

**DEMOCRATISATION BY FORCE:  
A CASE STUDY OF US INTERVENTION IN IRAQ**

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**AUGUSTINE MALSAWMDAWNGLIANI**



**Diplomacy and Disarmament Division  
Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament  
School of International Studies  
Jawaharlal Nehru University  
New Delhi 110067  
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**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled "**Democratisation by Force: A Case Study of US Intervention in Iraq**" submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

*Augustine MS*

**Augustine Malsawmdawngliani**

**CERTIFICATE**

It is recommended that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

*SSS*  
Prof. Swaran Singh 26.7.12  
**Chairperson**

Prof. Swaran Singh  
**Supervisor**

(i)

**To**

**My Parents,**  
**My everlasting pillars**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AID	- Agency for International Development
CDC	- Centre for Democracy and Governance
CFC	- Combined Forces Command
CIA	- Central Intelligence Agency
CPA	- Coalition Provisional Authority
DPT	- Democratic Peace Theory
EU	- European Union
FAO	- Food and Agricultural Organisation
FBI	- Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	- Gross Domestic Product
ICISS	- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IGC	- Iraqi Governing Council
IIA	- Iraqi Interim Authority
NED	- National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	- National Security Council
OFF	- Oil For Food Programme
OAS	- Organisation of American States
R2P	- Right to Protect
S.Korea	- Republic of Korea/ South Korea
TAL	- Transitional Administrative Law
TNA	- Transitional National Assembly
UK	- United Kingdom
UNDEF	- United Nations Democratic Fund
UNICEF	- United Nations Children's Fund
UNRIC	- United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe
US	- United States of America
USAID	- US Agency for International Development
USIA	- US Information Agency
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	- Weapons of Mass Destruction

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The question whether forcible democratisation in strife-ridden and non-democratic countries is not only effective but also 'just' has been an empirical puzzle for scholars as well as politicians alike. Countries often adopt democracy through different political processes and each of these has produced different outcomes. The history of democracy traces back to Athens, through its rise and fall and its recent reincarnation from the end of cold war since the early 1990s. The United States of America (US) herself stumbled upon democracy by way of a civil strife at the beginning of 1860s to later become one of the greatest democratic movements in recorded history.

### **What is Democratisation?**

The term 'Democracy' has been around for centuries dating back to the glorious days of the Greek philosophers. It is derived from the two Greek words 'demos' and 'cratia' signifying basically the importance of the people's voice and participation in the political processes i.e. 'rule of the people'. Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy gave a literal meaning to the word democracy which read that democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people. Democracy being a form of government implies that the ultimate authority of the government is being invested in the common people so that the public policy is designed to conform to the will of the people and serve their interests. Democracy in common general sense may be explained in such a way that it is a form of government in which supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation involving periodic free and fair election.

Democracy as a form of government implies universal suffrage, freedom of speech and the press, and the rule of law. This idealistic interpretation of a form of government is valued by most states in the international system. The end of



the Cold War sees the champion of liberal democracies as the ‘final form of human government’ and as such constituted the ‘end of history.’ (Fukuyama 2006b: xi). Even the former autocratic states have the second perspective of moving towards a democratic form of government. The pattern of development around the world brought forth by the incidences of regime change has witnessed the inclination of governments around the world towards democracy (Adesnik and McFaul 2006: 9). It has even been established that liberal democracy is the form of government that stand against the test of history.

However, it is challenged that if liberal democracy is the final form of human government, why not all states of the world today completely adopt democracy. Fukuyama in his essay ‘The End of History’ was considered too quick to proclaim his thesis. He himself acknowledged his mistakes in his book ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ that he was proven wrong by incidences happening around the world that happened to experience backlash of democracy promotion (Fukuyama 2006b: xii). It is because of this assumption that democracy needs to be promoted across the globe as the worldwide rejection for one party system and military rule is on the rise (de Zeeuw 2008: vii) and the fragility of democracy gives an excuse for the powerful states the purpose of imposing its interest around the world.

Coming to the process of democratisation, it is the transition to a more democratic political regime. The transition may be from an authoritarian regime to a full democracy, a transition from an authoritarian political system to a semi-democracy or transition from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political system. The outcome of this democratisation process may also be a consolidated democracy like in the United Kingdom (UK) or it may face frequent reverses like in Argentina. Different patterns of democratisation are often used to explain other political phenomena, such as whether a country goes to war or whether its economy grows. It is believed that democracy help strengthen economy as well as maintain not only local and regional peace but also international.

Democratisation itself is influenced by various factors, including economic development, history, and civil society. Democratisation is a modern term with a local, regional and global dimension. Although relatively a new context in the world history, it has influenced global politics by creating a certain utopia of the 21st century. Although the notion of democracy has credibility and its overall effect throughout both the first and the third world seemed to be increasingly positive, it is not without fault and neither is the process always a smooth ride. There are few factors which are debated to be affecting and limiting democratisation process such as cultures, history and economics.

Research in the past seems to contradict with each other and has proven only one truth regarding the phenomena of democracy that, it is incoherent to any rules applied as such. But this doesn't make democracy any less important and valuable and its effect is also very real and life changing for many citizens. The road of realism will always be littered with ethical issues and moral trade-offs. Its diversity holds important lessons for countries in both the pre and present stages. There are many factors that influence democratization according to scholars around the world (McFaul 2007: 45). But as there is an anti-thesis for every thesis, there are also some who propagated otherwise. Barany (2009) argued that the controversy in democracy promotion is that setting up of democracy assisted by external actors has been regarded as a threat to the prevailing government in power. The question of democracy promotion within a state has to develop a favourable consent of the governed.

Democracy and democratic institution can take root only if it is home grown. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 2007 even goes to proclaim that democracy cannot be exported or imposed. To them, it is solely the responsibility of the state to be democratic or otherwise. However, after the cold war and especially after 9/11, the installation of democratic form of government has been projected as one solution for all problems. Several questions on the process in which democracy promotion should be conducted are highlighted in Goldsmith (2008) like the manner in which United States should promote democracy abroad. There happened to be several dynamics of democracy promotion depending on the issues. It

can be strategic like the need for oil and other natural resources and military bases, (Goldsmith 2008: 120) or moral obligations which will be on humanitarian or religious ground.

Indeed a qualified deduction is also demonstrated in such a way that states can also encourage democratisation without the use of military force, which is through sheer diplomacy or ideological argument. The trend in which democracy promotion rely on the promoting party power status in international relation happens to be redundant. For some, it is believed that the imposition of democracy by stronger states upon weaker states is deceitful. Michael Walzer (2008) in his essay questions the promoters and the extent to which they are authorised to use force in promoting democracy. He suggests that sending an army across the border is not a good democratic move, nor it is likely to be an effective way to promote democracy. Contrasting to the fact that the Soviet Red Army marching onto Warsaw to create communism in Poland is much like the American army marching onto Baghdad to create democracy in Iraq (Walzer 2008: 354). It created backlash in the effort to promote democracy.

The global image of the US as a symbol of democracy and human rights had suffered a setback (Carothers 2006: 56). Even the establishment of the US based corporations had suffered the anti-wave. This is because the US has been repeatedly violating the rule of law, which happened to be the base of democracy, at home and abroad and has further weakened the legitimacy of the democracy promotion cause. The backlash produces the same supposition of what the US engage in its endeavour. For instance, the Russian government offensive posture against western democracy aid appears to become a way to portray the authoritarian project as a defence of Russian's national security. The area around the former Soviet Union, beginning to encircle Russia, as states like Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic States, etc. come under the influence of US democracy promotion that look as if threatening Russia's national security (Cox 2000: 15).

From the perspectives of the democracy promoters it is in the realm of national interest and the grand strategy to pursue or encourage others onto the goal of

democracy promotion. There happened to be moral as well as pragmatic reasons why such promotion has been pursued. There is an unchallenged assumption to the fact that only democracies promote democracy. This is because of the fact that the more democracies there are, the higher the intensity of cooperation in the international relations which also agrees with one of the postulates of democracy that it will bring international peace. For instance, the more democratic the UN will be the more it will promote democracy itself. From the experience of the European Union (EU), which is composed of only democratic countries, states began to transform and then move towards attainment of their democratic aspiration (Martinez-Soliman 2006: 1).

As for the United States, it happened to be motivated by a national mission to do good in the world, a mission consistent with its core self-image as a champion of personal freedom, by comparison to advancing its own expedient interests on the premise that liberal democracies form a security community in which the probability of armed conflict is zero (Rieffer 2005:385). It also has a great impact on the strategic front for the US. The other assumed reason will be that as a superpower, its grand strategy will be democratising the world thereby being the champion of democracy around the world which will enable it to establish the hegemony it aspires (Mandelbaum 2002: 23; Rieffer 2005: 386).

### **Democratisation and US since Cold War**

From the dawn of the new millennium, liberal democracy has crept into the minds and thoughts of people around the world. The aspiration of a good future for themselves has brought in the idea of democracy to and for the still non-democratic. Democracy promotion has been the by-product of military intervention although the state department using its favoured instruments like US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has been claiming to constantly use a non-military method through funds and aid to promote democracy. The real scenario is that the tax payers, that is, the American public will support the decision to use military intervention only when persuaded that a direct threat to US national security does exist.

However, the debate between the idealist and the pragmatist of making democracy as criteria for fostering and bridging a relationship in international relations is still under scrutiny. There may be an instance where the US had formed an alliance with non-democratic states in the course of history, but the fact that it is a strategic move to contain the communist expansion explained her behaviour then. But still, with the communism threat gone, the manner in which the US continue to intervene in other state's internal affairs on the question of humanitarian intervention and democratisation left other state and also her own American public doubt the commitment of US democracy promotion policy.

After the end of the Second World War, most countries suffered setbacks as the war took a toll on their economies and military prowess. There were but few countries and their allies still standing. Soon after the war ended, a new kind of war started between the US and the Soviet Union. The Cold War began after the success of their temporary wartime alliance against Nazi Germany. The USSR and the US saw each other as competing superpowers with immense economic and political differences. This war was a propaganda war, mainly between the Communist Soviet and the capitalist US. Both sides possessed nuclear weapons, and because their use would probably guarantee their mutual assured destruction the chief military forces never engaged in a direct battle with each other.

The nuclear deterrent kept the war 'cold.' The war ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 leaving the US to dominate the political scene and international politics. After the Cold War, promoting the international spread of democracy seemed ready and confident to replace containment as the guiding principle of US foreign policy. Many scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratisation could become America's next mission. Francis Fukuyama's classic in democratisation studies entitled *The End of History and the Last Man* spoke of the rise of liberal democracy as the final form of human government. However arguments also arose that the expansion of liberal economic reforms had mixed effects on democratisation.

Almost like the White Man's burden, the US had always put it on their hands to help spread democracy also through its various agents. Be it for democracy or other issues, the US has had a history of intervention in many country's problems since 1890 from Wounded Knee (with the Red Indians) to the present Iraq, Afghanistan etc. With the end of the cold war, US policymakers sought a number of rationales to justify continued engagement in the world and to promote American interests. Both the Republicans and Democrats alike were attracted to a framework developed by the Reagan administration i.e. the U.S. promotion of democracy. In 1993 under President Clinton, US administration went bolder and further than the previous administration of Reagan and Bush had ever gone, announcing that all US foreign policy would be guided by the doctrine of enlargement, officially aiming at the spread of democracy and thus increasing the number of democratic states.

Although this rhetoric reflected a shift in thinking from the former policy of containment which is no longer necessary after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was not backed up with significant policy initiatives designed to implement it. There were only some bureaucratic rearrangements such as the creation of the Center for Democracy and Governance (CDC) at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the State Department. The attempt of the Clinton administration to create a position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping at the Department of Defense was rejected by the Congress, but instead a special Assistant for Democracy was named as the National Security Council (NSC) (Cohn 1999).

For the Clinton administration, the promotion of democracy was valuable not only for its own sake but also because it enhances free trade and economic growth and also promotes global security. Adesnik and McFaul (2006: 7) illustrated different methods of democracy promotion like 'by-product of military intervention', non-military method of technical support for reforming government agencies or direct financial aid for civil society organisations and through diplomatic measures. However, they failed to mention the role played by great power of how intense they are involved in the democratisation of that particular state or states.

President Clinton had said in his 1994 State of the Union address that democracies don't attack each other and that the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. However, academics Michael E. Brown and others contend that this 'democratic peace theory' is based more on wishful thinking than empirical evidence (Cohn 1999). But among policymakers, analysts, and the public, there remains a broad consensus on supporting democracy promotion.

Democracy is considered to be the ultimate human good and countries like the US has been spreading the democracy gospel passionately. The consensus, which builds on the US national identity in global politics and the idealist tradition in foreign policy, has emerged with little critical examination of the objectives, methods, and impact of its democratisation programs. Since the days of President Woodrow Wilson, US presidents have made rhetorical commitments to democracy while supporting nondemocratic governments or forces if security or economic interests were at stake. In 1989 the US forces entered Panama to oust the regime of Manuel Noriega with the hope of ending the civil strife that led on to the killings of US citizens. This intervention was made to remove tyrants from power and uphold human rights.

At the time of the cold war, government democracy assistance programs were housed within the CIA and run covertly. It was from the Reagan administration that a number of government agencies began democracy programs under the preface of strengthening civil society. Although these programs are today no longer covert and administered by a variety of agencies, the US continues funding either directly or indirectly the foreign institutions such as the media, political parties, and trade unions supporting democracy.

The US government agencies currently involved in the promotion of democracy includes USAID, the US Information Agency (USIA), and the departments of State, Justice, and Defense. Also involved are quasi-governmental organizations, including the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Asia Foundation, that rely almost exclusively on government funding. These democracy programs focused on the rule of law, the administration of justice, human rights,

political processes and participations including elections, civil society, government institutions, and civil-military relations. Though most of these government agencies target foreign institutions, USIA's public diplomacy efforts which are considered part of US democracy assistance target foreign individuals sharing the same ideals and principles with the US.

The US since the end of the Cold War had spent billions of dollars for her democratisation process. The actual amount of US financial support for democracy assistance is difficult to assess because of numerous changes in the categorization of aid programs and accounting practices. Government figures have not consistently included economic assistance projects as part of democracy building funding. Recent figures from the State Department indicate spending of \$580 million in 1998 that increases to \$623 million and \$709 million in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Nevertheless, these levels of democracy assistance have not reflected the Clinton administration's grand commitment to a policy of enlargement. When compared with the 1999 appropriations of \$21.6 billion for International Affairs and \$276.7 billion for the Department of Defense, the dollar amounts are extremely small (Cohn 1999).

The goal of democratisation is often riddled with motives and interests on democracy makers' part. But democracy being an immense human good, even at times if its installation process may be considered crossing the very essence of it, it will be accepted as a just cause for military intervention. For this reason even the intervention in Iraq could be termed both strategic as well as morally ethical as it is well structured and welcomed by the Americans congressmen back home. However creating democracies today is not an easy job as the eyes of the world are now on the democracy makers and their every action and steps taken have to be measured thoroughly.

The traditional objectives of the US national security rely on realism. Their democracy promotion could be seen as an excuse to acquire strategic aims in securing their energy resources, "building military alliances to fight terrorist organisations and fostering stability within states" (Fukuyama & McFaul 2007: 24).



After the Cold War, with the US gaining leverage in the international politics, her policy makers regarded the spread of democracy as a 'win-win' situation. The Saddam regime in Iraq, especially after 9/11, was considered a threat to international peace and it needed to be checked in order to safeguard US access to the natural resources of the middle-east. Hence democracy promotion as an excuse for US military intervention in order to access the natural oil fields was projected as the principled choice and rationale for the invasion of Iraq (Carothers 2006: 64, Pelleteire 2001: 199).

### **Democratisation by Force**

For some specific reasons the *National Security Strategy 2002* commits the US to "champion the cause of human dignity and oppose who resist it", as in the case of Saddam's Iraq (Bush 2002:174). Thereby, this situation would create a "balance of power that favours human freedom" (Kaplan and Kristol 2003: 183-184). Thus achieving liberal democracy in Iraq has been the principal objective of the US campaign against Saddam's Iraq. However the doubt that remains is for how long will these impositions of democracy through military forces lasts? (Barany et al 2009: 1). It goes further to say that "unless the people of a country are willing to support and even defend democracy, no democratic system can survive long" with lots of experiences taken from the newly decolonised states of the developing world (Barany et al 2009: 2).

The rationale for the choice of Iraq as case study for this dissertation is such that the state in study is under one party rule for a considerable amount of time, with strong records of authoritarian type and absence from the experiences of a democratic institution of government. For instance other such countries may be Haiti, Georgia etc. These countries had overcome decades of military style domination and were unfamiliar with democratic institutions (Mitchell 2006: 670). All the states experience a kind of uprising, or even given a colour coded named revolution (Allen 2005: 38) vying for a democratic government. The roots of democratic aspirations in these states may be traced to the role of United States in pursuing its interests and the intoxication of the ideology of liberal democracy from the days of the Cold War.

Significantly, states are becoming democratic, holding elections in their own significant way.

Nine years ago on the 19<sup>th</sup> of March 2003, the United States began military strikes in Iraq where four satellites guided 2,000 pound bunker buster bombs being dropped along with nearly forty Tomahawk cruise missiles. Though it was not formally declared until the next day, this was the beginning of the US led intervention in Iraq. At that time in 2003, the current law enforcement forces in Iraq had only the goal of protecting the regime and the political system, rather than protecting the citizens of Iraq. As these Iraqi law enforcement forces were designed on an Eastern European model, they primarily perform security, surveillance and social control functions rather than law enforcement functions.

The vast majority of the human rights abuses within Iraq were being committed by the various security forces. Iraq did have an active police force which continued to exist, but this police force had become marginalized and no longer played an effective role in law enforcement. In fact, the concept of law enforcement in Iraq as it is commonly understood in countries with more developed police forces (protecting citizens from crimes) was almost non-existent. The law was on their hands and they were the law. To the extent that certain legitimate law enforcement functions exist, they were principally carried out by the security forces. And oddly in many instances in which ordinary crimes are committed, they were done so by paramilitary organizations or the security forces themselves.

With situation worsening in Iraq and Saddam regime not willing to democratise, it became the next thorn for the US that needed to be removed. The game changer was the fact that on September 11, 2001 the United States of America, one of the safest and secure places in the world was attacked by terrorists. This instance had triggered the war on Iraq on the pretext of national security and making Iraq a democracy. However, democracy promotion is a much debated issue in a contemporary world today. Democracy as a form of government is regarded the best and most essential. The propagators of democracy suggested that democratic

countries, specifically liberal democracies, almost never go to war with one another (Russett 1993: 86; Downes 2009:9).

Scholars all over the world, past and present, have come up with a number of explanations for this phenomenon with a belief that “democracies tend to find alternatives to violent conflict” (Russett 1993:25; Churchill 1994: 23), such as negotiation or arbitration, and even some other come up with an assumption that, for the leaders of democratic institutions, accountability is so strong that they find solution through peaceful means rather than engaging in differences. Hence, democracy is projected as the source of world peace (Russett 1993: 25; McFaul 2004: 149).

From the perspective of the ‘Democratic Peace Theory’, we do find that states do embrace democracy because of the fact that democracies do not make war on each other; the more democratic two nations are, the less the violence between them; democracies engage in the least amount of violence; democracies by far display the least amounts of internal violence, and so on and so forth (Rummel 2004: 23). It seems to be the reason behind the fact that most newly created or independent states adopted democracy. Also, even former autocratic and authoritarian states were inclined to adopt democracy as a form of governance.

According to the Democracy Index (2007: 3-5), developments around the world show that almost half of the world’s countries can be considered democracies but only twenty-eight qualify as full democracies. The number of electoral democratic states around the world rose from 119-122 in the year 2005 and still counting. However, the riddle that lingers is the notion of what factor contributes to the label; that what determines a state to become a full democracy and what factors determine them a ‘lesser’ democracy.

Yet the strong proposition that democracies are in general more peaceful in world affairs has drawn less worldwide acceptance. Some states even denounce that western democracy assistance as ‘illegitimate political meddling’ because of the nature and process in which the protagonist state promotes democracy.

It seems democratisation and intervention goes hand in hand (de Mesquita and Downs 2006: 627). Mitchell (2006: 670) also noted that “as the war in Iraq continues to dominate the Bush foreign policy, arguments that its democracy promotion policy is simply a part of promoting US interests, or even the newest form of American imperialism...” Some autocratic governments have won substantial public sympathy in its constituency by arguing that they are resisting not Western democracy promotion but to American interventionism (Carothers 2006: 54-56).

After the 9/11 attack, the US Administration, under the former President Bush took democracy promotion as the foreign policy centrepiece. However it was met with suspicion in the international arena because of the Iraq invasion. The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is considered legitimate because of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ projection. However, the Iraq case was met by suspicion both at home and abroad. To some, it seems insensible that an aggressive military policy could be coupled with a belief in spreading democracy. While in other case, suspicions crop up because US interests and democracy assistance are frequently intertwined (Mitchell 2006: 675).

The transition to a democratic Iraq must have, as one of its most important tasks, the role of transforming the various law enforcement and security mechanisms into a coherent law enforcement agency and a coherent, integrated intelligence agency. The arguments behind the invasion was on the grounds of security, including direct security of the region through the need to disarm Saddam Hussein’s government of its alleged weapons of mass destruction, and the intention to promote stability in the region through the faith in the ability of democracy to create peace and the conditions for development and belief that democracy would spread across borders. Weapons of mass- destruction or WMDs were one of the main arguments behind the invasion of Iraq.

It was argued by the US and the British governments that Iraq was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that were a serious threat to the security of western nations and the security of the nations in the region. They argued that intervention and regime change was necessary to forcibly disarm a nation that

was not complying with the demands and requirements of the international community and which they argued was a global danger. On this understanding then, one of the primary aims of the invasion of Iraq was to increase the security of the US and the rest of the world by removing a regime that posed a threat through its contempt for the international community, a historical record of hostility to its neighbours, and the possession of weapons capable of massive destructive force. According to one *ABC News* bulletin:

We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression... given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some-day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11 world (ABC News 2003)

The war in Iraq was tied in to the wider 'War on Terror' which planned pre-emptive military action against states believed to be developing WMDs and sponsoring terrorist organisations. It was argued that Saddam Hussein's regime created the conditions that aided the growth of terrorists, and that Iraq was itself a rogue nation. It was also insinuated a number of times that Iraq was partly implicated with the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, and had links with Al Qaeda, despite this being unproven and illogical as Hussein and Al Qaeda were of opposite political ideologies and had long been enemies.

This purpose for the war and the aim for securing the US against Iraqi attack is perhaps the most easy to refute. Saddam Hussein was in no position to pose any serious threat to the United States, there were no WMDs in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein's regime had nothing to do with the Al Qaeda terrorist network. In reality, the invasion may have actually increased the danger faced by US as it has increased the anti- American sentiment and radical Islamist movements in Iraq and the Middle East as the invasions could be viewed as a new form of imperialism and the number of civilian deaths and the grotesque treatment of prisoners in places like Abu Ghraib have severely damaged American support especially after pictures and videos came out that revealed the harassment and indignation.

The war also created an unstable, dangerous and turbulent Iraq and the war has shifted the Middle Eastern balance of power and has destabilised the entire region. This purpose for the war and the aim for securing the US against Iraqi attack is perhaps purported as the most easy to refute. Another element of the US plan to protect itself was based on the belief that undemocratic and dictatorial regimes create conditions that enable the growth of terrorist groups; are prone to war and create tensions and conflict internationally. Liberal democracy, they argued, is a much more peaceful form of government. The Neoconservatives that had a large influence over the Bush Administration's foreign policy argued that democracies rarely, if ever, fight one another or experience civil war or internal conflict.

This democratic peace exists because, according to liberals and neoconservatives, the decision to go to war is made by a government that is directly accountable to the people and it is the people who feel the consequences of warfare. Those who live under democratic governments are risk averse and cost sensitive and so are reluctant to agree to or support the decision to go to war. Another cause of the peacefulness of democracies that has an impact on wider security is that a democratic electoral system can create ethnic moderation, keeping extremists isolated and out of power, while ensuring that communities coexists peacefully. Based on this logic the American and British policy makers believed that by bringing democracy to Iraq, the regional security and their own security will be improved, the society would cease supporting terrorists and would end its hostility towards Israel.

However, this theory has come under considerable criticisms from academics from other schools of thought, and other liberals, who point out that democracies can be just as violent as other governments. For example, the only state that has deployed a nuclear bomb against another state was a democracy, and the Iraq War itself was initiated by leading democratic states including United Kingdom and United States.

The US had hoped that once democracy had been established in Iraq it would open the way to a far more stable and peaceful region. The global spread of democracy will advance American interests by creating more potential allies for the

United States. Historically, most of America's allies have been democracies. In general, democracies are much more likely to ally with one another than with non-democracies. Even scholars who doubt the statistical evidence for the democratic-peace proposition, agree that the nature of regimes are an important variable in the understanding the composition of alliances. Thus spreading democracy will produce more and better alliances and partners for the United States (Lynn-Jones 1998).

Those who supported the imposition of democracy on a nation argued that a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Iraq would cause a reduction in interstate antagonism and would serve as a beacon for liberal democracy in the Middle East that would inspire and pressure nearby states into liberalising, bringing further democratisation of the region. However, this belief has been criticised for being much like the domino theory on the spread of international communism in the Cold War and the objective has faced and is argued to face many challenges. Alina Romanowski, a senior US government civilian official in the Middle East argues that Iraq presents as unpromising a breeding ground for democracy as any in the world, and many argue that Iraqi society is too fractured and lacks the preconditions necessary for democracy to be established (Romanowski 2002: 25).

These problems include a lack of cohesive unifying identity, a risk of Iranian and Turkish meddling, a poorly organised political leadership, and the lack of a history of democracy. But despite the challenges and the antidemocratic terrorist attacks, democracy has been established, though the ability of this to continue to function and to thrive is yet to be seen. One of the main challenges to the new democracy is insecurity, but with the building up of a new Iraqi military and police force, and the assistance of other nations, democracy in Iraq might be feasible.

A further advantage Iraq would have over other states in a transition to democracy is that US resources would back it up, hopefully along with the assistance of the United Nations and other international organizations. During the last 15 years, numerous efforts to establish democracy after a major international intervention suggest that the same is possible for Iraq. In 1996, after the Dayton peace accords were signed, NATO and the UN created an extensive new program to rebuild Bosnia.

Early efforts were disjointed, but the program improved over time. Although Bosnia was hardly a model democracy, by as early as 1998 the US Department of State could brag that Bosnia's GDP had doubled, unemployment was falling, basic services had been restored throughout the country, an independent media was thriving, and public elections had been held for all levels of government. The Bosnia model was refined and reemployed in Kosovo in 1999 after hostilities ceased, where it worked better because lessons learned in Bosnia were heeded. In particular, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo planned and coordinated the efforts of international organizations better (Byman and Pollack 2003:120-131).

The same approach was even more successfully applied in East Timor, where a functional, albeit nascent, democracy is essentially now a reality. Panama provides another interesting example of US efforts to build democracy. Like Iraq, Panama before 1989 had never experienced anything other than pseudo-democracy in the form of meaningless elections that the ruling junta invalidated whenever it desired. After the US invasion in 1989, the United States instituted Operation Promote Liberty to rebuild Panama economically and politically. Although post invasion reconstruction in Panama had its fair share of mistakes and inadequacies, Panama today is not doing bad at all. Getting there took roughly 10 years, but it happened. None of the examples above may offer a perfect model for a post-Saddam Iraq but together they indicate that intervening forces can reduce strife and foster power sharing and that reform movements and even democracy can blossom in seemingly infertile ground (Yates 2005: 1-2).

The Iraq War undoubtedly did not go according to plan. The Bush administration's intention to quickly go into Iraq, finish off a brutal regime, install democracy and retrieve quickly and be ready for other matters was stalled as Iraq took far longer and was far more complex than anticipated. As the US went into Iraq, the reality was not what was expected. There were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the links between Saddam and Al Qaeda are unsubstantiated, human rights had its setbacks, living conditions were poor and there is still on-going internal conflict and hostility. The oil producing undemocratic regimes of the region are still



undemocratic, and anti- Americanism has fuelled extremism in the region which may further endanger the US.

The removal of Saddam Hussein from power freed Iran from a long time enemy and created instability in the regional balance of power. However, many of the current problems are partly caused by instability and insecurity in the nation, and gradually violence is reducing and so there is a possibility that these problems may be resolved once the new democratic government gains full control. Despite the shortcomings of the other aims of the US led coalition, democracy has been established in Iraq and so, depending on how successfully the democratic institutions grow and how the system is embraced by the people of Iraq, it might well become a 'bright beacon' in the region which may potentially help to create regional peace and stability (Enterline and Michael 2005: 1091-93).

“If Kuwait grew carrots, we wouldn't give a damn” says Lawrence Korb, Assistant Defense Secretary under President Ronald Reagan when the U.S. prepared its massive military assault on Iraq in 1991 (D'Amato 2000). The U.S. emerged victorious after the Gulf War, with its dominance over the region more firm than it had ever been. Iraq was destroyed and kept permanently weak, and the coalition allowed the US to cement stronger ties with many of the Arab states. The success of the United States in the Gulf War sent the message, in George Bush's words that “what we say goes” (Richman 2003). As Michael Hudson, professor of international relations at Georgetown University wrote in *Middle East Journal*:

Even critics, such as the author, of U.S. Middle East policy must agree that the United States today stands astride this unhappy region like a colossus. A half century of regional involvement in every conceivable way – through diplomacy, aid, culture, education, espionage, subversion and (not least) the projection of military power – has secured the “holy trinity” of American interests: Israel, oil and anti-communism. Those who said it could not be done underestimated the U.S. ability to achieve contradictory goals. Today, the American president can summon the leaders of most Middle Eastern governments to endorse his regional (and domestic) political agenda. American financial officials can write the domestic economic policy for most governments in the region. The U.S. military enjoys unprecedented access and acceptance from North Africa to the Gulf (Hudson 1996: 329).

Full-blown democracy in Iraq offers the best prospects for solving Iraq's problems over the long term for several reasons. Democracy would provide a means for Iraq's ethnic and religious groups for reconciling, or at least create political mechanisms for handling divisions by means other than force. It would create a truly legitimate Iraqi government one that did not repress any elements of the Iraqi people but instead worked for all of them. For the first time in Iraq's history, the government would serve its citizens rather than serve itself at its citizens' expense. If all goes wrong and there is failure to establish democracy in Iraq it would be disastrous.

Civil war, massive refugee flows, and even renewed interstate fighting would likely resurface to plague this long-cursed region. Moreover, should democracy fail to take root, this would add credence to charges that the United States cares little for Muslim and Arab people, a charge that now involves security as well as moral considerations as Washington woos the Muslim world in its war on terrorism. The failure to transform Iraq's government tainted in the 1991 military victory over Iraq, now more than a decade later, the United States must not make the same mistake.

## **Conclusion**

Globalised now, there is no nation that is truly independent procession for democracy in Myanmar even though little is shown to the world reverberate throughout the world with protestors storming Myanmar embassies worldwide, democratic nations protesting for more transparency in the government, civilians fighting on their own to remove incumbent regime where medias and world leaders flocked to broadcast and intervene. The installation of democracy in Iraq or military intervention on the part of the US is seen and weighted heavily the world over. It may be too soon to tell whether this is a complete success or another repetition of a disaster in Iraq but as of now, with the ideals of democracy always valuing human good and working for the citizenry, there is but no other answer to attain human dignity. In a place where one can passionately protest against one's own government and democracy itself, it may not be the right move to discourage others from attaining what one is enjoying at that very moment. History had shown that all is fair in War; if democracy is an end, military intervention would just be a short bumpy ride on the road to freedom.

## **Chapter 2:**

### **9/11 and the Politics of Democratisation**

On 7<sup>th</sup> October 2002, the 43<sup>rd</sup> President of the United States, President George W. Bush of the United States said in his speech that the people of the US want peace, will work and sacrifice for peace. But, in the same speech he was to put forward that there can be no peace if the security of a country or the world depends on the will and whims of a dictator. He was laying the ground for another US war on Iraq.

#### **Spark from 9/11**

The speech above came after a series of tragic suicide attack on the worlds' strongest and most powerful country hitting its most important cities the New York and Washington D.C. On the fateful day of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, at 8:46 a.m., as the plane was airborne five passengers hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 and crashed it into the World Trade Centre's North Tower. Then at 9:03 a.m. another five hijackers inspired by the same motive crashed United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower. After the second plane hit the South Tower, President George W. Bush was informed of the event while he was interacting with school children on visiting a classroom in Florida. In a rare interview with National Geographic, Bush reflected on what was going through his mind when he heard the attack.

My first reaction was anger. Who the hell would do that to America? Then I immediately focused on the children, and the contrast between the attack and the innocence of children. (Quigley 2011)

Bush said he could see the news media at the back of the classroom getting the news on their own mobile phones, and the moment for him was like watching a silent movie. Then at 9:37 a.m. a third batch of five hijackers flew American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon. One may say the first fight against terrorism started on board the fourth flight, United Airlines Flight 93 departing for San Francisco (History Channel 2003). Though problems with air traffic had caused delay by almost 45 minutes, the four hijackers who had boarded the plane successfully with knives and box cutters waited out 40 minutes to gain control of the flight.

A flight dispatcher for United Airlines had warned flights of possible cockpit intrusions informing pilots of the attacks on the World Trade Center. United Airlines Flight 93 received the dispatcher's transmission at 9:23 a.m. and Captain Jason Dahl responded at 9:26 a.m. to request clarification. Two minutes later the terrorists successfully infiltrated the plane's cockpit, and air traffic controllers heard what they believed to be two mayday calls amid sounds of a struggle. A hijacker, later identified as Ziad Jarrah, was heard over the flight data recorder, directing the passengers to sit down and stating that there was a bomb aboard the plane.

Later during investigation it was found out that the flight data recorder shows Jarrah reset the autopilot, turning the plane around to head back east. On learning the fate of other hijacked flights in New York City and Washington, D.C., the passengers realised that their plane was involved in a larger terrorist plot and would likely be used to carry out further attacks on US soil (History Channel 2003). After a brief discussion, a vote was taken and the passengers decided to fight back against their hijackers. The plane crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh, at 10:03 a.m. after the passengers fought the hijackers. Flight 93's intended target is not known but is believed to be the White House, the US Capitol, the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland or several nuclear power plants along the Eastern seaboard.

In their final report, the 9/11 Commission found the hijackers had recently purchased multi-function hand tools and assorted knives and blades (Kean 2004). A flight attendant on Flight 11, a passenger on Flight 175, and passengers on Flight 93 said the hijackers had bombs, but one of the passengers also said he thought the bombs were fake. The FBI found no traces of explosives at the crash sites, and the 9/11 Commission concluded the bombs were probably fake (CBC News 2004).

All international flights were banned from landing on US soil for three days. The attacks created widespread confusion among news organizations and air traffic controllers. Among the unconfirmed and often contradictory news reports aired throughout the day, one of the most prevalent said a car bomb had been detonated at the US State Department's headquarters in Washington, D.C. (Miller 2002). Another

jet, Delta Air Lines Flight 1989 was suspected of having been hijacked, but the aircraft responded to controllers and landed safely in Cleveland, Ohio (Adams et al. 2002).

For the nearly 3,000 ill-fated people, their families and people around the world, the attack brought to light not only the penetrability of US security but also the increasing capability of the terrorists under major advances in science and technology. News of the attack on the world's super power soon spread like wild fire and within minutes the entire world was shrouded with the threat of terrorism and worst of all, this attack was followed by many other terrorist attacks throughout the world. The history of the world since the beginning of time was a history of war, and war was fought between countries either to extend or defend boundaries. However this terrorist attack knew no boundary nor care for any international norms and standards. After 9/11 as the threat of terrorism loomed large, no country could work alone in the fight against terrorism, it was no longer an 'internal affair'. Though the word weigh heavy in terms of international relations yet it needs to be re-identified as the threat can no longer be a single country's concern but now an international concern.

When Osama Bin Laden, the Al Qaeda leader, on a news message aired on Arabic TV station took responsibility for the attack, it was more than a year after the world had heard of him. When the United States and allies invaded Afghanistan late 2001, he evaded capture believed to be taking refuge along the mountain chains bordering Pakistan. In one of his video statement, bin Laden said the attacks would have been less severe if Bush had been more vigilant and acted more quickly. Regarding the birth of his 9/11 attack idea, he said he decided that militants should start planning to attack the United States in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, when apartment towers in Beirut were bombed. The US had backed Israel in that action. Bin Laden accused Bush of misleading the American people in the three years since Al-Qaeda's 19 hijackers accomplished their deadly mission.

## **9/11 to War on Terror**

After the September 11' 2001 attack on the world's super power the US, the nature of international relations evolved as a result of it. Many countries around the world became more obsessed with security and for obvious reasons. The traditional international threat since the end of the Cold War had taken a completely different nature. Under the traditional Westphalian international system, the state holds responsibility to all matters within and is also guarded by the norms of sovereignty. However, for many the state has reduced in power with globalisation and other multiple factors. Especially after 9/11 and various other terrorists threats worldwide, this trans-border threat have forced states to further diminish in responsibility. This reality of threats and insecurity has removed the state centric relations and pushed us into a more interconnected international politics, thus heralding change in many a country's foreign policies and strategies.

All that was acceptable before 9/11 was no longer acceptable post 9/11. Besides the change in security and relative politics, change becomes necessary in world politics. A concerted international intervention now needs to replace the chaotic and insecure aspect of post 9/11 world towards a brighter and safer world through global security, stability and prosperity. The key element appears to be in the form of wiping out all threats, mostly the terrorist organisations and eliminating weapons of mass destruction and promoting democracy to strengthen international peace and stability.

The 9/11 attacked caused alarm for everyone. As countries grieved for America, foreign policy and national security issues loomed larger than economic policies for the first time since the Vietnam War. Nine days after the attack the US President Bush, in a joint session of the Congress, changed his direction of US foreign policy.

We will direct every resource at our command every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network...We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism... Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists (Pellegrini 2001)

Soon after 9/11 and Bush's declaration of his focus on 'War on Terror', he declared that the best hope for peace and security in the Middle East was through the expansion of democracy and freedom. Besides the official reason, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 had never been clearly understood and accepted by many. The US had tried to oust Saddam Hussein since the Gulf War but without any success. The official reason Iraq posed as a threat to the US and its allies was an intelligence claiming Saddam Hussein's alleged programmes of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possibility of passing of the arms to Al Qaeda. Unconfirmed reports also came of Hussein's involvement in funding the Al Qaeda (Katzman 2004: 9).

Between January 2000 and September 2001, 'Curveball' an Iraqi informant for the US offered 100 reports, among them the claims of mobile biological weapons labs that were central in the US evidence of an illicit weapons programme (Miller and Drogin 2005). For some, the invasion of Iraq was also contributed by these factors – US Dollar Hegemony, US Military Hegemony, US Oil Hegemony, US client state Israel Hegemony, Personal conviction. However with the new focus on democracy, liberation of Iraq from the tyranny of Hussein's version of Baathism and thus setting an irresistible precedent that would spread throughout the Arab world was pushed by the administration of President George W. Bush. This does not mean that other rumoured reasons are neither false nor right. Oil was irrelevant to the administration's calculations, but perhaps in a different sense than what was meant by the 'No Blood for Oil' slogan. After all, natural resources of the world are drying up and oil is an absolutely indispensable requirement for running modern economies and militaries.

The US intervention in Iraq could be found forceful and may demonstrate to the rest of the world, especially potential strategic rivals like China, Russia, or even the European Union, of Washington's ability to quickly and effectively conquer and control a nation in the heart of the mineral-rich Middle East region any time it wishes, perhaps persuading those lesser powers that challenging the US could well prove counter-productive when it comes to long-term interests. Then there is another theory that Bush wanted to show up his dad for failing to take Baghdad in 1991. Or he sought to 'finish the job' that his dad had begun in 1991. On

the other hand, the Rice University Institute publicly warned early on that if President Bush must invade Iraq for whatever reasons, he should not even consider it unless two conditions were met; that the action was authorised by the UN Security Council and that nothing whatever be done after the invasion to suggest that the motivation had to do with the acquisition by US oil companies of Iraq's oil resources.

Dwelling only on the officially claimed US motive – Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) – it is a critical issue in international politics and especially in the case of Iraq, a country under Saddam Hussein's regime with a long history of enmity between the two countries and no love lost. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other fissile materials is seen as immensely against peace and security by the international community. Led by the US, the international community could tolerate neither proliferation nor possession of WMDs by rogue regimes especially after 9/11. For this reason, the US under Bush Jr. had waged a war on terror and recognised it as a real threat for the US security as well as that of international security.

On 27<sup>th</sup> November 2002, United Nations weapon inspectors arrived in Baghdad. During the four day visit throughout the length and breadth of the country with an additional warning from President Bush's speech, the residents of Baghdad had to prepare for the worst by stocking up food, queuing up for gas and bread and taping their windows for fear of flying glass from US bombs. Many foreign embassies in the capital closed and some countries even evacuated their ambassadors. Saddam made a last minute bid to avert war, admitting that Iraq had once possessed weapons of mass destruction to defend itself from Iran and Israel to appear as her key military might but insisted that it was disposed of (Byman et al. 1998: 128).

When the US invaded Iraq in March 2003, it broadened its policy to include preventive warfare. Also known as the Bush Doctrine, US foreign policy shifted its focus to preventive action, not just pre-emptive action. Nations often use pre-emptive strikes in warfare when they know that an enemy action is eminent. The Bush administration told the public that Saddam Hussein's regime had nuclear material and would soon be able to produce atomic weapons. Bush, in a considered



political move, vaguely tied Hussein to Al Qaeda, and said the invasion was, in part, to prevent Iraq from supplying terrorists with nuclear weapons. Thus, the Iraqi invasion was to prevent some eventually foretold. As was wanted by the Bush Administration, the search for WMD started from the first day, however two years into the intervention, hope of finding WMD in Iraq fizzled out.

After many attempt to justify the intervention failed to convince the world in 2005 a piece of information came in that the US relied on an Iraqi informant, who was later found to be described as ‘crazy’ by his intelligence handlers and a ‘congenital liar’ by his friends (Helmore 2005: 1). Code named ‘Curveball’ by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), according to the information, the failure of US spy agencies to scrutinise his claims are the ‘primary reason’ that they fundamentally misjudged the status of Iraq’s (biological weapons) programs. The US had no direct access to Curveball as he was controlled by the German intelligence services that pass on his reports to the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon’s spy agency. The ‘informant’ Curveball offered 100 reports between January 2000 and September 2001. Among them the claims of mobile biological weapons labs that were central in the US evidence of an illicit weapons programme, but turned out to be trucks equipped with machinery to make helium for weather balloons (ibid:1). In the report, the commission concluded that Curveball’s information was worse than none at all, worse than having no human sources. Although this Iraqi informant has never been formally identified, it appears he was an Iraqi chemical engineer who defected after UN inspectors left the country in 1998 (Miller and Drogin 2005).

In the aftermath of the US-led invasion, Iraqis whom Curveball claimed were co-workers in Saddam’s alleged biological weapons programme did not know who he was. Curveball even made claims that he had witnessed a deadly biological weapons accident when he was not even in Iraq when the incident happened. After September 2001, his claims were given greater credibility despite the fact that he was not in Iraq at the time he claimed to have taken part in illicit weapons work (Prados 2007). His information was central to an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that concluded Iraq ‘has’ biological weapons and was widely

used by President Bush and Dick Cheney to make their case for war (Miller and Drogin 2005).

### **Politics of Democratisation**

According to Kaplan and Kristol (2003: 192) *The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*, it clearly mentions as to why US shifted its focus on the Middle East whereas the former Soviet Bloc states were also in the transitional stage towards democratisation, although still vulnerable. It also enlightens the reader about how liberal democracy and Islam is not compatible and adhere that democratisation is destined to fail in the region (Kaplan and Kristol 2003: 194; Adesnik and McFaul 2006: 24). The *National Security Strategy 2002* of the US Department of State also suggest that America's grand strategy is to prevent states, especially the so-called 'rogue states', from acquiring weapons of mass destruction thereby threatening the US, its allies and friends with such weapons (Record 2008:2). This situation has grasped more attention in case of Iraq than what it has for the other part of the world where a determination for democratisation has been enhanced.

Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, who was in power from 1979, Iraq faced many ups and downs. No fault of their own, the Iraqi people suffered most during sanctions leading to the deaths of 567,000 children according to the 1995 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report (Lopez and Cortright 1999: 3). Eventually after the 9/11 attack, the US led international community intervened to strengthen international security and install democracy in the land allegedly void of humanity and dignity. Democracy primarily as a series of procedural means to assure basic human rights needed to be installed in Iraq. Unlike others, a democratic regime is one in which the citizens are protected and defended from arbitrary aggression, thereby implying a fundamentally institutional problem rather than a socio-economic one (Przeworski 1988: 64-68).

The question of democratisation becomes one of the most debatable issues in the current international scenario with the US widely proclaiming the very act as one of its latest foreign policy achievement. The process of democratisation

may be understood along a number of related dimensions. At the levels of political institutions democratisation can refer to: the introduction of democratic institutions of decision making into polities previously subject to oligarchical or authoritarian rule; the extension of mechanisms of democratic control to cover a broader array of state functions and institutions; increasing the representative character of political organisations and legislatures; as well as the extension of citizenship to formerly excluded subjects. At the societal level, democratisation would involve extending the right of equal individual participation in collective decision-making to the governance of economic and social institutions (Acuna and Barros 1984: 22). In September 2002, the President of the United States, George W. Bush, proclaimed *The National Security Strategy* of the United States of America. In his statement he emphasised that the United States will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world.

The US intervention in Iraq was influenced by the Bush administration's conviction that the more the world is free and democratic, the more the world is safe. Elimination of authoritarian and despotic regimes and their governance according to them would undermine the nourishing environment for terror. The effectiveness and success of terrorist groups and their actions depended a lot on the support of rogue regimes which was proved from 9/11 attacks to terror in Iraq. As we are now living in the era of international relations which inspire the relevant values underlying the international policies, like democratisation there is but a need to create little space for others outside the democratic values and norms. Retrospection of the reason behind disintegration of the USSR takes us back when the state was suffocating itself under its communist regime surrounded by other democratic super power. Finally Perestroika and Glasnost were introduced but it was too late. The USSR disintegrated in 1991.

The twentieth century witnessed numerous attempts to bring democracy to countries that hitherto had been ruled by authoritarian regimes. The great majority of these efforts were promoted by the United States and its allies, backed by military intervention and occupation. The twentieth century was the American century and therefore, it was also rightly called the century of

democratisation (Kurth 2005: 305). The twentieth century started with the United States engaged in three different military occupations to bring democracy to the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. The Philippine occupation was a success in repressing insurgents but caused both countries loss in lives and money. Four thousand U.S. soldiers lost their lives in the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902), along with 16,000 Filipino guerrillas and as many as 200,000 civilians (ibid: 306).

Decades later, President Woodrow Wilson sent the US Marines into several Latin American countries declaring that he was going to teach the South Americans to elect good men. He then sent the entire US military into Europe, saying the United States was going to make the world safe for democracy. The US attempt at the beginning of the twenty-first century to use military conquest and occupation to bring democracy to Iraq and, by a vaguely defined process, perhaps to its neighbours as well, is thus the latest chapter in a grand American narrative that has been under way for more than a hundred years. By now, many countries know what it means to be, in the words of Jean Jacques Rousseau ‘forced to be free’ (Montgomery 1957: 6).

In promoting the Iraq War and the following regime change as the first phase in the hope of making it a grand project that would bring democracy to Iraq and its neighbours and to the Muslim world more generally, the Bush administration and neoconservative writers pointed to the US successes in West Germany and Japan as a historical standard. In her promotion of democracy, the US is not always successful and often face obstacles. They were on the contrary silent about the large numbers of US failures or disappointments elsewhere, particularly in the Caribbean Basin and Central America, not to mention Vietnam (Kurth 2005: 307).

Democratisation as a process targets the power structure more than other factors. This power structure may include the distribution of power and its limitations, legitimacy and ideology and freedom in the political society. As almost all authoritarian states are monopolistic and exert certain amount of ‘political violence’ to maintain power monopoly, to restrain the public along with the civil society, this needs to be eliminated first by the democratisation policy (Yaziji 2006: 12). With the weakening and elimination of this authoritarian hold, a transformation will

consequently appear in the structure of power towards achieving public freedoms and rights and political participation.

The right to participate in politics (including adult suffrage) is an essential element of democratic governance because it provides the people the voluntary activities which allow them in making personal choice in selection of their representatives which may be direct or indirect in the formation of public policy. Under most authoritarian regime, besides the invaluable ‘freedom’ the public or the civil societies are stripped from their right to take ‘chances’. This brought the need for assistance programs and plans in the society’s capacity building-reform programs- which go side by side with development and democracy.

### **Will Democracy thrive?**

Although the intervention in Iraq started after the United States had already set up camps in Afghanistan, the US left Iraq sooner than in Afghanistan. The intervention in Iraq heralded an era for the Iraqi public as they removed Saddam and his regime from power who otherwise would have continued his tyrannical regime through his sons. Regarding the ‘democratic regime’ installed, whether or not the people of Iraq have assimilated enough liberalism to allow for the external implementation of it is vague. No one could have the right answer but to hope for the best. Kevin Whitelaw in his report said that many Iraqi tribal chiefs are talking of American ‘liberation’ rather than ‘occupation’, and they are enthusiastic about their democratic future, as long as it emanates from Iraqi traditions and not American ones. But what the Americans install will be a democracy that needs a bit of a compromise (Schwalbe 2005).

As Basham explains, “most Iraqis view political nepotism as a moral duty rather than a civic problem. Extremely strong family bonds also may prove to be a significant obstacle to liberal democracy” (Basham 2004:5). According to Jeffrey Record and Andrew Terrill (2004: 42), “Democracy means different things to different communities in Iraq.... It is not clear that the Shiite leadership understands or accepts the concept of minority rights, rule of law, and other democratic principles

unrelated to majority rule.” The meaning of democracy to the Iraqis may be infinitive. Divided between different ethnic groups, tribes and clans there may be many who would not budge for anyone but their own. According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon in their book, *The Age of Sacred Terror*,

Each of the parties has to persuade the other that the rules of the democratic game will be obeyed. Regime members need to convince the opposition that they can keep the hardliners in the army and security services under control, and the opposition must show it can restrain the radicals in its ranks.... Such trust building is a time-consuming, uncertain process (Benjamin and Simon 2003: 482)

The key element to have a successful democratic government in Iraq would obviously be ‘trust’ between each ethnic groups. Peace in Iraq even before Saddam’s regime had always been fractured by lack of trust and hatred. In the Middle East and Arab countries, Iraq in particular ‘trust’ has always been the issue. Military regimes such as Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq, won independence from Britain claiming continued monopoly of power that was considered necessary to preserve internal and external security (Schwalbe 2005).

Also, trust between rulers and the people were not established because these authoritarian regimes in oil-rich countries did not depend on their citizenry for resources. In democracies, there is no taxation without representation; in these states like Iraq, there was no taxation and therefore no representation. The Iraqi faith, dominated mostly by Muslims, all believed in their authority through Allah and hence superiority above all others. As this result in distrust, compromising with the others was out of the question. This contributed to the problem of democratisation wherein the absence of suitable leaders becomes more prominent.

Among many factors that could work against the success of democratisation, one was on the part of the ‘democracy makers’ i.e. the US and its allies. On its intervention in Iraq, the US put upon her shoulder to appoint representatives to hold the political rein. Neither the transitional government nor the successors have had much authority regarding security matters. The US forces could operate freely throughout the country and the ‘sovereign’ Iraqi government had no right to limit their activities. To ensure US hold in the political structure, more than

1,500 Americans hold prominent posts in nearly every Iraqi ministry and even the Iraqi budget were controlled from the Ambassadors office. Adding up all these matters, a question arises; is the US really playing a supporting role or is it merely replacing Saddam's regime with theirs? Many other factors played against the successful implementation of democracy in Iraq or the region, even if there is some degree of liberalism among the moderate Muslim population (Schwalbe 2005).

An article was written by Greg Miller for the *Los Angeles Times* about a classified State Department report on the subject. The State Department report is highly sceptical regarding the outlook for the Bush administration's efforts. High levels of corruption and crime, immense infrastructure degradation, overpopulation and other forces have caused marginalisation of the people in the region. The report does not address the growing hostility of the majority of Iraqis towards the foreign military forces (American and British armed forces) they now perceive as occupying their country. The report entitled, "Iraq, the Middle East, and Change: No Dominoes," concludes that the democracy domino theory is not credible in the Middle East (Miller 2003).

Before democracy can be implemented in any fashion, there must first be stability and security in Iraq. Record and Terrill note that: "In Iraq, political success will require creation of – 1) a government regarded as legitimate by the great majority of the country's inhabitants, and 2) security forces capable of protecting the new political order" (Record and Terrill 2004: 20). Be it an interim government or any kind of government, how can it gain confidence of its own people let alone the world if its military forces are disbanded. Not only does Iraq need its own military force to protect its borders, it needs a competent police force and the infrastructure to make it effective, to include uncorrupted judges, courts, and prisons. Daniel Byman summarizes this problem stating,

The challenges to be faced by the new Iraqi government are staggering. It must reconstruct a devastated economy, establish the rule of law after decades of tyranny, and satisfy Iraq's myriad of communal problems—all while fighting an insurgency and securing Iraq's borders in a dangerous neighbourhood (Byman 2004:2)

Ahmed Hashim (2004) spent several months in Iraq, returning in April 2004. He says, “Iraq is overridden with partisan warfare by former regime loyalists, organized rebellions by disgruntled Iraqis, terrorism by foreign and domestic Islamist extremists, and a wave of crime by organized gangs.” While there, the number of insurgent attacks continually increased, and is still increasing. He notes that the movement is not united by a single leader or ideological vision. Instead, all factions are united in fighting against the American occupation of Iraq. Once the common enemy is removed, then the in-fighting among the factions will begin, and the civil war will likely ensue. Finally, Hashim declares that “The insurgency can evolve...into patterns of complex warfare and violence. Should this evolution continue, the prospects for American success in bringing about Iraqi security, political stability, and reconstruction will be non-existent” (ibid).

The primary issue for the United States becomes one of patience and perseverance. Record and Terrill (2004: 55) concludes that “Many experts believe that genuine democracy lies beyond the power and patience of the United States to create in Iraq.” Amy Chua notes that at no point in history did any Western nation ever implement capitalism and overnight universal suffrage at the same time – the precise formula of free market democracy currently being pressed on developing countries around the world. She finds that forcing a laissez-faire market and rapid democratization, such as the US is doing in Iraq, will more than likely aggravate ethnic instability and result in violence. The global spread of free market democracy has thus been a principal aggravating cause of ethnic instability and violence throughout the non-Western world (Chua 2011).

Many Middle East scholars also do not believe liberalism and democracy can be successfully implemented from external sources, such as by the United States. Graham Fuller (2002: 50) concludes that: “In the end, modern liberal governance is more likely to take root through organically evolving liberal Islamist trends at the grassroots level than from imported Western modules of ‘instant democracy’ ”. Record and Terrill observed that under even the best of circumstances, assembling a genuine democracy in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is problematic. Since inception, the country has known nothing but authoritarian rule and, under Saddam



Hussein, a vicious neo-Stalinist tyranny. Though Iraqi regimes, like other dictatorships, embraced such democratic trappings as elections, parliaments, independent courts, they did so fraudulently for purely propaganda purposes (Record and Terrill 2004: 41).

George Soros the multibillionaire financier, who had spent billions of dollars from his own account to promote the spread of democracy around the world, declares in an interview that “Introducing democracy by military means is not doable. The effort to promote democracy [in Iraq] has been undermined because we lost credibility” (Rubin 2004). The common belief is that after the US assumed control of Iraq during OIF, they lost credibility with the population by not providing internal security, except around the gas and oil facilities. Finally, Iraqi scholar Isam al-Khafaji concludes that:

Twenty years of uninterrupted brutal dictatorship have left the political culture of the people of Iraq more impoverished than ever. As a result they are unlikely, in the foreseeable future, to be able to develop radically different state structures required to replace the existing system (Schwalbe 2005)

### **Democratisation in Iraq**

The attacks on September 11’ 2001 on the New York City and Pentagon in the US had prompted the Bush administration to wage a war on terror and accordingly find out the ‘axis of evil’. These states may be those which possess WMDs, which support terrorism and which are a threat against the rest of the world. Few years into the intervention in Iraq, the US hesitantly announced their failure to find Saddam’s WMDs. Though Saddam or Iraq neither owned WMDs or supported Al Qaeda, his regime had been violent leaving no room for humanity. Death penalty was used on a massive scale covering wide range of criminal and political offences. Saddam was accused of torturing, imprisoning and killing many innocent people. His totalitarian regime created a state of fear. Hundreds of executions were reported every year.

With the 2003 intervention of US in Iraq’s political structure and consequently other development efforts, indeed the democratisation process was

expected to make for a far better regime than the former totalitarian regime of Saddam; but the democratisation of Iraq has not been without any obstacles. The goal of the Bush Jr. administration was to install liberal democracy to spread democracy bringing freedom to the people. However, as the Arab Middle East is the only region in the world that does not have even one fully democratic government, this process created doubts of ever succeeding amongst many. According to Esposito:

Most modern Muslim states, like many developing states, have artificially drawn boundaries determined by colonial powers that had their own strategic interests in drawing these borders when they left... The majority of Muslim or Arab countries continue to have serious problems with authoritarianism and with legitimacy, and therefore rely heavily on their security forces. In that kind of context, it is not a question of religion or culture that prevents democratisation, it is rather the history of authoritarianism (Esposito 2002: 56)

Amidst criticisms the US had intervened in the name of democratisation process in Iraq. For the Bush administration, in a region with not a single democratic government, they hoped that turning Iraq into a democracy would serve as a model for the rest of the region. To bring democracy into Iraq, the US initiated political process accustomed to the Iraqi needs. Soon after the intervention, it was made ready for the Iraqi public to participate in the political processes.

The US laid out a new political roadmap that envisaged an extended engagement with Iraq which was to be steered by the newly-established Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer. However, elections had to be deferred for later. The idea of installing the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) had also to be abandoned. Instead, an 'advisory body', the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), was formed on July 13, 2003. The 25-member IGC was invested with only limited powers. Its decisions could be vetoed by the CPA. The CPA and the IGC instituted a Transitional Administration Law (TAL) on March 8, 2004, which agreed to the appointment of an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) by June 30, 2004 and holding nation-wide elections for Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in January 2005 (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 12).

The US policy of tightly managing the transition process with little openings for consultations was manifest also in the formation of the IIG in June 2004, which marked the formal political handover to Iraqis. The composition of the IIG differed little from the outgoing IGC. Ayad Allawi, a secular Shia, and Ghazi al-Yawir, a Sunni Arab, were the prime minister and president of the IIG, respectively (Herring and Rangwala 2006: 31). However criticisms also arose that these and other appointments in the IIG were in effect made by the US without holding any consultations with different segments of population. In fact, the formation of the IIG was the continuation of the US policies in Iraq whereby “evolving strategies to create democratic State structures (had) consistently relied on the promotion of US allies and the exclusion of its adversaries” (Dalacoura 2005: 963).

The US envisaged holding nation-wide elections in January 2005 for the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and in December 2005 for a four-year-term national government. After the completion of the first term of parliament, second parliamentary elections were held on March 7, 2010. Though this election may be a step in the journey towards the democratic success, however, they have also failed to bring about political reconciliation between various ethno-sectarian groups by failing to resolve contentious issues of critical import. For some it was believed that the problem resulted mainly from US’s desire to steer the political process along its preferred course instead of letting the political dynamics play out autonomously.

## **Conclusion**

Over many contentions, one may try to understand what the situation is like in Iraq after US intervention. Generally, from the totalitarian regime to a democratic regime, the Iraqi publics without a doubt enjoyed more freedom and are now at a position to claim their basic rights. The democratisation process has ensured the people selecting their own representative yet it does not consequently ensure provisions for all other basic necessities. Fragmentation and instability that had existed in Iraq remains post intervention. Though some welcomed the US and UK forces, some wanted them out of Iraq. Fear of their being caught in crossfire between ethnic and political factions also arose (Katzman 2003: 17). Many predicted that after

the withdrawal of the US forces, in-fighting will continue amongst the factions again (Schmidt and Arango 2011: 2).

As predicted, when the US withdrew their forces in the middle of December 2011, 434 Iraqis were killed across the country, one of the highest tolls for that amount of time in the past few years. During the occupation of the US, suicide attacks were not as frequent as before nor deaths as numerous. But by the end of January 2012, suicide bombers start attacking other factions. In terms of war on terror, the US had provided extensive support to the Iraqi security forces in these operations against Al Qaeda including helicopters for raids. According to Iraqi's acting minister of interior, Adnar al Asadi, even though they may no longer have the US's support, they are still hitting the terrorists hard and arresting as much as 50 a day (Schmidt 2012).

For a multi-religious and multi-ethnic mosaic country like Iraq, it may be difficult to have a democracy that will run as smoothly as other democratic countries. Iraqi culture being under an authoritarian rule for so long it may still face numerous dilemmas even under a democratic regime. However a step towards full democracy has been taken with the help of US intervention and for the rest of the journey, it is now under the hands of the Iraqis to make their own happy ending.

## Chapter 3

### Case Study of Iraq

An independent country between the two great rivers of Euphrates and Tigris, Iraq once known as Mesopotamia prides of a rich history dating back to the Ottoman Empire. After the First World War Iraq was prepared for independence under the British mandate and in accordance with the terms of the Mandate, the United Kingdom (UK) recognised Iraq's independence in 1927. In 1932, the Mandate ended and Iraq becomes a sovereign state with a seat in the League of Nations. From 1932 to 1958 it was a constitutional monarchy with a two-chamber legislature. King Faisal II who became King in 1939 proclaimed the establishment of the Arab Federation with Jordan on 14<sup>th</sup> February 1958 and became the head of state of the Arab Union.

On 14<sup>th</sup> July after a coup d'état that saw the murder of King Faisal, the Prime Minister of the Arab Union, General Nuri-es-Said, and Faisal's uncle, Crown Prince Abdullah. Brigadier Abdul Karime, under the new government, then announced the withdrawal of Iraq from the Arab Union and declared a republic (Elliot and Summerskill 1966: 193). Iraq as the rest of the middle-east is rich in oil and other natural resources but this very gift has often been described as cause of its sorrow. In the present world where natural resources are running scarce and value of oil shoots up daily, Iraq where oil and other natural resources are rich, is considered occupied by the United States as a result of its need for oil.

The political history of Iraq showed the situation that the Iraqi society was under even before Saddam stepped in as the central figure. For some, a thought may arise as to whether Saddam behaved the way he did due to the prevailing conditions or whether Iraq became that way because of him. Iraq beginning from the day it was under the British mandate had many ups and downs in the politics of ethnic and religion. During the mandate period the British supported the traditional Sunni leadership (who occupied northern Iraq) over the urban-based nationalist movement. Britain imposed a Hashimite monarchy on Iraq and defined the territorial limits of

Iraq without taking into account the politics of the region related to religion and ethnic (particularly those of the Kurds and the Assyrians). During the British occupation, there was tension between the Shiites and Kurds culminating into the fight for independence.

### **Social Structures**

The society of Iraq much like India is multi religious and multi ethnic. Though most of the population are Muslims yet majority are Shiite and some are Sunni sects. This mosaic social structure not only influenced the social relationship but the political as well. In the north of Iraq we find the *Kurds*, the south is dominated by the majority *Shiites*. Before World War I, traditional Kurdish life was nomadic, revolving around sheep and goat herding throughout the Mesopotamian plains and highlands of Turkey and Iran. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire after the war created a number of new nation-states but not a separate Kurdistan.

In central Iraq we have the historically dominant *Sunni Arabs*, the rest of the population include others like the Turkomans, Assyrian Christians and the Iranians. Iraq too, like the countries of Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland etc., much have been made regarding the differences in ethnicity and religion. For a non-democratic country like Iraq, the turmoil in political processes may be little more chaotic as many voices will be suppressed that needs equal representation. The internal problems in Iraq have been time and again regarded as caused by the multi ethnic and religious factors.

Strife within various Iraqi ethnics and the Muslim sects started with the death of Prophet Mohammad and in the search of who will take over the reins of Muslim leadership after him. The Sunni Muslims who had been dominant historically in Iraq had chosen the grandson of the deceased Prophet while the Shiites chose four other Caliphs not accepting the choice of other sects. Like Marx says religion is the opium of the masses, each chose to support the decisions of their own sect. leaders blindly following their leaders and this sparked on towards contention which added to the troubles in Iraqi politics.

Though the two have different approaches to religious law and practises, they follow the fundamental Islamic tenets and articles of faith. The contemporary political problems between the Sunnis and the Shiite Muslims erupted from unequal representation besides the fourteen centuries old schism. The Kurds living in northern Iraq made up to 15-20 per cent of the population while the Shiites formed 60 per cent of the population (GlobalSecurity.org 2000). Though the Kurdish numbers less, their population provided the governing class under Saddam's regime and the majority Shiites were curtailed of political rights and religious freedom. This was one of the reasons why the establishment of democracy was considered risky by those who had the upper hand during Saddam's regime for fear of tyranny of the majority (Karon 2006).

The Shiite religious political parties that historically dominate Iraq's government had close ties with Iran which did not go down well with the Iraqi Sunnis, US and her allies in the Arab world. Though the relationship was not always rough with the US and the international community, they had attacked and declared sanctions against Iran (Operation Praying Mantis 1988, 1995 Embargo etc.) and even suspected of sponsoring international terrorism. Being a divided society, divided among the lines of religion and ethnicity Iraqi's have a limited sense of national unity. In the words of Iraq's first ruler King Faisal I in 1933,

There is still...no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever (Batatu 1978: 25)

Especially today, their Iraqi identity is weaker than before. Ruling with an iron-fist, like the colonial British, Saddam used divide and rule policy drawing attention away from pressing Iraqi problems and himself. The minority Kurds occupying the northern area waged a low-level war for independence throughout Iraq's modern history. In Iraq, the Kurds were heavily persecuted under Saddam's regime.

To quell their uprising in 1987, entire towns and villages in the Kurdish region were demolished by Saddam's secret police and people were buried in mass graves. There was large scale ethnic cleaning that killed at least 180,000 Kurds

between 1983 and 1988 (Shaban 2006). The intention behind the atrocity was believed that Saddam wanted to systematically change the demography of the oil rich town of Kirkuk in Kurdistan. During Saddam's leadership many Iraqis lived in fear, not just of their leader but of outside forces, especially Iran, from whom only Saddam could protect them which was a strategy he used to maintain his status quo.

### **Under Saddam's regime**

An account on Iraqi political history cannot start without Saddam Hussein as it was mostly during his control that the country appeared in the international news for many reasons. He led his country through a decade long war with Iran and also invaded Kuwait in 1990 provoking international ire. Ruling a divided society with religious problems that led on to political complications, Iraq was considered one of the most troubled country in the world though it was rich in natural resources. Saddam's rule was marked by costly and unsuccessful wars against neighbouring countries.

On December 13, 2003 barely nine months after the United States (US) led an invasion of Iraq, one of the country's most powerful leader Saddam Hussein was found hiding in a spider hole in the town of Tikrit (ibid:1). Saddam ruled for nearly 25 years with a firm hand often marked by brutality and force, but at the same time made social reforms making the country achieve the highest literacy rate in the Middle East. Born in 1937 to Sunni-Muslim farmers in a village north of Baghdad, Saddam joined the socialist Baath Party in 1958 which gave him entry into politics and later allowed him to control Iraq. The party was formed upon the goal of achieving a 'unified democratic socialist Arab nation' and had a network in several Arab countries including Syria, Lebanon and Egypt (AP 2003).

In July 1958, Iraq's King Faisal was gunned down in his courtyard by military plotters led by Brig. Abdel Karim Kassem and Col. Abdul Salam Arif. A few months later Kassem ousted Arif for being too pro-Nasserite (Friedman 2002:2). Since 1958 every one of these Sunni-dominated military regimes in Baghdad began with a honeymoon with the Kurds in northern Iraq and ended up fighting them.



Around the same time a young Saddam tried but failed, to kill Kassem, who himself executed a slew of Iraqi Nasserites in Mosul in 1959. The same year after British forces left Iraq, a group of young Baathists, opposed to Prime Minister Karim Qasim's lack of support for pan-Arab causes, plotted to assassinate the Iraqi leader. Saddam who was trained as a hit man was ordered to carry out the attack. After an unsuccessful attempt, the young Baathist was forced to flee Iraq to Syria and Cairo where he began studying law. During his time in exile, Saddam built a strong network both inside and outside Iraq before returning in 1963 (ibid; Shaban 2006).

In 1963 Arif came back from exile and killed Kassem. Later Arif and the Baath Party thugs around him savagely slaughtered and tortured thousands of left-wingers and Communists all across Iraq. Arif ruled Iraq until 1966 when he was killed in a helicopter crash and was then succeeded by his brother who was toppled in 1968 by Saddam. In a divided society like Iraq losing power poses grave risks. Losers are not only removed from office but also end up dead (Byman 2003: 60). Then Saddam first began sending away his opponents to a prison called Qasr al-Nahiya – 'the Palace of the End' (Friedman 2002).

Iraq suffered many embargos and sanctions from the US and the international community. Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, it suffered numerous problems both internally and externally. She had faced numerous sanctions and attacks from the United States and her allies. Under Saddam's government, as the international community knew about the conditions in Iraq, measures were looked into to help the Iraqi's from the clutch of Saddam's regime. A resolution 688 (1991) was made by the UN Security Council condemning the governments repression of the Iraqi civilians which was considered a threat to international peace and security in the region (Gallant 1992:881). For this the Council demanded immediate access by humanitarian organisations to all in need.

The government was adamant to not allow humanitarian intervention expelling UN personnel and NGOs and it did not stop civilian repressions. Since his first visit in 1992, the government even refused to allow the return of UN's Special Rapporteur for Human Rights. It was estimated that "a minimum of 100,000 and a

more likely estimate of 227,000 excess deaths among young children from August 1991 through March 1998” from all causes including sanctions (Garfield 1999).

In a response to the claim that Iraqi civilians were inordinately affected by the international economic sanctions and demilitarisation of Iraq, President Bill Clinton in 1995 introduced the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFF). The programme was introduced with the intention to allow Iraq to sell oil on the world market in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian needs for ordinary Iraqi citizens without allowing Iraq to boost its military capabilities. According to US Department of State:

In Northern Iraq, where the UN administers humanitarian assistance, child mortality rates have fallen below pre-Gulf War levels. Rates rose in the period before oil-for-food, but with the introduction of the program the trend reversed, and now those Iraqi children are better off than before the war. Child mortality figures have more than doubled in the south and center of the country, where the Iraqi government—rather than the UN—controls the program. If a turn-around on child mortality can be made in the north, which is under the same sanctions as the rest of the country, there is no reason it cannot be done in the south and center. The fact of the matter is, however, that the government of Iraq does not share the international community's concern about the welfare of its people. Baghdad's refusal to cooperate with the oil-for-food program and its deliberate misuse of resources are cynical efforts to sacrifice the Iraqi people's welfare in order to bring an end to UN sanctions without complying with its obligations (US Department of State 1999)

Though there are some who disputed this view claiming the dishonesty of blaming the Baghdad government alone as northern Iraq received more funds per capita. US President Bill Clinton argued that Iraq actually had far more money to spend on humanitarian supplies under the sanctions regime than it would have had over the same period based on the trends that existed before the Persian Gulf War, adding that “we have worked like crazy” to avoid the unnecessary suffering of civilians (Goodman and Gonzalez 2003).

In October 2005 after being captured, Saddam went on trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal, a panel court established to try officials of the former Iraqi government. Saddam was alleged to have taken many lives and even to the extent of invading neighbouring countries, he and several co-defendants who were charged with the killing of 148 townspeople in Al-Dujayl, a mainly Shiite town in 1982 (AP 2003).

Throughout the nine-month trial, Saddam interrupted the proceedings with angry outbursts, claiming that the tribunal was a sham and that US interests were behind it. The tribunal finally adjourned in July 2006 and handed down its verdicts in November. Saddam Hussein was convicted of crimes against humanity, including wilful killing, illegal imprisonment, deportation, and torture, and was sentenced to death by hanging. Saddam's half-brother (an intelligence officer) and Iraq's former chief judge also were sentenced to death. Days after an Iraqi court upheld his sentence in December 2006, Saddam was executed for brutal crimes committed during his reign (CNN 2006).

### **Conditions leading to Forcible Democratisation: WMD & 9/11**

The occupation of Iraq by the US started with the latter's determination to wage war on terror. When Bush Jr. took office in January 2001 after winning the Presidential election, one of the administration's foreign policy was fixed mainly on Iraq as a country. But for the first nine months there was no reason strong enough to deal with situations in the state. However with the September 11 attack, US foreign policy advocated war on terror and also ushered in a new era for Iraqi.

When President George W. Bush came to office in January 2001, Iraq was one of the first foreign policy topics to come to the fore. Due to many of the Iraqi government's actions towards the civilian population and alleged actions and inactions towards international decree meant for international peace, Iraq was a plank in the Bush administration's eyes. Then September 11 incident offered up an opportunity to get at Iraq. Also, the new US President was a neo-conservative and when he took office, under him were another group of neo-conservatives who would all wanted to do something about Iraq.

Though it was difficult for the neo-conservatives adorned government to agree upon the right actions for Iraq, it still became the focus of the White House. Many believed that Saddam Hussein had connections with the terrorists but no evidence was in their hands to support their claims except the claims made by an unknown Iraqi informant. As the administration took decision to first take action in

Afghanistan starting the war on terror in October 2001, Iraq was declared next. Right after the attack upon the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the President asked some of his aides whether Iraq was involved and whether Saddam had supported terrorists. That same idea was prevalent in the Defense Department where Secretary Donald Rumsfeld jotted off a memo saying,

Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at the same time. Not only UBL [Osama bin Laden]. ... Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not (Roberts 2009)

Rumsfeld, wanting to deal with the issue reportedly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look into attacking both Al Qaeda and Iraq even asking Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz for any information on links between the two. Separately Wolfowitz told his deputies that he thought Iraq was involved. When President Bush took office, like all others before him, changed the US foreign policy. His major foreign policy initiative was the creation of a ‘missile shield’ over parts of Europe that was believed (in theory) to protect the country against missile strikes from Iran and North Korea (Jones 2012).

Before a policy speech was to be made by Condoleezza Rice, the then head of National Security Council on 11 September 2001, President Bush shifted his foreign policy focus on war against terror. His aides had also pushed the government to go after state sponsors of terrorism with their eye on Iraq. Soon after the policy shift, Bush (2002) in one of his most famous televised speech to the nation said, “We will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” Iraq was one of the first foreign policy issues discussed by the Bush administration. In his speech on 20 September 2001 before a joint session of Congress, Bush announced the following changes in his foreign policy.

We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network (Pellegrini 2001)

The Pentagon became the major proponent of overthrowing Saddam Hussein using America’s military (Sowell 2011). Many were not aware of the existence of Al Qaeda but when September 11 happened, suspicions fell on the terrorist organisation.

However it was not until 2004 that Osama Bin Laden accepted responsibility for the attacks. Even through this, the US Defense Department staff derided the threat of Al Qaeda and stressed on Iraq instead. Bush believed that the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme was still active. Bush had explained that Iran had made rapid strides in its missile program, and Iraq like Iran persisted in a race to do the same. During the campaign in 2000 Condoleezza Rice described Bush's foreign policy towards Iraq as a clear case of deterrence writing, "if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration" (Rice 2000: 61). Though the US had no clear evidence to prove Saddam's links with the terrorist organisation, Iraq continued to be a security threat for the US.

When 9/11 happened, those ideas which were once weighted but met with a deadlock came to the fore again. Iraq was already on the minds of many in the administration, so many were quick to point at Saddam Hussein as being a participant in the September attacks. It also allowed those that were already supporters of getting rid of Saddam to push their agenda even further because now both the President and American public were more open to using military force around the world. As part of the cease-fire agreement with the UN, Iraq had been prohibited from producing or possessing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Numerous sanctions had been levelled on the country pending compliance, and these caused severe disruption of the economy. But during all these sanctions and embargo, the US with assistance from the UN introduced programmes that allow the Iraqis to sell Oil-For-Food (OFF) (Katzman 2003).

When Saddam continued to refuse cooperating with the UN arms inspectors, it led to a four-day air strike by the United States and Great Britain in late 1998 (Operation Desert Fox). Both countries announced that they would support efforts of the Iraqi opposition to unseat Saddam, whose regime had grown increasingly brutal under UN sanctions, but the Iraqi leader barred UN weapons inspectors from entering his country (Jones 2012). While the international communities were busy trying to offer help to the Iraqi civilian population and maintaining international security, words also spread that Saddam Hussein was

grooming one of his sons, Udayy or Quşayy, to succeed him. His sons were both elevated to senior positions and both were the image of their father in brutality. Moreover, Şaddam continued to solidify his control at home and pulling all cards to maintain status quo he struck a profoundly defiant and anti-American stance in his rhetoric. Though increasingly feared at home Şaddam was viewed by many in the Arab world as the only regional leader willing to stand up to what they saw as American aggression (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2012: 2).

Soon after 9/11 the White House counterterrorism head Richard Clarke and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said that Al Qaeda was behind the attacks. Still it was hard for Wolfowitz to digest the non-involvement of Saddam and disagreed saying that the operation was too sophisticated for a terrorist group to do by itself. He said a country must be behind it, and then began arguing that it had to be Iraq (Sowell 2011). Unable to find evidence but based on plans that was made before 9/11 and previous records, the Bush administration included Iraq in the war on terror. However, there were also those who disagreed like Clarke and Secretary of State Colin Powell both pushed back saying that Al Qaeda and Afghanistan should be the target. But Bush was determined to remove Saddam from his position. Then General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that Bush's plan could only be achieved through invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration was set on Iraq that no explanations could move them from changing their plans (Mitchell and Massoud 2009: 273-275).

For them, it was more right to attack Iraq whom they had little or no evidence of links with terrorism but alleged to possess WMD than to attack Osama's Al Qaeda, a well organised and powerful terrorist group. Osama bin Laden was never seen as being a major threat to the United States before September 2001 even though Bush's aides knew little about terrorism. The terrorising history of Saddam's government was also a factor in fingers pointed at Iraq on matters on terrorism. The new by elected President too, wanting to prove himself to the Americans and the world, was convinced by earlier arguments within the cabinet that Iraq was the real problem, not some non-state actor to look into the country's possible response to 9/11.

Faced with the greatest attack upon America since Pearl Harbor in 1941 the President and others were falling back upon what they knew, Iraq, rather than what they didn't, Al Qaeda (Wing 2011). When discussions were going on with regard the decision to attack Saddam's government, the fear of not getting support from the international community also came up. It was Rumsfeld who first warned of the repercussions if attacking Iraq would deter countries that supported terrorism. Searching for allies on the war on terror, President Bush approached the then Prime Minister of UK Tony Blair, and told him that Iraq was probably involved in the attacks, but Blair was however, skeptical. In the wake of the September 11 attacks in the United States in 2001, the US government, asserting that Saddam might provide terrorist groups with chemical or biological weapons, sought to renew the call for disarmament process (Sowell 2011).

Though Saddam allowed UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq in November 2002, his failure to cooperate fully with the investigations frustrated the United States and United Kingdom and led them to declare an end to diplomacy. It was March 17, 2003 that the US President George W. Bush asked Saddam to step down from office and leave Iraq within 48 hours or face war also indicating that even if Saddam leaves the country, need might arise for the US forces to stabilize the new government and search for the (alleged) weapons of mass destruction (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2012:2). When Saddam refused to leave, US and allied forces launched an attack on Iraq on March 20.

During earlier debates before the September 11 attack, the Bush administration had found it difficult to make plans regarding actions towards Saddam's Iraq often leading to a deadlocked within the administration particularly due to the State and Defense department having opposing views. Some of the men in the administration such as Powell wanted to continue on with the previous policy of containment while the Pentagon was pushing for overthrowing Saddam although agreements could not be made upon how. Like the change in foreign policy, changes had to be made in other aspects as well (Jones 2012). The United States, one of the world's most powerful countries was attacked and a new President, Bush and others were looking for revenge. Since the government was so use to dealing with nation-

states, Iraq seemed to be a much better target than a terrorist organization like Al Qaeda.

The vastly unexpected attack of 9/11 made the already suspicious new administration immediately think of Saddam and terrorism together. Later when leaders of allied countries gathered to discuss the plan of action against the alleged attackers at Camp David, the cabinet agreed and decided to deal with Al Qaeda and Afghanistan first and Iraq was to be the next target. Being surrounded by neo-conservatives in the government such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Rice, President Bush was easily convinced to confirm the decisions to go ahead with the war on terror. That is why within barely a week of the New York City and Washington D.C. assaults, the President had already ordered the US Defense department to review its invasion plans for Iraq. It was only a matter of time before US was going to overthrow Saddam Hussein (National Security Archive 2010).

The opening bombardment of Iraq was an assault by the US aircraft on a bunker complex in which Saddam was thought to be meeting with his subordinates. Although the attack failed to kill the Iraqi leader, subsequent attacks directed at the possible location of Saddam made it clear that eliminating him was a major goal of the invasion. Always obstinate in his tone, Saddam urged all Iraqis to lay down their lives to stop the US and British forces, but resistance to the invasion soon enough crumbled and on April 9, the day Baghdad fell to US soldiers, Saddam fled into hiding (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2012:2).

In Virginia, the CIA issued its first report on Iraq and September 11, as per the request of the President. It was presented as part of the President's daily intelligence briefing. The report found that Iraq had not cooperated with Al Qaeda but confirmed that the two did have sporadic meeting since the mid-1990s (CIA 2007). It was believed that Iraq might have offered a non-aggression pact and training to keep tabs on the organization's activities as well. Finally, it was stated that there was nothing behind the story that Mohammed Atta had met with Iraqi intelligence. Overall, the two did not trust each other and had different goals, which precluded them working together. All the way to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Agency



proved consistent with the report. It never claimed there was an Iraqi connection to 9/11 nor to Al Qaeda, although it did think that some meeting occurred and training might have been offered (US Senate 2006: 94-98). The Bush administration made such links a key piece of its argument for war, but that was only partially based upon the official intelligence it was receiving.

It is now a fact that Iraq was on the minds of all the top Bush administration officials from the day it took office in January 2001. During President Bush's first nine months in office, the US Defense and State Departments went back and forth on the issue of what to do about Saddam Hussein. The debate went nowhere because the President never made a decision about which policy he wanted to follow. When September 11 happened, it convinced Bush that America was no longer impregnable and enemies and terrorists could attack it, and that therefore the country had to be far more aggressive to protect itself. He along with many on his staff also believed that states are what mattered and that they were ultimately behind terrorism, not organizations like Al Qaeda. President and the Defense Department already believed that Iraq was the greatest security risk in the Middle East and was the prime supporter of terrorism in the world.

There have been many reasons (read justifications) behind US attack on Iraq though it was mostly the alleged possession of WMDs which was a direct threat to US and the world. Saddam's alleged terrorists links and for his alleged involvement in September 11 (which if true) needed to be revenged. Also Saddam was a brutal dictator who condoned torture and it was now lying on the shoulders of the international community to liberate the Iraqis. To create a better country for the Iraqis and a safer and peaceful world for the rest, the US and her allies occupied Iraq with the aim of pulling the weeds out with a sincere hope to establish democracy from outside.

### **Outcome of Self-Governance in Iraq**

George W. Bush had warned in 2001 that the 'War on Terror' would be long. In Afghanistan, by 2002 the Talibans were virtually driven out from the

country. In Iraq with the process of democratisation leading up to self-governance will take not only a long time. Being a divided society and a country that had never experienced democracy, there are still many obstacles that had to be cleared or compromised. *The New York Times* had a story about Iraqi parliament's approving a new government. With all major political parties and ethnic groups participating for the first time in an Iraqi government, the 325-member parliament approved each of the 34 ministers proposed by Prime Minister Maliki (Leland and Healy 2010). There's no question that the new government was fragile and that the delay in forming a government was frustrating. And the challenges facing Iraq are considerable.

According to *the New York Times Magazine*, "A nation with virtually no democratic track record and a history of sectarian warfare must figure a way to move forward with a government that comprises four major blocs - two Shiite, one Sunni-backed and multi-sectarian, and one Kurdish - each with a different agenda," (ibid). But it also points out that against predictions and despite a number of coordinated, deadly attacks that rattled the country, Iraq did not experience an overall rise in violence during the impasse. President Obama called the vote in parliament a "significant moment in Iraq's history" (RFERL 2010) and to him it was a clear rejection of the efforts by extremists to spur sectarian division.

In 2002, for example, Iraqi officials said the Iraqi president won 100 percent backing in a referendum on whether he should rule for another seven years. There were 11,445,638 eligible voters and every one of them voted for Saddam. Saddam's performance in 2002 was an improvement on the previous such vote which gave the Iraqi leader only 99.96 per cent support (Wehner 2010).

Prime Minister Maliki, on the other hand, is not a perfect leader, and some may accused him of having authoritarian tendencies or even dictatorial aspirations. But for Ryan C. Crocker, who was the US ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, he believed that Maliki, as a prime minister has to "grab every shred of power, or centrifugal forces will kick in and Iraq will become unglued." (Wehner 2010) A leader who replaced Saddam after his long brutal reign will find it difficult to take over a fledgling democracy and its people who were moulded under an autocratic

ruler may look for signs of the former leader out of fear to be dragged into the same situation.

Iraq unquestionably has a long way to go, and the road to the formation of a democratic government is a difficult one. But comparison between a fragile democracy and a totalitarian dictatorship is universe apart. Michael Kelly, one of the greatest journalists and columnists of his generation who covered the first Gulf war was deeply affected by what Iraq under Saddam Hussein had done to the people of Kuwait. His reports and writings told about the innocent civilians who had been killed, ritualistically humiliated, robbed, beaten, raped, and tortured by Saddam's forces. From what Kelly saw 'shattered' people were everywhere. Men in fear of other man, lost their dignity and for the number of generations that have come and gone, those who were brought up in that condition democracy and all that follows it was a fruit bore only in heaven (Kelly 2003: 302).

The reconstruction of Saddam's Iraq through installation of democracy by the US and her allies since 2003 became a great challenge not only for those occupying countries but also for the Iraqis. The occupation by the US forces to democratise Iraq was seen as integral to a military strategy and external strategic interest of the US. Iraq itself also presents a very different context in terms of its human and economic development also resources and recent history compared with other nations that have been the subject of democratisation.

Over the past decade a diverse set of actors such as the UN and its agencies, donor governments, international and national NGOs, national governments and global financial institutions, have increasingly focused attention on the management of post-war reconstruction and committed specific resources to it. This new focus suggests that reconstruction is not only part of a wider strategic agenda, beyond the familiar territory of humanitarianism, but more importantly that it is now recognised as a key element in achieving global stability, security and the eradication of poverty in the 21st century. However, this post-war reconstruction does not always have any set pattern that will indicate how a country will turn out to be. It does not always conform to previous patterns of conflict and reconstruction or democratisation.

The reconstruction in Iraq was conceived by the invading US forces and its allies as a watershed in the global 'democratic' revolution as it was expected to democratise and liberate the Iraqis who are at the heart of the Middle East (Steve 2012). Thus, unlike recent interventions in Afghanistan and Kosovo which did not have adequate and willing international support, the military powers had to work outside the legal parameters of the UN charter and putting themselves to be called 'occupying powers' while they came to liberate. With the situations in Iraq not reaching the point of being a successful transition, it is difficult even to classify the current situation as 'post-conflict' since what has occurred is a military occupation followed by various forms of violent resistance which are still on-going despite the declaration by the Pentagon on 14 April 2003 that 'major combat engagements are over' (Loughlin 2003).

It is important to remind ourselves that Iraq is not a typical context for post-conflict reconstruction. On the eve of the war it had little in common with the poor, underdeveloped, dysfunctional states that have been the subject of 'humanitarian' reconstruction interventions under the auspices of the UN. The main distinguishing factors include the fact that it was not a failed state or for that matter a failing state. On the other hand, Iraq can be considered a functioning modern state and it continues to be rich in liquid assets and human resources. The hardships it experienced economically was mainly brought through the international regime of sanctions and reparations but what needs to be kept in mind is that Iraq unlike other strife ridden countries suffered less economically (Lee 2010).

But Iraq has a heritage of mobilising for reconstruction. It is important to recognise that the creation of an effective reconstruction process involves the establishment of a shared vision beyond the technical and administrative process of responding to urgent needs. In the case of Iraq, a vision for a 'New Iraq' post-Saddam was developed within the US administration. It was founded on the concept of military victory leading to the removal of Saddam Hussein and his loyalists, creating a blank space in which to install a 'Western style democracy', favourable to US political and economic interests in the Middle East (Stansfield 2003:126).

The development of a national vision is important not only for peace building but because it can provide a unified conceptual framework around which reconstruction partners can build relevant and integrated strategies in a collaborative coalition of international and national actors. The substitution of such a vision with campaigning zeal to bring about a predetermined change by military means has resulted in the fact that neither experienced entities within the US administration, nor its allies nor, since it was being side-lined, the UN, were consulted.

International financial institutions were similarly not involved in any pre-war planning, since the US concept was that US private enterprises would lead economic reconstruction (Sowell 2011). Years of experiments in the reconstruction of war-torn communities in the wake of the Cold War have led US to conclude that, unlike short-term relief efforts, the success and the sustainability of long-term recovery is dependent on the existence of effective systems of governance.

Therefore, whatever the challenges to creating the vision, the implementation of an effective reconstruction requires the existence, and as soon as possible, of a strong state structure that enjoys 'legitimacy' and has the 'capability' to deliver the post-conflict dividends equitably. Bypassing 'bureaucratic' and 'corrupt' state structures in favour of the 'lean' and 'transparent' non-governmental and private structures may deliver short-term results but has often led to longer-term dependency (Dodge 2003: 159-161).

It is important to recognise that legitimacy cannot be based solely on re-establishing security and authority, but should be earned through advocating reconstruction policies that are inclusive and accountable. Rather than demilitarising Iraqi society and promoting civil governance, the disbanding of the army promoted the rule of the gun, thereby restricting not enhancing the participation of civilians in public life. The chaos of war often destroy or discredit traditional social structures and authorities, while new political structures may remain fragile, having yet to build their profile with the public. They too lack legitimacy and credibility and their reputation is frequently tarnished by perceived links to partisan interests. In Iraq, having dismantled the regular army and police without making arrangements for an

international police force, the CPA began to rely on militia groups, as Saddam had done, and even to recruit intelligence and security agents who had previously served the regime, allowing themselves to be discredited by association (Dodge 2003: 159-161). Thus the violence in Iraq is not solely an issue of security but also one of governance and credibility.

Stepping into the transportation hub of Baghdad in mid-April, a US Middle East policy expert recalled being 'very surprised' over the visible signs marking the transition from US military forces to the Iraqis themselves. "The airport did not look like police state, it looked like a normally run airport" (Lee 2010). Patricia DeGennaro, a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute and adjunct assistant professor at New York University, told similar stories to Xinhua in a telephone interview. Just a month and a half after the March parliamentary elections which left no clear-cut winner, DeGennaro visited Iraq for several weeks to assess the situation as US combat forces were nearing a withdrawal. To quote President Bush Jr.:

There are five steps in our plan to help Iraq, transfer full sovereignty to a government of Iraqi citizens, establish the stability and security that democracy requires, rebuild that nation's infrastructure, enlist additional international support, free national elections *no later than next January* (Bush 2004)

Iraq held its first elections on March 7, 2010 to elect a new Parliament and a Prime minister. Defying a sustained barrage of mortars and rockets in Baghdad and other cities Iraqis went to the polls in large numbers making history. It was the most open, most competitive election in Iraq's long history of colonial rule, dictatorship and war. The result of the first election was that the slate led by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki trailed the one led by a former interim leader, Ayad Allawi, by 89 seats to 91. Though there was difficulty in forming a government at first with problems arising from all ethnics and religion, yet the general election in its own right was a success with 62 per cent voter turn-out (Wehner 2010). Among the candidates 500 of them were banned from running the elections as they had connections with the banned Baath party. But despite the bombings and attacks around the cities even in Baghdad, the election was hailed as a 'milestone' in Iraq's history. Obama, the new US President, said that the voting makes it clear that the

future of Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq. This made the US project that their process of democratisation was over.

## **Conclusion**

Before the US and allies occupied Iraq, the Iraqi's were under the mercy of Saddam's regime who had devised numerous policies to divide and rule the people who were already immensely divided in religious and ethnical politics. The situation became bad enough to level up to genocide. The condition of human rights in Iraq was deplorable even before Saddam's regime and the division within ensured continued failure of human rights. Saddam was ruthless and even speculated of murdering his son-in-law after the later allegedly turned against him and ran away. The other issues included his constant tiff with the international community on charges of not complying with United Nations Security Council Resolution (full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its nuclear, chemical, biological, and long-range missile weapons programs etc.), invasion of Kuwait, an attempt to assassinate the former US President George Bush and the Emir of Kuwait, failure of human rights in Iraq, suspected terrorist links amongst many others (Cohn 1999).

The turn of event when the US suffered an attack by the terrorists on September 11 had changed the life of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis forever. When the US and her allies started occupying Iraq, it was stressed vehemently that the war against Iraq was not a war against Islam but a war against terrorism. However for the followers of Islam around the world, it was not so especially after security becomes tighter for travellers with Muslim names. For them, little issues like these confirmed or rather strengthened their perspectives and beliefs about the war. Though most people, including most Muslims have little sympathy for extremist Islam and deplore the violence, death and damage caused by terrorists. However, the religious overtones of President Bush's speeches, the actions of US and other authorities, in the treatment of suspects who are Muslims, and the detention of Al Qaeda suspects in Guantanamo Bay provided a context to persuade some Muslims that anti-Islam may be the underlying motive of US action (Ong 2003).

New US legislation has also been criticised for breaching civil liberties and key values, such as the rule of law, raising questions among friends and foes alike about US commitments to them when they themselves are threatened. When the US, UK and their allies occupied Iraq, their plan was simply to liberate Iraqis, quickly and with as little casualty as possible. According to Ong:

the liberation of the Iraqi people; the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the elimination of its terrorist infrastructure; the safeguarding of its territorial integrity and the beginning of its political and economic reconstruction (Ong 2003)

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was reported saying that the US would not be 'an occupying force' and according to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, it would only 'stay as long as necessary and leave as soon as possible.' To quote Kelly:

Tyranny truly is a horror: an immense, endlessly bloody, endlessly painful, endlessly varied, endless crime against not humanity in the abstract but a lot of humans in the flesh. It is, as Orwell wrote, a jackboot forever stomping on a human face (Kelly 2003: 368)

After the Iraqis have had a democratically elected new government, for a fledgling democracy, the country has not been as yet one like other democratic countries. Even to have a federal form of government, there will be problems as there is possibility that the majority who were once ignored will be holding the political reins. However as there is no clear-cut pattern that can help predict the future results, there will always be room for improvement to ensure that power lies with the Iraqi people.



## Chapter 4

### Democracy by Force: Implications

The unexpected September 11 attack on the US was the incident that had sparked the US global war on terrorism. With the intention of securing the US and other parts of the world from another such attack, the US decided to wage a war against the Al-Qaeda organisation of Osama Bin Laden and countries suspected of affiliating with terrorist groups. Meanwhile, as the timing would have it, a new government was just in place in the US and was determined to show its strength and reliability. The administration under the 43rd US President, George W. Bush made it plain for everyone that his administration would not tolerate anyone who makes attempt to destroy peace of democratic people. To quote from his first *National Security Strategy*:

Our nation's cause has always been larger than our nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (National Security Strategy Archives 2002: 2)

Even during his presidential campaign speeches Bush had been privileging his 'three pillars'- defend the peace, preserve the peace and extend the peace.

On the other hand, the history of Iraq remains streaked with incidents of war, international sanctions, embargo, alleged possession of WMDs and alleged association with terrorist organisations etc. She was kept under close observation for fear of intentions to disrupt international peace and posing a threat. It was of no surprise that suspicions fell on Saddam after 9/11 besides the Al Qaeda. Saddam's government was known to create problems not only for the Iraqis but also for the international community and with a new administration just in power headed by Bush, Iraq was attacked in March 2003. This occupation of Iraq however was guided by the aim of laying the foundations of democracy in a land that had never experienced one.

Though opinions differ on the reasons behind the occupation and ultimately the installation of democracy, a chance is given to the Iraqis to write their future on a clean slate.

### **Characteristics of Democratic Regime**

Though being one of the most popular concept in the world, the word 'democracy' is often misunderstood and misused when dictators, single-party regimes and military coup leaders assert popular support by claiming the mantle of democracy. The word 'democracy' that originates from the Greek word 'demos' meaning 'people' where the supreme power is invested in the people and this became one of the most popular concept widely used and the installation of which is fervently sought after even today. Generally in a democracy, the representatives are elected by the people through election and power emanates from the people.

Democracy is a set of ideas and principles about freedom but it also consist of myriads of practices and procedures that have been moulded for centuries. However there is often an interchange in the use and understanding of freedom and democracy. What needs to be made clear is that democracy is the institutionalisation of freedom. Democracy is more than just a set of specific government institutions; it rests upon a group of values, attitudes, and practices - all of which may take different forms and expressions among cultures and societies around the world. Democracies rest upon fundamental principles, not uniform practices. According to the US Department of State (2007:4) Democracy may have number of characteristics but its core characteristics are:

- Democracy is a government in which power and civic responsibility are exercised by all adult citizens, directly, or through their freely elected representatives.
- Democracy rests upon the principles of majority rule and individual rights. Democracies guard against all-powerful central governments and decentralize government to regional and local levels, understanding that all levels of government must be as accessible and responsive to the people as possible.

- Democracies understand that one of their prime functions is to protect such basic human rights as freedom of speech and religion; the right to equal protection under law; and the opportunity to organize and participate fully in the political, economic, and cultural life of society.
- Citizens in a democracy have not only rights, but also the responsibility to participate in the political system which, like a contract, will protect their rights and freedoms.
- Democratic societies are committed to the values of tolerance, cooperation, and compromise.
- Democracies conduct regular free and fair elections open to citizens of voting age.

Democracies rest upon the principle that government exists to serve their people. Taking the famous words of Abraham Lincoln, democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people. In other words, the people are citizens of the democratic state, not its subjects. Because the state protects the rights of its citizens, they, in turn, give the state their loyalty (US Department of State 2007: 3-4). For democracy to be at its best, it needs not only the people holding the political reins but also citizens taking part in the political process. Under an authoritarian system, the state demands loyalty and service from its people without any reciprocal obligation to secure their consent for its actions. There is no rule of law and the only law that exists will be that of the autocratic ruler. Fundamental rights, right to equality, right to religious freedom, human rights etc. will be absent under an autocratic rule. Written in 1776 on the US Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson he says,

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed (US Department of State 2007: 10)

A fledgling democratic country during the formation of a government will have a society that fear rule of majority and repression of minority. This fear is not uncommon as there are many instances where the minorities due to certain abilities that they possess rule over the majority. All democracies are systems in

which citizens freely make political decisions by majority rule. But it is to be understood that this does not necessarily mean the repression of the minority.

To the American essayist E.B. White, he says democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half the people are right more than half the time (US Department of State 2007: 7). The following of the majority decision is not necessarily democratic and right. In a democratic society, majority rule must be coupled with guarantees of individual human rights that, in turn, serve to protect the rights of minorities and dissenters - whether ethnic, religious, or simply the losers in political debate. The rights of minorities do not depend upon the good will of the majority and cannot be eliminated by majority vote. The rights of all citizens, the majorities as well as the minorities are protected because of democratic laws and institutions (ibid: 7).

Minorities on the other hand may feel vulnerable and insecure but in such cases, they need to trust the democratic government to protect their rights and safety and the government should also be unbiased and just. Once trust is maintained between all groups and participation in the political process is achieved contributions will be more and a success to their country's democratic institutions. The principle of majority rule and minority rights characterizes all modern democracies, no matter how varied in history, culture, population, and economy.

In the case of Iraq where the division in society is mainly based on religious and ethnic factor, there are the minorities and majorities. The political history of Iraq highlights the numerous sufferings i.e. repression, massacres and even genocide for some which is instigated by these divisions. Now that the international communities wanted to set up democracy, there was no room for Saddam and his autocratic regime to rectify the system internally.

The US and its allies started with an air campaign followed by ground invasion into Iraq thus commencing the 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' liberating the Iraqi people from an autocratic leader and installing democracy. The international

community and even all Americans did not support the actions of the US government and her allies. The then Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) Kofi Annan later said that for a country to invade another country, it was only possible through the permission of the UN Security Council (BBC News 2004).

On April 2003, Baghdad under Saddam's government fell and though WMDs were not found, the process of democratisation started. For some the inability to verify the possession of WMDs and cruise missiles in the hands of the Iraqi government was a disappointment to the point where the invasion of Iraq was considered a failure but for the US and her allies, there was a bigger challenge and it was that of the process of installing a democratic regime. The US had also to go great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq's main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, was not the US's main goal in Iraq. It instead was to create a stable democratic Iraq that could defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies.

Now that Saddam's regime was out of the picture, the US had to find a good replacement to fill the vacuum. The Bush administration, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the exiled Iraqis however firstly disagree on interim measures for governing Iraq, there was a surprising consensus on the transitory nature of Iraq's interim government. Almost all parties believe that Iraq must have a democratic, and highly federal, government (Byman 2003:47). Fully aware of the political situations in Iraq and the high expectations of the Iraqis and people around the world, the Bush administration and her allies understood and declared that all Iraqis must have a voice in the new government and that all citizens must have their rights protected. For many Iraqis who were mistreated for many years, both in the political processes and also through the denial of human rights, the actions of the US and her allies and the promise of an interim government was a welcome change. Skeptics abound, they did not believe that democracy will ever survive in Iraq due to her history and the fractures within the society and the absence of various institutions

and civil societies that help in the nourishment and strengthening of democracy. For the development of a democratic country, rather even at its initial stage of development, it needs a strong civil society to blossom. Chris Sanders, a Middle East specialist, says “there isn’t a society in Iraq to turn into a democracy” (Byman 2003:48).

Though this may not come from the skeptics yet, there are many who believed that like every other country, it is not impossible for Iraq to have a democratic regime. After Saddam was removed from his power, there was a silver lining in this cloud. US and Iraqi forces scored impressive tactical victories against the insurgents in Iraq from 2005-2009 (Alsis et al 2011: 3). The main problem that could hinder the democratic process is mainly the threat of security both directly and indirectly and on this matter, the US and other occupying powers could provide the necessary security.

Scholars have found a strong correlation between the history of democracy in the past and the successful installation of a democracy in the future which is shown by the waves of democracy that sweeps the world time and again. Many believed that the democratisation policy would be unsuccessful in Iraq as the result of this. However every successful democracy at one point was an autocracy or a colony like India, having a past experience with power sharing does make it more likely that a successive attempt will succeed. This does not necessarily makes the result of the democratisation process in Iraq a hopeless venture; depending on the situations and the society, in the arena of social sciences it is not easy to make any predictions as variables are dynamic.

Iraq, unfortunately may have had, at best a weak parliament in its past as it switched from a traditional monarchy to autocracies based on populism and military power and, therefore had no tradition of power sharing even at a local level. Though there may be myriads of points that could act as an obstacle for the installation of democracy, one also have to keep in mind that democracy is not an install-and-run program that will continue smoothly once installed. It will take time to develop roots and will be moulded throughout these years. When even countries with

a long history of democracy faces problems, especially for countries like Iraq, one should be more understanding and patient.

### **Democracy: the best form of government for the Iraqis?**

Since the days of Aristotle, in the realm of politics, the answer for the best form of government hangs in the air. During the fourth century B.C. the political conditions and the government then were not as it is today; the choices in the type of government were either a representative government or an autocratic government. The types of government that we have now are the product of a long, torturous history.

Democracy, unlike other types of government gives freedom to the people, grant them rights and also protect them from one another. In Iraq under Saddam's regime, not only was the country provoking her neighbours and threatening the international security but also the people suffered to the extent that it grabbed the attention of the international community. The degree of human rights violation was high and there were neither laws nor rights protecting the people from injustice.

The country leading the occupation of Iraq, the US made it in her foreign policy to spread democracy to the world. This in a way is similar to the 'Whiteman's burden' of civilizing the rest of the world. Though not appointed by any authority or organisation. The US put upon its shoulders the responsibility of advocating democracy. It is no wonder why democracy and the spread of it becomes such an important matter for one of the largest democracies in the world. It has been their cultural identity since the Founding Fathers laid the foundation of their polity and the idea of the US as a 'shining city on a hill'. Many Presidents before Bush like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, Clinton had pursued democracy as critical aim of US foreign policy and paved way for democracy.

Basically for the US, it is also a security strategy (Lennon 2009:97) linked with an enduring belief of the 'democratic peace theory' that mature democracies do not fight each other. Democracies are also seen as better partners as they are considered more reliable and better at decision making and more likely to be

rule abiding participants in a cooperative international system. Compared to other types of government, especially that of a dictatorship, there are less chances of violence (See Table 1) from a democratic regime.

The intensity of violence (number of violent conflicts in relation to existing regimes) is twice or three times higher in dictatorships than in democratic regimes (Trappl 2006: 19). Also for some, the US involvement in democratisation is also considered as reputation restore plan and acting the part of a benevolent global power.

**Table 4.1: Intensity of Violence according to decades and regimes**

Decades	50s	60s	70s	80s	90s
Dictatorships	0.97	1.37	1.01	0.62	1.00
Democracies	0.47	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.36

Source: Robert Trapple (eds.): page 19.

The essence of democratic action is the peaceful, active, freely chosen participation of its citizens in the public life of their community and nation. This was one of the most important aspects that the Iraqi government had lacked. Iraq was an autocratic country, ruled under the brutal leadership of Saddam, and it is obvious that the people had little or no experience regarding democracy and who ever had once a notion of political participation, would now only have a faint idea of it. Likewise, Iraq has no strong leader to rule after Saddam and soon after the fall of Baghdad, an interim government under a strong leadership need to form a government. The US and the other occupiers, in order to establish democracy, required to work together with the remaining leaders and the exiled Iraqis to decide. According to scholar Diane Ravitch,

Democracy is a process, a way of living and working together. It is evolutionary, not static. It requires cooperation, compromise, and tolerance among all citizens. Making it work is hard, not easy. Freedom means



responsibility, not freedom from responsibility (US Department of State 2007: 17)

Talking in context of Iraq, a fractured society with no strong civil society to count on and a constant denial of human rights; the Iraqis having no say in the actions of the government, and the actions of whom constantly pushed the ire of the international community, for the people in Iraq, democracy was the forbidden fruit until the removal of Saddam by the US and her allies. Now that Saddam was ousted, the country could now move on towards democracy. However, for a society divided along racial, ethnic or religious lines, the biggest problem is the larger group's use of elections and other legitimate democratic forms to ensure their dominance, which in turn may appear to be a tyranny of the majority. For liberal democracy relies on the expectation of an ever-changing majority to avoid such tyranny; there is a need to extend its influence to a wider spectrum of liberal secularists, the Kurds and the Shiites (Alsis et al 2011: 9). In a democratic country, there may be coalitions of individuals that form a government unified temporarily on the basis of shared political goals, economic interest, social concerns, and other factors.

When all people from various backgrounds come together, all voices are heard, be it from the minorities or the majorities. This can be seen in the Indian context where political parties no longer get the clear-cut majority to form the government and resort to gathering temporary support, aligning with other parties on their shared goals and interests.

In a divided society like Iraq, it is another story. Voting blocs may be more rigid and majorities unlikely to change; especially if individuals cast their votes giving preference to candidates from their own ethnic community. The chance to form a government may never come for the minority ethnic groups. And it is under these circumstances that liberal democracies often produce illiberal results. The Iraqis and US policymakers were well aware of the dangers of democracy in divided societies. To reduce the danger, almost all the plans introduced or supported so far by the US for Iraq's eventual government stressed to a large degree of decentralization; the

participation of all of Iraq's communities in decision making, and binding guarantees of local community rights (ibid: 26).

Iraqi opposition leaders who were active in exile explicitly advocated a federal form of democracy, where considerable power is given to political units below the level of the central government. In a federal form of government, after the installation of democracy, the free people of Iraq will choose and live under a certain constitutional framework where powers will be shared at the local, regional and national levels. Amongst the Iraqis, it is the opposition party leaders and those who were once in exile that advocated a federal form of democracy. To replace Saddam's regime, many Iraqi Kurds and Arabs inside Iraq also discussed a federal form of government; and for a multi religious and ethnic society like Iraq, federal form of government seems best suited in their context (Katzman 2004: 7). However, it is to be noted that the divisions of power and authority in a federal form of government also often overlaps between the federal, state, and local agencies.

When power decentralises down to the community or local leader, he will have authority over education, taxation, criminal justice etc. that may also bring conflicting agendas. Federalism is not a panacea to all Iraqis problems but through federalism, it can maximize opportunities for the citizen's involvement in policy and decision making that is vital to the functioning of democratic society.

Iraq situated in the most strategic place in the middle-east, plays a vital role in multiple political processes. If a strong and reliable democratic regime is established in Baghdad, there will be more or less peace in the middle-east that will facilitate the same to the rest of the world. Iraq being close to Iran, the two countries have now a good relationship and change in the government at Baghdad will eventually cause watershed in the middle-east politics (Rubin 2005).

Of the two countries, Iraq has become weaker especially after the 9/11, many Shiite majorities including the leadership has sought close links with Tehran; also Iran has built great presence on the commercial and religious activities in Baghdad (Alsis et al: 12). Though Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds do not get along with

Tehran yet there is close rapport between the other sects. Perhaps the most compelling reason to invest in building democracy in a post-Saddam Iraq is that the alternatives are far worse. Those who oppose such an effort have offered up two alternatives, an oligarchy that incorporates Iraq's leading communities or a new, gentler dictatorship.

The simplest alternative to democracy would be merely to install a new dictator to take Saddam's place. In effect, this would entail the US yielding in the establishment of one more Arab autocracy that, hopefully, would be no more troubling than that of Hosni Mubarak's Egypt. However, in addition to returning the moral burden of forcing the Iraqis to endure a dictatorship, besides being impractical the power brokers that are left after Saddam's fall are simply too weak to take or hold power forcibly themselves without constant and heavy-handed US interference in this exercise.

Being under Saddam for decades, there were no strong persons with good leadership quality that could presumably take over the political reins. Lacking Saddam's military power, any who try will provoke civil war when they attack but be unable to defeat the military forces of their domestic rivals. Because a US anointed successor to Saddam would find holding power difficult without the occupier's support, the most likely outcome of this approach would be a revolving-door dictatorship in which one weak autocrat is overthrown by the next, who then is himself too weak to stay.

The only way that another dictator would certainly have a chance of maintaining power would be to become a new version of Saddam himself; replicating Saddam's brutal regime in every aspect but none of that action would enhance the stability of the region or advance U.S. interests. At best, a new dictatorship would leave Iraq no better off than other regional autocracies, but this too would be a dangerous result. Under such a dictatorship, Iraq might, as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have, become a breeding ground for anti-US Islamic radicals or might slide into instability, even revolution. Setting post-Saddam Iraq on this path would be folly (Katzman 2004:30).

Saddling another strategically important Middle Eastern state with all of the same problems as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the others was not an outcome that the United States could seek. Skeptics of democracy argued that the US must be 'realistic' and recognize what options would avoid chaos and ensure Iraq's stability. That either of these approaches could offer a stable and desirable alternative to the lengthy process of building democracy from the bottom up which also remains highly doubtful (Byman and Pollack 2003:120).

### **Imposed Democratisation: Is there hope?**

In the process of democratisation, there are cases where democracy was fought for as a result of discontentment build up, from within, against an authoritarian government or when it is imposed by other countries as in the case of Iraq. This empowerment of the people to yearn for democracy is responsive to mass pressures for democracy. This has been the dominant type of democratisation in the emergence of nascent democracies and in the global wave of democratisation of recent times. But there are other types of democratisation where pressures come from external actors.

The type of democratisation associated with Iraq is that of an imposed democratisation from outside. Though there are many countries in the world that have democracy yet each country are all at different stages of democracy. As waves of democracy comes what has been popularised by Samuel P. Huntington (1991: 31) countries having democratic form of government increases. Starting with suffrage, free and fair electoral elections, protecting rights of the people, democracy has not only continued to spread in other non-democratic countries but democracy also evolved over period of time.

As regards to the democratisation process in Iraq, where democracy is brought about by external agents, one can also say that democracy was imposed on the Iraqi people. The success of such a democracy is hardly expected as in order to have democracy there are certain preconditions, institutions and civil societies in a country that ideally must help in the process. Unlike other countries, Iraq lacked many

of these preconditions considered necessary for a successful democratisation. Jack Snyder contends that a common mistake is for outsiders to back elections before other institutions and norms essential for the functioning of democracy are established (Byman 2003: 53).

For a long time, especially during the 1980s and 1990s, international actors involved in democratisation efforts tended to focus mainly on elections, that is, on the actual transition from authoritarian rule, and paid significantly less attention to what would happen afterwards. An important point which tends to be neglected in studies and international discussions of democratisation in poor countries is the issue of weak state. There is an assumption that democratic transitions in the Third Wave are being built on the foundations of coherent, functioning states (Huntington 1991: 298). Yet many of the countries stuck in incomplete democratisation processes are not only trying to democratise but are also struggling with the task of building functioning states.

To the extent that international democracy assistance has considered the possibility of state-building as part of the democratisation process, it has too easily assumed that the fostering of democracy and state-building are one and the same goal. However, this conflation of the state-building and democracy promotion agendas overlooks some inherent tensions. State-building requires the strengthening of state institutions and the solidifying/centralisation of state power, while democracy promotion calls for the substantial diffusion and redistribution of state power (Rakner 2007:6).

As with every new government in a once fragmented and troubled society, there were serious risks of chaos and warlords in Iraq. During the previous regime, there was no place for such possibility as the forces of Saddam maintained 'peace' where no one can either rebel or plan a coup against the government. Saddam organised his security forces keeping different points of power such as tribal, ethnic and personal in contention (Byman 2003:63).

Now with the new government, there was possibility that all these differences may boil over into violence. Fear gripped the country as Saddam had left

the people vulnerable to demagogues, because of the mistrust covering the society that feared everyone. The presence of the US military and other occupiers may calm the fear a bit but, even the democratisers were not to be trusted. Those most able to provide security, the Sunnis, who were tied to the Iraqi security forces were most hostile to the US and have the most number of records in human rights abuses (al-Marashi 2002: 1-13)

With the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion became an explicit goal for US development assistance and foreign policy, and the US devoted substantial resources to aiding democratic transitions and building democratic institutions abroad. Since the late 1980s, both Democratic and Republican administrations made the promotion of democracy an important part of their foreign aid and decades later, the Bush administration proudly announced the spread of democracy as their foreign policy goal. Approximately 7 per cent of US foreign aid was budgeted for democracy promotion in the early parts of this millennium, excluding the nation-building operations undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq (Rakner 2007:5-7).

In the occupation of Iraq and the many roles it had played in it, within these few years the US spent more than a billion dollars. Besides financial aid, in the democratisation process, the US and the occupiers monitored the electoral and political processes, including assistance to electoral administration etc. Also institution-building included work on national constitutions and the promotion of the rule of law and support to the establishment of institutions of restraint, such as anti-corruption agencies and more recently and modestly, parliaments. This democratisation process also required the institution of a strong civil society, where the principal focus was to be on so-called issue-oriented NGOs. Civic education groups, media, labour unions and business associations also received considerable support from US and its allies (Rakner 2007:7).

According to Lydia Khalil (2012), who had worked as a policy adviser for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, in an interview on 'Key Rebuilding Strategies in Iraq' on 24<sup>th</sup> September 2008, she says that financial aid

countries who had promised to help the Iraqis earlier still pends. Of the 400 project done in Iraq, only 8 were upto the World Bank standards. In rebuilding Iraq, the military actions were prejudiced and especially in the area of reconstruction and rebuilding, the military could do and did better than the NGOs. Khalil opined that the military having a liquid fund, could easily give funds unlike other organisations. In terms of the socioeconomic stage that Iraq is in, compared to other countries that were also democratised, statistics that scholars look to as possible indicators of the success of democracy also suggest that Iraq has a reasonably good set of 'building blocks' to make a successful transition (Byman 2003: 70).

As indicated in Table 2, Iraq is comparable to a large number of other states that have and are making a transition from autocracy to democracy such as Bangladesh, Bolivia and Kenya. Also Iraq, due to her rich oil reserves has economic advantages over others. Even when the international community put an embargo and sanctions, Iraq still survived because of her rich natural resources. Besides the economy, the Kurds at the north enjoyed success above all odds. Even though it often boils over with tribal and factional infighting, hostile neighbours and many other problems, power sharing still occurs. The Kurds in the north basically sets an example for the rest of the country, instigating the possibility of the success of decentralisation and consequently democracy (Cohn 1999).

**Table: 4.2: Socioeconomic Indicators Linked to Democracy: Selected Countries**

Country	Positive Factors				Negative Factors		
	Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (US \$, Purchasing Power Parity)	Basic Education (literacy: % of population 15 years of age and older)			Economic Inequality (Gini Index)	Urban Population (% of Total)	
		Total	Male	Female			Male-Female Gap
Bangladesh	1,750	56.0	63.0	49.0	-14.0	33.6	22
Bolivia	2,600	83.1	90.5	76.0	-14.5	58.9	60
East Timor	500	48.0	NA	NA	NA	38.0	24
Egypt	3,700	51.4	63.6	38.8	-24.8	28.9	44
India	2,500	52.0	65.5	37.7	-27.8	37.8	27
Indonesia	3,000	83.8	89.6	78.0	-11.6	31.7	36
<b>Iraq</b>	<b>2,500</b>	<b>58.0</b>	<b>70.7</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>-25.7</b>	<b>NA (high)</b>	<b>75</b>
Jordan	4,200	86.6	93.4	79.4	-14.0	36.4	71
Kenya	1,000	78.1	86.3	70.0	-16.3	44.5	29
Mongolia	1,770	97.8	98.0	97.5	-0.5	33.2	61
Nigeria	840	57.1	67.3	47.3	-20.0	50.6	40
Panama	5,900	90.8	91.4	90.2	-1.2	48.5	55
Peru	4,800	88.3	94.5	83.0	-11.5	46.2	71
Philippines	4,000	94.6	95.0	94.3	-0.7	46.2	54
Romania	6,800	97.0	98.0	95.0	-3.0	30.5	55
Senegal	1,580	39.1	51.1	28.9	-22.2	41.3	44
Turkey	6,700	85.0	94.0	77.0	-17.0	41.5	69

SOURCES: Byman 2003: page 71



## **Democratisation of Haiti and South Korea**

Besides Iraq, there have been several external interventions in Haiti for democratising it. Though in Haiti, 1994 was the first intervention mandated to 'restore democracy' in 2004 there was another intervention following the breakdown in democratic governance. The 1994 intervention in Haiti was to restore democracy and the democratisation process had soon begun to deteriorate and from the late 1990s was in severe decline – which was a result of both external and internal factors. This ultimately led to the conflict in 2004 which precipitated the need for a new international intervention to support democracy.

After, the first intervention, the country was without a prime minister for three years, the president, in the absence of a prime minister ruled by decrees, the police force was unravelling and accountability limited. The laws in Haiti were publicly known, but there had not been extensive reformulation of the laws and the judicial system was only semi-functioning and suffering from extensive corruption. Hence there was, at the time, no equality under the law since people who had the resources could buy their freedom from all cases that were registered against them. Worst of all, even perpetrators arrested by the police were regularly let back out onto the streets. Then in 1999, a new prime minister was appointed by the president Preval.

The renewed democratisation process from 2004 was very fragile but stability and security, donor support and coordination, building state capacities, security sector reform and justice, and targeted development aid were key issues for ensuring continued democratisation in Haiti. Even if Iraq's democracy fluctuates like that of Haiti, there is still hope and a beacon from what other fledgling and democratic countries have experienced.

South Korea (S.Korea) which is officially the Republic of Korea is a sovereign state in the southern Korean Peninsula. It came to be divided after liberation and occupation by Soviet and US forces at the end of the Second World War. After a history of one dynasty after another and liberation, S.Korea became democratic after 1948, though it was still inflicted with political turmoil and military rule, martial law

also characterising much of the period until the foundation of the Sixth Republic in 1987. The Sixth Republic which began in 1987 has continued as the Republic of Korea. In itself, the S.Korean history is marked with an alternation of democratic and autocratic rule.

From the First Republic, though initially democratic in the beginning later became increasingly autocratic whose pattern continued with the Fifth Republic. However, it was with the Sixth Republic that the country finally turned into a liberal democracy. It was mainly, the period of nation-building that struck the Korean peninsula in choosing their directions towards a democracy and communism. The northern peninsula was leaning towards the left supported by workers and peasants and the south, anti-communist and pro-Japanese in their leanings. Ideological and political conflicts were intensified by the post-Cold-war atmosphere.

Two schools of thoughts (Fowler 1999: 265) advanced their thoughts reflecting the choice of type of government. According to one, the US had little impact on events in Korea as it was strategically bound to support S.Korea regardless of its commitment to democratisation. The other school focuses on the presence of US troops in Korea and the US 'approval' of the use of Combined Forces Command (CFC) units in their bloody crackdown of the Kwangju province. For them, the US could have denied such approval and prevented the crackdown leading to seven years rule under the authoritarian Chun regime. South Korea's transition to democracy was proclaimed as an important part of the 'third wave' (Chaibong 2008: 129).

Although she has succeeded in establishing democracy in the procedural sense by holding regular, free, and fair elections, only some are willing to pronounce its democracy as fully consolidated. Of course, the periodic political convulsions and wild ideological and political swings followed by violent demonstrations conveyed an unsettled democracy; heightened by the National Assembly's 2004 impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun, stretching the young democracy to the limit. Despite myriads of setbacks, S. Korea's democracy today stands as a towering achievement. The country's democracy is considered

‘miraculous’ as signs and symptoms of weakness were time and again turned into opportunities to enact far-reaching reforms (ibid: 141).

Haiti was widely known as one of the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere (Gvosdev 2004). Her first brush with democracy was inspired by the French Revolution of 1789. Geographically located in the western hemisphere, it comes under the influence of Organisation of American States (OAS) which strongly committed to the protection and promotion of democracy. If democracy failed to be practised in a member country, “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institution process by the democratically elected government...look into the events collectively and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with the Charter and international law” (Leininger 2006: 483); it was the OAS responsibility to uphold it for them.

Though democracy was not installed in Haiti and S.Korea as in Iraq, there was slight external influence in both the countries after their democratic governments become shaky. Though in the case of Iraq democracy is installed from the external, there are chances if the Iraqi people are as supportive as the S.Korean citizenry and as interested in a peaceful nation-building.

## **Conclusion**

In Iraq, the US forces have now left and the US has not been able to transform the Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq into a strong, enduring relationship. US relations with Iraq are ‘good’, but scarcely exclude Iranian influence, given the US the strategic posture it sought, or put the US in a strong position to either help Iraq achieve political stability or exclude Iran.

For skeptics, the US occupation of Iraq and the establishment of democracy in Iraq had merely enabled Iran to be more powerful than ever. Though the US had wanted Iraq to act as a buffer between the two countries, it simply elevated Tehran to a better position. Whatever may be the real political situation or intention, a full democracy in Iraq offers the best prospects for solving Iraq’s problems over the long term for many reasons. Democracy would provide a means for

Iraq's ethnic and religious groups for reconciling, or at least create a platform where decisions can be made without the use of force and without anyone implicated for human rights abuse.

With an able government, elected through proper electoral process, Iraq stands better chance of improvement in all spheres of economic, social and the political. There is no better alternative for an autocratic country than democracy. Having the right leader at the helm, a democratic Iraq will improve and prosper and with help available from the international community, Iraq will have better relationship with other countries which will bring peace across the Middle East and the world.

## **Chapter 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

Since the beginning of time, whether in tightly-organised or loosely-organised societies, the nation-states structures have always had differing and distinct power clusters like clans, ethnic groups, classes or groups, all divided by their cultural or ideological orientations and yet all being part of one state. In the modern world, those structures that ensure the functioning of the State have evolved in various genres and styles. After the collapse of former Soviet Union in early 1990s, the democratic form of government was to become the most popular for it is seen as egalitarian system of governance wherein citizens take part in determining public policy, laws and actions of the government. Though many countries have adapted democratic form of government, these countries remain under different types of democratic governance; and then there are countries which are non-democratic.

#### **Advocating Democracy in Today's World**

Democratic peace theory believes in democracies not fighting amongst themselves. This theory believes that democracies not only maintain local and regional peace but also by their aggregation contribute to the international peace. By what is understood from a Table No. 4.1 given in chapter four, it shows how democracies usually create less violent outburst than dictatorship. To cite US President George Bush Jr. who emerged as major proponent of liberal democracy around the world:

And the reason why I'm so strong on democracy is democracies don't go to war with each other. And the reason why is that the people of most societies don't like war, and they understand what war means (Bush 2004)

In the contemporary world, where power equations amongst countries play major role in determining the nature of international politics, it is not friends or enemies but national interests that guide actions and policies. And since it is true that every country is governed by one's own interests, it suits advocates of democracy to propagate that it is best for all countries throughout the world to adapt a democratic form of government and practices and hope that this will bring out the best in all

countries and ensure world peace and prosperity. But then there can be also a whole range of versions of democracy as also varying motivations for these advocates of democracy to preach and practice it as a system of governance of their own and to try and extend it to other societies.

This study has examined the case of democratisation of Iraq where democracy was injected from outside and has led to mixed outcomes of partial peace. Iraq is located so strategically in the resource rich Middle East that it can play a major role in changing the political landscape of the middle-east. In its long history dating back to the 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C., Iraq (Mesopotamia) was known as ‘the cradle of civilization’ and its oil had made it capable to envision and implement its wisdom and priorities. But in terms of its domestic politics, 20<sup>th</sup> century Iraq had witnessed a tumultuous history of invasions, war and infighting and become target of regional rivalries and international embargo and sanctions. Iraq was attracting international attention and as some believed, had brought the US and the occupiers to their soil merely for the latter’s interests in oil.

The traditional US national security objectives rely on the perspective of realism. From these perspectives democracy promotion should be pressed forward in formulating an excuse to acquire strategic aims in securing US access to energy resources, “building military alliances to fight terrorist organisations and fostering stability within states” (Fukuyama & McFaul 2007: 24). However, in some instances US used of the term “democracy promotion” with a similar and parallel meaning for the code word “regime change” (Ottaway 2003: 5).

Nicholas Guilhot in his book *The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order* (2005: 42) made it seem obvious that democracy promotion functions as a lubricating form of “regime change conducive to US hegemonic expansion and corporate led globalisation”. The toppling of the Saddam regime that is hostile to US security interests needs to be checked in order to safeguard its interests of accessing the natural resources of the middle-east. Hence democracy promotion as an excuse for US military intervention in order to access the

natural oil fields has been largely considered as the principled and rationale for the invasion of Iraq (Carothers 2006: 64, Pelleteire 2001: 199).

The motive of the US and her allies behind the occupation of Iraq was according to some, Iraq's rich oil fields and many other selfish interests; but for the US, it was definitely not the main motive. Being one of the largest democratic countries in the world, since the time of their founding fathers they put it on their shoulders to democratise the undemocratic, liberate people from dictatorships and spread peace. After the 9/11 terrorist attack, as the Bush administration began to wage a war on terror, Iraq was their natural target. Though the US had taken part in the democratisation process of several countries across the globe, in the case of Iraq, it was instigated by the country's alleged possession of WMDs, cruise missiles and her alleged association with terrorist organisations which flared especially after 9/11.

Iraqis under the dictatorial leadership of Saddam Hussein were also suffering from denial of human rights and the absence of legitimate rule of law. When the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre were hit by terrorists on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, it gave an impetus to the new Bush administration to attack and occupy Iraq, wage a war on terror, install democracy thereby spreading peace to that part of the world. For some specific reasons the *National Security Strategy 2002* commits the US to "Champion the cause of human dignity and oppose who resist it", as in the case of Saddam's Iraq. Thereby, this situation was expected to create a "balance of power that favours human freedom" (Kaplan and Kristol 2003: 183-184). Thus achieving liberal democracy in Iraq was projected to be the principal objective of the US campaign against Saddam's Iraq.

As the process of democratisation is influenced by various factors namely economic development, history, and civil society; skeptics are concerned that democratisation process may not work in Iraq due to its ethnic and religious factions in the society which has often resulted in infighting. From the perspectives of the democracy promoters it is in the realm of national interest and the grand strategy of the US to pursue or encourage onto the goal of democracy promotion. There happened to be moral as well as pragmatic reasons why such promotion has been

pursued. There is an unchallenged assumption to the fact that only democracies promote democracy. This is because of the fact that the more democracies there are, the higher the intensity of cooperation in international relation which also agrees with one of the postulates of democracy that it will bring international peace.

### **Aftermath of the Occupation**

When US entered Iraq in March 2003, the search for Iraq's WMDs and cruise missiles started as well. The Iraqi government and military collapsed within three weeks of the beginning of the U.S.-led 2003 invasion of Iraq on 20 March. By April, US led forces occupied much of Iraq. The resistance of the much-weakened Iraqi Army either crumbled or shifted to guerrilla tactics, and Saddam had lost control of Iraq. However after they entered Iraq, no traces of the WMDs could be found and doubts began to rise; especially after Saddam's ties with the terrorists organisations was unconfirmed as well.

The US and her allies had decided to bypass the UN Security Council and attacked Iraq and when most allegations against Saddam were unconfirmed. This had created public outcry against the US led forces but gave credit to the skeptics of the invasion. On the other hand, the invasion brought to the downfall of Saddam's brutal regime thus liberating the Iraqis from the clutch of the dictator. Saddam went into hiding.

While he was in hiding, his sons Uday and Qusay and his grandson Mustapha were killed and finally on 13<sup>th</sup> December 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured in ad-Dawr near Tikrit. Saddam Hussein along with 11 other senior Baathist leaders were handed over to the interim Iraqi government to stand trial for crimes against humanity and other offences. Saddam Hussein was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by hanging. On 30<sup>th</sup> December 2006, Saddam Hussein, the once undisputed leader of Iraq, was hanged.



After Saddam's regime, a Transitional Iraqi government was formed with the help of the US led allies to fill the place of the ousted government. Keeping the multi religious and ethnic nature of the Iraqi society in mind, the interim government was formed to best represent all members of the Iraqi society. So on April 6th, 2005, the 275 members of the transitional National Assembly elected Iraq's new president, a Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, two vice presidents Adel Abdul Mahdi (Shiite) and interim President Ghazi al-Yawar (Sunni Arab). Then, the Presidency Council on April 7th named Shiite leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari as prime minister.

For the cabinet, recommendations were made by the prime minister, which must be approved by a simple majority vote of the assembly. Giving the proper nature of a democratic government, Iraq's transitional government is built as a parliamentary democracy with a legislature, executive branch, and independent judiciary. In the executive branch, the prime minister exercises almost all the real power. The Presidency Council has some important executive powers such as a veto power for legislations passed by the National Assembly, and the appointment of the Supreme Court and other judges. Similar to other democracies, in the new interim government, the president was primarily the constitutional head.

On December 2010, more than eight months after the national elections, Iraq finally decided on a new government, finally able to balance the main ethnic and religious groups as the US led forces prepared to leave Iraq. As new faces came into the government, the political deal that was negotiated saw the legislature re-elect as President Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, who then selected the incumbent Nouri al-Maliki for a second term as Prime Minister. It was a herculean task to form a cabinet within a month amongst the much mosaic society but for the new government to lay a strong foundation needs to follow a path towards egalitarianism in a divided society. Even then, four MPs were barred because of alleged ties to Saddam's banned Baath Party, causing a walkout by opposition leader Allawi and members of his Sunni-backed bloc.

The fear that now creeps in for al-Maliki is the Sunni community's potentially dangerous sense of alienation. But the fact that al-Maliki, unloved not only

by his foes but among many of his allies too, has managed to secure a second term is a reminder that Iraq's political game is won by those best able to manage a complex matrix of competing ethnic, sectarian, political and regional interests (Karon 2010). Al-Maliki won the election mainly because he was the most viable; and for the rest of his stay in office he will have to sustain that balancing act for the foreseeable future. At the United Nations headquarters in New York, the Security Council members welcomed the formation of the new government. Al-Maliki welcomed his unified but diverse government whose creation he considered was the most difficult task in the world.

### **From Invasion to Withdrawal from Iraq**

One wonders how the situation would be if Saddam was found to possess WMD or cruise missiles and having ties with any terrorist organisations? But the fact of the matter was that Saddam had denied in an interview with the CBS reporter on 24<sup>th</sup> February 2003 that his government possessed any WMDs and any weapons prohibited by the UN guidelines. According to him, in order to look strong in front of Tehran, he simply made it look like that he possesses the weapons. After Saddam was executed, there were many in the international community condemning the execution of Saddam as the trial was considered unfair for him being under the purview of the US led forces.

The timing of the 9/11 attack and the coming to the Oval office by George W. Bush Jr. all worked against the interest of Saddam. The Bush administration was filled with neoconservatives and they had always kept a close eye on the activities of Iraq and Saddam; instead of spending time investigating the lesser known Al Qaeda group, the administration chose to attack Iraq inviting hatred and condemnations from not only their own people but people across the globe. The US had on earlier times attacked other countries for various reasons but this attack provoked many as the US led forces did not take permission from the UN Security Council.

To oust Saddam's regime, however was not the only reason the US led forces went to occupy Iraq. Bush after coming to office changed the US foreign policy making the process of democratisation and its spread their new policy goal. Though the US had participated in many a democratisation before, there were some which did not bear full fruit. For instance, in 1994 there was an intervention to restore democracy at Haiti and the democratisation process soon began to deteriorate and from the late 1990s, there was in severe decline in the standard of democracy therein as a result of both external and internal factors. This ultimately led to a conflict in 2004 which precipitated the need for a new international intervention to support democracy.

Like in Haiti, Iraq and many other countries, South Korea also adopted a democratic form of government that came through numerous movements and internal uprisings. Korea was a colony under Japan and it was only in 1945 that it broke away from the Japanese yoke and later came to be democratised. Korea was in a bad shape; with the intensification of Cold War post her liberation there was ideological, political conflicts between left and right which consequently result in the Korean War on 25<sup>th</sup> June 1950. Post-liberalism Koreans wanted to build a strong nationalist state, however there was conflict in interests between left leaning workers and peasants and anti-communist right leaning pro-Japanese people.

The conflict of interest was aggravated by the presence of the US Military government in the south and the presence of Russian Military government in the north. At the time of the Korean War, the Soviet Union had boycotted the UN, forfeiting their veto power and giving the UN an opportunity to intervene in the civil war. After a series of coups and many years of successive political turmoil later, the autocratic regime was replaced by a democratic form of government instigated by the 19<sup>th</sup> April Revolution in 1960.

After South Korea became democratic, though the country was in a deplorable state post-liberation, it became one of Asia's richest countries. It has the fourth largest economy in Asia and an economy driven mainly by export. The democratic transition in S. Korea was also a product of the process of modernisation

that had enveloped the country soon after her civil war. The profound social change – the increase in the urban population within a short span of time, the increase of enrolment in schools and universities and also the rise in number of newspapers and magazines etc. – contributed in influencing the people against a dictatorial regime and towards embracing a democratic government.

### **Obstacles in the process of Democratisation**

During 1985 and 1995, the democratic movement in the world was followed by a huge euphoria as it spread around the world. In 1999, it even saw the overthrow of the authoritarian regime in Latin America, the dismantling of apartheid regime in South Africa, the fall of the Communist system and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was around this time that democracy spread with great fanfare, making historic milestones in many countries that had never seen the light of democracy before and in those that have struggled to renew it. There may be different instances why countries adopted democracy but according to what can be gathered from the past world history and recent history, citizens fought for democracy and governments adopted democracy for want of freedom and the rights that follow it.

In a democracy, the participation of people in the public affairs of their countries is more likely than any other form of government. A democracy ensures basic freedoms and equality meeting the needs of everyone and preserving domestic as well as international peace. The ultimate goal of democracy is to preserve and promote the fundamental rights of the individual, to achieve social justice, foster the economic and social development of the community, strengthen the cohesion of society and build a favourable environment for international peace. Man enjoys freedom and the power to dictate his or her own future; of the types of government that exists, democracy provides that freedom and ability.

There was a time in history when countries were ruled by monarchs and the law of the land rested on their whims. Such a time was the period of darkness in the political history as rights and dignities were almost non-existent for the citizenry. As people became more aware of their rights as citizens, monarchy began to

fail. This awareness was brought about by social changes becoming an eye opener for the elites in societies catching on to the popular; development led to modernisation that promotes democracy. Especially in the current international economy, there need to exist a link with other countries for export and import; no country can afford to stay isolated. When the Soviet Union realised it could no longer contain the frustrations within the country, Glasnost and Perestroika was introduced. Nonetheless, it led to the fragmentation of the country into 15 independent nation states, resulting in the formation of Russia and the collapse of a large Communist state. As against what has been found, it can be argued that development is linked with democracy.

Though development may provide impetus to the democratic process, it is unrealistic to assume that democratic institutions can be set up easily, almost anywhere and at any time. This also doesn't imply that it is hopeless in many situations and in many countries but, the fact of the matter is, democracy is most likely to emerge and survive when certain social and cultural conditions are in place. However, conditions favourable to democracy do emerge and modernisation or development promotes them. Taking a more technical term, 'modernisation'; this triggers social change penetrating all aspects of life. Improving the lives of people creating awareness to one's environment and that of others, it provokes mass participation in politics thus making the establishment of democratic political institutions increasingly likely.

Highlighting democracy need not be seen as the best form of government, there are critics who dwell on the notion that not all democracies have perfect and stable governments; no theory is without criticisms and even the Democratic Peace Theory is not without one. According to the critics, the theory focuses mainly on inter-state wars, and even in that realm some democratic countries wage war against other countries. For them the Spanish-American War in 1898 was a war between two democratic countries and even the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. On the other hand, supporters of the DPT argued that Spain was not a democracy at the time and neither was Prussia (Thomas 2010).

For a democracy to go into war against any country, it needs to take up the plan of war to the legislatures, the people's representative and if it is not supported by the people, government may find themselves in a tight spot as they can put themselves at a risk from losing popular support. There are also countries like the US that put DPT as an axiom of their foreign policy. It is of no wonder that the US get involved and often led many a democratisation process across the globe often spending away tax-payers money in bulk to install democracy in other countries. Being one of the largest democracies in the world and also being among the founding fathers of the spread of democracy, the US continues to make great headway in spear heading the process of democratisation.

The democratisation process in Iraq is often seen as 'forced' democratisation. The word 'force' associates with the use of physical power or violence to compel or restraint. This seems a contradiction in terms but the US led forces occupation of Iraq were projected as driven by insecurities felt by the US and the international community after a devastating terrorist attack that shook the world. Suspected of developing and possessing WMDs and cruise missiles and ties with terrorist organisations, the forces moved into Iraq to keep the world safe and to make sure the regime that was there was removed. Besides the removal of the autocratic regime linked with terrorists, the spread of democracy was the next and main motive. Though there may be some Iraqis who chose Saddam's brutal regime over the alternative to be installed by these external forces, there was no strong opposition against democracy itself. It was merely few skeptics, who from half way around the world, opined that democracy may not be the best form of government for the Iraqis i.e. the people who had been tortured, suppressed and denied of all rights for decades under Saddam.

For these skeptics, there must be certain institutional structures and pre-conditions for the successful installation of democracy. On the other part of the continent, in Burma, a woman had fought single handed for democracy for decades. Protests and demonstrations from students and Buddhist monks had resulted in the shutting of colleges and universities. Clashes often resulted between the people and the military regime causing deaths of many pro-democracy supporters, often covertly.

Taking over even the media and communications by the military regime, the country has been more or less isolated from the world for last 25 years. Nonetheless, through international support and a tireless determination to have democracy on the part of Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma is gradually pushing its way towards democracy. But this is an example of internally driven transformation and yet Myanmar may still be a long way to have a full blown democracy. However, the elections held in 2012 gave the ‘fall of Berlin Wall’ moment for pro-democracy Burmese.

It may be difficult for the people alone to fight against an incumbent non-democratic regime but with international support, there is always hope. Though in Myanmar, there was no military occupation of external forces installing democracy, it is clear that the process of democratisation often needs an external help and the level of help offered may also be contextual. No two countries are alike and no country’s fate can be predicted from others. But democracy is not the panacea for all problems. For a country that is inflicted with infighting, socio-religious tensions and problems that does not allow peace within the region, the only way a certain level of peace can be achieved is through democracy. By sitting together under the banner of a democratic government, a divided Iraq can form a government that represents all sections of the society, appointing a prime minister, a president and cabinets that represents all in the society. This could be achieved now without the use of force and infighting. Respect for diversity and pluralism, tolerance, justice, freedom, human rights, and non-violence are universal core values that are rooted in the rich cultural diversity around the globe. As the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated on 30<sup>th</sup> October, 2006, “democracy is a universal right that does not belong to any country or region, and that participatory governance, based on the will of the people, is the best path to freedom, growth and development” (UNDEF 2006).

And finally, democracy evolves over the ages and the type of democracy that a country has may also evolve over time, adapting to the socio-political and economic conditions that exists within the country. It is believed that democracy does not come by itself and it cannot be imported from outside. If this statement is true, how did democracy ever exist? Again if it is believed that it cannot be imported from outside, how about countries like Korea that has a totalitarian

regime in the North and a democracy in the South. The influence of the Soviet Union in the north and that of the US in the south are believed to have contributed to it during its nation building. If only an 'influence' (in the form of US military presence) is enough for some countries to adopt democracy and be successful, there are also chances that even other kind of 'influence' can help countries to have a successful democratisation; and as Kofi Annan once said no nation is born a democracy.

### **Findings and Recommendations**

At the end of this study one is not very sure if Iraq is now a better place without Saddam? However, there are two views on the fact that billions of dollars have been spent and thousands of lives lost on both sides. We do not know what Iraq will become under President Nouri al-Maliki and we do not know what it would have been even under Saddam Hussein. Saddam had continued violating the UN embargo and allegedly plotted to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction and cruise missiles. He is now no more. But some of these ifs and buts of recent history of Iraq will continue to haunt scholars trying to understand the validity of use of force for establishing democratic forms of government beyond their own borders.

Under the guidance of the US-led forces, Iraq as a fledgling democratic country totters. The fact that Iraq is developing, however slowly and imperfectly, into a representative democracy is a good sign so far. But there will remain questions on whether the methodologies of establishing democracy in Iraq are fully justified. And answers will vary based on perspectives from where these questions are addressed. For example, the invasion of Iraq was unquestionably worthwhile for the Kurds who gained a state within a state and are expecting to gain still more from oil and gas development on their territory. The Shias in the south of Iraq who were always repressed under Saddam, have made gains too though they face the menace of continuing sectarian violence.

For many who have lost their lives and whose families have perished in the invasion and the infightings that followed this question might not be worth asking what changes the war had brought to them. The 'Arab Spring' indicates that regimes



that only offer their people repression and delusion eventually collapse under their own weight of incompetence, corruption, and self-deception. Saddam regime collapsed under its own weight too. From the point of view of international law, it is obvious that a war started without UN Security Council approval without any evidence of a country's possession of weapons of mass destruction did cross the red line of international law and reduced the trust level of military intervention everywhere.

For critics of the war in Iraq, the loss of 100,000 to 1 million Iraqi lives and the hundreds of billions of dollars that was drained from the treasury, nothing in the world would ever come close to replacing them (Steele and Goldenberg 2008: 1). In a war that is not their own, four thousand US soldiers lay dead with several tens of thousands wounded and others forever bearing the scars of war. Besides those under the allied forces, the largest number of dead and casualties were the Iraqi civilians. Then soon after there were reports that the US led forces will leave Iraq in 2011, there was an increase in activity of the Al Qaeda, especially in Anbar province and also in Baghdad. There were reports on rise in street violence.

Though the Iraqi security forces may be able to handle the post US exist activities, the Iraqi civilians and politicians need to choose to continue rejecting Al Qaeda and not allow them to regroup and eventually get their power back. Some Iraqis, post-election were asked whether they still prefer Saddam over democracy, though some still preferred Saddam's regime, majority enjoyed having a democratic experience.

The process of democratisation needs time, it is a slow process. It needs co-operation from the people and its advancement is also linked with peace building, consolidation of human rights through the application of rule of law and social justice and with economic growth and development as the government is accountable to the people. Iraqi people have now experience of democracy, it may no longer be possible for the international community and the democratisers to intervene in every step of the way any more. Though the world may still be looking from afar but the success of democratisation now lies in the hands of the Iraqis.

The US led forces have been criticised myriads of times for their involvement in the democratic movement while the US foreign policy advocates the spread of democracy as a means to spread international peace. If the United Nations includes ‘democratisation’ under its objectives, would it receive less objections and wider international support? In the year 2005, the UN came up with a resolution to help countries in need of protection from their own government or people, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Luck 2008:2).

The protection of human lives and prevention of large scale massacres have ranked high in the UN’s priority list for many years. The numbers of lives lost have always been one important scale for measuring level of atrocities caused by war. For such an activity, legal organised initiative was made under the International Red Cross since 1864; helping the downtrodden and those who were abused. Though there has been many atrocities that gored the history of many countries worldwide, the model turning point that incepted the notion of R2P came from the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. On many instances, states in one way or the other have secured their people but R2P is new in the sense that the international community can intervene to protect civilians without boundaries where there are reports of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing to name a few.

In late 2001 the Canadian government had created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), that released its report *Responsibility to Protect* which advocated that state sovereignty is a responsibility, and that the international community could, as a last resort use military intervention to prevent “mass atrocities”. After support from the member states at the World Summit in 2005 and the Security Council formalising their support of R2P in April 2006, the implementation of R2P was discussed at the 2009 UN General Assembly resulting in Resolution, A/RES/63/308 (UNRIC 2012:1). And this resolution was recently invoked in military intervention in Libya in 2011.

Does this case of Iraq help us understand limitations of such humanitarian interventions better? Does this tell us something about limitations of

democratic peace theory? Does this tell us about declining relative power of US? What it speaks about the role of rising powers? When a state fails to play her role becoming a perpetrator, it calls for intervention from the international community. In the case of Iraq, the US forces not only intervened for international peace but also brought about changes in the type of government, from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. It is understood that democracy plays better role in serving its citizens with rights and liberty even to the extent of freely opposing the authority of an autocratic regime. However even if the intentions of the US forces were true in Iraq, due to the ever present doubt in the actions of countries as they are often linked with ulterior motives of the supporting country create certain limitations.

The case of US intervention in Iraq, shows the limitation in DPT. When democratic peace theory is viewed as a representational practice, war becomes inevitable between disputing liberal democratic states and non-liberal/democratic states not because of the aggressive nature of authoritarian regimes but because these situations are viewed as an opportunity for liberal democratic states to engage in a 'civilizing' mission and reaffirm their national identity and ontology by demonstrating their superiority in battle (Grayson 2003:8). By that logic, the US and other liberal democratic forces have 'civilised' Iraq by installing democracy.

In the globalised world, where news from one corner of the earth reaches the other corner within a matter of seconds, it appears that the power of the US including their prestige has been on a relative decline. On the contrary, the US being one of the most powerful and influential countries in the world can afford to be active and intervene in any matters relating to maintaining international peace and security and other humanitarian interventions when the need arises. It is only when one takes a step or lends hand that one gets noticed and since not all people think alike responses will always differ. Also there is always ambiguity about whose welfare and interests are guiding such a military intervention; are those that of the intervening power or the one which is intervened?

To conclude, therefore, it can be said that democracy is currently the best form of government as it provides representation, rights and freedom to its

people. In a world where many are still under rigid autocratic and non-liberal governments, the international community must work together to promote democracy. This does not however mean that intervention in coercive manner is supported but the fact remains that when there are men, women and children in other parts of the world tormented under brutal authoritarian regime, denied of basic human rights and dignity even in death; who are we to deny them a chance, a taste of freedom from the comfort of our peaceful democratic countries. The situation in Iraq may not offer the best environment for the rapid growth of democracy but introduction of democracy there is welcome. Also democracy takes time and will evolve according to local needs; the success of democracy now lie in the hands of the people of Iraq.

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