

**COLOUR REVOLUTION AND NATURE OF
STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY INTERACTION: A CASE
STUDY OF KYRGYZSTAN (2005-2011)**

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**COLOUR REVOLUTION AND NATURE OF STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY INTERACTION: A CASE STUDY OF KYRGYZSTAN (2005-2011)**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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DEDICATED
TO
MY AMMA AND BABU JI

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Alok Kumar Pandey

ABBREVIATIONS

CARs	CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
CDCS	COALITION FOR DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY
CIS	COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
CPSU	COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION
CSAC	CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST CORRUPTION
CSOs	CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
DDK	DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT KYRGZSTAN
KCHR	KYRGYZ COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IMF	INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
IOs	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
INGOs	INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
NED	NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
NGOs	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
ODIHR	OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OSCE	ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
USSR	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATION STATE: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The role of modern nation state has become a dominant discourse among political scientists in 21st century. Despite the differences among the scholars about the definition of the state, notwithstanding, still there is some consensus among them about the few core features of the state, which can be helpful for understanding that what the state is? The understanding of the 'state' by Max Weber has been is most accepted and it says:

The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: it possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only in so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it ... The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation (Weber 1978).

Weber's definition denotes these few main features of the state: a centralized bureaucratic legal order, a binding authority on a defined territory, a monopoly on the use of force. He also argues that state is also an internally and externally sovereign entity. Internal sovereignty means that there is no other organization is bigger than state in its defined territorial boundary. External sovereignty expresses that other states of international community, recognize the jurisdiction of a state within its territory and that state is the sole representative of the interests of its citizens in the international community of sovereign states. Recognizing the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of states in 1933 proposes the legal definition of the state. According to article 1, states must possess the following qualities: a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government capable of maintaining effective control over the corresponding territory (CFR 2012).

State is a political organization which has centralized but differentiated decision making authority. Thus it is not a monolithic structure and it consists a set of institutions and organizations. Judiciary, Executive and legislature are the three most significant arms of the state. Each is different from others in its function and

jurisdiction, but despite that there is a certain level of cohesion among them. These different arms of state do not use the authority on their own but on the behalf of state which flows to them as a part of the state. Generally 'state' and 'government' resemble each other. But they are not similar entity. A 'government' refers to the administrative organ of 'state' and is constrained by the constitution of the 'state'. A government may change but state always persists (Bhargava 2008:171).

From the beginning of state it is capacity (obligatory power) of the state that has enabled it to carry out its functions and jurisdictions across a given territory and claim internal and external sovereignty. So it the capacity of the state that is can be said the core characteristics in functioning of a state. When we discuss about the development of the state, it means we are throwing light on the capacity of the state. It is the 'capacity' of the state that has been continuously changing from the ancient city-state to 21st century's modern nation state. This 'capacity' depends upon the state's bureaucratic structure and its internal discipline and the relation between various state organs and different groups and classes of the society under its territory (Gill 2003:32)

Ancient State

The ancient state had a weak infrastructure, limited capacity, a very less developed and unorganized bureaucracy. There was very less interdependence between the state and its subjects. In the ancient period the state was becoming a stabilizing authority. No institutional sophistication and differentiation was there. The capacity of the state which comes from the centralized authority was not present during the ancient period. This ancient period can be categorized between 3000 BC to 400 AD. Though there were many city-states but Mesopotamia, Rome, and the Greece were prominent among them where the embryo of modern state had been developing (Gill 2003:33).

Feudal and Early Modern State

The weakness of ancient state like limited capacity, less penetrative state and limited organized bureaucracy was to overcome in the 15th to 19th century. In the feudal and early modern period national state emerged as supreme entity. The territorial principle became the dominant form of organizing large-scale society. The centralization of power and authority within its territory got combined. This paved the way for the

national state dominance in Western Europe. Many factors had pushed the territorial state toward the national state.¹

Internal Factors

The territorial consolidation of state, industrialization, means of communication, law and order improvement, and struggle between different groups and classes had paved the way for coming closer of state and society from the sixteenth to nineteenth century.

Territorial Consolidation of the State

from the second half of the eighteenth century, due to the vanishing the role of overlapping feudal actors in society, territorial state had acquired as a dominant political actor in Europe. This territorial consolidation involved both the extension of the power and authority of a single centre over the national territory which resulted in the elimination of autonomous centers of power which challenged the centre earlier, and the demarcation of national boundaries as lines establishing the limits of that centre's authority (Gill 2003:95).

Establishment of Law and Order

The state was also trying to establish the law and order system across its territory, although this was ad-hoc and intermittent. The elimination of rival centers of power (feudal landlords) within the national state ensured that at least only one political authority would prevail. The regularization of this authority was important because it reflected a growing predictability in life and security of commercial activity. The legal regulation and the extension of central power pushed towards the standardization of the currency and the establishment of common systems of weights and measures. These provided a consistent and standard medium of exchange, thereby facilitating increased economic interaction (Gill 2003:118).

Infrastructure Development & Literacy Growth

In the second half of nineteenth century, there was massive growth of the infrastructure in the state. In the century means of communication and transport were

¹We are not discussing about nation state. This came into existence in 20th century.

transformed fundamentally. Due to development of the Railway transport state penetrated into the remote, separated and deep flung areas (Hobson and Weiss 1995:94).

Industrialization, means of communication and transport were the most fundamental change in the European society because it reshaped human life which was earlier agrarian based. Because of demand of educated labour growth of literacy growth was also accompanying industrialization. And in the second half of 19th century and the illiteracy had been largely eliminated from the adult population. This was complemented by the creation of a system of technical and trade education designed to equip workers for the demands of the industrial economy (Hobson and Weiss 1995:94).

The abovementioned developments were happened from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Though the degree and pace were different and in various countries but the pattern across the Continent was the alike. The expansion of the state was even further into society than ever before. The result of this processes the local semi-autonomous feudal lords and other local power holders got lessened. The bureaucratic expansion was even dipper than earlier. This process was to be extended quite significantly in the twentieth century (Gill 2003:139).

New Classes in the Society

The industrial revolution fundamentally transformed the social structure in a more rapid, dramatic and far-reaching way than anything in the past. Pre-industrial society used to live in rural areas and the mode of economic production was located there. Industrialization changed both the living place and economic activity of the people. The location of population and economic centre of society were shifted from villages to the burgeoning towns and cities (Mann 1986:471).

The main result of aforesaid development was the emergence of two new classes, the capitalist owner of means of production and the working class of industries. These two classes attempted to access to the state power structure and in this process state came much closer to societal groups. These new classes established new organizational linkages between the institutions of the state and parts of the

population. These linkages may not always have been very effective in transmitting the views and interests of their constituencies into the apex of the state. Despite this, it was a positive development between states -society relations because many new classes peacefully entered into the political contours of the state (Crouzet 1985:148).

The industrial development during the nineteenth and early twentieth century thus transformed the state institutions and society fundamentally. It further reduced distance between state and society. It allowed state's decision-makers both to penetrate society to a much greater depth and to monitor about the events in the society. The problem of geographical remoteness was lessened by the new and fast means of transport which resulted in reduced autonomy of local magnates and state officials. It was easier for the centre to send off instructions, exercise monitoring and generally remain in contact with its specialized bureaucracy through these improved channels (Mann 1997:374).

The struggle of these new classes for entry to the political arena also strengthened unity between state and society. The spread of notions of democracy meant increasing acceptance this principle that government should be accountable to those over whom it ruled. Those who ran the state were not to be isolated from the governed but were to be continually answerable for their actions. The state itself was to be answerable to the populace within its borders. It was not now above the society (Gill 2003:148).

External Factors

The roles of external factors have also been very important in the development of state. The exogenous factors like war inter-state trade etc. This international context also includes the broader relationship between Western Europe and the rest of the world, most especially Asia.

The Growth of Inter-State Trade

The industrialization and its surplus production propelled the traders and merchants to search new market. These commercial expeditions facilitated the flow of information and knowledge across globe. So through the borrowing good ideas and their application from abroad states developed its capacity and institutions (Creveld 1999:134).

Role of War

War and geopolitical competition have also been seen a path breaking event in the emergence of the modern state (Ertman 1997:3-4). War has been a one of most important state-building activity in 20th century. It is clear that the conduct of war massively had increased the government's need for revenue and this stimulated the development of the financial apparatus of the state. More funds were needed not just to sustain the war's expenditure, but also to pay off the debts of states induced by war. War and particular advanced military technological changes were also important in undercutting the dyadic ties between states and feudal, that was at the heart of feudalism (Tilly 1975:26).

Creating National Identity

Inter-state competition, inter-state trade, and especially growing cost of war were main factor in arousing the sentiment of separate national identity among states. Because the warfare was a costly business and rulers needed more money sustain it. It was possible only through domestic sources. So it was in the rulers' interest to create a supportive attitude among the populace from whom such resources were to be collected. Due to this necessity the common shared national characteristics were created. Resulting this process, the concept of state now no longer had been the property of ruler. The people were also stakeholders in the State. (Lebow 2010:132).

The Role of the Colonial Globalization

The western European model of state has been travelled across globe in the carry bag of imperialism. The Spanish, English, Dutch, French and Portuguese, and later the Belgians, Germans and Americans, incorporated much of the world in far-flung overseas empires. This expansion of empire was a physical manifestation of the extension of competition between the European states beyond Europe. When these colonial powers left their colonies, the model of their state had been adopted by local elites for future state building (Balibar 1990:340).

STATE IN 20th CENTURY

In the twentieth century the state's development got two contradictory phases. In the first half it penetrated into society most in the name of welfare and communist model. But in the second half since the decade of seventies it has been reducing its role due the philosophy of neo-liberalism.

Rollout of the State

In the twentieth century the expansion of the state was major phenomenon. It penetrated further into society and controlling more of the lives of the people who lived under it than ever before. The principal form this took in the West was the capitalist welfare state; in the East, the communist state. There was an alteration in the state's formal relationship with the people over whom it ruled. This change reflected in the rise of democratic politics and the calling those people as 'citizens'. This welfare state was expanded interdependence with society at all levels, rendering the state much more embedded within society than it had been historically (Heywood 1994:218).

Rollback of the State

The welfare state was not a static, unchanging entity. There were many reasons such as oil crises of 1973, people protest of high taxation during the Arab-Israel conflict, increasing cost of budget and vigorous Anglo-Saxon ideology of neo-liberalism((an ideology most directly associated with Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the USA)could be called as major factors in the rise of a rolling back state(Baylis and Smith 2008:325).

The relationship between citizen and state has now been altered. Rather than offering a social security service which was the responsibility of the state, it is now in the business of selling services as a product to its consumer citizens. In a wide range of areas now the state is withdrawing from its earlier role. (Mann 1997:478).

The Soviet Model of State-System

The rise of the new model of communist state normally centered on USSR and China. It showed a new alternative means of organizing society to the model that had developed in the West. This was a struggle for ideology and political control. It

emerged as a dominant form of social organization. Intrinsic to this was the role of the state. These states are called totalistic states because in such type political system is geared for the total control over society (Kothz 1998:2).

But in 1989 the Soviet kind of state also collapsed. The communist state was considered to be very powerful because of the extent of the change it was able to implement in Soviet society. The reason of the collapse the highly centralized communist USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) were highly centralized party, sense of separateness among people, domination of state not cooperativeness, high despotic power but weak capacity to cop-up with new challenges can be argued some reasons behind the this alternative system failure (Strayer 1998:4-7).

STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

From the last two decades of the twentieth century, the nature of the state has been transformed fundamentally due to process of globalization. Instead of being associated with the territorial state, it has become deterritorialized. Many new multinational organizations, companies and supranational bodies of regional organizations are threatening the state's sovereignty which has been the very core concept of state. (Bhargava and Acharva 2008:184).

The pattern of institutions and functions of the state has not been static. It has been continuously changing and transforming and both have changed significantly since the emergence of city states. Even though, the Globalization has very deep impact on the nature of state. Notwithstanding, the state will remain the most important political organization in human society. State may be retreating from some sectors but it may also be expanding in others. (Gill 2003:253).

THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

“After a spell of hundreds of years, the theme of civil society has become a centre theme of social- political history.”² In fact the idea of civil society is a cause ‘célèbre’ for social scientists these days, partly inspired by recent East European democratic experiments. As a concept civil society means different things to different people.

²Kean, John (1988), *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspective*, London: Verso:1

Civil society is a society of citizens where people are free to express their views, manage their day to day affairs and to participate in all activities in the society that influence their lives (Chintan 1998: 59). Larry Diamond says that Civil Society is conceived as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules(Diamond 1995:5).

Diamond identified several formal and informal organizations of civil society: 1) economic (2) cultural (3) informational and educational (4) interest-based (5) developmental (6) issue-oriented and (7) civic.³

In analyzing the concept of civil society three schools-Liberal, Marxist and New Liberal's arguments are important for the understanding to civil society.

Liberal Conception of Civil Society

Subsequently, the idea of civil society was associated with liberalism in the later phases. This was possible with the coming of enlightenment where 'reason' or 'rational understanding' became the hallmark in every aspect of life. In fact, liberalism associated both Aristotelian and the medieval conception of civil society entails free citizens associating together to further their collective goals. Locke played a pivotal role in the development and growth of civil society.

According to the Liberals, like Hobbes, Locke, J.S.Mill, Tocqueville and Adam Smith, an active civil society is essential for democracy. Hobbes and Locke distinguished 'civil society' from the 'state of nature'. They argued that through social contract a civil society or political society came into being. Both talked about a public sphere where individuals had some inalienable rights which were protected by the state. For John Locke civil society is 'Civil State' (Mohindar 2008:188). Tocqueville and J.S.Mill both have maintained that the state power should be restricted through civil society. For de Tocqueville, Civil Society is 'Associational Life'(Bratton 1994:1).

³ Diamond, Larry (1994), "Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation", Journal of Democracy, 5 (3): 6.

Civil Society-Marx and Gramsci's View

Marx stressed that civil society is an instrument for the exploitation of the proletariat class by the bourgeoisie (Kumar 1993:383). Marx believed that in liberal democracies civil society was not able to create a situation for individual freedom, democratic transformation and state-society integration. He emphasizes that the civil society had become Neo-Liberal Conception of Civil Society (Mahajan 1999:1192).

Antonio Gramsci explained capitalist society in terms of structures of domination. The first part of the structure is constituted by family, religious institution, educational institutions etc. which provides legitimation. The second part which is the structure of coercion is the political society. He said that civil society facilitates capitalism for its survival through the cultural and ideological capital. Civil society supremacy and hegemony of the ruling class (Mohindar 2008:198).

Neo-Liberal View about Civil Society

Since the mid 1970s the public philosophy began to change in western countries. The Neo-liberalism criticized the Keynesian welfare model of state. Neo-liberalism demanded that government should reinvent its role and give primacy to non-profit sectors for the public services. They wanted that state should give up its responsibilities leave it onto market, nonprofit organizations and other voluntaries bodies for service delivery. This speaks to the neo-liberal desire to disinvest responsibilities for various citizenship rights in the social and economic spheres, and in the process, transform the state's caring role in society (Evans and Shields 2000:8).

Neo-liberals project the nonprofit sector as an independent third force, and emphasizes that many nonprofit organizations have historically played in close cooperation with government in creating and sustaining the welfare state. Neo-liberals hold the view that civil society (of which nonprofit organizations are substantive part) is entirely self-sustaining. In fact neo-liberals argued that that when government is too involved in the social, cultural and economic regulation of society that it acts as a barrier to the effective operation of nonprofit organizations (Edwards 2011:30). The neo-liberal project wants to build something structurally and culturally different market society. In practice, this translates into a policy framework and

political culture based on the notion of self-reliance and competition (Evans and Shields 2000:10.).

Re-emergence of Civil Society

The concept of civil society has acquired a new resilience and visibility in recent decades. It has been mentioned by theorists that two contemporary developments have contributed to this. One was the break-up of communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The prevailing condition in the eastern European communist states had drawn a worldwide attention. Accordingly, Rupnick and other western commentators took the emergence of dissent movement in Poland seriously as an existing and significant development within communism. There was, however, until August 1980, an air of utopianism wishful thinking about the rebirth of civil society. The strikes of that month and signing of the agreements between workers and the governments representatives in Gdansk, Szczecin and elsewhere, which allowed the formation of independent, self-governing trade unions, suddenly turned the dream into reality (Kean 1988:363). Polish party leadership gave into their unprecedented demands instead of suppressing them by military force which ultimately led the birth of solidarity (Kean 1988:363). A sizeable body of literature interprets the events of 1980-81 in the light of the concept of civil society is a truly remarkable intellectual development.

Apart from the solidarity movement, the influence of the Tocquevillian tradition in America helped to contribute the re-emergence of civil society in contemporary social and political theory. According to Putnam, democracy becomes more responsive and effective, when it faces a vigorous civil society. He argues convincingly that horizontally organized voluntary associations, that cut across social cleavages are more likely to nourish wider social cooperation, to reinforce norms of reciprocity and thus to 'make democracy work' than hierarchical segmental organization of clientelistic structures (Kohn and Aserato 1994:217).

State-Civil Society Relation

The state-civil society relation is dependent on the nature of governance that is operating in a country. In dictatorial regimes, civil society is perceived as a threat to the state power and hence the state attempts curtail the space of civil society. In fact in

some instances, the dictatorial regimes use civil society to their interest. It is only in a democratic state the civil society can emerge and progress as the state allows both democratic and civic rights essential for its growth and development. Also, civil society acts as a check on the functioning of the government in democracy. Hence both are complementary to each other. However, both state and civil society has distinct sphere of its own and hence cannot replace each other. In this context, Chandoke maintains that civil society organizations cannot replace institutions like state because there are certain issues which should be responded only by the state (Chandoke 1999:12-16). In short, civil society can serve primarily as complimentary or as a check on government; they cannot replace or assume the over-arching function of the state as the agent of development of society as whole (Putnam, 1993; Evans, 1995, 1996; Tandler, 1997).

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is dearth of literature on the state-society approach and they present a nuanced analysis about the interaction between the state and civil society that how they influence each-other.

The task of Conceptualizing of the state has always been a perplexing for the social scientists. **Gill (2003)** make efforts in this regard and follows the Max Weber' famous concept that state as enjoying sovereign rule-making power, ruling over a set territory containing a given population, and having a monopoly over violence. The state' infrastructural power is main concern of Gill. He argued that state embed itself into society through its 'institutional interdependence' (various organs of state) and 'organic interdependence' (people representation in state institutions). Gill elaborates the process through which state has travelled the long journey from city states in Mesopotamia and Greece to modern European model of modern nation state. He argues that state was able to penetrate society and create links with various societal groups, and now it has emerged as the prevailing organizing force within that society.

Migdal (2001) have analysed the interaction between the state and society and he have questioned the state-system approach of Talcot Parsons and tried to divert the focus on the state-society approach. Migdal suggests that the study of domination and

change requires an examination of multiple sites of political struggle and of the coalitions-spanning state and societal actors-that form around them. No society has one, uncontested, universal code for guiding people's lives but, rather, multiple sets of competing formal and informal guideposts promoted by different groupings.

There is considerable literature on the civil society. The civil society is considered as an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. In his book **Khilnani and Kaviraj (2002)**, argue that civil society as the instrument promising and providing the possibilities of democracy in a state. But, they both agree on the point that this side of the civil society has been dark in many of the countries that have emerged from the authoritarian rule or from close political regulation of the economy and the Civil Society remains as distant and precarious an ambition as ever. **Chandhoke (2009)** raises the question of civil society by defining it as an essential prerequisite of democracy and also said that civil society organizations cannot replace institutions like state because there are certain issues which should be responded only by the state. They all converge at the point of civil society to be understood as an instrument of change and democracy.

Geiss(2003) focus on Central Asia from the perspective of political sociology. He further, presents comparative analysis of Central Asian communal and political organisation before and after the tsarist conquest of the region. He also covers Turkman, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and other tribal societies, analyses the patrimonial state structures of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanates of Khiva and Khokand. He discusses the impact of the established tsarist civil military administration on the communal and political orientations of the Muslim population. He also analyses that how different political authority perceived the collective identity of the people of different regions. He argues that past patrimonial culture has decisive impact on current political situations in Central Asia.

Wheeler (1964) has concentrated the social, cultural and intellectual developments of Central Asia during the Tsarist and Soviet period. He emphasised that westernization process started during the Tsarist and Pre-Tsarist period did not yet superseded the Islamic way of life in Central Asia. But he also argues that massive security, communication and urban development occurred during this period. **Luong (2005)** very meticulously described the legacy of Soviet Union on Central Asian States. He

says that Soviet legacy both facilitated and complicated the process of state building in Central Asia. Benefitted means they got soviet administrative, economic structure and educated population. But the soviet institutional and ideological legacy has been the pessimistic factors.

Anderson (1999) puts an overview of Kyrgyzstan's history, politics, economic development, and place in the international community. In particular, it focuses on the problematic nature of political development, with democratic and pluralist impulses struggling to survive against the dominance of more traditional forms of governance. He argues that historical and cultural impact has been powerful on the Kyrgyz society and state. He narrates how community grouping Ashar Civil society in Kyrgyzstan started its flying mainly after the independence of Kyrgyzstan and to attracting foreign funding the President Akaev facilitated the development of civil society organisations. So, **Anderson (2000)** suggests that the creation of a 'modernize' civil society requires the emergence of five supportive contexts- political, economic, regulatory, informational and cultural, and explore the extent to which these are being developed in Kyrgyzstan. But its governing leaders had not utilised this opportunity and the democratic process had weakened. Therefore he has suggested for cooperation among different power holders to create a responsive, vibrant and active civil society.

Beachain (2010) define the 'Colour Revolution' is used to describe as a single phenomenon a number of non-violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during the first decade of the twenty- first century. This has involved thousands of people, wearing coloured symbols, taking to the streets and showing their discontent with the current regime while the opposition, legitimated by such crowds, has been able to negotiate political change with the authorities. Beachain also identify five conditions for the colour revolution- character of the state on the eve of protests, role of opposition leaders, external influence, role of the civil society, attitude of the people. He further argues that from Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution onwards, post- Soviet regimes learned how to contain civil movements, suppress the opposition and limit external influences on domestic politics. The result is a strategy that blends isolationism with violent repression of pro-democratic movements, effectively preventing further colour revolutions.

Tulip revolution was a very path breaking event in the Kyrgyz history and there are many causes and effects of this people movement. The Tulip revolution (2005) in Kyrgyzstan attracted the attention of international scholars, observers and academicians surprisingly. There may be many internal and external factors in this event and even still it is very difficult to find out those causes. A lot of articles have tried to explain this. **Cummings (2008)** has factored four lines of inquiry for the happening of Tulip revolution. First, process of state building, democratization, and divisional lines, the second is interaction between informal (clan networks, criminals and solidarity groups etc.) and formal institutions (state apparatus and political parties), the third is trigger of mobilization and last is international dimensions. **Kulov (2008)** argues that the trigger effect of elections provided opportunity for oppositional leaders to use this event as flying track. They used the election as trigger. There was the spill over effect of other countries colour revolution. **Maija, (2009)** seeks to reassess the outcome of mainstream civil society promotion policies in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. While the author agrees with critics that the distorting effects of funding relations have meant that the promised 'grassroots citizen empowerment' has not been achieved directly through NGOs, he does not agree that NGOs are therefore merely vehicles of the Western ideological agenda and international aid to the Kyrgyzstani population. He argues that the facilitation of international actors has opened up opportunities for individual NGO activists to pursue their own social and political development agendas. **Tursunkulova (2008)** has something different argument and she said that it was the Aksy events that helped to unite people in March 2005. Certainly, the opposition in Kyrgyzstan was also inspired by successful external examples but the Tulip Revolution also happened because political authorities, civil activists and the masses had learnt their lessons from 2002 Aksi event. **Lewis (2008)** has said that domestic and international factors were responsible for the Tulip revolution respectively. But he emphasised that domestic reasons were more influential for the occurrence of it. **Marat (2008)** sees tulip revolution as educative event because it has made people politically aware and praises the civil society as stabilizer. He sees it as positive sign that people have more faith in civil society than the political parties and politician.

DEFINITION, RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Civil society is considered as a third space between state and people. It plays a vital role on the one hand, educates, aware and organise the people about the government and its policies. On the other side it tries to check the authoritarian nature of government.

In the whole Central Asia as well as in Kyrgyzstan the modern civil society organisations are in nascent stage. While much valuable works have been done on post-communist political change, economic transition and, other conflicted issues in Central Asia and, less attention has been paid to the strength, influence and opportunities for civil society. But there is a deep dispute about the role of these civil society organisations in tulip revolution. That is why I have selected this topic to research

Very few researches have done research on the role of state-civil society relations in the context of Tulip Revolution. So there is good scope for my research and it will be little step by me to investigate and explore the complexities of civil societies' role in this so called Tulip revolution.

The present study will emphasize on some points:

- The conceptual understanding of the interaction between state and civil society especially in case of Kyrgyzstan.
- How was the interaction between state and civil society in Tulip Revolution and after (2005-2011)?
- Further it will also see how state has responded towards the activism of civil society and vice-versa.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study seeks to answer several relevant questions.

- What is nature of interaction between state and civil society?
- To what extent state's perception towards Kyrgyzstan civil society was changed during Akaev era?

- What has been the attitude of the state after Tulip revolution?
- Has civil society contributed to increase the pace of democratisation in Kyrgyzstan?
- What was the role foreign funded NGOs?

HYPOTHESES

The research attempts to find out two hypotheses.

- First, Weakening of the state system due to slow pace of democratisation process resulted in development of assertive civil society in Kyrgyzstan.
- Second, the Tulip Revolution provided an opportunity to the civil society to play the bigger role of social stabilizer.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The design for the study is exploratory, analytical and descriptive. The study would explore the historical context and the problems of democracy building in Kyrgyzstan. It would further assess the role of civil society-civil society in relation during the Tulip revolution. This would be based on primary sources like government documents, archives, reports and secondary sources as books, articles, research journals, magazines, newspaper clippings, etc.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

The study will begin with the Second Chapter Kyrgyzstan before independence. This chapter will focus what and how was the relation between state-society from earliest known past till the end of Soviet Union. It means this chapter is divided into three period- Pre-Tsarist, Tsarist and Soviet period. In each period it shows how the state and perceived and interacted with each other. The third chapter will throw light on Akayev regime from independence to before the occurrence of Tulip revolution till 2004. This will discuss the how the new state building process took place. What were

the new constitutional provisions regarding the flourishing of civil society organizations? This will also discuss why did state transform itself and became semi-authoritarian after few years of tolerance towards civil society. It also put emphasis that how civil society responded to this changing nature of Kyrgyz state. The fourth chapter will focus on the development during the year of Tulip revolution (2005) and what was role of civil society organizations in the revolution. It also briefly analyzes other factors that pushed the people to participate in Tulip revolution. It further discusses the developments after the Tulip revolution and role of the civil society during the Tulip II in 2010 and why the Bakiyev regime was ousted by the same kind of people' protest. It narrates about the recent development till the 2011. Finally, the research will conclude by seeking to draw answers through the analysis undertaken in the preceding chapters. It will test the hypothesis based on the outcomes and analysis of the chapters.

CHAPTER II

KYGYZSTAN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

The history has a deep impact of the political culture of the society. Political culture means the attitudes and behaviour of the people about the rule and decision making authority (Almond and Verba: 1963). Political culture in every country is formed in a specific political environment and is structured and affected by geographical as well as socio-economic factors. Many specific political events, such as wars, colonization and anti-colonial struggles, domestic and regional turbulences etc also decide the fate of society and its history i.e. how it would be shaped. Kyrgyzstan' current political situation is also result of its ancient culture of clan based patrimonial society. It has also legacy of Tsarist and Soviet period on the attitudes its personality cult political leadership and society. The modern history of Kyrgyzstan has been very dynamic and full of political upheavals. The geographical, cultural and ethnic divisions of Kyrgyzstan has played significant role on its political and social life and also nation building. When we delve into Kyrgyz state and its interaction with civil society, we try to trace out the historical root of these two institutions and make a general explanation about this, that how they interacted in past. However, it is to be noted that many argue that even today there is no existence of western concept of civil society in Kyrgyzstan.

A BRIEF PRE-TSARIST HISTORY OF KYRGYZSTAN

During the pre-Tsarist period there was no concept of modern nation state. Whole Central Asia was divided into different kind of Khanates but the nature of their political legitimacy was based on traditional beliefs and its decision making authority was relied upon traditional customs and familial networks. The power structure of society was defined by an intricate set of social and traditional norms developed over long period of time, which had determined the behavioural and communal interaction between individuals and societal groups. In short, politics had been the art of family ties and loyalties that occupied the upper classes of society, the lower social classes were usually excluded from the dynamic (Collins 2004:225). The common and lower class of the society was mostly traditional societies and tend to be agrarian- based, most individuals were occupied with subsistence living, and hence had little time for politics and discourse (Carley 1995:273).

As regarding to the origin and development of a separate Kyrgyz political identity, one should try to highlight the specific nature and characteristics of history, political culture and social customs of the whole region. There is huge debate about the existence of the separate and independent identity of Kyrgyz people. So there is no consensus among scholars and historians about it. As Robert Lowe argues- “The weakness of Kyrgyz national identity in the modern period is related to the confusion surrounding the ethno-genesis and development of the Kyrgyz people” (Lowe 2003). Another famous Soviet scholar S. M. Abramzon maintains that the question of the origins of the Kyrgyz nation is among the most complex and controversial aspects of the ethnic history of Central Asia (Huskey 1993). Notwithstanding there are some historical facts, which indicates some signs about the origin of Kyrgyz identity and give details regarding this. Say for example, a renowned Kyrgyz political scholar Rkhat Achylova held that the independent and separate identity of Kyrgyz people dates back to 300 BC (Achylova 1995). She claims that the first reference to Kyrgyz and their state can be found in Chinese sources of the third millennium B.C. In that remote period the Kyrgyz were dependent on ancient Chinese state and later, in the first century B.C. on the Huns. On the other side, scholar Ahamad Rashid argues that Kyrgyz history goes back to eight century BC. He pleads the earliest recorded inhabitants of modern day Kyrgyzstan were the Sakas, whose tribal confederacy established a kingdom in the region around the eighth century B.C. The Sakas traded with China and Persia and remained defiant until they were conquered by Cyrus the Great of Persia, who employed them to fight in his armies against Alexander the Great (Rashid 1994:150).

But John Anderson does not find any concrete evidence of the separate Kyrgyz till the period of 12th century. And he argues -“It is impossible to find more than passing reference to a people known as Kyrgyz and their origin remain the subject of controversy” (Anderson 1999: 1). It means that there is no certainty or clarity about the history of separate Kyrgyz identity till the 12th century. But it also does not mean that there is not any proof about the origin of Kyrgyz identity. Anderson maintains that the most convincing and lest controversial fact about the Kyrgyz was migration of the Turkic tribe from the banks of the Yenisey (Southern Siberia), to the Tien Shan Mountains sometime around the tenth century AD. This group has been identified as

‘Kyrgyz’. It can be argued that today’s Kyrgyz have descended from these Eastern Turks, as well as from Mongols and a myriad other groups who passed through the region. So we can accept the Anderson view about the separate Kyrgyz history since the tenth century AD (Ibid: 2).

Before the subjugation of Kyrgyzstan by Russian army and its inclusion into Russian Empire, the culture and political life of the region did not differ greatly from other parts of the nomadic world particularly in Islamic world (Wheeler 1969: 17). The earliest people of the region are believed to be a mixed community of Mongol, Turkic, and Kypchak descent. The society at the time of annexation was nomadic (Ploshikh 1998). It was based on customs and traditions and was tribal in nature in this period the people lead a nomadic life, and food gathering and hunting were their main occupations. Since it was a land locked country, it was largely cut off from outside influence (Vaidnath 1967: 16).

In the thirteenth century the Kyrgyz migrated towards south which was under the control of the Mongolian Empire. Different Kyrgyz tribes’ inhabited the area in fifteenth-sixteenth century stretched from western Mongolia to eastern Turkestan. However, the region of the central Tien-Shan, the Chui valley and the southeastern part of the Fergana region, i.e. the territory closely coinciding with the present borders of the Kyrgyz republic, formed the heart of the Kyrgyz nation’s territory. It was 16th century when the Kyrgyz came to their present appearance on the territory of what is present-day Kyrgyzstan.

In the mid of 18th century Kyrgyz came under the Chinese rule. Chinese did not attempt to alter the living style of Kyrgyz people. At the end of this century Kyrgyz were under the control of Khanate of Kokand. In the starting years of second half of the mid 19th century Kyrgyz people started rebelling against the perceived weakening of Kokand of Khanate. In the meantime the Russians also started to find some hope in this region to control this area. When the Kyrgyz were resisting against the Kokand Khanate, they contacted the Russians for their support against Kokand and Russians did not disappointed the Kyrgyz. Finally Kyrgyz, along with Russians, fought against Kokand Khanate and took control of Pishpek (later Frunze and then Bishkek) in 1876 and all Kyrgyz groups formally accepted the Russian rule. It means Kyrgyz came

under the power of Tsarist Russia in mid 1870s and it was under the rule of Tsar until the Soviet Revolution in 1917 (Anderson 1999: 4).

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF KYRGYZ SOCIETY

Before the Arab Conquest

The structure of Kyrgyz society before the Arab conquest in the seventh century throws light the interaction between the political authority and society. It shows that how the common people co-opted with the authority and got their demand fulfilled. The Kyrgyz had never been a unified group. They were divided, mostly at abstract level, into large kinship systems. That was roughly related to the North and South of the country. Kyrgyz tribes were usually divided in the three basic groups: the biggest grouping was the *Ong Kanat* (right wing) which included the *Tagai* grouping in northern and central Kyrgyzstan and the *Adigine* and the *Mungush* groupings in the eastern Alai Mountains (Geiss 2005: 25). The second largest grouping was the *SolKanat* (left wing) in the northern part of the Ferghana valley and in the Talas district, whereas *Ichkilik* was located in the western Alai Mountains and in the eastern Pamir. Each of these groups occupied defined regions (Ibid). Each tribe had its own territory which included summer and winter pastures, and it was the *aga biŭ* (tribal chiefs) who decided on the allocation of pastures and migration routes in larger tribal federations. In addition he was the supreme judge who decided rival judicial claims and settled disputes among his tribesmen. The *aga biŭ* decided also about the external relations of the tribe. It was up to his reason to make peace, to form alliances or to start raids with or against neighbouring groups and states. His decisions were highly respected by allied tribesmen (Ibid).

The Civic Virtues in Early Kyrgyz Tribes

These tribal groups used to help mutually and provide assistance and cooperation on the village level on various issues. It could be aid in domestic and economic matters and include activities such as sheep-shearing, harvest assistance or the digging and maintenance of canals and wells. Larger units like sub-tribes and tribes could build or maintain large canals, but normally they were less involved in economic matters. More often they acted as military units which occupied and defended territories or secured and coordinated routes of migration (Ibid).

Arab Conquest

The relation between Arab rule and society was based on coercion and atrocities. In seventh and eighth century AD after the control of the region the Arab rulers had forced the Sogdian people to accept the Islam religion. Arab ruler destroyed all historical and cultural memories of native Sogdians. The heritage and culture of the of the Sogdian people completely lost but despite this the local peoples had made hard to protect their native culture and values. So the relation between the Arab rulers and the local Sogdians could not be said on very interactive and positive because it was based on coercion not cooperation (Roudik 2007: 29).

Islam was and is also an important factor in Kyrgyz social life but it has conservative like the Arabic version of Islam (Kort 1994: 150). Islam reached the Western Talas valley region following Arab conflicts with the Chinese around 750 but, not for the first time, the mighty Tien Shan mountains offered an insurmountable barrier to further religious or political penetration. In subsequent years there were to be waves of Islamic expansion, but these had little impact upon the mass of the population who retained their traditional syncretic beliefs. Especially strong among the nomadic herders of Kyrgyzstan were beliefs in the spirit world, devotion to the supreme deity Tengri (heaven), the cult of ancestors, and various forms of totemism which sacralised the wolf, the horse, or other animals central to their daily life (Ibid).

Sufism as Civic Promoter in Kyrgyz Society

Sufism is also a very special feature of the Kyrgyz society distinct a special position. It developed initially as an ascetic movement, establishing a clear identity for itself in the ninth century, and retained its structures in Soviet times. It nurtured ascetics who rejected everything secular, gave priority to spiritual purity, despised luxury and wealth, and adopted a completely quietist attitude to the world around them (Achylova 1995: 134).

Society during the Mongol Rule

In the thirteenth century the Mongol Genghis Khan did conquest the region in 13th century and his rule had transformed the society substantially. This period appears to

have been significant for the consolidation of an identifiable 'Kyrgyz' people who developed a distinctive Turkic dialect, and some sense of ethnic awareness linked to a common territory, the care must be taken over the dating of any fusion of a Kyrgyz 'proto-nation', as the developing consciousness was ethnic, not national, and seems to have remained highly ambiguous: family and tribe continued to form the basis of social organization (Lowe 2003:107). The Mongol united the whole agricultural region of Central Asia, promoted new alphabet system and they had absolute tolerance towards the religion and culture, just opposite to Arab conquest (Ibid). So we can say the rulers-ruled relations were not very antagonistic.

Society before the Tsarist Conquest

Until the late 1800s, the way of life of the Kyrgyz tribes had been largely unchanged for centuries. They were still a nomadic people who loosely controlled a vast expanse of territory and whose society operated within a flexible structure, in which each family belonged to a clan group and, in turn, to a wider tribal confederation. The centre of the power was located in the informal relations of society. Ranks and titles of were granted by rulers as markers of status and authority, but they did not correspond to stable offices. "Neighborhood Community" The people had the relationship through their territorial neighborhood which formed around holy sites (*Zyarat* or *Mazar*) were the holy site of mutual assistance. This neighborhood community was based on social hierarchy and the multy layered pattern of political power provided a means of rulers and ruled (Khalid 1998: 37).

This is the reason that scholar Achylova asserts that throughout its history the Kyrgyz society has remained democratic for earliest times. She argues that:

"The main principles of Kyrgyz democracy can be found in such practices as the nationwide discussion on both minor and major issues, collective decision making on all the most important issues in the life of community, the voicing of personal opinion even those opposition to others; respect for the elderly as well as for the opinions of younger community members, the public election of rulers of all ranks, including the Khan; criticism of senior, the settlements of political debates through proper use of folk traditions of hospitality and generous gifts; and multi ethnic ruling system" (Achylova : 1995: 321).

Now we see that the undeveloped beginning of civic virtues can be traced within the Central Asian society from the known earliest history. The people always remained

respectful for other's ideas, opinions, settled the common problems of their society through dialogue, discussion and cooperation.

THE TSARIST RULE

Kyrgyzstan was under the Tsarist rule from 1876 to 1917. In this period many significant changes occurred in the country. These changes had impact on socio-economic and cultural structures. In the second half of the 19th century Tsarist Russian conquered and annexed the Khanate of Kokand and reduced the size of the other two Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva which had been drawn into the orbit of the Empire as vassal states. The Tsarist Russian Government supported the thrones of their Khan and Emir with its troops and helped the despotic ruling circles of these feudal states to exploit their toiling masses in various ways (Kaushik 1970: 65). In the colonial period, Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva were predominantly agricultural regions. But there were also many important changes in economic sphere of society. In 1913 only 19 per cent of the total population lived in towns and urban settlements. The process of capitalist development in Central Asia followed very slowly and unevenly because Tsarism and feudal regimes of Bukhara and Khiva purposely tried to preserve the feudal and patriarchal relations. Hence, the region remained until the October Revolution an extremely backward agrarian colony of Tsarist Russia (Ibid: 78).

At the economic spheres, after its annexation, Central Asia was converted into a raw material supplying base for the metropolitan industries. Tsarist administration paid attention to cotton cultivation and encouraged it at the expense of wheat and other agricultural products. But the development of cotton cultivation did not improve the material conditions of the local *dehkans* (peasants) (Ibid). A new exploiter entered into scene. This was the middle man who used to buy the raw cotton from farmers and sell to cotton mills. This middle man tried to purchase at the lowest price to get more benefit. The tsarist regime ruled the Turkestan through war ministry not by Interior Ministry. *Oblast* was the main unit like states. At the local level the post of *volost* was created along with the other village officials – *starshians*, *aksakals* and *kazis*. But these local posts were merely a token and they were under the corrupt local feudal leaders. The introduction of Railways in late 1880s marked the end of economic inclusion of the different regions inside Central Asia and also the end of isolation of

the whole of Central Asia. So modernisation process started in the region and it initiated the political consciousness among people about their rulers.

In the Tsarist colonial period the Central Asia also experienced a significant in the cultural sphere of the society. First- the opening of secular schools and other institutions. But the new Russian schools attracted very few native children and old *maqtab*s and *madrsas* continued to play a very predominant role in the education system of local people. Second, newspapers and magazines, books started to print and sold in the whole area. Third, new intellectuals and cultural movements by *Jadidism* started as progressive movements in the traditional society. *Jadidism* propagated the idea of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. But it should be clear that *Jadidist* to side against the people in Soviet Revolution of 1916(Ibid: 80).

Notwithstanding the many significant changes occurred during the Tsarist regime, such as rise of new towns, construction of railways, cotton agriculture and a general intellectual understanding. But in spite of this the region reeled under the pawns of cultural backwardness and ignorance and of Islamic dominance. The society was under the control of feudal leaders, mullahs and other local elder leaders. And this became apparent in 1905-07 workers movements and it reached its high mark in the Revolution of 1917 (Wheeler 1964: 67).

There were some uprising in the eighties against Tsar but did not succeed because of absence of popular support. The revolt in Samarkand in 1868 the uprising of the Shar-Subz bekdomb, the insurrections in Kokand in 1877 and 1876, the Cholera Riots in Tashkent in 1892, the rebellion of Madali Ishan in 1898, and ending with the uprising of 1916 were few revolts against Tsarist rule. The nature of these uprising revealed that masses did not participate except in 1892 Cholera Riots and in the uprising of 1916. The Cholera Riots in Tashkent and the 1916 revolution could be categorized as popular nationalist movements. But all the revolts in Tsarist regime could not be said to be religious in nature and they were only due to deteriorating economic condition of the toiling people (Kaushik 1970: 83).

Tsarist-State and Society Relation

During the Tsarist period the society-state relation had gone a major realignment. There was greater centralization in the political authority because disappearing of

tribal chief due to hard Russian state. Resulting this many new social elites emerged. The new ruler's dependence on local notables and translators had given them opportunity to further penetration in the society. Due to the elimination of tribal chiefs gave the *Ulemas* a greater role in the society. On the other side the Tsarist new economic, education and administrative policies for the first time in history transformed the Central Asian society on all fronts (Kaushik 1970:72).

As Anderson has argued that Kyrgyz society had developed around a distinctive, flexible, political-administrative structure, based upon independent family and tribal associations that are rooted in the nomadic life style of community. Its main foundation have been a collective, kinship based consciousness and a communal way of life that ensured solid and stable internal relations and the resolution of all societal issues in concert (Anderson 1999: 2). But again Anderson admonishes that there should not be exaggeration of democratic ethos of Kyrgyz society. These nomadic values did not preclude them to be divided on basis of ethnic and cultural divisions. Their differences led them to fall prey to foreign rulers, either khanate of Kokand or Tsarist Empire. That society was hierarchical, nepotistic and a normal family 'Auls' (mobile villages) governed their day to day affairs by their own. Only on few occasions such as marriage, festivals or games competitions, communities come together and talk on the common issues (Anderson Ibid).

Initially Tsarist administration did not attempt to intervene in traditional social structure, but later on two significant revamps occurred during the tsarist regime. The first, was the emerging new centres of urban areas and second the settled farming. Both these changes had overtly led to conflicts of interests between Russians and Kyrgyz people related to latter's culture and livelihood. From the 1860s onwards Slavs and Ukrainians started coming in Central Asian regions and made their homes in the cities like Osh, Pisphek and others. Due to this new change in the settlement structure, the cultural differences created a sense of 'us and them' in the Kyrgyz society (Wheeler 1964:183).

The second, modification initiated by Tsarist rule, the promotion of settled farming through disbursing cheap land to new immigrants. The land was not the private property until now and it was seemed to belong with the whole community as a collective property (Anderson 1999: 5). On the one side settled Russian farmers

needed land for cultivation and on the other Kyrgyz nomadic people required unfarmed vast free land for grazing their cattle. So the conflicts started to take shape. In 1890s more than eighty percent population of the Kyrgyz were nomadic or semi-nomadic. Though there were apprehensions and misconceptions between Russian settlers and Kyrgyz, but it did not cause any major revolt or uprising except few small incidents as Andizhan incident (1898). But in June 1916 a mass rebellion started across the whole Central Asia. The people were deeply dissatisfied with the government due to growing tax burdens, forcefully incorporation of young man into the army and war against the holy Ottoman Empire - Turkey were the main causes. In the August 1917 they revolted against the Russian government and 10,000 slovak people had been killed in the riots but soon this revolt had been controlled by army and nearly one lakh of death occurred in this process (Anderson 1999: 7).

Local affiliations were the most important to the individual and for the Kyrgyz who rarely settled, clannish and tribal ties, rather than a sense of precise locality, provided the foremost elements of their identity. Loyalty was always much stronger to family ties than to any sense of Kyrgyz brotherhood and, while the Manas legends acclaim the unity of the Kyrgyz people, internal conflict has predominated. Tribal disunity prevented any consistent opposition to the Mongol invaders, and in the eighteenth century a division developed between northern and southern tribal groups that remains even today. Before 1917, it is unlikely that many Kyrgyz people had given any thought to national identity (Anderson 1999:8).

The process of the development of 'civility' in Russian society can be traced back to the intellectual and cultural progress during the nineteenth century and the 1861 peasant reforms, when modernizing process of the society began (John 1980). The 1861 peasant movement led to the intellectual search for a model of development. Though this was move initiated and implemented by Tsarist autocratic monarchy but it was the Russian intelligentsia, which developed the concept of civil society, rights, liberties of individual and equality before law into public consciousness (Zinaida et al 1996).

By the end of nineteenth century, liberal philosophers exerted considerable influence on Russian society. Some of them were B.N. Chicherin, P.N. Norgorodtev, L. Petrazhitski, B. Kistiakovskii, and S.Gessen; who fought for the separation of law

from politics, drawing a clear distinction between laws as universal principle of justice and politics as a system of administrative and government ordinance (Ibid). For them, law was above the state.

There was growing disenchantment towards the tsarist regime among Kyrgyz people before the Bolshevik revolution. The Tsarist adopted the policy of promoting the private ownership of land and settled farming, unjustifiable land tax, and encouraging Russian settlers. Even in the First World War life conditions deteriorated more. Ultimately these developments had weakened the legitimacy of Tsarist regime heavily and Kyrgyzstan finally became the suitable ground for the success of Bolshevik revolution. The 1916 uprising was not simply against the rule of tsar, but to defend the honour, dignity, freedom and land (Dzhunushaliev 1998).

Finally we can say that peasants' movement in 1860s, opposition of immigrants slows, tension on cultural, religious or economic issues, participation 1916 uprising reflect that the people of Central Asia(Kyrgyzstan) were becoming aware about their indigenous welfare, culture, economy, etc., and they were demanding their rightful due from the Tsarist state.

FROM BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION TO SOVIET DISINTEGRATION

The condition for the origin of the civil society in Soviet Union was not very conducive due to strict control of state on the society. In 1917, the 'third estate' and the 'middle stratum' were very weak in Russia. Political Parties, Social movements and other organizations were still in their initial stage (Ibid: 17). The reason was Bolshevik who captured power in 1917 had no programs for the development of this middle stratum. The experience of parliamentary activities and state was quite limited. The internal and external conditions were not conducive for the evolution of civil society. These conditions served both as a catalyst for the development of civil society and a peculiar obstacle to it (Lu A : 1993).

In the early years of Bolshevism, attempts were made to resolve the task of transition to socialism by consolidating the dictatorship in order to initiate socialist transformation from the top by means of 'universal statisation' (Ibid). This rigid model of state socialism blocked the democratic culture of civil consciousness and contained the seeds of totalitarianism. During the period of Stalinist despotism, even

the elements of market structure, peasant economy, independent trade unions, and entrepreneurial groups and other associations were destroyed (Ibid). Socio-economic support for the crystallization of collective social interests and the creation of corresponding non-state organizations that enjoyed trust from the below ceased to exist.

The sphere of civil society that was separated from the state became very much relevant in Soviet in Soviet Russia by 1980s, as a result of negative effects of the rigid economic, socio-political and legal system, and also due to the ideological uniformity. The ideal has been developed that it was necessary to restrict the sphere of intervention by the state and by other political factors into economic and social life. This was essential in order to develop a society that is relatively free from the state's coercive intervention in the sphere of everyday life. Thus, the civil society in Russian became a paradigm in determining the possible direction of social reforms. It expressed the need and direction of change- as an alternative. Therefore the 'civil society' was reborn in the Russian culture as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian socialism (Zinaida 1999).

“Gorbachev reforms of Perestroika and Glasnost facilitated in reinvigorating the voluntary sector of society” (Vladimir and Turner 1995). Innumerable dissident groups that emerged in legitimate shape as informal organizations and associations, which could function openly. This period of transition led to the growth of a highly 'politicized civil society' and became important channel rallying anti-communist and anti-socialist political forces against the political society represented by the party and the state.

Lenin Period

After the outbreak of the revolution, the first group of soviet came in the region in March 1917 in the southern town of Kyzyl-Kiia and a number of mining settlements of Pishpek, Tokmak, Prezel'sk, Naryn and Osh. They faced many problems- such as local authorities loyal to provisional government, the a number of Muslim organisations demanding for the poor people and workers of the Kyrgyz society, a considerable decline in economy and return of people who fled from the region after the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, and taking control of the whole region and

the resistance of the Basmchi group in the Fergana Valley. According to the recommendations of Turkestan committee, in April 1918 the territory of present Kyrgyzstan was incorporated in new Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within Russian Federation (RSFSR). In 1924 this area became the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. And after few nominal alterations in 1925, 1927 and in 1936 this area became Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (Wheeler 1964:186).

As Lowe maintains -“When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, the issue of unequivocal identity among Kyrgyz people was not prominent” (Lowe 2003:107). He further says that Pre-Soviet identity construction throughout Central Asia was loose and variable, and did not conform to rigid European categories and definitions. After the arrival of the Russians, Central Asians, at the broadest level of self-consciousness, considered themselves ‘Muslims’ rather than ‘Kyrgyz’ or ‘Uzbeks’. Ethnic divisions were rarely obvious, as the Kyrgyz people, themselves encompassing a rich mixture of ethnicities, co-existed in multi-ethnic khanates and empires with Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uighurs, Dungans and others.

Though the promise of republican autonomy did not materialise and till e 1936 due the policy of Stalin it became heteronomy or ruthless centralisation. But the positive side of this centralisation policy had been the creation of an ‘embryonic state structure’, resulting in new youths of Kyrgyzstan being trained in new Soviet framework ,thus ensuring that when the Soviet union would collapse there was something for newly independent country to build upon (Anderson 1999: 29). After the efforts at administrative and cultural change in the early 1920s Soviet officials started to initiate the policy of land reforms and tried hard to change nomadic into settled farming in late 1920s (Ibid: 30).

Lenin initiated the policy called ‘Decree of Peace’ as a basic principle for the Soviet Union.

The first and second Congress of Soviets also mentioned the right of self determination as such-Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia, Right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination up to secession and establishment of independent states, Annulment of all national and religious privileges and restrictions, Free development of national and religious minorities and ethnographic groups

inhabiting the territory of Russia. After the October Revolution the people of Central Asia got a new life in their political, social and cultural advancement (Kaushik 1970:8).

Under conditions of the Soviet Socialist system the social and national oppression was abolished. The standards of living, public health, education, technical knowledge and the productivity in Soviet Central Asia were much higher than other African and Asian countries. A very remarkable socio-cultural transformation has been effected in the lives of the peoples of Central Asia by soviet rule during a short span of time. This was the first switch over to Socialism without the pains of capitalist development. The victory of Socialism had turned the Central Asia into an advanced industrial agrarian region (Kaushik 1970:9).

The soviet legacy has had a varied influence on modern Central Asian society, both good and bad. There has been extensive national development: a population growth, an increased standard of living for all layers of society, the growth of villages, towns, and cities, modern agricultural and industrial development, increased livestock production, total literacy and the establishment of compulsory secondary education, as well as higher and secondary special education, and the flourishing of state sponsored culture, including the arts and written literature.

Stalin Period

The victory of Joseph Stalin (May 1941) over Karl Kataski was the beginning of new industrial and agricultural policy in Central Asia. The campaign for industrialisation and collectivisation had a major impact on Kyrgyz society. The policy of industrialisation had created new urban centres in the northern region and in Kyrgyzstan many new hydro-electric projects were started during his regime. By the 1937 more than 200 big industrial enterprises were created and between the periods of 1913-40, the gross industrial output had risen more than 900 per cent (Anderson 1999: 11). The country side also witnessed a very significant change with the starting of a system of collective farming with promise of solving transition from nomadic to settled agriculture. The result of this policy was 98 percent republic farmers found themselves in collective farms by the 1940s. There were three main goals for collective farming - providing food stuffs to urban areas in Soviet Union, raw material

for food processing industry and, third for export need (Anderson 1999: 12). This collectivisation policy had fuelled tension between soviet officials and Kyrgyz farmers and those, who resisted, got severe punishment. But this collectivisation policy did not have any spectacular impact on the traditional communities and were not effectively broken up. These collective farms often represented a simple restructuring of existing kinship groups whilst leaving many traditional authority structures and agricultural practices in place (Anderson 1999: Ibid).

Since the starting the decade of 1930s the religious and other traditional customs also came under attack such as burning of veils, closing of mosques, attempts to break pilgrimage to Osh etc. Stalin wanted to reduce the role of religion on the everyday life of the Kyrgyz people. So he adopted the strategy of denouncing religion, promoting the idea of scientific thinking, liberation of women (khudzhum-advance), reducing the role of traditional customs, mosques were closed and religious education were prohibited. But these initiatives resulted to be counterproductive. People started to practice religious rituals more enthusiastically but secretly in private domain. Despite the constant Stalinist attack on religion to downgrade its impact on everyday life, they could not undermine their religious faith (Anderson 1999: 13).

In the beginning there was some ethnic representation in CPSU (Communist Party of Soviet Union). This representation policy was overturned by Stalin regime. He stated the policy of purge and terrorizes local leadership who opposed his policies. The policy of representation in the branch of Kyrgyz party was overturned and the membership was decreased from 19,932 to 6,345. Many party leaders were charged for acting against state and attributed to capital and other severe punishment. But the economic situation in Kyrgyzstan was improved due to eastward displacement of industrial units due the threat of Nazis, and Kyrgyz battalion fought bravely in the Second World War. So the economic situation got slightly improved but political life remained same as before (Anderson 1999:14).

Khrushchev Era

The death of Stalin in March 1953 had resulted in the policy of de-Stalinisation and rehabilitation. And it recreated some more space for the indigenous Kyrgyz leaders in the Kyrgyz Communist Party and they grew slowly. Notwithstanding this, in 1958 the

Communist Central Party heavily criticized the Kyrgyz cadres but the regional cliques and patronage networks continued. The officials had compromise with 'private property tendencies' and the survivals of the past in everyday life' a semi-coded reference to the continued strength of religious practices (Anderson 1999:15). As Huskey argues that first secretary of Kyrgyz communist party Turdakun Usbaliev (1961-86) opted a new approach of multifaceted policy towards central leadership. On the one side he showed extreme subservience to Russian leaders and public utterances to support their policies. But on the other he demanded for greater investment in Republic and more representation to n the official positions. It implied a well thought out policy of cooption and continuity with change (Huskey 1995:816).

But Usbaliev policy of improvise with central leadership and got economic aid and policy automoy was seen as excessive compromise with Russian leadership by other contemporary ultra nationalist Kyrgyz leaders. Moscow leadership tolerated the Usbaliev policy because they wanted to create their regional fiefdoms and loyalty. The regional clique and patron network remained intact during the Gorbachev era. Because the growing regional apathy towards the central policies was enhancing among Kyrgyz people and many times this was misused by religious leaders for their own narrow interest. At that time the Moscow leadership was becoming weak in regional and local level (Anderson 1999:16).

Even many cultural issues also became the issue of protest against the Central leadership. The most discernible impact was the promotion of Russian language and Cyrillic alphabet by the Central leadership. This was severely denounced by the famous writer Chingiz Aitmatov. The Kyrgyz cultural leadership had the fear that Moscow wanted to make cultural slaves, which had no memory of their history language, culture and heritage (Anderson 1999:16).

Gorbachev Era

The accession of Gorbachev to the Soviet leadership in 1985 was the starting point for reassertion of central control. This policy was primarily initiated by his predecessor Yury Andropov (1982-84). The policy of central control was launched in the name of eliminating corruption in party, reducing the family connections in party appointments. So Turdakun Usbaliev was expelled from Kyrgyzstan's Communist

Party (KPSU) and Absamat Masaliev replaced him. Meanwhile Gorbachev launched the “Perestroika (restructuring)” and “Glasnost (openness)”. But Masaliev did not have faith about these new policies.¹

Due to the result of ‘Glasnost’ and ‘Perestroika’ unemployment had been exacerbated in country side and people started protests in capital Frunze (Bishkek). In summer 1989 they created the first significant social organisation ‘Ashar’ (meaning mutual help) and under these auspices they began to seize land and build shanty towns on the outskirts of the city. Fearing for their future the Russian speaking people started to emigrate from Kyrgyzstan and until 1993 the Russian population had been reduced by 20 percent. This situation got worsened due to inter-ethnic clashes between Uzbek minority and Kyrgyz over the land issue in the Osh region in summer 1990. People started to protest in capital but Masaliev did not try hard to solve this issue. Then in October 1990 Kyrgyz parliament refused to elect him to new executive presidency.²

The parliament chose Askar Akaev as the new president who was then the chairman republican academy of science. Though Akaev had no base within the republic but somehow he managed the situation because he had the confidence of Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) and he adopted a more nuanced policy and promised that Kyrgyzstan would be safer place for all groups . In August 1991 military coup Akaev resigned from the party and de-partysised the state and administrative organs. Though Akaev supported the Soviet Union not to be broken but at the end of August 1991 the Kyrgyz parliament voted for independence from USSR. Akaev called for election and in October he won with a thumping majority (Huskey 1997:253).³

SOVIET LEGACY ON KYRGYZSTAN’S POLITICL CULTURE

The political culture in central Asia that exists in the 1990s is based on a structure imposed by the Soviet government. But there was also significant impact of old traditions. As Gleason argues that there remained a strong, regionally based tradition

¹ Chukin, Almas (1994), “Free Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Sollutions”, *Current History*: 164.

² Roi, Yaccov(1991), “Central Asian Riots and Disterbances,1989-90: Causes and Contexts”, *Central Asian Servey*,10(3):40.

³ Huskey, Eugen(1997), “Kyrgyzstan: The Fate of Political Liberalization”, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.) *Conflict, Cleavages and Change in Central Asia and the Cacausus*,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:253.

of fealty and loyalty that can be traced to the pre-Soviet period (Gleason 1991). The soviet legacy has had a varied influence on modern Kyrgyz society, both good and bad.

Positive Impacts on Society

There has been extensive national development: a population growth of nearly 250 percent; an increased standard of living for all layers of society, the growth of villages, towns, and cities, modern agricultural and industrial development, increase livestock production, total literacy and the establishment of compulsory secondary education; as well as higher and secondary special education; and the flourishing of state sponsored Kyrgyz culture, including the arts and written literature (Achylova 1995: 332).

Negative Impacts on Society

There were many negative impacts of the Soviet rule on Kyrgyzstan. Those were following: migration from rural to urban areas, massive industrialization and resulting this ecological degradation, ideological education system, concentration of property in few hands, unnecessary dominance of working class etc.. Traditional Kyrgyz society was replaced by different collective farms of coexistence. The establishment of small communal farms, which in the beginning coincided with the former rural and tribal communities, eventually led in the 1960s to their amalgamation into larger collective farms (kolkhozes) and in state farms (sovkhozes). Nomadism was forcibly replaced by settlement, though cattle breeding kept its priority in the national economy. On the political front the regional Kyrgyz leadership largely remained a puppet and heavily dependent on centralised power of the communist party, its ideology and the totalitarian soviet political functioning. Moreover political institutions prevailed to the detriment of civil society, breaking the rhythm of life and nullifying age- old democratic characteristics of Kyrgyz society (Luong 2005:219).

State-Society Relations during the Soviet Era

The concept of civil society in Soviet Kyrgyzstan is based on the argumentation that postulates that no civil society existed in Soviet Kyrgyz society. Two ideas have prevailed in the analysis of Soviet society's workings. First, it has been considered

that under communism there was no civil society because the state controlled all aspects of social life. Second, it has been argued that whatever civil society existed traditionally was too weak and divided to survive the socialist state's authoritarianism and coercion. Based on these arguments the state was viewed as an omnipotent force in the society.

Civil Society and Soviet System

Soviet state and society was racked by tensions, transformations and resistance to centralized decision making. However, there were discernible certain pattern of social practices that could be seen as a being a form of resistance to a political project imposed by the regime. For example, in the 1980s, the critique of Manas' epic by intellectuals in Moscow provoked a strong reaction in the Kyrgyz Republic where the Kyrgyz elite rejected the interpretation imposed by the centre (Achylova 1995:323).

Therefore, in Kyrgyz society, the elite was never cut off from the population and the idea that the state and society functioned separately is incorrect. On the contrary, the Kyrgyz political elite entertained close relations with the population through the establishment of solidarity networks that ran throughout the society and state. Furthermore, on a political level, even in a one-party system KPSU(Kyrgyzstan Communist Party), within the CPSU(Communist Party of Soviet Union) Party competition existed between different regional factions. This does not mean that civil liberties were guaranteed. Hence, it cannot be said that the idea that civil society was totally absent and follow a path suggested by CPSU as Olivier Roy who wrote that: 'There is apparently no "civil society" in Central Asia. (Petric 2005:319-332).

But we can say that the civil society was existing in the form of collective farming solidarity, cultural cohesion, solidarity network and clan based social relations during the Soviet period in Kyrgyzstan.

BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS IN KYRGYZSTAN

Despite the interaction between traditional mores and modernity in soviet period, political consciousness and mobilisation was not absent in total. The first independent political party to emerge in Kyrgyzstan was the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK), founded by three prominent figures: Kazat Ackamatov, Topchubek

Turgynaliev, and D. Gekshee, on 27th June 1993. In their first political steps, the leaders of DDK focussed protests against Kyrgyz Communist Party (KPSU) leaders, especially party secretary Absamat Masliev, as exemplified by a hunger strike by Turgynaliev, some students and other democrats. The DDK provided the impetus for the new political associations, paving the way for the formation of several other political parties- Asaba, Erkin Kyrgyzstan, Ata-Meken, the Social Democratic Party, and the women's Democratic Party(Achylova 1995:324) .

Some parties have specific regional orientations, as for example South Party of Kyrgyzstan. A similar situation occurred when women organised more than ten nongovernmental organisations and founded the women's Democratic Party as a protest against the declining role of women in the government. Several cultural and national centres for ethnic minorities have also formed that can be classified as somewhere between non- governmental organisations and political parties- the Slavic Union (Russians and other Slavs), Cheson (Koreans), the German unions, two Turkic unions and others. In addition Ittifak promotes the idea of building an independent Uigur state system on the territory of today's Uigur-Xinjian Autonomous Region. These centres' overall aims were to revive national traditions and languages, protect minority rights, and regulate migration issues (especially among Russians speakers, German and Jews)(Achylova 1995:325) .

Now we can see that since the beginning of Kyrgyz history there did exist a traditional society based on clan and primordial networks. In the Tsarist period the western industrialization and modernization had taken place and this process got more pace during the Soviet period. Though the control of the Soviet System was very tight and did not give opportunity for flourishing of civil society groups

CHAPTER III

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND
CIVIL SOCIETY DURING THE AKAYEV
PERIOD (1990-2005)

Since the beginning of 1990s various new political and economic initiatives have been taken place in the all former Soviet Union Republics. Many post Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) independent states have chosen the way of liberal democratic way of societal development. Such a concept makes a totally different political and economic sense from what existed in the erstwhile communist regime of USSR. The Communist ideology of USSR had hindered political freedom of their citizens for seven decades so that, they very enthusiastically pursued the democratic path of political functioning in the first few years after the fall of the USSR.¹ However, the majority of the population did not aware of concept of liberal democracy that what this concept is and how it works. But there was a beacon of hope that once the liberal democratic gate would open, the consequent flow of political freedoms would lead in a new dynamic in the erstwhile totalitarian political system (Loung 2002:11). After the journey of two decades of liberal democracy in these states now it would be very interesting to gauge the preliminary results of important transformations and to reach out some concrete conclusions about their success or failure. That would give a new sight of understanding of current politico-economic development of the region.

In the post Soviet states, by and large, outcome of the experiments with democratic has been very mixed. Although a few success stories exist there, but the rest of them have quickly drowned to old habits of Soviet authoritarian rule. It is the general perception among the social scientists that very active, aware, and cautious civil society organizations exist in western democracies. Such kind of civil society organizations (CSOs) was/is not present either in Soviet Union or in its successor states. But now, they are gradually making their presence felt after the demise of Soviet Union.

The former USSR had lacked any liberal kind of civil society organizations which is existing in the western countries. People were deprived of proper education on even basic democratic principles (Gibson et al 1992). Because Soviet People's democratic process largely guided and instituted from top to down, the masses had been

¹ Diamond, Larry (2002), "Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance", [Online: web] accessed of 5 March 2012 URL: www.stanford.edu/.../papers/advancing_democ_%20governance.pdf.

sidelined from crucial decision-making or policy-setting agendas as well as there was not any mechanism of free discussion, debate and criticism. Due to the lack of experience newly adopted political freedom merely translated into free elections for the majority of the people (Babajanian 2005). Used to trusting and relying on non-elected Communist officials for decades, millions of former Soviet people carried this 'trust' with them into the new and unknown post-1991 era. Thus, the USSR style mix of new democracies that emerged on the international arena is as different from each other as they are from the Western world (Ibid).

All of the former Soviet states had experienced of long and rich history of autocratic executive rule. The notion of parliamentary-style democracy, with checks and balances on the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, was a totally alien concept for them. Most of them had no idea that what would be their next political system replacing the old. The concept of free elections, proportionate representation and a leadership responsible to the people was just a desired by the people but they were no real ground in nearest post- soviet reality (Bendersky2005).

As discussed in earlier chapter, historically, autocratic rulers have governed the lands of Central Asia. Tribal and clan connections play a very significant role in the political, social and economic interactions among the people. But these clan connections have been effectively utilized to maintain the power hold by the ruling elite. Many times these clan have been used to put control on the ruling elite. Many Central Asian leaders have been successful in cultivating a Stalin like personality cult and removing any threat of opposition to their autocratic rule (Ibid).

EXPERIENCE OF KYRGYZSTAN IN POST-SOVIET ERA

The end of USSR was propagated as a victory of western liberal democracy in the west and discrediting the Soviet experience. Fukuyama predicted the demise of USSR as an end of history to describe the spread of democratic order and of a liberal economics (Fukuyama1989). But this feeling was not shared by elites and population of Central Asia. They did not think it to be their victory. In fact, there was a strong nostalgia for the Soviet period continued to prevail among the Kyrgyz population, who often expresses the end of the Soviet order in terms of loss of standard of living, power, independence, etc. Abandoned by Moscow, this small republic's elite has had

to adopt the international notion of democracy in order to tap international funds. This adoption has not only resulted in the international pressure and domination, but in reality an ordinary citizen had to face the new conditions and impositions of this new environment (Petric2005).

Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian state to declare its independence after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the leadership of the President AskarAkayev, Kyrgyzstandeveloped an international reputation by attempting to implement systematic changes toward a democratic republic. It can be said that the framework for the establishment of a democratic state based on the rule of law began to take shape. Young Kyrgyzstan had a lot of goals in terms of integrating into the world society, such as developing the state building process, introducing the liberal democracy based on rule of law, recognizing citizens rights, independent judiciary, free press, establishing the market economy and so and so forth. At the beginning, definitely there was a positive signs in achieving these grand goals. A number of political parties, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and independent media outlets mushroomed during the initial years. For these reasons Kyrgyzstan was called as a ‘Central Asia’s Island of Democracy’ (Anderson1999: 23). However, this honeymoon period did not last long and soon it turned into the authoritarian regime. In other words the first president of independent Kyrgyzstan AskarAkayev changed his policy from democracy to autocracy (Nichol2005).

Kyrgyzstan during Akayev’s first tenure as President (1989-1995)

AskarAkayev, Kyrgyzstan’s first president was elected by the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet in 1990. When the process of demise of the glorious and gigantic USSR has started, the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet voted for Kyrgyzstan’s independence on 31 August 1991. On October 1991, the Kyrgyz citizens elected AksarAkayev as the President of the newly independent Kyrgyzstan. Earlier Akayev had started his political life in 1981 when he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Spector2004:5). As soon as he became the president of Kyrgyzstan, Akayev showed to the world that he was going to transforming Kyrgyzstan into atrue liberaldemocracy through a spate of reform processes. Newly independent Kyrgyzstan began to be called as the Central Asia’s ‘Island of Democracy’ (Anderson 1999: 23).It

was not an overestimation, even if Kyrgyzstan was not fulfilling all the parameters of a democratic state. When we compare it with its post-Soviet neighbours we find that Kyrgyzstan really was a democratic island of Central Asia in the sea of authoritarian desert. When Akayev started his first tenure his goal was very clear about how he would lead his nation. He wanted to ensure the good ethnic relation between various ethnic groups, to lead the country towards liberal market economy, and to ensure the civil rights and the process of democratization. He wanted to establish a state on based of law and separation of powers (Fuller1992).

After the declaration of independence and re-elected as president Akayev started the Kyrgyzstan journey towards the liberal democracy based on civil society and market economy. It means that he was calling upon for social, political economic reforms in parallel. He was trying to harness the resources of the country towards development. In his speech, in 1991, he stated:

“The only way forward was through the development of private interest, private life and private property based upon strong civil society, guarantee of civil and political rights, ethnic harmony and social protection for those likely to find the transition period difficult”(Anderson1999: 24).

Askar Akayev in his first tenure as the President of newly independent Kyrgyzstan put much emphasis on the need of developing a liberal democracy based on civil society (Ibid). In this period emerging civil society organizations and free press were the most vibrant and critical in among all former Soviet republics. The law on social organizations, which allowed the political parties and movements to operate, came into effect in 1991. After introduction of the law with a legal framework, political parties began to emerge. By February 1993, 15 political parties and several CSOs (civil society organizations) were registered by the Justice Ministry (Niazaliev 2004). But Kyrgyzstan's limited economic resources, trade dependence on former Soviet Union and other neighbouring countries had constrained its real progress (Gleason2003).

During the Soviet period, Kyrgyzstan used to provide primary commodities for industries located in the European parts of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan lost its Soviet era customers of raw materials and suppliers of daily using commodities. As a result, Kyrgyzstan's most industrial enterprises

quickly became insolvent and closed entirely (Ibid). This situation made it really difficult for Kyrgyzstan in terms of transition to an open market economy.

As we know that Kyrgyzstan was one of the poorest state of the Soviet Union. So with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union small Kyrgyzstan felt helpless. The government quickly realized that it can solve the problems only on the ground of reform process. Kyrgyzstan needed to attract significant economic assistance and international support, primarily from the West. By going in the direction of openness, economic restructuring and liberal democracy aimed to get financial aid from Western donor states. Esanov, Raiser and Buitter argue that;

“...the presence of natural resource wealth allowed incumbent elites to remain in power and shut out reformers. This was the case in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan..... In the resource –poor countries, the absence of resource rents meant that incumbent elites had less largesse with which to bolster their position. The associated insecurity, exacerbated by greater GDP compression, initially made the countries more receptive to economic reform, reinforced by IFI (international financial institutions) conditionality.”(Raiser2006).

Of course it was not the only reason or factor in terms of explaining Kyrgyzstan’s determination in transformation to liberal democracy and market based economy. But it is the reality that, Kyrgyzstan got support from international financial institutions, only because of its intention of transformation to market based economy and democracy.

Such policies satisfied the expectations of major Western donor states.

“In so doing, Kyrgyzstan quickly became a “favourite child” of the international donor community, managing to get strong support from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan received substantial political and economic support from the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Japan and Turkey. As a result, Kyrgyzstan became one *of the leading states for liberal political and economic reforms not just in Central Asia, but also in the entire CIS* (DRR 2003).

On the other hand, in the way of building the new democratic political order, AskarAkayev had to work with a constitution and a parliament which was created and elected under the old Soviet rule. Many of these deputies opted for AskarAkayev in October 1990, but it did not mean that they represent a clear body of support for the marketisation and democratization, which was increasingly advocated by Askar

Akayev. Many parliamentarians were fearful that such reforms would threaten their political influence and economic well-being (Anderson 1999: 24). Such factors slowed down the transformation process of democratisation. As a result the president realised the need for a new constitution, which would create a smaller, but more operative Parliament, which would be able to elaborate quickly the legislative base for reforms during transition period (Niazaliev 2004: 94).

Constitution of the 1993

The independent Kyrgyzstan's new constitution, which replaced the Soviet-era constitution that had been in effect since 1978, was passed by the Parliament in May 1993 (Anderson 1997). Kyrgyzstan's 1993 constitution established legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. According to the new constitution the Kyrgyz Republic defined as a sovereign, unitary, and democratic republic founded on the principle of law, and secular government. It also recognized numerous civil and political rights and freedoms for its citizens. New constitution provided a legislative framework for further democratic transition.²

The constitution of Kyrgyzstan had the provisions about a strong president, independent parliament, governments and courts. Section I/ Chapter I/ Article 7 of the Kyrgyz constitution organized the state power on these principles.³ The constitution provided provisions related to democratic and civic virtues. For instance, under article 8, the constitution allowed the organisation of political parties, trade union and other public associations; article 16 provided for free expression and dissemination of one's thoughts, ideas, opinions, freedom of the press, transmission and dissemination of information, to form association and to assemble peacefully and without weapons, to free meetings and demonstrations; Article 21 allowed people to engage in any action or activity, except those prohibited or restricted by the present constitution and laws of the Kyrgyz Republic. As a result we can say that independent Kyrgyzstan's new constitution was the most liberal and provided better conditions for the formation of a democratic society than did its Central Asian neighbours. Introduction of the Kyrgyz currency in May 1993 was also proof of the progressive nature of the Askar Akayev. In addition as we mentioned above Askar Akayev did his best in terms

²Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek, 1996), Articles 3, 4.

³www.gender.cawater-info.net/publications/pdf/const_kg.pdf

of establishing a market-based economy and developing a liberal democracy based on civil society. All of these were indicators that Kyrgyzstan, with the leadership of Askar Akayev, was determined in transforming to liberal democracy. So it was called the ‘democracy island of Central Asia’ by John Anderson.

Gradual Shift from Democracy to Autocracy

Since the achievement of independence, a major concern of president Akyaev has been transforming young Kyrgyzstan to a liberal democracy. But with the beginning of 1994 Kyrgyzstan had witnessed the gradual stagnation of political reforms. There was a tendency from democratic reforms towards authoritarianism. In other words “democratic island of Central Asia” was getting more authoritarian. According to Gregory Gleason the meeting between the heads of states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that took place in Almaty in July 1994 was the beginning of the Akayev’s turn toward authoritarianism. At these meeting leaders of neighbouring states persuaded Akayev to agree on the model of an Asian development path. It meant he would have to abandon his efforts to reach national consensus democratically (Gleason 1999: 99).

Actually the tendency to autocracy began at the end of the 1993. After the adoption of the new constitution tensions between executive and parliament began. A lot of issues can be shown as examples to prove this reasoning that there were intense tensions between executive and parliament. But the ongoing economic decline and allegations of corruption against Akayev's closest political associates were most important issues. There was a constant attack directed at the government of Prime Minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev and indirectly at Akayev. The legislatives accused the government of being unable to stop the ongoing economic decline and corruption. As a result in mid-December 1993 the Kyrgyz Parliament initiated a vote of no-confidence that led to the dismissal of the government (Anderson 1999:27).

Analysis of first tenure of Akayev

During the first tenure of Akayev Kyrgyzstan, called the ‘island of democracy’ in Central Asian countries, adopted the policies of social and political pluralism. Akayev reforms created the hope in world and among its own countries’ citizens. He dismantled the Soviet type of political institutions and opted the western model of

liberal democracy. Kyrgyzstan has acquired the most liberal environment in all Central Asian countries. A scholar commented that in this first period President adhered the constitution in domestic foreign policy, discussed about the multi-party system and adopted the laws feely, government publically adopted the political and economic reforming policies, and regularly reported to Parliament. It means that first constitutions neither created strong Presidentialism nor strong Parliament. But it made a balance a between these two institutions.⁴

However, since 1993 he began to change his tactics and tried to make his position strong. In September 1994 he started a quiet revolution in which he disbanded the Parliament and forced the government to resign, cowed the Judiciary, shut down the press, set up new electoral commission, and announced the new Parliamentary election (Spector2004: 4). With the referendum of October 1994 he positioned himself as more authoritarian. So he was reverting to the Central Asian type of a more talk on democratic rhetoric but practise more authoritarian type of rule.

The Politics of Referendums and Election of 1995

In the first five years of Akayev regime two referendums were held. First in January 1994 and second in October 1994. In first referendum Akayevasked the people about the continuation of his economic policies because the oppositions were against his economic policies and he got the mandate of 95% of his population (Niazaliev2004: 97). In the second referendum Akayev wanted two major amendments. First was the mandate to amend in the constitution with referendum and second was to make the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) Bicameral. Successfully he also got the 86% of the support of his population (Ibid).

The 22 October 1994 referendum had far reaching implications for the transformation of the independent Kyrgyzstan towards the liberal democracy. First of all, the constitutional changes were to be made by referendum rather than parliament, thereby diminishing the power and privileges of the parliament. At the new bicameral parliament, which was to be elected in February 1995, the power of the

⁴ “Murat Ukushov about the parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan” 14 October 2011 [Online: web] accessed on 16 June 2012 URL: <http://ipp.kg/en/news/2262/>.

two houses was not separated. This problem really weakened the parliament.⁵ So if both houses wanted to stand up to the executive, first both had to be consensual then they can equalise the power against the President. Certainly it was impossible because there were Akayev supporters also in the Parliament. As the result of this, the newly elected parliament, which convened its initial session in March 1995, spent its one year on disputing the relative powers and jurisdiction of each chamber. These developments revealed by the two amendments to the constitution Akayev started to strengthen his power and weakening legislative simultaneously (Anderson1997).

First Parliamentary Election in 1995

The general elections for the two legislative chambers were held in February 1995. These elections were the first multi-party parliamentary elections in independent Kyrgyzstan. Several political parties participated in the elections and several of them won seats in the parliament. However none of them could form the majority in parliament. These elections did not result in the emergence of active political parties. Most of the political parties were newly organized and could not form a powerful bloc or unify their activities. The result of the elections showed that people gave their votes for independent candidates which were well-known figures and supported as fellow countrymen, not as representative of political parties. These exhibited that that personalities prevailed over ideologies, because independent candidates won most of the seats.

Kyrgyzstan during Akayev's second tenure as President (1995-2005)

In December 1995 Askar Akayev became the President for the second term. He started to reduce the democratic principles through the referendums. These referendums were held in 1996, 1998, and 2003. As Huskey stated that using these referendums as a tool he actually avoided the resistance of Parliament and constitutional provisions (Huskey2002). These referendums were not the result of people's demand but the Akayev's own need. Through the referendum of February 1996 he strengthened his power. Two years later he again introduced a surprise referendum. Through this second (total third from independence) referendum he

⁵ "Murat Ukushov about the parliamentary regime in Kyrgyzstan" 14 October 2011 [Online: web] accessed on 16 June 2012 URL: <http://ipp.kg/en/news/2262/>.

wanted five changes regarding the issues of private land ownership, reduction in size, structure and power of Parliament, immunity and privileges of the Parliamentarians etc. So these amendments were not related to the common people. This attempt was a kind of creating puppet parliament by Askar Akayev.

The referendum in February 2003 was related to two main issues. First, whether the new version of constitution should be adopted and second whether the Akayev should remain in office till the end of his official term in October 2005. With more than 70% of vote Kyrgyz election commission declared the result in the favour of Akayev.

In the political development of post-communist Central Asia, the role of elections (or pseudo-elections) has been of particular interest. Using the rhetoric of consultation, leaders in the region have held a series of elections, plebiscites and referendums, yet it is clear that in none of these were democratic norms fully adhered to and that in many the results were predetermined. Given that they have failed to offer the people adequate representation, or create salient political institutions, the purpose of these exercises can be seen in terms of affirming the positions of elites, recruiting ‘talented political entrepreneurs’, and anaesthetizing the population. These features are explained by the various constraints on political development in Central Asia, including elite concerns over stability, perceived developmental needs, the weakness of a ‘modern’ civilsociety with its particular values, and international factors (Anderson 1997).

CIVIL SOCIETY IN KYRGYZSTAN

Civil society is a concept that has travelled across the globe but which has rarely been studied comprehensively and comparatively in the Central Asia (Babajanian et. al. 2005). While much valuable work has been done on post-communist political changes, economic transition, and other disputed issues in Central Asian States. But only a very rare attention has been paid towards the existence, positivity, negativity, strength, influence and opportunities for civil society in the region. The dominant focuses of Central Asian scholars have been studying the democratisation process rather than civil society.

Civil society is important because Political scientists consider the civil society as a vehicle for the process of democratization (Robinson and Friedman 2005). But like a double edged sword it can also be used as a tool for the pursue of the some disguised interests of dominant powers. It is obvious that promotion of democracy through civil society development have been a disputed issue. Whilst the neo-liberal view of civil society, is society groupings should be independent from the state. But in reality this view is too naive. The history of Central Asian states suggest that it could be inappropriate to insist on separation between civil society groups and the state (Starr 1999).

Civil Society under Akayev's First Tenure (1989-1995)

The newly independent republic of Kyrgyzstan, which acquired independence as a result of Soviet collapse, was seen in the early 1990s as an 'island of democracy'⁶ within which a vibrant space of social organizations blossomed. Its first President Askar Akayev often spoke of the need to create a robust civil society if democratisation was to proceed and succeed. Therefore many new social organisations sprang up in most of the larger cities. Yet this was a country where more modern forms of self-organisation had not developed before 1989 and which had no experience of liberal democratic rule. Hence the development of both civil society and democratisation proceeded in parallel rather than linear fashion. So the fate of civil society was to rely on the activities and actions of political elites as well as its own self-organisational capacities (Anderson 2000).

In Kyrgyzstan, as in other post-Soviet countries, one of the main goals of democratization policies promoted by the international donor community has been the establishment of a strong civil society that promotes democratic ideas among the population and put a restraint (counteracts when necessary) on the actions of semi authoritarian state. However, the question remains to what extent this project has been achieved and whether the country has a functioning civil society (Schulte 2008).

⁶Anderson, John(1999), Kyrgyzstan: The Central Asia's Island of Democracy, Amsterdam, Heywood Publishers:23.

Askar Akayev, as selected leader of the republic in October 1990, was seen a compromise candidate but he quickly carved his mark upon Kyrgyz politics. On the day of his selection by the deputies he also met with leaders of various social groups demonstrating outside the parliament building. In many of his speeches Akayev made clear about his commitment to the Gorbachevian vision of reform. Therefore under his leadership the political atmosphere in Kyrgyzstan became much more stress-free. The official media followed the path of open and independent reporting about political events, and a number of independent papers began to appear in the country. Many new social organisations also flourished and only a few of them faced any legal hurdles in obtaining legal recognition. More importantly for our purposes, Akayev made frequent reference to the need to establish a vibrant civil society that would provide a foundation for democratisation (Spector 2004: 14). This approach continued after the attainment of independence at the end of 1991. The number of social organisations grew rapidly. During his first three years in office the president held frequent meetings with journalists and with the leaders of political parties, social organisations and religious communities. But some sceptics hold the view that this was largely an attempt to co-opt social organisations and blunt their critique (Anderson 2000). Critics argue that old nomenklatura of the Soviet system, in the new political and economic order, was playing a double role in local patron-client networks in the country. But finally we can say that during the early 1990s Kyrgyzstan remained the most open of the Central Asian states, and showed a relatively high degree of social pluralism (Ibid).

However, since 1994 there were signs that Akayev had lost some of his initial enthusiasm for democracy, or at least the mindless attempt to follow Western political models. Addressing a constitutional convention in December 1994, the president seemed to step back from his earlier commitment in the parallel development of political, economic and social reform. Speaking of Western political forms, he argued that they were based upon a strong economy. So they had a clear and defined property relations helped to shape distinctive class and social interests. So in western countries there existed a mature civil society and strong institutional structures supported by a democratic political culture and well-developed political parties (Pryde 1995). Though he argued that without these necessary preconditions it would be illogical to expect immediate results in the process of political transformation, he said that the country

was in transition phase so it would follow the path of evolutionary process of democratisation. During this period he suggested that it would be necessary to strengthen the capacity of the central state and grant the executive more power to forward the process of reform. But at the official level there were not any significant policy roadblocks against the social organizations, and response of the state was liberal enough for free functioning of them. Moreover, from mid-1994 onwards there were growing signs that Kyrgyzstan's experiment with pluralist politics was becoming a little bit difficult process. Several critical journalists were subject to criminal prosecution during 1994 and subsequent years. Parliamentary elections in February 1995 were characterised by considerable manipulation in much of the country by local networks as the central authorities. There were also some degree of electoral irregularity was evident in the presidential election of December that year (Anderson1996).

Civil Society under Akayev's Second Tenure (1995-2005)

In December 1995 Askar Akayev became the President for the second term. He started to weaken the democratic principles through the tool of referendums. Following his election, he extended his power through referendums in 1996, 1998 and 2003 in the next ten year till the 'Tulip Revolution' in March 2005. He had far greater personal power than the old communist first secretaries. But the formal extension of his power entailed no guaranteed increase in the actual reach of the central state. Nonetheless, a consequence of these developments was a harm of Kyrgyzstan's image as an 'island of democracy' and the creation of a more restrictive political atmosphere. Though the state still permitted a considerable degree of social pluralism, evident in the rise of registered social organisations to well over a thousand by 1997, an informal distinction was increasingly made between the 'harmless or useful' and the 'critical' (Ibid).

Thus whilst some flourished in the mid-1990s, others-notably some of the human rights groups and the settlers movement such Yntymak-were subject to increasing pressures from the authorities. At the same time many parliamentarians came to the forefront as the defenders of privilege and sought to prevent criticism and social activism though laws restricting the rights of the press and the right to hold meetings outside official building. These developments suggest that what we have

seen in Kyrgyzstan since the late 1980s should be seen in terms of ‘liberalisation’ rather than ‘democratisation’ (Anderson 2000: 80).

So the formation of a ‘public space’ by political elites, that has not been fully institutionalised and that can be restricted or removed with very little difficulty. In such circumstances social organisations may flourish, but they were located mainly in capital Bishkek, and the political context was only partially supportive of civil society, despite the extensive and seemingly liberal regulatory framework.

Non-Governmental Organizations in Kyrgyzstan

The concept of civil society is generally thought to represent the unofficial, self-governing social movements within a society that are outside of the affair of government structure. Though there are many kinds of organizations, groups and civic bodies are considered as a part of the civil society. But nowadays Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are a very prominent part of the civil society. The NGOs are also called the third sector. The Government and market are considered first and second sector. It is the established view that for true democratization in a polity there needs not only be top down approach, but also some basis in the grassroots of a society that NGOs try to do.

The diversity of NGOs make difficult to define the concept of NGO. They comprise many groups and institutions that are largely autonomous and they have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives. They are private agencies in industrial countries that support international development; indigenous groups organized regionally or nationally; and member-groups in villages. NGOs include charitable and religious associations that mobilize private funds for development, distribute food and family planning services and promote community organization. They also include independent cooperatives, community associations, water-user societies, women’s groups and pastoral associations. Citizen Groups that raise awareness and affect policy of the government are also NGOs (Bradford and Maslyukivska 1999).

Notwithstanding a weak history in democratic organization, Soviet Kyrgyzstan did produce some horizontally structured social movements. Non-governmental organizations, however, were restricted by the Soviet regime and laws clearly

prohibited the groups of citizens from organizing for non-state sponsored activities. The applications of these laws varied widely. The far distanced areas had some groupings than nearer. The major development occurred during the pre-Gorbachev era when some groups began to sprout (AKDN 2006).

For the first time under Gorbachev, citizen organizations were given authorization to register as legal entities. Social organizations shaped in the pre-glasnost period began to register. Many of these groups remained active throughout the last few years of the Soviet Union and those leaders involved in such organizations became leaders of other post-Soviet groups. Because of the favourable political environment in Kyrgyzstan, literally hundreds of NGOs have become active in the post-Soviet period (Ibid).

After the independence of Kyrgyzstan the western countries and financial supporter countries were of the opinion that the democratic process will be facilitated by the civil society organizations. That meant civil society was going to be the foundation bricks of the Kyrgyz democracy. That notion of civil society, based on the non-governmental organizations, was to work with the Kyrgyz authority to start the democratizations process in the country. In particular, it has been believed that NGOs as actors in civil society will promote democratic reforms and liberalize the government by raising public awareness, monitoring national and international laws on human rights and democratic governance and gating repression and corruption (Starr 1999).

Kyrgyzstan, with its population of more than 5 million people, has more than 14 thousand civil society organizations (Medet 2008). Today, NGOs in Kyrgyzstan have become political actors that openly voice their opinions and have been able to play an active role in country's major political events such as constitutional reform, discussing poverty reduction aid programmes and the abolition of the death penalty, to name only some examples. Given the ambitious attempts of the NGO sector to play a role in internal political processes and define their local model, it is being regarded as a having a mere "Western" agenda (Jailobaeva 2008).

Law Related to NGOs

The approach of the state to the ‘third sector’ has been submissive and observatory for a long time. Even the term ‘nongovernmental organization’ which is commonly acknowledged and widely used in Kyrgyzstan was not defined and documented by Kyrgyzstan’s legislation. The Law regulating establishment of nongovernmental organizations in the country is the Law on Public Associations. Adopted in 1991 the Law only refers to the fact that public associations are voluntary formations developed by the free will of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic united on the basis of common interests, goals and principles of activity. Other laws regulating the activity of Kyrgyzstan’s NGOs until the mid 1990s were quite contradictory and unclear. For instance, the 1996 Civil Code classified public associations as ‘noncommercial organizations’, however their definition did not differ from the one stipulated in the 1991 Law. The Civil Code just pointed to the fact that ‘a noncommercial organization’ is a voluntary formation developed by the free will of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic united on the basis of common interests, goals and principles of activity. The Tax Code (1996) in turn clarified that the term ‘noncommercial’ means ‘non-profit’ and does not stipulate any tax benefits for noncommercial organizations. The only exception was exemption from land tax for organizations for disabled people, war veterans and other charitable organizations (Ibid).

The national legislation of Kyrgyzstan is largely vague and inconsistent in defining the status of a civil society and its organizations. The law that regulates activities of non-governmental organizations is the Law on Non-Commercial Organizations, adopted on October 1, 1999.⁷ This law does not define the widely used concept of NGO, but instead defines the nature of a ‘non-commercial organization’ and points out its two main characteristics. These are a making a profit is not a major objective and second the obtained profit is not distributed among members, founders and official persons (Jailobaeva 2008).

⁷ For the on-line version of the law, [Oline:web] accessed on 10 June 2012 URL: <http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/4952>.

Role of NGOs during the Aksi incident

In Kyrgyzstan the tragic killing of demonstrators in the southern oblast of Jalal-Abad in early 2002 led to large-scale protests at the community level and the national mobilization of civil society groups on issues such as press freedom and the right to demonstrate. The sacking of the government by the President was one step in a series of only partially successful measures to placate the opposition; and in a complex situation some NGOs developed a clearly anti-government line. Later NGOs united in a Civic Forum to campaign against the referendum proposals which took Kyrgyzstan towards a combined presidential-parliamentary system, and against corruption and dynasty-building in the regime (Akcali 2005)

After this event government became critical and sceptical about the role of nongovernmental organizations. NGO leaders have also come under direct attack of the Akayev regime. Once in 1998, government had refused to register the outspoken Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights (KCHR) in 1998. But relented under international pressure, revealing the political nature of the denial (Akcali2005).

The reason for this is that the government lacks an integrated policy for working with NGOs. The government institutions distrust NGOs and are not interested in working with them because they are poorly informed about NGOs and their activities. All in all, the idea of working with NGOs has been a new phenomenon for the government and its institutions since NGOs emerged only after independence. The lack of state policy on NGOs has led to a desultory and sometimes discriminatory government-NGO relationship. The government and its institutions tend to work more with social service NGOs than with civil activist groups since the latter are considered to be more active in advocacy and policy-making processes. Civil activist groups which criticize the government and its activities, especially those infringing rights of citizens, are treated differently by the government and its institutions. Compared to social service NGOs, civil activist groups tend to encounter more problems created by government institutions, such as undermining NGO initiatives, refusal to re-register and others (Randnitz 2005).

Government-Civil Society Relations

The state's role in Kyrgyzstan has transformed dramatically since its independence. USSR provided security for decades and encouraged cohesion amongst its citizens. Living conditions have always been difficult in Kyrgyzstan, one of the poorest Soviet republics. Unlike its Kazakh neighbor, this country has no natural energy resources that would assist it in asserting its political and social sovereignty. So the Kyrgyz society has become the subordinate to international community. That is why independent Kyrgyzstan has been called as a 'globalised protectorate' (Petric 2005). To secure the support of Western countries, it has pursued the advice of liberal international economic advisers. So it implemented economic 'shock therapy' advised by their bosses and then it caught in international debt (Pomfret 2003). And restructured the state structure from a number of sectors of activity. It followed the economic policies of IMF and World Bank.

The state is retreating its role from the public sector and the numbers of international NGOs are growing. Higher education has been privatized and foreign foundations are trying to fill the space left by the state. Where religious affairs used to be carefully controlled by the state, today Saudi NGOs fund a number of mosques. In numerous spheres of political, legal and social life, the country has welcomed standards and practices recommended by UNDP, the OSCE, the European Union, foreign NGOs and foundations. Even in the field of national security, Kyrgyzstan has been purchasing equipments and resources from the Russians and Americans (Weitz2006)

Civil Society and its Role in Kyrgyzstan

From the independence, the relationship between government agencies and NGOs has an ad hoc character. During the first 5-6 years of independence, a state and non-government sector had emerged. In this period of mutual non-recognition, each sector was concerned with its own agenda. In those days non-recognition was explained by the absence of prior experience of cooperation, and the immaturity of state and NGO institutions (Esengul2008: 90).

Inter-relations between the third sector and central government could not be formed for quite a long period of time. The issue of relations between the state and noncommercial sector (NGOs) was not quite positive. Despite rapid development of

civil society bodies, their impact was limited. The major reason for such failure is (either state the person's name) lack of cooperation between state structures and NGOs (Chinara 2008). Problems of legislation, lack of clear and transparent financial policies in NGOs, weak organizational development, and lack of perception and necessity in interaction with regard to representatives of both NGOs and state bodies (Ibid).

Analyzing the existing relation between the state and NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan the following problems in relations between the state and the civil sector can be identified: lack of trust from both sides, potential partners not understanding the language of the activity and claims against each other, the impossibility of managing social and business activity through administrative methods, inclinations to act on behalf of the people by both parties, and a predominantly pretentious nature of relations. The foreign funding was a major part of functioning of these NGOs and this was a bone of contention with the government. This leads to complaints among NGOs about absolute control and accusatory rhetoric of the state structures (Kuchukeeva 2003).

By 2000 statehood with high concentration of power was formed in the country. This power could have been compensated by developed civil society institutions, such as parties, NGOs, mass media and influential public opinion. However in Kyrgyzstan these structures were only at the initial stage of development. Political weight of even the largest membership parties was small. Mass media experienced constant pressure from state agencies. Gerard Stoudmann, director of the OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), expressed deep concern about Bishkek's commitment to civil society development in the country. There is an imminent risk of further deterioration of the internal situation in case the authorities should not take all necessary measures to quickly resolve this case in line with Kyrgyzstan's commitments as an OSCE participating state, Stoudmann's stated (Chris 2002).

Role of Civil Society at the Local Level

Whilst presidents and government officials may demonstrate support, ambivalence or suspicion to the activities of the civil society sector, the question remains as to how,

or indeed whether, these attitudes translate into practice at the different administrative levels of the state structure. Relations are easier at the local level, but again, a cooperative working environment will often depend upon the knowledge, understanding and personality of particular office holders, both those working in administrative bodies and staff members of civil society organizations. In some cases, lack of understanding of the work of NGOs or community groups means that their actions are met with fear and hostility by government officials or are not taken seriously (Connery 2000).

Despite these expressions of resistance and suspicion, instances of government collaboration with newer style organizations are increasingly to be found at local levels in all countries in the region. This type of local level collaboration has been encouraged further by the recent donor trend towards funding community activities (Johnson 2008).

Local government offices at rayon, oblast and village level now understand that the activities of initiative groups and others in bringing international donor money for infrastructure projects, relieving the pressure on their budgets and bringing appreciate to the local authorities. Much of this local level work is associated with renovate and modernization of village infrastructure, since roads, water supplies, communal buildings and other facilities have all suffered from lack of maintenance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, there are many examples of village level groups, initiative groups or established NGOs, applying for funding to repair such structures. The more advanced NGOs, which have started of support to newer groups, make applications for funds. Most local levels governments do not fear another colour revolution (GDI 2006).

Therefore, it can be said that the last years of Akayev's regime had not been a fairy tale. His popularity heavily reduced because of a weak economic condition, widespread corruption. Even the capacity and capability of law order machinery got succumbed grossly. The increasing role of his family nepotism in economy and all spheres of public life were another cause for the disenchantment among the people.

The consolidation of power throughout Central Asia in the presidential branch, rather than decentralized through a system of checks and balances, is a worrying trend. Any government relying on one person rather than self-sustaining institutions that ensure

the peaceful transfer of power is inherently unstable. In tightening their grip on power, the Central Asian leaders run the danger of inadvertently causing their reins to snap, with consequences hard to predict. The Central Asian republics lived under the heel of Soviet domination for more than 70 years and before that, under Tsarist Russia. In both cases, the authority was imposed from above through force. It should not be surprising that democracy, with its non-coerced freedoms, would be perceived with suspicion and not taken seriously in the region. While Western critics may shake their heads at the recent spate of 'neither free nor fair' elections in Central Asia, they should be patient with the Central Asian republics. The considerable investment in democracy is not likely to yield direct returns. Interests in the region must be long term. The rewards will be widespread (Hogan 2000).

The next chapter attempts to see the role of civil society in the Tulip revolution. Why and how this revolution happened and what were implications of this on future political development.

CHAPTER IV

TULIP REVOLUTION AND AFTER (2005-2011)

The Tulip Revolution was the first Kyrgyz Revolution which overthrew President Askar Akayev and his government in the Central Asian Republic of Kyrgyzstan following the parliamentary elections of 27 February and 13 March 2005. The main rationale of the revolution was to end the increasingly corrupt and authoritarian rule imposed by Akayev regime particularly during his second tenure. It was a showcase of accumulated grievances against the high handed measures of the government.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO TULIP REVOLUTION IN KYRGYZSTAN

Both internal and external factors triggered the Tulip Revolution of 2005. Internally, the changes brought by Akayev contrary to what he promised in his initial years led to discontentment among the people of Kyrgyzstan. Externally, the changing dynamics of international environment, the attitude of the major powers- the US and Russia - towards the Central Asian states, and the growing dependence of civil society on external donors, particularly US influenced the developments leading to the revolution.

Endogenous factors

Mass mobilization is the by-product of institutional incentives endemic to nondemocratic political systems whereby self-interested actors adopt the strategy of *subversive clientelism* (Rdnitz 2010:3-4). It is the strategy of using a framework of incentives, by which people are encouraged to protest through a mix of purposive, material and solidarity incentives, and also purposive incentives. Material incentives include material rewards such as salaries, and material punishments such as threats of physical and economic retaliation and solidarity incentives include rewards as socializing, congeniality, sense of group membership and identification, status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, maintenance of social distinctions, and so on. Purposive are derived from the stated ends of the association, rather than from the simple act of associating (Terminkulov 2008). Mobilizations through *subversive clientelism* is likely to occur under the three situations working together. First, formal institutions are weak and rational individuals do not believe on politicized and personalized institutions. Second, there must be economic

opportunities that allow opposition actors to earn and dispose of wealth. Third, there must be a deficit of public good in the society (Rdnitz 2010: 4-5). All these factors were present in Kyrgyzstan that provided the fertile ground for mass mobilization for a regime change. These conditions are reflected in the following events that involved Kyrgyzstan.

The Parliamentary election in Kyrgyzstan scheduled to be held on 27 February 2005 was the main catalytic factor for the revolution. During the elections Akayev's government attempted to disqualify the main opposition leaders, who wanted to use the diminishing popularity of Akayev and other governing elites to their favour, on the basis of electoral rules. The opposition saw it as a suitable prospect for a change of government of Akayev like in Georgia and Ukraine. However, there was not any sign of pre-arranged powerful revolutionary movement in Kyrgyzstan because opposition was not unanimous on many issues. In the beginning of 2005 the political tension aggravated due to the government's attempts to discredit many candidates for the parliamentary election (Telekova 2005). For instance, the former Kyrgyz foreign minister and ambassador to UN Roza Otunbaeva and the editor of 'Obshchestvennyi Rejting' newspaper Bolotbek Maripov were both deprived of registration at the district level due to a residence qualification law adopted by the parliament (Gordeyev 2005). Due to constant international pressure this law was modified and Maripov was allowed for the registration. But Otunbaeva was charged for organizing unsanctioned demonstrations and had to testify before the city court (Marat 2005).

Akayev's misuse of the administrative resource machinery became apparent to everybody. For example, he refused to allow the opposition to use schools or public buildings for political meetings despite the extremely cold conditions. These moves displeased many people who were already dissatisfied with the excesses of power of the government. The opposition's suspicions of Akayev's nepotistic tactics were strengthened when a list of election candidates was published on the 20th of January. The list included Akayev's son and daughter as well as the son of the Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev (Henningsson 2006: 16).

The first round of the parliamentary elections was held on 27 February 2005. However, since only 31 out of 75 seats were decided, a second round of voting became necessary. The pro-government candidates acquired the majority of the seats that were decided. The President's son Aidar Akayev won one of these seats. However, there were many allegations of electoral frauds such as voting by non-Kyrgyz nationals and buying of votes etc. After the election a countrywide information blockade occurred and there were no open deliberations of the alleged electoral frauds. Commenting on the election, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) stated that the election was more competitive than previous polls but deregistration of candidates, interfering with independent media, vote buying and a low level of confidence in electoral and judicial institutions on the part of candidates and voters were prevalent. But on the other side the statement from CIS declared that the vote had been free and fair (Khamidov 2005).

The second round of parliamentary election was held on the 13 of March 2005. The result was an unambiguous victory for the President and his allies. The president's daughter, Bermet Akayev, won a seat in the second round which meant that both his children held seats in the parliament (Marat 2005: 10). Political commentators blamed the opposition for their lack of unity saying that there was no real alternative to the sitting government. Only five of the elected candidates could be termed as the opposition. However, further allegations of electoral fraud were heard and protests started to spread over the country. Many of the OSCE observers were not present in the country as they had left the Kyrgyzstan after the first round of the Poll. The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society commented that in certain areas people were transported in groups to the polling stations. This made it very difficult for independent observers to check their documents (Marat 2005: 10).

Another important factor that provided the impetus for the Tulip Revolution was the north-south cleavages in politics which impinged on economic sphere too. Kyrgyz politics since Soviet era is defined in terms of this regional division. Olivier Roy (2000) noted

“..built on an opposition between north and south. The [then] current president Akayev, and his whole team are from the north, from the valleys of Talas, Jui and Kemin . . . while the valleys of Issik kul and Nahrin remain outside their control. These regionalist oppositions do

not translate into a struggle for central power, as in Tajikistan, but rather into a determination to neutralize and ignore that power.”(Roy 2000: 115).

The post soviet era under Akayev was reflective of the northern bias in elite representation in high post in state institutions. This extended to distribution of economic rents besides important political and economic posts of provincial governors or akims. As is argued,

“During the early 1990s, the oblast akims were almost invariably members of a powerful local clan. However, by 1995, Akayev began to appoint northerners, especially from his own clan, to control the southern regions – the base of his main rivals” (Collins 2006).

This cleavage led to a political division in the north-south lines and determined the relationship between centre and provinces. Melvin, discussing the division of Kyrgyz politics noted,

“While Akayev eventually established considerable control over much of the elite in the Kyrgyz Republic, the regime remained fractured along a number of fault lines, notably the north–south axis, urban-rural tensions, and inter-ethnic fissures. These fault lines provided important spaces for forms of liberal politics to emerge” (Melvin 2008).

Akayev’s continued policy to concentrate political power in his family’s hands at the expense of the south after the election in 2000 led to a united southern opposition. This included such prominent politicians as Azimbek Beknazarov, Adakhan Madumarov, Omurbek Tekebaev and Doronbek Sadyrbaev. The mobilization that led to the Tulip Revolution on 24 March 2005 also took place primarily in the south. The fact that the revolution brought Kurmanbek Bakiev to power, a former prime minister and Jalal-Abad akim after Akayev ouster proves that regional dimension also impinged on the Tulip Revolution. Kurmanbek Bakiev was seen as a southerner who would restore the balance of power tilted in favour of the north under Akayev (Ryabkov 2008).

The economic disparity along the regional division of north-south also induced the tulip revolution. This could be seen in the increased participation of rural areas in the anti-government demonstration compared to the urban areas. For instance, the people

of Bishkek who had a better living standard did not show much interest in the demonstration. The growing influence of Akayev and his family in economic sphere in addition to their authoritarian leadership catapulted the movement (Henningsson 2006).

Thus, all the three conditions of weak political institutions as reflected in the parliamentary elections and centralised power structure, economic opportunities under the north-south division allowed opposition actors to capitalize the situation, and the economic disparities showed the deficit in public good.

Exogenous Factors

The international context in which regime operates to a great extent influence the process of regime change. In this context Joshua Tucker noted:

“...the role of foreign influences and actors continue to attract scholarly attention. The relationship between Western aid in various forms and democratization remains a source of controversy.....a relatively weak link between foreign money and democratization, the role of international influences in coloured revolutions, and more generally of ‘aid effectiveness’, may be studied as one such specific case” (Tucker 2007).

However, most important exogenous influence was the policies of major powers –the US and Russia- towards Kyrgyzstan. One of the exogenous factors was the changes in the regional dynamics. The colour revolution -Rose revolution in Georgia 2003 and Orange Revolution in Ukraine 2004- inspired the people of Kyrgyzstan. As Spencor argued that ‘inspiration for the protesters has also come from the success of recent peaceful resistance in Georgia and Ukraine’ (Spencor 2005).

American International NGOs (INGOs) were prominent mechanisms through which this causal link between superpower foreign policy interests and regime change worked out in many transitions from authoritarian rule in the twenty-one-year-long ‘third wave’. In fact, the role of INGOs in the Central Asian States dates back to the Reagan administration’s decision to create the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983 to roll back Soviet influence.¹ For instance, from 2003 INGOs, who

¹ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1638%20> (accessed on 14 July 2012).

had initially allowed access to the country during the time of IMF (International Monetary Fund) and USAID conditional lending, became active in defaming the Akayev for his policies. In this context it is said that,

“Practically everything that passes for civil society in Kyrgyzstan is financed by US foundations or by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). At least 170 non-governmental organizations charged with development or promotion of democracy have been created or sponsored by the Americans” (Escobar 2005).

After the fall of communism, Kyrgyzstan took a centre stage in US foreign policy under George H. Bush and Clinton administrations in order ‘to secure an alternative source for energy, help Central Asia gain autonomy from Russia’s hegemony, block Iran’s influence, and promote political and economic freedoms’ (Atal 2003).

US pressed for increasing military presence in the region and succeeded in securing membership for four of the five Central Asian states, including Kyrgyzstan, in NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1994.²

The post-September 9/11 witnessed change in US policy towards Central Asia termed as ‘arc of instability’ (Mainville 2004). Akayev in order to secure money allowed the largest American military base in the region at Manas, outside Bishkek, which seen with some concern by Moscow (Steele 2004). US saw it as an opportunity to ‘reduce Kyrgyzstan dependence on Russia’ (Atal 2003).

Russian foreign policy towards Kyrgyzstan was motivated by the behaviour of US in the region. However, Kyrgyzstan was dependent on Russia economically mainly because Russia could offer them tangible cooperation in the vital economic sphere that was not coming from the West- subsidised energy supplies, investment and trade. In 1999 the extension of the CIS Collective Security Treaty boosted Russian military leverage in Kyrgyzstan.³

² <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1638%20> (accessed on 14 July 2012).

³ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1638%20> (accessed on 14 July 2012)

Russia and China, both share border with Kyrgyzstan, and they got cautioned with the new military base of US in Manas. Russia along with China steered the Shanghai Cooperation Forum toward opposing and ending US military bases in Central Asia. In 2003, President Putin negotiated with Akayev to open up a Russian airbase at Kant, 30 KM from the American “lily pad.” China was also reported to be engaged in secret parleys for its own base in Kyrgyzstan and for border adjustments that stirred a political outburst against Akayev in March 2002.⁴

It is also not less important that the leaders of anti-Akayev coalition are mostly pro-western figures. One of these pro-western leaders is Roza Otunbaeva, who has extensive personal and political ties with the West in general and with the US in particular. Otunbaeva served as Kyrgyz ambassador to the US and Canada from 1991 to 1994. She also she had also served as Kyrgyz ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1997. She had given her service as deputy special representative of the UN Secretary General on the Georgian-Abkhazian border conflict from 2002 until September 2004. During her appointment in Tbilisi, she witnessed the “Rose Revolution” of Georgia. As Andrea Peters indicates, she consistently described events in that country as a model for change in Kyrgyzstan (Peters 2005).

Role of Civil society in Tulip Revolution

Following the first round of elections, concerned by the development of 20 January 2002, the NGO “Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society” announced that they would begin to educate 120 observers for the election. The government responded by proclaiming that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would send 100 observers to monitor the polls. Thereafter, on the 9th of March anti-government protests took place in the cities of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Uzgen. Opposition supporters occupied government offices in Uzgen. In Osh people demanded the resignation of Akayev and free and fair elections. In Naryn Province opposition supporters blocked a highway connecting Bishkek with China.⁵

⁴ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1638%20>
(accessed on 14 July 2012).

⁵ “Election Related Disturbances Hit Southern Kyrgyzstan”, [Online:web] accessed on 24 March 2012
URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030405.shtml>.

After the second round of parliamentary elections some smaller protests occurred in Capital Bishkek. The protests later spread up in the south of Kyrgyzstan and its main center was Jalal-Abad. Opposition demanded Akayev for other fair elections, his resignations as well as termination of local officials. Subsequently the regional government buildings were captured and a highway connecting Bishkek with Osh was shut down.

In the middle of March demonstrators and government forces were still battling for control in the south. On the 18th of March after much turmoil the government building in Osh was also in the hands of the protestors. Two days later violent clashes erupted when special police dispersed protestors by forceful means from government offices in Osh and Jalal-Abad. The exact number of fatalities and injuries that occurred during these clashes is unknown. Just hours after the buildings were seized by police up to 10 000 opposition supporters gathered to resist the police in Jalal-Abad. Soon after the government building was recaptured and the local Interior Ministry building was set on fire.⁶

In city Osh police attempted to take control of the government offices but on the 21st of March the government building in Osh was recaptured by protestors. They also overtook police departments and the National Security Service building. Soon the airports in Jalal-Abad and Osh were in the hands of the anti-government protestors and the chiefs of law enforcement bodies in Osh reported to support the opposition led 'Peoples Power' shadow government. On 21 March 2005 anti-Akayev protests were held in front of the Kyrgyz embassies and consulates in Washington DC, New York, Chicago, London, Brussels and Moscow. Akayev strived to tranquil the protestors by meeting with the head of the Central Election Commission and Supreme Court ordering an inquiry into the alleged voting irregularities. On the same day protestors strengthened their power in Osh and Jalal-Abad. Opposition leaders stated that a People's Power government would provide a provisional authority in the region. On 22 March 2005 most of the law enforcement officials in the both cities announced their loyalty to the "People's Power" leaders. The most active leaders in the opposition movement were Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Roza Otunbayeva, Bektur

⁶ "Violent Clashes Hit the Southern Kyrgyzstan", [Online: web] accessed on 1 April 2012 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav032005.shtml>.

Asanaliyev, Dooronbek Sadyrbayev, Usen Sydykov and Topchubek Turgunaliyev. On March 23rd Akayev made a desperate move to calm the protest by dismissing the Interior Minister Bakirdin Subanbekov and the General Prosecutor Myktybek Abdylidayev for “poor work”⁷

On 24th March, after the protesters’ capture of the main government building Akayev with his family fled to Russia via Kazakhstan. The Prime Minister Nikolai Tanayev resigned from his post. The outgoing parliament held a meeting in the afternoon with the Supreme Court and the Central Electoral Commission. Two parallel parliaments were formed despite the fact that the Supreme Court had declared the parliament election results invalid. Kurmanbek Bakiyev was announced as an interim Prime Minister. Felix Kulov had been liberated from the jail, which was in imprisoned since 2002.⁸

The INGOs also played a vital role in promoting anti-government demonstrations. As has been elaborated, the donor-centric nature of civil society led to absolute control of the Kyrgyz society by the INGOs. Fiona Adamson’s finds,

“Local NGOs receive almost 100 percent of their funds from international actors and can easily become almost 100 percent donor driven. International donors implicitly or explicitly expect local NGOs to administer programmes that do not necessarily match local needs.”⁹

Various strategies were adopted by the INGOs in the name of democratisation to bring about a regime change in Kyrgyzstan. They sought to win over local elites to Western ideas and models. They organised conferences, seminars, ‘technical assistance’ and exchange programmes with Kyrgyz elites, believing that domestic political change comes from exposure to western ideas. That this tactic worked was evident by the trend among the Kyrgyz business and political elites to endorse closer security and economic relationships with the US. Kurmanbak Bakiyev of the National

⁷ “Revolutionary Movement Builds in Southern Kyrgyzstan” [Online: web] accessed on 4 April 2012
URI: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032105.shtml>.

⁸ “Kyrgyzstan: Reporter’s Notebook-Witness to Uprising” [Online: web] accessed on 4 April 2012
URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp040505a.shtml>.

⁹ Sreeran(2005), “Democratisation, Colour Revolutions and the Role of the NGOs: Catalysts or Saboteurs?” [Online: web] accessed on 6 may 2012 URL:
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1638>.

Movement of Kyrgyzstan, the man who replaced Akayev as Prime Minister after the Tulip Revolution, was himself sent to the US on an exchange programme. Felix Kulov, the new head of security, and Omurbek Tekebayev, the new Speaker of the Parliament after the Tulip Revolution, were also beneficiaries of State Department-sponsored visitors programmes (Gutterman 2005).

The INGOs funded projects for publishing anti-government newspapers, training youth “infected” with the democracy virus through US-financed trips to Kiev for a glimpse of the Orange Revolution, and mobilising fairly large crowds in Bishkek who stormed Akayev’s Presidential palace and in the southern towns of Osh and Jalalabad. USAID “invested at least \$2 million prior to the elections” (Escobar 2005). The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS) and Civil Society Against Corruption (CSAC), key local NGO partners of the NED, played very active role with anti-Akayev parties without any impartiality. The US Embassy in Bishkek, continuing the murky tradition of interventionist behaviour in crises, worked closely with INGOs like Freedom House and the Soros Foundation, supplying generators, printing presses and money to keep the protests boiling until Akayev fled. Information about where protesters should gather and what they should bring spread through State Department funded radio and TV stations, especially in the southern region of Osh. Thus, it becomes apparent that US influence provided the impetus for the anti-government demonstrations. CDCS head, Edil Baisolov, admitted that the uprising would have been “absolutely impossible” without this coordinated American effort (Smith 2005). On the utility of the INGOs to the entire exercise of the Tulip Revolution, Philip Shishkin noted:

“To avoid provoking Russia and violating diplomatic norms, the U.S. can't directly back opposition political parties. But it underwrites a web of influential NGOs.”¹⁰

Thus, it is evident that during the Tulip Revolution of 2005 both NGOs and INGOs played a prominent role, despite the fact that Akayev accused them of being used as a tool to destabilize the region and creating unrest in the country. But the authorities underestimated the role of civil society groups involvement in demonstrations and

¹⁰ ‘Ripple Effect in Putin’s Backyard. Democracy Stirs- With US Help’, in *The Wall Street Journal*, February 25.

their firm commitment to democracy. The CSOs played the role of election observer, monitoring and educating the people. They even played the role of a mediator in Jalalabad, the first area of mass protests (Telekova 2005).

Post-Tulip Kyrgyzstan and Nature of Civil Society

Tulip revolution resulted in ousting of Askar Akayev and incoming of Bakiyev into power. The main Opposition leader- Kurmanbek Bakiyev won the Parliamentary election with 80% vote. The people of Kyrgyzstan were expecting, as he promised, to eradicate corruption and favouritism and nepotism in the country, which was rampant in Kyrgyzstan during the Akayev era. He also promised to curb the power of president (Marat 2010). But he failed to fulfil the promises (Marat 2011).

The Tulip Revolution was initially seen as a genuine popular protest against the Akayev family's ruling practices, a formative moment when reforms could be introduced that would fundamentally alter the nature of the state as it had evolved during Akayev's last years. However, it soon became evident that the opposition now in power had been united by nothing but their common resentment of Akayev. The first years witnessed chaotic competition for power (Pannier 2007).

In 2005 after the tulip revolution Bakiyev was elected president with a landslide victory. But there were different groups and communities in parliament and there is no cohesion among them. After this period due to many factors the political tension started between Prime Minister Felix Kulov and President Bakiyev. There were view among public through media that both were getting support from different factions and rival groups and regions in the country. The running of state system was not in cooperative manner instead there was confrontation between the two leading political authority. And finally in 2007 Kulov was outmaneuvered as Prime minister and replaced by Azim Isabekov (Engvall 2011).

Bakiev's strongest political rivals consisted of several politico-economic magnates in the parliament with extensive economic interests in lucrative spheres such as alcohol, tobacco, trade, construction and bazaars. These magnates were operating under the Akayev family's umbrella either shifted their loyalties to Bakiev over night or fiercely resisted. Because they wanted to make their new patron in society so they became the

new president's most bitter foes. The opposition of Bakiyev had not any clear political agenda but they were pursuing their own narrow interests. The opposition also did not have sufficient numbers in the Parliament and they found it difficult to challenge Bakiyev effectively (Engvall 2011).

Notwithstanding his grown power, Bakiyev failed to deal with the rise of the black economy, persistent corruption, and the general weakness of the economy. As a Stephan Blank stated that after the colour revolution in Central Asia the state ruling elites were becoming intolerant towards NGOs and human Rights activists (Blank 2006). It was approximated that as much as 52% of the Kyrgyz economy was black or related to smuggling. Another problem was the mounting influence of organised crime related mainly to the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan via Tajikistan on their way to Russia and beyond (Hiro 2009).

Bakiyev did not learn anything from the past and indulged with allies in rigging in Presidential election in July 2009. The leading opposition challenger Almazbek Atambayev, withdrew his candidacy from the fray. He also protested against the Bakiyev. These developments ruined any lingering prospect that this small republic of 5 million people would turn into a beacon of democracy in central Asia. After getting mandate, Bakiyev fastened the persecution of opposition leaders and independent journalists with a series of arrests and physical assaults by government agents, who authorities described as 'criminals' but failed to apprehend (Marat 2010).

It is worth noting that during the presidency of George Bush, Washington issued regular statement about free and fair elections in Central Asia, and expressed concern about the suppression of peaceful opposition. But gradually US changed his policy. During his visit to Bishkek earlier this month, William Burns, the US under-secretary for political affairs, hoped for 'fair and credible election'. But he astonishingly refrained from mentioning the rough treatment meted out to the opposition and independent journalists. This was part of the bargain that President Barack Obama reportedly struck with Bakiyev a month ago when, suddenly reversing his previous policy, the Kyrgyz leader allowed the Pentagon to use the air base near Bishkek for one more year. In short, the Tulip Revolution, much hyped by the Bush administration, finally proved to be a false dawn (Hiro 2009).

Reasons of Failure of Bakiyev and Tulip Revolution II (2010)

The government which came to power post-Tulip revolution failed to fulfil the promises resulting in disillusionment among people. Within few months of assuming power, disappointment in Bakiyev regime began to surface. Like Akayev, Bakiyev gradually began to control the state, corruption and political violence became rampant and there was growing difference between Bakiyev and north-supported Feliks Kulov. He got involved in greater corruption by appointing his relatives and associates into key political positions like his predecessor (Marat 2008). This led to renewed political tension resulting in the mobilisation of around 10,000 people in Bishkek in November 2006. Though Bakiyev signed the text of a new constitution, conceding presidential prerogatives to the parliament, including nominations of prime minister, he reversed his decision and appointed two prime ministers himself within the first three months of 2007 (Cummings 2009). The political situation further deteriorated when Bakiyev announced a constitutional reform in September 2007 that allowed unlimited powers and alienated the opposition (Marat 2008).

The north-south divide also began to debilitate the Bakiev–Kulov tandem seen after 24 March 2005. The dissolution of the Bakiev–Kulov tandem in December 2006–January 2007 was the culmination of tensions in the tandem that had been observed since 2005. From 2007, the opposition against Bakiev included a northerner, Feliks Kulov, and such prominent southerners as Omurbek Tekebaev and Azimbek Beknazarov, who were seeking to mobilize their supporters in the north. Like Akayev regime, the major opposition rallies against President Bakiev took place in the north (Ryabkov 2008).

The rapidly growing popular disaffection began to accumulate around the steep rise in fuel and water and gas charges. This provided a platform on which the fractious opposition groups could unite. In addition, UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon criticised the Bakiyev government during his visit. This event united the whole opposition which called on a national protest on 7 April 2010 and transformed into a national uprising. The demonstrators occupied official buildings and state-run TV stations all over the country, including the capital, Bishkek. The bloody clash with the

security forces took the toll of approximately 100 lives. Realising the fervour of the protests, Bakiyev fled from Kyrgyzstan (Nichol 2011).

This is seen as the second Tulip Revolution which received the support of Russia (the first was orchestrated by US) (Radyuhin 2011). After Bakiyev absconded from the country, Roza Utunbayeva from the opposition announced that government had fallen and that the interim authority she planned to lead would draft a new constitution and called a fresh presidential election (Hiro 2010).

After the ouster of Bakiyev, political instability continued to inflict Kyrgyzstan. On 10 June 2010, the southern province Osh saw the worst ever violence in Kyrgyzstan's history, provoked by the supporters of Bakiyev. Hundreds died in riots that targeted ethnic Uzbeks and tens of thousands fled to neighbouring Uzbekistan. The violence in June 2010 in Osh and Jalalabad 470 people were killed and over 400,000 people displaced. The military and government in Kyrgyzstan were ineffective in stopping the violence and preventing the illegal capture of its ammunition by conflicting parties (Marat 2011).

The difference can be easily recognized between the 2005 and 2010 revolution. The second Tulip revolution (7th April 2010) was not properly based on cooperation among opposition leaders. Because they were imprisoned one day before the Tulip Revolution. The natures of Protests were not organized but spontaneous. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were the main part of these protests (Marat 2010)

New Interim Government and Successful Transition after the Tulip II

The new interim government was formed after the second Tulip revolution and Rosa Otunbayeva became the interim prime minister. A constitutional referendum was held on 27th June 2010 just two weeks after the Osh ethnic riots. In this referendum appealed to citizens to participate and make the country possible to switch over from abusive prone Presidential system to a more European style Parliament democracy. This was done because the power Presidential system was rather misused by two successive Presidents for their own narrow political and economic interests. The more powerful President was instituted due to strengthen the President to lead the nation

towards glorious democratic path but on the contrary the carried it towards autocracy and personal fiefdoms (Hardin 2010).

Kyrgyzstan's transition from a presidential to parliamentary republic that began with the election of a new Parliament in October 2010 completed in December 2010, when interim President Otunbayeva stepped down and made room for Mr. Almazbek Atambaev. It was a milestone for the Kyrgyz democracy (Marat 2011) because this country saw for the first time, power change in peaceful manner without any violence, contested elections rather than turmoil. Kyrgyzstan today is not only the only democracy in Central Asia but has a more democratic political system than Russia and many other former Soviet states (Radyuhin 2011).

Thus, it is seen that the nature of state changed with changing positions and interests of leaders towards the society. Both Akayev and Bakiyev used the state structures to further their interests and power by putting their family in high official positions, thereby attenuating the state system and diminishing the prospects of democracy to thrive. This led the civil society to assert itself two times and put the country in the right track. The post-Bakiyev period, though beset with problems, has seen some improvements like the delegation of authority to parliament. However, much more needs to be done in future.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

All social communities have a history that is experienced, or perceived, or both. Communities survive and sustain themselves on these histories. “When political forces try to mobilise these communities, they usually do so by exploring their history and then giving it a political meaning that suits their agenda. In the beginning, when the political party is new, it gives space and respect to small histories of each community that it wants to mobilise” (Narayan 2012). Through this process, the party seeks to create unity among all these communities for its political purpose. When the party becomes powerful, it develops a meta or grand history in which it tries to appropriate the histories of all communities that are not politically powerful or do not have political representation get hidden. The same case happened with the Kyrgyz people after the much hyped Soviet Revolution in 1917.

The great Bolshevik project for the socialisation of the Tsarist Empire involved a fundamental reconstruction of society. This task was most challenging in remote Central Asia, where the ‘backward peoples of the east’ required a massive programme of education and modernisation to reach the standards envisaged by the Soviet planners. Bolshevisation conflicted with the ordering of traditional society and radically transformed Central Asia, leaving a legacy of crucial importance to today’s independent states. Moscow’s grand scheme involved far-reaching political, economic and social changes which irreversibly reshaped life and identity (albeit indirectly), while more abstract central ideological planning, designed to create new labels of self-consciousness, had a direct impact on the question of identity (Lowe 2003:108).

In Soviet period, the centralisation of power precluded any space for the emergence and sustenance of civil society in Kyrgyzstan. More so, the people of Kyrgyzstan could not disunite their traditional ties and authority structures did not allow any scope for civil society. Yet, by the end of Soviet era, people, particularly from elite sections, formed political association like the Democratic Movement Kyrgyzstan (DDK) which paved way for the emergence of more political associations. Therefore, it can be said that the centralised control combined with the existence of weak civil society embedded in traditional leanings inhibited the growth of civil society. Former USSR lacked any liberal ethos that is conducive for the growth of civil society that existed in western societies.

People were denied of political freedom, proper education, essential elements of democratic values, mainly because of the 'top-down' system of decision-making process.

Lacking in any concrete and substantive form of civil society, political freedom, in the aftermath of disintegration of USSR, merely translated into free elections for the Kyrgyz people. Being the poorest country in Central Asia, Kyrgyz society was compelled to adopt the notion of democracy in order to secure international funds for their development process. In the initial years of its independence, following its separation from Soviet Union in 1991, many civil society organisations flourished. President Akaev consistently promoted civil society as integral to the process of democratisation. With the international support many NGOs emerged. As is seen, the Constitution of 1993 also provided many provision supporting and restoring the democratic and civic rights. As regards the NGOs, there were several laws that promoted their development like the 1991 Law on Public Associations, the 1996 Civil Code and Tax code and the 1999 Law on Non-Commercial Organisations. However, most of these legislations were vague and inconsistent in defining the status of civil society.

There were dramatic changes in the state-civil society relation during the second tenure of Akaev presidency. In fact, the shift from democracy to autocracy was noticeable at the end years of his first term. Since 1993 he began to change his tactics and tried to make his position strong. In September 1994, he started a quiet revolution in which he disbanded the Parliament and forced the government to resign; the Judiciary was curbed, the press was shut down. He further set up new electoral commission and announced the new Parliamentary election. With the referendum of October 1994 he positioned himself as more authoritarian. So he was reverting to democratic rhetoric but practised more authoritarian type of rule like most central Asian countries. He imprisoned those who were vocal to challenge his growing power. There were increasing numbers of arrests of civic groups, political candidates and media with gross violations of legal procedures. In order to curb protests and demonstrations against such repressive measure of the government, the state exercised force to disperse the crowd leading to several deaths, which further strained the state-society relations. The Aksi incident of 2002 was the major tragedy which resulted in tragic killings of demonstrators.

The civil society supported by international donors challenged the growing abuse of power by Akaev government which resulted in the Tulip revolution. Particularly after the 27 February 2005 elections Akaev government's attempt to discredit opposition and promote his own family members aggravated the political tension. As a result 9 March 2005 anti-government protests took place in the cities of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Uzgen. Opposition supporters occupied government offices in Uzgen. In Osh people demanded the resignation of Akayev and free and fair elections. In Naryn Province opposition supporters blocked a highway connecting Bishkek with China.¹ After the second round of election on 13 March 2005, the government building in Osh was seized by the protestors on 18 March 2005. Two days later violent clashes erupted when special police dispersed protestors by forceful means from government offices in Osh and Jalal-Abad. Finally on 24 March 2005, after the protesters' capture of the main government building, the protestors succeeded in dislodging Akaev from power. The CSOs played the role of election observer, monitoring and educating the people. They even played the role of a mediator in Jalalabad, the first area of mass protests (Telekova 2005). As has been discussed the role of INGOs were of significant importance in contributing to the regime change. Various strategies were adopted by the INGOs in the name of democratisation to bring about a regime change in Kyrgyzstan. They sought to win over local elites to Western ideas and models. They organised conferences, seminars, 'technical assistance' and exchange programmes with Kyrgyz elites, believing that domestic political change comes from exposure to western ideas. The INGOs funded projects for publishing anti-government newspapers, training youth "infected" with the democracy virus through US-financed trips to Kiev for a glimpse of the Orange Revolution, and mobilising fairly large crowds in Bishkek who stormed Akayev's Presidential palace and in the southern towns of Osh and Jalalabad. The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (CDCS) and Civil Society Against Corruption (CSAC), key local NGO partners of the NED, played very active role with anti-Akayev parties without any impartiality. Infact it is believed that the Tulip revolution would not have succeeded without the support of US. CDCS head,

¹ "Election Related Disturbances Hit Southern Kyrgyzstan", [Online:web] accessed on 24 March 2012
URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030405.shtml>.

Edil Baisolov, admitted that the uprising would have been “absolutely impossible” without this coordinated American effort (Smith 2005).

However, even after the ouster of Akaev from power, there was no improvement. The Bakiyev government continued to follow the policy of Akayev government by indulging in Presidential election rigging in July 2009 and arrests and assault by government’s agents. The civil society again reasserted itself to lead another revolution against such autocratic measures of the Bakiyev regime on 7 April 2010, termed as Tulip Revolution II.

Thus, the state and civil society relation in Kyrgyzstan was more or less ambivalent. While in the initial years, the state promoted the growth of civil society organisations under the democratic rhetoric, gradually the state began exercising excessive power and prevented any form of resistance to the government authority. Therefore, it can be said that the excessive centralisation of power in Soviet and post Soviet era in Kyrgyzstan led to the weakening of the state system. This resulted in the slower pace of democratisation which resulted in the civil society assertiveness in Kyrgyzstan. Civil society activism was commendable in Tulip Revolution to bring in social stability. However, it should be borne in mind that civil society would not have been able to mobilise and bring about change without the support of external actors, particularly US. However, there is much debate among scholars about the role of INGOs funded by US in providing support to indigenous civil society in the Tulip revolution. However, compared to other countries of Central Asia, civil society is well-developed in Kyrgyzstan as is evident from the fact that since 1990s, civil society and political pluralism made some headway.

In summation it can be said that historically, autocratic rulers have governed the lands of Central Asia. Tribal and clan connections still play a significant role in the political, social and economic interactions amongst the populations. In Central Asia, indigenous civil society was stunted in its development by the Soviet system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government structures started to disintegrate, but also the centralized welfare model of the Soviet system fell apart. So it was necessary for a civil

society to develop quite rapidly to fill the gap.² Following the Tulip revolution, the state institutions perceived the civil society, particularly the NGOs with suspicion. The condition of political freedom in Kyrgyzstan at present is not very positive but still there is hope about the strengthening of democracy. This optimism is indicated in the post-Bakiyev era which is witnessing change for better. While promises are high, incentives to renege on promises are even higher. Therefore, it is essential for the new leaders to understand that the people granted them power with genuine hope to build democratic and prosperous Kyrgyzstan. This is possible only if the government manages the state accountably, combats corruption, protects property rights and improves the quality of life of the majority. This is not an easy task, but the necessary one for the new government to make a difference (Kobonbaev 2005). In this task, various stakeholders including civil society should also be made an integral part.

² Blua, Antonie (2004), "Central Asia: NGO's Helping to Develop a Civil Society" [Online: web] accessed on 28 Nov. 2011 URL: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp091804.shtml>

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