THE LIMITS OF COSMOPOLITANISM: RECONNECTING THE CLAIMS OF UNIVERSALITY WITH DIFFERENCE

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SASIWAN CHINGCHIT

CENTRE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
NEW DELHI-110067
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CERTIFICATE

The dissertation entitled "**The Limits of Cosmopolitanism: Reconnecting the Claims of Universality with Difference**" submitted for the award of the degree of **MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY** is my original work. The dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree to this university or any other university.

SASIWAN CHINGCHIT

We recommend that the dissertation be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

Prof. Valerian Rodrigues
(Chairperson)
Chairperson
Centre for Political Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Prof. Gurpreet Mahajan
(Supervisor)

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Introduction

Cosmopolitanism has come back to the focus of academic discussion again in the last few decades. The post-cold war era and globalisation set the conditions that encouraged people to start thinking about world governance (Held 1995) and life style which is not constrained by a single culture. The technologically integrated world creates interdependence between countries and many problems (i.e. international crime, economic crisis, environmental problems) which are beyond the capacities of a nation-state to cope with, and require a global cooperation. Also, as Appadurai and Breckenridge (1998) observe, globalisation turns the world cosmopolitan, our daily lives become connected to other cultures through internet, TV, products, food, tourism etc. With all these conditions, academic realm turns to discuss cosmopolitanism in various ways whether as a change in condition of life, a disposition, or as a desirable ethical ideal and institution.

In the situation where speculation done by one group of investors generates global oil price hike and global food crisis, American involvement in the Middle East leads to 9/11 and this in turn compels a Buddhist, Southeast Asian country like Thailand to choose between cooperation with Bush government or being regarded as a country that is helping the terrorists, cosmopolitanism becomes a cetral concern, both as a new set of institutions and as a moral value. If the preceding example shows that we should desire and seek supranational organisation which will work for the benefit of the whole world by controlling global capitalism and promoting people's well-being, it also suggests that the antagonistic attitude against other cultures that emerges in one spot of the world can create the effect to the other parts. This should invoke us to consider that maybe we should try to think about how we can like each other although we think and live differently. These two elements reflect how cosmopolitanism is important to us.

However, when cosmopolitanism is re-introduced, it faces many critiques urging the redefining of the concept. Soon after the concept of cosmopolitanism is re-asserted, there is a movement of new cosmopolitanism suggesting the new way of understanding cosmopolitanism. The movement points to the limitation in the mainstream

understanding of cosmopolitanism. Robbins' account summarises the shared attitude of this movement towards the mainstream concept;

> Understood as a fundamental devotion to the interest of humanity as a whole, cosmopolitanism has often seemed to claim universality by virtue of its interdependence, its detachment from the bonds, commitments and affiliation that constrains ordinary nation-bound lives. It has seemed to be a luxuriously free floating view from above (Robbin1998 a: 1).

The movement tries to suggest cosmopolitanism which is contrary to the traditional understanding by positing various kinds of cosmopolitanism which are unprivileged, particular and from below (Robbins 1998a: 1). Robbins further remarks that "like nations, cosmopolitanisms are now plural and particular" (Robbins 1998a: 2). Apart from this movement, there is a view point seeing cosmopolitanism as a response to the excesses of identity politics (Anderson 1998: 265). Amanda Anderson (1998: 274-5) points out that there is the existing tension between the universalist ethical assumptions of new cosmopolitanisms and their simultaneous desire to cultivate ethical practices that do not impose false universals. For Anderson this tension has led to the casual normativity of the new cosmopolitan and the reluctance to assert normative claims against other positions (1998: 275). Being not satisfied with the movement of plural cosmopolitanism and its casual normativity, arises the attempt to re-examine universalism and find a way to combine the critiques of partial or false universals with the pursuit of those emancipatory ideals associated with traditional universalism. Agreeing with this standpoint that the benefit of emancipatory ideals in mainstream cosmopolitanism should be reserved and accepting that there are still some flaws in it, this dissertation aims to explore which critiques really point to the real flaw in classical cosmopolitanism and how it should be refined in the way that its emancipatory project can be retained.

It is in this context that the Dissertation seeks to explore some of the existing notions of cosmopolitanism. The focus is on the ethical claims of cosmopolitanism and its limitations, particularly with regard to its capacity to accommodate differences while needing to maintain universal apllicability. The work argues that the major problem of mainstream cosmopolitanism lies in its nature of "single-entry reasoning" which overlooks that there can be many justified ways of thinking about one thing, depending

on different contexts and perspectives. 'single-entry' reasoning downplays the differences and is undemocratic in character. To overcome this limitation, the Dissertation invokes Habermas'communicative ethics and deliberative democracy, to argue that a dialogue between cultures and reflectivity can sort out this problem and redefine cosmopolitanism.

Structure of the Dissertation

The structure of content in this dissertation will be as following:

Chapter 1:
Cosmopolitanism in the Present Time
The first chapter explores the historical development of the concept of cosmopolitanism, as well as, the conditions that lead to the re-emergence of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is an aged-old concept which has gone through many modifications and redefinitions of an idea towards different contexts of different periods. In the present time, many ideas about cosmopolitanism have been proposed. These ideas are based on different perspectives about the problems that the present world is facing, for example, environment, social-economic change, global inequality, and cultural-ethnic conflict generated by the impact of globalisation and the end of cold war. However, for any ethical idea of cosmopolitanism to be viable and legitimate, it should be universally applicable and acceptable.

Chapter 2:
Exploring the Claims of Universality in Cosmopolitanism
Second chapter explores the characteristics of mainstream understanding of cosmopolitanism, its relation to the idea of modernity, liberalism and universalism by focusing on the universalism embedded in contemporary mainstream cosmopolitanism. Then the exploration will move to focus on the critiques of universality in cosmopolitanism. The critiques engage with four questions; first, is the present concept of cosmopolitanism universal or parochial?; second, is universal possible?; third, is universality preferable or if it is good for all to share the same idea?; and forth, what

should universality indicate, something absolute or temporary? The chapter goes on to look at the way cosmopolitanism is redefined by the critics.

Chapter 3:

Re-examining the Limit of Cosmopolitanism: A Response to the Critics

In the third chapter, the critiques against mainstream cosmopolitanism and their proposals are analysed and criticised. The analysis will show that some critiques namely, that cosmopolitanism represents Western culture and imperialism should be discarded. This includes the critiques which suggest that there is a clear cut difference between the Eastern and Western culture, which obstructs people both from having a shared to sharing a common value. The adequacy of the relativist approach is analysed here and it is argued that the flaw of mainstream cosmopolitanism lie in its nature of "single entry reasoning" which can be solved by new idea of cosmopolitanism stressing the importance of dialogic interaction across cultures and reflectivity.

Chapter 4:

Moving beyond 'Single-Entry' Cosmopolitanism through Communicative Action

This chapter will apply Habermas' communicative ethics and deliberative democracy in redefining cosmopolitanism. It will aim to show that Habermas' theory of communicative action can explain how the mediation between universality and particularity can occur through communicative action. Communicative ethics can be a guide for redefined cosmopolitan attitude while deliberative democracy extended for employment in the transnational level by Dryzek can guide how dialogic cosmopolitanism should be modelled and applied across culture.

Chapter 1

Cosmopolitanism in the Present Time

Within the last two to three decades, cosmopolitanism, one of the oldest concepts in the world, has been reactivated again. In academic community especially social science, the incidence of literature studying and discussing this concept has increased remarkably from the second half of the 1990's. Journals, for example, *Public Culture* in 2000, *Constellation* in 2001, and *Theory, Culture and Society* in 2002, each has dedicated one special issue for discussing cosmopolitanism. Although, many books whose content contributes to this concept have come out for three decades starting from Beitz's *Political Theory and International Relations* in 1979, many are being published in the recent years. The latest works are comments and refinements of the preceding ideas. There are a few that present a somewhat modified understanding of cosmopolitanism (see Appiah, 2006, Benhabib et al 2006) or attempt to historically revisit and trace the genealogy of the concept (Brown, 2007). Recently, even in new areas, like business management, Guido Palazzo (2005) adopts cosmopolitan approach in analysing innovativeness of transnational civil society activity and global cooperation of researchers fighting against SARS. Observing a stream of work concerning this concept, we can say that cosmopolitanism has not only come back but it has done so with unprecedented force.

The writings on cosmopolitanism, and the recent engagements with this subject in journals and books, have come from different perspectives. There are historical accounts of cosmopolitanism, sociological analysis of the emerging concern for the value of cosmopolitan ethic, as well as political and philosophical discourses on this concept. Before we begin to make sense of cosmopolitanism and try to understand what this concept stands for and represents in the present time, it is necessary to mention briefly the past usages of this concept and the manner in which the history of this concept is constructed. This is necessary both for understanding the particular form that the concept takes in the present world as well as to appreciate the multiple ways in which the idea of cosmopolitanism is invoked in the recent literature.

Cosmopolitanism is a concept with very long history. Its idea and practice can be found in both Western and non-Western society (see in Breckenridge et al 2000).

Cosmopolitanism has been addressed many times in the course of history. However, the various understandings and practices are not much in uniformity. Starting from where we should locate the origin of this concept is still arguable. Many believe that cosmopolitanism is as old as human history because it can be found in every civilisation. Harris (1927:1) presents the historical evidence of cosmopolitan outlook that can be found as late as 1375-1358 BC in the inscription found in Egypt. The inscription is believed to be written by Aknaton who preached a universalistic monotheism and regarded himself as owing the same duty to all men, irrespective of race or nature. The same idea was also found and developed in Hebrews biblical literature. Many characters in ancient Greek like Menelaus (Harris 1927: 2-4), Democritus of Abreda and Antigone (Palmer 2003) are cited as having cosmopolitan attitude. While taking the term itself into consideration, as well as, the systematic development of the concept, majority of scholars choose to regard its origin in Cynic-Stoic tradition, for the word 'kosmoupolites' was first uttered by Diogenes, a Cynics, and it was the Cynic school which first gave elaboration on the idea of cosmopolitanism.

However, when we consider the cosmopolitanism that develops from the Cynic-Stoic schools of thought, the idea of who should be considered as cosmopolitan and the duty that each owes to the other, undergoes some change. The Cynics in the period of Alexander the Great preached the doctrine of cosmopolitanism as opposed to all kinds of social convention, i.e. family, citizenship, marriage and property, while Alexander promoted the unity of people among ethnic differences under his empire. Cynics believed that the true form of cosmopolitan society would consist of wise men who understood the universal law and lived their lives in accordance with nature. This idea of Cynics was followed by early Stoics, for example, Zeno who believed in giving service to the duty assigned from God by adding the element of social service and friendship. When Stoics came to Rome, the doctrine was modified; cosmopolitan realm belonged to all men as they, as well as, God possessed rationality and thus had special position among other creatures. Roman Stoics turned to the humanitarian element by emphasising humanity, sympathy and kindness instead of austere life of self-control and devotion to spirit. This idea was propagated by Cicero and other prominent Stoic thinkers like Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. Newly emerged Christianity shared major doctrines with Stoics by

endorsing human equality and supremacy of natural law designed by God and achieved by human rationality. However, slavery and social hierarchy in society were still maintained throughout these periods; so the idea of human equality since the time of Cicero to the time of UN Declaration of Human Rights is significantly different in content.

In Reformation time, the social unrest due to religious conflict and rebellious act against the church was the background for Erasmus to address cosmopolitanism as advocating the ideal of world wide peace, unity of mankind over the division of states and people. He argued that humans were destined to live together in harmony and requested national and religious tolerance. Erasmus regarded people who shared the same idea as his compatriot. The meaning of cosmopolitanism in Enlightenment period shared the same vibe but was added with the concept of respect for human liberty. Enlightenment was the period of humanitarianism when people spoke of "free humanity" and cosmopolitanism more enthusiastically than nationalism and patriotism (Maxey 1948: 303). During the period, open-minded attitude towards differences in terms of cultural and racial differences and ideological conflict was promoted by the Encyclopedia thinkers (see Martin 1962: 129). The same group popularised the faith in humanity and ideal of free and equal society. Human equality in Enlightenment period became attached to the idea of liberty. The idea of natural law governing the world and acting as the guide for human practices and the source of human solidarity was detached from God and replaced by scientific knowledge, rational capacity to adapt according to their environment.[1] Within the same period, cosmopolitanism became recognised by the life style and taste of people who have admiration for other cultures, due to the world which became more integrated by communicative advancement and colonialism.

Kant's cosmopolitanism in *Essay for Perpetual Peace* and *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (Reiss 2002) deviated from the Stoics on the idea of universal hospitality bound by the respect for sovereignty of each state. He proposed cosmopolitan order by which he meant establishment of a lawful external relation among states and a universal civil society (Fine and Cohen 2002: 140) as the goal

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[1] For example Montesquieu's idea in *The Spirit of Law*, he argued that laws are the concrete social fact, the crystallisation of social experience and the by product of social adjustment arising from the nature of things. His idea provided support for self-determination of each state against the monopoly of the church.

that every nation should achieve. He upheld the idea of cosmopolitan rights, which everyone possesses by virtue of being human and which every nation-state must respect, and argued that every state should become a republic. Kant argued for the stranger's right not to be treated with hostility; in *Toward Perpetual Peace* this translates as the right of the host country to tell the visitor to leave if it does not want to receive him but not the sanction to harm and kill.

After Kant, the concept of human equality was also held differently by Marx, the libertarian and Rawls. Moreover, all of them understand cosmopolitanism differently. While Kant equated cosmopolitanism with universal law, Marx presented it as imperialism of capitalism while Rawls himself never endorsed this concept, although his theory of justice shared many fundamental elements with cosmopolitanism. Not only the content of idea varies in different periods, but also the justification of the concept is drawn from different sources by different approaches whether it is God, nature, or reason.

Today cosmopolitanism refers to many things. Vertovec (2002) points out that within the field of social sciences, contemporary writers writing on cosmopolitanism refer to - first, a vision of global democracy and world citizenship; second, transnational framework for making link between social movement; third, post-identity politics; and fourth, socio-cultural process or individual behavior, value and disposition manifesting a capacity to engage cultural multiplicity (2002: 1). He further adds that the concept can be invoked by six perspectives, namely, socio-cultural condition, philosophy or world view, political project of transnational institutions, political project of multiple subject, an attitude or disposition and a practice or competence (2002: 9-14). While, Pieterse (2006: 1251) analyses the variety of cosmopolitanism with the four types according to how the term is generally used in the broad area; *cooperate* for global economy and capitalism, *political* for political integration, cosmopolitan democracy, *social* for global solidarity and transnational network of civil society and *cultural* for aesthetic taste and life style exposed to other cultures. It is observable here that Pieterse's employment of cosmopolitanism in this case indicates the term as meaning merely global participation or activity beyond national frontier.

Cosmopolitanism is not a new concept. It has gone through many contexts of time and different interpretations in the history. Thus today when we come to consider and

employ this concept, there are many interpretations that we can choose depending on how we perceive it. Due to the complexity of its usage, some people say that the concept itself is many times misunderstood rather than understood (Lu 2000: 244). Trying to pin down what exactly cosmopolitanism represents therefore seems a difficult task. Some cosmopolitan thinkers put cosmopolitanism into different categories like, cultural/political (Hannerz 2006) ethical/political (Hayden 2005) while discussing about cosmopolitanism in the ethical sense. My observation is that there is a mingling between cosmopolitanism as presenting factual conditions, for example, shared taste or economy, and cosmopolitanism as embodying an ethical idea, like human equality, or cultural openness. For those who join the first movement to be entitled as 'cosmopolitan' is unacceptable for the latter whose concern is something deeper than that.

From development of this concept throughout different periods and circumstances, we may observe that first cosmopolitanism emerged as an ethical idea or just an outlook promoting the peaceful coexistence of human beings. Later the idea has become more and more involved with political institution. In the Middle Age it has been perceived as the means for homogenisation and monopoly of the church power towards the idea of natural law governing all humanity. During the Reformation and Enlightenment it is related to the political idea of equality, liberty and tolerance; and since Kant, it lays the foundation for political institution; domestic and international. With the process of globalisation through many periods, cosmopolitanism becomes identified also as social condition, way of life, shared tastes, etc., or, in conclusion, the new emerging reality. While considering this concept, it is useful to keep in mind that it takes many forms; as ideology, method (institutional arrangement) and reality. Sometimes they need to be separated while sometimes should be considered as relevant.

The present understanding of cosmopolitanism is different from the past but before discussing the character of this new form of cosmopolitanism let us consider under which condition cosmopolitanism has re-emerged. Essentially, there are two kinds of conditions – namely, socio-economic or practical problems and normative intellectual concerns - that trigger an engagement with the idea of cosmopolitanism. At the socio-economic level it is the context of globalisation that has fueled this interest. Globalisation creates the interconnected and integrated world. With the greater flow of human

migration, it yields a new discourse of hybridity and a search for identity that is not defined or restricted by the nation-state. For Appadurai and Breckenridge (1988: 1) globalisation turns the world cosmopolitan in terms of people's consumption, their taste and their attentiveness to the world.

According to Held (2002) and Beck (2002, 2006), globalisation creates conditions that make it difficult for the old paradigm and institution of the modern state. The end of Cold War and the impact of Fukuyama's the end of history theory generate a movement within the academic realm discussing the future of the world and the new political order based on liberal democracy. The beginning of Pogge's article (1992) which was first presented in "Ethikon: East/West Dialogue Conference on the Restructuring of Political and Economic Systems" in 1991, clearly represents this sentiment and the idea to build a cosmopolitan world. He announces

> The human future suddenly seems open. This is an inspiration; we can step back and think more freely. Instead of containment or detente, political scientists are discussing grand pictures: the end of history, or the inevitable proliferation and mutual pacifism of capitalist democracies. And politicians are speaking of a new world order. My inspiration is a little more concrete. After developing a rough, cosmopolitan specification of our task to promote moral progress I offer an idea for gradual global institutional reform (Pogge 1992: 48)

Preceding Pogge was Charles Bietz (1979) who observed that globalisation had brought to the world a remarkable integration and interdependence among state. This phenomenon makes international realm more like a domestic society that enabled Beitz to propose cosmopolitanism in the form of global distributive justice in his book *Political Theory and International Relations* published in 1979.

However, globalisation also generates other more complex phenomena. It ignites the nationalist sentiment in both developing and developed countries. Economic inequality and cultural threats are what developing countries perceive as induced by globalisation and the Western world (Habermas 2003; Cheah 1998); at the same time, global economy generates migration of people from the third world to the West and creates the nationalist vibe from the host country. Brock and Brighthouse (2005: 1-2) observe that nationalism has been on the rise since the mid 1980. With the end of Cold

War and the break up of Soviet Union, nationalism is no more suppressed and coupled with post-colonial sentiment of the former colonial countries which still bear the mark of history of domination and exploitation. When the border between Eastern and Western Europe was dismantled, there was an influx of immigrant from the former communist, Middle East and Northern African countries to Western Europe leading to the change of the state's concept of nationality and the adoption of multiculturalist approach. This incident fuels the nationalist sentiment of people in the West against immigration. Bowden (2003) and Held (2002) share the view that the present age is identifiable by the widespread visible resurgence of ethnic and economic nationalism, and exclusivist sentiments, however, it is also true that the era is marked by the counter-trends of rapid internationalisation or globalisation. This polarity of feeling and its intertwined effect is reflected in the major academic debates surrounding this phenomenon.

While the relevance of nationalism is being challenged by many cosmopolitan theorists especially after the post-cold war era (for example Held 2002, Beck 2002, 2006, Beitz 1983), many political philosophers came out with sophisticated work defending legitimacy and moral significance of national border in 1990's (Brock and Brighthouse 2005: 2) Rorty (1994), for example, praised the virtue of American patriotism and requested American citizen to invoke an 'emotion of national pride' and 'a sense of shared national unity' in New York Time. As a reaction to this, Martha Nussbaum (1994) came out to criticise Rorty's standpoint and strongly urged for cosmopolitanism. After 9/11 cosmopolitanism definitely becomes more in focus when inter-racial and religious dissident could turn to be a world-scale crisis.

Changes ushered by globalisation and post-cold war effect trigger thinking about cosmopolitanism and also nurture the priority of creating the cosmopolitan attitude. In addition, it is the growing recognition that the world is circumscribed with certain problems faced by all and cannot be dealt by individuals or nation-states by themselves. As Beck (2006: 23) points out, it is the recognition of common threats that leads to the norm, agreement and hence the institutional cosmopolitanism. He states three types of world risk: ecological, economic and security. Ecological problem has become a concern in social science debate presenting an urge for global solidarity and co-operation in the form of cosmopolitanism to counter this threat. While, the mainstream debate of ethical

cosmopolitanism is concerned with inequality in the world and the threat of nationalism and religio-ethnocentrism. The emerging philosophical and political debates about cosmopolitanism are concerned about how cosmopolitanism can be a solution to create a better world. The contemporary writings on cosmopolitanism are, thus, not only about cosmopolitanism as it is but also about what it should be.

The conditions discussed above collectively bring the present thinking, and with it different forms, of cosmopolitanism. In many cases,, when we discuss about an emerging new global condition, cosmopolitanism is equated with activity beyond national frontier. It is not therefore surprising that many times the term is used interchangeably with globalisation and global consumption. Considering cosmopolitanism in this way seem to be in conflict with ethical cosmopolitanism that emphasises the benefit of all human beings, especially the global distributive justice put forth by Rawlsian cosmopolitan like Beitz (1979). Most importantly, it does not improve economic inequality and disadvantage created by globalisation and counteracted by nationalism and consequently leads to cultural conflict. Theorists like Hannerz (2006), Fine and Smith (2003), and Pieterse (2006) share the same view that ethico-political cosmopolitanism spreading in social science should be differentiated from and help curbing the effect of globalisation and global capitalism. Hannerz (2006: 9) while arguing for political cosmopolitanism suggests that if globalisation remarkably refers to deregulation of market and the triumph of capitalism then cosmopolitanism would mean that human beings are not only related to the world merely as consumer or labor but also as citizen. While Fine and Smith (2003: 452) point out that the new cosmopolitanism growing after the fall of Berlin Wall indeed become a critique of at least certain qualities of global capitalism, as well as a search for ways of constraining it. Pieterse (2006: 1248) suggests that the kind of cosmopolitanism that makes a difference should offer an emancipatory perspective, in which emancipation refers to 'of benefit to the world majority'. He, thus, further proposes that it should contribute to rebalancing corporate, political and social globalisation and enable political institution and social force to countervail, re-regulate corporate globalisation and transform globalisation. If anything, cosmopolitanism is a critique of global capitalism. Pieterse's standpoint on cosmopolitanism and his earlier understanding of the term represents the strain between

how cosmopolitanism is perceived in reality and how it should be perceived in order for us to gain benefit from the concept. It is this question that propels the debate on cosmopolitanism. However, although global capitalism seems to be unanimously opposed by all ideas of ethical cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitan writers still have different perspectives about what cosmopolitanism should entail.

Many liberal cosmopolitans believe that inequality materially and socially is a major problem needing to be solved for the benefit of world majority. This idea coincides with classical ethical cosmopolitanism which believes in equal moral worth of all human being and demands empathy beyond conventional social tie like nation or cultural community. However, while many cultures in the world especially outside the West are still embedded in hierarchy, this may worsen the ongoing cultural conflict. Some argue that the proposals from liberal cosmopolitanism represent universalism and overlook the importance of national ties and cultural values intrinsic to individual identity. Considerable amount of literatures written after Nussbaum's "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" in 1994 criticise the universalism and rootless characteristic of her cosmopolitanism (see the arguments in Cohen 1996). The critiques urge for modification of the concept so as to escape these flaws. Those who think that cosmopolitanism is desirable claim that nationalism or patriotism (depending on how it is defined) can also get along with cosmopolitanism and they try to present alternative understandings of cosmopolitanism. (Appiah 1998; Erskine 2002; Bowden 2003).While liberal cosmopolitanism is claimed to be beneficial to the suppressed and marginalised groups, like women, Third World feminist like Chandra Mohanty in her essay."Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse opposes 'Ethnocentric Universalism" of the First World white women in the name of specific situation (Robbins 1998b: 251). Mohanty's standpoint reflects the conflict between the universally claimed proposal and specific situation of application which demands respect for its cultural differences. Soon after cosmopolitanism has re-emerged there are many critiques against it mainly from those who believe that the concept marginalises the differences.

The present conditions make it more and more convincing that in the technologically integrated world plagued by environmental problems, globalisation created-economic problems, cultural conflicts and fanatic fundamentalism, some kind of

solidarity as a basis for cooperation and coexistence is needed. Different ideas about cosmopolitanism are proposed to deal with global threats, each idea with different view about the significance given to different problems. However, a problem that also needs to be taken into consideration here is: in the world of cultural differences, on what values should global solidarity be based, or, what value can be endorsed by everyone while it can also help dealing with global threats and promoting collective responsibility? In part this problem arises because cosmopolitanism is not only like other moral concepts that generally have to claim universal validity and practice, the term itself appeals to, or alludes, to a universal identity, rather than a specific community. The major task of the cosmopolitans is to prove that their cosmopolitanism can and should be endorsed by everyone, as well as, suggesting that it is based on a universal principle that can claim to have validity across communities. This is the main question in the debate regarding the universality of cosmopolitanism, an element that will be discussed in the next chapter. However, while taking note of these universal claims of cosmopolitanism we also need to recognise an element to which Calhoun (2002: 88-89, 92) draws our attention: namely, that the nature of cosmopolitanism in the former period and now are not the same. The cosmopolitanism in ancient time and Enlightenment had different projects. While the tolerance of diversity in great imperial and trading city of ancient time reflects the absence of need or opportunity to organise political self-rule, cosmopolitanism was a philosophical project more than a political one like in the present age marked by democracy or self-rule of each political community of difference. The concept of cosmopolitanism and the problems it has to deal with in different time are thus different.

In the present globalised time, where some global-scale co-operations across units of sovereignty and solidarity are needed, institution of cosmopolitanism appears to be necessary. Yet, the values that govern collective solidarity must be framed in a way that they respect the other and recognise their right to self-determination. In other words, the values which cosmopolitan ethic brings in must not be imposed from the outside. They must be mindful of existing diversities and difference. How can these twin concerns of seeking universality and recognising differences be accomplished? This is the question that will be pursued more carefully later.

Chapter Two

Exploring the Claims of Universality in Cosmopolitanism

As we have discussed in the last chapter that the aim of ethical cosmopolitanism is to provide a solution to many global problems and to create benefits for the world's majority. However, this aim needs to coincide with the possibility of the idea to be applied and accepted across different cultures. The debate about what the idea of ethical cosmopolitanism should entail is thus also significantly related to the debate on universality of cosmopolitanism. The problem of universality of cosmopolitanism has been discussed presently among the cosmopolitans due to its importance in two ways; it is related to practicality and legitimacy of the idea of cosmopolitanism.

The present debate about universality of cosmopolitanism engages with four main questions. First, is the present concept of cosmopolitanism universal or parochial? Second, is universality possible? Third, is universality preferable or if it is good for all to share the same idea? And fourth, what is universality and whether it should classically mean everywhere and all the time or everywhere at a particular time? So far, most of the liberal concept of cosmopolitanism with the ethical project like human equality, well-being, and solidarity against other global threats are based on the thick concept of universality, believing that human beings are not only bound by the fact of being member of humanity but that they can potentially also share some universal moral values. On the other hand, those who argue for a thin concept of cosmopolitanism (believing that universal value is groundless and unfavorable) are more concerned about cultural differences and the threat of it being eliminated and imposed by cultural homogeneity. Are we forced to choose one of these apparently antagonistic approaches to cosmopolitanism or can we identify a shared ground between them? The answer of this question will be explored in this and the next chapter. In this chapter we will first explore the shared characteristics of mainstream ideas of cosmopolitanism and the critiques against them. Then some proposals of new understanding of cosmopolitanism from the critics will be explored. The next chapter will provide analysis of the critiques and their suggestion and try to come up with the answer if we can combine what we learn from the critiques with the benefit that the mainstream cosmopolitanism promises.

Modernity and Liberal Cosmopolitanism

The debate on universality has been raised primarily as a criticism towards a project of modernity considered[2] as underlined by the idea that there is a natural and universal law and that everyone should search and follow it in order to achieve the goal of humanity. Modernity is the present period in which this search for universal law succeeds with the help of rationality and scientific knowledge. Having its roots in Greek civilisation, modernity arguably maintains the logocentric characteristic of trying to find the ultimate truth or universal law. Foucault and Pagden share the same observation that the thinkers in Enlightenment were united in the search for a new order (Venn 2002: 66). Europe inherited from the Greeks, mostly on the basis of science applicable for the whole world (Venn 2002: 66). The idea of modern history is considered by the modernist to be a linear progression of mankind. For a theorist like Venn (2002: 68) Kant's idea of Enlightenment, the freedom of the individual from immaturity and the progress of the whole humankind is viewed as the replacement of Judeo-Christian journey of life to salvation and God is replaced by the linear progressive temporality of modernity and the individual as modern, rational, unitary and logocentric. This characteristic of modernity is called universalism. Cosmopolitanism rooted in Stoic thought has been linked to this characteristic of modernity, as Stoic teaching is predominantly based on the idea of natural law attained by rationality. According to Stoic teaching, human beings are equal and bound by their capacity to reason as Marcus Aurelius sums up that "my nature is rational and social and my city and country.... as far as I am a man, it is the world" and "one law, one common reason in all intelligent reason, and one truth" (Aurelius in Gilbert 2000: 79-80). Natural law approached by reason is the source of morality. It prescribes how men should behave and the duty of each to be cosmopolitan or to act in accordance with the idea that man is naturally united as a whole body sharing mutual welfare (Cicero in Pangle 1998: 243). Stoics represent the first school of thought in the Western tradition adopting the idea of universal humanity in which all are endowed with rationality as a common human nature. In the period of Greek city-states before the Cynic and Stoic

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[2] I imply that this idea about modernity is just one perspective among various ideas about defining feature of modernity.

time, the individual appeared as a citizen and his significance depended on his status or function within the state (Sabine 1961: 129) The Stoic idea about the individual and natural law has, since then, predominantly occupied the Western political thought until the contemporary period.

Liberalism emerging in the Enlightenment period has been linked to modernity and cosmopolitanism due to some shared characteristics and arguably same strand of development. But liberalism is a broad term and contains many different theories. Hampton (1998: 179) proposes that, in general, all variants share five fundamental commitments. First is a commitment that people in political society must be free although there are different understandings about freedom, which is seen either as highly individualistic or more collectivist. Second is the commitment to equality of people in the political society, although it can be understood in many ways, from merely denial of natural subordination to the idea of substantive equality. Third is a commitment that the state's role should be defined to support equality and liberty under the conditions of democratic procedure, implementing toleration and freedom of conscience for citizen and staying out of individual's conception of good. Fourth, the political society is to be justified by the individual as being legitimate and fifth, reason is the instrument by which the liberal state governs.

Modern liberalism can be considered developing the doctrine of human equality on the ground laid by Stoic cosmopolitanism and Christianity. Liberal commitment to people's freedom and equality is based on the understanding that each individual is a free and autonomous human being who is worthy of equal respect. This is the emphasis on individual quality as a human being, rather than as a citizen or as a member of society. This liberal concern coincides with cosmopolitanism founded by Stoics and its individualistic characteristic (see Sabine 1961: 121). Although the concern of liberalism in general is about equal liberty among the citizen of particular state, the theoretical argumentation supporting this principle from non-postmodern liberals always rests on universal equality of the human being built upon rational argument and assumption about human nature. Thus, it inherently contains universal application and universalism. Liberalism is not identical to cosmopolitanism for its theories provide guide for the relation between individuals and government within a specific political society and

basically do not provide guide for global government. Also, not all liberal theories necessarily feed into cosmopolitanism, but many writers on cosmopolitanism consider its present understanding and concrete form as a twin of the liberal doctrine (i.e. Hall 2002, Minolo 2002, Douzinas 2007). Considering the principles of cosmopolitanism recently proposed by Held (2005), Nussbaum (2005) and in the UN Declaration of Human Rights we can even say conversely that liberalism is fundamental to present cosmopolitanism. Calhoun presents his observation that contemporary cosmopolitanism is the latest effort to revitalise liberalism (2002: 93) However, it is very important to keep in mind that liberalism is a broad term and can refer to many schools of thought and theories considered sharing the same doctrine. They put different emphasis on each of the five commitments proposed by Hampton. Liberal cosmopolitanism, which is criticised as universalism, is represented by those theories believing in a single and universal rationality or, to make it simple, by those who attempt to put forward or inherently suggest a positive liberty in their idea of cosmopolitanism. Thus, for the purpose of our study, Kant's theory of cosmopolitanism and those cosmopolitan accounts affiliated to Kantian liberalism can provide good example as a springboard in exploring and engaging with the dispute on universality.

Kant and Kantian Cosmopolitanism and Its Implied Universality

In *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* and in *Perpetual Peace*, Kant proposes the idea of cosmopolitanism as sharing some similarities with the Stoic tradition. In the first essay, Kant starts his account by arguing that "human action is determined in accordance with natural law" (Kant in Reiss 2000: 41). This natural law can be found in a large scale of free exercise of human will exhibiting a regular progression, for the history of human species is the slow advancement of man's original capacity to realise the hidden plan of nature. The natural capacity of men is for them to "develop completely and in conformity with their end" (Kant in Reiss 2000: 42) which is described as a perfect civil union of mankind (Kant in Reiss 2000: 51). It is this human capacity which makes man different from other animals, shaping him as a rational creature. However, it is by performing the philosophical task that man can discover this "purpose of nature". Kant's idea is similar to Stoics' idea of human nature and the way to

arrive at natural law as well as to the early Stoic belief that the goal of humanity will be achieved by acting in accordance with nature and by being a wise man. What is different in Kant is that principles are constructed to fit the condition of international community whose members are sovereign states. Cosmopolitanism proposed by Kant is thus in the form of cosmopolitan right which is stated in *Perpetual Peace* in the form of universal hospitality. In this work, Kant emphasises:

> [reason's] relation to and conformity with the end which reason directly prescribe to us can only be conceived as an idea. Yet while this idea is indeed far-fetched in *theory*, it does possess dogmatic validity and has a very real foundation in *practice*, as with the concept of perpetual peace, which makes it our duty to promote it by using natural mechanism described above. (Kant in Reiss 2000: 109)

In *Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism*, Nussbaum (1994) obviously tries to bring back the ethical idea of Stoic cosmopolitanism in her attempt to present superiority of commitment to universal justice and global solidarity to nationalist bond. Nussbaum follows the same strand as Stoics and Kant in arguing that the scope of moral community is the humanity of men who are rational and mutually dependent. Nussbaum's morality is based on the Kantian concept of human equality. She equates the Stoic idea of citizen of the world with Kant's idea of 'kingdom of ends' where each is endowed with inalienable right and deserves treatment with equal respect for his dignity of reason and moral choice. She believes that this gives the guidelines for cosmopolitan duty for us by arguing that if we really believe that each is created equal and endowed with inalienable right then we are morally to think about what this conception requires us to do. In contrasting nationalist impulse with cosmopolitan duty, Nussbaum is also like Kant and Stoics in giving superiority to reason over emotion. She concludes that one is cosmopolitan if he puts *right* before country and universal reason before the symbol of national belonging. By this way, Nussbaum expresses her belief that there is such thing as universal morality for every human being no matter from what culture they are. And for her, this morality can be achieved by reason which she identifies as the mutual profit that the world gets from global solidarity free from the damage done by fraction of local allegiance.

However, we cannot say that Nussbaum's concerns are similar to those of Kant and the Stoics, for although all talk about justice, what they mean by it is different and this makes their conception of cosmopolitanism different in detail. After Rawls, the concept of justice is built by deepening the idea of Kant's "kingdom of ends". In Nussbaum's time the concern about human equality develops into the concept of substantive equality. Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism, particularly in her later works (2005, 2006a), suggests global justice which requires application of the capabilities approach world wide. The development of capabilities presents "a set of basic human entitlements, similar to human rights, as a minimum for what justice requires for all"[3] (Nussbaum 2005: 197). Nussbaum thus suggests a form of cosmopolitanism which requires material aids from rich to poor country in order for the disadvantaged people to enjoy the minimum standard of capabilities all human beings are entitled to. However, apart from invoking the Stoic view of cosmopolitan duty, which requires moral sentiment to be concerned about other's well-being because we are equally human (2000, 2005), and claiming that a world in which people have all capacities in the list is minimally just and decent (2005: 210), she does not clearly elaborate on the exact obligation of the rich to help the poor. Although she claims that contractarian scheme has a flaw for ignoring the fact that bargaining on a fair term is still far from reality (both at the international and individual levels) and offers an approach which seeks to correct the inequality in life circumstance of individuals prior to the agreement of fair term, we can notice that Nussbaum's approach depends on compassion, while the contractarian ideal offers a thick obligation in dealing with asymmetries of power and wealth.

Apart from Nussbaum, whose cosmopolitanism focuses on global justice working hand in hand with building global solidarity, Beitz is the pioneer among the liberals who expand liberal content of Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*'s to cosmopolitanism. For him, thinking of Original Position applied directly to the world is the way to use Rawlsian insights to establish a theory of global justice. Beitz argues that if Rawls' theory of justice is the product of a society where rational people with "cooperative venture of mutual advantage" (1979: 130) come together under the Original Position to consider the institution that would give them a fair distribution of benefit and burden, then this should

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[3] See the detail in Appendix 1.

also be applied to the present global community of inter-dependence. Beitz further claims that Rawls' view on the distribution of natural talent can be compared to Kant's account of human right to communal possession of the earth surface, which according to Beitz, should include its natural resource. He argues that the redistribution of natural resource is more justifiable than natural talent because it is out there, neither attached to person nor implies control over the person from without in using his talent (1979: 137-140). Although Rawls changes his position in *Political Liberalism* to claim that his theory of justice applies only to liberal society, as well as, rejects feasibility of cosmopolitanism in *The Law of People*, Caney (2002) and Kuper (2000), who come after Beitz's work of 1979, try to conserve the universality of *A Theory of Justice,* by pointing out Rawls' incongruence in these two works and the potential applicability of his original idea to every society.

Many cosmopolitans being concerned about global justice employ different rational arguments so as to convince that duty of justice and material aid across national boundary can have a universal appeal[4]. Although each is different in terms of approach, according to Held, the arguments for and against duty of local tie and establishment of world government or other cosmopolitan institution, explicate and offer a compelling elucidation of the "Kantian conception of subjecting all beliefs, relations and practices to the test of whether or not they allow for uncoerced interaction and impartial reasoning" (2005: 11). He uses this shared ground among the liberal-Kantian cosmopolitan in forming cosmopolitan principles claimed to be those "which can be universally shared, and can form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person's equal significance in the moral realm of all humanity" (2005: 12). Held's proposed cosmopolitan principles comprise of 1) equal worth and dignity 2) active agency 3) personal responsibility 4) consent 5) collective decision making about public matter through voting procedures 6) inclusiveness and subsidiary 7) avoidance of serious harm and 8) sustainability.

Held's principles, although thick in their philosophical justification for cosmopolitanism (see in 2005: 19-25), are intended to be general and more open to the

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[4] Discussion about global justice and cosmopolitanism can be seen, for example in Brock and Brighthouse's *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* and Brock and Moellendorf 's *Current Debates in Global Justice.*

cultural differences than the UN Declaration of Human Rights considered to be a contemporary form of cosmopolitan principles. For UNDHR the details have been elaborated for it to set the standard of political institution and what belongs to humanity as against barbarous acts. The content in UNDHR[5] obviously indicates the model of liberal democratic regimes for it contains the idea of private property, liberal individuality, legal and political rights. It goes so far as to prescribe marriage based on the full consent of intending spouse. Although some content like legal and political procedures are generally followed by most countries, the other part of it seems to be in conflict with some non-Western cultures. By claiming to be a standard of achievement for all people and all nations, and announcing that the disregard of human rights is barbarous, UNDHR[6] indicates that those who do not follow this standard become inhumane and fail to realise the universal end. It is, to some extent, the critiques against UNDHR that triggers the modification of cosmopolitan principles in academic realm (see Douzinas 2007, Turner 2002). However, it is also the UNDHR initiation of concern about human development, standard of living and social welfare, which induces the social redistribution of resource and becomes the main topic in normative debate of the mainstream liberal cosmopolitans like Nussbaum, Beitz and others in giving philosophical account for their proposed principles, measure and justification of global justice.

The Kantian idea of equal right and dignity seems to be the fundamental ground for each cosmopolitan in the liberal tradition cited as the examples here in constructing their cosmopolitan principles. This Kantian foundation about the individual, which becomes the definition of cosmopolitanism here, can be elaborated with Pogge's understanding of what all cosmopolitans share; namely, first, that the individual is the ultimate unit of concern; second, that the individual means all human beings; and third, that the individual is the ultimate unit of concern for everyone (1992: 48-9). Apart from the Kantian idea of individual rights, this tradition of liberal cosmopolitanism builds up the idea on what they understand as the essence of human beings. Belief that all share

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[5] See the detail in the Appendix 2

[6] The preamble states that "whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people".

capacity to reason as a human essence, the proposed cosmopolitanism on rational ground is expected to be universally and rationally accepted. However, while these cosmopolitan conceptions contain comprehensive content and lay philosophical ground for other cosmopolitans (such as Cabrera 2004 and Archibugi 2000), who share the concern of global justice as morality of cosmopolitanism and try to push the idea of global institution forward) they still have to face the critiques of those who doubt their claim for universality.

Critiques of Universality

The critiques against the mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism are related to the concept's relation to modernity. On one hand, the critique is grounded on the philosophical problems sharing the same issues as the critiques against modern rationality. On the other hand, it is grounded on cosmopolitanism's genealogy, its presence and image[7] in the real world. As already shown, Stoic cosmopolitanism and the mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism share the logocentric character perceived to be of modernity. All their arguments are grounded on the belief that by human rationality, there is a law or some common good waiting to be found and followed and can be applied universally. Cosmopolitanism is natural and is the objective of humanity according to Kant. The unified approach shared by all these mainstream cosmopolitans is the reflective approach of employing reason to come up with morality and its principles that bind everyone. Employing Heidegger (see Heidegger 1962) to explain this characteristic of Western modern philosophy, the 'I' who think in this case is the Cartesian 'I' representing fixed and universal 'I' thinking for the universal 'we' or humanity. The logic is based on the concept of man as rational animal. This characteristic is called universalism which posits commonality of needs, interest, or ideals between members of different cultures (Mehta 2000: 622). Moreover, holding that universal morality is achieved by reason indicates legitimacy to impose this to other who are not reasonable enough.

The sceptic view towards cosmopolitanism as intrinsically a form of imperialism and homogenisation is shared by many writers subscribing to different schools of

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[7] I use 'presence' and 'image' to show the consistency with the first chapter which presents the different understandings of cosmopolitanism. Some understandings are derived from the perception in reality which may be different and have no link with its philosophical concept.

thought. For them, cosmopolitanism and modern discourse are rather Western parochialism and do not really represents the claim of universal morality. Canto (2006) believes that the idea of cosmopolitanism itself suggests the superiority of the universal over the particular and claims its command on the latter. He thinks that from the Greek root, cosmopolitanism has its clear indication that it does not aim to get agreement from different states; instead it defines from the outset the objective for all citizen of the entire earth. The idea of natural law as well as Kant's universal law implies that the law for the world is pre-given and real, while those designed by states are just an extrapolation (2006: 268). Thus, the necessary condition for attaining perpetual peace is the disillusion from the particularity of state (2006: 272). Mehta also thinks in the same way that universalism is the project to emancipate individual from culture, tradition, quotidian form of existence to mode of collective directed by universal norm higher than the local culture it aims to replace (2000: 622). This logic renders that those who claim that their morality and way of life is in accordance with universal law are superior and legitimate to impose that to all others. It serves as the basis for the moral claim of imperialism and its homogenising mission. Analysing the history of cosmopolitanism and the development of other related ideas in Western modern tradition like rights, Douzinas and postcolonial thinkers contributing in *Cosmopolitanisms* (Breckenridge et al 2002) have considered the mainstream idea of cosmopolitanism as a part of modernity discourse which contains imperialist characteristics based on its claims for universality of human essence, morality and reason.

In his book, *Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (2007), Douzinas provides a historical account of the development of ideas like rights, individual and humanity which are essentially related to human rights and cosmopolitanism of contemporary time. He argues that the concept of individual free from tradition, history and community and becoming foundation and principle of social and political organisation emerges in modernity (2007: 34). For Douzinas, the idea of humanity in modern time posits the essence of human beings as an abstract that has little humanity as possible. This abstract concept of individual and humanity as well as in Western legal rights originally facilitates making business deals, contract and sales (2007: 39-40). He affirms that humanity has no intrinsic normative value but in fact has been

continuously mobilised in the domain, for example, of politics and military (2007: 57, 136-162); for example, the Roman perceives their empire as natural, eternal and limitless. This project is facilitated by transcending cosmopolis from a state of mind to territory and natural law to its legislation. The ideals of Kant also coincide with Napoleonic project of spreading universalism of French Revolution. While Jefferson's empire of liberty helps rationalising expansion and conquest of the West. Now human rights are used as justification for American Imperialism to intervene in other country. Human rights do not belongs to human and follow the dictate of humanity, in contrary, they construct humans as someone who can successfully claims these rights. Universal morality of human rights is like a religion. It sets the standard and hierarchy of people for those who follow them to be superior. The claim to spread reason and Christianity gave Western Empire their sense of superiority (2007: 82). Douzinas points out that this discourse also brings on the exclusion of those who cannot reach the standard of humanness and set the domain of universal and particular where the latter is marginalised (2007: 96). He agrees with Niall Ferguson in saying that the West should accept that its new civilising agenda is a fancy word for imperialism, imposing the value and institution on other in the context of American Imperialism (2007: 136).

However, Douzinas still sees better offer provided by cosmopolitanism in its original form and differentiates this from its institutionalised presence and human rights which are regarded as political tool. He chooses to see cosmopolitanism as morality being employed to serve imperial expansion by its transformation from morality to law and political ideology (in the form of rights). The postcolonial group who comes up with the book *Cosmopolitanisms* (Breckenridge et al 2002) does not have that differentiation in mind. The group refuses to separate cosmopolitan morality from its presence of global discourse like human rights and globalisation; it draws the line between cosmopolitanism emerges or falls under the standard of the West from the ones that emerge outside and do not follow the same logic. The group thus tries to present the cosmopolitanisms that do not spring from "the capitalised virtues of Rationality, Universality and Progress; nor is it embodied in the myth of nation writ large in the figure of the citizen of the world" (Breckenridge et al 2002: 6) The group relates the mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism with neo-liberalism, capitalism, globalisation, colonialism and modernity since all share

the same logic of the individualism and universalism. For them, individualist, universal norm and the struggle for equality as universal norm represent the neo-liberal cosmopolitan thought founded on a conformist sense of 'person' as abstract unit of cultural exchange (2002: 5), an account quite similar to that of Douzinas for the relation between abstract individual and legal rights facilitating business deal. For them, the struggle for universal equality which is the heart of late liberal theory is "tethered to a tenacious ethnocentric provincialism in matters of cultural judgement" (2002:5) The group argues that this is the discriminatory perspectives of an old globalisation and colonialism which revive themselves in the form that makes people consider themselves as citizen of the world (2002: 5). Each contributor tries to suggest that Western cosmopolitanism in the form of language (see Pollock) Marxism (see Chakrabarty) democracy (see Mignolo) is all homogenising.

Not only has the non-West been articulating this voice, Western thinker like Pieterse also thinks that the conventional cosmopolitanism has a strange double life for while it claims universality it reflects a parochial order (2006: 1252). He observes that all the expression of cosmopolitanism i.e. world citizenship, human rights, capabilities, entitlement as well as its theoretical lineage from Aristotle, Stoic, Renaissance, Kant, Rawls, Derrida, are all Western (2006: 1251). He points out that they all share the structure that can be summmed up as from Plato to NATO (2006: 1252). Pieterse believes that this brings about a cultural monotony and serves as the boundary making discourse; moreover, cosmopolitanism is often cosmopolitanism from above, considering the example of human rights discourse from the UN which set the 'standardisation of the dissent' from cultures that do not share this way of thinking (2006:1253). He further criticises the 2004 Human Development Report and its statement; "The central issue in cultural liberty is the capability of people to live as they would choose with adequate opportunity to consider other options" (UNDP 2004:17 in Pieterse 2006: 1253) that this declaration of identity to be a matter of individual choice is the imposition of liberalism as a general framework. According to him this is not essentially different from IMF and World Bank giving their structural reform to keep stabilisation. Nussbaum's capabilities approach is also criticised in the same manner by Gaspar (2006) for its nature of imposition from above. According to his observation on her argument in coming to terms

with what is in her proposal, the 'we' who realises the conclusion is not all people who voice their demand but rather a "group of educated governors" (2006: 1238).

On the issue of philosophical debate which closely related to the issue of imperialism and homogenisation of modernity expressed in the form of cosmopolitanism, mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism's rationality and its concept of self has been criticised from different points of view. Starting from the critique of communitarians who reject the impartialist position of cosmopolitanism and argue for culturally embedded self, communitarians reject that self can be removed from its social context and still possess a rich enough embodiment of who one is in order to arrive at moral decision (Erskine 2002:461). This stance subscribes to the idea of individual as a member of community, in contrary to autonomous agent of classical liberalism. Individuals should be loyal to their own community and culture as the source of their identity. Communitarians maintain that each culture is incommensurable and equally worth, thus, it is very crucial to maintain cultural diversity. Communitarians like MacIntyre concede to relativism and moral parochialism and tend to reject the potential of ethical cosmopolitanism while being critical towards attempt of an ethical perspective to transcend the particular loyalty (Erskine 2002: 462). Other communitarians like Walzer (1983) discard the quest for a universal justice. For him justice is how each community understands its concept of social good and that individual cannot step outside his history and culture and have a perspective external to the community. Communitarian standpoint stems from hermeneutic-linguistic relativism against modern rationalism which argues for universality of reason. This relativism is based on the idea that truth or the world as we know is the description of the world that each of the linguistic communities employ, individual's understanding about the world is restricted by his community's idea about it. This makes communitarianism affiliated to some postcolonial and postmodern writers who hold that cosmopolitanism and liberalism are a form of Western culture and it is difficult for a thinker who belongs to that tradition to come up with something out of their discourse (see the argument of Mignolo 2002: 159 & 170). Postmodern theorists, for example, Butler and Putnum (in Cohen 1996: 44, 95) criticises Nussbaum's universalism of morality by insisting that 'the universal' proves to be culturally variable and has no transcultural status.

Multiculturalists have affiliated themselves with the communitarian concept of self and community, for both share that individuals grow up and live within a culturally structured world which gives them the system of meaning and significance. Different cultures have different systems of meaning and visions of good life. For liberal multiculturalist[8], cultural diversity is desirable to enhance the richness in individual's life, for each to extend his intellectual and moral horizon (Parekh 1999). Moreover, individual self-respect is pertinent to recognition of her community and culture. For Parekh, cosmopolitanism ignores the attachment to one's community and can influence an unrealistic pursuit of the abstract ideal of universal well-beings (Parekh 2003: 12). Many liberals recently agree with this flaw in liberalism of not giving enough consideration to the fact that individual and the others in the community are dialogically constituted (Hall 1998: 28). Ignorance to cultural differences and importance of community to individual generates defensive reaction in the form of fundamentalism and nationalism (Parekh 2003: 15).

Sharing the view that mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism carries the element of dogmatic Western imperialism, Connolly (2000) chooses to focus his criticism on the logic of reasoning. He sees the problem in Kant's way of reasoning and analyses the relation between Kant's concept of morality and his injunction to cosmopolitanism. Kantian morality takes the form of categorical imperative that is applicable universally. By this logic of reasoning, there is only one way and one outcome of thinking and those who do not reach the same result and think in the same way are mistaken. Connolly maintains that Nussbaum's capacities approach although she appreciates both 'universal and particular' is still not good enough, for it also follows a way of reasoning, that he terms 'single entry orientation'; that is, it applies what one thinks as applicable to everyone without the second thought that the others may also justifiably think in a different way on the same issue. This orientation does not only belong to Kant and Nussbaum, other neo-Kantians also share the same way of coming to term with their moral proposal. Connolly insists that Nussbaum's list contains highly contestable elements and can find disagreeing expression within and across cultures. He further

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[8] Multiculturalism has many stages of development according to Kymlicka (2002: 327-376) starting from situated within the frame of communitarianism to liberalism and in response to nation-building

claims that the way Nussbaum always criticises those who disagree with her approach as relativist or lacking compassion sounds similar to what Augustine represented the pagan who did not endorse his universal God (2000: 607). Connolly holds that this view is untenable and implausible. Having different view points also depends to some extent on identity and culture which affect individual world view and context of reason. According to Mehta, cultural norm and practices exist in a context of reasoning and deliberation; "cultural practice is a kind of social interpretation of goods and as such it may have a rationale" (2000: 625) He claims that in the activity of giving reason, the embeddedness of culture does not count on a definite, universally good reasons, instead, it claims only that they stand in the space of reasons.

This view corresponds with Falk and Wallerstein (in Cohen 1996) who criticise context-independent choice of the subscription to cosmopolitanism or nationalism. Wallerstein does not think that it is viable to evaluate cosmopolitanism and its adversary like patriotism in abstract or universal term. He argues that in our deeply unequal world the options vary according to social location in power structure. Cheah (1998) also agrees with this position by employing the example of postcolonial countries which opt for nationalism against capitalist imperialism in the condition of economic disadvantage in the free market world. Cosmopolitanism cannot provide a satisfactory alternative for everyone. Nationalism and cosmopolitanism can be both emancipatory and constraining depending on particular condition of agent.

This point is also related to liberal nature of imposition from above which is presented by Gaspar from his critique of Nussbaum's argument in *Frontiers of Justice*, for how the educated governors really know what all other people want as well as their limitation and different contexts which define what is desirable as well as how to pursue it. Also, considering this point from a democratic perspective, Calhoun claims that the very idea of democracy suggests that it cannot be imposed from above simply as a matter of a rational plan but must grow out of the life world (1998: 92). For some, liberalism and democracy can have a conflicting relation. Mainstream liberalism is grounded on the idea that there are some fundamental and inalienable rights which cannot be changed because they are founded on natural law. In liberal constitutionalism what is right or wrong is pre-given and is translated by judge while in a democracy the source of law is people.

Ackerman in proposing the idea of rooted cosmopolitanism (1994) criticises how American constitution falls under the shadow of liberal foundationalism which blinds people from the fact that constitution is the product of ongoing struggle of people across generations rather than a timeless philosophy of rights. While Dryzek maintains that what rights mean in particular case should not be limited to judicial consideration but should be discussed in a wide-ranging political debate, for, they only have a real force by reflective acceptance of the citizens who take advantage of these rights for themselves and respect them as being held by others (2000: 13).

So far, mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism have been criticised on many issues that can be summed up again here as representing Western centric order, advocating imperialism, aiming to homogenise and marginalise the differences, grounded on the idea of free-floating self, single-entry reasoning and undemocratic way of thinking. All these critiques lead to the quest for new cosmopolitanism and modified position from the mainstream camp trying to escape these flaws. These various new conceptions of cosmopolitanism are different according to their underlying ideas about self, its relation to culture and community, reasoning and universality which initially define the critiques they endorse against mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism. Also these new conceptions aim to mend the social conflict believed to occur from the old understanding of cosmopolitanism.

Redefining Cosmopolitanism

For the-Western theorists who consider that the mainstream ideal of cosmopolitanism to be the discourse on universality and homogenisation rooted in the particular culture of the West and seeks to affirm Western superiority and reinforce imperialism, criticality and reflexive distance have been proposed to dissociate cosmopolitanism from this project and the false universality. Canto thinks that the best approach is to distance ourselves from the cosmopolitan ideal by borrowing from it what can be of real help for the world, for example, universality of human rights, global definition of problem and solution, and internationalisation while we should remain critical to the illusion that the cosmopolitan ideal carries within it (2006: 283). According to Canto, cosmopolitan morality instead of leading to perpetual peace can be a condition for unlimited violence due to its potential to

homogenise the world (2006: 283). Recognising this, Venn proposes that Derrida's idea on hospitality and philosophy can be of real help. Hospitality in this case covers treating stranger as a member with the granted power to give opinion (2002: 73). As for philosophy, Derrida maintains that it is the discourse to be able to critique and analyse the problem of humanism and universalism of humanities. The right of philosophy in the cosmopolitan case is the right to interrogate international institution on their responsibility for human rights and universal history (2002: 73). This philosophical critique would focus on deconstruction of the hegemonic discourse in the model of colonialism. This would allow a non-Eurocentric model to appear (2002: 75). Venn subscribes to Derrida's idea of 'cosmopolitanism to come' in which the ethics which should guide the cosmopolitan future should be a non-prescriptive, negative ethics grounded on the recognition that consciousness of temporary is fundamental and defining attribute of human beings (2002: 78). Derrida's "cosmopolitanism to come" is also proposed by Douzinas for contemporary period. Although Douzinas focuses his work on human rights, he shares the same approach with Venn in looking at cosmopolitanism and its relation with modernity. However, he goes further to state that humanity and rights are groundlessness and argues with Nancy's statement that in the present period "the metaphysics of our age is the deconstruction of essence and of existence as sense" (2007: 291). Douzinas follows Derrida in trying to search for universalising impetus of cosmopolitanism in the Stoic tradition. He holds that we should invent or discover in the European genealogy of cosmopolitanism whatever goes beyond and against its institutionalisation and proposes that the cosmopolitanism to come rests on the idea of respecting the other as other who we can never really know with his singularity and realising that our being with the other is being together (2007: 294). Douzinas announces that "cosmos to come is the world of each unique one, the polis, the infinite number of encounter of singularity" (2007: 295) and "the principle of cosmopolitanism to come : the other as singular, unique finite being putting me in touch with infinite otherness, the other in me and myself in the other" (2007: 296). Derrida's ideas of hospitality, philosophy and cosmopolitanism to come suggests dialogue of voicing and exchanging criticism, as well as, openness for criticism from 'other' which can be other person or cultures. This idea also sets the framework of new universalism based on present moment.

Criticising 'single entry' way of reasoning in Kant, Nussbaum and others who claims universality in their proposed morality and a form of Western culture it carries within, Connolly (2000) holds that genealogy, deconstruction and political disturbance can help to select some elements of thick universalism and put them into question. In this way, the regulative universal thoughts can be a positive guide and inspiration for other perspective and culture to come with the comparative contestability and to explore the creative lines of connection to other orientations (2000: 611). However, learning from Kant's case and not being sure that several parties can relax their demand that all others have to subscribe to their transcendental, universal belief to come to term with the affirmative negotiation, Connolly finally requests for agnostic respect across the line of differences.

Not only criticality but also inclusion by way of dialogical exchange and challenge are adopted by Venn and Connolly as an alternative for contemporary cosmopolitanism. Inclusion and engagement with other perspectives are the way to cope with conflict of identity and differences as well as to get away from Western parochialism of cosmopolitanism. Pieterse proposes emancipatory cosmopolitanism which engages alternative *cosmovisions* beyond Eurocentrism (2006: 1255) to deal with the nature of cosmopolitanism as European-ethnocentric in disguise with its consequence of creating ethnic conflict, as well as, its top-down implementation. He thinks that we can ask for the concept of universal and global harmony, the idea of hospitality, vision of humanity and human flourishing, for example, from the viewpoint of other cultures in order to yield a multicentric perspective of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan vision should embrace "experience, practices and making world citizenship of diaspora, migrant, traders and so on who have been traversing the world for ages" (2006: 1254). Thinking in the similar way as Pieterse, Asian theorist like Giri (2006) feels that much of the cosmopolitanism revival is drawn from only one trajectory that is the West and fails to build upon different traditions of cosmopolitan thinking and experimentation. He proposes multiversality which does not begin with an opposition between universal and particular but seeks to explore and understand if there is a yearning for the universal in one particular culture. It draws several contemporary efforts to rethink universality (2006: 1284).

Arguing for the significance role of cultural identity and community in individual life, Hall (2002: 30) proposes that we need a kind of "vernacular cosmopolitanism" to be aware that individual is a part of community and constructed by it. It is also the viewpoint which forwards that there are limits in the way of thinking of any one culture and identity to be applied for the wider scope. Hall thinks that cosmopolitanism should be the combination of equality and difference; that is the respects for cultural difference while maintaining the rights of individual to exit (2002: 30). Hall maintains that there needs to be a framework of what is good and right when communities need to live together and to come up with this conclusion, agnostic democratic process is needed to find the horizon within which the contending or contesting differences could be reconciled (2002: 30-31).

Calhoun (2002) also suggests the need for a dialogic to deal with the perceived relationship of cosmopolitanism with capitalism and imperialism. However, considering the status of cosmopolitanism in the present time and the need to construct global co-operation, we should first differentiate cosmopolitanism and democracy from capitalism and Western hegemony. Calhoun (2002: 108) points out that if cosmopolitanism wants to flourish and be open for all diverse identities and circumstances it should dissociate itself from neo-liberalism and encourage more discursive engagement across lines of difference to construct social solidarity with deeper recognition of significance diverse starting points and outcomes. In this way, Hall and Calhoun seem to believe that despite differences, agreement can be reached.

However, Mehta (2000) does not agree with this possibility of engagement. For him different backgrounds can create obstacles in understanding each other. Although dealing with the same issue of universality, Mehta adopts the solution quite different from Connolly. While Connolly doubts if each can relax with own universal belief in order to come to the conclusion in negotiation, Mehta believes that cosmopolitan claim that we can discuss, evaluate and understand as well as combine practices from the various range of culture is implausible due to the incommensurable background (2000: 625-630). He argues that for others to understand or be convinced by the particular reason behind the practice of one culture, they need to share a form of life which constitutes the structure of reason (2000: 627). Mehta believes like Connolly that the exercise of reason can result in plural outcome and it is not implausible to say that the

plurality is the outcome of reasonable thought. He argues that while modernity obliges people to conform to the particular view of the world, what is demanded is a commitment to pluralism not to see difference as mistake. Believing in universal capacity of every society or critical mind, Mehta instead suggests that cosmopolitanism depends on the possibility of reflective distance from one's own culture (2000: 264) and to understand that dealing with matters like the meaning of life and practices expressing those meaning, the conclusion of reflection may be different (2000: 628). In this way, Mehta's proposal suggests solidarity based on respecting the boundary of difference in the way of life of other culture without attempting to intervene and transcend it. Reflective distance from one's own culture as cosmopolitan virtue is also proposed by Turner (2002) as a starting point for everyone to respect other culture (2002: 56). However, Turner believes that there is a strong consensus against human suffering and he sees the possibility to build up cosmopolitan principle by using human physical vulnerability as a starting point (2002: 56).

Mehta considers the nature of culture in a way contrary to that of Robbins and Clifford. Robbins agrees with Clifford's view on culture that all are mobile, fluid, hybrid and inclusive (1998: 258). Refusing the abstract self detached from the influence of cultures and circumstance, as well as, accepting that all universals are particular in disguise (1998: 249), Robbins argues that, however, there is ethnocentrism not only in the West but everywhere including in the Third world. He thus endorses Clifford's cosmopolitanism identified as postcultural space where there is potential for subject and object of description to be reversible, where mobility and comparison are not observed and done by one side and where the word local loses it contrastive force (1998: 258). He also puts forward the idea of comparative cosmopolitanism identical to Clifford's proposed discrepant cosmopolitanism by which he identifies as it is the way one, instead of discarding cosmopolitanism as a false universalism, embraces it as an impulse to knowledge shared with others, an attempt to transcend partiality which is partial but "no more so than the similar cognitive strivings of many diverse peoples" (1998: 259). In conclusion, his cosmopolitanism is the condition of various cultures aiming to move away from ethnocentrism by learning and criticising the universal of other cultures and compare it with their own that may lead to improvement and mixing of cultures.

The same issues have been treated quite differently by the postcolonial group in *Cosmopolitanisms*. While most criticising the mainstream concept of cosmopolitanism are still concerned about the issue of global solidarity, humanity and human well-being and focus their criticism on the monopoly role of the West in defining these elements, the group tries to propose many forms of cosmopolitanism challenging the traditional understanding of cosmopolitanism which has uniform nature claiming universal application. Pollock (1998) focuses on cosmopolitanism in the form of language to propose the cosmopolitan vernacular. He compares the two cosmopolitan languages from two different worlds; Roman and Sanskrit. The two languages provide different natures of the two cosmopolis, while Roman maintains its unified form, Sanskrit immediately mixes with the local in terms of its presence in different scripts and usages varying up to the local context. Abbas (2000) chooses to present cosmopolitanism in the situation of force from colonialism. The example here is the eclectic nature of cosmopolitan urban cultures in Hong Kong and Shanghai. These places represent appropriation by the local of element of foreign culture (2000: 775), for example, the mixture between local items and Western setting in the museum, the rule breaking of telephone users in the traditionally high-class restaurant due to necessity of their new capitalist life. Mignolo (2002) talks about the new era of the postmodern/postcolonial moment, which replaces the modern/colonial world, and in which cosmopolitanism and democracy can no longer be articulated from one single point of view. He proposes critical cosmopolitanism and new democratic projects which imply negotiating the coloniality of power and the colonial difference in a world controlled by global capitalism (2002:178-180). Mignolo puts Zapatista's incorporation of democracy as an example of the critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism. For him, Zapatista has used the word democracy imposed by political hegemony but does not bend to its mono-logic interpretation. Democracy for Zapatista, according to Mignolo, is not conceptualised according to European political philosophy but in terms of Maya social organisation based on reciprocity, communal instead of individual value and wisdom rather than epistemology (2002: 108).

The main aim of this group is to provide these cosmopolitanisms as examples of the new understanding of the term, and to check the homogeneity imposed by coloniality and its top-down nature of imposition of the official and the outside (Pollock 2002: 47).

While they still accept the reality of hegemonic power from the West and the inescapability of taking that imposition. For them, cosmopolitan should be the producer of civilisation (Pollock 2002: 43) as negotiator between multiple and sometimes conflicting paradigms (Abbas 2000: 775) of the imposed global and local culture. Cosmopolitanism should be the project in which everyone participates instead of "being participated" (Mignolo 2002: 182). It should be projected from particular local histories positioned to devise and enact global designs (Mignolo 2002: 182).

There are various critiques of mainstream cosmopolitanism's claim of universality being shown as the examples here. The critics also try to suggest the new understanding of cosmopolitanism in different ways. Now the problem is which critiques and suggestions we should assume to be the new understanding of cosmopolitanism that gives a better offer than the criticised mainstream cosmopolitanism? To answer this question we should also be critical to these critiques and critically re-examine the limits of cosmopolitanism and evaluate the newly suggested ideas of cosmopolitanism.

Chapter 3

Re-examining the Limits of Cosmopolitanism:

A Response to the Critics

New cosmopolitanisms are trying to escape the Eurocentric characteristic of the classical mainstream cosmopolitanism and its hidden agenda of imperialism. Criticality, reflexive distance and deconstruction, as well as, dialogue have been employed in different ways to propose new cosmopolitanisms that move away from the high-mind ideology and its project to attitude and new way of defining cosmopolitanism based on experience, practices from various different cultures. Malcomson (1998: 238) observes that the present trend of cosmopolitanism is one of dialogue and popularised, driven away from the intelligentsia's traditional monopoly. In general, the tendency is that the critical viewpoint can help to see the false universality of ethical universalism in liberal cosmopolitanism as well as the imperialist project hidden behind the use of cosmopolitan ideology in the present time. Being critical to one's own culture can also be a starting point in respecting and understanding other cultures. Dialogic interaction in exchange, competing, and join in the definition and understanding of cosmopolitanism helps broaden and falsify the particular idea of universal.

However, we can see that the ideas of new cosmopolitanisms are based on different critiques against what they disagree in the mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism, thus critical viewpoint and dialogue are proposed for employment in different way. For example, regarding the relation between cosmopolitanism, universalism and Western hegemony, different treatments like distance (Canto), dissociation (Calhoun), deconstruction and cosmopolitanism to come (Venn and Douzinas) and counter-Western/modern definition (postcolonialists in *Cosmopolitanisms*) are suggested. The difference stems from the way cosmopolitanism is perceived, as well as from the problem and cause considered primarily. For Canto (2006) the fundamental problem is the cosmopolitan ideal which believes in superiority of the universal to the particular and its global homogenising tendency, while he thinks that other aspects of cosmopolitanism like internationalisation, the attempt to deal with global problems and even universality of human rights should be preserved. On his side, Calhoun accepts that liberal

cosmopolitanism is rooted in ethical universalism which overlooks importance of cultural identity and particularity (2002: 99-100). For him, it shares a fundamental ground with neo-liberalism that is the contractarian idea of individual interest and proto-utilitarian calculus (2002: 100). But he does not think that cosmopolitanism and imperialism or capitalism are the same thing. For him, "cosmopolitanism is not responsible for empire or capitalism ... but neither is it an adequate defense" (2002: 104). Seeing the problem in this way urges him to suggest that cosmopolitanism should be disentangled from neo-liberal capitalism, namely by having more commitment to reduction of material inequality as well as seeking engagement with other cultures (2002: 108). While Canto (2006) identifies cosmopolitanism by its homogenising characteristics, Calhoun sees cosmopolitanism as unity amid differences which is based on his idea that cultural identities should be available to individuals as lifestyle choice (2002: 91).

It is not only Canto who views cosmopolitanism in this way, but also Venn and the postcolonialists in *Cosmopolitanisms*. Venn (2002: 66-68) and the postcolonial group (Breckenridge et al 2002: 1-13, Mignolo 2002) share the same idea in seeing that Western cosmopolitanism is intrinsic to the discourse of modernity whose philosophical homogenisation and colonialism constitute the same project of transforming cultures to cosmopolitan culture. Considering the problem of cosmopolitanism as lying in the discourse of modernity, Venn thus proposes postmodern ethics (2002: 75), while the postcolonial group chooses to highlight modernity as Western and proposes the non-Western cosmopolitanisms. Douzinas (2007) may see cosmopolitanism in a slightly different way from Venn and the associated group, since he prefers cosmopolitanism in its original Stoic form before it degenerated into the modern form (2007: 294) But his account of the application of cosmopolitanism with the institution of modern law and politics which is based on the modern idea of individual and humanity suggests the close relation between the modern discourse and imperialism and leads him to adopt postmodern ethics like Venn.

What is very interesting is that these theorists come up with different understandings of cosmopolitanism although all employ the same line of historical study which starts from the Greek origins in their arguments (Canto 2006, Calhoun 1998, Pollock et all 2002: 1-13, Venn 2002, Mignolo 2002). Douzinas (2007: 294) considers

Diogenes and Zeno's cosmopolitanism and its imaginary "polis in the sky' as uprooting every city and contesting all sovereignty and hegemony, while historian of political thought like Sabine (1961) regards it as the starting point of universal law and humanity; or putting in another way, the universalism which is contested by many theorists here as the source of homogenising project of modernity. Taking a look at Anderson's view of cosmopolitanism (Anderson 1998), following the same line of history, she presents cosmopolitanism endorsing reflective distance from one's cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and custom and a belief in universal humanity. However, according to her, the relative weight assigned to these three constitutive elements can vary as can the cultural identities against which 'reflective distance' is defined. She further elaborates that in the ancient time cosmopolitanism of Cynics and Stoics was the cosmopolitan detachment defined against the restrict perspective and interest of the polis, in Enlightenment it was defined against the constricting allegiance of religion, class, and the state, while in the present era it is defined against those parochialisms arise from extreme allegiance to nation, race and ethnic (1998: 267).

Considering the various definitions and what cosmopolitanism refers to, as presented in the previous chapter, we are now in a position to thinly recognise it as global solidarity or solidarity beyond frontiers rather than homogenisation and imperialism. It is quite obvious that cosmopolitanism is not identical to colonialism, Western imperialism, homogenisation and modernity although they can be related in some points. However, what is an issue here is its morality, which has homogenising tendency, and the characteristics of universalism. Universal-natural law may be a shared belief of cosmopolitan morality, from Cynics to liberal cosmopolitanism, but only under the Church Regime that solidarity beyond frontier means one belief. Natural law in each period is identified differently. Voltaire and Montesquieu identified themselves as cosmopolitan and throughout their lives struggled for difference of belief and self-determination (see Martin 1962: 129). Montesquieu's idea of law suggests that the source of law is the law of nature; it is the social adjustment arising from the nature of things which is the sum of human rationality and their mode of life which is different in various circumstances (Maxey 1948: 307). Many figures and ideas of Western cosmopolitan are ignored when cosmopolitanism is discussed in the contemporary time. The focus tends to

be on Stoic and Kant as representatives of Enlightenment thoughts. However, although Kantian philosophy may come to the wrong conclusion of categorical imperative, Kant himself maintains that individual's ideal of life can be different and all have to respect each other as free and equal (Honneth 1995: 295). Kant's idea of hospitality, which entails that the host country has the right to tell the visitor to leave if it does not want to receive him - but not to harm or kill him, is considered by Martin (1962: 275) as meant to prevent the non-Western countries from Western imperialism. Contemporary liberalism is very well-entrenched with the respect for negative liberty. Positive liberty is rather suggested than imposed by force. These informations seem to be ignored when cosmopolitanism, Western culture and modernity are equated by some cosmopolitan writers. Reducing cosmopolitanism, imperialism, modernity and liberalism to be the same project seems to be implausible when some elements contradicting this reduction are omitted. Criticality in this case should be pushed forward to see the flaw in the reduction that many critiques employ. For ideological self-criticism, we should follow Beck's suggestion that in the case of dilemma between morality and practice we should be concerned about the ideological *misuses* that a well-meaning cosmopolitanism makes possible (2006: 45) rather than refuse and reduce that ideology into the same thing as political manipulation and distortion of idea.

Another viewpoint which is common to the critiques of classical cosmopolitanism is that it is not a universal but rather represents a parochial order of the West. Said comments on cosmopolitanism that "the privilege of standing above cultural particularism, of aspiring to the universalist power that speak for humanity ... is a privilege invented by a totalising Western liberalism" (Saïd 1978: 265 in Robbins 1998: 255). The belief that universal aspiration is invented by the West is also untenable considering that every orthodox belief in the world, for example, religion, always claims universal validation and authority. Also it is odd to relate universalism and the search for the law to govern the world only to modernity, when the ancient of both East and West also has this characteristic in their account of religion and philosophy. Eastern theorist like Giri argue that modernity's rationality and idea of cosmopolitan solidarity can be found in Buddhism and Japanese Soka Gokkai and Gandhi respectively (2006: 1283, 1280).

Giddens's (1994) idea that the difference between traditional and modern lies in the monopoly claim of access to truth is more convincing. Giddens points out that in the traditional society the guardian of the community claims the access to truth and authoritative power while in modern time experts become a referent point of knowledge, but the fundamental difference being that their knowledge is open to contestation and scrutiny (1994: 190). Pathak thinks in a similar way about modernity, namely that it is related to the spirit of freedom rooted in critical consciousness and "to subject everything to scrutiny" (2006: 13). And if Mehta (2000) argues that criticality is what people in every society possess, then modernity is definitely not Western parochialism since its potential lies equally within every society.

It might be more useful to note that the mainstream understanding of cosmopolitanism is drawn only from the Western tradition and infused mainly by Stoic and Kantian thought. The idea of global solidarity and universal humanity originates before Diogenes and can be found everywhere (see Harris 1927: 1-4, Hadas 1943: 106, Giri 2006: 1280-3). Considering cosmopolitanism separately from Stoic and Kant can potentially free it from universalism and deviate the accusations to be against the specific strand, as well as, can emphasise the fact that there can be many ideas about cosmopolitan morality. What all cosmopolitan ideas share as the context is the coexistence of people of different cultures and circumstances and the main mission is how to promote the solidarity among the difference. Each cosmopolitan idea should be considered as an attempt to achieve this aim. Evaluation should be done by considering advantage and drawbacks in each of them. However, when the discussion moves to liberal cosmopolitanism and its value of democracy, rights, liberty and individualism considered to be of the West (see Himmelfarb in Cohen 1996) the claim is clearly refuted by Sen (Cohen 1996: 177) and Turner who argue that 'not all form of Western rights are individualistic and not every instance of Asian thought is communal"; "the sharp distinction between the two tradition is bogus" (2002: 46).

This argument can be linked to the next argument, about the boundary of reasoning which is intrinsic to the idea about self and culture. Here there are two ways of understanding. The first is the modified liberal understanding, namely that the self is constituted by the community's culture but also has capacity to distance itself from the

native culture and to choose among many cultures what suits its plan of life (Parekh 1999, Kymlicka 1989, Hall 2002). The second view is from communitarianism, which tends to be pessimistic about, if not fully deny, the self's capacity to distance itself from one's own culture. Mehta's standpoint looks like falling between these two approaches, when he suggests the possibility of reflective distance and implausibility of understanding across the culture on the issue regarding the meaning of life. Mehta seems to be the only person here who refuses the dialogic engagement across cultures. Mehta proposes reflection with an ethos that is "mindful of the limit of reflective argument and committed to a pluralism that does not see difference as a mistake" (2000: 634). Mehta's standpoint leads us to several problems.

First, this statement can be assumed to be grounded on the premise that individual's argument is bounded by his incommensurable culture, thus it is implausible for someone to criticise other culture, and to have a different view is not a mistake. Since no one outside the cultural community can understand the meaning of the community's practice, there is no possibility of someone else becoming a member of a cultural community without being born into that culture. This logic cannot explain the dynamic dimension of culture, as well as the emergence of a culture; for example, how Mehta's case of *sallekhana*[9] (2000: 626) can be adopted by the first Jain follower?

Second, if the statement above is realised by everyone and no one can criticise other cultures, this will lead to relativism, which he himself seeks to avoid (2000: 630). Since relativism implies that there is no real value in the world including in what Mehta is trying to propose.

Third, Mehta's argument is based on cultural boundary of reasoning. If community is the only factor in providing individual 'structure of reasoning' (2000: 627), every member should define their meaning of life in one way. But what is that community in question, a nation, a religion, a local community or other sub-culture like gays or *goths*? Also it is quite obvious that in every society there are always people who think differently from the mainstream. Misunderstanding between people from the same community and different interpretations in one culture are also a normal social fact.

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[9] The Jaina practice of fast unto death for some select monks in their final stage of life. It shows the vision of no finality in death and the commitment to non-violence (see Mehta 2000: 626).

Moreover, culture is not the only element that defines meaning or a way of life of a person. Each person has a different context of life, i.e., intelligence, education, experience, circumstance and so on which makes each life different. People from the same family having different way of life and thinking is very common while it is also very normal that people always say "no one understands me" to a friend, family and other member of the society. People from different culture and language can understand each other in something and people from the same culture may not understand some unique condition of a life. Moreover, a person can have many identities and solidarities. Mehta's request for cosmopolitanism of reflective distance and pluralism should be applied rather to the individual than to the community level.

Fourth, what is the referent point of self when it takes reflective distance? Is it still within the hermeneutic realm of the linguistic community or it occupies the location beyond? To come to the point that people may have different reflection about meaning of life and the practice and that all the different reflections are equally justified, one has to go beyond own cultural experience to see that people from other culture think different and understand that there is reason behind the difference like there is in his culture. There are two ways to come up with the conclusion that different reasons of different cultures are equally valid; first, by deontologically subscribing to relativism, and second by having the criterion to judge that all the different reasons can equally reach. The first way does not constitute the feature of reflective distance. The second way is to find a standard in judging that all equally false or correct. Both ways go beyond culture, employ generalisation and claim universal application. Coming to the conclusion of second position, the thinking self does not have the characteristics different from the free-float thinking self of liberalism.

The fifth problem is that the relativist principle can be respected as long as the sovereigns are totally independent because as soon as there is interaction or coexistence some mutual standards need to be set. For example, in the society which upholds the negative liberty may set the rule that everyone is free to do whatever as long as one does not harm the other. In that case the criteria of what harm is needs to be set. Mehta's proposal is not tenable by the fact that different cultures are now interdependent. Mehta

may want to draw the boundary to prevent cultural hegemony and intervention but his proposal is not plausible in many ways.

Considering cultural community as the sole border of solidarity, identity and meaning of life of individual have been challenged by many theorists. Nava's work (2002) presents dynamic interconnection between identification across community and distantiation within the culture by exhibiting the case that white women in 1950s identified their struggle for social and sexual power with black men (2002: 89-90) and the case of migrant and traveler who moves away from their countries because of their desire to escape from 'home'(2002: 90). In their proposal on cosmopolitanism, Nava (2002: 91) and Anderson (1998: 284-5) agree with Kristeva's (1993) employment of psychoanalysis to show that cosmopolitanism can be built by exploring the strangeness in oneself to realise that "only strangeness is universal and such might be the post-Freudian expression of Stoicism' (1993: 21). This view is similar to Derrida's idea of otherness in oneself put forth by Venn and Douzinas.

Vuola (2002) and Turner (2002) raise the issue of who has right to speak for whom; who represents and interprets culture and its identity? Turner agrees with Ignatieff who points out that the West listens to the fundamentalists too much although they are not the only voice of Muslim (2002: 55). Instead, Vuola thinks that we should consider, for example, that Middle East is a huge and heterogeneous space which cannot be bound only by a single Islamic metaculture while Catholic Church as well should not be identified only with the Vatican (2002: 180). Both suggest that the dilemma between universalism and cultural relativism should be abandoned. For Vuola, regarding identity like being a woman, we have to be able to talk about woman as a gendered human being and woman with different, plural and conflicting identities (2002: 181). In her observation, contemporary feminist movements maintain two positions; first, considering that culture is not a transhistorical, homogenous and immutable entity but is a crisscross by internal division including those of power; second, the consensus of what all women suffer as woman (2002: 182). In the same way, Turner also thinks that there is a strong consensus against human suffering from physical vulnerability which could be a starting point to build up human rights accountability (2002: 56). He agrees with Ignatieff that although there are cultural differences, human rights can be a minimalist defense of rights

that promote human agency and dignity (2002: 54). Universal nature of human beings and their being equally worth are also upheld by Parekh in his narrative of human nature although their singularity should also be considered (2003: 4-7).

We can draw all these arguments to liberalism. Liberalism tries to respond to the communitarian challenge by arguing that liberals also care about community. Feinberg (Feinberg in Hampton 1998: 185-6) and Kymlicka (1989) show that liberals like Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Rawls have talked about human nature which is related to community and culture constituting their life and identity. However, liberalism maintains that the most important unit of consideration is the individual and equal rights of individual should be respected. In this way, liberalism takes individual, community and universality of human nature all into consideration. If we endorse individuals' rights to form and change their plan of life as they see fit to be the core of liberalism, then Derrida's proposal about 'other as singularity' and other postmodern ideas of ethics from Adorno and Lyotard which revolve around the idea of heterogeneous and singularity (Honneth 1995: 289) need to be located in liberal society, where equal liberty is a fundamental principle. Derrida's concept of hospitality which includes the openness to criticism from the stranger suggests that there is something universal which enables people across culture to understand each other.

Thinking about culture and community in relativist terms has many problems and does not seem to offer a good alternative to approach contemporary global conditions. Moreover, thinking that there is something intrinsic to the West and East or any particular culture is also a myth. However, many of the theorists who engage in the discussion about cosmopolitanism, that we have explored in this chapter, seem to think in this way. The postcolonial writers in *Cosmopolitanisms* tend to focus on challenging the Western idea of cosmopolitanism. Apart from employing a crude generalisation in the account of what is the Western essence, they are not concerned about justifying why their cosmopolitanisms are better than the mainstream Western one, even in the specific contexts in which those cosmopolitanisms occur. In fact, their examples of cosmopolitanism are what can be found in every society: the mixture between cultures whether from the West or the neighbours. This goes against their objectives to "specify cosmopolitanism positively and definitely" (Breckenridge et al 2002: 1), for it tends to

agitate the division between East and West, rather than giving a sound critique to what is considered a problematic idea of cosmopolitanism. Reflective distance or criticality should be employed not only to Western idea of cosmopolitanism but for every society including one's own. Self-criticism can lead to acceptance and understanding of the difference of the other culture but this does not mean that criticism from the other should not be welcomed and there is no such thing as understanding across cultures. Thus, proposals from Turner, Hall and Calhoun seem to carry more potential than Mehta's.

Another legitimate critique against the mainstream cosmopolitanism is the way it comes to its rational conclusion. Connolly suggests a very interesting flaw in the mainstream reasoning. Single-entry reflection proves not to be the best approach. Although the agent tries to free himself from personal bias, his experience and information which provide the basis for the consideration generate different outcomes. Robbins provides a useful way to connect the thinking self, which tries to keep distance from its own culture while trying to come up with universal proposal, and various outcomes of reflection which still cannot escape their context of reason. Instead of falling back to relativism, Robbins protects his profession which involves universalisation by suggesting that we should keep in mind that there is partiality in our universal, however, we should never give up to be free from it and to try to transcend it by comparing, criticising and mixing with other universals. Not only being aware that our idea about the universal may be partial, but realising that what is universal now can be otherwise in the future (Connolly 2000: 609) is also what we should keep in mind. Connolly, Hall and Robbins have quite the same conclusion; namely, that the critique about oneself and the other is very important, and along with it an engagement with the others is equally important for exploring what could be shared as universal. Agnostic respect is crucial when dealing with different opinion but agnostic process in coming to terms with the agreement needed in the interdependent world is also important. Dialogic engagement is also oriented to democracy when the voices of all involving parties are heard and there is no monopoly of thought by a single party.

Preferably new cosmopolitanism can be summed up by the idea proposed by Hollinger. Hollinger suggests that cosmopolitanism should be located between the universalist and pluralist viewpoint. According to him, new cosmopolitanism should

discard the flaw of both traditions and keep their respective advantages. It should follow universalism with the suspicion of enclosures while engaging in human diversity and understand individual's relation to their community (2001: 239). While pluralism is oriented to the pre-existing group and more concerned to protect and perpetuate it, cosmopolitanism is oriented to individual and encourages change, mixture and new form of community (2001: 239-30). The proposed cosmopolitan outlook from Beck who claims that it suits the contemporary period of second modernity is mindful of this and tries to include elements from both classical and new cosmopolitanisms. The outlook includes diversity, dialogic engagement and critical view to enclosure, clash of cultures within one's life, globally shared collective futures, sense of global responsibility to the world risk, commitment to dialogue and against violence, and commitment to destroy faith in supposedly natural artifice of society (2002: 35-36). Beck contrasts this outlook with the nationalist outlook, characterised as distinguishing the clear boundary between homogenous units which are proposed as unchangeable in their natural essence. However, Beck seems to highlight some more issues that most of the new cosmopolitanisms tend to overlook that is the concern of collective future and risk.

It seems that most of the people who suggest ideas of new cosmopolitanism focus only on the flaws of mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism and its tendency to promote cultural clash as reaction to Eurocentrism and overlook other problems like environment, inequality and other global issues. Anderson (1998: 274-5) points out that "there exists a genuine tension between the universalist ethical assumptions of new cosmopolitanisms and their simultaneous desire to cultivate ethical practices that do not impose false universals. It is precisely this tension that has led to the distinctly casual normativity of the cosmopolitan." She further criticises that these new cosmopolitanisms try to escape neo-Kantian universalism as they do not assert normative claims against other positions (1998: 275).

As we have discussed, many proposals in new cosmopolitanism need the liberal society. There can be no diversity, no openness to critiques, different opinion and identity in a society where individual rights and liberty and basic human rights are not guaranteed. Moreover, most of the proposals which seek to infuse new cosmopolitanism with criticality, reflective distance and engage in the dialogue, are more advanced than

the social condition and normative outlook that mainstream cosmopolitanism tries to establish and which should serve as the precondition. If single-entry reasoning and top-down imposition of the cosmopolitan principles are the only real problem, we can avoid it by perceiving those principles arising from the academic realm as proposal for further discussion. Lately in her work on cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum also states that the allocation of responsibility for capability approach application in global structure is subject to change and rethinking and there is no coercive structure over the task (2005: 214). Also, she says that one might have twenty principles in the list (2005: 217), so anyone can suggest a different principle. Linklater in his later book about cosmopolitanism (2007) also employ Habermas' dialogic approach in forming a universalisable principle of cosmopolitanism based on solidarity of human vulnerabilities. For institutionalised principles like human rights, the institutional structure can be changed for inclusion of global participation like in the case of Charter 99 which emerged out of the international NGO movements.

Mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism has provided many solutions for dealing with human inequality and suffering of many forms. Inequality has contributed to global conflict as already mentioned. Dealing with global crises like environment, natural catastrophes and epidemic needs cooperation which should be based on respect and understanding that people from different places in the world are equal human beings whose different opinions are worthy of concern, and the belief that humanity can understand each other in a way that can lead to agreement. New cosmopolitanisms should not discard mainstream liberal cosmopolitanism's basic principle of universal equality because without subscribing to this idea what new cosmopolitanisms propose will be impracticable. Cosmopolitanism as ethical idea should be grounded on this equality which also covers respect of other's opinion and singularity, as well as, realising that one's belief to be good and right can be view different and proven wrong by other and over time. Communicating with another is the way to learn and understand the other, as well as, a mode of reaching agreement. However, this can happen when the concerned parties learn to distance themselves from their position and use imagination in trying to understand the other's position.

Chapter 4

Moving beyond 'Single-Entry' Cosmopolitanism
through Communicative Action

Before we proceed with the discussion in this chapter, let me summarise the issues we have discussed in the last two chapters. The second chapter focused on the universality claims embedded in the concept of cosmopolitanism and the attempts to refine the classic-mainstream cosmopolitanism. Some relevant issues, for example, the understanding about universalism of modernity and liberalism, the difference between Eastern and Western cultures and Western parochialism intrinsic to the classical idea of cosmopolitanism, the conflict between particularity and universality were also discussed in those chapters. All these issues stem from different understandings about self and knowledge which form the basis for the judgment about the possibility of cosmopolitanism universality. Not only do these epistemic understandings serve as the basis in judging the validity of the universal claim of each conception of universality, they also contribute to the promotion of cosmopolitanism as a preferable attitude in dealing with the others in globalised world.

The third chapter analysed the critiques of the universality claims and suggested that the clear cut difference between East and West preventing them to share the same idea about cosmopolitanism and to understand each other was untenable. Heterogeneity is intrinsic in every society while some commonalities between human beings can be found and they can serve as the link between them. The respect for difference should be primarily paid to the individual. Culture and community are given significance because they constitute individual identity and not that they are important *per se*. Although native culture and community constitutes self-knowledge and provides a description about the world, self's understanding about the world of individuals within the same community can still be different. Also, self can come up with knowledge that goes beyond what is provided by its native community both in the way of expanding and criticising it. The polarity between particularity and universality can be mediated in the way that every individual possesses the particularity while, by virtue of being human, all share some

universal traits which enable them to understand each other and form a shared universal idea.

Another issue that was discussed related to reasoning. Reasoning in modernity and the way mainstream conception of cosmopolitanism is conceptualised represents one-sided characteristic while it claims universal validity and application. This kind of reasoning has two problems; validity and legitimacy problem. For there can be different ideas about an issue and no one can be sure that his idea is correct without affirmation from someone else. In the case that there is no empirical verification or the argument accepted by other, one-sided claim cannot prove to be valid, or legitimate if the idea is subject to practice. Also, there are examples of the belief which was held right only to be proved wrong later. Moreover, the monologic nature of reasoning does not present the attitude oriented to democracy in which all other voices should be respected. At worst, it can exhibit the arrogance of perceiving oneself as superior. When it comes to the situation of living with other voices and cultures, the case can become sensitive and leads to conflicts of differences.

In the previous chapter, the debate on cosmopolitanism's universality comes to the conclusion that distancing and dialogical interactions across cultures are the elements that should be added to the mainstream liberal concept of cosmopolitanism, for we cannot abandon universal equality as the fundamental element of cosmopolitanism. Also it has been shown that the ethical projects put forth by the mainstream liberal cosmopolitan can still be reserved in the refined concept of cosmopolitanism which suggests that the project should be a proposal for discussion and endorsement and not the imposition of a single- entry reason.

Although, the distancing/reflective and dialogical cosmopolitanism has been proposed by the new cosmopolitans, it still lacks sophisticated explanation and theory to give the clear picture about how it practically works. Since the tendency of new cosmopolitanism seems to reflect the deliberative turn, this chapter will explore how communicative ethics and deliberative democracy, pioneered by Habermas, can make the redefined notion of cosmopolitanism advanced in the last chapter clearer. It also helps us appreciate and apply the new cosmopolitan attitude to the political institution.

Habermas develops his critical theory from the Frankfurt School theorists who criticised Enlightenment's rationality for its characteristics of instrumental reason that subjects objective reality outside the self to technological control. This instrumental reason stems from the thought that subject is the observer, autonomous and independent of the outside world. When there is no linguistically mediated interaction with other that can change the subject's relation to itself "of knowing and acting in isolation" into another way, the subject thus view itself as dominating counterpart to the world as a whole (Habermas 1987: 297). What Habermas tries to suggest is a way to replace subject-centered reason, which forms a crucial element of instrumental reason, with communicative reason.

Habermas describes the subject-centered reason as exhibiting exclusion of the other (1987: 303). The other in this sense can mean both the area outside reason, like sex, body or imagination, and the other subject. Kant's work, for example, is considered as the critique of reason from reason's own perspective. It is abstract and situated in the personal sphere (see in 1987: 301-306). Habermas agrees with Böhme brothers' analysis which argues that Kant's critique of reason in fact shows self-limitation of reason. For reason does not exist apart from its other. With the monologic way of exercising reason and by ignoring other domains outside reason, reason shows itself to be narcissistic, "an identifying, only seemingly universal power, bent upon self-assertion and particular self-aggrandisation, subjugating everything around it as an object"(1987: 305). Habermas argues that this exclusive character of reason is not confined only to modern rationality. Although, the critique of Western logocentrism pioneered by Nietzsche demonstrates that the subject positing itself in knowledge is in fact dependent upon prior, anonymous, and trans-subjective (1987: 310), Habermas points out that those who try to leave all paradigms to the clearing of postmodernity can still not escape from the concept of subject-centered reason (1987: 309). The critique of domineering thought of subject-centered reason can emerge in the *determinate* form only when it is replaced by intersubjective relationship between individuals who are socialised through communication and reciprocally recognise one another. By this mean, Western logocentrism can be diagnosed as a deficit of rationality (1987: 310). Habermas suggests that we move to the model of action oriented to reaching mutual understanding and

attitudes of participants who coordinate their plan of action by coming to an understanding of something in the world. This model is the model of communicative action.

Habermas claims that communicative action is what reflects our everyday practice and already happens in our everyday life when it comes to judging what is true or right. In general, communicative action involves four validity claims; namely, intelligibility of utterance, the truth of propositional content, the correctness of performatory component, and the sincerity of the speaking subject (Thompson 1981: 86). These validity claims can be proved only in the interaction with the other (Thompson 1981: 87). The successful exchange of speech-act takes place when there is mutual recognition that the statement is valid according to these four validity claims. Habermas' theory of communicative action presents the alternative terrain in mediating the modern rationality and its critiques by pointing out that in the speech act, the speaker engages with three worlds which contribute to the criteria of judging validity claims; the objective world, something in common social world, and something in his own subjective worlds (1987: 314). The common social world is the shared context of life, norm and value including the connection between meaning and validity or truth condition that individual learns from communication with others in society and is something that the individual gets from everyday life. This triangle shows the relation between subject and the outside world and how he or she comes up with knowledge about oneself and the world. Individual is embedded in the common social world he shares with others and draws from it as the resource of, for example, culture, tradition, value and pattern of interpretation (1987: 314) in constructing his identity, defining situation, socialising and coordinating with others. However, in so doing the shared common world mingles with his own experience and interpretation. This aspect is the subjective world that individual presents or hide to the public in the attitude of the first person (1987: 313).

For objective world, Habermas thinks that in general it is considered to be the correlative of all truth-asserted sentences (1987: 313). Pure validity claim of truth can be tested by referential objective world (Marti 2003). The knowledge about the objective world is related to the teleological reasoning which is fundamental to instrumental reason. However, in the communicative action, in which knowledge about situation,

mean and consequence considered as fallible and criticisable, the assertion about which mean is the best can be shown to be wrong by others (Warnke 1995: 124) as well as tested by experience and consequence. However, whenever normative rightness is introduced as validity claims analogous to truth, the argument in the discussion has to correspond with the objective fact that can be approved by the third person, the common social world that regulates interpersonal relationship of participants or relation between validity and meaning in the conversation which defines which utterance is legitimate or rational, and finally the subjective experience (1987: 313-314). For Habermas, in the context of communicative action, a rational assertion is not only the one that can provide appropriate evidence when challenged but also the one that, by following the established norm, can justify the act of assertion under the legitimate expectation of that given situation. (Warnke1995: 125). Reason, for him, is thus always situated in the context of communicative action and structure of the lifeworld of participants.

When subject asserts a statement as true and right, his thought reflects his idea about the common social world he shares with others, for what he asserts is what he believes that other will accept, as well as, that it can be proved to be right by everyone's objective experience and its consequence. We can also say that what subject asserts as true or right represents *his* universal idea. In the process of communicative action, what the subject thinks is true and right and will be accepted by others can be proved and modified in the discussion. Habermas believes that with this action, when participants come up with mutual understanding and agreement with the best argument available, the difference between the subjectively asserted thought of participants will disappear and what an individual thinks that he shares with others become one with what all really share. This reproduced common lifeworld serves as the common life world which will become the social context and standard of the next communicative action (1987: 299). With communicative action concerning with the normative rightness, common social norm can be affirmed, propagated, reproduced and changed. The integration of groups by norms and values, and socialisation of succeeding generation are also achieved by this mean (1987: 299). Mutual agreement in communicative action also exhibits the transcendental moment of universal validity when the local context of each participant is transcended across space and time that their plans and actions are interconnected. The

validity endorsed by this mutual agreement is the universality which is situated in the specific context where the claim is raised here and now (1987: 322-3).

Habermas' communicative explanation shows how subjective idea about common lifeworld may be different from what the common lifeworld is. For Habermas, individual speech not only reproduces a set of established norm and convention but also reinterprets, resignifies, modifies and discursively challenges such norm and convention (Benhabib 1999: 340). When what individual thinks and the product of communicative action can be different from the pre-existing common lifeworld, what serves as the criterion for agreement of the newly proposed idea when these situations suggest the clash between different ideas about common lifeworld? In general, Habermas insists that although common lifeworld tells us under what condition the meaning is valid for utterance but it does not make the meaning equal to truth, for it has to be justified by experience and able to deal with the coming up of counter-arguments (1987: 320). The criteria for validity of utterance or what utterance is considered reasonable can also be reformulated during the communicative action if participants have different ideas on this issue. This is possible under the condition of communicative rationality or when participants overcome their subjective biased view in favor of rationally motivated agreement in order to bring along the consensus with a decentered understanding of the world (1987).When agents with different ideas come together, during the argument they start to set some rules, for example, in the case of practical discourse, rules of inference or some forms of required evidence are formulated under the condition that these rules will be accepted by everyone involved and will enable agreement.

Habermas believes that there is the unity of reason found in the diversity of voices .This unity serves as intelligible passage from one language to another (Dallmayr 2001: 337) and enables the parties of different ideas or background to learn and understand each other (Dallmayr 2001: 340). In general Habermas thinks that concept like truth, rationality and justification, although applied and interpreted differently, play the same grammatical role in every language community (Dallmayr 2001: 341). This enables the parties to imagine themselves in the position of others and trying to understand the different ideas that the others present. Habermas explains that in communicative action oriented to reaching understanding, when the subject presents a statement, and the other

takes it up, the two enter into an interpersonal relationship. The two parties have to learn to transform into each other including to take up the perspective of the third person or impartial perspective of a possible third party. Not only that the hearer has to try to understand the speaker, but speaker also needs to think about what he says from the other's perspective both before and after the speech act while at the same time expect that it can also be accepted by everyone else as the third person (1987: 296-98). The hearer does the same when he turns to be the speaker by trying to understand, analyse, and come up with a reconstructed argument expected to be accepted also by the second and third person. When there is mutual perspective taking between the speaker and the hearer, the act of trying to understand other people will gradually widen the participants' perspective. And by bringing all perspectives together, there can be a development of a common horizon of background for an intersubjectively shared interpretation (Habermas 2003: 37). Moreover, dialogue between people can help individuals to realise how their moral choice and preferences reflect personal bias and local cultural influence that other may not share (Habermas 1990: 36).

Although communicative action, to some extent, is what already happens in everyday life, there is still what Habermas calls 'distortion' causing conflict and failure in reaching mutual agreement and understanding. Distortion in communicative action starts when mutual perspective taking between speaker and hearer fails to happen (Barradori 2003: 64). Distortion shares the same characteristic with subject-centered reason in which interpersonal relationship does not take place. To get away from distortion and subject-centered reason, some attitudes are required. In communicative action, participants need to take into account that symbolic reproduction of lifeworld and objective reality are interrelated and that their discourse is never definitely purified from personal motive and compulsion and that it is fallible (1987: 322-23). Also, for Habermas, true communicative action exists when there is no priori certainty about who will learn from whom and when they willingly engage in the reciprocal critique (1990: 26) which enables them to become aware and eliminate their "pseudo priori unconsciously recollected from their way of life" (1987: 299). This attitude reflects the inclusion of the other's opinion, one which is regarded as containing the potential best argument, and a willingness of participants to distance themselves from their own discourse in the attempt to understand

the other's perspective and employ it as a resource for self-critique. With this distancing capacity, "participants aim to be guided by nothing else except the force of the better argument" (Habermas 1990: 66, 89) and agree that norm will be valid when everyone affected gives consent (Linklater 2007: 51). This suggests that although participants know that their thoughts always contain something specific from their own context, they need to try hard for self–critique and to take up the other's perspective to come up with better argument that aims to be universal, which in this case can be accepted by the second and third person. Rationality in this paradigm is the capacity of responsible participants to orient themselves in relation to validity claims geared to intersubjective recognition (1987: 314), while rational beings are those who find themselves in intersubjectively shared lifeworld and assume this discursive responsibility (1989: 173).

Habermas' communicative ethics can fit well with the cosmopolitanism suggested in the last chapter. First, his theory of communicative action provides the mediation between universality and difference, as well as, how they should be perceived. Habermas theory speaks for modern plurality of reason (Carrol 1997: 80) while giving the explanation of how this plurality can be mediated with universality. Universality in Habermas' account can be considered in two ways. First universality presents in what we all share, for example, the unified characteristic that all different reasons share whether it is universal capacity of human beings to communicate (Marti 2003), the universal physical vulnerabilities (Habermas 1990: 205 in Moon 1995: 152), the reference to objective reality or the same grammatical role of truth, rationality and justification in all languages which enables people from different background to take up the other's perspective and come up with comparison and mediation. This universality provides the reason why falling into relativism is not the right answer to replace modern logocentrism. Second universality is the outcome of the mutual agreement from all affected agents in communicative action. This universality is situated in a context and indicates temporality. However, it is different from relativism, for the rational argument employed in communicative action is also concerned about objective truth and aims to be valid also for the third person or everyone else apart from the participants.

Communicative theory suggests that difference is everywhere, individual although situated and drawing interpretation and knowledge from society can have

different ideas from his compatriots while universality among people from different linguistic communities is also possible. Robbins'idea of comparative cosmopolitanism and the striving for universality discussed in the last chapter is similar to Habermas's account of universality achieved by communicative action. For, both subscribe to the idea that by exchanging knowledge with the other, one can modify and transcend one's own universal, which is partial in disguise, into something more universal or closer to real universality.

The relation between individual and community in the theory of communicative action also provides an explanation of individual's relation with community and the other in a compatible way with that of the lately modified idea of liberalism, Kristeva and Derrida. For although individual's identity and lifeworld are drawn from his community, his own narrative is unique in the way that it can reproduce, reinterpret, modify and challenge what he inherits from his own culture. The theory of communicative action can explain the dynamic of culture through the act of communicative action in everyday life. It can also provide a good ground against the boundary of identity and cultural egocentrism. Benhabib (1999) employs Habermas's account of speech act which is similar to that of Derrida in arguing against "self-enclosed identity" (1999: 353). Habermas also does not believe that any culture should be the locus of individual loyalty and solidarity. He considers individual as the prime unit of consideration over community when it comes to political rights, an aspect which will be discussed later in this chapter.

Habermas's critique towards subject-centered reason is tied with the idea of the other. As mentioned earlier, when Habermas criticises modern subject-centered reason and argues that reason cannot exist without its other, he suggests intersubjective relation through communicative action as the solution. The other of subjective reason is not confined only to irrationality but includes the reason of other human beings. The other can be in and outside oneself; irrationalities like emotion, instinct, suppressed and alienated by modern reason, and the other person or community considered as apart from the subject. For Kristeva (1993), strangeness is a common condition that everyone shares, whether in psychological term with other subject, the foreign element in national history or individual's strangeness toward one's own society. She thus comes to the conclusion that human solidarity can be built on strangeness. Habermas and Derrida with the

influence of psychoanalysis also accept the strangeness within the self and that there are some elements one shares with and are constituted by the other. What Derrida suggests is hospitality to welcome critiques from the other while Habermas goes further in using communicative action as the mediation between self and the others.

Habermas's communicative action offers the scheme in mending the flaw of subject-centered reason or what Connolly (2000) calls 'single entry way of reasoning' discussed in the last chapter. Single entry way of reasoning not only displays methodic problem, but is also intrinsic to undemocratic way of imposing idea and decision which affects people as a whole from above. This problem is solved when Habermas applies communicative action to politics by proposing deliberative democracy in which people can participate in public decision through discursive engagement in public sphere.

Habermas develops the idea of public sphere as a discursive space distinct and separate from economy and state, in which citizen participate and act through dialogue and debate (Kapoor 2002: 461). Deliberative democracy is a procedural model of democracy claimed to be the third way which combines the advantages from liberalism and republicanism while offering to correct the flaws of both. Republicanism in Habermas view has characteristics quite close to communicative action. In republican view, politics is the reflexive form of substantial ethical life in which members realising their interdependence come to act with full deliberation, as citizens, to shape and develop existing relations of reciprocal recognition (Habermas 1999: 240). In this system, the state's objective is not the protection of equal individual rights from external compulsion, as is the case in liberalism, but instead to guarantee an inclusive process of opinion and will formation where free and equal citizen reach mutual understanding on which goal and norm lie in equal interest of all (Habermas 1999: 241). The legitimacy of law in republicanism ties to the democratic procedure where integrity of individual and integrity of community gains significance through the citizen's practice of self-legislation (Habermas 1999: 242). However, Habermas thinks that republican model is too idealistic, for, it relies on virtue of citizen to devote for public will and he does not think that politics is the realm that gives primacy to the problem of ethical self-understanding. Also, republicanism rather works under homogeneous society than under condition of cultural and social pluralism in which political relevant goals often have interest and value-

orientation which are not the representative for identity of political community as a whole (Habermas 1999: 245).

The third way that Habermas offers is a mixture between the advantage of liberalism which provides rule of compromise and negotiation for different interests and republicanism which promotes democratic will-formation of ethical self understanding. Deliberative democracy integrates both into the concept of ideal procedure for deliberation and decision making. The procedure is grounded on the presumption that under such condition reasonable or fair result are obtained.

The fair procedure is what he calls ideal speech situation in which the public dialogue is free and uncoerced; that is, it is inclusive of everyone who is affected by the topic of discussion, and, it is free of coercion, deception, self-deception, strategising and manipulation (Dryzek 2000: 22); moreover, it is open and symmetrical by imposing no limit on the scope or agenda, topic open and determined by those participate and subject to revision if required (Kapoor 2002: 467). The communication in the public sphere has to be oriented to persuasion (Dryzek 2005: 224), understanding between individuals (Dryzek 2000: 22) and consensus. Thus, it is expected to induce reflection and have capacity to link particular experiences of individuals or groups with a more general point or principle (Dryzek 2005: 224).

Habermas' understanding of deliberative democracy existing in communicative action and operating in public sphere still keeps the structure of liberal legal institution. Habermas thinks that communicative power should influence the premise of judgment and decision making in the political system without intending to conquer the system itself (Dryzek 2000: 25). He explains that the public-opinion formation generates influence which transforms into communicative power through the channel of election, and then become administrative power through legislation (Dryzek 2000: 26). Habermas also emphasises that individual autonomy is crucial for the existence of public autonomy, and public sovereignty expressed in citizen participation in the public deliberation to influence government. Thus, rule of law as guaranteed by human rights and presented in those classical basic rights which protect the private autonomy of the member of society is essential. Liberalism provides the principles of egalitarian universalism and ethical individualism which are the essential condition for public opinion (Habermas 2005: 1-3).

Habermas explains that there must be a legal code in the form of political civil rights to allow citizen to come together to judge which law is legitimate (1999: 260). "Without basic rights that secure the private autonomy of citizen there is also no medium for legally institutionalising the condition under which these citizens , as citizen of a state, can make use of their public autonomy" (Habermas 1999: 261); also, for that institution legalised by the legal code, the status of legal person needs to be created. Habermas argues that citizen can sufficiently exercise their public autonomy only on the basis of their equally protected private autonomy while, on the other hand, a consensual regulation of their private autonomy is derived from the citizen's exercise of their political autonomy. Putting it in another way, the legal rights guaranteeing equal liberty of individual is the precondition for public deliberation of citizen to exercise their public sovereignty while on the other hand the content of the law regarding private autonomy can be shaped by public deliberation. In *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas even goes further to focus on judicial discourse and how to put collective decision to legal practice so that it does not conflict with the established rights (Dryzek 2000: 25). Assuming this aspect of liberalism also reflects in Habermas's idea of cosmopolitanism.

Habermas thinks that globalisation affects the function and role of nation-state which is crucial to the concept of self-legislation. He explains that for self-legislation of citizens to work, administrative state is needed as the monopoly of legitimate use of force and public power to levy tax. These two main functions are related to the implementation of positive law and the capacity of the state to provide welfare service to citizen. For citizen to participate in a democratic self-control, boundary is necessary, since self-legislation is grounded on a specific group of people who "are united by the decision to grant one another precisely those rights that are necessary for the legitimate ordering of their collective existence through the mean of positive law" (Habermas 2001: 63). Moreover, they need to feel privileged by the rights and benefit they receive as the citizen of that particular state. A collective belonging of being citizens in the same state, the solidarity which goes beyond their inherited loyalty of family or clan is also necessary. Nation-state serves as the locus of their identity and solidarity. Habermas points out that while people remain strangers to each other in the nation-state, they, at least, feel that they are the member of the same nation and "feel responsible for one another that they

are prepared to make sacrifice" (2001: 64). Finally, state is the political authority which provides and guarantees 'subject' the rights of human beings and citizen; the precondition for democracy and self-legislation.

Globalisation is eroding these elements in the nation-state; for example, there are many issues like environment, crime across borders and global economic network weakening the capacity of state's domestic policy and levying tax. These examples are unmanageable within a national framework and affect individual states in maintaining the internal order. Nature of national solidarity also changes when each society becomes more and more multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. Under these conditions, the important question for Habermas is how should we adapt to all these when nation-states increasingly lose both their capacities for action and the stability of their collective identities and find it more and more difficult to meet the need for self-legitimation (2001: 80)? He, then, attempts to provide the explanation on how to compromise between nationally based democracy and the reality of post-national decision-making (Scheuerman 2008: 134). Habermas comes up with the three levels of global governance where "nation-state still remains the most important actor and the final arbiter on the global stage" (Habermas 2006: 176).

Habermas suggests the constitutional or legal order without the state as the model for the multilevel relation. Habermas thinks that in the supranational level, modified UN reflecting democracy among members can serve as a single world organisation to secure basic human rights and preserve world peace. However, it should perform this role in the form of governance by laying down the fundamental universal principles rather than exercising political power or implementation of political program in the form of government (see Habermas 2006: 131). While in the transnational level, regional-interstate organisation, like EU, can take care about energy, environment, financial and economic policy by exercising cross-border regulation. He thinks that these organisations can act as global actors who are strong enough to implement policies across territories and deal with globalising effects (Scheuerman 2008: 139) as well as develop to the form close to federalism (Scheuerman 2008: 145). He believes that at this level the form of civil solidarity that has been limited to nation-state can expand to the whole region to serve as a basis for democratic will-formation and policy coordination (Habermas 2001:

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99). However, he does not think that this development can happen in the global level because the world organisation lacks a basis of legitimacy on structural ground. For, he argues that UN is still a loose community of states that lacks the quality of a community of world citizen, who can really participate in the democratic opinion and will-formation. Cosmopolitan democracy of world government is not likely to happen since it requires the creation of a new political status of world citizen without mediation through nationality, the voting for world representative, and court of criminal justice (2001: 107). Moreover, world organisation still lacks basis of legitimacy on structural ground. Political deliberation aiming consensus and self realisation tends to occur within the framework of shared political culture and common value-orientation. Without this the agreement tends to be produced by equalisation of interests in power politics (2001: 109). In global level this thick communicative embeddedness is still far from reality. Most importantly, Habermas thinks that any political community that wants to understand itself as a democracy must at least distinguish between member and non-member (2001: 107). This is what is missing in the inclusive community of world citizenship.

The global governance of human rights is rather a universal community of moral person which is different from legal community under administrative government. Habermas explains that although each nation-state assumes the universalist principles of democratic constitutional state prescribed by human right principles, they interpret and realise these principles in the context of their own form of life and history (Habermas 2001: 106). Supranational level and nation-state have a thin relationship through nation-state's adoption of human rights and democratic principles which will be interpreted differently in different states.

Habermas' account of the three-level system is rather a reflection of the present inter-state relation. The new suggestion is the concept of constitutional patriotism which reflects the relation between world organisation's governance and the states, as well as, an attempt to replace nationalism in the globalised world. Habermas proposes that the way human and democratic rights are interpreted in a state's constitution could serve as the new locus of civil solidarity instead of nationalism. He insists that the commonly shared symbol and identity or civil solidarity inspires rationally based loyalty of citizen and inculcates the sense of personal sacrifice in the name of common good (Fine and

Smith 2003: 470-71). Globalisation pressures lifeworld of each society to open itself to foreign and new forms of life. This pluralisation of life forms reflects the danger of fragmented society and the loss of social cohesion (Habermas 2001: 87) which is crucial for domestic self-legislation. The lifeworld then needs to reorganise the structure of self-consciousness, self-determination and self-realisation anew (Habermas 2001: 83) in a way suiting the new conditions. Habermas thus suggests constitutional patriotism as the new way that citizens of plural life forms can have a shared identity in their nation-state. Constitutional patriotism performs the integrative function when each national culture develops a distinctive interpretation and application of universal values and principles (Fine and Smith 2003: 471). Constitutional patriotism refers to both a shared attachment to the universalistic principle implicit in the idea of a constitutional democracy and the actualisation of these principles in the form of particular national institution. The relation between supranational governance expressing itself in human rights and democratic principles and nation-state's constitutional regulation rests on the concept of 'co-originality of rights and democracy' (Fine and Smith 2003: 473) and reconciliation between the ideal of cosmopolitan rights and political democracy (Fine and Smith 2003: 478).

How can Habermas' public sphere and his idea of post-national democracy contribute to cosmopolitan institutions? Habermas' theory of communicative action can offer the answer for what new cosmopolitans look for in terms of cosmopolitan attitudes and how we should perceive and discuss cosmopolitanism. For the attitudes, Habermas'communicative theory offers an explanation about the dynamic and dialectic relation between self, its identity, community and culture. It also shows that rationality, referring to the set of criteria for judging validity claims, has two characteristics; it is constituted by particular context of communicative action (cultural and objective reality) and universal patterns (of the four types of validity claims which are correlative to objective world and embedded in every communicative act). Moreover, it shows that communicative rationality is also grounded on intersubjective recognition, since what is rational cannot be justified by the speaker himself. Accepting this accounts serve as the basis in adopting communicative ethics based on mutual understanding, free speech act of all equal participants, fallibility of knowledge and agreement, and open-ended result.

These ethics can provide the appropriate attitudes for new cosmopolitanism of dialogue and reflectivity.

Communicative ethics is tied to institution since it suggests the open-ended character of intersubjective engagement in communicative action that requires a guarantee from the state that a fair procedure will be followed and that all affected agents will have the right to participate. Habermas deliberative democracy suggests that existence of public opinion and its autonomy requires the negative principle of liberal rights to guarantee private autonomy which is equally important. These rights can be guaranteed by universal human rights and democratic principles prescribed by the world organisation like UN. While Habermas thinks that the human right principles can be interpreted differently by different state, it still suggests that the framework is there in measuring which interpretation is within the framework and which one violates the principles. Especially when they are attached to private autonomy and freedom of expression necessary for participation in public sphere, they may not become so thin that interpretation in each place can be so different. Habermas seems to forget that the present UNDHR itself is still controversial and prescribing thick value with the detail of what ideal society should be. The problem is how can these universal principles be legitimate if the public cannot participate in forming and endorsing but can only accept them through the state as the mediator? Global problems, like environment, cannot be treated by regional inter-governmental organisation but world organisation like UN. So UN role is not really limited like Habermas thinks. Universal principles and environmental problem need discussion across boundaries to come up with agreement, solution and cooperation. Only forums attended by state representatives may not be enough. Deliberation in transnational public sphere is thus also important. Most importantly, dialogical cosmopolitanism can take place only in transnational public sphere which is not restrained to regional realm. This sphere is beyond the jurisdiction of a particular state, the latter cannot ensure the rights of participants and the fair procedure, nor can it transform the public opinion to practices effectively by itself. However, Habermas' idea of deliberative democracy and his global model does not seem to provide a good ground for global public sphere.

In Habermas' three-level system, citizen's self-legislation can really operate within the nation-state and hopefully can expand to the transnational level if the regional organization can develop into a federal-like system as in the case of EU. State is the main actor and mediation of public opinion when dealing with higher level organisations. This downplays the role of transnational public sphere in shaping decisions in all levels. This is the result of how Habermas crafts his deliberative democracy by tying public sphere with election and legislative process. In this way, public sphere is attached with citizenship of particular state. Moreover, Habermas seems to think, like Carl Schmitt (Fine and Smith 2003: 474), when it comes to global level that the precondition of solidarity requires boundary and the other whom global inclusion cannot provide.

Dryzek (2000) agrees with Habermas that global governance is presently more practical than global government but he thinks that Habermas deliberative democracy assumes too much characteristic of formal liberal institution. In general, the idea put forth by many deliberative democrats that deliberation can take place within representatives, the legal system, court and public hearing, and the form of deliberation in public sphere proposed by Habermas are not opposed by Dryzek (2000: 81). But he thinks that these institutions should not be thought of as the only home to deliberation and election is not the only possible mean of transmission of public opinion (2000: 171-72). For Dryzek "there is so much more in politics than election" (2005: 228). Deliberative democracy can be applied in transnational realm. He believes that if we think about democracy in terms of the ideal of a self-governing community within an exact territory, to extend it to international system will be difficult. In contrary, he believes that if we think about democracy not only in terms of voting and representation but also in terms of deliberation and communication, this extension is made easier (2000: 129). Dryzek emphasises that deliberation taking place in civil society can play a crucial role in mobilising the public issues and changing the content of public discourse. He thinks that participation in unrestrained discourse in civil society can develop individual capacity of deliberation and generate an authentic informed public opinion which would benefit the political decision making process as a whole (Bray 2006: 14). Dryzek argues that compared to the realm of states and their interaction, transnational civil society is the realm of unconstrained and un-coerced communication since actors are not bound by the reason of states,

international convention and future foes and allies (2000: 131). He also believes that transnational civil society can encourage the kind of transnational reflexivity that enables collective action stretching across state borders. The de-centered characteristics of deliberation in public sphere suit the transnational practice of fluid boundaries tending to be defined by issue-specific discourse (Bray 2006: 14). The channel of political influence can be extended to and from intergovernmental bodies, like EU, international NGO's, transnational corporations, and even other states (2005: 232) in transnational sphere. While at the same time deliberation in public sphere can also be facilitated and sponsored by these institutions (2005: 230).

While Habermas stresses the role of the rights of the citizen to participate in public deliberation and to use their vote as the mean of political influence, Dryzek believes in the communicative power to change the public discourse not only in civil society but also the mind set of decision makers who are actually also a part of society (2000: 126). Dryzek's work (see 2000[10], 2005) provides examples of the success of civil society movements either led by NGO's or initiated by people's network in influencing policy of many intergovernmental organisation, international organisation and states, to show that not only formal process like voting can induce political decision. Dryzek's standpoint on the role of civil society and its capacity to influence political decision through informal mean is generally shared by activists. Habermas (Scheuerman 2008: 139) lately accepts that the growth of NGO's, transnational activism and emerging global sphere have the capacity to reform organisation like WTO and help them to become more democratic.

Dryzek proposes that Habermas' concept of deliberation itself should also be modified when applied with trans-cultural environment. He thinks that Habermas' aim for consensus in deliberation may not be achievable in the transnational public sphere where opinion and cultural background of participants are plural. Workable agreement on a course of action with different reasons is more feasible (2000: 170). This is in fact also contained in Habermas' idea. Habermas himself implicitly agrees that consensus may not happen easily in the broad society like state in which he thinks liberal rights should also be applied in deliberative democracy and in dealing with the conflict of interests (1999:

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[10] Many examples are discussed in the chapter 5.

245). He also suggests toleration in dealing with cultural diversity when one has to tolerate other people's belief without accepting the truth. However, in a democratic society nobody possesses the privilege of setting the boundary of what is to be tolerated. Toleration needs a common standard found in the principles of constitution presupposing equal liberty (Habermas in Barradori 2003: 41-42). When it comes to validity of universalistic morality which is related to cultural value, Habermas also suggests that its possibility depends on a form of life that meet it half way (Warnke 1995: 129) which suggests a form of compromise without transcending all parties into one reason.

Dryzek (2000, 2005) and other theorists like Bohman (2003) and Gabardi (2001) also claim that rational argument should not be the only type of argument employed in deliberation. Gabardi criticises that participants in the deliberation process have to follow the rule that restricts the discussion to rational dialogue and thus privilege a type of speech that is formal, argumentative, articulate, dispassionate and subjecless from particularity of the speaker (2001: 556). Dryzek agrees with this and point out that this subjectless characteristic can be the problem because sometimes identity of the subject is the key issue (2003: 233); moreover, other modes of communication like rhetoric, storytelling should be allowed in deliberation. While Bohman thinks that irrationality should be tolerated because justification is also owed to the unreasonable (2003: 762). These critiques are admissible but we should not forget that the main aim of deliberation is to come up with mutual agreement based on mutual understanding. Formal, rational and articulate argument can generally bring out the result more effectively than unclear and insensible. Habermas'subjectless deliberation means reflection and aiming at mutual interest rather than egoistic attitude. Habermas'deliberation is not an abstract reasoning like it is criticised for this is also the old paradigm of reason that his communicative ethics tries to escape. His theory also suggests that subject's speech is the outcome of his lifeworld. Being reflective is essential for taking up the other's perspective. However, irrational, emotional or identity-based speech should be allowed as long as the speaker can later take up the other's perspective and reflect upon it. In general, Habermas communicative ethics and his proposed procedure and condition of deliberation in domestic public sphere can also be applied to transnational public sphere.

Solidarity which is claimed to be the basis of selfless deliberation in the public sphere may not be available only in the context of nation-state. If, according to Habermas, constitutional patriotism can serve as a shared identity binding people in the state together, it is thinner than regional, clan and group identity of individual. Thus the binding force is more symbolic and can be generated by inculcation through education, media and so on. This should not be so different from cosmopolitan solidarity that also needs to be built through time. Moreover, in the transnational public sphere, deliberation and cooperation in the social movement across nations show that those who join the movement share solidarity based on their shared interest about the world. In this case, the global problem they want to solve can also be regarded as the enemy if Habermas thinks that is necessary for solidarity. Considering the reality, Habermas may be right that we still do not have the global solidarity sufficient for global government. However, this does not mean that transnational public sphere does not work because there is not enough solidarity because at the end people who join in the deliberation realise that they have to come to a form of agreement due to the fact that they have to live together. And this is why communicative ethics, guarantee of rights and their legitimacy matters.

Habermas' idea of constitutional patriotism as the locus of national solidarity cannot really fit well with transnational deliberation. Constitutional patriotism is the national solidarity emerging from the shared interpretation of universal principles of right. If we embrace transnational deliberation across cultures as the site of dialogic cosmopolitanism, constitutional patriotism is rather an obstacle. While transformation of the understanding through deliberation is encouraged in the first realm, the latter serves as the identity which should not be changed easily. Fine and Smith point out that constitutional patriotism closes people off from effective participation and identification with cosmopolitan institutions (2003: 473). And since nationalism itself also emerged from heterogeneity of ethics and cultures, solidarity based on some invented national identities can always arise even in the conditions of globalisation (2003: 474). However, as we have discussed in the previous part, the idea about identity that supports ethical cosmopolitanism is the recognition that identity is multiple and fluid. And this is, in fact, what is also indicated in Habermas'communicative theory. Constitutional patriotism still suggests a self-enclosed identity which reflects Schmittian attitude in Habermas'idea of

solidarity. As I have suggested, solidarity that can contribute to the emergence of cosmopolitanism should be based on the consciousness of global interdependence and the realisation that only by global cooperation that global problems can be solved.

Subscribing to the idea that cosmopolitanism should not be imposing and showing self-centric character but should embrace diversity and be sensitive to differences; transnational public sphere can be an appropriate start for the application of dialogic cosmopolitanism. Other sophisticated proposal to promote deliberative democracy across levels and regions, like Held's (1995) cosmopolitan democracy[11], which requires a world government founded on strong liberal principles may not suit the situation when thick liberal ideas still have to prove their universality across the globe and cultural difference between liberal and non-liberal is still a sensitive issue. Transnational public sphere can be a space for discussion about the world and transnational issues. Cosmopolitanism can emerge from this sphere in which not only its idea and project can be discussed but they can also be promoted through civil society movements and conversation across cultures.

Habermas' theory of communicative ethics and deliberative democracy can provide a good guide for the attitudes, procedure, and supporting institutions for cross-cultural deliberation which can serve as the expression of new idea of cosmopolitanism. However, his idea about democracy is too constraint within the nation-state and traditional mean of giving input to political decision. Guarantee of equality and liberty through human rights by the world organisation is crucial to sustain deliberation in public sphere; however, universal rights and principles themselves should also be subject to public deliberation both for refinement and endorsement. Transnational deliberation can supplement and check the performance of the presently operating global/ inter-state system of three-layer framework reflected in Habermas' theory[12].

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[11] Held proposes a cosmopolitan model of democracy with multilevel governments in state, region, world accountable for local representative and deliberation, UN reform to be world government, establishment and enforcement of human rights, correcting life inequality through seven site of individual's power.
[12] Habermas'three-level system reflects the reality of inter-state system.

Conclusion

There are many conditions leading to the call for cosmopolitanism whether they are the global threats, the changed conditions of the world, or morality concerns. While these issues are hoped to be solved by cosmopolitanism, cosmopolitanism as an ethical idea needs to prove that it can be applied universally. Its potential of universal application rests on its ability to engage with difference.

Although mainstream cosmopolitanism has developed many arguments and moral projects for the betterment of the world, many critics point out that it still overlooks the significance of differences. The ideas belonging to this strand are based on the thick concept of universal morality, which believes that every human being is morally equal and that rationality is the universal trait enabling them to attain universal moral value. The propositions from mainstream cosmopolitans rely heavily on traditional liberal concept of equal rights and morality and they tend to be monologic. The critiques against this characteristic of cosmopolitanism are therefore concerned about the conflicts which can be generated or deteriorated by cosmopolitan tendency to homogenise the world. The critics perceive that cosmopolitanism seems to rather represent Western culture than to really propose universally shared value.

The critiques against cosmopolitanism's universality include the arguments that cosmopolitanism reflects Eurocentric attitudes, is intrinsically imperialist, tends to homogenise and marginalise the differences while some argue that it is impossible for people of different cultures to share the same moral value. The critiques are both from those who are opposed to cosmopolitanism and those who think that traditional concept of cosmopolitanism should be modified to be more sensitive to cultural differences.

Most critiques regard cosmopolitanism as a part of modernity discourse with its imperialist characteristics. Cosmopolitanism and modernity are founded on the ideas of natural law and universal reason. This characteristic reflects universalism of one set of rationality claimed to be the basis for the moral claim of imperialism and its homogenising mission. It suggests that those who claim that their morality and way of life are in accordance with universal law are superior and legitimate to impose them to all others. The concept of individual as autonomous and free from community and tradition

is intrinsic in both cosmopolitanism and modernity, while this concept is also fundamental to liberalism and serves as a legal basis facilitating contract and agreement. Since the genealogy of modernity, cosmopolitanism and liberalism start from the West and Western powers often employ their claimed universal principles like human rights and free trade for their own interests, the critiques thus equate cosmopolitanism to modernity, liberalism, Western culture, Western colonialism, globalisation and global capitalism. Cosmopolitanism for them represents Western parochialism and its attempt to impose Western standard to the world.

Another critique against mainstream cosmopolitanism presupposes the belief that each culture has its own system of value which is incommensurable. In this perspective, the individual is believed to be embedded in his community; the idea which is contrasting to autonomous and free-floating self, as posited in the idea about self in modernity and liberalism. This critique suggests that the reform of culture to respect the other has to start from the insider, since the outsider does not share the same value and cannot understand the reason of the practices belonging to other cultures. According to this critique, intercultural discussion and universal morality is impossible.

Last comes the critique that focuses on the problem of "single-entry orientation" of reasoning in modern rationality and mainstream cosmopolitanism. This orientation represents the application of one's own universal rationality to everyone else without the second thought that other may also justifiably think about the same issue in a different way.

Although all these critiques are concerned about cultural differences and try to suggest the proper treatments, not all of them are viable or constructive. The first group of critiques tends to ignore the fact that the characteristics of modernity, cosmopolitanism, liberalism and cultural homogenisation can also be found in the non-Western society. Its arguments are based on the genealogy of the concepts while ignoring that the concepts are defined by many characteristics apart from what the critics select to discuss, for example, the fact that modernity, cosmopolitanism and liberalism presuppose the freedom to go beyond the restraints of a particular tradition. The relativist idea about cultural value and impossibility for intercultural exchange of cultural view also have

weak arguments considering the fact that intercultural exchange do happen and that the idea cannot explain the cultural dynamic.

The plausible argument against the mainstream cosmopolitanism seems to be that while the characteristics of cosmopolitanism can be found everywhere, its content is drawn only from the Western trajectory and fails to build upon different traditions of cosmopolitan thinking and experimentation. Most important is the critique about the way mainstream cosmopolitanism claims its universality through the 'single-entry reasoning'. Single-entry reasoning is fallible and it ignores the fact that the context in which each culture is situated can contribute to different reasons behind different cultural practices. Being too confident that one's idea is correct and insisting that it should be applied to everyone also contradicts with the democratic and liberal way of living in the society.

Since these drawbacks in the mainstream cosmopolitans' proposals stem from the monologic way of coming up with the cosmopolitan principles and applications, the resolution, then, is to allow the other opinions to take part in defining cosmopolitanism and its role in solving global problems. The new cosmopolitanism of dialogue across different cultures together with criticality towards one's own and the other's culture is proposed. The new cosmopolitans who endorse dialogic cosmopolitanism believe that although the self is embedded in its community, which plays a crucial role in the formation of its identity and its understanding about the world, each individual is different and detains agency to change his community's culture. Culture is dynamic and heterogeneous, while identity is multiple and also fluid. The dialogic cosmopolitanism is also based on the belief that the understanding across different cultures is possible due to some universally shared elements. Moreover, it needs the respect for the other's different opinions as well as the respect for the equal moral worth of every individual as an essential precondition.

Habermas' theory of communicative action shares the same view about self and community with the new cosmopolitans but in addition provides a clear account about how universality and differences can be mediated through communicative action. Communicative action is the process of all affected participants coming to the mutual agreement about something with the best argument. The process is based on mutual understanding, free speech and non-coercion. Habermas's theory of communicative

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action suggests the new understanding of rationality which operates in every communicative action. He argues that rationality is constituted by particular context of communicative action and operates in universal pattern. This explanation accepts multiplicity of rationality while also suggests the unity and possibility of cross cultural understanding. Rationality for Habermas requires the other, for it is grounded on intersubjective recognition, and assumes the other of reason, namely, emotion, instinct etc. His theory also suggests two kinds of universality; the temporary and contextual universality emerges when there is a mutual agreement among all participants and real universality of human common traits and the role of rationality operating in every language community.

Communicative ethics which can be extracted from Habermas' communicative action entails the attitudes that the universal (knowledge, agreement, culture, opinion etc.) is fallible, respect for the other's equality and significance of intersubjective relation in coming to term with mutual agreement based on rationality, mutual understanding and reflectivity. These attitudes are essential to the ideal speech situation of free and uncoerced deliberation. Habermas also agrees that the guarantee of individual rights and freedom is necessary as a precondition for participants to exercise their public sovereignty through deliberation in the public sphere. The state should be the guarantor of these rights translated from the universal principles of human rights.

Habermas also exhibits how communicative action works with political institutions through his idea of deliberative democracy. However, when it comes to apply with cosmopolitanism, Habermas' idea about the role of public deliberation is still constraint under the framework of nation-state while the role of cosmopolitanism is limited in the form of universal principles of rights. Dryzek's application of deliberative democracy in the transnational sphere can show how deliberation across national frontiers can be a site for the breeding of cosmopolitanism and the discussion about it, as well as, how it can influence the political institutions in both national and supra-national levels.

The debate about universality brings cosmopolitanism back to the idea of how we should treat the others as different and not only as the other who is same to us (who needs help and good life like we do) as well as, to the question of how we should mediate with

the alters and not only about helping human clan. For mainstream cosmopolitans who concentrate on solving the problem of global poverty and inequality, this seems like pulling the ethical project behind. However, if we think in the positive way this can be a rethinking about why cosmopolitanism really matters and how, from the other perspectives of all involved, it can help solving the problems. Any idea and project of cosmopolitanism which can pass the universality test of the public deliberation can be really ethical since it is not ethical only for the addressor but also for the addressee. The public deliberation can mediate the gap between above and below in the way that the below is not imposed with any principle but instead has opportunity to understand and choose to accept the principles suggested by the above. In general, the proposal can start from anywhere as long as it can be approved by all. The ethical projects of mainstream cosmopolitanism can be retained in the form of the proposal opened for discussion and approval from the other perspectives. The guarantee of universal principles of right is important. Although, in general, liberal rights to equal liberty of everyone should be guaranteed as a basis for transnational public deliberation, the imposition from UN or any political institution should always open for criticism and modification, discussion about the principles themselves in the public deliberation can also make people understand the significance of the principles more.

Apart from the more theoretical issues which have been discussed in this Dissertation, the problem of how the proposed attitudes of cosmopolitanism can be practically instilled into all of us is equally important. Our world of the past and the present is full of histories of conflict and resentment between different groups of people, cultures, civilisations and religions. If the consideration of the present affects how we choose to remember histories, and memories, in turn, constitute our identities and influence our present relation with the others, then we should necessarily learn to be critical to our memories, forget what is counterproductive to the future, and learn from the past with the help of comparison (Gupta 2005: 40-41). Being critical to the past can assist us in eliminating the pain of invented memory, but for the real and harsh past, we may have to learn to forget and forgive, even if we may have "to forgive the unforgivable" (see Derrida 2001). This is the way a conversation and productive deliberation can emerge between old foes.

APPENDIX 1:

THE CENTRAL HUMAN CAPABILITIES

1. **Life.** Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

2. **Bodily Health.** Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

3. **Bodily Integrity.** Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

4. **Senses, Imagination, and Thought.** Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason — and to do these things in a 'truly human' way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.

5. **Emotions.** Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in its development.)

6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)

7. Affiliation.

(A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)

(B) Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.

8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

10. Control over one's Environment.

(A) Political: Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.

(B) Material: Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

Source: Nussbaum (2006b: 1325-27)

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the full text of which appears in the following pages. Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicize the text of the Declaration and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories."

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore **THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS** as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to

promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1.

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11.

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14.

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15.

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16.

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17.

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20.

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23.

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25.

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical

care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26.

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27.

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29.

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due

recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

source: http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

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