

From Pragmatism to Indian Materialism:  
A Sociological Study

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**CERTIFICATE**

This is certified that dissertation entitled, "Pragmatism to Indian Materialism: A Sociological Study", which is being submitted by Anil Kumar for the award of degree of Master of Philosophy is his original work and may be placed before the examiner for evaluation. This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this university or of any other university.

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## PREFACE

At first I was thinking to work on education as I have studied from Gov. School with no building. And we used to study under *pipal's* tree. Then I came to state's renowned college and finally I am in country's renowned university. I was interested in debates and programmes operating about education. My father who is running a college and an NGO and working (also) on education, has been inspired.

Many times in news papers and in society I see that relation is becoming non functional, whether it is blood relation or family and kinship relation or a social and friendship relationship. Most of the people live and act according to their convenience. It is surprising when we claim that "wherever women are worshiped; God lives there." This thought is morally acceptable in public life, but in reality things are altogether different. It is not unusual that a son is not caring for parents in their old age. Son keeps them out of or makes them homeless. Things do not end here itself. It is also observable to any society in India that if parents are getting pension or earning or have a property and can give to other or till property is in his/her hand son and or relative cares for him/her. But things suddenly change when the situation changes. A friendship is broken if that has no utility, marriage engagement is ended if the situation becomes worse wedlock. All this happens in spite of propagated ideals in villages and towns. It happens everywhere, in most of families living in huts, slums or those, palace like homes. The difference between values and facts are too evident in Indian society at various levels.

I am in agreement with the view that we are going to temple or Mosque or Church, or Gurudhwara or any religious place for wishing something. We are not going

with empty mind and also not wish to come with empty hand. I would like to say also that spirituality and practice of public welfare have their own utility. It gives mental peace. In the past people visited temples mainly to get heaven or get benefit after death. It means that everything existed in society for some or the other utility and pragmatism ruled Indian life in most cases. This is my hypothesis in this research.

Before studying Indian situation closely my thoughts were similar to a common man that western social values are materialistic and Indian values are spiritual. Later on I realised that Indian society is also materialist in its own way and westerners are spiritual in their own way. No society can live with only spiritual or material way. So, I wanted to find out and prove that Indian society is also materialistic since the ancient times. But I had no clear philosophy or literature available to validate my observation and hypothesis.

If I say honestly I thought that I am going to do a new work or at least an unusual work in this field. Because I did not find in JNU library catalogue nor did I found any research work on this topic in sociology. But when I met my guide Dr. Amit Kumar Sharma, he said that there are already systematic works and philosophies in this area. The need is to interpret them sociologically in Indian tradition. And I was so impressed by him that I decided to do work on this theme.

After completion of this study I became aware of its incompleteness as a systemic thought which I intend to complete in my Ph.D. work.

### Acknowledgements

It is easy to think to do research work alone, but in fact research work is not a single person job. Research and its outcome is a collective effort, whether it is direct or indirect. Research like other endeavours is a social effort and it may be execrated for some persons but this is the reality. And knowledge comes from society and thus any research works are either based on that knowledge or go ahead with or using that knowledge. Society and individual is a result of society, where society is reproduced itself and individuals are product of society, in which every new generation give their own contribution to the society to develop its knowledge. So knowledge keeps on growing and developing. Thus naturally I also took knowledge from the society and my contribution is only that I collected available knowledge together and tried to interpret them in a new way. And thus my heartfelt gratitude goes to the society and its ancestors for their kind contribution to knowledge.

I am indebted to Dr. Amit Kumar Sharma for supervising my dissertation. Any acknowledgement of gratitude to him in words will not suffice here. His encouragement and guidance has been of great help in preparation of this study. He gave me the freedom to pursue my ideas, and pointed out my inconsistencies with patience and kindness.

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faculty members of Centre for the Study of Social Systems, for their scholarly guidance and valuable suggestions which helped me to organise my thoughts at various levels. This is a right place and opportunity to express my gratitude to all JNU community and my all teachers who taught me the alphabet which made me reach this juncture of academic pursuits.

I am also indebted to my family, especially my parents Smt. Kaushalya Devi and Badri Prasad Verma who are visionaries and who are a consistent source of strength to me. I am also grateful to my brother Gautam, sister Sarita and her husband Ravi, elder uncle Kedar who is deaf and unable to speak but his love is always speaks a lot for me, I would like to remember also my youngest uncle Samarjeet, aunty and cousin Deepak and Khusboo. And how can I forget smiley smile of my niece Shanghavi which inspired me to have smile in life.

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I express my heartfelt thanks to Kiran who has been a constant source of impartation throughout my research work. I am feeling homely environment in JNU because her friends and family took care and supported me like a family member. Now it is better to say that they are my family members. I must be thankful to aunty Smt. Usha Sharma who gave me motherly love, Reena didi who always cared for me and brother Manish and Abhishek whose love gave me some relaxed mood to continue my academic journey. I must remember Late Tulsi Sharma who is great source of inspiration of Kiran's family and I benefited by them. I am heartily thankful to Deepa, Dev Babu, Gadadhar, Mamata, Papiya, Sandhya and Sonam (Sona-Mona) and her all other friends. It is Kiran who encouraged me to visit and take membership of libraries which is out of JNU. She always took me to other libraries along with herself which benefited me a lot. I am thankful for her kind attention.

I express my gratitude to all my friends who have worked, in a way or the other, as the source of inspiration and motivation. I would like to take some name by

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I am also obligated to JNU Library; Neharu Memorial Museum Library; New Delhi, and Planning Commission Library, Government of India.

Finally, I extended my sincere thanks to MicroSoft, FireFox, Google Search Engine, Google Books, Gmail and MTNL Broadband etc.

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## INDEX

1. Preface -----	3-4
2. Acknowledgement -----	5-7
3. Index -----	8
4. Introduction -----	10-13
4.1 Purpose of Study -----	11
4.2 Objective -----	11
4.3 Research Question -----	12
4.4 Methodology -----	13
4.5 Universe -----	13
4.6 Limitations -----	13
5. Pragmatic View of Truth and Society: Whatever Works, is Likely to be True	14-64
5.1 The Introduction -----	14
5.2 Truth and Pragmatism: Criteria of Truth Based Upon Pragmatic Considerations -----	30
5.3 Classical Writings -----	32
5.3.1 Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) -----	33
5.3.1.1 How to Make Our Ideas Clear -----	33
5.3.2 William James (1842-1910) -----	35
5.3.2.1 What Pragmatism Means -----	36
5.3.2.2 Pragmatism and Humanism -----	46
5.3.3 John Dewey (1869-1852) -----	49
5.3.3.1 Does Reality Possess Practical Character? -----	49
5.3.4 Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) -----	51
5.3.4.1 Pragmatism and Sociology -----	51
5.4 Conclusion -----	59
5.5 References -----	61
6. From Pragmatism to Utilitarianism -----	65-96
6.1 Introduction -----	65
6.2 What is Utilitarianism? -----	66
6.3 Determination of the Right -----	69
6.4 Act Utilities of the Right -----	69
6.4.1 Rule Utilitarianism -----	71
6.4.2 The Nature of Good -----	72
6.5 Political Implications -----	75
6.6 Sociological Thought -----	76
6.7 The Major Utilitarian Premises -----	77
6.8 Hobbes versus Locke -----	79



6.9	The Concept of Order: Malthus and Marx -----	.82
6.10	From Utilitarianism to Social Darwinism -----	.83
6.11	The break with utilitarian premises -----	.85
6.12	Major Alternative to Utilitarianism -----	.86
6.13	Utilitarianism and Sociological Theory -----	.88
6.14	Criticisms -----	.90
6.15	Relation between Pragmatism and Utilitarianism Concept -----	.91
6.16	Conclusion -----	.93
6.17	References -----	.95
7.	From Pragmatism to Materialism: Indian and Western View: Every Things is on Earth; Nothing After Death -----	.97-132
7.1	The Origin of Materialism -----	.98
7.2	Western thoughts of Material aspects of Society -----	.99
7.3	Indian Thoughts of Materialism -----	.105
7.4	Materialism in Indian Philosophy -----	.107
7.5	Indian Materialism -----	.116
7.5.1	The Charvaka – Lokayata Thought -----	.116
7.5.1.1	Barhaspatya -----	.118
7.5.1.2	Nastika-mata -----	.119
7.5.1.3	Charvaka darsana -----	.120
7.5.1.4	Lokayat -----	.121
7.6	The epistemology of the Lokayata -----	.122
7.7	Ontology of the Lokayata -----	.124
7.8	Cosmology and Axiology of the Lokayata -----	.125
7.9	Relation Between Pragmatism and Utilitarianism -----	.126
7.10	Conclusion -----	.127
7.11	References -----	.131
8.	Conclusion -----	.133-138
8.1	Objectives -----	.134
8.2	Major Findings -----	.134
8.3	Pragmatic View of Society -----	.134
8.4	Utilitarian View of Society -----	.135
8.5	Materialistic View of Society -----	.136
8.6	Relation Between Pragmatism, Utilitarianism and Materialism -----	.137
8.7	Academic and Social Contributions; and Further Research -----	.137
9.	Bibliography -----	.139-145

## Introduction

What is truth? What is useful? What will work for what? What is and why we should go in particular way or means for particular achievements? It is often asked why a human being usually opts different standard for different goals? These are the questions which have been raised in every society, every epic, even at the level of every human being, and these questions are still relevant. These questions will also remain in future. These questions are not only raised in India but everywhere. For me those who are searching truth and utility, whether in life world or in sacred world (I am making this demarcation deliberately for better clarity with due respect to all those who disagree with me) are in fact defined by some usefulness, material expression which is active or passive and translate it into materialistic aspect in real life. Even those who called themselves spiritual have also some material and worldly aspects.

Human beings always think about means for end, but same time “human is a social animal”, so there are always a society, situations, terms, conditions, social norms and values attached to action. There are checks and balances in society. In the situation where society controls the human as well as social action both Durkheimian and Parsonsonian notions can be applied.

Society is made of individuals and individuals are individuals because there are societies and outside society there are no individuals.

## **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study is to find pragmatic theories in social sciences. Pragmatism deals with society and individual and their practical life. It provides a highly ethical foundation of behaviour in social life in its own way. My purpose is to examine pragmatism as a human value in social life.

## **Objective**

Objective of this study is to find out pragmatic theories in social science which the deal with practical things in which we practice in our real life. It is accepted as universal truth that human is a social animal. But in fact Aristotle did not tell only human as a social animal, for him many species is a social animal that is living in a group and thus he gave example of ant etc. Aristotle says "Man is by nature a social animal; and an unsocial person who is unsocial naturally and not accidentally is either unsatisfactory or superhuman...Society is a natural phenomenon and is prior to the individual...And anyone who is unable to live a common life or who is self-sufficient that he has no need to do so is no member of Society, which means that he is either a beast or a god."<sup>1</sup> Durkheim says society is existing with collective consciousness. Durkheim held the end of a moral act to be the preservation of society. A moral action follows a rule that furthers the interest of society rather than that of the actor. Since moral rules are widely shared by members of a society, he drew the logical conclusion that the existence of society depends upon a moral consensus.<sup>2</sup> That consensus is a necessary condition of social order is essentially the conclusion that August Comte had already reached.<sup>3</sup> The idea that moral consensus is a necessary condition of social order is a postulate of functional social theory. Individual always acting with his rational about his/her interest and goal. But it does not mean that individual can act beyond society. There is no freedom without cohesion, but no cohesion without freedom, which rules out the cohesion of an extensive consensus. He always emphasised on collective conscience. Durkheim in his 'The Division of Labour', wrote that "the individual while becoming more autonomous, depends more closely on society", "these two movements, however contradictory in appearance, take place in parallel", and there combinations is possible through "a transformation of social

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.radicalacademy.com/philosophicalquotations27.htm>, Retrieved on July 11, 2009

<sup>2</sup> Rhoads, John K. 1991. Critical Issues in Social Theory. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Park. Pg. 222

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Rhoads, John K. 1991. Pg. 222

solidarity due to the ever-increasing development of the division of labour.”<sup>4</sup> In Durkheim’s initial work, he explained social control and the maintenance of social order within society primarily from the perspective of external constraints. In his later works, however, he emphasized that social norms are internalized, they form society, they are living within us, and that they are not merely imposed on individuals from the outside<sup>5</sup>.

I referred Durkheim because he looks society in a collective way and also emphasised on Individual. It is true that human have emotions, relations, family, society and their own networks and feeling which make relation with others. Human beings are always searching truths, what is working, what are the right way and other things like this. So the question is what is the right way? What is working? So here my objective is to find out what is (real) truth? That means what is workable in practical life.

This is widely believed that Indian philosophy and culture is spiritual. This image was/is created by both Indian and western scholars. They neglected many aspects of Indian social philosophy which deal with worldly aspects of human conducts that we also know as Lokayata or materialism. These are neither devotional nor spiritual, but are about daily practical human conducts - human life. I am not saying that I cracked new things in Indian social thoughts but I would like to say surely that this was ignorant in academic world or less was recognised.

### **Research Questions**

My research question is to find out how society or individual acts in real life that is in day to day life. To analyse day to day life with worldly social theories. I will try to find out what these social theories have to say about this. My main effort will be to find out what is working? What is truth? How Indian ancient social philosophy is dealing with this?

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<sup>4</sup> Durkheim, Emile. (1893) 1960. *The Division of Labor in Society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. P. XLII, XLIV, Pg. 37-38

<sup>5</sup> Coser, Lewis A. 1982. *Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings*, (5th ed.). Macmillan Publishing.

## **Methodology**

This study is based on available literatures. I used both original texts and commentary on them for this purpose. I come to the conclusions after analysing original works, commentary and other available literatures.

## **Universe**

I believe that pragmatism is a universal phenomenon. And this study is primarily concerned with pragmatism in Indian society.

## **Limitations**

There are many philosophies which deal with worldly aspects of society and individual. There are also many thinkers and philosophers and commentators on particular philosophy. But practically it is not possible to deal with all. Second limitation for is that many Indian original writings are available in Sanskrit and Pali languages which I do not know. So, I totally depend on secondary sources. Third limitation that is that I did not touched two or three streams of Indian thoughts because of time limitations. Fourth limitation is that it is only based on review and analysis of original and secondary sources, so this study is not giving an empirical aspect. Fifth but final limitation is has not dealt all the criticisms.

But I would try my best to overcome the maximum possible limitations in the future studies.

## Pragmatic View of Truth and Society: Whatever Works, is Likely to be True

### The Introduction

According to Pragmatism, the truth or meaning of an idea or a proposition lies in its observable practical consequences rather than anything metaphysical. It can be summarized by the phrase “whatever works, is likely to be true.” Because reality changes, “whatever works” will also change – thus, truth must also be changeable and no one can claim to possess any final or ultimate truth.

Pragmatism, a philosophical movement, got systematic expression firstly in Charles Sanders Peirce and William James and later on was taken up, and transformed by John Dewey. It emphasizes the practical function of knowledge as an instrument for adapting to reality and controlling it. Pragmatism agrees with empiricism<sup>6</sup> in its emphasis on the priority of experience over *a priori*<sup>7</sup> reasoning. Whereas truth had

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<sup>6</sup> **Empiricism.** Lock, George Berkeley, and David Hume are classical representatives of empiricism. = Either of two closely related philosophical doctrines, one pertaining to concepts and the other to knowledge. The first doctrine is that most, if not all, concepts are ultimately derived from experience; the second is that most, if not all, knowledge derives from experience, in the sense that appeals to experience are necessarily involved in its justification. Neither doctrine implies the other. Several empiricists have allowed that some knowledge is a priori or independent of experience, but have denied that any concepts are. On the other hand, few if any empiricists have denied the existence of a priori knowledge while maintaining the existence of a priori concepts. John

<sup>7</sup> **A priori.**= In epistemology knowledge that is independent of all particular experiences, as opposed to a posteriori (or empirical) knowledge, which derives from experience. The terms have their origins in the medieval Scholastic debate over

traditionally been explained in terms of coherence,<sup>8</sup> pragmatism holds that truth is to be found in the process of verification. Pragmatists interpret idea as instrument and plans of action rather than as images of reality; more specifically, they are suggestions and anticipations of conduct, hypotheses or forecasts of what result from a given action, or ways of organizing behaviour.

This philosophical movement, developed in the United States, which holds that both the meaning and the truth of any idea is a functional of its practical outcome. Fundamental to pragmatism is a strong anti absolutism: the conviction that all principles are to be regarded as working hypotheses rather than as metaphysically binding axioms. A modern expression of empiricism, pragmatism has tended to criticize traditional philosophical outlook in the light of scientific and social developments.<sup>9</sup> 'Pragmatism is a unique school of American philosophical thought. Its approach constitutes the very core of classical American Club, founded by William James and Charles Peirce. Its development coincided with the Progressive Era (1896-1914) in America and was fostered at the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago. Along with James and Peirce, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead are most often associated with pragmatism. Thought difference exist between these philosophy is and what it should do.'<sup>10</sup>

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Aristotelian concepts. Immanuel Kant initiated their current usage, pairing the analytic-synthetic distinction with the a priori-a posteriori distinction to define his theory of knowledge.

<sup>8</sup> **Coherentism.** = Theory of truth according to which a belief is true just in case, or to the extent that, it coheres with a system of other beliefs. Philosophers have differed over the relevant sense of "cohere," though most agree that it must be stronger than mere consistency. Among rival theories of truth, perhaps the oldest is the correspondence theory, which holds that the truth of a belief consists in its correspondence with independently existing facts. In epistemology, coherentism contrasts with foundationalism, which asserts that ordinary beliefs are justified if they are inferable from a set of basic beliefs that are justified immediately or directly. Coherentism often has been combined with the idealist doctrine that reality consists of, or is knowable only through, ideas or judgments.

<sup>9</sup> American Pragmatism. Radical Academy.

<sup>10</sup> Pragmatism. 2002. The Gale Group in World of Sociology.

According to Columbia Encyclopedia,<sup>11</sup> pragmatism is a method of philosophy in which the truth of a proposition is measured by its correspondence with experimental results and by its practical outcome. Thought is considered as simply an instrument for supporting the life aims of the human organism and had no real metaphysical significance. Pragmatism stands to doctrines that hold that truth can be reached through deductive reasoning from *a priori* grounds and the need for inductive investigation and constant empirical verification of hypotheses. There is a constant protest against speculation concerning questions that have no application and no verifiable answer. Pragmatism holds that truth is modified as discoveries are made and are relative to the time and space and purpose of inquiry. In its ethical aspect pragmatism holds that knowledge that contributes to human values is real and that values play an essential role in the choice of means employed in order to attain an end as they do in the choice of the end itself.

According to encyclopaedia Britannica<sup>12</sup>, pragmatism school of philosophy, dominated in the United States during the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and is based on the principle that the usefulness, workability, and practicality of ideas, policies, and proposals are the criteria of their merit. It stresses the priority of action over doctrine, of experience over fixed principles; and it holds that ideas borrow their meaning from their consequences, and their truth from verification. Thus, ideas are essentially instruments and plans of action. Pragmatist position was first systematized by the U.S. philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910), who agreed on the practical nature of meaning but differed as to the implications of such a doctrine.

Charles Sanders Peirce is considered the founder of pragmatism, although later he changed the name of his philosophical position to "pragmatism." He developed it as a theory of meaning in the 1870s, holding that an intrinsic connection exists between meaning and action—that the meaning of an idea is to be found in its "conceivable sensible effect" and that human

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<sup>11</sup> Pragmatism. 2004. The Columbia Encyclopedia.

<sup>12</sup> Pragmatism. 1993. The New Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol. 9. 15<sup>th</sup> Edition. Pg. No. 662.



generation belief through their “habits of action”. “William James gave a further direction to pragmatism, developing it a s theory of truth. True ideas, according to James, are useful “leadings”; they lead trough experience in ways that provide consistency, orderliness, and predictability. John Dewey was another leading pragmatist whose influence on educational and social theory is still prevented in American society.”<sup>13</sup>

This philosophical school, founded in the United States in the nineteenth century, originates in the belief that philosophical standards, and especially the standards of truth, should be grounded in the efficacy of the practices that would result from their use.<sup>14</sup> Pragmatism is averse to all metaphysical, moral, and social ideals that claim priority over the solution to practical problems.<sup>15</sup> While several currents sociological projects draw inspiration from C. S. Peirce (1839-39), the father of modern pragmatism and the scholar who made communication central to pragmatic thought, Charles Horton Cooley and John Dewey (1859-1952) built more well-established bridges to topics of sociological interest from pragmatic philosophical positions. George Herbert Mead expanded and extended these bridges. Thereafter, some of Mead’s leading insights were institutionalized in sociology via Herbert Blumer’s interpretation to him. The Chicago School of symbolic interaction followed by Blumer’s lead.

For Peirce, pragmatism was primarily on investigation of the proper methods of procedure in the natural sciences, a reductive doctrine equating the meaning of theoretical terms with their impact upon experience. Peirce’s is a highly theoretical view of the proper meaning of ideas, deprived from Kant and the British Empiricists.

By contrast, James moved in a much more practical and moralistic direction. The virtues of belief, including truth, become in his view matter of their efficiency in enabling a person to cope with problems of living. The vital good of a

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<sup>13</sup> American Pragmatism. Radical Academy.

<sup>14</sup> Pragmatism. 2006. Cambridge University Press.

<sup>15</sup> Pragmatism. 2006. Cambridge University Press.

belief in one's whole life became its justification. James thus wrote: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactory, in the widest sense of the word it is 'true'." The antirational implications of this statement shocked many critics, including G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, who saw it as an invitation to wish-fulfilment and self-deception. That religious beliefs exhibit certain consoling and uplifting effects and work well in the lives of particular believers entirely to assert that such attributes substantiate the beliefs themselves. Even James's fellow Pragmatist, including Peirce, draw back from this identification of utility with truth.

Controversies over truth continued to dog the movement. Peirce's own account of truth was "that which is fated ultimately to be agreed by all who investigate"; in this view, truth represents a kind of limit of scientifically formed opinion. The real intention of the definition is to stress the role of practically motivated inquiry in shaping concepts and judgments and the particular truths accepted on their basis.<sup>16</sup>

The more practical aspects of pragmatism were followed up in the work of the American philosopher and theorist of education John Dewey (1859-1952). Dewey developed what he saw as a new attitude toward experience. In Dewey's view, the phenomenon of experience, which Empiricists tend too often to regard as a passive, mechanistic reflection of the world was in actuality an active, social process. Knowing, he asserted, is primarily a matter how inquiry tells us to transform situation warranted by inquiry. This insight was probably more influential on the practice of education than on philosophy, particularly after the Logical Positivists made their mark on the philosophy of science. However, specific emphasis on practice and technique regained prominence in American philosophy during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It dominates the later work of Wittgenstein, who saw possession of any kind of language as mastery of a body of techniques; the famous slogan that to look for the meaning of a term one must look for its use could have been endorsed by any of the Pragmatists.

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<sup>16</sup> Pragmatism. 1993. The New Encyclopedia Britannica. Pg. No. 662.

More W.V.O. Quine has influentially argued that the considerations that mold changes of theory are largely Pragmatism, and not, for instance, dictated by antecedent fixed concepts and meanings that interact that emerges from Quine's work, and the work of those influenced by him, is that the truth of any individual assertion is itself secondary.

The philosophy was given its name by C.S. Peirce (c. 1872), who developed the principles of pragmatic theory as formal doctrine. He was followed by William James, who held that in vital matters of faith the criterion for acceptance, was the key figure in promoting the widespread influence of pragmatism during the 1890s. John Dewey in his works developed the instrumentalist aspects of the doctrine. In Europe, F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937) and other took up the theory.

The succeeding generation of pragmatists include C. I. Lewis (1883-1964), whose conceptual pragmatism involves the application of Kantian principles to the investigation of empirical reality. W. V. O. Quine has upheld the validity of some a priori knowledge, pointing out that mathematics greatly facilitates scientific research. Richard Rorty has argued that theories are ultimately justified by their instrumentality, or the extent to which they enable people to attain their aims. Pragmatism dominated American philosophy from the 1890 to the 1930 and has re-emerged as a significant element in contemporary thought.

Pragmatism's arguments are situated in certain primary themes.<sup>17</sup> **First**, pragmatism reject the argument of modern philosophy and the language and notions central to it. Philosophy, as the pragmatist conceived it, is bound in everyday practice, not the wistful theoretical arguments of European philosophers. Instead of divorcing itself from everyday concerns, pragmatism approaches these as the primary interest of philosophy. **Second**, the pragmatists had no concern for an infallible truth but instead searched for a "plural" one. Instead of absolutist arguments, as philosophy often wishes to postulate, pragmatism pursues a truth bound within everyday concern and actions. Truths, pragmatism suggests, are real only insofar as they are experienced.

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<sup>17</sup> Pragmatism. 2002. The Gale Group in World of Sociology.

Thus, pragmatism researches for an individually based truth, not a metaphysical one. **Third**, regarding the idea that philosophy can improve the human condition, pragmatists conceived philosophy is useful only if it can resolve problems. Knowledge, they argued, is a highly practical thing and must be put to use in practical way to solve problems that affect social conditions. **Fourth**, and perhaps most important for sociology, pragmatists focused on the intersection of community and the individual. The individual self is inherently a “social self” bound by relations to social world. This position is a radical departure from more abstract metaphysics accounts of the self. While various pragmatists, considered this issue, it was Charles Cooley, who conceptualized it in the greatest detail. Mead argued that the self is developed through social process or interaction with others and the community. It is a play between free will and community needs and demands that determine individual action interpretation.

Certainly the most important contribution of pragmatism to sociology is its philosophical support of symbolic interactionism. The term itself was coined by Herbert Blumer, who studied under Mead while a graduate student at the University of Chicago. Symbolic interactionism argues that individuals origin to and act on the meaning they construct through interaction with each other. Everyday sociology argues social life is an ongoing process that is constantly negotiated and ordered by individual interpretation and action. Pragmatism’s down-to-earth orientation and focus on individual action are readily apparent in the theory.

Israel Scheffler<sup>18</sup> said that, Pragmatism is not only, as it has often described a distinctively American contribution to philosophy. In its effort to clarify and extend the methods of science, and to strengthen the prospects of freedom and intelligence in the contemporary world, it represents also a philosophical orientation of urgent general interest. “Comprehensive in its thought, it bears the imprint of traditional models of argument, but also of

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<sup>18</sup> Scheffler, Israel. 1974/1986. *Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead and Dewey*. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pg. IX.

advanced logical and methodological ideas; it address itself not only to problems of philosophers but also to problems of men.”<sup>19</sup> He also mentioned that, in its search for an integrated interpretation of human life, it strive to relate mind and nature, language and thought, and action and meaning, knowledge and value, emphasizing always the primary significance of critical thought, logical method, and the test of experience in all realms of endeavour.<sup>20</sup>

As we have see that above that pragmatism as a philosophical movement started in USA but all do not approve this theory as a philosophy. It is right to quote Israel Scheffler, “Pragmatism is widely described as American distinctive philosophy and the most important influence on its educational theory. But it has, in general not been understood *as a* Philosophy; rather it has been taken as an attitude: an emphasis on action, practice, society, a concern with what works.”<sup>21</sup>

It faced a word in which many opposition were apparent-science versus religion, positivism versus romanticism, intuition versus sense experience, the secular and democratic ideals of the Enlightenment versus the aristocratic and religious reaction of the turn of the century. It took the form of a *mediating* philosophy, striving to unity science and religion, theory and practice, speculative thought and analysis, tender-minded and tough-minded temperaments (James), and (Dewey) school and life

A major effort of pragmatism has been to assimilate modern science within philosophy, and to criticize traditional philosophical outlook in the light of new scientific development. “But unlike the tendency of positivism, pragmatism does not reduce or subordinate philosophical and other human interest to a simplified method of positive science. In the first place, it is the theory of evolution and the new statistical modes of reasoning that have exercised the greatest impact upon pragmatism, and that have led it to criticize inherited

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<sup>19</sup> Scheffler, Israel. 1974/1986. Pg. IX.

<sup>20</sup> Scheffler, Israel. 1974/1986. Pg. IX.

<sup>21</sup> Scheffler, Israel. 1974/1986. Pg. 1.

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conceptions of science itself. In the second place, pragmatism take quite seriously the legitimate demands of other modes of human experience- morality and social practice; art, poetry, history, religion and philosophical speculation. It does not use *de facto* science as a device for excluding or downgrading there other modes. Rather, it takes science as suggestive of more general concepts of critical thought, in terms of which the continuities among all modes may be revealed, and in light of which they may all be verified and advanced.”<sup>22</sup>

The broad scope of pragmatism reflected enormous social and intellectual changes in America during the period that Max H. Fisch called our ‘classical period’<sup>23</sup>: from the end of the Civil War to the eve of the Second World War- changes in which science played a major role. Fisch catalogues these changes as follows<sup>24</sup>-

the industrialization and urbanization of American society; the exploitation of our natural resources; the spreading and merging of railroads and other systems of transport and communication; the surge toward bigness in industry, business, capital, labour, and education; the management problems of large-scale organization; the drift towards specialization in all occupations; and the rise of an administrative and managerial class.

The most influential idea was that of evaluation, ‘expelling from nature the last fixity, that of species’<sup>25</sup>, including man in nature, and forcing the consideration of a biological view of man’s intelligence itself. The rise of experimental physiology and experimental psychology as well as the historical- oriented science of man (anthropology, social psychology, comparative religion and folklore, institutional and historical economics) reinforced the evolutionary ideas of *process*, as well as *continuity* between mankind and the lower animals, between higher mental faculties and animal

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<sup>22</sup> Scheffler, Israel. 1974/1986. Pg. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Fisch, Max H. (gen. ed.) 1951/1966. *Classical American Philosophers*. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts. Preface and General Introduction. (quoted in Scheffler: 1986: 3).

<sup>24</sup> Fisch, Max H. (gen. ed.) 1951/1966. Pg. No. 9.

<sup>25</sup> Fisch, Max H. 1951/1966. ‘The Classic Period in American Philosophy’. In, Fisch, Max H. (gen. ed.) 1951/1966. *Classic American Philosophers*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. (quoted in Scheffler: 1986: 5).

instinct. Israel Scheffler<sup>26</sup> said that pervasive social change were conflicting condition of life and making individuality, liberty, and authenticity more problematic, the new man generated the prospect of deliberate alteration of social problems. Responsibility for social arrangements replaced reliance on unalterable tradition as a consequence of the new conceptions of a *social science*. Knowledge and *action* now needed to be seen as intimately related. Knowledge, it seemed evident, arise in a biological and social context as a result of *experimentation*, that is, an active transformation of the environment directed towards the resolution of the problems of life. Knowledge, moreover, is so far as it increases the possibilities of deliberate social change and control increase our *moral* responsibility for the *actions* we take in determining the conditions of social life.

Russell B. Goodman started his argument quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson referring the emergence of the theory of pragmatism ““Each age”, Emerson stated, “must write its own books.”<sup>27</sup> Pragmatism may be, as William James suggested, “a new name for same old way of thinking,” found as much in Mill or Aristotle as in James or Peirce, but it nevertheless waxes and wanes in response to specific cultural and intellectual circumstances. Why does this age write its own pragmatic book? How it is that a philosophy to vibrant and promising at the turn of the twentieth century and so depleted at midcentury should review now at century end: after positivism, phenomenology, logical analysis, naturalized epistemology, and deconstruction?”<sup>28</sup>

‘To answer these questions, the alternative reading of twentieth century philosophy offered by Hilary Putnam, a leading philosopher of logic, language and mind who has taken a new turn towards pragmatism in his own work is noteworthy. According to Putnam, the first half of the twentieth century saw a serious of attempts to construct metaphysical system and the second, a

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<sup>26</sup> Scheffler, Israel. 1974/1986. Pg. 5-6.

<sup>27</sup> Emerson, Ralph Waldo. 1971. *The American Scholar*. in, Spiller, Robert E. et al., *The Collected Works of Ralf Waldo* vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

<sup>28</sup> Goodma, Russell B. (ed.). 1995. *Pragmatism: A Contemporary Reader*. Rutledge: New York and London. Pg. 1.

series of attempts to overcome them. The systems of Carnap, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein were put forward as attack on metaphysics, yet they were really Putnam writes, “among the most ingenious, profound, and technically brilliant constructions of metaphysical systems ever achieved.”<sup>29</sup> The “analytic philosophy” developed by these philosophy that continued even as their original systems were overcome – stressing formal logic, careful attention to language, analysis, and philosophical scenes. Yet, Putnam writes, “at the very movement when analytic philosophy is recognized as the ‘dominated movement’ in world philosophy, it has come to the end of its own project – the dead end, not the completion.”<sup>30,31</sup>

What brought pragmatism back again is neither the emergency of a new metaphysical system nor a technique for eliminating all systems, but rather the appreciation of a deep convergence of thought in twentieth century philosophy: in the writing of the classical pragmatists William James, Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, but also in the European philosophers Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein.<sup>32</sup>

It is important and necessary to remind the reader that pragmatism had originally announced itself in a lecture that Harvard professor William James delivered at Berkeley in 1898, entitled “philosophical conceptions and Practical Results”. Complicating the question of pragmatism’s origin from the start, James credited his friend Charles Sanders Peirce with originating the “principle of pragmatism,” which James stated as follows: “To attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object . . . we need only consider what effects of a conceivable practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from it,

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<sup>29</sup> Putnam, Hilary. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pg. 51. (quoted in GoodMan: 1995: 1).

<sup>30</sup> Putnam, Hilary. 1990. Pg. 52. (quoted in GoodMan: 1995: 1).

<sup>31</sup> Goodman, Russel B. (ed.) 1995. Pg. 1.

<sup>32</sup> For re-evaluation of these philosophers see Mark Okrent, *Heidegger’s Pragmatism* (Ithaca: Cornell university Press: 1988); Putnam’s book on *Wittgenstein and Prgmatism* (Blackwell); and Russell B. Goodman, “What Wittgenstein Learned from William James,” in, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, July 1994, pp. 339-54. (quoted in GoodMan: 1995: 2).



and what reactions we must prepare.”<sup>33</sup> Peirce and James stress results rather than origins in our understanding of ideas, and emphasize *our* sensations and *our* reactions.

The world for pragmatist is the world as we reacted to, or with, it – a scene of “transactions,” as Dewey put it. James spoke of “the humanistic principle: you can’t weed out the human contribution,” but only as intertwined with our contributions of organization, interest, and selection.<sup>34</sup> This “humanism” of the classical pragmatism of James and Dewey is an important source of its appeal to such neopragmatists as Putnam and Rorty.

Pragmatism has also had its important political and social side. It is most visible in the career of John Dewey. Dewey developed theories of education and politics that are of education and politics that are of a piece with his pragmatic theories of inquiry, truth, and meaning, and he states in autobiography that “*Democracy and Education* ... contains what was for many years the fullest exposition of his philosophy. In pursuit of his belief that one learns by doing...”<sup>35</sup>

Amid this welter of detail and tendency it is natural to try to define pragmatism or to seek essence. The problem than become, however, one of proliferating rather than absent definition. James’s *Pragmatism*<sup>36</sup> (1975) contain at least six accounts of what pragmatism is or contains: a theory of truth, a theory of meaning, a philosophical temperament, an epistemology metaphysics stressing human interest and action, a method for dissolving philosophical disputes, and a sceptical anti-essentialism.

No wonder that a year after James’s book appeared, Arthur Lovejoy was able to publish it in *Journal of Philosophy* a classic paper called “The Thirteen Pragmatism” in which he claimed that not only did “pragmatism” stand for different

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<sup>33</sup> James, William. 1975. *Pragmatism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (quoted in Goodman: 1995: 2).

<sup>34</sup> James, William. 1975. Pp. 122. (quoted in Goodman: 1995: 2).

<sup>35</sup> Goodman, Russell B. 1995. Pg. 2.

<sup>36</sup> James, William. 1975.

doctrines, but that in some case these doctrines conflicted.<sup>37</sup> The relation of various pragmatists and pragmatism to one another can best be understood, however, in terms of a metaphor James himself introduces when he attempts to define religion in *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Warning that “the theorizing mind tends always to the amplification of its materials,” James admits at the outset “that we may very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may alternately be equally important in religion.” So it is with pragmatism: there is no essence linking all pragmatist “characters which may alternatively be equally important.” Two pragmatists writer may share a theory of truth and diverge on their theories of meanings; share a romantic sense of fashioning the world, but not a religious sensibility. The person who knows a subject best, James asserts, enjoys “an intimate acquaintance with all [its] particularities in turn,” and would “naturally regard an abstract conception in which there were unified as a thing more misleading than enlightening.”<sup>38</sup> Contemporary pragmatists take up one or another of the linked character manifested by the classical pragmatists - as Putnam developed James’s humanism, and Rorty Dewey’s liberalism. Putnam turns towards the pragmatism of Peirce, Dewey and especially James for new approaches to problems of language, knowledge, and value.

Rorty’s pragmatism takes the form of an interdisciplinary or, post disciplinary conversation. Taking up issues in law, psychology, literary theory, and political theory.

In *Reason, Truth and History*, Putnam retains allegiance to a more traditional view of truth, stressing the difference between rational accepting at any given time and long-run or “ideal” acceptability. His view owes much to Peirce, who wrote, “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who investigate

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<sup>37</sup> Lovejoy, Arthur. 1908. “The Thirteen Pragmatism,” in *Journal of Philosophy*. 5. Pp. 5-12, 29-29. *Reprinted in*, Arthur Lovejoy. 1963. *The Thirteen Pragmatisms*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 1-29.

<sup>38</sup> James, William. 1987. *Varieties of Religious Experience*. In, William James. 1987. *Writings 1902-0910*. New York: The Library of America. Pp. 32. Quoted in Goodman: 1995: 3.

is what we mean by truth and the object represented by this opinion is real.”<sup>39</sup> This sentence expresses the key pragmatic (and Kantian) idea that truth is a human “opinion”, an opinion of human inquirers rather than a property of things “as they are in themselves.” Yet Peirce’s statement contains two important to Putnam’s position but foreign to Rorty’s view of things: “ultimately” and “fated”. Both suggest a pull towards the final human opinion on the part of the world, a pull Putnam gets at when he writes that “the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and world.”<sup>40</sup>

Rorty offers an account of language more deflationary than Putnam’s and Wittgenstein’s, in which not only is there no pre-established absolute set of meaning, but there is nothing more to language than “noise”. Rorty calls this account “Darwinian”: “a story about humans as animals which special organs and abilities: about how certain features of the human throat, hand, and brain enabled human to start developing increasingly complex and social practices, by battling increasingly complex noises back and forth.”<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Hartshorne, Charles and Paul Weiss (eds). 1965. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Cambridge, MA.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Pp. 268.

<sup>40</sup> Putnam, Hilary. 1981. *Reason, Truth and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg. 11. Later he states that truth “is expected to be stable or ‘convergent’; if both a statement and its negation could be ‘justified’, even if conditions were as ideal as one could hope to make them, there is no sense in thinking of the statement as *having* a truth-value” (Pg. 56). However, see his more recent attack on convergence as “incoherent” in ‘Reason, Truth and History’, p. 171, and the discussion in Richard Rorty, (Putnam and the Relativist Menace, *in*, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 90, No. 9, 1993, Pp. 443-61.

<sup>41</sup> Rorty, Richard. 1993. Putnam and the Relativist Menace. *in*, *Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. 90. No. 9. Pg. 448. At times, as here, Rorty seems to stand outside of the complex social practices in which he claims we are all immersed. These practices then flatten out: a production of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, the sounds of one’s local pop station, and a torture victim’s screams become equally “noises.” (There is some irony in Rorty’s offering this account of language and at the same time insisting on the value of literature.) But Rorty’s current “Darwinism” squares with nothing so much as his earlier, prepragmatic, writing on “eliminative materialism,” in which he defended the view not that mental terms can be *reduced* to physical terms but that, like “witch” or “phlogiston,” they will eventually *disappear* and so be *eliminated* from our language. Taking a stance that owes as much to the logical positivist Rodolf Carnap as to Nietzsche, Rorty maintains that the vocabulary of “truth,” “meaning,” “reason,” and “philosophy” will and ought to disappear from the intelligent conversation of humankind. Not only God, but any form of metaphysics, is dead. See Richard Rorty, “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories,” in *Review of Metaphysics*

Putnam sees in Rorty's stance a form of "mental suicide" in which normative notions like rationality, right and wrong, and thinking have been eliminated in favour of a grim causal account of language as "noisemaking."<sup>42</sup> For Putnam, notions such as rationality are both "immanent (not to be found outside of concrete language games and institutions)."<sup>43</sup> Philosophers who lose sight of the immanence of reason are in the grip of a function of absolute knowledge, significance, or morality which, Putnam agrees with Rorty, are untenable. But philosophers who lose sight of the transcendence of reason, Putnam holds, fall into a deeply irrational "cultural relativism."<sup>44</sup> Putnam's complex passion embracing immanence and transcendence is close to that expressed by Adorno and cited with approval by Habermas:-

The embracing immanence and transcendence is close to that that has happened and would no longer be free to credit itself with power over the absolute. It would indeed have to forbid itself to think the absolute, lest it betray the thought - and yet it must not allow itself to be gulled out of the emphatic concept of truth. This contradiction is the element.

According to the logical positivism that formed the backdrop to Putnam's and Rorty's philosophical education, all moral statements are "cognatively meaningless" "pseudo statements" that are neither true nor false. One reason both philosophers turn towards pragmatism is the ease with which moral and political (and aesthetic) statements can be validated within pragmatic theory. To paraphrase Kant, the new pragmatists deny absolute truth in order to make room along with humanized science, for humanized morality.<sup>45</sup>

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19:1 (September 1965), Pp. 24-54. See also "In Defense of Eliminative Materialism." In *Review of Metaphysics* 24:1 (September 1970), Pp. 112-21.

<sup>42</sup> Putnam, Hilary. 1983. Why Reason Can't Be Naturalised. In *Realism and Reason Philosophical Papers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. vol. 3. Pg. 246.

<sup>43</sup> Putnam, Hilary. 1983. Pg. 234.

<sup>44</sup> Putnam, Hilary. 1983. Pg. 235.

<sup>45</sup> Kant wrote that he had found it "necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for *faith*." In *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 1963. [Translated by Norman Kemp Smith]. London: Macmillan. Pg. 29

The positivists were, according to Putnam and Rorty, in one way right: there are no absolute values waiting to be “discovered” by humanity that must to be true. But since – as we have learned through the work of Quine, Nelson Goodman, Sellars, Kuhn and others – there are no absolute scientific or observational truths either, no absolute foundations on which all legitimate disciplines depends, there is no ruling talk about morality altogether out of bonds. Trading on the humanly – constituted nature of all truth (with small “t”), Rorty and Putnam each in his own way allows for and engages in substantial talk about morality. “I hold,” Rorty writes, “that distinction between true and false (the positives’ mark of ‘cognitive status’) is as applicable to statements like ‘Yeats was a great poet’, and ‘Democracy is better than tyranny’, as to statements like ‘The earth goes around the sun’.”<sup>46</sup>

William James wrote in his first chapter of *Pragmatism*: The philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos ... .. The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain temperaments.<sup>47</sup>

Putnam and Rorty, I want to suggest, have radically different intellectual temperaments, evident not only in their divergences on such issues as truth, moral realism, or reality, but in the differences of tone and tendency in their thought even in the many places where their views overlap. Their senses of the “total push and pressure of the cosmos” are at odds.

These temperamental differences can be classified if we apply a distinction James introduces in *Pragmatism* to define pragmatism itself; that between the “tough – minded” and “tender – minded” temperaments in philosophy. Although James presents the pragmatist—a “happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of character”<sup>48</sup>— as a

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<sup>46</sup> Rorty, Richard. 1993. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg. 3.

<sup>47</sup> James, William. 1975. Pp. 9, 11.

<sup>48</sup> James, William. 1975. Pg. 124.

mediator between them, these two temperamental tendencies from a further division within pragmatism, exemplified today in Putnam and Rorty. James drew his distinction via two lists:

**The Tender-Minded**

Rationalistic (going by 'principles'),  
Intellectualistic,  
Idealistic,  
Optimistic,  
Religious,  
Free-wilist,  
Monistic,  
Dogmatical,

**The Tough-Minded**

Empiricist (going by 'facts')  
Sensationalistic,  
Materialistic,  
Pessimistic,  
Irreligious,  
Fatalistic,  
Pluralistic,  
Sceptical<sup>49</sup>

**Truth and Pragmatism: Criteria of Truth, Based Upon Pragmatic Considerations**

One common criterion of truth is simple, straightforward pragmatism: if a belief “works,” then it must be true. If it doesn’t work, then it must be false and should be discarded in favor of something else. This criterion has the distinct advantage of being readily testable — in fact, the principle that beliefs and ideas must be verified before being accepted resonates strongly in scientific circles.

The pragmatic test for truth goes a bit further than just the scientific principle of verification, however. For pragmatists, the very meaning and nature of an idea can only be discerned when it is applied to real-world situations. Ideas which are only in the mind have less substance and less relevance. It is in the actions of our lives that meaning and truth are located, not in idle speculation.

There is certainly a lot to be said for relying on pragmatism when trying to distinguish between true and false ideas. After all, you can always point to a successful test or project and demonstrate to others the validity of your

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<sup>49</sup> James, William. 1975. Pg. 13.

beliefs. If your ideas weren't true, they couldn't possibly result in such success, right?

Well, maybe they could. The problem with relying heavily or even exclusively upon pragmatism is that it simply isn't the case that only true beliefs "work" and false beliefs don't. It's entirely possible for the success to be the consequence of something *other* than your belief. For example, a doctor could prescribe a medication to a sick person and watch an illness disappear — but that doesn't automatically mean that the medication was the cause of the improvement. Maybe it was a change in the patient's diet, or perhaps the patient's immune system finally won out.

In addition to false belief appearing to "work," true beliefs can also appear to fail. Once again, factors which lie outside your knowledge and control can intervene to cause a project which should succeed to ultimately fail. This happens less often, especially in carefully controlled studies, and as a result this sort of Negative Pragmatism (failed tests point to false ideas) is a bit stronger. Nevertheless, that really only works after rigorous and repeated testing — a single failed test is often not enough to give up on an idea.

The problem here is that the world around us is much more complex than we tend to realize on a conscious level. No matter what we are doing, there are far more factors involved than we usually think of — many of which we just take for granted, like natural laws or our own memories. Some things (like natural laws) are indeed reliable, but others (like the human memory) are not nearly so reliable as we assume.

Because of this, it can be very difficult to tell whether or not something is "working" at all, much less *why*. When we attribute something that works to a single belief which we then conclude is true, we are often simplifying matters incredibly. Sometimes this isn't a problem — and we do often have to simplify because, quite frankly, life and nature are just too complex to take in all at once.

However necessary simplification may be, it still introduces a level of uncertainty into our calculations and increases the chances of error. As a consequence, even though pragmatism can be a very practical and useful test for truth, it is still one which needs to be used with caution.

Steven Seidman<sup>50</sup> use the term pragmatism refers to a position on the production and justification of knowledge. Pragmatists assert that knowledge or truth is not something about which there can or should be a general theory. Knowledge should not be the occasion to inaugurate a special inquiry – epistemology - which, for example, might take the form of a transcendental argument explicating the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, an empiricist argument accounting for the relation of sense perception to ideas, or a linguistic proposal that assumes the task of linking word and world. Instead, pragmatists hold that knowledge should be approached as involving a practical relation to the world. Specifically, knowledge is viewed as a way of coping or securing particular purposes or goods. Truth or valid knowledge can only mean, says the pragmatist, those ideas and the strategies for their production that have proved useful or successful in "coping," at least with respect to their specific utility. What is taken for knowledge, in other words, is just another way of acknowledging that certain ways of thinking, inquiring, or interpreting things work or are successful vis-a-vis the purpose to hand.

Pragmatist understands moreover that claims to knowledge are often entangled in social interest and power<sup>51</sup>.

### **Classical Writings**

Here I would like to give gist of some selected writings of classical pragmatist thinkers for better under celerity. Not only this, but it will also help to make if their theories, ideas took shape. These writings are considered their representative works.

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<sup>50</sup> Seidman, Steven. 1996. Pragmatism and Sociology: A Response to Clough, Denzin and Richardson. In. *The Sociological Quarterly*. Vol. 37, NO. 4. Pg. 754

<sup>51</sup> Seidman, Steven. 1996. Pg. 757



### **Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)**

Charles Sanders Peirce was a brilliant and quirky mathematician, physicist and philosopher. His "How to Make Our Ideas clear", published in 1878, is acknowledged to be pragmatism's original written statement – even though the term "pragmatism" does not occur in it.

#### **How to Make Our Ideas Clear<sup>52</sup>**

Peirce begins with example of treaties; he says that whoever has looked into modern treaties on logic of the common sort, will without any doubt remember the two distinctions between *clear* and *obscure* conceptions, and between *distinction* and *confused* conceptions. He adds that they have lain in the books now for nigh two centuries, unimproved and unmodified, and are generally reckoned by logicians as among the gems of their doctrine.

A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure.

He adds "that when the logicians speak of "clearness," they mean nothing more than such a familiarity with an idea, since they regard the quality as but a small merit, which needs to be supplemented by another, which they call *distinctness*."

For him nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions. Nevertheless, our existing beliefs can be set in order by this process, and order is an essential element of intellectual economy, as of every other.

The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is, how to make our ideas clear; and a most important one it is, depreciated only by minds who stand in need of it. To know what we think, to be

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<sup>52</sup> Peirce, Charles, S. 1878. How to Make Idea Clear. In Popular Science Monthly. Vol. 12, January 1878, Pp. 286-302.

masters of our own meaning, will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought. It is most easily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted; and far happier than such as wallow helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions.

Peirce says that the essence of belief is establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. He gave example of music to understand the relationship. He says piece of music may be written in part having its own air, so various systems of relationship of succession subsist together between the same sensations. These different systems are distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions. Thought is only one such system, for its sole motive, idea, and function is to produce belief, and whatever does not concern that purpose belongs to some other system of relations. But the soul and meaning of thought, abstracted from the other elements which accompany it, though it may be voluntarily thwarted, can never be made to direct itself toward anything but the production of belief. Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest; and whatever does not refer to belief is no part of the thought itself.

And what, then is belief? He raised the question and answers it. It is the demi-cadence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life. We have seen that it has just three properties: First, it is something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a *habit*. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached. But, since belief is a rule for action, the application of which involves further doubt and further thought, at the same time that it is a stopping-place, it is also a new starting-place for thought. That is why I have permitted myself to call it thought at rest, although thought is essentially an action. The *final* upshot of thinking is the exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part; but

belief is only a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence future thinking.

Some belief are nothing but self-notifications what we should, upon occasion, act in regard to such things as we believe. The occasion of such action would be some sensible perception, the motive of it to produce some sensible result. He says thus our action has exclusive reference to what affect the senses, our habit has same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine.

Perce, says that the truth is, there is some vague notion afloat that a question may mean something which the mind cannot conceive; and when some hair-splitting philosophers have been confronted with the absurdity of such a view, they have invented an empty distinction between positive and negative conceptions, in the attempt to give their non-idea a form not obviously nonsensical

On the concluding remark he Perce says we have, hitherto, not crossed the threshold of scientific logic. It is certainly important to know how to make our ideas clear, but they may be ever so clear without being true. How to give birth to those vital and procreative ideas which multiply into a thousand forms and diffuse themselves everywhere, advancing civilization and making the dignity of man, is an art not yet reduced to rules.

### **William James (1842-1910)**

William James was an elder brother of the novelist Henry James. He introduced experimental psychology into the American university and published the monumental *Principles of Psychology* in 1890. Later on he turned from psychology towards philosophy and religion and published *The Will to Believe* in 1896 *Varieties of*

*Religious Experience* in 1902, and in the final decade of his life developing positions he coined “pluralism”, “radical empiricism” and “pragmatism”.

Here I give the gist of two chapters of James’s book *Pragmatism* (1907) where he expressed the main idea and tendency of his and subsequent pragmatism. “What Pragmatism Mean” begins with one of James’s memorable stories of dispute about whether a man chasing a squirrel around a tree goes around the squirrel too. The method is according to James, based on Peirce’s pragmatic account of meaning, according to which our conception of a thing in the “conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve.”

In addition to a theory of meaning and a method for settling metaphysical disputes, pragmatism is also for James a theory of truth. Idea, James holds, are themselves part of experience, and they “become true in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory, relation with other part of our experience.” Truth, James writes, is “a species of the good; truth carry us “prosperously towards or allow us to get into satisfactory relation with other part of experience.”

“Pragmatism and Humanism”, the second chapter of *Pragmatism* represented here, contains of this doctrine. Although James emphasises the human determination of the world, he at the same time offers a nuanced contrary account of the world’s facticity or resistance. He states “we carve out everything, just as we came out constellation, to serve our human purpose.” Nevertheless, there are “resisting factor in every experience of truth”, including not only our present experience but the whole body of our prior beliefs.

### **What Pragmatism Means**

Here I would like to explain “What Pragmatism Mean”<sup>53</sup> in the word of William James. This is a Lecture two, which is part of series of eight lectures dedicated

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<sup>53</sup> This is gist of, Lecture II from series of eight lectures dedicated to the memory of John Stuart Mill, , *A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, in December 1904, by William James.

to the memory of John Stuart Mill, *A New Name for Some Old Way of Thinking*, in December 1904.

He started with his memory of camping party in the mountains. He returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel – a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: *Does the man go round the squirrel or not?* After the discussion everyone had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Now each side, when he appeared therefore appealed to him to make it a majority. For him mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, he immediately sought and found one, as follows: "Which part is right," he said, "depends on what you practically mean by 'going round' the squirrel. He said that if you mean passing from the north of him to east, then to the south, than to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any further dispute. You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the other."

He said that "one or two of the hotter disputants called my speech a shuffling evasion, saying they wanted no quibbling or scholastic hair-splitting, but meant just plain honest English 'round', the majority seemed to think that the distinction had assuaged the dispute."

He said that this trivial anecdote because it is a peculiarly simple example of what he wish now to speak of as *the pragmatic method*. The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many? – fated or free? – material or spiritual? – here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and dispute over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right.

A glance at the history of the idea can show us still better what pragmatism means in between ways. The term is derived from the same Greek word *pragma*, meaning action, from which our words 'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled *How to Make Our Ideas Clear*, in the *Popular Science Monthly* for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve – what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by any one for twenty years, until, in an address before Professor Howison's

philosophical union at the University of California, brought it forward again and made a special application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the times seemed ripe for its reception. The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at present, it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic journals. On all hands we find the 'pragmatic movement' spoken of, sometimes with respect, sometimes with contumely, seldom with clear understanding. It is evident that the term applies itself conveniently to a number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective name, and that it has 'come to stay.'

He emphasizes that to take in the importance of Peirce's principle, one must get accustomed to applying it to concrete cases. He found a few years ago that Ostwald, had been making perfectly distance of the principle of pragmatism in his lecture on the philosophy of science, thought he had not called it by that name. "All realities influence our practice," Ostwald wrote to him, "and what influence is their meaning for us. He accustomed to put questions to his classes in this way; in what respects would the world be different if this alternative or that were true? "If I can find nothing that would become different, then the alternative has no sense," he said.

That is, the rival views mean practically the same thing, and meaning, other than practical, there is for us none. Ostwald in a published lecture gives this example of what he means. He gave example from controversy of hydrogen atom oscillates inside the hydrogen from chemistry. Then he says that controversy raged, but never was decided. "It would never have begun," says Ostwald, "if the combatants had asked themselves what particular experimental fact could have been made different one or the other view being correct. For it would then have appeared that no difference of fact could possibly ensue; and the quarrel was as unreal as if, theorizing in primitive times about the raising of dough by yeast, one party should have invoked a 'brownie', while another insisted on an 'elf' as the true cause of the phenomenon."

It is astonishing to see how many dispute collapses into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test of tracing concrete consequence. There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere – no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact

and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen.

There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates had expertise in it. Aristotle used it methodologically. Lock, Berkeley, and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means. Shadworth Hodgson keeps insisting that realities are only what they are 'known as'. But these forerunners of pragmatism used it in fragments: they were preludes only. Not until in our time has it generalized itself, become conscious of a universal mission, pretended to a conquering destiny. James believes in that destiny and he hope he may end by inspiring you with his belief. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad *a priori* reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins.

For James, pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to him, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed.

James also mentions that at the same time it does not stand for any special results. It is a methodology only. But the general triumph of the method would mean an enormous change in what he called in his last lecture the 'temperament' of philosophy.

Metaphysics has usually followed a very primitive kind of quest. You know how men have always hankered after unlawful magic, and you know what a great part in magic words have always played. He says that, if you have his name, or the formula of incantation that binds him, you can control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever the power may be. Solomon knew the names of all the spirits, and having their names, he (James) held them subject to his will. So the universe has always appeared to the natural mind as a kind of enigma, of which the key must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing word or name. That word names the universe's *principle*, and to possess it is after a fashion to possess the universe itself. 'God',



'Matter', 'Reason', 'the Absolute', 'Energy', are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them. You are at the end of your metaphysical quest.

But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word as closing your quest. You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value<sup>54</sup>, set it at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed.

"All these, you see, are *anti-intellectualist* tendencies. Against rationalism as a pretension and a method, pragmatism is fully armed and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. *The attitude of looking away first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts,*" he said.

Meanwhile the word pragmatism has come to be used in a still wider sense, as meaning also a certain theory of truth. As the sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations. The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is

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<sup>54</sup> (See detail ref—From the introduction to William James's *Pragmatism* by Bruce Kuklick, p. XIV.) James went on to apply the pragmatic method to the epistemological problem of truth. He would seek the meaning of 'true' by examining how the idea functioned in our lives. A belief was true, he said, if in the long run it worked for all of us, and guided us expeditiously through our semihospitable world. James was anxious to uncover what true beliefs amounted to in human life, what their "Cash Value" was, what consequences they led to. A belief was not a mental entity which somehow mysteriously corresponded to an external reality if the belief were true. Beliefs were ways of acting with reference to a precarious environment, and to say they were true was to say they guided us satisfactorily in this environment. If what was true was what worked, we can scientifically investigate religion's claim to truth in the same manner. James also argued directly that such beliefs were satisfying — they enabled us to lead fuller, richer lives and were more viable than their alternatives. Religious beliefs were expedient in human existence, just as scientific beliefs were.

absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summaries old facts and to lead to new ones. They are only a man-made language, conceptual shorthand, as someone calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; and languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and many dialects.

Riding now on the front of this wave of scientific logic Messrs. Schiller and Dewey appear with their pragmatistic account of what truth everywhere signifies. Even then, these teachers say, 'truth' in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means in science. It means, they say, nothing but this, *that ideas* (which themselves are but parts of our experience) *become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience*, to summaries them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true *instrumentally*. This is the 'instrumental' view of truth taught so successfully at Chicago, the view that truth in our ideas means their power to 'work,' promulgated so brilliantly at Oxford.

Messrs, Dewey, Schiller and their allies, in reaching this general conception of all truth, have only followed the example of geologists, biologists and philologists.

The observable process which Schiller and Dewey particularly singled out for generalisation is the familiar one by which any individual settles into new opinions. The process here is always the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment, he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all

extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously), until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expediently.

This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible. The most violent revolutions in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one's own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. We hold a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this 'problem of maxima and minima.' But success in solving this problem is eminently a matter of approximation. We say 'this theory solves it on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; but that means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently. To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic<sup>55</sup>.

The simplest case of new truth is of course the mere numerical addition of new kinds of facts, or of new single facts of old kinds, to our experience – an addition that involves no alteration in the old beliefs. Day follows day, and its contents are simply added. The new contents themselves are not true, they simply *come* and *are*. Truth is *what we say about* them, and when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the plain additive formula.

When old truth grows, then, by new truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the reasons. That new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying our double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself classed as true, by the way it works; grafting itself then upon the

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<sup>55</sup> Plastic is used in terms of flexibility and easy to mould.

ancient body of truth, which thus grows much as a tree grows by the activity of a new layer of cambium.

Dewey and Schiller proceed to generalize this observation and to apply it to the most ancient parts of truth. They also once were plastic. They also were called true for human reasons. They also mediated between still earlier truths and what in those days were novel observations. Purely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role whatever, is nowhere to be found. The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true, for 'to be true' *means* only to perform this marriage-function.

The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything. Truth independent; truth that we find merely; truth no longer malleable to human need; truth incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed superabundantly – or is supposed to exist by rationalistically minded thinkers; but then it means only the dead heart of the living tree, and its being there means only that truth also has its paleontology and its 'prescription,' and may grow stiff with years of veteran service and petrified in men's regard by sheer antiquity.

You will probably be surprised to learn, then, that Messrs. Schiller's and Dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of contempt and ridicule. All rationalism has risen against them. In influential quarters Mr. Schiller, in particular, has been treated like an impudent schoolboy who deserves a spanking. I should not mention this, but for the fact that it throws so much sidelight upon that rationalistic temper to which I have opposed the temper of pragmatism. Pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts. Rationalism is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions. This pragmatist talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and satisfactoriness, about the success with which they 'work,' etc., suggests to the typical intellectualist mind a sort of coarse lame second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths are not real truth. Such tests are merely subjective. As against this, objective truth must be something non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote, august, exalted. It must be an

absolute correspondence of our thoughts with an equally absolute reality. It must be what we *ought* to think unconditionally. The conditioned ways in which we *do* think are so much irrelevance and matter for psychology. Down with psychology, up with logic, in all this question!

The universe is a system of which the individual members may relax their anxieties occasionally, in which the don't-care mood is also right for men, and moral holidays in order, – that, if I mistake not, is part, at least, of what the Absolute is 'known-as,' that is the great difference in our particular experiences which his being true makes, for us, that is part of his cash-value when he is pragmatically interpreted.

'What would be better for us to believe'! This sounds very like a definition of truth. It comes very near to saying 'what we ought to believe': and in *that* definition none of you would find any oddity. Ought we ever not to believe what it is *better for us* to believe? And can we then keep the notion of what is better for us, and what is true for us, permanently apart?

Pragmatism says no, and I fully agree with it. Probably you also agree, so far as the abstract statement goes, but with a suspicion that if we practically did believe everything that made for good in our own personal lives, we should be found indulging all kinds of fancies about this world's affairs, and all kinds of sentimental superstitions about a world hereafter. Your suspicion here is undoubtedly well founded, and it is evident that something happens when you pass from the abstract to the concrete that complicates the situation.

In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them. My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, must run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs. Grant that it may be true in giving me a moral holiday.

## Pragmatism and Humanism

William James in his chapter "Pragmatism and Humanism"<sup>56</sup> begins with quest of truth. All the great single world answer to the grate single world answers to the world's riddle, such as God, the One, Reason, Law, Spirit, Matter, Nature, Polarity, the Dialectic Process, the Idea, the Self, the over soul, draw the admiration that men have lavished on them from this oracular role. By amateurs in philosophy and processionalists alike, the universe is represented as a queer sort of petrified sphinx whose appeal to men consists in a monotonous challenge to his divining powers. The truth: what a perfect idol of the rationalistic mind!

He was remembering an old letter by his friend written to him. Letter states "In everything, in science, art, morals and religion, there *must* be one system that is right and *every* other wrong." He James says that "what is *the* truth?" is not real question (being irrelative to all conditions) and that the whole notion of *the* truth is an abstraction from the fact of truth is the plural, a mere useful summarizing phrase like *the* Latin Language or *the* Law.

Distinction between the lawful and the unlawful in conduct in speech, have grown up incidentally among the interactions of man's experience in detail; and in no other way do distinctions between the true and way do distinction between the true and false in belief ever grow up. He also adds that truth grafts itself on previous truth, modifying it in the process.

He link truth with laws and language. He says that the law and languages at any rate are thus seen to be man-made things. He gives credit to Schiller who applies the analogy to belief, and process the name of "Humanism" for the doctrine that to an unascertainable extent all truths are man-made products too. Human motives sharpen all our questions, human satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all our formulas have a human twist.

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<sup>56</sup> William James. "Pragmatism and Humanism". Lecture 7 in *Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking*. New York: Longman Green and Co (1907): Pp. 92- 104.

Schiller adds that we can learn the limits of the plasticity only by trying, and that we ought to start as if it were wholly plastic, acting methodically on that assumption, and stopping only when we are decisively rebuked.

*"Reality" is in general what truths have to take account of;*<sup>57</sup> and the *first* part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are forced upon us, coming we know not whence. Over other nature, order and quantity we have as good as no control. *They* are neither true nor false; they simply *are*. It is only what we say about them, only the narrow we give them, our theories of their source and nature and remote relations, that may be true or not.

The *second* part of reality, as something that our beliefs must also obediently take account of is the *relation* that obtain between our sensations or between their copies in our minds.

The *third* part of reality, additional to these perceptions is the *previous truth* of which every new inquiry takes account. This third part is a much less obdurately resisting factor: it often ends by giving way.

In speaking of these three portions of reality as at all times contains our belief's formation, he says "I am only reminding you of what we heard in our last hour.

Now however, fixed these elements of reality may be, we still have a certain freedom in our dealings with them. *That* they are is undoubtedly beyond our control; but *which* we attend to, note, and make emphatic in our conclusions, he said depends on our own interests. He gave example of "waterloo" for how formulation of truth result is different. He said that we read the same facts differently. "Waterloo", which with the same fixed details, spells a "victory" for an English man; for Frenchman it spell a "defeat." So, far an optimist philosopher the universe spells victory, for a pessimist, defeat.

He says about reality that it is depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The *that* of it is its own; but the *what* depends on the *which*; and the *which* depends on *us*. Both the sensational and the relational parts of reality are dumb; they

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<sup>57</sup> Mr. Tylor in his Elements of Metaphysics uses this excellent pragmatic definition. (foot notes by James).

say absolutely nothing about themselves. We it is who to speak for them. This dumbness of sensations has led such intellectualist as T. H. Green and Edward Caird to show them almost beyond the pale of philosophic recognition, but pragmatists refuse to go so far.

Thus, to say nothing of the new *facts* which men add to the matter of reality by the acts of their own lives, they have already impressed their mental forms on that whole third of reality which he have called 'previous truths.' Every hour brings its new percepts, its own facts of sensation and relation, to be truly taken account of; but the whole of our past dealings with such facts is already funded in the previous truths. It is therefore only the smallest and recentest fraction of the first two parts of reality that comes to us without the human touch, and that fraction has immediately, to become humanized in the sense of being squared, assimilated, or in some way adapted, to the humanized mass already there. James says that there are nothing to discover truth, all things are already discovered.

He says that in many familiar objects everyone will recognize the human element. He says that we conceive a given reality in this way or in that, to suit our purpose, and the reality passively submits to the conception. He gave example of the number 27 as the cube of 3, or as the product of 3 and 9, or as 26 plus 1, or 100 *minus* 73, or in countless other ways, of which one will be just as true as another. In another example of a chess-board as black squares on a white ground, or as white squares on a black ground, and neither conception is a false one. He argue this in another example of big triangles crossing each other, and as a hexagon with legs set up on its angles, as six equal triangles hanging together by their tips, etc. All these treatments are true treatments -the sensible *that* upon the paper resists no one of them. You can say in a line that it turns east, or you can say that it turns west, and the line *per se* accepts both descriptions without rebelling at the inconsistency.

Here James's argument is that in all these cases we humanly make an addition to some sensible reality, and that reality tolerates the addition. All the



additions 'agree' with the reality; they fit it, while they build it out. No one of them is false. Which may be treated as the more true, depends altogether on the human use of it.

He quotes Lotze who says, we naively assume a relation between reality and our minds which may be just the opposite of the one. Reality, we naturally think, stands ready-made and complete, and our intellects supervene with the one simple duty of describing it as it is already.

### **John Dewey (1869-1852)**

John Dewey is best known as Pragmatist Educator of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. He was a writer, lecturer and philosopher whose theories had a profound influence on public education on the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially in the United States. During his distinguished academic career, which Dewey was a strong promoter of what was called instrumentalism (related to the pragmatism of Charles Pierce and William James) and the radical reform of the public education system. His view held no room for eternal truth outside human experience, and he advocated an educational system with continued experimentation and vocational training to equip students to solve practical problems. His works include *Democracy and Education* (1916), *Art as Experience* (1934) and a series of lectures collected as *Experience and Nature* (1925), *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (1920), *The Quest for Certainty* (1919)

### **Does Reality Possess Practical Character?**

In "Does Reality Possess Practical Character?"<sup>58</sup> he started his chapter with criticisms of the neo-Kantian conception that *a priori* functions of thought are necessary to constitute knowledge. It became relevant to deny its underlying postulate: viz., the existence of anything properly called mental states or subjective

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<sup>58</sup> Dewey, John. 1908. Does Reality Possess Practical Character? In John Dewey. *Essay, Philosophical and Psychological, in Honor of William James, Professor in Harvard University, by his Colleagues at Columbia University*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. Pp. 53-80

impressions precedent to all objective recognitions, and requiring accordingly some transcendental function to order them into a world of stable and consistent reference. It was argued that such so-called original mental data are in truth turning points of the readjustment, or making over, through a state of incompatibility and shock, of objective affairs. Dewey says this doctrine was met by the cry of "subjectivism"! He says it that had seemed to him to be criticism, on grounds at once naturalistic and ethical, of the ground proposition of subjectivism.

Dewey says "Arguments against pragmatism — by which I mean the doctrine that reality possesses practical character and that this character is most efficaciously expressed in the function of intelligence<sup>59</sup> — seem to fall blandly into this fallacy. They assume that to hold that knowledge makes a difference in existences is equivalent to holding that it makes a difference in the object *to be* known, thus defeating its own purpose; witless that the reality which is the appropriate object of knowledge in a given case may be precisely a reality in which knowing has succeeded in making the needed difference."<sup>60</sup> Further he says This question is not one to be settled by manipulation of the concept of knowledge, nor by dialectic discussion of its essence or nature. It is a question of facts, a question of what knowing exists as in the scheme of existence.<sup>61</sup>

Our objective test of the presence or absence of intelligence is influence upon behaviour. No capacity to make adjustments means no intelligence; conduct evincing management of complex and novel conditions means a high degree of reason. Such conditions at least suggest that a reality-to-be-known, a reality which is the appropriate subject-matter of knowledge is reality-of-use-and-in-use, direct or

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<sup>59</sup> He gave a foot notes as per quoted here, "This definition, in the present state of discussion, is an arbitrary or personal one. The text does not mean that "pragmatism" is currently used exclusively in this sense; obviously there are other senses. It does not mean it is the sense in which it *ought* to be used. I have no wish to legislate either for language or for philosophy. But it marks the sense in which it is used in this paper; and the pragmatic movement is still so loose and variable that I judge one has a right to fix his own meaning, provided he serves notice and adheres to it." [Pg. 80].

<sup>60</sup> Dewey, John. 1908. Pg 58-59.

<sup>61</sup> Dewey, John. 1908. Pg. 59.

indirect, and that a reality which is not in any sort of use, or bearing upon use, may go hang, so far as knowledge is concerned.<sup>62</sup>

### **Emile Durkheim (1858-1917)**

#### **Pragmatism and Sociology<sup>63</sup>**

It must however be fully understood that this book is not Durkheim's own text, since his manuscript, if it even existed, had not yet been found. This book is only a reconstituted text, in which the author has tried to establish as faithful as possible on the basis of the two sets of notes of his student.

Marcel Mauss who analysed Durkheim's unpublished work in *L'Année Sociologique* for 1925<sup>64</sup> wrote that 'similarly, the loss of the entirely new series of lectures which Durkheim gave in the academic year 1913-14 just before the war, is a sad one. His aim was to introduce students to pragmatism, a form of philosophical thought, which was still new at that time. The lectures were intended for his son, Andre, than a student of his. He wanted to fill a gap in the education of the young man of that period, and he took opportunity, not only of introducing them to pragmatism, but also of clearly defining the relationship, and the areas of similarity and difference, which he saw between this system and the fundamental ideas which in his view were emerging from the new discipline of sociology.

He established his own position with regard to Bergson, James, Dewey and the other American pragmatists. It is quite clear that the idea in these lectures both complement and, and so to speak, are a continuation of the theory of knowledge mapped out in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. As Durkheim points out at the beginning of these lectures there was at the time virtually no other theory of truth than pragmatism. Kantianism and neo-Kantianism were both already outmoded.

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<sup>62</sup> Dewey, John. 1908. Pg 61.

<sup>63</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. *Pragmatism and Sociology*. (Edt. and introduced by John B. Allock. Tran. by J.C. Whitehouse.) Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>64</sup> *Année Sociologique*, Vol. I, 1925. Pg. 10 (footnotes given by editor of Durkheim: 1955/1983).

Hamelin's synthetics idealism, however, had the disadvantage of presenting knowledge of presenting knowledge as presupposing a given, already existing external object.<sup>65</sup>

In contradictory to this, what Durkheim held on to from pragmatism is the idea that through creates truth and that consequently truth is neither something fixed nor already existing, but something living and human. But the way in which pragmatism interpreted that idea, which was correct in itself, seemed to him ultimately purely and simply to impoverish truth by making it into something arbitrarily variable, devoid of any objectivity and negating the idea of 'necessary' truths.

But Durkheim himself alludes especially in these lectures<sup>66</sup> to this possible misunderstanding. He rejects pragmatism as 'a logical utilitarianism' which does not explain the 'hard' character of truth. Probably, just as the moral good appears both 'desirable' and obligatory, the truth, as pragmatism says, brings us a certain 'satisfaction' (pp. 48-49). At the same time however, it 'imposes itself', both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, which an obligatory and constraining character. It is often painful<sup>67</sup> in Durkheim's view, only a sociological theory of truth can explain this double nature.

Durkheim will not accept that true can be defined in terms of its practical efficacy alone, or that it does not correspond to reality. He goes so far as to contrast the characteristics of thoughts and those of action<sup>68</sup>. He is almost too harsh in judging this transatlantic teaching, which he accuses of being not so much a doctrine of action as 'an attack on pure speculation and theoretical thought'<sup>69</sup>.

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<sup>65</sup> Cf. *Elements Principaux*, 1<sup>st</sup> edn., p. 471, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn. Pg. 508. "the will does not create objects: it presuppose them .... Not having created objects, the subject only impinges upon their situation when it makes itself available, opening itself to them through awareness or, on the contrary, by closing itself off from them.

<sup>66</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Lecture 18<sup>th</sup> Pg. 86.

<sup>67</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1995/1983. Pg. 74.

<sup>68</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 78-81.

<sup>69</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 64.

Against Dewey, he maintains vigorously that truth, of whatever kind, always has a speculative function. The expression 'of whatever kind' is important, for not all truth, Durkheim tell us, is of a purely rational order. Along with scientific truths, there are and always will be truths which he describes as 'mythological'. But even those are quite different from pure fantasies or mere instruments of action. If they too can in one sense be said to be 'truths', it is because they express, in local and temporal forms, realities which are unchallengeable, because they are seen to be rooted in the social. It is a mistake to believe that society can live in total illusion or total fantasy. These 'mythological truths' have thus a certain rational quality, since they correspond to a real intellectual need, a need to understand. They are cosmologies which express the way in which a society, at a given point in its history; both images the universe and also sees itself; and since for Durkheim society is part of nature and its 'highest manifestation', the categories which serve the intelligence of society are also knowing the universe.<sup>70</sup> Thus the true function of thought is very different from a practical one. Pragmatism was right to say that it is thought which creates reality, but was unable to interpret that formula properly. The role of consciousness is to create being<sup>71</sup>. This is true even at the psycho-organic level where, according to Durkheim, the sum of all discrete sense-impressions results in a level of consciousness which can be described as 'the organism knowing itself'. It is even more true at the psycho-social level, where it is clearer than elsewhere that the function of thought is 'to create a being which would not exist without it', to 'make', as the pragmatist say ('the making of reality' is the title of a chapter of Schiller's), highest reality which is society<sup>72</sup>.

It is curious to see that Durkheim's sociological realism finally resolve itself into a theory of knowledge which is at same time idealistic and realistic. According to

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<sup>70</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1915. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* [(trans. J. W. Swain), London: George Allen & Unwin Limited. Pg. 19, see esp.: 'For example, that which is at the foundation of the category of time is the rhythm of social life; but if there is a rhythm in collective life, one may rest assured that there is another in the life of the individual, and more generally, in that of the universe.'

<sup>71</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 23 and 82.

<sup>72</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 85.

this, just as society constitutes 'an organism of ideas', as Espinas had already, so too thought lectures is in fact a critique which is no longer restricted to pragmatism, but also includes Bergson, and which is directed at the idea that rational thought could be outside reality and life. The 'life force' itself, retorts Durkheim<sup>73</sup>, is deeply differentiated, and contains in embryonic form many immanent variations so that in this respect conceptual thought merely shares in a property of the real.

There is a second area in which these lectures help us in the better understanding of Durkheim's thought he has been accused of confusing the collective consciousness, the repository of all intelligences and truth, with 'the world of eternal Ideas', with the universal *Logos*, even with God, and also with having established behind what is ostensibly a sociological theory of morality, a 'semi-sociological, semi-metaphysical, meta-morality' claiming to 'draw from an existing theoretical knowledge a morality which impose ends and prescribes rules of conduct', and which subsequently leads to an inability to recognize the impossibility 'of both knowing and prescribing at the same time'.

The fact of the matter is, however, that fundamental to any 'normative science', any system of morality or logic, any 'theory of knowledge', there are one or more principle which are incapable of proof or demonstration in the proper sense of the world, if not of all rational justification. Thus, only 'lived experience' can provide us with these principle, or rather these 'foundations' for an axiology. There are, however, many ways of understanding what is meant by 'lived experience'.

We can see that in Durkheim's case recourse to the social is precisely the solution to the difficulty. It certainly does not mean that in his view society is a thing in *se*, externally fixed and unchanging, or a static 'supreme good'. What it does mean is that Durkheim was earlier aware, although of course expressing his ideas differently, of the need which contemporary philosophers have so keenly felt of *establishing the ground for man's basic values in his lived existence*, of 'grounding' them, as it were. It is not a matter of demonstrating them deductively or inductively, for this would involve

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<sup>73</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 95.

us in vicious circle, but of showing them as entailed in that very existence, which for Durkheim, at least at the level of ideal values, is a social existence. Thus it is quite mistaken to see any 'metaphysic' in this. Durkheim consistently takes the opposite path, and embraces the criticism which pragmatism makes of all those theories of largely Platonic origin which treat truth as something 'quasi-divine' (p. 66), in which truth is lost in the 'distant realms of an intelligible world or a divine understanding'<sup>74</sup>. In Durkheim, recourse to the social is an indication of his deep and lively sense of the existential conditions of choice.

We can now see why Durkheim, as Marcel Mauss notes, is so symbolic towards pragmatism, while at the same time expressing such serious reservation about it. Pragmatism chiefly sees its task as that of making truth less 'rigid', of 'softening' it as James says<sup>75</sup>, of showing that it is a human product and hence shifting and changing; in short, of; linking thought to existence and life'<sup>76</sup>.

Thus, pragmatism shows us the excessive narrowness of classical it, for it opens the way for us to accept a theory (namely, the sociological theory of knowledge) which will not see reason as a rigid and immutable faculty, but as linked to the history and the very life of humanity<sup>77</sup>. Durkheim himself says that what he most appreciates in pragmatism is 'its heightened sense of human reality, the feeling for the extreme variability of everything human'<sup>78</sup>.

This point we should consider as a third misunderstanding which has occurred .... There can be no possible doubt that Durkheim saw institutions as constantly changing (p. 70.) and, above all saw society as a historical reality in which 'new forces' came constantly into being and 'never remain the same, but development and grow in syntheses which are 'rich in boundless possibilities' and essentially creative'<sup>79</sup>. Misunderstandings of this of this kind can only be explained if they are seen

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<sup>74</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 97.

<sup>75</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 66.

<sup>76</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 16.

<sup>77</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 67-68.

<sup>78</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 71.

<sup>79</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pgs. 27 and 70.

as linked to that kind of sociological 'typology' which is essentially non-temporal, and is the prey, in the words of one eminent historian, to a basic 'anti historian'. It would be perverse to help the consequences of such an error on Durkheim's head.

But Durkheim's thought although it never retreats into anthological questions, and comes strangely close to certain perspective in modern philosophical, is by no means simply the appeal to 'lived experience' that it in nowadays often see as beings. In the first place, Durkheim does not see that lived experience of the individual (which is the last analysis would open the way to a flood of arbitrary and gratuitous interpretations which would negate all objective values).

It is collective experience the experience, of man in society. In addition – and this should be particularly noted – that collective experience should be the object of rational thought. In the first edition of *'The Rules of Sociological Method'* Durkheim declares that "the only designation we can accept is that of "nationalist"",<sup>80</sup> and is in *The Elementary Form of the Religious Life* he speaks of "the rationalism that is imminent in a sociological theory of knowledge".<sup>81</sup> This indicates a resolute opposition to pragmatist ideas, and he takes a vigorous stance against this war on reason declared by a doctrine of foreign origin, which goes against all the traditions of French thought. Durkheim says nowadays in France such language would lead to change of xenophobia and chauvinism, but Durkheim does not mince his words. It is a matter of (he says) 'national importance' (p.1) regarding this question, that we have a true picture in which the whole spirit of French culture is at stake.

It is interesting to imagine what his reaction might have been, regarding James's work, that pragmatism is 'fully armed and militant against rationalism'<sup>82</sup>; or even in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* that 'the science of nature is know

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<sup>80</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1964. *The Rules of Sociological Method*. [Trans. S.A. Solvay and J. H. Mueller]. New York: The Free Press. P. XXXIX.

<sup>81</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1915. Pg. 19.

<sup>82</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 1.



nothing of spiritual presence, and on the whole hold no practical commerce whatever with the idealistic conceptions towards which general philosophy inclines'.<sup>83</sup>

No one had stood more explicitly than Durkheim that the 'ideal' nature of human values, nor has anyone affirmed more resolutely that, in one sense, the idea is indeed 'both of and in nature and that consequently 'it is subject to examination'.

There is no doubt, as Durkheim says a sort of 'popular philosophy' which precedes science, which contains both a philosophy of truth and a philosophy of moral values. Sociology, although it can never completely replace it, aims at systematizing this spontaneous 'philosophy'<sup>84</sup>. The 'science of morals' is no more than the rationalization of the collective representatives and beliefs of humanity, of those lived truths just discussed which, when analysed, would enable us to identify real as distinct from abstract truths.

Fourth, we must mention (rather more briefly) the role of the individual as Durkheim saw it. Here too there have been many misunderstandings of various kinds. The (quite relative) antithesis between the individual and society can be disposed of as illusory and as a false problem.

From more or less all sides, Durkheim has been accused of 'deifying' society, individual, discrediting the subject and individual awareness and thus coming close to totalitarian doctrines. A German sociologist L. Von Wiese<sup>85</sup> spoke of 'strangling' of the personality by Durkheim in the individual/society antithesis. The eminent English sociologist Morris Ginsberg<sup>86</sup> also devoted an article to an examination of its real theoretical and practical importance. His lecture on *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* shows us how little, Durkheim describes the gradual emergence of the individual personality as the most constant fact of history. 'There is

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<sup>83</sup> James, William. 1912. *The Variety of Religious Experience*. London, Longmans, Green comp.. Pg. 490.

<sup>84</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 89.

<sup>85</sup> Wiese, L. Von. 1954. In *Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Vol VI, No. 2, Pg. 289.

<sup>86</sup> Ginsberg, Morris. 1996. *Bulletin International des Sciences Sociales (UNESCO)*, Vol. vi, no. 1. Pp. 156-65. [Reprinted in the *Collection of Essays* by the same author, on the *Diversity of Morals*. London: Heneman. 1996. Pp. 149-62.

no rule more soundly established', Durkheim<sup>87</sup> wrote. Insufficient attention had also been paid to those passages in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*<sup>88</sup> in which Durkheim seems to admit that the category of reason are, in certain sense and in a certain form, 'immanent in the life of the individual'; and that the role of social life has been chiefly to enable him to become aware of that fact. Here, in the lectures on pragmatism.

Durkheim not only retain the pragmatist notion of the diversity of mind (p. 24), but also takes pains to justify it sociologically, showing how 'intellectual individualism' develops with the arrival of rational and scientific thought, which itself is a correlative of the increasing complexity of societies<sup>89</sup>. He is led to conclude that 'truth is only ever achieved by individuals'<sup>90</sup>.

As we have already suggested, however these lectures do not only help us to understand Durkheim better. They are also of current interest, in that they offer a critique with anticipates certain contemporary philosophical position which, although they are quite independent of pragmatism, nevertheless have certain undeniable affinities with it as far as their inspiration is concerned.

We find 'pluralism' which derives in particular the unity of the social and multiple the distinction between the forms, levels, strata and so on of reality. Under the cloak of a war against dogmatism and 'the passive contemplation of eternal ideas'<sup>91</sup> this pluralism is a recrudescence of the hostility, which we have already

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<sup>87</sup> Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Pg. 56.

<sup>88</sup> Elementary Forms of Religious Life:- see also the following- 'if experience were completely represented from all that is rational, reason could not operate upon it, in the same way, if the psychic nature of the individual were absolutely opposed to the social life, society would be impossible. A complete analysis of the categories would seek these germs of rationality even in the individual consciousness' (ibid., p. 16, n. 10.) "The relations which they [the categories] express could not have been learned except in and through society. If they are in a sense immanent in the life of an individual, he has neither a reason nor the means for learning them, reflecting upon them and forming them into the means for learning them, reflecting upon them and forming them into distinct ideas' (ibid., Pp. 442-3).

<sup>89</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 91.

<sup>90</sup> Durkheim, Emile. 1955/1983. Pg. 97.

<sup>91</sup> Gurvitch, George . 'Hyper-Empirisme dialectique: ses applications en sociologic', in Cahiers Internationaux de sociologic. Vol. XV. Pg. 6 [quoted in Durheim, Emile. 1983.

noticed in pragmatism (which refused to be called a 'doctrine'), towards any attempt to achieve clarity and distinctions in the world of ideas, and towards any position avoiding intellectual dishonesty.

## Conclusion

Pragmatism is a philosophical movement first given systematic expression by Charles Sanders Peirce and William James and later on taken up and transformed by John Dewey. Pragmatism emphasizes the practical function of knowledge as an instrument for adapting to reality and controlling it. According to pragmatism, the truth or meanings of an idea or a proposition lie in its observable practical consequences rather than anything metaphysical. It can be summarized by the phrase "whatever works, is likely to be true." Because reality changes, "whatever works" will also change – thus, truth must also be changeable and no one can claim to possess any final or ultimate truth. Pragmatism agrees with empiricism in its emphasis on the priority of experience over *a priori* reasoning. Whereas truth had traditionally been explained in terms of coherence pragmatism holds that truth is to be found in the process of verification. Pragmatists interpret idea as instrument and plans of action rather than as images of reality, more specifically they are suggestions and anticipations of conduct, hypotheses or forecasts of what result from a given action, or ways of organizing behaviour.

It is mainly a method in which the truth of a proposition is measured by its correspondence with experimental results and by its practical outcome. It stands to the doctrine that holds that truth can be reached through deductive reasoning from *a priori* grounds and the need for inductive investigation and constant empirical verification of hypotheses. Pragmatism holds that truth is modified as discoveries are made and is relative to the time and space and purpose of inquiry. In its ethical aspect pragmatism holds that knowledge that contributes to human values is real and that

values play as essential a role in the choice of means employed in order to attain an end as they do in the choice of the end itself.

Pragmatism is averse to all metaphysical, moral, and social ideals that claim priority over the solution to practical problems. While several current sociologist projects draw inspiration from C. S. Peirce (1839-39), the father of modern pragmatism and the scholar who made communication central to pragmatic thought, John Dewey (1859-1952) (and other like C. H. Cooley) built more well- established bridges to topics to sociological interest positions.

In modern expression of empiricism, pragmatism has tended to criticize traditional philosophical outlook in the light of scientific and social developments.

For Peirce, pragmatism was primarily an investigation of the proper methods of procedure in the natural sciences, a reductive doctrine equating the meaning of theoretical terms with their impact upon experience. By contrast, James moved in a much more practical and moralistic direction. The virtues of belief, including truth, become in his view matter of their efficiency in enabling a person to cope with problems of living. The vital good of a belief in one's whole life became its justification. James could thus write: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactory, in the widest sense of the word it is 'true'."

Controversies over truth continued to dog the movement. Peirce's own account of truth was "that which is fated ultimately to be agreed by all who investigate"; in this view, truth represents a kind of limit of scientifically formed opinion. The real intention of the definition is to stress the role of practically motivated inquiry in shaping concepts and judgments and the particular truths accepted on their basis.

The more practical aspects of Pragmatism were followed up in the work of the American philosopher and theorist of education John Dewey's (1859-1952). Pragmatism's arguments are situated in certain primary themes. First, pragmatist philosophy, is bound in everyday practice, not the wistful theoretical arguments of European philosophers. Instead of divorcing itself from everyday concerns,

pragmatism approaches these as the primary interest of philosophy. Second, the pragmatists had no concern for an infallible truth but instead searched for a “plural” one. Instead of absolutist arguments, as philosophy often wishes to postulate, pragmatism pursues a truth bound within everyday concern and actions. Truths, pragmatism suggests, are real only insofar as they are experienced. Third, regarding the idea that philosophy can improve the human condition, pragmatists conceived philosophy is useful only if it can resolve problems. Knowledge, they argued, is a highly practical thing and must be put to use in practical way to solve problems that affect social conditions. Fourth, and perhaps most important for sociology, pragmatists focused on the intersection of community and the individual. The individual self is inherently a “social self” bound by relations to social world. This position is a radical departure from more abstract metaphysics accounts of the self.

Isreal Scheffler said that pragmatism in its effort to clarify and extends the methods of science, and to strengthen the prospects of freedom and intelligence in the contemporary world; it represents also a philosophical orientation of urgent general interest. Knowledge and *action* now needed to be seen as intimately related. Knowledge, it seemed evident, arise in a biological and social context as a result of *experimentation*, that is, an active transformation of the environment directed towards the resolution of the problems of life. Knowledge, moreover, is so far as it increases the possibilities of deliberate social change and control increase our *moral* responsibility for the *actions* we take in determining the conditions of social life.

Pragmatism has also had its important political and social side. It is most visible in the career of John Dewey. Dewey developed theories of education and politics that are of education and politics that are of a piece with his pragmatic theories of inquiry, truth, and meaning, and he states in autobiography that “*Democracy and Education* ... contains what was for many years the fullest exposition of his philosophy. In pursuit of his belief that one learns by doing.

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## **From Pragmatism to Utilitarianism**

### **Introduction**

Utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question "What ought a man to do?" Its answer is that he ought to act so as to produce the best consequences possible. Here main question is why human behave in particular way. Human always think of goal and path to achieve success. All human knows that joy and sorrow; happiness and sadness; success and failure is the integral part of the life but still everyone wants only happiness and success. It is believed that human is rational and to their action. They can think of his/her profit and loss. All actions of human are also done for some goal and that goal must have some utility otherwise their effort may be in vein (of no use). Because everything which is existed in this world have some utility whether it is material or non material; cultural-behavioral or human action. Logic is simple in question that, why human do an action? Answer is to achieve some goal. And goals must have some utility otherwise no one can make afford to achieve it. Because for everything we have to pay and why one will pay which does not have any sense with real world. Yes here arises a question that human action also contains non-material action which is linked with emotions. But for me emotions have also utility, which is mental and emotional. I know it is very difficult to answer this or may be my

thinking is wrong, but we can try to find answer of this very simple question, that is why we have only emotions for something, and not for all.

It will be better to know the different aspects of utilitarian concepts. How utilitarian concept has been theorized by different thinkers from different angle and critics of this concept, later on reach up to the conclusion.

### **What is Utilitarianism?**

Utilitarianism is a philosophical school of thought which holds that utility entails the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It is usually associated with Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73), although some would argue that the earlier philosophical works of Hobbes, Home and Locke are also utilitarian. This philosophy holds that the realization of utility should be the proper goal in life, but may be hindered by selfish prejudice and ignorance. Behavior which enhances happiness and reduces pain ought to be encouraged and behavior which increases unhappiness ought to be proscribed. Utilitarianism therefore, implies a model of social action in which individuals rationally pursue their own self-interests, with society being no more than the aggregation in individuals brought together in the realization of their individual goals. Bentham applied these principle to Economics, Social Policy and Law, Utilitarian-Influences the certain of many of the 19<sup>th</sup> century institutions, many of which still survive, such as the prison and the asylum. Spencer was influenced by utilitarian ideas, although Durkheim was critical, arguing that social order is the outcome of cultural traditions that are not reducible to individual interests.<sup>92</sup>

According to J. O. Urmson<sup>93</sup>, "utilitarian" is a term that has no precise or even unequivocal meaning. It is used both as a name for any ethical theory that seek to determine the rightness and wrongness of action by reference to the goodness and

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<sup>92</sup> Jary, David and Julia Jary. 1991/2006. Collins Dictionary of Sociology. India: HarperCollins PublisherCollins. Pg. 664

<sup>93</sup> Urmson, J.O. 1968/1972. Utilitarianism. In David L. Sills. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Vol. 16. Pg. 225. New York: The Mac Millan Comp. and The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Publisher.

badness of their consequences and as a name for the whole body of philosophical and political doctrines that was accepted by Bentham and philosophical radicals of the nineteenth century. The word “utilitarianism” was invented causality by Bentham and reinvented by J. S. Mill to apply specifically to their own doctrines, but a wider use is now very common. Thus, it is common to refer to Hume, who lived well before Bentham and G. E. Moore who had no political interests and rejected the doctrine that pleasure is the sole good as utilitarians.

This is the basic philosophical position that the merit of actions must be determined by reference to their consequences may be taken as having either of two incompatible methods for settling moral issues to replace less satisfactory ways of moral thinking; or it may be interpreted as an analytic doctrine whose aim is to make explicit those canons of sound moral thinking which are always implicitly followed in any sound moral reflection. In this second interpretation, it stands in relation to the practice of moral thinkers in general as a philosophical exposition of scientific method stands to the practice of scientists in general, whereas the first interpretation would be more like the advocacy of a new and “improved” scientific method. Although advocates of utilitarianism have not always been as clear as one could wish about how they should be interpreted, it is better to interpret the most philosophical among them, including Hume, J. S. Mill, and Moore, in the better, analytical way. Thus, Mill says that, to all moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, utilitarian arguments are indispensable, and he proceeds to criticize Kant, not for failing to be a utilitarian but for failing to realize that he was one.<sup>94</sup>

There are two basic questions that a philosophical utilitarian has to answer. First, he must tell us exactly how we are to determine the rightness and wrongness of actions in terms of their good and bad consequences. Second, he must give us a principle for determining what are good and bad consequences. To put it more simply, he has to tell us both how to determine the right in terms of the good and how to determine the good. The various answers that may be given to these two questions

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid. Pg. 225

are relatively independent of each other, so that we may consider each question in relative isolation.

'In normative ethics, a tradition stemming from the late 18th- and 19th-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill that an action is right if it tends to promote happiness and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness—not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also that of everyone affected by it. Such a theory is in opposition to egoism, the view that a person should pursue his own self-interest, even at the expense of others, and to any ethical theory that regards some acts or types of acts as right or wrong independently of their consequences. Utilitarianism also differs from ethical theories that make the rightness or wrongness of an act dependent upon the motive of the agent; for, according to the Utilitarian, it is possible for the right thing to be done from a bad motive.'<sup>95</sup>

In the notion of consequences the Utilitarian includes all of the good and bad produced by the act, whether arising after the act has been performed or during its performance. If the difference in the consequences of alternative acts is not great, some Utilitarians do not regard the choice between them as a moral issue. According to Mill, acts should be classified as morally right or wrong only if the consequences are of such significance that a person would wish to see the agent compelled, not merely persuaded and exhorted, to act in the preferred manner<sup>96</sup>.

In assessing the consequences of actions, Utilitarianism relies upon some theory of intrinsic value: something is held to be good in itself, apart from further consequences, and all other values are believed to derive their worth from their relation to this intrinsic good as a means to an end. "Bentham and Mill were hedonists; i.e., they analyzed happiness as a balance of pleasure over pain and believed that these feelings alone are of intrinsic value and disvalue. Utilitarians also assume that it is possible to compare the intrinsic values produced by two alternative actions and to estimate which would have better consequences. Bentham believed that a hedonic

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<sup>95</sup> Utilitarianism. Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite (CD): 2004

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

calculus is theoretically possible. A moralist, he maintained, could sum up the units of pleasure and the units of pain for everyone likely to be affected, immediately and in the future, and could take the balance as a measure of the overall good or evil tendency of an action.”<sup>97</sup> “Such precise measurement as Bentham envisioned is perhaps not essential, but it is nonetheless necessary for the Utilitarian to make some interpersonal comparisons of the values of the effects of alternative courses of action.”<sup>98</sup>

## **Determination of the Right**

### **Act Utilities of the Right**

The best-known answer to the question of how to determine the rightness of action by reference to the value of their consequences is that an action is right if, and only if, the value of its total consequences is at least as great as the value of the total consequences of any alternative course of action. In this view the correct decision about how to act on a particular occasion is ultimately governed by the facts of the particular situation: it will be wrong to kill on one occasion if the killing will have inferior consequences and right to kill on another occasion if the killing will have the best possible consequences. “This, the best-known answer is commonly dubbed “act utilitarianism” or “extreme utilitarianism” by philosophers. It is popular thought to be *the* utilitarian answer. But, although they occasionally gave it as an answer, it was certainly not *the* answer of Hume, Bentham, Austin, and J. S. Mill, and however formulated and however supplemented, it is subject to the gravest difficulties. A sustained attack on it would be out of place here, but a few of these difficult may be very briefly mentioned.”<sup>99</sup>

**First**, the concept of the total consequences of an action is of little value; there is no satisfactory way of delimiting the consequences of any given action.

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Urmson. 1968/1972. Pg. 225

**Second**, even if the concept can be used there is clearly no possibility of ever knowing the value of the total consequences of all the possible course of action on a particular occasion. To meet these two objections, it is sometimes said that appeal should be made to be made to be total foreseeable consequences only; but this modification make it impossible to recognize the proper distinction between correct moral decisions and honest errors of moral judgment arising from ignorance of fact. We may surely be justified, but mistaken, in acting on the basis of foreseeable consequences only. **Third**, this famous answer gives us no means of distinguishing moral from other practical issues: it is hard to see how, in this view; I would not be making a moral mistake if I took a party of friends to a less interesting entertainment than I might have chosen for them. **Fourth**, this answer is quite at variance with ordinary moral thinking: if I give as a reason for acting in a certain way that I have *promised* to do so, it is absurd either to insist that I am being irrelevant or that I am giving a reason for thinking that acting in that way will have the best consequences.

This last objection leads us to an alternative answer to the question of how the rightness of action is to be determined with references of actins is to be determined with reference to consequences. The point of the objection was that in sound moral thinking we do in fact appeal to principles other than that of producing the best total consequences. We also appeal to principles of promise keeping and truth telling, the kind of principles that are found in the Ten Commandments. The act utilitarian must either reject appeal to all such principles as improper, which is grossly implausible, or more commonly and more plausibly, give them a rule-of-thumb status. Thus, if promise keeping has in past experience nearly always had better results than promise braking, we may sum up this experience in the generalization "Promise breaking is wrong". It will be wise to keep promises in obscure situations in the light of this generalization, but it will have no more authority than the bridge player's adage, "Second player plays low"; an appeal to the actual consequences will always override the adage, which has no independent authority. The alternative answer discussed next attempts to do more justice to the role of such moral principles.

## Rule Utilitarianism

Another answer to the question of how to determine the rightness of actions by reference to the goodness of their consequences is called rule utilitarianism. J. S. Mill in his *utilitarianism* (1861) accepted what he took to be the received opinion that morality of an individual action is not a question of direct perception but of the application of a law to an individual case. J. O. Urmson<sup>100</sup> said that the laws Mill had in mind are the ordinary moral principles of truthfulness, honesty, and the like. Such laws Mill had in mind are the ordinary moral principles of truthfulness, honesty, and the like. Such laws Mill called "secondary principles." However Mill held that moralists do not commonly give us a satisfactory supreme principle is proper to accept. Mill therefore produced the utilitarian supreme principle that a secondary principle should be accepted and beyond if, the consequences of our accepting that principle will be better than those of our either having no principle at all or having some alternative principle. A secondary principle- "Always do X in circumstances Y"- will be justified if our experience shows that, in an overwhelming majority of cases, actions of the kind X have the best consequences in circumstances Y; that is, if the action X in circumstances Y tends to promote the best consequences.

Claim reflection on our secondary principles is always desirable, but so long as such a secondary principle is accepted, it should be followed in all cases of action to which it is applicable, without further reference to consequences. But two qualifications must be made. **First**, it may so happen that two secondary principles conflict on a particular occasion (e.g. the duty of truth telling and the duty of respecting confidences), in which case we must fall back on the supreme principle and appeal directly to consequences. **Second**, which in general to "see a utility in the breach of a rule, greater than . . . in observance . . . [is] to furnish us with excuses for evil-doing and means of cheating out own conscience"<sup>101</sup>, secondary principles are the crude handiwork of fallible men subject to "peculiarities of circumstances." Occasions

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<sup>100</sup> Urmson. 1968/1972. Pg. 226

<sup>101</sup> Mill, John Stuart. (1861) 1957. *Utilitarianism* Indianapolis, Ind.: Books-Merrill. Pg. 32

may arise when, with an eye to consequences, we must break a moral principle—perhaps to avoid causing great and unmerited hardship. However, the general principle remains: “we must remember that only in these cases of conflict between secondary principles is it requisite that first principles should be appealed to. There is no case of moral obligation in which some secondary principle is not involved . . .”<sup>102</sup>

David Hume was also a “rule utilitarian”; thus he reorganized that the repayment of a debt by a poor man with a sick family to a wealthy miser was in itself repugnant but held it justified by the necessary rules of the artificial virtue of justice.

The need for Bentham to be a rule utilitarian is surely obvious. His main interest was to bring enlightenment legislation into line with morality. His laws were to be defended as very special cases of moral secondary principles. Once it is grasped that in speaking of the “tendencies of actions,” Bentham is, like the other utilitarians, speaking of kinds of actions, then a reading of his work shows him clearly to be a rule utilitarian.”<sup>103</sup>

To claim that rule utilitarianism as presented is free from difficulties would be very optimistic. Without further qualifications it surely gives at least an overly rigid and simple account of moral thinking. But it does at least avoid some of the obvious objections discussed above to which act utilitarianism is liable. And later on moral philosophy makes (or criticizes) the attempt to present some viable version of it.

### **The Nature of Good**

Discussion of nature of good is discussed by J. O. Urmson<sup>104</sup>; he says we must now turn to the second major question to which utilitarianism is committed to giving an answer: What is the nature of the good, the production of which makes right action right? On this topic utilitarian exegesis has commonly been both confused and confused. Bentham’s own view (1789) is, no doubt, superficially plain and clear: the only good is pleasure, the only bad is pain. Anything that give a quantitatively greater

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<sup>102</sup> Mill [1861] 1957. Pg. 33

<sup>103</sup> Urmson, J.O. 1968/1972. Pg. 226

<sup>104</sup> Urmson, J.O. 1968/1972. Pg. 226 pg. 227-228



balance of pleasure over pain is better than anything giving a lesser balance- the quantity of pleasure being equal; pushpin is as good as poetry. He devised an elaborate calculus for the measurement of pleasure and pain. Thus he argued, if we mean by "happiness" pleasure and the absence of pain, the good which determines the rightness of action will be the greater happiness of the greatest number. This famous formula was, it appears, coined by Francis Hutcheson and used by Joseph Priestley, in his *Essay on the First Principles of Government* (1768) where Bentham found it. But this formula is much less clear than it seems. If we could somehow measure units of happiness, it is not clear whether on this principal it is better for ten men each to, to have a favorable balance of ten units and one an unfavorable balance of one hundred units or for all eleven to have an even balance of pleasure and pain, as Bentham himself came to see.

But there is a still more basic difficulty in Bentham's position. At the beginning of his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) he tells us that mankind is under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. They govern us all we do, in all we say, in all we think. This is for Bentham the ultimate self-evident truth. It is very hard not to interpret it as the doctrine of psychological hedonism, stating that as a matter of fact psychological fact men always have the aim of maximizing the balance of their own pleasure over pain. However, this doctrine, so far from being a basic for the ethical doctrine of utilitarianism, is incompatible with any ethical doctrine whatsoever. It would be idle to tell men that they ought to aim at the greatest general happiness or at anything else, even their own happiness, if as a matter of psychological fact, they will inevitable aim at their own greatest happiness. If anyone not wanted the stamp badly, he/she would not have been so pleased at obtaining it. Thus, Bentham's doctrine of the good has an unsatisfactory basis, thought as we shall see, one that was important to his more practical activities.

J. S. Mill paid lip service to the Benthamite position by claiming happiness to be the sole good and defining it as pleasure and the absence of pain. However, it is little more than lip service. **First**, he allowed that pleasure may differ in quality as well

as in quantity, but as critics have constantly observed, this means that something other than pleasantness determine goodness. **Second**, he makes preference by a wise and experienced judge the *criterion* of superior pleasantness, but this makes vacuous the claim that we prefer things because of their greater pleasantness. Ultimately, it is hard to see that Mill said more than that happiness is the life most worth living in the judgments of the wise and that we should have as our aim the provision of such a life for as many people as possible, which is as unrevealing as it is unexceptionable.

Two other utilitarian, but non-Benthamite, answer to the question of the nature of the good deserve mention. **First** there is the view, held, for example, by G. E. Moore (1903), that there is no single answer to the question. In this view there are many different things, pleasure among them, that are good in themselves and which have a duty to promote. Moore mentioned, among other, love, beauty, and knowledge. Anything that is, says both pleasure and beautiful would be superior to what was only pleasant, or only beautiful, to the same degree. Thought this position is linked in Moore with a doctrine of intuition of no natural characteristic and the attempt to give a list of “goods” seems artificial, the view that there are many quite different things which are good independently of each other is an accord with common ways of thinking, even if repugnant to the philosopher’s desire for neat and simple answer to questions.

**Second**, there is the view, sometimes called negative utilitarianism, of which Karl Popper is a noted exponent. According to negative utilitarianism, it is a mistake to suppose that in order to answer the question of what consequences are relevant to the rightness of action it is necessary to determine what consequences of action in general can be counted good. It maintains that there may well be many good consequences of actions which are quite irrelevant to their morality, for morality is concerned, negatively, only with the elimination of avoidable suffering. Moral norms, secondary principle, are justified by the fact social life would be impossible, or at least to some degree intolerable, unless those norms were observed. Social life would be impossible if there were a habit of violence, so there is a generally recognizes universal

duty to abstain from violence; it would be intolerable if we were continually misled by our fellows, so there is a recognized universal duty of truthfulness and promise keeping. Yet thought the production of beautiful works of art and the increase of human knowledge are great goods, neither is a recognized duty, even of those who are capable of them (even if the latter is a contractual duty of universal professors). To go out our way to help our neighbors is admirable, but it is a work of supererogation—there is no recognized universal duty to do so. There is much to be said for this viewpoint. Moreover, whatever Mill may have said *Utilitarianism*; it is tacitly accepted by him in his *On Liberty* (1859), where he denies the existence of any warrant for norms, whether legal or moral, save that of the prevention of harm to others.

### **Political Implications**

J. O. Urmson<sup>105</sup> analyzed utilitarian in terms of political implication also. It has been claimed that utilitarians regarded themselves not as proposing a new morality but as analyzing the nature of sound moral thinking in a way similar to the analysis of scientific method. However, the analyst of scientific method need not claim that there is no erroneous thinking, no superstition, on matter scientific. Certainly the utilitarians did wish to claim that all our norms – the secondary principles of morality, our political institutions, our penal codes – were in fact based on utilitarian considerations. One has only to glance at Mill's *On Liberty* to realize that he thought many of them to be founded on superstition, class interest, bigotry, and unthinking custom. Thus, there were two practical tasks for Mill as a utilitarian: he had to fight the attitude of bigotry and superstition by writing such polemical works as *On Liberty* and *The Subjection of Women*, and he had to provide knowledge of the consequences of social action by economic and sociological investigation to enable sound norms to be found by those with the desire to find them. Finally, there was the need for direct, practical action whereby the better norms discovered by enlightened utilitarian

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<sup>105</sup> Urmson, J.O. 1968/1972. Pg. 226. Pg. 228-229

institutions and Ricardo's discoveries in economics, might be brought into practical operation.

Bentham's proposal on penal reform merits some special examination, both in their own right and because they underline certain general points already made. For Bentham the purpose and justification of penal laws were no different from those of the secondary principals of morality- they required justification by the general happiness principal. Penal laws differed from moral principals only in their provenance – being the commands of an Austinian sovereign – and in having a political sanction instead of, or in addition to, the physical, moral and legal sanctions that other norms might have. Punishment, being the infliction of pain, is in itself a bad thing. Therefore, legislators will be justified in passing a penal law only if the general happiness it cause greatly outweighs the evil of punishment for its nonobservance. Now since the act made illegal would be done only if the doing of it would maximize the agent's happiness, in the absence of a penal sanction, the task of the legislator in framing the penal sanction must be to impose the minimum sanction that will outweigh the advantage of performing the act; hence the importance of an accurate hedonic calculus.

It seems that no utilitarian account of moral thought has yet succeeded in doing justice to all the complexities of our moral thought, and yet general utilitarian position continues to exert a strong attraction. In time a sufficiently subtle version of utilitarianism may successes in giving a general elucidation of moral thinking and it is possible that a pure utilitarianism must be, at least in part, a moral program rather than a philosophical elucidation.

### **Sociological Thought**

The movement of thought generally known as utilitarianism, which had its centre in England from the seventeenth until well into the twentieth century, provided one of the most important frames of reference in the shaping of social science theory, including sociological theory. The foundations of utilitarianism were laid above all by

Hobbes and Lock, with their very different emphases; its culminating phase involved the sequence of eminent writer that extends from Adam Smith, through Bentham, Austin, Malthus, and Ricardo, to John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer.

It was a frame of reference based on the action of the individual, but was extended, in ways that led directly to the conception of "social system," to include the interaction of an indefinite plurality of individuals. The individual of the utilitarian, unlike his counterparts in the Cartesian scheme, was an actor, not a knower. "That he had goals (which Hobbes called "passions" and the economists called "wants") was a basic assumption. In the main utilitarian tradition, however, little attention was paid to the interconnections between the different wants actuating the same individual or to the origins of these wants. To be sure, the associationist psychologists, building large on Locke's epistemology, developed a rudimentary theory in this area which has remained continuously influential, especially in the modern behaviorist movement. But since behaviorism has not strongly emphasizes the *organization* of an individual's wants into a personality system, it has not had same degree of impact on sociological theory as has psychoanalysis, for instance, or the type of social psychology deriving from Cooley and Mead, or even that deriving from Durkheim and his school."<sup>106</sup>

### **The Major Utilitarian Premises**

The primary focus of utilitarianism was on the process of action designed to satisfy *given* wants of individuals – that is, on goal-attainment, or want-satisfaction, whichever way it was put. The process was understood to be one of choosing means that would effectively gain the end. Since this conception was inherently "teleological," in the sense that the behavior was conceived as purposive, it required some normative reference beyond the mere desirability of being satisfied. This was the origin of the famous concept of rationality in the restricted sense of choosing those means and concrete behaviors that are "best adapted" to attainment of the end. Eventually it

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<sup>106</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Sociological Thought of Utilitarianism. In David L. Sills. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Vol. 16. Pg. 229. New York: The Mac Millan Comp. and The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Publisher.

became clear that the relations among multiple ends had to be considered in a double sense: as the various ends of the same individual actor, and as the ends of different participants in an interactive system. The most obvious way of introducing the consideration of multiple ends was through some conception of cost. Accordingly, to the conception of rational adaptation of means to ends was added the conception of scarcity, or the fact that the same means can be appropriate to the attainment of more than one end and that their utilization for one end may entail sacrificing their potential for attaining alternative ends (this eventually came to be understood as the economic conception of cost). However, the process of goal attainment can be impeded by other obstacles, in addition to the sacrifice of alternative uses of means. For instance, there may be factors in the situation that cannot be overcome or consequences of the line of action that are noxious to the actor.

These considerations constitute the essential conceptual setting of the famous utilitarian doctrine of hedonism – a doctrine which found its classic expression in the works of Bentham. Here, pleasure is regarded essentially as the gratifying consequences of successful rational action and pain as the subjective cost of encountering noxious consequences, some of which would not have been “chosen” if means and ends had been rationally developed. It was surely not a scientific psychological theory so much as a specialized language, to be used for formulating the balance between advantage and disadvantage in the attempt at rational satisfaction of wants. Nevertheless, the allegation that it was a definite theory of motivation has figured very prominently in this whole tradition of thought, especially perhaps through the claim that economic theory rested on hedonistic psychological postulates that rendered it vulnerable to refutation on psychological grounds. It turns out, however, that neither economics nor the sociological problems associated with utilitarianism depend basically on a single narrowly defined set of psychological assumptions. As aspects of the theory of social systems they are interdependent with the theory of personality and that of the behavioral organism, but this relationship is very different from that envisaged in the older discussion about psychological hedonism.

“The concept of rationality as developed in the utilitarian tradition is not so much a psychological theory – as it has often been held to be – as a value premise. Particularly as used by the classical economists, the concept defined a pattern of behavior which was expected to be recognized as the optimum by men engaged in economic activity. The extent to which *actual* behavior met these criteria was a distinct problem.”<sup>107</sup>

The model of action introduced and developed by the utilitarian was thus exceedingly simple; above all, it was not psychologically sophisticated. Its very simplicity, however, not only enabled it to serve as the vehicle for certain very important positive developments in social theory, but also facilitated the posing of sharp questions about its limits which eventually led to its being transcended. Including the conception of rationality as just characterized, utilitarianism can be said to have constituted, in its individual reference, a theory of the *rational pursuit of self-interest*. But the more significant developments for which utilitarianism was responsible concerned “interests” in the utilitarian sense. At this level the utilitarian scheme implied a conception of what we now call the social system.<sup>108</sup>

### **Hobbes versus Locke**

Halevy<sup>109</sup>, in his virtually definitive analysis of utilitarianism, dealt with its first basic cleavage, which arose in its founding generation as the difference between Hobbes and Locke. This difference centered on attitudes towards the problem of social order and its basis. In Hobbes’s account, the consequence of generalizing the rational pursuit of self-interest in a social system was progressive intensification of the elements of interindividual conflict which were inherent in the utilitarian assumptions. Though Hobbes certainly understood the factor of economic scarcity, he regarded the fundamental source of conflict to be the fact that any individual’s pursuit of his own

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<sup>107</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Pg. 229

<sup>108</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Pg. 229

<sup>109</sup> Halevy, Elie. (1901-1904) 1952. *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*. New ed. London: Feber (First pub. in French) quoted in (Talcott Parsons 1968/1972)

interests can eventuate only in injury to the interests of others. Since, Hobbes contended, "there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the objects themselves," the process will result in every man becoming the enemy of every other, so that all will "endeavor to destroy or subdue one another." The outcome is the famous Hobbesian state of nature, the "war of all against all," in which the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short"<sup>110</sup>.

The resort to mutual hostility, destruction, and subjection is motivated by one element of order which Hobbes assumed to be present in the wantsystem of the individual, namely the primacy of the "passion for self-preservation." It is the presence of this primacy in everyone that generates the vicious circle of a deepening conflict that operates through fraud and force. But unless individual men are to limit the possibilities of their existence to such conditions, there must be some collective equivalent of individual self-interest and of its ultimate form, the interest in self-preservation. Hobbes found this equivalent in the generalization of the interest in social order (a higher level of rationality than the strictly utilitarian), which he thought could be attributed to the act of the social contract by which a sovereign authority was setup to impose order. Having limited his "psychology" to the level of individual self-interest, and having implied that only punitive sanctions could effectively restrain the war of all against all. Hobbes had to whom men forfeit their "natural right" to pursue their own self-interest to the point of conflict with others.

"Hobbes's conception of sovereignty, with its sharp dichotomization between the mass of individual men – subjects, we may say – and the single, undivided source of authority, remained a continuing theme in utilitarian thought. Probably its most important later appearance was in the jurisprudence of Austin, with its conception that legal legitimacy may be derived through a series of deductions from the conception of sovereignty itself."<sup>111</sup> Indeed, since Marxian theory also tended to

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<sup>110</sup> Hobbes, Thomas. 1651/1946. *Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*. Edited with an introduction by Michael Oakeshott. Oxford: Blackwell.

<sup>111</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Pg. 231



adopt uncritically the utilitarian modal of action in the interest of individual want-satisfaction, especially as this model was mediated by Richard economics, it seems that the rigorous conception of the sovereignty of the Communist party may well owe much to the heritage of Hobbes. "The use of the concept of power in Western political theory also derived mainly from the Hobbesian tradition."<sup>112</sup>

The other main trend of utilitarian thought, stemming from Locke, set the tone that predominated during the culminating age of utilitarianism. Here a key concept, presented in Locke but greatly developed by Adam Smith, and successors, was the division of labour, which, on utilitarian assumptions, was made possible by the existence of mutual advantage in exchange. Such mutual advantage, however, presupposed the existence of an order which somehow constituted a solution of the Hobbesian problem, the more so the more extended the system of exchange relationships. As Halevy showed, this solution in Locke's case rested entirely on an assumption of the natural identity of interests<sup>113</sup>. Locke<sup>114</sup> assumed that instead of being impelled, because of scarcity and a consequent interest in mutual obstruction, to "destroy or subdue one another," men are so attracted by the possibilities of mutually furthering each other's interests through the division of labour and exchange that they need resort to the strategies of conflict.

Lock<sup>115</sup>, like Hobbes, ground social order in a social contract, but gave it a directly obverse emphasis. Whereas Hobbes conceived of his contradicting parties as surrendering their "natural rights" to the sovereign, Lock conceived of his as mutually contracting to protect each other's rights to "life, liberty and property" and as setting up a minimal government for that purpose. Locke's version of the utilitarian conception of the social system had critical consequences in two main directions. First, his conception of the direct and immediate rational pursuit of self-interest by

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<sup>112</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Pg. 231

<sup>113</sup> Halevy, Elie. (1901-1904) 1952.

<sup>114</sup> Lock, John. 1690/1960. Two Treaties of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge Univ. Press.

<sup>115</sup> Lock, John. 1690/1960. Two Treaties of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge Univ. Press.

individuals within the context of the division of labour and exchange provided the frame of reference within which the classical economics developed. Its most distinguished theorist, David Ricardo<sup>116</sup>, developed by far the most sophisticated theoretical analysis of an abstracted aspect of human social action which had yet appeared. To a large degree, it then dominated not only technical economics but the general economic liberalism of so much of the Western world in the nineteenth century. Second. Locke also greatly influenced social science through his analysis of the grounding of political democracy; he provide a basis that different sharply from that of French analysis, which stemmed above all from Rousseau and which contained more of the heritage of Hobbes than of lock (thought still more of the heritage of Descartes).

### **The Concept of Order: Malthus and Marx**

Utilitarian thought, however, had left the basic problem of order unsolved: Lock did not answer Hobbes, but only bypass him. These chickens came home to root, before the full emergence of sociology, at two primary points: in the work of Malthus, and in those of Marx, who was in part a utilitarian.

Malthus presented what was, in part, a synthesis of Hobbes and Lock. He did not question the existence of social order, the division of labour, or the process of exchange. Nor was he preoccupied with political authority. Rather, he focused on a set of conditions of economic life which were antecedent to any natural identity of interests, namely the number of the population which had to share the resources available to a society. He postulated a general tendency for human beings to reproduce beyond the means of subsistence, generating pressure on those means. This pressure was held to lead, unless counteracted, to the "positive checks," especially famine, which was to form such an important modal in the more popular versions of the principle of natural selection. Malthus also saw the pressure of popular as responsible for another dimension of the division of labour. He called this dimension the "division of society into classes," notably into the landowners,

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<sup>116</sup> Ricardo, David. 1817/1962. *Principle of Political Economy and Taxation*. London: Dent; New York: Dutton.

“capitalists,” and labours who figured so prominently in classical economics. If the idea of the positive check fed direct into Darwinism and especially into social Darwinism, the class doctrine, which Malthus did not originate but to which he gave a new rationale, fed very directly into socialist thought, especially that of Marx and his followers. Thus Marx, under Malthus’ influence, reintroduced a Hobbesian element by holding that productive efficiency adequate to mitigate the pressure of population was dependent on an inequality of economic resources which, at the level of the firm, because the focus of a power relation (compare Hobbes<sup>117</sup>). This relation was the structure focus of the Marxian theory of capitalistic exploitation.

### **From Utilitarianism to Social Darwinism**

Bentham may be said to have represented the more democratic wing of utilitarianism. Perhaps more than any other figure he is the intellectual father of British socialism, the proponent of the use of public authority as an instrumentality of social reform (see especially Bentham<sup>118</sup>). A strong egalitarian understanding was expressed in the Benthamite formula of “the greatest good of the greatest number,” thought until the advent of marginal utility theory late in the nineteenth century it was difficult to say what even the economic aspect of the greatest good for a single individual might be. As for the “greatest number”: from an ethical point of view it remained sheer assumption that all persons had equal claims to whatever the greatest good might be, thought this did not detract from the logic of Bentham’s argument. Bentham’s “philosophy,” with its hedonistic formulae, remained the most immediate broader background of economic thinking and policy and of reform politics for a long time. It also underlay the tendency, still present among economists, to consider the wants of different individuals to be in principle incommensurable; the assumption was

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<sup>117</sup> Hobbes, Thomas. 1651/1946. *Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*. Edited with an introduction by Michael Oakeshott. Oxford: Blackwell.

<sup>118</sup> Bentham, Jermy. 1789/1948. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. New Yourk: Hafner.

challenged by Pareto<sup>119</sup> for the conception of the utility of a society in a sense broader than the economic (compare Arrow<sup>120</sup>).

John Start Mill was the great synthesizer of the utilitarian tradition over the whole range of its concerns in ethics, economic, and political theory. He was also in many ways highly conscious of its difficulties and attempted to solve what seems to be the most formidable of these from the present point of view, the problem of order, by developing the new formula of social utility, i.e. the conception that through his own intelligent insight the individual could come to understand that his self-interest was bound up with the common interest, and to act upon that understanding.

Probably the most important break with the harmonistic themes of English utilitarianism came through the influence of Darwinism and through the attempt to extend Darwinism principles to the human social world. There were relative obvious connections between the process of natural selection and of economic competition, reinforced by the Malthusian heritage, though Keynes<sup>121</sup> certainly exaggerated in saying that Darwinism could be considered one grand generalization of the Ricardian economics, Furthermore, the conception of evolution came to be applied in the social field by a whole series of writers, among whom Herbert Spencer was the most prominent.

The conception of “natural red in tooth and claw” certainly again raised actually the problem of order; but perhaps equally serious for the utilitarian framework was a challenge to the postulate of the *givenness* of wants. Hard on the heels Darwinism came the instinct theory in biology and psychology, attempting to introduce order into human motivation within the utilitarian framework – McDougall’s *Social Psychology*, first published in 1908, being perhaps the most influential

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<sup>119</sup> Pareto, Vilfredo. 1916/1969. *The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology*. In 4 Vols. New York: Dover.

<sup>120</sup> Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951/1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: Wiley.

<sup>121</sup> Keynes, John Maynard. (1919-1947) 1951. *Essays in Biography*. New ed. Edited by Geoffrey Keynes. New York: Horizon.

work. A broadened theory of social action could not evade this problem and there was clearly no solution to be derived from strict utilitarian premises.

Simple assimilation to general biological theory also failed to survive as the most acceptable solution. On the broad base of Darwinian biology, and in terms of the heredity-environment distinction, increasing attention was given to the conception of the importance of the learned content of transmissible experience – a conception which came to be formulated in the anthropological concept of culture.

### **The break with utilitarian premises**

Both the tension in the utilitarian position and one of the ways in which this tension could be resolved can be illustrated by two major incidents. The first was the relation between John Stuart Mill and August Comte. The two developed an exceedingly close personal friendship. It proved, however, that the intellectual differences between them were too deep for it to endure and they eventually broke with each other. Mill documented the break with the exceedingly interesting little book, *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (1865). Basically the issue was that Mill was what I have called an “analytical individualist” and could not stomach the collective emphasis of Comte.

The second incident was the intrusion into the economics of Alfred Marshall, the main founder of fully modern British economic of an element which, in retrospect, can be seen clearly to be anomalous in a utilitarian system. This was his refusal to endorse wholeheartedly the reliance of economic theory on the theory of “want-satisfaction” as newly refined by the principle of marginal utility. Instead, he insisted on the importance of what he called “activities,” which he himself referred to the Ricardian labour theory of value, but which turned out to involve internalized values on a level incompatible with the utilitarian assumption of the givenness of wants (Marshall 1890; compare Parsons.)<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1961/1965. *An Outline of the Social System*. In Talcott Parsons et. Al. (editors), *Theory of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory*. New York: Free Press. Volume I, Chapter 3, Pp. 30-79

“In the sociological as distinct from the economic direction, there is an important line which runs from Mill through Spencer to Hobhouse. Spencer was the one who stressed the individualistic side, with special reference to social policy, while Hobhouse was in the tradition of Mill, as perhaps the last major social utilitarian.”<sup>123</sup>

But the theoretically specific solutions to the problem of social order derived primarily from contact with other main traditions of thought. The earliest of these solutions was proposed in Marxian theory; as already noted, Marx was both German idealist – in invested from, of course – and utilitarian. Yet Marxism did not take hold strongly in Britain, so that the importance of Marx properly lay more in exporting utilitarianism to continental Europe than in bringing historical materialism to Britain. However, Marx’s conception of the constraining system of competitive and power relations did have a fruitful affinity with Durkheim’s later formulation of society as a “reality *sui generis*” (1895). Durkheim oriented his analysis directly to the system of economic individualism. He issued a fundamental challenge to the utilitarian analysis of it, couching his argument explicitly in terms of the problem of order. The crucial factor, ignored in the utilitarian scheme, was that of an institutionalized normative order, of which the *institution* of contract was the key element in the economic context. This institution could not be derived from the interests of the contracting parties, but presupposed an independent source in what Durkheim called the *conscience collective* (1893).

### **Major Alternative to Utilitarianism**

‘The crucial developments, which owed much to the Cartesian tradition of French thought, arose from the interpretation of the implications of this break with the utilitarian scheme. One of these was the articulation of the basis of social order with legal tradition, as anchored in turn in *cultural* factors, not simply in the interests of individuals. This view was closer to Hobbes and Austin than to Locke, but came to

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<sup>123</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Pg. 232

emphasize values held in common by the participant in a social system, and eventually the grounding of these values in religious tradition.<sup>124</sup>

This outcome, which was reached by Durkheim late in his career, did not radically cut social institutions off from the biological realm. Rather it introduced a whole series of distinction among factors intermediate between the manifestations of the genetic constitution of a species, such as instincts, and a variety of socially and culturally order entities, among which religion comprised the highest set of components. This paved the way for a new and much more sophisticated attempt to fit society and its evolutionary development into the general world of biological life.

The second major direction of innovation was into the realm of utilitarian wants, which we now consider that of personality. In Durkheim's work this took the form of the conception of the internalization of social norms and objects in the personality of the individual, so that the primary sanctions lay in their moral authority (1893). This was an extreme antithesis of the Hobbesian position. The same applies to sociocultural values, a complex that Durkheim saw as basically accounting for societal integration that is as providing the solution of the problem of social order. Here Durkheim converged with Freud, and with the social psychology of Cooley<sup>125</sup> and Mead<sup>126</sup> was developing in the United States.

Starting from a base in German idealism, and with a polemic attitude towards both idealism and Marxism, Max Weber had independently been developing similar conceptions. His initial empirical insight was that a major component in the motivation for profit-making economic activity – the paradigmatic case for the utilitarian conception of the rational pursuit of self-interest – lay in the religious

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<sup>124</sup> Parsons, Talcott. 1968/1972. Pg. 232

<sup>125</sup> Cooley, Charles H. 1902/1950. Human Nature and the Social Order. Rev. ed. In Charles H. Cooley. Two Major Works: Social Organization and Human Nature and the Social Order. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

<sup>126</sup> Mead, George H. 1943/1963. Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. Edited by Charles W. Morris. Univ. Of Chicago Press.

derived values of the "Protestant ethic."<sup>127</sup> If Weber's thesis were empirically correct, this effect of the Protestant ethic could only be explained by the internalization of its value in the personality. Such an explanation constituted a basic divergence with Durkheim, Freud, and others. Weber generalized this insight immensely in his comparative analyses of economic, political, legal, and religious structures and their process of historical development.

### **Utilitarianism and Sociological Theory**

With both Marx and the anthropological tradition in the background, these theoretically specific breaks with the limitations of the utilitarian frame of reference constituted the main step in the emergence of sociological theory, a process in which the two most important figures were undoubtedly Durkheim and Weber. They brought to bear on the utilitarian scheme critical points of view derived from other major intellectual traditions and achieved original syntheses which were not derivable from any of their antecedent heritages.

Indeed, it can be said that anything like a satisfactory sociological theory could not have been developed at all within the utilitarian framework. Mill and Spencer probably came the closest to such a theory, yet Durkheim's critique of Spencer cannot but be regarded as definitive.<sup>128</sup> But this consideration, important as it is, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that utilitarian made enormous contributions towards establishing sociological theory. They introduced the most sophisticated conception of a *system* of social interaction which had yet appeared, one which was developed most impressively by the classical economists and their successors. Second, they defined, in term of a coherent frame of reference, a systematically ordered set of boundaries for the economic aspect of the social systems, most important vis-à-vis the political system. Thinking this the basic problem

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<sup>127</sup> Weber, Max. (1904-1905) 1930. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Translated by Talcott Parsons, with a foreword by B. H. Tawney. London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Scribner.

<sup>128</sup> Durkheim, Emile. (1898-1911) 1953. *Sociology and Philosophy*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1893, book 1, chapter 3



posed by Hobbes could not be solved in utilitarian terms, Locke, Bentham, Austin, and Mill, acting on the assumption that they had partly solved it, were able to make major contributions to the analysis of how political systems function. These contributions have remained essential to the development of both legal and political theory, the latter especially in the field of democratic process. Very important generalization in the field of social stratification came from the work of Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx. The utilitarian assumption of the givenness of wants posed essential problems for psychology which modern personality theory is perhaps only now beginning to resolve.

The utilitarian strain in economic theory has been somewhat accentuated in the last generation in connection with the development of highly technical particularly mathematical, economic theory. The very simplicity of the utilitarian framework favors its use in this context because it makes certain mathematical manipulations possible.

Behaviorist psychology and the more rigorous kind of economic theory have tended to form certain alliance, and that these have tended to be project into the realm of sociology. The most prominent representative of the latter trend is George Homans<sup>129</sup>, who claims that behaviorist psychology and the economic theory of exchange are virtually identical and can constitute the common basis of a general theory of social process.

These trends of thought stand today in dialectic tension with the more "holistic" trends deriving from Durkheim, Weber, Mead, and their forbears. The general economic-behaviorist them is a version of the "elementarism" that would deny the independent significance of systemic properties by reducing all of them to elementary components. These trends are also intimately associated with many of concern for quantification, greatly reinforced by the recent resource of the use of computers, which are so prominent in the social sciences of the last 1960s.

The broad conflict between elementism and holism seems to be general to the whole range of modern science. Utilitarianism was intimately connected with the

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<sup>129</sup> Homan, George C. 1961. *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*. New York: Harcourt.

early frame of reference of the physical science, and had served to connect social science both with these and with the emerging biological science. Above all utilitarianism contributed the concept of an abstractly defined system of interaction in the human social field. This is a platform on which sociology as well as economics and psychology must stand. It seems to me, however, that a purely utilitarian sociology will not prove to be viable. But that a synthesis of the utilitarian contribution and contributions deriving above all from German idealism and from French collectivistic positivism will prove to shape the theoretical future of the science of human behavior, society, and culture more than any of these traditions taken alone.

### **Criticisms**

One criticism is that, although the widespread practice of lying and stealing would have bad consequences, resulting in a loss of trustworthiness and security, it is not certain that an occasional lie to avoid embarrassment or an occasional theft from a rich man would not have good consequences, and thus be permissible or even required by Utilitarianism. But the Utilitarian readily answers that the widespread practice of such acts would result in a loss of trustworthiness and security. To meet the objection to not permitting an occasional lie or theft, some philosophers have defended a modification labelled "rule" Utilitarianism. It permits a particular act on a particular occasion to be adjudged right or wrong according to whether it is in accordance with or in violation of a useful rule; and a rule is judged useful or not by the consequences of its general practice. Mill has sometimes been interpreted as a "rule" Utilitarian, whereas Bentham and Sidgwick were "act" Utilitarians.

Another objection, often posed against the hedonistic value theory held by Bentham, holds that the value of life is more than a balance of pleasure over pain. Mill, in contrast to Bentham, discerned differences in the quality of pleasures that made some intrinsically preferable to others independently of intensity and duration (the quantitative dimensions recognized by Bentham). Some philosophers in the Utilitarian tradition have recognized certain wholly non hedonistic values without losing their

Utilitarian credentials. A British philosopher, G.E. Moore, a pioneer of 20th-century Analysis, regarded many kinds of consciousness—including love, knowledge, and the experience of beauty—as intrinsically valuable independently of pleasure, a position labelled “ideal” Utilitarianism. Even in limiting the recognition of intrinsic value and disvalue to happiness and unhappiness, some philosophers have argued that those feelings cannot adequately be further broken down into terms of pleasure and pain and have thus preferred to defend the theory in terms of maximizing happiness and minimizing unhappiness. It is important to note, however, that even for the hedonistic Utilitarians, pleasure and pain are not thought of in purely sensual terms; pleasure and pain for them can be components of experiences of all sorts. Their claim is that, if an experience is neither pleasurable nor painful, then it is a matter of indifference and has no intrinsic value.

Further the objection to Utilitarianism is that the prevention or elimination of suffering should take precedence over any alternative act that would only increase the happiness of someone already happy. Some recent Utilitarians have modified their theory to require this focus or even to limit moral obligation to the prevention or elimination of suffering—a view labelled “negative” Utilitarianism.

### **Relation between Pragmatism and Utilitarianism Concept**

Both pragmatism and utilitarianism concepts have similarity and differences. On the point of definition both are different. Pragmatism is concerned with results, utilitarianism with usefulness. It can be understood with one example. Somebody could be pragmatic regarding their future but they could not be utilitarian regarding their future. This is because the future does not have any obvious use, but results do come from the future. Hope this is useful to understand the difference between the two.

Pragmatism is defined as: 1. way of thinking about results: a straightforward practical way of thinking about things or dealing with problems, concerned with results rather than with theories and principles. While Utilitarianism

can be defined as: 1. ethical doctrine of greatest good: the ethical doctrine that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the criterion of the virtue of action 2. Doctrine based on value of usefulness: the doctrine that the value of an action or an object lies in usefulness.

Most of the thinkers who describe themselves as pragmatists have pointed to the connection with practical consequences or real effects as vital components of both meaning and truth. The precise character of these links to pragmatic is however, as diverse as the thinkers who have done the pointing.

Utilitarianism says, "do that which provides the greatest good for the greatest number." Pragmatism says, "Whatever works is what is good." (Note: this is NOT the same as saying, "what is good will work.") Utilitarianism is the premiere ethical theory of the Enlightenment, that period of human history that celebrated the deistic "marginalizing" or eclipse of God.

We can remember here William James who linked Pragmatism and Utilitarian concept and showed that how both are related with each other. William James<sup>130</sup> shows the link between the two in these words. "The practical value of true ideas is primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us you can say of an extra truth either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience. "It is debatable whether the concept of "useful" should be connected with the notion of "utility" in an ethical theory such as utilitarianism.

So here we can say that both Pragmatism and Utilitarian have some similarities and differences. Words of William James are enough to understand what similarity between them lie. For pragmatism it is 'whatever works is likely to be true', here works denoted by usefulness because no any things are consider as a workable without usefulness to either society or individual. For utilitarian concepts it is

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<sup>130</sup> Blacks Academy. Pragmatism and Utilitarianism.  
<http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/2926.html>.

'whatever have utility is true'. Here utility is similar to the usefulness. Here in this chapter, previous chapter and in above section we can find that on the ground of cause of action by society or individual is to gain the goal which must have a usefulness, workability and functional practical outcome for pragmatic thinkers and have utility and happiness for utilitarian. Here both features have common in practical. If anything is useful, workable, functional and practical outcome than that must have some utility and so it will give happiness. Where on the other side if any things have a utility and happiness than it must be a useful, workable and practical outcome.

### **Conclusion**

Utilitarianism is a philosophical school of thought which holds that utility entails the greatest happiness in great number. Utilitarianism therefore, implies a model of social action in which individuals rationally pursue their own self-interests, with society no more than the aggregation in individuals brought together in the realization of their individual goals.

For some thinkers like J. O. Urmson, "utilitarian" is a term that has no precise or even unequivocal meaning. It is used both as a name for any ethical theory that seek to determine the rightness and wrongness of action by reference to the goodness and badness of their consequences and as a name for the whole body of philosophical and political doctrines that was accepted by Bentham and philosophical radicals of the nineteenth century. The word "utilitarianism" was invented causality by Bentham and reinvented by J. S. Mill to apply specifically to their own doctrines, but a wider use is now very common. Thus, it is common to refer to Hume, who lived well before Bentham and G. E. Moore who had no political interests and rejected the doctrine that pleasure is the sole good as utilitarians.

Utilitarian have the position that merit of action must be determined by reference to their consequences. But there are two basic questions before utilitarian, **first**, how we are to determine the rightness and wrongness of actions in terms of their

good and bad consequences, **second**, what is the principle for determining what are good and bad consequences.

In normative ethics, a tradition stemming from the late 18th- and 19th-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill that an action is right if it tends to promote happiness and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness—not just the happiness of the performer of the action but also that of everyone affected by it.

Utilitarianism also differs from ethical theories that make the rightness or wrongness of an act dependent upon the motive of the agent; for, according to the Utilitarian, it is possible for the right thing to be done from a bad motive. According to Mill, acts should be classified as morally right or wrong only if the consequences are of such significance that a person would wish to see the agent compelled, not merely persuaded and exhorted, to act in the preferred manner.

The movement of thought generally known as utilitarianism, which had its center in England from the seventeenth until well into the twentieth century, provided one of the most important frames of reference in the shaping of social science theory, including sociological theory. The foundations of utilitarianism were laid above all by Hobbes and Lock, with their very different emphases; its culminating phase involved the sequence of eminent writer that extends from Adam Smith, through Bentham, Austin, Malthus, and Ricardo, to John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer.

One such criticism is that, although the widespread practice of lying and stealing would have bad consequences, resulting in a loss of trustworthiness and security, it is not certain that an occasional lie to avoid embarrassment or an occasional theft from a rich man would not have good consequences, and thus be permissible or even required by Utilitarianism.

Another objection, often posed against the hedonistic value theory held by Bentham, holds that the value of life is more than a balance of pleasure over pain.

Both pragmatism and utilitarianism concepts have similarity and differences. Pragmatism is concerned with results, utilitarianism with usefulness. It can

be understood with one example. Somebody could be pragmatic regarding his/her future but s/he could not be utilitarian regarding his/her future. Utilitarianism says, "do that which provides the greatest good for the greatest number." Pragmatism says, "Whatever works is what is good." William James<sup>131</sup> shows the link between pragmatism and utilitarianism in these words. "The practical value of true ideas is primarily derived from the practical importance of their objects to us. You can say of an extra truth either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'. Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. We can see above how pragmatism and utilitarianism is similar and different but in practical level both seem to be same, because both have common goal of action that is workability and practicality.

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**From Pragmatism to Materialism: Indian and Western View**  
***Every Things is on Earth; Nothing After Death***

Here I am going to analyse the materialistic view of society which deals with matter and believes that matter is everything in society. It is widely known to us that materialistic view of society have a western origin and Indian society was and is a spiritual society. Western emphasised on material aspect of society and Indians on spiritual things. But it is a false consciousness about Indian society. Because there are many thoughts in Indian society which suggest that Indian had and still have a rich materialistic thoughts. There are many thoughts in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism which are materialistic. But it is western and dominant Indian scholars who portrayed Indian society and its thoughts are spiritual and God devoted. But when we study Indian thought system carefully we can find many materialistic thoughts.

Here, at first I am going to discuss the western materialistic thoughts and then the Indian materialistic thoughts. Due to time limitation I shall only able be to discuss Lokayata or Charvaka as an Indian materialistic thought.

## The Origin of Materialism

M. N. Roy<sup>132</sup> in his book *Materialism* gives a brief account of the origin of materialism. He started with Greek thinker Thales who been called the father of philosophy. He is also honored as the founder of the physical science. He disbelieved the divinity of the physical science. He is also honored as the founder of the physical science. He disbelieved the divinity of the agencies causing natural phenomena. He saw that a rational explanation of nature was impossible as long as its phenomena were attributed to imaginary gods. Therefore, he discarded the old notion that all natural event were caused by the arbitrary and inscrutable volition of supernatural beings. Having set aside the old superstition, he began the search for the origin of phenomena in nurture itself: for a material cause of all things without any mystery or myth.

Along with all the other great Lonion physicist of his time, Thales did not distinguish between matter and a moving principle. They were all monists, and as such true philosophers. In their time, when science was just in the throes of birth, the knowledge about the origin of things could only be an ideal. But it was one of the greatest achievements of pure thought to have placed that noble ideal before making. In the beginning, there could be conjectures and working hypothesis. The rejection of the dogma that the world was produced and governed by super-natural, inscrutable and knowledge forces opened an era of free enquiry which was pregnant of unlimited possibilities. Human mind declared its independence of the bogeys of superstition, set up by the ignorance of its own infancy.

“The vulgar parody on materialism – “eat, drink and be marry” – is associated with the name of Epicuros, who gave ancient atomist the final shape in which it eventually became the foundation of modern physical science. The moral teachings of Epicurus, and the simplicity of the life lived by himself and his disciples, gave lie to malicious misinterpretation of his philosophy.”<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Roy, M. N. 1940/1951. *Materialism: An Outline of the History of Scientific Thought*. Pgs. 53 and 64

<sup>133</sup> Roy, M. N. 1940/1951. Pg. 64

In India, Charvak and his philosophy received a similar malicious treatment from the reactionist. For maintaining the very sensible view that there is nothing after death, all sorts of absurd and atrocious doctrines were attributed to him, and his authentic teachings were destroyed. Fortunately, Epicureanism escaped such a fate, and came down in history as an impetus to modern science. But only fragments of the very voluminous writings of its exponents have been saved.

### **Western thoughts of Material aspects of Society**

According to western thinker Material culture is<sup>134</sup>:-

1. 'Those aspect of culture which governs the product and use of artefacts' (Douglas: 1964).
2. The material product of artefacts actually product by society.

Debate about the reference of the term had focused on whether the objects or the ideas and social arrangements associated with the objects should be central. However, the study of material culture is bound to be concerned with the artefacts produced by a society, especially including its implements for the collection and hunting of food and the cultivation of plants, its modes of transportation, its means of housing and clothing, its techniques of food preparation and cooking, its art, and its magical and religious paraphernalia. An important part of sociology and social anthropology, the study of material culture is even more central in Archaeology, given that it has little to study but artefacts.

In philosophical sense materialism is<sup>135</sup>:-

1. The doctrine that nothing that is not 'matter'.
2. The doctrine that 'matter' is primary and thought or consciousness is secondary.

For either of these definitions the major-contract is idealism. However, problem exist in saying exactly of what 'matter' consists, especially given the

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<sup>134</sup> Jary, David, Julia Jary (eds.). 1991/1006. Collins Dictionary of Sociology. Pg. 376

<sup>135</sup> Jary, David, et al. 1991/2006. Pg. 376-77

considerable uncertainty surrounding many of the entities, forces, etc. which populate modern scientific thinking. It has been suggested that the best way to identify the issue that lead to a materialistic position is to say what materialism opposes. One central position is an opposition to Dualism, especially a dualism of mind and body. A main argument for opposition is the obscurity of notions such as Descartes' notion of the 'mind'; as on 'immaterial', non-extended, 'thinking substance'. The position of 'identity theories', for example, is that 'mind state' assumes a corresponding state (even if it is recognized that a particular mind state can never in practice be reduced analytically). Thus the goal of materialism is to head off any claims for a wholly separate, wholly immaterial realm. At the same time, the mind may be conceived (as for Bhaskar, 1979, 'emergent powers materialism') as a substance which is neither material nor immaterial; not a substance, but a complex of non-reducible power. Make a statement about the fundamental nature of the causation of social phenomena is:

(a) *For Historical Materialism*, the mode of production (the force and the relations of production) is the primary determinant of the constitutive role of human consciousness in producing and reproducing social life;

(b) *For Cultural Materialism*, ecological and environmental forces are decisive.

Cultural materialism is an anthropological approach (e.g. the work of Marvin Harris 1978) which suggests that the appropriate explanations of many aspect of human culture are material factors. In some aspects the approach is like that of Marx, but in Harris's work that determining feature of importance are more usually of a demographic or environmental nature.

What is materialism? Fred Hoyle<sup>136</sup> says that in the popular view I suppose a materialist is a pretty unpleasant person who gobbles babies for breakfast. This is a view I do not agree with. I am a materialist and I haven't gobbled any babies yet.

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<sup>136</sup> Hoyle, Fred. 1957. *Man and Materialism*

The essence of materialism lies in a refusal to separate Man and his environment into the mutually exclusive categories of “spiritual” and “material.” Man is regarded as belonging to the Universe, not necessarily insignificantly, as a star or a galaxy belongs to the Universe. State, galaxy, man, are all expressions of the structure of the Universe. No attempt is made to introduce the notions of value or importance. A star is not necessarily more important than a man, or vice versa. Star and man are in the same boat (if the phrase be permitted); they are both expressions of the same inner laws. This point of view lies at the base of the present book, although it enters explicitly only in the final chapter.

It is urged by the opponents of materialism that while it has been found possible to understand in some detail how stars behave, no one had so far been able to understand with real precision how men behave. Instead of admitting this as proof that stars and men belong to rootedly different categories, the materialist point out that a star is a much simpler structure than a man, so it is no wonder that we know more about the inside of a star than we know about the inside of our own heads. The materialist cannot remain content with this, however. He will only score a completely victory over his opponents if he is able to show that the behavior of Man can indeed be understood with precision, thereby destroying the case against him.

According to Encyclopedia Britanica<sup>137</sup> materialism is the view that all facts (including facts about the human mind and will and the course of human history) are causally dependent upon physical process, or even reducible to them.

The many materialistic philosophers that have arisen from time to time may be said to maintain one or more of the following thesis; (1) that what are called mental events are really certain complicated physical events, (2) that mental process are entirely determined by physical process (e.g.) that ‘making up one’s mind,” while it is a real process that can be introspected, is caused by bodily process, its apparent consequences also really following from the bodily causes, (3) that mental and physical process are two aspects of what goes on in a substance at one mental and bodily (this

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<sup>137</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol. 7. Pg. 929-30

thesis, whether called “materialistic” or not, is commonly opposed by those who opposed materialism), and (4) that thought and wished influence an individual’s life, but that the course of history is determined by the interaction of masses of people and masses of material things, in such a way as to be predictable without reference to the “higher” processes of thought and will.

Materialism is thus opposed to philosophical dualism or idealism and, in general, to belief in God, in disembodied spirits, in free will, etc. Materialistic views insight upon setting questions by reference to public observation and not to private intuitions. Since this is a maxim which scientists must profess within the limits of their special inquiries, it is natural that philosophers which attached that highest importance to science should lean toward materialism. But none of the great empiricists have been satisfied (at least for long) with systematic materialism.

The Greek atomists of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC (Leucippus and Democritus) offered simple mechanical explanations of perception and thought – a view that was condemned by Socrates in the *Phaedo*. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi, inspired by the Greek atomists, used materialistic arguments in defense of science against Aristotle and against the orthodox tradition, and in the next century the materialists, Paul d’Holbach, and others) attempted to provide a detailed account of psychology.

During the modern period, the question of materialism came to be applied on the one hand to problems of method and interpretation in science (Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander, A. N. Whitehead) of human history (G. W. F. Hegel, August Comte, Karl Marx). Marx offered a new kind of materialism, dialectic and not mechanistic, and embracing all sciences (see dialectical materialism).

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century materialistic thought had to face novel developments in the sciences and in philosophy. In physics relativity and quantum theory modified, though they did not abandon, the notions of cause and of universal determinism. In psychology, J. B. Watson’s behaviorism an extreme form of materialism, did not find general acceptance; and researches both in psychology and in psychoanalysis made it

impossible to hold and simple direct view of the mind's dependence on the process and mechanisms of the nervous system. In philosophy, further reflection suggested to money that it is futile to try to erect a system to belief, whether materialistic or otherwise, on the basis of the concepts of science and of common sense (especially those of causes and of explanation).

In sociology and related discipline, the word materialism had three quite distinct meanings which are, however, to some extent interconnected and very common confused with each other.<sup>138</sup> The first meaning is the drawn from popular moral or political controversy, according to which materialism refers to or physical comfort, at the expense of any higher moral or spiritual values or concern. This usage is generally pejorative.

The second meaning is to designate a range of metaphysical positions (philosophical view about the fundamental nature of reality). Thought recognizably materialist metaphysical positions were advocated as early as the fifth century BCE in Greece, promulgation of materialism as a modern world-view dates from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries CE in Europe. Whereas in classical times matter had spirit or mind. Descartes's metaphysics reduced all existence to two fundamental substances: matter, characterized by extension, the substance of bodily existence; and mind, not spatially located, and characterized by thought. The contemporary advances in the science of mechanics provided the basis for early modern philosophical accounts of matter, and also seemed to hold out the promise of ultimately accounting for all phenomena in mechanical terms. The early chapters of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* are a remarkable early example of such a materialist attempt (*contra* Descartes) to account for human mental operations such as perception, memory, volition, the emotion, foresight, reasoning, and so on, in terms of the concepts of mechanics.

In a period during which clerical authority and political power were closely intertwined, such doctrine were bound to be seen as radical and subversive in their implications. In the nineteenth century socialist and communist doctrines were

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<sup>138</sup> Marshall, Gordon (ed.) 1994/2009. A Dictionary of Sociology. Pp. 400-01

associated with materialism, by advocates and opponents alike. However, with changes in sciences and especially with the development of the life-sciences, the content of materialist doctrine also shifted. Organic (as distinct from mechanical) metaphors become more prominent, and processes of development and historicity entered into philosophical representations of the material world. These features were particularly evident in the mid-nineteenth century materialist revolt against the German idealist tradition, led by Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels.

These thinkers rejected both idealism and the narrower reductive forms of materialism which had been based on mechanics, and which had been incapable of taking full account of sensuous existence, of the emergence of conscious and active human subjects. These phenomena were, however, to be understood not by any concession to idealism; but, rather, by taking advantage of the increasingly complex and sophisticated account of matter itself, as made available by ever-advancing scientific knowledge. Engels later came to systematize the principles of this philosophical approach under the title dialectical materialism.

The third meaning of materialism in familiar sociological uses is also associated with Marx and Engels. In this meaning, materialism asserts the primary.

Of need-meeting interaction with the natural environment both to the understanding of human social structures and patterns of conflict, and also to long-run sequences of historical change. Though there is no obvious affinity between this doctrine and metaphysical materialism, they are quite logically independent of one another. The later writings of Marx and Engels contain attempts to define and classify the basic variant forms of human society in terms of the social organization of the activities of material production, distribution and consumption. The modes of production thus distinguished were held to have their own distinctive patterns of social dominance, subordination, and conflict, as well as definite tendencies for historical changes, and possible transition to new forms. Cultural forms, ways of thinking, and institutions were held to be characteristic of each mode.



This approach to social explanation, so-called 'historical materialism', is often criticized for its over-emphasis on economic life at the expense of political or cultural processes. Arguably, however, both Marx and Engels distance themselves from such economic determinist or reductionist interpretations of their work. Partly this is a matter of the non-correspondence between their concepts of 'mode of production', on the one hand, and the set of activities conventionally labelled 'economic', on the other. Also, however, even in society where there are institutional separations between economic and political, artistic, and other practices, historical materialism asserts that such non-economic activities have their own relative autonomy within a range of sustainable possibilities whose limits are set by the economic structure one of the most challenging problems addressed by twentieth-century Marxists has been to provide more rigorous and empirically defensible accounts of these relationship. It is arguable that historical materialism. With its emphasis on need-meeting interaction with nature, is only beginning to reveal its full potential towards the twentieth century, as social scientists increasingly turn their attention to environmental problems.

### **Indian Thoughts of Materialism**

Almost all the recent studies in Indian thought have emphasized its idealistic and spiritualistic aspects to the utter neglect of its materialistic ones. Mine is a humble attempt to bring the latter into focus. In doing so, I assume that Indian thought is as variegated as is our actual socio-cultural life. This, of course, that Indian thought is entirely, popular in philosophical circles, that Indian thought is entirely spiritual in outlook and character – a view which merely ignores materialism as a vital element in the traditional philosophies of our country.

In choosing to challenge this belief, and to invite attention to the role of materialism in Indian thought, I set a difficult task for myself. I have in mind, in particular, the paucity of literature on Indian Materialism proper, the Charvaka School. This would certainly have been a stumbling block in my way had I limited the scope of

my study to that system of thought only. But my aim had been to study the extent to which non-materialistic system of Indian thought have been, consciously or unconsciously, influenced by materialism or are carrying the same within their fold.

Some modern scholars – Indian as well as Western – have created an impression that Indian thought is pre-eminently spiritual or idealistic in its outlook and character. “Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual,”<sup>139</sup> says Radhakrishnan, for example. And it is so, he thinks, because “the spiritual motive dominates life in India.”<sup>140</sup>

It is difficult to see serious attempt to understand Indian materialism. It is to this prejudice, again, that one may trace the neglect of the study of materialism in Indian thought. As the prejudice has been widespread among the scholars, both ancient as well as modern, none ever made any serious attempt to make an impartial study of Indian materialism (Charvaka or Lokayata), and impact on the other schools.<sup>141</sup> Materialism has generally been neglected. Even an occasional mention of it is meant to condemn and malign it.

The religious men have nothing but contempt for the materialists. Gopinath Kaviraj observes,<sup>142</sup> “it is clear that in every system of thought, Hindu, Buddhist or Jaina – except Charvaka, the material principle<sup>143</sup> is recognized as evil. Conceived as a power or potency only or even as an entity, it is the source of all misery and tribulation. Every school advocates, therefore, that the self to be released from the bondage of the world must be freed in every way from its association with matter. Moksa is impossible so long as matter sways the spirit through its functions. Every code of Ethico-Spiritual discipline is so designed as to ensure gradual purification of the self from the dominating effect of accumulated matter in the form of error, doubt,

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<sup>139</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. 1923/1989. Indian philosophy. Vol. I. Pg. 24

<sup>140</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. 1923/1989. Indian philosophy. Vol. I. Pg. 25

<sup>141</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1959/2006. Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism. Introduction, Pg. xiii

<sup>142</sup> Mishra, Umesh. 1936. Conception of Matter According to *Nyaya-Vaisesika* . Introduction. Pg. XI

<sup>143</sup> Mishra, Umesh. 1936. Introduction. Pg. XI

Vasana, Karma, etc. and guarding the purified self against further inroads of the matter.”

### **Materialism in Indian Philosophy**

Here it deals with the work of scholars, M. N. Roy<sup>144</sup> and D. P. Chattopadhyaya<sup>145</sup> and Dakshinaranjan Shastri<sup>146</sup> and other scholar as a reference.

In India also, the dissatisfaction with the Vedic Natural Religion gave to speculations about the origin of things. Some of the earlier Upanishads are fragmentary records of those speculations. But for reasons stated in the preceding chapter, early Indian speculations about the origin of things developed directly into metaphysics and a precious form of homothetic religion. Yet, towards the close of the misty Vedic era, approximately about the ninth or eighth century B.C. there rose thinker who represented distinct materialist tendencies. The teachings of those early speculative rebels are almost completely lost. Only the general drift of the currents of their thought can be approximately inferred from the works of their orthodox opponents. These is, however, ample evidence to conclude that too earlier systems of Hindu philosophy – Vaisheshik and Sankhya – were the positive outcome of the speculations recorded fragmentarily and rather enigmatically in the earlier Upanishads. The Vedic society was in the process of dissolution. The pastoral trial organization, under priestly domination, was buttressed ideologically on the natural religion of the Vedas. The ideology of the forces making for its dissolution was exposed by the philosophers who challenged the authority of the gods by trying explaining the being and becoming of the world is a rationalist and materialist way.

All the existing schools of philosophy mention earlier thinkers as “heretics” or “nihilists”. The former had denied the authority of the Vedas; the later doubted if anything existed at all. According to the Sankhyas, the “nihilist” held; “Since nothing

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<sup>144</sup> Roy, M. N. 1940/1951. Pg. 76-112

<sup>145</sup> Some work of DP Chattopadhyaya which is in bibliography and foot notes

<sup>146</sup> Shastri, Dakshinaranjan. 1930. A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism. Pp. 6-29

really exists, except thought, neither does bondage exist, just as the things of a dream have no real existence.

Nihilism was the ideology of the dissolution of antique society in India. It was revolutionary in the sense that it was a mighty revolt against Vedic priest craft; but as a school of philosophical thought, it was sterile. Nevertheless, it was so powerful that subsequently it very greatly influenced Buddhist philosophy. The nihilist must have been very powerful, because all the philosophical schools were anxious for disputing the nihilist doctrine. The materialist schools of Indian philosophy represented currents of thought evidently stimulated by nihilism. In order to dispute the doctrine that nothing existed, it was necessary to rely upon the existence of the material world which no sensible person could possibly dispute. The connection between nihilism and outspokenly materialistic Vaisheshik system still remains a matter of investigation. But its connection with the quasi-materialist Sankhya system is quite evident. In their fight against the nihilists, the Sankhyas were driven very close to out and out materials. In order to prove the reality of some existence, Kapila had to fall back upon the material world. The existence of thought by itself, or that of disembodied spirits, could not be proved to the satisfaction of the skeptics who expounded their nihilism doctrines as the deduction from the early spiritualist cult which was being set up in order to drug the victims of social chaos, so that they might ignore the miseries of the world as bad dreams. Therefore, more tangible evidence for the reality of existence had to be produced. The rebels and revolutionaries of ancient India thus made the rise of a philosophy possible. In order to prove the existence of thought, Kapila, for example, had to refer the reality of thought to the reality of the external world. His highly materialistic theory of cognition was also developed under the powerful impact of nihilism.

Even in the major Upanishads, which have come to be regarded as the foundation of the Vedantist metaphysical system, the discerning student finds unmistakable evidence of materialism. That is only natural; because the speculations of men, whose spiritual thirst is no longer satisfied with the moonshine of natural

religion, inevitably tend towards a physical explanation of natural phenomena. Ancient Indian speculation could not be free from this general psychological rule. Fragmentary evidence only proves that records of the early materialistic thought were destroyed in course of time. Until those lost chapters of the spiritual history of India are recorded or rewritten, Indian philosophy will hang in the air. Pending the accomplishment of that outstanding task, for the present purpose it will be sufficient to reproduce some well known passage from the more important Upanishads:

“What is the origin of the world? Ether (*akasha*), for all these being take their rise from ether only, and return into ether. Ether is their rest.”

Again, “That which is called ether, is the revealer of all forms and names.”<sup>147</sup>

If the conception of *akasha* is devoid of all content, then, the argument of the nihilists becomes unanswerable, and everything must be reduced to nothing, as nonexistent.

Moreover, in the same Upanishad, Brahman is also mentioned as the cause of everything. If *akasha* was a metaphysical conception, identical with Brahman, it would not be necessary for its being specified as the revealer of all forms and names, in addition to Brahman. Obviously, the function of revealing form and names does not belong to Brahman. If things are supposed to have another cause, over and above metaphysical Final Cause, then, the former must logically be conceived as a material cause. There must have been dispute on this point. Because Sankaracharya found it necessary to insist that “the word ether must here be taken to denote Brahman.” But it is equally or perhaps more, logical to assume that the obvious meaning of passage is more sensible and, in that case, the fact that Brahman also was mentioned as the cause of all is to be to the credit of prevailing prejudice. The assumption of the material cause, named ether, is sufficient for explaining the origin of the world. Yet, the venerable conception of Brahman is retained as a matter of form. The entire history of scientific thought, almost down to our days, suffers from this fallacy.

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<sup>147</sup> Tachandogya Upanishad.

In Svetasvatara Upanishad, *Aga* (fire) is assumed as “the one unborn from which everything springs”. *Aga* is not, however, identified with Brahman. So, it must have been conceived as a cause other than spiritual First Cause. Here again, the physical world is traced to a material origin. The materialist tendency in the Svetasvatara Upanishad is so very pronounced that even Sankaracharya finds it very difficult to explain it away. It will be shown later on that, in order to combat Buddhism which was the ultimate outcome of all materialist tendencies in ancient India, Sankaracharya was compelled to take up a very thinly veiled materialistic position.

The Vedanta has come to be accepted as the most representative and authoritative school of ancient Indian philosophy. As its name implies, its claim to contain all the wisdom of the Vedas. But being based on the authority of the Scriptures, it can hardly be accorded the distinction of philosophy. As a matter of fact, Vedanta is a very highly metaphysical system of theology. As such it goes beyond the limits of a theistic religion, and represents a very highly developed form of pantheism. Pantheism is only inverted materialism. No other logical conclusion can be drawn from any consistent system of monism. The Vedantic metaphysical speculation completely destroys the idea of a God, and consequently liquidates religion. The materialist implication of the Vedantic pantheism becomes evident in its masterly exposition by Sankaracharya. The metaphysical monism of the Vedanta system was constructed by the Brahmin intellectuals in order to combat the materialist school of philosophy which had logically resulted from the earlier speculation of thinking no longer satisfied with the fantasies and fairy-tales of the primitive Vedic religion.

The spiritual revolt represented by the Indian materialists eventually culminated in the rise of Buddhism which all but liquidated the Vedic religion. The Vedanta Sutra were composed for combating Buddhism which all but liquidated the Vedic natural religion and freed India from Brahmanical domination for several hundred years. Internal evidence proves that the Vedanta Sutra were composed for combating Buddhism.

The composition of the earlier Upanishads and the Vedanta Sutra must have been separated by several hundred years, during which period the spiritual development of India was in the direction of materialism, represented by Kanada, Kapila and many others, and of rationalism, represented the Budhists and Jains subsequently.

The materialist essence of the *Sankhya* system is confused by its apparent rejection of atomism. But the very argument advanced for the purpus implies a more perfected form of materialism: "What is limited, cannot be the substance of all." Together with the *Vaisheshik*, the *Sankhya* system also reduces the "gross *Vaisheshik*, the *Sankhya* system also reduces the "gross elements" to atoms; but *Kapila* traces the severally existing atoms down to a still simpler all-pervading substance. This is very much the same as done by Aristotle; but there is no evidence whether he resorted to this expediency to avoid the baffling problem of action at a distance. However, by seeking the ultimate substance beyond the atoms, *Kapila* anticipated the most modern conception of substance instead of rejecting materialism.

The *Sankhya* system, with its rigid rationalism, cannot do without a materialist substratum of the world. Because, if that is dispensed with, everything may happen everywhere, which is an absurdity according to itself.

And it was the several centuries of the Buddhist era that India really attained a very high level of material and moral culture.

The long process of the development of naturalist, rationalist, sceptic, agnostic and materialist thought in ancient India found culmination in the Charvak system of philosophy can be compared with Greek Epicureanism, and as such is to be appreciated as the positive outcome of the intellectual culture of India.

The Charvaks laughed at the notion that Vedas were divinely revealed truth; they held that truths can never divinely revealed truth; they held that truth can never be known except through the senses. Therefore, the idea of soul is a delusion. The Charvaks thus anticipated the modern philosophical thought of ultra-empiricism.

They held that even reason was not to be trusted because every inference depended for its validity not only on accurate observation and correct reasoning but also upon the assumption that the future would behave like the past, and of this there was no certainty. That was anticipating modern agnosticism more than two thousand years before Hume. But the Charvaks were not mere nihilists, agnostics and sceptics. They developed an elaborate system of positive philosophical thought.

“All phenomena are natural. Neither in experience nor in history do we find any interposition of supernatural forces. Matter is the only reality; the mind is matter thinking. .... Morality is natural; it is a social convention and convenience, not a divine command. ..”

The Buddhist “nihilists”, however, did not reduce everything to non-existence as had been done by the older nihilists. The Buddhists visualized everything in an endless process of constant flux. They challenged the notion of an eternal, changeless, absolute existence.

On the basis of the materialistic and quasi-materialistic Vaisheshik and Sabkhya systems, Buddha reversed the relation between the spiritual and material beings. .... Buddha held that soul is a by-product of the very being of man, governing by the laws of nature.

Dakshinaranjan Shastri in his book *A Short History of Indian Materialism* (1930) says that Lokayat school of philosophy, being developed as the first system of philosophy, raised objections against the views of other school which were even then mere tendencies and which took shape as systems later on. Thus, although, as mere tendencies almost all philosophical thoughts are contemporaneous, as systems they belong to different ages.<sup>148</sup> Generally speaking the larger the brain in relation to the rest of body, the more the intelligence. Lokayat say that Mind is only a form or product of the body. The ultimate reality is matter. Consciousness is a function of the body.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Shastri, Dakshinaranjan. 1930. Pg. 6

<sup>149</sup> Shastri, Dakshinaranjan. 1930. Pg. 16



Dakshinaranjan Shastri<sup>150</sup> says that The Lokayat system does not admit the existence of *Karmaphala* or the consequence of good or evil actions. The experience of pleasure and pain comes by chance. Nature is all powerful. Moreover, recognition proves the identity of the body through all its changing states. There is another difficulty. The spiritualists advance another objection against the materialists. The objection is put in the following manner. The theory of matter is unable to account for the facts of memory and original experience which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject. But this identity of reference would be possible only when the subject is fundamentally an unchangeable unity. This difficulty is removed by the Lokayatikas in the following manner. The traces left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted from the material cause down to its direct product, an analogous instance being the transference of the odour of must to the cloth in contact with it. But the general answer, of this school to every why is the general answer, of this school to every why is the doctrine of Svabhava. Everything happens through the influence of Svabhava which is all powerful. It is Svabhav or law of nature that the consciousness is a function of the body and the body is the self. The Lokayatikas refuted the theory of Parloka – or previous and future births as there was no reality existing before birth or after death. The four 'bhutas' or atoms of primary elements are the four 'bhutas' or atoms of primary elements are the only realities. Mind is the production of these elements. So it cannot be maintained that the mind at death passes on to another body. Mind in different bodies must be different. The consciousness of a body which has already perished cannot be related to the body which comes into being. One mind cannot produce another mind after total annihilation. The theory that the foetus is endowed with consciousness cannot be asserted. Without sensation no consciousness is possible. All knowledge is derived from sense experience alone. All knowledge is posterior to derived from experience. The sensation organs cannot revive sensations when they are not in existence. Therefore the foetus cannot be endowed with consciousness. No power is possible

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<sup>150</sup> Shastri, Dakshinaranjan. 1930. Pp. 17-29

without a recipient. When the body perishes consciousness cannot remain as there is no recipient of consciousness. With the destruction of the body consciousness, also must perish. If you hold that the previous, presentation and future births are nothing but particular condition of the stream of consciousness which according to you is eternal the Lokayatikas would say that the chain of consciousness is not an entity and a condition that can be predicted only an entity and a condition that can be predicated only in respect of an entity cannot therefore be proved. A future existence of an entity which is non-existent cannot be predicted. With this line of argumentation the Lokayatikas of that period rejected the existence of future or previous births. The Lokayatikas of that stage also maintained that there was no soul apart from the body. If there be any soul it is only the living principle of all organisms.

'Pleasure is the highest goods of human life. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present. To sacrifice the present to the future is unwarranted and perilous. The present is ours. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all that we have let us make the most of it. With this credo the Lokayatikas of that remote period of Indian history preached and practiced the theory of the extreme form of hedonism, according to which sensual is the only end of human life. Here, in this stage of Indian Materialism, the School of the Lokayatikas in addition to its old names Barhaspatya and Lokayat got the designation Charvaka. The word means entertaining speech.'<sup>151</sup>

D. P. Chattopadhyaya<sup>152</sup> says that<sup>153</sup> among the opponent of Indian idealism, the Lokayatas are the only philosophers to call for a total rejection of the idealist view of soul and its salvation. With their characteristic simplicity they declare that all talk of liberation – like that of heaven and of the transmigration soul – is a fiction. There is nothing called heaven, nothing called liberation and there is no soul migration to the other world. Further he emphasised that rejecting thus the

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<sup>151</sup> Shastri, Dakshinaranjan. 1030. Pg. 29

<sup>152</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad 1979/2001. What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy. Pg. 609

<sup>153</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad 1979/2001. Pg 610

conception of the soul, the Lokayatas talk of enjoying life rather than evading it. While the others view life as only a painful prelude to eternity, the Lokayatas are the only Indian philosophers to insist on making “the most of our brief lives as human animal”.

D. P. Chattopadhyaya<sup>154</sup> quotes Dasgupta<sup>155</sup> who referred to the Buddhist text *Divyavadana* where the Lokayata was ‘regarded as a special branch of study which had a *bhasya* and a *pravacana* (i.e., a commentary and annotations on it).’ To this he added the evidence of Patanjali, already mentioned by Garbe, and considered this evidence to be decisive. By studying grammarian Katyayana (c. 300 B.C.) Dasgupta concluded that ‘it seems to be quite certain that there was a book called the *Lokayata* on which there was at least one commentary earlier than 150 B.C., or even earlier than 300 B.C., the probable date of Katyayana, the author of the *Varttika Sutra*.’<sup>156</sup>

Radhakrishnan<sup>157</sup> has argued that the Lokayata was the characteristic intellectual product of the unsettled conditions of India during the ‘epic period,’ i.e., 600 B.C. to A.D. 200. It was an age when the faith of the centuries was crumbling down and the hold of authority on the people was being shattered.

Indian materialism has passed through four stages of development.<sup>158</sup> In its **first** stage it was a mere tendency of opposition. It called in question all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate and all evidence perception as well as inference. It denied the authority of even the Vedas. In that period, its name was Barhaspatya. In its **second** stage, *Svabhavavada*, recognition of perception of source of knowledge and the theory of the identification of body with the self, were incorporated into it. In **third** stage it comes to be known as *Lokayata*. In its third stage, an extreme form of hedonism, which was due, perhaps, to the corruption of freedom of thought – social, religions and political, formed the most important feature of this school. Gross sensual pleasure superseded bliss or contemplative joy and licentiousness replaced liberty. In its **fourth** stage, it came to be at one with the

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<sup>154</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad 1979/2001. Pg 7

<sup>155</sup> Dasgupta, S. N. 1952. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. III. Pp. 514

<sup>156</sup> Dasgupta, S. N. 1952. Vol. III. Pp. 514

<sup>157</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. Vol. I. Pp. 271-76

<sup>158</sup> Shastri, Dakshinaraman. 1930. Pg. 1-2

Buddhists and the Jain in opposing the Vedicists and got the common designation *Nastika*. A *Nastika* is one who demns the Vedas *Nastika Veda-nindakah*.

In ancient India, the necessities of life being abundantly provided for by nature, the struggle for existence was not very keen.

Materialism is preached nowhere as a doctrine of philosophy, except as reaction against some perverted idea or practices. The materialist of Indi, namely, Brhaspati and his followers, do not pretend to lay down a constructive system of philosophy of their own. They try to refute foolish orthodox of other schools.

The materialists were strongly opposed to any inference pretending to prove the other world which was ever beyond the range of observation and as such simply a fiction.<sup>159</sup> Charvaka philosophy was the same that was also 'suitable' known as the Lokayata.<sup>160</sup> Lokayata was quite appropriate, because it literally meant 'that which was widespread among the people' or the same vulgar mob: being incapable of conceiving any nobler ideal in Life, they could think only in terms of gross enjoyments in life. It is concerning the ambiguity of the meaning of Lokayata. Lokayata meant the philosophy of uncompromising materialism.<sup>161</sup>

## **Indian Materialism**

### **The Charvaka – Lokayata Thought**

Our task in this chapter is to describe materialistic thought. The need to argue such a case arises because some component scholars have denied the very existence of a materialistic system of thought in India.

Charvaka is a system of Indian philosophy which also known as Lokayata. It named after its founder, Charvaka author of Barhaspatya-sutras. In overviews of Indian philosophy, Charvaka is classified as a "heterodox" (*nastika*) system, the same

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<sup>159</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1989/2998. Pg. 15

<sup>160</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1989/2998. Pg. 26

<sup>161</sup> Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1989/2998. Pg. 27

classification as is given to Buddhism and Jainism<sup>[162][163]</sup>. It is characterized as a materialistic and atheistic school of thought. While this branch of Indian philosophy is not considered to be part of the six orthodox schools of Hindu philosophy, it is noteworthy as evidence of a materialistic movement within Hinduism<sup>164</sup>. Chattopadhyaya<sup>165</sup> says uncompromising materialism in ancient and medieval India is referred to by three alternative names these are Charvaka, Lokayata and Barhaspatya. Charvaka have two meaning which is suggested<sup>166</sup>. First, the word is derived from *caru+vak*, the former meaning 'attractive' or 'beautiful' and the latter 'words'. This, if accepted, Charvaka should roughly mean 'the sweet-worded one'. Secondly, it is suggested that the word is derived from the root *carv*, literally 'to much' or 'eat'. This, if accepted, Charvaka should mean one for whom eating and drinking is the be-all and end-all in life, i/e. By implication, any talk of the so-called higher values of life is meaningless. Further he says it is from this viewpoint, the Charvaka are generally branded as hedonists *per excellence* in Indian philosophy.

Thus, for example, L de La Vallee Poussin state as his conviction that 'a materialistic school, a system in the exact sense of the term' did not exist in India<sup>167</sup> and whatever of it (materialism in the form of tendencies) was existent 'is expressly in contradiction with the general conception of Indian philosophy.'<sup>168</sup> T.W. Rhys Davis considering the various sense in which the word Lokayat (a name accepted now to be that of Indian materialism) has been understood and used in the Indian philosophical literature concludes that 'there is no trace of the real existence of a system of

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<sup>162</sup> Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli; and Moore, Charles A. 1957/1989. *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton University Press; 1957. Princeton paperback 12th edition, 1989. [contents]

<sup>163</sup> Flood, Gavin. 1996. *An Introduction to Hinduism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg. 224

<sup>164</sup> Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli; and Moore, Charles A. 1957/1989. Pp. 227-49

<sup>165</sup> Chattopadhyay, D. P. 1989/2008. Pg. 22

<sup>166</sup> Chattopadhyay, D. P. 1989/2008. Pg. 22

<sup>167</sup> Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, ed. James Hastings. Vol. VIII. Pg. 493 [quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishn. 1974]

<sup>168</sup> Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, ed. James Hastings. Vol. VIII. Pg. 493 [quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishn. 1974]

philosophy by that name.<sup>169</sup> Garbe, while considering the sources of information (on the Lokayata system) expressed the opinion that ‘materialistic doctrines have never gained any important place in the literature of India.<sup>170</sup> Indian materialism is known to us today in its four names: Barhaspatya, Nastika-mata, Charvaka Darsana and Lokayata philosophy. Scholars have differed considerably in their speculations about the origin, history and exact significance of these names, and the confusion, created as a result of this, had led some to deny the existence of an exact materialistic system in India. Even those who have no doubt about the existence of the system are unsure of its origin, antiquity and foundership. Conflicting opinions, therefore, have been expressed by the scholars on all these matters, making the confusion worse confounded.<sup>171</sup>

This is a humble attempt to clarify the situation in this respect to the possible extent. Taking them up one by one we may make following observations:<sup>172</sup>

(a) **Barhaspatya.** A host of scholars agree that Barhaspatya is a name which can be rightly applied to Indian materialism, together or alternatively with Lokayata and Charvaka – the last two being more popular now<sup>173</sup> - if not with “Nastika-mata which the Jaina thinker, Hemchandra, regarding as identical with Barhaspatya, and as distinct from Lokayata and Charvaka.<sup>174</sup> Materialism in India is known to be Barhaspatya because of the ascription, by tradition, of the authorship of the classic work on Indian materialism, viz. the “Brhaspati Sutras,”<sup>175</sup> to Brhaspati.<sup>176</sup> But as to who this Brhaspati was – and whether he was at all a historical figure – controversy

<sup>169</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. 1899, 1910, 1919. Dialogue of the Buddha. Three Volumes. Vol. I. Pg. 172

<sup>170</sup> Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, ed. James Hastings. Vol. VIII. Pg. 138 [quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishn. 1974]

<sup>171</sup> Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974. Materialism in Indian Thought. Pg. 29

<sup>172</sup> Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974. Pg. 29

<sup>173</sup> Cf. HIPRB, ii, Pg. 458, I, Pg. 79; iii (APPENDIX), Pg. 516. IP, I, Pg. HPBPI, Pg. 287, I, Pp. 83-84. L. De La Vallee Poussin, era, viii, Pg. 493. Macdonell, History of Sanskrit literature, Pg. 406. Lokayat, Pg. 1 etc [Quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974]

<sup>174</sup> Muller, Max. 1916. Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. London. Pp. 96-97. Max Muller considers the distinction pointless.

<sup>175</sup> Now the work is lost, though we do find some sutra quoted in the extant philosophical literature

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Sinha, Jadunath. 1949. Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Agara. Pg. 13

still persists. Scholars like Macdonell and B.M. Barua consider Brhaspati to be only a mythical founder of the system, the real historical founders according to them being Charvaka and Ajita Kesakambalin. S. K. Belvalkar<sup>177</sup> and Tucci<sup>178</sup> are on the other hand in favour of accepting the historical foundership of Brhaspati. D. R. Shastri, maintaining the real foundership of Brhaspati, attempts to distinguish Brhaspati the materialist from Brhaspati the writer on Artha and the Smrtikara.<sup>179</sup>

For our purpose, this much is enough that the word "Barhaspatya" is accepted to be denoting Indian materialism now. May be, it meant something different with them who considered Brahaspatya to be a subject worthy of study by a Brahmin.<sup>180</sup>

(b) *Nastika-mata*. The name Nastika-mata is applied to Indian materialism along with the other names in general and rarely as an alternative to the other today thought historically the latter use is not so infrequent. For the word "Nastika" (as in English atheist) is understood to mean 'one who does not believe<sup>181</sup> in God.' The Gita uses the word in this sense and Kumarila Bhatt also uses it in this very sense.<sup>182</sup> But if we accept this sense we shall be going against tradition which ascribes the title of astika-mata to Samkhya and Purva Mimamsa also even though they do not hold a belief in a personal God. Indian tradition makes a distinction between the school of philosophy on the basis of their acceptance or rejection (repudiation) of the authority of the Veda, in agreement with Manu's definition of the term 'nastika' as "one who condemns the Veda."<sup>183</sup> Traditionally, therefore, Indian materialism is not regarded, to be having the name nastika-mata as distinctive to it, but shares the same with Jainism and Buddhism (the two other systems rejecting the authority of the Vedas). The name

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<sup>177</sup> Belvalkar, S. R. and R. D. Ranade. 1933. History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II. [Quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974]

<sup>178</sup> Tucci, G. 1925. A Sketch of Indian Materialism, in Proceeding of the First Indian Philosophy Congress. (Pg. 26 fn 2), Pg. 40

<sup>179</sup> Cf. Muller, Max. 1916. P. 92, Brhaspati a perplexing personality.

<sup>180</sup> Among the list of sastra to be studied by a learned Brahmin, Barhaspatya also finds mention in the *Lalita Vistara*. See, Muller, Max. 1916. Part. I, Pg. 94.

<sup>181</sup> XVI, 8. [Quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974]

<sup>182</sup> See his *Slokavartika - Pratijnasutra* verse, 10

<sup>183</sup> *Manusmrti*, II, 11.

may still be accepted to be distinctively applicable to Indian materialism alone if we accept the meanings given it the word *nastika* by Panini who says that a *nastika* is 'he who holds the view that there is no other world',<sup>184</sup> for, strictly speaking, the materialist alone holds that view. But as Panini's meanings are derivative, we would like to agree with the established tradition.

(c) ***Charvaka darsana***. The name Charvaka applies to the materialists, holds Radhakrishnan, because it was the name of the founder of the system.<sup>185</sup> Macdonell<sup>186</sup> and Poussin<sup>187</sup> also hold the same view. Krishna Misra, the author of *Nataka Prabodha Chandroday*, tells us that the Charvaka was the disciple of Brhaspati and propagator of the school founded by him (the latter). This view is accepted by Vasudev Abhayankar<sup>188</sup> and B. M. Barua, thought the latter regards both Brhaspati and Charvaka as mythical figures.<sup>189</sup>

These views assume that Charvaka was a person. The identity of Charvaka as a person is sought to be explained in three different ways (two semi-historical and third mythological). Charvaka is referred to in *Mahabharata* as a Raksasa<sup>190</sup> but we find no philosophical views ascribed to him there. It seems, therefore, to us to be futile to see in this Charvaka of *Mahabharata*, a founder or propagator of materialism. Balasastrin's connecting of the word Charvaka with *carvi* – a name of Buddha<sup>191</sup> and thus making Buddha the Charvaka teacher of Lokayata (Indian materialistic system) seems to be an utterly artificial explanation.<sup>192</sup> Nobody would today take seriously an identification of Buddha with an out-and-out materialist known as Charvaka. Further, deriving the name Charvaka from *Caru* – name given original founder of the school, is

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<sup>184</sup> IV, 6 [Quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974]

<sup>185</sup> Radhakrishnan, S. 1923/1989. Vol. I. Pg. 279 [7]

<sup>186</sup> Muller, Max. 1916. Vol. I. Pp. 83-84

<sup>187</sup> Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, ed. James Hastings. Vol. VIII. Pg. 439 [quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishn. 1974]

<sup>188</sup> Introduction to his edition of, Madhavacarya. 1914. Sarvadarsana Samgraha. p. 133

<sup>189</sup> Barua, B. M. 1921. A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy. Calcutta. Pg. 287

<sup>190</sup> *Santiparva*, XII. 38:22 ff; Pp. 39 and 40

<sup>191</sup> See Preface to his edition of *Kasika*, pg. 2

<sup>192</sup> Muller, Max. 1916. Vol. I. Pg. 96



sought to be established.<sup>193</sup> Since a distinction is made almost by all (especially those who recognise Charvaka as a personality or agree to give the collective name to materialists as Charvakas) between Brhaspati and Charvaka, the latter being the follower of the former,<sup>194</sup> this third explanation also is not quite satisfactory.

(d) **Lokayat.** Ambiguity in the case of 'Lokayat' is much more than in the case of the other names of Indian materialism. Rhys Davids who makes an attempt to get at an exact significance on the basis of its use made by certain Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic texts<sup>195</sup> seems to us to be misled by the ambiguity in coming to a conclusion that no trace of the philosophy called Lokayata is to be found in the extant philosophical literature, and, wherever it is, it is imaginary.<sup>196</sup> In order to prove our contention we need not deny that the word Lokayata as used by certain early Buddhistic texts, for example, Ambattha sutta<sup>197</sup> and Anguttaranikaya<sup>198</sup> (and others), does convey the sense of a study worthy of a Brahmin's learning, along with the Vedas,- a nature lore (according to Rhys Davidas) – or that a host of other such as *Sumangala Vilasini* of Buddhaghosa<sup>199</sup> *Milindapanha*,<sup>200</sup> *Abhidhana Padipika*,<sup>201</sup> *Sasanavamsa Dipika*,<sup>202</sup> *Saddaniti*,<sup>203</sup> *Vidhura Jataka*,<sup>204</sup> use the word Lokayata in the sense of Vitanda – a work of useless logical quibblings, meaningless, destructive sort of unreasonable reasoning. Our disagreement with Rhys Davids is on the point of his carrying earlier understanding of the word Lokayata as Vitanda to the later periods and thus failing to recognise the change in the meanings of the word. For the word as used in the works on philosophy of the period exterior to 6<sup>th</sup> century or 8<sup>th</sup> century A.

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<sup>193</sup> Cf. Shastri, D. R. 1930/1957. Calcutta. (Appendix), Pg. 51

<sup>194</sup> This is the view of Madhavacarya and Krishna Misra

<sup>195</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. 1899, 1910, 1919. Vol. I. Pp. 166-72

<sup>196</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. vol. I. Pg. 172

<sup>197</sup> Section V; see Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pp. 138-39

<sup>198</sup> 1, 163, see Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pp. 166

<sup>199</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pg. 169

<sup>200</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pg. 170

<sup>201</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pg. 168

<sup>202</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pg. 168

<sup>203</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pg. 168

<sup>204</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. Vol. I. Pp. 168-69

D. unmistakably conveys the sense of a materialistic system.<sup>205</sup> Rhys Davids may be 'colser to the truth' when he maintains that 'there is abundance of evidence (especially in Buddhist sources, although not wholly so) the Lokayata as a proper as a name was attached to logical and sophistic disputation before the Christian era,<sup>206</sup> but is far away from it when he does not admit the sense in which Lokayata was understand in the later centuries. Samkaracarya's use of the word in connection with Dehatmavada<sup>207</sup> (an important doctrine of Indian materialism) cannot be dismissed as referring to a mere opinion, as Rhys Davids does.<sup>208</sup> No doubt, Kumarila uses th word Lokayata in the sense of a heretic (in an abusive sense), but that it refers to materialism is not lost on Muir<sup>209</sup> when he translates the word as "materialist" while Rhys Davids fails to see it.<sup>210</sup>

### **The epistemology of the Lokayata.<sup>211</sup>**

The epistemological thought in India is centred round the question of 'Pramanas' (the sources and proofs of knowledge). We are informed by many of the accoutres of the Charvaka (Lokayata) system that it recognise only one pramana, i.e. pratyaksa (perception)<sup>212</sup> and rejects all the rest including inference (anumana) and testimony (sabda) – the two widely accepted. From this exclusive emphasis on perception – and an absolute rejection of inference and testimony – attributed to the Charvakas, it becomes very easy for the opponents (reporters of the Charvaka views) to argue that the Charvaka (Lokayatikas), who did not have any logic and could not

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<sup>205</sup> Tattvasamgraha of SantaRaksit and Saddarasana Samuccya of Haribhadra Suri are the two earilier, Buddha and Jaina works to use it so

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Schermerhorn, R. A. 1930. When Did Indian Materialism Get Its Distictive Title. In, Journal of the American Oriental Society. Vol. L. (p. 33, fn 4), Pg. 137

<sup>207</sup> See Brahma Sutra Sankara Bhasya. i, 1.2, ii, 2.2 and iii, 3.53

<sup>208</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. 1899, 1910, 1919. Dilogue of the Buddha. Three Volumes. The Sacred Books of the Buddhists and Oxford. Vol. I. Pg. 167

<sup>209</sup> Muir, *Original Sanskrit texts*, III, 2009

<sup>210</sup> Rays-Davids, T. W. R. 1899, 1910, 1919. Dilogue of the Buddha. Three Volumes. The Sacred Books of the Buddhists and Oxford. Vol. I. Pg. 171

<sup>211</sup> Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974. Materialism in Indian Thought. Pg. 41-44

<sup>212</sup> See, for example, Madhavacarya's account in Sarvadarsana Sangraha; Krisna Misra's Probodhacandrodaya; Haribhadra Suri's Saddarsanasamuccaya

maintain any positive (ontological) tenet of their own,<sup>213</sup> and who had only a negative and destructive attitude, were mere Vitandavadins (given to useless disputations, trickery and sophistry) doubting everything.<sup>214</sup> It is the ascription of such an epistemological position which has led Cowell to consider Charvaka (Lokayata) thought to be scepticism at its best and Poussin to call the Charvakas “philosophers without philosophy.”<sup>215</sup>

In our view Madhavacarya and others who have limited Charvaka epistemology to sense perception only (and exclusive) have grossly misrepresented the epistemological position of the system. Like every other materialism (materialism in general) the Charvaka system must also maintain a realistic and rationalistic empiricism, and so it does, is our contention.<sup>216</sup> Kautilya, in his *Arthashastra*, mentions Lokayata as the science of logic (anvikski).<sup>217</sup> That Manu referring to the heretic thinkers as Haitukas (the propounders of Hetusastra i.e. logic<sup>218</sup>) meant to refer to the Lokayatas (Charvakas) is clearly given out by two of his commentators, Medhatithi and Kullukabhalltta<sup>219</sup> who clearly tell us that the reference is the deniers of the next world and efficacy of and sacrifices, and logicians opposed to vedic rites (Vedavirodhi tarka vyavaharinah). The Bhagvata Purana reference to the haitukas is again a reference to the materialist heretics.<sup>220</sup> The *Mahabharata* also refers to the haitukas and describe them to be those who were learned in the Vedas, strong in conviction, hated falsehood, made gifts and sacrifices. That this reference is also to the Lokayatas is clear

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<sup>213</sup> Cf. Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1959/2006. Pg. 23. Madhava quoted in this connection.

<sup>214</sup> The Pali Texts show Charvakas to be such. See DasGupta, S. N. 1952. Vol. III, Pg. 514

<sup>215</sup> Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion, ed. James Hastings. Vol. VIII. Pg. 494 [quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishn. 1974]

<sup>216</sup> Contrast, Sinha, Jadunath. 1956. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I, Pg. 235 who, upholding the traditionally accepted view states that “the Charvakas advocate naïve realism and empiricism.”

<sup>217</sup> Kautilya *Arthashastra*, i. A.

<sup>218</sup> *Manusmriti*, ii. 11 and iv. 30, etc.

<sup>219</sup> On *Manusmriti*, iv. 30.

<sup>220</sup> *Bhagvata Purana*, xi. 18.30

from the fact that to the above descriptive is added 'who did not believe in the next world'?<sup>221</sup>

Thus the Charvakas were not averse to reason. They did not reject inference in any absolute sense. The practical utility of inference is not lost to them. When they raise an objection against inference, it is an attempt to show that not certainly but only a practical probability can be established in the case of a reasoned conclusion. This consideration of the problem of induction, moreover, is itself logical.

### **Ontology of the Lokayata<sup>222</sup>**

Consistent with their rational empiricism, the Charvakas denied the existence of all that was super-sensible, and supernatural, i.e. of God, soul (apart from body) and the other world, etc. as it could neither be perceived nor proved on ordinary inference and testimony based on the perceptible (acceptable to the Charvakas). This negative aspect of Charvaka ontology find mention in all its accounts<sup>223</sup> and has been responsible for Charvakas being named as vitandavadins<sup>224</sup> and ucchedavadins<sup>225</sup> as also the nastikas<sup>226</sup> by their opponents.

The Charvaka view on soul or consciousness especially that of its discontinuity at death (its temporary existence characterised by its being a by-product) met with severe criticism from the Buddhist who sought to maintain that there is an

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<sup>221</sup> Dasgupta, S. N. 1952. Vol. III. Pg. 530

<sup>222</sup> Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974. Pp. 46-48

<sup>223</sup> See, e.g. Madhavacarya. 1914. Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Sanskrit edn. Vasudeva Abhyamkara, Poona; English trans. Cowell and Gough, London. And Suri, Haribhadra. Saddarsanasamuccaya, published along with *Loghu Vrtti* commentary of Manibhadra, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras. etc. [Quoted in Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974.]

<sup>224</sup> See, Pali texts referred to by Rays-Davids, T. W. R. 1899. Dialogue of the Buddha. Three Volumes. The Sacred Books of the Buddhists and Oxford. Vol. I. Pp. 167-8. And Dasgupta, S. N. 1952. History of Indian Philosophy. Cambridge. Vol. III, Pg. 515, etc.

<sup>225</sup> Silanka's Sutrakrtanga quotes and referred to in Barua, B. M. 1921. A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy. Calcutta. Pp. 329 ff.

<sup>226</sup> See Sarvadarsanasamgraha, Nastikasiromani.

eternal flow of momentary conscious state;<sup>227</sup> Naiyayikas who hold that soul is a permanent substance even though conscious only occasionally;<sup>228</sup>

### **Cosmology and Axiology of the Lokayata:<sup>229</sup>**

The Charvaka holding belief in a realistic and rationalistic empiricism and admitting the existence of nothing beyond nature, naturally comes to hold, like all materialists, that the question of why to the universe is irrelevant.<sup>230</sup> We cannot and do not find any 'purpose' in the universe. Nature is indifferent to 'the will' of a Super Being whose very existence is doubted by the Charvaka 'Nature endures and exist by itself.'<sup>231</sup> We do not need anything beyond nature to explain it. Charvaka cosmology, therefore, rejects the agency of an Intelligent Being (God) as the cause of the universe. The world, according to the Charvaka, is the result of a development from the combination of the four elements in various preparations giving rise to a verity of things, objects, and beings (birds, animals and men, etc.) each having its own nature. His is a doctrine of 'Naturalism, - Svabhavavada.'<sup>232</sup>

He does not believe in the doctrine of creation, and, therefore has no need of a Creator or a Creative Force. He not only rejects the agency of God but also of 'The Unseen' (Adrsta) 'Action' (Karma), 'Fate' (Niyati), 'Time' (Kala) and 'Chance' (Yaddrccha) and replaces them all 'nature' (Svabhava).<sup>233</sup> It is the 'internal go' of matter itself that explains the coming into being and passing into-being of things, according to him.

From this over-all position legitimately follows is surely different from which legitimately follows is surely different from what has been depicted in its

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<sup>227</sup> See Santaraksita, *Tattvasam graham*, op cit. (Pg. 25 fn 2).

<sup>228</sup> See Jyanta's *Nyaya Manjari*, Pps. 439-41, 467-68, 470-73, etc.

<sup>229</sup> Mittal, Kewal Krishan. 1974. Ps. 51-58

<sup>230</sup> For general materialistic axiology, see *supra* Chapter I

<sup>231</sup> Cf. Roy Woods Sellary. 1944. *Reformed Materialism and Intrisnic Edurance*. In. *Philosophical Review*. (Pg. 50 fn 4.) Pp. 359 ff.

<sup>232</sup> For Savbhavavada, see *Indian Philosophical Studies* by M. Hiriyanna. Pp. 71-77.

<sup>233</sup> The various causes are referred to the *Svetasvatara Upanisad*, 1.2. cf. *Conception of Matter According to Nayaya Vaisesika* by Umesh Mishra. Pp. 237-38.

misrepresented accounts. Happiness, no doubt still remains the ideal which ought, however, to be interpreted to mean 'happiness of the whole life-time' as opposed to the pleasure of the moment. The ideal, the Charvaka seems to hold must be defined with reference to human desires and in having such a view he is not maintaining something absolutely different from his condemning and maligning opponents.<sup>234</sup> Where however, he differs from some of his opponents is that there are objects of desire other than happiness in the ultimate analysis.<sup>235</sup> Happiness, though desired by all is not easy of attainment. Pleasure we find mixed up with pain. Mainly effort is required to achieve the ideal. One ought to strive for it in the face of difficulties. Since wealth is a means to get happiness, one should also make endeavour to earn wealth.

### **Relation Between Pragmatism and Utilitarianism**

There is an intimate relation between pragmatism and materialism. Pragmatism can be summarized by the phrase 'whatever works, is likely to be true', because reality changes, "whatever works" will also change – thus truth must also be changeable and no one can claim to possess any final or ultimate truth. It is mainly a method in which the truth of a proposition is measured by its correspondence with experimental results and by its practical outcome. Pragmatism approaches is bound in everyday practice. This philosophy is similar and near to materialism which we saw in last chapter. Here materialism believes in matter and opposed to philosophical dualism or idealism and, in general, to belief in God. And mental processes are entirely determined by physical process. That is accepted by both western and Indian. In the Indian materialism thought, Charvaka says, pleasure is the highest good of life. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. .... the present is all that we have thus let us make the most of it. Here similarity between two is that both are talking about utility and workability. For pragmatism whatever works is likely to be true and

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<sup>234</sup> "Value" itself is spoken of as "object of desire" (Ista). Cf. M. Hiriyanna (on Hedonism), *Philosophical Studies* by M. Hiriyanna. Pp. 127 ff.

<sup>235</sup> Many of his opponents agree with him even in this. See, for example, Uddyotakara, *Nayayavartika*, (Benaras ed.), p. 13. Cf. also Siddhanta Mukhavall, Pg. 467. *Vedanta Paribhasa*, viii, etc.

materialism opposed to dualism and God. Materialism emphasises on workability like pragmatism. Materialism also says that matter is important because matter is only working. But there are some differences also, like for pragmatism whatever work is likely to be true means if faith in God is working than it is true but for materialism God is not true because faith God is not a material thing. But on the ground of practical outcome both are same as both are talking and emphasise on worldly approaches that are practical approaches of society and individual about their behaviour in their real lives.

### **Conclusion**

M. N. Roy says that Lokayata was one of the greatest achievements of pure thought and it is a noble thought. In the beginning, there could be conjectures and working hypothesis. The rejection of the dogma that the world was produced and governed by super-natural, inscrutable and knowledge forces opened an era of free enquiry which was pregnant of unlimited possibilities. Human mind declared its independence of the bogeys of superstition set up by the ignorance of its own infancy.

According to this material culture aspects of western thoughts material culture is 'those aspects of culture which governs the product and use of artefacts; and the material product of artefacts actually product by society.

Debate about the reference of the term had focused on whether the objects or the ideas and social arrangements associated with the objects should be central. However, the study of material culture is bound to be concerned with the artefacts produced by a society. An important part of sociology and social anthropology, the study of material culture is even more central in Archaeology, given that is has little to study but artefacts.

In philosophical sense materialism is 'the doctrine that nothing that is not 'matter'. The doctrine that 'matter' is primary and thought or consciousness is secondary.

Material philosopher says that mental process are entirely determined by physical process (e,g,) that 'making up one's mind,' while it is a real process that can be introspected, is caused by bodily process, its apparent consequences also really following from the bodily causes. Thought and wished influence an individual's life, but that the course of history is determined by the interaction of masses of people and masses of material things, in such a way as to be predictable without reference to the "higher" processes of thought and will.

Materialism is thus opposed to philosophical dualism or idealism and, in general, to belief in God, in disembodied spirits, in free will, etc. Materialistic views insight upon setting questions by reference to public observation and not to private intuitions. Since this is a maxim which scientists must profess within the limits of their special inquiries, it is natural that philosophers which attached that highest importance to science should lean toward materialism. But none of the great empiricists have been satisfied (at least for long) with systematic materialism.

Now I would like to discuss the Indian Materialistic thoughts.

Almost all the recent studies in Indian thought have emphasized its idealistic and spiritualistic aspects to the utter neglect of its materialistic ones. Of course, that Indian thought is entirely, popular in philosophical circles, that Indian thought is entirely spiritual in outlook and character – a view which merely ignores materialism as a vital element in the traditional philosophies of our country.

Some modern scholars – Indian as well as Western – have created an impression that Indian thought is pre-eminently spiritual or idealistic in its outlook and character. It is difficult to see serious attempt to understand Indian materialism. It is to this prejudice, again, that one may trace the neglect of the study of materialism in Indian thought. As the prejudice has been widespread among the scholars, both ancient as well as modern, there are no much serious attempt to make an impartial study of Indian materialism (Charvaka or Lokayata), and impact on the other schools. Materialism has generally been neglected. Even an occasional mention of it is meant to condemn and malign it.



In India also, the dissatisfaction with the Vedic Natural Religion gave to speculations about the origin of materialistic thought.

The Vedanta has come to be accepted as the most representative and authoritative school of ancient Indian philosophy. As its name implies, its claim to contain all the wisdom of the Vedas. But as a matter of fact, Vedanta is a very highly metaphysical system of theology. As such it goes beyond the limits of a theistic religion, and represents a very highly developed form of pantheism. Pantheism is only inverted materialism.

The spiritual revolt represented by the Indian materialists eventually culminated in the rise of Buddhism which all but liquidated the Vedic Vedas. The Vedanta Sutra were composed for combating Buddhism which all but liquidated the Vedic natural religion and freed India from non-materialistic domination for several hundred years. Internal evidence proves that the Vedanta Sutra were composed for combating Buddhism.

The Charvaks laughed at the notion that Vedas were divinely revealed truth; they held that truths can never be divinely revealed; they held that truth can never be known except through the senses. Therefore, the idea of soul is a delusion. The Charvaks thus anticipated the modern philosophical thought of ultra-empiricism.

Generally speaking the larger the brain in relation to the rest of the body, the more the intelligence. Lokayat says that Mind is only a form or product of the body. The ultimate reality is matter. Consciousness is a function of the body. Dakshinaraman Shastri says that the Lokayat system does not admit the existence of *Karmaphala* or the consequence of good or evil actions. The experience of pleasure and pain comes by chance. Nature is all powerful. Moreover, recognition proves the identity of the body through all its changing states.

'Pleasure is the highest good of human life. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present. To sacrifice the present to the future is unwarranted and perilous. The present is ours. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful.

D. P. Chattopadhyaya says that among the opponent of Indian idealism, the Lokayatas are the only philosophers to call for a total rejection of the idealist view of soul and its salvation. With their characteristic simplicity they declare that all talk of liberation – like that of heaven and of the transmigration soul – is a fiction. There is nothing called heaven, nothing called liberation and there is no soul migration to the other world. Further he emphasised that rejecting thus the conception of the soul, the Lokayatas talk of enjoying life rather than evading it. While the others view life as only a painful prelude to eternity, the Lokayatas are the only Indian philosophers to insist on making “the most of our brief lives as human animal”.

Consistent with their rational empiricism, the Charvakas denied the existence of all that was super-sensible, and supernatural, i.e. of God, soul (apart from body) and the other world, etc. as it could neither be perceived nor proved on ordinary inference and testimony based on the perceptible (acceptable to the Charvakas).

At the concluding remark I would like to say that western thought of material aspect says that in real life matter is matter. It is human body which is doing and there is nothing called any supernatural power. It rejects the existence of God and idealism. On the other hand both Indian and western make image of India as a spiritual country where everyone believing in God and living an ‘ideal’ life. And it is taboo to talk about material aspects of Indian culture and thoughts. But in all belief system of India have material thoughts. But truth is that there are no adequate serious attempt to study and research on this field. I would also like to say that those who disagree with material thought whether it is western or Indian are in real life cannot live like what we know as spiritual. I know it need further deep research, but in my best scholarly knowledge, nothing exist without material reference and translate well get into materialist expression.

We also had seen that that the philosophy of pragmatism and materialism is related with each other, with their own fundamental philosophical differences. Pragmatism emphasised that whatever work is likely to be true has practical consequences. On the other hand materialism also emphasised on practical

consequences. For both working is important. From sociological point of view it is important because both are talking about practical worldly conduct by society and individual.

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### **Conclusion**

In this paper I deal with social and ethical philosophy of life known as pragmatism. All social philosophy which I deal here saying about this world, about real world, and not about ideals, God, or super natural powers. All are talking about what we behave in daily real life. It is true for all society and individuals, whether they believe in this philosophy or not. It is a human basic nature that they behave to achieve goals. Yes there is society, norms and values and situation which all have to follow but both society and individual try to maximise their own interests, try to more gain achievements. These kind of views exist in both Indian and western social philosophy. But, about Indian philosophy and thought it was both Indian and western responsible to make image of India, that Indian society, philosophy and thoughts are non materialistic and spiritual.

In this study we found that In Indian materialistic thought have no need to learn lesson from western. Indian materialistic social philosophy is much older than that but it is hidden because of false creation of idea of India and it is like a taboo to talk on this. Academic world especially Indian academic world did not paid proper attention to study and research in this field as I come to know by some work like by Kewal Krishna Mittal.

## **Objectives**

Objective of this study was to find out pragmatic theories in social sciences which deal with social and individual behaviour in real life. To full fill this purpose to analyse pragmatism, utilitarianism and materialism. All these three deal with social and individual behaviour which shows, 'whatever works is likely true', 'only utility is works and existing in society', and 'material aspects is every things; everything is on earth nothing after death' and this was also the objective of this paper. This study is to relate utilitarian and materialism with pragmatism.

## **Major Findings**

Society and individual is rational about their goal. And every time they try to optimise their achievements, goals and utilities. In society only those things exist which is working, utility and have a material expression or can be translate into material expression. Yes, there are spirituality, religion, beliefs and emotions but ultimately that must have to workable, utility and material aspects.

Topic wise major finding of this study is as follow, which will give a brief insight of theoretical aspects above major findings. These topic wise major findings give a different aspect of thoughts and philosophy of social and individual action and though. But these major findings have their own limitations because all study, analysis and conclusion are based on writings of original thinkers and commentary on that. But I did not verify it empirically in society which is a basic characteristic of sociology and its research methodology. So these findings are only theoretically and which is itself based on theory.

## **Pragmatic View of Society**

Pragmatism can be summarized by the phrase "whatever works, is likely true." Because reality changes, "whatever works" will also change – thus truth must also be changeable and no one can claim to posses any final or ultimate truth.

Pragmatism is averse to all metaphysical, moral, and social ideals that claim priority over the solution to practical problems.

For Peirce, pragmatism was primarily an investigation of the proper methods of procedure in the natural sciences, a reductive doctrine equating the meaning of theoretical terms with their impact upon experience. By contrast, James moved in a much more practical and moralistic direction. The virtues of belief, including truth, become in his view matter of their efficiency in enabling a person to cope with problems of living. The vital good of a belief in one's whole life became its justification. James could thus write: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactory, in the widest sense of the word it is 'true'."

### **Utilitarian View of Society**

Utilitarianism is an effort to provide an answer to the practical question "What ought a man to do?" Its answer is that he ought to act so as to produce the best consequences possible. Here main question why human behave in particular way? Human always think the goal and path to achieve that goal. Utilitarianism is a philosophical school of thought which holds that utility entails the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Utilitarianism therefore, implies a model of social action in which individuals rationally pursue their own self-interests, with society being no more than the aggregation in individuals brought together in the realization of their individual goals. Utilitarians have position that merit of action must be determined by reference to their consequences.

Utilitarianism also differs from ethical theories that make the rightness or wrongness of an act dependent upon the motive of the agent; for, according to the Utilitarian, it is possible for the right thing to be done from a bad motive. According to Mill, acts should be classified as morally right or wrong only if the consequences are of such significance that a person would wish to see the agent compelled, not merely persuaded and exhorted, to act in the preferred manner.

## **Materialistic View of Society**

Materialism is 'those aspects of culture which governs the product and use of artefact; the material products of artefacts actually produced by society.' This is a doctrine that nothing that is not 'matter'. The doctrine that 'matter' is primary and thought or consciousness is secondary. Materialism is thus opposed to philosophical dualism or idealism and, in general, to belief in God, in disembodied spirits, in free will, etc. Materialistic views insight upon setting questions by reference to public observation and not to private intuitions.

At Indian front almost all the recent studies in Indian thought have emphasized its idealistic and spiritualistic aspects to the utter neglect of its materialistic ones. I tried to bring the material aspects of Indian thoughts and philosophy. In doing so, I assume that Indian thought is as variegated as is our actual socio-cultural life. This, of course, that Indian thought is entirely, popular in philosophical circles, that Indian thought is entirely spiritual in outlook and character – a view which merely ignores materialism as a vital element in the traditional philosophies of our country.

Nihilism was the ideology of the dissolution of antique society in India. It was revolutionary in the sense that it was a might revolt against Vedic priest craft; but as a school of philosophical thought, it was sterile. Nevertheless, it was so powerful that subsequently it very greatly influenced Buddhist philosophy. The nihilist must have been very powerful, because all the philosophical schools were anxious for disputing the nihilist doctrine. The materialist schools of Indian philosophy represented currents of thought evidently stimulated by nihilism.

Later on materialist system of thoughts developed in India in Shankhya and Upanishads. The Vedanta has come to be accepted as the most representative and authoritative school of ancient Indian philosophy. And for some scholar it is matter of fact that Vedanta is a very highly metaphysical system of theology.

Lokayata says pleasure is the highest goods of human life. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present. To sacrifice the



present to the future is unwarranted and perilous. The present is ours. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all that we have let us make the most of it. With this credo the Lokayatikas of that remote period of Indian history preached and practiced the theory of the extreme form of hedonism, according to which sensual is the only end of human life. Among the opponent of Indian idealism, the Lokayatas are the only philosophers to call for total rejection of the idealist view of soul and its salvation. While the others view life as only a painful prelude to eternity, the Lokayatas are the only Indian philosophers to insist on making “the most of our brief lives as human animal”. Lokayatas talk of enjoying life rather than evading it.

### **Relation Between Pragmatism, Utilitarianism and Materialism**

All these three social philosophy have some similarities and differences as we have seen at the end of all chapters. Pragmatism is concerned with results, utilitarian with usefulness.

Utilitarianism says, “Whatever works is what good.” William James shows link between pragmatism and utilitarianism in these words. “The practical values of true ideas is primary derived from the practical importance of their objects to us you say of an extra truth either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful'.” Both pragmatism and utilitarianism is emphasis on workability and practicality. On the other hand materialism emphasised also on practical consequences.

### **Academic and Social Contributions; and Further Research**

This is popular belief that Indian social thoughts, philosophy and life are spiritual and devotional. Some modern scholars – Indian as well as Western – have created an impression that Indian thought is pre-eminently spiritual or idealistic in its outlook and character. It is difficult to see serious attempt to understand Indian materialism. It is to this prejudice, again, that one may trace the neglect of the study of materialism in Indian thought. As the prejudice has been widespread among the

scholars, both ancient as well as modern, there are no much serious attempt to make an impartial study of Indian materialism (Carvaka or Lokayata), and impact on the other schools. Materialism has generally been neglected. Even an occasional mention of it is meant to condemn and malign it.

Thus at first impact might be that my reader will think positive to research on this aspect of Indian society, thoughts and philosophy. It is also important that we assume that western society is materialistic and treating them also likes that. We also reading western aspects of worldly theories but we not implying it on Indian society or see on that perspective because for mainstream universities, academics and public domain discourse it have status like this is 'prejudice' to see Indian society in this way. Because for them this theory developed for 'them' and so this theory should implement for 'them' only.

At the social level if it reaches up to that than I think reader must take it seriously. It should be happy moment that if people will know that every aspect of Indian society, thoughts and philosophy. We are spiritual, but materialistic too.

I believe that this study will take in critical way. If this is criticised that this study presented Indian society in wrong way than, this study will give a chance to make them strong argument and if it take as another aspect of India than it will give a 'ideal type' to future researcher. In both situations it will give chance to both to prove themselves by stronger arguments.

I believe that this subject needs further deep study and research to know Indian society in better and deep way.

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