

**US PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN PAKISTAN, EGYPT AND IRAQ**

*Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University  
in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for award of the Degree of*

**MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

**RITAMBHARA**



**United States Studies Programme**

Centre for Canadian, US & Latin American Studies

School of International Studies

**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**

New Delhi 110067

2012



CENTRE FOR CANADIAN, US AND LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES  
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
**JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY**  
NEW DELHI - 110067

Date 25/7/12

**DECLARATION**


I declare that the dissertation entitled "US Public Diplomacy in Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

  
**RITAMBHARA**

**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
Prof. K.P. Vijayalakshmi  
Chairperson, CCUS&LAS

  
Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra  
Supervisor

*To my mother*

*Ms Rita Bhadauria*

*A woman,*

*who inspires and encourages me*

*everyday.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*I shall be forever grateful to Jawaharlal Nehru University for providing me the opportunity and the resources to write my dissertation. My particular gratitude goes out to my dissertation supervisor, Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra, who was generous and patient with his time and advice throughout the course of my work at JNU. I am thankful to Prof. Christopher S. Raj and Prof. K.P. Vijayalakshmi for their valuable guidance. The staff members of Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, the American Centre Library and Teen Murti Library were helpful and cooperative during each stage of my research. This dissertation would never have been completed without the constant encouragement of my friends. Finally, I wish to thank my parents for their unconditional support throughout my study.*

*Ritambhara*

*JNU, New Delhi*

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## **Diplomacy**

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AMIDEAST	America-Mideast Educational and Training Services
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CWC	Commission on Wartime Contracting
DOD	Department of Defence
DOS	Department of State
ECA	Educational and Cultural Affairs
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GWOT	Global War on Terror
IMN	Iraqi Media Network
IWASE	Iraq Women in Engineering and Applied Sciences
IYELP	Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MTCR	Missile Technology and Control Regime
MFO	Multi-national Force & Observers
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Government Organisation
PLUS	Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Study
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

VOA	Voice of America
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation
YES	Youth Exchange and Study Program



## PREFACE

American popularity has been on a downhill post- 9/11, in most Muslim-majority countries (even the ones that have been strong allies of the US like Egypt and Jordan), as reiterated by a number of polls like Zogby, Pew and Gallup. Thus, in the Islamic world, which accounts for one-fifth of the world, the American image remains largely dismal; (diluting which), remains one of America's foremost concerns, as it also remains a hindrance in America winning its Global War on Terror. Out of all the Islamic countries, Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq merit a more detailed analysis because of their geopolitical and demographic importance in the Islamic world.

The United States continues to remain the mightiest military and economic power in the world, possessing unparalleled hard power. However, there has been a decline in America's soft power in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks and America's subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, security measures at home like the PATRIOT act, etc. In the 21st century there has been felt, far more need for the nation-states to use soft power to enhance ones attractiveness in international arena; to show ones better side- in order to stimulate cooperation and dampen resistance, particularly concerning security policies. In this context, Public Diplomacy has become a very important instrument of soft power, as well as being a very vital tool of American foreign policy.

Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq are three of the most important countries in the Islamic world, owing to their locations, sizes and geo-political significance. There has been observed a persistent anti-Americanism in all these three nations as validated by many international polling agencies over the years since 9/11. There are many common reasons for apathy against the United States in these three nations; however, there are some very deep-seated and particular reasons for anti-Americanism in each of these nations as well, which makes for an interesting study.

Pakistan is the hotbed of international politics today, along with being one of the biggest and most influential Islamic nations' in the world. Not only this, Pakistan is essential for the United States, in its Global War on Terror, as without Pakistan's cooperation America cannot dismantle, destroy and defeat the terrorist strongholds in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the support from the Pakistani government hasn't been enough and whole-hearted and thus America anxiously needs the support of the Pakistani public for its policies in the region. This is only possible through a wide engagement with the Pakistani public by following an efficacious public diplomacy programme.

Egypt warrants a study of its own as its not only one of the historically big players in the Arab world, but also one of the leading nations in the democratic uprisings or what is now known as the Arab spring of 2011. In the case of Egypt, U.S. feels the needs to engage with the civil society much more, because of the ouster of its long-term ally, Hosni Mubarak (President of Egypt from 1981-2011). Engagement with the Egyptian public becomes crucial to the United States for maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, and to sustain its interests regarding Israel. The U.S. needs to maintain and rebuild its image in Egypt, especially as the country struggles through a period of democratic transition.

Iraq, on the other hand, is a test for U.S. public diplomacy, as the U.S. tries to vigorously sustain democracy in Iraq and reduce anti-Americanism. Iraq remains a very crucial example of Washington's foreign policy in the Islamic world, as America's Iraq war (2003) has been widely regarded as one of the most aggravating matters in the escalation of anti-Americanism in the entire Islamic world. The success or failure of the democratic experiment in Iraq remains a very important issue and is inextricably linked to the success of American public diplomacy.

Curbing anti-Americanism in these countries has become an important foreign policy goal for the United States in the 21st century. To meet this challenge, America requires a judicious mix of its hard and soft power, or what is termed as "smart power". Public diplomacy is increasingly being seen as, not only a very important instrument of soft power, but also as an imperative tool in the foreign policy arsenal of the United States. Public diplomacy becomes crucial in the globalized world of today, where interaction and strategic communication with the foreign public is indispensable. The US public diplomacy has become an integral part of US foreign policy arsenal today, and this study intends to test the following hypotheses:

➤ US public diplomacy has become a powerful tool to protect US interests in the Islamic world.

➤ Failure of public diplomacy in curbing anti-Americanism in Pakistan is due to flawed US policy.

The following research questions will be raised to aid in testing the hypotheses:

- Why is American public diplomacy considered an important foreign policy tool in the Islamic world?
- What has led to the growth of anti-Americanism in Pakistan post 9/11?
- How public diplomacy was used in Egypt to protect US interests in Israel?
- Has exercise in America's soft power succeeded in promoting democracy in Iraq?
- What are the systemic problems hindering US public diplomacy?

The study delves into the theoretical analysis of public diplomacy and soft power and their evolving nature in the 21st century. It also focuses on the emerging trends of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq and the reasons behind it in these countries, respectively. The study also throws light on the various public diplomacy programmes, undertaken by the United States Government in these countries to protect vital US interests. Source materials comprised of both primary and secondary literature. Speeches and statements of Government officials, Hearings and testimonies presented to the House and Senate subcommittees and committees, online research portals, books, articles and polls like Gallup and Pew have been used in this study as source materials.

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **Public Diplomacy: A Conceptual Analysis**

*“There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run, the sword is always beaten by the mind” ~Napoleon*

### **Introduction**

Public diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has become an extremely crucial policy undertaking for most nations, especially the United States of America, in the Islamic world, owing to an escalating anti-Americanism in the region. Anti-Americanism in the Islamic world has been a growing threat to American stability, security and national interest. Curbing this anti-American sentiment became one of the topmost goals of the United States post 9/11. Winning the hearts and minds of the people in the Islamic world, became imperative for the United States and thus Public diplomacy was reinvigorated as an integral component of foreign policy making in the US.

Public diplomacy acquired an added importance and urgency in the Globalized world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, where interaction and strategic communication with the foreign public has become indispensable. Public diplomacy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has had to considerably differentiate itself from the more propaganda-akin public diplomacy of the Cold War. In an era, dominated by twenty-four hours global media, it had to undergo transformation and communicate more openly and honestly with the publics in question. The refined and renewed public diplomacy was called the ‘New Public Diplomacy’ as it laid more emphasis on a mutual dialogue and listening than the old public diplomacy which focused more on telling America’s story to the world.

The importance of soft power and building up of soft power resources also increased rapidly in this period, which propelled public diplomacy as an even more critical tool to influence foreign publics and dampen their resistance and gain their support for American policies. Public diplomacy continues to be essential in meeting US interests, especially in America's Global War on Terror, as a comprehensive and cohesive strategy that is incorporated in the policymaking process to help America in achieve its goals. It has also become an important instrument of soft power and smart power of the United States in the Islamic world and cannot be alienated from the larger foreign policy making of the United States.

A study of American public diplomacy not only requires an understanding of the concepts of public diplomacy, but also a concise idea of anti-Americanism after 9/11 and the plausible reasons behind it. This study will also render focus on the changing nature of public diplomacy from being more propaganda-akin to the present age dialogic, mutual engagement based public diplomacy or what is called, "New Public Diplomacy". A detailed recapitulation of the history of public diplomacy in the American context will also be attempted in the course of this chapter. An analysis of the growing importance and vitality of an effective public diplomacy campaign as a foreign policy goal also becomes pertinent in undertaking this study.

## **Defining Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy has become a very inexplicable term ever since 9/11, drawing a lot of attention from not only scholars but also policymakers all over the world. It has become an integral policy programme for most nation-states today, especially the United States in the present context, as conditions for the production and enactment of public diplomacy have changed significantly because of the ways that global "interdependence" has radically altered the space of diplomacy. (Kennedy and Lucas 2005: 322)

Public diplomacy, both as a concept and as a policy programme has been put under a scanner since the events of 9/11 and an attestation of growing anti-Americanism in the Islamic world, especially the countries under consideration in this dissertation, namely, Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq. Even though it has become a very important concept in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, its not a novel concept, however, the purview and definition of public diplomacy

have not only broadened but undergone significant changes keeping in mind, the present context of the information age.

Public diplomacy has been practiced in America ever since World War I but the concept of public diplomacy was coined and defined much later in the 1960's. The Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Edward Gullion, first coined the term 'public diplomacy' in 1965. He defined public diplomacy as the diplomacy that deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.

According to him, it encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.”(Tiedeman 2004: 5)

This definition of public diplomacy is an all-encompassing one, which takes into account the role of all state and non-state actors into influencing public opinion. As America has an inordinate influence on international relations, the U.S. public diplomacy cannot entail only official government-sponsored efforts to shape public perceptions. (Gass and Seiter 2009: 155) Its definition has to be defined more broadly. Public diplomacy in the simplest form is a term that describes methods and tactics that are used mostly by states and inter-state organizations, as well as some non-state actors to influence public opinion to advance their interests and values, while at the same time attempting to understand and build relationships on shared goals and values.

A shorthand definition of Public diplomacy is that it involves getting “other people on your side”, - it's ultimately about influencing other people's ideas, opinions and attitudes. They need not only include high-ranking people or potential decision makers but also the ordinary folk, who have access to all sorts of information. Public Diplomacy can be seen as the instrumentalisation of soft power. (Gonesh and Melissen 2005)

Public diplomacy, in a broadened view, consists of more than the words or deeds of heads of state and their representatives. It also encompasses civic action, such as actions by social

movements, cultural exchange programs, and the involvement of non-governmental organizations. (Gass and Seiter 2009: 155) It is essentially a form of national image management, which includes any and all efforts to capture the hearts and minds of others, through official or unofficial means. (Wang 2007) Therefore, public diplomacy is not necessarily restricted to the state as it involves a host of other non-state actors. However, the bulk of the responsibility of carrying out public diplomacy programmes rest on a state's shoulder and thus in the context of this dissertation, emphasis will be laid more on the Government of the United States' official public diplomacy programmes and activities, through which they tried to influence foreign public opinion.

Public diplomacy is defined in different ways, but broadly it is a term used to describe a government's efforts to conduct foreign policy and promote national interests through direct outreach and communication with the population of a foreign country. Public diplomacy activities include providing information to foreign publics through broadcast and Internet media and at libraries and other outreach facilities in foreign countries; conducting cultural diplomacy, such as art exhibits and music performances; and administering international educational and professional exchange programs. (CRS Report 2009: 1)

Former U.S. Public Affairs Officer, Hans Tuch, provides a more appropriate definition of public diplomacy as "a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about an understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies." (Tuch 1990:3) This definition is in line with the State Department's view of its public diplomacy role. (Tiedeman 2004)

The State Department claims it uses public diplomacy and public affairs to: understand, inform, engage, and influence foreign audiences by reaching out beyond government-to-government relations to establish a foundation of trust upon which specific policy and societal issues can be addressed in a context of informed understanding and mutual respect." (Strategic Goal 2004:11)

Public diplomacy is the tool, which a government uses to communicate its policy and goals and try and garner foreign civilian trust and support. Therefore, public diplomacy to a large extent depends on the credibility of the government and its actions. Nye describes public diplomacy as a political expression of soft power. (Nye 2004: 18) Nye breaks down public

diplomacy into three dimensions. The first dimension is daily communication. At a basic level, this involves being present to offer a country's story to journalists, diplomats, and the media as a whole. This ability to offer "our side of the story" is essential. (Nye 2004: 107)

In addition, the messages conveyed must be seen as credible by the audience and must be consistent with the national position. Strategic communications is the second level of public diplomacy and in order to ensure consistency, all outlets must convey a single theme or strategic message. (Nye 2004: 108) Strategic messages are usually conveyed and reinforced through a series of events and messages and in this phase, it is crucial that the message is constant and consistent. (Nye 2004: 108) Finally, at the heart of public diplomacy lies the third dimension, the development of long-term relationships. These relationships are built over long periods of time through exchanges, training exercises, conferences, scholarships, and access to media channels. (Nye 2004: 109)

Keeping in mind Nye's definition of public diplomacy, public diplomacy must be a two-way communication, although the country conducting it will definitely keep its interests in priority. However, even then a country has to try and communicate with the foreign public and engage them in a dialogue and understand "their side of the story" than just telling them one's own side of the story. Public diplomacy is the face that the US government represents to the world and is essential to the development of sympathetic public ecologies that enable the uses of the US power abroad. (McEvoy-Levy 2001: 164) Thus it is not all about conveying messages to a foreign public but also listening to what the other people have to say. This becomes even more crucial in the case of the United States because most US policies and actions carry much weight with them internationally.

The main instruments a state uses to influence foreign public opinion in one foreign country or a host of foreign countries are generally speeches (Presidential speeches play a large role, sometimes they play a very instrumental role like president Obama's Cairo speech in 2009), official statements, interviews, strategic and symbolic appearances, document signings, foreign visits, and varied cultural, educational, and commercial initiatives and exchanges that involve and enhance people-to-people communication.

US public diplomacy is a complex phenomenon aimed at conveying the USA's commitments, goals and intentions to the world through a wide variety of means and



channels. It is a manifestation of the systemic transformation of international relations into a global political process, reflecting the reality that today's diplomacy goes far beyond accredited ambassadors and encompasses 'a wide range of actors from the private sector, civil society, the media, labor movements, and religious communities who influence decisions of global significance' (Khanna 2003: 102). Therefore, public diplomacy can meet a lot of goals, be it communicating directly with foreign publics, influencing a foreign government's decisions by influencing its citizens and creating a pressure on the foreign governments', indirectly through their citizens. It can also accomplish the task of creating a favorable image for one's own country, which makes it easier to achieve its political, economic and strategic interests.

Public diplomacy is a deliberate act designed to communicate with the public in foreign countries. It can and often does make use of soft power. But soft power exists whether anyone makes use of it or not, because American soft power derives from many different sources, not just American foreign policy. (Rugh 2009: 12) It is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism, and civil society in generating soft power. (Nye 2008: 94) The concept of public diplomacy is intricately linked to the idea of soft power. One cannot grasp the entire multitude of public diplomacy without throwing light on soft power and its relationship with public diplomacy.

## **Elucidating Soft Power**

Soft power, the term coined by Joseph Nye, has become a portent measure of a country's power and influence in the world today. Power is a chief component in the grand strategy theories, with more focus being centered on the hard dimensions of power. However, of late, soft power has become a very serious contender in the study of power dimensions in international relations. Soft power, today is considered an equally important measure of a country's power and influence in the world as much as its hard power, if not more. A country that can strike the right balance between its soft power and hard power resources, or what is called, "smart power", is often able to achieve most of its goals. Striving to attain

this balance between hard power and soft power remains a top priority for most of the countries in the world today.

Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through enticement and attraction rather than coercion or payment. (Nye 2008:94) Soft power of a country is mainly reliant on its culture, its domestic values and policies and lastly its foreign policy. (Nye 2004: 266) Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. (Nye 2004:17) The interlink-age between public diplomacy and soft power is extremely crucial and they are very closely intertwined with each other.

Soft power is in fact, one of the finest measurements of a country's influence and likability in the world. A country's soft power primarily rests on the attractiveness of its culture, political ideas and values and largely its policies both at home and abroad. (Nye 2004: 256) On the other hand, hard power of a country rests primarily on its military and economic might. However, a country's soft power does not rest primarily with the state actors as the non state actors also play an equally important role in harnessing a country's soft power, if not more, than the state actors. States can both acquire and apply soft power. (Kroeing et.al 2009: 8)

States acquire soft power resources when they nurture and harness cultures, values, and foreign policies that are appealing to an international audience. Both the state and non-state actors, therefore, determine a state's level of soft power resources. A state adopts foreign policies that may attract or repel foreign audiences, but non-state actors largely shape the international attractiveness of a state's culture and values. (Kroeing et.al 2009: 9)

Soft power is increasingly being considered a very strong element of a country's power, so much so, that some of the proponents of soft power like Joseph Nye have argued, that the era of "hard power" has ebbed away, when tangible and material military power (coercion) was the ultimate means with which governments pursued their self-interests and instead, a new era of "soft power" has arrived, in which intangible and normative power (attraction) has taken the center stage. (Nye 2004) In fact the era of "hard power" has been characterized as "power projection" and the era of soft power as "partnership". (Leonard and Alakeson 2000: 66) However, the critics of soft power have pointed out problems with

the concept. There are many lines of argument that question soft power, as even hard power when applied softly can produce the same results as soft power, for example, military help in humanitarian aid. (Mahapatra 2010) Another issue raised against soft power is that the media and the public, often the main targets of soft power, perceive power as hard power and do not necessarily see a contradiction between the two. (Gilboa 2008: 62).

Many scholars have raised the issue, that soft power of a country actually is directly correlated to its hard power capabilities. Additionally the perception of soft power can be very different from society to society, for example, American popular culture can be a huge source of the United States' soft power on one hand in most European countries, Australia, India, etc.; however, on the other hand it can be perceived very negatively in many Islamic countries and might be more detrimental than constructive to the American image there.

Thus a country cannot just rely on its soft power or hard power alone, in this information age. Thus a judicious mix of soft power and hard power is the need of the day, therefore, achieving a balance between hard power and soft power, or what Joseph Nye calls "smart power" is the need of the hour. Soft power and hard power have to be used in partnership and not as substitutes for each other.

"Smart power" can be defined as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing. (Wilson 2008) Achieving smart power requires artfully combining conceptual, institutional, and political elements into a reform movement capable of sustaining foreign policy innovations into the future. (Wilson 2008) Developing smart power has become a national security priority owing to structural changes in the international relations post 9/11. Therefore, public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of U.S. smart power and has to be used judiciously and effectively to achieve the desired results.

Before delving further into the changing structure of public diplomacy or what is known as "New public diplomacy", it is pertinent to shed some light on a brief history of public diplomacy in the United States.

## **Archiving Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy has become one of the most defining concepts of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but it is not really a novel concept or policy and has been used in varying degrees in the United States and other countries as early as World War I. However, if public diplomacy is taken to mean image promotion, propaganda, then it has been in use since the ancient times all over the world. (Melissen 2005: 1) References to image cultivation can be traced back to the ancient regimes of Rome and Greece, the Byzantines as well; however, with the invention of the printing press the scale of communication with foreign public altered even more and in fact under the French monarch Louis XIV, identity creation and image projection in other countries, or what is today called nation branding reached its peak. (Melissen 2005: 2)

Even though various European and Asian empires have used public diplomacy in some form or the other during the course of history; yet, public diplomacy in its modern day design was first used by America during World War I. The American government used some public diplomacy initiatives during World War I when President Woodrow Wilson created the committee on public information (also known as the Creel Committee) whose task was to make the US war aims known all over the world. Wilson was the first President to realize that it was important to consider public opinions in other countries because they could influence the policies of their governments. (Tiedeman 2004: 8)

World War II saw further strengthening of efforts being made to reach out to the foreign publics, especially in the light of countering the widespread fascist propagandas of Germany and Italy. The voice of America (VOA) was created in February 1942, as a US government channel to counter both fascist and communist propagandas and spread American values of freedom. American government at the same time also secretly funded Radio

Free Europe and Radio Liberation that were generally targeted at communist countries. (Tuch 1990: 15) World War II also saw the emergence of agencies such as the office of war information and office of strategic services and the advertising council (whose aim was to 'out Goebbel's Goebbels') to win over 'hearts and minds' both at home and abroad during World War II. (Van Ham 2003: 430)

In the post-World War II world, America took a keen interest in furthering its soft power and influence abroad. The first action in this regard was the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 (the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act), whose aim was to promote better understanding of the United States among the people of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations. (Tiedeman 2004:10) The next big step in promoting U.S. public diplomacy came with the creation of the USIA (The United States Information Agency) in 1953.

The aim of the USIA was “to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad.” (Bardos 2001: 429) However, the USIA did use some propaganda techniques as it’s main goal was countering the Soviet influence during the Cold War. Thus the USIA was more or less the incarnation of the U.S. government’s commitment to winning the ideological war. (Demian Smith 2009:27)

Public diplomacy initiatives expanded and became more substantial during the Kennedy years, as renowned journalist Edward R. Murrow was appointed as the director of the USIA. Many more programmes and activities were undertaken to promote public diplomacy initiatives of the U.S. in the world. The Fulbright program remained (as it does today) one of the most pivotal programs of American public diplomacy.

Under the Carter administration, the public diplomacy domain was broadened to make it more inclusive and efforts were made to not only disseminate information, but also on encouraging dialogue between America and the foreign publics. The spending on public diplomacy initiatives increased considerably under the Reagan administration, to counter the challenges posed by communist ideology.

The end of the Cold War and America’s ideological victory over Soviet Union put a dampener on the public diplomacy initiatives and spending. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the central impetus for U.S. Public Diplomacy as a national priority. (Demian Smith 2009: 29) Starting in the early 1990s, the United States dismantled its “arsenal” of influence in what Under Secretary Glassman called “unilateral disarmament in the weapons of advocacy.” (Moran 2009) The flagships of public diplomacy outreach, the

previously USIA-run American Centers, shut down around the world and both figuratively and literally ceded space to other first world nations' cultural outposts. (Demian Smith 2009:30)

Under the Clinton administration, public spending on public diplomacy was cut and exchange programs were scaled back. Between 1995 and 2001 alone, academic and cultural exchanges dropped from 45,000 to 29,000 a year. (Tiedeman 2004: 13) However, the biggest setback that came to public diplomacy was the disbandment of USIA in 1999. USIA's information and exchange programs were integrated into the State Department under the new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

The broadcasting arm of USIA fell under a new independent entity, the International Broadcasting Bureau. (Rosaleen Smith 2001: 425) Thus the events of 9/11 were a rude shock and awakening to the American nation and they were once again forced to analyze and retrospect their public diplomacy outreach and were compelled to reinvest, redesign and reinvigorate new public diplomacy techniques to meet the challenges presented by international terrorism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Events of September 11, 2001 were a wake-up call to the U.S. Government, which made them reassess the importance of public diplomacy and put a fresh impetus in conducting it to thwart the threats faced by them. This makes it vital for us, to throw some light on the importance of public diplomacy in dealing with challenges and threats faced by the American nation.

## **Salience of Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy is one of the most important tools in the arsenal of the United States' foreign policy to de-escalate anti-Americanism in the Islamic world and gain popular support for its policies in those countries. It is also vital to achieving American national security and foreign policy interests. It became even more crucial in the post 9/11 era, because of rising antipathy towards the US in the world. The realization that dawned upon many scholars and policy makers was that the War on Terror alone couldn't guarantee security for the United States. Winning the hearts and minds of the people in the Islamic

world, was equally important to safeguard America's interests in the world. Therefore, reinvigoration of public diplomacy became one of the most essential goals for the U.S. Government post 9/11.

Contesting the radical and extremist Islamic anti-American, anti-western ideologies became an essential goal for the United States, as a struggle against these extremist ideologies became crucial to the overall fight against terrorism. (CRS Report 2009: 9) U.S. Policy towards the Muslim world is based on the assumption that these negative ideas should be neutralized – and, in the end, changed – by a focused effort of public diplomacy. This approach has quickly become a central plank of the USA's approach to the war on terrorism, since Washington realizes that one cannot kill ideas with bombs, however precision-guided they may be. (Van Ham 2003: 428)

Public diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country's soft power and was essential in winning the Cold War. (Nye 2008:94) Thus in the contemporary globalized and inter-connected world, public diplomacy has become even more meaningful. America's soft power and its public diplomacy activities were very crucial in undermining the Soviet Union propaganda and containing its influence in the world during the Cold War period.

Conversely, the emergence of new players in international affairs and their substantial influence and considerable interdependence among all the actors required a revision of the Cold War model. (Gilboa 2008: 59) Thus America has to apply its new public diplomacy techniques even more fruitfully in the present day context to contain anti-Americanism and reshape a positive image for itself in the world, especially in Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq, as all these three countries are very important players in the Islamic world.

Not only this public diplomacy is an important tool of Washington's soft power and an effective public diplomacy campaign assures a favorable public opinion and lessens the resistance against policies and interests that suit America. Public diplomacy can be used to increase appreciation for one's country, engage people and influencing people's behavior eventually. (Leonard 2002) Public diplomacy is also a tool that can be used precisely to extricate advantages from the ample soft power of the United States. Public diplomacy is not only the core of soft power but it is also an invaluable national asset. (Demian Smith 2009:10) Therefore, public diplomacy is one of the most important tools in the arsenal of

U.S. foreign policy that can be used effectively to contain anti-Americanism on one hand and on the other enhance a positive image for the United States in the Islamic world, that dampens resistance to US policies in the region and help the U.S. achieve its interests.

The problem of anti-Americanism is not entirely new, but the scale of this problem increased drastically post 9/11, so much so that the United States had to take note of it and act immediately to curb this rising anti-Americanism in the world, especially in the Islamic countries. This makes it essential, to focus some attention on the meaning of anti-Americanism in the next section of this chapter.

### **Deducing Anti-Americanism**

9/11 acted as the rude wake up call for the United States' leadership and urged them to take note, of the escalating anti-Americanism in the Islamic world, and develop strategies to counter it. This sliding unpopularity of the United States was confirmed by a number of polls by polling agencies like Zogby, Pew, Gallup, etc. Checking the increasing anti-Americanism is a priority for the United States' national interest, security and stability in the world. Before we delve into the myriad reasons postulated for the rise of anti-Americanism in the post 9/11 period, it is pertinent to throw a brief light on the meaning of anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism, despite the prevalent opinion is not a cohesive and homogeneous phenomenon spread across the world. It is in fact; a multi-faceted phenomenon that takes a different shape and understanding in different contexts. However, in the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, anti-Americanism has emerged as a powerful cultural force that defines the current international context. (Chiozza 2004:5) Anti-Americanism in the simplest way can be explained as opposition, hostility, or resentment to the culture, values and foreign policies of the United States of America. Even though there are multiple kinds of anti-Americanism, they can be largely summed up into two categories, virulent anti-Americanism and benign anti-Americanism.

Virulent anti-Americanism goes beyond just aversion to the United States, it is the belief that Americanism (media, values, popular culture, world power dominance) destroys culture



and existing traditional way of life and therefore America must be attacked or destabilized as a power and culture. (Chianese 2002: 5) Examples of this type of virulent anti-Americanism were clearly illustrated by the bombing of USS Cole and US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.

However, this kind of anti-Americanism reached its peak, in the 9/11 attack on the United States and constant threats of international terrorism ever since. Benign anti-Americanism on the other hand does not rely on violence and does not really put American security in danger. Yet, somehow even benign anti-Americanism is threatening to U.S. stability and security in the world, because it creates an environment where violent anti-Americanism might breed and even benign anti-Americanism postulates challenges to U.S. interests and goals, especially in the Islamic world.

There are multitudes of sources of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world, however most of them arise because of dislike of US culture, values and most importantly because of US foreign policies in the region.

One of the reasons for the rise of anti-Americanism is the distrust of the US policymakers, who are suspected of ulterior motives and double standards by the Arab world. (Kraidy 2008) Thus the problem becomes one of policy rather than of communication. Many in the Islamic world view U.S. foreign policy in the region as being biased, inconsistent and duplicitous.

Policies such as U.S. unilateralism, vehemently expressed in the Iraq war of 2003, U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine, its silent support of authoritarian regimes (despite the U.S. claiming to be a champion of democracy), especially in the light of the Arab spring; all help harbor and deepen the anti-American sentiment. The perceived incongruence between the United States' ideals and its policies can be seen in U.S.'s empty rhetoric of democracy promotion and safeguarding human rights in the world, especially in the context of Guantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib incidents.

Not only is the US policy in the Islamic world responsible for creating anti-Americanism, but some of U.S. global actions and activities also create ill feelings for the U.S. on a larger scale. US actions like rejection of Kyoto protocol, stalling climate change talks repeatedly,

disrespecting sovereignty of countries like Pakistan, all make the US seem like a hegemonic bully.

Another reason for disaffection against America is the U.S. rhetoric. Usage of terms like “Axis of Evil” and “Us vs. Them” and “ You Are Either With Us or Against Us”, “War of Ideas”, “Crusade”, breeds an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility, as these words play into the notion of clash of civilizations theory, thus assuming there is an inherent dichotomy between the US and the Islamic world.

Nonetheless there are other reasons for anti-Americanism as well, which aren’t only rooted in American policies, but also in American culture, values and its style of communication. Anti-Americanism increased after 9/11 because of a failure of strategic communication, in communicating the right message by the right methods to the target audience.

Conversely, anti-Americanism to some extent can also be attributed to the US culture and values, which are viewed by many especially in the more traditional Islamic world as being offensive and horrifying. American movies, television, media and fast food on one hand give Washington an edge in the realm of soft power, but on the other hand they are also detrimental to U.S. image in a lot of countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, etc.

Growth of regional media has added to the mix of problems for the United States, because regional media like Al-Jazeera have vehemently challenged the hegemonic discourse of American soft power. (Samei 2010: 171) Regional media can sometimes strengthen the common anti-American sentiment present in the Islamic world and then the US actions, like attempting to curtail the freedom of expression of the local media there, in fact puts it in a worse light. The communications revolution has thus shifted the paradigm of diplomacy. On one hand, it emphasized the role of public diplomacy; on the other hand, it complicated the environment within which public diplomacy is conducted. (Samei 2010: 173)

There can be some reasons of anti-Americanism that are common to most Islamic countries, but there are crucially specific reasons which breed anti-Americanism in particular countries that are under study in this dissertation. Thus the reasons for anti-Americanism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iraq will be analyzed separately in chapters dedicated to them respectively.

After having thrown light on the concept of soft power and its relationship to public diplomacy, and history and salience of public diplomacy and a brief understanding of anti-Americanism and its reasons, it is pertinent to look at the changing nature and structure of public diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## **Illuminating New Public Diplomacy**

The new challenges that were thrown up in America's face in the light of the 21<sup>st</sup> century necessitated the need for developing new techniques and methods to resolve them. Thus the threats perceived from international terrorism, mounting anti-Americanism and the information revolution, all pried the US to reanalyze and reevaluate its policies and actions, especially redesign public diplomacy to re-correct its image in the world in general and the Islamic world, in particular.

In this regard, it is crucial to deliberate upon the changing face of public diplomacy, or what has also been called, "New public diplomacy". However, it is important to keep in mind that its not a homogeneous, co-terminus term; it is rather a loose term that distinguishes it from the old style of public diplomacy, that was more propaganda-akin, which was followed during the Cold War years.

In the changing face of the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with the upsurge of globalization and information warfare, emergence of powerful non-state actors and a vibrant civil society and greater global politico-economic integration; American public diplomacy had to be redesigned to meet the new goals because the old more traditional, hierarchical concept of strategic public diplomacy had become somewhat redundant. (Hocking 2005: 28)

One of the most significant characteristics of new public diplomacy is to clearly draw a distinction, between propaganda and public diplomacy. The distinction between propaganda and public diplomacy lies in the pattern of communication. (Melissen 2006) Public diplomacy is only similar to propaganda in the way that it also tries to persuade the foreign public what to think, but it is by no means a one way street, which only involves talking and

no listening. Thus new public diplomacy is persuasion by means of dialogue that is based on a liberal notion of communication with foreign publics. (Gonesh and Melissen 2005)

New public diplomacy also makes a distinction between public diplomacy and public relations and branding. Even though they share some similarities like image and symbols management, relationship building, and extensive use of the mass media; they are indeed very different. (Gilboa 2008: 68) Public diplomacy is a more complex phenomenon that has to deal with multi-dimensional problems, and unlike PR and branding, public diplomacy is not about marketing one's values, and actions, or selling 'Brand America' through simple advertising.

Public diplomacy has to provide answers to many foreign policy questions and must provide appropriate context to foreign policy decisions, and cope with social and political impetus not easily understood abroad. (Gilboa 2008: 69) In short, public diplomacy cannot be reduced to slogans and images unlike branding, thus the approach of private advertising and building PR image cannot be directly applied to public diplomacy as well.

New public diplomacy lays emphasis on adopting a more erudite grass root people to people communication, a more two-way engagement to develop a long-term understanding of policies, culture and values in the United States. (Payne 2009) A key element of public diplomacy is that it entails the building of personal and institutional relationships and dialogue with foreign audiences by focusing on values, which sets the activity apart from classical diplomacy, which primary deals with issues. (Riordan 2002) New public diplomacy has to be differentiated from the old, as new public diplomacy is more oriented towards public-to-public interaction, rather than a government-to- public interaction. (Snow 2009:6)

Public diplomacy is a complex phenomenon and it's a long-term investment; new public diplomacy also makes a note of not applying a one-size-fits-all approach to public diplomacy, as it understands the need of specialized application of public diplomacy programmes to different countries and regions. New public diplomacy makes use of all "three layers" of communication, monologue, dialogue and collaboration, as they are all essential as each "layer" of public diplomacy is heavily contingent on the needs of the moment, the characteristics of the communicator and the target audience, and the conditions

of their interaction. (Arsenault 2008: 11) Thus at different times, different aspects and different styles and their mix are used in this new public diplomacy.

Thus new public diplomacy differs from the Cold War public diplomacy in significant ways, as new public diplomacy is more inclusive and broad-based as it even includes variants of both cultural and media diplomacy, to make it more engaging and participatory. However, the basic goal of new public diplomacy remains the same, it is about communicating and explaining America's culture, values and foreign policy decisions to the foreign public, to persuade them to support American policies and abate the tide of rising anti-Americanism in the world. Thus new public diplomacy at best represents an attempt to adjust public diplomacy to the conditions of the information age. (Vickers 2004: 151)

New public diplomacy is more dynamic, flexible and capable of adapting to changing circumstances. It is more interactive, accommodative and participatory. It is essential for American foreign policy today, to effectively gain support of foreign public opinion and tone down anti-Americanism, especially in the Islamic world.

Public diplomacy can play a very vital role in minimizing anti-Americanism in the world, if effectively planned and implemented. Public diplomacy is vital to achieving American national security and foreign policy interests. Public diplomacy is the core of soft power and a very valuable national asset. However, one has to keep in mind that public diplomacy is not an answer to all of America's problems and the results of public diplomacy are not immediate but rather long-term. Public diplomacy is built on trust and credibility and its success can be gauged only in a long-term horizon.

Public diplomacy cannot be treated separately and must be integrated into the larger policymaking process from the beginning to produce more successful results. Public diplomacy can help America tilt foreign public opinion to some extent in its favor, reduce anti-Americanism, and help achieve its economic, security and geo-strategic interests and even if it cannot eradicate all hostilities, it can at least offset some.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### Afghan War: Engaging the Public in Pakistan Post- 9/11

*“For more than five decades, Pakistan has loomed large in one form or another, as either a staunch ally, a troublesome friend, or even a threat. Now, for the first time, it is all of these things”- USIP Report 2005*

#### **Introduction**

Few countries in the world have had a more tumultuous relationship than the U.S. and Pakistan. Even though Pakistan and the U.S. have been allies for the last 60 years, their relationship has been riddled with myriad fluctuations ranging from intense engagement to patent estrangement. Although it's a relationship based on mutual need, it's been mired with fairly high levels of mutual suspicion. The U.S. continues to need Pakistan to serve as a “frontline state” in its “Global War on Terror” in Afghanistan ever since 9/11.

The success of U.S.-Pak relationship is vital to dismantle and destroy the terrorist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to secure stability and security of not only the United States, but the rest of the world as well. Therefore, Pakistan continues to remain at the center of the American administration's foreign policy agenda. Islamabad remains a pivotal player in Afghanistan, as most of the US foreign policy decisions in Afghanistan are dependent on the Pakistani support. A whole-hearted Pakistani support is invariably linked to cooperation from the Pakistani public as well.

The United States' Global War on Terror in Afghanistan from December 2001 made Pakistan an indispensable ally for the US. Since then the US and Pakistan have worked closely together trying to weaken and demolish the terrorist strongholds in Afghanistan and

Pakistan as well. Pakistan, despite its promise of full-fledged support to the US in its war on terror, has shied away from a full-scale commitment to defeat and destroy terrorist strongholds in its own land. The situation has worsened over the years, with the US conducting drone attacks within the territory of Pakistan to defeat the terrorist networks, but this led many in Pakistan to complain about America's interference in internal affairs of Pakistan.

The sixth most populous country in the world is suffering its greatest internal crises since partition, with security, economic, and political interests in the balance. With such turmoil, we find U.S. interests in Pakistan are more threatened now than at any time since the Taliban was driven from Afghanistan in 2001. (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 9) The relations between the US and Pakistan hit a further roadblock with the NAVY SEALS raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad in May 2011.

The unilateral Abbotabad strike by America, without taking Pakistani Government and Intelligence into confidence, embarrassed the Pakistani leadership to no end. It raised questions not only on Pakistan's sovereignty, but also on its credibility, capability and intentions worldwide. Pakistan and the US share an increasingly uneasy relationship and at best are reluctant allies. Despite the growing frustration and apathy of the US government towards Pakistan, the US cannot choose to ignore a country as crucial as Pakistan, to continue its assault on global terrorism.

Pakistan, despite its myriad problems remains an important and extremely crucial ally for the US to finally destroy the terrorist networks and secure not only itself but also the world at large. Islamabad is a key player in Afghanistan and its decisions will have much to do with whether and how U.S. forces can leave that country. Al Qaeda and linked militant groups have used Pakistan as a sanctuary and recruiting ground, with the Afghanistan—Pakistan border areas becoming, in President Obama's words, "the most dangerous place in the world." (Staniland 2011: 133)

However, the problem that the US faces in Pakistan is one of an extreme anti-American feeling that ranges from the Pakistan government, military, to the common people of Pakistan. For that matter, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that Pakistan is the most anti-American country in the world right now, despite having been an ally of

Washington, for more than sixty years. This all-invasive anti-Americanism in Pakistan poses serious threats to the US in being able to achieve its goals successfully in the region. Thus countering and challenging anti-Americanism in Pakistan and trying its level best to swing Pakistani public opinion in favor of American policy and actions in Pakistan remains a critically vital task for the US. Thus American public diplomacy in Pakistan is crucial for the US to win its Afghan war on global terror.

It is pertinent to shed some light on a brief history of US-Pakistan relations that will help us gain a better insight into the present US-Pakistan relationship; as the history of Pakistan's relationship with the United States has an uncharacteristic bearing on its present relationship and engagement with the United States.

### **Background of the US-Pakistan Relationship**

The US and Pakistan have had a historically tempestuous relationship, vacillating between collaboration and discord. The US engagement with Pakistan has been ridden with a lack of consistency and has often bordered on being frivolous. This inconsistency in the US-Pakistan relationship can be explained by the divergence in interests of the US and Pakistan in seeking a relationship with each other.

The US sought a relationship with Pakistan during the Cold War to maintain somewhat of a power balance in South Asia and check the expansion of communist influence in Asia. On the other hand, Pakistan allied with the US to check the non-aligned India and secure its economic concerns as well. The indispensability of Pakistan for the U.S. has been directly proportional to the latter's security calculations and threat prognosis.

Each country has tried to influence the other with its own peculiar needs. Pakistan once viewed, as the most allied ally when suited to US interests in 1950s, became the most sanctioned ally of the United States in 1990s. (Baloch 2006: 29) The US-Pakistan relationship has been characterized by phases of cooperation and discord. The Pakistan-US relations can be divided into three phases namely, the Cold War years, the 1990s when US imposed a multitude of sanctions on Pakistan and lastly the post 9/11 era, in which Pakistan became an indispensable ally for the US in its Global War on Terror.



The Cold War witnessed the blossoming of the US's ties with Pakistan to check the communist expansion in South Asia and West Asia, following India's choice of non-alignment and its tilt towards the Soviet Union. The first major US-Pakistan engagement was the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954, which had started a defense relationship between the two. Moreover Pakistan joined SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) in 1954 and CENTO (Central Treaty organization) in 1958 to further strengthen Pak-US relations.

The 1960s witnessed a schism between the US and Pakistan, starting with the American military assistance to India in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. At the same time, Pakistan was increasingly getting closer to China, which would soon become its all-weather friend. Pakistan felt betrayed by US's support to India in the 1962 war with China and also with the fact that the US maintained a neutral position during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Pakistan felt betrayed by the US as a member of the SEATO and CENTO, further straining the US-Pak relations. (Aziz 2011)

The United States once again refused military assistance to Pakistan in the Indo-Pak war of 1971, though it made some sort of empty threats to India, which were soon countered by the Soviet Union coming to India's aid. The 1971 war was a devastating blow to Pakistan, as it led to its dismemberment and creation of Bangladesh. This sowed the seed of suspicion in Pakistani minds with regard to Washington being an unreliable ally. The relations between Pakistan and the US were further exacerbated in the 1970s, except for a brief period in 1970-71 when Pakistan aided back channel diplomacy between the United States and China.

This entente was however, short-lived and didn't stop Pakistan from withdrawing from the SEATO in 1972 and CENTO in 1979. The relationship hit a low point again in 1977 when mobs burned the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and several information centers while the Pakistani government stood by. The relationship remained strained through the end of the decade when the Carter administration introduced sanctions and terminated U.S. economic and military aid in 1979 following Pakistan's development of its nuclear program. (Cohen 2003: 131)

Despite this extreme low, the relationship quickly rebounded in the early 1980s following

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the second US-Pakistan alliance took shape. (Collins 2008: 3) The period from 1980 to 1988 ushered in the most intense period of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation and Pakistan again became a frontline ally to check Soviet expansionism. Pakistan became a recipient of aid package amounting \$1.625 billion in economic assistance and \$1.5 billion in military assistance spread over six years, and exempted from Symington and Glenn Amendments. (Azmi 1994: 29)

The Soviet Union's Afghanistan sojourn propelled Pakistan to the forefront of the U.S.'s containment agenda, and there amidst the Soviet Union's hopeless attempt at expanding its influence was born with the U.S.-Pakistan-Saudi assistance the jihadist phenomena.<sup>1</sup> The decade long 'jihad' against the Godless Communists in the eighties was important for another near irreversible development that of the Pakistani-Islamic bomb and the U.S.'s blind eye towards it. Both the creation of the Jihadists and the Pakistani bomb were to have disastrous consequences for the Americans and for a better part of the world. (Ritambhara and Hazarika 2011)

With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War, the American interests in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region waned, and so did the US-Pak relations. US once again placed sanctions on Pakistan in 1990, with George Bush Sr. failing to give a clean chit to Islamabad in its nuclear programs, thus leading to the imposition of the Pressler Amendment.<sup>2</sup>

This led to the stopping of most of US military and economic aid and also suspended deliveries of major military equipment like F-16s, which had been pre-ordered and pre-paid by Pakistan in 1989. U.S. sanctions contributed to the widespread feeling among Pakistanis that the United States had once again used their country and discarded it when it was no longer needed. (Baloch 2008: 39)

Not only this, the US placed more sanctions on Pakistan under the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) for allegedly receiving missile technology from China. Further

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<sup>1</sup> . The researcher co-authored an article titled, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations hit a new low after Osama killing", published in the foreign Policy Journal on 14<sup>th</sup> September 2011.

<sup>2</sup> . Pressler Amendment was a legislation enacted in 1985 that required the US President to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons; without certification, Pakistan would lose most of its military and economic assistance from the United States.

sanctions like Symington<sup>3</sup> and Glenn<sup>4</sup> Amendments were imposed on Pakistan following its 1998 nuclear test. In fact in October 1999 when president Musharraf staged a coup and came to power in Pakistan, more “Democratic Sanctions” were enacted on Pakistan. (Aziz 2011) Unfortunately, these sanctions were too weak to be effective at influencing Pakistan’s actions, but strong enough to be seen as an affront. (Aziz 2011)

At the same time, the U.S. offered Pakistan no incentive to change. Without U.S. economic aid, Pakistan’s institutions deteriorated, it accumulated huge debt and the cultivation of radical Islamic groups continued. (Cohen 2003: 132) Another downturn in the relations was Clinton’s five-day visit to India and five-hour one to Pakistan in 2000, which took the already plummeting ties to their nadir, especially as any overture to Pakistan’s enemy number one was treated with the harshest scrutiny and deemed possibly as betrayal by Islamabad.

## **Redefining US-Pak Relations after 9/11**

The US-Pakistani relationship on the eve of 9/11 was considerably at its lowest ebb. However, things took an about turn after the abhorrent attack of 9/11 on American soil. The US once again turned to Pakistan, because of its geo-political location, as frontline state in its Global War on Terror in Afghanistan. As the U.S. went into its longest war, Pakistan revised its role as the frontline and indispensable albeit temporary ally of the U.S., this time in the “War on Terrorism”. It served as the conduit for supplies and safe passage of the U.S. and later NATO troops to Afghanistan, and allowed a U.S. presence on its Durand Line and its sovereign space, thereby accepting that parts of its territory were beyond effective control of Islamabad.

Understanding the importance of Pakistan after 9/11, the Bush Administration moved quickly to rebuild a partnership with Islamabad that had atrophied in the 1990s. Washington lifted nuclear and democracy-related sanctions. It forgave more than \$1 billion of Pakistani debt. It resurrected bilateral military and intelligence cooperation and resumed weapons

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<sup>3</sup>. Symington Amendment was a legislation enacted in 1976 that banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that deliver or receive, acquire or transfer nuclear enrichment technology when they do not comply with IAEA regulations and inspections.

<sup>4</sup>. Glenn Amendment was a legislation enacted in 1977 that banned U.S. economic, and military assistance, and export credits to countries that acquire or transfer nuclear reprocessing technology or explode or transfer a nuclear device.

sales. It gave Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf an international stature and legitimacy that had previously eluded him. (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 6)

The United States and Pakistan went from being security partners in 2004 to “Strategic Partners” by 2006. (CRS Report 2012) Pakistan’s commitment to the war on terrorism was never openly questioned by the U.S. as over 20 billion dollars of aid poured into Pakistan in the next decade, although doubts of its competence arose time and again with little tangible contribution from Pakistan in dismantling, disrupting and destroying terrorism. (CRS Report 2011) Frustration over Pakistan’s inability to deliver on the anti-terrorism front led the U.S. to attach conditions to the aid that it doled out to Pakistan.

Growing U.S.-India ties possibly rankled Pakistan. India’s economic appeal, the possibility of it being propped up as a counter to an assertive China and its democratic success made it a ‘natural ally’ of the U.S. As India continued to grow economically, the U.S.’s calculations probably showed rationality in forging closer and deeper ties with India, with whom historically the ties have been remote and for periods even bordered on antagonism and open confrontations. (Ritambhara and Hazarika 2011) Islamabad viewed this development of the Indo-US ties with not only suspicion, but with disdain as well. The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal concluded in 2008 doubtless sealed the relationship between the U.S. and India while Pakistan was left in the cold by its former ally.

The relations were perturbed under President Obama, ever since the Kerry-Lugar bill was passed in 2009, which put riders on the U.S. aid to Pakistan. The relations were further incensed with Obama’s insistence on nuclear non-proliferation and the pressures put on illegitimate nuclear powers like Pakistan to come into the folds of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Then again, President Obama’s visit to India and growing relations between them (November 2010) and his criticism of Pakistan in the Indian Parliament further exasperated the situation of unease and discomfort.

2011 saw the worst of this relationship, beginning with the storm over Raymond Davis, the CIA agent who was arrested (and later released on U.S. insistence and compensation) for killing two Pakistani citizens in late January. In May, U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in a raid in Abbotabad, which was barely a few kilometers away from Pakistan’s military academy. The raid, carried out without Pakistan’s knowledge, severely mortified its military and intelligence agencies. The Pakistani government retaliated by expelling 100 U.S.

military trainers, it terminated counterinsurgency operations and restricted intelligence sharing with the U.S. and also insisted on an end to the drone attacks. On the other hand, many debates ensued in the U.S. congress to cut aid to Pakistan for following ‘two-faced policies’ towards terrorist outfits.

The detention of Dr. Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai, an American citizen of Kashmiri origin, in July 2011 (with established links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI) only added to the piling problems between the two countries. Pakistan also demanded that the US sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan specifying and defining US rules of engagement inside Pakistan, which the US refused to sign a binding document.

Towards the end of 2011, US-Pak relationship witnessed another spell of discord over the NATO air strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on 26<sup>th</sup> November 2011. As a result of the attack, Pakistani government ordered US army to evacuate Salala air base, which was being used to launch offensive on Taliban and militants. Moreover, the government also halted NATO supplies for United States, which have only been recently opened after more than six months of negotiations between the US and Pakistan.

The relations between Washington and Islamabad have been on a downward slope ever since 9/11 and have reached a pinnacle in the last two years. In fact, the developments that have taken place in the last one-year have fueled bilateral distrust and acrimony unseen in the post-2001 period. (CRS Report 2011)

### **Persistent Anti-Americanism**

A major complication in the US’s relationship with Pakistan has been the pervasive anti-Americanism spread across Pakistan. An anti-America stance has become a part of the Pakistani self-definition; used as a cohesive agent by ruling parties in the past, the stance has now become a segregationist tool for opposition parties and the media. (Khan 2010: 24)

For a population almost continuously disenchanted with its government, anti- Americanism is further ingrained in the mind-set of the average Pakistani. (Khan 2010:24) Despite being entrenched in the larger framework of anti-Americanism, which is spread throughout the Islamic world, anti-American feelings in Pakistan have a dynamic of their own. Estrangement in Pakistan is not a relatively harmless synonym for indifference but has

translated into hostility that makes government support for American policies in the region a subject of derision, instability and divisiveness – even when such policies are in the interest of Pakistan itself. (Khan 2010: 25)

The threat posed by anti-Americanism in Pakistan is very real and a big detriment to the US-Pakistan relationship in the present scenario. Aversion to the United States, in Pakistan has become stronger and more viral over the years since 9/11, both as a cause and consequence of the worsening Pakistan-US relationship. However, anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan and was present in Pakistan at many historical junctures, although its magnitude was nowhere as heightened as it stands today. It only came visible in the decade of the 1970s, after US's refusal to come to the aid of Pakistan in its two wars with India in 1965 and 1971.

America's reluctance to stand by Pakistan in its times of crisis, made many in Pakistan apprehensive of America's alliance. The first great act of anti-Americanism was witnessed in 1979, when acting upon a baseless rumor generated by ambiguous news broadcast relating to the capture of the Ka'aba by unknown persons, the American embassy was attacked and burned to the ground. (Naghmi 1982: 508) In Lahore another mob attacked the U.S. Information Center and set it on fire and in other big cities also, all U.S. buildings were similarly attacked by angry mobs and burned and looted. (Naghmi 1982: 508)

The relations between Islamabad and Washington improved drastically with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan became a frontline state in America's proxy war in Afghanistan. However, as soon as the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the US once again ignored Pakistan and this reinforced anti-American feelings in Pakistan, which gained strength over the years and were brought to the mainstream light after Pakistan's involvement in the US's Global War on Terror. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan kept gaining currency and it became colossal after the extensive American drone attacks in Pakistan's hinterlands.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is a multifaceted phenomenon, which has quite wide-ranging explanations. It is framed by four concentric circles: general reaction to U.S. might and power, America's current international conduct, relations between Islam and the West, and the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations. (Hussein 2005:9) The US being the most powerful nation on earth invariably invites envy and resentment from around the world, as any nation

in its position would. However, this sort of resentment that arises from the US being the most powerful country in the world also provokes equal admiration around the world and does not account greatly to anti-Americanism in the world. On the other hand, America's international conduct, its legitimacy and self-centeredness have been under challenge, especially after September 11. (Hussein 2005:9)

US rhetoric and usage of terms like "Axis of Evil" and "Us vs. Them" and " You Are Either With Us or Against Us", "War of Ideas", procreated an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility, as these words played into the notion of Clash of Civilizations theory, based on the assumption that there is an inherent dichotomy between the US and the Islamic world, which further cemented anti-American feelings. Conversely, anti-Americanism to some extent can also be attributed to American culture and values, which are viewed by many especially in the more traditional Islamic world as being offensive and horrifying. American movies, television, media and fast food on one hand give America an edge in the realm of soft power, but on the other hand they are also detrimental to U.S. image in Islamic countries like Pakistan.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan shared many reasons for holding a resentment against the US with many other Islamic countries; but most of the rationale behind it in Pakistan is unique to the country with a breathing dynamic of its own. Largely, U.S.–Pakistan cooperation is impeded by suspicions about U.S. designs for the region, its reliability as a long-term ally, and the widely held view that Washington manipulates Pakistan's leaders and policies. (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 9-10) Frequent American incursions and military (especially Drone) attacks in Pakistan have worsened the situation. The NAVY SEALS raid in May 2011 in Abbotabad to capture Osama Bin Laden further increased anti-American feeling as it largely obliterated Pakistan's sovereignty as a nation.

Highlighting anti-Americanism in Pakistan are many surveys conducted by polling agencies like Gallup, Zogby, etc. However, in the case of this study, most reliance has been placed on the Pew's Global Attitudes Project that began in 2002 and recorded America's favorability and unfavorability ratings across the world, with a special focus on the Muslim-majority countries.<sup>5</sup> Anti-Americanism has been persistent in Pakistan, ever since Soviet Union's

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<sup>5</sup> . Pew's Global Attitudes Project has been conducting surveys in the Islamic countries, almost every year and in Pakistan from 2001 to 2011.

withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1991, which in return led America to once again ignore Pakistan and impose heavy sanctions on its erstwhile ally. 9/11 forced America to enter into a re-engagement with Pakistan, owing to its geopolitical location because of its war on terror in Afghanistan.

The Pew survey conducted in 2002 in Pakistan recorded the lowest favorability rating for the US in Pakistan, at a meager 10% in the entire decade. 2003 didn't fare any better and US's favorability ratings remained low at 13%, as this was also the period of the US invasion of Iraq. 2005 and 2006 witnessed a more positive image of the US in Pakistan, probably owing to the US's generous aid in the aftermath of the Kashmir (Azad Kashmir-Pakistan administered) earthquake of 2005. (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2010)

2007 and 2008 once again witnessed a drop of favorable ratings for the US in Pakistan; however a very slight improvement was registered in the US image in Pakistan in 2009, with President Obama coming to power. Obama's presidency couldn't maintain this positive image and once again the negative ratings for the US in Pakistan increased in 2010.

The relations between the US and Pakistan has worsened ever since, as the number of drone attacks have increased more than ever and the US disregarding Pakistan's sovereignty, conducted a military raid to capture and kill Osama Bin Laden, barely few miles away from Islamabad. All these reasons were probably reflected in Pew's 2011 Survey in Pakistan, which reached one of the lowest levels ever at 12%. (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011)

The 2011 pew survey also brought to light President Obama's unpopularity in Pakistan, which was as low as the former President George W. Bush's in 2008. Most Pakistanis see the U.S. as an enemy, consider it a potential military threat, and oppose American-led anti-terrorism efforts. In terms of world affairs, most Pakistanis continue to see the U.S. acting unilaterally. Only one-in-five says the U.S takes into account the interests of countries like Pakistan when making foreign policy decisions. (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011)

Among the Pakistani public, roughly six-in-ten oppose U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism, while nearly seven-in-ten think the U.S. and NATO should remove their troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011) Overall, Pakistani views of the US and President Obama in 2011 was one of the most negative ones in the Muslim-majority countries in the world.



Anti-Americanism in Pakistan ranges from America's military policy in Pakistan, to the nature of economic assistance, to the US policy in the Pakistan and the Islamic world at large and finally in the historical context of the US-Pakistan relationship. Despite the billions of dollars spent, the United States has not made the necessary commitment to solidify the relationship for the long term.

This is not merely a function of the scale of assistance, but of its type, as the U.S. engagement with Pakistan is highly militarized and centralized, with very little reaching the vast majority of Pakistanis. (Cohen and Chollet 2007:9) Pakistanis also view the increasingly frequent U.S. unilateral attacks into the tribal areas—both missile strikes and, more recently, raids by U.S. forces—as direct threats to the country's sovereignty. (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 9)

The vast majority of U.S. assistance to Pakistan since 2001 has focused on enhancing Pakistani conventional military capabilities, reimbursing the government for military operations in the tribal border areas through the Coalition Support Funds mechanism, reducing Pakistan's debt burden, and stabilizing its macroeconomic indicators. (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 27)

The US Assistance with a focus on military aid and assistance have not been beneficial for the US in Pakistan and have played into the widely held belief in Pakistan that the U.S. is interested only in the war on terrorism and not in the Pakistani people, which further alienates the Pakistani public from supporting the US policy in the region.

Further, aggravating the rift between Pakistan and the US are the growing number of drone attacks, carried out by the United States inside Pakistani territory. In fact, the drone attacks drastically increased under the Obama administration, compared to the previous Bush administration. The effect of this public criticism of drone attacks by the Pakistani Government further strengthened public antipathy against the United States in Pakistan's hinterland, even while the U.S. was attempting to rebuild its relationship with the Pakistani people. (Nawaz 2010:13)

Many Pakistanis consider the military campaign in the tribal areas to be not only ill conceived but also unjust. They point out that the tribesmen were once asked by the United

States to liberate Afghanistan from foreign (Soviet) occupation. Now, because they are undertaking a similar effort to expel foreign (NATO) troops, they are considered terrorists. (Bennett-Jones 2008: 4) Drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas have in fact had a very negative impact on the US image in Pakistan as one bomb dropped from a drone in the tribal areas can undermine millions of dollars worth of pro-American attitudes purchased by civilian aid programs. (Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project 2007: 44)

Within this larger framework, the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations has generated its own anti-Americanism, which has been triggered by a perception that the United States has not been a reliable ally and has not helped Pakistan much in its conflict with India. (Hussein 2005:10) In the Pakistani political narrative, history matters. Both its people and its government have long memories of their roller coaster relationship with the United States. (Nawaz 2010: 14) In their narrative, the United States engages with Pakistan when it suits its global or regional interests and then departs. (Nawaz 2010:14)

Beginning with the first engagement in the 1950s against international communism, the US and Pakistan forged an alliance, which resulted in Pakistan joining SEATO and CENTO. However, this alliance waned in the 1960s and 1970s, when the US refused to come forward and support its ally (in fact the US stopped all military assistance to Pakistan as well) in its wars against India. A long period of cool relations ensued till the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, where Pakistan became a frontline state in America's proxy war in Afghanistan. Aid started flowing again, even as the United States turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.

As soon as the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, America once again turned its attention away from Pakistan and imposed many severe sanctions on it. This once again propelled the sentiment in Pakistan that America was an unreliable ally and only used Pakistan for its own interests and as soon as was done, it's discarded the Pakistanis aside.

The terrorist attacks on the United States of America in September 2001 revived the US-Pakistan alliance, with the U.S. needing Pakistan because of its geo-strategic location and support to invade Afghanistan and uproot the Taliban government in an attempt to get to the Al Qaeda leadership that had found refuge in that country. (CRS Report 2003) Suddenly aid began flowing to Pakistan again, and more than 20 billion dollars have already been inflexed

into Pakistan by 2011.

Once again the US became critical of Pakistan in not being fully committed to the cause of eradicating terrorism from Afghanistan and Pakistan and in fact even attempted to put riders on the aid that Pakistan was getting, like the Kerry-Lugar Assistance Act. Throughout, the U.S. view of the relationship was that Pakistan was a deceptive ally. But so long as there were no viable alternatives to supplying the war in Afghanistan, it was a necessary ally. (Nawaz 2010: 14) The Pakistani public was once again made to realize the duplicitousness of the US policy in the region, and there continues to be a widespread fear in Pakistan keeping the history in mind, that the US will soon withdraw from Afghanistan, leaving the dangerous mess for Pakistan, which will put Pakistan in a very vulnerable state.

The constructivist assertion that “history matters” is manifest in Pakistani grievances against the U.S. – the Pakistani perception that the U.S. has time and gain betrayed them by abandoning them from the first India-Pakistan war and every subsequent military crisis is an ongoing grievance, almost an expectation. (Khan 2010: 24)

The grievance is embedded in “national history and myth,” reinterpreted by Pakistan policymakers as it suits them. (Khan 2010: 24) In doing so, the rhetoric that previously came from the government and now the media has so entrenched the grievance in the national psyche that State support for American policy is one of the central determinants of government’s (un) popularity in Pakistan today. (Khan 2010: 24)

Exacerbating the problem of perception and history is the nature of U.S.-Pakistan alliances: in its dealings with Pakistan, America has pursued a relationship with individuals (persons and establishments) rather than a relationship with Pakistan per se. (Khan 2010: 24) This is true of leaders starting from Ayub Khan to Musharraf. While it has sought to redress this imbalance during the present tenure of President Zardari and President Obama through pledges that include the Kerry-Lugar bill, such a lackadaisical policy of engagement has been critical in the estrangement of the Pakistani populace with America. (Khan 2010: 25)

Another source of anti-Americanism in Pakistan, especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been the growing closeness between Pakistan’s arch nemesis, India and the United States. Pakistanis felt that the US was looking for a long-term strategic partnership with India, which

culminated in the US offering India a Nuclear Deal in 2008; whereas when it comes to Pakistan, the United States is only interested in using it as a frontline state and is not interested in building an equal relationship with it.

Constant criticism of Pakistan by the US leaders and officials and constant reaffirmations of a partnership with India did not help the cause of Washington trying to tone down anti-Americanism in Pakistan. Then again, President Obama's visit to India and growing relations between them (November 2010) and his criticism of Pakistan in the Indian Parliament further exasperated the situation of unease and discomfort.

US's policies in Pakistan are another major source of anti-Americanism in the region. When the U.S. government urges military action in the tribal areas and seeks to close madrassas or calls for curriculum reform, the perception in Pakistan is that the United States has a problem with Islam. (Cohen and Chollet 2007) Besides, the United States has provoked anger all around by denigrating Muslim societies as backward and failed and by patronizing them with offers to help them modernize. (Cohen and Chollet 2007)

Anti-Americanism has one additional dimension in Pakistan. For decades, Governments in Pakistan that often lacked popular support acquiesced to public resentment of America, using the United States as a lightning rod to divert dangerous currents of socioeconomic discontent within Pakistan and now this same anti-Americanism is being exploited by the Islamists to gain popular support. (Hussein 2005: 10-11)

Today, the United States government is so unpopular in Pakistan that Pakistani politicians find it difficult to support any initiative associated with America. They increasingly reap political dividends by adopting anti-American populist rhetoric. This trend is dangerous and facilitates the agenda of Islamist extremist forces. (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 23)

On the other hand, liberals in Pakistan too feel disappointed with the US because for a long time the US supported dictators in Pakistan, although it being a big progenitor of democracy worldwide. Liberals in the Islamic world have their own reasons to be disaffected with the United States, particularly those aspects of the war on terrorism that are seen as repressive. There is a sense that the United States has fallen short of its ideals and its foreign policy has abandoned soft power, losing its moral superiority. (Hussein 2005: 10) Most liberals also

feel that the United States is closing its doors on them with some of the more heavy-handed visa policies of the Department of Homeland Security. (Pakistan Policy Working Group 2008: 23)

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has been growing steadily, because of a multitude of reasons and remains a force to be reckoned with by the United States in Pakistan. Eradicating or lessening this antipathy towards America remains a top priority goal for the Government of United States in Pakistan and therefore, public diplomacy becomes a very important tool for the US Government, to achieve its goal.

### **Discerning Public Diplomacy Programmes**

The events of 9/11 forced the US to introspect its policies in the Islamic world at large, as they stared at an unprecedented anti-Americanism, which was breeding violent extremism against the United States. Pakistan, owing to its geo strategic location, once again became a frontline state in US's war on Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist outfits in Afghanistan. Pakistan became central to US policies in the region, as its support was vital to dismantle and destroy terrorist outfits in the region. However, the US soon realized that support of the Pakistan government alone wasn't enough to defeat the extremists, and roping in the Pakistani public to its side was necessary.

Not only this, but the growing hostility and antipathy to America in Pakistan was a threat to America's goals in the region, and thus they offset a flurry of initiatives to promote US image and policy in the region, by updating and introducing many new public diplomacy programmes. Thus, the development and implementation of a far-reaching public diplomacy program began that emphasized common U.S. and Pakistani interests in combating extremism, creating prosperity, and improving regional relationships (Pakistani Policy Working Group 2008: 10)

The United States began a fairly aggressive public diplomacy campaign to curb the spread of Al Qaida's anti-Western ideology in the hopes of discrediting Al Qaida's mission and ideas, eliminating terrorist activity and improving the United States' image in the Arab and Muslim worlds. (Quirk 2008: 2) Some of these noteworthy programs introduced were Shared Values Campaign, the Muslim Life in America Campaign, Diplomacy of Deeds, the Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange-Study Program.

Other old initiatives that were further encouraged like the Fulbright Program, English training programs, etc. Other than these, the American government has over the years arranged and sponsored many cultural diplomacy programs and functions in Pakistan. Not only this, America has spent large amount on development aid to Pakistan, the latest and the most prominent being the Kerry-Lugar Bill. It's pertinent to discuss these programs and some others to understand US public diplomacy agenda in Pakistan.

Shared Values campaign and Muslim life in America campaign programs were introduced after 9/11 across Muslim-majority countries in the world and the programs showcased how Muslims in America were living a peaceful and prosperous life, to highlight that there was no incongruity between America and Islam. "Shared Values" and "Muslims in America" campaigns may have made some headway in terms of opening a few eyes to the reality of Muslim life in America but they ignored the underlying reasons behind anti-American sentiment. (Djerjian 2003) However, these programs weren't very successful and were soon withdrawn because Muslims worldwide were more concerned about America's policies in their region, even though they mostly respected and admired American values of freedom, tolerance and democracy at home.

Washington also introduced English Micro Scholarship Program that provided underserved students, aged 14 to 18 in countries with significant Muslim populations, the opportunity to study English, gain an appreciation of American culture and values, and increase their ability to participate successfully in the socio-economic development of their countries and in future study and exchanges in the United States. (Public Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia: Is the Message Getting Through? 2007: 7)

Other prominent public diplomacy programmes introduced were Citizen Dialogue and Strategic Speakers Programs and Faith and Community Grants that focus on promoting interfaith dialogue and understanding between the Muslim world and America. (Public Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia: Is the Message Getting Through? 2007: 7) "Diplomacy of Deeds" was another such program that emphasized on America's good deeds in the world and which highlighted how America as a nation helped people around the world to have better lives, with a special focus on education, health and economic opportunity. (Public Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia: Is the Message Getting Through? 2007: 8)

The Kennedy-Lugar Youth Exchange Study program (YES), was another program that was introduced in 2002, funded by the U.S. Department of State and sponsored by the Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs (ECA) to provide scholarships for high school students (15-17 years) from countries with significant Muslim populations to spend up to one academic year in the U.S. Students live with host families, attend high school, engage in activities to learn about American society and values, acquire leadership skills, and help educate Americans about their countries and cultures. In 2007, YES Abroad was established to provide a similar experience for U.S. students (15-18 years) in selected YES countries, like Pakistan. (Yesprograms.org)

The Fulbright International Educational Exchange Programme has continued to play a crucial role in America's public diplomacy campaign in Pakistan. In fact the Fulbright programme in Pakistan has been expanded and is now the largest Fulbright program in the world. In the sector of education, USAID's education program in Pakistan have been efficient as they have provided training, technical assistance, and infrastructure for government officials, citizens, and the private sector to deliver high-quality education throughout the country. (Curtis 2007: 2)

The program has been currently focused on selected impoverished districts in the Sindh and Baluchistan provinces in addition to the FATA. The Basic Education Program benefits over 367,000 Pakistani children and USAID has so far trained over 16,000 Pakistani teachers and administrators. (Curtis 2007: 2) However, the US Government hasn't lived up to its potential in helping the education sector in Pakistan and much more effort and aid is desired.

Voice of America was one of the most successfully running programs in Pakistan and to further increase its popularity; the US introduced a new, youth-oriented, 12/7 radio station, Radio Aap ki Duniya (Your World) in 2004. The station was successful in drawing attention of a growing number of listeners to its news, information, roundtable discussions, call-in shows, interviews, features, and music. (Public Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia: Is the Message Getting Through? 2007: 37)

VOA's Urdu service introduced a television programme, Beyond the Headlines, as well in 2005, which focused on illustrating shared values between Pakistanis and Americans, which became quite popular. Along with this, VOA also made efforts and introduced Radio Deewa in Pashtun in the Pashto area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. (Public Diplomacy in the

Middle East and South Asia: Is the Message Getting Through? 2007: 37)

Another notable public diplomacy initiative that has been undertaken by the United States in Pakistan is the international “16 Days of Activism Campaign” which campaigned against violence against women, which was launched in Pakistan in 2011. This campaign stretched from metropolises of Karachi and Lahore to the countryside of Mardan and Multan, with the US mission in Pakistan working to improve the lives of Pakistani women and combatting gender-based violence. A series of initiatives were organized to highlight and energize the civil society to support women’s rights.

The program focused on training police officials, educating future leaders, engaging students, promoting women’s enterprise, supporting Benazir Bhutto women’s crisis centers (which provide services, legal assistance, counseling and temporary shelter for women victims of violence) and training health workers. (pdwali.wordpress.com) The program was well received and set a good example of the US public diplomacy work in Pakistan.

Other successful public diplomacy initiatives carried out by the US in Pakistan, which actually won the US accolades in Pakistan were US efforts and aid in the aftermath of the disastrous and destructive earthquake of 2005. The potential benefits of U.S. assistance were illustrated when the United States provided over half a billion dollars, in relief. The terrorists tried to compete, but the U.S. assistance was so large-scale and visible that Pakistanis began giving out small toy Chinook helicopters—the main purveyors of the food, blankets, and medicine. In return, the United States received a great deal of Pakistani goodwill. (World at Risk 2008: 71) A Wall Street Journal editorial published shortly after the earthquake called the response ‘one of America’s most significant hearts- and minds successes so far in the Muslim world’ (Wilder 2010: 5414)

Another significant public diplomacy success was witnessed when the US provided over \$115 million in food assistance to relieve the pressures of dramatic food inflation caused primarily by supply-side shocks. It also gave a token amount of emergency assistance funding (with more promised from the international community) to support those who had been displaced by the military operations in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. (White 2008: 128) An aggressive U.S. response to destructive flooding in Pakistan in 2010 was also a significant public diplomacy success for America in Pakistan.



When the Obama administration came to power in 2009, it also made the effort to transform the relationship with not only Pakistan's democratically elected civilian government, but also the common Pakistani people. There was an effort made by Senior US policymakers and diplomats to build bridges and to reach out to the Pakistani citizens. These included, interaction of political heavyweights like Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Late Special Ambassador of Af-Pak, Richard Holbrooke, the American Ambassadors with different sections and segments of the Pakistani population to address the misperception, built over years.

### **Corollary of Public Diplomacy**

The United States public diplomacy in Pakistan, despite some small successes has largely been a failure. Even though the small steps taken by public diplomacy initiatives lessened some hostility to America in Pakistan. These small achievements were, however, offset and swept aside by events that triggered a far more negative reaction in Pakistan, like the US NAVY SEALS raid that killed Osama Bin Laden and the atrocious drone attacks.

Even goodwill acts like the Kerry-Lugar bill which provided Pakistan a development assistance of 7.5 billion dollars, over five years to help build schools, healthcare clinics, and improve governance in Pakistan, came under criticism in Pakistan. By putting riders on the bill, the US efforts were undermined, as Pakistanis felt that they couldn't even spend the aid money as they wished but had to spend it under strict American supervision. In fact, Pakistani's were so up in arms about a couple questionable paragraphs in the legislation, Sens. Kerry and Lugar had to issue an extraordinary explanation that the U.S.-tax payer money was not intended - in any way - to infringe on the sovereignty of Pakistan. (Dey 2010)

US aid and assistance in 2010 floods in Pakistan, created some credibility and favorability for US in the region. However, the image upliftment couldn't be sustained for long, because soon the Raymond Davis incident<sup>6</sup> happened. Soon after this incident, the raid was

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<sup>6</sup> . Raymond Davis, an Intelligence operative with diplomatic status killed two Pakistanis on motorbikes (he claimed in self-defense) that led to a protracted

conducted by the US NAVY SEALS that killed Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad, which was perceived in Pakistan as a big blow to its sovereignty and pride as a nation, as America didn't even share such crucial information with Pakistan's intelligence services and neither took permission from the Pakistani Government to go ahead and conduct the raid, thoroughly disrespecting and obliterating Pakistan's sovereignty in the minds of the Pakistani people.

Another problem that public diplomacy in Pakistan faced was one of funding. From 2001 to 2011, the US has given more than 20 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan. However, the funding allocation has been significantly lopsided, with a much larger share, almost 75% of it going to the Pakistani military. On the other hand, economic assistance to Pakistan for development and governance has accounted for a small percentage of the total aid. This again lends strength to the argument and perception, that the US is concerned only about Pakistani military helping achieve its objectives in its war on terror, without caring about the Pakistani people and the condition of their country. Many perceive America's attitude towards Pakistanis and their sufferings to be callous, with such little spending on developing and stabilizing Pakistan as a nation.

Another problem adding to the US public diplomacy campaign in Pakistan is the lack of diplomatic interaction. Owing to strict security norms and regulations on American officers and diplomats in Pakistan, the interaction between American diplomats and American citizens with the common Pakistanis is limited. Even access to American corners in Pakistan is not very feasible and attractive to the Pakistani public because of tight security checks there. Another issue adding to America's problems in Pakistan is the trust deficit that exists between America and Pakistan. Pakistanis looking back at history, find it very difficult to trust Americans, as they have time and again, abandoned Pakistan to its misery in times of its need.

Further complicating the United States public diplomacy in Pakistan is the strong perception in Pakistan that America is in a war against Islam. Many Pakistanis believe that the U.S. intends to undermine Pakistan's religious character and advance a Westernized and secular vision of the nation state. Pakistan's religious parties effectively play on this rhetoric to

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standoff over treaty obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Pakistan released him after negotiating compensation for the victims' families but the public diplomacy damage was severe.

create a perceived gulf between Pakistani and American interests. (White 2008: 125) Thus this perception that US is against Islam, hinders the progress of American public diplomacy to be effective in Pakistan.

US to promote a more fruitful public diplomacy in Pakistan, must put more focus and expand its assistance to reform all of Pakistan's civilian institutions including judiciary, police and law enforcements, support major civil society groups and help Pakistan in its capacity building. (RAND Project Air Force: 2010) The US also must make special effort to reach out to the younger population in Pakistan, as they are warmer to US ideals and culture, even if they resent America's policies in the region.

America also needs to move beyond its comfort zone in Pakistan and not only engage with the moderate Muslims but make an effort to try and engage the more radical but peaceful islamists as well. The US must also keep up its support to the democratic rule in Pakistan and aid and support civil society groups in Pakistan. America at the same time must show a genuine interest in helping Pakistan come out of its long-drawn internal crisis and aid political and economic stability in Pakistan.

America has to make sure that history doesn't repeat itself when it comes to Pakistan, because Pakistanis have this inherent fear and belief that America only uses their country when it pleases them, and abandons them in a hotbed of problems. At the same time, America must also engage with the Pakistani public and convince them of their mutual interests in a fight against violent extremism.

There seems to be an assumption that if the narrative of U.S.—Pakistan relations were changed, so would Pakistani attitudes. (Staniland 2011: 143) However, this is unlikely because as long as the US actions in Pakistan remain the same, especially the military activities in Pakistan and the drone attacks continue being unpopular in Pakistan. Public diplomacy can help US redeem some of its image in Pakistan, but to expect a complete turn around in Pakistan's view of the US would be a futile prospect.

Nevertheless, this does not entail that the US should not emphasize on public diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, to curb anti-Americanism and gain Pakistani public support for its policies in Pakistan. The US must make public diplomacy one of its main concerns and

major foreign policy tools in Pakistan as Pakistan's political, economic, and security challenges undermine not only its own security, but also the security of other countries in the region and of the United States. (Birdsall and Elhai 2011:1) Public diplomacy may not be a full-fledged solution to eliminate the trust deficit between the US and Pakistan, but it definitely is an important mode to bridge some trust deficit between the two, now-reluctant allies.

The United States can only succeed in its longest war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan with the full support of Pakistan and that can only come through an espousal of the Pakistani public of American policies in the region. Winning the hearts and minds of the Pakistani public is critical to the US securing a victory in its Afghan war and public diplomacy becomes essential in helping the US achieve its goal.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### The “Israel Factor”: Seeking the Support of Egyptian Civil Society

*“I know that a democratic Egypt can advance its role of responsible leadership not only in the region but around the world.”- Barack Obama*

#### **Introduction**

Egypt happens to be not only the largest Arab state in the world but for very long, has also been the political and cultural center of the Arab world. A nation of 80 million people, Egypt stands as a bridge between Africa and West Asia, separating the Mediterranean Sea from the Red Sea, and has always been a crucial player in the region. Egypt has been one of the most formidable allies of the United States in the Middle East for over thirty years and its most trustworthy and important Arab partner. Egypt remains critical to the US political and strategic interests in the Islamic world.

Egypt, today finds itself in the midst of a democratic whirlwind, after the popular protests in Egypt in early 2011, which led to the end of Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship after more than thirty years. The democratic revolution in Egypt was part of the democratic uprisings in the Arab world, or what has been termed as the Arab Spring. The democratic uprising in Egypt has created some sort of unspoken tension between the US and Egypt, because US lost an old ally in the Mubarak Government and the ties between the US and Egypt now fall in a zone of uncertainty.

Egypt is of critical importance to US regional security in the region, as Egypt was the first Arab country to make peace with Israel and since then has been a peace partner with Israel,

thus deterring other Arab states from entering into open hostilities and wars with Israel. Maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East remains one of the most important goals of the United States. For the realization of this goal and the perpetration of stability in the Middle East, the Egypt-Israeli relationship becomes very crucial. Egypt needs to be a partaker in pursuing peace with Israel, to maintain stability and ensure security in the entire Middle East. Egypt's alliance and its policy of peace towards Israel is at the core to the US interest as, the US cannot afford to lose Egypt as its ally in the Arab world.

The alliance between the US and Egypt became clouded after the success of Arab spring in Egypt, which led to the ouster of US's long-term ally Mubarak in February 2011. The democratic revolution in Egypt is yet to take a concrete shape and the decisions that Egypt's newly elected government will or will not take, which will indeed have a bearing on the US-Egypt relations. With the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, there are many fears regarding the American-Egyptian relations. The US needs to reset its relationship with Egypt under its new government, because Egypt is critical to not only maintaining peace and security in the Middle East, but, also now, that it has successfully completed its democratic transition; it becomes an example in Middle East and North Africa.

The US needs to reset and restructure its relationship with Egypt's newly elected democratic government. The democratic revolution in Egypt is still not complete and is in its infant stage, thus the US has to proceed with extreme care and cautiousness in engaging with the public in Egypt. The US in order to protect its interests in the Middle East and the Arab world must ensure peace and prosperity in the region, which can be maintained only if Egypt maintains and respect its peace treaty with Israel. The recent democratic uprisings in the Arab world further complicate the situation and the US needs Egypt by its side to see the democratic revolutions in the Arab world bear fruit.

The people of Egypt, especially the urban youth played an incredibly important role in ushering in the democratic revolution in Egypt. The Egyptian public eagerly awaited democracy and prosperity for over thirty years and now the US must ensure the Egyptian public that it is on their side and is also an emphatic supporter of Egyptian democracy. The US has to gain the support of the Egyptian public, to maintain its relationship with the Egyptian government. The US in order to sustain peace in the Middle East has to ensure a

thriving relationship with Egypt, and a big aid in that would come through the US engagement with the public in Egypt, through a successful public diplomacy.

Before delving further into the US conducted public diplomacy programmes in Egypt, it is very crucial to shed some light on the historicity of Egypt's relationship with the United States, that will help us gain a better understanding of the present day Egypt-US relationship.

## **Chronicling US-Egypt Relations**

Egypt is a critical country for the U.S. military and strategic interests. Its location straddling the African and Asian continents on the west-to-east air corridor route to the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, possessing the important Suez Canal waterway, and next door to the volatile Israeli/Palestinian situation make it a vital partner for the United States. (Aftandilian 2011: 1) In addition, as the most populous country in the Arab world, and home to long-standing centers of learning in the Muslim world, what happens in Egypt is often a bellwether for developments in other parts of the region. (Aftandilian 2011: 1) This makes it very clear why the US has chosen to have Cairo as its ally in the Arab world for over thirty years and wants to continue this alliance, even after the democratic revolution in Egypt, which has brought the religious extremists, Muslim Brotherhood to power.

The constitutional parliamentary monarchy in Egypt was overthrown by a group of Egyptian army officers, the Free Officers' Movement, led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952. Nasser established an autocratic military role in Egypt and outlawed many of his rivals, including the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954. Nasser in the beginning tried to stay away from both the power blocs during the Cold War and he was one of the developing worlds' leaders who played an instrumental role, in founding the Non-Aligned Movement.

U.S.-Egyptian relations soured when Nasser turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for military training and equipment after the West, frustrated by Nasser's repeated rejections and his support of Algerian independence against the French, refused to provide Egypt with defense assistance. (CRS Report 2008: 4) Another problem during this period was the

British-US retraction of aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam, which incensed Egyptian sentiments.

The US-Egyptian relations improved after the US played a mediator in the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, and forced the three countries namely Israel, Britain and France that had attacked Egypt, (because Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956) to withdraw their troops from the Egyptian soil in early 1957. After the 1956 Suez War, Nasser's popularity soared, as he came to embody Arab nationalism in the post-colonial era.

Nasser did not hesitate to brandish his newfound authority and developed a muscular Egyptian foreign policy that attempted to destabilize pro-Western governments in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, support Palestinian guerrilla action against Israel, create a unified Arab state by merging briefly with Syria (the United Arab Republic 1958-1961), and intervene against the Saudi-backed royalists in the Yemeni civil war. (CRS Report 2008:4) However, after meeting defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israel war, Nasser's popularity and his pan-Arab ideology received a setback in the Middle East.

Anwar Sadat, one of the Free Officers came to power in 1970, after Nasser's death. Sadat soon undertook dramatic steps toward shifting Egypt's external orientation, as he expelled Soviet advisors in 1972, and changed the dynamics with Israel by initiating the October War in 1973. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 79) The 1973 war paved the way for Egypt establishing closer relations with the west and moving away from the Soviet camp.

In November 1973, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations (which had been cut off in 1967), and in December, the two countries participated in the Geneva peace conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy led to Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements in 1974 and a second set of Egyptian-Israeli disengagements in 1975; also the United States resumed economic aid to Egypt in 1975 after an eight-year hiatus. (CRS Report 2006: 5)

Following the 1973 war, the US became deeply engaged in promoting dialogue between Egypt and Israel and eventual negotiations toward a peace settlement. This culminated in Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977, followed by the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Israel-Egypt peace treaty in 1979. This solidified Egypt's standing as a uniquely



powerful Arab ally to the West and particularly to the United States. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 79)

The treaty Egypt signed at Camp David in 1979 made it harder for Israel's smaller Arab neighbors to go to war, encouraging Jordan to conclude its own peace deal, for example. (Cairo Colloquium Report 2010: 7) Egypt's alliance with the west was well-rewarded by the United States, as it became the second largest recipient of U.S. aid, only after Israel, receiving large chunks of it in military assistance.

This was also the beginning of a new chapter of military cooperation between the two countries, exemplified by joint military exercises, the training of Egyptian officers in U.S. military schools, and Egypt's purchases of U.S. military equipment. (Aftandilian 2011) However, Egypt lost its credibility in the Arab world, as it was expelled from the Arab League soon after and the headquarters was shifted from Cairo to Tunis.

The U.S. assistance program in Egypt also helped modernize the country's infrastructure, as U.S. economic assistance was used to build Cairo's sewer system, a telephone network, and thousands of schools and medical facilities. (CRS Report 2008: 6) The United States also helped organize the peacekeeping mission along the Egyptian-Israeli border and the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), and still maintains a rotating infantry task force as part of it. (CRS Report 2008: 6) President Hosni Mubarak came to power after the murder of Sadat in 1981, and carried on the Egypt-US partnership for the next thirty years. Mubarak carefully nurtured close U.S.-Egyptian strategic ties because he saw them as being in Egypt's national interests. (Aftandilian 2011: 2)

Security has been the central plank of the US-Egypt relationship ever since the Camp David Accords. Despite this, the relationship had other aspects to it as well, for example, throughout the 1980s, Egypt partnered with the US on a series of economic reforms and modest steps toward political liberalization. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 81) In the 1990s, Vice President Al Gore established a unique framework of direct partnership with President Mubarak, including regular meetings between the two to address opportunities for reform. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 81) Cairo also lent both political and military support to the US in the first Gulf War of 1990-91. However, the relationship had suffered some ups and downs in the period from 1981-2011, but none were magnified to cause long-term problems.

Egypt, even though it was highly critical of the US war in Iraq in 2003, did not cut off relations with the US for strategic needs. Mubarak also maintained the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty despite several flare-ups and small wars that have occurred between Israel and some of its neighbors between 1982 and 2006, which inflamed public opinion inside Egypt.

Egypt maintained relations with Israel, even though this peace between them has often been characterized as a “cold peace,” as it has kept the possibility of a general Arab-Israeli war, very low, which otherwise could have jeopardized vital U.S. interests in the region. (Aftandilian 2011:1-2) Cairo also provided support to Washington in its Global War on Terror, by providing over flight permission to many U.S. military aircrafts and also granted expedited transit to U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal. (Aftandilian 2012: 1-2)

The US government under George W. Bush after 9/11 did put some kind of pressure on Egypt to introduce democratic reforms under the “Freedom Agenda”. (Bush 2005) There were some successes in sight like the institution of direct popular election of the president, the organization of a large-scale electoral monitoring effort by civil society organizations, a loosening of restrictions on the media and freer campaigning by the opposition groups.

However, by early 2006, the US administration’s support for democracy in Egypt tapered off, after the better-than-anticipated success of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s parliamentary elections in late 2005. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 81) The Bush administration once again favored maintaining its strategic interests through its autocratic allies in the Middle East, compared to aiding democracy in these countries.

### **Delineating the US-Egypt Relationship the Arab Spring**

The January 2011 democratic revolution in Egypt, which led to the ouster of America’s long-standing ally Hosni Mubarak, has opened up a new chapter for Egypt in both domestic and international politics. The democratic revolution and Mubarak’s ouster from Egypt added new dimensions to the US-Egypt engagement in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. When the revolution

began in Egypt and started to gain steam, the US responses and reactions remained too little and came too slow, and as Philip Seib put it, were “overly cautious”. (Abdulla 2011:6)

However, there are divergent views regarding the US role in Egypt’s revolution. There are some who claim that US, even though it is the oldest and strongest democracy in the world, did little or nothing to aid Egypt’s democratic revolution. They felt that the US offered very little economic assistance to Egypt, which was insufficient to meet its economic needs. The other line of argument, is that the US jettisoned its long-time ally Mubarak with lightening speed, and they point out examples from President Obama’s statements, who made the conceptual leap from Mubarak-Our friend to Mubarak-must go in about one week. (Dunne 2012: 4)

Furthermore, tensions between the U.S. and Egyptian governments after the revolution were unusually high due to the unprecedented crackdown on Egyptian and American civil society organizations that were carried out by Mubarak-era holdovers in late 2011 and continue today. Although American defendants have been allowed to post bail and leave Egypt, the trial and investigation have made it difficult for the US administration to certify that the Egyptian transitional government has met congressionally mandated conditions for continued military assistance. (Dunne 2012: 5)

The US needs to reset its relationship with Egypt on a more equal footing and not just center it on Middle East security concerns. Engagement with the new Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt is very essential for the United States. The US must make the Egyptian government understand their mutual interests and continue to cooperate and address their common concerns, the most important one being maintaining Arab-Israeli peace in the Middle-East.

The US and Egypt continue to need each other’s assistance; Egypt, requires developmental and economic assistance from the US and now that it’s an infant democracy, the US can aid democratic reforms more swiftly in Egypt. On the other hand, Egypt remains crucial to the US security calculations in the Middle East and North Africa, especially after Iran’s emboldenment and suspicion of possessing nuclear weapons.

Cairo and Washington have had a long-standing and peaceful relationship. Through foreign aid, treaties, military cooperation, trade agreements, and political support, American-Egyptian interactions have been generally positive over the past 60 years although at some points the policies of the two countries have led to tensions. (Cairo Colloquium Report 2010: 14)

However, this relationship suffered somewhat of a setback after the ouster of Mubarak, America's long-standing ally in Egypt. There remains a certain obscurity in this relationship in the present-day scenario, as the Muslim Brotherhood have been ushered into power in Egypt and its still not very clear which direction they will take, in relation to Egypt's relations with the United States; even though maintaining an alliance with each other and peace with Israel are mutually beneficial to both the United States and Egypt.

After having shed light on the background of US-Egypt relations and also their present day scenario, it is time to discuss anti-Americanism in Egypt, that has been vehemently reiterated through many polls, taken ever since the Iraq war of 2003 and were more fervently expressed by some quarters of Egypt's population in the 2011 democratic revolution.

### **Inveterate Anti-Americanism**

Egypt and the United States have had a peaceful and friendly relationship for over thirty years. Despite, being long-term allies, Washington faces rampant anti-American feeling in Egypt today. Anti-Americanism runs deep in the Muslim world at large and especially in the Arab street. At the heart of anti-Americanism in the Arab world, is the United States' unconditional support to Israel; the anti-American feelings in the Arab world were further incensed by America's invasion of Iraq in 2003. Egypt, even though it has been a US ally since 1979 and the second largest recipient of US aid, witnesses a rising anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Egypt that emerged only in the 21<sup>st</sup> century; however, it is true, that its intensity has grown profusely after September 2001. The criticism was there long before 9/11. Criticism of American policy toward Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon has been consistent for three decades. (Armbrust 2007:27) Washington's policy regarding Israel and Palestine have been looked at with a lot of resentment in the Arab

world, as the Arabs have always felt that the US has blindly supported Israel in all of its claims, ignoring the rights of Palestinians and have been biased towards Israel in the Israel-Palestine dispute.

This resentment has placed a deep-seated bias against American policies in Egypt, as time and time again Egyptians felt that Americans supported Israel far more than any of its other allies in the Middle East. The other deep-rooted source of anti-Americanism in Egypt, that has been present over the years is Washington's support to the autocratic regimes in Egypt that suited its strategic interests, rather than taking any concrete steps to bring about democratic reforms and restructuring in Egypt.

Egyptian perceptions of the United States, especially of the sincerity of U.S. democratization efforts, have become increasingly more negative since 2005 and have been on a steady rise ever since. (National Security Project 2011) Egyptians' opinions about U.S. efforts toward democratization were quite low at 63 percent saying that U.S. wasn't genuine about its efforts, but it became significantly more negative in 2008, when this number increased to 75 percent. (Brown and Younis 2008)

Egyptian opinions about the job performance of the United States' leadership also grew more negative, going down notably from 13% in 2007 to 6% in 2008, which is among the lowest in the world. (Brown and Younis 2008) In fact, the poll conducted by University of Maryland in 2007, showed a 93 percent unfavorable rating for the US government, and this was among the very worst ever recorded from any Arab country. The same poll showed that three-quarters of Egyptian respondents agreed strongly with a statement "America pretends to be helpful to Muslim countries, but in fact everything it does is really part of a scheme to take advantage of people in the Middle East and steal their oil." (Zogby 2007)

The pew surveys conducted in Egypt from 2006-2011 have confirmed the same trends in the decline of American popularity in Egypt. In 2007, US favorability rating in Egypt stood at a mere 21 percent and in 2009, it went up to 27 percent, probably explained by Obama's rise to the White House and his Cairo speech, that aimed at placating the Islamic world at large. However, US soon lost this favorable opinion and as the 2010 pew survey showed that the US favorability opinion has dropped to a mere 17 percent, which is one of the lowest percentages polled in all of the Islamic world. (Kohut 2010)

America had a golden opportunity at improving its image in Egypt, by supporting the Arab spring in full swing; however, America failed to take advantage of the situation and America's standing improved only marginally to a 20 percent, as pinpointed by the pew survey of 2011. (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011)

Anti-Americanism in Egypt is a complex phenomenon, because Egypt and US have had peaceful and friendly relations over the last four decades on one hand. On the other hand, Egypt is at the center of the Arab world, (which for long has felt that America's policies and conduct, especially regarding the Israel-Palestine issue has been unjust and unfair) Despite the fact that Egypt is the second largest recipient of funding from USAID, the majority of the Egyptian people continue to express strong anti-American sentiment. (Ebeid 2007: 103) There are multitudes of factors that incite and encourage anti-Americanism in the Arab world at large, but some of them are peculiar to Egypt alone.

First and the foremost reason for the resentment against the United States in Egypt are regarding the US policies in the Middle East. Opposition to American foreign policy drives much of the hostility towards the US in Egypt. These policies range from unconditional support to Israel, Israeli attacks on Lebanon, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, biased policies towards Palestine and an unjust and unfair policy towards Israel-Palestine settlements. Iraq war added to the woes of the Arabs in Egypt, as many felt that America was only making a lip service for democracy and invading Iraq for oil and strategic control.

The perception that Washington lends unconditional and unlimited support to Israel over Arab concerns is one of the most formidable causes of anti-Americanism in Egypt. It should be emphasized that the unique American-Israeli relationship occupies a special position in the formulation of the U.S. image in the Arab world. (Kyaly 2007: 72) In fact, America's image in the Arab mindset is almost synonymous with that of Israel, which many Arabs perceive as an aggressive, colonial, racist, arrogant state that flouts international laws and standards, not to mention UN resolutions, using its brutal force to impose its interests and will on others. (Kyaly 2007:73)

Then there is the perceived willingness of U.S. government to overlook Israeli violations of international human rights law in the Palestinian territories, and the discounting of one of the

Arab Middle East's two democratic elections in the Palestinian Territories in 2006 have seriously undermined the legitimacy of the US with the Egyptian public. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 86)

Many of the Arab liberals are critical of the United States for the policies U.S. carried out in the region. Many people in the Arab world have held the United States responsible for the growth of extremist fundamentalist groups, who pursue violence to impose their own agendas. (Kyaly 2007:72) The United States is also seen as responsible for the growing influence of radical Islam in the Arab world, which was empowered as part of its Communism-containment policy during the Cold War, particularly during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Others accuse Washington of empowering the former regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which resulted in the out- break of the Iraq-Iran war and the subsequent invasion of Kuwait in 1990. (Kyaly 2007:72)

The straw that broke the donkey's back was the Iraq war of 2003, in which Arab governments joined the US in its war on Iraq, against their citizens' opposition (Rugh 2004: 8). This led to further anti- American sentiment, which manifested itself in aggressive riots and wall graffiti. These strong sentiments were beyond governments' control, especially that their control had already been undermined by global communications (Rugh 2004: 8). The invasion of Iraq in 2003 further reinforced USA's image of being hypocritical and having double standards, when on one side the USA pretended to be the guarantor of international human rights, freedom and liberty; and on the other side, invaded a sovereign nation and obliterated all these values.

The Iraq war was deeply unpopular as was the overall U.S.-led war on terrorism. Media coverage of abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan, rendition, references to the Crusades and clash of civilizations, and ethnic profiling contribute to the feelings of ill will. (Amin 2009:112) Overwhelmingly, Muslim publics believe that the United States ignores their interests when making foreign policy. In addition, there is widespread fear of American power, exacerbated by discussions of the Bush doctrine of preemptive strikes against perceived threats to the United States. (Amin 2009: 112)

Another source of anti-Americanism in Egypt is the legacy of prioritizing security cooperation over the interests of Egyptian citizens in bilateral relations. (Dunne 2012: 2) Since the mid-1970s, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship has moved forward on two legs: security (peace with Israel, as well as military and counter- terrorism cooperation) and development (economic development and, more recently, political development inside Egypt).

The problem is that the security leg was always more muscular and energetic than the development one and became increasingly so over time, demonstrated by the steady flow of U.S. security assistance, \$1.3 billion annually, versus the steep fall in economic assistance over time, from approximately \$800 million annually in the 1980s to \$250 million in 2011. (Dunne 2012: 2) This imbalance created a new set of problems for the US in Egypt, as the common Egyptian felt that the US hasn't done enough for their economic and political development.

Another major reason for the United States' unpopularity in Egypt is the US disingenuous regarding democracy and freedom and human rights in the Arab world. America condemns human rights violations, acts of extremism, and religious suppression, while simultaneously supporting undemocratic and violent regimes. (Cairo Colloquium Report: 8) Another reason for anti-Americanism in the Arab world is the lack of credibility of the US initiatives and policies. Throughout the Arab world, US policymakers are suspected of ulterior motives and double standards.

The perceived incongruence between America's ideals and its policies can be seen in US's empty rhetoric of democracy promotion and safeguarding human rights in the world (US has promoted and supported many dictatorial regimes in the world to suit its geopolitical interests and its talks about human rights violations sound hypocritical when one talks about the Guantanamo bay or the Abu Gharib prison stories).

The discrepancy between the US rhetoric and actions in the Middle East have often disappointed and dejected the public of the Arab world. The US is disliked and viewed as hypocritical and deceitful by the Egyptians because on one hand they talk about promoting democracy in the world, but on the other they have, for years supported authoritarian regimes in the Islamic world, to suit their strategic interests.



In fact, the slow and late US reaction to the democratic revolution in Egypt in January 2011 created a fresh bout of anti-Americanism in Egypt. Anti-American feelings were further strengthened by the perception that during the protest in the Tahrir Square the United States was chiefly represented by American-made tear gas canisters, “Made in USA” fired by security forces. (National Security Project 2011: 11) The American response came too late and was “overtly cautious” in Egypt’s democratic revolution, which brought about substantial anti-American feeling, ranging from disappointment to anger in the Egyptian public. (Seib 2011)

Ever since the revolution, America has been pursuing its relationship with Egypt with a lot of cautiousness, as it is wary of the new government, led by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who has more or less maintained an anti-American stand for years. This cautionary approach towards Egypt’s new-democratically elected government, is easily played into the discourse that America prefers an authoritarian military role in Egypt, that suits its own interests, rather than letting the Egyptian people realize their democratic aspirations.

The usage of terminology like “War of Ideas”, “Us vs. Them” “Crusade”, “Axis of Evil” all play into the discourse of America against Islam and have been cited many times to support the clash of civilizations theory, that further amplifies anti-American sentiment in the region. Other reasons for the US unpopularity in Egypt can be attributed to American popular culture, as a very negative stereotype of American morality exists due to American cinema and television content. (Djerjian 2003: 21)

There is also a consistent negative portrayal of Muslims and Arabs in American film and entertainment, which angers the Muslim populace in the world. (Cairo Colloquium Report 2010: 7) The portrayal of the United States in Arab media can also be held accountable to some extent to increasing anti-Americanism in Egypt. The United States is portrayed in the Arab media as: a country that has lost its credibility; an invading, occupying power, acting outside of international laws and legitimacy; a country whose policy contradicts its values and principles on justice, human rights, and freedom; and biased toward Israel. (Mohamed 2007)

Thus all these factors act individually and collectively, in varied combinations to intensify and escalate anti-Americanism in Egypt. Nevertheless, the American government has been trying its best to check this increasing anti-Americanism through a variety of means, the most crucial of them being through its public diplomacy. The aim of Washington's public diplomacy is not only to check anti-Americanism in Egypt, but also to rectify and renew its image, so the Egyptian public sees and realizes its mutual goals and interests in continuing their alliance with the United States.

### **Explicating Public Diplomacy Initiatives**

Public diplomacy activities, led by the U.S. Department of State, are designed to counter negative opinion by explaining American foreign policy, countering misinformation, and promoting mutual understanding between the US and other countries. (Amin 2009: 113) The United States did have some framework of a public diplomacy in the Middle East before 9/11, but few of them were adept in meeting the needs and interests of the region.

The incidents of 9/11 forced America to introspect and question its unpopularity in the Islamic world and this led the Bush administration to set in motion a flurry of initiatives aimed at resurrecting the US image in the Islamic world. One of the tools undertaken to achieve this was through reinforcing public diplomacy initiatives in the Islamic World. This can be clearly illustrated with the appointment of Charlotte Beers, former ad guru, as the new Under Secretary of Public diplomacy in September 2001. Her campaign centered on "rebranding and selling America" to the outside world.

This was amply exemplified by initiatives like 'Shared Values', introduced in 2002, which showed Muslim Americans living a good life in American cities. Five video segments were produced for the campaign, attempting to counter stories of hate crimes and discrimination against Muslims in the United States. (Amin 2009: 113) However, the shared value campaign was soon withdrawn in 2003, as many Muslim countries like Egypt refused to air it. 'Muslim life in America' was another such campaign that was introduced by the Bush Administration, which basically highlighted the freedom of religion and tolerance in American society.

One of the most important initiatives undertaken during this period was the introduction of Radio Sawa in 2002 in Arabic language in the Arab countries; however, Mubarak did not allow a free broadcast of Radio Sawa in Egypt, despite being a U.S. ally. Radio Sawa replaced Voice of America's Arabic service, in order to be able to reach out to a younger Arab population.

Another major initiative undertaken in this period was the publication of "Hi" magazine, which began in 2003. The magazine however, focused mostly on cultural matters, mostly avoiding any political issues that would bring about a difference of opinion between the Arabs and Americans. The magazine had a heavy western orientation and did not do well in the Arab world; barely selling 2000 copies a month. Many regarded the magazine as "soft-sell propaganda", which failed to reach out to the Arab youth. (Amin 2009: 115) In December 2005, the new undersecretary of public diplomacy, Karen Hughes suspended the publication of Hi, acknowledging that the dialogue it had sought to create with youth in the Arab world had become one-way. (Amin 2009: 116)

Al-Hurra, an Arabic-language television network was introduced in February 2004 to broadcasts news and current affairs programming to audiences in the Arab world; founded and funded by the Bush administration to check anti-Americanism and build a more positive image for the United States in the Arab world. The network was designed not only to counter Al Jazeera but also to provide Arab viewers with reliable, objective, high quality, and credible alternatives to state-owned television news broadcasts that were rigidly controlled by the governments of Arab countries. (Amin 2009: 120)

Al-Hurra was the most expensive public diplomacy programme in the Arab world; however, it failed to live up to its expectations and hasn't been able to give much of a competition to Al-Jazeera, as few people watch Al-Hurra, as they feel the channel lacks transparency and accountability as its funded by the US government. Despite low viewership, the channel has managed to steadily increase its audience numbers and has many times attracted large viewership, for example, during the 2008 Presidential elections, as it gave a good coverage.

Other notable public diplomacy initiatives undertaken were the Youth Exchange and Study program (YES) in 2002, to provide scholarships for high school students (15-17 years) from countries with significant Muslim populations to spend up to one academic year in the U.S.

(Yesprograms.org) Another such program was the Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Study Program (PLUS), introduced in 2004, which sponsored non-elite students from public schools in the Muslim world to study at universities in America. (Rugh 2004: 118)

The Fulbright International Educational Exchange Programme continued to play a crucial role in America's public diplomacy campaign in Egypt and some new components have been added to it, like the Fulbright's Arabic language and Islamic Civilization components. (Galal 2005: 5) Since 2002 over \$40 million have been dedicated to educational partnership programs with the Arab world and \$3.1 million have been directed to fund a micro-scholarship for teaching English language to 3400 underprivileged Arab youths. (Eisenstaedt 2011) Other programs were also initiated that brought English language teachers, journalists, women leaders and physicians, among others, for training and cross-cultural activities. (National Security Project 2011: 22)

The US government even undertook some cultural diplomacy initiatives like Culture Connect, a program that appointed prominent Americans as cultural ambassadors overseas and Citizen Diplomats, a program that sent regular Americans overseas. (Harrison 2004) The "Noopolitik" has also played an integral part in US public diplomacy, as US worked with more than 1500 organizations worldwide to improve life in Islamic countries, as well as its own image (Harrison 2004).

In this field, many US NGOs such the US Chamber of Commerce Center for Corporate Citizenship, the Business Roundtable, the National Foreign Trade Council, the Business for Diplomatic Action, Council on Competitiveness and the Young Entrepreneur Organization, were particularly active. One of the best examples was US cooperation with the International Wheelchair foundation that donated thousands of wheelchairs to Arab countries (Harrison 2004).

In addition to television and radio, the Internet has gained traction as a medium for public diplomacy and as a result of this, the State Department has increasingly began designing its public diplomacy programs to attract and influence the tech-savvy segment of Egypt's population. (National Security Project 2011: 22) In 2008, for example, the Alliance for Youth Movements, funded by the State Department, organized a summit for bloggers and political activists at Columbia University, which was attended by one, Ahmed Saleh, who

later went on to play a key role in the Tahrir Square protests. (National Security Project 2011: 22)

Egypt has also been the second largest recipient of American aid in the world, after Israel. Egypt has received military assistance aid of 1.8 billion every year along with an extensive developmental assistance. Egypt has received annual economic support funds (ESF) – flexible grants bestowed by USAID to sustain and develop economies – totaling more than those given to all of Asia and the Near East combined, excluding Israel. (Ebeid 2009:104) Not only this, Egypt, also has one of the largest USAID field missions in the world. (Ebeid 2009: 104)

President Obama's Cairo Speech in 2009 was a master public diplomacy effort, as the speech called for improved mutual understanding and relations between the Islamic world and the West; for peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and stressed on mutual interests between America and the Islamic world, he even quoted from the Holy Quran. (Obama: A New Beginning 2009) Obama's speech was hailed as a public diplomacy success in the Islamic world.

Other than that, Obama's initial plans to shut down the Guantanamo prison and secret CIA detention centers were received positively by the public in Cairo. He also appointed a special envoy to solve the Palestinian issue (which probably lies at the heart of anti Americanism in the Middle East). President Obama also characterized Iraq as the wrong war and ended the Iraq war by pulling out all American troops in December 2011.

Washington's public diplomacy wasn't clearly visible during the democratic protests in early 2011 in Egypt. Yet, some of the initiatives taken by America played a key role in the protests. Many American civil society groups and NGO's supported and aided the protestors during the revolution, for which they came under attack later. Many young Egyptians who have been educated in the US or were familiar with American values of democracy, liberty and freedom were the forerunners of the revolution and overall the revolution lacked an all-out anti-American feeling, even though there were particles of it present during the protests.

Understanding the role public diplomacy played in restructuring US relations with Egypt in the 21<sup>st</sup> century can only be captured by accounting for the success of public diplomacy

initiatives in Egypt. Therefore, ascertaining the success of these initiatives is essential for grasping whether public diplomacy in Egypt was able to realize its goals.

## **Construing US Public Diplomacy**

The United States' Public diplomacy in Egypt has covered expansive programmes under it, ranging from broadcast channels, radio stations to various educational and professional exchange programs, along with many economic and cultural diplomacy initiatives as well. Public diplomacy initiatives have had a mixed fate in Egypt, with some of them achieving limited success at some points, whereas some programmes have been utter failures from the very start. The Egyptian revolution has unfolded a new chapter in Egypt's history and this has in fact, also demands a new strategy of engagement between the Egyptians and the Americans that involves the Egyptian public as an active participant.

US public diplomacy programmes like shared value campaign and the Muslim life in America campaign, which showcased Muslim Americans living a good, free life in America, following their faith in peace, did not produce any valuable results. In fact, many countries, Egypt being one of them even took these campaigns off-air. The Arabs weren't questioning the treatment of Muslims or freedom in America, but the reasoning behind the American policies in their region, which these campaigns missed to address.

These public diplomacy efforts were operating on the belief that anti-American feelings were based primarily on a misunderstanding of America—that if only citizens of the region knew and understood American values, they would love the country once again. (Amin 2009: 114) The operative behind these campaigns was to address the perceived miscommunication between America and the Islamic world, which wasn't the real reason for anti-Americanism in the Arab world. (Zaharana 2001: 2) Another dismal failure of public diplomacy in Egypt was the Hi magazine, which out of the 55,000 copies published in a month, barely sold 2,500; in fact, the response to the magazine was so bad that it's publication had to be suspended in less than three years.

Al-Hurra, the US sponsored Arabic broadcast channel met mixed success in Egypt. Al-Hurra, which was planned as an antidote to the very popular Al-Jazeera in the Arab world,

wasn't able to uproot Al-Jazeera's as the most popular and reliable news channel. The challenge that Al Hurra has not been able to overcome is that viewers continue to see it as an American propaganda station, unwilling to cover controversial stories in the region and the network also faces the lack of transparency and accountability. (Amin 2009: 123) Despite this, the Al-Hurra did meet some limited success, as the number of people watching the channel in Egypt has increased steadily, although its share in the viewership still remains very low compared to other news channels in Egypt and the Arab world. Al-Hurra though did make some temporary gains during the 2008 US Presidential elections in the US, as it provided a very good and first-hand coverage of all the issues to the Arab population.

The role of Al-Hurra in the Egyptian revolution of 2011 has been highly debated. One line of argument argued that the United States largely regressed to relying on words, not actions, in reaching out to the Arab people. (Khatib 2011) The United States did not change the structure of its public diplomacy programs targeting the region and Al-Hurra kept broadcasting in its old way, and was totally eclipsed by Al-Jazeera's dedication to covering the Arab revolutions. (Khatib 2011)

The other line of argument pointed out that even though, not a lot of people watched the channel, but those who did regarded it credible and felt that the channel covered the revolution in all its aspects. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)- sponsored polling showed that out of, all those people who watched Al-Hurra during the revolution, 94 percent considered it "very" or "Somewhat Trustworthy," the highest score out of all the countries into which Al Hurra is broadcasted. (BBG Performance Update 2010) Additionally, 61 percent reported it contributed to their understanding of current events, 58 percent that it contributed to their understanding U.S. culture and society and 57 percent that it contributed to their understanding of U.S. policies. (BBG Performance Update 2010)

Public diplomacy's educational and professional exchange programmes have been relatively more successful than any of its other programmes. The Fulbright scholarship and exchange program continues to be one of the most important public diplomacy initiatives in Egypt. Other exchange programmes like Youth Exchange and Study program (YES) and Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Study Program (PLUS) have been efficient and have met with considerable success in Egypt.

The exchanges aren't only limited to civilian exchanges, but many Egyptian military personnel have undergone training and some form of military education in the United States under the International Military Education and Training program (IMET); on which the US spends \$1.2 million annually to train Egyptian military personnel. (CRS Report 2011)

Obama's Cairo speech indicated that a dialogic engagement could help resurrect a country's image and aid its public diplomacy. President Obama decided to reboot US relations with the Muslim world by giving an address at Cairo University on June 6, 2009. (Obama 2009) The speech was well received in most of the region, notably for its respectful approach to Islam and recognition of Palestinian suffering and it also included sections related to human rights and political reform. (McInerney and Fegiery 2010: 83)

Not only this, Obama also raised the issue of democracy, and characterized the Iraq war as the war of choice. Obama's initial plan to shutdown Guantanamo Bay prison and CIA detention centers were seen in a positive light by the Islamic world, along with US military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. However, most of these announcements and diplomat gestures made only temporary gains, as opposed to significant long-term impact.

The role of American public diplomacy in the Egyptian revolution of 2011 has been critically debated and deliberated among the scholars. One side of the argument states that Americans did very little and American public diplomacy played a negligible role in aiding the Egyptian revolution. There were no changes brought about in the public diplomacy programmes, during the revolution, to suit the needs of the changing times. (Khatib 2011) Moreover, the policy statements that came from the US leadership always seemed two steps behind the sentiment in the Arab world, to the Egyptian protestors. (Khatib 2011)

The response of the US government to the Arab Spring in Egypt came too late and too slowly and was "overly cautious" in its structure, thus making the Egyptian public skeptical of the US intentions in the region. (Seib 2011) The tear gas canisters used by Egyptian security forces, were labeled "Made in USA" only added to America's woes. Obama administration only offered reprogrammed assistance of a meager \$150 million, which fell way short of meeting Egypt's daunting economic challenges post the revolution. (Dunne 2012: 3)



Conversely the other line of argument maintained that despite and contrary to the popular perception; U.S.-funded programs did indeed play an important, if not easily perceptible role, in laying the structural groundwork for Egypt's revolution. (National Security Project 2011: 11) The US government, under President Bush did push for democratic reforms within Egypt after 9/11 as "freedom agenda", which became significant only in 2005. (CRS Report 2008) The support persisted despite difficult conditions and small skirmishes with the Egyptian government, but only until 2009, where once again America withdrew from putting too much pressure on the Mubarak regime to initiate democratic reforms.

Egypt, for the longest period has remained one of the largest recipient of American aid and a small fraction of this aid, also went into democracy promotion in Egypt. Not only this, many young, educated and well-travelled people took an active part in the protests and most of them did not view the US averse. Along with this, many US civil society groups and democracy promoting NGO's played a critical role in aiding the Egyptian public during the revolution.

Egypt today stands at the threshold of history, as it turns over a new chapter as a democratic nation-state. This new era for Egypt creates a sense of mixed optimism and wide-eyed expectation for an unknown future. The U.S. must learn from the lessons of its past colonialism and posit itself as a partner for peace in the region, a policy advisor rather than policy maker, through its public diplomacy programmes. (Marcos 2011:11)

Although, Egyptians of all walks of life carried out this revolution, it was started and steered by young, educated, well traveled, and well read Internet users. Many of these have had some American education, or at least do not necessarily view the U.S. as an enemy. (Abdulla 2011: 7) The U.S. needs to partner with these young Egyptians to help them rebuild their country, and it needs to start a new page in its foreign policy in the region, based on a partnership with a politically aware mass rather than an autocracy running a silent majority. (Abdulla 2011: 8)

The United States today has a great opportunity to reshape and reset its relationship with Egypt, as it enters the democratic club of countries in the world. If the United States succeeds in renewing its engagement on a more equal footing, in Egypt through new public diplomacy measures, then the US stands to benefit not only within Egypt, but within the

larger Arab and Islamic world as well. If the US aids and supports the democratic aspirations in Egypt and helps it sustain and manage its democracy efficiently, then the US will be able to considerably alter its perception in the Arab world, of being duplicitous regarding its rhetoric of democracy and its actions.

Preserving an alliance with Egypt and diminishing anti-Americanism remain very important priority goals for the United States, as Egypt not only lies at the heart of the Arab world, but is also an important pillar in preserving stability and security in the Middle East (by maintaining peace with Israel), which is a core interest of the United States in the region.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### Democratic Experiment in Iraq: A Test of Public Diplomacy

*“I believe in the transformational power of liberty. I believe that the free Iraq is in this nation’s (the United States) interest.” George W. Bush*

#### **Introduction**

The Iraq war was the breaking point in the United States’ relationship with the Islamic world and it escalated anti-Americanism all across the Middle East. The US invaded Iraq in March 2003, flouting international opinion and this unilateral act of the United States created worldwide resentment against the US power. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, the US focus shifted to rebuilding Iraq’s polity, society and economy. Rebuilding of Iraq centered on instituting and fostering a sound and stable democracy in Iraq.

Sustaining democracy in Iraq has not only been one of America’s most important goals in the Middle East but it is also a test of America’s public diplomacy. America has a lot at stake in the success or failure of the democratic experiment in Iraq, as the success of democracy in Iraq can help America reshape its image not only in Iraq, but in the larger Islamic world as well. The U.S. interests in promoting peace and democracy in Iraq are essential in maintaining security and stability in the entire Middle East. Thus it is pertinent for the United States to avoid Iraq from slipping into chaos and prevent it from becoming a failed state.

A thriving democracy in Iraq can only progress and sustain itself, if the people of Iraq whole-heartedly lend support to the democratic endeavors in their country. The support of the Iraqi public is crucial for the success of the democratic experiment in Iraq, which will

bring about peace and prosperity in the region. Not only this, a stable and secure Iraq can ensure the end of terrorist activities in the region and also contain Iran's growing influence in the Middle East. Thus, securing the support of the Iraqi public became a crucial goal for the United States, as winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi public is directly linked to a achieving a successful democratic experiment in Iraq. Therefore, the US public diplomacy becomes imperative for the promotion and sustenance of democracy in Iraq.

The United States through its public diplomacy in Iraq had to drive home the point to the Iraqi public that achieving sustainable stability and a working democracy in Iraq is mutually beneficial to both the Iraqis and the Americans. Iraq lies at the center of the Middle East and is a key player in the Persian Gulf region and one of the largest energy producers in the world. The Middle East peace and security and the world at large are heavily dependent on the security and stability of Iraq, which will come only through a stable and prosperous Iraq. Thus it is America's top priority to engage the Iraqi public, to make them more susceptible to democracy promotion in Iraq.

An understanding of a brief background of the United States' relationship with Iraq is critical to analyze the present relations of the two nations. Not only this, a brief outline of the Iraq war and the major bilateral agreements between the two are also essential in understanding the American public diplomacy initiative in Iraq in the present day.

## **Recounting US-Iraq Relations**

The US-Iraq relationship has undergone many phases extending from alliance to hostility, to a clandestine alliance to contain Iran in the Middle East in the 1980s. Then, finally becoming outright enemies that saw them indulge in two wars in 1990-91 and 2003 that finally saw the end of America's mortal enemy of many decades, Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein's defeat in Iraq turned a new chapter in America's relations with Iraq, where America had to take on a new role as an architect responsible for renewing and rebuilding Iraq's political and economic institutions.

The US engagement with Iraq began as early as 1930, when the US granted recognition to Iraq as nation. In 1958, Abdal Karim Qasim of the Nationalist Party staged a coup, which overthrew the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy. The US viewed Qasim with suspicion, because he was sympathetic to the communist cause, as he lifted the ban on the communist party in Iraq and there were some reports that suggested that the CIA was making plans to overthrow him. Qasim however became unpopular among his own party as he refused to join Nasser's United Arab Republic<sup>7</sup> and was overthrown in 1963.

The successor regime of Abdul Salam Arif was instantly befriended by the United States, who as soon as he came into power, expunged the Ba'athists from his Government. He was soon murdered and his brother Abdul Rahman Arif succeeded him, in 1963 and he was a supporter of Nasser's Pan-Arabism and sent Iraqi troops to fight in the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Post-1967, Iraq cut off all diplomatic relations with the United States because of the US support to Israel in the 1967 war.

The 1968 coup, staged by Ba'athist, overthrew Arif and installed Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as the leader of Iraq. (Battle 2002) During this period there was no engagement with the United States and the US also made arms sales to Iraq illegal. 1979 was a crucial year in the Middle Eastern politics, as the Iranian revolution overthrew the US-friendly regime in Iran and Egypt became the first Arab state to make peace with Israel, by signing a treaty.

Saddam Hussein also assumed presidency in Iraq in 1979 and played an instrumental role in getting Egypt expelled from the Arab league for making peace with Israel. This also led the US to put Iraq on the list of countries sponsoring "terrorist groups" in 1979. (Gagnon 2002) Iraq began a new phase under Saddam, in trying to assume and take over the leadership of the Arab world from Egypt.

With the backing of the US, Saddam waged an eight-year campaign, beginning from 1980-1988, against Iran, which has been called the Imposed war. (Samuels 2010: 2) The US though officially remained neutral during the war, it was very apparent that the US undertook every necessary measure to prevent Iraq from losing the war against Iran. In

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<sup>7</sup>. United Arab Republic was a sovereign union between Egypt and Syria. The union began in 1958 and existed until 1961, when Syria seceded from the union.

Saddam, the US found a secular and anti-communist Arab leader and a counter-balance to Iran's growing fundamentalism in the Middle East.

In fact, the Reagan administration chose to overlook many reports that alleged that Iraq was building biological and chemical weapons, even using them in some measures against the Iranians. Not only this, the US supplied billions of dollars of credits, US military intelligence and advice, selling military equipment to Iraq under pretexts, allowing Americana-allied Arab nations, to come to the aid of Iraq by secretly supplying US weapons to Iraq. (Gagnon 2002)

President Reagan also removed Iraq from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, and this made Iraq eligible for transfer of military technology and dual-use, which further allowed Iraq to develop and increase its biological and chemical weapons programme, which would later become a major issue in the 2003 Iraq war. However, Iraq's relations with US soured on discovering that the US had clandestinely been selling weapons to Iran as well during the Iran-Iraq war.

The eight year long war had left Iraq's economy in shambles and US allegiance to Iraq, connected as it was to secular anti-communism within the Middle East, lost currency with the depleted threat of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. (Jeffrey 2007: 452) The US-Iraq relations soon hit their nadir in August 1990, when the Iraqis invaded Kuwait. US-led coalition acting under the mandate of the United Nations and the Arab League came to the aid of Kuwait, launching 'Operation Desert Storm' and expelled the Iraqis forces from Kuwait by February 1991.

After the war, Iraq was slapped with many sanctions and it made the economic situation in Iraq even worse, which resulted in rebellions by the Shias and the Kurds against the Saddam government. The government responded in a very harsh manner, crushing the rebellions with brutal force and even using chemical and biological weapons against their own people. US-led coalition forces imposed no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq, to protect the Iraqis from further attacks and in fact, in 1995, the UN, under US leadership had to create

the Oil-for-Food program<sup>8</sup> to meet the basic needs of the Iraqi people, who were on the brink of starvation, because of a devastated economy in Iraq due to the imposed sanctions.

The US, under President Clinton kept up the pressure on Iraq by regularly imposing more and more sanctions on Iraq to check its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. Clinton also started stressed on the “Regime Change” option in Iraq and in lieu of this passed the ‘Iraq Liberation Act’ in October 1998, which promised and provided help to opposition groups in Iraq, in their quest to remove Saddam Hussein from power. (Zaborowski 2008: 45)

As the UN inspectors were forced to leave Iraq in 1998, the US along with UK bombed Iraq under its Operation Desert Fox, but the Operation was withdrawn in a mere three days. Iraq continued to remain under a regime of sanctions up to 2003 and Saddam Hussein continued to be the US’S no.1 enemy and a thorn in its side. In fact, soon after the 9/11 attacks on America, America under George W. Bush administration, clubbed Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil.”

### **Recapitulating the Iraq War of 2003**

The US undertook “Operation Iraqi Freedom” and launched attacks on Iraq on 20<sup>th</sup> March 2003, without any backing from the international community. The US invaded Iraq with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. (CRS Report 2009) Very soon, the US succeeded in removing the Saddam regime and even managed to capture Saddam Hussein in December 2003, who was later executed in 2006 by the Government of Iraq, acting on US directions. Soon after, the coalition military units had to quickly move from combat to peacekeeping operations in Iraq to prevent post-conflict Iraq from descending into anarchy. (CFR Working Group Report 2003: 5)

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<sup>8</sup> The Oil-for-Food Programme (OFF), established by the United Nations in 1995 (under UN Security Council Resolution 986) was established with the stated intent to allow Iraq to sell oil on the world market in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian needs for ordinary Iraqi citizens without allowing Iraq to boost its military capabilities.

During the war, as Iraq was falling more and more into chaos everyday, the US took responsibility for the security and administration of Iraq, and formed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to oversee matters. The CPA undertook the charge of securing and stabilizing conditions in Iraq and creating an environment for democratic institutions and reforms in the country. In June 2004, the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi interim government, who once again resumed Iraqi sovereignty from American hands.

However, for all purposes, Iraq became a sovereign nation only in name, with the real power in Iraq still residing in American hands. Iraq inaugurated a new democratic constitution in 2005 and elections took place in Iraq in December 2005 and in March 2006, a government was elected democratically in Iraq. Despite, the sovereignty having passed into the hands of the Iraqi people, Iraq plunged deeper and deeper into an abyss of violence, with the bombing of Golden Mosque in Samara in 2006, being the height of it.

The violence and instability in Iraq rapidly engulfed Iraq and drew it closer and closer to becoming a failed state. The US in order to check the quickly depleting situation in Iraq, ordered a “surge” under the ‘New Way Forward’ in January 2007, by increasing the number of US troops and civilian experts in Iraq. The influx of additional US troops utilizing improved counterinsurgency techniques, helped significantly improve the security situation and reduced violence in Iraq. (Kahl *et.al* 2008: 3) The Iraqi Government got more space to work independently and soon opinion started building up in Iraq, for the US troops to leave soon.

The next big step in US-Iraq relations came in January 2009, when the Iraqi government signed two bilateral agreements with the United States. The first agreement was the “Security Agreement” which addressed the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. In June 2009, in accordance with the Security Agreement, US forces withdrew from cities, villages and localities in Iraq. The second agreement was the “Strategic Framework Agreement”, which delineated an array of areas and goals for bilateral cooperation between the two countries and incorporated a large part of US engagement programmes and partnerships, with both the Iraqi people and Government.

In late February 2009, newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama announced an 18-month withdrawal window for combat forces, with approximately 50,000 troops remaining in the



country "to advise and train Iraqi security forces and to provide intelligence and surveillance" (Thomma 2009) Obama promised a quick exit from Iraq and even went on to call Iraq the 'War of Choice' compared to the Afghan war, which he termed as the 'War of Necessity'. (Obama 2009)

In August 2010, President Obama announced the end of 'Operation Iraqi Freedom', which signaled termination of major combat operations in Iraq and renamed the campaign as 'Operation New Dawn'. In October 2011, Obama announced full withdrawal of American forces from the Iraqi soil by the end of 2011 and the last of American troops left Iraq by December 2011, thus ending America's Iraq war after eight years.

### **Protracted Anti-American Sentiments**

Iraq posits a unique study when it comes to anti-Americanism, as it shares many lines of reasoning, which fall under the common purview of anti-Americanism in the larger Islamic world, but also has distinct reasons of its own. Iraq was ravaged by the war and thus Iraqis have a unique experience and many reasons of anti-Americanism in Iraq, are particular and specific to Iraq only. The Iraq war was the snapping point for many Islamic countries with the US, because they saw America's aggression in Iraq as not only a war on Islam, but as a misuse of its superpower status and America's unilateral march on Iraq escalated anti-Americanism all over the Islamic world.

The US image in Iraq remained dismal, with a large number of Iraqis opposing the US war in Iraq. According to a Gallup poll of 2004, around 71 percent of Iraqis saw Coalition forces as occupiers, rather than liberators. Polls conducted since 2006 in Iraq have repeatedly shown that Iraqis preferred immediate withdrawal of the US troops from the Iraqi soil. Ever since 2006 polls, more than 55 percent Iraqis maintain that the US made a mistake in engaging in the Iraq war. (Pollingreport 2011)

Nonetheless, there is another aspect to the polls, which often showed Iraqi's eagerness for the US to aid in Iraq's reconstruction and rebuilding and the US to maintain a civilian presence to aid Iraq's democratic institutions. Not only this, different ethnic groups in Iraq

entail a different story, for example, the Kurds were always more in favor of the US presence than other ethnic groups. (Kull 2008)

The Iraq war created a huge hue and cry against America all across the world and it created ripples of protests all over the world. The Islamic world took the Iraq war; the hardest and it escalated anti-American sentiment in these countries rapidly. However, the impact Iraq war had in Iraq itself was not significantly different. The US, contrary to its expectations of being welcomed as liberators of Iraqis from the oppressive Saddam regime, were perceived as occupiers and invaders by a large majority of the Iraqi people.

The loss that the Iraqis had to incur in both men and money was huge and thousands and thousands of innocent Iraqi people lost their lives not only during the siege, but also during the violence that ensued after the toppling of the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. America was blamed for the devastation that the Iraq war brought to the Iraqis and this led to deep-set resentment being planted in the Iraqi people against the Americans.

US's unilateral action in the Iraq war, without the support of the UN and even some of its own allies like France and Germany, fueled a fear that the United States would act in an unconstrained fashion that would damage the interests of others and was a threat to peace and stability in the world. (Steinberg 2008: 160) For many in Iraq and all across the Islamic world, Bush's doctrine of preemptive strike changed America's image from victim to aggressor. (Zaharana 2010: 17)

When America attacked Saddam, without the rightful backing of the international community and without the UN mandate, America shot down its own claims of playing by the rules of resolutions and this made America look hypocritical in the Iraqi eyes. (Dergham 2007) The Iraq war to many Iraqis highlighted America's superpower arrogance and acute disrespect for Iraqi sovereignty.

Another major source of Iraqi disaffection with the United States was because of the mismanagement by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA couldn't meet the Iraqi expectations of liberation and fell very short in providing them adequate electricity, water, sanitation, personal safety. The coalition at the same time did not make any attempts to communicate with the Iraqi public. (Al-Rahim 2004: 19)

The overall U.S. reconstruction effort suffered from poor management, a lack of planning and understaffing, and gross overdependence on a mix of contractors that focused more on profiteering than performance. (CSIS 2010: 225) Many Iraqis complained that they were in a better condition before America liberated them, as their basic needs also weren't being met.

Anti-Americanism in Iraq also gained strength because the pretexts that America had used to attack Iraq later proved to be futile and baseless. The WMD's that America had attacked Iraq for were never found and it was later declared that Iraq didn't possess any great amount of WMD's. Amidst reports that the Neo-Conservatives during the Bush period manufactured and altered information to find pretexts to attack Iraq, the Iraqi resolve against Americans grew even stronger.

Another major cause of anti-Americanism in Iraq was that in the early days of the Iraq war, all the engagement and communication with the Iraqi public was held by the Department of Defense, rather than the Department of State, that engaged with the Iraqi public in an archaic propaganda-akin way, which raised more questions on American credibility in Iraq. (Davis 2007) The Department of Defense conducted flawed public diplomacy practices in Iraq and painted extremely rosy pictures of American success in Iraq, when the reality was disparagingly opposite.

The behavior of American troops who manhandled Iraqis and used profane language and gestures against them, also created more ill feelings in Iraq. (Rugh 2006) Examples of such behavior, included American males physically touching Arab women during security body searches (a violation of customs forbidding public contact with the opposite sex); using dogs to search persons or homes (dogs are considered unclean); forcibly entering homes (trespassed on the sanctity of the home, especially the privacy accorded to females); forcing tribal leaders to lay on the ground (violated the respect due to community leaders); or putting boots on peoples' necks to force their head to the ground (shoes are unclean and one's forehead only touches the ground when offering prayers to God). (Zaharana 2010: 42) Even though, most of these practices were done to ensure the safety of U.S. troops, yet they sharply debased the culture and traditions of the Iraqis and created deep resentment amongst the Iraqi public.

In April 2004, the positive image of “America as liberators” in Iraq all but dissipated when graphic photos of U.S. military personnel maltreating Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison surfaced and circled the globe. (Zaharana 2010: 18) The Abu-Gharib incident also reinforced many people’s perceptions in the Iraqi society and the Islamic world at large, as America being an immoral and decadent nation, with no respect for other people’s culture and traditions. America had to engage in a lot of face saving, after the Abu-Gharib incident as it dealt a further blow to America’s fast declining image in the Islamic world.

America’s Iraq war plunged Iraq deep into the abyss of violence and instability. The sectarian violence in Iraq increased manifold and the squabble between the three largest sects in Iraq, namely, the Shias, the Sunnis and the Kurds created a bloodbath in Iraq. Bombings and attacks became everyday matters, forcing many Iraqis to seek refuge in other countries and this large scale violence in Iraq led to displacement of a lot of people and almost brought Iraq to the verge of a civil war.

Iraqis blamed the Americans for the worsening political and economic conditions in their country, as their miseries rose. However, after the 2007 ‘surge’ the violence and instability in Iraq were brought under significant control. During the height of violence in Iraq, America constructed the largest and most expensive embassy ever, with a swimming pool and movie theater, which were seen as an evidence of American arrogance and disconnectedness during a time, by the Iraqis, when most Iraqis lacked basic services and security. (Lapison 2010: 8) Iraqis grew more enraged with America, as they felt that Americans weren’t really concerned about the worsening situation in Iraq and were only after their own interests in securing oil deals and showcasing their hard power to the world.

Other reasons that resulted in increasing anti-Americanism in Iraq were common causes in most of the Arab nations. At the heart of anti-Americanism in the Arab world has and continues to be the Israel-Palestine issue. On no issue is Arab anger at the United States more widely and acutely felt than that of Palestine. (Makdisi 2002: 553) The “unlimited” and “unconditional” American support to Israel, from America’s position on Israel’s occupation of lands, to America’s position on the Israeli-Palestine peace process, to America’s policy in the UN security council and America’s aid to Israel, all help in creating strong grievances in the Arab world against America. (Kyalu 2007: 72)

The Israeli bombing of Gaza, following the bombardment of Lebanon in 2006, has provoked much anger worldwide and the United States' unwavering support for Israel in 2008 (let alone 2006) has not helped restore America's reputation in the Islamic world. (Khatib and Dodds 2008: 2)

Another attribute of anti-Americanism in Iraq is the distaste expressed against many American television shows and movies, as being corrupting, immoral and shameless. There is also dissatisfaction against the Arab portrayal in American films as the Arabs often find these portrayals as insulting and condescending. The portrayal of America in Arab media can also be held accountable to some extent for increasing anti-Americanism in Egypt.

The United States in its relationship with the Arab world suffers from a preconceived stereotype. (Asila 2007: 14) According to this stereotype, the United States is portrayed in the Arab media as: a country that has lost its credibility; an invading, occupying power, acting outside of international laws and legitimacy; a country whose policy contradicts its values and principles on justice, human rights, and freedom; and biased toward Israel. (Mohamed 2007)

Anti-Americanism is also caused by American usage of terminology like "Crusade", "Axis of Evil", "War of Ideas", "Us vs. Them", as these kind of terms play into the extremist discourse of America against Islam and should be carefully avoided. The incongruence between America's rhetoric and its actions made America more unpopular in the Islamic world.

The US is viewed as hypocritical and deceitful because they apply different standards to different countries, for example, Iraq was attacked for possessing WMD's whereas Israel, who is widely considered an undeclared nuclear power is not only, not condemned by the US, but regularly rewarded as well. The perceived disparity between America's ideals and America's policies was also seen in US's rhetoric of safeguarding human rights in the world and pulling up countries for their bad humanitarian records, when incidents like Abu Gharib and Guantanamo take place in its own backyard.

After having thrown light on anti-Americanism in Iraq and the myriad reasons behind it, it is pertinent to look at the various public diplomacy programmes that the government of united

states has undertaken since 2003, in order to improve its image in Iraq and promote and strengthen democracy in Iraq.

## **Delineating Public Diplomacy Initiatives**

Public diplomacy in Iraq aims to reduce anti-Americanism in Iraq and help reshape America's image. However, the more important goal of American public diplomacy in Iraq is to promote and sustain democracy in Iraq, which will ensure security and stability of not only Iraq, but the Middle East as well. The success of the democratic experiment in Iraq is invariably linked to the success of public diplomacy in Iraq.

The number of public diplomacy programmes that have been introduced in Iraq are more than any other country and some of them were specifically designed for Iraq alone, to cater to the needs of the Iraqi people in particular. The US has engaged Iraq on a wide variety of fronts, ranging from diplomatic, economic, informational, social and military as well. (Eisenstaedt 2011)

The public diplomacy programmes that were introduced in the larger Arab world were also introduced in Iraq before the war. Some of these early public diplomacy initiatives include programmes like "Shared Values" and "Muslim Life in America", which were introduced soon after 9/11 and they presented Muslim Americans living a good free religious life in America.

Another one of these campaigns was the website launched by America titled "Islam in the United States", highlighting how the US respected Islam and how the Muslims in America had become an integral part of American society. These kinds of programmes did not work in most Islamic countries, as they were seen as being just credulous propaganda of the US and were soon withdrawn by the US Government.

During the first phase of the Iraq war, when the CPA was controlling Iraq administratively and economically, the US government under the Department of Defense's guidance introduced a number of public diplomacy initiatives in Iraq, in order to bring some semblance of peace and stability in Iraq. One of the most significant public diplomacy

initiatives undertaken by the Defense Department was the establishment of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) after taking control over from former media outlets in Iraq in April 2003 (Zaharana 2010: 42) The Al-Iraqiya, an Arabic language television network was launched under the IMN, which reached around 85% of Iraqi viewers and became fairly popular.

Some of the old public diplomacy programmes that had been running since before the 9/11 continued to play a very important role in the Iraq war like Radio Free Iraq and Voice of America-Arabic. Despite this, Radio Sawa in the Arab world soon replaced VOA-Arabic. This was done to connect with the Arab youth, who were perceived to be more impressionable and receptive to American culture. (Rugh 2009: 3) However, Radio Sawa mostly aired American popular music and very little news and was largely apolitical in nature. The withdrawal of VOA-Arabic deprived many Arab listeners of a serious news and public affairs programming. (Rugh 2006: 173)

The Al-Hurra was an Arabic language television network introduced by the United States in February 2004, to broadcast news and current affairs programming to audiences in the Arab world. The network was designed not only to counter Al Jazeera but also to provide Arab viewers with reliable, objective, high quality, and credible alternatives to state-owned television news broadcasts that were rigidly controlled by the governments of Arab countries. (Amin 2009: 120) In April 2004, an additional channel was launched specifically designed for the Iraqi audience, called Al-Hurra Iraq.

A number of cultural diplomacy programs like Culture Connect and Citizen Diplomats were launched, that sent prominent and ordinary Americans overseas as cultural ambassadors of the US. Other notable public diplomacy initiatives undertaken were the Youth Exchange and Study program (YES) in 2002, to provide scholarships for high school students (15-17 years) from countries with significant Muslim populations to spend up to one academic year in the U.S. (Yesprograms.org) Another such program was the Partnerships for Learning Undergraduate Study Program (PLUS), introduced in 2004, which sponsored non-elite students from public schools in the Muslim world to study at universities in America. (Galal 2005: 5)

The educational and professional exchange programmes have always been one of the most important public diplomacy initiatives of the United States in the Islamic world. The Peace

Corps and Fulbright Scholarships continued to be one of the most successful American public diplomacy programmes in Iraq. A number of new educational public diplomacy initiatives were launched after 9/11 in the Islamic world. Some of the notable programmes launched in Iraq under this were the Partnerships for Learning programme, a student exchange program and the School Connectivity Program, a virtual student exchange program.

There were many educational public diplomacy programmes that were tailor-made, specifically for Iraq. Iraqi students, young adults, scholars, and teachers also got the opportunity to participate in Iraq-specific and other region-wide education programs sponsored by the US government, including the Iraqi Young Leaders Exchange Program (IYLEP), the Iraq Women in Engineering and Applied Sciences (IWASE) Program, the MEPI Student Leaders program, and the MEPI Civic Education and Leadership Fellowship. (Laipson 2010: 22)

Access Micro scholarship grant was another example of US educational public diplomacy initiatives, which was awarded primarily in the Muslim world to lower-income youths to provide access to US-Sponsored English classes. (Foreign Relations Committee Report 2009: 20) Many institutes like the Institute for International Education and AMIDEAST promote better understanding between Iraqis and Americans by regularly holding talks and inviting Iraqi scholars and leaders for lectures.

The US government has also been encouraging the Iraqi scientific community, by using their expertise in various fields in Iraq and opening foundation funding to the Iraqi Government for science projects. At the same time, the United States has also been encouraging Iraq to build linkages to science libraries and virtual repositories of new knowledge across the physical and social sciences. (Laipson 2010: 25)

The “Noopolitik” plays a crucial role in American public diplomacy, with US working with many organizations in the world to improve its image and improve the lives of people worldwide. A shining example of the use of Noopolitik as a public diplomacy tool was the Multi-National Force-Iraq’s YouTube channel that was launched in 2007. (Christensen 2008) The US in fact launched a website, “Telling Our Stories”, which detailed the work



that USAID does all across the world, spanning across varied spectrums, creating public awareness about USAID's activities. In fact, in 2008, James Glassman, the then Under Secretary of public diplomacy launched Public Diplomacy 2.0, to promote the use of Internet and technology to promote public diplomacy initiatives.

The United States undertook many economic initiatives in Iraq to bolster Iraq's economy. The United States organized US-Iraq business conferences, which were attended by a large number of businessmen from both the countries, to formulate and strengthen economic and business partnerships with each other. Not only this, the US also lent support to Iraq's candidature in the WTO.

America also lent, Iraq technical and professional expertise on many areas, spanning across a wide arena of issues. The provision of American technical know-how to help Iraqis more effectively use their human and natural resources are symbolic of the new relationship the United States established with Iraq. (Kane and Taylor 2011: 2)

The US had also been aiding Iraq's agricultural sector, as the agriculture sector in Iraq is very important for Iraq to achieve food security. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided support to Iraqi farmers and the Iraqi agricultural sector. US- funded initiatives to support sustainable and profitable farming practices included farming cooperatives with revolving credit systems for farmers, technical assistance for improved water and soil resources management, animal and plant health, and the training and education of public and private sector representatives. (FAS 2010)

America also set up a Public Distribution System in Iraq for a more robust and sustainable storage and shipment system; at the same time, America also helped Iraq meet some of the critical challenges, like drying up of marshlands and riverbeds in the south, and the rise in water salinity, which disrupted agriculture and livelihoods in Iraq. (Lapison 2010: 22) Another area, where Americans have played a very instrumental role in Iraq is providing assistance to the refugees and the internally displaced persons Iraqis and helping them relocate and resettle in Iraq.

America's most important public diplomacy programmes in Iraq have been related to America's promotion of democracy and strengthening democratic institutions in Iraq. In

2002, the State Department, in cooperation with the USAID, launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), whose aim was to Strengthen civil society and the rule of law, empower women and youth, improve and expand education, encourage economic reform and increase political participation in the Arab world.

MEPI, along with a number of dedicated NGO's has played a very crucial role in establishing democratic institutions in Iraq, ever since the Iraq war. The US department of state, the USAID along with many large-scale organizations, like the US Institute of peace, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, National Endowment for Democracy's constitute groups aid and fund many dedicated NGO's in Iraq that help Iraq build institutions and a democratic culture. (Lapison 2010: 7) The United States through many of its programmes continued to support and develops Iraq's civil society that aided Iraq's democratic transition.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team, widely known as the PRT<sup>9</sup> has played a very central role in aiding Iraq's transition to a democracy and in reconstruction of Iraq. The PRT's in Iraq comprised of military and civilian officers and many technical experts and diplomats, who were responsible for civil engagement in Iraq ever since 2005, and had been continuously helping Iraqi civilian units and Government, by empowering them to govern themselves more effectively. Public diplomacy was an essential element of Provincial Reconstruction Team projects. The PRT projects were considerably successful in Iraq after the 2007 'surge' and were rapidly expanded to 31 PRT's by the end of 2008.

The Strategic Framework Agreement of 2009, between the United States and Iraq governments was also another notable step in empowering the Iraqi nation and has played an instrumental role in strengthening American public diplomacy in Iraq. Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) laid down the foundation for a long-term bilateral relationship between the United States and Iraq based on mutual interests and under the SFA, the U.S.-Iraqi relationship continued to improve with respect to economic, diplomatic, cultural, and

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<sup>9</sup> . A PRT includes a military component (Civil Affairs/Force Protection, etc.), civilian police advisors, and civilian representatives of US (or other national) government foreign affairs agencies. In a US-led PRT, this generally includes a representative from USAID, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice. They are assisted by public diplomacy and reporting staff.

security ties; with the SFA serving as the foundation for a long-term cooperative relationship between the two nations. (Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq 2009: 3)

The Strategic Framework Agreement has helped Iraq across a plethora of issues, ranging from women rights, ethnic interests, educational cooperation, energy development, health care, information technology, communications and law enforcement. In conjunction with the SFA, U.S. and Iraqi officials worked within a framework of joint engagement to enhance stability, promote sustainable economic growth and the efficient distribution of essential services, improve governmental transparency, and advance regional relationships. (Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq 2009: 3)

Other worthwhile public diplomacy initiatives in Iraq have been diplomatic exchanges between Iraq and the United States. President Obama's first overseas trip was to Iraq, in April 2009. Not only this, he hosted Prime Minister Maliki of Iraq in Washington twice during his first year in office. Other than the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense and Agriculture have made numerous visits to Iraq and have held meetings with Iraqis from all walks of life.

The US played a key role in overseeing and supervising fair and free elections in 2010 in Iraq, which won it considerable goodwill in Iraq. America has also played a considerable role in reducing Arab-Kurdish tensions and conducting outreach programmes to engage with Iraq's Christian and other minority communities and helped them in active political participation in Iraq. (CWC Special Report 2011: 2) America has already expanded its civilian reach in Iraq, after the American troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011. America has expanded its permanent consulates and temporary embassy branch offices in Iraq for aiding Iraqi democracy and society as well.

An evaluative understanding of the success and failure of the US public diplomacy programmes is vital to this study and is discussed in the following section.

## **Conjecture of US Public Diplomacy**

The United States has implemented and executed the most expansive and wide-ranging public diplomacy programmes in Iraq out of the entire Arab world. The United States' public diplomacy is inextricably linked to the sustenance and maintenance of an effective democracy in Iraq. After the Iraq war, the US undertook the responsibility of rebuilding and reconstructing Iraq and the most important aspect of this reconstruction was laying down a successful self-governing democratic framework in Iraq. The success of this democratic experiment has been dependent on the success of the US public diplomacy in Iraq. The US undertook a myriad of public diplomacy initiatives in Iraq and some of them met considerable success, while some proved to be largely ineffectual.

Campaigns that aimed at “rebranding America” in the Islamic world, like “Shared Values” and “Muslim Life in America” which showcased lives of American Muslims living a comfortable and free life in America, with the freedom to maintain their traditions and religious values did not garner much success in the Arab world, because the Muslims in the Arab world were more concerned about American policies in the region. (Samei 2010) These campaigns came out to be seen as American propaganda by the Arabs and achieved very limited success. (Zaharana 2009)

At the same time when America was launching and running these campaigns, there were constant reports of ethnic profiling of Muslims in American cities and airports. Many actions of America's Homeland Security under the PATRIOT Act seemed to be attacking the Muslim community in America. Thus, to many in Iraq the reality in America seemed starkly contrasted to the picture presented in campaigns of ‘Shared Values’ and ‘Muslim life in America’. These campaigns were withdrawn soon by the Bush administration.

The Coalition Provisional Authority, which had assumed the security and administrative responsibility of Iraq after the fall of the government in Iraq, could not meet much success in developing public diplomacy programmes in Iraq. The programmes that were launched in this period were launched under the guidance of the DOD, which exaggerated the positives of America's role in Iraq and negated the instability, violence and chaos in Iraq. The DOS played minimal role in this period and this led to weak public diplomacy programmes, being

introduced in Iraq, which failed to make much impact on winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi public.

Al-Iraqiya was the most successful initiative launched by the DOS in Iraq, but even this registered only limited success, because many Iraqis felt that the network was more Lebanese in content and style than Iraqi, as it was run by Lebanese subcontractors hired by the Americans. (Rugh 2006: 172) The Abu Gharib incident was a big setback to America in Iraq as it raised hundreds of questions over America's commitment to human rights internationally, when its soldiers indulged in cruel and inhuman behavior. The increasing sectarian violence and rapidly increasing instability in Iraq only, made matters worse, which almost brought Iraq to the edge of a civil war.

Radio Sawa, was targeted at the Arab youth and replaced the Voice of America-Arabic which used to air more serious content and broadcast news shows. Radio Sawa did register some success in the Arab world, but most listeners tuned in for the music, rather than the political message funded by the radio station. (Nawawy and Iskandar 2003: 213)

Radio Free Iraq had been running and broadcasting in Iraq since 1998 and was one of the most successful public diplomacy initiatives in Iraq. An example of Radio Free Iraq's success was its outreach to the innocent Iraqis prisoners being in Saudi Arabia from 2009-10, without any legal counsel. Many of these prisoners had managed to sneak in their radios, through which they contacted the Radio Free Iraq, who in turn informed the Iraqi government, who started a series of negotiations with the Saudi government to rescue these prisoners. (Nekoomaram 2010) Radio Free Iraq has helped in giving a voice to the common Iraqis and is viewed as legitimate media source in Iraq. (McCullough *et.al* 2012: 81)

Al- Hurra, launched in 2004 was one of America's most expensive public diplomacy undertakings. Al-Hurra was launched to take on the Al-Jazeera in the Arab world, which it failed to do because many in the Arab world saw it being nothing but a mouthpiece for the US administration, which lacked credibility. (Dickinson 2005: 8) Al-Hurra also launched a special channel for Iraq, called Al-Hurra Iraq, which aired programs specifically catering to Iraqi needs, and was more successful in Iraq than the Al-Hurra, because of its focus on the Iraqi issues.

The public diplomacy programmes launched in the field of education were largely successful and created goodwill for America in the region. Some student and professional exchange programs were greatly welcomed in Iraq like Youth Exchange and Study Program, Partnership for Learning, Iraqi Youth Leaders Exchange Program, Iraq Women in Engineering and Applied Sciences Program, MEPI Civic Education and Leadership Program, Micro Scholarship Program. These new initiatives along with old ones like Fulbright and Peace Corps have played a prominent role in bringing about a more positive image for the United States in Iraq.

The US introduced a number of programmes to restructure the devastated economy of Iraq by organizing many bilateral business meetings and conferences, that encouraged Iraqi businessmen to start new ventures, with US aid. Not only this, US's support to Iraq's bid in the WTO has also been viewed positively in Iraq. The US Department of Agriculture supported Iraqi farmers and gave them large amounts of aid and support, so as to ensure food security in Iraq. The USAID launched a number of programmes, spending billions of dollars, in Iraq helping in the fields of education, healthcare, infrastructure, sanitation, etc. The US also launched programmes resettling refugees and internally displaced persons in Iraq due to the war.

The PRT's have played a very central role in America's democratic mission in Iraq and has been instrumental in the reconstruction of Iraq. The PRT's have been responsible for civil engagement in Iraq ever since 2005, and have played a big role in bringing democracy in Iraq by aiding civil society and establishing and overseeing democratic institutions and empowering Iraqi citizens and ensuring a better governance in Iraq. The PRT projects were considerably successful in Iraq after the 2007 'surge' and were rapidly expanded to 31 PRT's by the end of 2008. (CRS Report 2009) The USAID has also worked to strengthen democracy in Iraq through its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which did considerable work in strengthening Iraq's civil society and democratic institutions in the country.

Iraq witnessed massive violence and instability after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, up till 2008. This had led the Bush administration to order an increase in the number of military troops in Iraq, or what is called the 'surge', to take control of the worsening situation. This surge played a significant role in reducing the violence in Iraq, as Iraqi

civilian fatalities came down from 34,000 in 2006 to 3,000 in 2009. (CRS Report 2010: 2) The US also provided training and logistical help to Iraqi army and police to make them capable of handling the security of Iraq and prepared them for the American military withdrawal of December 2011.

The Strategic Framework Agreement of 2009, between the United States and Iraq was another prominent step in strengthening relations with Iraq and a crucial public diplomacy programme as well. Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) laid the foundation for a long-term bilateral relationship between the United States and Iraq and a commitment from the US government to help Iraq on all economic, social and political fronts.

The Strategic Framework Agreement has seen American civilian officers helping Iraq across a range of issues, extending from women rights, ethnic interests, educational cooperation, energy development, health care, information technology, communications to law enforcement. (CRS Report 2008: 17) The SFA has helped Iraq achieve more stability and prosperity, with the help of American aid.

Diplomatic activities and gestures have further fostered a positive image for the US in Iraq. President Obama's ascendance to the White House along with his erudite grassroots, people-to-people strategy of communication created a positive atmosphere in Iraq. (Payne 2009: 29) Notable among these have been Obama's Cairo speech in which he admitted that US made some wrong policy choices in attacking Iraq and went ahead to call it the "War of Choice" (Obama 2009) Obama's interview with Al-Arabiya was also widely heralded as positive in Iraq and the Arab world, at large. (Zaharana 2009: 7)

President Obama made his first overseas trip in April 2009 to Iraq to reconfirm US's commitment to rebuilding of Iraq and then he hosted the Iraqi president twice in 2009; which were all seen as favorable diplomatic gestures by the Iraqis. The most successful action was Obama's complete withdrawal of American military troops from Iraq in December 2011, also keeping his promise made to the Iraqis in 2010 to end the US military presence soon.

Iraqi opinion of the United States during the Iraq war was always very complex and complicated, as many Iraqis constantly demanded an end to US military presence in Iraq.

Despite this, a large majority of Iraqi public kept reiterating a demand for a larger role to be played by US, through its civilian presence in the reconstruction and development of Iraq. The Kurds in particular in Iraq were in favor of the US prolonging its stay in Iraq, as the presence of the US military curbed sectarian violence in Iraq to a large extent.

Many Iraqis expressed these views and have wanted the United States to play a larger role in bringing stability, prosperity and democracy in Iraq, as a partner and not an invader. While the Iraqis viewed the US military as a sign of American hegemony, they viewed American civilian expertise and aid positively and welcomed America's role in building democratic institutions in Iraq and strengthening them.

The consolidation of a stable, democratic Iraq depends in particular upon the evolution of a government that is seen as legitimate and effective, and the development of an economy that provides opportunities and livelihoods to Iraq's young and fast-growing population, America's role is critical in helping Iraq achieve these goals. (Pollack et.al 2010) American public diplomacy is crucial in Iraq for democracy to succeed in Iraq and prevent it from becoming a failed state.

Engagement with the Iraqi public and securing their support is essential for America, because the democracy in Iraq can only succeed if the Iraqi people see it in their interest and fight for it. Democracy in Iraq is invariably linked to the stability and security of not only Iraq, but the larger Middle East as well. A secure and stable Iraq can also quell terrorist activities in the region and help contain the growing influence of Iran. The success or failure of the democratic experiment reflects not only on American public diplomacy in Iraq but also the American power in the world.



## Conclusion

America woke up to the stark reality of widespread Anti-Americanism in the Islamic world post 9/11 and had to commence on a vigorous plan to control and check the rising anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. Anti-Americanism in the Islamic world threatened America's security, stability and national interest, as the 9/11 attacks on America were an extension of an extremely virulent and crude variety of anti-American thinking.

Therefore, Curbing the mounting anti-Americanism became one of America's principal foreign policy goals post 9/11. At the center of this plan for checking anti-Americanism was public diplomacy. Public diplomacy was reinvigorated as an important foreign policy tool by the United States to not only check anti-Americanism, but also to rebuild and reshape its image in the Islamic world.

Public diplomacy became crucial for the United States in the Globalized and interconnected world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, where the boundaries between nations blurred and the information revolution gave free access to the common people in the world. In this period it became clear that, hard power was not the only criteria of measuring a country's strength and significance in the world.

The soft power of a country became equivalently important in truly making a country powerful. In fact, the veritable evaluation of a country's power can only be gauged by its possession of both hard and soft power and the ability to strike a judicious balance between the two, i.e. its smart power. Public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power. It has become a significant part of American foreign policy apparatus.

An effective public diplomacy campaign is expected to reduce anti-Americanism in the Islamic world. It can also help America in garnering a favorable public opinion in these countries and gain support for American policies in the region. Public diplomacy by the US does not face much of a problem in these countries, as many governments in the Islamic world are friends and allies of the United States already. However, these governments

sometimes find it very difficult to officially standby and support Washington's policy as the public in these countries hold high anti-American sentiment.

America incorporated public diplomacy as an important program in its Global War on Terror as well, as the realization dawned upon the US foreign policymakers that military might was not enough to dismantle, destroy and defeat terrorist networks. Washington realized that in order to win the War on Terror, it had to win the War of Ideas and public diplomacy was one of the best bets to defeat the radical extremist ideologies that promoted such heinous acts.

Winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim masses became a crucial American interest to safeguard the security and stability around the world. America required the whole hearted support of the people of the Islamic world for it to succeed in its War on Terror, especially the support of the publics in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which were the centers of the Global War on Terror.

Pakistan became a frontline state for the United States in its Afghan war to dismantle the terrorist strongholds in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been a pivotal player in America's Global War on Terror and a full-fledged support of Pakistan became pertinent for the success of the war on terrorism. A whole-hearted support from Pakistan could not come without the support of the common Pakistani people and thus winning over the Pakistani public became essential for the United States.

America found itself in a difficult situation, vis-à-vis the Pakistani public because of their heightened anti-Americanism. Despite the United States having been an ally of Pakistan for over sixty years, very few Pakistanis viewed the US favorably. In fact, anti-Americanism in Pakistan was and continues to be widespread and all encompassing, which created and continues to create difficulties for the United States in the region.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has been a very complex phenomenon and has played a detrimental role in the US-Pakistan relationship since 9/11. It rapidly spiraled post 9/11 and became stronger and stronger as the War on Terror progressed. Antipathy against the US today has become viral in Pakistan and so much so that Pakistan has become one of the most anti-American countries in the world. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan remains a multi-faceted

phenomenon. It has not only been a part of the larger discourse of anti-Americanism in the Islamic world, but it also has many reasons of disaffection, owing to its close relationship with the United States.

The root cause of anti-Americanism in Pakistan ranges from Washington's military policy in Pakistan, to the nature of its economic assistance, to the American policy toward the Islamic world at large. History has played a very big role in shaping Pakistani views of the United States, as time and time again Pakistanis felt betrayed by their external ally. Pakistan's resentment against the US built up ever since its two wars with India, in 1965 and 1971, where the United States, despite being Pakistan's ally did not come to the aid of Pakistan and remained neutral.

America once again used Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as Pakistan was also bribed with huge amount of assistance into becoming a frontline state in America's proxy war. However, as soon as the Soviets withdrew from Pakistan, the US interest in Pakistan waned and it applied sanctions after sanctions on its erstwhile-ally. The US has had a waxing and waning relationship with Pakistan and a large number of Pakistanis have been suspicious of an alliance with the US, as the US has proved to be an unreliable ally to Pakistan, during its times of crisis. The fear of US backtracking and abandoning Pakistan in a hotbed of mess, once again manifested itself during the War on Terror.

On top of this, the US inched closer to Pakistan's arch enemy, India and established a long-term strategic partnership with it, which further fuelled anti-Americanism in Pakistan, as Washington had never sought that kind of a relationship with Pakistan. American assistance has been another source of resentment in Pakistan, as it's assistance to Pakistan has been very lopsided, with a very large share going towards military assistance and a very small amount for developmental assistance. This reinforced the belief in Pakistan that America only wanted to use Pakistan in its war on terror and was not interested in the Pakistani people and their development.

The American policy in Pakistan during the War on Terror, however, has been the biggest cause of increasing anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The US actions like openly criticizing Pakistan's efforts in the War on Terror and forcing it to make decisions against its own people, carrying out raids within Pakistan to hunt down terrorists made America more

unpopular in Pakistan. The US's disregard for human rights and democracy in Pakistan furthered antipathy in Pakistan against America.

US military actions have been the most damaging to the American image in Pakistan. The drone attacks killed a number of innocent Pakistanis and have created an abysmal image for the United States in Pakistan, with more and more Pakistanis viewing America as an enemy. Recent events like the Raymond Davis incident, Dr. Fai's arrest and the USA's airstrikes that killed some Pakistani soldiers and led to the closing of lines for NATO supplies by the Pakistan government, have all incensed tensions between Islamabad and Washington. The US NAVY SEALS raid in Abbotabad in May 2011 to capture Osama Bin Laden was very negatively viewed in Pakistan, because the US acted without informing the Pakistani government and in Pakistan's perception, disrespected and obliterated Pakistani sovereignty.

American policy in the Islamic world has also contributed to anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The most sensitive and crucial ones have been America's role in the Israel-Palestine issue and America's invasion of Iraq. Many in Pakistan view the United States popular culture and values as being un-Islamic and a bad influence on the society. Similarly, Washington's usages of terminology like, "Us vs. Them", "Crusade", "War on Ideas" etc. also aroused suspicions in Pakistani minds, and strengthened their perception that America was against Islam. Despite these reasons, the largest and the strongest source of persistent anti-Americanism come from unsound US policies in the region, which have fuelled anti-Americanism in Pakistan.

Egypt, another long-term ally of the United States and a big player in the Arab and Islamic world is today undergoing a period of democratic transition. Egypt has been an important ally of the US in the Middle East as it was the first Arab country that made peace with Israel in 1979 by signing a peace treaty with Israel, under the US guidance. Since then, Egypt maintained its peace with Israel and helped secure and stabilize the situation in the Middle East. Maintaining Egyptian-Israeli peace has always been one of America's core interests in the Middle East, and the United States to secure these interests has doled out huge amounts of aid to both Egypt and Israel.

Public Diplomacy in Egypt has been used not only to curb anti-Americanism in Egypt but also to gain support of the Egyptian public for overall US policy in the Middle East,

especially concerning Israel. America launched a number of public diplomacy programmes in Egypt to win the hearts and minds of the Egyptian public. Several of these programmes were introduced in the larger Islamic world and others were crafted for Egypt specifically. Some of the notable programmes launched to woo the Arab population in the Middle East were Radio Sawa, an Arabic language 24/7 radio station, Al-Hurra, an Arabic language television network and the Hi magazine.

Along with these, America undertook a number of educational and professional initiatives like YES, PLUS, Micro scholarship, programs. Moreover, America organized a number of visitor exchange programmes for Egyptian students, professionals, journalists, leaders and businessmen, and also launched many Internet public diplomacy initiatives to attract and influence the tech-savvy segment of the country's population.

More recently, Obama's Cairo speech was another successful public diplomacy initiative. Along with this, Egypt has been the second highest benefactor of US aid in the world, after Israel. Other major initiative in Egypt, undertaken by the US government, to complement public diplomacy was military training and education (IMET) to the Egyptian military personnel in the US, on which America spent \$1.2 million dollars annually.

US public diplomacy in Egypt has had a mixed success rate. It could not prevent completely anti-American sentiments spreading in the country and traces of opposition to US policy in the region were not hidden. Nonetheless, Egypt did not antagonize the US on crucial issues, although the public sentiment in the country induced the Mubarak regime to maintain "cold peace" with Israel.

However, things took a sharp turn in the aftermath of Arab spring in Egypt as US's long-term ally, Hosni Mubarak was overthrown by a popular revolution. America's approach to the revolution in Egypt was ambivalent in the beginning, as it lost out on an old ally in the Arab world. Nonetheless, as the democratic transition proceeded, America came out in support of the Egyptian people and promised to maintain an alliance with Egypt's future leaders.

Democracy promotion has always been an important part of America's foreign policy in the world. In Iraq, after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, Washington had

to take up the responsibility of rebuilding and reconstructing Iraq's polity, society and economy. Sustaining democracy in Iraq has been the biggest test of American public diplomacy in the Islamic world. The U.S. policy of promoting peace and democracy in Iraq was integral to US interest in maintaining security and stability in the Middle East. Washington introduced a whole set of programmes for promoting democracy in Iraq and made ample use of its soft power resources in aiding the political and economic development of Iraq.

Nonetheless, promoting and sustaining democracy has proved to be a very difficult task for the United States in Iraq. After the overthrow of Saddam's regime from Iraq, the US Department Of Defense undertook responsibility for the administrative management of Iraq, under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA could not achieve much success in securing and stabilizing conditions in Iraq, as Iraq plunged into a dark abyss of sectarian violence that led to huge bloodshed all over Iraq.

The CPA didn't register much success either in creating a healthy environment for democratic reforms and institutions in the country. The CPA soon handed over responsibility of Iraq to an interim Iraqi government, which soon introduced a democratic constitution in the country in 2005 and held the first free elections in 2006.

In 2006, the Iraqi people democratically elected a government. However, democracy in Iraq remained mired in conflict, chaos and corruption and did not function smoothly or effectively. The sectarian conflict and violence between the three main sects of Iraq, the Sunnis, the Shias and the Kurds, rose considerably.

In 2006, violence in Iraq reached its peak and Iraq stood at the brink of a civil war and was very close to being declared a failed state. This led the US to initiate its policy of 'surge' in 2007, a strategy of reinforcing more American troops to check and control the worsening situation in Iraq. The surge was largely successful in curbing the violence and instability in Iraq effectively.

In the following period, America dolled out even larger amounts of money for the progress of stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq. The US President Obama soon devised an 'Exit Strategy' for American troops from Iraq and pulled out all the American troops in December

2011. In the meantime, the United States prepared Iraq for a new era of independence and democracy and helped train many Iraqi ministries and police and military to become self-reliant and self-dependent as well. America also oversaw the 2010 presidential elections in Iraq as well as the provincial elections. Not only this, America initiated and oversaw a lot of programmes to increase the cooperation between different sectarian groups in Iraq. Even when, America put an end to its military presence in Iraq, it continued and still continues to maintain a large civilian presence in Iraq to help Iraqis chart out a successful path to democracy.

American public diplomacy in Iraq has played a huge role in introducing democratic reforms and setting up institutions in the country. It has also played an extensive and crucial role in strengthening the civil society in Iraq and inculcating leadership skills in many common Iraqis. Despite these successes, Washington has not been able to meet all of its goals of democracy promotion in Iraq, but has definitely managed to reduce violence and instability in Iraq in the last few years. The US continues to maintain close association with Iraq to promote democracy and prevent it from becoming a failed state.

The United States has incorporated public diplomacy as an integral part of its foreign policy apparatus in the 21<sup>st</sup> century to meet a number of its needs and achieve a number of its goals. Nonetheless, public diplomacy is not an all edged sword that can solve all of America's problems. The challenges confronting the US are multi-faceted and thus the response has to be multi-dimensional as well, with no over-reliance on one tool, be it hard power or soft power. Public diplomacy is an important instrument in the foreign policy arsenal of the US. However, it has not been able to accomplish the task of curbing anti-Americanism, resurrecting America's image and gaining support for American policies in Islamic countries, all on its own. There are systemic quandaries to what public diplomacy can achieve.

Washington's public diplomacy in the Islamic world suffers from some inherent problems that cannot be solved easily. The US's public diplomacy has many times faced criticism for being analogous to propaganda, which does not work in the Globalized and inter-connected world of today.

Simple propaganda often lacks credibility and becomes counterproductive to national interest and that is what happened in the American case, where the focus always remained on “American’s telling their stories” to the people in the Islamic world rather than explaining the reasons for their policies or engaging in an open and equal dialogue. The United States’ public diplomacy can achieve only limited success in in the Islamic world, as long as its policies in the region remain unchanged. Washington’s public diplomacy will continue to register only small gains until the gap between its rhetoric and its actions is met by change in onward policies.

American public diplomacy is not an all-round solution, as an over-reliance on soft power can also prove to be counterproductive to Washington’s interests in the Islamic world. Even then, public diplomacy in the Islamic world cannot replace the actual policies and their impact in the region and as long as people in the Islamic world perceive the United States’ policies as unjust, unfair and unfavorable to their interests, public diplomacy will make only limited progress. US public diplomacy can only succeed well, in juxtaposition to favorable American policies in the Islamic world. Nonetheless, Public diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has become a cardinal tool in the foreign policy arsenal of the United States.

Public diplomacy has and continues to remain an integral and crucial part of the foreign policy apparatus of the US and is an important instrument of its soft power. It is used by the United States in the Islamic world for fulfillment of a number of purposes ranging from curbing anti-Americanism, promoting its image and lessening resistance, to gaining support for its policies in the region. This research validates the hypothesis that US public diplomacy has become a powerful tool to protect US interests in the Islamic world.

Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has escalated over the years since 9/11 and yet public diplomacy measures in Pakistan have failed to make much of an impact and a large part of the Pakistani public remains unsatisfied with the US policies in the region. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan has only worsened with the United States’ military incursions in Pakistan, in the form of drone attacks and the Pakistani public relentlessly detests and remains highly critical of Washington’s policy. Therefore, this study substantiates the hypothesis that the failure of public diplomacy in curbing anti-Americanism in Pakistan is due to flawed US policy.



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