Intervention: 1956", American Journal of International Law, (Washington, D.C.) Vol.51, 1957, p.270.

13. W. Howard Wriggins, "Political Outcomes of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement or Intervention", Journal of International Affairs, (Washington, D.C.) Vol.22, N.2, 1969, p.226.

But sometimes military assistance of specific types do have a stabilizing effect on the relations between the donor and the recipient. It can also be contended that military assistance provides substantial opportunity for the donor to intervene in the domestic affairs of the recipient country. Military aid in several cases ensures the condition for the survival of the political regime in power.

2. Political Intervention

Arnold Wolfers puts different methods of intervention under this type,¹⁴ which are used basically to pressurise the political system of a country. These activities have been variously put under the categories called propaganda, espionage intervention, counter-intervention, indirect aggression, subversion, influence, diplomatic intervention and ideological intervention.

Propaganda intervention is one of the commonly used types of intervention. This type of intervention began from 1926 when the United States was enforcing its policies on Latin America.¹⁵ Germany came to the frontline. In pursuit of its aims the German government set about an organisation of propaganda in foreign countries to a degree hitherto unknown.

14. Arnold Wolfers, "Discard and Collaboration" (USA: Baltimore, 1965), p.73.

15. C.G. Ferwick, "Intervention by Way of Propaganda", American Journal of International Law, (Washington, D.C.) 35 October, 1941, pp.626-631.

This type of intervention has become very common in present times. Propaganda is a handy instrument in spreading or checking communist revolutionary activities.

Diplomatic intervention, which is an other type of political intervention takes place when a state exerts pressure on the political system of an other country diplomatically. To call back diplomats or to break diplomatic relations are some of the methods of diplomatic intervention.¹⁶

It is an important instrument in the hands of a state to persue its proposed design. It possesses total freedom in this respect to establish or break off diplomatic relations with another country. But when that weapon is used in a collective form such as by the United Nations, then one aims at not so much a collective recognition policy but rather a collective non-recognition policy.

Ideological intervention is also another type of important intervention. Today superpowers' intervention in the Third World comprises mainly on ideological grounds. After 1945 it got an impetus in international politics. However, it has a history of its own. Morgenthau refers to the history of ideological intervention from 1820 in the following way -

16. Cf. Quincy Wright, "The Munich Settlement and International Law". American Journal of International Law (Washington D. C.) 33 January, 1949, pp.12-32.

"...Russia tried to intervene in Spain in 1820, and actually intervened in Hungary in 1848, in order to oppose liberal revolutions, Great Britain opposed these interventions because it was opposed to the expansion of Russian power. Yet it intervened on behalf of nationalism of Greece and on behalf of the conservative status quo in Portugal because its interests seemed to require it....What Great Britain and Russia were doing in the 19th century, the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be doing today".¹⁷

Stating the present phenomena of superpowers' intervention in Third World, Morgenthau says, "Instead of confronting each other openly and directly, the United States and the Soviet Union, have chosen to oppose and compete with each other surreptitiously through the intermediary of third parties. The internal weakness of most new and emerging nations, requiring foreign support and the revolutionary situation in many of them give the great powers the opportunity of doing so. Thus, aside from competing for influence upon a particular government in the traditional ways, the United States and the Soviet Union have interjected their power into the domestic conflicts of weak nations, supporting the government or the opposition as the case may be".¹⁸

17. Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene", Foreign Affairs (New York) 45, April, 1967, pp.425-436.

18. Ibid, p.428.

The Soviets and the U.S. do operate and intervene at the global level to maximize their own respective gains under the cover of ideology.

Political intervention also includes activities such as inducing or assisting civil-strife, sedition and guerrilla activities, and assistance rendered to wars of liberation, to self-determination of people, or to help foreign governments in the garb of maintaining civil order. In a way, these are also widespread because the international viability of many states is rather weak making them vulnerable to external influences.¹⁹

The unilateral or mutual interference of states in each others' internal or external affairs has become a constitutive part of certain structure of international politics. Such types of interventions have become frequent in contemporary international relations.

3. Bloc Intervention

Bloc intervention is the most drastic form of intervention. It is also called collective intervention. It is different from unilateral intervention - intervention by one state in the affairs of another.

19. Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International System", in Richard. A. Falk, ed., The Vietnam War and International Law., Vol.II, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.1016-26.

Unilateral intervention has generally been seen by the countries other than those which are intervening as an undesirable activity. It is manifestly self-centered, undertaken in the interests of the power which intervenes. Whereas collective (bloc) intervention, as the definition implies is intervention that has been authorised by some international body enjoying widespread legitimacy. Intervention by such an organisation, duly authorised, is widely seen as proper. Collective intervention is undertaken for collective purpose.

The two most striking cases of today, in the history of bloc intervention, have been Hungary and Lebanon. In the case of Hungary, Russian troops were used against the legal government when it attempted to adopt a neutralist position. In Lebanon, American troops entered at the request of the legal government and presided over a political compromise between the warring factions that placed Lebanon in the neutral position - although not with the advantageous fervor manifested by the United Arab Republic. Intervention within one's own bloc clearly is less inhibited than intervention in the opposing bloc or in an uncommitted nation.²⁰

20. Morton A. Kaplan, "Intervention in internal War: Some Systematic Sources", in James N. Rosenau, ed, International Aspects of Civil Strife, (Princeton: New Jersey, 1964), pp.92-112.

4. Economic Intervention

Most of the cases of intervention are guided by economic interests. Earlier, economic intervention used to be in the form of direct colonization which has taken today the form of neo-colonialism. American intervention in Latin America was and is decisively influenced by economic interests. Intervention in Cuba by the U.S. in 1906-09, 1911, 1917-18, 1921-23 and later on was also guided by economic factor. Although later on economic factor was overtaken by ideological one.²¹

Economic intervention is made through various methods. Capital investment and economic influence in the internal affairs of another country are the ways of this type of intervention. This phenomenon, which in a different context is spoken of as neo-colonialism, is closely tied in with contemporary idea of intervention in the non-military sense.

Imposition of economic sanctions, exploitation of natural resources from the seabed (falling out one nation's natural boundry), investment in other countries, multinational corporations, sanction of loans on high interest rates,

21. "Invasion and Intervention in the Caribbean Areas", Editorial Research Report (Washington D.C.) 1959, Vol. II, p.544.

import/export of uneven goods (especially when great powers export finished products and import raw-material), etc. are the forms coming under the economic intervention.²²

5. Humanitarian Intervention

There is a general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a state can treat its own nationals according to ^{its} discretion. But there is a substantial body of opinion and practice in support of this view that there are limits to that discretion, and that when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its national in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind. Intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible. The Charter of the United Nations, which recognises the promotion and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, as one of the principal objectives of the Organisation, takes a step further in the direction of elevating the principle of humanitarian intervention to a basic rule of organised international society.

J.G. Starke enumerates the following principle in exceptional cases in which a state has under international law a legitimate right to intervene.

22. In fact these are the acts of economic exploitation and called neo-colonialism. But neo-colonialism is leveled now as the economic intervention - an intervention in indirect way.

- (a) Collective intervention, pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, viz., enforcement action under the authority of the United Nations Security Council.
- (b) to protect the rights and interests and the personal safety of its citizens abroad.
- (c) self-defence; if intervention is necessary to meet a danger of armed attack.
- (d) in the affairs of a protectorate under its dominion;
- (e) if the state subject of the intervention has been guilty of a gross breach of international law in regard to the intervening state, for example, if it has itself unlawfully intervened.²³

Under the pretext of these rights many intervening nations try to justify their acts on humanitarian grounds. As Michael Akchurst says, "During the present century, and especially since the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945, International law has developed a body of rules on human rights, which forbid states to ill-treat individuals, including their own nationals, but at the same time it has

23. J.G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law, 1st edn., (Woburn(USA): Butterworth & Co., 1977), p.96.

developed a body of rules restricting the (previously almost unlimited) right of states to use force".²⁴

United Nations, International Law and Intervention

The provision of UN Charter Art. 2(4) prohibits the members of the UN from the 'use of force' or 'threat of use of force' against any other state. The terms 'use of force' or 'threat to use of force' replace the former term "war", as enshrined in the League of Nations. Thus alteration in the terminology was necessitated because of the inherent difficulty encountered by the League of Nations, in defining the exact meaning of war -- as to when particular hostilities could be termed 'war'.

On the other hand, the UN Charter makes provision under article 51 of collective or individual self defence. Self defence in the wake of force being used on a particular state by another state. The term collective self defence needs an elaboration in this context. It pertains to the bi- or multi-lateral mutual defence tactics which characterise the constitution of various regional security arrangements or alliances and pacts. It is a common feature of all such mutual self defence arrangements that a provision is made

24. Michael Akchurst, "Humanitarian Intervention" in Bull, n. 6, p.95.

whereby in case of an armed attack on one member of the alliance the other members would automatically become involved. Such defence alliances should not be confused with the collective security arrangements of the UN. They exist and function not within but parallel to the UN system. Their role is primarily to function till the time the UN machinery is geared into operation, for the preservation of international peace and security. But in actual practice the importance of such mutual self defence alliances has emerged supreme since the UN agencies are handicapped due to their own inherent divisions especially with regard to the exercise of the veto power.

As far as the actual working of collective self defence arrangements is concerned, it has been observed that these function largely within the parameters of the superpower bloc politics. The two blocs have enunciated a code of unwritten rules of the game in demarcating the international arena into two spheres of influence' each dominated by one superpower.


Though hegemony exists within the bloc, parity is sought with the other bloc. A country is considered within the sphere of influence of a particular superpower/bloc, only if its existing 'legitimate' government is overtly or

covertly sympathetic towards that bloc. In case of a civil strife in the domains of a particular regime, both the superpowers put their hand forth. But their modus operandi is marked by a great difference. The superpower in whose sphere of influence the regime is considered to be existing can overtly come to the assistance of the government concerned apparently on the plea of consent even to the extent of sending its armed forces to aid the legitimate government in accordance with the provisions for intervention enshrined in the traditional international law, which makes intervention legal if made on behalf of a legitimate government. And a legitimate government in this context is defined as one having control over the territory of the state.

On the other hand the rival superpower will/may aid the rebels through such covert means as aid and supply of arms and ammunition and other provisions necessary for the conduction of hostilities. But it will never use its own defence personnel in an overt fashion especially if troops of the rival superpower are present in aid to the existing government. For such an irresponsible action in contradiction to the rules of the game would envisage superpower confrontation which the doctrine of deterrence does not permit.

The Problem of Theorising Intervention

The problem of theorising intervention stems from the controversy between the theory and praxis in this realm. Different interpretations, definitions and theoretical exercises have been attempted to from time to time from different quarters of intellectual domains. The basic contention which one can perceive is about the evaluative criteria to judge the merit of such attempts. In other words, it is to find out the theoretical underpinnings of different exercises to define the phenomena of intervention. It can either base itself on the very Act of intervention by the superpowers in third world countries or the act of interventions on the part of superpowers in these regions do constitute primacy in the dynamics of growth for theoretical and diffinitional interpretations of the term intervention. On the basis of above surveyed literature this issue can be seen in the following way. The major developments in the area of theoretical formulations do not rigorously stand to the empirical test. It is either based on factual enumerations without properly relating its underlying logical details and context based on assumptions or on value judgements varying from person to person. A proper arrangement of factors and variables and the varying primacies seems to be lacking in this exercise. Moreover, to divide this phenomenon into



TH-2462



different sections: political, economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, etc. means snatching the life from an organ by cutting it into different pieces. In what terms and on what grounds a particular act on the part of superpowers can be termed as political or other type of intervention and how it can be distinguished and separated from the rest of the types?

Given the multiplicity in the types of interventions, controversies shrouding the stands taken by United Nations and varying opinions of jurists over the interpretation of interventionary acts; it is difficult to evolve a theory which would be able to encompass the dynamics of the reality in totality. Limitations of space allow us only to make a systematic inquiry into three major dimensions of the problem i.e. moral, legal and strategic.

The Moral Dimension: The Double Standard

Intervention in international relations has taken a subjective orientation whereby its meaning and purpose vary from person to person and case to case. No standard measure can be put forward to determine its scientific standard. It may be good or bad in moral terms. Its goodness or badness does not come from the very existence of term intervention but rather from the value attached to this phenomenon. To

intervene in a peaceful country may be unwarranted but to intervene in a stormy and politically problem ridden country may be justifiable. This subjective notion of the problem under study has baffled the policy makers while acting in relation to the concerns, taking part in the internal/external affairs of another country. An astute observer says "There is not obvious synthesis between morality and intervention".²⁵

Given the number of solutions probably the best one is to greet the doctrine of nonintervention as an absolute one in so far as national actors are concerned. On the other hand, the interventionary behaviour in the international arena should be adjudged on the basis of collective morality rather than an individual one.²⁶

However, this explanation does not leave much scope for scientific interpretation. Because, the latter demands an objectivity and viability for empirical verification. Contrary to it, moral explanations always stand on value alternatives.

25. Manfred Halpern, "The Morality and Politics of Intervention, in Rosenau n. 20, p.455.

26. Richard A, Falk, "The Legitimacy of Legislative Intervention by the United Nations", in Ronald J. Stanger (ed.), Essays on Intervention, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), pp.31-61.

The confusion that has arisen over the concept of intervention is largely a result of the dual usage of the term. As James, N. Rosenau says, "Intervention" is used both as an analytical concept by political scientists and as an operational concept by diplomats and strategists. The political scientists seek to be precise in their description of intervention, excluding some relationships and including others. The operationalist, on the other hand, use the term in descriptive rather than an analytical manner, and tends to define every example of influence or involvement as intervention".²⁷

The Problem of Definition

Notwithstanding the voluminous literature on intervention, there appears to be no agreement whatsoever on the phenomenon designated by the term. Even in international law, where the definitional problem is an especially recurrent preoccupation, uniformity of usage has yet to develop.²⁸ On the contrary, both

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27. James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention", Journal of International Affairs, (New York) Vol. 22, 1968, pp.165-76.
28. Indeed, the absence of definitional uniformity has recently been generated a heated controversy among Jurists of international law.
- i) Elerhaid P. Deutsch, "The Legality of United States Position in Vietnam", American Bar Association Journal, (Chicago) 52 (May, 1966), pp.436-442.
 - ii) William R. Standard, "United States Interventions in Vietnam is not legal", American Bar Association Journal, (Chicago) 52 (July, 1966), pp.627-34.
 - iii) John Norton Moore, "International Law and the United States' Role in Vietnam: A Reply", & Richard A. Falk, "International Law and the United States Role in Vietnam: A Response to Prof. Moore," Yale Law Journal, (New Haven) (May, 1967), pp.1051-1158.

in law and in general "intervention has a perplexing vagueness of meaning"²⁹. Some observers point it as a certain form of behaviour, others conceive it to involve certain intentions underlying behaviour; still others think it in terms of certain consequences stemming from behaviour; and a fourth approach is to equate it with certain standards to which the behaviour cut to conform.³⁰

A major result of so many definitional options is that a number of observers end up by defining intervention as any action whereby one state has an impact upon the affairs of another. Thus the literature is pervaded with discussions of military intervention,³¹ propaganda intervention,³² economic intervention³³ diplomatic intervention³⁴ ideological

29. Percy H. Winfield, "Intervention", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 8 (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p.236.

30. Martin Wight, "Western values in International Relations", In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (ed.) Diplomatic Investigation: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp.111-120.

ii) William T. Burke, "The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework of Inquiry", in Stanger, n.27 pp. 88-90.

iii) Thomas & Thomas, n. 2 pp.400-14.

31. Cf. Quincy Wright, "Intervention, 1956", American Journal of International Law, (Chicago) 51(April 1957), pp.257-276.

32. Cf. C.G. Fenwick, "Intervention by Way of Propaganda", American Journal of International Law, (Chicago) 35 (October, 1941), pp.626-631.

33. W.B.B. Dickinson, Jr., "Challenged Monroe Doctrine", Editorial Research Reports, (Washington D.C.) II (10 August, 1960), pp.585-602.

34. Cf. Quincy Wright, "The Munich Settlement and International Law", American Journal of International Law, (Chicago) 33 (January, 1939), pp.12-32.

intervention³⁵ and customs intervention.³⁶ On the other hand, to avoid confusion and vagueness, certain analysts have tried to follow a near route of taking the concrete and specific act and behaviour as constituting intervention at its cost dynamics of complexity. Thus, for them interventionary behaviour is limited to dictatorial interference by one state in the affairs of another.³⁷ Appreciating the clarity involved with specific and precise identification and interpretation, we should at the same time endeavour to conceptualize the complexity in relative totality.

The given argument that compulsion and constraint, which may or may not be based on the coercive use of force in the key to both a precise and useful definition of intervention; that whether an act of interference is undertaken through physical force, economic pressure or some other form of compulsion, it is the compulsion and not its form that constitutes intervention, seems convincing in this respect.³⁸ The trouble with this broader formulation, of course, is that it reintroduces a vagueness about the line that divides interventionary behaviour from other types of international action.

35. Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene, Foreign Affairs, (New York) 45 (April 1967), pp.425-436.

36. Cf. L. Morley, "Invasion and Intervention in the Carribean Areas", Editorial Research Report, II (Washington, D.C.) (22 July, 1959), pp.5353-552.

37. Ibid, pp.68-69.

38. Thomas & Thomas, n.2, p.72.

Thus, a scientific approach to intervention would go a long way toward resolving these definitional problems. Science deals exclusively with observable phenomenon that can be measured, either presently or theoretically - and thus those who engage in scientific inquiry must operationalise their definition before they proceed to make empirical observations.³⁹ Scientists may construct models with conventional concepts, but ultimately - i.e., when they move to test their models - they must either employ operational definitions or abandon the models. Bridgman's original formulation of operationalism still makes this point most succinctly: "In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations: the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations".⁴⁰

Operational definitions, in short, avoid ambiguity. The resulting concepts may or may not be incisive and relevant, but they should not be vague. Operational definitions cannot be either right or wrong, but only more or less useful. The scientific literature on a subject, therefore, perpetuate precision rather than vagueness.

Strategic Analysis and the Problem of Theorising Intervention

Under what conditions intervention can successfully achieve its goals? What risks have to be run and what unintended

39. Ibid, p.284.

40. P.M. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

consequences have to be endured if success is to be achieved? What will be the consequences of non-intervention? When is intervention likely to result in outright failure? Such questions, of course, can not be answered by moral principles and judicial standards. In fact, the lack of scientific approach to explicate intervention, in terms of parsimonious and coherent ways led to the dominance of unsystematic and value-laden judgement to analyse the implications and strategic analysis of intervention.

Nations conceive their national interests in terms of power. This view-point is predominant among the protagonists of realist school. Taking clue from this perspective to assess the phenomenon of intervention in international relation, one should not judge this phenomenon from moral, ethical and other normative points of view, but rather from the hard priorities available to the nation which is embarking on intervention and the nations which are victims of such action.

For an intervention to be successful or not varies from situation to situation. It can not be said that given the conditions the intervention would be successful or otherwise. Intervention can not be a guiding principle of diplomacy. However, notwithstanding its empirical orientation and its clear-cut recognition that different conditions conducive to different interventionary result, the strategically-oriented literature is conspicuously lacking in a scientific

approach. For instead of formulating and testing empirical hypothesis in order to comprehend the range of situations in which interventionary behaviour is likely to occur and the conditions under which it is likely to succeed or fail, student of intervention strategy invariably falls back on a standard that is just as misleading and unempirical a means of explanation as any moral principle or legal precept. To examine a sample of interventions and conclude that such behaviour occurs because nations are "guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests"⁴¹ is not to offer a meaningful explanation. The national interest is merely a label that may denote the entire spectrum of human wants and needs and thus it in no way differentiates the circumstances that are likely to lead a nation to define its wants and needs as requiring interventionary behaviour.⁴²

These are the major problems in theorising intervention. An interventionary act can be interpreted in various ways. This is, what the two superpowers have done, especially after the Second World War. They have intervened in the third world countries, on the basis of different pretexts suitable to their modus operandi and thus have tried to justify their acts of intervention.

41. Morgantha, n.17, p.430.

42. Roseneu, n.10, p.239-249.

Chapter Two

SUPER POWERS INTERVENTION IN THE THIRD WORLD

The nature of international system has tremendously changed since the second World War. Revolutions in communication, transportation, weapons technology etc. have brought about corresponding transformations in the realm of politics also. Moreover, the emergence of interdependence and transnationalism in the modern world in collaboration with the above said developments in different fields have led to the formation of the global village. These developments led to the blurring of boundaries among the states. Amidst these changes in the world, came up a new and enduring phenomenon of the superpowers, taking its roots from the ashes of second World War. The interests of these power blocs are not limited to their territorial extents but rather spotted to the internal/external affairs of other states. They have demarcated different nations into their respective spheres of influence. In this titanic struggle for influence, the Third World encompassing the three continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, was a fertile field for, superpowers intervention, not only because the states of this region were poor, but also because most of them were newly independent and therefore susceptible to pressures.

The third world states which were instable and fragmented societies subjected to bribery, assassination, black

propaganda, subordination and other methods by the superpowers kept them poor and dependent; it further undermined the overall capacities of the nation falling in this vulnerable region to deal with its developmental projects effectively.

Since the end of Second World War, the idea that there is a tacit understanding about spheres of influence among great powers has cropped up. When one of the superpowers has resorted to armed intervention in a state, and has done so without being effectively challenged by its rival, the implications are obvious. There has been absence of either armed resistance or the threat of it or other forms of effective opposition from the rival power. Observers and analysts of international affairs have speculated that there is a tacit understanding between the superpowers over the spheres of influence.¹

Such tacit understanding, for the spheres of influence by the Superpowers has categorically, been denied by both superpowers.²

On at least one occasion the chief representative of one of the superpowers spoke for both in disclaiming any joint

1. Paul Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983). p.3.

2. i) Address by Secretary Rusk, Department of State Bulletin, (Washington D.C.) Vol. LIX, No. 1528, 7 October, 1968, p.350.

ii) A. Sovetov, "The Present Stage in the Struggle between Socialism and Imperialism", International Affairs (Moscow), 11 November, 1968, p.9.

intention to establish spheres of influence which by implication, means an understanding or agreement between them. This was done by President Nixon in the course of an address to the people of the Soviet Union, broadcast at the conclusion of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, held in Moscow during May 1974. President Nixon declared that neither power had the aim of establishing spheres of influence or of conspiring together against the interests of any other nation.³

This phenomenon has led the Third World in a situation where it finds itself under the influence of superpowers. The internal factional-strifes of the Third World have been taken by the superpowers as a favourable situation for supplying arms and carrying out spheres of influence. Economic needs of the Third World have been exploited by supplying them obsolete technology. In the long run, it is the Third World which suffers in these conflicts.

In the present study we have taken one case from each continent of the Third World for the study of superpowers' intervention. From the Latin American continent, we have chosen the US intervention in Cuba, from Africa, U.S. intervention in Congo, and from Asia the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

3. "President Nixon in Moscow: A Summary of Major Statements and Agreements During President Nixon Richard's Visit to the Soviet Union, May 22-30, 1972", United States Information Service Publication, (New Delhi) 72-399(44), pp.26 and 33.

American Intervention in the Third World

The common view that internal freedom creates situations essential for peaceful international environment, is supported neither by historical evidence, nor by reason.⁴ The United States itself has a long history of imposing oppressive regimes in regions of the world which fall within the reach of its power. Since the second World War, the United States has manipulated the conflicts within the Third World to suit its national and international interests. The United States has globalized the "banana republic".⁵ Overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran by involving itself actively in oil politics of Middle East, soon after the second World War and intervention in Lebanon on 15 July, 1958, when nearly 15,000 US Marines disembarked on the beaches of Beirut, America tried to impose its will by intervening and thus violating the norms of international law. The US intervention in the civil war of Congo in 1960, in the civil war of Nigeria, and in preserving the status quo in Southern Africa are the episodes of the American policy towards the Third World. Counterrevolution in Guatemala in 1953-54, the invasion of Cuba, and the Dominican intervention, give solid proofs of American destabilizing

4. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Great Britain, 1979), Vol. I, p.1.

5. Ibid.

policies in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries. Similar policy was pursued in the case of Vietnam and Korea also.

Cuba

In April 1961 landing of the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs was one of the worst concealed American interventions in the Third World, and of the few that failed to achieve their objectives. American concern about the Bay of Pigs "tragedy" or "fiasco" has been over the reasons that a bad decision was made -- the intelligence gap, poor planning and coordination, domestic political considerations, and bureaucratic momentum. Such a focus, however, divorces the intervention from its political and ideological contents, and hence distorts its broader significance. It implies that the intervention is to be criticised only because it was imperfectly executed. Yet the Bay of Pigs operation was no mere decision-making failure; it was a direct outgrowth of American antinationalism, expressed in a profound distrust of, and contempt for, Castro's revolution.

John. F. Kennedy took various stands about Cuba between 1958 and 1961. As a senator, he called Fiedel Castro "Part of the legacy of Bolivar", "a fiery young rebel" whose overthrow of the Fulgencia Batista dictatorship on New Year's Day, 1959

was just a revolution.⁶ Critical of American paternalism and mindless anticommunism in dealing with Latin America, the Senator spoke forcefully on behalf of non-intervention. He seemed more concerned with US support of rightist dictatorships than with the threat that might be posed by governments of Castro type, whose anti-Americanism, he believed, was influenced by that support.⁷

President Eisenhower was criticised on two counts, for having helped Batista to consolidate his regime and for failing to encourage resistance to Castro by "liberty-loving Cubans" in exile. "Castro betrayed the revolution", said John F Kennedy on several occasions; its worthy beginning had ended in Communist dictatorship and the creation of "a hostile and militant Communist satellite" only 90 miles away from American shores.

But John F Kennedy did not know or purported not to know, that the Eisenhower Administration, dating from an executive Order of 17 March 1960,⁸ had authorised the CIA to establish a base in Guatemala for the arming and training of anti-Castro Cubans. President Eisenhower, although, in a

6. John F. Kennedy, ed. The Strategy of Peace, (New York: Allan Nevins, 1960), p.133.

7. Ibid., pp.136-37.

8. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Random House, 1964), p.24.

press conference, warned that the United States would not permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere.

When Kennedy took office, he found plans already well underway to overthrow Castro with the CIA largely running the show. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy became aware that Latin American governmental opinion was far more inclined to support the overthrow of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic than of Fidel Castro.⁹ The driving force behind Kennedy's subsequent authorisation of the CIA's plan and behind his willingness to believe the CIA's assurances that an invasion by 1,400 men would lead to an uprising of the Cuban people against socialism was because of his conviction that such a political system was intolerable to the Cuban people. True to his campaign rhetoric, Kennedy said privately, "Our objection is not to the Cuban revolution, it is to the fact that Castro has turned it over to communism".¹⁰ Kennedy looked for an alternative to the leftist Castro and the extreme right Batistas. CIA support swung to those emigres newly arrived in Guatemala who had fought and served with Castro but then fled the island. They fit well under Kennedy's definition of a legitimate revolutionary

9. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the Whitehouse (Boston: Houghton, 1965), pp.175-85.

10. Quoted in Ibid., p.245.

alternative, one that could credibly redeem the revolution. For, as the State Department's White Paper on Cuba would reiterate, Castro's illegitimate regime posed a challenge to the United States:

The challenge results from the fact that the leaders of the revolutionary regime betrayed their own revolution, delivered that revolution into the hands of powers alien to the hemisphere, and transformed it into an instrument employed with calculated effect to suppress the rekindled hopes of the Cuban people for democracy... We call once again on the Castro regime to sever its links with international communism movement, to return to the original purposes which brought so many gallant men together in the Sierra Maestra, and to restore the integrity of the Cuban revolution.¹¹

It is hardly surprising that, for Kennedy, the lessons of the Bay of Pigs did not entail a new respect for the non-intervention principle or a new appreciation of self-determination in Latin America. Instead he was concerned principally with bureaucratic lessons -- never again trusting the CIA's or the military's judgements and, suspecting the State Department's utility in foreign policy decision-- and with the importance of subverting Castro's Cuba by other means. In his speech on 20 April 1961, Kennedy linked the Cuba problem to other areas of Communist threat.

11. US Department of State, Cuba (Washington, D.C.), 3 April 1961, pp. 1-2, 35.

Power is the hallmark of this offensive-- power and discipline and deceit. The legitimate discontent of erring peoples is exploited. The legitimate trappings of self determination are employed. But once in power, all talk of discontent is repressed -- all self-determination disappears -- and the promise of a revolution of hope is betrayed, as in Cuba, into a reign of terror We dare not fail to see the insidious struggle of this newer and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it -- whether in Cuba or South Vietnam.

... The message of Cuba, of Laos, of the rising din of Communist voices in Asia and Latin America -- these messages are all the same ... that our society may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.¹²

Kennedy's policy towards Cuba provided the backdrop of Castro's closeness with the USSR, culminating in the 1962 missile crisis.

The abortive invasion, crowning an intense period of American hostility towards Castro's Cuba, also assured a prolonged estrangement between the two countries. Its memory will linger on among Cubans of another North American intervention in their affairs. It is basically that, as Lester D. Langley has written, Castro's Commune is an "open denial of Jacksonian credos of democracy, Capitalism and progress" that Americans have wished to see adopted by Cuban government since 1898.¹³

12. Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.), Vol. 44, N. 1141, 8 May 1961, p. 660.

13. Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy of the United States: A Brief History (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 187.

Kennedy pledged to let happen such acts "never again". In a speech of 18 November 1963, Kennedy sounded the "never again" theme:

The American states must be ready to come to the aid of any government requesting aid to prevent a takeover aligned to the policies of foreign communism rather to an internal desire for change. My own country is prepared to do this. We in this hemisphere must also use our resources at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere.¹⁴

In pursuit of such objective, Kennedy in October 1963 ordered a high priority Defense Department study of US preparedness for "active ... military intervention" in the Caribbean and the Central America.

After US intervention in Cuba, this process has become almost a notorious routine in the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America. To defend its national interest, as well as imperialist designs, America hammered out the so-called Monroe Doctrine in order to weed out the other imperialist powers to take part in this continent. On the other hand, economically shattered, politically destabilized and socially backward states of Latin America rose to revolt and defy the American intervention. Cuba and Nicaragua hit back the US interventionist policies and led the revolutionary movements successfully. In spite of its failure in Cuba and Nicaragua, however, America is

14. Ibid., p.188.

still looking forward to draw something out of its covert and overt operations. The present emerging revolutionary opposition to American intervention in Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Costa-Rica and in Salvador are in line with the Cuban and Nicaraguan attempts at emancipating themselves.

African Continent - A Case Study of American Intervention in Congo

As a result of historical changes that took place in international politics after the Second World War many African nations emerged out as independent states from colonial yokes of different kind. Still few territories remained colonies till 1960s. Among the newly independent nations of Africa the socio-economic and political situations were not conducive for the establishment of strong nation-states. On the one hand they were suffering from the heritage of colonial subjugation, and the interfactional conflicts over power within the countries, on the other. This situation resulted in coups, military dictatorships and civil strifes.

Thus, even in the altered international political situations, the newly emerged policies were very much vulnerable to the outside interference. The Superpowers exploited this situation to increase their spheres of influence in the continent, as well as to serve their national interests.

The strategic location of the African states is not as significant as that of Latin America for the United States, but their political instability, military weakness, and continued influence of former colonial powers attracted the superpowers to exploit the situation.¹⁵

A case study of Congo will reflect the ways in which superpowers inflicted enormous atrocities on the newly independent nations of Africa.

Congo

US intervention in Congo, in the early 1960s created a situation of cold war in international politics. Commenting on how the US Government perceived the significance of Congo situation, Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy said:

In the sixties, the United States Government saw it as dreadly serious business, a test that would determine the destiny of a continent important and perhaps vital to American interests. The Congo was not only a wealthy nation strategically placed in the heart of Africa, it was also presumed to be a symbolic battleground between East and West, where the success or failure of one's clients would have repercussions throughout Africa and the developing World. Briefly then, for the first and last time, an African problem became a priority for the White House and the subject of a U.S. supported action by the United Nations.¹⁶

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15. Satish Kumar, CIA and the Third World: A Study of Crypto Diplomacy (Delhi:Navin Shahdara, 1981), p.65.
16. Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy, "Following the Scenario: Reflections on Five Case Histories in the Mode and Aftermath of CIA Intervention" in Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, ed., The CIA File (New York, 1976), p.35. Quoted by Satish Kumar, n. 19, p.77.

The US intervention started from the time of the Congolese independence on 30 June 1960. Congo was a colony of Belgium. In fact, Belgium was forced to grant independence to Congo due to the violence and riots of 1959 as well as the pressure of the world public opinion. In a political war between two native leaders -- Patrice Lumumba, President of Movement National Congolaise and, Joseph Kasavubu, President of Abako Party, Belgians were forced to support Lumumba - the victorious leader of national assembly elections. Earlier the Belgians had supported Kasavubu.¹⁷

In the month of July 1959, the domestic situation of Congo turned bad when a unit of Congolese army mutinied against their white Belgian officers. Consequently civilians were attacked by the Belgian force. On 11 July, Moise Tshombe, made a declaration for the independence of Katanga -- one of the provinces of Congo. Tshombe declared himself the Prime Minister of Katanga and demanded help from Belgium, Britain and Rhodesia. This event was welcomed by Belgium.¹⁸

Prime Minister Lumumba made a request to the United Nations for military assistance against the act of Tshombe. Lumumba also requested Secretary Khrushchev of the Soviet Union "to watch hourly over the situation". Immediately the UN

17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol), Vol.12, 1959-60, pp. 17640-41.

18. Ibid., p.17640.

Security Council ordered a force of 16,000 for patrolling Congo.¹⁹ The United States also appreciated the UN operation plan and provided transport planes to lift the UN forces.

Lumumba found the Congo situation deteriorating in spite of UN operation. So he demanded the withdrawal of UN white forces. But no attention was paid on his request. Thereafter, Lumumba launched a series of attacks on Dag Hammarskhold, the UN Secretary General. Even the Soviet Union, United Arab Republic, Ghana and other neighbouring nations joined hand in this assault.²⁰

In Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko made a statement on the Congo situation to the Belgian, UK, French, US and West German diplomatic representatives which accused all these countries and NATO of "aggression" against Congo.²¹

The US did not show any hesitation in exploiting this situation. On the advice and support of America, Kasavubu, the President of Congo, ousted Lumumba on 5 September and appointed Joseph Ileo in his place. Lumumba was kidnapped and murdered in January 1961. This event led the superpowers to diplomatic confrontation.

19. Ibid., pp. 17641-42.

20. Ibid., p. 17642.

21. Ibid., p. 17642.

Communist China had sent to Lumumba £ 1 million. The Soviet Union also gave him transport planes, air force crew, and a number of army officers. Many Soviet technicians were sent to Leopoldville and tonnes of communist literature were distributed.²²

With the help of the United States, General Lundula was replaced by Mobutu as the new army chief. CIA got Mobutu, the right person to throw the Russian technicians out of the country and confiscate their literature.

There were two groups in Kennedy administration -- one, which wanted to continue military assistance to the United Nations with a view to ending the secession of Katanga, while the other wanted to withdraw its backing completely. Kennedy decided to continue support to the UN operation in Congo.

By the end of 1960, an associate of Lumumba, Andoine Gizenga had set up a separate government in Stanleyville, in the northern province of Kivu. Gizenga's government was recognised by the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, the UAR, Guinea, Ghana, Mali and Yugoslavia. In a compromise between the USA and the USSR, Gizenga was appointed the Vice Premier of Central Congolese Government. Later, on 14 January, 1961, he was deposed from Vice-Premiership by the UN forces.

22. Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (Sandigo: Morrow, 1962) p.223.

Pierre Mulele and Christopher Gbenye, the radical members of Gizenga group demanded help from Nasser and some neighbouring governments to set up a Council of National Liberation to extend radical nationalist regime over entire Congo. Gbenya led the radical force and captured a large area in the northeast of the country. Even some units of the Central Congolese army defected to the Stanleyville Government.

In October 1963, the United States started helping the Central Congolese Government directly (not through UN force). By mid 1964 \$ 6 million and almost 100 military personnel to train Congolese troops were given by the US government.²³

According to the report of the Brookings Institution, two or three Americans recruited by the CIA flew combat mission in Kivu province. They had flown American-built T-28 fighters under contract with the Congo Government, and had attacked rebel position in Bakavu. When the Soviet Union objected to the use of American citizens, Cuban exiles were used instead.²⁴

In 1964, under the leadership of Gbenye, local organisations recaptured Stanleyville. President Kasuvubu was forced to invite exiled Tshombe to become Prime Minister. America tried to make a compromise between Tshombe Government and Gbenye.

23. Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: World Publishing Company, 1969), p.248.

24. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.248.

American Ambassador in Kenya, William Attwood, tried to intervene between the rebels and the Tshombe Government. He was told by the rebels, "If you persist in helping Tshombe, the Algerians, the Egyptians, and others will soon be in the Congo and you will regret it".²⁵

In order to combat the US and Belgian forces, Gbenya arrested 280 Belgians and 16 US citizens as "prisoners of war". In a big fight between Gbenya's supporters and US-Belgian forces 20,000 people were killed. Regarding the US clandestine intervention in the Congo in 1964, Richard Barnet comments:

The prime objective of the US policy in the Congo in 1964 was to bring down the Bbenya regime because of its reckless character and radical orientation. Unlike the other cases discussed ... Congo-Stanleyville although it had earlier been recognised by a number of African and communist states, had an ambiguous status. It was not clearly a legitimate government that had come to power according to constitutional processes, as had Mossadeq, Arbenz, and Jagan. However, Kivu province had never been brought under the administration of the central government in Leopoldville. In fact, Gizenga and Gbenya had carried on administrative and governmental operations in Stanleville and the surrounding area since 1960, an accomplishment which the Kasabuvu government had never been able to equal. Although US officials sought to justify the operation, not only on the grounds of humanitarian necessity but also on the UN mandate, the overwhelming majority of Black African who had approved the suppression of Katanga were outraged at operation Dragon Rouge. The Congo was a unique experience because of the role

25. William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967), p.205.

of the United Nations in the Katanga war and the use of a variety of non-American troops in the Stanleyville Operation. But once again the criterion for intervention was traditional American fear of communism, for the Congo was another case, along with the Dominican Republic and British Guyana, the preemptive intervention to forestall the possibility of a local communist government. ²⁶

Thus, the political weakness of Congo was exploited by the United States through persisting intervention in the internal affairs of Congo.

Soviet Intervention in the Third World

As mentioned earlier, the intervention phenomenon in the Third World is not only adopted by the United States but by the Soviet Union as well. The Soviet interest in the Third World has its roots in the thought of Lenin who long ago had perceived the connection between the West and its colonial empires as imperialism's "weakest link" and a source of socialism's final victory. But the fledgling Soviet state beset by problems of building socialism within the Soviet Union and coping with the "Capitalist encirclement", lacked the resources, the power, and the opportunity to exploit this weakness.

Soviet involvement in the Third World is due to ideological, political, economic and strategic reasons. But the first consideration is the importance of the Third World as a component

26. Ibid., n.27, p. 251.

of international system. The size, population and land of the Third World give to this region the physical dimension of a new center of international power and influence. The instability of the Third World has drawn superpowers into regional disputes, risking confrontation sometimes of grave magnitude.

The Soviet military power has been used decisively in many recent Third World crises. In the case of Angolan civil war of 1975-76, and the Soviet Union's massive airlift of arms and 10,000 Cuban troops in support of Angola's Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was of crucial importance in its defeat of Jonas-Lavimbi's National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola(UNITA) group and other National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto. In the Horn of Africa, the Soviets once again airlifted sizeable amounts of material and 20,000 Cuban troops, assembling Mengista Hailee Miriam to overcome Somali insurgents in the Ogaden and the secessionist movement in Eritrea. In Afghanistan in December 1979, the Soviet Union took the unprecedented step of directly committing its own troops to rescue a radical government that had been an ideological seal of approval.

In this study, we have taken the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as one of the examples of its policies in the Third World which has been a usual phenomenon during the last four

decades. The Soviet Union has, in most cases of civil war in the Third World, tried to use proxy combat forces. It has, even gone to the extent of intervening directly with its own forces, where it found itself unable to exploit the situation through proxy combat forces. The case study of Afghanistan is a story of direct Soviet involvement in the weak political situation of Afghanistan. Analysts and researchers have unanimously put forward the idea that USSR like USA, has exploited the unstable situation of the Third World for its designs in the form of intervention.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan was one of the first Third World recipients of the Soviet economic and military aid in the mid-1950s, attesting to Moscow's longstanding interest in bringing Afghanistan -- once a natural buffer state between imperial Russia and British India -- clearly into the Soviet sphere of influence.²⁷

Intervention in Afghanistan can be traced back from pro-Soviet coup of 27 April 1978 staged by the two rival Marxists-Leninist factions -- the Khalq and the Parcham.²⁸

27. William E. Griffith, "The Implication of Afghanistan", Survival (London), July-August 1980, pp. 146-47.

28. Hannah Negaran Pseudonym, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security", Orbis, (Philadelphia), Spring 1979, pp.96-100.

In this coup, the regime of King Mohammed Daoud, who, in July 1973 had unseated the parliamentary monarchy of King Mohammed Zahir Shah was removed.²⁹

Coup plotting had been underway for some time within the Afghan armed forces, but the communist organisational work was still far from complete. So the coup had to be put together hastily at the last minute on a makeshift basis. The coup got momentum when Hafizullah Amin was placed under the house arrest on the night of 26 April. He delivered handwritten instructions to various conspirators. Due to various factors -- incompetence of Daoud government, support of several key army and air force officers who had been trained in the USSR, the coup proved successful after only two days of fighting in which Daoud, his family and perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 others died.³⁰

Whatever may have been the Soviet role in the April 1978 coup, the Soviets immediately gave recognition to the New Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and started assisting the Khalq-Parcham group. Hundreds of additional Soviet civilian advisers and a number of military advisers took up posts throughout the Afghan government.³¹ A direct communication link

29. David Chaffetz, "Afghanistan in Turmoil", International Affairs (London), January 1980, pp. 17-18.

30. Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan (Ithaca, New York, 1981), p. 101.

31. Den Oberdorfer, Washington Post, 29 May 1978.

between Moscow and Kabul was also set up. Nur Mohammed Taraki became Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister; and Karmal, the head of Parcham, Deputy Premier without any specific governmental authority, in the new regime.

The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan became more pronounced after a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, in December 1978 was signed between the two countries.³² The new regime was lacking legitimacy and had narrow base support within the Afghan military. Growing unpopularity of the Taraki regime resulted in increasing Soviet economic and military support.

Despite admonishment from Washington against the military intervention in Afghanistan's civil strife, the USSR, in March and April 1979 accelerated military hardware deliveries, including helicopters for gunship and trooplift missions.³³ By May, the number of Soviet military advisers in the country had risen to about 1,000.³⁴

32. William Borders, "New Afghan Leader Denies Aim to Move Closer to Soviet Union", New York Times, 7 May 1978 and "New Regime Moving Afghanistan Deeper into Soviet Orbit", Ibid., 16 November 1978.

33. Aside from M1-24 Hind-type helicopters gunship, the best quality equipment the USSR had provided to Afghanistan at this point included MIG-21 fighter aircraft and T-62 tanks. See Jonathan C. Randal, "Afghanistan: Moscow's Vietnam?", Washington Post, 10 May, 1979.

34. William Borders, "Afghan Insurgency Threatening Regime", New York Times, 13 April, 1979.

Prompted by the inability of the Taraki government to deal with its insurgency problems, the Soviet Union sent General Aleksey A. Yepishev, Chief of the main political administration of the Soviet armed forces, to Kabul in April 1979. Another Soviet official, Vasility S. Safronchuk, a diplomat, was reportedly sent to Kabul to recommend a political solution to Afghanistan's civil strife.³⁵ The situation in Afghanistan went on deteriorating. A unit at Bala Hasrai fortress near Kabul rebelled on 5 August and the Rishkur barracks outside Kabul mutinied several weeks latter. Both uprisings were suppressed.³⁶ In this precarious situation Hafizullah Amin, replaced Taraki as Prime Minister in March and also took over direct control of the Afghan armed forces.³⁷

On 16 September, in a shoot-out by one of his bodyguard Taraki was killed and his posts as President of the country, head of its ruling party, and the chairman of the revolutionary council were taken over by Amin.³⁸

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35. Michael T. Kaufman, "Soviet Role in Afghan Clash Shows of Toughening", New York Time, 6 September 1979.
 36. Reuters dispatch, "Afghan Army Unit Reported to Rebel in 4 hours Battle", New York Time, 6 August 1979.
 37. Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan : The Difficulty of Knowing Where to Stop", Orbis (Philedelphia) Summer 1980, p.205.
 38. "New Afghan Leader, Taking Over, Promises a Better Socialist Order", New York Times, 18 September 1979.

This happening resulted in the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in December 1979 in which Amin was killed and Babrak Karmal was made the head of Afghanistan government.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place in the closing days of 1979. The initial Soviet forces comprised 1,500 airborne troops landed in Kabul on 24 December.³⁹

An aircraft of 150 to 200 flight by AN-12, AN-22, and IL-76 transports had delivered from 5,000 to 6,000 additional troops and equipments to Kabul international airport by 27 December 1979.⁴⁰ At the same time, the first motorized rifle units of a five-division force of more than 50,000 men, crossed into Afghanistan from Kushka and Termez and then fanned out towards Herat, Kabul and the Pakistan border. The resistance of Soviet forces by some local groups in Afghanistan and a few Afghan government troops, could not impede the operation. The details are not known of the elimination of Amin on 27 December. A cryptic obituary in Pravda on 3 January 1980, disclosed that he had died on 28 December 1979 -- the day after the Afghanistan revolution.

The Soviet Union had trouble in finding a convincing justification for military intervention and installation of the puppet government in Kabul. The Soviet Union's original

39. John J. Dziak, "The Soviet Intelligence and Security in the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimensions", Orbis (Philadelphia) Winter 1981, p. 782.

40. Donald E. Fink, "Afghans Invasion Linked to 1968 Action", Aviation Week and Space Technology (New York: McGraw Hill) 14 July 1980, pp. 20-23.

claim that it had been invited to intervene by Amin was replaced by the assertion that it had received invitation from Babrak Karmal in December. Even, the Soviets, in January 1980 first made an "astonishing allegation" that Amin was a CIA agent who intended to betray the revolution.⁴¹

Whatever the Soviet pretensions regarding the removal of Amin, the new Karmal government was clearly dependent on the Soviet administrative and military support than its predecessors.

Rather than reducing the Afghan insurgency, the invasion caused a dramatic increase in it. By February, defections and desertion had reduced the Afghan forces to half of its original strength of 10,000; by June the number had dropped to about a third of this. Moreover, the factional fightings among the Afghan troops led the situation in favour of the Soviet Union. Contrary to the Soviet allegation of heavy arms supply to Afghan rebels from the other countries, "only a trickle of arms" was reaching them from outside the country.⁴² This obviously included some weapons covertly supplied through Pakistan by the United States.⁴³

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41. Marshall D. Shalman, "Tales of Afghanistan, Moscow Style", Current Policy (Washington, D.C., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), No. 143, March 1980, p.2.
42. Marvine Howe, "United Front Still Eludes Afghan Guerillas", New York Times, 28 May 1980 and Edith M. Lederes, "Afghan Rebels Reportedly Stronger but Outgunned", Washington Post, 11 July 1980.
43. David Binder, "US Supporting Afghan Insurgents with Arms in a Covert Operation", New York Times, 16 February 1980.

Karmal's efforts to recruit new Afghans to rebuild the shrinking Afghan military forces in 1980-81, met with little success. The growing unpopularity of Karmal regime was witnessed by a week long strike in February 1980 in which Afghanistan was put under martial law. In this strike hundreds of civilians were killed by Soviet troops.⁴⁴ In April students took one procession for five days against the Soviet Occupation;⁴⁵ in May despite a curfew, school children and their elders distributed leaflets in the capital against the Soviet occupation.⁴⁶

Due to many reasons -- continuing deterioration of Afghan army, growing public hostility towards the Soviet occupation both at national as well as international level; the Kabul regime's inability to govern the country, -- the Soviet Union could not pacify furious public opinion by giving reasons to justify the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Moreover, despite a much publicised pullout of about 5,000 troops and some equipment in June, the Soviet forces increased in size and also changed in composition.⁴⁷ The initial Soviet combat forces

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44. James F. Sterba, "Gunfire Said to Continue in Kabul An Strike Keeps Business Closed", ibid., 25 February 1980 and "Anti Soviet Riding Brings Martial Law to Afghan Capital", New York Times, 23 February 1980.
45. Michael T. Kaufman, "Travellers Tell of Afghan Students' Bloody Protests", New York Times, 11 May 1980.
46. Michael T. Kaufman, "Afghan Leaflets Extolling Defiance Again Distributed Nightly in Kabul", New York Times, 16 May 1980.
47. Craig R. Whitney, "Soviet Seen Attempting to Sow Discord in West", New York Times, 23 June 1980.

numbering 30,000 to 40,000 that invaded Afghanistan in December increased to 80,000 by late January and soon after it reached to 85,000.⁴⁸ It increased to 118,000 by the end of 1985.⁴⁹

To combat with Afghan rebels equipped with modern weapons, the Soviet forces employed the higher tanks and armoured personnel carriers for manoeuvrability in mountainous terrain, rocket firing helicopter-gunships, etc.⁵⁰ The Soviet Union divided Afghanistan into seven regional command centres to oversee Soviet bases and operations in various sectors of the country.⁵¹

In spite of so many counterinsurgency efforts of the Soviet Union the situation in Afghanistan showed no improvement, and actually worsened. Morale of Kabul government continued to erode, while the Moslem rebel attacks, in rural as well as urban areas against the government, increased. Numerous Soviet military personnels lost their lives. At the close of 1981, US Defense Department sources estimated the two years toll of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan at about 5,000 killed and 5,000 wounded.⁵²

48. Edith M. Lederer, "Soviets Said to Hold to Its Afghan Forces", New York Times, 11 July 1980.

49. "Afghanistan's Six Years of Soviet Occupation", United States Department of States, December 1985 in World Review (Queensland) Vol. 25, No.1 March 1986, p.66.

50. Michael T. Kaufman, "Soviet Units in Afghanistan - Dig in As It for a Long Stay", New York Times, 9 October 1980.

51. Kaufman, New York Times, 9 October 1980.

52. Averbach, Washington Post, 27 December 1981.

Finally the hope of solution emerged after the Afghan government reached Geneva on 10 April, 1988 for negotiation. An agreement was signed between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the principles of resolution of all conflicts on the basis of mutual relations. The documents relating to agreement include a declaration on international guarantees, a bilateral agreement between the parties to accord, and an agreement on the inter-relationships of the situation relating to Afghanistan. The above mentioned declarations on international guarantees and an agreement on the interrelationships has also been signed by the Edward Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister of Soviet Union and George Shultz, the US Secretary of State. Both the Superpowers agree to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.⁵³ The actual withdrawal of the Soviet troops has now begun.

53. Ten years of Saur Revolution Afghanistan Today, (Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1988), p.6.

Chapter Three

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NICARAGUAN GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMY

Nicaragua, a country of lakes and volcanoes, is situated in the heart of the Central American Isthmus. It has two big lakes and more than fifty volcanoes. With Honduras to the north and Costa Rica to the south, Nicaragua has 57,145 sq. miles area and 3 million people.¹

Nicaragua is essentially an agrarian economy. Sixty seven per cent of the active population is employed in farming. The country lies in the tropic region still, the temperature varies from one region to another. Consequently, three distinct regions are found in Nicaragua: the Caribbean lowlands, the Central highlands, and the Western lowlands. The Caribbean lowlands occupies nearly half of the country having hot and moderate, temperature, which is useful for crops, but not for habitants. Only eight per cent of the total population lives there. The Central highland and Western lowland regions are considered best for human inhabitation, due to moderate temperature and seasonal nature. The Central highland is the best region for coffee cultivation because of the availability of rich soil and temperate climate. The Western lowlands are famous for the crops of cotton, rice and sugar. Ninety six per cent of the population is Mestiza, and the remaining four

1. Nicaragua Information, (Victoriasa: Managua, n.d.)p.1).

per cent is Miskito, Rama, Suma Indians and Criollas, Half of the population is urban and twenty five per cent of it lives in the capital, Managua.²

Mestizos who speak Spanish and number 1,82,000 came to this country more than hundred years ago in the course of U.S. trade expansion in the Atlantic.

67-70,000 are Miskito speaking. They are a socially mixed and culturally Indian people. In the 17th century they allied with the British, consequently acquired weapons and came to dominate the region. This community is mainly engaged in fishing and farming. Some 30,000 have been displaced by the war into Honduras.

26,000 Creoles are English speaking. They are Afro-American phenotypically and mix culturally with Europeans and Americans. This race came as the slaves in the seventeenth century, and later as merchants and wage labourers. They got mixed up with other races, in course of time.

Sumus, numbering 5-7,000 and being part of Maco-Chibeha were once spread over the large part of the country. However, Miskitos pushed them into the hills and captured their villages; selling the men as slaves and taking the women and children as their own.

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2. i) Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp.1-2.
 ii) Nicaragua Information, n.1, p.3.
 iii) Henri Weber, Nicaragua: The Sandinista Revolution (Great Britain: Survey, 1981), pp.1-2.

Garifonas who speak English and number around 1500 migrated to Nicaragua from the Honduras in 1870s and are settled in two communities on the west bank of Pearl Lagoon. They are the descendants of a mixture of fugitive African slaves with Caribbean Indian of the Lesser Antilles. Most of them have lost their language, tradition and culture because of the education which is in English.

Rama numbering 700, are also English speaking. This originally Chibcha speaking Indian group has been reduced to a small group. Like the Garifonas they have lost their native language and culture.³

In spite of its human and natural potential, Nicaragua is a poor country. The historical study shows how the people have endured oppressions. In the late 1970s the annual gross national product per capita was only a little over \$ 800 (US). Moreover, unequal distribution of wealth makes some people live in poor hutments, eating poorly and having little access to education, health and other public services before the 1979 revolution.⁴

Nicaragua, like all other countries of Central America, was conquered by Cortez's lieutenants during the year 1523.

3. Nicaragua Information, n.1, pp.2-3.

4. Walker, n. 2(1), p.3.

Most of Nicaragua/^{territory} was covered by dense forests, inhabited by Carib Indians, who resisted Spanish enslavement stubbornly and interestingly never allowed complete subjugation. In these hard-to-reach areas, Indian communities lived until the late 19th century in a state of semi autonomy based on their traditional mode of social organisation. The Indian community, living on the Atlantic Coast, enjoyed British support during and after the Spanish occupation. In 1522 or 1523, the Governor of mainland, went off to subjugate Nicaragua and made the most wretched entry into the region. This tyrant with the help of his companions, destroyed the existing small kingdom (Panama), and inflicted enormous atrocities on the people.⁵ Like other Central American countries, Nicaragua fell under spanish rule for three centuries i.e. till 1821. Slavery was abolished in 1824 there.

There was persistent fighting between Spain and Britain to exploit the weak social systems of the Caribbean. The United States was also eager to expand its hegemony. It got the right time immediately after the independence of Nicaragua in 1821. Thomas Monroe, the American President declared the famous Monroe Doctrine that no western power should have the business of intervening in American continent.⁶

5. Weber, n. 2(iii), pp.1-3.

6. Ibid., p.2.

After independence, Nicaragua was caught in a civil war situation. There was intense political struggle between two political parties of two cities: the Liberals of Leon, and the Conservatives of Granada, the country's commercial center. It led to a civil war in the mid-1850s. The United States exploited this situation to establish the roots of its empire. In 1855, the American filibuster William Walker contracted with the Nicaraguan Liberals to aid them against the Conservatives. William Walker, a journalist, captured the Conservative capital of Granada in October 1855, with the financial backing of the new Accessary Transit Company director. In June 1855, he got himself duly "elected" President of Nicaragua. Immediately his government was recognised by the US President, Franklin Pierce. English was declared the official language and slavery was reestablished.⁷

This incident left a great impact on other Central American states. They got scared of the re-introduction of slavery. They got together with flags bearing the motto: "Fire or None" and entered with force in Nicaragua and scored a first victory in May 1857 at the port of Rivas.⁸

Walker's intervention also made another impact on Nicaragua. This episode led the future of Liberal Party in

7. (i) Ibid., p.4.

(ii) Andrew C. Kimmens, ed., Nicaragua and the United States (U.S.A., 1987), p.7.

8. Weber, n. 2(iii), pp-5-7.

total darkness. In 1893, a liberal revolt brought Santos Zalaya to the presidency. Santos Zalaya ruled the country for the next sixteen years with an iron hand. His rule brought relative modernization and prosperity. The Spanish-American war of 1898 gave way to American hegemony outside its borders, especially in South American continent. Santos Zalaya's zeal for national integration came into clash with the new interventionary spirit of the United States. Nicaraguan leader even denied to give sanction to build a canal through Nicaraguan territory.⁹

... Washington eventually let it be known that it would look kindly on a conservative overthrow of Zelaya. In 1909, when the revolt finally took place in Bluefields, Zelaya's forces made the tactical mistake of executing two confessed U.S. mercenaries. The United States used this incident as an excuse to sever diplomatic relations and to send troops to Bluefields to ensure against the defeat of Conservatives. Though he held on for a few more months, Zelaya was ultimately forced to accept the inevitable, to resign, and to spend the rest of his life in exile.¹⁰

This description by Thomas W. Walker highlights the US interventionary intentions. It was a Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which resulted in the overthrow of President Zelaya. President Theodore Roosevelt's corollary held that the United States might, under certain circumstances,

9. Nicaragua 1986, (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986) pp.5-6.

10. Walker, n.2(i), p.9.

exercise an "international police power" in the Western Hemisphere. Of course, this view completely reversed the meaning of the original doctrine of 1823.¹¹

The United States put an end to the Zelaya regime and installed Adolfo Diaz in 1909. In fact, the US intervention of 1909 aimed at not to substitute an effective government for one in a state of collapse, but to replace a nationalist regime. The new regime did not save the country from chaos but plunged it into economic regression and an outbreak of violence that blocked all further developments. Thus, in 1926, Sacasa's adviser H. Ofilio Argirello wrote:

Nicaragua ... the past sixteen years has gone back at least half a century. Public schools ... throughout the entire country have been closed wholesale.... Money formerly devoted to public instruction is used to subsidize Jesuit and parochial schools ... Concessions of utterly serious character have been given to powerful American concerns, which have merely exploited the natural resources of the country for their own benefit without any benefit whatsoever to Nicaragua.¹²

The US Occupation, The National Guard and Sandino

From 1912 to 1933, Nicaragua remained under direct military occupation of America, except one year of indirect occupation. In these decades, America tried to install conservative regime in Nicaragua. During the first occupation

11. Ibid., pp.10-12.

12. Weber, n. 2(iii), p.10.

of 1912 to 1925 it ran the affairs through a series of conservative presidents -- Adolfo Diaz, Smiliano Chamoro, and Diego Mannal Chamarro. The US intention of direct intervention was very clear. The United States needed the conservatives, and the conservatives, who had neither military strength nor the popular backing to maintain themselves in power, needed the United States. Keeping the idea in mind that the conservatives will run the affairs without American military presence, the United States withdrew its forces in August 1925. Immediately after that there broke out conflict among the conservatives. Thus, the Liberals seized the opportunity and got into power in 1926. It led the conservatives to take shelter in Washington.

The United States captured Managua and thus manipulated the political crisis of Nicaragua. In spite of all US - Conservative efforts, Jose Maria Moncada, the candidate of the majority Liberal Party, won that contest. The United States thought it better to live with a Liberal president. For, in the words of one scholar, the North America "controlled his regime from a number of points: the American Embassy, the Marines ...; the Guardia Nationals with its United States Army Officers, the High Commissioner of Customs, the Director of the Railway; and the National Bank".¹³

13. Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America: A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p.200.

America again tried in 1932 elections to manipulate the situation. But the Liberal Candidate Juan B. Sacasa, the person who had led the Liberal uprising of 1926, won the presidential election. The significance of this period does not lie in the presidential election, but in the germination of the Somoza dictatorship, which was to rule Nicaragua for over four decades.

During the second US occupation (1927 to 1933), America continued to make political and economic decisions, in spite of the resistance of Liberal Presidents. America, not only involved itself politically and economically but also militarily. During the first occupation (1912-25) of Nicaragua, America stationed about 100 Marines - popularly called as "Legation Guard" by the United States. During the second occupation, the United States organised, trained and armed a new Nicaraguan force, the National Guard to control the Nicaraguan affairs. American excuse of first Nicaraguan occupation was to quell a rebellion out of the fight between the Liberals and the Conservatives. Liberal leader Benjamin Zeledon who fought against the US Marines, was captured and killed. Again the US excuse for the second occupation was the fighting between the Liberals and the Conservatives. The agreement imposed by the United States in 1927, was opposed by the Nicaraguan people at large, led by a charismatic and tactically brilliant field commander, Augusto Ce'sar Sandino.

When frontal assaults could not solve Sandino's purpose, he adopted the hit-and-run forays. He was supplied information about government troops movements by the peasants in the rural areas.¹⁴

The National Guard and the US Marines attacked with aerial bombardment on entire peasant villages. Despite the rapid build-up of US forces in Nicaragua -- some 5,000 Marines were sent against Sandino's group in 1930 and 1931. Sandino was still "as great threat ... as he had been at any previous point in his career" -- when the Marines left Nicaragua.¹⁵

Sandino fought with US forces to check them out of Nicaragua. Many Nicaraguans joined hands in this operation. "Dear Colonel", a young officer wrote to his superior from the interior of Nicaragua, "I am sending you herewith forty volunteers who will fight for the cause so dear to us... boys of eleven or twelve side by side in the ranks with men old enough to be their grandfathers, and even women were not lacking."¹⁶

Augusto Ceasar Sandino was a great threat to Anastasio Somoza Garcia. After the Marines departed, Sandino signed a

14. Andrew C. Kimmerns, *Nicaragua and the United States* (New York, 1987), p.10.

15. Richard Milet, *The Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U. S. Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Sandino Family* (Mary Knoll: N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977), p.32.

16. Quoted in Marvin Goldwest, *The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of U. S. Intervention* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962), p.23

parliamentary peace agreement with the Liberal Government. But early in 1934 Sandino when he was coming to Managua to negotiate a final agreement was treacherously ambushed and assassinated.

Sandino was a great hero who represented not only Nicaragua but the whole Central and even Latin America. He was a great nationalist and a man of action rather than a theorist, who found the US occupation and domination of his country to be a gross injustice and hence unacceptable. "The sovereignty and the liberty of the people", he said, "are not to be discussed, but rather defended with weapons in hand."¹⁷

On 1 June 1926, Sandino returned home. He saw that life had become worse. He organised poor workers, students and others to fight against the injustice. On 10 July 1927, he made public the first political manifesto of the insurgents. "My greatest pride is that I grew up among the poor; it is they, the oppressed, who are the soul and honour of our people". Again he held, "I pledge to my motherland and to history that my sword will save national honour and bring liberation to the oppressed. I answer the challenge of the treacherous occupationists and traitors of the motherland with a battle cry. My men and I shall stand like a wall against which the legions of enemies of Nicaragua will crash".¹⁸ "Nicaragua

18. Quoted in Latin American Studies by Soviet scholars, Nicaragua: Long Road to Victory (Social Science Today, Editorial Board, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1981), pp. 57-58.

17. Walker, n. 2(1), p. 22

will be free because it has sons who love it".¹⁹ The prophecy made by Sandino proved true later when FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) led the movement and got Nicaragua independence in 1979.

Sandino's ideas and strategy had a profound impact on the FSLN party. On 10 July 1927, Sandino said:

I am a city worker, an artisan. However, my ideal goes beyond these bounds, to the wide vistas of internationalism. My ideal is to be free and demand justice, even if to attain this aim it will be necessary to shed one's own or other people's blood A matter of highest pride for me is that I have grown up among the downtrodden, for it is precisely they who are the people's soul and energy ... I am a patriot who will not tolerate insult to our sovereignty. ²⁰

Somoza Era

The Somoza dictatorship actualized in two stages, one with Anastasio Somoza Garcia assuming control of the US created National Guard in 1933 and then taking over the presidency of Nicaragua three years later. The US intervention and occupation had been almost continuous for a quarter of a century.²¹

Division within the Conservative Party in 1932 left the way open for the liberal, Juan Bautista Sacasa to assume power.

19. Quoted in *ibid.*, p.77.

20. Quoted in *ibid.*, pp.77-78.

21. George Black, Triumph of the People : The Sandinista Revolution (London: Zed Press, 1981), p.4.

Somoza exploited the weak administrative situation of the country under the presidentship of Sacasa and won the confidence of the US Congress.²²

Somoza period marked two distinct factors which make it unique in Latin America. The forty-two and a half year subjugation of Nicaraguan people by dynasty was not only distinct in its duration but also in its dynastic character. Nowhere else in Latin America dictatorial powers has passed successively through the hands of three members of the same family. Secondly, Nicaragua is the only country in Latin America which experienced a real social revolution.

In 1936, Somoza got success in overthrowing the elected President Juan B. Sacasa and staged an "election" in which he was declared winner. On 1 January 1937 he got hold of National Guard and became its chief and ruler of Nicaragua.

1937-56 : The Rule of Anastasio Somoza Garcia

During his rule of nineteen years, Anastasio Somoza Garcia adopted three point formula to keep himself in power : maintain the support of the guard, cultivate the Americans and co-opt important domestic power contenders.²³ To keep the Guards in confidence, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, adopted the

22. Ibid., p. 28.

23. Walker, n. 2(i), p.27.

policy of isolating them from people by encouraging them to be corrupt and exploitative.

Somoza got success in manipulating the American support too. His regime consistently backed the US foreign policy. In the 1930s and early 1940s Somoza regime helped America against the Axis powers and against Communists thereafter. The United States was allowed to establish military bases in Nicaragua during the Second World War and use the country as a training area for the CIA-organised counter-revolution against Guatemalan President Jacobo Arleenz in 1954. Somoza, in return received funds to modernize the National Guard.

The rule of Anastasio Somoza Guards came to a sudden end in 1956 when on 20 September, a young poet named Rigoberto Lopez Perez sparked bullets into Somoza's corpulent hulk. In a letter to his mother, with instruction that it be opened only in the event of his death, Lopez explained, "What I have done is a duty that any Nicaraguan who truly loves his country should have done a long time ago".²⁴ In a biography of Somoza Garcia's assassin, the poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez, the Sandnista leader Jose Benito Escobar reflected on the importance of the assassination, by making the following points:

24. Walker, n. 2(i), p.28.

First : an incentive which would serve as an example to the masses. It was necessary to destroy the myth of tyrant with a successful action which could never be employed by the bourgeois as a demagogic weapon.

Second: it put an end to the traditional methods of opposition which the bourgeoisie had imposed on our people, the bourgeoisie having been the class which had until the time of this action headed the fight against the dictatorship in its own way.

Third: it reaffirmed to the people that the forms of struggle to be employed to attain liberation should be those which correspond to the needs of the people who should respond to the violence of exploitation with the violence of the popular masses.²⁵

Immediately after the death of Anastasio Somoza Garcia, one of his sons, Luis Somoza automatically assumed the presidency, while the others used National Guard to suppress the civilian politicians who might have taken steps to impede the dynastic succession. In 1957, Luis was formally "elected" the President of Nicaragua.

1957-1967 : Luis Somoza

Luis Somoza adopted liberal policy in handling the Nicaraguan situation. He was convinced that in order to

25. Quoted in Black n.21, pp.32-33.

preserve the system and protect his family's interests, he should bring about some reforms in this society. Luis introduced economic reforms in Nicaragua like public housing and education, social security, agrarian reforms, etc. He opened the door for the development of liberal and other political parties in Nicaragua. In 1959, he got amended the Constitution, preventing the rule of his family members after the expiry of his tenure in 1963. The terms of the amendment were also preserved when Luis ruled the country through puppet presidents, Rene Schick Gutierrez and Lorenzo Guerrero from 1963 to 1967.

The reforms introduced by Luis proved fake. The National Guards remained in authority to harass the people; job opportunities were availed by the emerging elite class. Thus, the reforms had little positive impact on the lives of the impoverished majority of Nicaraguans.

There were a number of attempts to overthrow the system through armed revolt. Some of these attempts were made by the surviving members of Sandino's army and a number of operations were carried out by the guerrillas of FSLN organisation, Sandinista Front of National Liberation. The FSLN organisation was formed in 1962 in the name of Sandino - a great national hero of Nicaragua.

In an interview in 1978, the Sandinista leader German Pomares remembered how the episode further discredited the

traditional opposition and placed the seal on the political weakness of the bourgeoisie as a force for social change.²⁶

In June 1967 - after a blatantly rigged election - Anastasio Somoza Debayle (who was the commander of the National Guard earlier) became the third member of his family to rule Nicaragua.

Anastasio Somoza Debayle's First Term, 1967-1972

Anastasio Debayle relied simply on military power to keep himself in power. The National Guard was the indirect instrument in the hands of America to support the US cause in Nicaragua. In 1944, Military Academy cadets were sent to Fort Gulick in the Canal zone in the final year of their training, and Somoza was able to double his military expenditure in the early 1960s. By 1963, an annual grant of \$ 1.6 million, enabled the Guard to expand and smash the FSLN's first guerrilla force on the Rio Coco. After the Cuban Revolution and the failure of the Alliance for progress, Washington updated its old theory of US trained 'constabularies' and started the school of the Americas in the Canal Zone to train Latin American officers. Secondly, the US establishment of Southern Command at Quarry Heights in the Canal Zone provided a link between Central America and the Pentagon. Nicaragua had a special place in

26. Ibid., p. 43.

the scheme. From 1946 to 1975 Nicaragua received \$ 23.6 million. From 1950 to 1975 4,897 National Guardsmen passed through US military training; of these 4,089 were trained locally, the highest figures for any Latin American country. From 1970 to 1975 Nicaragua put 52 graduates through the US Army Infantry and Ranger School, Army Civil Affairs School, Military Police School and Army Command and General Staff Schools, again the highest figures for all Latin America. From 1970 to 1975 303 Nicaraguan students passed through the Schools of America).²⁷

The United States used Nicaragua as a base during Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Somoza even provided to USA counter-insurgency troops for use in Vietnam war.

After 1964 Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua joined forces for more than a dozen counter-insurgency operations by CONDECA.²⁸

By this time the reputation of the Nicaraguan government had been totally tarnished. Its legitimacy and civilian power were evaporating rapidly. According to the provisions of the Constitution, Anastasio was to leave the presidency in 1971. However, he amended the Constitution to stay in office

27. NACLA : 'The Pentagon's Proteges : US Training Programmes for Foreign Military Personnel', Latin America and Empire Report, Vol. X, no. 1, January 1976. Quoted by Black, n. 21, pp. 47-48.

28. Black, n. 21, p.49.

for another one year. In 1971, he made a provision to hand power over to a triumvirate composed of two liberals and one conservative. This provision came out in the form of a pact advised by the US Ambassador Turner Shelton. In the transfer of power Somoza retained control of the guards. The result was that, in 1974, he was "elected" to another term that was to last until 1981.²⁹

1972-1977 Next Term of Presidentship of
Anastasio Somoza Debayle

The earthquake of 1972, cost the death of 10,000 people. Somoza, at this time because of his illegitimate rule was bound to allow large scale bungling and squandering of fund, by National Guards in the name of relief work. Thus, the resources which came from outside, in the form of international relief funds, were channalled into the pockets of Somoza and his associates. It was at this time that open expression of popular discontent against Somoza regime began to surface.³⁰ Although the triumvirate was in power when the quake struck, Somoza lost no time in pushing that body aside and proclaimed himself as the head of the National Emergency Committee. The funds given by the Agency for International Development (AID) to recover the loss, were used to construct luxurious houses

29. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol), Vol. 18 (1971-72), p. 24887.

30. Walker, N.2(i), p.31.

for National Guard Officers. The homeless poor people were forced to live in wooden shacks which were hastily constructed after the quake. No attention was paid to construct city's roads, drainage system and public transportation. This forced the people to organise strikes and demonstrations.³¹

At this juncture, even economic elite class in Nicaragua started objecting the Somoza rule. This elite class was asked to pay for emergency funds. Consequently many people belonging to elite class, started joining the FSLN party and some sectors of business community began giving the FSLN financial support.

The second wave of excesses followed a spectacularly successful guerrilla operation in December 1974. In this incident, a unit of FSLN held a group of elite Managua partygoers hostage until the government met a series of demands, including the payments of a large ransom, the publication and broadcast over national radio of a lengthy communique, and the transportation of fourteen imprisoned FSLN members for treatment.³² Enraged by this affront, Somoza imposed martial law and deployed the National Guards in the countryside to root out the "terrorists". During this operation the National Guard engaged in extensive pillage, arbitrary imprisonment, torture, rape and summary execution of hundreds of peasants.

31. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol), Vol.22(1975), p. 26986.

32. Ibid.

Catholic missionaries were harassed by the National Guards. These missionaries sent detailed information about the violation rights to their superiors. Accordingly, church hierarchy demanded the resignation of Somoza dictatorship.

All these factors earned for Somoza considerable international notoriety. His excesses became the subject of hearings of the House of Representatives Sub-committee on International Relations³³ and a lengthy Amnesty International investigation.³⁴ In the middle of the decade, Somoza was found as one of the worst human rights violator in the Western hemisphere.

Throughout the year 1977, the US administration put pressure on Somoza to improve his human rights image. Up to this time, Somoza had got bad reputation within and outside Nicaragua. The National Guards inflicted enormous atrocities on the common people protesting for a just regime. Obviously, the guerrilla groups got popularity among the people and were supported by the people at large. The totalitarian policies of Somoza were forcibly implemented by the National Guards which added fuel to the fire. The natural calamities put the whole economy in devastation which created unemployment, mal-nutrition, hunger, poverty and so on. At this stage, Somoza did not show

33. U. S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Sub-committee on International Organisations, Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador: Implications for US Policy, Hearings, 8, 9 June 1976 (Washington, D.C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

34. Findings Summarised in Amnesty International Report, 1977 (London, Amnesty International Publications, 1977), pp. 150-53.

any sympathy towards the people, rather he diverted the international funds which came for the help of the people into his pocket. When frustrated people protested against the regime as a consequence the country was put under the state of siege.³⁵

Economy of Nicaragua throughout Somoza era kept on declining. During 1950, the economic growth reached a new peak, as the cotton price increased. Nicaragua became the major cotton producer and exporter during this period. Industrialization was almost nil till this time. Secondly, during 1960s and 1970s the agriculture-oriented industry had little impact on the development of Nicaraguan economy. Most of the machinery for industry was imported which cost too much. It also increased Nicaragua's dependence upon imported goods, raw materials and machinery. For example, a study indicates that in 1974, 96 per cent of the inputs used in the manufacture of rubber products, 95 per cent in the electrical appliances, 88 per cent of printing and publishing, 85 per cent of metal products and 65 per cent of chemical products were imported.³⁶

The negative effects of this kind of industrialization on Nicaragua are recognised in a recent report of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America which notes that

35. Carlos M. Vilas, ed., Nicaragua : A Revolution under Siege (London: Zed Books 1985), pp.37-38.

36. Ibid., p.39.

due to the lack of more vertically integrated industrial development, the changes in the composition of imports involved in actually a more vulnerable balance of payment due to the raw materials, part and components and in equipment and machinery. ³⁷

Economic Crisis

Some economic analysts have pointed out to 5 to 6 year cycles of growth and slump in the Nicaraguan economy : growth from 1950 to 1956 and 1962 to 1967, decline from 1956 to 1962 and 1967 to 1972. No single spell of growth was capable of resolving the structural crisis of the economy under Somoza, and the brief respites of 1973 to 1974 (the false post-earthquake boom) and 1975-77 (with the worldwide rise in the prices of cotton) were the only interludes in an otherwise irreversible decline.³⁸ Moreover, life expectancy during the mid-1970s was one of the lowest in Latin America, nearly two-thirds of the rural population over 10 years of age was illiterate and a 1973 survey found that three-fifth, of the population had a deficient food intakes.³⁹

By the 1970s, inflationary pressures from the international market and the country's growing foreign debt brought its fragile industrial development to a near standstill. Moreover,

37. Ibid.

38. Black, n. 21, p.66.

39. Milette, n. 15, p.40.

insurrection, demonstration and strikes called by the opposition halted further investment. Most of the factories were owned by the Somoza family which were forced to lock up by the opposition factions. The Somoza regime and its supporters had amassed an external debt of \$ 1.65 billion. This amount was equivalent to about \$ 4,000 per family and was larger than the entire national income.⁴⁰

The Amnesty International suggested in its report that the decree of suspension of domestic and constitutional rights should be repealed. All the criminal matters in the military courts be transferred to civilian courts as provided for in Article 14, Martial Law of 1974, and all press censorship suspended. Local military commanders be prosecuted under military or civil law for abuses committed by forces under their command and the direct perpetrators of these acts be prosecuted.⁴¹

By the last quarter of 1977, the state of siege was lifted due to the pressure from within and outside.⁴² The reinstatement of freedom of the press provided opportunity to publish the inside picture of the Somoza regime. Newspapers such as La Prensa of Pedro Joaquin Chamorow, covered the

40. Ibid. p. 41.

41. An Amnesty International Report on the Republic of Nicaragua, 10-15 May 1976 (Amnesty International Publication, 1977), p.39.

42. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (Bristol), November 1978-July 1979, p. 29805.

opposition activities in detail of the past and present corruption and violation of rights. Thomas W. Walker describes his personal experience of Nicaragua in his book Nicaragua : The Land of Sandino in this way:

In a single week that I spent in Nicaragua early in December, La Prensa ran articles on opposition meetings, a successful guerrilla action in the north, the fate of "missing" peasants in guerrilla areas, Somoza's relationship with a blood-plasma exporting firm (Plasmeferesis de Nicaragua), and the apparent embezzlement of AID funds by Nicaraguan Housing Bank officials. As a result the regime's popular image dropped to an all-time low and Managua was alive with gossip and speculation about the impending fall of the dictator. 43

The Last Phase of Somoza Regime and the War of Liberation 1978-79

On 10 January 1978, Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of La Prensa, was shot dead at a close range by a team of professional assassins.⁴⁴ This was a final catalyst for a war that culminated in the complete overthrow of the Somoza system eighteen months later. Many Nicaraguans held the war between Somoza and the opposition FSLN as a "War of Liberation" in which an externally created dictatorial system supported almost exclusively by a foreign trained army was overthrown through the concerted effort of virtually all major

43. Walker, n. 2(i), pp. 33-34.

44. The New York Times, 11 January 1978, p.3(i).

groups and classes in the country. In fact, the assassination of Chamorro who had received Columbia University's Maria Moors Cabot Prize for "distinguished journalistic contributions to the advancement of inter-American understanding" -- aroused anger of the Nicaraguan people which ultimately resulted in a revolution. There was unprecedented general strike led by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry for more than two weeks with 80 to 90 per cent effectiveness.⁴⁵

Somoza refused to quit his post until the expiry of his term of office in 1981. On one occasion he angrily said that "They will have to kill me first ... I shall never quit power like Fulgencio Batista in Cuba or Perez Jimenez in Venezuela. I'll leave only like Rafeal Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.... That is dead."⁴⁶ He again reiterated in a calmer mood, "I'm a hard nut ... They elected me for a term and they've got to stand me".⁴⁷

On 5 July, the twelve opposition group returned from exile to Nicaragua against the wishes of Somoza. They were greeted as heros by Nicaraguans in huge crowds. On 19 July "over 90% of the business in Managua and 70% of those in the country as a whole" answered the Broad Opposition Fronts

45. Ibid.

46. "Somoza Rules Out Early Departure", Central American Report, Vol. 5, no. 12, 20 March 1978, p.95. Quoted in Walker, n.2, p.36.

47. "The Twelve Nicaragua's Unlikely Band of Somoza Foes", Washington Post, 23 July 1978.

(composed at that time of most Nicaragua's political parties and organisations) demanded Somoza's resignation and declared another nation-wide strike which paralyzed the country for almost a month.

Somoza tried to convince the Carter administration of the genuineness of his rule. In fact, the August to September uprisings had caused the Carter administration, at least temporarily to feel that Somoza might not be able to survive until 1981. This feeling was accompanied by a growing sense of alarm that Nicaragua might turn into "another Cuba".⁴⁸ Somoza tried to pacify Washington's fear of 'Communist jerk' through his lobbyists in the US.

The FSLN had learnt some valuable lessons from the uprisings of 1978. They thought to have a large, well trained and well-armed guerrilla force. Accordingly, they recruited and trained young men and women. Students took part in large in this campaign. The force of FSLN reached from several hundred to several thousand. At the same time, members of the opposition -- particularly the Twelve -- visited many parts of the world to convince the people for the right cause of the Sandinistas. They were even assisted financially and

48. William Leo Grande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua : Another Cuba", Foreign Affairs, (New York), Vol.58, no. 1, February 1979, pp. 28-50.

otherwise by various countries. The FSLN, which had been divided into three factions, finally joined under one nine-man directorate and issued a joint common programme of action.

In June, barricades were erected through out Nicaragua and National Guard outposts were overcome one by one. In mid-June a broad based government in exile was announced by the FSLN. The United States tried its best to check this alarming situation. It even requested to OAS to send a peacekeeping military force to Managua. But, this demand of Carter administration was rejected unanimously. Ultimately Washington arranged for the departure of Somoza to Miami on 17 July. A day later, the provisional government took the oath of office in a ceremony held in Leon and, on 19 July, the FSLN entered Managua and accepted the surrender of most of what was left of the National Guard. Walker says that after the Provisional Government took office, the enthusiastic crowd tore the statues of Anastasio Senior and Luis Somoza from their pedestals and dragged the broken pieces triumphantly through the streets.

Chronology

- 1909 Dictator Jose Santos Zelaya overthrown. Chaos and instability follow, leading to US financial and military intervention (1912-33).
- 1927 Peace accord among fighting factions provides basis for US occupation and subsequent elections. General Augusto C Sandino refused to accept peace accord and leads guerrilla force against US Marines.

- 1933 General Anastasio Somoza Garcia named dictator of new "non-Partisan" National Guard. US Marines withdrawn.
- 1934 Sandino assassinated by National Guardsman, Somoza seized power.
- 1937 Somoza officially became president.
- 1956 Somoza assassinated, sons Luis and Anastasio Jr. continue family domination.
- 1961 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) founded.
- 1967 Anastasio Somoza Debayle elected president.
- 1972 Earthquake devastates Managua: Somoza's mishandling of crisis and of international relief funds, increased antipathy to regime.
- 1974 Elected fraud ensures Somoza's reelection to six year term.
- 1977 Popular unrest intensifies. US suspends credits to Somoza Government through votes at World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
- 1978 US and Organisation of American States fail in mediation attempts; US suspends military aid to Somoza.
- 1979 FSLN supported by other opposition fronts overthrows Somoza.

Source:

Mark Falioff and Robert Royal, ed., The Continuing Crisis: U. S. Policy in Central America and the Carribean : Thirty Essays by Statsmen, Scholars, Religious Leaders and Journalists (USA: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987).

Chapter Four

US MILITARIZATION, ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA (1979-84)

The nature and extent of U.S. intervention into the internal affairs of another country is best exemplified in the case of Nicaragua. In this poor country, after a long drawn out struggle of eighteen years, the popular government of Frente Sandinista de Liberation National (FSLN) came into power.

Committed to the progress and wellbeing of the common masses, this very government of Sandinistas undertook various measures of Socio-economic reforms. Still, the U.S. government, questioning its legitimacy, found ways under various pretexts to harrass, demoralise, disturb and intervene into the sovereignty of Nicaragua.

On 20 July, 1979 a new government was sworn in, in which Sandinistas held a number of posts. The FSLN together with the government, tried to tackle the urgent task of the country's rehabilitation. A massive drive on mobilising popular masses to take an active part in this task of constructing those bases which would depend this revolution from both internal or external reactionary forces was undertaken.

Paying proper attention to the problems of economic rehabilitation of the country the Sandinistas, in order to avoid

unemployment from 28 to 17. It encouraged and closely cooperated with mass organisations in solving the housing problem. A programme was launched to improve the health services.³

Agrarian reforms were also introduced. During the Somoza dictatorship Nicaraguan peasants owned just four per cent of the cultivated land, while the Somoza family and a handful of big landlords owned 47.8% of the total land. Some 194,000 peasants were landless. These families lived in abject poverty and their children were starving to death. As an effective remedial measure, the Sandinista government distributed to the peasants 800,000 manzanas of fertile lands.⁴ Almost 3,000 peasants cooperative were set up on the vast track of land.⁵

So, under a comprehensive planning and committed practices on the part of leaders led to the thorough overhauling of the Nicaraguan society. Broadly it was undertaking public control of the foreign trades, nationalization of banks, country's resources, and democratic distribution of land. Since there was no formation of working class as such to play vanguard role in this process of radical reforms, all democratic and popular masses had to be mobilized in advance to overcome the crisis.

3. Ibid. pp. 109-10.

4. A manzenas equals 0.7 hectare.

5. S. Losev, "The people of Nicaragua defends Their Revolution" International Affairs (Moscow), July-Dec. 1984, p.33.

unnecessary trouble from international communities, agreed to pay back the huge foreign debt taken by the old government of dictator Somoza.

Thus, in December 1980, after a year of negotiations, the Republic of Nicaragua and 115 banks from 12 countries signed an agreement to restructure about US \$580 million of debt contracted by the Somoza government.¹

Despite these heavy economic constraints various policies were introduced to uplift the living standard of the Nicaraguan people. In 1980, the National Council of Industrial Policy was established to promote the rehabilitation of industry.

Many agrarian reforms were introduced to implement the governments' socio-economic policy. Somoza's property in terms of capital and land was confiscated and the state became the owner of 18.5 million hectares of fertile land.²

The problems of the common people, like Unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, housing, food supply and medical care were attempted to be tackled seriously by the Sandinista leadership. It announced 1980 as the year of combating illiteracy. A special plan was made to reduce the percentage of

1. Richard S. Weinert, "Nicaragua's Debt Renegotiation", Cambridge Journal of Economics (London) Vol.5, No.2, 1981, pp. 187-194.

2. Ibid. 2, p.108.

USA on the other hand, has been trying its best militarily, economically, politically and otherwise to exert pressure on the new FSLN regime in Nicaragua. It has been sticking false charges to the FSLN government, like calling that government possessing Marxist-Leninist understanding and backed by Havana and Moscow. In fact, the FSLN party is composed of other national parties. "If the bourgeoisie want to call this process communist, that is their problem", declared FSLN Party Organisation Secretary, Carlos-Carrin, towards the end of the first year, "Let the revolution be judged by its real social achievements and the New Man it creates", added Junta member, Sergio Ramirez, "and not by the ideological labels which some people try to pin on it".⁶

The major objectives of the new regime is of "economic independence"⁷ of the country. The containment and ultimate elimination of Nicaragua's foreign debt was soon as a basic ingredient in achieving this goal.

To make the administration more efficient, the sixteen departments of Nicaragua have been organised into six regions and three special zones, each one with its own local government and ministerial offices.

Region I: Esteli, Madriz, Nueva-S. egovia; 290,000 inhabitants, 21 municipalities. Economic Activity: Cattle and Agriculture.

6. George Black, Triumph of the Revolution: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua (London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 185.

7. Quoted in Walker, n . 1 p.61.

- Region II: Leon and Chinandega; 490,000 inhabitants, 23 municipalities, Economic Activity: Cotton, sugar cane, bananas, sesame, sorghum and corn corinto, the most important part in the country is located in this region.
- Region III: Managua, the Capital, 870,000 inhabitants. It is the center of country's economic and political activities.
- Region IV: Granada, Masaya, Carazo, Rivas; 260,000 inhabitants, 31 municipalities. Economic Activity: Coffee, sugarcane, cotton, basic grains, sorghum, sesame, meat, and vegetables.
- Region V: Boaco and Chontales, 260,000 inhabitants, 19 municipalities. Economic Activity: Principally Cattle farming.
- Region VI: Jinotega and Matagalpa; 360,000 inhabitants, 19 municipalities. Economic activity: Coffee.
- Special Zone I: The north of the Department of Zelaya, located on the Atlantic Coast; 80,000 inhabitants, 6 municipalities. Economic activity: Forests, minerals, and agriculture.
- Special Zone II: The South of Zelaya; 60,000 inhabitants, 3 municipalities, Economic Activity: Fish, Sugarcane, bananas, coconut.
- Special Zone III: Department of Rio San Juan. Its capital is San Carlos, 30,000 inhabitants. Economic activity: Basic grains and cattle.

With the triumph of the revolution, the government of National Reconstruction was formed to achieve the tasks of reconstructing the country's administrative as well as political system. 'Nicaragua had no police, no judges, no local government, no legislature, and Somoza had left the national treasury completely broken'.⁸

In 1980, the new government announced that the electoral process would begin in 1984 and thus began the long process of drafting laws to define the country's political framework.

Nicaragua approached the elections with full vigor and strength as it has approached myriad challenges the country faced since 1979 revolution. A special commission of the Council of state gathered opinions and suggestions for those laws which will govern political parties and elections, by consulting the country's numerous political parties, unions, professional associations, women's and youth organisations, neighbourhood groups, etc. Subcommissions were sent to study the electoral systems of other countries throughout Europe and Latin-America, although the scheduled trip to the United States had to be cancelled, when the United States government refused to grant the permission.⁹

8. The Government of National Reconstruction, (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986) p.4.

9. From the Elections to the Constitution... The Consolidation of Democracy in Nacaragua. (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986) pp. 7-8.

The elections took place at a time when Nicaragua was under attack, suffering the consequences of a war that had already left over 7,000 Nicaraguans dead or wounded and caused over 2 billion cordobas in damages.¹⁰

On 4 November, 1984 the Nicaraguan people elected the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Sergio Ramirez Mercado respectively and a 96 member National Assembly with representatives from seven political parties, all for a period of six years. The elections were held and the results were as follows:

Table 1

Number of registered voters	1,551,597
Number of votes cast	1,170,142 (75.4%)
Number of non votes	381,455 (24.6%)

Source: From the Elections to the Constitution The Consolidation of Democracy on Nicaragua. (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986), p.8.

The massive popular participation in the elections demonstrated both the enthusiasm with which the Nicaraguan people approached the elections and their rejection of calls for abstention by the Contra, the U.S. Embassy, and a few minority parties.

10. Ibid. p.8.

The distribution of votes was:

Table 2

Party	Percentage of Votes received in the President Elections
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	67.0
Democratic Conservative Party(PCD)	14.0
Independent Liberal Party (PLI)	9.6
Popular Social Christian Party(PPSC)	5.6
Communist Party of Nicaragua(PC deN)	1.5
Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)	1.3
Marxist Leninist popular Action Movement (MAP-ML)	1.0
	100.0

Source: From the Elections to the Constitution ... The Consolidation of Democracy in Nicaragua. (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986), p.9.

Now, this very legitimate government of Sandinistas, committed to the radical cause of up-lifting the down-trodden Nicaraguans appears in the eyes of U. S. A. to be an alien and illegitimate government. Such blindness on the part of this superpower coupled with the intoxicating physical strength has led it to time and again disturb, harass, denigrate, sanctions and covert and overt interference and intervention into the

Nicaraguan sovereignty. Let us now examine the nature and scope of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. In the sphere of economy, embargo was used as the major instrument to intervene and harrass Nicaragua. To make things more difficult for the young republic, the U.S. government in 1981 banned wheat sales to Nicaragua. In 1983 it slashed its imports of Nicaraguan sugar by 90% before cutting off imports of Nicaraguan cotton and meat. The U.S. administration clearly aiming at a reply of the Chile's situation, hoping to cause economic chaos in the country and popular discontent, particularly among the middle strata of society.¹¹

Now we will focus on the points of U.S. militarization, economic aggression and political intervention in Nicaragua, from 1979 to 1984.

U.S. Militarization in Nicaragua

In recent years, the world has watched with growing concern the unprecedented militarization of Central America. All five Central American countries are involved in a potentially explosive arms race all are currently at war or facing the danger of an imminent war.

The most disturbing aspect of the crisis is the danger that the conflict will explode into a regional war or even into

11. (i) Losev, Ch. 5. p.34.

(ii) James Chace, Endless War: How We Got involved in Central America and what can be done (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 68-69.

a world war. Besides, the very process of militarization of the region has far reaching implications for the Latin American countries which are for much vulnerable to any sort of imbalances of disorder.

The great power to the north, the United States, accuses Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union for increasing militarization of the region. The U.S. alleges that these three countries have their hands in armed subversive movements in the other countries of Central America, and that Nicaragua has a military force that is much larger than it needs to defend itself. This in turn, the U.S. claims, has forced the other Central American countries to arm themselves.

The objective facts about the region's armed forces, however, present a different picture. Nicaragua's military resources are not structured as an offensive fighting force capable of threatening its neighbours. To the contrary, its army and weapons are defensive, and have been developed in response to a real military threat. In the last seven years, the United States had not only armed the counter-revolutionaries, but has also dramatically increased its military assistance to the other Central American countries. This aid increased from \$10 million in 1980 to \$283.2 million in 1984, an increase of more than 280%. At the same time, the U.S. has constructed a military infrastructure in Honduras which is capable of supporting the most modern U.S. military forces, and has trained tens of thousands of U.S. combat troops for action in Central America or the Caribbean.¹²

12. The comparative study of the five Central American countries would clarify the actual situation of Nicaragua and that of United States.

Table 3

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FIVE CENTRAL
AMERICAN COUNTRIES

	Nicaragua	El Salvador	Honduras	Guatemala	Costa Rica
<u>Active Forces</u>					
Army	40,000	48,000	21,000	40,000	-----
Active Reserves & Other Forces	20,000	8,500	4,500	11,000	5,500
Total	60,000	56,500	25,500	51,000	9,500
Militia, Civil Defense & Reserve	50,000	(60,000-80,000)	-----	900,000	10,000 (32,000)

Source: U. S. Department of Defense, The New York Times, 30 March, 1985.

Military and Economic Aid

Military and economic aid are analysed together in the following table because most of the supposedly economic aid is directed towards military objectives. A large part consists of direct grants of money to governments that are friendly to the United States; these can then be used for military purposes. "The majority of U.S. economic assistance is in the form of economic grants to countries of strategic importance to the United States. In El Salvador and Guatemala, U.S. economic development projects have been diverted to those areas targeted by the military for pacification programs".

Table 4

UNITED STATES AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA

Countries	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Total 1980-1986
<u>El Salvador</u>								
Military	6.0	35.5	82.0	81.3	196.5	128.2	132.6	662.1
Economic	57.8	133.6	182.2	231.1	331.1	326.1	350.8	1592.7
Totals	63.8	149.1	264.2	312.4	527.6	454.3	483.4	2254.8
<u>Honduras</u>								
Military	4.0	8.9	31.3	37.3	77.5	62.5	88.2	309.7
Economic	51.0	33.9	78.0	101.2	209.0	138.9	157.9	769.9
Totals	55.0	42.8	109.3	138.5	286.5	201.4	246.1	1079.6
<u>Guatemala</u>								
Military	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.3	10.6
Economic	11.1	16.6	23.9	17.6	33.3	73.8	77.2	253.5
Totals	11.1	16.6	23.9	17.6	33.3	74.1	87.5	264.1
<u>Costa Rica</u>								
Military	0.0	0.3	2.1	2.6	9.2	9.2	2.7	25.8
Economic	14.0	13.3	120.6	212.4	177.9	208.0	187.3	933.5
Totals	14.0	13.3	122.7	215.0	187.1	217.2	190.0	959.3
<u>TOTALS</u>								
Military	10.0	44.4	115.4	121.2	283.2	200.2	233.8	1008.2
Economic	133.9	177.4	404.7	562.3	751.3	746.8	773.2	3549.6
Totals	143.9	221.8	520.1	683.5	1034.5	947.01	007.0	4557.8

Source: 'Militarization in Central America (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986), p.9.

It would be desirable to see the aid given by the Soviet Union to the Nicaragua.

Table 5
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO NICARAGUA

Year	
1980	\$ 6 million
1981	\$ 39
1982	\$ 80
1983	\$ 133
1984	\$ 112
Total	\$ 370 million

Source: Militarization in Central America (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986), p.10.

Table 6
MILITARY AID FROM THE "SOVIET BLOC" TO
NICARAGUA

Year	
1982	\$ 253 million
1983	\$ 146
1984	\$ 146
Total	\$ 545 million

Source: Militarization in Central America (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986), p.10.

Other U. S. Military Aid

Open U. S. military aid has been referred to as the "tip of the iceberg" (The Coalition for New Foreign and Military Policy): The Reagan Administration has granted an indeterminate sum in financial support and services to its Central American allies.

a) The Contras

Congress approved \$73 million for the Contras from 1982 to 1984 (1982:\$19 million; 1983; \$30 million; 1984:\$24 million); in June 1985 it approved \$27-32 million for 1985 and 1986. But the real aid to the Contras is clearly much greater. The U. S. has also:

- Constructed a military infrastructure in Honduras which is used by the Contras.
- Given planes and other military equipment.
- Sold military equipment at low prices.
- Provided intelligence data gathered by U. S. Spy planes.

These are only examples: the level of participation and coordination between U. S. forces and the Contras is unknown, as is the monetary value of all of this assistance.

b) Military Exercises and Construction

There have been at least 35 U. S. military exercises in Central America and the Caribbean between 1981 and 1985,

employing up to 30,000 regular U.S. troops at one time. (Caribbean Basin Information Project). They have constructed roads, trails, and an anti-tank trench, and have left substantial amounts of military equipment in the hands of the ~~con~~tras and the Honduran army. The total cost of these programs, the majority done without Congressional approval, is unknown.

c) Supervision

The Pentagon monitors Central America by means of warships and overflights of AC-130 aircraft (based in Honduras), and AWACS (from Oklahoma), as well as through satellites and CIA activity. The cost of these activities is unknown.

d) Training

The U.S. has trained an unknown number of officials and other members of the Central American armed forces and police. It is believed that at least 1,250 Honduran and 6,000 Salvadoran troops have been trained since 1981, at a cost of at least \$45 million. (Caribbean Basin information Project).

e) Through Third Countries

There are persistent reports that the U.S. has used its allies to channel aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

The Reagan Administration has accused Nicaragua of having constructed a powerful war machine that is a menace to

its neighbours and to the U.S. itself.

"In less than 5 years the Sandinistas have constructed the largest and best equipped military force in Central America".¹³

"Nicaragua has constructed 'a war machine' that draws the forces of all of its neighbours combined".¹⁴

An analysis of the armed forces of each country in the region has shown:

The Nicaraguan Army is more or less equal to those of El Salvador and Guatemala; its active forces of 60,000 is less than 40% of the total forces of its neighbours.

Nicaragua has a stronger force of armoured vehicles than the other Central American Countries; however, in the region's mountainous terrain, those vehicles are useful only for defense, not as offensive weapons.

Overall, Nicaragua is in a disadvantageous position, taking into account its neighbours armies and powerful air forces, as well as the military power of the U.S., which stands behind the forces of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.

13. Departments of State and Defense, "Background Paper", 18, July, 1984.

14. President Reagan, The New York Times, 30 March, 1985.

It is the United States, and not Nicaragua, Cuba or the Soviet Union, that is responsible for the growing militarization of Central America.

On 17 October 1980 under the Presidentship of Carter, USA and Nicaragua signed an agreement of \$75,000,000 aid package to Nicaragua though later on it was suspended by USA in response to alleged Nicaraguan arms trafficking to El Salvador, in early 1981.¹⁵

Even the sale of wheat worth \$9,600,000 was held up which earlier was sanctioned by the United States.

Nicaragua rejected categorically the charges of arms trafficking to El Salvador. Father d'Escoto, the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua on 2 March said that his government wanted good relations with USA but that such "irresponsible" accusation would not further the purpose.

The Nicaraguan deputy representative to the United Nations, Sr. Alejandro Bandano, on 9 April denounced the US cut off of aid as "economic aggression" and as the clear manifestation of the aggressive policy of "destablization" being persued by "certain sector of US Government" against Nicaragua.

15. Keesings Contemporary Archieves (Bristol 1981), p. 30975.

On 23 April, 1981 announcement was made in Nicaragua that the Soviet Union would deliver 20,000 tonnes of wheat to Nicaragua in the beginning of May. A donation of 10,000 tonnes was promised by Bulgaria, also. So many other countries like Cuba, Libya, Mexico sanctioned grants to help the needy population of Nicaragua.¹⁶

On 22 November Edwin Meese, Counsellor to President Reagan said in an interview that U.S. concern about Nicaragua is based on the fact that it presented a threat to other countries of the region. He also denied any "plan to put U.S. troops into combat."¹⁷

Washington Post on 14 February, 1982 said that President Reagan had authorised covert operation against Nicaragua, whereby the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a budget of \$19,000,000 was to begin establishing a Latin-American force to operate out of commando camp along the Nicaragua Honduran border. Immediately Nicaragua requested a meeting of the U.N. Security Council.¹⁸

President Reagan made his first official visit to Latin America from 30 November to 5 December 1982. He tried to persuade the governments of various Latin American countries to cut-off diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.¹⁹

16. Ibid. p. 30975 & 30975-76.

17. Keesings Contemporary Archives, (Bristol) 1982, pp.31290A & 31406P.

18. Ibid. pp. 31613A & 31615-16.

It is so to be done according to U.S.A. because Nicaragua is a threat to the neighbouring democratic countries of Central America; it has jeopardised the peace of Central America; therefore reiterated its (US) help to support the minority Christian Democratic Government in El Salvador; elected in March 1982 and also backed the Honduran government and regarded upheaval in these countries as a threat to U.S. Security.¹⁹

Many neighbouring countries tried to solve the problem of Central America. Most notably, Mexico held that the cause of the problem lay in the economic and social inequalities existing in separate countries.²⁰

The relation between USA and Nicaragua became more tense between January 1982 to September 1983 due to U.S. support for Nicaraguan exile (Contras), fighting to overthrow the Sandinista government. USA had already imposed sanctions against Nicaragua; curtailing economic aid in April 1981 and subsequently blocking possible loans. In October 1982, U.S. Standard Fruit Company announced its decision to suspend operations in Nicaragua before termination of its current five year contract.

Commenting on the peace proposal of July 1983, President Reagan said on 21 July that he considered this as a "first step"

19. Ibid. 32486P, 32486 & 32490.

20. Ibid. 32490.

but it did not "go far enough" and that achieving peace "would be extremely difficult" as the Nicaraguans "are being directed by outside forces".²¹

Throughout 1982 there were repeated allegations that the CIA was actively involved in Central America, not only in the affairs of Honduras, El Salvador but also in the plan to destabilize the Sandinista government. In the latter part of the year and early 1983 the U.S. administration acknowledged that at least some of these allegations were valid.

In the US Congress, there was a great controversy over the issue whether to sanction more aid to contras or not.

The US Defense Department announced on 10 January, 1984 that the joint "Big Pine II" military exercise with Honduras in August 1983 - February 1984 would be followed in June 1984" by "Big Pine III" exercises, possibly involving Salvadorian troops as well, so that in the meantime some U.S. troops would probably remain in Honduras.

Continued Presence of US troops in region

The US Defense Department comments on 10 January, 1984, that the joint "Big Pine II" military exercise with Honduras in August 1983 - February 1984 would be followed in June 1984 by "Big Pine III" exercises, possibly involving Salvadoran troops

21. Ibid. pp. 32486, 32487 & 32490.

as well and that in the meantime some US troops would probably remain in Honduras.

There were currently about 2,700 U.S. combat troops in Honduras, 44 military trainers, 7 military staff attached to the embassy, 60 members of the Air Force working of UN Security Council etc.²²

The Reagan administration faced substantial opposition to its Central American policy, and serious difficulties over congressional action on aid.

Early in 1983 the administration put before Congress a request for \$850,000,000 for the purpose of funding covert activities in Nicaragua within the intelligence authorisation bill. It was defeated in the House of representatives on 28 July 1983 by 228 votes to 195, but this vote was ignored by the Senate which then returned the bill to the House. Despite appeals from the administration the House again rejected the bill on 20 October while on 3 November the Senate approved the funding of covert activities but reduced the amount to \$19,000,000. But finally the approval was given by both houses on 24 November providing \$24,000,000 in covert aid.

It was reported in the US Press in October that the CIA had instigated the recent escalation in "contra" activity in Nicaragua, and in particular the explosion at the Corinto oil

22. Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bristol) 1984, pp.33269A, 33274-75.

refinery, in order to persuade Congress to accede to the administration as funding request for covert activities.

After deciding in mid-1983 to encourage "Contra" sabotage attack on Nicaragua installations, the CIA reportedly began funding the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) in June in order to bring pressure on it to coordinate with Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN).

CIA Involvement in Contra Activities

US involvement in the mining of Nicaragua ports was confirmed in early April when a letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence disclosed that CIA agents directed an operation in 1983 from a "mother ship" stationed outside the 12 mile territorial water limit. The actual raid on Puerto Samalino on 8 September 1983 was performed by "unilaterally controlled Retine assets" jargon which was generally interpreted to mean agents solely controlled by the CIA. It was reported on 28 April that the Director of the CIA, Mr. William J. Casey had formally apologized to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for failing to provide adequate information on the CIA's role, and agreed to give prior notice of "any significant anticipated intelligence activity".

The confirmation of direct CIA involvement in the mining of ports increased concern in the US Congress over the extent of CIA activities in the area.

The Reagan administration accepted the unanimous interim judgement of the International Court of Justice on 10 May, urging the USA to provide access to Nicaragua ports through mine laying. The suit was filed by Nicaragua in the ICJ against USA for using military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua".²³

U. S. Financial Support for Contras

The US Congress voted on 10 & 11 October to provide US \$4,000,000 in fiscal year 1985 to assist the Nicaraguan contras.

U. S. Trade Embargo - Relations from Other Countries

Amid deteriorating relations between USA and Nicaraguan governments, President Reagan announced on 1 May and executed order, imposing a trade embargo against Nicaragua, with effect from 8 May barring the exchange of all goods and services "except these destined for the organised domestic resistance".

The main impact of the embargo was political rather than economic. Because, Nicaragua exported 17% of its total exports to U.S.A. and imported 20% of its total import from U.S.A. in 1984. The most immediate problem was the purchase of spare parts for US made equipments although it was going to be obtained at a higher costs, from the U.S. allies.

23. Kessings Contemporary Archives. (Bristol) 1984, pp.32850A, 32851, 32268A, & 32219.

Military Activity

Table 7

THE NUMBER OF CLASHES BETWEEN SANDINISTA
AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

Year	Number of Clashes
1981	15
1982	78
1983	600
1984	948
1985, first half	710
Total	2351

Source: Nicaragua: The counterevaluation Development of Consequences. (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.) p.9.

Table 8

RECORD OF COUNTEREVOLUTIONARY ATTACKS CARRIED
OUT FROM COSTA RICAN AND HONDURAN TERRITORIES

Year	From Costa Rican territory	From Honduran Territory	Total per year
1980	0	49	49
1981	24	59	83
1982	16	53	69
1983	25	83	108
1984	22	46	68
1985 first half	18	10	28
Total	105	300	405

Source: Nicaragua: The counterrevolution, Development and Consequences. (Managna: Center for International Communication, n.d.) p.8.

the
 In August 1981/~~then~~ Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, visited Nicaragua and threatened to promote the counter revolution. In November of that year the U.S. National Security Council approved the first U.S. aid, US\$19 million, for the contras, and so began official U.S. aid for the contras.

Table 9

OFFICIALLY AUTHORISED UNITED STATES AID

Month-year	US(\$) Millions	Remarks
November 1981	19.95	Approved by the National Security Council for covert operations.
December 1982	30	
December 1983	24	Approved by the U.S. Congress for "direct or indirect support for military actions within Nicaragua".
June 1985	27 or 32	The House of Representatives and the Senate approve different "humanitarian" aid packages for the contras.

Source: Nicaragua: Counterrevolution, Development and Consequences
 (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.)
 p.20.

Table 10

VICTIMS (1981-1985)

Dead	2,817
Wounded or disables	3,020
Kidnapped	2,825
Women raped	114
Displaced persons	142,980
Orphan children	6,239

Source: Nicaragua: Counterrevolution, Development and Consequences
 (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.)
 p.20.

ECONOMIC AGGRESSION

Nicaragua's economy had severely broken under the forty years' of US puppet Somoza dictatorship and recurrent wars. The irresponsible erstwhile rulers had incurred heavy debt in terms of capital and capital technology from U.S.A. transferring her economy into a subservient one. This very nexus of structural dependency was exploited as a last resort by U.S.A. to weaken, demoralise, humiliate and destroy it or its legitimate leadership. Thus, as the culmination of four years of economic and military offensive, U.S.A. eventually proceeded to the extent of declaring total trade embargo on 1 May 1985 undermining the last semblance of dignity.

An Overview of the Nicaraguan Economy

During the Somoza dictatorship, the Nicaraguan economy was dominated by large multinational corporations. The majority of the population was malnourished, under-employed and illiterate. With the victory of the Sandinista revolution in 1979, it became possible for the first time to orient the economy toward the needs of an independent country and the majority of its people.

The private sector has been an important part of the development of the new economy. Private owners control almost three-quarters of the country's agricultural production, 74.4%.

in 1983, with an increasing private participation in the cultivation of cotton, coffee, sesame seed, corn, beans and sorghum.

A majority of the private producers belong to the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG). In addition to working with UNAG in the development of overall agricultural policy, the government works bilaterally with associations of farmers organized according to the crops they produce. As a result of the cooperation between the private sector and the government, agricultural production rose in Nicaragua in 1983 (the last year before the war began to take its toll) and the mixed economy became stronger.

The agrarian reform program took place within the framework of a policy of support for the prioritized productive sectors. A majority of the expropriated property, 19% of the total agricultural land in the country, belonged to Somoza. The land belonging to small and medium-scale farmers, 51% of the total, was not affected.

In addition to the local private businesses, a large number of foreign businesses operated in Nicaragua Esso, ICI, Pennwalt, IBM, Nabisco, B.T. (Tanic), Monsanto; these businesses are working with the government in search for new sources of supplies and spare parts in light of the trade embargo.^{23(A)}

^{23(A)} "The United States Trade Embargo", (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.) p.1.

2. Approval of IMF Loan to Nicaragua-
Development of Cardoba:

The United States, which in November 1978 had brought about the suspension of a projected Nicaraguan purchase from the IMF under the Fund's contemporary financing facility, did not oppose the decision by IMF on 14 May 1979 to approve the following three purchases by Nicaragua amounting in all to the equivalent of \$65,700,000.²⁴

Nationalization of Banking and other sectors -
Other Economic Measures - IMF Loan

The government announced on 25 July 1979 the nationalization of country's domestic banks and financial institutions. Foreign banks were made to comply with Central Bank regulations and were no longer permitted to accept Nicaraguan currency deposits. On 10 August 1979 the Junta announced that the state would be the chief buyer for major export crops principally Coffee, Sugar and Cotton) at a fixed price on 1 September. All Nicaragua's unexploited natural resources were declared the exclusive patrimony of the state by decree and an Institute of Natural Resources and Environment was set up. Finally on 17 October, 1979 the country's insurance companies were nationalised under similar conditions.

24. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol: 1980), pp.30025A & 30026.

The government also in August expropriated about 1,500,000 acres of cattle-grazing land which a preliminary survey had shown to belong to the Somoza family.

In a move to prevent members of the Somoza regime from re-entering the country and converting their holdings of Nicaraguan currency the Junta announced on 24 August that all 500 - and, 1,000 Cordoba bank notes (worth the equivalent of \$50 and \$100 respectively) were to be taken out of the circulation.²⁵

The Junta announced on 1 September that a unified official rate for the Cordoba had been established with effect from 30 August, 1979 at 10 Cardobas per US dollar.

Among many other organisations which promised aid to Nicaragua, the Inter-American Development Bank announced on 4 August that it was prepared to lend \$500,000,000 over the next three years including \$200,000,000 which had been negotiated with the Somoza government, would be restructured to meet the country's most urgent needs.

The USA and Nicaragua on 17 October 1980 signed a \$75,000,000 aid package under President Carter regime on the latter's request in November 1979 but which was held up by Congressional opposition, particularly by the Republican Party.

25. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol) 1980, p.30025A.

A renegotiation on lenient terms for \$582,000,000 of Nicaraguan Foreign debt (contracted under Somoza) was completed in September 1980 after nine months of talks. A period of 12 years was fixed for the repayment with an initial five years' grace period during which the payment of interests was stipulated to be 97 per cent only.²⁶

Suspension of US aid to Nicaragua:
Allocation of other Foreign Aid

The US State Department on 1 April, 1981 suspended the economic aid which was signed under Carter administration and alleged that the Sandinista government was "aiding and abetting violence" in El Salvador. The amount involved was \$15,000,000 and \$75,000,000 plus a wheat sale worth \$9,600,000 and food for peace aid. President Reagan had during his election campaign opposed the decision to grant aid to Nicaragua and immediately after taking office, on 22 January ordered to freeze the remaining money and the wheat sale, pending an examination of evidence. This very amount was supplied to left wing guerillas in El Salvador. U.S. State Department warned Nicaragua that if the supply of arms continued to El Salvador, it would impose further sanctions on her.

Statement by FSLN directorate broadcast over Managua Radio on 2 April said that the Reagan Administration's attempt to inculpete Nicaragua in alleged weapon trafficking to El Salvador were an "infamous pretext to come up the aggressive

26. Keesing's Contemporary Archives (Bristol-1981) pp.30659A, 30975A.

and ultra-reactionary foreign policy being applied by the US throughout the region". The same government had, they said, introduced - into the Carribbean "fabulous quantities of weapons, resources and military personnels.

Charges of arms trafficking to El Salvador had earlier been rejected by Father de Escoto (Nicaragua's Foreign Minister) on 2 March when he also said that his government wanted good relations with the USA but that such "irresponsible" accusation could not further that purpose.

The Nicaraguan deputy representative to the United Nations, Sir Alegondro Bomdan, on 9 April denounced the US cut off aid as "Economic aggression" and as "the most recent manifestation of the aggressive policy of destabilization" being persued by "certain sector of U.S. government against Nicaragua.²⁷

Help to Nicaragua

Due to the shortage of wheat, there was immense need of aid to Nicaragua. And USA had denied to assist it. This time many other countries extended help to Nicaragua, and it was announced on 23 April that the Soviet Union would deliver 20,000 tonnes of wheat to Nicaragua, beginning in May. A donation of 10,000 tonnes was presented by Bulgaria around the same time.

27. Keesing's Contemporary Archives(Bristol) 1982,pp.3975A, 30977.

On 24 April Libya granted \$100,000,000 to activate the mixed agricultural enterprise, in which scientific products, were to be determined by Libyan technicians. Apart from it various other Countries including Spain, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico and Brazil substantially increased their aid to Nicaragua. The Cuban government announced on 25 April that it would grant \$64,000,000 in aid for 1981.

During an official visit to Mexico by E.Ortega on 6-7 May, President Lopez Portillos promised that Mexico would defend Nicaragua's cause "as though it bore our own" and expressed that that, Nicaragua contributed to the stability of the region.²⁸

The Sandinista government on 9 September 1981 declared a state of "economic and Social emergency". Provisions were made to impose severe penalties on those flaunting the limits fixed on occupation under the new agrarian programmes and undertaking the control of those factories obstructing production. The government spending was cut by reducing subsidies on food, transport and other services. Heavy duties were imposed on imports of luxury goods from outside the Central American region.

Under the emergency, which was introduced for one year, it was considered to be an act of crime punishable for one to three years of imprisonment in the case of publishing false economic news, destroying raw materials or production equipments, halting public transport, raising prices without official

28. Ibid. p. 30978.

permission, or "inciting foreign government to inflict damage on the national economy".

Earlier, in July 1979 Daniel Ortega had announced decrees providing for the confiscation of waste land for redistribution and also seizure of land and enterprises which had been abandoned for more than 6 months. Ortega also said that the Sugar distribution industries could be nationalized that certain companies accused of keeping their profits outside the country would be made liable to market their goods through the Ministry of Trade; that other cooperative; would be placed under state control. Agricultural problems were exacerbated by large scale floods in May 1982 which caused damages to crops and infrastructure estimated at about \$356,000,000, by a draught in the Western region of the country in September and by persistent acts of shortage by anti-government guerrillas.²⁹

In spite of the aid extended by Western European Countries like West Germany, Sweden, Spain and European community to Nicaragua, the country's balance of payments position deteriorated further since the suspension of the economic aid in April 1981. The United States supported by Argentina and Chile, blocked two possible loans of \$30,000,000 from the inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in November

29. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol, 1983), p.32304.

1981 and September, and also opposed a \$2,200,000 IDB loan in June 1983 on the ground that the "macro-economic policies of Nicaragua were not propitious for the economic development of the country. Moreover, it was reported in February, 1983, that the US intervention had also been responsible for the refusal of the World Bank to grant Nicaragua a \$40,000,000 loan which had been requested in order to carry out improvements in the road, water and education system.³⁰

The Economic Aggression

The United States aggression has also been economic, a direct attack against Nicaragua's mixed economy.

Table 11

BILATERAL AID CUT-OFF

February 1981	A US\$35 payment is suspended, out of US\$75 million agreement approved by the Carter Administration.
March 1981	A US\$10 million loan to buy wheat under the program PL480 is suspended.
April 1981	The suspension of all future bilateral aid is suspended, including a US\$11.4 million loan for health, education and rural development programs.

Source: The United States' Trade Embargo (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d), p.7.

30. The United States' Trade & Embargo (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.) p.7.


Table 12

31

FINANCIAL PRESSURE IN MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

December 1982	The United States vetoes an Interamerican Development Bank project: US\$5000,000 to develop agricultural and ranching cooperatives.
February 1982	The World Bank suspends its loan program and the demands an economic stabilization program in Nicaragua.
November 1982	The World Bank suspends the payment of trade loans.

Source: The United States' Trade Embargo (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.) p.7.



Among the credits blocked in the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, were substantial loans for the private sector. With the suspension of commerce assistance, the net flow of capital decreased, and the financial flow reversed Nicaragua began to pay more to multilateral organisations. In spite of the increased debt, the Nicaraguan government was up-to-date on its obligations to the International Monetary Fund as on April 1985.

Suspension of Sugar Purchases

On 9 May 1983, the Reagan Administration suspended 90% of the sugar imports that it had purchased from Nicaragua.

31. The United States' Trade & Embargo (Managua: Center for International Communication n.d.) p.7.

60% of the country's sugarcane and 52% of its sugar is produced by the private sector. The sugar cut-off thus hurt the country's private sector and thereby reduced the overall strength of the economy.

Economic Consequences of the Embargo

1. The cost of Nicaragua's imports rises, as the number of intermediaries increases.
2. The harshest impact of the blockade was in two areas:
 - spare parts for machinery, the industrial plant of the country and the agricultural machiner were largely of U.S. origin.
 - certain agricultural supplies were only available in the United States - insecticides, herbicides, fertilizers, seeds and vaccinations.
3. The shortage of spare parts and the increase in the cost of imports would cause a nation wide rise in the cost of production.
4. The need to find new markets for exports should have the following consequences:
 - The size and packaging of certain produces will have to be adjusted, increasing costs.

- Banana exports will be affected, as a result of the need to ship over larger distances.
- The shrimp and lobster industries are based almost totally on the U.S. consumer, and will suffer large losses.

To understand the magnitude of the embargo against Nicaragua, it is useful to estimate the impact such a measure would have against a highly industrialized country such as West Germany.

Table

	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>
Total, millions of dollars(1984)	40,000	35,000
Per cent affected by the boycott	12.1%	20%
Quantity (Millions of dollars)	4,800	7,000

Source: The United States' Trade Embargo (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.) p.10.

NICARAGUAN FOREIGN TRADE DURING THREE PERIODS: UNDER
SOMOZA(1974-1977); ONE YEAR AFTER THE REVOLUTION(1980);
FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION 1980

	<u>Average</u> <u>1974-77</u>		<u>1980</u>		<u>1984</u>	
	<u>Exports-Imports</u>		<u>Export-Imports</u>		<u>Exports-Imports</u>	
Central American Common Market	22.8	21.6	16.7	33.9	8.8	11.2
Rest of Latin America(ALADI)	2.1	14.7	0.1	20.2	1.8	14.1
Western Europe	24.5	14.1	32.8	9.9	37.1	21.4
United States	24.8	28.8	36.0	27.5	12.1	20.1
Japan	11.6	10.1	2.8	3.2	25.0	3.3
Canada	0.9	0.7	6.3	1.2	3.0	3.4
Socialist Countries (CAME)	0.8	0.3	2.7	0.2	6.1	26.5
Others	12.3	9.7	2.6	3.9	6.1	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: The United States' Trade Embargo (Managua: Center for International Communication, n.d.)p.10.

The Nicaraguan Response to the Embargo

The Nicaraguan Government and the Sandinista National Liberation Front called on the Nicaraguan people to respond to the challenge posed by the U.S. embargo thus:

"The closure of U.S. markets for our exports and the ban on the import of raw materials, in-puts,

spare parts and other goods essential to our production and our social services in a measure that affects all sectors of the country. It therefore demands a joint response from all of Nicaragua, workers, small and medium business owners, large business owners, technicians and professionals. We must use the U.S. embargo as an incentive to implement an internal process of rationalizing and organizing our economy. Our entire population must actively participate in saving, rationalizing and seeking substitutes for the materials we need to work and to produce consumer goods".³²

A call was made to increase efficiency and voluntary work, and to eliminate payment with goods instead of salaries.

III- POLITICAL INTERVENTION

Militarization in the Central America and economic embargo in Nicaragua by the United States resulted in the deterioration of political relations between the two countries. From the very beginning, the United States tried to manipulate the affairs of Nicaragua. Violation of human rights and

32. Communique 10-May, 1985. Quoted in Nicaragua, 1986, (Managua: Center for International Communication, 1986) p.14.

enormous atrocities inflicted on the Nicaraguan people led to a wave of strong opposition against Somoza rule. That is why many member countries of organisation of American States recognised the provisional Junta of F.S.L.N. in Costa Rica, before the revolution took place.³³

The OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated in a report published on 17 November, 1978 which is regarded as one of the most critical document that during and after September 1978 fightings, National Guards had violated human rights in a "grave" persistent and generalized manner", had bombed civilians indiscriminately; had carried out "summary and mass executions" of numerous adults and of "youths and defenceless children" and had used also torture "extensively".³⁴

After the 1978 fightings - a group mediation commission of the representatives of the United States, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic made efforts to find out a solution to the Nicaraguan problem. The talks started with Somoza and Broad Opposition Front (FAO). This mediation group failed due to the rejection of the demands put forward by FAO before talks.

Later on, some demands were accepted and for the same the date was fixed around mid 1979. However, Gen. Somoza

33. Keesings Contemporary Archives, (Bristol 1979), p.29805A.

34. Ibid. 29805A.

rejected the proposal of mediation and described the plebiscite as the infringement of Nicaraguan sovereignty.³⁵

Due to international pressure against Somoza 30,000 people of Nicaragua participated in a general strike on the first death anniversary of the opposition leader Sr. Fadro Chamorro, on 10 January, 1979.³⁶

An agreement for united cooperation was signed on 8 March 1979 between the FSLN groups and other opposition fronts, against the Somoza rule.

On 5 April the Sandinista's nine member directorate issued a programme for reconstruction of Nicaragua after the anticipated downfall of Gen. Somoza which states (1) a provisional government of National Unity in which "all the social and political forces in our country will have real and effective participation (ii) a programme of national reconstruction to "save Nicaragua from the social, economic, political and moral catastrophe" in to which it had been plagued. (iii) a new "national army" with the task of defending the "democratic progress and national unity" excluding soldiers who were 'currupt and guilty of the crimes against the people" but welcoming those who" rejected the crimes and abuses of Somozaism". (iv) A non-aligned foreign policy emphasising

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

links with nations which respect self-determination and
 (v) the expropriation of all goods used by the Somoza family.³⁸

After 18 months fight (civil war) which started with the murder of opposition leader on 10 January 1978 and culminated in full scale civil war till 19 July, 1979, 40,000 to 50,000 Nicaraguan had lost their lives (total population 2,500,000).³⁹

The new leadership announced that there would be no elections till January 1984. And the present regime would remain in power till 1985.⁴⁰ With the coming into power President Ronald Reagan started conspiring against the Sandinista regime. There were also reports that USA is giving training to the former National Guards. In response to a New York Times report on 17 March 1981, that former National Guards were being trained in Miami to fight against the Sandinista regime, Sr. Ortega Saavedra said at a press conference in Havana on 19 April that the attitude of the Reagan Administration toward Nicaragua was "disrespectful". Sr. Ortega Saavedra alleged that armed groups had a base in Honduras with a "line of communication which passed through Guatemala" and had a central headquarter in Miami. Invaders from Honduras had, he said, attacked teachers in outlying

38. Keesings Contemporary Archives (Bristol 1980) pp.30025A and 30317A.

39. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol 1981) p.30659A.

regimes, killing seven and raping at least fifteen besides killing 60 other Nicaraguans.

During the second half of the 1981, relations between United States and Nicaragua further deteriorated due to the enormous military help given by the former to El Salvador. On the other, Nicaragua proceeded closer to the Soviet bloc for aid and loans.

In mid 1983, Nicaragua's security was seriously threatened from the anti-government guerrillas, based in Honduras to the North and Costa-Rica to the South. They stepped up their military efforts to bring down the Sandinista government. The Nicaraguan authority accused the United States of deliberately seeking to provoke a war between Honduras and Nicaragua in order to destabilize the Sandinista government.⁴⁰

Keeping in view, the growing tension on the Northern border, a state of emergency was declared on 15 March 1982.⁴¹

Nicaragua government in a decree stated that "The plans of aggression directed against our country, to destroy our system of production and our country's physical infrastructure to prepare an escalation of counter - revolutionary military attacks and consequently to replace people's power with a Somoza style regime".⁴²

40. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol 1982), p.31290A.

41. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol 1983), pp.32302A & 32304.

42. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol 1984), p.33269A.

General elections which took place in 1984, which has already been mentioned in the beginning of the Chapter brought normalcy in the relations of USA and Nicaragua, for some time. But USA continued its efforts to throw away the Sandinista rule. U.S. involvement in the mining of the Nicaraguan ports was confirmed in early April, 1984 when a letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence disclosed that C.I.A. agents directed an operation in 1983 from a "mothership" stationed outside the 12 mile territorial water limit. The Reagan administration accepted the unanimous interim judgement of the International Court of Justice on 10 May urging the U.S.A. to cease preventing access to Nicaraguan ports through mine laying.⁴³

Presently, we see no change in the attitude and activities of the United States in spite of the given directions in this regard by the International Court of Justice, that is, not to encourage contras against Sandinista regime. All the more, Reagan succeeded in securing recommendations for \$100 million to help the Contras, in spring 1986. He engineered secret plans to supply arms to the Contras in 1987.

Iran-Israel-Contras nexus which is popularly known as 'Irangate Scandal' is one of the glaring examples testifying the fact that U.S. is responsible for the crisis in Nicaragua as well as in Contra America. The U.S. militarization, economic-aggression and political intervention in Nicaragua has been proclaimed by the International Court of Justice as a "breach of International Law by the USA".

43. Keesings Contemporary Archives(Bristol 1984)p. 33269A.

CONCLUSION

It is an irony of history that every world war which caused tremendous loss to mankind in terms of men and material also brought forth from its womb of devastation, glimpses of new freedom to the enslaved people of Asia, Africa and Latin-America. Harassed and dissipated under its crusting weight of colonialism, these nations found opportunities to awake, arise, assert and finally win their independence from the clutches of colonial rule.

However, the hopes and aspirations of attaining independence were seen manipulated by the big powers in a way that would suit their future machinations in these newly independent countries. In the changed co-relations of forces at the global level, the big nations emerged supreme in deciding the new re-arrangement of the map of the newly liberated nations. Thus, the pre-second world war configuration of the great powers dissolved themselves in the emerging two superpowers, U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. forming the axis around which, the nations of the world were to revolve in order to keep their position intact. Given their geo-politico-military and economic strength, each and every development in the world was bound to receive their direct or indirect interference.

As a consequence of and against the backdrop of this scenario, the newly liberated countries of the Third World galvanised their common interests to offer a powerful forum of

resistance called as Non-aligned Movement. In order to enhance their level of autonomy and economic self-reliance, the forum took deep interest in exposing the nefarious exploitative links between the colonial powers and the erstwhile colonised nations which had been the main cause behind the pauperisation of 'South' and magnificent affluence of the 'North' Stagnation in the South was proved as being not because of the inherent weaknesses of these economies, rather the systematic exploitation of its marked by North and plunder of raw materials therefrom, for ages.

In the present study we find, that there is a lack of a coherent and systematic theory of intervention. There are definitions of different shades; which provide enough scope to the intervening powers to justify their acts of intervention. Even the UN Charter presents a loose interpretation of Intervention: The problem of strategic analysis, and the moral dimension of the interventionary acts bring the idea home that operational definition can answer better to the problem of a lack of scientific theory of intervention.

In the case study of Cuba we see a change of stands of John. F. Kennedy before the presidentship and as a President. The climax comes when the missile crises is resolved which shows a mutual understanding between the superpowers.

In the case of Congo, Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavuba were seen as the manipulators of the Congolese crises. To make

the situation worse Tshombe and Gizenga were used by USA and USSR respectively. Internal factional politics was considered best to subserve their purposes.

Afghanistan crises of 1978 and thereafter held Soviet Union responsible. The change of leadership in Afghanistan was brought about on the direction of the Soviet Union. The international presence and domestic changes in the Soviet Union forced the Soviet Union to start the process of pulling its troops out.

A detailed study of the US militarization, economic aggression and political intervention in Nicaragua presents a clear picture of U.S. manoeuvring. Dating back since Monroe Doctrine America has been exploiting many countries. Rule through puppet dictatorship remained the corner stone of U.S. policy. The FSLN ruling party of Nicaragua has been charged with the Marxist - Leninist labels. In fact, this party is a combination of two other political parties, one of peasants, and other of merchants. The defiance of ICJ ruling which charges U.S.A. for the crisis in Nicaragua shows US stickness of its surreptitious acts, despite such a strong international pressure on it.

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