

**The U.S. Diplomacy Towards India And  
Pakistan, 1977 to 1985 :  
A Comparative Study**

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
TO MY PARENTS

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(ANIL KUMAR)

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## INTRODUCTION

The year 1977 was a year of great significance in the history of both India and Pakistan in the sense that there occurred a change in the governments of both the countries. In India after independence for the 1st time a non-congress government came in power named JANATA Party headed by Mr. Morarji Desai, the then Prime Minister. Similarly, in Pakistan in the first week of July 1977 a military coup occurred headed by Jia-UL Haq. Thus Mr. Bhutto's regime was overthrown and replaced by the military Junta led by Mr. Haq.

Since there was a change in the governments of both the countries, it was a matter of great interest as <sup>to</sup> what sort of policy U.S. was going to adopt towards India and Pakistan in the changed scenario. However, it was also to be seen as to how the leadership in both India and Pakistan was going to respond to the U.S. foreign policy.

In India initially the changed leadership was taken to be pro-western if not anti-Soviet. In fact just after assuming office Mr. Desai in one of his speeches candidly made it clear that his government is going to follow what he called 'genuine or proper

non-alignment. In his First Press Conference on 24th March 1977, he said "The foreign policy of non-alignment is there for India. It will be proper non-alignment .. we must have relations of equality (with both the super powers). To his mind the previous Govt. of Mrs. Gandhi had compromised her non-aligned posture with Soviet Union by signing a treaty of cooperation and friendship for 20 years in 1971. He defined proper non-alignment by saying that his government will undo the tilt or favour shown by Mrs. Gandhi's Govt. towards Soviet Union.

In fact the very coming into power of Mr. Desai led to a feeling that U.S. policy towards India would take into account the changed scenario and would change her policies towards India accordingly. It was also expected that relations between Washington and New Delhi will improve. And improved relations between India and U.S. will certainly influence U.S. policy towards Pakistan.

This is how the year 1977 was a year of speculations and expectations became prior to 1977 Indo-U.S. relations were never cordial.

In Pakistan after what Zia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator, called "Operation Fair play" the military rule was brought back. The 1973 constitution was suspended. In this scenario, it was to be seen as to how the Americans were going to deal with the Chief Martial Law Administrator and how he will respond to them. Was he also going to bring about changes in the basic perception of the foreign policy of his predecessor - Mr. Bhutto or not, was a matter of another speculation.

In the light of the above the dissertation seeks to examine and analyse the American diplomacy towards India and Pakistan from 1977 to 1985. The study is comparative. An attempt has been made to compare the U.S. diplomacy towards India and Pakistan in a separate Chapter. The first Chapter deals with the U.S. attitude towards India and Pakistan prior to 1977. The second Chapter takes care of the U.S. diplomacy towards India in the said period. The third Chapter relates to the U.S. diplomacy towards Pakistan in the said period. The fourth Chapter endeavours to compare the U.S. diplomacy towards India and Pakistan in the said period. And finally Conclusion is given in the fifth Chapter.

## CHAPTER - I

### U.S.-INDIA AND PAKISTAN BEFORE 1977

Both India and Pakistan joined the comity of independent nations in the year 1947. Pakistan got independence on 14th of August while India on 15th of August in the same year. By then British power was declined. And by August 1947, it was obvious to the U.S.A. that South Asia would be most vulnerable point for communist expansion and hence U.S. could ill afford to neglect the region. The realization of this fact made U.S. decision makers to pay special attention to South Asia. In the U.S., it was generally agreed that -

"With the decline of the British power, America and Russia are bound to compete for position and influence among 400 million peoples of the new nations of India and Pakistan---" <sup>1</sup>

After the Second World War when the cold war began U.S. policy was that of containment of communism by means such as rearmament military alliances and the economic

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1. Natarajan, American Shadow over India, Delhi, 1956, p. 127.



and military aid to "free" nations. After China became communist, the U.S. leaders were fully convinced that the Communist threat to Asia was real and that military alliances were necessary to check the spread of communism in Asia.<sup>2</sup> Thus the peculiar psychosis of the cold war era led to a search for allies who would support U.S. interests defined mainly in terms of anti-communism.<sup>3</sup>

India followed an independent foreign policy right from the very beginning. Nehru scoffed at US fears of Soviet expansionism and scorned any suggestion that India would play the role of an American surrogate.<sup>4</sup> India refused to be aligned with any of the Super Powers. She adopted the policy of Non-Alignment not much to the liking of the US decision makers. So much so that in the beginning India's non-alignment was regarded by John. F. Dulles and other American leaders as 'immoral' and Pro-Soviet. Moreover, Nehru's adhering to Non-alignment was regarded by Washington "as an overt attempt to undermine the foreign policy aims of the United States."<sup>5</sup>

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2. M.S. Rajan & A. Appadorai, India's Foreign Policy & Relations, New Delhi, 1985, p. 215.
  3. Surjit Man Singh, India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982, New Delhi, 1984, p. 74.
  4. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
  5. M.A. Zafar Shah, India & the Super Powers, Dhaka, 1983, p. 21.

Divergence in strategic perceptions coupled with differing perceptions of national interests led both India and U.S. to differ on questions like - the representation of China in the U.N., the Korean war, the Japanese Peace Treaties, the Hungarian crisis, the question of Indo-China and the problem of Vietnam. The divergence in strategic perception was wide enough between the U.S. and India to prevent cordial relations - between the two countries. But differences were not such as to make the two countries enemies.<sup>6</sup>

Among other differences between the two countries, one was that U.S. seldom regarded India as special on the other hand Washington saw Pakistan as 'fulcrum of Asia' as it was located in the 'northern tier' of sub-tropical states and hence, an appropriate ally of the west.<sup>7</sup> The United States incorporated Pakistan into two of her cold war alliances, C.E.N.T.O. (Central Treaty Organisation) and S.E.A.T.O. (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) in 1954. Thus to U.S. the strategic importance of Pakistan has presented itself as a crucial strategic asset for the U.S.A. over the years. Pakistan's strategic

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6. Surjit Man Singh, N.3, pp. 85-86.

7. Ibid., p. 75.

importance to the U.S. did not diminish even when President Ayub Khan's foreign policy took on a distinctly non-aligned flavour in the early 1960s or when Pakistan left C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. in 1978.<sup>8</sup> The strategic location of Pakistan on the door step of the Soviet Union and the people's Republic of China was considered important.<sup>9</sup> It is said that Pakistan provided the U.S. military bases and facilities like landing and launching sites for the U.S. aircrafts. Furthermore, Pakistan was an important channel of communication between the White House and Beijing over 1969-71; and was an important arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry.<sup>10</sup>

Thus we find that once U.S. failed to seduce India to her way of thinking in international politics, it had to move closer to Pakistan as by then it had become clear "to the U.S. that Communist aggression could not be prevented effectively in South and South-East Asia unless the Asian countries could be brought under an alliance system based on the model of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)".<sup>11</sup>

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8. Ibid.

9. Rajvir Singh, U.S.- Pakistan And India: Strategic relations, Allahabad, 1985, p. 44.

10. Surjit Man Singh, N.3, p. 75.

11. Rajvir Singh, N.9, p. 32.

Pakistan also needed U.S. and her support, firstly to contain India and secondly to boost economic development. Ever since the creation of Pakistan in the wake of the partition of India, the Pakistani leadership perceived what they termed a threat from India and it could only be ensured by seeking the support of a powerful foreign country - the U.S. In security matters, the alliance with the U.S. greatly strengthened Pakistan's military capability.<sup>12</sup> The Pakistani Army was expanded to a great deal. Its capability was also enhanced in quality and sophistication much to the happiness of the Pakistani leadership. With the help of the U.S. military advisers, new techniques of Command and communications were introduced which made General Ayub to declare - "We are no longer short of men and materials... If we are to hit a target today, it will be not the same tomorrow."<sup>13</sup>

The U.S. arms supply to Pakistan was started in 1954. "American Arms for Pakistan were first delivered in 1954 after the Eisenhower administration decided that Pakistan was ideally situated to be a key-note of the so called Northern Tier defense against the Soviet Union."<sup>14</sup>

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12. Ibid., p. 212.

13. Dawn, 31 January, 1957.

14. Melvin Gurton, The U.S. Against the Third World, New York, 1975, p. 171.

Pakistan in turn provided intelligence facilities to the U.S. such as the one at Peshawar from where U-2 spy flights took off.

It is said that the arms delivered were of great significance as far as Pakistan is concerned. In fact one Writer<sup>15</sup> has pointed out that the main significance of the arms was threefold -

They enabled the army to become the central political force in the country, they enabled Pakistan to adopt a tougher policy toward India; and they ensured west Pakistan's dominance of the East (Now Bangladesh).

Thus we find that Pakistan enjoyed liberal doses of economic and military aid from her most allied ally the U.S. The process went on without much of change up to the year 1965 with occasional interruptions<sup>16</sup> and modifications, subsequently as well.

In the wake of the border clashes between U.S.S.R. and China in 1968 and the beginning of 70s Pakistan earned the gratitude of Nixon administration by providing

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15. W.J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, New York, Praeger, 1972, p. 104.

16. The U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan was cut off in 1965, the embargo remained on military aid, with an exception for spare parts in April 1967.

a communication link between Washington and Beijing. The reward Pakistan got was the Nixon-Kissinger tilt in favour of Pakistan in 1971. The result was that the Nixon administration gave every possible support to Pakistan during the crisis of 1970-71. So much so that in the midst of the war, Nixon ordered a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal. The aim of the show of forces to the U.S., was to deter India from "attempting to break up west Pakistan".<sup>17</sup>

But in the mean time a great change had occurred in the U.S. foreign policy because of changed dimension of the world politics. The growing detente with China and the Soviet Union, the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine on the policy of gradual disengagement from Asian conflicts on account of the frustrating experience in the Vietnam War led American policy makers to underplay their emphasis on containment of communism and to reduce their forces in SouthEast Asian countries.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, it was the time when American vital interests were at stake in west Asia. Resultantly, Persian Gulf Region became strategic area for the U.S.<sup>19</sup> Iran became very important for the

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17. M.A. Zafar Shah, N.5, p. 66.

18. Rajvir Singh, N.9, p. 103.

19. Shirin Tahir Kheli, "The Foreign Policy of New Pakistan", Orbis, Fall 1976, p. 755.

security of American oil interest in the Gulf Region. The U.S. administration's policy towards South Asia, during the South Asian Crisis, was rooted in its combined desire to maintain world order and a strategic balance and to prevent either China or the Soviet Union from strengthening its area of influence in the region. It, therefore, advocated the idea of regional reconciliation, including the normalization of Indo-Pak relations because an encouragement of turmoil would invite the "involvement" of outside powers.<sup>20</sup> It was the belief of the White House that the national interest of the United States required a rapprochement with China which would have a particular impact upon Washington's policy towards less significant region of South Asia.<sup>21</sup>

The growing Washington - Beijing axis in the early seventies had its bearings on Indo-U.S. relations as well. In fact in the Indian view point, the Washington-Islamabad - Beijing axis that appeared during the 1971 crisis was intended to promote super-power penetration in the subcontinent with the aim of sabotaging New Delhi's

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20. Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s. Shaping a Durable Peace, A Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973 (Washington, n.d) pp. 77-81 quoted from, Rajvir Singh, U.S.-Pakistan and India: Strategic Relations, Allahabad, 1985, p. 104.

21. H.Kissinger, The White House Year, p. 880.

strategy in the region.<sup>22</sup> The Indo-Soviet Treaty followed the dramatic Sino-U.S. rapprochement.<sup>23</sup> The treaty cemented the convergence of Indian and Soviet strategic interests in South-Asia. In fact it was in the background of super-power rivalries in Asia in general and the subcontinent in particular that the importance of the treaty was rooted.<sup>24</sup> The treaty represents the bond of long time friendship between India and the Soviet Union. The treaty serves the interests of both India and the Soviet Union. The allegation that by signing this treaty India has compromised her non-aligned posture with Soviet Union does not hold ground. In fact Article (IV) of the treaty in unequivocal terms states that the Soviet Union respects India's policy of non-alignment.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it can be said that the treaty did not signal the complete termination of India's non-aligned foreign policy vis-a-vis the super powers,

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22. M.A. Zafar Shah, N.5, p. 180.

23. Surjit Man Singh, p. 88.

24. M.A. Zafar Shah, N.5, p. 56.

25. The Article reads "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tension in the World".



although it did represent a technical abandonment of the traditional form of non-alignment as practised by Nehru.<sup>26</sup>

Thus we find that U.S. attitude towards India was one of distrust and suspicion. On the contrary "it loves to provide Pakistan with all the arms it wants. When the dual threat from China and Pakistan caused us to build or buy sophisticated planes, U.S.A. refused. Russian offer to India to buy and manufacture MiGs, came as a big relief. The feeling grew that a friend in need is a friend indeed.<sup>27</sup> Even on the key question of Kashmir, the U.S. attitude was one of siding with Pakistan. The U.S. refused from the very beginning to appreciate the essential justice of India's stand on Kashmir. The sort of diplomatic support India needed at that time never came from the U.S. Rather the reverse happened. This was unequivocally detrimental to India's interests and hence it hurt the feelings of Indians. The U.S. has adopted the same sort of attitude vis-a-vis to India over the years with certain changes here and there. India on her own always wished to have cordial relations with the U.S.

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26. M.A. Zafar Shah, N.5, p. 74.

27. K.R.Malkani "The Paradox of American Myopia", in the World Focus, Nov.-Dec. 1982 'India and the Super powers', p. 74.

and for that matter with all the peace-loving countries of the world. But U.S. always thwarted India's endeavour to draw closer to the White House. In fact one senior official was reported to have told American newspaper men in a rare display of anger. 'We are prepared to be as pro-western as you will permit us to be. But every time we try to make an opening you kick us in the teeth. It is quite difficult.'<sup>28</sup> The situation worsened with the coming of Regan and company in the White House in 1980. But even earlier - in 1971 the governments of India and the U.S. were in verbal combat over the issue of Bangladesh, though not actually engaged in military hostilities.<sup>29</sup> But still India continued making attempts to improve relations with the U.S. In 1972-73 Indira Gandhi sent out what the New York Times termed 'the Indian Love Call',<sup>30</sup> This led to what is known as healing the rift. The process continued even after Nixon's resignation in June 1974 and through Mrs. Gandhi's emergency rule, in spite of criticisms and misgivings about India in the American Press.

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28. Surjit Mansingh, N.3, p. 69.

29. Ibid., p. 70.

30. New York Times, 6 December 1972, quoted from Surjit Mansingh, India's Search from power; Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982, New Delhi, 1984, p.70.

On the other hand the U.S. attitude towards Pakistan vis-a-vis to India was one of favour and treating it at par with India. The U.S. helped Pakistan economically, diplomatically and militarily. In fact the U.S. military help to Pakistan has been a major irritant in the Indo-U.S. relations. Indian objection is that most often than not Pakistan has used U.S. military weapons against India. Hence, U.S. must dismentale the policy of arming Pakistan. Peace and stability in the sub-continent to the Indian view depends on the non-interference of the superpowers in the region. Hence, U.S. must not provide military help to Pakistan. U.S. policy in this regard has been very inconsistent. Sometimes, they announced that they are not going to give any arms to Pakistan as they did in 1967. But the policy was not followed for long. In 1975, President Ford lifted the embargo on all arms to the sub-continent.<sup>31</sup> This again opened channels for Pakistan to have the inflow of U.S. arms. Even earlier in 1974, on the Pokharan explosion which India termed as P.N.E.(Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) the U.S. reaction was not at all to New Delhi's satisfaction. Differences were also there between the two

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31. Surjit Mansingh, N.3, p. 82.

countries on the emergency rule in India (1975-77). Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers insisted that the emergency made no difference to inter-governmental relations. What Kissinger calls a 'state of frustrated in comprehension within a framework of compatible objectives'<sup>32</sup>, had become a norm. In fact the American Press and the government condemned the reins of authority of Mrs. Gandhi's government. Equally galling for the Indian elite was the fact that the U.S. in working out a scenario for crisis management, had altogether ignored India's claims as a regional power to have its interests taken into account.<sup>33</sup> Besides, New Delhi did not subscribe to the U.S. policy of assisting Afghan counter revolutionaries through Pakistan. In fact New Delhi was convinced that using Pakistan to aid the Afghan Mujahideen would further aggravate the crisis, not defuse it, and turn the sub-continent's backyard into an area of cold war confrontation through proxies. Thus it became evidently clear that the dream of the most powerful and the most populous democracies in the world working together remained at the inspirational level only.<sup>34</sup>

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32. Ibid., p. 94.

33. Rita Manchanda, "Double-Speak in Indo-Pakistan Relations", Strategic Analysis, Vol. No. 6, Sept. 1986.

34. Surjit Mansingh, N.3, p. 94.

## CHAPTER - II

### THE U.S. AND INDIA

With the coming in the power of Janata Government in March 1977, high hopes were voiced about Indo-U.S. relations. "The Janata's electoral promises to restore democracy and 'genuine' non-alignment were commonly interpreted as overtures to the U.S. The Carter administration, too, came to power on a platform of change in both domestic and foreign policy with heavy emphasis on human rights".<sup>1</sup> Thus, it was predicted that a kind of atmosphere was going to be created in which both the countries would have opportunity of removing doubts and misgivings regarding each other. In fact the Indian hostile U.S. Press, too showed signs of hope in Desai's Government. The New York Times welcomed the Janata's alterations in 'Key areas of foreign policy'.<sup>2</sup> But in reality no such 'alterations' took place. Rather, in less than a month of taking over by the Janata Government, Gromyko flew into Delhi. In turn Morarji Desai visited Moscow, in October 1977 and again in June 1979; on both

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1. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search For Power: Indira Gandhi's (Foreign Policy 1966-1982, New Delhi, 1984), p. 94.

2. New York Times, 27 June 1977.

occasions, he was received by Brezhnev with ceremonial honours befitting the head of a large friendly state.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. policy towards the sub-continent and particularly towards India did not reflect any marked shift except for some goodwill visits by the heads of both the States and other dignatories. Mr. Carter and Mrs. Carter visited India in January 1978 exuding praise for India's achievements and expressing interest in human - scaled cooperative projects for the future.<sup>4</sup> They received a warm welcome. In lieu Prime Minister Mr. Desai paid a goodwill visit to the U.S. in June 1978. High hopes of improved relations were sustained while the difficulties which surfaced were suppressed.<sup>5</sup> Foreign Minister Vajpayee expressed satisfaction with the 'sense of equality' which now marked Indo-American relations.<sup>6</sup> But this sense of equality did not last long. In fact in 1979 when Carter reviewed his foreign policy priorities from human rights back to national security, American and Indian strategic perceptions clashed once again.<sup>7</sup> The

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3. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Why the Soviets are closer" in World Focus, 'India and the Super Powers', Nov.-Dec. 1982, p. 48.
  4. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power, Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982, New Delhi, 1984, p.25.
  5. Ibid.,
  6. A.B. Vajpayee, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 13 May 1978, FAR May 1978.
  7. Surjit Mansingh, p.95.

strategic cleavage between Indian and the U.S. did persist in the Janata regime amidst rehtoric<sup>s</sup> of 'sense of equality'. Relations between the two countries did improve but not in the 'Key areas' as it is said. The improvement was confined to trade and collaboration agreements. In fact in 1978 Indo-U.S. trade touched the all time peak of \$ 2 billion, a thousand collaboration agreements were concluded, in 250 of which American partners invested in the equity capital, a direct line of communication was established between Carter and Desai.<sup>8</sup> But as regards to strategic perception both countries differed. The nuclear non-proliferation issue is one for instance. By making nuclear non-proliferation the centrepiece of America's relations with the third World, Carter hurt India's nationalist pride as well as its nuclear development programme.<sup>9</sup> The hopes whatsoever of getting shipments of enriched fuel from the U.S., were also belied down by them. It also became evidently clear that India was not

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8. Bhabani Sen Gupta, p.48.

9. Ibid.

going to accept full scope safeguards and submit her nuclear capability to international inspection and close her nuclear option. Furthermore, the U.S. proposed a no-nuclear - weapons agreement between India and Pakistan with a guarantee given by the U.S. the Soviet Union and China. But this was not all. In fact whether it was the question of constructing a China-Japan-U.S. axis in the western pacific to contain Soviet Power, or taking an unperturbed view of China's "educational expedition" in Vietnam (which Jimmy Carter described as "frontier penetration") or mootng a new military alliance spanning the Persian Gulf region in the event of a major emergency, or polarising the Arabs and pushing them into a Middle Eastern civil war, or enhancing American naval presence in the Indian Ocean or extending even indirect moral or material support to counter-revolutionary insurgency in Afghanistan; each one of these strokes, speculative or actual, tended to offend Indian strategic interests in South Asia; cumulatively, they posed a veritable threat to the predominance earned by India in the region.<sup>10</sup>

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10. Bhabani Sen Gupta, p. 49.



Hence, it can be said that the Janata Party's claim of "balanced and sober relationship" with the two super powers was destroyed by the U.S. foreign policy moves. This amply demonstrate that the policies of the United States towards India have been built upon strategic considerations as well as technocratic approaches to economic development.<sup>11</sup> The original appreciation of the United States for the Janata Government was partly founded on the belief that it would not be so close to the Kremlin as Mrs. Gandhi's Administration was.<sup>12</sup> However, the U.S. soon realized that the regional factors which had forced the convergence of Indo-Soviet interests, were still there.

The exist of the Janata Government in July 1979 did not lead to any significant revisions in India's foreign policy as such. The caretaker government of Prime Minister Charan Singh continued to follow the general foreign policy aims of its

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11. M.A. Zafar Shah, India and the Super Powers, New Delhi, 1983, p. 176.

12. Ibid., p. 178.



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predecessors.<sup>13</sup> It was in the December of this year that Russian intervention in Afghanistan took place. Indian response to the Russian intervention was not to the liking of White House. New Delhi has followed a two-pronged policy; it has made clear to the Soviet Union its disapproval of prolonged Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and it has tried at international forums to find the rationale for the Soviet intervention linking it to a sense of American military initiatives in the Persian Gulf region and to international assistance flowing to the rebels in Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup>

Mrs. Gandhi staged a come back into power in 1980 the year in which Mr. Reagan came to White House. As President Reagan entered the White House installing a highly conservative and hawkish administration

in Washington, relations between the two countries touched a very low ebb. Soon after assuming office, President Reagan offered a big haul of military aid to

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13. Ibid., p. 176

14. Bhabani Sen Gupta, p. 49.

Pakistan. Zia obtained a large assistance package of \$ 3.2 billion including the most sophisticated F-16 fighter bombers and other arms.<sup>15</sup> This decision resulted in the widening of the strategic cleavage between Pakistan and India and between Washington and New Delhi. Reagan's new policy of collaboration with Pakistan was loudly condemned in India. But the loud was <sup>not</sup> heard by the White House. However efforts were made on both sides to overcome the problem. In 1981-82 Mrs. Gandhi and President Ronald Reagan made efforts to surmount their differences.<sup>16</sup> They met at Cancun which produced as it is said, smiles , if nothing else. Their governments set about the task of improving bilateral relations by first limiting the effects of the existing damage and then seeking non-controversial areas of matching interests where cooperation could be encouraged.<sup>17</sup> Then came the summer 1982 Mrs. Gandhi's visit to the U.S. which to the most generated the most favourable publicity for India <sup>in</sup> the U.S.

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15. Rajvir Singh, U.S. - Pakistan & India Strategic Relations, Allahabad, 1985, p. 182.

16. Surjit Mansingh, p. 95.

17. Ibid.

In any case Mrs. Gandhi's state visit to the U.S. was a major event and more than a mere goodwill visit. Another aspect of this visit was that on the eve of the visit Reagan administration had announced an agreement by which the responsibility for re-supplying TAPS with low graded enriched uranium fuel had passed from the U.S. to France, putting the controversy over Tarapur to an end. But still the nuclear irritant between India and the U.S. persisted as India refused to consider any additional safeguards of 'pursuit and perpetuity' on its nuclear facilities.

Moreover, the Reagan administration's insistence that the developing countries must borrow more from private commercial banks than from international institutions like - I.M.F., I.B.R.D. etc. was against New Delhi's international monetary policy. Indian policy regarding economic aid was one of having more of it from multilateral institutions than from private commercial banks keeping in line what Nehru said that we should not put all our eggs in one basket. At the same time, the rapid unilateral build up of U.S. military power in the Indian ocean and the Persian Gulf region shook India's security planners.<sup>18</sup>

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18. Bhabani Sen Gupta, N. 3, p. 49.

Pakistan's growing relations with the U.S. in the Reagan regime had its ill effects on the Indo-U.S. relations. The U.S. initiated its own diplomacy to narrow, if not close, the strategic divide between Pakistan and India by persuading Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq in September 1981 to offer India a no war pact.<sup>19</sup> India under the late Mrs. Gandhi's regime, in turn offered to Pakistan a treaty of peace and friendship. Mr. Zia, uncertain of himself has been trying, of course, willy nilly to negotiate on the issue since the time the concept was floated. The efforts still continue with dim prospects.

Moreover, on issues like disarmament, U.S. invasion on Grenada, Indian ocean as a zone of peace, the independence of Namibia and the New International Economic order, the Indian and the U.S. differences are obvious. The Indian view as that of the most of developing countries is that the existing international economic order is discriminatory and favours the affluent countries of the west and hence it should be done away with. The protectionist

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19. Ibid., p. 51.

policies adopted by the countries of the west are cutting <sup>in</sup> roads in the economies of the developing countries. The disparity between the rich and poor nations of the world is widening with the result that most of Third World countries are falling in the grip of what is known as "Debt-Trap". The multi-nationals are sucking the economies of the developing countries with the result that neo-colonialism is finding deep roots. Hence, the western world should also come forward to assist in doing away with the existing international economic system as the crisis is common.<sup>20</sup> But ironically, the U.S. does not seem to share the view with the Third World, on the contrary, of late the U.S. seems to be threatening the world system as such. It has already disassociated itself from UNESCO (United Nations Educational & Scientific Organisation) and is showing signs of not cooperating with other agencies of the United Nations. On the question of the independence of Namibia, Indian position is crystal clear. The Pretoria regime must go and apartheid must be

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20. The view held by Willy <sup>B.</sup> in his report entitled "Common Crisis".

dismantled. There cannot be two opinions on this point. The linkage theory as floated by the U.S., according to New Delhi does not hold ground. The withdrawal of the Cuban troops has nothing to do with the independence of Namibia. The obnoxious system of apartheid, to the Indian mind must be done away with. The U.S. position is bogas and smacks of imperialistic designs. India has voiced loudly that the U.N. proposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria Regime must be applied come what may.

As regards to Indian ocean as a Zone of Peace, India is opposed to any super power presence in the region. But the Indian contention is that it was the United States that began the naval rivalry as early as the mid 1960s when it established the North-West cape very low frequency communication station in Austartia.<sup>21</sup> The American strategists regard the Indian ocean an important strategic area. The imperialist jumping off ground that is being created in Pakistan could, circumstances permitting, play an important, if not the key role in this direction.<sup>22</sup>

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21. Z.A. Zafar Shah, p. 133.

22. Pakistan's Arms Build Up' an article published in Pravada (June 24, 1984) quoted from Mainstream Vol. XXII No. 45, July 7, 1984, p.30.

The above observation is sufficient enough to suggest as to why Pakistan was included into the sphere of operations of America's Central command, which is oriented on the Indian ocean, primarily on the Persian Gulf and which has rapid deployment forces under its control.

The divergence between India and the U.S. on these issues did persist, "but on India's part, there has never been during the last four decades any conscious effort to distance itself from the United States, but unfortunately a deeper emotional closeness has been pre-empted not by Indian inhibitions, but by Washington's perceptions built around anti-Sovietism which impelled the United States to seek an ally in Pakistan in preference to India.<sup>23</sup>

India being a non-aligned country endeavours to follow an independent foreign policy. The Indian policy has been, over the years to take stand on issues on merit and not on other grounds. The same point was reiterated by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi who assumed the office<sup>of</sup> Prime-ministership after Mrs. Gandhi's

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23. Rajiv's Foreign Policy Projections, Mainstream, Vol. XXII No. 20, January 12, 1985, p. 4.



assassination on 31st October 1984. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi following his predecessors, in a bid, to improve relations <sup>with</sup> the U.S., paid a goodwill visit to the U.S. In his speeches there Mr. Gandhi made it clear that India wishes to have good relations with every nation without discriminating against any country. In his post-election national broadcast on January 5, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi said, "Our policy is to be friends with all countries on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit. Our commitment to non-alignment and a new world economic order based on justice, equality and mutual cooperation is unshakeable". Again answering the questions in interviews with News Week and Time Magzines, Mr. Gandhi said, "We like to look at issues on merit and we would like to continue doing that."<sup>25</sup> While indicating India's policy of improving relations with the U.S., Mr. Gandhi also made it clear that India would like to keep her option of individuality open. He said, "We want to improve our relations in every sphere with U.S. but we want to keep our option of individuality open".<sup>26</sup>

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24. Quoted from Mainstream, "Rajiv's Foreign Policy Projections", Vol. XXII, No. 20, Jan.12, 1985,p.4.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 34.

To sum up it can be said that the U.S. under Reagan administration did not show any signs of having cordial relations with India. That is why for the last four years India has had to frame its security policies on the assumption that Reagan could not be expected to assess India in the right perspective. Indian concern over the deterioration in the security situation brought about directly by the U.S. policy of reinforcing Pakistan's military power.<sup>27</sup> Indo-U.S. relations have undoubtedly had their ups and downs under successive American Presidents, but even the semblance of Johnson, Nixon and Carter vanished under Reagan.<sup>28</sup> The Reagan administration has given a deaf ear to the New Delhi's apprehensions that U.S. encouragement of Pakistan and other neighbours of India has resulted in a virtual encirclement of India.<sup>29</sup> But still, New Delhi will continue making efforts of having better ties with the U.S. as indicated by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi in

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27. S.Viswam, India and President Reagan, Mainstream, Vol. XXIII, No. 12, 1984, p. 6.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

his policy statement broadcast on November 12, 1984. But how Mr. Reagan will respond to Mr. Gandhi's endeavour in his second term in White House, is a matter of speculation and guess.

## CHAPTER - III

### THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN

The administration of Pakistan now headed by Mr. Zia, the Chief Martial Law Administrator did not change any basic perception as far as foreign policy is concerned. For U.S., Pakistan was as important as ever. But in the wake of the events like the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Russian intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan became even more important in the American calculations. In January 1979 the Shah of Iran was overthrown in a revolution headed by Ayatullah Khomeini. The result was the loss of a strong American ally in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. The fall of Shah of Iran meant a big loss to the U.S. in the sense that the Shah regime used to protect the giant oil tankers passing through the Persian Gulf to the U.S., Europe, Isreal and Japan.

The successful Iranian revolution led by Ayatullah Khomeini and the ouster of the Shah of Iran, the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan to preempt a coup in Kabul which would not have gone in

favour of the western alliance, the capture of American embassy personnel in Tehran as hostages by the Iranian revolutionaries and students and the inability of Washington to govern political asylum to the exiled Shah had a serious adverse effect on American image and influence on the international scene.<sup>1</sup>

By now the U.S.-Pak relations entered an important phase and Pakistan became much more important for obvious reasons in American calculations for playing important role in the Gulf region.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the American officials in talks with their Pakistani counterparts on numerous occasions stressed the need of upholding the territorial integrity of Pakistan. On 14 January, 1980, in his address to the nation President Carter promised to provide assistance "to help Pakistan depend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north."<sup>3</sup> Keeping in view this promise

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1. Rajvir Singh, U.S.-Pakistan and India; Strategic Relations Allahabad 1985, p.145.
  2. A.K. Damadaran, Soviet Action in Afghanistan, International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 14, Oct.-Dec., 1980, p. 589.
  3. DSB, Ja. 1980 addressed to Joint session of the U.S. Congress on 23 Jan 1980, quoted from Rajvir Singh, US-Pakistan & India, Allahabad, 1985, p.148.

Carter administration decided to make Pakistan militarily strong and proposed \$ 400 million aid to Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> The American offer of \$ 400 million was described by President Zia as "Peanuts" as it was too small to be effective but large enough to provoke the Soviets. Islamabad bitterly criticised the proposed aid to be given to the military regime.

The Carter administration paying heed to the Pakistani disgust of the proposal, sent Brezezinski to Islamabad in February 1980 for discussion on the quantum of aid and the nature of the American commitment. Brezezinski favoured the Pakistanis. He said, "The U.S. identify the integrity and independence of this vital region and its determination to help Pakistan meet the threat at its door."<sup>5</sup>

In the mean time the Reaganites came to power in the U.S. It was said that the victory of Republican Party over Democratic reflected the change from liberalism to conservatism in America. The change in the White House raised high hopes in the

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4. V.K. Srivastava, The United States and Recent Development in Afghanistan, p. 623.

5. Brezezinski's speech of the banquet, 2 Feb. 1980, Dawn, 3 Feb. 1980.

military Junta in Pakistan of forging a closer security relationship with the United States. After assuming office, the actor turned politician Mr. Ronald Reagan adopted the policy of militarization of the world to contain the Soviet influence which had increased during Carter regime, especially in South-West Asia, the Middle East and Europe. In the changed scenario (the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Russian intervention in Afghanistan) the U.S. was expected "to revive its interest in Pakistani base facilities at Badaber of Gilgit near the Pamir Plateau just south of Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan figured so important in the U.S. calculations that it was called a "front line state" in the area of crisis visualised by Brezezinski, the then national security adviser. Resultantly the U.S. promptly offered military and economic aid to Pakistan.

The coming of Reagan regime in the U.S. intensified the new-cold war. The Reagan administration made it a point that the Russian intervention in Afghanistan will no longer be tolerated. Hence, Pakistan was

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6. Rajvir Singh, N.1, p. 161.

vitally needed as conduit for weapons to Afghan insurgents to the insurgency going.<sup>7</sup> The strategic location of Pakistan was well perceived by the U.S. decision makers. Jaw A. Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on March 23 1981, emphasized the strategic location of Pakistan in the following words -

"Pakistan... (is) strategically located and most immediately threatened. A stronger, more self-confident Pakistan capable of resisting direct or indirect Soviet pressures through Afghanistan is thus essential for the protection of free world interests in the region... Pakistan deserves our support and we are in the process of developing a closer and more co-operative bilateral relationship."<sup>8</sup>

In keeping with this realization the U.S. administration upgraded the "peanuts" to

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7. Ibid.

8. Statement by Coon, 27 April, 1981 Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan, U.S. House 97th Congress. Ist Sers Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1982), p. 5. quoted from *ibid*, p. 161-62.



"Walnuts"<sup>9</sup> much to the satisfaction of Islamabad. The "Walnuts" included \$ 3.2 billion U.S. economic and military aid package to Pakistan.<sup>10</sup>

The changed U.S. policy towards Pakistan concurrent with the proposed U.S. arms sales to her, to the U.S. decision makers, was not going to destabilize the situation in the region in any way because of India's military superiority. Moreover, the U.S. decision makers time and again highlighted the point that their rearming programme of Pakistan was to protect her from the Soviets. Hence, India need not worry about it. But if history is any evidence, it can be proved without any difficulty that whenever Pakistan got arms from U.S. or for that matter from any other source, the Pakistan leadership tempted to use them against India - the 1965 and 1971 wars can always be cited as examples. But the Indian worries were never paid heed to by the U.S. strategic analysts. On the contrary, they have intensified the programme of arming Pakistan. The U.S. plan to supply arms

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9. P.B. Sinha, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. V, No. 7, Oct. 1981.

10. P.B. Sinha, General Zia's visit to the U.S., Strategic Analysis, Vol. VI, No. 10, January 1983, p. 611.

and equipments for Pakistan includes ToW missile equipped Cobra helicopters, 24 missile launchers, 2000 anti tank guided missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, SAN's, self-propelled guns, 2000 tanks including M-60<sup>S</sup>, M-113 armoured personnel carriers, automatic ladders, and night vision equipment.<sup>11</sup> But the most important factor of this arms supply to Pakistan was the acquisition of F-16<sup>S</sup>- highly sophisticated long range counter air fighter bombers, by Pakistan. The proposal to sell F-16<sup>S</sup> to Pakistan was described as "the key stone of the U.S. aid package".

The U.S., in abid, to justify the selling of F-16<sup>S</sup> to Pakistan, came out with many arguments with the ultimate analysis "that the sale of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan was in the overall interest of the United States."<sup>12</sup> The Indian view point was that the sale would escalate an arms race in the sub-continent. Furthermore, it would reverse the "limited but encouraging trend towards more cordial United States/

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11. Rajvir Singh, N.1, p. 168.

12. M.Shankar, Pakistan and the U.S. Congress, Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. V, No.10, January 1982, p. 509.

India relations" and would strengthen the hands of those in India who advocate closer relations with Soviet Union which in effect would mean more Indian dependence on the Soviet Union for military supplies.<sup>13</sup> Again, the official Indian response was that the weapons being supplied by the United States were not meant for defensive purposes but essentially for offensive purposes. The U.S. turned a deaf ear to Indian pleas and is likely to do the same in the foreseeable future, simply because it suits them to keep a pro-U.S. military regime. Moreover, the military regime of the sort of Zia, depends for its survival on its army not on popular support and hence the support of a super power like the U.S. is a must for its existence. Therefore, the Zia regime has to toe the U.S. line. Ironically, this is the irony with most of the Third World countries.

But all the same the U.S. and Pakistan have a mutual commitment to serve their different objectives. If the U.S.A. needs Pakistan's efficient and war-tested military machine to check the alleged Soviet

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13. Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations. 'The Latest' Phase," World Today, December, 1981, p. 471.

expansionism towards the West's oil lifeline in the Gulf, Pakistan needs U.S. support for its security in view of the changed geo-political situation in the region.<sup>14</sup> It is at this backdrop that the U.S. created a Central Command (Centcom) for military operations in the area - from Kenya to Pakistan - not specifically covered by its Pacific and Atlantic Commands, even a cursory glance at the map would indicate the confluence of interests between the U.S.A. and Pakistan in this region, especially with Islamabad's obsessive hostility towards India.<sup>15</sup> There are indications that the CETCOM has plans for various contingencies in the Gulf, ranging from intelligence sharing to military assistance to a Gulf State having internal security problems, if requested.<sup>16</sup>

The U.S. has global interests. The cetcom etc. are nothing but a part of the wider strategy. U.S. needs naval and other support facilities at certain

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14. R.G. Sawhney, "Focus on U.K.-Pak Security Relationship", Strategic Analysis, November, 1983, p. 144.

15. The Times of India, 16 April, 1984.

16. Rajvir Singh, U.S.-Pakistan & India, p. 186.

regions to achieve desired goals. There are indications despite repeated Pakistani denials that Pakistan's territory on the American sea might be made available to the U.S.A. for the construction of a naval cum air base. In fact in a dependency relationship, the dependent partner has to serve the interests of the dominant partner in the hope of getting some concessions. The same is the case with the U.S. - Pak relationship. For her South-Asia policy the U.S. needs Pakistan. And how Pakistan is being used by the U.S. can be illustrated by revealing what Jack Anderson has revealed. Quoting inside sources and several secret to the top secret documents Jack Anderson stated that (a) President Zia has promised "to allow U.S. planes to use Pak airfields should the Soviet bombers threaten the Persian Gulf from Afghanistan and (b) General Zia has agreed to let U.S. weapons be sent to the Afghan rebels through his special forces. Besides the Pakistan airforce base at Mairipur near Karachi is described as the facility most frequently utilised. This makes ample clear how Pakistan is becoming a major cog in the U.S. imperial strategy, and not by a

concurrence of events but in accordance with the political choice conspicuously made by its Govt.<sup>17</sup> American interest in Pakistan was based on her calculations which aimed at the exploitation of Pakistan's strategic situation on the map of the world.<sup>18</sup> The U.S. has kept her hand on Pakistan not because of similarity of perception but for the fact that it serves U.S. interests very well. The U.S., in order to encircle the spreading influence of the Soviet Union has provided Pakistan with military and economic aid to the extent possible. The U.S. help to Pakistan is not because of philanthropic reasons but simply for serving her strateging interests. The Zia regime has provided ample opportunity for this kind of exercise. The new cold war impelled the U.S. to look forward for reliable allies to encircle the Soviet influence.

The unpopular regime of General Zia also looked for the U.S. support to remain in power amidst movements like M.R.D. (Movement Far Restoration of Democracy). The internal disturbances in Pakistan

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17. 'Pakistan's Arms Build Up', an article published in Pravada (June 24, 1984) quoted from Mainstream Vol. XXII No. 45, July 7, 1984, p. 30.

18. Rajvir Singh, N.1, p. 212.

seemed to threaten the very moorings of the Zia regime. The Zia regime desperately needed a blessing hand to remain in power. The U.S. provided the 'blessing hand' on the condition that the Zia regime would have to show the gratitude. The Zia Administration has showed enough gratitude in many ways by serving the U.S. interests in the sub-continent. Thus it becomes clear that American policy toward the sub-continent continues to centre on an aid programme for Pakistan. For the U.S. Pakistan became the main roadblock to Soviet expansion southward.<sup>19</sup> It was also crucial as host for over two million Afghan refugees and numerous insurgent movements, and served as an uncertain but essential conduit for aid to the guerrillas.<sup>20</sup> This brings out the main tenets of Reagan administration's foreign policy in the early 80s which included - (1) a tough, ever harsh, diplomatic and ideological stance against Moscow; (2) an extensive build up of U.S. military power; (3) delay of negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

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19. Fred Greene, 'The United States And Asia in 1981' in Asian Survey, Jan.1982, Vol.XXII, No.1, p. 8.

20. Ibid.

until the armament programme was well under way; (4) a down grading of the value of arms control agreements in enhancing U.S. security; (5) emphasis of east-west issue and, deemphasis on various regional or local problems to solidify by the Soviet Union; and (6) heavy reliance on arms sales abroad to cement this consensus.<sup>21</sup> The U.S. policy towards the sub-continent under Reagan administration is being pushed in the light of the above foreign policy and goals.

The Reagan administration's sudden haul of military and economic aid package to Pakistan, explains the fact amply that it was a diplomatic move on the part of Mr. Reagan to suit the then situation. The situation, it is said was changed dramatically with the Soviet intervention in December 1979, because prior to 1979, American relations with its former Pakistani ally were rather poor. Military aid had ended with Pakistan's attack on India in 1965, and economic aid was terminated in 1979 following discovery of Pakistan's effort to make

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21. Ibid.



nuclear weapons.<sup>22</sup> The burning of the U.S. embassy late in 1979, and Pakistan's evident desire to stay on good terms with Iran (because Shi'ites comprised one quarter to one-third of the population), added to the tension.<sup>23</sup> Also related with it was the fact that Pakistan had joined the non-aligned movement.

To sum up, it can be stated that whatever may be the factors which impelled the White House to forge closer ties with Islamabad, one thing is clear that "Pakistan's alignment with the U.S. has limited the sphere of her foreign policy as she would not be able to settle all her differences with India without prior permission of the Western powers".<sup>24</sup> Hence, if peace is to be restored in the Indian sub-continent, U.S. must stop giving military assistance to Pakistan. India is not opposed to the good U.S.-Pakistani relationship but is certainly opposed to Washington-Islamabad axis aligned against India.

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22. Fred Greene, 'The United States And Asia in 1980', in Asian Survey, Jan.1984, Vol.XXI, November 1, pp. 8-9.

23. Ibid., p. 9.

24. Sasadhar Sinha, Indian independence perspective, Bombay, 1974, p. 226.

Indian contention is that super power rivalries should not find any place in the Indian sub-continent. Bilateral differences should be sorted out bilaterally. No third party should be given opportunity to exploit the situation particularly in the era of proxy warfare.

## CHAPTER -IV

### THE US-INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

The US policy towards Pakistan and India has been one of favour and biases. Despite having democratic systems both India and the US have managed to have developed a sort of chasm which does not seem to be abridged. The record of three decades shows that despite declared common interests in the peace and stability of southern Asia, the two countries found collaboration extremely difficult.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Pakistan having an undemocratic system has figured important in the U.S. calculations.

Despite the US claims, particularly after 1972 of their preference for good relations with both India and Pakistan, in practice, however, US strategic imperatives placed Pakistan in the category of an ally in a global confrontation and India in the low priority bracket of a

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1. Surjit Mansingh, India's Search for Power : Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-82, New Delhi, 1984, p. 69.

potential regional power".<sup>2</sup> The independent foreign policy of India was never looked with favour by the U.S. More so was the case with regard to the India's policy of non-alignment. The U.S. openly supported a rightest dictatorship in Pakistan against a democratic country like India.<sup>3</sup>

The situation went bad to worse with the coming of the Reagan & Company in the white house. The Reagan administration was most vociferous against the non-aligned countries particularly India. The Indian stand on issues like Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion on Grenada, the independence of Namibia, the U.S. policy in central American etc., was never in tune with the American stand. The growing Indo-Soviet relations was perceived by the U.S. as the key problem in the Indo-US relations particularly after India had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation for 20 years with the Soviet Union

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2. Ibid., p. 75.

3. K.P. Karunakaran, "The Role of Non-alignment", in World Focus, Nov.-Dec. 1982, New Delhi, p. 81.

in 1971. It appears that somehow the U.S. administration has laboured hard to follow the old dictum- "Enemy's friend is our enemy".

On the otherhand, the U.S. administration under Reagan, has offered a rich haul of military and economic aid to Pakistan despite knowing the fact that any upward swing in the military strength of Pakistan has invariably led its rulers to go in for a military adventure against India. Even if Pakistan's claims of Azad Kashmir are unrealistic, the U.S. diplomatic support on the issue was always forthcoming right from the very beginning. Not only this, there are reports that Pakistan had a clear hand in assisting Khalistani terrorists, the U.S. was uncharacteristically silent nor it did ask Pakistan to stop there kinds of activities. In the circumstances the Indian allegations of clandestine support to Pakistan in its sinister designs of destabilizing India are justified more so in the light of the fact of U.S. imparting training to the Sikh terrorists in camps stationed in America.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan towards the end of December 1979 brought about a dramatic change in the situation and led American policy makers to "rediscover"

the strategic importance of Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> As a frontline state, Pakistan has become "an essential line of defense and an indispensable element of any strategy that sought to punish the Soviets for their action."<sup>5</sup> The Reagan administration's attempt with a view to safeguard its strategic interests particularly in the Persian Gulf area after the fall of Shah of Iran, "to re-establish a close security relationship with Pakistan reminds one of the "special relationship" that existed between the two countries in 1950's and early 1960's specially under the Eisenhower Administration".<sup>6</sup>

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4. Rashmi Jain, U.S. -Pak Relations, 1947-1983; New Delhi, 1983, p. 91.
  5. Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools? U.S. Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration." Asian Survey, October 1982, 969. From 1977 to 1981 Thornton was a senior member of the staff of the National Security Council.
  6. Rashmi Jain, N. 4, p. 146.

The U.S. support for Pakistan over the years has primarily been influenced by its desire to contain Soviet influence and to promote its foreign policy objectives in the strategically and economically important Middle East where it cannot allow an unfriendly power to have exclusive access or increased influence.<sup>7</sup> The U.S. arms supply to Pakistan under Reagan administration<sup>8</sup> can be jolly well understood in the above context. However, the Reagan Administration has appeared to disregard Indian susceptibilities of U.S. supply of arms to Pakistan. The Indian objections are not considered by the Reagan Administration. In fact the new team was unwilling to either reduce the quantum of the package in the light of the Indian objections or give some sort of a guarantee or assurance that U.S. weapons would not be used against India.<sup>9</sup>

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7. Ibid., p. 148.

8. A \$ 3.2 billion package of economic and military aid to Pakistan.

9. Rashmi Jain, N. 4, p. 147.

Neither the quantum of arms supply was reduced nor India was given any assurance that the weapons given to Pakistan will not be used against India. The Reagan Administration somehow seems adamant not to pay heed to Indian worries.

Thus it becomes evident that "the relationship between arms and influence is a close one in the case of U.S.-Pakistani interaction".<sup>10</sup> The correlation was established at the very outset as it was clearly indicated by Pakistan that the United States "have to offere substantial arms assistance in return for Pakistani membership in pacts and the pursuit of joint interests along the "Northern Ties".<sup>11</sup> Since India right from the very beginning was opposed to military pacts and alliances because of her non-aligned foreign policy, the U.S. and Indian perceptions differed radically. Once it was clear to white house that New Delhi cannot be used as an instrument: by it

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10. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States & Pakistan: The Evolution of An Influence Relationship, New York, 1982, p. 106.

11. Ibid.



to further its(U.S.) interests in South Asia, it had no other option but to align with Pakistan. Pakistan on its own, from the very outset turned to the U.S. for political, economic and military support. Nursing a sense of insecurity, profoundly fearful of its bigger neighbour, disappointed in its expectations of support from other Islamic Countries and from Britain, and suspicious of the motives of the Soviet Union, Pakistani leaders felt that if they played their cards well, they might succeed in convincing American leaders of the value of forging a special relationship with Pakistan.<sup>12</sup> They did succeed because in them, U.S. found a useful ally. Hence, it is said that it was a marriage of convenience.<sup>13</sup> Whenever Pakistan seemed less important the relations between the U.S. and Pakistan touched a low ebb with the result that U.S.-Pak relations over the years have followed an uneven course with several ups and downs.

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12. M.S. Venkataramani and H.C. Arya, "America's Military Alliance with Pakistan: The Evolution and Course of an Uneasy Partnership", International Studies, July-Oct., 1966, p. 77.

13. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, No. 10, p. 106.

To sum up, it can be said that the U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan is a fine example of a typical Super Power adopting a regional policy guided by global objectives and considerations. The U.S. quest for establishing dependency relationship with some of the Third World Countries to have bases and <sup>other</sup> facilities, can be found in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. However, India does not want this sort of relationship with any country of the world. India wants friendship on parity. The U.S. could not force India to forge that kind of relationship with it or for that matter with any other country of the world. In fact the U.S. diplomacy of miles and a concerted drive to introduce corrections in India's policies specially in ties with other states, and more specially in ties with the Soviet Union, have failed.<sup>14</sup>

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14. H.D. Malaviya, M.P., India-US : A Blunt & Cold Relationship, New Delhi, 1978, p. 121.

### CONCLUSION

After having studied U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan it becomes clear that "Indo-US relations have for decades been affected by differences over matters both local and world affairs that are usually founded on major differences in perception and interests".<sup>1</sup> The understanding between the two democratic states sometimes did improve, but relations as such between the two, did not improve as external policies are founded not on understanding but on perceived national interests. The domestic changes within the two countries did not have had much impact on the relationship between the two countries in general. The U.S. is a world power and has global interests. The U.S. policies towards middle powers and third world countries are being guided by her global interests. That is why "the foreign policy of the United States towards India is only the regional implementation of a world wide strategy".<sup>2</sup>

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1. M.A. Zafar Shah, India & the Super Powers, 1983, p. 176.

2. Ibid.

The U.S. bias towards Pakistan and growing rapprochement with China has had its bearings on Indo-US relations too. The nature of Indo-US relations is, to a great degree, a product of the strategic options pursued by both states, including Washington's relations with Islamabad & Peking, and is not so much the consequence of an absence of understanding or sympathy, or because of personality confrontations.<sup>3</sup>

The crux of the U.S. diplomacy lies in the fact of using unpopular regimes as powers in the global chess board. The states which do not fit in the U.S. calculations are bound to be looked down by the U.S. The states which serves the U.S. interests in the U.S. perception, are rewarded accordingly. The problems between the U.S. & India arose precisely because of the fact that India ventured to adopt an independent foreign policy. The White House could not bully New Delhi with the result that the mantle had fallen upon Islamabad. After all the U.S. has to have somebody in South-

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3. Ibid., p. 176-177.

Asia so far as the U.S. policy for the region is concerned. The strategic location of Pakistan made her case very strong for carrying out the U.S. policy in the region. The unpopular regimes in Pakistan further strengthened<sup>ne</sup> the case of Pakistan. Moreover, in the U.S. perception, the Soviet influence in the region which certainly got widened by the Indo-Soviet friendship, was needed to be checked. And hence the need of an ally. The Russian intervention in Afghanistan made the region even more important for the U.S. Pakistan, being a neighbour of Afghanistan and situated in the close vicinity of the U.S.S.R., was elevated from a 'frontline state' to an 'indispensable' state as far as the U.S. policy for the region is concerned.

The U.S. policy towards India & Pakistan has not been consistent in general and towards Pakistan in particular. That is why it appears that the U.S. policy towards Pakistan will be influenced in the future, as in the past by its changing foreign policy priorities, the policies and attitudes of the two other interested Great Powers, viz. China and the Soviet Union, as well as by the developments within the U.S. and Pakistan and the Countries of the

region.<sup>4</sup> As far as the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relations is concerned, it seems probable that it would depend on the intensity or otherwise of the competition between the two Super Powers, Soviet Policy towards Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf region, and the nature and changes in Indo-Soviet, Indo-US, US-Chinese and Indo-Pakistani relations.<sup>5</sup>

As regards to India, the prospects of healthy Indo-US relations are rather bleak so long as the US is supplying arms to Pakistan. Of course, India is eager to mend fences with the U.S. but not on the US terms. Moreover, it is not a one way process. The US has to respond to the Indian call for an amicable and durable friendship. As regards to the future of the Indo-US relations, it can be said that a lot depends on the strategic environment and the perception of it by both the countries. Unless the strategic environment changes drastically, there does not seem to be much scope for a change in the Indo-US

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4. Rashmi Jain, US-Pak Relations, 1947-1983, New Delhi, 1983, p. 155.

5. Ibid., pp. 155-156.

relations. But whatever it may be, it is almost certain that no government in the United States can completely ignore or write off India altogether which is economically and militarily the most powerful nation in the region.<sup>6</sup>

The U.S. diplomacy in the Indian sub-continent has been one of using unpopular regimes to fulfill her global objectives. And the U.S. is likely to continue with the same policy so long as the military regimes of the region make room for that. The military dictators are hardly bothered about the interests of the people and the country. Hence, military regimes must go if the super power intervention is to be avoided in the region. Not only that, bilateral differences must also be sorted out bilaterally, if the vulnerability of the superpower rivalry is to be avoided in the region.

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6. Ibid., p. 148.

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