# FUNCTIONALISM : It's Application in South Asia

Dissertation Submitted to the Jawaharlal Nehru University
In Partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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TO BHAIYA

WHO HAS ALWAYS INSPIRED

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- OM PRAKASH MISHRA

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER-I

FUNCTIONALISM - AN INTRODUCTION

Of all the theories of contemporary international relations, Functionalism is perhaps the main alternative to the theory of power politics. As a conscious approach to international relations and world organisation, Functionalism dates back to the early years of twentieth century and its origin lie in the development of functional organisations in the last century. Ernst B. Haas's study[1] of Functionalism in 1964 and republication of David Mitrany's basic work[2] in 1966 introduced a new vigour into discussions about the Functional Approach to the problems of international society in the 1960s. Academicians and international civil servants who have long been attracted by the approach received new encouragement, As a result, Functionalism established itself as a

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1. See his Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation (Stanford: Standord University Press, 1964).

2. See his A Working Peace System (Chicago: Quaorange Books, 1966). This book was first. published in 1943 and its full title was A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation (London: Royal Institute of International Studies, 1943).

major approach and now it has a distinctive presence
in the literature on integration theories which has
rapidly proliferated in the recent past.

'The political theorists have long concerned them-
selves with the relationship between social, economic
and technological change on the one hand and political
change on the other. The Functionalist approach is
founded on the distinction between these two sets of
change i.e. between the political and non-political
aspects of societies and it pastulates an increasing
tension between particularistic nature of the former
and the internationalising nature of the latter in
modern era.[3]

This position has been argued most forcefully
and widely by a small group of theorists usually
described as 'Functionalists'. Since the 1870's
Functionalism has had a variety of spokesman. But,
as pointed out by Haas, "far from constituting a
coherent body of militants, these scholars are united
only by a vague and shifting syndrome of common
attitudes and propositions".[4] It can be safely

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3. Charles Pentland, <u>International Theory and Euro-
   pean Integration</u> (London: Faber and Faber, 1973).

4. Haas, n.1, p. 8.

said that avoidance of rigidity and dogma is the essence of Functionalism. But where are the basic ideas of Functionalism to be found? It has been correctly pointed out that the chief exponent and father of Functionalism is David Mitrany.[5] However, scholars like Paul S. Reinsch, Pitman Potter, Leonard Woolf, G.D.H. Cole, Norman Angell, etc. have also contributed extensively to the initial formulation of the approach.[6]

Paul Taylor has divided Functionalist literature at the present time into four major strands.[7] Firstly, there are the basic ideas to be found in the works of Angell, Woolf, Cole, Mitrany, etc. Secondly, writings which are either interpretations of the original ideas, a systematic development or amendment

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5. Ibid., p. 8.

6. Paul Reinsch, Public International Unions (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1911).
   Pitman Potter, This World of Nations (New York: MacMillan, 1929).
   Leonard Woolf: The Way of Peace (London: Benn, 1928).
   G.D.H. Cole The Intelligent Man's Guide Through World Chaos (London: Gollancz, 1932)
   Norman Angell The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1910).

7. Paul Taylor, "The Functional Approach to the Problem of International Order: A Defence", Political Studies (London), Vol.16 (1968), p.323.

of them or application to particular case studies.

This category will include Paul Hoofmann's and

William Reisman's contribution to Functionalist

thesis.[8] The Bruce Report also falls into this

category.[9] Thirdly, there are works which are

sharply critical of Functionalism and again which

use criticism as the first step towards the develop-

ment of Functionalist ideas and towards bringing

them into harmony with what the writers believe

are the more profound insights of contemporary

politics.[10] Lastly, there are works of Functiona-

lism as developed in sociology. Sociological

Functionalism and the ideas of Functionalists

have quite different purposes. Nevertheless

Sociological Functionalism has a lot to offer in

the systematisation of the ideas of Woolf, Mitrany

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8. Paul Hoofmann, Peace Can Be Won (New York: Double-
day, 1951)
William Reisman, "The Role of the Economic Agen-
cies in the Enforcement of International Judgement
and Awards: A Functional Approach", International
Organisation (Princeton) Vol.19 (1965).

9. Bruce Report, published in 1939, contained pro-
posals for the restructuring of the economic and
social organisations of League of Nations.

10. Cutis W. Martin, "The History and Theory of Functional
Approach to International Organisation" (Ph.D. thesis,
Harvard University, 1950). Harold E. Engle, "A Criti-
cal Study of the Functionalist Approach to Interna-
tional Organisation" (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia Univer-
sity, 1957). Inis Clause, Swords into Ploughshares:
The Problems and Progress of International Organi-
sations (New York: Random House, 1964). James P.
Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Ernst B.
Haas, no.1.

and others.   Ernst B. Haas'• study mentioned above
is an attempt to link sociological functionalism
with Functionalist ideas.

Three themes recur in the political and social
writings which culminated in Functionalism. They may
be recognised as reflections of actual developments
in social, economic and political life in the first
half of the present century. The first theme is that
of economic development, the second is that of growth
of concern with the states role in provision of
welfare for the individuals and the third is the
growing uncertainty about the traditional democra-
tic structures in the modern state. Functionalism
is built upon a recognition of these changes and
adopts these to a theory of integration. The
approach is firmly grounded in nineteenth century
rationalism. Functionalism is also rooted in those
changing attitudes and structures which culminated
in the evolution of the Welfare state.[11]

Functionalist writings are about cooperation,
collaboration, ploughshares and peace. The approach

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11. See Introduction, Paul R. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom,
ed., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in Inter-
national Relations (London: University of London
Press, 1975).

begins by rejecting the so-called realist position that all cooperation must begin with the positive acceptance of the primacy of the exclusive and competing interests of the national governments. The Functionalists believe that the cooperation between states for specific welfare benefits is possible in situations where political cooperation is impossible. This proposition assumes that such ameliorative cooperations can be insulated from the ideological clashes between the participants. Bleicher has summed up some other assumptions of Functionalism: (a) successful cooperation on a non-political basis through functional international organisations will breed habits of cooperation which will lead to the multiplication and expansion of functional organisations. (b) The successful satisfaction of the human needs by these organisations will engender a transfer of individual loyalties to international organisations and away from national units. (c) The growing scope and effectiveness of these functional organisations will ultimately lead to an integrated world community which will, in turn support a strengthened world organisation.[12]

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12. Samuel A. Bleicher, "UN vs. IBRD: A Dilemma of Functionalism", _International Organisation_, vol.24 (1970), pp. 42-49.

In David Mitrany's view a working peace system exists and functionalism seeks to remove impediments to its further growth. Its objective is to entangle the national government in a network of inter-lacking cooperative ventures.[13] Functionalism places greater significance on the emergence of an increasing range of inter-cross or transnational system of inter-dependence. The role of the national governments is to be progressively reduced by indirect methods, and integration is to be achieved by a variety of functionally based cross-national ties, peace and securities are to be guaranteed by the efficient provision of essential services to fulfill commonly felt needs rather than 'non-war' being introduced by fear of threat system and sanctions.[14]

Functionalist approach considers international economic and social cooperation as a major pre-requisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war. In Mitrany's words, "the problem of our time is not how to keep

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13. See his A Working Peace System (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966).

14. Taylor and Groom, ed., no.11, pp. 1-6.

nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together".[15] The problem of peace should not be approached through the points of national conflicts, but indirectly, by seeking out the area of mutuality and "binding together those interests which are common, where they are common and to the extent to which they are common".[16] Mitrany is against devising a blue-print approach to international organisation. He prefers, instead to rely upon the pragmatic development of special purpose organisations. These organisations, he feels, will evolve their own distinctive structural patterns, procedural systems and areas of competence in accordance with the inherent requirements of their functional missions.[17] This method is recommended as one which "seeks, by linking authority to a specific activity, to break away from the traditional link between authority and definite territory."[18] Inis Claude characterises this approach as horizontal as against vertical division of human society which is symbolised by the sovereignty of states.[19]

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15. Mitrany, no.13, p.7.
16. Ibid., p.40.
17. Ibid., pp.41,43.
18. Ibid., p.6.
19. Inis Claude, Swords Into Plough Shares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation (New York: Random House, 1964), Rev. edn. p.346.

Mitrany sees the ideal of peace in terms of "national coactivity rather than national co-existence". He puts his faith, "not in a protected peace but in a working peace",[20] and believes that a peaceful world society is "more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and market place rather than signing pacts in chancellories".[21] In "A Working Peace System", Mitrany states his central thesis as follows: "Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function. By entrusting an authority with certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite power and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority". And again, "Functionalism (will) overlay political decisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and lifes of all the nations would be gradually integrated".[22] This gradual evolution constitutes what Mitrany calls a process of "federation by instalments".[23]

20. Mitrany, no.13, p. 59.
21. Ibid., 5.
22. Ibid., pp. 9,14.
23. Ibid., p.51.

Functionalism is a pragmatic approach. It involves the step by step adjustment and development of hopeful elements in the existing world. Its starting point is the existing situation. The new situation is achieved by amending the earlier one gradually. Another aspect of Functionalism is that the new information is capable of amending man's earlier prejudices and assumptions. Man is sufficiently rational to respond to new informations and man is possessed of some sort of a natural recognition of the overriding importance of some ends and will select subsidiary ends which help their attainment.

The Functionalists are not unduly optimistic about the nature of man. In fact, they are not as much concerned with his nature as with his behaviour, and they claim that man's behaviour is at least open to amendment and control. Angell wrote that "it is not a question of changing human nature but of changing human behaviour and human behaviour can change as a result of outside circumstances".[24] The Functionalists stake much upon this assumption

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24. Norman Angell in L. Woolf, ed., The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War (London: Gollancz, 1933), p.491.

that man's behaviour might be amended by the process of learning from social environment. He goes to war because his social environment encourages him to ("that we should fight is perhaps part of our nature, what we fight about is part of our nurture - Angell"[25]) and his ~~social~~ social environment can equally restrain, him from going to war.

Functionalism holds that violence has its roots in socio-economic circumstances of the people and it is by the misleading lessons of nationalism and allegiance to the state that the seeds of war are fertilised. Mitrany wrote in 1944: "Give people a moderate sufficiency of what they need and ought to have and they will keep the peace; this has been proved time and again nationally but has not yet been tried internationally".[26] Angell argues that because people inhibit the structure of the nation-state they really have two conflicting sets of needs. On the one hand, there are needs which derive from their loyalty to the nation, on the other there are those needs which derive more

25. Ibid., p. 465.

26. David Mitrany, The Road to Security (London: National Peace Council, 1944), p. 15.

immediately from their existence as individuals, the need for economic security, etc. The trouble is that the first set of needs is always in the way of the second. Always a citizen is faced with the problem of according priority between two separate hierarchy of needs. Not only is he led astray from his more important welfare needs by nationalism, he is also blinded by it.

If welfare needs are more important, argue the Functionalists, then surely man can be persuaded through education and experience to switch their loyalties from national governments and redirect them to the agencies which best administer to those needs. In the long run, man's loyalty will be to those institutions which most successfully satisfy their welfare needs. State frontiers artificially divides and causes the inefficient administration of welfare requirements. What is needed, therefore is a range of institutions devoted to the satisfaction of the welfare-needs of the man and located, if efficiency requires it, across state frontiers. If we can organise such institutions, people will

learn about the advantages of international coope-
ration until eventually the powers of the national
governments are undermined. "Authority grows out
of consent and welfare is most likely to procure
consent."[27] The functional proliferation would
avoid divisive political debates and at the same
time create a community of interests which would
ultimately render national frontiers meaningless.
Mitrany stressed that the League of Nations failed
because it had not concerned itself enough with
fundamental problems of human need, and making the
same point about the United Nations, he wrote,
"If its outside activities and agencies do not
multiply and prosper, it will remain a mere shell."[28]

Functionalist ideas have been put to test
through some case studies. Most notable amongst
these are Ernst B. Haas' study of International
Labour Organisation (ILO), and James Patrick
Sewell's Study of United Nations programmes
financing economic development.[29] There are

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27. Mitrany, n.13, p. 28.

28. Mitrany, n.26, p. 9.

29. Haas, no.1. James Patrick Sewell, Functionalism
    and World Politics (Princeton, Princeton Univer-
    sity Press, 1966).

several studies testing Functionalist position and
assumptions on European Economic Community and on
the question of attitude change.[30]

In his study of ILO, Haas is sceptical of
Functionalist claims, although he is far from reject-
ing them. He points out that the cooperation of
group results from the convergence of separate per-
ception of interest and not from spontaneous
surrender to a common good. This does not necessa-
rily eliminate a learning process, but Haas sees
this in the form of task expansion. Thus, the
powers and competence of ILO grew over the years in
its own sphere rather than as a spill-over effect
into other areas. As a functionally specific inter-
national programme develops, and as behavioural
norms and procedures are built up, so are mechanisms
dealing with conflicts over these norms. However,
the experience of ILO seems to suggest that they
will not spread into a general international code.

30. See especially, Leon Lindberg, Political Dynamics
    of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stan-
    ford University Press, 1963); R. Inlehart, "Public
    Opinion and Regional Integration", International
    Organisation, vol.24 (1970). Peter Wolf, "Inter-
    national Organisation and Attitude Change",
    International Organisation, vol.27 (1973).
    Chadwick F. Alger, "United Nations as a Learning
    Experience", Public Opinion Quarterly (   )
    vol.27 (1963). Robert E Riggs, "One small step
    for functionalism: UN Participation and congress-
    ional Attitude Change," International Organisation,
    vol.31 (1977).

It seems that while task expansion comes more easily than spill over into other areas, there is no automaticity in either. If at all they are to come about they must be striven for.[31]

Haas introduces a number of modification in the Functionalist thesis. What he calls "the empirical evidence...about the actual behaviour of international organisations"[32] becomes his paradigm for his investigation of ILO. The investigation vindicates the refinement exercise, and in the process provides further evidence relevant to the original thesis. The study shows the effects of political developments and international environment upon the working of the organisation. Haas has summed up his findings: "The hypothesis advanced were verified with respect to the internal growth of the organisation, with respect to the impact of the environment on the organisation. They were proved false by and large, the experience of forty-five years of attempted international standard setting in the labour-welfare field, the environment was not markedly influenced by the programme".[33]

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31. See A.J.R. Groom's article, "Functionalism and World Society", in Taylor and Groom, ed., n.11, pp. 93-110.

32. Haas, n.1, p. 47.

33. Ibid., p.444.

Sewell's examination of United Nations Pro-
grammes Financing Economic Development was inten-
ded as a direct empirical test of the Functiona-
list thesis. Sewell examines the work of Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), which arose to meet a common need, and
evolved in function and structure in a way which
mirrored the development of the need itself. The
birth of International Finance Corporation apparently
confirmed the functionalists strategic position that
task will determine organisation and structure.
Sewell, however, has reservation about the ade-
quacy of an interpretation confined to the technical
self-determination process.

As a study of attitude change on the part of
participating states, the study in no way vindicates
Functionalist thesis: "In viewing these slices of
functional life, we perceived not so much of
habituation in agreement as the trappings of
continued conflict".[34]

There have been some very good studies on the
functioning of international organisations and
attitude change. In terms of Functionalist approach

34. Sewell, no.29, p. 287.

attitude-change is essentially seen to be the product
of socialisation into international organisation. As
Mitrany himself pointed out: "The functional method
itself, by concentrating all attention to a practi-
cal public service is likely to breed a new conscience
in all those concerned with such international
activities".[35]

Some other important empirical investigations
of attitudinal changes have been conducted by Alger,
Best and Riggs. Alger probed into the effects of
participation in the organisation on members'
attitude towards issues and towards other nations.[36]
Best dealt mainly with the delegate perceptions of
the organisational setting.[37] Riggs' study provides
support for some aspects of Functionalist approach.
It offers additional evidence to corroborate the
findings of other scholars that cognitive attitu-
dinal change results from exposure to international
organisation in a variety of settings. However, the
evidence is somewhat less conclusive with respect to
effective changes.[38]

35. Mitrany, no.13, p. 40.
36. Alger, no.30.
37. Gary Best, "Diplomacy in the United Nations",
    (Ph.D. thesis, North-Western University, 1963).
38. Riggs, no.30.

After a careful study of research conclusions on international organisation and attitude change, Peter Wolf maintains that the general line of Functionalist approach does not include the provision that international organisation vary with regard to (a) the degree to which the major activities are politically controversial, (b) amount of control exercised, (c) composition of the membership, and (d) sociological structure.[39]

The concept of Functionalism as an approach to peace is an extraordinarily attractive doctrine in more than one way. Inis Claude points out that the prescriptive and pragmatic ideas of Functionalism have the great merit of appealing to a variety of thought-structures such as humanitarian idealism, national self-interest, Pacifists, etc. Again, Functionalism is capable of striking a responsive chord in both conservative and liberal hearts. Its greatest merit lies in the fact that "it seems to emerge from the diagnostic clinic, not the drug counter, of the internationalist movement".[40]

However, the impressiveness of the approach and attractiveness of the functional programme are not in

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39. Wolf, no.30, pp. 347-49.
40. Claude, no.19, p. 353.

themselves evidence of either the theoretical
validity or the practical adequacy of the approach.
Functionalism is treated by way as a rather
imprecise and outmoded mixture of empirical and
prescriptive assertions about international coope-
ration. While Functionalists heart is at the
right peace, it is argued, their theory is deeply
rooted in questionable assumptions, and cannot be
of much guidance to social scientists or policy
makers today.

Inis Cluade challenges the central thesis of
functionalist approach that war is a product of
unsatisfactory economic and social conditions in
the global community. He approvingly quotes Hans
Kelsen to the effect that "it is not true that
the war is the consequence of unsatisfactory
economic conditions; on the contrary, the un-
satisfactory situation of world economy is the
conseouence of war".[41] A direct co-relation
between national economic backwardness and
aggressiveness cannot be confirmed through a study
of the recent history of the world. For example,

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41. Ibid., p. 353.

global peace was shattered in 1939 not by the back-
ward people of Asia and Africa but by the advanced
Germans.

The Functionalist approach involves the separa-
tibility of social and economic strata from the
political. It is hardly possible to segregate a
set of problems and treat them in an international
workshop divorced from national interests and con-
flicts. In fact there is a trend towards politici-
sation of all tissues operative in the twentieth
century. It is doubtful whether the states can
in fact be induced to join hands in functional
endeavour before they have settled the political
and security issues which divides them. As Cluade
has put it, "Functionalists insistence upon putting
first things first does not settle the matter of
what things are first".[42]

Both Haas and Sewell reproach the Functiona-
lists for their distinction between power relations
and welfare relations. Haas writes: "Power and
Welfare are far from separable. Indeed, , commit-
ment to welfare activities arises only within the
confines of purely political decisions which are

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42. Ibid., p. 354.

made largely on the basis of power consideration".[43]
Some other scholars have argued that functionalists
should have been explicit in acknowledgement of the
political issues involved. Many of the functional
international organisations have failed to attract
communist bloc membership for political reasons.
Bleicher has pointed out that the record of the UN
Specialised Agencies does not indicate success in
insulating their decision-process from political
concerns.[44] However, 'technical' the issue, the
view of non-political experts seemed to be shaped
by the political environment of the nation-state
they represent. Inis Cluade while referring to
the super-power rivalry points out that "the
politics of cold war shows no susceptibility to
being transformed by functional programmes, rather
it shows every indication of being able to transform
functional workshops into political arenas".[45]
Functionalists have failed to take account of the
political context in which international activities
take place. Therefore, Sewell's concluding theme in

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43. Haas, no.1, p. 23.

44. Bleicher, no.12, p. 43.

45. Cluade, no.19, p. 366.

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his study mentioned above is that "the functionalists completely neglect the context of the activities they propose to explain, except as they take that context to be the ultimate beneficiary of the functional endeavour. In the narrowness of its focus, the functional interpretation cuts off an understanding of the very dynamics which give rise to these and affect every aspect of their existence".[46]

Functionalism tended to assume that a global consensus on what constitutes 'welfare' is possible but as Harrison points out, the dissimilarity between states in their ideologies and levels of economic development would inhibit functional cooperation.[47] Welfare functions are predicted on prior political consensus rather than being independent of it. Harrison also takes the Functionalists to task for their loose interpretation of the concept of community and on this count rejects the Functional approach as a mono-casual explanation of social activity and hence inadequate.[48]

Some other assumptions of the Functionalists have also been questioned. Thus, in the study carried

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46. Sewell, no.29, pp. 287-88.

47. R.J. Harrison, "Testing Functionalism", in Taylor and Groom , ed., no. 11, pp. 112-137.

48. Ibid., p. 126.

out by Sewell and Haas it could not be shown that
through the process of learning, initially power-
oriented governmental approach evolves into welfare
oriented action. Haas also criticises, what he
calls, the fuzzy manner in which progress towards
world community is related to the leadership of
the expert.[49] Paul Taylor has countered this
criticism.[50] According to him, Functionalists are
well aware of both the advantages and difficulties
of the experts role in the international organisa-
tion. It is a mistake to believe that the Functiona-
lists are simple enough to advocate abandoning
unconditionally our future in the expert's hands.
Mitrany himself opined that "the national govern-
ments should retain the general power of supervi-
sion and veto."[51] The Functionalists stress is
upon the usefulness of the expert in a particular
situation and not on the expert as bearer of a general
panacea. Taylor also suggests that it is misleading
to oversimplify the manner in which the Functionalists
separate power from welfare. He points out that
functionalism has drawn the distinction not between

49. Haas, no.1, p. 30.
50. Taylor, no.7, pp. 393-409.
51. Mitrany, no.26, p. 18.

politics and welfare but between power politics and
legitimised politics. However, it can be safely
said that functionalists hope of circumventing
political factors and processes could not succeed
and is untenable in practice in the present situa-
tion.

J.W. Burton has argued that the prescriptive
and optimistic view of Functionalists is likely to
be valid only if it is inexorable at the domestic
level, as it claims to be at the inter-state level.
In many cases the reasons for international con-
flicts can be traced to decision-making within the
state. If international conflict is essentially
a spill-over of domestic politics then the inter-
national Functionalist alternative would not be
successful in resolving it. No amount of functional
cooperation of the inter-state level above would
eliminate the source of conflict. Unless Functiona-
lism offers an alternative to political decision
making at the domestic level, argues Burton, it is
unlikely to develop and to provide an alternative
form of organisation at the international level.[52]

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52. See his article, "Functionalism and Resolution
    of Conflict", in Taylor and Groom, ed., no. 11,
    pp. 240-49.

Inis Cluade points out the administrative diffi-
culties in coordinating the activities of a large
range of functionally specific institutions.[53]   This
problem has been difficult even in the context of UN.
Again, the lack of coordination between governmental
and non-governmental functional organisations is
another pointer.   The question of multinatioral
corporations (they are also international functional
organisation) is also important in this context.
Can by any reckoning multinational corporations be
equated with spread of internationalism in the
Functionalist mode?. Basically, multinational cor-
porations are manifestation of national power, and
on occasions, the instrument of the national policy
of the leading industrialised countries.

Furthermore, the Functionalists have been
accused of being deliberately vague on the question
of what the new world will look like.   Some have
seen in EEC or other regional organisations a pre-
cursor of the new order, while others, like Mitrany

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53. Cluade, no.19, pp. 356-365.

himself, see in the proliferation of regional orga-
nisations merely the old world writ large and look
therefore, for an entirely new system of inter-
national organisation which will eventually elimi-
nate the significance of political boundaries.[54]

Another dilemma to the practioners of Functiona-
lism is the fact that consciousness and concern with
the notions of state-rights, nation-building,
sovereignty, etc. has been rising in direct pro-
portion to the growth of functional organisations.
This suggests that the "learning process", and
"ethos of cooperation" on which the Functionalists
pinned so much hope has not yielded the desired
results inspite of proliferation of functional
organisations. Functionalism has to resolve this
dilemma if its claim to be a sound and promising
approach to international relations can be seriously
considered.

A major difficulty in an objective evaluation
of Functionalism is that there is still insufficient
evidence to test the central functional hypothesis

54. See Mitrany's article, "The Prospect for Inte-
     gration: Federal or Functional", in Taylor and
     Groom, ed., n. 11, pp.53-78.

that man will learn from the experiences of inter-
national cooperation and begin to owe loyalty to
those institutions which best satisfy his welfare
needs. Very few studies have been carried out and
those also on a very limited scale. Much more
evidence has to be collected and analysed before
satisfactory conclusions can be reached. However,
the lack of such evidence does not necessarily
disprove the Functionalist case. "Functionalism is
an appeal, a prescription; a doctor's treatment
cannot be shown to be unsatisfactory if it has not
been tried".[55]

Paul Taylor maintains that some of the criti-
cisms against Functionalism are misplaced. Again
the critics have taken Functionalism to task for
what it has omitted rather than for what the
Functionalists have said. Taylor concedes that
Functionalism is incomplete in some respects but
that cannot be an argument against the completed
parts.[56] In focussing our attention upon the possi-
bility of social learning and in establishing inter-
national order Functionalists have surely made a

55. Taylor, no.7, p. 408.

56. Ibid., p. 408.

major contribution. William Reisman's article brings out some of the advantages of Functionalist mode of thought.[57]

Functional cooperation does have an immediate beneficial impact even if it ultimately turns out to have negligible long-term integrative effects. Functionalism is an approach which stresses concrete needs and is pragmatic and flexible enough to respond to new situations. Functionalists have eschewed the blueprints of the utopians and are perhaps more likely to lead us to concrete and immediate advances in our knowledge of the integrative processes.

Functionalism shifts our attention from power, nation-state and potential violent competition about illusory ends to welfare and the advantages of coope-ration in a less fragmented world. Past attempts to keep the peace by negative measures have failed. Today technical progress has made it imperative that nations avoid war, it behoves us to give serious attention to any idea which holds forth promise of contributing to an understanding of the causes of war and in adding to the promotion of a peaceful world.

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57. William Reisman, "The Role of the Economic Agencies in the Enforcement of International Judgements and Awards", International Organisation, vol.19 (1965).

Most of the approaches to the problems of inter-
national order focus attention upon methods of
reforming national government or national control
on international society. They do not put funda-
mental questions about the continuing existence of
national governments. Unlike these approaches, the
Functionalist approach suggests that governments
might be dispensable; and, because it reminds us
"of that possibility Functionalism is well worth
reconsidering".[58]

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58. Taylor, no.7, p. 409.

CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER II

FUNCTIONALISM, NEO-FUNCTIONALISM AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

David Mitrany, the chief theoretician of Functionalist approach viewed Functionalism not only as a means of preserving peace but also as a means to integration; "federation by instalments", as he termed it. However, Functionalism was technically not a regional integration theory. Its ideas were borrowed by 'Europeans' like Jean Monnet and others to pass under the political hurdle faced by the European federalists. Mitrany's principal concern was with peace, not regional integration. But his solution to capitalise on the problems which all nations have in common has obvious implications for those who pursue another goal: the integration of Europe. The resulting theoretical vacuum was filled by neo-functionalism; first systematically presented by Ernst B. Haas in his "Uniting of Europe" in 1958.[1]

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1. Ernst B. Haas, <u>The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950-57</u> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

In addition to the sympathy of the neo-functionalist school which it inspired Functionalism has gained some support as a regional integration theory in its own right.[2]

Those who concern themselves with the building of empirical theories of integration tend to see the functionalists as belonging to a distinct pre-scientific age. The functionalists, in turn, see much of integration theory as a misguided enterprise based on faulty and dangerous assumptions. To suggest that there can be a fruitful relationship between the two is, therefore, often to risk offend-ing each. The functionalists believe that integra-tion theorists have taken a fundamentally wrong turn toward a narrow pre-occupation with the building of massively bureaucraticised regional super-state -- which has led them away from the central issues of world order. Integration theorists, though heavily criticised by the functionalists was a direct product of the confrontation of Functionalist ideas with the experience of one regional organisation: The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

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2. Ronn D. Kaiser, "Toward the Copernican Phase of Regional Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Oxford), vol.10, 1971-72.

Often one gets the impression that the study

of regional integration is same as the study of

regional cooperation, regional organisation,

regional system, regional sub-system on regiona-

lism. All these terms are widely used.[3] They

compound the general uncertainty of whether

regional conquerers and nation-builders are also

actors on the stage of regional integration. To

delimit the field, therefore, it must be stressed

that the study of regional integration is unique

from all previous studies of political unification

because it limits itself to non-coercive efforts.

The dominant desire of modern students of regional

integration is to explain the tendency toward the

voluntary creation of larger political units each

of which self-consciously eschews the use of force

in the relations between the participating units.

As Haas points out, "The study of regional inte-

gration is concerned with explaining how and why

states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why

they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their

neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of

3. For a detailed and useful discussion, see Ernst
   B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration:
   Reflections on the Joys and Anguish of Pre-
   theorising", _International Organisation_ (Princeton),
   vol.24, 1970, pp. 606-47.

sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves. Regional cooperation, organisation, systems and sub-systems may help describe steps on the way; but they should not be confused with the resulting conditions."[4]

Several years of work have not been suffi-cient to create a consensus on a clear delimita-tion. While Amitai Etzioni treats 'integration' as the terminal condition, Philip Jacob and Harry Teune regard integration both as a process and a terminal condition. Among others, Karl Deutsch speaks of integration as a process leading to the creation of security communities. Federalists see the end of the integration process in the growth of a federal union among the constituent nations.[5]

As we have seen in the first chapter Functiona-lists like Mitrany and others insist on talking in terms of global needs and world society. The contrast is drawn between the International system, i.e., the multi-state system, and the functional

4. Ibid., p. 610.

5. Ibid., p. 611.

pattern, which cuts across and overstays terri-
torial boundaries and which looks to 'needs' and
criterian of rational organisation for definition
of its administrative boundaries. Integration
based on functional national units or geographi-
cally defined is held merely to perpetuate dange-
rous political divisions. This is the basis for
the Functionalist critique of federal model as
well as regional forms of integration which may
create globally deeper rifts than those they
amend locally.[6] Functionalists understand that
a future European supranational organisation might
indeed keep order between member-states. Yet
would recreate at the regional level the funda-
mental problem of power politics. Replacing
nation-states with structures like themselves
only large would not eliminate international
violence. This led Mitrany to criticise the
founding of EEC. In Functionalists terms if we
have to have regionalism at all, it must be
functional, not territorial.[7] In this view,

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6. David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago:
   Quadrangle Books, 1966), pp.174-213.

7. Ibid., pp. 53-70.

regions are not entities such as western Europe or South Asia, but functional areas like railway transport or epidemic control. For such fields the geographical scope of cooperation would be defined purely by their technological and human implications. Nation-State is seen by the Functionalists as the chief barrier to rational organisation for human welfare. Nations remain the focus of men's irrational and dysfunctional emotions. As such they cannot be attacked directly but can be rendered harmless gradually. The integration of mankind will come about not through, not above or beyond, but despite the nation-state.[8]

The ECSC has often been referred to as the most representative organisation based on the Functionalist approach. In the ECSC, proposed by Robert Schuman in 1950 those favouring integration had turned down the disappointment of broad and ambitious pan-European federalist schemes to the Functionalist strategy of placing a sector of the economics of six countries under

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8. See Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 64-93.

a common supranational authority. From the experience of coal and steel community, however, and from its companies formed in 1957, Euratorn and European Economic Community (EEC),[9] came not the vindication but the reformulation of Functionalism, both as practice and as theory. From their observations of the working of these associations, both the 'Eurocrats' and the 'academicians' concluded that while certain Functionalist dynamics were clearly at work, the progress of integration could not be explained simply in terms of 'technical determination' and 'learning habits of cooperation'. From this realisation emerged the set of ideas which became known as neo-functionalism. Thus Haas remarks in the preface to the second edition of his Uniting of Europe, "the ECSC experience has spawned a theory of international integration".[10] Ronn D. Kaiser has defined neo-functionalism as "the theory of supranationalism built on a functional base and applied to the question of regional integration".[11]

9. The three communities were merged in July 1967.
10. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (2nd edn.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. xii.
11. Kaiser, no.2, p. 211.

The neo-functionalist argument is that when certain sectors of the life of sovereign states are integrated by being brought under joint control, a process can be set in motion in which organised interest groups and political parties tend to become involved. To involve groups and parties, the sector chosen must be important and controversial, but not so controversial that the vital interests of the states are immediately affected, nor so that the political elites feel that their power and vested interests are seriously threatened. The integrative step itself should be inherently expansive. That is, the joint activity will be larger than the sum of the original independent activities. It should involve some sacrifice and some disruption of existing activities. Strains and distortions may be felt in other sectors. These effects will give rise to a new need and consequently, a demand for remedies. The remedies could well be measures for further integration.[12]

Demands will be expressed by the pressure groups and parties. They are "singled out as the

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12. For an exposition of neo-functionalist approach see R.J. Harrison, _Europe in Question_ (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), pp. 75-93.

significant carriers of values and ideologies whose opposition, identities or convergence determines the success or failure of a transnational ideology".[13] The theory is that the demands, expectations and legalities of groups and parties will gradually shift to the new centre of decision-making. The central institutions will respond and become the driving force or motor of the community.

This is "the expansive logic of integration" otherwise called the 'spillover' effect, whereby "policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task".[14] The acceptance of each stage in this integration process "is best explained by the convergence of demands within and among the nations concerned, not by a pattern of identical demands and hopes".[15]

Ultimately, the expectation is that as the tasks and powers of the central institutions are

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13. Haas, no.10, p. 5.

14. Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process", Inter-national Organisation, vol.15 (1961), p. 368.

15. Haas, no.10, p. 286.

increased through the operation of the spillover

process, integration will gradually encroach on

that politically sensitive area where vital inte-

rests are at stake. So, an embryonic political

community will emerge and grow.

The neo-functional critique of functionalism

denied that politics and welfare could be separated.

Likewise it challenged the proposition that specific

functional activities could be separated from the

overall political context. Neo-functionalism

rejected the proposition that functional integra-

tion would automatically spread. According to neo-

functionalists, "the technical realm was made

technical by a prior political decision".[16]

The neo-functionalists have found the functiona-

list concept of incremental decision-making, whereby

participants in international organisation 'learn'

from success in one field to apply the same techniques

in another, an attractive one. They have, however,

found Functionalist strategy as too ambitious and

lacking in clarity. Haas has questioned the

Functionalist assumption that there is a fundamental

similarity of values in society which produces a

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16. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functiona-
    lism and International Organisation (Stanford:
    Stanford University Press, 1964); p. 23.

universal perception of welfare needs. He contends
that perceptions of welfare are shaped by cultural
values, with the result that a universal view of
welfare is unlikely to emerge from a culturally
diverse international organisation. Even in strictly
technical matters, the views of non-political experts
are shaped by the interests and political environ-
ment of the nation-state which they represent.[17]
Another neo-functionalist criticism of functionalism
is that welfare tasks involve the allocation of
scarce resources between competing demands and that
this process a political one, involving the exercise
of power. Power, therefore, is inseparable from
welfare.

Unlike the Functionalists, the neo-functiona-
lists do not stress the role of consensus in main-
taining stability and integration; rather society
and integrative process are dominated by self-seeking
interest groups who are restrained only by a common
acceptance of the rule of the game. A pluralist
approach informs neo-functionalists description of
society and it is also characteristic of their view

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17. Ibid., See Introduction.

of integration. To the Functionalists, however, consensus is the essence.[18]

In their acceptance of the pluralist model of society the neo-functionalists agree with the European federalists. The Functionalists, on the other hand, are suspicious of federalism. David Mitrany has written about the dangers of seeking solutions to societal conflict in formulas such as federalism.[19] It cannot provide a solution to the problem of divisive interests, and might in the absence of socio-psychological community add to the divisions in society.

But Haas rejects the Functionalist's idea of an emerging consensus on social questions: "there is no common good, other than that perceived through the interest-tinted lenses worn by the actors".[20] And, because social life is dominated by competition among interests, "integration is conceptualised as resulting from an institutiona-lised pattern of interest politics played out within existing international institutions".[21]

18. Paul Taylor's article, "Functionalism and Stra-tegies for Regional Integration" in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, ed., Functionalism Theory and Practice in International Relations (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp. 79-91.

19. Mitrany, no.6, p. 31.

20. Haas, no. 16, p. 35.

21. Ibid., p. 35.

It is the institutionalised pattern which is significant to the neo-functionalists, and not the development of socio-psychological community. Institutional spillover and the learning process of bureaucrats and technical experts is substituted for the Functionalists integrative dynamics of the learning and experience of citizens.[22]

It is clear that neo-functionalists are mainly concerned with the developments of the institutional level. Their acceptance of the pluralist model of society fits easily with the federalist belief that a unified Europe can provide a political solution. The Functionalists, on the other hand, insist upon the development of a socio-psychological community as an essential precondition of sovereignty; and believe that without such a community integration cannot come about.

The view which emerges from a merger of the neo-functionalist and federalist positions is that institutional change is the more important aspect of integration. The Functionalists' ideas when applied to Europe lead to a different position.

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22. For a comparison between Functionalists and neo-Functionalists position, Paul Taylor, "The concept of community and European Integration Process", in Michael Hodges, ed., European Integration (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 203-22.

They lead to the view that the analogy of national
institutions is highly inappropriate at present
precisely because of^anEuropean interest. Insti-
tutional changes would not be useful because the new
institutions could only increase the existing
differences in interest rather than bring them
together, and to create new institutions such as
a more powerful and representative assembly now,
would discourage the later emergence of an European
interest.[23]

Another main difference between the Functiona-
list and neo-functionalist approach is that whereas
Functionalist strategy sees integration as a process
which passes through several stages which are
different from the end-situation, the neo-functiona-
list approach seeks to involve the end-situation,
as far as possible, in the present one.

The Functionalist strategy sees socio-psycho-
logical community as the essential condition of the
transfer of real power and sovereignty to the inter-
national institutions. Before the arrival of that
stage any transfer of formal power is likely to be
misleading. It will continue to be the governments
who are expected to act in crisis situations and
they will continue to attract new tasks to themselves.

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23. Ibid., p. 216.

Ernst Haas described the neo-functionalist theory to be "one of the most promising models of analysis" available to students of international relations. Nevertheless, since 1958 he has found it necessary to revise the theory, first in 1967, as a result of 1965 EEC crisis, and again in 1970. In an article[24] Has engaged in some self-criticism and soul-searching. He observed that, "a giant step on the road toward an integrated theory of regional integration...would be taken if we could clarify the matter of what we propose to explain and/or predict".[25] Because of the failure to meet this issue, Haas has labelled prior theoretical endeavours in the theory of regional integration 'pretheories'.

In his article, criticising 'pre-theories' Haas faults neo-functionalism because the outcome of its "incrementalstyle" is so "highly contingent" on the manipulation of "heroic actors".[26] Neo-functionalist theory failed to deal with the myriad variables which determine the character of the integration process. He takes neo-functionalist

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24. Haas, no.3.

25. Ibid., p.607.

26. Ibid., pp.627-28.

approach to task because of its failure to clarify
the confusion between the process and the outcome
of integration.[27]

Although the establishment of EEC and Euratom
seemed to confirm the neo-functionalist split over
hypothesis, the development of European communi-
ties since 1958 has called many of the assumptions
of neo-functionalism into question. Lindberg
studied the EEC in its first four years of operation
and concluded that the bulk of the interest group
activity remained oriented towards national goals.[28]
Where general policy issues are at stake interest
groups have found it more effective to operate at
the national level by putting pressures on their
respective government. Thus Hodges maintains that
"member states of EEC...(are)...relatively impervious
to pressure by interest groups operating at the
supranational level".[29] Stanley Hoffman has argued
that the stagnation of European integration is due
to the distinction between 'low' politics - involving
calculable and relatively insignificant welfare issues -

27. Ibid., p. 622.

28. See Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of
    European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stan-
    ford University Press, 1963).

29. Hodges, no.22, p. 25.

and 'high' politics, involving major foreign policy
and defence issues which no government is willing
to entrust to an untried supranational institution.[30]
The failure of the Six to achieve integration in
high politics by means of spillover from economic
integration is the result of the diversity of their
aims and domestic conditions, and the global charac-
ter of the international system, in which there are
few 'European' issues as distinct from local or
global ones.

Another major criticism of the neo-functionalist
approach is that in concentrating on the activities
and aspirations of elites within a region such as
West Europe, it neglects the influence of inter-
national environment on those elites. Although Haas
has conceded that "relations between the regional
system...and the external world...can be of immense
importance in explaining integration",[31] the neo-
functionalists emphasis on the activities and
aspirations of regional elites rather than the
influence of international environment remains one
of the major deficiencies of the approach.[32]

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30. See, Stanley Hoffman, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The
    Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western
    Europe", Daedalus (Cambridge) vol.95 (1966).

31. Haas, no.3, p. 620.

32. On this point see, K. Kaiser, "The Interaction
    of Regional Subsystems", World Politics (Prince-
    ton) vol.21 (1968-69), pp. 84-87. Amitai Etzioni,
    Political Unification (New York: Hort, Rinehart &
    Winston, 1965).

Neo-functionalism was undoubtedly a theoretical breakthrough. It served both to define the field of integration in terms of systematic and manageable scheme, advancing a limited and ordered set of variables, and to put forward hypothesis - such as 'spill-over' - which explained the integrative process in a plausible and testable way. While other theoretical schools either became strongly policy-oriented or turned to exhaustive numerical empiricism, neo-functionalism embodied a drive toward middle-range theory, which enabled it to come forth rather early with a convincing and useful analysis of European situation. In great measure, then, neo-functionalism triumphed because it seemed to work.

The effectiveness of the Functionalist approach is difficult to demonstrate because the factors with which it is concerned are less tangible and dramatic. Yet, there is some evidence to suggest that socio-psychological community is developing in Europe.[33] Many European citizens attribute the increase in their standard of living to the EEC, and many interest groups and businessman are beginning to feel that they have a lot to loose if integration does not proceed.[34]

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33. Hodges, no.22, pp. 28-29.

34. Etzioni, no.32, p. 251.

Taylor points out that despite several crises a belief in the future of the EEC has permeated down to the people. Once the crisis is past the general feeling seems to be that integration will continue.[35]

The greatest achievement of European regional organisations have been to establish patterns of peaceful cooperation in various fields, as preliminary steps to build a community at the international level by negotiation rather than coercion. However, there is no escape from the conclusion that till date regional integration in Europe has not reached a stage where functionalist and neo-functionalist approach can claim success.

The Functionalists reading of the world trends has been found faulty by many studies. Far from being under inexorable pressure from economic, social and technological forces the nation-state seems to be moulding these to its own ends. On the basis of statistical data, Deutsch has argued that the trend is away from military, technological, economic and cultural interdependence, and towards a new particularistic national preoccupation. In 1900 Britain, France and Germany each spent around ten per cent of GNP through government budgets; now

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35. Taylor, no.22, p. 220.

the figure is thirty per cent, a great proportion
of which is not on defence but welfare, i.e. just
that field held by Functionalists to have inter-
nationalising implications.[36] If political loyalty
and authority require a sociological base, as the
Functionalists argue, and these are the socio-
economic trends, then it would appear that their
resources in the struggle against the nation-state
are ebbing away.

36. K.N. Deutsch, "The Impact of Communication on
    International Relations Theory", in A.A. Said,
    ed., Theory of International Relations (New
    Jersy: Englewood Cliffs, 1968).

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER III

FUNCTIONALISM AND SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION: INITIATIVES AND BACKGROUND

Regional cooperation has become a characteristic phenomenon of the post-war period. Beginning with the fifties and sixties of the present century the idea of regional cooperation has gained ground in most parts of the world. Of late, the countries of South Asia have also realised the necessity of forging inter-state cooperation in the region. Functionalism proposes that inter-dependence can be secured through inter-state cooperation and the resulting proliferation of functional organisations. These functional organisations will fulfil the basic welfare needs of the people and eventually win over the allegiance of the citizens of different countries bypassing national sovereignty and territorial boundaries.

Strictly speaking, Functionalism, as developed by David Mitrany and others, is not an approach to regional cooperation. Regional cooperation means inter-state cooperation within a given geographical region. Functionalism, on the other hand, is basically an approach to world order. Functionalists

have concerned themselves with global needs and world society and not with formulations of inter-state cooperation within a region.[1] As a result, technically, the ideas and tenets of Functionalism cannot be applied to regional cooperation.

However, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, the assumptions and viability of Functionalism have been analysed and tested in the backdrop of regional groupings in western Europe and various UN functional organisations. The countries of South Asia have recently grouped themselves together in an emerging institutional framework of regional cooperation. The birth of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a clear pointer in the above direction. The testing of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) proposals and the prospects of SAARC against the yardstick of functionalism is likely to enrich our understanding of both Functionalism and regional cooperation in South Asia.

Most of the areas for cooperation agreed upon by the member-countries of SAARC relate to functional

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1. In fact, David Mitrany has been a vocal critic of regionalism and regional organisations. For example, see his article, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional", Journal of Common Market Studies (Oxford), vol.4, (1965), pp. 119-120.

aspects of cooperation.[2] The SAARC countries have
also decided to keep bilateral, controversial and
political issues out of the scope of regional
cooperation process. This is in conformity with
Functionalism approach which maintains that fruitful
inter-state cooperation can be ensured by insulating
political and ideological clashes. For purposive
and mutually beneficial cooperation, similarity and
consensus on political and security aspects are not
needed. Indeed, Functionalism is founded on the
distinction between political and non-political
aspects of society.[3] The strengthening of functional
bases of inter-state cooperation and the consequent
proliferation of functional regional organisations,
will gradually erode the dominance of political and
strategic considerations. Thus, the member-countries
of SAARC by rejecting a political approach to the
question of regional cooperation in the area, have
adhered to Functionalist approach toward peace and
welfare.

However, the idea of regional cooperation in
South Asia is not new. Regionalism attempts began

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2. See Tarlok Singh, "SAARC: Priorities for the Next
   Phase" (Unpublished Background Paper, presented at
   the Seminar on South Asian Regional Cooperation,
   School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru
   University, New Delhi, 2-4 December 1985

3. Charles Pentland, International Theory and European
   Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp.64-
   66.

with the advent of independence of Asia from the colonial rule in 1947.[4] Several conferences were held at the initiative of South and South-East Asian countries between 1947 and 1955, which have been listed in Table-I at the end of this chapter. A close look at the conferences listed in the Table reveals some important aspects of the early attempts at regionalism involving South Asian countries. Firstly, there was a lack of clarity and precision about the region that was to be evolved into a viable grouping for common purposes as is evident from the geographical diversity and variations of the participating countries at these conferences. Secondly, these attempts were dominated by politico-strategic considerations on the one hand of military pacts and alliances and on the other of decolonisation and Asian resurgence. The agenda of the conferences (last column of the Table), thrust of discussions therein and the outcome of their deliberations clearly underline this. Economic aspects of cooperation figured in these conferences only casually and without much success.[5] The participating countries were too preoccupied with politico-

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4. See, Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia, (Bombay: National Publishing House, 1964)

5. See, Lalit Prasad Singh, The Politics of Economic Cooperation in Asia (Colombia: University of Missouri Press, 1966), pp. 3-12.

strategic considerations and the impact of Cold War.
As such they did not take any concrete initiative to
evolve regional cooperation.

From a Functionalist viewpoint, these early
attempts at regional cooperation in South Asia do
not merit much attention. The participating countries
were only vaguely aware that a regional cooperation
approach to much of their economic and developmental
strategy can be beneficial and mutually rewarding.
Functionalism holds that the desire for and move to-
ward inter-state functional cooperation emanates from
the socio-economic and technological compulsions of
the countries concerned. But the background of most
of the early attempts at regionalism were provided by
the extra-regional powers and were political.[6] As
such the prospects of effective regional cooperation
in South Asia could not move beyond the deliberations
of the conferences held.

Though the idea of regional cooperation did not
pick up immediate momentum in South Asia, generally
improved political atmosphere in the sub-continent
in the seventies proved conducive for the same.

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6. For details, Gupta, no.4.

Besides global compulsions and allied developments,
there were important changes in South Asia that helped
create favourable atmosphere for regional cooperation
initiatives. The first wave of regionalism attempts in
South Asia were political in motivation and content and
as a result could not be transformed into a basis for
the emergence of economic cooperation in South Asia.
But, the present move behind regional cooperation in
South Asia has the background of economic compulsions
and rationale behind it, though the initiative in the
direction has been taken no less from the political
considerations. In this context, therefore, the
question of mutual economic gains from such a move and
the political will to sustain the move has assumed
importance. Even in the case of regional cooperation
in Western Europe both the factors of economic compul-
sions and political considerations have played equally
significant role. Even the highly technical grouping
such as Customs Union in Western Europe were primarily
the outcome of "political and security" considerations
as concluded in a study by Jacob Viner.[7] Robert Gilpin
has commented: "The economic and technical sub-structur

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7. See, Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

partially determines and interacts with the political super-structure. political values and security interest are crucial determinants of international economic relations."[8]

Both the questions of economic compulsions and political considerations have helped generate the initiative on South Asian regional cooperation, and as such, the strength and vitality of SAARC will depend on "a converge of perceived interest under-pinned by suitable political and economic circum-stances".[9]

Several economic compulsions before the South Asian countries for regional cooperation can be enu-merated. Regional cooperation has acquired a momentum of its own in the context of developing countries quest for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The failure to implment the Programme of Action of NIEO and the stalemate over the launching of global negotiations have led to increasing emphasis on the regional and inter-regional cooperation among develop-ing countries, generally referred to as South-South Cooperation.[10] The situation in South Asian countries

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8. Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Econo-mic Relations", in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, ed., Globalism versus Realism: International Relations (Westview Press, 1982), p. 176

9. Michael Leifer, "The Limits of Functionalism Endeavour: The Experience of South-East Asia", in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, ed., Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations (London: University of London Press, 1975), p. 279.

10 Altaf, Gauhar, ed. South-South Cooperation (London: Thi World Foundation, 1984)

cannot be divorced from the deteriorating effects of global economy on the developing countries. South Asian countries are facing a developmental crisis of unprecedented magnitude both from the global environment and the domestic setting.[11] The three indicators, namely balance of payments and trade account, debt liabilities and prospect for foreign capital (i.e. concessional aid) are sufficient to suggest not only the dependency but also the vulnerability of the region to global economic fluctuations. It became extremely difficult for South Asian countries to sustain growth rate even at the level of two per cent. In 1974-75, the real growth rate had touched a new low of 2.2 per cent as against the population growth of 2.4 per cent.[12] Again, the impact of the second oil shock in 1979-80 further dampened the economic outlook since all these countries are oil-importing countries.

South Asian countries are mainly exporters of primary products. But, as pointed out by World Bank, economic recovery has not been helpful to primary good exporters. "The high real exchange value of the

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11. S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, _Regional Cooperation in South Asia_ (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), p. 45.

12. World Bank figures as quoted in _the Times of India_ (New Delhi), 2 September 1978.

dollar has contributed to depressing the primary commodity prices in terms of purchasing power over goods imported for the USA and industrialised countries."[13] The problem is likely to be compounded further by the emerging trend in technology development which is likely to upset the "comparative advantage of developing countries by taking away significance of cheap labour."[14]

All South Asian countries are mostly dependent on external sources of finance, investment and technology for their indigenous development. For their exports they have to depend primarily on the industrial market economies for their markets. With growing recession in developed countries and the consequent wave of protectionism in their economies, the market opportunities of South Asian countries have become restricted.[15] At the same time the availability of cheap services of finance from multilateral sources, particularly IDA, is drying up. There is evidence to indicate that remittances from the Gulf has reached

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13. Girijesh Pant, "Gains from Regional Economic Cooperation", Mainstream (New Delhi), p.48

14. Ibid., p. 49

15. I.N. Mukherjee, "South Asian Regional Cooperation: Economic Constraints and Potentialities", (Unpublished), Paper presented at the Seminar on South Asian Regional Cooperation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2-4 December 1985.

its plateau.[16] All these factors pointed toward the
urgent need of the countries of this region to act
together with respect to the terms and conditions on
which external finance, inflow of foreign capital,
transfer of technology and access to markets would
be made available to them. The obvious inference is
that a regional approach will be relevant not as an
alternative to global and domestic solutions but in
providing scope to minimise the impact of adverse
world trends.[17] Thus, we can see that regional
cooperation initiatives in South Asia have signifi-
cant economic motivation. Functional cooperation in
different fields amongst the South Asian countries
has been perceived to be beneficial and mutually
rewarding. Functionalist standpoint that economic
cooperation will pave the way for better political
understanding has been one of the important aspects
of thinking on the regional cooperation in South Asia.

Politically, the South Asian State system was
radically altered with the emergence of Bangladesh
in 1971, and the Simla Agreement (July 1972) between

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16. See, M.G. Quibria, "Inward Remittances and South
    Asian Economies", Commerce (Bombay) May 17, 1986

17. Mukherjee, no.15, pp. 27-28

India and Pakistan following the war. It was during this time that a good regime rapport was established between New Delhi and Islamabad, New Delhi and Dacca, and New Delhi and Colombo. But this lasted only for a brief spell of time as swift regime changes transformed the political landscape in South Asia. Mrs. Gandhi was voted out of power in India (1977) and Bhutto was overthrown by a military coup in Pakistan. Military also captured power in Bangladesh (1975), and Mrs. Bandaranaike's government was replaced by the United National Party (UNP) led by J.R. Jayewardene in Sri Lanka (1977). It seemed that initiatives regarding regional cooperation has received a serious jolt with sudden regime changes in the above South Asian countries.

However, some analysts argue that even during this period (1975-80) there were clear political compulsions on these new regimes for regional cooperation. It was from both domestic and external sources. It is also argued that these regimes had some ideological orientations which worked as a centripetal forces for greater regional harmony.[18] According

18. See Muni and Muni, no. 11, pp. 20-22.

to this view, another very significant conducive factor
was the interest shown by the Western powers in encourag-
ing cooperative relations in South Asia. As Muni's
write: "Western countries have been actively campaign-
ing for regionalism in the Third World - which besides
weakening the Third World solidarity and united front
may also help the North in integrating markets for
their goods, technologies and capital as well as in
coordinating the sources of vital raw material
supply".[19] This raises a pertinent question about
the implications of North's interest and support for
regionalism in Third World.[20] As a result of the
combined impact of all the conducive factors as well
as compulsions as detailed above on South Asian
nations, some sort of regional approach became
evident in many ways among these countries since
mid-1977. The visit of Heads of Governments of
the South Asian countries in this period to each
other's capital also reinforced concerns in the
need for regional cooperation in South Asia.

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19. Ibid., p. 7.

20. See, B.P. Menon, The Bridge Across the South
    (Pragen, 1980). For an overview of North
    and Third World Regionalism, Hans W. Singer,
    "North-South and South-South: The North and
    the Third World Cooperation", Development
    and Peace (Budapest), vol.3 (1982), pp. 5-11.

Even at the UN and international conferences, South Asian countries had more mutual consultations and contacts on the various economic issues of common interest. It was against this background, that Bangladesh initiative for the setting up of a forum for regional cooperation in South Asia in 1980 formally was taken.

It is in the nature of the region of South Asia that there should be both divergences and similarities between the circumstances in which the different countries are placed.[21] The divergencies relate to the basic factors of size, population, resource endowments, and stages of development. The similarities concern the broad pattern of problems that they confront in moving towards higher levels of development and productivity and higher rates of growth. Hitherto each country has looked at itself and the rest of the world as two entities and has developed patterns of trade and aid as circumstances demanded. The region and even the neighbouring countries had no significant role. To this extent

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21. Tarlok Singh, "SARC: Priorities for the Next Phase", (Unpublished) Paper presented at the Seminar on South Asian Regional Cooperation, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2-4 December 1985

divergencies tended to increase and countries of the region drew further away. The initiation of SAARC is looked upon by many as a corrective to the past negligence of regional cooperation efforts in South Asia.

Many common factors have also been at work in the South Asian region, notably, sharp increase in population, pressures on limited resources, excessive dependence on agriculture and vagaries of rainfall, the general state of low productivity and natural resources, unemployment, dependence on external resources, unemployment, dependence on external resources, inadequate and uneven rates of growth, etc. These common factors can be readily seen to be the foundation for a broad-based effort to put the resources, manpower and infrastructure of the region as a whole to greater common use. The Functionalist thrust in the regional cooperation approach envisages that shared problems can only be solved through mutual action. Mitrany had emphasised on "national co-activity", in contrast to "national co-existence".[22]

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22. See, David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: Qudrangle Books, 1966), p.59.

Cooperation between states for specific welfare-
oriented benefits is not only possible but also
necessary to cut the edge of political differences.
Regional cooperation can be built on the foundation
of scientific, technological and economic cooperation
amongst the countries concerned. It is on this
platform that the South Asian countries have maximum
convergence of interest. "One should not under-
score the possibility that perceived successes in
these areas could in turn help to mitigate bilateral
differences. By building up viable regional insti-
tutions and perhaps later undertaking joint invest-
ment projects, the member-countries would develop
stakes in the region which they would like not only
to maintain, but develop even further."[23]

In the following pages we will take up the
development of SARC process since the late President
Zia-ur Rahman of Bangladesh made a proposal for a
summit meeting of the leaders of seven South Asian
countries in May 1980. The purpose of such a summit
was to "explore the possibilities of establishing a

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23. I.N. Mukherjee, "South Asian Regional Coopera-
    tion: Economic Constraints and Potentialities",
    (Unpublished) paper, presented at the Seminar on
    South Asian Regional Cooperation, Jawaharlal
    Nehru University, New Delhi, December 2-4, 1935,
    p. 31

framework for regional cooperation". President Zia made a very forceful plea in favour of regional cooperation. According to him, such cooperation was taking place in all the regions of the world, in particular, in the Third World, and the rationale for this in South Asia lay in the fact that "the countries of South Asia share many common values that are rooted in their social, ethnic, cultural and historical traditions. Perceptions about certain specific events or political situations of the world may differ but such differences do not seem to create a gulf which cannot be bridged."[24] The underlying assumptions of Functionalism is clearly reflected in the above formulation. Political differences can be side-tracked and cooperation built through joint endeavours in acceptable and specific functional areas.

It seems that the Government of Bangladesh was working on the idea for nearly two to three years before giving it a concrete shape and announcing it. Initially, the proposal got a mixed response from the South Asian countries; a sort of cautioned acceptance. While Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives and

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24. As quoted in Muni and Muni, no.11, p.30.

Bhutan promptly endorsed the idea, India and Pakistan expressed some reservations, though not arbitrarily rejecting the proposal. The political considerations weigh heavily in the initial reservation of India and Pakistan to such a proposal.

There was, however, nothing apparently objectionable in the proposal. In essence it called for regional harmony and cooperation aimed at economic development in the compelling regional and international context. Therefore, India and Pakistan could not outrightly reject the proposal either. They instead sought to modify it so as to accommodate their respective apprehensions and requirements. This was done in a series of exchange of views that took place following the announcement of the proposal. The South Asian foreign ministers also discussed the subject at the UN Headquarters in New York during August-September 1980. The consensus that finally emerged among them was to have a meeting at the level of foreign secretaries which could prepare ground for the ministerial meeting that could subsequently lead to a summit. It was decided to exclude the bilateral, political and controversial issues out of the purview of the foreign secretaries meeting. Bangladesh was

entrusted with the responsibility of preparing the draft of the working paper which could be discussed at the first meeting of the foreign secretaries.

Bangladesh prepared and circulated the draft in November 1980.[25] It had two important features: (a) all the objectives of regional cooperation, were defined in very wide terms. It identified eleven specific areas of cooperation. These were considered as "non-political" and "non-controversial" items. (b) The draft suggested various institutional and organisational aspects of regional cooperation. The emphasis was on a summit of the Heads of Governments though it was accepted that way for the summit could be prepared by the meetings of the foreign secretaries.

The paper clearly admitted the tension generating potentially of a shared cultural heritage. It however, added that "there was no reason why the common heritage should not be converted into a positive factor to bring the countries of South Asia closer." It also saw no contradiction between "bilateralism and regionalism". On the other hand, in its opinion,

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25. See Annexure A, for the extracts of the Bangladesh Working Paper of November 1980, Muni and Muni, no. 11, pp.142-148.

some of the minor and major irritants in the bilateral relations...either be minimised or completely removed through a regional forum". Further, it pointed out how regional forum might serve as a feedback to the system of global cooperation. The paper was quite optimistic as to the ultimate emergence of a regional organisation in South Asia.

South Asian regional cooperation has indeed come a long way since 1980, after Bangladesh's initiative. The Bangladesh's draft paper formed the basis of discussion at the first meeting of the seven South Asian foreign secretaries held in Colombo from 21 to 23 April 1981. Two salient points emerged from this historic meeting: (i) regional cooperation was necessary, desirable and beneficial; (ii) there was need for moving with caution and making adequate preparation for realising the goal of regional cooperation. It was in pursuance of the recognition of these imperatives that the joint communique issued at the end of the meeting emphasised the principle of unanimity in making decisions and also the desirability of keeping aside all bilateral and contentious issues from future deliberations. The paper also

recognised that regional cooperation based as it would

be on mutual trust and appreciation of the nationalist

aspirations of the individual countries, it was not

expected to become a substitute for bilateral and

multilateral cooperations. It was maintained that

any regional cooperation need not be inconsistent

with bilateral and multilateral obligations of the

countries concerned.[26]

To begin with, five specific areas of beneficial

regional cooperation were identified at the meeting

These were, agriculture, rural development, tele-

communications, meterology and health and population.

Five study groups coordinated by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,

Pakistan, India and Nepal respectively, were insti-

tuted to make indepth studies in order to review the

existing arrangements and assess the feasibility and

scope for regional cooperation in the overall cost-

benefit framework.

Subsequently, three more meetings at the foreign

secretaries level were held at Kathmandu (November

1981), Islamabad (August 1983) and Dhaka (March 1983).

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26. See, Annexure PS-3 for the Joint Communique of
    the Meeting of South Asian Foreign Secretaries,
    Colombo, April 1981, Muni and Muni, no.11, p.151.

At the Kathmandu meeting, the recommendations of the five study groups as well as the report of the Committee of whole were endorsed.

It may be noted that as a result of these deliberations a fairly broad based and comprehensive scheme of South Asian regional cooperation was evolved and almost all the field outlined in the working paper of Bangladesh, with the exception of tourism and joint ventures, were accepted. In fact some of the new subjects like telecommunications, postal services and sports were also included.

Thus, the first meeting of the foreign ministers of Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka was held in New Delhi, on 1-2 August 1983. At the conclusion of the meeting Foreign Ministers signed a Declaration on South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC). All the seven foreign ministers expressed an ardent desire to foster regional cooperation in view of compulsions of the common problems and aspirations of their people and the need to accelerate socio-economic development. Besides, they were quite convinced that regional cooperation was desirable and necessary for achieving self-reliance. The Declaration highlighted eight objectives of SARC.

It emphasised that the guiding principle of SARC would be the recognition of sovereignty and the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of others and mutual benefit. A three-tier institutional arrangement was suggested. As to the financing of regional projects, it was decided that the constributions of member-states would be voluntary. The provision was also made for the recourse to external assistance from appropriate sources. The foreign ministers also agreed to meet once a year to review the progress of SARC. It was in pursuance of this decision that the second foreign ministers meeting took place at Male (Maldives) from 10-11 July 1984 and third foreign ministers meeting was held at Thimpu (Bhutan) in May 10-14, 1985. Thimpu meet became, in effect, a preparatory meeting for the forthcoming summit level meetings at Dhaka in December 1985. Here, the foreign ministers approved the draft of the ocument to be accepted by the Heads of Governments when they meet in Dhaka, which became the Charter of SARC. The idea of the establishment of a Secretariat was also mooted for the first time in this meeting. One of the more important offshoot of the Thimpu deliberations was the decision for greater

emphasis on the formation and execution of specific projects in agreed areas of cooperation.

The first summit level meeting among the seven South Asian leaders for regional cooperation was held in Dhaka, on 7-8 December 1985.[27] In this meeting, the seven South Asian leaders launched the world's most populous regional grouping with the hope that it would improve the security environment in the region and that cooperation among them in economic and cultural field will result in a better life for their people.

At the end of the two-day summit the Heads of State or Government of South Asian countries adopted a Charter giving birth to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).[28] The Summit also issued the Dhaka Declaration committing the participatin

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27. For a background and the deliberations at the meeting, see B. Udayshankar, "Limits and Limitations of SAARC", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.IX (February 1986).

28. Bangladesh Working Paper of November 1980 had suggested four nomenclature for the regional groupings in South Asia (a) South Asian Association for Cooperation (SAAC); (b) Association of South Asia (ASA); (c) Association of South Asia for Cooperation (ASAC); and (d) Organisation of South Asian States (OSAS).

countries to the concept of regional cooperation.[29]
The Charter consists of a preamble and is followed
by ten articles.[30] Quite significantly, the Charter
contains a provision for the meeting of the Heads of
State or Government annually. The framework of SAARC
will consist of a Council of Ministers at the head,
then Standing Committee of the Foreign Secretaries,
a Technical Committee and an Action Committee. A
Secretariat should be established at the appropriate
time.

To sum up, the regional cooperation in South
Asia in fact has come a long way since the Bangladesh
proposal mooted in May 1980. However, the Bangladesh
initiative is not less aided by the earlier moves,
particularly, that of the United Nations and its
specialised agencies. The changed political, economic
and strategic environment has also contributed a lot
toward building of regional cooperation in South Asia.
The range of activities taken under the SAARC framework
is indeed impressive, involving as it does, both infra-
structural arrangements and planning perspectives.

The regional cooperation process would receive
impetus as the existing vested interests around the

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29. See Appendix.

30. Ibid.

process start asserting themselves. It would further help if such new interests are created that will have deep stakes in continuing and strengthening the process. This can happen only when the regional cooperation process is broadened so that it goes beyond the exclusive par meters of the State structure in South Asia, and involves, in addition, the society as a whole. The neo-functionalist approach ~~which~~ maintains that the demand, expectations and loyalties of the group which get involved in the inter-state functionalist endeavour will shift to the new centres of decision making. The approach has the potentiality of explaining continuing interest in the regional cooperation process if such groups and vested interests are created. It is very important that there should be people and groups to speak and argue in favour of regional cooperation from the long term point of view. Because, these groups and interests may gradually gear the political factors in the desired direction of regional cooperation.[31] This would help the South Asian move advanced in a Functionalist framework. As pointed out by Munig, the process of

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31. R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 81-82.

regionalism in South Asia, in its scope, pace and
institutionalisation will be slow and cautious,
advancing only inch by inch.[32]

Functionalism, is a gradualist approach. It is
idealist and pragmatic too. Gradualism also seems to
have become the watch-word of regional cooperation in
South Asia. In South Asian context, inter-state,
regional cooperation will be a long and tortous
process. Any move to speed up the process might
backfire. As the late President Zia-ur-Rahman wrote
to his counterparts in the region: "Regional coopera-
tion in South Asia must be both pragmatic and realistic
in outlook. Such cooperation is intended to grow,
step by step in the economic, social and cultural
sphere". Subsequently, the way in which the areas
of cooperation have been identified seems to be in
conformity with the Functionalist framework.

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32. Muni and Muni, no.11, pp. 69-71.

TABLE 1

Early Attempts at Regionalism In Asia

Conference	Countries participated	Issues discussed
Asian Relations Conference, March 28, 1947, New Delhi*	Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Sri Lanka, China, India, Indonesia, Malaya, Nepal, Mongolia, Iran, The Philippines, Siam, Tibet, Turkey, Vietnam, Egypt, Palestinians, and Soviet Central Asian Republics**	Freedom Movements in Asia. Racial Problems and Inter-racial Migration, Cultural Affairs, Agriculture and Industry
Conference on Indonesia, January 1949, New Delhi	Afghanistan, Australia, Bhutan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Iran, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Thailand	Dutch action on Indonesia and the settlement of the Indonesia question, Machinery for continuous contacts
Baguio Conference, May 1950, Baguio (Philippines)	Australia, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia	Economic and cultural cooperation in Asia, collective security in Asia
Colombo Plan, formally launched on 1 July 1951 as a result of the meetings of the Ministers of Independent British Commonwealth countries in Sydney and London in 1950	India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (subsequently joined by many others)	Economic and Technical cooperation
Colombo Powers Conference April 1954, Colombo	Sri Lanka, Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan	Indo-China situation and other Asian crises, Hydrogen Bomb, Economic cooperation
Afro-Asian Conference, April 1955, Bandung (Indonesia)	Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Central African Federation, Sri Lanka, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Siberia, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey Vietnam (North and South Yemen)	Economic and Cultural cooperation, problem of national sovereignty racialism and colonialism, Afro-Asian contribution in World Peace
7. Simla Conference, May 1955, Simla (India)	India, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam (South), Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo.***	Utilization of U.S. special allocation of US$ 200 m.

* The second such Conference scheduled for China in 1949 was not held.

** In March 1947, Pakistan had not been created. The Indian Muslim League dissociated itself from the Conference and viewed this as a "thinly disguised attempts on the part of the Hindu Congress to boost itself politically as the perspective leader of Asiatic peoples".

*** Sri Lanka and Burma were invited but they declined to participate. Burma was not a recipient of the U.S. aid and Sri Lanka did not relish the idea of India being a link between itself and the U.S.

Note: Except for the Bandung Conference, all other attempts were welcomed by the Western Powers and disapproved by the Soviet Union.

Source: S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984).

CHAPTER FOUR

Chapter Four

FACTORS IN SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

As discussed earlier, one of the most important assumptions behind the Functionalist approach has been the negation of political factor as a determinant of inter-state cooperation. Inter-state cooperation emanates from the socio-economic circumstances of the countries concerned. Functionalists maintain that political factors and considerations are neither necessary nor desirable. However, the regional cooperation process in South Asia cannot be analysed in its background and perspective simply in terms of functionalist thesis.

The foundations of the current phase of regional cooperation in South Asia have been stated to be functional in content, and gradualist in direction. Several areas for possible inter-state cooperation have been listed and agreed upon by the participating countries. Economic rationale and potentialities of cooperation in South Asia exist, in a great measure. But to analyse the SARC process only in this context will be misleading. In the preceding chapter we have pointed out some of the political factors behind regional

cooperation initiatives in South Asia. What is important, however, is the sustenance of the present regional cooperation process. Though the economic rationale formed one of the important bases for the process, in itself, it cannot provide the answer, and ensure its continuation. In the context of the Third World, politics is the dominant characteristic of social reality and the question of regime stability and political survival eventually dictate the logic and rationale of socio-economic preferences and priorities.[1] This is more so in the context of South Asia where the factors of sovereignty and nationalism combined with historical, political, psychological and strategic reasons and considerations have generated and reinforced interstate disputes and strategic discords in the region.

Gradualism, the watch-word of Functionalist thesis has been incorporated into the regional cooperation process in South Asia. The areas selected for inter-state cooperation have a functionalist framework. However, the SARC process fails at several counts against Functionalist yardstick. It has several in-built limitations. It is

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[1] S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), Chapter-1.

true that by setting aside the question of political and bilateral issues from the SARC deliberations, an important advance has been made. But the political content in regional cooperation move in South Asia can be deduced from several sources.

In the case of Bangladesh, the initial impulse for initiating the idea of SARC was political.[2] At a time when the then President of Bangladesh was seeking earnestly to enhance his legitimacy in his country, the establishment of an association of South Asian States at his initiative would have contributed significantly to his image. It is also conceivable that Bangladesh, along with other small states, notably Nepal, might have initially entertained the hope of exercising greater leverage with their more dominant partner, India, in respect to several unsettled bilateral issues. The initial response of India and Pakistan showed reservation on the proposal for South Asian regional cooperation. This sprang from political considerations.

Political-security considerations had a lot to contribute towards building of a consensus in favour of

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2   Inaranath Mukherjee, "South Asian Regional Cooperation: An Analysis of Convergence and Divergence in Responses of Constituent States, _Asian Studies_ (Calcutta), vol.1, 1983.

regional cooperation. Perceptions seemed to gain ground
that outbreak of hostilities might erode the legitimacy
of some of the governments of the region. Therefore,
the governments in the region started showing greater
desire for peace and development. The question of
regime stability weighed heavily in the minds of the
governments. The problems of one country have a ten-
dency of spilling over in other countries too. More-
over with the increasing cost of the weapons it is
very difficult for the ruling regimes to sustain an
arms race despite the fact that the countries like
India and Pakistan are getting arms from USSR and USA
respectively. But for every deal there is a financial
cost as well as political cost involved in relation to
the supplier, whether it is the USSR or the USA.

Next we take up the external factors, especially
the political-strategic considerations of the Super Powers
in encouraging regional cooperation moves in the Third
World.

Some analysts believe that the SARC had come into
existence in the geo-strategic context of the Second Cold
War.[3] The early signs of Second Cold War witnessed two

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3   For the analysis of external factors, especially US
     interest in regional cooperation in South Asia, the
     present author is indebted to S.D. Muni's work,
     "Political Imperatives and the SARC" (unpublished), a
     paper presented at a Seminar on South Asian Regional
     Cooperation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi,
     December 2-4, 1985.

important parallel moves of the US in South Asia. One
was the attempt to revive security relationship with
Pakistan, the second was the encouragement to South
Asian countries for strengthening bonds of peace,
amity and cooperation in the region. Both the US
President Carter and the British Prime Minister
Calaghan during their visits to South Asian countries
in 1978 promised economic help for multilateral co-opera-
tive projects if undertaken by the countries of the region
together. The western leaders were also trying to secure
binding commitments from India and Pakistan for nuclear
non-proliferation. The linkages between the security and
cooperative components of regionalism could thus be seen
in these simultaneous attempts.[4]

Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan crea-
ted a compelling urgency under which such moves had to
be pursued vigorously. "Carter Doctrine" of January 23,
1980 with its thrust on evolving "Cooperative Regional
Security Framework" in South and South West Asia was a
clear statement of the US intent in this regard. The
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was its culmination in
South West Asia. It was not without reason, therefore,

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4   Ibid., pp.3-4.

that the move of a South Asian summit made by the then 'Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman in May 1980, which eventually set off the process of establishing SAARC was described by a left wing Dacca weekly as "nothing but an echo" of the Carter doctrine.[5]

The US has always been keen to secure geostrategic advantages and facilities which in the changed context of the modern warfare, and strategic power projection would greatly boost the American presence in the region against their main adversary, the Soviet Union. Economically, this would integrate the South Asian markets for the US and western consumer goods, investments and weapons and link thus integrated markets with that of the ASEAN.[6] The demands of some of the SARC countries, like Pakistan and Sri Lanka and the abortive attempt of Sri Lanka to secure ASEAN membership thus assumes added significance.

The question of external linkages behind SARC thus assumed importance. It is a separate matter that progress in the aforementioned direction could not be achieved.

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5   Holiday Weekly (Dhaka), 15 June 1980.

6   On non-viability of links between SARC and ASEAN, see S.D. Muni, "South Asia and the ASEAN: Vain Bids for Linkages", Times of India (New Delhi), 17 November 1982.

The regional specifications came in the way of the culmination of Carter Doctrine in South Asia.[7] Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Congress regime returned to power in 1980. Though the new regime was upset with the Soviet action in Afghanistan and viewed it as a matter of long-term security concern, it abhored the idea of joining any US sponsored move in opposing the Soviet Union. India perceived that while pleading for a regional response, the US wanted such response to be dove-tailed to its overall strategic approach in the region. Thus autonomy of the stipulated response was sought to be undermined from the beginning.[8]

These external sources of regional cooperation process in South Asia do not fit into the Functionalist approach. Convergence of interest perception and consensus on non-political welfare aspects amongst the participating countries are more akin to the Functionalists' thesis. In the context of South Asia this seems to be a far-fetched possibility. Inter-State cooperation and its justification are dependent on the political initiative.

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7   L.R. Baral, hegional and Extra-Regional Linkages in South Asian Cooperation (Kathmandu, 1983).

Politics defines the scope as well as the goal of inter-state cooperation in the region. For example, we can take the issue of inter-state cooperation in trade. Several studies have pointed out that improved trade relations in the region will be advantageous to every country. It will cut on transport costs and time, retain benefits within the region that are being appropriated by third country trading houses since they exploit the import quotas offered by the developed countries. This will give advantage and relief to all the concerned sections, e.g. the traders, producers and the consumer. Even then, the existing level of intra-regional trade is very poor. It does not exceed, on an average 5 to 6 per cent. The only exception is Nepal's heavy trade dependence on India. This poor level of intra-regional trade by implication indicates that scope for expansion is considerable. Till date, however, no agreement could be reached by the South Asian countries in including trade in the list of areas of cooperation. The explanation lies more in the political realm. Pakistan has been resisting the inclusion of South Asian Cooperation in trade matters. Many Pakistani economists and businessmen have forcefully pleaded in favour of greater intra-regional trade

in South Asia but to no avail.[9] Most of the analysts agree that political factors are the only major hurdles in increasing intra-regional trade and economic relations. Thus Functionalist "separability thesis" - politics on the one hand and welfare on the other - does not hold much ground in the concrete realities of South Asia.[10] There is no automaticity in the regional cooperation process either.

There is hardly any doubt that South Asian region is one of the most potential area for inter-state cooperation. As we have seen the regionalism in South Asia has been late to follow. The reason behind this has to be found in the impediments that exist in the way of cooperative ventures in the region. It is a moot question whether Functionalist approach can be an answer to these impediments. The problems in the way of greater inter-state cooperation in the region has several aspects. S.D. Muni divides the impediments to regional cooperation in South Asia into two categories, namely: (i) those related to technical and intra-structural factors, and

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9   See, Khalaquer Rahman, Ayubur Rahman Bhuyan and
     Sardel Riza, "The Trade Effects of a South Asian
     Customs Union: An Exploratory Study", The Pakistan
     Development Review, vol.20, Spring 1981.

10   Iris Cluade, Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems

(ii) those emanating from the nature of the region's
political economy, and power structure.[11] First cate-
gory includes the colonial legacies of South Asian
countries' economic, political and communication
linkages with U.K. and U.S. and other developed
countries of the West. These linkages have continuously
been nursed even after the attainment of independence
by India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka under various new
arrangements. It would not be easy to severe these
linkages, and, in many cases, the concerned developed
countries would not let them to be weakened without
offering resistance because of the advantages occurring
to them from such linkages. Further, the overall hege-
mony of the North dominated global economy come in the
way of forging and developing mutually beneficial
South-South cooperation.[12] The Non-Aligned Movement
and the "Group of 77" are confronting these hurdles
but the real progress is extremely slow and tardy.
Regional cooperation in South Asia cannot escape the

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11   Muni and Muni, n.1, pp.53-57.

12   For a theoretical exposition of this point, see
      Hans W. Singer, "North-South and South-South:
      The North and the Intra-Third World Cooperation",
      Development and Peace (Budapest), vol.3, (1982).

overall constraints of global economy and political
dynamics in general and North-South relations in
particular.[13]

However, more effective set of impediments spring
from the politico-strategic and economic implications
of the political economy of the region. The first
important characteristics of the South Asian region
is its Indo-Centric nature. This means that India is
central to the whole region. This is not so only in
terms of India's geographical location and contiguous
boundaries with neighbours, but with respect to socio-
cultural identities and experiences of historical and
political evolution. Commonalities in South Asia are
mostly bilateral between India and each of the neighbour-
ing countries separately and individually. There is a
bit of India in every other country of South Asia. As
against this, there is hardly anything of significance
which is common between India's neighbour and the
others. A clear implication of this Indo-centric
nature of South Asia is that no step towards cooperation
and collaboration in a regional framework can be taken
without India acquiring a central place in the scheme of

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13   W. Andrew Axline "Underdevelopment. Dependence and

therefore can only develop as a mutually supportive process to the thrust of bilateralism in South Asia as dictated by the realities of the region.

Another important characteristic of South Asian region is the power disparity between India on the one hand, and her neighbours on the other. India stands as a giant in South Asia. Except during the sixties India has been able to assert its primacy in the region. The indications of improvement in India's power profile since the beginning of the seventies were evident in India's assistance to Sri Lanka against the insurgency threat in April 1971 and its role in the emergence of Bangladesh. It firmly established India's credibility as a "purposive, powerful and skillfully managed regional power", in the words of an American scholar.[15] Director of Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies wrote; "The dismemberment of Pakistan has improved the long term position of India in the sub-continent and consequently in the region... India is now better able to face China in the north to deal with its scattered neighbours than at any time

15   See, Wayne Wilcox, <u>The Emergence of Bangladesh</u> (Washington D.C., 1973).

in the past".[16] Economically India is a big size

economy with a strong and diversified industrial base

and self-reliant strategy of growth.[17]

Apart from power asymmetry there are many other

points of divergence in the political system, regime

sustenance and the nation-building strategies, deve-

lopmental patterns and the defence and security posi-

tions in this region.[18]

Similarly, in the economic field, the strategies

of development pursued by these regimes have been in

contrast with that of India's. Under such strategies,

the dominant economic groups have come to establish

linkages with the forces and factors outside the region

including MNCs. Many of them now do not see adequate

advantages in weakening these links at the cost of

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16   Irtiza Hussain, "The Political Strategic Balance
      in South Asia", Strategic Studies, (London),
      vol.1, (July.September 1977), p.36.

17   John Mellar (ed.), India: A Rising Middle Power
      (Boulder: Westview, 1979).

18   For some recent publications on the sources of
      divergence, dimensions and conflict in South
      Asia, see (i) Stanley Wolpert. Roots of C----

developing intra-regional linkages. They fear that
the growth of regional cooperation will harm their
prosperity. Such fears of economically entrenched
groups have been coinciding with the apprehensions
of ruling elites to produce centrifugal economic and
politico-strategic policies in the region.[19]

Mutual distrust and lack of understanding in
political and economic fields in South Asia, therefore,
are built into the prevailing structure of political
economy of the region. Unless the structure is gra-
dually modified and readjusted, it may come in the way
of regional cooperation entering into a deeper and
broader phase. It is interesting to note that a
Pakistani economist, instead of suggesting other
South Asian countries to develop self-reliant economies,
asked India to give up its strategy of self-reliant
economic development in the interest of winning neigh-
bours' confidence and advancing regional cooperation.[20]

For other nations of the region Indian economic
development in a democratic set up is a matter of con-

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19   Muni & Muni, n.11, p.59.

20   M.L. Qureshi, Survey of Economic Resources and

cern because barring Sri Lanka[21] and Maldives, most of India's neighbours have destroyed democracy and are suppressing dissenting voices in their own territories. It is worth noting that degree of vehemence against India in these countries is in direct proportion to the denial of democracy under these regimes.

Moreover, the geographical fact of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka being peripheral to India, and also of their being adjacent to some other major region or country provides them a common motivation to act centrifugally vis-a-vis India and to take a stand in many international issues different from India's stand. And even in the context of SARC, the smaller states bind themselves together to counterbalance India. Historical contradictions also sway the behaviour of the nations towards each other with disastrous effect on forces of cooperation. The circumstances surrounding partition in 1947 made certain that India and Pakistan would be at loggerheads for a long time to come. Big powers have taken full advantage of the India-Pakistan cleavage to further their political and strategic objectives in the region.

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21   However, with the ongoing persecution of Sri Lankan
      Tamils the political system of Sri Lanka has dives-
      ted its title to be called democratic.

The fears and apprehensions of the smaller South Asian countries vis-a-vis India, though a natural and unavoidable consequence of power disparity in the region, have often been inflated and deliberately played up to serve narrow objectives. This has been done by those political and economic vested interests that have thrived and prospered on anti-India and regional centrifugal policies. Owing to historical links and socio-cultural contiguities that India has with neighbouring countries, the neighbouring regimes have often found it advantageous to pursue assertive and divergent stance vis-a-vis India in their strategies for political sustenance and mobilisation against domestic rivals. Inter-State conflicts and strategic disharmony in the region have, besides other things, forced South Asian countries to look outside in search of support and assistance, particularly from the great powers, to counter-balance intra-regional pressures. As already noticed, the external powers have often exploited and perpetuated strategic schism in South Asia to further their respective interests and global strategies. Some of the countries of the region have forged extra-regional links in an attempt to undo the implications of South Asian power assymetry and undermine India's

status.[22] This approach has been pursued very assiduously resulting in the consolidation of divergences and strengthening of intra-regional apprehensions and misunderstandings.

Another approach to minimise power asymmetry in the region is to ask India to lower its profile in regional affairs so as to allow greater initiative, self-confidence and participation on the part of its smaller neighbours. This is a legitimate demand and the Indian decision-makers themselves seem to be aware of it. There are a number of instances at least in the SARC processes where India has been more a respondent than an initiator. "The notion of low profile, however, is a highly subjective one. What is desired and expected as well as what is possible in low profile interactions can hardly be evaluated objectively".[23]

South Asian regional cooperation, both as concept and as process had come to stay. There does not seem to be any going back on it. This process, which was

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22   For a detailed account, see L.R. Baral, Regional and Extra-regional Links in South Asian Cooperation (Kathmandu, 1983), pp.105-43.

23   Quoted from S.D. Muni, n.1, p.5.

described by South Asian foreign secretaries at their first meeting in Colombo in April 1981 as "beneficial, desirable and necessary" came to be recognised a year later in Islambad in August 1982 as having gained "irreversible momentum". The Heads of State or Government of the seven South Asian countries met in Dhaka in December 7-8, in the first ever regional summit.

The summit adopted a charter converting the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. But leaving aside the euphoria during and in the immediate wake of the summit, one has to admit that the meet was not a big success.[24] There are certain realities of SAARC which can not be ignored in assessing its standing. There is almost a general consensus among statesmen and analysts that meaningful advances in the direction of regional cooperation can not be made without tackling some of these facets of South Asian reality.

The reality of SAARC has to be seen more in what Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq said in an interview to

24   B. Udayshankar, "The Limits and Limitations of
      SAARC", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), vol.IX,
      February 1983, pp.1-10.

a Bangladesh daily on the eve of the Dhaka summit, in
the literature distributed the Pakistani embassy in
Dhaka during the meet, in the incident pertaining to
the stamp cancellation ceremony on the concluding day
of the Summit, and in the inability of member-countries
yet to agree upon trade and industry as fields for
regional cooperation.[25]

Though there is lot of scope and potentialities
of regional cooperation in South Asia, the problems
and impediments in the way of successful regional
cooperation can hardly be overlooked. Regionalism
is essentially a political phenomenon notwithstanding
its socio-cultural cooperative and as such political-
security considerations will have important role in
promoting regional cooperation as well as in retarding
it.

With the launching of SAARC one may feel tempted
to suggest that neo-functionalist hypothesis of spill-
over might be set in motion in South Asia. This is a
far fetched possibility. Spill-over occurs when the
technical expert and interest groups are allowed to
have some role in the expansion of regional cooperation.

In South Asia the technical realm is defined by the government and the officials carry restricted briefs.

Functionalism has been applied, with some success, in situations where socio-economic interests and pressure groups are capable of acting as agents of regionalism and can place selective constraints on the countries concerned.

In the case of South Asia economic and technical interest groups are diffused, primordial and under-developed. Their leverage with the national governments is quite limited. As a result 'institutionalised pattern of interest politics' and 'technical self-determination' are not viable concepts in relation to South Asia. Functionalist emphasis on the learning process followed by habits of cooperation by the citizens is also not much of relevance. Far from building a socio-psychological community the regional cooperation process in South Asia has still much ground to cover even in terms of binding commitments from the participating countries. For example, shortly after hosting the first meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of seven South Asian countries in 1981, Sri Lanka went looking for ASEAN membership. Again, it almost backed out of

the Thimpu deliberations over a very political matter. It seemed that foundations of Regional Cooperation process in South Asia are very fragile.

The countries of the region are very sensitive over political issues. They are equally very possessive about their newly won independence and sovereignty. Four conditions identified as 'necessary' by Aaron Segal for regionalism in the Third World are worth taking note of. These conditions are that the proposed regional cooperation venture: (i) must offer economic benefits to each unit including an arrangement on the distribution of benefits. (ii) must not threaten existing beneficial relationships or they must be replaced with new ones, (iii) must not constrain the process of nation-building, (iv) must not threaten the bases of support of existing national political units.[26]

The relevance of these conditions in South Asia is self-evident. These conditions relate not only to the economic aspects of regional cooperation but also touch on the existing political arrangements.

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26   Aaron Segal, "The Integration of Developing Countries: Some Thoughts on Africa and Central America", Journal of Common Market Studies (Oxford), vol.2,

It is very difficult for Functionalist approach to breakaway from these conditions. The overall thrust of Functionalism is directed against the consolidation of nation-state system. But the functional areas for inter-state cooperation in South Asia are centralised at the national level. Regional cooperation may come handy to national governments to further consolidate their hold as the benefits accruing from such cooperation will be channelised by the agencies of the national governments. Whatever welfare measures percolate down to the citizens of these countries will be seen as achievement of the government.

Again, the low level of political awareness in the Third World countries prevents people articulating welfare demands even at the local or national level in an effective manner. Internationalisation of welfare demands, and its effective articulation seems a far-fetched possibility. The question of their appreciating and consequently shifting loyalties in favour of international/regional functional organisations does not arise.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

In the concrete reality of the Third World, poli-
tics is the dominant characteristic of social relation-
ship as well as the driving force behind economic deve-
lopment and various measures of social welfare. "The
question of regime-stability and political survival
eventually dictates, the logic and rationale of socio
economic preferences and priorities". In South Asian
countries, the overriding emphasis of governmental
action is directed to the goal of political integration
and consolidation of territorial entity which succeeded
colonial rule. In consequence, the prospects of Func-
tionalism which in principle graviates against such
goals is bleak. Indeed, that small measure of success
in Functionalist endeavour which has been possible
occurred only where it has operated well within the
context of the state-system, which Professor Mitrany
had hoped would be reduced to insignificance through
the application of Functional alternative.

Functionalism is not an activity, which emerges
simply in response to some objective notions of common
need. If such were the case, South Asia might well be
a suitable milieu for its active promotion. Functionalis

tends rather to be the product of convergence of per-
ceived interests underpinned by suitable economic and
political circumstances.

Central to functionalist thesis is the position
that functions determine organisation and structure.
However, the organisation and the structure of the
SAARC has depended not on functional imperatives but
on the political perceptions of the participating
countries. A study by I.N. Mukherjee on attitudes
of the participating governments to the institutional
arrangement has shown that by the time of third meeting
of Foreign Secretaries (August 82, Islamabad) four out
of six countries were in favour of early 'structured
institutionalisation' while only one (India) clearly
favoured 'evolutionary institutionalisation'. But,
by the time of Dacca Summit of Heads of Government or
State, even India more or less, fell in line with others.

SAARC does not foresee any implementing agency of
its own nor does it envisage any joint industrial pro-
ject in the near future. So tangible benefits coming
visibly from SAARC process do not accrue. Hence the
question of change of loyalties does not arise. It will
be timely to remember that the question of transfer of
loyalties of the individuals as a result of inter-state

cooperation, away from nation-states to international/
regional functional organisations is a crucial assump-
tion of Functionalism.

Areas of cooperation agreed to by the participa-
ting countries under SAARC does not affect public wel-
fare in a major or significant way. The inclusion of
trade and industry could have created benefits which
would have gone to powerful interest groups such as
trading houses and industrial enterpreneurs. This
could have helped create pressure groups with vested
interest in inter-state cooperation.

Unlike in Western Europe, the demand for regional
cooperation in South Asia does not have any popular base
(pressure from powerful interest groups). Neither are
there any influential intellectual groups propagating
regional cooperation or integration. The initiative has
come from the governments of the region only. Again,
unlike EEC or UN family of organisations, SAARC has no
bureaucracy of its own which in itself can act as an
interest group and sustain the regional cooperation
process.

Interesting light is thrown on the interrelationship
of SARC and Functionalism by a close study of (i) agreed

reas of inter-state cooperation, (ii) question of
nstitutionalisatioh, and (iii) nature of such co-
peration.

Working Groups in each of the agreed areas were
supposed to draw a comprehensive programme for action.
The immediate programme was to include, (a) exchange
of data and information; (b) exchange of experts, train-
ing facility and scholarship, etc., (c) organisation
of seminars, workshops, etc. The long-term programme
was to include (a) assessment of needs and resources,
(b) preparation of specific projects of a regional
nature, (c) modalities of financing projects. So far
there has been no implementation of the long-term
programme. The nature of the immediate programme is
such that present benefit accruing from Cooperation
between governments can only be utilised by the
national agencies and departments of the countries
concerned. Therefore, it can be argued that people in
participating countries have not been directly affected
to any significant extent at all. Even at the govern-
mental level the work done so far has been so sparce
that attitude change as an effect of socialisation in
the cooperation process does not seem to be visible
at all.

Neo-functionalism arose in response to the failure
of Functionalism when applied to the ongoing regional
integration process in Western Europe. The pluralist
model of neo-functionalism combined with spillover pro-
cess and 'institutionalised interest politics' was a
distinct advance over classical Functionalism. It put
the question of power politics vis-a-vis welfare
in perspective. But pluralism and 'institutionalised
interest-politics' belong more to the realm of inter-
state cooperation in Western Europe. Third World in
general and South Asia in particular, cannot provide
testing ground for neo-functionalist thesis.

The question of spill-over occurring as a result
of SAARC process seems a far-fetched possibility.
Spill-over occurs when the technical experts and inte-
rest groups are allowed to have some role in the expan-
sion of regional cooperation. In South Asia, the
technical realm is defined by the government, and
officials carry restricted briefs. Moreover, the inte-
rest groups in South Asia, as in the rest of the Third
World, are diffused, primordial and underdeveloped.

The 'learning process' and 'ethos of cooperation'
on which Functionalist pinned so much hope, has not

yielded the desired result. Notions of state-rights, nation-building, sovereignty, etc., have been rising in direct proportion to the growth of functional organisations. Regionalism has become more attractive and feasible for most of the countries and therefore Functionalist approach needs revision. If the claims of Functionalism to be a sound and promising approach to international relations has to be considered seriously it has to come to terms with the forces of regional cooperation in the Third World.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX-I

The Dhaka Declaration

Following is the text of the declaration adopted at the first annual summit of South Asian nations at Dhaka in December.

The Bangladesh President, the King of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of India, the Maldives President, the King of Nepal, the Pakistan President and the Sri Lankan President met in Dhaka on December 7 and 8.

They underscored the historic significance of their first ever South Asian summit meeting. They considered it to be a tangible manifestation of their determination to cooperate regionally, to work together for finding solutions towards their common problems in a spirit of friendship, trust and mutual understanding and to the creation of an order based on mutual respect, equity and shared benefits.

They recognised that periodic meetings at their level were central to the promotion of mutual trust, confidence and cooperation among their countries.

The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that their fundamental goal was to accelerate the process of economic and social development in their respective countries through the optimum utilisaiin of their human and material resources, so as to promote the welfare and prosperity of their peoples and to improve their quality of life. They were conscious that peace and security was an essential pre-requisite for the realisation of this objective.

The leaders of the South Asian countries reaffirmed their commitment to the UN charter and the principles governing the sovereign equality of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in internal affairs and non-use or threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political inde-

pendence of other states. They reiterated that the UN constituted the most important forum for the resolution of all issues affecting international peace and security.

Formidable challenges

They also reaffirmed their deep conviction in the continuing validity and relevance of the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement as an important force in international relations. The Heads of State and Government acknowledged that the countries of South Asia, who constituted one-fifth of humanity, were faced with the formidable challenges of poverty, economic backwardness, low levels of production, unemployment and pressure of population compounded by exploitation of the past and other adverse legacies.

They felt that, bound as their countries were by many common values rooted in their social,

ethnic, cultural and historical traditions regional cooperation provided a logical response to these problems. They were conscious of their individual and regional strengths, their potential as a huge market, their substantial human and natural resources and the complementarities of their economies. They were confident that with effective regional cooperation, they could make optimum use of these capacities for the benefit of their peoples, accelerate the pace of their economic development and enhance their national and collective self-reliance.

They were convinced that their countries, which had made important contributions to the enrichment of human civilisation, could together play their due role in international relations and influence decisions which affected them. They emphasised that strengthening regional coopera-

tion in South Asia required greater involvement of their peoples. They agreed to increase interaction and further promote people-to-people contacts at various levels among their countries. To this end, they decided to take steps to create awareness and public opinion in the region.

The Heads of State and Government welcomed the progress already made in the implmentation of the integrated programme of action in the nine mutually agreed areas. They expressed their desire to consolidate and further expand cooperative efforts within an appropriate institutional framework in a spirit of partnership and equality.

The leaders were convinced that they could effectively pursue their individual and collective objectives and improve the quality of life of their peoples only in an atmosphere of peace and security. In this context, they expressed concern at the deteriorating international political situation. They were alarmed at the unprecedented escalation of arms race particularly in its nuclear aspect.

Threat of self-extinction

They recognised that mankind today was confronted with the threat of self-extinction arising from a massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. The arms race intensified international tension and violated the principles of the UN charter. The leaders called upon the nuclear weapon states for urgent negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty leading to the complete cessation of testing, production and

deployment of nuclear weapons. In this connection, they welcomed the recent meeting between the US President, Mr. Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva and expressed the hope that the meeting would have a positive effect on international peace and security.

The Heads of State and Government expressed deep concern at the continuing crisis in the global economy. They underscored that deteriorating economic and social conditions and had seriously retarded development prospects in South Asia and other developing countries. Sharply falling commodity prices, deterioration in the terms of trade, intensification of protectionist measure spiralling debt burden an a decline in the flow of external resources, especially concessional assistance, had caused a seriou setback to the economi development of the de veloping countries. Thesl had been compounded by natural disasters and pre carious world food security situation affecting developing countries.

They also expressed concern over the diminishing capacity of international financial and technical institutions to respond effectively to the needs of the disadvantaged and poorer countries and regretted that the spirit of multilateral cooperation had begun to falter and weaken. This was particularly disturbing in the face of increased inter-dependence of developed and developing countries and the fact that economic revival of the North was closely

linked to economic progress in the South. They believed that developments in the past decades had clearly demonstrated the structural imbalances and inequities inherent in the existing international economic system and its inadequacy to deal with problems of development.

The leaders strongly urged that determined efforts should be made by the international community towards realisation of the goals and targets of the international development strategy as well as the substantial new programme of action for the least developed countries. They called for urgent resumption of the North-South dialogue and early convening of an international conference on

money and finance for development with universal participation.

Historic importance

They were conscious of the historic importance of the Dhaka summit and reiterated their conviction that the launching of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries which they had established at this meeting would place regional cooperation on a firm foundation, play an important role in accelerating the pace of economic and social development of their countries, promote the objectives of individual and collective self-reliance and further the cause of peace, progress and stability in their region and the world.

APPENDIX-II

SAARC Charter

Salient features of the Charter of South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation adopted on December 8 at Dhaka.

1. Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and Non-alignment, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes.

2. Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the objective of peace, freedom, social justice and economic prosperity are best achieved by fostering mutual understanding, good neighbourly relations and meaningful co-operation among the countries of South Asia which are bound by ties of history and culture.

3. Aware of the common problems, interests, and aspirations of the people of South Asia and the need for joint action and enhanced co-operation within their respective political and economic systems and cultural traditions.

4. Convinced that regional co-operation among the countries of South Asia is mutually beneficial, desirable and necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the quality of the life of the peoples of the region.

5. Convinced further that economic, social and technical co-operation among the countries of South Asia would contri-

bute significantly to their national and collective self-reliance.

6. Recognising that increased co-operation, contacts and exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute to the promotion of friendship and understanding among their people.

7. Recalling the declaration signed by their Foreign Ministers in New Delhi on August 2, 1983 and noting the progress achieved in regional co-operation.

8. Reaffirming their determination to promote such co-operation within an institutional framework.

Do hereby agree to establish an organization to be known as South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, hereinafter referred to as the Association, with the following objectives, principles, institutional and financial arrangements.

ARTICLE I

Objectives

1. The objectives of the Association shall be:

(A) to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life.

(B) To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials.

(C) To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia.

ARTICLE II

Principles

1. Co-operation within the framework of the Association shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE III

Meetings of the heads of state or government.

1. The heads of state or government shall meet annually.

ARTICLE IV

Council of ministers

1. A Council of Ministers consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the member states shall be established with the following functions:

(A) Formulation of the policies of the Association.

(B) Review the progress of co-operation under the Association.

(C) Decision on new areas of co-operation.

ARTICLE V

Standing Committee

1. The Standing Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries shall have the following functions:

(A) Overall monitoring and co-ordination of programme of co-operation.

(B) Approval of projects and programmes, and the modalities of their financing.

(C) Determination of intersectoral priorities.

(D) Mobilisation of regional and external resources.

(E) Identification of new areas of co-operation based on appropriate studies.

ARTICLE VI

Technical committees.

1. Technical committees comprising representatives of all member states shall be responsible for the implementation, co-ordination and monitoring of the programmes in their respective areas of co-operation.

ARTICLE VII

Action committees

The Standing Committee may set up action committees comprising member states concerned for implementation of projects involving more than two but not all members states.

ARTICLE VIII

Secretariat

1. The Council of Ministers shall consider, at an appropriate time, the establishment of a secretariat for the Association and its organisation, functions and funding modalities.

ARTICLE IX

Financial arrangements

1. The contribution of each member state towards financing of the activities of the Association shall be voluntary.

2. Each technical committee shall make recommendations for the apportionment of costs of implementing the programmes proposed by it.

3. In case sufficient financial resources cannot be mobilised within the region for funding activities of the Association, external financing from appropriate sources may be mobilised with the approval of or by the standing committee.

ARTICLE X

General provisions

1. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.

2. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations.

Major economic activities in south asian countries.

Bangladesh

Main industries (approximately 12 per cent to GDP in 1979)	*Jute based activity:*	Sacking, hessian, carpet backing;
	Textiles:	Cotton cloth, cotton yarn; newsprint and other paper, cement steel ingots.
	Mining:	Natural gas, oil, coal.
Agriculture (50 per cent to GDP)	*Main crops:*	Milled rice, wheat, sugar cane, sweet potatoes, pulses, oilseeds, bananas.
	Cash crops:	Jute, tea.
Imports	*Main sectors:*	Machinery and transport equipment, basic manufactures, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, raw materials, food and live animals, mineral, fuels, animal and vegetables oils, etc.
	Main sources:	Japan, USA, UAE, UK, Canada, Singapore, FRG, Netherlands, India, Australia, France, USSR.
Exports	*Main sectors:*	Jute; hides, skins, leather, etc.; tea, fish and fish preparations, newsprint, paper, etc. Main destinations: USA, Pakistan, UK, USSR, Mozambique, Italy, China, Belgium, Japan, Australia.

Bhutan

Main industries		Industry including manufacturing is small-scale involving probably less than two per cent of employment and similary small percentage of GDP)
	Activities:	Textiles, soap, metals, handicrafts, carpets, woodwork, matches, food processing.
Agriculture	*Main crops:*	Rice, wheat, maize, barley, millet, potatoes, pulses, tobacco, spices, fruit.
Imports	*Main sectors:*	Raw materials, fuel, food, consumer goods.
	Main source:	India
Exports	*Main sectors:*	Cardamom, gum, rosin, handicraft, timber.
	Main destinations:	India, Middle East, Singapore, Western Europe.

India

Main industries (25 per cent of GDP in early 1980s)		Textiles, fertilisers, chemicals, vehicles, metal industry, cement, mining (coal, iron ore, manganese, bauxite, limestone, chromium, lead concentrates, zinc, diamonds, gypsum, crude petroleum, natural gas).
Agriculture	*Main crops:*	Rice, wheat, pulses, sugarcane, rapeseed and mustard, jute, cotton, tea, tobacco, coffee, rubber.
Imports	*Main sectors:*	Mineral fuels, machinery, transport equipment, textile fibres, edible vegetable oil, pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, non-ferrous metals, organic chemicals, resins, plastics, crude fertilisers, wheat.
	Main sources:	USA, Iraq, German, Malaysia, France, Canada, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, Italy, UAE, Australia, Singapore, Switzerland, Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Sudan, Yugoslavia.
Exports	*Main sectors:*	Textiles, pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, machinery, tea, leather and leather goods, iron ore, fish, crustaceans, etc. iron and steel, jute manufactures, metal manufactures, chemicals, etc. spices, cashew nut kernels, tobacco, coffee, sugar, silver, wheat, fruit and vegetables, handicrafts.
	Main destinations:	USA, Japan, UK, USSR, FRG, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Australia, Switzerland, Poland, Egypt, Malaysia, Sudan, Yugoslavia, GDR, Czechoslovakia.

		Maldives
Main Activities	Fishing:	Fishing has been the main source of income and 44 per cent of the labour force are fishermen. The sector accounts for nearly one third of GDP.
	Tourism:	Tourism has grown remarkably since it was introduced in the early 1970s and is a major source of foreign exchange. Over 27,000 visitors per year have been recorded. Main source (58 per cent) of visitors is western Europe — FRG, Italy, France, Sweden.
Agriculture	Main crops:	Coconuts, breadfruit, finger millet, italian foxtail millet, sweet potato, cassava, taro, maize, sorghum.
Imports	Main sectors:	Consumer goods, intermediate and capital goods, petroleum products.
	Main sources:	Japan, UK, Thailand, Sri Lanka.
Exports	Main sectors:	Manufactured goods; garments, fresh fish dry salted fish, dry skipjack (Maldive fish)
	Main destinations:	Japan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Singapore.

		Nepal
Main Industries (contribution to GDP 10 per cent)		Industry mainly small scale.
	Activity includes:	Textiles (cotton, synthetic); paper and pulp; cement, leather goods; footwear; cigarettes; brewing; food processing; jute, pharmaceuticals; agricultural tools. (Industries are officially classified as large, medium, small and cottage industries. Foreign shareholding only is allowed in medium industries; upto 100 per cent in large industries only. The Government has given high priority to attracting foreign investment by providing liberal incentives and a broad range of investment. Priority industries are food processing, textile goods, construction, pharmaceuticals and educational materials.)
	Mining:	Minerals mined: quartz, lignite, copper, cobalt, iron ore.
Agriculture (Nearly 60 per cent of GDP)	Main crops:	Rice, maize, wheat, sugarcane, millet, barley, oil seeds, tobacco, jute, fruit and vegetables
Imports	Main sectors:	Basic manufactures, machinery and transport equipment; food and live animals; chemicals, mineral fuels; miscellaneous manufactures, raw materials.
	Main sources:	India, Japan, USA.
Exports	Main sectors:	Rice; raw jute; jute cuttings; timber; hessian; sacking, twine, etc.; ghee.
	Main destination:	India, USA, Japan, Singapore, Hongkong, FRG.

		Pakistan
Main Industries (24 per cent of GDP in 1979)		Textiles, chemicals and fertilisers, food processing, steel and natural gas, mining (coal, chromite, limestone, gypsum, silica sand, fireclay, celestine, rock salt, ochres, iron ore) machinery, drugs.
Agriculture	Main crops:	Wheat, maize, barley, millet, sorghum, sugarcane, tobacco, groundnuts, pulses, rapeseed, sesame, fruit and vegetables (potatoes, onions, mangoes, citrus), cotton (main cash crop) other agricultural animal products, sports goods; surgical instruments; footwear; synthetic textiles.
Imports	Main sectors:	Machinery and transport equipment including electrical; iron and steel; chemical fertilisers; vegetable oils, etc; chemicals; grain; flour; etc; tea; pharmaceuticals; non-ferrous metals; sugar, paper; dyes.
	Main sources:	Japan, USA, Kuwait, UK, FRG, Saudi Arabia, Netherlands, France, UAE, Italy, China, Australia, Malaysia.
Exports	Main sectors:	Rice, cotton (raw cotton, cotton fabrics, cotton yarn, cotton waste, cotton thread); carpets, rugs, etc; petroleum and products; leather; drugs, chemical etc; clothing, hosiery etc; fish and fish preparations
Main destinations:		Hong Kong, Japan, FRG, Saudi Arabia, USA, UK, UAE, Iran, France, Sri Lanka, Kuwait, Bahrain, Australia, India resumed 1975 — involves Pakistan's public sector only)

		Sri Lanka
Main industries (contribution of manufacturing to GDP 15 per cent)		State sector: petroleum products, chemicals; textiles, leather goods; steel, tyres, tyre products; ceramics; kaolin; mineral sands; bricks etc; food stuffs, paper, hardboard, plywood etc; Private sector: furniture, plastic products, metal products and machinery.
	Mining:	Graphite, mineral sands, salt, silica and quartz, mica, precious and semi-precious stones, including sapphires, rubies, cats eyes.
Agriculture (contributes approx. one-third of GNP)	*Main food crops:*	Rice, cassava, sweet potatoes, potatoes, maize, millet, onions.
	Cash crops:	Tea, (Sri Lanka is the world's second largest producer and exporter); rubber; coconuts, copra. Also dry beans, seasame, sugar cane, cashew nuts, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, spices.
Imports	*Main sectors:*	Petroleum etc; machinery and equipment, food, (rice, flour, sugar), textiles and clothing, chemicals, paper, etc.
	Main sources:	Japan, UK, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, USA, Singapore, Australia, China, Hongkong, Canada, France, USSR, Burma.
Exports	*Main sectors:*	Tea, rubber, coconuts and products, precious and semi-precious stones.
	Main destinations:	USA, UK, Japan, FRG, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Canada, Australia, USSR, Netherlands, France, Italy, Kuwait, Taiwan.

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