

**GEOPOLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION
ENLARGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
or the award of the degree of degree of*

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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
DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “**GEOPOLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY**”, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.


ANAND KUMAR

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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
Any research would be utterly impossible without the help of documentation and availability of scholarly works. For this JNU library have also been of immense help, especially the Cyber library.

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List of Abbreviation

AKP	Adaletve Kalkinma Partisi
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEEC	Central Eastern European Countries
CSFP	Common foreign security policy
CSU	Christian Social Union
CZ	Czechoslovakia
DE	Deustche (Germany)
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
HU	Hungary
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
PKK	Kurdish Worker's Party
USD	United States Dollar
UNCTAD	United Nations Cooperation Trade and Development

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Geopolitics when viewed broadly is just one of the subjects studied by political geographers. It is concerned basically with the application of geographic information and geographic perspectives to the development of states foreign policies. In simple words it has been called, with some justification, “applied political geography”.

Geopolitics as a concept is as old as civilization itself. It has evolved over a long period of time. At present, its importance can be easily felt the way it is used to highlight the present dynamic international relation across the globe, like geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, geopolitics of resources etc. But as a systematic study, it has a recent origin. Even now for want of a systematic theoretical basis, it is yet to become a regular discipline like geography, economics, history, philosophy, political science etc. However since the second half of nineteenth century, it has been steadily developing as a separate branch of learning. Geopolitics deals with the basic factors behind the origin and growth of history and civilization. It tries to narrates the precise geopolitical circumstances in which a state or supra-state (e.g. European Union) has risen or declined. It discovers the geopolitical basis for the growth of a worldwide empire. It further tries to evaluate geopolitical reasons for the success or failure of states or empire.

Geopolitics is presently widely used as a tool in disciplines like political science for various purposes like to examine the nature of the development of the contemporary regional and global geopolitics like Sea-bed resources, Jammu and Kashmir issue, EU enlargement issue etc., or to construct the history of any particular country or region and also to analyze the national power of important countries.

Thus, it is clear that Geopolitics is being used as a powerful tool in social sciences to understand and interpret world political affairs. Therefore it can be said that the scope of geopolitics is wider than that of any other discipline in the field of humanities. The term geopolitics itself connotes the inalienable relationship between geography and politics. However, the study of Geopolitics has undergone a major change during the past-decade. Multidisciplinary in its scope, Geopolitics includes all

aspects of social sciences with particular emphasis on political geography, international relations, the territorial aspects of political science and international law.

A large number of academic definitions are available for geopolitics. If one starts searching the exact meaning of the term of Geopolitics, he would fail to get the same. There are large number of definition exists for geopolitics. While on the one hand, popular media love to use the word without defining it. But, on the other hand, academic literature provides too many definitions of geopolitics, reflecting a broad and never ending intellectual debate.

Geopolitics has evolved over long period of time and thus can be said as a product of its time, and so its definitions have evolved accordingly. *Rudolf Kjellen* who coined the term in 1899 described geopolitics as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space”. This was the first typical sort of definition, based on the, those days of geographical and political surrounding. This definition contains two elements that are crucial within the concept of geopolitics: power (influence, politics) and space (territory, soil). The central role for the state as only powerful entity is very typical for the definition of Kjellen.

Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), another scholar in this field whose ideas inspired the Nazi regime, added political processes to the definition of Geopolitics (Cohen, 2003): “Geopolitics is the new national science of the state, ... doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography.” Haushofer considered Political Geography as an essential part of Geopolitics.

Cohen in his book (2003) defined geopolitics as the “analysis of the interaction between, the geographical settings and political processes. Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction.” This definition focuses on the dynamic interaction between power and space.

It will not be out of place to point that inspite of serious shortcomings; Cohen’s work on geopolitics has certain significant merits. He was the first to give a detailed and all-round picture of global geopolitics and in doing so he takes into consideration space, geographic location, area, population, and their distribution, as well as the existing economy, military might and political alignment of individual

nations, regions and the globe as a whole. These factors are essential pre-requisites in any geopolitical analysis.

However, Cohen's work in geopolitics lacks dynamism as it failed to appreciate the growth of science and technology, transport, population, economics and politics. In other words, Cohen failed to appreciate the dynamicity of the geopolitics which used to keep changing depending on the above mentioned parameters.

Idea of Europe

After having talked about the concept of Geopolitics, now the core of the topic i.e. European Union, will be discussed. Here, first the geography of Europe will be discussed and its connection with Asian land mass. And the political issue will also be dealt with.

Europe when seen from space, it appears a group of islands joined in the east with the land mass of Asia. Though recognized as a continent yet it appears as one of the four peninsulas of Asia. As a small continent, it has so much variety and diversity that the one does not find any other area of comparable size. Europe latitudinally spanning from the North Cape at 71° 8' N, which is the northern most part of the Europe and Cape Trafalgar 36° 30' N which is the southernmost part of Europe but, longitudinally it lacks clear boundary demarcation.

In fact, practically it is not possible to draw a physical barrier between Asia and Europe. The Ural is usually taken as the border line between Asia and Europe, but the Ural Mountain is so low and so much diffused in the south that it cannot be regarded as a distinct border. Though Turkey lies at the threshold of Europe and Asia yet there is no line of demarcation. In the Southern portion, unlike Turkey, Africa is distinctly separated from Europe by the narrow Mediterranean Sea through Gibraltar; the western ends of Europe and Africa appear to meet. However, the Mediterranean coasts of Africa and Europe, though separated geographically, but have been tied to each other culturally and economically throughout history. On the west the great expanse of the Atlantic Ocean had always dared the sailors and adventurers to cross it.

The geographical position of Europe can be conceived of in two distinct ways both as absolute and relative. Europe's relative position, in contrasts is not stable and

has greatly improved in the course of world history. This can be judged from the fact that in the pre-history Europe occupied a remote and terminal position in the world but, radically with the discovery of sea routes across the Atlantic which gave Europe a wider contact with rest of the world.

Economically and politically Europe has been the home of inventions, discovery and rapid rate of progress. The modern civilization took its birth in Europe and spread to other continents. That is why it is called a dynamic continent which has forced the neighboring countries to look at it as a development model both social and economically.

Europe's personality is unique and this can be attributed to the physical, economic and political factors which has always forced others to emulate, it in almost every field.

Europe has meant much different history. Not only have its physical boundaries been subject to dispute, but so too have the culture and political concepts associated with the idea of Europe. Europe's history is full with ruler's fighting with each other for political and economic domination. Nevertheless, at various point of time some uniting and reconciling themes emerged, which laid particular claims of being European. With the expansion of the Roman Empire, the idea of European civilization was born. In the medieval period, Christians came of prominence as a formative element of a European consciousness, and in the sixteenth century the renaissance provided the optimism out of which a modern European world system was forged.¹

Limits to Europe

One basic question which keeps resonating in the context of Europe is that, what is the limit of Europe? After all where does Europe end? These are some of the ancient question to which the conventional answer is the Urals and the Bosphorus. Another question might be that where should the EU end? This is a contemporary issue for which the conventional answer won't work. First, because many countries within those borders are far from ready for membership; but even if they were, the EU seems

¹ Green, Micheal David; (2007); "The Europeans- political identity in an emerging polity", Lynne Rienner; p.33-34.

reluctant to admit them as a full member. Basically, the EU is a variety of territory, an area of the earth's surface enclosed by a frontier.

As far as the concept of frontier is concerned, the frontier as an end or limit is conventionally more of an American concept than the current European one. The North American has space population, whereas the Europe has dense population. Normally, frontier in Europe divides peoples rather than forests or prairies as is the case in America.

However, in the today's context of globalisation these notions of frontier or boundary have no meaning. This seems to have been replaced by the kind of prevailing economic and the political structure.

Coming, to the core question concerning about the limit of Europe. It can be said comfortably that it kept on changing with the change in politics and economy. For example, the cold war gave Western Europe a secure and stable eastern frontier, guarded by the Russians. Western Europe thus came to be known as 'Europe'. Till 1980's Eastern Europe was attached to the communist ideology different from capitalist ideology of Western Europe.

This ideological difference between the Western and Eastern European, however, created a central problem for post-cold war Europe. The cultural claim to be 'European', to share European values, history, identity, has political, security and economic consequences. But these differences slowly began to lose their features with the enlargement of EU.

Overall, it can be said that Europe has a fuzzy borders. It is a moveable set of myths and images, both positive and negative, embedded in histories and vernacular literatures. In fact, there is no clear idea about the common Europe prevailing among European states and also part of because of this, no agreement on where Europe ends.

Turkey as an Idea

Historically, Turkey can be treated to stone age settlement constructed in 7500 BC and therefore, today unforgettable names like Troy and the Trojan war, Homer, Cyprus the Great, Alexander the Great, the Holy Roman Empire leap from the pages of its ancient history, and many relics and ruins of same still stand for all to view.

The modern Turkey was founded in 1923 from the Anatolian remnants of the defeated Ottoman Empire by its national hero Mustafa Kemal, later honored with the title Atatürk. Prior to 1950, the Republic of Turkey was essentially a one-party state ruled by the Republican People's Party, which had been created by Atatürk to implement the secular ideology. In 1950, however an experiment with multi-party politics led to introduction of many reforms. In recent years, the government has undertaken many reforms to strengthen its democracy and economy so that, it can eventually join the EU.

Turkey is geographically, politically and officially part of two continents - Europe and Asia. The smaller northwestern portion is part of Europe, while the larger portion (Anatolia) is part of Asia. Geographically, Turkey is in the northern hemisphere between the 36° to 42° northern parallel and 26° to 45° eastern meridian. It has an area of 783562 sq. km. It borders with black sea, Mediterranean Sea and Marmara Sea and has a total coastline of 8333 km. It has borders with Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

Surrounded by water from three sides and protected by High Mountain along its eastern borders, the country has well defined borders. Its demarcated land frontiers were settled by treaty in the twentieth century and have since remained stable. The boundary with Greece was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which resolved persistent boundary and territorial claims involving area in Thrace and provided for a population exchange (war of Independence).

Now, coming to the core of my research topic i.e. the 'European Union Enlargement' which has a complex history of about sixty years. It started from the scratch of six nations joining their hands after the devastating consequences of Second world war thus, pledging to build a new 'Europe' based on democratic set up with pervading respect for peace and human right. Through this vision started the processes of accommodating like-minded nations into the group called European Union.

With time ahead the vision of European Union Enlargement itself kept on taking different shape and directions depending on the changing geopolitics of the region.

As per as European Union Geopolitics is concerned, according to Dr. Luiza Bialasiewicz in her views regarding Geopolitical visions of European Union tried to explain the meaning of geopolitical vision and also the application to the concept of European Union. She questions why does the EU lack one geopolitical vision? Has the identity of the EU recently changed? And what has been the impact of the end of the 'Cold War' on Europe's borders?

She defines Geopolitical vision by quoting Gearoid O' Tuathail's definition as "congealments of geographical knowledge and strategy", particular (strategic) ways of thinking and ordering the world that "arrange different actors, elements and locations on a global chessboard", that assign particular roles to certain actors and certain spaces.

Ms. Bialasiewicz also tries to highlight the one of the EU's biggest challenges that is the lack of a single and coherent geopolitical vision. This is partly due to different political understandings of the EU's role and "purpose" (that cut across the member states), and also important national differences in foreign policy orientations. It is curious how national political cultures and national histories still strongly influence member states' geopolitical visions of and for Europe. Talking on the European Union's reconciliation over its ever expanding border issue Dr. Luiza Bialasiewicz, in the past twenty years have witnessed a "stretching" of Europe's borders to accommodate new EU member states, and also the creation of new "neighborhood" spaces, associated in various ways with Europe but not "fully European". At the same time, however, the past decade has been marked by an increasing preoccupation with the control and policing of the EU's borders against a series of new "threats" – whether illegal migration or the traffic of unwanted goods.

She said that dealing with this question will be the EU's greatest challenge for the years to come. How can the Union reconcile its self-representation as a unique space of social and human solidarity, as a unique space of "freedom, security and justice", with the need to delimit and defend - the borders of that space, with the need to decide who can and who cannot share in the "European Dream"?

Emergence of European Union

The idea of Europe before first half of nineteenth century was very vague divided into various segment. Large areas of Europe had previously been unified by empires built on force, such as the Roman Empire, Frankish Empire, Holy Roman Empire, the First French Empire and Nazi Germany.

European Union integration began under very specific and rather complex geo-strategic, political, and economic conditions. After Second World War integration was favoured by the United States (external federator), for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the devastated West European economies.

After the devastating effects of war, many people turned to the idea of some form of unified Europe, notably William Penn, Abbot Charles de Saint-Pierre, Victor Hugo, and Giuseppe Mazzini. Such ideas became greater in Western Europe following the First World War, with the massive loss of life it entailed, but it was not until after Second World War that real steps were taken in Western Europe. However, the devastating impact of the World Wars did not create such an ideological effect in Russia, perhaps because it adhered to an ideology of its own, that of Communism.

After two devastating world wars, which was specifically confined to European continent, witnessed human and economic cost which hit the Europe very adversely. This political climate favored an international unity that ensured peace. This demonstrated the horrors of war and also of extremism, through the holocaust and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example. Once again, there was a desire to ensure it could never happen again, particularly with the war giving the world nuclear weapons. The countries of Western Europe failed to maintain their Great power status leaving two rivals ideologically opposed superpowers.

With statements such as Winston Churchill's 1946 call for a "United States of Europe" becoming louder, in 1949 the Council of Europe was established as the first pan-European organization. In the year following, two Frenchmen, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, are recognized for their proposal of European Union. They proposed a community of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to integrate the coal and steel industries of Europe - these being the two elements necessary to make weapons of war.

In 1952, six² states established the European Coal and Steel Community, a single market in these two industrial sectors that was controlled by an independent supranational authority. The next step in the evolution of the EU was the formation of two more organizations, under the treaty of Rome in 1957. They were the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The EEC aimed at removing the trade and tariff barriers among the member states and facilitating the free movement of goods services, capital and people within the community's region. The EEC was eventually aimed at establishing a common market in Western Europe.

The United Kingdom was invited to join the EEC at the time of its formation, but UK had some reservation regarding the proposed tariff policy. It wanted some preferential treatment for its erstwhile colonies, which now constitute the Commonwealth of Nations. However, Charles de Gaulle of France outrightly rejected these British proposals. Throughout the 1960s tensions began to show with France seeking to limit supranational power and rejecting the membership of the United Kingdom. However, in 1965 an agreement was reached to merge the three communities under a single set of institutions, and hence the Merger Treaty was signed in Brussels and came into force on 1 July 1967 creating the European Communities. In 1967, these three formations collectively became known as the European Community.

The EC first added new members in 1973, with the entry of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. The Single European Act modified the EC Treaties in 1987 by increasing the powers of the European Parliament and enabling the 1992 single market program to move forward. At the beginning of 1993, the near completion of the single market brought about the mostly free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within the EC.

On November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) went into effect, establishing the European Union (EU), which encompasses the EC. The European Union consists of three pillars: an expanded and strengthened EC, a common foreign and security policy, and common internal security measures. The

² Six countries involved were namely, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

Treaty contains provisions that have resulted in the creation of an economic and monetary union (EMU), including a common European currency. The European Union is intended as a significant step on the path toward greater political and economic integration.

On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the EU, bringing membership to 15 states. With this enlargement, the population of the EU grew from about 345 million to 370 million. In June 1997, EU leaders met to review the Maastricht Treaty and for considering the future course of European integration. The resulting Amsterdam Treaty increases the legislative power of the European Parliament, strengthens the EU's foreign policy, develops a more coherent EU strategy to boost employment, and integrates procedures for managing internal security.

In December 2000, EU leaders concluded the Nice Treaty to pave the way for further EU enlargement while setting a limit of 27 member states. The Nice Treaty set out internal, institutional reforms to allow an enlarged Union to function effectively. Critics argued, however, that Nice established an even more complex decision-making process. Thus, the EU embarked on a new reform effort.

In June 2004, EU leaders concluded work on a constitutional treaty that would have simplified EU voting rules and contained changes to the EU's governing institutions. Commonly referred to as the "constitution," it must be ratified by all member states through either parliamentary approval or public referenda in order to come into effect. The constitution's future, however, has been thrown into doubt following its rejection by French and Dutch voters in May and June 2005, respectively. Some suggest that the difficulties with ratifying the EU constitution have called into question further enlargement of the EU, given that considerable public opposition to the constitution, at least in the French and Dutch referenda, was tied to concerns about EU enlargement.

The European Union is based on the concept of rule of law. This means that everything that it does is derived from treaties, which are agreed on voluntarily and democratically by all Member states. Previously signed treaties have been changed and upgraded to keep up with developments in society. The most recent one, the draft treaty for establishing a constitution for Europe, aims to replace all the existing

Treaties³ with a single text. It was adopted at the Brussels European Council in June 2004, but till now it has not been ratified by each member states.

Thus, in due course of time European Union evolved as a Geo-political entity covering a large portion of the European continent. It is founded upon numerous treaties and has undergone an expansion that has taken it from 6 member states to 27, a majority of states in Europe.

The European Union is a unique organization. It is unique in the sense that it is neither a confederation nor a federation. It is somewhere in between the both. It is also the most successful experiment in regional integration in human history. The European Union is generally described as an economic giant, political dwarf, and military worm. It is the supranational organization; an association of independent states.

Now, coming to the topic of the study, which is “Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement: A case study of Turkey”. The topic itself reflects to the significance of political geography- rather than just geography and politics. How does Enlargement become an area of geopolitical interest. Since the European Union is a supranational state i.e. an agglomeration of several countries, which often acts together based on common their understanding. It is a grouping of powerful and influential countries of the world which has a say in all the important happenings around the world. So the enlargement of such an important institution has its own repercussion both regional and global.

The study begins with treating European Union enlargement and Turkey as an important issue of geopolitics both at regional and international level. And thus it does not just stick to about European Union, its enlargement process, Turkey’s desire to join EU as a full membership, but also it is all about it is used as a weapon by some counties against others and to safeguard its own interests.

³Those treaties were namely as Paris treaty 1951, the Rome treaty 1957, the Merger treaty 1967, the European single Act 1986, the Maastricht treaty 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty 1997, and the Nice Treaty 2001.

EU- Turkey Relationship: At a glance

Turkey is located at the geographical crossroads between Europe and Asia; it is also a crossroads between diverse and sometimes contradictory, cultural and political models. Turkey many a times has remained in a debate for its geographical location as far as EU is concerned. Some calls it outside the geographical purview of Europe, while some calls it as part of Europe. Anyways former views are more prevalent than the latter one.

Historically, Turkey along with its true capital (Byzantium/Constantinople/Istanbul) was for fifteen centuries the center of empire that was by definition multi-ethnic and subject to variable borders depending on conquests and rebellions. As can be certainly expected these empires certainly had religious legitimacy, which were even essential for ruling over such a diverse populations.

Modern Turkey, which is less than a century old, has deliberately broken with this heritage under few most visionary leaders. Even if the Ottomans were the first to launch a process of westernization, with the *Tanzimat*, a period of reform which was inaugurated in 1839, it is impossible to overstate the importance of Ataturk, who clearly rejected the imperial model in favour of the nation-state, demanding above all the homogeneity in terms of population, territory, history and language, and defending national interests defined primarily in terms of military. Kemalist modernization put the role of military on the top in order to secure the system of administration envisaged to bring westernization. In a sense, westernization, in Turkey can be said was at once coerced and also successful.

Turkey after the end of Second World War in 1952 was warmly welcomed by NATO. It is because the western countries saw it as a buffer (may be said) against the Soviet enemy, and also against a Middle East that the West wished to keep as far away as possible. Once the center of Middle East, Turkey now became the Edge of Europe. Thus, slowly and slowly Turkey started assuming itself the integral part of west which later inspired it to apply for EU membership.

Yet, it is unfortunate for Turkey that today, the peak of this westernization, brought about since long time in order to get admission to the European Union, presupposes the abandonment of the very model that had made it possible- the

Kemalist nation-state, one which is authoritarian and fiercely nationalist- in favour of a Europe that looks more and more like a vague federal empire, with its fluid identity, fluctuating border, and a foreign policy limited to what each member is willing to contribute to the common interests. Since 1987 Turkey has been knocking insistently at the door that European Union occasionally which opens slightly and then closes again. This hide and seek game is still continuing.

Turkey's aspiration to become full member of European Union is not a recent development. From the very beginning of the creation of EU, Turkey has aspired to become full member of the EU as a logical consequence of its modernization and westernization policies. Consequently, Turkey applied for associate membership in 1959 and went on to sign the Ankara Agreement with the EU in 1963, an agreement which not only recognised Turkey's integration but explicitly envisaged Turkey's eventual full membership of the EU.

EU-Turkey relations have, however, experienced serious difficulties resulting from the essential incompatible of both parties' policies with the declared objectives of their Association Agreement. It seems unlikely in near future that Turkey will be fully accommodated into EU. This is because the EU has always considered Turkey to be an awkward candidate for European Union membership. For this Turkey has always been cited as different, problematic and thus by reason of this a more difficult case than any of the other earlier applicants.

In fact to avoid Turkey's full membership, EU has developed an alternative approach towards Turkey, which can be described as a containment strategy, designed to delay indefinitely the prospect of membership while anchoring Turkey in the European structure through a close relations. On the other hand at the same time, Turkey's inability to bring policy based reforms as required in order to acquire full EU membership, has given EU the legitimating role to adopt tough policy stance towards Turkey's membership.

There has many lacunae cited by EU institutions for the delay of accessionship of Turkey to EU. Some of them are lack of improvement in Human rights regime, towards Greece over the bilateral issues, and in adequacy in aligning its economic system with the EU.

The debate on Turkish membership will be most likely being one most hot topic on the agenda of the EU in the years to come. However there appears to have been positive developments in EU-Turkish relations in recent years. In October 2005, the European Union resumed the accession negotiations with the turkey. This is considered as watershed in the EU- Turkey relationship. On the basis of this development a close special relationship is now being built in a constructive manner and with the long-term prospect of EU relationship. But, despite concrete development the EU has exclusively underlined an ‘open-ended’ nature of accession negotiations, ‘result of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Therefore, the question of as to whether EU membership will be the final outcome of the negotiations for turkey is still doubt full and thus remains to be seen in the foreseeable future.

Statement of the problem:

The present study seeks to analyse and evaluate the Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement by considering Turkey as its future possible candidate. However, Turkey is considered as different by EU because of its different political and social identity.

Hypothesis:

- 1) Turkey presents some special case due to the existence of a non-western civilization. Thus aspects case to encompass political as political as well as cultural difference.
- 2) Since geographically Turkey is not in Europe entirely, The EU countries tend to view Turkey as “Other”.

Objectives:

- 1) Keeping in mind the above statement this study proceeds with the following objectives in view:
- 2) To define the meaning and concept of Geopolitics which seems has become self-introductory in the present day world affairs. It would also include the views of few scholars regarding geopolitics of European Union Enlargement. Also, to go into the detail in historical background of EU-Turkey relation.

- 3) To look into the matter what really makes the Turkey the “Other” in the eye of most of the European Union members as an individual and in cohesion.
- 4) To study the internal politics prevailing in both EU and Turkey thereby affecting the accessionship of latter toward European Union.
- 5) To identify the pressure groups involved both in the concerned region and around the world like United States of America, United Nation.
- 6) To focus on the scope and prospect of Turkish accession for both Turkey and European Union. It will also highlight the problems involved regarding Turkish accession.

Sources of information:

The sources of information would be mostly secondary. The reason being that since the area of my study is of the regional level it becomes difficult to generate too many data of a primary nature. However there will be few primary sources like European Commission, Eurobarometer etc. So the source of information includes books, articles, periodicals, publication of the United Nation like that from IMF, World development report.

Research Method:

To a large extent the study was sought to be qualitative, comprising of the descriptive analysis of the data and the information obtained. The focus of the undertaken research is the role of member state actors in the perception of the Turkey’s accession to the European Union. The research will thus operate within a present geopolitical paradigm, perceiving ideas to the rationalization of ingrained interests and policy outcome as a part of the process whereby the dominant class legitimize and secure their interests.

The basis for the study of EU-Turkey future relationship would be literature that deals with EU enlargement.

Analysis of speeches of top brass EU leaders about their views on Turkish accession to European Union. This will help to elicit the evolving political atmosphere regarding the Turkish probability of being included in EU.

Apart from analyzing the speeches of EU leaders, the same can be done for Turkish leaders. This will help in comparing the views of these leaders. The study will also focus on public perception regarding integration of both communities. Survey is available on Eurobarometre.

Chapterisation:

This study is divided into several broad sections for the ease of understanding, each being treated as a separate chapter. Hence, the study is divided into five such chapters, each dealing with as follows:

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

It is an introductory part of the study, providing a broad introduction the topic, presenting the objectives of the study, the sources of information on which the study will be largely based, the methodology involved, schemes of chapterisation followed and a brief survey of few selected relevant literature.

CHAPTER 2: DOMESTIC POLITICS INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT AND TURKEY

It will deal mainly with the domestic politics involved in the Turkey-EU integration. In this regard both the politics at EU level and at Turkish national level will be discussed. At the beginning of the chapter past enlargement and the process of EU enlargement are also discussed at brief.

CHAPTER 3: PRESSURE GROUPS INVOLVED

In this the pressure groups involved both at the EU level and at the global level are discussed. Pressure groups are analyzed at country level, and also at the institutional level. Public opinion is also taken care about these as are becoming more important at national there thereby influencing the concerned national policies.

CHAPTER 4: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

It will focus on the Problems and prospects of Turkish accession to EU, in terms of geopolitics. Thus, the changes which this relationship would bring at the regional and global order will be discussed in detail.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Finally tries to provide an overview of the entire study, trying to summarize it and conclude from the facts and findings of the study.

Literature Survey:

The vastness of the topic has made me survey a large number of works, but there were only few which were fully useful. This makes the task of, review of the literature more difficult. Here, I would be surveying only the major works. Since the involved selected few things a large literature, I have classified my literature under different headings, so that each work has its significance in its right place. The study revolves around three major area of study. First, study of area is covered under Domestic politics involved in the EU enlargement. Second area of study is covered under pressure groups involved, while last area of study includes Problems and prospects of the EU-Turkey integration.

Domestic Politics involved in EU enlargement and Turkey

Much has been said about domestic politics involved in the European Union Enlargement regarding Turkey's membership issue.

Esra, Lagro (2007), known for her expertise in EU enlargement and Economic governance. In her edited book 'Turkey and the European Union: Prospects for a difficult encounter' she tries to study and guide the difficult encounter that both Turkey and European (EU) are currently facing since the past few decades. This book prove to be very useful source of information in basic understanding of the difficult path Turkey is facing on account of its socio-cultural and political economic factors. It also analyses what path the EU-Turkey integration would take, in future. *Pulat Tacar,*

in this book refers to the complex factors of the EU-Turkey integration that is the socio-cultural dimensions of accession negotiations. In his article he highlights the ever growing doubt over Turkish accession because even if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, it is not of sure that he would get the EU membership.

Even the former *Frits, Bolkestein* in his very famous book 'Limits of Europe' talks about the possible limit of Europe, and this in turn tries to reflect the future course of the EU-Turkey integration. He views Turkey better as a buffer zone between EU and West Asia which in turn might help EU to keep itself in safe position from the latter's socio-political instability.

Kuran-Burcoglu in his article 'From vision to Realty: A socio-cultural critique of Turkey's Accession process' tries to highlight the Turkey as the other the EU's subjective approach. Granld Delanty, in his edited book 'Inventing Europe': Ideas, Identity, and Realty' discusses the origin of the idea of Europe, at the same time also considering the Limits of Europe. He highlighted in his book the European identity in the background of burning political issues like Yugoslavia crisis of that time and Bosnia war, the rise of xenophobia nationalism, neo-racism. Europe is much as an idea as it is a reality, but the same time is a contested idea.

Paul, Kubicek, (2005), work shop paper 'Turkish accession to the EU: challenges and opportunities for new Europe' deals brilliantly over the fate of Europe's own identity and Turkey. Turkish accession to the EU has become one of the most politically contentious issue in Europe, especially after 2004. It analyses the debates going on among the politicians and the public. It highlights public opinion of the European Citizens based on the recently held Eurobarometer polls.

Regarding the Internal politics in Turkey concerning EU membership, there have developed various factions in the Turkey who have different sorts of opinions. *Muftuler-Baac Meltem* (2002), in his article "Turkey's role in the EU's security and Foreign policies" deals with the Turkey's specific contribution to EU in terms of security and foreign policy perceptive. It also deals with the role of military in Turkey's civilian government. Considering its dominance role in Turkish internal politics (though positive) it is inconsistent with the EU's democratic norms.

Roy, Oliver (2005), in his book 'Turkey Today- a European country' deals with the question of adoption of Turkey in EU about what are the reasons that have delayed the Turkish accession.

Also the visions of Turkish elites and for that matter the common public. It also discusses on the issue of national perspectives of Turkey and its evolution from various angle like from security angle. It studies the issue of conflict between civil government and military regime in running the government.

Pressure Groups Involved

Unlike other candidate countries Turkey represents special case as per as EU's membership is concerned. In case of Turkey, it seems no doubt that there are more number of countries in queue against Turkish accession than in favour.

Moravcsik (1998), in his article 'National Interest, State power, EU Enlargement' with Vachudova deals with the material national interests and state power. They try to relate the EU enlargement with the long term benefit and geopolitical interest involved in it. They also propose three main dynamics in the decision of integration in the EU: the formation of state preferences, the outcomes of interstate bargaining and the choice of international institutions. Their model suggests that bargaining power of the states at the domestic and international level, dominant economic interests of states and the EU, and opportunities for economic exchange play major roles in defining the outcomes of the integration project.

Michael Emerson et. al. (2006), tries to evaluate the on-going slow process of EU enlargement as compared to earlier one on the basis of recent confusion among the member countries and the institutions. Like the rejection of EU constitution and the upbringing of referendum among few member countries. Author cites these developments as the sign of enlargement fatigueness which has given rise to a new concept called as 'Absorption Capacity'. There are various reasons behind the adoption of such vision like the *Wood, Steve* (2004), in his article 'The EU and Turkey: Political Mechanisations in a Three-Level Game' has discussed economic, cultural, and security-strategic considerations, all of which are politicised by advocates and opponents alike.

Morelli and Migdalovitz (2009), in 'European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations' discusses the current status of EU enlargement in line with the Turkish progress in the past few years. This is on the basis of the current release of the Commission's 2009 report. Authors view it as not a significant but a mixed sort of report. Here author also try to relate Turkish relationship with the Cyprus especially the trade relationship.

Stelios Stavridis (2006), in his paper tries to study and analyses the effects of the Cyprus question on current EU-Turkey accession negotiations. The argument of this paper revolves over the issue that Turkey is responsible for the current impasse in its negotiations with the European Union for a number of reasons, mostly having to do with its domestic context, but also because of Turkey's refusal to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and to remove its occupying forces from the northern part of the island. Thus in this the author tries to defend the Cyprus case contrary to the generalised view in Spain and other countries, who blames Cyprus as the culprit for the Turkey-EU conflict. He briefly analyses Turkey's and Cyprus' recent internal evolution and the EU reaction to them, to conclude that the EU is not consistent with its own standards and norms, and it is using the Southern Cypriot refusal of the Annan Plan in 2004 as an excuse to focus on Cyprus, thereby ignoring Turkey's serious shortcomings which are, according to the author, the real problem.

Problems and Prospects

Smith (2005), in his article 'Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey', tried to stress how the Islamic cultural is equated with national importance by the current AK party led government. After a long tradition of having rigid Secularism culture, guided and supported by the Kemalist followers but now the newly elected government wants to adopt to it a moderate Islamic culture. The article thus highlights the practice of liberal Islam in terms of popular culture, relation with the EU, and Islamic conceptions of human right, women's rights, minority rights, political economy and foreign policy.

Monnet and Penas (2005), in his article after going through a brief history of the EU-Turkish relationship tried to analyse the specificities of the Turkish enlargement, the basis on which the Commission recommended the opening of the

negotiations, and the implications of the European Council's Decision for the EU. Because the Turkish enlargement bears clear specificities, the impact of Turkey's accession would also have particular consequences for the EU.

Similarly, *Harun Arikian* (2003), in his book 'Turkey and the EU: An awkward candidate for EU membership?' analyses the development of the European Union's policy towards Turkey from a comparative perspective. Human rights, the Greco-Turkish dispute and the security considerations of both parties are chosen as specific policy issues. Moreover, the book adopts a new approach and covers several of the key topics in the EU enlargement debate. Finally, it tries to search the question as to whether the EU's containment policy towards Turkey will be sustainable in the long term and examines possible scenarios for both parties.

John, Agnew (1998), The book focuses on five key concepts of the modern geopolitical imagination: visualizing the world as a whole; the definition of geographical areas as "advanced" or "primitive"; the notion of the state being the highest form of political organization; the pursuit of primacy by competing states; the necessity for hierarchy.

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CHAPTER TWO

DOMESTIC POLITICS INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT AND TURKEY

This chapter will focus on the politics involved in the EU regarding the acceptance of Turkey as a full EU membership. It tries to highlight how EU both as a whole body and as individual member countries affects the accession of Turkey into EU. At the same time this chapter will also take into account the Turkish internal politics regarding its accession to European Union.

In order to avoid mere assertions, the study analyses the EU's policy towards Turkey from a comparative perspective and compares the EU's approach to the issues in the EU-Turkey relationships with that adopted with the regard to the other Applicants countries. From this perspective, the study investigates the extent to which the EU's policy instruments and its containment strategy for Turkey have been compatible with its overall enlargement policy has been operationalized for other applicant countries.

If observed carefully the objectives of the EU enlargement policy are to support the democratization process and to facilitate economic and institutional reforms in applicant's countries, which are considered necessary for the stability of Europe. For example, recently the EU has guided, catalysed, and even directed the process of political, economic, legal and social reform in the Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) by offering them a clear prospect of membership and an accession strategy. But contradiction to this, Turkey seems to be getting different treatment.

Indeed, by offering economic and political benefits through pre-accession strategies and by stipulating membership requirements, the EU has greatly influenced the domestic policy choices in the CEEC's. However, the EU seems reluctant to apply the same enlargement policy instrument and accession commitment to Turkey. Although, Turkey's failure to undertake the necessary policy reforms to meet requirements for EU membership has provided some grounds for the latter's

hesitation towards Turkey's membership, it cannot provide sufficient reasons why Turkey has been treated differently from the other applicant countries as they have similar problems.

Therefore this study argues that Turkey has been treated differently, compared to other applicant countries for EU membership. Further the EU's containment policy towards Turkey has lacked the clarity and certainty that would have best encouraged and facilitated Turkey's efforts to adjust its policies to make them compatible with EU membership.

Before starting the purpose of this chapter, clarifying the difference between the term of inclusion in 'the EU's enlargement policy processes' and term of inclusion in 'the accession process of negotiation' is important. The inclusion in the enlargement process refers to a strategy that might lead to the stage of the accession of negotiations process through meeting the criteria of accession. The term of the enlargement of the EU's enlargement policy process refers to the strategy, designed to prepare the applicant for a later accession negotiations process through an appropriate strategy with accession credibility, providing a considerable degree of influence. This implies that an inclusion in the enlargement process does not involve the same considerable costs or risks for the EU in respect of the included candidate as the accession process does.

The Turkey case provides a particularly unusual case in the sense it has not been fully included yet in the enlargement process of the EU, and indeed appears to have been treated differently. The EU it seems has pursued a policy of applying a containment policy to Turkey, although it revised its containment policy for Turkey after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, with blurred features of the accession partnership. Thus this great question still remains to be addressed as to why the EU has chosen to apply a different policy for Turkey.

There can be various reasons ascribed for this behaviour of EU towards Turkey, like huge population of Turkey, its different cultural orientation, poor economy. Although size matters but it is not the sufficient reason to explain why Turkey has been treated differently, since the inclusion in the enlargement policy process does not necessary imply the inclusion of Turkey in the process of accession negotiation.

In fact Turkey, like other applicant must fulfil, various criteria for accession before it can take off the stage of the accession negotiation process which would have certainly have a minimising effect on the costs or risks which Turkey would mean for the EU.

Process of Enlargement

The EU views enlargement as a historic opportunity to help in the transformation of the countries involved, extending peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights and the rule of law throughout Europe. The carefully managed process of enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools that has helped to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into more modern, functioning democracies.

Any country seeking membership of the European Union (EU) must conform to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union. Relevant criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council⁴ in 1995. In addition the EU must be able to absorb new members, so the EU can decide when it is ready to accept a new member.

The criteria for EU membership require candidates to achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”

Accession talks begins with a screening process to see to what extent applicants meet the EU's 80,000 pages of rules and regulations known as the *acquis communautaire*. The *acquis* is divided into 35 chapters that range from free movement of goods to competition. Detailed negotiations at a ministerial level take place to establish the terms under which applicants will meet and implement the rules in each chapter. The European Commission proposes common negotiating positions

⁴It requires that the candidate country must have created the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its administrative structures as underlined by the Madrid European Council in 1995.

for the EU on each chapter, which must be approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers. In all areas of the *acquis*, the candidate country must bring its institutions, management capacity and administrative and judicial systems up to EU standards, both at national and regional levels. During negotiations, applicants may request transition periods for complying with certain EU rules.

For this purpose candidates receive financial assistance from the EU, mainly to aid in the accession process. Chapters of the *acquis* can only be opened and closed with the approval of all 27 member states, and chapters provisionally closed may be re-opened. Periodically, the Commission issues “progress” reports to the Council and European Parliament assessing the progress achieved by the candidate country. Once the Commission concludes negotiations on all 35 chapters with an applicant, the agreements reached are incorporated in a draft accession treaty, which is submitted to the Council for approval and to the European Parliament for assent. After signature, the accession treaty must be ratified by each EU member and the candidate country. This last phase of accession process generally takes two years.

Even after a technically successful conclusion of the negotiation of thirty-five chapters of the *acquis*, all members’ states governments will have a decisive say concerning the start and end of the each chapter. Eventually the final decision will rest with the individual members of EU (peoples of Europe) through referendum. For instance, a citizen of Austria might say: ‘the Turks came up to the doors of Vienna and ruined everything here in 1683 so I don’t want them in the EU now’; while another citizen might say: ‘Turks are not Christian, they are Muslim, and I don’t want them in the EU’⁵.

Thus, it is being constantly reminded that even if it able to complete all the EU rules and standard, EU member states reserves the right to take final political decision regarding Turkish membership. In various political corners of the EU there are different gossips which are taking roots like some European leaders prefer the idea of a partnership agreement, something between full membership and a kind of association. Some of them, like the CDU leader the current chancellor in Germany, Angela Merkel, call this a ‘privileged partnership’ but without defining it clearly.

⁵ Tucar, Pulat; (2007) ‘Socio-cultural Dimensions of Accession Negotiations’, in Esra Lagro (ed), ‘Turkey and the European Union- prospects of difficult encounter’, New York: palgrave mamillan, p.128.

According to **F. Bolkestein**, the former EU commissioner, ‘Turkey should be kept outside the European Union to act as a buffer protecting Europe from Syria, Iran and the former republic of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine should be excluded, to insulate Europe from Russia’. He says this would help EU to keep itself away from the growing socio-political instability of the West Asia. (Bolkestein, 2004).

It seems leaders are considering a kind of buffer zone similar to neighbouring areas of the Roman Empire. But Turkey is already member of Custom Union, which is a case which is un-parallel in the history of EU. So, privileged partnership seems to have no meaning here.

Table 1: Enlargement of the European Union

Enlargement Rounds	Year	Countries	Total
Foundation	1951	Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands	6
1 st	1973	Denmark, Ireland, and UK	9
2 nd	1981	Greece	10
3 rd	1986	Spain and Portugal	12
4 th	1995	Austria, Finland and Sweden	15
5 th	2004	Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia	25
6 th	2007	Bulgaria and Romania	27
7 th	Future Prospect	Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania.	More than 27(expected)

Source: European Commission, Enlargement web page, Enlargement Process (past enlargements and future prospects).

Till now there have been six rounds of enlargement taken place in the European Union, raising the toll of the EU to 27 member states. On May 1, 2004, took the biggest explosion in the erstwhile EU when, the ten⁶ new states acceded to the EU, increasing the EU's population to roughly 450 million. Out of them five were communist countries. In next round in December 2004, the EU concluded accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania, and on January 1, 2007, bringing the Union to 27 member states and completing the fifth enlargement since 1957. The addition of these two nations brought the borders of the Union to the Black Sea and increases the population of the EU to over 470 million.

Internal Politics inside the *EU* regarding Turkey's Accession

The process of EU enlargement has never been a straight forward affair. Whereas every single instance of EU enlargement has followed a path of application, accession negotiation, ratification and membership, some applications have been rejected without much thought (Morocco) and others have been rejected twice, as in the case of the United Kingdom. No matter which sequence applies, analysts widely agree that enlargement processes are, made up of politics and law, socio-economic interests, grand bargains, phases of adjustment and EU self- reform⁷.

However, by contrasts Turkey's accession seems to have different from all earlier accessions especially from the point of view of cultural factors. Here, in Turkey's case cultural factors seems to have special significance in accession process.

In this sub-topic of internal politics inside the EU, regarding the Turkey's Accession, various factors will be discussed which are having significant correlation regarding Turkey's chances of future integration. These various factors can be categorised as a cultural, political, economic, social, and religion.

⁶ Ten new states are as follows: Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

⁷ Jorgensen, Knud Erik, 2007 "The politics of Accession Negotiation", Esra Lagro et. al., Turkey and EU; prospects for a difficult encounter, Palgrave macmillan.

Cultural Aspect

If the history of EU is examined carefully, since the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) it reflects the complexity of integrating several European countries into one community, first into ECSC and later into EEC from a socio-cultural point of view, which still holds true at the present time.

In debates on relations between the EU and Turkey generally, and the 1987 application for EU membership specifically, cultural factors figure prominently among master variables, sometimes almost by default, constituting the seemingly most relevant or powerful explanatory factor (Jorgensen, 2007, p.11).

Culture is a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterises an institution, organisation or group. It is very often said that Turks represents different culture as against Europeans which makes them different from the later. In this respect it can be asked 'what are the main founding pillars on which European cultures are based'?

'a common history, Greco-Roman culture, Roman law, Christianity, Christian values and morality, humanism, Enlightenment and the philosophical thoughts that are associated with it: rationalism, positivism and modernism, secularism, postmodernism, the idea of a nation, economic growth and capitalism, social Contract (Magna carta) and the ideas that are associated with it, declaration of Human Rights and the French Revolution with the principles of liberty, equality, fraternity that are strongly tied with it'⁸.

Above list shows how Europeans share general impressions of 'common' cultural roots. These common cultural roots are also shared by a certain minority group of highly educated Turks indifferent to common masses. This makes large difference between European and Turkish culture. This cultural difference has evolved from a long period of time which in due course of time has led to evolution of Other's⁹ (Turks) in the eye of Europeans. Images of the other's and identities are

⁸ Kuran - Burcoglu, Nedret (2007), "From vision to reality: a socio-cultural critique of Turkey's Accession process" in (ed), *Turkey and the European Union: Prospect for a Difficult Encounter*, New York: Palgrave macmillan. P. 155.

⁹ Ibid., 155.

formed as well as transformed over the course of time in various spaces that preoccupy human minds, and thus influences human thoughts and actions.

Historically, Turks in the course of their presence in Europe over seven hundred years, the image of the Turks had been formed and reformed for a variety of reasons. The factors behind these changes can be summarized as, the geographical proximity of the Ottoman Empire, wars, religious differences, cultural aspects, conventions and traditions, conflicting social norms and value judgements, and the positive or negative images of the Ottomans and Turks in the minds of Europeans (Kuran Burcoglu, 2003, p.23).

Turks during the expansion period of the Ottoman Empire well into the Fifteenth century, they were considered as 'Others' in the Europe, because of their expansionist character and their religion. This was the image of the 'enemy', who was 'cruel', 'barbaric', and devastating, and considered to be as a potential threat to Christianity (Ibid).

As Gerald Delanty (1995), has also mentioned in his book 'Inventing Europe', the Turks had served throughout their existence in Europe since mid-fifteenth century the purpose of the Europeans to define their identities by 'Othering' them on the basis of historical and socio-cultural identity. At first they were considered 'religionwise' the 'others'; this situation slightly changed with the coming of the Modern age, in which they became 'culturalwise' the 'Others'; and finally, after the emergence of the nation state they became nationwide the 'Others'.

On the basis of above the explanations, it can concluded that there are certain socio-cultural constraints that make the members of the EU, as well as the Turks feel a little uneasy about Turkey's accession to the EU.

After dealing with the cultural aspects of turkey prevailing in the EU, now political factors will be highlighted. In this sense it is important to make a distinction between the politics of accession negotiation in a narrow, and a wider sense. In narrow sense, political accession negotiation involves actors directly involved, the procedures for their interaction and the intuitional framework providing an environment for their negotiations. The second part includes accession negotiations in a broader sense which includes political and economic actors in society who have direct interests in the outcome of negotiations. Apart from this it also involves, public

debates on Turkish membership of the EU, public opinion, general images and widespread conceptions of Europe and Turkey.

Turkish membership of the European Union has a variety of political implications. It has broad geopolitical and geostrategic implications, as well as much more specific impacts on EU institutions, policies and internal political dynamics. Some of these specific impacts can be assessed relatively accurately now but others will depend greatly both on what sort of member state Turkey will be, and what sort of Union the EU will become in the next 10-20 years, something that can only be partially assessed at the current time.

All these scenario keeping in mind, it can be easily envisaged that Turkey has the tough road to go in near future in order to accomplish its dream goal. At the same time EU also needs to come out uniformly with homogeneous mind set regarding Turkish accession. But this does not seem possible at present as different countries have different divergent opinion regarding Turkish accession.

Despite several statements by the EU that the political principles underpinning the accession negotiations will remain same for all countries, this does not seem to be the case. The EU has become more demanding in general. This change is explained by the fact the political imperative for the EU to enlarge is much weaker after the Cold war division in Europe was removed. During the cold war period Turkey for example was much more in demand with respect to its distinct geostrategic location. However, suffering from pronounced enlargement fatigue, the EU will handle future accessions- including Turkish with more reluctance than before. For instance, compared to earlier enlargement rounds, the latter EU enlargements moved towards tougher more rigid rules, a tendency likely to be continued in the near future.

Since the EU is not a unitary actor, negotiation with a candidate inevitably involves even more negotiations among the EU member states and institutions. Before a negotiation chapter can be opened, in addition to the government of the candidate state, the EU member as a whole has to define its common position on the given chapter. This is a difficult process, because each accession entails an uneven distribution of costs and benefits among states, resulting in a division between 'drivers' and 'brakemen' (Schimmelfennig, 2001).

In the past enlargement, some member states (for example, Germany) had strong interest in the accession of Poland. Others (such as Spain and Portugal) did not expect any benefit at all, and felt they would experience only disadvantages (Breuss, 2002). This is they tried to delay the process by demanding extra payments, insisting on very strict adherence to some parts of the *acquis*, raising objections to closing chapters, or by connecting certain reform conditions primarily related to intra-EU policy with their approval to enlarge to the given country (Inotai,2003) . These kinds of strategies led to much bargaining among the member states, often preceding or running parallel with the negotiations with the candidate country, and often complicating and delaying the process.

As the candidate country has to comply with the whole *acquis communautaire* and *politique*, one cannot speak of real negotiations. It is a misleading term. There is little to negotiate about, apart from the length and quantity of transition periods and the budget. Newcomers have to comply with the EU system, ninety-five per cent of which is immovable (Grabbe, 2004). It was defined in the past, before accession, without any contribution from the candidate country. The fact that the candidate country did not contribute to the legislation means that parts of the *acquis* can be in strong contradiction to the country's primary needs and priorities. By demanding more from future members than from present ones, the EU applies 'double standards', which the former will have to accept in order to show their commitment to membership.

The candidate has much weaker negotiating powers than those the EU side (Smith, K.E., 2003). As a prospective member has more to gain from membership and a greater desire to become a member, it is always in the underdog position, through which it is forced to make disproportionate concessions and carry nearly all the costs of accession on its own, the EU side only marginally matching these costs. Whereas accession is a priority for Turkey it is not for EU member states. Although in the long term accession benefits both sides of the process, adopting the *acquis* is costly for the applicants in the long term. Meanwhile, the EU prefers to absorb substantially reformed or 'fit' candidates.

In this game EU effectively applies several strategies, such as delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third objective party (the commission); compensating the applicants for their reform efforts with assistance through which their benefits

ultimately increase albeit minimally; and the strategy of postponing the most difficult chapters to the final negotiation phase in order to put more pressure on the candidates, which will eventually surrender. At last it all demonstrate that despite the intention of establishing an objective EU accession procedure, subjectivity and politics remain inherent features of the process.

Debates over Turkish accession have led to one of the unending debates about what Europeans hope the new Europe will become. The German Christian Democrats in view of Turkish accessionship have pledged to block Turkish accession since it would “overstretch” the European Union. They together with the Australians and several other political forces in France- argue that instead Turkey should be granted a ‘privileged or special partnership’ with the EU¹⁰. But this is also clear that Turkey having waited for so many years won’t agree to such alternatives rather it would like to quit from the entire goal.

Apart from staunch political parties there are public opinions which seems to be hesitant to accept Turkey’s full member of the EU. This can be highlighted from the fact that in 2002 a Eurobarometer survey revealed that only 31 per cent of Europeans favour Turkish membership in the EU, the lowest for any aspiring EU member¹¹. The survey was based one way traffic as it did not asked about the specifically opposing Turkish, but in a study of overall opposition to EU expansion from the 200 Eurobarometer, noted that the level of perceived cultural threat from the Applicant- together with the size and relative poverty of an applicant state- best accounts for opposition against particular candidates. This reflects how controversial turkey’s future accession is inside the EU where all opinion polls show how deeply split the public is over this issue as are governments and the national parliaments across the continent.

Francois Heisbourg of the French foundation for strategic research maintains that “it is more or less spoken or hidden, but the major component in popular rejection of Turkey’s admission is Islam”¹². Such views are more or less common among the European masses. For them Islam is alien different from their “Christian club”.

¹⁰ Paul, Kubicek (2005), “Turkish accession to the European Union: Challenges and opportunities for New Europe” prepared for work shop on Feb. 2005 at the , Centre for European Studies, University of Florida, Paris, p.11.

¹¹ Ibid., p.11

¹² Ibid., p.12

However, in defence many have come with various examples like, Europe as a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. Erdogan maintained that “the idea of ‘Christian Europe’ belongs to the Middle ages. It should be left there.....There should be no doubt Turkey’s full membership will re-enforce the desire and will for cohabitation between Christian and Muslims”¹³. So there should be no problem for in accepting country different religion.

One another connection related to Turkey’s accession is with the “war on terror”, the idea being that inclusion of Turkey sends an important positive signal to the Muslim world. After 9/11 the fear of Islamophobia has encircled the European mind set which keeps haunting them whenever the matter of Islam comes to their mind. However, this is not the case of entire Europe. As there are also people like straw, former British Foreign Secretary, who considers ‘inclusion of Turkey would prove to be an “acid test” to ward off terrorist’¹⁴.

Some countries like France, Germany, Austria seems to have reserved their decision as per as Turkey’s accession are concerned. Countries like France may see Turkey as pro- American and would work against their designs to construct a strong European foreign policy independent of Washington.

Again, **Jacques Chirac** of France suggested that Turkish accession be approved by referendum in EU states. This was the major change in EU enlargement process, which was though individual, but not seen till CEEC’s accession in 2004. This reflects subjecting of Turks to double standard. Even once prime minister of Austria **Wolfgang Schussel** declared that Turkey’s population size, agricultural sector, and geographical location present major obstacles to membership, while remaining publicly silent on the cultural ground¹⁵.

However, in contrasts to these fanatical views if Turkey are to be left behind solely on the grounds based on such cultural or social benefits something which were kept out of purview till 2004 enlargement would definitely send wrong signals to many broader Muslim world, including reformers in Turkey. As are culturally diverse and knowing that in the near future the need for immigrants will grow, so such a

¹³ Ibid., p.12

¹⁴ Ibid., p.13

¹⁵ Ibid, p.14

narrower definitions of the EU as a cultural based will poorly serve a dynamic, multi-cultural Europe.

Is Really the Size of Turkey Too Big?

The fact that Turkey will become the EU's largest member state in population terms soon after accession is one of the biggest impacts of Turkish accession. Turkey is a large country in terms of population and but very small in economic terms. Political and economic aspects of Turkish accession, aside from cultural and religious arguments, give more accurate results in order to calculate real impacts rather than expected impacts of Turkey's membership. Political institutional and political economic analyses of Turkey's membership indicate that Turkey will not be an easy candidate for the EU with the current institutional and economic situations.

Flam (2004) calculates the effect of Turkey on the institutions and economy of the EU as a member. If the EU does not change the present structure and rules of the system, he argues that Turkey would have the greatest number of council votes within twenty years and receive the largest budget transfer. The current budgetary system of the EU requires rich member countries to transfer resources to poorer countries; however some rich countries give more than others while some poor countries receive disproportionate share transfers¹⁶.

These two facts have various potential political and economic implications. Opponents to Turkish accession suggest that Turkey will be both too powerful and too costly in budget terms to join the EU. Size per se is not a criteria for EU accession but potential impact of size on the Union is an important and relevant factor in managing accession.

Turkey's small economic size can in some ways make it easier to absorb and in others more difficult. It will clearly make it eligible for more financial assistance than if it were wealthier but it also means its economy will have a relatively small impact on the much larger EU market. At a political level, the fact that Turkey is a small economic player will reduce its political clout on economic policy issues.

¹⁶ Baldwin, R. et. al., (1997), "*The costs and benefits of EU enlargement to the East*", Economic policy, Vol. 24, P.125-176.

Institutionally, Turkey will have a large impact on the Council and the European Parliament but not on the European Commission. Assuming a double majority system of voting Operates in the Council (of countries and population), in an EU of 28 both Turkey and Germany will have around 14.5 per cent of the vote each. They will be strong players but unable to Block proposals even together but they will be able to block proposals with a third large Country. The large countries are not in a position to push through proposals on their own due to the need for a majority of countries as well as population.

According to Hughes “the largest 5 countries in an EU of 28 (considering Turkey) will account for about 60 per cent of the vote by population. This is only 3.4 percentage points higher than the share of the ‘big four’ countries in an EU of 27 (where they have 56.9 per cent of the vote). So, Turkey will be an important powerful player and will add to the already complex set of alliances and blocking combinations that are possible. But in an EU of 28, despite its size, it does not add strongly to the dominance of the larger Countries (assuming in any event that the large countries could and would agree). In terms of seats in the European Parliament, if seats are reallocated proportionately to take account of Turkey and Germany, would both have 82 seats – 11.2 per cent each of the total number”.

So, it can be expected, that by the possible accession date of 2015, the overall population of Turkey may rise by almost as large as Germany. Ten years later in 2025, Turkey at 87 million would be the largest member of the Union. Looking forward to 2050 (almost as far ahead again as the lifetime of the current EU, and too far for serious study of impact effects), Turkey’s population is predicted to stabilise at around 97 million. Turkey in 2025 would constitute 15.5 per cent of the EU’s population, while Germany would account for 14.3 per cent. In today’s EU of 27 members, Germany accounts for 18.1 per cent of the total population. Even in 2050, Turkey has a population share below this at 17.7 per cent. What is different from the current Union, is that its largest members today – Germany, France, Italy and the UK- also have the largest economies. Political and economic dominance go together. This is not the case for Turkey.

Foreign Policy Issues

European Union with ever enlarging supranational structure shows great dynamism in its economic, political as well as foreign policies level. In fact this continuous change, with respect to internal and external factors is the very essence of its survival. As for example the recent phase of EU enlargement was a substantial one that influenced the internal structure and main policies of the EU. However, unlike other enlargements, Turkish enlargement refers an unprecedented challenge for the EU because Turkish accession involves multi-faceted issues such as economic development gaps, cultural differences, political problems and issues related to the size and population of Turkey. Its inclusion in the Union will have greater implication on the EU whole and also for its individual members.

Turkey's accession to the EU will influence the balance of power among the member states, the main policies of the EU such as agriculture and structural policy, and the basic identity formation process within the Union. For the first time, the EU will be receiving a member that has a predominantly Muslim population. It will mean the addition of 70 million Muslims to the already existing Muslim population within the EU which is about 15-20 million. This prospect may cause anxiety within EU member states since it would constitute a challenge to a cultural understanding of European identity based on the values and symbols of Christianity. Turkey may represent a threat to European identity, way of life, and values. It is possible to discern that historical and cultural notions of 'otherness' that serve to distinguish the European' from the 'non-European' also underlies the present attitude to Turkey.

Besides, social and economic factors the political and security related aspects of the Turkish accession will have wide range implications in EU foreign policies. Turkey may also be a strategic partner and important member state in future military or civilian operations that the EU may instigate in the future. In this sense Turkey's geographic location adjacent to such regions as the Balkans, Caucasus, Mediterranean and the Middle East may prove to be an asset rather than a liability for an effective European security.

The fact that Turkey is located in a tough neighbourhood is also a reason for concern in some EU circles. Since Turkey shares borders with unstable and problematic countries such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, a probable Turkish membership to

the EU will carry the EU's borders as far as the Middle East which will bring a significant shift in the EU's foreign policy.

Thus it may also lead to an extension in the geographical reach of the EU, an integration project extending from the Atlantic to the Middle East. Thus Turkey's membership may foster the 'geopolitical' potential of the EU by contributing not only to an increase in size and scope but also to the ideal of a multicultural Europe.

European Security

One of the significant part of the EU's foreign policy which has been evolving since the end of cold war is security- one of the significant reason for the evolution of the European Union (erstwhile as an EEC). If seen from geostrategic point of view and as a member of NATO Turkey has an institutional lever which can affect the EU's defence aspirations¹⁷. Also Turkey's military capabilities are vital for defence operations in the expanded European security area. And last but not the least Turkey's control over a pivotal intersection between South-eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, which allows it to qualify as a major player in all these regions. All these factors have led EU to rethink on Turkey's membership accession negotiation in October 2005 and also in future this would be going to decide its full membership.

Internal Politics in Turkey Regarding EU Membership

Apart from internal politics of European Union which of course matters a lot regarding Turkish accession, but nevertheless Turkish own image and nature of its own socio-political establishment also matters a lot, which in turn shapes the European views regarding its accession demand. In this sub-unit the internal politics of Turkey will be dealt with keeping in mind its progress over European Union's demand towards the fulfilment of Copenhagen political and economic criteria.

The history of contemporary Turkey is characterised by change, the main causes of which have been the external stimuli and incentives, particularly the drive

¹⁷ Muftuler-BacMeltem, (2002), "Turkey's role in the EU's security and Foreign policies", SAGE publication, Vol.31 (4): p.489-502.

for transformation from an oriental Islamic empire to a secular national state. But this transformation popularly known as Westernisation has been slow and occasionally painful. This transformation gained momentum with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the rise of the Kemalism, when ‘everything had to be rebuilt, above all a new identity’¹⁸. Its main aim was to move Turkey from being a medieval Islamic theocracy to becoming a modern capitalist Western democracy. As a result of these changes, Turkey has become a secular democracy, although the politicisation of Islam and political role of the military are still features of the Turkish political landscape.

In the contemporary Turkey the challenge of Westernisation is taking the form of Europeanization, that is, the reform in domestic structures, institutions and policies to meet the requirements of the systemic logic, political dynamics and administrative mechanisms of European Union. This challenge is becoming tougher as Turkey is preparing to become a member of the EU and join the ‘process of creating an ever closer union among the people of Europe’. For this, the role of Turkey (its internal affairs) in this process can be catalytic, as the EU will be welcoming its first Islamic member state.

Political reform along with economic is one of the agenda sought by the European commission which needs to be followed by Turkey so that its political structure matches with that of the European Union.

Following a protracted period of ups and downs in EU-Turkey relations, accession negotiation finally started in October 2005. This decision was reached after a huge round of political settlement and finally the commission of accession negotiations was made by the Brussels European Council in December 2004 on the basis of a report and recommendation from the commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria¹⁹.

Thus, it can be said that the Turkey’s EU candidacy since 1999 has stimulated the Turkish political and legal reforms and intensified the Europeanization process in Turkey.

¹⁸ Nicole pope and Hugh pope, (2004), “Turkey Unveiled: A History of modern Turkey”, 2nd edition Woodstock, New York: Overlook press, p.59.

¹⁹ Joseph, S. Joseph (2006), “Introduction: Turkey at Threshold of the European Union”, in Joseph S. Joseph (eds.) Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges, New York: Palgrave macmillan, p. 2.

Turkey's most significant and ambitious adjustment to European norms in political and economic terms became possible only when EU membership became a less distant possibility and when the EU finally made a more concrete commitment to Turkey (Muftuler-Bac 2000; Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2003). In this sense, the EU can be said acting as a powerful external actor inducing internal change. The EU has increasingly been the main motor behind the Europeanization process in Turkey as the EU membership perspective became clearer for Turkey and as it became obvious that accession negotiations with the EU could not begin unless Turkey fulfilled the political conditions for EU accession. This is not to claim that the EU is the only reason behind the democratization process in Turkey, but to assert that the EU played a substantial role in stimulating internal change and Europeanization.

The beginning of accession negotiation was the result of long relationship which goes back to the early years of the European Union Community. Turkey showed its interest in institutionalizing its relations and becoming an associate membership of the EU in the late 1950's. In 1959 it applied for associate membership and in 1963 it signed an association agreement which was intended to pave the way for full membership. It went into effect in 1964. However for the attainment of full membership, EU applied conditions that when the relations of Turkey with the EU have advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations of the European community Treaty (EC), the (the EC) shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the European Community.

After a long journey of discussion European Union finally gave its recommendation for the opening of accession negotiation. The commission, however, pointed out that accession negotiation should be open-ended process the outcome of which could not be guaranteed in advance. This was a clear indication from European Union that Turkey's accession depends on Turkey itself, so it should be ready to change itself and EU should not be blamed for any mishap. It was also pointed out that the challenge now for Turkey was to 'win the hearts and minds of those European citizens who are open but not convinced of Turkey's European destiny'²⁰.

²⁰ Ibid, P.4

Accession negotiations opened on the basis that Turkey sufficiently meet the Copenhagen criteria which were decided by the Copenhagen European Council, on June 1993, and spelled out in the presidency conclusion as follows:

“membership requires that the candidate has achieved stability of institution guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union”
(Joseph S. Joseph, 2006, p.14).

Here, one important point to be noted is that Turkey was allowed to start accession negotiations although it was not in full compliance with the political Copenhagen criteria. However, it was clear from Copenhagen criteria that the advancement of the negotiations is going to be guided by Turkey’s progress in preparing for accession, within a framework of political, economic and social convergence.

In the following paragraphs the Turkey’s inherent problems related to its political system, economic and socio-cultural system which acts as obstacle in its journey towards the attainment of full EU membership will be discussed in brief.

Political Environment

Turkey’s main political difference with European standard probably lies in its Ottoman imperial past and its political culture. Politically, since the nineteenth century Turkey has proved to be a dynamic state with respect to Europe as a role model. The state elite that established the Turkish Republic in 1923 formulated the recognition of Turkey as a European state as one of its official foreign policy objectives. The political reforms in the early years of the Republic, from 1923 to 1938, were adopted in order to make a break with the Ottoman past and to create a ‘modern’ European state. This is not to claim that everybody in Turkey shared that ideal, since Turkey’s aspiration to become European has, of course, been an elite project. As a consequence, the Turkish modernization process became a struggle

between the Europe-oriented state elite and the conservative elements in Turkish society. Interestingly, as the Europeanization process stimulated democratic change in Turkey, the anti-European reactionary conservatives gained strength. Turkey's initial objective in associating itself with the EU was to get an acceptance for its European status.

The Turkish political system has revolved around that of 'security regime', a concept according to which national security and the institutions of security play a pre-eminent role in the workings of the regime. In this system the political parties and the military has most of the time being found confronting with each other where the later always remains in strong position. The genesis of the security regime system dates back to the military coup of 12 September 1980, which defined the political equilibrium on which Turkey to some extent still, depends today²¹. The Turkish constitution has seen three amendments since its establishment in 1876, during the period of the Tanzimat. The first, in 1924 the second after the 'progressive' military coup in 1960, and the last one following that of 1980. The last one is still in force, with significant amendments over past twenty years, recognizes the classic separation of powers and the sovereignty of parliament. Since the establishment of Republic Turkey's generals have been unflinching guardians of Kemalism. Both the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law of 1961 and the 1982 constitution entrust the military with the responsibility for promoting Ataturk's legacy.

Thus, it can be said that military's role as the watch dog of civilian government is embedded in Turkey's institutions. The constitution, for example, requires the cabinet to give "priority consideration to the decisions" of the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body of top military and cabinet members, that the NSC is chaired by the country's president and is nominally subordinate to the civil government, the 1982 constitution requires that the half of its members be army officers. In, fact the ultimate power rests with them²².

The internal workings of the army explain its capacity to impose its will in the political Process. The military institutions used every measure at their disposal to present a united front in relation to the rest of the society to ensure their independence

²¹ Dorronsooro, Gilles (2005), "Turkey- a Democracy under Control?" in Roy, Olivier (ed.) *Turkey Today- a European country?* , London: Anthem Press, p.27

²² Phillips L. David (2004), "Turkey's Dreams of Accession", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.83, p.86-97

from the political authorities. The strong position of the army within the political system has also enabled the Turkish army- unlike the armies of other NATO countries to exclude any cut to its budget.²³ Also the other peculiar thing about the budget is that it does under the control of parliament and until 1999 the cost of the war against the PKK was so great (10 billion dollars a year) that one could justifiably imagine of war economy. This has led to huge defence spending apparently about one-third of the budget, making Turkey one of the top buyers worldwide of military equipment.

Not only in the budgetary terms but also in philosophical terms, teaching in the officers' Schools puts emphasis on the duty of defending Kemalist values, and clearly anticipates an intervention in the political sphere if and when the military establishment judges that national unity or the principle of security are under threat²⁴. Thus overall about Turkish political establishment it can be said that military holds the overwhelming power which sometimes restricts the easy movement of the political will of the civil government. Such negative nexus between political and military is highly opposite to European Union standard, which would undermine the Turkish accession to EU.

Moreover, the military is split between two camps over the extent to which Turkey should implement reforms sought by the EU. On the one side the country's top generals support the EU based reforms while on the other hand few generals rejects such reforms citing that it would hurt the national sovereignty of the country.

Changing Military Power

Overwhelming power in the military's hand has very often proved to be embarrassing for politicians and civil government. Thus this has many a times led to hindrance for the normal growth of democracy. However, during the past few years the government under the EU's pressure has taken few majors to curb the overwhelming power of the military. But many more still has to be done.

Changing the distribution of power between civilian and military authorities has proved a trickier issue. A report by the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee emphasized the need for considerably more progress, noting the still

²³ Dorransoro, Gilles (2005), "Turkey- A Democracy Under Control?", op. cit. p.30

²⁴ Ibid, 31.

"inappropriately large power" of Turkey's military. The report called for stricter civilian control of the security sector as a pre-requisite for Turkey's membership in the EU. In response, a constitutional amendment that curbs the military's power was passed. It terminated special off-budget accounts, which had long been used to finance commanders' pet projects. The Court of Accounts can now audit all public funds at the request of parliament. Military courts may no longer prosecute civilians in peacetime or for offenses such as inciting soldiers to mutiny and disobedience or discouraging the public from military duty. Allegations of torture by the military are now expected to be investigated and prosecuted promptly. The NSC no longer has carte blanche to obtain any information or document it wishes.

Different views regarding EU Membership

Meanwhile, joining the EU has become an obsession for many Turks. There are three kinds of people in Turkey who usually look forward for the country's membership of the EU. The first group, most obviously comprises big business- in Istanbul capital and other cities, as opposed to small and medium domestic market oriented because it will promote their basic freedoms and accelerate economic reform. The second group is left/liberal opinion, ranging from social democrats and parts of some socialist organisations, to trade Union leaders and activists of the various human rights organisation. The third group is the Kurdish minorities.

Minorities, including the Kurds, see it as the best way to secure greater human rights. Islamists think that such a move will reduce chances of a military takeover; military officers believe that it will ensure Turkey's territorial integrity. Accession is an old but still-distant dream, however. To become an EU member, Turkey will have to overcome the reluctance of European states in order to be included in EU. Adding insult to injury, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker stated at the time, "A country in which torture is still a common practice cannot have a seat at the table of the European Union."

Minorities Question

The Kurdish conflict in Turkey has been a prolonged affair. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kurdish question has been a chronic reason for

instability and violence in the country. The Kurdish question springs from the emergence of Kurdish nationalism at the end of the Ottoman Empire. In the 1970s, certain Kurdish groups, such as the PKK (Kurdish workers' Party), turned into violent struggle. Since then the conflict has persisted in the form of guerrilla movements and limited warfare between Turkish government forces and the PKK. The guerrilla war launched by this organisation in 1984 continued until 2000. During this period, the Kurdish question was the principal factor that influenced Turkish foreign policy²⁵. The position of the government has been that of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the country cannot be jeopardised. The PKK's declared aims, on the other hand, range from cultural and political rights as an identity group to federalism and separate statehood²⁶. Since 1984, Thousands of people have lost their lives.

The EU's interests in Turkey's Kurdish question are motivated first and foremost by Turkey's geostrategic importance to Europe. This explains Europeans concerns about Turkey's democracy and human rights, its internal instability and its foreign policy orientation – all issues influenced by the Kurdish question. Influenced by this European Commission beginning with its 1998 progress Report, has called for 'a political and non-military solution to the problem of the south east'. The EU has also called for the abolition of the death penalty, the eradication of torture and the respect for rights and standards in trials and detention periods. Beyond these, EU institutions have made specific demands on governments and on cultural and minority rights, affecting principally (but not exclusively) the kurds²⁷. Thus, minorities rights especially concerning the Kurds have a significant say in Turkey's accession to EU, which the former cannot deny in any case.

Encouraged by the EU, Turkey has pursued legislative and constitutional reforms liberalizing the political system and relaxing restrictions on freedom of the press association, and expression. Turkey signed and ratified Protocols 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It abolished the death penalty and adopted measures to promote independence of the judiciary, end torture during police

²⁵ Bozarlan, Hamit (2005), "The Kurdish Question: Can it be Solved Within Europe?" in (eds.) Roy, Oliver 'Turkey Today- A Europe Country?', London: Anthem Press, p.79.

²⁶ Beriker-Atiyas, Nimet; (1997), "The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and prospects", security dialogue, sage Publication.

²⁷ Tocci, Nathalie; (2006), cited in " Turkey and the European Union" by Joseph S. Joseph; Palgrave macmillan; p.122

interrogations, and reform the prison system. In addition, Turkey has significantly reduced the scope of its anti-terrorism statutes, which had been used to curtail political expression, and it amended the Penal Code and Codes of Criminal and Administrative Procedure.

Police powers have been curbed and the administration of justice strengthened. The protection and promotion of the rights of the Kurds, which make up about a fifth of Turkey's population, have also progressed. In several South-eastern provinces, the long-standing state of emergency, which led to abuses by the military, has been lifted. New regulations have been adopted to facilitate Kurdish-language education. The rights of the Kurdish media and other broadcasters have been extended. And a provisional amnesty has been adopted for individuals involved in the Kurdish separatist movement.

Current status of Turkish Accession

The accession negotiation process which started in October 2005 is moving with slow pace due to some serious differences between the two groups, over issues like human rights, Cyprus conflict, political reform issue etc.

The EU did not suspended accession talks in December 2006 over Turkey's refusal to implement the Ankara protocol (which involves letting Cypriot ships dock in Turkish ports). Instead, EU froze eight chapters of the *aquis* that are related to the customs union. Accession talks have confined in other areas, with four now open another two likely to follow before the end of 2007.

Growing nationalism and disillusionment with the EU did not make Turkey turn away from accession. Instead, the government published a 'National Action Plan' to take over most of the EU related laws by 2013, irrespective of the state of accession negotiations. Nicolas Sarkozy the president of France did not follow his election plan to halt the Turkish accession. However, the repeated Turkish blockage of its ports and thus the denial of the benefits of customs union to Cypriot may raise serious confrontation between EU and Turkey as the Cypriot is the full member of the European Union.

Towards a Change in Mutual Perceptions as a Means of Fostering Closer 'Turkey-EU' Relations

A typical argument frequently advanced by Turkey's military-security establishment concerns Turkey's unique importance for Europe from the geo-strategic perspective. The basic idea is that Turkey could make a significant contribution to European security through active participation in the emerging European Security and Defence architecture.

This is not to suggest, however, that security conditions are not important and should be automatically minimized. The central point to emphasize is that security considerations per se cannot act as a substitute for democratic reforms and, hence, such considerations cannot be used as a means for bypassing the Copenhagen criteria in the first place. Indeed, once Turkey experiences major democratic reforms and resolves its central internal and external dilemmas, it will be in a much better position to contribute to European security as a full-member of the Union. Resolution of the Cyprus dispute would be a proof that Turkish membership would be a concrete security asset. Otherwise, in the European mind, Turkey in its present mould would still be regarded as security consumer rather than a security provider. This perception, in turn, will naturally reduce the incentives on the part of the EU to admit Turkey as a full-member.

The emerging pro-EU coalition in Turkey could make an important contribution by challenging the orthodox, security-conscious mind-set in Turkey and conveying what EU integration is all about in the first place. It is also crucial that the reform process is "internalized" in the sense that the kind of reforms needed to satisfy Copenhagen criteria ought to be portrayed as reforms, which are intrinsically valuable and not simply accomplished to meet EU criteria in purely instrumental fashion.

Ultimately, Turkey's attraction to the EU will rest heavily on her concrete achievements in such diverse areas as science, technology, education, culture sports, communications and entrepreneurship, achievements, which are likely to be far more important than its contribution in the narrowly defined security realm.

Turkey could also make a significant contribution towards the evolution of a genuinely multicultural Europe, a kind of Europe which is not only interested in what

is happening within her own borders but also extends her horizons to develop relations with the neighbouring Islamic world. Europe has a greater incentive to develop such a close relationship than the United States, given that Europe is geographically closer to the Islamic world and contains a significant Islamic minority within its borders.

Indeed, Turkey's contribution to a multicultural Europe would transcend the realm of Islam and include the significant non-Islamic elements in her rich cultural heritage. For this vision to be meaningful, however, especially after September 11, two basic pre-conditions have to be satisfied. First, Turkey needs to transform herself into a genuinely democratic state if it wishes to present itself as a model of multiculturalism both to Europe and to the Islamic world. Second, Europe needs to undergo a major transformation itself from being an inward-oriented entity towards a genuinely global actor, interested not only in its own internal dynamics but also in broader regional and global processes.

The origins of the current problems in Turkey-EU relations are, to a certain extent, due to the inward oriented nature of the EU. In such a scenario, a reformed Turkey could claim to have importance for the EU in terms of having a stronghold in the strategically important Middle East and the former Soviet Union, based on a role that extends well beyond the role of a security provider. Clearly, these are long-term visions and some drastic changes need to take place on both sides if such ideas are to have any concrete meaning.

It is clear that Europe itself does not constitute a monolithic entity. Deep divisions exist between different elements of the political spectrum concerning the meaning and limits of multiculturalism in the European context. The idea of a genuinely multi-cultural Europe is close to the visions of the European Left but tends to generate considerable resentment from the European Right, which is very much on the ascendancy at present. Similarly, the vision of Europe as a unified global actor appears to be somewhat distant. The kinds of obstacles that Turkey itself needs to overcome to conform to this long-term vision are quite formidable. In the meantime, the EU in the present setting could contribute further to Turkey's accession by improving the mix of conditions and incentives.

Concluding Observations

The Helsinki decision created a powerful set of incentives for change and reform in Turkey's domestic politics. Previously, change had been under way, but was less pronounced given that membership in the Customs Union in and of itself failed to provide an appropriate mix of conditions and incentives. The end of the armed conflict in the southeast during the early part of 1999 also paved the way for significant change in the direction of political reforms. Observing the Turkish scene two and a half years after the Helsinki Summit, one can clearly detect the beginnings of an influential pro-EU coalition in Turkey committed to undertaking the kinds of economic and political reforms necessary to facilitate full membership. It is fair to say that, hitherto, civil society associations, rather than political parties, have been the principal actors of this newly emerging pro-EU coalition. Key political parties are yet to establish themselves as active members of this coalition.

CHAPTER THREE

PRESSURE GROUPS INVOLVED

The previous chapter examined the domestic politics involved in both Turkey and European Union. This chapter expands the analysis by measuring pressure groups involved in European Union-Turkey integration both at micro and macro level. At micro level, analysis will be done at public, country, and institutional level in the European Union. While at macro level, countries and groups which are not the members of the European Union but still influential in the EU enlargement will be taken into account. While discussing the pressure groups involved in European Union regarding Turkey's accession, the reason behind such an act such as identity, enlargement, economic concerns, and crime related to Turkey to the EU and to the individuals will also be discussed.

European Unwillingness toward Turkey: Where does it come from?

The EU enlargement process and its consequences are largely governed by material national interests and state power. Such pressure groups have become dominant with each passing enlargements. Current EU leaders promote accession primarily because they believe it to be in their long term economic and geopolitical interest, whereas applicant states embark on the laborious accession process because in long term it would prove beneficial to them also. But all the EU accessions have not proved equal. Unlike other accessions, pressure groups seems to be more rigid and biased as per as Turkey's accession are concerned.

There is no doubt that the negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU have started in an unfavourable environment, which is very much different from all the erstwhile accession negotiations. It is very often said that the European Union enlargement has reached its 'absorption capacity'. This concept first appeared in official texts in the conclusions of the Copenhagen summits of 1993, which stated²⁸:

²⁸ Cited in Emerson, Michael et al, "Just what is this absorption capacity of the European Union?", September, 2006, CEPS No.113.

'The Union's capacity to absorb new member, while maintaining the moment of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of the Union and the candidate countries'.

The concept of absorption capacity has resurfaced again and again in the European debate which has strongly been linked to the further enlargement of the European Union. This has particularly been talked about the most sizeable candidate Turkey.

Apart from these heavily used official terms, the present time enlargement also seems to be influenced by EU citizens who were earlier isolated on the enlargement issue as it were mainly driven by political elites. But now it seems that they seem to have become more aware about the implications of EU enlargement and thus has started taking interest in this process. Earlier studies considered public opinion a weak foundation for foreign policy decision-making and to explain international relations. But, now public opinion has become more important. As such research now shows that majority of the EU citizens' shows scepticism towards Turkish accession, citing it as 'other' on the basis of culture, religion, economy etc.

Everything at present seems to indicate that Turkey's accession will not be a smooth drive to attain EU's full membership. Here it is necessary to mention that negotiations will be strongly influenced by individual member states' governments, and their domestic political concerns will largely determine the member states' positions. It means that Turkey needs to fight the battle both at the political and cultural level (Tacar, 2007).

Here the study will try to explore that on what basis of socio-political structure the European opposes the Turkish EU membership. In fact, according to Grigoriadis the current literature about anti-Turkism in Europe specifies several explanations for significant amount of opposition to Turkish EU membership²⁹.

However, following are the main opposing arguments based on non-technical factors (i.e. issues regarding enlargement not officially mentioned as criteria of accession rules) thereby demonstrating a variety of explanations:

²⁹ Grigoriadis, I. N. (2006), "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Debating the most difficult Enlargement ever", School of Advanced International Studies, Review, Vol. 26(1), p.147-160.

- 1) **European description based on geography of the region** which excludes, Turkey's claim that it does share the same geography as the current EU members,
- 2) **Common historical, socio-cultural values and identity** (arguing that Turkey has different history, religion and cultural dimensions very different from Europe itself³⁰,
- 3) **Immigration Problem** that Turkey might pose in case of a full membership with its population of approximately 75 million (European Commission, 2006; Moch, 2003; Spohn and Triandafyllidou, 2003; Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005),
- 4) **Economic trouble** that the Turkey faces and its possible adverse consequences,
- 5) **Religion issue**, Muslim dominated population creates challenges for the EU in terms of social cohesiveness and cultural diversity³¹.

Besides there are few other main issues European Union is concerned regarding the Turkey's accession. These are as follows:

- **Demography-** Turkey is huge, poor, and Islamic. Its population of 70 million would make it one of the largest-and fastest-growing-members of the EU. Western Europe has a declining birth rate and needs young workers to prop up its elaborate social pension schemes. However, many observers question whether Turkey can ever fit into the overwhelmingly Christian EU.
- **Democracy and Human rights-** Many European countries say Turkey has not done enough to bring its human rights practices in line with strict EU norms especially on respecting democracy and the rule of law, protecting human rights, and guaranteeing the rights of minorities.
- **Cyprus.** Historically, speaking Cyprus is a former British colony that has long been divided by the famous Green line demarcation boundary between the Greek Cypriot majority and a Turkish Cypriot minority. In 1974, Greek Cypriots tried to take over the government. In response, Turkey invaded and

³⁰ Smith, H. (1992), "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", *Internal Affairs*, 68(1), 55-78.

³¹ Bisaha, N., (2004), "Creating East and West: Renaissance humanists and Ottoman Turks", Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

took control of the northern third of the island. The latest round of UN-sponsored talks led to a referendum on unification in April 2004, based on Annan plan Turkish Cypriots voted yes, while Greek Cypriots voted no. Cyprus was accepted into the EU anyway, with the help of Greek pressure tactics as a new member on May 1 2004, hoping that this would in future help in resolving the issue. In July 2005, Turkey included Cyprus in an expanded customs union- which offers preferential trading terms-with new EU countries. However, Ankara refused to recognize the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus. EU ministers have demanded Ankara recognize the divided island or jeopardize the accession negotiations.

- **Armenia.** The Ottoman Empire carried out a campaign to eliminate its Armenian population between 1915 and 1923. More than one million people were killed in paramilitary raids, work camps, or death marches. The EU calls this campaign genocide and wants Turkey to acknowledge it; Ankara refuses.
- **Economic up-gradation.** European Union has been constantly asking Turkey for its betterment of economic growth as such to match with the EU's growth rate. It is to minimise the economic mis-match between Turkey and EU if in future Turkey is to be made the full member of the European Union.

Therefore, on the basis of both the subjective and objective way of thinking of pressure groups involved in this EU-Turkey integration, is going to decide the fate of Turkey's entry into European Union.

On the basis of current literature it is quite easy to reach on conclusion that EU enlargement and integration identifies a number of issues that produce fear among the European public about further enlargement and acceptance of new countries. These include the fear to lose national identity (McLaren, 2004), undefined "European identity" and unclear identity formation process in Europe (Bruter, 2005; Eder & Spohn, 2005; Smith, 1992), negative impact of new countries on the members states' economies, increasing number of unemployment, fears about economic globalization, unclear consequences of further enlargement, illegal immigration, organized crime, drug trafficking, and increasing number of drug use (European Commission, 2006).

Those concerns which effect the public perceptions about new members and further enlargement are also relevant to the Turkish case.


Pressure Groups Involved

In several EU member states, there appears to be a stark contrast between the opinion about the political establishment on Turkey's membership of the Union and that of the broad public. For some, but clearly not all, member states, Turkey represents a challenging but with huge potential. For many of these states' citizens, however, Turkey appears as a country too big, too poor, too distant and too Muslim.

While a few national governments and parliaments have already declared their respective positions on the Turkish bid, there are still many especially smaller the member states which appear to be taking time, seemingly waiting for the major powers to spell out and align their stances first. The figure (bar-diagram) below shows the level of opposition among countries (namely, EU-25 and EU-15 in combination, Denmark, France, Austria, United Kingdom, Italy, and Estonia respectively). Among these Denmark and Austria shows the highest level of dissatisfaction regarding Turkish accessionship.

Here, in this chapter for better understanding pressure groups have been broadly into divided two groups that is, one supporting the Turkish entry into the European Union, while other opposing the same. Above diagram tries to highlight the level of opposition among the core EU groups like (EU-25) as a whole and (EU-15) as a part and countries like Denmark, France, Austria, United Kingdom, Italy and Estonia respectively on individual basis. Besides, the other group which are though not the member of EU, but plays influential role in EU enlargement like the USA has also been highlighted.

Figure: 1



Pressure Groups Against

Countries like Germany, France, Greece, Cyprus, Austria and Estonia, for some or other reason are against the Turkish accession.

Germany is considered as one of the most influential and important actor in Turkey's EU accession process. This is due to its huge size, and influencing member as of the EU and its strong economic strength. On the other hand what makes still more important is that Germany holds the maximum Turkish population in European Union, which would make it probably the most affected state by Turkish EU membership. In economic terms Turkey is more closely integrated with it than with any other EU state. If the economic data is seen, one will find 14 per cent of Turkish imports and 16 per cent of its exports are traded with Germany and about 2.5 million people of Turkish origin live there.

Moreover, German population is more in touch with Turks than any other European country. Turkey is a very popular holiday destination for Germans, with 4.8 million German visitors in 2008. On the other hand about 2.7 million people with Turkish origin are living in Germany. And it is interesting to note that most of them

come from backward regions of South-east Turkey and not from the modern cities like Istanbul. What make situation even worse is that these immigrants tend to stick with their traditional culture and values they brought with them, years or decades ago. They are more conservative as for example, some Turkish families in Germany restrict their daughter's education and there have been about 45honour killings on German soil since 1996.

Table 2: Turkish Population in selected EU Countries

Country	Absolute population (in thousands)	As % of total foreign Population
Germany	1998.5	27.4
France	208.0	6.4
Austria	134.5	17.7
Netherlands	100.8	15.1
United Kingdom	58.2	2.2
Belgium	56.2	6.5
Denmark	35.2	13.6

Source: OECD- It does not include those of Turkish origin who has taken on citizenship of the country of residence.

Thus, on the basis of these facts it can be said that Germans are well acquainted about Turkish culture and custom. Polls indicate that 65 per cent or more of the German population currently opposes the Turkish EU membership³². This has helped in raising Germans scepticism against Islam.

³² Orendt, Moritz (2010), "Germany's Role in Turkey's EU Accession Process", Center for Strategic Studies, 16 February 2010, accessed on 29 May 2010, Available on URL: http://www.bilgesam.org/eu/endex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=233:germany_role-in-turkeys-eu-accession-process&catid=70:ab

Now we will look into the reason behind this adverse relationship.

Germany's Policy towards Turkey

Despite of having wide and comprehensive interaction with Turkey, Germany's policy towards Turkey has been unstable depending upon the political parties in power. If Germany's policy towards Turkey in past two decades is scrutinised, one can find that its policies are unbalanced towards Turkey. This can be evidenced from the activities of different political parties applying different pressure tactics concerning Turkey's accession in the two decades. During the summit of the European Council in Luxembourg, in 1997 the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl clearly opposed the candidacy status for Turkey on the basis of cultural and religious differences.

But with the change of the government from CDU/FDP with Kohl to the SPD/Greens coalition with the Chancellor Schroder, the German attitude towards the potential membership of Turkey in the European Union changed. They supported the Turkish desire of full EU membership. Beyond this, during its presidency of the Council of Europe in 1999, Germany tried to reduce the Greek's anti-Turkish views regarding EU membership. In fact after the victory of AKP in the 2002 elections keeping in mind there European Union and Western oriented reforms, Germany supported Turkey in their efforts to approach European Union. Besides, Germany convinced the sceptical members, especially France, to agree the start the accession negotiations with Turkey.

However, with the change of the government and CDU coming to power with Angel Merkel as Chancellor, Germany's attitude towards Turkey once again changed. Now Angela Merkel started suggesting the concept of a "privileged partnership", which was in her opinion the better alternative to a full EU membership. But her proposal of the "privileged partnership" was criticized by EU officials as nothing desirable for Turkey since it already has a unique partnership including a customs union. With the Merkel's coming to power there was a huge uncertainty about the German position regarding Turkey's perspective for EU membership. It reflected a position where the possibility of membership neither was denied nor guaranteed if the Copenhagen criteria were fulfilled. In other ways it can be said that Germany's earlier

active support towards Turkey's membership stopped, which is still being continued in the present time.

So, in Germany different political parties have different views regarding Turkey's accession. For example, in 2009 elected parliament, there are five different parties:

- Christian Democrats (CDU) with its Bavarian sister party CSU,
- Social Democrats (SPD),
- Liberals (FDP),
- The Leftists (Die Linke), and
- The Greens (Die Grunen).

Among the parties, CDU prefers the "privileged partnership" with the Turkey .i.e. they support for partial membership instead of full membership. It also talks about absorption capacity of the EU, which seems has specially been brought into keeping in view the Turkey's large size of population. Further its sister party CSU are more radical than and openly criticises Turkey's inclusion into EU. For the SPD, which is generally supported by the majority of the German citizens with Turkish origin, the membership of Turkey in the Union is a great chance to forge a link to other Islamic nations. They see the enlargement of the EU as a chance to spread peace, stability and wealth. It is also emphasized that the European Union has to keep its promises and stand to its commitments to states which fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria. The FDP is convinced that the decision about Turkey's EU accession is not a topic in the near future. Turkey has to continue with its reforms before the European Union has to decide if its "absorption capacity" is sufficient for the accession of such a big and different country. Die Linke is not against a Turkey EU membership. It emphasizes the need for reforms and especially the need for an improvement of the situation of the Kurdish minority (Ibid).

Public Opinion

Apart from political parties' views, the public opinion in Germany has also remained in turbulence. More or less public support for Turkey in Germany has never been outstanding. Since Eurobarometer spring 2005 poll it has even decreased about five per cent in less than one and a half years. The reluctance about Turkey membership is

partly caused by the general scepticism against EU enlargements. According to the last Euro poll report which referred to the public opinion about Turkey's EU accession, 54 per cent of the Germans think that Turkey belongs geographically at least partly to Europe. Only 35 per cent believe that the Turkish history is a part of the European history. More than 70 per cent are against a membership of Turkey because "the cultural differences between Turkey and the member states of the EU are too big for the accession to make sense".

The German mood is 15 per cent worse than the EU average. One explanation for this particular German unease is the integration problems of many Turkish migrants. Then it is asked how Turkey could succeed to integrate in the European Union if so many Turks fail to integrate in Germany. Many Germans connect Turkish migrants rather to forced marriages, honour killings, imported brides, failures at school and unemployment than to the positive examples of integration. Sixty per cent of the Germans think that there are too many foreigners in Germany. Due to the huge share of Turks in the foreign population foreigner is often equated with Turk.

McLaren (2007), under the stress of political changes, European public consider current Turkish immigrants as a threat to their national identities and eventually see Turkey's membership as a larger implication of this threat. Therefore this study hypothesises that people from countries with a larger Turkish population are less likely to support Turkey's membership.

France has the second largest Turkish population in European Union, just next to Germany. "In France the real reason for opposition to Turkey are not made explicit in the accession debate, they are underlying the debate", argues Nicolas Veron. He cites cultural differences and future balance of power in the enlarged Union as a few examples for the French opposition against Turkey. Many French people already worry about the ever enlarging European Union because it reduces their own political and social hold on the European Union. Thus the French public opinion is strongly against the EU enlargement. It is also clear that by the time Turkey clear the accession process it will become the largest populated country of the European Union, thereby surpassing the current largest country Germany. Being the largest member of the EU, Turkey's behaviour becomes unpredictable to imagine at current time.

Another reason for Turkey's opposition is the presence of large number of Armenians minority in France. Being highly vocal and well organised they were instrumental in pushing through draft law in 2006 aiming at criminalising the denial of genocide. Although, the draft could not able to make through the statute but it aroused considerable anger among the Turks.

It was the French initiative that led to the introduction of “*absorption capacity*” debate in Europe. During the 2006 summit French President Jacques Chirac initiated the debate by underlining that enlargement that enlargement ‘should only continue in a process that is controlled and better understood’. He defined the ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU as an institutional, financial and political capacity, the latter concerning the views of the receiving Population, which should “be able to say if they accept or not”³³.

In France the political pressure groups both the right and left factions of politicians are opposing any future enlargements. In fact along with Austria, France is the only country who has brought into referendum in their political system to ratify any future enlargement. These amendments seem to have been brought mainly to check Turkey's accession to European Union.

The former president of France, Valery Giscard d'Estaing openly said that ‘the capital of Turkey is not in Europe, so Turkey is not in Europe. If Turks join, that will be end the end of the European Union’. The former French president did not ask the same geographical question with regard to Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus which is also not in Europe (Tacar, 2007:128).³⁴ This reflects the biased and subjective approach which most of Europeans holds with regard to Turkey as per as its EU accession is concerned.

Greece is another EU country which till recently was strongly opposing the Turkish entry into the Union. Since Greece became itself a member of European Union in 1981, a long history of conflict with Turkey continued for a long time. In the first nineteen years of its membership, it tried to utilise its membership to exert pressure on

³³ Cited in Emerson et al (2006)

³⁴ In an article entitled “Return to Reason” in *Le Figaro*, the then French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing put forward reasons why Turkey should be left out of the EU (cited from Tacar (2007:145).

Turkey regarding a range of political and territorial issues. It largely followed a obstructionist approach, seeking to either block or severely slow down Ankara's path to EU. However, since the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, Greece not only ceased to pose an obstacle on Turkey's closer attachment to the EU³⁵.

The wavering Greece policy towards EU-Turkey relations, although by no means completely ended, has nonetheless considerably reduced since the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. The dawn of good relationship between two countries is also because of the earthquake which affected both the countries in 1999.

In so far as Helsinki broke the cycles of Greece's vacillations between vetoes and deals, this marked a considerable change from previous policies. Moreover, the breaking of these cycles with a comprehensive package, which included both Cyprus and the Aegean for the first time, triggered a qualitatively new phase in Greek policy whereby Turkey's attachment to the EU began to appear not only as a worthy cost, but also the fittest strategy towards the attainment of national strategy. This second change also came out of the fast improvement in Greek-Turkish relations which, between January 2000 and November 2001 which for example, produced nine bilateral treaties in various field³⁶.

Cyprus is among the most strongly opposing country as per as Turkish accession is concerned. This opposition became even more powerful with Cyprus joining the European Union club along with other nine countries in 2004, has proved a major blockage for Turkey's way towards attainment of EU's full membership. Cyprus remains one of the biggest deadlocks for Turkey's EU accessionship.

The Cyprus-Turkey-EU crisis started in 1974, when Turkey invaded the north of Cyprus. The Island's ongoing division and military occupation of 37 per cent of its northern part still continues all the same³⁷. It was hoped at the time of the Republic of

³⁵ Wood, Steve (2004), "The EU and Turkey: political Machination in a Three -Level Game", National Europe Centre, Austrian National University, Working Paper (139), Nov. 2004, P.15

³⁶ Kazamiass, Alexander, (2006) "The Greek variable in EU-Turkish relations" in Joseph S. Joseph (ed), *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges*, :, Palgrave Basingstoke.

³⁷ The northern part of Cyprus is part of Turkey and is called as Turkish Cypriot, while the southern part belongs to Greece.

Cyprus's accession negotiations that their 'catalytic effect' could solve this problem. But this did not happen.

Now since Turkey's own accession negotiations has begun, a common approach to the Cyprus problem is to claim that it creates a deadlock in Turkey's EU accession negotiations. In the words of Turkish foreign minister Gul, the Cyprus problem is 'poisoning' EU-Turkey relations³⁸.

To solve this crisis in 2002, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive plan to resolve the political division on Cyprus and to reunite the Island. Though neither side was fully satisfied with the proposal but they agreed to put it to referenda in the North and the South on April 24, 2004. The plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The European Union expressed regret over the Greek Cypriots' rejection of the Annan plan and congratulated the Turkish Cypriots for their support of the plan. Nevertheless, under Greek pressure, EU agreed in May 2004 to include the divided island as one of the ten new EU members. Cyprus inclusion into EU proved detrimental for Turkey's own accession.

For example, after the opening of negotiation with Turkey's accessionship, thirteen month later, the relations between EU and Turkey deteriorated to a new low to such an extent that Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn's much-quoted fears of a "train crash"³⁹ was becoming a reality because of Turkey's refusal to open its ports and airspace to the Republic of Cyprus. This problem aroused ever since Turkey signed the Additional protocol in 2005, which extended its existing customs union with the EU to the new member states (including the Republic of Cyprus), the EU asked Turkey to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels. But the Turkish government has not yet submitted this protocol to parliament for ratification.

Reason behind this move of Ankara was that until the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus is ended- something which failed after the collapse of Annan plan due to refusal of Greek Cypriot.

This deadlock becomes more deadly when seen from the point of view of European Commission's enlargement strategy point of view which states that, Cyprus

³⁸ Cited in Stavridis, (2007).

³⁹ Ackakoca, Amanda. (2006), "EU-Turkey relations 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment?", EPC issue paper No.50, Nov. 2006, p.7

being member of the EU, its agreement on each of the chapters is required before it is closed. The opening and closing of Chapters requires the agreement of all 27 member states. So far only one chapter (on science and research) has been provisionally closed (meaning that agreement reached). In the face of Greek Cypriot threats to veto the move, it can overall affect the progress in the Turkish accession negotiations.

According to the recent released European Commission's progress report, it has so far proved impossible to open a further five chapters- on agriculture and rural development, social policy and employment, economic and monetary policy financial control, and enterprise and industrial policy- mainly because the Greek Cypriots are blocking the progress⁴⁰.

If it were possible to remove Cyprus from the equation, the situation would have been very different but, as things stand, this decades-old problem will continue to cast a long shadow over Turkey's aspirations to become full membership of European Union.

In referendums on the creation of a unified state, which would enable both regions to join the EU, 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour and 75% of Greek Cypriots voted against.

About **Austria** experts say that they are culturally and historically opposed to Turkey joining the EU. Austria is the only country in Europe which holds extreme radical views against Turkey's accession to European Union. This radicalism is being there since for long time in history. Historically, Austria is the remnant of the Habsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires, historic rivals of the Ottoman Empire that preceded Turkey; Ottoman Turks laid siege to Vienna in 1529 and 1683.

Unlike in the past, today at current political scenario, a European citizen holds more power as compared to anywhere in the past. It has more say as per as European Union is concerned. For example, with regard to the recent Austrian Government's move to amend the constitution, making referendum compulsory. With this coming into force, for example, a citizen in Austria might say: 'the Turks came up to the doors of Vienna and ruined everything here in 1683 so I don't want them in the Union now' (Tacar, 2007:127).

⁴⁰ Akcakoca, Amanda (2006), "EU-Turkey relations after 43 years on: train crash or temporary derailment?", EPC Issue paper No. 50, November 2006.

Today, Austria and a few other EU nations want to offer Turkey a “privileged partnership,” or associate member status, instead of full membership rights. Austria also wants to change the framework of the current negotiations so their end goal is not explicitly Turkish accession. Instead, the talks would be an “open-ended process” whose results are not guaranteed. Much has changed since Europe granted Turkey the right to begin accession talks in December 2004. For example, France and the Netherlands rejected the EU constitution, EU ministers haven’t agreed on a new budget, and opposition to Turkey’s membership in the EU has not ceased.

Estonia like other majority of the EU members is also against Turkey’s entry into the European Union. According to an Opinion poll based on Faktum pollster December, 2004 in which 969 people were interviewed showed that Estonians are more against than for Turkey's accession to the European Union⁴¹.

The above survey showed that about 37 per cent of Estonia's voting-age residents are for, and 43 per cent against, Turkey becoming a member of the EU. The remaining one-fifth of the polled had no opinion on the issue. Among ethnic Estonians, about 38 per cent supported and 42 per cent were against Turkish membership, while among non-Estonians, 31 per cent were for and 43 per cent against admitting Turkey into the club.

Beside, these even electorates of all parliamentary parties are also inclined to oppose Turkey's accession to the union. The ratio of opponents is the biggest among Pro Patria Union voters at 59 per cent and in the Social Democratic party at 54 per cent.


⁴¹ The Baltic Times, (2004), “Estonians cool on membership”, The Baltic Times, 15 December 2004 [online: web] Accessed on 15 July, 2010, URL:<http://www.Baltictimes.com/news/articles/11641>

Pressure Groups in Favour

Countries like United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Netherland most of the Swedish countries and the other recently added countries into the Union among Central Eastern European Countries are the supporters of the Turkish accession to the Union.

The figure below gives a visual impression on the level of support available for Turkish membership in the EU. This is based on the result of Eurobarometer poll held on May-June 2005⁴².

Figure: 2 Support of Turkey



Considering EU average population as an watershed between Support and against Turkish EU membership than it is clear from the given figure that the countries like Hungary, UK, Portugal and Spain are high headed supporters of Turkish membership, while remaining countries like Greece, Germany, France, Cyprus and Austria are low ranker supporter for Turkish EU membership.

⁴² BBC News (2005), "EU Opens Turkey Membership Talks", on Tuesday, 4 October 2005, [Online: Web] Accessed on 18 May 2010, URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4305500.stm>

United Kingdom is one among the countries in the European Union who openly supports the future enlargement and in that connection it open heartedly welcomes the inclusion of Turkey in the European Union.

UK has different view regarding the future enlargement of the European Union. The ‘absorption capacity’ debate in Britain is very different from the state of the debate in France and Germany both in terms of content and intensity. The European affairs minister, Douglas Alexander, refrained from suggesting any limits to enlargement and of inclusion of any new member on the condition that it fulfils the technical demands of the membership criteria. While UK accepts the institutional, financial and policy reform favourably, the concept of the absorption of enlargement by the publics, the position advocated strongly in France and Germany as well as the notion of ‘cultural’ and ‘societal’ absorption are strongly opposed in Britain⁴³. Therefore for both the Labour and the Conservative party, absorption capacity refers just no more than the ability of the candidate to take on obligation of membership and also of the Union to adapt to, to assimilate the candidate.

For the UK, promoting Turkish entry maintains political and strategic alignment with the US, especially in the context of the battle against terrorism. It also supports the view that the UK prefers to extend rather than deepen the EU. On the other hand, it would be among the net-payers from who more would be required to fund the large net-receiver Turkey and might also face some immigration pressure. For the Blair government these considerations are outweighed by other factors. In November 2003, Foreign Minister Jack Straw declared Turkey should join the EU ‘as soon as possible’ and termed it a ‘great democracy’ and in May 2004 Tony Blair made the first visit to Turkey by a British Prime Minister in 14 years, during which he and Erdogan launched a bilateral ‘action plan’ of cooperation⁴⁴.

Other than UK, **Spain** is also the strongest supporter of Turkish accession to the EU. Spaniards continue to show a high level of support for enlargement. Spain’s general support for enlargement also applies to Turkey. Spain is in favour of Turkey’s entry

⁴³ Emerson, Michael et. al., (2006), “Just what is the ‘absorbing capacity’ of the European Union”, Centre For European Studies, September- 2006, No.113.

⁴⁴ Cited in “The EU and Turkey: Political Machination in a Three- level Game”, Steve Woods, National Europe Centre; working paper (139), Nov. 2004.

and at the same time it is also highly critical of the Greek-Cypriots over Cyprus Problem. It is interesting to note that Spanish PM Zapatero goes a way ahead to promote his 'Alliance of Civilisations' project, now co-chaired with Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan.

According, to Elcano barometer⁴⁵, 'regarding the future enlargement process, 58 per cent of Spaniards believe that Russia, followed by Turkey should become a member of the EU. Besides, 74 per cent of Spaniards agree that workers from the new member states should be able to work in Spain without restrictions. Still more noteworthy is the acceptance by 62 per cent that certain companies might have to delocalise their factories outside Spain in favour of the new EU members. Furthermore, these ideas are maintained despite the respondents believing that the enlargement of the EU will be less positive for Spain (53 per cent) than for the EU in general 71.7 per cent or 85 per cent for the new member states' (Torreblanca & Sorroza: 2006).

Unlike other EU members, support for Turkey's accession does not necessarily coincide with Spain's immediate economic or foreign policy interests, as it would introduce further pressures in terms of foreign investment, foreign trade and regional and agricultural policy or would probably require the commitment of additional diplomatic and economic resources that might be detracted from the Maghreb, which is indeed a priority area for Spain. Yet successive Spanish Governments (whether Conservative or Socialist) have backed Turkey's entry into the European Union for a number of different reasons which have to do with the EU's general political, economic and security interests, and have not considered issues of cultural or religious identity to be central. In fact, they consider that the Turkey's entry would help in reducing the monopoly of Northern member countries in EU.


Netherland is also among the countries which on an average are strong supporters of the Turkish accession. But this support is based on strict adherence of norms based on European values.

⁴⁵ Spanish version of Euro barometer.

According to Eurobarometer survey (2004-05), “with 41 per cent in favour of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, the Netherlands are one of the strongest supporters of Turkey’s EU accession. They rank fourth among all EU member states and second among the “old” member states. Only Slovenia (49 per cent), Sweden (48 per cent) and Poland (42 per cent) show greater support. Hungary demonstrates the same support level as the Netherlands, followed by Spain and Portugal (both 40 per cent).

Demographically, it has been seen that the young Dutch are among the ardent supporters of Turkish EU accession. About sixty per cent student are in support of Turkey’s joining which is 19 per cent above the EU average. In terms of political orientation, Left parties are more supportive than any other parties. Although Dutch citizen displays positive sign towards Turkish accession, but at the same time they are also cautious about the conditions that Turkey needs to fulfil before joining the EU. Nevertheless on an average Netherlands is among the top supporters of the Turkish membership when compared with European Union.

Figure: 3



Source: European Stability Initiative, (2010), “Strict but fair? Dutch views on Turkish accession”, based on (2004-05) Eurobarometer surveys.

While, eighty per cent of all respondents in the EU require Turkey to systematically respect Human Rights before joining, this pre-condition is supported by 95 per cent of all Dutch respondents. While the EU average shows 76 per cent saying Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy, this argument is made by 83 per cent in the Netherlands. On the other hand, only 46 per cent of Dutch respondents worry that cultural differences between Turkey and the European Union are too significant to allow for Turkey's EU accession (55 per cent in the EU). Sixty-One per cent of Dutch citizens are concerned that Turkey's accession could favour immigration to more developed countries, 3 per cent below the EU average⁴⁶.

Other Supporters

Other supporters of EU-Turkey integration in the European Union are among the ten recently acceded Central Eastern European Countries into the EU in 2004. Most of these members support the entry of Turkey into European Union. They might be finding themselves economically close to Turkey, reason behind their support to Turkey. Among the smaller member states, the **Czech Republic** is expected to vote in favour of Turkey's bid at the European summit, despite the fact that the country's ruling coalition remains divided on the issue. Accordingly, the Czech 'yes' is likely to be a careful 'yes'. Meanwhile, there is not much public discussion about the issue in the country, and no representative public opinion polls have been conducted yet.

In **Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states** and in many smaller member states the pattern appears to be rather similar to that in Prague. These governments are generally supportive of the Turkish bid, with dissenting voices coming either from the Christian Democrats or the opposition circles or from the radicals in the extremist corners. Several of the smaller member states are expected to side with a decision that would seek to attach a set of conditions to the projected negotiation process. In general, the public in these countries remains potentially divided but by and large ignorant of the issue and its implications.

⁴⁶ European Stability Initiative, (2010), "Strict but fair? Dutch views on Turkish accession", based on (2004-05) Eurobarometer surveys. Accessed on 15 July 2010, Available on URL: <http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=194>

Public that support for Turkey is far more marked in the Mediterranean states. At both official and public levels, **Italy, Spain and Portugal** look at Turkey as a potential balance against the EU-10 countries that joined the Union in May 2004.

European Union and Turkey's relationship are evolving in a rapidly changing global context. Therefore an outlook that goes beyond political dynamics in Ankara and Brussels is absolutely necessary. A wider picture of EU-Turkey relations needs to be taken into consideration not only from the transatlantic context but also on the basis of the tensions currently prevailing between Islamic world and the west. This larger framework is particularly important for the United States, a key factor in both the realms.

Outside the European Union, **United State** is the strongest supporter of the Turkish EU membership. In fact, Washington's support for Ankara on the issue of Turkish membership in the EU became part of the agenda of US-Turkish bilateral relations in the late 1980's. However it was during the course of the next decade that American officials began to engage in intensive lobbying efforts among U.S. allies in Europe to promote Turkey's EU aspirations⁴⁷.

The importance of US can be highlighted with three examples in a decade when U.S. has rescued Turkey from crisis regarding its EU accessionship. First, in 1995 due to Washington's intense campaign programme turned the tide in favour of the outcome desired by Turkey. Secondly, in December 1999, the U.S. played a similar critical role in the outcome of the EU Council's Helsinki summit, which formally recognised Turkey's candidacy for full membership. In this regard Washington had strongly disapproved the EU's decision in Luxembourg two years earlier, which excluded Turkey from the list of formal candidates for eventual membership. In 1999, the Clinton administration exerted considerable pressure through both formal and informal channels, including telephone calls by President Clinton himself to European leaders, for a reversal of that decision.

Similarly, in December 2002, the U.S. once again launched a major campaign to advance the cause of Turkey. This time the effort was to include Turkey in the candidate list to start accession negotiation process. This time also President Bush met

⁴⁷ Cited in Sayari, S. (2003) "The United States and Turkey's membership in the EU", Turkish Year book, Vol.xxxiv.

the party leader Tayyip Erdogan at the White house and confirmed Washington's support for Turkey and declared that the U.S. "stands side by side to join with Ankara in its bid to join the European Union." However, this time unlike in 1995 and 1999, Washington's pressure on EU did not proved as fruitful as it was in the past. In fact some Europeans backfired, complaining that U.S. is trying to encroach upon their subject.

According to **Alan Makovsky**, 'a senior staff member on the US House Committee on International Relations, and founding director of the Turkish Research Centre Program located in Washington, who is considered to be most influential when it comes to information and research regarding Turkey- they consider Turkey as an important ally of US in the West Asia. The Turkish Research Centre Program's goal is to analyse trends of foreign regulations in the country and how these may have an impact on both the interests of the United States and relation between the two countries. This is primarily done through the process of engaging policymakers in various discussions about the political, diplomatic and strategic environment of Turkey. Makovsky's foreign policy is considered to be an important factor in restoration of political and diplomatic ties between the United States and Turkey. In fact, his foreign policy is now considered as a model foreign policy that the United States should have with other Muslim-majority countries'⁴⁸.

He suggested, that in its diplomatic initiatives on behalf of Turkey's full membership, the U.S. has never asked its European allies to accommodate Turkey into EU as a special case. Because U.S. understands membership rules are EU's own internal matter and latter has all rights to apply these rules. But at the same time U.S. has asked EU to be rational and treat Turkey equally without applying any non-technical approach (like religion or culture).

⁴⁸ Kwitessential. Co. U.K., (2004), "Alan Makovsky Foreign Policy Turkey", [Online: Web] Accessed on 18 May 2010, available on URL: <http://www.kwitessential.co.uk/articles/Turkey/Alan-Makovsky-Foreign-policy-Turkey/3897>.

Reason for U.S. support to Turkey's EU Membership

The first is related to the growing role of religion which U.S. sees in mobilizing global conflicts. The increasing acts of Jihadist terrorism in America and Western Europe over the last few years have turned an otherwise unlikely scenario of 'the clash of civilisations' into global reality. Today, overtly or covertly large numbers of Muslims have turned hostile to America. Such polarisation along religious and cultural lines are against the security perspective of U.S. and Western Europe which they want to break with support of Secular and democratised Muslim nation like 'Turkey'.

Secondly, since 2002, Turkey has been pursuing its pro-EU reform agenda with vigour determination. This is highly appreciated in Washington as matter of its greater support to democratisation process in the broader Middle East.

Finally, U.S. support to Turkey can be seen as part of a trans-Atlantic context. Due to America's involvement in Iraq war, Turkey became more relevant in this trans-Atlantic context both due to its being of member of NATO and because it shares border with Iran, and Syria and Iraq while enjoying good relation with Israel and the Palestine. For these three reasons Washington's strong support for Turkey's EU membership became even stronger after 11 September 2001 attacks.

However, the strong relationship between US and Turkey has not always been free from flaw. Recently, the goodwill around Turkey in Washington faded somewhat in the lead-up to the US invasion of Iraq. After the heated debate in the Turkish Grand Assembly, the resolution that was grant transit rights to more than 60,000 US troops failed by the narrow margin of three votes. This decision came as a shock to Washington and effectively curtailed America's ability to freely manoeuvre in northern Iraq in its Iraq invasion.

Although disappointed, US reacted softly saying that Turkey is a democracy and its parliamentary process had to be respected⁴⁹. Not doing indeed have been self-defeating for the grand project the US was about to embark on in Iraq and the broader Middle East.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

At the same Turkey also seems to be disappointed with the US's Iraq invasion. Today, at the heart of Turkey's frustration with US lies the Kurdish issue. Iraq is particularly relevant here.

According to Ankara, the Kurds of Iraq under US watch have been taking were taking bold steps towards autonomy and independence. Making things worse was that Turkey's own so called Kurdish terrorist group-the PKK- also seemed to regain ground in both Turkey and Iraq. America's strong partnership with the Kurds in Iraq and the America's reluctance to take action against PKK terrorist in northern Iraq all rattles the Kemalist guardians in the Turkish military. These issues have carved a deep distrust about United States among the Turks⁵⁰.

In any case, irrespective all these growing issue US did not withdraw its support to Ankara with respect to European Union.

The US promotes the concept of Turkey as a 'model' for the Islamic world to which it can exercise a 'bridge' function. A stable Turkey also logistically assists American objectives in the region. Keeping its global vision and long term goal in the Middle East, Washington still strongly continues to back Turkey-EU integration.

European Union Institution

According to **Steve Wood** "formally the European Commission is a technocratic, 'non-political' actor concerned largely with research, management and advisory tasks. Enlargement Commissioner **Verheugen** stated that 'The task of the Commission is restricted to determining whether Turkey fulfils the political conditions for the commencement of negotiations'. He tested the boundaries implied here, as political aspects of his role were impressed. His views contrasted sharply with other opinions in the institution where five or six Commissioners had misgivings about presenting a positive recommendation. The European Parliament, on the other hand, is a designated political forum, the one whose members are keen to acquire more status and power in the European context. Through declarations and other lobbying, various groups attempted to influence the outcome on 17 December. The Council will then take the next major decision when all 27 states must approve, and later ratify the

⁵⁰ Ibid.

subsequent treaty, before negotiations with Turkey can commence. Within several states there is aversion to this difference on this account among the population and political elite”.

Conclusion

As per as supporters and opponents regarding the Turkish accession, are concerned arguments usually come from the two different points. While Turkey and its supporters like, United Kingdom, Spain and United States argue in support of Turkey's role as an Energy provider and foreign policy actor, while many other in Europe consider Turkey's political, economic, social and religious orientation. Many in Europe agree that energy security and foreign policy though important but it comprise only two or three of thirty-five chapters in the *acquis*, and Turkey come clean on the entire chapters of the *acquis*. Apart from this, recently it has been noticed that the public opinion in EU is also gaining importance in EU-Turkey integration perspective. So, it becomes quite clear that in the democratic set up of government no political party would like to go against the opinion of public opinion. Thus, in long term it necessitates the Turkey to gain positive impression on the European people.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

“An open dynamic Turkey is in the interest of a European Union capable of assuming fully its responsibilities in the world”.

-Jose Manuel Barroso,

President of the European Commission (2005)

This chapter will strictly limit itself on the analyses of ‘problems and prospects’ of European Union enlargement and its relation to Turkey in both general and wider geopolitical perspective. Thus, it will try to evolve a greater picture of European Union. In between it will also try to highlight the possible changes from geopolitical perspective with or without Turkey’s inclusion in the EU. At last the chapter will also discuss the mutual benefits of EU-Turkey integration from geopolitical point of view.

In today’s ever growing and changing International relation, there seems no doubt that ‘European Union’ has managed to evolve as the most outstanding international organisation in the present geopolitics. At the same managing such a huge group is not a straight affair. This is especially true for the Turkey’s accession, which is pending for more than past four decades thus representing the most complicating enlargement process the EU ever had with any of its current members. This is particularly because of the pressing need on the EU to decide to what extent it plans to remain as a global actor. In this sense it is clear that if EU wants to take lead in the present geopolitics as a key global actor, anchoring modern Turkey in its ranks is a significant critical step to be undertaken in its global quest.

Thus, it requires enough understanding of the dynamics that both the sides of the accession table are holding in order to understand the big picture of this complicated enlargement in the changing global politics.

World politics began to change slowly since the end of cold war and devastating 9/11 attacks and EU was no exception regarding this change.

Consequently, emerging threats such as transnational threats especially those emerging from Middle East, illegal migration, and drug trafficking, all signal the globalisation of insecurity. These problems need to be understood in the current evolving geopolitics where instead of looking world from unipolar view, a multipolar view needs to be created where European Union as supranational would hold equal significance vis-à-vis to other global power. Assuming that, this would bring stability in world politics.

For this to happen, besides the specific regional contexts, an assessment of Turkey's role in the wider European global power politics ought to take into account the Ankara's relations with the two other centers of power which have been very often found relevant to Europe's geopolitics: the United States and Russia. Thus, the EU enlargement prospects with regard to Turkey will reflect not only the standing of the EU, in geopolitics but also—more subtly, yet critically—the message that the EU projects to the rest of the world as to the nature of its global involvement.

Consequently, in the quest of becoming major global actor, accepting modern Turkey will be a critical step to be undertaken in this direction. Even this thought of global vision was clearly evident in the opening speech given by **Barroso, José Manuel**, the president of the European Commission on October 3, 2005, that “an open dynamic Turkey is in the interest of a European Union capable of assuming fully its responsibilities in the world⁵¹.” Thus with this thought he was quite clear that only such a dynamic and outward looking Europe can comprehensively look beyond its regional boundaries and historical quarrels and can deliver to the rest of the world the global message that is expected from its legacy in world history.

But the problems and prospects of EU-Turkey relation is more complex than it seems. Turkey, despite of being at the most significant geostrategic location both from the energy and military point of view and by virtue of that has the potential to make the European Union a leading global player in the world. But instead of this advantage Turkey is still outside the EU, waiting in long queue in order to become the EU member. There are two groups in the EU who are divided on the issue whether Turkey should be taken in or left outside.

⁵¹ Barroso, Jose Manuel (2005), “Declaration of President Jose Manuel Barroso, on the opening Accession Negotiation with Turkey”, EU News 73/2005, Brussels, 3 October 2005 URL: http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/home/news_en_newsobj1335.php

Reasons for against Turkey's membership are many, some are logical and some are illogical. For many Turkey is the most problematic among all other countries aspiring to join the EU. It is too big, too poor, too agricultural, too Muslim, too authoritarian, too nationalistic, some would claim, to fit into today's EU. Some fear its accession to the EU would be the end of Europe. While there are also groups in the EU who views Turkish membership as most prospective for EU both in general and in a global perspective. Thus, throughout the long history of EU-Turkey relation, Turkey's status within the Europe has always been a bit uncertain and volatile.

Considering, 'problems and prospects' of European Union enlargement and the case of Turkey from geopolitical perspective, I have divided the topic into few major themes like political, economic, security and identity which have the bearing or linkages in the European Union enlargement policy with respect to Turkey's accession in a global perspective. This division has been done especially, in order to have a clear understanding about this topic. Those of the broad groupings are as follows:

Political Perspective

The problems and prospects of Turkey's accession to European Union are quite large and complex. In fact throughout the Europe, the argument that surrounds Turkey's projected accession actually revolves around a number of issues, ranging from demographic through geographic to political.

Problems

Turkey since the mid 1990's till the beginning of the twentieth century had to face deep political and economic problems. Political crisis was rampant with no majority in the parliament. There was democratic deficit, human right violations, and economic fallouts. Apart from these internal national problems, there was also lack of foreign policy visions. In short it can be said that Turkey's image in the eye of EU was that of a state centric, security-oriented and crisis ridden country⁵². This period was also

⁵² Keyman, Fuat E. and Duzgit A. Senem (2007); "Europeanisation, democratization and Human Rights in Turkey", in Esra Lagro and Jorgensen, E. Knud (ed.), Turkey and the European Union: prospects for a difficult encounter, New York: Palgrave macmillan. PP.69-70

characterised by different identity-based conflicts, namely those of the resurgent Islam and the Kurdish problem, and other opportunistic and corruptionist politics.

But this downgraded Turkish politics took a sudden U-turn since the beginning of the twenty-first century. This change can be attributed to a number recent of historical developments and events that has played an important role in bringing recent changes and transformation in the state-society and political stabilisation in Turkey. Among those of special importance has been the February 2001 financial crisis, November 2002 national election, which brought the political stability by the establishment of a single-party majority government, and of course also getting official recognition as a candidate for full membership of the European Union membership.

In tune with the Turkey's constant efforts to initiate political and legal reforms, especially in the areas of human rights, and to deepen the level of its parliamentary democracy, European Council decided to announce that Turkey had meet its political criteria, and as a result of this full accession negotiations should be soon. As a result accession negotiation started on October, 2005.

But, according to some even though if Turkey successfully completes the Copenhagen Criteria, it does not mean that its democracy is flawless. In fact, here it is necessary to mention that Copenhagen Criteria is actually the minimum base rather than final verification for a functioning democracy. It is true that Turkey has demonstrated a strong political will to initialize a set of constitutional changes to upgrade its democracy. Yet it is equally true that these changes have still to be implemented in practical sense.

The problem of democratic consolidation still remains one of the crucial problems in EU-Turkey relations. This is especially because as far as regarding Turkey's fulfilment of Copenhagen political criteria, is concerned it seems that Turkey is being treated with double standard. It is usually agreed by many that in its recent 'big bang' enlargement in which ten newly CEEC's members were added into the European Union, for them political criteria was not strictly adhered to in accordance to Copenhagen criteria. Yet they got through the European Union and thus consequently became full members of the EU, which reflects the EU's direct and

effective support to these countries especially in their political reform process. But this does not seem to be possible for Turkey.

In addition to this, the 'no' votes in referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands during the first half of 2005 have been detrimental to Turkey's EU bid. Although subsequent research and surveys have failed to prove that enlargement in general, and Turkey's candidacy in particular, were key factors behind the public's rejection of the Constitution, the summer of 2005 still witnessed an increase Europe-wide of scepticism towards Turkey's European prospects. Whilst the climate for enlargement seems to have changed with the advent of the Lisbon Treaty, which got successfully passed in November, 2009 after a 'yes'⁵³ of 'Irish' a long journey of decades. However, it did not modify European leaders' and the public's perceptions of Turkey.

This shows that the Europe's soft power is alive and active. After a period of self-absorption and self-reflection during which there was a feeling of enlargement fatigue and a reluctance to consider the possibility of new members, the EU after the Irish 'yes' can re-engage in what it does best, enlarging while at the same time adapting its institutions to the global challenges it faces⁵⁴.

After having talked about the potential road blocks of Turkey's accession towards EU, it needs to be pointed out that the possibility of the Turkey's success in the process of implementation also requires a fair and objective treatment that EU employs and displays in its relationship with Turkey as a potential full and equal member⁵⁵. In this respect, the European Union should support the Turkey's accession with potent political and economic support, if it wants to be an influential global actor.

As according to a popular saying, which goes as 'there are no free lunches in this world', therefore here also it can be concluded that Turkey's political benefits to the EU would not come without few inherent drawbacks. Thus, Turkey needs to be

⁵³ Euroactive, (2009), "The Irish 'Yes' brings hope to Europe and Balkans", [online web] Accessed on 25 June 2010, Available on URL:<http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/irish-brings-hope-europe-balkans/article-186246>.

⁵⁴ Ibid

⁵⁵ Keyman, Fuat, E. and Duzgit A. Senem (2007); "Europeanization, democratization and Human Rights in Turkey", op. cit.

treated as a co-partner and a necessary key player in taking the EU to a greater height at a global level.

Prospects

Since more than forty-five years, Turkey's prospective membership in the European Union has captured significant attention in Europe. Factors like geographic size, large population, low per-capita income, level of income development, cultural difference and its strategic location at cross roads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, have made it a unique country among (both, current member or) the number of candidates waiting in queue for European Membership. And because of these unique features of Turkey that the EU under confusion has made Turkey to wait for such a long time. Thus, under these ambiguous conditions EU finds difficult to either absorb it or to reject it. These, characteristics of Turkey ask EU to take firm and bold decisions if it wants to transform itself from a regional player to a global player. Because inclusion of Turkey will definitely be going to change the functions of EU and thus would help it to expand its geopolitical reach.

Convincing answers to these questions require comprehensive consideration of global balances as well as the motivations of key global actors, if the EU aims to be one. After getting firm accession date, many started forming opinions that Turkey is the first Muslim country to have reached this position. However, this is not the real picture as Turkey though a predominantly Muslim country has a long historical relation with Europe. This special characteristic separates Turkey from other Muslim countries.

Despite of being a Muslim country Turkish identity unlike other Muslim countries is not as exclusively based on Islam. Unlike other Muslim countries Turkey's political, social, and economic structure is not based on Islamic ideologies. For example, as Iraqi clerics jockey for influence in Baghdad and theocratic mullahs crack down on reformers in Iran, but the secular Turkey stands out as the bright and shining model for democratic development across the Islamic world⁵⁶. In fact, in the Preamble to Turkey's Constitution states that 'there shall be no interference


⁵⁶ Smith, w. Thomas,(2005); "*Between Allah and Ataturk: Liberal Islam in Turkey*" The International journals in Human rights, vol. 9, No.3, 307-325; Routledge, PP.307-311.

whatsoever of the sacred religious feelings in State affairs and politics.’ Technically, speaking what is practised in Turkey is not secularism, or the neutral separation of church and state. Rather, it is subordination of religion to the state.

Turkey shows a European-style bureaucracy, a Western legal system and a progressive national education system redrew the boundary between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s secularism justifies on several basis for example, Erdogan before coming to power was jailed for four month in 1999, for reciting nationalist-Islamist poem in a political rally. Turkey’s secularism has always been found to be strictly followed and protected by the elite kemalists.

But, surprisingly in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), known as a reformed or progressive Islamist party, swept into power with fairly good margin of vote. Erdogan earlier known for his staunch Islamist supporter however, took opposite path and worked hard to prove that his party as a liberal secular and democratic party and at the same time of strong supporter of EU membership.

Figure: 4



Erdogan has since laboured to make his vision of ‘conservative democracy’ acceptable in Turkey and abroad, suggesting that the party is the Muslim equivalent of the Christian Democrats. Thus Turkey’s efforts in recent past to emulate European

standard in political and social field is still seems to be continuing with same passion as earlier.

Based on the objectives of Copenhagen criteria, adopted in June 1993 council summit, the EU stipulated clearly that the political and economic factors are to be given prime importance and on the basis that eligibility of any country seeking for EU membership will be judged. These objectives will act as a blue litmus test to determine the effectiveness of the level of functioning democracy with a functioning liberal market economy and also their corresponding institutions, such as the rule of law and respect for human rights. These are supposed to be considered as the hallmark of the EU's socio-political framework of governance. So Copenhagen Criteria acts as tool which helps the accession country to achieve the required level of political governance equitable to European level.

According to **Monnet and Penas**, "in May 2004 in Turkey the major constitutional reform took place, eradicating all remaining death penalty provisions, strengthening gender equality, broadening freedom of the press, aligning the judiciary system with European standards and establishing the supremacy of international agreements in the area of fundamental freedoms over internal legislation. In September 2004 Turkey adopted a new Penal Code, meant to improve the situation regarding, in particular, women's rights, discrimination and torture.

Furthermore, a new Press Law was adopted in June 2004 and a new Law on Associations and a Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts were approved in July 2004. A number of regulations and circulars were issued by the authorities in order to enable the implementation of legislation. In its October 2004 Report the Commission confirmed that Turkey had achieved significant legislative progress in a considerable number of areas and stressed the efforts made in implementing the political reforms. For the first time, the Commission concluded that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria - but emphasised that reforms still needed further consolidation⁵⁷."

Thus, by virtue of its moderate political governance Turkey represents a potential model for developing states especially in Middle East and Central Asia. These are the vulnerable regions not only critical for the security of Europe, but also

⁵⁷ Monnet and Penas (2004); *Turkey and the European Union the implication of a specific enlargement*; Royal Institute of International Relations, Brussels, p.10

essential for the growing European economy in context of the as the regional hydrocarbon hubs. Thus if the European Union wants to be a global actor, it needs to bring in stability in these region as well.

Around the world perhaps, Turkey is the only Muslim country whose political system is based on the democratic principle and thus the only one Western anchored Muslim brother, among the entire Muslim world. According to **Arikan**, by virtue of this position, “Turkey seems to have been ascribed the role and function of a stabilizing element and model for economic, social, and political developments among the countries in Central Asia and the Middle East⁵⁸”. Therefore, particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has become an ever more essential front zone country than it was before—in many ways as a means of exemplifying a stabilizing role in the periphery of Europe. This need has even further increased in the aftermath of 9/11, as it becomes ever clearer that the only effective way to deal with transnational terrorism in the long term is to strengthen the development of liberal democracies⁵⁹.

After the 9/11 attack and Madrid bombing in 2004, it has become clear that no corner of the World is safe and peaceful. Terrorism has taken its root across the globe. It has also become clear that this transnational terrorism cannot be fought just with the help of military, but it needs a comprehensive solution. This can be done by spreading and strengthening the development of good governance and liberal democracies. In this respect, Turkey can act as an agent and messenger for the promotion of such widely acknowledged principle of democracy, rule of law and system of governance, a free liberal market economy in the countries of Central Asia and Middle East⁶⁰.

According to Arikan, “Turkey provides a valid model of a secular, democratic, Muslim country, which has close relations with Western countries, including the USA.” And the anchoring of Turkey to EU is definitely going to benefit the entire surrounding region and in the long term the entire world. Not surprisingly, such a progressive move will send a signal to all such failed states of Caucasus and all other

⁵⁸ Arikan, Harun. (2003); “Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU membership?” Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

⁵⁹ Sadik, Giray; (2006), “*EU Enlargement in a Global Context and Turkey's Position*”, Georgia political Science Association; Conference Proceedings, University of Georgia, p. 8.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.8.

countries of Central Asia about the benefit of liberal democracies and will present the EU as being an actor with a soft geopolitical image.

Economic Perspective

The purpose of this topic is to deal with the problems and prospects of economic challenges arising from the EU enlargement in the context of Turkey's accession. Apart from political factors economic factors are among the most potential factors affecting EU enlargement. In fact the political and economic aspects were the basics of the EU establishment and are also important for its future enlargement.

Problems

Turkish economy remained a closed economy till 1980, isolated from the functional effects of the global economy⁶¹. After this period Turkey opened its doors to the world economy. Henceforth, the effect of the globalisation was started being felt in the every field of Turkish economy. However one thing which should be taken into note is that historically Turkey's economy has not functioned smoothly and there has been constant evidence of play and pause in between its past few decades of its functioning.

Turkey's main problem according to **Guney**, "lies in the macro-economic imbalance that characterise the country. Periodic crises and lapses in growth (e.g. in 1999 and 2001) have been a prominent feature in recent years. Furthermore, high state influence and recurring internal and external disequilibria (high debt and inflation) still typify the Turkish economy. However, after the crisis of 2001, the economy has returned to a growth path, inflation has reduced with the constant interference of the IMF, the currency has stabilised and debt indicators have improved⁶²".

The most problematic condition for Turkey's entry into EU is its, likely about the cost of burden which it will impose on latter's economy by virtue of its Entry into the Union. However, how precise will Turkish membership is going to cost the then

⁶¹ Katurcioglu, Erol. (2007); "*The Economic Challenges of the Accession Process: The matter in Question*", in Esra Lagro (ed.), *Turkey and the EU: prospects for a difficult encounter* New York: Palgrave macmillan, p.112

⁶² Monnet and Penas, (2004); "*Turkey and the European Union: The implications of a specific Enlargement*", op. cit.

incumbent members is not at all a straight forward answer to reply. The reason being that the both Turkey's and EU's economies are evolving with each passing time.

Not surprisingly, the EU member states considering Turkey's relatively poor economy and huge population size are scary about the repercussions of Turkey's future entry into EU. Though this point has an element of truth in it, similar was the case when earlier Greece, Spain and, Portugal, and more recently the ten CEECs were included as a full time member of the EU. Their inclusion also generated heat regarding their financial burden. So is the case with Turkey. In Turkey's case the problem seems a bit larger due to its huge size of population of about seventy million, which largely depends on Agriculture.

Based on the past enlargements for example, where poorer economies than Turkey has been included in the EU membership. Thus, it can be said that Turkey's economy should not act as a hurdle for its inclusion into the Union. In fact in the long term Turkey's larger size economy both in terms of its market and population is going to benefit the so called saturated economy of the European Union.

Prospects

Turkey during Ottoman Empire, at the turn of the 19th century, was called the "sick man of Europe". Today, modern Turkey, the state that emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of world war second, has one of the Europe's most dynamic economy and societies. Reforms have led to a profound transformation of the Turkish economy since the most recent crisis in 2000-01. Thanks to single party government formed during November 2002, and the combination of favourable demographic trends. It can be expected that the prospect of continued economic reforms and the eventual EU membership, might take its economy to the further height.

The achievements of European Union till date are counted more in terms of economic criteria and thus it behaves, more as an economic community rather than as a political. And this is clearly evident from "the underlying motto of the EU i.e. the "spill over effect," which functionalists summarize broadly as cooperation in

technical and economic spheres that will eventually lead to political cooperation⁶³”. This gets further justified by the establishment of single European market, that is then the creation of single currency (i.e. euro) and Schengen area (currently consisting of twenty-five states and two cooperating countries which maintain internal borders, where two Iceland and Norway are non EU members⁶⁴). All these developments are continuously dragging EU towards gradual integration project.

However, looking at the saturation point of the few EU members’ economy, especially of the core members, it can be expected positively that through the further enlargement of the EU, the economic market can be expanded so as to include new countries with more resources, more markets and outlets. This would make EU a global economic player with widespread manoeuvring capacity across the surrounding region.

In this connection, the importance of Turkey in EU is crystal clear with regards to its geostrategic location. This has become even more emphasising after the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, and thus the emergence of Turkey as a hydrocarbon rich region in the Caucasus and Central Asia can provide Europe a safe energy corridor which would in return help the later to satisfy its growing energy needs. To this end, it can be said that “the prospect of a Euro-Asian energy corridor, in particular, might provide an important ground that would increase Turkey’s geostrategic location as an assets for European⁶⁵”.

Apart from energy, Turkey since 2001 is doing good also in the macro-economic sector. According to (Jaeger, 2005), though “Turkey’s GDP per capita income is low but, its economic growth potential is good enough. Measured at market prices, Turkish GDP per capita was USD 3,400 in 2003, a level comparable to the likes of Bulgaria and Romania, but far below the Czech Republic and Hungary with roughly USD 8,300 (see figure-5).


⁶³ Sadik, Giray (2006); “*EU Enlargement in a Global Context and Turkey’s Position*”, op. cit. P.9.

⁶⁴ Europa, (2009), “*Schengen Area and Cooperation*”, Accessed on 25 June 2010, Available on URL: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/133020_en.htm.

⁶⁵ Henderson, Simon (1999), “*Caspian Energy Accord- A job half done*”, Policy Watch, The Washington Institute for near east policy, Accessed on 17 June 2010, available on URL: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=CO5&CID=1302>.

Figure: 5

Low GDP per capita



Source: Deutsche Bank Research, (2005); 'Turkey 2020: On course for Convergence'.

However, a more accurate measure of per capita wealth is GDP per capita measured on purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. Here, Turkey's per capita income amounts to around USD 6,700, again, comparable to the current EU accession candidates (Bulgaria, Romania), but only at around 20-25% of the biggest EU member Germany (DE). A low per capita income suggests substantial room for 'economic catch-up' in near future meaning that there is considerable room to improve productivity through technological innovation and investment⁶⁶ in wide field but yet untouched.


Again on the political economy of economic growth and stability (Jaeger, 2005) on the basis of structural factors which points towards a considerable medium-term economic growth potential says that "Turkey is at a crossroads and in a position

⁶⁶ Jaeger, Markus (2005); "Turkey 2020: on course for convergence", International topics, Economics, Deutsche Bank Research, p. 2-3.

to the economy on the path to sustainable growth". Turkey's strong and durable political system seems to be well suited for the successful implementation of macro-policies and bringing all sorts of necessary economic reforms. This supported by favourable demography like young evolving labour force, falling dependency ratios and increasing savings and investment and overall an increasingly open economy will further ignite the economic growth (Jager, 2005, p. 4).

Figure: 6

Favourable population dynamics



Source: UN data, cited in DBR,(2005), op. cit.


In terms of foreign direct investment Turkey's performance is still not upto satisfactory level. FDI averaged less than 1per cent of GDP over the past decade, a dismal performance by any standard (see figure-7). However, it is expected that due to EU convergence, increased macroeconomic stability and privatisation could help attract substantial FDI over the next few years.

This would help increase macroeconomic stability by providing a less volatile source of financing for the current account deficits. This would help prevent Turkish

growth being hampered by a shortage of foreign-currency financing, the so called balance of payments constraint. Equally important, FDI inflows will boost the investment ratios and bring technology and management skills which Turkey needs badly.

Also keeping in mind a large fully unexploited domestic market, a stable macro-environment and a stable political system could help in bringing in more and more FDI in near future. Apart from this Turkey's strategic location also can immensely help in this way. When compared to its nearest competitor it lags far behind. As such based on the UN data of the year 2003, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland rank 13th, 33th and 68th on the UNCTAD 2001-2003 FDI performance index, respectively, while Turkey holds just at 110th.

Figure: 7



Source: UNCTAD, cited in DBR, (2005), "Turkey 2020: On course for convergence".

Security Perspective

Security is one of the biggest aspects revolving around the EU-Turkey integration project which is in the process for more than forty five years. Historically, prior to this, and until the end of the Ottoman Empire Europe and Turkey used to perceive each other mainly as enemies and rivals. However, the situation began to fall on the right track after the decline of Ottoman Empire, as the founders of the Turkish Republic decided to break with the legacy of relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

Turkey's accession has also security perspective from both regional and global scenarios. Regarding Turkey's geostrategic location and considering its possible entry into Union, there have been many regional and geopolitical views based on security issue. Some consider it as advantage for EU both from regional and the global perspective, while few consider it as problematic and a sheer wasteful adventure.

Problems

Turkey's geostrategic location and its deep involvement in NATO are definitely assets for the EU if seen in the background of current geopolitics. As is apparently clear from the today's geopolitics in the Middle East (e.g. Syria, Israel and Iran), Caucasus (Armenia-Azerbaijan, Abkhazia), and the Balkans where American hegemony are deeply involved. For example, recently in Georgia-Russia conflict on Abkhazia's separatist move in May 2008, where America was deeply involved supporting Georgia. Here, it can be easily said that EU can take advantage and break the American monopoly in the region with strong support of Turkey. But in the eye of few Europeans, this advantage is not free from costs and risks involved in this daring adventure.

Prospects

Security aspect was the prime motive behind the formation of European Union because during world war first and second Europe had become epicentre of conflict zone and thus was affected very badly. Thus, in consequent planning, EU emerged as

effective tool to bring peace and stability in this region. Thus, defining security in a broader sense, the European Union is inherently a security project based on mutual understanding among liberal democracies stemming from shared values and interests so as to foster interdependence and to render war among the members of the community virtually impossible.

According to **Oguzlu Tarik**, “the two main functions of the EU’s accession process have been twofold. First, is to preserve and promote the peculiar security identity of the European Union, and the second is to pave the way for the transformation of the EU into an international actor that differs from other global actors on the basis of its distinctive security modelling⁶⁷”. In other words the widening of the EU is not only an end, but also a means intended to enable the EU’s members to transform their club into a more powerful international actor in the global arena, thus in this way to fulfil the intention to become powerful geopolitical actor.

This becomes more important in the light of today’s EU security perspective. On an average, today’s EU seems to be more of a normative-civilian actor than a global military one. There is still a certain lack of cohesion among EU members with regard to the geopolitical and strategic priorities of the Union. Clearly in geo-political terms, it seems that each individual EU member, particularly those with an imperial legacy, (for e.g., France and United Kingdom) has more of a role as an actor than the EU itself as an institution.

Even though one can safely claim that the EU is gradually evolving into an international actor with a military logic, this is in no way matches with the expectations of the classic real politik understanding of security. Because of the fact that the security interests of the EU are achieved through simultaneous processes of deepening and widening (Larsen, 2002). Moreover, the European Security and Defence Policy aims at the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force, dubbed the European Army, for tasks of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping and conflict management. Here, the major goal of the European Army has been to enable EU members to respond to any former Yugoslavia type crises that may occur within the European continent in future (Rasmussen, 2002, P.54). Here it reflects EU’s

⁶⁷ Oguzlu, Tarik (2002); “*An Analysis of Turkey’s Prospective Membership in the European Union from a Security Perspective*”, Bilkent University, Ankara, Sage Publication, vol.34(3):p 289-290.

approach of security concern based on post-cold war era, thus reflecting a regional approach.

Looking at the present geopolitical perspective this regional and narrow view of EU's security perspective needs to be modified in order. In this, Turkey can play an immense role both in bringing stability at the regional and world level.

Turkey geographically, links the South-eastern Mediterranean to the Balkan regions, and to the Black sea and the Trans-Caucasian area, whereby its borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq holds immense geopolitical and geostrategic opportunities for European Union. From foreign policy perspective by extending the EU's borders to the Southern Caucasus and to Syria, Iran and Iraq, Turkish accession will sharpen further the EU's foreign policy. In this it is indispensable for the EU to anchor Turkey. As **Açikmese and Aydin** (2004) pointed out,

“It is true that Turkey is surrounded with 3 security consuming zones, namely the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans, however by 9/11 terrorists attacks on the USA and Madrid bombings of March 2004 it was understood better that no country is safe from global threats and to be a global actor, EU should be active in these regions⁶⁸”.

Thus, Turkey's EU membership prospects will boost if the on-going accession process succeeds in paving the way for Turkey's adoption of the EU's distinctive security identity and if the EU member-states do not lose their penchant for turning the Union into an international actor with vital security interests in Turkey's vicinity.

From geopolitical perspective, building on its strong historical, cultural and economic ties with the region, a reformed full member, Turkey could also help in to stabilize Central Asia and thereby help in initiating to establish democratic values in a region where after the collapse of Soviet Union, has been subject to political instability. Here Turkey's role as the leading provider of assistance in NATO's

⁶⁸ Cited in Giray, Sadik (2006); “*EU Enlargement in a Global Context*” Georgia Political Science Association, Conference Proceedings. P. 11.

“Partnership for Peace⁶⁹” programme across the region will help in strengthening Central Asia’s international defence links.

Turkey’s strategic importance of its location makes it a unique country to complete the missing part of EU integration. Turkey has the potential to support the European integration as a multi-regional and a multi-cultural country. Owing to its historical, religious, cultural and geographical bounds with the adjacent huge land that lies from Caucasus to Balkans, from Asia to Middle East makes Turkey potentially influencing country in the region. As People of this region speak different versions of Turkish dialect, from Macedonia to Central Asia. This cultural and linguistic homogeneity makes Turkey a bridge connecting across the region.

Among the one billion Muslim populations across the world, Turkey being the only Muslim country with modest economic and social in terms of equal income distribution. In recent years barring Armenia, Turkey has been in good relation with its neighbours and has remained an important actor throughout the region. In 2004 Turkey undertook the general secretariat of Organization of Islamic Conferences.

Turkey, as the only Muslim country which has historically good relation with all the major western country (like USA, and most of the European countries) makes it unique country across the globe. These characteristics make Turkey a bridge between one of the best developed regions and one of the worst and unstable countries. Thus, if Turkey becomes the full member of the EU will have an opportunity to become an important geopolitical actor in this region and in that respect can provide stability to this region.

In this respect, EU can also take lead with the help of Turkey’s membership to bring down the widespread radicalism which is prevalent in this unstable region. Turkey’s membership will lead its neighbours Iraq, Iran and Syria, to a moderate policy line and make them draw away from radicalism. In long term Turkey’s membership will strengthen the democracy and stability in Middle East, considering EU’s neighbourhood policy.

Turkey being with close relations with Israel and also with the Arabic world through Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC) will give EU new horizons to

⁶⁹ Littoz-Monnet, and B.V. Penas (2005); “*Turkey and the European Union: The implications of a Specific Enlargement*”, Royal institute of International Relations, Brussels, p. 14.

undertake new initiatives within the region. After, the end of British mandate over Palestine in 1947 and the disputes followed by Venice Declaration in 1980 Europe might again get a chance to play an effective role over Arab-Israel conflict by the help of Turkey's membership⁷⁰.

Talking in terms EU's own security concerns, there will no effect of Turkey joining the EU club. In EU, internal security is managed with the help of military cooperation which is being carried out by the inter-governmental cooperation. Its military cooperation is still managed by Maastricht Treaty, on the basis of Common foreign security policy (CSFP), formerly known as (European Security and Defence Policy) ESDP is a major element of (Common Security and Foreign Policy) of EU and is the domain of the EU policy covering defence and military aspect. However if Turkey in due course of time joins the Union it seems there will be hardly any change in the current mechanism of military functioning.

Even though, not a member of EU, Turkey contribute a lot to the EU peace keeping force directly or indirectly so far, for e.g. recently in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo and in Macedonia Turkey joined to the peace force under the provision of EU with its police and military force⁷¹.

Besides, Turkey's contribution to Europe's security will not be only limited by military force. Turkey's contribution which has been continuing with dual agreements will increase more, in the light of present day threats after the membership for the threats towards security and stability such as international terrorism, organised crimes, human trafficking and illegal immigration.

With Turkey's membership EU will get rid of being just an economic giant and a political dwarf. It will become a regional military force which would take decisions and implement them. Also EU will reach its foreign policy goals easier and the influence of EU in new geographies will be increasing. EU will improve its power to impose sanctions more in Arab world, Balkans, Russia, Caucasus, and Middle East with Turkey's accession.

⁷⁰ Comark, Hasret, (2008), "How will Turkey's EU membership effect security in World and Europe", Accessed on 19 June 2010, available on [online-web] URL:

http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=109.how-will-turkeys-eu-membership-effect-peace-and-security-in-the-world-and-in-Europe&catid=70:ab-analyzer&Itemid=131

⁷¹ Ibid.

Based on the above study, in general it can be said that Turkey needs more recognition in the foreign and security matters of the European Union, it wants equal and full participation in the decision making process of the EU-led operations. Even according to (Ozkaragoz, 2005), “Turkey is an asset for the European foreign, security as well as defence policies with its military capability, young and dynamic population and promising role in the ‘near neighbourhood of the EU’⁷²”,

Identity Perspective

According to Diez, Thomas in his article in “Europe’s other and the return of Geopolitics’ about Identity concept he emphasizes that “one of the main contributions of post structuralism to international relations theory is the theorisation of identity, and in particular its relationship to difference. It can be explained in the various contexts. First, as identities are not simply given rather it is subjectively constructed. For example a European identity is not an innocent notion but political expression that inscribes the notion of a European identity into the political debate. Secondly, identities can never be entirely fixed barring national identities as they are relatively stable.

Finally, in terms of international relations, identities are always constructed against the difference of another. Identity is unthinkable without such a difference: it would make no sense to say ‘I am European’ if this did not imply a difference from being ‘Asian’, ‘African’ or ‘American’ or else⁷³”.

As per as European Union and Turkey’s identity is concerned especially in terms of geopolitics, it has never been static rather they have shown temporal variation. This theme of identity has been dealt by **John Agnew** in his book ‘Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics’, where he uses a “threefold periodisation to explain the development of geopolitical thought from the early nineteenth century until the end of the Cold war. The discourse of civilisational geopolitics is the one in which different parts of the world were categorised in people’s mental maps according to the ‘civilisation’ to which people that inhabited that ‘region’ were

⁷² Ozkaragoz, Elif. (2005); “*Turkey’s role in the foreign and Security Policy of the EU*”. Accessed on June 19,2010. Available online at <http://www.turksan.org/en/a148.html>.

⁷³ Diez, Thomas (2004); “*Europe’s Other and the Return of Geopolitics*”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, volume 17, Number 2, July 2004, p. 321-322.

perceived to belong. Others are naturalised geopolitics prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The third era is the 'ideological geopolitics' prevalent during cold war period when the world was divided on the basis of particular ideology. After the end of cold war the prevalence of the ideological geopolitics has come to an end⁷⁴”.

In the light of this civilizational geopolitical concept, the EU-Turkey image can be defined as follows: before cold war the relation was based on civilizational geopolitics, during the cold war period the image of EU was based on ideological geopolitics as both EU and Turkey was cooperating with each other against a common ideology i.e. Communist ideology. But this image of EU got a U-turn after the disintegration of Soviet Union as the EU lost the very reason to cooperate with Turkey.

This change of geopolitical image is evident in the case of Turkey where EU, while considering it constantly as 'Other', seems to deny its entry into Union. Thus, it can be said that, the post-1989 environment was received rather more favourably in the European Union, which increased its pace towards 'becoming Europe'.

Problems

European history is an important component of the European identity formation process and the "other" plays a crucial role in constructing the European "self". **Neumann** (1999) identifies four theoretical paths of studying identity construction; the Ethnographic path (study of ethnic groups, sub-cultures, villages, and other small scale collectives), the Psychological path (study of perceptions, belief systems, enemy images), the Continental Philosophical path (obligation to others, common good, presentation of self) and the Eastern Excursion (East as the other of Europe). He, then, focuses on the Eastern Excursion and the Eastern "other" and its role in shaping the European identity in his entire book. He argues that "the dominant other in the European state system remains the Turk" and its foundations goes back to the historical memories of Europe about the Ottoman Turk.

Bisaha (2004), argues that the struggle with the Ottomans from the late 13th to 17th centuries, Europeans created the image of the East and relied on that image for

⁷⁴ Agnew, John.(1998); " Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics", Routledge: London, P. 66-87.

the most part of the history. She specifically examines the 15th century humanists and their intellectual contribution to create the Eastern other of the Europeans. Although, the Humanist legacy promoted a greater openness and understanding of Muslim cultures and religion in Europe, most of the images created by the Renaissance humanists about the Ottoman Turks (and Muslims) as a response to their advance into the European continent were hostile and barbaric.

According to her the “Humanist response to the Ottoman Turks continued to influence Western views of the Turks and Islam for centuries; even today their impact is felt⁷⁵”. Identity or image problem based on historical and cultural factors (which is highly subjective and not mentioned in the EU manuals as criteria for its enlargement) is the sole largest reason for Turkey’s still being outside EU.

Although most Europeans agree that Turkey is more developed than other Muslim states (and for some can be a model for development) and has potential common interests with the EU, there has never been a consensus among Europeans over whether Turkey is a truly European Nation. As many Europeans considers religion as the basic hindrance in accommodating Turkey into EU. Other reason is evidently historical- a common perception about Turks which many European still found carrying such as that ‘Europeans used to get together to fight against Ottoman Turks.

This reflects the historical and cultural biasness which Europeans has preserved since the medieval days. But in today’s modern world in the changed political and economic landscape these issues hold no real meaning. In consequence to this, over a long period of time various debates within Europe have evolved regarding Turkey’s membership and the future role of Europe. This reveals the uneasy relationship between cultural identity of Europe and Europe’s place in the world affairs. Some tends to favour Turkey’s entry on the basis that it would put EU in the global stand more strongly and seriously, while others consider it in a opposite way.

Such people think that Turkey’s membership would increase the tensions around the creation of a common European identity since it requires incorporating a predominantly Muslim country into the cultural framework of Europe (Baban, 2006).

⁷⁵ Bisaha, N. (2004); “Creating East and West: Renaissance humanists and the Ottoman Turks”. Philadelphia: Universities of Pennsylvania Press. P-174.

Again according to (Baban, 2006) “the tension between the geopolitical significance of the EU and how much of this geopolitical significance should be derived from European cultural identity is further complicated by the internal organization of the EU. From the beginning, European integration has been influenced by two simultaneously developing trends: the gradual and piecemeal development of European unity, on the one hand, and the attempt to forge a shared European identity, on the other”. It has been seen that in the expansion of the EU from the membership of 6 to the present 27, there has been constant debate and resistance within the Union about the future physical, economic and cultural changes taking place in the European Union. This has become even more intense in the case of Turkey.

Prospects

Since the end of cold war and the 1990's establishment of Maastricht Treaty, the geopoliticisation of European Identity is considered as move from the construction of European Identity on the basis of 'temporal othering' and 'geopolitical othering',⁷⁶. This implies that with the end of cold war European Union started deepening and widening its political, economic and cultural identity which is becomes very clear from the big bang of Eastern enlargement of the EU where ten CEEC's among which few were having communist ideologies were accepted into the Union. But against this, Turkey which was until the end of cold war was ideologically very close (for that matter even now) to EU and other western countries and at present also has been trying to gain EU membership with all its effort since, 1960's has not yet been included fully into the Union.

While Turkey does not fit into the 'return to Europe' narrative, its inclusion into Europe is increasing being viewed as a responsibility and a political necessity. Nicolaidis Kalypso declared that EU membership for Turkey would be the most powerful signal yet that the EU is indeed a new kind of global normative power in the making which instead of banishing the Muslim world as Europe's 'other' is capable

⁷⁶ Diez, Thomas (2004); “*Europe's Other and the Return of Geopolitics*”, op. cit.

of taking on the challenge of having a Muslim country as its biggest single member one day⁷⁷.

Perception about Turkey is related to the perceptions of European civilization identity which has been defined as the struggle with the Ottomans and Islam for a long time. However, European integration-identity can tell us a different story. For example, as **Kaelble** (2005) argues, in the twentieth century European self-understanding changed and a new concept of “multiple modernity’s” (which refers to diverse structure of cultures in Europe) emerged by de-colonization, the division of Europe, globalization and immigration⁷⁸. Therefore, we can also expect positive feelings toward Turkey as a part of the European diverse culture.

Within the EU, the prospect of enlargement towards Turkey has coincided with a period of uncertainty and deep introspection. It seems that Turkey’s membership has become a central battlefield of opposing discourses on European identity. Skeptics have been very explicit in arguing that enlargement towards a Muslim country such as a Turkey would spell ‘the end of the EU’. Those in favor argue that Turkey’s EU membership is a historical opportunity for Europe to reflect upon its constitutive values and norms and their power.

This dilemma is inevitably connected to the impact that Turkey’s EU accession process is perceived to have on the geographical scope and ultimate purpose—what in EU jargon is often called ‘finality’-of the EU as a polity. A central aspect of this debate, addressed by both supporters and opponents of Turkey’s membership, regards the extent to which Turkey’s internal transformation can represent a precursor for democratization in broader Middle East. On the one hand, skeptics will argue that Turkey’s path to modernization has differed greatly from that of the other states in the Arab-Muslim world and that Turkey can hardly provide a viable model for them.

On the other hand, the argument is that the achievements of Turkey’s moderately Islamist government could be of inspiration to some Arab-Muslim states,

⁷⁷ Nicolaidis, Kalypso cited in Paul Kubicek (2004), “*Turkey’s place in the ‘New Europe’*”, perceptions. Summer. P.56.

⁷⁸ Kaelbe, H. (2005); “European Self-Understanding in the Twentieth Century”, in Eder, K. & W, Spohn (ed), “Collective Memory and European Identity”.

especially those which remain autocratic but have opened up extensively to economic liberalization, e.g. Morocco or Jordan.

According to **The Hindu**, over the years, Mr. Erdogan has emerged as a reformer and pragmatists, fixated in his belief that modern Turkey's future lies in the EU. In this context it would be essential to quote his highly regarded Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu who summed up in an interview on Al Jazeera television the place the leadership has assigned to religion, as Turkey doggedly pursues its path towards progress. "We are proud of our religion and identity but, at the same time, we are part of European culture and European history and we are proud of our identity as well"⁷⁹.

In fact in a May 20th of this year in the Foreign Policy magazine, Mr.Davutoglu shared his vision of Turkey for the next decade and a half. He pointed out that Turkey hoped to fulfil all EU member ship conditions and become an influential member-state of the grouping by 2023⁸⁰.

It is also speculated that Turkey's anchoring to EU will definitely to some extent bring positive geopolitical change in the Middle East and other adjacent region thereby heralding peace at global level.

Looking at the present level of the spread of transnational characteristic of terrorism, especially after 9/11, the international atmosphere makes it more conducive to subjugate the identity based polarization as it may led towards further polarizing of some radicals Muslim segment against Christian Europe and in turn, exacerbating anti-immigration sentiments in Europe.

Under such global turbulence, the EU, claiming to be the global "soft power", can take lead of sending message from the Western world. The EU through Turkey can demonstrate that there is no identity clash of civilization between West and Muslim world, and thereby can show and spread that the values of liberal democracy can grow anywhere irrespective religion.

Moreover, Turkish inclusion will help in reducing the rift between Western and the Muslim countries which has been created over a long period of time. Turkey's accession to EU will contribute to international peace and security besides it will open

⁷⁹ Aneja, Atul (2010); "Why the West cannot lose Turkey", *The Hindu*, 'New Delhi' 1 July, 2010.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

a gate that both sides will utilise from it. Firstly Turkey's membership will lead the concepts of European identity as soft, unbiased and secular power. Secondly, Turkey's membership will certify that EU is not a Christian's club.

Currently, both in EU and in outer world, some are addressing the Christian values and concepts while they are talking about the indicators evolving European identity. However during the inter-governmental conference for European Convention, this kind of attempts took part and the president of Convention Valery Giscard d' Easting supported them, but in the final act of the convention the religion had not been addressed.

However, the truth is neither geography nor religion are the key factors of EU. The key elements of European identity were stated in second part of the constitution in the "Charter of Fundamental Rights", that is "the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law⁸¹". Turkey's partnership will assure, European identity is based on universal values. I assume unlike, the current prevailing 'big-boss' image of America, this will help EU in establishing itself as a 'soft geopolitical' power, more secular and less aggressive.

EU-Turkey Integration and Mutual Benefit in Geopolitical Perspective

Achievement of Turkish process of democratic, political and economic consolidation, and, last but not the least, winning over of diversified unfriendly European Union public opinion will be key issues for the success of the accession negotiations. Turkey's is a difficult process but definitely not impossible task. The existing obstacles arising from Turkey's demography and economy can be surmounted within a spirit of compromise for the mutual benefit of the European Union and Turkey. In general accession will limit the corruption, improve administrative capacity and, most importantly perhaps, attract foreign investment and help in technology transfers (Grabbe, 2001). In the long run it will bring substantial returns to the national budget

⁸¹ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2000), Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000/C 364/01 Accessed on 19 June 2010, Available on URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf; P. - C/364/8.

to Turkey. For EU the huge market and skilled human resource will ameliorate the saturated EU market and labour force.

From geopolitical perspective, it can be said that European Union has been a visionary project of achieving 'unity in diversity' by bringing various nationalities and cultures to work together towards common objectives of peace and prosperity.

While on the one side the European project is trying to progress by espousing the values of multiculturalism, on the other hand the contemporary world is marked by an increasing tension between different religious and cultural world views. A quick glance to the current global setting suggests that one of the major assets of the Union is that it now stands out as the strongest candidate to set an example of successful coexistence.

The Turkish accession into the EU would further strengthen Europe's global soft power and substantiate the intercultural dialogue between the Christian and Muslim populations. In return, the European Union membership would irrevocably consolidate Turkish democracy and refute the claim that Islam and democracy cannot coexist.

In fact the Western countries have a major stake in Turkey's success. If it triumphs, the Turkish model, which aims to successfully harmonise Islamic, secular and democratic principles with good governance, would become a potent antidote to the virulence of jihadi extremism.

Conclusion

Therefore, in line with these developments we can expect that in near future, EU's image will change in a positive way in international arena especially among third world countries if Turkey becomes a member. Hostile thoughts from imperialist era against Europe will be replaced by the thoughts of mutual cooperation and understanding. Put differently, Turkey's membership would prove litmus tests for Europe's ability or inability to deal with the questions of geopolitics and cultural plurality. Thus, it can be concluded at the end of the discussion that while deciding the future of Turkey actually, Europe in this process is also deciding about its future both in terms of the formation of the European Identity and with respect to the role of Europe in today's emerging geopolitics.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This study attempts to look into the geopolitics of the European Union enlargement in general and Turkey in particularly case. As the study has relied on information which was in detail but only covering that was not giving a comprehensive and well-arranged picture on the topic. So the major effort had gone into collecting that collecting and putting the information in a more scientific way so as to fit into the scheme of my study.

When political geography regained some popularity after a long period of dark ages of Cold war at the end of 1970's and with the start of 1980's (a fact that was institutionalised with the creation of a new journal, political Geography quarterly, in 1982), geopolitics emerged as a new theme under the umbrella of political geography which was conceived as a major tool to be used to study and analyse the ever changing International relations. The term 'geopolitics' was avoided in common usage during and after the cold war. As the term geopolitics was badly used by the Nazis in Second World War. Thus it was used very carefully. The body of Anglo-Saxon political geographers also distinguished between old geopolitics i.e. serving the foreign policy of a particular state and the new geopolitics i.e. the geographical perspectives on the relations between states.

Later with the change in the International relation new version of geopolitics like 'Civilisational geopolitics', one of the three discourses identified by John Agnew in *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics*, where he uses a threefold periodization to explain the development of geopolitical thought from the early nineteenth century until the end of cold war. The discourse of civilisational geopolitics is the one in which different parts of the world were categorised in people's mental maps according to the 'civilisation' to which people that inhabited that 'region' were perceived to belong. Next came 'naturalised geopolitics' in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when geopolitics as a separate discipline began to flourish. The third era Agnew identifies is the 'ideological geopolitics' of the Cold War years, when the world was divided in line with the ideological leanings of individual governments. During this period the world was divided between communist and capitalist

groupings. It was during this period that the EU and Turkey was closely cooperating on the basis of their common ideological sharing. But this shattered with the end of cold war, where Europe seems to be busy in constructing an identity based Europe that is EU. Thus Turkey finds no place in this changed setting of Europe because of its different socio-cultural heritage.

This is the root cause for the pending 'EU-Turkey integration' project since four decades. Even if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria there is no guarantee that the Turkey will get the entry into European Union.

Thus, here comes the real complication regarding the Turkey's accession membership. It is not only the European institutions who is authorised to administer the enlargement issue but also public opinion whose acceptance is essential in any future enlargement. This has become more important since the adoption of referendum by countries like Netherland and Austria. This recent change according to many seems to have been brought by countries, who do want to mingle with countries (like Turkey) which are having different faith other than Christian. Unlike other candidate countries, in case of Turkey public opinion seems to varying and is thus much flexible.

For instance, in Eurobarometer conducted in the year 2005, it was revealed that about 54.5% of the people from 25 European Union member countries indicated their opposition to against the Turkish membership while about 31.1% of them support its membership; in geographical scenario almost 56% of the participants think Turkey partly belongs to Europe, 40.6% agree that Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history, 56.2% think "the cultural differences between Turkey and the European Union member states are too significant to allow for this accession". Cultural differences are the major and the root cause of the Turkish opposition To the EU. So in this direction Turkey needs to build a good social impression in the minds of the Europeans and by virtue of that need to prove that though they are different by religion but culturally and historically share the same European standard.

In this important cultural aspect of EU-Turkey integration, I would like to refer the recent study of McLaren (2007) where she analyses the European public opinion survey to explain attitudes toward Turkey's possible membership. She used two theoretical arguments, rational economic self-interests and groups level interests,

and found that rational economic self-interest is irrelevant to explain the opposition to Turkey. However, group level interests do provide an explanation for the background structure of opposition to Turkey's EU membership. Her analysis indicated that Turkey's candidacy has not been seen in terms of personal economic losses, but considered as threats to group-level resources and, symbolic-cultural aspects of Europe. One of the most important findings of her study is explaining the role of "*immigrant threat*" in opposition to Turkey. She argues that "migration from Turkey to some of the EU member states has combined with the feelings of group protectiveness to produce wide spread animosity to Turkey's entry into the EU" (MacLaren 2007, p.273). The most of the Europeans attribute the growing violence and crime to the Islamic culture. Thus cultural factor is going to play dominant role in the current Turkish accession negotiation.

Over the period of time the process of EU enlargement and its eligibility criteria are getting tougher and tougher. Some are citing Turkish accession as the possible reason behind the development of these tougher rules for the EU enlargement. Turkey because of its Islamic culture and due to its bad historical image among the Europeans, it finds difficult to get the EU membership. Countries like Austria links the present day's modern Turkey with the medieval day's Turks which were having hostile relations with the Europeans. Many Europeans still considers Turkey as the 'Other' thus differentiating it from the European culture and identity.

If EU enlargement judged from the objective perspective, based on the Copenhagen criteria which was made effective from 1993 onwards Turkey's future in the EU becomes crystal clear as has been the case with any of the past enlargements. The 'big-Bang' enlargement of the 2004 in which ten Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC's) got through the European Union quite comfortably. Though most of these countries were of communist ideology and were partners of the Soviet Union till late 1980's but inspite of their past ideological differences and their incomplete satisfaction of the Copenhagen criteria, they were quite easily admitted into the Union. This was mainly because of their common European identity.

After the decision of the EU to open accession negotiations, Turkey managed to make political and economic reforms in order to obtain a specific entry date to the Union. Recent reports and technical analysis of the accession process (European Commission, Turkey Progress Report 2009) highlights the progress made by Turkey

in several accession chapters, and also made some recommendations for further progress. At the technical level, the accession process continues without major concerns because of the stable state institutions and fairly well functioning statecraft of Turkey. Nonetheless the main criticism by the EU for the progress of Turkey comes about the areas of “the rights of non-Muslim religious communities, women's rights, trade union rights and on civilian control of the military.” (European Commission, European Union Enlargement Strategy 2006, p.17).

Not surprisingly, related to cultural scepticism is also the immigration problem which seems to have become more and more concerned in the present going on economic crisis. Countries in the EU also display some concerns about immigrant involvement to crime in their countries, and therefore, public in those countries demonstrates scepticism toward the immigrant populations in their countries. According to Solivetti (2005, p.322) “in almost all of the West European countries – Germany, France, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands- political movements with suspicion and hostility towards immigrants emerged, and those movements regarded them as responsible for the increase in crime”. The growing crime and violence in cities like Paris, Vienna (like the one that recently took place few months back, on the issue of the construction of Minarets) and other cities provide evidences of prejudice towards the growing immigration.

However, I strongly feel that the future of the so called ‘EU-Turkey integration’ project should not be decided solely on the basis of these aforesaid minute factors. The debate on Turkey that has exploded across Europe highlights the importance of developing new grand strategy for the further enlargement of the European Union. Above all if Europe wants to keep growing, it must think big. Enlargement shouldn't be viewed only from regional perspective.

Rather it should be seen in the backdrop of the emerging geopolitics. In the current prevalent unilateral World, EU with the supranational state can initiate the evolution of multipolar world. This is quite feasible also as EU's image across the globe especially among the developing countries is that of a soft state.

This soft state view of EU can be further taken to a greater height if Turkey gets firmly attached to the EU. Turkey as a secular, democratic and moderate Muslim state can become an ideal for the many failed state in the region. Turkey can serve as

a bridge between West Asia and Europe. This in turn would help in bringing stability in this so called politically and socially unstable region, which is also considered by many as the epicentre of the terrorism and other prevailing instability across the globe.

Thus, the EU-Turkey integration has not just regional significance, but it also has a wide global implications. It has the potential to change the current prevailing geopolitics and turn the World from the current unipolar to multipolar stand.

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