THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN FOREIGN POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS SINCE 1998

Dissertation submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University

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MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation entitled **"The Role of Civil Society in Foreign Policy: A Case Study of India-Pakistan Relations since 1998"**, submitted by me in partial fulfillment of the requirements for award of the degree of **Master of Philosophy** of Jawaharlal Nehru University is my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree of this University or any other university.

Priyadarshini Ghosh.
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CERTIFICATE

We recommend that this dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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Priyadarshini Ghosh.

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CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations

ACCI	Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industry
AICC	All India Congress Committee
ANI	Associated News of India
ASSOCHAM	Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industry of India
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
CCS	Centre for Civil Society
CEPA	Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CII	Confederation of Indian Industries
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FICCI	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FPCCI	Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
FLO	Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry's Ladies Organization
IOR-ARC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
ICCI	Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ICP	Integrated Check Post
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force
IPL	Indian Premier League
ISKON	International Society for Krishna Consciousness
KCCI	Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry
LoC	Line of Control
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MFN	Most Favored Nation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MNC	Multi National Corporation
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRI	Non Resident Indian
PIO	People of Indian Origin
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
RSS	Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangha
RTI	Right to Information
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organization

UPA	United Progressive Alliance
USIS	United States Information Service
VHP	Vishwa Hindu Parishad
WCCI	Women's Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Introduction

In the last decade, the word 'civil society' has assumed prominence in popular phraseology as the most widely quoted, discussed and debated term. Yet interpretations among the scholars and the masses vary as to what they mean and how people come together for collective action. For some, civil society refers to the violent protestors in Seattle during the WTO negotiations or Greenpeace's actions against the transnational corporations. For some civil society refers to a bulwark against the burgeoning web of global capitalism. For others, civil society refers to the groups that act as the much needed catalyst for the spread of democracy and development and interests groups that span borders. Some others identify it as the network of enlightened masses that show solidarity with the poor or the subjugated. Or for the rest, perhaps the term simply refers to the growing connectedness of citizens- networks of peace, environmental or human rights activists, student exchanges, or the global media. It is because of such varied interpretations that the term 'civil society' has not yet become what sociologist Zerubavel in 1991 called an 'island of meaning' in the conceptual framework of modern social science.(Anheier:1995:18)

Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor (2004) argue, "The 'market', the 'state', and, in recent years, even 'civil society' have to varying degrees become such 'conceptual islands' that we use in everyday language as well as for policy purposes and in social science analysis." (Anheier et al: 2004:3) While we generally associate certain discrete qualities and characteristics with terms like the 'market' and the 'state', and have at least some notion of the quantitative dimensions involved, no such predictable understanding exists for 'civil society' per se.

The 1990s saw the emergence of a supranational sphere of social and political participation in which citizens groups, social movements, and individuals engaged in dialogue, debate, discourse, confrontation, and conciliation with each other and with various governmental actors—international, national, and local—as well as the business world. Of course, the fact that cannot and should not be forgotten is that there have

historically existed elements of a supranational non-governmental sphere. The Catholic Church or Islam has long had 'global' aspirations for centuries; international nongovernmental organizations like the Red Cross have operated above the national level for many years, as have the various peace and environmental movements. What seems new and different, however, is the sheer scale and scope that international and supranational institutions and organizations of many kinds have achieved in recent years. Kaldor (2000) writes, "the number of organizations and individuals that are part of global civil society has probably never been bigger, and the range and type of fields in which they operate never been wider: from UN conferences about social welfare or the environment to conflict situations in Kosovo, from globalized resistance to the Mutual Agreement on Investments to local human rights activism in Mexico, Burma, or Timor, and from media corporations spanning the globe to indigenous peoples' campaigns over the internet."(Kaldor: 2000:34)

Civil society is an ambiguous and a contested concept. Both the ambiguity and the contested character of the concept can be attributed to its 'newness'. It is ambiguous because the boundaries of the concept are not clearly charted out. Even where there is an agreement on the core, there is a disagreement on what is to be included and what is to be left out. In part, the problem arises because "the term has both normative and descriptive content and it is not always possible to find an exact correspondence between the two." (Anheier et al: 2004:5) But the fuzziness also arises because the concept ventures outside the many familiar and well established categories within the discipline of social science. 'Social participation' is taken to mean participation in the context of a national or local society, By contrast, we find it difficult to think of social participation in global networks, political action in relation to global events, and movements that take on global rather than national issues. It is a contested concept for the term is used differently according to political predilections and inherited understandings. Among policy-makers, especially in the West, there is a tendency to conceive of global civil society as the spread of what already exists in the West, especially in the United States, as a 'metaphor for Western liberalism' (Seckinelgin: 2002: 357). The movements that demanded change in Latin

America and Eastern Europe countries like Poland, Bulgaria in the 1980s are understood as having wanted to build democracy on a western model.

Civil society is seen as a way of diminishing the role of the state in society, both an apparatus for restraining state power and as a surrogate for many of the functions of the state. NGOs perform the functions necessary to help the developing countries to demand an equitable distribution of the fruits of economic globalization. Humanitarian NGOs provide the safety net to deal with the casualties of liberalization and privatization strategies in the economic field. Their activities are not about minimizing the state but about increasing the responsiveness and accountability of political institutions. It is about "the radicalization of democracy and the redistribution of political power." (Anheier: 2004:6)

Civil society is the expression for an expanded space outside the formal political circles, in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which they live through pressure on the state. Transposed to a global level, this definition encompasses the need to influence and put pressure on global institutions in order to reclaim control over local political space. The fact that these same words are understood in very different ways creates a shared terrain on which individuals and representatives of organizations, institutions can communicate with each other, can engage in a common dialogue.

Two kinds of resources have facilitated the growth of global civil society in the last decade. These include: technology and resources. An increase in internet usage has greatly facilitated the construction of networks and channels of communication and has allowed greater access for groups outside the main loci of international power. Thus, even membership of INGOs, of low- and middle-income regions has increased faster than membership in high-income regions. (Anheier: 2004:6) Likewise, there has been a big increase in the economic importance of NGOs during the last decade. Specifically, governments and international institutions have greatly increased the amounts of development funds channeled through NGOs.

The growth of civil society is also considered to be a reaction to globalization, particularly to the consequences of the spread of global capitalism and interconnectedness. Together, activism and developmentalism may explain why, after Europe, the figures on INGOs show the greatest membership densities not for other advanced industrial countries but for countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.(Anheier: 2000:7) The relatively low membership densities in East Asia, South Asia, and North America are to be explained, in the case of East Asia, by the relatively low degree of INGO organization in general and, in the case of South Asia (particularly India) and the United States, by the relative lack of interest of local NGOs in global issues.

In the foregoing paragraphs, the study tried to trace and understand the growing importance of the civil society groups. It is almost an accepted notion among scholars that one of the most prominent political and social developments of the post–Cold War era has been the growing prominence and influence of civil society groups in global affairs. These groups are playing an increasingly prominent role in nearly every aspect of foreign policy, from promoting democracy, providing humanitarian relief, propelling economic liberalization and even curing disease. The international landscape abounds with examples: after more than a decade of international sanctions, Libya was finally forced to accept culpability in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in part due to a civil lawsuit initiated by the families of the victims and a group of enterprising trial lawyers. The European Nuclear Disarmament movement in the 1980s was a noticeable case in point, growing as it had done out of a purely British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and exerting considerable pressure in favor of a nuclear arms negotiation. Less political but still a considerable factor with its five million members and offices in forty countries is the World Wildlife Fund which attempts to shame and even help countries which do not protect their endangered species.

However, a critical survey of the available literature on civil society highlights that the role of the civil society groups have not been highlighted to the extent it should have been. Available literature on the issue of foreign policy making has focused heavily on

the behavior of 'groups' which essentially is quite vague. Here groups mostly refer to the various business groups and the power lobbies. But foreign policy is not only about these lobby groups. It also has such other groups like the media, individuals and hi profile personalities and NGOs. Here in lies the rationale of the current research – specifically focusing upon the emergence and role of these civil society groups and figure out where they stand in contemporary times vis-à-vis foreign policy. Since the issue of foreign policy making constitutes an interesting area of study within the discipline of International Relations, so the question of 'influence' in the study of foreign policy decision making makes its study even more intriguing. As James N.Rosenau says, "knowing where and when decisions are made is the central consideration for strategies designed to influence those decisions." (Rosenau 1967:235) States make foreign policies. Which are the other actors that influence foreign policy decisions of a state? Do actors other than the state and its institutions play any part in shaping the foreign policy of a state? This is what this current research would focus upon.

J.Bandyopadhayaya (2003) writes, "While geography, economic development, political tradition, the domestic and the international milieu, military strength, etc constitute the boundary conditions within which decision making in foreign policy must take place, the rationality or otherwise of a foreign policy depends largely on the process of decision making at various levels: on the nature and extent of articulate public opinion on foreign policy and the manner of its expression, the institutions of the political parties concerned with foreign policy, pressure groups, parliament, the inter- Ministerial institutions concerned with national security and foreign policy, the Foreign Office, the Foreign Minister and finally the Cabinet." (Bandyopadhayaya: 2003: 34) In order to locate the real position of the various civil society groups in foreign policy making it is necessary to take stock of the various actors involved in the process of decision making. Therefore it is necessary to study the process of foreign policy making in general and decipher how much and what role these civil society groups play in such processes. This research will focus on such aspects in order to find whether political culture, domestic structure and type of leadership has any role to play in encouraging or discouraging these groups to play their rightful role.

The current research will focus attention upon the foreign policy behavior of India and Pakistan vis-à-vis each other since 1998 and not upon the foreign policies of these countries in general. The case study of India-Pakistan will seek to unfurl the reality of 'peace activism' which has been so pronounced in the recent past with a wide range of Track II initiatives, people to people contacts, the bus service and even cricket diplomacy, student exchange programmes and the initiatives of the Indian film industry in reaching out to Pakistan. In a similar vein a vital issue is whether peacemaking is also influenced by the role of the non-state actors and civil society groups? Is the dialogue process a result of the activism by the civil society groups or is Indian foreign policy all about the foreign policy elites within the MEA? Since the term 'civil society' has been debated widely in academic circles, the aim of this research is also to clarify the possible ambiguities associated with the terminology in the available literature in order to have a clearer understanding of the subject. In the process the current research will try to seek answers to questions like- what role do civil society groups play in foreign policy? Do they actually play any role? Or is their role always under the shadow of the all encompassing state? Has the advent of globalization catapulted them to comparatively significant position in contemporary times? How important is the influence of the domestic environment, political structure and leadership style in providing the civil society groups their much needed arm space in foreign policy? Where do the civil society groups in both India and Pakistan fit into the scheme of influencing foreign policy? What is the position of the various civil society groups on Indo-Pak relations? Is there any economic logic to the policy of peace making and the various Track II initiatives? If yes, then do groups like the business associations play any role in the composite dialogue process?

The current research aims to understand the extent to which domestic factors influence foreign policy making and within these domestic factors which are the actors that enjoy prominence, if any, as it is widely believed that the extent to which civil society groups might influence foreign policy depends upon the domestic set up and the political system. Even on issues such as the corporate patenting of seeds and biological heritage, we find that civil society groups led the way in recognizing the problem and forced the

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government to follow suit. Transnational feminists continue to lead the world in helping shape new visions for improving the place of women and activists are at the forefront of new thinking in a variety of fields. Here it is relevant to make a mention of the theory of popular control on foreign policy that has been espoused by A.Appadorai in his book *Domestic Roots of Foreign Policy*. He argues that India's democratic polity has influenced her foreign policy. Since foreign policy forms a part of public policy, it follows that people would have an interest in the formation of the foreign policy. It is true that in India foreign policy has never really been an election issue, yet it certainly would be correct to ascertain that among the elite there is still a growing realization that foreign affairs do affect national well being and that it behoves the people to keep a tab what the government is doing in that field. It is India's relation with Pakistan and China that has brought home to the Indian masses the importance of foreign affairs for their survival and well being.

The hypothesis that this research purports to seek an answer to is the domestic structure of a country plays an important role in determining the influence of civil society on foreign policy. If civil society groups in India play a role in influencing the foreign policy it is because the democratic set up allows them to push forth their agenda. The same is not true for Pakistan as it is characterized by a fractured democracy.

In order to find answers to the research puzzle, this research will take recourse to deductive reasoning drawing inferences from the wide gamut of literature available. The research would be essentially analytical in approach. Focusing on both primary as well as secondary sources the various dimensions of the research questions would be explored. Official documents, policy papers and speeches of the leaders and officials will also contribute as a substantial source. However, before we begin it is necessary to give a broad overview as to how the chapters of the current research have been designed. Chapter 1 will seek to define 'Civil Society groups' in general, focusing upon the scholarly debate and also highlighting their role in foreign policy making with suitable examples from various countries.

Chapter 2 will focus upon Indian foreign policy making in general, trying to understand how foreign policy is made. Whether foreign policy is confined to the MEA and its mandarins or does the foreign policy decision making process in India spare a role for the various civil society groups as well? The idea is to trace the role of the domestic elements-political structure, political culture and the constitutional apparatus and what role do they play in providing the various civil society groups their maneuverable space.

The focus of Chapter 3 will be on how foreign policy is made in Pakistan. It will try and highlight how the various military regimes and the democratic interludes influenced the foreign policy making in Pakistan. What is the role of the various civil society groups in Pakistan in influencing the foreign policy of Pakistan vis-à-vis India? Do they actually play a role as they do in India?

Chapter 4 will focus upon Track II diplomacy. It would include tracing the roots of the Track II initiatives with special emphasis on the period since 1998 and subsequently in the aftermath of the Dec 13 Indian Parliament attack which saw a renewed call for the beginning of the Composite Dialogue Process since June 2004. The idea is to analyze whether the kind of government that was in power in both these countries over the years had a direct bearing on the kind of political space that these civil society groups enjoyed in decision making process and whether this had a direct or indirect fall out on the foreign policies of both the two states vis-à-vis each other. Finally the last chapter will be a summary of the observations and analysis of all the chapters and will seek to provide an explanation as to whether the hypothesis is valid or not.

Sovereign states will continue to play major role in world politics for a long time to come, but they will be less self-contained and more porous. They will have to share the stage with actors who can use information to enhance their 'soft power' and press governments directly or indirectly by mobilizing their publics.

Chapter 1

Civil Society and Foreign Policy

Millions in India woke up to a different news story this 1st of January 2010. Families in India whose mornings begin with the usual Indian cup of tea and The Times of India, this 1st of January had an interesting news item to make that cup of morning tea even more relishing. '*Aman ki Asha*' (hope for peace) – the latest venture by The Times of India and the Jang group of Pakistan. It is a bold 'civil society' initiative to, as they call it "…energize the process of peace between our two countries." (*The Times of India*: 2010:1) The reason behind this narrative is to illustrate the enthusiasm about the concept of 'civil society' and its prospects in contemporary parlance. Discussions on politics by the western theoretician to the subaltern school today, border around the idea of civil society-its rise, evolution, debility, problems and promises. Civil society has become one of the favorite buzzwords among the intelligentsia worldwide, touted by presidents and political scientists as the key to political, economic, and societal success. It is to understand initiatives like *Aman ki Asha* and the like; it becomes imperative to trace the genesis of the notion of civil society.

The idea of a 'civil society' is laced with ambiguity, because its diverse popularity in recent times has created the problem of indeterminacy. Indeterminacy and ambiguity emerges not only from the very fact, that there are several meanings for the word civil society, but also that the meanings are radically unclear. Multiple questions all intertwined at its root; so to speak, raise the specter of vagueness that is so pronounced while defining the concept of civil society. Questions like whether civil society is a notion of a social structure or a mode of a social behavior or is it just a political construct to express political unhappiness against the state and its agencies, make its study even more intriguing. The idea in this chapter is to delve into the historical contexts and the theoretical semantics of the idea of civil society, in order to make an exercise in clarification of the ambivalence associated with the terminology. At the same time since

the objective of this research is to understand the role of civil society in foreign policy, significant emphasis will be laid on the concept of foreign policy per se and the various elements that goes into its making.

Defining Civil Society

The notion of civil society has been of late, championed across the world as '*the* idea of the late twentieth century'.[1] Conservatives, liberals, peoples' groups, international agencies have all sought an intellectual refuge in the idea of civil society. Accordingly, Sunil Khilnani (2008) in his essay, 'The development of civil society' has aptly called civil society as "...the ideological rendezvous for erstwhile antagonists." (Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008: 11) Civil society in the West has been seen as a means for revivifying public life from the otherwise crumbling mundane party politics. In the south, especially in countries like in India, China, Africa and South East Asia, the collapse of the post-Second World War theoretical models for understanding of politics has infused fresh blood to the idea of civil society. In countries like India where democratic institutions have been more or less stable, the idea of civil society has been invoked to express dissatisfaction with the state. In an effort to accelerate the pace of developmental tasks, international aid agencies today directly assist what they identify as the constituents of civil society: the private enterprises, NGOs, church and denominational associations, in the process by-passing the state. In a nut-shell, civil society today infuses a desire for more accountable and representative forms of political power that has been believed to be usurped by the state.

The idea of civil society in early modern Western political thought in the nineteenth century in both Hegel and Marx arose in the context of the transition of the feudal society into the bourgeois society. But yet it is not a post-Hegelian concept. The term civil society can be traced through the works of Cicero and other Romans to the ancient Greek philosophers, although in classical usage civil society was equated with the state. The

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[1] This phrase was quoted by Sunil Khilnani (2008) in his essay "The development of civil society" in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (eds) "*Civil Society: History and Possibilities*, Cambridge University Press. The original phrase was however borrowed from "The Idea of a Civil Society", National Humanities Center, Humanities Research Center ,Research Triangle Park, North Carolina,1992,p.1.

modern idea of civil society emerged in the Scottish and Continental Enlightenment of the late 18th century. A host of political theorists, from Thomas Paine to Hegel, developed the notion of civil society as a domain parallel to but separate from the state-a realm where citizens associate according to their own interests and wishes. This new thinking reflected changing economic realities: the rise of private property, market competition, and the bourgeoisie. It also grew out of the mounting popular demand for liberty, as manifested in the American and French revolutions.

Theoretically speaking, the term is a much older term which entered into English usage through the Latin translation *'Societas Civilis'*, of Aristotle's *'Koinonia Politike'* (political community). In its original sense, it did not see any distinction between state and society or between political society and civil society. It was Hegel who first bifurcated the concept, but in a way whereby the idea of state and society functioned as 'redescriptions of one another'. However the concept remained largely on the wane during the days when models of state-led modernization dominated. It got a new lease of life only when these models disintegrated. In contemporary discussions, there is no consensus about the proper location of the sources of civil society.

Rummaging through the available literature, one can attribute the following features that we normally associate with a civil society : Civil society is conceived as associations, that : (a) interconnect individuals; (b) are autonomous from the state; (c) cater to cultural, social, economic and political aspirations of the members; (d) are modern and voluntaristic rather than ascriptive and traditional. (Singh and Saxena: 2008:259)

In the post -Second World War decades, the idea of a civil society did not receive the kind of attention in the West as it does now. Significantly, the idea did not even configure itself in the arguments of some of the prominent liberal theorists of the 1950s, like Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin, even though both of them clearly specified the limits of political authority and championed the cause of individual liberty. Even for the Marxist theorists of the same period, civil society was identified with 'bourgeois society', inextricably linked to the productive base of capitalist society in constant need of

regulation by the state. Influenced by Lukacs' interpretation of Hegel, the Frankfurt School saw the concept of civil society "as a prism through which the contradictions and conflicts of capitalism were refracted" (Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008: 16). A revival of the term occurred in 1960s, after it gained popularity among the radical left, who rejected the Communist party structures in favor of 'social movements'. Equally vital was Antonio Gramsci's revision of Marx's plan of base and superstructure applied to Western Europe and the invocation of the notion that civil society was the site of struggle for hegemony, which breathed new life into the idea of civil society as a whole. The highpoint in its graph of popularity was achieved in the 1970s and the 1980s, when the idea of civil society was used as a potent tool, espoused by the groups agitating against the authoritarian regimes and structures of the state especially in Eastern Europe and Latin America. In recent times civil society is seen as a project conjured up to reconcile socialism with democracy. Or to put it simply, it is seen as an endeavor by the association of intellectuals and an enlightened citizenry to supplement the illegitimacies of representative democracy.

Civil Society: Through the prism of theory

Constraints in historical perspectives have given birth to confusion in contemporary understanding, which instinctively tends to define civil society as an ideational sphere in opposition to the state. The rise of civil society induces some to see a nearly state-free future in which tentative, minimalistic states hang back while powerful nongovernmental groups impose a new, virtuous civic order. This vision is a mirage. Civil society groups can be much more effective in shaping state policy if the state has coherent powers for setting and enforcing policy. Good nongovernmental advocacy work will actually tend to strengthen, not weaken state capacity. A clear example is U.S. environmental policy. Vigorous civic activism on environmental issues has helped prompt the creation of governmental environmental agencies, laws, and enforcement mechanisms. Nothing cripples civil society development like a weak, lethargic state. In Eastern Europe, civil society has come much further since 1989 in the countries where governments have proved relatively capable and competent, such as Poland and Hungary, and it has been

retarded where states have wallowed in inefficiency and incompetence such as Romania, and Bulgaria. If civil society is defined in opposition to state, then the possibility of depicting a positive definition of civil society would not be possible, because then it becomes a question of listing everything that does not come under the term state. And that includes terrorist and separatist organizations which are not included under the rubric of the state. So under such circumstances, will such organizations be included in the domain of the civil society? Hence such attempts to corroborate the definition of civil society as a sphere in opposition to the state would ill serve the purpose of enquiry.

For the purpose of clarity, this chapter will seek to look at the idea of civil society as envisioned by some of the prominent political thinkers like John Locke, Hegel, Marx and Antonio Gramsci.

For John Locke (1632-1704), the fundamental contrast defining a civil society was the state of nature. In contrast to the state of nature, Locke understood civil society as a condition where there exist known standing laws, judges and effective powers of enforcement. Incidentally Locke made no distinction between a political society and a civil society- in no sense was his idea of a civil society distinct from the entity of state. Rather, civil society for Locke was a term accorded to a legitimate political order. According to John Dunn (1996), Locke "distinguished sharply between true civil societies in which governmental power derives in more or less determinate ways from the consent of their citizens and political units which possesses equivalent concentrations of coercive powers but in which there is no dependence of governmental power upon popular consent." (Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008: 42) For Locke, civil society was an aggregate of civilized individuals, that is, a society of human beings who had succeeded in disciplining their conduct. For securing such a civilized conduct certain minimal conditions were to be necessary, such as- a representative political order, a system of private property rights and toleration of freedom of worship.

Tocqueville valued civic associations because he believed that they promote liberal habits and encourage citizens to think independently. Civic associations, Tocqueville argued,

drew citizens outside of themselves and allowed for self-governance on a small scale. But, perhaps more important, when opportunities for self-governance are combined with the pursuit of common interests and values, civic associations could transform themselves into political organizations--groups aimed at actively shaping political outcomes. The key to the latter involved having a chance to do so, because these associations existed in a democratic polity. Tocqueville further argued that association helps to stabilize democracy in two ways. First, it enables the "citizens of the minority ... to ascertain their numerical strength and thereby weaken the moral ascendancy of the majority," thus presumably moderating the eagerness of the majority to impose its will and encouraging temperate compromise. Second, it promotes competition of ideas and sorts out those with the greatest popular appeal. The concept of voluntary association plays an important role in Tocqueville's thinking about the viability of democracy. As Tocqueville remarked in the introduction to Democracy in America, "Citizens joined together in free association might ... replace the individual power of nobles, and the state would be protected against tyranny and license." ((Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008: 22).

In his Ancien Regime, Tocqueville's native France provided the basis for a study of civil society, as he sought to understand the forces which had, prior to the revolution, managed to stifle all attempts at civic association. In poring over state documents from the pre-Revolutionary era, Tocqueville came to understand the vast bureaucratic schemes which had prevented civic engagement and political activity. He further found that the Revolution had adopted the same despotic features of the Old Order, again undermining the incentive for French citizens to create and engage in such civic life. In his seminal work *Democracy in America* he talks about the centrality of voluntary associations in maintaining a vital democratic culture in the US. According to Tocqueville, the voluntary associations are important for inculcating community feeling and allows individuals to act in concert and are important for a vibrant democratic polity.

Hegel (1770-1831) was the central figure in determining the contemporary understanding of the notion of a civil society. Primarily driven by the hope of creating and maintaining a community under modern conditions, Hegel made a distinction between 'civil society'

and 'the state'. His scheme for a civil society was created to amalgamate both individual freedoms and the ideal of a community thriving under the conditions of modern exchange. The novelty of Hegel's idea of civil society laid in the very fact that he did not see that term to be just another synonym for political society, but as a sphere distinct from the family and even the state. For Hegel, according to G.Stedman Jones, civil society was the space where the higher principle of modern subjectivity could emerge and flourish. Hegel's vision of a civil society incorporated modern liberal individual freedoms with a vision of moral and political life, the 'Sittlichkeit'[2] of community. Contrary to the natural rights theorists, civil society for Hegel was not the product of natural drives or instincts. Civil society for Hegel was much more than a system of needs; it was a sphere of recognition. The rational self which inhabited civil society was not a natural phenomenon, nor was it a product of the contract. For Hegel it was the result of a cultural and historical process of interaction and above all through a process of recognition. For him, the community was the source of the rational human being. Accordingly, the state was not imposed from above, but was ratified by the already existing community. In sketching out ideas like this, Hegel actually came out with a solution to the Christian problem of community. As Sunil Khilnani writes, "…he claimed to have produced a political equivalent of the Christian community, united not by fear of God but by belief in the divinity of the political community itself." (Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008: 24).

There are at least three identifiable strands in the contemporary literature on this concept from the standpoint of the Marxist school. The first school argues that there was an over arching preponderance over nearly all aspects of the social life, by the state machinery like the bureaucracy in the Communist systems. After the fall of those communist bastions, a need was felt, it was argued for advancing of the institutions of 'civil society' to flourish outside the legal jurisdiction of the state. Second, the radical theorists on the leftist side of the political thought who were disillusioned by the ideas of socialism and by the Communistic experience expressed an inclination towards radicalizing the notion

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[2] It refers to the concept of "ethical life" furthered by Hegel in the 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right'. It is the third sphere of 'right' that he establishes, and is marked by family life, civil society, and the state. It attempts to bridge individual subjective feelings and the general right.

of democracy by conjuring up the idea of a civil society. Some of the theorists within this leftist strand of thought also at times argued forcefully about the need for the revival of the associative initiatives of non-state organizations in civil society. Third and yet another string of thought in current western thinking with regard to civil society has been associated with the concept of the various social movements. Social movements for the restoration of democracy, human rights, environmentalism are considered by some quarters as the manifestation of the civil society movements.

Marx's conception of civil society was one of isolated and aggressive individuals bound together by the cash nexus under capitalism. As the participative actors in the public sphere were the direct expression of economic roles, the vital functions of civil society, according to Marx always remained political. Bourgeois emancipation which reached its glorification in the French revolution destroyed the estates, corporations and guilds, along with the priviledges and obligations and thereby abolished the political character of civil society. The economic realm was now liberated from political interference and civil society once composed of collective units was now composed of individuals. According to Marx, as a result of this, man led a double life- a 'heavenly life' and an 'earthly life'. In the heaven of political life he regards himself as a communal being, full of public spirit and mindful of general interest. In the earthly existence of civil society, however he acts as a private individual as the 'plaything of the alien market forces.' Marx's economic reductionism prevented him from comprehending the moral foundations of modern capitalism. To the practitioners of the new economic order, civil society was not simply a neutral space of market exchange. As A.Seligman (1992) wrote for civil society, "… it was primarily an ethical realm of solidarity held together by the force of moral sentiments and natural affections." (Seligman: 1992:34) As Weber pointed out, for the pioneers of capitalism, there was something much greater at stake than the cash nexus. Economic order was to be guided by a strict ethical code enjoined by rights and obligations in equal measure. For the Marxist however this code was just to hoodwink the masses.

It was Antonio Gramsci a prominent name in the Marxist tradition who tried to develop the concept of civil society in concrete terms. Gramsci, whose brand of Marxism was

shaped by an early adherence to idealist philosophy differed greatly from the Marxian analysis which identified civil society with commercial and industrial life and thereby reduced human beings to egotists bound together only by contracts. Gramsci, as Joseph Femia (2001) wrote, did not see "capitalism as an ethics-free zone, a Hobbesian state of nature where the strong dominated the weak." (Kaviraj and Khilnani:2008;139) These heterodox ideas formed the basis of Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' his most important contribution in the annals of political thought. Gramsci argued in the 1930s as to what was the reason for the survival of capitalism, when the condition was ripe for its transition to communism. The answer to this according Gramsci lay in the superstructure, which he divided into two levels- civil society and political society or the state. The first set includes institutions like the church, parties, trade unions, schools, universities, publishing houses and the like. These institutions according to Gramsci disseminated the ideology of the dominant class, ensuring its cultural and spiritual supremacy over the subordinate classes, who consent to their own subordination. Conversely the state apparatus of state coercive power enforces discipline in those cases where spontaneous consent has failed. In understanding how the prevailing order was maintained, Marxists concentrated almost exclusively on the coercive apparatus of the state, an institution which Engels once described as machine for the oppression of one class by another. On this understanding, it was the fear of coercion which kept the alienated and exploited majority in society from overthrowing the system that was the cause of their suffering. It was Gramsci who recognized that while this characterization may have tried true in less developed societies, such as pre-revolutionary Russia, it was not the cast in the more developed countries of the West. Here the system was maintained not by mere coercion but by consent. Consent according to Gramsci is created by the hegemony of the ruling stratum in society. It is this hegemony which allows the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant class to become widely disseminated throughout the society and be accepted by the subordinate groups and classes as their own. All these takes place through the institution of the civil society. Civil society for Gramsci is the network of institutions and practices in the society that enjoy some amount of autonomy from the state. Several important implications flow from this analysis. The first is that Marxist theory needs to take superstructural phenomena seriously, because while the structure of

society may ultimately be a reflection of social relations of production in the economic base, the nature of relations in the superstructure are of great relevance in determining how susceptible that society is to change and transformation. Gramsci used the term 'historic bloc' to describe the mutually reinforcing and reciprocal relationships between the socio-economic relations (base) and political and cultural practices (superstructure) that together underpin a given order. Its use serves as a reminder that for Gramsci and Gramscians, to reduce analysis to the narrow consideration of economic reductionism on the one hand, or solely to politics on the other is deeply mistaken.

The Promise and Prospect of Civil Society in the South

After listing the dominant perspectives on civil society, it becomes imperative to catalogue the various pre-requisites needed for sustaining a vibrant civil society. First, civil society requires a common conception of politics, i.e., it pre-supposes a common set of purpose. What is it that individuals and groups are fighting or competing for? This however does not mean participating in electoral politics, but it entails informal participation in the sphere of politics, which can even encourage potential adversaries to be comrades in arms for a common cause. When such common grounds are absent, the prospect of civil society activism gets imperiled. As an example to substantiate the above idea, Jean-Francois Bayart provides his case study of Sub-Saharan Africa. He explains that the reason for the absence of a thriving civil society in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa is that "there is no common cultural frame of reference between the dominant and the dominated and sometimes even among the dominated". (Bayart: 1986:117). For Bayart the lack of such common conception of politics has been the evasion of the intellectuals and this has dampened the prospect of presenting a unified common ground on any issue of national importance. Second, civil society is required to have a particular type of self that has the capacity to distinguish between its own identity and its interests. Such a self should be able to see its interests as transitory and not as pre-determined and should be able to reflect upon and be open to deliberations. Such a self should be able to distinguish between its self interests and the interests of the community. Scholars such as Sunil Khilnani (2001) have often argued about the incompatibility of liberal democracy

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and civil society. (Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008: 28)   According to the rational choice theory, liberalism essentially advocates the idea of a rational and interest maximizing self which seeks fulfillment. Such a conception of the self can jeopardize the interest of the community as a whole. The other school propagates that a viable liberal democratic order is not possible in the absence of a civil society, but as the East Asian cases demonstrate, civil societies can flourish in the absence of liberal democracy. In this connection, Cf .J.Gray wrote, "Civil society may exist and flourish under a variety of political regimes, of which liberal democracy is only one." (Gray: 1993: 203).

Such manifold requirements necessary for a civil society to flourish raises many a question for the newly formed states of the so called South, many of which are still in the process of negotiating their transition to democracy and market economy. In the developing societies of the South, civil society is viewed with apprehension, as one that stands in opposition to the machinations of the state. It has been painted as those agencies which are at loggerheads with the state and its institutions. It is viewed more as the space inhabited by the activists aiming to capture the areas back from the control of the state. Newly independent states formed in the aftermath of the nationalistic struggle from the colonial power, had to play many a roles- as a provider of security, as a welfare state, as a police state to oversee the peaceful transfer of power and also to legitimize their own authority. In situations where in the South many a states are quasi-states, viewing the civil society as an opponent of the state would harm the overall prospect of a holistic development of these nascent polities. The states of the South because of their troubled histories of communal blood bath and creation on religious and ethnic lines still have not been able to get over their torturous political lineage. Hence in many a developing countries various religious organizations and associations having communal overtones such as RSS and the VHP in India are technically a part of the civil society but are very different from other associations, especially those working on human rights, another social issues. Such dichotomy is shown by Sami Zubaida (2001), where in she makes a distinction between two entirely two opposing varieties of civil society in Egypt- 'secular-liberal' and an 'Islamic-communal' one. (Kaviraj and Khilnani: 2008:241). The first presses the case for legal recognition of the voluntary civil associations like the

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political parties, unions, pressure groups, the second delimits as civil society a space of practices and activities unregulated by the state, but which conforms to the interpretations of Islamic tenets.

In the Indian scenario the success of the nationalist struggle is said to be the result of *joie de vivre* of the civil society in its battle with the foreign domination. The saga of India's post-Independence reconstruction and relative stability was acclaimed to be the product of India's relatively well-developed civil society, mass media and pressure. However this acknowledgement of the civil society in India has been critically dealt with by Partha Chatterjee. Chatterjee (2001) distinguished between the associative civil society and the "demographic or population society". (Chatterjee: 2001: 169) He is of the opinion that the term 'civil society' should be used to denote those institutions of modern associational life originating in Western society based on equality, autonomy, freedom of entry and exit, contract, deliberative processes of decision making. Civil society institutions in countries like India, according to Chatterjee are best used to describe those institutions of associational life conjured up by the national elites in the era of colonial modernity, often as a part of their colonial struggle. These institutions symbolize the desire of the elites to replicate in their own society the forms as well as the substance of western modernity. Chatterjee sounds a bit less optimistic about these institution when he says that, "the new domain of civil society will long remain the exclusive domain of the elite, that the actual public will not match up to the standards required by the civil society and that the function of civil social institutions in relation to the public at large will be one of pedagogy rather than of free association." (Chatterjee: 2001: 174)

For Chatterjee an important consideration in thinking about the relation between the state and civil society in modern history of post colonial societies like India is the fact that whereas the legal-bureaucratic apparatus of the state has been able to reach out to the vast population of the state, the domain of civil society associations have not been able to penetrate much and is restricted to a fairly small section of the elites. This schism according to Chatterjee is the "mark of the non-Western modernity as an incomplete project of modernization" in countries of the South. Chatterjee puts forward the following

arguments in this regard: first, the most important site of transformation in the colonial period has been that of the civil society, whereas in the post-colonial period political society has been the most significant site of transformation. Second, in the contemporary phase of globalization, opposition would emerge between the forces of modernity (civil society) and democracy (political society). (Chatterjee: 2001: 177)

Civil society in Pakistan has borne the brunt of repeated military interventions in the country's polity. The state repression came in many of forms including bans on CSOs, arrest of civil society leaders and political pressure. While the situation steadily improved with the restoration of democracy in the late 1980s, a truly facilitative and enabling environment for civil society remained a distant dream. After a quasi-democratic interlude, the country was again under military rule even though during time round, the government has not imposed the kinds of restrictions that many feared it would. Certain socio-cultural norms and attitudes continue to impact on the strengthening of civil society. It is difficult to gauge the canvas of civil society in Pakistan as no comprehensive database has been maintained on a regular basis. Although several initiatives have been launched during the 1990s to collect data on various dimensions of the civil society, no comprehensive analysis has been undertaken so far. The available data are sketchy and sector- or area-specific, most of them focusing on NGOs. Navanita Chadha Behera in her paper 'Linkages between Domestic Politics and Diplomacy : Case of India and Pakistan' argues that 'weak state' syndrome in Pakistan breeds the "insecurity dilemma", which compels the state to tighten its grip upon the political system leaving very little room for the civil society groups to have their say.(Behera :1996: 156) However whether authoritarian regimes blight the prospect of a civil society or not will be taken up in greater details in Chapter 3 where case of Pakistan will be discussed.

To sum up the arguments as presented in the above pages, the current understanding of civil society invariably see it as essentially a result of the domestic political space. The extent and the kind of civil society which one is likely to find in the South – whether religious or secular, whether constituted by groups seeking inclusion or exclusion from

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the state, will directly vary with and depend on the nature and success of the state in question.

States do not exist in isolation. Every policy that a state formulates has both internal and external ramifications. Hence it becomes imperative to understand the role of civil society in the domain of foreign policy also, especially in today's integrated world. But before we analyze their role in the external setting, it is necessary to understand how foreign policy is made and then draw a linkage between the role and influence of civil society on foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Making – A Theoretical Analysis

The issue of foreign policy making constitutes an interesting area of study within the discipline of International Relations. It has been the subject of deliberation for as long as diplomacy- that is for more than 2,000 years from Thucydides through Machiavelli to Grotius. For the 250 years from about 1700 to 1950 it was the subject of increasing commentary: some technical about the qualities of skilled diplomacy, and some political, about the ends which foreign policy should serve. The former was evident in the writings of Francois de Callieres and Harold Nicolson, the latter in those of Richard Cobden and Jean Jaures. During this period, it was an accepted notion that foreign policy was of considerable importance for the survival and prosperity of a country. From 1954, when Richard Snyder and his colleagues produced the first formal study of 'decision-making' in foreign policy, through to the late 1970s and the rise of international political economy perspectives, the subject of foreign policy analysis was one of the most ground-breaking and productive areas of academic International Relations. Key books like Joseph Frankel's *The Making of Foreign Policy*, Irving Janis' *Victims of Groupthinking*, Robert Jervis' *Perceptions and Misperception in International Politics* and specially, Graham T.Allison's 1971 classic *Essence of Decision*, laid bare the role of bureaucratic and psychological factors in the formation of foreign policies, and also the importance of the domestic political environment to decisions which previously had been largely in terms of the logic of the international system.

The idea of domestic politics influencing foreign policy has been widely acknowledged from different sources within the field of International Relations ranging from Joseph Frankel who in his 1964 classic work *International Relations in Changing World* wrote, "...decisions taken on foreign policy differ from those taken in other fields in that they are subject to a unique interplay between domestic and foreign environments." (Frankel: 1964:81), to even in dramas of insurrection, as Fred Halliday has shown, the internal and the international are inherently interconnected. In the Indian context mention must be made of A.Appadorai's seminal work The *Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy: 1947-1972* to Shashi Tharoor's doctoral thesis *Reasons of State: Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi 1966-1977.*

For giving meaning and a direction to a country's objectives at the international level, each nation adopts a set of principles-and that is what a foreign policy of a country does. In simple terms, the foreign policy of a state is the expression of its national interest vis-à-vis other states. Hugh Gibson defines foreign policy as "a well-rounded comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of the government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation." (Gibson: 1944:13) According to George Modelski, "Foreign policy involves all activities o f a nation by which a nation is trying to change the behavior in the international environment." (Modelski: 1962: 17) Paddleford and Lincoln are of the opinion that "Foreign Policy is the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete action and to attain these objectives and preserve its interests. Reduced to its most fundamental ingredients, foreign policy consists of two elements- national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them. Since the national objectives are always stated with the help of set of national principles one has to study the principles of foreign policy on the basis of these actions of the state at the international level.

The policymakers are mainly responsible for the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of a nation. No doubt it is a complex affair because they have to take into account the interest of the nation, the internal and the external environment and the

national values. Hence James N. Rosenau refers to these as "the Foreign Policy Inputs". James N. Rosenau, K.W. Thompson and Roy C. Macridis have mentioned the following three factors which determine the foreign policy of a nation:

1. The relatively permanent material elements i.e., Geography and natural resources.

2. Less permanent material elements, i.e., Industrial establishments, Military establishments and changes in Industrial and Military capacity.

3. The human elements, i.e., Quantitative (population) and qualitative (policymakers and leaders). Ideology and information also play an important role.

Any discussion on foreign policy would remain incomplete with a description of the decision making theory. First popularized by H.A. Simon and then supported by Harold Lasswell, Harold Sprout, Richard Snyder and others the decision-making theory seeks to analyze political processes in terms of decisions. However, the peculiarity of this approach is that different advocates lay focus on different lines and processes through which decisions are taken. Decision making approach in the field of international politics was popularized by Richard Snyder, H.W.Bruck and Burton Sapin. They proceed with assumption that the key to political action lies in the way in which decision makers as actors define their situations and that their image of the situation is built around the protected action as well as the reasons for their action. Moreover the setting has its own importance in the decision-making activity of the state. In the external aspect the setting is subject to change, while the internal aspect includes the way society is organized and functions. Then competence, communication and information are the three basic determinants to explain the actions of the decision-makers. (Snyder et al: 1954: 35)

Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout (1969) subscribe to the same approach, but they throw more light on the factor of 'environment'. To them environment signifies a milieu having psychological as well as the operational aspects that lay down limits within which the decision-makers have to operate. (Rosenau: 1969: 145)

Personality has its own role in the decision-making process. This factor is given importance by Alexander George and Juliette George (1956). The Georges emphasize the fact that President Wilson's ambitions for power obscured his perception of the world to the extent that he could not understand the realities of the situations properly and as a result of that he had his failure in several important directions. In this way they characterize their technique as 'developmental biography' in which the factors of situation and personality are studied in a chronological and cross-sectional order. (George and George: 1956:57) On the other hand Bernard Cohen (1957) holds that a systematic analysis of foreign policy should be made in the light of interactions between official and non-official agencies. In other words, it means that in the formulation of the foreign policy of a state the official agencies certainly play a very important role, but at the same time the role of non-official agencies like public opinion, interests groups, communication media, specific agents in the executive and legislative branches through which they have their purpose served, cannot be denied. (Cohen: 1956:78)

Lindblom and Braybrooke argue that most political decisions fall into the category of 'disjointed incrementalism'. That is they are not arrived at in a rational and comprehensive manner, nor are they designed to promote common good of the society. Rather, they are marginal steps taken by various branches and sub-branches of government in order to 'satisfice'- to bring about gradual change, to close political gaps and to avert or control crises. Among others I.M.Destler, Anthony Downs, Morton Halperin and Graham Allison have laid more stress on the role of the bureaucrats in the decision making process and therefore are known as the 'bureaucracy watchers'. Their studies are based on the dynamics of 'bureaucratic imperatives' wherein it is taken that 'when the American President sneezes, the bureaucrats catch cold, if not pneumonia." (Johari: 2009 :134)

States make foreign policies. For more than three centuries, the nation- state has served as the foundation of the global political order—hence the "international" system. Although the nation-state remains dominant, no longer can it necessarily be considered preeminent. With the fading of superpower rivalry, the advent of economic and political globalization,

the diminished role of the state in economic affairs, and the spread of new communication technologies, the role of the nation-state has dramatically eroded. Christopher Hill (2003) in an article titled 'What is to be done? Foreign Policy as a Site for Political Action' writes, "Of the genuinely reasoned critiques which led to a turn away from the study of foreign policy, the first was the growth of skepticism about the state." (Hill: 2003:78) He reasons that skepticism about the utility and durability of the state has grown steadily in proportion to the rise of interdependence, transnationalism, globalization et al. Joseph S. Nye.Jr is of the opinion, "When we talk about the politics of interdependence, we must not assume that everything is captured by the traditional model of government to government relations. One of the distinguishing characteristics of complex interdependence is the significance of other actors in addition to the states." (Nye 2007:243) Nye further adds that in a globally interdependent world, the agenda of international politics is broader and everyone seems to want to get into the act. As an example he cites the case of USA, where "almost every domestic agency has some international role." (Nye 2007:247)   The scope and location of those in addition to the state and its institutions involved in a foreign policy decision varies with the type of problem under consideration and accordingly does the task of the actors hoping to influence the decision –making process.

The essential ingredient in the making of foreign policy is the choice of ends and means on the part of the nation state in an international setting. The question of 'influence' in the study of foreign policy decision making makes its study even more significant. As James N. Rosenau says, "knowing where and when decisions are made is the central consideration for strategies designed to influence those decisions." (Rosenau: 1967: 235). It must be understood that decision making in foreign policy does not mean the formulation of a "grand design" by a few individuals in terms of their personal wisdom and their perception of the global environment. It is essentially an "incremental process" involving the interplay of a wide variety of basic determinants, political institutions, organizational pulls and pressures of a bureaucratic-political nature and the personalities of the decision makers. Joseph Frankel is of the opinion that decisions and the resulting actions are the product of a confrontation in the minds of the decision-makers between

their wants and desires and what they know about their environment. He further adds that in the making of foreign policy the formal decision-makers are particularly important. Who is at the helm of foreign policy making depends upon the kind of political system a country has. Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter write, "The President stands at the center of foreign policy process in the United States. Although the President is the principal decision maker on important foreign policy matters, he does not act alone. He is surrounded on the one hand by a large number of participants with whom he is more or less required to statute or tradition to consult (obligatory consultation) and on the other hand, by those with whom he chooses to consult (discretionary consultation)." (Art and Jervis 1992:399) Depending on the particular preferences of the incumbent President certain members may also be consulted. Individual outside the government sometimes are participants in the national security policy process. Ostensibly private citizens who are the close personal confidants of the President are included in this category. Private interest groups such as defense contractors whose concerns are affected by foreign policy decisions will seek to influence the direction of policy. These groups may be consulted by the President from time to time. Other outsiders may be formally invited although for limited periods of time and with narrowly defined responsibilities to participate in the process.

Christopher Hill in a chapter titled 'The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy' argues that in powerful, quite self-sufficient countries like the United States, it may certainly seem to be the case that the complex politics of Capitol Hill are more crucial for international relations than any amount of speeches in the UN. It has often been assumed that if only the power of the Jewish lobby to determine the outcome of certain swing states in US elections could be diminished, American policy would change and new possibilities for peace would open up in the Middle East. For Hill this is a gross oversimplification. The US according to him has strategic and moral interests in the survival of Israel independent of lobby pressures. He argues that it is also remarkable how much continuity there has been over the decades in American foreign policy despite the vicissitudes of electoral politics. A more realistic approach to the domestic sources of foreign policy is to build on Robert Putnam's concept of the 'two-level', in which 'chiefs of governments'

are seen as playing politics simultaneously on two boards, the domestic and international.(Putnam: 1988:430). The model views international negotiations between liberal democracies as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the intra-national level (eg. domestic) and the international level (eg. between governments). Over domestic negotiations, the executive absorbs the concern of societal actors and builds coalitions with them; at the international level, the executive tries to implement these concerns without committing to anything that will have deleterious effects at home. Win-sets occur when the concerns of actors at both levels overlap, a condition under which an international agreement is likely.

However, the case of India might be different as we have a Parliamentary govt. J. Bandyopadhyaya (2003) in his book *Making of India's Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities*, provides an excellent description of the role played by the political institutions, the inter-Ministerial institutions like the PMO, and the influence of the personality of the leaders in India's foreign policy decisions. He very succinctly delineates the major actors involved in the making of foreign policy in India. His scheme of things includes-the cabinet, parliament and the pressure groups. Under the umbrella term of pressure groups he has included (i) business interests (ii) arms agents (iii) NGOs (iv) People of Indian Origin (PIO) (v) religious and cultural organizations like the VHP, RSS etc. and ; (vi) public opinion (Bandyopadhyaya: 2003: 54). A recurrent theme in his book has been the growing importance of these groups in the broader context of foreign policy decision making. Yet what appears after perusing through the available literature on foreign policy is that on the whole governments fully monopolize the control of foreign policy. Frankel says this is partly due to historical traditions dating from the absolutist period, and partly to the logic of the present situation, in which as a rule, governments alone deal with the other governments, command the best sources of information and have the monopoly of legitimate, and near-monopoly of physical force.

In sharp contrast to this, the pluralist model of decision-making attributes decisions to bargaining conducted among domestic sources which includes public opinion, interest groups, and multinational corporations. In non-crisis situations and on particular issues,

especially economic ones, societal groups may play an important role. Such a view has been put forth by Karen A.Mingst (2001). He provides a myriad of examples to drive home his point, starting from the role the rice farmer lobbies played both in Japan and South Korea in preventing the importation of cheap US grown rice; the success of French wine growers in preventing the importation of cheap Greek or Spanish wines by publicly dumping their product for media attention; to the power of the US shoe manufacturers in supporting restrictions on the importation of Brazilian-made shoes into the US, despite US governmental initiatives to allow for products from developing countries. (Mingst: 2001:124). He further argues that societal groups have a variety of modus operandi to forcing decisions in their favor or constraining decisions. They can mobilize the media and public opinion, lobby the government agencies responsible for making the decision, influence the appropriate representative bodies, organize transnational networks of people with comparable interests, and for high-profile heads of multinational corporations, make highest contact with the highest governmental officials.

New and intrusive technologies-direct satellite broadcasting, internet, e-mail and the new age social networking sites increasingly undermine the state's control over communication. Multinational corporations and the internationalization of production and consumption make it increasingly difficult for states to regulate their economic policies. Globalization of financial markets has left states less powerful. The movement to ban landmines in the 1990s is an example of a societally based pluralist foreign-policy decision.

An intriguing question that has surfaced in the academic debates within the discipline of International Relations time and again in the recent past, is whether it is time for obituaries to be written for the state? Has the state really retreated? If that is an accepted fact then who makes foreign policies? Do individuals matter in foreign policy? Liberals are particularly adamant that leaders do make a difference. Whenever there is a leadership change in a major power, like the US or Russia, speculation always arises about the possible changes in the country's foreign policy. This reflects the general belief that individual leaders and their personal characteristics do make a difference in foreign policy and hence in international relations. The example of Soviet leader Mikhail

Gorbachev also illustrates the fact that leaders can cause real change. Individual elites are also important in constructivist thinking. Constructivists attribute the change to the Soviet Union's "New Thinking" not only to the change in calculations made by Gorbachev himself but more subtly to the change caused by the policy entrepreneurs, the networks of western-oriented reformists and international affairs specialists who promoted new ideas. According to the realists and radicals, the structure of the international system is more than individuals. They argue that individual leaders do not make much of a difference in foreign policy. Two questions are most pertinent to determining the role of individuals in foreign policy then: When are the actions of individuals likely to have a greater or lesser effect on the course of events? And under what circumstances do different actors behave differently. Private individuals, independent of any official role, may by virtue of circumstances, skills or resources carry out independent actions in international relations. Herein, in a much broader framework, the role of the 'civil society' comes to the fore. In the area of conflict resolution, for instance civil society increasingly plays a role in so-called Track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy utilizes individuals outside of governments to carry out the task of conflict resolution. High level track-two diplomacy has met with some success. In the spring of 1992, for example, Eritrea signed a declaration of independence, seceding from Ethiopia after years of both low and high intensity conflict. The foundation of the agreement was negotiated in numerous meetings in Atlanta, Georgia and elsewhere between the affected parties and former president Jimmy Carter, acting through the Carter Center's International Negotiation Network at Emory University. In the fall of 1993, the startling framework for reconciliation between Israel and the Palestine Liberation was negotiated through track-two informal and formal techniques initiated by Terje Larsen, a Norwegian sociologist, and Yossi Beilin of the opposition Labor party in Israel. A series of preparatory negotiations was conducted over a five month period in total secrecy. Beginning unofficially, the talks gradually evolved into official negotiations, building up trust in an informal atmosphere and setting the stage for an eventual agreement.

It was, however, at the turn of the 1990s that we were to witness a veritable explosion of NGOs, which, networking across national borders, propelled critical issues onto

international platforms. The power of global NGOs was first visible at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, when about 2,400 representatives of NGOs came to play a central role in the deliberations (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001:326). "By putting forth radically different alternatives, by highlighting issues of global concern, and by stirring up proceedings in general, these organizations practically hijacked the summit. Subsequently, they were given a central role in the Committee on Sustainable Development created by the Rio Summit. At the 1994 Cairo World Population Conference, increasing numbers of international NGOs took on the responsibility of setting the agenda for discussions. And in 1995 this sector almost overwhelmed the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Almost 2,100 national and international NGOs, consisting largely of advocacy groups and social activists, completely dominated the conference" (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor :2001:328) Since then we have seen that international NGOs either participate directly in international conferences or hold parallel conferences, which incidentally attract more media attention than official conferences. And in the process they have won some major victories. "One of these major victories occurred when global NGOs launched a campaign to pressurize governments to draft a treaty to ban the production, the stockpiling, and the export of landmines. Almost 1000 transnational NGOs coordinated the campaign through the Internet. The pooling and the coordination of energies proved so effective that not only was the treaty to ban landmines signed in 1997, but the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and its representative Jody Williams were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The citation at the award-giving ceremony spoke of their unique effort that made it 'possible to express and mediate a broad wave of popular commitment in an unprecedented way'." (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor: 2001:330)

Besides official, secret and quasi official-diplomacy, some non official dialogues have tried to create extra-governmental links between the like-minded in the hope of creating an alternative to official or officially blessed diplomacy. In this context Stephen Philip Cohen (2004) writes, that there are two other type of interactions. One consists of contacts between individual and groups that are developed for purely professional or personal purposes. Businessman, teachers, intellectuals, religious leaders and journalists

of different states might thus meet for purely professional reasons but their meetings have larger political ramifications. This was the case with 'ping-pong diplomacy' between the USA and China and to some extent 'cricket diplomacy' between India and Pakistan. (Cohen: 2004:194) One variation of this kind of interaction is propaganda trips by official 'cultural' delegations ranging from ballet troupes to jazz musicians, workers, farmers and intellectuals.

To summarize there are many ways in which a state interacts with other states besides formal and conventional diplomacy. Stephen Cohen writes that compared to other conflict ridden regions South-Asia lags behind in the development of unofficial contacts. He mentions some examples of the 'Classical unofficial strategic dialogues' between India and Pakistan. Cohen writes, "Unofficial dialogues which do not have blessings of government...often involve retired civil servants, diplomats, academics, journalists." He gives the example of the Neemrana Initiative between India and Pakistan, which began in 1991 and lasted for six years, The Shanghai Initiative (1994-1999), the 'BALUSA' (knowledge) Group. The Shanghai Initiative was a four-country dialogue, including six to seven retired diplomats and scientists and military officials each from India, Pakistan, USA and China. Its focus was exclusively nuclear and many of its Indian and Pakistani members were also part of the Neemrana initiative. Founded by Alton Jones Foundation, the Shanghai group held meetings one each in China, India, Pakistan and the USA. However, in course of the time the foundation decided that the group was unproductive. The BALUSA (knowledge) Group has been organized by an American, Dr. Shirin Tahir-Kheli and has issued several public reports as well as studies on the prospective areas of India-Pakistan cooperation, such as oil and gas pipelines. It has had meetings in diverse locations like Maldives, Italy, US. Like the Neemrana and the Shanghai initiative it has an element of Track II diplomacy. Funding has been from American sources including US government.(Cohen:2004 : 205) Among the most notable Track II efforts are India-Pakistan People's Forum for Peace and Democracy which was started in 1994-1995 as a mass based advocacy group for peace in the region. Second such group is Pakistan-India People's Solidarity Conference which focuses upon nuclear issues, democracy and Kashmir. Lastly within this group but somewhat driven by notions of gender justice is the

Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia. One subset of continuous non-official interactions has occurred between the business and industry associations. While official trade between India and Pakistan might be negligible but unofficial trade routed through Dubai and Singapore and Kabul in the past is quite large. A number of highly visible meetings between businesspersons have been organized by Punjab, Haryana and Delhi Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Confederation of Indian Industry, Karachi Chamber of Commerce, Joint Business Council and the like.

As tensions between Pakistan and India continue to see-saw, citizens in both countries are stepping up efforts for peace through initiatives ranging from 'Aman ki Asha' to a cross-border signature campaign, seminars and personal efforts. Such efforts encounter hostility between the nuclear-armed neighbors. Beena Sarwar argues "It is clear that a dependence on the political- bureaucratic- military establishments in both the countries may not lead to reduction in tensions but on the contrary, this nexus could possibly land us in a war. Role of the media of both the countries in the ongoing crisis has also not been very heartening." She gives examples from the various civil society groups working to promote peace between the twin nuclear neighbors. Her article mentions the role of peace activists like Aasma Jahangir, Chairperson, Human Rights Commission[3] Pakistan, and groups like, Pakistan Peace and Solidarity Council and numerous other such groups.

What finally comes out in the end after a substantial scrutiny of the available literature on civil society is that we do not have 'one' universally acceptable definition of the term. As is inherent of any definition in the discipline of Social Science, the definition of civil society is also contested. But for analytical purposes in the current research it becomes imperative to conjure up a workable definition of the term so that the ambiguity surrounding the term is cleared to an optimal level. In this connection it is apt to take in to account the definition adopted by the Centre for Civil Society (CCS) of the London School of Economics, which is meant to guide but is by no means to be interpreted as a rigid statement:

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[3] The Human Rights Commission in Pakistan is not an institution established by the government unlike we have in India. It is autonomous and free from governmental control.

"Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group."[4] It is keeping in mind this definition that the current research would progress in the following chapters where country specific analysis on the role of the civil society in foreign policy would be discussed and analyzed.

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[4] This information on the CCS was accessed on 29 Jan 2010 at URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm More on the CCS (LSE) can be obtained from the same.

Chapter 2

India's Foreign Policy and the Civil Society

A General Outline of India's Foreign Policy

In the context of Indian foreign policy, K.R.Gupta and Vatsala (2009) in their book *'Foreign Policy of India'* have categorized three major bases of India's Foreign policy for the study of convenience into the following:

1. Historical Basis;
2. Philosophical Basis;
3. Ideological basis.

It was after the establishment of Indian National Congress as the political party of Indian people that the politicization of the people and formulations of foreign policy had its origins. The Indian National Congress leaders showed great interest in world affairs. (Gupta and Vatsala: 2009:23) As early as in 1885, i.e., in its very first session, the Congress deprecated the annexation of upper Burma by the British. However, it was after the First World War that India led by Congress started taking more active and articulated interest in foreign affairs. It was in 1921 that the All India Congress Committee in its Delhi meeting adopted a complete resolution on foreign policy and affirmed India's desire to establish good neighborly and friendly relations with neighboring countries and other states. The Calcutta session of the Congress of 1928 directed the AICC to open a Foreign Department for developing contacts and organizing the anti-imperialist movement of the dependent people. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru came to head this department and became the director of the foreign policy of Congress. He remained as the chief architect of Independent India's foreign policy. In 1930, the Congress came out with a thorough condemnation of the aggressive acts of Nazis and fascists. When the Second

World War broke out and Britain made India a party to war on its side, the Congress strongly attacked the British policy. During 1945-47, the Congress, through a number of declarations spoke out strongly "for the freedom of all countries and for the elimination of all traces of imperialist control by whatever name it may be called." It further demanded an end to the foreign domination of Asian and African countries. These historic declarations of the Congress were instrumental in providing roots to the anti-Cold war, anti-racialism, anti-power politics and pro-neutralism, good-neighborliness and solidarity with Afro-Asian states, principles of Indian foreign policy. The foreign policy of India has drawn ideas, principles and strength from these declarations and resolutions of the Congress.

The study of philosophical basis of Indian foreign policy includes an account of such moral ideals and values of Indian society which have influenced its nature and content. The high importance that we give to the ultimate good of life is different from the 'immediate good life approach' of the Western societies. Indian Foreign policy of peace and the policy of taking independent decisions on the basis of the merits of the individual cases definitely have their basis in the Indian values of peace, non-violence and truth. India regards non-alignment, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism, and anti-war principles as practical, egalitarian and realistic principles because of our faith in human goodness, equality of all men, universal brotherhood of man, unity in diversity, secularism, tolerance and accommodation. However, in the West dominated foreign relations system, India has to accommodate western values along with its own Indian values of peace, non-violence and truth. Here also Kautilya's realism and his *Arthashastra* come to our help. Thus, Indian foreign policy has some of its roots in our own philosophy and culture.

Like the foreign policy of other nations, India's foreign policy too has its strength in some well established and popular ideologies. In the main it derives its strength from Gandhism, liberalism, democratic socialism and internationalism. In these are included the ideologies of secularism, nationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-racialism. The faith in the principles of world peace, total opposition to apartheid and a firm commitment to peaceful coexistence and peaceful means are some of the important principles of India's

foreign policy. These clearly reflect the visible influence of Gandhism. Indian foreign policy stands for the objective of free and intimate co-operation among nations. It opposes tooth and nail imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racial discrimination, war in international relations. The faith in sovereign equality of states, the right of self-determination, the right to an independent foreign policy and a firm commitment to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations is an important and valued feature of Indian foreign policy. (Appadorai and Rajan:)

As far as the determinants of a country's foreign policy is concerned, needless to say that geography, size, natural resources, strategic location etc play a vital role. A.Appadorai and M.S.Rajan have well documented the geographical aspects of India's foreign policy in their book 'India's Foreign Policy and Relations'. But since the focus of this chapter is not on the details of the determinants of India's foreign policy, so description of the determinants in detail is unwarranted.

Even though geography, political tradition, the domestic milieu, military strength etc constitute the boundary conditions within which decision making in foreign policy is carried out, the rationality of a foreign policy depends largely on the process of decision making at various levels, it also depends on as Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya (2003) says in his book 'The Making of India's Foreign Policy', " ...the nature and extent of articulate public opinion on foreign policy, pressure groups, parliament, the MEA, the Foreign Minister and finally the Cabinet. He further adds, " where the lowest level of decision-making process, namely the electorate is uneducated, relatively less informed about the intricacies of international relations, where the decision making is filtered through a number of stages- pressure groups, political parties, parliament, the bureaucracy and the political executive- at each of which there are competent individuals or groups and articulate knowledge and public opinion; where there is knowledge and competence at the level of the Foreign Minister in particular and of the political executive in general, and where the personality factor plays a relatively unimportant role in the formulation of foreign policy, the chances of non-logical pressures influencing the

decision making process and therefore of non-rationality in foreign policy would be low."
(Bandhyopadhyaya: 2003: 5)

In a Cabinet form of government like that of India, the Foreign Minister occupies a pivotal role in the entire process of policy making. He is informed and advised from below by the MEA, and influenced and controlled from above by public opinion, political parties, pressure groups, parliament, the Cabinet and then the Prime Minister. It is the Foreign Service that studies the conditions in the foreign countries from day to day, and reports to the Ministry of External Affairs. At the South Block it is the Foreign Service (and its ancilliaries) which again sifts, compiles and assimilates the reported data and puts up their substance to the Foreign Minister with suitable recommendations from time to time. The Foreign Service also observes and reports on the reactions evoked by Indian policies in the foreign countries concerned as well as the problems and difficulties of implementing Indian foreign policy abroad. The Foreign Service therefore, possesses or is at any rate expected to possess more detailed knowledge of the field conditions abroad. The idea in this chapter is to focus on the non-institutional groups that are active in contemporary Indian foreign policy. Whether the role they play is very pronounced or not would be clear after a thorough description of their activities. This chapter will primarily focus on the evolution of a civil society in India and also some of the important non-institutional groups in the making of India's foreign policy-namely business interests, arms agents, NRIs and religious and cultural groups. But before we endeavor to do that let us understand how much role does the domestic factor play in India foreign policy.

The Role of Domestic Factors in Indian Foreign Policy

In a democracy, decision makers are generally sensitive to public opinion and take into account the broad spectrum of public opinion in the country while formulating the broad outlines of foreign policy. In India the history of the freedom movement as well as the broad ideology and orientation of the Indian National Congress were basic historical and ideological determinants of foreign policy. Similarly there was a broad consensus behind India's policy of Non-Alignment. For these reasons there has been a broad consensus in

favor of India's foreign policy in major instances. Favorable public opinion undoubtedly helped the Government of India to play a leading role at the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 held in New Delhi, in Indonesia's struggle for independence from 1947 to 1950, and the general decolonization process throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly there was public support for the Government of India in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947-48, the Indo-Chinese agreement of 1954, the military action in Goa in 1961,the Indo-Soviet treaty, the Indian military intervention in Bangladesh in 1971,the Shimla agreement of 1972, the first nuclear test in Pokhran in 1974, the Pokhran II test in 1998 and the Kargil war in 1999.

But that does not mean, however that public opinion has had no negative reaction to India's foreign policy. The pro-Soviet attitude of the Indian delegation headed by Krishna Menon on the Hungarian question at the UN in 1956 was considerably modified by Nehru within few days, largely under the pressure advanced by the domestic public opinion. According to some analysts, the most important reason advanced by Nehru for granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959 was that public opinion would have reacted unfavorably if such asylum was refused. Moreover the adverse public opinion occasioned by the escalation of the border conflict with China in 1959 impelled Nehru to change his earlier stance of maintaining a soft policy towards China. Angry public opinion resulting from India's abortive attempt to participate in the Islamic Summit Conference at Rabat in 1969 compelled Prime Minister Mrs.Indira Gandhi and Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh to offer an explanation and to be subsequently cautious with regard to Mrs. Gandhi's West Asia policy. Adverse public opinion caused by the heavy loss of life among the ethnic Tamils of Sri Lanka resulting from the Indian military intervention in 1987 was one of the reasons for the eventual withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. The sharp criticism by the political parties including the ruling parties, the parliament and the press regarding Government's handling of the Kandahar plane hijacking by the Pakistan based terrorists in Dec 1999 made the Government somewhat apologetic in Parliament and led to the institutionalization of the Crisis Management Group for more efficient management of such crisis in the future.

For many years after independence, there was no institutional link between public opinion and foreign policy. But with the growth of political education, spread of the print and the electronic media, and the new institution of public opinion polls and surveys, it is not difficult for decision makers to become constantly aware of the public opinion on foreign policy. Finally it should be remembered that there is a regular and frequent contact between the decision makers and the public in the political system. Moreover with the coming of the RTI, public opinion has been more active in its assertions on issues of foreign policy more frequently than ever before.

Civil Society in India

Discussing the relative merits of the different theories on civil society, Andre Beteille (2002) argues that one can learn about civil society, both its theory and practice profitably by adopting a positive view. In this connection, he stresses the importance of Toqueville, the famous 19th century writer. Toqueville held that the success of democratic way of life requires the diversity of institutions. Toqueville here emphasizes the importance of the mediating institutions- between the state on the one hand and the individual on the other. In other words, whether or not democratic aspirations, whose two pillars are the constitutional state and the citizen, get transformed into reality in any given society depends to a large extent on the kind and content of the mediating institutions. A plurality of the right kind of institutions is what can promise successful democratic government. One has, then, to look at three interrelated components- state, citizenship; and mediating institutions in order to understand the nature and significance of civil society.

In the context of the discussion of civil society, the state that concerns us is the modern constitutional state- the kind of state that the Indian Constitution has sought to establish. This state is based on a system of rational, impersonal law. It is based on the rights of individuals as citizens, and not on the privileges and disabilities of castes and communities. The Constitution guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. This formal equality derives from the impersonal rule of law which is the basic

characteristic of the Constitution. The Constitution and the laws are impersonal in the sense that they cannot be altered by the arbitrary decision of any individual, whether acting on his own or in the name of the people, but only in accordance with prescribed rules of procedure.

According to Beteille, citizenship and the moral and legal significance assigned to it are the result of a long line of historical development. Changes in the laws and the Constitution cannot produce a citizen all at once. The transformation of a peasant into a citizen in traditional, agrarian society is a slow and tortuous process. It entails, for instance, the task of making the people in the remote rural areas of contemporary India transcend their traditional sense of social identity and think in terms of the modern categories of state and citizen. The creation of citizenship in an effective way in a large, complex and in many respects, still backward society such as India faces numerous obstacles. Beteille argues, "For centuries, the ordinary Indian has viewed himself as a member of a hamlet, a village, a family, a lineage, a caste or community rather than what may be described as Indian society as a whole. The Indian peasant or even the Indian worker did not become transformed into a citizen of India overnight with the adoption of the Constitution of India, with its chapter on citizenship, in January 1950. Creating citizenship as a socially meaningful category is not the same thing as recording a set of rights on a document, no matter how greatly we value the document. Indeed, there is no dearth of rights in India, if we go by Acts and Statutes: the question is how to make those rights secure and effective." (Beteille: 2002: 32)

Mediating institutions are those that link individuals or citizens at one end with the nation or the state on the other. They are the internal arrangements that every society has: the associations, organizations and institutions; and the network of interpersonal relations, linking the different parts to each other and to the whole. While such internal arrangements are a universal feature of all human societies, not all such arrangements make for civil society. When it comes to civil; society, the nature and type of mediating institutions present are of crucial significance. Civil society has nothing to do with institutions that characterize traditional society, viz., those that are based on kinship, caste

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and religion. Civil society comes into being and grows out of open and secular institutions. Open institutions in the sense that membership in them is not restricted on the basis of race, caste, creed, gender and such other considerations. Further, selection to positions of respect and responsibility is based, at least in principle, on open competition.

In India, the emergence of these secular institutions of civil society began under the influence of colonial rule. After independence and the adoption of a new Constitution in 1950, committed to the goal of development and modernization, the growth of these institutions received a hefty push forward. The process was aided by the spread of modern education and the growth of a new occupational system that opened up new economic opportunities. Equally important here is the role played by the early leaders of our nation.

It is however obvious that the new institutions of civil society have not dislodged all the old ones based on caste, kinship and religion even among the well-educated and well-off sections, not to speak of the rest. The civil society institutions, it is clear, remain unassimilated by the society. That is to say, the institutions of civil society which have sprung up in India after independence, and without whose mediating presence the words in the constitutional document cannot be translated into live substance, have not yet acquired a meaningful existence. And until such time this happens, there is no escape from poor governance. One can cite any number of examples : Gram Sabhas (village councils) that are made to meet 'on record' and 'for record's sake' four times a year just to formally fulfil constitutional obligations under the new Panchayati Raj setup; highly politicized and corrupt civil and police services that are supposed to be 'rational' and 'impersonal'- again on record; a democratic government featuring personal rule in the name of party rule at all levels of the polity-national, state, district/local. As these examples demonstrate, what we are witnessing is an erosion of institutional authority and the resulting crisis in governance. How has this come about? Who or what is responsible? At the core of the crisis lies the erosion of the legitimacy of the institutions. An institution is a social arrangement and as such, it has not only a certain form and purpose but also a

certain legitimacy and meaning for its individual members. To the outsider, only the form and function are visible. But for its members, as important as the form and function are its meaning and legitimacy. Beteille obverses: "...An institution has meaning and legitimacy for its members only when they acknowledge its moral claims over them and are willing to submit to its demands, at least some of the time, even when they find those demands contrary to their individual interests." (Betaille: 2002: 39) This applies not only to institutions that are part of the government but to all public institutions including those created by an individual or group of individuals with vision and commitment. It is only by participating in the activities of a number of such institutions that an individual in a constitutional state gets transformed, over a period of time, in to a citizen. Where this happens, good governance is sure to follow. Now, the way the leaders of political parties- both national and regional- have shaped politics in India since the mid- 60s has only served to undermine the meaning and legitimacy of the nation's political institutions in the eyes of the public. Personalization of political authority, politicization of the bureaucracy, populism and the resultant corruption have all set a negative example.

However, an increase of middle classes and in students population as well as enlargement and differentiations in the elite strata in various sectors of life by the 1970s engendered a new phenomenon variously described as new social movements, middle class and student's activism, women's or feminist movements and grassroots movements. This new phenomenon differs from the earlier patterns of socio-political movements in a number of ways. Issues that animate the new movements are less concerned with economic production and redistribution than with removal of corruption and authoritarianism, protection of ecology and environment, provision of civic utilities, gender equality and child rights, employment, rights of the most vulnerable sections of the population like those living in hilly and forested tracts, and victims of big dams and construction workers in sites of dams and cities etc. Good governance and human rights generally are other areas while middle class activism is also much in evidence.

Another feature of these new social movements in India is that they have gradually disengaged from grand narratives of socialism, and nationalism and tended to move into

grooves of single issues, transient questions, regional and local issues even sectional and sectarian issues slanted more towards narrow identities than larger objective interests. For this reason they are called as "micro-movements". (Singh and Saxena: 2008: 274)

Over-dependence on the Government over the years which has been a consistent pattern in most of the developing countries has resulted in many negative effects. The most visible negative effect is the stark gap between inputs and outputs – between what governments spend and what society actually gains. For example, successive governments at the Centre and in the States have spent considerable sums on rural development, on drinking water, on afforestation, on road construction, etc. If all this money had been well spent, our villages would have presented a much healthier look than they do today. On the one hand, people were given to believe that Government is the answer to all their needs and problems. On the other hand, those in the Government failed to recognize the need as well as the usefulness of people's own organizations for better implementation of policies and programmes. They ignored the truth that the spirit of voluntarism and social service runs very deep in Indian society and, if properly harnessed, could be a tremendous force for social transformation.

The right relationship is that of partnership, in which the government acts as a facilitator and NGOs deliver on what they promise. There is also the malaise amongst some organizations to be excessively dependent on foreign aid. This can be somewhat offset if our business houses start contributing more to the voluntary sector than they do now. Some voluntary organizations also tend to be individual-centric with little internal democracy and sometimes transparency. Such organizations find it difficult to outlast their founder. There is also a need for greater cooperation among NGOs themselves. Together, they can achieve much more than if they choose to operate in their own small autonomous areas. Emphasizing the positive role of the voluntary sector, former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said, "I would like to liken nation-building to a chariot that is driven by five horses. These are: the Central Government; the State governments; Panchayati Raj Institutions; the private sector; and, last but not the least, voluntary

organizations and community-based groups. The chariot will run fast and in the right direction only when all the five horses run in tandem."[5]

In India there has been a proliferation of such civil society movements. From those related to the environmental issues like the Centre for Environment's campaign against the alleged groundwater contamination in Palakkad in Kerala by the Coco Cola Plant, to the Narmada Bachao Andolan spearheaded by Medha Patkar, Vandana Shiva's NGO Navdanya's campaign against flawed governmental policies with regard to environmental issues. Moreover the recent campaign of the various civil society groups against the introduction of the Bt Brinjal in India seeds forced the government to backtrack on its proposed policy for introducing Bt brinjal and setting up a Biotechnology Regulatory Authority. Such movements are manifestations of the larger picture of the growing increase in number of civil society initiatives in India. However, a majority of these initiatives are focused on domestic issues. When it comes to foreign policy the number and the effectiveness of such advocacy appears to dwindle.

Analyzing the evolution of a civil society in India and its activism on domestic issues, it now becomes imperative to focus on the various non-institutional groups influence foreign policy in India.

Non –institutional Groups in India's foreign policy

The Business Groups

Until recently business interests did not evince any organized interest in Indian Foreign policy. The FICCI, CII, ACCI and such other business organizations usually took considerable interest in the monetary, fiscal and import-export policies of the government. They are also known to have tried to influence individual Ministers,

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[5] This statement of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was from a speech made at the 'All India Conference on the Role of the Voluntary Sector in National Development', held on 20 April 2002 at the Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi.

Members of Parliament, influential political leaders and senior civil servants through their invisible channels in furtherance of their business interests. Krishna Menon, who was concerned with the making of India's Foreign Policy for many years since independence till his death, observed that business groups in India did not try to influence the Foreign Minister with regard to the general orientation of India's Foreign Policy. (Bandyopadhyaya: 2003:112) The same view was expressed by former Foreign Ministers like M.C.Chagla (1966-1967), Dinesh Singh (1969-1970) and Swaran Singh (1964-1966). The reason behind this visible lack of interest on the part of the business interests in foreign policy for many years was that they had very little direct economic involvement with foreign countries. (Bandyopadhyaya: 2003: 115) But with the growth of Indian MNCs abroad in the recent years, a growing number of Indian industrialists became interested in India's foreign economic relations.

With the increasing liberalization of the Indian economy since 1990s, the Indian business groups have begun to show organized interest in foreign policy, particularly economic policy. Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya writes, "Since the promotion of Indian exports and the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) to India have become primary objectives of Indian Foreign policy, Indian business interests have become directly involved with the formulation of foreign economic policies. Frequent and regular interactions with the Indian business community for promoting Indian exports and drawing FDI to India has become a major function of all the divisions in the MEA concerned with India's foreign economic relations. The Economic Division, Multilateral Economic Relations Divisions and the External Publicity Division maintain close contact with the leading Indian business organizations and houses. They not only provide essential information to the business groups on economic conditions and market prospects in foreign countries, but also officially assist them in connection with meetings and conferences with their foreign counterparts both in India and abroad." (Bandyopadhyaya: 2003: 116)

Arms Agents

Most of the third world countries depend heavily upon on foreign arms supplies, the foreign arms sellers usually employ local arms agents who lobby with the government for

the purchase of arms from the states whose multinationals they represent. In this way they also influence the foreign policies of their own states. The local agents of the foreign arms merchants thus not only influence the foreign policies of their own states, particularly in the Third World. India being a Third World state is also a major purchaser of foreign arms. Bandyopadhyaya in his book argues, "..a sinister feature of the operations of the arms agencies was that a large number of retired senior officers of the armed forces had become arms agents after retirement and lobbied regularly with their former colleagues in the Ministry of Defense for various arms supplies." The famous 'Teheleka.com' tapes, which were telecast on national television channels in March 2001 clearly showed that arms lobbies were not only present in New Delhi in large numbers, but actually influenced almost every arms deals of the Government of India through bribery at the highest bureaucratic and political levels. Political commentators have argued time and again in this connection that there is at times a cash nexus between the arms agents on the one hand and political parties, individual political parties, individual politicians and decision-makers on the other, but it does not conclude from this analysis that arms agents play an active role in foreign policy making in India. For the dearth of available and reliable information it becomes to naïve to conclusively say that they are a major determining factor in Indian foreign policy.

Religious and Cultural Organizations

Jayantanuja Bandyopadhaya in his book 'The Making of India's Foreign Policy' writes, with the exception of Ananda Marg, which has professed political objectives, the cultural activities of the religious organizations like the Ramakrishna Mission, ISKON, have not been of any particular significance for Indian foreign policy, at least in a negative way.(Bandyopadhyaya: 2003: 67) But this cannot be said of the activities of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the RSS in recent years particularly under the BJP and the NDA governments since 1998. Since however, the VHP and RSS do not openly call themselves political parties, they have to be treated as pressure groups. The VHP and the RSS in particular, during the NDA regime had put relentless pressure on the Government of India with regard to various aspects of foreign policy such as- they had been opposed to

the policy of liberalization, and wanted the Government to follow an economic policy of nationalist self-reliance. They strongly criticized the compromise made by the Government of India with the Pakistani terrorist during the IC-814 hijacking in 1999. BJP being anchored to the RSS ideology has made impressive electoral gains in past few years. The construction of a Hindu national identity casts the Muslims as the 'other'. BJP's active role in the demolition of Babri *masjid* in 1993 and resultant communal riots extending beyond India's frontiers in Pakistan and Bangladesh points to the potential dangers of inciting hatred for the Muslim community at home and across the borders. In seeking a ban on Indian films involving Pakistani actors/actresses or music directors and tearing up the pitch to stall an Indo-Pakistani cricket match, Shiv Sena activists had also furthered question the legitimacy of popular interactions with the so-called "enemy nation", that is, Pakistan. It is interesting to note that in Pakistan too such hard line elements have fomented hatred and animosity towards India. (See Chapter 3 for more details).

People of Indian Origin

Prof. Bandyopadhyaya in his book, have included the PIOs in his list of the various pressure groups that have a substantial influence upon India's foreign policy. He is of the opinion that old migrants overseas have generally been a negative factor in Indian foreign policy, particularly because no effort was made by the Government of India to protect the interests of overseas Indians or to utilize them for foreign policy purposes. He adds, "Nehru's policy was one of indifference". However things have now changed. The Government of India is now more pro-active in winning the support of the Indian diaspora for foreign policy purposes. The Indian diaspora in UK and USA have become economically and politically more important in these countries. In addition the financial contributions made by the Indians to the two major political parties in USA, have made them more important factor in American politics and foreign policy. There is little doubt that the Indian business community in the USA has been partly responsible for the recent improvement in Indo-American relations as has been represented by the increasing effective strength of the various Indo-US Caucuses. On the one hand they have put

relentless pressure on the Government of India to liberalize the rules and regulations for FDI in India, as well as for cuts in India's import duties. On the other hand, they have lobbied with the US government to improve economic and diplomatic ties with India. The Government of India also views the people of Indian origin abroad, particularly in UK and USA as prospective sources of foreign capital and technology. Indian political parties have also started using ethnic Indians abroad as a major source of political funding. The belated realization that PIOs can be a major positive factor in Indian foreign policy impelled the Government of India to set up in April 2000, an NRI/PIO Division in the Ministry of External Affairs and a full fledged Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs later. In the same year it also appointed a High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora on how to structure India's interaction with NRIs and PIOs in foreign countries. It seems likely that the PIOs, including NRIs, will play an increasingly important role in the making and implementation of Indian foreign policy in the coming years. This was clearly manifested by the hectic lobbying that went in USA with regard to the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear deal. But whether the PIOs influence India's foreign policy towards Pakistan or not, is a matter of debate.

The Role of the Media

Instead of acting like adversaries with two different sets of views, Pakistan and India need to focus on common problems, common ambitions and common dreams for a better future, not only of the two countries but also for the progress of Asia as a region. This has been the major focus of the various civil society groups in India that have been engaged over the years in promoting India-Pakistan peace initiatives. This section on people to people contacts will focus on the initiatives of 'Aman ki Asha' in facilitating people to people contact. Every war is followed by hopes of peace. 'Aman ki Asha' is an effort for peace that provides such a hope that will help ease tensions and prevent a third war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Dr Humayun Khan, a distinguished bureaucrat, former foreign secretary and Ambassador to India and a committed supporter of Pakistan-India peace process in his talk on 'Pakistan-India relations and the need to stay engaged in peace talks to find a way forward' termed 'Aman Ki Asha' as a forward-l

initiative of two important media groups and said that positive and constructive role of the media is a key factor in establishing peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan. "In the past, the media on both sides was never supportive of the idea of building peaceful relationship between the two countries." Since media enjoys great influence on public opinion and policy-making, he suggested that it should publicize more positive and less inflammatory approach to promote friendship between the two countries. Media is known as the fourth pillar of the state. It can play a key role in generating awareness regarding hope for peace. The media in India and Pakistan have started efforts to promote peace. If these efforts fail, the future of people in both countries will be dark. Incidentally, 'Aman Ki Asha' is the first media-led civil society initiative taken to bridge the gap between Pakistan and India. Shahrukh Hasan, Group Managing Director of the Jang Group said, "A majority of the people in both countries want peace. Through the peace process, we are also focusing on major disputes such as Kashmir, the water issue and others which are creating obstacles. Therefore Aman Ki Asha is facilitating an environment which will remove hostility among the masses," he said.

Despite the passage of 62 years, it seems that many Indians and Pakistanis have not accepted each other's existence. The main conflict between Pakistan and India is the Kashmir issue. The reduction in the arms race, and exchanges in the fields of tourism, culture, trade, sports, education, print and electronic media will help reduce tensions between the two countries. Such exchanges will also provide a suitable environment in maintaining peace. With frequent visits and meetings of intellectuals and authors of India Pakistan these wishes and hopes can materialize into reality.

The Pakistan Hindu Council desires that dialogue on vital issues should begin on the basis of equality. This will not only help in changing the scenario, but it will also have positive effects on this subcontinent. Pakistan's mainstream film industry, better known as Lollywood, may have fallen on hard times. But in recent years, an exciting bunch of off-beat movies by independent filmmakers has been showcased across the world. These films aren't regular Lollywood brand. Director Shoaib Mansoor's internationally acclaimed 'Khuda Kay Liye' (2007) depicted the plight of Muslims in post-9/11 US and

also showed how liberal-minded Pakistani youths were brainwashed by radical clerics. Such movies have helped in creating a positive atmosphere in India towards Pakistan and its people.

Aman ki Asha initiative has been conducting many activities in both India and Pakistan-from musical evenings featuring artists from both Pakistan and India, to food festivals, literary gatherings. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband paid accolades to the Aman Ki Asha initiative and its objective of bringing peace and stability to the South Asian region. He told *The News* exclusively that the Aman Ki Asha launched by the Jang Group and the Times of India is an important initiative with noble objectives. He saw in this campaign the potential to promote dialogue in an important and constructive way. David Miliband said: "The Aman Ki Asha initiative is doing an important job, helping to find common ground between Pakistan and India. It builds on the traditions, history, language and culture that Pakistan and India share. I support the aims of this initiative to bring together the people of the two countries in order to help promote dialogue." Miliband's outspoken support follows the groundswell of support the Aman initiative has generated across the world in diverse sections.

In a survey conducted by *The News*, British Asians have voiced their full support for the historic Aman Ki Asha initiative amid optimism that the Jang Group and the Times of India will pave the way for permanent peace between the warring siblings of 1947 partition. Prominent advocacy groups, cross-section politicians and leading individuals agreed that Aman Ki Asha initiative has inspired hope in a way unseen before in the conflict-ridden history of the two neighbors.

Tehrik-e-Niswan, one of the pioneer theatre groups of Pakistan, left for India on March 10, to participate in the 'South Asian Women's Theatre Festival 2010' that was held from 8 to 17 March in New Delhi. Led by its founder Sheema Kermani, the theatre troupe carried along with it a message of peace in shape of a play, 'Jang Ab Nahi Hogi'. Speaking with *The News* about their trip to India, Sheema Kermani said, "The reason to perform Jang Ab Nahi Hogi, is to give the people of India a message of peace and love

from people of Pakistan, saying them that we all want to live in harmony and with mutual respect." The well-attended Indo-Pak mushaira, organised under the aegis of 'Aman ki Asha', however, went a step further. It not only focused on the burden of history that clouds the two sides, it articulated hope and harmony too. This was indeed a topical message which struck an instant chord with the poetry lovers. Indian poet and lyricist, Nida Fazli pointed out, it was time to stop reading traditional history books since they talked only about hatred.[6] But amidst all such hope and friendly initiatives for people-to-people contacts like this, one thing that stands out is that such positive instances of people-to-people contacts can change things only if civil society in Pakistan gets organized to exert itself as a pillar of state. If civil society becomes united, many issues can be solved.

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[6] For an extensive coverage of the various comments by the eminent personalities mentioned in this section on 'People to people contact' see http://www.amankiasha.com/

Chapter 3

Civil Society and Foreign Policy in Pakistan

The idea of a civil society in Pakistan is one of an area of contested dichotomies. It is a rising arena of socio-political change in Pakistan. Since the history of Pakistan has been a story of undulating political upheavals in the form of military and democratic structures, the civil society organizations in Pakistan have also suffered a fate of consistent fluctuation. Interestingly although Pakistan does not consider the civil society organization to be of recent origin, the term 'civil society' per se is one in vogue only for the past decade or so. And when it comes to popular phraseology, the term is yet to gain salience.

Civil society is a term much-used in current development discourse in Pakistan, but among those who constitute the civil society constituency in Pakistan there has been little time spent on definitional issues. As a result, the term has been reduced to a catch-all phrase by development workers within Pakistan, and possibly by policy-makers and sponsors of development to refer to 'non-state activities' and associations that serve as a channel between the largely poor masses and the ruling establishment in Pakistan. These at times include within its ambit NGOs, social movements, the intelligentsia, trade unions, political parties, think-tanks, jirgas, charitable trusts, shrines et al. The activities of these aforesaid organizations in Pakistan have been eyed with suspicion by the state. Accordingly, there still remains a dearth of updated and reliable information on the dynamics of the civil society in Pakistan. Perhaps the answer to this lies in Pakistan's warped political establishment.

The British colonial legacy had profound structural implications for Pakistan. There is the colonial heritage and a culture of dependence on the state that it fostered, creating subjects rather than citizens. This militated against collective, autonomous action independent of state assistance. Historically, therefore the middle class has had a weak

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foundation in Pakistan. A dynamic middle-class now exists but while modern in its approach, its socialization in democratic norms remains problematic.

In West, the development of the basic unit of modern international society- the nation-state as we know it today followed a sequence in which-the nation came into its own first. In most colonial countries this process was reversed. In Pakistan therefore what emerged at the time of independence was not so much a nation-state as a 'state-nation' the institutions of the state such as the bureaucracy and the army were strong while voluntary associations that serve a socially integrating role were relatively weaker. The establishment of an over-centralized state also undermined the community of culture in Pakistan. As mentioned earlier since civil society in Pakistan has been considered to be an evolving concept, it encompasses an entire range of assumptions and facts that are considered quintessential for democracy. But given the political culture and socio-cultural matrix in Pakistan, civil society in Pakistan cannot be compared to an "ultra advanced" society of USA where the civil society groups and corporate consider themselves to be the connoisseur of the prevalent economic order and crucial in the policy making process.

The history of the evolution and development of the civil society in Pakistan has been replete with exclusivity typical of the Pakistani political history. During the early years of the state formation, despite creating a state, the political elites and the ruling establishment drove the state at the periphery thereby depriving it of a turf so very essential to evolve. This has led to parallel systems of tribal justice, ethnocentrism, political atrophy and extremism, despondency and dejection rampant amongst the poor and a widely prevalent sentiment of apathy shared among the middle classes.

In the aftermath of the partition, Pakistan received only eight towns. It received fewer than 10 % of the industrial enterprises. The bulk went to India. This is one of the reasons behind the weak trade union movement in the country that has the potential to serve as a major ally in civil society initiatives. (Rashid: 2004: 180) The idea in this chapter is to bring to the fore the various dimensions- both positive and negative, of the civil society in

Pakistan and also to analyze the problems and prospects of whatever vestiges of civil society activism exist in Pakistan. But before we endeavor to understand the various perspectives of the Pakistani civil society, let us first understand the dynamics of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Objectives of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Pakistan emerged on the map of the world on 14th August 1947 and it inherited the foreign policy from British India. After independence, Pakistan made some changes in British policy according to the ideology and the objectives of Pakistan Movement. Every country established its foreign policy according to own ideological, historical, political and geographical circumstances. Foreign Policy of Pakistan was established by Jinnah himself.

When Pakistan was created in 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the creator of Pakistan promised the subcontinent's Muslims that they would finally be able to fulfill their cultural and civilizational destiny. The new nation arose from the pangs of partition and the subsequent ethnic cleansing and sectarian violence, and its fundamental premise was that Hindus and Muslims could never live together, which was the ideological fall-out of Jinnah's two-nation theory.

With time, Jinnah's Pakistan grew weaker, more authoritarian, and increasingly theocratic. Pervez Hoodbhoy (2004) argues, "Now set to become the world's fourth most populous nation, it is all of several things: a client state of the United States yet deeply resentful of it; a breeding ground for jihad and al Qaeda as well as a key U.S. ally in the fight against international terrorism; an economy and society run for the benefit of Pakistan's warrior class,…a country where education and science refuse to flourish but which is nevertheless a declared nuclear power…" (Hoodbhoy: 2004: 122). Hoodbhoy questioned as to why the warrior class was never tamed by civilian rule in Pakistan. As an answer he pointed back to the founding of the Pakistani state. As the Pakistani scholar

Eqbal Ahmad has emphasized, "the civilian system of power was never regarded by Pakistan's citizens as just, appropriate, or authoritative. And despite Jinnah's declarations, the idea of Pakistan was unclear from the start. Lacking any clear basis for legitimacy or direction, the state quickly aligned with the powerful landed class: the army leadership and the economic elite joined forces to claim authority in a nation without definition or cohesion." (Hoodbhoy: 2004: 124) In subsequent years, the government continued to maintain the feudal structure of society and entered into a exploitative relationship with Pakistan's eastern wing (which became Bangladesh in 1971 after Indian military intervention). Politicians, with the exception of the "mercurial demagogue Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto", have made no serious attempt at reform, ignoring the masses in favor of the elites and pursuing their own vested interests .The result as Hoodbhoy argues, have been "ideological confusion, civilian helplessness, and an environment eminently hospitable to putsches." (Hoodbhoy: 2004:124) No elected government has completed its term in Pakistan's 57-year history. "Pakistani army Generals express disapproval for the civilian order and steadfastly hold that 'what is good for the army is good for Pakistan,' and Pakistani society is thoroughly militarized. Bumper stickers read, 'The Finest Men Join the Pakistan Army'; tanks parade on the streets of Islamabad while jet aircraft screech overhead; discarded naval guns, artillery pieces, and fighter aircraft adorn public plazas. It is even a criminal offense to 'criticize the armed forces of Pakistan or to bring them into disaffection'" (Hoodbhoy: 2004: 124)

The military is perhaps the most important component of the wider "establishment" that rules Pakistan. Stephen Cohen (2004) in his book *The Idea of Pakistan* calls this establishment a "moderate oligarchy" and defines it as "an informal political system that [ties] together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites." (Cohen: 2004: 4) Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen argues, requires adherence to a common set of beliefs: "that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true

Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of." (Hoodbhoy: 2004: 125)

The quest for security has been at the heart of Pakistan's foreign policy since independence. Pakistan's security environment derives its origins from the circumstances in which Pakistan was created. The violence accompanying the partition leading to the emergence of the two independent states of Pakistan and India generated hostility, which continues to afflict relations between the two countries mainly because of the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The issue is the source of continuing tensions and conflict, and shaped the unstable and tense security environment in the region.

The historical perspective of Pakistan's foreign policy falls in five broad phases. The first period covers the time from the UN enforced cease-fire of 1949 to the 1965 war over Kashmir. During this period Pakistan allied itself with the West by joining the Baghdad Pact and its successor, CENTO and SEATO. The primary motivation underlying Pakistan's membership of these alliances had been the need to redress her defense vulnerability and achieve a reasonable military equilibrium with India. The second phase runs from 1965 to the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan. The 1965 war, which was sparked by the Jammu and Kashmir issue, had led to a drastic reduction in economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The increase in defense expenditure together with the decline in foreign assistance compounded economic difficulties and aggravated political problems led by a sense of alienations in East Pakistan. Eventually Bangladesh was created as a result of India's military intervention.

During the third phase from 1971 to 1989 Pakistan remained engaged in rebuilding itself and facing the challenge of the Soviet military intervention in neighboring Afghanistan, which lasted for over a decade since 1979, and has spawned a conflict that continues to ravage Afghanistan even today.

The fourth phase covers the period from 1990 to the nuclear tests of May 1998. Two important events from the security perspective took place in 1990. USA clamped

economic and military sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment (which widened the conventional gap between India and Pakistan). The Nawaz Sharif years have witnessed important developments in Pakistan's foreign policy. That includes the call to resume bilateral dialogue with India, the nuclear tests that radically altered the security environment of South Asian 1998, the security dialogue with the United States and the crisis in Kargil in 1999. The unfinished agenda of Kashmir, together with the continuing conflict in Afghanistan, and the war on terror with Pakistan's 'blow hot blow cold' relations with India represent the major preoccupations of her policy makers.

Determining factors in Pakistan's Foreign Policy

The following are the main instruments of the foreign policy of Pakistan:-

1. *Administrative Troika* Administrative Troika comprises the President of Pakistan, the Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff. It plays very important role in formulating foreign policy. It can approve or disapprove the foreign policy of Pakistan or can make any change in it.

2. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* The ministry can play very important role in formulating the foreign policy. It comprises the specialists and experts of foreign policy and the bureaucrats of high level. They prepare foreign policy, keeping in view the basic objectives and principles of the policy. They formulate the policy, plans and programmes regarding the priorities of foreign policy, and fully cooperate with Troika for its preparation. In accordance with new constitutional amendment, the Troika has been replaced by the National Security Council.

3. *Intelligence Agencies* Pakistan's intelligence agencies also play very effective role in the formulation of foreign policy by providing full information about the objectives of other countries foreign policies. Keeping in view these information's, Pakistan formulates its foreign policy.

4. *Political Parties and Pressure Groups* The political parties and pressure groups have deep impacts on the formulation of foreign policy of any country. The political parties include the priorities of foreign policy in their manifestoes, and after their success in the

election, they force the government to change the priorities of foreign policy according to the changing scenario in the light of their view points. Likewise the pressure groups can also influence the foreign policy. But in Pakistan the shadow of the military is so overarching that political parties and pressure groups do not enjoy much of a space.

5. ***Parliament:*** While in India Parliament's role in running the affairs of the state was recognized and continued in the tradition of democracy, except for a brief period of rule by emergency, the Parliament in Pakistan experienced a complicated and conflicting history. Constitutional amendments gave further power to the executives at the expense of the parliament. The parliament was made to fall in line with the wishes of the executives. The parliament was shredded of its important role of overseeing the function of the government and became its appendix. In the end the Parliament and Parliamentary Democracy had to retreat in the background in Pakistan.

The Parliament however was restored in the bid to civilize the military rule, but the role of the legislature remained as an adjunct of the executive. It was limited to passing some legislation only. Though it was said that the executive would be answerable to the parliament, but that answerability was limited to giving answer by the ministers to the questions raised by the members in the form of starred or unstarred question. The parliament members tried to assert their role by using the existing rules, but could not do much as the executives were supreme in taking and making any decision. To the people the parliament was nothing but a showpiece to legitimize the functions of the executives and to show to the world that democracy is there. And this image of parliament also deteriorated further during the subsequent military regime. The election to the parliament became such a farce that people did not give any credence to that. They took to streets for free and fair election and a sovereign parliament. So even though Pakistan in the aftermath of the Musharraf regime have a democratic dispensation, how much of a role the parliament would enjoy in the coming years with regard to making of its foreign policy remains under a question mark because a majority of the important issues in Pakistan are still being decided by the military command, such as the nature of Pakistan's relationship with India and the United States and much of Pakistan's foreign and defense policy remains heavily influenced by the military.

Perspectives on Pakistani Civil Society

Today what is Pakistan has been the result of the movement for Pakistan that was spearheaded by a section of the Muslim elite during the struggle for India's independence. In the aftermath of the partition that resulted in mass displacement and that saw the largest migration of people across the borders in 1947, the nebulous Pakistani society produced many citizens' organizations and charitable trusts to accommodate for the basic needs of these migrants. The demise of the creator of Pakistan, Md. Ali Jinnah, saw the role of these organizations being usurped by the new elites in the political corridor, who took control of almost all spheres of the political and social life in Pakistan. In the course of the next few decades, the democratic scaffoldings in Pakistan wobbled and the idea behind the creation of a separate and yet a progressive, tolerant and egalitarian state of Pakistan with a vibrant and dynamic civil society receded into the background. Consistently after 1949, successive governments in Pakistan whether democratic or authoritarian have continued to show ambivalence towards the civil society constituency, arm twisting them to subjugation within the machinations of the state. In the absence of a thriving civil society, the common man has been left voiceless and this has restricted the developmental discourse in Pakistan. Hence despondency, institutional decay, corruption, poor law and order situation, absence of social justice, militarization of society, drug trafficking, and ethnic violence continue to cast its gloomy shadow over Pakistan. The phenomenon of low turnouts in elections, frequent military interventions, bureaucratic high-handedness, germination and subsequent propagation of a feudal mindset, an almost non-existent education system and tribal justice are pointers towards, fallouts of a conscious and consistent propaganda of marginalizing the civil society, which the Pakistani state has followed over the years. (Malik: 1997: 154)

The Pakistani state after independence has had limited success in delivering on its promise. There have been periods of rapid economic growth but equity has seldom been a priority. Pakistan ignored the important aspect of equity. Growth could not really be converted into broad based development and this had grave political and social repercussions. The confidence and self-consciousness of the middle class as to its role has

also been undermined in recent years by the downturn in Pakistan's economy. The citizens' absolute dependence upon the hybrid state, limitations on marketing, state's control and domination in almost spheres of public goods and amenities, snubbed the role of the civil society.

This had its manifestations in a centralized culture, and corruption and nepotism within the state machinery became an ordinary phenomenon. Political fragmentation also spawned the creation of a culture antithetic to those that led to the birth of Pakistan. The mismatches between hyper centralization and dwindling federalism, disproportionate gap in available resources and allocation between the provinces, have led to sub national tendencies, ethnocentrism and religious extremism. The powerful vested interests have made the Pakistani masses captives to their own interests over the years. The hold of the tribal lords in Sindh and Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are pointers to this. Such overt and covert discrepancies in the socio-political map of Pakistan have been utilized by the terrorist organizations to propagate their ideology of violence thereby undermining the state. At the same time over-regulation has bred corruption by the private sector in its business practices with the result that a competitive parallel economy now runs in Pakistan. As per an estimate, the cash flow in this sector is around 3% of Pakistan's GDP. This speaks volumes about the faltering principle of socio-economic justice in Pakistan.

There has been scholarly debate on the contrasts between the civil societies of the sub-continental neighbors- India and Pakistan. The argument provided from some quarters is that in the post-war era civil society developed in India, but the same did not flourish in Pakistan. The reason behind its success story in India was because the political leadership in post-independent India was deeply committed to the ideals of parliamentary democracy and secularism at the same time it was determined to keep the military subservient to civilian authority, which was quite unusual in some of the newly decolonized countries. It failed in Pakistan because political power was quickly hijacked by the so called 'Military-Mullah nexus', the powerful lobby of the feudal lords and

bureaucrats who trampled the principle of representative democracy under the military boots and favored military dictatorship.

Pakistan, in sharp contrast to India, lacked a proper political organization at independence. The near total absence of the Muslim League's organizational base in the Muslim majority areas that were to constitute Pakistan paralyzed the formation of a vibrant civil society. The political context for the development of a civil society was missing from Pakistan's political landscape at the dawn of Pakistan's inception. Such disadvantages were in sharp contrast to that of India. *Washington Post* columnist Jim Hoagland stated the dissimilarity between the two countries very well in his Aug 19, 2007 column. With regard to the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the state formation in India and Pakistan, he wrote: "India celebrated its 60th birthday with a raucous parliamentary debate over nuclear energy and its new strategic relationship with the US, while Pakistan marked the same occasion by sinking deeper into the past," producing "a cycle of disasters for the...nation - aided by the hidden hand of US diplomacy working to preserve President Pervez Musharraf's dwindling power in Islamabad."(Hoagland: 2007:5)

It can be argued that the difference that exists between India and Pakistan today in terms of the socio-political matrix, is a result of the political choices, which the leaders of these two countries made at the time of independence and during the process of state building that followed independence. It was largely due to the political sagacity of Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress party that India opted for Westminster democracy and a federal structure, establishing parliamentary bodies at both the national and provincial levels, vesting legislative powers to the provincial assemblies, and keeping the army well restricted to the barracks. This has successfully encouraged the culture of 'consensual politics' by managing diversity, and has given the country the much needed arm space for conducting its foreign policies without any strings attached. But Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of its independence traversed a different route altogether which year after its existence has pulled her to the brink of institutional corrosion, political atrophy and religious extremism.

Pakistani people have been wheedled to an unstable polity by its own leaders. The idea of Pakistan as envisioned by its political leaders and military bosses was a doomed enterprise from the very beginning. The Hindu nationalists did not succeed in imposing their ideological dictates upon a nascent India. Over the years the tradition of democratic and liberal polity, accommodative multi-racial and multi-ethnic culture has fostered the development of a vibrant civil society in India. However, a well educated and an enlarging middle class propelled by India's high rate of economic growth has also contributed to its rise.

There is also a sizeable 'peace constituency' in India, that advocates peace with Pakistan. It is in this context, a pertinent question arises- can we assert that a corresponding 'civil society' and 'peace constituency' also exists in Pakistan? A question mark hangs over their existence, as any sign of their presence would have surely put pressure upon the political establishment in Pakistan from using terrorism as a state policy against India.

In the wake of the terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008, India expected Pakistan to put the terrorist groups to book. It was expected that the 'civil society' and the 'peace constituency' in Pakistan would come out with strong condemnations of the Mumbai attacks. In the weeks that followed, India awaited condemnation from Pakistan's 'civil society' and 'peace constituency'. It was heartening to know that a thorough scan of the English press of the Pakistani media did not bear any evidence of any vocal condemnation. It is this which leads one to question about actual existence of a 'civil society' and a 'peace constituency' in Pakistan. What is more important is that the future of the India-Pakistan peace process would depend heavily on the strengthening of the role of a civil society and peace constituency in Pakistan. This is possible only when such groups clamor for the necessity of restoring peace with India.

Pakistan: The 'Absence' of a Civil Society?

The middle class constitutes a base for civil society and likely motor for change and institutional reform. Not only do the prerequisites exist, but also vibrant middle class is in

place in Pakistan today. The country has seen a significant level of economic growth and urbanization over the past decades. It has been argued that the growth in private sector social services emphasizes the vibrancy of the middle class that has built institutions of varying quality for its growing clientele. Again there is not much of evidence that middle class groups seek to influence the agenda of the political parties by way of better economic policies, improving the status of women and minorities, instituting effective mechanisms for accountability etc.

An issue that has serious implications for autonomy of the middle class and the rise of an enlightened and vibrant civil society is the extent to which feudalism still holds sway in Pakistan. Iftikhar Malik (1997) pointed out that "The hold of larger landowner at the local level is strengthened in many ways, not least through the administrative and revenue machinery and the institution of the religious divine or *Pir*. The Troika of Police, *Pir* and *Patwari* as in the past continue to have significant role in many parts of the country." (Malik: 1997:171)

The political context for civil society has been far from ideal. The polity has suffered from fractured and under-developed party politics. In comparison, politico-religious groups have enjoyed greater freedom under such dispensations. Political parties in Pakistan suffer from the lack of internal democratic practices and institutionalization. The inability of political parties to play their due role has aggravated internal dissonance within society; hence politicized ethnicity and violent sectarianism are close to top of the list. Pakistan has in the last six decades relapsed from the liberal political institutional framework left by the British and degenerated into an autocratic "Military-Mullah" impasse.(Malik:1997:225) Liberalism has been smothered and a deep chasm exists between ruling elite which is rich and urbane and a vastly large constituency of economically poor rural Pakistan. The legacy of successive authoritarian regimes has aggravated the imbalance between the polity's civil and military components. Military as well as civilian governments have displayed an authoritarian bent in governance. Martial law regimes in particular have restricted space for the civil society. The recent experience of military rule under General Musharraf was an interesting one that the press was

relatively free, even the electronic media could occasionally provide the forum for the opposition view point. (Rashid: 2004: 188) Abbas Rashid argues that undermining of the democratic system has its repercussion in undermining the growth of a vibrant civil society. Malik in work on 'State and Civil Society in Pakistan' makes the following observations:

"The Pakistani State has successfully refurbished itself at the expense of vital civil institutions – Constitution, pluralism, political parties, independent judiciary, free press and activist groups. The imperatives for establishment of a civil society in Pakistan have been side lined. Totalitarianism, elitist monopolization, majoritarian coercion and ethnic fascism which normally stand rejected by a 'civil society' are all pervasive and predominant in Pakistan." (Malik: 1997; 134)

There are trends that suggest the waning of enthusiasm for electoralism in Pakistan. In the October 2002 National Elections the polling in Pakistan was described as 'low' and below 36 %. What is even surprising is that the Pakistani Election Commission did not give out the official figures of voter turn out at the end of polling on 10 October. (Kukreja and Singh: 2005:74)

At the end of the day the strength of civil society is crucially dependent on the human resource base. And developing this resource is primarily a function of education. Successive governments in Pakistan have fallen short of the mark in giving the education sector the attention it deserves. While investment in education mostly hovered around 2% of GNP, defense has appropriated approximately three times the resources. Universities, institutes and centers of excellence have suffered abject neglect, merit has been discarded and many have in the course become bastions of politico-religious groups seeking to advance their own aims. This has been gravely injurious to the salient role of a 'community of intellect' that innovates and creates norms and shapes opinions and values across society. (Nayyar: 2003:131)

Among the sections with a key role in civil society are the Press, NGOs, Women's associations and others. The Press has suffered greatly during the periods of martial law.

Under the Ayub Khan regime key independent papers including *The Pakistan Times* were taken over and effectively destroyed. Under General Zia-ul-Haque, within months of the coup, three journalists were actually flogged in a transparent bid to terrorize the press. On the other hand, the enterprise of corrupting press broke new ground and then the national level as 'lifafa journalism'[7] (literally *'lifafa'* means envelope) became a frequently used epithet. The much more widely disseminated, largely Urdu-language press has also promoted themes of exclusivism, intolerance and jingoism.

The Press may be largely, though not entirely free from censorship imposed by the state but perhaps less so from a measure of self-censorship imposed by societal groups of the ethnic and sectarian variety, especially those prone to violence. In other words the 'uncivil' components of civil society are at times, the greater threats to it.

The judiciary in Pakistan remains a crucial mediator between the state and civil society. It has been hampered, among other things, by long spells of martial law rather than the rule of law. The Provisional Constitution Orders instituted by the military rule time and again clearly restricted judicial independence. Opinions vary on what courts can do in such situations. Some have pointed to the positive role of the superior courts in defending civil society during difficult times. Others have suggested that the court has no real power to confront a martial law regime and declare it illegal. But a former Lahore High Court Judge argued that "most of the confusion that has arisen in the country as a result of which the institution of democracy has suffered almost irreparably, stemmed from the fact that by and large the judiciary in Pakistan tried, in times of crises, to avoid confrontation with the executive and went out of its way to take the path of least resistance. It upheld the de-facto situation rather than declare the de jure position." (Rashid: 2004:221)

By some estimates there are more than 8,500 registered NGOs in Pakistan including religious, professional, commercial and sports organizations. (Banuri: 1997:7) Most are welfare oriented and issue oriented like the Agha Khan Foundation and the Eidhi

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[7] It refers to a term, where journalists are paid by the government to carry on the government propaganda. Quite similar to the recent phenomenon of 'paid news' as advocated by P.Sainath in the Indian context.

Foundation. Some are simply money-making enterprises and a large number are donor-driven. Baring exceptions, society's attitude towards NGOs in Pakistan is ambivalent given what are seen as having external linkages. It also seems that the state is more comfortable with NGOs that restrict themselves to traditional activities such as welfare, relief or service provision. It is less at ease with those civil society organizations whose work involves advocacy around social issues, critique of governmental policies etc.

India's peace overtures towards Pakistan has been based upon a belief that within Pakistan an appreciable 'peace constituency' exists. Although it is beyond doubt that a sizeable number of average Pakistani citizens (as understood from the poll conducted by Aman ki Asha initiative[8], where three-fourths of the Pakistani respondents polled aspired for peace with India), want peace with India.(See Chapter 4 for more details) This aspiration of such Pakistani citizens however does not get metamorphosed into a determining political force to oblige the governing establishment in Pakistan to forge a viable peace with India. In order to organize a mass political mobilization which might act as the harbinger of a transformation of Pakistan's political landscape, the people of Pakistan and the civil society need to be politically vociferous for peace with India. India can hope for that only when democracy in real sense of the term is restored in Pakistan.

The Pakistani political establishment has reverted to its old ways of arrogance, inequity and malfeasance. A vibrant movement of fundamental rights and justice led by the civil society has been machinated by political forces to grind their own axes. It was a tragic irony that "the power of black coats"[9], has slowly degenerated, which symbolizes that more than rule of law its power that rules in Pakistan. This downslide into 'black holes' has been chaotic and damaging for the health of the polity. Yet there are some positive indicators too. Most recently, the reaction of civil society to the 2005 earthquake and the switching of people from Swat were outstanding. Civic organizations streamed to the troubled areas with whatever assistance they could bring. At the same time, during all

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[8] For an exclusive analysis of this opinion poll refer to
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/amankiasharticleshow/5400921.cms
[9] The term refers to the Lawyer's movement that arose in Pakistan in March 2007 during the presidentship of Pervez Musharraf, for the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chowdhury.

suicide bombings and shootouts, volunteers and ambulances of the civil society out number the official rescue efforts.

For a better understanding of the exact location of the civil society groups in Pakistan, it is interesting to take account of the research conducted by the NGO Research Centre of Pakistan on the growth of Pakistani Civil Society and NGOs.[10] The idea behind the NGORC's survey was to analyze the role of the civil society. In May 2000, as part of the broader NGO enhancement initiative of the Agha Khan Foundation, a three-year international study covering a wide gamut of civil society in Pakistan was initiated. The study on the non-profit sector in Pakistan was undertaken by The Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) in collaboration with the Agha Khan Foundation (Pakistan) and Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore USA. This study was part of the 43 nation Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project in order to gain a better understanding of the role and contribution of the non-profit sector. The goal of the study according to the NGORC were: "to document the size, scope, internal structure, finances, and legal position of the non-profit sector; to improve public awareness of this sector and provide a more reliable basis for designing policies toward it; to evaluate the effectiveness and contribution of this sector and; to help promote the development of local capacity to chart the health of this sector in the future." NGORC brought out an Overview Report on Civil Society in Pakistan based on the analysis of the available literature and field work based on questionnaire.

According to the report for Pakistan, the civil society is in a moderately 'good health,' especially with regard to its structure and values. However, the dimensions that received a less positive rating are "space" and "impact". According to the Report, the internal characteristics of the civil society in Pakistan are slightly more positive than its external environment and its expertise to modulate this external environment. Apparently one is under the impression that the civil society commands substantial financial resources but its networking and alliance-building processes, do not quite paint an encouraging picture.

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[10] The data and research done by NGORC was interpreted from 'Civil Society in Pakistan: A Preliminary Report on the Civicus Index on Civil Society Project in Pakistan',NGO Resource Centre, Civicus Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series,Vol.1(1),2001,Pakistan.

The jolt comes from the discouraging statistics of limited membership. The survey identifies the general attitude of apathy of the state and lack of corporate funding and restricted access to the legislatures as some of the other weak points. Lack of gender equity within CSOs, and even their limited role in policymaking, and monitoring government activities need to be corrected. (Civicus Index: 2001:10)

The positive signals that emerge out of Pakistan are the handful of dedicated activists that still brave the odds to keep the banner of active civil society engagements alive. It is because of them that some scholars are of the opinion that Pakistani civil society is still alive and vibrant. .Rule of law and principles of good governance in Pakistan need to be strengthened. The civil society needs to stimulate and come up with new leadership capable of galvanizing the silent majority to venture out of their cocooned existence and exert relentless pressure on the government and political parties to perform their constitutional duty. It is from these initiatives that the next phase of true civil society activism for nation building will begin.

Challenges and Opportunities

In a broad sense, three components constitute a modern polity (a) the state and its various branches; (b) the political society comprising political parties; and (c) a civil society which comprises voluntary and autonomous organizations that are distinct from both the state and political organizations. A democratic dispensation can be established when all the three perform their bounden duties within the legal structure of the state and complement each other. Such a situation would be a win-win situation, wherein power would not be concentrated with only one component. However, in totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, the political opposition is usually ruthlessly repressed and, therefore, challenges to the power of the state have to emanate in a civil society. Seen from a different perspective the state itself needs to encourage a vibrant civil society for in not doing so the state in the modern context is denied depth and resilience and renders itself brittle. This has particular significance for most third world states in the modern era. Among other things civil society mediates between tradition and modernity and thereby

smoothes the difficult process of transition. The process of transition does not promise to be an easy one for Pakistan. Paradoxically, the military's pervasive presence further restricts the space for the development of a vibrant civil society.

Pakistan is at crossroads suffering from a number of institutional deficits. The judiciary and other state institutions need to be strengthened in order to protect them from political influence, to give them the power to fight corruption, nepotism, prevent abuses of power, and provide legal security to organize collective action. Fulfilling these objectives would require demand from below and increased support of political elites in close cooperation with CSOs.

To expedite a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in Pakistan, activated by civil society associations, Western models often suggest the creation of a social order which is only credible by the adaptation of Western institutional units. But at the same time we must remember that in each culture, civil society is a reflection of the traditions, conventions, and codes of behavior and norms that reside outside the legal hierarchal structure of the state. The values of each society are based on the socio-cultural, historical and religious background of a specific country or region. The importance attributed to traditional values by the society in Pakistan provides a strong foundation for the kind of norms promoted by a large number of CSOs and the citizenry in general. The need of the hour is to develop a more differentiated approach about the democratic discourse in Pakistan by acknowledging the influence of formal and informal civil society groups on domestic politics and not repudiating their agendas due to their varied modes of organization, diverse internal structures, and differing forms of mass mobilization. There is hence an immediate need to changing social attitudes. Industrialists have to play their role in their Corporate Social Responsibility which includes- enhancing productions, providing more jobs, social services, education and basic amenities to their workers. There needs to be a synergy between the industrialists who need to become the edifice of social capital and an adequate funding from the government. It should be the duty of the government to assist in the formation of such bodies that exercise acuity over governance. Consequently these organizations should display non-parochial behavior and

strive towards the constructing a mature and participatory civic culture in Pakistan's political terrain.

The solid foundation of a responsive democracy can be built only on the edifice of trust and faith in the unalienable right to self-governance and the innate capacity of the masses to achieve uncommon goals. For the sustenance of a civilized society, the citizens need to honor the coevality of rights and duties. The educated and the effluent sections of society instinctively do not support the idea that all citizens have the equal capacity for self-governance. The defiance towards genuine decentralization and people's empowerment is the most visible repercussion of this mistrust.

In Pakistan there is an imperative need to reform the internal structures of the political parties which still function as personal fiefdoms. Free and fair intra-party elections need to be regularized, transparency and accountability with strict disclosure norms on matters of party funding with penalties for violation are the necessary requisites for citizens' effective and active political participation. Perhaps the most pertinent indicator to gauge the extent of active citizenship is a high level of literacy. A healthy and modern education system would, should replace the *madarsas* (local Islamic schools) that act as the breeding grounds for religious intolerance. The adult literacy rate is still hovering around 40%. Healthcare for the vast majority is virtually non-existent. These are critical parameters. It is not easy to strengthen civil society when the individual at its core is vulnerable, when he is not a citizen but a subject. It would become extremely difficult to expect an entire mass of illiterate people to understand their fundamental duties or assert their fundamental rights, who are denied the basic needs of sanitation.

Civil society in Pakistan is entrapped in the intricate maze of modernity, globalization, religious extremism and sub nationalism and destitution. Concomitantly, rigid social and state pyramidal structures arrogate opportunities that exist. The local philanthropies and success of the local self government and an active citizenry could usher in a slow and continuous change, which would positively permeate the whole gamut of the political, social and economic life of the country.

The tragic irony is that disillusionment with the state remains high in Pakistan. The result has been a growing reliance on traditional and informal systems as well as private sector rather than the institutions of the state. Virtually the entire national budget is devoted to defense and debt servicing. A self-absorbed middle class still does not push hard enough for reform in the key sectors of an oppressive rural structure, radical change in the system of education, cultural pluralism, women and minority rights, etc. the dislocation and discontinuity caused by the high-level of migration among those with education and initiative has been a factor in undermining the ability of the class to play its crucial role. If the civil society is to be provided the necessary space, extremism in the guise of religion or ethnicity should find no endorsement with the state. Lastly, civil society institutions must develop a dynamic of complementary and crossover empowerment that would render the whole greater than its sum of its parts.

India-Pakistan Relations Through the Lens of the Pakistani Civil Society

When it comes to the sphere of foreign policy, there are still large sections within the Pakistani society who continue to keep the flames of antagonism with India alive. The Pakistani media is agog with such examples. The Times of India and Jang media groups' joint campaign, Aman Ki Asha, to create a favorable atmosphere for the restoration of peace between the two countries has elicited both positive and negative reaction from other media groups as well. *Nawa-e-Waqt*, an Urdu daily in Pakistan in its editorial on 23 March 2010 commenting on the Aman Ki Asha campaign says that "who denies the importance of peace for the stability of the region, but it can not be established without resolving the basic dispute between the two countries." [11] The editorial was also of the opinion that without respecting each others sovereignty the vision of Aman Ki Asha cannot be realized. The paper suggests that "first of all the Kashmiris should be given the right of self determination based on the formula of Hyderabad and Junagarh." The declaration of peace by both the media groups was criticized heavily. The *Nawa-e-Waqt*

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[11] This information was accessed from IDSA's website (URL : http://www.idsa.in/pup/feb23-Mar1_10).
More information on the Pakistani Urdu press can be had from the same.

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editorial said. "...they should not forget that it was on the issue of culture and economy, the two nation theory was the basis of division of India." It added, "...therefore the need is that we accept the reality first and then think of dissolving the boundary. Raising slogans merely helps economic and trade interests. The media groups can not achieve their goals."

Yet another Urdu daily *Ausaf* in its editorial on 2 January 2009 questioned whether "the masses can influence policy decisions of the two countries" adding that "in view of India's efforts destabilizing Pakistan especially in Balochistan whether peace can be realized?" This is similar to the 1988 Cultural Agreement between the two countries that had provoked a prominent opposition leader, Ghulam Hyder Wyne to argue in the National Assembly that the agreement would "destroy all kinds of Islamic and Pakistani values and traditions... and ultimately bring Pakistan under complete hegemony of India" and, canceling it would save the new generation of Pakistan from a "cultural aggression". (Behera: 2000:56) Any dissenting voices from Pakistani society advocating better people-to-people contacts are branded and dismissed as "anti-national".

The most significant cost for Pakistan is the transformation of Pakistan's political and social institutions. Growing military and jihadi influence has reduced the significance of democratic institutions. The military has over the years pervaded every segment of Pakistani society - industry and commerce, diplomatic services, and civil institutions.

Navnita Chadha Behera (1996) has argued that most scholars are fully convinced that the raison d'etre of the military-bureaucratic elite in Pakistan lies in a continuing antagonistic posture vis-à-vis India. She further highlighted that this domestic structure in Pakistan impedes the process of the development of a viable and politically conscious civil-society. (Behera: 1996: 98). Behera argued in her piece that 'weak state' syndrome in Pakistan breeds the "insecurity dilemma", which compels the state to tighten its grip upon the political system leaving very little room for the civil society groups to have their say. She calls this "the security problematique". (Behera: 2000:45) The military regimes in Pakistan have legitimized the military rule in terms of the "Indian threat". General Zia-ul-Haque believed that the Pakistan army was the custodian of not only its territorial

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integrity but also, its ideological foundations. So any type of initiative advocating normalization of cultural ties with India was opposed on the grounds that it was against Islamic culture and ideology. It is unfortunate that such threat perceptions are used as a rationale for restricting the free movement of people and goods even through legal channels.

Most civil society organizations in Pakistan are looked upon by the state with suspicion. The successive authoritarian regimes have kept it under a tight leash. Foreign policy being such a sensitive issue, it is no wonder that the establishment is not open to percolate the civil society activism into its corridor. Moreover, the entire calculus of the India-Pakistan relations is based upon a skewed perception of one-upmanship, that peace overtures of the civil society are not encouraged by the state. The underlying reason behind this feeling of enmity can be traced back to the creation of Pakistan itself. Pakistan was the result of an idea of separateness from India. The very identity of Pakistan is based upon this difference. And over the years this identity has made the conflict between the two countries even more intractable. There are sections within the establishment that thrive for the sake of keeping this idea of Pakistan's identity alive. It is this ideology of conflict over the year that has not allowed the peace overtures between the two countries to attain a level of fruition. The orthodox *ulemas* and the military in Pakistan have viewed the matrix of India-Pakistan relations in terms of this ideological conflict and hence the antipathy towards India is but natural. Accordingly any peace overture by the civil society in Pakistan has been eyed with suspicion in the Pakistani establishment. No wonder the civil society finds such less leeway to pursue their agenda of friendship with India. Because in harboring the cause of these civil society groups, the establishment would be questioning the very reason behind Pakistan's existence.

However, it would be in India's continued interest that sections of active civil society associations continue to emerge on Pakistan's hitherto troubled political horizon. But for these to surface, India will have to actively espouse and be consistently encouraging in promoting the cause for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Democracy in Pakistan is an imperative for India's national security interests and the surest way to carry forward

the India-Pakistan peace process. There cannot be a meaningful peace dialogue with Pakistan in the absence of representative and responsive political governance, as only a democratic edifice can act as a catalyst for the civil society in Pakistan to reoccupy its lost space.

Chapter-4

The Prospects of Civil Society Initiatives in India-Pakistan Relations

The role of civil society groups in influencing foreign policy has been a matter of great academic debate. At the inter-group or international level, the term encompasses a number of different terms: "Track II diplomacy," citizen diplomacy, "multi-track diplomacy," supplemental diplomacy, pre-negotiation, consultation, interactive conflict resolution, back-channel diplomacy, facilitated joint brainstorming, coexistence work. While differing in emphasis, agenda, and theoretical approach, these initiatives share many common goals. They attempt to provide a non-coercive and safe environment to facilitate a process in which participants feel free to share perceptions, fears and needs, and to explore ideas for resolution, free of the constraints of government positions. The process is designed to encourage the development of mutual understanding of differing perceptions and needs, the creation of new ideas, and strong problem-solving relationships.

In contemporary parlance, the ideas of Track II Diplomacy or Track II initiatives have gained quite a significant amount of focus. Even though the post Cold war phase did not see the outbreak of any major World war, the history of international relations have been bedeviled by conflicts among nations that has resulted in stalemate in their foreign relations. When official level dialogue fails to break the ice, the importance of Track II diplomacy assumes significance. Since this is the age of interdependence, strained foreign relations have a rippling effect in both political and economic spheres. Countries have hence resorted to Track II diplomacy to evade stalemate and turn the tables in their favor.

In this chapter hence we focus upon the role of Track II initiatives looked through the prism of India-Pakistan relation. The idea is to fathom out the role civil society groups play in such ventures. But before we begin, it is imperative to understand the origins and meaning of Track II diplomacy.

Understanding Track II Diplomacy

The term "Track Two" (Track II) was coined by Joseph Montville, who distinguished traditional diplomatic activities (track one diplomacy) from "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict." (Donald and Bendahmane: 1995:34 Louis Diamond and John McDonald, co-founders of the institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington D.C have defined Track II diplomacy in essence as the "realm of professional, non-governmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve and manage (intrastate and interstate) conflicts." (Diamond and McDonald: 1996)

The best known and most developed of the "Track II" models is the interactive problem-solving workshop developed by Burton, Kelman, Fisher, and others. Harold Saunders has developed similar process to "engage representative citizens from the conflicting parties in designing steps to be taken in the political arena to change perceptions and stereotypes, to create a sense that peace might be possible, and to involve more and more of their compatriots." Track II interventions bring together non-official, but influential members of the parties for direct, private interaction with joint analysis of the conflict and joint problem-solving. The intermediaries are typically knowledgeable and skilled scholar/practitioners who are impartial and whose training and expertise enable them to facilitate productive dialogue and problem-solving between the parties. The participants in these efforts, however, are not officials or members of negotiating teams, but rather "politically involved and often politically influential members" of conflicting societies. They may be parliamentarians, leaders, and activists of political movements, journalists,

members of think tanks, academics; people who are within the mainstream of their societies and close to the political center.

At the inter-group or international level, the term encompasses a number of different terms: "Track II diplomacy," citizen diplomacy, "multi-track diplomacy," supplemental diplomacy, pre-negotiation, consultation, interactive conflict resolution, back-channel diplomacy, facilitated joint brainstorming, coexistence work. While differing in emphasis, agenda, and theoretical approach, these initiatives share many common goals. They attempt to provide a non-coercive and safe environment to facilitate a process in which participants feel free to share perceptions, fears and needs, and to explore ideas for resolution, free of the constraints of government positions. The process is designed to encourage the development of mutual understanding of differing perceptions and needs, the creation of new ideas, and strong problem-solving relationships.

John W. McDonald (1991) gives five categories of Multi-Track Diplomacy in his essay "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy". (McDonald: 1991:13). Accordingly, Track II refers to official government to government interactions; Track II refers to unofficial, policy oriented problem-solving efforts by skilled, educated and experienced private citizens of a particular country interacting with their counterparts in other countries

Most Track II processes result in concrete, constructive joint actions designed to influence the political environment in which negotiations might take place. In Cyprus, numerous joint projects -- from a bi-communal choir to an EU Study Group and a lawyers' group identifying areas of divergence between the two communities' legal developments since the division of the island -- have provided practical experience and a model of cross-conflict cooperation. In Tajikistan, dialogue participants have become active in new civil society organizations that organize roundtable seminars on subjects important for peace building, develop projects to foster economic development, and foster dialogue in public forums at the regional level. Mercy Corps' Eastern Kosovo Stabilization Program developed inter-ethnic agricultural market linkages that provided

new business possibilities to both Serbs and Albanians when they worked together. Through public education, through opportunities for people at all levels of society to engage in dialogue, and through promotion of tangible benefits of cooperation across conflict lines, these projects contribute to the development of a peace constituency to support negotiation.

Unofficial processes create a model or a metaphor for the possibility of a different relationship. They also establish links across fault lines that form the basis for a societal capacity to resist extremist images and rhetoric, as well as an infrastructure both for negotiating and implementing a settlement. In assessing the effectiveness of Track II regional security dialogues in the Middle East, Dalia Kaye notes that "[i]t is an ironic aspect of track two that when such dialogue is most needed, it is often most difficult to bring about" or to sustain. (Kaye, 2001: 68)

Unofficial processes cannot completely insulate themselves from the political environment in which they are taking place. Participants in these efforts are always responsive to the political developments in their own communities, and evaluate their joint work in the context of official activities, media coverage, and public opinion. In intractable conflicts, this context is invariably hostile. "Spoilers" actively try to undermine and marginalize efforts to build bridges across conflict lines. Participants are subject to direct harassment, intimidation, and sometimes violence from rejectionists, hardliners, and their own governments. Other, less overt, hostile bureaucratic actions by political authorities -- including failure to grant visas and permissions, and enforcement of laws forbidding contact -- make participation difficult. And while unofficial intermediation processes are generally designed to be low key and private, they are not secret, and are vulnerable to negative media exposure caused by leaks or media commentary. These constant and unrelenting attacks can have a harsh effect on morale and deter all but the most intrepid participants.

All such non-official level dialogues and initiatives have received impetus especially in the post Cold war phase, with the diminishing role of the state and the rise of the global

civil society. Shantanu Chakraborty (2003) reasons that 'statist diplomacy' has ignored the human dimension of the conflict for too long. As the focus shifts from military security issues to human security issues, Track II initiatives would be strengthened in the days ahead. According to him the reasons behind Track II initiatives gaining prominence, are "continuing levels of state-to-state tensions", "rise of new transnational and unconventional security issues", the "growth of robust non-governmental organizations", the "success of various non-governmental and Track II process in other parts of the world" specially in the middle east and the Asia-Pacific region.(Chakraborty:2003:267) Opinion is divided on the scope of the Track II process. One view argues that the objective of Track II is to prepare the foundations when future inter-governmental or Track I interactions would be restored. However, this view has been criticized as being 'elitist', s most Track II dialogues consist of high-profile non-officials and hence it has been increasingly argued in favor of expanding the Track II to multi-track initiatives. Globally however the trend is to focusing more on integrating the grassroots organizations in taking such initiatives in both theory and practice. Adam Curle, a leading protagonist when it comes to Track II diplomacy has argued in favor of working at the grassroots level to promote peace from below. John Lederach on the other hand maintains that there are three approaches towards building peace (a) the top-level approach which revolves around high level leaders; (b) the middle level-approach which include highly respected and well known individuals as 'insider-partials' but who do not officially represent the conflicting parties; and (c) the grassroots approach that involves the people involved in the NGOs and the various other communities.(Chakraborty :2003:268) Paul Ekins, have argued that conventional policies for solving problems like war, insecurity, war, human rights issue and environmental degradation have so far attempted only flawed and partial solutions. Hence he has stressed upon the need to strengthen grassroots organization to act as the harbingers of peace in conflicts.

The rapid spread of information technology, the neo-liberal model of economics and the easier and inexpensive modes of communication which has flattened the world to some extent, have led to an increasingly prominent role for the NGOs to act as 'transmission belts' in creating the atmosphere for dialogue and discussion.

McDonald also talks about other stages of diplomacy – Track III, Track IV and Track. Track III stands for businessmen-to-businessmen contacts in private sector for free enterprise between two countries; Track IV refers to citizen-to-citizen exchange programmes of various kinds like scientific, cultural, academic, exchanges in the entertainment industry, involving films, sports, music, arts etc. And finally, Track V stands for media-to-media based efforts to educate the masses about the culture and aspirations of the people of the country with whom they are in conflict.

Track II Initiatives in South Asia

Advocates of Track II initiatives argue that it helps in fostering confidence between the parties involved, resolving the ongoing disputes, acting as 'check dams' for future conflicts and to act as platforms to encourage alternative approaches to rigid official positions.. During the last twenty years Track II initiatives in South Asia has evolved through four phases. The first phase began in 1980 when the government of Bangladesh floated an idea of an association of regional cooperation; the second phase began when the United States Public Diplomacy programme decided to engage civil society in South Asia to promote nuclear non-proliferation; third phase began in 1990s when those engaged in civil society decided to focus in solving bilateral and regional conflicts rather than on economic cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation; and finally the fourth phase began in 1999-2000, when emphasis shifted from group efforts to the use of services of individuals for facilitating communication between governments to resolve intractable conflicts.(Chakraborty: 2003: 270)

Even though non-official approaches are still at an embryonic stage in South Asia, yet they have succeeded in a number of cases. Like for instance, in the Ganga water sharing treaty between India and Bangladesh in 1996. Track II initiatives have also helped in normalizing the relations between India and Pakistan even after the violent aftermath of the Kargil war and the subsequent military coup or after the failed Agra Summit. Contact between the two countries in those times was maintained through individuals like

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R.K.Mishra of India and Niaz A.Naik (retired Pakistani diplomat). Quite similar Track II initiatives to resolve the Kashmir issue have been undertaken by Mansoor Izaz, an investment banker of Pakistani origin and Farooq Kathwari, an US businessman of Kashmiri origin. To quote Shantanu Chakraborty again, he says "in the broader context such initiatives have served as informal channels in exploring policy options, addressing contentious issues, lowering the cultural and psychological barriers, creating inter-regional economic and cultural transactional opportunities and in generating the overall favorable perception of each other." (Chakraborty: 2003: 269)

Track II initiatives have also been supported by various international agencies and institutions like USIS (United States Information Service), which was instrumental in initiating the Neemrana initiative in 1991. Initiatives by important institutions include Winston House (UK), Henry L.Stimpson Institute South Asia Policy series, the Shanghai Initiative. Among the regional institutes mention can be made of Centre for Policy Studies (India), the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (Sri Lanka), and Bangladesh Institute for International and Strategic Studies. However apprehensions have been raised from various quarters about the efficacy of involving such international institutions in South Asian peace processes as it only tantamount to toeing the lines set by the external influences. However the crux of this matter needs to be looked at from the viewpoint of the necessity of striking a balance and remaining alert to such influences and not letting the 'South Asian core' being hijacked by such external influences.

In the recent years there has also been a growth in the non governmental initiatives through the platform of SAARC, apart from the informal bilateral initiatives. The SAARC Visa Exemption scheme initiated in 1992, regular cultural festivals which the SAARC conducts has helped in enhancing regional cooperation in our troubled neighborhood. In recent years SAARC has also recognized the importance of the NGOs in promoting people-to-people contacts. Some regional NGOs that have been recognized by SAARC include Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians (1992) and SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1992). Initiatives that promote regional economic cooperation have also witnessed growth in the recent years. Regional business

and industrialist groups also initiated steps to promote regional economic cooperation in 1980s and 1990s. These include the creation of the India-Pakistan desk of the Punjab-Haryana-Delhi Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 1982, Regional Initiatives by Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry and finally the creation of SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Non-governmental influences greatly facilitated the establishment of two new Asian inter-regional associations in 1990s which includes-IOR-ARC and BIMSTEC. Several prominent non-governmental groups have also promoted regional socio-cultural interactions like the South Asian Theatre Committee set up in 1992. Yet another encouraging development in South Asia has been the growth of women's groups and associations with cross regional programmes in recent years.

Track II Diplomacy in India-Pakistan Relations

There is, of course, a pervasive cynicism in South Asia concerning Indo-Pakistan relations, which sees all peace negotiations as doomed enterprises. But we need to examine the context of present negotiations carefully to assess the chance for better outcomes. What factors produced the current rapprochement? Have changes in the international environment (especially the 9/11 attacks) played a transformative role?

The peace process is sustained by creative energies of citizens, transnational groups, and non-governmental organizations which have helped change public attitudes of Indians towards Pakistan. These unofficial groups play an indispensable role in promoting initiatives, reducing tensions, and coming up with useful alternatives to calm dangerous situations. Along with a changing public consciousness, we need to understand the reasons and imperatives that influenced leaders to begin bona fide negotiations. Have changes in public opinion decisively affected the calculations leaders make?

The Legacy of History

It is all too easy to assume that the relations between India and Pakistan are implacably hostile. Not only was partition in 1947 marked by searing violence, the two nations

fought three full scale wars and several other low-intensity conflicts over their first five decades. However, while public discourse remained fractious, in fact, the two nations edged toward muted cooperation. Indeed, right from the start, the two new states, with inadequate bureaucracies and police forces, and woefully insufficient infrastructures had to cooperate to cope with 12 million displaced people during partition to rehabilitate and resettle the masses.

In the ensuing years, the two neighbors have signed a number of important agreements. In 1948 they agreed to share water flowing between the two sides of Punjab and in 1960 to share Indus river basin water. They negotiated settlements of border disputes along the western Indian desert. In 1973-76, after the Bangladesh war, the negotiations between the three governments led to Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh, and an exchange of Pakistani prisoners. In 1988 they pledged not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, not to violate each other's air space, and to notify the other in advance of military exercises. In 1996 Pakistani and Indian military officers met at the Line of Control to wind down border tensions and in 1996-1997 diplomatic talks tamped down tensions in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1997 Pakistan proposed to discuss terms for a non-aggression treaty and for restraints on nuclear and missile capabilities.

However, the electoral victory of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in India in March 1998 derailed the discussions. But, contrary to most expectations, given its hardline stance (anchored by the VHP and the RSS) during six years of BJP rule (1998-2004), relations between India and Pakistan did not turn out to be hopelessly hostile.

Phase of Oscillating Relations: 1998-2004

In 1998 India under the BJP took South Asia and the world by surprise as it conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan retaliated with its own tests. The international community, alarmed, pressured the two nations to negotiate. In February 1999 Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif undertook an initiative to normalize relations. This led to a visit by the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Lahore via bus, across the Wagah

border. The leaders issued a joint communiqué, known as the "Lahore Declaration," and the two nations seemed to set on an amicable path. However, a few months later, insurgents in the Kargil in Indian Kashmir, ignited a three-month clash. President Clinton pressured the Pakistani leader to force rebels to withdraw. Kargil was a dismal low point. A few months later, in October 1999, a coup in Pakistan overthrew the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, and General Pervez Musharraf seized power.

In 2000 a ray of hope appeared on the Indo-Pak horizon. The main insurgent group declared a ceasefire and India reciprocated. In July 2001 President Pervez Musharraf went to Agra for a summit with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. Despite much fanfare, the two sides could not arrive at a conclusive compromise.

Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the Indo-Pakistan relationship slid into a downward spiral when Kashmiri separatists attacked the state legislature in Srinagar. That was followed by another bold attack in 2000 on Dec. 13 when militants associated with Lashkar e-Taiba attacked the Indian parliament. India held Pakistan responsible for this attack. Although President Musharraf denounced the attack, India deployed troops along the border. In response, Pakistan too mobilized its troops. The harsh rhetoric and threat of use of nuclear weapons again frightened the international community. The U.S. induced both sides to de-escalate. (Roy-Chaudhary: 2004: 34) India agreed to remove troops from forward positions, and Pakistan agreed to ensure that insurgent camps on its side of the border would be removed.

With strong mediation from the US, the two sides made another try to mend relations in 2003. The upswing began with a visit of Pakistani Parliament members to New Delhi in May, followed by the visit of Indian Parliament members to Islamabad in July. A few months later, a ceasefire was reestablished in Kashmir. In January 2004, Atal Behari Vajpayee met President Musharraf while attending the meeting of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad, Pakistan. There began a new round of negotiations, called the Composite Dialogue. There was some anxiety about the peace process when elections in spring 2004 brought the victory of the Congress-led coalition government under the new Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. However, the new

administration quickly reaffirmed its support for the continuation of the Composite Dialogue.

There are good reasons to be skeptical about peace prospects, as there are constituencies within Pakistan that does not appreciate the peace overtures with India. Skepticism about negotiations is squarely based on the Kashmir problem; India favors the status quo and Pakistan wants change, not leaving much ground for compromise.

The lack of trust is based on each side's perceptions of its own vulnerability and the other's lack of good faith. Actions aimed ostensibly at reducing tensions, such as India's fence inside its border to prevent incursions in Kashmir are seen by Pakistan as a violation of earlier agreements. There is impatience in Pakistan about the pace of progress in negotiations; the Indian side appears to be dragging its feet. The two countries have not established congruent doctrines on nuclear weapons use, leaving many security experts very uneasy.

Yet what is especially heartening in the peace process are the informal exchanges. Since the 1970s civil society engagement emerged as the educated middle classes became frustrated with the inability of their governments to provide social services and viable solutions. A variety of South Asian non-governmental organizations and networks got involved. Although not an exhaustive list, for the sake of analysis let us zoom into some of the initiatives undertaken by the civil society. India-Pakistan Friendship Society is one the earliest Track II organizations. Started in 1987 it organized visits of Pakistani cultural groups to India, annual lectures, and held discussions with the diplomatic staff at the Pakistan High Commission. It was chaired by I. K. Gujral, who became the Prime Minister briefly in 1997. Others are India-Pakistan Neemrana Initiative and the India-Pakistan Soldiers Initiative for Peace. The former, established in 1991, provided a forum for annual discussions for retired diplomats, academics and military personnel. The latter, formed in 1999 in Karachi by retired military personnel from India and Pakistan, offered chances to meet political leaders from the government and opposition. There also are business efforts to arrange mutual visits of chambers of commerce and to promote bilateral trade. Then there are reunions of elite educational institutions such as the Doon

School Old Boy's Society, and Kinnaird College for Women from Lahore, Pakistan, whose alumni occupy influential positions.

Among the Track III is the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy, who have organized annual conferences since 1994. Their meetings deal with conflict in Kashmir, demilitarization, persecution of minorities, etc. There is also the Pakistan-India People's Solidarity Conference which holds conferences on nuclear issues, democracy, and the Kashmir problem. Another is the Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia which exchanges delegations between the countries. The People's Asia Forum (established in 1996) brings eleven Indians and eleven Pakistanis in a face-to-face discussion to explore issues, and its recommendations are offered to the government. Such initiatives multiplied as more groups such as the Association of the Peoples of South Asia, the South Asian Human Rights Association and the South Asia Free Media Association sponsored organized dialogues.

A more glittering feature of Track III are visits of sports teams: cricket, hockey, polo, etc. And there is the steady stream of visiting movie stars, musicians, journalists, high school students, college students, and peace activists. The opening up of these societies has offered a richer view, from Indian movies at film festivals to an India book fair in Pakistan. Indeed, one sign of changing attitudes is a popular new breed of Indian cinema that does not portray Pakistan in the same hue as it did a decade ago. The new popular theme now focuses on the trauma of families divided between the two countries. This is a dramatic change because only three years ago, several Hindi films like 'Ghadar' exploited the hyper-nationalistic theme of an Indian hero fighting Pakistanis. Now when a film focuses on the Kargil conflict of 1999, it does not demonize the foe. A film with a hyper-patriotic message falters at the box office. Indian films, though banned in Pakistan since 1965, are widely seen because of availability of videotapes and pirated copies. Indian movie stars are treated as celebrities when they visit Pakistan. Both countries have talented breeds of singers and several artists cooperate to produce joint albums, and are sought to sing in the films and TV serials in each other's countries. The best symbol of citizen initiative is the spirit of bonhomie generated each year when peace activists gather

at the Wagah border to light candles to express friendship on Pakistan and India's independence days, August 14 and 15 respectively. This brings us to a pertinent question- Are the peace processes between India and Pakistan then the result of the initiatives of the civil society groups? Should we consider the many people-to-people contact initiatives responsible for facilitating the beginning of the Composite dialogue process? Let us understand the dynamics of the composite dialogue process by analyzing the political situation that prevailed within India and Pakistan since 1998.

Factors Enhancing Dialogue

During 1998-2004 Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee firmly associated himself with the peace process despite opposition within his own party. Commentators suggest that Vajpayee sought a major agreement to establish a glowing legacy. One cannot ignore electoral calculations either. Recognizing that peace attracted great public support, BJP leaders calculated that Vajpayee's rapprochement with Pakistan would translate into more votes in the parliamentary elections in 2004. Vajpayee's peace overtures need to be seen against the background of other developments as well. Militarily, India won the 1999 Kargil War and achieved a diplomatic victory by gaining American support for its Line of Control (LoC). President Clinton, fearing escalation, pressured Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to remove infiltrators from Kargil and to foreswear future transgression.

Yet India's military success did not translate into border security. India couldn't eliminate the Kashmir insurgency, which it blamed on militants based in Pakistan. After attacks on the Kashmir legislature and Indian Parliament in 2001 the Indian government shelled Pakistan's positions in October and amassed its troops. This expensive mobilization in 2002 was eventually called off. The Indian army simply cannot destroy terrorist bases on Pakistan's side without huge casualties and inviting international condemnation and intervention. Indian Ministry of Home Affairs reports that India spent $1.1 billion on cross-border insurgency over 1989-2002, plus $4 million a month on economic development in Kashmir. India's central government also provides $93 million assistance to the state government in Kashmir, which does not include cost for care of 40,000

displaced persons from Kashmir valley or compensation for 20,000 dead. How long can this burden be carried? (Behera: 2008: 2)

In addition to economic costs, the Indian leaders acknowledge that military operations rouse anger because security forces commit severe human rights violations. The search for a political solution to the growing alienation necessitated the Indian government's push for new state legislative elections in Jammu and Kashmir in October 2002. The new state government gained office by promising to increase economic opportunities, improve security, and investigate rights violations.

Another factor influencing Vajpayee's decision is India's ambition to be recognized as a regional leader and gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India cannot do so if it cannot ensure stability in its region and demonstrate good relations with neighbors. India also wants to achieve 8 -10 percent annual growth but for that it needs to attract more foreign investment, which is dependent on domestic stability and peaceful relations. Last but hardly least, there is an urgency to avoid nuclear war, and reap the anticipated benefits from trade with Pakistan. India surely preferred to deal with President Musharraf (who had shown willingness to compromise) than with the extremist Islamist parties. In summing up, the Indian side resumed negotiations because they hope to establish a stable relationship, regain peace in Kashmir, and seek a permanent seat in the UN's Security Council. They also hoped to make significant economic gains from future trade and investments in Pakistan. Also their calculations were based on limits of India's military capabilities, a nuclear weapons stalemate, and an increasingly urgent resolution of Kashmir problem.

What factors have influenced Pakistan? One is recognition of the growing disenchantment of Pakistani middle class citizens over Kashmir policy. The media and intelligentsia have raised questions about the high cost to Pakistan for its support of Kashmir's secessionist struggle. This policy resulted not only in diplomatic isolation but a decline in trade and tourism and a serious lag in technology development. Such a policy also fostered confrontation with India and the development of nuclear weapons as a

consequence of 'militarization.' Further, the support of Islamic militias damaged Pakistan's image abroad while, domestically, these religious groups began a gradual 'Talibanization' of civil society, causing discord and sectarian divisions. Critics contrast Pakistan's deteriorating economy to India's meteoric rise based on new foreign investments, development of its information technology sector and its acquisition of an immense share of America's outsourcing business.

Dissatisfaction with Pakistani military adventurism is matched by citizen discontent with the military's influence in politics. The 9/11 attacks forced U.S. policymakers to refocus interest on South Asia, which had flagged after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan had ceased to be a strategic ally and in 1998 the US Congress imposed sanctions after the nuclear tests. However, 9/11 brought U.S. back as it unleashed its war on terror in Afghanistan. Pakistan not only recognized the Taliban government but was its key sponsor. As the U.S. leaned on Pakistan to help it in Afghanistan, Musharraf complied but his regime continued to support 'Jihad' in Kashmir. In 2003 there were two assassination attempts on Musharraf. Public disenchantment in Pakistan grew over a Kashmir policy which drained large defense expenditure at the cost of development needs. There also is a public realization that support of jihadis was harming Pakistan by propagation of an intolerant, divisive and gender biased version of Islam, which negated Pakistan's self image as a successful, secular, progressive, tolerant multiethnic state.

The U.S., for various reasons, interceded to induce the rivals to work out solutions. Some observers also note that U.S. has likely designated India as a "crucial economic and military counterweight to China" and has increased military ties with India and conducted joint naval and military exercises.

In conclusion, a cautious optimism about the final outcomes is based on the fact that even when the talks seem to reach a stalemate as recently, the officials in both countries promptly reaffirm their commitment to negotiations, in recognition of the growing strength of their respective peace constituencies. In Jan. 2004, in Islamabad, Vajpayee

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acknowledged the "peace camp in India is much larger than that favoring perpetuating of enmity with Pakistan" while Pakistan's Information Minister, visiting India, remarked "hostility with India no longer sells in the Pakistani election market." (Parikh: 2006: 45)

In India and Pakistan the domestic environments have altered for the better. The peace constituency represents the wishes of average citizens who are eager to improve relations with their neighbor. At the same time, a benign byproduct of the War on Terrorism has been discreet but sustained U.S. mediation to encourage India and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding conflicts through negotiations.

Manjrika Sewak (2005) notes, the conflict between India-Pakistan "can be described as protracted (because it has continued for a long period of time) intractable (because it has been resistant to sustainable positive change for more than fifty years), and deep-rooted (because it has affected the thinking and attitudes of people in different sections of society in the two countries; the hostility has not been limited to governments, but rather has permeated into public discourse)." (Sewak 2005:65) The historical overhang of mutual bitterness and suspicion still continues to thwart many an efforts to pursue a creative, meaningful and forward looking peace initiatives between the two countries. Malini Parthasarathy (2007) in her article titled 'Engaging Pakistan : From NDA to UPA' is of the opinion that " Otherwise imaginative and sensitive individuals with outstanding leadership abilities are overtly transformed into cautious and defensive politicians afraid to break new ground in this one arena of bilateral relations." (Parthasarathy: 2007:47)

If the April 2005 Summit between India's Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and Pakistan's President Musharraf seemed to open up fresh political space, the tenor of the New York encounter between the two, later in September 2005, seemed to have relapsed into the old diatribes that were again hurled across the borders. The most striking diffident behavior that prevailed in the political approach to the subject in recent times was the launch of the 'Gujral Doctrine' in January 1997 which won international accolades for India's insistence on non-reciprocity in dealings with her smaller neighbors.

But the point that cannot and should not be glossed over is that this initiative did not include Pakistan within its ambit. The ironic part was that Prime Minister Gujral who was himself a prominent votary of peace in India-Pakistan relations, given the historically loaded context, was refrained from making what could have been a potentially radical gesture. The substantive issue that emerges out from this argument is that despite the latent desire of leaders on both the sides of the dividing line (in Pakistan both military and democratic leaders) to move forward and offer "out-of-the-box" approaches to the various issues on the bilateral agenda , the inhibiting factor of the daunting historical baggage of mutual distrust, kept alive too, in generous measures by cautious bureaucracies on either side, remains a barrier to creative political initiatives such as the Lahore Agreement. Malini Parthasarathy hence argues, "in attempting to generate fresh political thinking on this important task of narrowing the gap between the two countries, it would be have to be first acknowledged that whatever be the political or ideological orientation of the governing formation in New Delhi and Islamabad, the issue of building close ties with each other remains hostage to the political apprehensions that this is a matter involving national honor and sovereignty, affecting the national psyche." (Parthasarathy: 2007: 49) This hence results in a situation where despite history being often seen to have been made as in the signing of the Lahore Agreement, the Manmohan-Musharraf Summits in Delhi in April 2005 and earlier in New York in September 2004, and more significantly, in such historic steps as the Srinagar and Muzaffarabad bus service, the overall framework of the bilateral relation does not seem to lend itself to a dramatic transformation into a new paradigm of sustained cooperation, that would be more in tune with a radically changed global order of increasing trend of regional integration.

Non-conventional diplomacy had limited scope for success in the case of Pakistan because of the ingrained hostility of the Pakistani military to India, its unquenched desire for revenge against India by annexing Jammu & Kashmir because of the humiliation suffered by it at the hands of the Indian army in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh, its penchant for misreading non-conventional diplomatic initiatives and conciliatory approaches as indicators of a weakening of the Indian will and battle fatigue and its

calculation that a confrontational approach. The importance of moving beyond isolated political negotiations to include multi layered actors is to breakdown biases and prejudices that have been built and sustained over a number of years. In the case of protracted and deep rooted conflicts like Indo-Pak, entire populations have internalized a certain way of thinking about the other and this belief system can and does stand in the way of any political negotiations that might take place at the level of Track I. In India, the public is overwhelmingly concerned with the 'Islamic terrorist state' to its West. In Pakistan, India's role, particularly in Kashmir, and now in Afghanistan and also in Balochistan (as Pakistan suspects), is seen as an outgrowth of expansionist attempts by an imperialist country. Track II interactions can help break down these psychological barriers. There are various ways that the government can enhance this non-official people to people interaction. It can be achieved by easing visa restrictions, starting more buses between India and Pakistan, encouraging joint literary and musical exchanges, diplomatic exchanges, media exchanges to name a few.

No matter how much skeptic we might be in claiming that Track II initiatives provide only the atmospherics for a forward looking Track II dialogue. In the Indian context too Track II initiatives have not always been doomed to be a failure. In the following paragraphs we analyze the major Track II initiatives between India and Pakistan and try to scrutinize the prospects and challenges that have pulled the plug on towards the materialization of a positive framework for the official dialogue to take place.

The Neemrana Initiative

The India-Pakistan Neemrana Initiative (1992), the official name by which this dialogue is called had some distinctive features which made it distinct from the various other multi-track processes in the context of India and Pakistan. Satish Kumar in his article titled 'India-Pakistan Neemrana Initiative: An Experiment in Track Two Diplomacy' (2007) succinctly narrates his account of the features that make Neemrana a classic example of Track II Diplomacy (Kumar: 2007:123): The meetings of the Neemrana dialogue were regular and frequent. The participants of Neemrana met regularly twice a

year alternately in India and Pakistan. Although nothing much is heard about the initiative now but until 2007, the dialogue had 25 meetings among them, which is no mean a record given the trust deficit in Indo-Pak dialogue. These meetings had the presence of high level of expertise and eminent personalities on both sides. The delegation for the Neemrana Initiative on both the sides had former Foreign Secretaries, former vice-chiefs of the army, navy or the air force, prominent scholars, editors, economists, journalists and strategic affairs experts, like Khalida Ghous, an eminent scholar of International Relations and Human Rights from Pakistan, Niaz A.Naik, internationally acclaimed Pakistani diplomat, from the Indian side Satish Kumar and others. The agenda of the dialogue from the very beginning was precise and widely agreed. The participants sent their feedback to the government but took no cue from the government. The delegations tried to maintain independent and non-official character by taking no cue from their respective governments before the meetings. But the delegation did keep their governments abreast of the outcome of the deliberations and submitted the agreed recommendations. At times these recommendations were accepted and implemented too. Media publicity was widely avoided. This dialogue was kept completely closed to the media, in view of the hostility that pervades in some section of the media with regard to an Indo-Pak dialogue. Satish Kumar argues that this was a distinct feature of the Neemrana dialogue in comparison to the other multiple tracks of diplomacy between both these countries which have fallen prey to the excessive media publicity and the subsequent false propaganda or backlashes which such media publicity have often generated. Since the dialogue was held behind close doors, members on both sides tried to influence public opinion in favor of reconciliation through newspaper writings and participation in seminars and conferences.

While writing the reports on the proceedings of the Neemrana initiative, no names were attributed. This enabled the members on both sides to express their views more candidly and without any inhibitions.

Satish Kumar further argues that two ground rules which were agreed upon at the first meeting of the dialogue in October 1991 at Neemrana and which according to him

enabled the dialogue to move forward. They were, "...that no member would repeat the history of any issue in Indo-Pak relations, which should be taken as known, and two, that no member would reiterate the official or governmental position on any issue, so that it becomes possible to break new ground in resolving the conflict." (Kumar: 2007:124)

Apprehensions are always raised about the efficacy of the Neemrana initiative and whether it cut any ground and made any visible contribution to the vitiated Indo-Pak dialogue. And it is here that it becomes imperative to mention what Satish Kumar argues. He writes, "There is no doubt that any Track Two process can at best lend a helping hand in creating the right environment between the two parties. Real progress can take place only at the Track One level which is authorized to take decisions and implement them. But in a highly complex strategic environment, every fresh idea counts, and such ideas do get generated if the level of expertise in Track Two is sufficiently high and the attitude on both sides is positive." (Kumar: 2007:124)

This is what the Neemrana initiative had done. To substantiate this argument let us revisit the positives that this dialogue had achieved in fostering an atmosphere of trust and bonhomie in Indo-Pak relations, if at least for some years. At the second Neemrana Dialogue in Lahore in January 1992, a thorough discussion was held on the Pakistani proposal of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. However both sides recognized that in the course of this discourse that it was not possible to roll back the nuclear programmes of both these countries. Hence both the delegation agreed to make South Asia a nuclear weapons "safe zone". The delegation realized that instead of working at cross purposes, the two countries should work towards a common goal which was achievable. In the process of this dialogue, the suggestion for a nuclear weapons safe zone that emerged from this discussion helped in giving a positive direction to the nuclear debate between India and Pakistan.

In 1995, the members of the Neemrana dialogue decided to meet the Kashmiri leaders of all hues across both the sides of the border. After the meeting the Indian side of the dialogue members recommended to the then Indian Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao

to grant greater autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Rao arranged for a visit of five members of the Indian delegation to Kashmir for a close on the spot assessment of the situation and had another round of discussion with them. It was after this discussion that he made an offer in the Parliament that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should be given "Autonomy short of Azadi" and that "the sky is the limit".[12]

In 1997 during the prime-ministership of I.K.Gujral, the Neemrana delegation of India and Pakistan prevailed upon him to liberalize the Visa regime with regard to Pakistan. Mr.Gujral had himself kept track of the initiatives through frequent meetings with the Indian and the Pakistani members. His efforts in facilitating travel and communication between these two countries are worth commending.

The Neemrana dialogue held in October 2004 in New Delhi took up the issue of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and the difficulties that stalked this proposal. There was a difference of opinion between the two sides on the nature of documents to be produced at the border. While India was in favor of producing passport, Pakistan opposed it. The Neemrana dialogue members worked out a "substitute arrangement" which was submitted to the foreign ministers. The foreign ministers reacted favorably and submitted the document to their Foreign Offices. The document was fine tuned further and eventually became the basis of the procedure implemented by the two governments.

However, it has been pointed out by some observers like Manjrika Sewak (2005) that the decision of the Neemrana Initiative not to engage with the mass media has reduced its ability to affect public opinion and thereby exert its direct influence upon the policy-makers. But countering this argument, Satish Kumar writes that out of the sensitivity of some recommendations made from time to time by the Neemrana Initiative to the two governments would still require the principle of anonymity to be maintained (Mattoo *et al*:2007:261).

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[12] This statement was made by P.V.Narasimha Rao.This was actually quoted in Government of Jammu and Kashmir, *Report of the State Autonomy Committee (Srinagar/Jamm)u*, July 2000,p.100. However, it was cited in Sunita Mandla,Sunita (2006), *Politics of State Autonomy and Regional Autonomy: Jammu and Kashmir*, Delhi: Gyan Books,p.116,from where it has been borrowed for this chapter.

As two South Asian nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan, stepped into an era of 'new peace' in 2004. A ceasefire was declared across the Line of Control (LOC) between the Indian occupied Kashmir and the Pakistani part of Kashmir ; prisoners of war were swapped; there was a reactivation in trade talks, air, rail and road links were resumed; artistes, sports men and journalist were being exchanged; the ban on each others TV channels was lifted; patients moved across borders for treatments of fatal diseases; and, no wonder, the most vital of all, the visits of the foreign secretaries and foreign ministers in 2005 to each other's land for negotiating peace announced the arrival of a spring teamed with happy relations between India and Pakistan.

Their relation could be defined as "chequered", which implies cycles of alternating periods of crisis and normalization. Every crisis between India and Pakistan is followed by a normalization process. After the 1987 crisis, when India designed to pre-emptively attack Pakistan's nuclear installations, President General Zia-ul-Haq flew to New Delhi for reconciliation; after the 1990 crisis over Kashmir, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi drafted a set of Confidence Building Measures; the Lahore Declaration, was passed in February 1999 after the tit for tat nuclear explosion by Pakistan, which was followed by the Kargil war; subsequently, Musharraf held summit meetings with Vajpayee in Agra in Spring 2001. January 6th, 2004 marked the first real step towards thawing the bitter-cold relations as witnessed in the landmark meeting on Pakistani soil of the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee with the Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, under the auspices of the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation Summit. Only two years earlier, relations between India and Pakistan were in such fragile state that armies of both countries stood eye ball to eye ball on their borders with the persistent threat of a possible nuclear exchange. This was due to the December 2001 bombing of the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-backed terrorists. Following this event, the two erstwhile neighbors were not even willing to communicate with each other. All lines of communication were severed. Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf who participated in a conference at Al Matay, Kazakhstan were not even willing to shake hands, much less to enter into some sort of debate on issues of war and peace.

Sarrah Bokhari (2005) argues 9/11 was a defining moment in the process of Indo-Pakistani normalization. (Bokhari: 2005:143) Fearful of the emergence of India as a major destination for international investment and its growing geopolitical partnership with Washington, many members of the political elite in Pakistan argued it would be better to seek a deal with New Delhi now, while Pakistan remained a valued ally of the Bush administration in its 'war on terrorism', rather than to risk having to deal with a stronger India in the future. Moreover, many shared Musharraf's view that the military promotion of Islamic fundamentalist extremists in Afghanistan and Kashmir had redounded against their interests, bringing Islamabad into conflict with Washington after September 11 and fuelling increasing sectarian strife within Pakistan itself.

Bokhari further argues that behind-the-scenes initiatives taken up by many Track II Diplomats also had a role to play in the new peace process. Of course Pakistani, official line does not agree with it. They believe that its only official level understanding that starts a dialogue. The US has been the driving force of this unofficial diplomacy. Many individuals and think-tanks funded by the US government have become involved in supporting Track II initiatives, like the Neemrana Initiative which was the result of the backing of the USIS. The Regional Centre of Strategic Studies in Sri Lanka, with General Retired Dipanker Banerjee as its previous Executive Director, held summer workshops every year to give a chance to young scholars as well as senior policy makers from both countries to meet in an unofficial environment. In addition the Friends Institute in Pakistan headed by General Mirza Aslam Beg had been involved in organizing conferences and seminars in a very cordial atmosphere.

As tensions between Pakistan and India continued to see-saw in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attack, citizens in both countries stepped up efforts for peace through initiatives ranging from a cross-border signature campaign to seminars and personal efforts. Such efforts were aimed at encountering hostility between the nuclear-armed neighbors. The role of peace activists like Aasma Jahangir, Chairperson, Human Rights

Commission Pakistan, and groups like, Pakistan Peace and Solidarity Council and numerous other such groups should be mentioned in this context.

A 13-member Indian delegation, comprising eminent civil society members, journalists, peace and human rights activists, crossed the Wagah border on 23 Feb 2009 in a bid to promote peace and friendship between India and Pakistan. The delegation included eminent Indian personalities like former Indian diplomat and journalist Kuldip Nayar, renowned filmmaker Mahesh Bhatt, social activist Swami Agnivesh, historian and academician Prof KN Panikkar, former diplomat Salman Haider, human rights activist Prof. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, journalist Seema Mustafa, social activist Sandeep Pandey, social scientist Kamla Bhasin, etc. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) Chairperson Asma Jahangir, South Asian Free Media Association (Safma) Secretary-General Imtiaz Alam and many other representatives of the civil society at the border warmly welcomed the delegation. *The News* quoted Bhatt as saying that the main objective of the mission was to promote peace and build trust between the two countries. He symbolized the Indo-Pak situation with a long dark night but hoped that there was a silver lining in every cloud adding further that the Indian delegation had come to light candle of peace across the border to shed bad omens of the Mumbai attacks.

Yet another initiative was the Pugwash meeting on the 'Prospects for Restarting the India-Pakistan Dialogue' which was held at the Marriott Hotel, Islamabad, Pakistan on 5-6 March 2009. Thirty-one participants from India, Pakistan, and Indian and Pakistani Kashmir attended the meeting. The participants included leaders of major political parties in Indian and Pakistani Kashmir, retired government servants, diplomats, academics, analysts, and prominent civil society actors from India and Pakistan.[13] While the meeting was held specifically to address the emerging bilateral relationship after the Mumbai terror strikes on the November 26, 2008, it was part of the larger Pugwash track-II dialogue initiative in the region that began in 2002. Perhaps the most important point of

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[13] The report of this meeting was accessed online on 5 Oct 2009. The details of the report on the meeting can be accessed at URL: http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/sa/march2009/report.htm

unanimous consensus among participants was that unofficial interaction between Pakistani and Indian experts, like this Pugwash meeting in Islamabad, should continue uninterrupted irrespective of the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan. All participants felt that there was tremendous value added of such interactions; these could act as a genuine means to convince governments of the need for rapprochement and provide new ideas to that effect. Overall, there was support for increased Track-II interaction. There was unanimous support for enhancing interaction among Kashmiri politicians and civil society across the LoC. Participants requested Pugwash to provide a regular forum for these groups to come together and discuss means of enhancing cross-LoC interaction, which is especially when Indo-Pakistani relations are particularly volatile.

It was in the violent aftermath of the 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai where sparks flew between the hostile neighbors and recurrent mud-slinging game with frequent accusations and counter accusations became the order of the day that the 'Aman ki Asha' peace initiative was undertaken by two leading media organizations of Pakistan and India – the Jang Group and the Times of India group. That this initiative has drawn a robust response from a large number of people on both sides of the border is understandable, given their yearning for peace. Aman ki Asha has been a major civil society initiative in recent years between India and Pakistan. It has been organizing seminars, conferences, cultural fests, food festivals in both the countries to encourage people-to-people contact. Participation of both Indian and Pakistani masses in such forums has been both refreshing and encouraging experience.

But two big challenges must be met to bring this initiative to fruition. The first key challenge is to change the public mindset that has been so firmly conditioned in insecurity that altering it would require dogged perseverance. The media in both countries need to wean the public away from this mindset. It can achieve this by building and then expanding a peace constituency not of people just wishing for peace but of people who are devoted to peace. This constituency should comprise people who understand the importance of political activism for realizing their goals and who can see

through their governments' 'sabre-rattling' and propaganda. The Indian and Pakistani media needs to stop misleading the public and justifying military adventures in the name of national interests. Doing so is of immense importance. For we have seen the general public of even the mature democracies of the United States and Britain being snared in a web of lies and then misled into the Iraq war in 2003. The media in those countries either looked the other way or were co-opted into consolidating the case of that imperialist war, which has left hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead.

The second big challenge the joint peace initiative is going to face will come from their establishments' security paradigms. Having fought three wars, two of them over Kashmir, they are invariably suspicious of each other's intentions. The result both countries keep on increasing their defense budget. The fact that Indian foreign policy is not the domain of the military alone and is debated in parliament does not make it a pro-peace foreign policy. In fact, India has arrogated to itself the right to police the region as it pleases on account of its massive military might and 'big brotherly 'attitude. Since the terror strikes in Mumbai in November 2008 it has spurned several calls from Pakistan for the resumption of the Composite Dialogue. It has attached preconditions to restarting the process of dialogue. But the need for peace is pressing; India's procrastination will only aggravate the situation. The problem with the security establishment of Pakistan is more complex. It is always apprehensive of India's regional ambitions. New Delhi's increasing influence in Afghanistan, for instance, is giving Islamabad a cause to worry. The Pakistani military alone decides the country's foreign policy, particularly on matters of defense and relations with India. We cannot begin to hope it will significantly change its way of thinking unless parliament is given a greater say in deciding what foreign policy will benefit the country and how peace should be made with India.

While the establishments of both countries are believed to have given the green light for Aman ki Asha, several developments in the past suggest they may rather focus on or react to what their counterpart is doing. What has followed the launch of the joint peace initiative at the start of this year betrays their lack of interest in, if not outright opposition to, any peace efforts. Incidents of firing across the Line of Control in Kashmir have

increased and apprehensions have grown even stronger. Even cricket, which has helped reduce tensions in the past, has fallen victim to the worsening ties between the South Asian neighbors. The IPL fiasco in 2010, where no Pakistani player was auctioned has come as a shock and diminished any chances of reviving cricketing ties in the near future. It is also important to remember that the peace processes have suffered several setbacks at the hands of the security establishments. Years of peace efforts, including Track II diplomacy, culminated in the signing of the Lahore Declaration on Feb 21, 1999, by then-prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Atal Behari Vajpayee. All those efforts had gone waste owing to the military misadventure of Kargil. Ironically, the architect of that folly, then-army chief Pervez Musharraf, boasted of his "landmark" success in putting the Kashmir issue on the international radar. Peace was thus put on hold for the next five years until Jan 6, 2004, when both nations decided to start the Composite Dialogue. The Mumbai attacks happened dealing a severe blow to the peace process as India suspended the talks. So, while creating an environment conducive to talks is essential, it is equally important that conditions are created which will ensure any spoiler of peace efforts is brought to account.

Peace constituencies in both countries will need to eventually become pressure groups with the capacity to tailor public opinion strong enough to guard against any attempt to derail the peace process once it is resumed. Galvanizing the people into action will be possible only through creating political awareness, which is the soul of any meaningful change in society. The role of the media simply cannot be denied in this respect. Many thought the restoration of judges sacked by Musharraf in 2007 was impossible because both the army and government of the time were opposed to it. Nonetheless, a peaceful but determined civil society movement led by lawyers and helped by the media played an important role in making that possible. Of course Musharraf punished the media by blacking out the transmissions of private TV channels. Peace is also possible provided the civil society in both countries show the same kind of determination.

Trade and Business Associations in India-Pakistan Relations

Trade has multiple positive effects as it helps in process of development. It also becomes an instrument of peace between people. The present situation of trade between India and Pakistan is optimistic even though the two countries do not trade much (they trade far below their capabilities), this view was expressed by the former Foreign Secretary, Muchkund Dubey in 'India-Pakistan Conference : Roadmap to Peace' held in New Delhi in Jan,2010 (*The Hindu*:2010:1). Trade is a temporary love affair whereas joint venture is a marriage that brings stability between the two partners. What India and Pakistan need is a marriage alliance to foment long lasting stability. Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan, considered a vital aspect in improving the prospects for sub-continental peace, have become a victim of the terrorist attacks on cricketers in March 2009 in Lahore in Pakistan and on civilians late last year in Mumbai in India. Terrorism is being cited alongside the global downturn for a forecast 60% plunge in trade volumes between India and Pakistan in the financial 2010, according to FICCI.

The 3 March, 2009 terrorist attack on visiting Sri Lankan cricketers in the Pakistani city of Lahore has made more remote the chance of a resumption of bilateral trade ties that India snapped after the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Indian businessmen have been refusing since the Mumbai attacks to travel to Pakistan, even to sign previously agreed contracts, let alone to strike new business deals, according to FICCI. The Pakistani business side is reported to be showing a similar reluctance to travel to India. In February 2009, commerce secretaries of the eight-nation SAARC, meeting in New Delhi discussed measures to strengthen SAFTA agreement that was signed in 2004 in Pakistan. Little progress was made to benefit the Indian and the Pakistani business communities. Even though Indian and Pakistani officials met directly during the New Delhi SAARC conference for the first time since the November 26 attacks, they failed to crack the ice on the frozen bilateral ties. India's trade links with other violence-ridden neighbors such as Sri Lanka have survived any similar drastic dive in volumes. India and Sri Lanka expect trade in goods and services to rise from $516 million to $1.5 billion by the time their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) takes formal shape,

probably by 2012. Because of the historic enmity, Pakistan is not included among the special bilateral trade pacts that India is exploring with other Asian countries and with the European Union (EU). (Kothari et al: 2010:42)

Historically, India and Pakistan trade relations see a repetitive pattern of brief upswings interrupting longer phases of rupture that India has consistently blamed on Pakistan's most infamous export - terrorists. Pakistan, in turn, blames tensions on its pet peeve - the Indian-run part of Kashmir, which Pakistan claims in addition to that part of the state it controls. Even before the Lahore attack, the otherwise lucrative business in the sport between the two countries had taken a severe hit after India suspended its scheduled January 2009 cricket tour of Pakistan following the Mumbai attack. Pakistan's players are also paying a financial penalty for the attacks and government responses, over and above the immediate loss from canceled games. In retaliation to India pulling out of its January 2009 tour, the Pakistan government banned its cricket stars from participating in multi-billion dollar Indian Premier League, denying their own players and families massive income from six weeks of playing in Asia's richest cricket tournament. In response, eight IPL franchise teams suspended the IPL contracts of Pakistan players, at considerable cost to those involved. (Deccan *Herald*: 2010: 8)

However, terrorism is not the only factor dragging down official bilateral trade, nor are laments on the dismal state of affairs new. "The official trade between our two countries is meager at around $200 million and the unofficial trade including both smuggling and through third countries is estimated around $1.5 billion to $2 billion," A C Muthiah, the then-president of FICCI, said in July 2003, during a meeting of the India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a Karachi-based body promoted by the FICCI and the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry.[14] The India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, like its respective governments, has made little

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[14] The statement of A.C.Muthiah had appeared in an article titled ' India Pakistan trade takes a terrorist hit" by Raja Murthy, which was accessed online on 16 Feb 2010 from the URL : http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KC12Df03.html

progress in resolving the long-standing sore points hindering trade relations between the two countries, apart from cross-border tensions.

For numerous reasons one trades most with one's neighbors, as the global pattern of trade affirms. However, given the fact that India is seen by many as Pakistan's 'greatest enemy', this ranking is most exceptional and challenges a great deal of what is perceived to be conventional wisdom. It is not difficult to understand the economic arguments which give trade between neighbors such importance. We know that transport costs between neighbors are bound to be much lower than when countries are further away. Tastes and lifestyles are also often not very different, and within geographical regions such cultural and social similarities are accentuated, allowing for an exchange of products to take place. There are also the economies of scale to be considered. Often neighbors have access to much larger markets than their own, allowing for local and international firms to look at regional markets rather than national ones. Clearly, in this era of global trade and open borders, there is no economic rationale for neighbors not to trade. Politics, it is presumed, is a different issue altogether. Countries can cease trading with one another if there are disputes, disagreements or hostilities.

Yet, despite such political issues, countries which are adversaries or have tense ties often conduct a great deal of trade with each other. Taiwan and China have a huge and growing trade relationship, as do Japan and China. India and China still have unresolved border issues, but today China is India's largest trading partner. And Pakistan and India have traded for all but nine of their 62 years, albeit at levels which have always been below potential. Akbar Zaidi (2010) argues, "trade between Pakistan and India has increased whenever there has been a general in power in Pakistan, which has been the case far too frequently. Trade received a big boost when General Ziaul Haq ruled Pakistan, and then it was General Musharraf who actively opened up trade and other relations with India." (Zaidi: 2010:7) He further argues that most civilian governments, which have followed the ubiquitous military regimes, have continued with the opening up started by the military as the incumbent PPP government has done. What is surprising, however, is that trade between India and Pakistan was at its highest ever in the year following

Kargil. Even the Mumbai attacks have not significantly dented India-Pakistan trade relations. If anything, Pakistan's exports to India grew by 20 per cent in the financial year 2008-09, which ended many months after the Mumbai attacks. If trade and hostilities (or peace) were linked, this pattern may have been very different. Those who argue that 'peace is good for trade' or vice versa, that 'trade leads to peace', have failed to factor in the rather strange India-Pakistan relationship. As there has never been complete peace between India and Pakistan, and it has been more of a relationship of 'no-war', trade has not taken off for numerous reasons and not just those related to diplomacy. More importantly, we have seen that even when trade between Pakistan and India has picked up, peace has not prevailed as exemplified by the case of Kargil and Mumbai. According to Zaidi, "What is important to emphasize, hence, is that both trade and peace are important in their own right, and any cliché of linking one with the other, does not give a factual picture and serves the purpose of neither. It is difficult to argue for a position other than that Pakistan (or any other country) must have peace, not just for economic progress, but for itself as well. Citizens require conditions of safety and peace in order to live and to pursue their interests, in fact to exist as human beings. In conditions of war or hostility, the quality of life, material and non-material is heavily compromised and suffers. Even if countries do not trade with certain others, peace is the basic right of all citizens. Trade, on the other hand, is a purely economic activity which may have social and political consequences, but this need not always the case. Trade is opportunistic, for given equal conditions, firms and countries will conduct business with whoever appears to have the better product, price or terms. Ethical reasons, while they do increasingly play a role, are less important than the profit motive or economic considerations whenever business is undertaken. Trade would not take place unless it was profitable or essential. And trade, as numerous examples prove, can be profitable even if one trades with one's adversary. In linking trade with peace, those who want peace between India and Pakistan misunderstand the nature and essence of both. Peace should be the unconditional goal of both countries and their citizens, while trade will follow largely economic logic and arguments. If both complement each other, well and good; but it is a mistake to make either binding or conditional on the other." (Zaidi: 2010:7)

It is often said that Pakistan can survive as a State only if it is in a perpetual state of confrontation with its neighbor, which probably explains why the Kashmir issue is always kept alive by Islamabad, particularly the Pakistan military. From New Delhi's perspective, however, its neighbor is a part of reality and, therefore, cannot be ignored. Further, unlike the predominant view in Islamabad, since there is no virtue in being in a perpetual state of confrontation with that State, every effort needs to be made to have normal relations, a strong economic exchange being a veritable sine qua non for such a relationship. New Delhi, therefore, should be doubly careful of not walking into the trade-disruption trap.

Accordingly, two leading industry bodies from India and Pakistan on 13 Feb 2010, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to strengthen trade between the two countries.[15] The MoU has been signed between ASSOCHAM and ICCI at a ceremony held in New Delhi. As per the MoU, a forum will be established for jointly formulating concrete action plan to exchange delegations, people-to-people contacts at first stage and thereby boost bilateral trade delegations subsequently. Immediately after signing the MoU, ASSOCHAM General Secretary D S Rawat, who was also present at the event, said that ASSOCHAM has decided to take a 10-member delegation shortly to Pakistan with its President Swati Piramal as the leader of the delegation. In addition, ASSOCHAM Sr. Vice President, Dilip Modi and SAARC Committee Chairman of ASSOCHAM Ravi Wig would also visit Pakistan to establish one-to-one contact, a pre-requisite under current circumstances for establishing joint ventures between the two countries, said the ASSOCHAM in a press release in New Delhi. During the MoU signing meeting, the ICCI President Zaid Maqbool said that initially India and Pakistan can have business ties in oil & gas, power and coal mining and thereafter series of business ventures in areas of agriculture, food processing and other host of areas could be established. Incidentally, the signing of the MoU happened just one day after Pakistan Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's announcement that the two countries will hold

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[15] For extensive analysis of this MoU see URL:
http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2009/July/news/20indo1.shtml

foreign secretary level talks in New Delhi Feb 25 - for the first time since the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.

ASSOCHAM and the KCCI have set up special contact groups to boost bilateral trade. The move is significant as a substantial chunk of trade between the two countries now takes place through third countries. The proposed roadmap of the ASSOCHAM-KCCI group suggests creation of a dedicated freight transshipment facility along the land route through the Wagah border. The ASSOCHAM study predicted a 40-50 percent rise in bilateral trade as a possible target. "Presently, more than 25 percent of total Pakistani imports of Indian origin goods take place through Dubai and Singapore. Facilitating direct trade would be beneficial to both sides, and the trade level would jump dramatically," the study said. Both the chambers have suggested relaxation in travel restrictions for bona fide travellers and increased frequency of train and bus services, and attracting more patients from Pakistan for specialized treatment in India under a new scheme. The Indian chamber has also sought a new scholarship scheme for Pakistani students and researchers for higher courses.

Before the India suspended talks with Pakistan in the aftermath of 26/11, in July 2008, S.K. Modi, a former President of FICCI, in a meeting highlighted, "greater economic engagement in the region is seen as a means towards insulating their growth to a great extent from the global disruptions of the kind we are seeing today. "[16] He re-emphasized the importance of building economic bridges between India and Pakistan. He was of the opinion that there are avenues aplenty for India and Pakistan to come together and work in unison in different fields- trade, industry, energy and infrastructure were just some of the areas.

FICCI has advocated the imperative need to bring India and Pakistan closer in the realm of trade and industry. FICCI even has a dedicated team of professionals who exclusively focus on strengthening economic relations between India and Pakistan. It has been

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[16] S.K.Modi was a past present of FICCI. The speech mentioned here was made at meeting with the Mr.Salman Faruqi, the then Deputy Chairman of the Pakistan's Planning Commission.

working closely with Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) for enhancing the bilateral economic cooperation. FICCI and Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry have jointly formed India-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1999. FICCI and FPCCI also interact under the umbrella of SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry and have undertaken several confidence building measures between the business communities of India and Pakistan. Promoting more trade fair and exhibitions across each other's Countries to spread greater awareness about each other's competencies and business capabilities. In this regard, FICCI had organized 'Made in Pakistan Exhibition' in March, 2004 in New Delhi which drew more than 40,000 Indian visitors per day. Similarly FICCI would like to organize Made in India Exhibition in Pakistan with the support of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry which would be a giant leap forward in our bilateral trade and result in fructifying large number of business deals. FICCI has already approached Ministry of Commerce in this regard.

Islamabad Chamber of Commerce & Industry (ICCI) have also been stressing upon increasing cooperation among South Asian countries to promote direct ties and collaboration for opening new avenues of bilateral cooperation. According to, Zahid Maqbool, President, ICCI on his return from India after participating in the 37th World Marketing Congress on Marketing Opportunities and Strategies for South Asia held on 17 Feb 2010, said that promoting collaboration among South Asian countries including Pak-India and developing business channels will translate into the better economic cooperation, stability and people welfare of the region. He said there is a need of economic integration among South Asian countries to accelerate the trade and economic activities. He stressed that level playing must be provided to reap the benefits of each other markets removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and to create win-win situation. President said that through dialogue process between India and Pakistan, an environment of mutual trust and confidence must be improved that would lead to enhance two-way trade. He hoped for better outcome of expected meeting between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan. He also emphasized for people to people contact and exchange of trade delegations among the South Asian countries and to pool the existing

resource and potential to develop strong linkages with each other. He said that South Asian countries are blessed with a number of resources which must be exploited to make it an economically strong block.

A similar sentiment was echoed by the Home Minister P. Chidambaram on 20 Feb 2010 when speaking after the laying the foundation stone of Integrated Check Post (ICP) at Attari border on the Indian side of Punjab he said, despite India not being given Most Favored Nation (MFN) status by Pakistan as a reciprocal gesture, India doesn't intend to bring trade and commerce to come to an end. He added, "We have not got a MFN (Most Favored Nation) status that is a fact and that's a complaint we make, it is a fact of life but because we do not have the MFN status that doesn't not mean that all trade and commerce should come to an end. We will continue the demand for the MFN status but we will also continue to encourage trade and commerce". (*The Times of India*: 2010:4) According to ANI, the ICP project aims at improving trade link between India and Pakistan. The project, envisaged to boost the trade and commerce between India and Pakistan, is being constructed at a cost of Rs. 150 crores to be developed on 130 acres of land acquired by the Punjab Government. He further stressed, "The 21st century will be driven by trade, commerce, and people travelling from one part to the other. India is not an exception. Hence, to recognize these facts India should encourage trade and commerce with all its neighbors." Indirectly referring to Pakistan, Chidambaram said: "The neighbor in the west is the most important one and there are people living on the either sides of the border who have close family links and trade links, which cannot be ignored."

The consensus opinion of some prominent business leaders of Pakistan including S M Munir, President of the Indo-Pak Chamber of Commerce, Sultan Ahmed Chawla, President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry, Iftikhar Ali Malik, Vice-President of the SAARC Chamber of Commerce, Muhammad Mansha Churra, Hameed Akhtar Chadda and many others during a meeting at the ICCI on 8

March 2009 was on similar lines.[17] Munir emphasized the need for a no-war pact between India and Pakistan to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence for businessmen and the people at large. He said both countries cannot afford war as it will take them to the Stone Age. Therefore, they should focus on promoting trade and economic relations to create new hopes and a better future for their people. He said the government can easily come out of the IMF trap by promoting remittances through regular channels. Chawla said India should fully reciprocate all efforts of Pakistan to improve relations as Pakistan cannot promote trade unilaterally. He said national interest should be kept supreme in relations with other countries. Iftikhar Malik said negotiations should be preferred to confrontation to solve all problems between the two countries. He said India should not use water as a tool to damage Pakistan which is vital for sustainable growth of its agriculture and industry. He said trade is the optimum tool to bring improvement in the lives of 420 million people who are currently living below the poverty level in India and Pakistan. Zahid Maqbool, ICCI President, stressed the need for assigning leading role to the private sectors of both the countries to exploit untapped business potential and complement each other's economy. He said SAFTA should be implemented in true letter and in spirit for providing its full benefits to the people of South Asia.

Besides visiting women entrepreneurs from Pakistan on 12 March 2010, called for strengthening of trade and commerce with India. The Pakistani women's delegation said after they members of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry's Ladies Organisation (FLO).The delegation from Pakistan, under the banner of the Women's Chamber of Commerce and Industry (WCCI), was led by fashion designer Faizaa Samee. Samee said that individual efforts need to be lent a fillip rather than blaming the governments of India and Pakistan for the bottlenecks.

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[17] This information was accessed online on 23 Feb 2010 in an article titled " Trade Best Option for India-Pakistan Peace : Business Leaders" at URL : http://www.amankiasha.com/

Limitations of Track Two initiatives: New lessons from Old mistakes

Khaled Ahmed (2009) argues that nationalism of a small nation is more intense than the nationalism of a big nation. (Ahmed: 2009:48) This happens because the smaller nation is insecure. In needs to inculcate the fear and loathing of the other at a high level of intensity. Indoctrination against the other works, according to Ahmed, only if the two are kept separate from each other. Repeated meetings will invariably bring about experiences contrary to the intent of the indoctrination. Ahmed argues that Pakistan would discourage Pakistanis to meeting Indians because it fears watering down of the indoctrination fed to them. On the other hand India would prevent indoctrinated radical Pakistani elements with revisionist passions to infiltrate into India. Essentially the argument that emerges out of Khaled Ahmed's article is that Pakistan's state behavior towards people-to-people contacts is driven by its unspoken policy of keeping its people separated from the Indian people.

Khaled mentions of an interesting incident illustrating the indoctrination of the "free media" that took place on the independence day of Pakistan in 2008. He quotes an editorial published in the Daily Times on 16 August, 2008:

"The NGOs and ordinary citizens who went to attend the candle-light vigil at the border post of Lahore, Wagah, to celebrate Independence Day together with the Indians on the other side, were not treated well by the rangers. While the Indian authorities showed respect to their citizens shouting Pakistan Zindabad, our side subjected the crowd gathered there to a brutal baton charge. Not only that, a TV channel hosted a discussion later in the day on the 'shame' of a Pakistani lady human rights activist performing bhangra with Sikhs from the other side on the occasion of Pakistan's Independence day. Reference was made repeatedly to the matrydom of the Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz on the LoC inside the Indian administered Kashmir and it was agreed that it was disrespectful to the struggle of the Kashmiris to have celebrated together with the Sikhs from India. So much for the people-to-people contacts that the world is expecting India and Pakistan to encourage." (Ahmed: 2009:48)

The official deadlock is a crude representation of two "national minds" trying to defeat each other. Foreign offices clash regularly with each other hurling diatribes at each other. In this context Khaled Ahmed writes, "Different and irreconcilable versions of events and points of international law fill the briefcases the diplomats carry to their meetings. The diplomats feel safe when there are no breakthroughs because breakthroughs are interpreted as softening of the irreducible official policy." (Ahmed: 2009: 49)

Psychologically speaking, since the state separates two peoples, people-to-people contact is made less difficult after the hold of the state is loosened. Khaled argues that there are many ways in which the hold of the state is loosened: "... (a) waning of the isolation of the state through globalization; (b) development of dissenting sub-nationalisms within the state ; (c) disenchantment in the wake of the defeat of the state in conflict with the defined enemy ; and (d) the freeing of the media from state monopoly." (Ahmed: 2009: 51) Globalization has meant the influx of foreign investment and outflux of Indian and Pakistani citizens into third states at a much larger scale than in the past. The two find "zones of contact" not presided over by the state where imbibed indoctrination can be shed gradually as the definition of the enemy changes over time. Foreign states become "zones of contact" for expatriate Indians and Pakistanis where indoctrination may become less hostile.

When we talk about India and Pakistan and people-to-people contact, one cannot miss the strict visa regime that exists between the two countries. The two countries have always had a strict visa regime because of the 'mythology of conflict', ideological contamination, fear of terrorism and the fear of economic migration on Pakistan's part. Visa regime has always been reciprocal between the two countries. If one state becomes tough on the grant of visas, the other one follows suit .Even diplomats of both the countries have often complained about harassment and ill treatment. Diplomatic ousters become a pattern during heightened tensions. Until the peace process began in 2004, there was barely a trickle of Indians and Pakistanis travelling between the two countries. Just over 8,000 visas were issued to Pakistanis by the Indian High Commission in Islamabad the year before; that number reached a bit more respectable figure of 100,000

by 2007.(Varadarajan: 2009: 10) The numbers are far less for Indians visiting Pakistan. And it must rate as one of the most oppressive visa regimes between any two countries. For one, there is no concept of a tourist visa for nationals from the two countries. As an Indian, one cannot go to Pakistan as a tourist; it has to be for a purpose such as birth, death or marriage and you must know somebody there, such as a relative or a friend for the application to be even processed. And even if manages to get a visa after months of waiting, it is usually a city-specific visa; so if one is a Pakistani national he/she could get a visa to visit New Delhi but not Mumbai; for an Indian, it could be Islamabad, but not Rawalpindi. Even diplomats of the two countries suffer much the same restrictions. A Pakistani embassy official based in New Delhi for example cannot travel to Agra three hours away without permission from Indian authorities; and precisely the same restrictions apply to Indian diplomats based in Pakistan.

Hostility between the two neighbors has in the past impeded their entry into various regional groups and blocs, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Cumbersome visa procedures and restrictions on movement has ensured minimal people to people contact. Severance of transport links on many occasions has also caused drop in the number of people travelling across the border. For instance, the stopping of Samjhauta Express in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian Parliament led to a loss in traffic of about 150,273 passengers between January 2002 and December 2003.Infact it is surprising to find that the tourist inflows from Kenya is increasing at 63.1 % in 2008-2009 and the highest decline in arrivals was seen from Pakistan at 46.7%.(Kothari et al: 2010: 89)

The media flow across the border is also minimal, though Internet access makes up for it to some extent. Even during the recently concluded International Trade Fair in New Delhi in early 2010, there were reports of Pakistani traders facing problems from the customs department with regard to the shipment of their consignments. This made them suffer from huge losses, as during the fair they could not get their goods delivered to their stalls, as those were caught in the logjam of customs formalities. Yet another demotivating factor towards the establishment' discouragement of people-to-people contact is the

charter given to the intelligence agencies to mount surveillance on visitors who take the pains to cross the national frontiers.

States will restrict travel for security reasons. That has little to do with people-to-people contacts. In the case of India and Pakistan it is the retrospect of past wars that still drives the policy of non-contact. India fears terrorism and Pakistan fears ideological subversion. India's policy stems from a feeling of strength while Pakistan's springs from a feeling of weakness. The Indo-Pak normalization process will not proceed smoothly if people-to-people contacts are not allowed. There is an institutional struggle involved in the formulation of mechanisms of contact. The intelligence agencies representing the paranoia of the weak state thwart all forward moves by pleading security without the onus of proving the insecurity psyche.

Track II processes in South Asia have suffered from an inherent elite bias. It has mostly remained restricted to the quasi official realm with only a few retired officials both civil and military participating in it. Shantanu Chakraborty has argued that this has resulted in the lack of "cross-fertilization of ideas". He also argues that since most of the participating retired officials served their respective governments at some point in time, so their positions as Track Two participants hardly make their stated positions different from that of their own governments on any issue in the agenda. Hence after every major conflict that has besieged the India-Pakistan relations over the years, Track Two initiatives also got derailed and took a long time to get back on track. For instance, at the time of "Operation Parakram" in 2002, when India deployed more than 7,00,000 troops on the Pakistan border in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the role of Track II diplomacy would normally have been considered as extremely relevant. But the Neemrana Dialogue was completely suspended during that period. It was resumed only after the crisis was over. Similar thing happened in case of the Kargil war too. It is in this context that Sundeep Waslekar (1995) argues, "Track Two is an elite exercise designed to prevent or resolve conflicts, or build confidence between the polities that they represent." (Waslekar: 1995: 56) He is of the opinion that such exercises need to

be distinguished from the peace efforts initiated by the grassroots organizations and dedicated individuals

Yet another limitation Track II initiatives is the tendency of the stronger partner to dominate the weaker partner and sermonize it on how it should behave or what positions it should take during the course of negotiations. This has very often led to further rigidifying the behavior of the weaker partner. But what has perhaps been the biggest hurdle for the effective working of Track II initiatives in India has been the apathy and cynicism on the part of the bureaucratic establishment in the MEA. There were and are occasions when it is found that the bureaucratic apparatus were reluctant to give due importance to the considered views of the Track II participants, even though the political leadership is more receptive to the views emanating from Track II forums. Hence Satish Kumar is of the opinion that the success of Track II very much depends on the composition of Track II delegations and the stature of their leadership. The more influential and eminent the members, the greater are the chances of their success. Hence he writes, "The success has to be measured not only in terms of what the deliberations of Track II produce but also whether the outcome makes an impact on the deliberations of Track I."

The challenges of selling new ideas and policies back home poses yet another set of obstacles to Track II dialogue. Cooperative security ideas are unlikely to be popular among the population that has experienced long and protracted periods of conflict and high-levels of violence. Cooperative postures are particularly dangerous for vulnerable regimes lacking legitimacy, as domestic opposition groups can use new security policies favoring cooperation with an adversary as political ammunition against a regime, particularly if such regimes are closely aligned with the western agenda. Indeed media leaks of sensitive Track II dialogues have in the past caused much of a discomfort. While many Track II dialogues would never get off the ground, without operating discreetly, over time such sensitivity to public exposure possess limitations to how such processes can effectively influence security policy.

The slow growth in the Track II initiatives in South Asia is striking when gauged through the parameters of its success of such initiatives globally since 1990s. The general assessment of the various non-governmental initiatives in South Asia has been one of cautious optimism. Although such initiatives have unearthed the other alternatives for conflict identification, management and solution, but the impact upon regional policy making have been quite marginal. Informal diplomacy in South Asia suffers from the "geo-political asymmetry", prevailing trust deficit and the looming long shadow of history, low level of official interest in the process, the hawkish overtones of the MEA staffs, communication barriers, consistent resistance from a section of the population, and finally the institutional and political weakness of many a policy-related think-tanks. Therefore what is needed is to make the non-governmental initiatives more effective by expanding their scope and widening their support base by reaching out to the "pertinent constituencies" and individuals left so far. Peace building strategies can be strengthened by a comprehensive and sustained dialogue with the groups representing the civil societies. In-depth analysis of certain issues at the Track II meetings imbued with mature insights and independent thinking sometimes produces solutions which would not be thinkable at the Track I level.

Journalists can be the biggest catalysts in building the peace mechanism between India and Pakistan. To support the logic, one should cross the border and feel the pulse of a nation that has erroneously been branded as enemy number one. Pakistan and India allow just two journalists each as resident correspondents; it is very difficult for journalists to travel to the other to report; city-specific visas make it difficult for the foreign journalist to travel about freely and it may be almost impossible to report from hotspots. On occasion, visas are denied to journalists seeking to travel to the other country to participate in seminars. Journalists have been seen with suspicion in both countries; each has, from time to time, accused individuals of working for their country's intelligence agency. Journalists have been harassed and obstructed by intelligence agencies from doing their work. More journalists mean more on-the ground reportage back to the other country, rather than rumor and speculation. Information cuts ignorance, which gives rise to bigotry and hatred. Changing the visa regime along the lines of those with other

friendly countries might be a useful policy. Granting tourist and student visas; giving preference to business visas; offering visa on arrival to frequent travelers who have already been security cleared More people-to-people contact; will give a fillip to trade and business; a boon for families divided across the two countries; promote tourism in both countries; student exchange programmes will make for better understanding.

History stands testimony to the fact that however tense bilateral relations between two countries, non official communication has not been snapped up. Regional tensions have not prevented functioning of non-governmental initiatives in West Asia, or for that matter during the Cold War. Regional cooperation and functionalism has become a recurrent theme in the post Cold War era with the advent of globalization. In is in this context that Track II diplomacy can serve as the harbinger of peace and conflict mitigation even in volatile regions, in the days to come.

Civil society interactions are often dismissed as frivolous and fanciful and it is argued that relations between India and Pakistan will not improve unless the political leadership endeavors to change it. Undeniably, ultimately political decisions are going to be taken at the Track I level, but it is imperative to recognize that Track II and civil society can help develop an environment conducive to positive outcomes. The governments also need to appreciate the fact that just an official dialogue will not solve deep rooted prejudices and biases. A conflict that is affecting not just few government officials, but two entire countries will have to involve entire populations of the two countries in its solution as well and this can only be achieved through more interactions between Indians and Pakistanis. In this light, the meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and her Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir on 25 February 2010, was if not a watershed moment; was at least a positive start At this juncture, it might not be too imprudent for India and Pakistan to think out of the so-called security box and conceive of creative ways of solving this enduring conflict.

In the case of protracted and deep rooted conflicts, entire populations have internalized a certain way of thinking about the other and this belief system can and does stand in the

way of any political negotiations that might take place at the Track One level. Thus a peace deal signed by the leaders of the two countries might not be enough in an environment of animosity, as the populations might be opposed to a peace deal. The value of such unofficial contacts between opposing sides is that they can often de-escalate a conflict before any official negotiations can do so. These contacts can build bridges between people, increase trust, and foster mutual understanding. They can serve to correct misperceptions and unfounded fears, and can reverse the trend toward dehumanization and the entrenchment of enemy images that often occurs in escalated conflicts. Often the de-escalation that results from such contacts is necessary, before official negotiations could be considered politically possible. The people-to-people contacts and increased civic interaction between two communities would be an important tool to loosen the shackles of implied ideology and community memory. It will help in deconstructing the enemy images and stereotypes. We have observed during the course of last three years of the peace process between India and Pakistan that CBMs and people-to-people contacts are immensely useful in normalizing the situation and starting a healthy debate within the two communities.

The multi-track diplomacy between India and Pakistan which has just got a head start during the last few years needs to be made more comprehensive and more stable. All sections of the two communities needed to get involve in this activity. There is also a need to institutionalize this process and make it independent of the whims of two governments. The civil society and intelligentsia on both sides of the border have to come forward and create the stronger bonds so that they can sustain the friendly atmosphere even during the bad days, when two governments are at loggerheads with each other. Sports, show biz, art and literature and media can play a very constructive role in removing the stereotypes and prejudices within the two societies. A greater period of normalization with soft visa policies, cultural, social and political exchanges will surely help. It is apt to conclude this chapter by recalling what Pakistan's Former Foreign Minister Khurshid Ahmed Kasuri told in his concluding address of the 'Pakistan-India Parliamentarians and Journalist Conference' held on 10-11 August, 2003, Islamabad:

"On the basis of my experience in the past as a track-II person and currently as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, I would suggest that both track-II and track-I have to act in tandem. One could not be substitute for the other, admittedly track-II efforts can help promote understanding and confidence between our two countries in tackling outstanding issues."[18]

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[18]The full text of the speech can be accessed at
http://www.southasianmedia.net/conference/statement_foreignminister.htm

Conclusion

In all the previous chapters a recurrent theme that emerged was that civil society possesses a discrete and distinct raison d'être which marks it out as different as well as autonomous both from the state and from the market. Thus, civil society in contemporary political theory is often considered as an alternative to both the state and to the market. It simply emerges as the third sphere of collective life. Gordon White (1994), for instance, conceptualizes civil society as 'an intermediate associational realm between the family and the state populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values' (White 1994: 379). One cannot but quote what Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato referred to in a well known definition of the term. They called it as a 'third realm' differentiated from the economy and the state (Cohen and Arato 1992: 18).

If a unique feature of these groups is their disregard for the national boundaries, the foundation of global civil society is framed by the "self-conscious construction of networks of knowledge and action"', and by "decentred" local actors. Global civil society actors, in other words, engage in practices that can possibly reshape the landscape of international politics by negating the primacy of states or of their sovereign rights (Lipschutz 1992: 390).Or to put in simply, global civil society is in the business of inaugurating a post-foreign policy world (Booth 1991:540). That is, many theorists consider that global civil society, consisting of transnational non-governmental networks, political activists, social movements, religious denominations, and associations of all categories, from trade unions to business groupings, can counterbalance existing networks of power by according a different set of values.

Civil society groups across the world are touted to represent 'a post realist constellation', that is assumed to challenges the conceit of the state system. But to conclude from this that these actors have drawn up an outline for a new or an alternative global order, or to assume that they are autonomous of both states and markets, may prove too premature an assertion.

Do these civil society groups actually represent common masses, particularly of the Third World? Or are they self-styled voices of people who do not have even a remote chance of influencing the agendas? Do these more often than not well-funded and often well-organized civil society actors actually speak from below? Or do they claim to do so in order to gain legitimacy? Certainly cyber-savvy global activists are influential because they know the language that will win attention and perhaps applause. But it is precisely this that causes unease, for whatever happens to people who do not know any language that may have resonance in the world of international politics?

What happens when ordinary human beings do not have access to computers through which civil society actors wage their battles? What happens when activists who feel passionately about certain crucial issues are not in a position to participate in acts of resistance at the annual meetings of the international financial institutions? And now consider the somewhat formidable range of issues that have been taken up by global NGOs. Today they dictate what kind of development should be given to Third World people, what kind of education they should receive, what kind of democracy should be institutionalized, what rights they should demand and possess, and what they should do to be empowered ?

Frankly, it is unclear whether international NGO activism strengthens or weakens the role of the community. First, NGO activism, which straddles national boundaries to create global coalitions, is no substitute for self-determining and empowering political action born out of specific experiences.

Second, the third world state has proved notoriously non-responsive to the demands of civil society. Are these civil society groups accountable? For instance, the response of Lori Wallach, whose organization 'Public Citizen' orchestrated the battle for Seattle in 1999, in an interview published in *Foreign Policy*, was asked the following question: "You're referring to the idea of democratic deficits in multilateral organizations . . . Some people argue that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like yours also have a democratic deficit—that you also lack democracy, transparency, and accountability. Who elected you to represent the people at Seattle, and why are you more influential than the elected officials . . .?' Ms Wallach had the following to say: 'Who elected Mr Moore? Who elected Charles Barshefsky? Who elected any of them?' (*Foreign Policy* 2000: 36). This simply evades the issue. In another question she was asked who 'Public Citizen' is responsible to. 'Our members', she replied. 'How do they express their oversight?' 'Through their cheque books', she replied, 'they just stop paying their membership dues.'(Foreign *Policy*: 2000: 39). People would no longer expect to realize their selfhood through associational life, if their participation is just confined to the payment or withdrawal of membership dues. This is a cause for worry. "Much of the leadership of global civil society organizations appears to be self-appointed and non-accountable to their members, many of whom are passive and confine their activism to signatures to petitions circulated via e-mail." (Chandoke: 2002:40) So even though we see huge crowds during demonstrations against the WTO or elsewhere, such as the World Social Forum, between such phases, the activity is actually carried on by a core group of NGOs. This is hardly either democratic or even political. It may even render people, as Neera Chandoke (2002) says, "consumers of choices made elsewhere." (Chandoke: 2002:43) Moreover, as has been widely observed, international NGOs resist attempts to make their own functioning transparent even as they demand transparency and accountability from international financial organizations. Observers have commented that, since most global NGOs do not issue financial or activity reports or any declaration of objectives, it is difficult to gauge their nature (Scholte 2000: 119). Even if they do issue such statements, does this make their activities more transparent? There is still an grey area when it comes to the financial transparency and accountability of these organizations that need to come under scanner.

The evolution of the idea of civil society in the states of the Third World has traversed a different trajectory in sharp contrast to those of the Western world. Most of these third world continue to narrate a history of colonization of over a hundred years. Even after decolonization, a majority of these states did not abandon the colonial structures of the state. The arduous task of nation building and preserving national security in the aftermath of the decolonization process asphyxiated the role of the civil society in these post-colonial states. The state emerged as (to use Hobbes' term), *'The Leviathan'* having total control over its citizen's lives. Right from the 'cradle to grave', it was the state that was to dictate the destinies of the people of these states. Hence what emerged after a decade of the decolonization process was the establishment of a paradigm driven by the logic of the state. Add to that was the way these states fostered a sense of national identity among its subjects. It is an irony that most of these post colonial states in the third world today are the result of the colonial scalpel. Before the colonial masters left their colonized lands, they carved out the borders in such a way that borders became the second most prominent lines in the lives of these people after the lines in their hands. Hence among the geographically contiguous lands enmity with regard to the borders remain a characteristic feature of the decolonized states.

India and Pakistan also share the same history. Independence brought along with it the pangs of partition that left the legacy of millions of masses being separated across the borders and fostered a feeling of hatred and hostility. Over the years this hostility and hatred found manifestations in strict visa regime, low or marginal level of people-to-people contacts, and very little forward movement when it came to cross-border trade. In other areas too the political establishment's hawkish tenor also prevented the continuity of the dialogue process for a long duration of time.

The role of the civil society groups need to factored in the context of this baggage of bad history that the two countries still carry. When even the officials on both sides of the border still haven't been able to find a viable solution to the protracted conflict, it is too naïve to think that the non-official dialogues would achieve a solution in a short of span

of time. At the same time, one must not loose sight of the fact that civil society movements in South Asia are at an embryonic stage. One should not measure their efficacy on the same scales of success as achieved by their counterparts in the matured democracies and developed societies of the West. For example when strong protest lobbies raise the issue of the need for stricter immigration norms, the government in Britain cannot but pay heed to it. This happened during the Premiership of Gordon Brown. But the same cannot be said would happen in India or for that matter in Pakistan because under scanner are two different societies.

The hypothesis that this research sought to test was whether the domestic political structure of a country play a role in allowing the civil society to influence foreign policy. But what emerged out of the current analysis was that foreign policy per se has not been a major issue in the domestic circuit of the two countries (although for Pakistan anti-India sentiments still play a major role in its electoral politics). So while in both the countries the civil society groups might taste bouts of success in their efforts on domestic issues, but when it comes to foreign policy their influence is almost negligible. The reason behind this is the opaque nature of the political establishment warped in a strong bureaucratic framework that looks upon the activities of these groups with disdain. Officials in the foreign policy establishment consider these groups as "naive meddlers and amateurs" lacking the skills and information to manage sensitive issues." (Behera et al: 1997:32) Others discredit them as harmful to the "national interests". Moreover for the hawks in the security establishment there runs a vested interest to keep the 'conflict psyche' alive. Hence, official or non-official dialogues are not encouraged to the extent it should be.

However, the civil society initiatives that seek to lobby hard in their respective countries with the establishment tend to be harbingers of peace for the common masses. Although the interests of those in the MEA might be indifferent to the interests of the families divided across the border, yet on the ground the enthusiasm for these civil society initiatives among the masses paint a different picture. In an extensive poll conducted jointly for *The Times of India* and the *Jang* group of Pakistan, the Aman ki Asha

initiative found out that an overwhelming majority wanted a peaceful relationship. Aman ki Asha polled people in six Indian cities as well as respondents in eight Pakistani cities and 36 villages to feel the pulse of a sub-continent besieged by violence and fear. About two-thirds of those polled in India (66%) and almost three-fourths of those in Pakistan (72%) said they desire a peaceful relationship between the two countries. On the question of the effectiveness of people-to-people initiatives in bringing about the peaceful relationship among the two countries, the mandate was decisive. In India, 78% said they were an "effective" or "very effective" instrument of peace. The verdict was even more unequivocal in Pakistan, where 85% chose one of these two responses. In fact, an impressive 43% in Pakistan said it would be "very effective".[19] This is a more resounding endorsement of the belief that civil society initiatives can and must make a difference.

However in retrospection, we can infer that one reason for the initiatives of the civil society groups not achieving the kind of success that it deserves, has been the issue of 'trust deficit' that runs deep in the Indo-Pak relations. Each time India and Pakistan approached agreement there was derailment caused by an event. The Lahore summit was derailed by Kargil, the Agra summit was wrecked by a last-minute semantic dispute, the Musharraf initiative was aborted by his ouster and the Manmohan Singh-Zardari effort was stymied by 26/11. Each time warmth creeps into the Indo-Pak dialogue, a major event inflames public opinion to ruin the atmosphere. It required very little for the wreckers of peace to derail the peace effort. Similar sentiment was echoed by the Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh while addressing his first Press conference in his second term in office. He said, "Trust deficit is the biggest problem and unless we tackle the trust deficit we cannot move to substantive negotiations." (*The Hindu*: 24 May 2010: 1) To remove mistrust there must be an irreversible commitment at the top. No peace effort to make borders irrelevant can ever succeed unless there is trust between the armies of India and Pakistan. Indeed, far greater trust among the common peoples of India and Pakistan already exists than it does between their official establishments.

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[19] For an exclusive analysis of this opinion poll refer to
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/amankiasharticleshow/5400921.cms

Civil society groups in their non-official peace overtures can only act as the catalyst to get the atmospherics in place .How much of their agenda gets actually implemented in to a country's foreign policy depends upon the proximity that the group shares with the establishment. The type of government that a state has does influence in allowing the conditions conducive to their activism, but the efficacy of their activism hinges upon the issues and causes that they seek to uphold and want the state to implement. Security and sensitive political issues like solution of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan would require more than civil society activism to find a solution to. India might have had a democratic dispensation since its inception, but that does not mean that civil society activism has found manifestations in the country's policy process. While it comes to domestic issues their role is still much more pronounced but foreign policy still remains a sphere that is dominated largely by the state. And when it comes to relations between neighbors who still carry the baggage of a past history of conflict and enmity the role of the civil society actors get virtually eclipsed by the logic of the state.

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