

ROLE OF CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002-2011

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**Role of Canada in Afghanistan, 2002-2011**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other University.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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PREFACE

The present is a modest attempt to study and explore the shifts in Canada's foreign and defence policy post 9/11. It studies changes in Canada's relationship with United States of America (US) in the light of US intervention in Afghanistan. The study proposes that the cooperation between US and Canada reached an unprecedented level during invasion in Afghanistan. Moreover, while Canada's engagement in United Nations (UN) mission all over the world and particularly in Afghanistan decreased, its engagement with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has increased. Canada's involvement with NATO was at multilateral level as it provided both military support and funds to Afghanistan. As a departure from the past, Canada's military contribution in Afghanistan is at the level of active involvement. Canada participated in combat role with US and NATO force. Canada also provided aid for reconstruction and rebuilding in Afghanistan. The foreign aid of Canada to Afghanistan was channelled both through bilateral and multilateral programmes. Canada provided funds to Afghanistan primarily through two agencies, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). In this work Canada's participation in civil-military cooperation through Provincial Reconstruction Team is also explored.

The study also traces the shifts in Canada's foreign policy and its effects on national interest. The study also attempts to understand Canada's approach towards Afghanistan; the debates within the Canadian politics are also taken into account. It also discusses the parliamentary debates in Canada. The stand different political parties took regarding Canada's participation in Afghanistan invasion is also discussed. The study also explores the approach of different labour organisations in Canada regarding this intervention. The study takes into account the different public opinion surveys conducted on this issues and analyses the kind of trends of public opinion emerged from these surveys.

One needs to explore the military intervention of NATO and US in Afghanistan in terms of human rights discourse. It analyses the level of civilian casualties and

problem of refugees because of the invasion in Afghanistan. It also tries to explain the response of the Afghan people regarding this intervention.

This study relies more on secondary sources than primary. But the primary sources such as government reports and data, to the extent available, are used to make this study. The methodology is descriptive and analytical. The literature, reports and other data have been analysed for the purpose of the study. The sources of this research are sought from the libraries such as JNU Central Library, Shastri Indo-Canadian Library and IGNOU Library. Due to limited time and other kinds of constraints field study was not done.

ABBREVIATION

3D	Defence, Diplomacy and Development
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
AREDP	Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CAW	Canadian Auto Workers Union
CCTM-A	Canadian Contribution to the Training Mission in Afghanistan
CEFCOM	Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLC	Canadian Labour Congress
CUPE	Canadian Union of Public Employees
CUPW	Canadian Union of Postal Workers
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	New Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom

PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SAT-A	Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Canada is a middle power in the international system. While not a major power, Canada is nonetheless capable of expressing its views and providing leadership in its area of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, developmental aid and strengthening the UN based multilateralism. Canada has also been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) since its inception in 1949 and as such it plays a key role in the Western Alliance System.

In late 1956, Canada had a great contribution in United Nations Emergency Force and also played an important role as a peacekeeper in the Suez crisis. During the Cold War, Canada played an important role in UN peacekeeping mission. Through its involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, Canada contributed greatly towards the maintenance of international peace and security, promoted the protection of civilians in conflict zones and advanced principles of human security-related issues (Dorn 2005).

With the end of the Cold War, Canada's peacekeeping mission expanded to peacemaking and peace-enforcement. This also marked a shift from contribution to UN peacekeeping missions to greater role in peacemaking and peace-enforcement activities of NATO. Presently, 57 Canadian force personnel and 123 Canadian police are deployed in six peacekeeping missions of UN; contrary to this, Canada has as many as 2800 military personnel in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan alone. Added to this, Canada has contributed only one police officer to United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which is working there since 2002 (Badescu 2010).

Following the 9/11 incident, many resolutions were passed by the UN Security Council to authorize the International community to help the Afghan government in the areas of military, humanitarian, reconstruction and development. In December 2001, under Chapter VII of the UN Security Council Resolution 1386, an international security force with the mandate to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in

facilitating security in Kabul and its vicinities was established, and beginning in 2003 expanded all over the country through the UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (Independent Panel Report 2008).

But Guerre (2009) argued that the illegalized military intervention in Afghanistan by the US and ally countries including Canada under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) force on the basis of International Law and Domestic Law such as Criminal Law of Canada according to which force must not be used for revenge or punishment and as vigilantes. Secondly, in Criminal Law of Canada, self-defence is resorted to only when there is the serious threat of death or bodily harm, the only justification for the physical retaliation to an attack; self-defence cannot be used within a few weak. However, the concept of self-defence is recognized by the Charter of UN, under International Law. But Afghanistan was not an aggressor state and the plan was not prepared on its territory, thus, the concept of self defence and aggression could not be used in case of Afghanistan after 9/11 (Guerre 2009). On 12 September 2001, Article 5 dealing with the collective security was invoked by NATO for the first time (Independent Panel Report 2008).

There is no UN Security Council Resolution which authorizes the US and NATO countries to attack Afghanistan. And the two resolutions i.e. number 1368 on 12 September 2001 and number 1373 on 28 September 2001 passed in relation to 9/11 do not specify Afghanistan (Guerre 2009). But the United States of America (US) hegemony in the Security Council and the world influenced its decisions later. The UNAMA was created and authorized by the Security Council in March 2002 UN Security Council Resolution 1401 being continuously renewed on an annual basis since then (Independent Panel Report 2008).

The geostrategic position of Afghanistan is very significant as a link between Central Asia and South Asia. (Fraser 2006). Afghanistan can be called an energy bridge for linking the gas resources of Turkmenistan and this energy breathes life to the economies of India and Pakistan. There were efforts in the pre-9/11 period for a gas-pipeline in the region which broke down just before 9/11. In April 2008, TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gas pipeline project began with the joining of India. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) coordinated this project with support from the US Being an active member of ADB and due to Canada's significant

presence in this region, Canadian firms would also benefit from the TAPI pipeline gas project (Foster 2009).

Canada's contribution in the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan goes back to 7 October 2001. It is seen that Canada offered military, financial, diplomatic, legislative and domestic security initiatives in this regard. After 9/11, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien had announced that Canada would send six naval ships, six air force planes, special force soldiers and more than 2000 troops in the US-led mission, named Operation Apollo. Canada also joined the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In December 2001, Canada dispatched 40 members of its elite anti-terrorist group, Joint Task Force 2, to the Kandahar region of Afghanistan. A second deployment took place in mid-January 2002 which aimed at re-establishing the Canada-Afghanistan diplomatic relations. Canada also participated in Operation Athena in 2003. Canadian involvement began to increase after July 2003, when Canadian Brigadier-General Peter Devlin was to handle 3600 soldiers of the Kabul Multi-National Brigade for six months. On 14 April 2004, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin announced that Canada would continue to keep 600 troops and 200 air force personnel for the purpose of reconnaissance in Afghanistan. In August 2004, an important decision was taken to deploy Canadian troops from Kabul to Kandahar. In June 2005, Canadian soldiers established a base for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Canada refocused the PRT for the purpose of peace-building in Afghanistan. PRT constituted of Canadian force with civilian, diplomatic corps, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (McDonough 2007).

The government of Afghanistan agreed with the international community to establish a democratic state with a free market economy in exchange for long-term financial commitments from the developed countries in 2006 at the London Conference. This agreement came to be known as the Afghanistan Compact and led to the creation of Afghanistan National Development Strategy focusing on three components, viz. security and governance, the rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development (Holland 2009).

Keeping the inevitability of the security of Kabul in mind, the ISAF was given mandate by the UN to help the Afghan authorities maintain security in Kabul and

surrounding areas which resulted in Afghanistan Compact being launched in London on 31 January 2006 (Independent Panel Report 2008).

But the authority of Afghanistan is pseudo in nature and operates through the coalition of Mujahedin, warlords, drug lords, oil company executives and US agents which are compounding the security situation in Afghanistan (Dobbin 2009). However, there were improvements in not only socio-economic fields, but appreciable success was achieved in the field of political system in Afghanistan (Roi 2008). But the whole electoral process in Afghanistan was fundamentally anti democratic and it was a practice of neo-colonial power. So, this kind of undemocratic Afghan government has very little legitimacy and is unpopular among the Afghan people (Warnock 2009).

Kandahar PRT has been under Canada since August 2005, consisting of more than 300 people. It is composed of the expertise of diplomats, development experts, police and military as part of the whole of government approach supporting a broad range of activities (Holland 2009). A sad understanding of the risky situation in Kandahar and the meaning of the deployment of Canadian forces to Kandahar was internalized after the civilian diplomat Glyn Berry, the first Canadian political director of the PRT was killed by a car bomb in January 2006 which impeded an effective Canadian civilian presence in Kandahar for several years afterward due to security concerns, and military personnel were compelled to take over most development assistance work (Khan 2008).

In Afghanistan, Canadian Force oversees security and the issues of governance, and the rule of law and human rights are undertaken by other Canadian departments and agencies, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) while the CIDA leads on development. Besides this, police training and the operation of prisons are taken care of by other agencies, such as the RCMP and Corrections Canada. And in turn, all these departments and agencies work under Kandahar PRT. It was in connection to evaluating the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan that Manley Report was published in 2008 (Bourque 2006).

February 2006 proved to be a significant month for Canada's growing military involvement in Afghanistan. On 24 February, Canadian troops officially took over the province of Kandahar from the US troops. On 8 March 2006, Canada launched one of

its biggest military operations, especially in rural areas to root out the Taliban insurgents. In April 2010, about 2800 Canadian troops were present in Afghanistan; and Canada had contributed the 5th largest contingent to the ISAF and it had the 3rd largest contingent to carry out combating missions (Holland 2009).

The Canadian participation, alongside US, in combat duty has not been without domestic political opposition. A poll conducted by Decima research in 10 April 2006 showed that 46 per cent Canadians were opposed to Canada's participation in military operations, with about 45 percent supporting for the cause. Another poll conducted by the Strategic Council For CTV and The Globe And Mail presented the picture, with 54 percent Canadians opposing the deployment of the Canadian force in Afghanistan, out of which 23 percent were strongly opposed to it. Yet another poll by the Strategic Council on 19 July 2006 brought out the fact that 56 percent Canadians completely opposed while 39% favoured the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan. The main reasons for the fast depleting popular support for the Canadian government's policy in Afghanistan are as follows: First there has been a lack of transparency and communication with public. Second, popular support also decreased with the change in the nature of the mission from peacekeeping and reconstruction to combat. Thirdly, the Canadian government's association with the US, increasingly seen as displaying imperialistic behaviour, also led to a decline of support. Fourthly, the loss of life of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan was also a cause. Finally, a divided House of Commons: the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the Bloc Quebecois opposed this mission (Fletcher et al. 2009).

From 2001 till date, no differences could be marked out between the governments, liberals and conservative regarding the Canadian troop's deployment in Afghanistan. But, in a debate in the House of Commons in 15 November 2005, NDP leader Bill Blaikie opposed the deployment of Canadians in Afghanistan and further pointed out this to be more like a war situation rather than merely a peacekeeping mission. He further stated that though in 2001 the earlier commitments of the Canadian government regarding the deployment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan was mainly for peacekeeping, it has now changed the role of the Canadian military in Afghanistan. Another debate held in May 2006 proposed in the House to extend the Canadian deployment in Afghanistan for two more years. In this debate Gilles Duceppe, the leader of Bloc Quebecois opposed this extension because the mission

was an unpopular one in Quebec, and further raised a question on its extension even though it was opposed by a large number of civilians in Canada. Adding to this, NDP also was against the decision of extension of the mission in Afghanistan. But, later on, this motion was passed with a low margin of 149 against 145 MP's vote in the House. In 2008, Canadian government took initialisation to withdraw the Canadian force from Afghanistan in 2011. But in November 2010, it extended the withdrawal of Canadian troops for the purpose of military training mission to train Afghan national army and the police (Laxer 2008).

After the 9/11 attack, the Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin produced National Security Policy document which attached much importance to Canada's role in international security. The document also envisaged Canadian force to be flexible, responsive, capable of carrying out combat operations and able to work with its allies. It further stated that Canada would provide its experience of peace-building and good governance for the upliftment of the failed and failing states, would play an important role in countering international terrorism, would help in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and diffusing the inter and intra-state conflicts. Furthermore, Canada would help to restore peace, stabilise the country and rebuild democratic institutions. The document stated that Canadian foreign policy objectives are to defend its national interest, ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs, help Afghanistan rebuild into a peaceful and democratic country. To fight terrorism, Canada adopted the following methods which include mobilising civilians, empowering civil society, utilising information technology efficiently, and facilitating the development of new international norms. CIDA funded the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) initiatives for the development of Afghanistan. Canada also introduced a 'Signature' project for the development of Afghanistan basically applying it in the Kandahar province. As a part of this objective, Canada constructed an irrigational project in Dahla Dam which cost \$50 million in the 2008 and 2011 period, and where Canada provided nearly 10,000 Afghans with seasonal jobs. Furthermore Canada spent \$12 million over three years for improving education system across Kandahar and also spent \$60 million for polio eradication where it targeted around seven million children across Afghanistan involving 350,000 alone in the province of Kandahar. Canada adopted the 3D (Defence, Diplomacy and Development) approaches for reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan with the

help of PRT. The 3D approach originates from the UN Marine Corps concept of three block war. The three block war was as follows: firstly, combat operation against well armed militia forces in one city block; second, stabilisation operation in the next block; and third, humanitarian relief and reconstruction work over the two blocks (yari 2006).

Afghanistan has gained significantly from the human and financial (as opposed to the military) investment of Canadian resources due to several factors, including the strong leadership provided by Canada's ambassador, Chris Alexander, to the Canadian 3D team and the international community. Canada is one of the lead donors that uses the government's budget process for resource transfer and refrains from using parallel processes for planning and execution of programs (Lewis 2006).

Certain investments through Canadian NGOs failed to produce sustainable results e.g. women's radio stations and the Kabul Widows Program. Canadian Overseas Development Assistance investment in core development sectors, such as rural development and local governance, mine action, and microfinance programs, etc. and support to refugee and internally displaced people's resettlement generated positive results. But except for those in Heavy Weapons Cantonment, the security sector investments displayed weaker indicators of success. Millions of dollars have already been invested by Canada in this province and more have been promised. The funded programs range from Kandahar-focused national programs such as the National Solidarity Programme, National Area-Based Development Programme, National Rural Access Programme, and Mine Action to assistance for strengthening the justice system and the police, basic needs assistance for vulnerable rural families, polio eradication, maternal health, emergency food assistance, and infrastructure development (Banerjee 2008).

A Canada-based media development organization, called the Institute for Media, Policy, and Civil Society and funded by the CIDA and other sources, worked for the empowerment of women in Afghanistan (Kamal 2007). In Afghanistan, there is no confidence in the legal system and corruption is rampant which led to the failure of the program for humanitarian assistance. (Warnock 2009). On 5 December 2001, the Bonn agreement was adopted which outlined guidelines and timelines for the establishment of the post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan. The establishment of

an independent judiciary, reestablishment of the 1964 constitution and creation of several commissions with the aim of rebuilding the rule of law were the main focus of the Bonn Agreement (International Crisis Group 2010).

Canada argued that it is under the threat of international terrorism. The main points of national interest for Canada in intervening in Afghanistan are protection of national security, preservation of the institutional order and promotion of Canada's international influence and values. Canada adopted multilateral approach to international diplomacy because it wanted to be in limelight in the affairs of international politics. According to Canada, post 9/11 a new world order was created which focused mainly on global terror, global struggle and global threat, and for these dimensions, the 9/11 attack was not just against the US but on the entire international community, which therefore needed to be tackled collectively. It was further understood that the terrorism alone is not a global threat; but the root cause of terrorism also is a threat to all the nations. And it's precisely for this reason that terrorism should be foremost acted upon in those areas where it originates. With terrorism threatening the fundamental values of the Western societies, which are peace, security and freedom, the menace has to be tackled effectively through military means. Furthermore, it states that financial measures, international transportation, customs and energy should be most essentially protected from the harmful effects of terrorism.

Canada also supported and participated in US mission in Afghanistan because of its proximity and interdependence regarding trade relations with US. The daily Canada-US trade is worth about 1.9 billion dollar, with Canada depending upon US for about 80 per cent of its exports and it meets about two-third of its import needs from US. The three most important key objectives of the Canadian forces therefore were to defend Canada, to defend North American region and to maintain international peace and security. The Canadian forces have been fully engaged in all international operations, ranging from humanitarian assistance, to stabilisation operation to combat roles. After the US, Canada was the first country to deploy its forces for reconstruction in Afghanistan. For the sake of its domestic security, Canada had also signed the US Smart Border Agreement in December 2001 with US. Furthermore, Canada also joined hands with the US to satisfy the security concerns of the United States. Furthermore, it can be noticed that Canada entered into the affairs

of Afghanistan to also regain its lost diplomatic lustre in the world arena (EK and Fergusson 2010).

The trade relationship between US and Canada is run by US Canada Free Trade Agreement which comes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (EK and Fergusson 2010). The existence of the US Canada Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA represented the focus of border policies. The US knows the importance of NAFTA as a long term solution to its Southern border Security problems where illegal migration and drug smuggling are the serious issues. The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams was the centre piece of the policing mentality and it was placed along the border area and also coastal areas (Salter 2010).

North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement (NORAD) agreement was signed between US and Canada in 1958. This agreement encourages cooperation in aerospace technology and air command between two countries. After the 9/11 incident, the two countries reached a consensus about Bi-National Planning Group based on NORAD to develop cooperation in the crisis, such as terrorist attack and other crisis. In February 2004, Canadian government announced not to participate in Missile Defence System under civilian pressure of Canada (EK and Fergusson 2010).

Despite the Canadian troops deployed in Afghanistan for complete five years, we can still find Taliban insurgency prevailing in Afghanistan. Despite the presence of the international organisations, subsequent elections witnessed there have been completely fraudulent. Government and economic opportunities could be enjoyed by only a few elite civilians in Afghanistan. 106 million Afghans still today depend on opium production for their living. Even today, especially in rural areas, people stay under the fear of Taliban insurgents. People are also under the threat of the bombardment by the various international forces. The insurgency in Afghanistan mainly is composed of the tribal groups, militias, militants, insurgent warlords, religious leaders and organised criminal gangs and it is to be noted that, despite their numerous efforts, Canadian diplomats and other international forces could not tackle these agents of insurgency in Afghanistan. Thousands of civilian deaths have been recorded in Afghanistan following the combat force operations. According to Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), international force

assaulted the civilians in the name of Taliban in Afghanistan, for instance, carrying out raids in houses of the civilians, shooting at the common public in the streets, thus violating the civil rights of the Afghans. In the combat led operations, Afghan police were killed even more than the international force. For example, from May 2006 till August 2007, 406 Afghan police officers were killed in comparison to 170 international soldiers. According to an estimate, in 2007 and 2008, 3,641 civilians were killed by both international troops and resistance forces in Afghanistan and many lost their homes and livelihood which casts negative impacts on the development and stabilization of Afghanistan (Gaston 2009). According to the Senlis Council, there are 10 and 15 refugee camps in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar under the Canadian and British conventional war tactics (Dobbin 2009).

Furthermore, the opium production in Afghanistan has alarmingly increased by 100 per cent from 2001 to 2007. According to UN World Drug Report of 2007, Afghanistan contributes 93 percent of the total opium production in the world. In Afghanistan itself, the most amount of opium is produced in the southern region of Afghanistan which is mostly under the influence of Canadian forces. Due to the defects in past peace-building exercises in Afghanistan, the construction of a functioning Afghan state leading to the government's legitimacy and authority suffered. A fundamental problem remains the lack of state institutions capable of implementing a monopoly on power and a unitary legal order. The failure to achieve the desired turnaround in Afghanistan is in part due to conflicts between short-term political agendas and long-term state building processes. Such conflicts must be transcended if Afghanistan is to move from being a fragile to a stable state. Many surveys were conducted from time to time among Canadians to gauge the public opinion regarding Canadian involvement in Afghanistan which show diverse and changing attitude of Canadians with the change in time, region and affiliations etc., and affected by the imminent situation in the time of the survey (Ghufran 2008).

Research Questions

- How Canada responded to the 9/11 attack and what was the position of Canada post 9/11?

- What changes are brought about in the foreign and defence policy of Canada with respect to the ongoing mission in Afghanistan and what were the relations of Canada with UN, NATO and US?
- What are the Canadian national interest in respect to mission in Afghanistan, the Canadian perspective in Afghanistan intervention and the Canadian diplomatic role in reconstructing Afghanistan?
- What are the Canadian domestic policies during the ongoing mission in Afghanistan?
- What are the major roles of Canada in the reconstruction of Afghanistan?

Hypothesis

Commitment to NATO and the relationship with US have shaped Canadian perception and role in Afghanistan.

Chapterisation:

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Canadian Perception and Policy towards Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11

After detailing the reaction and response of the Canadian government towards the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in US, the chapter shall examine the United Nations resolutions which gave mandate for an international force to establish stability and democracy in post 9/11 Afghanistan. This was carried out in consensus which can be seen in the establishment of ISAF in Kabul. In second phase the deployment shifted from Kabul aiming at re-establishment the Canada-Afghanistan diplomatic relations. This participation is called as an Athena Operation in 2003. The third phase in Kandahar where United States led NATO forces took a lead role. This chapter would explore the three phases and also would try to find out the reasons behind the changing policies at every level.

Chapter 3: Combat and Non-Combat Functions in Afghanistan

This chapter focuses on Canadian military and civil role for reconstruction such as education, health and some basic infrastructure in Afghanistan. It also states the combating role of Canada and its various military strategies and operations. Furthermore this chapter focuses on Canada's contribution in stabilising Afghanistan.

Chapter 4: Domestic Political Debate on Afghan Issue

Different governments have followed the same policy of approval to Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. But the public opinion gathered by various groups in Canada show dissatisfaction with Canadian government involvement in Afghanistan. The opposition party NDP and Bloc Quebecois also opposed their government's approval. This chapter would explore the various debates in parliament and party-based approaches and the public opinion regarding the Afghanistan. It will also analyse the interventions by different labour organizations in opposing the war and mobilising opinion against it.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This chapter shall present the summary and conclusions of the preceding chapters and based on that make some prognostications as to perception, policy trajectory and phases in Canadian involvement in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER TWO

CANADIAN PERCEPTION AND POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN IN THE WAKE OF 9/11

This chapter details the shifts in the foreign policy of Canada, especially pertaining to its relations with the US and its role in global affairs. Until 2001, and especially in the 1990s, Canadian people and the government stressed the peacekeeping role of the country, and as a “balancer” in international relations. With the incidents of the 9/11, the Canadian government entered into more of a “combat” role, with attempts by the establishment to also come closer as an ally to the United States, partly due to the close economic interests. This was paralleled with a shift away from crucial roles in the UN peacekeeping agenda and a move more towards NATO’s armed invasions of Afghanistan. The justification for this by the Canadian government was through a security-centric approach, stressing national security in the light of possible further attacks by the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the West, especially Canada. The chapter first provides a background to Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War, from its attempts to generate an independent policy to its desire to be a close US ally. Next, it will highlight and the contrasting role Canada has played in the UN and in NATO. It will also go into the nature of Canada-US relations, stressing the importance of economic ties and agreements, and dependence of Canada on the US economic demand and supply. Finally it will cover the kinds of involvement of Canada in Afghanistan, in combat and reconstruction.

Background of Canadian Foreign Policy

Till the Second World War, Canada was the dominion country of Britain. The role of Canada in the world politics was decided by Britain. Canadian participation in both the world wars was dictated by Britain. The end of the Second World War marked a significant change in world politics in the form of decline of Britain as the

world power and the emergence of the two super powers, the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The control of Britain over Canada declined and Canada for the first time started participating in world politics more independently than before. Though Canada even after Second World War still remained as the member of the Commonwealth nations but in a significant departure from the past aligned itself more with US. Canada played significant role in the emergence and formation of the United Nations and joined United Nations as an active member. Canada also joined military alliance NATO under the leadership of the US.

Canada has remained a committed member of the UN since its inception in San Francisco in 1945 and since then has actively participated in its activities. It was among the first few UN members to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. In 1948, Canada contributed its troops to the peacekeeping mission operated by UN observer groups in Palestine. It also sent its forces to UN mission in Pakistan in 1949 to supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan on Kashmir issue. Canada also sent its troops as a part of UN Temporary Commission in Korea in early 1950s and the fourth largest contributor to UN operations in Korea. It was a Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, who played a significant role in restoring peace during Arab-Israel during Suez Crisis in 1956. He offered the idea of maintaining peace between Arab and Israel after the Suez crisis through UN peacekeeping forces (Windsor et al. 2008). The efforts of Pearson in peacekeeping led him to the award of Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Such contributions of Canada in world politics marked transformative events in its foreign policy and demonstrated its ability to make significant contributions in resolving international disputes and to maintaining a stable and peaceful international system.

According to Robertson (2010), the Canadian foreign policy has been broadly guided by the five principles of January 1947. These principles continue to remain the defining feature of the Canadian conduct in international politics. The first principle deals with the national unity of Canada despite its cultural and linguistic diversity. The then Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent argued for the united external policies despite differences. He warned against not just linguistic and cultural division but also of sectionalism and the danger of extravagant regionalism in formulating united foreign policy.

The second principle emphasised on political liberty and collective security. It underlined the liberal political institutions of Canada even when freedom or liberty was violated in other parts of the world. The third principle stressed on respect for the rule of law in national and international affairs. It illustrated the observation of the international laws and commitment as the necessary antecedent to self-government. Prime Minister St. Laurent defined fourth principle as the distinguishing feature of the west which emphasised on 'human values'. He highlighted that commitment to 'human values' was the most significant aspect of Canadian foreign policy. Last but not least, the principle emphasised Canada's willingness to accept international responsibilities (Robertson 2010).

In continuation of its five principles, Canada participated in several international and regional organisations at multilateral and bilateral levels. Canada joined international joint commission on trans-boundary water disputes, concluded Ogdensburg Agreement for mutual defence and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which effectively set the stage for NORAD. Canada also concluded economic agreements such as Free Trade Agreement with US and formed NAFTA with other North American countries along with the US. The then Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent emphasised on economic treaties along with military and strategic agreements with other nations as for him economic reconstruction of the world must go hand in hand with the political reconstruction. He said that, "*There was also the very practical reason that we depended on markets beyond our borders for our economic prosperity*" (Robertson 2010).

Canadian Multilateralism in UN and NATO

Canadian multilateralism shows the importance of Canadian national interest and ideas for confining new direction to the big and small powers. Because of these reasons Canada has been participating actively and attentively in the UN and further in NATO. At the time when Canada was a non permanent member of the Security Council, Ottawa responded to international humanitarian emergencies in the form of using military forces. Though Canada changed his multilateralism with UN and started to develop new ideals and interest outside the multilateralism. Another change occurred in 1990s in the multilateralism history of Canada but Canada was still being

considered among the top ten contributors to UN till the beginning of 21st century. However, Canada had given a new direction to the UN peacekeeping role and operations (EK and Fergusson 2010).

Canada always provided its military for international peacekeeping missions. In Suez crisis 1956, Canada sent peacekeeping troops in the first UN military peacekeeping operation to resolve this crisis. Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping operation ranging from Cyprus and the Sinai, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, to currently Afghanistan (EK and Fergusson 2010).

In 1950, the first operation of the UN Security Council was the 1950 intervention in Korea, followed by operations in 1991 Gulf War and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991. UN and NATO have Canada's participation in all the operations and programmes in the form of military participation and peacekeeping. Basically Canada had used military under UN and NATO command for peacekeeping goals. All these operations were endorsed by a multilateral treaty supported by 190 states under UN charter. However, UN operations varied many times, but Canada's participation took the form of a different role player and an adviser in world peacekeeping and human security with civilian protection issues. In the half of 1990, the Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy made little change in Canadian foreign policy and replaced the security of states agenda placing human security agenda in main stream (Furtado 2008).

The role of Canada was most important for establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the participation of Canada in the UN Security Council mission had got emphasis. Subsequently, the human security agenda was presented by Canada on the occasion of 1999 crisis in Kosovo, but UN Security Council did not agree clearly and continued its principles that are use of force. Soon Canada derived a strong UN framework for physical and legal protection of civilians and to reduce violence and conflict against civilians. Canada was also working for peace building besides the human security agenda and established a peace building fund in 1998. After unsuccessful protection of civilians in Rwanda, Canada played an important role in creating the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty with UN, when UN debate was focused on humanitarian intervention. In 2001, the Responsibility to Protect was established for those states that would be unable to stop

mass crime, violence against civilians, ethnic conflict etc. The Responsibility to Protect is an act which reveals the multilateral organisations help conflicted states. Canada played diplomatic role in multilateral organizations and brought about acceptance of Responsibility to Protect Act to G77 (Group of 77) and NAM (Non Aligned Movement) countries (Bellamy and Williams 2005).

Canada had moved away traditional peace keeping and peace building along with UN. Since 2001 Canada's contribution for peace building shows the shift, when 2800 Canadian forces were sent to Afghanistan under NATO, 184 forces and personnel sent to six different UN peacekeeping missions. These policies and agendas show the agreement in Canada's contribution to peace keeping when we find no military and police officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations appointed by Canada. There was no military commander, police commissioner, or special representative in Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Since 2001, there was general decline in western contribution to UN peacekeeping operations and the figures of UN reveal that the Canadian participation and contribution also declined (Bellamy and Williams 2005).

Western countries including Canada started taking less interest in UN peacekeeping programme and became more interested in NATO mission for western political economical interests. (Dorn 2007)

With increasing commitment to the US and NATO in Afghan Mission for the combating operation with the US-led war on terror agenda, there was simultaneously a decrease in Canada's contribution to the UN. From Paul Martin's Liberal Government onwards, Canada shifted the agenda towards military operations rather than contribution to human security agenda (Badescu 2010).

In 2005, Martin Government gave more attention to stronger Canadian defence and more cooperation with the US. In 2006, the Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Conservative Government continued to increase Martin's government agenda and increased the defence budget and equipments. After this strategic shift, Canada's strategy was based on three keys: defending Canada, North America and maintain international peace and security. When Canada sent forces and civilian personnel to Afghanistan after US, it was considered as a change in Canadian foreign policy, which came out from the Harper government's decision. The defence policy

makers of Harper government set the agenda of becoming one of the finest armed forces in world (Moens 2008).

Canadian forces took a risk for becoming a single military mission with the spreading of 2800 troop counterinsurgency operation. According to Permanent Mission Report, 2009 Canada provided \$21 million to support the rule and the law in Afghanistan and contributed \$20 million to the Law and Order Trust Fund which helped pay salaries of police and correction officers in Afghanistan. In 2009, Canada declared an extra contribution of \$12 million to the Law and Order Trust Fund for new police recruits. Afghan Police were assisted by Canadian civilian and military police officers and also assistance was provided to increase the capability of Afghan National security Force. Beside the work under NATO force under ISAF in Afghanistan, Canadian forces and personnel were working in a political mission under the UNAMA. Referencing the humanitarian issues, UNAMA passed a new mandate in 2009, suggested by Canada. (Badescu 2010).

The number of personnel in the armed forces of Canada fell from 87,000 in 1989 to 52,000 in 2004, 56th largest in the world. Canadian forces also were strapped for resources to replace old equipment. Because of this trend in March 2002, a Canadian senate committee had decided to increase defence budget and equipment to counter the international threat and terrorism. The Senate report in November 2002, recommend for extending of troop to 75,000 and reconstructing the forces. The manpower and budget were also recommended to increase. Another Senate Report in September 2005 recommended for doubling to the defence budget (EK and Fergusson 2010).

And in April 2010 the military capacity was increased by Canadian government, it had 66,000 regular forces and 34,000 reserved forces. Canada drifted upward its defence budget; in February 2005 it contained \$12.8 billion that was largest military expenditure in the last two decades. Subsequently in 2006, Harper Government increased \$5.4 billion over the next four years. Canada's budget for the defence was decided at an expenditure of \$20 billion annually in 2008 to 2012 (EK and Fergusson 2010).

There were two military operations in Afghanistan, first is US led OEF and second is NATO led ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Many countries including Canada

participated in both military operations in Afghanistan. NATO mission was divided in four stages. Stage one in 2003-04, NATO moved in Northern part in Afghanistan, stage two began in May 2005 and NATO focused on Western Afghanistan, stage three in Southern part in July 2006 and stage four mission included entire Afghanistan. Mainly, Canada participated with large number of troop in stage three missions in southern part of Afghanistan (Gallis and Morelli 2008).

Canada was one of the first countries to recommend combat forces. In May 2006, Canadian Parliament voted and decided to send 2,300 troops into Afghanistan till February 2009. Public support for the mission decreased, in 2002, 66 percent polls supported the mission but only 44 percent supported the extension year till 2009 in Afghan Mission. When the mission in Afghanistan needed more force for Southern and Eastern Afghanistan, on 13 March 2008, the Canadian Parliament extended the commitment to keep troop in Afghanistan until 2011. NATO forces were also joined by Afghan National Army (ANA) during stage three, Britain, France and Canada troop had given more responsibility to the ANA in joined operation. By February 2008, 38,500 ANA troops joined this operation (Gallis and Morelli 2008).

Canada-US Relations

Canada fell into recession and was affected badly by the weakening of US economy. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of Canada jumped down 2.6 percent in 2009. Annual consumer price hardly registered at 0.3 percent in 2009. The unemployment rate fell down 5.8 percent in January 2008 and increased 8.7 percent in August 2009, until gradually falling back to 8 percent by July 2010. Canada supplied to US widely in the arena of energy such as Oil, Uranium, Natural Gas, Electricity and this nexus has been growing day by day. Canada contributes 24.05 percent of US crude oil import, and provides 31 percent of US natural gas import (EK and Fergusson 2010).

The trade relationship between Canada and US is the largest bilateral commercial relation in the world. In 1989, first time Canada-US relations, run by Canada-US Free Trade Agreement came under NAFTA in 1994. In spite of this agreement, the trade relation also started working under World Trade Organisation

(WTO). This bilateral trade amount was over 1.2 billion dollar per day in 2009. That was received from cross border trade. (EK and Fergusson 2010).

The existence of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA represented the focus of border policies. Important initiatives were also taken between Canada and the US in respect of border accord in 1990s. The shared agreement between Canada and the US in 1995, focused on the facilitation of trade reduction in transaction cost at border and policy related to border security in respect of smuggling narcotics and illegal movements of people. In 1997, accord of border vision was the main theme of pact, focusing on coordination, facilitation and low politics. The asymmetric nature of Canada-US-Mexico relation made Canada very much poor in respect of continental feast. The Free Trade Agreement represents different structure along with NAFTA in relation to Canadian economic health. The US knows the importance of NAFTA as a long term solution to its Sothern border Security problems where the illegal migration and drug smuggling is the serious issue. The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams was the centre piece of the policing mentality and it was placed along the border area and also to coastal areas. However, the main focus of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams was on drug smuggling and to maintain trust building (Salter 2010).

Table-2.1: Selected Trade and Investment Partners

(All data in billions of Canadian dollars)

	Exports to	Imports from	CDIA*	FDI**
US	348,2	208,9	164,9	228,4
Japan	8,5	13,4	9,1	9,7
U.K.	7,6	9,6	40,7	27,1
China (excl. HK)	6,6	24,1	0,5	0,4
Mexico	3,0	13,4	2,8	0,1
Germany	2,7	9,4	7,8	7,3
France	2,4	5,3	11,6	31,6
Italy	1,7	4,6	1,6	1,0
Brazil	1,0	2,3	7,6	0,8
India	0,9	1,6	0,2	0,1
Chile	0,4	1,3	5,9	n/a
Korea	2,3	5,8	0,6	0,3
Australia	1,6	1,7	7,8	2,0
World	411,4	355,2	399,1	357,5

Merchandise exports and imports from 2004, CDIA/FDI from 2003

*Stock of Canadian Direct Investment Abroad

**Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in Canada

Source: Government of Canada (2005), *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Commerce*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa

The NORAD agreement was signed between Canada and US in 1958. This agreement encourages cooperation in aerospace technology and air command between two countries. After the 9/11 incident, a new discussion grew about NORAD model along with military cooperation proposed by newly created US Northern Command, to the issue of including land and sea forces. But the Canadian Government declared that the land and sea forces of Canada would not participate in the command in August 2002. However, the two countries made a consensus about Bi-National Planning Group based on NORAD to develop cooperation in the crisis, such as terrorist attack and other crisis. The report of Bi-National Planning Group in 2006 brought a common security vision, joint military planning training and information sharing. Under NORAD, Canada and US are permitted to share information about Ballistic Missiles. Both countries also agreed to encourage the scope of encompass nautical surveillance. Bi-national Civilian Assistance Plan was signed by US Northern Command and Canada's Counterpart in 14 February 2008. In this agreement both countries work together with each other on the issues such as floods, earthquakes, civil emergencies and terrorist attack. Canada pointed out about NORAD agreement to the US and wanted to share information about US Missile Defence System. US officials got disappointed on this announcement by Canada. However in February 2004, Canadian Government announced not to participate in Missile Defence system under civilian pressure of Canada (EK and Fergusson 2010).

The Liberal Government announced that Canada would not participate in the US National Missile Defence Programme, in February 2005. And for this purpose, a large discussion was also done by the all parties in Canadian Parliament and a consensus was made to renew the NORAD agreement and not to participate in National Missile Defence Programme but later, Canadian military participation increased as per NORAD renewal agreement in 2006. The Canadian military personnel was assigned to work for NORAD under the US command to perform its NORAD related duties and also to perform non NORAD activities within other command, in this way, NORAD got height under the US military command system and its global operations. A reputed scholar Joel Sokolsky gives suggestion in respect of cooperation of Canada with US, Canada must simply put aside its armed control difficulties regarding the possible weaponization of space (Crosby 2010).

There was another issue of ICC on which both countries differ. In May 2002, Bush Government declared that US would disagree with ICC and the same day Canadian foreign minister Bill Graham declared this as extremely disappointing (Byers 2003). Canada's Human security agenda brought the result as, in 1990 the Ottawa Convention which declared to ban anti personal landmines and establishment of ICC (Cheung-Gertler 2007).

Canada became the first country to authorise Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and played a lead role in UN on nuclear weapon issues. The purpose of Canadian government is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and has been continuously opposing the legitimisation of any new nuclear weapon. In 1995, the US presented an argument that there was no description of the states which were allowed to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons before International Court for Justice. The Republican majority in Senate in US also refused to accept the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, and subsequently Bush administration condemned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 (Byers 2003).

American president Ronald Reagan started the Strategic Defence Initiative which had ability to shoot down Ballistic Missile in 1983 and President George Bush went forward one step ahead in form of the plane of Ballistic Missile Defence System. At the time of Cold War, Radar Stations were constructed in Northern Canada by NORAD. A new arms race between US, Russia, and China was initiated and hence Canada found itself in the middle. Although the Radar Stations by NORAD bluntly show Canada's interest but Canada was less interested in Ballistic Missile Defence System. US secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld pointed out that the weaponization of space is the final goal and objective under Ballistic Missile Defence System. But in 1998, Canada called for a committee for negotiating a convention banning all weapons from space within the conference on disarmament. (Byers 2003)

Post 9/11 Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy

The geostrategic position of Afghanistan is very significant that links Central Asia and South Asia. On the South-East its border is with Pakistan, on the west is Iran, on the North former USSR country Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

There are many ethnic groups in Afghanistan. In the South and East the Pashtun people live. The Tajiks as well as Turkmens and Uzbek are in the West and North; the Taliban came out in the Pashtun, South-East region Kandahar and border area with Pakistan.

Afghanistan can be said as an energy bridge for linking the gas resource of Turkmenistan and this energy serves life to economy of India and Pakistan. During post 9/11, America was working towards a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and later India, that time Taliban was governing Afghanistan. There were two projects, one led by US firm Unocal and Argentina's firm Bridas. The US government supported the Unocal during both Bill Clinton and Bush administration and negotiated with Taliban regime from 1997 to August 2001. But this negotiation broke down in August 2001 just before 9/11 incident, and later Hamid Karzai was appointed the main authority of interim government of Afghanistan with the help of Northern Tribes in December 2001. By the way Taliban was kicked away by US. This brought changes in the original plan of gas pipeline and it extended only to Turkmenistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan. In April 2008 TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) gas pipeline project was started with the joining of India. This project is being coordinated by ADB and US also supported it. The ADB is a multilateral Bank, which has 67 members, 48 from Asian region and 19 from other parts of world, in which Canada is an active member. Canada invested largely in this region. There were 35 Canadian companies in Kazakhstan and 4 in Turkmenistan in 2005. Therefore, Canadian firms would also benefit from the TAPI pipeline gas project (Foster 2009).

Canada US relation also came in a juncture in the wake of 9/11 attack, when it was declared that the hijackers entered from Canada. It brought different argument regarding Canada's law about immigrants. Some American policy-makers asked for tightening of America's border with Canada. 9/11 incident brought various steps taken by Canada and Washington in December 2001, the Smart Border Agreement was signed by both countries for improving border security and efficiency. This Agreement included air, land and sea traffic. In 2004, Canadian Government established a Department of Public Safety and Emergence Preparedness countering to the US Department of Security and a Border Service Agency. Beyond the sphere of border security, Canada took many actions such as broadening the law against terror,

increasing police investigation technique and power and enlarging cooperation between Federal Bureau of Investigation and the RCMP (EK and Fergusson 2010).

Both Canada and US are situated in North American Continent and the geostrategic and neighbourly position and trade relation of Canada and US made Canada to be partner of US. The Canadian Prime minister Jean Chretien said that the terror on US was like a terror on NATO members, and Canada found it as a threat on its own national security (Gibbs et al. 2005).

The foreign and defence policy of Canada, post 9/11 got drastically changed. The security of North America especially public security got more importance in the governmental plan of Canada. And this plan along with the border agreement with US came into existence in April 2010. According to this policy a lot of committee had been constituted for instance, a Cabinet Committee on Security, a National Security Advisory Council, a Department of Public Safety and Emergence Preparedness etc. Canada concluded a Safe Third Country Agreement with US in respect of refugees from US in 5 December 2002. The main motive behind these agreements was to undermine constitutional protections for human rights under Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedom and under International Law (Cheung-Grtter 2003).

Therefore, the agreements banned the refugees from US border to Canada and vice-versa. There are few exceptions to these agreements but they are extremely limited (Doherty 2003).

This agreement was opposed by the refugee groups and anti immigration groups in US. There are many problems with immigration at border. As a result it is likely to undermine security by leaving refugees venerable to exploitation by the unsocial elements like smuggler (Doherty 2003).

Canada always believes in peace not in war and this agenda differentiates Canada from US. Post 9/11 incident Canada became part of the war led by US because Canada wanted to keep good relation with US. Finally Canadian troops were sent to Afghanistan for peace-building but got indirectly a part of the war (Shazad 2011).

Canadian foreign policy believed in maintaining a balance between big and small powers and ensured its national security and played active role in all

multilateral grounds for doing so. Since 2001 Canada's participation in NATO mission in Afghanistan may reveal that the principle of powership and peacekeeping has been questioned because of Canadian military strategies in favour of peace building. Afghanistan mission brought a crucial juncture to evaluate the traditional role of Canada as middle power with Canada's new modern strategy. After participation in afghan mission, Canadian foreign policy is taking central consideration in this mission and due to dangle of Canadian forces in this mission more or less 10 years, Canadian Government made schedule to end with troop pullout as soon as possible. In the wake of 9/11 Canada took interest in playing its role in both UN and NATO as security partner of US, and Canada played its role in Afghanistan by sending its troop assisted under NATO (Murray and McCoy 2010).

Before the events of 9/11, Canadian ground troops were not sent overseas immediately, While in mid-October 2001 Defence Minister Art Eggleton was offering the *“unqualified support of the Canadian Forces for US military efforts to strike at terrorists and their supporters in Afghanistan and elsewhere”* (Sjolander 2009).

Canadian forces are required to stand for 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedom, although they are outside the country. In January 2002, the Charter was disobeyed when Canadian troops handed over Taliban and Al-Qaida suspect to the US without any assertion that the death penalty would not be applied if those suspects were convicted of terrorist or other offences (Byers 2003).

Canada is one amongst 39 countries whose troops increased in Afghanistan and these forces are in Afghanistan at the request of Afghan government under the command of UN. Canada committed to Afghanistan for developing a comprehensive international programme of aid to Afghanistan's security, governance and development. For this purpose, Canada contributed \$1.2 billion to Afghanistan between the years 2002 to 2011. Despite conflict, violence and destruction Afghanistan had some development progress that is Afghan economy grew 10 percent annually and per capita income also doubled. However, that the war in Afghanistan concerns Canada is a fact. The development was found in many areas such as 5 million refugee returned to Afghanistan since 2002, 6 million children started to go to school, power lines were restored, roads were being reconstructed, etc. Canada played the role amidst 51 countries that were running the program and plan for Afghanistan's

development, governance and security. However Afghan war affected the image and persona of Canada among multilateral community, and there is no doubt the future of Afghanistan will pose concern to Canada (Paquin 2009).

Canada should not be too much involved in military operations and should focus more on the development work as education, health, food, agriculture etc. In a way the idea of failed state exposes the neo-liberal development project in Afghanistan in the name of reconstruction, in which it also expose the western policy as responsible for the rebirth of colonial enterprises in Afghanistan (Warnock 2008).

In the wake of 9/11 incident, UN Security Council called for supporting the mission in Afghanistan for justice and stated that the attacks are threatening to global peace and security and cleared about the provision of NATO Treaty that the attack on US represents the attack on all NATO members. Within a week a war started between NATO and Al Qaeda and after that Taliban regime collapsed in November 2001. ISAF is a body authorized by UN to act against campaign and to maintain interim authority in Kabul and nearby areas. In January 2002, ISAF troops reached Kabul for the first time. In OEF, an operation led by US, Canada also joined their mission in Kandahar with 850 troops in February 2002, which was subsequently withdrawn on completion of operation in July 2002. Different units of Canadian military have joined this mission in Kabul under ISAF with up to maximum capacity as 1700 troops in the time duration of 2002 to 2005 (Paquin 2009).

Initially Canada participated as a part of ISAF but later re-increasing the troops in Kandahar region it became a part of US. The basic motive of Canadian army's re-deployment was for development and safe environment of Afghanistan. But Canadian parliament did not take any concrete decision for reunite different ethnic groups such as Pashtun, Tajik, Turkmen, and Persian in Afghanistan (Tylor 2006).

In Afghanistan mission, all three wings of Canadian army participated first time and the three objectives of Canadian security as defend Canada, defence North America and participate for international peace and security were focused. Post 9/11 Canada participated in Afghan war with the policies of homeland defence and forward security (Gimblet 2002).

After 9/11 incident, UN Security Council cleared taking action against attackers and organisers and Canada sent four war-ships to Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea and sent troops to Afghanistan in February 2002. Canada and Afghanistan also restored their diplomatic relation in 2002 and in September 2003, the Canadian embassy was opened in Kabul. In 2005, Canada established PRT in Kandahar city for helping to extend the Afghan government's ability to protect and deliver service to the people of province. Kandahar PRT was one of 26 PRTs in which there were 315 Canadian forces and personnel among 335 people (Paquin 2009).

Canada made commitment for human security to Afghanistan and participated in various doctrines and policies through Operation Athena, Operation Archer and PRT. Canada also deployed various forces like Canada Expeditionary Force Command, Special Operation Task, and Standing Contingency Force (McDonough 2007). Canadian military forces redeployment in year 2005 from Kabul to Kandahar is primarily to support Canada's mounting civilian aid in this area (Paquin 2009).

UN office declared the Opium as a big factor for destroying Afghanistan's security and cleared that Opium production in 2007 was 34 percent higher than in 2006 and 90 percent of Opium was supplied by Afghanistan in whole world production (Paquin 2009).

The world Drug Report 2007 of UN described that the opium production in Afghanistan increased almost hundred times since 2001. Afghanistan is responsible for 93 percent of illegal opium crop in world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) figured out that the cultivation area of opium grew from 165,000 hectares in 2006 to 193,000 hectares in 2007 and the net productivity rose from 6100 tons in 2006 to 8200 tons in 2007. The opium cultivation also differs in different region. In 2008, about 70 percent of opium came from five provinces that have border with Pakistan. The 50 percent of entire Afghan opium come from one single province Helmand. This southern province of Afghanistan has become the largest source of illegal drugs in the world. The effort of International community including Canada has failed to diminish opium. The American efforts was to persuade the Afghan government to destroy the drug cultivation but was rejected as it would affect environment, the other crops and may harm human health. Taliban used this opium money for their arms supply and Guerrilla Fight. It was found that the violence

and insurgency are more where opium cultivation is more active for instance Kandahar province. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF), the non-drug economy of Afghanistan grew up at same pace about 16 percent. Although the IMF report pointed out overall possible growth, this growth has not even touched the rural area. However the foreign fund Aid contributed 50 percent in this growth rate, after all 70 percent of Afghan people live below poverty line (Ghufran 2008).

There are several issues such as drug cultivation, conditions of lawlessness, religious extremism violence, insecurity etc in Afghanistan. It is in need of Aid to restore its society to levels of normalcy. These local institutions are needed to support to democratic government but these local institutions are not able to rise and sustain long term issues of peace and stability and governance and development. There are two aspects of Canada's intervention in Afghanistan: Canada's initial participation in Afghanistan was under United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and Canadian army move to Kandahar region, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin suggested that the external army for security purpose in Kandahar region because ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) could not handle security in Kandahar region. Canada participated in combat role as well as the development and reconstruction work in Afghanistan (Pigot 2007).

Canada has been participating continuously in the military operations in Afghanistan since 2001, in assistance with OEF and the ISAF. When the war was withdrawn, Canadians stayed with OEF in Afghanistan for staff and training capacity and to develop a future plan of ANA and ANP. Taliban and Al Qaeda activity varied province by province, for instance there were small Taliban groups in North-West Helmand province, and more actively found in southern province mostly in Kandahar province (Paquin).

Canada's contribution to development program in Afghanistan mainly through CIDA and DFAIT was \$100 million annually. The main objective was to build Afghanistan and help Afghanistan government and non-government organisation. Different activities in the field of socio-economic infrastructure, like road reconstruction and maintenance irrigation and other allied agro based infrastructure, microfinance to support primarily small enterprises to woman, education, rural development, and community development which are tools to strengthen local

democracy are the works which are in the list of programme through Canadian aid assistance. There have been several casualties in 2006. ISAF's Operation Medusa which was lead by Canada, a major strike against the insurgents in Kandahar area occurred in the month of September of that year itself. Post this event, number of Canadian forces Casualties has declined through 2007 (Paquin 2009).

The Canadian House of Commons did not support the government's decision to deploy Canadian forces and civilian in Afghanistan. In May 2006 it was decided that any military commitments after 2009 will be submitted to parliament. By the way 2,500 Canadian forces and civilians were sent and divided in three key missions, the battle group, the PRT and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. In January-February 2006 government of Afghanistan and UN called for the London Conference and Afghan Government presented the Interim National Development Strategy (Independent Panel Report 2008).

The American invasion of Iraq pressurised the Canadian government for its disagreements with US, although Prime Minister of Canada announced that they were with American on terrorism in Afghanistan. This independent nature of Canada was possible because France and Germany also opposed the invasion of Iraq (yari 2006)

Document was published by the DFAIT that elaborated the review of Canadian Foreign policy and entitled Canada's International Policy statement. Prime Minister Paul Martin said the Canadian Forces expansion is for playing a leading role in peace support mission. In this International Policy statement, the country such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan are failed and failing states which create a challenge for Canada (yari 2006).

Under the Liberal Government of Chretien and Martin, the foundation of Canadian foreign and defence policy was based on 3D approach for rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan. There are mainly three objectives of Canada as to defend its national interest, assure Canadian leadership in world affairs and help Afghanistan to be a free democratic and peaceful country (yari 2006).

In January 2006, Stephen Harper became prime minister but the change of government did not change the policy regarding Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. There are two fundamental reasons in continuing and participating in

Afghanistan mission; they are wisdom of mission and to develop a new military leadership with new ideas focused on the mission.

Prime Minister Harper addressed the UN General Assembly and said about same as liberal policy on Canada engagement in Afghanistan. He also upheld the 3D approach as a rational and deliberate medium for an integrated foreign and defence policy (Yari 2006). Multilateral country had a different approach; the people were of the view that Canada must maintain its autonomy by defending Canadian beliefs and values (Haglund 2011).

In 2007, Canada defence policy by the new government shows a further extension of commitments made by Martin's Liberal Government. Human security affected the Canadian foreign policy and 3D approach came as a result, in which 3D included in single team's motto to help the population in failed states such as in Bosnia, Haiti and Afghanistan. The Canadian foreign policy shifted and focused more to the North Atlantic Alliance then human security and peace keeping culture as North Atlantic Alliance was considered third level importance in Canadian foreign policy in 1990s and later in European Union led mission as it started investing in NATO operation in Afghan operation. Canada's financial cost rose for approximately \$400 million in the 2005-06 financial years to \$1.5 billion the next financial year in military mission in south (Moens 2008).

Foster (2009) argued, the decision of sending the Canadian army was taken without any public and parliamentary debate. The landing of Canadian Army in Afghanistan shows two dimensions: the dependencies of economy upon US include ideology and military partnership; instant benefit by certain number of corporations in Canada.

Post 9/11 incident, the former American Ambassador to Canada Paul Celluci stated that Canadian military expenditure was deployed very significantly. He also stated the US believed that the security is more important than commerce, and George Bush declared Canada should support the mission otherwise it will be a support for terrorist. These announcements and statements revealed a clear message that if Canada did not agree to the same security agenda of US, it would affect the commercial relation between both countries. Canada supported and participated in the mission to keep its access to the US market. The mission in Afghanistan was

handled and directed by US. The multilateral organisation NATO took lead role, which invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 October 2001. The Article says that, an armed attack against any NATO member is considered an attack against all of them (Foster 2009).

To protect the Canadian Border was the central agenda of Canada's national security policy and hence established a Unified Canadian Border Services Agency. By 2003 there was less interest in its border relationship with US because the American point of view described that Canadian should assume the only security and border issues are the US' problems, while the Canadian perception was post 9/11 provided the prospect to negotiate economic security for Canada in exchange for national security for the US. The US's Department of Homeland Security created two major programmes, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in 2004 and the Secure Border Initiative in 2005 for entry into the US by air, land and sea. A passport and proof of citizenship were required in Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and the objective of Secure Border Initiative programme was to militarize the Mexican and Canadian border (Salter 2010).

A growing consensus appeared within the Canadian policy community with the 9/11 incident and global politics had changed with regard to the terrorism. The human security agenda of Canada embraced the counter-terrorism agenda of its American partner. However, there was an argument in response to assure the physical safety and human rights of Afghan people in the invasion that seemed to be inevitability imminent but Canada was silent. Canada participated in armed operation along with NATO and US for destroying Taliban from power in Afghanistan and eradicate the responsible for 9/11 attack (Grayson 2010).

The result of January 23 federal election in Canada provided a reason to be pleased to the Bush administration, as not only Harper was pro American but also supported the agenda to move Canada in a market oriented direction. After winning election within two months Harper Government appointed Michael Wilson as Canadian ambassador to US. Wilson was the part of the Mulroney government and also former finance minister in conservative government during 1980s and early 1990s, who negotiated the original Free Trade Agreement with the US in 1988 (Eagles 2006).

However, after 6 months the Harper government promised improvement in bilateral relationship and announced to deploy Canada's force in Afghanistan up to 2,200 troops in Southern region in Afghanistan. Comparing the budget of May 2006, in additional spending on policing, border security and public safety the budget of Harper government was \$1.4 billion while US budget was \$1.26 billion and over the next two years Canada's budget was \$1.1 billion while the budget of US was \$0.9 billion increased (Eagles 2006).

Canada participated in war against terror and Canadian government argued that security of the people of Canada is very important. If the terrorist attacks Canadian people, Canada will defend itself. According to Stephen Harper in 2007, in the 9/11 terrorist attack on North America and on Canadian people, so it is the responsibility of the government to participate in the war against terror, being a part of NATO, UN peacekeeping member, the Canadian government will help the international community from the terrorist activities and the people of Canada being good citizens must help the people of Afghanistan (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010).

Canada's involvement and sacrifices in Afghanistan serve in the national interest and the values. It is not about the foreign aid only but also humanitarian aid as well. Canada must protect the idea of freedom; believe in democracy, human rights and rule of law. Afghanistan is the threat for these all because it is the centre of terrorist Taliban and Al Qaida militancy groups. To combat the mission, Canadian government participated in the activities of ISAF and humanitarian aid programme because Canada made commitment to international community under the UN mandate. An elected Afghan government invited them along with 36 other countries of the world. Canadian soldiers, diplomats and human value workers were in Afghanistan to defend the universal human rights in Afghanistan. In this respect, the Canadian military performed its role to shift Afghanistan and established Canada as the good international citizen (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010).

Canada's Prime Minister Harper 2007 argued that the concept of global security is to increase the legitimacy of Canada's mission. If Canadian government fails in Afghanistan, this country will plunge into anarchy and once again Afghanistan would become a haven for the extremist and terrorist and the world will face more dangers. In this way, Canada's national security along with the world security and the

security of Afghanistan kept working with main concern, because a stable and developed Afghanistan would be beneficial for the world peace and security. Canada's mission in Afghanistan was a national interest of Canada in the wake of 9/11, because in this incident North Americans as well as Canadians were also killed. Harper said "*when terrorist attacks Canadians, Canada will defend itself that's why we are in Afghanistan.*" To achieve this, Canadian government increased the defence spending up to 18 billion dollar in 2006-07 and Canada became world's thirteenth largest nation in defence spending and sixth among NATO's (Bell 2010).

They enlightened self interest, which was not only good for Afghanistan but also well for Canada. Today, image of Afghanistan is recognized with terrorist or the heaven for terrorist. That's why George W. Bush said in 2005 that this mission has a global campaign of fear with a global campaign of freedom. The representation of Afghanistan as a terrorist haven caused danger for the peace and security of the world (Bell 2010).

The Canadian government's effort in the development of the Afghan Human Right establishment of democratic environment protecting women and children established Canada as a protector. Canada's role involves both military and the government directed them as protector. It can be seen through the Prime Minister Harper speech to the military, in 2007 "*because of you, the people of Afghanistan have seen the institution of democratic election, freedom of women, the starting of human rights, the construction of school, health care facilities and the basic infrastructure of functional economy. Still, you know that your work is not complete. You know that we cannot just put down our arms and hope for peace. You know that we cannot say arbitrary deadlines and simply which for the best and you must know that your hard work is making a real difference to real people and their families.*" (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010).

This speech delivered by Prime Minister Harper shows the courageous work of military, NGOs and social workers to strengthen the democracy and protecting Afghanistan from Taliban and other militants group. Canadian forces helped the Afghani women and the children to join the mainstream of the development in the Afghanistan. Because of the efforts of the forces, the girl child goes to school and women are participating in government. With the help of Canadian government,

Afghanistan adopted a new constitution that recognizes the equality between man and women. As a result 25 percent seats are filled by women in Afghanistan Parliament. But scholar Chandra Mohanty argued the importance of critically assessing representation of Afghan women as the helpless passive or innocent casualties of patriarchal cultural tradition, religions and government. The Taliban enacted policies violently to repress the women's rights, education and activities is not in contention. But the real image of Afghan women is not highlighted by western media. However, there have been a lot of changes in the face of Afghanistan by the efforts of Canadian government to project Canada as a protector (Sjolander and Trevenen 2010).

Human security was the most important agenda of the Canadian government post 9/11. Human security has never been in critical opposition to the status quo of the national and global stage. Canada's human security agenda was always content to work within them. Traditionally when outcomes failed to meet the desired aims and objectives, the role of the analyst was to pinpoint the results. The story of human security in Canadian foreign policy cannot simply be reduced for bad behaviour or elite manipulation. The culture is the main theme to understand the general public. And the second was structural; it was within the forms of governance that guide, practice and informs our understanding of the possible (Grayson 2010).

The recent report on Afghanistan suggests that NATO mission has not achieved its goal to alleviate poverty and provide security in Afghanistan. The self image of Canada in the world stage as a force for peace is still lacking, to maintain this image, there is need of self fulfilling prophecy in the name of peace and human betterment. Canada's whole government approach flows from an under criticized self interest that claims that what is good for Canada is also good for Afghanistan because Canada and Afghanistan have no similar political and economic condition. It is not the aspect of the military mission which may be controversial but to gain the process of peace building as well (Bell 2010).

UN mission in Afghanistan was complicated as well as more straight forward aspects for peace building tasks in Afghanistan. There was no long and difficult negotiation with the Taliban and there was no political structure for Taliban supporters to integrate in post war time. And hence, a kind of result from post war ended with a conflict that is in total victory and total defeat. On 28 March, 2002 the

UNAMA was established by Security Council for international assistance to Afghanistan. The primary objective of UNAMA was to implement the provisions of Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan under the assistance of the UN and US, on 5 December 2001. The agreement provides a framework for Afghan interim administration and the establishment of a following intermediary government for better governance of Afghanistan. The Afghan interim administration set up a Central Bank, Independent Human Rights Commission with the assistance of UN. It will also fight against terrorism drugs and crimes, but the agreement shows that Afghan Interim Administration can merely take command of all armed forces. However, the Bonn agreement was a parliamentary step after war, the main decision related to power sharing in political and military area, the objectives of reconstruction and rebuilding Afghan was taken as a peace building process (Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand 2002).

CHAPTER 3

COMBAT AND NON-COMBAT FUNCTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

The war in Afghanistan has proved a contravention of Canada's domestic laws on self defence and carried out in the larger US interests. Despite the repeated losses, Canada has increased its involvement in Afghanistan over time. This chapter will detail the combat and reconstructive roles played by Canada in the Afghan War. It begins by laying out the means adopted by the US and NATO allies to enter and wage war against Afghanistan. It points out the involvement of Canadian troops in the highest conflict areas such as Southern Afghanistan, and especially Kandahar which is a Taliban stronghold. This has led to loss of life among the Canadian troops. Thus, it covers the combat role played by Canada. It also goes into the various kinds of reconstruction activities carried out by NATO, especially the PRTs which were established initially by the US and later taken on by Canada as well. Thus the chapter demonstrates the close connect between the development work and combat carried out by NATO. Finally the chapter goes into the political reconstruction and new governance with the NATO forces in Afghanistan and looks at the setting up of the regime and administration.

Combat Role of Canada

Afghanistan is a country with the population of about 31.5 million which has been the target of foreign invasions over the millennia. Situated in the heart of Central Asia with a forbidding terrain, Afghan mountain passes have served as gateways for important commercial routes due to which the territory of Afghanistan has been termed as strategically important in imperial struggles over the centuries (Laxer 2008). Even after the end of the Second World War for several reasons Afghanistan had attracted attention from other countries and international organizations such as

UN. The member states of the UN and its operational agencies have long been preoccupied with the situation in Afghanistan over the last 30 years. Promotion of peace and security has been channelized, including through the imposition of sanction and humanitarian relief and development aid, through successive UN Security Council and UN General Assembly resolutions and special mandates (Independent Panel Report 2008).

After the Afghanistan-based Al Qaida group attacked the US on 9/11, a number of resolutions were issued by the UN Security Council that facilitated a way for the international community to provide support to the newly emerging Afghan transitional administration and the subsequent Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai in the areas of military, humanitarian, reconstruction and development. In December 2001, an international security force was established under Chapter VII of the UN Security Council Resolution 1386. This force was given the mandate to adopt all necessary measures to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in facilitating security in Kabul and its vicinities. Later, the Council renewed and expanded the mandate given to the ISAF from Kabul to all over the country beginning in 2003 through the resolution UN Security Council Resolution 1510. Since then, this mandate has been continuously renewed by the Council on an annual basis. The renewal of the mandate in September 2007 UN Security Council Resolution 1776 was a part of this routine. This resolution also urged ISAF to keep up its efforts in training, mentoring and empowerment of Afghan national security forces. The situation in Afghanistan was still perceived to be a threat to international peace and security by the Security Council (Independent Panel Report 2008).

But Guerre (2009) argued on the basis of International Law and Domestic law such as Criminal law of Canada, military intervention in Afghanistan by US and allay countries include Canada under ISAF force was illegal military mission. According to this law forces must not be used for revenge or punishment and as vigilantes, and secondly in Criminal Law of Canada self defence can only be used on the serious threat of death or bodily harm. In general it can be said that to justify the physical retaliation to an attack, self defence cannot be used within a few weak. In this situation the course of police action, legal proceeding and extra, can be taken. However, the concept of self defence is recognized by the Charter of UN, under International Law. In Article 51 of Charter of UN, there is no concept of individuals or

collective self defence against member of UN. If such action is taken then it is necessary to inform the Security Council because Security Council is the sole authority to maintain the international peace and security. According to Article 1 of Resolution 3314 of the UN General Assembly (1974), aggression is defined as the use of armed forces against state sovereignty, integrity and political independent of the other country. As per Resolution, instance of aggression consider as invasion, blockade, and bombarding.

The concept of self defence and aggression could not be used in case of Afghanistan after 9/11 incident. Because Afghanistan was never an aggressor state and the plan was never prepared on its territory, this planning took place in Germany. In both the International and Domestic Law, self defence cannot be invoked to justify an attack on a person and country who is presumed to be an aggressor. The US aggression against Iraq and Afghanistan was the case of preventive law, under the International Law such act and strategy is considered as illegal and illegitimate (Guerre 2009).

The UNAMA was created and authorized by the Security Council in March 2002 UN Security Council Resolution 1401 and demarcated its mandated activities. Since then, the UNAMA's work has been continuously renewed on an annual basis focusing on six main elements: political and strategic advice for the peace process; providing good offices, assisting the Afghan government with the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact; promoting human rights; providing technical assistance; and continuing to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the Afghan authorities (Independent Panel Report 2008).

On 12 September 2001, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked by NATO for the first time. This article formulates the principle of collective self defence according to which an attack against one or more of the Alliance partners should be treated as an attack against them all. Moreover, Article 5 gives a mandate to each and every NATO partner to take necessary action, including the use of armed force, in support of the ally attacked to safeguard their right of individual or collective self defence. In addition to this, the UN Security Council should be intimated of the actions pursued and that alliance actions should end as and when the Security Council

takes the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security (Independent Panel Report 2008). In realizing this article, America received pledges of military support from many nations, from the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand and Canada to France in the aftermath of 9/11 which eventually led to the participation of NATO and deployment of ISAF to Afghanistan Neville. Since late 2001, the Canadian Force was engaged in Afghanistan as part of the American led coalition in OEF and was deployed in Kandahar (McDonough 2009). Besides, Operation Enduring Freedom also included several special operations forces units from other Coalition nations like Canada's Joint Task Force 2, the German Kommando Spezial krafte, and New Zealand's 1st Special Air Service Group.

But according to Guerre (2009), the war in Afghanistan is directed by the US and ally countries or the members of NATO. There was no UN Security Council authorization for the US and NATO to attack Afghanistan. However, two resolutions were adopted in respect of 9/11 incident, the first resolution number 1368 on 12 September 2001 which stated: *“unequivocally condemn in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks...and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat of to international peace and security.”* The terms of the resolution did not authorize the Afghanistan War in respect of the individuals and collective self defence. Second Resolution number 1373 adopted on 28 September 2001 by UN Security Council, which stated that anti terrorism measures can apply on all states. In both the resolutions, the word Afghanistan was not mentioned but the Security Council allowed the US and its allied forces to prepare for and declare the Afghanistan War. The Security Council is not a neutral body, the five permanent member of Security Council have veto power which impairs the council capacity to prevent a war being conducted by any of the five; but in practice the US is more powerful in the UN Security Council. So the US used its influence in respect of Security Council majority.

Canada decided to go to Afghanistan as a result of the 9/11 incident which was further complicated by many new factors in the subsequent evolution of its policies. The tragedy of 9/11 alerted the international community to the dangers of terrorism and their vulnerability to similar attacks from terrorist groups in the future which resulted in a consensus that joint international action was necessary to eliminate such groups and their havens wherever they were located. President George W. Bush

explicitly demanded that all countries align themselves as “*either with the US or against it*” in the struggle. Afghanistan symbolized a key state in the broader effort to eliminate radical Islamic Jihadism which had particularly adopted Afghanistan under the Taliban as a safe haven for Al Qaida, an International Islamic Terrorist Organisation (Smith 2007).

The Chrétien government had committed 2,000 Canadian troops to Afghanistan as part of US OEF. This Operation, which launched the war to overthrow the Taliban government and is now handling counterinsurgency warfare against the various resistance forces identified as the Taliban, was completely under the control of the US and included the support of a few European States. To mop up the Taliban and Al Qaida forces, Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 Special Forces were deployed near Kandahar as part of the US military effort by 20 December 2001. Again in February 2002, armed forces were deployed to Kandahar to defend the airport and to fight the Taliban forces under Canada’s Operation Apollo (Warnock 2008).

Operation Apollo, the Canadian military’s contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom includes personnel from Canada’s naval, air and ground forces participating in various missions in Afghanistan. Canada contributed six warships and about 1,500 Navy Personnel for the participation in a range of naval operations encompassing force protection, fleet support, leadership interdiction and maritime interdiction operations. A total of about 500 air force personnel participated in Operation Apollo and provided strategic (one CC-150 Polaris) and tactical (three CC-130 Hercules) airlift, long range petrol craft and helicopters. About 850 ground troops forming the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group participated in Apollo and included three rifle companies and a reconnaissance squadron equipped with new, versatile Canadian made Coyote reconnaissance vehicles (specifically requested by the US), as well as their support units (Bouldin 2003).

Canadian forces not only conducted security and reconnaissance missions around Kandahar but also participated in three major coalition operations viz. Anaconda, Harpoon and Torii. The March 2002 Operation Anaconda was to root Al Qaida and Taliban fighters out of the mountains of Paktia Province. It consisted of 16 Canadian personnel, six snipers and an emergency extraction force. The land component of the joint US-Canadian operation Harpoon, an assault on a significant

pocket of Taliban and Al Qaida resistance, in support of Anaconda was commandeered by Canadian Lt. Col Stogran, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group. The coalition force engaged in Operation Torii, a three day mission to find and destroy Taliban and Al Qaida cave complexes in the Tora Bora region in early May 2002, which was also commanded by Lt. Col Stogran and included about 400 Canadian soldiers. Zabol Province and North-East of Kandahar saw the first coalition presence in the form of Canadian forces (Bouldin 2003).

In the spring of 2002, a "friendly fire" incident took place between Canadians and US forces. On 18 April 2002, four Canadians died and eight were wounded in the Tarnak Farm incident when a US F-16 fighter jet dropped a laser-guided bomb on a unit of Canadian soldiers. Canadian and US military inquiries were held to investigate the incident. The report of the Canadian military board reached the conclusion that the Canadian night live-fire exercise had been properly conducted and that the American airmen who contravened established procedures were responsible for the incident (Laxer 2008). The strategic military objectives for Operation Archer and the Canadian contribution to the US-led campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan have been outlined by The Department of National Defence in five points. First, reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in and around Kandahar. Second, help stabilize and rebuild the region. Third, help monitor security. Fourth, promote Afghan government policies and priorities with the help of local authorities and last to facilitate security sector reforms. According to the joint doctrine, operational level commanders should be instructed about these objectives and other components of military strategic direction in the form of a strategic directive. Canada offset US' opprobrium for staying out of Iraq by sending a second deployment of 2000 Canadian soldiers to Kabul in 2003 under NATO and the ISAF. Canada, in addition to its bilateral relations with US, has sought to play its role in Afghanistan within the broad framework of NATO and UN resolutions as a tool to legitimize its presence in Afghanistan (Smith 2007). Since August 2003, 5000 troops of the NATO-led ISAF mission, with the single largest contribution from Canada of more than 1900 soldiers, have helped Karzai government to stabilize. Canada is also assuming important command responsibilities exemplified by Lieutenant General Rick Hillier who was appointed the Commander of ISAF in February 2004 (World View Magazine 2003).

After the other NATO member countries sought to be deployed to more secure provinces in 2004, Canada took responsibility for Kandahar province. In 2005, taking over an American PRT, one of 24 PRTs, Canadian Forces moved to Kandahar. There are 2,500 Canadian troops in Kandahar, 30 Canadian Force personnel in Kabul involved in the maintenance of security. There is also a 15 member strategic advisory team of military planners which is assisting the Afghan government. There are various stabilization and peace building initiatives supported by Canada, mainly in the areas of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration of ex-combatants exemplified by the decommissioning of militia forces, the destruction of ammunition stockpiles, the collection and storage of weapons, de-mining, and landmine education (Smith 2007).

By June 2005, the decision to establish the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) was made up and in February 2006, a year after Hillier's appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff Rick Hillier, CEFCOM became operational. CEFCOM aimed at creating the clear hierarchy of command, necessary for cohesion and effectiveness abroad, lifting Canada's onerous restrictions or national caveats and aiding in the acquisition of equipment for Afghanistan. Strategic Advisory Team-Afghanistan (SAT-A), was another structural innovation introduced by Hillier when he became Chief of the Defence Staff in 2005. The origin of the idea of SAT-A can be traced to the days when Hillier commanded the NATO-led ISAF force in Kabul and sent in 2003 a team of Canadian Force officers at Karzai's request to help the Afghan Finance Ministry plan and launch a different kind of campaign focusing on accumulating and then deploying international investment and aid. SAT-A aimed at helping local officials to formulate and pursue clear policy goals and improving and streamlining the Afghan government's procedures. Another important objective of SAT-A was to help and clarify the direction to be adopted by the PRTs and integrate Canada's activities in Kandahar more intimately to the Afghan government's strategic goals and plans. This program, unlike CEFCOM was terminated in 2008 by Hillier upon his retirement (Marten 2010).

Kabul, the war-ravaged capital city of Afghanistan, is the test ground in ensuring the peace. Because of the country to be successful in its rebuilding efforts, a secure and peaceful atmosphere is a must for the transitional government and many other relief agencies. Keeping this inevitability in mind, the ISAF was given mandate

by the UN to help the Afghan authorities maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. Afghanistan Compact was launched in London on 31 January 2006 at a meeting co-chaired by the UN and the Government of Afghanistan and attended by representatives from 51 countries and 10 organisations. A series of critical goals and timelines for Afghanistan in the areas of security, governance and human rights, and social and economic development for the 2006-2011 period was set out in this Compact (Independent Panel Report 2008).

But according to Dobbin (2009) the Afghanistan government's authority is more or less fraudulent and it operates through a coalition of Mujahedin, warlords, drug lords, oil company executives and US agents. Post-9/11, the old Mujahidin, renamed the Northern Alliance, was created and helped by the US armed forces for toppling the Taliban. In the Afghan Parliament, many of the elected Members are accused of carrying out massacres, mass rape, torture and other war crimes. According to the Afghan women MP Malalai Joya, there are 13 former commanders with links to drug smuggling, organized crime and illegal militias in senior positions in the police force appointed by Hamid Karzai and his government. (Dobbin 2009). In the name of social and economic development of Afghanistan, US and its ally countries have asserted their domination in Afghanistan through the means of military power. Such humanitarian relief and military support by the US and ally countries has been key for the establishment of the unpopular and puppet Karzai government. It asserts its power in Kabul and all other parts of the Afghanistan (Neumann 2009).

In the year 2006, a command called Regional Command (RC-South) was established in Kandahar City which covered six southern provinces. 2,300 Canadian troops, second in number only to British troops, were deployed under RC-South in Kandahar province. Given the poor security situation in Kandahar due to the corruption from the booming opium trade, inadequate size, poor staffing and training and lack of sophisticated weapons of ANA and ANP, British, Canadian, and Dutch governments understood that their forces were entering a highly volatile area. But they were not prepared for the ferocious fighting that was to ensue by an intensified Taliban insurgency (Nagl and Weitz 2010).

Despite there being around 65,000 US and NATO troops and close to 40,000 members of the ANA active for peace and security purposes in Afghanistan till 2007,

Taliban and resistance forces have grown in large numbers and strengthened their organization. The conflict has increased and spread to Kabul and all other parts of the country. In comparison with earlier, the number of conflicts has doubled in the past year. The main reason behind the increase in the insurgency is the unpopularity of President Hamid Karzai and the national parliament of Afghanistan. Karzai has no mass base and little support for his government in the country. The image of the Karzai government is of a puppet government of the US in the view of a large section of Afghan People. The government of Afghanistan has been disreputably corrupt and characterized by nepotism and unfairness. The Afghan economy still centres on the production of opium and heroin and is influenced by the drug lords. Further, drug lords hold great power in the Karzai government and the legislature drug lords and local influence (Warnock 2009).

On 15 June 2006, Operation Mountain Thrust involving more than 11,000 coalition troops was launched as the largest offensive against the Taliban focusing on southern Uruzgan and northern Helmand provinces. During the months of June and July, over 1,000 Taliban insurgents were killed and almost 400 more were captured (Feickert 2006).

In the period between 2 September and 17 September 2006, a Canadian-led offensive in Kandahar Province named Operation Medusa involved about 2,000 ISAF and ANA troops in which 500 insurgents, one US soldier and twelve Canadian soldiers were killed. According to NATO officials, this operation succeeded in achieving its goal of expanding government control over rural areas of Kandahar Province (Feickert 2006).

The Joint Task Force Afghanistan Air Wing, known in Afghanistan as “Task Force Silver Dart” and comprising all Canadian Forces air assets deployed in the southwest Asia theatre of operations functioned from 6 December 2008 to 18 August 2011. The Air Wing contained three main units viz. Canadian Helicopter Force Afghanistan (CHFA), Canadian Heron UAV Detachment (CHUD), Tactical Airlift Unit (TAU) (National Defence and the Canadian Force: <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/aw-ea-eng.asp>).

To address civilian casualties, several mechanisms have been put in place. Most countries providing troops to the NATO-led ISAF have earmarked funds for ex

gratia payments to civilians suffering loss of life, limb or property in addition to formal claims systems. Moreover, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Afghan Government run various programmes for the survivors and victims of the conflict (Gaston 2009). Afghan civilians injured by Canadian troops are provided ex gratia payments by Canadian military. Canadian forces accept documents attesting to ownership signed by local elders if the real property has been damaged on the condition that evidence is provided to hold Canadian forces responsible for damage or harm. In case harm was suffered during joint ANA-Canadian operations and it is uncertain which force was responsible for the harm, payment will also be made (Rogers 2010). Canadian troops paid approximately \$243,000 from 2005 to 2008 as ex-gratia payments. Each and every case is expeditiously investigated and \$2,000 is sanctioned as ex-gratia payments under the Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces legal officers (Gaston 2009).

In 2007 and 2008, it is estimated that 3,641 civilians were killed by both international troops and resistance forces in Afghanistan. Not only have civilians been killed and injured but also they have also lost their homes and livelihood. The loss of a breadwinner, high medical or funeral costs, or the financial burden of sustaining disabled or dependent relatives can make even basic survival difficult for innumerable Afghan families living in destitution which in turn activates a vicious cycle of ripple effects on the development and stabilization of Afghanistan (Gaston 2009).

Table-3.1: Recorded Number of Civilian Deaths in the month of 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2007	50	45	104	85	147	253	218	138	155	80	160	88	1523
2008	56	168	122	136	164	172	323	341	162	194	176	104	2118
2009	141	149	129	128	271	236	198	333	336	162	165	164	2412
2010	173	197	198	211	166	322	312	350	207	290	171	180	2777

Source: Afghanistan Annual Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, published by United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), Kabul, Afghanistan March 2011

This data only shows government and UN records but there may be possibility that a lot more people were killed and injured. And there are no records for the initial period of 2001 to 2007 of Operation Enduring Freedom led by US and allies including Canada. In this period most of the bombardment by airlift took place, and there is a possibility of a large number of deaths and injuries to people. It can be said that a lot of refugees were bound to stay in camps and there are no records of where many war affected people were forced to go.

According to the Senlis Council, between 10 and 15 refugee camps were working in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, with strength of 10000 people in each camp. These camps worked under the Canadian and British, and were the result of Canadian and British conventional war tactics. They received “...little or no help from relief agencies” (Dobbin 2009).

Table-3.2: Recorded Number of Civilian/Female/Child deaths and injuries by Parties in 2010

	Civilian (death)	Female (death)	Child (death)	Civilian (death & injuries)	Female (death & injuries)	Child (death & injuries)
AGEs	2080	135	224	5446	324	770
PGFs	440	67	89	840	130	186
Undetermined	257	31	59	834	101	219
Total	2777	223	372	7120	555	1175

AGEs: Anti Government Elements

PGFs : Pro Government Forces

Source: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (2011), *Afghanistan Annual Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, Kabul

Table-3.3: Afghan Civilian Killed and Wounded by Parties in 2011 to April 2012

	Killed	Wounded
2011	3,021	4,507
Jan-Apr, 2012	579	1,216

Source: Chesser, Susan G. (2012), “Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress Report for Congress

The mission in Afghanistan was very expensive for the Canadian government. Not only in the respect of money, but also in terms of human loss such as military personnel, civilian development workers, diplomats. There was a lot of spending on equipment and post operational expenses in mission such as the rehabilitation of injured military personnel and the expenditure on beneficiaries of the death military personnel. Canada spent 90 percent of total cost on its military conflict in Afghan Mission (Dobbin 2009)

The following data shows the economic cost in Afghanistan Mission by the Canadian Government:

Table-3.4: Full Operation Cost of Canada in Afghanistan Mission and UN Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan (\$ in Millions)

Fiscal Year	Full Cost of Afghanistan Operation	Incremental Cost of Afghanistan Operation	UN Peacekeeping Full Cost
2000-01	0	0	94.1
2001-02	10.8	216.0	73.4
2002-03	709.3	233.6	35.3
2004-05	717.0	389.9	34.2
2005-06	1,098.5	421.6	23.7
2006-07	2,030.2	813.7	8.5
2007-08	2,590.1	1,086.0	9.4
2008-09	2,565.7	1,084.8	15.6

DND Reports on Plans and Priorities

Source: Staples, Steven and David MacDonald (2009), "How much is War Costing Canadians?", in Lucia Kowaluk and Steven Staples (eds.) *Afghanistan and Canada: Is there an Alternative to War?*, Montreal: Black Rose Books.

NATO launched a training program for Afghanistan named NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in which Canada participated with the code-name Operation Attention. The task force deployed on Operation Attention, consisting of 950 personnel was called the Canadian Contribution to the Training Mission in

Afghanistan (CCTM-A). It is scheduled to end in March 2014. Most CCTM-A personnel staff Advisory Embedded Training Teams and Training Advisory Groups attached to ANA, ANP and Afghan Air Force schools and training establishments (National Defence and the Canadian Force: <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/attention-eng.asp>).

The following table is a summary of the Canadian Forces' Non-Battle Injuries, Wounded in Action, Deaths and Killed in Action statistics sustained in Afghanistan from the beginning of the mission in April 2002 to 31 December 2011:

Table-3.5: Canadian Forces' Non-Battle Injuries, Wounded in Action, Deaths and Killed in Action (from April 2002 to 31 December 2011)

Year	Non-Battle Injuries	Wounded in Action	Deaths (those not KIA)	Killed in Action
2002	1	8	0	4
2003	0	3	0	2
2004	5	3	0	1
2005	7	2	1	0
2006	84	180	4	32
2007	299	84	3	27
2008	187	125	5	27
2009	330	124	3	29
2010	331	86	2	14
2011	168	20	2	2
Total	1,412	635	20	138

Source: (<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3695>)

KIA: Killed in Action

NOTE: Wounded in above action statistics include injuries from mines, rocket attacks, and direct combat with an enemy force or insurgent element, personnel injured in friendly fire incidents related to combat action and acute psychological trauma directly attributable to combat action that required medical intervention. It excludes traffic accidents, accidental discharges of a weapon, and other accidental injuries not related to combat action.

Non-Battle Injuries statistics include those injured as a result of traffic accidents, the accidental discharge of a weapon, and any other accidental injuries not related to combat. It also includes those members reported ill, repatriated for compassionate or for medical reasons, or returned to duty after being assessed by a medical officer.

Canadian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan since July 2005 was called Operation Archer under which about 12 senior Canadian Force members in Kabul were deployed with the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a US-led multinational organization involved in providing mentors and trainers to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior who work for the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (National Defence and the Canadian Force: <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/archer/index-eng.asp>).

In the War on Terror, many casualties also occurred amongst the ANP, ANA and other Afghan military. This can be seen in the following data. The local Afghan military and police witnessed more casualties than international troops. However, this data shows casualties only after 2007.

Table-3.6: Afghanistan Casualties: Afghan National Army, National Directorate of Security Operatives, Security Guards

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Jan-Apr 2012
Killed	278	259	292	821	511	92
Wounded	750	875	859	775	256	188

Source: Chesser, Susan G. (2012), “Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians”, *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*.

Table-3.7: Afghanistan Casualties: Afghan National and Border police

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Jan-Apr 2012
Killed	688	724	639	1,292	569	204
Wounded	1,036	1209	1,145	743	552	271

Source: Chesser, Susan G. (2012), “Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians”, *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*.

To concentrate on civilian and military efforts in key districts especially in Kandahar City and its surrounding villages, Canada launched an over-arching program named Operation Kantolo in 2009. This program involves security operations conducted by Canadian, Afghan and allied forces in sync with

development and reconstruction efforts at community level and carries two underlying principles, integral to the achievement of long-term stability in Afghanistan namely, helping the Afghans develop and implement their own solutions and delivering visible and effective results to the people where they live and work. In spring 2009, Operation Kantolo started its work in Dand District village of Deh-e-Bagh in Kandahar province. This project aimed facilitated improvements in governance and socio-economic development and built lasting relationships with village residents and the local Afghan authorities with support from the Civil-Military Co-operation Section of the Kandahar PRT. Technical expertise, especially in engineering and project management; mentoring of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police units; and funding was also contributed by Canadian task force (National Defence and the Canadian Force: <http://www.comfec-cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/kantolo-eng.asp>).

Canadian Engagement in Afghanistan through Provincial Reconstruction Team

In December 2002, the US took an initiative to establish PRTs or military-run enclaves with the objectives of providing safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and extending the influence and reach of the Kabul government. The main area of focus of PRTs was counter-insurgency. Other PRT activities ranged from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects (Katzman 2006).

Much of the development work undertaken in rural Afghanistan is done by PRTs due to the ongoing insurgency. These PRTS work independent of the Government of Afghanistan. A prime example of Civil-Military Cooperation, PRT is a special military unit that provides security for reconstruction in unstable countries, backed by local and international security forces. Generally, PRTs contain between 60 and 100 individuals. Some PRTs were transferred from the US to the NATO countries participating in the ISAF in 2006 after NATO intervened in Afghanistan. There are 25 PRTs working in Afghanistan under five regional command centers (Holland 2009).

The Government of Canada has established its own set of guidelines for civil-military cooperation and has been a major supporter of the Stockholm and Ottawa

conferences on Good Humanitarian Donorship. The establishment of a PRT by Canada in 2005 provided a significant moment for the setting of precedent in civil-military relations in Afghanistan and other places. The scholar Sedra recommended that the Canadian PRT model should emulate its British equivalent in the adoption of a peace building and security approach and differ by centring greater attention on the betterment of local governance and judicial reform areas that had received less attention, and where Canada could play an important role (Sedra 2005). Chris Alexander, Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan stated in this regard: “*The stability and security of Afghanistan is vital for the security of the world. Our vision of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRT's, is that it reflects the Afghans' great achievement and great hope for continued success. An Afghanistan that is peaceful, pluralist and prosperous*” (Yari 2006). Keeping these objectives in mind, the presence of the Canadian Forces was renewed in Kabul as part of ISAF and a PRT was deployed to Kandahar as part of the United States-led campaign against terrorism (Lewis 2006).

At the launching of the PRT by the US in 2002, both the British and American forces clearly held an idea of the PRTs, known as humanitarian aid and used as an instrument in the war against terror. In theory, the classic form of the PRT is constructed as Three Block War. In the late 1990s, the US General Charles Krulack assumed that the military would effectively conducting combat operations on one block, with separate peacekeeping on a second block, and distributing humanitarian aid on a third block, all in the same stage and all within a few hours (Cornish 2009).

The Kandahar PRT has been under Canada since August 2005, consisting of more than 300 people and is led from its base, Camp Nathan Smith, in Kandahar City. Kandahar is one of the most volatile and insurgency-hit Afghan provinces. The Canadian PRT is composed of the expertise of diplomats, development experts, police and military as part of the whole of government approach. Key initiatives in the province are supported and a broad range of activities including training police, strengthening local governance capacity for example, building bridges, culverts, police stations and schools, digging wells, helping women to establish carpet-weaving businesses, assisting farmers, vaccinating children against polio and providing literacy training to adults, are carried out by Canadian PRT (Holland 2009).

The likelihood of violence was not ignored in the deployment of Canadian forces in Kandahar, but its intensity and scope was underestimated because earlier military operations in the south were mainly of the nature of surgical strikes against the Taliban, and not with the purpose of maintaining a presence to support governance and development. A sad understanding of the situation and the meaning of this deployment was brought home to Canadians after civilian diplomat Glyn Berry, the first Canadian political director of the PRT was killed by a car bomb in January 2006. This tragedy impeded an effective Canadian civilian presence in Kandahar for several years afterward due to which security concerns and military personnel were compelled to take over most development assistance work (Khan 2008).

But Kandahar is the region of maximum unrest in Afghanistan because a large number of insurgents have emerged since 2005. Because of this many NGO workers, development workers including PRT civilian members of allied countries and Afghan aid workers, and development agencies are not showing interest in the development and humanitarian relief assistance project work in Kandahar (Cornish 2009).

In Afghanistan, while the Canadian Force oversees security and the issues of governance, the rule of law and human rights are undertaken by other Canadian departments and agencies, such as the DFAIT while the CIDA leads on development. Besides this, police training and the operation of prisons are taken care of by other agencies, such as the RCMP and Corrections Canada. And in turn, all these departments and agencies work under Kandahar PRT. In 2007, an independent non-partisan panel headed by former Liberal Cabinet Minister John Manley was commissioned by the Harper government with an aim to evaluate the effectiveness of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The finding of the report which came to be known as Manley Report was submitted to the government by early 2008. According to the Report's findings, the Canadian PRT consisted of 335 persons and was an integrated group of aid specialists, diplomats, military personnel, police and corrections officers who were engaged in development and reconstruction activities (Bourque 2006).

Developmental Work with UN and Afghan Government

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world due to the three decades of war and civil strife. It was realized that until and unless the curses of poverty and unemployment are uprooted from Afghanistan, it would not gain political stability and would continue to pose security threats to its neighbours and the developed countries. Keeping these facts in mind, a partnership has been developed since 2002 between the government of Afghanistan and the international community to restore and maintain stability (Holland 2009).

“Whole of government approach” is an approach which is examined by each policy specialist and practitioner and requires that the assistance is coordinated by the donors with all concerned ministries within the Afghan government and that the efforts, both civilian and military, of donor countries are coordinated among their own executive departments and ministries. Both the US and Canadian governments utilize this method of providing assistance. The whole of government approach visualizes the rebuilding of Afghanistan to rest on three pillars namely, good governance, safety and security, and economic and social development. The contributors to this approach focus on the steps to be adopted now to realize the goals set by the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 to end the conflict in Afghanistan and accelerate national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country. In connection to this, there emerged partnerships in Afghanistan between the US military and USAID and the Canadian armed forces and CIDA which resulted in the increase of the role of USAID, CIDA and their NGO partners in planning and conducting programs alongside the military. This partnership is evolving into a civil-military engagement (Holland 2009).

Moreover, the CIDA is also engaged in providing humanitarian and development assistance. The first and third largest donors in Afghanistan are the US and Canada which have invested billions of dollars in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan since 2001 (Holland 2009). About \$10 million annually were provided by Canada to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid prior to 2001. And Afghanistan became Canada’s single largest aid recipient when the latter declared new commitments to Kabul in Tokyo Conference 2002. Afghanistan is scheduled to

continue to receive Canadian development assistance with a current allocation of \$100 million annually (Smith 2007).

The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development aims at alleviating poverty and promoting social protection in the rural areas of Afghanistan. It also aims at creating an opium-free Afghanistan based on democratic governance and self-reliance for which the ministry runs six principal national programs: the Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program (AREDP), National Solidarity Program, National Rural Access Program, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation, National Area-Based Development Program and Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (Holland 2009).

Ever-growing and ever-strengthening ties between Canada and Afghanistan since the re-establishment of diplomatic relations underline the seriousness with which Ottawa takes the bilateral relationship. The Canadian embassy in Kabul was opened in June 2003 and Christopher Alexander was appointed Canada's first ambassador to Afghanistan. To discuss Canada's growing commitments in Afghanistan, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, reached Kabul in August, followed by a visit by President Karzai to Ottawa in late September. Subsequently, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien flew to Kabul in October. Explaining the objectives behind opening the embassy in Kabul, Mr. Graham said that it would work as a centre of diplomatic and logistical support to coordinate security and aid programs run by Canada in Afghanistan. Further, Canadian diplomats are also working in national capitals and multilateral organizations such as the UN, NATO and the Group-8 (G8) to facilitate the way for the reconstruction and stabilization process (World View Magazine 2003).

National Solidarity Program was created in 2003 by the Government of Afghanistan in order to enable Afghan rural communities to participate in their own development projects, to develop a sense of solidarity, experience democracy and build a trust in the government, including poverty eradication and the empowerment of women. This program is funded primarily by World Bank. Other donors to National Solidarity Program include the European Union and the governments of the US, UK, Canada, Japan, Germany, Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, the Czech Republic, Australia and New Zealand (Holland 2009).

The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development launched another programme called the AREDP in 2009. This program aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable job creation (Holland 2009). To address the challenge of interrelationship between poverty and insurgency, the National Area- Based Development Programme was launched which is part of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), one of the principal sources of development funds in Afghanistan and is one of the six closely interconnected National Programs of Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Holland 2009). The success of the battle against insurgency in Afghanistan is closely related to the success of the Afghan government and the international community in unlocking farmers from the vicious circle of opium cultivation, debt and poverty which can be attained only the overall recovery of the rural economy. There were credible rural livelihood options in 2005 that were geared towards this objective, including cash-for employment programmes and agricultural extension. These programmes were most often funded by the US and the UK, as well as Afghan government microfinance and community development programmes supported by the European Union, Japan and Canada (Alexander 2006).

According to the Government of Canada progress report on Afghanistan released in February 2007, over five million Afghan children, including one third girls have been helped by Canada and the international community to go to school. The number of children who were going to school in 2001 was 700,000 with no girl children. Moreover, teaching materials were provided to 363,000 teachers (Roi 2008). There have been efforts by the aid community including World Bank and USAID to strengthen higher education. Along with supporting elementary and secondary education, Canada has also provided assistance to the reconstruction and development of Kandahar University (Holland 2009).

The improvements were not confined to only socio-economic fields, but appreciable success was achieved in the field of political system in Afghanistan e.g. the agreement between the various Afghan factions to introduce a new constitution in January 2004, election of Karzai as President in nationwide elections in October 2004 and finally the conducting of free and fair parliamentary elections in September 2005 (Roi 2008).

However Warnock (2009) mentions another significant fact about the elected Karzai government and the Afghan parliament, that is, President Karzai adopted the Single Non Transferable Vote System and banned the use of party lists in the Afghan election because the Afghan government was working with officials mandated by the US government. This electoral system was also supported by the Canadian government, and Canada was also directly involved in the Afghan election. The main motive behind this was to prevent the development of new political parties on the democratic left in Afghanistan. Karzai refused a system of proportional representation, requested by 34 Afghan political parties. The Single Non Transferable Vote electoral system has strengthened the power of regional ethnic warlords and commanders. Karzai has appointed a joint electoral management body, included four international members including one Canadian. The demonstration of the elections process and formation of a new regime in Afghanistan was wildly appreciated by the Canadian Government. Canadian government officials directly supported and participated in policies of the Bush administration towards Afghanistan. However, the whole electoral process in Afghanistan was fundamentally anti democratic and it was a practice of neo-colonial power. So such an undemocratic Afghan government has very little legitimacy and unpopular among the Afghan people (Warnock 2009). According to Afghan Research and Evolution Units analysis of the election results, 133 members out of 249 members elected to the house of the people had a direct relation with the Mujahedin War. At the same time, 80 percent of the winning candidates in the provinces and more than 60 percent in Kabul had links with armed groups, concluded the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Karzai's appointments in senior posts were war lords in the country such as the appointment of new army chief of staff Abdul Rashid Dostum, known as the "butcher of the north". The only legal opposition in the Afghan Parliament is the United National Front. With such a scenario in the parliament, the political opposition is completely dominated by the Islamist Fundamentalist Parties and their warlords (Warnock 2009).

The government of Afghanistan agreed with the international community to establish a democratic state with a free market economy in exchange for long-term financial commitments from the developed countries in 2006 at the London Conference. This agreement came to be known as the Afghanistan Compact and led to the creation of Afghanistan National Development Strategy focusing on three

components, viz. security and governance, the rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development (Holland 2009). The first component focuses on the international military contribution, reform of the ANA and ANP, defeating the insurgency, and the disbandment of illegal armed groups. The second component includes governance, rule of law and human rights consists of reform of government machinery, justice reform, the fight against corruption and the poppy economy, revival of the civil service, and making the institutions of the state work for the people. Economic and social development, that is, the major part of the reconstruction activity falls under the Third Component and it is, in essence, the real objective of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (Capstick 2008).

On 26 September 2007, the expansion of the war and very limited support for the Karzai Government was pointed out by the report of the UN Secretary General. In Afghanistan, there is no confidence in the legal system and corruption is one of the most serious problems. Most of the ANA and ANP member are more corrupt because of very low salaries and involvement in illegal opium trade, such that these organizations have very limited public support. These corrupt practices and very little public support to the government caused the failure of the program for humanitarian assistance. It can be seen as a failure between 40 percent and 50 percent of all external aid inside the present government system (Warnock 2009).

Table-3.8: Canada’s Bilateral Aid directly to the Afghanistan by CIDA (\$ millions)

	CIDA						
	Geographic Program Branch		Other Canadian Partnership Programs	Multilateral & Global Programs		Other Branches	Total-CIDA
	Country and Regional Program	Canada fund for Local Initiatives		Humanitarian Assistance Programs	Other Program with International Organizations/ Global Initiatives		
2007-08	270.14	0.79	0.69	8.30	0.34	0.03*	280.29
2008-09	219.70	0.98	0.76	2.20		0.02	223.65
2009-10	204.83	0.78	0.92	23.26	0.37		230.16
2010-11	214.03	0.77	0.61		0.50	0.01	215.92

Source: Statistical Report on International Assistance Fiscal Year 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada

*Other Branches: Strategic Policy and Performance Branch, Development Information Program, Office for Democratic Governance and Corporate Administrative costs allocated at the continent level.

**Other Branches: Strategic Policy and Performance Branch, with corporate administrative costs from non-programming branches include.

Table-3.9: Canada's Bilateral Aid Directly to the Afghanistan by other Departments of Canadian Government (excluding CIDA), (\$ millions)

	Other Government Department								Total
	International Development Research Centre	National Defence and Canadian Forces	Foreign Affairs and International Trade	Finance Canada	Royal Canada Mounted Police	ICHRDD	Provinces and Municipalities	Others	
2007-08	0.71	9.13	26.44		1.56	0.09		0.03*	37.95
2008-09	0.62	10.73	47.50		3.96		0.03		62.84
2009-10	0.62	13.13	46.71	1.28	6.20			0.40**	68.34
2010-11	0.18	6.60	40.09		5.83				52.71

Source: Statistical Report on International Assistance Fiscal Year 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada

*Includes Department of Environment Canada, PWGSC, Industry Canada, Canada Post, The Provinces and Municipalities, and unallocable costs that cannot be directly or indirectly traced to a recipient country (Such as costs of refugees in Canada, imputed foreign student subsidies, and various administrative costs).

**"UN Organizations" exclude UN Organizations that are focused on providing Humanitarian Assistance, which have been accounted for the "Humanitarian Assistance Organizations" column.

Table-3.10: Canada's Multilateral Aid to the Afghanistan by other departments of Canadian Government, (\$ Millions)

	CIDA								Other Government Departments	Total OGD	Total
	Regional Development Banks	*	World Food Program	Other UN Org.	UN Org.	Humanitarian Assistance Organizations	Other Multilateral Organizations	Total CIDA	Finance Canada		
2007-08	2.85	0.09	0.03	6.21				9.19	12.57	12.57	21.76
2008-09	1.43				0.23 ¹	0.19 ²	1.33 ³	3.18	7.15	7.15	10.33
2009-10	2.09				4.34 ⁴		1.55	7.98	10.25	10.25	18.23
2010-11	10.19				3.40 ⁴	0.92 ⁵	0.77	15.28	5.60	5.60	20.88

Source: Statistical Report on International Assistance Fiscal Year 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11, Canadian International Development Agency, Government of Canada

*The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

- 1: UN Organizations (exclude humanitarian Assistance)
- 2: Humanitarian Assistance Organizations (include some UN Organizations)
- 3: Includes Changes in value of Investment in International Financial Institutions (IFIs) due to exchange rate fluctuations.
- 4: "UN Organizations" exclude UN Organizations that are focused on providing Humanitarian Assistance, which have been accounted for the "Humanitarian Assistance Organizations" column.
- 5: "Humanitarian Assistance Organizations" includes certain UN Organizations which are primarily focused on providing Humanitarian Assistance.

As per the Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Private sector initiatives and investment are regarded as the main driver of sustainable economic growth. But a free market economy depends on vibrant infrastructural facilities to be successful (Holland 2009). The fate of the justice sector as a whole undermines these efforts as Afghanistan's formal judicial institutions are beleaguered and replaced in most parts of Afghanistan by traditional judicial system. But there is a ray of hope in the form of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics courts, supported by UK, US and Canada which has convicted dozens of drug traffickers in 2005 (Alexander 2006).

In Bonn Agreement 2001, there was a consensus to make an interim government for rebuilding political institutions and reconstruction of development. But the process of building interim government being biased, undemocratic and influenced by US resulted in only the political organizations and some former militia groups which were liked by the US and allied countries forming the interim government. This included the Northern Alliance, the former King of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai and some others. The rest of the parties were not invited in the formation of the interim government, for instance, the Republican Party of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Freedom and Democracy Movement, People's Party, Council of Afghanistan Tribes, Alliance of Peace and Progress of Afghanistan. Finally Hamid Karzai was appointed the interim authority of Afghanistan because he was the first choice of the US, and was one of the negotiators between the former Taliban Government and the US based oil firm for the gas pipeline project. Canada actively participated and assisted the US in the formation of the interim government and in the Bonn Agreement. Later, during the parliamentary election in Afghanistan, despite the existence of approximately twenty other democratic parties they were not registered for participation in the election (Warnock 2009).

On 5 December 2001, the Bonn agreement was adopted which outlined guidelines and timelines for the establishment of the post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan. The establishment of an independent judiciary, reestablishment of the 1964 constitution and creation of several commissions with the aim of rebuilding the rule of law were the main focus of the Bonn Agreement. A Judicial Reform Commission and a Constitutional Commission were created and tasked with reconstructing the domestic justice system based on Islamic principles, international

standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions and with supporting the process of a constitutional Loya Jirga, which would in turn adopt a new constitution (Asia Report 195 by International Crisis Group: 2010). As the judicial system of Afghanistan was reeling under grave inefficiency, a coordinated strategic approach was required to achieve even minimal success. So, an attempt at the reformation was initiated and although Italy was cast as the leading nation in support of judicial reforms, multiple donors also shared the responsibility, including the US, UK, Canada, UNODC and UNDP (Asia Report 195 by International Crisis Group: 2010). There were investments made by Canadian Overseas Development Assistance funds in legal training through the International Law and Development Organization and in support of the justice sector reform process (Banerjee 2008).

To re-introduce Afghan women's voices into the public domain and increase the media's role in supporting Afghan women's participation in reconstruction and peace-building, a Canada-based media development organisation, called the Institute for Media, Policy, and Civil Society and funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and other sources, trained Afghan women as various media professionals between 2002 and 2006. Other four women's radio stations were also supported by Institute for Media, Policy, and Civil Society that were to be run, managed, and licensed through women. All these programmes aimed at increasing debate on gender issues, spreading awareness among women and empowering them (Kamal 2007).

A programme named Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration of the Regular Militia Forces was launched with the objective of demobilizing soldiers. It succeeded in demobilizing sixty-five thousand soldiers with the participation of Canada too. But the aspect of reintegrating the demobilized and decommissioned soldiers into society and providing them with the alternative means of livelihood proved less successful due to the unclear strategy of training provided to the demobilized soldiers.

A multidonor Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups program was launched by the Canadian Embassy with the support of Canadian Overseas Development Assistance but it failed to achieve its target of disarming fully due to resistance from the groups and a lack of government commitment. In contrast, a successful but

smaller project for Heavy Weapons Cantonment was launched under the leadership of the Canadian ambassador which delivered its desired results. A police training program was created by the United States and Germany and the Law and Order Trust Fund, (under UNDP) with Canadian contribution which could not achieve its desired goals due to lack of coordination between Germany and US, lack of mentoring and inadequate length and questionable quality of training. A field which has recorded major success in terms of improvement and betterment is ANA which was strengthened using some Canadian defence resources but no Overseas Development Assistance funds. Nevertheless, much remains to be done to expand the presence and legitimacy of the armed forces across the country (Banerjee 2008).

Counter-Narcotics is another field where the efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation have proved to be unsuccessful due to the top priority given to the eradication of the cultivation and less concerted efforts made towards the development and implementation of Alternative Livelihood Programmes. The alternative livelihood program under the Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, managed by UNDP is also contributed to by Canadian Overseas Development Assistance. In fact, Alternative Livelihood Programmes lacked integrated rural community development approach and a proper conceptualization of “Alternative Livelihood” which failed to compete with the income earned through poppy cultivation and thus lost attraction with the farmers. Getting a true understanding of the situation, the Canadian development wing urged strongly in favour of the adoption of true alternative livelihood programming in Afghanistan. Another approach suggested to eradicate poppy cultivation is to focus on the demand side. If stronger measures are adopted to curb demand at home by the heroin-consuming countries mainly the UK and the US, it would discourage poppy cultivation due to the lack of demand in the market (Banerjee 2008).

War leaves millions of refugees and Internally Displaced People whose rehabilitation constitutes a major contribution to security building in a post-conflict fragile state. Keeping this necessity in mind, multi-donor programs, led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and contributed majorly to by Canadian Overseas Development Assistance were launched which recorded considerable success in restoring peace in the country. In order to build and restore confidence of people in the government machinery, the National Solidarity Program was designed

and implemented by the Afghan government. This program has succeeded in improving state-citizen relationships and has established Community Development Councils supported through the National Area Based Development Programme at the district level which is also supported with Canadian Overseas Development Assistance funds (Banerjee 2008).

Technical Assistance (TA) program in Afghanistan has not been able to achieve much success due to the placements of inexperienced and under-qualified staff, and individual donor and UN-driven high-cost service provisions, and culturally insensitive operational styles of many advisors. Appointment of Afghan expatriate advisors and competent local Afghans at a salary higher than what is paid locally but lower than that of expatriate advisors by Canadian development wing could also not produce the intended result. In futuristic terms, it is highly improbable that better-paid Afghan staff would ever join the government and accept civil service salaries until the salary scales are raised in the Afghan civil service structure. Moreover, the huge gap between the salaries of Afghan staff and Afghan civil services and government officials creates disaffection among the latter which in turn hampers the capacity building process. Due to the fragile condition of Afghanistan and weakness of government delivery mechanisms, service delivery has been channelized through Alternative and Parallel Delivery Mechanisms which undermine the Afghan government's authority, ability and visibility as the primary service provider, prevent the international community from demanding accountability from the Afghan government and make financial planning unpredictable (Banerjee 2008).

CIDA allocated \$16.5 million immediately following 11 September 2001 mainly for emergency humanitarian assistance. Afghanistan has been the single largest recipient of Canadian bilateral aid since the in January 2002. Canada pledged \$100 million in January 2002, an additional \$250 million for 2003 and 2004 in March 2003, \$250 million in March 2004 for fiscal years 2005-06 to 2008/09 in Tokyo Conference, Brussels conference and Berlin Conference respectively. In March 2006, CIDA allocated an additional \$40 million to Afghanistan. In May 2006, the Prime Minister announced a further \$310 million in development funding to Afghanistan for the period from 2007-08 to 2010-11. The Prime Minister announced a supplementary \$200 million in development funding over the next two years on 26 February 2007. Therefore, Canada's total allocation to Afghanistan over the 2001 to 2011 period

stands at \$1.12 billion (Canadian International Development Agency: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.nsf/eng/NIC-65152224-QQK>).

In May 2002, the multilateral Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) was set up to provide support to Afghanistan in the areas of recurrent costs of the government and supporting the return of expatriate Afghans, investment projects, capacity building, feasibility studies, technical assistance. World Bank, UNDP, ADB, the Islamic Development Bank, international donor countries including Canada administers this program.

Table-3.11: Canada’s Contribution to Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

	US \$ Million	% of All Donor Contribution
2002-03	12.0	6.5
2003-04	50.0	17.5
2004-05	5.5	1.4
2005-06	72.3	17.9
2006-07	58.9	13.0
2007-08	213.4	31.0
Total 2002-08	412.2	18.8

Source:<http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21615898~menuPK:305990~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html>

Table 3.12: Canada’s Project Preferences

2002-08	US \$ Million
Education	29.17
Horticulture and Livestock	3.5
Microfinance	86
Employment	4.6
National Solidarity	120.4

Source:<http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21615898~menuPK:305990~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html>

In the fiscal year (2007-2008), Canada was the largest contributor to the World Bank-administered ARTF. Canada has contributed US\$412.2 million (18.8

percent of the total) since the ARTF's inception in 2002 which made it the largest contributor to the trust fund next only to the UK. CIDA is responsible for delivering assistance to Afghanistan.

Table-3.14: Transfer Payment Disbursements for Afghanistan Country Program in 2001-2008

Fiscal Year	Grants	Contributions and Contracts	Total
2001-2002	\$1.5 million (56%)	\$1.2 million (44%)	\$2.7 million
2002-2003	\$55.7 million (94%)	\$3.5 million (6%)	\$59.2 million
2003-2004	\$81.8 million (95%)	\$4.6 million (5%)	\$86.4 million
2004-2005	\$89.3 million (94%)	\$5.8 million (6%)	\$95.1 million
2005-2006	\$88.7 million (93%)	\$6.9 million (7%)	\$95.6 million
2006-2007	\$162.0 million (95%)	\$8.0 million (5%)	\$170.0 million
2007-2008	\$255.6 million (94%)	\$15.0 million (6%)	\$270.6 million
Totals	\$734.6 million (94%)	\$45.0 million (6%)	\$779.6 million

(Source: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/NAT-914949-HC6>)

In Afghanistan, Canada is running three signature projects focusing on Education, Eradication of polio and Dahla Dam. Under Education project, Canada is building and repairing 50 schools in Kandahar province and providing training to 3,000 teachers in addition to collaborating with the Afghan government to improve the quality of education for Afghan children. Eradication of polio plan shows Canada's commitment to the eradication of polio in Afghanistan and it is active in this field alongside the International community. Moreover, there are thousands of local teams which tour the neighbourhood and vaccinate an estimated seven million children each year. Canada is involved in repairing the Dalha Dam, the second largest dam in Afghanistan and its irrigation system at the request of Afghan government. This project is providing livelihood and job skills to thousands of seasonal workers working on the project (Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan: http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/fs-fi/projects_e.pdf).

CHAPTER 4

DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE ON AFGHAN ISSUE

This chapter analyses the domestic debate over the Afghanistan in the Canadian parliament and larger public arena. Lack of informed political debate on the Afghan intervention and the nature of Canadian involvement have been largely recognized. The chapter will initially go into the debate between the political parties. The Liberal and Conservative parties, despite being in government and opposition, largely came together to support the US and NATO. The chapter shows that debate in the Parliament with the parties opposing the intervention was limited. Next the chapter goes into the different positions on the war from the opposing groups, in particular the labour organizations and their efforts at mobilizing against the military intervention. The labour organisations called for withdrawal of troops for various reasons, for instance, it was against the workers' interests, it contradicted Canada's traditional role in foreign policy and it was being waged only for the oil and economy-centred interests of the US and NATO. Finally the chapter looks at the public opinion on the war. Analysis of public opinion surveys shows that there was a shift in support for the war after the heavy casualties faced by Canadian troops in the invasion. Thus the chapter shows that the debate in Canada on the Afghan war was largely on why the war was to be waged, and whether it was for military or economic interest or for humanitarian and reconstruction work.

Debate in Canadian Parliament and Political Parties

Canada is known as a nation of the belligerence of its southern neighbor. It is also known as a cultural resemblance to the US and contributes foreign aid and engages in UN peacekeeping operations and behaves as the “good cop” of the US. Before the Afghan war it was supposed that the Canadian public would never support the involvement in war fighting as it is opposed to their tradition of a peace keeping role. Although Canadian troops had contributed to the British War in Sudan, the Boer War, First World War, Second World War and the Korean War, the Canadian

government did not participate in war since the Korean War but engaged in almost every UN peacekeeping operation. But by 9/11 Canada found this as a chance to prove their war fighting credibility (Miller 2010).

Following 9/11, Canada participated in the military mission. Liberal Defence Minister Art Eggleton announced that Canadian soldiers would participate in any military or other mission taken by the US against the terrorist groups Al Qaeda and Taliban. From the beginning, the liberal government of Canada supported the US attack on Afghanistan. On 2 October 2001, for the first time in history, the NATO members invoked article 5 in response to the 9/11 incident. The Chretien government supported this mission led by US and Britain (Laxer 2008).

In 2001, no parliamentary vote took place to authorize Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. In October 2001, in a parliamentary debate, the Chretien government declared Canadian participation in Operation Apollo. As there was no real debate in Canada on the country's military mission in Afghanistan, the people of Canada depended mainly on the Harper government's monopolistic rationale for the war. The government defended the involvement in Afghanistan military mission with two basic arguments. The first argument was that the terrorists would regroup and may attack Western countries including Canada. The second was that the mission was for the development and establishment of a democracy in Afghanistan, with the rule of law, in which human rights and the rights of women would be safeguarded. Instead of answering the genuine opposition by Canadians, Stephen Harper and Peter MacKay took the shelter of questioning the courage of their opponents as though they lacked manliness (Laxer 2008).

According to Laxer (2008), in order to improve the general standard of the national debate regarding the involvement in Afghanistan, some basic questions needed to be addressed. The questions of the purpose of the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan and the definition of success, the balance between counter-insurgency mission and reconstruction of the invaded country, proportion of other NATO countries, the role of Pakistan in the conflict, the United States` commitment to a long-term military effort in Afghanistan, the vulnerability of Canada to terrorist attacks due to the Canadian mission in Afghanistan and the positive or negative roles played by foreign armies in Afghanistan should be addressed. In short, Canada needed

a healthy national debate without influence by irresponsible media, and in which politicians and general public would play a constructive role.

On October 7, Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced Canadian military support for the War on Terror after the US and the UK initiated their attacks on Afghanistan. This was implemented the following day when Canadian ships left Halifax en route to the Persian Gulf to join the US fleet followed by a statement issued by Chretien on October 14, declaring the unqualified support by Canada for the US war in Afghanistan. In the beginning, there were two separate missions, led by the US and the ISAF. While the OEF was under complete control of the United States, the operation by ISAF was a separate mission and its goal was to secure the Afghan capital and to establish and strengthen the new government (Laxer 2008).

The American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was driven by ulterior motives other than the human rights of Afghans with the American concern for human rights to quickly disappear once the geostrategic factors changed (Laxer 2008).

During the deployment of troops in 2005, the then-Foreign Secretary Bill Graham stated: *“Our role in Afghanistan is quintessentially Canadian: we are helping to rebuild a troubled country and we are giving hope for the future to a long suffering people. This is a clear expression of our Canadian values at work.”*

The chief of Defence Staff General Rick Hiller gave a statement exposing the fraud of humanitarian factor in the war. He stated: *“Being a soldier means that you go out and bayonet somebody. We are not the public service of Canada. We are not just another Department. We are the Canadian forces and our job is to kill people”*. Later the Liberal Prime Minister had to say to defend *“I had no sense that it was war. I surely didn’t think that it was war. It was not presented to me as a counterinsurgency operation. Our purpose was reconstruction”* (Miller 2010).

When Jean Chretien’s liberal government sent the forces in the Afghan mission, the supporters of the government decreased. During the spring and early summer of 2006, Canadian public opinion for the first time shifted against the Afghan war. A big casualty occurred in September and immediately after this, a large downfall was found in the government’s support. The Opposition Conservative party and the governing Liberal party supported the initial deployment of troops. However

the war increasingly became unpopular and parties such as the NDP and Bloc Quebecois opposed the deployment. The Liberal Michael Ignatieff supported the Harper Conservative Government in 2007 for extension of the mission until 2009 and only the support of the Liberal Michael Ignatieff saved the Harper Government from defeat. The House of Commons again voted in 2008 for further extension of troops in Afghanistan until 2011 and passed with majority. The Harper Government believed that forces would definitely drop out until 2011. During the period of 2009 Canadian Troops shifted from combat to reconstruction and training (Miller 2010).

The Harper Government improved its bad record in May 2006 by making a debate in Parliament on the issue of extending the Afghan mission by two years. During the voting in the Debate the extension mission of Afghanistan was passed with a narrow margin of 149 to 145. The debate was rushed without any serious discussion. The MPs were informed of the debate only two days before it was going to be held and the MP's time to address was only six hours (Laxer 2008).

Table-4.1: As you may know, Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan is scheduled to end in July 2011. The federal government has announced that Canada will keep 950 soldiers in Afghanistan until 2014 in a strictly non-combat role to help train the Afghan military. All things considered, do you agree or disagree with this decision?

Party support in 2008 federal election						
	Total	Con	Lib	NDP	BQ	Grn
Agree	48%	62%	50%	37%	25%	51%
Disagree	44%	35%	46%	55%	68%	36%
Not Sure	8%	62%	50%	37%	25%	51%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), "Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan", Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Con: Conservative Party of Canada, Lib: Liberal Party of Canada, NDP: New Democratic Party
 BQ: Bloc Quebecois, Grn: Green Party of Canada.

Between February 2006 and January 2010, 131 Canadian troops were killed in the province of Kandahar. In the terms of fatalities three years in Kandahar are more significant than 50 years of Canadian peacekeeping commitments under the UN.

However, the Canadian government predicted that the casualties might come from armed mission in Afghanistan. In 2005 the Minister of National Defence Bill Graham announced that the Canadian troops were exceptionally well trained and equipped for the mission in Kandahar region (Boucher 2010).

The Conservative Stephen Harper replaced the liberal Paul Martin as Prime Minister on 23 January 2006 but Canada's participation in Afghanistan continued. By September 2006, members of the opposition Bloc Quebec raised the debate on the Afghanistan mission in terms of Canada's historical position as a balancing country. In late 2006, the DFAIT made seven centers across the country to uncover the understanding and beliefs of the people about the mission in Afghanistan (Fletcher et al. 2009).

The large Canadian casualties brought about a political debate about the Canadian participation in Afghan war. In early October 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared that Canadian casualties in Afghanistan were the price of leadership associated closely with playing a significant role in global affairs. At the same time Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, stated in a television interview that the confidence and spirit amidst the Canadian forces is high in the volatile region although the Canadian casualties were maximum. A year later, Hillier became well known when he said that the Canadian military in Afghanistan is eligible to kill the people such as terrorists. He also declared that Canada was fighting in Afghanistan against terrorists whose general objective was murder and were essentially scumbags. A few weeks before the Prime Minister's Calgary speech, the NDP demanded Canadian soldiers to be out of the combat mission in Afghanistan at its Convention in Quebec City. Just before the NDP convention, federal party leader Jack Layton described the party's position on the war and said that Canadian efforts in Afghanistan are focused on military force which is an ill-conceived policy keeping in view the experience of Iraq and will not lead to long-term peace. He further questioned Canadian government's policy to follow the US blindly. He stated that Canadian troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as possible (Laxer 2008).

In the winter of 2006, Stephen Harper's Conservative government shifted the attitude and direction of Canadian foreign policy because of the elections. The

position, 'out of Iraq, but in Afghanistan' by the Liberals remained the same in an ambiguous condition. Before becoming prime minister, Stephen Harper declared the agenda that if he won he would form the most pro-American government in Canadian history. But the Liberal Government refused to work under the coalition. Harper also attended pro Iraq war rallies, with the clear agenda that when he became Prime Minister he would participate in the fight (Laxer 2008).

In 2006 Liberal supporters and Conservative supporters agreed with the mission while NDP, Green supporters and Bloc Quebecois Supporters opposed the Afghan mission. In 2006, the survey was based on the comparison between peacekeeping perspective and realist orientation. 47.2 percent Canadian liked the peacekeeping role in international conflicts but 52.8 percent Canadian selected the realist orientation role. One year later, the direction of opinion shifted in reverse as 66.5 percent Canadians chose the peacekeeping role of Canada and 32.5 percent Canadians selected realist orientation. Less than 5 percent of respondents did not choose any option (Fletcher et al. 2009).

The Canadian Government started a convention with the public about Afghanistan mission but was unsuccessful in connecting on an emotional level. And both the House of Commons and party leaders shifted this conversation to elite and engaged common people. As a democratic government the concern about public sufficiency in foreign policy debates were misplaced. In October 2007, prime minister Harper made a panel to study Canada's position in Afghanistan for strengthening public support. Former Deputy Prime minister John Manley was made the head of this panel. The report was released in January 2008 and described that Canada's participation continued in Afghanistan and announced this "a decision for Canadians". Prime Minister Harper instantly accepted the Panel's recommendations and the Deputy Leader Michael Ignatieff suggested that Canadians did not want election over Afghanistan and Parliament extended the mission to December 2011 (Fletcher et al. 2009).

Table 4.2: Canadian Newspapers' Afghanistan Focus on Average, August 2007

	Overall	Globe and Mail	National Post	La Presse	Gap between Globe and Mail and La Presse	Gap between National Post and La Presse
Front-page articles	58%	74%	46%	54%	20%	-8%
Percentage	18%	20%	14%	19%	1%	-5%
Editorials	30%	41%	23%	26%	15%	-3%
Percentage	14%	15%	11%	15%	0%	-4%

Source: Kirton, John and Jenilee Guebert (2007), "Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada's War in Afghanistan", Conference Paper, Universite de Quebec a Montreal: Montreal.

Table 4.3: Canadian Newspapers' Afghanistan Focus on Average, September 2007

	Overall	Globe and Mail	National Post	La Presse	Gap between Globe and Mail and La Presse	Gap between National Post and La Presse
Front-page articles	57%	63%	57%	50%	13%	7%
Percentage	15%	15%	15%	14%	1%	1%
Editorials	31%	25%	17%	50%	-25%	-33%
Percentage	14%	8%	8%	25%	-17%	-17%

Source: Kirton, John and Jenilee Guebert (2007), "Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada's War in Afghanistan", Conference Paper, Universite de Quebec a Montreal: Montreal.

These confused statements and the confused nature of war continued under Stephen Harper's Conservative government. It was no wonder that many Canadians became confused about what the real purpose of war was. The Harper government decided to stay troops in Afghanistan until 2011 and stated, "*there are enormous risks and challenges but it will improve and we can help Afghanistan and their security day by day and we are also not going to win this war just by staying and fighting*".

However the lack of clear rationality along with casualties was an important factor in falling support for Afghan mission (Miller 2010)

Stance of Labour about Afghan Mission

In May 2002, Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) President Buzz Hargrove delivered a speech in Toronto, Ontario. According to him, the nations are spending billions of dollars on security and defence and tax cuts. There is huge transfer in economic activity from public sector to the private sector. He argued that it was good for them as a nation and added that it was good for the private sector which makes a lot of money but not for the workers who had lost their jobs because of the privatization of government services. He showed concern on the conflict in the Middle East and the war on Terrorism. And concerning the issue of Afghanistan he said that the young Canadians in Afghanistan were killing other human beings. He described that there was Operation Torii for searching and destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda and these were young Canadians who were trained to kill. He declared it to be a sad day. Canada was, according to him, now part of a US led mission which pressurized it to participate in the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting against terrorism (Hargrove 2002).

Focusing on the war in Afghanistan against Taliban, Hargrove described the war as a US war and questioned the role being played by the Canadians in the war. He commented that Canada was not staying in its traditional role of peacekeeping. The NDP won the Parliamentary debate but nothing happened, it was simply a debate. None of the parties called for the troops to be pulled out of Afghanistan. He stated that as an organization they always tried to end the leading role of Canadian troops in Afghanistan and there must be a vote and election to end the Canadian involvement in the most troubled area of the world. Drawing attention towards the miserable condition in Darfur, Sudan and Chad, he commented that the ignorance of the horrible conditions in these countries by the US and its alliances could be traced to the lack of natural resources in these countries. He further said: *“I recommend that the CAW call on the House of Commons to hold a full debate and vote on the future of Canada's growing and increasingly aggressive military presence in Afghanistan, with the goal*

of restoring Canada's role there (and in other sites of conflict) to being focused on peace-keeping only, under the auspices of the United Nations” (Hargrove 2006).

The Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) declared the Canadian involvement in Afghanistan to be unsustainable. According to CUPE, the maximum number of Afghanistan parliamentarians were drug trafficking warlords, many of them participated in atrocities against their own people in Afghanistan's civil war in 1990. Thus CUPE said that the war could not be won. The National Executive Board supported the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) policies and resolutions on Afghanistan and called on the government to take immediate steps for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, to provide more development aid to Afghanistan and support human rights and gender equality and to assure that there will be debate and voting for future deployment of Canadian troops (CUPE: <http://cupe.ca/neb/a452bc2b67909d>).

In Ottawa Sept. 18-22, CUPE's National Executive Board approved and voted the CLC's position which was passed in May 2006 and demanded the government to adopt measures necessary to facilitate the safe and immediate withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan, make a significant increase in resource and financial commitments to UN-led multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian programmes such as Darfur; increase developmental aid to Afghanistan for reconstruction efforts and engaging civil society in developmental programs delivering good governance, and respecting human rights, gender equality and internationally-recognized core labour standards; ensure that any future deployment of Canadian troops would be debated and voted on by Canadian representatives in the House of Commons (CUPE: http://cupe.ca/s497e171766300/CUPE_backs_labour_co).

In October 2006, the National Executive Board adopted a resolution supporting the CLC's policy on Afghanistan and asked the government to withdraw immediately Canadian forces from Afghanistan, and that the subject of any future deployment of Canadian troops would be discussed in the House of Commons, as well as enlarge the development aid program and multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives where it was necessary (International Solidarity Report 2006-2007).

In October 2006, nationwide peace rallies were held by the Canadian Peace Alliance, the CLC and the Canadian Islamic Congress, calling on Stephen Harper to withdraw the Canadian troops from Afghanistan. CAW also supported the peace rallies. On 28th October, protestors from all over the country protested against the Canadian US militarism (CAW: <http://www.caw.ca/en/3801.htm>).

Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) asked the government to withdraw troops instantly from Afghanistan mission and to give humanitarian aid to the people. The union also decided to work with the CLC and peace groups to create awareness about the real reasons and effects of the war (CUPW: <http://www.cupw.ca/1/0/6/5/8/index1.shtml>).

2,500 Canadian troops were involved in the war in the highest conflict zone of Kandahar and till October 2008, almost 100 Canadians including Michael Starker (a member of CUPE) were killed in this mission. During election time, Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was not an important issue for Harper's Government. And Stephen Harper decided to extend Canada's involvement in the war until 2011. CUPE called on all party leaders to make the involvement and war in Afghanistan an election issue. CUPE suggested the provision of Aid and development assistance to Afghanistan and suggested that people elect the leader who would bring the troops home (CUPE: <http://cupe.ca/s497e171766300/bring-troops-hom>).

Six international resolutions were introduced by CUPE National submitted for debate and adoption at the CLC convention. The list contained Peace in Afghanistan as its lead point and called on Canada to call back the troops and invited the labour movement to "build solidarity with Afghani workers." (CUPE International Solidarity Report 2007-2008: 2008)

With an objective to pressurize the Government to bring the troops home, demonstrations were held in many cities on October 18, 2008. In April 2008, a resolution was passed by delegates to the CUPW National Convention calling upon the Federal Government to immediately bring back troops from the war in Afghanistan and to provide genuine humanitarian aid. A number of reasons worked behind the passing of this resolution, including the worry that the war in Afghanistan was about oil and was part of an agenda of privatization and resource development which would benefit large transnational corporations, not the Afghani people. It was

also a disappointment over the move away from an international peacekeeping role under the UN, conception that working class soldiers were fighting and dying in Afghanistan, anger over wastage of money in war which could be utilized for welfare programmes, sadness that the money being spent in Afghanistan was not spent on the poverty alleviation programmes on international level (CUPW: <http://www.cupw.ca/1/1/2/6/3/index1.shtml>).

The CUPE demanded that the Canadian government ensure safe and instant withdrawal of the Canadian troops from combat mission (CUPE: <http://cupe.ca/s497e171766300/100-soldiers>). Peace, Development and International Solidarity demanded that instant steps be taken to stop the military involvement in Afghanistan and withdrawal of the Canadian army from Afghanistan. It underlined the need to work with social justice groups and affiliates to oppose the military intervention and build solidarity with Afghani workers and emphasized on the promotion of sustainable development and pressure on the government to live up to 0.7 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to Overseas Development Assistance as well as pressing for divestment from Burma (CLC: <http://www.canadianlabour.ca/convention/2008-convention/action-plan>).

Canada spent almost \$174 million per month in Afghanistan for the funding of Afghanistan's development aid and spending on arms and equipment. The cost of the mission which involved 2,500 troops in Kandahar region was more than \$9.1 billion. The mission, which involved 2,500 troops in the Kandahar region, has already cost more than. This spending on Afghanistan was supposed to be for the better life of the Afghan people such as creating 36,000 jobs, help in the fields of housing, health care and education. In this, \$2.5 billion would be invested in creating 30,000 to 50,000 housing units across the country to end homelessness and create jobs. Pan-Canadian demonstrations were called by The Canadian Peace Alliance and the Collectif Echec a la guerre on 4th April with an objective to end the NATO-led occupation that the groups believed had already killed thousands of Afghan civilians and threatened to spread war to the entire region. This call was also supported by the CUPW. These groups stated that security and prosperity were possible only when Western governments ended their support for NATO's war. According to them, NATO members should be accountable to their own populations and not to NATO generals (CUPW: <http://www.cupw.ca/1/1/6/0/4/index1.shtml>).

In a speech to the CAW Council, CAW President Ken Lewenza stated that the union opposed the war in Afghanistan and further said that it could not be won through military means. The war could be solved with the help of development programs. According to him, the countries that attacked civil rights and liberty and created violence could not be finished by using arms against them. If the development and reconstruction programs would be provided to those countries, the problem of war may be solved. He stressed that all the countries should come together in support of developing countries and continue to promote and campaign for peace and stability. At last he said that Canadian troops would help and support the cause of international peacekeeping (Lewenza 2009).

On 19 November 2010, CAW President Lewenza sent a letter to Government House Leader John Baird calling for a public apology regarding misleading comments made by Baird on the CAW's position on Canada's mission in Afghanistan. In this letter, Ken Lewenza declared untrue the statement made by Baird in the House of Commons according to which CAW supported the position of Canadian Government in Afghanistan (CAW: <http://www.caw.ca/en/9658.htm>).

On 26 November 2010 CAW affiliated to the CLC, demanded that the Canadian troops be pulled out of Afghanistan and also supported an increase in Canada's commitment to peace-building, reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. The CLC executive praised the men and women's participation in Afghanistan but also added the statement that federal government put Canadian forces under NATO mission and US military mission that is harmful for the troops. The CLC executive council said that Canadian presence would not mean that Afghanistan would come on the road of development or improve women's equality in that country. CLC insisted that the federal government should assure the instant withdrawal of Canadian forces from Afghanistan, increase the participation in UN led international peacekeeping and humanitarian initiatives, provide more development and rebuilding programs in Afghanistan a for better society, life and security of human rights, gender and labour. Any future deployment of forces would be decided in the House of Commons by debating and voting procedure (CAW: <http://www.caw.ca/en/3782.htm>).

The 26th Constitutional Convention of CLC was held during May 2011, in which 170 resolutions were debated and passed. The composite resolutions such as GR1, GR2, GR120 and GR165 dealt with the withdrawal of troops from the war in Afghanistan (CLC: <http://www.canadianlabour.ca/convention/2011-convention/resolutions>). The resolutions (GR1, GR2, GR120 and GR165) focused on some points, in which the CLC decided to work with Canadian Peace Alliance. The resolutions contained a call for an end to the war in Afghanistan, opposition to the extension of the presence of Canadian forces in Afghanistan after 2011, opposition to any extension of the current NATO-led mission, opposition to further spending on F-35 jets or warships, call for a transfer of Canadian military spending in Afghanistan to support health care, education, job creation and social services in Canada, educating Canadians about the war and Call for a repeal of Afghanistan legislation that infringes upon the rights of women in the country (CLC: <http://www.canadianlabour.ca/convention/2011-convention/general-resol>).

Trends in Public Opinion

On the participation of Canada in Afghanistan war since 2001 Quebec was the province in which more individuals opposed the involvement. Since 2001, Canada sent military troops to three different military missions. First early 9/11 incident, Canada participated in the US-led operation in Afghanistan for destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Later in 2003, Canada participated in the NATO led mission to keep and secure peace and humanity in Afghanistan. Finally in 2006, Canada increased the number of troops in the southern region of Kandahar where troops would stay until 2011. As for Canada's involvement in the US led mission in Afghanistan in term of war on terror, there are four surveys, three from Ipsos Reid and one from Leger Marketing between 2001 and 2002. On the presence of Canada in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002, the opposition was greater in Quebec than any other provinces, with an average 42.75 percent respondent against the mission. In other provinces, the level of opposition was average between 28.5 percent in British Columbia and 18 percent in Alberta (Massie et al. 2010).

Table-4.4: Public Opinion Polls: Measuring Support for Canada's War in Afghanistan, 2001–2007

Date	Poll Company	Question Wording	All	ROC	Quebec	Gap
12 Sep 2001	Declaring War					
07 Oct 2001	Attacking Afghanistan					
17-20* Sep 2001	IR	Support with US	73%	78%	59%	19%
16-21* Oct 2001	LM	Support with US	84%	86%	78%	8%
14 Nov 2001	Sending Soldiers under American Command					
13 Jan 2002	IR	Support with US	68%	72%	49%	23%
March 2003	Conducting Ground Offensive with the Americans					
21 May 2003	Coming Home from Kandahar					
12 Feb 2003	Returning Multilaterally to Kabul					
14 Apr 2004	Extending the Mission					
21 Mar 2004	Expanding and Returning to Kandahar					
Nov 2005	Conducting Combat in Kandahar					
04 Mar 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	54%	58%	33%	25%
09-12*Mar 2006	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	55%	59%	43%	16%
13 Mar 2006	Promising Leadership					
25 Mar 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	52%	57%	37%	20%
05 May 2006	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	40%	44%	27%	17%
17 May 2006	Extending to 2009					
20 May 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	57%	64%	37%	27%
29 Jul 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	47%	50%	35%	15%
14 Aug 2006	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	37%	42%	21%	21%
09 Sep 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	51%	53%	45%	8%
18 Sep 2006	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	42%	47%	27%	20%
06 Oct 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	57%	63%	45%	18%
16 Oct 2006	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	44%	49%	30%	19%
04 Nov 2006	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	44%	50%	31%	19%
24 Apr 2007	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	54%	58%	37%	21%
14-17*May 2007	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	40%	45%	24%	21%
22 Jun 2007	"Parliament Will Decide"					
12-15*Jul 2007	SC	Support for Canadian Forces	36%	41%	22%	19%
16 Jul 2007	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	51%	55%	30%	25%
25 Aug 2007	IR	Support for Canadian Forces	53%	57%	35%	22%

Source: Kirton, John and Jenilee Guebert (2007), "Two Solitudes, One War: Public Opinion, National Unity and Canada's War in Afghanistan", Conference Paper, Universite de Quebec a Montreal: Montreal.

Notes: *Dates refer to when poll was conducted, all other dates refer to when poll was released.

ROC=Rest of Canada

IR=Ipsos Reid, SC=Strategic Counsel, LM=Leger Marketing.

In September 2001 Canada participated in war on Afghanistan under the alliance of NATO and soon backed its diplomatic declaration with deadly force and combat group with the American NATO allies. This mission became Canada's longest war. Just after the 9/11 incident the initial poll on Afghanistan mission was surveyed on 17-20 October 2001. The majority of Canadians (73%) supported joining the US and war on international terrorism. But from the beginning there were two sides in Canada. 59 percent Quebecers supported joining the US in war but not in case it became a reason for terrorist attack on Canadian civilians. The next poll was taken on October 10 to 14 2001. It found majority of Canadians strongly supported the American and British led air strikes on Afghanistan against Taliban and Al Qaeda. The majority of Quebecers (60%) also supported the American-British led attack but 66 percent Quebecers worried about other attacks on Canada. Another poll on mid October 2001, 16 to 21 was taken by Leger Marketing when Canada sent its ships to the war. Here 84 percent, 50.05 percent fully and 33.3 percent partially of Canadians supported the government's decision to military support to US against Taliban and Al Qaeda. In Quebec 78.4 percent respondents supported the mission. On 6 to 8 November 2001, Ipsos Reid poll showed 67 percent of Canadians and 59 percent of Quebecers agreed with the War on Terror and military actions in Afghanistan. Further in 2002, the overall Canadians supported the mission and percentage of respondents was strong. On 31 January 2002, Ipsos Reid poll revealed Canada's strong support to the mission. 70 percent of Canadians and 58 percent of Quebecers agreed with mission (Kirton and Guebert 2007).

On the issue of coverage of news related to Afghanistan mission, the central role of media came out with a question 'how effective is the media in providing accurate and meaningful information?' On 19 April 2002, four Canadian troops were killed and eight Canadians were wounded in a training camp Tarnak Farm in Kandahar province of Afghanistan. By the first week covering this incident the Globe and Mail and National Post published 86 reports, commentaries and editorials per day. Total 315 items, 130 items in Globe and Mail and 185 items in National Post were published related to Tarnak Farm fratricide incident since 2006. Total front page coverage was 24 times in Globe and Mail and 29 times in National post (Mark 2007).

The Canadian public opinion for using forces presented a lie to the image of pacifist Canadian. Pew Global's 2004 survey gave the result 71 percent of Canadian

believed the legitimate use of force to maintain the order in world. The CBC polls described Canada as a pro American country. The United States had a net favorability rating in Canada of 81 percent. On balance, 66 percent of Canadians believed the United States to be a force for good in the world, again second only to Israel. The number of Canadians agreeing that “America has reaped the thorns sown by its rulers in the world” was 56 percent, second lowest after the UK and Israel; 72 percent of Canadians responded that the United States is a beacon of hope and opportunity, again second only to Israel. Canada, in short, is probably the most pro-American country in this sample besides the United States itself (Miller 2010).

It was also said that there were a lot of multilateral burdens in Canada. The polls showed a belief that the Canadian troops were taking too much burden in Afghanistan as working lead role and this view was shown in majority by Angus Reid polls by 2007. The Canadian Senate Defence Committee’s 2007 recommendations described that Canada should withdraw troops if the support from other NATO country was not forthcoming. Many analysts who held to the pre-Afghanistan view of Canadian public opinion would question the applicability of the principal policy objective model to Canada. The majority support for the mission was strong since 2006. After that the mission was started to face the counterinsurgency and internal political change (Miller 2010).

On one hand, French speaking authors also participated in the subject of “undue” influence of Quebecers on foreign policy of Canada and some disagreed with the English speaking colleagues and described that the perspective of Quebec society about Canadian foreign policy was ignored by Ottawa. On the other hand, some French speaking authors agreed that the Quebec always has a valuable influence on Canadian foreign policy with a positive opinion and argued as Quebecers helped to keep away Canada from Iraq invasion and Ballistic Missile Defence System that could threaten global power balance, and also convinced Ottawa to sign the Kyoto protocol (Massie et al. 2010).

At the beginning of 2006, there were 24 public opinion surveys about the deployments of troops in Afghanistan mission, 15 polls from Angus Reid and 9 polls from Ipsos Reid. After all an average 63.46 percent respondents of Quebec opposed the involvement of Canada in southern Afghanistan between March 2006 and

December 2009. The opinion was an average of 49% in British Columbia and in Atlantic provinces, while in Ontario and in Manitoba/Saskatchewan the average opposition was almost 46 percent. The average opposition of 36.8 percent was found in Alberta province. Concluding all over country as a whole an average half (50.13%) of respondents were against the deployment of Troops in Kandahar. A survey was conducted by Globe and Mail and CTV between 2006 and 2008 to know the Canadian attitude towards Afghan mission. The earliest polls were surveyed in March 2006 that revealed that majority (55%) of Canadian supported the mission but a minority (44%) of Canadian opposed. After that survey the picture was reverse. The first more detailed survey was conducted in March 2006 and 2nd detailed survey was in July 2007 by the Strategic Counsel using three questions about support or opposition to the Afghan mission. The survey showed not only the changing the appropriate role of armed forces in the Afghan War, it also revealed the support for mission declined (Fletcher et al. 2009).

Table-4.5: As you may know, Canadian troops are now active in Afghanistan. Why do you think Canadian troops are there? What is the reason or reasons?

	Percentage (%)
Support US troops / US foreign policy / help George Bush	22
Support NATO/support United Nations	5
Restore peace	13
Defeat Taliban / warlords / insurgents	9
Help create democracy	8
War on terror / defeat world terrorism/defeat Al-Qaeda	8
Peacekeeping	24
Humanitarian assistance/reconstruction	18
Negative US influence / pressure	2
Stabilize Afghanistan	2
Sent by Canadian government	2
Other SPECIFY	6
Don't Know/ No answer	11

CBC-Environics public issues poll, CBC News, Last Updated November 2006

The results of the survey are based on 2005 telephone interviews conducted by Environics Research Group Ltd. for the CBC from 2 November to 6 November 2006.

Source: Laxer, James (2008), *Mission of Folly: Why Canada Should Bring Its Troops Home from Afghanistan*, Ontario: Between the Lines.

In March 2006 survey also described that the Canadians were not well informed about the Afghan mission as combat mission. Only about one in every four (27.7%) people knew about the mission. The 2006 survey asked two questions about Canadian emotional responses. The first question was, “when you think of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, do you have emotional feelings some way or another?” 72 percent replied that they did have feelings but one in four said no. The other survey question was asked Canadian troops being in Afghanistan, they feel proud? Almost 90 percent respondent agreed with this question while 10 percent said they were not proud (Fletcher et al. 2009).

Table-4.6: As for as you know, Canadian mission in Afghanistan part of a US-led coalition or part of a United Nations approved NATO mission?

	Percentage (%)
US led coalition?	35
UN approved NATO mission?	53
Don't know/ No answer	12

CBC-Enviro-nics public issues poll, CBC News, Last Updated November 2006

The results of the survey are based on 2005 telephone interviews conducted by Environics Research Group Ltd. for the CBC from 2 November to 6 November 2006.

Source: Laxer, James (2008), *Mission of Folly: Why Canada Should Bring Its Troops Home from Afghanistan*, Ontario: Between the Lines.

Table-4.7: In your opinion, should Canadian Forces

	Percentage (%)
Stay in Afghanistan past the year 2009	10
Stay in Afghanistan until 2009 and then return to Canada, or	23
Return from Afghanistan before 2009?	59
Don't know/No answer	8

CBC-Enviro-nics public issues poll, CBC News, Last Updated November 2006

The results of the survey are based on 2005 telephone interviews conducted by Environics Research Group Ltd. for the CBC from 2 November to 6 November 2006.

Source: Laxer, James (2008), *Mission of Folly: Why Canada Should Bring Its Troops Home from Afghanistan*, Ontario: Between the Lines.

Table-4.8: Do you think in the end the Canadian mission in Afghanistan is likely to be successful or not successful?

	Percentage (%)
Successful	34
Not successful	58
Don't know/No answer	7

CBC-Enviroics public issues poll, CBC News, Last Updated November 2006

The results of the survey are based on 2005 telephone interviews conducted by Enviroics Research Group Ltd. for the CBC from 2 November to 6 November 2006.

Source: Laxer, James (2008), *Mission of Folly: Why Canada Should Bring Its Troops Home from Afghanistan*, Ontario: Between the Lines.

During April and May 2007, a survey was conducted by SES Research and asked people how they reacted to casualties suffered during the Afghan mission. 54 percent of Canadian favoured the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan while 39 percent of Canadian accepted the fatalities as an unfortunate accident. The data of Canadian public perception regarding the Afghanistan mission were collected and surveyed by Angus Reid strategies and Ipsos Reid between February 2006 and January 2010. Basically they asked Canadians if they strongly support, somewhat support, strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, the use of Canadian troops for security and combat effort against Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The surveyor focused only on acceptance of mission in Kandahar and left out other activities such as reconstruction work. Before the House of Common's vote on March 2008 which decided to stay troops in Kandahar until 201, Angus Reid asked Canadians whether they agreed, disagreed or unsure about the withdrawal of troops. The report related to Accidents and suicides was also included. However neither the Department of National Defence nor the media published the number of injured soldiers in Afghan mission. Between February 2006 and January 2010 Canada lost average 2.7 soldiers per month after increasing troops in Kandahar region. These casualties influenced the Canadian's perception about the mission. Since February 2006 the casualties in southern Afghanistan affected the public opinion for the mission. The deployment of troops in Kandahar and the causalities affected the people's perception in Ontario, the Atlantic, Manitob/Saskatchewan and British Columbia provinces. But the Quebec

provinces disagreed with the participation in mission since beginning of the involvement (Boucher 2010).

Table-4.8: Overall, do you support or oppose the military operation involving Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan?

Region							
	Total	British Columbia	Alberta	Manitoba/Saskatchewan	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Canada
Strongly support	11%	7%	19%	5%	14%	4%	18%
Moderately Support	25%	30%	30%	21%	28%	18%	26%
Strongly Oppose	31%	30%	29%	19%	26%	48%	17%
Moderately Oppose	25%	28%	19%	43%	24%	23%	29%
Not Sure	7%	6%	2%	12%	7%	7%	10%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), “*Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan*”, Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Table-4.9: Overall, do you support or oppose the military operation involving Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan?

	Dec. 2010	Oct. 2010	Aug. 2010	Jun. 2010
Strongly support	11%	11%	15%	13%
Moderately Support	25%	25%	25%	24%
Strongly Oppose	31%	34%	30%	33%
Moderately Oppose	25%	21%	23%	26%
Not Sure	7%	10%	8%	4%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), “*Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan*”, Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Table-4.10: Thinking about the media in Canada, do you think it has provided too much attention, too little attention, or the right amount of attention to Afghanistan?

Region							
	Total	British Columbia	Alberta	Manitoba/Saskatchewan	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Canada
Too much	15%	12%	14%	8%	15%	20%	12%
The right amount	43%	35%	40%	44%	42%	49%	41%
Too little	26%	34%	31%	24%	27%	19%	29%
Not Sure	16%	19%	16%	25%	15%	12%	18%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), "Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan", Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Table-4.11: Thinking about the media in Canada, do you think it has provided too much attention, too little attention, or the right amount of attention to Afghanistan?

	Dec. 2010	Oct. 2010	Aug. 2010	Jun. 2010
Too much	15%	13%	12%	12%
The right amount	43%	47%	48%	51%
Too little	26%	25%	28%	25%
Not Sure	16%	15%	13%	12%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), "Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan", Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Table-4.12: Thinking about the federal government, do you think it has provided too much information, too little information, or the right amount of information about the war in Afghanistan?

Region							
	Total	British Columbia	Alberta	Manitoba/Saskatchewan	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Canada
Too much	5%	3%	2%	2%	6%	8%	3%
The right amount	24%	19%	32%	26%	25%	19%	29%
Too little	56%	59%	52%	50%	53%	63%	51%
Not Sure	15%	19%	14%	22%	16%	10%	17%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), "Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan", Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Table-4.13: Thinking about the federal government, do you think it has provided too much information, too little information, or the right amount of information about the war in Afghanistan?

	Dec. 2010	Oct. 2010	Aug. 2010	Jun. 2010
Too much	5%	4%	5%	2%
The right amount	24%	25%	26%	29%
Too little	56%	55%	57%	57%
Not Sure	15%	16%	13%	12%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), “*Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan*”, Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

Table-4.14: Major Troop Contributing States, Fatalities, Mean Public Support, Number of Polls, and Alliance Commitment from August 2006 to December 2009

Country	Mean Public Support (%)	Troop Contributions	Fatalities	No. polls	Observed alliance contribution
United States	55	45,780	973	43	Troop increase
Denmark	49	740	31	4	Troop increase
Norway	43	500	4	3	Troop increase
Netherlands	43	1,950	21	9	Extended commitment; flexible 2010 withdrawal
Canada	40	2,830	139	40	Extended commitment; flexible 2011 withdrawal
Czech Republic	40	370	3	3	Troop increase
Germany	39	4,280	34	11	Troop increase; expanded rules of engagement
Italy	34	3,150	22	3	Troop increase
France	33	3,750	39	8	Troop increase
Spain	33	1,065	27	5	Troop increase
UK	32	9,500	250	17	Troop increase
Poland	21	1,955	16	6	Troop increase
Turkey	18	17,755	2	4	Troop increase

Source: Kreps, Sarah (2010), “Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 6: 191–215

Table-4.15: Regional evolution of Canadian public opposition to Canada’s mission in Kandahar, Afghanistan (2006-2010)

Date	Quebec	Alberta	Ontario	British Columbia	Atlantic	Manitoba/Saskatchewan	Pollster
Mar 2006	67%	42%	35%	40%	49%	46%	Ipsos*
May2006	61%	26%	34%	37%	31%	41%	Ipsos
Jul 2006	65%	36%	36%	45%	44%	37%	Ipsos
Sept2006	51%	34%	38%	53%	34%	50%	Ipsos
Oct 2006	53%	25%	36%	40%	26%	30%	Ipsos
Nov2006	68%	24%	53%	53%	60%	50%	Ipsos
Feb 2007	64%	41%	41%	35%	41%	34%	Angus**
Apr 2007	66%	27%	50%	56%	49%	53%	Angus
Jun 2007	60%	43%	47%	54%	56%	32%	Angus
Jul 2007	60%	36%	43%	47%	54%	53%	Angus
Aug2007	61%	26%	41%	48%	38%	42%	Ipsos
Sept2007	64%	53%	51%	59%	58%	49%	Angus
Dec 2007	65%	38%	51%	51%	44%	52%	Angus
Jan 2008	64%	35%	40%	46%	41%	34%	Ipsos
Mar 2008	67%	41%	57%	49%	63%	55%	Angus***
May2008	60%	43%	47%	54%	56%	32%	Angus
Jul 2008	66%	51%	55%	55%	53%	66%	Angus
Sept2008	77%	38%	58%	53%	58%	43%	Angus
Nov2008	67%	37%	51%	47%	58%	54%	Angus
Jan2009	71%	31%	56%	55%	63%	53%	Angus
Mar 2009	59%	37%	50%	46%	66%	43%	Angus
May2009	69%	49%	53%	54%	45%	57%	Angus
Jul 2009	57%	32%	39%	42%	48%	51%	Ipsos
Dec 2009	61%	33%	50%	58%	46%	51%	Angus
Average	63.5%	36.6%	46.3%	49%	49.2%	46.2%	
St.deviation	5.6	8	7.6	6.7	10.6	9.4	

Source: Boucher, Jean-Christophe (2010), “Evaluating the “Trenton Effect”: Canadian Public Opinion and Military Casualties in Afghanistan (2006–2010)”, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 40 (2): 237-258.

Notes: *Question asked: “Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose, the use of Canada’s troops for security and combat efforts against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan?”

**Question asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: Canada should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan before their mandate ends in February 2009?”

***Question asked: “As you may know, the House of Commons has authorized an extension of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan until the end of 2011, which is conditional on Canada coming up with unmanned aerial vehicles and transport helicopters, and NATO providing an additional 1000 troops in the south. Do you agree or disagree with the decision to extend Canada’s mission in Afghanistan until the end of 2011?”

Canadian public opinion began to turn against war in the spring and summer of 2007. After January 2007 no poll shows in favour of Afghanistan war. The heaviest casualties happened to Canadian army in 2006 amongst all NATO forces in the Kandahar region. And somehow the fighting with Taliban in Kandahar region provoked the Taliban as recovered. The Canadian Senate Committee on Defence and National Security published a report and concluded, if the support from other NATO countries is not forthcoming Canada should withdraw the troops from Kandahar region. The Committee also said that the time and geography was with the Taliban. The Afghan Parliament's upper house passed a resolution in May 2007 to negotiate with Taliban who wanted to join government. By 2007 the defeat and casualties influenced a lot of Canadian public opinion. Some other fatalities also helped to oppose the mission (Miller 2010).

According to Angus Reid survey 2009, the majority of Canadians did not support the involvement of Canadian army in Afghanistan mission. All three opposition political parties with majority of seats in House of Commons were against further extension of Canadian troops in Afghanistan. Since March 2006 that is a month after Stephen Harper's government, a certain quantity of Canadians opposed the missions. Canadian people's attitudes were found different region by region. In December 2009, two thirds of Albertans agreed with Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan, while only one third of Quebecers supported it (Angus Reid). The result and perspective of opinion polls reflected the two different regional strategies as an Antimilitarist in Quebec and a continentalist in Alberta. In June 2007, Harper Government decided to make Parliament decide for future role of Canada in Afghanistan and this brought the voting in the House of Commons on 13 March 2008 and the result came out as ending Canada's combat mission in 2011 (Massie et al. 2010).

Table-4.16: As you may know, Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan is scheduled to end in July 2011. The federal government has announced that Canada will keep 950 soldiers in Afghanistan until 2014 in a strictly non-combat role to help train the Afghan military. All things considered, do you agree or disagree with this decision?

	Region						
	Total	British Columbia	Alberta	Manitoba/Saskatchewan	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Canada
Agree	48%	56%	62%	46%	50%	39%	37%
Disagree	44%	39%	34%	39%	41%	55%	51%
Not Sure	8%	6%	4%	15%	10%	7%	12%

Source: Angus Reid Public Opinion (2010), “*Canadians Divided on Assuming Non-Combat Role in Afghanistan*”, Angus Reid Public Opinion A Vision Critical Practice, Vancouver.

About 90 percent Canadians opined in the favour of calling back the troops from Afghanistan by the scheduled date 2011. The new survey conducted by The Canadian Press Harris-Decima poll stated that according to 40 percent of those surveyed, Canadians wanted the troop out of Afghanistan early while 46 percent stated that the troops should stay in Afghanistan until the scheduled time in July 2011. Only eight percent respondents agreed with the further extension of troop deployment in Afghanistan. The survey conducted among the political parties such as the Conservative and the Liberal parties shows the result in favour of the data of staying the troops until 2011 while the New Democrats and Green party along with Bloc Quebecois stood for withdrawing the troops out of Afghanistan earlier. 54 percent respondents opposed the commitment of the governments to the staying of the troops in Afghanistan till 2011 while 34 percent respondents supported it (The Canadian Press: <http://www.ctvnews.ca/four-in-10-say-end-afghan-mission-early-poll-finds-1.396550>).

Table-4.17: Public Attitudes in Canada towards the Afghan Mission

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Positive	43	37	40	39	38
Negative	45	57	57	53	58

Source: Nossal, Kim Richard (2010), “*Making Sense of Afghanistan: The Domestic Politics of International Stabilization Missions in Australia and Canada*”, Association for Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand, University of New England, Armidale.

Note: Aggregated from polls asking about general support for the mission, overall, do you strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose the decision to send Canadian troops to Afghanistan?

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

After the Second World War, Canada started participating independently in international politics, along with the emergence of superpowers US and USSR. Canada has also been working actively under UN since it was established in 1945. Canada was one of the founder members of the UN and participated in every UN peacekeeping program whether it was the 1949 India Pakistan War, 1950 Korea War, and Arab Israel Suez crisis in 1956. Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson contributed an important role to resolve the Suez Crisis and this peacekeeping contribution made him the Nobel Prize winner in 1957. The role and contribution of Canada has turned world politics in a different direction, in the direction of stable and peaceful world.

Canadian foreign policy has been based on five principles: national unity; political liberty and collective security; respect of national and international law; to secure human values; and lastly, to carry on international responsibility. This responsibility made Canada work with various National and International organizations in multilateral and bilateral level.

Owing to its multilateral politics and peacekeeping diplomatic role, Canada has emerged as a Middle power in prevailing international political scenario. Hence, Canada has participated in all the military and peacekeeping programmes of the UN and NATO.

In 1990, Canada's foreign policy witnessed change, where human security agenda was treated as the more focused centre than security of state agenda. Keeping human security agenda in view, Canada played an important role in establishing the ICC. In 2001, Canada contributed in establishing Responsibility to Protect in UN and also played important diplomatic role for accepting the Responsibility to Protect in other multilateral organization such as G77 (Group of 77) and NAM (Non Aligned Movement).

In 2001, a shift in Canadian policy under the auspices of UN and NATO in participating in the Afghan mission was witnessed. Henceforth, Canada's interest in the UN Peacekeeping programme started diminishing on the one hand but Canada started increasing its interest in NATO mission on the other hand. The peacekeeping agenda of Martin's Liberal government also changed and focus on the military mission increased, and hence an increase in its defence budget was observed. Canada also increased its quantity in defence and forces area and participated in both US led OEF and NATO led ISAF military operation.

The weakening of US economy affected Canada badly and witnessed its economy in recession. The Canada US trade relation is the largest bilateral commercial relation in the world. The amount of this commercial relation was \$1.2 million per day in 2009. This trade relation works under the rule of NAFTA and WTO. There was a NORAD agreement between Canada and US to share information of space technology and also missile technology.

The geostrategic position of Afghanistan is very significant and known as a bridge between Central Asia and South Asia, in the north side of Afghanistan is USSR countries (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan), in south-east side is Pakistan, in west is Iran. In 2005 35 companies of Canada was working in Kazakhstan and four companies were in Turkmenistan. In pre 9/11 era US was working on a natural gas pipeline project which was Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, Pakistan to India, and present Taliban Government was also involved in this pipeline project. Just before 9/11 incident the negotiation with Taliban failed. Further, in 2008, TAPI project was restarted with coordination with ADB and Canada is a member of ADB. At a present time this project is more influenced by US and Canadian contribution in this project as a partner of US.

In the Afghanistan Mission, Canada participated more actively as a partner of US and a NATO ally, because of the Canadian economic interest with the US. Canada's largest bilateral trade relationship is with the US. 9/11 incident brought a change in Canadian foreign policy. US and Canada signed Safe Third Country Agreement, in which the refugees were banned from US border to Canadian border and vice-versa. Canada has participated in Afghan war precisely because of the reason that Canada wanted to salvage its relation with the US as an ally. Initially Canada

participated in Afghan mission as a peacekeeper but that later turn out to be a military combating role in Afghanistan.

Initially, Canada took part in NATO's ISAF and US-led military mission but in Kandahar region ISAF became integral part of US-led military oppression. For the human's security of Afghanistan and eliminating Taliban and Al-Qaida Canada started Operation Athena and Operation Archer under US-led operation Enduring Freedom. Keeping in view human's security and peacekeeping agenda Canada launched several development and reconstruction programme. Canada has spent approximately \$100 million annually on development programme through CIDA and DFAIT. Canadian forces actively took part in Kandahar region for providing training to ANA and ANP.

Liberal government of Jean Chretien and Paul Martin, Canadian defence and foreign policy has adopted 3D approach in order to carry on Afghan mission. This 3D approach was also continued by Harper government. In 2005-2006, the financial budget of Harper government increased from \$400 million to \$1.5 billion especially for military expenses in South region of Afghanistan.

The Canadian decision to send Army to Afghanistan was taken without public debate and discussion, keeping in view the US interest. However, George Bush then announced that Canadian reluctance to support US militarily amounts to supporting terrorists. In addition to it American ambassador, Paul Celluci also announced that America gives more importance to its security than its trade and commerce. Henceforth, Canada became apprehensive of negative impact on its trade relation with US. Just after US attack on Afghanistan, NATO invoked its Article 5, in which an attack on any NATO member was considered as an attack on all NATO members.

When Stephan Harper became Prime Minister of Canada, he focused on better relation with US and also announced an increment of 2,200 troops in amount of reinforcements in Southern region of Afghanistan. In May 2006, the budget of Harper government on additional spending such as policing border security and public safety was \$1.4 billion whereas US spent \$1.26 billion on these programme.

After Al Qaeda's 9/11 incident on US, UN Security Council had passed many resolution on Afghanistan. According to international law and domestic law of

Canada, the invasion of Afghanistan by US and ISAF is illegal. US legitimized its invasion of Afghanistan an act of self-defence but this law can be imposed in case of serious threat and bodily harm or death by other state but not immediately. This self-defence law also exists in UN charter. The Article 51 of UN charter says that no agency (state) can attack on any other agency in the name of self-defence without informing the UN Security Council. This aggression of US is illegal in the name of self defence.

Canada assisted in reconstruction, rebuilding and development work apart from being engaged in military combat. Military oppression of Canada is centred around Kabul and Kandahar region under operation Anaconda and Torii. Canada has contributed in US led campaign against terrorism in which department of National defence has decided five points for work in Afghanistan. First, reinforce the authority of Afghan government in and around Kandahar region, second help stabilize and rebuild country. Third, help monitor security. Forth, promote Afghan government policies and priorities with help of local authorities. Fifth, to facilitate security sector reform.

In 2004, when most of the NATO members were reluctant to go to Kandahar then Canada stepped up and in 2005 US handed over the security and development responsibility of Kandahar to Canada through PRT. Chief of defence staff Rick Hiller created two structures: CEFCOM and SAT-A. SAT-A was helpful in formulating financial plan but it was not successful. On 31 January 2006, Afghan Compact was co-chaired by UN and Afghan government in which 51 countries including Canada and 10 organisations participated. The main goal of this Compact was to secure social and economic development of Afghanistan along with its security, governance and human rights.

Some elected MPs of Afghanistan parliament were former commanders of the Northern Alliance in 13 MPs were involved in drug-trafficking, massacre and mass rape. In 2007 along with 65000 troops of US and NATO, 40000 troops of ANA collaborated in order to provide peace and security in the region, although quantum of conflict with Taliban doubled and number of casualties increased.

The people, who are killed in military operation, are given ex-gratia payment by Canadian government. The total number of civilian casualties is 1523, 2118, 2412,

2777 in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively and in addition to it thousands of people were seriously injured every year. Apart from it, this conflict has forced many people to become refugees. Kandahar region alone has 15 refugee camps and Helmand province has 10. Almost 10000 refugees are staying in each camp.

In Afghan mission, the full cost of Canada's military operation in 2006-2007 was \$2590 million whereas cost for UN peacekeeping was \$9.4 million. In 2008-2009, the full cost of Canada's military operation was \$2565 million whereas for UN peacekeeping it was \$15.6 million. Canada started training programmes in collaboration with NATO for Afghan national army, Afghan national police and Afghan air force. This programme is known as CCTMA.

In Afghan war, from April 2002 to December 2011 total casualties of Canadian troops and personnel were 158. In this War on Terror from 2007 to April 2011 total number of casualties of Afghan army, Afghan National Directorate of Security Operatives and Afghan Security Guards collectively was 2253. The death toll of Afghan National and Border Police was 5116.

Canadian army and other organization such as DFAIT, CIDA and RCNP contributed in the development of Afghanistan. Canada for Afghanistan's development and reconstruction has always provided fund in collaboration with multilateral organizations such as the UN, IMF, World Bank and International NGO and bilateral with Afghan Government.

In 2001, in order to end the Afghan crisis Canada, US and international community passed the Bonn agreement, in which Afghanistan, US military, USAID, Canadian military and CIDA worked together. The US and Canada have become the 1st and 3rd donor countries respectively for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. Under ministry of rural rehabilitation and development of Afghanistan Canada contributed through several programmes such as National Solidarity Program, National Rural Access Programme, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation and National Area-Based Development Program. All these programmes are linked with the poverty, social protection and rural area development. Canada also worked for betterment of education in Afghanistan particularly for girls.

In order to secure political stability through Bonn agreement, under US pressure Karzai was appointed as interim authority of Afghan government precisely because of US's geopolitical interest in Afghanistan, and Canada as a partner in the Bonn agreement, associated itself with US politics internationally. The presidential election of 2004 and parliamentary election of 2005 were biased and undemocratic because other 34 progressive left political parties existing in Afghanistan were prohibited according to Single Non Transferable Vote System from participating in these elections. Canada was also engaged in this electoral process following the trail of US and international community.

Karzai was made President of Afghanistan who appointed the elements of Northern Alliance, warlords and drug lords and criminals for an instance Abdul Rashid Dostum as new army chief of staff. Most of these officers and staffs were corrupted who encouraged opium cultivation and used to manipulate for aggrandizement. Because such political environment, the Afghan people could afford to believe in Afghan government, ANA and ANP.

In December 2001, a general consensus was drawn in Bonn agreement for establishing independent judiciary and democratic secular government but newly elected Karzai government adopted the Islamic constitution. Here, Canada as a democratic state with western values gave green signal to it.

For women's empowerment, Canada started 6 women's radio station and for law and order, set up a Law and Order Trust Fund. Canada also participated in Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration along with another programme Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. Although, Law and Order Trust Fund and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups were not successful to achieve their goals. To order to make Afghanistan opium-free country, Canada contributed in Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund. In May 2002, ARTF was set up with the help of World Bank, ADB and Islamic Development Bank. Canada was also one of the donor countries in ARTF. Canada was working on three Signature project: education, eradication of polio and Dahla dam for irrigation.

In Canadian society, there have been various discussions regarding its government's engagement in Afghanistan. After 9/11 incident Chretien's Liberal government supported and participated in Afghan mission with US and NATO. This

political and military engagement was further carried out by the Liberal government of Paul Martin. After Martin, a conservative party Stephen Harper as Prime Minister engaged its government completely with US and NATO and enlarged its military programme in Afghanistan.

In the beginning, Canadian civilian supported the Afghan mission but after 2006 this mission started running out of favour in Canada and they started demanding withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. October 2001, a public opinion poll survey by Leger Marketing in which 84 percent Canadians voted in favour of Canadian military mission in Afghanistan. However, in January 2002, Ipsos Reid poll survey revealed the decrease in this support and dwindled to 68 percent. Further in May 2006, another survey by Strategic Council shows a drastic downfall in favour and dwindling drastically up to 40 percent.

In 2006, there were too many differences among several political parties of Canada regarding its military engagement in Afghanistan. NDP, Green Party and Bloc Quebecois strongly opposed its military involvements in Afghanistan. However, conservative and liberal parties supported going under US and NATO.

Increase in the number of casualties of Canadian forces in Afghanistan, Canadian civilians and labour organisations such as CAW, CUPE, CUPW and CLC strongly opposed government policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan and demanded withdrawing troops from Afghanistan.

Overall, one may state that Canadian engagement in Afghanistan was under the US as its junior partner and as a committed member of NATO. In international political scenario vis-a-vis oil and gas politics of US in the world, Afghan invasion was an integral part. Henceforth, Canada and US emerged as a well-knit neo-colonial force in prevailing geo-politics of Afghanistan.

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