

**NOTIONS OF LIFE AND DEATH AND THE NUCLEAR
BEHAVIOUR OF STATES:
UNDERSTANDING INDIA'S NUCLEAR BEHAVIOUR AND ITS
APPLICABILITY TO IRAN**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of*

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation titled “Notions of Life and Death and the Nuclear Behaviour of States: Understanding India’s Nuclear Behaviour and its Applicability to Iran” submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been previously submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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
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Introduction

This study, *“Notions of Life and Death and the Nuclear Behaviour of States: Understanding India’s Nuclear Behaviour and its Applicability to Iran”*, aims to link the field of biopolitics with the nuclear behaviour of states with the objective of widening the ambit of research in disarmament studies. The idea of this research project is to locate the notions of ‘life and death’, through the scholarship on biopolitics, in the dominant ways of thinking about nuclear politics and how these concepts related to the field get exercised in state behaviour by inserting nuclear logic to the bodypolitic.

What explains India’s decision to test nuclear weapons which alters the colonial experience and Indian ‘values’ as a society? Is there a ‘contradiction’ or ‘harmony’ between the acts of the nation-state and ‘viewpoint’ of the society? Can there be a contradiction since operation of power take under its control the ‘life’ of its population? Does this life and death game play out in nuclear politics? Does the nation-state, by pledging ‘preservation’ of life to its ‘populations’, make a case for acquiring deadly nuclear weapons, however subjecting the ‘populations’ to a vulnerable position? By analyzing the paradoxical nature of biopower in the Indian case, the study will attempt to see if it gives the impression of being applied to Iran which is at the threshold of going the nuclear way, i.e. testing nuclear weapons. The notions of ‘life and death’ have often meant studying the fundamental principles underlying contemporary and historical discussions such as issues of abortion, euthanasia, suicide and terrorism. However, these notions are also played out in international politics- in wars, security, interventions and weapons of mass destruction- the security of the body/life being the underpinning of a certain kind of ‘governmentality’. Michel Foucault uses the term biopolitics to highlight the focus on ‘life’ that is at the centre of contemporary politics. Biopolitics is the maximization of life through various regulatory apparatuses that monitor, modify, and control life processes.

This research will spell out and demonstrate Foucault’s framework in order to show how the nuclear discourse exercises a certain kind of power over the ‘species bodies/populations’ in the name of security. This research project suggests that the ‘political rationality’ around acquiring nuclear weapons is practised through policies, which are not coercive in nature, as a mode to put into effect ‘hegemony’ and therefore sort of ‘rule by consent’. There is a ‘preservation of life’ argument that may rest on the ‘murderous’ justification of the modern

nation-state in which one is either with nation-state (normal) or against it (abnormal) and the enemy population is perceived to be eternally 'evil', 'impure' and 'abnormal' and thus need to be annihilated. There is a sense of the intimidation of the accusation of 'anti-Semitism' involved here where one can only take two positions of either with the nation-state or against it and to be considered 'normal', one has to offer obedience to the nation-state. Judith Butler argues in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning* (2004) that 'the threat of being called 'anti-Semitic' seeks to control, at the level of the subject, what one is willing to say out loud and, at the level of society in general, to circumscribe what can and cannot be permissibly spoken out loud in the public sphere. The exclusion of those criticisms will effectively establish the boundaries of the public itself, and the public will come to understand itself as one that does not speak out, critically, in the face of obvious and illegitimate violence-unless, of course, a certain collective courage takes hold' (Butler 2004: 127). With the help of Foucauldian interpretation, this research project attempts to unmask the not-so-visible techniques of biopolitics that are applied on the population through which a nation-state legitimizes its actions of 'pledging life'. The techniques modern nation-states pursue to 'manufacture consent' create, what we will call, *homo bellum*, i.e. humans for war, to highlight the permanence of war in contemporary times driven by the dominance of nuclear weapons. The unmasking makes it possible to think differently which the primary task of a research endeavour is.

It should be emphasized at the outset that the principal objective here is not to uphold a particular form of governance as the ideal 'art of government' but the concern is to draw attention to the contradictions inherent in the assumptions legitimizing nuclearisation and we will try to unravel and underscore those contradictions using the biopolitical framework by interrogating the practices of the modern nation-state.

The Genesis

In a path-breaking article, *Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of Bomb* (1997), Scott D Sagan highlighted three hypotheses to explain why nation-states seek or give-up nuclear weapons: the security model, norms model and domestic politics model. Sagan emphasizes on multicausality as nuclear proliferation and restraint/renunciation takes place for more than purely one reason and it is not in the interest of methodological rigour to emphasize on just the security model in explaining the phenomenon (Sagan 1997). There are other lenses to analyze nuclear behaviour and this research project attempts to offer

alternative explanation to nuclearisation by inserting the logic of biopolitics into the nuclear domain.

The idea of this research is to understand and decode the way governments today become the adjudicator of the question of 'life', especially through welfare, by bringing the paradoxes and illogicality of 'governmentality'. How this adjudication influences domestic beliefs and 'normalise' public opinion on weapons as essential for the protection of life? Michel Foucault introduces biopolitics as a notion that accounts for a historical process in which 'life' appears as the object of political strategies. In the 1975–76 lecture course, *Society Must be Defended* (2003), Foucault succinctly summarised the two-fold orientation of power declaring that:

‘To say that power took possession of life in the nineteenth century, or to say that power at least takes life under its care in the nineteenth century, is to say that it has, thanks to the play of technologies of discipline on the one hand and technologies of regulation on the other, succeeded in covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, between body and population’ (Foucault 2003: 253).

Foucault's principal argument here in the lecture course is that the function of sovereign power is to 'make live and let die.' Since modernity, the state has taken on the responsibility to secure the 'life' of its population, understood as biological creatures, from internal or external threats, through disciplining to achieve docility of bodies and through regulation to achieve an optimization of life. The modern nation-state is able to govern at the level of 'life-itself.' Foucault identified three forms of government: sovereignty, disciplinary, and governmentality. These will be explained in detail through his lectures courses in the first chapter. To outline briefly, the first is associated with the characteristic of absolutism based on physical violence and retribution on subjects and external enemies to the extent of inflicting death; the second with the emerging administrative practices of the state in the fifteenth and sixteenth century based on the disciplinary regulation of individual bodies in different institutional frameworks, school, prison, clinic etc; and the third with the increasingly governmentalized state with a non-judicial conception, emerging from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when state concern was the 'life' of the population and its welfare, where life maximization was pursued through regulation. The practice of administration or management of life through birth control, health policy, race and longevity is what distinguishes biopower from the disciplinary power which managed individual body

through surveillance to achieve its docility-utility function. The latent and concealed *raison d'état* of biopower is supposed to reinforce the power of the state.

Dialectics of the Modern International Relations

It must be noted that Foucault's conceptualization of power is different from the traditional approach characterized by a top-down method of looking at it. He formulates an understanding of power from below and de-centring of the state, deriving from the existence of the bodies and their everyday practices rather than a single sovereign authority. We will study and scrutinize traditional approaches in the discipline of International Relations in the second chapter. To better understand Foucault's position on power (emanating from the state), the following quote is useful:

'I don't claim at all that the State apparatus is unimportant, but it seems to me that among all the conditions for avoiding a repetition of the Soviet experience and preventing the revolutionary process from running into the ground, one of the first things that has to be understood is that power isn't localised in the State apparatus and that nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed' (Foucault 1980: 60).

For Foucault, power is everywhere operating throughout the 'social body' and in the traditional analysis it has always been examined as though it concentrated on a particular entity which is very state-centric. Biopolitics is a field of study about the operations of power that govern a people and it is their 'life' that happens to be the object of control. The state has a significant role to play in formulating the notions of life and death which can be quite contrary to the pledges and promises states make to their populations. This is the paradox of biopower, explained in the form of nuclearisation, which can, if need be, justify the murderous function of the state. This paradox will be examined in the first chapter.

The word biopolitics has been used in various senses by philosophers, social scientists, and biologists. Although Foucault's work aimed very little on International Relations as a discipline, however his work on biopolitics and 'governmentality' is extremely pertinent to be employed in the study, the practices and techniques of international relations, specifically on role of war. War, in contemporary times, can only be waged if the state can establish 'convincingly/believingly' that it is 'vital' to serve the security of the 'population' as a whole. His lectures on 'governmentality' are about political economy, state-craft and

‘governmentalized’ state. Numerous International Relations scholars are now arguing for the relevance of theories of biopolitics and governmentality for understanding the Global War on Terror and broader issues of security and governance in the post 9/11 world. However, the field of biopolitics has so far not been extrapolated to the domain of nuclear politics.

The concepts of biopower and biopolitics are most closely associated with the writings of Michel Foucault, who deployed these ideas in his researches from the mid-1970s until around 1980. The transformation from the sovereign exercise of power over death, to the exercise of power in order to further life led Foucault to formulate the concepts of biopolitics, biopower and governmentality. Foucault’s *The History of Sexuality vol 1* (1975) has had an enormous impact on contemporary thought in terms of its identification and analysis of biopolitics. Foucault’s research on biopower and biopolitics in his lecture series taught at Collège de France taught between 1976 and 1979 touches upon the relationship of biological sciences to the state, their role in a liberal art of government, and the relationship between life, death, law, race and war, among others. The discussions that we find on the topic in the first volume of *History of Sexuality* (1975) as well as in the lectures series and interviews nevertheless provide us with a robust theoretical tool-box. Foucault’s work on biopolitics has been further extended, reworked and extrapolated by many authors, however in order to do justice in introducing Foucault’s conceptualization to the discipline of International Relations, specifically to the nuclear domain, this research will focus on Foucault’s formulation of biopolitics through his key texts on the subject.

The scholarship on biopolitics offers a potential platform to rethink issues of war and peace and put them to thorough scrutiny in novel and innovative ways. Therefore, nuclearisation/denuclearisation/disarmament can be analysed using the biopolitical framework and an attempt can be made to show that it is the interplay between the sovereign power and the biopower, the interplay between death and life, which shapes the decision of the nation-states to go nuclear. The capabilities of the state and their improvement are presented as the capabilities of the population. The approach can help to elucidate and disentangle the paradox of biopower: whether the possession of nuclear assets veritably protects the ‘life’ of the ‘population’ or puts it at risk instead.

Is Nuclearisation a function of biopower?

To simply describe biopower and biopolitics, Mitchell Dean provides a useful peculiarity between the two. He says,

‘Biopower is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and illness, both physical and mental, and with the processes that sustain or retard the optimization of the life of a population. Biopolitics must then also concern the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective, bio-politics is concerned with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call ‘lifestyle’, with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and standards of living. It is concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell’ (Dean 1999: 99)

To illustrate further, Biopolitics is governmental practice that regulates a population and guides its conduct through biopower. As an expression of power over ‘life’, the state’s desire to go nuclear to preserve the ‘life’ of its ‘population’ depicts that expression. Foucault writes, ‘The coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented to the care of individual life is something puzzling’ (Foucault 1988, 147). Sovereign power is exercised by a particular right, the right to decide life and death- the powers that a state is embodied with by the post-Westphalian world. Foucault identified a puzzle of how the essence of Biopolitics is a continuous negotiation between life and death. It is this puzzle that this research project attempts to extrapolate to the nuclear domain. This is the life and death game that plays out in nuclear politics where preservation of ‘life’ is pledged to the populations by making a case for acquiring ‘deadly’ nuclear weapons, subjecting the populations to a vulnerable position. Nuclearisation is presented as a strategy for intervention to ‘secure’ the collective existence of the entire population and for its longevity. This is a strategy for the ‘governing’ of ‘life’ and this governing requires new ‘techniques’ and mechanisms. The modern nation-state deploys various ‘apparatus of security’ to achieve preservation through organisation and ‘normalisation’ of ‘population’. This process actually puts into effect the supremacy of the state to exercise power at the cost of the individual citizen. With nuclearisation or denuclearisation, ‘life’ is at the heart of politics with the growing emphases on the management and monitoring of ‘populations’. The modern state manages ‘life’ of its ‘population’ and the ‘discourse’ gets so ‘normalised’ in the everyday lives that the structures become invisible and the ‘populations’ do not think of questioning.

The very real threat of devastation from these weapons easily gives way to thinking of usefulness which guides populations and therefore forms beliefs and opinions dominated on the usefulness of weapons of mass destruction. Bauman writes that as such, it is in war or preparing for war that state sovereignty finds its most explicit enunciation, in killing the other, but perhaps more importantly, in risking elements of the self (Bauman 1992).

The project tries to understand the Indian nuclear experience through that biopolitical lens and its applicability to Iran which is on the threshold of going nuclear. Although Foucault had explained the concept of biopolitics in the context of western liberal societies, however one can study this concept in the context of the emergence of the use of biopower as a 'technique' of governance by the modern nation-states in the third world as well. This research project does not pass any judgement on the Islamic Republic of Iran as a totalitarian regime because there are significant differences on the characteristics of a totalitarian system of governance that one can make to counter that assertion. Furthermore, that would be outside the ambit of this research project to indulge in a debate whether Iran is a totalitarian regime or a democratic one. For academic convenience, both India and the Islamic Republic of Iran are considered to be modern nation-states. Both the modern nation-state and the Islamic Republics exercise a certain kind of hegemony. This nomenclature will be useful in initiating a biopolitical understanding of their nuclear behaviour.

Rationale and Scope: Upsetting the Normal and Unsettling the Immutable

The study of nuclear weapons has been confined to the realist school of thought. Few attempts have been made to 'understand' the social phenomenon from the perspective of the actors involved, rather than explaining it (unsuccessfully) from the outside. For decades, the discipline of International Relations was dominated by positivism and has resisted the questions of epistemology and methodology posed by critical voices. These approaches deal with individuals, ideas, discourse and identities with a new set of actors, structures, processes and realities. The obsession with parsimonious explanation has, for long, prevented subjective knowledge to make any inroad in the study of nuclear weapons.

This is an exploratory research using Foucauldian methodology and therefore does not claim to come out with a 'grand theory', parsimonious explanation or any programmatic value. It is so because such a research is interested in exposing the interplay of power politics, unsettle what is perceived to be the stable concepts/binaries of 'normal-abnormal' and converting the

question of *What is?* to *How is?*. The purpose behind this research is to make use of a framework offered by Foucault, in his work on Biopolitics, and explore its applicability in the nuclear domain without the ambition of developing a 'prescriptive, prophetic discourse'. The idea is to test if such a framework helps to better explain the drive towards the aspiration to go nuclear and unsettle the rationale of *raison d'etat*. Not having a 'prescriptive, prophetic outcome' of research should not be seen as detracting from the research agenda/purpose and prevent a researcher from the 'act of criticising' through upsetting the normal and unsettling the immutable. Foucault writes,

'The necessity of reform mustn't be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, reduce or halt the exercise of criticism. Under no circumstances should one pay attention to those who tell one: 'Don't criticize, since you're not capable of carrying out a reform.' That's ministerial cabinet talk. Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is' (Michel Foucault, 1991: 84).

The advantages of doing a qualitative research on exploring the inclusion of bodypolitic into the nuclear domain include flexibility to follow unexpected and perhaps innovative ideas during research on a phenomenon that has not been studied before in a detailed way because of having being dismissed by mainstream research with the difficulties to study it, or that has been discarded as irrelevant, as if only one point of view about it was real. It is rather important to stress that a poststructuralist approach to study international relations is considered to be one of the most controversial theoretical developments in the discipline of International Relations because of its ability to, as mentioned earlier, upset the normal and unsettle the immutable thereby questioning the coherence of the discipline itself.

Research Questions

How can biopolitics help in understanding the nuclear behaviour of modern nation-states?

If the function of the modern nation-state is to 'make live', how can its 'martial' face in developing nuclear weapons be understood?

Can the Indian experience understood through the biopolitical framework shed any light on Iran's pathway to nuclearization?

How does the modern nation-state, biopower, exercise control over populations to establish war as a permanent feature in international relations?

Argument and Structure

The larger argument this research attempts to make is to assert that modern nation-states' *raison d'état* in acquiring nuclear weapons for the 'welfare' of their 'populations' is a flawed 'logic' because nuclearisation and impending and imminent arms race puts the 'life' of the 'population' at risk. As the nation-states acquire the power over the 'life' of their 'populations', they create the binary of 'pure and impure race' projecting the state as protecting its population from the impure race. In this process, nation-states implicitly impose their own will on their populations and initiate a weapons building programme for threatening or eliminating the enemy race. Nations-states acquire legitimacy for this 'murderous' function through a process of 'normalisation' by resorting to the racism project of inculcating an enemy as the 'impure race' and constructing a 'threat' emanating from it. This process of 'normalisation' leads to the formation of, what we will call, *homo bellum*, humans for war, establishing the permanence of war in the international society.

With this basic premise, the research progresses in three steps/chapters. In the first chapter, for a greater understanding of the concept of biopolitics, we will present a genealogy of the concept and related terms through the key texts by Michel Foucault from the mid 1970s and analyse power relations in the state. We will define the predicament of biopower and problematise it in the domain of atomic weapons which leads to the re-emergence of the sovereign power. Within the basic framework of Foucault's account of the biopolitical society, it will be argued, that the acquiring of nuclear weapons is a biopolitical war and that it manoeuvres according to its technique of 'normalisation' to defend the national population, justified by state racism. In the second chapter, to get acquainted with how the discipline of International Relations has come into being, we will give an overview of the discipline to assert that particular theoretical traditions are privileged over others. Further, we will attempt to decode the 'liberal art of government' by looking into how war has been conceptualised through the application of the biopolitical scholarship. This is done through a discussion of the work by Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live* (2009), and extrapolating it to the nuclear domain. This critical analysis of the liberal politics will bring out its pretentious appearance of pacifism, liberty and peace. This is followed by a discussion of the 'norm', 'normation' and 'normalisation' techniques nation-states pursue to 'manufacture consent' and create, what this research calls, *homo bellum*, i.e. humans for war. To embed this idea, an analysis through the case study of India and Iran will be pursued in the third chapter. Furthermore, it will be argued that there is perpetuity of war

in the contemporary international society where preparedness for war is a permanent and uninterrupted course of action. There is an eternal arms race between nuclear states and those who aspire to go nuclear and the 'life' of the population that the modern nation-state claims to uphold, preserve, affirm and protect becomes a 'life' under eternal threat. Life under eternal threat is explained through the eternal 'culture of danger' that nation-states construct. There is a sense of 'uncertainty' attached to the use/non-use of nuclear weapons which helps to instil fear and set up danger among population.

Conclusion

Itty Abraham writes that for as long as nuclear weapons have been around, nuclear issues have been secluded from studies of contemporary social and cultural life. The work of understanding and interpreting nuclear South Asia has always been offered by analysts of security studies and International Relations, but not by anthropologists, cultural theorists, sociologists of science and technology, all of whom have very important things to say about this object and the field of social relations it constitutes (Itty Abraham 2009). The idea of this project is to explicitly explain biopolitical concepts which very rarely have been used in International Relations literature. It is argued that giving attention to a range of philosophically fascinating and exceedingly eminent concepts can make valuable contributions to the discipline of International Relations. This engagement will encourage practitioners to reflect upon and assess the relevance of a variety of concepts/issues in global politics.

Foucauldian framework within the discipline of International Relations is a poststructuralist framework in which one is more concerned with identifying the contradictions in a particular strategy or phenomenon to best understand the problem at hand and uncover alternative readings and explanations. This research should be seen at the level of the disciplinarian discourse concerning 'life', as a 'critique' of the dominant discourses and bringing to light the elements of the discourses diminished in International Relations. It is felt that new research would bring a fresh voice and perspective that might challenge our existing wisdom. It seems that there are important gaps in our general understanding of nuclear issues that this research can effectively fill. Mostly, the literature on biopolitics has not been extended to the study of nuclear weapons. It is this void that this research aims to fill. It is pitched as the macro analysis of the domain and as an ongoing/evolving area of enquiry. In short, this

research presents a mapping of the field and opening it for the micro nature of biopower to be located.

Chapter One

Life, Death and the Predicament of Biopower

Introduction

Foucault introduced, and explained in detail, the concept of biopower/biopolitics in his lecture series *The Society Must be Defended* (1975-76; Published 2003) and it is during the same time he wrote about the concept in the final chapter of *History of Sexuality* (vol one) (1975). These are the two important texts, together with *Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison* (1977), responsible for the formation of scholarship on Biopolitics and its related themes. It is later elaborated and expanded by Foucault in the subsequent lecture series delivered at College de Françoise particularly *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-78; Published 2007) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (1978-79; Published 2008) by providing a genealogy of liberalism through the analysis of 'government', 'governmentality' and 'the apparatus of security'. These are the recurring themes in the concept of biopolitics which from the end of eighteenth century take biological life as the site of political control and regulate it. It is during this period, the transformation of the sovereign power takes place from Hobbesian theory of the right to kill and letting the subject live to the biological right to protect the population or abandoning it to death. This is also the shift to population from territory as the referent object stating the importance given to biological life as the problem of sovereign power. This is the point from where 'governmentality' begins. The idea of biological life is premised on Foucault's idea of docile body- body equipped/created for utility and subordination- generally means body which gives up itself without any resistance to power/exercise of power over it. It is the body produced out of the application of disciplinary mechanisms, from the institution of school to the strategy of war as the highest form of disciplinary practice. Foucault explains this in detail in *Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison* (1977).

In *The Society Must be Defended* (2003), Foucault makes a detailed reference to biopower in explaining the transformation of racial conflict. He discards the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty to analyse power switching to Nietzsche's notions of war and struggle. In the lecture of 17 March 1976, Foucault sets out to introduce biopolitics. In *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) and later *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008), Foucault explains the concept in detail in the context of modern political rationalism with regard to the study of liberalism. This chapter attempts to provide an understanding of the scholarship on biopolitics through

the key texts and to state the predicament of biopower, 'the martial face of biopower'. This understanding will be useful in its application on the issue of nuclear domain and the case studies in the subsequent chapters.

The idea is to make sense of and to decode how governments today become the adjudicator of the question of life, especially through welfare, by bringing the paradoxes and illogicality of 'governmentality' to the surface. In the contemporary international relations, premised on nuclear weapons and warfare, the significance of 'governmentality' cannot be ignored where populations are pursued and regulated by instilling discipline and control to advance particular objectives. While the nuclear weapons include both death and guarantee life, as will be explained later, the act of acquiring weapons of mass destruction is used to justify the biopower objective.

The first part of this chapter comprises an explanation and interpretation of Foucault's concept of biopolitics/biopower (used interchangeably) through his key texts on the concept. Biopolitics refers to political rationality, art of government, which regulates population through biopower which is the application of that political power on aspects related to human life- birth and mortality. The second part of this chapter is defining the predicament of biopower in the domain of atomic weapons. This is done by engaging with the final lecture of *Society Must be Defended* (2003) and the final chapter of *The History of Sexuality vol 1* (1975) to the contemporary geopolitical situation. Within the basic framework of Foucault's account of the biopolitical society and state racism, it will be suggested, with reference to the case studies of India and Iran (explained in subsequent chapters), that the acquiring of nuclear weapons is a biopolitical war, in fact all wars are biopolitical, and that it manoeuvres according to its technique of normalisation to defend the national population, justified by state racism in which people offering obedience to the nation-state are labelled as 'normal' and those against it are designated as 'abnormal' and the enemy population is eternally evil and abnormal. As this research project makes use of only particular aspects of biopolitics as conceptualised by Michel Foucault, however it is imperative to give an overview of his scholarship through key texts.

Life and Death: Overview of Foucault's scholarship on Biopower

'The greater the capacities of the state, the stronger the nation will be', Foucault asserts in before he introduces biopolitics in the last lecture of *Society Must be Defended* (Foucault

2003; 223). He states that the fundamental observable fact of the nineteenth century was 'power's hold over life', i.e. with increasing state control over the biological, over life, the 'right to take life or let live' of the sovereign state has moved to 'the right to make live or let die.' This is a transition from 'punishment' in the form of public humiliation to a disciplinary mechanism in the form a prison to appended method of regulation in the form of 'governmentality'. It is a significant change as it indicates the occurrence of man acquiring a political existence and it is his 'life' that is the object of reference for the government. It is also an evolution under which engaging in wars is no longer pursued for the defence of the sovereign but to make safe the continuation of life of the population and for the 'collective survival'. In this, killing is reasonable in the name of life necessity. It is this function of the modern nation-state, which this research project refers to, where acquiring of nuclear weapons, having the capacity to kill millions, is justified in the name of securing the life of the population of that nation-state. However, it is this very function of the nation-state that makes the life of the population at perpetual risk as well. This will be explained in detail in this chapter.

Society Must Be Defended (2003) comprises Michel Foucault's course of eleven lectures delivered at the Collège de France between January and March 1976. Foucault mentions biopower in the last chapter of *The History of Sexuality (volume one)* (1975), after describing the formation of sexuality's apparatus or *dispositif*, as a historical condition which leads to the birth of 'State Racism'. Foucault introduces the concept of 'apparatus' or '*dospositif*' by describing it thus:

'What I try to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. [...] between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function' (Foucault 1980; 194-195).

Foucault deals with the notions of life and death and how their meanings and application for the sovereign transformed over a period of time. He states, 'In one sense, to say that the sovereign has a right of life and death means that he can, basically, either have people put to death or let them live...' (Foucault 2003; 240). Therefore, for the relationship between the sovereign and the subject, his right to live or die becomes the will of the sovereign and it is at this juncture when the sovereign can kill that he brings to bear his right over life. Foucault says, 'it is essentially the right of the sword'. While pointing out about the transformation of this political right, Foucault asserts that it is not that the sovereign's old right gets substituted or swapped but it overlaps, infiltrates and compliments the new right- 'make' live and 'let' die. Foucault situates this transformation at the level of mechanisms, techniques and technologies of power.

On the point of techniques of power, Foucault mentions the techniques of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that were to all intents and purposes centred on the body. These techniques, he says,

'included all devices that were used to ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the organisation, around those individuals, of a whole field of visibility' (Foucault 2003: 241–242).

At the end of seventeenth century and during the course of the eighteenth century, a number of disciplinary techniques were made use of by the sovereign power to generate docile and rationalized bodies to take control. Foucault fleshes out the concept of docile bodies in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977), a landmark study about the investment of power on body and creation of a subject as an effect of power. Foucault explains docile bodies through the action of disciplinary methods on a soldier's body. He writes that

'by the late eighteenth century, the soldier has become something that can be made: out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit; in short, one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him 'the air of the soldier' (Foucault 1977: 135).

How are bodies of utility created? Foucault explains through examining Jeremy Bentham's architectural design of power, Panopticon. Panopticon is a circular space, consisting of

individual prisons, with a tower at the centre. From the top of this tower, it is possible to see each cell, with a flash of light directed on them. Prisoners can see the top of the tower but not the place/man from where they are being monitored. This brings about a sense of everlasting and undeviating visibility on them and they begin to watch over/discipline themselves. This is how power functions in everyday life too, through panopticism, with few people functioning and large, infinite, being controlled. Foucault defines panopticism as,

‘He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection’ (Foucault 1977: 202-203).

This creates subordination of bodies through the constant gaze of the observer and reinforces docility-utility function. This is important to understand how normalisation functions in societies. How do individuals, population, conform to a norm created by nation-states to extract adherence? How do nation-states create ‘support/public-opinion’ when waging a war against another state in the name of ‘prevention’, ‘pre-emption’ or ‘humanitarian’? How do binaries of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ get created through a discourse? Why do populations tend to affiliate with the ‘good’ and separate themselves from the ‘bad’? Why are nuclear assets necessary to make this separation? This chapter attempts to address these points.

Foucault points to a new technology of power that emerges in the second half of the eighteenth century which is not disciplinary but a modified version. Since the seventeenth century, power was structured towards life in the form that the object of control was the individual body considered as a machine with disciplinary mechanisms employed upon it. Since the second half of eighteenth century, it is the population, body species, which becomes that object. Here, instead of the disciplinary mechanisms, it acts on the population in an anticipatory manner. He states, ‘Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new non-disciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-species’ (Foucault 2003: 242). To put simply, this transformation of power involved first, the body in an individualizing mode and second that is directed not at man-as-body but man-as-species or nation as a race. This leads to ‘biopolitics of the human race’. To explain further, in this new technology of power, it does not comprise of the individual and the society of the sovereign and disciplinary power wholly or in particular as the juridical body defined by law and the contract. This technology of power acts on a new ‘living’ body, a body with an assortment of

heads, that is not countless in numbers, but cannot inevitably be counted. This is where the notion of 'population' appears as power's problem and site of control. Explaining 'population' in Foucault's analytic of the bio-economy of power relations, Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo Guerro write, 'A population is not a subject, a people or a public. A population is a cohort of biological individuals' (Dillon and Guerro 2008: 267). Therefore, population becomes a site of political and scientific problem on which the government acts in a preventive and regulative manner through techniques as diverse as censuses, surveys, insurance policies, infusing 'governmentality'. Stuart Elden writes,

'Foucault argues that governments are not simply concerned with their territory and the individuals within it – as might be dated to around the seventeenth century – but with the problem of the collective, the problem of population. Population is a political, economic, scientific, biological problem, it is a problem of power. Population can be usefully conceived as bodies in plural, and while discipline works on the individual body, a multiplicity dissolved, the new technology of power works on the bodies accumulated, as a multiplicity, a species' (Elden 2008: 24).

In this case, this multiplicity acts as a nation-species expecting a threat from the outside. The bodypolitic consolidates itself. So, what mechanisms does this technology of power instil and with what purpose is that different from those of the disciplinary? The purpose here is to make effective or optimize a state of life by means of mechanisms and operate in such a method as to achieve overall states of equilibrium to achieve balance, order. Here, the power takes control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and ensuring that they are not just disciplined, but regularized. This is where the notion of a 'normalising' society emerges. Foucault states, 'the normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation' (Foucault 2003: 253). It will be explained in the next chapter how nuclear assets become a norm in international relations. Foucault states,

'In our day, it is the fact that power is exercised through both right and techniques, that the techniques of discipline and discourses born of discipline are invading right, and that normalising procedures are increasingly colonising the procedures of the law, that might explain the overall workings of what I would call a 'society of normalisation' (Foucault, 2003: 34–35).

His formulation is that there is a continuing desertion of sovereignty leading to the ascent of a disciplinary society. Sovereign power punishes the body and with the advent of the disciplinary society and its mechanisms, its punishment extends to the soul because of the

ability of power to control humans without being physically present. This disciplinary society operates all the way through normalisation techniques materializing the next step of 'governmentality', or the liberal art of government, where the body or multiple bodies become the site of control, as explained earlier. This is the gradient, from the classical to the modern age, to biopolitics where 'life' becomes the object of control making the sovereign form of power less in use, if not unessential.

For Foucault, biopolitics is a technology of power that renders the control of population. He states that before biopolitics, the object of control for the sovereign power was the body, the individual and in the biopolitical, the object is the individual- as a species with regulatory mechanisms in place acting on them. Through panoptic gaze of the state, that responsibility of check is taken upon himself by the individual. Sovereign power employed the technology of violence or fear of violence to keep a check on the people under strict vision. However, biopower is premised on the control over life by pledging well-being and healthy life to its population. Here people outside of the population are declared to be of a different race and therefore the enemies. This will be explained later in the chapter while explaining the predicament of biopower and formation of state racism.

People to Population: Emergence of the Society of 'Security'

In summarizing *Security, Territory, Population* (2007), Foucault states,

'THE COURSE FOCUSED ON the genesis of a political knowledge that puts the notion of population and the mechanisms for ensuring its regulation at the center of its concerns. A transition from a 'territorial state' to a 'population state'? No, because it did not involve a substitution but rather a shift of emphasis and the appearance of new objectives, and so of new problems and new techniques' (Foucault 2007: 363).

To put emphasis on this transition again, this is a transition wherein the sovereign is no longer essentially motivated to secure its territory and the docility of the individuals but acts in a preventive manner over a population for its regulation.

Security, Territory, Population (2007) contains thirteen lectures given by Foucault from 11 January 1978 until 5 April 5 1978. *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) and *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008) retrace the genesis of 'power over life' or, to say, biopolitics, emerging in the eighteenth century and flesh out the concepts that become known out of this field of

study- 'governmentality', liberalism for example. Proceeding further with this new form of power, biopower, Foucault states that his project was to study the apparatus with which, since the end of the nineteenth century, we have moved to 'defend society'. The precise question that is posed in *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) is how we have passed from 'sovereignty over territory' to the 'regulation of populations'? How has this alteration affected the various governmental practices that have been in place? How this new alteration is changing the life of society? What happens to the previous forms of governance? In the opening lecture, Foucault delineates the proportions and scope of his concepts: 'sovereignty is exercised with the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals, and security is exercised over the whole population' (Foucault 2007: 11). Foucault admits that the distinctions for borders, bodies, and population are distorted and get increasingly fuzzy by the presence of colossal intricacy, or assortment/multiplicity of individuals (population). This is also what explains the operations of international organisations in the name of security like the United Nations and/or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation signifying the shift from security of national to global phenomenon.

Foucault sets out the problem which is to see whether, through the history of technologies, one can notice a 'society of security' emerging. This is a 'society of security' that believes acquiring nuclear weapons will deter the enemy to pose a threat to its existence. In this 'society of security', nation-states acting in a preventive fashion develop nuclear assets and if need be, wage wars against an adversary. Foucault takes this up by studying three examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and discusses the kinds of techniques used to prevent contamination for various diseases in different periods. Foucault offers a distinction between the 'art of government' and 'reason of state' in order to illustrate transition between sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Sovereign society uses exclusion as a technique for controlling leprosy, disciplinary society uses quarantine for controlling plague and security society is model of epidemic control (like smallpox). The focus for medical intervention in a security society rests on 'determining probabilities and establishing averages through the use of statistics' (Foucault 2007). In a security society, the purpose is not about prevention of the sick mixing up with the healthy but establishing the 'normal distribution' of smallpox in an entire population, which includes both the sick and the healthy, through variolisation and vaccination. Security here is not limited to medicine but extends into other domains. This is where the idea of population appears comprising of individuals and leading to enumeration/census and targets of policy making. This brings things under the control of the

state. However, security apparatuses do not foreclose continued existence of law and discipline. By marking out the account of technologies of security, Foucault unearths the prototype in which the population appeared to be an element of the device of power. Being in command of over a territory or instructing submission and compliance from subjects are no longer the imperative functions of the sovereign but as trying to impinge on a 'population' through techniques of investigation and definite activities.

Conducting Populations

Foucault traces the genealogy of 'art of governmentality' by studying the 'technologies of power' from Ancient Greece up until the modern neo-liberal world. By tracing the part of this political rationality, Foucault presents the functions of 'government' in the period which was in addition to the management of the state, it also provided guidance for the family and children, directed the soul. It is precisely for this, Foucault defines government as conduct, as 'the conduct of conduct'. Here government works through such processes that the performance of population gets conducted and the consent gets manufactured. The government does not only conduct the behaviour of its population but is able to compose individuals in such a way that they can be governed. In the attempt to develop nuclear weapons, the state's rationale is that this capability will secure its population and the public begins to think in that way too. People feel that they are in charge of themselves of their everyday lives yet they never realize that their conduct is being supervised, managed and directed. It signifies that it is not limited to state politics but has a broader domain of application.

The focus on 'governmentality' is the cornerstone of Foucault's work in the Lecture series and his major theorization. In fact, at the end of the lecture on 'governmentality', Foucault says,

'In conclusion, I would like to say that on second thoughts the more exact title I would like to have given to the course of lectures which I have begun this year is not the one I originally chose, 'Security, territory and population: what I would like to undertake is something which I would term a history 'governmentality' (Foucault 1991: 102).

The fourth lecture of the series (1 February 1978) had been previously published in English as 'Governmentality', in Michel Foucault, *The Foucault Effect*, trans. Colin Gordon in 1991. Foucault provides a three-fold definition/function of 'governmentality'. First, he says,

'The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security' (Foucault 1991: 102).

By this Foucault means that through the various apparatus of security, the most important objective of 'governmentality' is to maintain a well-ordered, healthy and happy society. This is achieved by inserting the logic of 'economy' acting on the population and acquiring information about them for them to be regularized. Second,


'The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs' (Foucault 1991: 102-103).

By this, Foucault encapsulates the transformation of power and the gradual process with which modern government has taken control over the forms of power like sovereignty and discipline to shape governmentality through its apparatuses. Third,

'The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized' (Foucault 1991: 103).

Here too, Foucault is mentioning the process of transformation where emphasis from law has shifted disciplinary techniques to, what is today, a governmentalized society. This 'governmentality' is the basis of modern forms of political thought and action. As a recurring theme of biopower, Foucault spends a great deal of effort and time in introducing and explaining 'governmentality' and its different stages. His emphatic affirmation is that the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other's embodiment.

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To explain 'governmentality', he begins the discussion with 'pastoral power' as a technology of power which developed in the Pre-Christian and Christian East based on the idea of a shepherd exercising power over a flock of men on the move, caring for them which involved salvation. This is then introduced in the Christian institutionalisation in the 'ecclesiastical pastorate' of the church. He then moves on from 'pastoral power' to 'political governmentality' which marks the origin of the modern state. This creation was the outcome of the pastoral revolts of the fifteenth and sixteenth century. There was not a rejection of the pastoral but an imperative need for alternative routes to spiritual direction. A questioning of the ways of governance leads to the creation of economic and social relations and new political structures leading to formation of the 'government of men' where a set of individuals involved in the exercise of sovereign power and the state became an object of knowledge and analysis. This leads to the emergence of the 'art of government' according to *raison d'état* at the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century. This meant analysing what is necessary and essential for the state to exist and to maintain itself in its integrity. Here there is no notion of a unified Empire but different states struggle to exist against each other. This establishes a relationship of confrontation where states seek to assert themselves in a space of increased economic exchange. The central issues of *raison d'état* become the 'dynamic of forces' and rational techniques that facilitate one to have an effect on it. The sovereign's worry is no longer territorial growth, but the knowledge of forces and resources, say through stratification, that describes a state at a given moment. *Raison d'état* fits very well in the decision of the state to go nuclear, i.e. to develop nuclear weapons. It essentially means the reasons for a state to pursue a particular policy which can ride roughshod over all other concerns of ethical, legal or moral categories. The nation-state articulates the decision to develop a nuclear programme in the national interest terms as the essence of the state fashioned by the international system.

Foucault, then, explains two components of political knowledge and technology in which *raison d'état* shapes in western societies- diplomatic military technology and the police. The former was to maintain balance in Europe through war, diplomacy and deployment of permanent military apparatus to achieve equilibrium and reinforcing the principles of Treaty of Westphalia while the latter was supposed to maintain internal order. Economic circulation was meant to be the common instrument of both the technologies and the logical outcome was thought to be having an escalating population, manpower, production leading to strong and large armies. This is what leads to political economy. The underlying logic that the

rationality inherent in *raison d'état* is that it can obtain whatever it wants from men. However, this assumption gets questioned by *physiocrats* and *économistes*, in the last lecture, who assert that not everything can be modified and attempting to modify can make things worse. *Physiocrats* appear in Foucault's works as planners of cities and organizing the lives of inhabitants. They prepared a critique of the police state in terms of the eventual or possible birth of a new art of government (Foucault 2007: 347). They believed that people should be allowed to be free in developing their own response to the prevention of famine. They oppose security to discipline. The *physiocrats* called their community *économistes*. This points to the fact that the good government of men requires certain kinds of freedom secured by it. It points to the linkage between the apparatus of security, here in biopower, and principles of liberalism, a specific political rationality. What the history of governmental reason allows us then to construct is a genealogy of the modern state, a state whose governmental management 'has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument' (Foucault 2007: 108).

(II) Liberal Society

The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) contains twelve lectures delivered between 10 January 1979 and 4 April 1979. These are an extension of *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) lectures where Foucault is extending and broadening his analysis of biopolitics through studying the practices of liberal form of government. Foucault creates a linkage of government as a form political rationality with economy putting it together to explain neo-liberal 'governmentality' and infiltrating in it the concept of biopolitics. At the end of *Security, Territory, Population* (2007) he highlights certain freedoms secured by liberal form of government and economy and, here, in *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008), he begins by elaborating the shift to liberal form of government as a political technology by asserting that individual liberty is the foundation of eighteenth century 'governmentality' and political economy. Foucault shows how liberalism emerges out of *raison d'état* by means of political economy.

Foucault emphasizes that while liberalism creates conditions of personal liberty for its subjects, it generates several other mechanisms that tend to curb many other freedoms on the other hand. This irreconcilable tension between freedom and security points to a moment of crises in liberal societies. Liberalism guarantees utmost freedom to citizens and is celebrated as its greatest achievement. However, this freedom disappears when power is exercised and it

gives the impression that this freedom can be put on hold/delayed/postponed. As per biopolitical understanding, freedom is a precondition for the exercise of power on the subject. Foucault exposes the duality of freedom and its perverse form in liberalism by saying that liberal form of government does not only produce freedom but consumes it as well. This interplay of freedom and security involves invoking the notion of danger. By de-humanizing the enemy race, the danger emanating from the enemy is invoked, security for one's form of life and freedom is guaranteed by nuclearisation. Freedom is identified with the idea of securing life.

We also notice these freedoms to have been suspended with the 'War on Terror' initiated by the United States of America and other Western European nation-states. Daniel Ross writes in *Violent Democracy* (2004),

'The War on Terror is formulated as a potentially endless struggle against an infinitely extended enemy, that permeates all borders, and that may inhabit any sphere. The new situation is essentially militarized, the sovereignty of individual states less important than a coordinated and integrated system of "security." Such a system may be centralized in the United States, but nevertheless implies the creation of planetary security arrangements that transcend any particular state. The development of such a system of security produces its own means, logic and autonomy, unlimited by the concept of state sovereignty' (Ross 2004: 2).

This directs us to enquire how has Iran negotiated a global environment of security for 'national' freedom or state sovereignty? Iran's projection of Israel as the enemy of the Muslim world and its own casting as the leader of the Muslim world has led to acquire legitimacy of having the bomb engrafting a sense of national pride among its populations. A statement by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 2001 demonstrates this. He said,

'If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality' (Clawson and Rubin 2005: 143).

Therefore, does the case of Iran indicate that the shift Foucault may have observed/claimed in the norm, from sovereignty to security in the case of diplomatic military relations, does not quite substantiate itself on the ground? When Foucault mentions the transformation, he does not really mean that there is a succession from sovereignty to security but a correlation.

Therefore, the two norms become more or less indistinguishable in the case of nuclear/atomic behaviour.

Through the fourth lecture, Foucault initiates a theoretical discussion on two neoliberal traditions: The German ordoliberalism of the Friedberg School from the 1920s and the American anarcho-liberalism of the Chicago School. In both cases, liberalism emerged as a critique of technology of government based on the principle that it is in already in itself too much, too excessive. German ordoliberalism invites state intervention in the market, in society, through legal measures to create conditions of competition as though competition is not a natural phenomenon in the market and therefore needs intervention to initiate viability. This was 'state socialism'. This characteristic feature of ordoliberalism points to that fact that the state and the market are no longer distinct domains. He explains this through citing the case of Nazism in Germany by asserting that in Nazi Germany, the lack of capitalism that led to lack of competition and the market. Foucault says,

'Working on the fundamental themes of the liberal technology of government, ordoliberalism tried to define what a market economy could be, organized (but not planned or directed) within an institutional and legal framework, which, on the one hand, would offer the guarantees and limitations of the law, and, on the other, would ensure that the freedom of economic processes did not produce any social distortion' (Foucault 2008: 322-23).

This, according to Foucault, will lead to regulation and the growth of judicial power to supervise mounting competition. Foucault states that this is the deep-seated shift in the constitution of state and sovereignty but it ought not to be seen as an extension of the state power. To a certain extent, it echoes the delimitation of the state under neoliberalism. On the other hand, the American neoliberalism rebuffs the social intercession of the state and supports the extension of the rationality of the market on non-economic spheres too, for example, family and the birth-rate, penal policy etc. Formulating research in the field, Foucault says,

'What should now be studied, therefore, is the way in which the specific problems of life and population have been posed within a technology of government which, although far from always having been liberal, since the end of the eighteenth century has been constantly haunted by the question of liberalism' (Foucault 2008: 323-324).

In the last two lectures, Foucault links the study of biopolitics to liberal form of government by establishing classical economic figure of *homo oeconomicus*. He defines *homo oeconomicus* as ‘an entrepreneur of himself’, a free subject with capacity to earn and ability for calculative reasoning and to lead a happy, healthy life. This places an economic subject at the basis of politics. He contrasts this figure as the subject of interests with the traditional political subjects of rights arguing that these figures cannot be reconciled and the former radically delimits the reach of state sovereignty. Foucault says,

‘*Homo oeconomicus* is someone who can say to the juridical sovereign, to the sovereign possessor of rights and founder of positive law on the basis of the natural right of individuals: You must not. But he does not say: You must not, because I have rights and you must not touch them. This is what the man of right, *homo juridicus*, says to the sovereign: I have rights, I have entrusted some of them to you, the others you must not touch, or: I have entrusted you with my rights for a particular end. *Homo oeconomicus* does not say this. He also tells the sovereign: You must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that “you are powerless.” And why are you powerless, why can’t you? You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know’ (Foucault 2008: 282-83).

This economic man dilutes the role and limits the exercise of sovereign power to rule thereby making it lose power. Foucault argues that civil society is a modern political construct aimed at overcoming this threat creating a zone of mediation between the economic and political subjects. This is the zone of biopolitics. Civil Society provides a location for the management of economic men. A zone between governors and governed. Civil Society is defined as

‘An omnipresent government, a government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social’ (Foucault 2008: 296).

Civil Society, therefore, is the modern technology of ‘governmentality’. Modern nation-states present the cult of *Homo oeconomicus*, ‘a rational actor’, as a norm for self ‘contentedness’ and ‘accomplishment’. By becoming a ‘rational’, ‘interest-driven’ actor, *Homo oeconomicus* becomes governmentalizable whereby his conduct is actually engaged toward the reason of the state. We can link these notions of ‘contentedness’ and ‘accomplishment’ with the proliferation of life and we are aware of the rationale behind nuclearisation is to avert or eliminate danger and allow one’s life to proliferate.

Predicament of Biopower: Waging Peace through Eternal War

'Wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death [...] now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital'(Foucault 1975: 136-137).

This incessant negotiation between life and death, how sacrifice and martyrdom infuse life into the body politic, presents the predicament of biopolitics. This takes us the point of 'life affirmation' and why does life have to be affirmed?

With the logic of saving/safeguarding/affirming life of the populations, nation-states initiate weapons programme, deadlier the better, to take preventive or preemptive steps to avoid the likelihood of biological, chemical, or nuclear attack. 'Life' of the population is 'sacrosanct' to the state and is therefore, to be protected from internal and external enemies and the destruction that they are seen to be capable of causing. It works just as medical vaccination and policies are meant to protect from disease.

Foucault identifies the paradoxes of biopower where it reaches its limit. He talks of the atomic power which is not only about the sovereign power to kill but also the power to kill life itself. Therefore, in a way, it does not guarantee life and therefore contravenes the contract. This is the paradox that the nation-state can both create the bomb and use it by exercising the right of the sovereign power or it can guarantee life which is the biopower, its function since the nineteenth century. Which function does it subscribe to, is the dilemma. Although nation-states tend to guarantee life from an external adversary by acquiring nuclear weapons, is it also ready to bear fatalities if the adversary were to give the same rationale to its population against it? With more and more states thinking of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation, are we to believe that this is the re-emergence of the sovereign power and biopower is on the retreat? Foucault goes a little further than this to problematize this paradox. He says it is a biopower that is in excess of sovereign right. He writes,

‘this excess of biopower appears when it becomes technologically and politically possible for man not only to manage life but to make it proliferate, to create living matter, to build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive. This formidable extension of biopower, unlike what I was just saying about atomic power, will put it beyond all human sovereignty’ (Foucault 2003: 254).

While asserting that the power of the sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat while the disciplinary and regulatory is rapidly advancing, Foucault raises an array of questions: how will the power to kill and the function of murder operate in this technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its objective? How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings? How, under these conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but its own citizens to the risk of death? Given that this power’s objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower? (Foucault 2003: 254).

It is at this juncture, Foucault brings in the notion of State Racism which gets inscribed with the emergence of biopolitics. Biopolitics generates a division between those who should live and those who should die by ascertaining a correlation between the two forms with the logic that those who are exterminated rationalize with their death the life of those who continue to exist. Foucault states,

‘And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race’ (Foucault 2003: 256)

It is important to reiterate that biopower coexists with the sovereign power’s right to kill and therefore, in offense and defence, can use force or weapons of mass destruction to wage a war. Defining the two functions of State Racism, Foucault writes that it works in the way by creating the categories of what must live and what must die. This is achieved by creating a distinction among races of inferior and superior.

‘It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by power’ (Foucault 2003: 254-255).

For its second function, it deals with the proposition that in order to live, the other must die. This, according to Foucault, is not a military kind of relationship but a biological one. He writes,

‘The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I – as species rather than individual – can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate’ (Foucault 2003: 255).

This racism is important for the modern state to create a normalizing society and create, what we can call, *homo bellum* (humans for war). This will be explained in the next chapter to explain the permanence of war. Once the state functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous functions of the state. While Foucault mentions this in terms of within the state using the example of Nazi Germany and its exercise of racism on the Jews. We are extrapolating it to the global view of how nation-states create norms and then normalizing of population helps them to justify nuclearisation and establish desired modes of behaviour.

Elden writes in *Strategies for Waging Peace*,

‘Foucault’s work, and that of his collaborators, demonstrates that the formation of a knowledge and power of normalisation is a crucial part of the way in which society is defended and security attained. The struggles that characterise war are those of the politics of a society constituted through strategies of waging peace’ (Elden 2008: 39).

This summarizes the basic contention in acquiring the nuclear weapons by nation-states. With nuclearisation or denuclearisation/disarmament, life is at the heart of politics with the growing emphases on the management and monitoring of populations.

Construction of the 'Other'

Discursively produced 'Other' as a biological as well as a social threat to the bodypolitic defines the enemy that explains the arms race and the imperative to acquire nuclear weapons as dealing with biopolitical concerns for 'life' to be secured. In explaining the way race is observed as a discourse of a normalising power, Foucault writes,

'It will become the discourse of a battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage. At this point, we have all those biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, but also all those institutions within the social body which make the discourse of race struggle function as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing society' (Foucault 2003: 61).

States have often created the notion of the 'Other' whose actions are to be restrained or cut back and why the population needs caring, to be protected. During the Cold War years, the Soviet Union was seen as the 'other' characterized by the West as aggressive and expansionist. Keith Krause and Andrew Latham wrote,

'Doctrines such as containment, deterrence, limited war, and AirLand Battle were artefacts of this framing, serving as a backdrop against which SALT I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the MBFR/CFE negotiations took place. In other words, Western military doctrines and strategic policies (including NACD policies) were responses to a specific discourse of threat in which Western interests had to be secured against the specific types of military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its proxies' (Krause and Latham 1998: 36).

Coming to the post Cold-War period, the construction of the 'other' still exists and this time it emphasizes on the threats posed by Third world nations, 'rogue states' and non-state actors. While it is true that nuclear proliferation in the Third World/southern countries is alarming and it is important to prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation, the problem however is that contemporary arms control measures have been derived from the East-West experience. In this respect, the representation of 'aggressive' and 'irrational' Third World states as comprising the foremost cause of danger and insecurity in the international system is analogous to Cold War version of the nature of the Soviet threat.

These are the kind of discourses that are fed and normalised in the general public by nation-states where developing nuclear weapons are presented as defending and caring of life vis-à-

vis an antagonist. Judith Butler in her book *Precarious Life: Powers of Mourning* (2004) takes issue with a racialized view of the 'Other' in post 9/11 America. In the light of global violence and conflict, she raises very relevant questions: 'who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, what makes for a grievable life?' (Butler, 2004: 20). Nation-states are able to dehumanize the 'Other' to carry out with its racist project because of its differential allocation of grief. There is no recognition of the grief, vulnerability and mourning of the 'Other' in the national media. Butler explains this in the context of American intervention in Afghanistan and media's role in reporting the conflict. She says that media's role was reduced to acting in accordance with what was already set by the establishment. There is a pattern which is pursued where certain lives are deprived public mourning and their voices remain unheard and their images unseen (Butler 2004). This is the 'Other' that one may never know through an authentic representation but is 'familiarised' through one's state's representation for specific purposes to be achieved.

The construct of 'Other' also explains the continuous arms race between India and Pakistan and the discourse in North Korea and Iran with their own constructs of 'other'. This continuous construction of the 'other' establishes the 'national identity' and the dissimilarity with other races which are to be eliminated. Viewing enemies as biological dangers is crucial to Foucault's argument regarding racism and biopower because it explains the identification of external and internal threats to the population. Hence, 'in the system of biopower, death is not a victory over the political adversaries, but rather it is the elimination of the biological danger (and the strengthening of the species, race itself)' (Foucault 2003: 265). The construction of 'Other' in India's national imagery and Iran's national imagery will be explained in third chapter in detail.

Conclusion

What we have tried to do in this chapter is to lay out and get acquainted with the genealogy of the scholarship of biopolitics and its related themes, largely through the works and lectures of Michel Foucault. We have learned about the shift from 'territory' to the 'individual body' and gradually to the 'population' as the problem of the sovereign power. This shift is not in the form of succession in which the earlier form of power diminishes and leads to another but there is a relationship of the operation of power that govern a people. This was the transition of the 'right to kill and letting the subject live' to the 'biological right of letting live or abandoning it to death'. This was the overview of how the modern nation-state has acquired

the power over the life of its populations through an art of governance in the form of regulation.

In explaining the paradoxes of biopower, we understood how biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics in the discussion around nuclearisation. In the name of affirming life of its population, from internal or external enemies, nation-states create a discourse around it to form a normalised society. However, this becomes the limit of biopolitics where killing is justified in the name of life-preservation. This is where states engender a racist project in defining the 'Other' and de-humanizing it. In the project of creating binaries and dichotomies, the modern nation-state through its politics of racism establishes a connection between 'my life and the death of others'. The 'Other' here is inferior, abnormal and aggressor and therefore has to be eliminated or deterred to make one's own life 'healthier, more pure'. By highlighting the predicament of biopower in the form of acquiring deadly nuclear assets, we have tried to extrapolate the scholarship to the discipline of International Relations. The scholarship on biopower opens up different questions about research in international relations and analysis of peace and war, particularly the nuclear domain which is can be seen as a pendulum oscillating between life and death. Before we turn to the specific case studies of India and Iran, we will attempt to explore the possibility of inserting the scholarship of biopolitics in International Relations by visiting the dominant perspectives and new scholarship describing the discipline and then offering the logic of bodypolitic as the new referent object of analysis.

Chapter Two

Normalising War: The Permanence of *Homo Bellum*

Introduction

Many of the features of international relations that are theorized through the discipline have existed much before the inception of International Relations as a field of study. Like all branches of political science, the study of International Relations began with political philosophy involving the thoughts and actions of human beings and classical political philosophers such as Thucydides, Aristotle, Augustine, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Kant have had a great influence in the study of international relations. The concepts of sovereignty, power, self-interest, war and peace have been theorized through the work of these philosophers. However, there is a drawback that the engagement with political theory may be too irregular or too confined to a few thinkers in order to produce the most successful results. It is argued these dominant concepts that are taught in International Relations are historically specific, contextual and privileges a narrow conception of reality that reinforces the interests of the powerful. They reinforce particular patterns, encourage their recurring and giving them a sense of legitimate authority. It is also argued that in the pursuit of painting a particular representation, International Relations has paid insufficient attention to a range of philosophically fascinating and exceedingly eminent concepts that can make valuable contributions to the discipline. These concepts can allow us to critically assess the interpretation and use of the classical thinkers within International Relations theory as it is conventionally understood. This tendency points towards a relationship of convenience, between political theory and International Relations, under which pressing questions are neglected by uncritically accepting the conception of the 'state of nature'. This chapter suggests that no constructive advancement can be made in the discipline of International Relations unless the relationship of convenience with the Political Theory transforms to a symbiotic relationship through a continuous engagement. This engagement will encourage practitioners/theoreticians to reflect upon and assess the relevance of particular thinkers to the understanding of international issues today.

The first half of the chapter begins with an overview of the discipline of International Relations and how it has come into being with particular theoretical traditions being privileged over others. Since the major thrust of this research project is on biopower, liberal

art of government, an attempt is made to decode the 'liberal way of war' through the application of the biopolitical scholarship as understood in the previous chapters. An attempt is also made to insert the biopolitical understanding of the 'liberal way' into the discipline of International Relations. This is done through a discussion of the work by Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live* (2009), and extrapolating it to the nuclear domain. This critical analysis of the liberal politics brings out its pretentious appearance of pacifism, liberty and peace. Everyday life within is instead rationalised within a virtual 'universal' knowledge system, which is actually biased towards specific, normally western, localities (Sylvester, 2001). This is followed by a discussion of the norm, normation and normalisation techniques nation-states pursue to 'manufacture consent' and create, what we call, *homo bellum*, i.e. humans for war. To embed this idea, an analysis through the case study of India and Iran will be pursued in the next chapter.

Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes and the Rise of the Realist School

Thucydides explored the role of ethics in international politics through his book on the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' explanation for the Peloponnesian War alludes to support the realist hypothesis that war arises when power begins to shift. Thucydides believed that the war between Athens and Sparta was unavoidable and was fought to maintain 'balance of power', concept that has been at the core of the realist philosophy. The burgeoning Athenian power instilled fear in Spartans who saw it as a threat to them and their alliance. Sparta was therefore compelled to break the treaty of peace and fought a war against Athens. Thucydides mentions in his book that the Spartans felt extremely guilty on moral considerations for breaking the treaty and waging a war. Athenians argue in favour of its imperialism that it is natural for any state to expand its power for honour and self-interest and their actions were therefore justified. Thucydides makes clear in his analysis of early Greek history that fear, honour, and advantage (the three qualities that the Athenians refer to) are fundamental forces that drive international affairs (Thucydides 1951).

Steven Forde writes, 'The fact that imperialism may stem from human impulses more generous than mere self-interest or lust for power complicates the moral issue in the famous expression of Thucydides realism, the Melian Dialogue' (Forde 1993: 71). The Melian debate points to the fact that power attracts ultimate authority in international politics 'the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.' This is precisely the crux of *realpolitik*.

Turning to Machiavelli, who is considered to be a great theorist of realpolitik, rejected the values of Renaissance that dominated during the medieval period as extraneous and defective for a ruler to rule. For Machiavelli, the international system is characterized by conflict and anarchy. The states and statesmen will continue to pursue their self-interest because it is what is expected and desired. He argues that in pursuing national interest, it is important for states and rulers not to adhere to any moral obligation (Machiavelli 1950). Like Thucydides, Machiavelli also backs imperialism without any limits. Machiavelli's work pointed to the new emerging world which is stable and unified different from chaotic, corrupt and violent political order of Renaissance Italy. 'Machiavelli's claim that 'how we live... is far removed from how we ought to live' was never more true than during the Renaissance, so he was forced to look at politics without illusions' (Nelson 2009: 140). The moral and religious explanation of events was a point of departure for Machiavelli and he sought to explain event as they really were.

In his book, *The Prince*, written in 1513, Machiavelli defines the features of international realism celebrating the Roman policy of imperialism. His justification is similar to that cited by Athenian Thucydides that states (here Italy) are compelled to preclude threats to their security. The states that he refers to in the book are Florence, Milan, Genoa etc in Italy and the rulers of these city states were pursuing an expansionist policy attacking and controlling other neighbouring territories. The following excerpt gives the crux of the book and sums up the standard realist argument in Machiavelli's work:

'But since my intention is to say something that will prove of practical use to the listener, I have thought it proper to represent things as they are in real truth, rather than as they are imagined. Many have dreamed up republics which have never in truth been known to exist; the gulf between how one should live and how one does live is so wide that a man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done learns the way to *self-destruction* rather than *self-preservation*. The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore, if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or not according to need' (Machiavelli 1988: 90-91).

This interplay of self-destruction and self-preservation is the idea that this research attempts to explore later in the chapter and in subsequent chapters. Since states are doomed to be in conflict with each other, Machiavelli writes that they often have two choices, either to initiate

an attack or wait for the opponent to attack. The position clearly points to the justification for a pre-emptive attack and waging a war against an adversary before it poses a threat. Another stance that is reminiscent of Thucydides' realism is the emphasis Machiavelli places on power for survival and the only goal states pursue so that they acquire most of it.

Placing a strong critique for those who advocate moral restraint, Machiavelli posits that believing in the moral abiding system corresponds to international order is a ridiculous situation as the natural order actually punishes those attempt to play by morals and not by rules of the international system (Machiavelli 1950). His philosophy is based on necessity outweighing morality- it is necessary to pursue self-interest because laws of political action compel one to do so. He extends his morality argument to the importance of international treaties and agreements. For Machiavelli, these treaties are ethics oriented and moral binding. These are actually a game of power. Allegiance to them is neither feasible nor desirable and should therefore be avoided because they against one's self-interest (Machiavelli 1950).

In Chapter XIII of *Leviathan*, Hobbes defines his 'state of nature' which is a state of war among individuals. He states that human beings are essentially selfish, brutish and nasty by nature which can be translated to the behaviour of states with each other (Nelson 2009). It is this pessimism in Hobbes' state of nature that defines the realist school of thought in international relations defined by the concepts of anarchy, self-interest, survival and perpetual conflict between states. Hobbes also defines the distinction between the domestic and international spheres characterized by hierarchy and anarchy respectively. The domestic sphere is organized through a social contract which stems from the need to end the violence and instability of the state of nature but the international system does not permit the restraint of a superior power over the states and therefore this leads to a state of war of all against all. Both the domestic and international aspects of Hobbes' political theory are steeped in the powerful emotion of fear (Nelson 2009).

The assumptions of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes have inspired the realist thought significantly. Hans Morgenthau's work in 1948 shaped the origin for the realist tradition and in 1979 Kenneth Waltz reformulated realism by concentrating on the nature of the system-level structure, Waltz avoided the need to make assumptions about human nature, morality, power and interest. Morgenthau's classical realism characteristically begins from a pessimistic notion of human nature. The premise of classical realism is its belief in the

primacy of self-interest over moral principle. It posits that pursuing national interest is the supreme duty of a ruler in all circumstances. In the general understanding of realism, it gives primacy to the centrality of nation-state in the international system (Morgenthau 1985). However, Thucydides and Machiavelli give as much importance to individuals as to the states. It is the facets of human nature that correspond to the reality of power politics. Classical Realism puts an emphasis on the self-interested and unchanging human nature that matches up to the state behaviour as power seeking, self-interested rational actor. For them, power is supposed to be both a means and an end and a state aspires to acquire most power. As Steven Forde puts it, 'No power prevents a resort to arms that whenever states find it advantageous and no power protects the victims of aggression except the victims themselves' (Forde 1993: 63). All strands of realism, believe in the anarchic and self-help nature of international system. To sum, the prominent concepts of classical realism are its emphasis on power, state and national interest.

Neorealism, the dominant theory of International Relations and theorized by Kenneth Waltz, focuses on material realities such as military and economic capabilities in trying to explain state behaviour and their foreign policy decisions. All states desire for power and security in an anarchic international system and this interest of states is *a-priori*. This self-regarding desire of state for power and security is presented as 'national interest' by the modern state (Waltz 1979). Through a particular view of human nature theorists tend to explain the likely behaviour of states parsimoniously. It is argued that the realist view tends to simplify state behaviour for its obsession to explain a coherent reality and methodological clarity which however is biased in favour of a particular view of reality. Measuring foreign policy solely through a cost-benefit analysis does not offer credible investigation of state behaviour and any understanding must involve the cognitive maps and emotions that drive decision makers.

Liberalism

Seeing the fall of the Soviet Union after the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama declared liberalism to be the cornerstone of an ideal state, celebrating liberal capitalism as an ideal form of political economy. A lot of his claims emerge from an imperialist epistemology. He believed that liberal democracies have gone beyond on their violent character and are more than willing to engender peaceful relations through norms and institutions (Fukuyama 1989). Scott Burchill writes,

‘For Liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs in Kant’s words, peace can be perpetual. The laws of nature dictated harmony and cooperation between peoples. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human nature. Liberals have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the human condition. Through their faith in the power of human reason and the capacity of human beings to realize their inner potential, they remain confident that the stain of war can be removed from human experience’ (Burchill 2005: 58).

In suggesting that biopower is the liberal form of governance, Foucault, pulling the carpet under the feet of those who celebrate liberal ideas of equality, free speech and civil liberty, private property and representative government, has stated how states tend to behave illiberally, under the guise, through its apparatuses of security.

Democratic peace theory is perhaps the most influential liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace. Immanuel Kant is more often than not cited as the first significant voice putting forward a philosophical explanation for the democratic peace in his essay *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795). Immanuel Kant hypothesized that a republican form of government, representing the rule of law, offers a rational basis for states to surmount structural anarchy and to achieve peaceful relations among themselves (Kant 1970). Early twentieth-century writers/leaders like Woodrow Wilson and Nicolas Murray Butler sophisticated the arguments of democratic peace in their writings, and ‘to a lesser extent in practice’ (Gartzke 2007). Critics of democratic peace have always been directed towards puncturing the empirical/observed implication of this observation. Etel Solingen in her book *Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (1998) argues that democracy is not an obligatory and sufficient condition for peace and writes that there is enough evidence suggesting that in certain regions democratic dyads have faced each other and have attained less cooperation than might be expected (Solinigen 1998). For Solingen, not -democracy but preferences for economic liberalization foster regional cooperation abroad. Indeed, the bulk of her empirical evidence suggests that regime-type affinity and discord is essentially irrelevant for understanding why and when regional peace emerges. Before we move further to the next section, there is a definition on liberal democracy that John M.Owen has offered in *How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace* (1994), that we must consider. He writes,

‘I define a liberal democracy as a state that instantiates liberal ideas, on where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions.

That is, liberal democracies are those states with a visible liberal presence, and that feature free speech and regular competitive elections of the officials empowered to declare war. I argue that liberal ideology and institutions work in tandem to bring about democratic peace. Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are fundamentally the same and are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being... Thus all individuals share an interest in peace, and should want war as an instrument to bring about peace' (Owen 1994:89).

This point does give an indication that war continues to be a necessity in liberalism just as we had noted in realism. In his book *War and the Liberal Conscience* (1978), Michael Howard attempts to explore the question of why do liberal states fight wars? As established in the previous chapter that a state's acquisition of nuclear weapons is seen as preserving 'life' of its population against an adversary, however, it is a step that also leads to putting one's population at risk. What explains this disregard for 'life' in the liberal discourse? This is the point that this research attempts to unwind and enquires if liberalism, biopower, is about preserving life, then why is war or preparation of war inevitable? Why is it inevitable in liberalism just as it is considered to be *a given* in the realist school of thought? Howard writes that mass industrialized societies generate malcontentment in the people so that they are easily dragged to libertarian or populist and militarist or warmongering movements and ethics. They cry for war, not (only) because of it. (Howard 1978) Michael Dillon refers to Howard's 'melancholy story' written in his epigraph,

'Not only has war remained uncommon. Not only has it also become unimaginably more destructive. Waged in pursuit of liberal democracy and perpetual peace, the life of the species globally is now wagered on its political strategies... the efforts of good men to abolish war only succeeding thereby in making it more terrible' (Dillon and Reid 2009: 2).

This is the logic of capitalism. As established in the previous chapter also about the construction of the 'other', Howard targets this sort of construction as liberal universalisation of war in pursuit of perpetual peace which impacted on the heterogeneous and adversarial character of international politics, translating wars into crusades. Howard indicts liberalism itself for its own commitment to war making (Howard 1978). In the section about the 'liberal way of war', our endeavour will be to uncover, unmask, and unwind illiberal tendencies in liberalism of making war to make peace.

The Critical Turn

With the end of Cold War and concepts like nationalism, ideological extremism, honour and dignity began to appear in international relations, it became apparent that the notions of fear and interests were no longer relied upon to understand state behaviour by academics. They posited that fear and hatred were not the only emotions that play an important role in world politics.

Rebuffing the rationalist principles of neorealism, constructivists press forward a sociological perspective of international relations, accentuating the significance of normative (not discarding the material) structures, the character of identity in the formation of interests and action, and the shared organization of agents and structures. All states are unique and have a set of defining political, social, economic or religious characteristics that influence their foreign policies. Constructivists recognise that emotions have a history and that this history is essential to know how collective identities, including those of state, are constituted. Constructivists explain the constructed and constitutive role of beliefs and emotions rejecting the material focus offered by the realist paradigm. Actors' attitudes towards each other are influenced by historically formed opinions and norms that give its followers a sense of identity, and a worldview. For constructivists, the study of international relations must focus on the ideas and beliefs formed through the inter-subjective understanding between actors. Therefore, the international system is formed through shared understanding constituted by ideas and norms which change over time leading to the change in structure as well. A lot of emphasis is given to the agent in shaping and transforming structure by thinking in new ways. Constructivism does not provide substantive explanations or predictions of political behaviour until coupled with a more specific understanding of who the relevant actors are, what they want, and what the content of social structures might be.

As argued earlier in the essay that advances in the field of International Relations can only come through if there is a continuous engagement with other branches of social sciences. Constructivism borrows a great deal from philosophy and sociology. This allows constructivism to construct a dynamic view of the international system and flexible anarchy. When making policies, actors rely on 'background knowledge' in order to interpret and predict a state's behaviour. There is a social construction of reality which is not biased in favour a particular kind of reality. The social world is not something which is independent of thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it. An increasing number of constructivist

International Relations scholars have investigated the formation of collective identities in order to explain the configuration of national interests and the development of foreign policy positions. Alexander Wendt (1992) has argued that self-esteem including the need for honour, glory, achievement and recognition is part of human nature and that collective self-esteem is universal national interest. While giving the biopolitical understanding, we will attempt to assert how states create a kind of racism on the principles of this self-esteem to mobilize support and obedience.

The positivist approach of realism to international politics was also abandoned by critical theorists who have held the view that 'theories are for someone and for some purpose' (Cox 1981). Critical theory questions and challenges the immutable thesis, put forward by realists, of the world around us, and, in particular, of what we are able to perceive through our senses and understand through the application of our powers of reason. They have emphasized on the connection between social phenomenon, the lives of individuals, historical processes and theories. The purpose of critical theory, particularly of the Frankfurt School, is 'to comprehend the central features of contemporary society by understanding its historical and social development and tracing contradictions in the present which may open up the possibility of transcending contemporary society and its built-in pathologies and forms of domination' (Devetak 2005). They reject the attempts of positivist methodologies to attain so-called objective truth about the state behaviour arguing for plural approaches for knowledge generation and interpretative strategies. Critical theory is always particularly concerned with probing into the troubles and limitations of the socialization process that enables human beings to relate with each other

Rejecting superficial assumptions/positions offered by rational choice theories, Feminist International Relations theory takes a post-positivist stand in its criticism. It rejects the masculine constructions of strength, power, rationality that are often associated with state behaviour and national interest. The masculine constructs are privileged in International Relations and through the process of socialization the behavioural concepts that grow out of men's experiences are considered to be the gospel's truth in the study of international affairs and state behaviour. The feminist constructs of care, emotion, alliances are seen through the prism of weakness and therefore are considered as irrational. While realist paradigm creates the dichotomy between feminine and masculine sociological categories such as public versus private, objective versus subjective, self versus other, reason versus emotion, autonomy

versus relatedness, and culture versus nature, it also privileges one over the other. Ann Tickner (1988) has argued, in contesting Morgenthau's portrayal of the international system that his assumptions about human nature are based on partial descriptions and that they privilege masculinity. Feminists look at the ways in which this selection of 'non-rational' and emotional factors is central to international relations.

Liberal Way of Peace through War

After having understood the war-mongering nature of realism and a supposedly 'benign' nature of liberalism, we will attempt to highlight the views on the issues related to nuclear proliferation. This will allow us to discuss the 'martial' face of liberalism which will make the distinction of malignant-benign nature of realism-liberalism fuzzy and overlapping.

After the end of the Second World War and since the beginning of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have played a crucial role in the international politics, determining state behaviour and relations between them. Since then a sub-discipline of security studies has acquired significance in the discipline of International Relations to address the problems of nuclear weapons, proliferation and technology. In a path-breaking article, *Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of Bomb* (1997), Scott D Sagan highlights three hypotheses to explain why nation-states seek nuclear weapons: the security model, norms model and domestic politics model. Sagan emphasizes on multicausality as nuclear proliferation and restraint occur for more than simply one reason and it is not in the interest of methodological rigour to emphasize on just the security model in explaining the phenomenon (Sagan 1997). Joseph Cirincione in his book, *The Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (2007), acknowledges this position but questions the utility of such an exercise as it creates difficulty in developing and sustaining a consistent and effective non-proliferation policy. He believes that it is important to get all the analyses to start from the 'same' page for an 'objective' assessment of proliferation drivers. He adds two more models, to Sagan's three models, technology, and economics.

In the light of offering alternative explanations, another article that explains nuclear reversal is *The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint* by Etel Solingen (1994). Her argument in the article is that liberalizing coalitions tend to oppose nuclear weapons because of the incentives of not acquiring nuclear weapons that favours trade, technology and investment. Cirincione extends Solingen's arguments and brings in the aspect of environmental costs. Developing a

nuclear weapon is expensive but costs required in environmental cleanup related to nuclear weapons programme are huge as well (Cirincione 2007). Solingen also says that the countries sitting on the fence between non-proliferation and developing nuclear weapons, liberalizing countries are likely to give-up developing capability but not the inward looking and nationalist states (Solingen 1994). Sagan (1997) explains this in the case of South Africa and perhaps this can explain India's case but only partly. At the peak of economic liberalization, India did call off the detonation of its nuclear devices in 1995. However, it did not give up developing the capability further and finally conducted the tests in 1998. Thereafter, India has maintained a steady economic rate of growth. President Ahmadinejad's spiritual mentor Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi wrote in his book, *The Islamic Revolution: Surges in Political Changes in History* (2005), that economic crunch in lieu of increasing costs of the nuclear programme should not deter Iran from exercising its right to manufacture the weapon. The epitome of liberal democracy, the United States of America, too does not rule out the utility of nuclear weapons. In the Nuclear Posture Review 2010, the United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and Iran if they do not comply with the 'norms' of the Non-Proliferation Regime. The Nuclear Posture Review 2010 states, 'the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations' (NPR 2010). Does the liberal promise of 'perpetual peace' and stability have a 'martial' face, a war mongering capacity? Does it fall prey to the notion of 'perpetual war' celebrated by the realist school of thought? Stephen Walt writes,

'No matter what the U.S. government says about its nuclear strategy, no potential adversary can confidently assume that the U.S. would stick to its declared policy in the event of a crisis or war. If you were a world leader thinking about launching a major conventional attack on an important U.S. ally or interest, or contemplating the use of chemical or biological weapons in a situation where the United States was involved, would *you* conclude that it was safe to do so simply because Barack Obama said back in 2010 that the U.S. wasn't going to use nuclear weapons in that situation? Of course you wouldn't, because there is absolutely nothing to stop the United States from changing its mind' (Walt 2010).

Hitherto, we have explored how the discipline of International Relations has been shaped by the various competing perspectives on state behaviour and that war remains a privileged concept. In what follows from now is a biopolitical understanding of war.

'It is always profitable to recall that the ways in which states prepare and organise themselves for war, and the ways in which their societies problematise security, directly reflect the forms of life that they enact. While the advent of global liberal governance is consequently associated with claims concerning the establishment and extension of liberal peace, it is frequently overlooked that the biopolitics of global liberal governance has a martial face. If there is a changing and evolving liberal way of peace there is certainly also a changing and evolving liberal way of war' (Dillon and Reid 2001: 44).

This is precisely what captures the heart of argument of what 'liberal way of war' is. There is a slyness attached to liberal way of rule and war as well. In this practice of deceit, the militaristic or war-mongering face is covered with a benevolent mask of establishment of liberal peace. This is how modern nation-states tend to 'prepare for war' as a 'necessity of life'. Commitment to war is perpetual and is presented for the pursuit of justice/peace. Liberal peace, therefore, becomes the continuation of war by other means (Dillon and Reid 2009: iv). It is important that we elucidate what exactly is meant by 'liberal way of war'. It is to be noted that this is not really about the notion of just war or humanitarian intervention carried out outside of one's own territory to respond to the 'cries of the aggrieved'. However, we will make a quick reference to the notion of 'just war' to explain the difference that we are attempting to make. Daniel Ross writes in *Violent Democracy* (2004),

'Even on its own terms, democracy has reserved the right to resort to violent action and claimed a monopoly on the "legitimate" use of violent means. The legitimacy of this monopoly has always been dependent upon the assertion of just ends. Violent means were always relative to and justified on the grounds of democratic *ends*, even when democracy perpetrated deadly violence' (Ross 2004: 1).

It must be noted that these 'wars' use the language of 'just war' to support and rationalize an intervention by harping on the notion of justice and 'ethic of responsibility' and by extending it to the realm of statecraft, it forsakes the exercise of power. By invoking such notions, it inadvertently (or perhaps deliberately) leads to privileging of order over justice. Jean Elshtain argues in *Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American Power In a Violent World* (2003) that notion of justice in the post 9/11 environment gives the impression to involve not only the argument to use violence in defence but to act in response to the 'cries of the aggrieved' thereby making the world a better place despite being tragic (Elshtain 2003). Responding to her work, Maja Zahfuss writes in *The Tragedy of Violent Justice: The Danger of Elshtain's War Against Terror* that it is precisely this tragedy that Elshtain fails to think through and inadvertently promotes violent imperialism (Zahfuss 2007). Elshtain uses the

principles of St. Augustine to justify interventions but ignores, as Cian O'Driscoll argued in *JB Elshtain's Just War Against Terror: A Tale of Two Cities*, the skepticism St. Augustine had about people in positions of power. That skepticism is not incorporated by Elshtain. Driscoll, therefore, calls for 'hermeneutics of suspicion', a term she borrows from social ethicists because she feels that although Elshtain's reinterpretation of the just war tradition is innovative but not a faithful one in the context of war on terror (Driscoll 2007).

For a biopolitical understanding, here 'liberal way of war', as different from 'war' in general, means, as Michael Dillon and Julian Reid have defined in their book *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live* (2009),

'The liberal way of war, therefore, derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics- biopolitics- as it pursues the project of removing war from the life of (bio)humanity. For these reasons we can say that just as the liberal way of rule is a biopolitical project, in as much as it revolves around the properties of species existence, so also the liberal way of war is biopolitical in as much as it, too, revolves around the properties of species existence. Similarly, also, these share the same ultimate objective or horizon of concern: the promotion of species existence, most notably by seeking to further promote the project of 'making life live', by removing war from the life of (bio)humanity' (Dillon and Reid 2009: 84).

This is to say and uncover how the benign notions of liberalism tend to possess a martial face. This is what Dillon and Reid are trying to do by offering a biopolitical understanding of the 'liberal way of war'. To explain this in detail, the authors offer three points to register the significance of their argument. First, they say that liberal way of war is not a static policy or act but it evolves and changes with different contexts just as the liberal way of rule. Although to consider a particular liberal way of rule or war will be a folly but one consistent feature with both is their claim to be devoted towards the promotion of species life. Furthermore, they suggest that there may be other ways of allowing life to live besides those restricted to the preoccupation of upholding species life. Second, extending the first point, they assert that there are other forms of war and liberal states may also act as geopolitical actors. Therefore to put liberal wars in a different and isolated category will be a mistake because on circumstances they may also be geopolitical. They say that wars can at the same time be driven by both geopolitics and biopolitics since the *raison d'état* behind war are multifaceted and beyond a naive and one-dimensional foundation. However, what discerns liberal way of war as liberal is the biopolitical quintessence which has always steered its brutal and violent

peacekeeping. Third, and most important for this project, is the element of 'contingency' which, according to them, has had an intense impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in modern times stressing on the magnitude of security and its related notions of 'dangers, threats and enemies'. This is what points to the martial expression of the biopolitical imperative which is the preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. They write that the liberal way of rule and war has thus imbibed a sense of vigilance to make war on whatsoever terrorizes or threatens life's facility to survive the 'emergency of its emergence' (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 84,85). Acquiring nuclear weapons add that value of contingency, of an unforeseen disaster, to liberal rule and nation-states exaggerate threat and danger to a hyperbolic degree to validate or rationalize acquirement of weapons of mass destruction as the preparedness to make war or to dissuade the adversary to make war against one's population.

The authors paint liberals and realists (geostrategists) in the same picture by making the point that war has been a necessity for both. Therefore, 'waging peace' or 'peace dividend' argument of the liberals is unmasked to show its violent face. The authors question the validity of the many wars liberal states have fought, the many interventions they have ventured and wonder what sort of objects drove those wars and in whose defence, on what concerns and in particular on what perception of humanity (Dillon and Reid 2009). As understood through the study of biopolitics that the development of biopower mobilises/normalises population to wage war in the name of life necessity. Therefore, acquiring nuclear weapons, nation-states tend to offer the deterrence argument thereby initiating an arms race. However, while harping on the notions of life necessity, there is notion of threat to life that is attached to this arms race. The population whose life the state wishes to protect is what is at stake in this entire politics. Dillon and Reid write,

'However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been instrumental to liberals as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedom it proclaims' (Dillon and Reid 2009: 7).

The attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction and acquiring them eventually has done much to discredit the universal claims of liberal peace in political terms. This indicates that

claims of emancipation, salvation, care that the modern state claims to achieve are a sham and have a bellicose face. The authors say, emphatically,

‘Via its proliferating mechanism of security and its continuous military preparedness as well as through the wars it is also currently engaged, the liberal way of rule is a war making peace machine whose continuous of war preparation prior to the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal way of life ’ (Dillon and Reid 2009: 9)

Is this to say that that the state is a killing-machine? It not only kills the adversary but offers its nation-as race to be killed by an adversary by initiating an arms race. So, to restructure the question, Does the state sponsor machines meant for killing, not just the adversary but the population whose life it pledges to affirm? The argument about ‘a war-making peace machine’ makes the benign face of liberalism topsy-turvy. The logic behind acquiring weapons of mass destruction is that it leads to better governance where risks are apparently mitigated. They are acquired so that the enemy state does not attack. Nuclear weapons have the potential to smear out life but the reason given is to guarantee ‘life’. This is how biopower legitimizes ‘killing’. Mitchel Dean writes, while quoting Foucault,

‘The idea of the population as a kind of ‘species body’ subject to bio-political knowledge and power operating in concert with the individual body subject to disciplinary powers would appear central. No matter how bloody things were under the exercise of sovereign power with its atrocious crimes and retributions, it is only with the advent of this modern form of the politics of life that the same logic and technology applied to the care and development of human life is applied to the destruction of entire populations. The link between social welfare and mass slaughters can at times appear to be a fairly direct one’ (Dean 2004: 19).

By making the population of the enemy nation-state as the target for its logic of acquiring the deadly weapons, nations-states provoke their counterpart to follow suit and therefore put their own population at risk. Foucault calls it ‘thanatopolitics’ which is the reverse side of biopolitics. This gives the state the power to impose death on the population of its enemy and its own population and yet is successful in mobilizing consent for the ‘indiscriminate’ slaughter.

Dillon and Reid (2009) signify that with the aim of promoting species of human life, the human is reduced to the ‘bio-human’ by reducing the subject of rights to the object of regulatory rule. Reviewing the work of Dillon and Reid, Chandler writes,

'for Dillon and Reid, governing interventions, including the waging of war, have become biopoliticised, constructing all behaviour in 'complex adaptive emergent terms, common to [...] network centred doctrines, which has enabled the intensification of 'liberal' contradictions where war is waged to secure life, understood as a greater range of threats from the complexities of global existence' (Chandler 2010: 288).

Homo bellum for Mobilisation of War

Biopower's control revolves around two poles of 'life' with 'body' as one pole and 'population' as the other. The former involves its disciplining, optimising of its capabilities and the extortion of its forces. This is the anatomo-politics of the human body. Here the individual bodies are treated as machines through the systems of control to yield maximum productivity and utility. For example, when a doctor operates on a patient, the doctor is a mechanic and the body of the patient acts as a machine. The second pole involves propagation, birth and mortality and other regulatory mechanisms. Here species as a whole is the centre of attention. Therefore, Foucault identifies two basic forms of normalisation- the discipline and regulation. The normalisation process is related to the disciplining of the body so as to be able to regulate the behaviour of populations. Avital Shein quotes Foucault from his lecture series,

'In a more general mode, it can be said that the element that circulates from the disciplinary to the regulatory, that is applied to the body and the population, and that allows the control of disciplinary order in the body and the random actions of a multiplicity, is the *norm*. The norm is what can be applied to both the body that desires discipline, as well as to the population that desires regularization.' (Shein 2004, 15)

In discipline, the distinction between the 'normal' and 'abnormal' comes into being after the creation and as an effect of *a/the norm*. Foucault calls it 'normation' as against 'normalisation'. For regulatory mechanisms and form of normalisation, it takes place through statistics and classification methods that create a normal distribution, a normal curve. Here the category of normal and abnormal is formed first which leads to the creation of *a/the norm*. These norms are created through the so-called 'discourse ethics' in a liberal art of government. These discourses create 'truth' as though there was only one truth. This so-called 'valid truth' is in fact a creation of power-knowledge interface.

Foucault explains this process of normalisation and creation of binaries of normal-abnormal through madness, criminality and sexuality. There is a shift from the domain of law to the normative one, yet both work in tandem. As established in the first chapter, Foucault states, 'the normalizing society is a society in which the norm of discipline and the norm of regulation intersect along an orthogonal articulation' (Foucault 2003: 253). The purpose of normalisation is to produce docile individuals ready of utilization by the nation-state. The state achieves this through institutions (hospitals, schools, prisons) with the purpose to regulate and normalize and create beliefs of normal-abnormal, acceptable-unacceptable, and sane-insane. Biopower directs the behaviour of individuals subtly towards a determined norm. Power operates in the society to constitute/re-constitute, produce/re-produce processes of normalisation. Acquiring nuclear assets to 'avoid war' is the idea or the norm that comes to be seen as 'normal' and 'natural'. This is a norm that population is expected to conform.

Foucault's concept of normalisation is important to understand how nation-states have justified their actions/desires, to go nuclear, to its population. The imperative of arms production becomes a norm and the nation-state claims to act on behalf of the population, nation as a race, for its obsession to act cohesively. From this security perspective resonating from the realist/neo-realist reasoning, states have projected an enemy (real or imagined) through the construct of the 'other', the 'adversary', the 'impure race'. Therefore to preserve the life and survival of its population, nation-states create a discourse/norm on the imperative of acquiring nuclear weapons for security. This, as we have established in the first chapter while explaining the predicament of biopower, is a flawed understanding of the nuclear threat.

From the point of view of norms too, a discourse is nourished in the population that acquiring nuclear weapons will bring prestige to the nation state, to the life of the society, which will lead to the creation of the 'pure race' identifying with modernity and superior identity. Scott Sagan writes that the decision to acquire or forfeit nuclear assets

'serve important symbolic functions, both shaping and reflecting a state's identity. At times, state behaviour is determined not by leaders' cold calculations about the national security interests or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations' (Sagan 1997: 37).

Preserving the life has to do with supremacy/prestige, a norm to achieve the status of great power. Nation-states create a different kind of racism with this norm of enhancing a state's status in comparison to other states in international relations. It also grounds itself on the notion of distinct and superior history and yet wants to maintain status quo for eternity. Therefore, nation states attach values to these weapons as the ultimate weapons, unparalleled to any other weapon, and from these values, Sagan says,

‘organizations and their weapons can therefore be envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams; they are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern states’ (Sagan 1997: 74).

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty too acts as a norm in international politics and anyone deviating from the norm of non-proliferation is considered to be the ‘abnormal’, yet states have and still do engage in proliferation.

This entire process of normalisation leads to the formation of, what we can call, *homo-bellum*, i.e. humans for war. *Homo bellum* thrives on the Hobbesian notion of state of nature where human beings are extended as nation-states. War (*bellum*) becomes the essence of the human as if it were the necessary condition of existence. There is a certain kind of thrill that is attached to this existence and this is what is aspired and needs to be achieved. This is the norm that the population has to conform and it defines what ‘normal’ is. These humans for war, *Homo bellum*, normalised through the norm creation of nation-states (racism) by acquiring deadly weapons, find death acceptable because and if it allows one to live. Quoting from Foucault’s lectures, Avital Shein writes that this

‘acceptance would not be possible if racism did not claim to secure the health of the population. It is only because of the biologization of the state, that is, the shift from a concern with political enemies to a concern with “the elimination of biological danger,” that racism can work as a tool to kill’ (Shein 2004: 13).

Population is normalised to believe that the nuclear assets will deter the inferior, the abnormal, the insane and the bad race, here the external adversary. This is how human beings, species, are offered/extended as nation-states and the legitimacy of the nation-state is established.

The norm that was created for acquiring nuclear weapons works after the normal has been defined. Given that acquiring weapons will bring prestige and purity to the social body, the race (population) aspires to achieve it and as the nation-state acquires these weapons, the population is made to think that they have become purer and the enemy (here external) has been pushed down on the racial magnitude. This is how *homo bellum* is created through the technology of power by the nation-state. The necessity which connects war is in the form of the matter of human existence. It also serves as a symptom, in other words the key to mystical logic of state sovereignty and national interest. This is a temporary classification but is in practice all the time. It needs activation for the 'sake' of 'national security' as a status during moments of crises of the nation state and its national interest. These notions of 'national security', 'sovereignty' are tied to the physical welfare of the populations. These discourses get so normalised in the everyday lives of population that this is seen to be the real picture and the only picture which sidelines pacifism.

In liberal art of government, acquiring consent of the population on the surface is important. How is that produced or fabricated? Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman classify two categories of people, as targets of propaganda, whose consent is sought by the government: the political class (with a role in decision-making) and the general population. They write that the consent of the political class is crucial and therefore they are to be indoctrinated the most through nationalised accounts of history and memory and their preeminence in media debates. The general population have to just follow. All this propaganda is done through the elite media, one that generally sets the agenda to serve the interests of dominant, elite groups in the society while other local media follows suit (Chomsky and Herman 1989). This is done through the 'propaganda model'. The function of this model is to 'manufacture consent' for government strategies and actions that press forward the objectives of conglomerates and investment firms and safeguard the capitalist/neoliberal system. Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang write, 'Far from being autonomous creations, media systems inevitably reflect, however imprecisely, the distribution of economic, political, and symbolic power in the society' (Lang and Lang 2004). One may question along the lines of the 'CNN Effect' that bringing the images of a state's military operations to the television screens affects national consciousness and the public pressure generated from that puts pressure on the governments. However, even though policies pursued can go wrong changing the public opinion, the discourse regarding the intentions of the government is never questioned. Pictures of dead American troops in Somalia in 1992-93 forced President Clinton to withdraw although the humanitarian

'intentions' with which American troops were sent after the broadcast of pictures of hunger and poverty-stricken people in Somalia on television are not doubted.

Lang and Lang paraphrase the five filters of the 'propaganda model' through which the raw information for news must pass through to give shape to the message that the powerful believe is fit for dissemination. They write,

'(a) a focus on profitability by an increasingly concentrated industry that has close ties to the government and is in a position by sheer volume to overwhelm dissenting media voices, (b) the dependence of these media organizations on funding through advertising, leading them to favor content likely to appeal to the affluent and making concessions to commercial sponsors, (c) the dependence of journalists who work for the media on information from sources that constitute, collectively, a powerful and prestigious establishment; (d) commercial interests that make the media vulnerable to "flak" and criticism from groups and institutions with the power to generate criticism and protest to which they respond with caution; and, finally, (e) "anticommunism" (or some ideological equivalent) that those who produce content have internalized, thus conjoining them to frame the news in a dichotomous fashion, applying one standard to those on "our" side and a quite different one to "enemies." Most recently, the "war against terrorism" has served as a non-ideological substitute' (Lang and Lang 2004: 94)

Chomsky makes a similar argument in his book, *Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies* (1989), that the media tends to reinforce and promote the interests of those in power through manipulation and control and therefore free speech and democracy are essentially illusions. These interests are a 'way of life' for those in positions of authority and the new journalists entering the field tend to internalize the same way of life and media practices and therefore they not necessarily fraudulent or insincere. Very superficial and marginal efforts of nonconformity are swallowed and therefore pursued to retain a sense of autonomy and fabricate an impartial image in the public as well. The book puts together five Massey lectures he had delivered over Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio in 1988. Chomsky gives a striking critique of media practices in democratic systems of governance where the national media houses shape public opinion and thought to satisfy the interests of the state-corporate nexus. He asserts that 'the general public must be reduced to its traditional apathy and obedience, and driven from the arena of political debate and action, if democracy is to survive' (Chomsky 1989: 10-11).

In this light, Priyanjali Malik elucidation of the role of Indian media in evoking the country's elite into the national nuclear debate in her book, *India's Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb* (2010), offers great insights. She says that while the English press endorses a more 'national' agenda that focuses on foreign, economic and security policies, the regional press advances a more conservative and conforming agenda based on parochial interests. She believes that the elite began to orient public opinion to a more muscular policy reflecting government thinking and policy (Malik 2010). We will discuss this in detail in the third chapter through the case studies.

Conclusion

In the chapter we have tried to encapsulate that the discipline of International Relations has been characterised with rationality, scientific method, relative/absolute gains and objectivity. The obsession with parsimonious explanation has, for long, prevented subjective knowledge to make any inroad in the discipline. We have tried to affirm that international relations are not only about facile assumptions pertaining to rational thinking and explored the prospect and significance of linking political theory with contemporary International Relations focusing on the concept biopolitics, i.e. inserting the logic of biopolitics in the nuclear domain.

On biopolitics, and calling for its political theorizing in International Relations, we attempted to expose the martial face of liberal art of government and how it is just another side of war-mongering realism. For both, war remains a necessity and therefore weapons of mass destruction are considered to be the assets. With this, we tried to explain the way nation-states carry out the project of creating *homo bellum* placing in the norm of prestige, pure race, and security from adversary. Populations offer adherence and support to the nation-states by the method of normalisation. On a cautionary note, here, that norms evolve over a period of time and attaching the norm of stigmatization to this category of weapons may produce normalisation around not-acquiring or renouncing. However, what will it mean for the project of racism and the categories of pure-impure race? Nuclear weapons will have to be replaced for another category for the martial face of liberalism to perpetuate. The two case studies, India and Iran, which will be discussed in the next chapter, have had a profile of those changing norms and normalisation of population around them.

Chapter Three

India's Nuclear Behaviour and its Applicability to Iran

Introduction

Having theoretically contextualized 'nuclear urge' of the nation-state in the field of biopolitics and formation of *homo bellum* as establishing war as a permanent feature of modern nation-state, we will take up the case study of India by exploring its nuclear path. We will try to uncover and analyse the way political rationality around acquiring nuclear weapons is pursued through policies which are of course the mode of exercising 'hegemony' and therefore sort of 'rule by consent'. It does not involve coercive mechanisms as tactics in the name of 'caring for life' of its population. Later, through the case study of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we will try to explain similar tendencies of the Iranian Republic as a nation-state to achieve normalisation or desired modes of behaviour in its population whose life it pledges to affirm by acquiring the weapons of mass destruction. In both the cases, we will attempt to locate the project of state racism pursued by nation-states to construct the enemy whose life must be threatened for the life of one's population to proliferate. Foucault writes, 'Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power' (Foucault 2003: 258). Both India and Islamic Republic of Iran have a lot of similar historical background, e.g. a colonial past, non-alignment during the cold war and other historical and cultural linkages, they have also pursued a similar nuclear path of ambiguity and ambivalence. However, it is not the purpose of this research project to establish those similarities or highlight dissimilarities or do a comparative analysis but it focuses on the question of *how* better than *what*. The idea of this research project is to insert the logic of biopolitic into the nuclear domain by understanding the nuclear behaviour and specific political rationalities of the two cases in point. The idea is to show how the two states have made known the nation as a race, as a species, whose life they pledge to purify, protect and preserve by attempting to eliminate and threaten the life of the external enemy. This assertion shows that the modern state is more than a mere biopolitical state where sovereign power exercises control over populations through biopower in a much sophisticated manner. Consent, therefore, appears as a 'normal' mode of thinking. It will bring to our attention how sovereign nation-state uses biopolitical means in order to achieve its ends.

As we know, when Foucault explained the concept of biopolitics, he explained it in the context of western liberal societies, however one can study this concept in the context of the emergence of the use of biopower as a 'technique' of governance by the modern nation-state in the third world as well. This research project does not pass any judgement on the Islamic Republic of Iran as a totalitarian regime because there are significant differences on the characteristics of a totalitarian system of governance that one can make to counter that assertion. Furthermore, that would be outside the ambit of this research project to indulge in a debate whether Iran is a totalitarian regime or a democratic one. For academic convenience, both India and the Islamic Republic of Iran are considered to be modern nation-states. Both modern nation state and Islamic Republics exercise a certain kind of hegemony. This nomenclature will be useful in initiating a biopolitical understanding of their nuclear behaviour.

This chapter begins with the description of India's nuclear path since Independence outlining its public stand on the related issues followed by understanding the State Racism project and construction of the 'other' in India's nuclear imagery. Similar course is then followed in the case of Iran. There is an effort to also understand the way approval of the elite and public gets contrived through particularly the media. The consent gets reflected in the popular polls that are conducted by various agencies. This has already been explained through the work of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1989) in the previous chapter which makes us understand how the consent gets manufactured. This chapter also revisits the concepts of 'norm' and 'normalisation' that were discussed in previous chapters and a discussion through the case studies is carried out. Furthermore, it is argued that there is perpetuity of war in the contemporary international society where preparedness for war is a permanent and uninterrupted course of action. This course of action prevails over all other interests. There is an eternal arms race between nuclear states and those who aspire to go nuclear and the 'life' of the population that the modern nation state claims to uphold, preserve, affirm and protect becomes a 'life' under eternal threat. Life under eternal threat is explained, in the conclusion of this chapter, through the eternal 'culture of danger' that nation-states construct. There is a sense of 'uncertainty' attached to the use/non-use of nuclear weapons which helps to instil fear and set up danger among population.

India's Nuclear behaviour

George Perkovich's book, *India's Nuclear Bomb* (2001), gives a comprehensive history of the evolution of India's nuclear policy since 1947 till 1998. His argument in the book has been that domestic factors in India have been at least as important, if not more, as external security considerations in determining India's nuclear policies. The elements that stand out from Perkovich's work in understanding India's route to declare itself as a nuclear weapon state are the imperatives of the political leadership, national security considerations, developments in Pakistan and China, and the policies of the US and its allies (Perkovich 2001). On the same lines, Sumit Ganguly had earlier argued that three factors that impelled India towards the 1998 nuclear tests were fifty years of critical political choices, influenced by ideology and the imperatives of statecraft; fitful scientific advances in India's nuclear infrastructure; and an increased perception of threat from China and Pakistan since the end of the Cold War (Ganguly 1999). India's nuclear behaviour has had a zigzag kind of route with strong 'moral' and 'ethical' beliefs guided by Gandhian legacy and nationalist struggle to eventually declaring itself a nuclear weapon state in 1998 as an extension of moral-ethical argument-preservation or affirmation of life of population. However, one feature that somewhat remained constant has been India's historic commitment to a nuclear-free world. There has been a unique concoction of moral politic and real politic in India's foreign and nuclear policy.

Brief History of India's Nuclear Behaviour

While India followed an exclusively "peaceful nuclear program" in the 1950s, by the mid-1960s it reassessed its abhorrence to nuclear weapons in the face of escalating regional instability. Though publicly, Nehru opposed the development of nuclear weapons, Homi Bhaba convinced him (Nehru), of the signal importance of atomic energy research in enabling India to build an industrial base and to tackle the overwhelming problems of deep-rooted poverty. Nehru therefore granted Bhaba a free hand in the development of India's nuclear infrastructure.

India's defeat in the 1962 border conflict with China proved its military unpreparedness and aggravated tensions between the two countries. Two years after the conflict, China tested a nuclear weapon, making Indian politicians question the wisdom of their nuclear policies. Segments of India's political and scientific establishments expressed a greater interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. This strengthened the debate in New Delhi and also made the

position of Indian nationalists stronger, who were in favour of obtaining an autonomous nuclear weapons system. Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri, too, did not go against the traditional posture of not acquiring nuclear weapons. Instead, he sought nuclear guarantees from the superpowers which did not come through. He emphasized on strengthening the conventional forces to defend against any external threat. Later, Indira Gandhi also sought nuclear guarantees from the super powers with repeated failures. These failures in attaining security guarantees caused shifts in India's nuclear policy with a reduced amount of moral principles and more adherences on the imperatives of statecraft. After the 1971 win against Pakistan and close ties established with the Soviet Union, India carried out its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974, announced as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion'.

Conceivably, acting in response to international ambivalence about the test, India hastily cancelled all other scheduled tests bringing a status-quo position of the nuclear programme. During the brief tenure of the Janata Party government (1977-79), the nuclear weapons program was put on hold. For a long time after that, the moral grounds were cited as India's opinion about the nuclear weapons. From the very beginning of the nuclear age, India was a determined supporter of a nuclear test ban. In fact, in 1954, India initiated a global call at the U.N. Disarmament Commission for an end to nuclear testing and a freeze on fissile material production. Likewise, in 1978 and 1982 at the Special Sessions on Disarmament, India proposed measures for banning nuclear testing, and in 1988, it introduced the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. These proposals were fashioned by the conviction that banning nuclear testing would be an irreversible step toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specific time frame. However, after co-sponsoring a resolution for a test ban treaty in November 1993, India reversed course and opposed the treaty text that was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament. This stance was actually ideologically consistent, since India felt that the treaty was flawed because it wasn't linked to a time-bound disarmament plan.

Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan called for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals by the year 2010. India had submitted an Action Plan to the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly in 1988 which called upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament. The heart of the Action Plan is the elimination of all nuclear weapons, in three stages, over twenty-two years. However, despite this renewed attempt at regaining the Nehruvian roots, the scientific-

military establishment received a considerable boost under Rajiv Gandhi. Later, Prime Minister Narsimha Rao permitted the preparations for carrying out a nuclear test in December 1995. The test was thwarted when United States inspection satellites picked up signs of activity at the test site. Doing 'justice' to security, domestic-politics and norms concerns, India, on May 11, 1998, tested three devices at the Pokhran underground testing site, followed by two more tests on May 13, 1998. One of the detonations was claimed to be thermonuclear. The outcry from outside India was almost universal. India has declared a policy on the use of nuclear weapons which is of 'no first use' but an 'assured and massive retaliation' in case of nuclear aggression on the part of its enemies.

NPT and CTBT

The Indian delegation to the UN had played a key role in drafting the central provisions of the text of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which embodied two principles of special significance to India's concerns. First, the draft treaty specified a balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations on the part of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers. It offered the non-nuclear states access to peaceful nuclear technology in return for their agreement not to obtain or develop nuclear weapons. Second, the draft indicated that the attempts to promote nonproliferation would be merely a first step toward the ultimate goal of universal nuclear disarmament. India also wanted that the non-nuclear weapon states to be allowed to conduct peaceful nuclear explosion which was objected to. When the major powers agreed on a draft treaty, India was quick to register its opposition. India refused to sign the NPT calling it discriminatory. Indian policy-makers pointed out that the nuclear states stubbornly refuse to curtail their own capabilities and do not hesitate to test devices regularly. Why then discriminate against other countries? Sumit Ganguly has argued that although India's argument was couched in moral terms, a more pragmatic consideration-namely, keeping its nuclear weapons option open-guided its decision not to sign the treaty (Ganguly 1999).

Another bottom line of India's argument against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was the unsafe security environment in South Asia, in which India had limited options as a non-nuclear weapon state to deal with the challenges from China's nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's nascent weapons program. By signing the CTBT, India would have foregone the right to test nuclear devices, yet its primary nuclear-armed adversary, China, would be able to retain its nuclear weapons under the treaty and could even upgrade them through sub-critical experiments. Specifically, New Delhi felt that the CTBT was insufficient in terms of

protecting disarmament commitments from the nuclear weapon states under declared deadlines. It saw this as a discriminatory as reminiscent of the disparity intrinsic in the NPT regime, in which nuclear weapon states are half-heartedly required to disarm and non-nuclear weapon states are strongly obligated to remain non-nuclear. The lack of commitments by the nuclear weapon states to get rid of their nuclear weapons under a confirmed time frame also forced India to oppose Article XIV of the NPT, which insists on the CTBT's entry into force after forty-four countries (Annex 2) sign and ratify it. Many in India do continue to cite the lack of sufficient disarmament commitments as central to their opposition to the CTBT.

While India's opposition to both NPT and CTBT may have been strategic in pursuit of more traditional goals of statecraft (such as national security based upon military power), however, the public posture in its nuclear behaviour has been guided by the force of moral arguments. In reality as well, India remains committed to both the NPT and CTBT in spirit and to the ideas of non-proliferation but it's the imperialist epistemology of these treaties that India is supposed to be committed towards for the sake of its moral and ethical nature since independence.

By building nuclear weapons a country hopes to enhance its international standing. This is thought to be both a reason for and a consequence of developing nuclear weapons. A nuclear arsenal is a token of modernity, legitimacy, and great-power status. Nations want nuclear weapons for countering the weapons of other great powers, usually by imitating those who have introduced new weapons. From an unequivocal nuclear abstinence posture between 1947 and 1964, India moved on to overt nuclearisation by the late nineties. However, India has positioned itself as a 'reluctant nuclear hegemon' and has always maintained a restrained nuclear posture. India has declared a policy on the use of nuclear weapons which is of "no first use" but an "assured and massive retaliation" in case of nuclear aggression on the part of its enemies. As the country to have introduced the proposals leading to the NPT and CTBT, India should be actively engaged in the global effort toward reduction of nuclear weapons and of global disarmament alongside the United States and Russia.

The 'Other' in India's Nuclear Imagery

After having mentioned 'India's nuclear labyrinth' since 1947, we will now try to apply the logic of bodypolitic as explained and understood in the previous chapters. Reverting to the

project of State Racism, as discussed in the first chapter, one can locate the discourse in the Indian nuclear thinking as well whereby acquiring and testing nuclear weapon capability does create the distinction between those 'who should live and those who should die'. The rationale behind detonation is the binary of 'pure-impure' race, in which for the 'pure' to proliferate and exist, the impure must feel threatened, deterred or just be eliminated.

India's perception of Pakistan and China as the 'impure race' is driven by factors and incidents of Partition followed by communal riots, India-China war of 1962 and territorial disputes with both the countries and this perception has played a fundamental role in motivating its nuclear programme extracting support from the public which was overwhelmingly unsupportive of acquiring the deadly weapons before. The normalisation techniques of the state reversed a pre-existing opinion/norm which too was its own formation driven by factors of colonisation, non-alignment etc.

David Campbell's *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (1998) is an interesting book to explore how a nation-state in order to exist on a distinct identity requires the existence of the 'Other'. He looks at the relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union through a constructivist lens. The continuous existence of the 'other' and attaching values of 'prestige', 'purity', 'normal' are important for the nation-state to create a normalizing society and through this technology states create war-mongering citizenry, *homo-bellum*. Acquiring nuclear weapons exposes the murderous function of a liberal art of government. The weapons are acquired against a perceived threat (which is 'abnormal') and to bestow 'prestige' on the population in the name of 'life' necessity. The leading discourse during the Cold War era of international politics defined power in terms of control. Nuclear weapons' utility was the currency of power in the international system. Once a state has nuclear weapons, it instantly causes a step change in the way its neighbours and other countries relate to it. Nuclear weapons are powerful because we treat them as powerful.

Runa Das writes, 'one finds that although India did have some political disputes with both China and Pakistan, neither of these assumed dimensions to warrant developing nuclear weapons as a defence against these states' (Das 2008: 47). In equal breath, Sumit Ganguly also maintains that several political observers and analysts have discharged the security point of view as a causal explanation to the Indian nuclear weapons programme and tests of 1998,

while giving more importance to other rationalization based on status, prestige, and the short-term exigencies of domestic politics. He goes on to say that 'conventional wisdom dismisses India's felt security needs and blithely asserts that India would be better off without nuclear weapons' (Ganguly 1999: 172). Therefore, despite becoming less secure, India asserted to have 'affirmed life' vis-à-vis an enemy race. The Indian state has always projected Pakistan as a principal adversary, the 'other'. It is eternally impure, abnormal, aggressor. It is an adversary, generated out of the division of the earlier nations, which initiated the 1947-48, 1965 wars and the Kargil conflict of 1999. Despite the existence of nuclear weapons and the assertion made by nuclear experts that nuclear weapons states do not go to war against each other did not 'deter' Pakistan to attack in 1999. Yet the imperative of attaining nuclear weapons becomes a 'norm' and the state claims to act on the behalf of the population. Is this not a flawed understanding of threat? Is India (or any nation-state) trying to defend a norm it has constructed in an attempt to create a 'self' or this is, in reality, defence from an adversary? Creation and reinforcing identities or norms help nation-states to retain their 'right to kill' which makes the right of sovereign power still pertinent in this new form of power called the biopower. This indeed is biopower in excess of the sovereign right. Barry O'Neil asserts that acquisition-with-testing behaviour is further hazardous for the reason that it engenders a larger risk of 'an arms race, crisis instability, accidental war or unauthorized use' (O'Neil 2006: 5). With acquiring the grand and deadly weapons, life of the population is kept at stake by the nation-state because with the arms race as a natural corollary, nation-states tend to put their own population at the risk of being attacked by the opponent. Is this not a treacherous role of the state with its population whose life it pledges to affirm? India and Pakistani explosions have made the region, the 'life' of their respective populations unpredictable. The whole 'life-affirmation' argument of biopower demonstrates its illogicality and irrationality.

Although constructivists harp on the notion of 'norm' as influencing state behaviour, the discipline of International Relations has not given a warm reception to such theorization indicating that it lacks explanatory ability. Recognizing the effect of norms, we had suggested in the previous chapter, that nation-states attach the value of prestige to nuclear weapons and create/initiate a different kind of racism representative of the subsistence/life of 'pure race', 'modern power', 'global reputation' and therefore better than the 'other'. In the years immediately after independence, these were the values/norms the Indian state had attached to itself. William Walker writes,

'It is a mistake to view India's actions just as reactions to Pakistan, or even to China, without whose assistance Pakistan could not have established its capabilities. Perversely, India's deepening affection for nuclear weapons has also been propelled by its hatred (this is not too strong a word) of the non-proliferation regime-by its intense grievance over being locked into what it sees as an inferior status due to the regime's politico-legal stratification. The term 'nuclear apartheid' which India has promulgated in recent years gives accurate expression to this grievance: Indians perceive themselves as victims of an immoral order and as being held in a position of inferiority by structures of power over which they have little influence' (Walker 1998: 512).

Manufacturing Consent

In the previous chapter, there was a reference to Chomsky and Herman's *Manufacturing Consent : The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1989)*, which classifies two categories of people, as targets of propaganda, whose consent is sought by the government: the political class (with a role in decision-making) and the general population. The press has an influential role in manufacturing consent for the state. Sagarika Ghose wrote in Outlook during the Kargil conflict,

'Glorifying soldiers and according mythic stature to men in uniform is the job of the army, the state and the other wings of government. If TV glamourises war, it becomes a propaganda wing of the state. If the media is as worryingly gung-ho about military victories as they were in Kargil, then the veracity of its reports become suspect. The power of TV then becomes harnessed to creating a war machine' (Ghose 1999)

This shows that the media functions to meet the desired ends of a dominant elite. Chomsky and Herman posit that the elite domination of the media and marginalization of nonconformists transpires so naturally that media practitioners still continue to believe that they are reporting and interpreting the news 'objectively' following news values (Chomsky and Herman 1989). There is a sense of normalisation at work and the media mobilizes 'support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity' by setting the agenda and influencing public opinion. (Chomsky and Herman 1989: xi)

A public opinion survey conducted among Indian elites in seven cities by the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame and its findings revealed what Chomsky writes that the consent of the political class is crucial and therefore they are to be indoctrinated the most. The general population have to just follow. According to the survey, a sizeable majority of fifty-seven percent of this political class had the opinion

'favouring with government's stance' of nuclear ambiguity and keeping the nuclear options open. In the same survey about thirty-three percent favoured an overt nuclear capability thereby advocated for developing nuclear weapons. The survey also revealed that the impending nuclear threat from Pakistan (more than China) to be a chief reason to persuade support for India's option for going nuclear (Cortright and Mattoo 1996). This political class' opinion is then fed into the general population in the name of common good and this how consent gets manufactured. A related survey carried out in Pakistan in 1996 by the same institution provided a diverse depiction on threat perception. The majority of the respondents felt danger to the state came largely from India and therefore going nuclear way was inevitable and important irrespective of the costs (Cortright and Ahmed 1998). From a strict opposition to developing nuclear weapons as a historic lineage of values of non-violence, there was a shift of Indian public opinion (not elites but the general public) towards favouring tests as shown by an *India Today* survey of 2000 adults on 5 December 1995 in which a majority of sixty-two percent of the respondents would approve if India were to test a nuclear device to build up its nuclear weapons capability (Chengappa 1995: 48-49). This dominant behaviour of the population helps the nation-state to create the binaries of normal-abnormal, sane-insane whereby dominant is normal, the sane opinion. The discourse around this normal behaviour facilitates obtaining obedience of the population to the policies and actions of the nation-state.

Both opinion surveys, cited above, seeking the 'knowledge of the population' were conducted before India conducted detonations in 1998 and therefore can be seen as the project of manufacturing consent as the practice of democracy. The Indian state from the mid 1990s, as a class case of biopower, began to create the discourse on the possible testing of nuclear weapons and created the 'necessary illusion, and emotionally potent oversimplifications' of the benefit and normative value of the act 'to keep the ordinary person on course' thereby controlling the population. Indoctrination, as established in the earlier chapter, is the essence of capitalism and democracy. This is so because of the extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in May 1995 which was of immense disappointment as there were no determined and concrete obligations for disarmament by the five nuclear states. A poll conducted by the Indian Market Research Bureau (IMRB) on May 12, 1998, right after the nuclear tests, in six metropolitan cities revealed overwhelming support. In the poll, ninety-one percent of respondents approved of the tests and about seventy-eight percent responded saying they felt more 'secure and safe'(Times of India News Service 1998). The response of

‘safe and secure’ alludes to the ethical reasoning of the nation-state of securing and preserving life as the primary function of biopower. These are the times when concepts that guide the formation *homo bellum* get activated wherein nuclear assets are tied to the logic of ‘national security’ as indicative of physical welfare of the population.

Brief History of Iran’s Nuclear Behaviour

Iran has always maintained the position that its nuclear programme is meant for peaceful purpose for domestic energy consumption. It has often reiterated this position on policy, national interest and religious grounds stating that Iran considers ‘the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its basic principles. They have no place in Iran’s defence doctrine’ (Khoshroo 2003). However, like India, they have pursued a zigzag path of ambiguity and ambivalence carrying on with its clandestine activities. Security is just seen as a window of opportunity, a value to manipulate.

Iran was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the NPT in 1970 and had submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly in 1974 that called for establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East despite having begun a civilian nuclear energy programme under the Shah’s regime in 1967. Iran got assistance in the form of reactors and training from the US, France and West Germany. Iran got the earliest nuclear help for a civil nuclear program from the US under the Atoms for Peace Program (Eisenhower 1953).

It is believed that the nuclear programme was driven by normative concerns of ambition and direction in the region. There is enough literature to suggest that the shah had assented for a parallel weapons programme using the available technical know-how through the civilian programme. It was precisely because of this policy of Shah that he was overthrown in 1979. It is believed that the US had remained complacent in keeping a check Shah’s weapon’s programme because it wanted the Shah to ascend to the position of regional leader in the Persian Gulf and also to deter the Soviet influence. The Shah had established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974 after receiving huge amount of money after the Arab-Israel war that led to increased oil price.

Iran cancelled the nuclear program after the 1979 revolution as Ayotollah Khomeini was strictly against the idea of developing nuclear weapons. They were seen against the Islamic principles on which the Revolution was premised. After the revolution, the US cooperation

with Iran had stopped as well which mad other European states to limit their role in Iran However, the war with Iraq and its use of chemical weapons which led to large-scale casualties and public debate on the logic of discontinuing with the nuclear programme made the Iranian state and clerics to rethink their stance against the weapons so as to balance Iraq's growing capability with economic and military aid from Europe and the Soviet Union. Ray Takey writes, 'The dramatic memories of the war have led to cries of 'never again' uniting a fractious public behind a desire to achieve not just a credible deterrent posture but potentially a convincing retaliatory capability' (Takey 2004-05: 53). However, a statement made on June 3, 2008 by Khomeini reflects the ambiguous position of Iran. He said that as per the religious and Islamic philosophy and also on the basis of common sense, nuclear weapons have no advantage but sky-scraping expenditure to produce and maintain them. Nuclear weapons do not bring 'power to a nation' (Khomeini 2008). There was also an arms embargo put in place by the US which left Iran isolated from the international community. The discriminatory behaviour of the international behaviour led to the feeling of agony.

By the 1980s and early 1990s, Iran had announced of having discovered Uranium ore deposits, its intentions to begin mining and constructing enrichment facility. Russia, for its pursuit of geopolitical interests, was assisting Iran in constructing a light-water reactor and providing nuclear fuel support as well. Oblivious of Iran's nascent nuclear infrastructure, the international community thought that the complications of reprocessing spent fuel to develop nuclear weapons would be difficult which would therefore be an unlikely situation. It was the Iranian opposition group, National Council of Resistance on Iran (NCRI), an Iranian exile group that played the part of the whistle-blower by informing the US about the secret nuclear programme and locations of nuclear facilities. This led to IAEA inspections edifying Iran's surreptitious activities which were going on for eighteen years and were a violation of its non-proliferation commitments. It was in 2003 when Iran openly declared and confirmed that it was building a heavy reactor at Arak and a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz. China had exported undeclared amount of Uranium to Iran violating the provisions of the NPT. With enough facilities to upgrade Uranium, missile technology it received from North Korea and China and nuclear weapons assistance from Pakistan through the AQ Khan network, Iran is seen to pose 'serious' threat to Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey and this can lead to arms race in the region.

There was a proposal by Britain, France and Germany, called 'EU3' expecting Iran to disclose nuclear activities, allow surprise inspections by IAEA by October 2003 on the condition that they will not refer the matter to United Nations Security Council and will provide nuclear technology for civilian purpose. Later under pressure from Japan, Iran agreed to sign the additional protocol to its 1974 IAEA safeguards agreement, comply fully with the IAEA's investigation and suspend Uranium enrichment by October 2003 only to resume enrichment again in August 2005 citing the reason that the EU3 had failed to live upto its commitments to Iran. Iran announced in January 2006 that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. In response, the IAEA board adopted a resolution February 4, 2006, that referred the matter to the Security Council. Two days later, Tehran announced that it would stop implementing its additional protocol. China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US had offered 'incentives' to Iran which included avowal of Iran's indisputable right to peaceful nuclear energy, support in building light water reactors, fuel supply assurance, ruling out action on U.N. Security Council concern of Iran's NPT disobedience, WTO membership, and an putting an end to the sanctions imposed by the US to enabling Iran to acquire Boeing aircraft parts, in order to suspend its enrichment and heavy water programmes. However, after thorough discussions and deliberations with the Iranian countries, the P5 expressed dissatisfaction with the Iranian response.

Pessimistic about the likelihood of Iran abandoning its acquisition of nuclear technology and know-how, George Perkovich wrote,

'Iran has invested too much pride, money and scientific technical talent in building its nascent nuclear infrastructure to abandon it completely. No state, even those that have halted clandestine nuclear weapon programs, has fired its nuclear scientific-technical establishment and shut down all its reactors. Nuclear establishments' around the world are too politically and symbolically important for political leaders to close down entirely' (Perkovich 2003: 2).

With numerous resolutions passed by the UN to limit Iran's nuclear programme, Iran has remained non-compliant prompting further actions. In May 2011, the IAEA, after its inspections in Iran, made known that it has acquired substantial proof that Tehran has performed work on an extremely 'sophisticated nuclear triggering technology that experts said could be used for only one purpose: setting off a nuclear weapon' (The New York Times 2011) However, It is also estimated that Iran would not be able to manufacture a bomb until 2012 and may even take more years.

The ‘Other’ in Iran’s Nuclear Imagery

Dr. Gholamali Chegnizadeh’s argument gives a wide overview on the factors that the Islamic Republic has used to ‘manufacture consent’ among population regarding nuclear assets and nation-state’s continuous mobilization of homo-bellum around these factors. He argues,

‘three pillars of Iranian strategic thinking are important to understand. The first is Iranians’ sense of victimization [because of the attitude of the West after the Islamic Revolution, especially during the war with Iraq]. Second is Iranians’ quest for recognition. Third is continuity with the pre-Revolutionary period. Iran is a proud country, a big country, and a leading country. This must be recognized. The sense of Iran as a leading country is something to which the leadership pays heavy attention. The psychological deficit within the Iranian leadership could be fulfilled by developing nuclear weapons capability.’ (Kibaroglu 2006: 219)

In Iran, notions of victimization, recognition and civilization have been used to create a normalising society and to create the binary of pure-impure race.

“*Na Sharq, Na Gharb, Faqat Jumhuri-ye Islami:*” “Neither East, nor West, only the Islamic Republic [of Iran]” was the guiding principle of the Iranian Revolution discarding being dependent on the power-blocs rejecting their ideas, goods, domination and influence and the focus was put on being self-reliant. The ‘west’ has been the ‘other’ throughout the period of post-Revolution wherein the Islamic Republic, through its practices based on rhetoric and jingoism, has created a discourse which is anti-American, anti-West. Some analysts have called America as the principal driver of Iran’s nuclear weapons policy. Although, I am not in any case condoning the practices of the US, however, it is imperative I reiterate that it is not the purpose of this research to analyze if the practices of the state as good or evil but to understand the *raison d’etat* or ‘reason of the state’ to govern and acquire adherence of the population in a ‘violent’ yet in a subtle way.

The Iraq War led to the creation of another ‘other’ in the national psyche of the Islamic Republic. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons led to a change of a ‘norm’ that weapons of mass destruction were against the guiding principles of the Islamic Republic. Taking an extreme departure from the earlier belief, a new norm that the clerics then sought to normalise was that it would be imperative to develop weapons of mass destruction for the preservation of life of the population. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander-in-chief of Iran’s armed forces, said in 1988,

‘With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear during the [Iran – Iraq] war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the moral teachings of the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violation and all the aggressions which are committed in the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacterial, and radiological weapons. From now on you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task’ (Cirincione 2002: 52).

Another ‘Other’ in Iran’s national psyche is Israel and there has been a continuous invocation of the potential nuclear danger emanating from the Jewish ‘state’ although Israel and Iran have not had any military exchange in the past but Iran’s support to terrorist outfits working against Israel is well known. Notions of ‘illegitimate state’, occupier of Islamic territory and an ally of the US are invoked under the State Racism project leading to manufacturing of consent of countering the threat, the evil force through acquiring the weapons of mass destruction and threatening the life on the other side.

As understood from the logic of biopolitics in the previous chapters, anything that is perceived to threaten the ‘life’ of population is supposed to be eliminated, these continuous constructions of the ‘other’ as the impure race, as a social threat to the bodypolitic or the rapacious external race involves acceptance for obtaining nuclear assets in the name of life necessity. The weapons are therefore seen as life rescuer deactivating the malevolence of the impure race. Michael Dillon writes, ‘Securing life is a continuous war against whatever threatens life. Life is thus a permanent security problem for biopolitics’ (Dillon 2008: 168).

On the normative concerns too, the norms of pride and prestige too have been instrumental in creating equilibrium of homogenized ‘opinion’ towards developing nuclear assets. We had earlier discussed through the work of Chomsky and Herman about the elite’s influence on creation a discourse after being ‘indoctrinated’. Dr. Hadian identifies four different viewpoints among the Iranian elite regarding the nuclear weapons. He says, the first group consists of those who believe Iran does not need at all nuclear weapons or the capability. These are the so-called ‘greens’ and they constitute only two or three percent of the population. The second group maintains that Iran is entitled to have peaceful nuclear technology and it should not give up its right to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The third group believes Iran needs to develop nuclear weapons capability, but not the weapons at this time. They say Iran cannot trust the international community. They refer to chemical

weapons area and point out that they thought the threshold would not be crossed; but when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, the West just watched, and did nothing to stop them. The fourth group are the hardliners who strongly argue and push for withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and developing nuclear weapons as soon as possible. Dr. Hadian continues, 'the first and the last options are unlikely under normal circumstances; a consensus will be reached somewhere between the second and the third options, which means having the full nuclear fuel cycle and the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons.' Dr. Hadian maintains that the second and third groups do not think nuclear weapons would enhance Iran's security; rather nuclear weapons will make Iran a target and will spur further proliferation in the region. (Kibargolu 2006: 220)

In Iran, one can find both the conservative as well as the 'liberal' media involved in 'manufacturing consent' in favour of the government. Takeyh cites newspapers reports to explain this Iran. The conservative newspaper *Mardom-Salari* captured Tehran's dilemma by noting in 2004, 'After the occupation of Iraq, the security ring around the Islamic Republic of Iran by enemy nations, enemy allies, or unfriendly nations is complete' (Takeyh 2004-05: 54). In a rare note of agreement, the leading liberal newspaper *Aftab-e Yazd* similarly stressed that, given the regional exigencies, 'In the near future Iran might be thinking of the military aspects of nuclear energy' (Takeyh 2004-05: 54). The discourses created by nation-state make identity unambiguous and something that is easily identifiable. The intercessions of institutions and discourses with their panoptic gaze validate and structure the identity of the nation as a race. Takeyh argues that the discourse is so strong that the student organisations have been most vocal advocates of nuclearisation. He says, 'Iranian students are seen by some analysts as a reliable barometer of public opinion, as they have historically played a vanguard political role in nearly every significant movement spearheaded by the universities' (Takeyh 2004-05: 59). Emphasizing their prominence and importance he mentions the widespread demonstrations by the student organisations against Iran's decision to sign the additional protocol in October 2003.

There were two opinion surveys conducted by WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO) and Terror Free Tomorrow (TFT) in early 2008. Both polls gave an idea about the 'public opinion' about nuclear assets. An overwhelming majority of people wanted Iran to develop nuclear energy with eighty-nine percent in TFT favouring the government policy and ninety percent in WPO in favour of having a full fuel cycle nuclear program (Richman 2008). From the reasons cited

in this section, it will be right to suggest that Iran has been successful to formulate and normalize public opinion regarding the nuclear weapons. These discourses of the nation-state help to produce a normalising society. The population tends to believe in the norms of nation-pride, international status and particularly to deter the 'other' as reasons of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. This is so because the discourse is such that if one adheres to these norms, is considered to be 'normal' and any deviation from the normal behaviour will not be taken care of by the state. This acceptance is a creation of the policies of state based on rhetoric and jingoism. It is believed that these reasons neutralize pacifism or restraint creating *homo bellum* and permanence of war by invoking overt nationalism around nuclear weapons. However, Oliver Schmidt writes, 'If an anti-nuclear fatwa really exists, which prohibits the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, it would provide a very strong norm against nuclear weapons procurement' (Schmidt 2008: 76).

Permanence of War: Normalizing Populations

In this section, let us visit some of the basic conceptualizations of biopolitics as discussed earlier, which was based on the fact that the basic phenomenon of the nineteenth century is the power's hold over life through various mechanisms and technologies of power-biopolitics. This technology of power extends from urban planning, birth rate etc to war preparedness. In both the case studies taken up for discussion in this study, I have tried to explain how the population- species' life- has been regulated. It is done with an aim to 'establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a sort of homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population' to 'optimize a state of life' (Foucault, 2003: 246)

Modern nation-states attempt to 'secure the subject' against the adversary through the construction of a sense of insecurity emanating from it. This explains the perpetuity of war in the contemporary international society where preparedness of war is a permanent and uninterrupted course of action. Dominance of nuclear weapons in international relations explains this process as this begins from developing nuclear infrastructure and research to attaining a full fuel cycle nuclear programme to testing a nuclear device to developing state-of-the-art delivery mechanism to an incessant enhancement programme. All of this leads to an ever-lasting arms race as a desire to control and regulate the population. Richardson has argued that an 'unstable' arms race can only lead to war since the threshold where a persistent arms race stops, open aggression will break out. By unstable, it is meant not reaching a level

of balance and stability and therefore military establishments will indulge in arms build-up without limits. (Richardson, 1960)

Considering that it is an ever-lasting venture of production and enhancement, the lives of population become interplay of life and death. The populations do not realize that in this discourse of 'securing life', it is essentially the 'life' that is at stake. This discourse gets normalised through the creation of norms of 'threat' and 'danger' as part of the state racism project creating binaries of normalcy and pathology. In an attempt to be identified with the normal, populations tend to accept and endorse state's constructions to avoid being labelled as deviant. We have seen in the previous sections that this acceptance and endorsement is actually manufactured by the procedures pursued by the nation-state by indoctrination through elite-opinion and harping on rhetoric. In the opinion polls conducted before and after the nuclear tests in India, most gave the impression of being content with the government policy.

Although in the case of India and Pakistan, both the actors have emphasized the validity of the deterrence theory but the region has also witness its illogicality in the form of Kargil conflict, Operation Parakram and both countries have continued to test nuclear capable missiles. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates in its Yearbook of 2011 that the nuclear arsenals of both India and Pakistan are greater than before increased their by up to a third. The Institute also noted this has led to proliferation in the region as the neighbours were intensifying their ability to generate fissile material for military purposes. (SIPRI Yearbook, 2011) Analysts may argue that no full-fledged war has occurred between India and Pakistan since the tests but the 'life' of population has been put at risk since then- the very life- modern nation-state pledges to preserve. The existence of the bomb and an eternal arms race makes the threat perception eternal as well. In Iran, although the cloud of war has been mongering over with the possibility of a US-led 'intervention' to 'save' the 'lives' and dismantling Iran's nuclear programme, Iran, on the other hand, considers the possibility of developing nuclear assets as 'life saviour' from the regional threats in the form of Israel and deterring threat from the US. However, as has been established earlier, its nuclear programme will make other states in the region to follow suit initiating an arms race. The 'life' of the population that the modern nation state claims to uphold, preserve, affirm and protect becomes a 'life' under eternal threat.

Conclusion

The modern era seems unthinkable without a 'culture of danger', without a permanent threat to the normal, without imaginary invasions of constant, common threats such as diseases, dirt, sexuality, or the 'fear of degeneration' (Foucault 2007, 101). We would extrapolate it to the nation-state's necessity for the use of nuclear weapons. The sense of 'uncertainty' attached to the use/non-use of nuclear weapons helps to instil fear and set up danger among population. As we have established in the previous chapters and sections the way nation-states bring into play these notions to construct an enemy, de-humanize it and create a normalised society. In order to diminish danger/threat from an external source, biopower inculcates the feeling of uncertainty of attack to ascertain the inevitability of danger. Acquiring nuclear assets achieves legitimacy as securing the life of the nation as race by averting danger and by preventing this danger, it is supposed to instil fear in the enemy race. This discourse is nourished in the minds of population as a means of life's maintenance. However, a similar discourse of the reciprocal fear of surprise attack is inculcated by the adversary in its population as well.

There is an eternal culture of danger that is invoked by the modern nation-state to delineate the enemy and justify its dubious ventures. David Campbell's book *Writing Security* (1998), premising on works of Foucault, elucidates the interplay of fear, danger, threat in representing the enemy and the identity of the nation-state and its security practices. Campbell posits that danger is not an objective entity and is therefore a construction of interpretation. This construal is dispersed in the national psyche as means of manufacturing consent through rhetoric and jingoism, and this construction, identification and representation of danger induces a sense of national identity to serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other,' a 'domestic' from a 'foreign' (Campbell 1998).

We have discussed this in detail that the desire of possessing weapons of mass destruction is based on construction of the enemy and the interpretation of threat emanating from that enemy. John Mueller and Karl Mueller write,

'Over a decade and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, euphoria about the end of the Cold War appears to have given way to anxiety about ominous perils lurking in the shadows of the New World Order. Western security concerns, once driven by the threat of apocalyptic war with the Soviet Union and the spread of communism, are now dominated by fears of terrorism, "rogue states," and above all acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by unpredictable potential enemies in the Third World. In fact, most of these dangers are neither as now nor as never as much

current rhetoric suggests. The process of finding new nightmares to replace the old ones is exemplified by the widespread adoption of (WMD) as a blanket label to embrace not only nuclear weapons, but, often on a seemingly equal footing, arms that have thus far killed scarcely anyone (biological weapons), arms that are vastly less effective at killing (chemical weapons), and dramatic but costly and often ineffectual delivery devices (ballistic missiles). This can lead to excessive fears and costly overreaction' (Mueller and Mueller 2000: 163).

What we have tried to establish in this chapter is the way preservation of life may involve and pave the way for mass slaughter. However, despite of the fact that nuclear weapons have the power of mass slaughter but if we consider their history they have been used just once and therefore it may be argued that the modern state guided by biopolitical principles refrains from mass-slaughter but keeps that option open by acquiring the capability to do so.

Conclusion

Throughout this study, we have tried to establish a link between the discipline of International Relations and Political Theory. We have tried this by inserting the logic of biopolitics into the nuclear domain. We argued that in order to practise hegemony by manufacturing consent, policies are put in place to justify the 'political rationality' around acquiring nuclear weapons. Nation-states emphasize the logic of defending the national population and this 'preservation of life' may rest on the annihilatory justification of the modern nation-state in which the path the state decides to take is the path of bliss and power. The one offering adherence to the nation-state is 'normal' and therefore will achieve a happy life and the one against it is 'abnormal'. The enemy population is perceived to be eternally 'evil', 'impure' and 'abnormal' and thus need to be annihilated.

With the help of a Foucauldian interpretation, we tried to unveil the mysterious and complicated yet perspicacious and not-so-visible techniques of biopower that function on the population through which a nation-state legitimizes its actions of preservation of life and defending a pure race. The techniques modern nation-states pursue to 'manufacture consent' create, what we have called, *homo bellum*, i.e. humans for war, to highlight war as a necessary condition of existence in contemporary times driven by the dominance of nuclear weapons. The normalisation extensively at work here does not bring to light the danger of death in acquiring the nuclear weapons and these weapons, as defenders of life, of good life, find acceptability and consent.

'Liveable life and a Grievable death'

'Some lives are grievable, and others are not; the differential allocation of grievability that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved, and what kind of subject must not, operates to produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as liveable life and a grievable death?' (Butler 2004: xiv-xv).

Judith Butler in her book *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning* (2004) raises extremely pertinent questions about factors leading to the formation of a brutalized/brutalizing society, characterized by aggression at home as well as on foreign lands. She writes that post 9/11, the United States missed an opportunity to be part of a global community by pursuing a path of aggression and unilateralism through engendering a very nationalist discourse suspending constitutional rights, political dissent and cultivating forms of implicit and explicit

ensorship. All of this has also led to thought control in the American society. Although she concedes of not explaining what conception she has of global community but vaguely it is the one where we are able to 'imagine and practice another future, one that will move beyond the current cycle of revenge' (Butler 2004: 10). She acknowledges that although what had happened on 9/11 is a cause of great fear and vulnerability, of grief and mourning, but does the experience of vulnerability and loss lead to the road to aggression and belligerence? Wouldn't that too lead to more vulnerability and loss and grief? It is so because life is highly interdependent in contemporary times. It is driven by an understanding that 'it is the 'other' on whom my life depends, people I do not know and may never know'. However, as understood in the previous chapters about the project of State Racism, the 'Other' is portrayed in a particular way by the nation-state. What is spoken, shown or heard about the 'other' is controlled on the value of what is liveable and grievable. The 'Other' may never be counted as 'human'. There is a sense of 'national melancholia' that lays down this discourse and strengthens it through a discourse forming a 'naturalized norm'. It is because of this norm, nation-states retain their 'right to kill' and endure their treacherous role by presenting the 'Other' as a biological and a social threat to the biopolitic. Nuclear weapons, therefore, deal with biopolitical concerns to secure life.

Before we summarize the arguments and conclude, we are going to draw an analogy from an ancient religious doctrine to understand life being at the centre of a particular kind of rationality and its interplay with death. We will try to identify certain linkages so as to see if the present is guided by its past. This is a mere exploration for opening up a field of enquiry and goes beyond the contemporary and conventional explanations of understanding the world.

Dialogue with Death

The *Katha Upanishad* is one of the philosophical chapters from the *Upanishads*, Hindu sacred philosophical text, and gives knowledge about spiritual emancipation. The *Katha Upanishad* reveals secrets about life after death in the form a dialogue. There was a wealthy king, *Vajashravas*, who often held religious ceremonies to give away his possessions in the aspiration to go to heaven after death. Once, while performing one such ceremony, his son, *Nachiketas*, noticed him giving away old cows of no productive value, and this prompted him to ask his father, 'O Sire, to whom wilt thou give me?' (Radhakrishnan 1994: 596). He asked the same question thrice and irritated over his son's rambling inquisition, *Vajashravas*

answered, 'Thee I give unto Death (Yama)' (Radhakrishnan 1994: 596). The young boy took his father determinedly and went to *Yama*, the god of Death. *Nachiketa* did not find *Yama* there and decided to wait for the god to appear. On the third day, *Yama* appeared and apologized for making the boy wait for three days. He requested him to ask for three wishes, one for each day.

Nachiketa seeks reconciliation with his father and asks the Death that his father accepts him when he returns to him with the same love and care. His second wish was he wanted to know the sacrifice, the fire, people have to make to come to heaven and achieve immortality and how his good works may never be exhausted. He says heaven is a place where there is no fear. People do not have to face poverty, hunger, old age and sorrow. *Yama* tells him that for a man to reach heaven will have to 'understand himself, understand universal Self' and pointing towards an equilibrium through the 'union of the two' the man 'kindles the triple Fire, offers the sacrifice; then shall he, though still on earth, break the bonds of death, beyond sorrow, mount into heaven' (Swami and Yeats 1937: 27). There is an emphasis on compatible, consistent, coherent and uniform order for achieving a sense of perfection where one will be rewarded.

Having his two wishes granted, it is his third wish which is something we need to pay attention.

'*Nachiketa*: There is this doubt in regard to a man who has departed, some (holding) that he is and some that he is not. I would be instructed by thee in this knowledge. Of the boons, this is the third wish' (Radhakrishnan 1994: 603).

'*Yama*: Even the gods of old had doubt on this point. It is not, indeed, easy to understand; (so) subtle is this truth. Choose another boon, O *Naciketas*. Do not press me. Release me from this' (Radhakrishnan 1994: 604).

Yama tries to dissuade *Nachiketa* by offering other gifts, wealth and long life, but *Nachiketa* is rejects all these desires as ephemeral and insists on knowing the secret about Death. *Yama* relents.

'*Yama*: Different is the good, and different, indeed, is the pleasant. These two, with different purpose, bind a man: Of these two, it is well for him who takes hold of the good; but he who chooses the pleasant, fails of his aim' (Radhakrishnan 1994: 607).

Yama tells *Nachiketas* about the two paths of temptation, of 'good' and 'evil'. The latter leads to death and the former to heaven. In our case under consideration, it is the path that populations, in modern times, are normalised to pursue and the 'good' path is the one defined by the nation-state. This is how binaries of 'good' and 'evil' get created through a discourse and populations tend to affiliate themselves with the 'good' and separate themselves from the 'evil'. This is the path which leads to the biopolitics of the human race. This dialogue between *Yama* and *Nachiketa* reveals a philosophically driven process of normalisation but one can attempt to draw parallels with the normalisation we expounded through Foucault's conceptualisation, one which is pervasive in society. It sets standards and norms to create the dichotomy between 'normal' and 'abnormal'. This is indicative of the two paths defined by *Yama* to achieve immortality.

The modern nation-state, too, defines dichotomous paths to create *Nachiketas* in society, an adherent citizenry. For the population to identify with the right path, to be identified with the 'pure race', it signs on a dotted line. But, there is much more than that. The permanence of war that we established through the formation of *homo bellum*, can be studied through this analogy as well. There is a belief of immortality attached to death. There is a death-defying logic to immortality and this gets normalised achieving a sense of purity. Similarly, in contemporary times, nation-states tend to play an analogous logic with the act of acquiring nuclear weapons. The act is presented as the 'preservation of life' and a defence of the pure race. This also signifies that only the idea of 'complete surrender' can be of worth to achieve immortality. It is pertinent to mention that in the above discussed story from the *Upanishad*, *Nachiketas* did not find his father to be completely dedicated to his deed of sacrifice. This notion of 'complete surrender' can be found in contemporary times too. We studied how power functions in everyday life through panopticism with a few people functioning to control large and infinite people. There is a complete surrender, a subordination of bodies, through the fear of a constant gaze of the observer. This, we learned, how normalisation functions in societies. It signifies the continuity between life and death, death and renewal, and a 'complete surrender' to ensure protection of the entire community, nation, against danger. Indulging in an extremely dangerous act of acquiring nuclear assets achieves legitimacy as securing the life of the nation as race and averting danger. This discourse is nourished in the minds of population as a means of life's maintenance. The analogy may seem sporadic and discombobulated but as expressed earlier, these are mere explorations.

This has been the objective of this research project to deprivilege the privileged explanations, those which reinforce particular patterns to achieve an elegant theory.

If we try to recapitulate the argument of nuclearisation, we noticed that there is an everlasting course of action of arms production and enhancement followed by nuclearisation, making the 'life' of the populations an interplay of life and death. The populations do not realize that in this discourse of 'securing life', it is essentially the life that is at stake. However, that 'danger towards life' gets attenuated for the 'greater good' of 'securing life'. Therefore, a danger of death is inflicted on a healthy body and the body is made aware of 'securing life' and not of having 'danger' inflicted on it and it walks the ordeal, a permanent feature of its life.

But the question arises, whether the populations become numb and indifferent to the technologies of power? Is the danger of death so fuzzy to be presented as a logic for the regeneration of life? Why are some humans more human than others? How does one get to know who is more human?

War as a Spectacle

Paul Virilio explains the spectacle of warfare and provides insights to the queries posed above in his book *Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light* (2002). He explains this in the context of the first Gulf War and its telecast on television screens worldwide. He believes that the Gulf War was not only indicative of future wars but future societies characterized with speed. The speed reduces any room or scope for political debate and discussion as information coming from different parts at a rapid speed leads to shrinking of space. He takes issue with the critical press and its role during wars and conflicts. Not only the press, with this speed and in times of war or crises, decisions are to be made swiftly by the leaders, which too leaves no room for analysis and any plural or democratic discussion. Virilio says,

'Politics depends upon having time for reflection. Today, we no longer have time to reflect, the things that we see have already happened. And it is necessary to react immediately. Is a real time democracy possible? An authoritarian politics, yes. But what defines democracy is the sharing of power. When there is no time to share, what will be shared?' (Virilio 2002: 43).

There is a 'culture of secrecy' that defines nuclear projects and policies of nation-states, as understood through the case studies of India and Iran in this research. There are these notions

of 'classified information' in defence research, 'code words' for testing, 'command and control', 'safety and reliability' of weapon facilities making the entire realm as some sort of a holy cow. This has led to a lack of debate in the public discourse on the nuclear issues because there is no time to share and therefore no time to discuss. However, there is a lot to share about the enemy's nuclear assets and the dangers emanating from them. The presentation of war is like a theatrical spectacle with deception, connivance and control as its chief characters.

Virilio's assertion is similar to Butler's when she says that the way certain people's voices are not transmitted, their images are not shown and their lives become ungrievable because of the populist discourse and the project of State Racism, as conceptualised by Foucault. Virilio explains this in the context of media's role during the first Gulf War where the speed with which information was being fed in by the state, left no room for critical analysis. This is a new form of propaganda characterized by too much information, although selective, in too little time. This leads to no scrutiny of the claims made by the state and its actions. The press tends to reinforce the act of dehumanizing the image of the 'enemy' and a certain conception of 'national security'. There is then, as Butler puts it, no mourning of deaths on 'enemy' lands and its population in the media. It would therefore be right to say that a discourse on the 'Other' to dehumanize can also occur through a lack of discourse, lack of representation.

Revisiting

In Chapter One, we introduced the scholarship on Biopolitics particularly that of Michel Foucault who was one of key scholars to have introduced the concept and explain it in great detail. We deliberately tried to not focus on the works of authors/academics/theorists who have extended and reworked on the concept to be able to do justice with Foucault's scholarship on the field. We attempted to spell out how notions of life and death and their meanings and application for the sovereign transformed over a period of time. To reiterate, this is a transition from 'punishment' in the form of public humiliation to a disciplinary mechanism in the form a prison to an appended method of regulation in the form of 'governmentality'. In this transformation, we deduced that there is no succession from sovereignty to security but there is a correlation. We analysed that it is a significant change as it indicates 'life' that is the object of reference for the government. It is also an evolution under which engaging in wars is no longer pursued for the defence of the sovereign but to make safe the continuation of life of the population and for the 'collective survival'. To

understand how and where the notion of a 'normalising' society emerges, we looked into the means of mechanisms, with the purpose to optimize a state of life that operates in such a method as to pull off overall states of equilibrium to achieve balance and order. Here, the power takes control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species ensuring that they are not just disciplined, but regularized.

To place in the concept to the nuclear domain, we highlighted the predicament of biopower which on one hand promises preservation of life while on the other hand develops deadly nuclear weapons bringing populations under the ambit of risk. This was explained through the emerging 'society of security' that believes acquiring nuclear weapons will deter the enemy to pose a threat to its existence. In this 'society of security', nation-states acting in a preventive fashion develop nuclear assets and if need be, wage wars against an adversary. We underlined the predicament of biopower in the context of nuclear weapons through Foucault's identification of the paradox of biopower where it reaches its limit. He wrote about the atomic power which is not only about the sovereign power to kill but also the power to kill life itself. This is the correlation we had suggested in the transition of power in which biopower coexists with the sovereign power's right to kill and therefore in offense and defence can use force or weapons of mass destruction to wage a war. We made recourse to the project of State Racism which rests on this murderous justification of the modern nation-state. We examined how states have often created the notion of the 'Other' whose actions are to be restrained or cut back and why the population needs caring and protection. These are the kind of discourses that are fed and normalised in the general public by nation-states where developing nuclear weapons are presented as defending and caring of life vis-à-vis an antagonist.

In Chapter Two, we discussed how the discipline of International Relations, with a special focus on the issues of peace and war, has been conceptualized and theorized with certain theoretical traditions being privileged over others. The purpose of doing this was to see where the scholarship on Biopolitics could best fit in. This was followed by a meticulous discussion on the liberal way of war and making a reference to a dichotomy of just and unjust wars where 'just' is guided by the reasons of the state. The explanation on the liberal way of war was premised on the bases of understanding war as an extension of control and regulating mechanisms of governance. We identified a practice of deceit, the malignant face of the nation-state which is covered with a benevolent mask of establishment of liberal peace. This

is how modern nation-states tend to 'prepare for war' as a 'necessity of life'. Commitment to war is perpetual and is presented for the pursuit of justice/peace. Liberal peace, therefore, becomes the continuation of war by other means. This allowed us to unravel the compartmentalization of theoretical camps and explaining the fuzzy boundaries of geopolitics and the interstices of biopolitics.

We also underscored the element of contingency which, according to Dillon and Reid (2009), has had an intense impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in modern times stressing on the magnitude of security and its related notions of 'dangers, threats and enemies'. This is what points to the martial expression of the biopolitical imperative which is the preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. We suggested that acquiring nuclear weapons add that value of contingency, of an unforeseen disaster, to liberal rule. Nation-states exaggerate threat and danger to a hyperbolic degree to validate or rationalize acquirement of weapons of mass destruction as the preparedness to make war or to dissuade the adversary to make war against one's population. This was an indication that claims of emancipation, salvation, care that the modern state claims to achieve or provide are a sham and have a bellicose face. This was followed by a discussion of the norm, normation and normalisation techniques nation-states pursue to 'manufacture consent' and create, what we have called, *homo bellum*, i.e. humans for war to highlight the permanence of war in contemporary times driven by the dominance of nuclear weapons. Acquiring nuclear assets to 'avoid war' is the idea or the norm that comes to be seen as 'normal' and 'natural'. This is a norm that population is expected to conform. We comprehended Foucault's concept of normalisation which is important to understand how nation-states have justified their actions/desires, to go nuclear, to its population. The imperative of arms production becomes a norm and the nation-state claims to act on behalf of the population, nation as a race, for its obsession to act cohesively.

We also offered an explanation that preserving the life has to do with supremacy/prestige, a norm to achieve the status of great power. Nation-states create a different kind of racism with this norm of enhancing a state's status in comparison to other states in international relations. It also grounds itself on the notion of distinct and superior history and yet wants to maintain status quo for eternity. This entire process of normalisation leads to the formation of *homo-bellum* which thrives on the Hobbesian notion of state of nature where human beings are extended as nation-states. In this conceptualization, we asserted that war becomes the essence of the human and the necessary condition of existence. There is a certain kind of thrill that is

attached to this existence and this is what is aspired and needs to be achieved. These humans for war, *Homo bellum*, normalised through nation-states (racism) by acquiring deadly weapons, find death acceptable because and if it allows one to live. We highlighted that this is a temporary arrangement but is in practice all the time. It needs arousal for the 'sake' of 'national security' as a status during moments of crises of the nation-state and its national interest. These discourses get so normalised in the everyday lives of population that this is seen to be the real picture and the only picture which sidelines pacifism.

To entrench this idea, an analysis through the case studies of India and Iran was pursued in Chapter Three. This was done to depict the way political rationality around acquiring nuclear weapons is pursued through policies as tactics (in which violence is hidden) in the name caring for life of its population. We established the way preservation of life may involve and pave the way for mass slaughter. Locating this discourse in the Indian nuclear experience, we witnessed acquiring and testing nuclear weapon capability did create the distinction between those 'who should live and those who should die'. This was driven by India's perception of Pakistan and China as the 'impure race' through historical factors and incidents and this perception played a fundamental role in motivating its nuclear programme deriving support from the public which was overwhelmingly unsupportive of acquiring the deadly weapons before. We also established that nuclear weapons have made India less secure and despite becoming less secure, India asserted to have 'affirmed life' vis-à-vis an 'enemy race'. In an attempt to be identified with the normal, populations accepted and endorsed state's constructions to avoid being labelled as deviant. We saw that this acceptance and endorsement is actually manufactured by the procedures pursued by the nation-state of indoctrination through elite-opinion and harping on rhetoric. We looked at the opinion polls conducted before and after the nuclear tests in India and Iran and most gave the impression of being content with the government policy. In Iran, notions of victimization, recognition and civilization have been used to create a normalising society and to create the binary of pure-impure race.

However, despite the fact that nuclear weapons have the power of mass slaughter, in their history they have been used just once and therefore we suggested that it may be argued that the modern state, guided by biopolitical principles, refrains from mass-slaughter but keeps that option open by acquiring the capability to do so. The 'life' of the population that the

modern nation-state claims to uphold, preserve, affirm and protect becomes a 'life' under eternal threat.

Sum and Substance

Therefore, what we have tried to do is to substantiate the argument we had made in the beginning that modern nation-states' *raison d'etat* in acquiring nuclear weapons for the 'welfare' of their 'populations' is a flawed logic as nuclearisation and impending and imminent arms race puts the 'life' of the 'population' at risk. In the transformation of the sovereign power that takes place from the right to kill and letting the subject live to the biological right to protect the population or abandoning it to death, the nation-state acquires the power over the 'life' of its 'populations'. With the logic of affirming life of the populations, nation-states initiate weapons programme, deadlier the better, to take preventive or pre-emptive steps to avoid the likelihood of biological, chemical, or nuclear attack from the adversary and the destruction that they are seen to be capable of causing. Nations-states acquire legitimacy for this annihilatory function through a process of 'normalisation' by resorting to the racism project of inculcating an enemy as the 'impure race' and constructing a 'threat' emanating from it. This process of 'normalisation' leads to the formation of *homo bellum*, humans for war, which establishes the permanence of war in the international society.

If we return to Judith Butler's point in *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning* (2004), she believes that the events of 9/11 led to the public intellectuals discontinue with their obligation to principles of justice and media abandons the investigative journalism. She says that fear and surveillance are so strong that makes it difficult to speak the unspeakable. She envisions a task for humanities similar to what we had visualized in the beginning of this research: *Upsetting the Normal and Unsettling the Immutable*. She suggests,

'If the humanities has a future as Cultural criticism and cultural criticism has a task at the present moment, It is no doubt to return us to the human where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense. We would have to interrogate the emergence and vanishing of the human at the limits of what we can know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can sense. This might prompt us, affectively, to reinvigorate the intellectual projects of critique, of questioning, of coming to understand the difficulties and demands of cultural translation and dissent, and to create a sense of the public in which oppositional voices are not feared, degraded or dismissed, but valued for the instigation to a sensate democracy they occasionally perform' (Butler 2004: 151)

Therefore, for disarmament movements and pacifism to become successful, such contradictions that we have pointed out in this research regarding nuclearisation, will have to come in the mainstream so that there is unequivocally denunciation on all fronts and there is a concord between the state and its population over the meanings they attach to life and death.

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