

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM IN ZAMBIA

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PREFACE

PREFACE

The present study deals with the origin and growth of African nationalism in the context of Zambia. An attempt has been made to make it pithy. The subject matter has been divided into four chapters. Each chapter is confluence of the two streams: European Politics and African response.

First chapter is an introduction to African nationalism, a general review of the phenomenon. Second chapter covers debut and development of colonial rule and early African reactions in Zambia till 1953. It engrosses the set up of the Administration, elucidates the politics behind the formation of Federation and the momentum generated by African opposition to it. The third chapter describes the interosculation of racialism and nationalism, the formation of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, division of power between Federal and Territorial Legislatures in such a way that no material power is devolved to Africans, British craving for "dominion status", decline of the African National Congress and restoration of its previous strength. Fourth chapter deals with the triumph of nationalism. It examines the white obstinacy in abdicating power to Africans and their ultimate failure in clinging to power. The chapter concludes with the description of African success in getting adult franchise and African government in 1964.

Throughout the study an attempt has been made to present a candid assessment. But since I have not been to

Zambia, my thesis is based on secondary sources. I have endeavoured to exclude all the melodramatic, inter-polated or otherwise low-credibility literature even if it meant protraction or retrogradation of my work.

I owe immense debt to my affable guide Professor Anirudha Gupta, Head of the Centre for West Asia and African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. It was but for his earnest and resolve that the research could take off the ground. His mellow supervision made me work hard and produce this study. His relentless attention and diligent counsel made me scotch every problem that emerged in the process of this study.

Though it is not in vogue to specifically name the seniors, friends and colleagues who might have helped, I cannot resist the temptation of doing so. It would be an ignominy if I be parsimonious in thanking Dr. Dharampal who was always candid and gracious. His assistance to me was always timely and prolific. I also thank my indulgent chum, Abhay, who shelved all his work in order to help me mop-up my dissertation. His help was modicum but cracker-jack. There are several other friends whose advice, criticism and encouragement I can never be oblivious of.

I am thankful to the librarians and staff of both the Indian Council of World Affairs and J.N.U. for the pains they took in meeting my requirements. Their help was of high order.

Special mention is due to my worshipful parents who brooked with the filial absence. They stimulated me and made it possible for me to do all that I have done. Without their goad, support and devotion my research could not have budged an inch. Without the understanding of and ensconcement given to me by Inder Mohan, Gurjeet, Harminder and Sumeet during the period, my research would have run aground. Their forbearance and affection was heartening.

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
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NORTHERN RHODESIA

- Territorial boundaries
- Federal boundaries
- Native reserves (LUBA)
- Mission stations +
- Railways
- Roads
- Towns o
- Hilly country
- Rivers
- Swamps



Source : Edward Clegg, Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London, 1960).

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN NATIONALISM

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INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Anthony D. Smith divides the development of African nationalism into different phases. First, the Primary Resistance: when various movements among Africans which opposed the gradual European penetration of the continent. It was usually put down by European force of arms. Second, the Millennial Movement: self-styled prophets preached the coming of the millennium, the end days when a wicked and corrupt world of sinners would be suddenly and dramatically replaced by an era of absolute justice and love. They also demonstrated the main ways in which they had hoped to transform African life. Third, the Inter-war Period: It saw a great increase in the role of urban strata and the beginning of African nationalist organizations. During this phase attempts were made to win more rights and a greater measure of social welfare from the colonial authorities, using legal and constitutional means by participating in the various consultative and advisory bodies. But success through such bodies was limited. Fourth and the last, the Second World War: It marked a watershed in the emergence of nationalism, and in European-African relations. The war greatly enhanced the sense of the territoriality and territorial bonds among the population in each colony.¹

So pervasive has been the influence of the theory of imperialism that the most popular view of nationalism regards

1 Anthony D. Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World, The Western State and African Nationalism* (London, 1983), p. 39.

itself as a movement for national liberation and a reaction to European colonialism. Thomas Hodgkin uses the term "African nationalism" in a broad sense, to describe any organisation or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspirations of a given African society (from the level of the language group to that of "Pan-Africa") in opposition to European authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives.²

Because of the vastness of the continent and the variety of historical background, African nationalism took many forms and thereby now it poses many problems, making it difficult to generalize.

African nationalism assumed global importance from two sources: first, the Pan-African movement - initiated by American and Caribbean Blacks; and second, the Ethiopian Church movements which derived their origins in the confrontation of traditional Africa with Christianity.³

There came a widening breakaway from Christian Church communities which were seen as dominated by Europeans for their own ends. By 1920 there were many independent African Churches whose message proclaimed "Africa for the Africans".⁴ It was as much political as religious.

2 Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London, 1956), p. 23.

3 Anirudha Gupta, Government and Politics in Africa: A Comparative Survey of Political Processes and Institutions (Delhi, 1975), pp. 24-27.

4 Basil Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and Outlines (London, 1963), pp. 278-9.

The group identity at the beginning of African nationalism was the identity of "blackness", racially. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, there was often no territorially exclusive term to designate the indigenous inhabitants in a given territory - at least, not when distinguished from the immigrant races. In Tanganyika or Kenya it would not have been racially specific to say "No Tanganyikans" or "No Kenyans" but "no Africans". Thus, to use Nyerere's rhetoric, Africans, all over the continent, without a word being spoken either from one individual to another or from one country to another, looked at the Europeans, looked at one another, and knew that in relation to the Europeans they were one.⁵

At a symposium at Welleale College, Nyerere emphasized that "the sentiment of Africa", the sense of fellowship between Africans was "something which came from outside". He said "one need not go into the history of colonization of Africa, but the colonization had one significant result - a sentiment was created on the African continent - a sentiment of oneness."⁶

Interaction with Europeans contributed profoundly to the outward and inward Westernization of the people in trans-Zambezia. This process goaded on Africans to acquire a national rather than parochial outlook. The missions unwillingly played a catalytic role in their struggle for home rule.⁷

5 Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (London, 1967), p. 47.

6 Ibid., p. 46.

7 Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, p. 9.

Ethiopian Church movements asserted in the language of the Bible the right of the Black people to be treated as equal in relation to the White people. With their initiation into the Christian doctrine, Africans became increasingly aware of the contradiction in their existence as Christians and as members of a crest-fallen race. They started denying the universality of the Church - since they clearly saw it associated with the privileges of the White race.⁸ Christianity came to be associated with the particular civilization. In one of his early speeches Jomo Kenyatta is said to have compressed into a witticism a feeling of disaffection shared by many other nationalists: "The white man came and asked us to shut our eyes and pray. When we opened our eyes it was too late - our land was gone".⁹

The national leaders, such as Obote, Jomo Kenyatta, Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure regarded, to nurse the young growing feeling of national unity, as one of their main tasks. They spoke of the danger of "Balkanizing Africa", that is, of splitting it into units too small and weak to survive. They opined that if they once begin the process of adjusting frontiers to meet tribal needs, they will find it hard to stop. National leaders all over Africa felt that they must preserve the national territory intact. They believed that Africa must pass on its way from the tribal to the international stage of

8 Gupta, n. 3, pp. 24-27.

9 The Guardian (Manchester), 30 January 1962.

development. They supported the Pan-Africa Movement, a movement which aimed at rallying the whole Negro race to a consciousness of what Negroes might do in the fields of politics, art, culture etc. Discussing the possible conflict between African Nationalism and Pan-Africanism, Nyerere said it is not impossible to achieve African unity through nationalism, just as it was not impossible for various tribal associations or tribally based parties to merge themselves into one nationalist movement. It is difficult,¹⁰ but it can be done if the determination is there.

Nkrumah emphasised the importance of African unity saying that "these (colonial) governments have often shown a touching concern for the rights of these minorities. In fact, their concern has in some cases been so great that it has overlooked entirely the rights of the majority. Examples of this attitude may be seen in the exercise of apartheid in the South Africa and its enforcement for many years, and in the formation of Central African Federation against the wishes of the Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was the operative principle in Kenya, which supported the supremacy of the European minority over the African majority and was implicit in the view that the rights of that alien minority needed armed protection against the indigenous majority. In fledgeling states, imperialist interests flourish where there is an atmosphere of dissension. They are endangered in an atmosphere of national unity and stability."¹¹

10 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism (Nairobi, London, New York, 1963), pp. 207-17.

11 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London, Melbourne, Toronto, 1963), p. 75.

Since the demand for racial equality involved complete reordering of human society on a global scale, egalitarianism represented the core of African nationalism.

This was the egalitarian tradition of thought, that held firm until the very threshold was crossed. "What is the difference between a white man and a black man?" asked an African missionary in the Nyasaland, "where the difference in power and wealth had become enormous. Are we not of the same blood and all from Adam?"¹²

With the exception of a handful such as the Fulani Emirates and some French-Africans, the Africans were seldom given an equal treatment by the Colonialist. Instead, the attitude was one of paternalism. In those territories where European settlers deliberately kept the Africans in a subordinate position, the social order was turned upside down almost as soon as power was transferred to the latter. In Kenya and Zambia political independence thus synchronised with a social revolution.¹³

Africans of Northern Rhodesia felt discriminated against both by White officials and the settlers. And, in African mind, there were no subjective differences between the various levels of discrimination.

Preoccupation with social equality, on the other hand, did not allow the Africans even to think in terms of nations, or nation states. In their view the territorial, linguistic

12 Davidson, n. 4, pp. 276-9.

13 Gupta, n. 3, pp. 24-27.

and cultural barriers did not appear important in comparison with the colour-bar. Mazrui also has tried to draw attention to this aspect but in a slightly different context.

The paradox of the African experience is that nationalism in Africa derived its original intellectual stimulation from the ethic of individualism. The result was that the rhetoric of the African nationalism, at least in British Africa, was not, in fact, filled with repetitions of the word "self-determination" as might have been expected. What were more common in the language of nationalism, "one-man, one-vote" and "majority rule".¹⁴

Thus political power in African view meant primarily the end of a pattern of racial domination.

The African sees the very real problems of the economic and cultural gap which separate him from political "maturity" as nothing but an elusive shadow cast by the Europeans to distract him from his real objective of political "power". Moreover, he reasons, even if maturity were a necessary condition for the effective use of power, it can never be a pre-condition.¹⁵ Nationalist leaders felt that they must start somewhere, sometime, and learn and practice. They would much prefer to have bad government of their own than a good government by a white outsider. "The only way to

14 A.A. Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth (London, 1967), pp. 21-22.

15 Thomas M. Frank, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia and Central African Federation (New York, 1960), p. 263.

learn how to walk is to crawl", they maintained.¹⁶

Mkrumah described nationalism as "the application of ... the right of the people to rule themselves".¹⁷

Thus, the basic motivation behind African Nationalism was the desire for "freedom". If they could not get it by the persuasion, they would certainly try to get it by force, and eventually they would succeed, it was asserted.

During the years between the two world wars, Africans sought in every conceivable constitutional way, to better the political, social and economic order. With an implicit recognition of the fact that the governments of Europe had come to stay and that the imposed codes of law could not be removed easily, Africans tried to work within the colonial context. Using the political concepts and language of their respective rulers, they unsuccessfully claimed a democratic right to participate in the governing process. At first, they wanted to achieve no more than the right to have their collective voice heard in matters directly affecting the lives and actions of the indigenous population. To this end, those Africans (primarily the educated i.e. lawyers, doctors, businessmen, clerks, evangelists, teachers, and journalists) to whom the Whiteman's ways had become most familiar, formed organizations in order to help themselves in expressing their pleas for reform and consideration.¹⁸ But success through constitutional means

16 John Gunther, Inside Africa (London, 1955), pp. 13-14.

17 Mazrui, n. 5, p. 50.

18 Robert I. Rotberg, Political History of Tropical Africa (New York, Chicago, Burlingame, 1965), pp. 341-2.

was limited and the essentially executive and bureaucratic nature of colonial regimes soon became apparent. Indigenous elites had to appeal over the governor's head to the Metropolitan governments and parliaments, if they were to secure reforms and social change. Particular interest therefore, came to focus on opening the ranks of the bureaucracy to men of talent, irrespective of race or creed, for it was the upper echelons of the colonial administration monopolised by Whites, which dominated governor's councils and blocked all efforts to reform. African elites became bitterly resentful of the bureaucracy's role in society, and its failure to democratize its ranks and apply universal criteria in recruitment to top posts.¹⁹

The turmoil and the propaganda of World War II ameliorated the general opinion and thereby created an atmosphere conducive to the rise of nationalism in tropical Africa. The stirring pronouncements of President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the appeal of General Charles de Gaulle, and the agitation in India and Palestine encouraged Africans of every station. The "Four Freedoms" became a household phrase. Moreover, African soldiers served with the Allied armies in Asia, North Africa, and Europe. They fought the Japanese, the Italians and the Germans and returned home with a new sense of self-respect. Within the colonies themselves, they helped the Gaullists to eliminate the influence of France in Equatorial Africa. Thereafter it provided the bases for Allied airplanes and

ships that incidentally afforded opportunities for the mixing of White troops and Africans on relatively equal terms. The impact of the war coaxed the colonial governments and several far-seeing administrators into promising and indeed in introducing a number of reforms. They, thereby, tried to give urban and rural Africans a greater sense of participation in the affairs of the state. In general, this combination of circumstances encouraged the educated Africans to take heart and to seek new ways to demonstrate their dissatisfaction. Political leaders were not satisfied by merely criticizing a policy laid down by the Governor and his officials. They wanted to make policy themselves.²⁰

Involvement in the war gave them a new strength. "If the African volunteers who suffered on the battlefield of European conflict were good enough to fight and die in the Empire's cause, they were good enough ... to have a share in the government of their countries".²¹

They started forming national political parties. Northern Rhodesia African National Congress was formed in 1948.

At its inception, nationalism was confined to a small minority of the educated elite the members of which sought for their own interest a greater share in the process of government which had hitherto been the monopoly of the Colonial Administrations. Although there were sporadic

20 Rotberg, n. 18, p. 248.

21 Davidson, n. 4, pp. 276-9.

outbreaks of resistance against the colonial regimes in the rural areas, which were led by traditionalist groups before 1945, the major impetus for the spread of nationalism came from the urban centres, where the symbols of self-government and independence could be more easily understood and communicated.

From the very early period, the urban nationalist leaders sought to forge links between the new urbanites and the rural masses. Since the city-dwellers retained a close connection to their rural homeland, the parties were able through them to transmit the message of independence to the villages. The villagers' political consciousness was gradually aroused by the young educated groups who sought more rapid political and social advancement for their people.²²

In Africa mass parties emerged in the final phase of colonial rule. Besides, even before these parties had any experience of organizing largescale political movements,²³ extension of franchise literally swept them into power. In Ghana, Nkrumah's "positive action" was scarcely launched before electoral victory led his party to form the first African majority government in tropical Africa. In Zambia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) had just started a massive protest movement when electorate reforms were initiated giving the Africans the right to vote in a settler

22 Gray L. Cowan, The Dilemmas of African Independence (New York, 1964), pp. 1-6.

23 Gupta. n. 3, pp. 24-27.

dominated territory. The elections of 1962 resulted in the formation of majority African government and in less than two years political power was formally transferred to the UNIP.

In Africa those nationalists who came to occupy power, in the wake of elections, did not belong to the elitist strata. In Ghana political success of the Convention People's Party (CPP) also symbolized a shift in the location of power from the elitist groups to an "indefinable" category of lower middle class people.²⁴

The British had expected nationalism, but what disappointed them was that nationalism arised in the "wrong quarter". They had hoped that national leaders would arise from among the councils of chiefs; it bothered them to see the new political parties led by doctors, teachers, lawyers and journalists.²⁵

The spread of nationalism inevitably met resistance from Colonial Administrations. Where the Administration sought to suppress the nationalist organization under the banner of a formal political party, alternative sources of collective strength were found.²⁶ As in Northern Rhodesia when Zambia African National Congress was banned United National Independence Party took its place.

Despite the occasional disturbances which took place during the nationalist campaigns between 1945 and 1960 (in the vast majority of cases), the culmination of the struggle

24 Gupta, n. 3, pp. 24-27.

25 W.E.F. Ward, Emergent Africa (London, 1967), p. 126.

26 Cowan, n. 22, pp. 1-6.

for independence was reached without serious violence. Often, independence came, not in sequel of pitched battles which sought to wrestle power from the hands of a reluctant colonial authority, but rather in the form of a grant of independence. Except in Algeria, Kenya and the Cameroon Republic, the birth of independence was generally not accompanied by violence entailing any substantial loss of life. Even in Congo, the violence which took place in July 1960, was actually a result of the post-independence breakdown of public authority. The major nationalist parties, almost everywhere, were swept into power with overwhelming majorities in the last pre-independence elections.

Hence, one can say that the roots of nationalism in Africa were found in the soil of colonial rule. After the first phase of resistance to the White control there came a period during which Africans attempted to adopt themselves to the West, and started using legal and constitutional means for greater measure of social welfare. But Colonial Governments did not accept the ultimate logic of this process. Then came the mass political resistance, constitutional reforms, elections and ultimate triumph of African Nationalism. The concept of Nationalism, therefore, did not spring full-blown into the minds of latter day African agitators. The difference between the African protest movements and later independence movements was only of scale and degree.

The beginning of the early nationalist movements were rebellious in character rather than revolutionary. That is, they accepted the prevailing political structure but tried to

obtain fairer opportunities within it. They simply wanted a fairer share of the cake but there was no question of wanting the whole cake and doing the sharing themselves; that came later.

Thus the entire course of colonial history in a sense favoured the development of African nationalism.

Chapter II

**COLONIAL RULE AND EARLY AFRICAN RESPONSE
TILL 1953**

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COLONIAL RULE AND EARLY AFRICAN RESPONSE TILL 1953

The British entry into Southern Africa dates back to the capture of the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) in 1795. However, geographical hindrances delayed their advance northward. Their northern advance recommenced in 1858, when the British Colonial Office and the "Royal Geographical Society"¹ appointed David Livingstone to explore the Zambezi region. His explorations lasted upto 1873. The news of rich mineral deposits revived British interest in the region and enhanced its economic potential.² The discovery of Chinde Mouth of the Zambezi delta in the Indian Ocean in 1899 was added stimulus.³ The subsequent scramble for Africa hastened the pace of the colonial expansion. The British declared the territory now known as Zambia, in their sphere of influence. However, it was left to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to undertake imperial expeditions into this region. The Company extended its hold over the region north of the Limpopo which came to be popularly known as Rhodesias, after the name of Cecil Rhodes, the mastermind of the Company. The British Government granted the British South Africa Company a Charter to establish its

1 As a Missionary of London Missionary Society (LMS), Livingstone traversed the region between 1851 and 1856. See I. Schapera, ed., Livingstone's Journal 1853-1856 (London, 1963), 2 volumes.

2 Alexander Campbell, Empire in Africa (London, 1944), p. 87.

3 Dharampal, "British Colonial Policy of Indirect Rule in Africa: A Case Study of Northern Rhodesia" (Ph. D. Thesis of C.I.S., J.N.U., 1979), p. 37.

administration over the territory.⁴

In the beginning, the Company divided the above territory into two separate units namely Barotseland North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia. The two units were amalgamated in 1911 into one under the name, Northern Rhodesia (NR). The Company administered the territory until 1924 when the Charter Administration was replaced by the Crown Administration.⁵

Administration :

Under the Charter Administration, the Crown exercised sovereign authority over Northern Rhodesia through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Secretary of State exercised his control through a Commissioner. The executive head was designated as Administrator. Next to him was a Chief Secretary (CS). His important associates were Financial Secretary and Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA). The legal affairs were looked after by a high court. It was headed by a senior judge. For the conduct of law the territory was divided into Magisterial Districts (MD). Each Magisterial District was under a Magistrate/Assistant Magistrate. The Magisterial District was further divided into native and

4 "Agreement Between Her Majesty's Government and the British South Africa Company, February 1891", British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 83, 1891, pp. 925-7.

5 Malcolm William Bailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories. Part II. Central Africa: Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia (London, HMSO, 1950), p. 76.

non-native areas. The native areas were administered by Native/Assistant Native Commissioners (NCS/ANCs). The non-native areas were controlled by the "Town Management Board". No executive and legislative councils were provided until the imposition of Crown Administration in 1924.

The Crown Administration was headed by a Governor. He was appointed by the Crown at its pleasure. An Executive Council (EC) advised the Governor in his executive functions. It consisted of heads of Departments in their ex-officio capacity.⁶ The Governor had the right to veto the Executive Council's decisions. For his executive actions he was responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies who in turn was responsible to the British Parliament.⁷

The Districts were sub-divided into "urban" and "rural" areas. Any area with even one white was declared "urban". The "rural" areas, home of the native people, were divided on the basis of tribal diversity. Each tribe was evolved into an autonomous administrative unit and administered through tribal chiefs.⁸

In a Memorandum issued in 1934, Moffat Thompson

6 A Department corresponded with a Ministry in the Cabinet form of Government.

7 Martin Wight, British Colonial Constitution 1947 (London, 1952), p. 16. See also Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1922), p. 194.

8 Lugard, n. 7, pp. 58-59.

classified these tribes into six "language groups".⁹ Every "language group" was further divided into "tribal units". All these "tribal units" were independent of each other at "rural" level. They were linked to the Colonial Administration through the "Secretary for Native Affairs". According to a survey by Lord Hailey, the Administration recognised the following tribal groups.¹⁰

9 The language groups are:

1. Mambwe - speaking tribes: Mambwe, Lungu, Inamwanga, Iwa.
2. Tumbuka-Nyanja - speaking tribes: Chewa, Senga, Ngoni, Chikunda, Tumbuka, Ambo.
3. Wemba and Lala-Lamba speaking tribes: Wemba, Mukulu, Ngumbu, Chrishinga, Ushi, Kawendi, Shila, Bivile, Tabwa, Unga, Lala, Lamba, Lima, Swaka, Wisa, Sewa, Kaonde, and Luano.
4. Tonga - Ila speaking tribes: Tongo, Ila, Lumbu, Soli, Sala, Lundwi, Gowa, Leya, Lenje, We, Leya, Totela, Toka, Subya.
5. Sikolo-speaking tribes: Rozi, Kwangwa, Shanjo, Moshi, Simaa, Nyengo, Mwenyi, Makoma, Ndumulu, Kwandi.
6. Lunda-Luba speaking tribes: Lunda, Luba, Ndembo, Nkoya, Mashasha, Luchaze, Mbowe, Luvala, M-bunda, Lukolwe, Mbwera.

Quoted from Dharampal, n. 3, p. 87.

10 Hailey, n. 5, p. 85.

Province	Superior Native		Subordinate Native	
	Chief and tribal council	Councils of chiefs	Tribal Council	Chief and Council
Barotse	1	-	-	5
Western	14	-	-	83
Southern	-	-	4	47
Central	4	-	3	44
Eastern	8	-	-	30
Northern	9	1	-	56
Total	36	1	7	265

The Advisory Council under the British South Africa Company Administration was replaced by a legislative council (Legco) which was constituted with officials and unofficials as its members presided over by Governor. The unofficial members were elected by an electorate comprising White Settlers. In spite of its consultative character, the legislative council acquired a dominating place in the Colonial Administration.

Central Secretariat was to control and co-ordinate the executive activities of the Colonial Administration. A Chief Secretary headed the Central Secretariat. A "Chief Native Commissioner" or Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) headed the native administration. The head was the coordinator of administrative affairs concerned with the African people.

The territory was divided into provinces and further divided into Districts. These were headed by Provincial

Commissioners and District Commissioners respectively.

The European Politics

The European settlers had been politically conscious from the beginning. They demanded "a major say" in the administration of Northern Rhodesia. They formed an association namely the Fort Jameson Farmers' Association (1904), changed to North Eastern Rhodesia Agricultural and Commercial Association in 1911. Leopold F. Moore, immediately after his arrival at Livingstone in 1904, raised the demand for the self-government to the Europeans. His efforts led to the formation of the North Western Rhodesia Commercial Association in 1909 representing the interests of White settlers in and around the Barotse Valley. Both these associations exerted pressure for granting the White settlers the representation in the administration. Their representatives met the then Administrator L.A. Wallace in August 1914 and demanded the formation of a "Legislative Council".

Administrator L.A. Wallace agreed to set up an "Advisory Council" in Northern Rhodesia in 1914. The outbreak of the First World War, however, delayed its formation. Despite this Leopold Moore, continued the settlers' agitation for the formation of the Advisory Council. In 1918, the Administration set up the Advisory Council consisting of nine officials and five elected unofficials.

After winning the first round of the battle, the Moore group called for the termination of the British South Africa Company Administration. In a meeting held on 26 July 1919 they passed a resolution demanding takeover of the territory



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by the Crown. In the election held in March 1920, the anti-Charter representatives were returned to the Second Advisory Council. In the Council Moore placed three demands: (i) freedom of speech; (ii) disclosure of all information; and (iii) laws and proclamations with the Advisory Council's approval.

The Administration was, however, hesitant to move fast in this direction so long as Northern Rhodesia could afford a viable economy to attract sizable settler population. British South Africa Company Administration was also contemplating amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. With this end in view, the British South Africa Company appointed Sir Chaplin as Administrator of both the Rhodesias in March 1921. Settlers in Northern Rhodesia were opposed to the amalgamation at that stage fearing domination by their counterparts in Southern Rhodesia. It may be recalled that by 1921 Southern Rhodesia had already advanced to the stage of self-government. The settlers in Northern Rhodesia also resented the diversion of Northern Rhodesia's labour to the benefit of Southern Rhodesians. The settlers of Southern Rhodesia were equally opposed to amalgamation since it could delay the grant of self-government to them. The administration of Northern Rhodesia rejected the demand of the White settlers in Northern Rhodesia. As a protest Moore resigned his seat in the Council.

Thus the settlers took an aggressive approach to pressurise the willing Colonial Office. Their stand was strengthened by the elections held for the third Advisory Council in 1922. 1,417 voted against and 310 in favour of

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the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. The new Advisory Council passed a resolution in July 1923, to terminate the Charter Administration. Consequently, the British Government issued an order in the Council (1924) to set up the Colonial Administration in Northern Rhodesia. Therefore Advisory Council gave way to the formation of a Legislative Council.

The settlers, ad interim, continued their agitation for self-government. They had a sympathetic Administration under the Governor Herbert James Stanley, who hailed from South Africa. He was succeeded, in 1927, by James Crawford Maxwell who came from the Gold Coast. Moffat Thomson became the new Secretary in Native Affairs. Both of them were not very enthusiastic to meet the settlers demands.

At this juncture in 1930, the Labour Party came to power in Britain. The Government in Britain declared that it would stand by its policy of finding a place for the Africans in the Administrations of their countries.¹¹

The declaration fell "like a bomb" upon the White settlers. The settlers were not prepared to accept the above imposition. Their Elected Members in the "Legco" argued that the "conception of rule in the interests of the majority was entirely inapplicable to Northern Rhodesia".

Their demand was soon met. The British Government appointed a Joint Select Committee of both the Houses of the

11 Cmd. 2904 (1927) and Cmd. 3731 (1930).

Lord Passifield, the Labour Colonial Secretary had declared the African interests should be paramount where there was any clash with the interests of immigrants.

British Parliament. The Committee visited the country in 1930. It rejected outright that Northern Rhodesia was a "native country". It further pointed out that "paramountcy of native interests" was irrelevant to Northern Rhodesia since there was no "native question". These recommendations were accepted by the British Government. But the settlers now saw their salvation only in the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias.

They had again a responsive Administration. The "Provincial Commissioners" (PCs) conference (June 1936) recommended the formation of Provincial Legislatures without further delay for also providing them a representation in the Provincial Administration.

Thus the settlers obtained their entry at all the three levels of the Administrations: 1) local self government at District level; 2) Provincial Council at Provincial level; and 3) Legislative Council at Central level. In 1937, a Standing Financial Committee was set up. It consisted of two officials and two Elected Members. The Committee was to be consulted in framing of the Estimates and on any financial business. Thus Unofficial Members had achieved a major say in financial administration of the territory.

Closer association, however, seemed more attractive to settlers in both the countries by 1936. Booming copper industry appeared to have a promising future. They held a conference in that year at the Victoria Falls. It was attended by the members, representing all the three parties in the Southern Rhodesia and all the elected members of the

Northern Rhodesia. The conference called for immediate amalgamation^{mak} of the two Rhodesias.

The Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs and for the Colonies discussed the matter with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and representatives of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in London during the summer of 1937. As a result of these discussions it was decided to recommend to His Majesty the appointment of Bledisloe Commission.

The Bledisloe Commission agreed to regard amalgamation as the ultimate objective, to be kept in view. However, it felt that immediate amalgamation was not desirable due to a sharp contrast in the two Administrations. It feared strong opposition from the natives. The Commission suggested that amalgamation could be contemplated only if the native policy of Southern Rhodesia was tailored to the best interests of the natives.

The leaders of the whites, Sir Godfrey Huggins in the South and Sir Roy Welensky in the North, however, continued their relentless support for the amalgamation. In February 1949, at the initiative of Sir Roy Welensky, a meeting was held at Victoria Falls to consider closer association between the two Rhodesias. They called for a conference of officials of the three Central African Governments, to examine the question of closer association afresh. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and the Central African Council met in 1951. The consequent Official report¹² set out the

¹² Which was published in June 1951, Cmd. 8233.

urgent need for closer association. It stressed upon the economic interdependence of the whole area and added that a single economic system would provide a more attractive field for investment than the three small territories. The report further argued that the strategic problems could be more easily handled on a federal scale. The report also argued that a federation would be conducive to improve health and education facilities and higher personal standards.

After discussing various forms of closer association, the officials recommended a detailed scheme for a "Federation" under which the Central Government would have certain specified powers, the remainder being left with the Territorial Governments. The constitution that they proposed included special safeguards for African interests.

The representatives of all four Governments met at the Victorial Falls and endorsed the principle of Federation.

Consequently the British Government made a statement in Parliament on 21 November 1951, implying that the Conservative Government was convinced of the urgent need for a federation of these territories. A second London Conference was called for in April 1952. The outcome of the Conference was a draft Federal Scheme.¹³ The conference recommended that three commissions should be appointed. Accordingly, the Fiscal Commission, the Civil Service Preparatory Commission, and the Judicial Commission were appointed in

13 Cnd. 8411.

June 1952. The reports of all the three commissions were presented in October 1952.¹⁴

A final conference met in London during January 1953 to consider the draft Federal Scheme. No African attended the conference. The Federal proposals were submitted to all the three concerned Governments which passed them jubilantly. Thus in 1953, the Federation of Rhodesias and Nyasaland emerged from the crucible of racial antagonism ignoring the increasing grievances of Africans. This finally destroyed the Federation itself.

Rise of Nationalism

The people of the native Northern Rhodesia were disquiet from the early times of colonial rule. Forced labour and taxation were most potent and irritating factors in causing this discontentment.¹⁵ This feeling had burst out in many forums at various stages, and helped in the emergence of nationalism. As Rotberg observed where the reaction to Colonialism could not be expressed directly or where the healthy protest failed to bring about any appreciable amelioration, the conquered people cloaked their rejection of

14 Cnd. 8671-3.

15 L.H. Gann, The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company 1894-1914 (Manchester, 1958), p. 77.

The British South Africa Company Administration introduced tax in 1901 in North-eastern Rhodesia. It was replaced by a poll tax on each adult in 1905, extended to North Western Rhodesia in 1906.

colonialism in religious garb.¹⁶

This silent commotion is known as "Watch Tower" movement in the growth of African nationalism in Zambia. Watch Tower movement was undoubtedly a religious movement. It had its roots in Ethiopianism which called for religious self-determination to cure the social and economic ills. It soon acquired political connotation and demanded political self-determination. The Watch Towerists preached disobedience to all civil authority, African as well as European. They enjoined their followers not to work for European or the Chiefs, who were like all non converts, labelled devils.¹⁷ Its popularity in tribal areas became a source of concern to the Administration.¹⁸ Acting District Commissioner, Tanganyika District, Charles Richard Eardley Draper sent frantic telegraphic messages to the Administration about the situation in Isoka.¹⁹ Native Commissioner Dewhurt contended that the doctrines of Watch Tower which were "inculcating the end of the present form of government and the advent of a theocracy cannot be considered mere religious propaganda".²⁰ He tried to crush

16 Robert I. Rotberg, "The Rise of African Nationalism The Case of East and Central Africa", World Politics, XV(1962), p. 84.

17 Colonial Administration needed the assistance of tribal chiefs in maintaining law and order, combating rebellious tendencies and getting more labours. Thus African people saw chiefs no more than policemen.

18 Henry S. Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism (Manchester, 1971), p. 139.

19 Ibid., p. 150.

20 Ibid.

the movement with a heavy hand. But the "novel movement of religious anarchism"²¹, grew from strength to strength in Northern Rhodesia. They were, however, overshadowed by the movement launched by the "educated" Africans.

In addition to labour, artisans, and traders, there also emerged a class of African teachers, evangelists and clerks with the advent of colonial rule. These people attained, in general, an important place as a link between the traditional rulers and British Administration. The latter (class) were designated as "educated" people. They started organising themselves into political bodies. They claimed to be spokesman of the improvised rural and discontented urban African population. They also sought themselves to be reckoned with accordingly. They formed the Native Welfare Associations, declaring that their aim was "neither directly nor indirectly to subvert the authority of the Government or of any lawful establishment, nor to induce the community to do so. They wanted to be helpful means in developing the country by becoming the connecting link between the government and the governed".²²

The first "Native Welfare Association" in the country was formed in 1923 at Mwenzo Mission by "educated" Africans. Although the association became defunct by 1929, its spirit lived on to inspire similar organisations in the country.

21 L.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953 (London, 1964), p. 170.

22 Richard Hall, Zambia (London, 1965), pp. 112-13.

In the late 1940s, these were to form the basis for a new and forceful nationalist movement.²³ When the Mwenzo Welfare Association was dead and gone, other Native Welfare Associations were formed. Among them Livingstone Native Welfare Association, Luanshya Native Welfare Association, Kasama Native Welfare Association, Abercorn Native Welfare Association, Ndola Native Welfare Associations were deemed important.

Through these Associations, the educated Africans wanted to persuade the colonial authorities to recognise that the Africans were as human as the Europeans, and therefore they were entitled to the same human rights as were accorded to the Whites. The Luanshya Association at a meeting held on 21 November 1931, carried a motion urging the Government to give the Africans "equal rights", "better treatment" and "justice to Native people".²⁴

These Associations also protested against social inequalities. The Livingstone Native Welfare Association resented the behaviour of the policeⁱⁿ/arresting Africans who were using footpaths. It pleaded that the Africans were using the footpaths merely for avoiding the danger of being run over by cars on the roads. It also condemned the frequent arrests of Africans for window shopping at European stores and asserted that it was a miscarriage of justice

23 Ibid., p. 113.

24 Ibid., p. 243.

based on colour.²⁵ They deplored the fact that such injustices should have been meted out to the Africans by a government whose proclaimed policy was to regard native interest as paramount.

The colonial authorities, however, maintained that Native Welfare Associations were upsetting the policy of administering African tribes through their chiefs.²⁶ The Administration sought to contain their aggressive growth by resorting to the policy of indirect rule. But the Native Authority system failed to contain their growth. The Administration sought to restrict the Associations which could thereon act only as the mouthpiece of those natives who were not within the ordinary organization of the native society. Therefore they restricted the organisations' membership only to those Africans who did not belong to the tribal authority for the area in which they were resident. They also enjoined that the chiefs and Native Authorities should not associate themselves with these "detrivalised" elements in the Welfare Associations.

The above restriction was sourly received by Native Welfare Associations. The Kasama Native Welfare Association criticised the government for circumscribing its operation and making the body to cease to be a viable organisation. The Associations did not agree that for representing the

²⁵ Ibid., p. 245.

interests of the Africans in Tribal areas they should lodge their complaints with the chiefs and the Native Authorities. They sought direct dealing with the Administration. These Associations remained popular for taking up the genuine grievances of the African people. Abercorn Native Welfare Association urged the government to give early consideration to reduce the onerous rentals which the poor African traders were forced to pay.

While the educated Africans contested the Administration they also worked for unity among themselves to meet the challenge thrown by the settlers. The Ndola Native Welfare Association complained to the Governor, in 1932, that the amalga^{ma-}tion of the two Rhodesias would be "greatly to the detriment of the interests and legitimate aspirations of the native population of this country". Representatives of Livingstone and Lusaka associations met at Kafue in July 1933, and attempted to launch a territorial association to meet effectively the settlers move to control the Administration.

They proclaimed the formation of a Federation on a territorial level by amalgamating their associations. The Administration felt that the amalgamation of African Welfare Associations on a territorial level would pose a threat to settlers' domination. Therefore, the Administration ruled out the formation of the Federation on a territorial level. The muzzling of the educated Africans, however, proved disastrous. The Administration could understand its shortcomings only after the violent strike at the Copperbelt in 1935.

On 5 April 1935, the mining authorities at Kitwe (Nkana) found a notice written in Bemba.²⁷ This notice was an important revelation of the mood of the African mine-workers on the eve of the disturbances. What appears more probable from the hindsight is that the "primary cause" of the strike was there long before the new tax rates. Grievances about pay, maltreatment, bad working conditions and even about the old tax rates had been smouldering in the compound. As one writer has commented, "the bowling out of the taxation increase was not as much the cause as the spark setting off the conflagration."²⁸ It was at Mufulira where the first strike occurred. It was triggered off by the introduction, on 20 May 1935, of a higher poll tax of 15s.

27 "Listen to this all of you who live in the country, think well how they (the Europeans) treat us and to ask for a land. Do we live in good treatment. Because we wish on the day of 29th April, every person not go to work, he who will go to work, and if we see him it will be a serious case. They cause us to suffer, they cheat us for money, they arrest for loafing, they persecute and put us in goal for tax. What reason have we done? Secondly, do you not wish to hear these words, well listen, this year of 1935, if they will not increase us more money stop pay tax, do you think that they can kill you, no. Let us encourage surely you will see that Goodwill be with us. See how we suffer with work and how we are continually reviled and beaten underground. Many brothers of us die for 22/6, is this money which we should lose our lives for." Quoted in A.L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, pp. 216-17.

28 Edward H. Clegg, Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London, 1960), pp. 81-82. See also Gann, n.21, p. 302.

The new tax rate was introduced under the native tax (Amendment) ordinance of 1935.²⁹ The strike soon spread to other mining towns.

Violence

Only a day after the strike at Mufulira ended, notices were found at Nkana on Friday, 24 May, threatening a strike and general violence as well as violence to people w' o would go on to work. The subsequent display of force both by the police and the army appeared to have a salutary effect on the strikes. The strike at Nkana was fizzling out. Luanshya was, however, developing into the stage for the third and last scene of the 1935 Copperbelt strikes. The situation was a repetition of what happened at Nkana and Mufulira, but here the atmosphere was much more tense. The police, in sheer excitement, opened fire and crushed the strike by the afternoon of 29 May 1935.³⁰

Though the Administration was able to control the disturbances, it was shaken by the violence which was creeping into the African agitations. The Administration appointed a Commission headed by William Allison Russell to inquire into the disturbances. After the investigations into the episode, the Commission singled out a bunch of raison d' etre of these disturbances. In brief some of the causes listed were: (1) the new rate of tax in the urban areas raised to 15s.

29 Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1883-1964 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 181.

30 Meebelo, n. 1B, pp. 260-1.

to finance the new rural projects; (2) insufficient wages; (3) insufficient rations; (4) deductions of miners' equipments' cost from their wages; (5) great number of unemployed relations staying at the mines, and (6) breakdown of tribal customs and controls.³¹ It also urged upon the need of accelerating the administrative machinery for the benefit of the urban Africans.

During the next few years African mineworkers and industrial labour generally remained dissatisfied. Neither the mine management nor the Government acted decisively. The causes of discontent remained largely untouched. The Administration rather strengthened its defences and supplemented the white manpower available on the Copperbelt for administrative duties. It moved at a very slow pace until after the break out of another violence in 1940. This violence was preceded by a strike by the White miners.

31 See the Russell Report, 1935, p. 18. Quoted in Dharampal, n. 3, p. 132.

Various opinions have been given by the scholars on these disturbances. Henry Meebelo and R. Hall hold respectively the subversive activities of the Berbas and Nyasas on the Copperbelt. Thus they hold politics as the cause of these disturbances. Meebelo, n. 18, p. 255 and Hall, n. 22, pp. 114-15.

Rotberg, Clegg and R.H. Bates refer to economic hardships and exploitation and the absence of any trade union bodies to explore the legitimate economic grievances of Africa workers. Rotberg, n. 28, pp. 162-3; Clegg, n. 28, p. 81; R.H. Bates, Unions, Parties, and Political Development (London, 1971), p. 8.

To Gann and Epstein the poor administrative machinery was the basic cause of the sudden eruption of these disturbances. See Gann, n. 21, p. 200 and Epstein, n. 27, p. 29.

The strike called by white mineworkers union was an eye-opener to the Africans. The management conceded to the Whites a war bonus of 5 per cent and an increased rate for overtime, and handed their other demands for arbitration. These concessions increased the gravity of discontent amongst the already underpaid African miners. They resorted to strike which soon turned violent. The strikers called for accelerating the process for providing an administrative machinery for the urban Africans.

Council System in Urban Areas :

Immediately after the Russell report the administration considered it necessary to introduce, for the educated Africans, a share in the Administration in Urban areas. The Administration advocated for the introduction of "a Native Council". They conceived the Council system both as a legislature of tribal states and as an electorate for the representatives to the Central (or Federal) legislature. Yet the Administration did not want to deviate from its principle that Africans belonged to "Native Reserves". They contemplated the strengthening of tribal states rather than integrating them in the Colonial Administration at territorial level. Thus the Council system was utilized more to solve the problems faced by the Administration rather than meeting the grievances of the Africans i.e. equal share to them in the Administration. The system could hardly reconcile the educated Africans. The

32 The John Forster Report, 1942. See in Dharampal, n. 3, p. 136.

Administration went ahead and introduced the Council system, keeping the Africans divided on tribal lines.

The steady deterioration of race relations highlighted during the 1940 disturbances, forced the Administration to take steps for the formation of a territorial council. A territorial body called the African Representative Council (ARC) was set up in the territory. It declared that it would become an electorate for the election of two members who represent African interests in the ^{Council} Legislative _{Le}. However it was only another intelligent move to strengthen the tribal bonds rather than conceding Africans a place at territorial level. A delegate to the African Representative Council was first of all required to be a member of the concerned tribe. He could reach the African Representative Council only through the tribe, Native Authority Council, and African Provincial Councils. It is worth noticing that this pyramid preserved the independence of a tribal state while operating at territorial level through the Council system. Secondly, it restricted the functioning of the independent political bodies formed by the educated Africans. Thirdly, it ensured majority for the rural delegates who could hardly reconcile with urban leadership within this pyramid.

This did not satisfy the educated Africans. They made efforts to form their own political body at the territorial level. In 1946 they formed a "Federation of African Welfare Societies of the Northern Rhodesia". Accusing the African Representative Council as being a government controlled body made of its stooges, this Federation sought to have at least five of its delegates

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in the Livingstone High Court, and a Secretary in the Livingstone Native Welfare Association (LNWA), argued that amalgamation was bad for the African people of Northern Rhodesia because it entailed radical constitutional changes, which were in every way detrimental to the African interests. In Northern Rhodesia, he said, although the White Legislative Council passed laws, they were usually sent to London to receive the royal assent before they could come into force. This arrangement was, in his view, a priceless constitutional safeguard which did not obtain under Southern Rhodesia's constitutional law, and which the Africans of Northern Rhodesia should not allow to be lost through amalgamation with the self-governing colony.

For Robert Sempelwe, another member of the Livingstone Native Welfare Association, amalgamation was detestable because it would introduce Southern Rhodesia's racial policies in Northern Rhodesia. The Whites would supplant the Africans who were employed as telegraphists, telephone operators, typists by the Northern Rhodesia Government and by the private sectors. The stringent pass, game and forestry laws of Southern Rhodesia would be used to curtail the social freedom of the African population in Northern Rhodesia. This opinion was shared almost universally by the Africans. It had rather brought both the educated Africans and traditional leadership together in sharing the same view. In all the districts and the provinces, one chief after another weighed against the whole idea. Some even dismissed the economic cooperation. Because the economic union, even

if in the extreme sense, would necessarily call for political union envisaged in amalgamation.

In variegated but consistent terms the educated and the traditional leaders gave expression to the universal rejection of the amalgamation by all the Africans. This unrestrained and trenchant opposition to the scheme greatly influenced the Commission. The Commission reported that although the amalgamation was a necessity but its immediate implementation was impracticable.

The Northern Rhodesia Government was no less aware of the African opposition to the amalgamation. While noting that this opposition was largely determined by the African fear of change, the Executive Council dismissed as unfounded the press statements that the African views were influenced by the "interpreter class". Although the illiterate Africans, like most chiefs, could not be expected "to reason the position out philosophically; it would have been quite erroneous for the Government or anybody to regard their views as worthless, because large numbers of Africans had first-hand experience of life in Southern Rhodesia". Their approach was further vindicated by a resolution adopted by the Ndola Native Welfare Association. The resolution reads:

That while this Association would welcome amalgamation with Nyasaland where laws and conditions are similar to those of this country, it humbly asks that the government will not agree to the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. Such a step would, in the opinion of this Association, be greatly to the detriment

of the interests and legitimate aspiration
of the Native population of this country...34

In 1951, the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress demanded the institution of universal adult suffrage; reinstatement of the policy of the African paramountcy; increased African representation in the legislature; removal of all forms of colour bar and segregation; assistance in higher education to enable Africans to take degrees; African members of the Legislative Council to be given portfolios; and the continuance of Colonial Office rule until such a time when Africans would be in a position to demand self-government on their own terms. By the time the Federation was implemented, these points formed the basis for African political leaders' demands.³⁵

In this way, the African nationalism sufficiently strengthened itself to meet the political strength acquired by the European settlers through the liberal approach of the Administration in Northern Rhodesia.


34 Qnd. 5949, p. 112.

35 Clegg, n. 28, p. 187.

Chapter III

**RACIALISM VS NATIONALISM - FEDERATION
PERIOD (1953-58)**

Source: Cmd 8754 (1953).



Chapter III

RACIALISM VS NATIONALISM - FEDERATION PERIOD (1953-59)

We have seen in the last chapter that the Federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland was born in the midst of a violent political controversy. The African communities declared its creation as another step in the direction of establishing a White oligarchy. The settlers were not apologetic. Majority of the European communities in the three constituent states welcomed the Federation. Moderates argued that the Federation would provide the key to multiracial living in Africa.¹

Constitutional Frameworks

The Constitution was favourable to the White settler communities. Its preamble itself "recites that the colony of Southern Rhodesia would continue to enjoy responsible government in accordance with its Constitution; Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would continue, under the special protection of His Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments".² However the powers and the composition of the legislatures at Federal and Territorial level had made the special protection useless.

1 Edward H. Clegg, Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (London, 1960), pp. 2-3.

2 Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report by the Conference on Federation held in London, Cmd. 8753 (1953).

The legislative powers at Federal level were divided into two parts for "Executive" and "Concurrent" subjects. The "Executive" list included those matters which were clearly in the interest of Whites, while the "Concurrent" list included the matters over which the Federation and the Territories both needed to have some jurisdiction. The Federal legislature had exclusive power to make laws for the subjects included in the "Exclusive" list. The Federal legislature could also make laws for the subjects included in the "Concurrent" list. The hold of the Federal Government was made stronger by stipulation that in the case of inconsistency between the laws made by Federal and Territorial legislatures, the Federal law was to prevail.³ The subjects closely concerning the Africans were the responsibility of the respective Territorial legislatures. The composition of the constitution helped the legislatures to exert greater control over the imperial civil service through which the Crown was expected to extend "special protection" to the African population.

Legislatures

The Constitution provided two legislatures: one at Central level called Federal, and the other at territorial level applicable only to Northern Rhodesia. The composition of the ^{Northern Rhodesia} legislature was as follows:

3 Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland, Federal Scheme Prepared by a Conference held in London, Cmd. 8754 (1953).

Legislative Council for Northern Rhodesia

	1924	1929	1938	1940	1945	1948	1954
Official Members: (including the Governor who was president of the Council until 1948):	9	9	8	9	9	10	8
Unofficial Members:							
Elected members	5	7	7	8	8	10	12
Nominated Unofficial members	-	-	1	1	5	2	4
African members	-	-	-	-	-	2	4
Total Membership	14	16	16	18	22	24	26

Executive Council for Northern Rhodesia

	1924	1929	1938	1940	1945	1948	1954
Official members	4	5	5	5	5	7	5
Unofficial members without portfolio	-	-	-	4	3	4	-
Unofficial members with portfolio	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Total membership (excluding the President)	4	5	5	9	8	11	9

Franchise

British subject only with £ 200 p.c., or property
with £ 250 or mining claim was franchised Northern
Rhodesia under the Federal Constitution.

4 Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional
Change, Cmd. 530 (1958).

The given composition of the Legislative and Executive Councils was set out in an announcement issued in London in September 1953. In January 1954, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, visited the territory at the request of unofficial members of the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia and held discussions with all sections of the community about the Constitution and franchise of Northern Rhodesia. The communique issued at the conclusion of the talks affirmed that the composition of the Legislative and Executive Councils would be as set out in the announcement of September 1953, and that no change in the franchise should be made during the lifetime of the first Legislative Council under the new proposals⁵ which would normally mean for five years. The statement added that there should be no change in the franchise without the consent of all parties.

With the achievement of the Federation, Northern Rhodesia's Whites expected a major Constitutional advance at the territorial level in early 1954. The Colonial Office, having demonstrated its confidence in Central Africa's Whites by supporting the Federation, was hardly in a position to refuse some measures of Constitutional progress for Roy Welensky's elected unofficials in the north. The position of the settlers had been considerably strengthened. First, by the convention agreed to in 1948 that the Governor would not overrule the unanimous advice of elected unofficials, and later (1949) by the provision of portfolios for two elected

5 Ibid., para 12.

unofficials in the Executive Council.⁶

The Federal Constitution provided for 16 seats from Northern Rhodesia in the Federal Legislature. Twelve of them were to be elected by an electorate constituted by a qualified franchise. The high franchise qualifications excluded all but a handful of Africans. Moreover, no African in Northern Rhodesia, even if fulfilling necessary qualifications, could vote unless he had first become a British subject by "naturalisation".⁷ In consequence, all twelve Northern Rhodesian seats in the Federal Legislature were filled by White Europeans. The Four African members of the Legislative Council were returned by an electoral college system culminating in the African Representative Council.⁸ It gave unlimited leverage to the Whites. In the first few months of the Federation, the elected European members in Northern Rhodesia showed that although they could be over-ruled by the Secretary of State, they commanded sufficient influence to keep for another five years a system of voting which effectively excluded all but about ten Africans.⁹

The Federal, Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland governments pledged themselves to support "partnership". The Northern Rhodesia Government published

6 David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964 (London, 1967), p. 48.

7 Clegg, n. 1, p. 180.

8 Cmd. 530, para 11.

9 Philip Mason, Year of Decisions: Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960 (London, 1960), pp. 101-2.

a draft definition of "partnership" to clarify the concept. The definition concluded that "the ultimate political objective for the people of Northern Rhodesia is self-government within the Commonwealth; self-government must take full account of the rights and interests of both the Africans and the (White) Europeans and include proper provision for both."¹⁰

Both Godfrey Huggins and Roy Welensky abundantly demonstrated from the beginning their contempt for African sensitivities and aspirations. Huggins reassured his White followers that he would never allow Africans to play an equal part in the affairs of the Federation. Welensky, speaking in Northern Rhodesia, explained that the "partnership" presumed no more than cooperation between the Africans and their European masters.¹¹

In brief the policy of "partnership" was a clear pronouncement against "paramountcy" of African interests.

Clarifying any misunderstandings about the meaning of "partnership", Huggins explained that the White people of the Federation had promised to "adopt a liberal policy in respect of the bulk of the people, who happen ... to be black. But that does not mean they have got to lose their heads and fondle these people as if they were pets showing off for the benefit of people in the United Kingdom. They are adult ... very backward, and it is going to take a very long time to

10 Clegg, n. 1, p. 195.

11 Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 253.

improve them ... we do not intend to turn them into spoilt children."¹²

Although none could admit it officially, "partnership" was dead. Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who understood the nature of African discontent, had already publicly decried "this partnership (as a) fraud."

"Those of us ... who live in Central Africa", he wrote to the Manchester Guardian, "know very well that 'partnership' between White and Black at the present time anyhow is at best a pious hope, at worst a disingenuous myth propagated for political purposes." He went further and added that:

We are always being told one of the most urgent needs of the day for Europeans in Africa is to retain, or rather regain, the confidence of Africans, and the sooner the 'partnership' myth is dropped the better. It will be time enough to revive it when something has been done about the colour-bar ... Partnership between races is a fine ideal, fraternity is perhaps a finer one, but nothing is gained and much is lost by pretending that either the one or the other is being attempted when actually nothing of the sort is happening. ¹³

Gore-Browne also pointed out a marked deterioration in race relations and suggested that "the only solution to the problem ... is to admit frankly that we regard the Native races as our partners, potential partners if you will, junior partners for as far ahead as it is possible to look, and to frame our Native policy accordingly."¹⁴

12 Ibid., p. 272.

13 Gore-Browne Papers : Sir Stewart Gore-Browne to the Editor of the Manchester Guardian, 6 February 1956. Quoted in Rotberg, n. 11, p. 283.

14 Clegg, n. 1, p. 92.

These suggestions by no means reflected the feelings of settler populace generally. His suggestions were outrightly rejected. Williams, an elected member, went so far as to suggest that "there is no conscious or deliberate colour-bar system in this country". As a result of the storm Gore-Browne's speech aroused, he resigned from the Chairmanship of the Unofficials' Association, and Welensky was subsequently elected in his stead.¹⁵ These developments gave a new push to the White aspirations. They sought for the "dominion status" for the Federations.

1954 was not yet half over, when Huggins and Welensky started what later became their drive for "dominion status" for the Federation. In fact, both of them claimed^{at} political meetings in Bulawayo in November 1953 that "dominion status" was their goal for the Federation.¹⁶

Dominion Status

During the next year additional Federal Legislation was proposed which sought to strengthen the Federal Government's position. Public statements on "dominion status" by White politicians, both in Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, continued to appear. In October 1955 Welensky voiced his confidence that the Federation would achieve "dominion status". "If we continue to show (that) we can govern with firmness, tolerance and justice, there will be no difficulty in persuading

15 Ibid., p. 132.

16 M. Franklin, Unholy Wedlocks: The Failure of the Central African Federation (London, 1963), p. 97.

His Majesty's Government to offer full self-government to the Federation".¹⁷

The Federal Party led by Welensky's successor in the Broken Hill constituency, John Roberts, demanded stricter control over African trade unions, the recruiting of more local-born White Rhodesians into the police, and the introduction of "riot damage legislation" which would give the Government powers of collective fining for personal injury and destruction of property, caused by African riots. In the Constitutional sphere, Roberts demanded additional and more important portfolios for the elected unofficials.¹⁸

Their demands got further strength after Welensky became Federal Prime Minister in November 1956. Preparations for the move were begun behind the scenes as early as 1955, and received sympathetic support at the Commonwealth Relations Office. Benson's reservations about the Federal Government's drive for greater independence had become serious enough by 1956. He wrote a Memorandum to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd. The Colonial Office was unreceptive. Benson soon discovered that his memorandum had been passed on to Lord Home at the Commonwealth Relations Office and then to his adversaries in Salisbury. Over the crucial months of late 1956 and early 1957, the Colonial Office proved unwilling to take a stand against its sister

17 Mulford, n. 6, p. 50.

18 Ibid.

office for the Commonwealth, and Welensky eventually won.¹⁹

On 26 April 1957 the extent of agreement between Welensky and the Commonwealth Relations Office became public. While much remained to be settled in detail, agreement had been reached on the following matters: (a) the Federal Government would be given additional responsibilities for external affairs; (b) the British Government agreed not to exercise its rights, conferred by the Federal Constitution, to legislate for the Federation, except at the Federal Government's request; (c) Civil Servants, whether Federal or Territorial, would eventually be locally based and look for their future in the Federal area; (d) proposals for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly would be accepted in principle; (e) the three territories would not be allowed to amalgamate or to secede from the Federation; (f) the Federal Review Conference, which had been provided for in Article 99 of the Constitution, would be convened at the earliest possible time in 1960; (g) the purposes of the conference would be to agree on Constitutional advance for the Federation and to consider a programme for the attainment of independence.²⁰

Armed with these assurances, the Federal Government introduced two highly controversial Bills.²¹ The first Bill provided for the enlargement of the Federal Assembly from thirty-five to fifty-nine members (excluding the Speaker),

19 Ibid., p. 51.

20 The Times, 27 April 1956.

21 Introduced in May 1957.

while the second Bill introduced a complicated "qualified²² franchise system" with two separate "classes" of voters.

The combined effect of the two Bills was to devalue African representation in the Federal Assembly, notwithstanding the fact that the proportion of Africans and Europeans charged with representing African interests remained constant at one quarter of the Assembly's total membership.²³

The African Affairs Board, a standing committee of the Federal Assembly and the chief safeguard of African interests under the Federal Constitution, invoked for the first time its power to reserve "discriminatory" legislation for the consideration of His Majesty's Government by declaring both Bills "differentiating measures". This was done on the ground that together they reduced the proportion of effective African representation in the Federal Assembly. But the British Government overruled the Board on both Bills. Unfortunately for the Board, the decision was fatal and from then the Board was regarded as a dead letter.²⁴

When Benson became Governor of Northern Rhodesia he was charged with the responsibility of designing a Constitution which would see the territory through its next stage of political development. Early in 1957 Benson initiated consultations on a new Constitution, later known as the Benson Constitution.

22 Introduced in September 1957, though the franchise proposals were first made public by Welensky in London in June 1957.

23 See Mason, n. 9, pp. 70-87.

24 Mulford, n. 6, p. 53.

In the course of these discussions various proposals and plans were put forward. They ranged over a broad spectrum. The right wing Dominion Party (D.P.), a minority White party with support among farmers in the Southern Province and South African miners on the Copperbelt, proposed that the territory be divided into separate spheres of influence between Europeans and Africans.²⁵ The Government of Northern Rhodesia rejected it because the territory of Northern Rhodesia itself and the Federation as a whole had become unified and indivisible and were pledged to a "policy of partnership of races".²⁶

The United Federal Party (U.F.P.), the governing party in all the three territories as well as at the Federal level, favoured a constitution which would set the form and pace of political development for the foreseeable future. Despite its support for "non-racial" political development, the United Federal Party adhered strongly to the view that political advance be based solely on "merit", i.e. on financial and educational qualifications.

At the other end, African leaders demanded parity of representation between the races. The African National Congress's definition of parity was equal representation between elected Africans and elected Europeans and Officials. The Government rejected it on the principle that political parties should begin to develop on non-racial lines.

25 Ibid., p. 54.

26 Cmd. 530, para 14.

The Franchise Commission, under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Tredgold, which was appointed by the Government of Southern Rhodesia rejected the concept of universal adult suffrage on the ground that it would lead in effect to a worse kind of racial representation than the present. Because there would be an overwhelming majority of one race whose members were for the most part comparatively uneducated and backward; and therefore subject to emotional appeals which might lead them in the cause of African nationalism to sacrifice their own "best interests". The Government of Northern Rhodesia endorsed this view.²⁷

The Governor continued consultations with European politicians and African members of the Legislative Council throughout 1957 and during early 1958. Throughout this period no attempt was made to consult nationalist leaders. Until March 1958, a mere three weeks before the proposals were presented to the Legislative Council. The meeting, when it did take place, was little more than a formality.

African Reaction

The immediate reaction of Africans to the formation of the Federation was one of disillusionment and resignation. Discredited to some extent by its failure to prevent the Federation, the African National Congress quickly lost much of the attraction and unity of purpose which it possessed before 1953. The movement entered into a period of disintegration and decline, characterized by inconsistent

27 Ibid., para 21.

policies, petty bickering amongst officials, poor relations with the African trade-union movement, and apathy among the African public.²⁸

The African National Congress's difficulties began several months before the Federation's formal implementation in October 1953. For some time there had been disagreement within the party over the methods to be adopted for the final stand against the Federation. The failure of the day of national prayer which Nkumbula had called in April weakened the Congress further by widening the breach with the trade union movement.²⁹

In a meeting in Livingstone on 7 October 1953, Kenneth Kaunda demanded political equality for Africans:

These people (Europeans) must be told that we are no longer babies. We do not hate the colour of a man, but his conduct ... We want the franchise now ... what can we do against people with the mentality of ... Welensky; they are enemies fighting against us; they must be taught it is our country; we are not afraid of guns or atomic bombs ... as long as power remains with the Whites it is a police state and no peace can prevail ... unless and until the foreign power is removed, there can be no peace. We want the franchise and we want it now. 30

The African National Congress's annual conference in August 1953 closed by adopting a policy of "non-cooperation"

28 Mulford, n. 6, p. 36.

29 A.L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester, 1958), p. 162. Epstein's entire chapter, "The National Congress and Local Politics", supports the view that African National Congress disintegrated during the period, both nationally and at the local level on the Copperbelt; see especially pp. 164, 179-82.

30 Rotberg, n. 11, p. 263.

without violence towards any move considered detrimental to African interests".³¹

Within two months after the formation of the Federation, the African National Congress compromised its "non-cooperation" policy by announcing that it would contest the first Federal elections.³² Though the Federation was still deeply opposed by the Africans, the African National Congress's leaders feared that boycotting the elections would lead to the appointment of African "stooges" by the (territorial) Governors. In fact, the African National Congress's decision made little difference. Since Northern Rhodesia's African members in the Federal Assembly were to be elected by the African Representative Council from among its own membership, the African National Congress could only endorse the candidates it preferred. When the Federal elections took place, neither of the African National Congress's candidates was successful, despite threatening handbills distributed by the African National Congress among the African Representative Council's members shortly before the vote. The Council was offended, not only by the handbills, but also by the African National Congress's allegations that the Council was not proper body to elect African representatives to the Federal Assembly; relations between the African National Congress and the Council, formerly good, now began to deteriorate.³³

31 Epstein, n. 29, p. 162.

32 Press communique, 13 October 1953, quoted by Kenneth D. Kaunda, Zambia Shall be Free: An Autobiography (New York, 1963), pp. 56-57.

33 Mulford, n. 6, p. 38.

For the first three years after the Federation, there were some changes in Government's policy regarding colour bar which to Europeans seemed considerable but to the Africans often disappointing. There was no general breakdown of the colour bar in hotels, cinemas and public places.³⁴ The African National Congress sought to keep African resentment alive by seizing on local issues and by encouraging Africans to demand equal rights as a means of testing the official policy of "partnership". The Federation had done little to bridge the gap between the views of the two races in the Protectorates about future constitutional development. The Preamble of the Federation Constitution stated that "the association of the three Territories under His Majesty's sovereignty ... would conduce to the security of advancement, and welfare of all the inhabitants, and in particular would foster partnership and cooperation between their inhabitants".³⁵ In the circumstances, these words rang a little hollow. Post Offices retained separate entrances, hospitals separate services and plants and the railways differential facilities of all kinds. Hotels, stores, and private establishments discriminated. An industrial colour bar effectively prevented Africans from competing with Whites for jobs. Even the Federal civil service remained a White preserve.³⁶

34 Mason, n. 9, pp. 168-9.

35 Cmd. 8754, n. 3, p. 5.

36 Rotberg, n. 11, p. 255.

Though in the early years the African National Congress had become weak, it continued its opposition to the Federation. It urged its followers not to work for European farmers or European owned construction firms in Ndola and Lusaka. It opposed the introduction of a new pass system. It also attempted to close the municipally run beer hall in Lusaka.³⁷ It also sought the Africans' right to secede from the Federation and endeavoured to promote Africans' claims upon an independent future. The nationalists grouped ceaselessly for ways in which to exploit Africans' grievances of the day. Petitions and memorials circulated, boycotts became common, and ad hoc outbreaks of violence testified current of discontent beneath pools of surface calm.³⁸ But neither the British, nor the Federal nor the territorial governments paid serious attention to nationalists.

Both in order to denounce racial discrimination generally and to indicate the strength of their movement, Kaunda, Secretary General and Nkumbula, President of the African National Congress, timed the inauguration of a new boycott to coincide with a visit to Lusaka by Lyttelton.³⁹ In January 1954, the African National Congress organised a boycott of Lusaka butcheries which aimed at ending the discriminatory practice of serving Africans pre-wrapped, often spoiled, meat through a hatch in the wall of the shop. One

37 Ibid., p. 267.

38 Ibid., p. 258.

39 Ibid., p. 265.

forceful speaker reminded the Africans that they had "the same money as Europeans. The money with which we buy meat goes into their banks in the same way as the European money".⁴⁰

Attempts to extend the boycott to the Copperbelt in February, however, were largely unsuccessful. Though Lyttelton had refused to deal with nationalists, the leaders of the Congress now sought political independence with greater determination than ever before.⁴¹

By late 1954 Kaunda, the African National Congress's Secretary-General, realized "that some constructive thinking would have to be done if the Congress were going to hold together".⁴²

Early in 1955, Nkumbula and Kaunda were arrested for possessing copies of a banned publication, Africa and the Colonial World, and sentenced to their first term in prison, two months with hard labour. The police also discovered in their possession sample copies of pamphlets distributed by the British Communist Party, the Berlin Women's International Democratic Federation, and the New York Council of African Affairs.⁴³ Towards the end of the year Kaunda drew up a five-year plan aimed at revitalizing the party.⁴⁴ Kaunda saw the African National Congress's next five years as crucial ones,

40 Quoted in Epstein, n. 29, p. 172.

41 Rotberg, n. 11, p. 266.

42 Kaunda, n. 32, p. 60.

43 Mason, n. 9, p. 114.

44 Kaunda, n. 32, p. 60.

particularly for the fight to prevent the Federation from attaining its intended goal of "dominion status". The fight, as Kaunda saw it then, was not to achieve self-government in Northern Rhodesia but instead to remain a protectorate under the direct control of the Colonial Office until Africans were ready to participate fully in the territory's affairs.⁴⁵

Danti Yamba, one of the two indirectly elected African representatives from Northern Rhodesia, moved "that equal treatment be accorded immediately to all races in all public places within the Federation and that such action be enforced by Federal Legislation". He received ridicule from the Prime Minister Huggins who refused to allow Africans to use "white entrances" to post-offices or to expect impartial service on the railways. Both were federally controlled. Huggins asserted, "It is perfectly obvious, that the system we have ... at ... present ... is the most satisfactory to both sides."⁴⁶ This response aroused African dissatisfaction. Yamba commented that all he had tried to obtain was "a promise by the Federal Government that all races will be given a fair play, but pity the (Prime) Minister went too far out of rail, and instead of trying to catch the African confidence he simply added the insults to the injuries".⁴⁷

Before the year 1955 was out there were signs of a resurgence of the Congress activity in some areas, notably

45 Ibid., p. 65.

46 Ibid.

47 Rotberg, n. 11, p. 255.

the Northern Provinces and the Copperbelt. In Chinsali district, Robert Makasa, the Congress Provincial Chairman, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, who had only then returned from India, John Sokoni, and other leaders of the local Congress encouraged villagers to take "positive action" against the White rule. The Congressmen got the orders of chiefs and district commissioners disobeyed, the official producers' cooperative organization boycotted and even trees uprooted that had been planted to celebrate the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.⁴⁸ Makasa's approach was aimed to split the Native Authorities from Bemba⁴⁹ by denouncing the chiefs as creatures of the Government. In Chinsali District the Provincial Administration took a strong line with the chiefs in an effort to force them to exert their authority against the African National Congress.⁵⁰ Towards the end of 1955, violence on the Copperbelt increased, especially the stoning of houses and cars, blames for which was generally laid on the African National Congress.⁵¹

Industrial disputes flared up on the Copperbelt, and the Congress began to extend its influence over the African trade union movement. In 1955 the African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU) called a strike over the issue of African advancement. During the course of the strike, the African National Congress's leaders played an active part in encouraging the miners to remain out until the mining companies had met their demands.⁵²

48 Ibid., p. 273.

49 Mulford, n. 6, p. 39.

50 Ibid., p. 40.

51 Ibid., p. 42.

52 Ibid., p. 43.

A feature of this burst of strikes, boycotts, statements and demands was a temporary alliance of convenience between Harry Nkumbula and Lawrence Katilungu.⁵³ At a public meeting Lawrence Katilungu praised Nkumbula as a national leader.⁵⁴ In early 1956 it appeared that the trade unions and the African National Congress had begun to work together.

In April 1956, not long after Nkumbula had sent out a virulent circular to all the African National Congress branches which alleged that racial discrimination and the social colour bar were worse in Northern Rhodesia than in South Africa, there was an outbreak of boycotts organised by the African National Congress against European and Asian shops. At first dissension appeared in the African National Congress ranks, and Nkumbula called off the boycotts on 23 April.⁵⁵ In the months of May and June, however, the boycotts were resumed, and this time more effectively and in more centres.⁵⁶

At about the same time the famous "rolling strikes" began on the Copperbelt.⁵⁷ In late June the first of the strikes began, ostensibly over the regulation which required African workers to wear protective leg guards.⁵⁸

53 Katilungu's refusal in 1953 to throw full support of the African unions behind African National Congress's support of the African unions African National Congress's anti-Federation campaign, made Congress leaders his enemies.

54 Mason, n. 9, p. 116.

55 Ibid., pp. 114-15.

56 In addition to most of the major urban centres, boycotts were organised in Fort Jameson, Monze and Kasama.

57 The term was used because no sooner had one strike ended than another began somewhere else; Mason, n. 9, p. 116.

58 Mason, n. 9, p. 116.

Europeans, alarmed by the sudden burst of African aggressiveness, demanded that the Government take action. The European Press remarked on the growing link between the African National Congress and the African Mines Workers Union. The Acting Deputy Labour Commissioner reported that Copperbelt Europeans believed strike action to be an extension of the African National Congress's boycott. As with the boycott, Europeans tended to regard strikes by Africans as "racial and nationalistic in origin, other than due to industrial or economic causes". From the Copperbelt itself, Labour Department Officials reported that Europeans were wondering why the Government had failed thus far to act.⁵⁹

Encouraged by such sentiments, the Government instituted a Crown prosecution in Mufulira against the four African National Congress officials, including the Provincial President and his deputy, for conspiracy to injure the business of European traders. The African National Congress engaged a senior member of the Southern Rhodesia Bar to fight the case.⁶⁰ In the ensuing deliberations the judgement went against the Government; the four accused, amid the jubilation of the African National Congress supporters who had gathered outside the court, were acquitted. Mufulira's decision greatly enhanced the African National Congress's reputation in the eyes of Africans throughout the country, and the Congress leaders, both at that time and years later, tended to regard the victory as one of the great

59 Mulford, n. 6, p. 46.

60 Kaunda, n. 32, p. 75.

milestones in their struggle.⁶¹

By the end of 1956 constitutional issues, both territorial and Federal, began to loom large on the horizon.

On 12 September 1956, the Government declared a State of Emergency on the Copperbelt and 32 of the union leaders were arrested. In November the Secretary of the African National Congress, Kenneth Kaunda, sent to the Colonial Secretary the requests passed in October by the General Conference of the party. He put forward three main requests that the emergency in the Copperbelt should be ended; that Northern Rhodesia should be allowed to secede from the Federation when the Constitution was reviewed; and that British Protected Persons should get the vote and should have equal representation with Europeans in both the Legislature and Executive Councils.⁶²

In January 1957, the emergency was ended in the Copperbelt. The African National Congress survived its period of decline and disillusionment. The most important change in the African National Congress that took place was a shift towards greater militancy in nationalist thinking. A group of young nationalists, whose single minded purpose was to break the Federation by first achieving self-government in Northern Rhodesia was soon to grasp the reins of leadership.⁶³

Despite strong opposition from Kaunda, Justin Chimba and other members of the Executive Committee, Nkumbula

61 Ibid., p. 77.

62 Mason, n. 9, p. 118.

63 Mulford, n. 6, p. 48.

inaugurated a policy of moderation - as he and other
termed the "New Look". He committed the Congress to gradual
reform and compromised his earlier militancy.⁶⁴ His policies
strongly dissatisfied radicals who refused to moderate their
political approach. Gradually they built up branch organiza-
tions and began consolidating the Congress' more militant
elements. The build-up continued until October 1958 when the
split occurred which produced Kaunda's Zambia African National
Congress (ZANC).⁶⁵

64 Rotberg, n. 11, p. 279.

65 Mulford, n. 6, p. 63.

Chapter IV

TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM

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Our analysis in previous chapters shows that the settlers community had been tightening its control over the Federal as well as Territorial Government. African freedom fighters did not take it passively. They had recovered from earlier chaos and organised into a powerful resistance movement. At that time, "the wind of change" was emerging to blow over the continent. It gave a powerful impetus to the Freedom struggle in all the countries of the continent.

The 1958 Benson Constitution was finally passed. It was the first of Britain's complicated "multi-racial" constitutions to be introduced into Central Africa. The main objective of the Constitution was to encourage policies to develop on party lines as opposed to racial lines. Under the Constitution all members of Legislative Council would be elected by common machinery providing for the direct representation of all qualified voters in a geographical constituency.¹

In addition to the fixed and permanent "ordinary" qualifications, "special lower qualifications" were introduced for those Africans who had not yet reached "European standard".² The Africans who qualified as "special" voters were to be transferred to the "ordinary" section if they showed gradual progress.

1 Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, Cmd. 530, September 1958, p. 20.

2 Ibid.

The Legislative Council, which was enlarged from twenty-six to thirty members, was to have twenty-two elected members, six officials, excluding speaker, and two unofficial nominated members. Elected members were to be returned from as follows: twelve from "ordinary" constituencies consisting of urban European areas; six from "special" - dominated rural areas. The two Africans from reserve constituencies covering the same area as the "ordinary" constituencies; and two Europeans from reserve constituencies covering the same area as the "special" constituencies.³

Despite the fact that the Constitution was to encourage the development of "non-racial" politics, it was carefully arranged on racial lines. "Ordinary" and "special" constituencies returned Europeans and Africans respectively. Out of 22 elected members, fourteen members (twelve "ordinary" and two reserved) were to be Europeans, while eight seats (six "special" and two reserved) were to be filled by the Africans.

For the Executive Council it was proposed that the Governor would preside over nine ministers - four official and five other ministers of whom four must had to be "ordinarily qualified" candidates. There would also be two Assistant Ministers, making a total of eleven ministers and Assistant Ministers, of whom not less than two must be Africans, and one of these must be a Minister.

In addition to the complicated voting arrangements and the composition of the Legislative and Executive Councils, an attempt was made to encourage a closer link between the

3 Cmd. 530.

Legislature and the Native Authorities system. "Special" candidates were required to obtain certificates indicating that two-thirds of the recognised chiefs in their respective constituencies did not object to the nomination.⁴ The Africans deeply resented this attempt to strengthen the authority of chiefs by establishing them as "quasi-judges" of suitable African candidates. The Africans for the last time in Northern Rhodesia's history had remarkably little influence on the final settlement. In the end the vast majority of the Africans were to reject it.⁵

All African People's Conference (AAPC) was held at Accra in December 1958. It extended its guarded support for people who were obliged to "retaliate" when they were subjugated by violent means.⁶ This provoked a new note of anxiety in the utterances of the Federation's protagonists. In Lusaka, John Roberts said that the United Federal Party was "very much in favour of establishing a Federal Police Force".⁷ Sir Roy Welensky asserted that the All African People's Conference had inspired the Nyasaland disturbances. Sir Arthur Benson Governor of Northern Rhodesia resolved to discourage the tide of black nationalism with firm hands. It was necessary since elections were due in 1959.

4 Ibid.

5 David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964 (London, 1967), p. 61.

6 Richard Hall, Zambia (London, 1965), p. 188.

7 Ibid.

The Government started registration campaign to bring a rapid increase in "special" voters. But the campaign encountered serious difficulties. Zambia African National Congress's (ZANU) election boycott campaign was gaining influence. Thus the figures at the close of registration were far below the Government targets.

Events moved swiftly. Emergencies were declared in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 26 February 1959.

The rise of militant nationalist parties posed a great threat to the settlers who were fighting the election on the issue of greater independence for the Federation in 1960. Acting under the authority of Emergency Power Ordinance,⁸ the Governor issued the "Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulation, 1959". The Zambia African National Congress was banned on 11 March, nine days before polling, and its prominent leaders including Kenneth Kaunda, Munu Kayambwa Sipalo and Simon Kapwepwe were arrested. The Government hoped that the Zambia African National Congress's boycott threat would die with the ban on the party and that the African voters would flock to the polls. Benson defended the ban on the Zambia African National Congress saying that it had spread uncertainty and fear in the country to prevent registered Africans from voting in the elections. Benson then made his well-known comparison between the Zambia Africa National Congress and Chicago's "organisation of killers", of the 1930s, "Murder Incorporated".

⁸ Northern News, 13 March 1959. Cited in Mulford, n. 5, p. 96.

The 1959 Election

The 1959 election, as in the past thirty-five years, was essentially a contest among Europeans. The outcome was never seriously in doubt. European majorities in both the Legislative and Executive Councils were assured by the Constitution; nor could the United Federal Party's continued dominance be seriously challenged by either the multi-racial Central African Party (C.A.P.) or the right-wing Dominion Party (D.P.). Nevertheless, the election introduced important new developments. For the first time an election was fought largely on party lines. A relatively large number of Africans, admittedly a highly selective group, was voting for the first time. Thus the election set a severe test for its prescribed objective of encouraging the evolution of politics along "non-racial" lines over the next decade.

The United Federal Party (U.F.P.) fielded 18 candidates, the Dominion Party had 10 candidates, and there were 6 from the Central African Party. There were 19 independent candidates, mostly Africans.

The election was held without any serious incident. Voting was heavy among Africans, who recorded an average polling among "special" voters of 85.7 per cent. European apathy, which had marked the entire campaign, held the percentage poll among "ordinary" voters down to 61.2 per cent. The United Federal Party won thirteen of the twenty-two elected seats, eleven "ordinary" and both reserved African seats. The Central African Party secured the two European reserved constituencies and one of the "special" seats.

Nkumbula won Southern-Western for the African National Congress, and the Dominion Party's candidate upset his United Federal Party opponent by a majority of five votes in Southern "Ordinary" constituency. The two remaining "special" constituencies were won by African independents. It made the Legislative Council composition as under:

Legislative Council, March 1959

Composition of Elected Members by Party and by Race

Party	No. of Members	Africans	Europeans
U.F.P. (United Federal Party)	13	2	11
C.A.P. (Central African Party)	3	1	2
A.N.C. (African National Congress)	1	1	-
D.P. (Dominion Party)	1	-	1
Independents	2	2	-
Total	20	6	14

Source: David C. Mulford, The Northern Rhodesia General Election, 1962 (Oxford, 1964), p. 147.

The new Legislative Council met for the first time in April. Though Sir John Moffat and Harry Franklin hinted at the need to appreciate the extent of the African grievances and to remove them, the Legislative Council gave general approval to Governor's action banning the Zambia African National Congress and detaining its leaders.

In July 1959, just as the publicity given to the March disturbances and arrests was dying down, another thunderbolt hit the Federation. It was a thunderbolt - the conservatives own making - the report of the Commission, led by Justice Devlin.⁹ The Commission had enquired into the Nyasaland disturbances and their causes. The Commission observed that the protectorate was a "police state" and that the African opposition to the Federation was almost universal. It was severe indictment which could not but relate also to the Rhodesias.

The Devlin Report encouraged the view that the Federation might be better off without Nyasaland. But this would make the African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia impossible to contain. For this reason, Welensky was insistent in the final months of 1959 that the Advisory Commission being set up to survey the Federation before the Review Conference should have clearly defined its terms of reference. If the Advisory Commission was allowed to consider the possibility of any territory opting out, the Federation was on the road to disintegration. He also stood on the widely held view that Britain had no legal power¹⁰ to change unilaterally the Federal structure.

Monckton Commission was formed to review the constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Nineteen of the twenty-six members were Whites, rest were several of the

9 Report on the Nyasaland Commission of Enquiry, July 1959, Cmd. 814.

10 A.J. Hanna, The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (London, 1964), p. 268.

Central African representatives who were known Federationalists, and even some of the British elements which appeared unsympathetic to the African cause. The Africans boycotted it.

After the formation of the Commission, Macmillan flew off to Africa, on a tour which took him through Nigeria, Ghana, the Federation and the South Africa. It was in Capetown on 3 February 1960 that he said: "The most striking of all the impressions, I have formed since I left London a month ago, is of the strength of African national consciousness. The wind of change is blowing through the continent ... our national policies must take account of it."¹¹

There was a sharp and unfavourable reaction from the European communities to the British Prime Minister's statement. The above statement dispelled all hopes that the Federation would attain independence as an effective White-dominated state.

It was further confirmed by the Monckton Report which was released in October 1960. The report declared that in the northern territories the opposition to the Federation was "widespread, sincere and of long standing". The Report conceded that racial partnership and discrimination was rampant in the Federation. It added that the Federation in its present form could be maintained only by force. The majority in the Commission thought that there should be racial parity in the Federal Assembly and an African majority in Northern Rhodesia. The report was full of warnings that events in Africa were moving like an avalanche, and "those who merely cling to their familiar

11 Hall, n. 6, p. 190.

positions will be swept away¹².

The Monckton Report had almost imposed the death sentence on the Federation. It only remained to discover when and how judgement would be executed.

Constitutional question had returned to the forefront of Northern Rhodesian politics. On 28 September Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced a constitutional conference for Northern Rhodesia after Federal Review early in 1961. The nationalist leaders of all the three territories had threatened to boycott the Federal Review unless and until both Southern and Northern Rhodesia's constitutional conferences had been concluded. The British Government agreed to move forward the opening date for the two territorial conferences from January 1961 to 14 December 1960. The three nationalist leaders Kenneth Kaunda, Joshua Nkomo and Banda agreed to attend the Federal Review.

Northern Rhodesia's 1962 Constitution evolved in three stages. The first began in December 1960 with the Federal Review and London Constitutional Conference, ending with the Colonial Secretary's proposals of February 1961. The second, February-June 1961, including the Governor's consultations with the Territory's various political groups in Lusaka and concluded with the Colonial Secretary's presentation of June proposals. The third stage, after serious disturbances had occurred in Northern Rhodesia. The British Government reconsidered the June proposals

12 Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmd. 1143.

and announced final changes on 1 March 1962.

A constitutional conference on Northern Rhodesia was convened at Lancaster House, London, on 19 December 1960. In February 1961, the Secretary of State for Colonies, Macleod brought his proposals for some changes in Northern Rhodesia's constitution. It proposed that there should be a substantial increase in the number of the Africans in the Legislature by non-racial approach and by qualified franchise. He also wished to consider the proposals for a Bill of Rights and a Council of State which had been put forward in the Monckton Report to safeguard the rights of the minority community. He asked for the special arrangements to give the chiefs some special place in the Central Councils of the Government.

Macleod's proposals called for a Legislative Council of forty-five members. Among the elected members, fifteen would be returned from single-member constituencies, by upper roll voters, fifteen from single-member constituencies by lower roll voters and fifteen from National constituencies by both rolls voting together. Candidates in National constituencies would be required to qualify for election by obtaining the same prescribed minimum percentage of the votes cast on each roll. ¹³

Though there was a big concession to the settlers, the United Federal Party representatives challenged the view that there was any justification either for a substantial increase in the number of the Africans in the Legislative Council, or

¹³ Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, Cmd. 1295 (1961).

for an extension of the franchise. They favoured continuation of the policy giving greater representation of the African opinion by associating the chiefs more closely with the Central Government. They stood by the principle underlying the 1958 constitution, the most important of which were that individual merit must be the criterion for political and economic advancement. They demanded responsible government based on the franchise and electoral arrangements laid down in the 1958 constitution.¹⁴

The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, bitterly opposed Macleod's proposals, for in them he saw the very real possibilities of an African majority in Northern Rhodesia and the far-reaching consequences of such a development to both, to Southern Rhodesia and to the future of the Federation. He totally rejected the proposals pleading that the Federal Government had not been adequately consulted.

In June 1961, Macleod amended his February proposals. There was little variation from the proposals on February 1961, except as regards the national seats. Here the changes were crucial as the candidates were required to obtain 12½ per cent (or 400 votes) of the votes cast by both races.¹⁵ Thus it gave advantage to European parties.

The Africans condemned June proposals as "betrayal" by the British Government. As a result of the Africans dissatisfaction serious disturbances started erupting in Northern

14 Ibid., pp. 4-6.

15 Northern Rhodesia: Proposals for Constitutional Change, Cmd. 1423, June 1961.

Rhodesia in early August. Macleod was forced to provide further amendments on June proposals.

In September 1961 the British Government announced that it was reopening discussions on the Northern Rhodesia constitution. This announcement enraged and baffled the Federationists. On 14 September, Welensky expressed settlers mood in the Federal Assembly "when the signs first appeared I was hesitant to believe that the British Government could contemplate a retreat in the face of violence - after all we have had numerous assurances from the Secretary of State that violence does not pay."¹⁶

Compared with the events of late February, the Colonial Secretary's announcement of the British Government's final plan on 1 March 1962, seemed something of an anti-climax. Secretary of State for Colonies, Reginald Maudling's only change was in the prescribed minimum percentage arrangements for the election of National members. The contentious requirement, which had stipulated that National candidates must secure 12½ per cent or 400 votes (whichever was less) of the votes cast by each race, was adjusted to a single figure of 10 per cent of the votes cast by each race.¹⁷ The change, though small, had important consequences for Northern Rhodesia.

European Politics

The final version of Macleod constitution broke the year old stalemate. The general election was set for October

16 Quoted in Hall, n. 6, p. 211.

17 Mulford, n. 5, p. 210.

1962. The constitution's electoral arrangements presented political parties a dual challenge. The first was to mobilize traditional supporters to win upper and lower roll. In order to win National seats, parties were forced to appeal to racial and political opponents.

The United Federal Party began to address itself to the problem of attracting African support. Welensky adopted a somewhat more accommodating attitude. For National seats he started thinking of alliance with the African National Congress. In November the United Federal Party organised the Northern Rhodesia Build-A-Nation (B.A.N.) campaign to gain the African support. But it was a failure and within a few months the Build-A-Nation campaign had closed its offices.

1962 Election

The United Federal Party campaign leaflets campaigned on one theme: "United National Independence Party was a party of criminals", who, in the words of Welensky, "wanted to replace the security of Federation with some unholy alliance dreamed up by Pan-Africanism". A European who voted for the United National Independence Party was a traitor.¹⁸ While the United Federal Party was condemning one nationalist party, it was at the same time building up another. The Congress was promoted as a "moderate" organisation and non-violent ally.¹⁹

United Federal Party-African National Congress alliance came into open since nomination day. In several National

18 Ibid., pp. 115-19.

19 Hall, n. 6, p. 219.

constituencies each party nominated only one candidate and instructed its respective supporters to cast the second of their two National votes for the "allied party's" candidate. The chief objective of the alliance was the defeat of the United National Independence Party. To this end United Federal Party and African National Congress were prepared to co-operate, despite their diametrically opposed policies and traditions.

The alliance with African National Congress enabled the United Federal Party to concentrate its campaign almost exclusively on upper roll voters. They at the same time prepared Whites to vote for African National Congress candidates in several National constituencies.

The United Federal Party saved its major effort for the campaign's final ten days. Welensky entered Northern Rhodesia for a whirlwind tour of the Territory's major towns and warned the Europeans against voting for the United National Independence Party. Welensky's dynamic presence and skilful oratory completed the closing of European ranks. Almost overnight Europeans seemed to have come to one mind in their fear of the United National Independence Party and their renewed confidence in the United Federal Party.

Thus, at the end of the National campaign, Europeans and Africans appeared as fundamentally divided as ever. The United National Independence Party's European campaign had failed in the final week.

As the results of the voting came in, three main facts were apparent: the polarisation of the races was much more absolute than anyone had expected, no party had won a clear

majority of seats, and the Liberals had been obliterated. On the African lower roll, United National Independence Party gained 78 per cent of the votes and 12 seats, while African National Congress had 21 per cent of the votes and 3 seats. On the Upper roll, where almost four-fifths were Whites and the rest higher-income Africans, the United Federal Party had obtained 70 per cent of the votes and 13 seats, while United National Independence Party collected 20 per cent and 1 seat (in a rural constituency with a predominance of the African voters).

In the national constituencies, four United Federal Party-African National Congress candidates were successful, giving both parties two more members. On the other hand, the United National Independence Party candidates in the national seats were utterly crushed, obtaining almost all of the African votes and a handful of European. The final tally of the parties was: United Federal Party 15, African National Congress 5, and United National Independence Party 14 (including the special Asian-Burafrican seat).

Legislative CouncilRacial and Party Composition of Elected Members following
the General Election

	UNIP	UFP	ANC	TOTAL
Europeans	-	13	1	14
Africans	12	2	4	18
Asians	1	-	-	1
Euro-Africans	1	-	-	1
State of Parties	14	15	5	34

Source: Mulford, n. 5, p. 286.

In the by-election held soon afterwards in an effort to fill some more of the national seats, the "pact" worked again to raise the United Federal Party total to 16 and African National Congress to 7.

Racial and Party Composition of
Elected Members

	UNIP	UFP	ANC	TOTAL
Europeans	-	15	2	17
Africans	12	1	5	18
Asians	1	-	-	1
Euro-Africans	1	-	-	1
State of Parties	14	16	7	37

Source: Ibid., p. 296.

Thus, the constitution had failed to achieve the "non-racial" political approach, explicitly encouraged by its design. Election results in the National constituencies clearly indicated that while Europeans and Africans voted for each other's candidates, both had refused to support those candidates who genuinely represented the opposite race. A vote for the United National Independence Party candidates of either race was a vote for the African Government, while support for the United Federal Party expressed a preference for White Government and the continuation of the Federation.

The Constitution had failed to produce a conclusive election result. Both the African parties held power, each regarding itself as Northern Rhodesia's legitimate nationalist movement. The United National Independence Party, with approximately 60 per cent of the total vote and 37 per cent of the Legislative Council's seats, had been forced to share ministerial posts equally with the African National Congress, which had won a mere 16 per cent of the total vote and controlled only 19 per cent of the legislature's membership. The United Federal Party, Territory's only significant political force and still the party with the largest single bloc of seats, found itself suddenly stripped of power. The stage was set for a stormy interlude of interparty rivalry and intrigue, which could only deepen as the next and final round of constitutional negotiations began.

African Politics

The final announcement of the Benson constitution in September 1958, brought two African nationalist parties into

direct and bitter conflicts. The African National Congress accepting the constitution and contesting the election, Zambia African National Congress boycotting the elections and dedicating itself to the total destruction of the constitution.

With the split less than two months old, both Kaunda and Nkumbula departed for Ghana to attend All-African Peoples Conference, Nkumbula gave the impression of a moderate leader and returned to Northern Rhodesia shortly after the All African People's Conference was over. Kaunda remained there for another month. In a fifteen page memorandum he set out the African case against both the Federation and the Benson constitution. Kaunda succeeded personally in winning President Kwame Nkrumah's esteem, which helped him.

After the Accra Conference (All-African People's Conference) Kaunda refused to rest until he had removed the Union Jack from Northern Rhodesia. "Whatever the consequence", he told his followers in Lusaka, "we are prepared to pay the price of freedom in this country". If the government banned the Zambia Congress, "as I hear they intend doing", he promised that Africans would continue the struggle. "Zambia may be banned, public meetings may be banned, but the spirit of Zambia will march on until independence is obtained". His followers took up the similar themes. They exhorted the Africans to "begin to hate anything white which had two legs". In Chingola, Munukayumbwa Sipalo repeated the reasons for Africans anxiety: "We must have self-government, and a democratic constitution now in Northern Rhodesia. We must get it before 1960 or face

the prospect of Dominion status, and that means perpetual subjugation to the British."²⁰

The Accra Conference (All-African People's Conference) in December 1958 certainly exhilarated the Central Africans among the 300 delegates. Kenneth Kaunda mounted the rostrum and shouted "Freedom. Freedom". It also produced a new unity of purpose between the nationalist leaders. Any hope of an accommodation between Welensky and the Africans had vanished with the failure of his belated "meet the people" tours through the northern territories. The Africans were determined to come to grips with Welensky before the Federal Review conference.²¹

The Zambia African National Congress declared boycott of the elections. Nkumbula, the leader of the African National Congress himself stood as a candidate. Zambia African National Congress's intention of boycotting the elections complicated the security situation. To prevent it the Government tightened the security measures. Zambia African National Congress was banned and its prominent leaders were arrested.

Election was held without serious incident. It produced two developments of fundamental importance for the future of Northern Rhodesia politics.

The first was the failure of the Benson Constitution, despite the large turnout of the African voters on polling day. The second was the dramatic rise of Zambia African National

20 Quoted in Robert I. Rotberg, The Rise of African Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 293.

21 Hall, n. 6, pp. 185-6.

Congress and the whole question of the Government's repressive actions against the party. A wave of the African discontent swept the country. The African National Congress expressed bitter disappointment at the disproportionate influence of "ordinary" votes in constituencies returning the Africans. It alleged that the election had been "rigged" by an unfair constitution. Lawrence Katilungu, too, was bitterly angry about his defeat in the Copperbelt seat. The Africans felt the powerlessness of their votes against the European vote.²²

At the African National Congress's first National Assembly after the election Nkumbula condemned the policy of moderation. He said the British Government regarded it as a sign of weakness. The Assembly drew up a petition to the Colonial Secretary which denounced the constitution as a fraud.²³

The Government's action against Zambia African National Congress b^lowed it with an element of martyrdom and exposed Government's planned attempt to destroy major nationalist parties in Central Africa. It was clear that London, Salisbury and Lusaka all cooperated closely in the execution of this highly controversial and complicated action of banning Zambia African National Congress in order to ensure the future survival of the Federation. Despite the ban on Zambia African National Congress, the Government was unable to crush the party completely.

The African political awareness was quickly increased. The African trade union movement edged farther into political areas. Katilungu still bitter about his defeat in the March

22 Mulford, n. 5, p. 99.

23 Ibid., p. 100.

election, spoke out strongly against the colour bar. He also re-established friendly relations with Nkumbula. A series of meetings between the two leaders in May led to an agreement to intensify militant political activity on the basis of co-operation between political and trade-union organization. Nkumbula emphasized the need for unity between the African National Congress and the African Mines Workers Union, predicting that strikes and boycotts would begin soon. In short, quest for the African unity had begun.

Internal dissension reappeared in the African National Congress's Provincial Conference in Lusaka on 9 June 1959 produced a lengthy list of resolutions covering a wide range of national and local issues, including boycotts. In addition to the usual demands for self-government and Northern Rhodesia's secession from the Federation, several resolutions were directed against the local Indian community. They demanded that Indian bus inspectors employed by Central African Road Services (CARS) be replaced by the Africans. Nkumbula condemned the proposed boycotts on the ground that there should be no job reservation on racial lines. This angered his colleagues and provoked the first serious move against him since 1958. The movement against Nkumbula was gathering momentum. An action group meeting on 4 July in Lusaka, probably staged by Mukupo who now believed the African unity under Nkumbula's leadership to be impossible, called for Nkumbula's resignation. Two days later the African National Congress Titus Mukupo discussed with Paul Kalichini the possibility of unifying all the African groups. The African National Congress, the African National Independence

Party and the remnants of Zambia African National Congress were joined by still another splinter group in late May, the United National Freedom Party (UNFP), which was formed by Dixon Konkola. The first signs of a revival of Zambia African National Congress under another name came in June 1959, the African National Independence Party and United National Freedom Party merged to form the United National Independence Party (UNIP) under the leadership of Paul Kalichini, the vice president of Zambia African National Congress who had been released in June. By November 1959 United National Independence Party had become sufficiently established force to reckon with. Kaunda was released from prison on 9 January 1960. On 31 January he was elected president of the United National Independence Party.

Freedom! All I am asking of Africans of Northern Rhodesia is that they should remain calm and patient; and should prepare themselves for the real non-violent struggle that lies ahead. The Zambia African Congress was banned, but there is no power to ban our desire to be free, to shape our own destiny. In this struggle for freedom, we will tell the present rulers to realize that the colour of a man should not count; what should count is behaviour....

I am determined more than ever before to achieve self-government for Africans in this country. Detentions, imprisonments and rural area restrictions will only delay, but will not stop us from reaching that goal, which should be reached this year, 1960. 24

At this crucial time when the United National Independence Party wanted to organise a mass party and extend its influence, "Monckton Commission" provided an immediate

24 Kenneth D. Kaunda, Zambia Shall Be Free: An Autobiography (New York, 1962), pp. 138-9.

focal point for widespread political agitation. They associated the Commission with maintenance of the Federation. The United National Independence Party boycotted the Commission. Boycott proved highly successful.

The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's statement "that the 'wind of change' is blowing in the African continent" had boosted the morale of nationalists. Kaunda and Nkumbula met Macmillan in Lusaka and reiterated their stand that they were unshakably opposed to the Federation.

Soon after the departure of the Monckton Commission, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Iain Macleod, visited Northern Rhodesia on his way to Nyasaland where constitutional discussions were being held. He made it clear that there were no plans to amend the Northern Rhodesia constitution. United Federal Party's John Roberts was heartened by Macleod's assurance. The prospects of the United National Independence Party's constitutional objectives in Northern Rhodesia looked bleak. The African frustration increased. The United National Independence Party strengthened itself and political agitation spread. Disturbances broke out at a number of African schools during March 1960. The Government gave attention to the Societies Ordinance and intensified their campaign to register new United National Independence Party branches to collect information about existing branches and their office bearers.

The most serious incident occurred on 8 May at Ndola where a mob of the Africans attacked a White house-wife, Mrs Lillian Burton. As a result of "Burton tragedy", the Governor acting under the Preservation of Public Security

Ordinance, banned the United National Independence Party in Western Province.

On 28 September 1960, Macleod announced that constitutional changes were planned for Northern Rhodesia; a conference would be held in December, concurrently with the Federal Review.

The announcement was a landmark in Zambia history. For the first time, the African pressure had scored a political victory over the settlers population. This announcement consolidated Kaunda's leadership of United National Independence Party.²⁵

In the informal and confidential talks with Macleod the African leaders demanded African majorities in both the Legislative and Executive Councils and an electoral system based on the principle of universal adult suffrage.²⁶ In February 1962, Macleod presented his controversial 15-15-15 plan for Northern Rhodesia. The African delegates refused to accept it. They claimed that they were incomplete and failed to reveal essential details on voting arrangements and racial composition of the legislature. The Africans condemned it because they were convinced that eventually they would be denied majority rule.

In June proposals for constitutional changes, the arrangements for the election of National seats were altered. To win it, a candidate was now required 12½ per cent or 400 votes cast by each race in the election. The Africans

25 Hall, n. 6, p. 199.

26 Cmd. 1295, pp. 4-6.

condemned it as "betrayal" by the British Government which under pressure from Welensky had sought to appease the forces of White supremacy in Central Africa.²⁷ The United Federal Party National candidate would find it easier to fulfil prescribed minimum requirement on the African side.

Speaking to the conference's 4,000 delegates amidst shouts of "Action Now" and "Kawacha", Kaunda launched into an impassioned attack on the British and Federal Governments.

They (the British Government) have sold us down the cold river of White supremacy... They are treating us like pieces of dirt... We are being sacrificed on the altar of foreign politics. They gave to Welensky in order to save White-heads referendum which means saving Welensky himself and, therefore, saving the Federation at the expense of our political advancement, the very thing successive colonial secretaries have assured us would not happen.

The battle still remains the same. It is not anti-White, but anti-wrong. We have many friends among men of all races. We shall not fight against White racialists and at the same time be racialistic ourselves.

I have repeatedly asked the people of Northern Rhodesia to be patient and non-violent in thought, word and deed. But I have recently had to remove one of these noble words from my vocabulary. It is 'patience'. Welensky refused to be patient and he got what he wanted. We who were patient have been neglected. 28

After the United National Independence Party's Mulungushi Conference incidents of mass boycotts, minor disorders began. The first disorder came in the middle of

27 Northern News, 28 June 1961. See in Mulford, n. 5, p. 197.

28 Kaunda, n. 24, pp. 158-9.

July, with beerhall boycotts and crude attempts at sabotage by the United National Independence Party Youth League on the Copperbelt. In the Luapula Province, several bridges were destroyed. Early in August, sabotage developed with an attempt to blow up a bridge on the Ndola-Kitwe road, with the cutting down of telephone wires and outbreaks of arson on the government property. Thousands of trees were cut down to block roads, bridges were burnt and government buildings such as schools and transport workshops were destroyed. The people deserted their villages and marched chanting the United National Independence Party slogans. The government responded to this challenge by sending police followed hotfoot by army to riot-affected areas. The United National Independence Party was banned in Northern and Luapula provinces.²⁹

The disturbances stopped when Macleod announced his willingness to consider further representations on the proposed constitution. This decision could be regarded as nothing less than a clear United National Independence Party victory. In dealing with the British Government, organized violence appeared to pay handsome dividends.

The British Government reconsidered the June proposals and announced final changes on 1 March 1962. The minimum percentage requirement for the election of National members was adjusted to 10 per cent of the votes cast by each race. With this the most decisive constitutional negotiations in the Territory's history was over.

²⁹ Hall, n. 6, p. 209.

The United National Independence Party accepted the final proposals and agreed to participate in the election. Its main task was to mobilize traditional supports and also to attract European support to win National seat. But there was no change in its policies to please the Whites. The United National Independence Party remained rigidly opposed to the Federation and firmly committed to its complete destruction. The demands for universal adult suffrage, a government, fully representative of the African people and the grant of independence remained unchanged.

Nkumbula was released from prison in January 1962. The political situation was radically different. He resumed leadership of a party which, in European eyes, had become increasingly moderate and responsible. He was not in a position to challenge the United National Independence Party among the Africans. Alliance with United Federal Party seemed the only alternative.

The formal election campaign got momentum after the nomination day on 9 October. The United National Independence Party had three themes for national campaign: the first was a direct appeal to make a new and prosperous Northern Rhodesia. The second was the party's attempt to explain itself. The United National Independence Party issued a sixty-page booklet with detailed statements of the party's position. The British Government's disregard for African opposition to the Federation;

30 United National Independence Party's Policy,
released on 15 June 1962. See Mulford, n. 5,
p. 240.

the complete failure of partnership; the sacrifice of Northern Rhodesia's interest and wealth to Southern Rhodesia; and the long struggle of Kaunda and his colleagues against minority rule and Federal domination; were brought skilfully to the attention of Europeans. The third major theme was to attack United Federal Party-African National Congress alliance, which since nomination day had come into open. Kaunda condemned both parties for consummating a marriage of pure convenience in which neither partner held any thing in common but the desire for power and the wish to destroy the United National Independence Party.

In lower roll the United National Independence Party had no difficulty to mobilize African supporters. Except Southern rural, which was a strong hold of the African National Congress, the United National Independence Party had counted its triumph in all other lower roll constituencies. The impact of the United National Independence Party's European campaign was difficult to assess before polling.

The 1962 election results showed that voting had been purely racial. The United National Independence Party convincingly demonstrated its dominance among the African voters. The United National Independence Party's portion of the upper roll vote (19.75 per cent) corresponded approximately to the proportion of the Africans on the upper roll. On the lower roll the United National Independence Party defeated the African National Congress overwhelmingly. Nearly two-thirds of African National Congress's support was confined to Southern Province. Apart from Southern Province, the

United National Independence Party clearly controlled the entire country. The African National Congress-United Federal Party alliance alienated the African National Congress from its traditional support. A crucial time for the African National Congress, Nkumbula did not know which way to turn whether to join the United National Independence Party and restore its image as African nationalist party or to remain with the United Federal Party. The by-elections in the National constituencies were set for 10 December. Thus, to Nkumbula the path ahead, though fraught with subtle dangers, seemed obvious. He had first to play for time, continually stressing the African National Congress's crucial middle position. He had to maintain the United Federal Party electoral alliance. Though in the by-election campaign the African National Congress came close to the United National Independence Party but formal alliance with it was postponed till 10 December, the by-election day.

Though in the by-election, the African National Congress secured two additional National seats yet just after the final by-election results Nkumbula announced coalition with the United National Independence Party. The United National Independence Party acceded to Nkumbula's demand for three portfolios and the Governor announced the formation of Northern Rhodesia's first African Government.

The African Coalition

In one sense the 1962 constitution held ^{to} in the territory's first African Government, on the other hand it failed to produce a conclusive election result. Both the African parties held power, each regarding itself as Northern

Rhodesia's legitimate national movement. The United National Independence Party with approximately 60 per cent of the total votes and 37 per cent of the Legislative Council's seats, had been forced to share ministerial posts equally with the African National Congress, which had won a mere 16 per cent of the legislature's membership. The United Federal Party found itself suddenly out of power. The stage was set for a stormy interlude of interparty rivalry, which could only deepen as the next and final round of constitutional negotiations approached. It was hardly surprising under these conditions that the United National Independence Party-African National Congress coalition produced neither stable nor productive government. Nkumbula repeatedly threatened to resign and there were rumours that he might once again join up with Roberts.

By the mid of the year, Nkumbula had problem holding his own party together. A faction led by Job Michello broke to form the People's Democratic Congress (PDC).

The rivalry and instability among the politicians was reflected among the people. Constant fighting took place in the Copperbelt towns during the first half of 1963. A commission of enquiry was appointed. It reported in August. The principal recommendation of the commission was that there should be a new constitution as soon as possible and that the general election date should be announced quickly.

Kaunda welcomed the commission's recommendations. He had pressed for an election before the end of 1963. Nkumbula and Roberts wanted to delay election until May 1964. The British Government announced in early September that the

general election would be held in January and the registration of voters was to begin immediately. Welensky resisted but he was alone, for the United Federal Party had been ousted from power in all three territories of the Federation. He accused that Britain had dishonoured her solemn pledge to support the Federation rather than tear it apart.

Barotseland question was to be settled before the new constitution could be introduced. Though Barotseland was opened to political parties before 1962, Litunga refused to compromise the Protectorate's special political position. The British Government wanted it to integrate into Northern Rhodesia and suggested political reforms which would produce a more representative Government in Barotseland.

The Government's first step was to reform the Barotse National Council to include twenty-five elected members. The election was set for late July. In the election the United National Independence Party candidates won in all the twenty-five seats, seven of them unopposed.

The 1964 Constitution :

The British Government proceeded with plans for the new constitution, the broad features of which were known by the end of September. It was revealed that a general election would be held on 20 and 21 January 1964, under a constitution based on universal adult suffrage. The Legislative Assembly was to be expanded to seventy-five members, of whom sixty-five were to be elected in main roll constituencies by the African voters and ten in reserved roll constituencies by European

voters. The Executive Council was replaced by a Cabinet consisting of a Prime Minister and not more than thirteen ministers with portfolios. The Bill of Rights was also provided for the protection of minority rights.

1964 Election :

With the introduction of universal adult suffrage there was never much doubt about the outcome of Northern Rhodesia's pre-independence election. The United National Independence Party was the only organised territorial party. The African National Congress and its recent offspring, the *People's Democratic Congress* (PDC) were both highly disorganised and were facing serious financial problems. They wanted to get the elections postponed. But the British Government had rejected their demand. Registration proceeded on schedule during the two-week period - 22 September to 6 October.

During November the Delimitation Commission divided Northern Rhodesia into sixty-five main roll and ten reserved roll constituencies.

The African National Congress's situation was desperate. Before the nomination day both the African National Congress and the *People's Democratic Congress* merged once again. When the nomination closed, the United National Independence Party nominees remained unopposed in twenty four main roll seats.

The election results were never doubted. The United National Independence Party had both mobilised and controlled its overwhelming African following in the country. The United National Independence Party secured fifty-five of the sixty five

seats on the main roll. The African National Congress secured ten seats, which represented something of a setback to the United National Independence Party, which had organised a major campaign effort in the African National Congress areas.

As soon as the United National Independence Party's majority was confirmed, Northern Rhodesia's Governor invited Kaunda, as the country's first Prime Minister, to form his new Government. Thus Northern Rhodesia's first African party Government was sworn into office. Kaunda selected 24 October 1964 as the day for Zambia's independence for it marked not only the nineteenth anniversary of the United Nations, but also the date on which six years earlier Kaunda had led his followers from the African National Congress to Zambia African National Congress.

Chapter V

CONCLUSION

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Due to the vastness of the continent and diverse historical background African nationalism took many forms. Its motley character at different times and places provoked a plethora of opinions. The most popular view, vindicated in the course of this research, regards African nationalism as a movement for national liberation and a reaction to European colonialism.

In the beginning the identity of "blackness" racially, of being "African" became the hallmark of African nationalism. A sentiment of "oneness" was sought to be created in Africa. The path towards African unity became the tenor of African nationalist movements.

Since the demand of racial equality involved complete reordering of human society - egalitarianism represented the core of African nationalism. Since Africans were seldom given an equal treatment by the colonialists, political independence almost synchronised with a social revolution. Colour-bar eclipsed territorial, linguistic and cultural barriers. Political power in African view primarily meant the end of pattern of racial discrimination.

During the years between the two world wars, Africans sought in every conceivable constitutional way to better the political, social, economic order but success was limited. The events during World War II turned the tide in favour of African nationalism. The service rendered by African soldiers in the Allied armed forces and several other factors coaxed the colonial

governments who thereafter tried to introduce a number of reforms. African political leaders were still dissatisfied because they wanted not to share the cake but to have it.

Mass parties emerged in the final phase of colonial rule. Even before these parties accrued any experience of organising large scale political movements, extension of franchise literally swept them into power. These powers were dominated by an "indefinable" category of lower middle class people; not by elitist strata, as the British had expected. Nationalism in Zambia was also analogous to African nationalism in general.

The European settlers who were politically conscious from the beginning made presentation to the colonial office and tried for union with South Africa but failed. They, then, turned to the North for union of Rhodesias. The British Government was not sympathetic to them. Britain was genuinely concerned to develop a large multi-racial community not only as a bastion of goodness and moderation against the harsh racial policies of South Africa. Thus she could magnanimously withdraw her responsibility from Central Africa and yet maintain its monopoly over the region.

British South Africa Company administrated Northern Rhodesia until 1924 when Charter Administration was replaced by Crown Administration. In 1930, Labour Government in Britain declared itself in favour of finding a place for Africans in the administration of their countries. It was known as the policy of "paramountcy of native interests". But a government appointed

Committee denounced the policy as irrelevant pleading that there was no native question in Northern Rhodesia.

Taking advantage of the responsive Administration, the settlers obtained their entry at all the three levels of the Administration and achieved a major say in the financial administration of the territory. Now the settlers were more forceful in demanding the closer association. As a result of several parleys, it was decided to recommend to His Majesty the appointment of Bledisloe Commission. The Commission, agreeing to regard amalgamation as the ultimate objective, however, did not favour its immediate implementation.

Discontent amongst the people of the native Northern Rhodesia, ad interim, continued to simmer. It also burst out in many forms, at various stages and helped the emergence of nationalism. Where healthy protest failed to bring about any appreciable results, the conquered people cloaked their rejection of colonialism in religious garb. "Watch Tower" movement was one such movement, popularity of which in tribal areas became a source of concern to the Administration. Such movements were, however, overshadowed by the "educated" Africans' movements. These Africans formed several Native Welfare Associations and protested against social inequalities. While the "educated" Africans were at loggerheads with the Administration, they worked for unity among themselves to meet the challenge thrown by the settlers. They maintained consistent opposition to the Federation.

Introduction of a higher poll tax, on 20 May 1935, triggered off strike at Mufulira which soon spread to other

mining towns. But a display of force crushed the strike. The Administration appointed the Russel Commission to inquire into the disturbances. The Commission severely indicted the Administration in its report and listed out various causes for these disturbances. The Administration, instead of diluting African discontent started strengthening its defences and supplemented manpower available for administrative duties.

The steady deterioration in race relations came to light by the 1940 disturbances. This violence forced the Administration to take steps. It tried to hoodwink the Africans by setting up a territorial body called the African Representative Council. The "educated" Africans fathomed the intelligent move and formed their own political party. Soon this party gave way to an organised political party namely the African National Congress (ANC) in 1948. Within two years, the mass protest movements which the African National Congress launched against the Federation brought a complete change in the politics and turned out to be a mass struggle by all sections of Africans.

The leaders of the Whites, Sir Geoffrey Huggins in the South and Sir Roy Welensky in the North, continued to voice their support for amalgamation. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Central African Council held a meeting in 1951. The official report set out the urgent need for closer association. The representatives of four governments met at the Victorial Falls and endorsed the principle of Federation. A final conference met in London during January 1953 to consider Draft Federal Scheme. No African attended the

conference. The Federal proposals were submitted to all the three concerned governments which passed them jubilantly.

Thus Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was born. The Africans declared its creation as another step in the direction of establishing a White oligarchy. European settlers in the three constituent states welcomed the Federation. They wanted to further tighten their control. But by this time, African nationalism was also sufficiently strengthened to meet the political strength acquired by the European settlers.

With the achievement of Federation Northern Rhodesia's Europeans expected a major constitutional advance at the territorial level in early 1954. The Colonial Office, having demonstrated its confidence in Central Africa's Whites by supporting the Federation, was hardly in a position to refuse some measures of constitutional advance. The position of the settlers was considerably strengthened, first, by the convention agreed to in 1948 that the Governor would not overrule the unanimous advice of elected unofficials, and later (1949) by the provision of portfolios for two elected unofficials in the Executive Council. The unofficial elected European members in Northern Rhodesia, though they could be overruled by the Secretary of State, commanded sufficient influence to keep for another five years a system of voting which effectively excluded all but about ten Africans.

In the circumstances the policy of "partnership" in no way served the policy of "paramountcy of African interests". The leaders of the European settlers abundantly demonstrated

from the beginning their contempt for African sensitivities and aspirations. Although none could admit it officially, "partnership" was dead. Gore Browne, who understood the nature of African discontent, publicly decried the "partnership" as a fraud.

As a result of the storm his anti-"partnership" viewpoint aroused, Gore Browne resigned from the Chairmanship of the Unofficials' Association. This led to the election of Welensky in his stead and further boosting of White aspirations. The European settlers now sought for "dominion status" for the Federation.

Whites got further strength after Welensky became Federal Prime Minister in November 1956. On 26 April 1957 the extent of agreement between Welensky and Commonwealth Relations Office became public. In May, the Federal Government introduced two highly controversial Bills - the combined effect of which was to devalue African representation in the Federal Assembly.

Early in 1957, Governor of Northern Rhodesia Benson initiated consultations on a new constitution, later known as Benson Constitution. In the course of subsequent discussions various proposals and plans were put forward. They ranged over a broad spectrum. The Governor continued his consultation with European politicians and African members of the Legislative Council throughout 1957 and early 1958. No attempt was made to consult nationalist leaders until March 1958, a mere three weeks before when the proposals were presented to the Legislative

Council. The meeting when it did take place, was little more than a formality.

The failure to stall formation of the Federation came as a prostrating blow to the African National Congress, which quickly lost much of the attraction and unity of purpose which it possessed before 1953. The movement entered a period of disintegration and decline, yet it continued its opposition to the Federation. The nationalists grouped for ways in which to exploit the grievances of the day. By late 1954, Kaunda, African National Congress' Secretary-General, realized that some constructive thinking would have to be done if "Congress" were going to hold together. Towards the end of the year, Kaunda drew up a five-year plan aimed at revitalizing the party. Before the year 1955 was out there were signs of a resurgence of the African National Congress activity in some areas. Towards the end of 1955, violence on the Copperbelt aggravated, blame for which was generally laid on the African National Congress. Industrial disputes flared up on the Copperbelt, and the African National Congress began to extend its influence over the African Trade Union movement. In early 1956, it appeared that the trade unions and the African National Congress had begun to work together. In April 1956, there was an outbreak of boycotts organised by the African National Congress against European and Asian shops. At first dissension appeared in the African National Congress ranks, and boycotts were called off on 23 April. In May and June, however, they were resumed, this time more effectively and in a larger number of centres.

Europeans, alarmed by the sudden burst of African aggressiveness, demanded that the Government take action. They regarded strikes by the Africans as racial and nationalistic in origin, other than due to industrial or economic causes. Encouraged by such sentiments, the Government instituted a Crown prosecution in Mufulira against the four African National Congress officials. The African National Congress engaged a senior member of South Rhodesia Bar to fight the case. The judgement went against the Government; the four accused, amid the jubilation of the African National Congress supporters, were acquitted. Mufulira's decision greatly enhanced the African National Congress's reputation in the eyes of Africans throughout the country. Thus the African National Congress survived its period of decline and disillusionment. The most important change in the African National Congress was a shift towards greater militancy in nationalist thinking.

But the African National Congress President Nkumbula and his comrades favoured a policy of moderation. He committed the Congress only to gradual reform. This strongly dissatisfied radicals who refused to moderate their political approach and pronouncements. Gradually they built up branch organisations and began consolidating the party's more militant elements. The build-up continued until October 1958, when the split occurred which produced Kaunda's Zambia African National Congress (ZANC).

In 1958, Benson Constitution was finally passed. The main objective of the Constitution was to encourage policies

to develop on party as opposed to on racial lines. Yet it was carefully arranged "ordinary" and "special" constituencies which returned Europeans and Africans respectively. In its entirety, the Constitution was favourable to the Whites.

The final announcement of the Benson Constitution brought the two African nationalist parties into direct and bitter conflict. The African National Congress accepting the Constitution and contesting the elections, the Zambia African National Congress boycotting the elections and dedicating itself to the total destruction of the Constitution. Nkumbula gave the impression of a moderate leader. Kaunda refused to rest until he had removed the Union Jack from Northern Rhodesia.

All African People's Conference was held in Accra in December 1958. It extended its guarded support for people who were obliged to "retaliate" when they were subjugated by violent means. The conference exhilarated the Central Africans. Any hope of accommodation between Welensky and the Africans further vanished with the failure of his belated "meet the people" tours through the northern territories. The Africans were determined to come to grips with Welensky before the Federal Review Conference.

This provoked a new note of anxiety in the utterances of Federation's protagonists. Sir Arthur Benson, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, resolved to discourage the tide of Black nationalism with firm hands. Further, the Zambia African National Congress declared boycott of the elections. This complicated the security situation. Emergencies were declared in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on ²⁶February 1959. The

Zambia African National Congress was banned in March, nine days before polling. Its prominent leaders including Kaunda, Sipalo, and Kipwepwe were arrested.

Elections were held without any serious incident. It produced two developments of fundamental importance for the future of Northern Rhodesia politics. The first was the failure of Benson Constitution, despite the large turnout of African voters on polling day. European majorities in both the Legislative and Executive Councils were assured by the Constitution. The African National Congress was bitterly disappointed at the disproportionate influence of "ordinary" votes in constituencies returning Africans. The Africans realised the powerlessness of their votes against the European vote. In consequence, at the African National Congress' first National Assembly after the election, Nkumbula condemned the policy of moderation. The Assembly drew up a petition to the Colonial Secretary which denounced the Constitution as a fraud.

The second development of fundamental importance was the dramatic rise of the Zambia African National Congress and the whole question of the Government's repression against the party. The new Legislative Council gave general approval to Governor's action banning the Zambia African National Congress and detaining its leaders. But despite the ban, the Government was unable to crush the party completely. Rather, the ban against the Zambia African National Congress induced an element of martyrdom and exposed Government's planned attempt

to destroy major nationalist parties in Central Africa. The African political awareness was quickly increased.

In June 1959, internal dissension reappeared in the African National Congress' Provincial Conference. Nkumbula's opposition of boycotts directed against local Indian community, provoked the first serious move against him since 1958. The movement against Nkumbula was gathering momentum. An action group meeting in July in Lusaka, probably staged by Mukupo who now believed African unity under Nkumbula's leadership to be impossible, called for Nkumbula's resignation. Two days later Mukupo discussed with Kalichini the possibility of unifying all African groups. The African National Congress, African National Independence Party and the remnants of the Zambia African National Congress were joined by still another splinter group in late May, the United National Freedom Party (UNFP), which was formed by Dixon Konkola. The first signs of a revival of the Zambia African National Congress under another name came in June 1959, the African National Independence Party and United National Freedom Party merged to form the United National Independence Party (UNIP) under the leadership of Paul Kalichini, the Vice-President of the Zambia African National Congress who had been released in June. By November 1959, the United National Independence Party had become sufficiently established force to reckon with. Kaunda was released from prison on 9 January 1960. On 31 January 1960 he was elected to the presidency of the United National Independence Party. Kaunda's

determination to force the pace of political advance, setting the stage for a dramatic struggle for power lasted well over two years.

In July 1959, another thunderbolt hit the Federation - the report of a commission which had enquired into the Nyasaland disturbances and their causes. The Commission observed that the protectorate was a "police state" and that African opposition to the Federation was almost universal. It was a severe indictment which could not but relate also to Rhodesias. It encouraged the view that the Federation might be better off without Nyasaland. But this would make African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia impossible to contain.

Monckton Commission comprising Whites and known Federationists was formed to review the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Commission provided an immediate focal point for widespread political agitation to the United National Independence Party which wanted to extend its influence and become a mass party. The United National Independence Party boycotted the Commission. Boycott proved highly successful.

Monckton Report was released in October 1960. The report discreetly brought out the gravity of the situation. It conceded that racial partnership and discrimination was rampant in the Federation. It virtually imposed a death sentence on the Federation. The British Prime Minister Macmillan's statement that the "wind of change" is blowing over the African continent boosted the morale of nationalists. Kaunda and Nkumbula met Macmillan in Lusaka and reiterated

their stand that they were unalterably opposed to the Federation.

During a visit to Northern Rhodesia, Iain Macleod made it clear that there were no plans in contemplation to amend the Northern Rhodesia Constitution. The prospects of the United National Independence Party's constitutional objectives looked bleak. African frustration increased. The United National Independence Party strengthened itself with the spreading political agitation. Disturbances broke out at a number of African schools during March 1960. As a result of a serious incident on 8 May at Ndola, the Governor banned the United National Independence Party in Western Province.

On 28 September 1960, Macleod announced that constitutional changes were planned for Northern Rhodesia, a conference would be held in December, concurrently with the Federal Review. The announcement was a landmark in Zambia's history. For the first time, African pressure had scored a political victory over the settlers' population. This announcement consolidated Kaunda's leadership.

In February 1961 Macleod presented controversial 15-15-15 plan for Northern Rhodesia which was later refused by African delegates. In June 1961, when Macleod altered the February proposals regarding elections of national seat, Africans condemned it as a "betrayal" by the British Government which under pressure from Welensky had sought ^{to} appease the forces of White supremacy in Central Africa.

Speaking to the conference's 4,000 delegates amidst shouts of "Action Now", Kaunda launched an impassionate attack on the British and Federal Governments. Soon mass boycotts, disorders began. The Government responded to this challenge by moving in all the riot police it could, followed by troops and spotter planes. The United National Independence Party was banned in Northern and Luapula provinces. The disturbances ceased when Macleod announced his willingness to consider further representation on the proposed constitution. The decision was regarded as a clear United National Independence Party victory.

The British Government reconsidered the June proposals and announced final changes on 1 March 1962. The United National Independence Party accepted the final proposals and agreed to participate in the election. The United National Independence Party remained committed to the complete destruction of Federation, demands of universal adult suffrage, the grant of independence etc.

Nkumbula was released from prison in January 1962. The political situation was radically different. The 1962 election results showed that voting had been purely racial. The United National Independence Party convincingly demonstrated its dominance among the African voters. The African National Congress was dominant in Southern Province. After the final by-election results Nkumbula announced coalition with the United National Independence Party. The United National Independence Party acceded to Nkumbula's demand for three portfolios and the Governor announced the formation of Northern Rhodesia's first

African Government.

Inconclusive election results led to stormy interlude of interparty rivalry. The United National Independence Party-African National Congress coalition produced neither stable nor productive government. Nkumbula had problems holding his own party together. A faction led by Job Michells broke to form the People's Democratic Congress (PDC).

The rivalry and instability among the politicians was reflected among the people. Constant fighting took place in the Copperbelt towns during the first half of 1963. A commission of enquiry was appointed which recommended that there should be a new constitution as soon as possible and that general election date should be announced quickly. The British Government, proceeding with plans for the new constitution, revealed that a general election would be held on 20 and 21 January 1964, under a constitution based universal adult suffrage. With the introduction of universal adult suffrage no doubt about the outcome of Northern Rhodesia's ^{last} pre-independence ^{elections} was left. The United National Independence Party was the only organised territorial party. The African National Congress and the People's Democratic Congress were both highly disorganised and before the nomination day both merged once again.

The United National Independence Party secured fifty-five of the sixty five seats on the main roll. The African National Congress secured ten seats. Northern Rhodesia's Governor, immediately after the results, invited United National Independence Party's leader Kaunda, as the country's first Prime Minister to

form his new Government. Thus Northern Rhodesia's first African party government was sworn into office. Kaunda selected 24 October 1964 for Zambia's independence, the date on which six years earlier he had led his followers from the African National Congress to Zambia African National Congress.

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