

**ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN AFGHAN CONFLICT  
RESOLUTION, 1988-1998**

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**SURESH KUMAR**



**CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAMME  
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WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
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NEW DELHI 110067**

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CENTRE FOR SOUTH, CENTRAL, SOUTHEAST ASIAN & SOUTH WEST PACIFIC STUDIES  
 SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**  
 NEW DELHI - 110 067

Phone : 2670 4350  
 Fax : 91-11-2674 1586  
 91-11-2674 2592

Dated: 17/07/2012

**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled “**Role of United Nations in Afghan Conflict Resolution, 1988-1998**” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

*Suresh Kumar*  
 Suresh Kumar

**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

*G. V. C. Naidu*  
 Prof. G. V. C. Naidu  
 (Chairperson, CSCSEASWPS)  
 Jawaharlal Nehru University  
 New Delhi - 110067

*Ambrish Dhaka*  
 Dr. Ambrish Dhaka  
 (Supervisor)  
 Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian  
 and South West Pacific Studies  
 School of International Studies  
 Jawaharlal Nehru University  
 New Delhi - 110067  
 Phone: 26704350, (R) 26188817

**DEDICATED TO MY  
PARENTS**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ACBAR	Agency Coordination Bureau of Afghan Relief
AIG	Afghan Interim Government
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent State
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
DRA	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
ISA	Islamic State of Afghanistan
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OSGA	Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan
OSGAP	Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan



PEACE	Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment Programme
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SFA	Strategic Framework for Afghanistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Fund
UNGA	United Nations General-Assembly
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCA	United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSMA	United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme



## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

## 1.1 Introduction

The conflict is an inevitable part of human life and civilization, occurring in various forms in different periods. Conflict has occurred in the past, is happening in the present, and will occur in the future. It can occur globally, as well as in other dimension varying from region, nation, community, families and among individuals. Peace building is designed to address the causes of conflict and the forget the grievances of the past. It must involve justice to promote long-term stability, human security and equality. The development and implementation of peaceful strategies for settling conflicts- using alternatives to violent form of leverage are known by the general term conflict resolution. The method of Conflict resolution uses a third party whose role is mediation between two conflicting parties. There is no hard and fast rule saying what kind of third parties should mediate what kinds of conflicts. Presently the UN is the most important mediator on the world scene.

The realist theory argues that conflict is an inevitable part of human nature unlike the thoughts of an idealist which think that human nature is basically good and the world peace is achievable through norms, values and a world government. In this regard, the international system may be termed to be based on a set of relationship among the world's states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interactions. The principle of sovereignty is the basis of the modern nation-state system. Post- Second World War international order for Maley accepted sovereignty and its corollary, i.e., non-intervention, as its core principles. Article 2 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations declares that the Organisation is *“based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members”*. And article 2(4) urges its members to *“refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”* (UN website). The UN Charter is based on the principles on that states are equal under international law, that states have full sovereignty over their affairs, that states should have full independence and territorial integrity. The Charter also lays out the structure of how it operates the peace process and the methods applied. The UN does not exist because it has power to force its will on the member states; it exists because states have created it to serve their needs. The UN is a symbol of international order and even of global

identity. It is also a forum where states promote their views and bring their disputes. And it is a mechanism for conflict resolution in international security affairs. The UN also promotes and coordinates development assistance and other programmes for social and economic development. The UN Charter establishes a mechanism for collective security- the banding together of the world's states to stop an aggressor. Chapter VII of the Charter explicitly authorises the Security Council to use military force against aggression if the non-violent means called for in Chapter VI have failed (Goldstien 2003:266). Chapter VI of the UN Charter makes provisions for peaceful settlement of international disputes and Chapter VII provides for enforcement of collective security upon the “aggressor” or invader state. The ideological difference between the two super powers in Security Council during Cold War period, however stalled the use of provisions in Chapter VII. Consequently, “UN Peacekeeping” was developed as an alternative. It means an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the UN to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.

The United Nations plays a distinctive role in conflict resolution in divided societies and various countries. The United Nations work in regard to the concept of conflict resolution is part of its overall responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, which being the fundamental reason behind the world organization’s establishment and thus draws on two broad mechanisms conferred upon it in Article 1.1 of the UN Charter: peaceful settlement of disputes and collective security enforcement. The purpose of the United Nations described in article 1 is:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:10).

According to the Charter of UN has a moral obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of a country if it is deemed to be in the interest of global society. After the World War II, the UN was conceived as an international organisation primarily

performing three roles: one was the facilitation of peaceful resolution of international disputes; the second being enforcement of collective security and the last being the promotion of international cooperation and coordination in various fields (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:10). The post-World War II UN Charter can be seen as having been designed for interstate wars e.g., Article 39, threats to “*international*” peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:10).

As the United Nations has developed and its role in world politics has been adapted to the necessities and changing realities, there has emerged a new political function what Inis L. Claude calls “*collective legitimisation*” (Misra 1981:102). The United Nations' role has changed over the years, in response to new phases of the conflict and changes in the global environment. During the Cold War era the UN started to intervene in interstate conflicts. The UN adopted light-foot print approach to resolve the conflicts, particularly in Afghanistan. Traditional peace operations were designed to respond to inter-state crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:12).

With the end of cold war international politics has changed. In the early 1990s, the UN's agenda for peace and security thus rapidly expanded (Griffin 1999:8). The Security Council's thus broadened the traditional reasons for intervention, including aspects of domestic political oppression short of massacre and human suffering associated with economic malfeasance- the so-called failed states. The Security Council had also demanded international humanitarian access to vulnerable populations, insisting, for example, that humanitarian assistance be allowed to reach the people affected in Yugoslavia and in Iraq. At the request of the UN Security Council Summit of January 1992, then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, *An Agenda for Peace-1992* (Wolff and Yakinthou 2011:21). In addition to preventive diplomacy designed to head off conflicts before they became violent, the Secretary General outlined the various interconnected roles that he hoped the UN would play in the fast changing context of post-Cold War international politics.

### ***1.1.1 The United Nations approach to conflict resolution***

The United Nations recognizes four major stages of conflict resolution and supporting peace:-

**(i) Conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy:** undertaken in order to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Involving confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning and possibly “preventive deployment” of UN authorized forces, preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects of peaceful settlement.

**(ii) Peacemaking:** designed “to bring hostile parties to agreement” through peaceful means such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement, mediation, and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences. Peacemaking involves “building a solid foundation for peace” and addresses conflicts in progress (Crowin 2003:22).

**(iii) Peace keeping:** peacekeeping, established to deploy a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials to implement an agreed peace. Peace keepers’ tasks can include establishing and policing buffer zones, demobilization and disarmament of military forces, establishing communication between parties, and protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

**(vi) Peace building or Post-conflict reconstruction:** Peace building is a complex and lengthy process. It encompasses political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms. organized to foster economic and social cooperation with the purpose of building confidence among previously war-ringing parties, developing the social, political, and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a durable and sustainable peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:10).

The Secretary-General's *Agenda for Peace* is the culmination of an evolution of the UN doctrine and an adjustment of the instruments used to maintain the peace since the organization was formed in 1945. A unique vocabulary separates distinct strategies that would fit within the generic UN doctrine of building peace. These strategies, evolving over time, have encompassed three generational paradigms of peace building. They include not only the early activities identified in UN Charter Chapter VI first generation peacekeeping, were designed to respond to interstate crises by stationing unarmed or lightly armed UN forces between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations went forward. As F. T. Liu, an eminent peacekeeping official of the UN has noted: monitoring, consent, neutrality, non use of force, and unarmed peacekeeping the principles and practices of first generation peacekeeping (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:12). These key principles were articulated by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson in conjunction with the creation of the first peacekeeping operation, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai, which was sent to separate Israel and Egypt following the Franco-British-Israeli intervention in Suez in 1956 (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:12). During the Cold War, the UN record indicated much success in interstate conflicts (while little in intrastate) and much in material and territorial settlement (while little in value or identity conflicts). Particular attention is devoted to internal strife that dominates the Cold war period as the principle source of current conflicts. In this regard the utility of UN peacekeeping is undermined. But many of the problems UN addressed including recruiting qualified personnel, finance, expending use of peace mission and also language problems in various countries. Second generation peace operations developed as a part of negotiated political and responsibilities of peacekeeping included non-military tasks such as disarmament, demobilization, resettlement of refugees, election monitoring.

The UN has a commendable record of success, ranging from mixed to transformative, in second generation peace operations as diverse as those in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Eastern Slavonia (Croatia) (Yilmaz 2005:17). The United Nations' role in helping settle those conflicts has been four-fold. It served as a peacemaker facilitating a peace treaty among the parties; as a peacekeeper to monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces,



resettling refugees, and supervising transitional civilian authorities; as a peacebuilder to facilitate monitoring and in some cases organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections, and economic rehabilitation; and in a very limited way as peace enforcer when the agreements came unstuck (Yilmaz 2005:17). After the end of Cold War, UN peace operation increased. A main reason for this expansion has been the increased capacity of UNSC to agree on action in security crisis after the end of the Cold War (Yilmaz 2005:17). Third generation primarily enforcement operation included particularly humanitarian assistance. This multidimensional peace-keeping is aimed at capacities expansion (e.g., economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g., reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society rebuilding). In these operations, the UN is typically involved in implementing peace agreements that go to the roots of the conflict, helping to build long-term foundations for stable, legitimate government. As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali observed in *An Agenda for Peace*,:

“peace-making and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace... These may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, re-forming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:15).

The result of these three “generations” operating together in the post-Cold War world was an unprecedented expansion of the United Nations' role in the protection of world order and in the promotion of basic human rights in war torn areas. In today's circumstances, these operations involve less interstate conflict and more intrastate wars or civil wars.

## **1.2 Afghanistan in the Cold War geopolitics**

For millennia the area called Afghanistan has been the crossroads of invading empires, a network of trade routes and a centre or meeting place for different cultures. The great civilizations of the Asian continent, in particular the Indian and Chinese,

were inter-linked by various trade routes crossing through Afghanistan. An historian of the region summarizes in the following words: *“No land, in ancient times, was more thoroughly traversed in every direction. Doubtless no other was so well situated geographically to act as a link between east and west”* (Misdaq 2006:35). A land-locked Afghanistan occupies a very important strategic and political position in South, West and Central Asia. Perhaps the Afghanistan's biggest misfortune is to have been entangled for so many years in other people's politics: as a buffer state between the imperial powers of Russia and Britain in the nineteenth century; as a battleground for the twentieth century struggle between the Soviet Union and USA, and as a focus for regional political rivalries and finally the continuing USA intervention in Afghanistan. Because of the country's location along the crucial trade route between Asia and Middle East, Afghanistan has been repeatedly invaded and conquered by rulers and foreign governments for centuries. The roots of current instability in Afghanistan can be traced back to the period much beyond the Soviet invasion of that country in December 1979. Afghanistan has always been strategically important, as it is easy to penetrate from Central Asia through a route that leads on to India in the east and Persia and the riches of the Middle East in the west. Alexander left his mark in the fourth century BC. After his death the southern part of Afghanistan was ruled from northern India. Islam came to the country in the seventh century AD, but the invaders were unable to hold on to the territory and were soon expelled. Prior to this Hinduism and Buddhism were influential. There were Hindu kings ruling from Kabul. Local dynasties emerged which adopted Islam in the ninth and tenth centuries. The northern part of the country was often ruled from Bukhara, in present-day Uzbekistan. Genghis Khan arrived in 1219, waged destructive wars and carried everything before him. His empire fell apart after his death. Towards the end of the fourteenth century Tamerlane (Timur the lame) conquered large parts of the country. In 1507 the Uzbeks rose to power in Central Asia and made their capital in Herat, western Afghanistan. All of eastern Afghanistan, south of the Hindu Kush, was part of the Mogul empire, from the sixteenth century.

The modern Afghan state emerged in the mid-eighteenth century when Ahmad Shah, a Pashtun, became king. From this inception, Afghanistan was a Pashtun-dominated state. It was then up to the Pashtuns to enforce their rule throughout the

country. Historically, Afghanistan's ruled by Pushtun ethnic community. It also had other ethnic groups, for instance, the Tajiks, provided a king from time to time, a common Afghan ethnic identity might have emerged. It was reasonable that the royal family was Pashtun since demographically Pashtuns dominated the country. The Durrani line ruled until 1973. Afghanistan found itself between two expanding empires, the Russian and the British (McCauley 2002:4). In post World War I conditions, Afghanistan regained full sovereignty in 1919. The First World War had exhausted Britain, and the Russians were still preoccupied with consolidating their revolution. Russia, however, was the first to recognize Afghanistan's independence and offer her assistance and enter into a treaty of friendship. The British also accepted Afghanistan's independence by concluding a new treaty at Rawalpindi the same year. A number of European states began to assist Afghanistan, but the foreign aid was not enough to support the modernization program that the country's new modernist ruler Amanullah Khan had on his cards. The kingdom of Afghanistan has existed since the nineteenth century. In 1973, King Zahir Shah was overthrown in a coup by Mohammed Daoud and Afghanistan became a democracy. Daoud, the cousin of the dethroned King became the Prime Minister. The coup was followed by many years of instability. The traditional ethnic leaders as well as the leftist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) opposed Daoud's rule. The leftist military officers led by another coup in April 1978 to overthrow the Daoud government and Daoud was killed in this coup. Soon after the traditional ethnic leaders and Islamic fundamentalist elements began an armed revolt against the PDPA rule.

Since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the country has been used as battlefield between competing global and regional powers and groups-a battlefield between the former Communist USSR and the Capitalist West (mainly the USA) in the 1980s; a battlefield between Pakistan, the Arab Gulf countries, on the one hand, and Iran and Russia in the 1990s on the other.

### ***1.2.1 Afghan-Soviet Relations between 1974 to 1978***

In the early 1970s, Afghanistan was on the brink of crisis. The departure of the British from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 drastically altered the geopolitical environment of Afghanistan and also later shaped its new alignments in foreign

policy. The Pashtunistan issue had become crucial after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Pashtunistan, the land of the Pashtun or Pathans, lies on both sides of the Durand Line, the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pashtun question is multidimensional. It is an ethnic, political and geographical problem. It is the core of Afghan nationalism. Pashtun lands beyond the border in the east make the conundrum of nation building in Pakistan itself. Both the Pashtun and non-Pashtun elites have instrumentalized it in the two countries, although in a contradictory manner, for domestic politics purposes. In Afghanistan all ruler who belong to the Pashtun ethnic group, use Pashtunistan issue time and again for their legitimacy. And the other side, Pakistan's Afghan policy has been cautious of Pashtunistan issue. The Pashtun question has been a source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the creation of the Pakistan in 1947. According to Afghan sources Pashtunistan consists of the area west of the river Indus up to the Afghan frontier representing a territorial claim against Pakistan's Baluchistan Province and the tribal regions which are now know as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Runion 2007:98).

The origin of Pashtunistan can be traced in 1893 agreement. On 12 November 1893, Mortimer Durand and Amir of Afghanistan Abdur Rahman signed a treaty over the line of demarcation between British India and Afghanistan (Dupree 1973:485). This particular line called the Durand line, which divided Pashtun population into two parts across the borders. The Pashtunistan issue preoccupied Daoud's administrations both as Prime Minister 1953-63, and President 1973-78. Other Afghan governments also questioned the legality of the Durand Line, in the agreement signed between Afghanistan and British India. The agreement mentioned that in terms of international law, it could not be passed on or inherited by a third country (Pakistan) born out of the 1947 Partition of the Indian Subcontinent (Misdaq 2006:77). The validity of this treaty was questioned on several occasions by successive Afghan government prior to 1947. After the creation of Pakistan, successive Pashtun led Afghan governments backed demand for Pashtunistan to be carved out of the territory of Pakistan. The Pashtun nationalists on both sides of the border had demanded a third choice, independence for the Pashtuns. Failing to achieve this objective, the Afghan rulers raised the issue of the Durand line, the boundary settled by the British and Afghan king Amir Abdur Rehman in 1893. They also demanded creation of a

Pashtunistan state by separating tribal areas of Pakistan. Kabul's demand was supposedly in support of the right of the Pakistani Pashtuns for self-determination. But in reality it was grounded in a firm assumption that Pashtunistan entity would be closely linked to Afghanistan (Saikal 2010:13). Afghanistan never reconsigned the Durand line as an international border. Afghan scholars claim that they have a long association with the Pashtun areas on the basis of historical, linguistic, genealogical and cultural lines. Some called that the Durand line is a line rather than boundary. Nabi Misdaq argues that the agreement was signed under the war and economic blockade (Misdaq 2006:297). The return to Afghanistan of the Pashtun areas situated on the Pakistani side of Durand line has always been a perennial Afghan demand. Zahir Shah, the late king of Afghanistan, President Muhammad Daud, and the successive Communist leaders all maintained the old Afghan claim on Pashtunistan. The Pashtunistan issue became the principle source of dispute with Pakistan, although its intensity has varied over time

Afghanistan had neither the military power nor any external support to reshape its boundary with Pakistan. Afghanistan's international environment changed for the better with the coming of the Cold War and the strategic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1950s. Pakistan's decision to join the Western alliance's against communism brought Afghanistan closer to the Soviet Union. Moscow extended large-scale economic and military assistance to Afghanistan, and as a rebuke to Pakistan, began to support Kabul's claims against Islamabad. Realizing Afghanistan's position as a historic buffer and communist expansionism, the United States also provided a significant amount of economic assistance to Afghanistan but declined requests for arms, which it feared could be used against her ally, Pakistan.

On July 17, 1973, Daoud seized power via a military coup and forced Zahir Shah to exile to Italy. He abolished the monarchy and proclaimed himself as the president of the country of Afghanistan. Both the superpower and regional states feared that the abolition of monarchy without an alternative political system could provoke a future succession crisis (Rubin 1995:26). The increasing tension between both cold war ideological blocs affected their attitude towards domestic political forces in Afghanistan. In the wake of continuing tensions between both power blocs, the United

States preferred a security alliance with Pakistan over Kabul for its containment strategy against communism. Though Washington provided considerable development assistance to Afghanistan, it did not match the growing influence of Moscow in the important areas of training and supply of military equipment. The relations based on the concept of dependency of the Afghan state with the Soviet Union in modernizing the armed forces and launching development projects increased its vulnerability to penetration in important areas of public policy and national security by big neighbours. Moscow's involvement in the political affairs of Afghanistan further deepened with the Saur revolution of April 1978 (Dorrnsoro 2005:192). In following years, Daoud's relationship with the Soviet Union and internal Afghan communist deteriorated gradually beginning in 1974. This was due to Daoud's shift to the western bloc and his aligning Afghanistan away from communism. Since Daoud had shifted away from accepting economic and military support from the Soviet. Afghanistan sought to build relationship with other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran. However, relations with Pakistan improved by 1977 with aid of the US and in March 1978, Daoud visited Islamabad. The intention of the visit was to negotiate an agreement with Pakistan for prisoner exchange and also to agree to the expulsion of Pashtun and Baloch militant from Afghanistan (Runion 2007:102). Prime Minister Daoud achieved some success in his form of foreign policy, but these reforms created economic instability in the country. His goal in foreign policy were to improve relations with the Soviet Union without harming aid from the United States and also to pursue and resolve the Pashtunistan issue. Because of increasing hostile relations encouraged by Pakistan, the economic trade of Afghanistan began to suffer. Afghanistan had little choice as a land-locked country with no access to an independent port. For these reasons, Afghanistan was forced to ally with the Soviet union. In 1978, PDPA seized power in a military coup in which Daoud was killed. The PDPA established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) became unilaterally dependent on Soviet aid. The US ended aid to the Afghanistan in February 1979, when ambassador Adolph Dubs killed by Maoist Guerrillas (Rubin 1995:28). There were Soviet regional interests with a dependent Marxist regime in Afghanistan. These were, to counter the rising power of the Islamic movements in the region; to ensure stability in the bordering areas and to demonstrate the ability to militarily intervene to defend allies

in the region. Finally in December 1979 USSR invaded in Afghanistan.

### ***1.2.2 Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan***

During the 1980s the United States and the Soviet Union were the two most influential actors on Afghanistan political scene. The two superpowers engagement in the Afghan conflict was inspired by strategic visions. Afghanistan has been in the limelight since the Soviet invasion in December 1979, when it became a geopolitical issue in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the USA (Misdaq 2006:1). On 25 December 1979, the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and established control on Kabul. The reaction of the world to the occupation was swift. On 7 January 1980 the non-aligned group deplored the intervention, calling for “*the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops*” sponsored the United Nations Security Council Resolution (Misdaq 2006:156). On January 14, the UN General Assembly adopted by 104 votes to with eighteen abstentions (India, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Ethiopia and others countries with close economic and military links with the Soviet Union), a resolution calling for the “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops”. In November, the UN General Assembly approved a second resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops by a majority vote of 111 to twenty-two with twelve abstentions (Misdaq 2006:156). On other side the west, most of Islamic countries strongly condemned the Soviet intervention. The US declared that the Soviet undertaking was a threat to world peace. US president Jimmy Carter called the attack “*an extremely serious threat to peace*” and “*a violation of the United Nations Charter*”. He called Brezhnev’s explanations in their private communications as “*completely inadequate and completely misleading*” (Ewans 2002:207). In US, President Carter's statement that the Soviet invasion constituted the “*greatest threat to peace since the Second World War*” set the tone (Rubin 1995:30).

The presence of foreign troops of Afghan soil caused localized resistance to evolve into nation-wide uprising. The Afghan life is governed by the institutions of "Pashtunwali". A Pashtun’s honour extends from the individual to the family, the clan, the tribe, the nation and even to religion. The communist takeover in 1978 threatened all of these. Resistance therefore became a matter of honour, incorporating the

requirement of revenge. As for the Afghans, the impact of the invasion was totally unexpected and therefore stunning (Misdaq 2006:156). The Afghan Mujahedeen, or 'holy warriors', especially in the initial years of the Soviet invasion, came from nearly all ethnic groups and tribes in the country. Before the Soviet invasion, the resistance to the Communist government had been spontaneous and under local leadership. Political parties rarely involved and external aid was minimal. After the Soviet invasion the resistance movement began to change. Resistance was motivated by a range of factors, including calculations of interest, but the power of Islam as a basis of resistance proved of fundamental importance. Religion can provide a basis for resistance in at least two different ways. On the one hand, religious doctrines and practices may endow certain individuals with authority, which they can then use to lead others in a political struggle. On the other hand, religion can serve as an ideology of resistance, by providing direct legitimacy to resistance in certain circumstances, even in the absence of authoritative figures to exercise a leadership role (Maley 2002:58). Despite all these facts of uniting Afghans against Soviet intervention, the resistance never managed to form a national leadership.

The Soviet intervention invited counter intervention from Iran, Pakistan, Islamic states of the Middle East, and the Western powers. Soviet military presence across the Khyber Pass changed the buffer status of Afghanistan, complicating Pakistan's security dilemma. The inflow of refugees and Mujahedeen further dragged Pakistan into accepting a "front-line" state role. In Pakistan, a military regime which was alienated found a splendid opportunity in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to attract Western support.

It was considered as an opportunity for the West and especially the Americans to dent the might of communism by making the occupation of Afghanistan politically and economically as expensive as possible. The Americans and the West soon came to the conclusion that if the Afghans were to resist the Soviet military might, they would need substantial military aid. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Islamic militants and transnational extremism became the most favored US backed fighters in Afghanistan. The US believed that the Islamists were the most zealous and devoted anti-Soviet fighters and deserved to be supported. The US even help to create an international network of militant Islamists to fight with the Mujahedeen in



Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Soviet policy of “divide and conquer” created armed local and ethnic militias in support of Moscow's client regime in Kabul (Rotberg 2007:22).

All military and financial aid that came from abroad was channeled by Pakistan’s ISI to the resistance groups. The Saudis, who had no diplomatic relations with Moscow and regarded communism as a threat to Islam and they provided financial aid to resistant’s. The Gulf States, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Libya, together with private Arab sources all contributed towards the war (Misdaq 2006:159). By the middle of the 1980s, the Afghan resistance movement had received a substantial amount of aid and training for Afghan fighters by US and Pakistan. The US secretly provided arms to the Mujahedeen forces. On 4 January 1980, President Carter announced that *“along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence”* (Dorrnsoro 2005:104). The Carter administration allocated US\$ 30 million for the programme in 1980 and about US\$ 50 in 1981. Under the Reagan administration this amount increased to US\$ 120 million by fiscal 1984 and in 1985 reached to US\$ 250 million. Saudi Arabia approximately matched US aid. The US aid reached to US\$ 470 million in 1986 and US\$630 million in 1987. By mid 1989, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed to supply US\$ 600 million each to the Mujahedeen by the end of the year; an additional US\$ 100 from the United States brought the total to US\$ 1.3 billion (Rubin 1995:180-2). The American meanwhile determined to make Afghanistan the USSR's Vietnam, poured in weapons to arm the opposition. Humanitarian assistance was closely tied with Western efforts to bring about Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the communist regime (Johnson 2004:19). Internally, the Afghan resistance went through many ‘enforced alliances’, imposed on it by its paymasters the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In May 1985, the seven main Mujahedeen parties united and formed the Seven Party Mujahedeen Alliance, also known as the Peshawar Seven. The Party sought to act as a diplomatic representation in the world. The Mujahedeen Alliance was active around Kabul, previously working to coordinate their anti-Soviet operations. However, no genuine unity was ever achieved among Afghan resistance groups and failed to agree to produce an overall national leadership. They were divided among themselves, first

into the two broad categories of "*fundamentalist*", Islamists and "*moderates*", and then on ethnic, religious, linguistic, tribal and provincial bases (Misdaq 2006:157).

On other side, the UN mediation in Afghanistan started soon after the Soviet intervention. The first reaction against Soviet aggression in the UN was the special session of General Assembly in January 1980, which voted in favour of resolution condemning the Soviet intervention and thereafter number of resolution passed every year until the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1988-89.

The Afghan occupation by Soviet Union brought no success for the Soviets, weakened by diminishing resources at home and increasing resistance in Afghanistan, Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership opted for compromise and withdrawal. Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union was committed to a political rather than a military solution. And after many talks, he announced, in February 1988, that if an agreement could be reached between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Soviet troops, now thought to number in the region of 115, 000, would withdraw (James 1990:242). As a result of the UN promoted negotiations, the Soviet Union was ready to begin the withdrawal process after Geneva Accord in 1988. Dorronsoro argues that the UN adopted a policy of indirect rapprochement for mediation that brought together Pakistan and Kabul government in the presence of Soviet and American observers and finally Geneva Accords signed on 14 April 1988 (Dorronsoro 2005:121). The Accords said that "*a bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan about non- interference and non- intervention in each other's matter*" ( go to UNGOMAP website) The Secretary-General established with the authorization of the Security Council, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) consisting of a military section under the Finnish General Rauli Helminen, and a political section under Benon Sevan. The mission was mandated to oversee the withdrawal of foreign troops and authorized to receive complaints from both sides about alleged improper implementation of the Agreements. With the lapse of UNGOMAP's mandate one year after the Soviet withdrawal, the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) was established on 15 March 1990, which mirrored the dual set-up of a military and a political component. The latter was headed by Benon Sevan as the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General's ideas

included independence and self-determination, a cease-fire, a cessation of arms supplies and a 'transition mechanism' leading to free and fair elections and a broad-based government. The Kabul government promptly accepted the plan, as did Pakistan and Iran. The traditionalist groups decided to accept the plan, while the commanders in Afghanistan were not opposed. Benon Sevan drafted a transition plan once the United States and the Soviet Union suspended military aid to their respective factions and declared their support for a UN-sponsored transfer of power to an interim government. The transition plan elaborated by Sevan, however, “*broke down with the disintegration of the state that the interim government was supposed to rule*” (Maley 2002:147).

In 1990, with the end of cold war the international scenario changed and the UN also brought the changes in their approach to resolve conflicts. The changed international scenario also affected the UN role in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal. The post-Geneva UN efforts have been exerted in two interrelated directions- first, eliciting an agreement from outside power to endorse a stronger role for the UN and second, promoting an international and Afghan consensus on elements of a political settlement (Khan 1993:311). In September 1991, the Americans and Russians were able to reach an agreement to cut-off the supply of weapons under negative symmetry, while the Russians abandoned their insistence that Najibullah should be a member of an interim government. As negotiation continued into 1992, the Russia and America stopped their military aid. Pakistan also put an end to all its support for the Mujahedeen. Meanwhile in the north, Dostam's Uzbek militia joined forces with Massoud and took Mazar-i-Sharif. Together these developments sounded the death knell of both for the UN peace plan and for the Najibullah regime. With the Russian and the UN intensifying the pressure on Najibullah , he agreed on 18 March to step down in the context of any transition government (Ewans 2002:176).

### ***1.2.3 Conflict Transformation in post-Soviet period***

The withdrawal of the Soviet Union did not bring peace in Afghanistan. While other nations celebrated the end of cold war, Afghanistan degenerated into chaos, amidst the factional fighting of Mujahedeen leaders. The Afghan civil war continued after the Soviet withdrawal. The civil war in Afghanistan became a multilateral

competition involving internal armed factions with extensive foreign links, neighboring states pursuing competing strategic interests and extra-regional players with ideological, security or economic stakes in the chaos. The US, its regional partners and the various Mujahedeen groups had different objectives and found it harder to cooperate. The Mujahedeen resisted Pakistani attempt to place favored Islamist radical groups in power. The fragmentation of power as much as the regime's illegitimacy was becoming the real obstacle to a political settlement in Afghanistan (Rubin 1995:9). Due to the fragmented nature of the resistance with shifting loyalties and rivalries, meant that Mujahedeen were unable to turn these local victories into a national one. The Najibullah government which never fully achieving popular support, was able to defend the government from Mujahedeen attack for three years from 1989 to 1992 (Ewans 2005:123). After the fall of the communist government in April 1992, the resistance entered a new stage of struggle, this time attempting to seize power on a national level (Misdaq 2006:169). Entering Kabul in 1992, the Mujahedeen suffered from two weakness that became the basis of the collapse of their case to establish themselves as having legitimate rights to form a state :First, despite years of expectation, their agreement for power sharing in Kabul was flawed. Second, the Islamist ideology that had allowed devotion to a cause even when faced with a magnitude of force was shaken in the face of ethnic competition for political power (Magnus and Naby 1998:162). During 1992-94, the conflict in Afghanistan became highly territorialised. The country was divided into war zones under various warlords, who were also divided along ethnical lines (Dorransoro 2005:257). The PDPA renamed itself the Homeland (Watan) Party, forged alliances with some of the northern peoples (notably Uzbek general Rashid Rostam) and with the financial support of Russia and some Central Asian states, held out against the resistance. When the government finally collapsed, Kabul fell not to the Pakistan- based Pashtun groups, but to Tajik forces headed by Ahmed Shah Massoud. The civil war that followed was on the surface a clash between the Pashtun and the northern people of Afghanistan (Roberts 2003:232).

In this tense situation UN attempted to manage transition. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Afghanistan was thrown into a civil war. But UN did not send peacekeeping forces to bring about truce. The United Nations' role was limited to

offering good offices to conflicting parties to negotiate settlement. On 21 May 1991, following extensive discussions between Afghan actors and Benon Sevan, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar issued a new statement on Afghanistan. The statement said that *“I believe that the following elements would serve as a good basis for a political settlement in Afghanistan, acceptable to the vast majority of the Afghan people”* (Maley 2002:182). The UN Secretary-General’s 1991 plan for a political settlement incorporating a proposal for the transfer of power to a credible and impartial transition mechanism failed in part because of the continuation of Soviet aid to Kabul. The various rebel factions in Afghanistan had not signed the agreement and these factions continued their fight against the Najibullah government. The continued struggle led ultimately to the a fall of Najibullah government in 1992. Along with UN efforts, a Pakistan sponsored the Peshawar Agreement signed of 24 April 1992. It provided the framework for an interim government to be implemented in stages (Dorransoro 2005:141). On 24 April 1993, leaders of the Mujaheddin forces except Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, agreed to form a transitional government. In July 1992, Burhannudin Rabbani was declared President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. President Rabbani and eight other Afghan leaders negotiated two peace accords. One was signed in Islamabad on 7 March 1993, and the other was agreed upon in Jalalabad on 18 May 1993. By these accords, the Afghan leaders agreed to form a government for 18 months, to initiate the electoral process, to write a new constitution for Afghanistan and to establish a defense council to set up a national army (Meher 2008:107). Unfortunately these attempts were not successful. In 1994. The faction among the leaders of the multiple Mujahedeen factions resulted in a period of warlordism in Afghanistan. As these leaders fought for power among themselves to control over Kabul. Ongoing chaos in the country gave rise to Taliban. A special mission for Afghanistan was appointed in December 1993, headed by Mohmaud Mesriti. The United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) with a more active mandate of *“facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction”*, beyond merely monitoring events and reporting them, but all these efforts ended without much success (Afsah and Guhr 2005:396-398).

The the failure of UN peace efforts and other peace agreements to form a stable government and peace in Afghanistan. The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan create a

debate in academic world. The international cooperation between imperial powers created the buffer state of Afghanistan. Later, the breakdown of cooperation between hegemonic powers during the endgame of the Cold War turned that buffer state to an arena of regional conflict (Rubin 1995:143). In civil war period Afghanistan turned from regional conflict to failed state. Some scholars called Afghanistan-Country without State?. A failed state could be characterized by “*collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of government, a breakdown of law and order as well as general banditry and chaos*” (Noelle 2002:205). When we discuss 'failed states' we tend to think of Somalia, ruled by 'warlords' since 1991, of genocide and massacres in Rwanda, or of the Congo, which has been practically 'ungovernable' since the foundation of that state. These cases have following elements in common-inner-state, endogenous problems which however in some cases may also have cross-border implications, a complete breakdown of state regulatory power and the absence of a reliable partner for negotiation which could be influenced and controlled from outside.

When applying these criteria in the Afghanistan context some elements and facts could be seen in these regard. In 1991-92 the UN, with US and Russian verbal support, failed to create an interim government from the leaders of different resistance groups. The regional states that supported the combatants had not evolved a cooperative agreement on the role of Afghanistan. What failed in Afghanistan was not just the Afghan state, but the international system that had first sustained and then undermined its rulers (Rubin 1995:143). Despite this failure, the intensification of armed hostilities in Afghanistan and the complex nature of the conflict, including its ethnic, religious and political aspects, the mass killing and systematic human rights violations against civilians and prisoners of war, reports of rape and cruel treatment, the continued displacement of millions of Afghan refugees and reports of attack on and looting of cultural artefacts in Afghanistan. As well as permanent violation of the rights of women and girls are undoubtedly a consequences of the internal conflict in Afghanistan (Noelle 2002:207).

In the context of a failed state, international intervention would emphasize the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective central authority. The lesson of failed state not only of Afghanistan but also of Angola,

Cambodia, Nicaragua and other conflicts show that some preconditions must be met before a national assembly can make enforceable, legitimate decision. The breakdown of agreements in both Angola and Afghanistan argues that disarming contending militias, at least depriving them of heavy weapons, must precede national elections or power sharing (Rubin 1995:144). The fact is that resolution of conflicts in states that have been failed by the international community requires sustained cooperative efforts by that community.

#### ***1.2.4 UN engages Taliban, 1996 to 1998***

As a result, the Mujahedeen forces turned on each other in a fight for control after the evacuation of the Soviets. The US provided military weapons were no longer used against the Soviet but instead among the Mujahedeen forces, which resulted in the killing of Afghan citizens and thrusting the country deeper into a civil war. In 1994, the friction among the leaders of the multiple Mujahedeen factions in a period of warlordism in Afghanistan. The continuing chaos in the country gave rise to Taliban, which means "*student*" or "*seekers of knowledge*" (Runion 2007:120). Taliban was originally formed as a Sunni Muslim puritanical movement composed of Pashtun students from the southern Helmand and Kandahar regions in Afghanistan. The primary goal of Taliban was to impose a strict allegiance to Islamic law. The emergence and advent to dominance of Taliban movement was one of the oddest things ever to happen to modern Afghanistan, and their pattern of rule was one of the strangest to be witnessed in the modern world, perhaps because it was so determinedly anti-modernist (Maley 2002:218). They developed a politico-religious force of Pashtun from southern Afghanistan and also from north-western Pakistan. Pakistan has played a key role in the internal politics of the country from organizing, training, and funding the Mujahedeen resistance to switching its support to Taliban movement (Rais 2008:67). Pakistan's backing for Taliban was explained in different ways. Some commentators saw in it a relentless searching for 'strategic depth' in the event of a conventional war between Pakistan and India. Others saw it as driven by economic concerns, notably the belief that there were profits to be made from oil and gas pipelines from Central to South Asia through a stable Afghanistan. Still others

defended the policy in terms of ethnic factors, in terms of the alleged 'need' for Afghanistan to be ruled by Pashtuns, but not Pashtuns of a nationalist stripe (Maley 2002:222). Taliban, it comprised mostly of the sons and orphans of the Mujahedeen, the religious elements fighting against the Soviet occupation with the support of Pakistan and the US. Between 1994 and 1996, Ahmed Rashid has argued, *"the USA supported Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia, and pro-Western"* (Rashid 2000:176). The US initially supported Taliban movement in early period but later due to radical policies of Taliban and massive violations of human rights, US changed their policies toward Taliban. Taliban regime recognized only by three countries United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The majority of the other surrounding countries opposed Taliban and associated with the Northern Alliance and these countries included Iran, Turkey, India, Russia and Central Asia and other countries also did not recognize Taliban regime.

Taliban had taken control of much of southern and western Afghanistan, including Kandahar and Herat, by early 1995. In September, Taliban seized the control of Kabul. Rabbani joined an opposition alliance, which came to be known as the Northern Alliance (Meher 2008:107). After the Mujahedeen warlords surrendered, Taliban worked quickly to issue policies that would bring Afghanistan back to an Islamic-centered way of life. For men, these requirements included wearing turbans and no longer shaving their beards. Women were required to wear the burqa at all times in public and they outlawed from employment, schools etc. During fighting continued without interruption between Taliban and the coalition of opposition forces there was massive killing and ethnic cleansing by Taliban. Taliban regime was responsible for gross violations of human rights in Afghanistan cause for inviting the attention of the UN.

Despite Taliban's rapid rise and control over 90 percent of the country, the UN did not recognize the legitimacy of Taliban movement and consider their government as a non-entity. And, since 1996 to 2001, the fighting continued without interruption between Taliban and the coalition of opposition forces. UNSMA took on the responsibility of investigating allegations of human rights abuses. The work of UNOCA (renamed UNOCHA in 1993) was now limited to its humanitarian aspect,



while the UNDP tried in vain to launch programs. Serious concerns were raised about the treatment of women by both sides and the use by Taliban of child soldiers, aged 13-14 years. Appeals to member states for funding for humanitarian operations generally fell on deaf ears, and UNOCHA was frequently in a state of financial crisis. Sometimes the UN had to suspend its activities in view of threats to the safety of personnel and security reasons. During this period, the UN repeatedly pointed out the difficulty of resolving the conflict as long as foreign powers continued to provide military equipment to the belligerents. At the end of 1997, the Secretary-General said bluntly, *“They all enthusiastically proclaim their support to the United Nations peacemaking efforts but at the same time continue to fan the conflict by pouring in arms, money and other supplies to their preferred Afghan factions... They must be held responsible for exacerbating the bloody conflict in Afghanistan”* (Johnson and Leslie 2004:69).

The many difficulties the assistance community experienced in trying to work out how to relate to Taliban coincided with a growing concern about the evident failure of international political, assistance and human rights strategies to work effectively in the cause of peace in Afghanistan. At the same time the UN was struggling with the wider issue of what role it should play globally in countries with long-running conflicts. This had already prompted the Secretary General to consider proposals for system-wide reform, as part of which a decision was taken to use Afghanistan to test an innovative approach in the form of a Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (Johnson and Leslie 2004:69). Integral to the Strategic Framework from the beginning, and later to be elevated to the status of one of its three pillars (the other two being politics and assistance), the concept of rights was always key to attempts to define a principled stance in negotiating with Taliban. Rights became the lens through which assistance was viewed, whether it was the question of humanitarian space (the right to assistance) or discrimination against women. The UN as an organization found Taliban extraordinarily difficult to handle. Taliban proved unexpectedly adept at playing one part of the UN system off against another. The result was a growing contempt for the UN. After a series of provocations, culminating in an assault on a UN official by Taliban Governor of Kandahar Mulla Muhammad Hasan, on 23 March 1998, the UN ordered the withdrawal of its expatriate staff in Kandahar and

suspended its humanitarian activities in the south of the country.

In the context of failed states, which Afghanistan considered after the Soviet withdrawal due to failure of international and regional efforts to bring peace in the country. Since then Afghanistan is going through the turmoil of conflicts and state building. The neighbouring countries also feel different degrees of insecurity. Any conflict and power shift movement in Afghanistan, the spillover effects resulting security dilemmas in regional countries. If the international community seriously wants to rebuild Afghanistan, it must start with a framework for regional cooperation.

## **Section:B**

### **1.3 Nature and Aims of the Research**

This section gives basic outline about the importance of this research, hypothesis, research questions, research method and brief introduction of all chapters.

#### ***1.3.1 Importance and objective of research***

This study therefore seeks to analyze the UN involvement in Afghanistan according to different dimension in the period of 1988 to 1998. This study will also make some investigation about the United Nations peace building and conflict resolution approach during the Cold War era and post-Cold War period briefly, in the terms of its success and shortcomings due to ideological differences between two Cold War blocks. This will also set the UN increasing role in world affairs after the end of Cold War.

This study also set the UN peace negotiations efforts for Soviet intervention and withdrawal. After the Soviet withdrawal the approach and pattern UN adopted towards Afghanistan to build peace and security in the country and the region. It will also focus on the UN role in civil war which was started after the Soviet withdrawal between resistance Mujahedeen groups on one end and how UN worked in this situation. The United Nation's role in establishment and making consensus broad based government in Kabul and negotiation with USA and Russia for the making its success. It will also deals with the UN's less success in civil war torn situation. Further it analyze the emergence of Taliban and the UN's peace process and relationship with Taliban during later ruling era.

The proposed study acquires importance because it deals with the very start of the years of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and involvement of global and regional power in this conflict in the wake of cold war politics. In particular, it will discuss the UN efforts of conflict resolution in Afghan conflict and its success in critical manner. The scope of study is limited to the period from 1988-1998. The year 2001 witnessed 9/11 and start of US lead war on terror in Afghanistan. It will also deal UN involvement after 2001 and finding an ideal solution in the evaluation of Bonn Conferences and other efforts made by international community.

### ***1.3.2 Research Questions***

1. What is the UN's approach towards international order and how does it work?
2. What activities has the UN undertaken in Afghanistan and to what effect?
3. How much UN succeeded in its goal in Afghanistan?
4. How the Cold War ideological differences and post-Cold War politics affected United Nation's efforts in Afghanistan?
5. Was Taliban recognized the United Nation's involvement in Afghanistan and vice-versa?
6. What factors have impinged on the success of the UN for a peaceful resolution of the problems in Afghanistan?

### ***1.3.3 Hypotheses***

1. The UN purportedly a neutral arbiter essentially drove in the western interests that led to its exit in post-Soviet Afghanistan.
2. The UN's partisan role allowed its presence under Taliban's regime that averted major humanitarian crises during 90s and post-9/11 Afghanistan.

### ***1.3.4 Research Method***

This research problem is aimed at studying the discourses and their interpretation in a historical perspective. The reason for grounding the study in a historical perspective is to highlight the United Nation's involvement in resolution of Afghan conflict and building peace in that period.

The idealist approach viewed that there should be a broad based membership world organization for conflict resolution. On the basis of this approach, the United Nations' role in conflict resolution can be analyzed, but this will be one sided view. Therefore proposed research would see United Nations' role under different approach realistic, neo-realistic, conflict resolution and light-foot print approach.

This research would analyze practical aspects of UN role in peace building in Afghanistan, which can be drawn from the various sources. This proposed research will be based on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include government records and documents, statements and records of various agencies, western archives which were based on the UN records. Other primary sources include newspaper archives and think-tank analysis of the worldwide organization. The proposed research would also to use secondary sources include books, articles published in various Journals and News Papers clips, various academic papers and internet sources also.

### ***1.3.5 Chapterization***

#### **Chapter One: Introduction**

This chapter will deal with the historical background of nation-state building in Afghanistan. It will also explain the UN role in peace operation since its formation and when the UN help and support started to Afghanistan.

#### **Chapter Two: UN role from the Soviet Invasion to the fall of Najibullah Government (1979-92)**

This chapter would explain the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and reaction from the external players and the UN peace negotiation which resulted in Geneva Accords. It will also deals with the UN efforts in Afghan conflict resolution after the Soviet withdrawal and what factors leads to fall of Najibullah government.

#### **Chapter Three: The Civil war and the UN involvement**

This chapter would analyze the situation arises after the Soviet withdrawal when resistance groups got involved in Civil war and the UN efforts to resolve the crisis and establishment of a broad based national government. And Mestiri mission particularly and humanitarian assistance by UN in war torn country.

## **Chapter Four: Taliban rule and the UN efforts to conflict resolution**

The chapter would discuss the emergence of Taliban after the long conflict and the United Nations' efforts to get out the crisis. This chapter would also include humanitarian crisis which was resulted Taliban's offensive attacks and hard-liner policies.

## **Chapter Five: Conclusion**

This chapter would have the concluding observation. It will test the hypothesis and try to answer research questions.

### **1.4 Summary**

The first chapter gives the introduction of the study. This chapter has described the larger and broad framework of this study. The first section is a small attempt to explain the United Nations conflict resolution approach theoretically and Afghanistan in historical perspective. The first part of this section gives the basic understanding about the United Nations' approach to maintain international peace and security and its approach to conflict resolution. The second part of this chapter has begun with pre-invasion Afghanistan and its international relations particularly with Pakistan. The Pashtunistan issue dominated in both countries relationship. In the cold war period, Afghanistan received the assistance and other kind of support from both ideological blocks Western and USSR. It is also talk about the resistance movement against Soviet occupation and role of external power in this phenomenon particularly US and Pakistan. Finally the Geneva Accords signed as a result of long and labours negotiations supported by the UN, which paved the withdrawal of foreign troops. Post-Soviet Afghanistan faced many challenges and got in civil war. Due to fragmented nature sometimes it is called a failed state. During this like failed state situations, the UN did various efforts to form a broad-based government in Afghanistan, but civil war intensified day by day due to the fragmented nature of the Mujahedeen parties. This part also focus on the rise of Taliban and its ruling. Second section of this chapter gives the explanation of the importance of this study and method, objectives, hypothesis and brief introduction of the chapters of this research work.

**CHAPTER TWO**  
**UN ROLE FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO THE FALL OF NAJIBULLHA**  
**GOVERNMENT (1979-92)**

## **2.1 International reaction to Soviet Invasion**

On 25 December 1979, the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and established control over Kabul. As result of Soviet invasion, Afghanistan had become a geopolitical issue in the Cold War politics between Soviet Union and USA. In the Afghan conflict internal parties were Mujahideen and Kabul government and the external parties were Pakistan, USA and USSR. The two superpowers engagement in the Afghan conflict was inspired by strategic visions. The reaction of the world community to the military invasion was swift. The west and most of Islamic countries strongly condemned. The US declared that the Soviet occupation was a threat to world peace and stability. The US President Jimmy Carter called Moscow's aggression in Afghanistan "*the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War*" (Feifer 2009:86). The invasion invited counter reaction from Iran, Pakistan, Islamic states of the Middle East, and the Western powers. Internally, the Mujahideen resistance emerged in Afghanistan against the invasion. The Mujahideen received military and other assistance from west, particularly from USA through Pakistani sources. When the United Nations Security Council met during the first week of January 1980, non-aligned members presented a draft resolution condemning the Soviet invasion. In January 1980, pursuant to the Uniting for Peace resolution, the UN Security Council called an emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly which overwhelmingly adopted a resolution calling for "*the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan*" (Riaz 1993:14). Following the one year of Soviet intervention (1980) the UN backed negotiation process began and after eight years labourers efforts in April 1988, it ended with the signing of Geneva Accord, which resulted in Soviet troops withdrawal. To understand the overall situation that time in Afghanistan, there is need to elaborate the activities from intervention to withdrawal.

### **2.1.1 United Nations Reaction to Soviet Invasion**

In conflict and post-conflict situations, it is often elements of the UN system that provide some degree of continuous international presence in disturbed regions. Afghanistan, it has been a UN member since 1946. Since 1980, the United Nations has had an extensive history of involvement in Afghanistan through political missions,

humanitarian agencies, and particular attention of high UN organs such as the Security Council and the General Assembly. The overwhelmingly majority of nations in the Islamic and non-aligned world and the west reacted strongly to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The United Nations had condemned the invasion as early as January 1980. Mostly member states of UN described the introduction of foreign troops in Afghanistan as a “*serious violation of the norms of peaceful coexistence and the Charter on the United Nations*” and called for the “*immediate removal of these troops from Afghanistan*” (Riaz 1993:14). The Assembly maintained its focus on Afghanistan throughout the 1980s, adopting a series of resolutions which called for an end to the conflict, withdrawal of foreign troops, the UN assistance to find out a political solution and international help for refugees and others affected peoples by the conflict.

The Security Council debate of the issue in January 1980, had failed to produce a resolution. In order to circumvent the deadlock, the matter was referred, under the “*A Uniting for Peace*” procedure (as provided in General Assembly resolution 377-V) of 3 November 1950 (Cordovez and Harriossn 1995:74), to an emergency session of the General Assembly. Under this procedure on 14 January 1980, the Assembly passed a resolution (ES-6/2) condemned the intervention. The resolution strongly deplored the armed intervention and called for “*the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to freely determine their own government*” (Cordovez and Harriossn 1995:74). And a humanitarian appeal was also included in resolution for relief assistance for the Afghan refugees. The first UNGA resolution from Sixth Emergency Special Session addressed the issue of invasion but did not call for negotiations or a settlement. The second General Assembly resolution of 20 November 1980, authorized the secretary-general to attempt to negotiate a political settlement to the Afghan problem. The resolution listed four essential points to form the basis of a solution:

First, preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and non-aligned character of Afghanistan; Second, the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political, and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion, or constraint of any kind what soever; Third, immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from



Afghanistan; and Forth, creation of the necessary conditions that would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour (Bokhari 1991:62).

The successive the General Assembly resolution called not simply for a political solution, but for a political settlement in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution. These resolutions in turn called for an '*immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan*', and reaffirmed "*the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever*" (Saikal and Maley 1989:23). These resolutions followed the principles, accordingly to international law and Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, of "*the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State*" (Saikal and Maley 1989:23), and also the principle of self-determination of peoples which set out the General Assembly in 1970 "*Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States*" (Saikal and Maley 1989:23) according to the Charter of the United Nations.

On other side, since the Soviet invasion, the Security Council had been unable to intervene in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's veto power had prevented the Council from taking action. The Soviet Union said that it had been invited into Afghanistan by the legitimate, internationally recognized government (which it had installed), and that the UN Security Council had no authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Its position was supported by several other countries, and of course, by Afghanistan (Corwin 2003:6). The General Assembly resolutions, while powerful indicators of international opinion, could not bind member states as a matter of international law. Thus, there was no effective mechanism available in the UN system by which to compel a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the innovation by the UN known as the "Good Offices" of the Secretary-General, in which the UN mediates between parties to a dispute with a view to producing a peaceful resolution on terms satisfactory to the parties (Maley 2002:135). The UN Secretary-General started efforts to negotiate through his "Good Offices" and to find out solution of Afghan conflict.

### ***2.1.2 Resistance against the Soviet troops***

The Soviet intervention created tensions in Afghanistan, particularly in tribal areas and resistance emerged against Soviet troops. As for the Afghans, the impact of the invasion was totally unexpected and therefore stunning (Misdaq 2006:156). Raiz identified that *“the Afghan resistance was a generic term applied to disparate Afghan groups inside and outside Afghanistan engaged in an essentially anti-communist armed struggle, a jihad against the PDPA government and the presence of Soviet troops”* (Raiz 1993:68). The presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil caused localised resistance to evolve into nation-wide uprising. The communist occupation of PDPA (1978) and Soviet intervention (1979) threatened the Afghan life and property which is governed by a code of honor and shame epitomised in the institutions of ‘Pashtunwali’, namely *nangizat* (honour), *badal* (revenge), *milmastia* (hospitality) and *nanawatai* (refuge) (Misdaq 2006:143). Therefore the resistance became a matter of honour, incorporating the requirement of revenge among unsatisfied groups. After the Soviet invasion the nature of resistance movement began to change. Before the Soviet invasion, the resistance against to the communist government had been spontaneous and under local leadership. Resistance, which to that point had largely been localised, took a national character, focused on the Islamic forces known as the Mujahideen (Maley 2002:58). The Afghan resistance was motivated by many factors, including calculations of interests and individual ambitions, but the power of Islam as a basis of resistance. William Maley argued that the religions can provide a basis for resistance in at least two different ways: *“first, religious doctrines and practices may endow certain individuals with legitimate authority, which they can then use to lead others in a political struggle and second, religion can serve as an ideology of resistance by providing direct legitimacy to resistance leadership”* (Maley 2002:58). Despite all these uniting facts to the Afghans against Soviet aggression, the resistance movement in Afghanistan never managed and agreed to form a national leadership or nation-wide following.

The Soviet occupation was condemned on various international platforms over the next ten years. Internally, the Afghan resistance went through many ‘enforced alliances’ by its paymasters the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In May 1985, the

seven main Mujahideen rebel parties united known as the Peshawar Seven. The Party sought to act as a diplomatic representation in the world. The Alliance was active around Kabul, previously it working to coordinate their anti-Soviet operations. Resistance political parties, which previously had attracted little attention, became favourite of the states affronted by the Soviet invasion particularly Saudi Arabia, United States and Pakistan, which facilitated the flow of arms to the Mujahideen, and Pakistan housed the headquarters of the seven most important Sunni resistance parties (Saikal and Maley 1989:6). By the middle of the 1980s, the Afghan resistance movement had received a substantial amount of aid and training from US and Pakistan. The US secretly provided arms to the Mujahideen forces through Pakistani channels. On 4 January 1980, President Carter announced that “*along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence*” (Dorrnsoro 2005:104). The Americans meanwhile determined to make Afghanistan the USSR's Vietnam. Following this, the humanitarian assistance, a controversial aspects and a strategy, was closely tied with Western efforts to bring about Soviet withdrawal (Chris 2004:19). The resistance alliance had its limitations. No genuine unity was ever achieved among Afghan resistance groups and failed to agree to produce an overall national leadership. They were divided among themselves, first into the two broad categories of “fundamentalist”, and “moderates”, and then on ethnic, religious, linguistic, tribal and provincial bases (Misdaq 2006:157). The various parties retain considerable differences over their visions of a post-Soviet Afghanistan. The alliance thus far has had greater impact abroad than inside Afghanistan. It remains only a representative coalition that lacks a central authority and consensus among them (Karp 1986:1043). Over the years, with gradually built outside support, the Afghan resistance grew from its bushfire character to a better equipped and better organised guerilla forces, which fought throughout the civil war after the Soviet withdrawal.

### ***2.1.3 Reaction from World Community***

The world community reacted strongly against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The invasion condemned worldwide. The Soviet action was generally perceived as part of an increasingly aggressive Soviet posture that had seriously disrupted peace and power balance in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced an

international shockwave in the cold war politics. It had created a number of serious diplomatic difficulties for the Soviet Union. The overwhelming majority of nations in the Islamic and non-aligned worlds and in the west reacted strongly against the Soviet occupation. Sixth Emergency Special Session of the United Nations from 11-14 January 1980 adopted the resolution calling for the *“immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops”* (Misdaq 2006:156). The Soviet Union rejected the UN resolution and President Brezhnev argued that the deployment of troops was not an invasion but rather was in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, arguing that it was the right of the Afghan government not of the United Nations to determine the status of the Soviet troops (Runion 2007:112). The Soviet Union also said that the Afghan government had invited Soviet assistance and criticised the UN resolution as interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs (Observer Reporter: Nov. 1981). On 25 January 1980, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) convened the first-ever extraordinary session and passed a resolution similar to that of the United Nations. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in February 1981 issued a resolution calling for *“political settlement based on the withdrawal of foreign troops, full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference”* (Riaz 1993:20).

The intervention became the cold war and strategic issue immediately between two ideological blocks. News of the invasion stunned the world and appalled most of its leaders. US president Jimmy Carter called the attack *“an extremely serious threat to peace”* and *“a violation of the United Nations Charter”* (Ewans 2002:207). He called Soviet's explanations for military intervention as a defensive measure, *“completely inadequate and completely misleading”* (Ewans 2002:207). He made a statement that the Soviet invasion constituted the *“greatest threat to peace since the Second World War”* set the tone (Rubin 1995:30). The United States also worked to gain world opinion against the invasion. The American response took shape in two directions: one, a strategic doctrine delineating vital US interests in the region and second, a series of punitive sanctions and symbolic decisions to demonstrate US indignation over the Soviet action. The European Community supported US perception that the Soviet action posed a threat the world peace and to their strategic

interests in the Persian Gulf region and sought to immediate withdrawal of troops. With the Soviet advance into Afghanistan, Pakistan assumed a strategically important role in the region. In first sight Pakistan took the invasion as threat to its sovereignty and had taken the lead in bringing the Afghan issue to the UN Security Council. Throughout the Soviet occupation, Pakistan remained a key player in international fora coordinating diplomatic pressure for Soviet withdrawal.

The depth and range of international reaction against the Soviet invasion was typically evident in the successive deliberation undertaken by the UN, the OIC and the NAM in there resolutions. In addition, for nearly two years until the launching of the Geneva negotiating process in 1982, the UN General Assembly sessions and the OIC meetings provided important platforms for Afghanistan related diplomatic activity (Raiz 1993:12). The UN took the matter on priority and started efforts to resolve the problem. On 11 February 1981, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed Javier Perez de Cuellar as his “personal representative” to promote peace negotiations among the concerned parties. After Cuellar was elected the new UN Secretary General in 1981, Diego Cordovez took over his position as under secretary general for political affairs and with it the responsibility for promoting peace talks among parties (Grau 2007:237). The Soviet invasion sent shock waves through the chambers and corridors of the United Nations (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:74). The current Afghan crisis created new and tough test for UN in ongoing the cold war between two ideological blocks, because both blocks involved in this conflict and pursuing their strategic interests.

#### ***2.1.4. Role of external players in resistance***

The invasion was seen by western ideological block to as threat to world peace and security as well as their strategic and economic interests. As said by the US, President Carter's statement that the Soviet invasion constituted the “*greatest threat to peace since the Second World War*” (Rubin 1995:30). It was strategic one also, what the west saw that the invasion as a threat to Middle East oil reserves, the fulfilment of the Russian dream to find an outlet to warm waters, and thus a threat to the status quo in the region (Misdaq 2006:156). The West and especially the Americans considered as an opportunity to defeat communism by making the occupation of Afghanistan

politically and economically as expensive as possible for the Soviet Union. Therefore fighting to communism was first and foremost in the minds of US policy-makers. And this was dictated by the cold war geopolitical code-defeating communism was part of the daily US foreign policy routine on the global scale. Misdaq argued that the US ignored the threat of Islamism and used it as a bulwark against communism and revolution in Afghanistan (Misdaq 2006:156).

The Americans and the West soon came to the conclusion that Afghan resistance would need substantial military aid to fight against Soviet troops. The Mujahideen resistance emerged in Afghanistan as an Islamic warrior forces against the Soviet invasion. Islamic militants and transnational extremists resistance groups became the most favoured US-backed fighters in Afghanistan. The US policy-makers believed that the Islamists were the most angry and devoted anti-Soviet fighters and deserved external assistance. Resistance parties dominated by religious orthodoxy and they received the bulk of US and other foreign military assistance through Pakistani sources. Throughout the nine year Soviet occupation, these Afghan rebels was financed, armed and trained by the CIA beginning with the presidency of Jimmy Carter and continuing under Ronald Reagan, who famously praised the multitude of Mujahideen rebels as "*freedom fighters*"(Runion 2007:112).

Soviet military presence across the Khyber Pass changed the buffer status of Afghanistan, and complicated Pakistan's security dilemma. The wave of refugees and Mujahideen further dragged Pakistan into a "front-line" state role. Military regime of Pakistan found a splendid opportunity in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to attract Western support. During that time, most of military and financial aid that came from abroad was channelled by ISI to the resistance groups. The Saudis, who had no diplomatic relations with Moscow and saw the communism as a threat to Islam and ultimately they made it known that they would match United States aid dollar for dollar and they provided financial aid to resistance groups (Misdaq 2006:158). The Gulf States, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Libya, together with private Arab sources all contributed towards the war(Misdaq 2006:158).

By the middle of the 1980s, the Afghan resistance movement had received bulk

of aid and training from US and Pakistan. The US secretly provided arms to the Mujahideen forces through Pakistani channels. Outside assistance channelled in a controlled fashion by Pakistan. Following the readiness of Pakistan to assist to resistant groups, the Carter administration allocated US\$30 million for the programme in 1980 and about US\$50 million in 1981. Under the Reagan administration this amount increased to US\$120 million by fiscal 1984. US assistance registered a quantum jump from 1984 onwards, when it crossed the US\$100 million mark. The allocation of US\$280 million announced in November 1984 approached the total assistance provided by US over the entire 1980-1984 period (New York Times: 28 Nov., 1984). It was increased to US\$470 million in 1986 and US\$630 million in 1987 (New York Times: 18 April, 1988). Saudi Arabia approximately matched US aid. The US budget for aid to the Mujahideen, reportedly still matched by Saudi Arabia contributions, climbed to US\$470 million in 1986 and the flow of Saudi funds to the resistance had totalled at US\$500 million by 1986 (Washington Post: 20 June, 1986) and US\$630 million in 1987. By mid 1989, however, the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed to supply US\$600 million each to the Mujahideen by the end of the year an additional US\$100 million from the United States brought the total to US\$1.3 billion (Rubin 1995:180-2). President Reagan in July 1985 approved delivery to Pakistan of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and basic Stinger ground-to-air missiles (New York Times: 12 July, 1985). Starting in September 1986, the US also supplied hundreds of shoulder-held, laser-guided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen, the first time this ultra-sophisticated weapons had been distributed outside of NATO (New York Times: 12 July, 1985). From 1984 on, Chinese assistance estimate over five years from 1980 at US\$400 million (Washington Post: 24 January, 1988). From 1986 to 1989, total aid to the Mujahideen from all sources exceeded US\$ 1 billion per year. The American meanwhile determined to make Afghanistan the USSR's Vietnam, poured in weapons to arm the opposition (Johnson 2004:19). However, the Soviet invasion and the US subsequent assistance of the Mujahideen resistance was another round of the Afghan "Great Game". The term "Great Game" portrays Central Asia, and specifically Afghanistan, as the region where two great powers Russia and Britain had fought for supremacy in 19<sup>th</sup> century.

## **2.2 United Nations efforts to end conflict**

This section would describe the efforts taken by United Nations just after the Soviet intervention to end conflict in Afghanistan.

### ***2.2.1 Processing a negotiating Settlement- Geneva Accords***

The United Nations started efforts to negotiation and for settlement of Afghan issue just after the Soviet intervention and many resolutions adopted and called for a immediate withdrawal of foreign troops. Though the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet veto, the General Assembly resolutions gave the Office of Secretary General a mandate to seek a political settlement (Rubin 1995:39). The first Soviet signals of a serious interest in negotiations came after the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly passed a resolution on November 20 1980, condemning the invasion and calling for the appointment of a Special Representative to seek a peaceful solution. However, the Soviets tried to reduce pressure on them by showing willingness to find a solution. They agreed that a “personal representative” of the UN secretary-general could mediate the parties. At this juncture, the United Nation adopted a policy of indirect rapprochement (Dorrnsoro 2005:199). Following this policy, the UN Secretary General's Office began a series of consultations, authorized by General Assembly resolutions that advocated a political solution. On 11 February 1981, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim appointed Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, then Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, as his “Personal Representative” on the Situation Relating to Afghanistan. On the first shuttle to the region in April 1981, Perez de Cuellar held extensive discussions with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to determine the substantive issues to be negotiated in resolving the conflict and sought agreement on both the format for negotiation and the substantive agenda for discussion (Rubin 1995:42). Pakistan urged the secretary-general to follow up on the resolution and also suggested trilateral negotiations involving Pakistan, Iran, and the Kabul regime. Moscow's stand on the question of negotiations was one of ambivalence (Rubin 1995:42). While Soviet Union supported a political settlement of the Afghan problem, because overwhelming condemnation of intervention and faced many diplomatic difficulties and it wanted only a minimal role for the United Nations. The DRA demanded direct bilateral talks



with Pakistan and Iran and rejected any participation by the resistance. Iran refused to participate in any negotiation without representation of the Mujahideen. Pakistan refused to accord the Karmal regime the recognition implicit in bilateral talks but did not demand participation by the Mujahideen (Rubin 1995:42).

After Perez de Cuellar's election as UN secretary-general. Mr. Diego Cordovez, who had succeeded him as Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, as his "*personal representative*". Beginning in June 1982 and over the next six years, Mr. Cordovez acted as intermediary in a series of indirect negotiations between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva and in the area. Efforts of the United Nations to negotiate a settlement in Afghanistan have resulted in six rounds of talks in Geneva since 1982. Here, the U.N. was facing and suggesting two possible procedural approaches: first, intensive shuttle diplomacy by the personal representative between Islamabad and Kabul and second, an invitation to the foreign ministers to begin negotiations by proxy in Vienna or Geneva (Cordovez and Harrioso 1995:80). The Office of the Secretary General began working out withdrawal plans from the start of 1982, under the direction of Under Secretary General Diego Cordovez.

On 24 August 1981, eight months after the Soviets indication of their support for negotiation, the Kabul government give signal to Pakistan that it no longer insisted on bilateral talks. With the mediation of UN negotiators brought together Pakistan and the Kabul government on negotiation table, in the presence of Soviet and American observers. In August, after two shuttle missions to Kabul and Islamabad, Perez de Cuellar reported to the secretary-general that Pakistan and Afghanistan had agreed on the following four-point agenda: *first, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan; second, pledges by both countries to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs; third, international guarantees concerning non-interference and; forth, the return of the refugees* (Bokhari 1991:62). The talks were organised around four issues agreed by Afghanistan and Pakistan. By mutual agreement between Pakistan and the Soviets, the Mujahideen were not represented (Dorransoro 2005:199). All concerned parties participated in the UN sponsored negotiations but due to the complex nature of Afghan conflict, it resulted in partial success.

In June 1985, the United Nations reported tentative agreement on three out of four proposed accords and Cordovez announced that the agreement was “95 percent completed”. The first accord calls for non-interference in Afghanistan's affairs; second, international guarantees of a final settlement, and third, the voluntary return of Afghan refugees. And discussion of a fourth accord dealing with the key issue of a Soviet troop withdrawal (and establishing a timetable) was blocked in August 1985 when Afghanistan continued to demand direct negotiations with Pakistan (Karp 1986:1043). In a letter presented to Cordovez on 10 December 1985, the United States, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead wrote to Cordovez and expressed its willingness to be a guarantor in the context of a comprehensive and balanced agreement in which the central issue of Soviet troop withdrawal and its interrelationship to the other instruments would be resolved (New York Times: 14 Dec. 1985). On the question of the time frame for a Soviet troop withdrawal, there was a narrowing of the gap between positions, Afghanistan offered 18 months and Pakistan insisted on 7 (Bokhari, 1991:65; Washington Post: 6 Sept. 1987). On 8 April 1988, with the seven years long and laborious negotiation process, Cordovez announced that the Geneva Accords were finalized and ready to be signed, as was done on 14 April 1988. The UN officials argued that an agreement reached within the proposed format and agenda would promote self-determination in accord within the General-Assembly resolutions. Therefore, the Geneva Accords were the result of a series of structured negotiations orchestrated by the UN between 1982 and 1988 (Maley 2002:135). Between 1982 and 1984, the communications took the form of “*shuttle talks*” (Maley 2002:136), with the mediator travelling between capitals to pass on the positions of concerned parties. From August 1984, the negotiations took the form of “*proximity talks*” (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:9), in which the participating parties occupied rooms at in Geneva, between which UN officials oscillated. This kind of arrangement was necessary because of Pakistan’s refusal to agree to any measure which might be interpreted as according *de facto* recognition to the regime put in place and sustained by Soviet troops (Maley 2002:136).

### **2.2.2 *Signing of Geneva Accords***

Following the exercise of the UN Secretary-General's good offices, the Geneva Accords signed on 14 April 1988 were the result of a diplomatic process started by the

UN soon after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The Accords, formally known as the "*Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan*", signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the United States, provided the overall framework for the Soviet troops withdrawal.

The Geneva Accords consisted of four instruments:-

- The *first* was entitled Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non- Intervention. Article I provided that "Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non- interference and non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States". Article II (4) committed each party "to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Parties". Article II (8) obliged each "to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries". Even more specifically, Article II (12) required each party "to prevent within its Territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups".
- The *second* was a Declaration on International Guarantees, signed by the USSR and the United States. Each committed itself "to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non- Intervention"; and urged all states "to act likewise".
- The *third* was entailed Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees. This was the least contentious of the documents, providing in Article I that “All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement”, and in Article VI that “At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will co-operate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement”.

- The *fourth* Geneva Accord was simply entitled Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan. It stated that all Accords would enter into force on 15 May 1988, Its key provision was contained in Paragraph 5: “In accordance with the time-frame agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months” (Maley 2002:139-41; Saikal and Maley 1989:17-19).

In the annexe of accords, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) particularly deal with the modalities and logistical arrangements for the UN representative and authorise its personal to investigate any possible violations of the provisions of the accords. To coincide with the signing of the Accords, the US Secretary of State transmitted to the Secretary-General an official Statement. The key paragraph read: “The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the US retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the US similarly will exercise restraint” (Saikal and Maley 1989:19).

For the United Nations, the Accords represented the major success in many years. And created hope for greater UN prominence and a more active UN role on the world scene. The Secretary-General on 14 April 1988 stated that the Accords “*lay the basis for the exercise by all Afghans of their right to self-determination, a principle enshrined in the Charter*” (Maley 2002:145). But the Geneva Accords were intended

not only to promote the withdrawal of Soviet troops but to launch a new era of international cooperation. As said by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev *“it will have the most profound impact on other regional conflicts”* (Rubin 1995:6). The merits of the Geneva Accords continue to be debated by timely. From a narrowly diplomatic perspective, this was certainly a case. But a conflict resolution perspective yields a different evaluation. In 1989, Maley argued that the Geneva Accords with the warning that *“for many Afghans, they offered only the peace of the grave”* (Maley 2002:145). Although the Geneva Accords provided the solutions of Soviet occupation but it also has some limitations of the Geneva Accord for political settlement. First, the Afghan resistance parties were neither included in negotiation, nor involved in final agreement. The resistance leaders were angry that they were excluded from the Geneva talks. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, chairman of the seven party Mujahideen alliance, attacked the accord as *“imperfect, impractical and ineffective”* (BBC News: 14 April 1988). Second, the Accords left a crucial issue in the Afghanistan conflict, namely the character of the country’s rulers, unaddressed and did not talk about the future of political arrangements in Afghanistan. Thus, the implementation of Accord faced many difficulties.

In February 1988, the Soviet Union announced that it would start repatriating its forces from Afghanistan in May, which agreed in the accord (Dorrnsoro 2005:201). The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was taken in 1986. Gorbachev had decided to resolve the Afghan crisis soon after becoming the president, which was impeding his policy of reconciliation with the West. The withdrawal was all the more necessary due to the mounting diplomatic and internal costs of the occupation, the war had left the Soviet Union diplomatically isolated (Dorrnsoro 2005:192). Gorbachev also took the step of withdrew the troops not only because of the situation in Afghanistan, but to advance his broader agenda of building a more cooperative relationship with the United States (Rubin 1995:69). Finally, the Soviet withdrawal was completed in February 1989. The Mujahideens, who had not signed the agreements, continued their fight against Najibullah's regime and the civil war had intensified.

### ***2.2.3 Implementation of Peace Accords***

The Geneva Accords were signed by the four countries on 14 April 1988, which paved the way for Soviet troops withdrawal. The accords introduced United Nations observers to watch the troops depart (New York Times: February 16, 1989). The Soviet Union withdrew its troops on time by 15 February 1989, ending the longest period of sustained foreign aggression in modern Afghan history. On the same day, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the role requested of him in their implementation. The Secretary-General was asked to appoint a Representative to lend his good offices to the parties for peaceful transformation. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar set up a mission named the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops and made plans to support the anticipated repatriation of refugees (Afsah and Guhr 2005:398). The Representative would be assisted in his work by a support staff, organised as UNGOMAP, which would investigate and report on any possible violations of the accord's provisions. Simply, the mandate of UNGOMAP was derived from the Geneva Accord provisions and accordingly, comprised the monitoring of non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other's affairs, the Soviet troops withdrawal, and the voluntary return of refugees from neighbouring states (Afsah and Guhr 2005:398).

The UNGOMAP mission operated from May 1988 until March 1990 (Maley 2002:143). It comprised 50 military observers, together with local support staff. These military officers were temporarily seconded from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. And ten countries contributed to the UN mission: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland and Sweden. Cordovez, as Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, controlled the mission, with Major-General Rauli Helminen of Finland serving as his Deputy during the withdrawal period (Maley 2002:144). The mission monitored the withdrawal of Soviet forces by land and air through its permanent checkpoints at the border points. The mission established three permanent outposts on the Afghanistan side: at the border points of Hayratan and Torghundi, and at the Shindand air base which was used for withdrawal monitoring by air (Wahab and Youngerman

2007:169). The mission's operations also entailed visiting garrisons during or immediately after the departure of foreign troops.

Starting from 14 May, the mission members met regularly with the Afghan and Soviet military representatives. At these meetings, it received information on the ongoing withdrawal progress, as well as on any changes made to the original schedule. Numerous complaints of alleged violations of the first instrument, on non-interference and non-intervention, were submitted to UNGOMAP from both parties. Kabul lodged 7545 complaints alleging violations, and Pakistan 1317 (Maley 2002:143). From Afghanistan side complaint included allegations propaganda hostile to the Afghan government taking place in Pakistan, border crossing and cross-border firings, attacks on major urban centres by rocket, violations of Afghan airspace by Pakistan aircraft, the continued presence in Pakistan of training camps and arms supply for Afghan opposition groups, and direct involvement by Pakistan military inside Afghanistan. On other hand, Pakistan complained almost did by Afghanistan including the use of SCUD missiles against Pakistan from Afghan territory. Under the supervision of the UN mission finally the Soviet Union had completed its troops from Afghanistan by February 1989. Therefore, the UNGOMAP was a huge success for the UN as Maley argued that the UNGOMAP was the first peacekeeping operation to monitor the actions of a superpower (Maley 2002:142).

#### ***2.2.4 Efforts to form the broad-based government***

The Afghan state broke down at the end of the 1970s, around the time of the communist coup and the Soviet invasion. On the eve of Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan state had lost its capacity to function with any significant degree of autonomy (Maley 2002:157). Lack of legitimacy and central authority was biggest problem faced by Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet withdrawal. Between December 1979 to December 1991, a Soviet support communist system sustained the regimes of Babrak Karmal (1979-86) and Najibullah (1986-92) (Maley 2006:17). The year (1989) began with great hope that a withdrawal of Soviet forces would usher in peace for Afghanistan and an opportunity for its people to choose a new constitution, a

noncommunist government and commence the reconstruction of their devastated country (Afsah and Guhr 2005:382). Following the Soviet withdrawal, the war had intensified between the Najibullah led PDPA government and the Mujahideen groups. At that time there was no unity between the Mujahideen groups, and it helped to survive the Kabul government. When the Soviets withdrew, the bipolar conflict declined in intensity and the alliances sustained by that showed increasing strains. The US, its regional partners and the various Mujahideen groups had different objectives and found harder to cooperate. The Mujahideen had been involved in heavy battles trying to force a Soviet retreat (BBC on this day: February 15, 1989). The Mujahideen resisted Pakistani attempts to place favoured Islamic radical groups in power in Kabul. The fragmentation of power as much as the regime's illegitimacy was becoming the real obstacles to settlement in Afghanistan (Rubin 1995:9). The Geneva Accords which provided the Soviet troops withdrawal, left the issue of future political settlement unaddressed. The accord and USSR having left Afghanistan went down into the anarchy, which had created power vacuum situations. The fact that the Geneva Accord was indirectly negotiated and signed by Pakistan and Kabul government and witnessed by US and USSR. The talks were held in the absence of the main party (Mujahideen) of the conflict. *"The accords said nothing about the future government of Afghanistan"* in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal (Rubin 1995:91). At the signing ceremony, all parties to the Accords stated that they had asked the secretary-general of the UN, through his personal representative Diego Cordovez, to use his good offices to help the Afghan to form a transitional power sharing mechanism. In this direction, in November 1988 the UN General-Assembly had asked the Secretary-General to help in the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan.

The complexity of Afghan conflict has been profoundly transformed as a result of the Soviet withdrawal completed by 15 February 1989. Internally in Afghanistan, immediately after the signing of the Geneva Accords, as the Soviet troops started disengaging, struggle for power became tense. The Najibullah government has displayed unexpected staying of power, even considering the massive Soviet military and financial assistance. Although, stopping of external interference was part of the Accord under negative symmetry but in reality external supporters continued to flood



Afghan government and the Mujahideen with weapons and means of violence and destruction even after the Accords was signed (Rubin 1995:10). During that time Najibullah made attempts to get legitimacy. Following the Soviet withdrawal and UN secretary-general's statement, Najibullah made a fervent appeal to Mujahideen commanders, addressing them as "*my brothers*" to negotiate cease-fire in return for setting up Mujahideen controlled regional administration (Raiz 1993:308). In this process he changed the name of PDPA as Hezb-e-Watan and few other reconciliation courses (Maley 2002:172). This was preceded by an abandonment of communist rhetoric and adherence to the principles of Islam. Najibullah's new plan had also introduced the multi-party system and creation of coalition government (Saikal 2004:206). From time to time, Najibullah suggested general or local cease-fire (Eliot 1990:162). Najibullah announced yet another peace initiative at a highly publicised Loya Jirga (a grand national council) convened in Kabul on 20-21 May 1989 (Rubin 1995:84). He proposed setting up a "*mediation commission*" of the Loya Jirga to contact the Mujahideen to pave the way for a nationwide peace conference. This conference would elect a "*leading council*" which could act as a broad-based government to oversee a cease-fire and the drafting of a new constitution, and thereafter organise elections for a new parliament (Raiz 1993:308). Within six months of the Loya Jirga, Najibullah convened the Melli Shura (National Council), reiterating the need for reconciliation and dialogue between both sides. On 15 January 1990, he proposed a Shura of all Afghan parties inside the country and abroad, to be held in Kabul in the presence of UN representatives. A week later, addressing a press conference on 24 January, Najibullah suggested UN-supervised election (Washington Post: 25 January 1990). This national reconciliation offers made by the Najibullah government have mostly been predicated on establishing an intra-Afghan dialogue for power sharing, combined with a cease-fire or the creation of peace zones. But the Mujahideen parties firmly rejected these proposals with the Najibullah's regime. They did not believe that Najibullah's offer to share power was sincere and they preferred to continue the war rather than being a part of power sharing regime. They felt that a political settlement would marginalise them in favour from the old regime.

Although during withdrawal process, there was some attempt to form an Afghan interim government. The precipitous move to establish the Afghan Interim

Government in February 1988, made in response to Gorbachev's deadline for the Geneva settlement. At that time various ideas of a nominated Shura, Jirga or elections in the Mujahideen controlled areas have been proposed time to time by the Peshawar based parties. The Mujahideen leaders announced the formation of a commission to draft statutes for an Islamic interim government that would hold elections and establish the framework for Islamic state (Rubin 1995:80). In this process, on 19 June 1989, the Pakistan-based seven parties alliance announced the formation of Afghan Interim Government (AIG) where Mojaddidi became president (Rasanayagma 2005:127). The provisional government, financed by external sources particularly, Arab and some western countries, set up its headquarters in Peshawar. But this government had remained exile because Najibullah government has survived in Kabul. It was not a legitimate government, in terms of its capacity to control the territory and mandate from Afghan people. So in these situations it was a tough job a bring all rival Mujahideen parties in one stage to form a government to rule the fragmented Afghanistan. Therefore first attempt by the Afghan resistance failed to develop a alternative government in Afghanistan. The political power remain fragmented in Afghanistan following dissolution of the traditional power structures. The fractured character of the Afghan resistance is not a new phenomenon. The seven Mujahideen parties recognised by Pakistan since the early 1980s remained throughout deeply divided along political and ideological lines (Raiz 1993:303).

The AIG was a power sharing arrangement between the Mujahideen parties who had based in Pakistan and Iran, and some other field commanders. Most importantly these all exercises isolated the common man, royalist and secular elite in the country. Following this, the another option was Zahir Shah and to lead a broad-based government. Internationally, the Zahir Shah remains the most acceptable Afghan personality to lead a transition to peace mechanism. The foreign office and the Kabul government proposed a version of the Zahir Shah option, the establishment of a small interim State Council, to be led by the former king as an interim authority pending elections. Najibullah had offered to hand over power to Zahir Shah or to a neutral force, but not to a fragmented resistance that had not defeated him and that offered no united alternative (Rubin 1995:127). In a BBC interview on 11 May 1987, Zahir Shah said he was ready to take up his responsibilities if the majority asked him to do so.

According to the Afghan Information central report, there was an enormous support for the king, particularly among Afghans from the southern provinces. The former king also supported throughout by the refugees (Edwards 2002:279). But on 16 June 1987, Zahir Shah gave his final refusal as a consequences of the negative reactions from the Mujahideen (Dorransoro 2005:200). The main opposition to Zahir Shah comes from the Mujahideens and the fundamentalist groups based in Peshwar and also opposed by Pakistan. Finally, the Zahir Shah option for transition regime failed due to lack of support from both internal and outside.

To solve the Afghan conflict it was necessary to form a broad-based government which all the stake holder of Afghanistan would be participated. After the Geneva Accord and soviet withdrawal, the UN has continued the efforts to settlement of Afghan conflict and for a broad-based government along with the efforts made by Mujahideen and Najibullah. The post- Geneva UN efforts have been exerted in two interrelated directions: *first*, eliciting support from outside powers to endorse a stronger role for the United Nations, and *second*, promoting an international and Afghan consensus on elements of a political solution (Raiz 1993:312). The UN in its capacity did a great job to begin negotiation with all parties to form an Afghan government. Cordovez, Special Representative on Afghanistan to the United Nations Secretary-General, decided to take a more active role at devising a form for the “second track” for political settlement in Afghanistan. In July 1987, he drafted a proposal for a UN sponsored meeting of representatives of all Afghan parties. The meeting was to include the seven major Peshawar based Sunni parties, resistance commanders, refugee and tribal leaders, the former king and his supporters and the PDPA. The participants would choose an interim government in which “*no party would be assured a predominant role*” (Rubin 1995:81). The Soviets did not gave assent to the Corvodez's proposals. The US and Pakistan initially did not oppose the proposal but saw it as premature. Corvdovez tried to negotiate and circulate the proposal to all concerned parties, but response came in the form of negative to non-committal.

Cordovez announced yet another “peace plan” on 9 July 1988 in Islamabad which included three basic suggestions: “(a) a *ceasefire*, (b) an *interim 'national government for peace and reconstruction'*, formed after consultation with all 12

*groups of Afghans, with the chief mission of creating peaceful conditions and (c) a Loya Jirgah, called by the interim government, to write a constitution. With the promulgation of a new constitution, the interim government would resign, and its members would have already guaranteed not to participate in the subsequent elections”* (Saikal and Maley 1989:35). In 1989, the UN Secretary General Culler proposed a Afghan assembly of Afghan leaders representing all section of the society to meet in a neutral place to select a council for choosing the member of an Afghan government. But he didn't get positive response from the concerned parties.

By mid 1990, the UN made another attempt and proposed some principles to settlement. These principles included the need for a transitional mechanism for holding UN-supervised elections, the cessation of hostilities and the cutoff of external aid to all Afghan faction. In May 1991, Secretary-General Cuellar proposed a peace plan calling for a cease-fire, an end to arms supply, and a transitional set up leading to elections (Rubin 1995:111). The Kabul regime endorsed the plan, as did Pakistan, Iran, US, the Soviet Union, and the traditionalist Mujahideen. Both Iran and Pakistan have said they would support the UN initiative to convene a Loya Jirga. They have particular interest in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, because they cannot absorb more refugees (Corwin 2003:36). Once again Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a Pashtun and founder of the radical Hizbi-I-Islami Party) and Sayyaf played the role of spoilers (along with some of the Shiite parties), preventing the AIG from accepting the UN peace plan (Wahab and Youngerman 2007:192). As Benon noted that *“my main concern is for Hekmatyar, who may feel he is losing and is threatened”* and he will not even talk to the UN, because he feels it is protecting Najibullah, and that the UN is willing to allow communist participation in a new Afghan government (Corwin 2003:56). The United Nations main difficulties lay in eliciting support from the Mujahideen groups, in whose eyes it was suspect for being deferential to the government in Kabul.

Unlike the US-Soviet dialogue, the UN approach prefers to circumvent the issue of Najibullah regime. The UN approach leaves all details to be worked out through consultations with all Afghan factions inside and abroad. Like Pakistan, the US also stressed on Najibullah regime removal is essential condition for internal political settlement in Afghanistan. That policy had already been recognized in 1988 by

Cordovez:

“All my talks with Afghans also led me to conclude that my efforts would be particularly useful if I was able to persuade Najibullah to step down. An intra- Afghan dialogue could start, I had been told, only if all the participants were on an equal footing. If the Soviet withdrawal was the first requirement for the solution of the Afghan conflict, the continuation of a regime set up by the occupying power would be seen by a vast majority of Afghans as an intolerable obstacle. Inasmuch as the resistance leaders and field commanders did not recognize the legitimacy of Najibullah’s government, military operations against Kabul and other cities under his control might continue” (Corwin 2003:9).

In this process, Sevan consulted with Kabul, Peshawar, Riyadh and agreed to make Najibullah step down in context of any transition government in May 1991 (Crowin 2003:27). But every time the Mujahideen refused these proposals and the UN efforts did not produced positive results.

The UN General Assembly had noted in its resolution 46/23 of 5 December 1991 that there should be in Afghanistan “*a broad-based government to ensure the broadest support and immediate participation of all segments of the Afghan people*” (Crowin 2003:9). The UN Secretary-General made another statement of 27 January 1992, which briefed the UN's plans for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem. The Secretary-General argued that the Loya Jirga would have “*150 middle-level representatives acceptable to all sides, from all segments of the Afghan people, including representatives of political parties, religious and tribal leaders, opposition groups, resistance commanders, prominent personalities, and representatives from Kabul*” (Crowin 2003:4). Following the Secretary-General's statement, Sevan had been trying to organise a Loya Jirga and he told that Najibullah's resignation was a step in this process (Crowin 2003:121). After 1992, the UN had been negotiating with various opposition leaders to negotiate fifteen or twenty names that would take over as an authority to replace Najibullah. The secretary-general’s decision to press Najib to resign came at the behest of all the major players in the conflict (Crowin 2003:13). At the same time, the US made clear that the Afghan people would not have a chance of peace and stability, if Najibullah were to remain in power. And even the US considered Kabul regime as “illegitimate” and refused to talks (Eliot 1989:8). The

White House stated: *"President Bush reaffirmed our support for the Afghan resistance's efforts to achieve self-determination and also expressed US interest in a political settlement"* (New York Times: November 29, 1989; Eliot 1989:8).

In April 1992, after months of laborious negotiation, the UN had finally convinced Najibullah to resign his post as president of Afghanistan. Najibullah finally agreed for resign and in an address to the nation on 18 March 1992, he called on the various factions *"to actively enter the process for political and peaceful settlement of the Afghan question and practical realization of the U.N. peace formula"* (New York Times: March, 19, 1992). He also said that his resignation would take effect once the UN had established an *"interim government"* to which he would transfer all powers and executive authority (New York Times: March, 19, 1992). On April 10, Sevan announced that he had brokered a transitional council of Afghan leaders to accept a handover from Najibullah at the end of that month. He met with Massoud and Dastum (after the fall of Najibullah government) and agreed them for a coalition government. But the Pakistan had the problem between any kind of settlement.

During this phase, the UN in its capacity did a job to form some kind of broad-based transition government in Kabul. The international community and UN prepared for the implementation of the regime for conflict resolution in Afghanistan. But the UN efforts to establishment of broad-based regime faced a set back when Mujahideen attacked Kabul and Najibullah escaped from the presidential palace. However, on 15 April 1992, Najibullah regime finally collapsed. The failure of the UN sponsored transition government because of following ethnicisation of the conflict, role of external actors particularly neighbouring states their competing geopolitical interest, personal rivalry between elites and fragmented nature of overall internal Afghan politics. The UN efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem unfortunately overtaken by all these events. Consequently, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that UN efforts *"have not been successful"* (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:386). All these events resulted in civil conflict and internal Afghan situation had become like the anarchy.

## **Section B: Review of Literature**

### **2.3 Major Themes**

This part divided in two themes. First theme gives explanation of the United Nations approaches to resolve conflicts between states and civil wars. The basic responsibility of the UN is to maintain international peace and security. And its efforts of conflict resolution is part of this responsibility. Second theme provide brief sight of the United Nations peace-building and conflict resolution efforts in post-Soviet Afghanistan. It explain that the UN did efforts in its capacities and the results were mixed.

#### ***2.3.1 United Nations involvement in conflict resolution and peace operations***

The United Nations plays a distinctive role in conflict resolution in divided societies and various countries. The UN's work in conflict resolution is part of its overall responsibility for maintaining international peace and security which was the fundamental reason behind the world organization's establishment and thus draws on two broad mechanisms conferred upon it in Article 1.1 of the UN Charter: peaceful settlement of disputes and collective security enforcement.

Wolff and Yakinthou (2011) offered an overview in theory of relevant UN bodies and mechanisms, the UN entities in the historical practice of conflict resolution from the Cold War to the post-Cold War and contemporary periods; it highlights the nature of the international system and problems in each period, and accordingly the evolution in UN thinking and practice. UN efforts in the late 1980s paved the way for a vast expansion of its operations with the definitive end of the Cold War. They argued that end of the Cold War has allowed the UN to play a more prominent and relatively successful role in post-civil war situations .The post-Cold War period has witnessed a dramatic increase in the UN's profile in managing and resolving conflicts around the world. While the General Assembly has been sidelined, the Security Council reassumed its primary responsibility in peace and security; while the Secretariat under two active Secretaries-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) and Kofi Annan (1997-2006) innovated a whole new forum of understanding.

Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *An Agenda for Peace* put forward four categories of UN conflict resolution activities-peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict reconstruction or peace building. One of the main strengths of UN conflict resolution is its unparalleled dispute resolution machinery and processes, a venue for communication and coordination, opportunities for quiet diplomacy, and a normative framework. Most importantly, its universal membership provides unrivaled legitimacy. Doyle and Sambains (2006) provide some theoretical outlook to the understanding of the UN peace process after the end of Cold War. They discuss theories of the origins of and solutions to civil wars, the principles behind and the practices of the UN as an institution and the debate over doctrines and strategies of intervention. They also explain how UN can assist in the reconstruction of peace in war torn lands. They argued that sustainable peace is the measure of successful peacemaking. The UN can be good at peace making, mediation and implementation of comprehensive negotiated peace. Another argument that they put forward is that UN authorized peace operations increased in the 1990s reflecting a new wave of interventionism and redefining new generation strategies in peacekeeping designed to fulfil the ambitions expectations unleashed by the new willingness to intervene. Sovereignty was redefined to incorporate a global interest in human rights protection and UN was seen to be a legitimate agent to decide when sovereignty was and was not violated. Author argues about the effectiveness of UN peace operations by comparing peace building outcomes in cases with and without an UN intervention. They also focused how the UN has succeeded in making peace in countries as various as El Salvador, Cambodia and East Timor when enlisted.

James Dobbins (2004) talks about the UN way of nation building. In which UN prefers the maintenance of a low profile and small footprints approach to nation building. Unlike USA, UN focus more on soft power rather than hard power, influence depends more upon the moral rather than physical, more upon legitimacy in nation building process. UN mandates are highly negotiated. Francis Fukuyama has suggested that UN nation building mission can be divided into three distinct phases-first the initial stabilization of war-torn country or society, second the recreation of local institution for governance and third strengthening of institutions for rapid economic growth and sustained social development. Yilmaz (2005) provides



evaluation of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era in terms of its strengths and shortcomings. He argued that the traditional tasks of UN peacekeeping operations included interposing between conflicting parties and monitoring cease-fire. These tasks were usually carried out on the ground of three key principles- the consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force. Particular attention is devoted to internal strife that dominates the Cold war period as the principle source of current conflicts. In this regard the utility of UN peacekeeping is undermined. But many of the problems UN addressed including recruiting qualified personnel, finance, expending use of peace mission and also language problems. After the end of Cold War, UN peace operation increased. A main reason for this expansion has been the increased capacity of UNSC to agree on action in security crisis after the end of the Cold War. He also talks about the challenge to UN is that there is growing disparity between the capacity of the UN and demands of international peace and security. Michele Griffin (1999) explains the UN's role as the sole global, moral authority over international peace and security remains essential. He described the evolution of UN peace operation since 1948 in terms of generation. Classical (first generation) operations basically involved the post-truce interposition of a peacekeeping force with consent of the concerned parties. Second generation peace operations developed as a part of negotiated political and responsibilities of peacekeeping included non-military tasks such as disarmament, demobilization, resettlement of refugees, election monitoring. Third generation primarily enforcement operation included particularly humanitarian assistance. He also talked about the conceptual evolution of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding now considered central to the UN, and have not been mentioned in the UN Charter. Last but not the least the inclusion of the formal definition provided by the Secretary-General ButrasButrasGhali in his Agenda for Peace in 1992. On the similar approach Wentge (1998) talked about two conceptually peacekeeping types classical (emphasis on consent, non use of force, impartiality and small footprints approach) and second generation mission (are dynamic operations) that drive the process forward and emphasis on dynamic conflict prevention, reduction and settlement. To extend further categories these two types peace operations into three parts- classical (consensual, uni-functional and static), wider (consensual, multi-functional and dynamic) and assertive (enforcing, uni-

functional, quasi-static). Salman Ahmed, Paul Keating and Ugo Salinas (2007) argued that in last decade UN peacekeeping activity increased rapidly. There is a need for the UN to develop a comprehensive doctrine that better defines what modern UN peacekeeping has become and covers the full range of civilian peace-building activities that are now a standard feature of Security Council mandates. It also highlights key conceptual challenges and political fault lines to be reconciled in order for a comprehensive doctrine to enjoy broad support of the UN's 192 member states, while still providing relevant guidance to thousands of personnel on the front-lines of the efforts to help rebuild war-torn states.

### ***2.3.2 UN Peace Building Efforts in Post-Soviet Afghanistan***

Several authors in their works conclusively illustrate the Soviet intervention and withdrawal, civil war and UN involvement in these events in different ways.

Ewans (2005) explain the Afghan's struggle with Soviet Union. He said it was a question of their independence and even survival. Ewans argued that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had three broad sets of consequences. Consequence for Afghan itself, for the Soviet Union and for the world at large. To extend this, Craig M. Karp (1986) focused on the Afghan resistance character, it consists several elements, both inside the country and abroad. He said that Mujahideen could not survive without the support of the Afghan people and resistance alliance between different groups. Meanwhile Pakistan has become a front line state threatened by the prospects of permanent Soviet Union domination of Afghanistan. In between UN started negotiation for a settlement in Afghanistan have resulted in six round in indirect talks in Geneva since 1982 and that negotiation provided a door for the possible withdrawal. Rubin (2000) explores some points, in the aftermath of civil war international actors often worry about the incoherence, tribalism and division of war-torn nation states like Afghanistan. However the problems that arose in the Afghanistan recovery and reconstruction efforts illustrate that the division, rivalries and fragmentation of authority. Rubin argued that sustainable stability require democracy and international actors to delegate some sovereign functions. Further he argued history and contemporary situation in Afghanistan makes clear that there is

an important need for the peace-building mechanism proposed by the UN. This would involve a unified international decision-making body that would act as a supportive role to national government. Dr. Misdaq (2006) explores the clashes, reconciliation between the central government and tribes. He also investigates the effects of foreign invasion over the past two and half century on Afghanistan. It provides the analysis of the power politics since 1975 till the year 1992, when there was a fall down of the communist government in Kabul. After this, civil war spread across the country and most atrocious kind ensued in a struggle for power between resistance groups. He argued that Afghan resistance groups emerged against Soviet invasion but later turned in civil war for control of Kabul. This book also figures out the UN involvement since 1979 and during civil war. Despite Taliban's rapid rise and control over 90% of the country, the UN did not recognize the legitimacy of Taliban movement and consider their government as a non-entity.

Bokhari (1991) mainly focused on the negotiation process for peace establishment in Afghanistan. The negotiations in Afghanistan following the introduction of Soviet troops in 1979 pursued along two tracks. First intra-Afghan negotiation between Soviet supported Afghans government and Mujahideen resistance groups. The second track consisted of negotiation officially conducted between Pakistan and Afghanistan but in reality it was between the US and the Soviet Union over the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He argued that the Geneva Accords provide a highly complex but equally instructive study of regional problems. This agreement also provided an example of the role of the UN in situations where it can be a useful mediator. Maley (1997) argue that one of Afghanistan's greatest difficulties is to execute the complementary tasks of institutionalizing politics and uniting the national elite, this problem has dominated the stormy politics of post-communist Afghanistan. Without progress towards the development of legitimate national institutions, changes in the composition of the Afghan government will leave Afghanistan in at best a fragile political equilibrium. In this regard UN should play a significant role. Maley argued that the UN has for years been involved in Afghanistan attempt to facilitate elite settlement in Afghanistan but with no success. The UN Secretary -General's 1991 plan for a political settlement incorporating a proposal for the transfer of power to a credible and impartial transition mechanism failed in part because of the continuation

of Soviet aid to Kabul. A special mission for Afghanistan was appointed in December 1993, headed by Mohmaud Mesriti but without much success. In this article Maley particularly deals with the complexity of the dynamics of regime transition in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal and UN peacebuilding efforts and its evolution.

Dorrnsoro's provides some points related to UN presence in Afghanistan. The author talked about the efforts made by UN after the Soviet intention to withdrawal. He said that UN adopted a policy of indirect rapprochement with the mediation of UN negotiation they brought together Pakistan and Kabul government in the presence of Soviet and American observers and finally Geneva Accords were signed on 14 April 1988. In 1992 Kabul regime collapsed for lack of external Soviet support. After that new phase civil war began and finally in 1996 Taliban captured the Kabul and other parts of the country. Till 1998 Taliban controlled 90 % of the country. In forth sections of this book he focuses on the developments after the Soviet withdrawal and especially at the abortive reconstruction of a central political authority the ethnicisation of the war and the aims of the fundamentalist Ulema. Further he argued that the primary consequence of the war has been abrupt and rapid politicization. Therefore the re-establishment of the state has been the key issue in Afghanistan since the 1988. Corwin (2003) argued that the UN's intention in Afghanistan were always to act as a catalyst and a facilitator for the Afghan people themselves to resolve their differences politically. He basically focused on UN peace process in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal. He argued that the events surrounding Najib's failed in Kabul raised question on UN's role in international peacekeeping, its role in conflict within a country, its moral and political images. After Soviet withdrawal, the UN with political office, a small contingent of military observes and humanitarian agencies were trying to prevent an impending disaster and form a transitional government. It further explains about the Accords implementation and different views of concerned parties. Pakistan was angry that Accords might allow for a broad based coalition which would include communist participation to serve as an interim government in Afghanistan .Pakistan and Saudi Arabia wanted an Islamic state and even USA wanted total victory over communist. Meanwhile the UN General Assembly had noted in its resolution of 5 December 1991 that there should be in Afghanistan "a broad based government to ensure the broadest support and immediate participation of all

segments of the Afghan society”. Rubin (1995) explore some facts on the how shifting pattern of strategic conflict and cooperation altered the flow of money and weapons into the region as the Great powers in turn consolidated Afghanistan as a weak buffer state. He argued that Geneva Accords were intended not only to promote a political solution in Afghanistan but to launch a new era of international cooperation. Soviet troops started withdrawal from Afghanistan under the UN sponsored agreement. The UN began its mediation efforts in Afghanistan under the rules of diplomacy, which codified in the UN charter. The author describes that how UN made efforts with USA and USSR to maintain peace in Afghanistan and settlement of conflict. Both Moscow and Washington agreed to authorize the UN to implement peace plan in Afghanistan. He also focused on how Geneva Accords concluded under UN leadership. All concerned parties agreed to grant the UN Secretary- General the authority to use the good offices to promote the formation of a broad based government in Afghanistan .

Maley (2002) focuses on each wave of war in modern Afghanistan that rocked the region leading to its instability including Soviet intervention. Armed conflict in Afghanistan takes place in a socio-political context. The book deals with the Soviet -Afghan war. The author also deals with the role of UN in structuring negotiation between concerned parties. The UN mediation between parties through ‘Good Offices’ of the Sectary- General to producing a peaceful resolution on terms satisfactory to the parties. The Geneva Accord was the product of a series of structural negotiations orchestrated by the UN between 1982 and 1988. The Accord left a crucial issue in Afghan conflict namely the character of the country’s rulers unaddressed. The UNGOMAP was the first peacekeeping operation to monitor the actions of a superpower in Afghanistan. This Accord led to the establishment of an institution for the delivery of post-war reconstruction assistance with a particular focus on refugee repatriation. Maley also discussed the UN attempt to manage transition and formation of broad-based government in Afghanistan. The Sectary-General’s May 1991 plan issued a new statement on Afghanistan. It was basically a political settlement in Afghanistan, which would be acceptable to majority Afghan peoples. It included a variety from sovereignty to transitional government and humanitarian issues. Responses came differently from Afghanistan, Pakistan and USA. This plan was criticized because of lack of provision of power sharing in Najib government, before

elections who would determine that the arrangement is acceptable to majority of Afghans and also the lack of credible and impartial transition mechanism. The Special Mission in Afghanistan on 14 Feb 1994 worked in a low fashion. Its mandate after all was to inquire and recommend rather than mediate directly. And later UN representation was unable to secure any commitment from Taliban to accept the UN's plan. In later of this book Maley also discussed Taliban and UN negotiation and evaluated it that UN was unable to commit to Taliban to accept UN plan. Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie (2004) provide some critique of the UN and UN post conflict policies in Afghanistan. They states that the UN developed a new approach the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan (SFA) designed to bring together the political and assistance wings of the UN in common pursuit of a peaceful solution of Afghanistan crisis, adopted in 1998, the SFA aimed to provide a more coherent, effective and integrated political strategy and assistance programme on the basis of shared principles and objectives. They observed the UN's work in Afghanistan was seen as having two components: an assistance pillar and a political pillar. Within the assistance pillar the key operational elements was known as Principal Common Programming. The book also talks about the UN engagement in Afghanistan and the reaction of Taliban. They argued that UN did not achieve much success in Taliban period due to almost 90% of country captured by Taliban and their un-cooperative view towards UN policies. Afsah and Guhr (2005) explore the United Nations engagement in Afghanistan. The UN had been active in Afghanistan even before the conflict broke out. It was engaged in normal development assistance work. In response to the Soviet intervention, the Security Council met many times since 1980. General Assembly began to look into the human rights situation and throughout the period of the conflict humanitarian assistance was being provided by the respective UN agencies. The UN offered its good offices resulting in a series of agreements concluded in Geneva, which provided the legal basis for the withdrawal of foreign troops. The authors argued that in comparison with many other countries where the UN has played a significant role in the peacemaking and reconstruction process, due to Brahimi's light footprint approach, the Afghan authorities are more actively involved in all aspects. Compared to other peace-building and peace-keeping efforts by the UN, the Afghan peace process is characterized by a number of factors that are

unusual in this context: the limited role played by the United Nations. The United Nations has limited itself to playing a supporting role in Afghanistan, leaving visible leadership to the Afghan elite. The author also describes chronology and precise nature of the UN involvement in Afghanistan.

Laurenti (2005) deals with the fact that the international community may take upon itself a greater collective responsibility for effectively assisting Afghanistan in its transition from a war-ridden failed state to a reasonably peaceful and stable one. The author talked about the international stakes in Afghanistan. He argued that Pakistan, USA, India, Iran, China, Japan and EU have their own strategic stakes in Afghanistan and shaped policies in this direction time by time and followed and supported UN role in Afghanistan. He argued that the UN has become a principle actor on behalf of the international community at large in Afghanistan. During Communist period the UN General Assembly (UNGA) articulated the overwhelming global condemnation of the Soviet intervention even as UN mediators shuttled between Moscow and Washington, Kabul and Islamabad trying to negotiate a formula for a Soviet withdrawal and a compromise all-party government. During Taliban period, the UNGA refused to accept the legitimacy of Taliban's envoys credentials and left Afghanistan seat in the hands of the Mujahideen government that controlled the northern most region of country. The author argued that the UN mission in Afghanistan needs to have a constitutive relationship with the government in Kabul if it is to fulfil the Secretary-General's mandate to promote the process of country's political and economic reconstruction.

The United Nations' effort in Afghanistan has deliberately concentrated on building Afghan capacity and enabling local governmental and administrative structures to develop. In the ongoing UN mission in Afghanistan, emphasis has been placed on ensuring Afghan ownership of the reconstruction process, rather than imposing an international administration.

## **2.4 Summary**

The first section of this chapter has begun with the post-Soviet Afghanistan and the United Nations efforts to resolve the Afghan problem. The first part explains the Soviet

invasion in Afghanistan. The invasion was the part of cold war politics to get supremacy in the international system. The Soviet Union invaded in Afghanistan in the range of extending influence in the region and for strategic interests. The intervention invited swift reaction from the world community. The west and US reacted strongly against it and US said that it the biggest threat to international peace after the Second World War. The United Nations also condemned the invasion and passed many resolutions with huge majority. And it called immediate and unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghan land. The NAM countries, Islamic world also reacted same. The presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil caused localised resistance to evolve into nation-wide uprising. US and Saudi Arabia feeded the resistance groups through the Pakistani route. In this environment Pakistan became the front-line state and provided all kind support to Mujahideens. Essentially, Pakistan saw the invasion as strategic challenge and soon realised that it is an opportunity to get western support. The second part gives the understanding of the United Nations efforts to end the Afghan problems. The UN put together all conflict parties on negotiation table and finally Geneva Accords signed. Which provide the way of troops withdrawal. The third part of this chapter talk about the implementation of the accords and monitoring of troops withdrawal. It also focus on post-Soviet peacebuilding efforts of the UN. The UN did negotiations with various concerned parties to the establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul, but succeed partly, due to the fragmented nature of internal Afghan politics. The second section of this chapter includes the review of literature, which is related to this research work.



**CHAPTER 3**  
**THE CIVIL WAR AND THE UN INVOLVEMENT**

### **3.1 Post Soviet Afghanistan**

The recent history of Afghanistan is a tale of coups, wars, invasion and civil conflict. On 25 December 1979, the Soviet forces entered in Afghanistan. As a result of Soviet intervention, Afghanistan had become a geopolitical issue in the Cold War politics between the Soviet Union and the United States. In Afghanistan, the two major global powers fought the Cold War by proxy. The Geneva Accords of 1988, brokered by the United Nations, paved the way for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The treaty postulated the need for international cooperation for peace in Afghanistan rather than war, and provided for the cessation of arms deliveries to both sides which is called “*negative symmetry*”. But the civil war continued even after the Soviet withdrawal and fuelled by continuing external interference and by the huge arsenal that had come into the hands of the warring factions (Rasanayagam 2005:163). While many expected the departure of the Soviet army in February 1989 to mark the end of the war, it did not. The Najibullah government has displayed unexpected staying in power, even considering the massive Soviet military and financial assistance made available to it in the post-withdrawal period. To attract support, Najibullah attempted to liberalize the government’s policies but did not succeed. On other hand, the Afghan resistance failed to develop sufficient military and political cohesion to isolate, demoralize and hasten the collapse of Najibullah regime. The prospects of a political consensus in Afghanistan have narrowed mainly because of the failure of the Afghan resistance to develop a credible political profile (Riaz 1993:303). In this civil conflict, the United Nations made some efforts for settlement and proposed the formation of a broad-based government. But the situations remained same and the civil conflict fought between Mujahideen and other ethnic groups and in 1996 finally Taliban took control on Kabul and most of the territory of Afghanistan.

#### ***3.1.1 Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet withdrawal***

After the one decade of staying in Afghanistan, Soviet Union left in 1989. On the eve of Soviet exit, it appeared very clear that Afghanistan was entering into a volatile phase. Because the Afghanistan itself was virtually fragmented in nature and lack of national character and statesmanship among leaders. The country was essentially divided into fiefdoms-small warring states in which factions fought, switched sides,

and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals, and bloodshed. The Mujahideen had been involved in heavy battles trying to force a Soviet retreat (BBC on this day:February 15, 1989). Ahead of departure, the Mujahideen fired four rockets in the capital, with three targeting in the in the airport area. As a BBC correspondent reported, “*Kabul had been surrounded by Mujahideen forces of around 30, 000 with the city under artillery and rocket bombardment*” (BBC on this day:February 15, 1989).

On the eve of Soviet departure, external parties had still existed in Afghanistan. With the country and even the capital city divided into a patchwork of *de facto* sovereignties, economic life remained depressed. One result of the Soviet withdrawal was the diffusion of the use of force by armed warlords throughout the country (Feifer 2009:260). The Soviet Union had all set of withdrawal their forces by 15 February, 1989, as predetermined by the Geneva Accords, but they “*left behind military advisers and a large stockpiles of arms amounting, by their own admission, to over US\$ 1 billion in value*” (Eliot 1990:158). On other side, similarly the Mujahideen did continue to revive weaponry and other assistance from United States which came through Pakistani channels. At that time Washington made a unilateral statement pledging “*positive symmetry*” (Roy 1990:234). It meant that it would supply arms to Mujahideen as long as the Soviet did the same with the PDPA government.

When the Soviet withdrawal began under the Geneva Accords, there was a common thought that Kabul regime would fall down immediately after the withdrawal, but the situation was different. On the one hand, the Mujahideen groups were involved in military ambush to defeat the Najibullah led Soviet backed regime. On the other side they participated in government formation. As the Soviet were making withdrawal, these groups were pursued by Pakistan and the United States, to form a government that would serve as an alternative to Kabul regime. In this process, on 10 February, 1989 they convened a Shura near Islamabad (Eliot 1990:160). After much haggling, the Shura ended in two weeks later with the formation of an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) under the presidency of a moderate Mujahideen leader, Sibghatullah Mojaddidi. Though, we have discussed the AIG formation in second chapter.

Against all expectations, the Najibullah regime did not collapse, the war continued

and very few refugees were able to return to their homes. Almost a year later, in March 1990, Najibullah's Afghan Army fought off a coup attempt by Defence Minister Shah Nawaz Tanai, who had joined forces with Hekmatyar. To attract support, Najibullah attempted to liberalize the government's policies. To signal that he was changing his ways, he had already altered the country's name from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) to the Republic of Afghanistan. He also changed the PDPA's name to Hizb-i-Watan, "the Homeland Party" (Feifer 2009:260). From time to time, Najibullah suggested general or local ceasefire, and the Soviets called for a halt to all external military assistance to Kabul and the Mujahideen (Eliot 1990:162). But the Mujahideen parties firmly refused to negotiate with the Najibullah's regime. The United Nations had been advocating a plan to transfer power peacefully from the government to the Mujahideen. That solution failed. In August 1991, the Soviet government decided that it could no longer afford to prop up Najibullah. It negotiated with the American government an agreement on "*negative symmetry*", and all its aid to Kabul, both military and economic, ceased. This, finally, was the death knell for Najibullah's regime in April 1992 (Ewans 2005:123). Now Mujahideen leaders turned on each other to battle for control over the capital. Civil war broke out almost immediately (Feifer 2009:261). The fall of Najibullah regime created the power vacuum and the coalition of the resistance parties was unable to replace the Najibullah regime and every faction was pursuing their own separate agendas. At that time the nature of conflict had changed. The resistance parties got into civil conflict, earlier it was against Soviet invasion. Basically the civil war started after the communist coup of April 1978 escalated primarily due to the massive military aid and support extended to the opposing sides: the Soviet Union to its client regime in Kabul, and Pakistan serving as a covert conduit for military aid from the United States to the Afghan resistance (Rasanayagam 2005:163).

On the eve of Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan state had lost its capacity to function with any significant degree of autonomy (Maley 2002:157). At this juncture, the basic need was to form a capable state that would be able to regulate the anarchic Afghan terrain. And it was not possible without a legitimate and competent government in Kabul. This was the biggest problem that was faced by Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet withdrawal. Along with this situation, the consequences for Afghanistan of the

Soviet ten-year occupation were horrific. Due largely to the indiscriminate Soviet bombardment of villages and the mining and devastation of the countryside, civilian deaths were of the order of 1.25 million. Agriculture, on which the bulk of the people relied, was largely ruined, together with what little industry and infrastructure the country possessed. Casualties have continued ever since, with some 50 per cent of those injured dying for lack of medical facilities (Ewans 2005:125). At this juncture, conflict turned towards the civil struggle and the anarchy situations became in Afghanistan due to lack of credible central authority.

### ***3.1.2 Geopolitical impact of Soviet departure***

The end of cold war had changed the situations in the region as well as in world politics. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War were momentous developments which overshadowed Afghanistan. Some major policy and security issues often took priority over issue of the Afghan conflict. The US and the Soviets were concerned more on including the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the first Gulf War rather than Afghan conflict. When the cold war was over, the Afghan conflict, in the words of one UN official, became a “*forgotten war*” and the Afghans became “*a forgotten people*” (Rotberg 2007:26). During the Cold War the struggle over building post-colonial states largely took the form of competing foreign aid projects among the alliance systems led by the USA and USSR. Afghanistan received aid from both camps (Rubin 2006:177). The situation in Afghanistan after the Soviet troop withdrawal appeared a minor concern to US. The Bush Administration and its key policy makers were preoccupied with the careful management of transition in the Soviet Union and then from August 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its regional and international consequences (Maley 2002:168). After the Soviets pulled out, the US funnelled hundreds of millions of dollars, arms and other aid to the Mujahideen through the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI. One important legacy of the Accord negotiations practically ensured continued Soviet and US military involvement in Afghanistan. In the mid-1980s, due to strategic interests the US had begun to participating actively in the negotiations, conducted by a special UN emissary in Geneva. The major stumbling block for reaching agreement on the Accords involved

the issue of “*symmetry*” in which the US would cease its military support to the insurgents if the Soviets withdrew all their military forces from Afghanistan and ceased all types of assistance to Kabul regime, which is called “*negative symmetry*” (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:262). Moscow insisted that while it would withdraw its military forces, it could not accept a prohibition on providing military supplies to the Afghan government that was recognized by and held a seat in the United Nations. The US Administration, on the other hand, would not commit to a formal agreement permitting the USSR to provide military assistance to a regime that it had installed through military intervention, while ceasing US assistance to the Mujahideen, or “*freedom fighters*” attempting to oust this installed regime (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:262). The Soviet exited from the Afghanistan, but did not provide ground for peace and transition to a legitimate government in Afghanistan.

Few observers expected Najibullah’s regime to last for very long after the Soviet exit from Afghanistan. Yet over three years were to pass before it finally disintegrated, years of what Goodson called “*high intensity civil war*” (Goodson 2001:480). While the US and Soviet Union were in initial discussions to end the supply of military aid to Afghanistan. Finally, both sides agreed to end arms support to the combating factions in Afghanistan, effective January 1, 1992 (Maley 1997:170) under “*negative symmetry*”. Four months later, Najibullah’s communist regime in Kabul was finally ousted in April 1992. The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) was dissolved by the Pakistanis shortly thereafter. For the next two years, the various warlords who had fought the Soviets turned against each other and fought head to head and house to house. Kabul was almost destroyed from the constant attacks, and the civilians suffered from large numbers of casualties. Maley argued about the emergence of these new institutional forms has not in itself solved Afghanistan's institutional crisis. He observe that they have not succeeded in stabilizing relations between each other and they do not constitute a system of institutions which could provide a stable framework for the practice of politics (Maley 1997:170). On other side, the most considerable post-cold war changed had occurred in Afghanistan's neighbourhood; in Central Asia where five Central Asian Muslim states emerged. These countries had given enough space to regional power for attracting towards them. Out of five, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had also changed the regional dimension

vice-versa. These newly emerged states changed the earlier geopolitical setting and regional affairs entirely. This changed geopolitical settings also had impact on Afghanistan.

Earlier superpowers were involved in Afghanistan's conflict. The remarkable changes that emerged at the regional and global level after the post-cold war. Now, USA did not have any interest in this region. It created much geopolitical space for the regional players to indulged in the Afghan state. Now the regional actors began to get involved in Afghanistan. Iran increased its support to the Shia Mujahideen parties under a common banner of Hezb-i-Wahadt. Saudia Arabia supported Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf's party (Goodson 2001:147). On other hand, Uzbekistan supported Dostam's militia and Tajikistan backed Tajik led Rabbani and Massoud (Goodson 2001:147). But the most important actor, Pakistan supported Peshawar based Pashtun parties which were developed in 1980s. Between these regional competition Pakistan had the clear edge upon all of them because Pakistan has created a structure of Mujahideen parties during anti-Soviet resistance. With the emergence of these countries, Islam again revived in this region. The Central Asian countries share ethnic linkage with Afghan minority groups which inhabit in the periphery of their respective countries. In post cold war Afghan conflict these ethnic groups were in commendable situation in most of the northern Afghan territory. It inspired the Central Asian elite to engage with these groups directly or indirectly. Although all these events made Afghan conflict much more complex.

### ***3.1.3 Change in the Nature of conflict from Holy Jihad to Civil War***

On 25 December 1979, the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and established control on Kabul. The presence of foreign troops of Afghan soil caused localised resistance to evolve into nation-wide uprising. As for the Afghans, the impact of the invasion was totally unexpected and therefore stunning (Misdaq 2006:156). The Afghan Mujahideen, or “*holy warriors*”, especially in the initial years of the Soviet occupation, came from nearly all ethnic groups and tribes in the country. Resistance was motivated by a range of factors, but the power of Islam as a basis of resistance (Maley 2002:58). The foreign invasion provoked a declaration of jihad from

thousands of mullahs, instilling a grim determination in the age-old warrior culture of the countryside. Those who had not already been in revolt against Amin now joined the resistance against the Soviet occupation (Tanner 2002:243). Despite all these uniting facts against Soviet intervention, the resistance never managed to form a national leadership. Once the Soviet forces had left, the Mujahideen were able to capture large parts of Afghanistan, but the fragmented nature of the resistance, with shifting loyalties and rivalries, meant that they were unable to turn these local victories into national one and civil conflict intensified.

The completion of the Soviet troop forced the Afghan resistance forces to reconsider the nature of their struggle. During the Soviet occupation, for resistance forces one unite goal was the withdrawal of foreign troops, which united them from localised to nationalised resistance. The war against the communists and then the Soviets was fought on nationalist and religious grounds, aimed at freeing Afghanistan and averting any threat to the Islamic culture of Afghanistan (Misdaq 2006:173). But after the Soviet withdrawal, it soon became clear that the long-feuding Mujahideen parties and militias would be unable to unite for establishment of central authority. Once the communists and the Soviets as a common enemy had gone, Afghanistan was left in the hands of a multiplicity of factions led by warlords who had networks of support based on ethnicity, language, religion, political ideology, kinship, regional loyalty and so on. They also had access to arms, money and external resources. The face is that the respect for central authority had always been a weak instinct in Afghanistan (Wahab and Youngerman 2007:195). The one unifying factor, Islam (jihad) had disappeared along with the Soviet troops and little was left but a raw struggle for power (Jhonson 1998:22). It was observed, for instance, that in areas vacated by government troops for strategic reasons, the first priority of the local commanders was to consolidate the authority of their clan, lay claim to land, and settle local disputes (Dorrnsoro 2005:128). Local warlords became laws unto themselves, and the long-suffering Afghan people became subject to random atrocities and injustice. Kabul was largely reduced to rubble in the struggle between the different Mujahideen forces (Wahab and Youngerman 2007:195).

Although Soviets did remove their forces from Afghanistan, but they continued to aid Najibullah government. Not surprisingly, the resistance was not in a position to



invoke any legal or for that matter conventional processes of political change to create a broad based and representative Islamic government to replace the regime of Najibullah. The UN efforts to put together a transitional team, composed of 'neutral' Afghans, proved futile. The following month, the deteriorated government at Kabul finally succumbed to the Mujahideen forces led by Dostam and Massoud, and Najibullah and his communist-funded government were overthrown. On April 18, 1992, the two men took control of Kabul and declared the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was named the interim leader of the Islamic State of Afghanistan after the fall of the communist regime in 1992 (Runion 2007:116). After the fall of the communist government in April 1992, the resistance entered a new stage of struggle, this time attempting to seize power on a national level (Misdaq 2006:167). The Islamists were the major groups who organised resistance against Daoud (1973-78), against the communists (1974-79), against the Soviet invasion (1979-89), against one another for power (1992-96), and finally against Taliban in 1994 onwards. With the fall of the communist government the war continued unabated for nearly five years amongst the Islamists, the Shia and the former communist militias who formed and dissolved alliances frequently (Misdaq 2006:167).

Therefore, with Soviet exit, the war changed in nature, it became ethnic and local civil conflict to control of Kabul, which is generally called "civil war". We need to understand what civil war is ?. The civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction. Civil war is an armed conflict that pits the government and national army of an internationally recognized state against one or more armed opposition groups able to mount effective resistance against the state, the violence must be significant, causing more than a thousand deaths in relatively continual fighting that takes place within the country's boundaries, and the rebels must recruit mostly locally, controlling some part of the country's territory (Doyle and Sambanis 2006:31). Goldstien defined civil war "*the civil war refers to war between factions within a state trying to create, or prevent, a new government for the entire state or some territorial part of it. The aim may be to change the entire system of government, to merely replace the people in it, or to split a region off as a new state*" (Goldstein 2003:214). The US Civil War of the 1860s is a

good example of a secessionist war, the war in El Salvador in the 1980s is an example of a civil war for control of the entire state and the Afghan civil conflict also had same nature.

### **3.2 Period of Conflict Transformation**

Negotiations to end the war culminated in the 1988 Geneva Accords, whose centrepiece was an agreement by the Soviet Union to withdraw all its uniformed troops by February 1989. The Accords said nothing about the future government of Afghanistan (Rubin 1995:91). At the signing ceremony, all parties to the Accords stated that they had asked the secretary-general of the United Nations, through his personal representative, Diego Cordovez, to use his good offices to help the Afghans to form a transitional government. The United Nations did some efforts in its capacity but not succeeded. With substantial Soviet assistance, Najibullah government held on to power through early 1992 while the United Nations frantically tried to assemble a transitional process acceptable to all the parties but it failed. In that period the nature of conflict had also changed from against Soviet to civil war or internal conflict. To find out settlement, two accords (Peshawar and Islamabad Accords) were signed but not implemented fully and the civil conflict continued. Between 1994 to 1996, the emergence of Taliban had created many difficulties for peace process and derailed and in 1996, finally Taliban sized control on Kabul.

#### ***3.2.1 Fall of Najibullah government and continuation of civilian conflict***

After the Soviet withdrawal, the conflict had intensified between the Najibullah led PDPA government and the Mujahideen. At that time there was no unity among the Mujahideen groups, they divided on ethnic and local leadership, and it helped to survive Najib government. Though the Soviet troops exited from but they continued their military and economic assistance to Najibullah regime. With the Soviet disintegration, there was common thought that Kabul government would fall down soon. At that time internal rivalries and struggle between the Mujahideen groups come into surface for capture the Kabul. Najibullah government survived till April 1992. During this period he made attempt to get legitimacy. His regime abandoned its ideology in favour of survival and legitimacy. To attract support, Najibullah attempted

to liberalize the government's policies. To signal that he was changing his ways, he had already altered the country's name from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). In this process he changed the name of PDPA as Hezb-e-Watan (Party of the Nation) was officially created on 27 June 1990 (Dorransoro 2005:203) and few other reconciliation courses (Maley 2002:172). Najibullah's new plan had also introduced the multi-party system and creation of coalition government (Sikal 2004:206). In December, Najibullah announced the plan for national reconciliation; a cease-fire, a coalition with political leaders in Kabul, and recognition of the local power of commanders. But the Mujahideen alliances rejected these proposals. They did not believe that Najibullah's offer to share power was sincere (Rubin 1995:80). After all these efforts Najibullah could not survive without the huge Soviet funding that was cease after August 1991. Shortly thereafter, the Moscow and Washington agreed to stop funding both sides of the Afghan conflict by the end of 1991 under "*negative symmetry*" (Feifer 2009:260).

Now the Mujahideen leaders turned on each other to battle for control over the capital. During this time General Abdul Rashid Dostum (General of 53 Infantry Division, which made by the mostly of Uzbeks) had shifted its loyalty from Najibullah to Ahmed Shah Massoud (Sikal 2004:206). Sikal observed all these events in terms that, Dostam used to be the important ally of Najibullah government in post-Soviet Afghanistan and in February 1992, Dostum, who had fought the Mujahideen in northern Afghanistan, turned against Najibullah. Somehow he was responsible for the survival Kabul government so long. On the eve of Najibullah's departure, Massod, Dostam, Ali Mizari and Islam Khan controlled most of northern, western and central Afghanistan. "*Massod controlled Takhar, Badakhshan, Kapisa, Parwan and some district of Kunduz; Dostum remained strong in the provinces of Jawzjan, Baghlan, Balk, Faryad, Samangan and parts of Kunduz, and Hezbe-e-Wahdat hold Herat, Badghis and Farah*" (Sikal 2004:207). The capital was put largely under the jurisdiction of Tajik and Uzbek forces from the north. This was a psychological blow to the country's majority Pashtuns, who lost control of the capital for the first time in three hundred years (Feifer 2009:262). On other hand, the Pashtun provinces in the south, south-east and south-west were the control of different field commanders who were affiliated from the seven Peshawar based Sunni Mujahideen parties. Under these

circumstances it was very hard for Najibullah government to survive, when all these Mujahideen groups looking to capture Kabul. On 22 March, Ahmed Shah Massod, Dostam, Ali Mizari and some other commander decided in a meeting to overthrow President Najibullah and set up a new visionary leader in the "*Coalition of Northers*" (Kakar 1995:274). During the last days of Najibullah regime, the United Nations in its capacity did a great job to form some kind of broad-based transition government in Kabul. But before the UN accomplished the mission to form a transitional government Mujahideen reached to Kabul and the Najibullah escaped from the presidential palace. At that time, three years after the Soviet withdrawal, the Mujahideen began closing in on Kabul, and Moscow advised Najibullah to resign (Feifer 2009:263). The regime failed to find any formula for internal coherence that could substitute for its abandoned ideology. Rubin argued that Najibullah regime fell not because of any onslaught by Mujahideen but because the loss of Soviet aid eroded his ability to control factionalism and ethnic conflict in his own ranks (Rubin 1995:124). Finally, the Najibullah regime collapsed on 15-16 April, 1992. Consequently, the power vacuum increased the conflict.

Civil war broke out almost immediately after collapse of Najibullah government. Although, after the Soviet withdrawal, there was some attempt to form an Afghan interim government. But this regime had remained in exile because Najibullah government has survived in Kabul. After the collapse of Najibullah government, there was the need for a functioning regime in Kabul. For that, there should have been some compromise between the various concerned parties. With the collapse of the Communist regime, a further attempt at an elite settlement became a matter of urgency. The result was the Peshawar Accord of 24 April 1992, which established two executive organs with ill-defined spheres of responsibility, an Interim Islamic Council and a Leadership Council, headed respectively by Professor Sebghatullah Mojadiddi, leader of the Jebha-i Milli Nejat and Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-i Islami, who served in turn as the first two presidents of post-Communist Afghanistan (Maley 2002:171; Dorronsoro 2005:239). This accord provided the framework for an interim government to be implemented in different stages. According to Maley it was the first attempt at an "*elite settlement*" which provided for the structure and process for the Islamic State of Afghanistan (Maley 2002:197).

Tajik scholar Rabbani soon took over the presidency from Mojaddidi. In December 1992, a special assembly confirmed Rabbani in office for a two-year term. In response, Hekmatyar began mercilessly bombarding the city from the south to dislodge Massoud, who took command of forces fighting for the Rabbani government. The Hezb leader was again named Prime Minister pursuant to an agreement signed in Islamabad in March 1993 (Saikal 2004:215). But the conflict continued and most of Kabul systematically destroyed as the rival Mujahideen groups fought each other house-to-house (Feifer 2009:262). The new council was fatally flawed. These attempts again existed mainly on paper, and in no sense mapped the power realities in the country. This accord did not bring peace because of the heterogeneous and fragmented nature of concerned parties. The fact was that the Afghan groups who had divided in different lines.

### ***3.2.2 Struggle for political power among Mujahideen groups***

Civil war broke out almost immediately after collapse of Najibullah regime. The civil wars are usually about the failure of legitimate state authority; hence, sustainable civil peace relies on the successful restoration of that authority (Misra 2002:6). In this power vacuum situation, the domestic politics of Afghanistan soon offered a close approximation to the anarchy of international relations theory. The power vacuum increased the conflict. The civil war in Afghanistan became a multilateral competition involving internal armed factions with extensive foreign links, neighbouring states pursuing competing strategic interests and extra-regional players with ideological, security and economic stakes in the chaos (Rotberg 2007:26).

The fall of the regime of Kabul in 1992, opened the way to a new war between the victorious parties (Dorransoro 2005:199). The Mujahideen forces turned on each other in a fight for control over Kabul after the evacuation of the Soviets. Sikal explain this power vacuum situations that, the US-provided military weapons were no longer used against the Soviets but instead among the Mujahideen forces, which resulted in the killing of Afghan citizens and thrusting the country deeper into a civil war. Despite their withdrawal, the Soviets continued to support President Najibullah of Afghanistan until the Mujahideen forces led by Rashid Dostam and Ahmed Shah Massoud gained control of Kabul. The capture of the capital was a devastating blow

to the Pashtuns, who had held control of the city for nearly 300 years. The Mujahideen declared Afghanistan an Islamic state for the first time in its history, and their takeover was welcomed by many Afghans in the expectation that their war-ravaged country would return to peace and order. As the collapse of the Najibullah government approached, the Mujahideen remained as fragmented along ethno-linguistic, tribal, sectarian and personality lines as ever (Sikal 2004:210). Mujahideen groups had failed to agree on a common political settlement. Not one of the groups or their respective leaders had managed to develop a national profile. Most groups functioned as fighting militias within specific localities from which their leaders originated, and enjoyed support substantially along lines of ethnic, linguistic and tribal identification.

After the fall of Najibullah, four principles armed groups fought for power in Kabul. These groups had different ethnic composition and different sources of foreign support, according to the regions in which they were based. Each group to some extent also enjoyed income from local taxes or customs, as well as from the drug trade and other enterprises (Rubin 1995:129). Rubin identified these four groups, Abdul Rashid Dostam, a Uzbek commander and he had support from other ethnic groups from northern Afghanistan. Former leader of Parcham, including Babrak Karmal, joined him in Mazar-i-Sharif. Massod and Rabbani, led mainly Tajiks, with members of some other north-eastern ethnic groups, and they were allied to one small but well-organised Shia party. Hikmatyar led mainly to Pashtuns. And fourth one was the Hizb-i-Wahdt, which, had a base in the Hazarajat, organised the Shia of Kabul city, who were armed by the Iranians and Parchasim during Najibullah's fall (Rubin 1995:129).

In June 1992, Rabbani, the Tajik leader of Jamiat-i Islami, became president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was designated prime minister. But, Hikmatyar did not participated in interim regime and continued to bombard Kabul with rockets. After ensuring that the governing council (Shura) was stacked with his supporters, Rabbani was again elected president in December 1992. But the Rabbani government failed to bring peace because of infighting among the Mujahideen and some other accused to Hilmatyar for Rabbani regime failure. Rabbani and his chief commander, Massoud, and Hekmatyar were locked in a bloody power struggle (Sikal 2004:211). The conflict was particularly bitter between the eastern

Pashtun, Hezb-i-Islami followers of Hekmatyar, who were supported by Pakistan, and Massoud (a Tajik leader of Jamiat-i- Islami) who came to control Kabul (Collins 2011:37). Fighting intensified throughout the summer of 1992. From April 1992 to April 1993, much of Kabul was destroyed and 30, 000 inhabitants were killed, with another 100, 000 wounded. In August 1992, the UN reported that more than 1800 civilians had been killed, food was becoming scarce, and some 500, 000 people were fleeing from Kabul. At that time humanitarian conditions worsened. By the end of 1992, Kabul was devastated, the casualty total had risen to 5000 innocent people dead and about one million displaced, either within Afghanistan or as refugees in Pakistan (Johnson 1998:24). In other cities, things were often more peaceful under the control of local warlords, such as Ismail Khan in Herat and Abdul Rashid Dostum in Mazar-i-Sharif. In many other places, however, law and order disintegrated. Local or regional warlords were dominant and men with guns made the rules. In Kandahar and other locations, rape, armed robbery, kidnapping young boys, and other crimes of violence were all too common (Collins 2011:38).

In August 1992, Hekmatyar launched a barrage of rockets in Kabul from his bases south and east of the city that killed over a thousand civilians. Even after he was named prime minister in another agreement signed in Islamabad in March 1993, he did not take up his post but remained outside Kabul (Maley 2002:199). Between 1992 and 1994 the capital was the objective of most of the fighting (Dorransoro 2005:242). These attacks destroyed half the city, took some 25, 000 civilian lives, and caused tens of thousands of Kabulis to seek safety in Pakistan or in the north Afghanistan. Some scholars argued that Hikmatyar played role of spoiler. Hekmatyar's objectives, according to Amin Saikal, "*were to ensure that the Rabbani government did not consolidate its power by building a credible administration and expanding its territorial control, and that it did not acquire the capacity, with lavish international support, for the reconstruction of the country* " (Rasanayagam 2005:141).

The civil war raged, the nation's economy and humanitarian conditions worsened. Farmers fled their villages for the cities, the fields remained fallow. Ten million dollars in aid from the UN for food and medicine could only begin to meet the country's needs not for all affected peoples. By the end of the year the death toll from the civil war had risen to 7, 000, with about 100, 000 injured and 500, 000 left

homeless (Otfinoski 2004:30). According to the Red Cross some 60, 000 citizens were killed in these urban internecine wars with some half a million fleeing the city in all directions (Misdaq 2006:173). Meanwhile, Hekmatyar and Dostum's forces failed to take Kabul, but their long effort seriously hurt Rabbani's power (Otfinoski 2004:30).

Numerous peace efforts, pursued by various Mujahideen leaders (two Acoords Peshawar in April 1992 and Islamabad in March 1993) the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the United Nations, produced no positive result. Amin Sikal argued that in fragmented and heterogeneous nature, *"only a rainbow coalition of various ethnic groups could deliver a stable order in Afghanistan"* (Saikal 2004:211). While the Rabbani government still retained Afghanistan's UN General Assembly seat and most of the country's diplomatic missions (Dorransoro 2005:199). In 1994, the friction among the leaders of the multiple Mujahideen factions resulted in a period of "warlordism" in Afghanistan (Runion 2007:120). As these leaders fought for power among themselves to control the Kabul and for power. For the next two years until the rise of Taliban, Afghanistan descended into chaos. This chaos in the country gave rise to Taliban, which means *"student" or "seekers of knowledge"*. The primary goal of Taliban was to impose a strict allegiance to Islamic law (Runion 2007:120). Taliban supported by Pakistan and finally on 26 September 1996 Taliban took control on Kabul.

### ***3.2.3 The rise and fall of the Political Regime between, 1992-1996***

The civil conflict between various factions continued after the Soviet withdrawal. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Najibullah regime, the need for a functioning political system was considerable. But at that time internal Afghan political structure was heterogeneous and fragmented and it was difficult to conclude a political settlement and establishment of a broad based government in Kabul. The seven Peshawar-based parties had operated independently in the long years of the Afghan resistance, but had never been able to agree on a common political platform for the exercise of power in a post-communist era in the country. No single group or leader had managed to develop country-wide following. Each functioned as a sponsor of fighting militias within the specific regions or localities from which they drew their



support, substantially on the basis of ethno-linguistic or tribal identification (Rasanayagam 2005:135). Therefore, Najibullah government fall created a power vacuum in Afghanistan and civil war intensified. In 1992, with UN help, a provisional government was formed to rule the country. It failed because of infighting among the Mujahideen.

To find out a solution of containing civil conflict Peshawar Accords of 1992, was the first attempt at an “*elite settlement*” which provided for the structure and process for the Islamic State of Afghanistan (Sikal 2004:104; Maley 2002:197). Peshawar Accords provided the framework for an interim government to be implemented in different stages. On 28 April 1992 Sibgatullah Mojaddidi became president. Mojaddidi had served as President as a compromise choice to head a two-month transitional government (Sikal 2002:214). This agreement had established an Islamic republic and an interim government consisting of a president, an executive council of 51 members, and various ministers. But Hekmatyar refused to sign the agreement, despite his appointment as prime minister. He demanded a more powerful role in the government for his party. Sikal argued that, as a pressure tactic, Hekmatyar launched rocket attacks against city neighbourhoods. The second phase to be followed was a four-month interim government to be headed by Rabbani, who's had control Kabul through his commander Massoud. When Rabbani took over, the foundation of Islamic state had been laid. And in third phase the interim government would be selected by the Shura, and this government would remain in power for two years. In the third phase it had to be followed by “the holding of a council of expert (Shura-ye-ahl al-hall wal-aqd) on solving and binding to constitute for 18 months as a prelude to a general election for creating a popular government” (Sikal 2002:214). This agreement faced a number of fundamental challenges. Hekmatyar, who resented Massoud's appointment as Defence Minister, restored to the strategy of “*spoiling*” (Maley 2002:198). Hekmatyar had said he would not participate on any council that included Massoud, his rival (Desert News archives: April 28, 1992). But Sikal believes “*Hekmatyar's thrust for power and his ISI patrons displeasure with not having him at the helm of post Najibullah Afghanistan rapidly led them to work against Peshawar Accord*” (Sikal 2002:215). Later he refused the offer of the Prime Ministership for his party, and criticised the Rabbani government as communist, because of Dostum

presence in government. His argument was that Dostum had once been a significant ally of Najibullah. He had said “*General Dostum association with the old government made him ineligible for any position in an Islamic Afghanistan*” (New York Times: January 17, 1993).

The failure of Peshawar settlement had created the chaos in Afghanistan. The fighting between rivals intensified. Fighting since April 1992, had killed an estimated 5, 000 people, wounded thousands and forced an estimated 750, 000 people to flee Kabul (The New York Times: March 8, 1993). In this state of conflict, the new wave of refugees came to Pakistan. To solve conflict, Pakistan offered the mediation between the opposing factions and Islamabad Accord signed in 7 March 1993. In reality, the ISI engineered the Islamabad Accords to get Hekmatyar to the prime minister's seat and to evict Massoud from the powerful defence ministry (BBC News: 7 November, 2001). The accord, which gave Hekmatyar the premiership and confirmed Rabbani's presidency for a period of eighteen months, commencing in December 1992. At the end of this period, parliamentary elections were to have been held under a new constitution, which was to be drafted by the signatories to the accord. Under pressure from Hekmatyar, Dostum was denied any role in the Leadership Council or in the Constitutional Committee established to draw up the new constitution on the grounds that he was an unreconstructed Communist (Clements 2003:51). It did nothing to resolve the problems.

Hekmatyar resolutely refused to move to Kabul, and Hezb-i Islami rocket attacks continued, even after an agreement in Jalalabad on May 1993, removed Massoud as “Defence Minister” and nominally put the ministry under collegial control, which of course had no effect whatsoever on its operations. The United Nations' suggestion that Rabbani should resign because his term of office, as defined by the Islamabad Accord, had expired (Maley 1997:171). However, despite all these positive developments, fighting was soon resumed. In January 1994, a new offensive destroyed further areas of Kabul, and more refugees fled from the city to other areas. Afghanistan's Supreme Court ruled on 28<sup>th</sup> June, that President Rabbani's term, due to expire today, should continue for six more months (The New York Times: June 29, 1994). On 28 June 1994, Rabbani refused to step down as required under the terms of the Islamabad Accord, and the civil war intensified. The efforts of the United Nations and other

countries in the region to secure peace were not succeeded (Clements 2003:51). Throughout 1994, Hekmatyar and Dostum, attacked Kabul. Over the next six months 2, 500 innocent people were killed. By the end of the year the death toll from the civil war had risen to 7, 000 with about 100, 000 injured and 500, 000 left homeless and humanitarian conditions worsened. Hekmatyar and Dostum's forces failed to take Kabul, but their long effort seriously hurt Rabbani's power (Otfinoski 2004:26). Later in 1994, Kabul was besieged once again, this time by Taliban, a newly emerged movement.

The attempt of an elite settlement for political power failed for two reasons. The first was that the level of distrust and individual ambitions within the elite was too high, especially the rivalry between Hekmatyar and Massoud. In Hekmatyar's case, Stephen J. Stedman has called "*total spoilers*": individuals "*who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and often suffer from pathological tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of conflict*" (Maley 2002:200). The second problem for an elite settlement was the impact and role of external powers, which affected the identities of the participants in the settlement. The external powers were pursuing their own strategic interests.

Later in 1995, Rabbani's government embarked on a process of decay, which culminated in its displacement by Taliban in September 1996. Maley found four factors for its failure. The first, but least important, was factionalism within the Jamiat-e Islami. The second was a failure to find moderate Pashtuns with whom to ally. The third was Rabbani's serious error of judgement in reaching a rapprochement with Hekmatyar. The fourth, and most significant, was backing for Taliban from Pakistan (Maley 2002:213). Consequently, the weak Rabbani government created favourable space for Taliban. Taliban, mysterious new actor, burst on to the chaotic Afghan political scene in November 1994 and took control on Kabul in September 1996, under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Runion 2007:120). But Taliban regime had considered as non-intity by the UN and was recognized as legitimate by only three nations: Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, though the latter two maintained only a limited diplomatic presence in Kabul (Collins 2011:39).

### **3.3 United Nations mediation for conflict settlement**

Since the end of World War II, the United Nations has become an important actor in international politics to settle the conflict between intra-states and inter-state. The case of Afghanistan constitutes a critical test of the United Nations' capacity for meaningful intervention in situations of widespread conflict because it was unique in nature. As earlier mentioned in chapter second, the UN has been active in Afghanistan from 1946 when it has been a UN member. Although the UN had been providing development assistance to Afghanistan for several decades, its involvement expanded after Soviet invasion on 25 December 1979. Through political missions, humanitarian agencies, and the attention of high UN organs such as the Security Council and the General Assembly and personal representatives, the United Nations has had an extensive history of involvement in Afghanistan since 1980. Starting in the early 1980s, the UN started humanitarian assistance programs in the zones controlled by the Kabul government and offered support to refugees, working in collaboration with the Red Cross/Red Crescent and other concerned parties. For political settlement after Soviet withdrawal, the UN did many efforts like the General Assembly had noted in its resolution 46/23 of 5 December 1991 that there should be in Afghanistan "*a broad-based government to ensure the broadest support and immediate participation of all segments of the Afghan people*" (Crown 2003:28) but succeeded partly. Meanwhile ongoing civil conflict, for a short time at the end of 1993, the situation again seemed favourable to peace, and the UN instituted the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA). And many objectives were defined within the UNSMA framework. Besides the problem of civil war, the UN also addressed the humanitarian issues emerging from the continued civil conflict in the country.

#### ***3.3.1 Attempt to implement the UN Peace Plan***

United Nations mediation started soon after the Soviet invasion. Even after Soviet withdrawal, the UN did continue its peace efforts in Afghanistan. To solve the Afghan conflict it was necessary to form a broad base government in which all the stake holder of Afghanistan would be participated. But it was very tough to agree all concerned parties for a political settlement, because they were fragmented in nature. Although the UN did first government formation attempt in 1989, after the immediate

Soviet withdrawal when it appointed Sevan Benon as the UN Security General's "*personal representative*" for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The post-Geneva UN efforts have been exerted in two interrelated directions: first, electing an agreement from external powers to endorse a stronger and leading role to the United Nations, and, second, promoting an international and Afghan consensus on elements of a political settlement (Riaz 1993:311). The UN chief negotiator Diego Cordovez continued UN efforts to find a negotiated solution to the "*Afghan Problem*" between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The resistance parties refused to negotiate with Kabul, fearing that would legitimise the regime (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:373). But every time the Mujahideen refused these proposals. For successful implementation of the UN peace efforts, there was a need of international support particularly from Moscow and Washington. The Secretary General wanted that the major foreign powers with an interest in Afghanistan to appeal to the rebels to join a broad new opposition group and negotiate a political settlement (The New York Times: January 14, 1990). In this direction, December 1990, the Soviets and the USA came very close to an agreement, with broad consensus on the need for a cut-off in weapons supplies and they supported a UN-sponsored transitional process (Maley 2002:183). By the end of 1991, the US and dissolving USSR finally agreed to authorize the UN to implement peace plan in Afghanistan to end conflict and establishment of a broad based government in Kabul. Both Washington and Moscow agreed that they would end deliveries of weapons and aid for the purchase of weapons to all parties in Afghanistan and would work toward a UN sponsored political solution of the civil conflict (Rubin 1995:10), which is called "*negative symmetry*" under the Geneva Accord provisions.

After Soviet withdrawal, the UN did some meaningful efforts for peaceful transition of power to a broad-based civilian government in its capacity. In this process, on 21 May 1991, following extensive discussions between Afghan concerned parties and Benon Sevan, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar issued a new statement on Afghanistan (Maley 2002:183). And he announced a peace plan (The New York Times: April 26, 1992). The key paragraphs read as follows: I believe that the following elements would serve as a good basis for a political settlement in Afghanistan, acceptable to the vast majority of the Afghan people:-

- (1) The necessity of preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned and Islamic character of Afghanistan.
- (2) The recognition of the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government and to choose their economic, political and social system, free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.
- (3) The need for a transition period, details of which have to be worked out and agreed upon through an intra-Afghan dialogue, leading to the establishment of a broad-based Government.
  - (a) The need, during that period, for transitional arrangements acceptable to the vast majority of the Afghan people, including the establishment of a credible and impartial transition mechanism with appropriate powers and authority (yet to be specified) that would enjoy the confidence of the Afghan people and provide them with the necessary assurances to participate in free and fair elections, taking into account Afghan traditions, for the establishment of a broad-based Government.
  - (b) The need for cessation of hostilities during the transition period.
  - (c) The advisability of assistance, as appropriate, of the United Nations and of any other international organization during the transition process and in the electoral process.
- (4) The necessity of assistance, as appropriate, of the United Nations and of any other international organization during the transition period and in the electoral process.
- (5) The recognition of the need for adequate financial and material resources to alleviate the hardship of the Afghan refugees and the creation of the necessary conditions for their voluntary repatriation, as well as for the economic and social reconstruction of Afghanistan (Maley 2002:183; Crown 2003:150).

The Kabul regime accepted this peace plan almost instantly. Gailani, Mojadiddi, and Muhammadi were the most in favour of the proposal, and in February 1992 stated that *“the UN talks-and not continued military pressure-offered the best way to resolve the conflict”* (Maley 2002:183). In early 1992, Pakistan appeared to be willingness to support the Secretary-General’s plan. On 27 January, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan announced that his government had decided *“to support the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to convene an assembly of Afghan leaders to decide on an interim government acceptable to the Afghans and to facilitate the convening of such an assembly”* (Maley 2002:190). The critical section of this plan was that, what Massoud said in an interview with a French journalist, remarked that *“UN efforts to bring peace to*

*Afghanistan are appreciable, but as long as Najib is in power or has a share of power, in one form or another, UN efforts will not succeed*” (Maley 2002:184). Maley argued that the UN Secretary-General's 1991 plan for a political settlement in Afghanistan, incorporating a proposal for the transfer of power to a “*credible and impartial transition mechanism*”, failed in part because the cessation of Soviet aid to Kabul (Maley 1997:172). The United Nations special envoy, Sevan, acknowledged that his plan for a neutral interim government has been derailed and accepts possibility of a governing council led by guerilla factions (The New York Times: April 26, 1992). At that time the United Nations' main difficulty lay in eliciting support from the Mujahideen parties, in whose eyes the UN was suspect for being deferential to the government in Kabul and it wanted to isolate them in political settlement.

In January 1992, the new secretary-general, Boutros Boutros Ghali, announced a fresh plan under which all Afghan parties would submit to his office lists of candidates for an “Afghan gathering” (ijlas) (Rubin 1995:127). Under this plan, the UN would negotiate agreement among all Afghan parties to select about 150 representative, and the gathering would elect a committee of about 35. This committee would summon a nationwide meeting to decide on an interim regime and the holding of elections. But the power-sharing negotiation remained impossible because the resistance parties still refused even to meet openly with the existing government (Rubin 1995:127). Rubin said that the UN plan operated on the premise that the Afghan groups assembled could build legitimate and authority in incrementally and this procedure drew on certain Afghan traditions. Earlier in 1988, Cordovez attempted to resolve the conflict by an appeal to pre war Afghan "national" traditions (Rubin 1995:126). But UN peace approach did less to settlement and civil conflict intensified. Meanwhile, under pressure of UN, on 18 March 1992, Najibullah announced his resignation, which, he said, would take effect once the United Nations had established an “*interim government*” to which he would transfer all “*powers and executive authority*”(Rubin 1995:127; New York Times: March 19, 1992). For this UN step, Giandomenico Picco, who in March-April 1992 was Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, argues that it was a “devastating error of judgement” on the part of the Secretary-General to pressure Najibullah to announce his intention to relinquish power, since it had the potential to create “*a vacuum that could be filled*

*only by a more devastating civil war*". Further he reports that Sevan stated that the *"men in Peshawar will help fill the vacuum with Pakistani help"* (Maley 2002:190). And consequently, fighting intensified in 1992 and the Mujahideen closed in on Kabul and brought down the Najibullah regime.

To find out solution of ongoing civil war, the first attempt at an elite settlement came in the Peshawar Accord of April 1992, which provided for the *"structure and process for the provisional period of the Islamic State of Afghanistan"* (Maley 1997:198). In July 1992, the Islamic State of Afghanistan was proclaimed as the successor to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Rabbani as its president. The General Assembly welcomed the establishment of the state, seeing it as *"provid(ing) a new opportunity for the reconstruction of the country"*, *underlined "the importance of the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan"*, *whose development had suffered during the previous fourteen years of war, and "affirmed the urgent need to initiate international action to assist Afghanistan in restoring basic services and in rebuilding the devastated country"* (Afsah and Guhr 2005:401). But this elite settlement did not bring peace and stability and civil conflict had intensified. Under the influence of the continued heavy fighting the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General in December 1993 to establish the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) with a more active mandate of *"facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction"*, beyond merely monitoring events and reporting them (Afsah and Guhr 2005:401). But again due to some factors including, unwillingness of the local factions to come to an agreement, and the proxy nature of much of the fighting with regional powers each pursuing their own political and strategic ends through their economic and military support of competing Mujahideen groups, it should come as no surprise that UNSMA remained largely ineffective and the UN efforts gone in futile. The 1991-92 plan had failed in part because it had focused too much on reaching agreement among unrepresentative party leaders rather than on pressing agreement to mobilise broader political process and consensus And these plans had also failed to address the question of to disarm and separate the antagonists and enforce an agreement.



### 3.3.2 *Special Mission under Mestiri*

In 1994, the United Nations tried another attempt to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan by applying a variant of the regime for conflict resolution. In December 21 1993, UN General Assembly resolution, (UN resolution 48/308) entitled “Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan”, was a request to secretary-general “*to despatch to Afghanistan, as soon as possible, a UN special mission to canvass a broad spectrum of the leader of Afghanistan, soliciting their view on how the UN can best assist Afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction*” (Rubin 1995:136).

In March 1994, a United Nations mission to Afghanistan headed by Tunisian diplomat Mahmud Mestiri began working toward a peace agreement between the major Mujahideen groups, supported by a Security Council resolution in August. The important fact about this mission was that it virtually created a national public space that had long been absent from Afghan politics. Mestiri took the initiative of meeting with various groups and leaders within and outside Afghanistan. Between March 27 and April 29 the mission travelled to eight cities and towns in Afghanistan, the Pakistani refugee centre of Peshawar and Queta, Tehran, Riyadh, Jeddah, Moscow, Ankara and Rome (Rubin 1995:136). By this time most Afghan people were desperate for peace. This proved in, when in 1994, the members of a UN mission travelled around the country, thousand turned out to meet them and to demand that the UN should renewed efforts to negotiate a peace settlement. During this visit, the mission received over three hundred peace proposals, letters, and requests (Rubin 1995:136). These proposals revealed that the expectation of the Afghans who had converged on something like the international regime for conflict resolution. Common themes included an end to the foreign involvement that Afghans claimed was fuelling the war, a UN monitored cease-fire, a natural security or peacekeeping force, a transitional period leading to elections, and a disarming of the population and the principles belligerents (Rubin 1995:137). On September 7 1994, secretary-general Boutrus Ghali visited Islamabad, where he issued a statement noting “*with regret that the efforts to convene a joint meeting of the warring factions and leaders of the neutral parties were not successful*” (Rubin 1995:137). And he also met various representatives of various Afghan faction and some independents (Matinuddin

1999:185).

Once again concerned party leaders had failed to reach agreement on the terms demanded by the Afghan people many times. On September 29, Mestiri opened a meeting of forty-member Afghan “advisory council” in Queta. In this meeting the council proposed that Rabbani hand over power to an authoritative council that would oversee disarmament of the belligerents and prepare for a Loya Jirga to decide the future of the country and a neutral security force would take control of Kabul (Matinuddin 1999:186). Rubin argued that the notion of setting up local rather than international peacekeeping forces was an innovation in UN conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Rabbani, Hikmatyar, and other Afghan leaders accepted the proposals in principles and it was endorsed by the UN Security Council in November 30 (Rubin 1995:138) and General Assembly in December 1994 (Matinuddin 1999:186). Mestiri shuttled between Kabul and Islamabad, trying to arrange a transfer of power from Rabbani to an interim administration initially acceptable to all Afghan parties (Matinuddin 1999:187). The negotiation related to the UN plan continued, Rabbani announced on December 26 that he would step down in accordance with the UN plan, but two days later he refused to step down and once again unilaterally extended his term. At that time the US ambassador to Pakistan met Rabbani, Dostam, and Hikmatyar to push for implementation of the UN plan. The main obstacle was the composition of the interim authoritative council, but the underlying problem was the rivalries between Hikmatyar and Rabbani-Massoud forces (Rubin 1995:141). As the negotiation continued, the two sides continued to pound each other with rockets, and innocent civilians continued to die.

In November 1994, the UN Security Council president issued a statement welcoming “*the acceptance by the warring parties and other Afghan representatives of a step-by-step process of national reconciliation through the establishment of a fully representative and broad-based Authoritative Council*” (Maley 2002:211) which would include: (i) negotiate and oversee a cease-fire, (ii) establish a national security force to collect and safeguard heavy weapons and provide for security throughout the country, and (iii) form a transitional government to lay the groundwork for a democratically chosen government, possibly utilizing traditional decision making structures such as a “*Grand Assembly*” (Maley 2002:211).

The one positive development of this peace process was as the UN Special Mission concluded in 1994 that “*the people widely identify themselves, first and foremost, as Afghans and Muslims*” and want “*to ensure the territorial sovereignty of Afghanistan*” (Maley 1997:180). But surprise arrival of Taliban at the gates of Kabul in February 1995 stopped that process in its tracks and derailed. All such efforts became moot by 1995 in the face of the conquest of southern Afghanistan by Taliban. Taliban's arrival created obstacle to the UN peace process. Consequently, in the UN Development Programme's donor conference in Stockholm in June 1995, Mestiri admitted his peace efforts had failed, a new formula was needed and the ethnic war so feared now loomed (Maley 2002:211). Finally, he resigned in May 1996, and succeeded by Dr Norbert Holl, a German diplomat.

### ***3.3.3 Humanitarian assistance by UN during civil war period***

As described in second chapter, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was facilitated by the good office of the then United Nations Secretary-General. The UN continued to play humanitarian role in crisis-affected Afghanistan ever since. Earlier in 1984, a UN special rapporteur was appointed to examine the human rights conditions in Afghanistan and to submit reports to the UN Human Rights Commission and General Assembly. After Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan, the UN made strenuous efforts to coordinate humanitarian assistance. By mid 1990s, the fighting in Afghanistan intensified, nearly 800, 000 persons displaced from Afghanistan and staying in the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran depended on UN for food and sustenance (Meher 2008:109). The UN Security Council got concerned over these developments. The problem of refugees, shelter and food for the displaced people, were among the major humanitarian issues that called UN attention.

During Soviet occupation period the country devastated largely. It reflects in some reports. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that the area under agricultural cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 40 per cent between 1979 and 1991. The Soviet occupation had created various problems in Afghanistan, particularly large numbers of refugees and civilian casualties. The UNICEF, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), along with the Coordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic

Assistance Programme, jointly developed in 1989, a plan of action for Afghanistan (Meher 2008:111). Agriculture assistance, food aid, public and maternal health services and economic recovery programme were initiated with resources provided to the UN by international community Afghan peoples. Other programmes included repairing infrastructure, providing shelter and discouraging narcotics production.

After the Geneva Accords of 1988, a single UN entity was formed to coordinate all humanitarian efforts inside and outside Afghanistan. This was the UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA), headed by a distinguished former High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan and, also known as “*Operation Salam*” (Donini 2004:125). The coordination was facilitated by strong leadership and the availability of high amounts of funds for which UN agencies and NGOs were vying. UNOCA's ambitious plans for the relief and rehabilitation of the stricken populations and for reconstruction of the country were aborted by the continuing civil war and the anarchic conditions (Rasanayagam 2005:196). Along with this numerous NGOs that had also mobilized for the effort continued to carry out rehabilitation work and assistance wherever possible.

After the fall of Kabul regime in April 1992, the principal problem had become the reconstruction of the country and acceptable settlement of conflict. According to needs the United Nations' diplomatic role in peace-making in the country became more active once again. But economic and humanitarian conditions worsened for the Afghans, especially for residents of Kabul and for refugees (Khalilzad 1994:147). By the time UN special agency UNOCA started efforts to work in this direction. The first UN Coordinator, Sadruddin Aga Khan, came armed with well-tested humanitarian credentials and a formal agreement with the Kabul authoritative and the Mujahideen leaders (Donini 2004:122). The UN agencies based inside Afghanistan worked in partnership with government authorities and focused on such residual development activities. During the continued civil conflict, the number of civilians feeling the country increased steadily, marking Afghanistan the world's worst refugees and humanitarian crisis. By 1990, there were 6.3 million civilians in exile, out of which 3.3 million were in Pakistan and 3 million were in Iran (Meher 2008:111). International relief efforts for Afghan refugees led by UNHCR. The core of the UNHCR's repatriation package in Pakistan was a cash grant to defray transportation

and other expenses, and an adequate stock of wheat distributed by the World Food Programme (WFP) to cover the basic food needs of each returning family (Rasanayagam 2005:196). International assistance had also reached in Afghanistan, through the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), or the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAAR), were funded by their national governments, and served also as implementing agencies for the UNHCR, UNDP and USAID projects in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. For NGO coordination and the sharing of information was ensured by an umbrella organization based in Peshawar, the Agency Coordination Bureau for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). In the 1990s there were some 70 NGOs and contractors participating in this voluntary body, with a combined budget of US\$80 million (Rasanayagam 2005:196).

Later the UNOCA was replaced by the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan (UNOCHA). But a purely humanitarian response in the face of the complex political realities on the ground proved inadequate. The General Assembly's annual assessment of the situation-summarized in a resolution on emergency international assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan (resolution 47/119 of 18 December) - noted that establishment of the Islamic State provided a new opportunity for reconstruction, welcomed the Secretary-General's efforts to draw attention to mobilizing assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and sought funds for an emergency trust fund to support that rehabilitation (go to UN News website). In December 1993, the Secretary-General established the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSM) to canvass a broad spectrum of Afghan leaders and solicit their views on how the UN could best help with national reconciliation and reconstruction. In this direction, the first of a series of annual consolidated appeals to aid Afghanistan was launched in 1994. The appeals detailed the emergency needs of Afghan people and asked for funds to enable non-governmental and UN agencies to address those needs (Mehtar 2008:111). This appeal had some success, with donors supplying 75 per cent of the funds requested. Rehabilitation projects focussed on human development and poverty alleviation particularly in rural communities. But this process was not so smooth. The UN backed humanitarian assistance faced many difficulties for example, a mysterious campaign of terror in the name of Islamic fundamentalism is jeopardizing the lives of Western

aid workers and those Afghans, particularly the women, who have dared to ally themselves with educational and social programs that challenge certain political and religious leaders (The New York Times: August 19, 1990).

The instrumentalisation of assistance during the cross-border period had a number of lasting negative impacts: it contributed to the legitimisation of the Peshawar-based resistance parties and allowed them to increase and consolidate their patronage, including through Afghan 'NGOs' they established; it resulted in the concentration of assistance particularly in Pashtun areas and neglected the deserving communities further in the central or northern areas of the country; and it fostered one-sided approaches and selective amnesia on the issue of human rights violations by the Mujahideen (Donini 2004:124). However, despite all these positive developments, Kabul was soon besieged again firstly by various Mujahideen factions, and then by newly emerged Taliban. Therefore once again fighting raised the worst humanitarian crisis with arrival of Taliban. The United Nations effort to produce a negotiated settlement failed partly because of continuing civil conflict.

### **3.4 Summary**

The first section of this chapter has begun with the post-Soviet Afghanistan internal situations. The Geneva Accords provided the way of smooth withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Unlike expatiations, the Soviet withdrawal did not bring peace in the country. Due to the fragmented nature of Mujahideen parties they were unable to form an alternative regime to Najibullah. Later power vacuum conditions resulted in extensive civil war and thousands of civilians died and many displaced from their localities and humanitarian conditions worsened. By the time regional geopolitics had also changed and the Afghan issue lost their supremacy on agenda. Meanwhile, the Najibullah regime collapsed, but the Mujahideen parties failed to form an alternative authority. To solve the ongoing conflict, some accords were signed but did not succeed in reality. After the withdrawal, the UN also continued their peacemaking efforts through personal representatives, special mission and proposed many peace plans including Mestiri mission. But all these United Nations' succeed partly because the unwillingness of conflicting parties in Afghanistan.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **TALIBAN RULE AND THE UN EFFORTS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

## 4.1 Emergence of Taliban

Till today there is no clear cut explanation how Taliban emerged so swiftly. According to Ahmed Rashid's "*it was the unique nature of Taliban and the lack of literature about their meteoric rise*" (Rashid 2000:viii). Taliban emerged in southern Afghanistan, as a diplomats in New York later explained, "*to free Afghanistan from the vicious circle of anarchy, chaos, and corruption*" caused by the Mujahedeen and to combat moral disarray and ir-religion (Crews and Tarzi 2008:39). Thus it may be said that the conditions of anarchy, foreign intervention, warlordism, and lawlessness were effectively exploited by the Taliban in order to shape their movement and seek early local support, gaining their external support from the country of Pakistan.

### 4.1.1 Causes of Rise

Different scholars define Taliban by different names like the forces of Islamic fundamentalist, Pashtun resurgence, and external instrument. First factor that explain the rise of Taliban is the existing condition of Afghanistan. Particularly, Pakistani scholars believe that Taliban was an indigenous movement which rose due to Afghan civil war. Well known Pakistani scholar Ahmad Rashid describes Taliban as the byproduct of the Afghan civil war:

"Taliban phenomenon was a reaction to the state of anarchy in Afghanistan. It was neither the ideology Taliban propounded, nor the religious fervour of the people that accounted for their subsequent success. Rather it was the war wearing of the populace which stood ready to welcome any force that promised the disarming of the local brigands, the restoration of peace, the semblance of an honest administration, no matter how rough and ready its system of justice" (Rashid:April 11, 1998).

Similar argument in this regard has been given by another Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai "*the story of Taliban is not one of outsiders imposing a solution, but of the Afghans themselves seeking deliverance from Mujahedeen groups that had become cruel and inhuman. The Afghan people had been waiting a long time for relief from their miseries, and they would have accepted anybody who have freed them from the tyranny*" (The New York Times:December 31, 1996). Rashid also illustrates Mullah Omar emergence as a Robin Hood figure, helping the poor against the greedy commanders. His prestige grew because he asked for no reward or credit from those



he helped, only demanding that they follow him to set up a just Islamic system (Rashid 2000:25).

Not only Pakistani scholars but many other eminent Afghan scholars like Dorronsoro and Maley for some extend agreed with the said argument. *“Taliban were a product of the war, displacement and dislocation brought by the Soviet invasion and Western response. The leaders of Taliban movement were almost without exception former Mujahedeen, many of them affiliated with traditionalist Pashtun parties”* (Maley 1998:15). Maley argued that the majority of Taliban militia and leaders had only known war and life in the refugee camps (Maley 1998:20). Dorronsoro also justified this argument that Taliban was the by-product of anarchy. *“In such a situation of moral and social crisis, allegiance to a charismatic persons or movement enabled social relations to be rebuilt espically in a segmentary society where mobilisations around charismatic personalities were historically commonplace”* (Dorronsoro 2005:246). All these arguments valid because appeared to present an alternative of Mujahedeen who killed more people than the Soviet-Mujahedeen war and the internal situations were like the state of nature. And with the early victories Taliban fulfilled its promise to bring peace to Afghanistan, establish law and order, disarm the people, and impose Sharia and it appreciated by the people.

The second argument about the rise of Taliban movement is that the shared Pashtun identity had a greater role of mobilizing the masses behind this. At the time of the Afghan interim government, Pashtun remained isolated in the power sharing arrangement. Specially a number of decisions taken by Rabbani-Massoud government like the removal of the Kabul Police Chief Abdul Haq, who was a moderate Pashtun had been created anxiously within moderate Pashtun faction. (Maley 2002:214). Maley argued that moderate Pashtun had felt that they were being marginalised, or even excluded (Maley 2002:214). Taliban exploited the situation and mobilized the Pashtun faction. Entire Afghan history shows that whoever successfully mobilized the Pashtun, ruled Afghanistan, and Afghanistan cannot be ruled without their consent. The two rulers with little support among the Pashtuns were the Tajik’s Hibibullah Kalakani and the Ahmad Shah Massoud who had tried to rule but had failed (Crews and Tarzi 2008:59). Pashtun identity had also been easily digested by the Pakistan. Although Taliban never identified itself as a Pashtun group but it recruited only

among the Pashtuns, and such, it was seen as facilities a return to the traditional Pashtun domination of Afghanistan's national territory (Dorronsoro 2005:266). In this sense Taliban is sometimes described as a tribal Pashtun movement. Larry Goodson also justified this argument and argued that the shared Pashtun ethnicity of Taliban and the majority of the non combatant population in most of the area they have come to control (Crews and Tarzi 2008:74).

Third factor that explains the identity of the Taliban is religious one. Taliban was a movement dominated by a group of religious individuals, who come from the Madrassas. Most of Taliban were the children of the Jihad against the Soviet Union. Many were born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in Pakistani Madrassas and learnt their fighting from Afghan Mujahideen parties based in Pakistan. In addition Taliban movement was found in a fundamentalist ideology opposed to all nationalist pretensions (Dorronsoro 2005:267). Its official goal was the reunification of all Afghans under an Islamic government. It rejected all national or tribal justifications and took satisfaction in drawing attention to the presence within the movement of non-Pashtun such as mullah Ghaysuddin Agha, who was a member of the Shura of Kabul and came originally from Badakhshan (Dorronsoro 2005:267). There are some classical examples where Taliban has given priority to Islamic identity rather than the tribal one. Some communists believed at this point that they could merge themselves into Taliban movement on the basis of their Pashtun solidarity. At first Taliban accepted them since their officers were particularly important for a relatively unstructured movement without military experts other than some Pakistani officers. After the capture of Kabul, however, most of the former communists were ousted or even physically eliminated (Dorronsoro 2005:267).

Fourth factor that explains the success of Taliban is its support by the external powers like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Without their material support it could not sustained for so long. Saudi Arabia was the champion of the cause of Sunni Muslims worldwide because of its interests to lead the Islamic world. But in Afghanistan's case it wants to counter Shia Iran with the help of Pakistan. As for the Pakistan's role in concerned, it was the founder of Taliban. The next part of this chapter would extensively discuss Pakistan's role in Taliban formation.

#### ***4.1.2 Pakistan's institutional role in creating Taliban***

The fact that the rise of Taliban movement took place at a time of internal conflict in Afghanistan and bitter rivalry among its neighbours. Pakistan was better poised to exercise influence than others because of its wartime linkages and dependency relationships that it had created during the anti-Soviet war. But soon after a Mujahedeen government was installed through the Peshawar Accord, which Pakistan was instrumental in brokering, Pakistan's influence had begun to wane with other regional powers also stepping in and supporting various groups that would be compatible with their vision of politics and regional security (Rais 2008:68). Therefore, Pakistan's search for an Afghan client was the main cause of Taliban formation. Taliban phenomenon and all interpretation of its emergence (Indigenous, Pashtun, Islamic) appropriate for Pakistan's calculation. Historically, Pakistan wanted an Afghan client in Kabul, who would be Pashtun or Islamic. The Hikmatyar was the model of that and when he failed, Pakistan search for another one. Toward the end of 1994, Pakistani policy on Afghanistan became focused on support for Taliban and the ouster of the Rabbani government. Relations with Kabul deteriorated rapidly, when the government accused Pakistan of having created Taliban and of being directly involved in the attacks against Kabul.

Why did Pakistan shift its policy from the former Mujahedeen parties to Taliban? There is no answer to this question, nor is there any single factor that influenced Pakistan's new Afghan policy. Pakistan's policy toward the new emerging Taliban militia at first was a result of political expediency. Those who were responsible for Afghan policy in Islamabad thought that aligning with Taliban would serve Pakistan's interests better than the old policy of supporting the feuding Mujahedeen parties or serving as a mediator among them (Rais 2008:70). Pakistan, under the compulsive security environment of the region, needed Taliban on its side to deny influence to its rivals in Afghanistan and also to effectuate its theory of "*strategic depth*" that one of its prominent generals, Mirza Aslam Beg, had articulated in 1990 (Rais 2008:70). According to the "*strategic depth*" policy, Afghanistan presented Pakistan with a strategic advantage in the event of a future war against India. Islamabad has tried to establish a friendly government in Afghanistan in order to gain strategic depth against India, avoid problems with its own Pashtun and Baluch populations that an unfriendly

Afghan government could encourage, and allow Pakistan easier access to economic and geopolitical dealings with the newly independent Central Asian states (Khalilzad 1995:193). Competition for access to the oil and gas rich states of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia added an economic component to Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan. Hekmatyar's forces, backed by Pakistan, were failing militarily and politically to capture Kabul. Moreover, ISI support for Hekmatyar had already antagonized Islamabad's relationship with the Afghan Mujahedeen government led by Rabbani (Crews and Tarzi 2008:102).

Pakistani leadership saw domestic political gain in supporting Taliban movement, which draws most of support from the ethnic Pashtun who predominated along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (The New York Times: December 31, 1996). In 1993, Benazir Bhutto became Pakistan Prime Minister and she appointed Major General Naseerullah Babar as her Interior Minister, who was a Pashtun from the NWFP and a former governor of that province, had been in the 1970s the chief adviser on Afghan affairs to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the than Prime Minister (Doronsoro 2005:245). Mr. Babar saw a Pakistan linked to the newly independent Muslim republics of Central Asia, along roads and railway running across Afghanistan. He believed that stability in Afghanistan would mean a potential "*economic bonanza for Pakistan and a strategic breakthrough for the west*" (The New York Times:December 31, 1996). Babar was also instrumental in identifying the Madrasa as a fertile ground for the indoctrination of Afghan students to establish a new order in Afghanistan, with the objective of cleansing the country of the corrupt Mujahedeen leaders (Clements 2003:240).

Pakistan has played a key role in the internal politics of the country from organizing, training, and funding the Mujahedeen resistance to switching its support to Taliban movement (Rais 2008:67). After that Taliban moved rapidly to capturing the Kandahar and Pakistani help gave the opportunity to increase a major operation. On 5 November 1994, after a number of clashes, it was in occupying the Kandahar, and by the end of November entered the neighbouring provinces of Helmand and Zabul (Doronsoro 2005:245). Till January 1995, Taliban captured the Helmand and Ghazni (Doronsoro 2005:245). Following some enormous fight with the Mujahedeen, finally Taliban swept into the Kabul at the end of September 1996, with little

resistance from government troops, most of them had fled (The New York Times: September 27, 1996). After reaching Kabul, immediately Taliban hanged the former Afghan President, Najibullah, and his brother from a concrete traffic-control post at the gates of the presidential palace which was crowded with more than a thousand people around to watch (The New York Times: September 27, 1996; Rasanayagam 2005:153). The United Nations issued a strong statement condemning the violation its offices and the execution of Najibullah without an open trial. The UN Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) head Nobert Hall said in a statement that, “*the abduction of the former President and his companions and the subsequent killings of his brother without any legitimate judicial procedure... constitute a grave violation of the immunity UNSMA enjoy under international law*” (Roy 2002:112). He said the killings “further jeopardise all the efforts which are being made to secure a peaceful settlement of the Afghanistan conflict (and) cast doubt over the willingness of those responsible to achieve reconciliation and justice”, adding that the UN “*deeply deplored*” the incident (Roy 2002:112). During that period when Taliban was moving from Kandahar to Kabul, Pakistan help the diplomatically and militarily. But Pakistan's help in military operations perhaps more important. After the initial success of Taliban Babar took the credit for Taliban's success telling journalist privately that Taliban were our boys (Misdaq 2006:180). Another fact is that Taliban movement rising from the Pashtun areas adjacent to Pakistan had multi layered linkages with the Pakistani state, society, and religious parties that made it a natural partner of Pakistan and it was also natural for Taliban to look toward Pakistan for whatever assistance it needed.

The Rabbani government had claimed repeatedly that Pakistan had always been the supporter and initiator of Taliban leading to its success in the region. This charged surfaced in December 1995 during a UN General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, when Deputy Foreign Minister Abdul Rahim Ghafurzai charged that Pakistan supported Taliban with arms, military equipment, logistics, and military intelligence. But Pakistan rejected the charges and stated that the root cause of the conflict in Afghanistan arose out of the failure of President Rabbani to quit his office long after the expiration of his legal term in early 1994 (Magnus and Naby 1998:190). Pakistan has denied being the power behind Taliban and ridiculed accusations by India and Iran

that Pakistani military officers have been involved in Taliban operation (The New York Times: October 16, 1995). Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh on 18 November 1994, speaking at the United Nations, about the Pakistan's analysis of Taliban phenomenon, as a reaction to the state of anarchy in Afghanistan. It was neither the ideology, nor the religious fervor of the people that accounted for their subsequent success. Rather it was the war weariness of the populace which stood ready to welcome any force that promised the disarming of the local brigands, the restoration of peace, the semblance of an honest administration, no matter how rough and ready its system of justice (Misdaq 2006:179). But the fact was obvious that the success of Taliban as an organized force was a result of the support the movement received from Pakistan's Interior Minister Babar. Pakistan turned Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training, logistical support and equipment, which led to their success. Pakistan had played an important role in allowing Taliban four key elements in its struggle. These were: access to food and medical supplies, provision of fuels that Taliban badly needed to run and move their war machine, recruit fighters, and raise funds through private sources, and finally a diplomatic link to the outside world that Pakistan gladly offered by recognizing its regime as the legitimate one (Khalilzad 1995:193). Pakistan offered them intelligence support and strategic advice in their key battles, and helped them negotiate political deals with local commanders and warlords. Islamabad appears determined to keep Taliban adequately supplied. According to the Kabul government, on several occasions' Pakistani aircraft, including C130s, have flown supplies to Kandahar for Taliban, and Pakistan may have helped Taliban service captured military aircraft and recruit pilots. Independent reports said trucks had crossed into Afghanistan with supplies intended for Taliban (Khalilzad 1995:193). Citha D. Maass argued in his article that Pakistan had supported Taliban in various forms and he called the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as the "godfather" of Taliban (Maass 1999:69). And the Pakistan was the first country, who recognised Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and followed only by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Maass 1999:69).

### ***4.1.3 External power involvement***

The Role of the external actors in Taliban phenomenon was varying. It is a generally accepted fact that the Pakistan played an important role in Taliban's rise and advance. But the Pakistani government kept issuing statements denying their links with Taliban and terming the movement as an indigenous movement.

Iran is now the second most influential outside regional power involved in Afghanistan. To prevent the takeover of Kabul by Taliban and help Rabbani and Massoud, Tehran provided economic assistance to the capital. It also sought to convince Dostam and Hezb-e-Wahdat to decrease their opposition to Rabbani, and tried to convince Pakistan to press Taliban to accept a ceasefire and enter into negotiations with Rabbani on a future Afghan government. By the end of 1995, the Iranian efforts had been only partially successful (Khalilzad 1995:194). As Taliban gained more territory, Pakistani and Iranian policies became more competitive. When Taliban captured Kabul, Tehran was forced to gradually expand its support to the other member parties of the Northern Alliance (Maass 1999:71). Iran wanted to prevent Taliban and their radical-Islamist ideology from spill over effect into Iranian bordering territory. Contrary to the Afghanistan lobby in Pakistan, Tehran gives only low priority to the domestic Afghan power struggle in its overall foreign policy and supported indirectly and carefully. Iran saw Taliban as a "*Torjan horse*" with whose assistance the US can extend its influence into the Central Asian region and cement Iran's isolation (Maass 1999:72). It also feared that the US might be planning to turn Afghanistan into an anti-Iranian base of operations. Iran's reaction to Taliban success in Afghanistan was another one of anger because for years it had provided strong moral and material support for the Rabbani government.

Saudi Arabia now did not have as much influence as they did in the 1980s, when they provided a major part of outside assistance for the Afghan resistance movements. Yet, they continued to provide limited financial support in 1995, and Riyadh sought to limit Iranian influence in Afghanistan. As Rabbani moved closer to Iran, the Saudis moved closer to Taliban, in general, it tended to support Pakistan's approach to the Afghan conflict. Saudi Arabia's massive financial and political assistance to Taliban is based on some their goals, particularly the religious-ideological interests in spreading its Wahhabite interpretation of Islam in greater Central Asia (Maass 1999:73) and

political interests in extending the Saudi influence Islamic world. Another regional actor, Turkey has no interests directly projecting its power in Afghanistan and did not feel immediately threatened by Taliban and supported the Northern Alliance.

US and USSR had been playing a role in Afghanistan since the cold war period and played proxy war. But after the end of cold war strategic interests had changed both of the actors. Russian influence in Afghanistan is limited, although Moscow has maintained ties with Dostam and some of the other groups. Russia's objectives were not entirely clear. Initially, it may not have wanted either Taliban or Rabbani to win; instability in Afghanistan might have been perceived as providing the rationale for the Russians to maintain a presence in Central Asia. But over time Moscow became more hostile towards Taliban, which had forced a Russian plane transporting arms to Kabul to land in Kandahar and refused to free the pilots. Moscow's renewed engagement in 'near abroad' policy was basically to prevent a spillover of Islamist movements into the Central Asian CIS states. Russian Foreign Minister at that time, Jevgenij Primakov, in summer 1996 warned the wave of Islamic fundamentalism emanating from Afghanistan could have a domino effect on the Central Asian region (Maass 1999:76). Washington remained noticeably silent during Taliban's advance. The United States, while not directly implicated, was not an uninterested party (Rasanayagam 2005:143). The US intended to act only indirectly on the conflict situation, their prime motive being to limit Russia's influence in Central Asian region and to secure its geo-strategic goals in the region. And US half-heartedly supported the United Nations mediation to solve the conflict.

#### **4.2 Internal situation at the Dawn of Taliban rise**

The Afghan conflict belongs to the category of complex nature. Following the Soviet withdrawal, the war soon resumed a new version of a civil war by the internal actors for individual ambitions. Up to this point all resistance parties, despite not having a common leadership, shared the common cause of overthrowing the communists and driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan. From this time on a new stage of vicious accountability based on ethnic and religious "*indebtedness*" began (Misdaq 2006:167). When the fall of the communist government began in April 1992, the resistance entered a new stage of struggle, 'civil war', this time attempting to seize



power on a national level. After the collapse of the Najibullah and the subsequent failure of the seven Peshawar-based Mujahedeen groups in restoring a functional and stable national government, the civil war intensified. Following this, in a surprise move, Taliban entered in the political scene in October 1994 and finally in September 1996, Taliban captured Kabul and conflict entered a new stage. On the eve of Taliban rise internal Afghan situation was fragmented. Afghan terrain was divided by the civil war which followed after the Najibullah's departure and it created a power vacuum. The civil war resulted in an anarchic situation and Afghanistan was fragmented between warlords. Due to this kind of nature at that time Afghanistan was termed as a failed state. This was serious concern for civilians because there was no guarantee of life and property. And this internal situation was like the Hobbesian condition what is called '*state of nature*' in which everyone fights against everyone. On the other side United Nations did peacemaking efforts during the conflict to its capacity. The United Nations' strategy based on to achieve a cessation of hostilities; seek a regional political consensus in support of the peace process, and seek direct negotiations between all parties on a political settlement. But all these efforts did not bring peace and stability in Afghanistan.

#### ***4.2.1 Power vacuum after the fall of Najibullah government***

Following the Soviet troops withdrawal, the situation of power vacuum and the lack of a central regime created anarchical situation in Afghanistan. Before Taliban rise, Afghanistan was under chaos and facing the serious crisis of disintegration and different groups were fighting each other and day by day. Mujahedeen parties were unable to form an alternative regime to replace Najibullah and even Kabul government fall in April 1992, did not bring stability due to fragmentative nature of the resistance parties and civil conflict continued. On 1 January 1994, a new alliance, Shura-i-Hamanhangi (Council of Coordination), consisting of Hekmatyar, Dostum, and Hezb-e-Wahadt, with Mojaddidi as a loose association, launched a huge rocket and artillery attack on the capital (Maley 2002:203). Forces loyal to the Afghan President, Rabbani, attacked their opponents in Kabul with artillery and infantry, capturing several strategic positions and killing and injuring dozens of people. Rabbani's forces bombarded position held by Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his allies, and the Prime Minister's troops also responded the same way (The New York Times: June

26, 1994). In these situation hundreds of civilians were killed each day particularly in Kabul. It created the atmosphere where United Nation's aid agencies and other foreign missions and diplomat left the country. On the first week of January 1994, a 24-hour cease-fire between the rival groups in Kabul, allowing diplomats to leave the capital (The New York Times: January 9, 1994). More than two dozen foreigners, including four United Nations staff members and diplomats from Pakistan, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Libya, drove out in two convoys headed for neighbouring Pakistan (The New York Times: January 9, 1994). But interestingly some Pakistani, Saudi, and Iranian diplomats stayed on (The New York Times: January 9, 1994). In this process the UN had also evacuated its international staff from some areas (Maley 2002:203). But the conditions remained the same and the fight between government and opposition intensified day by day. As The New York Times had reported that on a single day in September 28 *“at least 58 people were killed and 224 were wounded today in rocket and motor attacks on Kabul, the Afghan capital, the official Kabul Radio said”* (The New York Times:September 28, 1994). The rocketing of Kabul reduced large tracts of the city to debris, but the human tragedy was more worst and pathetic. According to different sources the killings of people during this time estimated in thousands, alone in Kabul. *“The Special Reporter of the UN Human Rights Commission estimated that at least 3500 people had been killed since the beginning of the 1994”* (Maley 2002:205). Last episode of this fighting ended in March 1995 and in September 1996, when Taliban took control over Kabul. In that situations, between 1994 and 1996, Taliban achieved a succession of remarkable strategic victories against their Mujahedeen rivals. In September 1995, they captured the western town of Herat, and in September 1996 they took the eastern town of Jalalabad and finally Kabul. Within only two years, they had gained control of most of the country (Crews and Tarzi 2008:5). It is rights to say that, Afghanistan was under civil war on the eve of Taliban formation. The civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction. The *“civil war refers to war between factions within a state trying to create, or prevent, a new government for the entire state or some territorial part of it”* (Goldstein 2003:214). In that internal unstable conditions, Afghanistan was truly in a state of nature, a state so vividly described by the eighteenth century English

philosopher Thomas Hobbes, to drive the point home that without the strong arm of state, the society would lose its peace because the selfish nature of mankind would lead them to violate rights of other human beings, particularly the weak ones who might lack the power to defend themselves. The social conditions in Afghanistan mirrored the chaos of the state of nature in turmoil, *“every one against every one”* and *“life was short, brutish and nasty”* (Rais 2008:65). Under these circumstances ordinary Afghan people were desperately waiting for someone who could solve this anarchy and restore peace, law and order. It was natural for the ordinary Afghans to accept the protection that the newly emerging Taliban force offered. The later part of this chapter would extend this argument, how Taliban was best situated under these conditions and their early success.

#### ***4.2.2 Factors responsible for Taliban's initial success***

It is necessary to understand the circumstances in which Taliban would realize why their rise was welcomed initially by the Afghans. Prior rise of Taliban, the sole means by which to combat aggression perpetrated by the warlords was through other warlords. Such inter-group conflict created more mayhem for common man, as loyalties constantly switched and bad blood between parties increased correspondingly (Misdaq 2006:178). It was the situation of anarchy. The conflict among the warring factions that had begun to shape along ethnic and regional lines dashed the hope about peace and normal life of millions of Afghans dislocated inside the country and living in exile in refugee camps in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. The Mujahedeen lost their credibility, among civilians that supported them during the war of resistance, to govern the country after withdrawal. All groups, with disregard to ethnicity, became greatly disillusioned with their selfish and individualist quest for power, lawlessness of former commanders who became local warlords, and inability of the Mujahedeen factions to work together to maintain social peace and order (Rais 2008:61). As said by Dr. Misdaq, Taliban appeared at a time when the public had reached the point of desperation from the excessive aggression of the warlords and were also exhausted from the long war against the communists, Soviets and then amongst their own leaders. These conditions account not only for the rise to

prominence of the group themselves, but also the early widespread support they enjoyed from amongst the common Afghans, especially in rural Pashtun areas (Misdaq 2006:178). People were exhausted of war and the uncertainties of everyday life. As Khalizad explain the situations,

"Taliban pledged to restore law and order by removing the warlords who soiled the name of 'Jihad' and had inflicted wounds on the people. True to their promise, they defeated warlord after warlord and collected millions of arms, making it an offence for individuals to carry or to own arms. Taliban faction emerged as a major new force in Afghanistan, benefiting from widespread unhappiness with the infighting and perceived corruption of the existing mujahedin parties" (Khalilzad 1995:190).

Since the fall of Najibullah regime and Mujahedeen takeover of Kabul, several accords were signed among the Afghan factions did not procuded positive results. These accords failed because what A. Roy said that the Mujahideen leadership *"lacked statemanship and political wisdom and were blinded as they are by consuming ambitions for power, seemed singularly incapable of grasping the immediate and long term consequences of their actions"* (Roy 2002:102). The factional nature of internal politics was very complex. The factional struggle and regional support for the factions was compounded by the fact that each of the provinces in Afghanistan has its own autonomous or semi-independent government, run by the area's local most powerful commanders.

To understand Taliban rise, there is a need of evolution of internal conditions of Afghanistan and regional geopolitics. Taliban emerged in the Afghan political scene at a critical juncture when peace seemed elusive with violent factional fighting and disagreement on power sharing between the different Mujahedeen groups after the communist government fall. The spell of violence between the forces of President Rabbani and General Doustum claimed hundreds of lives. Hekmatyar, who extracted the portfolio of Prime Minister but continued to bombard his own capital to gain exclusive control over Kabul. The situation in the civil conflict was horrendous causing death of an estimated 2, 500 Afghans and injuries to 17, 000 others (Roy 2002:103). As a result of continuing civil conflict, Pakistan and Iran were faced with a fresh refugee wave, to add the 1.5 million still in Pakistan and 2 million in Iran (Roy 2002:101). The capital had become a scene of bloody battles that had brought greater

misery and problems. The destruction in Afghanistan in the first four months of 1994 was considered to be the worse than what the country had suffered during the years of Soviet occupation. Meanwhile, the inability of President Rabbani, his Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud and other Mujahedeen factions aligned with them to come to acceptable terms with intransigent Hekmatyar led to lingering anarchy and continuing bloodshed. Amidst conflicting claims of success and counter-success, calls for a cease-fire went unheeded (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:387). Further the crisis mounted when President Rabbani refused to step down after the expiry of his term and reiterated that holding of elections in Afghanistan at that point of time was not a realistic option. His refusal to step down and Hekmatyar's determination to see him go provided further stream of bloodshed. The security situation in the Pashtun areas was another important reason why the cross-section of the population from ordinary villagers to tradesmen, commanders of the Afghan army and former members of the communist party welcomed Taliban (Rais 2008:64).

Such internal politics and complexities were worsening the Afghan situation and had attracted UN attention. The UNGA was asked to Secretary-General to send his Special Representative to take some efforts for peacemaking and national reconciliation. The UN mission headed by Mahmoud Mestiri. But it failed to bring the warring factions on the negotiating table. Mediation offer had been ignored by both groups. The voice of the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to restrain the movement also remained unheeded. Competing rebel factions rushed to fill the power vacuum. U.N. efforts *"have not been successful"*, said Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Cordovez and Harrison 1995:387). In that complex and fragmented nature of internal politics paved the way to emergence of Taliban.

Taliban leaders very effectively exploited conditions of anarchy, foreign intervention, warlordism, and lawlessness to shape their movement and they got early local support from Kandahar and its vicinity to their rule over Kabul and beyond. Their appearance on the scene in 1994 and their spectacular successes in taking over 90 per cent of the country in three years are mainly due to the state of anarchy and lawlessness at that time in the country. Misdaq conclude Taliban as *"the most dramatic shift of forces in Afghanistan's recent history"* (Misdaq 2006:175). Comparing with earlier regimes, Taliban movement has strong parallels as well as

differences with the previous rulers, Abdur Rehman, Amanullah and the communist that failed to centralised the Afghan state. Taliban began operations in early of 1995. By July-August 1996, they took control over southern and western Afghanistan and had infiltrated northern Afghanistan. And by the end of 1998, Taliban had established control over twenty provinces of Afghanistan, leaving only the Panjsher valley under General Dostum. Taliban declared Afghanistan as the Islamic state and imposed a strict, orthodox and fundamental Islamic regime in all areas under their control. The *Shariah* became the supreme law in Afghanistan.

The international reaction to the new balance of power in Afghanistan came swiftly. Much of the attention focused on the status of women under Taliban rule and the enforcement of Islamic rule particularly by international media. The international impact of Taliban victory was immediate and nowhere more alarming than in Russia and the Central Asian Republics. Alarmist newspaper reports warned “*the freed jinni of Taliban's Islamic fundamentalism, burnishing out of its Afghan bottle, could threaten not only Tajikistan, but the other republics of Central Asia as well*” (Magnus and Naby 1998:189). The United States reactions were initially not very clear. The US expressed the hope that Taliban would work with other Afghan factions to form a representative interim government and for law and order. The Pakistani government that had been insisting on a broad-based government for quite some time declared that the take-over of Taliban had created a “*qualitatively different situation*” (Roy 2002:112). Russia reacted with alarm to the Taliabn capture of Kabul. The Russian Foreign Ministry said “*Taliban victory only aggravates the crisis into which Afghanistan has been plunged through internal armed conflict*” (Roy 2002:113). Iran had also made known its dislike of Taliban rise.

#### **4.3 Effectiveness of the UN Peace Process**

The peace process in Afghanistan is almost as complex as the war itself, with reversals followed by slightly favorable signs and every move so far dictated by the self-interest of Afghan factions and their foreign supporters. The United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan said that Afghans cannot blame outsiders for everything, for in the end they are fighting each other. In mid 1990s, civil conflict

intensified in Afghanistan. The United Nations involvement increased in 1994, with a special mission to Afghanistan headed by Mahmoud Mistiri and followed by new special mission under Nobert Hall but minimal success. From 1996 till September 1997, the United Nations only played a marginal role in dealing with the continuing military conflict in Afghanistan. Because the newly emerged Taliban regime rejected all its efforts of peace making. But UN remained in the country and provided humanitarian assistance in war torn Afghanistan.

#### ***4.3.1 United Nations' efforts for political settlement***

In continued civil conflict, internal situation had become very complex and every concerned party involved in the peace-braking activities. The United Nations involvement increased in 1994, with a special mission to Afghanistan headed by Mahmoud Mistiri of Tunisia. The mission went through several phases, starting with a fact-finding tour of Afghanistan and adjacent areas in March and April, which concluded that a military victory by either side was impossible. In July the second phase sought unsuccessfully to negotiate a political settlement acceptable to the two sides fighting in Kabul. Mistiri attributed the failure mostly to the Rabbani coalition. In a third phase, the mission sought to find a formula of its own that could be put forward as the UN peace plan. It called for an immediate ceasefire and demilitarization of Kabul, establishment of a ceasefire monitoring and control body supported by the UN, collection of heavy arms from private hands; and the establishment of a national security force (Khalilzad 1994:150). Though we have discussed the Mistiri mission in third chapter, but in this segment the focus would be particularly on Taliban ruling and United Nations peace missions including Mestiri mission.

In view of the military successes of Taliban in early 1995, Mestiri realized that peace in Afghanistan could not be achieved without the willing cooperation of the student militia or Taliban. The UN tried to oversee negotiations to end the civil strife in Afghanistan in February 1995. Their objective was to turn over power in Kabul to a council of representatives of all ethnic and political groups. After the fall of Herat to Taliban in the fall, Mistiri conducted two months of shuttle diplomacy involving the

Afghan factions, Iran, and Pakistan but did not produce a settlement. Rabbani wanted a ceasefire before starting negotiations on the transfer of power and formation of a broad-based transitional government. On other hand, Taliban wanted Rabbani to resign and transfer power to them before agreeing to a ceasefire. Mistiri's shuttle did produce a list of 28 people acceptable to Rabbani as members of a transitional government and in Authoritative Council, but the list was rejected by Taliban (Khalilzad 1995:195) and Taliban called the council as "*corrupt council*" (Otfinoski 2004:25). Unfortunately for him, Taliban declined to participate in any process which would mean sitting with Rabbani or his nominees (Matinuddin 1999:187). The UN continued its search for a negotiated settlement in 1995 but by the end of the year this had stalled. Mistri, said that he had an agreement among the Afghan groups early in the year but that effort failed with the emergence of Taliban, which refused to participate in the process toward a transitional government. Rabbani and Massoud, in turn, rescinded their earlier agreement to transfer power to the UN- organized neutral authority. Mistri blamed Rabbani for the failure of his peace effort, and the UN stepped back and waited for the Kabul government to change its stand (Khalilzad 1995:195). Since Taliban rejected the proposal of Mestiri the efforts of the UN once again failed.

On March 5 1995, fighting broke out between Hizb-e-Wahdat (Mazari) and Masood, and between Massod and Taliban (Matinuddin 1999:188). The rapid advance of Taliban towards Kabul had already angered Massod, who went back on his word and told the UN representative that there would be no transfer of power unless Taliban also agreed to participate in the mechanism for the transfer of power. Taliban, on the other hand, did not accept the list of twenty-eight members of a transitional government which Mestiri had prepared. The United Nations representative had, therefore, to establish a rapport with Taliban so that they would co-operate with his efforts towards a transfer of power in Afghanistan. Taliban set three conditions for their participation in any peace process:only "*good Muslims*" were to be part of the interim administration; all thirty-two provinces had to be represented in the interim arrangement; and, according to Mullah Gulab Borjan, a Taliban commander, "*the neutral force to ensure peace in Kabul be taken from Taliban only*" (Matinuddin



1999:188). Taliban, who had set out to push aside all the older Mujahedeen leaders, were not willing to give any role to Rabbani nor to Hikmetyar.

While Mestiri did agree that the only way peace could be ensured in Afghanistan was by having a broad-based government in the country, he could not accept a list of 'good Muslim' from Taliban only, nor could he allow only them to contribute to the neutral, he could force to be placed in Kabul. Afghan watchers felt, however, that the United Nations was not doing enough nor was the international community taking adequate interest in the enforcement of peace in Afghanistan (Matinuddin 1999:189). Mestiri at one stage announced that Taliban were ready to talk to Rabbani in order to find a way out of the logjam. His optimism about the peace talks was raised because Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, Deputy Leader of Taliban, had assured him that Taliban were ready for talks whenever the other side was willing. But Maulvi Wakil Ahmed, a spokesperson of the militia, in an interview with the BBC, rejected Mestiri's statement that Taliban were ready to hold direct talks with Kabul regime (Matinuddin 1999:189). "*These conflicting views reflected a split between Taliban's religious and political leadership*", said a Kabul-based senior UN official in April 1996. Mestiri continued his efforts to find common grounds on which all Afghan parties could agree unconditionally. He held discussion with Taliban at Kandahar; met General Dostum in Mazar-e-Sharif, talked to Rabbani in Kabul; briefed the Foreign Office in Islamabad, but the prospects of peace in the unfortunate land remained as elusive as ever (Matinuddin 1999:191).

A General Assembly debate on Afghanistan on December 19 resulted in a resolution directing the U.N. special envoy to continue his effort to "*facilitate national reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan, in particular by ensuring transfer of power through the urgent establishment of a fully representative and broadly based authoritative council*" (Khalilzad 1995:195). The General Assembly also supported the decision of the Secretary-General to strengthen the UN Mission. Mestiri was directed by the Secretary to move his office inside Afghanistan from Pakistan. Mestiri's move to Afghanistan was welcomed by most Afghan factions as they felt that the United Nations representative should operate from within the country rather than from a foreign land. The Secretary-General also enhanced the Special Mission and the Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan (OSGA) by

stationing additional political affairs officers in the country (Matinuddin 1999:188). Mestiri's main concern at that movement was to prevent the major outbreak of hostilities between the so-called 'mysteries army' and Rabbani's forces.

Now in control of most of the country, Taliban declared Afghanistan a “*completely Islamic state*” (Otfinoski 2004:32). Despite the fact that Taliban had an effective control of over-thirds of Afghan territory since entering Kabul in September in 1996, the United Nations continued to recognize the government of ousted President Rabbani during the 1997 General Assembly Session. The UN did not recognize the legitimacy of Taliban movement and considered their government as a non-entity. Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations and most embassies abroad remained occupied by representatives of the previous regime led by Rabbani (Collins 2011:36). The UN insisted that Afghanistan was one of its earliest members, has stood by UN decisions in the past and that Taliban should continue to honour that. According to the UN, Taliban cannot claim to be the government of the whole country. As to Afghanistan’s territorial integrity, the UN pointed out that its northern neighbours and Iran do not accept Taliban rule in north and western Afghanistan, by saying that people in these provinces may not have voluntarily accepted Taliban rule. Another reason that the UN sometimes put forward was that the will of the people of Afghanistan was not tested in an election or referendum, and so it was not clear whether they would have voted for the movement of their own free will (Misdaq 2006:194). When the UN rejected Taliban’s request for membership of the UN and thus their recognition. Predictably, Taliban viewed the UN as part “*of the West’s dislike of an Islamic State*”, and claimed that their partiality towards a “*true*” Islamic state was clear (Misdaq 2006:194).

As the fighting in Afghanistan intensified in mid 1990s, the United Nations Security Council got concerned over the developments. In a Presidential statement on 15 February 1996, the Security Council expressed concern about intensified hostilities of humanitarian aid. It was also deeply concerned for terrorism, arms transfers and drug trafficking, which destabilized the whole region (Mehaer 2008:109). On 22 October 1996, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution 1076, calling upon all Afghan parties to end hostilities and engage in a political dialogue aimed at achieving national reconciliation (Mehaer 2008:109). It repeated its deep concern that the

conflict was providing fertile ground for terrorism and drug trafficking and called on the parties to halt such activities. The United Nations peace proposal included a ceasefire, handing Kabul over to an international peacekeeping force, an intra-Afghan dialogue, and the convening of a regional conference in or outside Afghanistan. In this resolution the Security Council also expressed concern about allegations of extreme discrimination against women and urging Taliban to adhere strictly to the norms of international law (Jahanpour 1999:115). An international conference to discuss these proposals was called by the United Nations on 18 November 1996 (Matinuddin 1999:191).

Disappointed at not being able to make any headway towards finding an acceptable solution to the Afghan crisis, Mestiri resigned at the end of May 1996. The UN Secretary-General appointed Nobert Hall, former German Foreign Minister, as head of the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan on 7 July 1996. Nobert Hall's first visit to Kabul was welcomed by a hail of rockets fired by Taliban. Nevertheless, he continued with his peace mission and, like his predecessor, he made frequent trips to Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif and held talks with both Taliban and those opposed to them. He also remained in touch with Islamabad and Tehran. His efforts to arrange a ceasefire and to make the various factions agree to a broad-based government in Afghanistan did not succeed. In fact, he was disappointed with Taliban for renewing their offensives just when the UN-sponsored talks were moving towards a solution. Due to continued conflict, initiative taken by UN had received a set-back. But all these attacks did not deter Nobert Hall from continuing with his efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Afghanistan. He visited Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif again in July 1997, but once again he felt that *"nobody was willing to compromise"*. On 13 December 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted a consensus resolution calling for a solution through the plan of Nobert Hall. Further peace talks conducted by Dr. Hall under United Nation auspices, were conducted in Islamabad in January 1997. Represented in the talks were Taliban, former president Rabbani, General Dostum and the Hizb-i-Wahdat. Nothing substantive on a ceasefire, much less an ultimate political solution was accomplished, although some detailed talks on the exchange of prisoners took place (Magnus and Naby 1998:192) but did not produced result. The uncertain situation in Afghanistan prompted the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to send

Lakhdar Brahimi, an Algerian diplomat, as his special envoy to re-evaluate the UN role in Afghanistan and highlighted the root cause of the conflict.

In July of 1997, the Secretary-General appointed Lakhdar Brahimi, as his Special Envoy for Afghanistan. His job was to conduct consultations with interested and relevant countries and parties and make recommendations on UN peacemaking activities there (Mehaer 2008:109) and to take in hand the diplomatic efforts to bring the warring factions to the negotiating table (Rasanayagam 2005:197). In October that year, Brahimi, along with the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, convened a series of informal meetings with what came to be known as the 'Six plus Two' group-composed of the six states bordering Afghanistan (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) plus the United States and Russia (Mehaer 2008:110). Following the August 1998 terrorist attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the UN Security-Council adopted resolution 1193 on 28 August 1998 (Mehaer 2008:110). The Security Council has demanded an immediate end to the fighting in Afghanistan and the resumption of talks between the warring parties. The resolution reiterated the concern of the Security-Council over the continuing presence of terrorists within the territory of Afghanistan. The resolution condemned attacks on UN personnel in Taliban-held areas, including the killings of two Afghan staff members of the World Food Programme and UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Jalalabad, and of the Military Adviser to UNSMA in Kabul (Mehaer 2008:110). It also condemned the capture of the Consulate-General of Iran in Mazar-e-Sharif. Resolution 1214 of the Security-Council adopted on 8 December 1998 demanded that Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organization and that all Afghan factions cooperate in bringing indicted terrorists to justice (Mehaer 2008:110). But the situation remained unstable and it created a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. The rapid pace of military events in the mid 1990s sidelined UN initiatives. The UN did peacemaking efforts in its capacity but the fragmented state of nature and lack of statesmanship among the various groups' leadership did not produce fruitful results. Maley (1998) identifies two main reasons behind the failure of the UN missions. Firstly, traditional peace-making approaches which focus on bilateral negotiations or talks within the '*Six plus Two*' framework, have had a limited impact on the transnational and non state entities that are an

integral part of the conflict. The UN has often failed to understand that the crisis in Afghanistan runs deeper than the mere composition of the government. Secondly, the UN has limited credibility with the different actors because of its previous failures, its limited capacities (both in terms of individual performance and political muscle) and on occasion, a perceived bias (Maley 1998:186). Although, one can be critical of the UN role, it is important to note that without the political will of the international community, its impact was always going to be limited.

#### ***4.3.2 Humanitarian conditions and assistance from UN agencies***

Besides the problems of civil war and terrorism, the United Nations also addressed the humanitarian issues emerging from the continued conflict in Afghanistan. Earlier in 1984, a UN special reporter was appointed to examine the human rights situation in Afghanistan and to submit reports to the General Assembly and UN Human Rights Commission. Before Taliban rise, larger number of Afghans killed in the civil war. In a report to the UN General Assembly in February 1994, the UN special rapporteur referred to massive numbers of civilians killed indiscriminately in Kabul as a result and air attack, including the cluster bombs (Donini 2004:64) and larger number of people displaced. The entry of Taliban into the fighting once again led to the displacement of populations. Some 350, 000 people fled the Kabul region and took shelter in camps near Jalalabad, bringing the total of internally displaced people dependent on the UN for food and sustenance to 800, 000 (Mehaer 2008:111). Another fact was that in pre-Taliban struggle for power, discrimination and violence against women did not generate much interest or concern beyond the Afghanistan's frontier. But Taliban's fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic and Sharia law imposed various restrictions on people, particularly on women. Women and girls had faced many difficulties to survive and that paved the way to violation of human rights on large scale. As a report by the Amnesty International concluded that armed groups *“have massacred defenceless women in their homes, or brutally beaten and raped them. Score of young women have been abducted and then raped, taken as wives by commanders or sold into prostitution. Some have committed suicide to avoid such a*

*fate*” (Donini 2004:65). Taliban regime was responsible for gross violations of human rights in Afghanistan, again invited the United Nations' attention.

In 1994, Taliban came on the political scene. The emergence of an assertive Islamic traditionalism has placed new obstacles in the way of international humanitarian and peacemaking programmes in Afghanistan. In a statement on 22 October 1996, the Security-Council also expressed deep distress of involvement in the fighting, on Taliban side, of thousand of non-Afghan nationals, some of whom below the age of 14 (Mehaer 2008:112). It expressed grave concern at the seriously deteriorating humanitarian situation and deplored the worsening human rights situation, including forced displacement of civilian populations, summary executions, abuse and arbitrary detention of civilians, violence against women and girls, and indiscriminate bombing. As was routine, the UN issued calls for both sides to show restraint; it also added its specific concerns for the protection of civilians.

In all these worst humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan, the UN took step forward. The UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) was replaced by the UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan (UNOCHA). But a purely humanitarian response in the face of the complex political realities on the ground proved inadequate; negotiating agreements between the warring parties to enable humanitarian assistance to be delivered across political and military lines was no substitute for serious diplomatic efforts aimed at bringing peace through an overall political settlement (Rasanayagam 2005:196). In 1994, the first of a series on annual consolidated appeals to aid Afghanistan was launched. The appeals detailed the emergency needs of Afghan people and asked for funds to enable non-governmental and UN agencies to address those needs. And the rehabilitation projects focused on human development and poverty alleviation in rural communities. From 1995, however, the annual consolidated appeals were less successful in raising the necessary funds. The 1995-96 appeal, for example, raised only 50 per cent of the amount deemed urgent of which practically nothing was available for crucial infrastructure repairs. In the 1990s there were some 70 NGOs and contractors participating in this voluntary body, with a combined budget of USUS\$ 80 million (Rasanayagam 2005:196). Although there was a proliferation of Afghan NGOs in the early 1990s few of them have developed into robust and sustainable institutions.

Another fact, there was a shift away from humanitarian relief into rehabilitation programmes and developmental activities in the agricultural and education sectors.

As a result of the ongoing United Nations efforts of peacebuilding did some output and minimized the conflict. However, the absence of conflict in some parts of the country made it possible to reopen some roads, allowing greater aid distribution by the UN and aid agencies. From January to June 1995, WFP distributed more than 53, 000 tons of food aid, while the UN Centre of Human Settlement helped some 10, 000 families rebuild their homes. During a health campaign in 1995, nearly 2.4 million children under five years of age were immunized against polio and more than 80, 000 under two years old were inoculated against measles (Mehaer 2008:112). The United Nations and private organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross continued humanitarian assistance to Afghan people. The Red Cross visited over 7, 800 prisoners of war from all sides during the first nine months of 1997 (Magnus 1997:114). The UN also arranged the air drop of food to central Afghanistan, which was cut off in the winter and subject to an economic blockade by Taliban. The people had been deprived of the emergency food supplies looted from UN stocks in factional fighting between elements of the Northern Alliance (Magnus 1997:114).

In 1997, the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed, and his UN agency counterparts agreed, to test an innovative and more unitary approach in Afghanistan: the Strategic Framework (SF). Recognizing the failure of the recent past, the aim was to bridge the gap among the political, assistance, and human rights strategies relating to Afghanistan so that the combined synergies would contribute to the quest for peace (Donini 2004:126). The SF was officially launched in September 1998. All UN agencies endorsed it, though some did so reluctantly. Its success was predicted on the coordination structure. The humanitarian and development coordination functions had been merged into one office in 1997. The UN field coordination office was based in Islamabad for security reasons, and its seven sub-offices within in Afghanistan became the service center for the assistance community, providing information, particularly on security matters and space for meetings and coordination of programs. Other international donors saw that the SF had potential for a new approach in “*failed state*” Afghanistan called by the Barnett Rubin (1995:142). As result of the SF, UN agencies, NGOs and donors had for the first time subscribed

to a set of common principles and strategic objectives aimed at maximizing the synergy among assistance, human rights and political action, as well as the internal coherence of the assistance efforts itself. Nevertheless, the SF provided a coherent strategy and instilled a sense of meaning to the disparate projects and activities of what had been until then a fractious assistance community. In the same year a major initiative called the Poverty Eradication and Community Empowerment Programme (PEACE) was launched in 1997 by the UNDP with a US\$33 million budget to address humanitarian and developmental needs, and to build up social and economic infrastructures in the context of the breakdown at all levels of governance in Afghanistan. A number of UN agencies and NGOs participate in this programme according to their areas of expertise and in selected locations. UN staff sit down with the local community at each location and work out what needs to be done (Rasanayagam 2005:201).

But the continuing brutal attacks by Taliban on people and humanitarian assistance workers, it was difficult to work under these conditions. As the result of these worst conditions many international agencies threatened to pull out from the Afghanistan. In 1997, the chief of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Gustave Speth, warned Taliban that there would occur a lack of donors if the fighting continued and if Taliban did not change their repressive attitude towards the female population. He also threatened that the UN agencies would pull out of Afghanistan and that UN projects in Afghanistan would be stopped if the war did not come to an end (Matinuddin 1999:192). The warning did have some effects, for Taliban signed an agreement with the UNDP promising a review of the gender issues as far as the education of girls was concerned. In these conditions a British NGO "Save the Children" suspended its programmes in health and education, while UNICEF took a policy decision not to fund education in parts of the country where girls were barred from going to school (Johnson and Leslie 2004:69). The Oxfam announced that it would close its programme in Afghanistan if Taliban did not moderate their position. Oxfam suspended its Kabul programme on 4 October and issued a press statement saying that Oxfam would "*work with women in Kabul, or not at all*" (Johnson and Leslie 2004:67).



In the meantime, a number of other aid agencies in Kabul tried to negotiate their way around the stream of regulations issued by Taliban. Many Afghans who continued to work in the administration negotiated to retain the support of aid agencies in their work and thereby managed to continue employing women, notably in healthcare. The many difficulties the assistance community experienced in trying to work out how to relate to Taliban coincided with a growing concern about the evident failure of international political, assistance and human rights strategies to work effectively in the cause of peace in Afghanistan.

Although the UN and other aid agencies did many efforts for Afghan peoples. But that did not bring fruitful results for them because of Taliban's hardliner policies and continued civil fighting. A new UN report on Afghanistan (submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva) says the human rights situation there has continued to deteriorate, leading to unprecedented violence and a massive loss of life. It also describes horrific attacks against ethnic groups, including the gang rape and genital mutilation of three young Hazara children in the capital, Kabul. According to the UN report, the suicide rate among women is rising (BBC News: April 15, 1998). Meanwhile a meeting of international donors to Afghanistan “*the Afghan Support Group*” has decided to support United Nations efforts to reopen talks with the governing Taliban movement, aimed at securing the return of aid organizations to the capital, Kabul (BBC News: July 25, 1998). At that time aid agencies were in dilemma situation. As a BBC correspondent in the region says donors have been divided on how to respond to attempts by Taliban to restrict the activities of aid workers. Further he says that some are insisting that aid be cut back, while others say that the desperate need for food and medicine in Afghanistan should outweigh other considerations (BBC News: July 25, 1998). Due to security reasons most foreign aid workers left Kabul in 1998 under pressure from Taliban when the local peoples needed desperately.

#### ***4.3.3 UN presence and confrontation with Taliban***

The rise of Taliban on political scene had become a challenge to the United Nations peacemaking process. The security of the UN and international aid staff was the main concern at that time and they faced many difficulties because of Taliban's

hardline policies. With their capture of Mazar-i-Sharif in September 1998, Taliban effectively imposed the military solution that they had wanted all along, by refusing any power-sharing arrangements proposed during the UN mediation. In almost three years of its rise over 90 per cent of the territory under Taliban control, brought new problems and raised new issues for the international community and the United Nations.

The continuation of the humanitarian programme had become a main concern to the UN at that time. Special representative of the UN went public regarding the UN's frustrations by saying that Taliban was "*an organization that hands out edicts that prevent us from doing our job*" (Rasanayagam 2005:198). But Taliban did not relent. In February 1998, the UN halted all its aid operations in Kandahar and pulled out its staff after Taliban had beaten up some of them. In March 1998, the UN withdrew its staff from Kandahar (Otfinoski, 2004:34). On 20 July Taliban closed down all NGO offices by force, and an exodus of foreign staff began. On the same day the bodies of two staff members from the UNHCR and WFP who had previously been kidnapped were found in Jalalabad, but no explanations for their deaths were offered by Taliban. No one questions the need for humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan (Rasanayagam 2005:198). In fact, United Nations officials say, its workers struggling to save lives and lessen human misery around the globe are being killed, kidnapped, detained, raped, robbed, attacked and harassed as never before. As said by Terence Burke, a United Nations security officer from Ireland, thought he was a dead man (New York Times: September 19, 1999).

Concern about security reached on head after an Italian UN military observer was gunned down following the United States cruise missile attack on suspected terrorist bases in eastern Afghanistan on August 20. Two Afghan workers were also killed in July in the eastern city of Jalalabad and Taliban were urged to bring the culprits to justice but Taliban did nothing and the issue was quietly dropped (Johnson and Leslie, 2004:79). The UN banned its officials from travelling to Afghanistan after this incident. In same month that eight Iranian diplomats were murdered by Taliban forces (BBC News: October 13, 1998). The UN has in the past complained to Taliban about harassment of women aid workers, and the closing down of their offices in Kabul. But Taliban have said they are now very keen for the UN workers to return, primarily to

continue their humanitarian aid operations (BBC News: October 23, 1998). But in August more than 60 UN workers were withdrawn from the country after three staff members were killed (BBC News: October 23, 1998). The UN says international staff will not return to Afghanistan on a permanent basis until Taliban complies fully with a security of its staff (BBC News: November 25, 1998).

Taliban aggressiveness came to high in 1998. Taliban hardliners seemed intent on forcing the UN agencies and NGOs that employed large numbers of educated Afghan women in their programmes to leave the country by provoking a number of incidents that tested their patience to the limit. Many NGOs said that would withdraw from the country due to security of its staff. Twenty out of 30 NGOs voted to pull out of the country. The European Union (EU), a major funding source for NGOs, suspended all humanitarian aid to areas under Taliban control.

The UN and other agencies withdrew, for security reasons. UN and NGO staff were seen as legitimate targets for attack by Taliban because they are deemed to be complicit with the US project (Johnson and Leslie 2004:85). Because of the attacks in Kabul, U.N. staff members left and U.N. humanitarian aid declined-while the need for it increased (Zalmay 1995:146). On the question of return, a UN spokesman said the actual return of staff would depend on what it called *"satisfactory reports"* from Taliban on investigations into the killings (BBC News: October 23, 1998). International agencies providing relief and basic services to the stricken populations in Kabul and elsewhere had to operate under the most difficult conditions. As Brahimi stated bluntly *"In the north we have complete insecurity for our aid operations aid in the south we have a hell of a horrible time working with Taliban"* (Rasanayagam 2005:197). The extraordinary conditions under which agencies of the United Nations system had to operate during the protracted Afghan civil war revealed their statutory and operational limitations; they also demonstrated that these agencies would need to come up with novel and imaginative solutions if they were to carry out their mandates in a meaningful way.

#### **4.4 Summary**

This chapter explain the emergence of Taliban and its relations with the UN. In ongoing civil conflict threatened to life and property of common Afghan peoples.

Conditions of anarchy, foreign intervention, warlordism, and lawlessness were effectively exploited by the newly emerged Taliban in order to shape their movement and seek early local support, gaining their external support from the country of Pakistan. Different scholars define Taliban by different names like the forces of Islamic fundamentalist, Pashtun resurgence, and external instrument. Pakistan provided an institutional role in forming Taliban movement for gain of strategic depth against India in any possible future war. And it also historically wanted a client regime in Kabul of its strategies interests. In mid 1990s, civil conflict intensified in Afghanistan. The United Nations involvement increased in 1994. The UN again started peace process through special missions to Afghanistan which headed by Mahmoud Mistiri and followed by new special mission under Nobert Hall but minimal success. Because the newly emerged Taliban regime rejected all its efforts of peace making and remained less effective. The extraordinary conditions under which agencies of the United Nations system had to operate during the protracted Afghan civil war revealed their statutory and operational limitations, particular concern was the security of the UN personal in Afghanistan.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONCLUSION**

## **5. Conclusion**

The United Nations' role in Afghanistan was shaped up by the prevalence of the level of international and regional support that it could acquire for the resolution of the problem. The United Nations has a history of playing a distinctive role in the process of conflict resolution tackling the scenario of divided societies in various countries with utmost precision. The very basis of the United Nations was the concept of Conflict Resolution in which the former institution the League of Nations had failed. Keeping in regard the basic nature of the establishment in the year 1945, it has lived up to the dreams of the founders for the establishment of peace in the world and providence of measures for the maintenance of peace. In the Afghan conflict resolution, the UN adopted the approach of limited involvement, basically driven by the Secretary-General good offices and the special representatives. With the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the scenario that evolved a need was felt for the resolution of the problem as soon as possible. It was due to the negotiation of the UN that the intervention between the concerned parties led to a way out for the Soviet troops from the Afghan territory. The Afghanistan became the area of conflict between the two great powers of the time, which was inspired by the strategic visions of the two superpowers, who had been the permanent players of the Security Council resulting in the UN General-Assembly resolutions becoming less effective, then desired.

As a result of the United Nations' sponsored long negotiation process, finally the Soviet troops withdrew from the Afghan land. Due to the lack of all party involvement in the negotiation process, Afghanistan still yearns to at peace again. This has resulted in the internal civil war in the country, bringing UN peace efforts to ground zero. The UN's strategy aims were to achieve a cessation of hostilities, seek a regional political consensus in support of the peace process, seek direct negotiations between all parties on a political settlement, to establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul and national reconciliation and reconstruction, all the factors which the agreement between the two superpowers had lacked in the year 1988. Due to the lack of coordination and statesmanship among the conflicting parties, various UN efforts had received a setback. The UN failed to bring in a stable government in power amongst the disturbance between various factions in Afghanistan, later the rise

of Taliban further deteriorated the situation. The UN efforts were further hampered by the intervention of regional and international players each trying to bring in a solution of their own and for strategic gain.

Following have been the inferences:

### ***5.1 Lessons from the UN experience***

As it is described in the study, that the United Nations was the outcome of Second World War with the aim of the maintenance of international peace and stability. Following its aims the UN took some efforts to negotiate and resolve the Afghan conflict. In Afghan conflict the UN preferred the indirect rapprochement to solve the problems and not sent peacekeeping forces. Its role was limited to offering good offices to conflicting parties to negotiate a settlement between them. The Soviet invasion was the test of the United Nations ability to resolve the conflict because this time a great power occupied the another country and Afghanistan became the battle field of ideological virtual war between two conflicting blocks. And both sides were perusing their own strategic interests, but the nature of Afghan conflict limited the United Nations' role. The UN condemned the Soviet occupation immediately and passed many resolutions demanding its unconditional immediate withdrawal from the region. But the Soviet Union rejected that appeal and argued that it is the violation of the Afghanistan's sovereignty claiming the Afghan government had made appeal for the assistance. After a UN backed long negotiation process Geneva Accords signed which ultimately provided the way of troops withdrawal. For the United Nations, the Accords represented the major success in many years because a superpower was the party of that accord and agreed to withdraw its troops. It was the first of its kind agreement and held out hope for greater the UN prominence and a more confident UN role on the world scene. Although the Accords paved the withdrawal but it did not bring peace in Afghanistan. The Accords did not talk about the post-withdrawal future of the Afghanistan. And some weakness of its including the Afghan resistance groups were neither parties to the Accords, nor involved in any serious way in the negotiation process. The resistance leaders were angry that they were excluded from the Geneva talks and it left a crucial issue in the Afghan conflict, namely the character of the country's rulers, unaddressed. Therefore the withdrawal did not result in bringing

peace and stability in Afghanistan. The withdrawal had created a power vacuum situation, the domestic politics of Afghanistan soon offered a close approximation to the anarchy of international relations theory. The power vacuum increased the conflict making "lack of legitimacy" as the biggest problem faced by Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet withdrawal. While other nations celebrated the end of cold war, Afghanistan degenerated into chaos, amidst the factional fighting of Mujahideen leaders. The civil war in Afghanistan became a multilateral competition involving internal armed factions with extensive foreign links, neighbouring states pursuing competing strategic interests and extra-regional players with ideological, security or economic stakes in the chaos.

The United Nations made continuous efforts for the formation of broad-based and legitimate government in Afghanistan tried to act as a negotiator between various groups. The post-Geneva UN efforts have been exerted in two interrelated directions-first, eliciting an agreement from external power to endorse a stronger role for the UN and second, promoting an international and Afghan consensus on elements of a political settlement and national reconciliation. The UN Secretary-General's special representative took steps in the directions for the establishment of interim government in Kabul. The United Nations had been advocating a plan to transfer power peacefully from the communist government to the Mujahideen. Its plan operated on the basis that the Afghan groups assembled could build legitimate authority drawn on certain Afghan traditions. Nonetheless it failed to anticipate the brittleness and lack of coordination and statesmanship among the Mujahideen groups, which had little incentive to accept a negotiated settlement. The United Nations' main difficulty lay in eliciting support from the Mujahideen groups, in whose eyes it was a suspect for being deferential to the government in Kabul. The United Nation's peace plan for a political settlement failed because it had focused too much on reaching an agreement among unrepresentative party leaders rather than on pressing agreement Cordovez's strategy to mobilise broader political process. The fragmentation of power as much as the regime's illegitimacy was becoming the real obstacle to a political settlement in Afghanistan.

Due to the fragmented nature of the resistance with shifting loyalties and rivalries,



Mujahideen's were unable to turn these local victories into a national one, turning Afghanistan into a 'failed state'. Meanwhile the Najibullah government in order to attract support, attempted to liberalize the government's policies but did not produce positive results. After 1992 the resistance had entered a new stage of struggle of a struggle to seize national power. Several efforts had made to form a legitimate government in Kabul, but the Mujahideen parties failed to bring consensus. The Mujahideen suffered from two weakness that became the basis of the collapse of their government: first, despite years of expectation, their agreement for power sharing in Kabul was flawed. Second, the Islamist ideology that had allowed devotion to a cause even when faced with a magnitude of force was shaken in the face of ethnic competition for political power.

At that time most Afghan were desperate for peace and welcomed the United Nation's mission and demanded that the UN should renew efforts to negotiate a peace settlement. The Mestiri mission received enormous response from the Afghan people. It shows the willingness of the Afghan people to bring peace through international channels particularly the UN. While on the other hand the elite establishment was pursuing their own narrow ambitions over the national interests. To end the ongoing civil conflict some internal or elite efforts had been initiated particularly the Peshawar and Islamabad agreements, which proved to be a failure to bring in stabilization. The United Nations continued their efforts and widened the scope of negotiations. The UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) put forward a more active mandate of facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction, beyond merely monitoring events and reporting them. Given the unwillingness of the local factions to come to an agreement, and given further the proxy nature of much of the fighting with regional powers each pursuing their own political and ideological ends through their economic and military support of competing groups, it should come as no surprise that UNSMA remained largely ineffective. Therefore all these peace efforts produced no positive results. The Mujahideen, Rabbani and his chief commander, Massoud, and Hekmatyar were locked in a bloody power struggle. There were some spoiler of the peace process particularly Hikamtyar who were backed by Pakistan. Another problem for an elite settlement was the impact of external powers, which affected the identities of the participants in the settlement.

Ongoing chaos in the country gave rise to the Taliban. The Taliban leaders very effectively exploited conditions of anarchy, foreign intervention, warlords, and lawlessness to shape their struggle and seek social energy from Kandahar and its environs to their rule over Kabul and beyond. The rise of the Taliban had created obstacles to the United Nations efforts but the UN remained active. Despite Taliban's rapid rise and control over 90% of the country, the UN did not recognize the legitimacy of the Taliban movement and considered their government as a non-entity. The United Nations peace plans faced many challenges from various factions particularly the Taliban, as they were not ready to become a party of settlement and claimed legitimate right on Afghan land.

### ***5.2 Human security dimensions of conflict***

After end of World War II, concept of security has changed. Traditionally, security meant protection of of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. Now the concept of security had widened and became comprehensive and human rights and human security took place on top of agenda. The concept of human security challenges the state-centric notion of security and focused on individual as the main referent object of security. Therefore the human rights had become important and recognised in the UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948*. And the humanitarian intervention had become a debatable issue. This concept involves the principle that the international community is justified in intervening in the internal affairs of states accused of gross violations of human rights. But it routinely criticised by many states as 'interference in our internal affairs'.

In Afghanistan case, the UN also addressed the various humanitarian issues from the continued conflict in Afghanistan. The UN had not only backed the humanitarian assistance in war torn Afghanistan in accordance to the norms of international law, but it also invited criticism that it is a western agenda and strategy to dominate and intervene in the internal matters of the country on the name of human rights. The instrumentalisation of assistance during the cross-border period had a number of lasting effects: it contributed to the legitimization of the Peshawar-based resistance parties and allowed them to increase and consolidation their patronage; it resulted in the concentration of assistance in Pashtun areas and the neglect of equally or

deserving communities further a field in the centre or north of the country; and it fostered one-sided approaches and selective amnesia on the issue of human rights violations by the Mujahideen. Later the rise of the Taliban in the political scene resulted in gross violations of human rights and invited international attention. The Taliban ruling had made it difficult for the humanitarian agencies to work in Afghanistan resulting in the withdrawal of donors from the country a much desired help by the local people.

### ***5.3 Epilogue***

Afghanistan has always been known as the "land of warriors", they since centuries have resisted any effort by invaders to take hold of the region, the same happened with the intervention of the Soviet Union. Invasion by the Soviets resulted in a local uprising which turned into a nation-wide uprising. Though Islam was the bond that had strongly held the motives of the leaders, it lacked to provide a national leadership which was divided on the basis of ethnicity, religiosity, linguistic, tribal and provincial bases.

Bringing in international condemnation as the biggest threat to peace after the second world war, the western powers came to the conclusion of helping the Afghan resistance both financially and militarily. At that time, Islamic militants and transnational extremism became the most favoured US-backed fighters in Afghanistan. And Pakistan had become the most favourable channel to the western block to feed resistance groups. The inflow of refugees and Mujahideen further dragged Pakistan into accepting a "front-line" state role and it assumed a strategically critical role in the area. On other side, in Pakistan, a military regime found a splendid opportunity in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to attract Western support. Therefore Pakistan had taken the lead in bringing the Afghan issue to the UN Security Council and throughout remained a key player in international for coordinating a diplomatic pressure for Soviet withdrawal. It is a fact that Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been determined by the ethno-geopolitical linkages and Pashtunistan factor and to gain strategic depth against India, which adherently reflected in Pakistan's policy to support the resistance groups of Hikmatyar and later the Taliban.

Iran was the second leading actor in the Afghan conflict and had been supporting the Shia community, as it shared ethnic linkages with the region. Saudis had no diplomatic relations with Moscow and always had regarded communism as a threat to Islam, resulting which they started providing financial aid to the resistance groups through ISI. The American response was basically shaped with the aim of making Afghanistan USSR's Vietnam while there lay two interests in their involvement in the region. By one the strategic interests regarding the invasion as a threat to Middle East oil reserves, Russia's outlet to warm waters resulting in a status quo in the region and the need for symbolic decisions in order to prove US indignation over the Soviet action.

The study also reveals how the changing nature of regional geopolitics in the post-cold war era played an important role in shaping external powers actors interests in Afghanistan. The United Nations peace building and conflict resolution efforts has also been influenced by the regional equation. The regional actors were pursuing their own strategic interests in Afghan conflict and responded to the UN's peace plans accordingly. One side Pakistan had supported the UN peace plans but on other hand it was pursuing strategic interests through backing Mujahideen particularly Hikmatyar and later the Taliban. Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been determined by the Pashtun factor and to gain strategic depth against India while Iran did almost same and backed the Shia community. Iran also suspected the United Nations' sponsored peace process as being backed by the West. It feared that US and other allies but put an agenda to isolate Iran in the region. Newly emerged Central Asian republics had been basically concerned about the spillover effects of the Afghan conflict particularly threat of rise of Islamic extremism into the region of Central Asia. More or less these countries had supported peace process in Afghanistan. After the end of cold war and USSR disintegration, Russian policy towards Afghanistan changed. Unlike earlier, Moscow had been in favour of the Afghan conflict resolution, declaring that the UN owed more representation to the local people as was being given.

The United Nations did many efforts in its capacity to resolves Afghan conflict since the Soviet invasion. Its efforts had passed through many stages, sometimes partial failure and success. Although, one can be critical of its role, it is important to

note that without the positive and honest political will of the international community, its impact was always going to be limited. As the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commented in 1997 "it could be argued that the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan is little more than that of an alibi to provide cover for the inaction-or worse-of the international community at large" (Maley 1998:198). Therefore, in fragmented and heterogeneous nature of Afghanistan there is only a rainbow coalition of various ethnic groups could deliver a stable order and peace in Afghanistan .

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