

**AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE  
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS  
1949 - 1959**

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1949 - 1959**

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**P R E F A C E**

## PREFACE

Foreign policy is the outcome of the interaction of various elements in a process within the framework of an institutional structure. Perception of an objective foreign policy situation alone does not determine foreign policy. It is nonetheless a very important element and enters into the making of foreign policy.

The emergence of Sino-Soviet schism in the late 'fifties can be regarded as one of the most interesting developments in international relations. It had an enormous influence on the course of international affairs. It contributed to the appearance of a new international system based on multipolarity rather than a bipolarity of the international power structure. Yugoslavia had also broken free of the Soviet domination but it did not prove to be of as great importance as the defiance of the Soviet Union by China as the latter was far too big and important.

The first signs of Sino-Soviet differences appeared in the late 'fifties. Nevertheless, strain in the relations between the two powers had already appeared from time to time. The interests of the two were not identical. An attempt has been made here to analyze how the United States perceived the relationship between the two giants of the Communist world. Although the Sino-Soviet relations constitute the main theme of the work, this is much more an exercise in understanding American foreign policy in an area where there was uncertainty.

The author worked in the libraries in India as well as the United States. A four-month visit to the United States was made possible by a field-trip grant of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. It enabled the author to work in the various American libraries like the Library of Congress and libraries of Georgetown University, Council on Foreign Relations, Columbia University, Brookings Institution and so on. He also had the opportunity to meet eminent scholars in the field and had discussions with them.

The thesis has been written under the supervision of Professor B.K. Shrivastava of the American Studies Division at the School of International Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University. I owe an immense debt of gratitude to him not merely for his expert guidance right from the time of selection of the topic to the completion of the work, but also for such assistance and cooperation at human level without which the completion of this work would have been a much more difficult task. I also express my gratitude to Professor M.S.Venkataramani, Head of the Centre for American and West European Studies at the School, for his encouragement and valuable suggestions from time to time. I am highly grateful to Miss Indira Kaul for her consistent help and encouragement at every stage.

My sincere thanks are due to the staff of the Library of the Indian Council of World Affairs, the American Library, the Parliament Library, the Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, the Library of Congress and the Library of the Council on Foreign Relations for their cooperation and assistance. In this connection I wish to record in particular the assistance

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**Chapter I**

**THE GENESIS : 1919 - OCTOBER 1949**



## Chapter I

### THE GENESIS : 1919 - OCTOBER 1949

The most important goal of a state is its security -- security from an external as well as an internal threat. But who defines a threat? Theoretically it is the decision-makers who define a threat. However, these decision-makers are the product of and operate within a given socio-economic and political system. An effort will be made here to analyze how the American policy makers viewed the emergence of the Soviet Union as a threat to their country's security. It was the appearance of an alternate system which really constituted the threat as the "elective monarchy" in Poland had posed an ideological challenge to the monarchies of Europe in an earlier period.<sup>1</sup> Later, Communist China was viewed with the same perspective.

The perception of threat has its psycho-sociological dimensions. In general, an individual shares and represents the social and political values of the society he lives in. An American psychologist, Joseph de Rivera, has analysed in great detail the psychological compulsions of an American decision-maker in a given situation. According to him in a given situation

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1 The system of elective monarchy in Poland caused anxiety to the European Powers in the eighteenth century. The constant interference of the Powers with the royal elections often led to a chaotic political situation. This in its turn led to anarchy paving the way for the first partition of Poland between Russia and Prussia in 1772. Subsequently the Poles changed their constitution and made it a hereditary constitutional monarchy. Even then the constitutional reforms were not tolerated by the Powers and they led to further partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. For details, see H.A.L. Fisher, A History of Europe: From the Beginning of the 18th Century to 1935 (London, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 804-10, 910-11.

a decision-maker has a few choices available to him. How does he choose from these different choices? De Rivera says that he opts for that which "does not contradict one's other beliefs"<sup>2</sup>. He illustrated his argument by taking an example from the Korean war. In early June 1950, the US Ambassador to South Korea, John J. Muccio, cabled the State Department in Washington about a heavy North Korean military build-up along the 38th parallel. The Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, to whom the cable was referred, ignored it. De Rivera argued that the Assistant Secretary interpreted the Ambassador's cable as a manoeuvre in support of his earlier request for more military assistance to South Korea and so it was ignored. According to him, the other interpretation could be that it was common belief in Washington that North Korea was a puppet of the Soviet Union and since the Soviet Union did not have a nuclear capability they would not dare to launch an attack. Under both the "systems of belief"<sup>3</sup> a response to the cable was not called for.

The relationship between the decision-makers and the dominant belief system is not a one-way street. If they are influenced by the social beliefs, they in turn influence that belief system. Since the foreign policy of a country is profoundly influenced by a sense of threat to the established order of that country, it becomes imperative on the part of the ruling elites to inform and educate the public opinion about the gravity of the

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2 Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), p. 20.

3 Ibid., pp. 19-21.

threat. A systematic and constant communication exists between the people in power and the masses who have raised them to power.<sup>4</sup> Since the political elites owe their existence to popular support, they tend to represent the feelings of the masses and the masses on their part continue to be influenced by their leaders. The interdependence between the two is so basic that it often becomes difficult to identify their relative influence on each other.<sup>5</sup> In a democracy, as a result, either the opinions of the public and the ruling elites converge into one composite national policy or the one ruling elite is replaced by the other under popular pressure or the public opinion itself is made to share the views of the ruling elite or the public opinion remains divided leading to a confusion in the policy.

The differences between the capitalist and Communist systems indeed are vital and fundamental. And yet one can discern commonalty of the problem which the decision-makers must confront. In order to successfully meet the threat to the system which they perceive, they must ensure the support of the people for their policies. They must prepare the people to cheerfully bear the cost of their decision. The people will be willing to make this sacrifice duly if they share the decision-makers' perception

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4 For a detailed study of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy see Harwood L. Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation, and Role (Princeton, N.J., 1965), pp. 291-321.

5 Gabriel Almond has argued that very often the government first takes a decision and subsequently public opinion supporting that decision is built up. See Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), p. 105.

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of the threat. In a democratic society the popular perception of the threat can force the government to adopt a policy posture. In a totalitarian society the people are unlikely to force the policy makers to accept their perception of a threat. However, within both the systems it is possible for the leadership to convince people through subtle manipulation of the sources of information regarding the existence and the nature of a threat.<sup>6</sup> Once the perception of the leadership and of the people merge together, a national consensus on foreign policy emerges making foreign policy more effective.

The government of any country is thus primarily interested in the preservation of its own system and counters the challenge. It identifies the source of the challenge as the enemy. Then it goes on to project the image of the enemy as opposed to the values cherished by the public in the country. Needless to say that the projected image of the "enemy" is far from the reality. The image is sustained and strengthened by the intellectual establishment. After a time the entire country comes to believe the reality of the image of the enemy which it itself created. As the nature of threat posed by the enemy changes, the image of the enemy also changes.

#### EMERGENCE OF THE SOVIET THREAT

How a country develops the enemy image of another country,

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6 For how the government uses its machinery to influence the public opinion see Harold D. Lasswell, "Political Power and Democratic Values", in Arthur Kornhauser, ed., Problems of Power in American Democracy (Detroit, 1957), pp. 57-82. See also C. Wright Mills, "The Power Elite: Military, Economic, and Political", in *ibid.*, pp. 145-72; Richard S. Lambert, Propaganda (London, 1938), pp. 97-104.

perceived as a threat to itself, is best illustrated by the American behaviour at the time of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917. The revolution by proclaiming its fundamental opposition to private property and adherence to the cause of world-wide revolution to overthrow capitalism challenged the existing state system rooted in capitalism. The United States too viewed the revolution as posing a serious problem. So long the Russian revolution appeared to be within the liberal-democratic framework, it was appreciated by the United States. During the rebellion of 1905 in Russia, called the Grand Rehearsal of the October revolution by Lenin, the United States seemed sympathetic to it. The Americans were increasingly getting inclined to echo Edwin Markham's poem : "Russia Arise !", which was published in 1905. They also rejoiced in the March Revolution of 1917 thinking that democracy had replaced an autocracy. At that time the world was in the midst of a great war and the dawn of democracy in Russia was considered as a significant addition to the strength of the democracies which were fighting the Great War against the autocracies. American businessmen, bankers and missionaries all fondly hoped that vast opportunities would open for their operations in new Russia. David R. Francis, the American ambassador to Russia, informed Washington that there were better prospects of the revolutionary provisional government being a more powerful ally. President Woodrow Wilson sent a special mission to Russia under the leadership of the veteran diplomat

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7 Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia : Russian - American Relations from Early Times to Our Day* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1950), p. 208.

Elihu Root. Root was a conservative Republican and was suspicious of the radical and liberal elements in Russia. The Root mission did not bring back a clear-cut picture of the developments that were taking place there. The unabated American enthusiasm for the provisional government however was reflected in the Congressional pressure for granting a huge loan of \$ 187 million to Russia.<sup>8</sup> But the American attitude underwent a sea change when the Bolshevik revolution instead of being satisfied with the Western style democratic reform, overturned the entire socio-political and economic system of Russia. This to the American mind posed a serious challenge to the American values. The revolution was opposed to everything that America stood for and championed. All possible efforts were made to meet this ideological challenge.

The coming to power of the Communists in Russia came as a shock to the United States. The negation of the concept of private property and denunciation of religion invited strong criticism. The New York Tribune characterized the Bolsheviks as "embittered paranoiac adventurers", while a New York Times correspondent compared the Russian situation with "nightmare in a lunatic asylum".<sup>9</sup> George Kennan, who had supported the March Revolution, now called the Bolsheviks a "usurping gang". He recommended military intervention to end the Red despotism. Perhaps the only section of the Press which seemed to be sympathetic to the Revolution was the Hearst chain but it also eventually became a staunch critic of the Russian Communists. The Houston Chronicle commented: "The Bolsheviks are as dangerous

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8 Ibid., pp. 233-4.

9 Ibid., p. 235.

to organized government as are the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs,  
 and probably more so."<sup>10</sup> The Dexter (Missouri) Statesman said:  
 "Bolshevism is merely Czarism in overalls."<sup>11</sup>

The Americans had fondly hoped that the revolutionary  
 upsurge in Russia was a passing phase.<sup>12</sup> They believed that once  
 the initial joy of testing freedom would fade out, a mature  
 democracy would be ushered. A segment of public interpreted it  
 as a conspiracy hatched by the German High Command.<sup>13</sup> The American  
 Press was partly responsible for encouraging these misconceptions.  
 Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz have pointed out how the New York  
Times moved by its own wish reported the probable fall of the  
 Bolsheviks at least ninety-one times during the two years between  
 November 1917 and November 1919.<sup>14</sup> Except for a few liberal  
 journals like the Nation and the New Republic, the American Press  
 in general was hostile to the Bolsheviks. Bolshevism was given  
 such epithets as "despotism by the dregs", or "Tzarism upside  
 down", and so on. Many found Ivan the Terrible less terrible  
 than the Bolsheviks. Complete misunderstanding of the Bolshevik  
 ideology, or in other words the Communist ideology, led to such  
 misreportings that there was the "nationalization of women" in  
 Communist Russia and that there was "the Bureau of Free Love", etc.<sup>15</sup>

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10 Ibid., pp. 234-5.

11 Ibid., p. 239.

12 It is interesting that similar wishful thinking was current  
 in America when China became Communist in 1949.

13 Bailey, n. 7, p. 236.

14 Ibid., pp. 236-7.

15 Ibid., p. 247.

The New York World called the Communist Russia as "the Judas of the Nations"<sup>16</sup>.

Not only did the revolution pose a threat to the capitalist order, but also in its immediate context it was a challenge to the Allies. The Allies were afraid that if Russia withdrew from the war the power of Germany and Austria-Hungary would be considerably augmented as the latter would not have to bother for their eastern fronts. In March 1918, the Bolsheviki signed the treaty of Brest Litovsk with Germany which marked the Russian withdrawal from the First World War. At this the Raleigh (North Carolina) News and Observer jibed: "Trotsky might get the ignoble peace prize"<sup>17</sup>. The Kansas City Star wrote: "Well, if Russia is lost to us, all right. We never did want to make the world safe for the Bolshevik kind of democracy anyway."<sup>18</sup> The American official reaction to this development was very cautious. President Wilson did not approve of the Russo-German peace treaty but at the same time, he did not comment on it.<sup>19</sup> The American policy was to wait and watch before taking a specific stand. When the French Government suggested that the United States should join in a strong protest against the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Assistant Secretary Frank L. Polk replied that:

... owing to the present rapidly changing and uncertain conditions in Russia, the Government of the United States, although

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16 Ibid., p. 250.

17 Ibid., p. 239.

18 Ibid., pp. 239-40.

19 See George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, N.J., 1956), vol. 1, pp. 372-7.



according in principle with the views outlined in the suggested protest, would prefer, for the present, to abstain from joining in the publication of the proposed declaration. 20

Obsessed by the radicalism which the Bolsheviks were supposed to represent the US Government decided neither to recognize nor to have any dealings with the Bolsheviks. This attitude of the Government was endorsed by the American public as well.<sup>21</sup> This, however, did not mean a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Moscow. On the contrary, the United States tended to assist the counter-revolutionary forces operating in Russia against the Bolsheviks (Reds versus Whites). From all the sides the Bolsheviks were facing military challenges. In the east (Siberia) west and south, the White army under Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin and General Yudenich respectively were increasing their strength to overthrow the Bolsheviks.<sup>22</sup>

The US intervention in Russia during these years might have been a part of the general strategy against the Germans yet it was primarily motivated to overthrow the Communists. Herbert Hoover later on called it as the "Second American Expeditionary Force to Save Europe".<sup>23</sup> The forces of Kolchak were assisted by the United States on the understanding that the former would work for the freedom of the Russians from the

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20 Ibid., p. 375.

21 Bailey, n. 7, p. 240.

22 Ibid., p. 241.

23 Lloyd C. Gardner, "American Foreign Policy 1900-1921: A Second Look at the Realist Critique of American Diplomacy" in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York, 1968), p. 225.

Bolsheviks and recognize the foreign debts. American official position was expressed by the Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby in the following words:

The United States maintains unimpaired its faith in the Russian people, in their high character and their future. That they will overcome the existing anarchy, suffering, and destruction we do not entertain the slightest doubt. The distressing character of Russia's transition has many historical parallels, and the United States is confident that restored, free, and united Russia will again take a leading place in the world, joining with the other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice. 24

President Wilson came to believe that the Bolsheviks were no less tyrants than the Czars and pursued a policy of waging an economic war by clamping an embargo. 25

The Wilson Administration did not view the new Soviet Government as representative. And as he had done in the case of the Government of Mexico earlier, he refused to recognize the Soviet Government. 26

The period of great labour unrest which followed the end of the First world war had alarmed the business and other conservative elements in America. The "progressive era" in American history had

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24 See Paul V. Harper, ed., The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper: 1902-1941 (Chicago, 1965), p. 132.

25 Bailey, n. 7, p. 246.

26 In November 1910, a revolution had broken out in Mexico under the leadership of Francisco I. Madero, a democratic reformer. Madero, however, was assassinated on 22 February 1912 by the agents of the reactionary General Victoriano Huerta, who seized power and held it amid revolutionary upheaval. When Wilson became President, he followed a policy of cooperation with only such governments that rested upon the undoubted consent of the governed. For a detailed study of these events, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, N.J., 1956), pp. 348-92.

come to an end and the country was swinging to the right. The revolution in Russia and the initial policy of the revolutionary government in supporting the revolutionary movements in Europe and the birth of the Communist party within the United States led to the brutal suppression of civil liberties and trade union movement.<sup>27</sup> Known as "Red Scare", it was in many ways a precursor of "McCarthyism" of the fifties. The Red Scare represented a paranoia which has recurred in American history. It no doubt derived a measure of support and sustenance from the fear of the Bolshevik revolution.

Some explanation of the Red Scare has been offered by Walter Lippmann. In 1922 Lippmann wrote in his work Public Opinion that normally human behaviour is guided by "the pictures in our heads".<sup>28</sup> "At the core of every moral code", he wrote, "there is a picture of human nature, a map of the universe, and a version of history."<sup>29</sup> This results in myths which people religiously believe. Lippmann wrote:

What a myth never contains is the critical power to separate its truths from its errors. For that power comes only by realizing that no human opinion, whatever its supposed origin, is too exalted for the test of evidence, that every opinion is only somebody's opinion. And if you ask why the test of evidence is preferable to any other, there is no answer unless you are willing to use the test in order to test it. 30

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27 For a detailed account of these events, see Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New York, 1957), pp. 270-302; William Z. Foster, History of the Communist Party of the United States (New York, 1952), pp. 196-210.

28 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1956), Fifteenth Printing, pp. 3-32.

29 Ibid., p. 122.

30 Ibid., p. 123.

He further argued that the mental image of the event is the only source of feeling which people have about events of which they have no experience.<sup>31</sup> He thus argued that human images profoundly influenced the human perception and correspondingly the course of events. This applied without any exception to all societies. Deeply influenced by the revolution in Russia, Lippmann argued that "the justification by the Bolshevik propagandist of the dictatorship, espionage, and the terror, because 'every state is an apparatus of violence' is an historical judgment, the truth of which is by no means self-evident to a non-communist."<sup>32</sup>

The Russian revolution represented everything that the Americans did not approve of. To the Americans free enterprise, right to property, freedom of expression and other fundamental rights are inseparable elements of human existence. Since we construct the reality in which we operate the Americans perceived the Russian revolution as a serious threat. Seen from this perspective, any international conflict would also appear to be a psychological conflict -- a conflict between different "belief systems". In this context, it has been suggested that decision-makers act not on the basis of the existing reality<sup>33</sup> but often of their "image" of the reality. When a nation perceives another as a threat then there will be a very high probability that the national image will be distorted and then these distortions will become

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31 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

32 Ibid., p. 122.

33 As states provide facts to suit their own interests, any perception of reality can neither be completely objective nor universally acceptable.

stereotyped. A student of international relations, Ole Holsti, has accordingly asserted that "international conflict frequently is not between states, but rather between distorted images of states".<sup>34</sup> Kenneth Boulding, an internationally known economist, has stated: "The national image, however, is the last great stronghold of unsophistication.... Nations are divided into 'good' and 'bad' -- the enemy is all bad, one's own nation is of spotless virtue."<sup>35</sup> Every society sees itself as the embodiment of virtues and its cause as always just. An American psychologist while sojourning in the Soviet Union found a curious similarity between the American and Soviet images about each other. He<sup>36</sup> called this phenomenon "a mirror image".

#### FEAR OF COMMUNISM RECEDES

The intense fear psychosis which had gripped the United

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- 34 Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images : A Case Study", Journal of Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbor, Mich.), vol. 6, September 1962, p. 244.
- 35 Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 3, June 1959, p. 131. See also Charles E. Osgood, "An Analysis of the Cold War Mentality", Journal of Social Issues, vol. 17, no. 2, 1961, pp. 13-14; Noam Choamsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York, 1969), pp. 31-33.
- 36 Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet American Relations; A Social Psychologists Report", Journal of Social Issues, vol. 17, no. 2, 1961, p. 46. Cited in Leslie Kirby Adler, "The Red Image : American Attitudes Toward Communism in the Cold War Era" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1970), p. 7.

States from 1918 to 1920 gradually subsided.<sup>37</sup> Although during the Harding Administration, the United States continued the Wilsonian policy of non-recognition and spurned the Soviet overtures for the establishment of diplomatic relations, yet a softer line towards it was emerging. The United States interpreted the New Economic Policy, launched by Lenin in 1921, as a failure of communism and a prelude to return to capitalism. During the Russian famine of 1921 many Americans thought that since the Russians were coming back to the fold of capitalism and democracy the United States should take this opportunity of sending relief materials and speed up the process. Eventually an estimated \$ 66,300,000 of American aid was given to the Soviet Union.<sup>38</sup> It should also be noted that it was a period of boom in American economy and the challenge posed by the Soviet communism did not seem to be very serious. In passing it may be added here that when the Communist Party of China was established in 1921 under the guidance of the Soviet Union and worked under its direction in the twenties, it aroused no interest. After Lenin's death in 1924, American anxiety about Communist challenge further

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37 On this point Holsti's argument is relevant. He writes: "... while national images perform an important function in the cognitive process, they may also become dysfunctional. Unless they coincide in some way with commonly-perceived reality, decisions based on these images are not likely to fulfill expectations. Erroneous images may also prove to have a distorting effect by encouraging the reinterpretation of information that does not fit the image; this is most probable with rigid 'models' such as 'totalitarian communism' or 'monopolistic capitalism' which exclude the very types of information that might lead to a modification of models themselves." See Holsti, n. 34, p. 246.

38 Bailey, n. 7, pp. 251-6.

diminished. Lenin's death was widely greeted in America and Stalin's takeover was considered as a drift to moderation.<sup>39</sup>

What the United States wanted during the twenties was to ensure a universal "Open Door". It wanted to ensure access to raw materials and markets and opportunities for investment. Secretaries of State Charles Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, and Henry L. Stimson all tried to build up a "law-bound" world through treaties and other arrangements to maintain a status quo conducive to American prosperity.<sup>40</sup> This situation which was epitomized in President Calvin Coolidge's statement that the business of the United States was business, however, did not last long. American economy was gripped by a world-wide economic depression worst of its kind in recorded history. Beginning with the great crash in the New York stock-exchange in November 1929, it soon became all-pervasive. It was a worst nightmare which had come to life for the American society. It continued for nearly a decade with varying degrees of intensity.<sup>41</sup>

Unlike the danger from communism the economic crisis was internal. It was not caused by any challenge posed by an alternative economic system but by the crisis of capitalism

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39 Ibid., p. 257.

40 Robert Freeman Smith, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942", in Bernstein, n. 23, pp. 237-45.

41 See John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (London, 1955), p. 152; Murray N. Rothbard, America's Great Depression (Princeton, N.J., 1963), pp. 296-304. The rigour of the depression, however, declined after Franklin D. Roosevelt came to the White House and Adolf Hitler to the Reichschancery in 1933. See Goromwy Rees, The Great Slump: Capitalism in Crisis, 1929-33 (London, 1970), p. 280.

itself. So intense was the crisis that many thought it to be the beginning of the collapse of the capitalist system. The New Deal was the American response to this deep crisis of American capitalism. The basic idea behind the entire New Deal domestic and foreign policies was to salvage the American economy from the scourge of depression. It inclined the United States to grant recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933 and showed little interest in the Chinese civil war.

During the 1930s the basic problem with the American economy was overproduction. The solution of the problem required expansion of exports and opening of new markets. Sensing that the recognition of the Soviet Union could open up a huge market for them, the business groups advocated the recognition of the Soviet Union. National perceptions keep changing along with the changing needs of the nation.

The recovery of the American economy also required a peaceful world. Germany, Italy and Japan were systematically growing in strength and their imperialistic ambitions could eventually threaten the economic interests of the United States. This was manifest in a US War Department memorandum of June 1935 which defined the "threat" in Asia mainly in economic terms and stated that Japan's growing influence in Asia would have "a direct influence on those people of Europe and America who depend on trade and commerce with this area for their livelihood"<sup>42</sup>. Almost during the same time Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that Germany was "straining every tendon to undermine United States trade relations with Latin America". In a conversation with

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42 Smith, n. 40, p. 247.



the German Charge d'Affaires Herr Rudolf Leitner on 4 May 1935, Hull expressed the anxiety that Germany "could handicap the United States Government in its efforts to carry forward its present program for trade restoration"<sup>43</sup>. In 1937 a Division of Cultural Relation was established in the Department of State to bring the two Americas -- North and South -- closer. Its activities were not confined to cultural fields but also included political ones. Its basic objective was to contain the influence of Germany in Latin America.<sup>44</sup>

It was against this background that the United States strove to lessen international tensions and look for more and more accommodation with the erstwhile outcasts. Recognition of the Soviet Union under such circumstances was supposed to be a double-edged weapon. On the one hand this would have lessened international political tension and on the other it was hoped that the Soviet Union being a vast and populous country would substantially absorb the American manufactures and thereby partly salvage the American economy from ruin.<sup>45</sup> Important Senators like William E. Borah (Dem., Idaho), Burton K. Wheeler (Dem., Montana), Robert M. La Follette (Rep., Wis.), Hiram Johnson (Rep., Cal.), and many others in both the Senate and the House strongly pleaded for recognition. Important officials in the State Department also favoured recognition.<sup>46</sup> Eventually, in 1933, the United States

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43 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, 1948), vol. 1, p. 496.

44 Childs, n. 4, pp. 296, 325.

45 Congressional Record, 77, II, vol. 88 (1942), pp. 1040-1.

46 Louis Fisher, Why Recognize Russia? : The Arguments for and Against the Recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States (New York, 1931), p. 140.

accorded diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. Although it necessarily did not mean that the United States had reconciled itself to the existence and growth of communism in the world yet surely it was a step forward towards an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Basic dislike for the Communist system remained but it no longer appeared as a serious threat to the security of the American system. On the contrary, it was to some extent cushioning the impact of the great depression.<sup>47</sup>

#### THE US, THE WAR, AND THE COMMUNISTS IN CHINA

Similarly this changed perception of threat was also reflected in the American ignorance and apathy to the civil strife in China between the Nationalists and the Communists. The Communist influence in China, which was gradually increasing ever since the rise of Mao Tse-tung in the early 1930s, was totally discounted by the United States. Communist insurgencies were often referred to as bandit raids. Even the few American journalists who gave objective account of the situation were not taken seriously. The favourable evaluations of the Chinese

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47 That the American public were either critical or ignorant of communism were revealed by the public opinion polls conducted during this period. In a poll conducted on 12 November 1937, 54 per cent of the respondents supported police action padlocking places printing Communist literature. Of the rest 35 per cent opposed while 11 per cent had no opinion. Again, a poll conducted on 8 November 1939 showed that 52 per cent of the respondents believed that American Communist Party received its guidelines from Moscow. Of the rest 39 per cent knew nothing about the Communist Party and only 9 per cent considered the American Communist Party as totally independent of any foreign influence. See Hadley Cantril, ed., Public Opinion, 1935-1946 (Princeton, 1951), p. 130.

Communists by Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong and others were hardly taken with seriousness in America.<sup>48</sup> While the Americans ignored the growth of communism in China, they could not have attached importance to its Soviet connections. They only took note of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the KMT Government. It was also a time when the Soviet grip over the Chinese Communists was loosening which all the more made America less concerned about the Communists in China. In this situation when no Communist danger was perceived in China as well as the Soviet threat appeared to be less serious, American role in China remained minimal.<sup>49</sup> It is interesting to note here that in 1929 when the Soviet Union pushed into North Manchuria, the US Government did not take any positive step to oppose it.

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48 It has been said: "Various writers produced books purporting to tell the 'real truths' about China, but of course none of them agreed on just what the truth was. While the output of literature added greatly to public awareness of the China problem, it added also to public confusion of mind." See A.T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966), p. 19. According to one writer, same can be told about all "China hands". Christopher writes that "the psychology of the 'China Hand', which greatly influenced government, was often one of considering the Chinese as a sort of sub-human being; the mind of the 'China Hand' tended to become so atrophied that he lost all sense of perspective all ability to evaluate the situation accurately." See Jame William Christopher, Conflict in the Far East: American Diplomacy in China from 1928-1933 (Leiden, 1950), p. 21.

49 It can be noted that during the thirties the Soviet influence on the CCP was on the wane. The period saw the growth of an indigenous Communist party under Mao's leadership in which the dictates of Moscow did not carry much weight. So much so that the Soviet Union itself was largely ignorant about the working of the CCP and its leadership. This was evidenced by the fact that when Mao was gaining in power and causing real trouble to the Kuomintang leadership Moscow published a report of Mao's demise along with an obituary. See K.N. Ramachandran, "Origins of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1920-1950", Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Journal (New Delhi), vol. 7, January-March 1975, p. 404.

Subsequently, when the Japanese aggression against South Manchuria in 1931 complicated the situation, Secretary of State Stimson urged both the Soviet Union and China to settle their dispute through peaceful means under the terms of the Kellogg Briand pact to which both the countries were signatories. American anxiety at the possibility of a war was more due to the fact that Chinese raid on the Soviet consulate might be the prelude to Chinese determination to shake off every fetter imposed on it by the West.<sup>50</sup>

The United States remained preoccupied with developing its international trade and its exports gradually rose in the 'thirties. Except for rhetorical support for the cause of the independence of smaller nations, it did not take any positive stand against the militarist countries. On the contrary, it remained a major supplier of heavy machinery and military hardware for Japan while the latter was pushing its imperialist designs against China whose sovereignty and integrity the United States was committed to champion. With the entry of the United States into the war in December 1941, this situation radically changed. America became solely concerned with the attainment of victory in the war, which required close co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the two important wartime allies.

A public opinion poll in October 1941 showed that of the 86.8 per cent of those who had opinion on Soviet-American relations, 73.3 per cent supported mutual co-operation to beat Hitler. Only 13.5 per cent opposed any sort of help to the

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50 See Tarun Chandra Bose, American Soviet Relations, 1921-1933 (Calcutta, 1967), pp. 163-6.

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 Russians. The Roosevelt Administration began to project a positive image of the Soviet Union and its leaders. Stalin came to be described as a person of great integrity and his country as a great democracy. In a speech on 8 November 1942, Vice President Henry Wallace said: "Russia has probably gone further than any other nation in the world in practicing ethnic democracy." About Soviet-American co-operation he said that "the American and Russian people can and will throw their influence on the side of building a new democracy which will be the hope of the world".  
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 The unity among the Chinese Communists and the KMT since 1937 for resisting the Japanese aggression was highly appreciated in the United States.

The American views on the Chinese Communists before they overthrew the Chiang regime and established their own were vague and confused. As the victory of the Allies in the Second World War appeared imminent, America devoted itself to planning the future. One of the areas to which serious thought was to be given was the Sino-Soviet relationship. Torn by internal war China did not present a clear picture. Of course, the Chinese Communists had emerged as an important political force, but they were operating within the country and were yet to establish their control over whole of China. The KMT also was not appearing to move towards total collapse. The Americans could still hope for a unified and strong China with a non-Communist Government in the

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51 Cantril, n. 47, p. 961.

52 Quoted in Louis F. Budenz, The Cry is Peace (Chicago, 1952), pp. 1-2.

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saddle. The uncertain situation in China was responsible for the divergent views in America on such questions as what was the exact nature of Chinese communism, were they Communists or agrarian reforms. If they were Communists, were they dictated by Moscow or were independent? Sandwiched between strong Republican criticism of the lukewarm support to Chiang against the Communists and constant pressure from the China hands for an objective evaluation of the growing popularity of the CCP and tailor American policy accordingly, the Democratic Administration continued with its efforts to make both the contending factions in China strike a deal. Such a deal, the United States wishfully calculated, would maintain the Nationalists in power in China and result in a strong China to withstand the Russian influence in that part of the world.

#### CLEAVAGE IN AMERICAN THINKING

Already in February 1942, the Senate in a unanimous joint resolution had authorized the President to provide economic assistance to China.<sup>53</sup> The House had similarly approved a resolution on 4 February 1942. During the course of the debate on the bill, the Congressmen praised China for its courage and tenacity against the Japanese aggression.<sup>54</sup> Representative James Richards (Dem., S.C.) remarked: "It is with China, hand in hand, that we must battle to the bitter end to win this war. It is my belief that China will never fail us under her Generalissimo

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<sup>53</sup> Congressional Record, 77, II, vol. 88 (1942), pp. 1137-8.

<sup>54</sup> Fisher, n. 46, pp. 85-199.

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Chiang Kai-shek."

American opinion in general strongly favoured economic assistance for China. But certain elements in the bureaucracy had serious misgivings. They were afraid that the Kuomintang-Communist rift might jeopardize the Chinese war efforts against Japan.<sup>56</sup> The United States policy during this period was, therefore, not geared to oppose Chinese communism but was happy to see the emergence of a unified front of the Nationalists and the Communists against the Japanese. There was no doubt a segment of radical opinion within the United States which praised the Chinese Communists and criticized the obstructionist policy of the Nationalists. For instance, the July 1942 issue of Amerasia editorially praised the gallantry of the Chinese guerrilla forces, obviously meaning the Chinese Communists. It added that "the Kuomintang must withdraw its blockade of the 'guerrilla forces'... since at present these noble forces are receiving no munitions, supplies, etc." The editorial concluded:

No matter how prominent the persons responsible for this situation [the KMT leadership] may be, they should not be allowed to carry on an internal struggle against their fellow-countrymen while China's life hangs in the balance. 57

The State Department was so committed to the idea of unity among the forces fighting against Japan that when Earl Browder, then Secretary General of the American Communist Party, alleged that Chiang was misusing the American aid by utilizing it

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55 Congressional Record, 77, II, vol. 88 (1942), p. A376.

56 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 : Diplomatic Papers : China (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 191-267.

57 Amerasia (New York), vol. 6, July 1942, p. 206.

against the Communists, he was taken into confidence by the United States Government and summoned for a meeting in the Department.<sup>58</sup> The meeting was attended by Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, Lauchlin B. Curry, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in China, and Browder. The latter was told that the American policy in China was to see a unified action against Japan. The Administration's position, was thus summarized in the Far Eastern Survey:

... the nearest approach to "advice" given by ... the Department of State ... has been an expression of an opinion that civil strife in China ... would be especially unfortunate at a time when China is engaged in a desperate struggle of self-defense against an armed invader.... Both the armies of the National Government and the "Communist" armies are fighting the Japanese.... This Government has in fact viewed with skepticism many alarmist accounts of the "serious menace" of "Communism" in China. 59

Thus, in 1942, the major American concern no doubt was to bolster Chinese resistance against Japan. Yet one should note the existence of another line of argument which took the position that Chiang would eventually frustrate the Communists and the Soviet Union in the post-war world. However, this was not the dominant view. The argument for reinforcing Chiang as an eventual counterforce was reflected in the New York Times report which said:

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58 It can be noted here that public opinion polls during this time showed less tendency among Americans to oppose the Communists compared to two years before. While a July 1940 poll showed 75 per cent Americans favoured law preventing people from belonging to the American Communist Party, a June 1942 poll showed only 50 per cent willing so. See Cantril, n. 47, pp. 130-1.

59 "Welles States United States Policy on Chinese Unity", Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 11, 16 November 1942, p. 238.



... the Chinese Communists gain their importance less from internal backing than from their link with Russia.... On the other side of China lies Port Arthur and Manchuria. Some believe that when Japan is defeated, especially if this is achieved with Russian participation Moscow will evince more than an academic interest in these regions on China's borders.... It is for these reasons that some suspect Moscow is not displeased by the limited amount of lend-lease aid reaching China, where the reconciliation between Communists and Nationalists is recent and perhaps not permanent. 60

The State Department was preoccupied with the problem of winning the war at this stage and consequently it was much more bothered about the KMT-Communist strife than the problem of eventual predominance of Soviet influence.<sup>61</sup> Secretary of State Cordell Hull praised the Chinese for their war efforts and felt that "China's primary need was sufficient arms to repel the aggressor".<sup>62</sup> While thinking about its post-war objectives in Asia in which the United States assigned pivotal role to China, it did not feel too much concern about the prospect of a Communist China. It believed in the viability of Chiang Kai-shek. As it believed China to be the sheet-anchor of its future policy in Asia, it took lead in conferring the great power status on it. China was given the position of a permanent member in the United Nations Security Council. The United States also sought assurance<sup>63</sup> from the Soviet Union that Dairen would be kept as an open port.

60 New York Times, 18 February 1943, p. 7.

61 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943 : China (Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 191-400.

62 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 9, 18 September 1943, p. 179.

63 See Herbert Feis, The China Tangle : The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton, N.J., 1953), pp. 95-113.

With the war drawing nearer to its end, the American suspicion which had been dormant during the war, suffered again. Several voices were heard within the government departments advocating different courses of action. The public opinion too was deeply divided. While everyone agreed that American interests in East Asia could be best served by a strong and unified China, there was no agreement as to how this could be brought about. According to many of the China hands this could be done by aiding the Chinese Communists against the corrupt and inefficient Nationalists. Others violently disagreed.

Despite the intelligence reports and analyses made by the Office of the Strategic Services (OSS) during 1943-44 that as a result of collusion between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union the situation from the American point of view was very grave, quite a few of the China hands continued to believe that the Chinese Communists were actually nationalists. These people foresaw the possibility of a unified China under the leadership of the Chinese Communists. They overlooked the linkages between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union and misjudged the real nature of the Chinese communism.

In February 1943, reporting on China's first public opinion poll conducted by a Hunan newspaper the Research Analysis Branch of the OSS did not give sufficient importance to the fact that the 86 per cent of the respondents favoured the Kuomintang. The report drew the attention to the fact that most of the respondents were illiterate and might have been

"dictated by patriotism and party loyalty rather than by conviction"<sup>64</sup>. But sometime in the same year, the OSS again submitted a report of an interview with a former Chinese official, familiar with Chinese-Russian relations, and said that according to him the Chinese Communists were financed and guided by the USSR.<sup>65</sup> The OSS expressed its anxiety about the growing influence of communism in Southeast Asia and suggested: "As long as the Chinese and Russian monopoly in these areas is not broken up, China and Russia will determine domestic and international political issues in these areas after the war, and Chinese and Russian domination of eastern and southeastern Asia will complicate economic adjustments in these areas and threaten legitimate American interests."<sup>66</sup> The OSS report clearly stated that it would like to see the area under the American influence and regarded the Russian as well as the Chinese influence in the region as an obstacle in the attainment of that objective. The OSS report did not make any distinction between the Chinese Communists and the KMT. It was argued very persuasively that the Soviet support for the Chinese Government was only tactical. One US Consul wrote to his Ambassador in Chungking that "the Soviet experience of the party in power in China has not been

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64 U.S. Congress, 91, I, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the International Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China (Washington, D.C., 1970), vol. 1, pp. 248-52. Cited hereinafter as Amerasia Papers.

65 Report of September 20, 1943, entitled "Communists in China", *ibid.*, pp. 270-2.

66 Report entitled "American Strategy and Revolutionary Movements in Asia", 25 October 1943. *Ibid.*, pp. 280-2.

such ... to cause the Soviet leaders ... quickly to accept the Kuomintang leaders as comrades-in-arms, nor it is likely ... to play a Chinese game<sup>67</sup>".

Thus, if the Soviet support to the KMT was tactical it followed that it favoured the Chinese Communists even if for the time being it was doing nothing much to help them. Therefore, if the Russian influence was to be resisted in future, it was in the American interest to buttress Chiang in his struggle against the Communists. The other view was diametrically opposite. It saw the Chinese Communists as an independent nationalist force, a powerful force for social change and political reform. On the other hand the KMT was seen as decadent and corrupt; inefficient and incapable of anything. The conclusion was to support the Chinese Communist, the wave of the future. This would have the effect of contracting the Soviet influence. The two diverse perceptions of the Chinese situation led to two diametrically opposite policy recommendations. Latter view was held by the so-called China hands like John Paton Davies, Jr., a US foreign service official and General Stilwell's political adviser, John Stewart Service of US Army Observer Section in China, Owen I. Lattimore, a State Department representative who served as aide to Chiang in 1941-42, and others. At home their views were supported by the Institute of Pacific Relations and its organ Amerasia.

Both Davies and Service were almost certain that the KMT would fall before the Chinese Communists in a civil war.

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67 O. Edmund Clubb, American Consul at Tihwa, to Clarence E. Gauss, the US Ambassador in Chungking, dated 23 October 1943. Ibid., pp. 292-5.

They were highly critical of the maladministration of the KMT and kept on advising the State Department to tailor its policy in view of the almost inevitable changes that were expected on the Chinese political scene. Their main apprehension was that if the situation in China deteriorated, the Soviet Union might take advantage of the growing Communist power. In a memorandum dated 15 January 1944, Davies asked that an American mission be sent to China whose purpose should be to keep in touch with the Chinese Communists so that the latter could provide information about their strength as well as the Soviet operations in North China and Manchuria.<sup>68</sup> In an almost identical memorandum Service wrote:

We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are. A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful first-hand study of the strength, attitudes and popular support of the Chinese Communists.... The Chinese Communists have a background of subservience to the U.S.S.R., but new influences - principally nationalism - have come into play which are modifying their outlook. 69

In a long memorandum to the State Department in June 1944 Service suggested that the United States Government should stop its policy of "mollycoddling" Chiang and the KMT and "continue to show an interest in the Chinese Communists". He argued that the United States should support the liberal elements within the KMT, and the Communists which were likely to win in the long run. American support for them would have enhanced their prestige in

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68 U.S., Department of State, United States Relations with China ; With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 564. Cited hereinafter as China White Paper.

69 Ibid., pp. 564-5.

China and thwarted the Soviet influence there, he emphasized.<sup>70</sup> He felt that the Chinese Communists were "democrats" and would continue to encourage "capitalistic enterprises". His interviews with Chou En-lai and Lin Pio and his study of the reports of Guenther Stein, Maurice Votaw and Israel Epstein on their interviews of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh convinced him that the Chinese Communists "actively encourage capitalistic enterprise and recognize its important place in the development of a democratic economy based on private property".<sup>71</sup> So much was Service convinced of the democratic and nationalistic character of the Chinese Communists that in one of his reports he went to the extent of suggesting that the orientation they had toward the Soviet Union was only a "thing of the past". And that they wanted to bring economic regeneration in China through capitalistic means and in this regard the United States rather than the Soviet Union could render real assistance to them. Service also opposed the continuance of American aid to Chiang and cautioned that "the Chinese Communists are at present sincere in seeking Chinese unity on the basis of American support" but they might turn back toward the Soviet Union "if they are forced to in order to survive American-supported Kuomintang attack".<sup>72</sup>

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- 70 Memorandum by John S. Service on "Kuomintang And American Policy", 24 June 1944. Amerasia Papers, n. 64, vol. 1, pp. 575-91.
- 71 Report No. 3 entitled "Views of Communist Political and Military Leaders" from John S. Service, US Army Observer Section, to Commanding General, US Armed Forces, China-Burma-India Theater, 30 July 1944. Amerasia Papers, n. 64, vol. 1, p. 691.
- 72 Report No. 34 entitled "The Orientation of the Chinese Communists Toward the Soviet Union and the United State" from John S. Service, 28 September 1944. Amerasia Papers, n. 64, vol. 1, p. 940. Also see vol. 2, pp. 976-1003, 1400-5.

Like Service, Davies also had least hope in the viability of the Nationalists. In his memorandum of 7 November 1944 he emphatically stated: "The Communists are in China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but theirs." He suggested that the United States should take this opportunity now to help the Chinese Communists so as to find an independent and friendly China in the future. If it failed to do so the Soviet Union will capture the Communists and make them their satellites.<sup>73</sup> Later, on 4 January 1945, he wrote:

The current situation in China must afford the Kremlin a certain sardonic satisfaction.

The Russians see the anti-Soviet Government of Chiang Kai-shek decaying -- militarily, politically and economically. They observe the Chinese Communists consolidating in North Korea, expanding south-ward in the wake of Chiang's military debacles and now preparing for the formal establishment of a separatist administration.

It is equally evident to the Russians that the Chinese Communists will not in the meantime be idle. The Communists have amply demonstrated a capacity for independent, dynamic growth. However Marshal Stalin may describe the Chinese Communists to his American visitors, he can scarcely be unaware of the fact that the Communists are a considerably more stalwart and self-sufficient force than any European underground or partisan movement.<sup>74</sup>

The Institute of Pacific Relations in the United States echoed the arguments of the China hands. It piled on criticism of the KMT. Its editor Philip J. Jaffe held the view that "bureaucratic centralization" of the KMT was not helpful for China and that the Chinese Communists had more democratic means of governance. He warned that the Axis and their Fifth Columnists in the United States had been exploiting the American fears of the

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73 China White Paper, n. 68, p. 573.

74 Ibid., p. 567.

Soviet Communists and hindering the US Government from accepting a "proper" China policy.<sup>75</sup> The New York Times also praised the Chinese Communists for their sincerity in repelling the external aggression and in striving for democracy in China.<sup>76</sup>

In spite of the constant advice from the China hands to shift the support from the Kuomintang to the Chinese Communists, the Roosevelt Administration continued its pro-Chiang policy throughout the war.<sup>77</sup> There were many in America who saw in Chiang a natural leader of China and felt that unity could be achieved under his leadership. Congressman Walter Judd (Rep., Minn.) strongly felt that the crisis in China was "largely made in America".<sup>78</sup> Judd was no doubt a passionate anti-Communist and

75 Phillip J. Jaffe, "China Can Win and Yet Lose", Amerasia, vol. 7, 25 July 1943, pp. 201-5. See also "The Communist Problem in China", Amerasia, vol. 8, 20 April 1944, pp. 134-41.

76 New York Times, 1 November 1944, p. 4; 2 November 1944, p. 8; 26 November 1944, p. 43.

77 According to Tang Tsou these China hands did not have much knowledge about Communist ideology and so they underestimated the influence of ideology on the Chinese Communist tactics and over-emphasized their national fervour. He writes:

In the writings about Chinese politics at this time, one searches in vain for the view that a communist party based on Leninist principles is a tightly organized and highly disciplined group of professional revolutionaries, aiming at the seizure of power whenever possible, exploiting mass discontent from whatever sources are at hand, and employing a multiplicity of means and a variety of institutional forms to achieve its purpose. It was not widely understood that the totalitarian character of the party arises both from its aspiration for total power, so necessary for the realization of its highly ambitious program of drastic institutional change, and from its organizational principles which make it a free altogether outside the interest groups, manipulating them without being dominated by them.

See Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago, 1963), p. 230.

78 See Judd's speech in the House on 15 March 1945. Congressional Record, 79, I, vol. 91 (1945), pp. 2297-2302.



remained so throughout his life. As could be expected from a man of such background, he was a strong pro-Chiang man.

Probably the Roosevelt Administration naively believed the Soviet leaders when they said that they did not consider the Chinese Communists as Communists. In spite of the fact that Chiang was informing the American Government that the Soviet Union was assisting the Communists both the President and the State Department believed Chiang's reports to be only a device to get more American aid. On 17 March 1944, Chiang wrote to Roosevelt:

... though the Chinese Communist Party have outwardly professed support of the Chinese Government's policy of resistance against Japanese aggression, since February they have been secretly assembling their guerrilla units from various places and concentrating them in North Shensi, evidently preparing for an opportune moment to rise in revolt in the Yellow River Valley. The indications are manifest. Considering the matter objectively, it does not seem likely that the Chinese Communist Party would dare to make such a move without some understanding having been reached between the Soviet and the Chinese. 80

When in Sinkiang the Chinese soldiers pursuing the Chinese Communists were killed by the Soviet troops, Chiang informed Washington about collaboration between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. The Roosevelt Administration showed least concern. Both the President and the Secretary considered them as exaggerated reports and deplored these because they undermined the unity among the United Nations. 81

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79 Feis, n. 63, p. 139.

80 Ibid., p. 137.

81 Ibid., pp. 137-8.

With his object of seeing China strong and united, Roosevelt decided to send Vice-President Henry A. Wallace on a mission to China. Wallace reached Chungking in the latter part of June 1944 after short visits to Soviet Central Asia.<sup>82</sup> On his way, at Tashkent, Wallace was met by W. Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who told the Vice-President how Stalin had branded the Chinese Communists as "margarine"<sup>83</sup> communists. During his stay in China, Wallace was again told about Stalin's comments to Harriman about Chinese Communists by Vincent.<sup>84</sup> Contrary opinion, however, was expressed by Chiang who told Wallace not to believe that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers. He told that they were more sincere Communists than the Russians. Wallace however, stuck to the point that no situation should be created in China which would bring the Soviet Union and China into conflict. Eventually Chiang had no alternative except to agree to the American position. He stated that if the United States could bring about better relations between the USSR and China by arranging a meeting between their representatives he would welcome it.<sup>85</sup>

The bitter debate over America's China policy continued. General Joseph Stilwell, American Commander in the China theatre, was recalled in late 1944 because of his differences with Chiang. This provided an impetus to a serious debate on the effectiveness

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82 China White Paper, n. 68, p. 65.

83 Feis, n. 63, p. 144.

84 China White Paper, n. 68, p. 56.

85 Ibid., pp. 56-57. See also Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. 16, 67-68.

of US China policy. Maxwell Stewart wrote in the Nation that American aid could be utilized in a better fashion if given to the Chinese Communists and that it could be much larger if there was unity in the country.<sup>86</sup>

While Chiang's critics in America tried to make capital out of Stilwell's recall, there were others who continued to support Chiang's cause. For example, the Time wrote:

The White House believed that the Nationalist government could do a lot more in the fight against Japan by pressing domestic reforms and by coming to terms with the Chinese communist government at Yen-an. Nobody ever urged the Chinese Communists to come to terms with Chungking.<sup>87</sup>

It concluded with the warning that "Chiang has been forced to fight both Japan and Yen-an in the cause of democracy ... if we do not heal the breach quickly, we may wind up with a Communist China".<sup>88</sup>

During 1944-45 the US Government projected Chiang as the real leader of China who was worthy of support. However, within the executive branch there were serious misgivings about him. Returning from his visit to China, Vice President Henry Wallace suggested to Roosevelt that the US concern should not be limited to Chiang but it should create grounds for a coalition which could take care of the post-war developments in China.<sup>89</sup> The

86 Maxwell S. Stewart, "China's Zero Hour", Nation (New York), vol. 159, 25 November 1944, pp. 637, 639. See also the editorial, ibid., 9 December 1944, p. 705; Harold Isaisis, "One Man's Fight Against Corruption", Newsweek (New York), 13 November 1944, pp. 45-46; Lawrence E. Salisbury, "Report on China", Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 137, 15 November 1944, pp. 211-13.

87 Time (Chicago), 13 November 1944, pp. 41-42.

88 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

89 See U.S., Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), p. A2544. It has been alleged that Wallace Report was actually drafted by Owen Lattimore who wanted a shift in America's China policy. See William R. Johnson, China, Key to the Orient and to Asia (Polo, Ill., 1950), p. 7.

United States was thus in the last phase of the war was already moving towards the idea of a post-war coalition between the Nationalists and the Communists. Testifying before the Senate Committee W. Averell Harriman, the war-time US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, stated that the Yalta objectives of the United States, besides soliciting the Soviet Union to join the Pacific war against Japan, were "to limit Soviet expansion in the east and to gain Soviet support for the Nationalist government of China".<sup>90</sup>

#### WHEN THE WAR ENDED

The Second World War destroyed the international system that had prevailed before it. Great Britain, France and China remained great powers only in name despite their status as great powers in the United Nations. In the midst of the war, the leadership of the western world had passed from Britain and France to the United States. The latter had escaped the ravages of the war and its economic and industrial capabilities had hastened the allied victory. It was not without reasons that the American leaders dreamt of a Pax Americana. The only challenge to the American dominance of the world could come from the Soviet Union, the only power which, despite the terrible losses it had sustained in the war, appeared

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90 U.S., Congress, 82, I, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 3332. See also Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (Edited by Walter Johnson) (New York, 1949), pp. 44, 66, 87.

to have that capacity. The Soviet Union's capacity to challenge the dominance of the United States was partly due to the fact that the Soviet Union represented an entirely different principle of organizing the society. The nature of the challenge was to a considerable extent ideological. The United States now began to see the possibility of the Soviet challenge as an existing reality.

A cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union ensued for supremacy. So long as the common threat faced them, they worked together. But as the threat receded to the background their differences aggravated. Deep-rooted differences between the Soviet Union and the West had existed even during the war but after Yalta the will to overcome these differences was no longer there. Both drifted to a position in which conciliation was no longer possible. This was caused mainly by mutual suspicion and hatred. Each of the powers considered the other to be a danger to itself. Archibald MacLeish, the Assistant Secretary of State, was right when he said in an NBC broadcast on 26 May 1945: "What underlies the current talk of inevitable conflict between the two nations [the United States and the Soviet Union] ... is nothing real; nothing logical. The basis of the fear is only fear itself. The basis of the suspicion is nothing more

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91 | Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has argued that the war had created a power vacuum and only the United States and the Soviet Union had the capacity to fill it. See U.S. Congress, 92, I, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Hearings, The Cold War: Origins and Development (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 3-10. For an analytical study of the cold war writers see Michael Leigh, "Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?", Political Science Quarterly (New York), vol. 89, March 1974, pp. 101-16.

substantial than suspicion."<sup>92</sup>

The mutual suspicion and fear entertained by each of these two powers created numerous problems in the peace settlement. Each power viewed its interest as diametrically opposed to that of the other. There were many real and imaginary problems and as the US and the Soviet Union struggled to attain the objectives regarded essential in their national interest, they only served to heighten the tension. The rupture in the cordial relations that had generally prevailed during the Second World War did not come off suddenly. They slowly moved in that direction. And with each step the tension mounted and the hostility increased. The mass media and the leaders of the public opinion in the United States projected the image of the Soviet Union as the enemy. The psychological climate which was to sustain the cold war for years was slowly built up.<sup>93</sup>

The public opinion polls conducted in the United States during 1944-46 showed that the American people in general still

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92 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 12, 27 May 1945, pp. 951-2. American fear of the Soviet Union can be understood by the fact that after 1945 Averell Harriman felt that "officers with Moscow background should be stationed at strategic spots around the world". See John F. Melby, The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War (London, 1968), p. 17.

93 The revisionist school of the cold war historians has emphasized the role of business interests and the mass media in heightening the tension of the cold war. See, for example, James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (Boston, 1970); David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Middlesex, 1969); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York, 1967).

held the view that there could be mutual co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. They believed, however, that the war-time friendship was no longer there. A poll on 4 September 1945 showed that about 70 per cent of the Americans were in favour of friendly co-operation with the Soviet Union.<sup>94</sup> A year later, in September 1946, another poll showed that 87 per cent of the Americans believed that there would not be any war between the United States and the Soviet Union if the people in the two countries as a whole had the power to take a final decision. Sixty-two per cent Americans, however, agreed that their feelings towards the Soviet Union were less friendly than they were a year ago.<sup>95</sup>

Actually the American opinion seems to have been deeply divided during this time over the exact nature of the Soviet threat. But as events moved on, a growing number of people began to perceive the Soviet Union as a grave threat to their nation. Many sincerely believed the Soviet Union to be really an expansionist power which was planning to run over the countries of Western Europe, thereby affecting the strategic position of the United States. Yet there was no general agreement on the response to that threat. This lack of agreement was not confined to the general public which had only vague ideas about these issues but extended to the bureaucrats who dealt with them and knew precisely what was at stake.

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94 Cantril, n. 47, p. 962.

95 Ibid.

The United States considered the growth of communism in any part of the world as adversely affecting its interest. Soon the Soviet Union and communism became synonymous. In any place where the Communists appeared to be moving towards the capture of power even by democratic elections, the United States was alarmed. This happened during 1945-47 in France and Italy. To defeat the French Communists the United States poured in money and through its intelligence operations tried to influence the electoral outcome in Italy.<sup>96</sup> The enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 can be explained in the same light. It was promulgated in response to what the Americans perceived to be the Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey.

#### A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

As in many West European countries, the Communist Party in China too was contending to gain control of government against its rival in power — the KMT. However, the US response, as will be shown in this section, was in striking contrast to its attitude towards the European situations. It did not regard the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the same hostility as it did the other Communist parties, till the time it appeared certain that the CCP would establish its control over entire China. For this

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96 The growing influence of the Communist parties in France and Italy in the post-war years caused serious concern to the United States. The anxiety was so acute that at one point the Truman Administration contemplated a plan for American military intervention in France and Italy to crush the growing influence of the Left. For a detailed study of the American reaction towards the growth of communism in these countries, see Kolko and Kolko, n. 93, pp. 146-60.



contrast possibly there were several reasons. For one, the United States always attached far greater importance to Western Europe than to any other region. The other reason was that the Soviet Union had already spilled over Eastern Europe and had radically altered its strategic boundaries. The threat of Soviet expansion in Western Europe therefore really loomed large in the eyes of the Americans. What, they believed, really restrained the Soviet Union was the American determination to deter such an expansion. In the case of China the Soviet Union appeared to be respecting the agreements which it had entered with the KMT Government and was not aiding and abetting the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, the United States was in effect the sole authority occupying Japan. The Soviet Union despite its loud protests had no control over the policies adopted towards Japan. The United States expected China to be the "sheet anchor" of its policy in the Far East. It expected China to be strong and eventually to be a containing force against the Soviet expansionism in Asia. The Chinese Communists were already a force and the Americans knew that they could not be wished away. Therefore the "right strategy" was to bring them within a government in which they would have a minor share which in effect would be controlled and dominated by their real friend Chiang Kai-shek.

It was neither certain how much the Soviet Union was involved in the Chinese civil war nor was it clear to the Americans whether the Chinese Communists were really Communists. The US response for this reason was also not very positive. The Chinese Communists were still not in power but only trying to gain it. Secondly, the Americans expected the KMT to be able

to face the Communist challenge with some American help. Anyway, they could not completely force the KMT to see their way. Furthermore, the linkages between the Chinese situation and the European situation was not very clear. The ignorance and apathy of the people towards China <sup>98</sup> ruled out any firm action by the Government of the United States. An opinion poll taken on 28 August 1946 showed that only 57 per cent of the respondents were aware that there was a dispute in China between two opposing groups. What was still more strange was that among the aforesaid 57 per cent, 43 per cent either showed their reluctance to suggest or opposed any positive step on the part of the United States against the Chinese Communists. Only 6 per cent suggested assistance to Chiang and only 1 per cent asked to "keep Russia out". <sup>99</sup> This kind of public indifference and apathy coupled with the uncertainties in the situation led to a serious confusion in the United States with regard to the formulation and implementation of the China policy. No clear-cut understanding could be developed about the Soviet role in the Chinese civil strife nor the fact of their co-operation with the Chinese Communists could be established. The ideological complexion of the Chinese Communists remained an enigma for the American decision-makers and hence the Soviet attitude towards them remained obscure to the American decision-makers. Under the circumstances what they did was to work for cessation of the civil war and work towards the establishment

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98 The numerous opinion polls conducted by various American agencies during 1945 and 1946 prove this point. For a catalogue of these polls see Cantril, n. 47, pp. 962-4.

99 Ibid., p. 953.

of a strong and united China.

The course of developments in the Far East were such as not to give rise to a feeling in the United States that the Soviet Union would not abide by the spirit of accommodation which was the basis of the Yalta agreement. After all, all the major Soviet demands relating to the Far East had been accepted. The Soviet Union was a satiated power and there was no indication that it wanted more territory. Therefore, when the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the Nationalist Chinese regime in August 1945, the United States perceived it as an encouraging sign. Secretary of States James Byrnes appreciated this new Far Eastern spirit of "continuing unity and mutual helpfulness"<sup>100</sup>. That the United States expected close co-operation from the Soviet Union on China was also apparent during the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in December 1945. The Department of State Bulletin reported:

They [foreign secretaries of the Soviet Union, England and the United States] were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

The two foreign secretaries (Molotov and Byrnes) were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities. 101

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100 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 13, 2 September 1945, p. 333.

101 Ibid., 30 December 1945, pp. 1030-1.

In December 1945, President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China with the objective of bringing all the contending forces in a coalition as had been done earlier by President Roosevelt. In August 1944 Roosevelt had despatched General Patrick J. Hurley to China. On his way to Chungking he made a stopover at the Kremlin to gauge the Soviet attitudes towards the Chinese Communists. He was happy to know from Molotov that the Russians were not seriously considering the Chinese Communists as Marxist-Leninists. Molotov also refuted the charge of Chiang Kai-shek that the Russians were assisting the Chinese Communists.<sup>102</sup> On 8 September 1944, Roosevelt read a telegram to Gromyko from Hurley which reported that Molotov had told Hurley that the Soviet Union was indifferent to the Chinese Communists and that they were not really Communists.<sup>103</sup> Hurley who was somewhat ignorant of the Communist ideology and tactics, was taken by the CCP slogans to follow the democratic ideas of Sun Yat-sen. In a Press Conference on 2 April 1945 he said:

All the demands that the Communist Party has been making have been on a democratic basis. That has led to the statement that the Communist Party [sic] in China are not, in fact, real Communists. The Communist Party of China is supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China and conceded to be objectives also of the

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102 Lisle A. Rose, The Coming of the American Age - 1945-1946. Dubious Victory: The United States and the End of World War II (Kent University Press, 1973), p. 129.

103 Stettinius, n. 90, p. 20. It may be noted here that George F. Kennan during this time expressed serious doubts about the advisability to believe the words of the Kremlin. See George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), pp. 250-1. See also China White Paper, n. 68, pp. 96-98.

National Government.... The divergence between them is the procedure by which they can be achieved. 104

Hurley, however, could not succeed in his mission to bring about a compromise between the two warring groups and resigned on 27 November 1945. In his letter of resignation to President Truman he charged the American career diplomats in China of sabotaging his efforts. He wrote:

Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed forces to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control. 105

Like Hurley mission, Marshall mission also failed. Marshall later stated that actually it was difficult to reach any settlement in China because both the Communists and the KMT regarded each other with "almost overwhelming suspicion". He felt that the extremist elements on both sides did not want any agreement and stuck to their rigid stand.<sup>106</sup>

While the United States was pursuing the objective of bringing the two warring factions into a coalition, the internal strife in China continued. The perception of the Truman Administration was not universally shared. The Republicans did not agree

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104 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 90, p. 2896. During this hearings, however, Hurley said that he had made such a remark because Roosevelt wanted him to say something good about the Chinese Communists which would help the unification of China. See p. 2906.

105 China White Paper, n. 68, p. 582.

106 For the full text of Marshall's statement of 7 January 1947 see John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 343-9. See also Millis, n. 85, p. 190.

with the Administration's policy of treating the KMT and the Communists alike. They were extremely unhappy that Chiang and the Nationalists were not helped economically and militarily. As the Administration's policy failed to show any tangible result, the Republican attacks on the China policy mounted in intensity. Their perception of the Chinese Communists was far different from that of the Administration. They saw the situation differently.

In order to secure their support for his plan for economic assistance to Western Europe, President Truman partially accepted their demand about China. In late 1947, at the suggestion of Congressman Walter Judd (Rep., Minn.), Truman sent General Albert C. Wedemeyer to China to study the situation and report to him. The General submitted his report to the President on 19 September 1947. He reported a tremendous growth of Soviet influence in China and recommended that steps be taken to thwart it. Since he also did not have any trust in the capability of Chiang to face the Communist challenge, he recommended that increased American economic and military aid should be given to the Nationalists but utilized under the supervision of the American experts. He concluded;

The military situation in China is grave. Communists have the tactical initiative in Manchuria and in North China.

The Nationalist position in Manchuria is precarious, and in Shantung and Hopei provinces strongly disputed. Continued deterioration of the situation may result in establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria and ultimately in a Communist-dominated China which would be inimical to United States interests. 107

Wedemeyer said that the Soviet Union was being "actively assisted by the Chinese Communist Party, which by its actions and propaganda is proven to be a tool of Soviet foreign policy". The only possible way to revitalize the Chinese national resistance against the growing Soviet influence was to augment the military potentiality of "the presently corrupt, reactionary and inefficient Chinese National Government". Wedemeyer recommended that

the United States provide as early as practicable moral, advisory and material support to China in order to prevent Manchuria from becoming a Soviet satellite, to bolster opposition to Communist expansion and to contribute to the gradual development of stability in China. 108

American economic and military aid continued to flow to bolster the Nationalist Government against the Communists but due to the corruption in the government most of the aid started getting smuggled out to the Communists. One observer wrote in a highly exaggerated style but no doubt with some truth that in a military parade of the Chinese Communists "everything was of American manufacture except the soldiers"<sup>109</sup>. The soldiers were proud of this as well. They waved banners declaring ironically: "These fine weapons have been received from Imperialist America,<sup>110</sup> through the courtesy of Chiang Kai-shek. Thank you, America."

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108 Ibid., p. 814.

109 Walter Sullivan, "Reds in Shanghai's Show Off Might", New York Times, 8 July 1949, p. 8. See also Millis, n. 85, pp. 533-4.

110 Harrison Forman, Blunder in Asia (New York, 1950), p. 4.

The Nationalists steadily lost ground and the Communists improved their position. American aid failed to influence the course of events. In October 1948, Secretary of State George C. Marshall stated:

To achieve the objective of reducing the Chinese Communists to a completely negligible factor in China in the immediate future, it would be necessary for the United States virtually to take over the Chinese Government and administer its economic, military and governmental affairs. Strong Chinese sensibilities regarding infringement of China's sovereignty, the intense feeling of nationalism among the Chinese, and the unavailability of qualified American personnel in large number required argue strongly against attempting such a solution.<sup>111</sup>

Although the task of stemming the on-rushing tide of the Communists was viewed as practically impossible yet the United States did not give up. It continued to support Chiang. In the Presidential election of 1948, the United States China policy appeared as an issue. It is interesting that Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, criticized his opponent for not consulting the Republicans on the China issue. He did not make it clear as to where he disagreed with him. Only Henry Wallace, the Progressive Party candidate, attacked Truman Administration's aid to Chiang on the ground that it would serve no purpose. He argued that in the first place, Chiang could not defeat the Communists, and secondly, it would alienate the Communists from the United States and force them to be friendly with the Soviet Union.<sup>112</sup>

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111 China White Paper, n. 68, p. 281.

112 Henry A. Wallace, Towards World Peace (West Port, Conn., 1948), p. 93. See also Robert A. Hart, The Eccentric Tradition: American Diplomacy in the Far East (New York, 1976), pp. 168-70.



Truman's victory in the election and his appointment of Dean Acheson as the Secretary of State signified that there was going to be no change in the US China policy.

The United States had gradually moved to the view that there was a close link between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. There were, however, people in the highest echelons of American decision making who still had their reservations on this issue. George F. Kennan, formerly US Ambassador to Russia and counsellor in the State Department since June 1949, doubted the validity of the theory of Sino-Soviet bond. In a subsequent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1965 he stated that in 1948:

We had the impression - we may have been right or we may have been wrong, but I think the historical evidence today confirms it - that Stalin did not particularly want to see the Chinese Communists take power in all of China. I think we would have liked to see them take power in the northern part of China, but he would have liked some sort of buffer government farther in south simply because it was his confirmed tendency always to divide and rule. He did not trust anybody very far. He figured that the Chinese Communists would be more amenable to his influence if they had some sort of a rival or enemy on the other side than if they were triumphant throughout all of China.

I think nobody was more surprised than he was when they suddenly emerged as the masters of all of mainland China. 113

Referring to the traditionally deep-rooted Sino-Soviet antagonism and clash of interests between China and Russia,

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113 U.S. Congress, 89, I, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Hearings, Sino-Soviet Conflict Together with Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 68-69. Cited hereinafter as Sino-Soviet Conflict Hearings. Emphasis added.

Kennan said it was unlikely that conflicts of interest would have ceased to be operative "just because they had Communist governments".<sup>114</sup> Kennan's misgivings at that time were shared by others. Testifying on the China issue before the Senate joint hearings, George C. Marshall himself said in 1951 that during this period the Administration was not clear in its mind as to whom to support — the Communists or the Nationalists.<sup>115</sup>

On 24 April 1949, the Communists entered Nanking. Soon afterwards, on 30 April 1949, they approached the American Ambassador John Leighton Stuart for recognition which the latter considered to be premature. He felt that the Chinese Communists first must show that they had the popular support and then they should express their willingness to have diplomatic relations with foreign countries under international law. He said that "it was they rather than the foreign countries who were on trial".<sup>116</sup>

The United States was gradually reconciling itself to the fact that the Chinese Communists would shortly control entire China. The release of the China White Paper by the State Department in August 1949 epitomized this belief. In his letter of transmittal Secretary Acheson wrote:

The heart of China is in Communist hands....  
The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that  
the ominous result of the civil war in China  
was beyond the control of the government of

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114 Ibid., p. 48.

115 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 90, p. 465.

116 John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador (New York, 1954), pp. 247-8. See also New York Times, 1 May 1949, p. 1.

the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. 117

At least in the last phase of the Chinese civil war, before finally concluding that the victory of the Communists was inevitable, the United States desperately tried within the existing situation to prevent it. But it was not to be. The Communists prevailed and the entire China was under their control. The Chinese Communist Party was one thing without access to the state power and quite another when it controlled the power of the state. What relations it was going to have with the Soviet Union? Would it coordinate its strategy with the latter and extend the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Asia and increase the challenge to the United States manifold? Or would it develop into a countervailing force against the Soviet Union? These were complex and difficult questions. How the US perception of the Sino-Soviet relations evolved as the time went on and affected its policy will be discussed in the chapters that follow.

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117 China White Paper, n. 68, p. XVI.

**Chapter II**

**UNCERTAIN OUTLOOK : OCTOBER 1949 - JUNE 1950**

## Chapter II

### UNCERTAIN OUTLOOK : OCTOBER 1949 - JUNE 1950

On 1 October 1949, the long drawn Chinese civil war virtually came to an end. On that day Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This Government, Mao announced, was the "sole legal government representing all the people". He expressed his willingness to establish diplomatic relations "with any foreign government willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territory and sovereignty"<sup>1</sup>. The Soviet Union recognized the regime on 2 October 1949 and the other Communist countries followed suit.<sup>2</sup>

Much before the formal announcement of the establishment of the Communist Government in China America had reconciled itself to the fact that the "fall of China" was inevitable. The major question it faced was how China would reinforce the power of the Soviet Union in its struggle for predominance.

#### FEAR OF SINO-SOVIET COLLUSION

Although the Americans had for quite some time expected the Communist triumph in China, yet it came at a time when the world history was entering a crucial phase. Almost a month before the event, the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic

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1 New York Times, 2 October 1949, p. 1.

2 Ibid., 3 October 1949, p. 1; 4 October 1949, p. 6; 5 October 1949, p. 17.

device which ended the American nuclear monopoly. In the context of the Cold War the significance of the Russian explosion was enormous. Some people tried to derive some comfort from the fact that the United States still had enormous superiority over the Soviet Union. They argued that the Soviet Union was eventually bound to develop nuclear capability and it made no significant difference if what was bound to happen happened a little ahead of schedule. What mattered was continued superiority which the United States had in the matter. But this argument did not reassure the American public.<sup>3</sup> As Hans J. Morgenthau, an eminent scholar of international affairs, later pointed out that superiority did not count in nuclear warfare. Even a comparatively weaker nuclear power could inflict severe damage on a superior nuclear power. Once the Soviet Union acquired nuclear capability, it changed the balance by affecting America's capability to use its nuclear power. The explosion taking place before American expectation "makes all the differences in the world, for it upsets the timetable of our foreign policy", he argued.<sup>4</sup>

China becoming Communist at this juncture was something much more significant than it would have been at any other time. In its struggle against communism America was now faced with a fresh challenge. It would still debate whether China would join

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3 New York Times catalogued the various reactions in America to the news of Soviet explosion. See New York Times, 24 September 1949, pp. 2, 3, 12; 25 September 1949, p. 1; 26 September 1949, p. 11; 28 September 1949, p. 7.

4 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of National Interest : A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1951), pp. 172-3.

hands with the Soviet Union but there could be no doubt that the "fall of China" had a profound impact on the American prestige and security. It was a very significant development from the point of view of American global interest -- political, economic and strategic.

The basic question was how strong China was likely to become and in what ways it could threaten the United States. Had China remained a weak and disunited country, its pro- or anti-Soviet Union position would not have mattered.<sup>5</sup> But such did not appear to be the case. Besides the possibility of its following the Kremlin line in the world affairs, there was also the prospect of its setting a socialist model of economic growth in Asia. Many in the United States felt that on the outcome of the competition between "totalitarian" and "democratic" modes of economic growth the fate of America in the Asian continent would depend. In line with this sentiment President Harry S. Truman informed the Congress subsequently that where private capital was not in a position to "meet the need, this Government must provide substantial quantities of supplies and equipment to assure real progress on vital programs for development".<sup>6</sup> Writing in January 1950, columnist Walter Lippmann emphasized the same theme. He said that the Communist countries presented themselves as models of economic growth to the underdeveloped world. In support of his argument he cited the speech of Joseph S. Stalin

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5 See George W. Keeton, "The Next Step in the Far East", World Affairs (London), vol. 4, April 1950, p. 134.

6 Message of the President to the Congress, 6 March 1952. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 26, 17 March 1952, p. 407.

inaugurating the Fourth Five-Year Plan on 15 March 1946. Stalin had pointed out that how in thirteen years of revolutionary reconstruction the Soviet Union was transformed "from an agrarian to an industrial country". It was as a result of this transformation that the Soviet Union was able to withstand and defeat the onslaught of the German army. Lippmann concluded: "We should be merely deluding ourselves if we refuse to recognize the tremendous force of this — the central theme of the Communist propaganda in Asia."<sup>7</sup>

The American anxiety over the implications of a Communist regime in China generated an acrimonious debate within the United States. Who were the people responsible for such a development?, it was asked. A wave of criticism against the Democratic Administration for its mismanagement of the China affair swept the United States. "Loss of China" became a vital issue in American politics. It was alleged that negligence, lack of drive and dynamism on the part of the Truman Administration had thrown China in the lap of the Communists. It was also charged that had sufficient and timely military and economic assistance been provided to the Chinese Nationalists they would not have succumbed to the Communists.<sup>8</sup>

The Truman Administration strongly defended its role in China but the fact that China had "fallen" weakened its case.

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7 Walter Lippmann, Commentaries on American Far Eastern Policy : Selections from Walter Lippmann's newspaper column "Today and Tomorrow", the N.Y. Herald Tribune (New York, 1950), pp. 22-23.

8 Gallup found on 18 September 1949 that people blamed the United States, in the ratio of 53 to 26, for not sending more help. Cited in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, 1964), p. 786.



The American failure in China had severely hurt their amour propre and they were in an angry mood. In the past they had looked upon themselves as the patrons of the Chinese republicans. In 1940, for instance, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (Rep., Neb.) had told a cheering crowd: "With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City.<sup>9</sup>" During the Second World War, General Douglas MacArthur reiterated the emotional bond between America and China by saying:

Europe is a dying system. It is worn out and run down, and will become an economic and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia.... The lands touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history for the next ten thousand years. 10

Except for sending armed personnel, the American involvement in the Chinese civil war was total — political, moral, military and economic. Chiang's defeat was, therefore, interpreted as a defeat for the United States and the Truman Administration was held responsible for it.<sup>11</sup>

Due to strong attacks to which the Administration was subjected, the latter could not completely devote itself to the problem of evolving its own response to the developing Sino-Soviet relations. It must be stated here that the Sino-Soviet

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9 Quoted in David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (London, 1965), p. 106.

10 Quoted in John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 67.

11 Joseph Alsop published a series of articles in Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia, Pa.) under the heading "Why We Lost China?" These articles articulating the Republican point of view were published soon after "China fell".

relations did appear prominently in the planning of the Administration but the heat generated by the China issue was a severe constraint.

#### GROWING SINO-SOVIET CORDIALITY

Already before the declaration of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communists had shown their friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union. Mao had reacted to the creation of NATO by saying that in the event of a Soviet American war China would side with the former.<sup>12</sup> Stalin enthusiastically reciprocated to these gestures and in May 1949 emphasized the importance of the Soviet Union as a "base of the world revolutionary movement".<sup>13</sup>

The major policy statement with regard to the Sino-Soviet amity came on 30 June 1949 when Chairman Mao Tse-tung made a statement "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship". He pronounced by now very well-known principle of "leaning to one side". The Chairman reaffirmed in a very strong language that the new Chinese government was Marxist-Leninist and declared that "people's democratic dictatorship" was absolutely essential for China. He denounced all the imperialist nations and categorically asserted that "China would not look to them for help".<sup>14</sup> "The Chinese people", he said, "must either incline to the side of imperialism or towards that of socialism.... It is impossible to sit on the fence; there is no third road; neutrality is merely

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12 China Digest (Hong Kong), vol. 6, 19 April 1949, p. 2.

13 New York Times, 30 May 1949, p. 8.

14 Ibid., 1 July 1949, p. 1.

a camouflage; a third road does not exist....<sup>15</sup> A day later, he unequivocally proclaimed: "Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the U.S.S.R."<sup>16</sup>

On 29 September 1949, the lean-to-one-side policy was adopted by the People's Political Consultative Conference in the form of a "Common Programme", article 2 of which read: "The People's Republic of China shall unite with all free and peace-loving countries and peoples in the world -- above all, with the Soviet Union."<sup>17</sup>

After the establishment of a Communist Government in China, Sino-Soviet bonds became more strong. In November 1949, the Communist Information Bureau adopted three resolutions which called for a unified assault on the militaristic designs of the Anglo-American bloc.<sup>18</sup> On the occasion of Mao's visit to Moscow in middle of December, Eugeni Zhukov, a Soviet commentator, wrote in the New Times that the Chinese revolution was a precursor of Communist rebellions in the whole of the colonial world.<sup>19</sup> Emphasizing the role played by the Soviet Union in the Communist victory in China, another commentator named Yurev said

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15 U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), Annex 120, pp. 720-9. Cited hereinafter as China White Paper.

16 New York Times, 2 July 1949, p. 4.

17 Propaganda Department of the South China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Kan-Pu Hsueh-Hsi Tzu-Liao (Study Materials for Cadres) (Canton, 1950), vol. 3, pp. 9-10. Cited in Henry Wei, China and Soviet Russia (New York, 1956), p. 265.

18 New York Times, 29 November 1949, p. 5.

19 Ibid., 29 January 1950, p. 5.

on the Moscow Home Service on 27 December 1949 that the CCP had worked in close co-operation with the CPSU.<sup>20</sup>

Sino-Soviet friendship took further strides when in December 1949 Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, went to Moscow to negotiate a treaty of friendship. Six weeks of discussions between Mao and Stalin led to the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid on 14 February 1950. According to the published terms of the agreement the Soviet Union not only promised to provide economic assistance worth \$300,000,000 in the next five years, but also agreed to withdraw from Port Arthur and Dairen.<sup>21</sup> The treaty forged a military alliance between the two nations. Chou En-lai said that the treaty "welded together the two countries into a force of 700 million people which it is impossible to defeat".<sup>22</sup> The Peking radio called it as "only the start".<sup>23</sup> Commenting on the treaty one commentator in the Far Eastern Survey wrote that it demonstrated to the West that "hopes for Titoism in China were premature, if not baseless".<sup>24</sup>

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20 See U.S. Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), p.4951.

21 Wei, n. 17, pp. 266-77.

22 Congressional Quarterly, China and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 9.

23 New York Times, 7 April 1950, p. 15.

24 Robert C. North, "The Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1950", Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 19, 12 July 1950, p. 126. During this time the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association of China was actively promoting the cause of Sino-Soviet friendship. See Klaus H. Pringsheim, "The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, October 1949 - October 1951" (Master's thesis, University of Columbia, New York, 1959), pp. 109-11.

DETERIORATING SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

While there were indications pointing to closer Sino-Soviet affinity, evidence suggested that Sino-American relations were fast deteriorating. On 3 October 1949, Michael J. McDermott, a spokesman of the State Department, declared that the new government did not offer any "assurance that this regime is prepared to assume the international obligations which devolved upon a government of China". He clarified that any government seeking diplomatic recognition from the United States must fulfil three conditions; (a) it should actually control the area it represented; (b) it should fulfil its international obligations; and (c) it should govern with the consent of the ruled.<sup>25</sup>

The Government of China not only showed its indifference to such American pronouncements but it intensified the "Hate America" campaign and started harrassing American diplomatic and consular representatives and private citizens in China. The U.S. Military Attache to China, General Robert B. Soule, then in Nanking, and three members of the American consulate in Shanghai were refused exit visas.<sup>26</sup> On 29 October, Angus I. Ward, the American Consul General in Mukden, and four of his colleagues<sup>27</sup> were arrested on the charge of beating a former Chinese employee. The American Government strongly protested against these acts and on 16 November Dean Acheson indignantly stated that under such situation the United States would not have the luxury of even

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25 New York Times, 4 October 1949, p. 1.

26 Ibid., 27 October 1949, p. 9.

27 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 21, 21 November 1949, p. 759.

considering the question of Chinese recognition.<sup>28</sup>

Communist hostility continued unabated. On 26 November it was reported that William N. Stokes, the American Vice-Consul in Mukden, had been arrested for espionage, a charge which the State Department characterized as "absolutely false".<sup>29</sup> The Chinese did not allow some important American businessmen to leave the country and when American ships came to evacuate 2,000 stranded foreigners, including 400 Americans, they were refused permission to enter the Shanghai port.<sup>30</sup>

Besides harassing American officials and private citizens, the Chinese also seized American property. The consular property in Peking was seized on the ground that the land was acquired under the unequal treaties. These acts infuriated the American policy makers. Tom Connally (Dem., Tex.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and John Kee (Dem., W. Va.), Chairman<sup>31</sup> of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, denounced the actions. In March 1950, several thousand bales of American raw cotton were seized by the Chinese. George St. Louis, till recently director of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Shanghai made futile efforts to persuade the Chinese to an orderly distribution of the cotton, and to the use of the proceeds by a non-political, all Chinese board of trustees appointed by the Chinese authority<sup>32</sup> with the ECA concurrence. In May two U.S.-owned buildings were

<sup>28</sup> New York Times, 17 November 1949, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 27 November 1949, p. 1.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 9 March 1950, p. 14; 23 March 1950, p. 19; 23 April 1950, p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 15 January 1950, p. 1.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 3 June 1950, p. 4.

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seized in Canton.

#### OPINIONS IN THE CONGRESS

The developments in China became the subject of a heated debate in the Congress. In the beginning it centred round the issue of recognition of the new Chinese government but later matters such as the defence of Formosa and the Chinese entry into the United Nations were also brought in. Although the Senators and the Congressmen generally did not directly refer to the question of Sino-Soviet relationship, in this emotionally charged debate they were obsessed with the growing influence of communism in the world and the danger it posed to American interest. In discussing this subject they inevitably came to the question of the course which the Sino-Soviet relations were likely to take.

The Senators opposed to the Truman Administration's handling of the China policy used the occasion of the nomination hearing of W. Walton Butterworth as the Assistant Secretary of State on 27 September 1949 to launch their attack. The supporters of the administration rallied to strongly support the nomination. Whereas Senator Connally supported the nomination, Senator William F. Knowland (Rep., Cal.) opposed it. Connally was supported by Senators Allen J. Ellender (Dem., La.), J. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.), Elbert D. Thomas (Dem., Utah). Senator Knowland had the strong endorsement of Senator Styles Bridges (Rep., N.H.). From the party affiliation of prominent Senators the debate gave the impression of a partisan battle.

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33 Ibid., 20 May 1950, p. 6.

34 Congressional Record, 81, I, Senate, 27 September 1949, vol. 95, pp. 13577-87.

Senator Knowland said that Butterworth was a symbol of the Administration's failure in China. Senator Connally argued that the nominee was not personally responsible for whatever might have been done by the Administration with regard to China. While defending Butterworth, Senator Connally and other Democrats did not whole-heartedly support Administration's China policy.<sup>35</sup>

Both Knowland and Bridges repeatedly stressed in their speeches that the Chinese revolution had been engineered and directed by the Soviet Union and therefore the China problem should be taken as seriously as the East European problem. They said that the developments in China should be seen in the context of the Cold War. Senator Bridges said that "there is no question at all ... that we failed free China, our friend, and by our inaction have helped to establish in China a government which looks upon America and the rest of the free world through the eyes of Moscow".<sup>36</sup> Senator Knowland read into the Congressional Record a number of newspaper articles which reflected the view that the Soviet Union and China were united. He cited an article from the New York Times of 24 September 1949 entitled "People's Democracy" which had questioned the popular base of the new Chinese government. The article alleged that China was run by a handful of people who received their mandates from Moscow. Knowland included yet another article into the Record from the New York Herald Tribune which had appeared on 24 September 1949. The article similarly alleged that the Chinese leadership was totally subservient to the Soviet Union. It went on to predict

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35 See Ibid.

36 Ibid., p. 13577.



that the Chinese people would not tolerate for long the  
 subservience of their leaders to the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup>

The Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Connally, said nothing in the debate on Sino-Soviet relations which would have contradicted Senator Knowland's and Senator Bridges' contention. From his silence one can possibly infer his concurrence on the subject. It should be noted in this connexion that Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, a distinguished Democrat and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, had said in a radio broadcast :

I don't think there's any doubt that Russia is behind them [Chinese Communists]. I don't think there is any doubt that Russia is sympathetic and reasonably supporting these Communist forces. Indeed, the leaders of the Communist forces in China have been briefed and schooled to a considerable extent in Moscow and other places in Russia and are sympathetic to the Communist doctrine. 38

Knowland cited Senator Tydings with great relish.

The severity of the Republican attack against the Administration went on increasing. On 4 October 1949, Senator Knowland again reiterated in the Senate the close relationship between the Soviet Union and China and strongly opposed the idea of recognizing China. He read into the Congressional Record an editorial from the New York Times which had precluded any possibility of Mao emerging as an Asian Tito and had argued  
 that Chinese subservience to Moscow would continue.<sup>39</sup>

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37 Ibid., p. 13583.

38 Ibid., p. 13582.

39 Ibid., p. 14048.

Two days later, the Administration was again assailed by Senator Irving M. Ives (Rep., N.Y.). He was angry not against the Chinese Communists but against the Chinese Nationalists who had seized two American flag ships on 29 September 1949. He accused the Administration of having no policy in China. "If the Government", he said, "does not want us to call at China, we will not call at China, but you [Mr. Acheson] must say so, and you have not told us so."<sup>40</sup>

On 11 October, Senator Knowland again took the floor and listed a number of reasons that should preclude the United States from recognizing China. He felt that there was neither "at this time" nor "in the immediate future" any basis for recognition.<sup>41</sup> Sometime later Senator Connally expressed the same view. Although he was one of the strongest supporters of the Administration's foreign policy he felt outraged at the irresponsible actions the Chinese Communists had taken against the foreign nationals and property.<sup>42</sup>

Early in January 1950, Congressman Walter Judd (Rep., Minn.) who subsequently was to become one of the most militant anti-Communists in the United States, went to the extent of suggesting that Britain should be denied economic aid if it recognized China. He felt that China was "a partner of the Kremlin" and the British recognition would only jeopardize the common cause against "world communism".<sup>43</sup> Senator Knowland reiterated the monolithic character

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40 Ibid., p. 14258.

41 Ibid., 81, I, vol. 95 (1949), p. 14180.

42 New York Times, 30 December 1949, p. 3.

43 Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), p. 14.

of communism and wanted to know why the United States should fight communism in Europe and not in Asia.<sup>44</sup> Identical views were expressed by Senator Alexander Smith (Rep., N.J.) who emphasized the close link between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union.<sup>45</sup> Senator Robert A. Taft (Rep., Ohio) was of the view that America should take responsibility for the defence of Formosa and pleaded for a strong anti-Communist policy in Asia. He criticized the Administration's stand on Formosa and said that it was "entirely inconsistent with the position this country took on Greece under almost the same circumstances". Other Republicans who opposed the Administration's China policy included William Jenner (Rep., Indiana), Leverett Saltonstall (Rep., Mass.) and Eugene Millikin (Rep., Colorado).<sup>46</sup> The main thrust of the Republican attack was that the Chinese communism was merely a part of the international Communist movement guided by Moscow and there was equally pressing need to devote as much attention to the threat posed by China to the Asian countries as had been devoted to expansionist thrusts in Europe.

The dissatisfaction which the Congress felt over the handling of the China policy by the Administration was to some extent felt by the Democrats also. They valiantly tried to defend the beleaguered Truman Administration as they could but their dissatisfaction sometimes spilled over. When, for instance, Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa) alleged that the State

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44 Ibid., p. 81.

45 Ibid., pp. 85-86.

46 Ibid., pp. 89-98.

Department had suppressed the Wedemeyer Report, Senator Connally ironically remarked that it was a "vivid illustration of the bipartisan nature of the policy". The Democrats, he contended, had been kept in as much dark as their fellow Republicans.<sup>47</sup>

Whether it was a question of recognition or the Chinese entry into the United Nations, the Republicans were for adopting a hard line towards China. Their attacks on the Administration's "do nothing" policy went unabated and subsequently assumed hysterical overtones which found expression in McCarthyism.

In February 1950, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Rep., Wis.) stormed the United States by his hysterical outbursts against Communist conspiracy within the country. He accused the State Department of its failure in China and blamed it for its sympathy for communism.<sup>48</sup> He branded Owen Lattimore, one of the top advisers of the United States Government on Far Eastern policy and was sent by the State Department as aide to Chiang in 1941-42, as "the top Russian espionage agent" in America collaborating with those "who have sworn to destroy the nation by force and violence". He demanded the dismissal of Secretary Acheson for his friendship with Alger Hiss<sup>49</sup> and accused John Stewart Service, a US foreign

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47 Ibid., pp. 100-2.

48 New York Times, 12 February 1950, p. 5; 21 February 1950, p. 13  
McCarthy was the culmination of a process. Even before his rise there were Senators like Richard M. Nixon (Rep., Ca.) and Karl Mundt (Rep., S.D.), and Congressmen like Fred E. Busbey (Rep., Ill.) and George A. Dondero (Rep., Mich.) who in their speeches during 1947, 1948 and 1949 alleged that there were people in the Truman Administration who had sympathy for communism.

49 Alger Hiss was accused on 3 August 1948 by Whittaker Chambers as a member of a pre-war Communist apparatus in Washington. A libel suit brought by Hiss against his accuser led to the production by Chambers of State Department classified documents allegedly turned over to him by Hiss. On 17 November 1948, Hiss was sentenced to prison for five years.

service officer in China and General Joseph Stilwell's political adviser, as being on a "mission to communize the world".<sup>50</sup> Scores of other State Department and Foreign Service personnels were also accused of being Communists and pro-Communists and President Truman was branded as a "prisoner" in the hands of an influential group of left-oriented intellectuals.<sup>51</sup>

There were a few important newspapers which were not taken in by McCarthy's hysterical attacks against the "Communist conspirators". After McCarthy's attack on Lattimore and John Paton Davies, who had served as General Joseph Stilwell's political adviser, the Washington Post observed that the nation's capital had been "seized and convulsed by a terror" for weeks. McCarthyism, the Post rightly pointed, was in fact an "assault on freedom of inquiry" and showed "the intolerance of opposition".<sup>52</sup>

The result of the rise of McCarthyism was that every American in the decision making process was scared of being identified as a Communist and avoided the impression that he was sympathetic to the Communist China. The same point was stressed by Owen Lattimore. He argued that the China lobby and its friends in the Congress had prevented the United States from bringing into existence a moderate Government in China and thereby forced the United States to follow a policy that resulted in "putting China" completely under the Communist control. This was because, Lattimore argued, the Americans had developed a blind

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50 New York Times, 9 March 1950, p. 1; 15 March 1950, p. 1.

51 Ibid., 21 February 1950, p. 13; 24 February 1950, p. 4.

52 See James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (Boston, 1970), p. 66.

spot against the word "communism". They reacted to it emotionally rather than rationally. The crux of his argument was that if the United States showed more respect for their independence to the Communists who were also nationalists, they would have found "ways of getting along with us". But the State Department was in danger of being assailed if it took advantage of this fact.<sup>53</sup> The subsequent development of Sino-Soviet relations only demonstrated the wisdom of Lattimore's foresight.<sup>54</sup>

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53 Owen Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander (Boston, 1960), pp. 227-8. As the McCarthyite attacks grew, Joseph Alsop became outraged. It is to be noted that Alsop had criticized the Truman Administration's China policy. See n. 11. He later on testified on behalf of the China hands and about Lattimore he said: "Lattimore was a perfect fool, of course. It's awful to have to defend fools and knaves, but sometimes you do have to.... And there is a difference between foolishness and treason." See David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1972), pp. 115-16.

54 Writing about the American domestic scene which was convulsed by McCarthyism Louis J. Halle, a noted author and former member of the State Department policy planning staff, commented in the New York Times Magazine of 6 June 1971:

We interpreted the advent to power in China of Mao Tse-tung's Communist regime ... as the conquest of China by Moscow. There were those among us who knew the historical, geographical and strategic circumstances that, in the long run, made everything but conflict between Mao and Moscow. They were, however, intimidated into silence, or if they tried to speak out their careers and reputations were ruined by accusations of treason.

See New York Times, 6 June 1971, p. VI:36. See also Felix Greene, The Enemy: Notes on Imperialism and Revolution (London, 1970), pp. 206-7; A.T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966), p. 38.

## WHAT THE MEDIA AND ACADEMY FELT

While the members of the Congress showed overwhelming concern with the danger which the emergence of Communist China posed to the United States, the writers and the publicists gave expression to divergent points of views. To some it appeared that as part of international Communist movement the Chinese would only enhance the power and influence of the Soviet Union. Others argued that sooner or later the Chinese were likely to emerge as an independent force.

Some writers argued that ideological, military and economic compulsions would keep the two countries united. George Creel, a noted author and a veteran of the Wilson Administration, was of the view that "Communist China is Russia's China".<sup>55</sup> S.B. Thomas, the editor of the Far East Digest, felt that the Soviet Union was making headway into almost all aspects of Chinese life, of course with Chinese approval. He visualized the possibility that Chinese subservience to Russia might be a permanent phenomenon. Illustrating his argument by taking the example of the Chinese education policy, he wrote: "In accordance with the Peking Government's stated policy there have been a corresponding emphasis on Russian literature, arts and language and general encouragement of study and emulation of Soviet cultural and educational practices."<sup>56</sup>

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55 George Creel, Russia's Race for Asia (New York, 1949), p. 250. Emphasis in the original.

56 S.B. Thomas, "Recent Educational Policy in China", Pacific Affairs (Richmond, Va.), vol. 23, March 1950, p. 33. A graphic description of the Chinese subservience to Soviet system of education can be found in the article by Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "New China: New Texts", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 19, December 1950, pp. 321-7. For some interesting Chinese eulogies about Russian system see Richard L. Plunkett, "China Views Her Russian Tutor", Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 22, July 1953, p. 101.

Other writers pointed to the Chinese adherence to Marxism-Leninism. Norman D. Palmer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, said that the Chinese leaders not only admitted this but also publicly boasted about it. They belonged, as Mao Tse-tung himself had said, "to the anti-imperialist front headed by the U.S.S.R."<sup>57</sup> Replying to the question whether a development similar to Tito's break with the "workers homeland" would happen to China, Karl A. Wittfogel, Professor of Chinese History at the University of Washington,<sup>58</sup> felt that it was highly improbable. According to him, besides ideological and economic considerations the military and security considerations would also go a long way to prevent a breach between the two Communist giants. He stressed that, unlike Yugoslavia, China was a big nation and so had less fear of being overwhelmed. As China was a big power with a common border with the Soviet Union, the latter was likely to behave more cautiously. According to Wittfogel, in the event of an open conflict between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds, China would have been left with no other alternative than to side with the Soviet Union. As a victorious capitalist world would not tolerate another Communist order in the Far East, similarly a Russian victory also would most probably prove even more disastrous for a neutral China. Chinese leaders, Wittfogel felt, had no illusion about Soviet "magnanimity" under such a situation. The Soviet Union

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57 Norman D. Palmer, "Recognizing China", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 18, February 1950, p. 81.

58 Karl A. Wittfogel, "How to Checkmate Stalin in Asia: An American Policy Geared to Chinese Realities", Commentary (New York), vol. 10, July-December 1950, p. 337.



would take all possible steps to eventually liquidate the Chinese Communist leaders who followed a policy of neutrality in the life and death struggle between the two ideological systems.<sup>59</sup>

Robert Strausz-Hupe who was then in the Political Science Department of the Wharton School in the University of Pennsylvania said that China needed economic assistance and technological know-how for its economic development and industrial growth. According to him, it was apparent that as a Communist state China would first try to get, whatever it could, from the Soviet Union. The latter also would find in the new Communist state a chance of fulfilling its age-old dream of exploiting the natural resources of Manchuria and a warm water outlet to the Pacific. Strausz-Hupe felt that the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 caused "a virtual domination of the Far Eastern littoral".<sup>60</sup>

Frank Graham, President of the North Carolina University, and Lawrence J. McGinley, President of the Fordham University, condemned communism as "totalitarianism" and "atheism".<sup>61</sup> Cyrus Leo Sulzberger and M.S. Handler, distinguished correspondents of the New York Times, characterized communism as an "instrument of the Kremlin" and Chinese communism its pliant tool.<sup>62</sup> Among other distinguished writers who held similar views regarding the close and friendly Sino-Soviet relations were Louis F. Budenz,

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59 Ibid.

60 See Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Manchuria and Mongolia: Red and White Imperialism", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 19, August 1950, pp. 73-77.

61 New York Times, 14 January 1949, p. 1; 14 February 1949, p. 3.

62 Ibid., 16 January 1949, p. 1; 9 October 1949, p. VI:9.

Professor of Economics at Fordham University and formerly the Managing Editor of the Daily Worker, Kenneth Colegrove, Professor of Political Science in the North Western University, and Clyde Farnsworth, the noted journalist.

As distinguished from the group of writers and publicists who believed for one reason or the other that China and the Soviet Union were bound to remain closer, there were others who felt equally strongly that there was chance of their breaking apart. According to them the close and friendly relations were expressions of expediency and they would deteriorate in future. Some of these writers saw no common interest between the two countries. Ideological, economic, historical, cultural and military interests of the two countries were bound to pull them apart.

To Harrison Forman, Mao's ideology and tactics were so different from those of the Soviet leaders that their breaking apart, if not imminent, was only a question of time. As the Soviet Union was quite aware of this, it was behaving very cautiously. From the very warm welcome accorded Mao at his arrival in Moscow in the winter of 1949-50, Forman inferred that the Soviet Union was fearful of Mao's independent outlook. The Soviet hospitality was one of the most elaborate ever given to a foreign dignitary because "Mao Tse-tung was no pipsqueak

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63 Ibid., 24 April 1950, p. 3; 15 March 1950, p. 2; Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), p. A905.

puppet returning to report to his masters"<sup>64</sup>. He was an important leader in the Communist world in his own right. He had conquered a large part of the world and brought one-fourth of its people under the Marxist ideology, an achievement which was not less significant than that of the Soviet Union. He was a colleague of the Soviet leaders and not one to be merely patronized.<sup>65</sup> Had it not been so, John Gunther subsequently asked, why Mao and Stalin had two months of tough negotiations before they could reach an understanding mutually advantageous. Gunther wrote: "The Kremlin does not often spend two months negotiating with a puppet."<sup>66</sup> The Sino-Soviet alliance was not based on love but a common fear of resurrected Japan, and their mutual suspicion of each other.<sup>67</sup> According to Forman, when Mao

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64 Harrison Forman, Blunder in Asia (New York, 1950), p. 176. When Mao reached Moscow, an enterprising Tass reporter asked him, "for how long Mr. Mao Tse-tung, have you come to the U.S.S.R.?" Mao apparently muffed at not being called Comrade replied coldly, "I have come for a few weeks". Then he added, "The length of my sojourn in the USSR depends on the period in which it will be possible to settle questions of interest to the People's Republic of China." See Marvin L. Kalb, Dragon in the Kremlin: A Report on the Russian-Chinese Alliance (London, 1961), pp. 13-14.

65 Forman, n. 64, p. 176.

66 John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea and the Far East (New York, 1951), p. 208. Six weeks of hectic discussion has, however, been interpreted differently by Dr. Franz Michael of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University. Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1965, he said that Mao "had to cool his heels in Moscow for more than 6 weeks before he obtained a not-too-favourable treaty". See U.S. Congress, 89, I, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Hearings, Sino-Soviet Conflict together with Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 10. Emphasis added. Cited hereinafter as Sino-Soviet Conflict Hearings.

67 Gunther, n. 66, pp. 208-9.

went to Moscow "there was blood in his eye"<sup>68</sup> and the Kremlin understood that it had "created something of a Frankenstein's monster"<sup>69</sup>. Expediency, however, made Moscow take a soft line. "It knew better not to antagonize the cocky Chinese reds at a time when the whole cold war with the West virtually hung in the balance. An open break between Red China and Red Russia would be disastrous to the cause of world communism", Forman said.<sup>70</sup> He also expressed the opinion that the Sino-Soviet ideological differences were deep-rooted. "To a Chinese", he wrote, "be he politically red, white or blue, all westerners, including Soviet Russians, are 'upstart long-nosed' barbarians who are his social and intellectual inferiors."<sup>71</sup> This deep-rooted dislike for foreigners which the Chinese had, would probably explain why Mao was reluctant to regard Stalin as a master, politically or otherwise. Stalin and other comrades in Kremlin were at best "spiritual colleagues" of the leaders in Peking and nothing more than that. Chinese Communist ideology was derived directly from Karl Marx and the Chinese Reds were quite insistent about that.<sup>72</sup> Another writer in an

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68 Forman, n. 64, p. 183.

69 Ibid., p. 176.

70 Ibid., p. 184.

71 Ibid., p. 175. Identical views were expressed by Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (Garden City, N.Y., 1949). She wrote: "Their past for a hundred years was determined by every other nation. But now they have conquered their country. China's future will be determined by Chinese." p. 275. It should, however, be noted that Strong was a Communist and she later on renounced the American citizenship and settled in the People's Republic of China.

72 Forman, n. 64, p. 176.

article in the Current History wrote that Mao had always believed that Marxism must be adapted to suit Chinese conditions. He had criticized in the early 1940s the impractical formalism of party workers and constantly warned them against the futility of studying "the abstract principles of Marxism without an accurate knowledge of the practical problem of China".<sup>73</sup>

Some writers saw military and economic considerations as yet other reasons for the eventual discord between the two Communist giants. Some Americans had argued even before the People's Liberation Army had entered Shanghai that the economic situation in China was such that the Chinese Communists could not launch a programme of massive industrialization while at the same time incurring the hostility of the United States.<sup>74</sup> Almost all American observers in China in the past had advocated American aid to induce the new Chinese regime to adopt a businesslike attitude toward the United States and prevent it from becoming a stooge of the Soviet Union.<sup>75</sup> One author, Derk Bodde, pointed out that it would not be so easy for China to completely sever commercial links with the western world with which it had large

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73 Theodore Hsi-en Chen, "Communism Wins", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 19, August 1950, p. 82.

74 Gould, "Cross Purposes in China", Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 9 May 1949, p. 18. Quoted by Tom Engelhardt, "Long Days Journey : American Observers in China, 1948-50", in Burce Douglass and Ross Terrill, eds, China and Ourselves : Explorations and Revisions by a New Generation (Boston, 1970), p. 111.

75 Ibid., pp. 111-12.

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scale trade.

#### ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS ON CHINA POLICY

Shortly after the announcement of the Communist rule in China, the Department of State organized from 6 to 8 October a secret Round Table Conference on China which was attended by twenty-five foreign policy experts and people who had considerable expertise on China. George F. Kennan and Ambassador Leighton Stuart were among the participants but Dean Acheson was conspicuous by his absence. Strong opinion was voiced in the meeting that China and Russia might be on the same side of the fence for the time being due to mutual advantage but their deep-rooted differences would prevent them from becoming permanent partners in progress. American policy had to be more objective and tailored in such a fashion that it could drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. General consensus in the meeting was for the recognition of China.

With the exception of a few like John F. Fairbank of the Harvard University who refused to speculate on the nature of Sino-Soviet relationship most of the participants did express their views on the subject. Fairbank only said that since Russia was an underdeveloped country and was in a close geographical proximity to the Asiatic countries it had a better appeal to the underdeveloped Asian world. He, however, suggested

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76 Derk Bodde, Peking Diary : A Year of Revolution (New York, 1950), p. 265. George B. Cressy, Chairman of the Department of Geography at the Syracuse University and considered to be an authority on Asia, said that it was more useful to harbour friendly relations with China than to follow a policy of hostility. See New York Times, 18 September 1949, p. IV:10.

that it would be of vital interest to the United States in "getting those people on our [United States] side or keeping them out of the other side".<sup>77</sup>

John W. Decker of the International Missionary Council and Harold Stassen of the University of Pennsylvania were among those who felt that the Chinese communism could be regarded as an expansion of the Soviet communism in so far as the United States position in the Cold War was concerned. Stassen felt that the Kremlin considered its interest in Asia more important and an American policy would be deemed as foolish and short-sighted if it evolved a policy for China in isolation. An Asiatic policy was needed to tackle the expansion of communism in the Far East and eastern Asia.<sup>78</sup> Talking about Chinese leadership Decker emphatically said: "I think there is no doubt whatever but that the leadership, the present political leadership, of the present regime in China is Communist and certainly for the time being at least is thoroughly committed to a Russian line."<sup>79</sup> Bernard Brodie of the Yale University, whose major interest was weapons technology and military strategy rather than the Far Eastern politics, argued that the post-war experience with communism in Europe had revealed that the cultural aspect of a country upon which communism was imposed did not have much relevance because communism relied on coercive techniques. He

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77 U.S., Department of State, Transcript of Round Table Discussion on American Policy Toward China, October 6, 7 and 8, 1949 (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 138. Cited hereinafter as Round Table Discussion.

78 Ibid., p. 126.

79 Ibid., p. 104.

advocated that the United States would, therefore, have to face the unpleasant fact of conflict with a potential Sino-Soviet bloc.<sup>80</sup>

While this was one view-point which took the Sino-Soviet bond as strong and lasting there was another, much more emphatic, that doubted very much the reality and effectiveness of the Sino-Soviet friendship. Harold S. Quigley of the University of Minnesota said:

... we cannot conclude ... that Communism in China will be the same thing as Communism in Russia, and it seems to me we must distinguish, therefore in our policy between countries that are Communist of their own choice ... and those that are dominated from outside. And at the present time I would be inclined to say that the burden of proof that Communism in China is merely another brand of Russian is on the person who makes that allegation. 81

Joseph W. Ballantine of the Brookings Institution expressed similar views and said that it might be that Russian domination of China was an accomplished fact but it was not final.<sup>82</sup> Asked by Harold M. Vinacke of the University of Cincinnati about the student response in China, Ambassador Stuart said that it was not the Marxist ideology which rallied the students against the KMT but it was the failure on the part of the KMT to bring changes that had won the students' support for Mao Tse-tung. When they found the United States supporting the KMT, they started identifying Americans with reactionaries. Asked by Quigley whether he believed that "Chinese culture contains powerful

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80 Ibid., p. 190.

81 Ibid., pp. 184-5. Emphasis added.

82 Ibid., p. 100.



forces of resistance to domination by any outside culture?"  
 Stuart replied: "Yes, emphatically."<sup>83</sup> George C. Marshall, former Secretary of State and then associated with the American Red Cross, although evaded to answer categorically as to what would be the reaction of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai if something happened which hurt the interests of China in its dealings with the Soviet Union, expressed the view that Chou En-lai was a great negotiator and he would manage things successfully. About Mao he said that he was "a real iron curtain" which he "could not penetrate" in spite of the fact that he had many frank discussions with him.<sup>84</sup> George F. Kennan urged that the question that China was a Communist country be distinguished from the question of the prospects of a durable Soviet tutelage over the Chinese Communists. The latter was the real problem but Kennan thought that "the Russians are perhaps the people least able to combine with the Chinese in developing the resources of China and producing anything which in a physical sense would be dangerous to us".<sup>85</sup> He felt that in many respects China and Russia were competitors. The produce of the Soviet Siberia which the Soviet Union was in a position to export to China were also in plenty in the Chinese mainland. Japan was in a much better position, Kennan said, to share in the Chinese industrial build-up. He recollected that Stalin too had a similar opinion.<sup>86</sup> According to Kennan:

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83 Ibid., pp. 186-7.

84 Ibid., pp. 408-9.

85 Ibid., p. 24.

86 Ibid.

... the existing industrial plants, skills of Japan, the fact that those are surplus to Japan itself, and have to find some sphere in both the sources of raw materials and markets. In other words, Japan's industrial strength has got to operate in a realm much wider than the Japanese islands themselves, as does that of the British Isles. That is not true of the Russian economy and will not be for I think a long time. Vast sections of the Soviet Union today need very much the same sort of development that China needs and the things they have to offer to the Soviet Government in the way of manpower, etc. are also similar. I mean the Soviet Government is in no great real shortage of manpower which would be what China has to offer. 87

Kenman said that transportation from east to west in Russia was very much underdeveloped and so it would not be advantageous for Russia to intertwine its economy with that of China. He recollected one conversation between Stalin and an American diplomat in which replying to the question what Russia could offer to China, Stalin snorted "rather contemptuously and vigorously" : "What the hell do you think we can give to China? We have a hundred cities of our own to build in the Soviet Far East. If anybody is going to give anything to the Far East I think it's you." Kennan felt that the words were spoken quite seriously.<sup>88</sup> Sharing an almost similar view Edwin O. Reischauer of the Harvard University and an expert on Japan said that the Japanese had an inherent liking for the Chinese (and hatred for the Russians) and this had all the more been increased after

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87 Ibid., pp. 37-38. See also Douglass and Terrill, n. 74, pp. 111-12.

88 Round Table Discussion, n. 77, p. 39. During the Second World War Mao was once branded by Stalin as "margarine communist". See W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation (London, 1971), p. 54.

the defeat of Japan. So far as the United States was concerned it would be a disastrous situation if it seemed to create a wall<sup>89</sup> between China and Japan.

China was bound to knock at the doors of "Uncle Sam" for assistance, it was felt. China needed certain things which the United States alone could provide. Therefore, Arthur M. Holcombe of the Harvard University and Lawrence K. Rossinger of the American Institute of Pacific Relations suggested that the United States should wait and watch up to that opportune<sup>90</sup> moment. Till that time American policy should not be too strong to throw China in the lap of the Soviet Union. Refuting the argument of John D. Rockefeller III of the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund who said that a US trade embargo would put the Chinese economy in a hot soup and thereby discredit the Communist there, Nathaniel Peffer of the Columbia University said that such a policy would be disastrous for the United States.<sup>91</sup> If millions of Chinese starved due to a US embargo then instead of discrediting the Chinese Government that would result in a strong anti-US feeling in China. Peffer said: "Shall we as Americans do most to Keep Russia out by making ourselves as disagreeable as possible, by hanging on us the onus of having starved the Chinese? Is this not ... God's gift to Mr. Stalin."<sup>92</sup> Sharing Peffer's view, Owen

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89 Round Table Discussion, n. 77, p. 476. Kennan even doubted that Russia would want China to become a major military power. See *ibid.*, p. 100.

90 *Ibid.*, pp. 179-81.

91 *Ibid.*, pp. 338-40.

92 *Ibid.*, p. 341. Similar view was also expressed by J. Morden Murphy, a banker, who participated in the discussion. See *ibid.*, pp. 331-2.

Lattimore, an old China hand, and then a professor at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, held that:

... if a country like China, in spite of its communists in the government, is shown that certain conditions of prosperity go better and faster by friendly association with the United States, that is something that automatically weakens the Chinese conviction with Russia. 93

In the Round Table Discussion on China, thus, a majority of the American "Far Eastern experts" expressed the "possibility of converting Mao Tse-tung to Mao Tse-Tito"<sup>94</sup>. Only a very small segment was in favour of taking a hard line.

#### THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS

Against this background, it will be interesting to make an assessment of the Truman Administration's perception of the Sino-Soviet relations. Ever since the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, America had watched the development of communism in any part of the world with concern. To the Americans, even the Chinese civil war was a part of the Cold War. In a memorandum to the National Security Council dated 10 June 1949, Secretary of Defence, Louis Johnson, expressed his anxiety at the growth of communism in Asia and particularly at the success of communism in China. He held that such a situation would "seriously affect the future security of the United States"<sup>95</sup>. The Soviet nuclear explosion followed

93 Ibid., p. 152.

94 Spanier, n. 10, p. 51.

95 See Memorandum of the Secretary of Defence, Louis Johnson, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, dated 10 June 1949, in U.S., Department of Defense, United States Vietnam Relations 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C., 1971), Book 8 of 12, p. 218. Cited hereinafter as Pentagon Papers.

shortly thereafter by the establishment of Communist Government in China made this anxiety all the more acute.

The Truman Administration did not appear to regard Communist China as a threat to the United States by itself. It believed, however, that the Communist triumph in China considerably increased the Soviet capabilities in regard to Asia. Not only that but the Soviet Union now included Chinese territory as part of its power base in the Far East. This thinking was reflected in some of its documents prepared at that time. A National Security Council report on "The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia" dated 23 December 1949<sup>96</sup> expressed grave concern at the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Asia. It argued that before its defeat in the Second World War Japan had served as a check on the Soviet influence in the Far East. Since its defeat the Soviet Union had been "able to consolidate its strategic position until the base of Soviet power in Asia now comprises not only the Soviet Far East, but also China north of the Great Wall, Northern Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles"<sup>97</sup>. The report suggested a very careful and cautious handling of the Chinese situation. It made the assessment that under the existing situation the Chinese Communists would be able to control China and this could enhance the Soviet capabilities. It was argued in the document that should the Soviet Union "attempt to extend to China the pattern of political and economic control and exploitation that has characterized its relations with its European satellites, it is quite possible that serious frictions would develop between the Chinese Communist

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96 N.S.C. 48/1. Ibid., pp. 226-64.

97 Ibid., p. 228.

regime and Moscow." It held, however, that "for the very immediate future it may be assumed that both Kremlin influence on the Chinese communists and Chinese communist control over China will grow more firm and that China will represent a political asset to the USSR in accomplishment of its global objectives"<sup>98</sup>. From this the document concluded that in the foreseeable future it was not possible for the United States to weaken the influence of the Communists in China nor was it advisable to obstruct the efforts of the Chinese Communists to extend control over such Chinese territory as Formosa, for such an action would be capitalised by the Communists to rally all the anti-foreign sentiment in their favour.<sup>99</sup>

The NSC 48/1 was finally approved on 30 December 1949 with a few amendments (NSC 48/2). It laid down premises on which America's China policy was based. It was to be a blending of conciliatory gestures and firm attitudes. It stated clearly:

The United States should exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rift between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where appropriate, covert as well as overt means should be utilized to achieve these objectives. 100

It was decided that the United States would "adopt a posture more hostile or policies more harsh towards the Communist China than towards the USSR"<sup>101</sup>.

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98 Ibid., pp. 243-4.

99 Ibid., p. 244.

100 Report by the National Security Council on The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia. Ibid., p. 270.

101 Ibid.

## AMERICA'S CHINA POLICY

There were three important issues which arose as a result of the establishment of the People's Republic of China. These issues were recognition, Formosa and the entry of the Communist China into the United Nations. The United States was required to take a position on all of them. The Truman Administration decided to adopt the policy of blending conciliatory gestures with firm attitudes.

### Recognition

On 3 October 1949, after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, Michael J. McDermott, a spokesman of the State Department, stated the United States position on recognition. He laid down three prerequisites for recognition: (a) the Communist Government of China should de facto control the areas it represented, (b) it should respect international law, and (c) it should enjoy the consent of the ruled.<sup>102</sup> The spokesman said nothing at all whether these conditions prevailed in China. The United States reserved the right to determine the timing of recognition by interpreting these conditions in the case of China. So far (a) and (c) were concerned, the 1 October Declaration of Mao Tse-tung had already claimed to have represented the entire Chinese people and obviously the people's consent was implied. So far (b), respect for international law, was concerned, China did not show any respect for diplomatic immunities with regard to American diplomats, and American citizens in China were also maltreated, thus providing Americans excuse for non-recognition.

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102 New York Times, 4 October 1949, p. 1; 13 October 1949, p. 19.

Nor there was any indication that China was going to change its attitude towards the United States in near future. The United States was interested in seeing how the Sino-Soviet relations developed before actually granting recognition.

In a closed meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early January 1950, Secretary Acheson outlined the United States policy on Chinese recognition.<sup>103</sup> He stated that since the United States was not very sure whether the new regime in China would protect the safety of American citizens and live up to its obligations under the law of the nations, there was "no need for haste".<sup>104</sup> On 18 January, at his Press conference he said that by evicting the American diplomatic personnels from Peking, China had showed its unwillingness and utter indifference to the American recognition.<sup>105</sup>

#### Representation in the United Nations

In the autumn of 1949 the most widely accepted view on the question of representation of China in the United Nations was that it should be first determined by the Security Council to be followed by other UN organs. On 18 November 1949, Chou

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103 Ibid., 11 January 1950, p. 3.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., 19 January 1950, p. 1. Subsequently, addressing the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, the American Ambassador to India Loy Wesley Henderson said on 27 March 1950 that the US non-recognition of China had nothing to do with the fact that it was controlled by the Communists nor that many of the areas in China were directly or indirectly under the control of the Soviet Union but it was due to Chinese indifference towards American friendly gestures. See Times of India (New Delhi), 28 March 1950.



En-lai sent a telegram to the UN Secretary General demanding that the Communist China should replace the Nationalist China as the legitimate member of the United Nations.<sup>106</sup> Dr. Twigfu F. Tsiang, the leader of the Nationalist delegation, strongly opposed this. Branding the Communist regime as a "puppet regime", he argued that they did not have any authority to challenge the Nationalist representation in the United Nations. The Soviet Union favoured the Communist Government of China and attacked the Nationalist delegation.<sup>107</sup>

In the debate which ensued, the United States representative Philip C. Jessup criticized the Soviet Union for violating the Yalta agreement and the UN Charter. He also accused the Soviet Union of encroaching upon the Chinese territories. He then emphasized that it was perfectly within the right of any people to choose their own government. He said:

While it was for the people of China to decide the nature of their future institutions and policy, the United States believed that the General Assembly should work for the re-establishment of international conditions which would make it possible for the Chinese people to determine these matters freely without outside interference. 108.

A draft resolution (A/C.1/552) which the United States submitted urged all states to (a) "to respect the political independence of China, and to be guided by the principles of the United Nations in their relations with China;

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106 General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), yr 4, mtg 338, 25 November 1949, p. 339.

107 Ibid., pp. 339-40.

108 GAOR, yr 4, mtg 339, 28 November 1949, p. 349.

(b) "to respect the right of the people of China now and in the future to choose freely their political institutions, and to maintain a government independent of foreign control;

(c) "to respect existing treaties relating to China;  
and

(d) "to refrain from seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign-controlled regimes within the territory of China and to refrain from seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China."<sup>109</sup>

The resolution sponsored by the United States did not deal with the issue of representation of China at all. It side-stepped the issue. In fact it was directed against the Soviet Union by inclusion of such phrases as "respect the political independence of China", "refrain from seeking to acquire spheres of influence", "create foreign-controlled regimes" in China, and "refrain from seeking to obtain special rights and privileges". These were injunctions for the Soviet Union. As far as the new regime was concerned the resolution said nothing at all.

The United States declared that the issue of admission of China was a procedural one. Ernest Gross, the United States delegate, expressed strong opposition to any change in the representation and said:

... the United States Government considers that the Soviet draft resolution [to replace the Nationalist delegate] presents to the Council a procedural question involving the credentials of a representative of a member. Accordingly, a vote against the motion by my Government could not be considered as a veto .... [It] will

accept the decision of the Security Council on this matter when made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 110

It is interesting to note that when the Soviet proposal (S/1443), pleading for the Chinese Communist entry and eviction of the Nationalists, was voted out on 13 January 1950, it was rejected by 6 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions.<sup>111</sup>

With a view to resolve the complex problem of China's membership in the United Nations, Secretary General Trygve Lie evolved a formula. On 8 March 1950, he circulated among the members of the Security Council a memorandum entitled "Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation in the United Nations". In this document the Secretary General argued that the recognition of a government and a vote to accept that government in the UN were two entirely different issues. He suggested that even without recognizing a government one could vote for its admission into the United Nations.<sup>112</sup> By accepting the formula in Lie memorandum the United States could easily side-step the problem of recognition and support China's admission into the United Nations as a de facto government. Yet the US Deputy Representative Ernest Gross had no hesitation in turning down the solution recommended by the memorandum. He declared that since the United States had not recognized China its affirmative

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110 Security Council Official Records (SCOR), yr 5, mtg 461, 13 January 1950, p. 6.

111 Ibid., p. 9.

112 New York Times, 9 March 1950, p. 16. The day Lie Memorandum was circulated, Secretary Acheson in a Press Conference expressed almost identical views. See Washington Post, 9 March 1950, p. 1.

vote for China's representation in the UN would amount to seating of the Chinese representative and unseating of the Nationalist representative.<sup>113</sup> The stand taken by Gross was in no way different from the stand adopted by the United States in January 1950 when the Security Council had debated the Soviet resolution seeking the expulsion of the Nationalist China from the United Nations. The pro-Nationalist elements in the United States were strongly opposed to the formula contained in the Lie Memorandum and the Truman Administration's own attitudes were not different.<sup>114</sup>

John Foster Dulles, whom the Truman Administration brought in as consultant from 6 April 1950, was theoretically sympathetic to the suggestion that China be recognized. In his book War or Peace published on 19 April 1950 he observed:

If the communist government of China in fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance, then, it too should be admitted to the United Nations. However, a regime that claims to have become the government of a country through civil war should not be recognized until it has been tested over a reasonable period of time. 115

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113 Ibid.

114 See Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), pp. 3180, A2488, A4426, A4547; New York Times, 9 March 1950, p. 16; Washington Post, 9 March 1950, p. 10; The Nation (New York), vol. 170, 6 May 1950, p. 423.

115 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1950), p. 190. Emphasis added. Advance copies of Dulles' book were sent to the Secretary General and leading delegations in the UN. The New York Times commented that it was expected to influence the current deadlock in the Security Council. See New York Times, 18 April 1950, p. 1. It may be noted here that in 1917 when Dulles was twenty-one, he was sent to Costa Rica by his uncle Robert Lansing, the then Secretary of State, to look into the case of American

In the assessment of Dulles, before recognition could be granted to China it was essential that "a reasonable period of time" must pass. Thus in operational terms Dulles too was in favour of suspending the issue of recognition of China for the time being.

On 30 May 1950, Acheson reaffirmed that the United States would abide by the majority decision of the Security Council and that it did not desire to use its veto to keep the Communist China out of the United Nations.<sup>116</sup> The "do-nothing" policy of the United States was again manifested in Dulles' memorandum submitted on 6 June 1950. The memorandum suggested that instead of allowing either Communist China or Taiwan to have a UN seat, both the Chinese governments should be represented in the United Nations eaching having a separate vote in case of their disagreement and two votes should be counted as one in case of their agreement.<sup>117</sup>

Some writers have taken the view that the United States by regarding the issue of China's representation as procedural

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recognition of Costa Rica. Dulles had recommended for recognition saying that mere non-recognition had no potency unless accompanied by positive action. He had also argued for recognition of the Soviet Union in 1924 and 1933. See Michael A. Guhin, "The United States and the Chinese People's Republic : The Non-recognition Policy Reviewed", International Affairs (London), vol. 45, January 1969, pp. 50-54.

116 New York Times, 31 May 1950, p. 28. The same view was reiterated by Acheson before an informal gathering of Senators and Congressmen on 31 May. See ibid., 1 June 1950, p. 1.

117 Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement With Japan (Princeton, N.J., 1963), pp. 99-101, 127-8.

and not substantive indicated that its position was flexible, while others have argued that in declaring the issue procedural the United States had fully taken into calculation the composition of the Security Council. It knew very well that a vote in the Security Council could not go against the position it would advocate. This writer is of the view that the American position was comparatively less rigid at this stage as compared to later on when the United States was ready to use its veto to bar the Chinese entry into the United Nations.

### The Formosa Question

The third and more complex issue was that of the United States relations with the Nationalist government now located in Taiwan which still claimed to be the legal government of entire China. On 12 October 1949, a consensus was reached among the Army, Navy and Air Force and the State Department that Taiwan would be conquered by the Communists by the end of 1950. Colonel Allan R. McCann, Vice-Admiral, US Navy, believed that the Communists were in a position to take over Taiwan even without a full-scale invasion. The unpopularity of Chiang Kai-shek was one of the reasons that would make the defence of Taiwan against the Communists almost impossible. <sup>118</sup> A C.I.A. estimate dated 19 October 1949 (ORE 76-49, concurred in by the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force) stated that the Communist capabilities were such that only "extended U.S. military occupation and control of Taiwan ... [could] prevent its eventual capture and subjugation

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118 See Pentagon Papers, n. 95, p. 245.

by Chinese communist forces". If, however, the United States failed to take this action the Communists would conquer the island "by the end of 1950"<sup>119</sup>.

Thus it was evident that no amount of political, economic and logistic support could save the Nationalist regime on Taiwan from being eventually overrun by the Communist forces on the mainland. The State Department had already reached the conclusion that physical military occupation of Taiwan should not be undertaken. Subsequently Secretary Acheson explained to the joint meeting of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services that as only physical occupation of the island could save Taiwan any further military assistance as was being proposed by the Defence Department would have been ineffective and "we would involve ourselves with further damage to our prestige and to our whole position in the Far East"<sup>120</sup>.

After the Nationalist Army had completely withdrawn from the Chinese mainland and moved over to Taiwan, Secretary of Defence Louis A. Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the Taiwan situation. They recommended that a fact-finding commission should be sent to the island. The State Department, however, disagreed with the proposal.<sup>121</sup> On 22 December, the President told Secretary Johnson that while he "did not

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119 Ibid.

120 U.S. Congress, 82, I, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 1674-5. Cited hereinafter as Military Situation in the Far East.

121 Ibid., p. 1674.

disagree with the military considerations", he would go along  
 with the State Department on political grounds.<sup>122</sup>

The Truman Administration was under intense pressure from the militant members of Congress who demanded American support for the Nationalist regime. They detested the idea that Taiwan too would be overrun by the Communists. The State Department understood the political and military reality very well but they could not ignore their critics. As a result when the National Security Council met on 30 December with President Truman in the chair, it laid down that the United States should not allow Taiwan to collapse. It was decided to use diplomatic and economic means to continue to pursue the policy of denying Formosa and Pescadores to the Chinese Communists. The United States policy-makers also understood that it might not be possible for the United States to save Formosa from the Communists merely through diplomatic means. The National Security Council, therefore, suggested that "the United States should make every effort to strengthen the overall U.S. position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan".<sup>123</sup> Probably this measure was intended to deter any further expansionist move from any quarter, either by China or by any combination of Powers.

The Truman Administration was placed in an extremely difficult situation. It was not in a position to use sufficient means at its disposal to attain its objectives. Pressurized from different sides it made concessions here and there often making its China policy more and more inconsistent. After having taken

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122 Ibid., p. 2578.

123 Pentagon Papers, n. 95, p. 271.



the decision in the National Security Council that the United States would support Taiwan with diplomatic and economic means and continue to pursue the policy of denying Formosa and Pescadores islands to the Chinese Communists the President himself declared that he regarded Taiwan as part of China and the situation in China as nothing more than a civil war in which the United States had no intention to intervene. In a speech made on 5 January 1950 President Truman reaffirmed the US support of the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 as well as the Potsdam Declaration of 20 July 1945, which had promised the restoration of Taiwan to China. The President went on to say:

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights and privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items when they consider necessary for the defense of the island. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance. 124

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Conally reported to the Press that Secretary of Defence Johnson and General Omar N. Bradley, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had testified before his Committee that they had seen the President's

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124 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 16 January 1950, p. 79.

statement only a short time before it was made and that both had  
 "approved and confirmed it".<sup>125</sup>

On the same day the President made his statement, Secretary Acheson made it clear that the President's statement was to counter the argument that the United States should take steps not to allow Taiwan to fall to communism. He said that it "is not the function of the United States nor will it or can it attempt to furnish a will to resist and a purpose for resistance to those who must provide for themselves."<sup>126</sup> The United States was fully conscious that if it intervened in Formosa it could create an unsurmountable obstacle in the future improvement of relations. The State Department even brought the Sino-Soviet relations into focus. Replying to a House Foreign Affairs Committee report regarding US economic aid for Formosa and related matters, the State Department said on 8 February 1950:

... we do not wish to create a Formosa irredenta issue about which the Chinese Communists could rally support within China and with which they could divert attention from Soviet actions in the North. We must not place ourselves in the unenviable position of the USSR with regard to the integrity of China and must remain free to take the position that any one who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our interests. 127

It is possible that the United States concluded that the energy of the new regime of China would be so much absorbed in

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125 New York Times, 27 January 1950, p. 9; 9 February 1950, p. 2.

126 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 16 January 1950, p. 81.

127 New York Times, 9 February 1950, p. 2. State Department reply to questions contained in House Resolution 452, H. Rept. 81-1618, 9 February 1950, quoted in Congressional Quarterly, China and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 26.

the consolidation of the gains in the mainland that they could not undertake the difficult task of launching a naval operation against Taiwan hundred miles off-shore. It required an amphibious capability which the Communists did not have. To Americans, an immediate Chinese military action against Taiwan appeared unlikely. However, this was equally clear that the United States did not desire Taiwan to be under the control of an enemy. The US military leaders during this period constantly emphasized the strategic importance of Taiwan for the United States. In his testimony on the military situation in the Far East, Acheson later affirmed that during the period between August 1948 and June 1950 great strategic importance was attached to Taiwan. General MacArthur and General Bradley also testified that they regarded Taiwan as strategically very significant.

#### THE SOVIET CONNECTION

The American position on the three specific issues as well as its overall policy posture towards China were determined to a considerable extent by its calculations of China's Soviet

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128 Actually the Taiwanese navy had an edge over the Communist Chinese navy. It blockaded the Communist controlled ports of Shanghai, Tientsin and Tsingta. The United States opposed it as it considered that such a blockade was ineffective. There were reports of shelling of American ships by the Nationalists and on 6 October 1949 Secretary Acheson warned them against such action. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 21, 11 July 1949, p. 35; Far Eastern Survey (New York), vol. 19, 22 March 1950, p. 60.

129 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 120, pp. 1671-2.

130 New York Times, 2 January 1950, p. 2.

connection. That the Soviet Union was never far from their minds when they were speaking about China becomes apparent from important statements during this period. On 12 January 1950, in an important speech delivered before the National Press Club, Secretary Acheson dwelt on Soviet intentions in China considerably. He contrasted at length the Soviet policy of dominance with what he called American traditional friendship towards China. He declared that American policy towards China was based upon the traditional principle that whosoever violated the independence and territorial integrity of China would be acting "contrary to American interests"<sup>131</sup>. He professed that this concern for the territorial integrity and independence of China was not the result of mere anti-communism. In contrast to the American attitude which were based on principles, said the Secretary of State, the Soviet Union had long-cherished ambitions which encroached upon this freedom. He reiterated;

The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long antedates Communism. This is not something that has come out of Communism at all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This Communistic concept and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration. 132

According to Acheson, Soviet "imperialism" constituted a great menace to the Communist China. He pointed out that the traditional geo-political considerations would certainly come in the way of closer relationship between the two countries despite the fact that both were Communist. The Secretary of

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131 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 23 January 1950, p. 114.

132 Ibid., p. 115.

State went on to allege that the Soviet Union "is detaching the northern provinces (areas) of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in Manchuria and I am sure that in Inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are many happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow". This he described as the "single most significant, most important fact".<sup>133</sup>

The Secretary of State was vehemently opposed to the view that the United States should bring about the collapse of the Communist regime in China. If the Americans pursued such a course it would only succeed in deflecting from the Russians to themselves "the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people". The Russians by their own actions in Northern China had opted for this position.<sup>134</sup>

Acheson's futuristic perception was that the Russian quest for spheres of interest in Manchuria and North China would alienate Chinese nationalism. He also thought that the Chinese leaders had shown themselves to be completely subservient to the Soviet leadership. They had shown that they "served not the interests of China but those of another nation". Thus they would be eventually identified with foreign domination which "was still hidden behind the facade of crusading movement,

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133 Ibid.

134 Ibid. Moscow's sensitivity towards this uncomfortable criticism was evident when Vyshinsky angrily denounced Acheson's statement as "false" and "slanderous". See Shao Chuan Leng, "The Chance of Titoism in China", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 21, December 1951, p. 344. It is ironical that when ten years later Sino-Soviet antagonism became quite visible it was due to a growing impatience of China with the Soviet Union's alleged softness toward the United States.

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whose roots were indigenous and national". But this could not go on for ever and "the profound civilization and democratic individualism" of China was bound to reassert itself. <sup>136</sup> Alternatively, the Chinese leaders would themselves emerge as Asian Titos. The conclusion followed that if the United States refrained from interfering in China, sooner or later the Soviets by their tendency to impose their will were bound to create a government in China which could be acceptable to the United States. Expressing the very same sentiment President Truman had written in 1949 to Arthur B. Vandenberg, "I think you will find that the Russians will help establish a Chinese government that we can recognize and support". <sup>137</sup>

When the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship was concluded on 14 February 1950, Acheson called Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai as "agents" of the Soviet Union. According to him the Chinese leaders were dissatisfied with the developments that were taking place in their country and that was why they were invited to

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135 Ibid. For an interesting attempt to use the Yugoslav situation to promote conflicts between nationalism and communism in Asia see the State Department's statement of 16 September 1948, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 19, 26 September 1948, p. 410. It can also be noted that when on 30 January 1950 Moscow recognized the Vietnamese government of Ho Chi Minh, Secretary Acheson expressed his displeasure and said that it should "remove all illusion to the nationalist nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims, and reveals Ho in his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indo-China". See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 13 February 1950, p. 244. See also Freda Utley, The China Story (Chicago, 1951), pp. 85-86.

136 China White Paper, n. 15, pp. xvi-xvii.

137 Quoted in Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York, 1973), p. 412.

Moscow. They were "thoroughly indoctrinated" and "they returned to China prepared to resort to any means whatsoever to establish Communist control".<sup>138</sup> This statement would suggest that the Secretary was not aware of the difficulties which existed between the two countries. As we now know, the Chinese leaders were reluctant to make the concessions which Stalin demanded of them. Eventually they accepted because they saw no way out of their difficulties. They could not simultaneously oppose the Soviet Union as well as the United States.<sup>139</sup>

On 15 March 1950, Secretary Acheson again spoke on China before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco. He said:

The Soviet Union and its most ardent supporters in China may have temporary success in persuading the people of China that these agreements refute the contention of the non-Communist world that alliance with Soviet Russia holds an evil omen of imperialistic domination. These agreements promise help in the rehabilitation of China's war-torn and impoverished economy. They promise, in particular, assistance in the repair and development of China's railroads and industry. The Chinese people may welcome these promises and assurances. But they will not fail, in time, to see where they fall short of China's real needs and desires. And they will wonder about the points upon which the agreements remain silent. 140

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138 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 20 March 1950, p. 428.

139 Mao recalled later: "Our attitude was like this: 'If I disagree with your [Soviet Union's] proposal I shall struggle against it. But if you [Soviet Union] really insist then I shall accept it'." Quoted in John Gittings, The World and China: 1922-1972 (London, 1974), p. 237.

140 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 27 March 1950, p. 468.

The Secretary reiterated that the Sino-Soviet treaty had been "forced upon" the Chinese people. They had neither freely chosen their own leaders nor had they opted for a "status within the orbit of the Soviet Union". He again stressed that the United States had no intention of telling "them what ideologies or form of government they should have". He asserted in categorical terms: "We do not intend to engage in any aggressive adventures against them." He reiterated that the American people would remain friends of the Chinese.<sup>141</sup>

This period of nine months between the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War was of crucial importance in the development of the United States policy towards Asia. The United States was aware of the possibility of Sino-Soviet differences. It also knew that the Chinese Communists were divided ideologically among pro-Stalinist and anti-Stalinist forces. It intended to exploit this tension to its advantage. But the outbreak of the Korean War upset the American time-table and at least for the time being forced the United States to rethink the premises of its policy towards Asia, particularly towards the Far East.

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141 Ibid., p. 469.



**Chapter III**

**TOWARDS A HARD LINE : JUNE 1950 - NOVEMBER 1950**

## Chapter III

### TOWARDS A HARD LINE : JUNE 1950 - NOVEMBER 1950

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and launched a full-scale attack against South Korea. Within three days they captured Seoul, the South Korea capital, and threatened to overrun the entire country.<sup>1</sup>

With the outbreak of the Korean war America's China policy shifted significantly. These changes reflected a clearer understanding of the existing Sino-Soviet relations. It was generally believed that behind the North Korean aggression was a well-calculated international Communist conspiracy master-minded by the Kremlin.

The Korean War in some respects was a peculiar war. Unlike other wars, in this war neither the enemy was properly identifiable nor were the war-aims of the United States clearly defined. The United States was fighting the North Koreans on the assumption that the latter were merely instruments of an international Communist conspiracy. The American anxiety was primarily caused by an ever-expanding Soviet influence in the Far East. Already the Communist China had been causing concern for the Americans and now the North

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1 The origins of the Korean war are still shrouded in mystery. Although it is commonly believed that North Korea attacked South Korea yet a few revisionist historians have questioned that the war was entirely the result of the actions of the North Koreans. For instance, see David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam : American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Middlesex, 1969), pp. 115-24; James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (Boston, 1970), pp. 104-15. For an opinion that the United States engineered the war, see Herbert Apthekar, American Foreign Policy and the Cold War (New York, 1962), pp. 139-43; Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism : American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Baltimore, Md., 1971), pp. 194-7.

Korean aggression made them all the more apprehensive of a growing Communist danger. According to the United States, in the Korean drama North Korea was the puppet whose threads were being controlled by the Kremlin. Hence one of the basic goals of US policy was to deter Kremlin from repeating its Korean type adventure in future. This required appropriately defined war aims and the war tactics.<sup>2</sup> Conventionally, in a war the basic concept is that there is no substitute for victory but in the Korean war it was felt that there might be a substitute. What this substitute was supposed to be was not very clear but it was understood that the US Government, as the agent of the United Nations, would be willing to accept something less than a complete military triumph. The Korean war had to be fought with limited objective, with limited means, and with limited involvement. What was needed was not a complete defeat of North Korea but the creation of a political situation that would not allow the Communists further gains.<sup>3</sup>

#### INITIAL RESPONSE

The news of the outbreak of the war was first communicated to President Truman by Acheson in the night of 24 June (local time)

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- 2 Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs (New York, 1966), p. 114.
- 3 Donald F. Bletz, The Role of Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 1972), pp. 47-48. Bletz writes that "considering the experience of the professional military officers who provided the leadership in Korea, it is perhaps possible to appreciate the frustrations they endured in the prosecution of that war", p. 48. Also see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age: Principles, Problems, and Prospects (Evanston, Illinois, 1960), p. 79; Frank J. Johnson, No Substitute for Victory (Chicago, 1962), pp. 23-27.

at Independence, Missouri where the President was spending the weekend with his family. It was immediately decided that an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council should be called and North Korea should be branded as an aggressor. The next day the President was informed that a Security Council meeting had been called. But taking in view the fact that in the past UN mandates had been flouted by the "North Koreans and their big allies" Acheson advised that some positive action should immediately be taken for the defence of the Republic of Korea. Within hours Truman left for Washington.<sup>4</sup>

It is apparent that the Truman Administration was caught unawares. It, however, acted promptly and decisively. President Truman reflected: "I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead.... If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war...."<sup>5</sup>

#### The Blair House Conferences

On reaching Washington Truman and his advisers met at Blair House to discuss the situation. Besides the President those who participated at the deliberations were Acheson, Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Mathews, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar

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4 Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 ; The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), vol. 2, p. 332.

5 Ibid., p. 333.

N. Bradley, the Army Chief General J. Lawton Collins, the Air Force Chief General Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. Acheson was accompanied by Under Secretary James Webb, Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk and Assistant Under Secretary John Hickerson, and Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup.<sup>6</sup>

The President and his advisers were almost sure that the North Korean aggression was being directed and controlled by Moscow.<sup>7</sup> Averell Harriman, one of the advisers to President Truman, continued to believe even as late as 1971 that the Soviet Union was behind the North Korean attack.<sup>8</sup> At the adjournment of the first meeting, Acheson showed the President a message from John Foster Dulles who had just returned to Tokyo from Korea. The message stated that if the South Koreans were able to repel the attack it would be good but if they were not in a position to do so then the "US force should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves".<sup>9</sup> George F. Kennan, the State Department Counsellor, who had discussed the Korean crisis with Secretary Acheson and others just before the Blair House Conference thought that "the Russians were surprised that the United Nations would regard it as within its competence to take cognizance of what was, in the formal sense, a civil war".<sup>10</sup> Ambassador Jessup attributed

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6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., pp. 335-6.

8 W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World: A Half Century of Personal Observation (London, 1971), p. 55.

9 Truman, n. 4, p. 336.

10 Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950 (New York, 1968), p. 132.

Soviet absence from the Security Council to a general lag in the Soviet decision-making process. He felt that probably the Soviet Union believed that the United States would not take any action and even if they did it would be either invalid or ineffectual.<sup>11</sup>

It is interesting to note that in the Blair House Conference attention was primarily focussed on the Soviet ambitions and its political designs in Asia. Significantly, there was no discussion on China and its intentions. This, however, did not mean that the United States regarded that China had nothing to do with the Soviet designs and aspirations. It was viewed as a junior partner in the firm of which the Soviet Union was the managing partner. No Communist country, the Americans believed, could act on its own initiative. If the North Koreans had moved, they had done so at the bidding of the Russians and not the Chinese. It was, however, felt that the Korean War was not connected to a wider design and that the Soviet Union did not have any intention to precipitate a third world war. At the Blair House, Truman wanted to know about the Soviet designs in Korea. Secretary Acheson had conferred with Kennan on this question. On the basis of available evidence it was inferred by them that the North Korean invasion was a "local affair".<sup>12</sup>

The second meeting at the Blair House was held on 26 June 1950. In it one of the President's chief advisers in the State Department said that there was no doubt that the North Korean

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11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 147. See also George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), pp. 485-8.

invasion had been inspired by the Soviet Union and that the reasons for it were obvious. In the first place, the emergence of Georgi Malenkov over Andre Zhadonov in the Soviet hierarchy meant a shift in Soviet policy in the Far East. Secondly, the invasion was partly a response to indications that the United States was proceeding, without the Soviet participation, to conclude a Japanese peace treaty on its own. The Soviet leaders undoubtedly were disturbed by the news that the United States intended to retain some sort of military presence in Japan for an indefinite period of time. Thirdly, the Soviet leaders might have felt that the lightly armed South Korea would be an easy prey to Communist expansion if the well-trained, heavily armed North Korean People's Army launched a full-scale attack on it. According to this analyst, a fourth major consideration in the Soviet decision to trigger the invasion was the fact that since 1949 "the fine bright new stars of Communist China had risen triumphant in the East to rival in brilliance to red star of the Soviet Union". Since the Second World War the Soviet Union had achieved no comparable success and therefore was in need of a political adventure and diplomatic victory to counterbalance the growing prestige, power and influence of Communist China in the Orient. Only possible area for such an adventure seemed to be Korea because outside the Soviet-Afghanistan border, including the Pamir mountains, the rest of the Soviet Asian frontier nestled against China and Mongolia. On the basis of these considerations the analyst hoped that the Soviet Union would keep the war as a limited war and avoid direct involvement in

it for that might trigger the third world war.<sup>13</sup>

On the basis of this analysis and a world-wide intelligence check-up of the Soviet intentions the participants in the Second Blair House Conference were in general agreement that the Soviet Union would like to make the Korean war a limited war. The invasion of South Korea hence, was considered to what General Omar N. Bradley later termed a "limited challenge".<sup>14</sup>

The President accepted the consensus which had been arrived about the Soviet intentions. He later recalled, "I told my advisers that what was developing in Korea seemed to me like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin. The reds were probing for weakness in our armor; we had to meet their challenge without getting embroiled in a world-wide war".<sup>15</sup>

President's analysis of the North Korean invasion was probably derived from Kennan's analysis of the Soviet conduct in which he had spoken about "probing" of "soft spot".<sup>16</sup> A New York Times report of 26 June 1950 said that sources close to American policy-makers

... were certain that the North Korean attack was being viewed as a test of the countries, including the United States, that are standing

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- 13 Paige, n. 10, pp. 169-70. For a similar interesting analysis of Stalin's underlying motives during the Korean War see, Chang Hsin-hai, America and China: A New Approach to Asia (New York, 1965), pp. 53-54.
- 14 U.S. Congress, 82, I, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 1070. Cited hereinafter as Military Situation in the Far East.
- 15 Truman, n. 4, p. 337.
- 16 See George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 24, July 1947, pp. 566-82.



up against Communist expansion. In such a light, the march across the North-South Korean border would appear similar to the attacks that Hitler used to make to feel out the opposition. 17

### Declaration of American Policy

On 27 June 1950, in a major policy statement the President announced:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.... Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack from Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or a consideration by the United Nations. 18

In private, the President made a more suggestive explanation to the members of the White House staff. Pointing to Korea on the globe Truman said: "This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, there won't have to be any next step."<sup>19</sup> He offered a similar assessment to the members of the Congress. He told them that if the United States did not support South Korea then the Soviet Union would take "one piece of Asia after another". Therefore, it was required of the United States to take some stand somewhere. Following the logic of the "domino theory" he went on to say "if we were to let Asia go the Near

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17 New York Times, 26 June 1950, p. 1. Such a view was expressed by John Foster Dulles in a speech made on 1 July 1950. See *ibid.*, 2 July 1950, p. 2.

18 Truman, n. 4, p. 339. Emphasis added.

19 Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency : The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York, 1966), p. 297.

East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe". Not only the President had decided to support Korea but he also had taken the decision to oppose the expansion of communism in Indo-China, Philippines and Formosa.<sup>20</sup>

After the outbreak of the war the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union on 27 June 1950 asking it to "use its influence" to restrain the North Koreans. To this the Soviet Union replied on 29 June 1950 that

... the responsibility for these events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who stand behind their back. As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. And now as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea. 21

This reply was considered by the State Department as motivated by a desire "to avoid formal responsibility for the North Korean invasion". The Soviet reply to the cable sent by the UN Secretary General to all members of the United Nations to respond to the UN resolution of 27 June was also in a similar vein. In contrast, Chou En-lai, the Chinese Foreign Minister, issued a bellicose statement in reply to Truman's policy statement of 27 June. So

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20 Ibid., pp. 371-2. Long before the Korean War, in February 1950, the National Security Council had contemplated that China's turning red "represented a grievous political defeat for us: if Southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia". See Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots of Commitment (New York, 1973), p. 141.

21 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 10 July 1950, p. 48.

strong was Chou En-lai's rejoinder to Truman that the State Department thought that it amounted to a declaration of war.<sup>22</sup> On the basis of these statements Acheson came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union might not directly join the war but might instigate China to intervene.<sup>23</sup> The State Department believed that the Soviet Union was likely to assume the posture of an "interested bystander" while involving the United States in confrontation with the Communist Chinese and other Soviet satellites. The Americans had no authentic reports of direct Russian involvement in military operation. A military spokesman in Tokyo denied that the North Korean fighter planes were being piloted by the Russians.<sup>24</sup>

#### LARGER INVOLVEMENT

The North Korean invasion, which, according to John Gunther who accompanied the South Korean forces as a correspondent, was launched from four points and consisted of 70,000 men and 70 tanks, soon assumed serious dimensions.<sup>25</sup> As the North Korean army virtually wiped out the resistance put by the defending South Korean and American forces and the news of the military reverses poured in the United States military involvement increased. On 27 June, the Straits of Taiwan were neutralized

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22 Paige, n. 10, pp. 247-8.

23 Truman, n. 4, p. 342; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London, 1969), p. 412.

24 Paige, n. 10, p. 248.

25 John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur (New York, 1951), p. 166.

and the Seventh Fleet was ordered to execute it. On the same day, a resolution was passed in the Security Council by a vote of seven to one (Yugoslavia opposing) recommending that all member nations furnish "such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area"<sup>26</sup>. Secretary Acheson asserted that it was now clear to all "if indeed it was not clear before -- that free nations must be united, they must be determined and they must be strong, if they are to preserve their freedom and maintain a righteous peace. There is no other way."<sup>27</sup> Though twenty-five nations participated in the UN forces in Korea in some form or the other yet it remained mainly a US affair.<sup>28</sup>

On 29 June, General Douglas MacArthur, the Commander of the American occupational forces in Japan, flew to Korea to study the military situation. He gave a very gloomy picture and said, "if the enemy advances continue much further, it will threaten the Republic"<sup>29</sup>. The following day the President announced that he had lifted the previous restrictions on the use of air force and navy and "authorized the United States Air Force to conduct

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- 26 Russia was absent. India and Egypt abstained. See United Nations, Department of Public Information, Korea and the United Nations (New York, 1950), p. 12.
- 27 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 28, 15 July 1950, p. 43.
- 28 It was announced at Lake Success on 27 July that following Trygve Lie's appeal of 14 July, 25 of the total of 59 member-states of United Nations had given assistance to the UN forces in Korea so far. See New York Times, 28 July 1950, pp. 5, 20.
- 29 Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York, 1956), pp. 332-3.

missions on specific military targets in North Korea, wherever militarily necessary, and had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast". The release ended with this clear-cut sentence: "General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units."<sup>30</sup>

On 30 June, Truman authorized General MacArthur to deploy US ground troops in Korea. He also authorized the General to conduct air and marine operations after carefully studying the strength of the enemy. As the North Koreans had the initiative in the beginning, MacArthur's job was difficult. On 6 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked him to give an estimate of his total requirements to fully repel the North Korean aggression. While this exercise was being carried out the United States continued to suffer reverses and the North Koreans advanced. By August, the UN troops were obliged to retreat and were confined to the Pusan perimeter. An early victory of the allies seemed less likely. MacArthur then planned an amphibious landing at Inchon to catch the enemy from the rear. On 15 September, the United States forces landed at Inchon and in a surprise attack from the rear overpowered the North Korean forces. On 29 September Seoul was liberated.<sup>31</sup>

#### THE THEME OF SOVIET MENACE

As the war broke out in Korea the Truman Administration acted on the assumption that it was engineered by the Soviet Union. It was so prone to believe the Soviet complicity that it

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30 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 10 July 1950, p. 46.

31 New York Times, 29 September 1950, p. 1.

completely overlooked the possibilities that the North Koreans themselves might have initiated the adventure.<sup>32</sup> It has been argued by some scholars that had the Soviet Union actually engineered the war it would not have continued with its boycott of the United Nations when it was known that the latter was going to declare North Korea as an aggressor. They would have instead postponed the war for one month until the Russian delegate would have become the chairman of the Security Council<sup>33</sup> and could have foiled the UN intervention in the war. Moreover, the outright invasion was a departure from the usual Russian tactics of seeking control through subversion. Why then the Soviet Union would have entered into a direct military gamble which was fraught with grave risks? Acheson himself later stated before a joint Congressional committee: "The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression."<sup>34</sup> The same assessment of the situation was made by MacArthur when in his cable of 25 March 1950 he stated that "the most probable course of North Korean action is furtherance of its attempt to overthrow the South Korean Government by the creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic

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32 See William Barrett, "World War III : The Ideological Conflict", Partisan Review (Seattle), vol. 17, September-October 1950, p. 651.

33 On this point see Evan Luard, ed., The Cold War : A Reappraisal (London, 1964), pp. 55-56; Horowitz, n. 1, p. 120.

34 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 14, p. 1991.

through guerrilla activities and psychological warfare."<sup>35</sup>

I.F. Stone, a well known Leftist scholar, has argued that only a week before the aggression, a new South Korean legislature had assembled with an overwhelming anti-Rhee majority, so there was the possibility that the Syngman Rhee Government soon would be transformed from within into a new regime willing to negotiate unification.<sup>36</sup> Another scholar has pointed out that the Communists practically lost four concrete advantages by the outbreak of the war: (a) a favourable rearming-rate ratio, (b) the neutrality of certain peoples, (c) the element of surprise, and (d) the imminent recognition of Red Chinese delegates by the United Nations.<sup>37</sup>

The immediate US response was to show to the non-Communist nations that the United States would stand by them if they were similarly threatened by Communist aggressions.<sup>38</sup> George F. Kennan had argued that any "soft spot" would tempt the Soviet Union to

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35 I.F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York, 1952), p. 65.

36 Ibid.

37 For substantiation of these points see Wilber W. Hitchcock, "North Korea Jumps the Gun", Current History (Philadelphia), vol. 22, March 1951, pp. 137-9.

38 It cannot be conclusively established that the Soviet Union engineered the war. For a study of various possibilities, see Richard J. Barnett, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York, 1968), pp. 67-68; Anatol Rapaport, The Big Two: Soviet-American Perceptions of Foreign Policy (New York, 1971), p. 147. For arguments that the Soviet Union had instigated the North Koreans to launch the attack see Simon Serfaty, The Elusive Enemy: American Foreign Policy Since World War II (Boston, 1972), pp. 85-90; Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973 (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y., 1974), pp. 70-71.

launch an aggression. A few months before the outbreak of the Korean War, Acheson had said that the Kremlin would not hesitate to seize any territory that was "within its grasp and reach"<sup>39</sup>. According to the Truman Administration Korea was such a soft spot, and therefore, it unhesitatingly reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union had masterminded the Korean action. Secretary Acheson said, "It seemed close to certain that the [North Korean] attack had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet Union."<sup>40</sup> On 19 July 1950, President Truman in his message to Congress said: "I shall not attempt to predict the course of events. But I am sure that those who have it in their power to unleash or to withhold acts of armed aggression must realize that new recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace."<sup>41</sup> It seems clear that the President's warning was directed to the Soviet Union. A small war on the Korean peninsula was not otherwise supposed to topple "the fabric of world peace".

The war in Korea thus was viewed by the United States in a larger perspective. It resulted in a reevaluation of the strategic importance of Japan and Europe. John Foster Dulles, then an aide to the State Department, said that a victory of North Korea would place Japan "between the upper and lower jaws of the Russian Bear"<sup>42</sup>.

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39 See Joseph Alsop and Stewart Alsop, "The Lessons of Korea", in Peter G. Filene, ed., American View of Soviet Russia, 1917-1965 (Homewood, Illinois, 1968), p. 253.

40 Acheson, n. 23, p. 405.

41 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 31 July 1950, p. 169.

42 Ibid., vol. 23, 10 July 1950, p. 50.



As the United States viewed the war in Korea as part of a larger Communist manoeuvre it decided to take counter-measures in Southeast Asia. The reason for this was that the Administration had the strongest feeling that the countries of Southeast Asia were vulnerable to strong Communist pressure. It considerably increased its assistance to France which was fighting a colonial war in Indo-China against the Nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh, the veteran Communist leader. The United States also decided to provide military aid to the Philippines and Indonesia immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War.<sup>43</sup> On 27 June 1950, President Truman announced that he had "directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indonesia and the despatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces"<sup>44</sup>. A few people in the United States distinctly saw the aggression in Korea as a threat to American way of life. The New York Times wrote editorially: "Korea is only a single battle in a long war whose sphere of action is the greater part of the world. This is an acute phase of a struggle in which our liberty and our way of life are at stake."<sup>45</sup>

In September 1950, the United States concluded an agreement with France with a view to create strong local army in Indo-China. It was believed that such a step would be able to check the growth of Communist insurgency in Indo-China and

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43 Acheson, n. 23, p. 673. See also Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (New York, 1972), p. 97.

44 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 3 July 1950, p. 5.

45 New York Times, 20 August 1950, p. IV:8.

leave the bulk of French army intact for possible use in Europe. France asked for American military and economic assistance for raising an indigenous army for its associate states in Indo-China. The United States acceded to this request.<sup>46</sup> Its economic assistance which was \$ 10 million in May 1950 reached a billion dollar figure by the time Dien Bien Phu fell.<sup>47</sup>

Even before the Korean War began, Acheson had regarded the threat posed by the Soviet Union as global in its dimension and not merely confined to Eastern Europe. He had evolved a policy of global containment of communism. The increase in military assistance to France, and associated states under it in Indo-China and the Philippines following the outbreak of the Korean War was a logical development. However, even before the Chinese intervention took place in Korea far-sighted State Department official like John Ohly pointed out to Acheson that by supplanting the French efforts in Indo-China rather than supplementing it, the United States was moving rapidly on the slippery road to military involvement in Indo-China. Acheson later recalled: "The danger to which he [Ohly] pointed took more than a week to materialize in full, but materialize they did. I decided, however, that having put our hand to the plow, we would not look back."<sup>48</sup>

Acheson was a Europe-oriented man. The war in Korea led to a dramatic increase in American concern in the security of

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46 Acheson, n. 23, pp. 673-4. See also John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite (Lexington, Mass., 1974), p. 111.

47 Donovan, n. 46, p. 111.

48 Acheson, n. 23, p. 674.

Western Europe. "The best hope of peace in the present situation is", testified Acheson before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on 2 August 1950, "to make it clear that acts of aggression will be resisted and resisted successfully."<sup>49</sup> Sometime during the fierce fighting on the Korean front President Truman told General MacArthur that the United States had taken up the responsibility in Korea "to lend resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the shadow of Communist power, and to let them know that they need not now rush to come to terms with communism on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission."<sup>50</sup> He further asserted that the American policy was "to inspire those who may be called upon to fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist China".<sup>51</sup> The Korean War "precipitated the first and only serious attempt to create the forces [NATO] ... for withstanding a Soviet attack in Europe".<sup>52</sup> Rearmament of the NATO allies was speeded up and American military assistance increased. On 27 July 1950, President Truman told a Press conference that the Administration was finalizing a 12 billion dollar programme for three years of military assistance

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49 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 14 August 1950, p. 249.

50 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 14, p. 504.

51 *Ibid.* These quotations are from the paraphrased version of Truman's message of 13 January 1951 that was presented to the Senate Joint Committee by George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defence, on 11 May 1951.

52 Robert Osgood, NATO ; The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 1962), p. 68.

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to its allies.

The American involvement in the Korean War brought about a radical change in American thinking on security and military affairs. When in April 1950 the NSC-68 was being drafted, there was considerable discussion on the ceiling to be imposed on American defence budget. Under the impact of the Korean War, the debate completely disappeared and the United States military budget jumped from \$ 14 billion to \$ 60 billion.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, the expectation that foreign assistance would be considerably diminished, if not altogether abolished, after the end of the Marshall Plan, ended. Foreign aid as an instrument of security was much more used. During 1951 to 1954, American foreign assistance in terms of grants and loans totalled approximately \$ 23 billion.<sup>55</sup> In a message to Congress on 19 July 1950, President Truman pointed out that the developments in Korea should not be seen in isolation. The United States "must assist the free nations associated with us in common defence to augment

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- 53 James E. Pollard, "The White House News Conference as a Channel of Communication", Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 15, Winter 1951, p. 671. See also Coral Bell, "Korea and the Balance of Power", The Political Quarterly (London), vol. 25, January-March 1954, p. 24.
- 54 The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, International Stability and Progress : United States Interests and Instruments (New York, June 1957), p. 61. For the details of the American military assistance after the Korean War see The Brookings Institution, Industrial Studies Group, Current Issues in Foreign Economic Assistance (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 74-85.
- 55 Paul H. Nitze, U.S. Foreign Policy : 1945-55, Headline Series No. 110 of Foreign Policy Association (New York, March 1956), p. 30.

their military strength"<sup>56</sup>.

Truman's plans for increasing military strength were supported by the Congress. In early July, even before he had asked the Congress for additional troop levels, Truman had authorized an increase of 110,000 army personnel above the existing total strength of 592,000. The day Truman sent his message to Congress a bill was tabled to lift all legal limitations on personnel ceilings in the armed forces for the next four years. The bill was approved on 8 August 1950.<sup>57</sup>

In July 1950, Truman signed \$ 1.2 billion appropriations for mutual defence for the fiscal year 1950-51. To this was added an additional \$ 4 billion in September. On 6 September, he signed the pre-existing defence appropriation of \$ 14.6 billion and again on 27 September, he sanctioned one of \$ 12.6 billion.<sup>58</sup> Thus within a few months after the outbreak of war in Korea a series of measures were pushed through the Congress which made the United States a formidable military power.

#### SHIFT IN CHINA POLICY

The outbreak of the war in Korea marked a change in US policy towards China. The change did not imply a complete reversal but only a shift. The United States ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Straits of Formosa which directly affected China. What were the implications of this step? Although the President

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56 Acheson, n. 23, p. 421.

57 Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power : Harry S. Truman As Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge, 1973), pp. 188-9.

58 Acheson, n. 23, p. 421. Also see Pollard, n. 53, p. 672.

said in his 27 June statement that the objective behind this action was "to prevent any attack from Formosa" against the mainland, the possibility of the Chinese attack on Formosa was a far greater reality. What the President then had in mind was to freeze the situation in the Strait. It clearly implied a new obligation on the part of the United States to frustrate any Chinese effort to take over Formosa if it came during the war.

The Americans, however, still wanted to reassure the Government on the mainland that the US objectives in Korea were limited. And as soon as the "security in the Pacific" was restored and a peace settlement with Japan had taken place, the future of Formosa could be decided by the United Nations. In that event the United States could by deciding to go along with the majority in the United Nations favour China. Any way, the US aim was to assure the Chinese people that it had no hostile intention against the mainland despite the beginning of the war. This was clearly manifested in the US response to the proposal to accept the military assistance offered by Taiwan for the UN task force operating in Korea.

When on 27 June 1950, the United Nations appealed to its members to send military contingents to form a UN army, Chiang expressed willingness to send 33,000 trained Chinese Nationalist soldiers. Truman agreed to the proposal but when Acheson advised against it on the ground that such a policy could be inconsistent with the Administration's previous decision to neutralize the Straits of Taiwan, he refused.<sup>59</sup> In a statement Secretary Acheson on 1 July 1950 argued that before "any final decision on the

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59 Truman, n. 4, p. 342.

wisdom of reducing the defence forces on Taiwan by transfer of troops to Korea" could be taken, it was desirable for the representatives of General MacArthur's head-quarter to hold discussions with the Chinese military leaders in Taiwan concerning defence of the island against "the threat of invasion" of the island "by Communist forces from the mainland".<sup>60</sup>

Furthermore, Acheson also argued that if the Formosan troops joined the UN forces in Korea, the Chinese Communists might be provoked to side with the North Koreans. Under such circumstances severe damage could be inflicted on Generalissimo's army which would put him in a more vulnerable position. In case the Chinese Communists decided to invade Taiwan the latter would find itself defenceless.<sup>61</sup>

That while thinking of Taiwan and the overall policy towards China, the United States was really thinking in terms of large situation in the Far East becomes evident from the fact that after the outbreak of the Korean War the United States linked the signing of the Japanese peace treaty with Formosa. The US policy towards Japan underwent radical transformation. The United States began to view Japan as a possible bulwark against communism in the Pacific. John Foster Dulles who was entrusted with the task of negotiating a peace treaty with Japan was of the view that the North Korean aggression was motivated partly by desire to block the American efforts to make Japan a full member

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60 U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955 ; Basic Documents (Washington, D.C., 1957), vol. 2, pp. 2541-2.

61 Truman, n. 4, p. 343.

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of the free world.

The American objective was to limit the scope of the Korean War and avoid more international and domestic complications. It was expected that on the one hand such a policy would satisfy Chiang's supporters in America and on the other, Taiwan could be denied to the Chinese Communists without committing the United States to Chiang's cause. The Truman Administration was striving to maintain this delicate balance.<sup>63</sup> It continued its efforts to assure China that the US actions in Korea were not directed against it.

At this time there were elements within the United States which were apprehensive that China might not only militarily intervene in Korea but also provide overt military assistance to Communist elements in Southeast Asia region. For instance, on 7 July 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that in such an eventuality the United States "should prevail upon the British to reverse their proffers of recognition to Communist China".<sup>64</sup> Fearful that the Korean War might be only part of a general offensive in a larger area, the United States was

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62 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 10 July 1950, p. 50. See also Alexander L. George, "American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggression", World Politics (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 7, January 1955, p. 214.

63 On this point see Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York, 1971), p. 202.

64 U.S., Department of Defence, United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C., 1971), Book 8 of 12, p. 341. Cited hereinafter as Pentagon Papers.



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strengthening its military build-up.

In August 1950, General MacArthur prepared a statement at the request of the American Veterans of Foreign War (VFW) in which he suggested that the United States should accept the fact that in the Far East the real enemy was China and that more militant posture should be taken for the defence of Formosa and Korea. MacArthur's statement contradicted the American policy of reassuring China. As a result of President Truman's request MacArthur subsequently withdrew the statement. It was, however, leaked to the Press and created furore.<sup>66</sup> Obviously, the General was indulging in a bit of policy formulation which he had no right to do. Nonetheless the statement showed how militant anti-Chinese a section of Americans became after the outbreak of the war.

President Truman was so alarmed by MacArthur's statement that he thought it necessary to make the American policy clear in a nation-wide broadcast on 1 September 1950. He made it clear that the Seventh Fleet was stationed in the Straits of Taiwan not only to defend Taiwan from Communist Chinese aggression but also to prevent Taiwan from making efforts to make a comeback

65 Within a few months after the outbreak of the Korean War the Truman Administration was authorized to commit an additional \$ 5.2 billion for military aid under the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. The original authorization under the Programme was \$ 1,314 million. See Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York, 1965), pp. 8-9. US defence expenditure rose from \$ 11.9 billion in 1950 to \$ 43.6 billion in 1953. See Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945 (New York, 1969), p. 50.

66 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 11 September 1950, pp. 411-13.

to the mainland. Truman also was concerned about the possibility of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War. Sticking to the distinction between the Chinese people and the Communist government he expressed the hope that the Chinese people would not be "misled or forced" to enter into military confrontation with the United Nations and the United States. He reiterated the American friendship with the Chinese people and assured them that the United States did not want Formosa for itself. He repeated: "We believe that the future of Formosa, like that of any other territory in dispute, should be settled peacefully.... The mission of the 7th Fleet is to keep Formosa out of the conflict. <sup>67</sup> Our purpose is peace, not conquest."

On 25 August, in a letter to the UN Secretary General, Warren R. Austin, the US representative to the United Nations, clarified the American position on Taiwan. He said that neither the United States had attacked the Chinese territory nor did it have any such intention. The sudden outbreak of the war had necessitated the neutralization of the Strait of Taiwan and China's future would be decided by the United Nations. He went on to assert the traditional friendship between the Chinese people and the United States. He reiterated that "we still feel the friendship". According to him it was the Soviet Union which was against the Chinese people. The United States, he said, moved in the General Assembly a resolution supporting the territorial integrity of China which was opposed by the Soviet Union and its

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67 Harry S. Truman, "Aims and Objectives in Resisting Aggression in Korea", *ibid.*, pp. 407-10.

satellites. President Truman approved of Austin's statement and said that it accurately recorded the position of the United States.<sup>68</sup>

The Secretary of State Acheson reiterated the same theme. In a television interview on 9 September 1950, he harped on his old tune that the Soviet Union had expansionist designs on China and that America and China were traditional friends. He saw no reason "why they should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into this Korean War now".<sup>69</sup> Replying to the question that Asia was lost to communism, the Secretary emphatically asserted: "We still believe that the Chinese are going to be Chinese before they are going to be Communists."<sup>70</sup>

Acheson made it clear that the future of Formosa was not foreclosed. Referring to the President's statement of 27 June he said: "These should be made by peaceful means, and he [Truman] has stressed over and over again that our sole long range desire about Formosa is that its future should be decided by peaceful negotiation and settlement and not by force."<sup>71</sup>

The day the Secretary of State made the speech, Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, addressing the National Convention of American Veterans of World

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68 Letter from President Truman to the United States Representative to the United Nations, Warren Austin, 27 August 1950. See Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, eds, Documents on American Foreign Relations (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 12, 1 January - 31 December 1950, pp. 505-6. Emphasis added.

69 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 18 September 1950, p. 463.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 464.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 463.

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War II, repeated the same arguments.

#### DETERMINANTS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

The invasion of South Korea came as a surprise to the Americans. The American public was stunned. Most of them believed the aggression to be a part of an overall Communist strategy for the domination of "Free World". The shock which the American public received initially produced a bipartisan support for President Truman's actions in defense of the Republic of South Korea.

#### The Initial General Approval of Truman's Policies

Truman's decision to intervene in Korea enjoyed a good measure of public support. James Reston commenting on the public mood wrote that there were indeed some differences in the last seventy-two hours over the manner of reacting to the Communist invasion. But even these differences were swept away by a general awareness that the dangers which were posed by the invasion were far greater than the dangers of bold action taken by the President.<sup>73</sup>

As could be well expected, the American entry into the Korean War generated a great nationalistic upsurge in the country. The acrimonious debate over the President's China policy abated at least for the time being. The Republicans rallied to the support of the Presidential action. Thomas Dewey, a frequent critic of Truman's Far Eastern policy, and his 1948 Presidential rival,

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72 Dennett and Turner, n. 68, p. 436.

73 James Reston, "New Spirit in the Capital", New York Times, 28 June 1950, p. 4.

telegraphically complimented the President by saying: "I wholeheartedly agree with and support the difficult decision you have made."<sup>74</sup> Sharing an identical opinion, or perhaps representing a genuine Republican sentiment, an Iowan Republican official made the remark: "We don't know who told him <sup>75</sup> [Truman] to do it, but for once he made the right decision."

In the Congress, the Republicans supported the Administration's bold action. Even Senator William F. Knowland (Rep., California), a frequent critic of the Administration's Far Eastern policy said in the Senate:

I believe that, in this very important step the President of the United States has taken to uphold the hands of the United Nations and the free peoples of the world, he should have the overwhelming support of all Americans, regardless of their partisan affiliations. 76

Only one member of the Congress, Vito Marcantonio (American Labor, N.Y.), dared to oppose the Administration's stand and lost the re-<sup>77</sup> election. For the Republicans Formosa constituted an important citadel of the "free world" in the east. The President's action in ordering the Seventh Fleet implied that the United States was no longer disinterested in the future of Formosa.

Another important consequence of American involvement in the Korean War was that the differences between the Departments of State and Defence over the question of support to Chiang

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74 Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade : America, 1945-1956 (New York, 1956), p. 158.

75 Ibid.

76 Adlai E. Stevenson, "Korea in Perspective", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 30, April 1952, p. 352.

77 Ibid.

started getting narrowed and both Acheson and MacArthur came forward to accept the defence of Formosa as essential in the interest of American security. Yet another development of some significance, observers noted, was the sudden disappearance of the atmosphere created by McCarthyism.<sup>78</sup>

Ninety per cent of the letters arriving at the White House endorsed the Presidential decision.<sup>79</sup> The opinion polls conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion during August and September 1950 also revealed general public support. Only 20 per cent of the respondents seemed to be of the opinion that American intervention was a mistake. Leaving aside the 15 per cent who did not have any opinion the rest 65 per cent approved the intervention.<sup>80</sup>

#### Republican Criticism of the Administration's China Policy

After the outbreak of the Korean War as the Truman Administration took a firm stand in Korea the Administration's critics endorsed it. But they never failed to remind that such a policy in the Far East was long overdue and that in the past they had made vain efforts to make the administration believe the necessity of such a policy. Senator Taft's speech in the Senate on 28 June 1950 reflected this feeling. He read into the Congressional Record an article in the New York Herald Tribune by Bert Andrews entitled: "United States Far East Policy

78 Reston, n. 73, p. 4.

79 Goldman, n. 74, p. 158.

80 Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 15, Spring 1951, p. 170.

Reversed by Truman's Order for Action - Stand of Herbert Hoover, MacArthur, Taft and other Republican Senators Seen as Upheld". The article highlighted the fact that MacArthur and Republican critics of the Administration had already expressed the necessity of greater commitment for the defence of Taiwan. The article read in part;

President Truman's strong stand regarding Korea and Formosa marks an almost complete reversal of the position he and Secretary of State Dean Acheson held on these Far Eastern matters just six months ago. It almost amounts to vindication of the attitude taken at that time by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, former President Herbert Hoover, and four Republican Senators; Robert A. Taft of Ohio; H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey; Homer Ferguson of Michigan; and William F. Knowland of California. 81

The Republican "as I predicted" attitude continued to be frequently ventilated in the Senate. Early in July 1950, Senator Hugh Butler (Rep., Neb.) read into the Congressional Record an article entitled, "Who's A Formosa-Firster Now Fellows? - Senator Taft is Enjoying a Last Laugh". This article by James Daniel, the Scripps-Howard columnist, appearing in the Washington News, criticized all those, including the President, who had opposed Taft's pro-Formosa stand. It also recalled Acheson's comment on Taft as being "often in error, but not in doubt". Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was also assailed for his remark that Formosa was of no importance in America's "impregnable line of defence in the Pacific". The article further criticized the Truman Administration for using a statement made by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). The ADA was supposed to

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81 Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), pp. 9326-7.

have said: "If Formosa Firsters believe that propping up a dictatorship on an island [Formosa] outside our main defence line is more important to the United States than nurturing democracy wherein it has a chance to grow, we demand that they say so publicly." The writer of the article felt that such a question now should be directed not to Taft but to Truman. He wrote that when Taft prescribed for Formosan defence it was branded as "adventurism" but when Truman did it, it was called "great leadership".<sup>82</sup>

In early July 1950, Senator McCarthy intensified his attack and kept on charging the State Department of being an accomplice in the Communist plot. Commenting on the recent major shift in the American Far Eastern policy he said:

As we know, the Acheson-Lattimore-Jessup group took a severe beating when the President made his about face. We know they were temporarily in confusion and consternation. But they will surely regroup in an attempt to sabotage these new efforts. 83

Although the adoption of the hard line in the Far East had the general endorsement of the Republicans, their criticism of the Truman Administration did not abate. Combined with the hysterical outbursts of McCarthy, it created not a very congenial environment for conducting the war. On 10 August 1950, Senator Knowland took the floor and criticized the secretive tendency of the Truman Administration. He was particularly critical of Acheson's refusal to divulge the name of the person who was

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82 Ibid., p. 9719.

83 Ibid., pp. 9715-18.



responsible for drafting the State Department memorandum of December 1949 which had written off Formosa and suggested that <sup>84</sup> nothing should be done for its defence.

In September 1950 the Republican attacks showed a new trend. Hitherto they only boasted of their foresight and criticized the pre-Korean non-intervention policy of the United States. But now they started voicing concern that at the close of the Korean War the Truman Administration might again show leniency and allow Formosa to fall to the Chinese Communists. On 1 September 1950, Senator Knowland read into the Congressional Record an article by David Lawrence, a syndicated columnist and editor of the U.S. News and World Report, that appeared in the Washington Evening Star. It said:

Is the United States government trying to wiggle out of its entanglement in defending Formosa and thus make diplomatic concessions to certain European governments and pave the way for appeasement of Communist China and its possible admission to the Security Council of the United Nations? 85

Such a doubt was caused by a Presidential statement on 31 August 1950 that after the Korean War the Seventh Fleet would be withdrawn. Lawrence felt that the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet would amount to a renewed appeasement which would expose the weakness of the United States and provoke the Chinese Communists to launch further aggressions. He wondered whether MacArthur knew about this plan to appease Communist China and whether he did not speak out, risking a reprimand against it

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84 Ibid., pp. 12180-1.

85 Ibid., p. 14049.

because he felt that it was his duty to do so. If the policy was to appease China in the long run, what was the need for the sacrifice of American lives on the Korean soil. <sup>86</sup>

Knowland unceasingly carried on his criticisms. He made political capital out of the story of the death of Captain John Birch in August 1945 at the hands of the Chinese Communists. He reiterated the responsibility of the Truman Administration for the loss of China and expressed his apprehensions that similar policy was currently being pursued in Formosa. Knowland said:

Mr. Lattimore's theory on South Korea, as he expressed it in several articles he had written, was that Korea should be allowed to go down the drain, and that it should be allowed to go without our appearing to push it. That was his novel idea on Korea. What I am afraid is being done now in regard to Formosa is an adaptation of the Lattimore line, namely, that Formosa shall be allowed to go down the drain without our appearing to push her. <sup>87</sup>

During the confirmation hearings on the appointment of General George C. Marshall as the Secretary of Defence, Knowland alleged that Johnson was removed from the position of Secretary of Defence because he was more militant on Formosa and the consequent disagreement with Acheson. Knowland asserted that Johnson represented the opinion of the entire Department of Defence. <sup>88</sup> He linked up Marshall's appointment with the appeasement of China and expressed his strong opposition to the appointment. He read into the Congressional Record an article from the Wall Street Journal which accused the Truman Administration of

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86 Ibid., pp. 14049-50.

87 Ibid., p. 14205.

88 Ibid., p. 15172.

acquiescing in a Communist takeover of Formosa. The idea behind such a policy, the article noted, was "to make another Tito out of Mac"<sup>89</sup>.

Similar anti-Administration sentiment was also voiced in the House by the Republicans. On 14 September 1950, Charles Wolverton (Rep., New Jersey), spoke strongly against the removal of Johnson. He went to the extent of saying that the American people would have been happier had Acheson resigned.<sup>90</sup> As the Congressional elections approached the issue of Acheson's removal became more important.

#### Congress Suggests a Hard-line China Policy

There was a considerable shift in the opinion regarding China in the Congress. Even those Democrats who had earlier supported the Government on issues like recognition changed their position. By September 1950 even such a strong supporter of the Administration's policies like Senator Millard Tydings (Dem., Md.) had submitted resolutions strongly opposing any American recognition of China. The Senate Resolution 345 which Tydings submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee spoke of the "forces of freedom and democracy ... engaged in bloody conflict against ... totalitarian dictatorship", forces that represented the Soviet Union and its "unlawful puppet and satellite", Red China. He condemned recognition of such a nation and stated that it would amount to an approval of acts of "international piracy and brigandage". He went to the extent of asking that the United

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89 Ibid., p. 15176.

90 Ibid., pp. A 6560-1.

States use veto to bar the entry of China into the United  
 Nations.<sup>91</sup>

Senator Tydings was not alone in taking this posture. Senator Herbert O'Connor (Dem., Md.), another consistent supporter of the Government policy, argued that China's entry into the United Nations would on the one hand affect its normal functioning and on the other "tip the scale further on the side of Russia and its satellites". In a highly aggressive tone the Senator indicated that he regarded the Soviet Union as "primarily responsible" for the Chinese revolution and regarded the Chinese government as nothing more than a "puppet government". He felt that it was the Soviet Union which was forcing the admission of China in the United Nations and asked that the United States use all "its prestige and its persuasive powers" with other nations to prevent its admission in the United Nations.<sup>92</sup> In another speech on the floor of the Senate the Senator called the Chinese government an "evil regime". He alleged that they were preparing for the liquidation of 700,000 Christians in Korea and strongly opposed its recognition.<sup>93</sup>

#### Democratic Reaction to Republican Accusations

Although there had been sympathy among the Democrats for the Republican anti-appeasement argument, there was considerable opposition to the hysterical outbursts and wild accusations of Joe McCarthy and his supporters. The defenders of the Adminis-

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91 Ibid., p. 14267.

92 Ibid., pp. 14267-8.

93 Ibid., p. A 6436.

tration could utilise the vulnerability of McCarthy. They first tried to counter McCarthy's charges of internal subversion against the State Department.

In the summer of 1950, the Tydings Committee investigated these charges and its findings, made public on 17 July 1950, dismissed them as "fraud" and hoax".<sup>94</sup> The next day the Washington Post editorially praised the findings.<sup>95</sup> The Tydings Committee report, however, was not acceptable to the Republicans. The Republican members of the Committee criticized the report on its merits and said that it was "derogatory and insulting to Senator McCarthy".<sup>96</sup> To this the Democratic majority on the Tydings Committee replied that the Senate and the American people had been deceived by "the most nefarious campaign of half-truths and untruths in the history of this Republic".<sup>97</sup>

In contrast to the Republicans, quite a number of Democrats felt that a militant stand on Formosa might endanger the world peace to the detriment of the United States. Some of them felt that if the United States and China fought a war over the question of Formosa it would serve the interest of the Soviet Union alone. Congressman Cecil White (Dem., California) said on 11 September 1950 in the House that Moscow "would be the certain gainer" should the United States find itself in a

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94 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 17 July 1950, pp. 106-11.

95 Washington Post, 18 July 1950, p. 12.

96 New York Times, 18 July 1950, p. 1; 19 July 1950, p. 20.

97 Ibid., 23 July 1950, p. 1.

struggle with the Chinese millions.<sup>98</sup> Senator Connally expressed the view that the Formosa problem should be solved under the auspices of the United Nations. This, the Senator felt, would avoid the possibility of a war with the Chinese Communists.<sup>99</sup>

#### STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION

Like the Congressional opinion, the American people also reacted rather vigorously to the American involvement in the Korean War. During August and September, the American Institute of Public Opinion conducted a series of opinion polls which revealed a popular mandate in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war. Sixty four per cent of the respondents favoured the idea of carrying the war into the North Korean soil across the 38th parallel. Questioned as to what chance did the United States have of winning in case the Chinese intervened on behalf of the North Koreans, again a majority of 57 per cent of the respondents believed that chances were excellent. Only 11 per cent felt that the chances of American victory were bleak. Of the remaining, 21 per cent thought that the chances were "fair" while 11 per cent had no opinion on the subject.<sup>100</sup>

But while the general mood was in favour of the anti-Communist war that America was waging on the Korean soil, there were criticism of America's China policy and appeals for a more tough stand towards China. Alarmed at the possibility of

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98 Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), pp. A 6435-6.

99 Ibid., pp. 15526-32.

100 Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 16, Spring 1951, p. 170.

cessation of hostilities at the cost of granting admission to Communist China in the United Nations, the San Francisco Chronicle editorially cautioned against a "Munich" that would destroy the United Nations. It strongly voiced its warning against the Chinese entry into the United Nations.<sup>101</sup>

In late August, the withdrawal of MacArthur's VFW message sparked off a heated public controversy. For instance, when the St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorially supported the Truman action, a number of letters to the editor strongly criticized it. One such letter said that the editor should be ashamed of writing such a thing. It said that the only way of getting rid of Acheson, was to defeat Truman in 1952 because "after their insult to our beloved General Douglas MacArthur, that is our duty".<sup>102</sup>

The Administration was strongly criticized for its policy of appeasement and it was urged that it should put its foot down against China's admission into the United Nations. A Scripps-Howard editorial appearing in the Rocky Mountain News and entitled "Another Munich?" said that a vote for Red China to have its seat in the United Nations "would mean selling out the Chinese Nationalists and Formosa".<sup>103</sup>

But while there were strong voices criticizing Truman's China policy there were important segments of opinion that endorsed it. On 2 September, the New York Herald Tribune editorially supported Truman's Formosa policy and endorsed the

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101 San Francisco Chronicle, 3 August 1950, p. 14.

102 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 3 September 1950, p. B 2.

103 Rocky Mountain News (Denver), 9 September 1950, p. 20.

idea of making it "a matter of international decision"<sup>104</sup>. The same day, Richard Rovere in his column in the New Yorker cautioned against the China lobby and Chiang's supporters that had been revitalized after the American decision to defend Formosa was announced. He said that the enthusiasm of these people would "increase the chances of war with Communist China"<sup>105</sup>.

John K. Fairbank, the Harvard China specialist, also supported the Administration's China policy and said that while formulating it the Administration should take into account the social forces at work in Asia. In an article in the Foreign Affairs, he assailed the partisan bickerings on the China issue as "regrettable" if not "disastrous" and wrote that "it would hardly have occurred if the American public had been united in its understanding of the revolutionary process in China"<sup>106</sup>. In the same issue of the Foreign Affairs, another writer, Hu Shih, also highlighted the complexities of the Asian situation but in a different context. He emphasized the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union and said that since unlike eastern Europe China was not an easy prey for the Soviet Union, so Stalin had "to resort to the most cunning forms of secret diplomacy in order to overcome the resistance that Nationalist China had been able to summon for over two decades"<sup>107</sup>.

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104 New York Herald Tribune, 2 September 1950, p. 8.

105 New Yorker, 2 September 1950, p. 59.

106 John King Fairbank, "The Problems of Revolutionary Asia", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 29, October 1950, pp. 101-13.

107 Hu Shih, "China in Stalin's Grand Strategy", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 29, October 1950, p. 40.



## CHINA'S CRITICISM

Peking had indicated clearly from the very beginning that it leaned towards Moscow. After the Korean War started, Peking, like Moscow, emphasized the illegal character of the UN measures and dubbed them as intervention in the domestic affairs of Korea. It also alleged that the UN action served as a cover for American imperialism. American support of the Rhee Government was vehemently attacked and in an official statement on 28 June 1950, a day after Truman decided to intervene, the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai accused President Truman of committing "aggression against China" after having instigated the puppet regime of Syngman Rhee to provoke civil war in Korea. Official propaganda emphasized the theme of "Asia for the Asians" and "American trouble maker, get out".<sup>108</sup>

Stuart Schram in his biography of Mao Tse-tung has written that the Korean War was the turning point in Mao's attitude towards the United States. The United States "openly exposed its own imperialist face", he reported Mao as saying, and China had no alternative to "Resist America and Aid Korea".<sup>109</sup>

Chinese reaction to President Truman's decision to neutralize the Strait of Taiwan was sharp. Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of China, criticized the policy and said: "I declare that no matter what constructive action the U.S. imperialists may take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China

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108 Ieland M. Goodrich, Korea : A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations (New York, 1956), pp. 137-8.

109 Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (London, 1967), pp. 244-6.

will remain unchanged forever."<sup>110</sup> The Chinese newspapers supported the cause of North Korea and denounced American action as interference in the internal affairs of China. Hate America campaign was carried on in full force. At the end of July, when MacArthur flew to Taiwan and spoke that it was his "responsibility and firm purpose" to defend Taiwan from falling to the Chinese communism, the People's Daily wrote that "the American imperialists ... [were] plotting to widen the scope of their war of aggression in Asia". A Chinese reporter who paid a visit to the camps of captured American soldiers in Korea said that they were "ignorant, uninformed or plain stupid. Their perverted psychology and criminal act, are largely traceable to their overemphasis of the so-called American age."<sup>111</sup>

On 1 August 1950 General Chu Teh, head of the People's Liberation Army, stated: "We Chinese people recognize that the Korean people's struggle is entirely just. We definitely come to the relief of the Korean people, and definitely oppose the American Government's aggression against Korea."<sup>112</sup> On 24 September Kuo Mo-Jo, Chairman of the Chinese World Peace Salvation Society, warned, "We should, in the name of the progressive youth of the whole world, oppose American imperialism's aggression and use practical actions to come forward to support the Korean people's just struggle". On the same day the Chinese Government lodged a protest in the United Nations against the United States for its

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110 New China News Agency, 27 June 1950.

111 Ibid., 9 August 1950.

112 Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, Roots of Involvement: The U.S. in Asia, 1784-1971 (London, 1971), pp. 62-63.

"criminal act in the armed invasion of the territory of China". To this the State Department in a carefully worded reply, so as not to sound provocative, said that the "United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the Formosa problem.... Of course the Security Council should not be diverted from the urgent business already on its agenda, the aggression against the Republic of Korea."<sup>113</sup> Chou En-lai appointed Chang Wen-tien to present the case of China before the General Assembly. He criticized the United States for building military forces in Formosa and emphasized the Chinese determination to recover Taiwan. He warned the enemies of "the people" of the serious consequences for their imperialist manoeuvrings. These charges led to a series of debates in the General Assembly where the United States and China traded allegations and counter-allegations.

The Chinese remained very suspicious of the American designs in Korea. On 25 September 1950, Jen-min Jih-pao criticized in strong words the American interests in Asia and said that "the American warmongers are mistaken in thinking that their accusations and threats will intimidate the people of China."<sup>114</sup> On 29 September the Chinese Aliens Association of North Korea in a telegram to Mao Tse-tung expressed their solidarity with the Government in its struggle against the "American imperialists."<sup>115</sup> Other public organizations expressed

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113 Goodrich, n. 108, p. 139.

114 Quoted in Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, 1960), p. 106. See also Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963), p. 577.

115 Kalb and Abel, n. 112, p. 63.

the desire that the Peking Government should "protect" China from "blatant violations of Chinese territory".<sup>116</sup> On 30 September the People's Republic of China formally published and ratified the Treaty of Alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>117</sup>

The US policy was to reassure China that the US actions in Korea were not directed against it. But it was not easy to succeed in that policy. On the one hand were people like MacArthur who were clamouring that China be declared as the main antagonist of the United States in the Far East and on the other Secretary of State and other members of the State Department kept on denying the representative character to the Communists government in China. The US reiteration of friendship was meant for the Chinese people and not their government. Obviously, the United States had not given up its hope of utilizing the possible tension between the government and the people. The outbreak of the war had made no difference. This of course overlooked the fact that the Chinese Government alone had the power to act. These contradictions were reflected in American explanations of the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet. Presumably the American expectation was that the Chinese would not come in direct military confrontation with the United States. The response of the Congress was less sophisticated than that of the Administration. It responded to the heat and emotion generated by the war.

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116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.

## DEBATE OVER THE CROSSING OF THE 38TH PARALLEL

Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel

After the landing of the UN forces at Inchon on 29 September 1950 there was a dramatic reversal in the military situation. The North Koreans began to retreat. It enabled the Republic of Korea to regain the territories it had lost since the outbreak of the war. But the Truman Administration faced a dilemma. Should they cross the 38th parallel, defeat the North Korean and proceed to unify the whole country under the UN auspices; or, stop at the 38th parallel and assist the Republic of Korea to consolidate its position?<sup>118</sup> The latter course was likely to promote domestic criticism from the Republicans. In the face of a forthcoming Congressional election such a course was not politically advisable. Moreover, General MacArthur was in favour of an all-out war against the North Koreans. He had outlined his military plan to the Pentagon for crossing the 38th parallel.<sup>119</sup> Even before the General's plan was formally approved by the Pentagon the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent MacArthur a message in late September 1950 authorizing him to cross the 38th parallel and "conduct military operations". He was, however, cautioned not to cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea.<sup>120</sup> The message implied that under no circum-

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118 One can find the first signs of Washington's thinking in this regard in American delegate Warren Austin's remarks in the Security Council on 17 August 1950. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 21 August 1950, p. 331.

119 Douglas A. MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, 1964), p. 358.

120 Ibid.

stances the military operations in Korea should provoke the Soviet Union or China to join the war. On 30 September the JCS formally approved MacArthur's plan.<sup>121</sup>

These developments aroused acute Chinese concern. They were not willing to accept the disappearance of North Korea and to have a unified hostile Korea at their very door step. As pointed out, they repeatedly warned the Americans that there would be serious consequences if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel.

The Truman Administration never took these warnings seriously. On 1 October 1950 MacArthur asked North Korea to surrender "under such military supervision as I may direct".<sup>122</sup> On the same day Premier Chou En-lai issued a statement warning that "the Chinese people definitely cannot tolerate foreign aggression" and "cannot allow imperialists recklessly to aggress against their own neighbour and disregard it".<sup>123</sup> On 3 October, China ventilated its determination to intervene if the UN forces continued to march towards the Manchurian border. This time<sup>124</sup> also Washington ignored it.

On 13 October, the Chinese started crossing the Yalu river into Korea and by 20 October, nine Chinese infantry divisions were deployed facing the Eighth Army and the ROK II Corps.<sup>125</sup> The Korean War assumed serious dimension.

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121 Ibid.

122 Kalb and Abel, n. 112, p. 64.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War, South to the Naktong North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 717.

The American policy makers had considered the possibility of the Chinese and Russian intervention in the Korean War. For instance, as far back as September 1950, immediately after the Inchon landing, President Truman approved the recommendation of the National Security Council to General MacArthur to continue naval and air operations but not ground operations in case North Korea was occupied by Soviet or Chinese forces.<sup>126</sup>

The success of the Inchon landing made the Americans more bold. When MacArthur sought permission to announce that he was crossing the 38th parallel, he was instructed to proceed with operations "without any further explanation or announcement". The reason was that the Truman Administration wanted to avoid having to make an issue out of the 38th parallel "until we have accomplished our mission".<sup>127</sup> Despite the serious warnings issued repeatedly by the Chinese, the Americans were somehow not sure that the Chinese would intervene. On 27 September 1950, Washington instructed MacArthur to conduct military operations including amphibious and air-borne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel. But it added that "provided that at the time of such operation there had been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, and no threat by Russian or Chinese Communists to counter our operations militarily in North Korea".<sup>128</sup> This directive would make it clear that if the Chinese or the Soviet Union entered,

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126 Harold Stein, American Civil Military Decisions : A Book of Case Studies (University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 584-5.

127 Whitney, n. 29, p. 399; Truman, n. 4, p. 361.

128 Truman, n. 4, p. 360. Emphasis added.

threatened to enter or even threatened to counter the military operations in North Korea, military operations north of the 38th parallel was not to take place. The crossing of the 38th parallel by the United States thus would indicate that the United States had not considered the Chinese entry into the war as a serious possibility. The general consensus in Washington — in the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon — actually discounted the danger of Chinese intervention. With the important exception of George F. Kennan, who was not on active service, having gone on leave from the State Department in September 1950, Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor on the Policy Planning Staff, and Thomas K. Finteller, Secretary of the Air Force, the Truman Administration on the whole held the view that China would not intervene.<sup>129</sup>

Kennan and Nitze had consistently maintained that the crossing of the 38th parallel was not only fraught with grave risk of inviting anti-US intervention but it was unnecessary. Kennan was of the view that there still was some opportunity to drive a wedge between Peking and Moscow if a status quo ante was achieved without further fighting. He believed that the Soviet Union had reacted differently to an Indian prodding to get a seat for China in the United Nations. So long a war situation existed in Korea, the USSR would be morally bound to support the Chinese People's Republic in its adventure. But once status quo was restored and fighting stopped the Russians with the hope of keeping the Chinese isolated and dependent would not want Mao's

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129 Stein, n. 126, p. 595. See also MacArthur, n. 119, p. 362.



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Government in the United Nations.

With the perception of the situation, Kennan had written prophetically in a memorandum sent to his superiors in the State Department on 8 August 1950:

... when the tide of the battle begins to change, the Kremlin will not wait for us to reach the 38th parallel before taking action. When we begin to have military success, that will be the time to watch out. Anything may then happen — entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, new strike for U.N. settlement or all three together. 131

Two weeks later, just before leaving the State Department, he again warned in a Press conference in Washington:

... Russians will not be inclined to sit by if our forces or United Nations forces ... of any sort push the North Koreans beyond the 38th parallel again.... They may ... reoccupy North Korea, or they might introduce other forces which would be nominally Chinese Communist forces ... (goodness knows who would be really controlling them).... Obviously, they are not going to leave the field free for us to sweep up the peninsula and place ourselves forty or fifty miles from Vladivostok. 132

It is to be noted here that in Kennan's view it was the Soviet Union which was going to be the principal actor. If the Chinese were to intervene they were to do so only at the behest of the Russians.

Finletter shared Kennan's perception in as much as he too felt that the Communist intervention in the war would take place if the UN forces pushed beyond the 38th parallel. But he felt

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130 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (Boston, 1972), vol. 2, p. 24. See also Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schelsinger, Jr., The General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1951), p. 151; James Reston in New York Times, 16 November 1950, p. 6; Walter H. Waggover in New York Times, 16 November 1950, p. 2.

131 Kennan, n. 130, p. 24.

132 Ibid.

that it would possibly be a Chinese intervention. Finletter said on 3 October 1950 that he was "extremely worried" about the possibility that "China might intervene momentarily in the Korean War".<sup>133</sup>

Thus there were apprehensions that either China or the Soviet Union might intervene and the directive sent to General MacArthur on 27 September contained the cautionary note about the Communist threat. There had been urgent appeals from India and Yugoslavia also for the UN forces to hold back from crossing the 38th parallel. Moreover, Chou En-lai's very public warning was in the headlines before the US forces marched across the 38th parallel. Consequently, by the time China intervened, Kennan's misgivings about desirability of crossing the 38th parallel had come to be shared by a number of highly placed people in Washington including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>134</sup>

The Truman Administration thus failed to correctly gauge the nature of Chinese anxiety and apprehension. It failed to understand that the crossing of the 38th parallel would seriously threaten the Chinese security which they would not be able to ignore. On the basis of available evidence now it can be stated that China intervened in the war for its own reasons, not for the cause of world communism. Allen S. White, who has made a detailed study of the causes and consequences of China's crossing the Yalu,<sup>135</sup> has pointed out that "China entered the war of her own free will". He further pointed out:

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133 Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, Douglas MacArthur (New York, 1952), p. 204.

134 Kennan, n. 130, p. 25.

135 Whiting, n. 114, p. 154.

It would seem that a Soviet diktat was not needed to bring the PRC into the war. There may have been differences between the two allies as to the timing and extent of the move.... There undoubtedly were questions of mutual responsibility, some of which may have been resolved to the dissatisfaction of one or both partners.... But the final decision to fight appears to have been basically a Chinese decision, conditioned by Russian advice and encouraged by Russian support. 136

Whiting has written that it could well be that China had anticipated a favourable Soviet response but this "may have been a contributing, rather than a determining, factor in the Chinese decision to enter the war".<sup>137</sup>

When the Chinese intervention took place the American leaders first wondered how China failed to understand how friendly the United States was to them and then concluded that Peking, like North Korea five months before, was obviously acting as the puppet of Kremlin. In his radio address of 15 December 1950 President Truman told that "in November, the Communists threw their Chinese armies into the battle against free nations".<sup>138</sup> It is quite interesting to note that the President spoke as if China did not have any interest of its own to join the war.<sup>139</sup>

136 Ibid., p. 160.

137 Ibid., p. 152.

138 Department of State Bulletin, n. 23, 25 December 1950, p. 999. See also Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Dean Acheson (New York, 1972), p. 233; Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1951 (New York, 1952), pp. 81-82.

139 It has been said that just as the Soviet authorities misjudged the American perception of the danger in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the American policy makers gravely miscalculated the real Chinese apprehensions. See Paul Seabury, The United States in World Affairs (New York, 1973), p. 84; David S. McLellan, "Dean Acheson and the Korean War", Political Science Quarterly (New York), vol. 83, March 1968, p. 18.

There were strong differences of opinion on the question of America's crossing the 38th parallel. When this brought about the massive Chinese intervention, the Administration accused General MacArthur of facing "a reluctant Civil Administration into a dubious political adventure" by appealing to military necessity. He was also charged with flouting the Washington's mandates and exceeding his orders. But such allegations have been rejected outright even by the General's worst critics. Many scholars have held the American bureaucracy to be responsible for this unwise step. Walter Millis, a noted journalist and author, has opined that possibly "most critical decision of the Korean War" was the product of "blurred and fuzzy processes". It was made in "the worst way, for confused reasons, on deficient intelligence and with an inadequate appreciation of the risks". One writer has tried to rationalize the decision by attributing it to a failure to anticipate Chinese intervention, the enthusiasm generated by the Inchon victory, the idea that a possible Chinese intervention would be duly responded to and the "desire to establish the Democratic Administration's prestige in its Far

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140 See Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., American-East Asian Relations : A Survey (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 367-9. Commenting on the Truman-MacArthur controversy, Millis has very correctly said that "it could happen in the Korean war only because this was a limited struggle and because the underlying problems of waging limited war by democratic methods in the modern age had scarcely even been discerned, much less resolved". See Walter Millis, Armies and Men : A Study in American Military History (London, 1958), p. 333.

Eastern policies"<sup>141</sup>. Richard Neustadt, who was closely associated with the Truman Administration, has suggested that Acheson had some apprehension of Chinese intervention but due to domestic pressure he did not convey his misgivings to Truman.<sup>142</sup> It can be argued that the outcome of such a fear of domestic pressure might as well have been the opposite. Probably, as it has been said, "Acheson did not ignore the possibility of Chinese intervention,<sup>143</sup> [but] he did not think it likely".

China had been warning frequently that if the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea China would join the war in support of the North Koreans. This step, however, would not be taken if only the South Koreans crossed the parallel. By 2 October the South Koreans had advanced beyond the 38th parallel. The same day, Chou En-lai summoned the Indian Ambassador, Sardar K.M. Panikkar and told him about the Chinese stand on intervention in Korea. Truman has written in his memoirs that this information about Chinese intent sent by Panikkar was received in Washington

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141 May and Thomson, n. 140, p. 368. See also Rovere and Schelesinger, n. 130, pp. 142-52; Truman, n. 4, pp. 383-4. For the argument that the crossing of the parallel was chiefly a tactical move to defeat the enemy, see Acheson, 23, pp. 445-55. For the argument that it was a political decision, see John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 87-91.

142 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Powers: The Politics of Leadership (New York, 1960), pp. 145-6. See also William O. Chittick, State Department, Press and Pressure Groups: A Role Analysis (New York, 1970), p. 145.

143 Smith, n. 138, p. 210.

with some skepticism, because the Indian diplomat had in the past<sup>144</sup> "played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly". He discounted the possibility of a Chinese intervention. Even when the Chinese warning was confirmed by diplomatic cables from Moscow, Stockholm, and New Delhi and newspaper reports, he did not modify his previous instruction to MacArthur. He told him on 9 October 1950 that "in the event of the open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units ... you should continue the action as long as, in your judgement, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success".<sup>145</sup> MacArthur, however, was forbidden to undertake any action against Chinese territory unless approved by the White House.<sup>146</sup>

#### Wake Island Meeting

As the Chinese entry into the war appeared to be a possibility the Truman Administration decided to take steps to allay the fears of the Chinese. With this object in view the President decided to have discussions with General MacArthur. The meeting took place on 15 October at Wake Island in the Pacific. The other conferees in the meeting were Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, Ambassador John Muccio; Secretary of the Army, France Pace; Colonel A.L. Hamblen; Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup; General of the Army,

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144 Truman, n. 4, p. 362.

145 Ibid. Emphasis added.

146 Ibid.

Omar N. Bradley; Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; and  
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 Averell Harriman.

In the meeting the discussions veered round to the possibility of Soviet and Chinese intervention into the war. MacArthur held the view that even the Soviet or the Chinese intervention should not cause any anxiety to the United States. "We no longer stand hat in hand", he said. Moreover, he also thought that operationally the United States forces were in a better position because the combination of the Chinese Communist ground forces and the Russian air forces "just wouldn't work".  
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After the Wake Island conference, in the face of larger intervention of the Chinese forces, serious differences developed about the scope of the war between the President and the General leading to the dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951. The circumstances leading to this meeting, the conversations that took place there and the subsequent allegations and counter-allegations by Truman and MacArthur over the question of responsibility for American military reverses in the Korean War reflect the American perception of the Sino-Soviet relations.

In the Wake Island meeting, Truman has written in his memoirs, MacArthur had categorically said that there was no possibility of Chinese intervention. MacArthur believed that China did not have an Air-force and so its intervention would only be possible if the Chinese infantry was supported by a Russian air-cover. This was possible but MacArthur thought it

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147 U.S., Senate, Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950 (Washington, D.C., 1951).

148 Ibid., p. 5; Truman, n. 4, pp. 365-6.

would not work. In an interview given to his friend, which was not published till 1964, after his death, MacArthur had said that he had never told the President that the Chinese would not enter the war. He said that Truman by saying so wanted to "discredit" him. He rather had the plan to bomb the bridges at the Yalu River, which separated Korea from Manchuria, in case of Chinese intervention. Such a policy, MacArthur hoped, would cut the invader's line of communication and they would be doomed "to starve a while before being destroyed".<sup>149</sup>

Major General Courtney Whitney has attributed this meeting to narrow, capricious motives of the President. He wanted to get credit for the Administration in MacArthur's victory and get an alibi for the Administration in case of Chinese intervention.

Whitney writes:

It was only later, when Mr. Truman made his amazing charge that MacArthur had misled him on the possibility of Red Chinese intervention and when the scandalous method of preparing the 'record' of the proceedings was exposed, that MacArthur realized that Wake Island was no longer an enigma - it was a sly political ambush. 150

Whitney's views, however, have been strongly criticized<sup>151</sup> by Spanier. He says that Truman decided to meet MacArthur because he had the apprehension that China might intervene unless it was sufficiently assured of the US intention not to wage war against it. Spanier says that it was possible for Mao to join the war for either of the two reasons, first, he had no trust in

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149 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 57, 20 April 1964, p. 48.

150 Whitney, n. 29, p. 395.

151 Spanier, n. 141, pp. 106-7.



the integrity of Secretary Acheson's assurances, or second, he was afraid that the President could not control MacArthur who was quite unfriendly to China.<sup>152</sup> Chinese fears were strengthened from the image of MacArthur which was presented in well informed US publications. Chinese Communist reference to the New York Times, Time and U.S. News & World Report reflected the careful study of American periodicals for information on US intentions. These reports used to show the value that the Pentagon and the White House used to attach to MacArthur and the latter's anti-Communist pro-Chiang policies.<sup>153</sup> He had paid a widely publicized visit to Chiang on 31 July and a few days later in a message to the Veterans of Foreign War, had demanded "aggressive resolute and dynamic leadership". He said that "nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia".<sup>154</sup> In private, the General added that the State Department's hostile attitude toward Chiang might affect his own mission in Korea adversely. The Administration, however, was reluctant to accept MacArthur's prescription of close relations with Chiang. It felt that a close political alignment with Chiang would not only estrange the support of America's allies and alienate the sympathies of most of the Asian countries, but it would make it impossible, for the United States to exploit the conflict of interests

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152 Ibid., p. 107.

153 Whiting, n. 114, pp. 88-89.

154 Truman, n. 4, p. 354.

between the Soviet Union and China. A hostile attitude towards China would invoke an anti-American sentiment in China and would thereby bar the possibility of a break between the two Communist giants.<sup>155</sup> Anthony Leviero of the New York Times wrote in his column of 12 October 1950:

Informed sources in Washington said today that Mr Truman is desirous of winning General Mac Arthur's support for our Far Eastern Policy. It is known that the General disagrees in important respects, favouring strong acts backed by military force.... The basic principle of the policy that the Administration would like General MacArthur to support is that communism, especially in China, cannot be overcome by force. Administration advisers see the solution as a long-term one that will come about when the Chinese leaders ... recognize that their best interests are not served by alliances that keep them subservient to the Soviet Union. 156

The Truman Administration believed that an extension of the war would lead to various complications. If China was provoked to join the war Russia would follow suit which might lead to a third world war. On the contrary, harbouring friendly attitude toward China would discourage it to join the war as well as in the long run might incline it to change its unfriendly attitude toward America and cause a break in the Sino-Soviet bond. Unlike MacArthur, Truman felt that it was not wise to embroil in a big war when the United States had other responsibilities in Europe. In his address at San Francisco on 17 October 1950, after his return from Wake Island, the President emphasized that the Soviet threat was directed at both "Europe and Asia" and discussed the Korean War only within the context of a

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155 Spanier, n. 141, pp. 107-8.

156 New York Times, 12 October 1950, p. 4.

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global Soviet menace. It was only on 15 November, a few days before the massive Chinese intervention, that Secretary Acheson said in his extemporaneous remarks made before a National Conference on Foreign Policy held in the Department of State, that there should not be any misunderstanding about America's good intent towards China. He clarified that America did not have any ulterior motive at the cost of China. Although he warned the Chinese that the United States would stand resolutely against any Chinese blackmail, he also expressed his feelings respecting Chinese sentiments and susceptibilities. With regard to the Chinese anxieties about the use of Yalu river, Acheson assured the Chinese that the United States would use its influence in the United Nations "to bring about a constructive adjustment of Chinese-Korean interests in the Yalu River"<sup>158</sup>.

Acheson said:

... we must ... clear away any possible misunderstanding that there may be in the minds of the Chinese. If they believe ... that the United Nations or the United States have any ulterior designs in Manchuria everything possible must be done to disabuse them of such an illusion because it is not true ... and I should suppose that there is no country in the world which has been more outstanding in developing the theory of brotherly development of border waters (referring to Yalu river problem) than the United States. 159

Almost during the same time, on 24 November 1950, Ambassador Phillip C. Jessup in an address delivered before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council at Philadelphia expressed

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157 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 30 October 1950, pp. 683-6.

158 Ibid., 27 November 1950, p. 855.

159 Ibid.

similar sentiments. He again emphasized the traditional American  
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 friendship with the Chinese people. He accused the Communist  
 regime of China of parroting the Soviet propaganda that the  
 United States was interested in dismembering Manchuria.  
 Referring to President Truman's phrase "the new colonialism -  
 Soviet style" he rather accused the Soviet Union of having  
 imperialistic designs in the northern provinces of China and  
 reassured China of America's fundamental policy of maintaining  
 its territorial integrity.

In a statement made only a few days before the massive  
 Chinese intervention on 24 November 1950 (Chinese troops were  
 already engaged in the Korean War and their participation was  
 gradually increasing) Truman reiterated the American friendly  
 feelings towards China and said:

Speaking for the United States Government and  
 people, I can give assurance that we support  
 and are acting within the limits of United  
 Nations policy in Korea and that we have never  
 at any time entertained any intention to carry  
 hostilities into China. So far as the United  
 States is concerned, I wish to state unequivocally  
 that because of our deep devotion to the cause of  
 world peace and our long-standing friendship for  
 the people of China we will take every honorable  
 step to prevent any extension of the hostilities  
 in the Far East. If the Chinese Communist autho-  
 rities, or people believe otherwise, it can only  
 be because they are being deceived by those whose  
 advantage it is to prolong and extend hostilities  
 in the Far East against the interests of all Far  
 Eastern people. 162

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160 Ibid., 4 December 1950, p. 885.

161 Ibid., p. 886.

162 Ibid., 27 November 1950, pp. 852-3. Emphasis added.

On 24 November 1950, the day when the UN forces launched their "home by Christmas" offensive the massive Chinese intervention took place. From this time the Americans started stressing that communism in Asia, as in Europe (except in Yugoslavia) was a monolith and, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it in 1952, "each communist gain directly involves a loss to the Western world".<sup>163</sup>

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163 John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point ? ", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 52, January 1974, p. 397.

**Chapter IV**

**UNIPOLAR COMMUNIST WORLD : NOVEMBER 1950 - JULY 1954**

## Chapter IV

### UNIPOLAR COMMUNIST WORLD : NOVEMBER 1950 - JULY 1954

On 27 November 1950 General Lin Piao, Commander of the People's Republic of China, ordered all his forces to cross the Yalu and advance to the front. The Chinese clandestine participation with the North Koreans which had already started in October was now formalized and greatly enlarged.<sup>1</sup>

#### CHANGE IN AMERICAN ATTITUDE

With the intervention of the People's Republic of China into the Korean War, the US attitude towards international communism hardened. The restraint which the American policy showed in its dealings with China evaporated. Hitherto, the American policy-makers did not take the so-called Chinese threat as seriously as it had taken the Soviet threat in spite of the existence of a growing awareness of the partnership between the Soviet Union and China. Consequently, although a fierce battle was being waged in Korea against Communist aggression, American policy of not provoking China continued in policy pronouncements and significant extempore remarks. It was interesting that no statement ever emanated from Washington that the United States was countenancing a "Communist international brigade", a phrase which was used later on to brand the anti-American forces in Korea; nor was it seriously contended that the world was on the brink of a third world war.<sup>2</sup> While the Soviet Union had been subjected to

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1 New York Times, 29 November 1950, p. 1.

2 Congressional Record, 82, I, 18 June 1951 - 30 June 1951, vol. 97, nos 108-18, p. 7185.

constant and severe criticism for violating world peace and causing serious tensions, no charges were levelled against Chinese complicity therein. The United States continued to entertain the hope of detaching China from the Soviet Union. The Americans understood that once China became belligerent it had of necessity to depend on the Soviet Union. Therefore it is not surprising that the speculation about the nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance virtually ceased in the United States after China entered into the Korean War. The US policy thereafter was based on the assumption of the Sino-Soviet unity. The assumption did not change till the evidence of Sino-Soviet discord began to pile up in the late nineteen-fifties. Even then the policy framers took considerable time to adjust the policy to this changed reality. The US foreign policy continued to operate on the old assumptions. The hardening of America's China policy was reflected in the postponement of the issue of recognition, making of Formosa an integral part of the American security system in the Pacific, and branding the communism in China as "a passing and not a perpetual state"<sup>3</sup>. To all intents and purposes China was taken for granted to be a partner of the Soviet Union in the latter's "grand design for world domination".

In the evolution of the American perception of the Sino-Soviet relations the Chinese intervention into the Korean War served as a catalyst.

The US response to the Chinese intervention was violent. No effort was made to retrace the steps which had led to the intervention. President Truman expressed his grave concern at

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3 A. Doak Barnett, A New U.S. Policy toward China (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 11.



the possibility of a world war and in his Press conference on 30 November 1950 he did not hesitate in declaring that if need arose even nuclear bomb might be used. He also expressed the feeling that the Soviet Union was behind China and that the Chinese action filled into a grand international Communist design.<sup>4</sup>

As a result of the Chinese intervention in the war domestic pressures on the Truman Administration became more intense and partly accounted for the stiffening of American attitudes towards China. The fact that the massive Chinese intervention resulted in the rout of the American and South Korean forces made it virtually impossible for the American government to talk of peace and reconciliation. That would have appeared in the eyes of the Americans as nothing less than abject surrender.<sup>5</sup> The China lobby and the McCarthyites who had been the critics of the

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4 See James E. Pollard, "The White House News Conference as a Channel of Communication", Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 16, Winter 1951-52, pp. 673-8; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-53; The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (Bungay, Suffolk, 1956), vol. 2, p. 395.

5 The Democrats' reverses in the Congressional elections of 1950 showed that the Americans had listened more sympathetically to those who attributed the loss of China to some conspiracy within the Administration and advocated a more vigorous anti-Mao policy. See John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 151-2. For a detailed analysis of the state of public opinion, 1950-52, see *ibid.*, pp. 217-20, 268-70; Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade, 1945-1955 (New York, 1956), pp. 202-18; Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study (Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 209-13; Warren E. Miller, "Voting and Foreign Policy", and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crisis", both in James N. Rosenan, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 1967), pp. 213-30, 263-93.

Truman Administration's China policy would have further exploited the situation to their advantage had the Administration not taken a firm and drastic stand.<sup>6</sup>

If the Administration showed some restraint and decided not to go for a full-scale war with China, it was because of international compulsions and pragmatic considerations. Korea was not worth the price of unleashing a world war when Europe was the real prize. The spokesmen of the Administration very often expressed the view that once America got embroiled on Asian soil the Soviet Union would get a free hand in Europe. Truman, for instance, recorded in his memoirs: "I had no intention to allow our attention to be diverted from unchanging aims and designs of Soviet policy. I knew that in our age, Europe with its millions of skilled workmen, with its factories and transportation network is still the key to world peace."<sup>7</sup> General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had said that according to the CIA

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6 After the Chinese intervention in Korea, the State Department specialists in China, specially O. Edmund Clubb, John Paton Davies, John Steward Service, and John Carter Vincent, were abused, humiliated and persecuted for their alleged treason. When the Chinese intervention convinced most people of the monolithic nature of international communism, the earlier contention that traditionally and culturally China and Russia were so different that a rift between them was impending seemed to many as naive. McCarthyism consequently became very popular, see Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York, 1971), pp. 206-7. How the Republicans made use of McCarthyism in their campaign against the Democratic Administration can very well be understood by a story which McCarthy himself liked to tell. Senator John W. Bricker (Rep., Ohio) once said to McCarthy, "Joe, you're a real son of a bitch. But sometimes it's useful to have sons of bitches around to do the dirty work". See James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (Boston, 1970), p. 79.

7 Truman, n. 4, p. 403. See also Congressional Record, 82, I, 9 April 1951 to 19 April 1951, vol. 97, nos 63-71, p. 4173.

estimates the Soviet Union was preparing for a war with the United States within 12 to 24 months. According to the American policy makers, since European security was more fundamental to US interest it would have been unwise to invest American men and money in Korea.

Truman adroitly avoided both the extremes. He tended to follow a course in Korea which would neither give the impression to China that the United States was going to accept Korea as "a Far Eastern Munich"<sup>9</sup> nor unleash a full-scale war with China which might escalate to a world war. In the meeting of the National Security Council held on 28 November, the day following the Chinese intervention in the war, Acheson urged that the Chinese intervention must not be seen as an isolated phenomenon but should be considered as part of the total confrontation with the Soviet Union. Similar feeling was also expressed by Defence Secretary George Marshall, who cautioned the United States against a "Russian trap".<sup>10</sup> This theory of Chinese being a tool of the Soviet foreign policy and the feeling that Chinese attack was inspired by Kremlin was so strong in the National Security Council that Acheson preferred to use the word "formally" in charging China of aggression.<sup>11</sup> In a broadcast from Washington

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8 Gaddis Smith, *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy : Dean Acheson* (New York, 1972), p. 224.

9 The Republican opposition was beginning to talk of appeasement as a "Far Eastern Munich in the making". See William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, *United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955* (Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 275.

10 Smith, n. 8, p. 219.

11 Ibid.

on 29 November Acheson for the first time talked about Chinese complicity in the Korean War. He accused China of involvement in the Korean war right from the beginning and went on to allege that even before the war broke out in Korea China had been co-operating with the North Koreans in building up their military machine. This sentiment coupled with his criticisms of Soviet expansionism in the latter part of the speech meant to suggest that he was talking of an international Communist "conspiracy" directed against the "free" nations, and that the Soviet and Chinese shared the same ambitions.<sup>12</sup> Acheson remarked:

The increasing boldness of the international Communist movement, its willingness to use overt aggression, and to accept the deliberate risk of war make it increasingly urgent for all American citizens to face squarely the danger that confronts us and to give vigorous and united support to the measures we must take to meet this danger. Those who control the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement have made clear their fundamental design. It is to hold and solidify their power over the people and territories within their reach, however ruthless the means required. 13

It has been observed that Acheson's statement was one of the last American official expressions of the hope that the United States could profit from the rift between the Soviet Union and China. Henceforth, Truman and Acheson viewed the Chinese as no less implacable in their hostility as the Russians.<sup>14</sup>

Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, expressed similar opinions and in a statement made on 15 November 1950

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12 Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. 23, 18 December 1950, pp. 963-4.

13 Ibid., p. 964.

14 Smith, n. 8, p. 220.

a few days before the massive Chinese attack, said that Chinese intervention had started much earlier, so much so that the Korean War itself was practically engineered by the Moscow-Peking clique. The intervention of China was only "a change in scale, a change in shape"<sup>15</sup>.

On 28 November, MacArthur in a communique told Washington that "over 200,000 Chinese were arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea ... we face an entirely new war"<sup>16</sup>. Within a week after the Chinese intervention it began to appear that MacArthur's entire command might be destroyed or thrown back to Japan. On 3 December, alarming news came from MacArthur that there was little possibility of further success "unless ground reinforcements of the greatest magnitudes are promptly supplied"<sup>17</sup>. Keeping in mind the unwillingness of the American allies to escalate the war, Washington showed no interest in MacArthur's request.

The United States had the feeling that China had unleashed the war under Soviet dictates and any escalation might lead to a final showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup> Kennan's Memoirs is replete with evidences supporting this contention. It was on 1 December 1950 that Charles A. Bohlen, then serving as Minister in the American embassy in Paris, had

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15 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 23, 4 December 1950, pp. 889-90.

16 Smith, n. 8, p. 218.

17 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (Boston, 1972), vol. 2, p. 26.

18 See Trumson, n. 4, p. 400. Dean Acheson also understood the danger inherent in escalating the war when there existed a mutual assistance treaty between Moscow and Peking. See *ibid.*, p. 396.

written to Kennan to go to Washington and influence the decision there by his expertise about the Soviet Union. Presumably, Bohlen had the feeling that the Korean problem was fundamentally a Soviet problem and so Kennan was the right person to save the United States from this imbroglio. On Bohlen's request Kennan met the people in the State Department. The talks which ensued revealed that the fear of the Soviet Union loomed large in the State Department too. About James Webb, the Under Secretary of State, Kennan's diary recorded that he had a similar feeling and believed that:

No course would be decided on until we had talked with the British. One of the variants that would be discussed with the British would be a direct approach to the Russians with a view to bring about a ceasefire in Korea. What they wanted from me he said was a view as to the prospects of negotiation with the Russians on this problem at this time. 19

Secretary Acheson also wanted to know from Kennan about the proposal of a direct dialogue with the Soviet Union, as a possible escape from the embarrassment that the United States was facing on the war front. The memorandum which Kennan submitted on 3 December with the help of John Paton Davies, Jr., a seasoned China hand, and G. Frederick Reinhardt, an old Moscow hand (who later served as US ambassador to Rome) suggested that any approach to the Russians must be preceded by "the demonstration that we have the capability to stabilize the front somewhere in the peninsula and to engage a large number of Communist forces

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19 Kennan, n. 17, p. 29; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929-1969 (New York, 1973), pp. 294-8. See also Charles E. Bohlen, The Transformation of American Foreign Policy (Madras, 1969), pp. 114-16.

for a long time"<sup>20</sup>. Acheson and Rusk on the whole accepted the view. It was felt that the time was not opportune for a dialogue with the Russians. Acheson told the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee the following day that the moment appeared to him to be "the worst one for negotiation with the Russians since 1917". The Russians, he added, "saw themselves holding the cards and would concede nothing"<sup>21</sup>. However, no opinion was ever expressed for "a total and abrupt military withdrawal from the peninsula". General Marshall, the Secretary of Defence, and Robert A. Lovett,<sup>22</sup> then serving as Deputy Secretary of Defence, had identical views. Eventually it was the President who made it all the more clear by saying that he did not have any sympathy with the suggestions that the United States should abandon Korea.

In all these crucial talks in the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House, the question about the Chinese intention did not figure significantly. The aggressor was China but the prospect of peace negotiations concerned the Soviet Union only. It was thus clear that in the American thinking Chinese attack was directed by the Soviet Union and as such it was useless to make efforts to cure the symptom while the disease was still there.<sup>23</sup>

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20 Ibid., p. 29.

21 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London, 1969), p. 482.

22 Kennan, n. 17, pp. 32-33.

23 For instance, Thomas K. Finletter in his book Challenge and Responsibility (Pasadena, California, 1951) wrote about Communists, Iron Curtain, etc., without mentioning even for once China.

That the United States perceived the Chinese as subser-  
 vient to Moscow was further revealed in Truman's disagreement with  
 the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee during their meeting in  
 Washington in the first week of December 1950. The British leader  
 had the feeling that it was a mistake to write off the Communist  
 China as a Soviet satellite and that it would be wiser to  
 recognize China and give it its rightful place in the family of  
 nations.<sup>24</sup> Such a situation in the long run, the British Prime  
 Minister felt, would bring in conflict the national interests of  
 China and the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup> Truman records that Attlee felt  
 that "even if the Russians might think of a settlement (of the  
 Korean problem), that might not necessarily convince Mao Tse-  
 tung".<sup>26</sup> Truman and Acheson differed with him. Acheson pointed  
 to Attlee that "it had to be remembered that the central enemy  
 was not China but the Soviet Union. All the inspiration for  
 the Korean action came from Moscow".<sup>27</sup> The President himself  
 asserted that "the Chinese Communists were Russian satellites".  
 The problem was not confined to Korea alone but "was part of a  
 pattern". And projecting what later came to be known as the  
 'Domino theory', the President said: "After Korea, it would be  
 Indo-China, then Hongkong, then Malaya".<sup>28</sup>

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24 Truman, n. 4, pp. 396-9. See also Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1949-69 (New York, 1972), pp. 107-8; Forrest Davis and Robert A. Hunter, The Red China Lobby (New York, 1963), p. 69.

25 British opinion also seems to have supported Attlee's contention. See C.P. Fitzgerald, "Peking and Moscow", The Spectator (London), vol. 185, 8 December 1950, pp. 642-3; "Two Views of Korea, British and American Policies Compared", Round Table (London), vol. 164, September 1951, pp. 323-9.

26 Truman, n. 4, p. 397.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 399.



Did Truman and Acheson really believe China to be nothing more than a satellite? Evidence thus far produced would indicate that they did. However, for them "it really didn't matter too much whether the Chinese Communists were satellites or not. They would probably act in much the same way, regardless of the answer to that question."<sup>29</sup>

#### DEBATE OVER THE SCOPE OF WAR

With its awareness that the Soviet Union and China were united the Truman Administration was very keen to limit the Korean War so that it could not trigger a third world war. The controversy that developed between Truman and MacArthur, culminating in the removal of the General from his Far Eastern Command in April 1951, manifested the seriousness with which the Truman Administration was watching the situation created by the Chinese intervention. According to Truman the escalation of the war would have entailed a grave risk for he understood that in such a war China would be assisted by the Soviet Union. General MacArthur refused to subscribe to the idea that the Chinese were subservient to the Kremlin. He held that they had identical interests and identical policies to serve those interests.<sup>30</sup> Here was the crux of the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Unlike Truman, MacArthur believed that if necessary the war should be taken to the Chinese mainland which would intimidate

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29 Ibid.

30 U.S. Congress, 82, I, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee, Hearings, Nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be United States Representative to the Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 232, 799.

the Chinese and they would refrain from major military involvement. This would also, MacArthur thought, facilitate the American military operations in Korea. He criticized the Truman policy as "appeasement" and blamed the Administration for its adherence to "the concept that when you use force, you can limit the force"<sup>31</sup>. But the Pentagon did not consider it wise to risk a global war. As Secretary of Defence George Marshall stated subsequently:

... General MacArthur ... would have us, on our own initiative carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He should have us accept the risk involved not only in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe. 32

For the Truman Administration it was also difficult to convince its allies of the desirability of enlarging the scope of the war as suggested by MacArthur. The Administration therefore did not try to convince its allies of the desirability of accepting MacArthur's plan of a naval blockade of Port Arthur and the Chinese-Soviet coastlines. According to MacArthur such a blockade would have cut off the supply lines from the Soviet Union to China.<sup>33</sup> The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sherman,

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- 31 See Les K. Adler and Thomas J. Paterson, "Red Fascism and the Development of the Cold War", in Gary R. Hess, ed., America and Russia: From Cold War Confrontation to Coexistence (New York, 1973), p. 70.
- 32 U.S. Congress, 82, I, Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 325. Cited hereinafter as Military Situation in the Far East.
- 33 Ibid., p. 261.

expressed the view that without the active co-operation of other allied powers a naval blockade could not be successful.<sup>34</sup>

It was felt in the United States that the Korean War was not worth unleashing a world war. General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the view that Korea was "not the critical strategic prize" for which the United States should commit the entire American forces.<sup>35</sup> In his opinion the course suggested by MacArthur would have involved the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy".<sup>36</sup> He was also doubtful of the prospect of complete victory over China in case of a Sino-American war. He said that in spite of its overwhelming superiority even Japan failed to completely subjugate China.<sup>37</sup>

While military and naval considerations did not seem to favour MacArthur's design for an assault on China, aerial considerations also did not lend support to his forward policy. Views were expressed by General Vandenberg, Chief of the Air Staff, that no effective purpose would be served by just bombarding the area across the Yalu unless the industrial centres of China were destroyed. But he thought that such a course was unadvisable because it involved the risk of provoking the Soviet Union to join in China's defence. Vandenberg observed:

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34 For the views of Admiral Sherman see *ibid.*, pp. 1512-15.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 731.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 732.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 733.

While we can lay the industrial potential of Russia today waste, in my opinion, or we can lay the Manchurian countryside waste, as well as the principal cities of China, we cannot do both, again because we have got a shoestring Air Force. We are trying to operate a \$20 million business with about \$ 20,000. 38

Even before the Truman-MacArthur controversy over the Korean policy surfaced, Secretary Acheson expressed his concern at the escalation of the war. During the winter of 1951, in his effort not to provoke a world war Acheson sent a memorandum to Ambassador-at-Large Phillip Jessup relating to President Truman's proposed speech at San Francisco following his Wake Island meeting with MacArthur. The memorandum criticized the draft of the speech and ordered deletion of all references to the developments in the Korean War in terms of victory. It read, inter alia:

... the whole idea of victory should be taken out. We should not be talking about victory. This is out of keeping in the U.N. There are no victors or vanquished in this kind of situation, only an adjudication. The only victor is peace.... To talk in terms of victory makes this too much of a U.S.-USSR conflict. This part of the speech should be done with great restraint, should be sober, somber, with a sense of responsibility. 39

Acheson also disapproved of the speech's "hammering away at the theme of Communist imperialism in this way. Not only stale and uninteresting but dangerous in the present situation." Acheson's

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38 Ibid., p. 1379.

39 Memo; Schulman to Jessup, in the files of Charles Murphy, Truman Library, Independence, Mo., cited in David S. McLellan; "The Role of Political Style : A Study of Dean Acheson", in Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good, eds, Foreign Policy in the Sixties : The Issues and Instruments (Baltimore, Md., 1965), p. 253.

posture was in marked contrast with that of MacArthur.<sup>40</sup>

Placed between the two diametrically opposed views, represented by MacArthur on one side and the US allies on the other, the Truman Administration stood for a "not-too-hard not-too-soft" line in its China policy. It did not accept the views held by Clement Attlee, that China had been traditionally a rival of the Soviet Union and so it should be encouraged to challenge the Soviet dictates by according it a full diplomatic recognition and giving it its rightful place in the international organization. Similarly it did not accept MacArthur's view that since the Soviet Union was not in a position to effectively assist China, the war should be escalated and carried into the heartland of China. Between these rival prescriptions, one for an immediate end to the war and the other for a full-scale war the Truman Administration stood firm in its policy of having limited objectives of the war eschewing the possibility of enlarging it. Unlike MacArthur it believed that there could be a substitute for victory in Korea; unlike Attlee, it believed there could be a substitute for a softer policy towards communism.

#### IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN STRATEGIC THINKING

From the time of the Chinese intervention to the beginning of truce talks in July 1951, the US policy in Korea was based on

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40 Ibid. MacArthur believed that war should be fought with the psychology of victory in mind. He felt that the "Asiatics adore a winner, despise a loser". See Edgar J. Fredericks, MacArthur: His Mission and Meaning (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 63; William P. Gerberding, United States Foreign Policy: Perspectives and Analysis (New York, 1966), pp. 214-21.

the assumption that the Chinese problem represented a larger Communist menace. Apart from the President's warning that if necessary atom bomb might be used, the Administration's anxiety was reflected in other measures too.<sup>41</sup> On 1 December the President asked for a vast expansion of the armed services and on 16 December he proclaimed a national emergency. Two days later he announced the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then President of Colombia University, as the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (SCAPE). This appointment had already been agreed on in October but now the President chose to highlight it as part of a large scale preparation to rebuild the defence of the "free world".<sup>42</sup> With the recurring reverses of American forces in Korea, Seoul being abandoned on 4 January, the US defence preparations were geared up. In his State of the Union Message on 8 January 1951, President Truman emphasized the necessity of European defence from the point of view of American defence. Already on 3 January 1951 a Defense Mobilization Board and a Defense Production Administration had been set up under Charles E. Wilson and William H. Harrison respectively. On 15 January the President submitted before the Congress a 1951-52 budget of \$71.6 billion of which 69 per cent was for defence and foreign aid.<sup>43</sup>

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41 Smith, n. 8, p. 221.

42 Harold Stein, American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (University, Alabama, 1963), pp. 617-18.

43 Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1951 (New York, 1952), pp. 445-6.

Military and economic aid to Formosa substantially increased. Supply of military hardware to the Nationalists was secretly resumed in December 1950.<sup>44</sup> On 30 January 1951, an American note was sent to the Nationalist Government which formalized this assistance by stipulating four conditions: (1) The assistance was to be used only for the country's "internal security or its legitimate self-defense"; (2) secrecy was to be observed in case of classified information and material; (3) to supervise the proper use of the supplies American experts were to be allowed in the island; and (4) without prior permission of the United States the Formosan government was not supposed to sell or transfer the supplies to any third party. All these conditions were accepted by Formosa on 9 February 1951.<sup>45</sup> As a corollary to this agreement a military mission consisting of several hundred Americans was sent to Formosa in April 1951.<sup>46</sup> Although after receiving these military aid Formosa might have been feeling more secure or even might have thought of staging a comeback to the mainland but the American policy did not seem to suggest such a course for Formosa. Even after the "demilitarization" of Formosa was announced by Eisenhower in early 1953 American government was supposed to be consulted before Formosa decided to undertake a forward policy.<sup>47</sup>

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44 New York Times, 7 January 1951, p. 1.

45 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, 7 May 1951, p. 747.

46 New York Times, 2 May 1951, p. 7.

47 Ibid., 7 February 1953, p. 2; 9 February 1953, p. 2; 11 February 1953, p. 1; 25 February 1953, p. 4; 21 August 1953, p. 5; 22 December 1953, p. 3.

Along with military assistance, economic aid to Formosa was also substantially increased. Between 1950 and 1953, American economic aid to Formosa in goods and services amounted to \$100 million which was half of the total military assistance offered during the same period. The main purpose of this economic assistance was to build Formosa's economic and industrial capability to enable it serve as a base for the containment of Communist expansion.<sup>48</sup>

The emerging hard line against international communism was also reflected in a deeper involvement in Vietnam. The deteriorating military situation in Vietnam had already forced the American administration to gear up its military aid.<sup>49</sup> By the end of 1950 the Truman Administration was firmly committed to the defence of Vietnam as a part of its global strategy of containment and the US military aid to the French in Indo-China was increased to five hundred million dollars in 1951.<sup>50</sup> In February 1952, according to a CIA estimate, there was a possibility of Chinese intervention in Indo-China. The report, however, added that in order to avoid such a possibility from materializing the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand should join with the United States in issuing a warning<sup>51</sup> to China that it would be challenged militarily if it intervened.

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48 Werner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy (Minneapolis, 1953), pp. 304-5.

49 Acheson, n. 21, p. 674.

50 Ibid. Also see John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors : A Policy-Making Elite (Lexington, Mass., 1974), pp. 112-13.

51 U.S., Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C., 1971), Book 8 of 12, pp. 478-9. Cited hereinafter as Pentagon Papers.



The report further stated that if the Chinese defied the joint warning then it was to be assumed that the "Chinese Communist planning unquestionably would have been coordinated with the USSR". It "would almost certainly involve the prior consent of the USSR".<sup>52</sup>

In June 1952, the joint communique that was issued after the meeting of Acheson, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, and Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister reviewed the Franco-American resistance in Vietnam as a part of global resistance against Communist expansions and subversions.<sup>53</sup> As Acheson prepared to leave the State Department following the Presidential election of 1952, he was convinced that French forces could not discharge the responsibility of resisting the Communists in Indo-China and that more American involvement was necessary to thwart the challenge.<sup>54</sup>

In the overall US strategy in Asia the "Soviet menace" figured significantly. In May 1953, the National Security Council in a statement expressed the fear that the Soviet Union by exploiting the resources of the Communist China might bring the whole of Western Pacific under the Soviet control. If such a situation materialized it would vastly augment the Soviet power in the region making it capable of striking at other parts of the world, particularly Western Europe.<sup>55</sup> Taking this into account the NSC suggested that one of the primary objectives of American

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52 Ibid., p. 484.

53 Acheson, n. 21, p. 676.

54 Ibid., p. 677.

55 Pentagon Papers, n. 51, Book 8 of 12, p. 426.

policy should be to "detach China as an effective ally of the USSR and support the development of an independent China which has renounced aggression"<sup>56</sup>. To fulfil the objective the NSC recommended the continuance of American non-recognition policy. It further suggested that efforts should be made to deflate the prestige of the Communist government both within and without China by inflicting severe military losses. It was emphasized that the American policy should be directed to "stimulate differences between the Peiping and Moscow regimes and create cleavages within the Peiping regime itself by every practicable means"<sup>57</sup>. On 17 May, the President approved the NSC study and agreed that although the Soviet Union had not yet directly involved itself in the war yet by implication it had taken larger risks than in the past by making North Korea and China wage war.<sup>58</sup>

The American anxiety about a growing international Communist threat to Western Europe led it to augment the military capability of Western Europe. In early 1951, the United States announced its intention of adding four more American divisions to Western Europe to its already existing forces of two divisions there.<sup>59</sup> This Soviet-oriented, Western Europe-focussed policy was further reflected in Bradley's statement made at the Senate Joint Hearings. He said that the

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56 Ibid., p. 428.

57 Ibid., p. 431. Emphasis added.

58 Ibid., p. 441.

59 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 32, pp. 731-2. According to the Observer (London), 14 December 1952, the West had eighteen divisions in Germany. See Coral Bell, "Korea and the Balance of Power", The Political Quarterly (London), vol. 25, January-March 1954, p. 25.

enlargement of the war in Korea to include Red China would probably delight the Kremlin more than anything else we could do. It would necessarily tie down additional forces, especially our sea power and our air power, while the Soviet Union would not be obliged to put a single man into the conflict.... 60

Acheson feared that the Korean type of aggression might occur any time in Europe. There, he thought, the Soviet threat might take the form of a "disguised aggression through a satellite". He said: "In the absence of the defense forces in being, satellites might be used for such disguised aggression in the hope that they could get away with it."<sup>61</sup>

In its efforts to strengthen the European defence the United States sought to include Germany into the NATO. When the question of German participation aroused French anxiety the United States devised to bring Germany into the European Defence Community (EDC) which was to be brought within NATO. Subsequently, in February 1952, the United States also succeeded in bringing Greece and Turkey into the NATO.<sup>62</sup>

During this time the United States also tried to improve its relations with Yugoslavia. The purpose of the policy was to further the alienation of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union. A State Department publication of June 1952 said: "There is no doubt that the Yugoslav break with Moscow and the policy of the western nations to encourage this break have been important factors in lessening the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe."<sup>63</sup>

60 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 32, pp. 731-2.

61 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, 26 February 1951, p. 324.

62 Ibid., vol. 26, 25 February 1952, p. 306.

63 U.S., Department of State, Yugoslavia : Titoism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1952), p. 7.

what the United States was trying to signal was that any nation, be it Communist, could earn America's friendship if it opposed the Soviet Union or adopted a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union. This, of course, did not imply an endorsement of its domestic policies.<sup>64</sup>

#### OPINIONS IN THE CONGRESS

While the Truman Administration was apprehensive of the outbreak of a third world war and had adopted a cautious line towards China, the Republicans in the Congress advocated a hard line. They accused the Truman Administration of following a weak policy toward China. Already several Republican Senators, William F. Knowland (California), Alexander H. Smith (New Jersey), Irving M. Ives (New York) and Ralph E. Flanders (Vermont) had expressed their serious disagreement. They had urged the Government to take a strong attitude towards China and stressed the need of developing more friendly relations with Taiwan.<sup>65</sup> The result of the Congressional elections of November 1950 showed that public opinion was slowly moving in their favour. In the Senate, the Democratic majority was reduced from twelve to two. In California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Utah, and Iowa, Democrats who supported the Administration's policy lost to the Republicans. These men included such important and high ranking

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64 George C. Allen, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, said that American assistance should "not be interpreted as implying endorsement of measures undertaken by the Government of Yugoslavia suppressing or destroying religious, political or, economic liberty". *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

65 New York Times, 5 November 1950, p. 38; 6 November 1950, p. 19; 7 November 1950, p. 9.

Senators like Scott W. Lucas of Illinois, the Democratic Majority Leader, Milliard E. Tydings (Maryland), the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and Francis J. Myers of Pennsylvania, the majority whip. On the other hand, Republican senators like Robert A. Taft (Ohio), Eugene L. Millikin (Colorado), Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Iowa), Homer E. Capehand (Indiana), and Alexander Wiley (Wisconsin) were returned. Many other supporters of McCarthy and critics of the Truman Administration also won.<sup>66</sup>

Ever since the establishment of the Communist Government in China the critics of the US China policy were forcefully arguing that there was a strong Sino-Soviet bloc and hence the Truman Administration should not see the United States China policy in isolation but as a part of the policy towards international communism. They, therefore, asked that it take a hard line towards China. After the Chinese entry into the Korean War, their attack became more intense. In December 1950, the American Institute of Public Opinion carried out a series of polls in regard to Korea. These polls revealed that 50 per cent of the respondents were of the view that American performance in Asia was "poor". Only 17 per cent endorsed America's Asia policy while 21 per cent believed that the Truman Administration was doing a good job and rest 12 per cent had no opinion.<sup>67</sup>

It was argued in the Congress that a stronger military action should be taken in Korea and MacArthur should be given a

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66 Spanier, n. 5, p. 151.

67 Public Opinion Quarterly (Princeton, N.J.), vol. 15, Spring 1951, pp. 171-2.

free hand to tackle the Chinese danger. It was also suggested that Chinese Nationalist troops might be utilized in Korea. Senator John Stennis (Dem., Miss.) said: "I think the day has long since arrived when we ought to strike Communistic China with all the force and power we have; we ought to give the commander in Korea full power to strike with everything we have, in every way he can, ... even if it means war with China or even Russia."<sup>68</sup>

McCarthy's allegation of sabotage by the State Department continued unabated. He had now a larger audience. The essence of his argument was epitomized in a speech that he made on the Senate floor, following the dismissal of MacArthur. He said:

Congress should intervene in behalf of the American people and fix responsibility for this lying propaganda before the State Department hands over the rest of Asia to Moscow on the excuse that it is not "important". A few persons marked by anonymity should not be permitted to betray the government and the people. 69

Such was the deep impact of these allegations that by 1951 many a State Department China expert had to undergo repeated "loyalty checks".<sup>70</sup>

By December 1950 the Congressional criticisms of the American policy virtually merged into an anti-Truman, anti-Acheson and anti-State Department outrage. A public statement made by the Republican House caucus during this time strongly

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68 Congressional Record, 81, II, vol. 96 (1950), p. 16071. Emphasis added.

69 Ibid., 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), pp. 4263-4. Emphasis added.

70 Rossy Y. Koen, "The China Lobby and the Formulation of American Far Eastern Policy, 1945-1952" (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Florida, 1958), pp. 343-77.

pleaded for the replacement of Dean Acheson. It said that the latter had lost confidence of both the Congress and the people. The statement claimed that there should be "a thorough house cleaning in the State Department and changes in personnel and policies responsible for this lack of confidence"<sup>71</sup>. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Rep., Mass.) asked for a "house cleaning" in the State Department and proposed a commission to be created "... to ascertain the facts with respect to disloyalty in the State Department and the security of the Department against foreign penetration". Such a commission, it was further suggested, should be independent of the executive branch so as to make its finding impartial. Only then, it was believed that public confidence in the Truman Administration could be restored.<sup>72</sup> In January 1951 a series of Congressional Resolutions urged the United Nations to declare Communist China as aggressor in Korea and not to grant it a UN seat.<sup>73</sup>

Upholding the importance of Formosa in America's war against communism, Senator Knowland strongly pleaded that Formosa should not be surrendered to the Chinese Communists. He expressed the view that the existence of the island as a non-Communist area indicated that there were anti-Communist groups within China and the defeat of the Nationalists in Formosa due to American "appeasement" of the Communists would destroy these dissentient groups. He also felt that a situation might arise when the

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71 New York Times, 16 December 1950, pp. 1, 3.

72 Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), pp. 208-9.

73 See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, 29 January 1951, p. 168; *ibid.*, 5 February 1951, p. 208.

United States, 'in teeth of Mao's war against the United Nations and his "Russian master's" threats, might have to encourage the Nationalists to fight for their freedom.<sup>74</sup>

#### PRESS OPINIONS

Truman's China policy was also assailed by an important section of the Press. The New York Times and New York Herald Tribune sharply reacted to Truman's soft policy towards China. The New York Herald Tribune accused President Truman of pursuing a timid policy toward China and urged that the United Nations should denounce the Soviet Union and China as aggressors.<sup>75</sup> Hanson Baldwin, the military commentator of the New York Times expressed the opinion that American military preparedness was insufficient as compared to that of the Chinese guerrilla forces and it was "as lame and contradictory as our general Asiatic policy". He advocated a more militant posture on behalf of the United States and prescribed American aid to the anti-Communist guerrilla forces within China. He wrote:

The military and political prospects of such a guerrilla campaign, coupled with the adoption of other dynamic policies in Asia, are sufficiently bright to justify considerable United States help. Now, forced by the crisis of the Korean war, it seems certain that such help will be forthcoming. 76

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74 Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), p. 481.

75 New York Herald Tribune, 29 November 1950, p. 8; New York Times, 26 November 1950, p. IV:8; 30 November 1950, p. 32. See also Blair Bolles, "Will United Nations Members Follow United States on China Policy?", Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York), vol. 30, 26 January 1951, pp. 2-3.

76 Hanson Baldwin, "China's Guerrillas Grow", New York Times, 1 January 1951, p. 3.



The U.S. News and World Report also assailed the American policy and urged that strong attitude should be taken against both the Soviet Union and China. It cautioned that if the United States did not fight the war with a determination to win, it would have to face larger problem in the future.<sup>77</sup> The Life magazine editorially pleaded for the American acceptance of Nationalist Chinese military assistance and felt that it was necessary to "unleash" Chiang as a device to resist the onslaught of the Chinese Communists.<sup>78</sup>

There was, however, also opinion in the Press that tended to defend the Administration's China policy. Writing in his "Washington Tides" column in the Newsweek, Ernest K. Lindley upheld Truman's balanced "middle ground" policy towards China. He said that it was wise on the part of the Administration not to follow an aggressive design against China but to see economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Such a course, Lindley thought, would "contrive for them [the Chinese] a combination of discomforts, sufficient to sap some of their strength and conceivably to help them change their minds about aggression".<sup>79</sup>

#### CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISMISSAL OF MACARTHUR

It must, however, be noted that although a sizeable opinion existed in the Congress and public against the Administration's China policy, there was no disagreement with the

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77 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 30, 9 February 1951, p. 64; 13 April 1951, pp. 14-15; 20 April 1951, p. 76; 27 April 1951, pp. 16-18.

78 Life (New York), 9 April 1951, p. 36.

79 Ernest K. Lindley, "Our Policy toward China", Newsweek (New York), 5 February 1951, p. 24.

government on one question. After China's entry into the war, communism was seen as monolithic and so the Chinese intervention was never viewed as an isolated development. It was only over the question of the strategy to meet the challenge that they differed. This domestic controversy which had thus evolved over the question of war aims reached the climax over the issue of the dismissal of MacArthur from his Far Eastern Command in April 1951.

By this act, the President indicated that he rejected the alternative advocated by MacArthur of extending the scope of the war. Truman thus set himself against escalating the war because he felt that this entailed larger risks. General MacArthur pressed for this course. He described China as:

... a new and dominant power in Asia, which, for its own purposes, has allied with Soviet Russia but which in its own concepts and methods has become aggressively imperialistic, with a lust for expansion and increased power normal to this type of imperialism ... the aggressiveness recently displayed not only in Korea, but in Indo-China, Tibet, and pointing toward the south, reflects predominantly the same lust for power which has animated every would-be conqueror since the beginning of time. 80

The President and the State Department never disagreed with MacArthur over the nature of the Chinese threat but they felt that MacArthur was ignoring the risks of Soviet intervention, the danger of Soviet expansion in Europe, and the general climate of international opinion.<sup>81</sup> Secretary Acheson charged that MacArthur was proposing "a gamble with the essential security of our nation".<sup>82</sup> Truman believed that if war was extended to China,

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80 Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs (New York, 1966), pp. 114-15.

81 Ibid., p. 115; Truman, n. 4, pp. 405-6.

82 See Military Situation in the Far East, n. 32, pp. 325, 731-2, 1719.

then Russia would intervene because they were allies, ideologically as well as by treaty. He said that had MacArthur's course been followed there would have been the third world war. After firing the General, Truman declared: "In the simplest terms what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war."<sup>83</sup>

After the dismissal of MacArthur the Far Eastern Command was taken over by General Mathew B. Ridgway who conducted the military operations according to the directives of Washington.<sup>84</sup> The idea was to limit the scope of the war to Korea only. This change in the military leadership and clear cut definition of war aims underlined how seriously the Truman Administration tried to avoid a larger military showdown with the Communists.

The dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur resulted in an uproar in which the Republican voices were the loudest. On 11 April 1951, the day MacArthur was fired, a Republican Congressional caucus proposed an immediate investigation into the matter and asked for a full discussion on Truman's foreign policy. Mail started pouring in the White House criticizing the dismissal. President Truman's effigies were burnt in many places, and in many other places flags were flown half-mast. Wherever MacArthur went and talked he had a wild cheering audience.<sup>85</sup>

In the Congress MacArthur's dismissal was strongly assailed. The House Republican Policy Committee approved a

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83 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, 16 April 1951, p. 603.

84 Ibid., pp. 604-5.

85 New York Times, 12 April 1951, p. 1; 13 April 1951; p. 1; 20 April 1951, pp. 1, 4, 16, 20, 22, 28.

manifesto asking whether the "Truman-Acheson-Marshall triumvirate" was preparing a "super-Munich" in Asia. It was charged that the Truman Administration had fired the General in order "to appease the British interests". Congressman Charles Wolverton (Rep., New Jersey) contended that "the appeasement policy toward China" was the result of "foreign influences"<sup>86</sup>. On 17 April 1951, a Congressional resolution was passed to invite the General to address the Congress. The resolution strongly criticized the China policy of the Truman Administration and said that MacArthur was fired because he "has long urged an intelligent and consistent Far Eastern policy". Quoting the General who had said in the fall of 1947 that the US China policy "may prove to be greatest single blunder in the history of the United States", the Resolution said that he had been the target of the Communists since 1945.<sup>87</sup>

When MacArthur spoke before the Congress on 19 April 1951 he was repeatedly interrupted by applause.<sup>88</sup> The Senate reprinted the speech as a document. After the speech Senator McCarran observed that it had necessitated a complete reinvestigation into the Far Eastern policy of the United States. Colonel Robert McCormick, proprietor and publisher of the Chicago Tribune, proposed MacArthur and Senator Taft's name for Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates for 1952.<sup>89</sup>

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86 Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), p. A2071. Also See New York Times, 13 April 1951, p. 1.

87 Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), pp. 3919-22.

88 New York Times, 20 April 1951, pp. 1, 4, 28.

89 Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. <sup>97</sup>(1951), pp. 4563-4. See also Newsweek (New York), 7 May 1951, pp. 21-23.

MacArthur's Far Eastern policies were endorsed by many Senators. Senator Malone suggested immediate bombing of Manchuria and unleashing of Chiang's forces.<sup>90</sup> The anti-Administration sentiment caused by the dismissal of MacArthur derived further sustenance by the release of Freda Utlay's book The China Story.<sup>91</sup> The U.S. News and World Report strongly criticized the dismissal and said that the President was making the General a scapegoat for the Administration's failures. It commented that by 1953 Moscow would have no problem in Asia -- the problem of a second front in Asia -- for Asia would be a Russian sphere of influence.<sup>92</sup>

So strong was the criticism of the Administration at this time that Senator Wayne L. Morse (Rep., Oregon) suggested another investigation into the activities of the China lobby. But such a proposal was strongly attacked by the critics of the Administration as an obstructionist device. Senator Homer Ferguson (Rep., Michigan) said:

If the President's pledge is one of full co-operation to investigate both the supporters of the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, it is praiseworthy reversal of his past attitude and a great step forward in the national interest. Should it develop that it applies only to an investigation of anti-Communists, however, the offer is a snare and a delusion, as it will appear to be only an effort to cover confusion and error within his own administration, whose policies have long been opposed to the Chinese Nationalists. 93

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90 Ibid., pp. 4066-7.

91 Freda Utlay, The China Story (Chicago, 1951). Utlay was an ex-Communist. The book was favourably reviewed by Time, 21 May 1951, pp. 32-38 under the caption "The Mistake of a Century".

92 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 30, 11 May 1951, p. 132; 18 May 1951, p. 136.

93 Congressional Record, 82, I, vol. 97 (1951), p. 6365.

Not surprisingly, the minority (Republican) report at the conclusion of the MacArthur hearing adhered to the anti-administration, pro-Chiang stand. It stated:

A policy of supporting the Republic of China should have been the firm and continuing policy of the United States. President Chiang Kai-shek was and is the outstanding anti-Communist leader in Asia. Our enemy in Asia and throughout the world has been identified as Russian Communism.... We have not been convinced that Chiang lost China for any other reason than that he did not receive sufficient support, both moral and material, from the United States. 94

By implication this meant that whosoever claimed to be fighting against communism should be supported.

#### ADMINISTRATION STICKS TO LIMITED WAR

The Administration, however, stuck to its previous stand of a limited war. It emphasized the theme of China's subordination to Moscow. In a radio address made to the nation on 10 April 1951 President Truman declared:

The dangers are great. Make no mistake about it. Behind the North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the front lines stand additional millions of Chinese soldiers. And behind the Chinese stand the tanks, the planes, the submarines, the soldiers, and the scheming rulers of the Soviet Union.... 95

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94 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 32, pp. 3593-4.

95 Stanley S. Jados, ed., Documents on Russian-American Relations: Washington to Eisenhower (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 185. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966, Harold C. Hinton, said:

The alliance [between the Soviet Union and China in the early 1950s] was seriously strained by the Korean Crisis ... and reduced almost to the vanishing point Soviet willingness to take serious risks on behalf of China....

See Akira Iriye, ed., U.S. Policy toward China: Testimony taken from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings 1966 (Boston, 1968), p. 122.

Similar views were also expressed by other members of the Administration. In an address to the China Institute in New York on 18 May 1951, Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, emphatically said: "The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world there is room for only one master - a jealous and implacable master whose price of friendship is complete submission." <sup>96</sup> After reiterating the old allegation against the Soviet Union for its expansionist designs in Sinkiang, Manchuria and Mongolia, Rusk tried to arouse the Chinese national sensitivities. He said that the territorial integrity of China had been sacrificed for the interest of communism under the dictates of "foreign masters". He thus tried to appeal to the Chinese to use against their Communist rulers who were cutting "across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people". He then defined the American policy in the following words:

We do not recognize the authorities in Peking for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government - a static Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.... We recognize the national government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. 97

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96 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, 28 May 1951, pp. 846-8.

97 Ibid. On 18 June 1951, Congressman James S. Golden (Rep., Ken.), referred to a report in the Washington Evening Star of 15 June 1951, giving an account from Hongkong by the Associated Press, which said that a prominent European who had just arrived after his 5 year stay in Canton was told

In the same meeting John Foster Dulles also remarked about subservience of the Chinese Communists to Moscow. He said: "By the test of conception, birth, nurture and obedience, the Mao Tse-tung regime is a creature of the Moscow Politburo and it is on behalf of Moscow, not of China, that it is destroying the friendship of the Chinese people toward the United States."<sup>98</sup>

#### TOWARDS A CEASEFIRE

As the war in Korea assumed the form of a sea-saw battle both the parties felt inclined to negotiate for a ceasefire. The Korean objectives were discussed in the National Security Council meetings of 2 and 15 May 1951. About the decisions taken in these meetings Truman writes in his memoirs:

Regarding Korea we distinguished between the political aim - unified, independent, democratic Korea - and the military aim of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the purpose would be to establish the authority of the Republic of Korea over all of Korea south of a northern boundary line suitable for defence and administration and not substantially below

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by the Chinese Communists: "We are not afraid of the atom bomb. We're going to lick the American Army and then, with Russia, we're going to conquer the world in 2 years." This illustrates the type of wild rumours that the Americans found easy to believe. See Congressional Record, 82, I, 18 June 1951 - 30 June 1951, vol. 97, nos 108-18, p. A3831. For a study of the Chinese criticisms of the United States, see Foreign Languages Press, China Accuses: Speeches of Special Representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China at the United Nations (Peking, 1951).

98 See U.S. News and World Report, vol. 30, 1 June 1951, p. 25.



the 38th parallel, to provide for the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from all of Korea, and to build up the ROK forces so as to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. 99

The Administration was thus already reconciled to a ceasefire and status quo ante. During the Hearings on Military situation in the Far East in June 1951, Secretary Acheson clarified that the US objective in Korea was to have an armistice along the 38th parallel and "that would accomplish the military purposes in Korea".<sup>100</sup> The Soviet Union and China had their own reasons for looking for a ceasefire. The Soviet Union had concluded that nothing could be gained by the prolongation of war. Initially, China had gained an upper hand in the war. But the advantage it had gained gradually disappeared. The UN forces stabilized their position and then started pushing the North Koreans and the Chinese northward. On 25-26 May 1951 the UN forces once again crossed the 38th parallel at several points. The Chinese losses were enormous. The question was how long the Chinese could continue to bear the loss. Any way there was nothing to be gained. Thus the interest of all the three major parties coincided in desiring a ceasefire. In a radio broadcast in New York, Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative in the United Nations, said on 23 June 1951 that "discussions should be started between the belligerents for a ceasefire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the thirty-<sup>101</sup> eighth parallel". Two days later the Chinese endorsed Malik's

99 Truman, n. 4, p. 456.

100 Military Situation in the Far East, n. 32, pp. 1782-4.

101 Denise Folliot, ed., Documents on International Affairs: 1951 (London, 1954), p. 633.

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proposals.

On 29 June President Truman instructed General Mathew B. Ridgway to make a statement to the effect that he was prepared to meet the Communist commander for ceasefire negotiations. Accordingly Ridgway wrote to his Communist counterpart expressing his willingness for a peace negotiation and suggesting as venue a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Harbour. In his reply to this message of 30 June, the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, Kim Il Sung, stated on 2 July that he was ready for negotiations but suggested as venue a place called Kaesong, three miles south of the 38th parallel. General Ridgway accepted the offer and the talks commenced on 10 July 1951. A bloodstained chapter of the Korean history came virtually to an end.

The intensity of the war was substantially reduced but soon it was realized that conducting the peace talks was no less difficult than conducting the war. On 10 July 1951, the negotiations commenced between General Ridgway and the Communist commander at Kaesong, later at Panmunjom. The two issues that created disagreements between the negotiators were the question of border and more importantly the repatriation of the prisoners of war. The latter question posed a two-fold problem -- (a) the number of the prisoners, and (b) the mode of repatriation. The number which the Communists supplied of prisoners they held was substantially less than the American

estimates.<sup>103</sup> Again, America insisted that the prisoners should be released first and then they should be given an option to choose either of the sides to settle in. This the Communists opposed. They held that the prisoners should be repatriated on the basis of their nationality.<sup>104</sup> Although the American Defence Department was willing to accede to the Communist condition yet the State Department was adamant on its stand which became the official US stand.<sup>105</sup> Since both the parties were reluctant to concede on their respective positions the talks broke down in 1952 and were resumed in April 1953 after Eisenhower took over as the President.

#### THE ELECTION OF 1952

Failure of the Truman Administration to reach an armistice in Korea made it more and more unpopular. As the elections of 1952 neared, the Republican attack against the Administration increased in intensity. Senator Taft, who was

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103 New York Times, 10 July 1951, pp. 1, 26; 11 July 1951, p. 1; 12 July 1951, p. 24; 13 July 1951, p. 3; 19 December 1951, pp. 11, 30; 20 December 1951, p. 4. For details, see "Report of Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway on the Situation in the Far East" before the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 22 May 1952. U.S. Congress, 94, II, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Historical Series (Washington, D.C., 1976), vol. 4, pp. 427-56.

104 See statement by Secretary Acheson before Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on 24 October 1952. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 27, 3 November 1952, pp. 691-2.

105 See Dean Acheson, "The President and the Secretary of State", in Don K. Price, ed., The Secretary of State (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960), p. 40.

aspiring for the Republican nomination, criticized the Administration policy and said: "We can't fail to point out the tremendously disastrous result of the policy of the last five years which has lost the peace after we won the war."<sup>106</sup> McCarthy later branded the twenty years of Democratic rule as "twenty years of treason".<sup>107</sup> The main focus of the Republican attack was on the failure of American policy in Asia which was epitomized in an anti-Acheson tirade. Senator Hugh Alfred Butler (Rep., Nebraska) had once said: "I look at that fellow, I watch his smart-aleck manner and his British clothes and that everlasting New Dealism in everything he says and does, and I want to shout, 'Get out ! Get out ! You stand for everything that has been wrong with the United States for years !'"<sup>108</sup>

Actually there was hardly any difference between the Republicans and the Democrats in their attitudes towards the Sino-Soviet bloc but the Republicans capitalized on the temper of the time to criticize the Administration for its "soft" line towards communism. Although few Republicans had actually advocated to commit American troops to support Chiang before the fall of China yet they saw no contradiction in condemning Truman for his failure to avoid the collapse of the Chiang government.<sup>109</sup> They were in substantial agreement that the Sino-Soviet threat

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106 Quoted in Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1960 (New York, 1974), p. 30.

107 See Frederick H. Hartman, The New Age of American Foreign Policy (London, 1970), p. 190.

108 Ibid.

109 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968 (New York, 1971), vol. 4, p. 3216.

and the international Communist threat were one and the same. The only difference was that the Republicans preferred a more militant response to that challenge. During his campaign the Democratic Presidential nominees Adlai Stevenson argued that the withdrawal of American troops from Asia and the subsequent creation of a situation to allow "Asians to fight Asians" would amount to an Asian Munich. The American voters, however, were not inclined to take his charges against the Republicans seriously because by and large they tended towards the view that it was the Democratic Administration which had appeased the Communists. The Presidential election made it necessary for the candidates to present their arguments in absolute terms. There was no scope for sophistication and subtleties. The candidates and parties, therefore, took uncompromising positions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or China.<sup>110</sup> The past record of the Democrats which was being stressed by its Republican critics was to its disadvantage. In the Republican convention at Chicago, General MacArthur attacked the Democratic administration for its blunders in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam and called its leaders as "reckless men who, yielding to international intrigue, set the stage for Soviet ascendancy as a world power and our own relative

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110 See the various campaign speeches of Stevenson, Eisenhower, Taft and Nixon in *ibid.*, pp. 3293-3336. Highlighting the American determination to stick to its stand on the prisoners-of-war issue in the Korean truce negotiations, Stevenson said: "Korea was a crucial test in the struggle between the free world and communism. The question of the forcible return of prisoners of war is an essential part of that test." See *ibid.*, p. 3335. See also the interview with Senator John Sparkman, Democratic nominee for Vice President, in U.S. News and World Report, vol. 33, 22 August 1952, p. 29.

decline".<sup>111</sup> Hoover also criticized the Administration for its failure. He closely followed the arguments of Dulles and Taft. He cried: "The sure defense of London, New York, and Paris is the fear of counter attack on Moscow from the air." The general mood prevailing in the convention can be gauged by the fact that Hoover's almost sixty minute speech was interrupted seventy times by applause.<sup>112</sup> It may be noted here that the acceptance of an uncompromising posture against communism was so important that to talk about direct negotiation between the American and the Chinese Communists was almost like a "political horror" for both the political parties. During the truce negotiations, the Truman Administration under such intense domestic pressures constantly rejected the idea of enlarging the scope of the truce talks to include the question of political fate of Korea. Similarly, in spite of the fact that Dulles believed that eventually there had to be political negotiations between the United States and the Communist China, he could not yet find a suitable way to express the idea in the midst of the aroused emotions of the time.<sup>113</sup>

In their respective party platforms both the Democrats and the Republicans opposed the MacArthur plan of bombing across the Yalu.<sup>114</sup> But as the campaign rhetoric heated up, the Republicans

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111 Divine, n. 106, p. 33.

112 Ibid.

113 On this point, see "America's Watch on Asia : A Dilemma for the State Department", Round Table (London), vol. 44, December 1953, pp. 12-13.

114 See Schlesinger, n. 109, p. 3234. For the Democratic and Republican platforms, on foreign policy and national security see pp. 3268-72 and 3282-6 respectively.

took a position which was close to MacArthur. During the campaign, the differences between the two major parties on their position on the Sino-Soviet relations increasingly became divergent. One may still doubt, however, whether the Republicans really believed in what they said. It might have been nothing more than campaign rhetoric intended to cash on the public mood and win votes. It was an election in which the issues of foreign policy played an important role and the Republican candidate won a landslide victory. This had a tremendous significance for the future.

The Republican foreign policy platform had borrowed much of the Dulles' idea on "liberation". In his article "A policy of Boldness" in Life magazine in May 1952, Dulles had championed the cause of a peaceful crusade through the Voice of America against the Soviet domination of the East European countries. It was more elaborately spelt out in the Republican platform which said:

The policies we espouse will revive the contagious, liberating influences which are inherent in freedom. They will inevitably set up strains and stresses within the captive world which will make the rulers impotent to continue in their monstrous ways and mark the beginning of their end. 115

The Republicans were thus demanding the abandonment of a comparatively passive, reactive, and cautious policy of containment. They wanted a more active and ambitious anti-Communist stance.<sup>116</sup>

The Republican espousal of the policy of liberation of Eastern Europe aroused considerable misgivings in Europe.

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115 Ibid., pp. 3233-4, 3285.

116 On this point see Gerberding, n. 40, p. 227.

Eisenhower and Dulles, wrote an observer in the Manchester Guardian, were offering a policy that "no European statesman could follow". He lamented the transformation of the prudent and cautious General into "St. Ike the crusader against the Communist dragon and liberator of the captive peoples". Similarly, the Daily Mirror of London commented that Eisenhower was "almost outMacArthuring MacArthur". Nearer home the response to the Republican championship of the liberation of eastern Europe depended on the political inclination of the commentator. While the New Republic, the voice of the liberal America, was critical, the Time praised Eisenhower. If the New Republic argued that commitment to liberate Europe could be carried out for certain only by the means of a third world war, the Time felt that the Republican candidate "rediscovered courage as a policy for the nation". The Soviet Union was only amused by these campaign rhetorics. Pravda commented that "the Soviet people can only laugh at them as they laughed in their time at threats of Hitler"<sup>117</sup>.

To Adlai Stevenson, the Republican position was utterly impractical, imperceptive and inoperative. In retrospect it can be said now that the Democrats were probably more correct in their perception of the Soviet potentiality than their rivals. They had a more realistic assessment of the tight Soviet control over the countries of eastern Europe and were convinced that it could not be ended by any American effort short of a war. The Democrats were not willing to accept such a war which was likely to turn into a nuclear war. Truman warned; "To try to liberate these enslaved people at this time might well mean turning these



lands into atomic battlefields."<sup>118</sup> Stevenson understood that victory was always not possible and therefore he advised that American policy should acknowledge limited means and hence restrict itself to limited goals.<sup>119</sup>

Besides differences on the issue of "liberation" of eastern Europe there were also serious differences between the Republicans and the Democrats on the question of China. It has already been said that in their platform both the parties had pointed to the danger of a Sino-Soviet threat and argued against bombing across the Yalu. During the campaign, however, the Republicans tended to assume a more militant posture. In early October, Eisenhower endorsed the adventurist design of MacArthur and said: "I have always stood behind General MacArthur in bombing these bases on the Yalu from which fighter planes are coming."<sup>120</sup> The Republicans also started to argue that an attack on China might not bring about a Soviet military response. Many of them felt that when the growth of armies of Western Europe and the existence of US bases in Europe were not regarded as sufficiently provocative by the Soviet Union how the bombing of Manchuria could amount to a provocation. They were doubtful that even if there was a Sino-Soviet pact the Soviet Union would really honour it. Taft asserted: "The whole Atlantic Pact, certainly the arming of Germany, is an incentive for Russia to enter the war before the

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118 Ibid., p. 53.

119 Schlesinger, n. 109, p. 3253. See also Stuart Gerry Brown, Adlai E. Stevenson, A Short Biography: The Conscience of the Country (New York, 1965), pp. 100-5.

120 Schlesinger, n. 109, p. 3249.

army is built up. I cannot see that any bombing of China without invasion can be regarded in any way by Russia as an aggressive move against Russia itself, or a reason for war, unless they have made up their minds to start a third world war anyway.<sup>121</sup> The Republicans were not underestimating the Soviet threat to Western Europe but they were emphasizing that it was much more serious in Asia. However, they were beginning to urge strong action against China in the hope that this would not bring a retaliatory response from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, the argument assumed, would not be willing to suffer "unacceptable damage" for the sake of China. Here was the crux of the debate "Europe first" or the "Asia first". MacArthur was concerned more about Asia than Europe. His opinion was that to avoid the World War III it was necessary to checkmate Communist power in the East. Many other Republicans also held similar views. They were also critical of the Administration's argument that an escalation of war in the Far East would alienate the western allies. They believed that American alliance with Western Europe was more for the protection of the latter than the vice versa. They denounced the very limited participation of the West European allies in Korea and were antagonized by Truman's declaration: "We cannot go it alone in Asia and go it with company in Europe."<sup>122</sup>

The Democrats without going into the question of "Asia first" or "Europe first" argued that Sino-Soviet threat was a matter of serious concern for the United States. To them the Republican remedy was fraught with risk. Stevenson attacked

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121 Ibid., p. 3217.

122 Ibid., pp. 3218-19.

MacArthur's forward policy and at the same time declared the American determination not to withdraw from Europe and Asia. "I am ... proud", he asserted, "that we have had the fortitude to refuse to risk extension of the war, despite extreme communist provocations and reckless Republican criticisms."<sup>123</sup> He added, "I think the Soviet Union will be influenced only by a steady, serious undeviating determination to build up the strength of the free world - not with a view toward war but with a view toward preventing war and negotiating the conditions of peace."<sup>124</sup>

That the Republicans were attaching serious importance to Asia was further revealed when on 24 October Eisenhower announced that if elected he would pay personal visit to Korea to help end the war.<sup>125</sup> Stevenson tried to counter this political gesture by saying that Eisenhower was oversimplifying the complexities of the issue of the Korean peace. Emphasizing the point that the American refusal to accept the Communist demand of forced repatriation of all prisoners of war as the main reason of the stalemate in negotiations, he asked Eisenhower what he would do with 50,000 prisoners who preferred to die than to repatriate. Stevenson tended to project the problem within a broader framework and said that "if we give up on this point ... we will no longer lead the coalitions of the free world". He explained that championing the cause of freedom was the credential of the United States and the latter would lose if it accepted forced

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123 quoted in *ibid.*, p. 3253.

124 Adlai E. Stevenson, Major Campaign Speeches of 1952 (New York, 1953), p. 55.

125 New York Times, 25 October 1952, p. 8.

repatiation.<sup>126</sup> According to him the question of peace in Korea was actually to be decided in Moscow.<sup>127</sup> In November, Eisenhower<sup>128</sup> won a landslide victory winning 442 of the 531 electoral votes.

#### DULLES' PERCEPTION OF COMMUNISM

With the coming in of Eisenhower to the White House a generation of Democratic rule came to an end. As was expected, the new President appointed John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State in place of Dean Acheson. Dulles, partly because of his personality and partly because he enjoyed the confidence of the President, remained the guiding force of American foreign policy till his death in 1959. It would be interesting here to briefly examine the views of Secretary Dulles on Sino-Soviet relations.

From the beginning of his political career Dulles held strong anti-communist views. He felt that communism was atheistic and immoral. His strong Christian faith was against any spiritual subjugation of humanbeings to anybody other than God.<sup>129</sup> His

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126 See Schlesinger, n. 109, pp. 3254-5. Also see Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism : A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950 (New York, 1956), pp. 101-3.

127 On this point see Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New York, 1964), p. 520.

128 In Congressional and Gubernational elections also the Republican gains were sizable. See U.S., Congressional Quarterly Service, Politics in America, 1945-1966 (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 13.

129 Dulles' emphasis on an approach to international morality might have been motivated as a tactic to influence domestic political opinion. On this point, see E. Raymond Platig, "John Foster Dulles : A Study of his Political and Moral Thought Prior to 1953 with Special Emphasis on International Relations" (Ph. D. Thesis, Chicago University, Chicago, 1957) p. 415. It is relevant to note here that Acheson discounted

antagonism to the Soviet Union flowed from the fact that it was the nucleus of this Communist power.<sup>130</sup> That is why when he had no admiration for Yugoslavia, he was happy at its defection from the Communist bloc. He branded the Sino-Soviet alliance as "an unholy arrangement" and said that the American policy should be directed at its destruction.<sup>131</sup>

To Dulles freedom of thought and the Communist ideology of "a world of conformity" were utterly irreconcilable. Testifying during his nomination hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1953, he highlighted the inherent contradiction between the atheistic Soviet communism and a system based on the doctrine of a Christian, Jewish or any religious faith. He said that a working relationship between the two systems could be developed but a total reconciliation between the two systems was impossible. He saw the conflict

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the concept of morality in international politics. He believed that "moral terms of individual relations do not apply to societies in dealing with one another". He said: "It is best to state principles in terms of their purpose and effect without characterizing them as moral or immoral." See Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (New York, 1962), pp. 107-8. On this point also see Oscar William Perlmutter, "Acheson and American Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs in a Mass Democracy" (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1959), pp. 98-100.

130 For a detailed and analytical study of Dulles' perception of the Soviet Union see Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Time (New York, 1972), pp. 137-54.

131 U.S. Congress, 83, I, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nomination of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Designate (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 5. See also Guhin, n. 130, pp. 100-1, 142.

between the West and the Communist world in moral terms. Even during his tenure as Secretary of State there was no change in his views. In late 1958, he reiterated that "if it was only power politics and did not involve a basic threat to the whole moral values of our civilization, we would not treat it as a world-wide struggle". The Secretary felt that in this struggle all must stand together.<sup>132</sup>

Dulles argued against a mere defensive posture and spoke strongly in favour of a massive counter-offensive that would throw the aggressor off balance. The aggressor must not be given time to consolidate its gains and efforts should be made to create doubts in its minds as to its own potentiality, Dulles said.<sup>133</sup> Elaborating his arguments, he wrote in 1952 that American efforts had merely been directed at containing Soviet communism which he branded as a "negative" approach. He prescribed far more vigorous anti-Communist policies so that a situation would come when the Americans would live without any Communist danger. He argued that a Communist aggression must be instantly retaliated in a massive way so as to teach the offender that "if they aggress, they will lose in punishment more than they can gain by aggression".<sup>134</sup> Side by side with military preparedness Dulles also prescribed for a positive political offensive to "liberate" peoples who lived behind the Iron Curtain. During his nomination hearings, he said:

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132 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 10 November 1958, pp. 734-5.

133 Ibid., vol. 24, 11 June 1951, p. 936.

134 John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness", Life (New York), vol. 32, 19 May 1952, pp. 146-8.

It is only by keeping alive the hope of liberation, by taking advantage of that wherever opportunity arises, that we will end this terrible peril which dominates the world, which imposes upon us such terrible sacrifices and so great fears for the future. But all of this can be done and must be done in ways which will not provoke an insurrection which would be crushed with bloody violence. 135

Accepting that Communist danger was a global phenomenon, Dulles advocated a global strategy to counter it. He strongly urged the necessity of building anti-Communist forces on a global  
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basis.

The containment of communism in Asia, according to Dulles, was as important as Europe. In his War or Peace (1950) he advocated a new Asian policy to face the changed situation there. He believed that if the US policy was based on the consideration of distinctiveness of Asian peoples and their penchant for national independence then it would be "qualified to establish a permanent Association of the Free Nations of Asia and the  
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Pacific". The most serious threat in the Asian continent, Dulles considered, was the Communist violence planned to bring the Asian peoples under the Soviet hegemony. He regarded the Communist insurrections in China, Korea, Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines and Tibet as a grand international Communist design "plotted for 25 years and finally brought to a consumma-  
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tion of fighting and disorder" in the area. Citing Stalin's

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135 Nomination of Dulles Hearings, n. 131, pp. 5-6.

136 Ibid., p. 10.

137 John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1950), pp. 228-9.

138 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 24, 26 March 1951, p. 484.

Problems of Leninism, Dulles viewed the Communist menace in Asia as a prelude to world conquest. He said that Stalin had outlined a plan of world conquest. His first targets were the weaker nations where it was easy to use such methods as propaganda, penetration and subversion. Last in the list would be strong non-Communist countries like the United States.

Dulles wrote:

Stalin points out ... that the "road to victory" over the West lies through "revolutionary alliance" with the liberation movement in the colonies and countries of the East. The hostile tide of Communism in Asia, which looms so dangerously today, has been announced and actively nurtured for 25 years. 139

During the 1952 Presidential election Dulles was put in charge of the committee to draft the Republican Party platform on foreign policy. He strongly criticized the Truman Administration for its negligence of the Asian countries. On the question of American policy in Asia the Republican platform declared that the United States "shall end neglect of the Far East" and that it had "no intention of sacrifice the East to gain time for the West".<sup>140</sup> Speaking before the American Legion in September 1953, Dulles said that even if a political settlement was reached in Korea the US involvement in the Western Pacific would not cease. He said that the Korean War was not an isolated affair and it should be seen that after the Korean armistice the Communist<sup>141</sup> forces could not unleash attacks elsewhere.

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139 Ibid., vol. 23, 17 July 1950, p. 88.

140 Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds, National Party Platforms: 1840-1956 (Urbana, 1956), pp. 497-8.

141 See U.S., Department of State, Korean Problems (Washington, D.C., 1953), pp. 8-9.



Dulles spoke strongly against recognizing and seating China in the United Nations. In 1950 in his War or Peace he had shown his willingness to recognize China provided the Chinese Communists could show that they had confidence of the people and had ruled for "a reasonable period of time"<sup>142</sup>. The phrase "a reasonable period of time" might be interpreted as his real unwillingness for recognition. His perception was different from that of Acheson. In 1951, during the Senate hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1951 Acheson had clarified the point that America did not have any intention of accepting the Communist government of China as a perpetual phenomenon. Answering Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa), he said that no fund of the Mutual Assistance Programme had been allocated to China because that could not be done. He made it clear that this did not imply that the United States had reconciled to the fact of the existence of Communist government in China.<sup>143</sup> By 1952 Dulles was totally against Communist China. In his article, "A Policy of Boldness", he wrote:

Surely there is a vast range of possible China policies between the one extreme of liquidating the loyal representation of Free China on Formosa and the other extreme of now escorting them to the military reconquest of the mainland. Also we need not assume fatalistically that China's future is now immutably foreordained, beyond our power to influence. 144

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142 Dulles, n. 137, pp. 189-90.

143 See U.S. Congress, 82, I, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 26.

144 Dulles, n. 134, p. 160.

This was clearly a reversal of earlier American policy of hands off China's civil war. By implication this meant enlarged American assistance to Formosa and putting constant pressure on Communist China to speed up the process of its ultimate collapse. Probably, Dulles was thinking of a NATO type of alliance for the Pacific region. As a first step in that direction he started concluding security treaties with the countries in the region after the outbreak of the Korean War. He, however, realized that political diversities and mutual hatred and jealousies among these states made this task extremely difficult. Behind the concept of an alliance was the idea of utilization of the manpower and resources of these countries in the realization of the American objective of countering expansionist thrust of the Communist powers. Dulles felt that militarily "the United States should not assume formal commitments which overstrain its present capabilities and give rise to military expectations we could not fulfil, particularly in terms of land forces"<sup>145</sup>. As a remedy to all these problems Dulles suggested that a situation had to be created where the Asian countries would dissipate their mutual rivalries and understand the necessity of a united stand against Communist expansion. For this it was necessary to give Japan its rightful place in the family of free nations. Japan should be accorded an opportunity of "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations"<sup>146</sup>. Inclusion of a free Japan into the American global defence system was strongly urged

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145 John Foster Dulles, "Security in the Pacific", Foreign Affairs, vol. 30, January 1952, pp. 182-3.

146 Ibid., p. 184.

by Dulles. He had serious apprehensions regarding the dangers which the combination of Japanese technical knowhow and the Chinese and Russian manpower would present. He argued that during the Second World War when China was an ally and the Soviet Union was neutral, the United States found that to defeat Japan was a very difficult task. Now if all the three powers combined, it would pose a grave threat to the United States.<sup>147</sup> Any failure to align Japan with the West, Dulles warned, entailed the risk of "being expelled from Japan and seeing all Asia consolidated against us". He advocated for a "shift from the role of conquerors to one of cooperation in friendly association with Japanese as sovereign equals".<sup>148</sup>

Thus it is apparent that before he became the Secretary of State, Dulles strongly believed that the Communist movement was a centrally directed monolith. Soviet Union was the nucleus of this movement which aimed to bring the entire world under its domination. Logically it followed that China was likely to act in unison with the Soviet Union against the United States.

The image which Dulles had of the Communist world and in particular of the Soviet Union and China was reflected in his choice of Walter S. Robertson as the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Robertson had served as a minister-counsellor at the American embassy at Chungking at the close of the war and was a staunch supporter of the KMT leader Chiang. He believed that both the Soviet Union and China had identical

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147 U.S. Department of State, A Survey of Foreign Policy Problems : Address by the Secretary of State, January 27, 1953 (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 4.

148 Dulles, n. 145, pp. 185-6.

ambitions and means. He considered the Chinese Communists as "zealous consecrated Marxists in their loyalty to Moscow and haters of everything we are and stand for.... What do the Communists want? The answer is 'the world' - their world, our world, everything."<sup>149</sup> Eisenhower has testified that Robertson was "a tower of strength to Foster Dulles in the framing of policy".<sup>150</sup>

#### DULLES-EISENHOWER POLITICAL STRATEGY

At the time when Eisenhower took charge of the Presidency the Korean truce talks had reached agreements on (a) a military demarcation line, (b) the execution of a detailed armistice agreement, and (c) summoning of a political conference on Korea within three months of the armistice. But it was the Prisoners of War issue on which no agreement appeared to be in sight thereby making agreement on armistice difficult. The Communist side insisted that all prisoners of war be repatriated without any exception. But the UN Command, strongly backed by the United States, held that no prisoner should be repatriated against his will. It was over this diametrically opposite viewpoints that the truce talks were stalemated.

In early December, as a President-elect, Eisenhower in fulfilment of his election promise visited Korea. One of the possibilities of making a dent in the stalemated situation, Eisenhower later said, was "to let the Communist authorities

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149 Dulles, n. 24, p. 134.

150 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years : Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), p. 481.

understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean peninsula. We would not be limited by any world-wide gentleman's agreement.<sup>151</sup> Eisenhower Administration from the outset tried to put political pressure coupled with military threat to bring the Communists to the negotiating table. He thus tried to make it clear that any non-compliance on the part of the Communists would lead to a resumption of war and even use of the ultimate weapon if found necessary.

In pursuance of this policy the President deneutralized the Strait of Taiwan and "unleashed" (a phrase later used by the journalists) Chiang Kai-shek to stage a comeback to the mainland. In his State of the Union Message of 2 February 1953 Eisenhower declared:

... there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. This permitted these Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

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151 Ibid., p. 181. Sixteen years later, in a television interview Eisenhower said: "I let it be known that if there were not going to be an armistice ... I would no longer regard this war as being limited." See Dulles, no. 24, p. 137. It can be noted here that in March 1952, testifying before the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, George F. Kennan, Ambassador-designate to the Soviet Union, doubted the possibility of Soviet intervention on behalf of China. President's bold stand might have been influenced by similar perceptions. See U.S. Congress, 94, II, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Historical Series (Washington, D.C., 1976), vol. 4, p. 204.

I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make this crystal clear: This order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea. 152

Eisenhower later wrote:

of/ If (the deneutralization of the Strait of Taiwan) put the Chinese Communists on notice that the days/stalemate were numbered; that the Korean war would either end or extend beyond Korea. It thus helped, I am convinced, to bring that war to a finish. 153

The Eisenhower Administration also took steps to urge the Soviet Union not to assist militarily the Communist forces fighting in Korea. On 25 February 1953, US representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, made a direct reference to this by saying:

The whole world knows the truth; That except for the active aid furnished to the North Korean and Chinese Communist aggressors by the Soviet Union, the war in Korea would now be over.... The rulers of the Soviet Union can stop the war whenever they want to, and Mr Vyshinsky knows it. 154

Following the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953, President Eisenhower said on 16 April that the attitude of the new Soviet

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152 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 28, 9 February 1953, p. 209.

153 Eisenhower, n. 150, p. 123. Henry Cabot Lodge, however, records that the President was quite sceptical about the possibility of success of the Nationalists on the mainland. During his interview with the President on 7 January 1953, Eisenhower had told him that the US military picture was so bad that it was not advisable to encourage the Nationalists to launch a guerrilla warfare against the mainland. See Henry Cabot Lodge, As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the '50s and '60s (New York, 1976), p. 55.

154 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 28, 9 March 1953, p. 383.

leaders to world peace would depend on how they respond to vital world problems such as disarmament, peace in Asia and liberation of captive people. He expressed grave doubts at Soviet intentions and said that if it really took some positive steps in the direction it would surely receive American reciprocity.<sup>155</sup>

In pursuance of its policy of pushing Communist China into a difficult position, the Eisenhower Administration took further steps to make the UN General Assembly resolution of 18 May 1951 more effective. This resolution had imposed restrictions on a member state in their trade in strategic materials with the Communist China and North Korea. In a statement on 18 April 1953 Dulles said that negotiations had been undertaken with Britain, France and other maritime countries with the object of reinforcing the blockade of China.<sup>156</sup>

Along with efforts to create an international opinion against China, the Eisenhower Administration continued its endeavours for the resumption of the Korean truce talks. On 22 February 1953, General Mark Clark, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea, proposed an immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war which was accepted.

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155 Ibid., vol. 28, 27 April 1953, p. 601. It may be noted that after Stalin's death the Soviet leaders showed some relaxation in their iron grip over the satellites. The revolt of the East Berlin workers, the non-Soviet method of collectivization in Hungary etc. were indications of this softening of attitude. On this point, see Albert L. Weeks, The Other Side of Coexistence: An Analysis of Russian Foreign Policy (New York, 1970), pp. 161-3; Richard Gold-Adams, The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962), pp. 135-6.

156 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 28, 27 April 1953, p. 601.

by the Chinese and North Korean authorities. In a statement made on 30 March 1953, Chou En-lai expressed his willingness to resume talks on the entire question of the POWs.<sup>157</sup> This desire was endorsed by North Korea and the Soviet Union. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, in a broadcast made on 1 April 1953 called Chou's gesture as a "noble act".<sup>158</sup>

President Eisenhower expressed his happiness at the possibility of resumption of talks.<sup>159</sup> But the question remained whether a political solution was to be made a condition for a military truce. Clarifying the Administration's stand, Secretary Dulles said at a Press conference on 20 April 1953 that the United States should try to assure that political discussions would immediately follow an armistice. And hence the longer the debate was on armistice, postponement of political discussions would be prolonged.<sup>160</sup> He did not think it wise to explain the American stand on a political settlement in Korea in the truce talks as he felt that it was not the proper forum for such a discussion.<sup>161</sup>

Following an exchange of sick and wounded soldiers on the basis of the agreement of 11 April 1953, regular negotiations were resumed at Panmunjom on 26 April 1953. Soon, however, it reached a deadlock again over the question of repatriation of prisoners. The United States reiterated its earlier stand on the issue and made it clear that the US stand on the prisoner-

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157 Ibid., vol. 29, 24 August 1953, p. 250.

158 New York Times, 2 April 1953, pp. 1, 3.

159 See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 28, 27 April 1953, pp. 601, 603.

160 Ibid., vol. 28, 4 May 1953, p. 655.

161 Ibid.



of-war question flowed from the fundamental philosophy of the Free World which believed in the integrity and rights of the individual.<sup>162</sup> It has been suggested that actually it was Dulles' psychological offensive which was responsible for ending the deadlock. In May 1953, Dulles paid a visit to New Delhi and presumably talked with the officials with the expectation that the American decision to cross the Yalu into Manchuria if the truce deadlock was not broken would reach the Chinese ears. Immediately afterwards the Chinese agreed to resume the negotiations.<sup>163</sup>

On 8 June 1953 Prisoners of War Agreement was signed which insured that force would not be used in the repatriation of the prisoners.<sup>164</sup> Eventually on 27 July 1953, the Korean truce was signed and a long drawn out limited war came to a close.<sup>165</sup> On the same day, referring to the truce agreement, Dulles said, inter alia,

The Communist rulers now know that if they wage another war of aggression, those who unwillingly serve in their Red armies can escape to freedom, confident that they will never be handed back. Thus the Red armies

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162 For points of disagreement over the repatriation question see *ibid.*, vol. 29, 24 August 1953, p. 250. For the purpose of the present study they are not relevant.

163 Goold-Adams, n. 155, pp. 73-74.

164 New York Times, 9 June 1953, p. 1.

165 U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents (Washington, D.C., 1957), p. 2662. For a study of the circumstances leading to the truce and the last minute complications that arose due to Rhee's action see Eisenhower, n. 150, pp. 181-91.

become less dependable as instruments of aggression and the chance of aggression is correspondingly reduced. 166

It can be noted here that the armistice was signed with the Chinese but Dulles referred to the "Communist rulers".

It is not known that who actually, Stalin or Mao, was adamant on the POWs issue. However, it is interesting to note that it was only after Stalin's death that the Chinese made decisive concession in this respect and paved the way for the Korean truce. There might be many interpretations of the event, but our concern primarily is about how the Americans tended to see it. 167

There is not much evidence in the public domain to indicate the nature of discussions in the United States on the implication of Stalin's death on the Sino-Soviet relations. The United States at this time was confronting a steadily deteriorating military situation in East Asia. In responding to it, the United States continued to operate on its old assumptions. After meeting Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador, in autumn of 1953, Dulles criticized the Chinese for their involvement in the Indo-Chinese war. On 2 September, he warned: "The Chinese Communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina." He also emphasized that the Korean War was not an isolated event and it was a part of a global Communist plot "to conquer

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166 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 29, 3 August 1953, p.132.

167 See Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic ; The United States and the World, 1945-1973 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974), pp. 62-63. Also see "America's Watch on Asia : A Dilemma for the State Department", Round Table (London), vol. 44, December 1953, pp. 13-14.

freedom".<sup>168</sup> American anxiety in the Western Pacific veered round the possibility of a Sino-Soviet military thrust. On 15 December 1953, the CIA prepared a policy paper entitled "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible U.S. Courses of Action in Indochina through 1954". In this CIA estimate, Peiping and Moscow were viewed as a single problem. References to Communist threat in Indo-China included both the threat from China as well as the Soviet Union.<sup>169</sup> Dulles again reiterated the same theme in a speech on 12 January 1954.<sup>170</sup> Commenting on the speech James Reston wrote that it appeared as if Dulles was telling Moscow and Peking, "as clearly as governments ever say things that in the event of another proxy or brushfire war in Korea, Indo-China, Iran or anywhere else, the United States might retaliate instantly with atomic weapons against the U.S.S.R. or Red China".<sup>171</sup> Vice-President Richard M. Nixon made a similar interpretation and said:

Rather let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we choose.

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168 Pentagon Papers, n. 51, Book 9 of 12, p. 142.

169 Ibid., pp. 206-11.

170 For a study of Dulles' concept of massive retaliation, see William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton, 1954), pp. 1-5. For the text of the speech, see Ernest R. May, ed., Anxiety and Affluence: 1945-1965 (New York, 1966), pp. 211-17. For the contemporary criticisms of Dulles' speech see Henry Steele Commager, ed., The Conscience of a Liberal, Chester Bowles: Selected Writings and Speeches (New York, 1962), pp. 14-19; Gerberding, n. 40, pp. 228-9; High Ross, ed., The Cold War: Containment and Its Critics (Chicago, 1963), pp. 33-35.

171 New York Times, 17 January 1954, p. IV:8.

We adjusted our armed strength to meet the requirements of this new concept and, what was just as important, we let the world and we let the Communists know what we intended to do. 172

As the military situation in Vietnam worsened and the fall of Dien Bien Phy became imminent the State Department in January 1954, started considering whether to commit American forces in Indo-China. In March, the NSC discussed the proposal. Eisenhower, however, was reluctant to order a military intervention so soon after the armistic in Korea. The United States, however, was concerned about the danger that might arise in case France withdrew from Indo-China. According to an assessment:

Regardless of the outcome of military operations in Indo-China and without compromising in any way the overwhelming strategic importance of the Associated states to the Western position in the area, the U.S. should take all affirmative and practical steps, with or without its European allies, to provide tangible evidence of Western strength and determination to defeat Communism; to demonstrate that ultimate victory will be won by the free world; and to secure the affirmative association of Southeast Asian states with these purposes. 173

After the signing of the Korean truce American policy in the Far East was primarily directed to reach a political settlement of the Korean problem. From the beginning the United States was determined not to offer major concessions to the PRC. In a Press interview held on 28 July 1953, President Eisenhower made it clear that he would not approve the idea of bringing unity of Korea at the cost of Chinese entry into the United Nations

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172 Ibid., 14 March 1954, p. 44.

173 "1954 Report by Special Committee on the Threat of Communism". See New York Times, The Pentagon Papers (Toronto, 1971), pp. 35-36.

and, far less, into the Security Council.<sup>174</sup>

The Armistice Agreement provided for a high level political conference "within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective". The objective of the conference was to be to reach an agreement on "the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlements of the Korean question, etc."<sup>175</sup> Nothing was said as to how or by whom such a conference was to be summoned, nor was there any clarification as to who were to be the participants. These ambiguities naturally led to serious differences between the United States and the Communists. So much so that it took nine months before the conference could meet in Geneva in April 1954.

Before the conference met many issues cropped up that revealed the American attitude towards international communism. One such issue was the right of participation in the conference. The United States strongly emphasized the phrase "a political confluence ... both sides" and interpreted it to mean all nations contributing forces to the UN Command in Korea on one side and China and North Korea on the other. The USSR and India were not to participate. This US proposal which had also been endorsed by other fourteen of the sixteen countries participating in the UN Command was adopted on 27 August 1953 by the political committee and subsequently on 28 August by the General Assembly by a 43-5

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174 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 29, 10 August 1953, p. 177.

175 U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy : 1950-1955 : Basic Documents (Washington, D.C., 1957), vol. 1, p. 742.

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vote with 10 members abstaining.

Opposing the US proposal the USSR proposed a eleven-nation conference consisting of the United States, Britain, France, the USSR, the People's Republic of China, India, Poland, Sweden, Burma, North Korea and South Korea. By implication such a proposal excluded from participation a number of states which had participated in the UN Command. Moreover, by stipulating that only the signatories to the Armistice Agreement would have decisive voice in the conference, it tried to eliminate South Korea from having a significant role therein as it was not a signatory. The Soviet resolution, however, was rejected by the General Assembly by a vote of 42-5, with 12 abstentions. <sup>177</sup>

On the question of composition of the Conference Britain and France took a different position. They favoured the inclusion of the USSR and India into the conference and suggested that instead of making it an across-the-table conference it should be a round table one. The proposal was rejected by the United States. It was not totally opposed to the participation of the USSR but pleaded that the latter should participate as a member of the Communist side provided "the other side" (i.e. the Communist side) wanted its participation. A resolution to this effect was adopted by the committee on 27 August 1953 by a vote

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176 See UN Doc. A/L.151/Rev. 1, 17 August 1953, General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 7th Session, Annex 16, p. 3; GAOR, yr 8, mtg 430, 28 August 1953, p. 735.

177 See UN Doc. A/C.1/L.48, 18 August 1953, GAOR, 7th Session, Annex 16, p. 2; GAOR, yr 8, mtg 430, 28 August 1953, p. 735.

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of 55-2, with 2 abstentions. The next day, a resolution of the UN General Assembly was passed calling for participation on the UN side of "those among the Member States contributing armed forces which desire to be represented, together with the Republic of Korea". It was<sup>s</sup> also resolved that the USSR could participate "if the other side desires it".<sup>179</sup>

As was specified in the General Assembly resolution the United States was to arrange the conference in consultation with the governments of Communist China and North Korea not later than 28 October 1953. The first round of talks commenced on 26 October 1953 and continued till it was deadlocked on the question of composition of the conference on 12 December 1953. The Chinese proposed that the USSR, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma be invited to participate as neutrals. The United States opposed this proposal and as an alternative suggested that the Soviet Union be invited by China and North Korea as a participant on their side and not as a member. So far the other countries were concerned the United States conceded to their participation without voting right. But the US list of such participants was different from that of China. It consisted of India, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan and Chile. No final compromise was, however, reached and the

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178 See GAOR, 7th Session, First Committee, mtg 613, 18 August 1953, pp. 699-704; *ibid.*, mtg 625, 27 August 1953, pp. 765-8.

179 GAOR, 7th Session, Supplement No. 20-B(A/2361/Add.2), 28 August 1953, pp. 1-2.

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negotiations broke off.

During the protracted negotiations which intermittently passed through clouds and sunshines the United States made constant efforts to keep the Western alliance intact. The communique issued after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in October 1953 had affirmed the determination "to cooperate in carrying out the Armistice Agreement and to work for the early convening of a political conference, as provided in the agreement, in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question."<sup>181</sup>

The question of a political conference was finally solved in the Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference at Berlin in January-February 1954. The communique, which was issued on 18 February after the close of the conference, expressed the view that besides the Korean question the issue of Indo-Chinese peace will also be discussed in the conference which would meet on 26 April 1954 in Geneva. The representatives from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, South Korea and North Korea were to participate in this conference. The communique, however, stipulated that "it is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the ... conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic

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180 Shihchieh Chihshih (World Culture), A Chronicle of Principal Events Relating to the Korean Question, 1945-1954 (Peking, 1954), pp. 80-82. Also see Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York, 1968), pp. 28-29. For a study of the internal stresses and strains within the Communist camp over the peace negotiations, see Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (London, 1975), pp. 207-46.

181 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 29, 26 October 1953, p. 546; and 21 December 1953, p. 852.



recognition to any case where it has not already been accorded." It was clear that the reference was to the question of the US recognition of the Communist China. Dulles made the point clear when he told Molotov that the United States would not "agree to meet with the Chinese Communists unless it was expressly agreed and put in writing that no United States recognition would be involved".<sup>183</sup> A study of the communique would clearly indicate that the United States compromised on two important counts. In the first place, it accepted the idea of a round table conference; and secondly, it accepted the Soviet Union's presence as one of the sponsors of the conference and not on the side of the aggressors.

The Geneva Conference met on 26 April 1954 and continued up to 21 July 1954. It had mainly two issues to tackle - (1) question of Korean unification and (2) peace in Indo-China.

The question of Korean unification triggered off a heated debate between the Communist and Western sides. The Communists proposed unification of Korea following an election. But the terms and conditions of the election were unacceptable to the Americans. Commenting on the proposal Dulles said:

General elections are proposed by the Communists under a law, the terms of which would be subject to veto by the Communist regime. The proposal stipulates that the election conditions should

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182 American Foreign Policy ; 1950-1955, n. 165, p. 2698.

183 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 30, 8 March 1954, p. 346. See also Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden ; Full Circle (London, 1960), p. 89. The U.S. News and World Report reported that Dulles strongly opposed Molotov's idea of accepting China as one of the "five great powers". He branded China as the "offspring of Soviet Communism". See U.S. News and World Report, vol. 36, 19 February 1954, p. 34.

exclude all "foreign interference". Presumably, this is intended to exclude United Nations supervision. 184

He, however, went on to reiterate the American desire to see Korea united. Such a Korea, he said, would be an independent and free country. <sup>185</sup> During the entire conference the United States did not treat the Soviet Union and the Communist China as independent entities.

The antipathy of the United States towards the People's Republic of China was greatly reflected in the attitude of their officials to the Chinese leaders and officials. Dulles was frigid when he met Chou En-lai. The New York Times reported that they did not look at each other and Dulles made no effort <sup>186</sup> "to disguise a deep-seated resentment". Anthony Eden later wrote that the Russian delegate Molotov had told him that Dulles "had succeeded during his stay in Geneva in never once acknowledging Mr Chou En-lai's existence". <sup>187</sup> The American delegates might not have considered it worthwhile to discuss the issue with China. For the American side ~~while~~ the most important participant was the Soviet Union. The bitter emotional response of the Americans towards the Chinese was the result of their direct clash with China in Korea. The United States had earlier taken the decision to exploit the possible rift between China and the Soviet Union. The negotiations were stalemated and on <sup>188</sup> 3 May 1954 Dulles left Geneva saying "just as we expected".

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184 American Foreign Policy : 1950-1955, n. 165, p. 2690.

185 Ibid., p. 2692.

186 New York Times, 27 April 1954, p. 1.

187 Eden, n. 183, p. 117.

188 New York Times, 4 May 1954, p. 5.

Although the Korean part of the negotiations collapsed yet the talks on the fate of Indo-China continued. Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, the US delegate in the place of Dulles, refrained from playing an active role. Eventually, on 21 July 1954, the participants reached an accord. They agreed to respect the sovereignty of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Vietnam was to be divided along the seventeenth parallel to be unified after an election in 1956. An International Control Commission was to be constituted consisting of India, Poland and Canada to supervise the observance of these agreements. The United States and Vietnam did not approve the agreements and issued independent declarations presenting their respective positions.<sup>189</sup>

There were quite a few in America who saw the Geneva Conference as a failure for the United States. Senator Knowland called the Geneva accord as "one of the greatest victories for Communism in a decade". A Reporter editorial commented: "We stood aside, holding our noses, but the pre-destined truce was signed. The Communists have gained another smaller China."<sup>190</sup>

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189 For the text of the Geneva accord, the Vietnamese and US declarations, see Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C., 1962), pp. 146-50. See also U.S. News and World Report, vol. 37, 16 July 1954, pp. 29-31; 23 July 1954, pp. 73-78.

190 Dulles, n. 24, p. 146.

Chapter V

AWARENESS OF SINO-SOVIET RIFT : IMPLICATIONS :  
JULY 1954 - 1958

## Chapter V

### AWARENESS OF SINO-SOVIET RIFT : IMPLICATIONS : JULY 1954 - 1958

The US foreign policy after the Geneva Conference for a time followed a hard line towards international communism. This was manifested in the US support for the formation of the defensive military organizations in Asia and its efforts to encircle the Soviet Union and China with military bases from which an attack could be launched if the situation so demanded. As time passed on and the United States began to be aware of the growing differences between these two giants, it started feeling that while both the Soviet Union and China were anti-American, the latter was no longer totally an instrument of Soviet policy. The United States realized that two independent power centres had emerged in international communism. While it was still ready to frustrate any overt aggression, it tried to persuade both China and the Soviet Union to give up their anti-American postures. Instead of merely directing its efforts to lure China out of the Soviet camp as it had done in the past, in the post-Geneva Conference period it first made efforts to persuade both these powers to think that their anti-American policy would not serve their national interest and later, directed its efforts to exhort the Soviet Union to delink its policy towards the United States from that of China. The United States tended to believe that it was more likely that the Soviet Union would respond to its overtures than China because it had a larger stake in the preservation of the existing international order than in its destruction.

## REACTIONS TO GENEVA ACCORDS

As could be well expected, the conclusion of the Geneva accords in July 1954 provoked an intensely heated debate in the United States. In the US Senate, Senator William F. Knowland (Rep., Cal.) branded the Conference as an "Asian Munich" and condemned it for preparing ground for the Chinese entry into the United Nations. He said that in case China was admitted into the UN, he would devote all his energies to see to it that the United States withdrew from that international body.<sup>1</sup> Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (Dem., Tex.), leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate, Senator George Smathers (Dem., Fla.) and Congressman Emanuel Celler (Dem., N.Y.) expressed similar feelings and said that the people of the United States would lose confidence in the United Nations if China was given a seat there.<sup>2</sup> Senators Mike Mansfield (Dem., Mont.) and John F. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) also expressed their strong opposition to China and blamed the Eisenhower Administration for creating confusion regarding US stand on China.<sup>3</sup>

Like the Congress, the Administration was also sceptic about the promises made by the Communist China and North Vietnam at Geneva. The danger of a Sino-Soviet threat in the Far East still loomed large. Soon after, on 22 July 1954, the Peking radio reported Ho Chi Minh as saying that the agreement could not

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1 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 37, 9 July 1954, p. 36.

2 Ibid., pp. 36-37; Congressional Record, 83, II, vol. 100 (1954), p. 10048.

3 Congressional Record, 83, II, vol. 100 (1954), p. 9565.

impede the unification of Vietnam and that "all the people and soldiers of the North and the South must unite to conquer victory"<sup>4</sup>. In a similar vein, on 11 August, talking in the context of the situation that had emerged in the eastern Pacific after the Geneva agreement, Chou En-lai called for the liquidation of "the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group" and liberation of Taiwan.<sup>5</sup> On the same day, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed its concern about the growing Sino-Soviet danger in the Far East. Reviewing the United States policy in the region, the Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Mathew B. Ridgway, suggested that one of the "principal objectives" of American policy should be "to split Communist China from the Soviet bloc". He, however, cautioned that the United States must avoid a war against the combined Sino-Soviet bloc for it would not only be "a war against the most potentially powerful enemy coalition" but would also alienate the American allies from active support.<sup>6</sup> He suggested that in order to wean away China from the Soviet Union, the former should be made to understand that the Soviet Union was looking with covetous eyes on its territory and resources and that in the long run it would be much more in the Chinese interest if it developed friendly relations with

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4 Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs : 1954 (New York, 1956), p. 256.

5 Ibid., p. 264.

6 Memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defence, 11 August 1954. U.S., Department of Defence, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C., 1971), Book 10 of 12, p. 712. Cited hereinafter as Pentagon Papers.

the United States. To make all these plans successful the Army Chief felt that the United States should strengthen its military capability so that "American diplomacy may have that essential military support without which it cannot hope to succeed"<sup>7</sup>.

The theme of a Sino-Soviet combination in the Far East again recurred in the report of the Van Fleet Mission in October 1954. The mission of General James A. Van Fleet was despatched in May 1954 to the Far East with the object of analysing the political-military situation in the region. In its report, the Fleet Mission pointed out that for several years China would pose a greater danger to the security of the "Free World" than the Soviet Union itself. It, however, said that China was "aided and abetted by Soviet Russia"<sup>8</sup>. General James A. Van Fleet was of the opinion that the Sino-Soviet interests were complementary to each other. He said that "the ancient Chinese dream, now taken over by the Reds, of engulfing all the Far East, can be realized only in partnership with Russia, the little peoples around her rim who hope to stay free can look for help only to the West"<sup>9</sup>.

The National Security Council (NSC), which had been discussing the Sino-Soviet threat to the Asian region, in its statement of 22 December 1954 emphasized the need for making

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7 Ibid., p. 713.

8 Report of the Van Fleet Mission to the Far East, October 1954. Ibid., p. 794.

9 U.S. News and World Report, vol. 37, 17 September 1954, pp. 24-26, 28.



efforts to disrupt "the Sino-Soviet alliance". Analysing the situation that had resulted with China having "established and consolidated effective control over the mainland" and having "maintained and developed close working relations with the Soviet Union", the NSC reiterated the necessity of intensifying "existing and political areas of conflict or divergence of interest between the USSR and Communist China"<sup>10</sup>. But the NSC did not recommend any change in the existing policy and asked for the continuation of non-recognition of China and barring its entry into the United Nations.<sup>11</sup> The search for "existing and potential areas of conflict" was to be carried on within the old policy framework.

With these objectives in view the Eisenhower Administration followed a policy of support for strong nationalist governments in Southeast Asia which would counter the efforts of the Communists to increase their influence in that region and their possible repercussions in other parts of the world.<sup>12</sup> Dulles had already reached the conclusion that the indigenous Communist movements threatening the stability of the regimes in Indo-China were closely linked with international communism. On 24 March 1954, he said:

In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use nationalistic anti-French slogans to win local support. But if they achieved

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10 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on current U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429/5, 22 December 1954). Pentagon Papers, n. 6, pp. 837, 839.

11 Ibid., p. 847.

12 Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967), pp. 189-90. See also Asher B. Lans, "Illusions of American Foreign Policy", The American Scholar (Richmond, Va.), vol. 24, Autumn 1955, p. 406.

military or political success, it is certain they would subject the people to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking its orders from Peiping and Moscow. 13

Dulles was strongly of the view that the French hegemony in that area should be replaced by that of the United States. He wanted to have direct dealings with the governments in Indo-China and not via Paris. He advocated American economic and military assistance for these governments. Eisenhower approved the Dullesian strategy and in a letter to Diem said that the purpose of American aid was to "assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means"<sup>14</sup>. Gradually the United States stepped into the shoes of France in Indo-China and the latter became hereafter<sup>15</sup> an American responsibility.

Diem's anti-Communist stance appealed to Dulles and in spite of French exhortations to the contrary, the United States helped Diem to assume dictatorial power in 1955. The next year when the North Vietnamese Government asked for election to unify the country Diem refused. Thereafter the North Vietnamese Government took recourse to guerrilla tactics and put constant pressure on the Diem Government. American aid and assistance continued flowing to South Vietnam to help it resist the Communist expansion.

American feeling of hostility towards communism under the Eisenhower-Dulles leadership gained in intensity almost with

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13 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 30, 12 April 1954, p. 539.

14 Ibid., vol. 31, 15 November 1954, pp. 735-6.

15 Gerson, n. 12, pp. 190-1, 341.

every passing day. The United States was determined that the Communists would not be allowed to make further inroad into the "Free World". As the State Department under the leadership of Dulles looked around the danger of Communist expansion appeared to it to be greatest in Asia. After all China, North Korea and North Vietnam where communism had moved in were all in Asia. The threat to the security of non-Communist nations particularly appeared to be serious on the periphery of the Communist world.<sup>16</sup> The United States decided to meet the challenge by taking a variety of steps. It signed a number of security treaties with several of these countries. It brought into existence multi-lateral defence organizations like SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS. It buttressed the military capabilities and economic viability of these countries.<sup>17</sup>

The State Department and Dulles had no use for those who did not share the American perception of international communism. This was manifested when the British pleaded for the inclusion of India into the SEATO. Although India had never asked to be included in the US sponsored defensive pacts and consistently opposed them, the British argued with the United States for India's participation in the SEATO. To this Dulles reacted by firmly rejecting the proposal. He criticized Nehru's non-

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16 Statement of William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 11 May 1955. U.S. Congress, 84, I, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1955 (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 187.

17 For a study of the U.S. commitments against Communist aggression as guaranteed under these agreements, see Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy: Building and Using Military Power in a World at War (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 56-58.

alignment as an immoral act because for him there could not be neutrality between good and evil. For Dulles international communism was nothing but an unexpurgated evil.<sup>18</sup>

Dulles understood that even though the United States had succeeded in bringing its Western allies in the SEATO, they would be reluctant to be involved seriously in a Far Eastern crisis. He also understood that the Western allies of the United States believed that an active American participation in the Far East would undercut its commitment to the European defence. But actually the Secretary of State felt differently. According to him any loss to the free world in any part of the globe to the Communists meant American reverse. Dulles said later: "If we are weak in situations in the Far East, ... we may get pressures elsewhere, for instance in the Persian Gulf and Berlin." Such being the case he argued that neither the United States should retreat in the face of a Communist Chinese attack nor should it invade it. If the United States retreated in the face of Communist China "no matter how we rationalize it, the nations of the area will say: 'One side retreated, one side advanced'",<sup>19</sup> Dulles said.

When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1955, there was a lot of talk on the nature of the threat posed by international communism but not much was said on the subject of Sino-Soviet relations. Even Chester Bowles, former ambassador to India and Nepal, who had

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18 Mutual Security Act of 1955 Hearings, n. 16, p. 195.

19 Andrew H. Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J., 1965), p. 62.

hinted at the possibility of China following a course independent of Moscow, stated that the existing relationship between China and the Soviet Union was "certainly very close".<sup>20</sup>

#### QUEMOY CRISIS : 1954-55

While arrangements for Asian security were still being made, American determination to stand against Communist China in Asia was put to test. On 3 September 1954, the day Dulles arrived in Manila for the SEATO negotiations, the Chinese artillery started shelling the offshore island of Quemoy which formed a part of the group of offshore islands under the control of the Nationalist China, others being Matsu and Tachen islands. Ever since the withdrawal of the Nationalists from the mainland, these islands had been held by the Chiang Government. Explaining the reasons behind Chiang's pledge to defend these islands, Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs:

Chiang's forces held the offshore islands for several reasons. The most important was Chiang's conviction that if he lost Quemoy and Matsu, his main forces would lose their will to fight. Historically, he and his men remembered, Quemoy had been the site of strongholds of men who had defied and fought - sometimes with striking success - the rulers of the mainland. To Chiang and his people, Quemoy and Matsu would one day be stepping stones for the reinvasion of their homeland. Meanwhile, the possession of these islands enabled Chiang to preserve for his forces a jumping-off place for guerilla raids on the mainland (these had been discounted, however, in the summer of 1953); to sustain the morale of anti-Communist Asiatics in other areas of the

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20 See Bowles' statement, 23 May 1955. Mutual Security Act of 1955 Hearings, n. 16, p. 531.

Southwest Pacific, and to compel the Communists to tie down troops to guard against the threat which the island-based forces posed. 21

The Quemoy crisis which opened up in September 1954 was not something abrupt. Its antecedents can be traced back to May 1954 when there was an exchange of fire between the Chinese Communist and Nationalist ships in the region. After the signing of the Geneva accord the situation worsened. On 13 August 1954, Chou En-lai called for the "liberation of Taiwan" from the clutches of Chiang.<sup>22</sup> On 16 August there was a skirmish in the region in which the Communists took a toll of ten Nationalist soldiers. When events were thus taking serious turn, on 17 August in a Press conference President Eisenhower made it clear that "any invasion of Formosa would have to run over the Seventh Fleet".<sup>23</sup>

In Manila Dulles pondered over the possible Communist intention in shelling the offshore islands. He was very much influenced by the report of a British Labour Party member who had recently paid a visit to the Soviet Union and China and had interviewed leaders of both the countries.<sup>24</sup> The Labour member had gathered the impression that in spite of their mutual differences, the two countries had the same objective of driving a wedge in the Western camp. Dulles shared this perspective. He felt that the Communist plan had been put into operation by

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21 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years : Mandate for Change 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y., 1963), p. 461.

22 New York Times, 14 August 1954, p. 1.

23 Ibid., 18 August 1954, pp. 1, 10, 28.

24 Gerson, n. 12, pp. 199-200. The Labour member has not been identified.

launching an attack on the offshore islands. The attack, he believed, was not a prelude to invasion but it was a trap to get the United States militarily involved in the crisis. If the United States did get involved then the Soviet Union would take the matter to the United Nations and try to get the United States branded as an aggressor. In such a situation, the Soviet Union was confident, Dulles thought, that Britain and France would not support the United States and the latter without support from its allies would have to withdraw from Asia and Europe paving the way for a Communist Chinese takeover of Taiwan and Soviet domination of Europe and other areas.<sup>25</sup> It was quite a fanciful scenario, which was dependent on so many contingencies.

Dulles was, however, determined to take a firm stand against the Communists. On 9 September he paid a visit to Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. There he said unequivocally that the United States stood firmly behind the country in its defence against the Communist attack.<sup>26</sup> Before his departure for Washington he discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of a mutual defence pact.

The assessment of the crisis in Britain was different. Both the Conservatives who were in power and the Labour Party which was in opposition firmly held the view that the decision to defend the islands could pave the way for ironing out the differences between the two Communist countries. It would enlarge the conflict. They suggested that the islands should be given to the Chinese on the mainland in an exchange for the

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25 Ibid.

26 New York Times, 10 September 1954, p. 1.

ceasefire. These differences persisted making any joint action improbable. The American policy makers tried to persuade the British. At the same time they pushed their policies as much as they could. Their perception of the Sino-Soviet relations was at this stage markedly different from that of the British.<sup>27</sup>

It is interesting to note here that Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Defence Secretary, informed the President that there was no consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of the defence of the offshore islands. Although many believed that the defence of these islands was not essential, nevertheless the majority believed that the fall of the islands to communism would have disastrous psychological effect on Formosa. General Ridgway, who did not concur with the majority view, held that it was not the business of the Joint Chiefs to meddle with the psychological and political aspects of the issue and that militarily it was not advisable to commit American forces for the defence of the offshore islands. On two points, however, there was agreement among the Joint Chiefs, viz., (1) for the defence of Formosa the islands were not militarily essential and, (2) the Chinese Nationalists could not defend them without American assistance.<sup>28</sup> Replying to views expressed by Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Navy, and General Nallian Twining, Chief of Air Force, that the United States should defend the islands and

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27 Britain had from the beginning held different views from those of the United States. Even during the Truman-Attlee meeting in December 1950 this was clearly revealed. See Chapter IV.

28 See Eisenhower, n. 21, p. 463.



bomb the mainland, Eisenhower cautioned: "We're not talking now about a limited, brush-fire war. We're talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If we attack China, we are not going to impose limits on our military action, as in Korea."<sup>29</sup>

The President made it clear to his advisers that "if we get into a general war, the logical enemy will be Russia, not China, and will have to strike there"<sup>30</sup>.

Eventually, the President accepted Dulles' strategy after their meeting on 12 September 1954 at Denver (Colorado). Dulles realized the complexity of the situation. While an American indifference could be disastrous to American interests in the Far East, an American intervention could involve the United States in a war with the People's Republic of China. When it came to decisive action, Eisenhower and Dulles were both very cautious men and took recourse to safe devices rather than launching adventurous actions. Keeping in line with this policy Dulles thought of taking recourse to a UN mediation. He suggested that:

We should take the offshore-islands question to the United Nations Security Council with the view of getting there an injunction to maintain the status quo and institute a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. Whether Russia vetoes or accepts such a plan the United States will gain. 31

On 29 September, while attending the nine-power conference in London regarding the question of Germany, Dulles broached the idea of a UN mediation to Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister

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29 Ibid., p. 464. See also Stebbins, n. 4, pp. 264-6; Gerson, n. 12, pp. 200-1.

30 Eisenhower, n. 21, p. 464.

31 Ibid.

of Britain, and Thomas Clifton Webb, the High Commissioner of New Zealand. It was decided that New Zealand would table such a proposal in the Security Council. The possibility of a UN mediation, however, made Chiang apprehensive of the fact that it might lead to a reopening of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations and might upset the status quo. To <sup>a</sup>ally the fear of Chiang, Dulles affirmed on 14 October that "the United States would never agree to submit to the United Nations the question of Chiang's right to rule Formosa"<sup>32</sup>. On the following day Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, was despatched to Taiwan to conduct further negotiations on the proposed mutual defence pact.

In November, the Quemoy crisis took a more serious turn. On 23 November, the Peking Radio broadcast the news of imprisonment of thirteen Americans by the Chinese Government for their alleged spying. Senator Knowland strongly criticized the action and urged the Administration to blockade the Chinese coast to force the release of American prisoners. Eisenhower did not approve of the idea. He was supported not only by the Republican leaders, save Knowland, but also by some important Democratic Senators such as Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, John J. Sparkman of Alabama, and J. William Fulbright of Arkansas.<sup>33</sup>

One outcome of the Quemoy crisis was that the United States speeded up security arrangements with Taiwan. The negotiations on the conclusion of a US-Taiwan defence treaty which had been going on ever since the beginning of the Quemoy

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32 Ibid., pp. 464-5.

33 Ibid. pp. 465-6.

crisis culminated in November 1954. On 1 December, at a Press conference, Dulles declared that the treaty had been concluded. The following day it was formally signed by Dulles and George K.C. Yeh, the Foreign Minister of Taiwan. It is to be noted that the treaty excluded from its purview the offshore islands. On 20 December, when Yeh tried to extract from Washington "logistic support" for the defence of these islands, President Eisenhower categorically said that it would be "a mistake to expand the treaty at this time". It may further be noted that according to the treaty recourse to force was a matter of joint agreement. By implication it meant that the decision to join a war in defence of Taiwan was reserved by the United States, for Taiwan alone could not take action, but the United States could, by forcing Taiwan to agree.<sup>34</sup>

In January 1955 when islands such as Ichiangs and Tachens fell to the Communists the Eisenhower Administration discounted them as militarily unimportant. Dulles said that their "relationship to the defence of Formosa was at the best marginal".<sup>35</sup> He, presumably, was determined to defend Taiwan but not the offshore islands. When the Chinese Government on the mainland continued to proclaim their intention of liberating Taiwan, Dulles thought of modifications in American policy. He said:

... we should assist in the evacuation of the Tachens, but as we do so we should declare that we will assist in holding Quemoy and possibly the Matsu, as long as the Chinese Communists profess their intention to attack Formosa. 36

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34 Ibid.

35 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, 31 January 1955, p. 192.

36 Eisenhower, n. 21, p. 467. Emphasis added.

The President endorsed the Secretary's views. Eisenhower records in his memoirs that he was determined not to repeat the error of the Korean War. He wanted to make it clear to the Chinese as well as to America's own allies that America was committed to the defence of Taiwan.

On 24 January, Eisenhower in a message to the Congress said that "in unfriendly hands" Formosa and Pescadores would pose threat to the American security in the Pacific. He sought authority from the Congress to defend the islands. The Congress responded favourably. In the Senate, Walter F. George (Dem., Ga.) and in the House James P. Richards (Dem., S.C.) introduced two identical resolutions (S.J. Res. 28 and H.J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to take action in defence of Formosa and Pescadores. The resolutions were easily passed in both the Houses. This was the first of such Congressional resolutions endorsing Presidential action in advance.

During the discussion on the bill in the Congress the question of the existing Sino-Soviet relations figured significantly. There was almost no disagreement that there was a close relationship between the Soviet Union and China. Even those who opposed the resolution did so on the ground that since the Soviet Union was closely aligned to China, this "blank check" to President to use American armed forces for the security of the offshore islands would be full of risks as it might lead to a global war. Congressman Timothy P. Sheehan (Rep., Ill.) pleaded

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37 Ibid. See also The Nation (New York), vol. 180, 29 January 1955, p. 91.

38 See New York Times, 25 January 1955, p. 1; 26 January 1955, p. 1; 29 January 1955, p. 1.

that the United States should be realistic and make it clear to the Soviet Union that "any warlike movements on the part of her satellites will cause us to retaliate against Moscow and the rest of Russia".<sup>39</sup> He added:

Communist dominated China ... reflects the views and policies of the men in the Kremlin, and if we are to face the issues squarely, we should let the Russian rulers know that we consider them our enemy and that we will retaliate against the roots of the cancer.... We should hold to the long-accepted legal theory that a principal is responsible for the acts of its agent, and in this case Communist China, as an agent for Russia, should be held only secondarily responsible; and we should proclaim to the world that it is Russia who is seeking the downfall of religion and capitalism throughout the world and the satellite wars are but part and parcel of the Russian plan of world domination. 40

The Congressmen who supported the resolution like John W. McCormack (Dem., Mass.), Winston L. Prouty (Rep., Vt.) and others expressed the view that "Moscow and its Chinese Communist puppets" should know that the United States was prepared for a showdown if the situation so demanded. McCormack said that it should be shown to the Kremlin and Peking that when American security would be threatened the United States would fight unitedly. It was immaterial whether it was ruled by the Democrats or the Republicans.<sup>41</sup>

In the Senate also, important Senators like William F. Knowland (Rep., Cal.), Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Rep., Iowa) and others strongly argued that the Soviet Union and China were

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39 Ibid., 26 January 1955, p. 1. Congressmen Graham Barden (De., N.C.) and Eugene D. Siler (Rep., Ky.) also opposed the resolution.

40 Congressional Record, 84, I, vol. 101 (1955), pp. 677-8.

41 Ibid., pp. 659-75.

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 closely aligned. Senators Russel B. Long (Dem., La.) and Wayne L. Morse (Rep., Oreg.) opposed the resolution on the ground that it would entail larger risk of war because China was aligned to the Soviet Union while it was doubtful that the allies of the United States were prepared to support the American stand. 43  
 Senator Long cautioned against this "go-it-alone policy". Senator Morse read into the Congressional Record an article by Stewart Alsop entitled "It Could Mean War" appearing in the Washington Post of 26 January 1955. Alsop said that the proposed resolution would lead to bombing the Chinese mainland which meant war with China and then with China's ally, the Soviet Union. 44

In its report to the Senate, the joint committee of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee expressed its apprehension that in case of a war, China might invoke the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. Therefore the report conceded that the American decision to defend Quemoy was a "calculated risk" and said:

In the first place it is not the intention of the United States to take aggressive action against any country. In the second place, the language of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty is open to widely different interpretations. The executive branch indicated to the joint committee that it very much doubts whether the terms of the treaty would be invoked even if further difficulties should arise between the United States and Communist China. 45

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42 Ibid., pp. 750-6, 760.

43 Ibid., p. 735.

44 Ibid., p. 743.

45 U.S. Congress, 84, I, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Report on Authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp. 7-8.

The joint committee's proceedings were in executive session. Thus there is no hard evidence available on which inference can be based. However, the language of the brief summary of the committee's point of view does suggest some difference in the assessment of the situation by the two branches of the American Government. The committee was of the view that China could, if it so chose, widen the conflict by seeking Soviet intervention under the terms of 1850<sup>9</sup> treaty of friendship. And thus there was positively a risk of not only a Sino-US confrontation but also of Soviet involvement. The Administration, however, doubted if the treaty could be invoked (the treaty particularly discussed the contingency of aggression by Japan and its allies). In the event of a wider conflict, the Congress could always disown responsibility and pin it on the executive branch.

As had been arranged, the Quemoy crisis was brought up before the Security Council on 28 January by New Zealand representative, Sir Leslie K. Munro. Britain and the United States supported New Zealand. The USSR protested. According to the New York Times the State Department surrendered the initiative to the British in London and Moscow and carried the matter to the Security Council because it had no direct diplomatic channel of communications with China.<sup>46</sup>

The Administration's handling of the crisis aroused the opposition of conservative elements in the Congress. Senator John J. Sparkman (Dem., Alabama) saw in it an indication of a basic shift in America's China policy. He interpreted the

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46 New York Times, 29 January 1955, p. 3.

American acquiescence to the UN invitation to China to attend the Security Council meeting as the beginning of America's "two Chinas" policy. William F. Knowland, the Republican Senate Leader, along with some House members, protested against the move. Congressmen John M. Vorys (Rep., Ohio) and Alvin M. Bentley (Rep., Mich.) said that they doubted that the Chinese Communists would accept the offer to negotiate through the Security Council.<sup>47</sup> On 30 January, the Soviet delegate urged on the Security Council to consider the American aggression against the People's Republic of China and its islands. The following day both the proposals were tabled for discussion. The discussion was to start with the one by New Zealand. It was agreed that China should be called to participate. Accordingly China was invited.<sup>48</sup> On 3 February, replying to the invitation Chou En-lai agreed to participate provided (1) only the Russian proposal was discussed and, (2) Nationalist China was replaced by the Communist China in the United Nations.<sup>49</sup> On 14 February, the Security Council rejected the Soviet proposal and adjourned its consideration of the New Zealand item.<sup>50</sup> With this ended the prospect of peace in the Taiwan Strait through the UN mediation.

While Quemoy crisis was being discussed in the United Nations, significant changes took place in the Soviet leadership. On 8 February the Soviet Prime Minister, Georgi Malenkov, was replaced by Marshal Bulganin and Nikita S. Khrushchev became

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47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 1 February 1955, p. 1.

49 Ibid., 4 February 1955, p. 1.

50 Ibid., 15 February 1955, p. 1.



the Secretary of the CPSU wielding real power. On 12 February, in a Moscow Radio broadcast the Soviet Union proposed to co-sponsor an international conference on Formosa along with Britain and India. The People's Republic of China, the United States, France, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon were to be the other participants.<sup>51</sup> It is interesting to note that the announcement made it clear that although the Soviet Union fully supported China's claim to Formosa yet it did not endorse the Chinese Communist military activity in the region which entailed the possibility of provoking a world war.<sup>52</sup>

In mid-February the Quemoy crisis assumed serious proportions. The Chinese Communists intensified the bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu and Chiang Kai-shek issued provocative statements. On 14 February the anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship, Chiang Kai-shek expressed his desire to liberate the mainland. This provoked sharp British reaction. The British Government tried to persuade Washington to put pressure on Chiang to bargain a ceasefire with the Chinese in exchange of Quemoy and Matsu. Dulles, however, rejected the British proposal.<sup>53</sup>

On 16 February, in a major policy statement Dulles strongly upheld the US decision to defend Formosa which necessitated the defence of "coastal positions". What was probably more significant in the statement was Dulles' reference to the Soviet Union

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51 Ibid., 13 February 1955, p. 2.

52 See Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London, 1962), pp. 173-4.

53 New York Times, 14 February 1955, p. 3.

and his efforts presumably to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Communist China. In the context of the deposition of Malenkov, Dulles emphasized the "historic friendship" between Russia and America and said:

Undoubtedly, we see an elemental, personal struggle for power. But also one can perceive the outlines of a basic policy difference. There must be those who are primarily concerned with the welfare, security and greatness of the Soviet Union and its people. There are others who would have the Soviet Union and its power serve primarily as a tool of International Communism and as a means of achieving its world-wide ambitions. These two ends, the one symbolized by the State, the other by the Party, do not always coincide.

To us, the party and the State in Russia usually seem indistinguishable, because many individuals serve in dual capacities. But Lenin and Stalin constantly emphasized the distinction between the two. "The Party", said Stalin, "is not and cannot be identified with the State Power."

We should keep that distinction in mind. The time may come - I believe it will come - when Russians of stature will periodically put first their national security and the welfare of their people. They will be unwilling to have that security and that welfare subordinated to the world-wide ambitions of International Communism. If their point of view should prevail, then indeed there could be a basis for worthwhile negotiations and practical agreements between the United States and the new Russia. Then there might be reactivated the historic friendship between our countries and our people. 54

Dulles probably implied that the Soviet Union might care more for its own national interest than for pulling the Chinese chestnuts out of the fire. Truman, Acheson and Rusk had previously attempted to drive a wedge in the Sino-Soviet camp by provoking the Chinese nationalist sentiment, but now Dulles was trying to do the same thing by invoking the Russian

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54 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, 28 February 1955, pp. 328-9.

nationalist sentiments. Commenting on Dulles' statement the New York Times' columnist Harry Schwartz wrote that "judging by his spector,... Dulles believes that 'Russians of stature' in Moscow are troubled by such questions" as policy towards Taiwan, question of leadership of the Communist world and so on. The columnist, however, felt that "the obverse of this, of course, is the possibility that Peiping may fear a Moscow betrayal when Moscow's goals conflict most directly with Communist China's"<sup>55</sup>. Similar views were expressed by another commentator who said that Dulles was hoping that a new leadership would emerge in Russia "whose objectives will not be so far apart from those of the United States as to preclude useful negotiations"<sup>56</sup>.

According to Sherman Adams, the Chief of the White House Staff and Assistant to the President, Dulles understood that Sino-American confrontation should not be pushed to the point where the Soviet Union would be left with no choice except to come to the rescue of its ally. He also realized that a Sino-American war could put Western alliance system under an intense pressure and could create an unbreachable rift. Dulles did not share Eisenhower's trust in the US allies. He feared that the Soviet Union might itself be interested in pushing China into a war with the United States by provoking it to attack Formosa. This then might call for an atomic response, providing opportunity of propaganda against the United States. Dulles, according to Adams, was determined not to enter into this trap and wanted to

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55 New York Times, 20 February 1955, p. IV:3.

56 Vera Micheles Dean, "What Are Russia's National Interest?", Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York), vol. 34, 15 March 1955, p. 103.

avoid an all-out war. Although Sherman Adams does not state it specifically, Dulles could push the United States to the brink to see how much ground the Chinese would concede.<sup>57</sup>

Eisenhower also held identical views. He thought it was unlikely for the Soviet Union to intervene in the crisis. But if the United States pushed a forward policy, it would not have the support of England and would result in the estrangement of the latter from the United States. Such a situation would help China.<sup>58</sup> The President argued that if the United States wanted to avoid Soviet intervention in the crisis, it must make its stand absolutely clear so that there could be no possibility of misunderstanding the American moves. In his letter to Prime Minister Churchill of 10 February 1955, Eisenhower suggested that the Nationalist Chinese "must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands".<sup>59</sup> He disagreed with Churchill on the question of complete withdrawal from the offshore islands and in his letter of 19 February he again wrote that such a policy would amount to appeasement and would eventually lead to a situation which would be "worse than a Munich".<sup>60</sup>

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57 Sherman Adams, First-Hand Report (New York, 1961), pp. 131-3.

58 Eisenhower, n. 21, pp. 470-1. It can be noted here that the 12 October 1954 Sino-Soviet declaration on foreign policy did not at all mention about "the liberation of Taiwan". It only talked about the Sino-Soviet co-operation as a "reliable guarantee for peace and security on the Far East". See Peter V. Curl, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations : 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 323-6.

59 Eisenhower, n. 21, pp. 470-1.

60 Ibid., pp. 472-3.

The Anglo-American differences persisted. Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, thought that when he would meet Dulles in Bangkok next week of February he would press British proposals for Formosa's withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu. Eden asserted that "the more you attack the Chinese, the more they will look to their only friends, Russia". But the United States was committed to the defence of the Nationalist China.<sup>61</sup> The Dulles-Eden meeting on 23 February in Bangkok consequently did not bear any fruit. On 6 March Eden reiterated the old British stand that the Nationalist Chinese should exchange Quemoy and Matsu for a ceasefire. He felt that only then negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the political issues could be undertaken. To the United States this was "more wishful than realistic, in the light of our past experience".<sup>62</sup>

The Quemoy crisis triggered off a serious debate in the Congress. Senator Barry Goldwater (Rep., Ariz.) criticized the American soft line policy towards China and attributed the crisis to Truman's failure to face the Communists boldly in Korea.<sup>63</sup> Senator Knowland emphasized that by putting up a bold stand only the United States could retain its prestige.<sup>64</sup> Democratic Senators, however, blamed the Eisenhower Administration for the situation. Senator Hubert Humphrey (Dem., Minn.) argued that the reduction of the US armed strength in the Far East after the Korean truce had caused the American weakness in that area.

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61 New York Times, 20 February 1955, p. 1.

62 Eisenhower, n. 21, p. 475.

63 Congressional Record, 84, I, vol. 101 (1955), p. 1085.

64 Ibid., pp. 1155-6, 1170, A3299.

He viewed the Communist problem in its global context and said: "Red China is like a substation compared with the master powerhouse of the Kremlin.... The center of Communist power is in the Kremlin, and we had better keep our eyes not only on Charley McCarthy in this instance, but on Edgar Bergen." He cautioned against the possibility of getting embroiled in a war against China because that would deplete the American material and human resources.<sup>65</sup>

The Eisenhower Administration could not take a definite stand with regard to the defence of Quemoy and Matsu. The situation became all the more critical for Washington when in March Dulles reported to the President about his Asian trip and expressed doubts as to "how loyal would Chiang's troops be if attacked".<sup>66</sup> He, therefore, reserved for the United States the decision whether to defend or not to defend Quemoy and Matsu. This was evident from Dulles' statements in March 1955. He said that a decision had been taken "to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. However, the law permits a defense which will be flexible and not necessarily confined to a static defense of Formosa and the Pescadores themselves."<sup>67</sup> In another statement he said:

... the issue is, would an attack on Quemoy, Matsu, perhaps elsewhere, be part of an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores? If so, then both under the treaty and under the law the President would presumably react with U.S. force.

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65 Ibid., p. 1155.

66 Eisenhower, n. 21, pp. 476-7.

67 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, 21 March 1955, p. 463.

If the President judges that the attack is not related to an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, then neither the treaty nor the law gives him authority to act.... 68

Dulles continued his efforts to drive a wedge in the Communist camp by eulogising the Soviet good sense in contrast to Chinese "fanaticism". Speaking before the Advertising Club of New York on 21 March, Dulles said that unlike the Soviet Communists the Chinese were engaged in "aggressive fanaticism" like Hitler. He added that in spite of the fact that both the Soviet Union and China had "same ideological motivation" yet their manifestations were different. Comparing the present Chinese tactics with those of the Soviet Union immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, Dulles said:

The temperament of the Chinese Communists is different and while, in the long run, the Soviet method may prove more formidable, yet, in the short run, the Chinese Communist method may prove more dangerous and provocative of war. 69

Commenting on the Dulles' speech, the New York Times columnist Harry Schwartz wrote that it seemed the Secretary had changed his technique. Previously he was directing his effort to make Mao the Asian Tito but now he was trying to take Soviet Union away from China. However, according to Schwartz, the developments in the Far East were being interpreted differently. The high diplomatic sources in Europe suggested that "behind the scenes Moscow is actually egging Peking on, happy to increase tension which ties up both large American and Communist forces". Schwartz

68 Ibid., 28 March 1955, p. 527. See also Eisenhower, n. 21, p. 480.

69 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, 4 April 1955, p. 562.

felt that to think of Sino-Soviet rift was merely wishful thinking, at least for the time being. He said that it must be noted that it was "as long ago as 1923 Lenin declared that the struggle for the world 'will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, and China, etc. constitute the overwhelming population of the globe'". Schwartz felt that at present the Soviet industrial development and Chinese man-power were complementary to each other and this combination represented a force more powerful than Nazi Germany. He, however, felt that each would have to accommodate the other's views. The perspectives of Moscow and Peking were different. Europe-oriented Soviet Union found the situation in Europe more or less stabilized. Such was not the case of Asia where China was aspirant for the hegemony. This assessment of the situation might have, Schwartz wrote, motivated Dulles to lure the Soviet Union out of China's friendship.

The newspapers and journals carried articles on Sino-Soviet relations which were based on the presumption of conflict of interest between the two. The presumption itself was very often based on subjective leanings of the individual rather than on objective evidence of Sino-Soviet rift. An article in Foreign Policy Bulletin in June 1954 contended that the Soviet Union could not be very serious in espousing the cause of admission of China into the United Nations. It argued that it would be much more in the interest of the Soviet Union if China remained out of the United Nations. In that case the Soviet Union would

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70 Harry Schwartz, "Moscow and Peking : Can West Drive a Wedge?", New York Times, 27 March 1955, p. IV:3.



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be the "agent and attorney" of China in the United Nations. Vera Micheles Dean, an authority on Soviet affairs, commenting on the Sino-Soviet accord of 12 October 1954, wrote that there had already been indications that Mao Tse-tung intended to have China treated as an equal of Russia. The question according to her was whether Mao would act independently if he thought it in China's national interest.<sup>72</sup>

Some writers were of the view that the United States must recognize China promptly in order to make it independent of the Soviet influence. In an editorial, a powerful liberal weekly of the United States, The Nation, argued that "America will have to recognize China". The Nation went on to ridicule the hardline policy pushed so vigorously by Senator Knowland. In fact The Nation endorsed the opinion advocated by Business Week and St. Louis Post-Dispatch.<sup>73</sup>

The New York Times, through its cartoons and articles, highlighted the theme of Sino-Soviet differences and from time to time advised the government to review its policy towards

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- 71 John Cowles, "The United States and Asia", Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York), vol. 33, 15 June 1954, p. 2.
- 72 Vera Micheles Dean, "Peiping Moves to Stage Center", Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York), vol. 34, 15 November 1954, pp. 38-39. According to the terms of the Sino-Soviet accord of 12 October 1954 the friendly relations between the two countries "will be the basis of their continued close cooperation in accordance with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and respect for one another's national sovereignty and territorial integrity". See Curl, n. 55, p. 325.
- 73 The Nation (New York), vol. 179, 14 August 1954, pp. 121-2; 11 September 1954, p. 204; 23 October 1954, p. 356.

communism in the light of the changing situation. For instance, on 16 January 1955, there appeared two cartoons in the New York Times. The first showed Mao Tse-tung sitting on Malenkov's lap and looking very uncomfortable. In the second, he was shown sitting on a chair by the side of Malenkov and grinning.<sup>74</sup> The same day, Harry Schwartz in an article wrote that it was evident from the speeches of different Kremlin leaders that there were differences among them on major policy issues. One among them, according to Schwartz, was the issue of China. Should the Soviet Union go all out to support Peking's objective of capturing Taiwan? This was a major point of difference between the two for it was understood that such a step would lead to a wider conflict. Schwartz had serious doubts about Khrushchev's commitment to the annexation of Taiwan to the mainland. According to him, in October 1954, immediately following Khrushchev's pledge in Peking for full support to China on Taiwan issue, the Russian censor made it clear to an American correspondent that Khrushchev had pledged the support of the "Soviet people" and that this did not mean the support of the Soviet Government.<sup>75</sup>

A month later, Schwartz again wrote on the theme of Sino-Soviet relationship. He said that although there was conflict of interest between the two powers, yet in the short run the advantages of staying together far outweighed those of pursuing independent policies.<sup>76</sup>

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74 New York Times, 16 January 1955, p. IV:2.

75 Ibid., p. IV:5.

76 Ibid., 20 February 1955, p. IV:3.

The issue of Sino-Soviet relationship drew the attention of other columnists also. Writing in the New York Times of 21 March 1955 about Chiang Kai-shek, C.L. Sulzberger, the foreign policy columnist of the New York Times, viewed that according to the Generalissimo the Soviet Union and China had identical ambitions in Asia, i.e., the expansion of communism. He, however, felt that in the end the Kremlin would be the master because China itself was part of the Soviet sphere of influence.<sup>77</sup>

The U.S. News and World Report also wrote that the Soviet Union was making use of China's bellicosity for its own interests. Its editor, David Lawrence, jibed at America's inactivity in controlling the growth of communism and branded Dulles' "massive retaliation" as "passive retaliation".<sup>78</sup> He went to the extent of asking for the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the United Nations for it had aided Red China and North Korea in their war against the United Nations.<sup>79</sup> Referring to the speech of Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in Peking on 30 September 1954 the U.S. News and World Report observed that it was "a clear sign of Russian prodding behind

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77 Ibid., 21 March 1955, p. 24. Writing in The Nation, Edmund Clubb, an old China hand, cautioned against any forward step in Quemoy which might lead to a world war. See O. Edmund Clubb, "Quemoy - or Asia? : The Choice is Ours", The Nation (New York), vol. 180, 16 April 1955, pp. 321-3.

78 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 37, 10 December 1954, p. 160.

79 Ibid., vol. 38, 25 February 1955, p. 140.

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the challenge issued now by Red China's Premier".

Many of the columns and editorials in the newspapers and periodicals were based on the assumption that there was a basic conflict of interest between the two Powers. They had very flimsy evidence to prove their case. Nor could they say with a reasonable amount of certainty as to what course of action the Soviet Union would take in case of an outbreak of hostilities.

The State Department faced the same dilemma. It had no hard evidence to base its policy. It admitted as much in an unambiguous language. On 30 March 1955, Dulles told Congressmen in a White House meeting that "the United States had no means of knowing how much the Russians supported the aggressive tactics of the Chinese". He, however, expressed the belief that an escalation of the war to the extent of a US involvement would require "the Russians to increase immensely their deliveries of military equipment to their Chinese allies".

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Unexpectedly, Americans were provided relief from tension and from this uncomfortable uncertainty. The tension in the Formosa Straits started lessening during the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955. On 23 April, Chou En-lai declared in the conference that China had no intention to have a war with the United States and that it was willing to settle international disputes through peaceful means. He urged on the assembled delegates to help in the relaxation of international

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80 Ibid., vol. 38, 4 February 1955, p. 63; vol. 38, 18 February 1955, pp. 70-74. See also Henry Shapiro, "Has Russia Changed Since Stalin? - Policy Abroad", Foreign Policy Bulletin (New York), vol. 34, 1 March 1955, pp. 93-95.

81 Eisenhower, n. 21, pp. 479-80.

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tension. The United States reciprocated the Chinese gesture and on the same day Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary of State welcomed "any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world". He went on to indicate that what he meant by Chinese sincerity was an immediate ceasefire, release of American prisoners and the acceptance of the invitation by the Security Council for participation in the deliberations to end the state of war in the Formosa region.

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In his Press conference of 26 April, Dulles welcomed direct talks with China. However, he attached a pre-condition by stating that China should agree to a ceasefire by a public pronouncement. Answering a question whether he had marked that the Chinese had proposed bilateral negotiations with the United States relating to the possibilities of a ceasefire while the Soviet Union not long ago had proposed a ten-power conference to discuss the same matter, Dulles agreed that there was some significance to it. He was of the opinion that there was basic coordination of policies of the two powers. The party discipline in both the countries reinforced this coordination. But in respect of the enforcement of the agreed principles the Chinese exercised much more freedom, certainly more than that enjoyed by the satellite countries of Europe. He said that he had a feeling that in the Formosan area the Chinese Communists exercised "a measure of independence". The statement clearly sets out the Dullesian view that China was not in the same category as the countries of Eastern Europe. But

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82 New York Times, 24 April 1955, p. 1.

83 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, 2 May 1955, p. 738.

it is not clear that he had reached the conclusion that an intense  
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 conflict was in the making.

In May, Dulles went to Vienna to attend the Big Three Foreign Ministers Conference in connection with the Austrian State Treaty. There Dulles talked to the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov about the Quemoy crisis which resulted in the establishment of a channel of communication at each nation's capital through diplomatic representatives. Dulles hoped that the Soviet Union would exert pressure on China to persuade the latter to a ceasefire. Reporting to the President about his talks with Molotov Dulles said:

I talked alone with Molotov about the China situation. He said it was very complicated. I referred to the menacing build-up of airpower and said he must know about it because it was being done with Soviet equipment. Molotov said this was purely a Chinese internal affair. I said we were exerting influence on the Chinese Nationalists and they should exert a comparable influence on the Chinese Communists. I said that we need a situation where as in Germany, Korea and Vietnam, it was agreed that unification would not be sought by force. Molotov said they wanted peace. He suggested a five-power conference. I said a six-power conference would be better. He said the Chinese Communists would not meet with the Nationalists. I said we would not meet with the Communists without the Nationalists. I urged him to think about a way of solution, and he said he would do so. I said to communicate with us either through our ambassador at Moscow or their ambassador at Washington.

I do not feel that much concrete progress was made, but I think that the Soviet may as a result of our talk put increasing pressure upon the Chinese Communists to avoid war. 85

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84 Ibid., vol. 32, 9 May 1955, pp. 755-9.

85 Eisenhower, n. 21, p. 482.

The long communication from the Secretary of State to the President shows that the Soviet Union could, if it wanted to, restrain the Chinese in the same manner as the Americans did the Nationalists. This way the crisis in the Far East could be contained. On the basis of developments elsewhere, Dulles was hopeful that the Soviet Union might be interested in doing so. He was coming to believe that the Soviet Union was reducing its commitment to international communism. His conversations with Molotov encouraged him to feel that the Soviet Union might agree even to the abolition of Cominform. At this stage he expected it to accept Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" programme and an agreement for the cessation of propaganda against each other.<sup>86</sup>

Following the Bandung Conference Quemoy crisis gradually faded. On 16 May, Chou En-lai said that "the Chinese people were willing to strive for the liberation of Formosa by peaceful means as far as this is possible".<sup>87</sup> On 22 May, the New York Times reported that there was practically a ceasefire in the Formosa Strait and the Chinese MiGs and warships had ceased operation.<sup>88</sup> On 30 May, the Chinese agreed to release four American prisoners and with this the Sino-American tension started decreasing.<sup>89</sup> Tension subsided but the American anxiety of the Communist threat persisted. On 10 June 1955, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe told the Senate Armed Services Committee that although

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86 Gerson, n. 12, p. 231.

87 New York Times, 17 May 1955, p. 1.

88 Ibid., 22 May 1955, p. 1.

89 Ibid., 31 May 1955, p. 1.

there were occasional changes in the Communists' tactics, "the ultimate objective of its leader is a Communist world dominated by the Kremlin and controlled from Moscow". He said that Communist China was likely to continue "vigorous and cohesive", and the Red Chinese-Soviet alliance "probably will remain strong for the next few years, not only for ideological reasons, but also because it furthers the purposes of both parties"<sup>90</sup>. This was the traditional conservative wisdom in which people like Radford sincerely believed.

On 28 June, Dulles reiterated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with China but reminded that this would not amount to a diplomatic recognition of China.<sup>91</sup>

On 11 July, the United States proposed that the Sino-American talks should be raised from the consular level to the ambassadorial level.<sup>92</sup> During the Big Four meeting at Geneva from 13-23 May, Quemoy crisis was informally discussed as it was beyond the purview of formal talks which were to relate to Europe only. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, who had dined with the Russian leaders and talked to them about the Far Eastern crisis, told the House of Commons on his return: "Geneva has given this simple message to the whole world; it has reduced the danger of war."<sup>93</sup>

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90 Ibid., 11 June 1955, p. 2.

91 Ibid., 29 June 1955, pp. 1, 3.

92 Ever since the Geneva Conference of 1954 consular talks in Geneva had been going on between China and America on the question of release of Americans held in China.

93 Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London, 1960), pp. 309-11.



On 25 July, Washington and Peking announced in a joint  
 communique their agreement to hold ambassadorial talks in Geneva  
 from 1 August 1955.<sup>94</sup> The American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia  
 U. Alexis Johnson, and the Communist Chinese Ambassador to Poland  
 Wang Ping-nan started negotiations on the appointed day. The  
 next day, Dulles at his Press conference spoke again of the  
 Chinese fanaticism and said that Russians were less so. Answering  
 a question whether better relationship could be possible with China  
 as it had been achieved with the Soviet Union, he said: "I pointed  
 out some time ago that the Chinese Communists seem to be much more  
 violent and fanatical, more addicted to the use of force than the  
 Russians are or have become."<sup>95</sup> A few days later, on 29 August  
 1955, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon called for wide mending of  
 ways on behalf of China before the United States could grant it a  
 UN seat.<sup>96</sup>

Despite the beginning of the Sino-American dialogue which  
 was to continue for long the American hostility to China showed  
 no signs of abatement, at least publicly. On the contrary, the  
 United States increasingly took the lines that, of the two  
 Communist powers China posed a more serious threat to peace because  
 the Soviet Union had mellowed whereas China had not.

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94 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 33, 8 August 1955,  
 p. 219.

95 Ibid., 15 August 1955, p. 262. David Lawrence editorially  
 criticized Dulles' policy. See U.S. News and World Report  
 (Washington, D.C.), vol. 39, 5 August 1955, p. 124; vol. 39,  
 19 August 1955, p. 156.

96 New York Times, 30 August 1955, p. 4. Also see Neal  
 Stanford, "Is Our China Policy Changing?", Foreign Policy  
Bulletin (New York), vol. 34, 1 September 1955, p. 187.

The ambassadorial talks, however, succeeded in cooling off the crisis and on 10 September the negotiating parties agreed on the repatriation of civilians, the first item on the agenda. The talks were, however, deadlocked because of the Chinese insistence on US withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from Taiwan Strait and the acceptance of Taiwan as a matter of Chinese internal affair. Nonetheless, the Quemoy crisis was solved for the time and an enduring channel of communication was established for direct talks between China and the United States.

#### GROWING AWARENESS OF SINO-SOVIET SCHISM

After Stalin's death, powers in the Kremlin had passed in the hands of a troika — Georgi M. Malenkov, the Prime Minister, Marshal Klement Y. Voroshilov, the Chairman of the Presidium, and Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Foreign Minister. But within a short period, in September 1953, power passed in the hands of Nikita S. Khrushchev. His policy towards the West represented a change from the past. It came to be based on the "peaceful coexistence", a name given to the policy later. It was manifested in the lessening of tension for the time being at least. As already noted many newspapers and foreign policy observers noted the Sino-Soviet schism which the new Soviet policy was bringing about. The Administration was unwilling to commit itself to the existence of Sino-Soviet rift. But even a hardliner like Dulles began to emphasize the differences between the policies of China and the Soviet Union. It was obvious that the United States was finding it much easier to deal with the Soviet Union than China. But it was not willing to predicate United States policy on the assumption of the rift.

The US policy makers continued to regard Western Europe as the most vital region from the point of view of their national interest. One of the biographers of John Foster Dulles felt that he was neither anti-British, nor anti-French, nor pro-German, "he was pro-European"<sup>97</sup>. Therefore, he was more concerned with the Soviet designs on Western Europe and watched with interest the steps that the new leadership of the Soviet Union took to ease the tension in the area.

In June 1955, the Kremlin extended an invitation to the West German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer to visit the Soviet Union in the coming autumn. The invitation came soon after the Federal German Republic had become a partner in the NATO in May 1955. It marked a definite change in the Soviet policy towards Western Europe.<sup>98</sup>

The invitation to West Germany was followed by a visit by Bulganin and Khrushchev to Tito's Yugoslavia from 26 May to 3 June 1955.<sup>99</sup> The Soviet Union again gave indication of its new policy when in June, Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, who had come to San Francisco to attend the UN General Assembly meeting, handed over a note to Dulles expressing the Soviet regret over an attack on an American naval plane on 22 June. The note also offered to pay half the damages.<sup>100</sup> In the Geneva Conference of July 1955, Khrushchev accepted Eden's invitation to visit England

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97 Gerson, n. 12, p. 303.

98 Goold-Adams, n. 52, p. 180.

99 Ibid., p. 181.

100 Ibid., p. 185.

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 following spring. Dulles must have watched these Soviet  
 diplomatic manoeuvres with great deal of interest.

#### THE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which met in February 1956 was one of the most significant events in the history of International Communist movement. The high watermark of the Congress was Khrushchev's acerbic speech of 25 February 1956 denouncing Stalinism. While criticizing Stalin Khrushchev did not spare his "adventurism" in foreign policy. "During Stalin's leadership", he said, "our peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened, because one-man 102 decisions could cause, and often did cause, great complications." In the speech Khrushchev fervently argued for preventing war and emphasized Soviet willingness to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist camp. He said:

When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the two systems - the capitalist and the socialist systems - this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries.... We believe that countries with differing social systems can do more than exist side by side. It is necessary to proceed further, to improve relations, strengthen confidence between countries and cooperate. 103

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101 Ibid., p. 194.

102 Quoted in Bertram D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost: Text, Background and Meaning of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of February 24-25, 1956 (New York, 1957), p. 236.

103 G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, documented and analysed, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (London, 1961), pp. 42-43.

Khrushchev's speech in the 20th party Congress of the CPSU became a matter of controversy between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese leaders alleged that Khrushchev did not give any prior information to the other Communist parties about the content of the speech, particularly the de-Stalinization aspect of it. Moreover, they did not approve the way Stalin's image had been tarnished. They conceded that serious mistakes had been committed by Stalin but that necessarily did not wipe out all his contributions in industrialization and collectivization of the Soviet Union as a dedicated Marxist-Leninist. Probably, they feared that Khrushchev's attack on "the personality cult" might have its repercussions in China and affect Mao's own position which was in many respects "comparable to Stalin". According to the Chinese leadership, Stalin's contributions to the cause of communism far outweighed his personal shortcomings.<sup>104</sup>

The Chinese Communists also differed with the Soviet Union on the policy to be followed towards the new independent or likely-to-be-independent countries. Both agreed on the basic question that the national liberation movements in these countries should be helped. They, however, differed as to how this was to be done. According to the Soviet Union the changes in the strategic balance, the economic achievements of the Soviet Union and the economic assistance provided by it to the Third World countries, and the possibility of deterring armed intervention of the imperialists made the peaceful transition possible. Furthermore, the danger of nuclear war made it

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104 Geoffrey Hudson, "Russia and China", Survey (London), no. 42, June 1962, p. 42.

desirable. The Chinese on the other hand found the concept of peaceful transformation misleading. They believed that the concept of peaceful transition worked to the advantage of the imperialist powers. The Chinese blamed Moscow for overestimating the imperialist strength and of having little confidence in socialism.<sup>105</sup> The Soviet Union did not accept the Chinese allegation of undermining the national liberation movements and "substituting peaceful coexistence between Socialism and imperialism for the revolutionary struggle of all oppressed peoples and nations and 'subjectivism' in defining the basic contradictions of the modern world."<sup>106</sup>

Khrushchev's statement at the Twentieth Party Congress and the Chinese response to it created considerable confusion in the highest echelons of American policy making. What was the real meaning of the ideological differences on the role and significance of Stalin in the international Communist movement? Were the Chinese by openly exhibiting their disagreements showing their independence from the Soviet Union or despite it they still were subservient to the Kremlin?

On 13 April 1956, Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, speaking before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council doubted the subservience of the Communist countries to the Soviet Union. He pointed to the fact that the

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105 Philip E. Mosely, "The Chinese-Soviet Rift : Origins and Portents", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 42, October 1963, pp. 16-17.

106 I.T. Nazarenko, "Socialism and National Liberation Movement", International Affairs (Moscow), August 1963, pp. 39-40.

Chinese had taken several weeks to publish their acceptance of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.<sup>107</sup> In another speech on 21 June at San Francisco Dulles referred to a statement made by Mao Tse-tung after Stalin's death in which Mao had said: "We rallied around him, ceaselessly asked his advice, and constantly drew ideological strength from his works." He then referred to the statement of the Chinese representative at the 20th Party Congress alluding to "the firmness and invincibility of the Soviet Communist Party created by Lenin and reared by Stalin". Dulles felt that these statements clearly indicated that Russian and Chinese ideological lines were diverging. The inference which he drew from this was that while the Soviet Union was making efforts to change its ways the Chinese were seeking "to extend its system in Asia".<sup>108</sup> A few days later in a Press conference, he again referred to the disagreement of the other Communist countries over the question of de-Stalinization. He concluded that after the death of Stalin the control of the Soviet Communist Party over other Communist parties had weakened.<sup>109</sup> He said: "International communism is in a state of perplexity and at internal odds because certain basic truths have caught up with it."<sup>110</sup>

The discussion on the meaning of de-Stalinization continued. In March 1956 in a document on the basic national security policy, the National Security Council mentioned, as it had done several

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- 107 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 34, 7 May 1956, p. 762.  
 108 Ibid., vol. 35, 2 July 1956, p. 5.  
 109 Ibid., vol. 35, 9 July 1956, pp. 49, 52.  
 110 New York Times, 28 June 1956, p. 1.

times in the past, the possibility of "exploiting differences between ... [Communist] regimes to disrupt the structure of the Soviet-Communist bloc". But since the NSC was preoccupied primarily with the danger arising out of a growing Soviet nuclear potentiality it did not attach too much importance to the question of Sino-Soviet differences. Moreover, as it understood that it was not possible to check the development of Soviet nuclear capability it suggested that the United States encourage <sup>111</sup> disarmament and other persuasive methods.

While replying to a question at a Press Conference in July 1956, Dulles asserted that there was no sufficient evidence on the basis of which one could form opinion on the effect of de-Stalinization on other Communist parties. He pointed out that although the first reactions of the Communist parties were those of acceptance yet they seemed "to be tentative rather than <sup>112</sup> definitive". For a change in policy this certainly could not have constituted a strong premise. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, was a little more emphatic in stating the same point of view. In a speech made on 3 August 1956, he emphasized that de-Stalinization must not be understood with the renunciation of communism. He referred to a statement of Khrushchev of 17 September 1955 when the latter had said: "Any one who mistakes our smiles for withdrawal from the teachings of Karl Marx and Lenin is making a mistake. Those who expect this will have to wait until Easter Monday falls on

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111 Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5602/1, Pentagon Papers, n. 6, Book 10 of 12, pp. 1055-6.

112 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 35, 23 July 1956, p. 145.



Tuesday." Robertson's emphasis was on the fact that adherence <sup>113</sup> to Marxism-Leninism was by itself a danger to the United States. The premise of Sino-Soviet solidarity on which the United States foreign policy had been based was thus coming under some strain. But it held firm.

The United States was aware that whatever might be the intensity of discord between the two Communist giants they posed a serious threat to American interests, jointly and separately. Therefore while there were discussions on the nature and impact of de-Stalinization the American spokesmen in different forums also warned against these threats. Dulles in a speech on 23 March 1956 pointed to the danger the Asian countries had been facing from both the Soviet Union and China who were trying to subjugate them by providing them with economic assistance. <sup>114</sup> Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 March 1956, the Secretary expressed his concern at the Chinese refusal of a "meaningful renunciation of the use of force". During the course of his testimony he referred to China as one of the Soviet Union's "satellite allies". <sup>115</sup> Other witnesses before the Committee pointed to the military-strategic threat the Sino-Soviet economic and technical assistance to the developing world posed and how it was a matter of grave concern for the United

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113 Ibid., vol. 35, 13 August 1956, p. 265.

114 Ibid., vol. 34, 2 April 1956, p. 540.

115 U.S. Congress, 84, II, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1956 (Washington, D.C., 1956), pp. 980-2.

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States.

The Soviet Union with its great military potential and nuclear capability was a global threat and China with its limited capabilities a regional threat, particularly in Southeast Asia. As both were Communist powers and openly professed their hostility to the United States the American policy continued to maintain an overall posture of hostility towards international communism. However, it had to respond to two significant developments. One was of course the Sino-Soviet schism but the other was undoubtedly the fact that the Soviet Union was willing to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. According to his biographer Gerson, Dulles felt that the trend towards more intellectual and economic freedom in the Soviet Union might lead to irresistible demands for the renunciation of communism. He, however, suspected that if the experiments failed, Khrushchev and Bulganin might then behave erratically in international sphere as a recourse to sustain themselves in power.<sup>117</sup> The various statements made by Dulles at this time leads one to the conclusion that despite the Sino-Soviet differences the Secretary of State was intent upon maintaining greater alertness and preparedness against the possibility of Communist aggression. For instance, speaking before the Philadelphia Bulletin Forum on 26 February 1956 Dulles emphasized the fact that despite their talks of peaceful

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116 See statements of Stephen P. Sorscy, Acting Regional Director, Office of Near East, South Asia and Africa Operations, International Cooperation Administration and John J. Murphy, Controller, International Cooperation Administration, on 23 April 1956 and 2 May 1956 respectively, in *ibid.*, pp. 555, 716.

117 Gerson, n. 12, p. 305.

coexistence it was doubtful that the Communist powers had given up their aggressive designs.<sup>118</sup>

The developing schism in the Sino-Soviet relations was also observed by the American Press. Although a few hardliners on communism like David Lawrence of the U.S. News and World Report continued to be critical of what they regarded as softness towards communism,<sup>119</sup> there were quite a few who took note of the increasing tension in Sino-Soviet relations and felt that the situation required a new approach. Harry Schwartz of the New York Times wrote that the recent Soviet offers of economic assistance to India, Egypt and other under-developed non-Communist countries could have its impact on the Sino-Soviet relations. This meant a cut in the Soviet aid for China. Schwartz wrote:

What is known of the history of Soviet-Chinese negotiations on economic aid suggests that there have been examples of hard bargaining in which Moscow has been anything but very openhanded. Even the trip of Nikita S. Khrushchev, Communist Party chief, and Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin, now Premier, to Peiping a year ago resulted in promises of Soviet economic aid amounting to only \$ 200,000,000 more than what Stalin had promised. 120

One writer thought that the "Soviet experiment" had caused "certain anxieties in Peking". He wrote: "If the concept of party infallibility declines, if the facade of monolithic unity

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118 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 34, 5 March 1956, pp. 363-4. See cartoon in U.S. News and World Report captioned: "Let's Be Friends Until We're Able to Dominate You". It showed a monstrous looking Khrushchev standing on the Kremlin and extending his hands of friendship to the West. U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 40, 16 March 1956, p. 23.

119 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 39, 16 September 1955, p. 150.

120 New York Times, 27 November 1955, p. 10.

in the Soviet Union is cracked, if what remains of the common ideology is still further corroded, this is bound to affect the Chinese movement.<sup>121</sup>"

Reports in the Press persistently highlighted the Sino-Soviet differences. When Tito visited Moscow in May-June 1956 the New York Times reported that a number of diplomats in Moscow regarded Tito's visit as a Soviet manoeuvre to build up Tito as the European counter-weight to Mao Tse-tung. The report argued that since after Stalin's death Mao was left as the only "ideological fountainhead" of international communism so Tito alone had "the record and the background to make a showing against Mao".<sup>122</sup> On the following day the paper suggested that had it not been for the hardness of the United States policy toward China, Peking might well have decided to break with Moscow as Belgrade did in 1948.<sup>123</sup> Harrison E. Salisbury reported that some of the Sovietologists were of the view that Stalin had used the Korean war as a device to force the Chinese into submission.<sup>124</sup> On 30 June 1956, the paper editorially endorsed Dulles' policy by saying: "Caution rather than excessive optimism is called for now."<sup>125</sup>

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121 Benjamin Schwartz, "Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations : Repercussions in China", New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 134, 11 June 1956, pp. 30-32.

122 New York Times, 3 June 1956, p. 3.

123 Ibid., 4 June 1956, pp. 1, 3.

124 Ibid., 6 June 1956, p. 5.

125 Ibid., 30 June 1956, p. 16. See also Editorial, The Nation (New York), vol. 183, 6 October 1956, p. 278.

The New York Times concluded that in spite of differences between the Kremlin and Peking they were still close and committed to the common goal of expansion of communism. On 30 December 1956 it editorially referred to the Chinese Communist statements supporting the Soviet action in Hungary and criticizing Tito and concluded:

This should have some impact upon the thinking of those who still preach the gospel of "don't be rude to Red China" on the ground that a "Chinese Tito" is in the offing. Obviously Peiping does not approve of Titos. Obviously it approves of massacres in Hungary. Even more obviously, it is still taking orders. 126

The next day, the New York Times reported that the wide display in Pravda of Chinese acquiescence to Soviet actions in Hungary that covered more than two of Pravda's six pages "was a measure<sup>127</sup> of the warm welcome the Chinese views received from the Kremlin".

#### SUBSERVIENCE TO "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM"

By the end of 1956, policy makers in the United States had come to realize the existence of the very serious differences between the Soviet Union and China. There was, however, no agreement as to their policy implications — to what extent these fundamental differences impaired their capacity to act jointly against the United States and its allies. As seen in the

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126 New York Times, 30 December 1956, p. IV:6.

127 Ibid., 31 December 1956, p. 4. For an interesting analysis of the mixed Chinese reaction to the speeches of Anastas Mikoyan and Nikita Khrushchev delivered at the Communist Congress in Peking in September 1956 see Mark Gayn, "10 Days that shook the World: The Counter Revolution", The Nation (New York), vol. 183, 10 November 1956, pp. 379-82.

previous section, a lack of agreement on this fundamental issue resulted in statements which were often not compatible with one another. If one official described China as a Soviet satellite other described it as an independent entity. China's inconsistent support for Soviet action further added to this confusion. It was therefore absolutely necessary that the United States discover some principle to make things more coherent for itself and explain the developments to its own citizens. One can see this explanatory principle emerging in Dulles' emphasis on the concept of international communism.

In his Annual Message to the Congress on 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower enunciated certain principles which later on came to be known as Eisenhower Doctrine. He promised economic and military aid to the nations in the Middle East and assured them of the American armed forces when requested. He said that such assistance would be made "to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."

Supporting the Eisenhower Doctrine before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 7 January 1957 Dulles said that it was his "definite belief" that without American economic and military assistance the Middle East would be "lost" to the Communists. He added that it would lead to economic and political disasters of the region and would be the greatest victory that the Soviet

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128 For the text of Eisenhower's message to Congress see U.S., Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States : Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957 (Washington, D.C., 1958), pp. 6-16.

Communists could ever have gained. If they could get into this area they would in effect get Western Europe without war. <sup>129</sup>

A few days later, on 14 January, Dulles made the point more clear. Replying to questions by Senators Humphrey, Fulbright and Russel during the joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, Dulles said that although the Administration did not have any plan to station American forces in the Middle East, but there was a great likelihood of such a thing if the Congress rejected Eisenhower Doctrine. <sup>130</sup> In his Press conference on 2 April 1957 Dulles showed his concern at the increasing cordiality between Egypt and the Soviet Union and drew attention to the fact that Egypt was the first Arab nation that recognized China when no other country had done so since the Korean war. <sup>131</sup>

At the third meeting of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Canberra from 11 to 13 March 1957 Dulles pointed to the "open support" of the Chinese to "Soviet colonialism and imperialism" in Eastern Europe. He ruled out any possibility of recognizing China under the existing conditions. <sup>132</sup> A

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129 New York Times, 8 January 1957, p. 12.

130 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36, 4 February 1957, pp. 170-4.

131 Ibid., vol. 36, 15 April 1957, p. 602.

132 Ibid., vol. 36, 1 April 1957, pp. 530, 536; New York Times, 13 March 1957, p. 1. Already several times Dulles had expressed similar feeling. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36, 7 January 1957, p. 7; 25 February 1957, p. 297; 11 March 1957, pp. 404-5; New York Times, 19 February 1957, p. 12 and 20 February 1957, p. 11.

National Intelligence estimate in May 1957 while referring to the support received by North Vietnam from the Communist countries spoke of the Bloc.<sup>133</sup>

On 23 April 1957, Dulles again reiterated his concept of international communism. According to him China was not a satellite in the sense the East European countries were, while the latter were dominated by the Soviet Union the Chinese Communists were, like the Soviet Union itself, dominated by international communism.<sup>134</sup> The implication was that even if there was a bitter Sino-Soviet rift it was immaterial because both were integral parts of an international Communist movement which was anti-American.

Dulles was deeply concerned with the "Sino-Soviet military threat". On 10 June 1957, he emphasized this danger in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He recommended economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries of Asia so as to insulate them from the Communist influence of the neighbouring "Soviet-Communist China bloc".<sup>135</sup>

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133 See National Intelligence Estimate, Number 63.2-57, 14 May 1957; The Prospect for Vietnam, Pentagon Papers, n. 6, Book 10 of 12, p. 1102.

134 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36, 13 May 1957, p. 768; New York Times, 24 April 1957, p. 14. According to one contemporary American opinion China could pose a greater danger to world peace if left independent of the Soviet influence. It was argued that the Soviet Union "was potentially the more responsible of the two partners" of international communism. See Howard L. Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip Mosley and Benjamin Schwartz, Moscow-Peking Axis. Quoted by Robert C. North, "How Close Are the Soviets and China?", New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 137, 26 August 1957, p. 19.

135 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 37, 1 July 1957, p. 5.



## NO CHANGE IN CHINA POLICY

The emphasis on international communism so often voiced by Dulles clearly implied that there was no prospect for a change in the United States China policy. Following the statement at Canberra by Dulles that under the existing circumstances the United States could not recognize China the State Department announced on 28 April that it would "continue its unilateral embargo on all trade with Communist China"<sup>136</sup>. According to James Reston of the New York Times the State Department contemplated to follow even a tougher policy towards China than towards the Soviet Union. He wrote that the State Department was "most disappointed" with the British action of opening its trade with China on the same basis as with the Soviet Union. He wrote: "There is a strong feeling in the State Department ... against what the State Department feels was the sentiment of most of the Governments concerned for the maintenance of a tougher trade policy toward Peiping than toward Moscow."<sup>137</sup>

During this time the business circles on the West Coast desired the establishment of trade relations with China. They felt that while other countries were reaping the benefits from trade with China they were being deprived of this opportunity. These interests compared the existing situation with the one which had prevailed in 1933 when the United States recognized the Soviet Union after sixteen years. Dulles however was unconvinced. Speaking before the Lions International at San

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136 Ibid., vol. 36, 13 May 1957, p. 773.

137 New York Times, 4 June 1957, p. 9.

Francisco on 28 June 1957 he reiterated the US China policy. He contended that the Communist Chinese regime had failed to pass even the first test for recognition. He categorically denied that there was any parallel between the existing situation and the situation that existed in 1933.<sup>138</sup>

He was equally firm in rejecting the argument that if the United States pursued friendly policy towards China it would bring about an estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations. "No doubt there are basic power rivalries between Russia and China in Asia. But also the Russian and Chinese Communist parties are bound together by close ideological ties."<sup>139</sup> Eventually the Chinese Communists might clash with the Soviet Union if they went on becoming more and more ambitious. He was convinced that the Communist regime on the Chinese mainland was a passing phase. It was bound to come to an end. However, that did not mean that the United States had no role to play and should allow things to take their natural course. He said:

We can confidently assume that international communism's role of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people to do all that we can to contribute to that passing. 140

The statement clearly implied that the United States was not only unreconciled to the existence of the Communist regime on the mainland but was determined to contribute to its destruction.

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138 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 37, 15 July 1957, p. 92.

139 Ibid., p. 94.

140 Ibid., p. 95. See also New York Times, 29 June 1957, pp. 1, 6.

This aggressive policy had the support of a very large segment of American public opinion whose anti-communism had been largely created and nurtured by the Cold War. The New York Times editorially supported Dulles.<sup>141</sup>

Why did Dulles feel that the Chinese Communist regime was only a passing phase? The reason was his conviction that any rule which forced strict conformity and eliminated all differences of opinion was not likely to prevail anywhere in the long run.<sup>142</sup> When he was asked whether he believed that China acted in strict conformity with the Soviet Union, he evaded a direct answer. However, he implied that he believed in the inevitability of Sino-Soviet differences in the future. It was in the nature of human beings that they were bound to differ with other.<sup>143</sup> He, however, was pointing to the internal differences within the Communist countries. In the existing situation he did not find any possibility of a discord between China and the Soviet Union. He said:

... the nations which are within the Sino-Soviet bloc are all dominated by what can fairly be called international communism, a single group which provides a guiding force. No one does seem to detect at times differences between the Chinese ideology and the Soviet ideology, and President Tito indicated he thought there was a difference and that the Chinese ideology was tending more to a nationalistic form. However, I would not think that our estimate conformed to President Tito's in that respect. 144

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141 New York Times, 30 June 1957, p. IV:8.

142 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 37, 22 July 1957, p. 139.

143 *Ibid.*

144 *Ibid.*, p. 140.

He thus clearly rejected the idea that a Chinese nationalistic line was emerging. Yet, a few days later in an another Press conference on 16 July 1957, he said that though China was not as fully dependent upon the Soviet Union as the latter's European satellites were, nevertheless, he felt that in the matter of military build-up "the dependence of Chinese upon Soviet Russia is so nearly complete that I would doubt very much if in that area Red China would try to take a different position from that of the Soviet Union"<sup>145</sup>. Chinese dependence for arms on the Soviet Union was also highlighted by Robert D. Murphy, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, in a speech in New York<sup>146</sup>.

Dulles was increasingly becoming convinced of the inevitability of internal revolts within the Communist world. Referring to the developments in Hungary he said: "International communism is subject to change even against its will." He said that one could possibly discern these changes in Khrushchev's February 1956 speech, changes in the Soviet ruling clique of July 1957 and Mao's speech of February 1957.<sup>147</sup> Dulles' belief

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145 Ibid., vol. 37, 5 August 1957, p. 231.

146 Ibid., vol. 37, 23 September 1957, p. 484.

147 Ibid., vol. 37, 7 October 1957, pp. 569-70.

On 27 February 1957 Mao Tse-tung said: "Contradictions exist everywhere, but as things differ in nature, so do contradictions, in any given phenomenon or thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and transitory and hence relative; whereas struggle between opposites is absolute. See Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", Current Background (Hong Kong), no. 458, 20 June 1957, p. 7. It can be noted that in the above speech Mao did not refer to any contradiction between the Soviet Union and China. But in an earlier speech, in January 1957, which was not revealed

was also shared by Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence. According to him internal unrest was growing in both the Soviet Union and China over the questions of intellectual freedom, agricultural failures and lags in other fields.<sup>148</sup> While the difference of opinion existed on these, the spokesmen of the Eisenhower Administration never got tired in pointing out that the Soviet Union and China were closely united as far as their policies toward the United States were concerned. Howard P. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, for instance, underlined on 5 November 1957 that the Chinese support extended to the Soviet Union in the "crushing of the Hungarian people's bid for freedom". Quoting Chou En-lai's speech of 27 September 1957 in honouring ceremony of Premier Janos Kadar of the Hungarian People's Republic in which the Chinese leader had strongly supported the Soviet action in crushing the Hungarian revolt, Jones said:

Communist-bloc solidarity under the aegis of the Kremlin comes first and foremost, human liberty comes last. The hammer and sickle continues to fly over the roof-tops of Budapest while at the bottom of the rubble of a crushed revolt lie the broken bodies of Hungarian patriots. This is communism's scale of values, shared as much by the leaders in Peiping as in Moscow, and should be remembered by those who would substitute wishful

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till the Cultural Revolution, Mao had said: "Differences always exist.... Sino-Soviet relations have their differences at present, but they are not major differences.... Organizationally we joined the party but not mentally. Thought reform is a difficult task, but we should not be afraid of difficulties. There is often divergence of views in the party. That's why we hold meetings in order to solve problems." See Joint Publications Research Service, Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, 1949-1968 (Arlington, Va., 1974), p. 56.

148 Ibid., vol. 37, 21 October 1957, pp. 639-46.

thinking for facts when they talk of incipient Titoism in Peiping and of redesigning United States policies so as to drive wedges between Peiping and Moscow.

Jones championed the American policy of non-recognition of China and said that contrary to the belief that American recognition would weaken the Sino-Soviet bond it would strengthen it because this "would confirm to the Chinese Communists the great value of the Soviet alliance" and "would be taken as clear evidence of free-world weakness"<sup>150</sup>.

To face the challenge of the Sino-Soviet bloc in Asia Dulles strongly supported the mutual security programme. He opposed the idea of recognition and said that in the existing situation recognition would not be in the interest of the United States.<sup>151</sup> On 26 February 1958, in a statement made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, he identified "international communism" as the principal threat to the United States. He referred to it variously as "international communism", "Communist bloc", "Soviet bloc", "Communist imperialism"<sup>152</sup>.

#### OPINIONS IN THE CONGRESS

The subject of Sino-Soviet relations and its implications for the United States came up several times before the US Congress. It would appear that a significant number of members shared the Dullesian view. However, there was a small number which wanted

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149 Ibid., vol. 37, 25 November 1957, p. 842.

150 Ibid.

151 New York Times, 17 January 1958, pp. 4-5.

152 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 38, 17 March 1958, pp. 427-31.

the United States to change its course in view of the reported Sino-Soviet differences. There was yet another segment of opinion which did not agree with the Administration's policy. It was a small group of hard-liners who had since 1949 taken a strong anti-Communist line. For this group even the Dullesian brand of anti-communism was "soft". In this group were such old stalwarts as Senators William F. Knowland (Rep., Cal.), Alexander H. Smith (Rep., N.J.), Congressman John W. McCormack (Dem., Mass.) and others. It, however, supported the Administration to the extent it felt that the Administration was taking a tough line.

For Senator Knowland there was no question of any compromise with international communism. It was "an evil thing" and none of its leaders like Kadar of Hungary, Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, Gomułka of Poland, or Chou En-lai of China was to be trusted. He strongly protested against American assistance to the East European countries for he understood that it would merely "lessen the drain on the Soviet Union" and the latter would "have more economic resources to use against the nations of the free world or to subvert the uncommitted countries outside the iron curtain"<sup>153</sup>. He jibed at the US policy towards Poland and said that while the United States was negotiating a loan of \$ 100 million to Poland, the latter was issuing joint communique with China upholding socialist unity and criticizing Western

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153 Congressional Record, 85, I, vol. 103 (1957), pp. 808, 7671-2.

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imperialism. He argued strongly against recognition of China and said that it was utterly wrong to think that the recognition would help in driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. He felt that the existence of a long common boundary between the two countries made it expedient to both the countries to have a mutually advantageous friendly relations. Moreover, Knowland argued that a "common ideology makes disagreement between Moscow and Peiping an unhealthy situation from the point of view of both countries' domestic and international propaganda". He endorsed the decision of the Department of State in opposing the British action to lift the embargo against shipments of certain materials to Communist China.

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- 154 Ibid., pp. 6071-3. Knowland read into the Congressional Record the joint Sino-Polish communique which said, inter-alia:

The Socialist countries are striving for a common aim, the construction of a Socialist and Communist society. The Socialist countries are guided by a common philosophy, Marxism-Leninism. This common philosophy and this common aim bind up closely the Soviet Union, Poland, China, and the other Socialist countries.

- 155 William F. Knowland, "The United States should Not Recognize Communist China", Journal of International Affairs (New York), vol. 11, no. 2, 1957, p. 167. This article was read into the Congressional Record by Senator Smith. See Congressional Record, 85, I, vol. 103 (1957), pp. 13093-5. For a similar opinion in the House by McCormack see p. 3242. Senator Hubert Humphrey (Dem., Minn.) expressed concern at the growing Communist propaganda. See p. 7989.
- 156 Congressional Record, 85, I, vol. 103 (1957), pp. 8127-8, 8746. Knowland read into the Congressional Record an article by David Lawrence appearing in the New York Herald Tribune of 31 May 1957. Supporting the embargo against China the article asked that "why should things be made easier for the Red Chinese, and the expenses of Soviet Russia cut down and her internal burden with scarce goods eased?"



There were some members of the Congress who did not share Senator Knowland's views. When the Chinese Government on the mainland permitted thirty American correspondents in August 1956 to visit China the State Department denied them permission to go.<sup>157</sup> A few Congressmen felt that that was an unwise decision. Senator Thomas C. Hennings (Dem., Mo.) said that when the Chinese Communists had opened the door, the Americans should avail of the opportunity to obtain first-hand knowledge of what was happening in China.<sup>158</sup> Even Congressman Walter Judd (Rep., Minn.), a consistent critic of the soft line towards communism, felt that the American newsmen should be permitted to go. He, however, doubted that any good would come out of the visit. According to him, American newsmen who went to China in defiance of the government brought back a grossly misleading picture. The Congressman was convinced that things were in bad shape in China and therefore regarded any favourable reporting as "grossly inaccurate and misleading".<sup>159</sup>

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- 157 A few American correspondents had sought the Chinese permission to visit the mainland China. The Chinese permission had come all of a sudden.
- 158 Congressional Record, 85, I, vol. 103 (1957), pp. 3440-1. In support of his argument the Senator read into the Congressional Record an article by Edward W. Barrett, Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, entitled "Diplomacy, Press, and China". It said that "the State Department's new policy appears clearly ill-advised".
- 159 Ibid., pp. 6903-4. He read into the Congressional Record an A.P. despatch from Hong Kong which appeared in the Washington Star of 12 May 1957. It said that due to famine and job shortage unrest was growing in China. This was the type of report which the Congressman used to read with relish.

An opinion was slowly building up for some sort of accommodation with China. However, on the question of recognition no Senator or Congressman seemed to be inclined to compromise. Senators Alexander H. Smith (Rep., N.J.) and Karl E. Mundt (Rep., S. Dak.) strongly argued against the recognition of China. Smith cautioned that any opening of Sino-American trade might lead to recognition.<sup>160</sup> Opinion, however,<sup>was</sup> gaining ground for lessening of the East-West tension. Important Senators like J. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.), Hubert Humphrey (Dem., Minn.) constantly argued for opening Soviet-American trade and relaxing the international tension. They said that peaceful coexistence was the only way of achieving an enduring peace. Humphrey stated: "We cannot wish away the Soviet state or Soviet economy. Until we accept the relative permanence of our chief adversary we shall continue to pursue policy based on optimistically unrealistic assumptions."<sup>161</sup>

#### THE PRESS OPINIONS

Like the Administration the American Press also by and large agreed that Sino-Soviet rift was not only a possibility but a fact. There was of course some confusion as to the real nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute but it was generally held that a rift existed and that American policy should be tailored to suit the changed situation. Many of them demanded certain relaxations in US China policy. They insisted that the American newsmen be permitted to go to China to see things for themselves.

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160 Ibid., 85, I, vol. 104 (1958), pp. 424, 6351-2.

161 Ibid., pp. 11845-8, 12658-61.

William Worthy, Jr., an American correspondent, who had gone to China in the face of State Department's disapproval, wrote after his return that Communist China ought not to be regarded as a Soviet satellite. "Despite pretty serious dependency economically", he said, the Chinese were "going to challenge Russia eventually" for the leadership of the Communist bloc.<sup>162</sup> Richard Hughes, a special correspondent of the Sunday Times of London, in an article in the New York Times agreed with Worthy that the Chinese had deep-seated distrust of the Russians and that a growing uneasiness marked their relationship. The Chinese, however, demonstrated by their actions unity with the Soviet Union because they considered such a course expedient.<sup>163</sup>

In June 1957, Harrison E. Salisbury analysed the ideological dispute between the two Communist Powers. Referring to Khrushchev's interview on the Columbia Broadcasting System on 2 June 1957, Salisbury wrote: "If ... Moscow and Peiping are moving into an era of ideological conflict, the practical advantage of a more flexible and imaginative United States policy in the Far East are obviously enhanced."<sup>164</sup> In the said interview

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162 New York Times, 11 February 1957, p. 8.

163 Richard Hughes, "Report on Peking : Communist, Yet Chinese", New York Times, 31 March 1957, p. VI: 11. Also see the Interview with Akio Doi, leader of the Japanese military group that visited China recently in U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 42, 22 March 1957, pp. 54-56. Doi said that mutual advantage, both ideological and political, would keep the Soviet Union and China united for the time being.

164 Harrison E. Salisbury, "Red 'Contradictions' : An Analysis of Khrushchev's Aid to those Urging New U.S. Policy", New York Times, 6 June 1957, p. 9.

Khrushchev by refusing to believe that there were "contradictions" in the Soviet system had placed himself in opposition to Mao because the latter had said that "contradictions" between the leaders and the people were possible in Communist societies. Mao had generalized the situation for all Communist societies including the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, however, tried to repair the damage done to the Sino-Soviet relations by eliminating this part of the interview from the report which was carried in the Soviet Press. But this suppression of fact, wrote Salisbury, "served to emphasize to the West the reality of the ideological difference between Moscow and Peiping".<sup>165</sup>

Most of the writers on the theme in the New York Times appeared to be convinced of the growing discord. They differed only as to its breaking out in public. One commentator wrote that some West European experts on the Far East were "convinced that the conflict of interest between the two Communist giants in Manchuria, Korea and probably elsewhere is irreconcilable and that they will eventually go to war if they cannot achieve a modus-videndi".<sup>166</sup>

As the Chinese policies and actions towards the Soviet Union did not follow a pattern, it resulted in confusing appraisals. Some emphasized growing discord despite essential unity and others essential unity despite differences. Those who took the former position could ask for the continuation of old policy with more tough attitude towards communism and those

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165 Ibid.

166 Thomas J. Hamilton, "U.S. Policy on China Prolongs a Stalemate", New York Times, 7 July 1957, p. IV:3.

who adopted the latter position could ask for a change. There were also people to whom situation was not clear.

On 6 June 1957, the New York Times reported that Peking had approved the Kremlin purge of Georgi E. Malenkov, Lazar M. Kagonovich, Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Dimitri T. Shepilov and in its message to the Soviet Union emphasized on the Sino-Soviet cordiality "for lasting world peace and for the triumph of Marxism-Leninism"<sup>167</sup>. On the same day, however, it editorially commented that the significance of the Chinese stand "is still not clear"<sup>168</sup>. The U.S. News and World Report continued to believe communism as a monolith and remained critical of the policy of the United States.<sup>169</sup>

In view of the changed situation arising out of a growing discord in the Sino-Soviet camp C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times felt that the United States should have pragmatic rethinking on the issue of recognition of China.<sup>170</sup> On 25 August 1957, there appeared two cartoons under the heading - "Two Views of U.S. China Policy". One with the caption "B - but Foster" depicted Dulles as beating a big drum of the American Far Eastern policy. The rest of the world which earlier followed him had taken a different route. Uncle Sam with an anxious

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167 New York Times, 6 July 1957, pp. 1-2.

168 Ibid., p. 14. One writer expressed the opinion that Molotov was purged because he "favored a tougher attitude towards Mao". See Mark Gayn, "Behind the Moscow Purge", The Nation (New York), vol. 185, 20 July 1957, pp. 23-24.

169 Editorial, U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 42, 15 February 1957, p. 156. Also see Editorial, "No Divorce in Sight", The Nation (New York), vol. 184, 15 June 1957, pp. 509-10.

170 New York Times, 17 August 1957, p. 14.

look was shown as asking Dulles to see that his followers had deserted him. The other cartoon showed a massive stone work with a gate. The wall was depicted as the boundary of China. Besides the gate was hanging a signboard: "Proceed at your risk".<sup>171</sup> A man symbolizing "Press" was watching the signboard. The Nation also editorially pleaded for the lifting of American embargo on China trade and argued that if the United States did not do so other countries would develop their trade with China to the detriment of American business.<sup>172</sup>

The Nation continued to plead for a change in America's China policy. It said that if the United States could lessen the Sino-American tension over the question of troop withdrawal from Korea it would deprive the Soviet Union of an important leverage in its equation with China.<sup>173</sup> The Nation criticized the Eisenhower Administration for its foolishness of clinging to a trade embargo on China. If such a situation continued then, it cautioned, the Soviet Union would go on increasing its trade with China and the prospect of Sino-Soviet conflict would be bleak. It assailed America's China policy as one of "the major diplomatic absurdities of the postwar period".<sup>174</sup>

Like The Nation another liberal journal The New Republic also argued that a fresh start in America's Asia policy must

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171 Ibid., 25 August 1957, p. IV:3.

172 The Nation (New York), vol. 184, 27 April 1957, pp. 353-4.

173 Editorial: "Back Door to the Summit", Ibid., vol. 186, 19 April 1958, p. 333.

174 Editorial: "Our Dunderheaded China Policy", Ibid., vol. 186, 10 May 1958, p. 403.

begin with the recognition of Communist China and granting the latter a seat in the United Nations.<sup>175</sup> The journal made an interesting analysis of the developments in Eastern Europe and their repercussions on the Sino-Soviet relationship. It pointed out that unlike the Soviet Union which had emphasized the Yugoslav heresy, the Chinese emphasized Yugoslavia as an agent of the United States. The Chinese wanted to stress that good relations with the United States were suspect in themselves. Indirectly it was an attack on Moscow's "coexistence" campaign,<sup>176</sup> The New Republic concluded.

Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York Times noted with interest that in the text of the Sino-Soviet communique issued during Khrushchev's visit to Peking in August 1958 China's name was mentioned before that of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that out of nine places, in eight places, the "People's Republic of China" was mentioned first and then followed by the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". He said that this was unlike the tradition of giving primacy to the Soviet Union while listing the names of the countries.<sup>177</sup> He admitted that Sino-Soviet relations remained a great blank in Western intelligence estimates as there did not exist any normal sources of diplomatic and newspaper communication. He also admitted that Western opinions were largely based on guess-work and sometimes by

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175 Editorial; "The Long Climb Back", The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 138, 16 June 1958, p. 4.

176 Editorial; "Dizziness in Moscow", Ibid., vol. 138, 30 June 1958, pp. 3-5.

177 New York Times, 5 August 1958, p. 4.

prejudice. He, however, drew satisfaction from the existing problems in the Sino-Soviet relations.<sup>178</sup>

#### QUEMOY CRISIS : 1958

With the shelling of the offshore islands by the Chinese Communists on 23 August 1958 the peace in the Formosan Strait was again disturbed. China called it a first step toward the liberation of Formosa.<sup>179</sup> The islands had gained in importance in years following the first Quemoy crisis to the United States. This incident, therefore, aroused serious concern. In a letter to Thomas E. Morgan, the Acting Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 24 August, Secretary Dulles wrote that the islands and Formosa "have become closer and their inter-dependence has increased".<sup>180</sup> He thereby implied that the Chinese action was a threat to Formosa and endangered peace in the area. The President expressed the same opinion three days later in his Press conference on 27 August. He said: "It [the islands] is part of the territory from which they hope to make their lining, so there is closer relationship than there was before."<sup>181</sup> The next day, the New York Times reported, Peking expressed its determination to liberate Taiwan and a US naval contingent was sent from the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet to join the Seventh Fleet.<sup>182</sup>

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178 Ibid., 6 August 1958, p. 8.

179 Ibid., 29 August 1958, pp. 1, 3.

180 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 8 September 1958, p. 379.

181 New York Times, 28 August 1958, p. 10.

182 Ibid., p. 1; 29 August 1958, p. 1.



Some people in the United States concluded from this development that the Soviet Union was making use of China to destroy the Western unity. On 31 August 1958 in the New York Times a cartoon captioned "Remote Control Toy" showed a smiling Khrushchev in Kremlin controlling through wires a bull-dozer engaged in felling a massive concrete pillar. On the toy was written "Red China" and on the pillar "Western Unity".<sup>183</sup>

While the situation was becoming tense in the Formosa Strait, on 30 August, Pravda warned the United States that "he who threatens today to attack the Chinese People's Republic must not forget that he threatens the Soviet Union as well", and that "any aggression by the U.S.A. in the Far East will inevitably increase international tension and result in the spreading of the war to other areas, with all the consequences that follow this".<sup>184</sup>

Tension mounted in the region with the Chinese blockade of the islands and subsequent American assistance to escort the Nationalist ships deliver supplies to the islands. On 6 September Chou En-lai expressed the Chinese willingness to initiate ambassadorial talks with the United States "to make a further effort to safeguard peace".<sup>185</sup> A White House statement<sup>186</sup> was issued the same day welcoming the statement. When the tension was lessening Khrushchev in a letter to Eisenhower on

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183 Ibid., 31 August 1958, p. IV:3.

184 Ibid., 1 August 1958, p. 1.

185 Ibid., 7 September 1958, pp. 1, 2.

186 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 22 September 1958, p. 447.

7 September 1958, accused the United States of aggressive attitude and said:

An attack on the Chinese People's Republic which is a great friend, ally and neighbour of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union. True to its duty, our country will do everything in order, together with People's China, to defend the security of both states, the interests of peace in the Far East, the interest of peace in the whole world. 187

It should be noted here that the Sino-Soviet communique issued on 3 August 1958 after Khrushchev's visit to China did not mention anything about Taiwan. 188

The signal contained in Khrushchev's letter to the American President was clear. It simply asserted that in case China was attacked the Soviet Union would be under obligation to come to the assistance of China even if it meant an enlarged war. As the United States itself entertained no idea of launching an attack on China, it could take the Soviet Premier's letter coolly. The letter was directed much more to the Chinese than to the Americans, the obvious purpose being demonstration of their goodwill to China. According to George F. Kennan, serious differences between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties had

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187 Ibid., vol. 39, 29 September 1958, p. 502.

188 New York Times, 4 August 1958, pp. 3, 20. J.H. Kalicki has argued that it was possible that the omission reflected the reluctance to disclose the Sino-Soviet attitude in the matter. See J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s (London, 1975), p. 183. U.S. News and World Report, however, held a different view. Commenting editorially, David Lawrence wrote that as communist aggression in the Middle East had been checked "so the Moscow-Peking alliance decided it was opportune to probe the situation in and around Formosa". U.S. News and World Report, vol. 45, 12 September 1958, p. 112.

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already developed to serious proportions by 1957. One wonders how much impact such a letter could make in view of the fact that the letter was dated 7 September when the crisis had to some extent subsided with the Chinese decision to have ambassadorial level talks. James Hagerty, the Press Secretary to the President, on 8 September pointed that the letter described the situation as dangerous and the United States regarded it as such. It had gone ahead and agreed to have an ambassadorial talk on the crisis. Hagerty added that the United States hoped that the Chinese would not use force to gain their territorial objectives. To that end the United States sought the Soviet co-operation. "The United States would welcome the Soviet Government's concerning itself with this aspect of the matter",  
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said Hagerty.

Secretary Dulles, however, had no reasons to believe that it was in Soviet interest to restrain China. If China was involved in a war with the United States its dependence on the Soviet Union for military supplies would increase. He said that even the shells which were being used by the Chinese were of Soviet make. He felt that the terrible losses in a war with the United States would make China "less of a possible threat to Moscow than it is now". Dulles, however, added that this was  
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nothing more than "mere speculation". Therefore, it obviously

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189 See U.S. Congress, 90, I, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Communist World in 1967 (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 7.

190 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 29 September 1958, p. 499.

191 Berding, n. 19, p. 64.

had no policy implications.

On 9 September, in his Press conference Dulles reiterated the old American posture of defending the islands if it was understood that their defence was essential to the defence of Taiwan. He drew a comparison between the existing situation and Korea and insisted on renunciation of force on the part of China as a policy.<sup>192</sup> Two days later, the President explained the American position in these words:

If the Chinese Communists have decided to risk a war, it is not because Quemoy is so valuable to them.... If they have now decided to risk a war, it can only be because they, and their Soviet allies, have decided to find out whether threatening war is a policy from which they can make big gains.

If that is their decision, then a Western Pacific Munich would not buy us peace or security. It would encourage the aggressors. It would dismay our friends and allies there. If history teaches anything, appeasement would make it more likely that we would have to fight a major war. 193

In his reply to Khrushchev's letter Eisenhower on 12 September urged him to exert his influence on Peking to accept a peaceful settlement of the problem by ceasing all military operations.<sup>194</sup>

Three days later, Sino-American ambassadorial talks commenced at Warsaw. Soon they were stalemated on the questions of immediate ceasefire and American withdrawal from the Taiwan Strait. Both the parties stuck firmly to their demands.<sup>195</sup>

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192 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 29 September 1958, pp. 487-92.

193 Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblenz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (London, 1960), pp. 127-8.

194 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 29 September 1958, p. 499.

195 Editorial: "A Way Out", The Nation (New York), vol. 187, 20 September 1958, p. 141.

On 19 September, in a letter to Eisenhower, Khrushchev again reiterated unequivocally that an attack on China would amount to an attack on the Soviet Union. Criticizing the American "atomic blackmail" he said:

Those who harbor plans of an atomic attack on the People's Republic of China should not forget that the other side too has atomic and hydrogen weapons and the appropriate means to deliver them and, if the People's Republic of China falls victim to such an attack, the aggressors will at once get rebuffed by these same means. 196

On the following day Eisenhower branded the Soviet position as "grotesque and dangerous" and said that "it is tragic that Soviet military despotism should support the use of force to achieve expansionist ends". He again ventilated the idea of reaching "a peaceful solution through ambassadorial talks at Warsaw"<sup>197</sup>. On 25 September 1958, in an address before the Far East-American Council of Commerce and Industry at New York, Dulles pointed to the military assistance China had been receiving from the Soviet Union. He said that the latest Khrushchev letter which had been rejected by Eisenhower "boasted that the Chinese Communists, with Soviet support, would bring about the 'expulsion' ... of the United States from the entire Formosa area." He once again reiterated the policy of the United States not to withdraw in the face of armed threat. He, however, said that the United States was in favour of solving the problem through peaceful means.<sup>198</sup> As could be well expected these grave

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196 New York Times, 20 September 1958, pp. 1, 2.

197 Ibid., 21 September 1958, pp. 1, 2.

198 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 13 October 1958, pp. 566, 573-4. See also vol. 39, 20 October 1958, pp. 604-5.

developments again led to a spurt of speculations about the true nature of Sino-Soviet relations. Were they as close as Khrushchev's statement implied or it only concealed the growing differences? Writing about the impression of his tour of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Adlai L. Stevenson said that "the biggest anxiety for the Soviet Union is China". He said that although the Soviet Union was all praise for the Chinese industrialization yet their relationship was not as warm as it was before. He, however, ruled out the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rift at the present moment.

On 5 October the Chinese ceased bombing of Quemoy and expressed its willingness to negotiate with the Taipei Govern-<sup>200</sup>ment. The United States welcomed the decision. On the following day the Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter made a statement to that effect.<sup>201</sup> On the same day the Nationalists<sup>202</sup> also ordered a ceasefire.

It is not clear why the Chinese suddenly accepted a ceasefire. One can only speculate that the Chinese were not getting assurance of necessary support from the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government was constantly harping on the tune that if China was attacked it will come to its support. But it did not want to take any responsibility on behalf of China so long China was not attacked. Khrushchev's 5 October statement, the day

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199 New York Times, 2 October 1958, pp. 1, 4. See also Editorial, "The Great Reconnaissance", The Nation (New York), vol. 187, 4 October 1958, p. 181.

200 New York Times, 6 October 1958, pp. 1, 3.

201 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 27 October 1958, p. 650.

202 New York Times, 7 October 1958, p. 3.

China ordered the ceasefire, may be interesting in this regard.

He said:

The Soviet Government has thought it necessary to make this warning (i.e. Soviet Union would intervene if China was attacked) as the atmosphere in the Far East is such the United States interference in Chinese internal affairs has brought the United States to the very brink of a direct military conflict with the CPR. And if the United States steps over this brink, the USSR will not stand aside. But we have not interfered in and do not intend to interfere in the civil war which the Chinese people are waging against the Chiang Kai-shek clique. 203

The Chinese regarded these assurances as meaningless. As it came to be known later on they wanted the Soviet Union to help China acquire independent nuclear capability to deter American aggression. The Soviet refusal to accede to their request contributed to their decision to deescalate the crisis. The upshot was that the Soviet assertion that the Soviet Union would intervene if China was attacked did not bring out a solidarity. The Soviet refusal on the other hand became a cause celebre in the development of Sino-Soviet hostility.<sup>204</sup>

It is not clear how much importance the United States Government attached to the growing Sino-Soviet discord over the issue. As late as 23 October 1958, Dulles in a British Television broadcast was still talking about the struggle with

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203 Ibid., 6 October 1958, p. 1. Emphasis added.

204 On 15 October 1957, a Sino-Soviet agreement on "new technology for national defence" was concluded. The Soviet Union probably hoped that this would stop China from seeking an independent deterrent. China, however, did not like the strings attached to the agreement, when during May-July 1958 China embarked upon a major programme of nuclear research it is less likely that the Soviet Union had supported it. See John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967 (London, 1968), pp. 102-9.

communism as "primarily a moral struggle"<sup>205</sup>.

The Chinese resumed their shelling on 20 October 1958. In the Dulles-Chiang conference of 21-23 October this matter appeared as a serious issue. Dulles persuaded Chiang not to assume a forward policy and advised him to try to seek a political solution instead of a military solution of his differences with the Communist China.<sup>206</sup> On 25 October following Chiang's pledge to accept peaceful means the Chinese announced a partial ceasefire, by shelling every alternate day.<sup>207</sup> Dulles strongly criticized the Chinese action and said: "It is an extremely repugnant procedure according to our standards."<sup>208</sup> This showed that the United States at this stage was not interested in intensifying its pressure against China.

The American Government still held the view that the Chinese action in the Formosa Strait was a joint Sino-Soviet adventure.<sup>209</sup> In his Press conference of 5 November 1958, President Eisenhower in a reply to John Scali of the Associated Press said that there would not be any change in foreign policy as a result of the Congressional elections.<sup>210</sup> On 11 November

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205 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 10 November 1958, p. 733.

206 Ibid., 10 November 1958, pp. 721-3.

207 New York Times, 26 October 1958, p. 1.

208 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 17 November 1958, pp. 769-70.

209 American reluctance to support the Soviet idea of a perpetual nuclear test ban might have been caused by the doubt that the Chinese soil might be used by the Soviet Union for its nuclear tests. See Editorial, The Nation, vol. 187, 8 November 1958, p. 329.

210 New York Times, 6 November 1958, p. 18.



1958, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy referred to the existence of a theory that the Soviet Union was growing restless at the Chinese adventurism and that it pressurized China to halt the shelling. But he himself did not believe it to be true. It should be noted, he said, that the Chinese shelling started on 23 October, just after Khrushchev's visit to Peking. One interpretation of the event was that the Communist move was designed to counter the psychological effect of the US policy of supporting firmly the independent countries of the Middle East. Another interpretation was that it was a pressure tactic to wrest from the United States its approval for the Chinese admission into the United Nations. Whatever might be the case, Murphy was convinced that it was directed "as a testing operation to determine whether the disunity in the free world on this question was sufficient to force a concession, especially by the United States, to the detriment of its ally, the Republic of China." He added: "More broadly, some of our Asian friends believe that the action was a test of the whole U.S. position in the western Pacific."<sup>211</sup> The correspondent Gerald Clark, who had just returned from his tour of China, expressed the view that although China was increasingly becoming independent, the ideological bond would prevent it from completely breaking its ties with the Soviet Union. He told that it would be "foolhardly for the West to imagine that self-protective and ideological ties can be easily cut". He contended that the Sino-Soviet differences were not unlike those in the Western camp -- differences of

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211 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 1 December 1958, p. 878.

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"emphasis rather than of purpose".

Dulles was convinced that there was a Sino-Soviet collusion in the Western Pacific. In an address on 4 December 1958 he said:

The Communist regime in Peiping, closely leagued with Moscow, is bearing down hard on the free Asian countries with its massive weight of number, its rising military power, and its infiltration among overseas Chinese. 213

He opposed the recognition of Peking and trade with the mainland regime. He held that an easing of China policy would imperil the Asian allies of the United States. 214

The crisis in the Formosa Strait which had already been de-escalated since 6 October came to an end by December 1958. Chinese shelling became more and more infrequent and the United States also reduced its force in the area. The crisis thus petered out. Dulles' policy in the crisis seems to have been, to quote Eleanor Lansing Dulles, "to give the Communist Chinese the maximum possible reason for acting in a calm manner and helping to restore peace in the Strait without weakening the morale of the whole Pacific area". 215

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212 New York Times, 26 November 1958, p. 2.

213 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 22 December 1958, p. 991.

214 New York Times, 5 December 1958, pp. 1-2.

215 Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles : The Last Year (New York, 1963), p. 179.

Chapter VI

TOWARDS A PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE : 1959

## Chapter VI

### TOWARDS A PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE : 1959

In the aftermath of the Quemoy crisis signs of change began to be visible in the Sino-Soviet-American relations. The most dramatic events symbolizing this new wind of change were the exchange of visits between the Soviet and American leaders. There was a growing demand in the United States, which was voiced by a section of the business and the academic community, for the revision of China policy. One cannot precisely state the causes for the change. But one can vaguely identify several factors which contributed to this process. The dramatic Soviet success in space technology symbolized by the launching of the sputnik, the awareness that the Soviet-American arms race might soon get out of hand unless controlled and the growing knowledge that all was not well in the Sino-Soviet relations all made their contribution in generating a genuine desire for improvement in American-Soviet relations.

#### AN OVERVIEW

The Quemoy crisis had petered out practically without bringing any change in the prevailing situation in the Pacific. It did not alter in any significant fashion the overt relations among the three powers. However, from a long term perspective it did significantly contribute to the estrangement between the two Communist giants. For China the United States was still the enemy frustrating its efforts to unify Taiwan with the mainland and the Soviet Union and China were together fighting the "American imperialists". The United States still regarded

itself as the leader of the "free world" and considered "international communism" as a powerful threat to its security. But beneath the surface of the East-West confrontation there were serious new undercurrents which were undermining the unity of each bloc. The Soviet Union appeared to be slowly but steadily moving ahead of the United States in the field of space technology and inter-continental ballistic missiles. The Chinese were consolidating their hold in Tibet and making incursions into the Indian territory. They were aiding and abetting the Communist insurgents in Laos. These activities of the two Communist powers were causing serious concern to the United States. There was a distinct possibility that if the United States responded to these challenges it might result in an intensification of the cold war. But what happened was just the opposite. Although the Sino-American relations further deteriorated, the Soviet-American relations entered a new phase of "reconciliation" and "readjustment". The United States began to pursue two divergent policies towards the two stalwarts of the Communist camp. This clearly showed that the American policy was gradually moving to the view that there were two independent power centres in the Communist camp and each of them needed an independent consideration.

The year 1959 was a significant year in many respects. That year the Soviet Union, which had already established a lead over the United States in the field of space research, took three significant strides. In January it launched its first solar satellite, in September it established first direct contact with the moon, and only a month later, in October, it fired the first rocket that achieved a lunar orbit. These

achievements not only enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union among the less developed countries of Asia and Africa but also exposed the mainland America to a missile attack. A study group of the Johns Hopkins University observed: "The military position of the United States has declined in the short span of 15 years from one of unchallenged security to that of a nation both open and vulnerable to direct and devastating attack."<sup>1</sup> Soviet influence in the Middle East was also increasing and its stand over Berlin was becoming tougher. But in spite of these serious threats to peace the Soviet-American relations moved generally towards a policy of mutual accommodation. The exchange of visits between the leaders of the two states to a great extent allayed the doubts in the minds of the two nations that war was not inevitable. Americans had come to believe that these crises would remain at a low level and would not result in a war involving the two super powers. A survey conducted by the New York Times in March 1959 indicated that the people generally<sup>2</sup> believed that the Berlin problem would be solved peacefully. Already Secretary Dulles had prophesied that the Russian posture over Berlin was merely a "probing operation" to test the Western unity and did not indicate any serious intention on the part of

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1 See U.S. Cong., 86, I, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy, No. 8: Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy (A study prepared by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University) (Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 3. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, expressed the view that the Soviet missile build-up was dominating the US decisions. See New York Times, 3 February 1959, p. 3.

2 New York Times, 23 March 1959.

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the Soviet Union to go to war. Even as late as April 1959 when the crisis over Berlin was deepening, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy explained confidently:

I start from the premise that the Soviet leadership does not want war, and we know that we do not want it. I just don't believe that an all-out nuclear war is going to happen by sheer accident. Therefore we do not approach these negotiations weighed down by fear and apprehension of ultimate destruction. 4

While the leadership in both the countries realized that there was a certain compatibility of interests between them and they were moving towards a normalisation, the Sino-American relations were deteriorating. In 1959 the Chinese Communists assumed a hard posture towards the United States, and, its policies towards Laos, Tibet and India displayed, according to the Americans, an aggressive and expansive spirit. In Tibet the Chinese crushed a "patriotic movement" with an iron hand and strengthened their hold over this erstwhile Lama kingdom. In Laos it provided assistance to the Pathet Lao who were carrying on a struggle for the establishment of their control over Vientiane. It disputed the existing Sino-Indian boundaries and claimed ownership of thousands of square miles of territory which was in India. It clashed with India over the border issue. 5

How far these provocative actions of the Chinese Communists were supported by the Kremlin is not known. It, however, appears

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3 Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs : 1958 (New York, 1959), pp. 88, 167-8.

4 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 4 May 1959, p. 631.

5 Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs : 1959 (New York, 1960), p. 3. See also Vidya Prakash Dutt, China's Foreign Policy, 1958-62 (Bombay, 1964), p. 48.

that Moscow, which was proclaiming its adherence to the principle of peaceful coexistence at this time and had discarded the concept of war as a means to solve international disputes was not happy with the Chinese policies. There is evidence to show that Moscow was watching with concern the independent attitude of the Chinese Government. It was also concerned about the growing population of China and was agitated over the prospect that one day the Chinese would put pressure on Siberia and Outer Mongolia.

The United States attached serious importance to these developments. It was not ignored that despite its successes in missile build-up the Soviet Union was looking for an accommodation with the United States. And this was in the face of a militant anti-American posture adopted by the Chinese. Probably no one expected that the American policy would make a volte-face but its response to Soviet overtures symbolized a change in American strategy. In public pronouncements the American officials seriously reminded the public of the seriousness of the danger from international communism but the emphasis was shifting. It was a period of transition and therefore the change in policy was marked with caution.

#### "IMMEDIATE SILENCE AND ENDURING DISCORD"

The period that followed the Quemoy crisis has been characterized as one of "immediate silence and enduring discord".<sup>6</sup>

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6 This phrase has been used by Kenneth T. Young to characterize the post-Quemoy crisis Sino-American relations. See Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York, 1968), p. 199.



In the Far East, the United States guaranteed the existing power relations and thereby indirectly stabilized its relations with China. Already Secretary Dulles had been showing both firmness and flexibility so as to give Peking "the maximum possible reason for acting in a calm manner and helping to restore peace in the Straits without weakening the morale of the whole Pacific area".<sup>7</sup> As his sister Eleanor Lansing Dulles later wrote, Dulles' Press Conference on 30 September 1958 was meant to convey to the Chinese an "accommodating attitude".<sup>8</sup> In this Press conference the Secretary implied that the United States would withdraw its forces from the Taiwan area if the Chinese stopped their bombings; and, if the Chinese showed their willingness to co-operate with the United States the latter would show its flexibility.<sup>9</sup> In its effort to bring about a ceasefire the United States was indirectly assisted by the Soviet Union. By showing its unwillingness to support the use of force in solving the Taiwan problem the Soviet Union had not only strengthened the hands of the United States for a ceasefire but had also annoyed the Chinese.<sup>10</sup>

The fact that the Chinese felt that they were let down by their Russian friends during the crisis was ignored by the Soviet Union. No effort was made to mollify the Chinese. The Soviet Press merely said that "with the support of the peace-

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7 Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles : The Last Year (New York, 1963), p. 179.

8 Ibid., pp. 179-81.

9 For Dulles' Press conference of 30 September 1958 see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 39, 20 October 1958, pp. 597-604.

10 Young, n. 6, p. 202.

loving forces" the Chinese people had countered the American "aggression". The subject was also ignored in the 21st Congress of the CPSU which met in January 1959.<sup>11</sup> One scholar has argued that the Sino-American ambassadorial talks provided Moscow with an excellent opportunity. It could have pledged its support to China because it knew that the resumption of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw had lessened the chances of a serious escalation of war. It provided the Kremlin a diplomatic opportunity "to make a commitment to Peking without an unconditional guarantee and a warning to Washington without an unlimited risk".<sup>12</sup> Analyzing the Soviet commitment to China Edgar Snow, who visited the Soviet Union in 1960, subsequently wrote: "The Soviet guarantee was limited to a defensive war by China against any attack backed by the United States; apparently it did not extend to an offensive by China against American armed forces in the Taiwan Straits". By creating an "equilibrium of power"<sup>13</sup> the Soviet Union proved instrumental in reducing the tension. The Chinese were critical of the diplomatic manoeuvre of the Soviet Union. They pointed out that the Soviet support for China came only when the Soviet Union realized that there was no threat of a nuclear war. In 1963, by which time Sino-Soviet

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11 Ibid., p. 209.

12 Ibid., p. 210.

13 Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River (New York, 1962), p. 634. For a study of the growth of the Sino-Soviet tension over the Taiwan question see Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, 1962); John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958", Orbis (Philadelphia), vol. 6, Spring 1962, pp. 38-64; Tang Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence", Orbis, vol. 8, Spring 1964, pp. 36-51; O. Edmund Clubb, "Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa", Political Science Quarterly (New York), vol. 80, March 1965, pp. 1-21.

polemics had reached high intensity, the Chinese Communists referred to the Soviet commitment in the letters of 7 and 19 September 1958, and stated:

Although at that time the situation in the Taiwan Straits was tense, there was no possibility that a nuclear war would break out and no need for the Soviet Union to support China with its nuclear weapons. It was only when they were clear that this was the situation that the Soviet leaders expressed their support for China. 14

It is thus evident that the military and diplomatic aspects of the Taiwan crisis created serious differences between the Soviet Union and China and proved to be one of the major factors in the future Sino-Soviet rift.<sup>15</sup>

While the United States Government was not showing much interest in the modification of its China policy, at the non-official level an opinion was slowly building up pleading for such a change. The National Council of Churches (NCC), which embraced two-thirds of the Protestants in the United States (35 million), showed keen interest in this. In November 1958, under the auspices of the NCC, the Fifth World Order Study Conference met in Cleveland, Ohio. A resolution was passed in the conference about China saying:

... Christians should urge consideration by our government of its policy in regard to the People's Republic of China. While the rights of the people of Taiwan and of Korea should be safeguarded, steps should be taken towards the inclusion of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and for its recognition by our government. The exclusion of the effective government on the mainland of China ... from the international community is in many ways a disadvantage to that community. It helps to preserve a false image of the United States,

14 . Peking Review, vol. 6, 6 September 1963, p. 13.

15 Zagoria, n. 13, p. 217; Thomas, n. 13, p. 41.

and of other nations, in the minds of the Chinese people. It keeps our people in ignorance of what is taking place in China. It hampers negotiations for disarmament. It limits the functioning of international organizations. We have a strong hope that the resumption of relationships between the peoples of China and of the United States may make possible also a restoration of relationship between their churches and ours. 16

Although the Cleveland resolution, as it later came to be known, did not represent the official stand of the NCC, got wide publicity. The Daily Worker and other left-wing publications greeted the resolution while the Right concluded that Communists had infiltrated even the churches. The Catholic organizations in general argued against any change in the US China policy. Presbyterian and Baptist organizations, however, strongly supported the resolution and pleaded for a revision in the  
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US China policy.

Opinions were also expressed that the question of Taiwan was an impediment to any revision of America's China policy and therefore something needed to be done to alter the situation. American business interests were advocating a change in America's China policy. Cyrus S. Eaton, an important American industrialist whose over enthusiasm for the restoration of the East-West trade earned him the name of "the controversial industrialist", said: "We have elected to invite the enmity of the 600,000,000 Chinese on the mainland and have substituted

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16 Christian Responsibility on a Changing Planet, The Report of the Fifth World Order Study Conference, Cleveland, Ohio, November 18-21, 1958 (Cleveland, 1958), pp. 22-23. Cited in A.T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966), p. 133.

17 Steele, n. 16, pp. 133-5.

for our friendship with that proud and powerful nation a futile alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, an exiled has - been whom we have installed and maintained on a neighbouring island at fantastic expense to the American taxpayer." No less important a diplomat than Kennan lent his support to this view. On 12 May 1959, he testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "it does seem to me too much to hope that the present set-up there should endure indefinitely". He pleaded for a change in China policy. Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic presidential candidate of 1952 and 1956 and considered seriously as a candidate for 1960, also pleaded for a change. He urged that "instead of fighting over Quemoy and Matsu, we should be discussing the independence of Formosa together with the admission of China to the United Nations". The United States should "not veto the admission of Communist China to the United Nations", he said.

#### STATE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS

By this time the Americans had an inkling of the split in what they in the past had considered as the Sino-Soviet solidarity. But it did not bring about a significant change in US policy towards China. On the other hand, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union went on showing

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18 The Nation (New York), vol. 188, 31 January 1959, p. 87.

19 U.S. Congress, 86, I, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Informal Meeting with George F. Kennan (Washington, D.C., 1959), p. 4.

20 The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 140, 25 May 1959, p. 8.

signs of improvement. One important reason for this was the Soviet anxiety to improve relations with the United States and other Western countries. It wanted to present itself as a power with a sense of responsibility. Both the countries were making efforts to come closer to each other.

On 29 December 1958 both the countries entered into an agreement on a Reciprocal Exchange of Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture during the summer of 1959.<sup>21</sup> In his New Year's message to the people of the United States, Soviet Premier Khrushchev emphasized the need of co-operation between the American and Soviet people for the maintenance of international peace and stability.<sup>22</sup> The visit of Anastas I. Mikoyan, the First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, to the United States in January 1959 was an important step in the search for a new pattern of relationship. It was hoped that it would pave the way for serious negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States for international peace.

#### Mikoyan's Visit

On 4 January 1959 Mikoyan arrived in the United States on a two week "private visit". Just before his departure for the United States, Mikoyan expressed the feeling that the two countries must sit and confer "to work out major problems that divide the countries".<sup>23</sup> In the United States, he held serious discussions with the top American political, industrial and

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21 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 26 January 1959, pp. 132-4.

22 New York Times, 1 January 1959, p. 2.

23 Ibid., 6 January 1959, p. 1.

labour leaders. Expressing the genuine desire of the Soviet Union for peace, he told a meeting of the top industrialists of Detroit on 8 January 1959 that "we are all tired of the cold war and would very much like to have a hot peace". It was useless to debate over the question as to which country was responsible for the cold war, he said. He humourously added: "We say, you are wrong. You say that we are wrong. Solomon would probably decide to split the blame down the middle."<sup>24</sup> He said that "Nyet Nyet Nyet" relationship between the two countries should be replaced by one of "da da da".<sup>25</sup>

Mikoyan's visit was watched with a great deal of interest in the United States. Although some people felt that the visit might have been motivated to show to the Chinese that the Soviet Union did not share their concept of world situation, yet in general the American leaders were cautious in their appraisal and restrained in their optimism. Appearing on 14 January 1959 before a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Dulles evaded the question on the state of Sino-Soviet relations. He only said that although in "the long run" the Communist world would face serious difficulties yet in "the short run" it would expand to the detriment of world peace.<sup>26</sup> He probably wanted to focus the attention of the Congressmen to the talks ahead and did not feel that the United States should slacken its efforts because there was some thawing of the cold war. He emphasized that the Sino-Soviet economic

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24 Ibid., 7 January 1959, p. 1; 9 January 1959, pp. 1, 4.

25 Ibid., 15 January 1959, p. 1.

26 Ibid., p. 7; 11 March 1959, p. 18.

offensive, particularly in Southeast Asia, was causing serious concern to the United States. He also stressed the danger of Chinese military power, which had the Soviet backing, in the Far East.<sup>27</sup> President Eisenhower also expressed similar opinion. In his Press conference the same day, he said that time had to mature before it could be predicted whether Red China was potentially greater threat to the United States or the Soviet Union. He simply said that China was trying hard to become a great industrial and military power.<sup>28</sup> Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.) criticized the evasive testimony of Dulles. He said that he had found only six sentences in the testimony "which contained some new information or some revealing insight or some provocative idea, or some analytical assistance".<sup>29</sup> According to him the Secretary was only reiterating his old ideas. That Fulbright found lack of innovation in US policy towards China was in itself significant.

The Eisenhower Administration wanted to convey to the American people that the purpose of Mikoyan's visit was to seek a meeting of the minds.<sup>30</sup> That both the countries were primarily preoccupied with the danger arising out of the nuclear proliferation was revealed by the fact that just after Mikoyan's

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27 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 2 February 1959, pp. 151-2. See also the statement of Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23 February 1959. *Ibid.*, 16 March 1959, p. 375.

28 New York Times, 15 January 1959, p. 18.

29 *Ibid.*, 18 January 1959, p. 66. See also Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China? A Study in Argument (New York, 1961), p. 13.

30 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 2 February 1959 p. 155.



departure the US Embassy in Moscow delivered on 15 January 1959 a note to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the problem of minimizing the possibility of a surprise attack. The United States expressed the feeling that both the countries should seriously review the problem.<sup>31</sup> Secretary Dulles continued to harp on the line that the ambition of the international communism was the crux of the problem and it would be better for the world peace if the Soviet Union confined itself to the welfare of its own people. This was in line with his old policy of provoking the nationalistic sentiments of the Russians.<sup>32</sup>

Soviet policy seemed to be one of "blow hot blow cold". While on the one hand the Soviet Union boasted of its superior missile power which could tilt the strategic balance in its favour, on the other it showed willingness to enter into a cordial relationship with the United States. Mikoyan's visit was given wide publicity in the Soviet Union and the Moscow radio commented that the warm reception given to him showed that there were no differences between the Soviet and American people that could provoke a war.<sup>33</sup> But Dulles remained unmoved by these statements. He had doubts about the Soviet peace offensive and accused the Soviet Union of spurring the cold war.<sup>34</sup> On the concluding day of Mikoyan's visit, when the latter accused the State Department of not helping to reduce the Soviet-American trade barriers, a State Department spokesman termed Mikoyan's

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31 Ibid., pp. 163-4.

32 Ibid., 16 February 1952, p. 220.

33 New York Times, 14 January 1959, p. 2.

34 Ibid., 28 January 1959, p. 1.

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remark "fatuous".

The American public opinion was not as restrained and cautious as the government. It rushed to the conclusion that the Mikoyan's visit indicated nothing less than the growing discord between the Soviet Union and China. Analyzing Mikoyan's remarks at the National Press Club about Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese communes, the New York Times' political commentator Harrison E. Salisbury said that "Mr. Mikoyan's choice of curt, non-committal language reflected differences between Moscow and Peking of a theoretical nature, specifically on the question of Chinese communes". He said that it "left no doubt that Moscow regards them as an obsolete and imperfect organizational form that will not work without the addition of profit motivation". Salisbury further noted that Chinese population problem was also causing concern to the Soviet Union.<sup>36</sup> The U.S. News and World Report expressed similar views and held that the growing population pressure of China would cause anxiety to the Soviet Union. It added that the problem would all the more become serious for the Soviet Union if China was sufficiently armed with nuclear weapons. It concluded that Khrushchev, "ruling a restive empire -- had plenty to fear".<sup>37</sup>

In a report published in The New Republic about the 21st Congress of the CPSU it was held that there were serious ideological differences between the Soviet Union and China over

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25 Ibid., 20 January 1959, p. 1.

36 Ibid., 25 January 1959, p. 4.

37 U.S. News and World Report (Washington, D.C.), vol. 46, 16 January 1959, p. 53.

the latter's experiment in commune system which was termed as "a revolutionary short-cut to the higher stage of egalitarian Communism". The report said that although the Chinese leaders approved of the Soviet line, it was under "Soviet pressure". It added that despite the fact that China had accepted the Soviet claim to leadership in foreign policy and ideology yet it emphasized the independence of approach within the limits of the "common laws of socialist development"<sup>38</sup>. Identical views were expressed by Isaac Deutscher in The Reporter who said that at the 21st Congress Khrushchev was able to reach something like a compromise with Mao by admitting that the Communist Parties would not interfere in each other's internal affairs. He concluded that "the Chinese and the Russians were determined to maintain their solidarity vis-a-vis the West yet there were wide ideological differences between the two Parties and Khrushchev had for the first time openly admitted it"<sup>39</sup>.

Many of the newspapers and columnists did not indulge in much speculations about the motive behind the Mikoyan visit. They, however, felt that it was a good omen and would strengthen the Soviet-American economic ties. The Nation editorially expressed its happiness at the prospect of US-USSR business.<sup>40</sup> It also published an interview with Cyrus S. Eaton, an American

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38 The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 140, 16 February 1959, p. 7.

39 Isaac Deutscher, "Khrushchev, Mao, and Stalin's Ghost", The Reporter (New York), vol. 20, 19 February 1959, p. 16.

40 The Nation (New York), vol. 128, 17 January 1959, p. 41. Also see Paul Niven, "Mikoyan - Plus and Minus", The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 140, 2 February 1959, p. 7.

industrialist who strongly championed the cause of East-West trade. It may be noted that in Cleveland, Ohio, Mikoyan had spoken to the American industrialists under his auspices.<sup>41</sup>

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA POLICY

The United States assessed the Soviet peace offensive against the background of a changing Sino-Soviet relationship. Commenting on the power struggle in the Soviet Union Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy said that since Khrushchev had apparently won the battle there was more likelihood that he would take "greater risks" in international affairs. Referring to the deliberations in the 21st Congress of the CPSU he said Chou En-lai's speech there was "more militant" and there was "the possibility of future differences" between the Soviet Union and China.<sup>42</sup> Murphy pointed out: "In contrast to the lack of emphasis by Khrushchev upon the 'contradictions' of Western society, Chou declared that 'the enemy rots away with every passing day'. While Khrushchev argued that growing Communist strength makes war less inevitable, Chou warned that 'imperialist war maniacs may stake their hope on war'." He noted that Mikoyan's statement in the Congress was also much milder in comparison to that of Chou and represented "a new doctrinal step beyond the 'war is not inevitable' dogma enunciated at the 20th Congress 3 years ago".<sup>43</sup> While pointing

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41 The Nation (New York), vol. 188, 31 January 1959, p. 87.

42 New York Times, 11 February 1959, p. 42.

43 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 2 March 1959, p. 293.

to these indications of Sino-Soviet differences, Murphy also warned against any underestimation of the strength of the Sino-Soviet combination.<sup>44</sup>

Although the United States differentiated between the Soviet restraint and the Chinese arrogance, it was not sure in which direction the Sino-Soviet relations would develop in future.<sup>45</sup> It felt that as a Communist country China might as well follow the leadership of Moscow. After all Mao had reiterated this time and again.<sup>46</sup>

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 May 1959, Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson stated that it was much better that China was economically and militarily dependent upon the Soviet Union. He thus implied that the Russians were far more restrained than China and possibly could not launch an aggressive action without its acquiescence. He however doubted whether China would like to allow this situation to continue indefinitely or the Soviet Union would continue to feed the Chinese war machine perpetually. He noted that the launching of the system of the "Chinese commune" was motivated by the desire to rapidly industrialize China so that the latter could maintain independently its 2.5 million army.<sup>47</sup>

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44 Ibid., 8 June 1959, p. 829.

45 See Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson's speech in the Congress on 21 April 1959. New York Times, 22 April 1959, p. 5.

46 See Statement by Robertson before the Canadian Club, Ottawa, on 13 March 1959. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 6 April 1959, p. 475.

47 U.S., Congress, 86, I, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Mutual Security Act of 1959 (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 389-90.

The combined strength of the Soviet Union and China remained a matter of concern for the United States. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, cautioned against this danger and expressed the view that both Moscow and Peking were guided by the concept of international communism.<sup>48</sup> On 17 March 1959, the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, concluded:

It is indisputable that Communist military strength is steadily increasing. Clear evidence has recently appeared of an intent to wield that strength in order to obtain political objectives. The attack on Quemoy, the threats of atomic destruction, and the talk of possible war over West Berlin, are the most dramatic recent instances of the continuance of the military threat. 49

The unlikelihood of an imminent Sino-Soviet rift was stressed by others too. A New York Times commentator noted that China's need for external assistance precluded any rift with the Soviet Union. He argued that this was reflected in the appointment of Liu Shao-chi, "the Moscow-trained super party-line theorist", as Chairman of the People's Republic of China in the place of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>50</sup>

Although the uncertainty in Sino-Soviet relations did not result in a call for a change in US policy yet it influenced American opinion. As the rigour of the cold war somewhat declined Americans started thinking in terms of opening up a new pattern of relationship with China.

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48 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 27 April 1959, pp. 583-9, 590-6.

49 Ibid., 1 June 1959, p. 799.

50 Greg MacGregor, "Ambitious China Program Tightens Ties to Soviet", New York Times, 31 May 1959, p. IV:3.

## TOWARDS A SOFTER CHINA POLICY

For a few months after the Quemoy crisis Peking was unusually silent about the future of Taiwan and the Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks at Warsaw. Probably, this was the time when serious differences were developing with the Soviet Union. It may be noted here that in February 1959 while celebrating the ninth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet treaty, the Chinese Government emphasized the point that the American aggression was checkmated by the "Chinese people". It gave credit to the Soviet Union only for solidly backing up the Chinese people. Moreover, the Soviet Union was clubbed with the "other fraternal countries"<sup>51</sup>.

It was only on 18 April 1959, after the Ambassadorial talks of 7 November 1958, that the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai for the first time reopened the issue of Taiwan after remaining silent for months and accused the US imperialism of occupying Taiwan and threatening Chinese security. He also vehemently criticized it for its "Two Chinas plot" and ascribed the ill feeling between the two nations also to the absence of a diplomatic tie. He said:

China is willing to establish diplomatic relations on an equal footing with all countries. There are now no diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and indeed their relations are very bad. As the whole world knows, responsibility for this state of affairs does not rest with us. We have not gone swashbuckling to the United States, we are not blockading the United States, occupying its territory or creating two United States of America. There is only one United States of America in the world. Likewise, there is only one China in the world. Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan.

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51 Young, n. 6, p. 202.

Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu. All US armed forces in the Taiwan area must be withdrawn. The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate any plot to carve up Chinese territory and create "two Chinas". 52

On 23 April 1959, the State Department issued a Press release saying that it would extend for one year the validity of the passports of some thirty American correspondents who were to go to Communist China. It is to be noted that it was on 22 August 1957 that the State Department had agreed to grant these passports in response to a Chinese offer of inviting certain American newsmen to visit China. But when the State Department named some thirty news organizations who might enjoy this facility by sending one representative each the Chinese refused to grant visas to them with one exception. The Press release refuted the Chinese charge that the United States was not showing reciprocity. It made it clear that if the equal number of Chinese newsmen requested for American visas the State Department was "prepared to consider recommending to the Attorney General a waiver under the law so that a visa could be granted"<sup>53</sup>. This was an indication of the softening of US attitude.

By mid 1959 there was a growing feeling in political circles that urged a revision in the US China policy. It was also voiced in the Congress. On 21 May 1959, Senator Clair Engle (Dem., Calif.) pleaded for a realistic approach towards China and urged for an exchange of newsmen and a relaxation of

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52 Peking Review, vol. 2, 21 April 1959, p. 27.

53 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, 11 May 1959, pp. 673-4.



trade embargo. He said that although Taiwan's interest should be protected yet Taiwan problem should receive an international solution. He argued strongly against helping or instigating Taiwan to indulge in military adventures against mainland China.<sup>54</sup> Although Engle's speech drew support from liberal-minded Congressmen, it was generally ignored by the Press. It found no mention in the New York Times and the internationally minded San Francisco Chronicle published it as an unimportant news item on page seven.<sup>55</sup>

At the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Conlon Associates, Ltd., a private research firm of San Francisco, prepared a "Report on Asia". Robert A. Scalapino, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, who wrote the China section of the report, argued for a systematic revision of America's China policy. He pleaded for a more workable relationship with China to be preceded by Chinese entry into the Security Council along with India and Japan as permanent members. He added: "If feasible, the United States would negotiate a treaty of commerce with Communist China, and if successful this would be followed by de facto recognition."<sup>56</sup> The Senate Foreign Relations Committee showed its interest in holding public hearings in the light of revisionist opinions about China policy. But when it found that the Executive Branch

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<sup>54</sup> Congressional Record, 85, II, vol. 105 (1959), pp. 8760-2. See also the Editorial: "Engle Speaks Up", The New Republic (Washington, D.C.), vol. 140, 1 January 1959, p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> The Economist (London), vol. 192, 25 July 1959, p. 221.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted by Steele, n. 16, pp. 212-13.

of the Government was not willing to offer testimony on a voluntary basis it decided not to proceed with the hearings.<sup>57</sup> The Conlon Report, like the Engle speech, proved to be nothing more than mere intellectual exercise.

#### THE AMERICAN-SOVIET THAW

Efforts for a Soviet-American rapprochement went apace. Vice President Richard M. Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union on 23 July 1959 and the subsequent announcement of the exchange of visits by Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower were considered to be footsteps in the direction.<sup>58</sup> On 1 August 1959, in a radio and television address at Moscow, Nixon said: "what we need today is not two worlds but one world where different peoples choose the economic and political systems which they want but when there is free communication among all the peoples living on this earth."<sup>59</sup>

Soon after Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev paid an official visit to the United States in September. On his arrival in New York on 15 September, Khrushchev said that the main purpose of his visit, like that of Mikoyan and Kozlov earlier, was "breaking up the ice of the cold war". Addressing the UN General Assembly on 18 September he propounded a sensational plan for total and universal disarmament in four years. The talks with President Eisenhower at Camp David on 25-27 September resulted in generating enormous

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57 Ibid., p. 213.

58 New York Times, 30 June 1959, p. 1; 4 August 1959, p. 1.

59 Department of State Bulletin, vol. 41, 17 August 1959, p. 235.

good will. They paved the way for the four-power meeting which was scheduled to begin in Paris on 16 May 1960 to resolve the Berlin problem. The Soviet-American relations further improved as a result of an agreement that the negotiations on the settlement of the USSR's lend-lease debt would be resumed as a prelude to any further expansion of Soviet-American trade. Both the countries also agreed to a broadening of bilateral cultural and technical exchanges and joint ventures in the fields of medical research and "atoms-for-peace" programme.<sup>60</sup>

Like the Mikoyan visit the Khrushchev visit gave rise to speculations about the Sino-Soviet-American ties. Although the White House and the State Department did not consider it as heralding a new era in Soviet-American relations yet they termed it as successful experiment. Adlai Stevenson called it a "Hopeful Omen" for peace.<sup>61</sup> Speaking at a news conference President Eisenhower said that Khrushchev's visit was only "a beginning" towards melting the ice in East-West relations. He said that as a friendly gesture the Soviet Premier had agreed to take up with the Chinese Government the release of five American civilians held in jail in China.<sup>62</sup> The President subsequently stated in his memoirs that "it seemed that at the end of the Khrushchev visit there was less public pessimism than when he came to our shores".<sup>63</sup>

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60 Stebbins, n. 5, pp. 31-33.

61 New York Times, 29 September 1959, p. 1.

62 Ibid.

63 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years : Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y., 1965), pp. 448-9.

The American political commentators devoted considerable attention to the state of Sino-Soviet relationship. Tillman Durdin of the New York Times wrote that the Chinese were closely watching the developments in the Soviet-American relations and that explained their relative coolness for the past few months. He added that Peking was carefully studying the Soviet motives. Ever since the signing of the Sino-Soviet agreement in the early 1959, according to which the Soviet Union was supposed to exchange its capital goods and technicians for Chinese products, there had been no significant development in the Sino-Soviet relations. Durdin concluded that China was not happy at the prospect of a Soviet-American rapprochement. He pointed out that the Chinese Press had not shown much interest in Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union and Poland earlier. Even in its limited coverage it had presented Nixon as unpopular with the Russians. Durdin felt that if Soviet-American rapprochement continued apace then it would "be a source of concern in Peiping and add to the strain on relations that have long encompassed such prickly matters as rival expansionist programs in Central Asia and competition for influence in South and South-east Asia."<sup>64</sup>

Harry Schwartz, another columnist said in his piece in the New York Times that the Soviet Union was clearly not sharing the Chinese views regarding such matters as relationship with India. Although Premier Khrushchev in his recently published Foreign Affairs article did not mention China, yet it was clear that he did not share the Chinese ill feelings against Nehru on the

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64 Tillman Durdin, "China Presses for a Role on World Stage", New York Times, 16 August 1959, p. IV:3.

question of Tibet. Schwartz said that Peking must not have overlooked President Eisenhower's recent statement to reporters that he was confident that there was increased Soviet concern about China. Schwartz felt that Eisenhower's statement implied that the United States had taken into consideration the prospect of a Sino-Soviet rift at the time of inviting Khrushchev.<sup>65</sup>

Harrison E. Salisbury, also of the New York Times, attributed Khrushchev's overtures to the United States to the fear of China's atomic potential.<sup>66</sup>

The view that the Sino-Soviet rift was growing was not shared by all. In a paper read before the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Allen S. Whiting, an eminent American student of Chinese foreign policy behaviour said that the "hope for dissolution of Sino-Soviet alliance seems misplaced". He cautioned the Americans against entertaining the wishful thinking that there were growing differences between the Soviet Union and China. He said: "Talk of an allegedly 'inevitable' Sino-Soviet schism may serve as intellectual aspirin to repress our policy headaches with both Moscow and Peking. Like aspirin, however, the repressant only postpones coping with the problem; it does not eliminate it." Whiting also emphasized that it was wrong to believe that the Soviet Union was concerned at the prospects of the growing Chinese population pressure on Mongolia. In support of his argument

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65 Harry Schwartz, "Sino-Soviet Relationship Still an Enigma", *ibid.*, 6 September 1959, p. IV:3. For Khrushchev's article see Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence", Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. 38, October 1959, pp. 1-18.

66 New York Times, 11 September 1959, pp. 1, 10.

he cited the fact that the Soviet Union had assisted China in building a railway linking Peking with Ulan-Ude in the Buryat-Mongol Soviet Republic which traversed the Mongolian People's Republic.<sup>67</sup>

Khrushchev's visit to China immediately after his return to Moscow created enormous interest in the United States. Many of the American observers expressed the view that since the Chinese did not approve of Khrushchev's visit to the United States which they considered as "Enemy No. 1", Khrushchev had to make a visit to China to placate the Chinese leaders. They implied that serious differences existed between the Soviet Union and China over their respective positions on international issues. They did not, however, contemplate any change in American policy.<sup>68</sup>

There were a large number of Americans who fondly believed that China was behaving arrogantly and that the Soviet Union was trying to put pressure on China to realistically appreciate the changed world situation. The Nation commented that Khrushchev's visit to Peking was meant to placate his "powerful and bullheaded" ally but there was no conspicuous success.<sup>69</sup> C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times said that in spite of ideological differences both the United States and the Soviet Union had understood the danger arising out

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67 Ibid., 12 September 1959, p. 3.

68 Ibid., 30 September 1959, p. 5.

69 Editorial: "Pre-Summit Contretemps", The Nation (New York), vol. 189, 24 October 1959, p. 241.

of nuclear weapons but this China had failed to understand.<sup>70</sup> Most of the American diplomats in Washington were convinced that Khrushchev had gone to China to dissuade the latter from pursuing adventurist policies. They noted that in spite of his boastings about Communist achievements Khrushchev had cautioned that they do not "by any means signify that if we are so strong, then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system". Contrary to the Soviet restraint, the diplomats noted, the Chinese had expressed their determination "to<sup>71</sup> liberate our territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu".

Opinion was expressed in some quarters that since China was in a different stage of development of communism it was unlikely that it would support the Soviet Union on relaxation of tension.<sup>72</sup> Tillman Durdin wrote that China's differences with the United States were fundamental involving such questions as the fate of Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu and the entire Southeast Asia and so China would not change its policies just because the Soviet Union desired it.<sup>73</sup> The New York Times wrote in an editorial that there were wide differences between the Soviet

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70 C.L. Sulzberger, "Changing the Cold War's Name", New York Times, 30 September 1959, p. 36. See also C.L. Sulzberger, What's Wrong with U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 1959), pp. 203-4.

71 New York Times, 4 October 1959, p. 19; 21 November 1959, p. 22; 23 November 1959, p. 30.

72 Ibid., 4 October 1959, p. IV:1.

73 Tillman Durdin, "Peking is Wary of the Coexistence Theme", ibid., 4 October 1959, p. IV:3. See also Harry Schwartz, "The Talks : Unanswered Questions", ibid., p. IV: 5; E.W. Kenworthy, "Communists Keep up Propaganda Barrage", ibid., 11 October 1959, p. IV: 9.

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Union and China.

The Eisenhower Administration did not undertake the task of revision of the US China policy. On the contrary, the State Department blamed the Soviet Union for the Chinese action over Taiwan. The United States still held Russia responsible for Chinese actions over Taiwan and said that it might lead to "total war".<sup>75</sup>

Thus, it is evident that by 1959 the United States saw the Sino-Soviet relations in a different perspective. However, the actual policy was based on the old instinctive drives developed during the cold war. This was being assailed by those who thought that a new approach was needed. James Reston, for instance, questioned the sagacity of Secretary of State Christian Herter's statement that the Soviet Union had "a great degree of responsibility" for the actions of China. He believed that such statements could provoke Moscow to champion the cause of China.<sup>76</sup> Reston's argument implied that mere American statements could again bring them together. The difference between the critics and those who were being

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74 New York Times, 5 October 1959, p. 30. The Reporter also felt that there should not be any change in American policy. It commented that the United States must not be swayed by a sense of complacency and cautioned against the Russian moves. See Editorial: "Now That We've Seen Him", The Reporter (New York), vol. 21, 15 October 1959, pp. 18-22.

75 New York Times, 7 October 1959, p. 10; 8 October 1959, pp. 1, 10; 17 October 1959, pp. 1, 2; 21 October 1959, p. 12.

76 James Reston, "Am I My Brother's Keeper?", *ibid.*, 11 October 1959, p. IV: 4.



criticized was not fundamentally and radically different. But the critics wanted the American government to change its policy hoping that it would work. The upholders of the policy had no such hope.

The United States stuck to its policy of non-recognition, opposition to China's entry into the United Nations, maintenance of embargo against trade with China, presence of American naval forces in the Taiwan Straits and continuance of security relations with Taiwan. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter upheld the old policy. The President turned down the proposal made by Congressman Charles O. Porter (Dem., Ore.)<sup>77</sup> for an exchange of visits with the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

The need for change was becoming increasingly more apparent. More and more people joined the ranks of those who wanted change. The old critics became more insistent and vocal. After the visits of the Russian leaders to the United States, things could not remain as before. The perception had changed but it was not easy to change policy.

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<sup>77</sup> New York Times, 13 August 1959, p. 10; 14 August 1959, p. 2.

**Chapter VII**

**CONCLUSION**

## Chapter VII

### CONCLUSION

American perception of the Sino-Soviet relations during the period under survey was an interesting amalgum of pragmatism and emotionalism; of fear psychosis and wishful thinking. During this one decade it evolved through several phases in which one or several of these elements predominated. Often this perception did not translate itself into an indication of clear policy direction but pointed in different directions. Individuals, and officials, in the foreign policy process argued for different options, for, they viewed the situation from different perspectives. The result was that the US policy frequently gave the appearance of being indecisive and vague. In times of crisis a sense of unity and coherence did appear but it vanished the moment crisis eased.

How far the American policy was influenced by the perception of the Sino-Soviet relations of the concerned elites is not very clear. Nor can it be said that these concerned elites shared any common perception. But the administration no doubt had several channels of information unavailable to the public at large, and, therefore, was in a better position to formulate its own position and influence the public opinion to a considerable extent. But such was the profound uncertainty and confusion regarding the nature of Sino-Soviet relations that within the administration several alternate positions were advocated. In weighing various policy options the political leadership at the head of the administration attached considerable

importance to what policy would have public support. Thus if the government because of its control over information influenced the opinion of the concerned elites, the opinion of the elites too had its impact on government policies. The administration was always more cautious and calculating than the other elements in the foreign policy process like the Press, the elite groups, and even the Congress. While an important segment in the Congress was moved more often by emotion than appreciation of reality and cherished the illusion that Sino-Soviet rift was imminent, the executive being more realist only occasionally indulged in such hopes. Even faced with a steady deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relationship, its feeling of satisfaction was not unmingled with reservations and caution.

In the policy pronouncements and decisions of the executive one can see a gradual evolution influenced by its own calculation of what was the state of Sino-Soviet relations and much more, what it was likely to be. But it was not a one-way street. If the government's own policies were influenced by what it conceived to be public view, concerned elites were in turn influenced by administration's views. In fact, American public had very limited knowledge of the developments which took place in Sino-Soviet relations. The United States had no diplomatic links with China nor had it any newspaper representative there. Its sources were indirect.

The period under survey from this point of view can be broadly divided into five phases: first, from the establishment of the People's Republic of China to the outbreak of the Korean war;

second, from the beginning of the Korean war to the Chinese intervention; third, from the intervention to the meeting of the Geneva Conference; fourth, from the conclusion of peace in Geneva in 1954 to the second Quemoy crisis in 1958; and fifth, the beginning of the thaw in 1959. Though one must say that there is no clear line of demarcation between the one phase and the other. Ideas from one phase survived into the other but one can also feel the prevalence of new ideas.

First phase : In this phase the United States nurtured a number of ideas simultaneously, namely, China would be a partner of the Soviet Union, Chinese communism would be a passing phase, Mao's independent personality would come in conflict with the Soviet leadership, Chinese people would realize the Soviet selfish motives and would revolt against them, etc. The United States believed that China's becoming Communist in October 1949 posed a potential security threat. Not only there was a possibility of its following the Soviet Union and thereby augmenting the power of the Soviet bloc but China also presented the rather unpleasant prospect of setting a model of socialist economic growth in Asia. Many in the United States felt that the outcome of the competition between "totalitarian" and "democratic" modes of economic growth would to a considerable extent determine America's fate in Asia. This sentiment made President Truman to exhort that where private capital was unable to meet the need, American government should provide large quantities of aid to generate economic growth and progress.<sup>1</sup>

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1 Message of the President to the Congress, 6 March 1952. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 26, 17 March 1952, p. 407.

It was argued that the Soviet-American Cold-War was rooted in the social, economic and political differences of the two powers. Accordingly Communist China was a natural ally of the Soviet Union and consequently an enemy of the United States. But on the other hand some people argued that it was possible that a country might be Communist but not pro-Soviet. Therefore, China's acceptance of communism did not necessarily make it an enemy of the United States. The latter claimed that it was not opposed to communism as such but when only it assumed an expansionist character. And it called the Soviet Union an expansionist power. The Cold War began largely due to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union alone had the necessary capability to appear as a threat to each other and this situation resulted in a state where mutual suspicions and hatreds were bound to arise. Differences in ideology of the two nations merely aggravated these suspicions and fears.

It was understood by the United States that the Soviet Union posed a threat to its objective of maintaining its dominance. It also understood that the Soviet Union was globally using its ideology as an instrument to counter American influence. The distinction between mere communism and that supporting the Soviet Union became all the more evident when Yugoslavia despite its communism defied the Soviet Union. American goodwill and material assistance to Yugoslavia thereafter demonstrated that adherence to communism did not necessarily make a country non-grata for America. On the contrary, defiance of the Soviet Union made it more eligible for American assistance. It, however, remained true that the Communist ideology of a state made it

easier for the Soviet Union to extend its influence. Any country which embraced communism for one reason or other was viewed as a potential threat until it proved otherwise by raising a banner of revolt against the Soviet Union. The question was thus quite complex.

When the People's Republic of China was established, it caused serious anxiety to the United States as the latter viewed China as a potential area of Soviet influence. It also feared that the Soviet Union would ~~also~~ use China to extend its influence in Asia. The National Security Council argued that ever since the defeat of Japan there was practically no nation in the Far East which could withstand the Soviet power. The Soviet Union, it reported, was "able to consolidate its strategic position until the base of Soviet power in Asia now comprises not only the Soviet Far East, but also China north of the Great Wall, Northern Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles". It strongly felt that China would "represent a political asset to the USSR in accomplishment of its global objective"<sup>2</sup>. But in this there was a little hitch. In the first place, many Americans had doubts about the permanence of the Communist regime in China, and secondly, the Americans knew the Chinese as great nationalists who for long were unlikely to be subservient to the Soviet Union. They calculated that if the ruling Communist leaders in China behaved subserviently to Moscow they would face domestic resistance and would be eventually overthrown. Secretary Acheson

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<sup>2</sup> N.S.C. 48/1. See US, Department of Defense, United States Vietnam Relations ; 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C., 1971), Book 8 of 12, pp. 226-44. Cited hereinafter as Pentagon Papers.

was one important personage who fondly nourished such hopes and gave frequent expression to these.<sup>3</sup> In retrospect, it now appears amusing that Acheson and many others believed that only real Communists could be subservient to Moscow. When the Sino-Soviet rift reached its height in the 1960s, the Chinese Communists staked their claim of being "true" Communists and accused the Soviet Union of deviating from the goals of Marxism-Leninism.

The Americans took serious note of the "hate America" campaign that was launched by the Chinese Communists in 1949-50 which led them to conclude that there was close link between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. However, Mao's personality was a constant enigma for them. The result of this contradiction in their perception was that the American policy towards China was not based on the assumption of the Chinese Communist leaders being the puppets in the hands of the Soviet Union. But in order to put pressure on the Chinese leadership, the United States often at times directed a propaganda barrage toward the Chinese people alleging that the Soviet Union coveted Chinese territory and that the Americans were traditional friends of China who had stood for the Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.<sup>4</sup>

If the United States did not accept Mao as a puppet of Kremlin, it also did not accept him as an Asian Tito. They wavered between their two divergent assessments. While the

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3 Statement of Secretary Acheson at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950. See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 22, 23 January 1950, pp. 114-15.

4 Ibid.



policy makers entertained the hope that China might go the Yugoslavia way, yet they got ready to contain the thrust in Southeast Asia by China either alone or in collusion with the Soviet Union. This policy was enshrined in NSC 48/2 of 30 December 1949. It stated that the United States would "adopt a posture most hostile or policies more harsh toward Communist China than towards the USSR"<sup>5</sup>. This was to be supplemented by the creation of a situation of strength to face any eventuality of a war with the Soviet Union, alone or joined by the Chinese. This was probably calculated to deter China from full scale collusion with the Soviet Union. That the Soviet Union was viewed as the principal adversary during this period is evident from the decision to go for the Hydrogen bomb and the drafting of the NSC 68 which set out a blueprint for US military strategy against the possible growth in Soviet influence during this period. Indeed, from the beginning of his presidency, Truman was convinced that "force is the only thing the Russians understand" and that it was necessary to "face Russia with an iron fist and strong language"<sup>6</sup>. Secretary Acheson endorsed the idea. The establishment of the PRC only strengthened that resolve. Since during this period Americans had no doubt about the Soviet intentions and the threat it posed to American security, no efforts were made to woo the Soviet Union. But, as already stated, the case of China was different.

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5 Report by the National Security Council on The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia. Pentagon Papers, n. 2, p. 270.

6 Quoted by Henry T. Nash, American Foreign Policy : Response to a Sense of Threat (Homewood, Ill., 1973), p. 16.

Second phase : The outbreak of war in Korea did not bring an immediate end to the first phase. The United States continued to hope for improvement in relations with China. For the North Korean aggression against South Korea, the United States threw the entire blame on the Soviet Union. China was not even mentioned in this context. The Truman Administration, however, believed that the Soviet Union was using China for its own purpose and a Sino-Soviet programme of world revolution had been launched under the auspices of Moscow. The United States believed that the Soviet Union was likely to assume the posture of an "interested bystander" while involving the United States in confrontation with the Communist Chinese and other Soviet satellites. American people endorsed Truman's decision to go to war with an overwhelming majority. One might observe here that unlike the debate on the Vietnam war as to "why Vietnam War", the Korean debate was over "how" to conduct it. There were no doubt differences as to how this threat should be met but none whatever that the threat had to be met. Any idea that the North Korean invasion might have been motivated by a patriotic desire to attain national unity was ruled out by the Americans. The United States government, supported by an overwhelming majority, jumped to the conclusion that it was a Soviet manoeuvre. This perception was reflected in a major shift in America's China policy. Its policy towards China hardened. The United States' stance over the recognition issue was stiffened, it moved in the Seventh Fleet to prevent the unification of Taiwan with China thereby bringing Taiwan within the American defence perimeter.

In the environment of suspicion and hostility generated by the intensification of the Cold War, it was probably the only conclusion that the government and the people in the United States could reach. And the fact that China was led by Communists made them believe that the latter's sympathies were with the Soviet Union. Though China was not initially accused of planning the aggression, yet once America intervened in the war, it took into consideration what China could do in the event it decided to back up the Soviet Union, or take advantage of the confusion to further its own nationalistic aim of uniting Taiwan with the mainland by using force. Efforts were made to make Taiwan an American bastion in the Pacific. But in spite of all these changes, the policy of reassuring China that the United States had really no hostile intention towards it while pursuing the policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union continued. The impression was given that the American objectives in Korea were limited. As soon as the "security in the Pacific" was restored and a peace settlement with Japan had taken place, the future of Formosa could be decided by the United States.

Third phase : American perception dramatically changed with the Chinese entry into the Korean war in November 1950. From this time onwards, upto the change in the leadership in the Kremlin following the death of Stalin and the subsequent changes in the Soviet foreign policy the United States entertained a feeling that the relationship between the Soviet Union and China were very close and their expansionist and anti-American policies were coordinated in Moscow. Both Acheson's "total diplomacy" and Dulles' "massive retaliation" were meant to contain the threat of

the Sino-Soviet bloc. The substance of the Truman-MacArthur controversy in a way reflected two different views of this relationship. President Truman was convinced that if the Korean war was escalated to force the mainland China to come in, the Soviet Union would surely intervene and the war would assume global proportions. The Secretary of Defence George Marshall subsequently stated that the General's actions might "expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in the Middle and Eastern Europe".<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, MacArthur as a military man could not sufficiently appreciate the concept of limited war. For him there could be no substitute for victory in a war. He criticized the Truman policy as appeasement and blamed the Administration for its adherence to "the concept that when you use force, you can limit the force".<sup>8</sup> It can also be said that the General's fear of the Sino-Soviet combination was far less than that of the President. Unlike MacArthur, Truman not only visualized the military danger arising out of the extension of the war involving China but also understood its political implications. In addition to strengthening the Sino-Soviet bond, such a course of action could alienate American allies. Already England had showed its willingness to follow a softer line towards China. The January 1951 meeting

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7 U.S. Cong. 82, I, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington, D.C., 1951), p. 325.

8 See Les K. Adler and Thomas J. Paterson, "Red Fascism and the Development of the Cold War", in Gary R. Hess, ed., America and Russia : From Cold War Confrontation to Coexistence (New York, 1973), p. 70.

between Truman and the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee revealed further differences between American and British perceptions of the Sino-Soviet relations. The United States was convinced that China and the Soviet Union coordinated their moves and refused to subscribe to the British view that given opportunity China would break free of the Soviet Union. Hence, between the two rival prescriptions - one advocated by the British for an immediate end to the war and the other put forward by MacArthur for a full-scale war with an objective to gain victory - the Truman Administration remained firm in its policy of "limited war", eschewing the chances of widening the war and involving China and possibly the Soviet Union.

The United States Government's firm belief in the existence of a close Sino-Soviet tie did not change with the change in the administration in Washington. The Eisenhower-Dulles team like its predecessor continued to see communism as a monolith; an all-devouring dragon with its head in the Kremlin. Dulles who played such a dominant role in formulating American foreign policy in the Eisenhower Administration went to the extent of imparting a moral connotation to the entire Cold War. Dulles argued that even non-alignment was immoral.<sup>9</sup> Anti-communism, and not even non-communism, was the only morality, he felt. With such heavy

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9 Dulles failed to distinguish between non-alignment and neutrality. Interpreting them as synonymous he declared that neutrality "which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others" had "increasingly become an obsolete conception and except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception". See Department of State Bulletin, vol. 34, 18 June 1956, pp. 999-1000.

emphasis on moralism in international relations Dulles saw no need to explore the nature of Sino-Soviet relations. They both were evils and it was the purpose of the US policy to defeat and destroy them.

Fourth phase : The idea that communism was a monolith, however, gradually gave way to a new idea that international communism had two nerve centres — Moscow and Peking. The death of Stalin in 1953 led to a new concept of group leadership in the Soviet Union. One thing which this leadership did was to signal to the United States that it was interested in a truce in the Korean war. This eventually led to the Geneva Conference. Although the change in Soviet leadership can be regarded as a stage but the present writer feels that the Geneva Conference was the most concrete manifestation of this change and in this work he has viewed it as marking the end of one phase and the beginning of another.

The United States in the beginning failed to perceive any basic difference in the operational style of the new Soviet government from that of its predecessor. But as the days passed, the United States slowly began to appreciate that the new government was taking relatively soft approach to the West. In contrast to the new Russian leadership, the Chinese appeared much more doctrinaire and determined to oppose "American imperialism". The American view of China consequently began to change. Its perception of Sino-Soviet relations in the latter half of the fifties was diametrically opposite to the one it had held immediately following the establishment of Communist government in China. First, the United States no longer believed that the

Soviet Union controlled the Chinese Communists and for any commission or omission of the latter the Soviet Union was responsible. Now it believed that the international communism had two nerve centres, one in Moscow and the other in Peking. The implication was that in the Communist world two power centres had emerged and each required an independent American response. As the United States gradually moved towards a policy of seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and receiving favourable response from the latter, it came to believe that of the two, the Soviet Union was more responsible. China itself was viewed as constituting a threat to the security interests of the United States. Efforts were made now to highlight the understanding between the two great powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- maintaining an intricate global balance of power. The Soviet Union was regarded as more mature and more responsible. It was not interested in promoting revolutions abroad but China was more radical, intent upon promoting world revolution. In this sense it was a greater threat. Unlike the earlier days when the United States made conciliatory gestures to China to lure it to break free of the Soviet influence, gestures were now directed towards the Soviet Union to impress upon them the need not to back China's adventurist policies involving the risk of super-power confrontation. The US perception had come round a circle. The United States thus tried to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union thereby not only lessening the world tension but also driving a wedge in the Sino-Soviet relations.

After the meeting of the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 in which Khrushchev vehemently assailed

the cult of Stalin and evoked sharp Chinese reaction, the United States became more hopeful of the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rift. In spite of Dulles' constant effort not to over-react to this possibility one can find his deep sense of understanding of the shape of things to come in the Sino-Soviet relationship. He clearly understood that a process had started which would lead to a division in the Communist camp. He, however, strongly opposed any change in the basic anti-Communist stance of the United States and took sufficient precaution not to over-react.

Fifth phase : Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new one in the Soviet-American relations. Such enthusiasm was generated by this extra-ordinary visit that in certain quarters voices were raised supporting the idea of similar exchanges between Chinese and American leaders. Congressman Charles O. Porter (Dem., Ore.) pleaded for a visit of the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to the United States.<sup>10</sup> The Administration ignored the suggestion. In fact, when meeting between Khrushchev and Eisenhower took place the issues relating to China did not figure. And subsequent to the visit, the United States did not relent in its opposition to China's recognition and its admission to the United Nations. At Camp David when President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev issued joint communique, the emphasis was on the disarmament and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Although the United States was receiving reports of serious Sino-Soviet differences, it had not reached

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10 New York Times, 13 August 1959, p. 10; 14 August 1959, p. 2.



the conclusion by this time that the breach between the two Communist powers was irreparable and the United States could act in a way to benefit from it. No doubt there were solid grounds for seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The United States, however, could not be unaware that one result of rapprochement with the Soviet Union would be to increase the Sino-Soviet differences. It was well known that the Chinese were not happy with the Soviet Union's policy of seeking accommodation with the West. The United States was still not willing to base its policy on this. It did not believe that a point-of-no-return had been reached in the Sino-Soviet relations.

Foreign policy issues figured significantly in the presidential election of 1960 and the voters' choice for lessening the tension was reflected in the election campaign. Although in the initial stage of his election campaign the Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon gave the assurance that if elected he would pursue a tough policy towards the Soviet Union, he moved subsequently to a less tough position in response to the public mood. The Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy's case was no different. He was critical of the Eisenhower Administration for its failure to uphold the prestige of the United States vis-a-vis the Communist world. But it was nothing more than campaign rhetoric. Indeed, hardly any substantive differences on foreign policy issues appeared between them. Both the candidates understood the need of adjustment with the changing world situation but in practical terms both were unwilling to take any major risk so far as policy was concerned. The Kennedy Administration inherited the legacy of the ideas and policies of

the Eisenhower Administration as far as Sino-Soviet relations were concerned.

On the basis of our study of American perception of Sino-Soviet relations over nearly a decade, one can draw certain general inferences about foreign policy process in the United States. It has already been noted that the executive was far more cautious in evaluating developments in Sino-Soviet relations than other elements like the Congress or the Press. Members of the Congress and the Press often moved by their wishful thinking advocated policy option which would not have served American national interest. But the executive refused to be hustled in. It withstood the pressure because it alone has the capability within the system to initiate changes in foreign policy. It also carries the responsibility for change. Therefore, before it initiates a change it wants to be certain that an objective situation warranting such a change now exists. This was the case in respect to American policy towards the Soviet Union and China.

For the major part of this period, though the United States prepared itself for the military containment of the Communist expansion but by and large, the problem remained essentially of a political nature. One result of this was that it was the State Department which played a very dominant role and whose views of the nature of Sino-Soviet relations dominated in shaping the American perception in this regard. This was also because of the dominant personality of the two Secretaries who presided over the State Department -- Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles.

Truman and Eisenhower both had enormous confidence in their respective Secretaries of State and therefore their advice mattered. Even when the Korean War broke out and subsequently the Chinese twice launched the offensive against Quemoy and Matsu, the importance of the State Department did not diminish. It is clear that similar confidence was not enjoyed by Dulles' successor Christian Herter. During the short period Herter held the office, he played a much less dynamic role and it was the President who assumed initiative in foreign policy matters.

During this period there was a national consensus on foreign policy objectives. The entire nation agreed that it was the responsibility of the United States to defend the "free world" by containing the threat of Communist expansion. The American attitude towards the Sino-Soviet relations was therefore partly derived from its hostility towards international communism. The Congress too shared the Administration's concern. Therefore, confronted with such crises as the invasion of South Korea and the Chinese shelling of the offshore islands, Congress overwhelmingly endorsed the Executive. In 1955, the Congress went to the extent of endorsing a presidential action in advance thereby surrendering its legitimate prerogative and function of serving as a check on the executive. But at other times, the Congressional critics of the Administration assailed the Administration.

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