

**NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING:
A STUDY OF
IRAN AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLICIES**

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Date: 25.7.2011

DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled “Nuclear Decision Making: A Study of Iran and South Africa’s Policies” submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.


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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.


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Chapter One

Introduction

This study seeks to analyze the emotional aspects of states' nuclear decision making. It aims to bring to the foreground the complex emotions that give direction to a state's nuclear posture. Research done on understanding the reasons for a state going nuclear (Scott Sagan, 2009; Wheeler and Ruzicka, 2010; Richard Price, 2009) focus on only two primary emotional states, that of fear and trust. This study seeks to look beyond fear and trust as the emotions that lead to a state's nuclear response. With the two case studies of Iran and South Africa, the emotional responses that are being looked into are pride and submission.

Background

An emotion is a complex chain of loosely connected events that begins with a stimulus and includes feelings, psychological changes, impulses to action and specific, goal-directed behavior (Robert Plutchik, 2001). In International Relations, it is often seen that within states, there are certain voices that help frame the nuclear rhetoric. These voices act and react to situations in the international arena which in turn lead to the states' views on a situation. A state posture refers to an image or policy as perceived by the public and/or other nations (dictionary, 2010). This study looks at the state's rhetoric and tries to understand its reasons for having crossed/ not crossed/ or gone back from the threshold of being a nuclear weapons state by bringing in the role of emotions. What influences a state's nuclear posture? Do emotions play a role? Considering that proliferators are subject to diplomatic pressure and international sanctions, as well as moral and legal condemnation, only states that are willing to suffer significant international disapproval and are materially capable of proliferation are likely to proliferate. But what are the

possible reasons for this behavior? Do the insecurity and constraints from the international system only lead to fear or trust? Are states not capable of responding by way of other emotions as a response to insecurity?

Advanced emotion	Composed of...	Advanced opposite
<u>Optimism</u>	<u>Anticipation</u> + <u>Joy</u>	<u>Disappointment</u>
<u>Love</u>	<u>Joy</u> + <u>Trust</u>	<u>Remorse</u>
<u>Submission</u>	<u>Trust</u> + <u>Fear</u>	<u>Contempt</u>
<u>Awe</u>	<u>Fear</u> + <u>Surprise</u>	<u>Aggressiveness</u>
<u>Disappointment</u>	<u>Surprise</u> + <u>Sadness</u>	<u>Optimism</u>
<u>Remorse</u>	<u>Sadness</u> + <u>Disgust</u>	<u>Love</u>
<u>Contempt</u>	<u>Disgust</u> + <u>Anger</u>	<u>Submission</u>
<u>Aggressiveness</u>	<u>Anger</u> + <u>Anticipation</u>	<u>Awe</u>

SOURCE: Warren, Chris; http://www.bukisa.com/articles/114818_power-writing-using-words-to-create-emotion accessed on 26/11/2010

Through this study, the idea is to bring in the advanced emotions given by Robert Plutchik (2001) in his Multidimensional Model of the Emotions (MME) and place them in the understanding of nuclear decision making.

Of the advanced emotions, the ones that would be useful for our purpose here are: submission, contempt, and pride. These emotions would help us understand the nuclear decisions taken by states that do not necessarily be due to the fear of the superpower or

trust in the international system. Though these emotions are a combination of the basic emotions such as fear, and trust, they intend to provide a psychological understanding of nuclear decision making and posturing.

Emotion plays an important role in the escalation or de-escalation of a conflict. Clausewitz observed that anger and hostility can also affect the performance of political and military leaders in crisis (Ned Lebow, 1988). A major reason for the complexity of emotions is that they often consist of a cluster of emotions. Thus guilt may be associated with fear, and fear may be associated with envy, contempt, and hate (Ben Ze'ev, 2000). Various Scholars (Scott Sagan, 2009; Wheeler and Ruzicka, 2010; Richard Price, 2009) tried to understand the reasons for states choosing their respective paths, whether it was going nuclear, giving up nuclear weapons or providing nuclear umbrellas. These articles on nuclear proliferation help comprehend the choice of states to 'Cross the Rubicon' or do their bit for international peace by denouncing nuclear weapons or remain a fence-sitter. But there is a lacuna of research with respect to the role of emotions in leading to make the final decision.

The study brings in a psychological aspect in the study of International Relations by looking at the role of emotions in nuclear decision making. It questions why nuclear decision making has mostly been looked into from only two emotions- trust (cooperation) and fear (deterrence). By bringing in the complex emotions such as contempt, pride, and submission, this study tries to understand and expand the role of emotions in the nuclear posture of a state. The case studies of Iran and South Africa help understand the role of emotions in greater detail by giving contrasting responses to the same idea of becoming a nuclear state.

Max Weber in his categorization of Social actions refers to four ideal types; namely, Instrumental action, in which the means to attain a goal are rationally chosen; Value-oriented Action, in which the goal may or may not be rational, but the means to achieve it should be rational; the affective action, in which the emotional state rather than means and ends are the deciding factors; and lastly, the Traditional Action, where people are guided by custom or habit (Weber, 1947). Weber's categorization helps understand how

affective action is an important factor in decision making whether it is at the individual level or at the state level. It is through this category of understanding i.e. Affective Action that this study proceeds.

Review of Literature

Nuclear proliferation, due to its far reaching impact, is one of the most well researched topics in the subject area of international relations. Every country that has gone nuclear, whether it is the P5 or the outlier states of India, Pakistan and Israel, have been researched thoroughly by political scientists world over. But with respect to emotions the research done is still comparatively new and not very in-depth. The little research done by scholars (Scott Sagan, 2009; Wheeler and Ruzicka, 2010; Richard Price, 2009) focuses on two basic emotions, fear and trust, which are seen as stemming from the degree of security/insecurity that a state faces from the international system. Beyond trust and fear, the role of emotions as a determining factor has not been explored in a states' nuclear posturing.

In order to get a grasp of the work done in the area of nuclear rhetoric with respect to emotions, the literature review has been thematically divided into Nuclear Proliferation and State Rhetoric, Emotions and the Role of Norms, and the Case Studies of Iran and South Africa.

Nuclear Decision making and State Rhetoric

The nuclear decision making capacity of a state does not rest with a single person, unless living in an autocratic/dictatorial style state. These decisions are taken collectively by the top leaders of the government. In the cases of South Africa and Iran, it has been found, that public sympathy has been taken into account. This public sympathy comes from a variety of emotions that have not been clearly identified by researchers. Other groups that effect and contribute to the decision making are the elite or the political class, the

military, and lastly the scientific community. Literature explaining the role of the different groups of decision makers is few and far in between. A few scholars (Michael Herzog, 2006; Farideh Farhi, 2010) do touch upon the subject, but no one offers a proper analysis.

For the P5 states, going nuclear was seen as not only symbolic of the technological advancements, but also of military superiority. But after the NPT came into force and the second generation of nuclear states, the outlier states, came into being, the main purpose of a nuclear weapon was leverage, and prestige. India, for example, considers its nuclear arsenal one of its most prized possessions, but swears never to be the first to use it. The same is the case with Iran. But symbolic value does not mean that the weapons do not possess the same amount of risk they did prior to the outlier states going nuclear. Thus, every time a state decides to go nuclear, it will get a lot of backlash from the international community. Iran too, has been subject to this for a very long time (Solingen, 2007). Have weapons actually changed the way states interact with each other and how important has it become for a state that wants a larger role in the international arena to be a nuclear power? Glaser (1998) argues that complete nuclear disarmament is a not a possibility until there is a drastic political change in the international political setup (Glaser, 1998).

Harald Muller (2010), points out the successes that have been achieved as a result of the NPT as that majority of the states worked their way around the dichotomy of the P-5 wanting to keep their nuclear weapons but not allowing others to do so. He brings out the merits of this sacrifice given by a number of states in order for some sanity to prevail. This is because changes in the US government policy have led to changes in the international norms. A most recent example would be the inclusion of India in the nuclear market. On the other hand there are articles that are pro nuclear weapons, such as Louis Delvoie's "In Praise of Nuclear Weapons" which points out to the old argument of no world war taking place after the advent of nuclear weapons.

Glen Chafez (1995), states that the liberal states are biased in their perception of the threats to the Non Proliferation Regime and thus there is a need for a comparison between the two. In an article titled 'Nearing a fork in the road: proliferation or nuclear

reversal?', Ambassador. Thomas Graham and Douglas Shaw bring out the complexities that are being faced by the current leaders about how to change the path of nuclear proliferation to that of nuclear reversal. The article talks about the progress that has been made, the states such as India and Pakistan that have unnecessarily added to the weight of nuclear material in the world and the resultant consequences.

This study focuses on understanding whether the nuclear policy of a state remains stable or changes with different political heads. Is the role of the leader a factor that can lead to a change in the state's policy? Is nuclear decision making is done by bringing about a change in the minds of the people? How does the change affect the state's prior rhetoric?

Emotions and their Ability to Influence

Emotions as an area of study has not been very well researched in International Relations. Their role has, till now been limited to understanding the two basic emotions of fear, which is seen in the form of deterrence, and trust, which is seen in the form of co-operation (Scott Sagan, 2009; Wheeler and Ruzicka, 2010; Richard Price, 2009). In the literature on emotions, the areas that have been looked at are: what are emotions and how can they be identified in the international system? Can emotions be detected in speech? How much of an impact does the selection of words have on crowds? What factors are at play in a social environment in bringing out the elicitors of emotions that lead to a nuclear decision?

In the literature on emotions, a number of articles focus on defining and understanding them, but as already pointed out, work done on locating the different emotions in the field of International Relations, especially in the area of nuclear decision making is sparse.

In their article on "Psychology and International Relations Theory", Goldgeier and Tetlock shed some light on the importance of bringing in psychological perspectives in the study of International Relations. They also talk about the power of human emotions to shape judgments. It specifically talks about developments in cross-cultural social psychology sheds light on constructivist arguments about the creation and maintenance of

international social order that typically rest on assumptions about decision making that are qualitatively different from realist and institutionalist approaches to world politics. But it only points out to the problems that are there, it does not offer any solutions on how to go about dealing with such situations.

Theodore Kemper (1987) states that primary and secondary emotions are distinct in that secondary emotions are socially constructed and their linkage with primary emotions due to socialization helps identify their emotional tone. Thus, in this study, the secondary emotions being studied will have linkages to the primary emotion of fear but they still need to be studied as their existence has not been acknowledged in the field of International Relations.

Amelie Oksenberg Rorty in her article, "Explaining Emotions", very clearly explains how emotions come about and what all are the causal factors that lead to the building of an emotional history in the psyche of the society. Ellsworth and Sherer in their paper on "the appraisal process in emotion" take a psychological angle to the emotions at play and explain how perception of an emotion matters much more than what emotion is being felt or experienced. They also point out that appraisal theories can be used to help identify emotions but certain limitations need to be kept in mind. Andrew Ross tries to mend the gap between psychology and International relations by trying to apply the role of emotions into the field of IR and points out to the gaps that are existent in the literature. He also points out to the various changes that need to be brought about, in order to understand the different emotions and their applicability to the field of IR. Thus one can see that the gaps are existent and scholars in different capacities point out to them. But almost no one has ventured into the area of applying them in case studies and discovering as to whether emotions can in fact explain the reason a state chooses its nuclear option.

Historically derived group cognitive and moral structures influence, to a large extent, the way in which individuals in a society interpret themselves in their daily lives. The Emotional style of a group reflects the regulative role of culture in providing certain emotional experiences. Thus, a culture becomes entwined with the emotional experiences of the group (Middleton, 1989). Early emotional experiences within a society such as the

way leaders respond to situations, their assassination, the role of the state in a war and so on influence the way people of a state perceive their place in the international arena (De Mause, 2002; Hyman, 2008). Hyman (2008) refers to the concept of Oppositional Nationalists as those who try and generate emotions such as pride within its people so as to emotionally make them want a nuclear status for their country. These oppositional nationalists see their country as both naturally at odds with an external enemy and its equal if not superior. The term of Emotionology, as given by Peter and Carol Sterns talks about the idea of a society having a single emotional viewpoint on many issues, an important aspect that is covered in the chapters. Dwight Middleton (1989), talks in similar lines when he points out that one's emotional lives, ordered by culture, contribute greatly not only to a sense of identity, but also our interpretation of the acts of others. These emotions are historically shaped sociocultural constructions more than they are personal possession. They are tied fundamentally to other domains of culture. Emotions, like culture, are organized in distinctive patterns. Thus, a number of explanations exist regarding emotions and their psychological/sociological effect of society.

In addition to understanding a state's security environment, one must appreciate the social forces that influence how states conceptualize the value of nuclear weapons. The nuclear nonproliferation movement has created an international social environment that exerts a variety of normative pressures on how state elites and policymakers think about nuclear weapons (Ruble, 1985). This is with respect to the case study of South Africa, which was so eager to please the international community of how responsible its government could be.

Power as a concept can also have its effect on emotions. In a study conducted (Kemper, 1991) power status outcomes in a situation can accurately predict the likely emotion. Social codes end up defining what constitutes power and status use, what is legitimate and what is not. These socially anchored definitions guide social behavior and help understand the complex power games between nations.

Social relations are the prime instigators of emotions (Kemper, 1978; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984). A study of the history of emotions in different cultures (Oatley, 2004), shows that emotions help us discern the deeper layer of ourselves and our relationships with others. Speech too, plays a major role in the understanding of emotional expression. Findings indicate that listeners are accurately able to judge emotions from speech at greater rates than expected (Bachorowski, 1999). Word choice too plays an important role in understanding the emotion. Human language carries various kinds of information. Merely considering strings of words without regard to the manner in which they are spoken, one might miss important aspects of an utterance. Additional information which can carry cues to the underlying emotional state of the speaker is encoded on the acoustic level (Lewis, 2008).

Micheal Lewis (2008) identifies the factors or elicitors that lead to certain emotions. For example, pride occurs when one makes a comparison or evaluates ones' behavior vis-à-vis some standard, rule or goal and finds that one has succeeded. Shame or guilt, on the other hand, occurs when such an evaluation leads to the conclusion that one has failed (Lewis, 2008).

Richard Ned Lebow (1988), talks about emotions and political sabotage and how emotions and friction can increase or decrease a conflict situation if handled properly. Lebow brings in Clausewitz and explains these perspectives from his perspective. He explains the position of Clausewitz on emotions by stating that the civilized people are ruled by the mind whereas the passion and emotions are left for the uncivilized ones. But this does not hold true. Emotional intelligence is as important if not more important than the IQ level of an individual.

Case Studies: Iran and South Africa

Most studies on the South African Nuclear Program focus only on a domestic reason for the state coming out in the open with its nuclear policy (Scott Sagan, 2001; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, 1993), but very few delve deeply into the other reasons for

South Africa to give up its nuclear arsenal (Mitchell Reiss, 1995). Some of the reasons being explored in this study are the emotions such as submission and a need for recognition from the other. Did the South African state start feeling that the nuclear weapons were becoming a hindrance in their global ambitions? With the end of the cold war inevitable, did South Africa feel a need to be more submissive towards an international treaty such as the NPT to find its feet in the new world map? Was the need for approval within the South African elite so strong that they could not do without the support of the Western States?

Being the only State to have given up its nuclear arsenal voluntarily, South Africa is an important case study for understanding how emotions are used to help make altering decisions. The political history of the South African bomb state that focuses should be on not only the internal dynamics, but also on security incentives, international pressure along with growing state sensitivity to the issue (Lieberman, 2001). These areas give scope for understanding the emotional underpinnings of submission and an external locus of control that resides with the Western States in the final call to give up its nuclear arsenal and join the NPT. When studying South Africa's nuclear program, the biggest hurdle one comes across is the data. There is almost no data available on its nuclear past apart from a few select readings as most of the official data had been destroyed at the time of the destruction of the weapons. Also, the leaders refuse to talk in detail about the program and remain tight-lipped about the events that led to the decision of giving up its nuclear weapons.

However, of the literature that was used in order to understand the South African nuclear program, a number of things stood out. Maria Babbage (2004) points out that with respect to South Africa the only explanation for the state giving up its nuclear weapons is the apartheid policy that led to the destruction of the weapons program before the black government could come to power. But this explanation does not suffice as it ignores the fact that even though the state leaders had pulled back from the policy of apartheid, it did not stop the international condemnation that South Africa was being put through. The article by Purkitt, Burgess, and Lieberman (2002), questions why the most important aspect, that of the political psychological angle had not been studied in detail with respect

to South Africa's nuclear policies. It then goes on to bring out the psychological factors involved. Harris, Hatang, and Liberman (2004), look into the documents released by the government and try to bridge the gap in the literature as to what led to the decision to give up its nuclear arsenal and why was only partial information released during the destruction of the nuclear weapons. But the most important article on South Africa's nuclear policy is by Peter Liberman (1962) which talks about the political history of the South African bomb and sheds light on the sources of its nuclear weapons policy: security incentives, organizational politics, and international pressure along with state sensitivity to such pressure. The article by Burgess (2006) is also significant as it highlights South Africa's transition from being a US ally to being isolated and the resultant paranoia that led to the development of a covert nuclear weapons program. The article then goes on to point what changes took place in the international system that led to South Africa giving up its nuclear arsenal.

The primary focus of the paper by Roy Horton (1999) was to understand the impact of the key South African leaders on the successful development and subsequent rollback of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. The paper highlights the important milestones in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability and relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa's nuclear deterrent. Lastly, Richard Betts (1979), in his article before the dismantling of the bomb points out that South Africa does not need the nuclear weapon and thus, the bomb would act only as a diplomatic shield. This argument now stands corrected as South Africa did do the unprecedented and gave up its nuclear weapons.

Iran, as a case study, presents the diametrically opposite view of what South Africa as a case study represented. While South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons program, Iran started to develop its nuclear program, after officially leaving the NPT. In this study, Iran's reasons for going nuclear are being looked into from the emotions of contempt and pride. Is the long history of strained relations between the United States and Iran a reason for why Iran wants to be known as a nuclear power? Is there a need to be seen as an equal, an Oppositional nationalist (Hymans, 2008) that leads to the contempt in the

speeches of the Iranian leaders? Does the need also arise from being a Shia state surrounded by Sunni states and maintaining a sense of regional balance?

Fariborz Mokhtari (2005) in his article "No one will scratch my back: Iranian Security Perceptions in the Historical Context" points out how the national psychology of the society is framed by the historical experiences and in the case of the Iranians, the impact was major with the Iran-Iran war, which went on for eight years with Iran not receiving any help from the International community. Mustafa Kibaroglu (2006) also points out how the development of an Iranian Nuclear Program is in progress and how it has become a matter of pride for the Iranians to develop and complete the program without outside help. Farideh Farhi (2010) in her article examines Iran's nuclear policy and the rhetorical instruments used in the shaping of public opinion between 2002 and 2007. While Bahman Bakhtari (2010) brings out the ideas of prestige, honor, dignity, and how they have affected/ influenced attitudes and policy positions. In an EPC Issue Paper by Sara Kutchesfahani (2006), the Iranian history is looked at from the point of view of the Europeans as the article points out how the Iranian nuclear program is a weapons program and Iran need not have left the NPT in order to fulfill its requirements. Michael Herzog (2006) in his article talks about the public and how especially in Iran, the nuclear debate was almost one-sided in the public domain as they unabashedly were supporting their state's right to go nuclear and what were the factors that led them to support their state in this manner.

When looking at the nuclear discourse of Iran, the article by Mojtaba Mahdavi (2008) brings out the different structural and agential factors and explains them in the context of Iran's political discourse. Tanya Ogilvie-White, in her article 'Is there a theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate' clearly lays down the arguments from different perspectives, be it realism, liberalism, a Sociological perspective or Psychological one. She also goes on to bring out the pluses and minuses of each existing theory and questions they are unable to answer. R.K.Razamani, a well known researcher on Iran, through his articles points out how Iran is a pragmatic state and even though it has been ruled by the Clerics; its decision has never been influenced by religion. Most likely, the clerics find a religious explanation for their actions, but are

never guided by them. Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007), in his article focuses on the discourses of Justice and Independence and points out how they have unconsciously seeped into the nuclear discourse as well. Ray Takeyh, another scholar on Iranian Nuclear Politics points out to the relationship between the United States and Iran and the policy changes that are needed on both sides in order to bridge the gap.

Iran went through the official process of withdrawing from the NPT before it embarked on its nuclear program. This goes to show that it does not want to spite the international community, but wants to find its place in or rather create a new world order as it feels that the present does not do justice to its glorious past (Allagappa, 2009). This sense of pride that may or may not be misplaced, leads to emotional reactions such as contempt and aggression towards certain states that stop Iran from pursuing its nuclear weapons program.

The Argument

The main argument that presents itself in the following chapters is that the understanding of emotions with respect to nuclear decision making has been limited to fear and trust. With the help of the case studies of Iran and South Africa, it can be seen that other emotions, whether it is via the different decision making groups or via their influence of the national psyche, are also existent and play a significant role in changing the nuclear path of a state.

Organization of the Research Work

The study intends to understand and place emotions as the underlying reason for a state's nuclear rhetoric. Emotions are reactions consisting of subjective cognitive states, physiological reactions, and expressive behaviors (Baron, 2001). Broadly, an emotion is defined as a relatively short-lived positive or negative evaluative state that has neurological and cognitive elements (Schachter & Singer 1962, Izard 1991). Emotions

are internal states that are not under the complete control of actors. All emotions vary along a few abstract dimensions, but also that each emotion may have a few concrete properties that make it unique from others (Lawler and Thye, 1999). There are various theories of emotions, such as the James-Lange theory, Cannon-Bard Theory, Schachter-Singer Theory, and so on that explain the basis of why certain events lead to specific emotions. These theories will help enrich the study as they would help understand the different responses of a state based on its history, its international standing, and its internal security.

Contemporary work done in the area of non-proliferation and nuclear studies does not emphasize the role of emotions. Studies done on 'why' states go nuclear (Scott Sagan, 2009; Wheeler and Ruzicka, 2010; Richard Price, 2009) do not go beyond fear and trust. The idea behind the study is to draw upon the grey area or the spectrum between trust and fear and to bring out other complex emotions such as remorse, contempt, aggression, submission and place them in the nuclear decision making or the nuclear rhetoric of states.

The research puzzle being addressed here is why is a state's nuclear posture looked at from only two emotional stand points? How does a state's decision making work? Are there other groups that are considered? There is a wide range of reactions to every situation, but with respect to the nuclear weapons program the complexities increase as there are more underlying factors involved in such a decision. But when it comes to nuclear decision making, the state is seen as responding its insecurity either by way of deterrence (fear) or of co-operation (trust). Thus, there is a need to bring in the aforementioned emotions within the fold of the nuclear posturing of the state.

Iran and South Africa have been taken as the two case studies for this research so as to draw a comparative analysis between the two, one having given up nuclear weapons and the other on the brink of 'Crossing the Rubicon'. With respect to Iran, the state is seen as very anti-US in its policy and despite repeated efforts by the latter; it does not seem to want to stop its nuclear program, which it refers to as peaceful. There is urgency in the state structure to show the world that it too can be a power to reckon with. As a regional

player, Shia Iran feels the need to stand out in the Sunni dominated region. These statements reflect that the state does not want to go nuclear because of mere fear of the super power. It shows that Iran's reaction to its insecurity as a state in the international arena is due to the above mentioned factors and the resultant emotions are pride and contempt.

South Africa provides another important case study as it was one of the few countries that shocked the international community by disclosing its nuclear weapons and then surprised the community by giving them up. Most of the literature on South Africa's nuclear program focuses on how the domestic factor was a major turning point, with the end of apartheid and the change in government. But a careful analysis of the case shows that there were many more factors at play. This study aims to explore those emotions. This study would broaden the scale of emotions in understanding a state's nuclear posture. It would also seek to bring out a comparison between the two case studies and study the similarities and differences in their nuclear posture.

The Nuclear rhetoric of a state is a result of many complex emotions, not just fear and trust. South Africa did not give up its nuclear weapons because of 'trust' in the NPT or the international system; it did so because it felt a need for identifying with the Western world and the need for identification brought with it the emotion of submission to the demands of the Western world. Iran's response to the insecurity in International Relations is not because of fear but a sense of contempt and mostly pride in its own capabilities.

The research would be analytical and qualitative methods would be used for the study with focus on the case study approach. The study uses both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources would include white papers, and other government documents, speeches of political and religious leaders, press releases, and interviews of leaders given to international as well as national newspapers, and research scholars. Secondary sources will include literature on nuclear proliferation, constructivism, norms, and so on. Literature on emotions will be studied in detail so as to understand their workings and interplay. Newspaper articles, papers published by international organizations, research based think tanks, Indian as well as international such as

Brookings Institution, IDSA, CSIS, and so on, will also be included. A comparative study of the two case studies would also be included in the conclusion bringing out the different ways states can react.

The qualitative method would be used for the analysis of the case study(s), as personal observations would be used to draw inferences. The theoretical aspect of the research would be studied by purely qualitative method as there is no statistical analysis to be done. While the research questions are descriptive and relational in nature, the research design would be quasi-experimental. Placing the different emotions such as contempt, pride, and submission in the nuclear positioning of a state would be the independent variables. The state's nuclear rhetoric would be the dependent variable in this study.

Conclusion

Thus, one looks at the different emotions that lead to nuclear decision making of states and tries to understand the reasons for a state to go nuclear. The basic argument of the study is to understand the different emotions that can be involved in the nuclear decision making of a state and how emotions can lead states to make diametrically opposite decisions. The study also focuses on the perception of the 'self' and the 'other' and how much of each other do they influence.

The case studies provide for very interesting subjects. In the case of Iran, pride as an emotion does color a lot of the judgments that are taken by the decision making bodies. The Iranians are what Jacques Hymans talks in his book about oppositional nationalists. The term refers to a group of people or a society that believes that their state is one of the most superior states in the world and having been glorious and flowing civilization at one point of time, they aim to get their state back to those days when the world revolved around them.

In the case of South Africa, submission is the emotion as all its decisions were taken with the sole aim of appeasing the Western world. With respect to South Africa, the world was first shocked at what their leaders had done, but was pleasantly surprised when the news

of its nuclear dismantlement was heard. But the reasoning for this was based on a need of the South African elite to still retain their ties with the White Christians for Europe and the US and for South Africa to be counted as a developed nation.

Every state has a different reason for it to take certain decisions. But when it especially comes to the understanding of the nuclear decision making of states, emotions play a major role. They help understand the psyche of the people of that state and the reason for all the decisions that were taken. The following chapters provide an account of who are the different decision makers involved in the states' decision making and what are the emotions that lead them to make certain decision. The following chapter also looks at the reasons or events that affect the psyche/ emotional orientation of the decision makers and lead them to their decisions.

Chapter Two

The Decision Makers: Emotions at Play

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to understand the different decision makers involved in the process of a state's decision making and the various emotions that make them choose certain paths. Another important aspect that is focused on in this chapter is the role of certain emotions and how they become a part of the psyche of the nation and as a result, that of the decision makers. These emotions lead the decision makers to take certain decisions that do not comply with the idea of a rational choice.

As the process of decision making evolves in the foreign policy of a state, it is seen that no one person can take full responsibility for a decision, especially in the matter of making the nuclear choice. Decision making is not an individual's domain and can be done only after consultation from different sections of society. A number of groups influence that final decision. But what events influence these groups in to taking certain decisions? What is the psyche of the nation that leads it to make certain decisions? Are emotions involved in the process of decision making? To what effect do emotions color the perceptions of society?

In the study of emotions, the biggest hurdle one faces in its definition. There is no one universal definition of emotions. Different definitions exist according to the aspect that is the focus of the study, whether physiological or cognitive. For this study, emotions will be looked at not from a physiological sense, but as a mental state, wherein they influence the decision making process and end up swaying the rational decisions of states into non-rational decisions that change the political setup in a negative or positive manner for the

international community. This chapter focuses on the definition of emotions and how they influence a decision as critical as states making the nuclear choice.

Factors such as people's perceptions, the opinion of elites, strategic community, scientists and so on are taken seriously in the decision making process of states. People's emotions arise from their perceptions of their circumstances- immediate, imagined or remembered. Work by Mikula and his associates (Mikula, Petri, and Tanzen, 1990; Mikula, Scherer and Athenstaedt, 1998) have shown that perceived injustice can provoke and increase the intensity of a number of different emotions, anger in particular.

Most societies look back in history to see whenever in doubt about the present. If the history of the state is rich and the state has had a period of glory, the people try and reach that level of glory. These groups of people are known as oppositional nationalists. This term was defined by Jacques Hymans in his book on "The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation". The term refers to those who see their nations as superior and at odds with an external enemy. This conception in turn, generates emotions of Pride and Fear respectively. These emotions in turn can lead a state to produce and own nuclear weapons, as nuclear weapons are associated with notions of superiority. These nuclear weapons become a source of self-expression for the states. Thus, an oppositional nationalist identity combines antagonism toward an external enemy and inflated sense of national strength, which results in the combination of fear and pride (Hymans, 2006).

This is the basis for the entire argument of the study. It states how a nation begins to perceive all the events in its past and the response of the international community to the events. The effect of these events is that it makes a direct impact on the psyche of the society which in turn influences every decision taken by the state.

The focus of this chapter is to look at the reasons apart from the ones that exist in the literature that have made states take decisions that take the international community by surprise. In understanding the puzzles in International Relations, the three major theoretical aspects are taken as lenses, i.e., realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The study of emotions comes loosely in the constructivist bracket but for now, the role of emotions is being looked at separately. Thus, the aim of this study is bring in the

psychological factors at play, and more importantly, the role of certain emotions such as prestige that motivate states to take decisions. There is an important aspect of understanding international relations through the lens of emotions and literature of this is barely existent.

This chapter first looks at the various influencing groups and their specific motivations to be either for or against a nuclear weapons program for their state and then looks at the different manifestations of emotions, whether it be in the form of leadership, group behavior, cultural impact, or collective emotional orientation in international relations. The next section brings in the understanding of nuclear decision making and looks at nuclear rollback and nuclear proliferation as the options that states take. The chapter lays down the outline for the next two chapters which are the case studies of Iran and South Africa. The outline explains all the factors that would be used in understanding emotions and placing them in the nuclear rhetoric of a state. The emotions would have to be placed as, no state has ever made the claim that a decision, nuclear or non-nuclear was taken due to the emotional orientation of a state.

Influencing Groups


The decision of a state to go nuclear is mostly a top-down approach; whether it is the United States, India, or Iran or South Africa. The groups that affect/influence the decision making process of states' nuclear policies are the elite, the military, the scientific community and lastly the public. The amount of effect of each group may vary from state to state and at some point may be negligent, but nonetheless, they do have an effect on the final decision taken by the state.

The opinion of the elites is influenced by many factors. One of the most important factors would be the relations that they share with elites from other countries. If incase the relations are very good, the elites would be want for the relations with the other state to flourish and if they do not have good relations with the elites from a particular state, they would try and influence decisions that do not promote good relation between the two

states. When it comes to the strategic community, focus would be on how strong the state is diplomatically and as to whether a certain decision would increase the standing of the state in the international community or not. The most important, the scientific community focuses only on how it would further the knowledge of the community and bring glory by creating something new. The military thinking from a security perspective looks at the fear of another state attacking and responds accordingly. When it comes to the public opinion, in a number of cases it is not considered because the elite have the ability to mould the public opinion according to their requirements and more often than not, this does happen. Nonetheless, public opinion can still affect the decision of a state's policies as the people in charge need to keep the public happy in order to get reelected. So this vicious circle entangles the process making all four groups equally significant. As a result, the emotions that lead to a response from the four groups are also interlinked and are set in their understanding of a situation.

Scientific Community

For a scientist, invention comes above all. The scientific community of every nation takes pride in its work and development. But due to the size of the project being so and the complexities involved, the scientific community of every state has received help from another scientific community. Although they have outgrown their mentors and developed their own centers for study, the initial help has been important. Examples range from the South African scientists who were helped by Israel, to Iranian scientists who were helped by the United States or the Pakistani nuclear program which had help from not only North Korea but also from China. The scientific community of every country has aimed for its own nuclear program so as to match up to the rest of the community and make their state the proud owner of a nuclear program, showcasing the state's capability in the knowledge arena.



The Military

The role of the military is very little in the case studies undertaken in this study, for linking of the nuclear program with the military leads the international community to believe that the nuclear program is not a peaceful one and the international community begins to doubt the sincerity of the concerned state. Thus the role of the military was kept at arm's length in both the states of Iran and South Africa so as not to alarm the international community and create an irreversible situation. For the military the primary concern is the security of the state and whether nuclear weapons would help in enhancing the security of the state or not is the only question that concerns the military.

The Elite

In every country, the role of the elite is considered the most important. This is because a majority of them constitute the polity as well.¹ The elite is not necessarily concerned with the details of the nuclear program of a state and steer clear of the technological aspect. But they focus much more on whether they should or should not have nuclear weapons.

The elite of every state want their state to be in a position of significance within the international community. Taking the case of Iran, the elite wanted to see Iran as it was during its glorious days and for Iran to reach the pinnacle of economic and social growth, just as it had during a particular historic period. With respect to South Africa, the elite wanted to be associated with the Western powers so badly that they decided to give up their nuclear weapons program completely, in turn gaining not only the Western states' approval, but also that of the international community.

¹ In both the case studies of Iran and South Africa, it was found that the elite and the polity intermingle at various levels and thus represent a single group amongst themselves. Thus, in this dissertation, the elite represent the polity to a large extent.

Public Opinion

The public opinion, as mentioned before, does not count most times with respect to the decision making of nuclear option; but nonetheless, it does have its effect when the public is kept in the know about secret events. For example, in South Africa, a weapons program was built, was thriving for some time and was eventually destroyed, but the public got to know about the events later, after everything had been destroyed. However, in Iran, the public has vociferously supported the need for Iran to stand tall and develop its nuclear weapons program.

The public at most times is manipulated according to the will of those in power in the name of propaganda. According to Chomsky and Herman (1988), the elite control all the sources of information to the public and thus are able to manipulate information accordingly. This manipulation is done via the news channels, media outlets and so on. Since attitudes involve rational (cognitive) components as well as emotional (affective) components, either avenue may be used effectively to carry out propaganda. Rational propaganda attempts to persuade the public that the advocated attitude is rational and logically sound. Emotional propaganda maybe based on attempts to persuade the public in the absence of a pertinent fact. A variety of devices may be employed to achieve this kind of change. *Prestige identification, Sympathetic Identification*, and the most commonly used emotion: *fear appeal*.

Emotions and their Manifestations

The decision to go nuclear or not is taken by the state, as mentioned above, which is influenced by the various groups that make up the society within which the state is located. These groups in turn are influenced by the events that shape their thought process and are either aggravate certain emotions or pacify certain emotions. This section of the chapter points out how emotions affect the society in a collective manner and how they are either aggravated or pacified.

According to Crawford (2001), Emotions are inner states that individuals describe to others as feelings, and those cognitive feelings may be associated with biological, cognitive, and behavioral states and changes. Aristotle defined emotion as "those things by the alteration of which men differ with regard to those judgments which pain and pleasure accompany." He saw emotions as something that could be manipulated by rhetoric and that would also affect the reception of arguments (Crawford, 2001, p 1). The cultural theory of emotion states that, emotions are learned behaviors transmitted culturally, much like languages. Just as you must first hear English before you speak it, so you must see others feel joy before you can feel it (Evans, 2001). Thus, the subject matter of emotions is very varied and vast. For the purpose of the study, we look at only certain emotions and how events have lead to their development in the psyche of the society.

According to Neta C. Crawford (2000), emotions are influenced and influence not only perceptions of events in history but also the evaluation of past choices and the recall of memories. Thus, an emotion such as fear could bring back memories where threat played a major role or a shameful event could trigger the emotion of shame.

Emotions can be used to calm a hostile environment or to incite a crowd. The recent terminology in the speeches of the American President, Barack Obama, focusing on nuclear disarmament shows that his arguments generate emotions such as compassion and empathy for the other. Every organization uses emotions to get its point across to the crowd. The military uses emotions of solidarity and pride to instill a sense of patriotism within its ranks; international and non-governmental organizations use guilt and empathy in order to get aid and disaster relief. These emotional appeals become particularly more effective in situations where there are already pre-existing beliefs and feelings towards the out groups (Crawford, 2001). According to a statement by Jonathan Mercer, norms are developed by way of collective emotions. These collective emotions in turn are developed when certain events leave their imprint on the psyche of the society as a whole.

Emotions are of different types, primary or basic and secondary. The basic emotions are universal and have been incorporated in the field of International Relations, for example fear, anger, surprise, joy and so on. The secondary emotions though also universal, are at a higher cognitive level, take longer to build up and die away than basic emotions. Higher cognitive emotions include: love, guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride, envy, and jealousy (Evans, 2001). Through this study, the aim is to place higher cognitive emotions in the understanding of a states' nuclear policy.

In the existing literature, prospect theory has received a lot of support. The theory by Tversky and Kahneman has been widely applied in the IR field. The theory states that when states are in the domain of losses (or, like Serbia, have not psychologically adjusted to ancient losses); they are more likely to take the irredentist approach that Mearsheimer posits (e.g. Germany in 1939, Japan in 1941). When states are in the domain of gain, they are more likely to accept the status quo, as Waltz would predict (examples, arguably, are the US reluctance to incur any casualties in interventions abroad in the 1990s—Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—as well as NATO's hesitation about expanding into parts of Eastern Europe more sensitive to Russia, notwithstanding Russia's palpable weakness) (Goldgeier & Tetlock, 2006; pg 71). But the theory does not account for South Africa's behavior with respect to its nuclear decisions of first acquiring nuclear weapons and then abandoning them.

According to Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (1978), the causal history of our emotions, rather the significant events that develop into our habits affects our conceptions of their objects. There are three closely interwoven strands in that causal history: first, the events in a person's psychological past; second the social and cultural range of emotions and their corresponding behavioral and linguistic expressions; and lastly some genetically fixed sensitivities and patterns of response. These three strands very clearly bring out the emotional history of a society or individual. They help understand where certain emotions come from and why they have such a deep impact on the psyche of the people. The next section discusses the already existent data with respect to emotions.

Fear and Trust:

In literature, fear and trust have been studied by scholars with respect to their significance in IR. Corradi, Fagen, and Garretton (1992) analyzed the formation of the collective emotional orientation of fear in four South American societies in the 1970s: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. In these cases, the collective emotional orientation of fear developed because of certain threatening societal conditions: Members of the four societies were subjected to the systematic and consistent use of terror. As a result, they perceived the political system as generating life-threatening dangers. This perception was shared by a substantial segment in each society, resulting in a "fear culture," as the researchers called it (bar-tal, 2001, p 607).

Aristotle defines fear "as a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future." It is caused "by whatever we feel has great power of destroying us or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain" (Lebow, 1996; p 89). The emotion of fear is mostly aroused not by the reality, but by the expectation or rather anticipation of an untoward event. Fear is provoked when an actor abuse's his power and threatens the social order (Lebow, 1996; p 89).

According to Daniel Bar-Tal (2001), in situations where society members have prolonged exposure to violence and stress, the selective memory of the public focuses on the mal-intentional acts that serve as a fertile ground for the formation of the collective fear orientation. Accumulated evidence in psychology shows that negative events are well attended and remembered and that they have determinative influence on evaluation, judgment, and action tendencies .

Fear constitutes combined physiological and psychological reactions programmed to maximize the probability of surviving in dangerous situations in the most beneficial way. Although reactions of fear may be evoked in view of the situation's appraisal through conscious process, they also may be activated via a programmed system that allows unconscious reaction processing, which deals with danger in a routine way, regardless of intention or thinking (Bar-Tal, 2001). Accumulated evidence in psychology shows that negative events are well attended and remembered and that they

have determinative influence on evaluation, judgment, and action tendencies (Christianson, 1992; Lau, 1982; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Taylor, 1991). As Maslow (1963) noted, "all those psychological and social factors that increase fear cut impulse to know" Over sensitized by fear, a society tends to misinterpret cues and information as signs of threat and danger, searching for the smallest indication in this direction, even in situations that signal good intention. A society in fear tends to fight in order to cope with the threatening condition. Fight is a habituated course of action based on past experience, and thus a society again fixates on coping with threat in a conflictual way, without trying new avenues of behavior that can stop the violence. In times of conflict, the collective orientation of fear is not only maintained by the experiences of the society members, but usually is also reinforced by society's channels of communication and its institutions (Bar-Tal, 2001, p 608- 609).

The emotion of trust too has received its fair share in the academic writings. Nicholas Wheeler, in his article, refers to the trust deficit that is existent between states and that trust deficit is the reason states are not able to keep their side of the bargain in bi-lateral treaties (Wheeler, 2009). Wheeler, in the context of nuclear weapons clearly states that if abolition of nuclear weapons is desired then it is important for the states to not look at the problems as a zero-sum game.

Thus, fear and trust as an emotion are well understood and adapted in the field of International Relations, but apart from fear and trust, there are certain emotions that have not been studied in detail. The case studies spread more light on the emotions involved, while the next section discusses the various aspects that lead to the buildup of certain emotions in a society.

Group Behavior and the role of leadership

Group behavior gives the people involved certain advantages and thus important decisions such as those relating to the nuclear program of a state are taken collectively. This is because working collectively gives the eventual decision reached greater

legitimacy than if a decision were reached in unilateral fashion, after minimum consultation with others. Secondly, it provides leaders with a 'political cover' as no one person can take the entire blame for a bad decision. Third, group decision-making ensures (at least in principle) that the leading decision-maker is exposed to a variety of differing and possibly dissenting opinions, minimizing the possibility that a leader takes a decision without considering all available facts. Fourth, some leaders may prefer to work in groups where they are not well informed about the policy area concerned (Goldgeier and Tetlock, p 72). According to Evans (2001), decision makers virtually never work in social isolation, with the occasional bizarre exceptions of leaders such as Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and Saddam Hussein, who centralized enormous authority in themselves. As a process, decision making operates at many different layers and different networks thus making the process a non-linear one.

But nonetheless, a decision making group too, in the end requires a leader who takes the final call. Hymans, in his book on the *Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, points out that it is the leader alone who is responsible for the final decision on the nuclear program of a state. He goes on to support his argument by stating that if the leaders were different the states would not have taken the same decisions. But when one looks at the model by Hymans, regarding oppositional nationalists, it can be seen that their nuclear program will grow. The approach of Hymans also adds something new and interesting to our understanding of nationalism—an understanding of the role of leaders and their individualized conceptions of national identity (Houghton, 2006). But he does not take into consideration the groups that are involved in the decision making process and how a single person can go against the will of the rest of the decision making group. Thus, the leader is as important as the groups involved in the decision making process.

Cultural Impact

Culture does not only refer to the different ethnic groups that develop a way of living, it also refers to the larger influence a specific culture can have over the other cultures. For example, the concept of democracy brings in a new cultural way of conducting affairs.

Karsten Frey (2006) points out to the role of democracy and how more than 90% of the states that are nuclear states are also democracies. Every culture brings with it different events that are specific to its culture and the effect of these events on the psyche of the society would also thus, be unique. For example, with respect to India, the need to be a part of the international community without the help of others was a major aspect of its foreign policy. The reasoning for this was the colonial mindset of the people of India who wanted to let the world know that they were independent in their own right and were more than capable of producing a bomb on their own.

According to Dwight Middleton (1989), the impact of culture on the emotional orientation of society is deep. The historically derived group cognitive and moral structures provide motivation and meaning by which the individuals in the society enact and interpret style and self in their daily lives. A term coined by Peter and Carol Stearns explains the culture on the psyche of the state. 'Emotionology refers to the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression; ways that institutions reflect and encourage these attitudes in human conduct, e.g., courtship practices as expressing the valuation of affect in marriage, or personnel workshops as reflecting the valuation of anger in job relationships' (Stearns and Stearns, 1985, pg 1). Emotional learning is a combination of environmental inputs, and an innate disposition to learn some new things rather than others (Evans, 2001).

Emotions in the cultural sphere of life are an inescapable reality. They color the thought process and it leads to decision makers' strike at the most, some concrete action into a position where they do anything for the family. Examples stated above show how the use of smaller spaces needs to be known. The point by Frey stating that democracies are the states that are more likely to gain nuclear weapons is not false. This is bound to happen if a state's growing democracy tries to flex its muscles.

Collective Emotional Orientation

Numerous authors recognize that emotions have a history and that this history is essential to how collective identities – including those of states – are constituted. Crawford, for instance, stresses that emotions, and the situation in which they become political, are linked to particular historical, political and cultural circumstances. She along with other constructivists follow the logic of classical realists, stressing that conflict emerges not from systematic restraints, but from the manner in which emotions, such as fear or anger, shape the perception of decision-makers. Mercer too points out that questions of affect play a crucial role in determining how individual and collective identities are constituted, thus also shaping perceptions of the international system and the threats it may pose to states. Lebow, likewise, recognizes how the behavior of states is intrinsically linked to their prior identity and interests, which, in turn, are bound up with a range of emotional factors (Bleaker and Hutchison, 2001; p 7-8).

Just as individuals may be characterized by certain emotions, similarly societies may develop collective emotional orientations, with an emphasis on one or more particular emotions. Society provides the contexts, information, models, emphases, and instructions that influence the emotions of its members. Because these are cultural frameworks shared by society members and have strong effects on them, emotional experiences become a societal phenomenon, taking the form of collective emotional orientation (Rime & Christophe, 1997). This collective emotional orientation can have a deep impact on the decision makers' thought process and seep into their unconscious; leading to them making decisions, but not realizing the source of their actions.

The idea that society, or specifically its culture, shapes individuals' emotions is not a new one (Lazarus, 1991; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). A society may be characterized by sensitization to a particular emotion and by the evaluation and expression of that emotion. Society members share this emotion, because emotions reflect norms, values, and expectations of the society (Lovin, 1990). A society's emotional orientation is done not just in the family setting, but also via political, educational, and cultural mechanisms such as the mass media and other channels of communication. Cultural products, such as

books, films, or theatrical plays, express the particular emotion and the beliefs that trigger it. The educational system, through school textbooks, ceremonies, and teachers, transmits beliefs that evoke the particular emotion. The emotion and the beliefs that evoke it are embedded in the society's collective memory. Beliefs evoking the particular emotion are used for decision-making by society's institutions, and influence policy or course of action (Bar-Tal, 2001). It is thus not surprising that societies can become characterized by particular emotions. For example, Bellah (1967) proposed that hope characterizes American society: It is a central ingredient in what he called the "civil religion" of the United States.

Psychologists have long been aware of the power of social groups to amplify emotions, but they have tended to view this with suspicion rather than admiration. The French psychologist Gustave Lebon described the concept of mob behavior and how people can be swept away by the passions of the crowd, working themselves up into frenzy more vicious than anything of which they would be capable on their own. More recently, psychologists have speculated that demagogues such as Hitler and Mussolini achieved and maintained their power in part by taking advantage of a primitive 'group mind', in which collective emotion drowns out the individual voice of reason (Evans, 2001).

Collective emotion can be a powerful force, and has been used by politicians' world over to help them remain in power. Shadow projection can function, as a major threat to both social and international peace, for it enables us to turn those whom we perceive as enemies into devils or vermin that is legitimate to hate, attack, or exterminate. Unscrupulous leaders can manipulate this mechanism in whole populations. Adolf Hitler, for example, repeatedly described the Jews as 'sub humans' and through the skillful use of propaganda was able to induce enough Germans to project their shadow on to them as to make the holocaust possible. The same mechanism is involved in all pogroms, all 'ethnic cleansing', and all wars (Evans, 2001). This idea of shadow projection has been repeatedly used by the Iranian leaders who refer to the United States as Satan in their speeches and incite emotions of pride in Iran and anger towards the 'other'.

Thus, when one looks at the factors that influence decision makers, the collective emotional orientation of a society plays one of the most important roles. It shapes the thinking of the elites, the military as well as the scientific community as all these groups are ultimately formed from society.

Placing Emotions in International Relations

The three major theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism are used as lenses to understand and study International Relations. This study aims to place emotions in the study of International Relations, what factors are at play, how emotions such as pride and a need for recognition color the decision making of states.

According to Karsten Frey (1996), in making a choice for or against nuclear weapons, the normative disposition of a country is rooted in the identity of its society. When decisions regarding nuclear weapons are taken, the notion of how a society sees its country in comparison to other states is important. This identity conception determines whether a country views its position as more competitive or accommodative, reclusive or inclusive, high or low in the perceived international status ranking. Stemming from a collective identity, a set of norms is established which manifests itself in the nuclear policy of the state. The us-against-them pattern contrasts the self-defined 'us' to a real or imagined antagonist. Postcolonial identities tend to add a strong emotional dimension of humiliation and pride to the definition of the us-against-them antagonism and strongly impact the collective sense of sovereignty. Frey also points out that this emotional disposition clashes with the international nuclear order, in which former colonial powers or their perceived successors claim supremacy through an unequal treaty pushed through by a safeguard regime, which is often perceived to violate the sense of sovereignty and national dignity defined by post-colonial states. The strong sense of sovereignty displayed by postcolonial states, and their search for the 'right place at the table' in the international arena, which often translates into a pronounced sense of national prestige and status, are both crucial conditions for the emergence of the nuclear myth, i.e. the set of norms favorable towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Itty Abraham, in his

article on “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories” talks about the discourse of control and how it has come to dominate the nuclear history (Abraham, 2006).

Thus, emotions do play an important role in the study of International Relations. They affect the group as a whole, or in the form of a leader and lead to decisions. But no decision related to the nuclear topic is one that would be contemplated without consultation across a wide spectrum of groups available. Of the range of emotions, Iran looks at the emotion of Pride as the most important while for South Africa, there is a constant need for approval by the Western states owing to its past association with the Western world and its inability to give up that association.

Nuclear Decision Making

In his model on the nuclear choices of state leaders, Jacques E. C. Hymans developed the National Identity Conception (NIC) as the independent variable studying it. His research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, which he defines as “an individual’s understanding of the nation’s identity – his or her sense of what the nation naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international arena”. The NIC is a deep-seated belief that does not change over time. Hymans states that the oppositional nationalist leader is likely to develop a positive attitude towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In contrast, those actors defining the relationship to ‘the other’ exclusively in oppositional terms tend to be attracted by the sense of immunity symbolized by nuclear weapons as deterrent devices. Pride, or, for that matter, the desire for status, is the second crucial element of the identity concept. The concept of ‘pride’ is significant for a society that sees itself as equal to or better than the ‘other’ wherein the ‘other’ owning the nuclear weapons contributes to its status (Mansbridge, 1989). The next two subsections look at the two options that any state on the nuclear edge thinks of, either giving up its nuclear weapons or building them with full force.

Nuclear Rollback

If within a total of 180 states, eight have gone nuclear, keeping the majority free from the taint of nuclear weapons, it can easily be said that there is a dominance of the nuclear taboo over the nuclear myth. Thus, one needs to understand the dynamics of the norms composition, as to how the same symbols that the eight nuclear powers consider to signify prestige and immunity become symbols of abhorrence for the rest (Frey, 2006, pg 5).

One of the reasons for states wanting to comply with the NPT could be their need to not only feel good about themselves but to gain social approval from the P-5 who were the states in control of the international organizations. States may also follow the norms which are clearly biased in order to avoid the bad feelings associated with violating normative injunctions. Elster believes that "sanctions-whether mild or severe-matter mainly because they are vehicles for the expression of feelings of anger, disgust, and contempt. When a state is sanctioned by the international community, the problems are faced mostly by the people, the vote bank for the leaders. Thus, sanctions have a direct impact on the leaders/ politicians of a state and would thus be avoided by these respective state leaders (Crawford, 2001, p 154).

This aspect would be studied in detail in the fourth chapter, but in order to understand the basis of South Africa's decision, one must understand its history, and what were the influencing factors that lead to a change in the decision. South Africa represents the world's first instance of nuclear rollback, a state which has unilaterally and voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons. President F. W. de Klerk declared to a special joint session of the South African parliament on March 24, 1993, that "at one stage South Africa did develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability," but "early in 1990 final effect was given to decisions that all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed." As President de Klerk explained in his March 24, 1993, speech, South Africa feared "a Soviet expansionist threat to southern Africa," which included a build-up of Cuban forces in Angola starting in 1975 (Masiza, 1993). The imminent independence of neighboring Zimbabwe under an actively anti-apartheid regime also

worried Pretoria. These events augmented the minority government's fears of encirclement. De Klerk also noted Pretoria's "relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance should it be attacked." Even though these were the statements made by the then President, the important deciding factor for South Africa was its relations with the Western Powers and its need to be associated with these powers rather than be considered a third world country.

By the late 1970s South Africa's participation in the U.N. General Assembly and its specialized agencies were suspended. The Security Council had imposed a mandatory weapons embargo and voluntary oil embargo on the country (Masiza, 1993). Moreover, even as the most advanced nuclear energy state on the continent, South Africa for political reasons was denied its designated seat on the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors and participation in its General Conference. All these developments contributed to South Africa's sense of isolation from the Western world, something that was very important to the elite and the ruling class of South Africa.

South Africa also intends to cooperate fully with its neighbors to abolish an African nuclear weapon-free zone. An NWFZ treaty will limit African states "not to research, develop, stockpile, manufacture, or otherwise possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device" (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss; 1993; p 9)

Thus, apart from the domestic factors that very strongly influenced the leaders in their nuclear decision, there was the pressure that the government felt from the international community in complying with the norms of the NPT and signing up as a member of the Zangger Committee. South Africa felt the need to show the world, especially the Western world, that it was a responsible state and that it could rise above the pettiness of being a nuclear weapon state if it were provided the resources to grow.

Nuclear Proliferation

Though the majority of states are in compliance with the international norm of following the NPT despite its faults, there are some states that have risked questioning the P-5 and

going 'rogue'. These states feel that nuclear weapons signify power and control of the international structure. They state the example of the five countries that formulated the NPT there by creating the divide between the haves and the have-nots.

The concept of 'nuclear myth' is closely related to the idea of prestige, which these states seek internationally. They aim at status gains through the display of power, usually for the purpose of increasing it. Nuclear weapons as symbols of omnipotence appear to be particularly attractive devices for some states in their aim to display power for this purpose. These states are those that at one point of time in history were the centre of the world or were major players but due to the course of events had lost their status and now with the coming of the new order are trying to benefit from it. Within the nuclear realm, the international order, established in 1968 through the NPT preserves the power balance of this era by giving a superior status to the 5 then-dominating states. Those states which think of their status and power as having increased since then tend to oppose the regime. This opposition, in most cases, is limited to diplomatic gestures, but in some other cases it might cause an emerging power to seek a system change by building up nuclear arms (Frey, 2006).

According to Scott D. Sagan (1996, 73-85), "[f]rom this sociological perspective, military organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams; they are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states". It is on these lines that the some states have opted for the nuclear program. It does not signify a need for destruction. For example, most of those states owning or developing nuclear weapons (with the exception of Israel and North Korea) signed the Chemical Weapon Convention while explicitly applying moral, normative driven arguments for doing so.

Despite persistent chaos on its frontiers, Iran's nuclear program has always been conditioned by a narrower but more existential set of threats. With Saddam gone, America has emerged as the foremost strategic problem for Iran and the primary driver of its nuclear weapons policy.

Iran's leadership clearly sees itself as being in Washington's cross hairs, and it is precisely this perception that is driving its accelerated nuclear program. As Khatami confessed in early April, "They tell us that Syria is the next target, but according to our reports, Iran could well follow." Statements such as these show how the Iranians view the United States of America. While nothing is done by the US to remove these rumors, the President of the US, George Bush made statements to the effect of calling Iran an 'axis of evil' and more recent statements by administration officials such as Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who called on Tehran to "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq," these events only strengthen the resolve within the Iranians with respect to their nation-state. The North Korean model suggests that a presumed nuclear capability may not only avert a pre-emptive American strike but generate its own set of economic rewards and future security guarantees. But because a model worked in a particular set up, does not mean that it would always work and give similar results. The first sustained exposure of Iranian nuclear deliberations came when Pakistan test-fired its first nuclear weapon in 1998. The debate in Tehran focused not so much on whether Iran should pursue a robust nuclear research program but on the wisdom on crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. As one of Iran's leading reformist politicians, Mostafa Tajazadeh, said on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, "It is basically a matter of equilibrium. If I don't have a nuclear bomb, I don't have security." The truth is that given its ideological precepts, its suspicions and paranoia, the Iranian right does not find international isolation and dogmatic confrontation with the West necessarily objectionable. There are those within the Islamic Republic's hierarchy who insist that the only way to negate the American challenge is through the possession of nuclear weapons (Takeyh, 2003). Having nuclear weapons would give Iran the leverage it needs in order to believe that it is at par with the Western World.

Thus, the state of Iran clearly follows the Hymans model of oppositional nationalism. It feels very strongly about its security as do most states under a perceived sense of injustice. It is very much aware of the destruction that could be caused by a nuclear war and does not intend to go in that direction. Though sanctions do tend to restrict its economic progress, its people and leaders are willing to sacrifice economically as they

feel that a state that is a nuclear power gets the respect and power that an ancient and once powerful Persia did. They aim to reach the same level of cultural superiority.

Conclusion

The chapter points out to the literature that existed with regard to the role of emotions in nuclear decision making. In the name of emotions, the only two emotions of fear and trust existed in literature. This study, aims to bring in other emotions such as pride, contempt, and submission in the understanding of the nuclear decision making. The chapter also aims to look at the various decision making groups and how each group is influenced separately as well as collectively as a society into taking certain decisions.

The chapter pointed out the various decision making groups that become part of the state structure by default, i.e., the elites, the scientific community, the military and the public. The reasons for them choosing a particular path is usually based on a similar emotional ground as their emotionology is the same. The society's reactions to events that make a mark on their psyche would be similar and thus, the groups may be different but the resultant emotion would come out to be the same. The idea of a collective emotional orientation though not well understood in the field of nuclear decision making does exist and this aspect would be more evident in the following chapters where the case study is used to explain the how emotions do color perceptions of the people involved and result in decisions that are thus a result of not rational thinking or strategy, but an emotional response.

States take a lot of irrational decisions in the name of security. The aim of this study is to look at those irrational decisions and understand why they happen. Another aspect that is important for this study is the understanding of the emotions orientation of the case studies. The following two chapters show the different directions states took due to the different psychological factors that affected them. While South Africa decided to go public with its nukes and become a part of the international community by signing the NPT, Iran did not feel secure in the blanket of the NPT and has decided to pursue its own

nuclear program. The events and their effect on the national psyche is what will be studies in the next two chapters.

Chapter Three

Iran: Crossing Over

Introduction

The previous chapter laid out the outline for the case studies to be presented. This chapter takes the base provided to the next level and tries to understand Iran's decision through an emotional angle. The chapter analyses Iran's nuclear policy and explain the reasons for the state wanting to develop a nuclear program after a hiatus. What led to the sudden change in the nuclear policy? Why did the Iranian government, that was one of the first signatories to the NPT, decide to withdraw? How does the role 'prestige' pan out in the nuclear discourse of Iranian decision making? What was the role of the US in facilitating the Iranian change from not wanting to want nuclear weapons? The argument being presented here is that emotions such as pride and contempt lead to the changes in Iranian society and that these emotions are the reason for the state wanting to become a nuclear power.

Given the short term risks involved in developing a nuclear program (economic sanctions, international pressure and condemnation), the reasons for Iran going nuclear would have to much more than just a security threat, which, as shall be later pointed out, are more or less negligible. Since it would not benefit in the short term, the benefits would primarily be long term (Macdonald, 2004). Thus, the chapter looks into the role of different decision makers and how their psyche has affected the nuclear path of the state. The chapter also delves into the reasons for the Iranian insecurity and its contempt at the US efforts to curb its nuclear program².

² The Iranian nuclear program here refers to an all inclusive program, civilian and military. Although it has been stated by the Iranian government that the program is only for peaceful purposes, there are doubts in the minds of many. Thus, for this dissertation, the Iranian nuclear program would refer to not only its civilian program but also its covert weapons program. This understanding of the Iranian situation is also the same as the IAEA's position whose head pointed out that even though he was against nuclear weapons, that fact was that Iran was heard only after it made the right noises.

If one looks at the history of Iran, it can be seen that the quest for a nuclear program is not new. The state has had a nuclear program that began from the time of the Shah. This nuclear program has had a very zigzag graph. But pragmatism has ruled the decision making of the Iranian policies from before the time of the shah. This pragmatism is still one of the key constituents of the decision making in the state. The foreign policies of the Achaemenid, the Sasanid, and the Safavid governments showed pragmatic consideration of state interests as well as the presence of religious ideology (Ramazani, 2004). With the coming of the shah, a new wave of policies began of which the nuclear program was one. Considering that Iran's reserves might, at one point or another, deplete, the Shah collaborated with the Americans and focused only on the energy aspect of nuclear technology. Thus the Americans too, in return conducted a number of joint programs for scientists and engineers, the institute of nuclear sciences was shifted from Baghdad to Tehran University and became a training centre for not only Iranian students but also Pakistani and Turkish students (Parsi Times, 2010). The establishment of the Atomic Research centre too happened during this period. A 5 smw research reactor, which became fully operational in 1967, was also provided by the US along with a package containing 554 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 112 grams of plutonium (Parsi Times, 2010). With the coming of the Iranian revolution, there were fears in the minds of the international community as to what would be the take of Khomeini on Iranian nuclear policy, but they were dispelled immediately when he publicly stated the nuclear program to be defunct. The next major event that influenced the psyche of the people was the Iran-Iraq war. With the Iran- Iraq war almost every family lost a member and the Bushehr nuclear plant was also destroyed (Parsi Times, 2010). The importance of nuclear weapons was realized by the decision makers and thus they ventured into the building of their own nuclear program rigorously after the war. This was because, they felt that when Iran needed help, no one came and Iran was left to fend for itself. However, support for Iran's current nuclear program has remained astoundingly strong among many of the high-level officials of the Pahlavi monarchy. For example, Akabar Etemad, the first and only director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran under the shah, and Ardeshir Zahedi, the Iranian foreign minister who signed the NPT as the shah's representative, in an

interview to Radio France international expressed strong support for Iran's right to engage in nuclear research and have access to the most advanced nuclear technology, even under a regime they detest (Entessar, 2010). Although the Iranian government has clearly stated that it is developing its nuclear program because of its future energy needs, and would use all the nuclear material only for peaceful purposes, the international community is a little skeptical. This is because the argument of using peaceful nuclear energy is the one used by every state in order to develop its nuclear military capability whether it is South Africa, or India. Thus, even though there is no substantial evidence of Iran developing a nuclear weapon, the international community is treating Iran as a state that is on its way to develop or has already developed its nuclear arsenal.

When trying to understand the reasons for a state going nuclear, a level of analysis is chosen, i.e., either the systemic factors or the unit level factors. The security dilemma, the explanation used by almost every state in order to justify its development of nuclear program, wherein the security of a state is of utmost importance and leads them to produce weapons one after the other in turn causing the start of world war III. But when closely observed, in the case of Iran, the threat factor was negligent as the US was never trying to attack Iran, Israel also did not question its existence. The only possible threat that could be considered was the Iraqi one, but that too is defunct post the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime. Thus the domestic factors do not play a role either as even though the Iranian people were democratically electing their president, the ruling clergy did not take decisions according to the will of the people. Though it is difficult to quantify psychological factors, this study is an attempt to bring in those factors as they have been underplayed in the work done on understanding the reasons for a state's decision making policies.

In understanding the reasons for a state going nuclear, many factors need to be considered: national pride and prestige; contempt at the Western powers for doubting the capability of the Iranians. The myth of becoming a mighty nation once nuclear capabilities are acquired; the perception of threats to national security from changes in the international political environment; the push for weapons development from the elites and from scientific and bureaucratic circles; the deterioration of the domestic

economic and political situation that can be offset by uniting different factions around the nuclear objective; public support coupled with support from other nations that strengthens the hand of politicians (Kirbaglo, 2006). In this study, the Iranian case is looked at from the angle of national pride and prestige, how these emotions were effected and how they spurred the Iranians to make their own way in the world.

Oppositional nationalists see their nation as both naturally at odds with an external enemy, and as naturally its equal if not its superior. Such a conception tends to generate the emotions of fear and pride – an explosive psychological cocktail. Driven by fear and pride, oppositional nationalists develop a desire for nuclear weapons that goes beyond calculation, to self-expression. Thus, in spite of the tremendous complexity of the nuclear choice, leaders who decide for the bomb tend not to back into it. For them, unlike the bulk of their peers, the choice for nuclear weapons is neither a close call nor a possible last resort but an absolute necessity (Hymans, 2006).

Despite the non-proliferation norms exhibited by countries such as South Africa and Libya, Iran, a major economic power in the Middle East, chose to side with proliferation not because of a threat to its security or because of the political ideologies and ambitions of its domestic actors, but because to Iran as a nation, a nuclear program symbolizes its change from a revolutionary theocracy to a developing ‘state’, offering it a major source of prestige and modernity influencing its own sense of international importance (Goel, 2008).

The main focus of this chapter is to understand the changes that led to the shift in the nuclear policy of Iran. Thus, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first section looks into the reasons for Iranian insecurity and how has that worked in making the nuclear decisions. The second aspect looks at the nuclear discourse and how it has flown within Iran. The next segment delves into the role of ‘pride’ and how it has been affected by the events which has led to a change in the decision making of the state. The fourth section states the different reactions to Iran’s nuclear program from different sections of society and the last section looks at Iran’s quest for nuclear power.

Iranian Insecurity

Every state is greatly influenced by the demographics and politics of the country at the time of its establishment. For example, America was established on the principles of 'individual freedom', and reference to this aspect of American 'freedom' is given by policy makers in order to induce changes in the American policy. Similarly, a communist China would argue its policy decisions with a much more socialistic base (Goel, 2008).

The same is the case with Iran. The reasons for Iranian insecurity run deep and are not a result of just some recent events. Nonetheless, the shift in policy due to the Islamic revolution and later events did drastically push the process of nuclearization. The Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, immediately after being elected as head of state made a declaration that the state of Iran had no use of nuclear weapons (MacKay, 1998). The international community breathed a sigh of relief and, it was assumed that the post revolution Iran was to be a nuclear free zone. But political events that happened in the next ten years drastically affected the psyche of the nation and thus lead to a change in its nuclear policy.

According to Fariborz Mokhtari (2005), for Iranians, national psychology defines national security. Their thought process is very much colored by their historical experiences as they have had a major impact on the psyche of the people. When the historical experiences of a state are positive, or something that the people take pride in, then the people of the state start identifying themselves with those historical experiences. They become a source of pride, and inspiration. But this leads to the people of the state always wanting to live their past glory and thus view the present system with skepticism. In order to understand the psyche of the Iranian policy making, one must look at the events that unfolded after the revolution that made the decision making body change their decision for being a staunch supporter of the NPT to being pro- nuclear weapons.

The impact of the Iran-Iraq war

The Iran-Iraq war had a very big impact on the national psyche of the Iranian people; more than the 1979 Islamic revolution. The war was sprung on Iran by Iraq and it had an impact not only economically on the nation but also psychologically as almost every family lost a member as a result of the eight year long war.

It was during the war, when biological and chemical weapons were used by Iraq, that Iran realized the importance of WMDs. Also, it was during this period, when Iran was suffering as a result of the chemical and biological weapons, that no one from the international community came to its rescue. More than 5, 00,000 Iranians died and the international community looked the other way as the United States, the superpower, was supporting Iraq. The war showed that Iran's interests could not be safe guarded by adhering to international treaties or appealing to Western opinion. In their view, the United States has caused all of Iran's misfortunes, from the shah's regime to the country's invasion by Iraq under Saddam (Takeyh, 2007). As Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's powerful former president, said in the aftermath of Iran's war with Iraq, "The war taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper."

The effect of the Iran-Iraq war was felt most with the targeting of Tehran with Scud-derived missiles during the 'war of the cities' in 1988 was a key factor in persuading Iran to accept a ceasefire (IAEA official website, 2011). The speaker of the Majlis and commander-in-chief of Iran's military at that time, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, said after the ceasefire that, 'With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapon training, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive... We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons' (Tehran Domestic Service, 1988).

Though the Iranians did survive the war and lived to tell the tale, they were psychologically scared. They also realized that the idea of dependence that they so abhorred should be practiced not just with respect to foreign policy decisions and economic decisions, but also with respect to military and resource decisions. Thus, the Iranians realized that no one would come to their rescue and they should be independent

of other states in seeking not just economic help but also seeking help in the nuclear program.

The effect geographical positioning

As the only Shia-dominated country surrounded by Sunni-dominated countries on all sides, Iran has always had a very hostile neighborhood. Add to that the United States which according to Iran is a form of Satan and the Zionist enemy Israel, and Iran's need for self-sufficiency can be well understood. One looks at the each aspect in this sub section.

The neighborhood of Iran comprises of, as stated earlier, Sunni dominated states, all of which feel threatened by the growing power of the Shia-dominated Iran. Saudi Arabia, the next powerful state in the region and an ally of the United States has already made statements to the effect that if Iran becomes successful in its path to obtaining or developing nuclear arsenal, it will not be left behind. Similar statements have been made by the other powerful state in the already volatile west Asian region by Egypt, and Syria.

The United States and Iran had a very good and profitable relationship during the time of the Shah, but this was considered to be on the lines of boot licking by the Iranian people, who became anti-shah because of his pro-US policies among his many other policies. But with the coming of the Iranian revolution, and Khomeini's anti-US speeches, the US was branded as a form of Satan and every policy of the US was scrutinized and found fault with. Add to that statements made by the leadership within the United States such as President Bush's earlier denunciation of Iran as a member of the "axis of evil" and more recent statements by administration officials such as Undersecretary of State John Bolton, who called on Tehran to "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq," these statements only reaffirm the Islamic Republic's position about insisting that the only way to negate the American challenge is through the possession of nuclear weapons (Takeyh, 2003).

The Zionist enemy, Israel is seen as another threat as Tehran supports the organizations that create havoc in Israel such as Hezbollah, and Hamas (Bowen and Kidd, 2004).

Moreover, it is an open secret that Israel possesses nuclear arsenal, and would not think twice before attacking Iran or any of its neighbors if its existence was in danger. The geographical positioning of the state focuses on the territorial threat that it faces by Iran. And in the case of Iran, when it is threatened, it reacts aggressively towards the 'other'. Thus, the emotion that best explains the reaction of Iran is contempt, at its adversaries who have not been able to cash in the oil excesses.

All these factors make Iran geographically vulnerable to an attack, and as a result, insecure. This insecurity is dealt with by showing contempt for others and pride in one's own state.

The Reasons for Dissent

Thus, the existential threats in the form of Iraq and America have been the most important aspects of their national security. The horrors of the Gulf War have made the Iranians very guarded about their borders. On the other hand, the idea of the US again being in control of Iran with the Shah as a puppet also does not bode well with their idea of Iran as a nation (Takeyh, 2003). Oddly, with the going of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US has ended up helping to reduce a major threat in its neighborhood. But at the same time, it has increased the US presence, something that has not had a positive response from Iran.

According to Bowen and Kidd (2004), Iranian fears have been exacerbated by the US administration's statements which hope for a regime change in the Iranian state. Iran, given its past does not take lightly any allegation or derogatory statement that is made against the nation (Mokhtari, 2005). The reactions such statements elicit are very extreme, and that leader, or country is looked upon with contempt. Among other things Iran, hoping for a better and more involved role in the international scenario, feels threatened when the GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) states try to exclude Iran from the decision making related to the Persian Gulf (Ramazani, 1992).

The Nuclear Discourse

In understanding the nuclear discourse of Iran, it is important to know the different discourses that constitute the identity of the Islamic republic. This is because the nuclear discourse, just as the state discourse, had become a part of the identity of the people of the state. According to Homeira Moshirzadeh, (2007), the three main discourses have been independence, justice and resistance. They were formed over a course of time, but were firmly implanted within the identity of the state with the coming of the Islamic revolution. These discourses also explain how the nuclear issue became important for the people of Iran and why they started identifying the success of the nuclear program with their pride.

In understanding the discourse of independence, one has to just look back at the history of Iran. Iran has always seen itself as an independent country. Even during the Shah's reign, the rulers felt that they were independent in their decision of foreign policy (Holsti, 1987). One factor that affected this idea of themselves as independent were Iran's glorious past, which still is a source of pride and self-confidence for the people of Iran. Another factor is the sense of historical victimization by the invaders (Greeks, Turks, and Mongols) that led to a feeling of vulnerability being etched in the psyche of the society. They also believe that this victimization happened because of its geographic location, which connects South Asia to Europe and is a major stop over for almost all trade routes. Lastly, its recent imperial encounters (British and Russian) wherein Iran was never formally colonized but was perpetually dependent on others powers and also led to the under-development of the state (Moshirzadeh, 2007).

Since self-reliance has been the motto of the state, self-reliance in not only the nuclear field but also the technological and agricultural areas is seen as an important aspect in the growth of Iran. With respect to the nuclear issue, independence is seen in the same light. In the nuclear discourse, any form of submission to the western powers is seen as a sign of weakness. Western powers try and deny Iran its right to develop nuclear energy and the more they deny Iran what it feels is its right, the more Iranians feel the need for independence

Justice is seen as an even more important aspect of Iranian ideology. This is because, the concept of justice has not only Islamic connotations but also Zoroastrian ones. Thus it is one of the most important components of Iranian national identity. In both the Zoroastrian faith and Islam, there are two essential forces of good and evil at work in the universe, and the ultimate victory of the good is the triumph of justice over oppression and injustice. It is suggested that the embracement of Shiism in Iran has been due to the justice-seeking spirit of Iranians (MojtahedZadeh, [1383] 2004). Thus, justice has an even stronger influence than independence in the narratives of the state and with respect to nuclear politics, seeking and developing a nuclear program is seen as a justice seeking endeavor. Iran has actually tried to use its discourse of justice to justify its position to international audiences as well, and it seems that this line of argument has in some cases successfully convinced Third World members of the IAEA Board of Governors (Moshirzadeh, 2007). According to Sandra Mackey (1998), for Iranians, the idea of justice holds a very special significance. It dates back to pre-Islamic concepts and was conceived by Cyrus some 2500 years ago. This idea was further exemplified by Ali, the Shia leader and was further taken ahead by the leader of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, who championed the cause of justice. This idea of justice was also used by the government to validate its claim that they also deserve to have nuclear weapons.

The concept of resistance is a little similar to the idea of Independence, in that the Iranians are not followers of a particular state and are able to resist the imperialist forces that try and control Iran for their own needs. With the United States as the superpower, Iran sees it as an imperialist force that is out to get Iran. Every statement made by the leaders of the US is scrutinized and looked at from an angle of distrust. According to Christopher De Bellaigue (2006), the United States is a declared enemy of the Islamic Republic, and Iran reflexively does the opposite of what it advises.

The Concept of Pride

There is a direct co-relation between the nuclear status of Iran and the sense of pride its people have in being a part of the state of Iran. This conception of pride stems from the

rich historical past and the glory of the time when Persia was the centre of not only the Islamic civilization, but also the centre of all the trade routes connecting central Asia to south Asia and south Asia to Europe. Like all civilizations, they too want to reach that peak again. The Shah's famous line "Neither East, Nor West" stem from this discourse. This line has now been followed by a new motto which is more inclusive 'Both North and South'.

The emotion of 'pride' is very staunchly existent in the self perception of Iran and its people, whether it is the elite (comprising of the leaders and the polity), the masses, the scientific community or the military. This can very clearly be seen in their statements to various newspapers or to the various organizations such as the UN.

According to Aron Ben Zeev (2000), as in other emotions, the comparative concern is important in pride. The comparative value, rather than the absolute one, is of greatest concern in pride. Pride does not necessarily presuppose exclusivity, but it presupposes some sense of a comparatively high value and often also superiority. Although we share the object of our pride with many people, we are still in a better position than others with whom we can compare ourselves. The importance of the comparative concern in pride indicates that although pride is directed at ourselves, the opinion of others is of crucial importance as well.

According to Richard Betts (1979), the Shah's attempts at modernization coupled with Iran's national prestige led many believe that Iran might be motivated to acquire nuclear weapons. The name of the state itself 'the Empire of Iran' suggests the grandiose idea of their state the people had. The humiliation of the occupation by the British and the Russians did leave its mark on the psyche of the people who are now more guarded about their national sovereignty.

In his book, "Politics among Nations", Hans Morgenthau coined a specific term for Iran's foreign policy and its nuclear decision making policy, called the 'policy of prestige'. Iran's desire for national prestige has been evident for years. He also explains that, "Besides the practices of diplomacy, the policy of prestige uses *military demonstrations* as a means to achieve its purpose." And Iran did prove Morgenthau

correct when it test fired the Shahab-3 missile in October, deliberately showing off its military capability (Mac Donald, 2004).

The emotion of contempt can be seen in the speeches of Khomeini that equals the United States to *Satan* (MacKay, 1998). The Iranians feel that they are not at par with the world and have got left behind only because of the imperialist forces which time and again used Iran for their purposes; whether it was the British and Russian forces in the early 19th century or the United States in the 20th century. Thus, there are a number of emotions such as contempt, and anger towards the Western world. The term 'Westoxicated', coined by Khomeini, is something that is looked down upon in Iranian circles and this same term is what South Africa constantly aspires to become. But this emotion is not all encompassing in a way the emotion of pride is and thus pride is the emotion that explains the decisions of the state.

Since there is no major security threat to Iran, and the organizational systemic theory also does not help understand the Iranian need for a nuclear weapon, the Iranian pursuit is nothing but a race for prestige. France and UK continue to hold nukes for the same reason of prestige in Europe, despite the significant thaw in relations with Russia. But Iran, a major source of US rebuke and consternation, has always been looked down upon by the international community as a rogue state for its terrorism proliferation of Islamic jihad and antagonizing history of war in the Middle East. Thus the status of a nuclear weapon state, even if for an instant, would help Iran regain its international pride as a forward looking and modern Islamist nation (Goel, 2008).

Iran did put its 'trust' in the international system but this trust was broken by a series of events forcing the state of Iran to realize that, in the end, every state has to fend for itself. As a result, it decided to take matters in its own hands. Though it was one of the first states to ratify the NPT, it withdrew from the treaty citing its need for nuclear energy. Due to its past glory, Iran does feel that it is not given its rightful place in the international system. The discourse stemming from the government and other agencies clearly points out to the sense of pride the Iranians as a people have in their culture and how misunderstood they are by the rest of the world. It is this emotion of pride that will

make sure that the state of Iran gets its own nuclear program that is devoid of any help from 'the west'. This concept of pride will also direct, as it is directing, the state to become a regional head that is just in its dealings with other countries.

Statements by leaders point to the same. According to a speech given by Ayatollah Ali Khomeini in 2007, "If a nation wants to protect its rights against bullies, then it must also pay a price. One cannot sit in a corner and expect development and progress. . . . In accessing nuclear energy, Iranians cannot plead and beg" (Clawson and Rubin, 2005). Thus, in order to understand the reasons for Iran going nuclear, the correct way would be not to look at the problem from the realist angle and brand it just as a backlash of security, but to look at the role of how emotions play with the national psyche of a state and make it take decisions completely opposite to its ideals.

Iranian society's expectations of its program

The Iranian nuclear program was in a sense, one of the first foreign policy decisions that had elicited a response from different sections of the public. It was not thoroughly debated in public spheres but was systematically play with lives. The support the government has received has been unequivocal; even those who constantly criticize the government for its various policies have supported its right to develop a nuclear program.

Shirin Ebadi, a Nobel Prize winner, has been openly critical of the present regime but has openly defended the Islamic regime's nuclear development program: "Aside from being economically justified, it has become a cause of national pride for an old nation with a glorious history. No Iranian government, regardless of its ideology or democratic credentials, would dare to stop the program." (Mc Geogh, 2006, p 1). Dr. Saeed Khatipzadeh, the editor of the Iranian Journal of International Affairs says, "We want to be admitted to the nuclear club, we want the prestige, and we want to be respected in the world." (Kirbaglo, 2006, p 219) This emphasis on prestige and respect comes from the idea of how their society was during its prime and a desire to relive those glory days. But

the emphasis on pride comes out naturally without much probing stating that the emotion is most definitely an important factor in Iranian decision making.

The chairman of the Expediency Council, former Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated that 'the Islamic Republic of Iran will not submit to bullying and pressure over the issue of signing the additional protocol.'³ Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, a member of the influential and conservative Guardian Council,⁴ stated in reference to the NPT that *'It would have been much better if we had not entered it at all. But now that we have entered, we are free to reconsider. Why should we not reconsider this?'* He went on to argue that the AP *'would impose an extraordinary humiliation on us and we should not accept it under any circumstances'*.⁵ The hard-line Iranian newspaper Jumhuri Islami described Iran signing the AP as 'an everlasting disgrace' (Bowen and Kidd, 2004).

Dr. Gholamali Chegnizadeh, Professor in the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Allame Tabatabaee in Tehran, argues, that in order to understand Iranian strategic thinking, one needs to understand the three pillars that support this thinking (Kirbaglo, 2006). These three pillars are the ones mentioned earlier, that of independence, justice and resistance. There is a need for the psychological deficit within the Iranian leadership which could be fulfilled by developing nuclear weapons capability. The three pillars mentioned are still considered important to Iranians as they date back to

³ 'Ex-President Rafsanjani rejects "bullying" over signing NPT', Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network I, Tehran, in Persian, 12 Sept. 2003, in BBC Monitoring, Middle East, 12 Sept. 2003. Expediency Council is an advisory body for the Supreme Leader and is described as the ultimate adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the Majlis and the Guardian Council. Members are appointed by the Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani has developed the Council into an influential strategic planning and policy-making body: BBC News Online, 'Iran: who holds the power?'

⁴ The Guardian Council is regarded as the most influential political body in Iran. It is currently controlled by conservatives and consists of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by the Majlis (parliament). The council approves all bills passed by the Majlis and ensures they conform to the constitution and Islamic law. The Council also has the power to vet all candidates in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts: BBC news online, 'Iran: who holds the power?', http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/assembly.stm, accessed 1 Dec. 2003

⁵ 'Senior cleric says Iran should pull out of nuclear treaty', Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran in Persian, 19 Sept. 2003, in BBC Monitoring, Middle East, 19 Sept. 2003.

pre-Islamic times. With respect to the nuclear question, there are a number of differing voices but a common angst against the 'Western Powers' can be clearly observed in the speeches and interviews given.

In conversations with Mustafa Kirbaglo (2006), Dr. Kayhan Barzegar, an Iranian scientist, states that

“There are a significant number of brilliant young scientists who earned their degrees and training in Iranian nuclear research institutions and abroad. The majority hold that, as a regional power with great ambitions, Iran must have nuclear capabilities. After having developed the capability, stopping would be a backward step; our population is 90% in favor of nuclear power and would not accept that. We spent billions of dollars on the nuclear projects.” He adds, “bureaucrats, scientists, and technicians who are directly involved in the nuclear projects are very concerned about halting the uranium enrichment process and stopping the nuclear projects, because they are afraid of losing their jobs and prestige”.

In an informal interview Mustafa Kirbaglo (2006) took of Dr. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, then Head of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Supreme National Security Council, pointed out that, “we are under pressure from both the US and the Iranian public in exactly opposite directions.” He also argued, “if, under US pressure, we agreed to cease uranium enrichment, which is highly unlikely, then we will most likely be replaced by the hardliners.” It is easy to feel the degree of public support in Iran for the nuclear program, which is very much associated with national pride. Iranian people consider nuclear technology to be the most advanced technology, and they see Iran's nuclear capabilities as an indication of their place in the world. It is also seen as a means of equating themselves with the most powerful countries in the international arena.

Dr. Hadi Semati, Professor at the University of Tehran, in conversation with Mustafa Kirbaglo (2006), suggests that

“The support did not exist before as knowledge about the program is fairly recent. As more information became available, and public debate about it took a more serious tone, the support seems to have gotten stronger. Five years ago no or very little discussion existed, as there was no wide public knowledge about the issue. The government now feels somewhat constrained because of this public discourse and the more present nationalism.” Regarding Iran's technical ability to develop nuclear

weapons. He asserts, "there is no doubt Iran has the scientific, technological and industrial base to produce weapons-grade uranium. But this is also true of many other signatories of the NPT who do not belong to the so-called nuclear weapons club." (Excerpts from a paper written by Ameri)

Similarly, Dr. Kaveh Afrasiabi from Tehran University in conversation with Mustafa Kirbaglo, 2006 argues that in the 21st century building nuclear warheads is not a big deal, implying that Iran has overcome many of the technological difficulties. Dr. Nasser Saghafi-Ameri from the Tehran-based Center for Strategic Studies, argues that, "despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to be legitimized by treaties like NPT. The American, European, and Russian doctrines stress the value of nuclear weapons in national and collective defense strategies. Today's international system is characterized by American preeminence and unilateralism; and by the increased role of nuclear weapon as a means of political blackmail. These policies foment the nuclear arms race, lower the threshold for resorting to nuclear weapons and dramatically increase the insecurity and vulnerability of non-nuclear weapons states." Dr. Saghafi-Ameri also argues that "America still keeps 480 nuclear weapons in Europe in six countries, including neighboring Turkey. The Russians had a policy of "no-first-use" but they rescinded it, because they feel that they have become weaker in conventional terms. France also decided to follow the US by widening a nuclear strategy that was originally designed to deter the Soviets. The British government maintains and develops the Trident nuclear weapons system. The Chinese are modernizing their nuclear arsenal by increasing the size, accuracy, range, and survivability of their weapons." (Mustafa Kirbaglo, 2006, p 223).

Regarding Iran's technical ability to develop nuclear weapons Dr. Saghafi-Ameri in conversation with Mustafa Kirbaglo (2006) asserts, "There is no doubt Iran has the scientific, technological and industrial base to produce weapons-grade uranium. But this is also true of many other signatories of the NPT who do not belong to the so-called nuclear weapons club." Similarly, Dr. Kaveh Afrasiabi from Tehran University argues that "in the 21st century building nuclear warheads is not a big deal, implying that Iran has overcome many of the technological difficulties." (Kirbaglo, 2006, p 223)

Furthermore, according to Homeira Moshirzadeh (2007), the Iranian nuclear program enjoys the full, unconditional support of the public from all strata of society. Even if the elite, i.e., the intellectuals and the oppositional political forces do not agree with certain policies of the government, they still support the idea of a nuclear program of their own. This reaction exists despite the fact that they are aware of the high costs involved in the nuclear program and that it might not reap as many benefits as people hope for it to. The views of the government are also clear on the issue as they feel that even if they have to suffer economically for the time being, it would reap benefits at a later time once they have a running nuclear program. Statements made by the leadership in Iran that emphasize on the distrust of United States and have terminology such as ‘great divine test’, ‘necessary preparation for the next phase’, ‘the future battlefield’ (Takeyeh, 2007) clearly signify the meaning that the leadership is pointing to.

The Iranian Quest for a Self-Developed Nuclear Program

The role of the leader- there was no one particular leader who influenced the society to that extent apart from Khomeini, and his views on the nuclear were very clear: nuclear policies only harm and provide no benefit. After Khomeini there were a number of leaders in important positions, but none took a decision that changed the course of politics so dramatically. But the decision to develop its own nuclear weapons program which happened because of the factors discussed above, has led to a situation where Iran is on its way to becoming a nuclear state. This quest, though still not complete, is nearing completion according to reports. This does not auger well for the United States and more specifically for the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Iran’s nuclear program that began with the help of the United States in the 1970s did give it the initial push needed to develop the defunct program. The program began due to the coming of the Nixon era in the United States and the initiation of the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ that emphasized the need for initiatives by regional states to ensure stability and security of the respective regions (Kirbaglo, 2006). Though this move was a positive step from the United States, and did have its small term effects in a positive way, it did the long term

harm to not only the Shah's regime, but also to the US-Iranian relations that took a deep U-Turn and got only worse with time.

But before they went bad, the US-Iran relations benefitted the nuclear trade such that Iran proposed investment of \$2.75 billion in a uranium enrichment facility in the US (Timeline, 2009). There were a number of MoUs signed by the universities of both the states for training of scientists and nuclear engineers.

But after the revolution the relations went from good to bad. The US government did not trust the new system of theocracy and according to the US, the new government had come to power only because of its anti-US stand. Thus, the beginning of the new government's relations with the US began at loggerheads.

The US and other western powers are not against the peaceful uses of nuclear power and the purpose of the NPT is to ensure that every country gets its share of nuclear power. The NPT guarantees Iran the right to acquire nuclear power plants; Iran could have legally developed the capabilities from which it could further break out at a later date (IAEA Report). Thus, when Iran decides to withdraw from an international treaty that it had vehemently supported at the beginning, doubts are raised in the minds of the international community with respect to Iran's intentions. Also, the fact that Iran kept its nuclear program hidden for almost a period of two years and took all the help it could in the form of being a part of the NPT does not yield much support in its favor. Another aspect that has led to doubts about Iran's nuclear program is the fact that it has kept all its nuclear facilities underground so as to ensure that the incident with Iraq (where Israel destroyed its nuclear plant) does not happen in Iran. To protect its nuclear facilities from possible U.S. strikes, Iran has dispersed them throughout the country and placed them deep underground. Any U.S. attack would thus have to overcome both intelligence-related challenges (how to find the sites) and thorny logistical ones (how to hit them) (Takeyh, 2007).

But considering the reasoning behind its nuclear program and the emotions of pride and self-confidence that the people of the state associate with the nuclear program, it does not seem that Iran will stop the development of its nuclear program. It may be a peaceful

nuclear program or it may be a covert nuclear weapons program or it may even take the same course as India and start with a peaceful nuclear program, but later convert it to a nuclear weapons program, but the path has been taken and there is no stopping Iran from its nuclear development.

Conclusion

In an address to the council of foreign relations, Mohamed El-Baradei pointed out that, "In my view Iran's nuclear program is a means to an end: it wants to be recognized as a regional power, they believe that the nuclear know-how brings prestige, brings power, and they would like to see the U.S. engaging them" (Krastev, 2009). El-Baradei did acknowledge that there was a difference in the way the western powers dealt with nuclear states and non-nuclear states and Iran had realized that too, wanting the same equation as the nuclear states. He also warned that bombing Iranian facilities would do no one any good and would at the most; delay the program by about two years as one cannot 'bomb knowledge'.

The term popularized by the Iranian writer, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, 'Westoxicated' has been used time and again by leaders to get their point across. This is because, there is nothing that Iranian people hated more than feeling that they cannot make their own decisions and have been contaminated by the western powers. Exhibiting this ingrained xenophobia of the Iranians, which always sees foreigners secretly plotting against them; Khomeini too identified "the west" as the cause for Iranian suffering in the twentieth century (Mackey, 1998). This made his (and the many leaders who used this term) point to be more easily understood.

Thus the idea of being robbed of their culture and heritage, in which they take great pride, is a matter of concern for the Iranians. This culture and heritage is what pushes them to fight for their space in the international community not just as a member, but as an equal member that has a glorious past. They also believe that with time, the effect of the exploits of the western world that put Persia out of the important tables would go away

and subsequently Iran would be not just a regional power in West Asia, but the centre of the world power.

Iran's security concerns are real and legitimate. National experience has undoubtedly colored Iranians' perception of other nations' intentions. One cannot dismiss lessons learned through bitter experiences. Iran, cognizant of historical realities encountered, has a serious security problem which it seeks to solve the best way it can. Iranians have reason to be wary of the nations that have harmed them in the past. But they are also adaptable, and if historical survival is an indicator, not devoid of talent for international relations. Furthermore, Iranians are sophisticated enough in their views to distinguish between certain nations who have been exploitive, and others who have disappointed them due to compulsion or manipulation. Seen from the Iranian historical perspective, neither alliance nor neutrality, nor engagement has saved Iran from the designs of its foes (Mokhtari, 2005). The discourses are very set in the unconscious as well as the conscious of the Iranian people, and thus they frame the collective orientation of the society to a very large extent.

Iranian experts indicate three variations of protection: Iran's building nuclear weapons as an efficient deterrent against foreign aggression and unwanted interference; Outside protection using the nuclear umbrella of the world nuclear powers; the nuclear disarmament of Israel and creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Near East (Minasian, 2002). But this aspect may not work in the case of Iran, as the reasons for Iran going nuclear is not the security threat, especially the threat from Israel. The third point of a nuclear umbrella might work, but the nuclear umbrella would have to be provided by Iran, a point the other Sunni states and specifically Israel would never be okay with.

Thus, the state of Iran has been through a number of events that have left a mark on its national psyche. The emotions of pride, contempt, fear, and anger can be seen in the quoted texts of the various civil society members. Although the only emotions discussed in this chapter are pride and to some extent contempt, fear and anger are what help build upon the secondary emotions of pride and contempt.

The next chapter looks into the case study of South Africa, a state that gave up its nuclear weapons and set an example for the other state to follow suit. But was this decision to give up its nuclear arsenal meant to be an example for the rest of the world? Or was it the result of the pressures of international community that led to this decision? The next chapter discusses in detail the reason behind South Africa's nuclear decisions.

Chapter Four

Understanding South Africa's Nuclear Policies

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the case of Iran and its nuclear trajectory, the events that led to make a mark on the national psyche of the decision makers. This chapter looks at the other case study of South Africa and what shaped its nuclear trajectory. The chapter looks at why the South African state made the decision to develop and later dismantle its nuclear weapons. Was it the US pressure that made them change their decision? Did the change in government from a white minority to a black majority make them change their decisions? Were their feelings of guilt or remorse in the state that led to the change in policy? Or was it the need of the Afrikaner minority to be associated with the western world at all costs that made them take decisions accordingly? Or was it that the South African government's locus of control resided with the Western Powers⁶?

The South African case is a peculiar one. Roy E. Horton (1999, p 18) points out that the ebb and flow of the South African nuclear deterrent effort is all the more remarkable given the small number of personnel involved (1000 total and no more than 300 at any one period), with those actually responsible for key programmatic decisions being not more than six to twelve. The first formal announcement about its nuclear program came after the dismantlement of the weapons when De Klerk, as head of state, made the statement in 1993 to the country's parliament. The statement, considering it was a big statement to begin with, did not offer any explanations for the number of questions that

⁶ The term Western Powers in this dissertation refers to the states comprising of United States and NATO states of Western Europe. They signify the developed World which was ruled by the minority Whites and as South Africa too was ruled by the White Minority, these leaders associated themselves more with this World and gained their legitimacy from them.

were going through the heads of millions of South Africans and world leaders. The only rationale that was given by him was “a nuclear deterrent had become not only superfluous but, in fact, an obstacle to the development of South Africa’s international relations” (BBC 1993a). But as explained further, this would only be the official position of the government for many years to come, even though evidence points otherwise.

In an interview given to Lieberman (1962, p 9), Andre Buys, a former scientist with the Atomic Energy Board (AEB), states that the memorandum given by the government “was not very concise and we often ...had difficulties in interpreting it. There was a lot of argumentation in it that didn’t lead to any clear conclusion.” This memorandum, moreover, left little guidance on contingencies for nuclear disclosures, threats, or use. Buys recalls that he and other scientists worried that “nobody actually sat down and worked out a proper strategy for what they wanted to do with [the bombs]. And if they’re in a desperate situation that they could take an irrational decision simply because they haven’t got time to really consider”. If De Klerk was so clear on why the dismantlement took place, then how was he not able to get the message across to his own government?

The given statements show the confusion that led to the dismantlement of the South African bomb. When one looks at the history of South Africa’s nuclear path, one realizes that even during the beginning of its nuclear program, there was a lot of confusion regarding who was in control of the bomb and what was its purpose. The government was not ready; the scientists wanted to see whether they could actually create a bomb on their own; while the military was unaware of the program. In this confusion, a nuclear program was started in South Africa without the knowledge of the Western powers.

In trying to understand the decision making policy of the South African government with respect to its nuclear policy, there are three major arguments, first is the security dilemma, the second being the domestic political change that was taking place, and the third and mostly underdeveloped argument, that the South African Elite and polity needed legitimacy of their actions from the western powers, particularly the United States. The security threat, although existent, was never that big a threat as amongst its neighbors, South Africa was militarily superior and with respect to the Soviet threat, they

always had the backing of the United States. Thus, the argument does not hold ground. The same goes for the domestic political model. The political changes at the domestic level would have led to a black majority government in power and subsequently also in charge of the nuclear weapons and this fear of a black government that was sympathetic to the Cuban forces and had contacts throughout Africa led to dismantling of the nuclear weapons is also not reason enough for South Africa taking the decision. This is because, the weapons were dismantled before the policy of apartheid was officially banned. The government had hoped that by dismantling the weapons, the international community would welcome South Africa. Even though the step was welcomed by all the leaders, the full initiation of South Africa in the international community took place only after it stopped practicing apartheid. This chapter suggests that the third argument, wherein South Africans polity and leadership seek recognition from the Western powers, as the reason behind the decision making of the states nuclear policy.

One of the most important aspects that led to the development of the program was the easy availability of the uranium reserves that were earlier used for the Manhattan project but was later used by South Africa to establish its indigenous nuclear research and development program for peaceful purposes (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss; 1983). Later this program was converted into a military program that resulted in six and a half Hiroshima bombs.

The South African nuclear weapons program has always been looked at from a domestic angle (Sagan, 2001). In this chapter, the argument made by Scott Sagan is not dismissed but used to enhance the emotional reasoning behind the decision. The aspect under study is the psychology of the reasoning behind the decision making of the government and the leadership which points to the state's need for approval and recognition from other powers, leading to an external locus of control. The focus of the chapter is not on the creation of the weapons programs or on the later dismantlement, but on the reasons that led to the decisions that were made, whether it was dismantling the weapons or creating them.

The rest of their chapter looks at the role of the United States and other western powers, and whether it was the pressure exerted by these powers or the need for recognition that was so high in the Afrikaner elite that led to the sudden change in South Africa's policies. It also delves into the role of the changing government and the coming of the ANC (African National Congress), and how these changes affected the psyche of the people in the decision making groups.

The Secrecy behind the bomb making and dismantling

In the study of South Africa's nuclear weapons program, one of the biggest hurdles one faces is the secrecy surrounding the program that once existed. There is almost no literature available when studying the South African covert nuclear weapons program. The government sources refuse to talk about it and are almost in denial about its existence with most of the documents being destroyed around the time of De Klerk's announcement of the ending of the nuclear weapons in the possession of the South African state.

The one thing that stands out in the South African nuclear program is the secrecy surrounding the entire project- from its initiation to its final destruction. Internal secrecy remained a hallmark of the program for its lifetime. In an interview to Liberman (1962, pg 16), Neil Barnard, a former cabinet member pointed out that, the whole cabinet was never officially informed about the nuclear program until after it had been dismantled. Nor was the program ever discussed in the State Security Council, a powerful interdepartmental agency that coordinated internal and external security policy. The military intelligence chief, General du Toit, was informed only in 1977, when asked to provide security for the cold (i.e., without a fissionable core) underground test planned at the Kalahari site. Thus, no one knew who to look to for guidance.

One of the main reasons for the secrecy could be the fact that the scientists, engineers and managers who made the disclosures did not know much about political decision making, and released information that they could relate to (Harris, Hatang, and Liberman; 2004).

Thus, most of the information released was technical in nature, leaving almost no political insights into the decision making process of that time.

According to Burgess (2010), South Africa wanted to build its weapons covertly, and thus formulated a strategy for nuclear use. Thus different ploys were tried out, but none made strategic sense. The Strategic incoherence and the timing of the weaponization decision clearly suggest that a secret weapons program was the South African Atomic Energy Board's best justification for continuing nuclear explosives research after international condemnation in 1977. With respect to the dismantlement of the weapons, the official position adopted was the security threat from the Soviet Union and the 50,000 Cuban forces in Angola. The easiest explanation was the security threat that was not so strong a threat but due to lack of any other explanation was adopted by the polity.

The strategy, according to David Albright (1994) was to create a situation where the Western governments would come to South Africa's rescue in the event of a crisis. This 'strategy of uncertainty' thus, required secrecy as the government itself was not certain of what it wanted from the weapons apart from the western support.

In an interview with Roy Horton (1999), Dr. Fredrick Lamb stated that despite the secrecy, visitors to South Africa during the 1970s report the AEC scientists were proud of their efforts and privately revealed their nuclear research and that they found the scientists to be well trained and pursuing their work with an attitude of "...wanting to show the world what South Africa can do" (Lamb, 1998; p 16). It shows the kind of commitment the scientific community had put in so as to make their state a nuclear powered state.

According to Lieberman (1962), although a lack of strategic planning could also be explained by a policy that sought nuclear weapons as a status symbol, the tight secrecy maintained on the program suggests that this was not a critical goal. There would have been at least some form of gloating, but none took place due to the secrecy surrounding the project.

The realist explanation of the decision making points out that the threat that was looming in front of the state a threat in the form of the Soviet Union whose forces were present in the African continent and were nearing South Africa and the 50,000 Cuban troops posted in Angola. But these threats were totally gone by the end of the cold war. A 1988 agreement had seen the withdrawal of the Cuban troops in exchange for Namibia's independence, and the Soviet Union had scaled back its aid to Angola, Mozambique, and the ANC, discouraging the ANC from continuing an armed struggle (Lieberman 2001). De Klerk notes most of these changes in his memoirs, adding: "Under these circumstances, the retention of a nuclear capability no longer made any sense—if it ever had in the first place—and had become an obstacle to the development of our international relations. I accordingly decided to dismantle our capability" (De Klerk 1999, pg 274). Though the reasons do not further the argument of this study, De Klerk played an important role in the dismantling of the nuclear weapons and thus needs to be mentioned in a study where South Africa is being studied.

De Klerk's reasoning follows generally accepted realist arguments for disarmament: remove the threat to security, and the need for a nuclear deterrent will also disappear (Lieberman 2001; Posen 1984, 59-79). Indeed under de Klerk's administration, there was a 40 percent rollback in overall military expenditure between 1989 and 1993 (Lieberman 2001). However, the declining security threat does not seem to be a convincing reason for such drastic measures. As Lieberman points out, "a residual nuclear capability would not have endangered South African security, and the budgetary savings from dismantlement were relatively small" (Lieberman, 2001, 75).

In order to understand South Africa's decisions, one must look at the nuclear program from its initiation and what were the reasons that led to the making of the bomb in the first place. Of the documents released, many shed light on the early military thinking about whether South Africa should acquire nuclear weapons and about the 'Jericho Weapons System' which envisaged a hostile African nation might acquire a nuclear weapon from China, and that a United States pursuing East-West detente could not be counted upon to come to South Africa's aid (Lieberman, 2004). From the South African history archive, a memorandum from Chief of the Defense Staff (Lt-Gen. R. F.

Armstrong) stated that the vulnerability of aircraft to modern air defenses, as demonstrated in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, warranted a missile or other stand-off delivery system, such as a guided glide bomb. This state's clear security reasoning for the development of the bomb. But, according to Liberham (2001), the security angle that was officially pursued by the South African government does not hold ground, as the security threat from the Soviet Union was negligible and its neighbors were in no condition to fight with a state that was stronger than their own. The South African bomb was thus, developed because it was felt that the Western Powers that the government depended on might not be able to help them in time as they were busy fighting their own battles; and the development of a bomb would draw their attention back to South Africa. They would not let the bomb be built and make sure South Africa was safe from any onslaught. But this help never came, and South Africa ended up with six and a half bombs.

In confronting international anti-apartheid pressure, some South African officials even saw a nuclear option as a diplomatic shield. In separate interviews with Liberman (1962), to the question of how South Africa could have used its nuclear weapons for diplomatic purposes, P.W. Botha replied that it enabled the country "to maintain its self-respect."; National Intelligence Service Director-General Niel Barnard, though he says he was not involved in nuclear policy-making, thought that a "psychological deterrent" would command respect and leverage for South Africa. The statements made by the leaders during the process of making the nuclear weapons points to the fact that even though the leaders were not clear about the use of the nuclear weapons, they made statements to the effect that supported the nuclear program completely. The reason given by the leaders was the 'security'- the threat of the Soviet Union and the deployment of troops in the region. But all these actions were a result of only one action, a need to be recognized by the western powers as one of them. The white elite felt that they were part of the developed world and could lead South Africa in the required direction. For them, their locus of control resided in the Western powers. But with international pressure rising against the racist government, South Africa had to pay heed and change its tracks if it wanted to be associated with the developed countries and get major benefits in return.

Due to its nuclear program, South Africa was isolated from the international community's activities and thus it had to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle. This process was a long one and took a toll on its resources. Long and Grillot point out: Foregoing its nuclear weapons and joining the NPT was a way "*To reenter the international community in compliance with international norms.*" But, these actions alone would not be sufficient to earn the West's support. The basis for Pretoria's isolation was its apartheid policy, not its nuclear policy. Internal reform in dismantling apartheid and denuclearization would have to be addressed together (Long and Grillot 2000, 32).

In other words, the dismantlement of the country's nuclear weapons was part of his larger plan to normalize South Africa's international relations. Long and Grillot examine this claim, citing the South African example as a possible extension of "democratic peace" theory, which would argue that "decisions to denuclearize are the result of "internal domestic norms affecting external behavior" (Long and Grillot 2000, 26). Taken in the South African context, therefore, if the Cold War strategy involved using the bombs to force the West to defend South Africa, then getting rid of the bomb after the Cold War would seem to guarantee some sort of acceptance by the international community. Signing the NPT would alleviate South Africa's international isolation by signaling to Western countries that it was serious about democratic reform (Babbage, 2004).

Psychological factors, including apartheid leaders' extreme sense of nationalism, a laager (or "circle the wagons") complex, and fear of onslaughts by Soviet-backed communists and black nationalists contributed significantly to South Africa's decision to build the bomb. But the most important influencing factor was the US isolation that gave the final push to the program. The elite would have been okay with disapproval of the US in any decision of they took. The weapons were developed because the elite wanted the US to stop them from being developed and help South Africa. When help did not arrive, the South Africans decided to continue with the development of the program. During the dismantling of the weapons too, there were many factors at play but the final push came when US back channels forced South Africa to change course.

The Role of the Leadership

In the decision making of a state's policy the leader, i.e., the head of state plays an important role in making the final call for giving the go-ahead to a project. But apart from the leader, there are a number of groups that have the ability to influence the decision making of a nuclear program- the scientists involved in developing the program; the military; and the elite, in this case the minority White population that were known as the Afrikaners. The history of the State indicates the decision makers' perceptions and motivations that led to the initiation and sustenance of a nuclear weapons program. Being isolated from their brethren led the Afrikaner elite to feel a need to reconnect with them. As the country got isolated from its western allies, there was confusion about the next step of affairs.

Thus, psychology in the form of strong nationalist sentiments, paranoia about what the government felt was "an onslaught by communists and blacks," and a sense of abandonment by the United States played a role in South Africa's nuclear weapons development decisions (Hymans, 2006). The following section looks at various aspects of leadership that affected the decision making process; whether it was the then leader, De Klerk, the political parties' role, the miniscule role of the military and the scientific community or the important aspect of Afrikaner nationalism that came into play.

De Klerk

When De Klerk came to power, the South African State was isolated from the western powers; The United States had imposed economic sanctions; and there was a fear in the international community about how the rising ANC would lead the state. But most of all, the absence of US and other western powers' protection umbrella was the reason for South Africa to feel left out.

According to Albright (1994), the weapons program became the reason for South Africa not getting the recognition it wanted from the United States and not joining the international community. In November 1989, the government decided to stop the

production of nuclear weapons. On February 26, 1990 de Klerk issued written instructions to terminate the nuclear weapons program and dismantle all existing weapons.

According to an interview by Stumpf given to Liberman (1962), de Klerk “informed those present of his decision to normalize the internal political situation of the country and that the nuclear devices would be a liability in South Africa gaining international acceptance in the process.... There was no debate about the decision but rather how it should be implemented and how South Africa should accede to the NPT.” De Klerk’s intention is also evident in his selection for the committee of only officials—other than Malan—with no loyalty to the nuclear program and a chairman who he knew opposed it.

Thus, De Klerk was clear that he wanted to dismantle all the nuclear weapons in store and that relations with the United States would be mended at all costs. According to Liberman, Purkitt and Burgess (2002), De Klerk understood the fears of the US. He could also gauge the reaction of the ANC and the public, and thus chose to inform them much later, after the dismantlement had taken place.

Many officials, including de Klerk’s defense minister, minister of justice, deputy defense minister, national intelligence chief, and SADF chief, thought that de Klerk should hold out for a Western quid pro quo for dismantlement (Liberman, 1962). In an interview, an official claimed that he felt de Klerk’s haste to disarm to his being overly hungry for Western approval, though this could reflect their unfamiliarity with the lack of bargaining opportunities evident from the Kennedy-Botha sessions. And in a correspondence with de Villiers, it was found that De Klerk’s inner circle believed that conservative nationalists would be even more opposed to disarmament, as removing a pillar of white power, which is one reason they concealed the decision at least until after the March 1992 white referendum on democratization. In 1989, with the rise of F.W. de Klerk to the presidency and with increasing likelihood that the ANC would take power in South Africa, the United States threatened to treat South Africa as a “hostile nation” to induce disarmament, according to Renfrew Christie, a noted South African expert on the nuclear weapons program.

Although De Klerk and his government disliked the idea of turning over access to nuclear weapons to the ANC, they did not take any concrete steps to change their nuclear position. But when the coming of the ANC to power seemed eminent, the view was also shared by the U.S. government officials who felt that it would be unwise to have nuclear weapons in the hands of a majority-rule government that was friendly with Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi and Cuba's Fidel Castro, among others. The United States quietly communicated its position to the de Klerk government via diplomatic and back channels (Burgess; 2010). The de Klerk regime, in turn hoped that eliminating its bomb program would improve its relations with Washington.

Thus, the whole policy of the De Klerk government was based on the reactions it would illicit from the United States, which suggests a dependency on the latter state.

The Political Parties

The political parties too played a major role in giving the nuclear program its direction. Though they were not very heavily involved in the nuclear program during its initiation, they did play an important role in the destruction of the weapons. The parties, like De Klerk, were mostly concerned with the fear of abandonment by the western powers and awaited the positive reaction of the international community after they would have announced their giving up the nuclear program.

According to Roy Horton (1999), the political leadership firmly established the foundation for their long-term objective of maintaining close and continuing ties to the West. It viewed itself more as defending Western interests on the African continent, whether it was in the form of stopping the forces of communism or whether it was making a base for their security. The political leadership felt that if they were ever in a spot, the western powers would always protect them. South African Prime Ministers Vorster and PW Botha were convinced in a situation of East vs. West the US was unwilling to give up on South Africa. As a result, their identity as part of the West would be sustained.

When the US canceled its existing contract with South Africa for the SAFARI -1 reactor and refused to refund the money already paid by South Africa for the fuel, the leadership in South Africa realized that the some other means had to be applied to secure Western support in times of crisis (Horton, 1999).

In order to sustain its identity with the west, the nationalist party actively pursued membership in a Western alliance (to include NATO) to gain security guarantees (Long, 1996). South Africa eventually succeeded in gaining an alliance of sorts under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement to provide British Royal Navy use of a base near Cape Town in exchange for sales of military equipment to the SADF (Moore, 1987). Although rebuffed by NATO, South Africa's senior leadership were convinced their nation's geostrategic position, wealth of critical materials, and staunch opposition to communism would gain it favor—and military support—from the West. Thus, even though their equation with the western powers was skewed negatively towards South Africa, the leaders wanted to have some semblance of contact with the western powers at any cost. When, the US put economic sanctions during the 1980s as a result of the apartheid followed in the state, the leadership, in its desire to break South Africa out of its isolation, increasingly favored reforming apartheid.

According to Liberman (1962), nationalist statist governments such as South Africa, are more in a position to flout international norms as they seek symbolic benefits in defying foreign demands. But because, in the case of South Africa, there was a need to seek approval of the western powers, the state changed its policies.

At no point was the influence of South Africa's political leadership over the nuclear program greater than at its termination. The transition from a nation determined to sustain its nuclear capability into one committed to a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa reflected a change in means, but not ends for its national security strategy (Horton, 1999); the security strategy being the protection and approval of the United States for the decisions taken in South Africa. Thus, one can see a constant need for gratification from the western powers was needed for the South African leadership.

The Afrikaner Elite

There existed a very thin line between the views and thought process of the political leadership and the Afrikaner elite. Their reasoning and understanding of the situations were completely alike, and the only difference was that the political leadership was the official position of the Afrikaner elite.

William Long (1996) asserts that South Africa's leadership was motivated to take the measures it did in the late 1980s to insure the West did not totally isolate it. Their desire to be a part of the West, not collapsing regional security, allowed them to take advantage of the "nuclear card" to gain recognition and support from the West. When viewed in this context, the decision on South Africa's part to pursue the development of nuclear weapons—and subsequently, rollback that nuclear capability—is more plausible and logical than a purely "security-interest driven response".

De Klerk and the Afrikaner elite were less concerned about economic liberalization than an eventual takeover by the ANC and the restoration of relations with the United States and European powers, all of which feared implosion and proliferation (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman; 2002). Thus, one can see that whether it was De Klerk or the political parties or the Afrikaner elite, the driving vehicle was legitimacy in the eyes of the United States and other western states. The need of the people to seek recognition from that of another state shows the level of dependency the state or the people of the state are facing.

The Scientists and the Military

According to Burgess (2010), the Afrikaner scientists (and many English-speaking ones) who worked on the covert nuclear weapons program shared a strong sense of patriotism and were united by a firm commitment to ensuring the success of the program. This shared commitment was vital: The well-trained scientists and engineers formed the human capital needed to design and build sophisticated weapons systems in an increasingly isolated scientific environment.

The scientific zeal and drive of the AEC's Ampie Roux and Wally Grant to demonstrate that South Africa could make a nuclear device established the technical foundation for the program (Reiss, 1995). The strong leadership of the ruling Nationalist Party supported the AEC's research during the 1950s and 1960s before molding it into a key element of national strategy in the 1970s. The military exerted strong influence within the SSC but their role focused primarily on domestic security and conventional military operations (Flournoy, Michèle A. and Campbell, Kurt M.; 1988). The two Defense Ministers overseeing the nuclear program were PW Botha and his handpicked successor, Gen. Magnus Malan. Finally, the technocrats—the engineers at ARMSCOR—exerted heavy influence over the nuclear program, particularly during its critical middle stage. Together, these four groups formed a partnership that conceived, produced, and then discarded South Africa's nuclear deterrent. Yet in the end, the political leadership exerted the pivotal influence over the program's progress (Horton, 1999).

The technological know-how to the South African Program was brought about by the AEC and its representatives, Ampie Roux and Wally Grant. The military kept its part of the bargain by providing security at the domestic front and focusing on the conventional military options. The two Defense Ministers overseeing the nuclear program were PW Botha and his handpicked successor, Gen. Magnus Malan. Finally, the technocrats—the engineers at ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa Limited)—exerted heavy influence over the nuclear program, particularly during its critical middle stage and helped it through. Lastly, the leadership of the nationalist party provided the right guidance and support that was needed for the development of the bomb.

According to Albright (1994), the weapons came out of a technological “can-do” mentality that coincided with South Africa's increasing international isolation in the 1970s and 1980s. The political leadership took advantage of its scientists' eagerness to demonstrate South Africa's technical prowess at time when the military had no rational operational requirement to pull it towards developing a nuclear deterrent. This apparent dichotomy was resolved by linking South Africa's nuclear strategy to the reaction of key Western nations and not those of its potential adversaries. From South Africa's isolated position and parochial worldview, it made sense (Horton, 1999).

The fear of abandonment, that was a direct result of having an external locus of control, was so strong for the South Africans that they decided to violate the 1972 Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention so as to build a nuclear bomb. They feared abandonment by the West in the face of rising domestic protests by opponents backed by the Soviet Union and other allies that had NBC capabilities. Apartheid leaders made little distinction between the domestic threat posed by the ANC and its sympathizers, the presence of socialist regimes in the region, and the influence of the Soviet Union; in addition, they viewed them all as part of a threatened Soviet-orchestrated takeover (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman; 2002). Thus for them, the need to please the US was much stronger than anything. This need for recognition stems from the 'locus of control', which can be either internal or external. In the case of South Africa, the locus of control is external and thus a reason for its entire decision making process.

Quest for acceptance: An External Locus of Control

The South African quest for acceptance from the international powers comes from the fact that the minority government, ruling a black majority did not want to be clubbed in the third world countries. The South African government and the Afrikaner elite, the major decision making players, wanted to be associated with and were for fighting for their states' space in the coveted first world. The isolation of the western world due to the apartheid policy followed by South African government did have a major impact on the psyche of the nation and its people, wanting them to identify more with the ways of the western states and changing their policies in tune with the needs of the developed states.

Considering the South African elite were already wanting to identify themselves with the Western world, the move by the United States to remove South Africa from the IAEA board of governors and replacing it with Egypt, hit South Africa's prestige. The seat was reserved for the "most advanced nuclear country in Africa" and being the only nuclear fuel producing state in Africa, they felt it had been unfairly taken from them. To add insult to injury, South Africa was refused participation in the 1979 IAEA General Conference in an attempt to compel it to join the NPT (Horton, 1999). These events made

South Africa feel more vulnerable and away from the United States, an aspect they had not considered. From a South African perspective, it was all alone, without the support of the western powers it so depended on. It also felt that it was being unfairly punished for its domestic policies despite its anti-communist stance on the African continent (Horton, 1999). The more the US and other Western powers tried to punish South Africa, the more its need for association with the Western Powers increased.

Besides injuring South African pride, nuclear sanctions necessitated a scramble for fuel for its nuclear power plants. But this was circumvented, if expensively, by the building of a second enrichment plant (the Z-plant) and a fuel assembly facility to attain nuclear energy self-sufficiency (Lieberman, 1962). After the near-total nuclear isolation of the late 1970s, only a few further Western sanctions were threatened, and no incentives offered, to change South Africa's nuclear policies.

The *locus of control*, a concept developed by Julian Rotter (1954) looks at individuals as having an external or internal locus of control and reacting to situations accordingly. Thus, individuals with an internal locus of control are independent in their decision making as they do not look for approval from others on any decision they take and those with an external locus of control are constantly trying to please the other on which their locus of control is dependent as they do not do things without the approval of the 'other'. In the case of South Africa, the locus of control was external as the Afrikaner elite identified with their brethren from the other states (Western powers) and thought that it was the same for the Western Powers, who would always protect them. The South Africans decided to build a bomb and hoped to be stopped by the Western powers. When this did not happen, their dependency on the Western powers grew and they constantly kept their side of the bargain by fighting the Cuban forces and being pro-Christian governments in Africa, but to no avail. The Western governments still pressurized them on their policy of Apartheid and kept pushing for them to give up its nuclear arsenal. The Afrikaner elite and polity soon realized that the international community had closed its doors for them and in order to survive as a nation, they needed to heed to their locus of control and work accordingly. An external locus of control could be the result of a number of factors, one of the most important being social discrimination. In the case of

South Africa, this factor does seem to fit as the Afrikaner elite felt they were not being treated at par with their fellow white Christian brethren and were being discriminated against even though they were keeping their side of the bargain. In the nuclear path of South Africa, one can also see the emotion of submission, wherein, the state realizes that it is not in a position to command power so it follows the path laid out for it by the superpower.

South Africa's transition away from being a U.S. ally toward being a neutral country was followed by the development and then rollback of a nuclear weapons program. In South Africa's case, paranoia that the United States was abandoning it was a significant motive for going nuclear. Realism does not fully explain South Africa's desire for nuclear weapons, since the country faced no major strategic threats. Paranoia about communists and the loss of the United States as a major ally increased South Africa's sense of insecurity, thus it began to develop weapons and missiles. U.S. pressure increased in the late 1980s, and in 1989 the apartheid government began the process of surrendering power. South Africa signed the NPT, and in 1990 and 1991, it unilaterally disarmed (Burgess; 2010).

Roy Horton (1999) supports the argument being made in the chapter by stating that the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own "identity crisis." The Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long-term end of a closer affiliation with the West. Though extreme, nuclear weapons were very much a means to fulfill their desire to be linked to the west. The US policy did nothing to understand the root causes, i.e., the desire for western guarantees, but instead focused on the identity crisis within the state, i.e., apartheid and nuclear program (Horton, 1999). Horton also clearly points out that with respect to South Africa, the core beliefs and interests have remained the same throughout its nuclear path; only the means changed as a result of the change in the strategic environment. The yearning of the South Africans to be identified as a Western nation rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. They hoped that by developing a nuclear deterrent the Western states would consider South Africa as one of them.

Emphasis is often given to changes in South Africa's security environment and to the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as the rising demand for domestic political reform. However, too little attention has been paid in the nonproliferation literature to the importance of the longer-term effects of psychological factors associated with the increased isolation and economic costs of comprehensive sanctions (Burgess; 2010). In the South African case, international isolation and sanctions took a long time to have a major impact. Over time, these factors became increasingly important.

Although South Africa did pull back its nuclear weapons program, it did not get the approval of the west as it had hoped for completely. An NPT-compliant South Africa still under the rule of a minority white government practicing apartheid could not gain its coveted place in the West, something it had not hoped for. This was because of its apartheid policy. President de Klerk recognized the only way to secure his nation's future identity with the West lay in a dual-track policy of domestic reforms and nuclear rollback (Horton, 1999). This helped him secure South Africa's place on the international map.

'South Africa felt that its decision to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear deterrent capability and to fully embrace its responsibilities as a non-nuclear-weapon state would guarantee it an unprecedented place of honor in the evolution of the international non-proliferation regime' (Stumpf, 1996, p 8). This argument by Stumpf, himself a member of the then parliament and someone who played an active role in the nuclear decision making during the crucial years, points out that even though the decision to give up their nuclear weapons was a need to please the western powers, they did hope to get the maximum benefit from it and earn 'brownie points' in the international forums where it would be looked upon as a model state. The South African government felt that disclosures would benefit not only the global non-proliferation regime, would support South Africa's international prestige and foreign policy agenda, but would also enhance South Africa's democratic transparency (Harris, Hatang, and Liberman; 2004). But this reaction is only a state trying to get the maximum out of its decision, which in no way is similar to the concept of pride talked about in the earlier chapter.

Liberman claims that international pressure on South Africa to dismantle did not increase substantially in the late 1980s; the evidence demonstrates otherwise. The United States, as the main supporter of the NPT, did not want weapons in the hands of the ANC. Liberman interviewed U.S. officials about this, but he did not emphasize the pressure that they applied on de Klerk or his response (p. 79). In late 1986 the United States realized that the imposition of sanctions would produce rapid change in South Africa. Consequently, Washington ratcheted up pressure on Botha, the then minister, to dismantle the nuclear weapon program. In 1989, the election of de Klerk took place and there was a very likely chance for the ANC to come in power. According to Renfrew Christie, a well known nuclear expert, the US threatened to treat South Africa as a hostile nation if it did not change its nuclear path (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman; 2002).

Conclusion

As several scholars (Albright, Doyle, Kelley, Pabian and Reiss) have pointed out, every nation is unique in its path to acquiring nuclear weapons and in one rare instance, rolling back that capability. The South African program demonstrated the strong pull national identity exerted over the nation's leadership to elect such an extreme approach to achieving its end of closer ties to the West (Horton, 1999). The emotions of submission and external locus of control were the reasons for the state taking certain decisions in its nuclear path. South African elite were hell bent on their need to appease the Western States; to add to that these states were economically, and militarily superior. Thus submitting their right to own nuclear weapons did not turn out to be the most complicated decision as the conditions were favorable in more ways than one.

The South African state in its nuclear decision making did not represent the views of the people. The black majority was not even aware of the program until it was dismantled. Thus, in the case of South Africa, the decision makers were the Afrikaners elite and the polity which comprised of the Afrikaner elite. Their emotions and reactions were taken into consideration in the decision making. Their wanting to join and gain the acceptance

of the Western club of liberal democratic states was the finalizing factor in the nuclear decisions that were taken.

The chapter also points out to the changes in the nuclear path. It may seem as if the state could not make up its mind as to whether it wanted the nuclear weapons or did not want the weapons, but having understood the South African case, one can say that the means kept changing, but the goal of the government was the same from the beginning.

South Africa, as a result of giving up and dismantling its nuclear weapons decided to change its emphasis from nuclear deterrence and make it into an economic entity. It now caters to the industrial and economic needs of the state by assisting in the development of around 150 products and services. These products have applications in mining and aerospace development, food production, transportation, and environmental preservation. Some examples are air filters for motor vehicles, a measuring device for minerals industry flotation processes, radio-isotopes for medical and industrial use, and biogas units to recover methane from refuse for use as vehicle fuel (Timeline, 2009). This has helped South Africa grow not just economically but also developed a reputation for the state as a responsible and mature state that can handle difficult situations. Thus, once a positive image of the state is created, all the other things fall into place; South Africa is now a member of not only the Zangger Committee but also of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG was established in 1975 to minimize the risk of diversion of nuclear technology and to regulate nuclear technology transfers, control the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology and monitor the transfer of dual-use materials. South Africa became a member of the NSG on 5 April 1995. The Zangger Committee defines and monitors trade in goods and equipment especially designed for nuclear uses. South Africa became a member of the Committee on 21 October 1993 (Goel, 2008).

Thus, the emotions of submission and having an external locus of control lead the state of South Africa on its nuclear path. One of the reasons the locus of control is with the western powers is because the Afrikaner elite see an authority figure in their conduct and are thus naturally submissive to the wishes of the Western Powers.

South Africa is a reminder that political isolation increases incentives to build nuclear weapons and become self-sufficient. International sanctions cannot always be relied on to stop a technologically capable country (Albright, 1994). But one must also remember that political isolation can have the adverse effect too, as in the case of Iran. Thus, one must tread with caution in dealing with state that are about to go nuclear and try and understand the end results they aim to achieve by becoming a nuclear state.

The next and last chapter brings together the argument with a comparison between the two case studies that shows how the two states chose the different paths and the only reason being the different emotional responses that were in turn a result of the national psyche.

Chapter five

Conclusion

The argument presented at the beginning of the dissertation was that the understanding of emotions with respect to nuclear decision making has been limited to fear and trust and with the help of the case studies of Iran and South Africa, it can be seen that other emotions, whether it is via the different decision making groups or via their influence of the national psyche, are also existent and play a significant role in changing the nuclear path of a state. This chapter hopes to draw from all the chapters and make its own conclusion accordingly.

The first chapter outlined the different literature that is present in academics and how there is a gap in the understanding of emotions with respect to nuclear decision making. The theories of liberalism and realism do explain the events in international relations but the purpose of this study was to bring out the different emotional orientations that effect the psyche of a nation as a whole and in turn effect the decision making process of states. The emotional orientation of a state is developed by way of 'emotionology', a term coined by Peter and Carol Sterns that explains the culture on the psyche of the state. It refers to the attitudes or standards that a society, or a definable group within a society, maintains toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression; ways that institutions reflect and encourage these attitudes in human conduct, e.g., courtship practices as expressing the valuation of affect in marriage, or personnel workshops as reflecting the valuation of anger in job relationships'. This collective orientation of a society does influence its decision makers as they too are a part of the society. The perspectives of these decision makers are as a result colored by the events in history. For example, the Iran-Iraq war left a huge impact on the psyche of the people of Iran and till now the people are proud of the way they conducted themselves for the entire period of eight

years and survived in the toughest of conditions without any international aid. Their sense of pride that was drawing its inspiration from their rich history got more etched in their psyche as a result of events in their history.

Another aspect that has been discussed is the different groups of decision makers: the role of the military, the scientific community, the elite and the political class and lastly the public. Each groups' role in the decision making varies from state to state. For example, in the case of South Africa, the public was not even aware of a nuclear program or that it was dismantled; whereas in the case of Iran, the public has been known to be very passionately supporting its government in the pursuit of its nuclear program. Similarly, the military in both the case studies had a very limited and miniscule role. This is because if the military's role would have been more pronounced, the international community would have been up in arms trying to figure out the final plan of the concerned state. With respect to the scientific community too, the role in both the case studies is similar as the communities of both the states wanted to be able to develop its own nuclear program but both did receive help from their respective quarters; Iran received help from United States and South Africa received help from Israel. The elites in any state would always be the most powerful group as the political class also invariably comes from this group. Whether it be the Afrikaner elites of South Africa or the clerics from Iran, their emotions and the effect of the events on their psyche does act as the major influencing factor from all of the decision making groups.

When discussing the different decision making groups, the role of the leader cannot be forgotten. In the case of South Africa, De Klerk played a very significant role in dismantling the nuclear weapons and making the announcements only after they had been destroyed, resulting in taking everybody by surprise. But even leaders need the help of the decision making groups. Group behavior gives the people involved certain advantages and thus important decisions such as those relating to the nuclear program of a state are taken collectively. This is because working collectively gives the eventual decision reached greater legitimacy than if a decision were reached in unilateral fashion, after minimum consultation with others. Secondly, it provides leaders with a 'political cover' as no one person can take the entire blame for a bad decision. Third, group decision-

making ensures (at least in principle) that the leading decision-maker is exposed to a variety of differing and possibly dissenting opinions, minimizing the possibility that a leader takes a decision without considering all available facts. Fourth, some leaders may prefer to work in groups where they are not well informed about the policy area concerned (Goldgeier and Tetlock, p72).

With respect to nuclear decision making, a number of authors focus on the dangers/ perils of proliferation and many talk about the need for different measures to be taken to control the nuclear threat, but hardly any article or book talks about the association of nuclear weapons with different notions such as pride and submission.

In the third chapter on Iran, the main emotion that was being looked into was pride. The emotion of contempt too is found in the Iranian narrative with respect to the United States, but it is not the overriding emotion at play. The emotion of pride, in the Iranian psyche stems from its past heritage, which the Iranians believe to be the most glorious and richest of its time. There is a direct co-relation between the nuclear status of Iran and the sense of pride its people have in being a part of the state of Iran. This conception of pride stems from the rich historical past and the glory of the time when Persia was the centre of not only the Islamic civilization, but also the centre of all the trade routes connecting central Asia to south Asia and south Asia to Europe. Like all civilizations, they too want to reach that peak again. Thus, the Iranian study can be explained with the help of Hymans' concept of oppositional nationalist. The Shah's famous line "Neither East, Nor West" stem from this discourse. This line has now been followed by a new motto which is more inclusive 'Both North and South'. According to Aron Ben Zeev (2000), as in other emotions, the comparative concern is important in pride. The comparative value, rather than the absolute one, is of greatest concern in pride. Thus, when Iran embarks on its nuclear program, the idea is to match up in comparative terms to those states that already have nuclear programs.

Shirin Ebadi, a Nobel Prize winner, has been openly critical of the present regime but has openly defended the Islamic regime's nuclear development program: "Aside from being economically justified, it has become a cause of national pride for an old nation with a

glorious history. No Iranian government, regardless of its ideology or democratic credentials, would dare to stop the program” (Mc Geogh, 2006, p 1). Thus, even if the public or a section of the elite are unhappy with the government’s policies regarding other issues, their pride in their culture does not permit them to not allow the nuclear program to go ahead.

The Iranian nuclear path has been as criss-crossed as the South African one. This is because Iran was one of the first countries to get the NPT ratified when it was proposed by the United States. Furthermore, Iran was in a very open nuclear program with the United States and the Iranian scientists got their initial knowledge of the nuclear power plants from the United States itself. Even after the Islamic revolution when the international community was a little wary of Khomeini and his ideals, Khomeini himself specified that Iran had no use of a nuclear weapons program and shut down the nuclear power plants. These plants remained closed for a long period of time during which incidents happened that affected the psyche of the Iranian people in such a way that it changed the course of its nuclear trajectory. The major event was the Iran-Iraq war. The eight year long war is also known as the Imposed war in Iran as Iran was minding its own business when all of a sudden Saddam Hussein sprung a war on its borders. The war killed more than a million people and every family lost a member as a result of the war. Thus, the scars of the war were and still do run deep in the hearts and minds of the Iranians. As Saddam Hussein had the backing of the United States, International aid was not provided to Iran. It was then that Iran realized that international laws are nothing but scraps of paper. Against all odd Iran managed to defeat the Iraqi forces and emerged victorious. But the use of chemical and biological weapons by the Iraqi forces did hurt the pride of the Iranians. The trust that Iran had put in the International system came crumbling down and Iran decided to heal its wounded pride on its own. For this purpose, among many others, Iran decided to develop its nuclear weapons programs.

The emotion of contempt can be seen in the speeches of Khomeini that equals the United States to *Satan*. The Iranians feel that they are not at par with the world and have got left behind only because of the imperialist forces which time and again used Iran for their purposes; whether it was the British and Russian forces in the early 19th century or the

United States in the 20th century. Thus, there are a number of emotions such as contempt, and anger towards the Western world. The term 'Westoxicated', coined by Khomeini, is something that is looked down upon in Iranian circles and this same term is what South Africa constantly aspires to become.

With respect to South Africa's nuclear weapons program, one of the biggest hurdles one faces is the secrecy surrounding the program that once existed. There is almost no literature available when studying the South African covert nuclear weapons program. The government sources refuse to talk about it and are almost in denial about its existence with most of the documents being destroyed around the time of De Klerk's announcement of the ending of the nuclear weapons in the possession of the South African state.

The emotions involved in the decision making of the South African government are submission which stems from the state having an external locus of control. For the state, the western Powers give legitimacy to what is right or wrong. The South African quest for acceptance from the international powers comes from the fact that the minority government, ruling a black majority did not want to be clubbed in the third world countries. The South African government and the Afrikaner elite, the major decision making players, wanted to be associated with and were for fighting for their states' space in the coveted first world. The isolation of the western world due to the apartheid policy followed by South African government did have a major impact on the psyche of the nation and its people, wanting them to identify more with the ways of the western states and changing their policies in tune with the needs of the developed states.

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dismantle the nuclear weapon program. In 1989, the election of de Klerk took place and there was a very likely chance for the ANC to come in power. According to Renfrew Christie, a well known nuclear expert, the US threatened to treat South Africa as a hostile nation if it did not change its nuclear path (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman; 2002).

Considering the South African elite were already wanting to identify themselves with the Western world, the move by the United States to remove South Africa from the IAEA board of governors and replacing it with Egypt, hit South Africa's prestige. The seat was reserved for the "most advanced nuclear country in Africa" and being the only nuclear fuel producing state in Africa, they felt it had been unfairly taken from them. To add insult to injury, South Africa was refused participation in the 1979 IAEA General Conference in an attempt to compel it to join the NPT (Horton, 1999). These events made South Africa feel more vulnerable and away from the United States, an aspect they had not considered. From a South African perspective, it was all alone, without the support of the western powers it so depended on. It also felt that it was being unfairly punished for its domestic policies despite its anti-communist stance on the African continent (Horton, 1999). The more the US and other Western powers tried to punish South Africa, the more its need for association with the Western Powers increased. This increase in dependence led South Africa to develop the emotion of submission towards the western powers, more specifically towards the United States.

When looking at both the case studies from a realist angle, both the states were feeling insecure due to certain events. Iran was insecure because it has just faced a chemical and biological war from its neighbor, and this insecurity was increased because it did not have any international support. But as a reaction to this insecurity, Iran became more aggressive, found examples in its past that gave the nation a sense of pride. Thus, there was contempt for the imperialist powers who time and again had plundered Iran for their own purposes and Iran was left groping in the dark; there was also a sense of pride that did not let them ask for help. The Iranians decided to develop a nuclear weapon on their own merit. Another important factor would be the geographical positioning, wherein every state that surrounded Iran was not friendly towards it due to the Shia-Sunni divide. Thus, the sense of pride in one's culture is doubled when it is felt that the 'other' is

jealous of your history or that it is out of reach for the rest. Another important argument is about the Iranian discourse and how relevant it is in the lives of Iranians. The discourses on justice and independence still play a significant role in the understanding of the world system for the Iranians as it dates back to the Pre-Islamic era, and was reinforced during the Islamic period as justice was an important ideal on which the faith of Shi'ism is based.

With respect to South Africa, the need for recognition wherein one places ones identity with another state, led it to become submissive to the Western powers. The reasons for the two states choosing diametrically opposite emotional responses to the same situation can be seen in their history and their needs. Iran, was never pro the western states; it had suffered a number of times in the hands of the imperialist powers. Thus it was easy for the Iranians to see the Imperialists as the enemy/ Satan. On the other hand, the Afrikaner elite felt a bond towards their White counterparts in Europe and the United States, and did not want for this bond to break, as it was for them a source of their identity. Thus, when the international community started to give South Africa the cold shoulder, it did not go well with the South African elite. Fighting their own did not appeal to them and thus they felt that submission to the needs of the Western Powers was a better alternative.

Thus, the aim of the study, to bring out the various emotions apart from fear and trust in the understanding of nuclear decision making, has been successful to an extent as certain emotions such as pride and contempt have been identified in the case of Iran and submission and an external locus of control have been identified as the emotions with respect to South Africa.

The research conducted has brought a new dimension of thinking for me and I would like to continue researching on the role of emotions in much greater detail for my Ph.D too. The vast literature that I have come across but not been able to utilize in my M.Phil dissertation has laid out the path for research in my Ph.D.

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