


**United States Intervention in Somalia(1992-93)
Realist and Liberal Explanations**

Dissertation Submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the award of the degree of

MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

RENU



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DECLARATION


I declare that the dissertation entitled “UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA (1992-93): REALIST AND LIBERAL EXPLANATIONS” submitted by me for the award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru university is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this university or any other university.



RENU

CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation



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“Dedicated to my Wonderful Parents”

**Who consistently supported me in every step of my life and
guided me to overcome all the hurdles strongly.**

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Renu

CONTENTS

Map

Preface

Abbreviations

Chapter: I Introduction

Chapter: II The Somalian Crisis: A Historical Background

2.1 Geography

2.2 People and Livelihood

2.3 Religion and Society

2.4 Economy

2.5 Somalia at Global Level

2.6 Emergence of Somalia as a Nation States

2.7 The Cold War Legacy

Chapter: III Liberal Explanation of U.S. intervention

3.1 Liberalism

3.2 Liberalism and International Relations

3.3 Liberal Theory and Humanitarian Intervention

3.4 Liberal Theory and the Somalia Case

Chapter: IV Realist Explanation of U.S. Intervention

4.1 Realist Theory and International Relations

4.2 Neorealism and Structural Realism

4.3 Realist Concept of Humanitarian Intervention

4.4 Conceptualising Realist Theory and the Somalia Case

Chapter: V Conclusion


PREFACE

In today's global politics United States of America plays a central and very crucial role. After the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989 it remained as the only super power of international politics. However, since then it has been enjoying the position of hegemon and influences the international issues directly and accordingly. There have been many cases in the recent history when U.S intervened in many countries without the formal invitation of local authorities of those particular nations. The recent Iraq case, Rwanda, Iran, Bosnia, Kosovo and so on are the examples of U.S. interventions. Moreover, the 9/11 incident, attack on World Trade Centre has brought tremendous shift in U.S. foreign policy and it started taking initiatives in world affairs more directly and interestingly, of course. In addition it has been trying to impose its policies and ideology over the victim nations. In this context it becomes necessary to study the determinants of U.S. foreign policy. In other words this research work seeks to examine the factors behind the U.S. foreign policy that it is always inspired by its own national interest or some humanitarian cause as well.

Realism and liberalism have been two most important theories of international relations which try to explain states' behaviour differently. According to realism states are always self centred and seek to maximize their national interest. On the other side liberals believe that states are cooperative in many circumstances and formulate their foreign policy for larger causes as well. Thus this research will try to understand U.S. behaviour of intervening according to these theories- realism and liberalism. In this way the Somalia is a good case to understand and examine the motives of intervention led by U.S. that whether it was result of U.S's own national interest or based on some larger ground also. In this context, the Somalia case is good instance of U.S. intervention to understand the internal and external factors which affects U.S's foreign policy. The East African country the "Republic of Somalia" has been facing civil strife which led to disorder and famine in the country. In these circumstances, the U.S. intervened in Somalia to offer some food supply and establish peace and order. Here, it is necessary to examine that the intervention led by U.S. was made to protect its own self interest or was motivated by larger humanitarian cause.

Abbreviations

A.U	African Unity
G.A.T.T	General Agreement on Trade and Tariff
I.B.R.D	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
I.C.R.C	International Committee of the Red Cross
I.M.F	International Monetary Fund
N.A.M	Non- Alignment Movement
N.F.D	Northern Frontier District
O.A.U	Organization of African Unity
S.L.A	Southern Legislative Assembly
S.N.M	Somali National Movement
S.P.M	Somali Patriotic Front
S.R.C	Supreme Revolutionary Council
S.R.S.P	Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
S.S.D.F	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
S.S.N.M	Southern Somali National Movement
S.Y.L	Somali Youth League
T.F.G	Transitional Federal Government
U.N	United Nations Organisations
U.N.H.C.R	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.N.I.T.A.F	United States led United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II	New United Nations Operation in Somalia
U.S	United States of America
U.S.C	United Somali Congress
W.F.P	United Nations World Food Programme



Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

Realism and liberalism have been the most important theories of international relations which seek to explain the behavior of nation states in world politics. According to realism, states only follow and are always inclined with their narrow self interests. Thus, to fulfill their national interest they always strive to maximize their power which leads to conflict and tensions in the world system. However, the realists believe that the possibility of wars cannot be abolished from the international system. Moreover, for them international politics is struggle for power. So, power is crucial for realists. For them world system is anarchic where all the independent nation states formulate their foreign policies in order to maximize their national power to fulfill their national interests. Thus there is always possibility of war and to maintain their well being and survival in the anarchic world order, states always seek to maximize their power. In short, states formulate their foreign policies and maintain foreign relations only to maximize their national interests. On the other hand, liberalism presents totally different argument from the realist point of view about the states' behavior. However, liberals argue that states' foreign policies are not only driven by their national interest but they are also based on larger global interests such as cooperation for humanitarian cause to maintain peace and stability in world order. Although liberals agree with realist that world system is anarchic as there is no global government to control the behavior of sovereign nation states. But at the same time they argue that through mutual interest peace can be achieved in this kind of anarchic world order. Moreover they claim that in this anarchic system only the most powerful states or the hegemon can maintain peace and order in the world system.

In this context, Somalia is a good case to study because this country has been going through serious internal civil strife since January 1991. After the overthrow of President Siad Barre the country went into complete state collapse. Thus, since January 1991 Somalia has been without central government which led to instability and anarchy in the country and caused famine and starvation throughout the nation. However, this situation generated the United States to intervene in Somalia's internal affairs in December 1991. In addition, it sent military troops and offered food assistance to the victims of the famine. I propose to study whether the United States'

intervention in Somalia was based on its own national interest or on some larger humanitarian cause. Thus, the entire research design will seek to study United States intervention in Somalia from both, realist and liberal perspectives to understand and explain the United States interest of intervention. Before we look into theoretical perspectives to intervention, it will be useful to understand the historical background of both the countries so that we can apply the theories in a constructive manner in Somalia case.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as a hegemonic power in world politics. The end of the Cold War allowed the United States to conduct a searching reexamination of its role in world politics. The driving force behind America's foreign policy was the containment of its cold war adversary. Since the end of the cold war the United States foreign policy has dominated the world stage. The global reach of the United States is backed by a \$14.3 trillion dollar economy, the largest national economy in the world, and a defense budget of \$711 billion which accounts for approximately 50% of global military expanding. From the establishment of the United States after the American Revolution until the Spanish-American war, United States' foreign policy reflected more on the country's regional issues as compared to global focus. During the American Revolution, the United States established relations with several European powers as France, Spain and the Netherlands to intervene in its war against Britain, a mutual enemy. After the revolution, the United States moved to restore peace and resume its substantial trade with Great Britain in what is called the "Olive Branch Policy". However, United States foreign policy has assumed a global role only after the Second World War. Soon after the end of the cold war politics, United States remained as the only super power in world politics. Initially United States had adopted the policy of isolation in international affairs and focused upon its regional and national affairs such as economic growth and security. Later on, after the end of the Second World War in 1945, United States emerged as a super power in international politics and started taking initiatives in global politics as well. This was a huge shift in United States foreign policy.

The United States position in the current world order is best understood as one of the primacy which has been mainly caused by the decline of the Soviet Union. Today, United States is the only great power in the modern history to establish a clear lead in the virtually every important dimension of power. The United States has the world's largest economy, an overwhelming military advantage, a dominant position in the key international institutions and a far reaching cultural and ideological influence. Moreover, the United States share of global production to nearly 50% after the Second World War. The United States' economy is more diverse and self sufficient than the other major economic power, making less vulnerable to unexpected economic shift. Today, the United States is not only the world's foremost economic power; it is clearly the dominant military power as well. Thus, the task before United States diplomacy is to create a new world order in which United States reduces conflicts by asserting its position as a leading world order. The substance of American foreign policy is to serve American democracy against its enemies and support and defend democratic nations against their enemies.

On the other side, Somalia, officially the Republic of Somalia and formally known as the "Somali Democratic Republic" is a country located in the Horn of Africa. Somalia had never been formally colonized. Somalia was a product of agreement between Britain and Italy to combine their two Somaliland colonies into a single independent state. Thus independent Somalia had come into being in July, 1960. Mathew (1993) elucidates that the new "Republic of Somalia" which became independent on July 1, 1960 consisted of only two out of the five parts of Somali nation- namely the British Somaliland and the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia and the other three parts, namely French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and the Somalis in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya remained under foreign control.

Somalia is merely an Islamic country based on clan system. In Somalia, traditionally the clans are led by Sultans, but in reality the elders control clan affairs. There are six major clans in Somalia- the Dir, the Isaaq, the Hawiye, the Daarood and the Rahwanwin. The Republic of Somalia adopted its name from its population (Lewis 2005). The Somali language is spoken all over the country (Contini 1969).

The Somalis, bitterly divided into tribes, are centered along the coastline where the political map locates the Democratic Somali Republic. Since the inception Somalia's economy has been remained as one of the poorest economy in the world. Its

productivity is primarily based on pastorals nomadism and, in some regions depends on agriculture. Most of the people in the country are nomadic- move from one place to another with their animals and semi-nomadic herdsmen whose principal measure of wealth is the camel. Due to its ancient brother ties with the Arab world, Somalia was accepted in 1974 as a member of the Arab League. A Muslim country, Somalia is one of the founding members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and a member of U.N and the NAM. Despite civil strife and instability, Somalia has also managed to sustain a free market economy. Moreover, in antiquity, Somalia was an important center for commerce with the rest of the world. Its soldiers and merchants were the main suppliers of frankincense, myrish and spices. For the first nine years of its existence Somalia was largely stable and peaceful, and came to be seen as something of a model for successful African statehood. In 1969, however things took a more violent turn following a military coup led by General Mohammad Said Barre. Then, later on there was an ongoing civil war in Somalia which took place in January 1991. The conflict has caused destabilization and instability throughout the country, with the current phase of conflict seeing the Somali government losing substantial control of the state to a rebel force. By the early 1990s, Somalia was gripped by a terrible famine. The famine was the result of a bitter civil war which had destroyed the nation's economy and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Due to the full scale civil war, the country has lost nearly two-third to one-half of the population, at least 14,000 people were killed and 27,000 wounded in the capital city Mogadishu. In early 1993, the United States led a United Nations' military intervention into the country. It is argued that the interest and reason behind the United States intervention, first and foremost was to end the famine and to prevent starvation.

On the basis of above discussion we have come to know that the United States of America as hegemonic power plays a supreme and central role in international affairs to maintain peace and stability. Therefore, in the period of civil war and instability in the Somalia, the United State as a single supreme power intervened in the Somaliland to reduce the starvation and provide a government based on law and order. However, it was not successful in achieving its objective in Somalia. Thus, this research design seeks to examine the United States interest of intervention in Somalia and to what extend it has been successful to achieve its objectives.

Review of Literature

Norrie MacQueen in *Peacekeeping and the International System* argues that there have been many arguments about the intentions behind the American offer during the period of instability and civil war in Somalia. The most skeptical explanation was that the Bush administration in its last weeks had consciously pretended a problem to pass on to the new president, Bill Clinton, who was about to take office at the beginning of 1993. There was definitely a high level of dislike between two men and their associates, which was unusual in presidential politics. But other explanations are more likely. The American offer came in the warm exhilaration of Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf in which a U.N. legitimized American-led coalition had successfully ended the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The expression of a “new world order” still had some significance. In his presidency, the Somali crisis offered George Bush an opportunity to mark his place in history as global humanitarian. Finally, of course, America more than most countries was subject to the continuing ‘CNN effect’ which showed the evident failure of UNOSOM’s initial efforts was stronger than ever. Whatever the motives were – political or psychological, for its creation, the so-called Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was quite simple, an offer that United Nations’ Security Council could not “refuse”. So MacQueen’s book elaborately discusses the motives and significance of U.S. intervention in Somalia with special focus on the George Bush presidency that began as a symbol of ‘humanity’. He presents the peace keeping experiences and the steps taken by the U.N. during the Somalian crisis.

Hugh Smith in *International Peacekeeping* discusses about the bitter Somalian civil war when President of Somalia Mohammad Siad Barre was overthrown from the country on January 26, 1991. Instead of indicating stability, the new order quickly fell upon itself, and the Somali state collapsed into a total anarchy. It is estimated that over three hundred thousand people died of starvation in 1992 alone. Humanitarian agencies around the world responded to the crisis, but their efforts were severely limited by the constant looking of relief did by the militias and bandit. In early December 1992, the U.N Security Council under Resolution 794 authorized intervention by United States-led coalition whose operation was quite simple to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia. In short, Smith has only explained the instable and anarchic situation of Somali people

and the humanitarian initiatives led by the United Nations Security Council which was mainly an authorized intervention of U.S.

Jonathan Stevenson in "Hope Restored in Somalia" explains the initiatives which were taken by the United States in the name of United Nations to control the food scarcity and instability in the Somalia and in this process 25,000 American troops were sent there. By the time, the first American landed in December, 1992, Somalia seemed to need a miracle. After taking control of Mogadishu other cities in south central Somalia, and the routes that connect them to the capital, the United States led forces known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) did succeed in dramatically improving food distribution. By the end of December, the number of malnourished children under five in Mogadishu had returned to near normal 10 percent, compared to the more than 60 percent 5 months before. Wider distribution has stopped migration by keeping hungry people at home and has enabled seed programs to take hold. But there are still people in Somalia in need of food assistance. Although relief groups started feeding and seeding programs in the region during the fall of 1992, a new offensive by Siad Barre Loyalists in early October disrupted planting and drove out aid workers.

The United Nations has also inherited America's public relation problem. The Somalia's initial enchantment with the United States troops cooled, they came to see Americans, like the United Nations, more as colonizers than as saviors. Somalia's recalcitrant politics, the United Nations neglect, regional apathy and internal anarchy all distinguished Somalia as a place in the direst need of assistance. But Stevenson, moreover, argues that the United Nations was slow to respond to Somalia's worsening crisis. It did not understand the depth of the catastrophe until late 1991, long after the famine and clan fighting had become critical.

John R. Bolton in his article "Wrong turn in Somalia" argues that the Bush administration set out clear relief channels and averts mass starvation in Somalia, resisting a more ambitious United Nations agenda. But Clinton administration embarked on "nation-building" and assertive multilateralism. The resulting violence and embarrassment cast doubt on the United Nations' competence in peace enforcement and nation-building. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, pressure has mounted to involve the United Nations in a growing number of countries that are experiencing internal civil strife. According Bolton, Somalia is the paradigm case. It

is therefore extremely important to clarify the historical decision-making record. What President Bush Originally decided and what the Clinton administration later did represented fundamentally divergent approaches. The Bush administration sent United States troops to Somalia strictly to clear the relief channel that could avert mass starvation. It resisted U.N. attempts to expand that mission. The Clinton administration, however, see about pioneering “assertive multilateralism” and the efforts at nation building that led to the violence and embarrassment that ultimately ensued. These failures raise larger question about the United Nations’ competence in more ambitious areas of peace enforcement and nation-building especially without enduring commitments from the United States.

Bolton concludes his article with three judgments:

First, the original united mission proposed by President Bush was deliberately and consciously expanded by the Clinton Administration. Second, the role of the Clinton administration envisioned for the United Nations in Somalia was a “Peace enforcement” role, similar to the original American-led coalition mandates rather than a more traditional “peacekeeping role”. Third, whatever the real meaning of “assertive multilateralism” that policy died an early death in Somalia. The U.S experience there demonstrates the truth that the United Nations works only when the United States leads the organization to a final conclusion. Finally Bolton elucidates how basically both Bush and Clinton administrations utilized the U.N. for satisfying their national interests in the name of “international security and preservation”. Actually, U.N. has become an instrument to implement US decisions over the world, specifically on weak countries.

Ken Menkhaus in “Governance without government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the Politics of Coping”, claims that since January 1991, Somalia has been without a functional central government, making it the longest running instance of complete state collapse in past colonial history. He assess that the challenges of state revival in Somalia and examines the roots of states collapse in the country. Menkhaus also discusses the failure of state building projects, tracks trends in contemporary governance and considers projects for integrating local, “organic” sources of governance with top-down, “inorganic” state building process.

He makes the following arguments:

First, the Somalia case suggests that state building is exponentially more difficult where the country has been in a state of collapse for an extended period of time. This finding points the need for more context-specific state-building strategies in zones of protracted state collapse. It also serves as a cautionary note that delayed external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty state building later on. Second, Somalia's governance without government has been shaped by the evolving interests and adaptation of a range of Somali policy makers. Somali constituencies today have economic and political interests in a certain level of predictability and security and a greater capacity to advance these interests, than in the days when Somalia was dominated by a war economy and warlordism.

In sum, the author claims that the problem in Somalia is not that state building itself is doomed to fail; it is rather that the type of state that both external and local actors have sought to construct has been impossible and has as a consequence repeatedly set up Somali political leaders and their external mediators for failure. After reviewing the above mentioned arguments by many international scholars we have come to know that all these scholars have only discussed about the Somalia Crisis and the immediate response of United States to bring stabilization and stop starvation in the country in a historical perspectives. But these scholars have not studied the internal conditions of strife and civil war which led to U.S to intervene in Somalia. The entire literature have analyzed the United States intervention through U.N in an authorized manner but they did not try to explain the United States interest of intervention and the consequences and the reason of its failure in maintaining peace in Somalia. The entire literature only assesses the history of United States and Somalia but they completely forgot to discuss the U.S's success, failure and interest of intervening in a theoretical perspective. Somehow they tried to defend the United States intervention in Somalia in the name of humanitarian cause. Most of the literature assesses the United Nations intervention in Somalia rather the United States. And as it well known that the United States celebrates a supreme position in the world order and plays a central role in international affairs, therefore it is necessary to understand its interest of intervention which has been neglected in the entire literature. Thus, this research will try to study the United States interest of intervention in the name of so called "humanitarian cause".

Scope and Rationale of Research

As we all know that Realism has been a dominant theory of international relations since the initial time, according to which every nation state is driven by its national interest and always try to maximize its gains. On the other side, liberals believe that states also take initiatives for cooperation and humanitarian cause without any direct self interest. In addition they claim that only through the international organizations such as U.N.O international cooperation and stability within the state and in the global system could be achieved.

As the hegemony and the supreme power of the world system, the United States plays a crucial role in international affairs. Thus, it is necessary to understand that on what basis the United States formulate its foreign policy and behave in international affairs. Whether the United States' intervention in Somalia was the result of its self interest or it was really motivated by the humanitarian crisis due to the ongoing civil war. Thus, the main objective of this research design is to examine United States' interest of intervention in Somalia from the both, the realist and the liberal perspectives.

Hypothesis

The United States' intervention in Somalia was not to protect any national interest but for larger humanitarian goals. Since the downfall of Siad Barre's regime in January, the people of Somalia have been facing internal civil strife and famine. Moreover, thousands of people died of malnourished and many became refugees. The country has been witnessing the worst crisis for its survival. Due to the full scale civil war, the country has lost nearly two-third to one-half of the population, at least 14,000 people were killed and 27,000 wounded in the capital city Mogadishu. Children were likely to die from malnutrition and diseases. In this account U.S. intervened in Somalia and sent military troops to protect the lives of thousands of people. It was aimed to protect the lives of the thousands of people who were injured and facing the malnutrition and provide them humanitarian aid. Therefore, the Bush administration sent 25,000 American troops to Somalia to stop the civil war and mass starvation. In addition the intervention led by U.S. was based on larger humanitarian ground. There was no other geo-political in interest behind the intervention. As a hegemon U.S. tried to maintain peace and order and cooperated with the victim country on humanitarian gro

The following questions will be examined throughout the entire research design:

What was the United States interest to intervene in Somalia?

What were the conditions which led to United States intervention in Somalia?

What were the consequences of United States intervention?

What did United States expect to achieve in Somalia?

Methodology

As the research design is about the United States' interest in the intervention of Somalia, first we need to have a historical framework of United States of America's primacy and foreign policy in the world affairs and relationship between both the countries where the realist and liberal theories of international relations could be applied. Therefore, during the entire research program historical-descriptive and theoretical analysis including realist and liberal perspectives will be applied. The research method will be a qualitative interpretation of relevant facts and figures, which would include primary sources (the original documents of United States aid to Somalia, the governmental archives, and the interviews and surveys of the authentic persons) and the secondary sources (the relevant books, journals and articles).

The dissertation is divided into five chapters.

In this first chapter the entire research problem will be discussed. It will try to provide brief information about the research design and related methodology and techniques as well. It will also introduce the scope and objective of the research. The central purpose of the second chapter is to identify the causes of civil war in Somalia. In addition, this chapter will examine the causes of the internal strife which led U.S. to intervene in the country. Thus, it will also deal with the historical, geographical, social, economic, political and cultural structure of Somalia. However it will also try to inspect the historical relationship between both the countries that promoted U.S. to intervene in Somalia. Importantly, an overview of Somalian crisis will be discussed throughout the chapter. In the third chapter, the primary objective will be to investigate the U.S. intervention in Somalia from liberal point of view. The chapter will be divided in four different sections. The first section of the chapter will try to provide some information about the liberal theory of international relations. Moreover it will endeavor to understand the liberal theory and its basic assumptions about states' behaviour. Then, the second section of the chapter will discuss about the

humanitarian intervention worldwide. The third section will seek to confer the liberal understanding of humanitarian intervention. Then fourth and the last section of the chapter will attempt to explain the U.S. intervention in Somalia from liberal point of view that there was no self interest behind the U.S. intervention.

The central aim of the fourth chapter will be to examine the U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist point of view. The entire chapter will seek to explain U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist perspective in three divided sections. The first section of the chapter will explore the realist theory of international relations. However, it will try to look into the realist understanding of international system and individual states' behaviour as well. The second part will deal with the realists understanding of humanitarian intervention. Then the third and final section of the chapter will seek to explain the U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist point of view that there was U.S's own interest to intervene in Somalia and send its military troops.

The concluding chapter will seek to analyze U.S. intervention in Somalia from both, realist and liberal point of views in a critical manner. Moreover it will try to produce an overall understanding of U.S intervention whether it was result of humanitarian crisis or driven by any national interest. In addition, in this last chapter a conclusion will be drawn on the basis of entire earlier observation that to what extend United States has been successful in maintaining peace and providing food assistance in Somalia. Moreover it will attempt to examine the objectives and consequences of the U.S intervention.

**Chapter 2: The Somalian Crisis:
A Historical Background**

The Somali Crisis: A Historical Background

Since 1991, Somalia, an east African country situated in the 'Horn of Africa'¹ has been facing famine. The famine was the result of a bitter civil war which had destroyed the nation's economy and displaced hundreds of thousands of people from their native place and made them refugees, who were looking for safety. This was the year when with the end of the cold war, Somalia became one of the world's bloodiest ethnic battleground. The country has been witnessing the worst crisis² for its survival (Biswas 1994: 194). Due to the full scale civil war, the country has lost nearly two-third to one-half of the population, at least 14,000 people were killed and 27,000 wounded in the capital city Mogadishu (Ommar 1991: 230). Children were likely to die from malnutrition and diseases. Although famine has been a common phenomenon in the history of Africa and Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia have faced the famine in the country's history due to natural disaster such as drought, climate instability and flood and this was the first time when the country faced the worst starvation in its history. Unlike the earlier famine, this famine was the also result of man-made civil war. However, drought has played a minor role in this crisis. Thus, this chapter seeks to examine the causes of civil war which led to U.S/ U.N intervention in the country. Due to this civil war people became vulnerable and dependent for their livelihood and needed external assistance. However the U.S. intervened in Somalia to provide food aid but could not establish state system. Yet the Somali Republic is still going through the civil war as there is still no permanent governmental system has been established. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to study the causes behind the civil war which completely affected the entire society and state structure.

¹The Horn of Africa is a vast spearhead extending into the Indian Ocean south of the Arabian peninsula. Politically the area comprises four states: the Somali Republic along the coast of the Indian Ocean; the French Territory of Afars and Issas- better known as Djibouti- an enclave at the southern end of the Red Sea; the Ethiopian monarchy in the center; and the Sudan at the base of spearhead stretching deep into the Sahara and north to Egypt.

² According to Aparajita Biswas, "Crisis we refer to a situation in which a system or structure "begins to experience serious breakdown in the process of reproducing itself in a form hitherto considered Normal." Peter Lawrence described the crisis situation as "a moment or specific time period in the history of a system at which various development of a negative character combines to generate a serious threat to its survival. See Aprajita Biswas (1994): 193.

Before examining the causes of the civil war which led to the crisis and famine in the country, first we do need to have a brief knowledge about the geographical, economic, and historical framework of the country because as we know that these factors play a very crucial role in formulating the policies and conducting the political system of a particular state. In addition, it is impossible to understand Somalia's political relations with the external world without having some knowledge of the country and of the climatic conditions which limit their economy and the patterns of territorial dispersion.

Geography

The Republic of Somalia has a total area of approximately 637,657 sq km (246,201 sq miles) and a population of 3,253,024 on the basis of a census taken in February 1975 (Lewis 2005). The February 1986 census recorded a total of 7,114,431 and the U.N. report estimates, the mid- year population in year 2002 was 9,480,000 (Lewis 2005). The size and population of the northern region (the former British protectorate of Somaliland) accounts for about one-fourth, whereas those of the southern region (the former Trust Territory) accounts for approximately three fourths of the country as a whole (Contini 1969). It has only two permanent rivers- Juba and Shebelle (Lewis 2005). I.M. Lewis, a scholar in 'Somali History' (2005) explains its geographical situation. According to him, it has a long coastline on the Indian Ocean in the east and the Gulf of Aden in the north, forming the 'Horn of Africa'. To the north, the country faces the Arabian peninsula, with which it has had centuries of commercial and cultural contacts. To the north-west, it is bounded by the Republic of Djibouti, while its western and southern neighbours are Ethiopia and Kenya. It controls access to the Red Sea and is closely linked to the oil rich region of the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf (Mathew 1993: 3). Geographically, the country can be divided into four topographic zones. As the geography shows, the Somali peninsula is an arid, semi desert unfit for cultivation and only suited for raising farming. This is especially true of the north-eastern and central part of the country which together constitutes eighty percent of the land mass. Moreover Lewis (2005) elucidates that there are only two permanent rivers- Juba and Shebelle rise in the Ethiopian highlands, but only the Juba regularly flow into the sea. The territory between these two rivers is agriculturally the richest part of the Somalia, and constitutes a zone of mixed cultivation and pastoralism.

Sorghum, Millet and Maize are grown here, while along the rivers, on the irrigated plantation, bananas (the core of Somalia's export) and citrus fruits are produced. On the other side the climate is also not suitable for the cultivation and the survival of the country. It is hot and dry, with an average annual temperature of 27°C, although temperature at higher altitudes and along the coastline during the June-September, with annual rainfall rarely exceeding 500 mm in the most favourable regions, which is also not suitable for the cultivation (Lewis 2005: 1016).

In contrast, the southern part of Somalia is agriculturally rich as the region is well watered by river Shebelle and Juba and has some unique socio-cultural life. The northern coastal plains that extend from the deserts of Djibuti along the Gulf of Aden to Cape Guardafui are especially arid. The whole physical structure of the region is dominated by the Golis and Ogo mountains that rise behind the coast. In comparison with the north, the southern part of the Somali Republic between the two rivers, namely Shebelle and Juba, is relatively well watered and constitutes the richest arable zone in the whole of Somaliland. Despite this general division in physical features and productivity, both northern and southern Somaliland is subject to a similar cycle of seasons associated with the rotation of the north-east and south-west monsoons. Apart from a variety of minor local wet periods, the main rains fall between March and June, and between September and December. Similarly the dry seasons are also distributed. Mogadishu, Capital of the Somali Republic and the other ports of the Southern Indian Ocean coast have a climate which though often humid is pleasant in the cool season. As a whole the environment is not promising. Most of the part of the country is semi-arid area of low rainfall and scrub bush. The distribution of rain is uneven and for the major part of the country cultivation is impossible. Mixed farming is practiced in the richer soils of the highlands in the west of the British protectorate and Harar province of Ethiopia due to their relatively abundant rainfall. The monotony of the seemingly endless wastes of bare plain which make up much of the northern Somaliland is broken in many places by massive and magnificent mountain ranges (Lewis 1961: 30).

Northern Somaliland is divided into three main topographical zones which Somali call Guban, Ogo and Haud. The Guban is the region largely of desert, coastal plains etc. This part experience scattered showers in the months of October to March which are sufficient to produce a good covering of green vegetation. The maritime hills are scarred with innumerable valleys carrying the northern run-off from the central

highlands. The Ogo highlands lie behind the Guban and extend southwards. These are fairly well watered. Due to variety of types of well this region provides the home-wells for those lineages which in the dry seasons customarily inhabit it, as they provide sufficient water for the needs of all livestock. The Haud, into which the Ogo descends to the south, is less favoured in water resources. Despite the fact that this land lacks permanent water, it is perhaps the most important pastureland of the north, and its rich grasses provide excellent food for camels. Like the southern part of the Ogo highlands, the Haud is intersected by numerous valleys and natural depressions. The pools in the Haud provide water for Pastoralists and for the less hardy livestock like sheep, goats, cattle, donkeys etc. To counter its deficiencies in water resources in some parts of the Haud artificial basins have been excavated by individuals using hired labour, by lineage-group, and by the Government. Throughout these three topographical zones there are four main seasons- two wet and two dry.

People and Livelihood

Ethnically and culturally Somalia belongs to the Hamitic ethnic group. Lewis (1961) says that in the first place the key to Somali politics lies in the kinship. Moreover, kinship ties based on clan lines defined political community, and the interplay of traditional codes of conduct (*xeer*) and Islamic law (*shari'a*) provide the backbone for law and order in the society (Jan 2001: 57). A Somali genealogy is not a mere family tree recording the historical descent and connections of a particular individual or group. Whatever its historical significance, in the sphere of politics its importance lies in the fact that it represents the social divisions of people into corporate political groups. Their closest kinsmen are the surrounding Hamitic peoples of the Ethiopian lowlands and Eritrea. The Somali language contains a considerable number of Arabic words due to many centuries of contacts between the Somali and Arabian coasts which have brought Islam and many other elements of Muslim Arab culture. Due to the arid conditions of the north, centre and extreme south areas, nomadism is the prevailing economic response, and mode of livelihood and social institutions in general are tightly adjusted to the scant resources of an unenviably harsh environment. Generally, people and stock are most widely deployed after the rains when the grazing is fresh and green; while in the dry seasons they are forced to concentrate nearer the wells and make do with what grazing can be found in their

proximity. Although the Somali pony remains the prestige beast, it is their camels which Somali most esteem. Milch camels provide milk for the pastoralist on which alone he often depends for his diet; burden camels which are normally not ridden except by the sick. In fact in Somalia, social as well as economic transactions of the pastoralists operate on a camel standard. Furthermore, the Somali culture comprising its song, poetry, folklore, music is considered to be one of the most beautiful in the world, but it never got proper support and publicity specially during the colonial period when colonial powers ruled Somalia (Aidid 1993: 15).

Religion and Society

Somalia is merely an Islamic country based on clan system. In Somalia, traditionally the clans are led by Sultans, but in reality the elders control clan affairs. In the traditional social system, however, the six clan-families into which the Somali nation is divided are generally too large, too widely scattered, and too unwieldy to act effectively as corporate political units. According to Lewis's thesis, the first scholarly study of Somalia, four decades ago (1961), seems valid in the current history, that the segment clan system remains the foundation of the pastoral Somali society, and that 'clannishness'- the primacy of clan interest- is the natural divisive reflection on the political level" (Lewis 1961). The Somali society is essentially clan based. There are six major clans in Somalia- the Dir, the Isaaq, the Hawiye, the Daarood and the Rahanwin. The dir, Issaq, Hawiye, and Daaroor- are mainly and most characteristically pastoral nomads, and the another two- the Digil and Rahanwin- settled in southern Somalia are largely agricultural (Lewis 1961: 7). However, there are several sub clans as well in all the five principal clans. Altogether, they number in dozens, each with its own leader. Some of sub clans have organized guerrillas armies, since the collapse of Somalia, which are not even answerable to the leaders of major clan. The northern region where some peace prevails is known as Puntland or Majerteinia. The dominant leader of the area is General Mohammed Abshir Musa who heads the Majertein clan's political wing known as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Reorganization of Somalia on clan-basis has always been the goal of many of the clan leaders. According to I.M. Lewis, "Of an estimated total of two-and- half to three million Somali, the Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Daarood collectively comprise well over two million, and, while all are originally of

northern provenances, are today widely distributed throughout Somaliland” (Lewis 1961: 7). Moreover, in Somali society, clans provide the fundamental basis for identity information.

Opposed to the hierarchical pattern of authority, Somali society is customary in practice of democratic decision making almost to the point of anarchy. Lewis (1961) observes that the principle of governance, of institutionalized hierarchical authority which is so important in so many other parts of Africa is here replaced by binding ties of patrilineal kinship. But in the modern situation of party political competition, such extended kinship links acquired new vitality and significance. The Somalis, bitterly divided into tribes, are centered along the coastline where the political map locates the Democratic Somali Republic. For thousands of years, the pastorals nomads of Somalia have been discussing and deciding their personal and tribal disputes most democratically under big trees in the open (Aidid 1993: 12). There is a logic and unity to the Somalis. Therefore, they have been described by Burtons as “a fierce race of Republicans” (Aidid 1993: 12). Furthermore, Aidid (1993) explains that the basic Somali society was based on liberty, equality, free trade, brotherhood, love, free expression of ideas, free speeches and they never accepted authoritarian regime or rulers even when such autocratic rulers tried to emerge. Then Aidid (1993) describes Somalia’s judicial system and says that the essence of the Somali judiciary has been clean justice. However, Somalis regard judiciary as the most important organ of state machinery which takes independent decisions. According to him, traditionally judiciary was to decide cases both penal civil. Besides, in certain areas in the North there was a Supreme Court which was supposed to take ultimate decisions. Moreover if the parties were not satisfied and happy over the decisions of the lower court, they had right to appeal in the Supreme Court and whatever the decided by the SC was accepted by the parties.

The Republic of Somalia adopted its name from its population (Lewis 2005). The Somali language is spoken all over the country (Contini 1969). A mixture of Mediterranean and Negroid stocks, speaking a language unrelated to their neighbours, and converted to Islam, they have for centuries pushed toward and been driven from the Ethiopian highlands. The social composition in Somalia is unlike that of other African countries. This is because the nation is made up of numerous clans or clans families. The nation consists of six main clan groups or families and they form 85 percent of total population. Finally, Somalia was proud of being the only

homogeneous state in the African Continent where the people speak the same language (Somali), pursue the same rural economy and share the same religion (Islam), same culture and same tradition, has virtually lost its elements of quality of being a nation- state.

People of this area are generally of secular orientation. Those who devote their lives to religion and in some sense practice as men of God are known as *wadads* or sheikhs who fulfil the tasks of teaching the young about Quran, solemnizing marriage and ruling according to the shariah in matrimonial disputes and inheritances, and directing the religious life of the community in which they live. But what is significant here is that in contrast to the position in so many other Muslim countries, Somali sheikhs are not normally political leaders and only in exceptional circumstances assume political power. In Somalia, each community has adopted Islam in slightly different ways corresponding to differences in traditional social organisation. Like, while in the north many lineage ancestors have been accommodated in Islam as saints, in the south where lineage organisation is less strong and important, these are replaced by a multitude of purely local figures that have no significance as founders of kinship groups. Thus while the Somali draw many of their distinctive characteristics, like strong egalitarianism, their political behaviour and opportunism, and their fierce traditional pride and contempt for other nations from their own culture, they also owe much to Islam which adds depth and coherence to those common elements of traditional culture which over and above their many sectional divisions unite Somalis and provide basis for their strong national consciousness. Lewis remarks that although the Somali did not traditionally form a unitary state, it is this heritage of cultural nationalism, which strengthened by Islam, lies behind Somali nationalism today. Society here is controlled by chiefs and is well arranged. Rich agriculture has not only changed the life style of people, it has facilitated the growth of urban population in Mogadishu, Merka and Baraanne. In spite of division of clan line, Somali society is ethnically and culturally homogeneous; they belong to the Hametic ethnic group (often called as Cashitic).


Economy

Like the geography, economy of a particular state plays a very crucial role in state building and the development of the nation. But unfortunately, since the initial time Somalia's economy has been remained as one of the poorest economy in the world. Its productivity is primarily based on pastorals nomadism and, in some regions depends on agriculture. There is a prominent urban-rural gap in the country. However, if geography is an indicator of the economy of a country, it could be said that Somali ecology gave birth to Somali pastoralism. About two-third of the population earn their livelihood from animal husbandry and related enterprises, a rare example in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of the people in the country are nomadic- move from one place to another with their animals and semi-nomadic herdsmen whose principal measure of wealth is the camel. Camel is the widely domesticated animal, though cattle, goat, sheep and other animals are raised by the people. Social life in country is not organized, as the pastorals move from one place to another with their camels, cattles and family members to earn money and fulfill their daily necessities. Until the '70s, Somalia was self-sufficient in grain, and its agricultural land is productive enough that the country should have been able to feed itself despite the drought. Those who were living in the agricultural area besides rearing the livestock were required to produce food and other items for the benefits of the society including the pastoral people who were dealing with domestic animals in area far from agricultural land (Aidid 1993: 13). Moreover they were free to sell their livestock and agricultural products in the market. In addition Aidid (1993) elucidates that there was competition in improving manufacture of farm animals and agricultural products.

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Somalia at Global Level

A Muslim country, Somalia is one of the founding member of the organization of Islamic Conference and a member of U.N and the NAM. Historically, relations between Somalia and Kenya have been close (Ofcansky 2005: 1023). However, there have been period of tensions between both the countries as well. In Kenya a diplomatic struggle was waged for two years to determine the disposition of then Northern Frontier District (NFD) where over 240,000 Somali lived (Gorman 1981: 35).



The first few years of Somalia's independence were marked by violent relations with both of her neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia (Gorman 1981: 35). Mathew (1993) expresses that the post independent governments of Somalia, both democratic and autocratic (1969-1991) followed the irredentist policy and supported secessionist movements operating in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and NFD in Kenya. Moreover he discusses that Somalia fought violent wars with Ethiopia in 1961, 1964 and 1977-1978. However there has been virtual state of war existed between the two countries for the most part of 1980s. Similarly, he expresses that Somalia was at war with Kenya from 1963 to 1967. However a temporary detente was adopted with the help of the OAU. The defeat in Ogaden war was a great failure for the country. There was a close link between Somalia and Soviet Union during the initial period of the Somalia independence. Somalia Republic attained its independence on July 1969. Soon after the independence President Siad Barre tied with Soviet block and achieved financial and military assistance as well. But later on, during the Ogaden war there was a shift between the alliance of Somalia and USSR and Somalia joined the western group. Furthermore, the 'Republic of Somalia' also obtained some financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.

Emergence of Somalia as a nation-state

Somalia, formally known as the "Republic of Somalia" attained its independence on July 1, 1960 (Lewis 1988). It was formed by the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, while French Somaliland became Djibouti (Ofcansky 2005: 1016). Somalia became independent, with the claims- based on self- determination and the rights of the pastorals. Actually, it was a product of agreement between Britain and Italy to combine their two Somaliland colonies into a single independent state. On June 26, 1960, the British Protectorate of Somaliland became the independent state of Somaliland (Gorman 1981: 35). Five days later, the Somaliland joined with neighboring Somalia, a United Nations Trust Territory under Italian Administration, which achieved independence on July 1, 1960 and they formed a unitary state called the 'Somali Republic' (Ofcansky 2005: 1016). Thus, independent Somalia- "the Somali Republic" came into existence in 1960. Mathew (1993) elucidates that the new "Republic of Somalia" which became independent on July 1, 1960 consisted of only two out of the five parts of Somali nation- namely the British Somaliland and the

Italian Trust Territory of Somalia and the other three parts, namely French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and the Somalis in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya remained under foreign control.

According to Thomas Ofcansky (2005), "British Somaliland became independent on 26th June and 1st July, having secured its independence, the former Italian Somaliland united with former British Somaliland as the independent Somali Republic". Before that, in 1886, both United Kingdom and Italy established protectorate colonies over northern and southern Somalia, with the aim of safeguarding the trade relations of its colony Aden and excluding other interest. In 1889 Italy established a protectorate over parts of Somali coast on the Indian Ocean south of Cape Guardafui. In the succeeding years the Italian occupation and administrative control was gradually extended to which became known as Italian Somalia. The Italian Somaliland became a base for the Italian conquest for Ethiopia in 1936. Later on, the Italian colony (the southern Somaliland) was captured by British forces in 1941 during the Second World War and placed under British military administration. Although in the Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, Italy subsequently renounced all rights and title to Italian Somaliland, in 1950, it (Italian Somaliland) became the UN Trust Territory of Somalia, placed under Italian administration for a 10 year transitional period prior to Independence (Ofcansky 2005: 1016) . The British Protectorate of Somaliland was established by means of a number of treaties of protection made by the British Government in 1894 and the following years with Somali clans inhabiting the African coast on the Gulf of Aden. During the Second World War British Somaliland was captured by the Italians in August 1940, and seven months later (in March 1941) it was recaptured by allies. After a period of British military administration, the British protectorate meanwhile had re-established to civilian rule in 1948, while most of the Somali areas in Ethiopia had been returned to Ethiopian administration. Under the U.N. Trust Territory's first general election on the basis of universal adult franchise was held in March 1959, where 83 of the 90 seats in the Legislative Assembly were won by Somali Youth League (SYL) (Ofcansky 2005: 1016).

As a result, northern and southern Somaliland attained their independence from the protectorate of United Kingdom and Italy on July, 1960 and became the "Democratic Republic of Somalia" and Mogadishu was declared the capital of the newly independent state. The President of the Southern Legislative Assembly (SLA) was declared Head of the State and the two legislatures were merged to form a single

National Assembly in the capital Mogadishu (Ofcansky 2005: 1016). A coalition government was formed by the SYL and Dr Abd ar-Rashid Ali a member of Darood clan was appointed as the first Prime Minister of the independent Somalia". Moreover, the new regime was established with the essential elements of the rule of the law (Contini 1969: 89). In addition the Somali authorities and people were inclined to follow the rule of the law.

Contini expressed that on June 27, the day after its independence, Somaliland's Legislative Assembly passed 'The Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law³', incorporating the proposed Act of Union previously sent to Mogadishu (Contini: 1969: 9). Additionally, section 1(a) of the new constitution stated that 'the state of Somaliland and state of Somalia do hereby unite and shall forever remain united in a new independent, Democratic, unitary republic the name whereof shall be the SOMALI REPUBLIC' (Contini 1969: 9). The law contained detailed provisions concerning the 'conditions of union', citizenship, the head of state, executive and legislative power, the succession to rights and liabilities and other matters. The new state was described as a 'unitary Republic' in article 1, paragraph 1, of the constitution (Contini 1969: 11). However, in the initial period the only unitary elements were at top of the state pyramid: there was a single government comprising ministers from the two top parts of the Republic. The constitution was prepared in Mogadishu during the Italian Trust Administration (Contini 1969: 56). However, there was not a single legal system in Somalia. There were two legal systems. One was introduced by the British in the North and the other one by the Italian in the South (Contini 1969: 88).

The first government was formed on July 22, 1960, with Dr. Abidrashid Ali Shermake as the first President of the independent Somali Republic. But in most respects the northern and the southern regions still remained as two separate states. There were two different judicial systems; different currencies, different organizations and conditions of service for the army, the police and the civil servants. Besides that different training programmes, outlook and habits between northern and Somali officials, even governmental institutions, both at the central and local level were also differently organized and were given different powers as well, and same was with the educational system. Although the Somali language was spoken throughout the country but it was not adopted as a written language because of lack of agreement on whether

³Law No. 1 of 1960.

to adopt the Latin or Arabic characters, or a specially devised script called Osmania. Therefore, English was adopted as an official written language in the north and Italian in the south and Arabic in both territories. According to the constitution, the new Republic of Somalia would be a unitary, democratic and parliamentary state and Mogadishu would be the capital of the Republic and seat of government.

The colonial history of the two territories had been far from calm and peaceful. Both British Somaliland in the north and the larger Italian territory in south had been seen frequent local uprising by the patchwork of different clans that had always coexisted uneasily in the region. For the first nine years of its existence Somalia was largely stable and peaceful, and came to be known as something of a model for successful African Statehood. A newly established regime Somalia is world's poorest country and had only the most limited resources, few trained leaders, a divided colonial heritage, and a history of backbiting tribes who wandered far beyond the ill-marked boundaries of the new republic. In this situation a central government had to be created, control maintained over the tribes, and a beginning made on economic development. There was almost no infrastructure to build few schools, roads, hospital and small and untidy towns. Since the independence, the country face development challenges with limited sources which has been responsible for the problem of starvation and internal instability. There are many factors which led to instability and internal conflict or both in the Somalia.

A Socialist country Somalia was established following a rebellion led by Major General Mohammad Siad Barre. General Siad Barre came to the power in a bloodless coup on October 21, 1969 who overthrew the country's democratically elected government of President Abdi-Rashid Shermake and Prime Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Egal and ruled the country until he was overthrown in January 1991 (Colin and John Drysdale 1993). Following the coup Siad Barre quickly positioned himself as a head of the state. In 1969, however, Siad Barre took more violent and wrong turn to establish himself as the head of the state on the basis of military coup and violence and President Shermake was murdered for political reasons. Otherwise, before that as earlier mention that for the first nine years of its independence Somalia presented itself as peaceful and stable state in the Horn of Africa. Although there had been the challenges of development and starvation but still in initial stage it managed to maintained the peace and order in state somehow. After the overthrow of President Shermake, it was quite clear that the State Assembly would elect a new President by

Egal, the army took over the control through a bloodless military coup and Siad Barre President of a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which includes army and police officers, claimed that he and his council had served for the preservation of the democracy, justice, order and to eliminate corruption and violence from the state and presented himself as a better option for the betterment and development of the state and established his rule in a violent manner.

It was claimed that civilian rule headed by President Abdulrashid Shermake was not able to make any breakthrough in rebuilding Somali state and society. Hence, the president of the SRC, Maj. Siad Barre came into power and became the head of the state as the next President of the "Republic of Somalia" in 1969. But after the establishment of Siad Barre's regime, the things suddenly got changed and Somalia became a revolutionary socialist state. As soon as, he took control over the government, he introduced a policy of 'scientific socialism' and, thus under the former Soviet Union influence the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was established in the state. As a result, all private organizations were banned. However, the Russians (former Soviet Union), increasingly interested in the area, came to provide Somalia financial assistance with \$35 million in 1963 (Bell 1973). Increasingly, the regime depended upon the Soviet Union, long a major source of aid. Between 1961 and 1972, the former USSR extended extensive economic grants and credits, and had been aiding in the construction of schools, printing plants, a radio station, a fish cannery, two hospitals, a milk processing plant, and the modernization of the port of Berbera. In 1974, Somalia and Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which gave the Soviet access to naval and other military facilities. In return Siad Barre was promised to receive larger amount of economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union. During this period, the army's dependence on Soviet Union's equipments and training greatly increased Soviet influence in Somalia. Due to Soviet influence and treaties, many key sections of the Somalia economy were brought under the government control. In 1975, land was also nationalized and farmers were given land on the lease from the state. But on the other side all the system was being operated in a manipulated and corrupted manner which increased violence and further led to civil war in the state. Actually, from the beginning, Somalia followed the irredentist policy (policy of violence and disorder) which was another factor of instability and civil war.

It was observed that the new head of the state was merely opportunistic and very less interested in the progress of the conservative Muslim society. Actually Siad Barre had been a complete failure in fulfilling all his promises and agenda as the head of the state on the basis of which he established his dictatorship. After the establishment of a revolutionary regime Siad Barre did not take initiatives regarding Great Somalia, but only focused on internal development. He merely, as an opportunist, focused on his individual interest rather the national interest. "However, in ruling the country President Siad Barre followed a double standard policy. On the one side in order to unite the entire Somali society, he officially banned the "Scourge of tribalism" which was associated with nepotism and corruption, and on the other side he himself was covertly relying on clan politics. Actually Siad Barre played the clan card on the basis of which his rule was marked by manipulation of ethnicity.

Thus many opposition parties and groups came forward against his corrupted administration. In these circumstances the Somali people viewed the attainment of the independence only as a half won battle where people were still facing the same problems of violence, corruption which caused mainly starvation and brought many diseases especially in children. Therefore, the entire Somali society was dissatisfied with the President Siad Barre's regime. Fourteen separate political groups with different aims and beliefs, some with well armed militants, joined hands together against the Siad Barre's dictatorship and corrupted administration and overthrew him after a long civil war which was motivated from the entire country's grievances. With the end of President Siad Barre's regime in 1991, the country went into the hand of clan and sub- clan warlords and their guerrilla groups who ousted him from power. But they did not trust each other and had never been successful to form a government of national unity. Thus the lawlessness and destruction caused a famine which all of sudden brought on humanitarian crisis in a large scale. It is estimated that over three hundred thousand people died of starvation in the 1992 alone.

According to Rakiya Ommar, "Most of the casualties were civilians and due to the rivalry between the forces of two ruthless men- interim President Mohammad Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, both of whom belong to same clan and the same movement, the United Somali Congress (USC) – has made Mogadishu an exceptionally dangerous place" (Ommar 1994: 199). As a weak state, the politics of Somalia state was more and more dependent on the clan politics. Significantly, these clan- based political- military groups have been regarded as the major actors in the

conflict. As a result of rivalry, Somalia went into the total anarchy and has never had a central government since then. Thus the lawlessness and destruction caused a famine which all of sudden brought on humanitarian crisis in a large scale. It is estimated that over three hundred thousand people died of starvation in the 1992 alone.

Both the regimes of independent Somalia whether based on democracy ruled of president Shermake or autocratic ruled by president Siad Barre supported secessionist movements operating in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and NFD of Kenya. In response to Somali challenge, Ethiopian have pointed out that the Mogadishu regime is a successor state which has had no historical empire. Somalia fought many violent wars with Ethiopia in 1961, 1964 and 1977-1978 and was at war with Kenya from 1963 to 1967 when a temporary détente was achieved with the help of the Organization of African Union (OAU). The defeat of Somalia particularly in the 1977-1978 Ogaden war was a disaster for the country. Inspired by the policy of irredentis, President Siad Barre launched a military effort to bring the Ogaden region of Ethiopia under his control. The Somali claims on the Ogaden region was regarded in Adid Ababa- the capital of Ethiopia, as a threat to the stability of the country. And it was in reality a threat to Ethiopia. Each Soviet shipment of arms, each new revolutionary project was being used to create instability and anxiety in the country. Ethiopia's revolutionary transformation to military socialism in September 1974 at first seemed to offer the prospect of an acceptable accommodation for Somali aspiration to self- determination in the Ogaden. Soon there was an internal disorder and anarchy in the Ethiopian state which Somalia took as an opportunity to reactivate claims to the Ogaden and the Somali speaking region of Ethiopia.

After the overthrow of the United Somali Congress (USC), of autocratic military rule of Siad Barre, who ruled the country for twenty- two long years, Somalia had immediately became the victim of clan rivalry. As Somalian society has been clan based, as a result after coming to power, the party had been divided between Abgal sub-clan led by the President Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the Hadi Gadri Adidi sub-clan led by Prime minister, General Mohhamed Farrah Aideed. However, the people of Somalia were trapped between the two rival wings of the Hawiyes clan. In June 1991, Aideed was elected chairman of the USC by a two third vote, but Ali Mahdi refused to step down as President. By October 1991, Ali Mahadi formed a government of eight ministers, and the Italian government promised massive financial support. In this respect the civil war was the result of military factions. The factions

among several local clan competed with each other to achieve the control of Somalia administration after the collapse of Siad Barre's regime. However, Aideed's militia force gained the upper hand and restricted Mahdi's supporters to a portion of Somalia's capital Mogadishu. Aideed then, concentrated his efforts on violent factions in Southern Somalia, which were largely responsible for the famine in that region.

Since the beginning there has been the situation of uncertainty and conflicts between both the clans which further led to a ruthless and bloody struggle in which civilians were exploited. Thus, Somalia turned into a state of war and state collapse. In large numbers men, women, and children had become the victims of disputes. Due to this, there was a mass destruction in which hundreds and thousands of people died because of starvation and malnutrition. In this way, 1991 which was the year when entire world's attention was focused on Gulf war but the tragedy in Somalia in the same year suddenly attracted the attention of media worldwide and became the daily headlines of national and international newspapers. This was the year when the regime based on dictatorship of the President Siad Barre collapsed and the state went into total anarchy. Since then the state has been without a central government and at war with itself (Ommar 1992: 230). In the first six months of the war alone, 14,000 people were killed and over 27,000 wounded in the capital Mogadishu (Ommar 1992: 230). The current disaster in the country, which is already a habitual of facing natural disaster like drought, is beyond words. The drought and famine had already taken the lives of 350,000 innocent human live. Some months back before the civil war in the Somali state, the UN reported that most of the people especially women and children were dying due to drought and famine. During the civil war people approximately 300,000, mostly women and children for the sake of their lives moved towards the neighboring country Kenya. But unfortunately women became the victims of violence and were raped at the Kenya- Somalia border. According to a report released by Africa Watch and the Women's Right Project, divisions of Human Right Watch, Somali refugee came to Kenya to escape and secure themselves from the violence and danger in the country faced the similar abuse. In a large number Somali refugee women and girls were attacked by unknown army people. On the other side people within the state were facing the problem of starvation and malnutrition. Today Somalia is a stateless state where there is no central government and rule and law for the maintenance of the society. Since then the country has become a symbol of human misery and needs international assistance which could provide it 'peace and meal'.

The stateless state of Somalia is costing the former nation in several ways. Many countries are taking extra advantage of the anarchy to exploit Somali resources and utilize the territory as dumping ground for the waste made by them. Somali themselves and UN officials noticed that many foreign ships from countries such as China and its renegade provinces of Taiwan had been dumping toxic waste in Somalia's territorial water. Somalia's water has now become an international dump site due to lack of security initiatives and surveillances by Somalia's national government- which is nonexistent. In this context the U.N. took initiatives as international organization and opened its office in Mogadishu for the sake of many human lives. However, it realized the internal anarchic situation of the stateless Somaliland and concentrated on reducing the famine of southern Somalia. For first nine years of its existence Somalia was largely stable and peaceful, and came to be seen as a something a model for successful African statehood. But later on there was an ongoing civil war in Somalia which took place in 1991. Most of Somalians are in ruin since 1991. It had no government, no police force, nor even basic services. Army made violation and attacks wandered the country, and went for stealing and lootings, and murderous warlords battled savagely for control of the capital, Mogadishu. The carnage and the drought claimed over 300,000 lives, and heartbreaking spectacles of emaciated bodies of famine victims were daily visited upon the public by the Western media.

The 1969-1991 Siad Barre dictatorship is directly responsible for the current famine. The Somali clan hardest hit by the famine, the Rahanweyn, was the group living adjacent to the lands of Siad Barre's clan, the Marehan, and consequently had much of its productive land stolen during the dictatorship (Africa Report, 11-12/92). It was this political conflict, not natural disaster, which created the desperate condition of many of the starvation victims seen on TV. Moreover, there was a widespread perception that the north had benefitted insufficiently from the Union, especially under President Siad Barre. Certainly, after the 1981 foundation of the SNM and the start of guerrilla struggle, the north became a government military target. Moreover, Biswas explains that large scale military offensive had been launched by Somali Armed forces in northern Somalia (Biswas 1994: 200). Furthermore, she elucidates that in 1989 Guerrilla warfare spread to the central and southern parts of country, when two new movements- United Somali Congress (USC) operating in the central region with the

support of the Hawiye clan, and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPM), supported by Ogaden living in the south- declared war on the government.

The Cold War Legacy

The Somalian crisis is a legacy of cold war politics between Western and Soviet bloc. Therefore it is also important to specially highlight the legacy of the cold war while dealing with the crisis in Somalia. In addition the cold war legacy (1945-1990) played a very crucial role in the Somali crisis. The strategic location of the Somalia invited cold war politics into the region (Mathew 1993: 4). The high level of Cold war generated foreign aid that Somalia received funded an expansive but unsustainable patronage and civil service (Rawson: 1993). Mathew (1993) describes that the regional disputes between Somalia and its neighbour countries invited super powers to interfere in their regional issues and use them for their own purpose. Furthermore, he elucidates that in this process Somalia received large quantities of weapons from both the superpowers and their allies as well. In addition, he says that during the first fifteen years of independence (1960-1975) the weapons came from the Soviet Union as the President Siad Barre had aligned with the Soviet world. Moreover, in 1969, Siad Barre had also made a socialist state. However Ethiopia's revolutionary transformation to military socialism in September 1974 led to a shift in the alliance between Somalia and Soviet Union (Lewis 2005: 1017). Moreover, he explains that now U.S. neglected Ethiopia and started supported the Somali autocracy. Thus the competitive arms trade and military aid from both the superpowers and other allies led to heavy buildup of arms and missiles in the country. In the process the USSR began to supply Ethiopia with weapons and on the other side Somalia broke up its treaty of friendship with USSR and expelled 6,000 Soviet advisers and experts (Lewis 2005: 1017). Furthermore, Lewis (2005) elucidates that the defeat in the Ogaden war and the break up with the USSR led to a gradual strengthening of relations with the USA. However, in regard a defense agreement was announced in 1980 which permitted the use of the air and naval facilities at Berbera by U.S. military personnel. In reverse the U.S. provided Somalia with substantial amount of aid during the 1980s. Thus the government in Somalia also distributed and utilized the weapons to meet the danger and threats from the internal rebel clan and from neighbouring countries as well, particularly from Ethiopia. As a result when fighting intensified in Mogadishu early in

1991 the government was practically unable to control the situation (Mathew1993: 4). Thus at the end of month- long intense fighting in Mogadishu Siad Barre was overthrown. The state lost its authority and went into total anarchy.

After a long and costly civil war which destroyed the entire Somali country and all of sudden transformed it into the famine and mass destruction throughout the country. However it caused the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who have been suffering due to the civil war and have become refugees. Since then the country has been at war with itself, particularly after the downfall President Siad Barre's administration on January 21, 1991. However, it was evident that in the first six months of the war alone 14,000 people were killed and over 27,000 wounded in the capital Mogadishu (Mathew 1993: 4). Furthermore, the current crisis in Somalia led by internal civil strife is a disaster beyond description. Soon after the one year of civil war 35,000 innocent human beings lost their lives due to war and famine as well. In addition, most of the country has been in the grip of the ruthless famine. According to UN report 2,000 people, mostly children and women were dying daily in Somalia (Mathew 1993: 4). It is estimated that over three hundred thousand people died of starvation in 1992 alone (Mellon 1993: 159). Thus the catastrophe in Somalia created one of the greatest humanitarian and political challenges to global community. However the humanitarian agencies around the world responded to the Somali crisis, but their efforts and initiatives were severely limited by the constant looting of relief aid by the militiamen and bandits. In this context U.N. intervened into Somalia under Security Council Resolution 751 and authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force and military observers to supervise it (Mellon 1993: 160). The first U.N. intervention in Somalia which came to know UNOSOM I was a typical peacemaking mission for the U.N. In addition the U.N. opened office in Mogadishu a few months after the collapse of Siad Barre's government. However the U.N's expansion campaign resulted in more violent as the Somali tribes fought to preserve their traditional system and their rights to the self defense. Moreover the U.N. has been failure to establish peace and order in the Somalian state. Thus, the failure of U.N. in achieving its objective generated U.S. to intervene in Somalia.

In early December 1992 the UN Security Council under Resolution 794 authorized intervention by a U.S. led coalition whose mission was quite simple to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia (Mellon 1993: 159). Furthermore, to stop the civil strife and control the problem of starvation in the

country, the United States of America sent military troops. President George Bush ordered U.S. troops into Somalia on December 4, 1992, in what he described as a humanitarian mission to ‘save thousands of innocents from death’⁵

Conclusion

On the basis of above mentioned discussion we can say that the east African country “the Republic of Somalia” became the victim of internal clan politics. However the clan faction led rebel caused civil war in the country and overthrew the current President Siad Barre from his regime. Thus the Somali country went into complete state collapse which caused famine and starvation throughout the nation. Due to the civil war and famine thousands of people died in the first one year of war. The tragedy in Somalia invited international community to provide humanitarian assistance in terms of food supply and maintaining peace and order within the anarchic state. Although, U.N. and U.S. offered their services during the civil strife and supplied food assistance but unfortunately both, UNOSOM and UNITAF could not establish complete peace and order in the Somalian society. The militias and bandits did not allow them to enter and looting of food products was being done by them. Thus the U.N. and U.S. could not succeed in achieving their objectives in Somalia. Besides, there was no permanent government till 2004 after the downfall of Siad Barre regime. In 2004, a transitional federal government (TFG) was formed. This had a 5-year mandate. Somalia is currently claimed as the sovereign territory of the Transitional Federal Government, internationally recognized as the Government of Somalia.

⁵ See “Africa Today: America’s Leading Magazine on Africa”, (January/ February 1993), vol. 38.

Chapter: 3 Liberal Explanation of U.S

Intervention

Liberal Explanation of U.S Intervention

In previous chapter we mainly discussed about the causes of civil war in Somalia. Due to this internal strife the country has been facing the famine and the problem of mass destruction. However, it promoted U.S. to intervene in the country. The liberal theory of international relations strongly defends the U.S intervention of Somalia in December 1991 from a humanitarian perspective. According to liberals, states formulate their foreign policies to establish peace and order at global level and on humanitarian ground as well. Moreover, they believe that states also take initiatives for international cooperation and humanitarian cause without any direct self interest. In this respect they assumed that the intervention led by U.S was made to provide food security and stability in the Somali state due to civil war. Thus this chapter seeks to explain the U.S. intervention in Somalia from the liberal point of view that the U.S. as a hegemon intervened in Somalia on humanitarian ground rather than any narrow national interest. But before examining the U.S intervention in Somalia from liberal point of view first we do need to have some understanding about liberalism and what does humanitarian intervention actually mean? Only then we can analyse the U.S intervention in Somalia from liberal perspective that states are not always influenced by and try to protect their national interest but takes their decision on humanitarian ground as well. In this way, the chapter seeks to explain the liberal argument of U.S invention which was done through military force to end the civil war in the Somalian society and prevent serious human rights abuses and was for larger goal. It relies basically on twin assumptions of liberal moral and political theory: that the primary purpose of U.S was to protect human rights, and that victims of war and famine were entitled to outside assistance.

Liberalism

Liberalism has been an important theory of international relations for a long time. We can trace the rise of liberalism from eighteen century France, through nineteen century England, to today's world of the twenty first century. It was a result of the breakdown of feudalism in Europe and gained world- wide attention just after the end of Second World War. After the Gulf War and the collapse of Soviet Union as well as communism it became famous as the only alternative to world order. Fukuyama

claimed that the collapse of Soviet Union proved that liberal democracy had no serious ideological competitor: it was “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1992: 48). He believes that western form of democratic government and political economy are the ultimate destination and that liberal capitalism was unchallenged as a model of political and economic development of individuals.

Liberalism is a comprehensive political doctrine. In simple words liberalism means liberty under the law. It primarily focuses on absolute individual freedom. It believes that states should perform a very limited role in public domain and individual should be left free from state interference and obligations. According to liberalism, a state should play a police-state role which means that the only task of state is to maintain law and order in its internal territory so that peace can be achieved and to protect it territory and civilians from the external attack and war. Thus, according to liberals, the only function of state is to provide security and stability to the nation and individuals should be left free in their political, economic, cultural, domestic domain, and so on. State should not make any interference in individual freedom. The liberals believe that human beings by nature are peaceful and cooperative, competitive in a constructive way. They are guided by reason and rationality, not emotions and greed and know their good. They typically believe that human beings are naturally in ‘a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, as they think fit without asking or depending on to will of other man’ (Locke 1960, 1989: 289). Therefore, according to them the state should perform the limited number of tasks which individuals are unable to perform themselves, such as national security, maintenance of law and order and currency. According to J.S Mill (1806-1873), “the state should take limited and selective action to supplement the market, correcting for market failure or weakness better to achieve social progress”. Mill believes that the state should “laissez- fair⁶” in most of the areas of life. Thus, liberals are merely committed to absolute individualism and believe in the supreme importance of the human individual and individual freedom (Haywood 2004: 29). Although they agree that individuals are fundamentally self interested but they take it as a positive- advantaged factor through which competition will increase in the society and provide benefit to all. They have also argued for individual competition in civil society and believed the capitalist

6 It means “let be, let pass”. Leave the individuals alone from state interference.

market system will promote competition and by allocating scarce resources in the society provide benefits to the entire society. Thus, in a jargon of political economy, liberal thinks that society is a positive-sum game. In a positive-sum game, everyone can potentially get more out of a bargain than they put in (Balaam and Veseth 2001: 48). In economic realm, they believe, it is the 'invisible hands' of market on the basis of which market should be operated. On the other side in political realm; it advocates constitutional and representative government which guarantees rights and individual liberty and privileged equality before the law⁷ (Burchill 1996: 29).

Whereas the classical liberals primarily emphasised on absolute individual freedom and determined limited tasks for states, new liberals advocate state system. Classical liberals place a particular focus on the sovereignty of individual, with private property rights being seen as essential to individual liberty. They hold that individual rights natural, inherent and exist independency of government. Besides, they mistrust the state and argue that society is like to regulate itself if state interference is removed. Hayek (1982) argues that all states activity is liable to undermine the freedom of individual. On the other side neo liberals shifted their attitude from *laissez-faire* system to a more collective system. However new liberals try to maintain some balance between absolute individual liberty and state interference. In addition they regard state as an important entity which should take necessary action for the development and betterment of the society. According to them state formulate its policies and distributes resources based on the principles of equality, liberty and justice. Therefore, neo-liberalism is also known as 'welfare state' or perhaps best understood as 'social justice'. It arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period in which the ability of a free market to sustain was being questioned. It challenges the close connection between personal liberty and a private property based market order (Miller and Paul: 2007). Moreover, new liberals came to doubt that free market was an adequate foundation for a stable and free society. In addition, they were losing faith in the market and their faith in government as a means of supervising economic life was increasing. The seeds of this new liberalism can be found in Mill's *On Liberty*. Mill insisted that the 'so-called doctrine of Free Trade'

⁷ It was the John Locke who for the very first time introduced the idea of limited government, representation and constitutionalism to protect natural and human rights of individuals. He championed the idea of limited government on the basis of social contract theory in which individuals make agreement among them and give their powers to their representatives.

rested on 'equally solid' grounds as did the 'principle of individual liberty' (1963, vol. 18: 293). Nevertheless, he insisted that the justifications of personal and economic liberty were distinct (Mill: 1859).

In short, neo liberalism emerged as a revised description of classical liberalism which tried to amend the traditional values of liberalism. It expanded the state's area of work. However, it claimed that state can play a very crucial role in the development of the society. According to them, the job of state is not only to work as a 'police state' and establish and uphold peace and order in the country, also to fulfil all needs of society for their progress and welfare. In contrast to classical realism, neo realism expanded the functions of state and tried to maintain some balance between individual's liberty and state authority. However, it also emphasised the importance of individual liberty but simultaneously, it put some restrictions over them and advocated states' legitimacy in order to provide basic facilities to its society. Moreover, it criticised the absolute individual freedom and tried to limit it. According to neo liberals state can play a important role for the progress and welfare of the society because it distributes resources within the society on basis of equality and justice.

Liberalism and International Relations

Since the end of the cold war there is no effective, global challenge to liberalism. It is understood as contemporary western-style democracy which is based on market-oriented capitalism. Liberalism, in this sense, is actively promoted by Western, and especially American government and theorists (Richardson 1997: 5). The earlier advocates of liberalism were most famous political economists, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. According to the famous liberal historian Stanley Hoffmann, "the international dimension of liberalism was little more than an afterthought of the projection of domestic liberalism on a world scale" (Hoffmann 1995: 160). As the theory of international relations, liberalism advocates free trade and capitalist economy as the way towards international peace and prosperity. It believes that conflicts and disputes among the states can be reduced by creating common interests in trade and economics. Today most of the global economic and financial institutions such as IMF (International Monetary Fund), IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), and GATT/ WTO (General Agreement on Trade and Tariff/ World Trade Organisation)

have been created on the basis on liberal ideology to reduce the tariff barriers and promote trade among the states. Although, unlike the realist they view international system anarchic⁸ but they do not identify it as the cause of war. They believe that in this anarchic system, cooperation among states is possible in international relations. In this regard, the liberals argue that with the help of international organizations such as U.N and international economic institutions like IMF, IBRD (World Bank), and WTO through negotiations possibility of wars can be reduced and cooperation and peace can be achieved in international relations.

According to David Baldwin, there are four dimensions of liberalism which influence the contemporary international politics: Commercial liberalism advocates free trade, capitalist economy as an instrument to achieve peace and prosperity at global level. Today most of the international economic and financial institutions are based on commercial liberalism. Second, republican liberalism believes in constitutional democratic system and claims that democratic states are more inclined to respect the rights of their citizens and are less likely to go to war with their democratic neighbour states. Third, sociological liberalism believes that today, at transnational level people and governments have become more interdependent for their various needs. Thus, they cannot act unilaterally and avoid cooperation with their neighbour states which however, promotes peace and prosperity among international community. Fourth, liberal institutionalism or neo- liberal institutionalism claims that cooperation among states can be achieved through 'institutions'. They see 'institutions' as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation among the national actors of international system. According to Keohane and Nye, "we live in an era of interdependence. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to a situations characterized by reciprocal effects among actors in different counties⁹." Interdependence operates where there no state is self sufficient to fulfil its requirement and dependent on other states to fulfil its all requirements.

8.It means that there is no central government and authority in international system that can control the behaviour of sovereign states which are motivated by their national interests and leads to conflicts and possibilities of war.

9. Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., "Interdependence in World Politics", pp: 122-123.

Moreover, they believe that only a hegemon¹⁰ can supply the public goods, such as security and free trade, which makes the international system function more efficiently and effectively. According to them, a hegemon or powerful state can play very crucial role in maintaining peace and stability in international system.

Liberal Theory of Humanitarian Intervention

There is no definite and neutral definition of 'humanitarian intervention'. Scholars and state actors try to interpret it according to their own interest and perceptions. The word 'intervention' refers the exercise of force and authority by one state or a hegemonic power to control the situation of instability and injustice in the territory of another state without any formal consent. Intervention basically denotes the interference of an external power, mainly by superpower of international system, in the internal affairs of another state. But still, it is more than interference because during the intervention period the external power or authority gets direct involvement in the internal matters of the victim state and sometimes undertakes it statehood and sovereignty instead of directing it from outside and providing aid. It merely refers to the involvement and forcible actions by one state or mostly hegemonic power in the territory of instable and victim state without any formal consent from the victim state in the name of humanitarian cause in order to prevent constitutional governance and human rights. It usually involves military force to bring stability in that particular state as the state system has already become failure.

Stephen Garrett (1999: 3) defines humanitarian intervention as "the injection of military power-or the threat of such action-by one or more outside states into the affairs of another state that has as its purpose (or at least one of its principal purposes) the relieving of grave human suffering" (see also the elements put forth by Natsios 1997: 73). The cause of the human suffering may involve "the systematic abuse of basic human rights by a cruel and repressive regime" or simply the "general breakdown of central government authority, leading to a condition of anarchy that in itself threatens those rights" (Garrett 1999: 3). Thus, humanitarian intervention

¹⁰ A hegemon is a most powerful state in terms of economy, politics, military, geography, technology and so on and operates and organizes international system, and somehow compels other states to do whatever it wants.

usually involves the use (or threat of use) of military force to impose some sense of stability on what may appear to be a chaotic situation. The military forces are not expected to provide humanitarian relief themselves although in some cases they provide initial nutritional and medical aid, but rather to restore some rule of law so that relief agencies may reach the endangered populations. Obviously some interventions are more difficult than other. Till 1990, according to United Nations Charter (Article 2 (4) (7)), humanitarian intervention is unlawful, precisely because it undermines state sovereignty. However, the principle of sovereignty is the basis of international law and the U.N. But after the collapse of Soviet Union and communism which led to the end of cold war politics open the door for humanitarian intervention. It was the time when most of the African countries and Yugoslavia were facing massive destruction and violation of human rights. It was realised in U.S and much of Western Europe that government should take initiative to bring an end to the internal conflict and strife in these countries. However, the word intervention implies the act of one state or group of states to influence the conduct of the internal affairs of a state and bring the situation under control. Although it is true that humanitarian intervention undermines state sovereignty. But it is always argued that humanitarian intervention is done in order to stop violation of human rights and maintain peace and order in the constitutionally failed state. Therefore, they claim that wars and military led intervention are justifiable if they are made on humanitarian ground. The idea of military intervention to put an end to humanitarian crisis is, in certain circumstances, justified. It is a policy of liberal interventionism which includes the proposition of military in intervention to stop genocide is, in certain situations, justified. Sometimes the word liberal interventionism overlaps with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It is more than humanitarian intervention. It includes other things than the principle of humanitarian intervention such as regime change and war. But still, these two are interchangeable.

The doctrine of humanitarian intervention or liberal interventionism is associated with the name of Tony Blair. Blair's doctrine of 'liberal interventionism' is what he called "the standpoint in need of being dumped". Its origin is generally dated to a speech Blair made in Chicago in April 1999. According to him, war is an imperfect instrument to stop human disaster, but armed forces are sometimes the only means of dealing with disasters.

Liberal Theory and the Somalia Case

Today in the era of globalisation which is basically based on liberal theory of international relations and capitalism, U.S possesses the position of an all powerful hegemon. It is the only great power in modern history to establish a clear lead in virtually in every dimension of power. It has the world's largest economy, an overwhelming military advantage, a dominant position in key international institutions, and far-reaching cultural and ideological influence which are magnified by a favourable geographical position (Walt 2005: 32). Moreover, it has direct control over international institutions such as U.N, I.M.F, World Bank, and W.T.O. In the U.N, the U.S is one of the five permanent members in Security Council, and thus retains veto power. According to William Pfaff, "today's international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony. The international financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve American interests. The international security structure is chiefly a collection of American led alliances (Pfaff 2001: 223). According to Colin Powell, today, America is a remarkable nation and the sole super- power left on earth, obligated to lead the world, and shoulder the responsibilities of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

The cold war's end in 1990 allowed the U.S to establish itself as a hegemon of international system and re-examine its role in world politics. Since then, it has been trying to influence the world order and intervene in global issues. Although it was involve in world affair in terms of peace making and security issues already before the collapse of Soviet Union and cold war, but the new world order permitted it to take direct initiatives and actions to control the world affairs without any threat and challenge. The year 1991 was the time when with the collapse of Soviet Union and cold war politics, United States of America emerged as the only superpower of international system. Since then, U.S. has been involved in peacekeeping efforts. There are number of instances of such interventions which were made in the name of peace making and humanitarian aid. The Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the

Kosovo, Rwanda, Bosnia and the Somalian case, are the examples of such interventions made on humanitarian ground. However, it is only after the end of the cold war politics that it has adopted a new meaning and a new dimension of peacekeeping. The end of cold war allowed U.S to take direct initiatives in international affairs such as peacemaking and global security issues without any challenge. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War, there has had pressure on U.S to involve in a growing number of countries which are experiencing civil strife and violence. There have been many instances of intervention on humanitarian ground to protect democracy and human rights. However, Somalia is one of them. This east African country became the victim of civil war between two rival clans and has been facing the instability and famine which promoted U.S to intervene in the stateless state.

Soon after the overthrow of Siad Barre's government in 1991 that caused by a civil war, Somalia turned into a complete state collapse and became a victim of the rivalry between the two clans. There was no government to maintain peace and order in the state and secure its territory and citizens from the external attacks. Ken Menkhaus states that since January 1991 Somalia has been without a central government, making it the longest- running instance of complete state collapse in postcolonial history (Menkhaus 2006: 74). Thus, the overthrow of Siad Barre's government and the civil war led starvation and famine in the country. Aparajita Biswas states that due to the civil strife, more than 25,000 Somalis were killed and over half a million homeless Ogadeni refugees crossed the border of the disputed region of the Ogaden and entered to the northern region of Somalia which put a lot of pressure on an already weakened economy and stateless nation. As a result, the state had now become more vulnerable and more dependent on humanitarian aid from the western-developed bloc (Biswas 1994: 200). The worse situation in Somalia in 1992, however, promoted or needed a humanitarian response from the U.S administration, as it is the only super power of international system and can provide such assistance. Thus, this situation promoted U.S. to offer American military force named 'Operation Restore Hope' also known as Unified Task Force on December 9, 1992, following UN Security Council authorization under chapter VII of the U.N Charter, to Somalia.¹¹ Its

11 S/ Res/ 794 (December 3, 1992).

mandate was limited to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and welcomed by the local authorities.

According to liberal theory of international relations, “only a hegemon can maintain peace and stability in international system and provide economic and military assistance as a benevolent and that states formulate their foreign policies on humanitarian ground as well.” Today, as the hegemonic power of international system and on some humanitarian ground, in November 1992, the U.S President George Bush announced that U.S would lead a multinational peace enforcement operation in Somalia. It was aimed to protect the lives of the thousands of people who were injured and facing the malnutrition and provide them humanitarian aid. Therefore, the Bush administration sent 25,000 American troops to Somalia to stop the civil war and mass starvation. By the time, the first American landed in December 1992, Somalia was seemed to need a miracle which can stop the violence and starvation in the state and bring some humanitarian aid. The state now became more and more dependent on humanitarian aid from the western bloc bilaterally and the UNHCR. In this process, a U.S airlift was authorised to assist in food distribution and up to 30,000 U.S troops were offered to ensure food deliveries to those in need, and to prevent looting. According to John R. Bolton, “the Bush administration sent U.S. troops into Somalia strictly to clear the relief channels that could avert mass starvation” (Bolton 1994). It is argued that it was made to stop the violation of human rights and provide humanitarian aid to the terribly demoralised and instable state. Furthermore Bolton (1994) elucidated that the force sent by U.S. under ‘Operation Restore Hope’ consisted of 24,000 Americans along with 10,000 troops from other mainly western countries.

As an international organisation, liberals argue that through international organisations peace and stability can be achieved and maintained in international relations. U.N. already had shown a deep concern about Somalia to stop the civil strife and maintain international peace. In July, 1992, the first 50 military observers were sent for U.N. operation in Somalia to monitor the peace in capital, Mogadishu. In January 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 733 under chapter VII of U.N. charter to stop civil war and the violation of human rights. By Resolution 733, adopted in January 1992, the Security Council acted under chapter VII of the charter

to impose a restriction on deliveries of weapons and military equipments to the entire military bloc in Somalia.¹²

Later, the U.N. stepped into overcome starvation, stop large scale killings and to bring the bitter conflict to an end. Many U.N. agencies, non- government organisations and international commission on Red Cross establish their mission for humanitarian assistance. The U.N., in April 1992, deployed U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) of 4,200 troops. UNOSOM was intended as a classic peace-keeping operation.¹³ UN Security Council Resolution 733 and UN Security Council 746 led to the creation of UNOSOM I, the first mission to provide humanitarian relief and help restore order in Somalia after the dissolution of its central government. Over the next year the mission expanded from humanitarian relief to include elements of "nation building," which translated into helping Somalia establish some sort of stable, workable, democratic polity that would ultimately prevent the need for future outside interventions. In addition United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, adopted unanimously on December 3, 1992, after reaffirming resolutions 733(1992), 746(1992), 751(1992), 767(1992) and 775(1992). The Council expressed serious concern at the worst situation in Somalia and authorized the creation of the United Task Force (UNITAF) to create a "secure environment" in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. However the UNOSOM was followed in December 1992 by the United Task Force (UNITAF), led by U.S. The current resolution determined that "the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance" constituted a threat to international peace and security. As a result, the incidents of killing, starvation and malnutrition reduced considerably. In 1993, a new U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) replaced the UNITAF. UNOSOM II sought to restore order, promote reconciliation and help to rebuild Somalia's civil governance and economy. But unfortunately U.N initiatives were proved ineffective in front of the clan rivalry and civil war. The U.N. Security Council could achieve little progress under UNOSOM. In November 1992, the Secretary General of Security Council Mr. Boutros Ghali advised in Security Council that 'the situation in Somalia has deteriorated beyond the point at which it is vulnerable to the peace-keeping treatment'

12. Greenwood, Christopher, "Is there a right of humanitarian intervention?" P: 39.

13. See the Report of the Secretary- General, Agenda for Peace (June 1992), UN Doc. S/24111, p.6and pp. 14-16.

and that the council had 'no alternative but to adopt more forceful measures to secure humanitarian operation in Somalia'¹⁴. Actually, the internal rivalry between the various clans and sub-clan and new president General Mohamed Farah Aided did not allow the deployment of 'U.N. Operation in Somalia or UNOSOM to intervene in its territory in the name of peace making and nation building. John R. Bolton claims that the U.N peacemaking programme or UNOSOM was too weak to protect the lives of displaced people and stop hunger in society. In fact, he argues, that the Somali gangs or the clans were free and stronger to violate the U.N. facilities, steal food trucks and fuel supplies. As a result the civil war in Somalia kept on and increased the number of victims of starvation and diseases due to malnutrition. Thus, the objectives of UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) –were completely failed to achieve state building and national reconciliation, establishing peace and protecting humanitarian aid and took over in 1993. In this context- the failure of UNOSOM, promoted U.S to take initiatives in this paradigm case and take the lead in providing troops for a substantial military operation in Somalia in order to ensure the relief operation. Although, the UNOSOM was sent in Somalia under U.S leadership as it plays an influential role in international organizations, but the failure attempts of UNOSOM remained Somalia as a collapsed state and promoted U.S to take direct initiatives in Somalia's peacemaking and state building process. However the UNOSOM was the combine efforts of U.N. and U.S to bring stability and stop civil strife in the Somalian society. But unfortunately the UNOSOM could not succeed in achieving its objectives and as a result U.S had to come forward to take the charge of this humanitarian crisis and was willing to keep entire operational command and control in its own hand. The result was Resolution 794, which was adopted collectively on 3 December 1992. This resolution welcomed the U.S offer and various other countries to provide troops for peacemaking in the Somaliland. According to this resolution, U.S. was authorized to use all necessary means to achieve peace and stability the country.

Thus, after the failure of U.N, to establish peace and security in Somalia, U.S. as a hegemon and supreme power of international system, as liberal believes, tried to stop the civil war and starvation in the Somali state. In this peacemaking process, they sent 25,000 troops to Somalia, a country which was going through severe humanitarian crisis. December 1992, after U.N Security Council Resolution 794, was the first time

14. UN Doc S/ 24868.

when U.S took direct initiatives to provide food security and stability to displaced people of Somalia due to ongoing civil war and famine. Meanwhile, "Operation Restore Hope" was America's an expansive and dramatic humanitarian initiative in this context. President Bush justified his decision to intervene by saying that 'some crisis in the world cannot be resolved without American intervention.'¹⁵

At the peak of the famine, in August 1992, the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 4.5 million people were facing starvation and hunger. According to figure from the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP), one half of the people in the country's south- central region, more than 500,000 people had died of hunger due to violence caused by civil war by December 1992. Moreover, around 1 million people of 7 million died due to hunger, according to ICRC. In this way Somalia, a complete state failure country needed help around the world. All these circumstances and humanitarian factors led U.S to intervene in Somalia to provide basic facilities and assistance for the sake of thousands of human lives. Bush was embarrassed by the fact that the 'new world order', which was identified with American- leadership, was now characterised by the mass starvation of Somali children. Therefore, U.S took control of Mogadishu and eight other cities of south-central region and led forces known as Unified Task Force (UNITAF) which was succeed in food distribution. The America-led UNITAF was authorised by Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, and its mandate was to use all measures necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, to stop organised militias and bandits from looting convey of relief supplies and to ensure that ceasefire were observed (Makinda 1993: 185). However, UNITAF, with more than 37,000 troops from over 20 counties, opened its supply routes and started food distribution. By the end of December, the number of malnourished children under five in Mogadishu had returned to a near- normal 10 percent, compared to the more than 60 percent 5 months before. Wider food distribution has stopped migration by keeping hungry people at home¹⁶ (Stevenson 1993: 139). In fact, by the May 1993, under U.S led UNITAF humanitarian assistance was reaching to those who needed it. Its impact on Somalia was immediate and positive. Thus, the UNITAF more than

15. *International Herald Tribune*, 4 December 1992.

16. Jonathan Stevenson is journalist based in Nairobi who has covered Somalia for the *Economist*, *Newsweek*, and the (London) *Sunday Times*.

UNOSOM became successful in saving the thousands of human lives in the areas most affected by the famine, mainly the southern region.

However, the intervention firstly made to establish peace and control the famine due to the civil war. But later on under UNOSOM II (May 1993- March 1995), it transformed into “nation- building” programme under resolution 814. In addition the nation – building resolution was aimed to re-establish Somalia’s political institutions and rehabilitating its economy. Moreover it was also desired to assure security and safety not only in the famine affected south central regions but throughout the country as well.

By early summer, at least 300,000 civilians had already died and in July the International Committee of the Red Cross re-iterated its six-month old estimates that 95 percent of the population of Somalia was malnourished and 70 percent in imminent danger of death by starvation. Virtually all available evidence suggests that the situation had become untenable long before November 21 (Western 1999). In addition Western describes that the U.S. decision in November 1992 came nearly a full year after Somalia had been declared the world's worst humanitarian emergency. It is also argued that television caused the U.S. to intervene in Somalia in 1992. Berrand C. Cohen argues that in the 1990s television has demonstrated its power to move governments. However, T.V mobilised the consciences of the nation’s public institutions, compelling the government into a policy of intervention of humanitarian reason. Michael Mandelbaum, explains that television pictures of starving people in Somalia created a political clamour to feed them, which propelled the U.S. military into action. Similarly, Adan Robert identifies U.S. intervention in Somalia as responding to the immediate pressure of media. The media was focusing on the starving children in Somalia. In addition, pictorial stories were being made for T.V. to mobilise the governments of various counties to provide aid to the starving people. Besides, according to liberal interpretation, perhaps the most common explanation for the U.S. intervention was that stunning images of starving children on daily news broadcasts. However it irritated not only the American public, but also President Bush and his key military advisors. Likewise, the general impression is that these graphic pictures generated moral responsibility and intense political pressure on the Bush Administration to respond aggressively to end the massive starvation.

In short, the CNN-Report made U.S. to intervene in Somalia rather than any strategic interest, according to liberal explanation. A second conventional explanation for the

U.S. intervention suggests that by November 1992, the humanitarian situation simply had become morally untenable. According to this view, President Bush and his key military advisors were morally outraged by the increasing reports of massive starvation. By mid-November, they concluded that the situation was dire; that only the United States possessed the capabilities to off-set the enormous humanitarian crisis; and that Somalia was a case where the mission of providing security for humanitarian relief was well-defined and do-able.

On this ground the liberals claim that the intervention was merely made to stop the starvation. Thus it was an act of human solidarity as it did it in Rwanda, Iraq and so on. There were no other factors that promoted U.S. to take initiative in Somalia's strife. In addition the U.S. intervention in Somalia can be described as an ideational programme (Glanville: 2005). Moreover he elucidates that there was no strategic and material interests at stake, but still the U.S. Norrie McQueen expresses that U.S. was subject to the continuing 'CNN effect' which offered President George Bush an opportunity to mark his place in history as global humanitarian. Western (1994) elucidates that rival faction led by respectively by General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi caused collapse of states structure and left much of the country's civilians left much of the country population under rigorous threat of malnutrition and starvation. In the course of increasing security concerns, the UN withdrew its relief operations in mid-1991. Nevertheless, it left only a few non-governmental organizations to deal with the increasing humanitarian crisis. By January 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that almost half of the country's 6 million people faced ruthless nutritional needs, with many subject to death by starvation without some form of immediate assistance. Furthermore, he explains, by January 1992, 300,000 had already died of malnutrition; more than 3,000 people were dying daily from starvation; more than 500,000 had fled to neighbouring Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, severely taxing resources in those countries; and more than 70 percent of all livestock in Somalia had perished from famine.

For liberal humanitarianists, Somalia was significant, but it was only one of many regional conflicts that had humanitarian concerns. Wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Chad, Liberia, Mozambique, southern Sudan, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere all produced humanitarian challenges that diverted concentrated liberal attention and resources from Somalia. The few NGOs working in Somalia issued reports beginning in the fall of 1991 citing the catastrophic conditions. And efforts

were made by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to mediate a settlement between the warring factions. But unfortunately the UN mediation efforts could not stop the war between various clan factions and establish peace and stability in the Somali society. Thus the failure of U.N. in Somali civil war and famine promoted U.S. to acquire necessary actions in the Somali case. In addition according to Liberals, it was the responsibility of U.S. to intervene in Somalia and offer basic commodities. Moreover in early November, dozens of international relief groups and representatives from UNHCR again urged the international community to step up its efforts to alleviate the famine. There was a constant sense in news coverage that a full-scale U.S. military operation was the only way to save lives. "The American troops are the only solution. Somalia's long civil conflict and lack of central governing institutions presented an international security challenge. However terrorists have taken advantage of the state's collapse to attack neighbouring countries and transit agents and materiel. There was a constant sense in news coverage that a full-scale U.S. military operation was the only way to save lives.

It was believed that the American troops were the only solution.

As a result, in December 1992 American forces entered Somalia as part of a UN mission to feed starving people in a nation affected by internal chaos. The United States initially approached the intervention in Somalia with ad hoc decision making, but leaders in the field were able to impose their own strategy and integrate the elements of national power well. Prior to and during UNITAF's humanitarian operations, the National Security Council (NSC) operated without a strategy and on an ad hoc basis. The intervention was driven more by the president's personal feelings than by serious calculations of national interest. Western (1999) claims that for more than a year, the Bush administration, and General Powell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular, had steadfastly opposed calls for U.S. humanitarian military interventions in Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia, and elsewhere. None of these conflicts was relevant to U.S. vital interests. They were simply humanitarian tragedies.

Conclusion

From the Liberal point of view, we can say that the U.S intervened in Somalia to protect the lives of thousands of people who were facing starvation and malnutrition.

The internal- local authorities were not able to establish rule and order and to provide a stable and peaceful environment to the citizens. Thus there was an urgent need of food assistance and relief channels which U.S provided. In this way the intervention made by U.S was believed to protect human rights and stop ongoing civil war so that stability can be achieved and based on humanitarian ground. According to the liberals, the entire intervention was made on humanitarian ground. For them, as a hegemon of international system, it was U.S's sole responsibility to take action in peacemaking process and maintain stability in the world order. To some extends U.S was successful to achieve its objectives. However it was not successful to stop the ongoing civil war in the country and establish a stable government which can maintain and sustain the law and order in an anarchic society. But still it could make available the immediate food assistance and save the lives of the victims of starvation. It is estimated that upwards of a quarter of a million Somalis lives were saved. It was not completely successful in establishing law and peace during the ongoing civil war in the Somalian society. But it is measured that today large parts of the country are free of conflict and widespread human suffering. Although still today it not a peaceful and hopeful place, but in a better off as compared to the earlier situation of starvation. All these positive effects were led by U.S. to provide immediate humanitarian assistance. In this account UNITAF, a multinational force initiated by U.S. in December 1992- April 1993, quickly offered safety and started low key politics. In contrast to UNOSOM I (April-December 1992), it was welcomed by Somalia's internal leaders and became entangled in internal politics. Moreover, it maintained working relationship with all Somali factions and groups. In this way the liberal argument is justifiable that U.S. tried to achieve peace and stability in the Somalian society through cooperation with the help of internal factions and groups.

At last, according to liberal argument we can say that Operation Restore Hope or UNITAF was purely a humanitarian operation. It strengthened Somalia's collapsed civil society and challenged the warlords' political monopoly. Moreover, it protected the victims of civil strife and provided food aid. In addition, in December 1992 American forces entered Somalia as part of a UN mission to feed starving people in a nation threatened by internal disorder. Today Somalia represents one of the greatest tragedies of our times that the U.N. and the U.S. found it necessary to take immediate action and intervene in the Somalia society to protect the lives of civilian population. 'Operation Restore Hope' was a milestone in the history of the United States as well

as the United Nations. For the first time, the U.N. was involved in peace enforcement that is the armed intervention into a conflict without the prior consent of the state authorities involved in the hostilities. Operation Restore Hope expanded the role of the United States as well as the U.N. in the post Cold War era. In late 1992, the United States intervened in Somalia to prevent fractious warlords from hindering the distribution of international food aid in the midst of widespread drought and economic collapse. Moreover U.S. forces performed admirably (as part of UNITAF) and ensured food distribution. Following several months of low-level conflict, the United States sent U.S. special operations forces to Somalia to neutralize the most troublesome warlord.

Chapter: 4 Realist Explanation of U.S Intervention

Realist Explanation of U.S Intervention

The primary objective of the previous chapter was to understand the U.S. intervention in Somalia from the liberal point of view that states formulate their foreign policies on larger humanitarian ground. In this respect U.S. intervened in Somalia and delivered food assistance to control the problem of immense starvation. In contrast to liberalism, the realist theory of international relations claims that states always seek to “maximize” their national interest and formulate their foreign policies on that ground only. In this context the realists tend to claim that the U.S intervention in Somalia was made on national interest ground rather than on humanitarian crisis. However, they explain that after the downfall of Siad Barre’s regime in January 1991 which caused destruction and instability throughout the country, the intervention led by U.S. was driven and influenced by its own narrow self interest. Thus, this chapter seeks to study the U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist point of view that the intervention made by U.S was not on larger humanitarian ground to protect the lives of the victims of the civil war but to protect its national interest. Before examining the U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist perspective; we do need to have some information about realist theory of international relations and how do they view humanitarian intervention at global level, only then we can make the argument that the intervention led by U.S was based and inclined to its own national interest. Significantly, here it is essential to study realist concept of humanitarian intervention to understand the U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist point of view. Thus this chapter tend to attempt the realist understanding of humanitarian intervention at global level and will also try to analyse the U.S. intervention in Somalia from realist perspective that there was no other humanitarian cause rather the U.S’s own national interest.

Realist Theory of International Relations

Realism has been an important and dominant theory of international relations. It believes that states are rational unitary actors and their main goal is to attain power to survive in world system. According to realists, states always try to achieve maximum power to maximize their national interests that leads to conflicts and war in international system. It is regarded as the most influential theory of international relations which emerged as the powerful critique of liberal internationalism. As its

name implies, realism tries to describe the international system 'as it is or in a realistic manner' rather how it ought to be or how it should be (Burchill 1996: 70). Burchill expresses that the realist sees the world as a dangerous and insecure place where there is always the possibility of violence and wars. It provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war which is the regular condition of life in the international system. In this account they give high priority to the centrality of the nation state as the supreme political authority to provide safety and security to its territory in the world system (Burchill 1996: 70). However, they also recognize the importance and the role of most powerful- the great powers to explain the violent behaviour of nation- states. E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau are widely regarded as the founding fathers of the classical realism (Burchill 1996: 71). Although its primary assumptions have been expressed in earlier writings of Chanakya, an early Indian statesman and writer who explain it in the *Arthashastra*, Niccolo Machiavelli in *The Prince* and Hobbs in *Leviathan* but it actually gained worldwide attention after the writings of Carr and Morgenthau. Machiavelli, a Florentine political philosopher, who wrote *The Prince*, in which he held that the sole aim of prince, was to seek power, regardless of religious or ethical considerations. Likewise, Hobbs in *Leviathan* stated that the state of nature was prone to a "war of all against all". The realist theory of international relations believes that the international system is anarchic. According to them it is the single most important characteristic underlying international relations. According to Oxford English Dictionary, anarchy means lack of government. At international level, it means absence of laws, order and lack of a central authority which can govern the international system and control the behaviour of independent nation states which are always driven by their national interest and leads conflicts in the system. For realist, there is no central government and authority in international system to control the behaviour of the sovereign states and provide security in case of outside threat produced by other nation or rouge actors, like terrorists and violence. For them anarchy is the fundamental fact of international system. For Kenneth Waltz, anarchy is the first element of structure in the international system (Waltz 1979:88). Robert Gilpin defines the fundamental nature of international politics as "a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy" (Gilpin 1981:7). Furthermore, in this anarchic system each of the independent sovereign state considers themselves to be their own highest authority and do not recognize a higher power above to them. According to Morgenthau, the master key is

the concept of interest defined in terms of power in international system. He defines power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”. He emphasizes the importance of national interest.

Realist believe that mankind is not inherently kind and cooperative but rather self centred and competitive. Theorist such as Thomas Hobbs views human nature as egocentric and conflictual. They seek to maximize their self interest and less interested in cooperation. Moreover they can coexist unless given the right conditions. Early realist such as E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau argued that states are self interested and power seeking rational actors who attempt to maximize their security and chances of survival. Realist theory advocates the use of power to fulfil the interest of a nation. According to realist, “international politics is struggle for power” and possibility of war cannot be removed from the international system. In contrast to liberals, they believe that cooperation among states is impossible to achieve and difficult to maintain. Because there is no global government, it is important for nation to achieve as much as power as it can to ensure that its citizens are protected. Therefore there is always the possibility of wars and violence in international system. In this anarchic system, according to them, state plays a very crucial and central role in global affair. In this way state is a central actor in international affairs. Hobbs described international relations as a state of war of all against all, an arena of struggle in which each state is pitted against every other. According to him, international relations represent pure conflict between states and explained it as a ‘zero- sum game’. In zero- sum game only one state can get absolute gain. On the other side the other state is under the situation of complete loss which further cause conflicts and war in the international system. Moreover realists believe that there is no room for ethics, emotions and morality in international arena, everything that can be done will be done to gain and sustain power. In *The Prince* Machiavelli (1549) claimed that everything is just and moral to achieve its goal and objective in politics. According to Morgenthau and other realists, ‘international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power (Morgenthau 1948/ 1955: 4). He explains international system on the basis of existing facts and values. It is believed that the behaviour of the state as self seeking actor is understood to be merely a reflection of the people who comprise state. It is from fear, and war can be explained. Morgenthau argues that ‘politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature’ (Morgenthau [1948] 1955: 4) the nature of man that the essential features of

international politics such as competition. Thus human nature itself is regarded as the basic cause of wars in international affairs.

The concept of anarchy is used by realist to emphasize the point that the international realm is distinguished by the lack of central authority. Thus, Hans J. Morgenthau argues that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”. In addition realists argue that the basic structure of international politics is one of anarchy in which each of independent states consider themselves to be their own higher authority and do not recognize a higher authority above them (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008: 93). However under anarchy the survival of state is not guaranteed. Moreover self help is the principle of action in anarchical world to maintain its survival. According to realism each state is responsible for ensuring its own well being and survival (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2008: 93). Therefore power is crucial to the realist lexicon. However it traditionally means military power; but today it widened to include even economic, geographic, technological power. According to realist it is important for state to achieve more and more power to maintain its survival in an anarchic system. Therefore the core national interest of state is to maintain and sustain its well being and survival. It prioritizes national interest and security over ideology, moral concern and social reconstruction. To achieve national interest it is essential to achieve as much power as states can. Therefore realists believe in the principle of ‘balance of power’ according to which each state tends to attain power to compete with its nearest threat.

Neo- Realism and Structural Realism

Neo- realism derives most of its assumptions from classical realists. Unlike the classical realist, neo- realists also assume international system anarchic. Instead of human nature its primary focus is predominantly on the international system. However Kenneth Waltz’s book *Theory of international politics* (1979) has had a significant impact on the revision of the early assumptions of realism. ‘Like the classical realists, for neo realists states remain the principle actor but greater attention is given to the forces above and below that states go through level of analysis or structure (Waltz 1979). The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state with individual below the level of state acting as an agency on the state as a whole. Moreover, Waltz claims that the structure of international system is the key

factor in shaping the behaviour of states (Waltz 1979). As compared to classical realism, neo-realism claims that it is the international system which affects the behaviour of national states. In addition, states formulate their foreign policies according to the structure of the international system. For instance, the bipolar world influenced the behaviour of national states to join any of the blocs during the cold war. However, Waltz agrees with traditional realists when he states that major powers still determine the nature of the international system. In addition, neo-realists minimize the importance of national attributes as determinants of a state's foreign policy behaviour. To these neo-realists, all states are functionally similar units as they perform similar tasks and experience the same constraints presented by anarchy. Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchical system. According to realism, each state is responsible for ensuring its own well-being and survival. Moreover, they believe that states cannot rely on another actor or international institutions such as the UNO for their safety and survival. In short, states should not depend on other states and institutions to secure their own security. There is no emergency power or ultimate authority to which states can approach and appeal when they are in danger. Therefore, for realists, it is essential to attain as much power as states can to maintain and sustain their safety and survival in the anarchic world order. In this way, they believe in the principle of 'balance of power'.

According to them, the international system is a self-help system where only powerful states can maintain their survival. They, furthermore, argue that because there is no central government at the international level, there has been a threat to the survival of states, which is the main problem generated by the anarchic system. Therefore, there always remains the situation of fear and distrust. Whereas, for neorealists, the principle obstacle to cooperation among states with mutual interest is the threat of cheating. Thus, in this kind of anarchic system, every state seeks to maximize its power, which leads to conflict in the international system. Moreover, they argue that states are always driven and inspired by their own national interests and thus try to maximize their national power. The only state which has nothing to fear in the anarchic system is the hegemon. Waltz argues that the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security. Moreover, Mearsheimer explains that states tend to be revisionist and will expand their powers when given the opportunity. States seek to survive under anarchy by maximizing their power relative to other states, in order to maintain their survival and self-defence. Gilpin also defines that states are revisionist and seek opportunities for

expansion and suggesting that throughout the history a principle objective of states has been the conquest of territory. He predicts that hegemonic periods will be far more typical than balance of power theorists assert. In contrast to Mearsheimer and Gilpin, Waltz suggests that states are more concerned with maintaining what they already have, and faced with a threat from competition. So obviously, balancing remains the most efficient strategy. He holds that hegemony is a rare, and perhaps impossible.

Many neorealist scholars predict that cooperation is hard to achieve and difficult to maintain, and will only happen under limited conditions. All neorealists assume that states seek to survive in an anarchic environment, but they differ as to what is appropriate general strategy to pursue in order to sustain in the anarchic world order. Thus, Offensive neorealists suggest that states should maximize relative power gains. In contrast to offensive neorealists, defensive neorealist argues that states should minimize their power losses. Offensive neorealist, such as Mersheimer argues that only a hegemon can be certain of surviving in the international system. The only state which has nothing to fear in the anarchic system is hegemon. In contrast to offensive neorealist, defensive neorealist assert that the key to survival is defending the status quo. Waltz argues that the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security.

In summary, realism is bound to state. Moreover, the realist theory is 'state centric' or statist as Morgenthau has elucidated in the *'Politics among Nation'* (1948). The main argument of realist theory is that states are always engaged in a struggle for power to maximize their national interests. However, according to them international politics is a 'struggle for power'. Therefore there is always possibility of conflicts and war in the international system which cannot be removed from the system. In addition, realists consider the sovereign as the principal actor in international politics. This is often regarded to as the state- centric assumption of realism. In short nation- states always formulate their foreign policies to maximize their national powers to achieve their national interest. Before we discuss the factors which support to realist argument, it may be useful to define the realist point of view about humanitarian intervention.

Realist Concept of Humanitarian Intervention

We have already discussed about humanitarian intervention in previous chapter. In simple words humanitarian intervention means the use of military power and force to protect foreigners from harm. According to liberal theory international relations, it refers to the use of military force and authority to control the situation of instability and massive destruction in a humanitarian manner. But realists view humanitarian intervention apparently in a different manner. According to them there is nothing like humanitarian intervention in international relation, as every state is self centred and its national interest seeking. For realists, humanitarian interventions make irrational policies (Welsh 2006: 62). There are simply too many unknown factors and variables which the intervening state will not be able to control. More importantly, by intervening militarily in the name of humanitarian intervention or abstract principles, we create more problems than we solve. In addition they argue that in formulating foreign policy statesman should not aim to maximize global well being directly but rather focus on the immediate interest of their citizens. In arguing for the national interest, realist believe that states should further their own national interest because it is likely to produce the best overall outcomes.

According to realists there is no normative framework exists in international politics (Welsh 2004: 62). Moreover there is no relevance of norms, ethic and morals in international politics. The essence of realist ethics is that political leaders have an overriding moral obligation to advance the interest of their own. So the basic component of any realist ethics must be the consideration of the motivation for political action, based on a governments' obligation to protect and advance the interest of its constituencies. The mere fact is that a government engage in pure humanitarian intervention by definition shows that it acts contrary to best interests of its citizens. However so called political realists of which Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan are perhaps the most influential examples who have typically opposed the pure humanitarian intervention (213). In this way realists argue against pure humanitarian intervention. There are two quite different ways to understand realist's antipathy to pure humanitarian intervention. According to the first realist view which is called the moral nihilist view, all moral actions in international relations are irrational because the conditions for moral behaviour beings rational do not obtain

in the international system. According to the second realist view which might be called the fiduciary obligations, the states leaders always tend to serve the interests of their people. In this process even they violate the other recognized moral principles. In this way the state is dedicated to high morality to serve the interests of its citizens first in international system.

According to realist point of view of intervention, there is no room for moral concepts or moral behaviour at international relations (May and Brown: 213). Moreover they claim that states act wrongly if they act on the ground of moral principles. In addition they believe that humanitarian intervention put the states' survival at risks. At least more powerful state can engage in pure humanitarian intervention without risking their survival. (Buchanan 214). Welsh (2006) claims that even states that proclaim an ethical foreign policy rarely stray far from the dictates of self interest. A realist system of ethics determines that just actions in international relations must align these three principles: motivation according to states' interests, justification in terms of principles of legitimate action, and validity by reference to the principles of international order. Interventions motivated by general moral justifications or conceptual appeals to the validity of international order will either fail to occur or will succumb to half-hearted commitments (as the cases of Rwanda and Somalia showed). Interventions based on self-interested motivation alone (as some argued was the case with the 2003 invasion of Iraq), will strike resistance on the ground and incur great costs in morale, materiel, and diplomatic capital.

In short, realists believe that states should pursue rational decisions which could execute their national interest rather than focussing on humanitarian intervention. According to them rational means that the state is capable of 'identifying goals and preferences and determine their relative importance'. Thus states always formulate their foreign policies to enhance their national interests. Moreover, they are very less interested in cooperation and charitable initiatives.

Conceptualizing Realist Theory and the Somalian Case

As earlier mentioned, the realists believe that there is nothing like humanitarian intervention in international system and states are always inclined with their national interests. In addition, they assert that states prepare their foreign policies and maintain international relations only to serve their own benefits and interests. In this account,

the realist theory of international relations endeavours to explain the U.S. intervention in Somalia during the civil war and famine in 1991, in a realistic manner. Moreover, the realists argue that there were U.S.'s own hidden interests behind the intervention. In addition the U.S. intervened in Somalia in the name of humanitarian cause and provided food assistance to the people who were facing the starvation due to the instability and disaster in the country.

The realists argue that the U.S. is better known for interventions made on the ground of self interest rather than humanity. The war on Iraq is the better case to understand the U.S. tendency of intervention. In this respect they argue that there have been many geopolitical factors that promoted to U.S. to intervene in Somalia. However they believe that there was nothing related to humanitarian intervention. In fact U.S.'s own national interests were inclined with Somalian stability and peace. Moreover they tend to explain the U.S. intervention in Somalia in a realistic manner. In other words, they believe that the UNOSOM led by U.N and UNITAF were the result of U.S.'s national interest policy. Although due to the civil war and famine there was an urgent need of food distribution and establishment of peace and law but the U.S. intervened to maximize its national interest rather than the humanitarian goal. As the realists believe that states always tend to maximize their national interest, therefore they blamed that the 'Operation Restore Hope' was a programme to serve the U.S. selfish political motives.

The realists argue that there have been various factors that led to U.S. intervention in Somalia. Since the cold war period Somalia has been strategically crucial for U.S. foreign policy. The oil factor in Somalia is one of the reasons of intervention led by U.S. They claims that four Americans Petroleum giants had agreements with the African nations before its civil war began. If the ongoing civil war was stopped and peace was restored then the American could have obtain big rewards. Moreover, it is also argued that nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips in the final years before Somalia's pro-U.S. President Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown and the nation plunged into disorder in January, 1991. Industry sources said that the companies holding the rights to the most promising concessions are hoping that the Bush Administration's decision to send U.S. troops to safeguard aid shipments to Somalia will also help protect their multimillion-dollar investments there. Officially, the Administration and the State Department insist that the U.S. military mission in Somalia is strictly humanitarian.

One side the Officials, the Administration and the State Department of U.S. claimed that the U.S. military mission in Somalia was strictly humanitarian. But on the other side the oil industry spokesmen dismissed as "absurd" and "nonsense" allegations by aid experts, veteran East Africa analysts and several prominent Somalis that President Bush, a former Texas oilman, was moved to act in Somalia, at least in part, by the U.S. corporate oil risk. But corporate and scientific documents disclosed that the American companies are well positioned to pursue Somalia's most promising potential oil reserves the moment the nation is pacified. And the State Department and U.S. military officials acknowledge that one of those oil companies has done more than simply sit back and hope for peace.

For the United States, with a renewed interest in the colonization of Africa, Somalia is of key geo-political importance, lying at a commercial crossroads between the Middle East and Asia. A large portion of the world's oil tankers pass along its coast, particularly European and Chinese. There was also little discussion of the fact that northern Somalia (which has declared itself independent under the name Somaliland--Oakland Tribune, 12/21/92) contains mineral deposits and potential oil reserves. Considered geologically analogous to oil-rich Yemen across the Red Sea, it has been the site of oil exploration by such companies as Amoco, Chevron and Conoco. Not until six weeks into the operation (1/18/93) did a journalist for a major media outlet, Mark Fineman of the L.A. Times, report on the "close relationship between Conoco and the U.S. intervention force," which used Conoco's Mogadishu headquarters as a "de facto U.S. Embassy". At the outset, decision makers wrongly identified the problem in Somalia as "purely humanitarian" rather than political (Fox: 2000).

However, sufficient evidences were available against the U.S intervention which acknowledged itself as humanitarian. In addition, strategically Somalia has been crucial for U.S's cold war politics. Significantly, it controls access to the Red Sea and is closely linked to the oil rich region of the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf. However the strategic location of Somalia invited the U.S. and, somehow enhanced the cold war politics. Furthermore, Fox explains that in 1992, a famine, caused in part by continued fighting and lawlessness became sharply worse in southern Somalia. However news of the worsening conditions reached Washington through diplomatic reporting from the U.S. Embassy and, increasingly, by Newspaper and television journalists reporting from the south of the country. Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Nancy Kassenbaum (R-KS) visited Somalia, reported their observations and urged

U.S. action. Moreover Fox elucidates that in August 1992, President Bush, reacting to the worsening famine, ordered the U.S. military to accumulate an airlift of food and medicines into Somalia from Kenya. By late fall, there were persistent reports that, despite the U.S. airlift, the bulk of food aid was being pillaged by warlords.

Fox explains that President Bush, in announcing the impending U.S. intervention, dubbed "Operation Restore Hope," described it as "purely humanitarian." The mission of the U.S. and coalition forces, he said, was "to create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. However Bush appears to have been motivated primarily by compassion for starving Somalis, about whose plight he learned from media reports and from diplomatic reporting. However Bush remained active throughout the crisis in Somalia and encouraged his staff to develop new options to deal with problem. A telegram from the U.S mission to the U.N. emphasized the need to increase UN credibility in peacemaking. The telegram was consistent with Bush's view and had obvious application to the case of Somalia (Fox: 2000).

In January, 1991, the brutal dictator, Siad Barre, was overthrown from power and Somalia quickly descended into clan based civil war. Within two months the US State Department had declared Somalia to be in an official state of disaster and began providing humanitarian aid largely through NGOs and UN agencies. Glanville (2005) explains that in the first six months of 1992, the crisis in Somalia failed to generate significant interest in the Bush administration. According to him "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for African Affairs between 1986 and 1994, James Woods, recalls that while US administrations had perceived a substantial strategic interest in Somalia in the 1980s, the end of the cold war and the departure of the Russians and Cubans from East Africa had seen this interest give way to a new attitude approaching indifference". Moreover Glanville describes "while Andrew Natsios, Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance declared in January, 1992, that Somalia was the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world and staff at the Bureau of African Affairs tried to attract the attention of the State Department, Woods recalls that the violence and starvation remained a third tier issue for the administration." He suggests that there existed a hope at intermediate and high policy levels that the United States could avoid the costs and complications of a deeper involvement. The absence of any significant media interest in the crisis, in contrast to the strident calls for the

protection of Kurds in northern Iraq the previous year, meant that the Bush administration could ignore the Somali crisis and acquire little or no political cost. The US-led intervention in Somalia should be understood as representing a false start for the norm prescribing humanitarian intervention. Constructivist scholars such as Martha Finnemore were quick to mention Somalia as an example of a normative response to suffering in the absence of material self-interest. However, without material interests, the American commitment to intervention proved to be unsustainable. A key factor in the decision to intervene in Somalia was the belief that there was little risk of casualties. As soon as US troops began to accept a small number of casualties, support for the operation, within and outside the new Clinton administration, vanished. The Clinton administration's retreat from the norm prescribing intervention can be directly attributed to the loss of American lives.

Another reason of U.S. intervention in Somalia, according to realist, is there hegemonic attitude to power. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the USSR in 1990–1991, the United States quickly emerged as the world's lone superpower. Under the leadership of President Bill Clinton, the realization of the country's superpower status inaugurated another massive disagreement over the country's proper role in world affairs. However the end of the Cold War presented the United States, with all its power, an extraordinary opportunity to embrace the country's historic mission to humanity. Besides, in his inaugural address President Clinton promised “There would be interventions, he promised, not only to defend national interests, but also to satisfy the national conscience”. After the collapse of Soviet Union and end of cold war between the rival blocs allowed U.S. to establish its hegemony over the world and take necessary action in the international affairs. In addition the U.S intervened in Somalia not only to protect its geopolitical interests but to maintain its supreme power in the world's matters. However 1991 was the year when the cold war ended, simultaneously President Siad Barre was overthrown from his ongoing administration which led to disorder and anarchy in the state. Moreover this situation caused famine and invited U.S to intervene in the country and enhanced its hegemonic power throughout the world.

Conclusion

The American- led operation in Somalia that began in December 1992 continues to affect the debate over humanitarian intervention. According to realist argument U.S. led UNITAF programme in Somalia was directly related to its national interest. Somalian case, in other words, suggests that there was no such thing as a purely humanitarian operation. Additionally, there are many factors which support realists' criticism of U.S. intervention in Somalia. There were some geopolitical factors which inspired U.S. to intervene in the country and establish peace and order in order to safeguard its own petroleum agreements with the Somalia. Besides, 1991 was a crucial year for U.S's foreign policy to set up itself as a hegemon of international relations after the collapse of Soviet Union. Therefore it intervened in Somalia not only to provide food assistance and safety but to enhance its national interest first. Nevertheless, it sent American troops to Somalia to distribute the food item to the victims of the famine because there was less risk to the lives of American soldiers in the stateless Somali Society. Realists claim that when the Somali militias and gunmen attacked on American troops and many were killed, then the U.S. did not bother about the humanitarian cause and withdrew its operation from the Somalia. In this account we can make our judgement that U.S. led intervention in Somalia was more or less based on its own narrow national interest. According to realist explanation there was nothing like humanitarian intervention.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Conclusion

An East African country Somalia was established following a rebellion led by Major General Mohammad Siad Barre. In addition, General Siad Barre came to power in a bloodless coup on October 21, 1969 who overthrew the country's democratically elected government of President Abdi-Rashid Shermake and Prime Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Egal. He ruled the country until he was overthrown by clan rivalry in January 1991. Following the coup Siad Barre quickly positioned himself as a head of the state. In 1969, however, Siad Barre took more violent and wrong turn to establish himself as the head of the state on the basis of military coup and violence and President Shermake was murdered for political reasons. Hence, the president of the SRC, Maj. Siad Barre came into power and became the head of the state as the next President of the "Republic of Somalia" in 1969. But after the establishment of Siad Barre's regime, the things suddenly got changed and Somalia became a revolutionary socialist state.

As soon as, he took control over the government, he introduced a policy of 'scientific socialism' and, thus under the former Soviet Union influence the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was established in the state. As a result, all private organizations were banned. Actually Siad Barre had been a complete failure in fulfilling all his promises and agenda as the head of the state on the basis of which he established his dictatorship. After the establishment of a revolutionary regime Siad Barre did not take initiatives regarding Great Somalia, but only focused on internal development. He merely, as an opportunist, focused on his individual interest rather the national interest. However, in ruling the country President Siad Barre followed a double standard policy. Thus many opposition parties and groups came forward against his corrupted administration. Therefore, the entire Somali society was dissatisfied with the President Siad Barre's regime. Fourteen separate political groups with different aims and beliefs, some with well armed militants, joined hands together against the Siad Barre's dictatorship and corrupted administration and overthrew him after a long civil war which was motivated from the entire country's grievances. With the end of President Siad Barre;s regime in 1991, the country went into the hand of clan and sub- clan warlords and their guerrilla groups who ousted him from power. But they did not trust each other and had never been successful to form a government of national unity.

Furthermore, in January, 1991, the brutal dictator, Siad Barre, was overthrown from power and Somalia quickly turned into clan-based civil war. As a result the state went into complete state collapse. Since then there is no permanent government and central authority which can provide safety and basic facilities to its citizens. Ken Menkhaus states that since January 1991 Somalia has been without a central government, making it the longest- running instance of complete states collapse. Thus the lawlessness and destruction caused a famine which all of sudden brought on humanitarian crisis in a large scale. It is estimated that over three hundred thousand people died of starvation in the 1992 alone. This east African country became the victim of civil war between two rival clans and has been facing the instability and famine which promoted U.S to intervene in the stateless state. In addition, war and drought combined produce famine. As a result, by late January, 1992, 140,000 Somali refugees were reported to have fled to Kenya. Furthermore, the famine had destroyed the nation's economy and displaced hundreds of thousands of people from their native place and made them refugees, who were looking for safety. This was the year when with the end of the cold war, Somalia became one of the world's bloodiest ethnic battleground. Since then the country has been witnessing the worst crisis for its survival. Due to the full scale civil war, the country has lost nearly two-third to one-half of the population, at least 14,000 people were killed and 27,000 wounded in the capital city Mogadishu. Children were likely to die from malnutrition and diseases. By October 1992, an estimated 300,000 Somalis had died since the civil war began. A further 4.5 million of a population of only 6 million were threatened by severe malnutrition and disease. At least 1.5 million of these Somalis were deemed to be at human risk. Due to this civil war people became vulnerable and dependent for their livelihood and needed external assistance. However the U.S. intervened in Somalia to provide food aid but could not successful to establish state system. Nevertheless the Somali Republic is still going through the civil war as there is no permanent governmental system has been established.

The tragedy in Somalia invited international community to provide humanitarian assistance in terms of food supply and maintaining peace and order within the anarchic state. Although, U.N. and U.S. offered their services during the civil strife and supplied food assistance but unfortunately both, UNOSOM and UNITAF could not establish complete peace and order in the Somalian society. The internal militias and bandits did not allow them to enter and looting of food products was being done

by them. Thus the U.N. and U.S. could not succeed in achieving their objectives in Somalia. Besides, there was no permanent government till 2004 after the downfall of Siad Barre regime. In 2004, a transitional federal government (TFG) was formed in Somalia, backed by UN, AU and United States. Somalia is currently claimed as the sovereign territory of the Transitional Federal Government, internationally recognized as the Government of Somalia. The humanitarian crisis promoted U.S. to offer American military force named 'Operation Restore Hope' also known as Unified Task Force (UNITAF) on December 9, 1992, following UN Security Council authorization under chapter VII of the U.N Charter, to Somalia. Its mandate was limited to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and welcomed by the local authorities. On December 4, 1992, President Bush sent 28,000 US troops into Somalia as Unified Task Force (UNITAF). They were expected to police a ceasefire agreement but, for various reasons, the security situation had deteriorated significantly in Mogadishu by May 4, the following year, when the Clinton administration formally handed control over to the second UN operation, UNOSOM II. What had begun to occur was the dreaded mission creep that so frightened Washington. There remains disagreement about who was to blame but history shows that operations gradually expanded to include nation-building and disarmament.

The year 1991 was the time when with the collapse of Soviet Union and cold war politics, United States of America emerged as the only superpower of international system. Since then, U.S. has been involved in peacekeeping efforts. There are number of instances of such interventions which were made in the name of peace making and humanitarian aid. The Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the Kosovo, Rwanda, Bosnia and the Somalian case, are the examples of such interventions made on humanitarian ground. However, it is only after the end of the cold war politics that it has adopted a new meaning and a new dimension of peacekeeping. The end of cold war allowed U.S to take direct initiatives in international affairs such as peacemaking and global security issues without any challenge. 1991 has been an important year in world politics. This was the year when U.S emerged as a supreme power of international affairs after the collapse of Soviet Union. Moreover, the end of cold war politics allowed U.S. to set up its dominance over the world. Simultaneously, there was an ongoing civil war in Somalia, an east African country.

Somalia is a good case to study that on what basis U.S. as hegemon of international system formulates its policies. In this context realism and liberalism, the two most

important theories of international relations have tried to explain intervention led by U.S in different manners. Liberalism claims that the U.S intervention in Somalia was based on larger ground to protect the lives of thousands of people who became the victims of ongoing civil war. In this chaotic situation U.S. sent its military troops to Somalia to protect the lives of victim people and provide them food assistance. Furthermore, the liberals argue that there were no other factors which promoted U.S. to intervene in Somalia. However, the 'CNN EFFECT' made U.S. to offer food facilities to the victims of the civil war. In this way the media played a very crucial role to inspiring U.S. as a hegemon of international affairs to sustain the peace and order at global level. In this milieu, the U.S. offered to take the lead in providing troops for a substantial military operation in Somalia in order to ensure the safety. Finally, in Somalia American troops were sent in to guarantee that U.N. food aid reached those for whom it was proposed and was not simply hijacked by gunmen in the services of one other Somali clan chieftain. In this chaotic situation U.S. sent its military troops to Somalia to protect the lives of victim people and provide them food assistance. Within two months the US State Department had declared Somalia to be in an official state of disaster and began providing humanitarian aid largely through NGOs and UN agencies. In April of that year, the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed with the consent of the respective leaders of the two leading Somali factions, General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Deployment of UNOSOM I was slow and chronic lawlessness prevented aid from being distributed. However, the UNOSOM could not establish law and order in the Somalian society that invited U.S. to take direct initiatives in the ongoing civil war. As a result, The Council e authorized the creation of the United Task Force (UNITAF) under Resolution 794, to create a "secure environment" in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. The current resolution determined that "the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance" constituted a threat to international peace and security. As a result, the incidents of killing, starvation and malnutrition reduced considerably. In 1993, a new U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) replaced the UNITAF. UNOSOM II sought to restore order, promote reconciliation and help to rebuild Somalia's civil governance and economy. But unfortunately U.N initiatives were proved ineffective in front of the clan rivalry and civil war. Nevertheless, the U.S. also could attain complete success in

Somalia for maintaining law and peace but it saved thousands of lives by providing them food assistance.

On the other side, realism believes that states always seek to maximize their national interest, claims that U.S intervention in Somalia was also a result of its foreign policy to protect its national interest rather than humanitarian cause. Moreover they provide many domestic factors of U.S. foreign policy that promoted U.S. to intervene in Somalia. Furthermore, they believe that the UNOSOM led by U.N and UNITAF were the result of U.S's national interest policy. Although due to the civil war and famine there was an urgent need of food distribution and establishment of peace and law but the U.S. intervened to maximize its national interest rather than the humanitarian goal. As the realists believe that states always tend to maximize their national interest, therefore they blamed that the 'Operation Restore Hope' was a programme to serve the U.S. selfish political motives. The realists argue that there have been various factors that led to U.S. intervention in Somalia. Since the cold war period Somalia has been strategically crucial for U.S. foreign policy.

According to realists the oil factor in Somalia is one of the reasons of intervention led by U.S. They claim that four American Petroleum giants had agreements with the African nations before its civil war began. After the collapse of Soviet Union and end of cold war between the rival blocs allowed U.S. to establish its hegemony over the world and take necessary action in the international affairs. In addition the U.S intervened in Somalia not only to protect its geopolitical interests but to maintain its supreme power in the world's matters. However 1991 was the year when the cold war ended, simultaneously President Siad Barre was overthrown from his ongoing administration which led to disorder and anarchy in the state. Moreover this situation caused famine and invited U.S to intervene in the country and enhanced its hegemonic power throughout the world. According to realist explanation there was nothing like humanitarian intervention. The U.S.-led military intervention in Somalia, which began in 1992, had profound impact on U.S Foreign policy and the use of military force, in general. The ultimate failure of the international community's intervention in Somalia, and especially the death of 18 Army Rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993, not only forced the end of the intervention, it caused the Clinton administration to be more cautious about the future of such interventions and U.S' s foreign policy. The mission ended disastrously on October 3, 1993, when U.S. special operations forces were pinned down in a protracted engagement. After inflicting close to a thousand

casualties on the enemy and losing eighteen soldiers, a UN relief force extracted the special operations forces. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. military withdrew from Somalia. The failed intervention had momentous consequences at home and abroad. The Somali intervention also allows an examination of the U.S. government's ability to integrate its instruments of national power, as represented by the multiple national security organizations involved. The liberals argue that the U.S. intervention in Somalia was accomplished in humanitarian terms and a larger tragedy was averted. For them this intervention in Somalia was not a complete failure. Although the intervention led by U.S. could not succeed in establishing a complete state system but everything did not go wrong. There were many positive effects of intervention in terms of saving human lives and providing them food and other necessary assistance. Today large parts of the country are free of conflict and widespread human suffering. It is estimated that a quarter of a million Somali lives were saved from the famine and drought. Although Somalia is not a peaceful or hopeful place even after the U.S. led intervention but it is better off than the initial stage of crisis. But on the other side liberals are not able to explain that if the intervention was based on humanitarian cause then why U.S. withdrew its military troops from Somalia in the condition of attack from internal militias. In contrast to liberals, realists argue that states are self-seeking actors and prioritize their national interests first. In this way they claim that intervention led by U.S. was a result of its own national interest policy due to some geographical factors. Moreover, they explain that the U.S.'s oil agreement with Somalia actually inspired U.S. to intervene in the ongoing civil war and establish peace and order in the country so that the U.S.'s companies may not suffer. Furthermore, they raise the question that if the intrusion was based on humanitarian ground only then why U.S. withdrew its military troops from Somalia so early. But the liberals claim that the U.S. was not motivated by any national interest, the very first objective of U.S. intervention was to provide food assistance to the victims of the civil strife. However, later it transformed its interest into nation building. Moreover, the U.S. took the decision to intervene in Somalia as a result of media reports of the victims of mass destruction and famine. Thus it intervened in Somalia to secure the human rights and democratic system of the government. But liberal explanations totally failed to explicate the withdrawal of the military troops from the country without establishing peace and order in the Somali society. According to realists, even in a purely humanitarian intervention the decision to intervene is made independently of

the interveners self interest; even though such interventions seem justifiable on higher moral grounds-they are actually in effective.

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