SUFISM AND THE STATE IN 20TH CENTURY AFGHANISTAN

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of

MASTER OF PILOSOPHY

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NEW DELHI-110067

2012

Date: 20-7-2012

DECLARATION

This is to certify that the dissertation entitled "**Sufism and the State in 20th century Afghanistan**" submitted by me in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the Degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** of this university is bonafide work and has not been submitted previously for any degree to this or any other university.

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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that the dissertation may be placed before the examiner for evaluation.

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Dedicated to My Grandfather

Late Kacho Sikander Khan Sikander

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Preface

The present study is inspired by the defeat of Taliban in 2001, as it forces one to think why the radical fundamentalist failed to create a true Islamic state in Afghanistan after their initial success in the country. To answer this question, the study tries to look into the role Sufism played in Afghan politics and its impact on the society.

The importance of this study is that it helps to understand the nature of state and its relation with religion, especially with the Sufis. It mainly deals with the political aspect of religion in the country and how the state uses religion to contain different warring tribes and build a modern state. It will try to highlight the position of religion through the constitutional provisions from first Afghan constitution up to resistance period. The interference of external powers also affects the state-religion relation in other Muslim countries, like the case of Central Asian countries. This study also looks into the aspect of external interference in Afghanistan and its overall impact on the state-religion relation in Afghanistan.

To bring peace and stability in the present condition, it is very important to look into the developments of 20th century Afghanistan. As it was the most dramatic period of Afghan history both in terms of political as well as social changes. The present problem in the country is the consequences of the political developments during 20th century, as the marginalization of the Sufis in post-Taliban period indicates the extent of changes in the society in present scenario. So through this study we will try to understand the process of marginalising the Sufis in Afghan politics and its adverse affect on the society.

Kouser Fatima
17/07/12

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The transition from tribal society to a nation state in Afghanistan was not a smooth process as the country is still struggling to build a modern nation state. The challenge that modernity presented to Muslims differed across space and time. Modernity, in its various manifestations—technological innovations and political ideologies had divergent impacts on society across the globe. Its further mediation by Colonialism complicated the experience of societies, thus checking their smooth transformation. The Nation-building project in Afghanistan was at the centre of modernisation process, which located over a century and continues even today created ruptures within the society in Afghanistan. It pushed for re-organization of the traditional structures and norms, which thus divided society in various segments, in terms of their support or opposition to the project.

State building in Afghanistan was not a unidirectional process in terms of its ideology and institutions. From the late 19th century to present, the process itself with the quest for nation state at its centre went through several ups and downs. The very nature of state, in terms of its ideology and scope was constantly being debated and reformulated at various time in the process. The response of different communities and groups within Afghanistan was contingent upon the nature of process at any stage and its compatibility with their own communitarian norms and ideology. Sufis also diverged in their response to the process of state making in Afghanistan. Sufis in Afghanistan played an important role in the process of state making. They participated in the process both by taking active part in it and by opposing it at various stages. Their response to the state, like other communities was based on convergence of their own interest with the objectives of the state making process.

However, to understand the response of Sufis to the nation building process, it is necessary to know some basic concepts and principles of a tribal society in general. This will help us to understand the nature of state in Afghanistan and the inherent problems of these tribal societies towards nation building. The first section of this introductory chapter deals with the main feature of tribal/ traditional societies in general and the tribal features of Afghan state in particular during 19th century. The second section looks into the origin of Sufism in Islam and its gradual rise and

development into various orders or tariqahs. This will also analyse how different orders interacts with the state and influence the politics of the state. It will also try to find out whether Sufism played any role in empire building. This is important for us to understanding how Sufism could be used in nation building in the present condition. This chapter also looks into the religious institutions and there importance for building strong centralised Muslim empires in all parts of the world during the medieval period. It will help us to understand the continuity and changes in Afghan society and how the Amirs used these religious institutions for creating centralised authority in the country.

1.2 Tribal and Traditional Societies

By traditional society we mean a society which is basically rooted in the past and guided by its ancient values, norms, custom and conventions. Some important characteristics of traditional society are

- The status of a person is determined by birth and is fixed.

- Individual behaviour is governed by custom and ways of behaviour of the people vary only slightly from generation to generation.

- Individual identifies himself with primary groups and kinship relations predominates its interaction.

- People are conservative.

- Economy is simple and production is low.

- Mythical thought predominate society.

- Distinct apparatus of government headed by king or tribal heads.

These are some important features of tribal/traditional societies which are also found in many parts of the world mainly in developing countries of Asia and Africa. The strength and weakness of these societies is their kinship relations as it gives them stability within the tribe. They fight united against the external aggression but also source of weakness because of kinship rivalries among various groups or tribes led to loss of life and property within the society.

Many features of traditional society are present in Afghan society in modern times also, like the feature of conservative outlook of the people toward women and male domination of social institutions, government apparatus controlled by the tribal and religious heads, domination of religion over the state and life of the people. The economy of the country is agriculture based and use of traditional methods of agriculture with cattle rearing important source of livelihood. The politics of the state is dominated by the elites either traditional (royal families and tribal heads) or educated (both religious and modern educated) who are always fighting with one another to gain political advantages.

The tribal nature of state in Afghanistan since its inception in 1747 when Ahmad Shah was elected to rule the country by a council or jirga of tribal elders continued till today in one form or other. Ahmad Shah Durrani was succeeded in establishing his authority throughout the present Afghan area and extended Afghan rule from Mashhad to Kashmir and Delhi and from Amu-Darya to the Arabian Sea. The Empire began to disintegrate under his successors due to the rebellion of the tribal heads and attack from Persians in the west and the rising Sikh in the east. The growing interest of colonial powers during 18th century (Britain and Russia) further affected the precarious existence of the Afghan state (Dupree1976: 334). The internal rivalry between the ruling dynasty, among the Saddozia Popalzia and the Mohammadzai Barakzai branches led to dismemberment of the Durrani Empire with each contender striving for regional control. This gives the colonial powers a reason to interfere in the affairs of the country on behalf of one contender or other. As Saikal (2004:3) rightly said that the stability of Afghan state depended upon the alliance between the ruling family, tribal heads and foreign powers aid and assistance. The two Anglo-Afghan wars in 19th century and the treaty of Gandamak in 1879 with British further curbed the independence of Afghan state. The treaty determined that Afghan foreign policy should be controlled by the British, and the British representatives should be stationed in Kabul and in other strategic places and that there should be an extension of British control in North-West Frontier region. In return, the Amir was to receive a subsidy of 600,000 rupees per annum (Olesen 1995:28). Despite this treaty peace in Afghanistan was nowhere as the presence of British influence on the country was challenged by the tribes and religious groups. The internal compulsion of the

British due to change in power in Britain and the deteriorating conditions forced the British to accept Abdur Rahman as new Amir of Afghanistan in 1881 despite the fact that he lived many years in Russia during his exile. In the following years, British influence in Afghanistan was ensured through the control over the foreign policy as stated in treaty of Gandamak and with a handsome financial aid in the form of subsidy. In 1883 the subsidy was raised to 1200,000 rupees annually. This subsidy helped Amir Abdur Rahman to build a strong centralized state without the support of tribes and religious legitimacy. He maintained a strong army and brought the tribal and religious institutions under direct control of state which started the conflict between the religious leaders and state.

On the other hand the Afghan state was in essence a confederacy of Pashtun tribes which conquered and lost adjoining territories. The state and the Pashtun tribes are closely interconnected and interdependent upon one another. In the words of Tapper (1983:4), "tribes and state have created and maintained each other as a single system, though one of instability". Tapper further defined tribe, state and confederacy as "tribe may be used loosely of a localised group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organisation, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in-terms of customs, dialect or language and origin)... The term confederacy should be used for a local group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and perhaps class composition, yet it is politically unified, usually under a central authority...The state is a territorially – bounded polity with a centralized government and a monopoly of legitimate force, usually including within its bounds different social classes and ethnic/ cultural groups...". When the Durrani Empire was founded, the state and government was essentially tribal in nature. The tribal leaders were confirmed in their possession of land, the main offices of the state were distributed among different tribes and the king had to consult a council of tribal chiefs. The Durrani Empire was more of a confederacy of tribes rather than a centralised monarchy (Dupree 1973: 338). Thus the ruler was viewed by the tribes merely as a superior chief, a man of personal qualities admired by the tribes and religious heads.

The lack of institutionalised means of power forced the Afghan rulers to exploit the continuing tribal rivalries and feuds among the Pashtun tribes to maintain

the central authority. The paradox between the state and tribes was that the state needs some sort of tribal unity to maintain the hierarchy of indirect rule, while as on the other hand it exploits the tribal fission in a divide and rule fashion. This constant conflict and tension between the state and tribes made the tribes both 'king makers and king breaker ' which severely affected the stability of the state. The tribal nature of the Empire was further strengthened by the economic system of the country. The land revenue and taxes were collected through the tribal heads. The jagir system helped to maintain the balance between the tribes and the state under a strong ruler. But the same system became the source of weakness under a weak king same as happened in Mughal Empire which historian Satish Chandra calls jagirdari crisis. It was the cause of disintegration as it led to the development of semi-independent tribal leaders and affected the economic system of the country. However, to control this situation Amir Abdur Rahman appointed new state officials in the provinces to collect land revenue and look after provincial administration. These officials were loyal to the Central authority and reports directly to the Amir.

The ideological base of the Afghan state remained Pashtunwali until 1880 when Abdur Rahman tried to change it to hierarchical monarchy. The concept of legitimacy or ultimate source of authority was Allah and the Prophet, but rather than being mediated through the ulama to the temporal ruler in the person of the Shah/Amir, the tribes mediated this divine authority to the ruler through the institution of jirga (Olesen 1995:34). It was the reason that despite the reforms and modernisation programs the institution of jirga maintained its position in Afghan state. Thus by the end of nineteenth century, central power-which both political and militarily originated from the Pashtun tribes had not been able to supersede the structural limitation of a tribal state with its inherent tendencies to fragmentation and disunity. The situation improved only after 1981 when Amir Abdur Rahman was succeed in getting the support of both British and Russian to declare Afghanistan as buffer state. He centralised the Afghan state on modern terms and tried to destroy the tribal nature of the state. He brought the tribes and religious institutions under state control and used them to centralise his authority over all parts of the country. He institutionalized the education system by bringing the madrasa under direct state control by regulating the curriculum and salaries of the mullahs and ulamas in these

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institutions. This aspect we will deal in the next section because the education system was the main focus of the state and religious group throughout the 19th and 20th century.

The above features will help us to understand more clearly our topic and highlight the cause of the conflict in Afghan society. The Sufi -State relation in Afghanistan could be better understood if we know the social relation among various groups with one another. The relation between Sufism with state passed through many phases mainly due to the presence of the mosaic culture of the Afghan society. These features would be highlighted in the subsequent chapters.

1.3 Sufism in Islam

In a hundred of places the Quran set up as an ideal trust in God, absolute submission to the will of Him whom it proclaim the merciful. On the other hand Monotheism has placed Allah very high, far removed from weak humanity. Love implies the idea of giving and receiving. The Sunni Theodicy, therefore, distrust and regard as meaningless the concept of the "Love of the God" and still more than that of the union (*wisal)* with him. Thus there is no direct communication between God and man and every effort to lessen this distance was considered as *shirk* a move in the direction of polytheism. In opposition to such rigid theories some believers like Hasan-al-Basri (728) and Ibrahim-ibn-Adhan (777), felt the need to lessen this distance. They sought to approach the Divinity more by means other than fidelity to external practice and the path of legal justice. These Faithful aspired to a personal and more intense experience of the religious truths which should aid the gradual ascent of the soul to God (Ernst2003: 5-7). These tendencies, ill satisfied in official Islam, gave birth to the mystical discipline, *tasawwuf* or Sufism. Some of the famous definitions of Sufism are

- "Sufism, an Umbrella term for the ascetic and mystical movements within Islam".(Columbia Encyclopaedia)

- "Mystical movement within Islam that seeks to find divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It consists of a variety of mystical path that are designed to ascertain the nature of

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mankind and God and to facilitate the experience of divine love and wisdom in the world". (Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia)

- "Sufi are the members of a small Islamic sect that arose as a protest against the growing worldliness of Muslims after the time of the Prophet...Although Sufism is firmly anchored in orthodox Islamic doctrine, it emphasises the inner pursuit of love, obedience and devotion to God over concern with the outward law or *Sharia,*and is often associated with mysticism and esotericism". (Food and Culture Encyclopaedia)

Sufism according to Muslim orthodox scholars is a deviation from the path of monotheism to polytheism and they consider it as *shirk or unlawful.* During the initial years Sufism was confined to a very small section of people and scholars who were against excessive formalism in Islam without any space for individuality. Some western scholars also believe that Sufism in Islam emerged due to the influence of Christianity and other earlier religions. Their view is mainly based on the fact that earlier culture and religion were modified to adjust itself in Islam and it lead to the emergence of Sufism in Islam. But Sufism according to the Sufis like al-Hujwiri in mid eleventh century summed up as follows:-

*"Some assert that the Sufi is so called because he wears a woolen garment (jama i-suf), others that he is so called because he is in the first rank (saff -i-awwal), others say it is because the Sufis claim to belong to the ashab-i-suffa (people of the Bench who gathered around the prophet's mosque). Other, again, declare that the name is derived from safa (purity)" (*Schimmel 1975: 14)*.

Like him, Junayd the undisputed leader of the Iraqain school of mysticism wrote "Sufism is not [achieved] by much praying and fasting; but it is the security of the heart and the generosity of the soul" Scholars like Junayd and Nuri also highlighted the social and practical aspect of Sufism as "Sufism is not composed of practices and science, but it is morals and who surpasses you in good moral qualities surpasses you in Sufism". Sufism during the formative period was mainly internal purification of Islam, a personal experience of the central mystery of Islam, that of *tauhid,* (Schimmel 1975: 14). The Sufis always remained within the fold of Islam despite their adherence to any legal or theological school.

1.3.1 Rise and Growth of Sufism

The early centuries of Islam witnessed the growing popularity of Sufism. The Sufis were individual of high intellectual level and were against the rulers of the period and the growth of materialism in Islam. They were against the formalism in the religion by the ulamas and the excessive emphasis on *fiqh* over the individual. During the early period Sufism was confined to the intellectual section of the Muslim societies in some part of the Muslim land like Iraq and Khurassan. Some of the renowned Sufis who lived in the 8-10ᵗʰ centuries are Hasan al Basri (d.110/728), Malik ibn Dinar (d.131/748), Abu Hashim al Kufi Ibrahim ibn Adham (d.160/777), Husayn ibn Mansur al Hallaj (d.309/922), and many more (Schimmel 1975: 15).

By the 11-12ᵗʰ century the popularity of Sufism spread among wide range of people in many Muslim lands and became an integrated part of Muslim life and it emerged as a dominant mode of Islamic piety. The process of reconciliation between juristic and Sufi version was initiated during this period by some Sufis like Abu al Ghazzali (1058-1111) and Abd al Qadir al-Jilani were prominent. Due to this more people are attracted toward Sufism including some Jurists belonging to the various schools of *fiqh* (Muslim Jurisprudence) and stared entering the fold of Sufism. This led to the emergence of Khanqahs and Madrasas as the teachings of Sufism were stated in madrasas and the teaching of *fiqh* in khanqahs. It furthered the popularity of Sufism among the people. Besides these there are some other factors which led to the growth of Sufism and these are socio-economic, religious and political conditions of the Muslim land like Egypt, Iraq, Persia, central and Western Asia and Afghanistan.

With the beginning of Umayyad rule (661-750) the Muslim rule spread to different parts of the world due the expansionist policy followed by the Umayyad governors. The fast spreading of Islam led to many problems in the conquered areas as the Arabs tried to establish their hegemony. The Arabs also promoted racial supremacy and treated others as inferior and subordinate to them. This was not acceptable to the intellectuals and ascetics of the conquered areas and they rise in revolt against the rulers. This brought them near to the common people and popularity of Sufism in the conquered areas. Secondly the rising prosperity of the ruling class due to control over new areas led to excessive materialism and worldliness of the

Umayyad Caliphat rule which was against the basic tenets of Islam and the traditional religious class of the ulamas also became part of state force the Sufis to rise against them. Third important factor was the separation between the exoteric and esoteric dimensions of Islam which were earlier complimentary to each other. The main reason for this was the codification of *fiqh* and *Sharia* laws for the newly conquered land which reduced Islam to mere its external identity only (exoteric) and it provoked the reaction of Sufis in the form of esotericsm or Sufism (Anjum 2006:221-224). Finally the political instability of the period especially during the Umayyad period also played important role in the rise of Sufism.

A later development in Sufism was the division of Sufism into orthodox Sufism and Marabout Sufism. Orthodox Sufism does not challenge the formal religion but offers the believer the opportunity to strengthen his spiritual life while at the same time respecting *Sharia*t laws. This form of Sufism was originated from the reform introduced by Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (Mujaddid Alf-e-Thani) and Shah Waliullah who firmly believed in the *Sharia* law (Roy 1986:39). They believed in the active participation of the Sufis in state affairs to reform the state from unIslamic practices crept in the state policies due to contact with the infidels. This form was more popular in the Indian subcontinent especially the area around Pakistan -Afghanistan border during the 18th century. It is still prominent in Afghanistan and plays an important role in the social and political life of the people. The Maraboutism is the collective allegiance of a clan or tribe to a family of saints reputed to be endowed with hereditary *barakat,* which the family may act as a channel to sanctify the community.

1.3.2 Sufi orders or Tariqah

An important development in Sufism was the emergence of silsilah or *tariqah* . Tariqah literally means a path or way and a practical method, whereas silsilah literally means a connection, a link or a chain. Every silsilah traced its spiritual lineage or genealogy to some revered Sufi shaykh, considered to be the founder of the silsilah and through him it was linked to his spiritual preceptor and this vertical chain of authority was invariably traced back to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be on him). The first pedigree of Sufi teachers was prepared by Abu Muhammad al-Khuldi (d.348/959), after which this practice became customary among the Sufis of later

generations. It was the 12th and 13th century which witnessed the growth of silsilahs all over the Muslim lands. Some of the important Sufi silsilhas that emerged and their founders are as follows**:-**

- *Silsilah Qadririyyah* was named after Shaykh Abdal Qadir al Jilani who is buried in Baghdad.

- *Silsilah Chishtiyyah* was founded by Khawajah Abu Isaq Shami (d.238/940). It was originated from Chisht, a small village near heart in Khurasan in then Persia. Nowdays it is situated in Afghanistan. The silsilah was popularised in India by Shaykh Muin al Din Chishti of Ajmer(d.633/1236).

- *Silsilah Rafaiyyah* was derived from Shaykh Ahmad ibn al Rafai (d.578/1182).

- *Silsilah Yasaviyyah* was associated with Shaykh Ahmad al Yasavi (d.561/1166).

- *Silsilah Shadhiliyyah* originated from Shaykh Abu Maydan Shuayb (d.593/1197), but attributed to Shaykh Abul Hasan ali al Shadhili (d.656/1258) who popularised it .

- *Silsilah Badawiyyah* of Shaykh Ahmad al Badawi (d. 675/1276) was centred in Egypt.

- *Silsilah Suharawardiyyah* was founded by Shaykh Najib al Din Abd al Qahir (d.563/1167), also known as Diya al Din Abu Najib al Suhrawardi. Suhraward was a town situated in north eastern Persia. The real founder of the silsilah is considered to be his nephew named Shaykh al Din Abu Hafs Umar b Muhammad al Suhrawardi (d.632/1234), the author of the famous Sufi text Awarif al Maarif.

- *Silsilah Kubrawiyyah* was originated from Shaykh Naim al Din Kubra(d.618/1221).

- *Silsilah Naqshbandiyyah* is intially attributed to Shaykh Yusuf al Hamadani (d.543/1140) and Shaykh Abd al Khaliq al Ghujdawani

(d.575/1179). Later, it came to be identified with Shaykh Muhammad Baha al Din Naqshbandi (d.791/1389). The silsilah was introduced in India by Khwajah Baqi Billah in the 15th century. The silsilah is also known as Silsilah i- Khwajagan as well.

- *Silsilah Mevleviyyah* was founded by Mawlana Jala ud din Rumi who was buried in Konya (Turkey). The silsilah is confined to Anatolai and the whirling *darveshes* are identified with it.

The above silsilahs shows that Sufism was prevalent in many parts of the Muslim world. The most important areas were Central Asia, Persia and Egypt from where it spread to other parts. Like from Central Asia it spread to south Asia were Sufism found the soil very fertile and became an important feature of the south Asian societies till today.

1.3.3 Sufism and State

The relationship between the Sufis and the state is very complex as it is not an uniform phenomena due to the existence of a large number of Sufis orders. As seen above there are many Sufi orders founded by different Sufi saints in different parts of the world. The emergence of these Sufi orders was mainly due to the political conditions prevailing in the areas like Baghdad, Khurasan, Egypt and many more. The Sufi orders are influenced by either Shi ism or Sunni school of *fiqh*. The former consider Hazrat Ali the fourth Caliph as the main Sufi and the later Abu Bakhr the first Caliph. Due to this difference also the Sufis varied in their attitude towards state and politics.

The complexities of the relation arise from the fact that various Sufi order either response to political engagement with the state or to refrain from it. Some Sufi orders avoided any contact with the kings and nobles and, these orders discouraged any association with political authorities among their fellow Sufis. Sometimes, Sufi engagement with the state or ruler found to have positive influence on the state policies. This shows that the response of the Sufis to the political authorities was not homogeneous. Similarly, the behaviour of the rulers was quite heterogeneous toward Sufism. Some of the rulers sought counsel from the Sufis for their personal as well in the state affairs, some thought it better to keep their hands off the Sufis and leave

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them and their khanqahs undisturbed, whereas some rulers tried to regulate and control the Sufis as well.

The relationship with the state has generally been divided under two broad themes, one those who followed a friendly relation with the state and cooperated with the state in establishing their control over the people and second those who are against the state. The example of the former is the Suharawardi and Naqshbandi orders that had very good relations with state and readily accepted land grants and *fatuh*. The later is the Chishti order, popular in India and established their power centre far away from the capital of the state just to avoid contact with kings and nobles.

A very good example of Sufi state relation can be seen in the Naqshbandi order which had a very good relation with state during history and is still continued in many places. This order was consolidated and expanded after the death of Bahu ud-Din by his Khalifas. The order began to play not only an important role in religious life but also political, social and even economic life of the Transoxiana and it retained until the Rusian subjugation of central Asia in 19th and 20th century. This trend was fully promoted by Khwaja Nasir ud-Din Ubaydullah Ahrar (d.1490) (Algar 1976:124). Khwaja established a close relation with Abu Sa'id, a Timurid prince, who had been driven out of Samarqand by the rival powers and it was only with the help of Khwaja that the prince was able to regain the power. With this, Khwaja became the virtual ruler of the area and his influence was felt up to Farghana valley. The most striking example of the political role of Naqshbandiya is explicable in terms of the principle, *khalvat dar anjuman,* of exercising intense devotion to God within the context of society. When recounting a certain instance of his political influence, Khwaja Ahrar said:

*"If we acted only as Shaykh in this age, no other task has been assigned to us, to protec*t *the Muslims from the evil of oppressors, and for the sake of this we must traffic with kings and conquer their souls, thus achieving the purpose of the Muslim..."(*Algar *1976:140).*

It is this vision that has continued to dominate Naqshbandi political activity down to the present. Another such Sufi order is the Suharawardis who are more popular in Multan and the surrounding region. Their idea of state and society brought

them close to the state from which they accepted land grants and fatuh. They also helped the sultans to establish their power and increased social acceptability among the people. On the other hand some Sufi order like Chishti maintained a minimal or no relation with the state. They never accepted any land grants from the state.

Second important feature of the Sufi -state relation is the relation of the Sufis with the ulamas or jurist as the latter played important role in policies of the state toward Sufis. Historically, the relation between the Sufis and ulamas, jurists and theologians were not cordial. The later three groups were the traditional custodians of religious authority, and were in most cases allied with the state. The main reason of difference was their attitude towards Islam, the ulamas emphasis the exoteric or outward aspect while the Sufis believe in the esoteric or inward aspects of the religion. Similarly, the approach of the ulamas and Sufis towards the issues of morality is also radically different from each other (Anjum 2006:230).The institutionalization of the silsilahs gave Sufism a wide appeal. The silsilahs made the Sufi master the centre of religious authority for the common people which undermined the influence of traditional ulamas in the realm of religion. In other words the Sufis emerged as a parallel locus of religious authority, as the exclusive monopoly of the ulama over religious affairs was challenged by the Sufis.

The Sufi- state relationship was a two way traffic, the Sufis needed the state patronage to make themselves more popular among the people during the later period of its development through the institutionalisation of the Sufi orders. While the state like the Seljuqid state in order to establish their political authority supported and patronised the Sufi khanqahs. Like the Seljuqid state, the Zingid, Ayyubid rulers and their lieutenants and successors not only constructed khanqahs but also supported Sufi establishments. This helped the states to get legitimacy for their rule among the people due to the Sufis and in the same way it helped the Sufis to get social approval and acceptance among the people.

In fact many Sufis tactfully used their association with the political authorities to influence the behaviour of the Caliphs, Sultans, as well as their state policies. The best example is the Suhrawardiyyah Silsilah's Shaykh Najib ud Din Abul Qahir Al Suhrawadi, who had close and cordial relations with the Caliphs of Baghdad (Nizami

1961:252). This trend was seen in Egypt, Persia, India and many newly conquered Muslim areas. One main reason for the well developed Sufi-state relation in these regions was that both the Sufis and state supported each other to earn legitimacy. Due to this Sufi-state relation, Sufism was perceived as a threat or challenge to the power and authority of the ulama and jurists. It was the main reason of enmity or cause of tension between the Sufis and ulamas during the medieval period and is still continued in many regions of the world.

Thus we can conclude from the above historical analysis that the relation between the Sufism and the state varied within Sufi orders. The state's relation with Sufis depended on the nature of society and its relation with ulamas. The Sufi response to the state varied from political alliance and collaboration with the intent to reform the state or to influence the state policies, to criticise the personal and political conduct of rulers, which some times turned into violent clash between the two. In the same way, the policy of rulers and political authorities was also not consistent. Some rulers had very friendly and cordial relations with the Sufis and extended official patronage and grants to them, while some others consider Sufis as a threat to their political authority, and thus tried to control and contain them to make them subordinate to the state.

1.4 Religious Institutions in Islam

There is no formal religious institution in Islam unlike Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. But with the rise of dynastic rule the need for institutionalisation of religious groups emerged. The reason for this was the foreign nature of the ruling class especially in Egypt, India and Africa. The ruling class has no direct connection with the masses in these areas and they lacked administrative machinery to run the state. The only available such group was that of the legal scholars who were used during the caliph time as interpreter of Islamic laws in day to day affairs. This created the necessity to formalise the legal scholars and use them to get legitimacy among the people. The legal scholars usually came from individual study circles, but during the late tenth century, the law colleges, known in Islamic languages as the Madrasa, came into being, exhibiting the tendency to superimpose itself over the study circles. The

study circle differed from the madrasa in one crucial aspect that study circles were largely a free scholarly gathering of a professor and his students, for the most part without political interference and unfettered by financial patronage. The madrasa, on the other hand, was as much a financial and political phenomenon as it was an educational one. It subjected legal education to increasingly systematic control by rulers (Hallaq 2009:38). It was established as charitable trust through the law of Waqf, whereby a mosque would be dedicated to the teaching of law and the professor and students provided with stipends, food, a library and dormitories. The ruler and his immediate entourage like wazirs, commanders, mothers and wives etc. founded and patronages big and affluent madrasa which finally led to the rise of relationship between law and politics and also establishment of religious institutions in Muslim society.

The first dynastic warlords who introduced the policy of establishing madrasas were the Seljuqs (1055-1175) who defeated the Buyids of Iran (934-1055). The Seljuqs were committed Sunnis but lacked both religious authority and political legitimacy and to solve this problem they introduced the madrasa system to get legitimacy from legal scholars and jurist (Magnus and Naby 1998:75). By the end of 11th century, a substantial segment of the legal elite was in the service of the government. With the incorporation of the professors into the madrasa system furthered the political domination over the legal and religious aspects making them subordinate to the ruler. On the whole, equilibrium did exist between the man of the sword and those of the law. The ruling elite received the cooperation of the scholars a and their legitimacy to his rule, while the scholars received a salary, promotion and the full right to apply the Islamic law according to his owe interpretation.

Physically, the madrasa was constituted of a building that at times was the mosque itself, but sometimes a special structure built was built as an annex to a mosque. Inns were also built in the vicinity of the mosque, separate from the madrasa. They were supported and maintained through the system of Waqf boards (religious endowment). According to Hallaq (2009:40), the law of waqf "represented the glue that could bind the human, physical and monetary elements together". Essentially, waqf was thoroughly religious and pious concept, and as a material institution it was meant to be a charitable act of first order.

The madrasas were owned by government and private individuals, which impart religious education in different fields like *fiqh* (jurisprudence), hadith (Prophet's sayings), Quranic interpretation, *Sharia* laws. It was the government owned madrasas which produced great number of scholars and jurists who took active part in politics and in state administration. They provided stability and enhanced the process of centralisation in peasantised societies as they are deeply connected with the people, land and formal economic system.

The mosque acts as religious institutions at village level as the only educated person in a village is the mullah, who led the prayers, presents the sermon on Fridays, recites or reads the Koran and teaches Koran to young boys. His income came from payment of services, including teaching and maintenance of the place of worship would be part of community or assumed the responsibility by a rich patron. The main difference between the institution of mosque and madrasa is that mosque are symbol of Islamic identity and are open to all irrespective of his position in the society or wealth he possessed. On the other hand madrasas acted as bridge between the ruler and people and its existence is more important to the state rather than to the religion. The admissions to the madrasa were open to only those who pass certain exams to get admission to a madrasa.

Some important religious authorities

1. Mullah Bashi, who selected the mullahs to be summoned to the majilis -i-ulama (presumably the adhoc council of religious scholars) and acted as the channel of communication between the ruler and the mullahs.

2. Shaykh al-Islam, who administered the stipends and pensions to mullahs on instruction from the local hakims (provincial administrators).

3. Sadrs (chief magistrates) of the cities, who kept the register of all religious land whether granted by the king or bequeathed by private persons, and ensured its proper deposition, subject to the king's order.

4. Qazi(judge), in all large towns. They were appointed by the king but only a few were salaried by the state. Instead they were either paid by local community or charged a fee for their services.

5. Mullah: The title used to identify a religious functionary, cleric, learned man or someone with religious education.

6. Muhtasib(always a mullah) enforced public morals, controlled adherence to religious obligations and prohibitions as well as administered punishments according to *Sharia* on possible offenders.

7. Ulama: Man of knowledge (sing., alim). Refers to those who have been trained in religious science (Koran, Hadith, *fiqh*,etc.).

1.5 NATURE OF STUDY

The failure of Taliban to establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan highlights the complex nature of the Afghan society. Religion plays important role in the country but only religion or religious sentiments is not useful. Religion along with ethnic and tribal identities is a powerful instrument to mould the direction of state and society. As the introduction of modern education and legal system not only changed the social order but also had deep impact on the religion and politics. It created a new urban class who belonged to both rural and urban areas and were influenced by new ideologies which they wanted to implement in Afghanistan. This changed the relation between religion, tribes and state in Afghanistan during 20th century and made the situation more complex after Soviet invasion in 1979. This study will deal with this aspect of the society in light of nation building process in Afghanistan. However one important marker to study the changes in society and politics is the changes in position of Sufis during and after the Taliban period. The importance of Sufism is also due to the active role played by Sufis in the politics especially during resistance movement as two leading resistance parties were formed and led by Sufi pirs i.e. Sebhagtullah Mujaddidi and Sayyid Ahmad Gailani.

The rise of revivalist/reformist movement in Muslim world in 1940s and 50s had it impact on Afghanistan also as a new modern educated class emerged in the country due to changes in education system. Some of the educated youths who studied from Al -Azhar University were influenced by Islamists ideologies of Sayid Qutab and Muhamad Abdu the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Some of them were younger generation of Sufi pirs also who interacted with the Islamist and

influenced them through their *zikir* centres like Mawlana Faizani. This study will try to highlight the important role Sufis played in the rise of Islamists in Afghanistan. It will also discuss the contribution of Sufis during the resistance movement against Soviet invasion and in containing the radical Islamists influence after 1980's.

The chapters will highlight the different aspect of the State-Sufi relation in Afghanistan and its overall impact on the society. The second chapter deals with the rise of revivalist movement in Muslim world and its influence on Afghanistan. This will help us to understand the complexities of different ideologies and how they work in different conditions such as in tribal societies. The third chapter will look into the institutional developments of religious institutions during the nation building process and how Sufism responded to it. The fourth chapter mainly focus on the conflict between the State and religion due to reforms and modernisation. The Constitutional experiments in Afghanistan during 20th century influenced not only the political condition but also the society at large and the fourth chapter also looks into these changes. It will also highlight the changes in the nature of conflict due to the participation of foreign countries during the resistance movement. The concluding chapter will try to find whether the social structure in the country changed or not through the position of Sufis, an important indicator change in society. It will also see the prospects of nation building in Afghanistan with the help of religion, especially Sufism.

Some important Definitions:

Sufism: Sufism is defined as "Mystical movement within Islam that seeks to find divine love and knowledge through direct personal experience of God. It consists of a variety of mystical path that are designed to ascertain the nature of mankind and God and to facilitate the experience of divine love and wisdom in the world". (Britannica Concise Encyclopaedia)

State: the state is defined in sociological terms as "Government institutions ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by law and the ability to use force" (Sociology Dictionary).

Marabout: According to Oxford Dictionary of Islam it is defined as "Westernised form of Arabic word Murabit, referring to a saint or to a person

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living in a Sufi hospic. It refers to Sufi leaders or saints who are believed to have received barakah, or blessing from God, which they are able to pass on to their followers when petitioned, whether they are dead or alive".

Madrasa: "Establishment of learning where the Islamic sciences are taught; a college for higher studies" (Oxford Dictionary of Islam).

Qawm: it is a basic social unit of Afghanistan that is based on kinship, residence occupation. The protean word qawm is of Arabic origin and is used in Afghanistan to refer to any form of solidarity. The Afghans identify themselves by qawm, rather than by the tribe or nationality. Qawm identity has added to the challenge of creating a national identity in Afghanistan. The qawm is governed by a jirga or shura. (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online)

Chapter 2

SUFISM AND ITS ROLE IN POLITICAL ISLAM

2.1   INTRODUCTION

2.2   SOME IMPORTANT REFORMIST AND REVIVALIST MOVEMENTS

2.3   IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM/ REFORMISM

   2.3.1   ISLAMIC REVILALISM IN SOUTH ASIA

   2.3.2   ITS IMPACT ON AFGHANISTAN

2.4   REVIEW OF LITERATURE

   2.4.1   SUFISM AND RESISTENCE MOVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

   2.4.2   RELATION BETWEEN STATE, RELIGION AND TRIBAL STRUCTURES DURING 20TH CENTURY

2.5   SUMMARY

2.1 Introduction

The modernization of the Muslim world has posed a very serious question among the religious and intellectuals scholars of the Muslim societies that whether modernization is compatible with Islam or not. The response of different groups to this situation was also different which led to many revivalist/reformist movements in different parts of the world. As the reformist movement started by Abu Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutab in Egypt was very different from that which is found in Afghanistan and this was mainly due to the socio-political condition in Afghanistan due to its tribal and ethnic identities, which are clearly visible in the revivalist and reformist movement emerged in the country.

Revivalism denotes Islamic movements that emerged in 18-19th century. It was mainly confined to peripheral areas lying beyond the reach of Central authorities. Its social base had a predominant tribal formation. On the other hand Islamic Reformism was and urban movement that came into being in the 19th century and lasted well into the 20th century (Choueiri 1997: xii) It led to discussion on the issue such as Islam and politics or state, nature of state, supremacy of *Sharia*, position of ruler and religious leader in the functioning of state due to the differences between the revivalist and reformist. The main difference between the revivalist and reformist was their attitude towards the state, as revivalist wanted to change the nature of state and not the ruler or the state itself. However for the reformist the state itself is corrupt and wanted to replace it with Islamic state based on the ideology of Islam.

The difference between all these revivalist/reformist movements is their approach toward socio-political changes and the challenges of modernism. These revivalist/reformist movements were based upon certain ideologies like the *Salafism, Wahabism, Islamism, Islamic Fundamentalism, Pan-Islamism,* etc. which played important role in developing a political consciousness among the Muslim masses in different parts of the world. Moreover, they were the result of modernization or westernisation of Muslim countries and societies due to colonialism and imperialism during 19th century especially in the coastal areas. As for the *Salafist* the reforms did not means adopting modernity but returning to the tradition of the Prophet, which would enable one to conceptualize this modernity. Secondly the *Salafist* political thought remained traditionalist i.e. there was no wholesale condemnation of the existing Muslim governments while as for the Islamists all the existing Muslim governments were un-Islamic and should be replaced.

The rise of Islamic revivalism was also a reaction against the gradual contraction of internal and external trade, brought about by the mercantile activities of European nations. This interference of European powers in the peripheries led to the loss of livelihood of tribal confederations, pastorals and nomads as they acted as guides and guards of trade caravans, protégés of merchants or governors etc. As due to industrial revolution the European established their factors around the coastal areas (Choueiri 1997:8). Thus we can say that revivalism to a large extent echoed peripheral penetration.

Some important revivalist movements launched during 18-19th century are the Wahhabism in Arabia which was inspired from the teachings of Abd al-Wahab (1703-92). This revivalist movement was consolidated into an alliance between the tribes led by local chieftain, Ibn Sa'ud and Abd al-Wahab the founder of this movement. Another one was the movement started by Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (1786-1831) and Isma'il Shahid (1779-1831), to purify Islam against Hindu and Sikh influence and declared jihad against them. Two late revivalist movements were launched in both Sudan by Muhammad Ahmad b. Abdallah (1844-85) against the British penetration and Somalia by Sayyid Muhammad Abdallah Hasan (1864-1920) against the British, French, and Italian presence in the main coastal centres of Somalia (Choueiri 1997:9-10). The common characteristics of all the revivalist movements are *hijra* (migration) and *jihad* (holy struggle). However, Islamic reformism was a modern movement which came into being in the wake of European supremacy and expansion. It was different from revivalist movement in a number of ways and it has also adopted a variety of political programmes.

2.2 SOME IMPORTANT REFORMIST AND REVIVALIST MOVEMENTS

The word *salafist* is originated from the word *Salaf* meaning predecessors or ancestors and is usually used in the sense of "*pious ancestors"* especially the first three generations of the Muslim community who are considered to have lived the normative experience of Islam. The reform movement started by Jamal- al Din al Afghani and Muhammad Abduh is known as *Salafi movement* as derived from the word *Salaf*. The main focus of this movement is the restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure forms, adherence to Quran and Sunnah, rejection of latter interpretations and unity of *umma (*Muslim community). They were also against the clergy and the concept of *taqlid* (unquestioning imitation of precedent) of a *mujtahid* which is more prevalent among the Shi'ia (Espoisto 2007:274-275). They were basically intellectual

and modernist in nature and worked to assert the validity of Islam in modern times, compatibility with reason and science, and legitimize the acquisition of western scientific and technological achievement are some of the important features of *salafist* movement which makes it different from other reform movement. The *salafists* viewed political reform as an essential for revitalization of the Muslim community. Its influence spread to Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, India, Indonesia and Egypt in particular. The most influential movement inspired by the *salafist* were the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jama'at -i islami of Pakistan.

Like-wise Wahabism a revivalist / reformist movement started during the 18th century for socio-moral reconstruction of the society by Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhhab a Hanbali scholar of Arabia. Wahhab proclaimed *tawhid* (uniqueness and unity of God) as its primary doctrine and it began as response to the perceived moral decline and political weakness of the Muslim community in Arabia. He proposed a return to an idealized Islamic past through reassertion of monotheism and reliance on Quran and *hadith*, rejecting medieval interpretations of Islam and jurisprudence. It formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in 1747, which served as the basis for the consolidation of the present day kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Espoisto 2007:333). They were referred to as Wahhabis by opponents, but themselves as *Muwahhidun* or those upholding the doctrine of *tawhid*. Wahhabism is basically a message oriented movement and its *tawhid* message was modelled on the Hanbali tradition, which treated charisma with certain reservations. The alliance between Wahhab and Amir Abd al Saud was on the basis of Unitarian message rather than the charismatic leadership qualities of Wahhab. Therefore, in contrast to the Sufi tradition which embraced *al Mahdi al Muntazar* (blessed with baraka), ibn Abd al Wahhab embraced *tawhid* as his guiding message (Warburg 2009:662). He urged his followers to follow *tawhid* his Unitarian message. Wahhabism is present in both the diluted form and the extreme form in Muslim world. The ideology of the present day Saudi Arabia is a diluted form and its more extreme manifestations, has provided the Islamists ideology of the Al-Qaida and many other Jihad movement throughout the Muslim world (Warburg 2009:664).

Pan-Islamism as an ideology is very important to understand Islamism. Islamism is the natural consequence of Pan-Islamism formulated by Jamal al Din al Afghani, in that pan-Islamism was forced to operate in a system of modern nation state (Mendoza 2002:7). Pan-Islamism is an ideology which calls for socio-political solidarity among all Muslims. This ideology was emerged as a modern political ideology in 1860s and 1870s at the height of

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European colonialism, when Turkish intellectuals began discussing and writing about it as a way to save the Ottoman Empire from fragmentation. It became the state policy during the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and was adopted by members of the ruling bureaucratic and intellectual elites of the Ottoman Empire (Espoisto 2007:243). According to Al-Afghani revivalism and purification are very important to eradicate western influence and return to *Sharia*. He advocated resistance to foreign encroachment and tried to arm Muslims with the knowledge that their own religion was sufficient to treat any situation. Pan -Islamism rejected the concept of nationalism as it is divisive and gave the concept of universal caliphate to implement *Sharia*. Pan-Islamism as a political expression was in many ways precursor to Islamists movements. The major difference between the two is their reaction to nationalism, Pan-Islamism was at odd with nationalism as it consider natioanalism as divisive while as the Islamists operate in the framework of nationalism, though at times reluctantly. The example of this is Mawdudi's reaction to the creation of Pakistan, as he was opposed to it initially but later accepted the creation of Pakistan as a new Muslim state (Mendoza 2002:8-10).

The most important of all the revivalist or reformist movement in Islam is the Islamism or Islamists movement as it is spreading very fast among the masses in various Muslim countries. The recent development in the Arab states which is popularly known as "Arab Spring" is mainly due to the activities of the Islamists in these countries. Then comes the basic question why the Islamists are becoming very popular as against other reform movements, is it against the concept of modern state, what is their ideology and how they work? The answer to all these questions lies in the past especially during the colonial period. It basically started as a third world movement against the colonial rule. Therefore Islamism can be defined as an ideology that demands man's adherence to the scared law of Islam and rejects as much as possible outside influence. It was against the west increasing influence in the Muslim countries. The concept of Islamism was popularised by Hasan al- Banna (1906-1949) the founder of Muslim Brotherhood and Abul-Ala Maududi (1903-1978) the creator of the Jamaat-i-Islami party in the Indian sub-continent. Islamism also refers to Muslim individuals, along with organisations and movements who use Islam's main source i.e. Quran and *Sunnah* (traditions of Prophet) as the main source or inspirational basis of their political theory and ideology (Kirmanj 2008:43-59). the most important aspect of the Islamists movement was that it originated from modern education system like schools, colleges and universities, who studied both religion and science. This makes them different from traditional religious group, was the reason for their popularity among youths and educated

section of the Muslim society. However, due to their modern identity the Islamists failed to create support base in traditional and tribal societies like Afghanistan were their presence is confined to Kabul and other urban areas only.

Today Islamism is both an ideology and a movement that seeks to establish a specific form of government. It has all features of a totalitarian system or ideology whether that is in political ideology, political movement or form of government. This we can see from the fact that the central theme of the Islamists ideology is the differentiation between self and the others; i.e. between Muslims and Non-Muslims. The Islamists claims that they want to eliminate the differences among the people on the basis of colour, race, nationality, blood and lineages and the only difference among people is that of people of God i.e. Muslims and others.

Another feature of the Islamists which highlights their totalitarian view is the concept of Jihad. According to them the universal nature of Islam can be achieved through Jihad i.e. they justified violence. This ideology was promoted by Sayyid Qutb the most radical disciple of Hasan al-Banna, in his influential book *Milestones* the main focus of this book was that he justified violence for asserting Islamic domination (Mendoza 2002:10). According to Sayyid Qutb:

"*the cause of Islamic Jihad should be sought in the very nature of Islam and its role in the world, in its high principles, which have been given to it by God and for the implementation of which God appointed the Prophet-peace be on him- as His Messenger and declared him to be the last of all prophets and messengers.*

This religion is really a universal declaration of the freedom of man from servitude to other men and servitude; it is a declaration that sovereignty belongs to God alone and that He is the Lord of all the worlds. It means a challenge to all kinds and forms of systems which are based on the concept of the sovereignty of man; in other words, where man has usurped the Divine attribute. Any system in which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the sources of all authority are human, defies human beings by designating others than God as the lords over men. This declaration means that the usurped authority of God be returned to Him and the usurpers be thrown out – those who by themselves devise laws for others to follow, thus elevating themselves to the status of lords and reducing others to the status of slaves. In short, to proclaim the authority and sovereignty of God means to

eliminate all kingships and to announce the rule of the Sustainer of the universe over the entire earth". (Mendoza 2002:10)

He reproves those who would define jihad as defensive:

"if we insist on calling Islamic Jihad a defensive movement, then we must change the meaning of the word 'defensive' and mean by it 'the defence of man' against all those elements which limit his freedom. These elements take the form of beliefs and concepts, as well as political systems, based on economic, racial or class distinctions. When Islam first came into existence, the world was full of such systems, and the present -day Jahiliyyah also has various kinds of such systems". (Mendoza 2002:11)

Sayyid Qutb has no faith in the present government and the ulamas as he says that the present day system only promotes the servitude of man on man and not the God. He also rejects the interpretations of Quran and Hadith by the ulamas as he says that man should use his own logic and intellect to interpret and does not depends upon the any other to understand the religion. To achieve this goal he justified *jihad* and is one of the reason that Islamist are more popular among the youths. Thus from the above quote it is clear that Sayyid Qutb provided the ideological base for the Islamists in Egypt and other parts of Muslim countries.

Likewise Maududi's writings also resonate with Sayyid Qutb's view:

"The cause of Islamic Jihad should you have come to know that the cause of the evils which spread among God's servants is a bad government and it is necessary for reforming it to set right the root-cause. But the question now arises as to what is the basic cause of the badness of the government itself; where is the root of this evil; and what basic reform should be effected in it in order to wipe out the evils mentioned above? The answer to this question is that the Lordship of man is over man is the root cause and there is no other method of reform except that there should be sovereignty of God over man". (Mendoza 2002:12)

Maududi sees jihad as the means to remove the servitude of man to other men. He says

"In the eyes of Islam it is certainly not enough for you to believe God as God and His law as true law. Simultaneously with your faith in these two verities, the duty devolves on you that wherever you are, in whichever country you live, you must get up there for the reforms of God's creation, try to transform the wrong principles of the government into correct principles, snatch away the power of legislation and lordship and superintendence of God's servants, conduct the affairs of the government in accordance with God's laws and with

belief in their responsibility and accountability in the Hereafter as also in God being the Knower of the unseen. The name of this striving is Jihad" (Mendoza 2002:*12).*

Same as Sayyid Qutb, Maududi also rejected the present governments and he tried to find out what are the causes of the present problems in Muslim states due to the western influence and came with the conclusion that it is man rule over man and not God. The remedy for this problem is to overthrow the present system and establish the sovereignty of God. The only way is to wage a war i.e. jihad against the present system. Thus we can say that these two personalities provided the much needed ideological base for the Islamists and the only difference between the two was the method of reforms in the society and state. For Maududi the area of concern was for the whole Muslim world and his appeal was to all the Muslims of the world to raise their voice against the un-Islamic rule of the present day. This led to many revivalist movements in South Asia like Salafist movement in Pakistan. The Islamists are mainly product of modernity and came not from the traditional religious groups but from universities and colleges where they rubbed shoulder with the Marxist and other socialist and also adopted some of the organisational features of the Marxist (Roy 1986:71). This we will discuss in detail in our next section which will focus on some ideological aspects of revivalist movement especially in South Asia. But unlike the reformist/revivalist movements, Sufism also responded to modernization and imperialism in the Muslim countries.

The main difference between the revivalist movements of Islamists and Sufis is that the Islamists wants a top- down approach in which their main focus is to change political system to reform the society and individual Muslims. However, for the Sufis it's a bottom-up approach i.e. to reform the heart and actions of the Muslims. This difference is mainly found in the revivalist movements of Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband and Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly. Mawlana Thanvi (1865). Mawlana Ashraf was educated at Deoband and took initiation on the Sufi path at the hands of Hajji Imaddullah, the Chishti-Sabiri *Shaykh* who was the spiritual guide, *murshid* of many Ulama, particularly those of Deoband. He settled at the Imdadullah's Sufi lodge (khanqah)in Thana Bhavan, where he lived until his death in 1943. it was here that Mawlana Thanvi started his Sufi and revivalist activities, particularly the composition of a large number of works in a wide variety of fields, including Quranic commentary, jurisprudence, theology, and Sufism and training, in person and through correspondence, of a large number of disciples to whom he served as a Sufi master. Mawlana Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi lived from 1856 to 1921and took initiation at the hand of Shaykh Al-eRasul, a Qadiri pir of Barakatiyya family. He achieved mastery in a variety of

fields, particularly jurisprudence, to which most of his written work is devoted, largely in the form of *fatwa*. He was widely active in revivalist activities in the name of the *ahl-e-sunnat wal jamaat* at a time of great ferment in Muslim South Asia (Naeem 2009:439).

The revivalist movement in Sufism was a reaction against the British colonialism in India and in other parts of the world also. In the same way, the movement started by Mawlana Thanvi and Mawlana Barelvi was also a revivalist movement against the British introduced modernity and corruption in Muslim society mainly due to the western educated Muslims who followed the British. The area of focus was social relations, political and economic life and personal life. According to Thanvi the downfall of the Muslim community was mainly due to casualties in different forms like social, political, economic and personal ethics, and it is in these forms of ethics that he believes the rectification of the will lead to the revival of the Muslim community. This involves certain ethical practices which can only be performed correctly through rigorous training of the *nafs (*self) (Naeem 2009:442). The bottom up approach of the Sufis helped them to be more close to the people without offending the state. If we take the example of Mawlana Thanvi the main cause of the problem in Muslim society was the dearth of knowledge and wide spread ignorance among the Muslims, and lack of determination. The first problem pertains to intelligence and second to will. Islamic revivalism would rectify these problems through knowledge and practice of the religion. His main emphasis was on education to all men and women,young and old, rich or poor. He was an amalgamation of Sufi-Alim who believes that *alim* the chief authority among Muslims acts as the "glue" that holds the Muslim community together. It was through the *alim* that spiritual knowledge and religious education, are transmitted and mediated, especially at a time when all other source of authority collapsed in Muslim society (Naeeem 2009: 244).

Mawlana Thanvi emphasised the role of Sufism and Sufi *Shaykh* for curbing the second cause of Muslim decline, weakness of will and lack of determination in the fulfilment of religious obligations and the pursuit of the spiritual perfection. According to him-

Experience has proven that the following means are especially efficacious for the strengthening of one's spiritual will (himmat). The first of these ways is the spiritual company (suhbat) of perfect spiritual masters (shuyukh-e-kamilin), whose characteristics are the following : He possesses necessary knowledge of the religion; he firmly follows the dictates of the Sharia in beliefs, practices, and morals;he has no desire for the world; he makes no claims to complete perfection, for these too reveal attachment to the world; he has stayed for a while in the spiritual company of another Shaykh-e-kamil; the honourable ulama and Sufi

*Shaykhs of his day have a good opinion of him; compared to the ordinary people (awamm), the elite (khawwass), meaning intelligent and virtuous people, are more inclined to his company ; the condition of the majority of his disciples in relation to obedience to the Sharia and diminishing of worldly desire, is good; he is alert to the condition(hal)of his disciples and disciplines them and not leave to their own fancies; after sitting in his company for a few times, one's love of the world is diminished and love of God- the Real-(Haqq Ta'ala)is increased. He engages in the invocation and remembrance of God (dhikr) and meditation and contemplation (shaghl), for it is through them alone that there is blessing (barakat) in spiritual instruction. Spiritual unveilings (kashf), miracles (karamat), the acceptance of prayers (istijabat-e-du'a), and paranormal acts (tasarrufat) are not requirements to be a Shaykh. The spiritual companionship of such a Shaykh-e-kamil is exceptionally efficacious. (*Naeeem 2009:444)

From the above it is clear that Mawlana Thanvi emphasized the role of the Sufi shaykh in the life of his disciples and the people to bring reform in the society. This is the main point of difference between Mawlana Thanvi and Mawlana Ahmad Raza, while Mawlana Thanvi emphasised the role of teaching shaykh and opposed many forms of mediational Sufism and Mawlana Ahmad Raza on the other hand emphasised on the role mediating shaykhs. Mawalana Raza's whole teaching in fact revolves around the centrality of mediation as the Prophet mediates with God, the Shaykh and Sufis with Prophet (Naeem 2009:446). Thus his movement of revivalism was based on the concept of mediation and it sought to enable the cultivation of devotional attitude through love of the Prophet and the saints combined with strict adherence to the *Sharia* and sunna of the Prophet.

The revivalist movements articulated their revivalist programs as a revival of the prophet's sunna, through the means of the people. They wanted invert reform in the people to change the society and preserve the Muslims from the onslaught of modernity. The Sufi revivalist movement were directed towards the British rule and not the local governments unlike the Islamists movements. These two movements maintained an ambivalent relation with the modern state of India and Pakistan not due to quieteism but due to their inward reform of the self to change the outward society. However, this was the general trend in South Asia which was different from other Sufi revivalist movement in other parts of the world. In other areas the Sufis played an active role in the state functioning and started revivalist movements to overthrow the regime. The best examples of this was the revivalist movement of the Sufis in North Caucasus who were successful in overthrowing the Soviet rule and

establish a Sufi supported government there. Yemelianova in her paper highlighted the role of Sufis in the Islamic Liberation (*gazawat)* in North Caucasus and after that the Islamic revivalist movements as part of the process of political and intellectual liberalization of the society (Yemelianova 2001:661-664). The main feature of the Sufi revivalist movement in North Caucasus was *muridism* a specific politicized and militarized version of *tariqatism,* in which the Sufi leader of any order played an important role in organising his followers against the Russian rule. The dominant Sufi orders who participated in *muridism* were Naqshbandiya and Qadiriyya order especially the wird of Kunta Khadzhi. Another significant feature of this revivalist movement was that they worked with the Islamic traditionalist, Islamists, who represent pure Salafi Islam (Yemelianova 2001:670). Their ultimate aim was economic and political liberalization and creation of an Islamic state in North Caucasus. Thus we can say that Sufism played different role in different places depending upon the society whether it is tribal or peasentized or modern nation state. Moreover, Sufism is more popular in tribal societies in which it mixes well with the local culture or tribal norms with main focus on the people. While as the Islamists revivalist were a challenge to the nation state and wanted reform in the political system to bring change in the state itself. The Islamists mainly belonged to urban space and were the product of modernity like doctors, engineers, professors from the universities, colleges and other modern education systems. They used Islam not only as a religion but also as an ideological tool to counter the challenge posed by the western culture to Muslim society.

2.3 IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS of ISLAMIC REVIVALISM/ REVORMISM

2.3.1 Islamic Revivalism/ Reformism in South Asia

Traditionally, Islam has provided two channels of responses to new problems and challenges, while interpreting the *Sharia* and those two channels were *Tajdid* (revival) and *Islah* (reforms). Revivalism denotes a type of Islamic movement that emerged in the pre-modern period in response to internal development within the community. The concept is derived from the Prophetic utterance that in every century God will send to the community an individual to renew its religion. The significance of revivalism is that it is an affirmation to the fundamental principles of Islam in accordance with the Quran, Sunna and the four schools of law, the cornerstone of Sunni Islam. The idea of regeneration is contained in the term

itself: *tajdid,* renewal. The person who renews Islam in this sense is a *mujaddid.* John Esposito (2007:265) notes:

"Pre-modern revivalism was primarily a response from within Islam to the internal socio-moral decline of the community.....In contrast to later Islamic modernism, pre-modern revivalism simply sought to restore and implement an existing ideals, not to reformulate or reconstruct new Islamic responses to modern changes".

In contrast to the *tajdid*, the revival, *islah* means reform. The term appears frequently in the Quran and refers to striving for the moral perfection of the individuals. In its early application, *islah* represented a total allegiance to Prophetic tradition and a rejection of Sufism as innovation (Lizzio 2006:39). In modern period, *islah* refers to urban based reform movement of the 19-20th century that arose in reaction to European expansions. Among the most famous proponents of the ideology of renewal are Mohammad-al-Ghazali, Ahmad-ibn-Taymiyah and Ahmad Sirhindi. During the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, Al-Ghazali reconciled mysticism with mainline Islam. Two centuries later, *Ibn-Taymiyah* dealt with the challenges of idolatry and social upheaval brought by the Mongolian invasion. During the sixteenth century the Mughal king Akbar propounded a new faith a fusion of Hinduism and Islam called Din-Illahi, in order to meet the aspiration of the pluralistic society of the Indian subcontinent. However, Ahmad Sirhindi opposed Din-Illahi and sought to defend the boundaries between Hinduism and Islam. He wanted to get back to Islam purified of all Hindu influence, while ensuring, that its spiritual dimension remained untouched by the legalistic formalism, as propounded by the ulamas. He therefore advocated that Sufism should free itself from its tendency towards monism (Roy 1985:55). In the same way Shah Waliullah (1703-62) was also an *alim* and a Sufi and carried on the work of Sirhindi but with a stronger streak of mysticism. In particular Shah Waliullah focused on *ijtihad (*independent reasoning) and he began to preach Islam in political and social terms, advocating greater social justice.

There could be many reasons for rise of Islamic revival moments, but the main reason was the growing influence of westernisation on Muslim societies. The revivalist movements were basically was defensive social and political movement to protect the society from outside influence. Islamic moment is not a monolithic movement and is totally different from fundamentalist movements. According to Roy "the Muslim revivalist movements were basically an effort by the Muslims to regain their past glory and preserve their culture as other great powers like the Japanese, the Chinese and the Europeans have all regained their world

influence" (Roy 1985:56). The British divide and rule policy played important role in the emergence of revivalist movements in South Asia during colonial period. The Deobandi and Barelvi movements were direct response of Sufi/ulamas to the growing interference of the British in religious matters and promotion of Christianity.

The present anger and revulsion of the Muslims against the Western society is engrained in its long history. Though Islam sprang from the same family of Semitic religion yet right from the inception the Jews and Christian had become the arc enemy of Islam, because Islam proclaimed itself to be the best and the last revealed religion. Subsequently the Muslims forced out the Jews from the valley of Khyber and other areas. Despite the anger and resistance the Jews could not stop the Muslim onslaught. This animosity later on transmitted from one generation to another generation till it reached to the climax in the form of Crusade battles. During the Crusade wars the entire European countries assembled under one banner and were determined to wipe out the new religion from the face of the earth. But despite tremendous bloodshed and loss of lives to both sides no tangible result was achieved except more and more bitterness in the relation of the two communities. Since then many Muslims desired to revive Islam to its golden period.

In the 19th and 20th centuries the Islamic world had to respond to the onslaught of western institutions and culture. In the late 19th century the Islamic reformers such as Jamal-ud-din Afghani and his disciple Mohamad Abdu, who were impressed by the western scientific and social advances, begin a painful appraisal of the declining condition of the Islamic world. In the early 20th century Hassan-al-Bana moved Islamic revival from the realm of individual reforms to a popular movement by introducing the concept of mass organization. Sayeed Qutub, the successor of Al-Bana, developed the ideology further by using the fascist and Marxist organizational principles. The result Islamic revivalist movement was transformed into a political movement. With the emergence of green shirt and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, many such groups were emerged in the entire Islamic world, including the Islamic salvation front in Algeria, Al-Nahdab in Tunisia and Jama'at-i-Islami in the Indian subcontinent.

Disgruntled by the plight of the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, Sir Sayeed Ahmad Khan and Allama Dr. Sir Mohd Iqbal propounded their ideology for the improvement of the condition of the Muslims in the sub continent. However the ideology of Sir Sayeed Ahmad Khan and Mohd Iqbal was quite different. Sir Sayeed Ahmad was of the view that Muslims should come out of the cocoon of their religion and embarrass the modern education

and technology of the west, without compromising the basic Islamic principles. However, Iqbal himself educated in the west had experienced and witnessed the material progress and intellectual heights of the western society, was skeptical about the material progress of the west at the expenses of social decadence and human values. He says in one of his famous poems, "The flash of light of the wisdom of the West could not blink my eyes because I have put the surma of the soil of Medina and Mecca in my eyes". To elaborate it, Iqbal says that "my thought and intelligence is engrained by the precepts of Islam originated from Mecca and Medina. Therefore the intellectual wisdom of the West could not impress me". Iqbal considered Islam as a complete philosophy of life and a better society could be developed on the principle of Islamic precepts. Iqbal also propounded the idea of an Islamic state without the help of the Western democracy. In fact he was also skeptical about the concept of Western democracy. He says, "Democracy is the way of a government, in which heads of men are counted but not weighed". Influenced by his philosophy Mohd Ali Jinnah demanded a separate country to be established on the principles of Islamic tenets and *Sharia* and finally the state of Pakistan came into existence due to the revolutionary thought of Iqbal and Jinnah, the two important proponents of Islamic revival in south Asia.

Similarly the famous scholar and politician Abul Kalam Azad published the news papers *Al-hilal* and *Al-blagh* and through these papers endeavoured to awaken the Muslim community. Another man of steel will created Jama'at-i-Islami in the subcontinent was Mawlana Maududi not only translated the Quran with a new outlook and meaning into Urdu language but vociferously worked for the organization of Jama'at-i-Islami. The concept of ideological system was an alternative that Maududi offers against nationalism. The presentation of Islamic system as an ideological system expands its scope beyond the nation state:

"*Instead of national system it should be an ideological system based on certain fixed principles and stable values...Under such a system a citizenship should not be confined within geographical boundaries of a state but should be common and based on ideological foundations" (*Maududi 2000: 27).

This ideological expression gives Muslims an identity distinct from other forms of identification. Maududi seeks to argue of an identity in a universal perspective and not in terms of nation or classes. He believes that Muslims living in various parts of the world share a single and identifiable religious and cultural personality. They share same ethical standards, values, beliefs, and a common way of life (Ahmad 1967:376).

All these ideologues and revivalist in south Asia endeavoured to bring the Muslim Umma out of the precincts of shrines and mosques into the open field of politics so that a vibrant society could be formed upon the principal of Islamic *Sharia* with the hope to usher a society based on brotherhood, compassion and social justice as envisaged in the Koran. Consequent to these efforts, many youths journeyed to Iraq and Iran to receive religious teachings in the Houzias (institutions) opened by leading Islamic jurists and clergies. Some of them were famous Mujtahids (revivalist in Shia's). However these schools (houzia) belong to the Shi'a sect, while the Sunni seekers of religious teachings approached to the Deoband School in India where great scholars imparted religious teachings to these students. The entire student Shi'a or Sunni after receiving the religious education returned to their respective areas and regions and thereby spreading Islamic revival in far off places.

Though the Muslim society in most cases did not gain much material progress yet they realized that their religion cannot remain isolated with the political system and to achieve the goal there must be a government based on Islamic principles. They realized that religion plays an important and practical role in politics by offering a transcendental order; an order in which the ruler can be held accountable. The oppressed or deprived can defend their right by approaching and appealing to the religion, for a decree according to the divine will conveyed through the Koran and Sunna. Similarly when the ruling regime persists in corruption and repression then Islam offers a vocabulary of resistance. Based on this Ideology Immam Khomeini successfully accomplished the revolution in Iran and for the first time established an Islamic state in Iran in the 1970s (Moaddel and Talattof 2002:259-60).

During the last quarter of the 20th century, internal conflicts in the west and the assimilation and diffusion of western technology wit in the Islamic world have redressed the balance between the two cultures. Besides, Muslims are gradually rediscovering the inherent worth of their own culture. Probably the most dramatic example is the awakening still under way in the multifaceted revival that is called the Islamic fundamentalism by the Westerners. This revival combines a rediscovery of the vitality of the Islamic experience with a determination not to submit any longer to the cultural humiliation of judging oneself by the western standards

Despite vast disparities in the attitude, Islamic revivalist hold in common a set of ideological beliefs. They view Islam as total way of life, for personal conduct and for the conduct of state and society. Westernisation is regarded as the primary cause of the political, economic and social ills of the Muslim societies. Finally followers of Islamic revival

movement believe that the introduction of the *Sharia* will produce a moral, just and just society (Choueiri 1990:171-176). The issues that motivate the Islamic revivalism are similar to those which provide impetus to revivalism in other religions, like everywhere there is latent dissatisfaction with materialistic, consumer-oriented society offers, and with failures of national governments to offer their people an effective political, social and economic institution. Thus the inadequacies of economic globalization and dominant western conception of progress are increasingly recognized by the advocates of inter religious solidarity and cooperation. These types of solidarity and co-operation are termed by some policy makers and media persons as fundamentalism. The term fundamentalism derived from the western experience, has been applied to entire spectra of cultural, political and religious activity. However, it is also a fact that the religious fundamentalism manifest under conditions of social, economic and political marginalization. In case of Muslim fundamentalism, it can be defined as a kind of pathology of culture that arises under presence of insecurity as in all conflict situations, people under stress react by reducing their own beliefs to a small workable subset in order to fight and protect themselves. Islamic fundamentalism is an extreme reaction to a tangible external threat, and must be differentiated from Islamic revivalism a movement to renew the community from within. Under conditions of cultural, economic, and political marginalization, large number of Muslim population are returning to deeply embedded religious discourse as they search for authentic values and alternative means of responding to their problems (Roy 1994:4-6). They feel that western ideology have not worked and thus Muslims are struggling to move beyond the notion that they must either reflect or reject the west. They are not satisfied merely with a choice between Ataturk and Khomeini.

Islamic revival spans the political and ideological spectrum, influenced by local socio-political condition as per religious faith. Islamic revivalist are seeking to restore an old civilization, not to create a new Empire. In this revival movement both ulamas and Sufis are playing an active role. Like the movements in North Caucasus, Afghanistan, Syria and in many other places, the Sufis pirs are leading the movements. But the influence of traditional leaders of these movements (Sufis and ulamas) were replaced in many areas by the Islamists who not only wanted to reform religion but also wanted to revive the true Islamic State of the Prophetic period. Thus the feeling of deprivation in Muslims of third world countries especially in South Asia due to colonial legacy breaded many revivalist movements in the region like the Jamiat-i-Islami, Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl -al hadith or Salafist movement had

direct impact on Afghanistan. This we will deal in next section, as how the revivalist movements in South Asia influenced the social and political conditions of the Afghan state.

2.3.2 Its Impact on Afghanistan

Afghanistan sandwiched between the two great powers, the Indian subcontinent on one side and the Persian Empire on the other, has been influenced by the culture and tradition of these two since ancient times to the present. The wave of religious revivalism in India swept Afghanistan from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Until 1947 India was the main educational centre for Afghan ulamas, and it also provided them with the opportunity of coming face to face with other religions (Roy1985:54). Religious reform movement in India had some aspects in common with Islam in Afghanistan. Roy identifies these similarities as first the fundamentalism, the desire to return to the *Sharia* and to the original scriptures. Secondly, there was Sufism, the predominant figures of which were Naqshbandi. Finally, political issues played a more important part, a prelude to the Islamist movement.

Despite disagreement among the modern writers, from Mujaddid Alf-e-Thani Shaikh Ahmad Sirhind to Maududi a common strand of thought had great influence on the ideas of the ulamas and religious intellectuals in Afghanistan. The revivalist movement started by Shaikh Sirhind in India reached Afghanistan through the Mujaddidi family (one branch of the family settled in Afghanistan) promoted his teachings there like promotion of spiritual dimension of Islam and opposition to the legalistic formalism of the ulamas (Roy1985:59). He was himself a Sufi and an *alim* and followed *Sharia* in the strict sense. This merging of a fierce orthodoxy with a Sufic spirituality runs through Indo -Afghan revivalism and due to this feature it is clearly distinct with the Wahhabi movement in Arabia which is fundamentally hostile to Sufism.

Another important impact of the sub-continent was the Deoband school of thought. Most of the Afghan ulamas studied at Deoband before 1947 and due to their exposure to different religion like Hinduism and British rule in India they played an important role in the politics of the country. This is proved by the fact that the head of royal madrasa at Kabul, Abdurrazzaq, a former student of Deoband, tried to mount anti -British operations on the frontiers and also led a campaign, the aim of which was to arouse the Pashtun tribes along the frontier against the British. They played crucial role in the development of Islam in Afghanistan and the only opposition to this tradition has been provided by the secular parties and by the Islamists (Roy 1985:57). The Deobandi and Wahabi inspirations, in particular,

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contributed to a radicalisation among Afghan traditionalist and fundamentalist groups in 1980s, forging strong ties to madrasas and political parties in Pakistan and to groups in Saudi Arabia.

The Islamists movement began in Afghanistan in the 1958 in the faculty of Theology at Kabul University. Its teachers had studied at Al- Azhar in Cairo, where they came in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood (*al- ikhwan al- Muslimin*) (Lizzio 2006:44). Islamist represented an entirely new generation of religious leaders in Afghanistan. Whereas traditional Afghan ulama were educated in private Deoband and Barelvi madrasas of the sub-continent, the Islamists were products of state madrasas. They also owed more to the intellectual ferment of Egypt than to the revival or reform movements of the sub-continent. Their western orientation is reflected in the term they used to describe themselves: not alim but roshanfikr or a new kind of intellectual, as Roy notes. The Sufis also participated in Islamist movement like Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, the current head of the Naqshbandis order.

The emergence of revivalist and reformist movements in the Indian- sub-continent had influenced the religious leaders in Afghanistan. This influence on traditionalist and modern educated groups after 1950s gradually changed the nature of relation between the state and religious leaders. The earlier relation of patron client between the state and religious group had now changed into equal contenders for power with the emergence of three new religious groups of fundamentalist, Islamist, neo-fundamentalist after Soviet invasion. Thus we conclude from above analysis that the role of Sufism in political Islam was overshadowed by other reformist movements. The reason could be the spread of modern education and neglect of madrasa all over the Muslim world. Secondly, the decline of Sufi participation in politics or political Islam is also due to their practice of non-interference in politics once their mission of securing Islam is achieved.

2.4 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.4.1 Sufism and resistance movement in Afghanistan

Sufism played an important role in resistance movements in all the third world countries. The modernization and westernisation by the colonial powers or their supporters were the cause of the Sufi movements. Olivier Roy (1986) in his book *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* says that the Sufis were the first to rise against the external force and modernization of the society in the country from the beginning of 20th century. The authors

also explains that the main reason of this was the orthodox Sufi orders present in Afghanistan, who wanted to maintain the traditional social structure of the society based on Shari at laws. The main two variants of Sufism in Afghanistan according to the author are the orthodox Sufism and marabout Sufism. Of which the Naqshabandi and Qadariya orders are influential among the people of Afghanistan and the two order act differently in different parts of the country. In the same way Galina Yemelianova (2001) in her article *Sufism and Politics in North Caucasus* shows the rise of Islamic revivalism led by Sufis of Naqshabandi and Qadariya orders. This article helps us to understand the political and ethnic dimensions of Sufism. Sufism became an alternative and anti-establishment form of Islam to the clan based societies. It became deeply integrated into the system of traditional community, providing it spiritual substance. The author also highlight that the difficult geographical terrains and tribal social structures plays an important role in the spreading of Sufism. This is also applicable to Afghanistan also as it is also a mountainous region with different ethnic and tribal groups.

In Afghanistan there is a Sufi- ulama amalgamation which led to Islamic revivalism during the resistance period and finally led to the Islamist movement. Kristin Mendoza in her article *I*slam *and Islamism in Afghanistan* deal with various aspect of Islam in Afghanistan and the rise of Islamist movement. The author says that Islam in Afghanistan exists in many forms like the popular Islam, tribal Islam, Sufism and reformist fundamentalism. The author says that to understand Islam in Islamism in Afghanistan one has to look into the relation between these in the wider aspect of the political situation of the country. According to her the two reform movement that emerged in the Indian subcontinent (Deobandi) and Saudi Arabia (Wahhabism) had influenced Afghanistan. The two movements differed to each other in their view towards Sufism. When this view is applied to Afghanistan we find that the Gourmandism which was started by the followers of Shah Waliullah at Deoband was accepted by the orthodox Sufis like the Naqshabandi and Qadari orders in Afghanistan. And the Deobandi ulamas also accepted the orthodox Sufism but were against the marabout Sufism in Afghanistan. But as the Wahhabis were totally against Sufism so their influence during the Islamist period of Afghan resistance was absent due to strong Sufi control of the movement. Another example of this Sufi-ulama amalgamation was presented by Fuad S.Naeem (2009) in his article *Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia* in which he highlight the views of Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of Deoband and Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly. Both of them were Sufi- ulama and played an active role in the Islamic revivalism in south Asia. The author views that the Sufis use of Sufism as a means of internalization and self rectification

that would eventually lead to exteriorization helps in the rectification of the Muslim society. Due to this process, Sufis were the first to rise against the interference into the religion whether by the state or by foreign powers. This is what happened in Afghanistan during the Amanullah period 1929 during which the Sufis first raised revolt against the Amir's modernization policies. Same thing happened during the 1979-80 Soviet invasions, in which the Sufi- ulama joined hand to fight the enemy. As most of the ulamas in Afghanistan are the product of Deoband School before partition of India-Pakistan they followed the Sufi-ulama amalgamation in the tribal areas. The same thing is highlighted by scholar like Bo Utas and Oliver Roy in their edited book. BoUtas says that the relation between the Sufis and ulamas are very friendly in Afghanistan which is a unique feature of Sufism in Afghanistan as it is absent in most Muslim countries. The author also says that the Sufis due to their less covert form of organisation can work under political pressure. This is proved during Daud's period and latter during the communist regime. In the same way Olivier Roy also showed that the Sufi and ulama in Afghanistan can be one and same person and the Mujaddidi Sufis are the best example of this.

The state response to Sufism varies from one Muslim state to another and also from time to time. This was proved by Katherine Ewing (1983) in her article *The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan.* In this article the author describe the political situation in Pakistan after independence and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. Katherine says that to control the ulamas and fundamentalist the Pakistan government promoted the Sufi orders and Sufi festivals among the people. This was done by the government by promoting religious pilgrimage as tourism and granting grants to Sufi khanqahs. The main reason of the change in government attitude was to stop religious interference in politics of the state and run the country on secular basis. Pakistani government realized that government can't be run on religious basis so they avoided direct confrontation with religion by using Sufism as a shield. The same thing was also done in Afghanistan during the Musahiban period when the state did change the constitutional reforms of Amanullah's period under the pressure from the Sufis and ulamas (Roy1986).

The resistance movement in Afghanistan reflects not only political crises but also ideological crisis in Afghan society. The two ideologies which are present in Afghanistan are the communist and Islamists ideologies. The book by Oliver Roy (1994) *The Failure of Political Islam is an important* source to understand the rise, growth and decline of Islamism or Islamist ideology in Muslim countries. This book highlights that the Islamist rises from

urban areas and are product of modern education system. The masses that follow the Islamists are not traditional or traditionalist as they live with values of the modern city- consumerism and upward social mobility Roy says. This was the reason for rise of Islamists in the urban centres of Kabul mainly among the educated group who are exposed to revivalist movements in other parts of the world like Egypt and Indian Sub-continent. This book also deals with jihad and traditional Afghan society during the resistance movement. Roy says that the politicization of traditional society in Afghanistan both by war and by Islamism has produced only one form of relatively modern politico- military organisation; the Masud system. The rise of Islamist had direct impact on the decline of traditional religious groups like the Sufis and ulamas. The radical Islamists were strictly against Sufism in any form while as the moderate Islamists are ready to cooperate with orthodox Sufis like Naqshabandis or Mujaddiids in Afghanistan.

The reformist and revivalist movements which swept the Muslim World from the 1940s-1950s with the rise of Islamists challenged the undisputed authority of the Sufi pirs and their collaboration with monarchy or state. Scholars like Kenneth Lizzio (2006) *The Naqshbandi/ Saifiyya Battle for Islamic Tradition* and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001) *The New global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad* mainly focus on the reformist and revivalist movements like Salafis and Mujadddidya in Indian sub-continent and Afghanistan. These articles help us to understand the Sufi tradition in Afghanistan and their relation with the state during different periods. Quintan mainly focus on the rise of terrorists organisation like *al-Qaeda* and their ideological background and the role of USA in Muslim countries which led to rise of Salafi movements there. The author talks about the relation between the jahadi Salafis and Afghan resistance who are directly responsible for the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan.

2.4.2 Relation between state, religion and tribal structures during 20th century

The Afghan state is composed of three important components which are tribalism, Islam and ruling elite which together can defeat any super power. This is shown during the Anglo- Afghan wars and also during the Russian invasion. Nabi Misdaq (2006) in his book *Afghanistan Political Frailty and External Interference* deals with the history of state formation in Afghanistan from the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali to the present time. He says that the three main themes of the Afghan history are the fragility of the state, attempts of modernization, and its vulnerability to external forces. The fragility of the state is due to the delicate balance between tribal leaders, ulamas and the state which is disturbed whenever the

state tries to control the tribal leader and religious heads. Second the state under the influence of external forces tried to modernize the society which ultimately led to the destabilization of state apparatus (Misdaq 2006). Amin Saikal (2004) in his book *Modern Afghanistan* says that the polygamous rivalries within the successive royal families proved impediment in developing solid domestic structures of state hood and stability. This interacted with external forces led to the further destruction of the weak foundation of the state. Due to the failure of the rulers to incorporate moderate Islam into a culturally relevant ideology of state building and modernization, the tension increased between the radical modernization and traditional conservatism in the 1920's, communism and Islamism and moderate Islamism to regressive Islamic medievalism during different time period (Saikal 2004). This shows that to define Afghan state on modern lines is very difficult and one has to have a deep understanding of the social structures of the society. Thomas Barfield (2010) in his book *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* says that only Amir Abdul Rahman achieved complete centralization and curbed the powers of tribal and religious heads. He highlights that how the amir used religion to weaken the tribal leaders by applying Shari at laws in the tribal areas. The author says that due to the excessive centralization by Amir Abdur Rahman their created social problems which resurfaced during the reign of successive ruler. The rise of two groups during the reign of Habibullah one headed by his brother Nasirullah representing the religious group who wanted to apply the *Shariat* laws. Second by Ammanullah his son and Tarzi representing the modernist group who wanted to modernize the country to fight the western powers by using their own method. This shows that religion in Afghan politics plays an important role from the beginning to the present time. The author says that due to centralization and modernization the traditional social structures of the society is disturbed and new social classes emerged which have little contact with the rural or village culture. Due to this they are not accepted in the rural areas and their ideas as alien. The example of it is the Islamists and communists during the resistance movement, which led to their failure. Another article by Shahmahmood Miakhel *Understanding Afghanistan: The Importance of Tribal Culture and structure in Security and Governance* highlights that only a balance between the tribal, religious and government structures can save Afghanistan from further destruction. The main theme of this article is the working of tribal code of conduct and the role of jirgas and religious leaders in governing the state. The author says that despite the breakdown of state institution the working of rural areas remained as it is due to the presence of counter institution based on Pakhtunwali the tribal code of conduct. The tribal and district structures, the qawm, have played a strong role in keeping the security and ensuring governance. The

tribal structures of locally established shuras (councils) and jirgas have been the only source of social justice. Due to this system the Afghan state still continued to exist despite the complete failure of state structure in the country for last thirty years.

The conflict between the state and religious leaders in Afghanistan changed from time to time. The earlier effort of religious leaders was to maintain its independence from direct state control which was later changed to direct participation of the religious heads in politics and ruling the country by themselves. This ideological shift within the religious group led to the rise of Islamists. The 20th century struggle between the state and religion in Afghanistan was highlighted by Olesen (1995) in her book *Islam and politics in Afghanistan*. The main feature of this book is that it deals with all the aspects of the state and religion, which changed the course of Afghan history in 20th century. Secondly, it looks into the constitutional provisions of all the constitutions from 1923 to 1987 and the role of religion in it. Olesen is of the opinion that Sufis were the first to revolt against the modernisation and reforms and it was further carried out by the alliance of the tribal heads with traditional religious heads like ulama and mullahs. The book also deals with the various reforms introduced by the state and its impact on the society and economy. The author says that the political polarization of Afghan society in the 1960s was due to result of half hearted reforms introduced by Zahir Shah and his Prime minister Daud which to the rise of leftist and Islamists. These two groups played very important role in the stability and breaking of civil war in Afghanistan during the rule of PDPA. Another book which deals with the transition in Afghan politics and society during the 20th century especially after the 1960s is the book by Raja Anwar (1988) *The Tragedy of Afghanistan.* This book is a firsthand experience the author had during his visit to Afghanistan on the eve of Soviet Invasion. The author visited different parts of the country and meet with various leaders of the resistance movement and also leaders of the ruling PDPA. It highlights the impact of constitutional reforms introduced by Zahir Shah in 1964, which changed Afghanistan into a secular state. The rise of leftist ideologies and the formation of the PDPA party were the direct result of the reforms by the king who believed in multi-party system. This book focused more on the left parties of Khalaq and Parcham than on the Islamists. One important aspect of this book is that it deals with the Afghan society on the eve of invasion and the impact of civil war on it. The author is of the opinion that the resistance movement and civil war led to the re-emergence of tribal and ethnic conflicts in Afghan politics. He also showed that the participation of foreign powers in the conflict aggravated the situation as it divided the various parties on ethnic and religious lines. Like the

Hizbi-i-Islami and Jamayat -i Islami on the basis of Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups, on the other hand it further increased the divide between the Sunnis and Shia due to participation of Saudi and Iran. The role played by Pakistan and USA is also highlighted in the book.

The fluid political condition of the country after the Soviet invasion was not only due to internal disturbance by the tribal and religious groups but also due to the interference of international powers in the conflict. Afghan conflict soon became a proxy war for scoring the differences between various other countries like USA, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi, China, Russia. Authors like Galles Dorronsoro (2000), *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present,* and Barnett Rubin (2002), *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* mainly deals with the state formation with the help of foreign powers and causes of it failure in Afghanistan. It highlights the role of educated middle class whose existence is depended upon the state itself and how different ideologies shaped their course of action in the long run.

In the same way books like *An Introduction to Islamic Law* by Wael Hallaq and *An Introduction to Islam* by David Waines helps us to understand Islamic Laws and Institutions. These books gives the idea how politics and religion are non-separable in Islam as both spiritual and temporal authority are held by the Khalifat period and how with the rise of dynastic rule the the problem of legitimacy occurred. To solve this problem the institutions of madrasas and khanqhas were brought under direct control of the state. This helps us to understand why Amit Abdul Brahman tried to bring madras as under state control so as to get legitimacy to his centralised rule in tribal society.

2.5 SUMMARY

The rise of reformist and revivalist movements in Muslim world during the 18-19th century in all over the Muslim world as a response to colonialism and westernisation could not reach Afghanistan, as it was not under direct control of any colonial powers. Secondly, the tribal nature of the society also prevented the spreading of reformist movements during nineteen to mid-twentieth century. The Afghans consider themselves as true Muslims and that they don't need any reform movement to purify themselves. People blindly followed the Sufis who acted as mediator not only between God but also between the state and people also. The revivalist movements in the country were initiated by the Sufis against the ruler from time to time when the ruler was influenced by foreign powers or western ideas.

The rise of reformist movement in the Afghanistan was a direct consequence of nation building project started by Amirs after 1880s, as they emphasised on modern education in Afghanistan which created educated middle class who are receptive to the influences from other parts of the world. As the Islamists were the product of schools and colleges in Afghanistan also like other Muslim countries. The only difference between the Islamists in Afghanistan and other countries was their response to changes as there was no colonial rule in the country at any point of time unlike other countries like Egypt and Pakistan. The Wahhabi influence in Afghanistan felt only after the Soviet invasion and direct participation of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in Afghan conflict through Afghan resistance parties.

Chapter 3

ROLE OF SUFISM IN INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

3.1   INTRODUCTION

3.2   SOCIO-POLITICAL MILIEU FROM 1901-1964

3.3   RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON STATE INSTITUTIONS

3.4   EVOLUTION OF THE CONSITUTIONAL IDENTITY OF THE STATE

3.5   SUMMARY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The role of religious groups in institutional development of the state in Afghanistan can be better understood by looking at the developments after the death of the great Afghan King Amir Abdur Rahman at the beginning of 20th century. The rise of new ideologies during the beginning of 20th century and new pressure groups in the society also played its role in institutional development of the state. Amir Abdur Rahman tried to break away from the traditional pyramidal authority pattern to the hierarchical political relationship to change Afghanistan into a modern nation-state (Gopalakirishnan1980:53). He institutionalised the bureaucracy and army and declared the monarchy to be hereditary. The Amir understood that to build a nation-state it is necessary to weaken the traditional pressure groups and create new groups which are loyal to the state and appoint them in provinces to keep tribes under state control. This hierarchical transformation had long term consequences on the politics and society of Afghanistan. Amir Abdur Rahman himself was able to control the tribes and religious groups but his successors were not able to continue his policy due to the rise of new groups both traditional and modernist in the court. The interference of the foreign powers especially British influences also played an important role in Afghan politics. Saikal (2004:7) was right that the political stability of the country depends upon the polygamous alliances among different tribal elites, religious groups and the interferences of the external powers. This was one of the reasons that Amanullah (1919-1929) introduced political, military and religious reforms to broaden the basis of loyalty from royal family to nation. But, Amanullah had neither the required trained personnel to balance the impact of the political modernisation upon administrative structure nor had the adequate support and power base to enforce and implement the reforms (Olesen1995:120). This led to factional confrontation among the various groups within the court which not only exploited the inert weaknesses of the central government but also encouraged traditional social forces to resist the modernising influences of the innovative policies of the central government (Gopalakrishnan 1980:55).

In the provinces the tribes always tried to remain independent and only accepted nominal authority of the central government. However, this was not acceptable to the new Amirs as they wanted to build a nation state. In this conflict between the state and tribal heads, religion played important role. The best example of this was the tribal uprisings against the government during Habibluuah's period in which religious leaders supported the state, like the Mangal and Ahmadzai in 1912, in which Lal pir and Mullah *Mohammad Sayyid Akhundzada* of Musai, Logar helped the government to suppress the uprisings (Olesen

1995:102). But the same religious group revolted against the constitutional reforms introduced by Amanullah in 1923. This forces one to think what exactly had happened between 1912- 1923 that the religious groups swing towards the tribal heads and stood against the state. The reason according to Roy (1986:16) was not the reforms but the conflict of interest between the state and religious groups. The state wanted more control over the religious groups and bring them as subordinate to the state to create a strong nation state based on secular ideals. This was not acceptable to the religious groups who wanted complete monopoly over certain spheres like education, judiciary, and wafq.

In a tradition oriented society like Afghanistan, the religious leaders held a position which was both political and sacred. It was through their mediation that the predominantly tribal society settled its disputes with one another. The introduction of new reforms in the judiciary challenged the authority of religious heads in the society as a mediator (Roy 1986:26). This was another reason that constitutional government of Amanullah was perceived as a threat to autonomy by the religious groups. This perception of threat led to the alliance between tribe and religion in 1929 and executed a general tribal uprising to oust Amanullah. From the experiences of Amanullah the future Amirs of Afghanistan understood how important role religion plays in traditional society and the state cannot directly control them due to their mass followings. The Amirs from 1929 onwards tried to reconcile with religious groups and assigned important roles to religious leaders in state functioning especially in Judiciary and education system.

The state has been the driving force behind modernisation, provided new ideas and introduced new institutions both in religion and government. The introduction of *Shariat* laws was merely due the practical approach of the Amirs to enforce state laws and counter attack tribalism. The best example of this was the reforms introduced by Amir Abdur Rahman as it was not based on any reformist ideology but was purely pragmatic. The Amir's idea was to rationalise the institutions of the state and make them more efficient without thereby affecting traditional society. The Amir Abdur Rahman in order to curtail the influence of tribalism, for first time focused attention upon the legal function of Islam. He attempted to integrate the clergy with the secular institutions of state by controlling the madrasa, the waqf and wages of ulamas and mullahs, even going so far as to intervene in the theological domain (Roy 1986:16). This brings the state and religion in direct contact with each other and led to institutional development in Afghanistan like education system and judiciary which were under the direct control of the religious groups.

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This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the socio-political milieu during 1901-1973 which led to formation of three constitutions. The second part is about how the issue of religion and state formation is dealt with in the constitutions especially 1933 and 1964. The main focus would be on the role played by the leading Sufi in state institution and its development. The third part deals with the evolution of constitutional identity of the state which can be understood from the developments in legal and education system.

3.2 SOCIO-POLITICAL MILIEU FROM 1901-1964

The Afghan society was basically a traditional society in which the role of every member is predefined according to the norms and customs of the tribes. Their concept of state and nationalism is not same as that of the western concept of the two. For them state means only a defending agent during external threat and does not interfere in their daily lives. The concept of tribal loyalty is dearer to them than nationalism. It was only during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman that the traditional pyramidal authority pattern was changed to hierarchical political relationship. This gave birth to strong centralised central authority which had control over every aspect of society and emergence of modern nation-state in Afghanistan. The stability of the central authority depended upon the support of various pressure groups present in Afghan society. This changed the socio-politico milieu of the Afghanistan and introduced some new elements in the society which changed the direction of the state from monarchy to constitutional monarchy and finally to democratic state. In the changed scenario the role of religion also changed and played more active part in the politics of the country.

Amir Habibullah (1901-1919) basically followed the policies of his father but he allowed local chiefs detained in Kabul to return to their homes and tried to improve relation with local leader. He also proclaimed an amnesty and invited Afghan families to come back who are exiled by his father. The two important families who came back and played important role in politics are the Musahiban family and the Tarzi family. In 1903 he laid the foundation for the modern educational system in Afghanistan by opening Habibiyah School, followed by number of other schools. Because of the relatively peaceful situation within the country, urban conditions began to improve and urban population grew but the modernisation program was restricted to Kabul (Shahrani 1987:41). After signing the Anglo-Afghan treaty

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of 1905 and his official visit to British India, Amir left much of the administrative tasks to his brother and elder son and he indulged in leisure activities like hunting and sports. Large sums of money were spent by the court and members of royal family and to cover the costs a variety of new taxes were introduced and collected. Tax collection had become major task of the government and source of misery for the common people as corruption, bribery and frauds increased. The chronic and systematic abuse and exploitation of the rural and peripheral population at the hands of government officials was the direct consequence of the centralization of power (Dupree 1986:482). The challenge to the power of Habibullah did not come from the rural or tribal areas but from the small urban intelligentsia, which included members of his own family and courtiers. This opposition to Habibullah was not a simple dynastic struggle, instead it was guided by particular ideological inclinations aimed to alter or modify the existing power structure. These ideals were closely linked with the ideologies prevalent in other countries like the constitutionalism prevalent in Iran under Reza Shah, nationalism in Turkey, reformism and Pan-Islamism in Egypt. These ideological currents in the Kabul court were divided into two groups some supporting the Amir and other strongly opposing his policies. Among the strong opponents of the regime was a group called Jami'at -i- Siraiyi Milli (Secret Society of the nationalists) which called for a democratic and constitutional government. A number of mawlawis and mullahs were active members of the movement. Another group, which attracted many nationalists, reformists and Islamic modernist elements from among the Kabul intelligentsia, was headed by Mahmud Beg Tarzi and his associates, the Young Afghans (Shahrani 1987:44). The political neutrality of Amir Habibullah against the British during the war sharpened the political tension within the court and divided the court into two groups as:

- A pro-British group (or those who wanted to maintain neutrality in war) consists of Abdul Quddus (chief minister), Bibi Halima (widow of Amir Abdurrahman) and many merchants trading with India.

- The so-called 'War Party' consisting of firstly 'traditionalist' led by Sardar Nasrullah (brother of Amir), Qazi al Quzat Haji Abdur Razzaq and supported by most of the religious and tribal leaders, and secondly 'modernist' led by Mahmud Tarzi and Sardar Amanullah (son of Amir) and Nadir Khan (Olesen 1995:100-101).

The Amirs pro-British policy during the war resulted in the formation of a coalition of traditionalists, court liberals, Islamic modernist forces due to the appeal of the Pan-Islamic

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sentiments they shared. This opposition finally led to the assassination of the Amir in 1919 and it led to the power contest between the traditionalist and modernist. The traditionalist supported Nasrullah Khan who was orthodox and more close to the religious group. The modernist-nationalist group supported Amanullah Khan, who was influenced by the Pan-Islamic ideology and believer in greater participation of the people in state functioning. Finally Amanullah succeed to the throne with the help of the army and declared himself King and not Amir of Afghanistan (Shahrani 1987:45). The rise of Amanullah to power signifies the change in Afghan society and politics as the modernist-nationalist were the new urban middle class who overpowered the traditional groups. The middle class was loyal to the state as it was the result of reforms introduced by the Amirs to create a modern nation-state.

In his first address to the people Amanullah expressed his gratitude to the "honourable nation of Afghanistan" for putting the "crown of the Kingdom" on his head. He promised total independence for the country, and proclaimed that internally all citizens would be granted complete freedom and safety from "all forms of oppression and transgression and will be subject only to the obedience of the law". He also declared that "all forms of forced labour and corvee is forbidden". Amanullah promised that he would rule through consultation (shura), and urged the nation to be alert in guarding their din (faith), *dawlat* (state), and *millat* (nation), and to remain awake to, and aware of, the threats to the security of their *watan* (country) (Dupree 1973:442-443). Amanullah's address to the nation focus on safeguarding the country from both internal and external threats was to promote nationalism among the people over tribal loyalty. The reason was to curb tribal tendencies which hinder the centralisation process in the country. The process of nation building was incomplete without the support of clergy who acts as a link between the state and people. The Amir used jihad to get the support of clergy to fight against the external threat. The external threat at that time was the growing British interest in the politics of the country due to Great Game politics. The participation of religious and tribal leaders in the jihad helped the Amir to achieve his goal of independent Afghanistan after the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. Following the war of independence Amanullah introduced a wide range of administrative, legal, social, economic and political reforms. These programs aimed to achieve further centralization of the state and strengthening of direct rule and radically transform Afghan society. The nature of reforms introduced by king Amanullah Khan reflects the change in outlook of ruling class as both internal and external conditions were changed after the World War First.

But the major constraint to implement the reforms was ideological difference between the King and his Prime Minister Abdul Quddus Khan and some members of the cabinet. They were apprehensive of the King's social, political and religious reforms introduced in the constitution and started propaganda against the King's program among prominent ulama and Sufis in Kabul. This difference within the government led to the weakening of administration in the provinces and increased number of corruption and official tyranny (Shahrani 1987: 48). The Prime Minister was basically representing the traditional groups (tribal and religious heads), who wanted no social changes in society and were against modernisation.

The reforms and modernisation programs were challenged by the religious and tribal heads in various parts of the country. In 1924, the first formal reaction came in the form of a petition from two mullahs from Paktya and Zadran tribes, who were particularly disenchanted with the oppressive rule of the governor and provincial official. This local administrative conflict was thus turned into a jihad against Amanullah's regime and reforms. The conflict lasted almost a year and anti-government agitation spread among the Ghilzai and Khugiani tribes in the eastern frontier areas and in Kohistan. The government responded to these uprisings from the fear of British interference in the country on this issue. The rebels were defeated and government control re-established in these regions with the support of Hazaras and some segment of Paktya population (Olesen 1995: 136).

However, the immediate and long term costs of this rebellion to the government and to the Afghan society were tremendous. Economically, the rebellion cost the government the equivalent of one to two years state revenue. Socially, the incident caused further distrust between the traditionalist ulamas and alienation of prominent Sufi family, the Hazrat of Shor Bazar, whom Amanullah had earlier respected and consulted regularly in public matters (Shahrani 1987:48-50).

The Khost rebellion displayed another significant fact, that Amanullah was initiating wide-ranging reforms without begin able to rely on a strong army as Amir Abdur Rrahman had done as the General Commander Nadir Khan refused to lead army against Khost tribesmen. The government used the tribal differences between the tribes such as Mohmand, Shinwaris, Waziris, Afridis and Hazaras against the rebel tribes of Mangals and Zadrans which showed the weakness of the central authority in provinces. Finally, the Khost rebellion signifies the interference of external powers in the country. It was for the first time that Russia helped Amanullah with military support to suppress the internal uprisings (Olesen1995:138). The Russian support to the Afghan government was due to the change in

foreign policy of the Afghan state as it softened it position on Pan-Islamism and restraining itself from the Central Asian Basmachi movement. After the suppression of the rebellion Amanullah further intensified modernisation programs and introduced the further changes in the constitution to change the social and political conditions on secular basis. This led to struggle between the centre and countryside which ultimately took a religious overtone under the leadership of Habibullah II (Bacha Saqao) a Tajik. He was supported by ulamas and Sufi pir the Hazrat of Shor Bazar and non-Pashtun Turkestan and Herat Province but the Hazaras remained loyal to Amanullah Khan.

With the overthrow of king Amanullah, the struggle for ideological hegemony was over. The king and his small group of basically urban intellectuals and educated bureaucrats had failed in their endeavour. Their new concept of nation and citizens and their modernist interpretation of Islam made little or no impact on the Afghans, living in a society where the socio-economic and political structures, communication and education all maintained the existing parochial identities (Olesen 1995:165). It was, however, not only a matter of the traditional groups of religious and tribal leaders managing to retain their influence and turn back the secularist tide but also showed that the religious leaders by no means constituted a homogeneous blocs, hostile to all reforms policies of King Amanullah. The eastern Afghan pirs remained loyal to the King almost to the end, motivated not by his reform policy but by his pan -Islamic and anti imperialist attitude. Olesen says that the battle was not a simple question of being for or against secularism and this can seen from the stand taken by Hazrat of Shor Bazar, for whom the battle centred around securing the *ulama's* control over the state.

Under Nadir Khan (1929-1933) a modus vivendi was reached between religious leaders and the government which effectively removed Islam as a subject of debate for the next three decades. The more conservative religious elements in the country, as well as Naqshbandi Sheikhs, were pacified that after Amanullah no leader attempted to enact reforms that would have jeopardized the role of Islam in society. The constitutional changes introduced by Nadir Shah adopted many feature of the 1923 constitution. The main difference with the previous one was that he constituted a religious advisory group (*jamiyyat al Ulama),* which was a national council charged with the responsibility to check whether any law or other government regulation was in accordance with Islamic law (Voggelsang 2008: 285). The new king cancelled reforms introduced by Amanullah Khan like the veiling, polygamy, girls education. Nadir Shah fully understood that outward symbols of policy play an important role Afghanistan. The religious and tribal leaders regained much of their former

influence but the constitutional provisions were vague due to which the king and state retained their importance. Despite of his harsh rule, opposition to Nadir Shah was never completely wiped out. He was assassinated on 8 November 1933 while visiting a school in Kabul and his murder was the result of tribal feud between the Charkhis (followers of Amanullah) and Musahiban brothers. This was what Saikal called polygamous rivalry which resurfaced time and again in Afghan history to destabilize the government. But fortunately this time the feud did not spread any further and the brothers and half brothers (Charkhis) formed a united front and acknowledged Nadir's son Zahir Shah as the new king.

The period from 1933 to 1950's the religious groups lent their support to the state and did not cause any trouble to the state. Due to this Olesen called this period as the disappearance of 'activist' mullahs. The main reason for this was that they got back their importance and influence in state affairs and became active participator in government functioning. Like the establishment of *jamaayyat al -Ulama* the council of religious leaders whose main function was to ensure that law and other government orders were in accordance with *Sharia*. Secondly, no religious leader seems to have lent support to tribal disturbances during these three decades.

Another factor which played significant role was the ideological climate in Afghanistan had changed considerably during the three decades. The reasons for this were the economic development and an expanded secular education system producing a growing urban middle class and the changed outlook of the religious class. Olesen says that "the reason for this openness in the society was the Musahiban's policy of gradual modernisation, in which the *jamayyat al Ulama* had been assigned the role as religious guarantor, opened the gates for a religious discourse of more scriptural character". This change in religious discourse may possibly due to the higher level of scriptural learning among new religious personnel as a result of the massive build-up of new government madrasas. It was accompanied by gradual replacement of the *pir*, whose position depended upon the veneration of his followers, by the *alim,* who owed his educational and employment to the government. Despite the fact that the 1931 constitution was formed under the influence of traditional powers groups of the Afghan society, the economic development and expansion of state control led to the emergence of a new urban middle class who ultimately claimed their share in the politics and power through constitutional reforms. This new urban elite group challenged the constitutional base (tribal and Islamic alliance) on the future of Afghan state and society which culminated into the formation of 1964 constitution. The constitution of

1964 was not formed under the influence religious groups but was more due to the dominance of the new educated class or the urban elite led by Prime Minister Daoud. This group was not a homogeneous in the sense that it was not a Pashtun dominated one but equal number of Tajiks and other ethnic groups. They mainly came from the young people educated at Europe or French and German school at Kabul, graduates from the technical and Medical colleges plus a large number of military officers trained in Turkey (Kakar 1978). The spread of modern education and reforms introduced by the government led to another change in the Afghan society was the change in the nature of pressure groups. The earlier vertical kinship and ethnic affiliation was changed into horizontal class division (Gopalakrishnan 1982:58-59). The members of these horizontal groups are:

Cross-Stratification Profile of Afghan Society

Horizontal Groups	Who are the Members	Vertical elements in Horizontal Group
1. Elite	Kings, royal family and top government officials, wealthy merchants, large landowners, tribal chiefs	Pushtuns Sunnis
2. Intelligentsia	Higher ranks of government employees, professional men, teachers, students, literati, religious leaders, army officers	Mostly Pushtuns substantial Tajiks, predominantly Sunni but Shia, e.g., Qizilbash
3.Urban Middle Class	Lower civil servants, shopkeepers, scribes, accountants, artisans, literate, religious leaders etc.	Predominantly Tajik but many Uzbek and Pushtuns. Some Turkmen and even Hazaras.
4. Lower Class	Factory and semi-Skilled workers	Tajiks, Hazaras and Pushtuns

The horizontal group signifies the change in Afghan society but deeper analysis of this group shows the continuation of tribal identities despite education and modernisation of the

ruling elites. This division resulted in the perpetuation of the conflict between the traditionalists and modernists. In a traditional society this confrontation brought major changes in the value system and priorities. The main issues supported by the Young Afghan's who were still active in the educated group especially among the students of French and German schools according to Olesen (1995:202) are as follow-

- rapid westernisation of life and manners

- replacement of old people with young people in position of authority

- discarding of socio-religious forms and observance plus the destruction of the influence of religious leaders

- spread of nationalism, isolationism and territorial expansionist forms

- fusion of different races and tribes into homogeneous whole under the domination of the modernist youth

The issues state above shows the changes in Afghan society especially among the urban elite and middle class people for whom religion is something private matter and the expansion of Afghan state is important.

The reasons of difference between the urban and rural or traditional people were the reforms introduced by the government and the socio-economic changes in the society. The social changes occurred slowly with the divisions in society increasing between the urban and rural areas. It also depended on the changing world view of the urban elites that began to separate them from the conservative countryside. Secondly, the change in the education system further widened the gap between the two groups as educated youths preferred to settle down in the major cities like Kabul, Herat etc. due to the availability of good government jobs. The royal family not only encouraged women to receive secondary education in girls schools, but also formed an increasingly large proportion of co-educational university student bodies. The consequences of the unsynchronized social development was complicated by the ethnic diversity of privileged in appointments to government sector employment, which finally led to the rise of Islamists and Leftists in Afghan politics (Magnus and Naby 1998:77).

With the new modus vivendi established between the state and the religious leaders after 1930, Islam ceased to be subject of political debates in Afghanistan. The main political issues had been economic development as well as the demand of political liberalization since

the late 1940's, culminating into the 1960's experiment with democracy (Roy 1985:212). The failure of this democratic experiment led to political and social crisis, which is reflected in the polarized political culture outside the parliament. The clash between the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar and Ghulam Hassan Safi, belonging to the Wakh -Zalmayan over the issue of later comment on that funds provide for construction of schools were illegally diverted to the building designed for the protection of an alleged hair of the prophet. The Hazrat Sahib took exception to this and tried to stir up a public outcry by accusing Safi of blasphemy, demanding that according to *Sharia* he be stoned for this sin (Kakar 1978: 203). This issue led to the re-entry of Islam into Afghan politics, as the ideological differences between the new urban group dominating the state machinery and the traditional religious groups after a long period of cooperation between the two.

Another issue of the rise of traditional religious groups against the state was the emancipation of women. Prime Minister Daoud managed to abolish the veil and an increasing number of girls were attending university and some were even parading Western style fashions, did not mean that it was accepted in the religious circles. They showed their resentment by throwing acids on those women but the public sympathy was this time with the women and they demanded punishment to the attackers. This shows the change in Afghan society from the period of Amanullah to Zahir Shah in accepting reforms and modernisation by the society.

The time was ripe for political change and this change was mainly prompted by the differences in perspectives as well as governing methods of two powerful individuals: the King and his Prime Minister Daoud Khan. The best example of these differences was the issue of political parties. The King supported the initiation of a multi-party system as long as the party's political platforms did not contradict basic Islamic tenets and continued to support Afghanistan's constitutional, monarchy. Daoud on the other hand argued in favour of an incremental approach to modernization of the state structures and society. An advocate of slow and measured reforms, Daoud Khan asserted that Afghans were not yet familiar with political parties and important advances towards democratization needs to begin with one party (Fraser 1976:316-317). Daoud Khan feared that the proliferation of multiple parties at such an early stage of political liberalization may result in clashes between the political parties and bring about chaos that prove detrimental to both state and society.

3.3 Religious influence on development of state institutions

The 20th Afghanistan witnessed five or six constitutions which is in itself a unique thing for a country. The reason for this change was influence of different ideologies prevalent during that period which changed the outlook of the king. As Thomas Barfield argues that while Afghan expresses a particularly robust Muslim identity, they are generally resistant to radical forms of Islamic political ideology. This was the reason that the people on one hand rejected the modernisation of the society by King Amanullah during 1920's and on the other excessive Islamization of the state by Taliban.

Between these two extremes lies the constitution of 1931 and 1964 which tried to balance Afghan state and establish modern state institutions. The main state institution on which religion and religious groups influenced are the judiciary education system and interpretation of the *Sharia* laws. These institutions were important for both religious leaders as well as for the state. According to Tabi (2005:167), "in cultural sociology, scholars are aware of the fact that new ideas and world views need to be institutionalised by establishing the related new knowledge in the system of education. Otherwise the new thinking will fail to have a social impact". Due to this fact rulers in Afghanistan from Amanullah to Daoud paid attention to bring reforms in education system and had complete control over it. This process reached its climax during the PDPA regime as compulsory education was introduced not only in urban centres but also in rural areas also with special focus on women education. The purpose of the government was to make people aware of communist ideologies and create sympathisers among the mass.

The constitution of 1931 followed a conservative path to regain the support of ulamas and Sufis and revised the secular innovations of 1923 constitution. The main feature of this constitution was that it readmitted the religious and tribal heads into the state machinery. The constitution was a reflection of the government policy of gradual modernisation. It has feature of French, Turkish, Iranian constitutions, including the constitution of 1923 plus aspect of Hanafi *Sharia* of Sunni Islam and local customs, several of them in fact contradicting the *Sharia* (Olesen 1995:176).

According to Dupree (1973:464) "the ideals of Afghan society are more or less expressed in the 1931 constitution, but the government never implemented the proscribed constitutional monarchy within the parliamentary system. The institutions created by the document appeared to allocate authority to various government offices, but in reality, power

centred in the monarchy and the royal family, creating a veritable oligarchy". Therefore we can say that the 1931 constitution created the illusion of popular participation without proper enforcement provisions. The illusion was well propagated in the constitution in the form of importance to *Sharia* over secular laws and secondly sovereignty lies in Islam especially Hanafi *fiqh*. The forming council of ulamas also helped the state to get legitimacy among the people. The constitution partly maintained the Afghan character and social system as compared to the 1923 and was the reason for its success. The main features of it were tribal, authoritarian, patrilineal and patriarchal in nature. Nadir Shah permitted the religious leaders much more freedom than they enjoyed under Amanullah. The model of the legitimacy of the state was based on religion. The constitution specified that state power were vested in the person of the monarch and next to him, in the executive branch of government.

Article 6 stated that the King, before the National Council should swear:

"… to rule according to the *Sharia*t of Mohammed (peace be upon him) and the fundamental rules of the country (and to strive) for the protection of the glorious religion of Islam, the Independence of Afghanistan and the rights of the nation, and for the defence, progress and prosperity of the country, so help me God through the blessing of the sacred spiritual force of the blessed saints (approval of God be upon them)".

Article 7 spelled out the powers of the King which included:

"bestowal of ranks and office, awards of honours, appointment of the Prime Minister, sanction of the appointment, transfer and dismissal of Ministers assent of measures passed by the National council, proclamation and enforcement of the same, protecting and implementing the *Shariat* and civil laws, command of the military forces of Afghanistan in general, declaration of war and conclusion of peace and treaties generally, remission and reduction of punishments in general according to *Shariat* laws".

This Article shows that the monarchy maintained it power but the only difference was the acknowledgement of the supremacy of Islam. It gives precedence to the *Sharia* laws over statutory laws. In the section of judiciary, all references were made exclusively to *Sharia* and where ever both are mentioned the *Sharia* comes first over the statutory laws and at least 18 of the 110 articles stated the adherence to Islam. Due to this Kamali (1985:27) concluded that "the 1931 constitution upheld the classical Islamic doctrine that sovereignty belongs to Allah". This constitution recognised the supremacy and orthodoxy of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence and the judiciary system (civil and criminal law) reverted back to the religious

leaders and the complete autonomy of the *Sharia* courts was guaranteed subject to the monarch's right of final approval (1931 Constitution:Article70). Gregorian (1969:305) observe that, by granting the Muslim ulama broad powers while reserving for the monarchy the right of final appeal, Nadir Shah made a deliberate though indirect attempt to make use of the religious establishment's power to extend the jurisdiction of the state over tribal territories; in other words used the ulamas as a tool to ensure the polity expansion of the state. In return the religious groups were granted the freedom and influence thus pacifying their interest with that of the state which was also tried but Amir Abdur Rahman but reached its culmination during the Musahiban period.

The formation of the Jamayyat al Ulama the council of religious leaders at the central level was another institution formed under the influence of religious groups. It was the first national organisation of ulama in Afghanistan. It was entrusted with the interpretation of existing law and all proposed governmental regulations and laws were to be submitted to the ulams in order to ascertain their compatibility with Islam. The formation of the Jamiyat al Ulama on one hand can be seen as an attempt to close ranks and present a common front in view of the growing bureaucratization and co-option into the state apparatus. On the other hand, the solution was attractive for the state as a clergy with a centralised and less anarchic structure was an easier partner to deal with (Olesen 1995:184). The activities of the Jamayyat al-Ulama was not only general propagation of the faith but also promotion of national unity and the protection of both nation and government and it suggest that the state's interest were predominant than those of the ulama.

Another institution which was under the control of the religious heads was the ministry of Justice and it was assigned the responsibility of enforcing Islamic law throughout Afghanistan and a department of *Ihtisab*, which supervised the strict adherence of Muslims to moral codes of Islam was an essential feature of the government. The Minister of Justice was with Hazrat of Sahib of Shor Bazaar Fazl Omar Mujaddidi and his son-in law Fazal Ahmad having the post of Deputy Minister, while his brother was ambassador to Egypt. Fazal Ahmad later replaced Fazal Omar in 1932 and later he occupied the position of Chairman of the Senate. Over the period many more Mujaddidis found their way into the formalised political system such as Abdul Baqi (Herat branch) and Mahroon and Hashem Mujaddidi were senators at one time. The Mujaddidis became the first religious family closely integrated within the state and also established matrimonial alliance with the ruling class. After them many other religious families also followed similar trends after few generations (Olesen

1995:185-86). The participation of the Sufis in state was something new as earlier they only supported the state from outside through their blessing and barakat, but know they actively took part in state functioning and provided stability to the government.

The section XI (Article 87-94) and Section XII (Article 95-96) deals with the courts and the Supreme Court or *Dewan-Ali* respectively. These two are under the control of religious heads and the new constitutions brought changes in this system. Section XI established in principle that all legal battles would be within the framework of the Hanafi *Sharia* of Sunni Islam, but confused the issue by stating in Article 94: " The classification and powers of courts have been laid down in the Fundamental Organization Law", a secular document(1931 Constitution) . Therefore, two separate and often contradictory legal systems, one religious (headed by Qazi, religious Judges), other semi secular (operating under the supervision of provincial governors and their assistants), attempted to function side by side (Dupree 1973:468). This weakened the state as there was no uniform legal system in the country. If one is not satisfied with the verdict of one court he appeals to another court mostly to religious courts rather than secular courts. One reason for it according to Dupree1 (1973:581) was that the secular law tried to ameliorate some of the harsher, eye to eye, tooth-for -a -tooth aspect of legalistic Islam. Often, however, a criminal would request a judgement from a qazi in preference to a civil decision.

The education policy pursued from 1930 onwards was characterised by a gradual extension of the secular school system, and parallel with that, a considerable extension of the religious educational institutions (madrasa system) but under government control. The inclusion of religious educational institutions was due to the presence of ulama in the government bureaucracy because government needed a number of graduates from religious institutions with standardized and sufficient knowledge of *fiqh* etc. to occupy the government posts as qazi, mufti, teachers (Olesen 1995:187). The madrasas were traditional source of power for the ulamas and it became necessary to bring them under state control to break traditional pressure groups and build a nation state. The education system was influenced more by the Al-Azhar University rather than Deoband. With the establishment of the Faculty of *Sharia* at Kabul University in 1952 with assistance from Cairo's Al-Azhar university produced a new class of religious scholars who were more loyal to the state. The Faculty was also responsible for the rise of Islamists in Afghanistan who later played crucial role in state politics. The Law Faculty was established in1938 with French support it provided secular law along with courses on Islamic law but in general with no expertise among the faculty in

advanced religious laws. The Faculty of *Sharia* offered courses within the *Sharia* tradition with few minor exceptions like international and commercial laws. This shows the careful reforms introduced by the government to mix religion and secular education without any outward differences between the two. The constitution of 1964 was formed under the influence of modern, educated urban middle class under the circumstances as stated above. It was worked out on a western, particularly French model and a French constitutional expert acted as adviser for the constitutional committee. The main feature of this constitution was secularisation of Afghan state and society. It was basically an attempt to accommodate the Afghan state and constitution to the changing socio-economic structure of the society. It also worked to provide a legal framework to the government in accordance with the notions of legitimacy among the new middle class.

In the constitution of 1964 sovereignty belonged to the nation personified by the king as stated in the Article1 of the constitution.. Unlike the 1931 Constitution which made Hanafi *Sharia* the state religion, the1964 constitution simply prescribes that the state shall conduct its religious rituals according to the Hanafi school (Article 2).The constitution also guarantees freedom of worship to non-muslims "within the limits determined by law, decency and public peace"(Article 2). The parliament manifested the will of the people and represented the whole nation (Article 41). The king was to take the oath to protect Islam, guard the constitution, and protect the independence and integrity of Afghanistan and laws of the country and rights of the people (Article15). The main features of the 1964 constitution are-

Sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation... (Article 1)

The Shura (parliament) in Afghanistan manifests the will of the people and represents the whole will of the nation. The people of Afghanistan participate through the Shura in the political life of the country... (Article 41)

The Shura consist of two houses: *Wolesi jirgah* (House of People) and *Meshrano jirgah* (House of the Elders) (Article 42)

Members of the Wolesi jirgah shall be elected by the people of Afghanistan in a free, universal, secret and direct election, in accordance with the provisions of the law... (Article 43).

All these provisions of the constitution show the secular nature of the constitution and the least influence of religion on the formation of the constitution unlike the 1931 constitution. The religious leaders also objected on many provisions but were challenged by

the new finely trained mullah cum lawyers. Dupree (1973:573) argues that "the timid attitude of the religious leaders in parliament was due to firstly, in the former Prime Minister Daoud's harsh treatment of the religious opposition and secondly, because of the well qualified, religious- trained but liberal minded members of the Constitutional Committees, like Mohammed Moosa Shafiq (Director of the Law Department in the Ministry of Justice) and Sayyid Shamsuddin Majrooh (Minister of Justice)".the composition of constitutional committee reflects the transformation of the religious elites as Mossa Shafiq and Shamsuddin Majrooh were sons of traditional ulamas who where against reforms and modernisation of society.

The legal institution which are earlier dominated by the religious leaders were now replaced by the government educated mullahs and lawyers. This new group was influenced by the state ideology of secularization and not by religious ideologies and followed statutory laws instead of *Sharia* laws in the courts. The example of the inherent contradictions now introduced in the judicial system was that the doctrine of *tazir* (deterrence), which had been extensively applied in Afghan courts, in Hanafi laws, grants the qazi wide discretionary power to order punishment in accordance with the individual circumstances of the case. This contradicts with the legality of the constitution of 1964 which gives precedence of statutory law over *Sharia*t laws (Dupree 1973:580).

After the 1964 constitution the position and conditions of the qazis improved as the government took certain steps to integrate them fully into the state institutions. As theoretically, the qazi made decisions under Hanafi *Sharia*, but in the time of Nadir Shah, law increasingly moved into the hands of provincial administrators. Law evolved along two convergent lines: *haq-ul abd* (rights of the individuals) and *haq-ul Allah (*Right of the state and religion). A case first went to a qazi who gave his judgement on *haq-ul Allah.* The provincial council, including the governor and his staff, could change the decision in accordance with the growing body of secular law. Such procedures undermined the position and powers of the qazis. After the promulgation of the 1964 Constitution, all legal decisions have been transferred to the qazi (theoretically) but secular law has supremacy (Dupree 1973:581). The Ministry of justice founded a training centre in 1964 to help the qazi improve their foreign language capabilities (Arabic, English, French) and also to provide courses in the practical nature of the new secular laws. Many of the top qazi go abroad on in-training fellowships, established to enable them to adept a secular out look more easily.

The Sufi pirs who were earlier appointed as minister and officials in the Justice department were now no longer holding the post. They were replaced by graduates of theology and political science from Kabul University. From the period of 1953-1973 the Sufis did not played any active role in the politics and were mostly against the state policies. No scholars like Dupree, Roy and Olesen have mentioned about the activities of the Sufis during this period in political context. The reason in my opinion was that other political changes during this period had more significant impact on Afghan politics. Like the Pushtunistan issue, cold war between Russia and USA, emergence of a strong educated middle class, and finally the resignation of Daoud in 1963. Secondly the active participation of the new class of ulamas was also a reason for the decline of Sufi influence in the state politics. Another important institution which earlier had been under the control of clergy and Sufi was education system. The introduction of modern education in government schools reduced the importance of traditional mullahs and *alims (*religious scholars). Article 34 of the constitution states that:

"Education is the Right of every Afghan and shall be provided free of charge by the state and the citizens of Afghanistan. The aim of the state is to reach a stage where suitable facilities for education will be made available to all Afghans, in accordance with the provisions of the law. The government is obliged to prepare and implement a program for balanced and universal education in Afghanistan. It is the duty of the state to guide and supervise education. Primary education is compulsory for all children in areas where facilities for this purpose are provided by the state. The state alone has the right and duty to establish and administer the institution of public and higher learning. Outside this sphere, Afghan national are entitled to establish technical and literacy schools. Conditions for the establishment of such schools, their curricula and conditions of learning in such schools are to be determined by the provisions of the law, to foreign persons to establish private schools for exclusive use of foreigners".

This Article clearly shows the intention of the state to provide secular education to all its citizens with a uniform curriculum for all government and private schools. Another important feature was girls' education and opening of co-educational institutions in Kabul. This increased woman participation in public and private offices and institutions. Major role in this direction was played by Sardar Daoud earlier. All these steps reduced the religious influence on education and government opened training colleges for mullahs to appoint them as teacher in government schools.

The Constitutional developments from 1923 to 1964 clearly show the change in role of religion in the state and society. The constitution of 1923 sets the bases for future governments to introduce secular reforms in the country despite the fact that the constitution was itself a failure as the tribal-religious alliance toppled the secular rule of Amanullah in 1929. The reason for not discussing the features of 1923 constitution is that the constitution tried to separate religion and the state and neglected the role of religious group in developing a nation state. Secondly, some important religious heads like the Mujaddidi's did not participated in the state functioning due to the reformist attitude of the king which they considers as un-Islamic. Finally, the tribal nature of the society does not changed despite the introduction of reforms. Due to these reason there was no religious influence on development of state institutions. Religion remained important part in all the constitutions from 1923-1964 and the main difference between them was the outward expression of religion in state functioning.

3.4 Evolution of the Constitutional Identity of the State

The evolution of constitutional identity of the state can be clearly seen from the development of two institutions which were earlier under religious control, these two are education and justice departments. The education and justice institutions played pivotal role in Muslim states to get legitimacy among the people and establish monarchy or central authority of the king. Secondly these two institutions were filled by religious persons who are coming from the people acts as a bridge between the people and state. There role in state politics changes from time to time indication the role of Islam in state and society. The example of this is the four constitutions of Afghanistan which reflects the changing role of Islam in the country. All the constitutions agree on Islam as the state religion of the country. However the difference between all of them was on the emphasis on any particular school to be followed. Like the 1923 and 1931 constitution specifically emphasised the use of Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence, while as by the time of 1977 no mention has been made of any particular school of Sunni Islam nor even Sunnism (Naby 1987:131). This development reflects on one hand the decline of the role of religion in state affairs as perceived by the Kabul educated elite who drafted the constitutions and on the other increased jurisdiction of secular law. This dropping of Sunni Islam helped the state to develop a national identity by including the minorities also. The example of this changing nature of the state can be seen in the inclusion of non- Muslims in military services. For example the non Muslim religious

minorities, specifically the Hindus and Jews, have enjoyed tolerance of their beliefs and practices, they paid the jaziyah (poll tax for non-Muslims), were excluded from the military and were enjoined from proselyzation and otherwise "disturbing" the Muslims as stated in 1923 constitution (Constitution 1923: Article 2). Payment of jaziyah and exclusion from the military were deleted in later constitutions to reflect the reduced attention to Islamic Law.

The decreasing jurisdiction of *Sharia* laws in both family and criminal laws helped the state to secularise the justice department in various ways. At first, the rulers tried to increase their discretionary legal powers by removing from *Sharia* those crimes that they wished to adjudicate personally. For example, the stoning of a married adulterer or adulteress no longer occurs (Dupree 1973:579). Later taxes on polygamous marriages and the like marked the entry of secular courts into areas reserved for Islamic law. Thus the state started using justices department for its own benefit. In most of these cases the crimes were of a civil nature where the *Sharia* did not prescribe the death penalty but the ruling group wished to do so (Naby 1987: 133).

Moreover, in order to control the qazis (religious judges) the Afghan rulers introduced uniform legal codes by instituting national penal codes that would subject the Pashtunwali to the *Sharia* and later to secular courts. Certain basic rules of the Pashtunwali are clearly contrary to Islamic law and moreover, endanger the establishment of a stable government. This was the reason that since 1920s Afghan government has attempted to limit and control *badal* (blood feuds and clan or tribal vendettas) a primary element of Pashtunwali for which an elaborate code exists. Another example was the change in inheritance law *rajaw* (sole male inheritance). *Rajaw* was essential to the social structure of Pashtun tribes, though modified by Islam has not been discarded in tribal areas without government intervention. The government has justified this intervention into tribal law by drawing upon Islamic law where personal vengeance is codified and estates are inherited by females as well as males (Naby 1987:133; Constitution 1964, 1977).

Thus, the secularisation and codification of the legal system have offered rulers an opportunity to weaken the powers both of the religious establishment and of the tribes by fostering reliance on the ruler as the final arbiter of law. The periodic *darbar*s of the rulers where people can personally present petitions helped them to raise his personal prestige and damaged that of qazis. As the country moved towards secularization and erosion of legal jurisdiction of the ulama, the need to create in the ruler a religious figurehead declined (Naby 1987:133). Instead, the monarchy shifted towards becoming a military figurehead enjoined to

defend the independence of the country and, only by extension, Islam. This tradition, begun at the time of Nadir Shah and continued in the Musahiban family were both Zahir Shah and Daoud had military training. With the creation of Pakistan and contention over the issue of Pashtunistan, the military issue became more important. The government was more concerned with the Pashtuns in 1960s rather than the disaffection with the religious establishments.

Like the legal system the education system which was also under the religious control showed gradual transformation to a more secular and modern one. The Islamic clergy depends upon the network of religious schools and upon charitable endowments to build and secure followers, develop ideas, and disseminate them among the people. In absence of a viable madrasa system in Afghanistan, the individuals aspiring to higher education especially religious education have to go abroad to either central Asia or India, barred the scholars to create their followers in the country. Due to this they acted individually and not as a group without any state control. The state from 1900s tried to create a regulated madrasa system in Afghanistan so as to use the *Sharia* laws to centralise the state power over tribal areas. In 1944 the government began to exert its influence by establishing a school for the study of Islamic law. Six year later this faculty became the Faculty of Islamic Studies, a part of Kabul University, and is held in high regard as the centre for training of young religious leaders and teachers (Naby 1987:135). It is interesting that, this centre provided leaders to both leftist and Islamist and many resistance leaders came from the faculty of Islamic studies and other centres.

Another useful method followed by clerics traditionally to gain and keep followers was through the disbursement of funds from charitable endowments. This avenue was shut to Afghan clergy by Amir Habibullah (1901-1919), who took over the control of *waqf* system. The Afghan government has continued to administer the purse since that time. The controlling of funds thus became one more method of government control over the religious establishment as mullah and mosque had to be maintained at the pleasure of the ruling class (Naby 1987:135). This isolated the Afghan clergy from the people as they received their training at a government institution were paid by the government and their jurisdiction curtailed. The educational system, especially the secondary educational system, was beyond their control although the curriculum still includes Islamic subjects. The *Sharia* courts operated within reduced spheres. In fact, the clergy had become part of the government

bureaucracy. Its ability to mediate between the government and the people or to form bridges between the Kabul elites and the country side diminished.

3.5 Summary

The reforms introduced from the time of Amir Abdur Rahman to Zahir Shah changed the nature of Afghan society from a traditional tribe based to modernised secular class based. Due to this change in nature of society the role of Sufism also changed from time to time. Earlier it acted as mediator between different warring tribes and had commanded only on religious issues only. They had complete independence in religious sphere which made their position more powerful in the politics of the country. It was the reason that they in alliance with the tribal heads created problems in the modernising efforts of the state. This was the reason that the state from 1880's onwards tried to bring religious groups under state control.

Amir Abdur Rahman introduced reforms in the religious spheres and brought religion under direct control of the state. He established government madrasas, *waqf* broads, paid salaries and pensions to religious heads to bring them under state control as other institutions. The main conflict between the state and religious heads especially the Sufis occurred during Amanullah's period. The reason which the Sufis gave was the reforms introduced by the Amir to modernise Afghanistan as a nation state were anti-Islamic in nature. The reforms were more or less secular in nature and tried to broaden the political base of the state by creating new educated class loyal to the state. But in reality it was increasing state control over religious heads and challenge to their authority in the society.

From the 1930's onwards religious heads played important role in the institutional development of the state as new Amir Nadir Shah accepted their demands. He also nullified the reforms introduced by Amanullah and formed the new constitution under religious influence. The main Sufi order which played active role in politics was the Mujaddidi family led by Hazrat of Shor Bazaar. He was also the Justice Minister in 1948 and his brother was deputy minister. They also had matrimonial alliance with the ruling elites. These were the reason that the Musahiban period till 1953 followed the policy of gradual reforms while maintaining the traditional nature of the state (at least in theory).

However, from 1953 onwards the influence of Sufis was decreased due to the rapid reform policy followed by Prime Minister Daoud. He was representing the new pressure group who wanted to establish a constitutional government with more power to the people.

The result of their effort was the new constitution of 1963 which declared Afghanistan as a secular democratic country with all citizens enjoying equal right. The traditional religious group was weakened by the new religious group who came from government madrasas, graduates from Kabul university who where well versed in religious laws and secular laws. This new religious group helped the state to develop the institutions like judiciary, education on modern lines to strengthen state power. Some students of Kabul University were influenced by the reformist movements in other Muslim states, started Islamists movements and they later played important role in polarising the Afghan state after 1963 onwards.

Chapter 4

SUFI REFERENCE TO CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The 20ᵗʰ century was a turning point in Afghanistan as the nature conflict between the state, religion and tribes passed through different phases. The modernisation and reforms introduced by the State had far reaching influence on the society and changed the country from a traditional society to a modern society at least in the urban areas. But the state was unable to destroy the tribal -religious alliance which re-emerged during the civil war and resistance period.

The policies of Amir Abdur Rahman to change the nature of state from a traditional tribal state to a modern nation state were too many extents successful, as the state was able to bring tribal and religious groups under its control by sheer use of force. But this led to widening the gap between the state and religious groups which created tension in the society. The result was many tribal-religious revolts in different parts of the country. This policy was continued by the new Amir Habiullah Khan (1901-1919), with a liberal attitude towards the religious head. It helped the new Amir to focus on the centralization of the state as without the religious support the tribal uprisings were futile to impact the stability of the state. However a new problem resurfaced on the political front in Afghanistan, it was the external interference in the country due to Great Game politics. The growing mistrust between the Russian and British powers proved detrimental to the stability of the new state. As Amir Habiullah followed the policy of neutrality towards both the great powers which was not acceptable to the pressure groups (both traditional religious, tribal group as well as to new educated elites led by Amanullah). The political inactivity was the reason for his assassination in 1919.

The next Amir Amanullah Khan waged a war against the British, the third Anglo-Afghan War and Afghanistan got its independence. The Amir was successful in getting the support of religious groups by using the ideology of Pan-Islamism. But this alliance between the state and religious groups did not last long due to the reforms and modernisation policy of the new Amir. According to Olesen (1995:161) the real cause of alienation of the religious heads was the direct involvement of the state in religious affairs and civil matters which the religiousleaders considers as their independent domain. The problem was not with modernity as a concept but the outward expression of it in a traditional society like equal rights for men and women, western clothing, unveiling of women, change in the relationship between different groups etc. This was the reason which caused Amanullah Khan his throne and back staged the process of reforms for some time in Afghanistan. The lesson learnt from the

experience of Amanullah Khan was that to bring changes in a traditional society two things are important one a strong national army and second a powerful educated middle class to support the reforms introduced by the state. The new Amirs Nadir Shah (1929-1933) and Zahir Shah (1933-1973), understanding the nature of society and politics struck off those reforms which are outwardly influenced from West. During this period the modus vivendi between the state and religion was reached which was the reason of peace and stability in Afghanistan from 1929-1964. The policy of the state was to give full control of religious and civil affairs to religious heads. The religious heads were used by the state to get legitimacy and suppress the tribal heads by implementing *Sharia* laws as against tribal laws and codes. To appease the religious sentiments the new constitution introduced in 1933 mention many times the use of word *Sharia* and the supremacy of *Sharia* laws over secular laws at least theoretically. In practice the state maintained its supremacy and followed the policy of gradual reforms to build a strong nation state. The number of educated middle class also increased due to opening of many government schools and establishment of Kabul University.

The growing influence of the educated class played important role in the politics of the country. As seen in chapter 3 the new urban middle class comprised of both religious educated and western educated, had their influence on both religion and politics of the country. They wanted immediate change in the political and social conditions of the people with greater public participation. As schools and universities are institutions concerned with not only cultivating and passing on traditions but also with evolving new cultural patterns to help and accommodate changes taking place in the world (Tibi 2001:168). This role was played by Kabul University as it became the testing ground for new ideologies like Marxism and Islamism and also creates awareness about the reforms of the state among the people. The growing number of educated class and their heterogeneous composition as many of them came from far off places was mainly due to the government policy of rapid modernisation. The policies of Sardar Daoud, mainly the educational policy and establishment of new government schools and expansion of Kabul University directly helped in the growth of middle class educated group. He took an autocratic approach to modernisation, development and politics in general and to achieve this gaol the educated class helped the state to spread its ideology among the people.

The internal reforms and the foreign aid created unrest among the educated group. They were sceptic about the growing influence of Russia on the politics of the country. As

Olesen (1995: 216) states that 'the democratic experiment failed- stifled by internal power struggles of the Establishment-the crushed hopes, aspirations and ambitions led to ideological crisis'. The discontent was mainly among the urban educated population as with the introduction of parliamentary rule the struggle now was about the nature of the state and role of individuals in state politics. Hence, parliamentarianism and the existence of highly politicized urban intelligentsia, an educated middle class and a student body had given a new ideological dimension to the political progress in Afghanistan which had far reaching consequences on Afghan politics during the resistance movement later..

The emergence of three new ideological trends in Afghanistan like the Pashtun nationalism, Islamism, and the Afghan version of Marxism-Leninism created a new social problem in the country (Olesen 1995:217). The ideological trends disoriented the educated urban class from their roots both in terms of classical tradition in Islam and also from their rural popular culture. The introduction of modern schools in the villages created social tension between those who supported modern education and those who were against modern education. Those who were against assumed that it was a government policy to interfere in their lives for which they are not ready and it was also against tribal tradition and norms. Most of them who supported modern education belonged from rural areas were confronted by many problems as they were socially boycotted in rural areas. In urban cities they were confronted with new life-style, new norms, values and knowledge which proved a challenge to their rural background and whole outlook, to all their concepts of social hierarchy, kinship and tribal allegiance. The conflict between ideology and identity led to the rise of Leftist and Islamists movement in Afghanistan (Roy 1985:15).

The educated people like Muwlana Ataullah Faizani and Sayyid Ismael Balkhi, who were also the pioneers of Islamists movement in Afghanistan tried to create awareness among the Muslim youth. They organised themselves through meeting places like Kalab i Jawanan during the liberal period of the 1940s. The trace of all the present political movement in Afghanistan- religious, communist and liberals all lies back to the Kalab-i Jawanan, as the small educated youth's from different faculty's organised meeting to discuss the future of their country. People like Taraki and Karmal also members participated in the discussion of Kalab-i-Jawanan, were influenced by leftist ideology which created difference among the members of Kalab-i-Jawanan on the issue of religion. However, due to ideological differences among the members the discussion group split up along ideological (socialist vs. religious), ethnic and sectarian lines. Balkhi and Faizani each established their own group.

and Taraki and Karmal founded the PDPA which further split into Khalaq and Parcham (Olesen 1995:227).

The processes of rapid modernisation on a major scale started in 1956, when Premier Daoud Khan launched the first five year economic development plan. Along with the modernisation programs, Daoud also highlighted the Pashtunistan issue with Pakistan more strongly. The reason for this was to get the support of Pashtuns for his reforms and promote feeling of nationalism in the country especially among the Pashtuns. The Soviet funding for the five year plan helped the Afghan government to handle both the issues easily. But the acceptance of the Soviet aid and training created problem for the government both internally as well as externally. Internally the politically active middle class educated group regarded the Soviet aid would make Afghanistan vulnerable to communist influence. On the external front, American's held firm on their position that they would support the Afghan government only when the issue of Pashtunistan was dropped from the agenda of the state. This political stand of America due to its closeness with Pakistan isolated Afghanistan internationally for help and support. Hence, American blatant disregard for Afghanistan's political, national and territorial integrity forced political leadership in Afghanistan to seek Soviet assistance. The foreign aid allowed the governing elites the opportunity to distance themselves from historically traditional elites such as the Pashtun tribes and the clergy. Rubin (1995:72) asserts that the state building projects which were supported by foreign assistance made the government autonomous of the tribes, peasants, and the ulamas. The government relied more on the new educated middle class and introduced reforms more rapidly after 1953 with Daoud as the new Prime Minister.

The Islamists and leftists played an important role in the polarisation of the politics. As they were both products of modern education, their aim was same i.e. complete control of the state by the people but their method was different. The coup led by Sardar Daoud on 17 July 1973, further aggravated the situation in the country. The coup was carried out with the assistance of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, which was not acceptable to the Islamists, who went into exile during Daoud's period. The exiled Afghan leaders in Pakistan organised themselves to fight against communism. The reason was their fear of communist influence on the state and it resulted in the rise of more militant Islamists.

The time was ripe for political change and this change was mainly prompted by the differences in perspectives as well as governing methods of two powerful individuals: the King Zahir Shah and his Prime Minister Daoud Khan. The best example of these differences

was the issue of political parties. The King supported the initiation of a multi-party system as long as the party's political platforms did not contradict basic Islamic tenets and continued to support Afghanistan's constitutional monarchy. Daoud on the other hand argued in favour of an incremental approach to modernization of the state structures and society. An advocate of slow and measured reforms, Daoud Khan asserted that Afghans were not yet familiar with political parties and important advances towards democratization needs to begin with one party (Fraser 1976:316-317). Daoud Khan feared that the proliferation of multiple parties at such an early stage of political liberalization may result in clashes between the political parties and bring about chaos that prove detrimental to both state and society. The serious difference within the ruling family was resolved by the resignation of Daoud in 1963, with the promise of dignified exit and acceptance of the draft for new Constitution prepared by Daoud himself.

In keeping the above facts this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section views the social and political changes after the 1964 constitution and how it helped in the conflict transformation. It also looks into the reactions of religious groups to the changes in the society. The second section deals with the rise of Islamists movement in Afghanistan and its relation with the Sufi. The Sufis played its role during the early phase of the rise of Islamists. It is important to note that the influence of Sufism in Afghanistan declined after the interference of foreign powers during the resistance movement. The next section deals with the external factor present in Afghan resistance and its influence on Sufism.

4.2 1964 CONSTITUTION AND CHANGES IN SOCIETY

The social and political reforms introduced by Prime Minister Daoud after 1953 and the growing influence of educated class culminated into the formulation of new constitution in 1964. The resignation of Prime Minister Daoud in 1963 due to growing   differences with king Zahir Shah over the issue of Pashtunistan raised the expectations of very section of the society. The business class were hoping that the border issue with Pakistan will be sorted out by the king and restoration of economic relation between the two countries. The conservatives (especially religious leaders and their devout followers) predicted a return "to the principles of Islam", as for them Daoud is an agent of Russia and will do whatever the Russians say (Dupree 1973:560). The literate group (mainly civil servants, students and professional) were expecting greater democratic processes and free elections. The 1964 constitution turned Afghanistan into a modern democratic state by introducing free elections,

a parliament, civil rights, liberation of women and universal suffrage. These features of the new Constitution became problem for the government after 1964 as it led to polarisation of Afghan society and politics. In the preceding pages we will deal with those provisions of the constitution which changed the nature of politics in the country.

The main features of 1964 constitution that formally changed Afghanistan into a modern, democratic nation state was the establishment of Parliamentary system with a Meshrano jirga (Upper House or House of Nobles) and Wolesi jirga (Lower House or House of the People) and greater participation of the people. The members were elected both directly and indirectly. The members of Wolesi jirga were elected directly by the people of Afghanistan through a free and fair election on the basis of universal franchise for a period of four years. The members of Meshrano jirga were both nominated and elected as: i) one third of the members appointed by the king for a period of five years from amongst well informed and experienced persons; ii) the remaining two third members were elected by the members of the provincial councils and one representative elected by the people from each provinces through direct election (1964 Constitution: 13). This complex procedure of electing representatives was not understandable to the common people especially those living in villages and rural areas made the constitution unpopular among the general mass. The example of this was the less participation of the people in the first election under new constitution. According to Dupree (1973:587) 'the bulk of ninety five percent non-literate Afghans living in villages and nomadic camps, knew little and cared less about new constitution and "New Democracy". On the other hand the new constitution aroused new enthusiasm among the urban intelligentsia in all major towns as they were hoping for a rapid change in the society and politics with greater participation of the people.

Moreover, members of Wolesi jirga came from different social backgrounds and ideologies when interacted with one another made the functioning of the Wolesi difficult as they still continued to represent their own tribe or region and not the country as a whole. This led to the division of members into various groups representing their own interest and ideology. The main six groups were: a conservative , go slow group headed by Mujadidi family representing the traditional religious leaders; a laisez-fair economy group, favouring free enterprise and market who were supported by Abdul Majid Zabuli the founder of Bank-i-Melli; the *Wahdat-i-Melli* (an informal National Party) led by Khalilullah Khalili, a close confident of the king; small group of liberal led by Mir Mohammad Sadiq who favours public sector development; finally the most important group who profess a local brand of Marxism

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was led by Babrak Karmal and Dr. Anahita (a woman deputy from Kabul) (Dupree 1973: 591). This division of the members led to the polarisation of Afghan politics after 1964 as every member was promoting their own ideologies through assembly proceeding and news papers.

The Parliamentary functioning was disturbed due to the clash between the old traditional groups and the new urban groups. Olesen even says that parliament just became a new forum for the old power struggles between religious, tribal and rural leaders with an added minor group of urban elite. According to Weinbaum (1977:110), "the wakils (members of parliament) were behaving vis-a-vis the government as brokers of personal and particular matters rather than as law-makers, which was a political culture suitable to an autocratic regime but not to the realization of the Afghan middle class's vision of parliamentary democracy". Thus the introduction of parliamentary system furthered the gap between the traditional groups and educated urban intelligentsia which created social tension.

Prime Minister Daoud Khan proposed a strict system of reforms for Afghanistan, and he expected that the firm grip of that system would guide the country through the complex procedure and stages of reforms and development. His priority was a "smooth and unhampered transition to genuine democracy" (Ghaus 1995:95). Another source of conflict between the two leaders was the position of the royal family in Afghan politics. According to Saikal (2004:133), the king was convinced that political liberalization and increased popular participation in governance would require Afghan royals to withdraw from holding various political offices, such as premierships, cabinet posts, or membership in parliament. Daoud objected to this position, arguing that close to 95 percent of the population was illiterate, and the country could not afford to reject the existing limited skill and talent. The King ignored Daoud's suggestion and apprehensions about the nature of Afghan society at time of new constitution, which resulted in weakening the king's powers and its control over the administration and military. The result was military supported Daoud during the 1973 coup due to the inefficiency of the king.

The political freedom in the country after 1964 led to emergence of many formal parties, who were earlier acted as secrete societies due to repressive policy of Daoud. In 1965 twenty eight educated Afghans with leftist political orientation assembled in the home of Nur Mohammad Taraki in Kabul city, and founded the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Roy1985:122-123). The new party was inspired by the other pro-Moscow communist parties. Still its leadership did not ignore issues of ordinary Afghans. Its original name was

the Association of National Democrats and the party's founding leaders developed a political platform consisting of national issues such as Pashtunistan (Kakar 1995:54). Regardless of the party's ambitious claims, this group failed to achieve the support of the Afghan peasants and workers who preferred to align their lives with the principles of Islamic traditions. From its inception the PDPA was inundated by the factional disputes and by 1967 the party fragmented into Khalaq (people) led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Parcham (Flag) led by Babrak Karmal. The split was a manifestation of personal and doctrinal conflicts. And another factor characterising the distinctions of these two factions was that their composition was influenced by ethnic, regional, and social considerations (Hyman 1984:58). The Parchamis evolved around the figure of Babrak Karmal and they were mainly from cities, members of the upper classes as well as urbanized Dari speakers. A number of the Parchamis emerged from the landowning, bureaucratic and wealthy families and most of them were non-Pashtuns. On the other hand almost all Khalaqis were generally poor, from rural areas, predominantly from minorities integrated among Pashtuns, revolving around Nur Mohammad Taraki (Saikal 2004:160). Both Khalaqis and Parchamis were product of modern Afghan education systems (Kakar 1995:58). Both successors to the original Association of National Democrats failed to find support among the majority of Afghan population. During its lifetime, the PDPA pursued its mission to win over the Afghan elite, exert control over the state apparatus and to eliminate any Western influence (Roy 1988:41). The failure of PDPA to gain the support of common people reflects the nature of Afghan society where religion still played important role for getting legitimacy among people. Another important aspect of the society which still continues to exist was the tribal and ethnic loyalties not only among the rural areas but also among the educated urban class. The split of PDPA on ethnic and tribal bases clearly showed the dominance of tribal identities despite all the reform and modernisation programmes.

On the other hand the Islamists movement gained momentum after 1963 due to the polarization of the Afghan Politics due to rising influence of the leftist on the government. The Islamists articulated that Islam provided a complete and comprehensive system to the Muslims. They rejected the republican forms of government as well as general elections because for them the whole process is corrupt and demanded an Islamic state based on *Sharia*. The Islamists was influenced by the revivalist movement started by Sayid Qutub (Muslim Brotherhood) and Mawlana Maududdi (Jamyat i-Islami) in Egypt and Pakistan respectively (Olesen 1995:229).

Like the political front, the 1964 constitution had its impact on the economy of the country also and it was proved as an economic catastrophe for Afghanistan. The establishment of the first Assembly immediately led to a steep fall in foreign credits. From 1967-1971, externally raised loans shrank from 62.2million dollars to 27.5 million. The shrinkage in external assistance caused a concomitant loss in employment opportunities. Things soon reached a point where there was simply no job for graduates. The economic situation worsened further with the drought which hit the country in 1971-72, leaving in its wake the most terrible famine in Afghan history (Anwar 1988:69).

More over the introduction of social reforms like uniform civil code, unveiling of woman and greater participation of them in public and private sectors, introduction of co-education in Kabul and provinces had deeper impact on the society. The common people and traditional groups were not ready for such radical changes due the tribal nature of the society. The political crisis caused by the failure of the parliamentary regime, and aggravated by the drought and following hunger in 1971-72 was ended with the palace revolution in 1973. Ex-Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud with the help of the military abolished the monarchy and proclaimed himself as the President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (Roy 1985:122). Daoud addressed the nation over Radio Kabul and declared the he wanted to bring back Afghan Government back to the principles of Islam and save the nation from economic disaster. A strong emphasis was laid on economic development, social reform and social justice which among other things include land reforms (Olesen 1995:220).

The political and social reforms introduced by President Daoud created more problems in the society rather than solving the issues. His internal policy of land reform and emancipation of Afghan women alienated the tribal and religious heads against the state. His repressive policy against religious heads and Islamists leaders forced them to leave the country and seek asylum in foreign countries. Among them are the Mujaddidi family and the Gailani family the two powerful Sufi families and Islamist leaders like Rabbani and Hekmatyar who later during the resistance against PDPA played important role to Pakistan. On the external front the growing dependency on Russian aid and military help created fear among the Islamists of growing influence of Communism in Afghan society. It was also promoting the aspiration of the leftist parties to influence the state policies. As Parcham group supported Daoud during the Palace revolution, their presence in the government increased especially in the army. It was only after 1977 that Daoud changed his policy and tried to get financial support from other foreign powers like USA and Iran.

President Daoud's initial support among the Left was soon alienated and the announced social and economic development failed to materialize and remained empty phrases. Under such circumstance the President relied upon the strong army and bureaucracy to silence any challenge to his authoritarian rule. According to Olesen (1995:224), the downfall and the death of Daoud was logically brought about by shifting loyalties in the very army that he more than anyone else had built up since 1950s thus paving way for the Saur revolution, the coup of 27 April 1978. The Saur revolution not only brought political change but also led to the beginning of civil war in Afghanistan and the involvement of foreign powers which further polarised the situation in the country.

4.3 RISE OF ISLAMIST AND THEIR RELATION WITH SUFIS

The revivalist movement in Islamic countries due to interaction with colonial powers gave rise to two types of movement, one led by traditional religious groups (Sufis and Ulamas) and second by modern educated Muslim scholars who call themselves Islamists. The difference between the two was that the ulamas continued to uphold their "traditional" methods of interpretation of legal sources, treatises, legal schools. Secondly, the ulama's professional loyalty to their area of specialization and they continued to dedicate themselves to religious knowledge either as a student or as a teacher. On the other hand the Islamists are trained in a wide variety of modern technical disciplines, ranging from engineering and medicine to accounting, business or teaching in secular schools. They are not bound by an established or a given reading of the Quran and the prophetic Sunna, as the ulamas are (Hallaq 2009:142). The Islamists were influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutub the founder of Muslim Brotherhood and Mawlana Maududdi the founder of Jamiat i-Islami of Pakistan during the 1950's and 60's. The background of the rise of Islamists movement in Afghanistan was the slow social, economic development and currents of Islamic revivalism felt by the small group of educated youth. Since the revival largely affected the educated middle class, there was a comparatively close correspondence between revival as a socio-psychological phenomenon and the spreading of the politico-religious ideology of Islamism (Olesen 1995:228).

The leaders of the Islamists groups were inspired by various thinkers of modern Islamic world, particularly thinkers from India, Pakistan and Egypt. The Islamists were mainly influenced by the writings of Sayyad Qutub (Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt) and Mawlana Maududdi (Jamayat -i Islami, Pakistan). While initial inspiration in Afghanistan

came from Egypt, Maududdi's influence on the Afghan Islamist movement seems to have increased greatly from the 1970s, when a number of Islamists went into exile in Pakistan due to the repressive policies of Daoud (Olesen 1995:230). This has changed the relation between the Islamists and Sufis during later part of the resistance movement due to Wahhabi influence on Islamists in Pakistan.

The Islamists movement in Afghanistan was started in 1958 in the religious-intellectual circles, supported and protected by Dr Gholam Mohammad Niyazi (future dean of faculty of theology) when he returned from Egypt (Roy 1985:70). The founders call themselves as the "professors" (ustaz) and not alim or ulama. They received their education within the government system and not in private madrasas and completed their further education in the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. There were they encountered with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. At first it was a group without clear definition rather than a party. Besides Niyazi the other members were Rabbani, Tawana, Sebghtullah Mujaddidi and Minhajuddin Gahiz. During the 1958 the movement worked secretly as *Jam'iyyat -i- islami (*Islamic society) or *Tahrik-i -islami* or *Nihzat-i islami,* and concentrated mainly on cultural activity within the student body mainly due to the repressive policy of Daoud towards Islamists. Daoud arrested many important leaders of the movement including Sebagtullah Mujadddidi a leading member of the Majadididi Sufi family (Roy 1985:71). Due to the difference with more radical Islamists Sebghtullah was not member of the movement but took active part in discussion.

The Islamists movement was organised on three levels the first of senior members, the second the youth wing and the third connecting link. The first cell was initially under the leadership of Professor Ghulam Niazi until his death, after which it was taken over by Burhanuddin Rabbani and assumed the name Jami'at -i Islami. The next youth wing known as the Jawanan -i Muselman, carried out the outward political activities of the movement which initially focused it activities among the students of Kabul University. Towards 1970, the movement attempted to come out from the campus and started a campaign of politico-religious preaching throughout the country, with a branch called *dawat- o- tanzim* (preaching and organisation) as its spearhead. Finally, the linking cell, worked on establishing contacts in the bureaucracy with a view to influence policy makers (Olesen 1995:231; Roy 1986:73). The youth wing gradually became more popular among the students of schools and university due to their active participation in rallies and demonstration against the government. The third wing failed to create much influence among the officers in bureaucracy and military due

to strong presence of leftist supporter in them. This was one of the reasons for the success of PDPA revolution in 1978 in which military played an important role.

The younger generation Sufi pirs took active part in the Islamic movement from the very beginning of 1950s. Sufi pirs like Mawlana Faizani and Sebghatullah Mujaddidi were the founding members of the Islamists movement in Afghanistan. Mawlana Faizani, born in 1924 in western Herat province, grew up in a family of *miagan* (venerated saint) and religious scholars from whom he gained his primary education. He later attended the teachers training college in Kabul and started teaching in Herat province. He established a Sufi khanaqah near Pul-khumri in northern Baghlan Province, where he managed to secure a large followings particularly among teachers, students and mid-level military officers and government officials. He also participated in the Pul-i Khishti demonstration and was arrested in 1969. When he was released in 1970, Faizani remained in Kabul and started a library near Pul-i-Khishti mosque and presided over weekly *zikir* ceremonies (Edwards 2002: 42). His library and zikir circle attracted numerous visitors, including Muslim Youth leaders like Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman and Maulavi Habib-ur Rahman and many government officials.

Faizani enjoyed his greatest support among military officers. He used the traditional zikir circle as a platform for not just spiritual enlightenment but also for political activities. He used the traditional method of Sufi association with military which was cause for trouble to the state during Amanullah's period. According to Edwards (2002:67), one of the early points of contention between Amir Aamanullah and the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar and other prominent Sufi pris in the mid-1920s was the Amir's attempt to forbid members of the military from active participation in Sufi circles. As Amanullah recognized the conflict of loyalty that could emerge when officers develop relation with spiritual leaders and submit their loyalty to both temporal and spiritual heads.

Another feature of Faizani's leadership was his ability to appeal to younger people. Some of his disciples contend that he was closely aligned with Abdur Rahim Niazi, the founder of the Muslim Youth Organisation, and it was Faizani who originally convinced Niazi to enrol in the university in order to recruit students away from Marxism to the Muslim cause (Edwards 2002:69). This assertion is impossible to prove as there is no evidence of it in any writings of the period.

However, there is evidence that Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman, the leading member of Muslim Youth was a frequent visitor of Faizani's zikir circle, and he was aware of the Hizb-i Tauhid's planned coup d'etat. He was also among those arrested when the coup was

uncovered and he was executed with other plotters in 1974. After Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman's death, the Muslim Youth turned away from alliances with Sufis, keeping themselves and trusting no one other than those whose loyalty to the party was assured. They also took to disapproving Faizani and his role in the Islamic movement (Edwards 2002:70).

The Mujaddidi family played an important role throughout 20th century. It had been the most influential religious family in the country and from 1920s onwards heavily involved in politics. According to Olesen (1995:233), the driving force behind the Jamiyat-i -ulama's involvement in government since 1930s was the Mujaddidi family. They also had matrimonial alliance with the ruling families and supported many initiatives regarding the political awaking among religious circles. The Hazrat Sahib Mohanmmad Ibrahim Mujaddidi was behind the Khuddam -i Fuqan, a political party founded by Mawlana Faizani in 1960's.

The influence of modern education can also be seen on the Mujaddidi family whose younger generation were influenced by reformist movements like Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The popular among them was Sebghatullah Mujaddidi a radical leader of the family. He studied at Al-Azhar University along with other Islamists leaders like Niazi and was actively involved in Islamic movement. Khan (1984:18) informs with reference to Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, that "he requested the university teachers (Professor Niazi and others) to launch the Islamic movement at the university, which he himself had no access to as he was under constant surveillance. His close connection to the Islamic movement is further underlined by his frequent contributions to the Gahiz magazine, which was the mouthpiece of the Islamists movement (Khan 1984:18-19). In 1972 Sebghatullah founded a political party Jamiyat al Ulama-i Mohammadi. However the party hardly managed to exert any influence because Sebghatullah like many Islamists went into exile in 1973 when Daoud Khan assumed power.

In 1978, Sebghatullah Mujaddidi organised a meeting with Sufi pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, Rabbani and representatives of Zahir Shah to organise a joint party against the communist government of Khalaq. The idea behind this alliance according to him was:

"I contacted some leaders of the tribes-secretly. I called them to Peshawar. Some ulama from my own Jamiat-i- ulama Muhammadi (society of Muhammadan Clerics). They had come already. Some of them were here...Then I went back. I contacted some friends in Saudi Arabia, Egypt – Afghanistan people. They were here, there, and everywhere-America, Europe said, "We have to arrange a meeting in Mecca. We came to Mecca-fifteen to twenty persons. Rabbani was also with us at that time....And then we agreed that we should establish

a front in this name-Jabha-yi Nejat -i- Millli Afghanistan (Front for the National Salvation of Afghanistan) - and this front would be a platform for all the groups... All the tribes, all the people must come together on one platform, under one umbrella." (Edwards 2004:55)

This alliance under the leadership of Sebghatullah as the Amir and Rabbani as his deputy was organised on traditional lines in which religious and tribal sentiments were once again used to fight against the state. This rise of tribal sentiment was not limited to this party only but affected most of the resistance parties. The Leftist were divided into Khalaq and Parcham mainly due to ethnic differences. Former King Zahir Shah did not participated directly in this alliance but his son-in-law Sardar Abdul Wali was main advisor and he maintained close contact with Sehghatullah (Edwards 2004:55). Through this alliance Sebghatullah attempted to organise an alliance of traditional and moderateIslamists groups against the communist rule.

The first action undertaken by Sebghatullah Mujaddidi's party was a nationwide uprising planned for mid-March 1979. Small uprisings occurred in Jalalabad, Kunar and Nuristan and Kabul but most serious was the Herat province incident. In this some two hundred thousand people participated on the call of Mujaddidi against the regime. This uprising proved detrimental for the Mujaddidi's future course in Afghan politics because it failed and a many thousands of people were killed in it due to states repressive action. The main reason for the failure of this uprising was lack of coordination and unity among the members of the party. According to Sebghatullah, he never intended for uprisings to occur in urban areas, but to start from rural areas due to strong followers in rural areas. Sebghatullah was suspicious of Jamiat party led by Rabbani for the failure of the uprising, as Edward (2002:60) quotes him as:

"Everyone agreed on this plan, we chose the time. Two days before (planned date), letters were delivered to all (front commanders inside Afghanistan), but unfortunately Jamiat- they did something dishonest with me. Because I was busy with all other things, I signed the letters. All of these went out with my signature, all over Afghanistan...I told them for Herat, Khost, Qandahar, for these flat areas, don't deliver now. After our activity is very warm, very hot in the mountainous areas, then we shall start there. But unfortunately, they sent out all the letters at one time...And Herat people tell me, "when we say your signature we thought, oh this man is the right man. We shall start". They started and in one day twenty five thousand people were killed. This was all from Jamiat. This Sayyid Nurullah from Herat

was with Jamiat. He sent this (letters), and I did not know it. I was surprised that Herat rose up. We did not inform them." (Edwards 2002:60).

According to Edwards (2002:60), truth of this assertion was not known but one thing is certain that Mujaddidi's party lost much of its credibility as a result of the failure of the rebellion. Indirectly it shows the distrust between the Sufis and Islamists during the resistance movement and was the reason that both Rabbani and Sebhatullah formed different parties after Herat failure. The alliance with Zahir Shah furthered the distance between the Sufi leaders with more radical Islamist like Hekmatyar and Nabi as they do not wanted a new moderate Islamic state in Afghanistan which could deprive them of their position in society.

The relation between the Islamists and Sufi pirs depended upon on few other things like the individual personality of the Sufi leader, the change in course of movement and active participation of external forces, popularity of the Sufi leader among the masses etc. If we look deeply into the personal attitude of the Sufis Faizani was more open to accept the leadership of other and attracted more Muslim Youth leaders to his zikir circle. This was one of the reasons that earlier Islamists were moderate in their attitude towards Sufism. On the other hand Sebghatullah Mujaddidi treated the student leaders of Muslim Youth with arrogance taking credit for much of their work. Edwards (2002:62) quotes him as:

"This youth (jawanan) activity was indirectly guided by me. (Abdur Rahim) Niazi was just like a student to me. He respected me so much. I told them, 'Please jawanan, I have started this activity in the university indirectly from the outside'. I taught them I guided them."

Due to this attitude the Muslim Youth leaders downplayed Mujaddidi's role in the movement and cited that his family's connection with the royal family as the principal reason he was denied membership in the party. Another reason for the difference between the Islamists and Sebhatullah Mujaddidi was that Hekmatyar and his Hizbis were not ready to share their pride of place with him. Hekmatyar based his opposition on the distrust of the Mujaddidi family and their connections with the king, but he was also worried that Sebghatullah would make Hizbi's gradual efforts at mobilising carders of mujahidin in different localities irrelevant. With his name and recognition, Sebghatullah could potentially galvanize a nationwide uprising overnight. If that uprising were to succeed in sweeping out the government, a new moderate Islamic regime would likely come to power, and the Hizbis would find themselves again in the wilderness (Edwards 2002:63).This was the major difference between Hizbis and Sebghatullah, which gradually puts Hekmatyar more close to Pakistani Jamiat -i Islami and Wahabi ideology of the Saudi Arabia. But other Islamists

leaders like Rabbani accepted the leadership of Sebghatullah as Rabbani was more open to the possibility of working with former king if it meant gaining advantage over the Khalaqis (Olesen 1995:247).

On the other hand Sayid Ahmad was relatively less known to the Hizbis than Sebghatullah, they viewed him in much the same light- as a proxy for Zahir Shah who could push back into the hands of the monarchy as soon as the communists were defeated. Sayid Ahmad and his Mahaz party though limited in influence mostly to the tribal borderlands, proved relatively more effective because of their willingness to work with local leaders without imposing a rigid set of doctrinal expectation on them. Gailani and the people around him were not accused of the kind or degree of corruption that Mujaddidi's associates were. This was the reason that they did not come under direct fire line of Hizbis leaders unlike the Mujaddidi's.

4.4 INTERNATIONLIZATION OF CONFLICT AND the LIQUIDATION OF SUFISM

The simple civil war started by the tribal groups in 1978 against the PDPA government gradually changed into an Islamic jihad after the Soviet Invasion in1980 for national independence and for the creation of an Islamic government in which international powers also participated. According to Roy (1985:207), the three basic reasons on which Afghan Conflict got international support are: first, since the Islamists resistance forms part of the revivalist movement which swept the Muslim world, so it got the support of Muslim Brotherhood. Secondly, the soviet invasion caused anxiety to other governments in the region, in particular Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Finally, the Afghan resistance was benefited from the support of western countries mostly the USA. This makes the conflict international in nature in which the actual control of the resistance movement passed into foreign hands especially USA and Pakistan.

The Afghan resistance movement was not a homogeneous one and the parties are divided among themselves on the bases of different ideologies. Roy (1985: 208) says that "there were three conflicting currents present in Afghan resistance movement. The first two are political in nature, the difference between them being the interpretation of *tafkir* (should one damn a pious Muslim as a heretic, because his political views are not those of Islamists). This was the reason for the schism which occurred in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood between the groups which planned the assassination of Sadat in October 1981 (*al-jihad)* and

the official Brotherhood led by Shaykh Talmasani. The same division in Afghanistan was between Hekmatyar and Rabbani, who condemned the assassination. The third current within the Islamists movement is less political and emphasises the need for a return to religion and this group include the *jama'at al-tabligh* organisation". On the basis of these division different international powers supported different groups. Iran supported the first group who believe in *al-jihad*. Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries supported the third group due to the suspicion of the radical and much politicized Islamists. Their fear was that the Islamists would undermine the authority of the regional governments because the Islamists wanted to create a greater Muslim *umma* by replacing the present rulers. The USA government indulged in the Afghan conflict due to the Cold War and to stop the spreading of Communism in this region beyond Central Asia.

The involvement of the external powers changed the course of direction of the conflict. It became a proxy war for scoring against one another on behalf of the Afghans, like the US -Russia, Iran-Saudi, Pakistan-Russia, China- Russia and many other small countries. This changed the society and promoted the ethnicization of the Afghan society once again after the introduction of reforms and new constitutions. Once again the tribal-religious component became important for the stability of the nation which was for some time went into background due to the modus-Vivendi reached between the state with religious and tribal groups during the Musahiban period.

If we look at individual countries and their influences on the resistance movement in Afghanistan, Pakistan comes at first position due to its geographical proximity. It played the role of king-makers for the different resistance parties because without their support the parties were unable to get financial and military help for the movement. The reasons for the active involvement of Pakistan are according to Roy (1985:209) are:-

1. It was facing the problem of huge Afghan refugees which was causing demographic and   economic problems in the country.

2. Political destabilization.

3. Its fear that the Afghan resistance might also not follow the same line as that of Palestinian movement thus creating a state within the state of Pakistan with the help of large number of Afghan refugees and the army.

These reasons forced Pakistan to have a clear-cut policy and strong control over the resistance movement. Their policy until 1983 was based on maintaining control over arms

supply to the resistance and keeping it within limit that did not provoke violent Soviet reaction. Secondly, work to prevent the emergence of an Afghan government in exile thus encouraging the continued political fragmentation of the resistance. Finally, Pakistan wanted to retain the political initiative to control the movement according to their wish. The Pashtunistan issue was also one of the main reason that Pakistan did not wanted a strong government in Afghanistan and nor a strong resistance movement.

The ideological bending of the resistance parties also helped them to get foreign support during the resistance movement. The relation with the Islamists parties was maintained by the Pakistani Jamiat-i-Islami and moderate parties were handled by the army (Anwar 1988:233). This sets the course of action for other countries also, like Saudi government had no Afghan policy as if but they directed their financial assistance to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan. Their main agenda of getting involved in conflict was to contain the influence of Iranian revolution from spreading to other regions like Afghanistan (Roy 1985:213) and to use the opportunity to propagate Wahhabi Islam among the Afghan mujahedin (Weinbaun 1991:498). Saudi Arabia provided funds to buy Russian weapons for the mujahedin and it also logged a sum of $250 million dollar in the Swiss Bank created by U.S. to support the Afghan resistance movement.

On the other hand Iran on the eve of Soviet invasion was going through turmoil due to Khumayni revolution. Its leaders were preoccupied with internal restructuring and war with Iraq (Farr and Merriam 1987:75). The immediate reaction of Iran to the invasion was condemn the Soviet invasion and open up its borders to refugees and extends material support to some resistance groups especially Shia parties or groups. But the basic feature of Iran's policy was different from Pakistan. Tehran rejected any justification for aligning Islamic countries with Western powers. It preferred to rely on its own resources for assisting Afghan resistance. Secondly, it tried to maintain a balance between helping the Shiite Afghan resistance parties and its relation with Moscow which was more cordial than Pakistan had (Rais 1993:918).

Iran played a critical role in the evolution of the Shiite resistance groups in Afghanistan. Emissaries from Tehran mediated in the disputes between different Shiites groups as they were the only beneficiary of Iranian weapons and related supports. This support was further increased only after Iraq war, after which Iran played more active role in Afghan conflict. It helped the eight Shiite groups to unite and the result was the formation of a single Shiite party the Hizbi-i-Wahdat (unity party) with the exception of Harkat-i- Inqilab

-i- Islami (Islamic revolutionary movement) of Ayatullah Mohseni. He moved his head-quarter to Peshawar in 1989 (Rais1992:917-918).

Iran's Afghan policy was to seek greater representation for the Shiite parties in any future mujahedeen government. According to Roy (1985:214), "Iran's Afghan policy has three phases: the first, it supports the Shia community as a whole, and then it limits its support to those groups which recognise the leadership of Khumayni. Finally it focuses only on those who will allow themselves to be absorbed into the Iranian Pasdaran or organisation". Iran's intervention in the resistance movement on the one hand helped the Shai'as for the first time to consolidate their power and play an active part in the politics of the country. However, on the other it created more distance between the Shia's and Sunnis due to radicalisation of the resistance movement because of Iran- Saudi rivalries.

The involvement of US in the conflict was due to Cold war rivalries between two superpowers and the defeat of US in Vietnam War. Initially the US took an indirect role in the Afghan conflict till the fall of Shah of Iran. From 1979 onwards its active participation begins and invested nearly 625 million dollars in Afghan conflict up to 1985 (Anwar 1988:232; Farr & Merrrriam 1987:75). This amount they supplied to resistance parties through the mediation of Pakistan. CIA acted as its nodal agency to deal with Afghan resistance movement and provide arms and ammunition to resistance parties (Weinbaum 1991:498). The covert arms shipments from US via Egypt, China, and some of the Muslim countries continues to show the level of US involvement and its serious commitment to the Afghan liberation struggle or in other words to stop Russia from reaching the "warm waters" of Gulf. The Afghan conflict provided US the much needed ground to seek Chinese help to contain Russia. The conflict between Russia and China provided this ground and in January 1980, just days after Soviet invasion the US Secretary Harold Brown visited China. During this visit China agreed to permit the over-flight of US planes carrying arms for resistance in Afghanistan. The Chinese also allowed unloading equipment in China and also China would facilitate the difficult transshipment by overland. But China did not agree to active participation in the conflict and acted as a participator in discussion only (Farr & Merriam1987:74). The other country which had active role in the conflict was Egypt during Saddat's period and after his assassination the new President Mubarek did not continued active involvement in Afghan resistance further.

Moreover the participation of foreign powers not only changed the political atmosphere in Kabul but changed to a great extend the social fabric of the country. The problems of ethnic infightings and religious fundamentalism or extremism are the result of

internationalization of the Afghan resistance movement. What started as a national resistance ultimately changed into an ethnic conflict with every tribe/ethnic group supported by a godfathers from abroad. As for promoting their own goals like to solve the Pashtunistan issue once for all and to build strong Afghan politico-military forces to contain Soviet invasion out of their borders Pakistan started promoting one group against other. The good example of this policy was the promotion of Hekmatyar by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Hekmatyar is a Pashtun and extreme Islamist, who had fled to Pakistan in the early 1970s following his implication in the murder of a fellow student at Kabul University (Saikal 1998: 114-26). The ISI channelled the bulk of Pakistan's external assistance to Hekmatayr and his radical mujahidin group. In doing so it reinforced Pashtun ethnicity as a basis of political identity and consequently aggravated latent ethnic differences within the Afghan resistance.

On the religious front the problem of conflict between the Sunnis and Shia groups were aggravated further with the involvement of Saudi and Iran, the two arch rivals. Resistance leaders like Sayyaf, Hekmatyar and Khalis were supported by Pakistan and Saudi were against the participation of Shia's in any negotiation after Soviet withdrawal from the country and were also against Sufism. The concept of jihad and *tawhid* also changed due to influence of Wahabism. Earlier jihad was led by Sufi pirs against any foreign invasion or against a sovereign who is deemed to have become *kafir*, as was the case of Amanullah in 1928 after he tried to introduce reforms based on western culture (Olesen 1995:247). The Sufi jihad focuses on internal purification of the society but know jihad is personal act of violence to achieve particular political ends. Roy (1985:122), describes jihad in Afghanistan as an act which "always involved a coalition of tribes formed around the person of a leader fired with religious zeal...the charismatic leader nearly always stood outside the tribal framework, his point of reference was not tribalism, nor even the Pashtun community but the Muslim *Umma*". But know this relation between Sufis and tribal leaders had changed due to ethnicization of the conflict and its impact on religion. The leaders both Sufis and tribal warlords concentrate more on their own ethnic tribe for support to get power. The example of this was the split of Muslim Youth due to the differences between Rabbani and Hekmatyar. The reason was radicalization of the resistance due to influence of Pakistan and Saudi which was not acceptable to Rabbani who was a Sufi follower of Naqshbandi order and wanted to establish a moderate Islamic state in Afghanistan.

Afghan fundamentalism was different from Wahhabi fundamentalism on one crucial issue-Sufism. Wahhabism, which advocates a return to the literal teachings of the Koran,

rejects any form of Sufism. On the other hand Afghan fundamentalism, which was born in Naqshbandi circles, accepts orthodox Sufism (Roy 1985:39). However this was changed after 1980's due to active participation of Saudi and the presence of Arab mercenaries in Afghan Conflict and their focus on creating madrasa system to spread Wahabism. Secondly, the presence of large number of refugee camps in Pakistan which acted as breeding ground for fundamentalist ideologies like Wahabi and Salafist as these camps were maintained from the funds from Gulf- Arab countries. As Magnus and Naby argued in 1988, "the best hope for the mujahideen unity, based on a specifically non-ethnic and non-regional Islamist perspective, failed on the triple danger of ethnic rivalry, envy and distrust". The first attempt at unity among the different resistance forces made in March 1980, failed in April 1981 and new alliances were formed on the bases of ideologies and goals. The result was the formation of the seven resistance parties in Pakistan which clearly reflects the nature of transformation of Afghan conflicts due to the presence of external forces and internal disunity as the parties follow the ideology of their foreign patrons. The growing influence of Wahhabi ideology in the country is a clear indication of change in Afghan society, as earlier Wahhabi was not popular in the country.

4.5 SUMMARY

The central government's efforts to modernise state and society were challenged by society. Similar to reforms programs of developing states, the pattern of development in Afghanistan was not implemented at the grass root level. Rather reform was initiated by bureaucratic elites who ambitiously attempted to transform the economic, political and social base at a rapid pace without first creating a solid base of support. The Afghans experienced the benefits of a number of positive developments in education, liberalization of politics, the advent of a constitutional monarchy, freedom of press and general social progress. In-order to gain legitimacy the ruling class used Islam and promoted nationalism in order to neutralize radical elements of the left as well as Islamists. In addition the state relied on foreign aid of finance development projects. The conflict between segments of society within the state apparatus and their reliance upon the superpowers as well as regional powers for aid, both military and financial contributed to the radicalization of the Afghan conflict.

The 19th century simple state- religion conflict in which religious leaders demand was for control of religious and civil affairs of the state. They never wanted to govern the country and accepted the kings right to rule the country. However this conflict was transformed into a

more complex one in 20th century with the rise of revivalist movements in all parts of Muslim world. It had its impact on Afghanistan also as the modus-vivendi reached between the state and religious leaders from 1933-1953 reached its climax with the rise of Islamists and modern educated middle class. The Islamists concept of state was totally different from traditionalist. The Islamists no longer consider themselves as sub-ordinate to the state and wanted to control the state and establish true Islamic state. They are ready to replace the king and themselves rule the country directly on the basis of pure Islamic laws. The radical Islamists were strictly against Sufism in any form. This attitude was promoted by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who promoted Wahhabi ideology in Afghanistan. This led to liquidation of Sufi influence in Afghan society. The foreign governments involved opposed the emergence of a national leadership because each pursued their own specific agendas in order to dominate Afghanistan. To this end and until the last days of the resistance, these governments supported the most radicalised of the Islamists party such as Hizbi Islami to the detriment of other groups. They wanted to guarantee the right not only to influence the jihad, but to be part of the development of a future political leadership. The Afghan Islamism of 1980s did not offer a new model for the society, and the Islamists political elites attempt to mobilize the people around the myth of an Islamic authenticity which only existed in the imagination of the elites. The failure of Islamists led to the rise of radical fundamentalist like Taliban in the country.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Nation building and the Sufi Response

The challenge that modernity presented to Muslims differed across space and time. Modernity, in its various manifestations—technological innovations and political ideologies had divergent impacts on society across the globe. Its further mediation by Colonialism complicated the experience of societies, thus checking their smooth transformation. The Nation-building project in Afghanistan was at the centre of modernisation process, which located over a century and continues even today created ruptures within the society in Afghanistan. It pushed for re-organization of the traditional structures and norms, which thus divided society in various segments, in terms of their support or opposition to the project. State building in Afghanistan was not a unidirectional process in terms of its ideology and institutions. From the late 19th century to present, the process itself with the quest for nation state at its centre went through several ups and downs. The very nature of state, in terms of its ideology and scope was constantly being debated and reformulated at various time in the process. The response of different communities and groups within Afghanistan was contingent upon the nature of process at any stage and its compatibility with their own communitarian norms and ideology.

Sufis also diverged in their response to the process of state making in Afghanistan. This concluding chapter, based on the explorations made in previous chapters, suggest that Sufis in Afghanistan played an important role in the process of state making. They participated in the process both by taking active part in it and by opposing it at various stages. Their response to the state, like other communities was based on convergence of their own interest with the objectives of the state making process. With this background in mind we can divide our conclusion into two themes as nation building and Sufi response to it; nature of conflict between the state and Sufis due to external interference.

The transition from a tribal confederation to a nation state in Afghanistan was not a smooth process and faced opposition from various sections of the society. One of the important responses to this transition came from the Sufis. Sufi response was contextual or situational in nature as it varied from time to time during the whole 20th century. The first Sufi response to the building of state or absolute monarchy came during the period of Amir Abdul Rahman (1881-1901), who the Sufis opposed due to his interference in religious matters and harsh treatment towards the tribes. The Amir tried to bring religious leaders and religious institutions under direct state control so that he can use religion as a tool for subjugating the

tribes by applying *Sharia* laws. The cause of conflict was not the ideological content of the Amir's policy but his attempt to transfer the alliance and dependency of the religious leaders from tribe to the state. The state institutionalised the religious supremacy over the tribe but religious leaders lost their independent authority over religion as they were made dependent upon the state for their economic sustenance. The Amir was successful in his attempt to win the support of many leading ulamas, both by pursuing them through economic incentives and also using brute force to change the nature of state and centralise his authority. On the other hand the Sufi leaders were not ready to accept a strong centralised monarchy due to their strong tribal relations. This was the reason that Sufi pirs like Hadda-i-Sahib throughout the Abdul Rahman's rule opposed Amir's policy of nation building via suppressing the tribes. This 19th century conflict of interest between the state and Sufis continued in 20th century under different context but the basic issue remains the same i.e. the attempt of state to transfer the nature of alliance and more interference by state in religious matters.

The second major setback to the process of state building from the Sufis came after the introduction of secular reforms during Amanullah Khan's (1919-1929) period. The nature of 1924 and 1929 revolts highlights some important features of Sufi-state conflict in the country. Firstly, the conflict was a continuation of the powers struggle between the state and religious leaders started during Abdur Rahman's period due to centralization of power into the hands of Amir. As Abdur Rahman increased the influence of Islam and authority of clergy by subduing it to the centralised state, Amanullah tried to separate the state and religion through reforms in educational and legal systems. This ideological difference between the two rulers shaped the intensity of Suifs response to these changes. The Sufi leaders like Hazrat of Shor Bazar Sham al-Mahshayikh (d.1923) maintained friendly relation with Amanullah but his brother Nur al- Mashayikh opposed reform policies of the state and organised support against the king during the 1929 revolt, which overthrow Amanullah from power. The downfall of Amanullah and the establishment of Musahiban dynasty was mainly due to the support of Sufi leaders especially the Mujaddidi family, who after the 1929 uprising played active role in state politics. Thus the first phase of nation building ends with the downfall of Amanullah mainly due to the strong opposition of Sufis, who became reactive to the growing state power to curb their independence.

The coming of Musahiban dynasty and their policy of state building changed the Sufi response towards the state. The first thing that Nadir Shah did was to reconcile the religious leaders by changing the reforms introduced by Amanullah and re-establishing Islamic state in

the country. The formulation of 1931 constitution was mainly due to religious influence and to end the conflict of interest between the state and religious groups. Nadir Shah tried to integrate religion and politics by using the religious leaders in the administration. The formation of Jamiayyat al Ulama for interpretation of existing law and all proposed government regulations and laws to ascertain their compatibility with Islam, handled very tactfully the growing influence of religious leaders by making them part of the state. This led to the beginning of second phase in nation building process by maintaining close relation between the state and religion. During this phase the state maintained the outward Muslim identity of an Islamic state by emphasising the importance of *Sharia*. Along with this the state also introduced gradual reforms in education and military to create new base for introducing modernisation program towards building nation state. During this phase the Sufis responded positively to the new changes introduced by the state.

The second phase of nation building ended in 1953 with the coming of Daoud as the new Prime minister and this ended the cooperation between the traditional religious groups with the state. As we have seen in the preceding chapters that the Sufi participation in the state reached its climax during the second phase with the appointment of Hazrat of Shor Bazar in the cabinet as Minister of Justices and his brother as deputy Minister. The participation of Sufis don't confined to the Mujaddidi family only but other smaller Sufi orders also participated in the administration and established matrimonial alliance with ruling elites. This highlights one important fact that the Sufis were not against the concept of modern nation state, but were against the outward expression of westernisation which was proved during the third phase of nation building.

The third phase of nation building started with the rapid modernisation program introduced by Prime Minister Daoud with the support of king Zahir Shah after 1953 and continued till 1978. The main feature of this phase was that religious symbolism began to take a backstage and outward expression of modernisation was emphasised by the state. The state focused more on development of state institutions on secular basis by widening the social base of these institutions. The greater participation of women in public and private jobs, the expansion of modern education to far of places, development of military on modern lines, introduction of penal code in judiciary over *Sharia* laws were some important features of the state during this phase. This reflects the changes in the nature of Afghan state from a tribal confederacy to a true nation state with secularism as the ideology of the state. This ideological shift once again created tension in the state as it was opposed by not only the

traditional religious groups but also by modern educated middle class intelligentsia due to growing dependency of the state on foreign financial aid. The rise of Islamist and Marxists in the country was the direct result of state policies after 1953.

The Sufi response during the third phase was more or less against the state and its modernisation program. However, could not create serious problem for the state. The reason for the failure of Sufis was the rise of two new religious groups. The first group was of the government trained ulamas and mullahs who were well versed in religious education and they supported government policies of modernisation in light of religion. The second group the Islamists, who opposed the traditional ulamas and Sufis for their inactivity and their concept of Islamic state. The third phase of nation building ended with the end of Musahiban dynasty after the killing of Daoud during the PDPA revolution 1978. Till third phase, the state maintained the identity of a Muslim state despite introduction of democracy and republican form of government, as the 1963 constitution declared Islam as the official religion of the state. The final phase of nation building during PDPA rule was influenced by communist ideology and they considered religion as a private matter with no role in state politics. The importance of this phase was the Soviet invasion in 1979, replacing one communist party with the other. The PDPA revolution and Soviet invasion activated the panic button among religious groups to organise themselves against the spreading of atheism or communism in the country.

Both the traditional religious groups and Islamists leaders were brutally suppressed by the new regime which forced these groups to went out in exile and then organise resistance against the state. During this phase the Sufi pir founded parties to organise resistance movement against the PDPA rule. This was the final stage of nation building. After the downfall of communist rule, the new Mujahiddin government tried to establish a moderate Islamic state and then with the rise of Taliban a radical Islamic state in the country.

However, an important feature of the third and final phase of nation building was the dependency of the state on foreign support to introduce new changes in the country. This dependency on foreign aid both financial and military exposed the country to external interference in internal politics of the Afghan state. This exposure to foreign interference had many long term consequences which we will look in the next theme.

5.2 Impact of External interference on nature of conflict

The conflict between the state and religion in Afghanistan before soviet invasion was for independent space of influence i.e. state wanted its supremacy over religion but religious leaders wanted no interference of state in religious affairs. The example of this conflict of interest was the revolt of 1929 against Amanullah Khan. But after the Soviet invasion new groups emerged which challenged the traditional religious leadership of ulamas and Sufis and wanted direct participation in politics of the country. The main of new religious group was to create an Islamic state with Islam as the political ideology. In the emergence of these three new religious groups: the Islamists, the fundamentalist, and the neo-fundamentalist, external powers played important role especially Pakistan and Saudi which hindered the nation building process in the country.

The nation building process in Afghanistan was to a large extent depended upon the foreign aid and military support due to poor internal resources and avenues. Rulers from Amanullah to Daoud depended upon financial aid from Russia and America to introduce new reforms and started new projects in the country like the Helmand Project started by Daoud with the help of America. But the nature of these external interferences were purely economic and did not affect the norms and customs of the society. But the ambition of Afghan rulers to build strong nation based not on developing internal resources but on foreign help from super-power countries like Russia and America invited more external interferences. The religious leaders were against this growing influence of foreign powers on the politics and society, which created tension in the society between the state and religion.

The traditional religious leaders opposed the state's dependency on external powers through petitions and by organising revolts and uprisings against the state with the help of tribes. They could not create serious problems for the state as the government used brute force to suppress the religious uprisings forcing many religious leaders to go into exile either in Pakistan or Iran. This led to the beginning of changes in Afghan politics as many new parties were formed in Pakistan on the eve of Russian invasion which were supported by different foreign powers. The parties were formed on religious bases and the two leading parties were formed by Sufi pirs. The support of external countries was based on the ideological affiliation of these parties. The external powers focused more on radical parties rather than on Sufi parties of Sebhagtullah or Gailani, which gradually led to the decline of Sufi influence on the resistance movement.

This ideological aspect of foreign support changed the situation and introduced new elements like spreading of Wahhabism, ethnicization of conflict, and decentralization of power among different warlords. The spread of Wahhabi ideology directly challenged the Sufi culture and marginalised the importance of Sufism in the country by breaking the link between the Sufis and their followers through a network of madrasas in villages. The Sufis and Islamists up to 1980 were not hostile to each other despite ideological differences but with the participation of Pakistan and Saudi the relation between the two deteriorated due to Wahhabi influence on the Islamists. The radical Islamists promoted by Pakistan were staunchly against Sufism in any form and did not cooperated with Sufi leaders to form a united front against the communist rule.

Another important development after the Soviet invasion was re-emergence of tribal identities in the country like growing ethnic and tribal ties between the resistance parties and the people. This led to the ethnicization of Afghan society and politics by dividing the whole country into smaller fragments hostile to each other. The foreign powers in order to achieve their own interest or goals promoted different ethnic groups during the resistance movement. Like Pakistan and Saudi promoted Pashtuns over the Tajiks and other, Iran promoted the Shai Hazaras, central Asian countries promoted the Tajiks and Uzbeks. This ethnicization and radicalization of Afghan society during the war not only change the composition of society but proved detrimental to the process of nation building in the country. The ethnic rivalries between the tribes or ethnic groups were more sever now than it was at the beginning of 20th century. The radicalization of religion created new religious groups of fundamentalist and radical Islamist who were opposed to traditional religious leaders and wanted to create an Islamic state based on pure *Sharia*. The failure of Mujahiddin government in 1990s and the emergence of Taliban were the direct result of this social change due to internationalisation of Afghan conflict after Soviet invasion.

If we analyse the failure of traditional religious leaders to influence the resistance movement, we can say that it was basically due to the change in conflict of interest between the traditional and new religious leaders. The traditional religious leaders supported the re-establishment of monarchy in the country but the radical Islamist and fundamentalist wanted to create Islamic state led by religious leaders and not by the king. The support from Pakistan to radical Islamist weakened the position of traditional religious leaders among the people living inside or outside the country due to their weak financial support. Thus we can say that the success of Taliban in the country after 1996 highlights the marginalization of traditional

religious leaders like Sufis and ulamas, creating a vacuum between the people and the state. International powers played an important role in this marginalization of the Sufis and creating tension within the society among various groups by promoting one group over other on the base of ethnic affiliation.

5.3 Epilogue

In conclusion we can say that nation building and modernisation of Afghan state could not the successful without the support of religious groups who acts as a link between the state and people. After the defeat of Taliban, the new governments had to decide how they could revive the traditional religious groups so as to create a link with the people through them, to build a new nation state. Through the help of this study we can safely deduce that only modernisation of state structure without the support of religious groups is only wastage of money and time with no success. One important fact coming out of this study is that, the tribal nature of Afghan society is still intact despite all the reforms and modernisation process introduced throughout 20th century. This forces one to thing why the process failed and what is the missing element that state could not reach to the people. The answer according to me lies in the fact the all the previous rulers from Amanullah to Daoud ignored the importance of religion in tribal society and emphasized more on superficial modernisation of the state. They could not realise that the best way to penetrate into the lives of people is through religion especially through the use of Sufis and their barakats.

This is my observation that a tribal society could not be directly converted into a modernized nation state through reforms in education or judicial system, it has to be done in phases by creating social acceptability among the people. This acceptability could only be gained through the support of religious leaders and their participation in state building as Nadir Shah did. The nation building based on western system would be a failure in Afghanistan and it should be based on mixing democracy with religion. It should be something like what Akbar the Great did in India or the Safavid in Iran did to break the tribal-religious alliance for creating great Empire in the region. The breaking of this tribal- religious alliance is very important to create a modern nation state in Afghanistan. This could be easily done by bringing religious leader under state control with active participation of them in administration of the country.

This study also highlights some new areas of research through which the present condition of the country could be improved like the integration of religious education and institution into modern education system through the help of mullahs and ulamas; importance of women in nation building in traditional societies like Afghanistan; revival of Sufi culture through promotion of Sufi tourism as Pakistan during Bhutto's period did; ways and means to improve Sufi-state relation.

Glossary

akhund: a title of respect given to eminent religious teachers, a mawlawi.

Alim: a learned man (especially in religious knowledge).

Amir: lit. 'military commander'. The title of Afghan rulers until King Amanullah introduced the title of King (shah).

barakat: (sing. Baraka) blessing, 'beneficent force' (of divine origin). God may imbue his prophets with barakat, some of which may touch ordinary people in various-sometimes strange-ways.

Basmach: lit. bad-ma'ash which means a rascal and villain. Has come to denote the Muslim resistance to Soviet rule in Central Asia in the 1930s and 1930s.

Caliph: the political and religious head of Islamic government; deputy of the Prophet, also known as the commander of the Faithful and Imam.

darbar: the court or levee of a prince; an audience chamber.

Dhikr: '   reminding oneself'. Ritual prayer or litany practised by Sufis for the purpose of glorifying God and achieving spiritual perfection.

Din: religion.

Fatwa: an opinion on a point of law, an evaluation of a religious questionor a binding religious pronouncement given by a mufti.

fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence.

Hadith: a tradition of what the Prophet said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence.

Hanahi: a legal school; a legist loyal to the principles and substantive law of Hanafism.

Hazrat: honorific religious title, in Afghanistan especially given to the head of the Mujaddidi family.

Ihtisab: enjoining good and forbidding evil; the duty and function of the muhtasib. Ihtisab is the office of the hisba (Irano-Turkish territory).

Ijtihad: 'to endeavour or 'to exert effort' to solve a problem. In early Islam this took the form of the exercise of individual reasoning or independent judgement but this was put to an end (in Sunni Islam) during the second century AH when 'the gate of ijtihad' was closed and qiyas came to the force. In Shi'a Islam, the lawyer qualified to use ijtihad is called mujtahid.

Jizya: in the early conquest a tax imposed upon the subject populations, which later developed into a poll tax on the dhimmi, i.e. leived on non-Muslims in Muslim states.

Khalwat dar anjuman: lit. 'solitude within society'; i.e. not to seek seclusion from society in devotion (from Naqshbandi Sufism).

Khan: originally this was a title, equivalent to Lord or Prince used among Mongol and turkic nomads. Hence the english derivation khanate, a state ruled by a khan. Also applied to various other chiefs and nobles. Besides this sense, in Afghanistan it has become a sort of respectful title of address.

Khanaqah: a building usually reserved for Muslim mystics belonging to a darwish order.

Khutba: a special sermon given by the khatib ('spokesman') in the mosque on Fridays in which the ruler's name is customarily mentioned.

Madrasa: institution where Islamic sciences are taught. In medieval usage, essentially a college of law in which the other Islamic sciences, incl. Literary and philosophical ones, were ancillary subjects.

Mawlana: scholars of religious learning.

Mawlawi: scholars of religious learning.

Millat: nation.

Mufti: an Islamic legal authority who gives a fatwa (opinion) in answer to an inquiry by private individual or a qazi (judge).

Muhtasib: he official entrusted with the supervision of moral behaviour and of markets. Normally a faqih, who apart from the above 'police' functions also acted as qazi (judge).

Mujtahid: legal expert, one qualified to exercise ijtihad (within Shi'a Islam only. Sunni Islam deems 'the gate of ijtihad to be closed).

Pashtunwali: Pashtun tribal code.

Pir: lit. 'elder'. In Sufism, the murshid (spiritual guid) is called pir.

Purdah: 'veil', 'curtain', the general idea that women should be secluded. The Quran, hadith and Hanafi code do not specifically prescribe the veil but rather decency in dress and behaviour. Veiling in Afghanistan was only an urban phenomenon which rural and nomad women was maintained in many other subtle ways in the countryside.

Qazi: a judge applying *Sharia*.

rawaj: customs, tradition (probably derived from Persian rawiya).

Rawshanfikr: 'enlightened', intellectual in the modern sense.

Sayyid: 'patrilineal' descendent of the Prophet via the sons of his daughter, Fatima.

Shah: king.

Sharia (*Sharia*t): the sacred law of Islam.

Shirk: idolatry, polytheism, attributing partners to God.

Silsila: line of spiritual succession in Sufi tariqat.

Sunna (Sunnah): a precedent, normative legal custom; a tradition (of the Prophet).

Tariqat: road, way, path; the whole system of rites for spiritual training within various Muslim religious order (Sufi orders).

Tazir: discretionary punishments; determined and meted out by a qazi, these punishments cannot reach or exceed hudud penalties.

Ulama: (sing. Alim) ' the possessors of ilm', religious scholars.

Umma: the Islamic community.

Waqf: a charitable endowment; usually, immovable property alienated and endowed to serve the interest of certain beneficiaries, such as members of the family, the poor, way-farers, scholars, mystics, the general public, etc. examples of endowments are mosques, schools and graduate colleges, hospitals.

Wakil: representative, authorized, proxy.

Watan: fatherland.

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