

# **CRITICAL APPROACHES TO HUMAN SECURITY**

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## **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY**

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
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**DECLARATION**

I declare that the dissertation entitled “Critical Approaches To Human Security” submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.

  
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**CERTIFICATE**

We recommend that this dissertation may be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

  
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## INTRODUCTION

The term security evokes four basic questions. What are the threats to security? Who provides security? Who is the subject of security? What means are employed in the provision of security? The answers vary according to different approaches to the subject (Liotta 2002).

P. H Liotta remarks that traditional approaches to security based on realism focus primarily on national security. The state is considered the subject of security along with territorial integrity and sovereignty, other states and non-state actors are identified as threats in this case. Streams of thought with both liberal and realist influences consider the economy, quality of life along with national and societal groups as the primary subjects of security. This view treats other nations, migrants and foreign culture as threats to security (Liotta 2002). Non traditional liberal viewpoint of security considers the individual as the primary subject of security and human rights and humanitarian law are viewed as pivotal in guaranteeing the survival of the individual (Liotta 2002). Threats emanate from the state and the forces of globalization, according to this stream of thought. Certain non-traditional approaches to security consider environmental sustainability as the subject of security. They focus on global sustainability and preservation of the ecosystem against threats of global warming, depletion of natural resources and ecological destruction (Liotta 2002).

The notion that individuals have rights by virtue of being human is modern both in its political and ethical claims (Dunne 2007). This idea was the foundation of the French Revolution, the anti-slavery movement and became associated with the discourse on equality and justice in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Post 1945, the same idea marked the details of human rights (Dunne 2007). Matt McDonald (2002) explains that the end of the cold war brought an era where security became a contested turf. On one side of the spectrum lay realist thought that advocated the relevance of realism and questioned alternative security paradigms. The other extreme pointed out the gaps in realist notions of security and their incapability of explaining a world that was moving beyond state centrism. George MacLean (2010) points out that as we move away from

the Cold War era it becomes crucial for one to consider the context in which we analyse security. End of the Cold War did not mark complete dismissal of dominant security issues like interstate warfare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms race. Yet the challenges to states and sub state actors made it essential to focus on both new threats to security and new techniques to deal with them. Security concerns like intra-state conflict, ethnic violence, migration, environmental degradation emerged as existential threats to security (MacLean 2010). The study of international security is still being adapted to a scenario where non state actors are being recognised as agents. Individuals and communities are now being considered as security referents as state security invisibilizes their vulnerability. Human security recognizes that state protection is essential for individual welfare; however it does not guarantee the same (MacLean 2010).

The idea of human security was brought to the fore by Mahbub ul Haq in the Human Development Report (HDR) of 1993. It was nuanced later in the HDR of 1994. This concept added to the conventional conceptualization of security by emphasising income security, along with food, environmental and health security. Political freedom and security of identity and community were also brought into its realm (Gasper 2005). Human security as a concept gained popularity in the mid 1990s. The UNDP report of 1994 defines the concept as, “first safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life- whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development” (European Commission Report 2007: 41). Human security was adopted as a foreign policy measure by the states of Canada and Norway. Almost a year later nine other countries were requested to come forward and form the Human Security Network. While Canada used this foreign policy initiative to negotiate the Mine Ban Treaty, countries like Japan sought initiative regarding human rights violations pertaining to trafficking and other transnational crimes (Glasius 2008).

Des Gasper (2005) illustrates that various factors contributed to the academic enthusiasm regarding human security. It was primarily considered as an initiative to

seek stability and protection from what Amartya Sen termed as 'downside risks'. Therefore human security gained salience in the discourse of human development.

At the outset this well intentioned definition seems noble as it prioritizes the individual. However such a broad definition often leads to securitization of innumerable issues which often lack prioritization. In the face of violence this can have disastrous consequences. Besides issues of parsimony within human security, there is almost no consensus regarding underwriting notions of vulnerability, thresholds of threat and contextualized practices in the light of universalist claims. Human Security is a broad concept and as a discourse is fraught with debates regarding approaches to the concept – broad and narrow, applicability, measurement and its relationship with state and sovereignty.

Anuradha M. Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) in their exposition of the concept of human security state that the concept of "safety" has been extended in the wake of threats in the post cold war era. The primary referent of security is the individual and not the state. Safety of individual against socio-economic, political and environmental threats is emphasized within the value laden rubric of equity, dignity and solidarity. Thus security is broadened to include issues that go beyond the traditional security threats. The state dominated traditional theory expressed the views of realists, neo-realists and to a great extent that of the liberals; where the individual was at the receiving end of state power. This view was challenged by the critical theorists and radical feminists. Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh (2009) argue that the proponents of human security take the middle path wherein they bring ethics back into the discourse of international relations. The achievement of human security entails securing the daily lives of individuals through provision of safety nets and political participation that mitigates threats against lives, livelihoods and dignity. The two writers state, that in practice human security raises the crucial question of responsibility. They conclude that human security is a right of all and the obligation to provide the same goes beyond the state. This in my opinion implies redefinition of state sovereignty; wherein sovereignty is conditional on the willingness and the capability of the state to provide human security. The democratic right based state is viewed as the legitimate and the most effective provider of human security. However

the state is not considered to be sole provider of security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Their work also emphasizes the identification of thresholds of insecurity below which life is unbearable to human beings.

Several sections of the corpus of the criticism of human security is centred on issues of definitional broadness that renders security as an ‘umbrella term’, its relationship with the state and its conceptualization of sovereignty. Roland Paris (2001) and David Chandler (2008) describe human security as unfathomable, as it seeks to take into account each individual act of security. Both the scholars consider the term as applicable only in the rhetorical realm. Chandler (2008) along with the likes of Astri Suhrke (1999), Ryerson Christie (2010) consider human security as a tool to advance national security. Suhrke and Christie look into the foreign policies of countries like Canada, Norway and Japan to conclude that human security has served as a mechanism to wield ideological power to secure middle power status to these countries. Matt McDonald (2002) illustrates this position by stating that human security can only claim to be politically neutral and eventually turns out to be a wish list of prescriptions.

Another critique of human security views the same as a discourse that reinforces international hierarchies and serves as a mechanism of excessive control domestically by the state governments. Kyle Grayson (2008) expands this position by suggesting that human security is contextually blind and is often rendered useless as a regulatory discourse geared towards biopolitical control of people. It precisely does the same by granting all issues of development the same urgency as an immediate security problem without dealing with the subjective attributes of each issue. In this manner human security ceases to be an emancipatory discourse. In Grayson’s opinion measures taken to evaluate levels of human security serve the hierarchies of power embedded the collection and labelling of so called facts and by analysing the same vis a vis the international law which only serves the interests of the powerful. Tara McCormack (2008), Miguel De Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet (2008) further this argument.

The biopolitics of human security comes to the fore in case of extreme violation of basic human freedom and dignity. Human security identifies the



circumstances in which state failure or conscious inaction in the light of humanitarian disasters can lead to military intervention by the international community. Such intervention leads one into exploring the notion of sovereignty as perceived by the advocates of human security. One needs to trace the trajectory of sovereignty as it moves from absolute notions of Westphalian sovereignty to ethical sovereignty and to be finally viewed as concomitant with responsibility. This raises crucial questions regarding agency of the state and the international community in ensuring individual security. I have looked into the current debates on the viability of intervention especially in the form of the Responsibility to Protect.

I focus on its first principle of human security - the 'freedom from fear'. Violations of this inherent principle of human security cannot be viewed in isolation from the 'freedom from want'. I analyse the two principles with reference to the definitional debates within the field. However 'freedom from want' entails a thorough analysis of human development which is beyond the scope of my study. I have primarily dealt with human rights violations in case of genocide, ethnic violence and crimes against humanity and the tools available to human security to deal with the same.

This study looks into

- the viability human security as a normative value and policy framework in case of extreme violations of human rights.
- perceptions regarding human security in terms of state co-option and its relationship with national security.
- the debates regarding Responsibility to Protect and state sovereignty, focusing on the accountability of the international community in the policy implication of human security.

Through this study i intend to explore the impact of human security on the discourse of security as a whole. I look into the claim that human security marks a paradigm change in the conceptualisation and the practice of state and international security.

## CHAPTER ONE

### HUMAN SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW

*Human security developed in the post cold war era. In its theoretical conception it endeavours to go beyond the state and considers the individual rather than the state as the primary referent of security. Therefore it proposes an alternative to the traditional state-centred notion of security. Its practice however suggests that policy implementation of individual freedom and safety nets cannot be secured without the state. This chapter looks into the tensions within its normative theorization.*

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

Barry Buzan (1984) explains that insecurity is the core problem that underlies all the interests and actions in international relations. Power and peace are in fact concepts that offer an explanation and measures to deal with insecurity, which as an issue area is vast both in complexity and scale. Insecurity is experienced from individual to global levels across cultural, political, military and economic dimensions. He also stated that individuals are insecure because of their limited powers. They are unable to express this and take remedial action. The role of relieving individuals of this insecurity is performed by organizations such as banks, cooperatives, political groups and states. These organizations then become actors themselves, however when the relations among these actors become competitive, insecurity intensifies and compounds. Buzan analyses the various perspectives through which insecurity can be ameliorated. The peace perspective suggests the removal of violence between nations as a remedy, while the power perspective suggests the internal control of states as a dynamic through which states can maximize advantage and minimize the disadvantage of insecurity. The security approach on the other hand focuses on the need to satisfy only the legitimate concerns of states in such a manner that the security of other states

is not hampered. The security approach thus addresses both the unit and structural level security concerns.

As Buzan (1984) reasons, insecurity has risen due a variety of reasons in the recent times. One of the major reasons is the fear of war, as both the costs and the scale of warfare have increased. Buzan focuses on warfare between states which is embedded in anarchy and arms race. He views anarchy and arms race as concepts that sustain each other. Anarchy as a political condition in which states have to fend for themselves whether it comes to welfare system or military security. The need for securing a state leads to acquisition of arms which in turn reinforces anarchy. In his opinion a true security policy attends to both the stability and vulnerability of the state and the system. It also avoids conflict (Buzan 1984). The state centric perspective was dominant during the Cold War. Amitav Acharya (2001) explains that governments in Southeast Asia did widen their approach to security threats by adopting certain forms of comprehensive security during the Cold war. Comprehensive security addressed economic concerns like threats to livelihood and access to international markets in Japan; while the same concept was used by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address concerns of domestic politics and stability of the regime. However this formulation of security accorded less value to individual and community security and least importance to personal freedom and human rights. Comprehensive security basically answered concerns regarding threats to state security and was founded on the values of stability and order (Acharya 2001).

Seven years later Barry Buzan (1991) remarked on the new patterns emerging within global society and predicted their consequences. He described global society as the relationship between the developed nations at the centre and the developing ones that marked the periphery. Through a broad perception of security Buzan explained that survival would remain pivotal in the twenty first century, however the conditions of survival would gather greater value. He articulated that a conglomeration of great powers at the centre will not be divided along ideological lines and would result in the rise of regional politics. The global capitalist centre would form a security community with related advantages in the global political economy. International society would be

strengthened as its existence would be a response to the international system (Buzan 1991).

At this point one must trace the details of the thought on security. Sarka Waisova (2003) avers that the study of security in international politics was dominated for the longest time by the realists. Their traditional approach to security focused on the state as the sovereign power and the object of security whose existence was threatened primarily by military means. Security was a derivative of the state and individual security was perceived in terms of citizenship. Its foundation lay in Hobbesian thought wherein the individual was protected by both internal and external threats according to the social contract (Waisova 2003). A shift in this approach came in the 1970s when pressures of the international market intervened in matters of national security. Economic issues came to the fore during the oil crisis and therefore, protection of borders, along with military might were not considered as the only indices of security. The agenda of the Copenhagen school advocated for security as a political category applicable to a wide range of subjects (Waisova 2003). The military no longer remained the primary concern of security as politics; compulsions of the economy, environment and the larger society were brought within its purview (Waisova 2003). Relationship between the state and the individual came to be viewed as reciprocal. State was seen both as a provider of and a threat to security in terms of internal and external policy making and its implementation (Waisova 2003). Despite this fact theorist like Barry Buzan acknowledged that individuals could also challenge both the coherence and the authority of the state (Waisova 2003).

Many attempts are being made to define security in the post Cold War era (Baldwin 1997). Pinar Bilgin (2003) emphasises that in the post cold war era sociological approaches have come to shape academic thinking on security itself as a concept. She describes the work of Ken Booth as one that that questioned the traditional referents of security, which defined threats and the plausible solutions to those threats. Booth argues that the security of the individual must be prioritised. Bilgin explains that Ken Booth primarily argues against the assumption of the state as the primary provider of security at all times; as most of the states fail in responding to the needs of the citizens. Booth's call for changing the referent of security is

supplemented by Martin Shaw's (1993) argument for a multi layered analysis of actors and social groups as a requirement for guaranteeing security.

Bilgin (2003) avers that Ken Booth's proposed framework of human emancipation, freedom from physical constraints and threats got an encouraging response from the likes of Mohammed Ayoob. Third World School with scholars like Ayoob and Amitav Acharya pointed out the distinction in the conceptualisation of security amongst the strong the weak states. Threats to individual security by state institutions in the developing world, led to a conceptualization of individual rights and individual security independently of the state (Waisova 2003). The concept of human security grew from the realisation that security of individuals does not necessarily follow from the security of the state. Booth (2008) argues that since the 1980s security studies have challenged orthodox notions regarding state and the sole sovereign decision maker in security matters. He states that the holy trinity of statism, stability and strategy has been consciously opposed by alternate security paradigms. These alternate paradigms gained strength with the breakup of the bi- polarities of the cold war era. In Booth's opinion rethinking of security came as an inevitable consequence of inequalities in the levels of income, large scale violation of human rights, proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism and environmental crises (Booth 2008).

Simon Dalby (2000) argues that a vast gamut of issues exist in the post Cold War security agenda. These include discussions on traditional transfer of arms, violence caused by socio – economic inequalities, economic transactions, suppression of women and environmental hazards. He points out that scholars have also been thinking about the identity of security practitioners and its implication on policy framework (Dalby 2000). Sascha Werthes and Tobias Debiel (2006) in the Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF) Report on human security, explain that in the 1990s gradually new concepts of security emerged that focused on comprehensive security. However they did not subvert the realist state centric perspective, yet they did imply a change in perception. Scholars advocating comprehensive security looked at the world as a society of states where shared interests and norms could be institutionalised. Comprehensive security explored the role of international law in addressing security threats (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006).

Dalby (2000) avers that in a world of global networks the state is no longer the sole object of security concerns. He states that the Copenhagen school has been pivotal in critiquing the traditional notions of security. The Copenhagen School focused on securitization of non-military issues (Dalby 2000). The referent object in this case could be the society however the state still remained primary security actor (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006). Scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and DeWilde argue that apart from other things security is an act of speech that brings into existence threats and danger that need instant attention (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006). These writers explain that such acts of speech are always addressed to a specific audience. The authors link the formulation of security to the five areas that are relevant to the study and practice of international politics (Dalby 2000). These areas include the military that is marked by force and coercion, politics that is a function of a recognised governing authority and its legislative practices, economic relations of production, trade and finance along with societal relations; and environmental issues (Dalby 2000). All these areas interact within the security dialectic. Dalby goes on to describing Emma Rothschild's conceptualization of security. The purview of security has been expanded to include the security of individuals and groups and has been scaled upwards to look into the security of the international system. Besides these downward and upward movements, security has also been expanded to include economic, political, social and environmental aspects. Finally accountability for ensuring security has been spread in all directions, ranging from the state to international organisations, non-governmental organisations and the forces of media and the market. A broader approach to security was taken up by the proponents of human security (Dalby 2000). Rajesh Rajagopalan illustrates that multilateral agencies endorsed this broadening of security and thereby bestowed legitimacy on the same. It was being recognised that concerns beyond the traditional language of security could cause conflicts amongst both states and individuals (2012).

Pinar Bilgin (2003) points out that the Human development Report of the United Nations Development Program of 1994 presented human security as a universal concept. The components of which were interdependent. The report projected the world as an inter-connected whole, therefore security concerns of one part of the world were not viewed in isolation. It stressed on preventing conflict and

crises and asserted that people rather than states should be the referents of security. Security has been at the centre of the International Relations (Booth 2008). The subject of security and the conduct of the same have changed over time. According to Booth,

[i]t has been so ever since David Davies founded the world's first university chair in the subject back in 1919, and so began its professionalization. In the decades since, though insecurity has never been out of season at any level of human society, the prevailing concept of 'security', and how it should be operationalized, remained narrow, fixed and uncontested until relatively recently (Booth 2008: 5).

Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2004) as advocates of critical theorisation of security remark that international relations as a discipline has been silent in its response to violence. They assert that challenges to traditional approaches to security came through during the 1980s through which familiar and established ideas regarding security were unbundled. Security came to be viewed from the victim's perspective. Critical theory recognised the fact that a shift of reference from the state to the individual brings about a change in the terminology of security. Despite the resilience of realist thinking on security, the fulfilment of human rights remains crucial. The two scholars state that the tension between national security and humanitarianism is self evident, yet negotiable through a multidimensional perspective of agency (Dunne and Wheeler 2004).

Globalization became another mediating factor in the study of security at the end of the Cold War. It brought new technology, new methods of communication and new global threats such as global crimes of drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism. New actors like international non- governmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations were recognized. Thus the concept of security was broadened and deepened (European Commission Report 2007). A rethinking of security led to a change in the conceptualization of threats. National security is meant to address specific threats pertaining to sovereignty and the state, while human security deals with issues of vulnerability that manifest into threats in the most extreme cases (Liotta 2002). The concept of vulnerability was introduced by Keohane and Nye who termed it as a consequence of complex interdependence (Kirby 2006).

P.H. Liotta (2002) explains that an overview of security would be aided by a detailed look at the differences between threat and vulnerability. The difference between the two concepts was highlighted in UNDP Report of 1994, through focus on conflicts within nations. Liotta asserts that threats are easily identifiable, immediate and require quick responses. Vulnerability is an indicator of a problem. It is often unacknowledged as it remains obscure and in most cases it does not evince an immediate response. Hunger, crime, political repression and environmental hazards fall in this category. Vulnerability is visible in cases of interlinked issues like poverty and human trafficking. Within the gamut of human security and environmental security situations of extreme vulnerability garner the attention of both policymakers and academicians. Such situations occur when people live under extreme poverty, or under the threat of natural disasters or even in situations of political repression or conflict. The concept of vulnerability was developed further by Peadar Kirby (2006) in his analysis of risk society, poverty, inequality and human livelihood. In Kirby's opinion vulnerability refers to the capability of a state to address economic and political threats. In Liotta's opinion security today cannot be conceptualized without a new "survival dilemma" along with old security dilemma (Liotta 2002: 480). The idea of security was therefore broadened to include environmental security, food security and respect of human rights to acknowledge such vulnerabilities (European Commission Report 2007).

As Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh illustrate, human security focuses on the goals of dignity, equity and solidarity. The concept "changes the very status of the individual, who is no longer consubstantial to the state- an infinitesimal part of an organic whole- but an equal subject and actor in international relations" (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh 2009: 13). They explain that the state dominated traditional theory expressed the views of realists, neo-realists and to a great extent that of the liberals; where the individual was at the receiving end of state power. This view was challenged by the critical theorists and radical feminists. Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh state that

[t]he proponents of human security take the middle path wherein they bring ethics back into the discourse of international relations. They add to this by stating, the debate between human security and other paradigms is not closed...human security has



a long history and derives its strength from many ideas and theories across disciplines. It can develop as a concept only by maintaining and advancing this plurality (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh: 2009:93).

Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy argue that human security has a three dimensional agenda that consists of security, development and rights. For the purpose of policy implementation, protection and restoration come first; followed by prevention and improvement. A change in security perspective is a part of long term policy when all the immediate concerns of security are taken care of (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh: 2009). The discourse of human security evolved gradually in the post cold war era; however, its definition still remains a contested turf. Scholars like David Chandler (2008), Kyle Grayson (2008) state that the practice of international politics still serves the state centred political order. Human security is not an alternate perspective of security as it serves current hierarchies of power and sustains a politics of governmentality. While human security has been discussed a lot in the cold war era, one needs to explore whether its material and conceptual dynamics offer an alternative to the earlier state centric notions of security.

#### DEFINITIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY

The project report (2007) on Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law by the European commission, explains that there is no single accepted definition of security in academic literature; and that the discourse of security has been evolving with the times. The traditional approach to security focused on the state and the external threats to security that could only be countered through military means. UNDP's Human Development Report (1994) delineated a broad conceptualisation of security that acknowledged the mundane insecurities accounted by individuals in terms of employment, availability of food and a sustainable lifestyle, political freedom and freedom from discrimination. This concept was introduced as one that is concerned with human dignity and wellbeing. The UNDP Report (1994) explicates its four essential features. It bestows universality on the concept as issues of human rights violation along with unemployment; crime and environmental pollution are present everywhere in different measures. The components of human security are considered interdependent. Problems emanating from pollution, disease, smuggling and human trafficking travel across porous borders in a globalized world. The third feature

acknowledges early prevention as an effective tool to deal with issues of concern. The final feature labels human security as people centric in nature. Human security is primarily concerned with the lives of individuals, their ability to exercise choices and access a sustainable standard of living. Social opportunities, cultural freedom and a life of dignity are considered parameters to assess the level of human security. The report states that human security is easily identifiable through its absence rather than its presence (UNDP 1994). The European Commission Project Report (2007) recognizes the Report of the United Nations Development Programme – 1994, as the most profound articulation of the concept of human security. This Report quotes UNDP's conception of human security. It states that human security is composed of two components, "first safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life- whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development" (European Commission Report 2007: 41).

The UNDP Report (1994) differentiates between the interlinked concepts of human security and human development. While human development widens the choices available to people, human security assesses whether individuals can exercise these choices in an unhindered manner. Failure or success in one area directly affects the other.

Anuradha M. Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) in their exposition of the concept of human security state that the concept of "safety" (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh 2009: 9) has been extended in the wake of threats in the post cold war era. The primary referent of security is the individual and not the state. Safety of individual against socio-economic, political and environmental threats is emphasized within the value laden rubric of equity, dignity and solidarity. Thus security is broadened to include issues that go beyond the traditional security threats. The achievement of human security entails securing the daily lives of individuals through provision of safety nets and political participation that mitigates threats against lives, livelihoods and dignity. Human security intends to guarantee individual well being along with that of the community. The two writers suggest that, in practice human security raises the crucial question of responsibility. Human security is a right of all and the obligation to

provide the same goes beyond the state. This in my opinion implies redefinition of state sovereignty; wherein sovereignty is conditional on the willingness and the capability of the state to provide human security. The democratic right based state is viewed as the legitimate and the most effective provider of human security. However the state is not considered to be the sole provider of security. Their work also emphasizes the identification of thresholds of insecurity below which life is unbearable to human beings. They cite the Human Development Report of 1994 to delineate the seven components of human security- economic, food health, environmental, personal, community and political security. As an approach, human security aims at complementing state security by ensuring and facilitating human rights and human development. Therefore security threats are meant to be dealt with both development and foreign policy tools. Advocates of human security assert that in a globalized world, socio-economic distress, and involuntary immigration, transnational networks of crime and violence cause insecurity that demands an urgent policy response (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006).

Some authors suggest that human security as a concept includes crisis management, conflict prevention and civil–military coordination (Kaldor et al 2007). They suggest that human security, human development and human rights are interrelated in the globalized world. The three concepts encapsulate the notions of ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. They explain that just as human rights are about economic, social and political rights and human development goes beyond the ability to afford a decent standard of living; human security itself goes beyond the loss of life due to military violence. Human security as a concept caters to all situations of severe vulnerability. These situations could be a result of violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and lack of health care or even extreme poverty. The three scholars describe the basic principles of human security. The first one is refers to respect of human rights and focuses on the needs of the individual. The second principle caters to the establishment of legitimate political authority and enabling civilian involvement in a peaceful political environment. Human security in this sense empowers threatened communities.

Sabina Alkire (2003) argues that human security focuses on human lives. Therefore it identifies factors that threaten human security and even prepares against these threats. Threats that are critical and impact core of human well being, they could occur without prior warning and could impact a large section of the population; are analysed. Threats to human security have different modes of operation. There are those that are direct like genocide and floods, while others are indirect like lack of governmental investment in health and education. Human security looks into both kinds of threats and seeks to protect individuals in a manner that is compatible with their well-being in the long term (Alkire 2003).

Alkire (2003) emphasises on good governance, people's participation along with institution –building as mechanisms that develop human security in the long run. She argues that human security concerns itself with practical outcomes that are crucial to security. Therefore human security is linked with human rights. It may prioritise certain human rights over the other to acknowledge immediate threats that would affect the core of human lives. The protection and promotion of human security entails the prevention and mitigation of risks along with a reasonable response to a state of crisis. Alkire points out that, human security is in itself insufficient for human well being; it works along with human development. She asserts that threats have indeed increased in a globalised era, yet even the possibilities to counter the same have multiplied. The process of identifying these threats is still not very clear yet as Alkire suggests that threats that challenge the core of human lives are dealt with immediate attention. Like human rights, human security acknowledges the protection of physical security along with measures that safeguard basic liberties and financial needs. Advocates of human security see it as an exposition of public good and sustainable development. Psychological aspects like healthy social and familial networks along with a sense of hope and well being for the future are crucial to human security (Alkire 2003).

Amritav Acharya suggests that the concept of human security is used as a tool for reducing the human costs of conflict; it is a strategy that enables governments to address basic human needs and counter the inequities of globalization. It is a framework for providing social safety nets to the poor and the marginalized against

sudden and major economic crises (Acharya 2001). Here one observes that human security is seen as a tool to prevent violence and economic and social injustice.

The components of human security are both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Till now various indices have been devised in order to measure human security in terms of human development, food security and factors like the availability of basic material needs. Kanti Bajpai (2003) states that the audit of human security should consider the direct and indirect threats to individual freedom and safety; along with the level of democratization, development of norms and institutions that facilitate coping mechanisms against various forms of threat. Such a measure would take into account the level of increase or decrease in threats and would estimate the capabilities required to face those threats. This measure in Bajpai's opinion should be carried out on a cross-national basis as it would delineate a map of violence that would go beyond the traditional statist study of the concept. The jurisdiction of human security is huge (Bajpai 2003). Kanti Bajpai simplifies our understanding of the complex world system with its myriad agents and processes; human security can therefore be effectively enhanced by detailed studies concerning its application.

Similar to Bajpai, Taylor Owen (2004) explains that a threshold based definition of human security requires some degree of sacrifice from those who defend its narrow and broad conceptualization. A threshold definition then would not consider lack of education as a threat to human security. However certain health and human rights abuses would be a cause of concern. Owen prescribes a monitoring system that can identify threats and a security infrastructure that can mitigate the same. The agenda should be set by political priority in Owen's terms, however if governments themselves cross the threshold then the international community must act.

Acharya (2005) asserts that continuous debates are needed within the discourse of human security if the current policy challenges are to be met. Human security as a concept is viewed as a reflection of new forces and trends in international politics. In the era of globalization and democratization, governments cannot survive or even garner legitimacy by simply addressing the economic needs of the people. Political and social stability cannot be guaranteed by defence against external military threats. Democratization brings to the fore new actors, such as civil society, that must be

accounted in the security framework. Amitav Acharya suggests that developments in world politics cannot be captured solely by a narrow and military-focused notion of national security. He casts human security as a notion that is interdisciplinary. Human security is not a liberal, constructivist, or critical theoretical notion that realists are meant to oppose or condemn. As a notion it challenges the academic community to transcend the so-called inter-paradigm debate. Liberalism with its focus on non-state actors is not equipped to deal with the diffusion of human security norms across various conditions. Realism can inform us better about material conditions at the national and systemic level that influence the diffusion of ideas and practices of human security. Liberalism and liberal institutionalism can help one understand human security through notions of interdependence, international institutions and democratic transformations. Critical theory sheds light on the state driven threats to human security and the role of civil society. The constructivists focus on ideas around human security by global norm entrepreneurs and debates within the discourse that often shape its survival. Acharya explains that the academic community needs to develop curricula and intellectual tool kits in order to explain and understand human security. As a discipline it needs to be cautiously explained in the class room through case studies of conflict and poverty zones (Acharya 2005).

Acharya's illustration is in tandem with Kanti Bajpai's (2004) argument for looking beyond differences between the proponents of national and human security. Bajpai asserts that broad research programmes that look for issues of convergence between the two and those between various schools within human security; are the need of the hour. The study of human security should be treated like one of policy science. This study should be carried out with methods involving an analysis of threats and the existing resources to deal with them. The focus on threats caused by human agency, are fundamental in his view, unlike those that are a result of natural and structural causes (Acharya 2005).

Edward Newman (2010) explains that broad approaches to human security focus on issues that affect the daily lives of a large number of people. Advocates of this broad normative approach persuade policy makers to realise that poverty, diseases and environmental degradation take maximum lives. As opposed to this view the

narrow approach focuses squarely on the impact of armed conflicts, repressive state policies and state failure. The third perspective on human security uses the concept as a tool to address concerns regarding trade in small arms, human trafficking, spread of HIV and drug trafficking. Advocates of this approach tend to draw the attention of policymakers to issues that are marginalised. Newman's exposition also familiarises one with streams of thought dealing with the nature of threats to human security and appropriate responses to the same. Certain academicians dealing with the subject also look into the relationship between human security and the relations and institutions of power. Newman suggests that from a normative perspective the definitional debate is of little importance. Advocates of this view discount conceptual coherence to attain the objective of securing the most vulnerable amongst individuals. The divide between narrow and broad approaches provides creative space for scholars to look into diverse views on security and international relations (Newman 2010).

Besides the debate between the broad and the narrow approaches to human security, the discourse is also characterized by a debate between definitional versions of the so called 'East' and the 'West'. Amitav Acharya (2001) explains that the discourse of human security is marked by debates over the criteria of security and the means to achieve the same. In Acharya's opinion human security is a concept that aims to ameliorate the inequalities inherent in globalization, sensitize governments into addressing the basic needs of individuals and reduce the loss of life in armed conflict. He states that different measures employed to achieve these goals, create room for controversy and scepticism regarding the concept. Acharya remarks that advocates of human security in the West are challenged by their counterparts in the East. He suggests that governments and analysts in Asia (East) view human security as an attempt by the West to inflict its liberal political tradition on non-western cultures. Academicians in the East also question the novelty of the concept, as they believe that non- military aspects of security have been addressed earlier within the rubric of comprehensive security (Acharya 2001).

Acharya (2001) quantifies his argument by describing the human security policy of countries like Canada and Norway in comparison with that of Japan. The Canadian outlook on human security can be termed as one that focuses on the

protection of human rights and humanitarian law in conflict and otherwise. Partnership on human security between Canada and Norway was centred on the banning of landmines, creation of International Criminal Court, humanitarian law, human rights, proliferation of small arms, vulnerability of women and children in armed conflict, child labour, child soldiers and cooperation amongst the countries of the north (Acharya 2001). The Japanese approach on the other hand focused on the ‘freedom from want’, the basic needs for survival and a life of dignity.

Amitav Acharya remarks that countries like Thailand have tried their best to reconcile both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ in their domestic policy. Despite this fact the East largely remains suspicious of the Western notion of human security as an extension of liberal democracy and human rights; as it implies the infringement of sovereignty through humanitarian intervention (Acharya 2001). Acharya argues that neither view is incompatible with the larger concept of human security. Human rights do not negate the importance of human development and ‘freedom from fear’ cannot be treated in isolation from ‘freedom from want’; as evinced in the work of Amartya Sen. He furthers this argument by stating that human dignity is imperilled by ever growing cases of civil strife and intrastate conflict and its importance is reinforced by the spread of democracy. Besides these two aspects human dignity is emphasised in a context where economic inequalities are exacerbated by globalization and where humanitarian intervention by the international community is justified by some advocates of human security in order to protect human rights (Acharya 2001). The scholar concludes that approaches that focus on the first two aspects complement those that focus on economic inequalities and intervention. Thus the Western approach and the Eastern approach are not isolated streams of thought; they are responses that are evolving to face the current challenges. Both the views are not beyond reconciliation. However the extent of this reconciliation depends on the interaction of the “emerging norm” of human security with beliefs and practices regarding security; which are relative to each context (Acharya 2001: 451).

At this point it becomes essential for one to look into the policy agenda of human security. Taylor Owen (2008) in his article “The uncertain future of human security in the UN” explains that the discourse of human security covers all aspects of



international security. This is evident through its impact on development studies, policies pertaining to sustainable development, military intervention and evolving models of global governance. The UN largely remains central to its discourse (Owen 2008). In Owen's opinion the United Nations systematically endorsed the concept initially through the UNDP reports, followed by the report on the Commission on Global Governance (1995), Kofi Annan's report "On the protection of civilians in armed conflict" (1999), the report by the Commission on Human security (2001), Kofi Annan's report focusing on human rights and freedom and subsequently the UN World Summit's "Outcome document". Owen explains that the UNDP reports focused on social development, justice and the relationship between threats of violence and the vulnerabilities induced by skewed development. The report by the Commission of Global Governance addressed issues of state sovereignty and intervention by calling for UN expansion in terms of global taxation, a permanent army of the UN along with a new International Court of justice. The Commission endorsed protection of the environment and measures of conflict prevention. The state of internally displaced persons was taken up by UN High Commission on Refugees that focused on individuals displaced due to complete state failure or rather disappearance. Threats to people caught in violent conflict was later also addressed in the ICISS report (Owen 2008). The Commission on Human Security focused on the so called essential core of human lives. This essential core was left undefined, which largely left room for a large number of threats to be included in the purview of human security; contrary to intentions of this particular definition. The Commission on Human Security asserts that human security compliments national security (Owen 2008). However the Commission's report could not ameliorate fears of governments regarding the supposed loss of their sovereign power (Owen 2008). Keith Krause (2008) spells out the agenda of the Human Security Network (HSN), which was founded through multilateral initiatives by Norway, Canada, Austria and Switzerland to culminate in an agreement by 11 countries to contribute for sustainable development, ensure the protection of human rights, and encourage peaceful resolution of conflicts. The HSN focused its attention on the 'freedom from fear' to ensure respect for international humanitarian law and discourage impunity in case of its violations.

Human security in one way transcends the state, by focusing on the individual as the security referent. However, it looks up to the same state as the primary agent for guaranteeing security to the individual. The concept necessitates participation of non-governmental organizations, regional and international bodies to secure the individual; and intends to bypass the state in case of humanitarian emergencies. I look into this dichotomy with human security in the next section.

### HUMAN SECURITY, THE STATE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) state that the notion of human security does not replace state security and only supplements the same. Military power can no longer suffice as the sole guarantor of national security. Favourable social, political and economic conditions, along with the promotion of human development and human rights contribute to a state's security. The state remains crucial in the operationalization of the goals of human security. The absence of the state or a lack of effectiveness on its part can be damaging to human security. However they are quick to assert that "states are not a sufficient condition for human security; they can even be an obstacle, as is the case of failed or weak states" (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh 2009: 167). The two scholars assert that the state is the most capable as an actor to protect human security. It has the capability, knowledge and administrative authority. However, changes are needed in state's policy practice to achieve human security goals. It needs to intervene to ensure equal opportunities and equitable distribution of resources. They emphasise that the state cannot be replaced and non state actors are facilitators of the state's functions. However at the same time they suggest that the state is responsible for its actions. They explain that it is the primary responsibility of the state to ensure traditional security and by an extension protect its citizens from threats. This is followed by the responsibility to provide basic rights and economic and social safeguards to its people. Finally the state is bound to empower its citizens in a manner that they can provide for themselves and lead their lives in the best possible manner (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh 2009).

David Chandler (2008) criticises Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy's normative conceptualization of human security. In his opinion, the notion of the individual as the ultimate actor, renders the discourse as unfathomable. He suggests that every

individual act cannot create a security discourse. Chandler is concerned about the perspective of the south. He questions why the South has been critical of the notion of human security and why are authors like Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy so quick in dismissing these critics? He calls for an empirical analysis of human security and is critical of its exposition mainly at a normative level. Chandler explains that unlike what Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy suggest it is not that the new paradigm is hindered only by the vested interests of powerful states and the political elite. The notion of human security itself has several grey spots. One concept cannot accomplish the mammoth task of evaluation of threats, prediction of crises along with an analysis of the causes of conflict, and propose solutions. Chandler accuses Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy of dividing the world into the realm of realism and human security. While the realist world houses policy trade-offs and power politics, in the idealized world of human security the three wishes of freedom from fear, want and a life of dignity are automatically fulfilled. He accuses them of making idealistic claims and empty policy prescriptions regarding sustainable development and the use of systemic and structural forces. Chandler goes on to say that both Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy diffuse their own radical bifurcation by stating that securing individuals is not just an ethical imperative but also the best possible way of securing the state. He states that the merging of ethical issues with security and self interest is a technical imperative or wishful thinking is that which remains obscure throughout the literature on human security. Advocates of human security conflate prerogatives of ethics and security, which makes the concept vulnerable to cooption by elites. He suggests that human security tends to exaggerate threats in the post cold war era. Chandler cites the example of speculation regarding existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Human security in his opinion skilfully dodges prioritisation of needs as they suggest that all threats are inter linked.

In Chandler's opinion (2008) human security systematically locates threats in the third world by focusing on conflicts in failed states. Poverty, human rights and good governance are its policy focus. He cites another work, "A Decade of Human Security" edited by Sandra J. MacLean, David R. Black & Timothy M. Shaw, to explain the conflict in the third world. He suggests that failed states are issues that are the focus of a realist paradigm- the war on terror. Human security and its goals then

become easily compatible with that of the realists, that the poorest states are the biggest security threat to the developed world (Chandler 2008).

Human security facilitates short term policies while hinders the systematic long term strategic planning. The focus on the interdependent and interlinked policy threats hinders prioritization within the policy framework (Chandler 2008). States can often hide behind the so called inter dependence of threats to shirk responsibility. Theorists vouching for human security label policy making as a flexible and networked process, and prioritization of the goals of human security as futile. Therefore, in the process they enable governments to shirk responsibility regarding foreign policy. This process is further exacerbated with the integration of non-state actors in policy making and implementation. David Chandler concludes that both security and policy making should be viewed in general, sans the struggle between paradigms based on states and those based on individuals and emancipatory goals. He disagrees with the founding point of human security that characterizes the individual and not the state as the primary subject of security. In his opinion the discourse on human security projects the world as more complex and threat ridden, however discourages policy responsibility and long-term strategic planning to ameliorate the same (Chandler 2008).

Ryerson Christie (2010) agrees with David Chandler that greater empirical analysis is needed to understand how human security has been used to shape policy. He argues that human security does risk serving national interests, yet as a concept it is consistent with interventionist processes to alleviate both conflict and poverty. Human security has shaped the discourse on alternate security, yet it does not mark a break from prior security practices (Christie 2010). Human security has been adopted to shape foreign policies of states like Canada, Japan and Norway (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). It is important to note that the middle powers have achieved much in their human security initiatives. Middle powers are those states that approach international problems through multilateralism, based on a sense of accountability that goes beyond their borders. Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and Austria are some countries that fall within this category. Each has used its expertise to advance human security. The governments of Canada and Norway signed the Lysoen Declaration in 1998 for a bilateral cooperation over issues of human security. This

later expanded to include thirteen other countries and a large number of NGOs to culminate into the establishment of the Human Security Network. Netherlands and Canada along with twelve other countries developed proposals to enhance the reflexive capacities of UN Peace keeping missions which resulted in the creation of UN Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (Behringer 2003). Sascha Werthes and Tobias Debiel (2006) in the INEF Report (2006) titled “Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases”, state that human security has received a great amount of academic and political attention, however a consensus over its working definition is yet to appear on the horizon. The two authors propose that understanding human security as a “political leitmotif” serves as a solution in analysing human security and its significance to agendas of foreign policy (INEF Report 2006: 11). They explain that political leitmotifs are those coherent ideas that help in formulating political agendas and policy framework. Moreover political leitmotifs retain their definitional core and can be modified subsequently. They help in guiding policymakers through situations of urgency and ambiguity. They fulfil three functions of “explanation and orientation, coordination and action related decision guidance and motivation and mobilisation” (Institut für Entwicklung und FriedenReport 2006: 12).

In the first case the concept helps in explaining and elaborating on the policy debates regarding security in developing societies. In an interconnected world failed states, terrorism, transnational networks of crime impact international security on the whole. Traditional theories of realism and multilateralism fail to address these issues. A political leitmotif like human security helps in analysing these complex issues without conceptual rigidity. Human security as a concept brings together diverse issues of human rights, democracy, economic vulnerabilities, health hazards and environmental concerns. Framing and labelling of such concerns lie at the core of the human security project. The second function of coordination and guidance regarding decisions and action flows from the first. The concept endorses the engagement of the state, along with multilateral and non-state actors. The writers cite the example of the Human Security Network which plays a significant role in applying human security to international concerns. It mobilises political knowhow towards promoting development and peace. It promotes both the objectives of freedom from fear and

freedom from want. As a political leitmotif human security seeks to mobilise and motivate concerned actors through norms and ideals. It appeals to both cognitive and emotional attributes of individuals. The discourse of human security calls for compassion and international solidarity (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006).

Sascha Werthes and David Bosold argue that the actual impact of this mobilisation still remains open to scrutiny. Middle powers like Canada and Norway along with other members of the Human Security Network have used the same leitmotif to mobilise collective action. The discourse of human security when perceived as a political leitmotif, offers a normative framework for foreign policy. They argue that human security is pursued by the government when it is accepted as a norm that legitimizes policy and action. A policy framework aimed at the objects of insecurity like small arms and landmines also creates a political identity. Human security as a leitmotif shapes foreign policies of states that credit themselves as its judicious advocates. Such policies are considered to be morally and ethically superior and thereby create unique political identities. Human security permits the existence of a certain political rhetoric through the language of official statements and acts of speech on foreign policy ( Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006).

According to Astri Suhrke (1999) Canada has used human security to establish itself as a forward looking middle power. During Canada's presidency of the UN Security Council, it put forth the agenda of widening the Council's jurisdiction beyond the traditional state security to include individual security. Canada has primarily focused on freedom from fear in its promotion of human security. Foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy reshaped Canada's foreign policy to accommodate measures that could deal with terrorism, circulation of arms, and civilian death in conflict zones. His approach was founded on humanitarianism and intervention with shared responsibility. Canada's human security policy is based on public safety, conflict prevention, protection of civilians, governance and accountability and international operations. It sought the establishment of legal norms to reduce the loss of innocent lives in conflict zones and at the same time built on international expertise to curb cross border terrorism and drug trafficking. Canada sought measures to resolve conflicts through

public and private sector accountability (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Measures were taken by funding the Canadian Consortium for Human Security and a human security programme was established for funding and facilitating the ideal both inside and outside the government (Christie 2010). The human security agenda enabled Canada to play a leading role in the campaign calling for the ban of landmines- Ottawa Convention. Its efforts contributed to the creation of the International Criminal Court, the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). As a middle power with restricted military capability Canada could carve out space in the international arena to stand up to its powerful neighbour- the United States of America (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009).

Astri Suhrke (1999) observes that Norway established bilateral ties with Canada, and initiated a coalition of states on issues of human security to avoid complete political isolation especially when it chose to keep out of the European Union. The Japanese initiative of promoting human security that began in the 1990s is also considered to be a product of larger diplomatic interests. It had established a Commission on Human Security and had set up a huge trust fund in the United Nations and contributed US\$300 million to various projects under the aegis of the UN. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sponsored the Commission of Human Security in 2001 (Ho: 2008). The Japanese approach to human security focused on 'freedom from want' and prohibition of the use of force with the exception of cases concerning international security. Human security was pursued as an approach based on so called 'Asian values' and protection of livelihood (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Satomi Ho (2008) describes the human security policy of the country as a tool for acquiring a leading position in the international society without the use of armed force. Japan used development assistance as a tool to get past its military limitations (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). It conducted its human security policy in the context of Asian values based on non-interference and state security. Therefore, Japan was and still is reluctant in deploying forces in other countries to protect human rights and human security. Japan's human security policy aligns with national interest in order to promote a non-interventionist and development oriented framework to consolidate its position in the international arena. Sascha Werthes and Tobias Debiel (2006) look into

the implications of a human security based framework of foreign policy. Ethical attributes of such a foreign policy are used to shame certain acts and therefore the norms of human security themselves can be used to judge the coherence of any specific policy (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006). The writers are quick to point out that such a foreign policy may not always be free of hypocrisy. In many cases human security becomes a mere rhetoric in foreign policy. Unlike Astri Suhrke who perceives such endorsement of human security as a measure to advance the power oriented national interests; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy view the merger of national and human security as complementary to the larger policy goals of human security.

Scholars like Pauline Ewan (2005) suggest a methodology similar to that used by David Chandler. Ewan talks about shifting the attention from theoretical quest of parsimony to that to contextualized and empirical analysis in which threats to human security exist. However she is not dismissive of human security threats in the third world and focuses her attention on the reduction of avoidable deaths through analysis of routinely available international data.

David Ambrosetti (2008) points out that David Chandler is correct in identifying the problem with rhetoric that has the potential to simply reproduce existing positions of authority and may lead to lack of responsibility in policy making and implementation. However, new doctrines may not initially affect the existing hierarchies of power which does not mean that they lack the potential to achieve the same (Ambrosetti 2008). Human security has already proved its potential to generate some form of acquiescence from diverse agencies in international politics who grant it legitimacy. Ambrosetti is not idealistically ambitious about the rhetoric of human security. Yet he believes that the outcome of such advocacy depends on the actors and agencies that are involved in what is done in the name of human security. Novel political principles like human security with what Ambrosetti calls “acknowledged legitimacy” must be perceived as a new “resource” for political mobilization for both traditional and novel actors (Ambrosetti 2008: 443). This political resource of human security can both foster emancipation and submission. Its outcomes largely depend on the nature of the linkages between policy practices carried out in the name of human



security and the concept itself. The normative framework human security is meant to counter power maximising tendencies, which is futile in Ambrosetti's opinion. As long as political analysts focus on the dichotomy between human security and power maximising practices they would overlook the manner in which dominant state practices actually integrate human security concerns. The nature and extent of such policy integration has to be looked into. Ambrosetti clearly warns one against the evaluation of human security vis-a-vis the state. However he does call for greater empirical research on the practices of human security and the shifts that it causes within the rules political power and competition.

One reasons that the integration of human security with foreign policy or national security should not be perceived as problematic in itself. As David Ambrosetti (2008) points out, greater empirical research should guide us through a case by case analysis. At this point it would be crucial to look into the debate between David Chandler (2008) and Taylor Owen (2008).

Taylor Owen (2008) states, that David Chandler is correct in his analysis of the

[m]yth that human security represents a paradigmatic clash between state and individual security interests. However, in focusing exclusively on this myth, Chandler falls victim to another: that there is a singular human security project encompassing both the theoretical utility of critical security studies and the policy challenges of implementing the concept (Owen 2008:445).

Owen disagrees with Chandler's claim that security threats have been exaggerated in the post cold war era. Threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have actually magnified along with extreme poverty and spread of communicable diseases. Owen argues that "If 18 million people die from disease versus 300,000 from conflict, as was the case in 2000, how is shifting the focus of security to public health threats overestimating the vulnerability?" (Owen 2008: 447). Jie Zhang and Junsen Zhang (2004) in their analyses of data collected across developing and developed countries, conclude that developing countries face over-population, high illiteracy, slow economic growth, and have little or no social security. Their results suggest that the introduction of social security would help to solve such problems. Compared to this, the old-age social security tends to speed up per capita growth in developed countries. Thus trends in developed countries reaffirm the link between enhancement of human

capital and economic growth. Developing countries on the other hand lack the institutional mechanisms to ensure social security which deeply hampers economic growth and security. Nita Rudra (2002) quantifies this proposition by drawing a comparison between the condition of labour in least developing countries and developed countries. She concludes that

[g]lobalization leads to lower social-welfare spending in labour rich least developed countries because low skilled workers have limited political leverage. In least developed countries the labour's political power and interests are the opposite of what existing political and economic theories predict. In most developed countries, however, labour groups have the institutional clout to ensure that they do not lose political power with globalization and can successfully demand compensation in the form of social welfare spending (Rudra 2002: 420).

This argument finds resonance in Ken Booth's assertion that "the chronic insecurity of the world's victims has been their actual way of life. But these realities have been invisible to, or ignored by, the traditional mindset of those who have dominated and disciplined International Relations" (Booth 2008: 8). The claim that the threats in the developing world are exaggerated is indeed a sweeping statement. The example of Iraq cannot be extrapolated to conclude the non existence of insecurity in the third world.

Owen (2008) avers that Chandler makes no claims that public health should not be securitized. Chandler in Owen's opinion is bothered by state appropriation of the human security goals and the lapse of the proclaimed dichotomy between the realist and the human security approaches. He explains that securitization itself of issues is not the problem, however the consequences of this are crucial. The goal of human security is to attach urgency and immediacy to dire conditions of human development. While David Chandler is dismissive of security threats in the developing world, Owen calls the same an "empirical reality" (Owen 2008: 447). He argues that there are regions within developed countries that have human security problems, and points out to the condition of aboriginal communities. Owen states that over a billion live in extreme poverty, and are exclusively located in the developing countries. One needs to focus on security as the ability of individuals to live, and map regions of vulnerability. Focusing on the secure existence of states does not do the needful. Such a realisation does not warrant a consensus or uniformity regarding human security

practices and policy prescriptions; which are spread over a wide spectrum within the discourse (Owen 2008).

Taylor Owen (2008) differentiates between the security concerns of realists, and those of human security advocates. He argues against Chandler's statement that goals of human security are largely compatible with that of the realists. In Owen's opinion the former make no absolutist claims of a direct relationship between southern vulnerability and northern security. It would be important to site Roland Paris here, as he critiques human security for the lack of conceptual clarity, regarding causal factors and their consequences.

Paris (2004) explained that the binary between the realist state centric approaches of international relations as opposed to the individual centred human security approaches should not be taken too far. Such a binary overlooks the problems regarding "definitional boundaries" (Paris 2004: 371) within the discourse of human security. Paris states that human security includes concepts as diverse as substance abuse and genocide. Such a definition then encourages the widest possible coalition of actors and interests and complicates matters for academicians and researchers. It is futile to talk about socioeconomic factors leading to decline or increase in the levels of human security, when these factors are a part of the definition of human security. According to Paris, separation of causal factors is urgently required to consolidate the definition of human security. Taylor Owen (2008) disagrees with Paris as well and states that "as the analytic utility charge depends wholly on what we use as the dependent variable" (Owen 2008: 448). There is indeed little doubt that individual vulnerability is not exaggerated in the developing world. Yet one must differentiate between the act of labelling an issue of as a human security problem and the existence of the same. Chandler's (2008) example of exaggeration as evident in the perceived existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq falls in the former category. In my opinion the labelling of human security concerns in the case of Iraq was highly problematic. One has to be cautious not to extrapolate and generalize from this instance. One can't dismiss genuine human security concerns in the developing world.

Owen (2008) is critical of Chandler as he dismisses crisis management as short term policy. According to Taylor Owen crisis management of human security

emergencies is in no way in conflict with long term policy planning. Owen cites the example of conflict prevention as a crucial part of human security discourse which is essentially long term in nature. Policy prioritization depends wholly on the definition of the concept that is used. The Canadian government which takes a narrow approach to human security has streamlined its long term policymaking on security issues (Owen 2008). The long term human security initiatives of Canada, Japan, Norway, Netherlands and Austria along with other middle powers have yielded significant results. Taylor Owen cites Tadjbaksh and Chenoy (2009) as they explain, that applying a concept to a policy makes way for policy prioritization and distribution of resources. Unlike David Chandler's explanation, Owen insists that Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy believe that the state is an important purveyor of human security. They however insist that it is not the only purveyor of security (Owen 2008).

As far as the relationship between the state and human security is concerned, David Chandler finds the two paradigms as inseparable yet problematic. David Chandler (2008) insists that the state has co-opted human security to an extent and would always promote its authority over and above the rights of individuals. Owen however questions this claim. He argues that, in the case of Canada, and its narrow approach to the concept eventually led to positive policy initiatives, like the Mine Ban Treaty. In Japan, the concept has led to a larger role for the nation's development organization. Owen questions further by asking, what are the desired outcomes of questioning state co-option of human security. If such a critique is absolute in nature then the act remains within the purview of theory. However if state co-option of human security is analysed, qualitative as in the case with Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2009); then it shall be more useful as a large number of actors beyond the state become its purveyors. Owen states that as far as critical security studies are concerned, human security has been primarily used to critique state based security. Owen concludes that the two uses of human security can coexist as long as the former recognizes that the state is often the cause of the insecurity for citizens that it is meant to protect. The latter also needs to acknowledge recognizes that better state policy is the end goal of the criticism of the state. A theoretical critique in itself is not useful. However, Owen does agree that there could be an indefinite and irreconcilable tension between human security as a policy paradigm and as a critical tool (Owen 2008). One

agrees with Owen's assertion that human security must acknowledge insecurity inflicted by the state. I intend to look at the implications human security as a framework for policy. Human security has been adopted to frame foreign policy but we need to explore the extent to which it has been implemented domestically especially in the case of genocide and state led violence. How does the prevalence of human security as a foreign policy tool impact intervention in case of genocide and state led violence?

A similar question is posed by David Chandler (2008) in his response to Owen and Ambrosetti. If the concept calls for a security alternative then why human security has been readily co-opted by Western States and the international institutions that they dominate. He answers for himself by stating that, it is the lack of political contestation over the agenda for international security that governs the human security framework. Chandler states that, there is no major clash of political subjects, either in terms of binaries of the left and right or in terms of great power or inter-power rivalries. The security agenda is continuously expanding, yet it cannot be explained in terms of a radical challenge from a top down or even a bottom up perspective (Chandler 2008). Through the following chapters I would look into this so called co-option and the implications it has for human security and the study of security in general.

Annick Wibben (2008) agrees with David Chandler that human security does not indicate a paradigm shift. She explicates her position by stating that human security does not pose any explicit challenge to the political perceptions that underlie the debate around security studies. Wibben cites the Commission on Human Security to assert that human security does not replace the security of the state. The state still remains pivotal in our understanding of international politics.

Efstathios T. Fakiolas (2011) delineates the diverse agendas involved in the human security discourse. He explains that human security as a concept and as a framework for policy building calls for a strong foundation of democracy and human rights within the state. At another level the same concept entails the endeavour to establish a managerial system of global governance. The third form of policy within the framework of human security reinforces the existing power relations in international politics through securitization of myriad aspects of international and

national politics. In his opinion these three forms of human security are not quite compatible with each other. While analysing the role of the state and its relation with human security, Fakiolas reminds us that the state is marked not only by the government but also by the social relations that exist within a geographical entity. The state is therefore viewed as product of social interaction which is a result of interplay of both ideational and material factors in a specified historical context. The state with its organised machinery of government, territory and population is located in an anarchical system. This anarchical system according to Fakiolas, comes with its structural compulsions. The potential of the use of force positions the state in an environment of threat and suspicion. In their struggle for survival the state has to promote its interests and work at improving its position within the international structure (Fakiolas 2011).

This process of interaction with the international system and the domestic society brings with it the need to consolidate authority. The state protects the population against internal threats through the legitimate use of force or violence. As Fakiolas explains such violence warrants both vertical and horizontal legitimacy. Vertical legitimacy implies the right of the state to govern and legitimize its authority while horizontal legitimacy pertains to the territorial base and the people over which the authority is established. Horizontal legitimacy establishes the rules for people's participation and a system for social goods through taxes. Individuals do not live in isolation and they cannot be separated from the societies in which they live. Human security therefore overlooks the fact that the human in aspect of security is not its discursive prerogative. Both national and human security are intrinsically human and have common origins (Fakiolas 2011). Sabina Alkire (2003) observes that concerns of national security overlap with those of human security. However she is guarded in her assertion and states that are still vast differences between the two. Human security unlike the state centric perspective vouches for a more expansive view on security. Unlike state security human security is not bound by the borders of the nation state, its jurisdiction is much wider. Human security is not limited to the citizens of a particular state as it caters to the global population. State security has an additional attribute of foreign policy that seeks to maximise state power. She delineates this position by referring to John Mearsheimer's offensive realism which focuses only on action that

maximises state power. Human security is quite removed from this power maximising agenda. Alkire continues her argument by explaining that state security and human security compete when questions of sovereignty as responsibility are raised along with those regarding intervention (Alkire 2003).

### CRITICISM OF HUMAN SECURITY

While the above scholars discuss the components and various attributes of human security, scholars like Roland Paris (2001) and Kyle Grayson (2008) question its expansive conceptualization. Paris (2001) argues that human security lacks an accurate definition. Its conceptual expansiveness encapsulates everything from physical security to psychological well being. This in turn makes prioritization difficult for both academicians and policy makers. Purposive vagueness pertaining to its broad conceptualization renders it useful only in the rhetorical realm. Due to its broad and expansive definition a vast coalition of states, international institutions and non-governmental organisations come together for addressing concerns that earlier came under the rubric of international development. However Roland Paris is not dismissive of human security's achievements in the form of a political coalition. The coalition led to the adoption of anti-personnel landmine convention and the creation of the International Criminal Court that had been imminent when Paris wrote the concerned piece. Yet he differentiates between the concept's appeal as an effective "rallying cry" and one that can provide a "useful framework for analysis" (Paris 2001: 89).

As an instrument for analysis, human security treats all policy concerns and values as equally important. Thus all issues are treated on the same plain and with an equal sense of urgency. This is extremely problematic for policymakers who need to find immediate solutions to problems that concern national security. The lack of precise content of human security makes room for any hypothesis along with its absolute opposite during the course of its analysis. Causal relationships that can be explained between separable factors are required for a thorough study of security. However human security obscures any attempt for such a separation amongst factors (Paris 2001). Paris's critique of the broadening of security finds resonance with the views of the traditionalists. Paris (2001) is also critical of the attempts to narrow the focus of the concept. He questions the act of prioritisation of certain threats over

others, without any definitional justification. He is critical of Kanti Bajpai's assertion of prioritising physical safety and individual freedom over the right to education, by stating that Bajpai fails to provide any reasons for the same. Paris avers that the agenda of human security is purposively broad as it provides space to a wide range of actors on board (Paris 2001). Stephen M. Walt (1991) comments, that efforts at the broadening of security remind one of the importance of non-military. However he disapproves of the inclusion of issues as diverse as environmental pollution and child abuse within the gamut of security. In his opinion such securitization would achieve little in terms of addressing these concerns and would in turn hinder the conceptual coherence of security.

Narrowing of the definition could lead to alienation of certain participants in what Paris terms as the human security coalition (Paris 2001). Paris asserts that it is nearly impossible to operationalize the concept of human security yet it can serve as a broad category for research in the non-military aspects of security such as health, urbanization and environmental degradation. Human security in his opinion can also serve as a tool for collective action for those who are a part of the human security coalition. However it fails as a tool for analysis and policy implementation (Paris 2001).

Taylor Owen (2008) seeks to address the concerns regarding definitional obscurity of human security along with its policy prescriptions within structure of the UN. Owen points out that the trajectory of human security at the UN is becoming increasingly obscure. In contrast to the report by the Commission on Human Security, in the Secretary General's Report (2000) the concept is trivialised in Owen's opinion through the exaggeration of the differences between broad and narrow views. This particular Report endorsed the narrow view on human security. The "Outcome Document" of the United Nations separated the concept of development from security and peace (Owen 2008). As Owen explains, human security in the UN is largely characterized by lack of clarity regarding the relationship between human security and development, the conceptual overlap between human rights and human security and "conceptual overstretch" (Owen 2008: 120). Human security and human development are often used interchangeably; Owen resorts to Sabin Alkire's (2003) exposition of



the two concepts. Owen states that despite being people centred and multifaceted the concepts do not have long term goals and are not overtly focused on poverty. In last two points Owen disagrees with Alkire as she attributes both long term goals and focus on poverty as aspect of human security and development. In Owen's opinion the time frame of human security is subject to the area in which the concept is applied. Owen points out that human security and human development can be neatly demarcated only when one takes a narrow approach to human security. A broad definition of human security as espoused by the commission on human security makes the relationship ambiguous between the two concepts (Owen 2008).

As opposed to other critiques of human security, Kyle Grayson (2008) states that human security till date is founded in the objectivist discourse which remains largely removed from subjectivist interpretations. In his opinion human security is embedded in "cosmological realism" (Grayson 2008:384). His critique of human security is not shaped by ambiguities of an expansive discourse. Unlike Paris he criticises human security for its lack of contextual specificity and mechanisms of regulation of individuals. The attempts at quantification of human security, efforts to give the concept the most comprehensive definition, and the constant emphasis of the concept as a regulatory discourse is geared towards biopolitical control of people (Grayson 2008). Grayson avers that human security constantly endeavours to be applicable at a policy level. The definition of human security with its components like freedom from fear and freedom from want culminates in a binary in terms of its classification. While the UN takes an inclusive view of the concept by articulating interrelatedness of economic, health, food and environmental security; the Human Security Report takes a more narrow approach by focusing on threats like genocide and displacement. There is also a third position that advocates for avoiding civilian casualties caused by political, cultural, social and economic threats. It therefore combines aspects of both development and physical security. However the tendency to claim verifiability is common to the three positions. They constantly question what should be done to establish causal variables with facts. Measures are taken to achieve precise indicators of threats so that the relevance of a particular intervention can be established. Moreover Grayson cites Roland Paris here to establish that such a task is inherently ambitious as such indices cannot be removed from the lack of clarity over

what should be investigated or examined. In essence Grayson questions the very process of choosing and verifying facts that fit into the definitional basis of a human security policy imperative. Prescribing a clearly drawn policy framework is another aspect of the concept's inherent leaning towards cosmological realism. Only those definitions that can be implemented on a policy level are taken into consideration (Grayson 2008).

Scholars like David Roberts advocate a definitional middle ground. In Grayson's opinion such scholars work along empirical lines to classify and categorize threats to human security. Within the human security discourse, priority is given to studies that investigate the factors related to health, environment, economic and social well being. However, almost no attention is given to factors that cannot be measured directly. The discourse endeavours to come up with a definitional consensus that universalizes the acceptance of the concept. The current literature focuses on mitigating risks, while the entire process of collection and classification of data to promote the effect of power through government practice is totally ignored. The entire discourse of human security is inclined towards the maintenance of current power relations. It focuses on the definition of security threats that are directly measurable and policies to ascertain the importance of causal factors. The collection of facts is not value free and beyond the dynamics of global power relations. Therefore the policies that follow also become a function of global hierarchies (Grayson 2008).

This broadening and deepening of security has also been opposed by realists who are concerned by the shift in focus from military to other ends, which are not appropriate for strategic analysis. Traditionalists have critiqued human security for overloading the discourse on security with that which is both unattainable and idealistic (Alkire 2003). They are usually impatient with human security and label it as a liberal discourse that believes in the inherent benevolence of human nature (Alkire 2003). Siddharth Mallavarapu (2008) asserts that the realists have always been sceptical regarding the broadening of security. They believe that all issues cannot come under the banner of security, as they cannot be dealt with the same urgency (Mallavarapu 2008).

Rajesh Rajagopalan (2012) explains that the horizontal and vertical expansion of human security during the 1990s targeted neorealist perspectives on security. Rajagopalan points out that Stephen Walt had been dismissive of these efforts to include poverty, environment and health within the purview of security. This dismissal was based on the neo-realist prioritization of objectivity and rationality. Walt critiques the inclusion of novel issues into security to point out the resultant incoherence within the study of security. Walt also asserts that the mere inclusion of poverty and the environment into discourse of security would do little in addressing these concerns (2012). Rajagopalan argues that this alternative approach to security looks at the state as a problem, prioritizes everything and in the process fails to differentiate between the extent of insecurity involved in different situations. He avers that treating situations as diverse as ethnic violence on the same plain as humanitarian disasters caused by floods and famine; is morally problematic. The act of prioritizing every concern is overly ambitious, burdens policy and hinders action in case of emergencies. The act of dealing with all concerns of insecurity on an equal basis may lead to action that sympathises with both the victims and perpetrators (Rajagoapalan 2012).

Another position against the broadening of security calls for de-securitization or demilitarization of threats concerning socio-economic and environmental issues. As labelling concerns in these areas as dangerous calls for exceptional measures that such situations often do not demand (Dalby 2000).

Human security has been characterised by an inevitable tension between its practice as a policy framework and as an ideological critique of state security (Owen 2008). How do we deal with this tension while assessing human security within the larger rubric of security? Matt McDonald (2002) deals with this question by stating that human security as a policy agenda is not helpful in analysing security as a discourse or even its practice in the international system. Human security has received both political and academic attention. He views this fact as a response to the continued prioritization of the military at the state level and the related negligence of individual security concerns. There is a lack of consensus over an authoritative definition of human security. Its practice is perceived as fluid and constructed and its normative nature is in line with its moral position in relation to the concerns of humanitarianism.

Acts of defining and redefining security are political in nature and the current debate over human security makes one question the meaning of security and its agents. McDonald says that it is problematic to implement human security with the individual as its referent. In McDonald's opinion this marks a regression to a pre social contract era. Therefore the referent object of security must be determined by the context. Human security cannot be described as universal and independent of a cultural context or identity (McDonald 2002).

Tara McCormack (2007) states that human security highlights the failures of the sovereign state and tends to suggest how it fails to serve the individual's needs and views the relationship between the state and the individual as one imbued with conflict. McCormack avers that advocates of human security subvert the primacy of the state as the guarantor of security and subsequently implies a state of institutionalised insecurity which is reminiscent of the liberal conceptualization of the state of nature. Tara McCormack resorts to Emma Rothschild's conceptualization of security as a political relation between the agents and the subjects of security within the larger rubric of sovereignty. In her opinion human security "depoliticizes society" (McCormack 2007: 86). McCormack argues that the sovereign state itself emancipates individuals from conditions of insecurity that exist in the state of nature. By acknowledging the individual as the primary agent human security in essence constructs a state of nature where practically everything that exists socially is seen as a threat. All social, political and institutional relations are therefore viewed as removed from the individual. Its drive for providing 'real' security in McCormack's opinion can sustain itself only by producing new threats.

Security is a contested concept as the political and analytical categories within the same cannot be separated (Dalby 2000). It is embedded in a wider, social order of meaning (Dalby 2000). Security does not reflect an objective reality rather it establishes its meaning on its own. The labelling of threats and those that are threatened is specific to each context (Dalby 2000). Sascha Werthes and David Bosold in the Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF) Report (2006) on human security argue that arriving at a clear meaning of human security is an arbitrary process, as its meaning is specific to each context. Human security is an unstructured term that is

subject to change. Multiple actors within the discourse give their own meaning to the term and more importantly new events constantly reshape its definition (INEF Report 2006).

## CONCLUSION

Human security is contested as a concept as scholars find it overtly ambitious and achievable only in the normative realm. Roland Paris (2004) criticises excessive securitization of the discourse. He suggests that the concept lacks clarity as it cannot differentiate between dependent and independent variables. This stands in sharp contrast to the views of writers like Taylor Owen (2008) who suggest that each case study determines the relationship between causal variables. David Chandler (2008) points out lack of prioritization of goals, simultaneous bifurcation and intermingling of state and human security and location of human security threats exclusively in the third world as failures of the discourse. Other scholars like Nita Rudra (2002), Taylor Owen, Jie Zhang and Junsen Zhang (2004) view these threats as empirical facts. The current academic debate on the relationship between human security and the state suggests that the two cannot be seen as oppositional forces challenging each other. The convergence between human security and foreign policy is viewed as an advancement of interests guided by power by Astri Suhrke (1999), while Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy focus on the achievements of this middle power leadership of human security.

Human security may not supplant the state as evinced in the work of Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2009). One needs to look into the long term co-option of human security by the nation- state. Is this co-option limited to the sphere of foreign policy? Has human security been incorporated by the state in the domestic policy? How does Human Security influence policy action in case of state perpetrated violence? One needs to look into policy imperatives by both the international community and the concerned state. Does human security as a normative discourse pressurize states to not commit acts of violence against its own population? How does it expect the international community to act in case of state sponsored violence and genocide?

Efstathios T. Fakiolas (2011) simplifies the three strands of human security for us and points out that they are essentially incompatible. Since human security is an evolving discourse one needs to look into the implications of human rights within the state, the system of global governance and the forms of policy that reinforce international hierarchies. I intend to pursue the same in the ensuing chapters.

## CHAPTER TWO

### SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN SECURITY

*Human rights and human security interact with each other on multiple levels. This chapter looks into the implications of this interaction on state sovereignty. Human security challenges the traditional notions of sovereign authority. It conceptualises state sovereignty as conditional upon the fulfilment of the state's responsibility towards its citizens. This has raised several questions regarding the sanctity of state sovereignty and the role of the international community in case of state failure. In this chapter I look into the related concepts of human security and sovereignty as responsibility.*

### HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN SECURITY

Security is political in nature; it is both fluid and constructed (McDonald 2002). Since policy making lies within the domain of the state, even security policy comes within the jurisdiction of the state. The makers of policy do not choose the definition of security. This definition is determined by history, identity and culture as they form the security discourse (McDonald 2002). Since security is contextually dependent, it would be interesting to look into the framework of human security within the larger juridical apparatus of the state. Judith Butler argues that “the state defines the legal and institutional structures that delimit a certain territory...It is that which forms the conditions under which we are juridically bound” (Butler 2007: 4). Reinhart Kossler (2003) defines the state as a prerequisite to and a product of modernity. He argues that states have specific histories of emergence (Kossler 2003). Kossler goes on to assert that the modern state is a culmination of a long drawn historical process. The application of state sovereignty implies the monopoly over violence by the state. This monopoly however, does not imply the absence of violence by the state. There is systematic application of violence by the state to safeguard basic political, economic

and social life that fall under the banner of national security (Kossler 2003). Such violence is often questioned by advocates of human rights and human security. The practice of security by the nation state is also being looked into by theorists of security. Issues of human rights emerge in the conversations on both national and human security.

Sabina Alkire (2003) describes the three fundamental changes to the concept of security. First is the addition of several issues to what is now considered as basic to security. Collective security is questioned in the context of changing power relations. With the coming of human security international institutions, NGOs, regional and local groups have come to play a great role as agents of security. In Alkire's opinion the literature on national security is drawing closer to human security (Alkire 2003). Alkire's exposition adds to Astri Suhrke's (1999) assertion regarding the relationship between human and national security.

Human rights cannot be removed from human security as the latter endeavours to create an environment where the attainment of the former is possible (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh point out that human rights are founded in the basic condition of being human. Since states are viewed as actors that would ensure basic freedom and safety, the issue of human rights and human security cannot be removed from the practice of states (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009).

Human rights were officially approved in international politics through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy explain that these include personal, legal, civil and subsistence rights. While personal rights include the right to life, protection against cruel forms of punishment and racial, ethnic and religious discrimination. The basic attribute linking human security and human rights is state accountability. However such assurance has been subjected to various digressions by the nation state. Human security as a concept claims to reduce such digression by states in pursuing human rights. The relationship between the state and human rights is delineated in the UN Charter (1945), along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the Helsinki Accords (1975) that acknowledged and reaffirmed the centrality of human rights to international peace and security (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2009).



Advocates of human security like Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy (2009) view the model of human rights as a precursor to the development of human security. They suggest that combining human rights and security into a single framework helps in fulfilling the interrelated goals of each agenda. Since human rights come within the larger rubric of human security it is important to look into their development, implementation and the dynamics of their relationship with human security. The scholars state that the moral and ethical imperatives of human security engage with human rights in order to recognise and define threats to individual security. Both human security and human rights focus on the individuals and communities. Both the concepts acknowledge the interrelatedness of rights and are committed to the pursuit of human dignity. The first generation of human rights guarding the right to life finds clear resonance in the 'freedom from fear' doctrine of human security (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009).

Sabina Alkire (2003) explicates the similarities and differences between human security and human rights. Human rights identify certain inalienable rights that must be ensured even in case of state emergency. Human security in a similar manner addresses the universal appeal of basic rights and freedom that guarantee both survival and dignity. Both human rights and human security cater to poverty and violence. Alkire explains that the first generation of human rights focused on civil and political needs, followed by the second generation of economic, social and cultural rights. The second generation of human rights finally led to rights of the community and the right to peace. Scholars have focused on mending the differences or rather the hierarchy between different generations of human rights. Due to these reasons Alkire perceives human security and human rights as similar in their aspirations (Alkire 2003).

While judging the relatedness of human security and human rights, Bertrand Ramcharan (2004) remarks that security signifies a condition of being safe and protected. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the wider body of human rights conventions are meant to ensure an international order in which basic human freedom and equality can be realized. He avers that individual security is inextricably linked with national security. Both national and international security are concomitant with individual security, human rights and basic freedom (Ramcharan 2004)

However, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2009) are quick in pointing out that unlike human rights human security is not guaranteed by a set of legal norms and conventions. The purview of human security goes beyond that of human rights. This is due to the fact that human security entails the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities that arise in situations when human rights are missing or when violations of human rights are possible (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Andreas Schuller (2010) explains that the foundation of human security developed in the 1980s to safeguard the individual in situations where international humanitarian law was not applicable, and the violation of human rights was possible.

Alkire (2003) suggests that a sense of duty and accountability is common to both human security and human rights. Governments and international institutions are obliged to adhere to human rights. The discourse of human rights permits other parties to act in case of violations. However human security is largely catered to by the government. It provides a platform for international, national and local groups to work together. The international community is bound to protect the concerned population only in case of state failure along with failure of local groups. In this manner human security moors itself onto the vocabulary of obligation valid within the discourse on human rights (Alkire 2003).

Unlike human rights that have a clear set of universal legal obligations, definitions of human security work on a cross-section of appeals. While activists of human rights argue that each right is indivisible, advocates of human security acknowledge the need for prioritisation beyond a certain threshold of human security, in order to overcome definitional obscurities and problems of implementation. The primary difference between the two concepts is of the institutions that implement the same. Human rights have laws to prevent and punish abuse, while human security uses economic, political and military force in extreme cases to ensure the same. Alkire concludes that both the approaches complement each other yet unlike human rights, elements of human security vary according both time and space (Alkire 2003). Wolfgang Benedek (2008) remarks that human security is unimaginable sans human rights and both the concepts owe their allegiance to human dignity. The discourse on human rights has been enhanced by human security as the latter often serves as a

mechanism of warning against human rights violations; as human security entails humanitarian law, peace and prevention of crimes against humanity (Benedek 2008). Therefore one can discern that human rights and human security interact closely and the former functions within the orbit of the latter.

It is important to look into the implementation of human rights and human security. Peter Hough (2008) explains that the policies pertaining to the implementation of human rights have developed significantly. However they have been unable to secure all individuals. He goes beyond Alkire's (2003) analysis and suggests that national security is always prioritized over and above human security. The nation state's existence is founded on its capability to provide security (Hough 2008). However human security cannot be guaranteed when traditional mechanisms and structures of the state are left unchallenged (McDonald 2002). Restructuring of these mechanisms and structures of the state would therefore entail conceptual changes in sovereignty and security. Each scholar has a different take on the relationship between the state, human rights and in turn human security.

Klejda Mulaj (2007) avers that the nation state is the primary agent that implements human rights. Certain states draw on national security concerns to justify policies that are detrimental to a particular community. Certain ambiguities in international law can also provide the legal impunity to acts of ethnic cleansing. This exists primarily due to the fact that the state has not yet been superseded in security policy. The implementation of security by any other entity has not been pursued satisfactorily in international law. Foundational principles of state sovereignty give the states full leverage to deal with domestic threats and emergencies. Due to this privileged status of state security some states carry out a range of controversial activities like arbitrary arrest and detention. Mulaj then illustrates Ken Booth's argument regarding sovereignty. This classification divides states into those who are in the so called business of security and those that are not, those states that look into the means of security and not the ends, and finally those that are so diverse and unpredictable in character that they cannot give a comprehensive picture of their security policy (Mulaj 2007). She categorically states that, individuals and groups are soon becoming the focus of security thinking and that state security is the primary but

not their sole support system. She also disagrees with the dichotomy of state and human security. Thus state security may still be the primary mode of analysis regarding sovereignty; yet individual society is gaining ground slowly and steadily (Mulaj 2007).

The aim of governance is to ensure human rights. A sense of duty and responsibility is what human rights add to the notion of governance and to the discourse on security (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2009). State responsibility is crucial in ensuring human security as well. However, despite these attempts at converging individual security with state security, human rights are violated in so called emergencies and are justified in the name of national security. Human security builds on the human rights model to look into justifications of state violations of the same in the name of national security (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2009). Ellen Seidensticker (2002) argues that human security can help in recognising and reducing state antics like arbitrary detention and arrest along with suppression of political freedom; that come in the way of the realization of human rights. National security is often used to justify the suppression of human rights. Therefore, an increase in the importance attached to human security would change this practice of easy marginalization of human rights (Seidensticker 2002).

Studies suggest that around nine countries run a high risk of genocide. These are Sudan, Burma, Somalia, Pakistan, China, Rwanda, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Schneider 2010). Lack of development in the South has culminated in violence and intrastate conflict in the post Cold War era. Intra state conflicts in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Burundi and Afghanistan have become issues of major concern for international politics. In all these cases civilians were targeted by unabated violence by their own state (Christie 2010). Schuller (2010) observes that no binding document is applicable on states in situations of internal disturbances and tensions. Notions of absolute sovereignty are been questioned in this context. Therefore concerns of human security have to be understood in relation to issues of responsible governance, the state's commitment to human rights along with the changing conceptualization of state sovereignty.

## SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY

Human security and human rights differ in terms of their systems of accountability. For the former accountability goes beyond the nation-state to include regional organizations, non-governmental bodies etc, while the same system is based strictly at the national level for the latter (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2009). While human rights entail state's accountability, human security seeks to address the shortcomings of the same by taking state accountability beyond its territorial borders. Human rights were however not organized in a manner that their implementation be ensured and facilitated. This policy gap was met through human security as it shapes both the reasons and the methods of promoting human rights (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2009). As is evident the state still remains a crucial actor in the guarantee of human rights and human security. In my opinion this subject cannot be approached without taking a look at the aspect of state sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty is the undercurrent that shapes the policy formulation and the practice of human security within the state and in the international arena.

Stevie Martin (2011) explains that the Hobbesian notion of sovereign as the loci of absolute power. The sovereign would then be responsible for the protection of each individual in the society. Such a sovereign would ameliorate the insecurity experienced by the individual in the chaotic and violent state of nature. However according to Locke, the state of nature that preceded the state, was characterised by freedom where hierarchies were non-existent. Thus any form of domination is unimaginable once the social contract comes into being. This is due to the fact that even the sovereign becomes a part of the contract. A similar position was taken up by Rousseau in which he states that the sovereign and the individuals are equal partners in the social contract. Therefore the state subverts its own existence when it violates the social contract that explicitly states its duty to protect and facilitate the interests of its citizens. As Martin illustrates (2011), this particular explanation of sovereignty espoused by both John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau feeds into the notion of sovereignty as responsibility where there is trust between the sovereign and the people.

Stephen D. Krasner avers that the international system has its own actors and rules. In this system states are the basic actors. Sovereign states are those territorial units that have juridical independence and are not subservient to any external authority (Krasner 2001). Krasner argues that the preferences and power of foreign agencies do limit the choices of a state; yet these choices are not a consequence of external invasion of domestic structures of governance. He illustrates the four different meanings of sovereignty- domestic, interdependence, Westphalian and international legal sovereignty. While domestic sovereignty implies the ability of domestic structures to control behaviour within the state; interdependence sovereignty refers to the control of borders and the movements across the nation state. Exclusion of external authority from domestic structures of authority is covered by Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty refers to mutual recognition of state boundaries and non- intervention. International legal sovereignty pertains to the equality of nation states and the illegality of coercion. Sovereignty as a concept emerged over a long period of time. He observes that like the concept itself, the primary challengers of sovereignty- globalization and human rights also developed over time. In Krasner's opinion states have always sought control over flows of people and ideas and have always been challenged by external actors concerned about issues of international security, minority rights and rights guaranteeing basic individual freedom. Moreover globalization and international norms have always existed, however these have coexisted with sovereignty and are yet to supplant the same (Krasner 2001). For some scholars sovereignty signifies a relationship of authority in which commands by one actor are to be obeyed by the other (Lake 2003). The authority of sovereignty has both internal and external aspects. Internally it refers to the highest authority within a state and externally it refers to formal equality of all states. External sovereignty as Lake specifies, causes anarchy which characterizes the relations between states (Lake 2003).

However, sovereignty is not seen as unconditional and sacrosanct today. Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh explain that, the principal of state sovereignty and the norm of universal human rights along with the international obligation to protect involve fundamental contradictions when they understood within their traditional conceptualizations (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). They point out that with the development of human rights the international community is unwilling to

tolerate large scale violations of these principles. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 posited major underlying principles of the international system. This included invocation of the sovereign state that had absolute and unconditional power and authority over its territory and citizens. There was no supra-national authority in the form of an organization or a coalition of states that could have an authority above the nation-state. The emergence of human rights in 1948 directly implied that the rights of the individual are meant override over power and state politics. This was viewed as a direct contradiction of the principle of state sovereignty, especially when the international community was obliged to intervene in cases where the state was unwilling or unable to protect individual rights (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009).

Defined narrowly, human security entails the recognition of transnational threats that make individuals vulnerable (Thomas and Tow 2002). As individuals and states are rendered vulnerable they require some form of international intervention to gain both freedom from fear and freedom from want (Thomas and Tow 2002). Thomas and Tow believe that human security addresses the behavioural change in international politics by getting international civil society in purview of decision making. State sovereignty is still important, yet the security norms of the international arena are essentially shaped by the internal behaviour of states. In their opinion power sharing between the state and the civil society is crucial in improving the lived experiences of individuals and communities that are responsible for the state's existence (Thomas and Tow 2002).

Edward Newman (2010) argues that human security has direct implications on the conceptualization of state sovereignty. Traditionally sovereign authority of the state is legitimised by its control over a territory and population along with an acknowledgment of the same by other states. However human security reverses this pattern by advocating that state sovereignty is conditional upon the fulfilment of human rights and basic needs of citizens. Therefore within the discourse of human security, the sovereignty of those states that fail to account for basic requirements of its citizens can be questioned.

Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh (2009) point out that the reconciliation between sovereignty and the notion of human rights and human security occurred when

sovereignty came to be seen as responsibility. They cite the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) when they state that the sovereign state remains the pivotal organising agent in international politics, and is responsible for ensuring the security of its people. Sovereignty as responsibility is not limited to the protection of individuals within the state. The second aspect of this concept deals with responsibility towards the society of states. Moreover the state is responsible for ensuring that threats to human security should not permeate its own borders to plague the territory of other states (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Michael Newman (2009) states that the concept of sovereign as responsibility developed under the aegis of Francis Deng who had been the UN's Special Representative on Internally Displaced People in 1993. Deng had described the position of displaced individuals as dependent on the mercy of domestic authorities. Deng observed that there was a clear absence of international legal norms to authorize their protection. Along with Roberta Cohen he established that the state played the most important role in protecting its citizens, however it was accountable to some higher international body in case it failed to perform its duties (Newman 2009).

The framework of sovereignty as responsibility suggests that both the UN and the states outside the UN have a responsibility to protect human security (Cunliffe 2007). Lucian Espas, Alin Cirdei and Catalin Negoescu (2011) explicate this position. They illustrate that governments cannot assert their sovereignty if they are unwilling or unable to provide security to their people. Human security in their opinion means implies protection of people from persistent and critical threats, therefore protection and empowerment are essential to the legitimacy of a sovereign. Strategically the concept endeavours to establish legitimate political authority that ensures rule of law and social and economic well being. The scholars view the concept of human security as a site of political reworking where humanitarian law and human rights function together.

An argument for sovereignty with responsibility is also made by Christian Reus-Smit (2001) when he asserts that human rights are foundational to the taming of the nation state. He states that both sovereignty and human rights are a part of the same normative dialogue about the legitimacy of the state. Smit illustrates further, that



the norms of human rights delegitimized the colonial state and were foundational to decolonization in Asia and Africa. Sovereignty as a notion is therefore, in conjunction with lawful state action and the guarantee of basic rights and freedom (Smit 2001).

Violations of human rights have become a starting point for discussions on new forms of intervention and along the same lines human security has become a reference point for global action in case of such violations (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006).

However claiming that human security is increasingly becoming a focal point for the conceptualisation of global security and action would be an exaggeration (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden Report 2006). Critics of the notion of sovereignty as responsibility argue that sovereignty is general will and the political representative is accountable to the people who are form the political constituency. Therefore state sovereignty itself is equipped with the means to assess the actions of states. In cases where insecurity is perpetrated by the state, the people who are a part of the sovereign structure must themselves act to ensure the state's compliance with their interests (McCormack 2007). Unlike the notion of state sovereignty, human security in itself offers no theory of institution building through which people can organise themselves into a collective that can effectively deal with problems of insecurity. She terms human security as a theory that antithetical to politics as only those institutions sans accountability exercise authority and power, only because they adhere to those definitions of security that are justified by the powerful (McCormack 2007).

Tara McCormack argues that the apparent animosity of human security towards state sovereignty conceals its ambitions of usurping the power of the state. It does so by terming each issue as a security problem and thereby demanding a response that is immediate; such a response requires "organized power" that is embodied by the state (McCormack 2007: 87). She pursues this argument by stating that insecurity is rendered permanent when human security replaces national security. Human security views social problems through the lens of security sets aside the criteria for legitimate political responsibility. In simple terms the urgency to act in order to uphold and guarantee human security is determined by "who is *able* to act, not who is authorized

to act” (McCormack 2007: 87). McCormack’s assertion links up with the larger issue of human security and intervention.

### HUMAN SECURITY AND INTERVENTION

Amitav Acharya (2001) states that generally advocates of human security vouch for non-violent and diplomatic means to guarantee human security. However, he suggests that the practice of human security cannot be separated from the issue of intervention, especially because human security entails reduction of individual costs of conflict, genocide, ethnic violence sponsored by the government or any group of individuals (Acharya 2001).

William Bain (2001) probes the relationship between national and human security to analyse practices of the state and the responses of the international community in case of state failure. National security is concerned with the safety of sovereign states and is considered as a precursor to individual security. Individual security flows from our virtue of being a member of a political community. However in certain cases states do not provide for their citizens and are often the source of misery. Therefore, national security can be objected on moral grounds when it violates the claims of humanity (Bain 2001). The problem of failed states and rights of legal equality and non-interference often contradict each other. The nature of failed states has pushed scholars to look into the problematic nature of national security (Bain 2001). They recognise that individual security does not necessarily flow from national security. Advocates of human security argue that it offers a better framework to deal with the insecurities that mark today’s world. Human security entails a commitment to the people regarding equitable development, freedom from political repression, along with freedom from hunger and disease. Human security as an approach asserts that rights of sovereign states must not interfere with the security of individuals. Therefore the ethical concerns of human security do not allow indifference in the sight of human suffering. In these cases the practice of human security often violates state sovereignty. This was evident in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo when international law was bypassed to alleviate human suffering (Bain 2001).

Bain (2001) also looks into human relations that underlie both national and human security. In his opinion the two strands of security look into problems of justice, order and conduct of human relations. However he explains that the two strands of security often contradict each other. Both human and national security constitute ways of organising human values and are a result of specific contexts. The problem that concerns us invokes the moral question of right and wrong in human relations. Since human conduct is a result of conscious choices, accountability for this conduct reconciles fears of insecurity (Bain 2001).

Bain (2001) vouches for the principles of non-intervention, despite his advocacy of human security. He argues that while pursuing the cause of individual security we risk inhuman consequences. Intervention in Kosovo by NATO was undertaken against the abuse of human rights. However the same forces of intervention were indifferent to the loss of innocent lives. Bain (2001) states that one cannot be insensitive to genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic violence; and continue with the adherence to principles of non-interference. Yet in the same breadth he argues that by intervening in the internal matters of states we destroy what seems unjust, yet the same issue is invaluable to those who reside within them. He explains that the acceptance of the norm of state sovereignty, the creation of international society and the definition of international law are all arbitrary processes and reflect the dynamics of power. Therefore intervention in cases where human security stands in contrast with national security may seem reasonable at first; however it results in distressing consequences for the subject state in the long run. Unbridled promotion of human security at the cost of non-intervention is therefore an unwise act (Bain 2001).

National security and human security do argue for different methods of security organisation, yet as simple theoretical constructs devoid of any socio-political context; they offer little in guiding us through the practices of the state (Bain 2001). Sans the context either doctrine can become a tool for tyranny and subjugation. Problems of human organisation are subject to principles of justice and liberty. Therefore it would be unwise to grant human rights and humanitarian law more importance by undervaluing rights of self determination and autonomy. The best

solution in case of state failure is to let the people express what they decide for themselves (Bain 2001).

Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann (2012) argues that the goal of human security is to persuade states to pay heed to the needs of the citizens. Human security advocates that state security is citizens' security. It also implies that states can be rendered insecure even if people outside their own borders are victimised. It urges states to take up the cause of human security of other people for its own self-interests. An aspect of this agenda includes the obligation to protect peoples' security through intervention when the host state fails to do the same. The Responsibility to Protect (RtP) is an attempt in the same direction (Hassmann 2012).

Panu Minkkinen (2007) comments on the Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter citing the sovereign equality of all nations, by stating that in reality "some states are more equal than others" (Minkkinen 2007: 34). This can be seen in the special powers given to the permanent members of the Security Council. He explains that the Draft Declaration on the Rights and duties of States delineated the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in a manner similar to the Peace of Westphalia. Though it was never adopted, the declaration brought to the fore the inherent contradictions in the UN Charter. Article 1 (2) of the Charter allows members to take collective measures to ensure peace and international security, which can effectively overpower notions of sovereign equality and non-intervention (Minkkinen 2007).

Minkkinen resorts to Jean Bodin's definition of rightful sovereign power that is vested in the government. Sovereignty signifies the lawful authority to legislate. Minkkinen argues for a sovereign state that governs without any outside interference. He asserts that independent and sovereign states are bound to attain the twin goals of perfection and preservation. Preservation is fundamental to the core of the state as it is obliged to protect and defend its territory and its people. The end goal of any sovereign state is to meet the needs of its citizens. Thus the duty to protect and care for its citizens is derived from the notion of classical sovereignty itself (Minkkinen 2007).

The new notion of ethical sovereignty states that sovereignty belongs to a state as long as it is capable of carrying out its obligations. Sovereign states are the subjects

of international law (Minkkinen 2007). In contrast to the classical notion of sovereignty states are answerable to the international community in case of failure to guarantee the minimum requirements of individual well being. One state can appraise the performance of other states in the realm of human rights. The restrictive interpretation of ethical sovereignty manifests itself in the form of humanitarian intervention and the right to intervene (Minkkinen 2007). Justin Conlon (2004) looks at humanitarian intervention as a new form of imperialism and terms the doctrine as a regression in terms of alleviating human misery. In his opinion intervention is of two kinds. One that uses force to protect human rights and the other that focuses on provision of food, health and shelter without the consent of the authorities of the receiving nation. Conlon focuses on the tension between human rights and state sovereignty especially in cases where force is used. He asserts there is no guarantee of safety of the vulnerable through humanitarian intervention. Forces that intervene can themselves indulge in abusive behaviour. He questions the intentions behind such intervention that evokes human rights (Conlon 2004).

Justin Conlon (2004) categorically states that the motivations in case of humanitarian intervention are mostly political and guided by self interest. In his opinion state sovereignty has enough room to provide for human rights of citizens. He asserts that respect of state sovereignty largely prevents conflict and the human rights abuses that follow such conflicts. The basic individual right to self determination spelled out under state sovereignty is pivotal to the realisation of other human rights. He exemplifies his position by citing US intervention in Iraq in 1991. Conlon argues that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was preceded by gross human rights violations which were easily overlooked by the US. While the Kurds in Iraq were being protected, the government of Turkey was being assisted in actions against the same community by the United States America. The motivations behind this intervention were driven towards ensuring oil stability in the Middle East and preventing the Kurdish crisis from entering Turkey. Intervention in Somalia took place during the civil war. However the humanitarian crisis had begun two years before the intervention. The troops were pulled out soon enough, when they faced serious casualties. Conlon continues with his argument by stating that intervention in Haiti was carried by the US to bring the country within the neo-liberal world order. In the case of crisis in Croatia,

Slovenia and Bosnia – Herzegovina when the US took over the operation; it exacerbated the ethnic conflict. Justin Conlon states that the West cannot be blamed completely for the crisis, yet it did worsen the situation. He concludes that state sovereignty must be guarded against humanitarian intervention. The latter's ability to ameliorate human right violations in the long run has not been proved yet. State sovereignty entails the right to self determination that is foundational to human rights and imperialism in the name of humanitarian intervention cannot answer concerns of human rights (Conlon 2004).

Iain Atack (2002) talks about the infringement of state sovereignty by humanitarian intervention, along with the negative effects of military action. He upholds the sovereignty of the state as supreme over its territory and population. Atack observes that there are serious limitations to the use of international law to sanction humanitarian intervention, as it erodes the basic principle of state sovereignty. Atack points out the difference between humanitarian intervention and conventional peacekeeping operations by the UN. He states that in case of the former there is no room for consent of the subject state while it is requirement in case of the latter. Humanitarian intervention in his opinion causes loss of life and becomes an excuse for militarism. Atack illustrates this by citing the example of UN intervention in Somalia and the bombing of Serbia by NATO. In his opinion the loss of life due to military intervention can never be reconciled with humanitarian purposes.

Dorota Gierycz (2010) informs us that humanitarian intervention lacks any formal or official definition. The concept is premised on the right of other states to intervene in case of atrocities against individuals. Humanitarian intervention emerged in the post Cold War era that was marked by intra-state conflicts. The United Nations was considered the only impartial agency that could guarantee protection to victims. Crises arose in Bosnia and Somalia in 1992. Both the cases demonstrated the inability of the UN and the members of the international community to protect civilians. The Security Council was frozen due to political divisions. Indecisiveness and inaction failed to prevent massacres in Somalia, Srebrenica and later in Rwanda. This made room for unilateral interventions by powerful states as witnessed in the case of NATO's actions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). In her opinion the illegitimate

humanitarian interventions were successful in ending the conflict and made way for societal reconstruction. However Gierycz asserts that interventions by French forces in Cote d' Ivoire and Chad and by US in Haiti were noticeable failures. Massacres in both Rwanda and Srebrenica went unabated despite being under UN observation. Countries in the South were deeply agitated by unilateral intervention in Kosovo. These fears were reaffirmed by the US led war against terrorism. As the world welcomed the new century, humanitarian intervention was debunked conceptually and mechanisms of civilian protection in case of natural and man-made emergencies were being relooked (Gierycz 2010).

In continuation of this argument Michael Newman (2009) states that despite the increasing awareness regarding sovereignty as responsibility, dual standards of the West regarding intervention were becoming evident. The West cared little about the massacres in Rwanda and Somalia and was equally insensitive to the dynamics of global inequality. Their efforts in theoretically devising a norm for intervention were viewed with great suspicion (Newman 2009). It is important to know that Newman here points out to the perceptions of the developing world before the dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect began. In fact he remarks that the Report on the Responsibility to Protect (RtP) and its subsequent reference to human security developed in this context of third world scepticism.

Dorota Gierycz (2010) says that the failures of the international community in preventing massacres in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Yugoslavia and Sudan and unilateral interventions by certain states in the case of Kosovo, pressurised the international community to look seriously into prevention of crimes against humanity. Redefinition of state sovereignty became inevitable along with an elaboration of principles of intervention that could prevent such atrocities in the future. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed these concerns in the General assembly meetings of 1999 and 2000. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was instated in response to the UN General Secretary's concerns and the Millennium Report. This Commission came up with a Report in 2001 that explained the terms of the RtP (Gierycz 2010). The RtP was invoked to ameliorate fears regarding humanitarian intervention and to re-assert that ethical sovereignty falls

largely within the gamut of human security (Minkkinen 2007). The state is considered responsible for guaranteeing human security and other states, international and regional organisations are obliged to act in case of state failure. This often requires the identification of certain failed or rogue states (Minkkinen 2007).

Tadjbakhsh and Cheney explain that the Responsibility to Protect (RtP) Report 2001 (RTPR) clearly states that sovereignty of a state should be defined in relation to the state's primary responsibility of protection of its population. In cases when the state fails to do the same or perpetrates violence against its own people, the international community has a responsibility to intervene. Ramesh Thakur (2002) in the article "Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from the ICISS", emphasises that sovereignty can be defined as both internal and external in nature. Internal sovereignty implies the jurisdiction of the government over its people, territory and resources. External sovereignty on the other hand refers to the legal identity accorded to the state in international law which implies an equality of position in comparison to other states. He describes that "state sovereignty establishes order, stability and predictability in international relations" (Thakur 2002: 329). The sovereignty of a state implies an inherent duty to respect the sovereignty of other states. Yet sovereignty in his opinion is not a sacrosanct principle. It is constantly being challenged by internationalization, norms regarding human rights and humanitarian intervention. Thakur asserts that memories of colonialism are fading away to give way to civil society within the state. He asserts that the objective of intervention for protecting individuals is not to do away with statehood. Humanitarian intervention replaces the authority of the state, only to exercise those protective functions that the state is unwilling or unable to provide (Thakur 2002).

In Thakur's opinion intervention does not challenge the sovereign status of the state, as it always carried within a time frame and is subject to "the capacity of the state itself to resume its protective functions" (Thakur 2002: 331). Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun (2002) argue that this language of dealing with intervention implies a critical appraisal of the situation from the perspective of the victim. It protects both individuals and communities from mass murder, sexual abuse and starvation. The international community is made accountable to both react and rebuild



in case of a humanitarian crisis. They point out that the principle of sovereignty as non – intervention, instituted in the UN Charter has been reworked to take into account the norms of human rights. Such a shift is marked by prioritizing national and international accountability over and above the exercise of absolute sovereignty by the nation state (Evans and Sahnoun 2002). Scott Watson (2011) argues that securitization theory has emerged as one of the most important new approaches to the study of security. However besides securitization, humanitarianism has also guided various emergency measures. Humanitarianism has also shaped the official justifications given for intervention in Somalia, Kosovo, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo amongst many others. The ICISS’s report on the Responsibility to Protect has used humanitarianism to advocate for action in case humanitarian crises (Watson 2011).

As a concept RtP has evolved over a short period of time. It has become a part of the working dynamics of international engagement with humanitarian conflicts (Bellamy, 2008). Aidan Hehir (2010) suggests that the Responsibility to Protect has been centre stage in the debates regarding humanitarian intervention. It has its genesis in the report of the International Convention on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001. The Responsibility to protect entailed six criteria for legitimate intervention- right authority, right intention, just cause, last resort, right intention, reasonable prospects and proportional means. The report defined dual thresholds of large scale casualty and ethnic pogrom for the term just cause. In both the cases the scenario for intervention could be apprehended in advance (Hehir 2010).

Bellamy (2006) explains that in the days after NATO’s intervention in Kosovo the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan questioned the legitimacy of a regional organisation to use military intervention without any UN sanction. However in the same breath the General Secretary also questioned whether it was wise to let crimes against humanity go unabated. Bellamy (2006) describes the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan’s sentiment as one that was extremely concerned about the urgency to avoid crimes against humanity; as seen in the case of Rwanda. Annan emphasised the need to go beyond a deadlocked security council to prevent humanitarian crises as witnessed in Kosovo. This particular sentiment was embodied by the ICISS, an autonomous body partially funded by the Canadian government (Bellamy 2006).

Unlike humanitarian intervention the Responsibility to Protect was spelled out in the ICISS report. The Report stated that military intervention was the last resort to be used in case of real or apprehended large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing. The report highlighted the criteria for such intervention as right intention, last resort, and use of proportional means and reasonable prospects of success. After a considerable amount of debate the concept was adopted by the General assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations (Bellamy 2006). RtP can be applied only in case of war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Unlike humanitarian intervention the new concept focuses on the safety of the vulnerable. The right to intervene has been replaced by the duty to protect. Responsibility to Protect is founded on the notion of sovereignty as responsibility along with prioritization of such responsibilities (Bellamy 2006).

The Responsibility to Protect rests primarily with each sovereign state and then with the international community as a whole. The international community is bound to assist states in building their capacity for meeting the needs of their citizens. However, in case of state failure due to lack of state will or capability the international community must resort to diplomatic dialogue, negotiation on humanitarian grounds (Gierycz 2010). When these measures fail the international community must resort to the use of force in accordance with the UN Charter (Gierycz 2010). The Responsibility to Protect sanctions the use of force only under the aegis of the UN. This measure was adopted to ameliorate fears of unilateral interventions that were permissible under humanitarian intervention. This measure has not been successful in placating the anxieties of the South regarding intervention (Gierycz 2010). The clause for protection was taken up again in 2009 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon at the 63<sup>rd</sup> session of the General Assembly. He emphasised on its effective implementation through prevention, timely reaction and reconstruction and defined the three pillars of RtP as the state, the internal community that assists the state, and response that both timely and effective (Gierycz 2010).

The obligation of states to protect human rights is based on treaties, customary international law and domestic legislation (Gierycz 2010). The UN General Secretary's Report further highlighted the need to back state accountability with

judicial institutions like the International Criminal Court (Gierycz 2010). It also probed the conditions that led to mass murder and violence. This particular Report focused on human rights as precursors to the RtP and focused on state accountability. It also emphasised that prevention of violence must take place in a proactive and unprejudiced manner. The Report vouched for rights based, gender sensitive training programmes along with non-governmental groups and the civil society. In Dorota Gierycz's opinion the report delineated the difference between international assistance and aid given to states that are willing to address the violence but are incapable of stopping the same; and those that themselves perpetrate violence. The Report however fails to provide any directions to deal with the latter (Gierycz 2010).

Yu-tai Tsai (2010) questions that if humanitarian intervention is abominable the how should the international community respond to conditions in Rwanda or even Srebrenica. Tsai tries to find the answer in the notion of RtP cited in the ICISS report of 2001. The responsibility to protect emphasised that the responsibility to protect civilians, lay primarily with the state and intervention would be possible only when it were unwilling or incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities (ICISS Report 2001). Parameters were drawn out by the ICISS in order to prevent cases like Rwanda and Kosovo and to avoid the use of force in cases where it was not necessary. The Responsibility to Protect Report (RTPR) 2001 defined the conditions under which international society could take action for preventing, stopping, and restoring in case of a humanitarian emergency it placed limits on the use of veto by putting in place thresholds regarding just cause. Thus under the circumstances when ethnic cleansing and mass murder were evident the Security Council would be obliged to act and publicly explain its position (ICISS Report 2001).

According to this report state sovereignty implicitly refers to responsibility. Therefore in case of an emergency, when the state is unwilling or unable to act, the principle of non-intervention gives way to the responsibility to protect to safeguard the vulnerable and the victimised. The foundation of this notion lies within the framework of sovereignty as responsibility, the UN Charter which guarantees the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 and the shared understanding amongst states, international organizations and the UN regarding behavioural norms

(Thakur 2002). The authority to intervene lies with the United Nations Security Council, which plays a pivotal role in the protection and promotion of human rights. Responsibility to protect focuses on the need to intervene. On the basis of his experiences at the ICISS, Ramesh Thakur explicates the attributes of responsibility to protect. He states that it is the primary responsibility of the state to protect and promote the life and welfare of citizens. However when the state becomes incapable of doing the same or becomes a perpetrator of violence, then the international community must intervene. In his opinion the responsibility to protect addresses the need to protect population facing threats of mass killing or torture. However he states that such intervention is conditional upon circumstances and procedural safeguards. Thakur (2002) emphasises that the United Nations is the only organization that has the authority to legalize such operations. At the same time he argues that the North Atlantic Military Organization (NATO) is the only body that has the capability to take on operations of enforcement. The term humanitarian intervention raises anxiety regarding the domination of the weak by the strong. However, in Ramesh Thakur's opinion, the notion of Responsibility to Protect implies international solidarity. It recognizes that the issues need to be evaluated from the eyes of those who need support and not those who intervene. Intervention for protection is limited by both space and time. Prevention is considered a crucial part of the Responsibility to protect and it addresses the main causes of conflicts. He concludes that intervention for protection is always subject to the proportionality of violence and as a last resort (Thakur 2002). Aidan Hehir (2010) points out that the RTPR sought a commitment from the UN to act in the face of emergency and whenever a threshold of violence was crossed. It also sought a guarantee from the Security Council members that they would not use the veto in case of a humanitarian emergency. Tsai (2010) remarks that the ICISS report was received extremely well by countries like Japan, Canada, Kenya, UK, Rwanda, and New Zealand.

Hehir (2010) informs that countries like Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom welcomed the report while the rest like Croatia, South Korea, Sweden and Peru were guarded in their response. Initially the Security Council was set against the concept. However it later adopted the Responsibility to Protect after bringing forth significant changes. As Hehir explains, in the final approval of the Responsibility to

Protect, the obligation to act and non-use of the veto were removed to gather the support of the members of the Security Council (Hehir 2010).

Alex J. Bellamy (2008) summarises the four principles of the concept, as proposed by the ICISS, as accepted at the World summit 2005 and re-endorsed by the Security Council in 2006. They entail domestic responsibility of the state towards its citizens regarding protection from all crimes against the human person. States thereby agreed to cooperate with each other in order to fulfil this responsibility and use peaceful measures to protect people at risk. The Responsibility to Protect Report (RTPR) of 2001 aimed at ensuring intervention in cases of humanitarian emergencies and reducing collateral damage during such interventions. The RTPR had set “parameters of responsibility” for carrying out military interventions (Bellamy 2008: 146). It emphasised that the international community is responsible for carrying out the process of reconstruction post a humanitarian emergency. ICISS illustrated the criteria under which intervention is inevitable and delineated the process for its implementation. Mass murder and ethnic pogroms were stated as circumstances under which members of the Security Council were obliged not to cast their veto. The ICISS affirmed the necessity of presenting the proposed case for intervention before the council (Bellamy 2008). In Bellamy’s opinion the ICISS also delineated the conditions of for intervention in clear terms to avoid abuse of the concept. Finally the report acknowledged the need to use unsolicited force as a last resort to protect the victimized (Bellamy 2008).

Stevie Martin (2011) states that the Responsibility to Protect conceptually seeks to overcome the tension between state sovereignty and human rights. International Customary Human Rights Law is equally important as the protection of sovereignty. He defends this statement by citing Article 1.3 of the UN Charter which calls for the respect of human rights and freedom of all individuals. The same charter also guides states to refrain from interference in domestic matters of other states. In the twentieth century the debate regarding humanitarian intervention was polarised between those who regarded the same as crucial to deal with human rights violations and those perceived it as a means to further great power interests. He cites Kofi Annan’s argument that in case of severe humanitarian crisis individual sovereignty

should be taken into consideration. The Responsibility to Protect claims to go further by including prevention of such crisis in its purview. The concept has three integral components of prevention, reaction, and reconstruction. However the Responsibility to Protect is largely associated with intervention which has linguistic and political associations with the terms like neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Evans (2008) says that scepticism regarding the concept is spread across a wide gamut; from Arab-Islamic countries to those in Latin America. He argues that the Responsibility to Protect is in urgent need of diplomatic advocacy along with academic engagement, and institutional overhaul. The scope and the limits of the Responsibility to Protect are to be clearly stated to evince the right response at the right time (Evans 2008).

Institutional capacity needs to be looked into in order to safeguard the political, economic and social interests of victims and those who are vulnerable. Evans (2008) emphasises on political preparedness to generate the will to respond to humanitarian crisis. He avers that the humanitarian intervention implies coercive intervention to meet humanitarian ends, however the Responsibility to Protect implies much more. It includes preventive measures which also have to be satisfied if the case is to be made out for coercive, non-consensual military force to be deployed within another country's sovereign territory. He recognises that there would always be countries that are military powerful and action against them would certainly be taken. Evans argues that there is hardly any country that is immune from international pressure. He argues that the Responsibility to Protect needs to be in place in order to face the challenge of large scale atrocities (Evans 2008).

Sabina Alkire (2003) draws our attention to the references to human security in the report on the Responsibility to Protect. The ICISS report in Alkire's opinion calls for a reorientation of national security to account for social security. The report also acknowledges that states often fail or are unwilling to guarantee social security and rights of fundamental freedom. Here human security is linked with state responsibility and accountability of the international community in case of state failure (Alkire 2003). Alkire concludes by stating that human security is increasingly being taken up and discussed by wider concerns of international relations. Thus security is increasing being focused on individuals and communities. She also illustrates that the

operationalization of human security is essentially context specific. Human security in Alkire's opinion is still being developed. The process by which institutions and states adapt it to their policy framework is still being researched. However the specificity of human security policy to cultural contexts is undeniable. Human security is made of a multitude of elements yet it has a recognisable core of functions linked to survival, livelihood, dignity and rights of fundamental freedom (Alkire 2003).

One observes that the notion of sovereignty as responsibility entails accountability of the state towards its own citizens and the international system. However, many scholars do not view the concept as politically neutral. Philip Cunliffe (2007) perceives sovereignty as responsibility as highly problematic. In his opinion responsibility must be accompanied by accountability, which is absent from the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. He argues that the sovereign state is responsible for its actions within the territory of the state and cannot be removed from its actions outside the state. Cunliffe (2007) makes this statement in the context of the Responsibility to Protect. The concept was introduced in order to arrive at some closure on the debate between the absolute rights of the sovereign and the 'right of intervention'. Such intervention could be carried out only to protect human rights in tandem with international law (Cunliffe 2007). The debate is not yet settled and its nuances find resonance in the debates regarding the use of RtP in guaranteeing 'freedom from fear'. I would take up this debate along with its relationship with human security in the next chapter.

Till the time state sovereignty remains primary states would wield maximum power pertaining to domestic security. Since many years intervention in relation to victims of human right violations was obstructed by state sovereignty. While the Responsibility to Protect states its primary commitment to protection of civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing; it also addresses the need for state building especially in conditions involving conflict. Finally the concept encourages action to prevent and stop war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing. Systems of early warning, and capacity building of regional organizations along with an approach based on human rights, are encouraged. RtP is seriously hindered by the acknowledgement of responsibility in case of humanitarian emergencies. Mark Schneider (2010) explains

that an early response in case of crisis can prevent loss of lives. Such measures vary according to the situation and generally include mediation before military action. Military action is in fact used only in extreme cases. The responsibility to protect focuses on the rebuilding in the aftermath of a crisis. Yet this norm is not universally accepted to ensure the absence of war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

## CONCLUSION

The traditional notions of sovereignty are being continuously negotiated by the current discourse on human rights and human security. The international systems of states, along with international institutions have become more sensitive to the misuse of absolute notions of sovereignty especially in the case of supposed national emergencies. The Responsibility to Protect is one such tool to facilitate individual security, as is witnessed in the case of Darfur, Kenya and Libya. However as one reads along, one realises that each intervention is different from the other. As Meyer (2011) remarks, the intervention in Libya is a perfect example of verbatim execution of the conditions of intervention under the RtP. As a discourse the Responsibility to Protect is highly contested. This fact is due to its genesis and the subsequent changes before final adoption by the United Nations. In the next chapter I intend to explore the debates regarding the RtP especially in relation to human security.



## CHAPTER THREE

### RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND HUMAN SECURITY

*Human security advocates intervention in case of humanitarian emergencies and crimes against humanity. The nature of such intervention is highly circumspect. This is primarily due to the fact that only the powerful and developed countries are capable of carrying out interventions. The act of labelling of circumstances as those that need immediate international attention is also not politically neutral and devoid of the pursuit of national interests. Does human security eventually serve national interests through the paradigm of Responsibility to Protect? Does the discourse of human security eventually reinforce international hierarchies?*

#### RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Scholars dealing with international law and human security suggest that human security is by nature interventionist. States have to go beyond their own territories in order to achieve humanitarian goals (Oberleitner 2005). The normative universalization of human rights was foundational to the notion of RtP. The RtP implies an obligation by the other states to intervene in a state marred by conflict or a natural disaster, where the concerned authority is incapable or unwilling to undertake action (Tadjbaksh and Chenoy 2009). This notion considerably alters the implication of human security in relation to state sovereignty. The traditional notion of absolute sovereignty gives way to one that is mediated by human needs and basic freedom.

Louise Arbour (2008) argues that the debate regarding humanitarian intervention got intensified during the 1970s. As India intervened in East Pakistan (1971), Tanzania intervened in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin (1979) and the French government supported groups against Jean- Bedel Bokassa in Central Africa (1979) (Arbour 2008). In these cases interventions were marked by large scale loss of lives

and violations of human rights. These interventions lacked sanction by the United Nations Security Council and were declared illegal and considered as violations of human security (Arbour 2008). The principle of non interference in domestic affairs of a sovereign state was challenged again during the 1990s. With the consequences of the Rwandan genocide and internal war in Yugoslavia, it became evident that sovereignty itself was not sacrosanct. Due to failure in prevention of large scale violence the UNSC created Ad Hoc tribunals (Arbour 2008). During this time the right to humanitarian intervention gathered greater public attention. This right gave an upper hand to the states that intervened. Intentions regarding such interventions were soon questioned (Arbour 2008).

Michael Newman (2009) remarks that military action against Serbia in 1999, followed by the intervention in Iraq in 2003 made liberals and those on the left suspect intervention. Attempts to circumvent this scepticism were made at the 2005 UN Summit on the Responsibility to Protect. The concept was taken up later by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Intervention was made legitimate in the language of protection. This doctrine emphasised intervention in cases even where regional and international implications of violence within the state were not evident (Newman 2009).

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's address to the 54<sup>th</sup> General Assembly meeting after NATO's intervention in Kosovo highlighted the failure in reconciling the two ideals of universal legitimacy and human rights. Kofi Annan asserted that massive violations of human rights must not go unabated (Arbour 2008). Such a context marked the emergence of RtP. This concept claimed to be grounded in law and institutions. It claimed to improve upon the disadvantages in the formulation of humanitarian intervention. Like humanitarian intervention the new concept stated that state sovereignty is not absolute. Under the aegis of RtP, the right to intervene gave way to the duty to protect the vulnerable (Arbour 2008). Individuals were guaranteed protection against state abuse. Louise Arbour explains that the RtP lay with the international community in cases where the individual state failed to pursue the same. The RtP is based on the three ideals of prevention of conflict, reaction in case of large scale violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide; and post – conflict rebuilding (Arbour

2008). The RtP did not change much in terms of the norms regarding treatment of the defaulting state. The legal foundation of this concept lay in the Genocide convention which has been a part of customary international law (Arbour 2008). Besides this no legal doctrine has been formulated to regularize the role of third party states in prevention of crimes against humanity (Arbour 2008).

Gerd Oberleitner discusses the concept of RtP as described in the ICISS Report of 2001. Oberleitner begins by stating that the RtP replaced humanitarian intervention and gave importance to non state actors as guarantors of the components of human security. He also suggests that certain Ad Hoc coalitions are formed amongst states and international institutions and non-governmental organizations; in order to advance the goals of human security. As a concept human security brings to the fore tensions in international law. It highlights the role of non-governmental actors as both providers of and threats to human security. In Oberleitner's opinion it also challenges the role of certain international institutions like the Security Council. It pressurises the Council to look beyond the post Second World War dynamics, to protect the individual. As a discourse it has the potential to shape international law by addressing the gap between human rights and humanitarian law. Oberleitner states that

[h]uman security -as both an academic concept and a political agenda that takes up, reinforces, and underlines ongoing developments in international law- has the potential to become a new organizing principle of international relations. In this respect, human security seems to be a natural step in further moving international law beyond being concerned with national security toward including the fate of individuals as the ultimate beneficiaries of law. As a value-based approach to security with a focus on the individual as the ultimate beneficiary of international law, human security will continue to contribute to normative changes in the international legal order. (Oberleitner 2005: 198).

Gareth Evans (2008) delineates the trajectory of the development of the RtP. In the post Cold War era the international community witnessed the Rwandan genocide, along with political crisis in Somalia followed by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Evans states that the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo left little room for doubt regarding military intervention, especially when the international community failed to act effectively in the previous cases. However the Security Council failed its purpose by the probability of a veto. In this case intervention was carried out by what he terms

as the coalition of the willing. In his opinion this intervention challenged the traditional conceptualization of sovereignty. The states that had emerged as a result of decolonization were particularly apprehensive about these developments. This deadlock regarding sovereignty was somewhat negotiated with the RtP (Evans 2008). It advocated the responsibility of all states to protect their citizens and enable other states to do the same. While the individual state remained the primary actor in ensuring security, the concept focused on the duty of the international community to intervene in case of inaction or lack of will by the state. Thus 'intervention' was replaced by the term 'protection' (Evans 2008).

David Chandler (2004) explains that the institutional framework of collective security established under the UN Charter is being reconsidered amongst the Western powers. The tension between legitimate and illegitimate intervention came forth in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. The military intervention led by NATO was conducted outside the purview of the United Nations in the absence of a clear mandate in the Security Council. Thus a new set of norms were sought to protect individual rights. Such norms were supplemented by the discourse on democracy, human rights and sovereign equality under what David Chandler terms as "liberal peace" (Chandler 2004). This notion of liberal peace is concerned with the so called the right of intervention. RtP owes its genesis to the demand for a consensus around the issues regarding humanitarian intervention by the United Nations General Secretary Kofi Annan (Chandler 2004). In response to this demand the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien (Chandler 2004). The Commission was chaired by Gareth Evans, former Australian Foreign Minister and Chief Executive of the International Crisis Group along with Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria who had been a Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General and had been a Special Representative for Somalia (Newman 2009). These individuals who Co-chaired the Commission were clear in their agenda of gathering international support that could avoid inaction in case of crimes against humanity (Newman 2009).

The Commission was instituted with the purpose of gaining moral consensus around military intervention especially in cases where there was urgent need to save

human lives. It conveyed that intervention was compatible with sovereignty, as sovereignty implied responsibility (Chandler 2004). The ICISS sought an alternative authority to the United Nations in humanitarian emergencies and intervention was redefined to specify the differences between humanitarian intervention and international peacekeeping (Chandler 2004).

Michael Newman (2009) avers that the RtP was well appreciated in Africa as it looked into post-conflict reconstruction. This was primarily due to the fact that the constitutive act of the African Union also entailed military intervention in a member state in case of genocide, war crimes, and ethnic violence. State failure in case of a humanitarian emergency also provided justifiable reasons for intervention; according to the constitutive act.

The doctrine of RtP was significantly diluted when it was finally endorsed by the UN. Newman (2009) argues that this was primarily due to the historical context. According to Newman, the resilience of the Responsibility to Protect is primarily due to three factors. The first factor is the unflinching support of states like Guatemala, Argentina, Mexico, Rwanda and Chile. The second contributing factor is the initiation of an NGO campaign by the Canadian government along with the emergence of crisis in Darfur. These two issues brought greater academic attention to the discourse. Finally the proactive agency of individuals like Kofi Annan and Gareth Evans played an important role gathering support for the doctrine (Newman 2009). Members of the UN voiced their concerns regarding the use of RtP even after the Report and termed it as a tool for intervention and pointed the political selectivity of the use of force (Gierycz 2010). They also were sceptical about the criteria employed in deciding on the use of force (Gierycz 2010).

However when the RtP was adopted by the UN its definition was removed from the wider discourse of human security and human development. The final version that was accepted focused only on intervention by the developed countries in case of atrocities in the developing world. The UN in its final acceptance of the doctrine adopted a narrow approach. It removed the links of global hierarchy and development from the RtP (Newman 2009).

Dorota Gierycz (2010) states that the RtP can never be applied to those that hold veto powers; and the judicial accountability would be meaningless as all the UN members are not a party to the Rome Treaty. She argues that an approach based on rights can lead to effective implementation of the RtP. International humanitarian law and human rights law facilitate the agenda put forward by the clause of protection. Therefore the legal standards governing crimes against humanity need to be looked into. The framework of RtP can be used to assess the state level implementation of human rights. Reviews in cooperation with the UN can go a long way in protecting individuals. The linkage of human rights violations with international jurisprudence is crucial to the prevention of crimes against humanity (Gierycz 2010). In Dorota Gierycz's opinion the application of RtP remains highly selective and prone to political pressures. The concept invokes the duty of the international community to be decisive and prompt in its action against atrocities; however there is hardly any clarity regarding the time frame and nature of such measures. The concept makes intervention dependent of the sanction of the UNSC making it impossible to respond to humanitarian crisis in case of a political logjam. She further remarks that the criteria for intervention remains obscure and could lead to great greater loss of life due to inaction in the face of a humanitarian emergency. She points out to the cases of Darfur, Sri Lanka and Myanmar where victims were deprived of prompt and effective intervention. The clauses for protection approved by the UNSC and the UNGA lack a clear terminology in terms of the required criteria for intervention and advocate for a case by case empirical analysis. Lack of clear guidelines regarding intervention freezes the prospects for effective applicability of the concept (Gierycz 2010).

In Geiercz's opinion universal ratification of the Rome treaty would go a long way in the prosecution of human rights violations by the International Criminal Court. Gierycz (2010) vouches for the establishment of a right based legal system that can assist reconstruction and reconciliation in post intervention scenarios. She recommends painstaking research as a tool that can help in depoliticizing the concept and its implementation. Her approach focuses on amending the RtP. Therefore Gierycz urges policymakers and academicians to link the RtP with principles of justice both within the state and outside. Implementation of this norm requires sensitization of the members of the UN with regard to the violation of human rights; and non – use of

veto in case of humanitarian crises. Participation of civil society needs to be enhanced through transnational networks in order to enhance the responsiveness of the international community (Gierycz 2010).

Alex J. Bellamy (2008) avers that RtP can never fully take charge of its application. Bellamy (2008) points out that there is no assurance that the states within the Security Council would agree that the threshold of violence has been crossed or that alternate measures have been exhausted. He cites the case of Darfur when the Council members opposed sanctions against Sudan for its role in the crisis. This indeed implies lack of agreement over the crossing of the threshold of violence. The possibilities of political neutrality while judging the facts of a situation are also low (Bellamy 2008). In my opinion the naming and labelling of facts is also not politically neutral. Bellamy goes on to assert that the West's claims of legitimate action are not always accepted as seen in the case of Kosovo and Iraq. However, the probability of legitimizing genuine non-Western intervention is extremely low, irrespective of the authenticity of the crisis. Bellamy suggests that unlike what the ICISS presumes, governments cannot be made to act under international and domestic pressure in humanitarian crisis. He exemplified this point by stating that the US intervened in Somalia in 1992 not under any external pressure but when it was assured of a relatively risk free intervention. In cases like Kosovo it was the governments involved in NATO that convinced people of the urgent necessity to intervene (Bellamy 2008). In his opinion there is little substantial proof to testify that governments are shamed into intervening under moral pressure of domestic or international population. Bellamy (2008) concludes by stating that as a concept the RtP remains highly problematic as unlawful intervention can be easily sidestepped by the UN Security Council itself. It can even discount the so called threshold of just cause for the sake of political interest (Bellamy 2008).

The political limitations of RtP are explained further by Cristina G. Badescu and Linnea Bergholm (2009) through the example of Darfur. The scholars suggest that Darfur is a good example of the evident overlap of civil protection agendas and the RtP. They assert that the civil society and international institutions involved in conflicts like Darfur, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or in Kenya post the

elections; suggest that it has gained policy recognition as a concept. Members of the UN were unwilling to take responsibility pertaining to collective action that would have helped in protecting civilians in Darfur (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). Darfur became a case in point regarding the pitfalls of the implementation of the RtP. There was an evident lack of planned economic, diplomatic and legal actions which should have been prioritized according to the authors, in order to protect the civilians (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). During a military intervention major risks are involved. Counterproductive outcomes, along with the lack of political will can prevent adequate reforms for sustainable results (Badescu and Bergholm 2009).

G. Badescu and Linnea Bergholm suggest that there is usually a lack of consensus over the range of activities that can be come under the term 'Protection'. The points of disagreement include the agency that carries out these tasks and the strategy that is used for such intervention. In the case of Darfur the intervening western states prioritized the consent of the Sudanese government over and above the concerns of human rights. Badescu and Bergholm continue with their argument by stating that the western states wanted to secure the economic and trade relations with a stable Sudanese regime (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). Russia and China also did the same to secure their arms trade and strategic interests in oil. Members of the UN disagreed over the extent of their commitment in Sudan. The situation was worsened by multiple interpretation of the term 'Protection'. In their opinion in recent times the acceptance of RtP has suffered greater setback as it has been wrongly invoked to justify intervention in the case of Iraq. The RtP is mostly seen as a tool of interference, especially by the countries in developing world (Badescu and Bergholm 2009).

Thomas G.Weiss (2004) explains the inherent problems within the framework of Responsibility to Protect. He says the problem is not too much humanitarian intervention, but too little. Weiss states that the RtP would fare better if it held the state more accountable for its actions. Such a policy would sustain human rights and ensure peace. The so called threshold in the RtP is higher than that put forward by the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court that mentions everything from imprisonment to murder as a crime against humanity (Weiss 2004). Weiss observes that the threshold put forward by the RtP does not include racial discrimination and



human rights abuse besides the violation of the basic right to life. The rhetoric of humanitarian values used by the United States of America in Afghanistan and Iraq has done more harm than good regarding the acceptance of this concept as a norm (Weiss 2004). He states that the Bush Doctrine has had the effect of steering people in the developing world away from RtP and the obscure humanitarian endeavours that signified the justification of the war in Iraq were far from the purview of the concept. This rhetoric pertaining to Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of September 11 made Ad Hoc rationalizations converge with humanitarian goals (Weiss 2004). However in the same breath Weiss notes that the United States is vital in carrying out humanitarian interventions anywhere in the world due to its military prowess (Weiss 2004).

Scholars like Theresa Reinold (2010) add to Thomas G. Weiss's explanation by stating that the so called humanitarian intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan was detrimental to the acceptance of RtP as a norm. Reinhold also argues that few states would deny the value of sovereignty as responsibility. However; few would be willing to be bound legally to ensure human rights to people in areas removed from their immediate neighbourhood. According to Reinold, the concept of the RtP needs a considerable amount of conceptual clarification. The discussion over the RtP indicates that the language of sovereign responsibility has been internationalised to bring civilian protection to the centre stage. In Reinold's opinion the case of Darfur received more attention than any other conflict ridden state in Africa due to the current debates on the RtP. Despite the sustenance of state sovereignty the RtP does challenge the current norms of domestic jurisdiction (Reinold 2010).

The policy brief of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2010) suggests that the RtP fared well in case of Kenya. The peaceful referendum came in as a welcome change post the violence of December 2007. It states that the months following the Presidential election were marred by murder, forced migration and rape. The victims were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity and political leanings. This was followed by a mediation process led by the African Union, the UN, Kenya's neighbours and civil society (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2010). The Centre informs one that reforms intended to ameliorate the causes of violence and

strategies were also incorporated to stop atrocities. Action in this case was driven by regional actors who also planned preventive measures to avoid violence in the future. As a consequence of the negotiations a coalition government was formed along with a commission to look into the electoral violence. Since some of the underlying causes of violence remained unaddressed the threat of violence looms till date. The report also suggests that international assistance would be required in order to implement the reforms suggested in the new Kenyan constitution (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2010). A BBC report dated 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2012 suggested that ethnically based political groups could still act violently during elections next year.

The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect in a piece titled “Impact of Action in Libya on the Responsibility to Protect”<sup>1</sup>, observes that the crisis in Libya was termed as a case for Responsibility to Protect; when political protests demanding an end to the dictatorship were targeted by the state. The official website of the coalition informs us that the international community reacted against the human rights violations of the Libyan population. With a continuously rising death toll, a coalition of states was formed which implemented a no-fly zone over Libya. These forces supported the rebels across various towns in Libya. The crisis deteriorated into a civil war between the rebels and the pro – Gaddafi military, and was followed by aerial bombardment by NATO. According to website of the coalition, the International criminal court in its report criticised NATO for using force in an unmediated manner in civilian areas. The civil society also criticised the organisation for overshooting its agenda of protecting civilians, by supporting the rebels. The National Transitional Council and other anti- Gaddafi forces were also accused of mass executions. By the end of October Gaddafi was captured and was supposedly killed, leading to further investigations of war crimes and digression from due processes of law. The web piece states that the International Commission on Inquiry in Libya was established by the

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<sup>1</sup> The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect builds consensus and encourages dialogue over the responsibility to Protect. It brings together NGOs from all over the world to advocate for action against ethnic violence, torture and crimes against humanity on a case by case basis. <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/RtoP%20in%20Light%20of%20Libya%20FINAL.pdf>  
international coalition for the responsibility to protect

UN Human Rights Council to look into all violations of human rights and asserted international accountability by listing out the names of violators from both sides.

Jason Dominguez Meyer (2011) analyses the difference in the response of the international community to genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s and the recent intervention in Libya as a response to political repression. He states that at this point of time the Security Council may sanction military intervention to protect people from genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against humanity with greater ease due to the adoption of the emerging norm of RtP. He emphasises that the intervention in Libya would have long term repercussions on the practice of international law regarding military intervention. The primary actors in this case were the Security Council, the multilateral forces came to play in order to preclude a single state's interest in Libya's strategic resources. In the Libyan case all the conditions of Responsibility to Protect-just cause, right intention, last resort and probability of success were met. This would certainly be a positive precursor to future operations under RtP (Meyer 2011).

The achievements of RtP have been limited and have failed in addressing the suspicions of countries in the developing world. The primary objection to the notion comes from countries that fear western domination and perceive RtP as a tool to reinforce global power hierarchies without any guarantee of a feasible response to humanitarian crisis.

#### RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND HUMAN SECURITY

Human security is intrinsically concerned with the well being of the individual irrespective of states and citizenship (Farer 2011). In this manner it can be termed as cosmopolitan as it carries the same significance as human rights. Tom Farer quantifies his argument by stating that the norms of human security in some ways go beyond humanitarian law and human rights as they question the use of force even in cases when the action is sanctioned by the UN Charter with reference to the high probability of civilian deaths (Farer 2011). In recent times when state sponsored violence has increased it is important to understand that new norms that are evolving to deal with the same. The Responsibility to Protect is one such norm.

Michael Newman (2009) points out the references to human security in the ICISS Report on the Responsibility to Protect. The Report points out that the basic components of human security could be put to risk not only from external aggression but also from factors within the state. The International Commission on State sovereignty also draws attention to the role played by the developed world in fuelling conflicts in the developing world through trade of armaments, the cycle of debt and skewed trade policies. The Commission emphasises on the prevention of internal conflict in the developing world. It advocates for action against the basic economic and political causes of conflicts. Such action includes diplomatic mediation, arbitration and in sanctions in some cases. The RtP entails the responsibility to rebuild according to the Commission and acknowledges the need to plan a strategy of timely exit before proceeding with the intervention. Sustainable development comes along with its stress on an agenda for human security. A continued emphasis on both human security and human development helped in building a consensus over the issues raised by the ICISS. The report explained both the coercive and peaceful measures that are required in a humanitarian emergency and brought to the fore the crucial links between human security, human development and military intervention as a last resort. These factors were indeed foundational in differentiating the RtP from humanitarian intervention (Newman 2009).

Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) argue that the notion of responsibility to protect should be removed from the purview of human security. They argue for human security engagement as opposed to humanitarian intervention. They critique the ICISS approach to humanitarian intervention by suggesting that it focuses on the causes and severity of issues. Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh argue that human security responds to the severity of the crisis irrespective of its causes, whether man made or otherwise. Therefore human security and not the prospects of success should be the criteria for intervention. They assert that the RTPR does not give enough emphasis to both prevention and engagement. In their opinion the concept needs to take into consideration the problems of formulation and execution of policies of conflict prevention. The RTPR needs to take greater cognisance of problems involved in post-conflict rebuilding and reconciliation processes. The scholars state that the report fails to ameliorate fears regarding humanitarian intervention as the motives

behind intervention remain obscure in most cases. They suggest that apolitical and neutral intervention is not possible and recognition of insecurities is a subjective process (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009).

Mary Kaldor, Mary Martin and Sabine Selchow (2007) assert that there should be more dialogue regarding the use of military within the notion of RtP. In their opinion human security is concerned with both ends and means. Therefore it is concerned with the rule of law. Human security entails respect for human rights; therefore military action should aim at protecting civilians rather than defeating belligerent groups. Unlike traditional warfare collateral damage cannot be justified in humanitarian missions. In operations of human security each life is important as there are no traditional enemies and belligerents are treated as criminals. This makes humanitarian missions within the RtP more risky than other military operations (Kaldor et al. 2007). While these scholars label military intervention as risky others like David Chandler (2004) view it through the lens of 'Realpolitik'. Scholars like Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell (2006) along with Tara McCormack (2008) analyse the RtP's relationship with human security through a biopolitical lens.

David Chandler (2004) explains that the RtP and its new norms of intervention emerged from the so called liberal peace perspective, to facilitate democracy and human rights. However in practical terms only the developed western states can intervene in other states. Thus the morality to intervene converges with 'Realpolitik' (Chandler 2004). In tandem with Chandler's argument P.H Liotta (2005) explains that human security is continuously converging with national security as is seen in Iraq in 2003. He remarks that a sharp increase in the hegemonic behaviour of Britain and the United States of America marks a lopsided commitment to issues concerning human security. While the heads of states of both the countries vouch for freedom and human dignity as universal values, interventions are almost always made by keeping national interests in account (Liotta 2005). Human security as a concept and a principle is subverted by national interests. Liotta argues that political posturing by Norway and Canada to exercise moral clout by promoting human security in matters of high politics, is enmeshed in the global power dynamics. These middle powers gain visible soft power through adoption of human security in foreign policy (Liotta 2005).

However the same policies backed by the military might of the great powers are resented and negated by these countries. Therefore idealism pertaining to human security becomes embedded in realism and is undertaken by the powerful to protect the powerless (Liotta 2005). Voices that support the RtP in the guise of state responsibility actually obfuscate the choices that mark international action in each intervention. Dominant states choose the time and place of intervention in the name of just cause and feasibility of action (Liotta 2005).

Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell (2006) perceive human security and the Responsibility to Protect as interlinked within the framework of the former. They illustrate that the paradigm of human security largely focuses to the need to protect individuals. Human security functions in this manner by classifying states as effective or failed. Interconnectedness of threats is emphasised within the discourse on human security (Duffield and Waddell 2006). They argue that states have moved away from human rights in the light of threats emanating from terrorism. Duffield and Waddell cite detention without trial and the adverse impact on the working of aid agencies as examples. Moreover aid and social rebuilding have turned into political processes with the military being an active participant in the same (Duffield and Waddell 2006). Tara McCormack (2008) avers that nation states had rejected intervention as a strategy through their endorsement of sovereignty as codified in the UN Charter. Such notions of sovereignty, which prioritised order and stability, are considered outdated by the human security framework; especially in the light of new security challenges. State sovereignty is redefined by human security and becomes conditional on the performance of responsibilities towards its citizens. According to Duffield and Waddell (2006) this situation can be analysed through a biopolitical perspective. The war on terrorism has brought into focus the governmental nature of human security. Security of people in failed states is devalued in favour of the so called national security. Unlike the cosmopolitan notion of human security this approach focuses on particular states as potential grounds for the breeding of terrorism. Objectives of non-governmental bodies have been sharply narrowed down. Surveillance and centralization of planning with a heightened focus on organised action both over local and global population, mark the biopolitics of a possible global dictatorship.

Miguel De and Marc G. Doucet (2008) look into the working of human security. Human security in their opinion fosters an exercise of both sovereign and bio power. They use analogies provided by Foucault and Agamben to look into the same. The scholars disapprove of the removal of the clauses proposed initially in the Responsibility to Protect Report (RTPR) by ICISS regarding intervention. These clauses entailed the responsibility to act in the face of emergency and the non-use of veto and were unconditionally removed from the final draft of the Report. Larrinaga and Doucet view the RtP as a continuation of international hierarchy without any guarantee of responsible action in the face of an emergency. The document in its final form gave the Security Council or rather the P 5 the authority to use their political prudence instead of the set criteria for humanitarian intervention. They are also critical of the concept – sovereignty as responsibility. Larrinaga and Doucet term it as “a codification of sovereignty in biopolitical terms, and thus as reinforcing the linkages between sovereign power and biopower” (Larrinaga and Doucet 2008: 532). They state that human security is not path breaking regarding global security norms. Instead it defines those situations in which a state of exception can be claimed and international intervention be materialised. It delineates the terms under which a certain threshold of threat can be ascertained and “a suspension of conventional international law of nations can occur” (Larrinaga and Doucet 2008: 532). They argue that a state of exception is proclaimed when international law of sovereignty is suspended to invoke the law regarding humanitarian intervention. The people of the state where the intervention is carried out become what Agamben terms as ‘homo sacer’. Thus human security becomes a tool for the exercise of global sovereign power (Larrinaga and Doucet 2008). This argument is furthered by Tara McCormack (2008) who states that the framework of human security invisibilizes the politics behind intervention and eventually disenfranchises the individual who is the subject of intervention. The RtP when viewed as tool for attaining individual security becomes a new form of political management of the weaker states by the developed First world.

Tara McCormack (2008) points out that the relationship between the agents of intervention and the subject is not a political relationship. There is a visible lack of a formal relationship marking authority through representation. In such cases, there is a clear gap between accountability and the exercise of power. In such cases the

individual is rendered vulnerable when NGOs, other states and international organizations that lack accountability replace a direct relationship between a state and its citizens. McCormack states that

[i]n an international realm marked by vast power inequalities the problematization of the poor or underdeveloped state and the re-characterization of sovereignty as responsibility does not challenge the international status quo and international power inequalities (Tara McCormack 2008: 124).

In her opinion the definition of sovereignty as responsibility does not defy the international status quo and international power inequalities. Kyle Grayson (2008) furthers the argument made by Duffield and Waddell (2006) by asserting that knowledge production is underscored by a biopolitical understanding of both the subject and the measures of human security. Detailed concepts and norms are used to judge threats to human security. Humanitarian interventions are considered a necessity when these threats are heightened. Decisions regarding interventions are not devoid of current power relations in Grayson's opinion. The developed west decides when and where to intervene which is carried out through the production of a discourse that systematically shapes opinions, and behaviour of the population in focus. This is carried out by systematically producing indices representing the level of health, employment and freedom from political repression (Grayson 2008).

Panu Minkkinen (2007) finds such indices and the consequent labelling of states as 'rogue' or 'failed' as extremely problematic. He terms the RtP as a euphemism for imperialism which entails derogatory perception of any state and makes it an object of sanctions driven by power politics (Minkkinen 2007). In Kyle Grayson's opinion such indices and subsequent classification ensure the management of population in a manner that is in accordance with certain forms of governance. However, the biopolitical project that forms the core of this classification is often left beyond the purview of analysis. Thus a form of global governmentality is produced through the tacit approval of human security norms (Grayson 2008).

This reminds one of Foucault's (1980) explanations of power in *Power/Knowledge* (1980) where his concerns are focused on the "how of power" (Foucault 1980: 92). He describes that in



[a]ny society there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse (Foucault 1980: 93).

Grayson (2008) asserts that the entire discipline of human security focuses on technique, which is removed from larger political currents. He contends that the discursive space for a dialogue over ethical considerations -especially when the international community acts or decides not act in a particular situation- is largely absent.

Human security is therefore perceived as a traditional security framework, as it locates the underdeveloped countries as the subject and gives agency to intervene to the powerful (McCormack 2008). It claims to be an empowering discourse that gives voice to the vulnerable. It places the individual at the centre of the security realm however its success in the policy realm is severely limited (McCormack 2008). In Tara McCormack's view human security largely remains seated in the rhetorical realm. She finds the conceptualization of sovereignty as responsibility very problematic as it gives the powerful states the licence to intervene and control weaker states. She contends that such intervention is carried out in the name of the people who often cannot hold the intervening state or organization accountable for its actions (McCormack 2008). Her argument is in tandem with the criticism of sovereignty as responsibility by Philip Cunliffe (2007). The relationship between the intervening agent and the subject of intervention is not a political one. As a concept human security serves to neutralize the notion of intervention, however in reality no intervention is apolitical. In Tara McCormack's opinion the categorization of states on the basis of provision of human security, is tilted against the developing states. Therefore such a modification of state sovereignty serves only the powerful as it reinforces international hierarchy in the name of emancipation and empowerment. She questions the agency behind such decisions regarding the reshaping of sovereignty. The RtP according to McCormack idealizes intervention by discounting the material costs of the same. The framework of human security that gives external agents like states and international organizations greater freedom to control weak states worsens the condition of the weak and the powerless (McCormack 2008). Ryerson Christie (2010) substantiates McCormack's argument by stating that the concept of human

security has evidenced a great deal of malleability. Due to its non specific nature human security has been used as an ‘umbrella term’ to accommodate state interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Christie 2010).

Gerald Caplan (2011) explains that the United Nations approved a declaration in 2005 stating that the international community has a RtP the people of a nation when its government is unable to the same or is itself a perpetrator of violence. The RtP according to Gerald Caplan covered a gamut of issues and could be used as a policy tool in the diplomatic and the economic realm. He cites the example of Libya where the same tool was used despite earlier debacles in Afghanistan. Moreover Caplan states that the RtP would not persuade any nation to intervene against its will. In his opinion, when provisions of the United Nations have been unable to compel states to act in cases where genocide was evident; the RtP would bring out no radical change. He suggests that there is no uniformity of perception regarding intervention as each nation would see its own interests (Caplan 2011).

While analysing the situation in Afghanistan, Gerald Caplan observes that despite almost ten years of military action, aid and reconstruction; the situation on ground remains very grim. Violence is endemic in the society and is exacerbated by the continued presence of the Taliban and the rival war lords. The country’s GDP remains largely dependent on the narcotics trade, while close to seven million citizens of Afghanistan lack basic access to health and nutrition (Caplan 2011). Caplan (2011) states, that the Responsibility to Protect has achieved little security for Afghans and the attainment of freedom from fear still remains a distant possibility. Mohammed Nuruzzaman (2009) observes that intervention in the state of Afghanistan had more to do with US strategic gains and achieved very little in terms of security for Afghans. The above explanation finds resonance with Matt McDonald’s statement that, “intervention in the name of humanism is still defined as much by political interest as changing conceptions of responsibility” (McDonald 2002: 294).

P.H Liotta (2002) addresses the issues arising from the co-existence of national and human security. The events of September 11 made a powerful nation like the US realise that non-state actors could be detrimental to security and made them aware of their vulnerability in face of unidentifiable assailants. The developed and the powerful

states were now being threatened by non – state actors. Earlier such “human- centred vulnerabilities” were confined to the developing world (Liotta 2002: 473). This event led to obscuring of both traditional military based and alternate tools of protection. Thus national security and human security clashed and merged with each other at the same time. This scenario would in Liotta’s opinion lead to varied implications for policymakers and academicians. Academic and policy focus needs to be balanced in order to meet the ends of both national and human security (Liotta 2002).

Philip Cunliffe (2010) argues that only the powerful states determine the conditions under which Responsibility to Protect is implemented. Instead of international law, in practice it is military might that makes action possible. As a concept the Responsibility to Protect suppresses state sovereignty and weakens accountability accrued due to popular mandate within the state. States are rendered “responsible for their people rather than to their people” (Cunliffe 2010: 79). He considers sovereignty and principles of non- intervention as crucial in the critique of both humanitarian intervention and the RtP. Cunliffe comments on Arbour’s (2008) assertion that humanitarian intervention cannot be left to the states and therefore they should be bound by a system of obligations to ensure prompt action. He describes this statement as one that is highly problematic. He avers that motivations of states remain unchanged even under a system of obligations. The RtP is hardly seen as an improvement on humanitarian intervention, as the states that are the subjects of intervention remain as vulnerable as before. In fact Cunliffe argues that the situation regarding state sovereignty has worsened under the Responsibility to Protect. Since the international community would be held to account for non-intervention the subject state would have to defend its right to sovereignty. Unlike humanitarian intervention the RtP does not even acknowledge non-interference as a principle of international relations. Such justification of political authority to external powers subverts sovereignty and popular mandate (Cunliffe 2010).

In his opinion RtP is highly problematic as there is no singular agency accountable for its implementation. This condition is termed as one of “disembodied duty” (Cunliffe 2010: 86). Foreign powers would intervene only if they find a convergence with their national interest and foreign policy and could in his opinion

lead to insurgency and secession. Moreover imposition of conditionality on sovereignty strikes at the foundation of democracy. Responsibility to Protect becomes a tool for the powerful to states to watch over the weaker ones, as only the former can project military power across borders. Therefore structure of international norms through the Responsibility to Protect mirrors the inequalities power and reinforces them (Cunliffe 2010).

Philip Cunliffe explains that sovereignty understood in its essential form is the perfect agent to address human rights abuses therefore is compatible with human security. Sovereignty is indeed absolute only because it is linked to the binding nature of law and signifies freedom and self-determination. Therefore sovereignty should not be viewed as a mere licence to perpetrate violence against citizens. State responsibility towards citizens is accounted by political representation and does not require an international norm to guarantee the same. Cunliffe remarks that it is not the international community but the people themselves who must “impose their will on the state” (Cunliffe 2010: 91). He argues that it is impossible to justify intervention as it always impinges on self-determination. Intervention in case of violation of human rights is also unjustifiable as in most cases, as it has increased the suffering instead achieving the opposite. The Responsibility to Protect disturbs the working of sovereign governments and makes the exercise of power less accountable. Since it enables the control of the weak by the strong, it justifies “paternalism” (Cunliffe 2010: 96). He is also sceptical about the sources that convey information regarding humanitarian crises.

William Bain (2010) continues the argument against the Responsibility to Protect by stating that the notion of responsibility alone cannot sustain the project of prevention, reaction and reconstruction. The actual implementation of the concept relies on the notions of blame, culpability and accountability (Bain 2010).

Michael Newman (2009) argues that in the real world interventions are primarily located in transitional and developing countries. This fact leads one into realising that the RtP is not phenomenally different from humanitarian intervention. The third world does remain the primary target of interventions under the two doctrines. Newman (2009) is of the view that the importance of the RtP must be

upheld, however one needs to take into account global inequality and poverty that often abet violence and atrocity. He explains that violence can also occur in rich countries yet the relationship between poverty, inequality and violence cannot be denied. This fact points out that the structure of the international system in terms of political and economic hierarchies contribute significantly to the occurrence of violence in the developing world. He states that scholars often look into Rwanda to argue against non-responsiveness in case of genocide. However one needs to look into the external economic and political policy influences that contributed to the circumstances in which the crimes against humanity took place. Michael Newman concludes by stating that the current version of the RtP fails to taken into account global hierarchies and its separation of the human security agenda favours the developed and the powerful First world (Newman 2009). Tom Farer (2011) explains that human security may not bring up about a revolutionary change to the hierarchies of power or their policy implications, however over time it has occupied greater analytical space in the discourse on international politics. He describes human security as a cosmopolitan concept that is definitionally similar to human rights (Farer 2011).

## CONCLUSION

In recent times the right to intervene militarily to ensure human security has taken the form of RtP claiming to have evolved in a better form from the earlier notion of humanitarian intervention. The discourse of human security pertaining to sovereignty and RtP is fraught with problems. Intervention even if sanctioned by the UN, is not politically neutral. Scholars like Kyle Grayson, Miguel DeLarringa and Marc G. Doucett along with Aidan Hehir view the concept of human security with the same suspicion as David Chandler. They take a critical approach to the policy implementation, conceptual framework and the methodology of justification of the concept. They are vocal in their criticism of the prescriptive value of human security as advocated by Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. These scholars view the discourse of human security as a narrative of global biopower.

## CONCLUSION

Human security came to the fore to address new security threats in the late twentieth century. It takes into account situations of extreme vulnerability as emphasised by P.H. Liotta (2002). Scholars like Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) suggest that human security as a concept focuses on the individual as a subject and as an agent in international relations. They argue that the concept of human security has its roots in multiple ideas across various disciplines and its plurality its primary strength. Its definitional attributes intersect with that of human development and human rights. Authors like Sabina Alkire (2003) and Taylor Owen (2008) have addressed the concerns regarding conceptual overlap and definitional obscurity of the concept. The entire discussion on the definitional attributes of human security, its criticism and its defence suggest that human security cannot be abandoned. I disagree with Roland Paris's dismissal of the concept based on its expansiveness and the so called unjustifiable narrowing of the notion. In my opinion human security cannot be debunked as there is enough evidence to show its effectiveness in terms of the creation of the International Criminal Court and banning of the anti-personnel landmines under the aegis of the human security network and prioritising individual security as a value that states ought to aspire for (Krause 2008). The normative value of the discourse can certainly not be underestimated.

The expansiveness of the definitions of human security can be dealt with by reading human security as a discourse that deals with threats of violence and economic crisis in an overt manner. Unlike human security, human development is more concerned with institution building and long term goals of political and economic well being (Owen 2008). Similarly Owen clarifies the conceptual overlap between human rights and human security. He states that human security makes room for human rights to garner greater space in the discourse of security especially in case of violations by non-state actors, or in situations of post conflict reconstruction. Owen vouches for a threshold based definition of human security, which takes into consideration the location, the time frame and the scale of the considered threat. An objective judgement

can salvage the concept within the system of the UN (Owen 2008). An initiative in this regard would be identifying the fact that loss of human life can occur under financial stress, floods or conflict. Here the three point system of area of threat, its scale and its time frame would come of great help. Like Kanti Bajpai (2004) Owen also calls for strict categorization of threats that distinguishes between threats to human development and human security. Similarly human rights should be considered as legal entitlements and human security must concern the urgent and immediate needs of survival. Here Owen (Owen 2008) makes a pointed remark that human rights abuses can effectively be dealt with by the nation state, however when a certain threshold of abuse is crossed then it becomes a human security concern. Owen calls for an effective monitoring system to identify such situations and the creation of such infrastructure that can effectively deal with the threat. Taylor Owen (2008) suggests that each case study determines the relationship between causal variables within the practice of human security.

Scholars like David Chandler (2008) state that each individual cannot shape an entire discourse on security. Chandler considers the merger of ethics with security as naive in terms of thinking on security. Chandler is suspicious of the merger of human security with national security.

David Chandler (2008) points out lack of prioritization of goals, simultaneous bifurcation and intermingling of state and human security and location of human security threats exclusively in the third world as failures of the discourse. Here Astri Suhrke's (1999) exposition of middle power leadership on human security becomes vital. Unlike Shahrbanou Tadjbaksh and Anuradha Chenoy views the endorsement of human security as a foreign policy initiative a measure to advance national interests. In my opinion until both David Chandler and Astri Suhrke are not entirely unjustified in the fear of such an amalgamation of national and human security. In my opinion the merger of national and human security becomes problematic only in cases of international intervention, when the Responsibility to Protect is invoked. I shall discuss this point elaborately later.

Other scholars like Nita Rudra (2002), Taylor Owen, Jie Zhang and Junsen Zhang (2004) view these threats as empirical facts. The current academic debate on

the relationship between human security and the state suggests that the two cannot be seen as oppositional forces challenging each other. The convergence between human security and foreign policy is viewed as an advancement of interests guided by power by Astri Suhrke (1999), while Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy focus on the achievements of this middle power leadership of human security

One reason that the practice and policy implications of human security cannot be divorced from the theoretical aspect of the discourse. Since human security is easily co-opted with national security and foreign policy interests, its definitional aspects need to be relooked. The theoretical shift in terms of security referent from the state to the individual has not marked any clear shift in the practice of security. Policy formulation regarding security remains largely within the purview of the state, as the non state actors lack the required legitimacy.

Human rights and human security are founded on the principle of human dignity (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009). Scholars like Sabina Alkire (2003) explain that human rights are guaranteed by legal norms and are not dependent on specific contexts. Governments are supposed to guarantee human rights as specified in international law. Unlike human rights, human security lacks any legal foundation to prevent and punish abuse. Human security largely relies on political and economic means to protect individuals and only in worst case scenarios it resorts to military action. Alkire concludes that each human right is said to be inalienable while there are definitional thresholds that prioritise goals of human security. Bertrand Ramcharan (2004) remarks that national and international security are inextricably linked with human rights. Kledja Mulaj (2007) argues that states vary in their responses to security, yet individual security is gaining ground within the discourse. She argues against the dichotomy between state and human security. Contrary to Mulaj, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy (2009) differentiate between state and human security. They argue that states often violate human security to serve the aspirations of national security. The implementation of human rights is not guaranteed and human security fills this gap by providing the means to promote human rights. Ellen Seidensticker (2002) argues that human security keeps the violations of human rights under check and prevents state marginalization of the same. Since the state



remains the primary actor in the protection and promotion of human rights; it is important to look into the options available to human security in case of human rights abuse by the state. In order to deal with the same one must look into the notion of sovereignty that underlies state legitimacy and authority.

Stevie Martin (2011) explains that the Hobbesian notion of sovereignty views the insecurity felt by the individual in the state of nature. It states that the social contract came into being to protect the citizens. The state which is a part of the social contract brings its own existence into question by violating the rights of its citizens (Martin 2011). The discourse on human security does not view sovereignty as absolute. As Edward Newman (2010) states human security views state sovereignty as conditional upon the fulfilment of the basic rights and needs of citizens. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2009) argue that the notion of sovereignty as responsibility reconciles the differences between human rights, human security and state sovereignty. Sovereignty as responsibility which was promoted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; highlights the role of the state in ensuring human rights and security of its own citizens. The notion also sees the state as responsible for the curtailing human security concerns within its borders (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2009).

Lucian Espas, Alin Cirdei and Catalin Negoescu (2011) explicate this position. They state that governments cannot assert their sovereignty if they are unwilling or unable to provide security to their people. Human security in their opinion means implies protection of people from persistent and critical threats, therefore protection and empowerment are essential to the legitimacy of a sovereign (Espas et al 2011). Panu Minkkinen (2007) explains that ethical sovereignty entails intervention by a state in the internal matters of another state. Ethical sovereignty makes the state answerable to the international community for the guarantee of basic needs of the individual. Ethical sovereignty also entails the appraisal of the condition of human rights in one state by the other (Minkkinen 2007)

Questions of intervention come to the fore in case of failed states. As William Bain (2001) comments issues of legal sovereignty, non – interference and state failure contradict each other. In cases where states are a source of insecurity and misery for its

citizens, national security and human security contradict each other. In such cases the best solution is to uphold state sovereignty and let the people within the state address issues of state accountability (Bain 2001). According to Bain the blind pursuit of individual security can lead to violent intervention that destroys more than what it intends to salvage. Bain cites the example of Kosovo where intervention against the violation of human rights resulted in the loss of many innocent lives. Intervention in his opinion destroys the sovereign and political apparatus of the state which invaluable to its citizens (Bain 2001). Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann (2012) vouches for the opposite. Hassmann asserts that other states are obliged to intervene and protect individuals in case of gross failure by the state in question. Justin Conlon (2004) labels humanitarian intervention as a new form of imperialism which does not address concerns of human rights. The so called right to intervene interferes within political accountability of the sovereign.

Dorota Gierycz (2010) explains that the failures of the international community in preventing massacres in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Yugoslavia and Sudan and unilateral interventions by certain states in the case of Kosovo, pressurised the international community to look seriously into prevention of crimes against humanity. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed these concerns in the General assembly meetings of 1999 and 2000. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was instated in response to the UN General Secretary's concerns and the Millennium Report. This Commission came up with a Report in 2001 that explained the terms of the Responsibility to Protect (Gierycz 2010). The Responsibility to Protect aimed at ameliorating fears regarding the imperialistic nature of humanitarian intervention (Gierycz 2010). The mechanism of dealing with such threats to human security and the identification of such thresholds of violence have in my opinion been evidently explained in the final adoption of the Responsibility to Protect. The traditional notions of sovereignty are being continuously negotiated by the current discourse on human rights and human security.

The international systems of states, along with international institutions have become more sensitive to the misuse of absolute notions of sovereignty especially in the case of supposed national emergencies. Tom Farer (2011) explains that human

security may not bring up about a revolutionary change to the hierarchies of power or their policy implications, however over time it has occupied greater analytical space in the discourse on international politics. He describes human security as a cosmopolitan concept that is definitionally similar to human rights (Farer 2011). In recent times the right to intervene militarily to ensure human security has taken the form of Responsibility to Protect claiming to have evolved in a better form from the earlier notion of humanitarian intervention. While some theorists like Thomas G. Weiss state that the problem with the Responsibility to Protect is not too much but too little in terms of intervention; a major section of theorists focus on the inviolability of state sovereignty. Scholars like William Bain (2001), Philip Cunliffe (2007), and Tara McCormack (2007) focus on the unjustified compromise with the political legitimacy of the sovereign state within the discourse on the Responsibility to Protect. Scholars like Kyle Grayson (2008); Miguel De Larringa and Marc G. Doucett (2008) along with Aidan Hehir (2010) view the concept of human security with the same suspicion as David Chandler. They take a critical approach to the policy implementation, conceptual framework and the methodology of justification of the concept. They are vocal in their criticism of the prescriptive value of human security as advocated by Anuradha Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. These scholars view the discourse of human security as a narrative of global biopower.

From this study one gathers that human security indeed functions as a political leitmotif which helps in analysing issues of vulnerability that are linked with globalisation, governance and human rights. One agrees with Taylor Owen (2008) when he argues that the two aspects of human security – the state and humanitarian concerns can coexist when the former acknowledges that human security is indeed hindered by the state in multiple cases; and the latter acknowledges that better state policy is the ultimate objective of nuanced theoretical critique. However one cannot be dismissive of Chandler's (2008) fears regarding the co-option of human security within the gamut of national security. Chandler's claim is most evident in the practice of intervention in the form of the Responsibility to Protect. The concept endeavours to move beyond biases of national interests by replacing the 'right to intervene' with the term 'Responsibility'. The Responsibility to protect fails to address the issues of individual security as in most cases it serve as a tool of the powerful to intervene in

weaker states. On its own terms the Responsibility to Protect marks little change in terms to responsiveness in case of any humanitarian crisis. Its current form creates high thresholds of violence to evince adequate international response. The practice of such military interventions are not removed from the military and economic prowess of specific nations. Moreover it has failed in ameliorating the suspicions of the nations in the developing world where state sovereignty is hard- earned. The term fails to acknowledge that only that it refutes the basic principle of international legal sovereignty that entails sovereign equality and non interference. As emphasised by Stephen D. Krasner (2001) that emerging norms are yet to supplant this basic principle of international law. In my opinion the RtP has not been able to supplant the value of state sovereignty yet it challenges the same.

The notion of protection and safety embedded in the Responsibility to Protect cannot be removed from the theoretical and the practical purview of human security. The implications of this fact are most eloquently expressed by Tara McCormack who such intervention is carried out in the name of the people who often cannot hold the intervening state or organization accountable for its actions (McCormack 2008). Human security therefore depoliticises security by removing conditions of political accountability available to individuals within the gamut of state sovereignty. (McCormack 2007). I agree with McCormack (2007) and William Bain (2001) when they assert that the political relationship between the individual and the state is that which gives maximum assurance of security. It signifies the foundation of accountability enshrined in the legitimate sovereign authority of the state. I would also agree with Philip Cunliffe (2007) when he argues that state sovereignty has enough mechanisms to check insecurities within its institutional and structural apparatus. Therefore in case of state failure the citizens themselves are to push for their sovereign rights guaranteed through the social contract.

Human security and its relationship with human rights should be developed as norms that nations would aspire to achieve. Empirical studies, as argued by David Chandler (2008) along within the development of definitional thresholds and context specific criteria, as advocated by Kanti Bajpai (2004); would indeed go a long way in addressing contextual insecurity and conceptual ambiguities within the discourse of

human security. However as Ryerson Christie (2010) points out one needs to be extremely guarded in the inclusion of instances as facts especially while dealing with humanitarian crises and state failure.

One reasons that the practice and policy implications of human security cannot be divorced from the theoretical aspect of the discourse. Since human security is easily co-opted with national security and foreign policy interests, its definitional aspects need to be relooked. I seriously doubt that a theoretical shift in terms of security referent from the state to the individual has marked any clear sway in the practice of security. Policy formulation regarding security remains largely within the purview of the state and a pursuit of national interests. Despite claims of the advocates of human security the state largely remains the primary agent of security, as non state actors lack the required legitimacy.

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