

# **EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY AFTER LISBON TREATY**

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**DECLARATION**


I declare that the dissertation entitled "EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER LISBON TREATY" submitted by me, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any degree of this University or any other University to the best of my knowledge.


  
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We recommend that this dissertation be placed the examiners for evaluation.

  
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MY PARENTS

K. Ngamrei Francis & K. Lily (Maitamla)

"Because of you (mom and dad), I am always  
doing things I can't do in my life."

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## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<b>BiH</b>	<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>
<b>CDP</b>	<b>Capability Development Plan</b>
<b>CEE</b>	<b>Central and the Eastern Europe</b>
<b>CFSP</b>	<b>Common Foreign and Security Policy</b>
<b>COSI</b>	<b>Committee on Internal Security</b>
<b>CSDP</b>	<b>Common Security and Defence Policy</b>
<b>DGs</b>	<b>Director Generals</b>
<b>EAC</b>	<b>European Armaments Cooperation</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>
<b>ECSC</b>	<b>European Coal and Steel Community</b>
<b>EDA</b>	<b>European Defence Agency</b>
<b>EEC</b>	<b>European Economic Community</b>
<b>EDTIB</b>	<b>European Defence Technological and Industrial Base</b>
<b>EDRT</b>	<b>European Defence Research and Technology</b>
<b>EEAS</b>	<b>European External Action Service</b>
<b>EMU</b>	<b>Economic and Monetary Union</b>
<b>ENP</b>	<b>European Neighbourhood Policy</b>
<b>EP</b>	<b>European Parliament</b>
<b>EPC</b>	<b>European Political Community</b>
<b>ESDI</b>	<b>European Security and Defence Identity</b>
<b>ESDP</b>	<b>European Security and Defence Policy</b>
<b>ESS</b>	<b>European Security Strategy</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>European Union</b>
<b>EUMS</b>	<b>European Military Staff</b>
<b>EUMC</b>	<b>European Military Committee</b>
<b>EU- ISS</b>	<b>European Union – Internal Security Strategy</b>
<b>EU (OHQ)</b>	<b>European Union - Operation Headquarter</b>



<b>EUPM</b>	<b>European Union Police Mission</b>
<b>EU15</b>	<b>European Union with 15 members (1995-2004)</b>
<b>EU25</b>	<b>European Union with 25 members (2004-2006)</b>
<b>EU27</b>	<b>European Union with 27 members (2007- present)</b>
<b>FAC</b>	<b>Foreign Affairs Council</b>
<b>FYROM</b>	<b>Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia</b>
<b>GPG</b>	<b>Global Public Good</b>
<b>HG2010</b>	<b>Headline Goal 2010</b>
<b>HHG</b>	<b>Helsinki Headline Goal</b>
<b>HR</b>	<b>High Representative</b>
<b>IAEA</b>	<b>International Atomic Energy Agency</b>
<b>IGC</b>	<b>Intergovernmental Conference</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>ISS (EU)</b>	<b>Internal Security Strategy</b>
<b>HR/VP</b>	<b>High Representative/Vice-President</b>
<b>JHA</b>	<b>Justice and Home Affairs</b>
<b>MONUC</b>	<b>United Nations Organisation Mission (DRC)</b>
<b>MS</b>	<b>Member States</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non-governmental Organization</b>
<b>NIS</b>	<b>New Independent States</b>
<b>NSS(US)</b>	<b>National Security Strategy</b>
<b>OLAF</b>	<b>European Anti-Fraud Office</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</b>
<b>PSC</b>	<b>Political and Security Committee</b>
<b>PSCD</b>	<b>Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence</b>
<b>QMV</b>	<b>Qualified Majority Voting</b>
<b>SFOR</b>	<b>Stabilisation Force</b>
<b>RRF</b>	<b>Rapid Reaction Force</b>

<b>SSR</b>	<b>Security Sector Reform</b>
<b>TEU</b>	<b>Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)</b>
<b>TFEU</b>	<b>Treaty of Functioning of European Union</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNSC</b>	<b>United Nations Security Council</b>
<b>US</b>	<b>United States (of America)</b>
<b>WB</b>	<b>World Bank</b>
<b>WEU</b>	<b>Western European Union</b>
<b>WMD</b>	<b>Weapons of Mass Destruction</b>
<b>WTO</b>	<b>World Trade Organization</b>

## *Preface*

The publication of “*A Secure Europe in a Better World*”, the European Security Strategy (ESS), in December 12, 2003, was a milestone in the development of a Common European Foreign and Defence Policy. It made explicit for the first time how the EU as a community perceives its current and emerging new security environment. The ESS underscores the multilateral cooperation within the international organisations and rightly states the common threats assessments are the best basis for common action. Whether the EU becomes a robust international security actor will depend first and foremost on its ability to live up to the challenges listed in the ESS. Perhaps, the EU is facing a real prospect to stand on its own feet as a security actor.

With the adoption of European Security Strategy, the EU has developed institution and some military capabilities and its autonomy from the US is likely to grow. Here, the ESS confirms that the EU as a power concerned with upholding and improving the current international order, at the same time pledge to share the responsibility for global security and building a better world manifests the EU’s desire to become a more powerful actor on the world stage. The adoption of Lisbon Treaty in 2009 creates new architecture for foreign policy making that is expected to enhance coherence and effectiveness within and outside the Union.

The capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past seven years, and must strengthen through better institutional coordination, coherence and more strategic decision making. In this context, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve these challenges. Seven years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a fair, safer and more united world. But the world around us is changing fast with evolving new threats and shifting powers. As such, to build a secure a Europe in a better world, EU must be comes more strategic in their thinking and more effective.

The interests and rationale for the study stem from the fact that the primary question to be answer is whether it is possible for the EU to strengthen its politico-security influence commensurately with its economic power. The research will examine the

ESS and final adoption of Lisbon Treaty and raise the question whether member states can adjust their policy cultures to promote a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once asked, "Who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?" Kissinger may ponder over the right phone number for long time, after two or three decades, does the EU have answer for that? In this context, this research will critically evaluate the action of the EU involved on the security strategies. With the EU entered into a crucial new phase with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The research is desirable on account of the fact that what need to be done to make security and defence policy and defence culture that can functions for EU 27. Finally in order to achieve the effective multilateralism called by the ESS, EU need first to take a close look at the realities outside the cocoon of certain offices in Brussels and member states capitals.

The entire research is presented in five chapters. Chapter one deals with some introductory debate on ESS and the framework for security aspects with definitions. This part is exclusively introductory in nature and states the problem of research with a brief description of research area. The second chapter brings the significance of the conceptual evolution. This chapter also address the central aspects of the ESS. Then the chapter moves to the theoretical and empirical concept of ESS with its success and failures. Chapter 3 exclusively deals with the journey from the ESS 2003 to the adoption of Lisbon Treaty 2009, it also explains the necessary conditions for the collective action within the main principle of ESS. The fourth chapter is mainly study the different institutions brought in with adoption of Lisbon Treaty. This chapter mainly focus on the institutional structural changes and action taken in course of time. Finally, the concluding chapter highlights the weakness and strength of EU with critical observations. The chapter ended up by concise presentation of EU's response in the current Arab Spring, particularly in Libyan crisis.

This research will attempt to explore the developments in the EU and its policies since 2003 to till date. In the process the study will try and determine whether it has delivered its high expectations of citizens or not and how the Lisbon Treaty will change the Union image by introducing a new mechanism for capability development, permanent structured cooperation which allows those member states that are willing to enhance military integration with the EU's framework and strengthened position of High Representative. The aim of this research is to present

and analyse the approach advocated by strategy in realist perspective. This research will further explore and examine the underlying concepts and implementation of the ESS as judging tools of all the European Union's external actions. Assess questions such as how the strategy has shaped EU policy, how it relates to existing policies and also how it has added value to these policies and whether the strategy objectives are sufficient to safeguard EU interests. This work will try to offers a comprehensive view of how the EU can achieve the ambitious objectives of the ESS after the adoption of Lisbon Treaty and become an effective global actor as the strategy helps to forge a global Europe.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **Introduction**

The European Union (EU) is a regional organisation of sovereign states which have agreed through series of treaties to work together in carefully defined areas to pursue common objectives, founded in 1957 on the inspiration that Europe would never again be plunged into internecine warfare. The EU as a collection of democratic countries committed to uphold the principle of UN sanctioned security. The EU operates in a unique form of internal governance, based on the principle of conferral, whereby Member States (MS) pool their national sovereignty in order to coordinate certain national policies. They only deal with the issues for which the member states have given it responsibility. In the vast majority of the case, the EU only takes supporting action that supplements efforts already made by the Member States. Since its inception the EU has encouraged many new members to share its values of democracy, human rights, economic liberalism and development and adhered to rule of law. Perhaps, in the modern era Europe has been a playground of war till mid-20<sup>th</sup> century but after 1950 it converted itself as a zone of peace and stability through the process of economic integration. However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Europe is facing threats which are more diverse, dynamic and less visible and less predictable (ESS 2003). At the same time, economic growth and globalization give rise to a number of different and evolving threats and complex challenges for which EU needs to prepare to tackle. Until 2003, Europe remained without a strategic concept and it appeared that the regular calls for one would remain unanswered.

#### **1.0 Lack of Cohesion and Coherent: EU Unable to Act**

After the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) terribly failed during the Iraq crisis in 2003 to produce a common EU stance on a major crisis, the member states gave the High Representative for CFSP the mandate to lead efforts to finally address the issue of where the Union stands as a global player and how it sees its evolving security instruments meeting the vision. It was amidst this backdrop that in 2003, the EU published "*A secure Europe in A Better World*", European Security

Strategy (ESS)<sup>1</sup> which set out the principles and priorities of how the EU intends to protect and promote its security interests based on EU core values, reflected its ultimate goal. The document was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. The document made a simple statement of fact, but it indeed has profound implications. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant. In this strategic document, the EU presents an analysis of the main perceived threats and sets out three strategic objectives to defend its security and promotes its values. The concepts of security as laid out in this document can be broadly categorized as internal, borders or neighbourhood and external or global. The ESS clearly states that the EU and its member states will tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions and upholding the principle of force as a last resort. This document was meant to define the security challenges confronting the Union and to provide a common purpose to the EU in shaping the international system and contributing to world peace. The rationale behind the ESS is to support a multilateral system of world governance that can deliver international peace and security.

Here, security will simply define as the condition of being protected from or not expose to danger, feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger (Oxford dictionary; Biscop 2004: 3; Delcour 2010: 536). Security clearly contains a subjective element, an element of perception. Since there are many kinds of danger, security by nature is a very broad concept that comprises several dimensions. We define security policy in traditional sense, a security policy associated with military dimensions with the use of politico-military instruments. Perhaps, security has both state centric and an individual security concept as well as internal and external dimensions, to analyse security in European context the study will examine both the concepts and dimensions. For the first time in 2003, the member states solemnly adopted a common strategic vision for the whole of EU foreign policy. While recognizing that EU should be prepares to share the responsibility for global security, the EU also wanted to set out its own distinct approach to security issue.

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<sup>1</sup>A strategic document proposed by Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of state and Government at the European council in Brussels o 12<sup>th</sup> December 2003.

The ESS provides a framework for the definition of the EU strategic posture in defence matter. According to the ESS, the EU needs to be more active, more coherent and more capable. This strategic document provides the room for fertile cooperation between external experts and representatives of EU bodies in shaping the policy.

The term 'strategy' means the 'art or science of planning for success.' Ultimately, it involves thinking about what goals are achievable and how with the given available resources and capabilities and in a chosen timeframe. It is especially crucial in the conduct of war to have a strategy designed to achieve military victory. It serves as a reference framework for day to day policy making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the means, i.e. the civilian, military capabilities and sometime both that need to be developed. According to the Oxford dictionary, 'strategy is a plan designed to achieve a long term aim or the planning and directing of military activity in a war or battle.'

In the past Europe has a major difficulty in coordinating its policies in the area of foreign and security affairs. The EU did not manage to raise a single voice on the issues apart from some statements of principle that had little to offer to actual events and developments. In many policy document and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and its military dimension i.e. the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to. The ESS is organised into three chapters; on the security environment, strategic objectives and the policy implications for the EU. The question is that, to what extents do the choices made in the ESS effectively functions as reference framework for day to day decision making and shape EU policy? Are the assumptions of the ESS still valid and its objectives sufficient to safeguard EU interests and can they be achieved? It should be noted that the ESS had a much stronger emphasis on threats, especially on terrorism and WMD (Cameron 2006: 51).

Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy, progress has been made in rationalising instruments and procedures encouraging developments are unfolding on the ground as well, notably on the counter proliferation and counter terrorism fronts. Progress has been considerable but still insufficient compare to present and



potential challenges. However, CFSP of the Union has failed to enthuse the public or to convince observers and policy makers. The 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the ESS is not far away, but there is a chance that it may go unnoticed. The Union is strong on trade issues where it can speak and act as one body in international stage but weak in foreign policy and security matter where national government cannot agree to cooperate closely. However, with the birth of ESS, the EU 27 in a concerted effort to define a set of shared fundamental objectives as a basis for new impetus to political action on security issues. Now the question is what is European Security Strategy? Does the European security strategy really matter? In this context, both the ESS and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of United States can be interpreted as marking the adoption of new doctrines after a period of tumultuous change in the international order (Dannreuther and Peterson 2006: 2) Why does the EU need ESS? And how the ESS will work? First and foremost, the ESS is a strategic draft which reaffirms common determination to take the responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe and enable the EU to better deal with the global threats and challenges facing today. It clearly shows an active, strong will, capable and more coherent EU would make a positive impact on global scale. Within the democratic world there is a need and requirement of draft such as ESS to identify the threats and challenges. The ESS provides the legitimacy to EU and partners to take actions against the threats and providing the space for evolving the strategic culture. It also helps EU to take decision and provides safeguard EU's interest in international stage. It is somehow difficult to provide how the ESS works, nonetheless it provides a broad guideline to perform in a specific manner. Hence, the ESS is not only a draft but a process too because it is a strategic document and strategy is always to achieve its goal, a stratagem rather than strategy (Biscop and Anderson 2008: 3) Therefore, it would contribute to an effective multilateralism system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

With the emerging new geopolitical reality and the new challenges, does the EU need a new European Security strategy? Does the EU have to increase the military strength? The objectives of the ESS were so broadly defined that they still hold. The NSS states that US security strategy must start from core beliefs and look outwards for possibilities to expand liberty. However, the ESS claimed that 'development is a precondition of security.' The ESS shows the commitment and willingness of

European Union toward security, it is a preventive rather than pre-emptive. Identify threats in global terms and distinctly a post-modern approach combining observations from the political, social and economic as well as traditional dimensions. The European Union's security strategy offered a chance to give a fresh policy framework to the ESDP and endorses the view that the European Union needs its own military capability but firmly rejects unilateralism in favour of multilateralism (Dannreuther and Peterson 2006: 14). The US-NSS urges that it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. However, in contrast the ESS repeatedly stresses that military force alone can solve no major international security problem and insists that no single country is able to face today's complex challenges on its own.

### **1.1 Adoption of European Security Strategy: A Response**

Today's EU is a unique economic and political partnership among 27 diverse democratic nations united in their commitments to peace, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. The outline of the ESS is followed an addressing its historical and conceptual context, the threat assessment, the multilateral and regional policies of the EU, its military capabilities and its strategic partnerships. It develops the combination of a comprehensive security concept and multilateral approach to tackle the threats, to extend the zone of security around Europe and to strengthen the international order. Its headline reads, "*A secure Europe in a Better World.*"<sup>2</sup> It can be considered a counterpart to the NSS of the United States. The document starts out with the declaration that "*Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free*". The opening sentence of the document states that, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than any time in its history, in the light of Europe's history that statement still hold true today. In its conclusion the document states that "*The world is full of new dangers and opportunities.*" Along these lines it argues that in order to ensure security to Europe in globalising world, multilateral cooperation within Europe and abroad is imperative. Moreover European societies are facing serious security threats that are growing in scale and sophistication. Many of today's security challenges are cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature. The ESS identifies

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<sup>2</sup>The first version of the ESS was presented by High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana in June and provisionally endorsed at the Thessaloniki European Council on June 2003. After a review process the text was finally adopted by the Brussels European Council on 12 December, 2003.

a string of key threats which Europe needs to deal with; terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states and organized crime. Not only Europe but whole world is facing the same threats and challenges. The document will enable the European to better deal with these threats and global challenges facing the EU. The catastrophic 9/11 creates the serious security problem in whole world and changes the whole dynamics of international politics; it shows threats are not only threats but also as complex and strategic threat. It creates the condition of strategic security and strategic partnership among the democratic nations.

The elaboration of a security strategy by Solana and his policy unit without doubt is one of the most exciting, but certainly also one of the most important projects the EU has undertaken in the broad field of foreign and security policies. At the same time it has become an important reference framework for the EU since its inception in 2003. Without strategy any actor can only really be a reactor to events and developments, equipped with a clear strategy and endowed with a strong strategic culture an actor can shape the world (Biscop and Anderson 2008: 4). Therefore, in ESS the EU now has a strategy, with which it has the potential of shifting boundaries and shaping the world. It is hardly surprising that the European security strategy places particular emphasis on the European Union's regional ambitions and outreach. European countries are similarly redirecting their forces, through both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) to deal with instability on the periphery of Western Europe in the post-cold war world (Huntington 1996: 90). Perhaps, the ESS recognizes that the EU has special responsibilities towards its neighbourhood and that its strategic aim and vision is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the east of European Union and on the borders of Mediterranean with whom EU can enjoy close cooperative relations. EU is only partially a global actor and cannot have the same global strategic reach as the United State. However, the European Union's ambitions to be a global actor do have meaning in the context of its engagement with neighbouring regions. On one hand ESS makes explicitly mention the need for multilateral cooperation between international organizations, require much greater cooperation with a wider range of organizations including civil society, international financial institutions and private

sector. It also points out that problems are rarely solved on a single country basis or without regional support.

## **1.2 The Features of European Security Strategy**

The ESS provides a strategic orientation to build security architecture for Europe and avail a clear mandate for enhancing the capabilities. The broad principles and its strategies allow the partners and willing European states to cooperate on pressing issues that face both the EU and its partners such as fight against proliferation of WMD and global terrorism. Development is crucial for collective and individual long term security, they are complementary agendas and neither is subordinate to the other. There cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and sustainable development is the best structural response to the deep rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism often linked to poverty, bad governance, the deterioration and lack of access to natural resources (ESS 2003).

The ESS advocates a holistic approach and has been incorporated in all parts of the EU machinery. The holistic approach cannot be efficiently implemented without changes in the EU machinery. Biscop conceptualized the holistic approach through the notion of Global Public Good (GPG). GPG have traditionally been seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is being used more and more in general political terms. He states that effective global governance means ensuring access to GPG, a system that fails to provide the core GPG lacks legitimacy. Therefore, the security of all states depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG.<sup>3</sup> He says that securitisation i.e. the instrumentalisation of non-military dimensions of external policy in function only of hard security concerns or freedom of fear must be avoided for, it ignores the intrinsic importance of the other GPG as effective action in all policy fields concerned requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors at many levels, a global public good oriented policy implies multilateralism. However, according to ESS, in the framework of multilateralism, the use of force can only be a measure of last resort to be mandated by the Security Council (ESS 2003).

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<sup>3</sup>Rather than terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military threats, the most important threat is the ever-growing gap between haves and have-nots. This gap is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it is a threat of a systemic nature.

The personal Union of the High Representative and the Commissioner for external relations, and the European External Action Service (EEAS) provided in the Lisbon Treaty would allow for the deeper integration of the security, political, social and economic dimensions in all foreign policies, from the creation to the implementation and to evaluation of the policy. A High Representative with a stronger mandate would also strengthen the EU's capacity for preventive diplomacy and increase leadership in EU foreign policy. One thing is clear that the EU can only have an impact when they makes the policy in function of Europe's own interest, priorities and act as one. EU must resolutely choose to act as one united pole in a multipolar world, including on matter of foreign policy, security and defence, only such a Europe will be relevant to the world.

If the EU today is not the global power that it could have been, it is not because its strategy is invalid, but because it has been half hearted in implementing it. The ESS is not very clear on priorities for ESDP operations, EU needs to prioritise its commitments in the line of resources, if the EU's engagement for global peace and security can be step up but there many conflict and crisis in the world for the EU to deal effectively with all of them, certainly in leading role. Perhaps, ESS was developed partly in response to highly complex problem of global security. European thinking about security still revolves around soft power, and as such is ill-suited to new security challenges which are non-traditional in nature, if this lack of new thinking about the role of military force as valid instrument persists in EU, it will hinder the emergence of effective Strategies. The key question is whether the security strategy will make the EU more effective actor on global security issues that the EU aspires to be? The strategy rapidly became a broader consensus building exercise for the enlarged EU and it has become the closest thing to European foreign and security doctrine as well as effective tool of public diplomacy.

President Barroso at the 4<sup>th</sup> joint parliamentary meeting on the future of Europe sharply asserts that,

Only the right institutions and policies can give Europe the capacity to act. We cannot face successfully the 21<sup>st</sup> century globalization with the institutions of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European will strengthen its political, its strategic and its economic voice in diplomatic, security, trade and development issues. The Treaty of Lisbon in short will reinforce the Union's coherence, cohesion and effectiveness in

external affairs. As such, it will improve the Union capacity to pursue one of its central tasks.

The Lisbon Treaty is the most recent attempt to reform the EU's rulebook. The Lisbon Treaty creates new architecture for foreign policy making that is expected to increase coherence and effectiveness within and outside the Union although implementing fully will take time. The ESS rightly states that the common threats assessments are the best basis for common action and confirm that the EU as a power concerned with upholding the current international order.

The 2003 strategies is good strategy concept, however it is too early to judge whether the Lisbon Treaty has damaged or brought new impetus to the EU security dimensions. With the adoption of Lisbon Treaty, ESDP has renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in December 1, 2009 and is the most recent revision of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which contains a number of provisions bound to strengthen collaboration in security and military affairs. Notably, it foresees the creation of a common European diplomatic service and the extension of enhanced cooperation to 'permanent structured cooperation' permitting groups of states to proceed to new levels of inter-state military team work. Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) Article 42.2 foresees the possibility of the creation of a common defence through a unanimous decision by the council. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might led to a common defence.

The Lisbon Treaty has reinforced the Agency's role in the improvement of European capabilities for the CSDP. This added thrust, brought forward by the institutional reform now needs to be fully utilised. New efforts are needed to enhance interoperability and standardisation not only between military forces but also between military and civilian actors. Internal security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world and it is therefore, important to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal and external aspects of European Security<sup>4</sup>. The European External Action Service will be invited to participate to ensure

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<sup>4</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU Internal Security Strategy in action. Five steps towards a more secure Europe, Brussels, 22/11/2010 com (2010) 673.

consistency with the wider European security strategy and exploit synergies between internal and external policies, including risk and threat assessment.

### **1.3 The European Security Strategy in post-Iraq Crisis**

The European Security Strategy is the document in which the EU clarifies its security strategy aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the EU, defining its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe. The starting point of the strategy's comprehensive approach is the recognition of the interdependence between all dimensions of security, political, socio-economic, cultural, ecologic, military and hence the need to formulate integrated policies on all of them (Biscop 2005). Why EU needs a security strategy? Answer to this question may not be touching all aspect of international relations which is necessary to every nation state. According to Steven Evert there are some main reasons for the EU to formulate a security strategy. EU needs to come to terms with how much the international landscape has changed after the September 11. This means agreeing how to response to major threats and to US administration which combines pre-eminence with pre-emption. The second reason is that EU is still divided into camps on its foreign policy ambitions. This divide is perhaps more damaging in the long term than the split between the Euro-Gaullists and Euro-Atlanticists (Steven 2003: 2). However, in practice the EU needs to use its trade, aid and other policies to support a clear political strategy. The European Union has been rather good at putting out grand declarations and long lists of key priorities but it has been poor at devising concrete policies aimed at tackling concrete problems. He asserted that, EU security concept should help to address the weakest link in EU external relations. Finally EU needs to overcome its tendency to react to crisis with glorified Ad hocery, it security should identify what kinds of developments would trigger what sort of reaction?

The United States led invasion of Iraq without specific UN mandate greatly influenced the European leaders to unite in welcoming a first draft of a new security strategy for the EU (Bailes 2005). Moving to more specifically institutional dynamics, the story of the European security strategy itself began with the informal meeting of EU Foreign Ministers at Kastellorio on the Island of Rhodes on 2-3 May 2003, where Javier Solana was mandated to produce a European Security Strategy.

concept and present it to the next European council. The EU was increasingly preoccupied with the need for coherence and longer term consistency in external politics and following the breakdown of former rigid boundaries between the CFSP and first-pillar related proceedings at council minister level. The EU remains a very heterogeneous group of countries with a wide spectrum of military cultures and security concerns because the EU is group of countries and not a nation-state. Hence, it is difficult for the EU member states to formulate strategic interest.

Building a security and defence policy that functions for EU 27 requires a common security and common interest that can easily translate into efficient common institutions agreed procedures and joint action. Here the EU's main doctrinal document, the ESS's clearly places the focus on conflict prevention but finding that the EU tends to react rather than taken preventive action is surprising. The EU is often regarded as civilian power but certainly demonstrated global engagement and fostered cooperation between the EU member states in sensitive domains of security and defence. It is also true that the EU has developed an innovative set of instruments with initially military approach to crisis management very soon becoming civilian-military one. No doubt, since 2003 the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict to ensure their security and meet the expectation of the citizens. Therefore, what is Europe's level of military ambition? This question should be addressed from a political perspective and complemented with a strategic and diplomatic approach the European security strategy and the Lisbon Treaty are the broad political guidance to provide EU's military level of ambition. However, the ESS is not fully-fledged strategies, the reason is that it does not clearly identify the require means to achieve the strategic objective, even with all the political guidance mentioned some ambiguities remained unaddressed but sound military judgement led to consensus. Here, the coherence of the EU's external action is currently seriously hampered by the institutional structure of the Union, in which external competences and procedures in all three pillars, the European Community, the CFSP, Police and Judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

#### **1.4 Changing Security Landscape after Cold War and 9/11**

In the past most threats to states came from other states, but now non-state actors have increasingly posed major threats in world security. In the contemporary world,



open economies and open societies have improved economic welfare but have also made the tasks of pursuing security more difficult. The concept of security can be defined in various ways, starting from relatively restrictive definitions building on military defence i.e. security from war and conquest to more inclusive definitions of security that consider a wider range threats against human life. Moreover, political security (i.e. security from extreme political oppression and persecution), economic security (i.e. security from hunger and deprivation), social and cultural security (i.e. cultural survival and minority rights) and environmental security (i.e. security from environmental degradation and disasters).

In the post-cold war period, threats against the state are indirect rather direct. The new security threats are generally aimed at society and threaten the social contract instead of the state's ability to govern (Kirchner 2007: 5) The EU must respond to conflicts in neighbouring states as well as to attacks of international terrorism. By being able to dispose over a spectrum of economic, political and military tools, the EU can effectively engage in different security functions such as conflict prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building. Here, the important question to ask is to what extent should development policy be subordinated to common foreign and security policy. How the European development policy allocates its scarce resources effectively emerged as one of the EU's top priorities at 21<sup>st</sup> century. The proper and judicious implementation of these problems will lend additional gain for ESS, which has been perceived as a significant contribution to a more coherent implementation of the European foreign, security and development policy. The major threats for Europe identified by the ESS have been perceived as being an increasingly global nature. Transnational terrorism has its sight on Europe and also the base.

The failure and erosion of state system in many regions of the world like Iraq, Afghanistan etc. provides the space for international organized crime and terrorist activities. In view of the existence of new international security threats, the EU will have to step up its efforts to promote effective multilateralism in global stage. ESS itself outlines the strategic nature of a globally oriented security strategy. Since the process of European integration as well as globalization the geographic distance between the EU and the most sensitive areas of the European security is diminishing. According to ESS, by strengthening international organizations and global security

regime compatible with the principle and norms of the UN Charter can create international framework capable of mitigating the global threats. EU recognizes the need to increase its efforts to prevent state failure in order to bring down the scope of ensuing crises. Therefore, the ESS makes it clear that these security threats cannot be addressed by military means alone rather it must consist of both civilian and military instruments. In this context, the ESS explicitly links the policy arena of security with the field of development policy. In the face of increasing interdependence between security and development policy, it is indeed very important to examine the emerging integration of European foreign, security and development policy as such to discuss and identified some of the challenges that emerge from dovetailing of European security strategy and development policy.

The end of the cold war produced a drastic change in Europe's security environment. The collapse of the Soviet bloc meant the end of a direct and major military threat to Europe's security. As a result, defence policy became less important. In response to this changing security environment and based on a new assessment of security threats, a member states have sought new ways to deals with security. The use of politico-military instruments can deal effectively with immediate security threats but the underlying causes of instability, conflict and terrorism demand a much broader, longer term and permanent policy of conflict prevention. A first limited attempt to draft a European security strategy was undertaken within the framework of the western European Union (WEU). The WEU states acknowledge that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperation mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent. Only a comprehensive security concept can provide an effective response to the new security environment. The EU, as a *sui generis* organisation with a foreign and security policy that has a global scope and covers all dimensions of international relations, now has the opportunity to adopt the comprehensive approach as the foundation of its external action.

The EU Security Sector Reform (SSR)<sup>5</sup> becomes an essential component in the delivery of the EU's defence, security, development, crisis management and

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<sup>5</sup>SSR is reform process applied in countries, whose development is hampered by structural weaknesses in their security and justice sectors and frequently exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight. It is relevant in many diverse contexts and can be deployed in support of range of key

conflicts prevention policies. To become a global actor, the EU needs to develop an effective, overarching and comprehensive SSR strategy that would enable it to address current security challenges. The SSR objective was to develop a shared understanding which would lead the EU to adopt a more coordinated and coherent approach. Even though there are interdepartmental mechanisms for funding conflict prevention and peace building activities within their domestic structures, many donor governments are still reluctant to fund activities relating to the security sector. The reason behind is the continuing misperception that SSR relates predominantly to achieving more efficient military capacities and counter terrorism programmes rather than to justice and development. Adoption of the ESS triggers the European Union to making a significant contribution to security and stability in the world. In realist approach military security is one of the important issues in international system. Here foreign policy is a major part when we talk about the capability and capacity to influence the global politics. In 1992, Union acquired new institutional capability and enhanced its role as security actor with adoption of Common Foreign Policy. Hereafter, the EU moved from notion of civilian power to military power and provided EU a new political culture.

By considering that the ESS is a fairly recent policy document, thus it has to blend with other established policy areas, institutional channels and instruments. Like any other world class power of the past and present, the Union's own identity is shape, first and foremost by its immediate neighbours environment. For the first time ever, the EU has agreed on a document that sets out what the threats to Europe are, main interests and objectives are and how the EU will achieve them? However, for the ESS to be implemented in full will require far reaching changes in how the EU conducts its foreign and security policy in coherent manner (Andersson 2008). What is coherence and why is EU needed? Is fundamental question which need to be answer, will be discussing in the next chapter. The ability of EU's security would be credible If EU tackles these four distinct questions satisfactorily, who provides security? Whose security? What threats and with what means?

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
objectives including poverty reduction, conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, promotion of human rights and democratization.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **The European Security Strategy**

The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) by the EU is a landmark in the development of its common foreign and security policy. Its implementation report, entitled 'Providing Security in a Changing World,' was presented to the European Council in December 2008. This report does not supplant the European Security Strategy which remains fully valid, but examines how it has fared in practice and what more needs to be done. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict. Yet 21 years after the cold war, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges. The EU has made substantial progress over the last 7 years and recognised as an important contributor to a better world. Despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. To realise the full potential the EU need to be more capable, more coherent and more active. As a matter of fact, the ESS established principle and clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests based on EU's core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant, it is the first time that Europe has formulated a joint security strategy. It identifies a host of key threats Europe needs to deal with. Certainly, the European Security Strategy was an important step in setting the broad strategic guidelines for the Europe's global role and time has come to turn those words into action.

The update of the strategy that was adopted by the European council effectively reflects the evolution of the wider security context since 2003. It rightly highlights the growing threat from the Iranian nuclear programme, Europe's energy security, new threat of maritime piracy. The EU's global influence will reflect how and with what instruments and extent EU can practically address those issues. Thus, it is necessary to be effective in three major areas in order to be a credible player in the global stage. First, the EU must improve its own military capabilities to be domestically effective. Second, the EU needs to develop closer ties with neighbouring non-EU states in order to enhance its influence within the immediate regional sphere. And third, the EU must be effective at a global level through the promotion of multilateralism. The table shows the framework of this chapter.



## 2.0 The European Security Strategy: A Conceptual Context

The security strategy clearly states that the EU and its member states will tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institution and rule of law. The document has no illusions regarding the weakness of the EU's military capability and highlighted as a major weakness in the EU crisis management and conflict prevention toolbox. Observers such as the United States accused European states during the cold war era of lacking a strategic thinking. The obvious point is that the EU had no military component at all up to 1999 and there were divisions between different European states in strategic position and outlook<sup>6</sup>. In terms of substance, Europe was not ready to use powerful sticks and carrots to pursue its

<sup>6</sup>Up to 1989 the most obvious of these was the East-West Confrontation; there were also differences between power with a global or localist, federalist or statist vision, big and small, north and south European states.

strategic aims. Its development and humanitarian aid were sizeable but not applied with any kind of security conditionality. Of course, the EU member states did own and often use substantial military resources abroad but did so in a purely national interest. In more substantial terms, the launching of the ESDP at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 may be seen as having helped to create the opening and the need of the eventual ESS. It allowed the EU's first military institutions, the European Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Military Committee (EUMC) to be created bringing some notions of strategic culture into the European Union, for the first time although the initial impact was limited due to poor civil-military coordination.

By 1990's the EU was increasingly preoccupied with the need for coherence and long term consistency in external policies, following years the European Council adopted a series of documents relevant to external relations where the word 'strategy' appeared. The EU is an organisation with weak political cohesion amongst the member states. In order to reinvigorate Member states interest and therefore attract their investment in ESDP oriented capabilities, there needs to be continued progress at the EU level in achieving a strategic concept and should be built on the present security strategy and provide the necessary decision making framework. The US decision to take military action against Iraq with only some members of the EU on its side had created open rift and more general crisis of confidence within the EU and NATO. Many observers were claiming that Europe's divisions reflected a more general inability by the continents to get to grips with the new threat agenda,<sup>7</sup> some even questioned whether a semi supranational, legalistic and consent based community like the EU could cope at all with the realities of power and responsibility in the world. The contents of ESS may conveniently be addressed under its three main sections. The acknowledgement that "*Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free*" is of the fundamentally changed situation for western democracies after the cold-war. The ESS policy implication for Europe calls for the development of an EU strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention. Perhaps, EU explicitly pledges operational support in crisis and post conflict situations through UN and further emphasis on multilateral regional solutions and partnership and reject unilateralism. The ESS reflect the

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<sup>7</sup>Primarily involving terrorism WMD proliferation and the failed-states regimes.

current progress and encourage further breakthrough in building the EU's strategic identity, call for more pooling and sharing of military<sup>8</sup> assets and it stresses that greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states.

The creation of ESS produced various important steps in building of the EU's policy corpus and governance structure. The adoption of ESS reflect the determination of the then EU 15 members but now 27 member states to build doctrinal common ground and to demonstrate their capacity for action after the setback of early 2003. However, the experience of drafting ESS be credited with a certain confidence building value, within the EU community before the member states went out together to test their unity in the face of new responsibilities and new risks. A suitable political and procedural transmission appears to have been found to translate specific desiderata from ESS into more immediate operational requirements. To express it in other way, the ESS exists to proclaim and promote greater unity in facing still emerging challenges rather than directly close the gaps or heal the wounds of past disunity. But still the open question is whether when faced with the next set of seriously divisive issue, Can EU tackle within the framework of the ESS? The ESS was born at a time when leading EU states were seeking reconciliation both with each other and across the Atlantic. The ESS represents the EU's acquisition of the self-awareness and need to stand up for itself. The ESS itself pointed out that, Europe believed in multilateralism and partnership and signal to them was one of an increasingly distinctive European voice with more than a hint of willingness to make common strategy. But the bigger question is whether the EU's methods and values as reflected in the ESS can offer anything at all useful and whether Europe has the will and skills to apply them to kick start integrative regional security solutions in the regions. The aspirations of the ESS for greater coherence will never be realized fully until and unless such provisions of the constitutions and the fusion of EU external services and European Council and foreign minister come into force<sup>9</sup>. If the dynamics of enlargement lead to the fragmentation of the EU polity into inner and outer tiers some observers have feared that, it is hard to see how the unity and solidarity required realizing the stated goals of the ESS could be maintain.

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<sup>8</sup> Stress on the need for intelligence sharing and common threat assessments.

<sup>9</sup>There has been comment on how the ESS could be vitiated if European states are not prepared to spend it more on defence and spend it wisely.

## **2.1 The European Security Strategy: Regional Objective**

With the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2004, the EU intends to reinforce stability and security in adjacent areas. The EU's capacity to emerge as a security provider and the approaches developed in this purpose will be gauged against its security objectives in the region as identified in the EU main policy document and in EU actor's discourse (Delcour 2010). EU mentions a vast range of security issues which need to address in order to promote stability, security and wellbeing, defined as the Union's main interests at its periphery under the title 'building security in our neighbourhood,' the EU security strategy mentions a number of challenges which all pose problems for Europe i.e. conflict, ill-governance, weak states, organised crime, dysfunctional societies and exploding population growth.

The role of security builder and provider that the EU intends to take over in its vicinity, therefore supposes the achievement of a wide range of long term objectives which depict as follows (Biscop 2005: 40). Preventing conflict in neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the EU, Settling on-going dispute and conflicts; Establishing close economic and political partnership based on shared values, prosperity and security; Controlling migration and all form of trafficking into the EU and Protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad. One of the major geostrategic priorities of the EU is to create a ring of friends outside its border, which respect the European values and also enhancing cooperation, security and stability. The efforts to reach the objectives, which considers important for regional security are undermined by a lack of coherence in policy implementation. Good governance and democratisation being considered by the EU as a prerequisite for stability are at the forefront of EU's foreign policy initiatives in the neighbourhood (Tocci 2007: 24; Delcour 2010: 543).

It is hardly surprising that the European security strategy places particular emphasis on the European Union's regional ambitions and outreach as a regional objective. The ESS recognizes that the EU has responsibilities towards its neighbourhood. The aim of building security in the neighbourhood is also one of the main concerns of ESS as one of the two core pillars of the European Union's strategic priorities. The ESS has contributed to giving greater strategic coherence and policy capacity to the



EU in dealing with neighbouring countries. Hence, the EU's ambitions to be a global actor do have meaning in the context of its engagement with neighbouring regions, where the EU can potentially project itself with the full complement of economic, political, diplomatic and military instruments and can most effectively promote its distinctive comprehensive conception of security. The EU's immediate neighbourhood is the principle testing ground for strategic ambitions to be taken seriously as an autonomous and powerful actor in international politics. The development and promotion of the European neighbourhood policy might not have emerged solely from the strategic impulse of the ESS but it was certainly influenced by it (Roland 2008: 64).

The ESS recognises that the European Union has a special responsibility towards its neighbourhood. Its strategic aim and vision is to enhance and promote well governed countries on the borders of the Mediterranean to the East of the European Union with whom EU can enjoy very close and cooperative relations. The issue of the European Union's neighbourhood policies is also significant, that the ESS can be seen to have had specific and concrete policy outcomes. Therefore, how the EU can define a regional foreign policy which aims to promote the goals of transformation as set out in the ESS? ENP is an important attempt at reforming the failed strategies towards Russia, the New Independent States (NIS) and the southern Mediterranean and at the same time the EU has demonstrated a considerable seriousness of intent in this regard (Roland 2008: 68). The reforms and procedures in the European neighbourhood policy might not represent a radical departure from earlier policies but do still reflect a new strategic urgency, a greater coherence and a genuine opportunity for the EU to influence positive future developments in its neighbouring regions. The ENP gives substantial weight to the ambitions and objectives of the ESS to promote a more cohesive and capable strategic capacity for the EU. The important question is whether this strategic ambition can be translated into effective action. Roland argued that, certainly the EU as a widely non state and quasi-supranational body is less proactive and more reactive policy maker than classical nation-state and thus more deeply affected by the unpredictable turn of events.


The main internal challenges that the European Union faces is that its clear interest in promoting economic and political transformation in its neighbourhood is counter balanced by a number of strategic and security driven interests. (Roland 2008: 69).

As such, the ESS can be seen to exacerbate these tensions as the document arguably concentrates more on the security threats posed by the European Union's neighbours than on their prospects for change and transformation. The ESS does admittedly recognise that transnational threats prosper and proliferate in weak or failed states and to the extent that such states exist in European Union's immediate neighbourhood. There is a strategic interest for EU member states to promote the economic and political reforms which can strengthen the capacity of these states.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps, it would be a mistake to dismiss the ENP purely as an exercise in empty rhetoric. Roland assume that, the ENP is certainly an adaptive and incremental policy and it is far from radical or revolutionary in its current form, but it does potentially making innovative policy framework and vision where the European Union's interests in its neighbouring countries become more heavily invested in seeing their political and economic transformation and their convergence with European values. If the ENP does develop in a positive and radically challenging way, then the ESS can said to have contributed to a policy outcome which fulfils the ambition expressed in the ESS of a Europe ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

Political will and moral courage should be develop in order to have real partnerships with neighbours and should adhered the basic philosophy of ESS in respect of democracy and human rights, strategic partnerships with other powers should develop in the multi-polar world. And the CSDP interventions need to have strategic objective and long term impact for peace and security. The continuation of enlargement process is crucial to influence neighbourhood, the EU needs to create a regional space for democracy, human rights, development and free trade, dealing with the wider world demands effective policies and a strategic framework with clear priorities in reflecting the diversities of the neighbourhood geopolitical dynamic. Analyses of the EU's foreign and security policy have often pointed to the complexity of EU foreign policy system and the heterogeneous preferences of EU actors. to account for the limits in the EU's external action, more specifically regarding its coherence (Delcour 2010: 543). It is necessary to explore and enhance the complementary between defence and security on the one hand and on the other

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<sup>10</sup>The challenge for implementing the ENP in the future requires the EU to be considerably braver in integrating this transformative agenda with its multiple security driven interests most notably immigration, energy and counter-terrorism.



hand instruments of external action, most notably trade policies, development aid, and promotion of democracy, humanitarian work and the protection of the environment. An effective implementation may thus contribute to reaching the EU's security objectives and dealing with regional stabilisation which has been a central rationale of the ENP (Smith and Weber 2008: 73; Delcour 2010: 546).

## **2.2 The European Security Strategy: Global Objective**

The security interests are both regional and global, indeed the 'world is the stage' said Guile. The ESS is the first ever common strategic document of the EU that accords a central place to the collective security system of the UN. The best way of summarising the ESS is through effective multilateralism that the strategic document outlines 'Effective multilateralism is a good formula for Europe.' Effective multilateralism is the third objective mentioned in the European security strategy, development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and rule based international order. The ESS calls for an international order based on effective multilateralism, it was originally set up in strategic official document 'A Secure Europe in Better world.' European commission declared that the UN's role as the axis of the multilateral system is necessary not only for peace and security but also for developing a ruled based international trading system. Hence, the EU and UN need each other. EU has already presented a multilateral vision of world through ESS, so also UN advocates multilateral faith. Significantly, the European provides the lion's share of UN budget, UN needs the active engagement of EU member states. EU is committed to upholding and developing international law.

The bilateral transatlantic relations also works at the level of multilateralism so cannot ignore the transatlantic relations. However, effective multilateralism requires not only broad international presence and legitimacy, but also the capacity to generate initiatives and political leadership to shape the agenda, define deadlines, mobilize resources and promote effective implementation. As such EU can act as political catalyst within the UN system. EU has engaged in discussions of more formal institutional reforms of the UN system. In its objectives and prescription it emphasizes the strengths of the existing EU instruments, the need for strengthened relationship and an international legal framework. This type of approach is described

by Solana as 'effective multilateralism.' However, Europe's security is not provided and there are security threats and challenges to be address that cannot be tackle alone by military muscle. The conclusion is that the Union's cooperative and institutional approach to security remains valid and important as the EU takes up greater global responsibilities in meeting its own security needs. Therefore, effective multilateralism is strongly identified with the very essence of the Union. No such assertions can be found in the US National Security Strategy.

The first version of the text presented by Solana to the European Council in June 2003 appeared to play down the UN's role (Richard Gowan 2008: 45). However, he argued that it was notable that when the European Council approved a revised version of the ESS in December 2003, the text placed much greater emphasis on the UN. Now it was the first strategic document which addressed the effective multilateralism and acknowledging the UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. While the ESS highlights that the EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts and enhancing its support for the UN in short term crisis management situations.<sup>11</sup> The circumstances surrounding the finalisation of the ESS were conducive to positive reference to the UN, a relation between two must be understood in the long term context of other international perceptions of the UN's contribution to global order. No doubt, the final draft of the ESS refers to the legal status of the UN charter, the political primacy of the Security Council and operational significance of the UN in post-conflict and conflict prevention and a separate EU strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction agreed alongside the ESS also emphasised the UN's role in fighting proliferation (Gowan 2008: 47). The ESS framed proliferation of WMD as a global threat that was becoming increasingly dangerous because of the potential link to terrorism. The ESS for the EU was developed through the office of the High Representative for common foreign and security policy. The aim of a Common Security Strategy for the EU was according to Solana, to make the EU a more credible actor and a more influential partner.

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<sup>11</sup>The UN seemed to have moved from an almost peripheral role in the ESS to its Centre and the EU had been also able to find some consensus through backing the UN elsewhere.

The principle of the ESS is used also for enlarging EU capabilities and contribution to global security. Therefore, this can be envisaged as a message to the world, aiming at explaining how EU would be able to face global challenges and threats including the transnational organized crime. The ESS stresses EU responsibility for global security the need of effective multilateralism and the extension of the international rule of law. Perhaps, effective multilateralism requires the development of broad based coalitions. In this context Richard Gowan argued that, it should also be understood in terms of the complexities of the Union's own profile within the multilateral system and its evolving attitude to the relationship between the legal, political and operational aspects of the UN. As seen already, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the security strategies of the both US and EU political powers presented some significant differences, but the ESS was essentially produced in response to the challenges posed by the US about the Union's actor-ness in the sphere of security policies. The lists of the key security issue are identical basically in the two texts. However, both the documents use different tones to describe the same need for more joint cooperation.

The ESS argues that the best protection for our security is a world of well governed democratic states and for strengthening international order. Here multilateralism is based and conducted on common and agreed rules and norms along with coordination created for solving problems instead of rivalry and simply juxtaposition (Irrera 2009: 9). There are many enemies in the NSS, while in the ESS there are many challenges. The will of the EU to build long term stabilization, to act through multilateralism and to be inspired by norms and ideas are the main elements of the global actor-ness EU has developed. The more complex set of competences the Treaty of Lisbon will give to the High Representative for Foreign Policies should strengthen even the fight against transnational organized crime. It can dramatically help to develop a common perception which passes through a multilateral process of creating joint policy initiatives and rational exploitation of international institutions, like the UN, the World Bank (WB), the IMF, the WTO and other regional organisations. The EU is not a coherent actor in the UN, the fact is that a fully coherent European Union could carry immense weight within the UN system (Gowan 2008: 50). As we have seen that, the ESS considered state failure a key

threat to the European Union and strongly argues that the UN's capacity for crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction should be bolstered.

The ESS exposed the significance of EU-UN cooperation in conflict management, the EU set out a framework for inter-institutional cooperation. On proliferation issue the European Union does not have an operational role but has tried to give the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) additional legitimacy while maintaining the political relevance of the Security Council. The UN is uniquely placed to provide the framework for international institutional cooperation, since the threats defined in the ESS required economic, political, as well as military instruments and close cooperation between the states. So as to deal with the complex, interconnected threats, collective tools and collective will to apply them must be built together. Perhaps, multilateralism alone is no guarantee of an effective response. Thus the European Union, under the ESS is determined to make effective use of the instruments available to it and continue to pursue an active, coherent and capable approach to complex threats and challenges. The EU searches for coordination and partnership across governments and organizations responding to interconnected and dynamic challenges with equally complex international alliances.

European Union has grown to 27 members and is poised to become even more dynamic now that the Treaty of Lisbon has been ratified. So the accomplishments of the past half century have showcased, how vital European security is, not only to the individual nations but to the world. It is after all, more than a collection of countries linked by history and geography. Perhaps, it is the model for the transformative power of reconciliation, cooperation and community. But it is not surprising that the EU had to go through a complex period of adjusting to various challenges. This experience would prove a lasting lesson for some of the EU member states. These significant developments and the gradual realization of the major among EU members shift the approach to regional and global security in the ESS.

### **2.3 The European Security Strategy and Internal Security Strategy**

The EU Internal Security Strategy (EU-ISS) was adopted by the council in February 2010 under the auspices of the Spanish Presidency with a view to setting out a common European security Model. The objectives of the EU's Internal Security

Strategy is to establish a shared agenda on internal security that enjoys the support of all the member states, the institutions, civil society and local authorities and the EU security industry. The ISS identified a number of principles and guidelines for action in pursuit of a 'European security model. The European Commission communications on the EU internal security strategy in action identifies five strategic objectives and outlines a series of actions such as disrupt international crime networks threatening their security, prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment, raise levels of security for citizens and business in cyberspace, strengthen security through border management and increase Europe's resilience towards crises and disasters towards a more secure Europe, plans of working with other member states to strengthen the security of EU citizens.

The Lisbon Treaty facilitates the Union to develop its own action and policies concerning security and justice. The Stockholm Programme<sup>12</sup> calls for the development of comprehensive EU Internal Security Strategy. It is important to recall that the Lisbon Treaty has abolished the Maastricht Treaty pillar structure and shift police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Despite of the EU member states having their own national security policies and strategies, it has been considered that member states cannot respond to today's complex security challenges on their own. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty and Stockholm programme have enabled the EU to further effective action in this area. An internal security strategy should be developed in order to further improve security in the Union and thus protect the lives and safety of European citizens and tackle threats. Moreover, the European Union needs to base its work on solidarity between member states and make full use of article 222 TFEU. As institutional matters, the European Council is setting the Internal Security Committee (COSI)<sup>13</sup> as a body in charge with developing, monitoring and implementing the strategy. Under the Lisbon Treaty COSI is thus, in charge with developing, monitoring and implementing the security strategy in protecting the people in Europe within a global society. The strategy was founded on certain values and principles of transparency and accountability, mutual trust, solidarity between member states in security policies. The council of the European

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<sup>12</sup>The Stockholm programme is the EU's programme for justice and home affairs for the period 2010-2014. It aims at creating genuine European area of freedom, security and justice.

<sup>13</sup>This is composed by the member states representative.

Union Declared, that 'member of the Union should agree on the European strategy for Home security promoting the creation of a European model that will gather the EU guiding principles and strategic lines on the matter.'

Following the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 the EU has now further powers to strengthen security related issues and instruments to interfere within the member states nature security policies. The key role of EU in the internal security consists of common policies, legislation and practical cooperation in the areas of police and judicial, border management and put forward shared agenda for member states, the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council and Agencies. However, security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world and it is therefore important to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal and external aspects of EU security. In particular internal security related priorities should feature in political dialogues with third countries and regional organisations for combating multiple threats, such as drugs and human trafficking and terrorism.

A picture is already emerging of a body with the potential to play key role in guiding the European Union's more operational side of internal security. The member states no longer pose or face any direct military threats to each other and to their territorial integrity for foreseeable period of time by strengthening the existing web of political, economic, social and military interdependence between current and further to enlargement future member states, the EU is continuing to build an area of freedom, security and justice. But, the EU's territory and population stand vulnerable to global threats. To enhance the confidence of EU's population, the EU and its member states as the strategy stipulates, have equipped themselves with new instruments, such as the European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism. The commission communication on an EU internal security strategy in action towards a more secure Europe commences with a series of arguments that move in one direction, first there is a need for more security and secondly the EU 27 should have a common framework for common internal security strategy. A European internal security strategy must be built on the basis of evidence and analyses of the security interests of the people of Europe as well as the added value and effects of new internal security policy strategies (Guild and Carrera 2011: 9)



The strategy should function as a tool for policy makers as a set of guidelines for day to day policy making in all of the fields. This applies to setting objectives as well as choosing the instruments and building the necessary capabilities. The adoption of the strategy is a major step for external action. The ambitious agenda set forth in the strategy serves as an affirmation of the EU as a global actor. Effectively implementing of strategy therefore, is now essential to the credibility of the EU. In that sense, the strategy also is a measure of performance. For the citizens of the EU, security is one of their main priorities, communicating security policies to the citizens and recognizing the interdependence between internal and external security. Therefore, security has become a key factor in ensuring high quality of life in European society, in this sense EU internal security means protecting the people and values of freedom and democracy. It also reflects EU's shared vision of today's challenge and combined resolve to address these threats. The Lisbon Treaty enables the EU to take ambitious and concerted steps in developing Europe as an area of freedom, security and justice.

With globalization ushering in a new era of commodification, high mobility, instant financial transaction, porous borders and high speed communication have impacted on security and safety within and outside the EU. Terrorism has global reach and devastating consequences, its ability to recruit through radicalization and disseminate propaganda over the internet and financed make terrorism<sup>14</sup> a significant and ever evolving threat to human security as the ESS rightfully identified. Perhaps, the time has come to harness and develop common tools and policies for tackling threats and risks using a more integrated approach.<sup>15</sup> Security itself is a basic right, people in Europe expect to live in security and to enjoy the freedoms. Thus, security, freedom and justice policies are mutually reinforcing while respecting fundamental rights and the rule of law. Along with integration, social inclusion and the fight against discrimination are the key elements for EU internal security.

A concept of internal security with the external dimensions given that more and more internal security depends to a large extent on external security. It is important and necessary to build relationships through a global security focus, working closely with other countries especially neighbouring countries and supporting their

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<sup>14</sup>Terrorism in any form has an absolute disregard for human life and democratic values.

<sup>15</sup>This is the main and principle aim of the internal security strategy.

institutional, economic and social development when necessary. Also the effort to fight against transnational crime outside the EU and to build respect for the rule of law is crucial. The cooperation with European Defence and Security Policy, especially between the EU agencies and the respective missions needs to be enhanced even more. In this way, the internal security strategy serves as a perfect complement to the European Security Strategy which was developed in 2003 under the EU's security and defence policy. To address global threats and security risks and make most effective way of achieving longer term security of social, political and economic development of EU's society as well as global society. It is necessary to consider the feasibility of setting up of an internal security fund to promote the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy so that it becomes an operational reality.

#### **2.4 The European Security Strategy: Military Dimension**

The present debate in the ESS had avoided serious consideration of the level of force and what circumstances European envisage for the evolving ESDP. The military instruments of the CFSP, the European security and defence policy has been vaguely articulated in the form of Petersberg Tasks (Guille 2004: 11). If the EU cannot have open discussion about the areas of interests and the implications for the use of force, it is difficult to see how the EU can achieve and have adequate calculus of military needs. Furthermore, the potential range of operations, the level of concurrency, sustainability and logistic support are only possible to define sensibly after broader discussion on the purpose of the EU's military instruments. The EU could play a more prominent role in fostering strategic debate to which would help to build confidence between the member states and in turn help to foster that elusive European strategic culture.

After the Cold War, all European nations had no options but to transform their militaries. The types of forces required for the territorial defence objectives of the cold war was quite inappropriate for the new crisis management and peacekeeping missions of the post-cold war world (Howorth 2008: 82). The basic shift was from quantity to quality which requires a range of skills not only military skills but also political, social and even cultural and linguistic skills. The challenge of transformation was acute especially for Europe, during the cold war the European

forces were rarely deployed far from home they spent most of their time on exercises and virtually none of it on active duty. As such we witnessed a transformation of the European Union's plans, structures, weapons system and equipment. Delcour argued that, the difficulties of EU as a security actor on the world stage are often explained by the weak military capabilities, lack of engagement into hard security issues and different interests of EU actors, less attention is paid to policy implementation processes.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair resolutely moved towards improving European capacity in 1998, broke the log jam that European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) had been unable to shift. The historic summit at Saint-Malo gave a new dimension to move the European defence project to a higher level, ever since the quest for autonomous EU military capacity has proceeded. The European Union launched its first ever autonomous military operation outside NATO framework in 2003, a peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) taking over from NATO forces. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) offered even richer lessons about the European Union capabilities (Cornish 2004). Operation Althea of 2004 represented an even greater test of the European Union's military's muscle which involved the transfer from NATO to the EU of responsibility for the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). As far as the armed forces of the EU are concerned, the ESS mentioned the on-going effort to transform their militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources is necessary i.e. systematic use of pooled and shared assets. Drawing the lesson from the invasion of Iraq, the document underlined that in almost every major military intervention has been followed by civilian chaos, thus EU needs greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis. Military capability according to Samuel P. Huntington, has four dimensions; Quantitative: the numbers of weapons, men, equipment and resources; technological: the effective and sophistication of weapons and equipment; organisational: the discipline, coherence, training and morale of the troops and effectiveness of command and controls relationships; and societal: the ability and willingness of the society to apply military force effectively (Huntington 1996).

In the early 1990s, defence planners began to address the problem of developing a serious EU military capacity that would allow the Union to assume responsibility for the new crisis management tasks (Howorth 2008: 84). The challenge of improving military capacity in Europe remained unaddressed throughout the 1990s. However, the EU entered a new and qualitatively different stage in the process of strengthening military capabilities in 2004 with the announcement of the new Headline Goal 2010 which formally adopted in the European Council meeting on 17 June 2004 strengthening on the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), HG 2010 commits the Union to be able by 2010 to respond to a crisis with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. They are defined as the minimum military effective, credible, rapid and capable to stand alone operations. Perhaps, by the end of 2004 the European Union was beginning to look like an increasingly credible potential military actor. Moreover, Althea allowed the European Union to experiment with large scale helicopter manoeuvres, combating drug running, organising the voluntary surrender of small arms, peace support training schemes and psychological operations (Howorth 2008: 96).

The European military capacity after a long period of stagnation has come a long way within a few short years, progress in procurement, rationalisation, planning, force transformation has been impressive. However, the European Union still has a long way to go before it overcome all its weaknesses and emerge as fully credible coordinated military actor. But only these ambitions can be attained when European Union clearly established what it hopes to achieve, with what levels and equipment and to have clear idea about how much money is required for force transformation. The agreement to set up a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as part of a European Security and Defence policy has been variously described as Europe's military revolution (Andreani et al 2001; Mawdsley et al 2008). The political and military weakness of Europeans shown by the Balkans conflicts stirred the UK and France to respond with a declaration at Saint-Malo in France in 1998 which gave birth to ESDP. While the EU is more deeply involved in the political and economic fabric of its neighbourhood the Balkans in particular, it is also a de facto global political actor in other spheres such as through its special representatives, its role in the Middle East through the Quartet (Mawdsley et al 2008: 12).

Perhaps, France has traditionally envisaged an EU military function as an alternative to NATO but the UK has traditionally opposed such version. But this will depend on member states providing the appropriate decision making structures, which although functioning in operation in Concord<sup>16</sup> and Artemis do not meet ideal standards for crisis management military hierarchies, civilian interaction and not least democratic accountability. The dynamic and involving nature of the EU Sui generis provides opportunities for member states to collectively generate the necessary European defence capabilities to respond to their shares global security concern. However, without thinking collectively it will be impossible for the member states to meet their collective ambitions as set out in the ESS to act globally and have a military instrument available to support political, diplomatic and economic objectives. The prevailing consensus in the debate on EU military capabilities is below the mark. The war in Kosovo and the catastrophic 9/11 events are commonly considered to have acted as a stimuli for the debate on capabilities. The ability to provide an integrated approach to preventing and managing violent conflict is perhaps the single greatest challenge facing the EU. The complexity of contemporary intervention operations has raised a number of issues relevant to their conduct, which the EU will have to face in the near future. Maintaining high standards in this area will be an essential component of attaining credibility in the international stage, which is the prioritise objective of ESS.

Without doubt, that European security is entering a state of emancipation and self-reliance. Talks about developing more integrated defence policies in the form of structured defence cooperation and autonomous planning capabilities for the EU are well advanced with all major member states now broadly supportive of such ideas. It may be a premature assertion, but it does appear that the emergence of an integrated European defence capacity with fully fledged European forces is round the corner. The Europeans must agree with Kofi Annan's (former UN Secretary General) adage; 'You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force.' It is increasingly clear that Europeans and the EU in the security strategy see the military dimension of security as an instrument for achieving security policy that must be employed in the context of a

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<sup>16</sup>The EU launched a military operation (Concordia) in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 31 March, at the explicit request of FYROM government to contribute further to a stable secure environment.

comprehensive security strategy and not a one-step solution to manifest political crises.

## **2.5 The European Security Strategy and Strategic Culture**

While there is a strategy in theory, putting it into practice is quite a different story. Building a security and defence policy that functions for 27 countries in fair weather requires a common security and defence culture, something which is still in an early stage of development. At present, only a minority of the member state take defence and security and believe in military intervention to solve security problems. The absence of a security strategic concept has been described as an obstacle to developing a European strategic culture which in turn would help foster greater political will to cooperate in the area of foreign policy under the CFSP. The ESS may be an important step along the road to an EU strategic culture. Cornish and Edwards warn against the dangers of not achieving this strategic culture. Without it, any political aspirations can only appear disconnected and either empty or superfluous (Guille 2004: 10).

Solana recognizes the important of developing an EU strategic culture, he noted that the development of such a strategic culture will improve decision making, facilitating rapid and if necessary robust interventions in crisis situations. The strategy itself is not an immediately operational document in the sense that it is not a detailed plan of action it lays down the overall objectives of EU external action and principal ways of achieving these. Certainly the EU is one of the most active and often most powerful players in the vast and diverse field of international trade, development, environmental policy etc. Implicitly the strategy opts for the use of force as a last resort only and with a UN Security Council mandate. A strategic culture must be developed; this will increase the coherence of EU's external action, harmonizing the agendas of all policy area and will increase efficiency. It is at the same time crucial for the success of the strategy to recognize that it does just concern security policy in the narrow sense i.e. politico-military dimension. In this sense, it is really more than a security strategy but it is a comprehensive strategy for external action.

There are strategic lessons to be learnt from Europe's response to North Africa, which will be clearly reflected in the policy making, structures and the rules of

procedures. Foreign policy does not belong to diplomats only anymore and it is not Wikileaks proof, all governments are accountable to their communities. Carl Bildt the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs said on March 23, 2011. The notion of strategic culture has entered the realm of actual policy and most visibly in 2003 in the EU security strategy document which called for the creation of a European strategic culture. In the interpretation strategic culture is not deployed purely as a means to reject the claims that states are egoistic actors driven by self-interests, some words we are not seeking to negate fully the key assumptions of realism. However, the approach here rejects the claims that states' interests are exclusively defined by material factors, predominantly on their location and military power. In strategic culture perspective material factors are significant, but it is equally important to consider the weight of a state's past experiences (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004). They argued that, the response and positions adopted by individual states in Europe were heavily influenced by the past experiences and strategic cultural predispositions. Despite the heterogeneity of strategic culture in Europe, what is common to all is a slowness to react and respond to the challenges.

The European thinking about security will be ill suited to new security challenges if it revolves around soft power, containment and deterrence. If this lack of new thinking about the importance of military force as a valid instrument persists in Europe, it will hinder the emergence of effective European security strategies. To overcome this obstacle, Hyde-Price identifies the principals which could form the basis of a new European strategic culture. Strategic perceptions and institutions as well as policies which were rooted in the cold war era were slow to adapt to the new environment. The significant elements of this continuity were the US's sustained involvement in European affairs, NATO's important role as primary institutions in European security, the continuation of the EU's principal role as an economic, rather than political agent (Hyde-Price 2004). One way or other way, it is clear that the end of the cold war has now begun to translate into the transformation of institutions and policies in European security. In decision making process member states as well as the European institutions can make good use of the ESS. A strategic culture is thus developing at the EU level, i.e. the habit of automatically referring to the strategic framework of the ESS when taking decisions and willingness to undertake the actions and commit the means to achieve those strategic objectives (Biscop 2004).

The ESS emphasizes the need to develop a strategic culture, a concept introduced by Jack Snyder in 1977, in a research report on Soviet and American nuclear strategies, and since the term strategic culture has been part of the international vocabulary. Snyder defines strategic culture as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional response and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy. According to Snyder, strategic culture is embedded in a country's history, in its political culture and in the attitudes of the military leaders. In other words, strategic culture provides framework in which an actor approaches the questions of threats or use of force. And the broader question of hard power capabilities as policy resources. In its avoidance of coupling military means to policy objectives, the EU strategic culture is therefore, in itself testimony of the need to develop an EU strategic culture. In 2005 AlseToje argues that, the call to develop an EU strategic culture draws attention to the constructive of the ESS. It assumed that by reflecting on our experiences, we construct our own understanding of the world we live in. Thus according to this logic, a strategic culture can be constructed by an act of will. Constructivists have rejected realists for having a functionalist imperative, that state behaviour is governed by the incentives offered by the state system. On the other hand, constructivists are open to the critique that societal imperatives where states acts on the basis of ideas generated at a national or supranational level have similar place in thinking. The ESS aspects such a culture to materialize as a result of experience and the ESS rightly states that common threats assessments are the best basis for common actions. The most significant goals for the first ever EU security strategy was therefore to specify what the EU security and defence policy is about on a practical level (Toje 2005: 124).

## **2.6 The European Security Strategy and Increasing Search for Coherence**

In 2008 Andersson said that, "Coherence, like coordination is a principle everyone in the EU agrees with but only when it applies to someone else." The EU's international strategy must be comprehensive and overarching, it must unite all EU institutions behind the same set of goals and critically draw on their ability to bring about convergence with and among Member States (MS). EU external action must link up in a coherent and consistent way with many aspects of different EU policies including development, the promotion of good governance, rule of law and notably



trade. A particularly important part of this comprehensive approach is to integrate security and defence more effectively into the broader picture of EU wide international policy. Ultimately, while Lisbon Treaty reforms should help the future, success of CSDP aspirations will depend on the commitment of EU governments, meaning not only ability to agree on effective common policies but also on their willingness to contribute adequate resources. The issue of coherence is complex, coming up at many stages in the policy process (Andersson 2008).

In short coherence means that the EU should be able to pursue its external policy goal regardless of which institution and policy tool it chooses. For the purpose of analysis, Andersson divided coherence into two dimensions; horizontal and vertical coherence. Horizontal coherence concerns the extent to which the various external policies and activities of the EU's institutions, agencies and representatives are logically connected and mutually supportive. Vertical coherence concerns the extent to which the external policies and activities of the member states are logically connected and mutually supportive with those of the EU's institutions, agencies and representatives<sup>17</sup>. In fact, it is true that in the absence of coherence the EU can be an inefficient and uncoordinated external actor. The problem of coherence is not only a problem for EU institutions and policies. More coherent EU in external affairs also requires more coherence between what is being done at the EU level and the member states. Andersson argued that, Vertical coherence demands greater coordination between EU institutions and member states in both Brussels and in the field.

Coherence is also an issue between the EU and various other different regional organisations in Europe and elsewhere. However, coherence does exist in policy area of trade, the EU has successfully negotiated its position as one voice for many years in bilateral talk with other countries and in multilateral negotiations in organisations such as the WTO. So could the EU trade policy be a blueprint for a more coherent CFSP? Some would argue that pooling national responsibility to a supranational institution might be acceptable on matters of low politics such as trade but would be impossible on high politics such as security and defence. However, improving coherence is not only a question of better strategic planning to become a

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<sup>17</sup> The EU consisting of 27 member states, and growing numbers, of individual, the EU institutional lack of coherence is quickly becoming a recipe of disaster.

more effective external actor. The EU also needs to ensure that any policy decision taken by the EU is rapidly integrated by all EU institutions into both internal and external development policy. This requires close cooperation between EU institutions and member states and the establishment of a shared diplomatic culture between the different actors in EU external policy.

The fact that the diversity of its own national interests and priorities of member states poses a significant challenge to the CFSP, however the adoption of the ESS was a crucial step towards a more coherent EU. It provides a common frame of reference for both long term strategies and for current political problems and also provides a common base for negotiations with other countries and organisations on issues of strategic importance (Andersson 2008:136). When EU speaks with one voice as it does in international trade negotiations, it carries tremendous weight. But when it fails to act in a coherent manner during the Balkan conflict of 1990s and the Iraq crisis, it loses influence as well as credibility. Therefore, it is necessary to meet the challenge of coherence if EU wishes to become a major international actor. No doubt, the adoption of ESS and strong support from the member states will help in meeting this challenge. More coherent future Common Foreign and Security Policy for Europe is conceivable and achievable but only time will tell the story.

The major setback is that, the implementation of security strategy suffers from the Union's difficulty in defining a coherent foreign policy to back its missions and to bring all the components of its external action to bear on a given crisis in an effective way. Civilian missions and community measures are often deployed in the same country alongside ESDP military operation which requires a closer inter-institutional cooperation and also working with the EU presidency and the Member States. Apart from internal coherence between the Council and the Commission and among others, the EU needs to work effectively with other organisations and countries. For instant, in Afghanistan it must work with NATO and the US. According to Solana, one major problem is that EU structures are not designed to have a single chain of command. Thus, the EU should carry out more crisis management exercise to develop its internal coordination, understanding the range of security challenges the EU is attempting to tackle, the Union's institutions must also further engage the private sector and NGO's in their coherence discussion. Bringing the gap between sectorial policies and agencies should also be a priority for

the Union in shaping the multilateral system at large, as challenges are growing more complex and interconnected. But the Lisbon Treaty creates new security architecture for foreign policy making that is expected to increase coherence and effectiveness within and outside the Union.

## **2.7 The European Security Strategy: Looking Ahead**

Not surprising that the capabilities of European countries fall well below their own strategic needs. European must do their own assessments of what they need from their militaries. The ESS constitutes a real effort and indeed a step forward. Having identified common threats and shortfalls, working to develop certain common or collective capabilities may be a good way to force more discipline on individual member states of EU in order to rationalise the use of scarce resources. The ESS has become the closest thing to European foreign and security policy 'doctrine' and also an effective tool of the public diplomacy. So it remains as relevant as when it was first published in 2003. The EU has become more active on the international scene since 2003, the EU has blossom into a wide array of diplomatic initiatives and overseas missions. Moreover, the EU is also becoming more coherent in how it conducts its external policies. The institutional and operational capabilities have been improved, more member states now seems willing and able to put up forces for common operations than before.

However, overall pool of European capabilities has grown only marginally, the readiness of the individual member states to resort to force in peace support operations remain not homogenous. This may hamper to modernize the common policies provided appropriate arrangements are made in terms of decision making and funding. It has been able to transcend the context of its adoption, the ESS has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU foreign policy making. In the sense, the ESS has consolidated the strategic orientations that were already emerging. To the extent that the strategic document will effectively functions as a reference framework for daily decision making in all fields of foreign policy, it will promote consistency and the emergence of a strong strategic culture (Biscop and Anderson 2008: 8). In the ESS many important issues are find place not to do so would have invoked strong criticism. The document does contain a number of clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU

foreign policy and it could be a team building exercise for the new foreign policy actor established by the Lisbon Treaty.

Perhaps, the ESS is probably the best policy document the EU had ever delivered in the past years. Over the last few years, a distinctive European approach to security has emerged which is characterized by a broad, multidimensional and comprehensive notion of security which starts from the interdependence between all dimensions of security i.e. political, socio-economic, ecology, cultural and military Biscop said. In its 2001 communication on conflict prevention, for example the commission proposed to address the root causes of conflict by promoting structural stability defined as sustainable economic development, democracy, respects for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions with the capacity to manage change without resort to the use of force and avoid unwanted conflict. He calls the comprehensive approach to security particularly characteristic of EU policy with respect to neighbouring states. Further, he argued that when the EU is confronted with acute crisis such as the one in Iraq, these implicit assumptions have proved to be insufficient to arrive at a common policy, the EU fails to deliver consensus on how to respond to such crisis, even when the instruments and means to do are at hand. As a consequence little or no effective action is taken, EU external policy are ineffective, hence the need to define a strategy as framework for dealing with crisis situations. The ESS can be characterised as a holistic, integrated or comprehensive approach (Biscop 2005; Biscop 2006: 89).

The events like 9/11 force EU to adopt in depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism come into being and the integration of all the countries into the fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development. However, the US invasion of Iraq led to sharp division within the EU. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called between 'new Europe and old Europe,' due to its internal divisions the EU was absent from the scene. A concrete strategy should be able to overcome the damaging effect of internal divides and ensure the EU's active participation in international decision making. The EU operation in the Congo Artemis has demonstrates that the EU can act rapidly and decisively if there is a political will. A strategy would provide a clear and concrete framework for policy making and thus would render unilateral decision and act

stronger in any event. Such a bold step might also remove the misgivings among the EU's neighbours about a building up of military capabilities which in their views lack clear objectives. The adoption of the strategy would enhance the openness and democratic legitimacy that are needed to gain important support of public opinion.

Today if the EU is not a global power, it cannot be because its strategy is invalid but because it has been half hearted in implementing it. No doubt, all the new threats and challenges are already mentioned in the ESS, the strategic document offers both sound concept and ambitious agenda. Perhaps, the major contribution of EU member states to the NATO mission reflects the trend that the political centre of gravity is shifting away from NATO. The EU is increasingly becoming the political centre and the primary decision making level for European states the complete foreign policy actors, covering from aid to trade to diplomacy and to military. It is in the EU they decide whether or not to act in a given situation. As such, if their decision entails military action, the next step is to select the organization through which EU wants to act and should decide which organization is suited best.

The EU as a political platform of Europe should decide on a military or civilian-military strategy for CSDP and must assess how many forces should the EU 27 be able to muster for crisis management and long term peacekeeping and what capacity must be maintained for territorial defence is imperative for EU? However, in the Mediterranean, public opinion mostly views the EU as a status-quo actor, working with the current regimes rather than promoting fundamental change (Biscop et al; 2009: 14). Notwithstanding, the ESS advocates a holistic approach but the holistic approach cannot be efficiently implemented without changes in the EU machinery, it also requires the active cooperation of all global powers. The High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations and the EU External Action Service provided in the Lisbon Treaty would enhance the integration of the security, political, social and economic dimensions in all foreign policies. Perhaps from creation to the effective implementation and evaluation of framed policy, the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. The ESS laid out the major threats facing the EU, but what requires further in depth analysis now is how these various factors interact in different setting and how best the EU can bring to bear its different instruments and capabilities to address

them.<sup>18</sup> In many ways the ESS concluded that terrorism poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe as well as the entire world. The ESS needs to provide some insight into the balance that needs to be struck between counter-terrorism activities and upholding the human rights of EU citizens. We have to assess how far the ESS aspiration for better coordination between external and Justice and Home Affairs policies has been realized. The juxtaposition of radicalized terrorists, failed state and WMD is a terrifying prospect and that could pose a strategic threat to European security. If the ultimate weapons of terror fall into the hands of those who would have no compunction about using them, this would be catastrophic. Hence, the ESS should acknowledge that trying to stop proliferation without addressing its root causes is almost bound to fail.

Although in the spirit of human security the individual is taken as point of reference, the state remains a primary partner, for no effective arrangements can be made with weak and failed states. In the words of the ESS, the best protection for our security is a well governed democratic state. The document recognised that the third states must therefore be seen as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies, the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. Sometime there will be case where the use of force is inevitable, for all actors are not amenable to preventive initiatives and security threats will arise. But it should be in the framework of multilateralism (ESS 2003: 9). The EU did not attempt to analyse the emerging centre for the strategic power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century world. Moreover, the December 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS recognizes that, the new threats pressing EU have become increasingly complex. However, the work of ESS is progressing with more active in pursuing the strategic objectives as well as more coherent and more capable. It is too early to judge and conclude in negative assumptions because it will take time to realise the full potential. An active and capable European Union would make an immense impact on a global scale.

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<sup>18</sup>Tackling state failure on Europe's periphery could require an ESDP interventions and commission funded development assistance, buttressed by strong border controls. Combating terrorists could well necessitate sending troops overseas and strengthened security services as well as a strategy for winning the hearts and minds of terrorists potential support base through development assistance, educational programmes and cultural exchange.

Why does Europe need the Treaty Lisbon? To realise its full potential, the EU needs to modernise and reform, the EU 27 members are operating with rules designed for an EU 15. The EU has grown and responsibilities have change too. To make more efficient in the decision making process, more democratic through a greater role for the European Parliament and National Parliament and to increase external coherence are the three fundamental reasons for the Treaty Lisbon. Here, the Lisbon Treaty reinforces the Union's capacity to act through strengthened external coherence and broadened range of internal policies and modern institutions that work in a Union of 27 also provides more practical diplomatic actions(Wassel 2009: 2).

## CHAPTER III

### From ESS to Lisbon Treaty

The Berlin Declaration on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, Berlin, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2007, asserted that;

We are facing major challenges, which do not stop at national borders. The European Union is our response to these challenges..... We will fight terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration together. We stand up for liberties and civil rights also in the struggle against those who oppose them. Racism and xenophobia must never again be given any rein. We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the and to ensuring that people do not become the victims of war, terrorism and violence. The European Union wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to continue to drive back poverty, hunger and diseases. We want to take a leading role in that fight. We intend jointly to lead the way in energy policy and climate protection and make our contribution to averting the global threat of climate change.

For the foreseeable future the EU can finally close the lengthy saga of institutional reform with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The President of the Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso optimistically stated, "*In this old continent, a new Europe is born*", during the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007. The Lisbon Treaty is an attempt to overcome the impasse caused by the failure of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. It aims to create and enhance institutional architecture and to offer better opportunities for strengthened collective action. The Lisbon Treaty seeks to respond the lack of continuity inherent within the six month rotating presidency system by inaugurating a permanent president within the European Council elected by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)<sup>19</sup> for a period of two and half years, renewable once (Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), Article 9B paragraph 5). This new position aims to give better visibility and stability in the preparation and the continuity of the work of the European Council and the external representation of the Union on the CFSP issues (ToL, Article 9B paragraph 6). The creation of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security in another innovation, essentially the purpose is to achieve greater coherence. The HR will be assisted by the creation of EEAS<sup>20</sup> (ToL, Article 3a paragraph 3). The CSDP now has its own section with the Lisbon Treaty and symbolically upgraded from a

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<sup>19</sup>The significance of QMV is that it overcomes the internal veto i.e. QMV enables a majority of states to push through a decision against the opposition of a minority.

<sup>20</sup>EEAS composed of officials from the council, commission and diplomatic services of member states, the EEAS will seek to streamline the EU external services by combining all those involved in foreign affairs.



'European' to 'Common' security and defence policy. This key innovation was presented by Lisbon Treaty. This change indicates a greater willingness by the member states to develop a 'military arm' of the EU. The European Defence Agency (EDA) created in July 2004 is also now inserted within the legal framework of the CSDP (ToL, Article 28D). The Lisbon Treaty also institutionalizes the implementation of a mission by group member states that are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task on behalf of the Union and entrusted by the council. The Lisbon Treaty now lifts the ban on using enhanced cooperation<sup>21</sup> in defence matters as well.

An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale (ESS 2003: 11). The EU must enhance its strategic autonomy through a strong and effective foreign security and defence policy, more effective and better defined crisis management operations and synergies between the civilian and military activities of the EU and its member states. What are the main institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty? Is Europe's voice in the world stronger with the Lisbon Treaty? Does the Lisbon Treaty weaken the member states ability to have independent foreign policy? This will be discussing in subsequent section. It alters the structure of the EU's institutions and how they work. As a result, the EU is more democratic and its core values are better serve. The Treaty of Lisbon is the result of negotiations between EU member countries in an intergovernmental conference, in which the commission and parliament were also involved and ratified by each of the EU's 27 Members States. This new treaty will turn the European Union into full external political actor by giving the Union sound legal personality. The Lisbon Treaty establishes common principles and objectives for the EU's external action in all aspects, it will allow the emergence of a true common European Defence and introduced a mutual defence clause and solidarity clause including energy security. In short, the treaty will reinforce the Union's cohesion, coherence and effectiveness in external affairs. As such it will improve the Union's capacity to pursue one of its central tasks to shape international system.

The EU security strategy acknowledges the need for a wide approach to security, calling upon an EU that is more capable, more coherent and more active. And to

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<sup>21</sup>ToL, Article 10, the enhanced cooperation mechanism, established by the treaties of Nice and Amsterdam, enables a group of willing states to deepen their cooperation within CSDP.

reach these aims the strategy demands better coordination, transparency and flexibility across different agencies, at the national and European level. The EU's strength lies with its ability to combine military and civilian means in support of their missions, the Treaty allows a more efficient and effective action at EU level and consider that, as a mandate given to the EU institutions and also to the EU member states with the better objective to enhance and improve their interaction and action.

The Treaty of Lisbon<sup>22</sup> seems to mirror the EU's global security ambitions as it addresses the European security and defence policy. To become a global security actor, the Union is increasingly undertaking civilian and military crisis missions all over the world. However, European missions still depend on the willing states to make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for implementation of its security and defence policy. To study the relationship between the Union and the member states in the area of the common foreign and security policy and the ESDP<sup>23</sup> and whether the Treaty of Lisbon manages to clarify the situation is the purpose of this research. Has there been some transfer of power from the member states to the EU. The answer to this question will be availed by examining the common foreign and security policy. The European security and defence policy forms an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. The nature of the European security and defence policy are intergovernmental under the Nice Treaty, which is contrast to supranational European community usually the European member states chose to work together in the high political area of foreign and security, but they have not been willing to pool their sovereignty and use the community law method.

The key factors that turns the European community into a supranational system has been the transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the community to some extent e.g. trade area. Hence, the question is to what extent the common foreign and security policy is binding and what is the nature of its binding character? Is it binding in a political term or legal term or is it in both? If the member states is binding by CFSP then the member states must have transferred some of their powers

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<sup>22</sup>Motive behind the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty was to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's external action and provide with the military capability to implement its civilian aims and objectives set. But the effectiveness and efficiency of the Union's external action depends on the Union's relationship with its member states.

<sup>23</sup>The main function of the ESDP is to make foreign and security policy operational.

to the Union in the field of common foreign and security policy. As such, member states are constrained in the conduct of their respective national foreign policy. However, that the common foreign and security policy is binding on the constituent member states does not necessarily yield the common foreign policy being a supranational one. Legal personality<sup>24</sup> is conceived as the ability to exercise certain rights and to fulfil certain obligations. Here, the Lisbon Treaty merging the pillars of the EU and leading to the replacement of the EC with the EU (article 1 TEU Lisbon version) now state that the Union shall have legal personality (article 47 TEU Lisbon version). However, the question is that, is the Lisbon Treaty granting international legal personality to the European Union in the area of common foreign and security policy for the first time.

Although the member states still have the competence to conclude international agreements and to adopt unilateral decisions, they are not entirely free to do as they please. This limit is set by EU law obligations. As a consequence, the member states are not supposed to disturb the functioning of the institutional mechanisms and they are not entitled to adopt decisions that might undermine existing Union policies. The Lisbon Treaty still short of introducing a strong enforcement mechanism since the treaty does not introduce jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in respect of the European foreign and security policy (article 24 (2) TEU) resulting into the constraints of the CFSP on the member states appear legally not strong. As a matter of fact, the CFSP is not just about the pooling of sovereignty by the member states to enhance their national external capacity but rather about a transfer and relative loss of sovereignty. Here, it is worth to mention that there are no clear demarcation lines drawn between the competence of the Union and those of the member states in the common foreign and security policy. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty does not offer a different approach that offered by Nice Treaty between the European Union and member states in the area of common foreign and security policy and the European security and defence policy. The EES tells the EU to do things in a holistic, preventive and multilateral way but this doesn't provide direction about what to do? The EU needs to cooperate to solve complex challenges like climate change in the interdependence of the great power inter-polarity. The ESS needs regular updates,

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<sup>24</sup> According to ToL, Article 46A, legal personality implies the ability to enter into a contract, notably to be part of an international convention or be a member of an international organization.

since with the change of time the 'threat scenario' changed and altered international context in which Europe's security strategy operates.

### **3.0 The EU's Role in International Security**

Playing different roles with different partners and on different policy issues would carry significant implications for the way in which the EU is perceived by others, in a given changing strategic landscape. More importantly, the EU needed to organise itself more effectively if it wanted to help to shape the international order at large. At European level coherence needed to be enhanced between different pillars and within each institution in terms of both policy measures and effective use of financial resources and devising and implementing the European security strategy crucially required cohesion, consensus building, coherence and continuity. The Lisbon Treaty did not transform the European Union into super state. The EU's ability to influence the international order in future depend not only on its ability to bring together the whole of the EU i.e. institutions, crucially the member states who remain decisive in foreign and security affairs. In this case Lisbon Treaty offers a new opportunity for the Union to take on a world role compatible with its status and aspirations. The various civilian and military operations undertaken reflect the EU's growing role in international politics.

While the threats of general inter-state war in Europe receded with the end of the cold war (1989-1991). However, serious challenges to international security have persisted the instability gave birth by impoverished and weak states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threats posed by terrorism and organised crime are the most urgent threats identified within the Union's own security. Since its origin in the 1950's, the EU gradually established a significant international presence through its trade policy and later its commercial and development aid policies. As a powerful trade negotiators and a leading player in global issues such as the environment, development aid and human rights the EU is recognised by many as a new force for global security and welfare. It has long played a central role in promoting economic prosperity as well as political stability and democracy in Europe. But does the EU giant have feet of clay? If the challenges the EU facing today are as varied as they are difficult and complex, it is because Europe has changed and is in the process of reimagining it to confront new internal and external

forces which imperil the foundations of its very existence<sup>25</sup>. The EU has transformed itself in response to sweeping European and world catastrophic events. In response to shift in global security, it has adapted its development policy and its instruments for humanitarian assistance to place more emphasis on security.

As we are aware that the EU of today is a different organisation to the one that witnessed the fall of the Berlin wall and is undeniably different from the European communities of the 1950s when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) took its first fledging steps and followed by European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM. As a result, the EU increased in size from 15 to 27 countries and its population jumped from 392.61 million to 495.88 million inhabitants an increase of 26.3% (Winand et al 2010: 3). The new security situation also led to tensions in the Atlantic while the relationship between a uniting Europe and the US had remained largely asymmetrical. In security aspects after the 2nd world war the EU now claimed a more autonomous foreign, security and defence policy from the US in the new post-cold war architecture. However, the internal crisis and external complex challenges such as energy dependence, global terrorism, organized crime, regional conflicts and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made it essential for the EU to redefine its security strategy to tune with the change of time in international stage.

Building on previous initiatives and treaties, the ESS attempted to deal these challenges by finding ways of addressing the new threats of the post-cold war world while identifying the EU core values. In the wake of the terrorist attack of 9/11 the EU identified the main achievements of a united Europe as having fostered peace and stability within its own borders<sup>26</sup>. The question nowadays is whether the EU has really succeeded in conveying the image that it truly promoted the values it seeks to project. The qualifications are many and pose the question of how strong the EU is seen in terms of hard and soft power by various players on the international stage. In the view of Joseph Nye, military and economic power can be used directly to apply pressure to other actors, even to the point of coercion. No doubt, that the EU can be

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<sup>25</sup> The EU is changing in response to global security challenges which it cannot address on its own such as climate change, but it claims to have a certain leadership or recognition in international order.

<sup>26</sup> Dealing peacefully with disputes and cooperating through common institutions, thereby spreading the rule of law and democracy. To do so the ESS recommend promoting effective multilateralism by backing international institutions, international law and regional organizations.

a highly relevant security actor in the world where there is an increasing need to manage conflict by using both military and civilian means to obtain durable and long term stabilising effect. The emergence of new players with their own world views and interest is also an important new feature in the international environment.

The recent economic and financial turmoil has dramatically shown the extent to which the well-being, security and quality of life of Europeans depends on external development. The strong economy and internal cohesion will strengthen the Union's ability to project its influence in the world and must ready to share in the responsibility for global security. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty and in line with ESS, the EU and member states will act more strategically so as to bring Europe's true weight to bear internationally. This requires a clear identification of its strategic interests and objectives at a given moment and focused reflection on the means to pursue them more assertively.

The European External Action Service will be a crucial tool in support of the efforts towards enhancing the Union's external policy. That an energetic efforts is needed, making the most of the opportunities offered by the Lisbon Treaty in order to bring the Union closer to its setting goals of becoming a strategic international player. Stressing that a genuine common foreign and security policy can be only exist if all EU member states are prepared to give up their sovereign right to act when they deem their national interest to be at stake. In a more competitive international system, the EU has to pursue a multi-level foreign policy that includes both defending its interests and promoting its values. This is going to be a very tough but essential balancing act. The EU needs to become better at establishing strategic partnerships with other global actors keeping alive the pursuit of effective multilateral solutions and promotion of human rights, good governance and democracy.

On the issues of response to any global challenge, the EU Member States need to be more realistic about which response to security challenges can be shared and which cannot. EU governments have not clearly defined their strategic or security interests. For instance, every member agrees in principles that energy security is in their interests, but in practice that would require EU governments to form a single energy policy both internally and externally. Perhaps, any discussion on interests must

include rethinking territorial security, crisis management and the between internal and external security and how to mix civil and military resources for effective policy response. The more complex the challenges the EU faces, the more flexible the EU must be, appropriate and effective command structures and headquarter capability are key and finally maintaining public support for the global engagement is fundamental aspect. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion play crucial role in shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining commitments abroad. Seven years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. The EU has come long way but still long way to go, since the world around is changing fast with evolving threats and shifting powers. Now to build a secure Europe in a better world, EU must do more to shape events around the world and must do it.

### **3.1 Permanent Structured Cooperation and Lisbon Treaty**

Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that ‘those member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.’ And further the Article 46 explains the detail procedure for implementing permanent structures cooperation.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, permanent structured is a formal entity whose membership is determined by a Council decision taken by qualified majority voting<sup>28</sup> after the consultation with the HR. What will be the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on European defence cooperation, assuming it will enter into force in the near future? The title of the defence section, Common Security and Defence Policy suggests more than realistically can be expected. The Reform Treaty does not imply the construction of a European Army. Neither does it create territorial defence under the EU flag. ESDP remains focused on crisis management operations requiring deployable, mobile and adaptable forces. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) concept was to develop before the agency was

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<sup>27</sup>Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security policy.

<sup>28</sup> According to the formula of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 55% of the member states and 65% of the population of the Union should agree.

established. Permanent structured cooperation can be a very flexible instruments, allowing all EU member states to participate if they so choose (Biscop 2008). The original purpose was to speed up European defence by creating a core group of member states willing to commit themselves to realise higher ambitions. In this context, the Lisbon Treaty offers new opportunities for bringing European defence capability development forward assuming that the right criteria are chosen.

The Lisbon Treaty actually provides several opportunities not only the appointment of a permanent president of the European Council and the strengthening of the position of the High Representative, which can be helped to generate more strategic, coherence and proactive policies at the highest political level. Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty introduces permanent structured cooperation open to all states who commit to taking part in the main European military equipment programmes and providing combat unit, that are available for immediate action to the Union. The current pillar structure within the EU dilutes the achievements of common and coordinated EU action. The Lisbon Treaty through its rationalisation of the EU institutional architecture is clearly an attempt to dismantle the pillar structures in order to create more policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility. The innovations of the Treaty are of the highest importance in two respects, first the institutional reforms with permanent presidency, the foreign minister and the unification of council and commission services in a single external action service. The Treaty contains provisions for permanent structured cooperation in defence domain which will bring together the military capable member states and set out on the path towards a more effective capability of the Union.

The structured cooperation is tool to perform abroad and will realize the political implication for the most committed security and defence while overcomes all obstacles. The Lisbon Treaty will allow the EU greater role in international geopolitics and a global player in a multipolar world. Europe still struggle to deploy more than 4% of its 1.8 million troops and still the major capacity shortfalls have not been address (Biscop and Coelcmont 2010) so the challenge is to provide the Union with more effective military capabilities to mount crisis management. The CSDP needs a new stimulus and mutual Defence is another important addition. That leaves the required capabilities in which area the Treaty introduces a new mechanism of



Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD). Now the challenge is to configure PSCD in such a way that it strengthens CSDP without dividing the Union. According to Biscop, rather PSCD ought to increase solidarity and convergence. The beauty of PSCD is its flexibility what ultimately counts most, European will be available and will effectively deploy more troops for operations under EU, NATO or UN command or in another multilateral configuration. In doing so they will finally live up to the expectations generated by the ESS and the Lisbon Treaty, these are half a dozen good reasons why member states should launch PSCD and mark the occasion by a declaration of the European commission. The heads of the states and government can provide the high level political impetus that will stimulate Foreign and Defence Ministers to take permanent and structured action (Biscop and Coelmont 2010: 6).

Indeed the establishment of permanent structured cooperation could create a momentum for those member states who want to deepen their cooperation in different defence related areas such as capability development, operations, training, logistic and joint acquisitions. Now, the key question is how can permanent structured cooperation have a fundamental and unremitting influence on the way a credible EU defence is developed and implemented? Effective permanent structured cooperation will lead to less fragmentation and duplication of defence efforts and to economies of scale, encourage pooling and sharing of capabilities (Hougardy 2008: 16). However, as it is in the treaty, member states should therefore have to consider whether and how to make use of it, it presents a window of opportunity to further ESDP. Without doubt permanent cooperation is the only means towards deploying Europe's forces in the service of global peace and security. However, even the capabilities are available the political willingness to commit troops where necessary to act as EU is the key. Perhaps, the more integrated Europe's military capabilities will push EU member states to act as one. Recalling the need to clarify whether groups will be formed and act inside or outside the treaty framework, the Lisbon Treaty clearly embeds the options for group building within the EU framework. Analysing the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty concerning enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation, the strengthening of the flexibility approach can be recognised (Algieri 2008: 24). Enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation offer opportunity for more flexibility. In view of the evolution of the

security context, the EU has become a global player whose action is appreciated and whose reputation as a peace keeper is positive everywhere, despite of her limited operations. There is a need for the world to have Europe playing its role in achieving more security and stability, just as there is a need for Europe to positively influence global stability by intervening even militarily (Perruche 2008: 27).

The establishment of permanent EU strategic planning and conduct structure in Brussels can be considered the most appropriate and suitable answer to empirically needed EU capabilities in the field. A mere enlargement of the civil-military and its deeper integration under EEAS is not seen as a sufficient answer to require EU crisis management capabilities. There are several factors that support the establishment of permanent and comprehensive strategic planning and conduct structure. This structure should be able to bring together capability planning, operational planning and operations command. The result would be EU Operation Headquarter (OHQ), a single permanent civil-military planning and conduct structure. This proposed structure is seen as the only capable of developing a lasting strategic culture of comprehensive response to crisis management mainly through the mechanism of institutional memory maintenance (Hynek 2011: 96). To this end, this is seen as especially important in the context of the EEAS. Hynek argued that, such a permanent structure would allow for the planning and conduction of more complex and larger EU crisis management missions. It is clear that if the EU really wants to turn its discursive security aspirations into a set of predictable and proactive practices it needs to think beyond any of the three existing options to become a full-fledged security actor able to make important decisions on crisis management policies and operations the EU need to establish permanent crisis management support structures (Khol 2010: 3). What badly needed is a strong permanent staff trained to deal with urgent requests for rapid deployment of forces and civilian experts.

The creation of permanent comprehensive planning and conduct structure is seen as inevitable in overcoming current political problems associated with any of the three current options. While the mechanism of permanent structured cooperation introduced into the TEU facilitates for cooperation it cannot provide the solution. This is due the fact that the role of political mobiliser has so far been associated with the activities of ad hoc internal champions. The EU Member States which have been

willing to provide leadership and create coalitions of support within the PSC, the EU's main decision making platform for crisis management in the past. This role was linked to a country which held the rotating presidency and chaired the PSC. In the post Lisbon context with the introduction of the permanent PSC one can question to what extent at all political support can be produced in a similar way? What's more, even if political support could be generated, the permanency of strategic planning and conduct structure is seen as inevitable in making CSDP decision making in the field of crisis management much more proactive, not passively waiting for a request from an international organisation. Effective decision making and steady leadership are the two crucial characteristics of the EU's crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty. Qualified majority voting can be newly used for creating funding and administering a start-up fund to ensure rapid access to appropriation of the EU budget for urgent need to finance CFSP and CSDP initiatives such as crisis management.

While the reforms contained in the Lisbon Treaty have the potential to further integrate civilian and military planning and conduct structures for EU crisis management, the political will of Member States will be the most important factor in its future realisation. Hynek says that, the further integration of civilian and military crisis management and the creation of comprehensive permanent planning and conduct structure can be achieved with relatively little efforts, if the political position of the Member States most importantly Germany, France and especially the UK will be crucial for development in the due direction. The EU needs to invest more resources and time to develop civilian crisis management capabilities. The European Parliament (EP) needs to use its supervisory and consultative role in foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty strategically. In particular, the close working relationship with the HR who has the responsibility to consult the EP regularly and ensure that its views are being taken into account will be crucial for EP's enhancement of its profile in this area.

### **3.2 The Strategic Partnership and Lisbon Treaty**

The European Union policy took a new turn with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Perhaps, a certain amount of changes foreseen by the Treaty should bring more coherence and continuity into the European external

action.<sup>29</sup> Historically, the ESS published in 2003 was the first strategic document to envision the strategic partnerships as a foreign policy tool. It is true that this document was more political than strategic, in the context of the Iraq war and of the resulting transatlantic and intra-European dissensions but it was the first document to formulate objective in connection with the pursuit of strategic partnerships. It is also in the ESS that the EU discovered for the very first time the lists of the EU's strategic partners. Furthermore, the ESS tells us that most strategic partnerships should be regarded as an objective to pursue rather than a depiction of the reality in 2003. Despite all these major problems, which remain to a large extent unaddressed to this day, the EU has developed a certain amount of strategic partnerships based on the recommendations of the ESS. More precisely, the European Commission followed the suit of the European Council and produced a series of documents intended to feed into the general elaboration of strategic partnerships. The EU must consistently pursue its interests and promote its universal values in its conduct of foreign policy. The EU needs to become better at establishing strategic partnerships with other global players and regional powers while at the same time the pursuit of effective multilateral solutions and the promotion of good governance, human rights and democracy must not be neglected.

Much has been said about strengthening relations with this or that part of the world. But it would be more practical to start from the beginning, what do strategic partnerships mean? Currently the Union has nine strategic partnerships with individual countries, three with the EU's traditional partners (US, Canada, Japan), with Brazil, Russia, India and China, South Africa, Mexico and with regional organisations or group of countries. The ESS committed to the pursuit of its foreign policy goals through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnership with key actors. According to the vision outlined in the ESS, the EU's strategic partnerships are divided into three categories. The relationship with the US is described as the EU's strategic partnerships irreplaceable and the value of the EU and the US acting together is strongly underlined throughout the document. The second relationship that is mentioned in the document is the EU's relationship with Russia. The document calls for closer relations with Russia which is described

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<sup>29</sup> Among the major changes, one can mention the creation of a new HR for Foreign Affairs and security policy or the creation of a new European diplomatic corps (EEAS).

as a major factor in their security and prosperity. The third category is a group of countries; Japan, Canada, China, and India with which the EU sought to develop strategic relationships. Since the adoption of ESS, the EU has signed strategic partnership documents with these countries.

In these times of geopolitical upheaval, the EU certainly needs to discuss and analyse the EU's strategic partnership. The global shift of power from the Atlantic to the Pacific forces the EU and its member states to fundamentally think their foreign policy with a strong focus on great and emerging power, otherwise the EU is at risk of falling into global irrelevance (Renard 2011: 11). The recent crises in Arab world have proved again that Europe is not at ease with contemporary challenges. The concept of strategic was adopted in the late 1990s- early 2000s by EU. The strategic partnerships are a necessary strategy for the EU to cope successfully with the changing global order and to avoid global irrelevance. In the context of a growing complexity and uncertainty, a new global order unfolding from the ashes of the cold-war, the emerging global order is probably more fragmented in the sense that new strategic opportunities have opened for international actors searching for a new power status. This fragmentation makes international cooperation to solve global challenges more difficult.

As a matter of fact, the world is increasingly interdependent and interconnected as largely illustrated by the recent economic and financial crisis. The global interdependence per se is not new. Interestingly this new global order is creating a challenging environment for the EU and its member states. The EU has a lot of tools at its disposal to adapt successfully to the new global order building on the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, EU is a potential power to cope with the complex challenges and threats, the EU should strike in its relationship with great and emerging powers. No doubt a strategic partner can be defined as a key global player which has a pivotal role in solving global challenges by coordinating the position with those strategic partners in multilateral forums. So what is strategic partnership? According to Thomas Renard, strategic partnership must be comprehensive, built upon reciprocity, share a common understanding of their mutual values and objectives, oriented towards the long term and must go beyond bilateral issues to tackle regional and global challenges. Sadly, the objectives that the EU is supposed to pursue, notably through its strategic partnership are unfortunately

not developed in the ESS. What are these objectives? What are the EU's interests and priorities in the field of foreign policy? The ESS remains silent on these fundamental questions (Renard 2010: 19). The 2008 'report on the implementation of the ESS' underscores the progress accomplished regarding the strategic partnerships.

Perhaps, certain amount of changes foreseen by the Treaty<sup>30</sup> should bring more coherence and continuity into European external action. Among major changes, one can talk the designation of a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or the creation of a new European diplomatic corps (EEAS). The strategic partnerships started to come into term with the ESS after the invasion of Iraq which jolt to European who realised that the transatlantic alliance cannot tackle and solve all global challenges. In this context, the EU needs to reaffirm the importance of the transatlantic relationships while opening the possibility of new strategic partnerships with rising powers. Significantly, strategic partnerships constitute an attempt to assert the growing importance of the EU over the national diplomacies of the member states not because according to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has now the tools and legitimacy to act in the name of Europe vis-a-vis third countries.

In fact, the important of the Lisbon Treaty to the revival of the strategic debate cannot be underscored sufficiently. The Lisbon Treaty offers a legal framework to the strategic partnerships in its article 21<sup>31</sup> and article 22.<sup>32</sup> The Treaty gave new opportunities to the EU in terms of foreign policy via the action of EEAS and greater interaction among various dimensions of foreign policy for example diplomacy, trade, development, finance, energy and climate change. The creation and designation of two new positions according to the Lisbon Treaty i.e. president of the European council and High Representative were favourable to the revival of the strategic debate. The EU and its member states need to develop a strategic approach to international relations and more particularly to their relations with emerging

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<sup>30</sup>It is important to emphasize the conditions because instruments foreseen by the Treaty will be fully exploited only if there is sufficient political will to do so.

<sup>31</sup>The article 21 states that, the Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first paragraph.

<sup>32</sup>According to article 22, on the basis of the principles and objectives set out in article 21, the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.

power to turn EU into true strategic partnerships. Internally, the development of this strategic approach entails the revival of debate on EU strategic interests, a review on the EU institutional set up, a reconstruction of its diplomacy and the establishment of coordinating mechanisms within the EU and between the EU and its member states. The EU ought to reconcile its bilateral approach to strategic partnerships with its more traditional multilateral approach to international relationship its fundamental objectives as stated in the ESS to promote effective multilateralism globally.

The strategic partnerships should constitute an effective tool for the EU to pursue its interests globally, preferably in a multilateral framework but relying on its bilateral relationship. Yet the EU's strategic partnerships are regularly criticized for their lack of implementation. With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has the opportunity to directly address UN Security Council (UNSC) via its head of delegation or via HR. This innovation entails a lot of potential for the common foreign and security policy notably the possibility for the EU to provide direction (set the EU's interest and priorities) whereas the member states can provide the political backing and the means of soft power or hard power to pursue the EU's interests. This, it seems rather difficult for European members of the UNSC to strictly abide by Article 34 of the Lisbon Treaty stating that 'those member states who are members of the Security Council, in the execution of their functions will defend the positions and the interests of the Union,' the opposition over Libya between France and the UK on the one hand and Germany on the other hand illustrates the current limits of Article 34.

Now, do the EU and its strategic partners deploy troops in the same place? The EU's most comprehensive strategic partner in peacekeeping operations is China (Renard and Hooijaijers 2010). The EU and its strategic partners share the burden of peacekeeping unequally. The establishment of strategic partnerships does not seem to have altered this reality. Nonetheless, peacekeeping is one area where more cooperation between the EU and its partners is not only desirable but also possible. This calls for more coordination at the political level between the EU and its partners, where to launch new missions and more cooperation on the ground not only deploying troops, alongside each other but effectively cooperating together within the UN framework. The future will only tell whether the relationship between the EU and the emerging powers will be cooperative or confrontational.

Now the time has also come to rethink the EU's approach to international relations. Indeed, the EU itself is often perceived as the weak end of the strategic partnerships. Looking at the world from the Washington, Beijing, New Delhi or Moscow, the strategic value of the EU can be questioned. Interestingly, a cable recently released by Wikileaks quotes an Indian official saying that the EU identity for obvious is shabby, short sighted, full of contradictions, naïve, overly proactive and possessing a tendency to go overboard when it comes to delicate issues. The Union security strategy recognized the significant of working with partners and these both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnership with key actors. Acting and working together the EU and the US as well as with other strategic partners can be a formidable for good in the world.<sup>33</sup>

### **3.3 The challenges and Opportunities after the Lisbon Treaty**

The European Council call for improving synergies between the EU and national levels consistent with the provision of the treaties for enhancing coordination between institutional actor. The recent economic and financial turmoil has dramatically shown the extent to which the well-being, security and quality of life of Europeans depend on external development. A strong economy and internal cohesion will strengthen the Union's ability to project its influence in the world, at the same time the EU's strategic partnerships with key players in the world provide a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests. To improve the functioning of the European Union's external policy the European Council calls for more integrated approach ensuring that all relevant European Union and national instruments and policies are fully and coherently mobilised consistent with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.

Close and regular coordination between all the different institutional actors involved in the definition and implementation of the European Union's external relations is necessary to ensure the European Union representatives can defend coherent positions on the whole range of the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. The Union external action service will be a crucial tool in support of the efforts

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<sup>33</sup> The documents (US NSS and EU-ESS) share an emphasis on threats, although the EU strategy's comprehensive approach contrasts with US NSS. When it comes to dealing with these threats the European strategy however advocates a much more positive and comprehensive approach unlike the US; the EU does not consider itself to be engaged in new war.



towards enhancing the European Union external policy, under the authority of the High Representative at the service level provide support to the European Council, the council and the Commission concerning the strategic overview and coordination necessary to ensure the coherent of the European Union's external action as a whole (European Council statement 2010).

As we have seen, the EU is a giant when it comes to international trade but a dwarf in international politics. To speak with a single voice on international issues long been a challenge for the EU, as foreign policy remains one of the emblems of a sovereign nation state. However, one of the purposes of a Union policy is not to replace state but to increase the impact that a national foreign policy can have individually. With the Lisbon Treaty foreign and security policy decisions of the EU are taken by consensus by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) or European Council. Decisions on strategic and objectives pronouncements are taken by the European Council while necessary follow up decisions are guided by the Foreign Affairs Council to ensure together with the High Representative the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the EU' (Art. 26 (2) TEU). European Union foreign and security policy essentially aims at protecting the identified common interests and defending common values.

Europe must meet the complex challenges which are well placed to do so with a range of diplomatic, development, economic, humanitarian and military instruments. This comprehensive approach to understanding security move beyond a traditional military assessment. Solana described a new environment where defuse challenges must be address by the Union including poverty, energy security, climate change and bad governance. Addressing each requires a mixture of instruments. Perhaps, proliferation may be contained through economic control and attack through political tool box. Dealing with terrorism may ask a mixture of intelligence, political, military and others means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order and humanitarian aid to tackle the immediate crisis. The use of economic instrument will support reconstruction and civil crisis management can be used to support restoration of civil government. Solana asserted that, the EU is particularly well equipped to respond to such multifaceted situations or challenges.

The ESS identifies the combinations of a comprehensive security concept and multilateral approach when it identifies the EU's strategic objectives, to tackle the threats, to extend the zone of security around Europe and to strengthen the international order. The EU strategy includes offering assistance to secure weapons and materials of mass destruction and encourages compliance with international regimes which third states will be expected to accept if they wish to profit from trade and development agreements. This mainstreaming of non-proliferation and disarmament activities is seen as an area where the EU provides values added and one that will attract less controversy than military approaches adopted in Iraq by the United States and the UK. The EU enlargement has undeniably been the Union's most successful foreign policy instrument. It has yet to be seen how the ESS will provide a focus for consolidating the security gains from enlargement and provide momentum to extend that security to neighbouring states. Incoherence has been a strong feature of the Union's approach to the region with competing interests between the member states and the commission and indeed between different agencies of the Union.

The implementation of the ESS in the Balkan provides an important test case as to whether the comprehensive security approach can be applied as prescribed in ESS. Indeed, the ability to achieve greater coherence in its neighbourhood ought to be a measure of how credible the approach is in the world? If Iraq represents a test case for the US approach, the ability of the EES to lead to greater coherence in the Union's future role in Balkans ought to be a measure of the success of the EU's approach. The identification of threats is the crucial and novelty of the European Security Strategy. The threats identified by the document are a mix of old and new threats. But sadly, the ESS does not prioritise the five identified security threats. If there is an implicit ranking in the threats defined by the ESS, failed states, regional conflicts and organized crime, first from the strategic point of view they are less directly threatening to EU interests than the new ones.

It is the first of three strategic objectives outlined in the strategy which the EU will continue to pursue in dealing with the key threats. The EU vulnerabilities are inside as well as outside the continent, Jean Yves Haine identified three broad dimensions, first is in essence an issue of human rights or human security, the second dimension of state failure is linked to the broader issue of governance. In this category, the

failed state has lost its ability to provide to its citizens positive political goods such as the provision of an independent judicial system to adjudicate disputes, to enforce the rule of law and to protect the most fundamental civil and political rights, the rights to participate in free and fair elections, freedom of speech etc. such unstable situations can rapidly spill over to neighbouring countries. Collapse state can lead to chaotic situations, economic crisis and international crime. In these situations, the EU has developed a comprehensive and preventive approach aimed at strengthening or restoring state authorities. And finally the third dimensions of state failure is linked to international terrorism, the case of Afghanistan did show that collapsed states could be safe havens for terrorist groups (Haine 2008: 25).

If globalization is about integrating economies and societies, opening borders, creating interdependence and coordinating policies, EU is indeed its embodiments and thus the credibility of the European Union as a security actor may start at home. An unprecedented combination of non-state actors with easily available capabilities to inflict mass destruction is the character of post 9/11 world. The threat of terrorism in EU is thus extremely high since Madrid and London attacked the EU efforts in counter terrorism having dramatically heightened (Haine 2008: 27). However, what is lacking in Europe is strategic planning, since terrorism is an ideology it required also an ideological response.

The strategy also puts down the general principal of how comprehensive relations with the state concerned will increase security i.e. an approach that emphasises long term prevention. The potentially most effective instruments would be the comprehensive neighbourhood policy proposed by the commission under the heading of wider Europe. The neighbourhood policy's main objectives are preventing conflicts in our neighbourhood and act of aggression against the EU, settling on-going disputes and conflicts, protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad, controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU and establishing close economic and political partnership based on shared values and vision. If it is successful in long term perspective, the neighbourhood policy could through permanent close interaction and sharing of norms and values. Which lead to the progressive emergence of new security communities with regard to the Mediterranean the strategy stresses that resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict is a strategic priority. The Middle East conflict receives additional emphasis in the final

version of the strategy, sought a strong call for a joint effort by the EU, the US, the UN and Russia to implement the two-state solution. But the strategy further states that a broader engagement with the Arab world should be considered.

The strategy strongly stresses that for international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective the EU must be ready to act when their rules are broken. In the EU's range of instruments an effective military instrument and the willingness to use it are necessary assets to enhance the credibility of the EU as a player on the international stage. As the strategy puts to both prevention and crisis management, the EU which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight. The strategy also calls for more resources for defence and more effective use of resources. Certainly for the smaller member states, widening could lead them to making the whole of their armed forces available to the EU. Deepening would imply increasing multinational cooperation, pooling of means and task specialisation around the cores of excellence on the basis of force planning at the European level by the military staff in function of the capabilities required for the implementation of the strategy. Many described the international system shaping up as multipolar and maintained that the biggest challenge for the EU would be to manage emerging multipolarity through multilateral structures and initiatives. The lists of threats and challenges included in the ESS are considered still relevant but it is argued that the shift in the underlying geopolitical paradigm needed to be better reflected in the EU's policies.

### **3.4 Eight Years on: A Significant Journey**

In the twenty first century, the European Union is confronted by myriad of security problems that demand concerted action and cooperation. As a crisis manager EU seeks to contribute to global peace and stability through civilian and military operations. Europe is today rich and powerful. The strategic challenge facing the EU's today is not only the traditional threats from the state. The dark side of globalisation is spawning new challenges in the form of strategic terrorism fuelled by radical Islam and international crime that exploit the increase movement of commodities and money. Importantly, energy security will provide an essential dynamic for the change in the global state system and Europe must face up to that. The search for energy to fuel economic growth led to the competition leading to new

balances of power. The energy security and energy competition also a strategic challenges Europe is facing. The nature of today's security environment and the complexities it generates is profoundly different therefore, to generate strategic effect a joined up approach to security is vital coordinating all national and where possible, transnational efforts in a complex security environment. Interestingly, the ESS has adopted such broad security policy to deal with strategic challenges coming from diverse sources. The EU must forge close strategic partnerships with all powerful actor both states and institutions to foster global stability. Such partnership would reinforce the centre piece of an EU security policy, effective multilateralism, which the ESS prioritises in dealing global strategic challenges, this would both reinforce Europe's political legitimacy, effectiveness and enhance global stability.

Europe today must therefore, answer a question both simple and complex, what role Europe plays in the world? The Europeans need a galvanising strategic security initiative that can harmonise all Europe's security efforts through better strategic awareness, relevant institutional reforms, serious capability and capacity building and the raising of public awareness. Project European security would require nothing short of a political breakthrough if Europe is to be transformed from a regional into global security actor. The changing nature of threats identified by the ESS reinforces this point. Unfortunately, acting upon the ESS has been prevented by the woolly strategic thinking that still pervades much of Europe. The power of the individual European state, however large, would appear to be reaching the limits when it comes to managing the new global challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Power is after all relative. According to the ESS, Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas, the imports account for 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. ESS should be the political statement of intent by EU member states to engineer a common approach to mutual threats and shared interests (ESS 2003: 2).

Perhaps, given the tragic events in Madrid and London, it is all the more surprising that the EU and the Europeans continue to punch beneath their security weight. The ESS remains the foundation of strategic conceptual thinking essential to the development of a European grand strategy. To this end, the ESS rightly posits that 'the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.' The ESS seeks to combat terrorism globally while respecting human right and making Europe safer,

allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. To achieve these vital objectives, the EU proposes action on prevention, protection, response and pursuit. The EU's most influential leverage tool aid and development still needs to be far more closely linked to European strategic objectives as lay out by the document. As a matter of fact, both the CFSP and CSDP are essentially reactive and founded on regional strategic security assumptions and principles.

In forging strategic partnerships, there are four pillars upon which a European grand strategy would necessarily have to be founded: strategic partnership, the transatlantic relationship, relevant strategic capabilities and public support, in the absence of robust domestic popular support a European grand strategy will be of little value. The ESS makes that the EU must forge special bonds with the Russia, China, Japan, Canada, and India and of course the US (ESS 2003: 11). Somewhat, the EU has made some progress in fashioning its security role in the world after the publication of document in 2003. However, the pace of change beyond Europe seems markedly quicker than the pace of security reform within Europe. Significantly, security policy and democracies is necessarily founded on strong public support. Therefore, decision makers have no choice but to engage their populace in an open and frank debate about the security environment and the strategies and capabilities required to realise national and European interests. Avoidance of political decision makers from such debate will not lead to sustainable strategic development. Therefore, the need for a public debate about security and defence is urgent with strong political will.

The emerging ESS emphasise a comprehensive approach to understanding and responding to contemporary security threats and challenges.<sup>34</sup> The Union's cooperative and institutional approach security remains valid and important as the EU take up greater global responsibilities in meeting its own security needs. The development of the institutions and policy framework for a security strategy are important parts of the socialisation of the EU and the development of a strategic culture. The ESS assert that, the approach of EU to security is distinct from the actions of some its member states and has been described as fundamentally different from that of the United States NSS. The challenge for the Union is not just how to engage with the United States on the differences but also how to avoid internal

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<sup>34</sup> The success of the Union enlargement and the member states commitment to its institutions are all elements of the EU contributions to security in Europe.

conflict and division as witnessed over Iraq, which undermine the comprehensive and cooperative approach to security and the effectiveness and credibility of EU role in international security. Fundamentally, the novelty of the European approach to be retaining its distinctive agenda and to convince others that the Union's approach and the values it promotes are important in how the EU contribute to international security and prevent violent conflicts. The Treaty of Lisbon gives Europe's a clear voice in relations with its partner world-wide. It harness Europe's economic, humanitarian, political and diplomatic strengths to promote Europe interests and values while respecting the particular interests of the member states in Foreign Affairs. The Treaty responds to the concerns raised by European citizens, for instance the political commitments to tackle the challenges of climate change and energy security policy. These innovations give the Union the possibility to better implement its policies, enhance personal and collective security and finally improving its ability to act on the international scene.

The Treaty brings stronger coherence in external action and will raise the EU's profile in the world. It sets out common principles and objectives for the external action. According to the Treaty of Lisbon most of the external relations provisions of the existing treaties are regrouped in a single title of the Treaty of Lisbon. This improve their readability and promotes the coherence of the Union's action, the Treaty states clearly that the reduction and the eradication of poverty is the primary objective of the Union's development cooperation policy by introducing a specific legal basis for humanitarian aid for the first time. With the Lisbon Treaty the EU has now become a sound legal and political institution basis.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **European Security Strategy after the Lisbon Treaty:**

#### **A Comprehensive overview**

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton told in Parliament on March 24, 2011.

The fact that I chair and draw up the agendas for the monthly meetings of the EU Foreign Ministers, as well as the meetings of Development and Defence Ministers mean we get to promote coherence and consistency... the fact that, I am also Vice-President of the Commission helps to ensure consistency across the spectrum of EU external relations.

The European Union has undergone many changes over the last fifty years through a series of Treaties and amending treaties, of which the Lisbon Treaty is the latest. The aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to simplify the way in which the European Union works by reforming the institutional structure of the Union and the way in which decisions are taken to enhance the credibility and effectiveness. These Treaties form the rulebook of the EU and can be amended by further treaties among the member states. The Lisbon Treaty provides for the formulation of the European Council as an official institution of the EU, which would be chaired by an independent and impartial president of the European Council. The European Council provides a forum within which the member states may coordinate certain national policies. Significantly what difference does the Lisbon Treaty make to the European Union's security strategy and defence policy? Most part of Treaty was restates and codifies the existing policy and practice more fully, with some amendments designed to consolidate original intent and procedures.

#### **4.0 The Institutional Structures after Lisbon Treaty**

The newly structured High Representative post is potentially an influential one. Giving the new style High Representative a place in both council and commission, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Council and the support of an integrated external action service has the potential to strengthen the post further. Now, the HR under the proposed Lisbon Treaty can only act on the basis of unanimous decisions made by EU 27 national sovereign states representative. The EEAS does not replace 27 foreign ministries, but it designed to improve coordination between them and to pursue unanimously agreed common policies. Moreover, other innovations such as



the solidarity clause may be increasingly important as the EU plays a central role in responding not just to terrorist attacks but also to natural disasters. Finally, the provision for permanent structures of cooperation allows some of the EU member states with greater military capability to coordinate their own capacities more closely without creating an obligation for all member states to get involved as the ESS designed to do so.

There are different levels in the institutional structure of the EU relating to the common security and defence policy. Specific policy decisions are the responsibility of the Council of Member State Foreign Ministers who would under the Lisbon Treaty, meet under the leadership of the proposed EU foreign policy chief the HR of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The post of HR was established in 1999 after the Amsterdam Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty has expanded the role in several significant ways in order to provide a better focus for the relatively new policy area. In addition, to bring the EU's chief diplomat responsible for the coordination and implementation of the CFSP and answerable to the Member States meeting within the Council of Ministers, the HR would also be a member of the Commission and be in charge of the Commission's External Relations portfolio. Thus, in that capacity the HR would be directly responsible to the European Parliament. This is specially designed to facilitate better consistency and coherence in the EU's relations with third countries and it gives even more focus to the Union as an international actor. In respect of the EU's level of planning and leadership, the Lisbon Treaty offers concrete solutions by restructuring the institutional architecture behind CFSP and CSDP, as well as through improved cooperation across relevant EU assets (N. Hynek 2011: 90)

The EU has adopted the practice of appointing Special Representatives to deal with particular issues. But the pragmatic development is to be buttressed under the Lisbon Treaty by the creation of a new European External Action Service, which is designed to ensure better consistency between and representation of the foreign policy of the individual Member States and the common foreign policy of the EU.<sup>35</sup> The role is defined as one which will support and assist the implementation of EU policy in coordination with national diplomats. As a matter of fact, the EEAS will

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<sup>35</sup>This service is to be composed of officials from the Commission, the Council Secretariat and from Member State Foreign Ministers.

not replace national foreign ministries, nor will it decide on matters of national foreign policy (Keatinge and Tonra 2009: 29). The European parliament has a consultative role regarding the CSDP matters. The HR is required to consult regularly in plenary sessions and the European parliament hold twice yearly debates on policy implementation (Article 36 TEU). The parliament usually have powerful role in the EU budget is qualified in this area by the fact that all military spending is funded directly by national governments and only subject to national decision making rules. The coherence is further reinforced by its institutional innovations namely, the double-hatted High Commissioner and European External Action Service that is uniquely positioned to play the role of a principal agency in the field of crisis management (Hynek 2011: 1).

Having all the foreign policy related instruments under a single roof in the EEAS provided a unique opportunity. The EEAS have acquired important competencies in the programming of aid and development policy which is part of foreign policy. But Rosa Bulfour added that there were serious concerns about development aid being subject to foreign policy objectives, especially in the context of security. Since parameters have changed, security has become network centric and the convening power of social media needs to be factored in because the threats analysis of ESS is still hold. New form of ad hoc flexibility is introduces by article 44 of new TEU, the council may entrust the implementation of task to group of member states which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. This allows the Union to implement its new CSDP by sub-contracting it to coalitions of the able and willing. Example of this arrangement can be found in operation Artemis, in which France took the initiative to form a group of EU member states and other states to assist the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) renamed in 1 July 2010 as United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). A second form of institutionalisation may be found in paragraph 6 of article 42, which introduces the notion of permanent structured cooperation for those Member states which military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions. The permanent structured cooperation is further elaborated by article 46 and by a special protocol. According to this protocol the permanent structured cooperation can be seen as an

institutionalised form of cooperation in the field of defence policy between the able and willing member states.

According to Missiroli, the EEAS is the main story of the Lisbon Treaty, but not the only one. Unequivocally, EU is a typical global actor, with two voices, the EEAS and the member states. This state of affairs further complicates the formulation of a coherent EU crisis response. Hence, confronted with internal challenges ranging from conceptual lacunae to dilute awareness and training to decision making deficit, the EU crisis management tool do not yet provide a solid platform for the EU's global role. The post Lisbon era is a time for both the development and transition to a coherent EU approach to crisis situations. This fulfilment of the Lisbon Treaty is dependent on the EU's ability to reconcile competing intra-institutional attitudes and the national-European dichotomy as well as on the EU's willingness to create a strong support structure for its forays into crisis management. The Treaty also introduces a new mechanism for capability development which allows those member states that are willing to enhance military integration among them within the framework of the EU. Furthermore, the strengthened position of the HR (currently Catherine Ashton), who will chair the Council of Ministers when dealing with foreign and security policy ought to give new impetus to decision making.

#### **4.1 From ESDP to CSDP (post- Lisbon EU's External Action)**

The European Security and Defence Policy have been re-baptized as 'Common' Security and Defence Policy, with the entry into force the Lisbon Treaty<sup>36</sup>. It is desirable for an increase in the coherence of the European Union's external action including its crisis management efforts. The Union is in important juncture with merits strategic reflection about the objectives and priorities in CSDP. The Union's interests and objectives in a region should determine to what extent it will contribute or even take lead in conflict resolution and crisis management through diplomatic, civilian and military instruments. In this juncture, EU strategic thinking is the least explicit. There is a missing link between the vague ambitions expressed in the ESS to responsibility for global security (Biscop 2010). Even if the EU's engagement for global peace and security can be stepped up, sadly there are too many conflicts and

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<sup>36</sup>Lisbon Treaty control external borders, fight crime, management disasters, this treaty (no more pillars) is allowing comprehensive approaches and enhanced definition of EU security policies, with stronger guidelines for security research.

crises for the EU to deal effectively with all of them especially in leading role. Therefore, as the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS providing security in a changing world the EU needs to prioritise their commitments in line with resources. So which types of operations? Which priorities? Perhaps, priority of regions and scenario must be defined in relation to Europe vital interests, where and why should EU deploy troops? And what scale of effort to devote to these priorities?

Quantitatively, CSDP is based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) i.e. 60,000 troops. The EU grand strategy elaborating on and complementing the ESS must define Europe's ambition as a global security actor, which can then inform a military or civil-military sub-strategy specifically for CSDP (Biscop 2009). It is in the EU as well as the member states can build more deployable forces through various forms of cooperation and pooling between Europeans via permanent structured cooperation, which will be available for all potential frameworks for operations. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty stipulations about the solidarity clause and mutual defence, currently existing plans are too much of a paper exercise; it is far from clear which capabilities are effectively available for collective defence. How many forces should the EU 27 be able to muster for crisis management and long term peacekeeping? And what are the needs of collective defence?

The Lisbon Treaty amending the Treaty on the EU and the Treaty establishing the European Community has entered into force on in December 2009 has brought with its significant institutional innovations in the EU's external action. These changes were previously embarked upon, in order to streamline the related decision making processes and to increase their internal coherence and efficiency (Hynek 2011: 83). One of the main changes made in the Lisbon Treaty has been the abandonment of the pillar structure, as well as the close interlinking of what was formerly the first pillar and the second pillar, despite the fact that some experts questioned the absoluteness of such a view in light of common foreign, security and defence policy remaining the only policy field with its own separate legal status (Kurpas 2007; Hynek 2011). Apart from this, the Lisbon Treaty also endows the EU with a legal personality, meanwhile the qualified majority voting procedure has been introduced to some areas of common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy decisions with military and defence implications still require unanimity. Thus, the new CSDP brings together principles of greater coherence and

flexibility by allowing the possibility of delegating tasks to a group of member states through a new concept of permanent structures cooperation.

However, member states widely differ on the political or strategic dimension, a debate goes far beyond ESDP and the CFSP it touches the whole of EU external action. What should be the scope of the EU's foreign and security policy ambitions? What should be the precise role of the military instrument in EU external action? And what degree of autonomy should the EU have in future? Following the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where the 'Headline Goal'<sup>37</sup> was defined. The EU started building military (ESDP) and civilian capabilities for crisis management in the absence of overall strategic framework for its external action. It would not be a problem in the absence of an explicit strategy if all those involved in policy making, share the same basic views and can thus easily reach a consensus on policies that fit within these general guidelines, even if they are not explicitly written down. As a result, EU's external action has lacked direction, determination and consistency. Without a clear strategy of own, the EU cannot escape the American framework of thought and promote its own policy priorities in terms of both objectives and instruments. The EU is firmly placed to contribute to the development of international peace and security, having at its disposal for this purpose a unique range of instruments of action. The Union is often perceived as an effective intermediary with the possibility of playing a credibility and constructive role in situation of instability and conflict. For the first time since its existence, the Union is in a position to define and implement a genuine external policy. Apart from a deep institutional change, the Lisbon Treaty introduces major innovations in ESDP matters while according to legal and legitimacy of primary of law to practices progressively established over the past seven years out of necessity. In addition, it introduces legal commitments which translate an elementary solidarity of Union partners, in the face of aggression from a third state and in the event of terrorist attack, following the entry of the Lisbon Treaty the new common security and defence policy should set its sight on the future.

The long and winding path followed by the Union's latest institutional reform, which is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty has given rise to an odd sort of the road

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<sup>37</sup>To deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Task.

feeling that is clearly perceptible in Brussels and in many capitals of the member states (Arteaga 2010). The document fails to answer one of the significant question of, when does the EU will deploy its military muscle? Under what conditions and what circumstances? These questions remained unanswered. Here, the document correctly identifies the incoherence of the EU and the lack of coordination of its various policies and departments as a serious stumbling block in the successful implementation of all the EU decisions. Therefore, the document underlines the importance of cooperation amongst nations.

However, the CSDP is a project in progress which needs to adapt to changing circumstances and that the Treaty itself acknowledges that there is still ground to be covered. Therefore, it cannot close the door for future institutional developments in this field, while obviously lacking the significance of these incorporated into the treaty will have to be decide by the European Council.<sup>38</sup> Without doubt, this mechanism for permanent structured cooperation contains the requisites for allowing the EU to develop a more ambitious ESDP. The Lisbon Treaty has made important contribution to the present and future design of the Union's CSDP. This statement is supported by two reasons; firstly, it relates to the series of legal instruments it makes available to the Union and the member states which are capable of giving the CSDP the impetus it needs. Secondly, it linked to the manner in which the Lisbon Treaty has resolved the difficulty of finding a balance between the necessary inclusion techniques that lend the CSDP coherence and unity and the formulas for reconciling the wishes of states willing to pressed ahead with those of states which prefer to dissociate themselves from certain decisions that are incompatible with certain national defence policies (Corres 2010).

A significant innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is that the High Representative is institutionally anchored in both the council of ministers and the European commission. It is not that the EU lacks military capacity or the will to fight, rather that the EU's foreign policy elites have fundamentally redefined what they mean by security. Surprisingly, the EU's security elites increasingly look at security through

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<sup>38</sup>The 2003 ESS a document conceived as all embracing, maintained the difference between internal and external security. And despite the fact that divisions between pillars were supposed to disappear with the entry into force the Lisbon Treaty, in 2010 the justice and home affairs ministers began to draw up an external security strategy for the EU, which will accentuate the separateness of the two cultures.

the eyes of insurance companies rather than military planners. They take peace for granted and think in terms of risks instead of threats (Ivan Krastev et al, 2010: 30). Despite the development of the ESS in 2003, the CFSP and CSDP did not make much progress due to the institutional problems. Yet the EU did not relinquish its operational commitments and deployed some military or civilian operations in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. However, the Treaty of Lisbon offers considerable improvements regarding the visibility of CFSP and CSDP. Further improvements would include the enlargement of Union's scope of action in Foreign Policy including the establishment of a new legal basis, as well as new instruments in the area of CFSP. How is the Lisbon Treaty going to effects EU's security and defence? The Foreign Affairs Committee said, the EU enhance its strategic autonomy through a strong and effective foreign, security and defence policy. It aims should be to preserve peace, prevent conflicts, strengthen international security, protects the security of citizens, defend EU's interests in the world and uphold its founding principles and values.

While contributing to effective multilateralism in support of international law and advance human rights and democratic values world-wide. The CSDP is one of the Union's most dynamic and innovative policy areas, its development has now reach a plateau and there is a risk of stagnation unless courageous steps are taken. With its rather eclectic list of deployments, the EU is certainly an actor in international politics, but not yet a strategic one. Despite the use of the term 'common' the policy is not supranational but it remains inter-governmental. The EU has certainly demonstrated global engagement and channelled and fostered cooperation between EU member States in the sensitive domains of security and defence. It is also true that the EU has developed an innovative set of instruments with its military approach to crisis management very soon becoming a comprehensive civil-military one. In the meantime, the EU has made use of practically all combinations of instruments and mission components at its disposal including the various set ups for operational planning and command. But the period of testing its tools and procedures should now be followed up by a more coherent path of action equip to clear set of priorities.

The new High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) will be then responsible for harmonising and coordinating the EU's external action between the commission

and council (Dagand 2008). In the area of the EU external action the treaty sets out the creation of two new posts, the permanent President of the Council and double-hatted HR/VP. These two new roles must ensure coherence in EU foreign policy, at least reducing the current fragmentation of represent action of the Union on the international scene. In particular the new HR/VP will emerge as the main personality for external affairs, taking charge of the functions previously exercised by the 6 months rotating Presidency. According to articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty, HR/VP will conduct CFSP by making proposals and presiding over the foreign affairs council as well as representing the EU for the matters of CFSP and political dialogue with third countries. Thus, the HR/VP will not only be responsible for CFSP but also will coordinate the work of the commission Director Generals (DGs) with external responsibility resulting to reduce the inconsistencies associated with the complex pillar system. However, it is clearly appear that HR/VP will be a very difficult job. Many expert considered it impossible and pointed out that HR/VP needs to be 'superhuman gymnast', to deal with the numerous and challenging tasks. Besides the HR/VP and the President of the council, the Lisbon Treaty sets out the creation of the European External Action Service, debated size is more likely to be towards 1500-2000. It will be fully operational in 2012 and will be subject to review in 2014 which is '*sui generis*' in nature the EEAS is created to overcome the pillar structure and lay the basis for a more coordinated and coherent EU forging policy which will dramatically enhance the EU global status as the ESS intended to be.

However, the ever increasing complexity of modern crisis requires a comprehensive approach in crisis management operations and interventions. The inconsistencies cannot be overcome simply through the personal union of the HR/VP. If the EU wants to be a credible and influential actor on the international stage, it has to improve coordination between CFSP and long term development assistance policies. The EEAS represents an opportunity to improve the current situation, the EU has wide range of tools (EU is the world largest aid donor) but has not proved to combine its own dimensions (intergovernmental and community) in effective way. If the two dimensions are kept separate the effects of EU foreign policy are destined to remain limited. Therefore, it is necessary but not sufficient that at least tighter cooperation channels between the diplomatic service and commission DGs with external responsibilities are established. If the EEAS will be tasked with long term



assistance and development programming, this way it would be possible to step towards a more effective coordination and synergy of the EU external policies.

#### **4.2 Crisis Management in post-Lisbon Era (Decision Making and Leadership)**

The European crisis management capabilities have come a long way since 1999. The EU has range of civil and military instruments which enabled it to carry out numerous civil and military crisis management missions throughout the world. The Lisbon Treaty, amending the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and Treaty establishing the European Community was signed on 13 December 2007 and come into force on 1<sup>st</sup> December 2009. It replaces the Treaty of Nice, formerly the legal basis for EU activities under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). According to article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty member states make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy to contribute to the objectives defined by the council. Those member states which together established multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy. The phrase 'improving the coherence of its actions' in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty refers primarily to the Union's role in international affairs of the key ESDP missions revealed that the classic distinctions between internal-external and soft-hard security policies are blurring. The pillar structured introduces an inherent risk of inconsistency by dividing the Union's international relations over two different legal treaty regimes (Blockmans and Wassel 2009: 45). Analysis reveals that a number of things will change in the common foreign, security and defence policy and that the Lisbon Treaty can certainly be seen as yet another step in the on-going integration process in this policy field. The upgraded role of the HR is certainly the most innovating aspect. Apart from HR extensive role as the key representative of the Union in all international affairs, HR function has the potential of bridging the currently existing divided between community and CFSP international relations. The same holds true for the future European external action service. With the entry into force the Lisbon Treaty, the divide of the Union's international actors representation over different institutional actors will repair two of the main current shortcomings in the realm of EU security policies i.e. leadership and decision making. The new solidarity clause

of the Treaty will make the Union to take decisions easier and faster in the field of security, so thanks to the new solidarity clause.

While initially controversial, the introduction of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy may improve leadership when duly assisted by the European Commission. Again, much will depend on the High Representative rapport with the newly created president of the European Council who will also responsible for the external representation of the EU on issues concerning the common foreign and security policy. The EU's potential in crisis management not only depends on the general institutional set up but also and more particularly on the provisions establishing common security and Defence Policy. Lisbon Treaty not only extends the possibility of the Union in this area and also introduces something of a collective defence obligation. Perhaps, together with the European Defence Agency and the possibility of permanent structure cooperation, the new CSDP may allow the Union to further develop its presence as a military actor (Blockmans and Wassel 2009: 46).

As a matter of fact, effective crisis management calls for effective decision making. The key role of the member states is maintained by the Lisbon Treaty but with some modifications so far, most proposals in the area of CFSP came from the member states with particularly active role of the presidency. The new role of the commission brought by Lisbon Treaty may trigger new and many possibilities in its external affairs including international crisis management. Potential impact of the combination of Commission and Vice-President on the role of the EU in international affairs lies in the fact that there could be more natural attuning different external policies. Much will depend on the way in which the legal provisions will be used, over the last many years practice revealed a process of institutional dynamics in which a growing together community and CFSP decision-making and institutional involvement proved unavoidable. The Lisbon Treaty foresees a more efficient, more democratic and more transparent Europe which is more united on the world stage and better and able to guarantee the safety of its citizens.

In terms of leadership, however something seem to change, most of the institutional changes in Lisbon Treaty relate to the position of the High Representative for the CFSP, which will be renamed as High Representative of the Union for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy. This changed name reflects the fact that it has become clear that the High Representative indeed represents the Union and not the collective member states. However, the term 'Foreign Ministers' which was used in the constitutional treaty has been abandoned, the new provisions make clear that the High Representative will indeed be the prime representative of the Union in international affairs. The appointment of High Representative by European Council by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)<sup>39</sup> again underlines HR role as Union representative, who is competent to decide and act even in the absence of consensus among the member states. Above all, the position of High Representative has been upgraded to allow for a stronger and more independent development and implementation of the Union's foreign, security and defence policy which potentially allows for a more coherent and more effective role for the EU in international affairs.

The Lisbon Treaty seems to offer of improvements which may compensate for the choice to separate the foreign, security and defence policy from other external policies including trade, economic, social and environmental development. Perhaps, in that respect one can point to the broader objectives of the new CFSP and CSDP and the possibilities for the High Representative in his double-hatted function to combine security and military measures with the softer crisis management measures which from the part of other Union policies. As we have seen that effective crisis management mainly depends on the potential of the EU to formulate and implement a security and defence policy. The Nice Treaty provides a basis for a European Security and Defence Policy through a modification of article 17 TEU. Whereas, originally the implementation of EU decisions with defence implications was left to the Western European Union (WEU), the Nice Treaty deleted all references to the WEU. Nevertheless, one cannot overlooked the gradual development from the first provision in the Maastricht Treaty<sup>40</sup> to Amsterdam Treaty and finally to Nice Treaty were all references to the WEU were deleted, thereby making the EU itself

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<sup>39</sup>As from 1 November 2014, qualified majority voting shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing member states comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union see article 16, par. 4 new TEU. A blocking minority must include at least four council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.

<sup>40</sup>The eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to common defense.

responsible for the elaboration and implementation of the decisions and actions which have defence implications.

The Lisbon Treaty can certainly be seen as a further step in this development. According to Lisbon Treaty, the common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the CFSP. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN charter. The performance of these tasks undertaken using capabilities provided by the member states. The Petersberg Tasks include joint disarmament operation, humanitarian and rescue tasks military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories as the ESS underscore. Nevertheless, the feeling that something similar to a collective defence obligation has been created and becomes stronger when the so-called 'solidarity clause' is taken into account. While, the wording of the solidarity clause leaves room for both the member states and the council regarding the type and scope of their reaction, it may be seen as an innovation to the current legal regime where no obligations for the member states or competences of the council form part of the treaties.

To analyse the EU's policies and action in the CSDP and crisis management framework with particular focus on the role of the EU External Action Service (EEAS) in post-Lisbon era, institutional equation and to assess the appropriate EU crisis response in a transformational environment where factors such as the EEAS, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and humanitarian aid should be taken. CartionaGoourlay's analysis confirmed that the EU civilian missions is reactive nature of CSDP decision-making, according to him, missions typically result a request from the international organisations or a host nation. In the past majority missions providing leadership and forging coalitions of support within the PSC, the EU's decision making body for crisis management has been played by the country that holds the Presidency of the EU and serves as chair

of the PSC. However, the dynamic of CSDP decision-making will change in post Lisbon context when there is no longer a rotating Presidency system. Although the Lisbon reforms offer new opportunities for strengthening the linkage between CSDP planning and decision-making with other EU actors, Gourlay see little evidence that this will be achieved through the creation of EEAS, so long as the crisis management and diplomatic remain structurally separated within.<sup>41</sup> The lack of normative perspective across the EU's different crisis management and crisis response process tools and instruments, the need for enhanced accountability, credibility and integrity in creating structures and concepts to ensure better EU response to crises.

### **4.3 European Security Strategy and Political Perspective under Lisbon Treaty**

The ESS offers the potential to generate the necessary political momentum. EU's foreign and security policy as well as its defence policy would however be greatly served by completing the ESS with guidelines as to how EU should act to come to a genuinely comprehensive approach, on how to effectively join up all the instruments of the EU. A timely update of the ESS could inspire the on-going work on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty by introducing strategic and tactical thinking on security matters. Perhaps, a revised ESS could offer directions on how to deal with some specific military matters. Moreover, an updated and more detailed ESS would offer an additional sound basis for a continued constructive transatlantic dialogue leading to even more mutual benefits. According to Biscop this will be one of the strongest determining factors with regard to the EU's military level of ambition, its military presence on the terrain and indeed the further development of ESDP as such for the simple reason that all this will influence the thinking in all the capitals of their transatlantic community. Here, the questions are what does it mean for the EU to contribute to peace and stability? Why should the EU strengthen its capabilities? What does the EU aim to achieve? One argument underlined that the strategic document has not been translated into a military sub-strategy and proposed that an EU civilian-military strategy should be discussed with a view to updating the ESS. Perhaps, it was agreed that the pooling of forces and assets would be crucial for the success of permanent structured cooperation, it was stressed that pooling

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<sup>41</sup>Ensuring that CSDP decision making is formed by EU country strategies and more rigorous political analysis will likely require procedural innovations, with greater role played by other EU actors, including EU delegations in preparing CSDP missions.

could increase the sovereignty of EU member states allowing smaller member states to participate in larger operations. The enlargement of the Petersberg missions advanced by the Thessaloniki European Council by the Headline Goal 2010 and by the European security strategy has a legal base<sup>42</sup> and a solidarity clause in case of a terrorist attack or a natural or human made catastrophe.

The post-cold war period determines that the state is not the only referent object of security. It is not the only target of threats, nor the sole supplier of security the different referent objects face multi-level and multi-sectorial threats. Conflicts are predominantly intra-state and tend to potentiate transnational threats. Therefore, the post-cold war security and insecurity environment require a combination of diversity of actors, policies and tools. According to European Policy Centre (EPC) senior policy analyst Bulfour the political context today is fragmented and uncertain and political solidarity has been weakened, there is a problem of building consensus. It was important to put up question why the EU has not been able to implement its foreign policy objectives effectively. What are the obstacles to EU cooperation and real interests? He further argued that foreign policy is not just about having an impact on the world it is increasingly about representing citizens and responding to their expectations. The EU's moral claim to be a global power is based on its experience of integration as a means to secure peace. No doubt, standardising military equipment is difficult and requires strong political leadership to achieve. In order to obtain these security activities in the neighbouring countries can also be necessary where the main aim is the promotion of stability. As we have seen that all the three aspects security listed in ESS are mutually influencing and cannot be separated from each other politically.

Following the historic launched of ESS, considerable progress has been achieved over the year both on paper and on the ground. The pace of change, the scale and nature of threats in the world, however make such positive developments look modest. The CFSP of the EU essentially remains a delicate balancing act between 27 national diplomacies, albeit with a growing input from the EU institutions (Grevi

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<sup>42</sup>Article 43 TEU: 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their terrorist.'

2004). In the absence of political debate, the EU's CFSP are likely to limit their scope for action in favour of a common position. Much of the 2003 strategy was good and is still relevant, but significant challenges require a new strategic debate to focus attention in the different policy communities around Europe on the issues that lie ahead. Political will however can only come from serious political debate. Grevi argued that diplomacy can bring about progress in coordination or cooperation between national foreign policies. But only common politics can underpin a common policy. Since the ESS has laid down common security and defence policy, the EU needs common politics. Thus, political debate on EU's CFSP has to be enhanced across the Union. The ESS does identify a range of key objectives but does not include a detailed list of measures or quantifiable indicators. The public which is already very sensitive to the role of the Union in international affairs would be better informed. Perhaps, thriving public debate along with workable rules are important and best way to create political will. Significant progress was made in terms of institutional reform in the convention and at the subsequent inter-governmental conference. Since, the ESS elaborated innovative and throw new scope for cooperative policy-making. The Commission and the European Parliament which are the two important actors were more or less marginalised, they should be much more closely involved in the follow up to the ESS and the CFSP policy making more generally.

The ambitious vision outlined in the ESS should be regarded as the important factor in shaping a credible CFSP. The ESS is a good platform to focus the minds and provide guidance towards shared goals. Institutions as well as conceptual innovations are however of little use in the absence of political will. What really matters is to build new initiatives on the basis of past accomplishments thereby, adding to the emerging international identity of the EU. No doubt, the ESS was intended to become the framework of reference for foreign and security policy making in the Union. It outlines priorities to counter threats and shape to safer and just global environment, the fight against terrorism, action to counter proliferation of WMD, the Balkans, the Middle East and strengthening effective multilateralism. When it comes to strengthening effective multilateralism, the approach of larger EU member states to the reform of the UN Security Council shows that the time for a pioneering role of the Union in the management of global security is not attained it

maturity. Most importantly, institutional reform cannot replace, but only enhance and sustain political will. There is no formula to produce political will but to open democratic political processes. The absence of such a process at the European level partly explains the underdevelopment of the EU's stature in world affairs. Giovanni asserts that, the missing link between progress on institutions and stalemate on the ground is politics, fostering a public political debate at the European level on the shared priorities of the CFSP and the major initiatives undertaken to pursue them seems an important contribution to bridging the gap between the words and deeds. Public political process should be established in order to monitor the follow-up and implementation of the ESS.

To enhance a sense of team spirit between the different institutional actor in Brussels i.e. EEAS and Foreign Ministers and strengthen public awareness of achievements and features against the commitments made in the adoption of ESS. More importantly this political process should be embedded in suitable institutional mechanisms as to complication and maximise transparency and inclusiveness. The ESS explicitly acknowledge that the distinction between security policy and development and trade policy can no longer be drawn when shaping a common foreign policy is widely accepted phenomenon. Interestingly, today foreign and security policy occupy a much more central role in the public debate across different countries not only in EU, most significantly the Union's stance in the world will define what the Union itself is because a global player reflect its internal identity in external action and vice-versa. Now a day foreign policy making is essentially about who we are? And what we want to be? A political process channelled through institutions at the national level and European level might unleash new dynamics by holding governments accountable for their action or inaction, public exposure can play a healthy role in preventing governments from digging their feet to deeply into pre-determined positions.

This comprehensive approach to understanding security and seeking policy responses can be found in the present ESS and also in the literature on the EU as a robust civilian actor. Hence, the most important thing is that the challenge seems to be more about implementing the security concept and objectives of the EU in the most effective manner. This will no doubt determine the success and efficiency of the EU and its member states as an international security actor. Therefore, it requires



moving beyond an agreed comprehensive concept to its implementation of ESS with strong political will. Lacking these innovations, a European Union of 27 member states could never hope for more coherence than the European Union of 25 of it replaced, which never very coherence in the first place (Smith 2005; Dannreuther and Peterson 2006: 3). This change can be bringing by strong political will among the 27 member states taking along with the public concerned.

Lack of political cohesion within the EU is difficult for the EU 27 to formulate common interests that easily translate into efficient common institutions agreed procedures and joint action. The real question is, what needs to be done to make security and defence policy to works well? Lack of political will from member states is the biggest obstacle in achieving the EU's international aim of promoting peace and reducing human suffering. This essentially undermines the member states armed forces modernisation and rationalisation. The EU has already signed up to ambitious global targets it must be supplement them with more political targets. The EU's ability to project power depends far more on political will than military hard-ware. Europe could become a multilaterals superpower tomorrow if it will be more strategic in playing the non-military cards it already holds. The Europe is extremely bad at setting the global political agenda (Ramses 2009: 25). while some statesman such as Joschka Fisher have tried to map out strategic goals for the EU's own development, this has not been met by a strategy of setting a global agenda or even articulating what the EU stands for in the world. The ESS is an important start to this, but the EU will find it hard to achieve anything if it is not more explicit in making clear what it wants and then setting a new agenda to back up its goals.

#### **4.4 Major Changes of the ESS under the Lisbon Treaty**

The Lisbon Treaty creates overarching principles and objectives that govern the EU's common Foreign and Security Policy. The post of EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is proposed, which would be responsible for ensuring a common ground among the Member States in implementing the CFSP. The Lisbon Treaty ensures that each Member States would retain its veto in decision making in the area of security and defence, meaning decisions must be unanimous (Article 22(1) TEU). There is no obligation to partake in operations. The Treaty extends the scope of the Peterberg Tasks to joint

disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention. The European Defence Agency (EDA) would become part of the legal framework of ESDP under the Lisbon Treaty and calls on the Member States to progressively improve military capabilities through the EDA by boosting defence research and development and creating an effective defence market (Article 42(3) TEU). This seeks to avoid duplication, reduce the cost of equipment for the Member States defence forces and increase interoperability. The Treaty allows members to engage in permanent structure cooperation in civilian and military tasks. The mutual assistance clause in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 42(7) TEU) would ensure that all Member States provide aid and assistance military or non-military if another Member States was the victim of an armed aggression on its territory. In addition to this mutual assistance clause,<sup>43</sup> the Treaty provides for a solidarity clause, which allows the Member States to mobilise all means at their disposal if one Member States is the victim of the terrorist or natural or man-made disaster (Article 222 TFEU).

The wide range of EU external actions, new trends under way and the Lisbon Treaty entering into force means that existing institutional structures for the formulation and implementation of relevant decisions in the area of CFSP and CSDP both pre-Lisbon and the more recent need to be strengthened. As EU crisis management activities demonstrate the need to consolidate civil-military coordination becomes ever more apparent. Increasingly, EU crisis management missions that combine military and civilian aspects which need to be built into plan in a holistic way and executed seamlessly. The Lisbon Treaty brings an inspiration of better institutional coordination and more strategic decision making for crisis management. At the political level the implementation of comprehensive strategic options which would further integrate civilian and military approaches is being discussed. The Treaty reinvigorates the on-going process of overall structural change of the EU Council Secretariat and connects it with the launch of EEAS. The Treaty has created a new institutional set up that has a strong imprint on CFSP coordination with a powerful High Representative supported by the emerging European external action service. The Lisbon Treaty has open up new prospects and new possibilities for cooperation

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<sup>43</sup>The Lisbon Treaty's mutual assistance clause is the result of a compromise between those EU member states that wanted a mutual defence commitment.

but what matter is whether EU can grasp the opportunity and live up to the challenge. This Treaty has been introduced numerous new and innovative forms of cooperation regarding CSDP; mutual assistance clause; solidarity clause; permanent structured cooperation, the possibilities of the creation of a start-up fund for rapid deployment of expert etc. Based on the increasing demand of CSDP activities world-wide and the limited resources at the disposal to meet it, pooling and sharing is one of the principles that should prevail while seeking efficiencies. The scope of such cooperation is very wide and can be extended to a whole of area both in military and civilian field such as a logistics, training, infrastructure, capability-building, operations etc. the achievement of synergies by closer cooperation and interaction between the various actors and elements of civilian and military. Making better use of existing capabilities and maximising coherence will be essential in order to achieve these objectives.

Since 2003 the EU has conducted a wide range of CSDP missions and operations on three continents and delivered highly visible achievements in strengthening peace, security and the rule of law world-wide. Most importantly, the EEAS is only the tool and not ultimate goal for the EU to become a real global player, CSDP is also an asset amongst others in the EU's external relations. The threats listed in the ESS should be address through CFSP and CSDP in order to enhance EU's strategic autonomy through a strong and effective foreign, security and defence policy said the Foreign Affairs Committee. Hence, the EU must develop more effective and better defined crisis management operations and synergies between civilian and military activities of the EU and of its member states. To realise its full potential, the European Union needs to modernise and reform. The EU 27 members is operating for EU 15 for many years, the EU has been looking for the right way forward to optimise an instrument at its disposal and reinforce its capacity to act. As the EU has grown and its responsibilities have change, it makes sense to update the way in which it works. We find the on-going reflection on the future implementation of the European neighbourhood policy important in order to make best use of the new opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty and to optimise the ENP's contribution to the EU's long term objectives.

The Lisbon Treaty provides new tools for the development of the common foreign and security policy, the treaty continues the path towards peace, not only in European theatre but also world-wide and especially in the immediate vicinity to the EU through one policy of good neighbours and security. The Treaty provides a solid institutional structure with a council president elected for two and half years and High Representative for foreign and security policy with more powers. Perhaps, the European external action service<sup>44</sup> that will give greater continuity and coherence to the CFSP and therefore also to the ESDP, Miguel Ballesteros Martin said that, the goal of the Lisbon Treaty on security and defence is the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence. For instant developing not Europe of soft power but hard power, ability to maintain the security of European citizens, interests groups of the Union and international stability. Joseph Nye said that *“Europe must develop the so called smart power considered a combination of hard and soft power in the same strategy as adopted by the ESS.”*

Interestingly, the EU suffer from a large uncertainty in its community engagement and this translate into a security strategy is very ambiguous. Undoubtedly, one of the biggest challenges is to harmonise national interests and interests of the Union. Till now, it is more or less understood that European interests were the mere juxtaposition of national interests. As the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be strengthened, it will help the Union to speak with single voice, therefore be more united on the world stage. Moreover, a new European External Action Service will provide the structure to support and deliver the full range of European external policies. Article 72 of TFEU suggests that member states also remain the principal actor as regards to internal security. However, it is clear that the EU has an increasingly important role in coordinating action taken by member states to protect internal security. This reflected in the Lisbon Treaty which established a new standing committee called COSI, responsible for cooperation on internal security. COSI purpose is to facilitate, promote and strengthen operational action in the field of internal security involving national law

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<sup>44</sup>The EU's embassies will be created across the globe, called the EEAS. The EEAS will be staffed by national diplomats, staff from the European Commission and from the Council of Ministers in equal proportion.

enforcement bodies. For the first time, calls on the council and commission to develop a comprehensive EU internal security strategy. According to the European council, the strategy should further improve security in the Union and thus protect the lives and safety of European citizens and tackle organised crime, be aimed at strengthening cooperation in law enforcement, border management civil protection, disaster management as well as criminal judicial cooperation in order to make Europe more secure and natural and man-made disasters and other common phenomena which create safety and security threats such as road accident.

The threats facing the EU should address through CFSP and CSDP<sup>45</sup> and adopt more effective and better define crisis management operations and synergies between the civilian and military activities of the EU and its member states. This Treaty brought its institutional innovations, make it possible to reform the institutions of the enlarged Union and come out of the institutional stalemate. This includes the establishment of an integrated management system for external borders, it also extends the Union's potential in terms of the fight against terrorism, conflict prevention missions, post-conflict stabilisation missions, etc. The EU lacked common interests or a common view of its role in the world and that made it difficult to provide for its security and defence needs within the ESDP. The ESS compensate for the strategic shortcomings of the ESDP but despite that the EU was not up to the challenge of defining its interests vis-à-vis the rests of the world or promoting its own values externally (Solana 2008: 5; Martin 2010: 29). The ESS could only move forward as long as there was consensus and it could therefore, promote structural change in the ESDP or impose obligations or future commitments on the member states. The ESS identified four principles through which the member states should promote the EU's global role in matters of security and defence, at the same time acknowledged the limitations of international organisations as regards guaranteeing collective security and proposed to reinforce them in order to achieve an effective multilateralism. To assess what was achieved by the ESS, one must bear in mind that the EU's limitations as a strategic actor due to the plurality of actors and interests involved in its planning and implementation and to the fact that its design was confined to the sphere of crisis management (Martin 2010: 30) with the ESS,

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<sup>45</sup>The decisions concerning the CSDP are made by the Foreign Affairs which is chair by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

the EU departed more or less from its traditional identity as a civilian power, although the member states continued to state a preference for soft security. The ESS did contribute some elements of strategy which go a long way to explaining the behaviour of the EU in matters of security, in view of the both their positive contents and their omissions and which offer guidelines as to the best way forward. However, in practice it has been used as a reference document for almost every initiative promoting the expansion and strengthening of the ESDP including autonomous international missions.

All the provisions on CFSP and ESDP tend to promote a European identity. The simple question that we need to ask is. Has a European identity be opposite to other international actors, mainly the US? Some argued that, some parts of the Lisbon Treaty would tend to confirm this idea, i.e. the expression of principles and values guiding the EU external action, including the promotion of an international system based on a solid multilateral cooperation and a good governance or multilateral solutions for common concerns, especially into the UN framework, or the effective multilateralism according to ESS words. According to Natividad Fernandez sola and David Garcia Cantalapiedra, that human security is about the basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. According to a human security approach, civilian and military initiatives should prioritise the protection of civilians over the defeat of enemy as protection of human rights is the main challenge. They further argue that human security implies effective multilateralism which means a commitment to work within the framework of international law alongside other international and regional agencies individual states and non-states actors.

#### **4.5 The Institutional Challenges: A Comprehensive Coherence**

In 2009 the EU has a unique opportunity<sup>46</sup> to reinvent itself. Failure to seize this opportunity may seriously jeopardise its future. The challenge today is to make the best use of the Lisbon Treaty by following in the footsteps of those who have historically played a key role in the construction of political Europe. The most dangerous threat to Europe today is its own Member State's reluctance to accept additional shifts of sovereignty from national to European levels of governance in

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<sup>46</sup>With the official adoption of Treaty of Lisbon in December 1, 2009. EU is taking into new turn in defence and security issues.

foreign policy making. Clearly, it is essential that Europe emerges as a coherent foreign policy actor. In the short term, coherence will have to be sought between the European External Action Service, the Member States and the Commission. In the longer term EU foreign policy coherence needs stronger leadership, smoother voting procedures and stable representation at the UN Security Council in order to develop (Vasconcelos 2010: 19). As a global actor in the making, the EU still needs to be much more assertive and effective. Fragmented Europeans are already unable to exert influence over the global powers, not only economically, commercially and financially, but also politically and militarily. The EU's internal coherence and the image it projects to the world have been undermined by the difficulties the Member States had in agreeing on financial regulation, on how best to alleviate the financial crisis in Greece currently. With the new treaty having been entered into force i.e. the Lisbon Treaty, external coherence should not be allowed to fall hostage to internal wrangling over the economic and financial policies as well as military aspect.

Protecting the Member States interests while advancing common projects or framework based on cooperation has been at the heart of European political leadership in the last 60 years. The world is changing faster today than the European multi-level governance strategic and tactics. What is probably needed is more delegation of sovereign power by Member States and increasingly closer intergovernmental cooperation and supranational policies in certain policy field i.e. research and innovation and crisis management. The fundamental values enshrined in the Union's treaties and strategic documents are not always easy to reconcile in the absence of political aspiration, despite the fact that the EU has articulated its commitment towards coherence. Vasconcelos argued that, the supposedly bright future of coherent EU external action will depend on the division of a diverse range of tasks among the Member States, strengthened schemes of cooperation and variables geometry formats such as core groups and contact groups. In its partnerships policy the EU aspires to move beyond bilateralism and endow its strategic partnerships with multilateral dimensions by incorporating global issues into the agendas of its summits. According to Alvaro, the EU aims to promote the notion of responsible powers whereby it expects that its recognition of the emerging

powers enhanced status will act as an incentive for them to take a larger share of responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security.

The EU is not a super power and it is unrealistic to expect that it could be cast in the role of chief facilitator. But perhaps, it is through smaller, more gradual, that the EU can make a difference. It remains to be seen if the Lisbon Treaty succeeds in fostering the coherence of EU foreign policy, including with regards to the strategic partners. The creation of European External Action Service should have major implications in this context.



## **CHAPTER V**

### **Conclusion**

Our world is changing and so are the threats and challenges around the world. So the response from the EU should evolve correspondingly by working together to implement the actions outlined in ESS. Moreover, it is inevitable that however strong and well planned we are, the threats can never be entirely eliminated. That is the reason why it is all the more imperative that we step up our effort. Likewise, the success rate will depend on the combined efforts of all EU actors and also on cooperation with the outside world. Clearly, the EU has capacity to play a major role in bringing peace to other regions of the globe. Certainly, much has been achieved after the adoption of ESS in 2003. But the strategy updated in 2008 still recognises the implementations of ESS remains work in progress and suggests few concrete proposals for tackling the ever evolving threats and complex problems.

### **5.0 European Security Strategy in a Changing World**

ESS should undergo a continuous review process in order to adapt to rapidly changing intricate international challenges. The strategy makes a common analysis of security threats and challenges much easier and it delineates ways of dealing with them. The ESS is a comprehensive concept of security but the conceptual framework can be still strengthened in order to provide a clear and powerful link among different external policies areas. In the meantime the ESS should not be interpreted as being directed against the NSS of United States or as a competition between the Europe and the United States. To make it more workable and effective, the EU leadership will need not only political will but also new political thinking free from the cold war stereotypes and phobias in order to get a wider Europe. In this way, the EU can engage in systematic political engagement of prevention. The ESS constitutes great step forward and should constitute a good basis for future action. EU need intra-institutional coherence urgently, as concrete step toward increased military cooperation and enhanced capabilities. For the global dimension much will depend on the extent to which CFSP turns into a driver of European policy at large and commits the member states to pooling interests and capabilities that go well beyond the immediate periphery of the EU. As such, the EU member states can share a strategic vision of the EU's regional and global role in order to reinforce the role of

the EU, the ESS framework for CFSP should be mentioned in the future constitution.

Can the EU become a truly global strategic force? This question can be answer in political perspective, that the EU will require strong political direction and common effort. However, without the means to pursue the objectives set out in the ESS, EU will remain nothing but a talking shop. The condition of instability, conflict and state failure have detrimental impact on our own security in this interdependent world. Iraq is a warning of any physical intervention, the basic question we should understand, when should the EU intervene? How should it best bring of its relevant policy instruments to bear? Without united approach and agreed strategy, interventions can become mired and dragged down by indecision essentially this is what happened in Iraq crisis. The Afghanistan operation<sup>47</sup> threatens to go down the same road. The need for and value of ESDP working to a common mandate drawn from political consensus underpinned by a collective security strategy. If member states are participating in operations for different reasons and some are not prepared to accept by others within the ESDP coalition, this can seriously damage operational efficiency, undermine morale on the ground and tarnish the EU's reputation as a serious international security actor. Precisely, well targeted and early intervention can achieve far better results than a far larger effort applied clumsily and too late.

Stability in the wider region, including the Middle East is likely to raise on the security agenda for various reasons. Therefore, the terrorist threats and Iraq war have again reminded the EU of the need to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The reason is that Russia may be the major energy supplier for the EU i.e. gas, the member states are dependent on oil from the Middle East. Moreover, Caspian Sea countries are likely to be significant supplier in future which is why the EU's projection of greater involvement in the Caucasus. However, the question for the future is whether the new members will feel sufficiently assertive in Brussels as well as confident in their relationship with US to actively engage in the EU's discourse on security policy and the negotiations on the transatlantic relationship. In one way, for transatlantic relations row over Iraq may have been healthy, it triggered EU to reflect on its capabilities, military and expertise and yielded new determination to

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<sup>47</sup>Growing local resentment, heavier casualties and ignominious defeat, moreover, NATO direction and conducting operations fail to minimize civilian deaths in Afghanistan.

seek rational and complementary approaches to highly complex and interconnected problems of global security and reminded the EU member states.

Political stabilisation, conflict management and the prevention of weak or fails states are the development related building blocks of the ESS. The road to a common security and foreign policy contains a number of potholes. Presently for example many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This could result in differing perceptions of threats, Europe should strive to create an effective European security and defence initiative, and will have to take a larger role in ensuring their own security through by pooling together into EU, taking the necessary step to ensure that they possess the military capabilities needed to meet the potential challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment. A strong European security role also should lead to improvements in military capabilities.

Regardless of economic, political, demographic and military weight, there is no power without will powers. The EU will only be powerful if its member states consciously and collectively muster the will and constitute one of the poles of the multi-polar world and act accordingly. Likewise, there is no power without capacity for autonomy of decision making. The capacity for decision making rests on political consensus. The long term security is based on institutionalized rule based multilateralism as ESS assert. Perhaps, it is Europe's interests to make multilateralism work, this will affirm EU as an international actor and will enhance the legitimacy of its external action as the first tranquil world leader.

### **5.1 Implications of European Security Strategy**

The success of European Security Strategy ultimately depends on the political will of the member states to take action, the EU should be prepared to invest the necessary financial means in effective partnership and cooperation in developing its own policy instruments and also must be prepared and able to implement those mechanisms and instruments if need arises. The EU need not thus strive for a military capacity equal to that of US but must carefully plan its capability needs according to the strategy. Member states need to speed up the reconfiguration of their armed forces to make them suitable for deployment in today's ESDP missions simply presiding over withering or unusable forces as budgets are constantly reducing is the antithesis of a sensible defence strategy. As the ESS evolves and

more ESDP missions are launched, so the European Parliament which continues to extend its authority over external relations will need to be able to enhance its ability to oversee activities in this field. To retain its usefulness the ESS has to be able to respond flexibly and rapidly. Moreover, to become a genuine strategy it should contain clear targets and objectives and detailed action plan for their achievement. In order to build stronger institutional support and earn greater democratic legitimacy for the ESS the revision process should involve proper oversight by the European Parliament and national parliament.

Both the US and EU contributed to shape the international set of definition and rules in the field of organized crime by applying their diverse and different but leading roles. The rising of non-state actor and the consequent development of the human aspects of security in globalization era and even the catastrophic event of September 11 pushed the main international political actor to change this composite structure relation. In particular, the potential of EU can develop and be considering as fundamental basis for launching multilateral cooperation in security affairs. European Security Strategy provides a strategic orientation to build security architecture for EU. This can be possible only with multilateral system by which we can make fairer, safer and more united world. The broad principles of ESS and its associated strategies allow the partners and willing European states to cooperate on pressing issues that face both EU and EU's partners and provides a clear mandate for enhancing the capabilities to fight, such as fight against global terrorism, WMD proliferation etc.

The European Union's policy will be different from Washington's in balance between strengthening international treaties, beefing up inspection and verification mechanisms, implementing sanctions and using of military force. A weak oscillating between internal divisions and inaction cannot be the strategic partner that Washington wants with EU (Steven 2003: 2). It is the striking contribution of the ESS that the European Union now has some form of clearly identifiable grand strategy. Rather than focusing the only prospective proliferator, the EU also addresses the central question of the motivation for acquiring WMD's. The European Union is determined to play active role in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes. The ESS argued that, the best solution to the problems

of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. The more secure countries feel, the likely they are to abandon programme. To this end, the European Union will foster regional security arrangements and regional arms control and disarmament processes and will encourage other countries to renounce the use of technology and facilities that might cause a particular risk of proliferation.

The one crucial aspects that is missing before the EU can really become a significant security actor, seems to be political will, whether this missing element will ever materialise will depend on the mood of the European electorates (Moller 2005: 51). It cannot be argued that, as a result of various missions the EU has emerged as a major new strategic actor in world politics. European military capacity after almost a decade of stagnation has come a long way in a few short years, but the EU still has a long way to go before it overcome all its shortcomings and emerge as a fully credible coordinated military actor. Wiser spending of resources would certainly help, when the EU has clearly established what it hopes to achieve and with what level of force, finally with what state of equipment, until then EU's force transformation programmes will remain incomplete (Howorth 2008: 101).

To be a true global power, the EU must further strengthen its emerging strategic culture and put to use all necessary instruments to implement them. At one hand, a balance partnership with the US global economic governance, strategic partnership with China and India etc. require the weight of a united EU. Institutionalising the strategic reflection in the EU could contribute to the consolidation of its strategic culture. But the mechanisms and institutional capacity for permanent strategic reflection to feed decision making, seem to be insufficient (Biscop 2006: 99). The ESS is clear about what the threats to Europe are. Haines argues that, the ESS by stressing the notion that the European Union's first line of defence now lies abroad, implies a projection of both soft and hard power in a way previously unknown in the EU. The management of old and new risks and threats must be collective and requires a unity of diplomacy and military capabilities that does not exist. Perhaps, the ESS may have been clear about the threats facing the Europe, while it has been less clear in its call for an international order based on effective multilateralism. Despite these competing understanding of multilateralism, the ESS strongly emphasised the importance of the UN and stated that an effective UN must be a European priority (Biscop 2008). However, it remains unclear how the EU as one

type of multilateral organisation can act effectively within and with other type of multilateral organisations such as the UN. A more capable Europe does involve both more effective policy and requires improving the military capabilities of the Union, the ESS called for the transformation of the member states militaries into more flexible and more mobile forces that could address the new threats facing the EU, although it may take time.

However, Biscop shows that improving the effectiveness and coherence of the European Union's external capabilities has been on the agenda for many years. While all EU member states and EU institutions agree on the need to improve coordination when the European Union is acting externally but surprisingly no member states or institutions has been willing to relinquish its own role in this area entirely. If the ESS has played an important role in convincing both Europeans and others that the EU can be an actor in international affairs, but its continued relevance may perhaps depend on factors beyond the strategy document itself. Thus, it is the political will of the member states that will determine what kind of global actor the European Union is and will become. The fact remains that the ESS has been and continues to be the reference framework in forging of a global Europe, even the verdict is somewhat mixed on the effect of the document and the extent to which it has helped shaping a European strategic culture which is necessary for EU to develop.

There are no benchmarks concerning the policy implications of the ESS, the aims are quite general. Here, capability is still the biggest problem associated. Solana has argued that ESS as a set of guidelines for possible actions not as a politically, legally or operational binding document. In the absence of constitution, the ESS has been used as legitimising document. No doubt, most of the enemies in the contemporary time are not the states with military forces but thugs. Since, there is limited number of tools or methods avail when it comes to conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Europe is very reluctant on the use of force, how one can exercise coercion without the use of force? Instead it has always and very keen on using positive incentives. Hence, the use of force is one of the fundamental issues that needs immediate attention EU should paid.

Now is the time for EU to look to a new strategy, engaging all the stakeholders in the process so that a more unitary approach will be forged between the different actors, producing a strategy more capable of handling issues in the long and short term. It identified two priorities for strategic action that EU needs to emphasise. The economy, if the EU is seen as declining, it will not take seriously in the world. It is imperative for the EU to maintain its position as a hub of innovation and entrepreneurship in a rapidly changing global economy. And the second is the neighbourhood, the EU must demonstrate the power of its policies and seen to be effective, relevant and powerful in its own neighbourhood if EU has to influence in other parts of the world. While the ESS makes great strides, it is fair to say that the international identity of the Union's is work in progress. In fact, they should forged national legislatures and the European Parliament (EP) have to join forces and overcome the mutual suspicions of the past, accept full cooperation with Commission officials in paving the way for the ESS implementation and vice-versa. Moreover, the European Council must take charge of ensuring the effective implementation of ESS in near future.

## **5.2 European Security Strategy in the New Security Environment**

It is increasingly clear that Europeans and the EU in the security strategy see the military dimension of security as instruments for achieving security policy, which must be employed in the context of a comprehensive security strategy, the Iraq war exemplified this. Defence is an instrument of security objectives and not just military one. This comprehensive approach in understanding security and seeking policy responses can be found in the present ESS. Talking about the use of force in security policy seems almost academic, because European military capability is widely regarded as weak. The challenge seems more about implementing the security concept and objectives of the ESS in the most effective manner. This will determine the success and efficiency of the EU and its member states as an international security actor.

The Lisbon Treaty alongside the revision of the European security strategy of 2008 has enabled the European Union to adapt to its new security environment. To move forward EU must remember that it is based on competitiveness, yet in cooperation and solidarity. In this context Jaques Delors said that "*competition that stimulates,*

*cooperation that strengthens and solidarity that unites.*" The Lisbon Treaty marks the target and the way to go further to implement the ESS effectively. The security policies of the EU have increasingly been filled and stuffed with substance and military capabilities especially in the last decade in the wake of Lisbon Treaty, leading to a changed perception of the European identity. It is more and more developing towards an actor with military capabilities but this does not mean that EU is military actor. More than a year after its entry into force, it is certainly still too early for a full assessment of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the Union's institutional development, political formulation as well as military improvement. It is a framework that sets scene for political action to bring it to life and to use its full potential for Union.

Indeed, another way of overcoming the limitations of an evolving EU may be to capitalize on its recent experience in conflict resolution and crisis management beyond its immediate neighbourhood. By continuing to show its willingness to cooperate with regional organisations, the UN and other key players in addressing pressing global complex challenges such as climate change and terrorism and in promoting and managing conflict essentially via soft power security. The EU will not improve its images vis-à-vis its own citizens and international community, but continue to build substance behind this image.<sup>48</sup> The ESS could be functioning at its best when a broader consensus on EU policies would be able to bring coherence and clarity.

With the Lisbon Treaty, numerous changes and recommendations have come up with better and more efficient tools and procedures in the future. These can be broadly group together under the following headings; strategic perspective, funding and capabilities, institutional and political support (comprehensiveness) and civilian-military cooperation and finally lessons learned. To avoid an ad hoc player and become more of a strategic with respect to crisis management and resolution, EU should move towards long term strategic planning of CSDP operations. The essence of a strategic player is to clearly define its long term interests and to put in place a list of policies for achieving them. The EU member states should also deepen their strategic dialogue and identify those areas in which they wish to have a long term

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<sup>48</sup>Also see page 18, 'a new Europe in a changing world: challenges and opportunities, Winand, P. et al. 2010.



impact. The current system of funding CSDP operations is in need of revision. If the CSDP operations follow a long term plan based on agreed common priorities, it should be possible to agree on increasing the share of the mission that is funded by all member states. Like the creation of a CSDP operational fund could increase the part of the shared cost of operations.

Coordination of the strategic planning of missions including the divisions of tasks and responsibilities and the synchronisation of deployments would be easier under the Lisbon Treaty. Thus a long term crisis management policy geared to conflict prevention and resolution instead of intervention only calls for a more strategic approach, which includes building sustainable and deployable military capabilities. There can be no comprehensive civil-military approach without sound military means. The ESS tells the EU to do things in a holistic, preventive and multilateral way but this doesn't provide direction about what to do. Lack of priorities is a problem, many of the other world powers are much more proactive about their interests said Biscop. He quoted the quote of Winston Churchill, "*However beautiful the strategy one should occasionally look at results.*"

However, the threats and challenges that were identified in 2003 have not gone away. Proliferation in weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organised crime and failing states continue to threaten human security. With the passage of time these threats become more complex and interconnected in recent years, not least as a result of globalisation. The distinction between internal and external dimensions has become blurred. Perhaps, there are different issues, notably energy security and the security implication of climate change, which increased significantly since 2003. Reflecting all the security aspects the EU needs political cohesion, solidarity and continuity to enhance the international identity. The same elements that guarantee the EU's relevance in the eyes of its citizens are the essential building blocks for the external projection of the European Union. Moreover the effective implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's dispositions on CFSP is important to enable the Union to devise a strategic approach to international challenges and above all to apply it coherently and consistently.

It is pointed out that there is a pressing need for strategic thinking, such thinking should be framed in European terms with a view to identifying common interests.

and focus should be put on the implementation of strategic guidelines. Alvaro de Vasconcelos argued that, the EU cannot realistically aim to intervene everywhere at all times but some ranking of priority is essential to channel resources and determine the degree of the EU's involvement. Therefore, the need to be given the appropriate instruments and procedures to implement its strategic objectives set out in ESS and the full implementation of the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty concerning CFSP and external action at large would be crucial to enable the EU to shape and implement an effective security strategy.

### **5.3 Critical Evaluation of European Security Strategy**

When assessing its security policies, the EU must reconsider two competing and interdependent trends, globalisation and the return of power politics. In the current multipolar world there is no doubt the US will remain powerful and a crucial partner for Europe. Russia is not an existential threat for Europe. Multilateralism will remain very complex, reforming multilateral institutions is very difficult and the EU must learn to use its power in those institutions. The EU will have to work more closely with other global players such as China, Russia, India, Brazil and other regional powers to ensure its own security and to contribute to a better world.

The picture of the EU that emerged from this research is that the EU is an increasingly important actor on the world stage, not only in economic terms, but also in political and security, even more influence if it tackles some of its more pressing internal and external challenges. The international perceptions of the EU are intimately connected with internal developments, and an EU that is better to engage its own citizens will also be better able to project a credible and engaging image on the world scene (Winand et al 2010: 32). They argued that, to overcome the current limitations of evolving EU may be to capitalize on its recent experience in conflict resolution and crisis management beyond its immediate neighbourhood. As a matter of fact, the external and internal policies and actions cannot be separated as they impact upon one another.

Realists would easily dismiss the EU's potential as a global security actor because it lacks the institutional framework and military capacity found in a sovereign state. The realist and neo-realist perspective, which centre on power in more material terms, also offer explanations to military cooperation. If these theoretical perspective

offer limited explanations why a powerless actor like the EU can have influence on the global stage (Karlsson 2009). And he argued that the EU as an organisation is very different from a state when it comes to foreign policy and military power but a measuring influence in today's world is done by more parameters than hard-core military strength. However, an explanation of the ESDP/CSDP from a realist perspective would say that the cooperation of between the European States exists because of an external threat (Smith 2005: 5). Moreover, realist interpretation of the ESDP is that the member states have chosen to cooperate in order to increase their own influence. Drawing upon the experiences from the UN for instance, the study show that Germany and Japan have little influence over the Security Council today, despite of their financial and political authority. This lack of influence is a consequence of that they were kept out of the institutional building of the UN in the 1994-1995 (Koremenos et al 2001: 761-762; Karlsson 2009: 15).

Realist perceive the realm of international relations to be in eternal conflicts, with winners and losers, resulting from every bargaining (Wendt 2001: 1048; Karlsson 2009: 15). This does not fit well into an institutional system like ESDP where decisions are taken in consent to increase cooperation. Another question for realists would be that EU did not develop military capabilities on itself during cold war because NATO was already handling those issues. So why does the military cooperation start at a time when EU has no imminent military threat within the Europe. The answer could be that Europe now focuses on international security, which can be seen in the five threats listed in the ESS.

The testing ground for EU in international system is reflected in the current Arab Spring. The fragmented European response to the Libyan crisis show once again how difficult it is for Europe to forge a Common Foreign Policy and to respond as one to crises through multilateral framework. Although, European countries have been prominent in the operation in Libya, the crisis has exposed sharp disagreements and shortcoming of the defence structures that the EU has been painstakingly grafting for long. Moreover, it reveals the emptiness of claims that the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 would make better fitted to take action than it was during the crisis of the Balkans in 1991. Thus, 20 years after the Balkan crisis broke out, the EU remains far from ready to assume a role as an international and regional actor even though it has adopted the ESS in 2003 and reinforced in 2009 with the adoption of Lisbon Treaty.

It is demonstrated in the current Libyan crisis which widely shows the divisions on foreign policy among the European countries, particularly the EU member states, and this underscores that the ESS is a strategy that is still evolving.

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## **Appendix- I**

### **A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD**

#### **EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY**

Adopted in Brussels, 12 December 2003

#### **Introduction**

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent. The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own. Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians. As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the

EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

## **I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS**

### **Global Challenges**

The post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence and so vulnerability on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields. Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90% of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict. In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world's population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and the competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions. Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world's largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

## **Key Threats**

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

**Terrorism:** Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society. Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

### **Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:**

It is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.

In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

### **Regional Conflicts**

Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer



to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

### **State Failure**

Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, which undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

### **Organised Crime**

Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world-wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy. Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised

crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

## **II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives:

### **Addressing the Threats**

The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats. It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defences. It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions. The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU. In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate world-wide: their activities in central or southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world. Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left

alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, and judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

### **Building Security in our Neighbourhood**

Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform. It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which

will in due course also be a neighbouring region. Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solutions which Europe has long supported is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves. The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

### **An International Order based on Effective Multilateralism**

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards. One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship. Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and

effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world. It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond. The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world's largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens. A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should re-join the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.

### **III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE**

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

### **More active**

In pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations. We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight.

### **More Capable**

A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities. In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication. Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners. As we increase capabilities

in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building. The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century.

### **More Coherent**

The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime. Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states. Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.

### **Working with partners**

There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors. The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This

is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence. We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership. Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.

### **Conclusion**

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

